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HOME DEPARTMENT.

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Proceedings, December 1916, No. 358.

Despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India regarding the recognition of India's services during the War, and the lines that her future political progress will follow.

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RETURN TO
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PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HOME DEPARTMENT, DECEMBER 1916.

Despatch to S. of S. regarding recognition of India's services during [Pro. No. 358
the War.

DESPATCH TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA REGARD-
ING THE RECOGNITION OF INDIA'S SERVICES DURING THE WAR, AND
THE LINES THAT HER FUTURE POLITICAL PROGRESS WILL FOLLOW.

SECRET.

No. 17 of 1916.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

H O M E D E P A R T M E N T .

POLITICAL.

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No. 17 of 1916.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

H O M E D E P A R T M E N T.

POLITICAL.

To

THE RIGHT HONOURABLE AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN,

His Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Delhi, the 24th November 1916.


SIR,

You are aware that for some time past we have had under our most anxious consideration questions of great moment arising out of the part played by India in the present supreme crisis of the Empire, and the recognition which is her just due for the ungrudging services that she has rendered, and the steadfast loyalty which she has displayed. We have now the honour to lay before you the broad general conclusions at which we have arrived, esteeming it to be no less our privilege than our duty thus to represent the cause of India before you, and having the fullest confidence that these representations will receive on the part of yourself, and of His Majesty's Government, that most willing and sympathetic attention for which her noteworthy services to the Empire have given her the right to hope.

2. We need make no apology for the fact that we are placing our proposals before you at a time when the crisis of the war has still not been fully surmounted, and when the conclusion of an honourable and victorious peace may yet be distant. While we recognise that after the stress and turmoil of the war have ceased, the statesmen of the Empire will be for long engrossed both in the complicated negotiations connected with the conclusion of peace, and in the settlement of world and Empire problems of the greatest magnitude, we earnestly desire that the interests of India shall in no way suffer through any hesitation or delay on our part in putting them forward. We wish to emphasise that the future position of India within the Empire is itself one of the most important of these problems, and that no settlement of the relations of the mother country with His Majesty's dominions beyond the seas which fails to take into due account the special position of India, the generous traditions of her princes, and the growing self-consciousness of her peoples, can ever prove satisfactory or enduring.

3. It is doubtless true that among the broad proposals that we are about to lay before you there are several in regard to which detailed decisions can only be arrived at after protracted discussion and consultation between the authorities most competent to advise, and the people whose interests are most deeply concerned, and that in respect of these no immediate announcement will be

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possible on the restoration of peace. But there are others which admit of early decision, and in the case of all of them we believe that certain principles may be accepted and affirmed, to the great satisfaction of all those in India who are looking for an early sign that the appreciation by England and the Empire of the faithful services that she has rendered will not pass away with the emergency that called them forth. It is for this reason that we have thought it right to press on your attention the expediency of an early decision upon all those matters upon which a decision is possible, so that when the time comes for the public recognition of India's legitimate hopes and aspirations arising out of her support of the Empire during the war, her loyal expectations may not be chilled by any suggestion of tardiness or of a grudging spirit in the announcements that it is finally found possible to give out to the world at large.

4. Before we pass on to a detailed explanation of our proposals, we deem it wise to place on record our appreciation of the situation in India as it has developed since the commencement of the war, and as it appears to-day. Our enemies have done their utmost to persuade the world that India has been throughout the war on the brink of revolution, that the chiefs are disloyal, the educated classes seething with sedition, and the masses in a ferment of discontent. They have done their utmost to seduce her troops in the field, to stir up and support with emissaries and money, as well as by lavish promises of arms, the small knot of revolutionaries and anarchists from which no country in the world is free, and to arouse Muhammadan fanaticism, both within and without her borders, by incitements to a religious war for the protection of Islam. But the support that they have received from the people at large has been utterly feeble and insignificant, and their plots have ignominiously failed.

On the outbreak of the war there occurred that outburst of spontaneous loyalty to the British Crown and Empire, which evoked the gracious acknowledgments of His Majesty and the enthusiasm of both Houses of Parliament, and excited the wonder and admiration of all friends of the British nation throughout the world. Our enemies may endeavour to console themselves with the cynical view that India has acted under compulsion, that the generosity of her chiefs and her richer citizens has been prompted merely by hope of favours to follow, that her army is an army of intimidated mercenaries forced to go where they are ordered, and to fight when they are told, and that the thousands of offers of help and services proffered by men of all degrees, high and low, have merely been the offers of a lip loyalty professed by a servile people, without sincerity, and inspired only by motives of self-advantage.

We need hardly deign to refute these calumnies, for we have only to contrast the state of things, as it has been and is, with the state of things as it would have been had the condition of India at all resembled that which our enemies believed, or affected to believe, it to be. If their estimates had been even approximate to the truth, not a soldier nor a gun could have been moved from India; on the contrary, we should have been forced to ask for help from England at a time when her resources were strained to the utmost. Instead of this, we have been able to place our troops, our guns and our resources, limited though they may have been, at the disposal of the Empire for employment in every one of the numerous theatres of the war. We were able for a time to reduce our garrison of British troops to the smallest dimensions, and afterwards to accept, in lieu of trained regulars, territorial units and garrison battalions, many of which at the time that they arrived in this country were only partially trained. Our guns and equipment were at times dangerously depleted, and even the small obligatory forces retained were kept more with regard to the dangers on the frontiers than to anticipated disturbances of internal peace.

5. We have no desire to ignore such untoward incidents as the *émeute* of part of the 5th Light Infantry at Singapore, or the disorders in the Punjab which marked the end of the year 1914 and the opening months of the year 1915. These incidents and events caused us much anxiety at the time, but their failure and speedy suppression have demonstrated more clearly than any other argument could how false were the hopes of those who placed their

dependence upon the disaffection of India to British rule. In the case of the Singapore incident the mutineers had been subjected to constant preaching of sedition by the returning emigrants from the Pacific Coast and the Far East, and there were local as well as general causes which contributed to the outbreak, but had there been any general feeling of disaffection abroad in the Indian Army, such an incident could scarcely have failed to be the spark to kindle a wide conflagration, and the conduct of these men would surely have been imitated over every cantonment in India. Similarly, as regards the *Ghadar* movement in the Punjab which was engineered by Sikh malcontents from abroad, while we have the greatest admiration for the firmness and promptitude with which the Lieutenant-Governor dealt with the situation, the Lahore trials have given the most conspicuous testimony of the courage and fidelity of the police, and of the true feelings of the people, who not only failed to sympathise with the conspirators, but took an active part in their detection and capture. The fact that scattered handfuls of sepoys, here and there, have been untrue to their salt, and have succumbed to the seductions of a few sinister conspirators, serves but to enhance the effect of the valour and fidelity exhibited by the vast majority of the Indian troops, and is a striking testimony both to the loyalty of the troops themselves and of the masses from whose ranks they are drawn.

6. The entry of Turkey into the war on the side of our enemies caused a serious strain upon the allegiance of His Majesty's Muhammadan subjects. Amongst so many millions of Moslems there are of necessity many dreamers and religious fanatics whose sympathies for Turkey, already aroused by her war with Italy and by the Balkan wars which preceded the present great conflict, were stimulated by the fact that her hereditary enemy Russia was her most prominent adversary, and by the perception that the victory of Great Britain and her allies must almost surely be followed by the disappearance of the ancient Islamic empire from the place among the greater powers of the world which she has for so many centuries occupied. We consider that that strain has been most admirably borne, and we have every hope that the same restraint and support of our cause, which have thus far been exhibited by Indian Muhammadans as a body, will continue to the end. If the vicissitudes of the war, or dangerous ferments and attacks on the North-West Frontier, or deep, though unfounded, anxiety for the safety of the Holy Places, should unhappily cause a wave of uncontrollable fanaticism to spread over the Muhammadan races of India and lead to serious disorders, it will not be on account of any temporal disaffection towards British rule, but will be entirely due to religious causes which alone could momentarily seduce the Muhammadans from their allegiance. For, apart from impulses of this nature which may at any time carry away ignorant and unreasoning men, the Muhammadan subjects of His Majesty have, as a whole, been singularly free from seditious tendencies. We do not apprehend any such calamity, though religious movements require the most careful watching, and while we should be foolish to be over confident that all risk of any unfortunate turn of events has passed away, we do not feel that such risk as may still exist is sufficient to induce us to keep back our recommendations for the recognition of the loyalty displayed by all classes in India not excluding the Muhammadans.

7. Again, we have no wish to minimise the unpleasant features connected with the anarchical movement in Bengal. This movement in no sense owes its origin to the war ; it developed long before the war, and it is likely, we fear, to continue for some time after the war is over. That there has been a temporary connection between the anarchists and our enemies, owing to the feelers thrown out by members of the party abroad and to the desire on the part of Germany to encourage and take advantage of any movements which were likely to cause us some embarrassment, is an undeniable fact. But the German supporters of the movement have already been disillusioned of any hopes that they may have entertained regarding the practical assistance that they might have received from their anarchist allies. The money that they expended has mostly been intercepted or wasted, and, thanks to the vigilance of British consular agents and other officers abroad, and to the protection afforded by the Navy, they have been unable to carry out their grandiose intentions

of supplying arms on a large scale to a supposed host of Indian revolutionaries only waiting the receipt of these weapons to rise *en masse*. Even, however, had they succeeded in landing arms on the coast as they had intended, we feel sure that the small band of conspirators in India would still have failed completely to excite the general populace, or to enlist any support to their schemes. We are far from underrating the seriousness of the anarchist conspiracies in Bengal. They are most deplorable; and they constitute potential sources of danger, both in Bengal itself, and as *foci* whence contamination may spread to other parts of India, but they represent not any deep-seated or widespread dissatisfaction with British rule, but the morbid and malignant product of an ill-digested and ill-regulated education which has turned young men from being singularly intelligent and amenable students into paths of conspiracy and crime. We have been obliged during the war to use stern measures to repress these manifestations, and must continue to resort to them when necessary in the future, but we recognise fully that repressive methods alone will not suffice to extirpate the evil, and we are concerting with the Government of Bengal constructive measures of a remedial nature. The considerable personal daring shown by some of these conspirators, and the feeling that the motive behind them has its origin in a genuine, though wholly perverted, sense of patriotism has no doubt evoked a measure of sympathy even among some of the older men of the educated classes, while among students and school-boys they are regarded in the light of heroes. But there is no popular movement of any sort behind these anarchists. They are cordially disliked by the people at large, and the sort of sympathy for daring which they may gain from the educated classes would give place to serious alarm if any greater success should attend their conspiracies.

Recent instances have occurred in which these so-called political dacoits have met with vigorous resistance from the villagers, and an inspiring outcome of these nefarious crimes has been the constancy and devoted courage shown by the police officers of their own race, and of every grade, many of whom have lost their lives from the bombs and pistols of these political assassins. We recognise indeed that there is a dangerous secret society in Bengal—a cancerous growth among the educated and semi-educated youth of that province, which must be extirpated if the body politic is to be healthy; but it is in no sense a popular movement, it dare not come out into the open, and we do not despair that by vigorous repressive measures against the older and more hardened conspirators, and by patient remedial action to improve the system of education, and to divert the energies of young Bengal into healthier channels, we shall succeed, after some interval of time, in mastering this movement, and securing its death from inanition. But the existence of a Camorra in one province in India affords no index of the general attitude of the people towards British rule. Though it may have attracted some thousands of adherents and sympathisers among school-boys and students, these form but an insignificant fraction among the teeming millions who inhabit Bengal; and its existence, greatly though we lament it as a dark spot on the picture, constitutes in our judgment no obstacle which should deter us from calmly and quietly pursuing those measures of progress which we believe to be just and proper.

8. Lastly, we do not overlook the existence of extremists and political agitators in many provinces of India, who are seeking to make political capital out of the services rendered by the ruling chiefs, by the Indian Army, and by the thousands of loyal men who have worked hard in our cause, and to exploit these services as a basis for their own most extravagant claims. Extremists of this description have their counterpart in every country and every community, but, in India, excesses of speech and writing committed by men of this kind require special restraint. In their hands liberty becomes license, and in an oriental country they may, if allowed this license, succeed in perverting the ignorant and deluding the youth of the land. Indeed, it was in such perversion that the anarchical movements of Bengal had their origin, and the example of Bengal is a sufficient warning to us against too indulgent a toleration of such abuses of the liberty of speech and writing. The right policy in our judgment is, while continuing to restrain extravagances of this nature, to follow an even

path of progress, in the assurance that by so doing we shall win and retain the confidence of the many loyal and moderate men of educated India, who recognise our difficulties and realise that advances that are too rapid may end in disaster.

9. We have now reviewed the situation in India as we believe it to be to-day. The only conclusions that we can draw from the facts that we have set forth is that our enemies within the gate are proportionately very few, and that the miserable failure of the efforts that they have made against us is the surest testimony to the staunchness of the people at large. We do not expect to find organised demonstrations in our favour among the vast masses of the population. To them the war is a long way off, and they do not realise their hearths and homes to have been in jeopardy. But even in respect of them our officers have paid eloquent tribute to the many words and deeds of individuals which have shown their devotion to our cause. Humble as well as wealthy subscribers, men and women, have generously and eagerly contributed not only to the large war relief funds, but to such objects as the supply of aeroplanes, motor ambulances and launches, and generally to purposes connected with the comfort and care of the troops. The military censorship has brought to light the spirit of loyalty and of exhortation to courage and patience, until the arms of the King-Emperor shall have finally triumphed over his enemies, that has permeated the correspondence between the troops in the field and their relatives in India.

No one would be so foolish as to imagine that, among so vast a population, there will not be found criminal classes and turbulent spirits chafing under the restraints of civilization, who see in any weakening of control an opportunity for plunder or the gratification of old family feuds and private animosities, but British rule has been so long established that the innate conservatism of the masses has been enlisted in its favour. Such panics as have occurred, and such fantastic rumours as have from time to time passed through the bazaars, though doubtless fostered by ill-wishers of constituted authority, have been actuated, not by any desire for our discomfiture, but rather by a natural timidity and a genuine alarm lest our arms should suffer defeat. As British regiments were withdrawn one after another in the early phases of the war, much genuine consternation was expressed by men of many classes. Had there been any real or general disaffection pervading the people their departure would have caused not uneasiness but delight.

It has been our policy throughout the war to endeavour to maintain all the appearances of a normal tranquillity, to keep the surface unruffled, and to preserve unimpaired that confidence in the strength and justice of British rule which has ever been the bulwark of the Empire in India. We realise how great is the difficulty felt by men of a reserved and unemotional Western nation in interpreting the working of the minds of oriental peoples, but we are firmly convinced that the heart of India is staunch and loyal, and that the war has brought home to the people, rich and poor, educated and ignorant, consciously or subconsciously, the realization of all that British rule represents, in a way that half a century of peace had entirely failed to achieve. It is on this conviction that we place before you the conclusions and proposals which follow.

10. These proposals fall into several categories. Some are of the nature of rewards for meritorious services rendered, while others consist of changes or developments of policy or administrative practice hitherto followed, with the object of removing grievances material or sentimental which are felt to reflect upon the trustworthiness or self-respect of Indians, and the continuance of which has been a constant cause of complaint. Others again represent the steps forward in political progress that we think it wise to recommend, in deference to Indian aspirations, and in pursuance of the desire to associate them with ourselves to a continuously increasing degree in the administration of their country.

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We shall therefore treat these subjects under the following separate heads :—

Rewards and recognition of distinguished services rendered.

Measures designed to remove existing grievances.

The goal before India.

The early advance towards that goal in the domains of

urban and rural self-government ;

larger employment of Indians in the higher ranks of administration ;
and

general political progress.

The difficulties to be surmounted in the advance.

We cannot entirely avoid all overlapping between these several questions, but we think that some such broad classification will assist you in considering this long despatch.

REWARDS AND RECOGNITIONS.

11. We feel no doubt that you will agree with us that the most signal services that have been rendered to the Empire by India have been those of the ruling chiefs and the Indian Army. The princely gifts of the ruling chiefs, the aid of their Imperial Service Troops, and in several cases the personal services rendered by some of the chiefs themselves and their near relations, will ever be famous in the annals of the Empire. It is, however, with the affairs of British India that we are most concerned, and though no record of the roll of India's services would be complete which contained no mention of the distinguished loyalty of the ruling chiefs and their invaluable support, the recognition of their high merits falls outside the scope of this despatch, and is reserved for separate consideration.

12. Not less remarkable have been the valour and fidelity displayed by all ranks of the Indian Army in every theatre of war in which they have been called upon to serve. The timely arrival of these troops in France in the autumn of 1914 enabled the front in Flanders to be maintained intact at a moment when fresh reinforcements of trained British troops were not available. The Indian regiments took their place, with their British comrades from India, in the very front of the battle line. In a strange land, and in climatic conditions to them most trying, they were exposed to the strain of the most terrible and scientific warfare that the world has yet seen, against an enemy at that time superior in numbers, in artillery and in every mechanical engine of destruction. The honours and decorations which they have won for acts of valour and heroism are the most striking proof of the devotion and courage with which they fought. They gave the Empire breathing time to gather its resources at a time of great stress and crisis, and their casualty lists show the greatness of their effort and sacrifice. In Gallipoli, Egypt, East Africa and Mesopotamia, distinguished Indian regiments have nobly maintained the cause of the King Emperor, and added fresh lustre to their rolls of honour. To them the conflict has been one of determination to crush the King's enemies, without that full realization of the deadly consequences of defeat which has animated and inspired the men by whose side they fought. The fact that, for the first time in history, men of Indian race have fought on the battlefields of Europe to maintain the cause of liberty must leave an ineffaceable mark on the self-esteem, and on the traditions of the Indian Army, as these are handed down from father to son for generations to come.

We feel sure of your agreement that the services of the Indian Army should not go unrecognised and unrequited, and that rewards to them should hold the foremost place in the recognition accorded to the loyal support of India, when once the present crisis is overpassed.

13. By the rank and file of the Indian Army no mark of approval will be more appreciated than an increase in their pay and pensions. And, similarly to the Indian officers, commissioned and non-commissioned alike, who have long been apt to contrast their remuneration unfavourably with that received by their brethren in civil life, such increases will be most welcome. We are in separate correspondence with you on this important subject, but the close of the present war will afford the most fitting occasion for the announcement to the army of such increases in their pay and pensions as you may be pleased to sanction.

14. The increases that are decided upon will represent material benefits which it is just and right to grant ; but the appreciation of rewards of this kind is naturally evanescent. They are at best mercenary in their nature ; and they require to be supplemented by other marks of confidence, which appeal more to the imagination both of the soldiers themselves and of the general public.

In Indians the sentiment of heredity is particularly strong ; the young are wont to appeal at every turn to the services of their forefathers as their chief claim for consideration, and the deepest concern of the old is the maintenance unimpaired to their descendants of the honours and benefits, comprehended in the familiar vernacular word "*izzat*", which they themselves enjoy. We are now engaged in considering a system of land grants, or military *jagirs*, as a reward to those who have rendered the most meritorious services. Grants of this kind are not only thoroughly in accord with the sentiments and traditions of the people, but they keep alive, as nothing else can, the memory both of the services rendered and of the reward received. In other cases of conspicuous merit we contemplate the grant of special pensions in money, the terms and conditions of which are still under our consideration. We shall address you separately regarding the details of these proposals.

15. The better education of the children of soldiers is another direction in which the Government can well do something to show their appreciation of the services of the army. Hitherto the sons of Indian officers of the army have received no special attention at the hands of Government, and we regard it as most desirable that this omission should be supplied. We have in our minds an institution for the sons of officers at which the system of education should differ from that of the ordinary schools. It should aim at preparing its *alumni* for a military career, though its leaving certificate should also qualify for entrance into other public services. The institution that we contemplate would be managed more on the lines of the English public school than on those of an ordinary Indian high school, and the teachers would largely be Europeans. We would not insist upon masters with distinguished university degrees, but would be prepared to draw upon officers of the Indian Army for some of the instructors. We feel sure that some very suitable masters would be forthcoming from this source, and that the traditions of honour and discipline, which they would inspire, would have a most beneficial effect on the afterlives of their pupils. There would be many questions to be considered, and some initial difficulties of language, site and location to be overcome, before this proposal can take concrete shape, but we think that the foundation and maintenance of such an institution would constitute a worthy memorial to the late Earl Kitchener, and would receive wide and enthusiastic support in this country. This would especially be the case if the "Kitchener College" were to become a preparatory training ground for a higher and more important military career than is now open to the young men of the country.

This last question we shall presently discuss in some detail, but before leaving the subject of education, we would advert to the education of the sons of sepoys. We do not think that it would be necessary to provide separate institutions or special instruction for these, since they can share in the general education open to the classes to which they belong. But the orphan sons of those soldiers who have perished in the war, as well as the sons of those who have been permanently incapacitated from earning their living, and are in straitened circumstances, should receive their education at the cost of the state, and the Government should make it clear to all that the welfare of these children is their special care.

16. The rewards that we have thus far enumerated involve no change in the constitution of the Indian Army. But the war is bringing within the horizon problems of army reorganization which may result in very wide and radical alterations in the existing system, and one of the most important of the questions that will call for early settlement is whether the time has not come for opening to Indians British commissions in His Majesty's army. Such a step forward, although primarily the most striking recognition possible of the services of the Indian army, would at the same time remove a grievance long felt and in many quarters resented; it would also form an appropriate part of the policy of admitting Indians to the higher ranks of the public services. It would, in fact, fall within all the three categories of recognition described in an earlier paragraph.

The removal of this bar before the war might not from the point of view of the Indian army have been received with quite unmixed satisfaction. The present generation of Indian officers and men have grown up in the existing system; they regard with respect and attachment the British officers under whom they serve, and under whose fathers, in many cases, their own fathers had also served before them, and before they would have been ready to welcome officers of Indian race, they would have liked to know what sort of men these would be and from what races and classes they would be drawn. Of the many gallant Subadars and Risaldars serving in the army but few could be found qualified by age and education for selection to the British commissioned ranks. The question to them was therefore not one of pressing and personal interest; and it is correct to say that, before the war, the demand for commissions for Indians was a great deal stronger from outside than from within the army itself. This has all been changed from the day that the Indian regiments valiantly passed through their baptism of fire on European battle-fields. They have seen how quickly their small band of British officers can be swept away, they have seen or heard that in the French and Russian armies, men of the African and Asiatic regiments may rise to full commissioned rank. They have seen Turkish officers bravely leading their troops in the most modern warfare, and they must ask themselves why to Indians alone this privilege should be denied.

While, however, they have realised their worth—it is well to use plain words to represent plain truths—they have also realised their limitations. While, on the one side, for the first time they have felt the proud privilege of fighting for the very liberties of the Empire, on the other they have realised, as never before, the mighty resources of that Empire, the fortitude and numbers of its men, and its almost limitless capacity for producing guns and all the engines of war. We trust that the time may never come, when serious and organized attempts by enemies within our borders may sorely tempt the Indian troops from their allegiance, but, if unhappily such efforts should be made, the army will know, as it never knew before, the utter folly of any such treasonable designs. The war has, indeed, at one and the same time established the case for the new privilege, and removed one of the old causes of apprehension which for so long has barred the way.

17. On the other grounds for the grant of this privilege we need not dwell at length. The opening of a higher military career to their sons would be welcomed by all Indian fathers who have been connected with the army, by the landed aristocracy, and by many who have attained eminence in other walks of life. By Indians at large it would be welcomed as the removal of a bar which has been felt to be a slur upon their loyalty and capacity. To grant it would be in keeping, to refuse it inconsistent, with the whole policy which underlies our recommendations.

While we advocate unhesitatingly the taking of this step, we do not fail to recognise how many and how great are the obstacles that stand in the way. It is impossible for us to submit to you at this stage any detailed and considered scheme for carrying out this most important recommendation. We apprehend, though we have no information on the subject, that great and important changes will be effected in the whole military system of the Empire as a consequence of the war. From these changes India, and the Indian Army,

cannot stand aloof. They may have a vital bearing, not upon the principle of our proposal, but upon the methods whereby our object may best be achieved. Further there are social difficulties to be surmounted, and problems of training to be solved. Even among those who know India and the Indian army best, widely different opinions are held. Some advocate the training of Indian cadets who shall in time completely officer Indian regiments specially constituted for this purpose; others lay great stress on the intermingling of British and Indian officers in the same units. Some advocate the foundation of an Indian Sandhurst; others insist that the training should be carried out in England, as an indispensable condition to its success. Others again would lay stress upon the young cadets of both races being trained together in whichever country that training may take place, in the belief that it is in early youth that they can best learn to appreciate each other's merits and understand each other's idiosyncracies.

18. We cannot yet offer final opinions on these and kindred points of difficulty, but we shall lose no time in investigating these most important questions. We consider, however, that at the time when the grant of this privilege is announced in general terms, it would be most prudent to use words of caution. The efficiency of the army must not be jeopardised by too rapid an advance on untried ground, and the numbers to be admitted must at first be comparatively few, and on a scale that is tentative, until practical experience has shown us how to secure the best material, how best to train it, and how best it may be utilised.

We must not forget that, even in the sphere of civil employment, the present stage of progress towards the free admission of Indians was not reached at once; the beginnings were small, and the process a slow one. In the army the issues at stake are more vital, and the consequences of a false step more disastrous, the need of good leadership is more essential, the disciplinary relation between superior and subordinate is much more strict, and the social intercourse between men of different race in the same service necessarily closer, than is the case in civil life.

It is not by ignoring these difficulties, but by facing them frankly, and by patiently solving them, that the best hope of success lies for this new and striking departure that we so earnestly commend to your attention.

MEASURES DESIGNED TO REMOVE EXISTING GRIEVANCES.

19. We now turn to those measures which fall within the second of the three categories into which we have divided our recommendations, the removal of grievances, material and sentimental, under which Indians labour. These matters vary considerably both in kind and degree, but they resolve themselves, roughly, into two distinct classes, those which wound the self-esteem of India as a component part of the British Empire, and those which appear to impose upon Indians in India itself disabilities harmful to their proper pride. Both these kinds of grievances are closely interconnected, and they do not admit of entirely separate consideration, but, so far as possible, we shall endeavour to distinguish them in the observations that we are about to make.

20. At the outset we would refer you to the resolution passed unanimously by the Imperial Legislative Council at the meeting of the 22nd September 1915, a copy of which, with the speeches of the non-official members and of Lord Hardinge's own pronouncement upon the subject of the resolution, accompanied our despatch No. 7 of the 16th of June last. This resolution asked for the official representation of India upon imperial conferences of the Empire. His Majesty's Government promised, in terms which were publicly announced in the council by Lord Hardinge—"while preserving their full liberty of judgment, and without committing themselves either as to principles or details, to give an undertaking that an expression of opinion by the Imperial Legislative Council in the sense of the resolution before them would receive most careful consideration, as expressing the legitimate interest of the legislative council in an imperial question, although the ultimate decision of His Majesty's Government must necessarily depend largely on the attitude of the members of the conference."

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That is how the matter now stands ; and we hope that an early and favourable decision may be found possible. We expressed an earnest recommendation in forwarding those papers that " the interests of India in the Empire, no less than the interests of the Empire in India, fully justify her admission in some definite form to the deliberations of an imperial council." We can only leave it to the combined wisdom of the statesmen of the Empire to find a satisfactory solution of the problem. We must, however, express the hope that whatever may be that solution, the interests of India will not be prejudiced by the fact that she is not, and cannot for a long time become, a fully self-governing nation. That very fact indeed constitutes the strongest possible reason why her interests and claims should receive the most impartial and punctilious attention at the hands of the conference. Her vast territory, her huge population, her undeveloped resources, her great potential wealth when once those resources are prudently developed, and last, but not least, her loyal support to the Empire during the present crisis, plead most eloquently on her behalf. It would ill become a great Empire, as it reckons up the sum total of its own assets, to dwell with pardonable pride on that territory, that population, those resources, and that loyal support of India, and then to turn a cold shoulder to her just petition. We can only urge once more that her claim to a hearing be not disregarded.

21. We believe that, outside the ranks of a few men of extreme views, educated India as a whole views such representation chiefly as the means by which Indian interests may be secured against neglect and meet with more sympathy at the hands of future imperial conferences. The fact that men of the Indian army have fought in the battle line side by side with men of the great colonial contingents should, we trust, tend to assuage differences and allay irritation whenever the relations of India with the colonies come under discussion. Such matters as the admission of Indians into the colonies and their residence therein, wherever such residence is already established, are matters requiring the most delicate consideration and the highest mutual forbearance. In this connection we earnestly trust that restrictions, designed against an influx of labouring men, may be withdrawn in the case of Indians of education and good social position, who are travelling either for study or pleasure and with no intention of becoming settlers. The treatment of all Indians alike, as if they were coolies, is most hurtful to the feelings of a high spirited and sensitive race. We commend these observations to yourself, for consideration by all those who have a voice in the issues involved.

22. It is not only in her relations with the self-governing dominions of the Empire that Indian sentiments require special consideration. In one of his farewell speeches Lord Hardinge looked forward to the day when India should be regarded "as a true friend of the Empire and not merely as a trusty dependant". There are relations also both with the mother country and with the crown colonies in which Indians have felt acutely their position of dependency. On the subject of one of these, indentured emigration, we have already submitted to you our conclusions that the indentured system should cease, and we have asked you to discuss this matter with the colonies concerned. On our side we are working at a solution by which, while the emigration to distant colonies of such Indians as think they can better themselves there might be permitted under due safeguards, the employment there obtained should not carry with it any badge of servitude, or bear any of the ugly features which have grown out of the existing system. We are now in correspondence with the various local governments upon this subject, and shall in due course address you further. We mention this matter therefore only because no statement of the grievances felt by Indians and admitting of removal would be complete without such mention.

23. The grievance just mentioned is one which is partly sentimental in character ; but the levy of the cotton excise duties, to which we will next refer, is regarded both as most unjust in itself, and as most humiliating to India, since in the case of other industries no excise duty is imposed to countervail our import tariff. At the same time, too, we are precluded from raising the duty on imported cotton goods to our general tariff level. India's position in this matter is not even that of the trusty dependant of whom Lord Hardinge spoke :

it is that of a vassal bound to submit to the will of the overlord if his interests clash with her own. The history of these duties is well known to you, and we need not go into the discussions of the past. The expediency of abolishing them is a subject which unites nearly all non-officials, European and Indian, who would carry with them practically unanimous official support also, if the officials were at liberty to express publicly their own views on the subject. We cannot insist too strongly upon the expediency of removing this grievance as being a source of irritation and distrust. No enlightened country in these days would ever dream of imposing a special embargo, however small, upon one of its own industrial enterprises, and Indians feel with some justice that their rights are being sacrificed to the interests of a manufacturing community in England, against whose powerful influence their voice is of no account. We feel, too, apart from the question of justice, that the interests of the British manufacturer are in the long run badly served by any fiscal duty which has even the appearance of placing a disability on India's industrial enterprise. Even in cotton manufactures, India, relying, as she must, on a largely preponderating proportion of short staple cottons, can never become a serious competitor with Lancashire in regard to the finer counts; while it is to the interest of British trade and British industry that she should emerge from her present comparative poverty into the fullest development of her industries that her soil and climate, and the capacities of her people, permit. Her agriculture will ever continue to be her principal industry, but as her industrial prosperity increases, her value as a customer of British manufactures will become much greater than it has ever been in the past.

As above indicated, cotton cloth manufactured in India, being mainly produced from yarn of the coarser counts, competes only to a very small extent with the class of cloths produced in England, but Japan has during recent years greatly increased her production of cotton cloth, especially of the coarser qualities, which she is now exporting to India in large quantities. She is thus reaping by far the greater share of the benefit of the cotton excise duty which was originally enacted in the supposed interests of English manufacturers.

We recognise the difficulties with which His Majesty's Government are confronted in coming to an early decision on this question, and we gratefully acknowledge their attitude of readiness to consider the case, along with other trade problems of the Empire, when circumstances permit, as indeed our Honourable Colleague, Sir William Meyer, was authorised to announce when introducing the budget for the current year; but we could not in this despatch omit reference to the extreme desirability of removing a grievance that has been so long and so acutely felt.

24. One further defect, for which Indian public speakers and writers never cease to reproach both the British Government and the Government of India, is the slow development of Indian industries. They point to the wonderful expansion of Japan, and contrast unfavourably the small advance made in India during the same period. This is not an indictment to which we are willing to plead guilty. Whatever degree of truth may once have attached to a charge of unfair treatment of Indian industries, it is certain that for many decades past the Government and its officers have never ceased to impress upon the people by precept, and in some cases by direct or indirect assistance, the necessity of devoting their energies and their capital to the restoration and improvement of their ancient industries, and to the introduction of new ones from abroad. But the response until lately was, generally speaking, exceedingly cold. We do not, however, seek to blame the people for a backwardness that was mainly due to a lack of capital, lack of confidence, and lack of experience: nor can we deny that Government officers themselves had been brought up in a school which regarded industrial development as the particular attribute of private enterprise. But all are now convinced that India's advance has been one-sided, and that her future welfare depends on the equilibrium being restored by such a development of her industrial activity as shall utilise her great latent resources, give scope to the energy of her workers, skilled and unskilled, and engage the capacities of her best educated sons in occupation of usefulness and

profit. Such a policy will help to relieve the pressure on the land, and the present competition for Government service, and for literary and professional employment, which threatens to give a one-sided bias to her educated classes, to the neglect of aims which are equally deserving of their attention.

25. We need not recapitulate our previous correspondence with you on this most important subject, and we are looking with confidence to the help of the Holland Commission (now just entering upon its labours), in order to find the best solution to these many industrial problems and to decide upon the most promising lines of progress. From the scope of that commission's enquiries has been excluded all consideration of future fiscal policy. Greater independence in the financial position of India, liberty to control such matters as protective tariffs for the encouragement of nascent industries, are *desiderata* upon which Indian politicians lay much stress. But the whole fiscal system of the Empire is in itself in the melting pot, and until the future relations of the Empire's trade with her component parts, with the allied countries, with neutral states, and with her present enemies, have been decided, any specific recommendations regarding the fiscal system of India in the future would be entirely fruitless. We can only express the general hope that the place which she occupies in the future scheme will be determined in accordance with her importance both as a producer of raw materials and as a country eager to develop by manufacture her natural resources. We would also urge that she should be allowed a larger amount of discretion in shaping her tariffs with reference to her fiscal as well as her industrial needs.

26. There remain for consideration two grievances which have been a constant theme of complaint in the columns of the Indian press, and are the subject of most insistent reference at all congresses, leagues, and conferences where non-official Indians meet to discuss their present position and their aspirations for the future. These grievances are wholly internal in their nature, and are cognate in subject. We refer to the question of Indian volunteering, and to the administration of the Arms Act. Discussion on both these subjects is often accompanied by much loose talk and confusion of thinking.

The subject of Indian volunteering is one of much difficulty. By statute there is no bar to the enrolment of Indians as volunteers; but in practice such admission has been limited to individuals who have been accepted by officers commanding volunteer corps, with whom the discretion now lies. With a very few exceptions these admissions have undoubtedly been on a very limited scale. We cordially sympathise with the dislike that is felt by Indians at their virtual exclusion from volunteering, but the form in which this grievance most commonly finds expression, namely that Indians as such are debarred from defending their country, rests, we think, on a misconception.

The regular army of India is constituted to defend her frontiers against foreign aggression, and is also charged with the maintenance of internal peace. That the troops are now mainly drawn from northern India is due to the belief hitherto prevalent that the greatest efficiency in return for our large military expenditure was to be secured by the employment of martial races from the north. This has been the sole reason for the practice, and it was with no thought of excluding Indians in other parts of India from fighting for their country that it came to be adopted.

The drain upon the present recruiting grounds which the war has caused, and the excellent fighting qualities displayed, for instance, by such Mahratta regiments as are still to be found in the army, have brought into prominence the question whether the area of recruitment might not be greatly extended, and an attempt made to revive the martial spirit among races which, though not of late recruited for military service, are known to have supplied good fighting men in days gone by.

The existing system of reserves for the Indian army has also proved unsatisfactory. The reservists are in most cases either old or of poor physique, and the main dependence for repairing the wastage of war has had perforce to be placed upon young, raw, and hastily trained recruits. This serious flaw in our military system demands a remedy.

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27. These most important questions must come up for settlement when the restoration of peace relaxes the present pressure on the high military authorities, and permits them to devote time and thought to these and other problems of military reconstruction. We should be rash indeed to attempt any forecast now of the probable results of a reorganization of the military forces in India, but a possible outcome might be a complete reconstitution of the volunteer corps which now form part of our military system. These European and Anglo-Indian corps, like the regular troops, and unlike the old volunteers in England, are liable to be called out in aid of the civil power to suppress local tumults and disorders. They had their origin in troublous times, and when the country was disturbed, and, in their relation to the proportions fixed between the British and Indian forces in India, they have been regarded as a local supplement to the British element in these forces.

In these circumstances, it is impossible for us to proceed further now with this much vexed question of Indian volunteering, but we can at least give the assurance that, whatever shape the expected reorganization may take, the right claimed by Indians to be given their due share in the defence of their country will not be disregarded. We do not think that you are likely to disagree with us on this important principle, and we see no objection to such a general assurance being made public when the war is over.

28. The cognate grievance regarding the restrictions upon the possession and use of arms by the people at large, to which we will next refer, has been the subject of much uninformed criticism. The demand for the redress of this grievance is usually couched in the form of a request for the repeal of the Arms Act. But that act is concerned with much more than the mere possession of firearms, it deals with cannon, and every kind of munition of war, and with the control over the import, export, transport, sale and manufacture of arms and munitions. The advocates of the drastic proposal to repeal the act are probably unaware that the act itself neither requires repeal nor modification to meet their views. Such relaxations as they desire could be effected merely by modifications of the rules and schedules, and in some respects even by the executive action of local governments. In fact, it is not the act itself that should be the stumbling block in their eyes, but the present method of its administration. By the rules made under the act certain persons and classes of persons are exempted altogether from the operation of certain sections of the act, and the rest are obliged to obtain licenses from Commissioners of Police in the presidency towns, and from District Magistrates elsewhere, if they wish to possess or carry arms. Such licenses may be obtained to carry arms for the protection of crops and human life from wild animals, for the general protection of life and property, and for purposes of sport or display, while licenses for bare possession in their houses may also be granted, and the holders are at liberty to use such arms against thieves or dacoits to the extent that the law allows a right of private defence. The grant of arms licenses of these various kinds to respectable persons of all classes, to meet their reasonable requirements, is regulated by the local officers under the supervision of the several local governments, and is a subject which, to our knowledge, receives from them constant care and vigilance. Those who ask for all restrictions on bearing arms to be swept away can hardly have paused to reflect upon the consequences if their request were to be accepted. They probably have never contemplated what would happen if firearms were to replace bludgeons in the faction fights, the agrarian disputes, and religious riots which figure so frequently in the records of our criminal courts. In the dacoities which occur over the land the weapons that are most commonly used are axes, spears, and clubs, and, except in our border districts, firearms are few and far between. In Bengal only, in the case of anarchist dacoities have pistols and revolvers, stolen or illicitly obtained, figured largely in recent years in these serious crimes of violence. If firearms are freely held and freely used throughout this land, overt bloodshed and secret assassination might become a common feature, and the armed police might probably have to be increased to many times their present strength.

29. We hold that, in respect of the general restrictions upon the possession of arms, no reasonable grievance exists that we can find it possible to redress.

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But it is in regard to the exemptions that we think a real grievance will be found to lie. Some exemptions are common to India as a whole, others are granted by the various local governments on personal grounds, and these latter are more jealously restricted in some provinces than in others. To most of these exemptions no objection is taken by the advocates of repeal, for, in fact, universal exemption is what they claim. But there is one exemption which rankles in the minds of many Indians, namely the fact that Europeans and Anglo-Indians, however humble their degree, are exempted as a class, while many respectable Indians are forced to apply for a license if they wish to carry arms. This purely racial exemption had its origin in the same considerations (to which we have previously referred) as gave rise to the enlistment of the European and Anglo-Indian volunteer corps; and it extended for the same reason not only to British subjects but to all European foreigners and to Americans. We think that this racial exemption at least can no longer be supported. Times have changed; and it was a shock to many to realise that on the day after the war broke out alien enemies were bearing arms without license, under a privilege denied to Indians of good social status and unblemished character. That exemption was at once revoked; but it brought into the immediate arena the vexed question of arms privileges which had from time to time engaged the attention of our predecessors only to be dropped till a more convenient season. We therefore addressed all the local governments on the subject, and suggested to them that the best solution might lie in the total abolition of exemptions, so that all, high and low, Europeans and Indians, might be on the same footing, and all alike be required to take out licenses in order to possess or carry arms. The replies of the local governments show that there are great difficulties of sentiment among many classes of men, whose feelings are entitled to our respect, which stand in the way of so sweeping a departure, and we have not yet had time to come to a decision upon this difficult question. But it is the general view that the exemption of a whole class is no longer warranted, and that if exemptions are to continue they should depend, for Europeans as they do for Indians, on office, status, and character, and not on racial distinction. We shall in due course consider further this important subject, and submit our final recommendations for your approval; but we can at once unhesitatingly ask for your agreement to the removal of this one distinction which Indians have for some time past regarded as a stigma of racial inferiority.

THE GOAL BEFORE INDIA.

30. We now pass to the third category of our recommendations, those forward steps in political progress, which we believe to be both prudent in themselves, and calculated to prepare the ground for future advances along the same path when the time for them seems ripe, and as the experience gained may justify. The proposals that we have hitherto made in this despatch are such as we believe will command general acceptance, but we are conscious that we are now entering upon controversial regions in which the opinions held are many and various.

The two questions that we have set to ourselves to answer are, first what is the goal before British rule in India? and secondly, what are the early steps that should be taken in the direction of that goal?

31. On the first of these questions there are many who doubt the wisdom of an attempt to define—much less to announce—the goal before India, or to penetrate the veil behind which her political future is shrouded. These urge that future political changes are determined by the stern logic of events, and not by the prophecies of statesmen, and they contend that the premature announcement of a distant goal may lead only to greater disappointment and disillusionment than if no such attempt to foresee the future had been made at all. It will, they think, awaken hopes that may never be realised, and provoke anticipations that may never be fulfilled. They fear that, in the long run, such an announcement may be the cause of more unrest and dissatisfaction, than if the aspirations of Indians were allowed to rest upon the basis of progress already achieved and the hopes derived therefrom of further progress to come, without any more precise definition of far off aims and ultimate destinations. They point to the natural impatience of the advanced leaders of Indian ambitions, and they do not conceal their alarm lest this impatience should lead to premature and ill advised attempts to reach the goal by

means that may be harmful to the public good, and by attempted short cuts that may only imperil the prospects of a safe arrival at the promised destination.

32. We have not failed to recognise the weight of these objections, and it may be, that if there had been no war, we might have acquiesced in the view that it was right to wait for some time longer before an attempt was made to define and proclaim any goal to which the Government and the peoples of India should alike direct their gaze. But while many of the changes effected by the war are obvious and patent, there are others which are none the less real because they are more subtle and less visible. There are changes in the outlook of peoples which cannot wisely be ignored. By effecting such changes the war has really taken the decision out of our hands.

33. Some ten years have now passed since advanced political opinion in India first began to formulate a goal for itself. Some indeed proclaimed a goal of complete independence, others favoured adherence to the British Empire. The congress attempted a goal of "self-government on the colonial system," the Moslem League asked for "a form of suitable self-government." But the Government itself has made no sign. The Royal Proclamations that were issued from time to time by Queen Victoria and her successors on the Throne have all reiterated their affection for their Indian subjects, their determination to respect their religious faiths, their promises of equal justice to all, their sincerest assurances of solicitude for their welfare, and their fervent hopes for their continued progress and prosperity. They have indeed intimated possibilities of higher trust and higher responsibilities, but they have never proclaimed any final aim of their sovereignty over India, or pointed the way to any definite land of promise.

34. In the third paragraph of their notable despatch proposing the change of the capital to Delhi, Lord Hardinge's Government foreshadowed greater association of Indians with the Government in the conduct of public affairs, and greater delegation of powers to local governments, which they designated by the name "Provincial autonomy"; but the answering despatch of your predecessor, Lord Crewe, contained no reference to this particular paragraph, and made no allusion to its subject matter. Some public men both in India and in England read into the Delhi despatch a wider meaning than we believe that our predecessors intended to convey. The latter no doubt wished to indicate that a withdrawal of the Government of India to a capital at Delhi would be in full harmony with the policy of granting greater independence to local governments, and they pointed out that as, in course of time, Indian aspirations found more satisfaction, it would be in provincial matters, rather than in imperial, that the best scope for their activities would lie. Ambitious Indian politicians read into the paragraph the promise of the very early grant of a provincial autonomy under popular control, and the passage has been quoted again and again as a pledge that the Government was about to commit its powers to representatives of the people. We cannot support any such extravagant interpretations of the language of the despatch, and while we are in full harmony with what we understand to have been the intentions of our predecessors, the line of advance which commends itself to us in present circumstances is that developed in the ensuing paragraphs.

35. Soon after the Delhi announcements His Imperial Majesty King George gave to the people of India his parting message of hope. We believe that the changed outlook of thoughtful Indians, and the clearer realization by all classes of the people of the permanent nature of India's connection with the British Empire has now made it imperative that His Majesty's gracious message should receive some concrete interpretation. The interpretation must be such as will appeal to the imagination of an oriental people, and will be a beacon light to guide successive generations of Englishmen who are called to assist in the administration of this land, as also all those loyal and moderate Indians, who, while yielding to none in their desire for the emancipation of India from her state of tutelage, are fully conscious of the many and formidable difficulties to be surmounted before the distant goal can be attained.

The desire for a goal of this kind found earnest expression in the notable presidential address made by Sir S. P. Sinha, sometime member of the Viceroy's Executive Council, at the last annual meeting of the National Congress. No one is better qualified than he to speak on behalf of those loyal

sections of the educated community who are not led away by extravagant ambitions to make demands upon us for the immediate grant of powers which they must know in their hearts that they are not yet fitted to exercise. While, therefore, we are prepared to envisage a goal, we will not essay the fruitless task of defining its precise character. The conditions of India have no parallel in the history of the civilised world, and we may search the centuries in vain for any exact analogy. Nor must we raise false hopes in the hearts of impatient reformers. We must clearly indicate how toilsome is the path, and how many the obstacles, and the measure of our sincerity must be judged, not by the qualifications upon which we find it necessary to dwell, but upon the actual steps that we are prepared to take in the direction of our desired destination. We have deliberated long and anxiously over this most vital matter. We have consulted many experienced and competent advisers, and we now, in the passage which next follows, formulate an ideal which we believe will give satisfaction to Indian aspirations without embarrassing the present or future administration of the country :

The goal to which we look forward is the endowment of British India as an integral part of the Empire, with self-government, but the rate of progress towards that goal must depend upon the improvement and wide diffusion of education, the softening of racial and religious differences, and the acquisition of political experience.

The form of self-government to which she may eventually attain, must be regulated by the special circumstances of India. They differ so widely from those of any other part of the Empire that we cannot altogether look for a model in those forms of self-government which already obtain in the great Dominions. In all parts of the Empire which now enjoy self-government, it has been the result, not of any sudden inspiration of theoretical statesmanship, but of a steady process of practical evolution, substantially facilitated by the possession of a more or less common inheritance of political traditions, social customs and religious beliefs.

British India has been built up on different lines, and under different conditions, and must work out by the same steady process of evolution a definite constitution of her own. In what exact form this may eventually be cast it is neither possible nor profitable for us to attempt now to determine, but we contemplate her gradual progress towards a larger and larger measure of control by her own people, the steady and conscious development of which will ultimately result in a form of self-government, differing perhaps in many ways from that enjoyed by other parts of the Empire, but evolved on lines which have taken into account India's past history, and the special circumstances and traditions of her component peoples, and her political and administrative entities.

Our most anxious desire is to see a real and immediate advance made towards this goal, and in the belief that the time has now come when the rate of progress may be accelerated on definite lines, we propose :—

- (a) To develop urban and rural self-government in the direction of giving greater powers to the local boards and councils, and making these more predominantly non-official and elective in character, while at the same time extending the franchise in the wards or other constituencies by which the elected members are chosen.*
- (b) To increase the proportion of Indians in the higher branches of the public service, and thereby to enable Indians to take a more important part in the administration of the country.*
- (c) To pave the way for an ultimate enlargement of the constitutional powers of the provincial legislative councils—(i) through an increase in the elected element; and (ii) through a material expansion of the constituencies by which the elected members are chosen, so as to bring about a state of things under which they will become more truly representative of the interests of the people as a whole.*

Our formula pointing the goal thus indicates three roads of progress each in a separate domain, and also three conditions which must regulate the pace of the advance along those roads. We now turn to each of these domains, and indicate the steps forward on each road that we think it wise to take in earnest of our good intentions.

FURTHER DEVELOPMENT OF URBAN AND RURAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

36. The first road lies through the domain of local self-government, the village, the rural board, and the town or municipal council. In this domain the course was first set by Lord Ripon a little more than 30 years ago, but the advance has as yet, on the whole, been slow. As might be expected, it has been more rapid in the great towns, but it has lagged behind over the country at large. All history teaches that this domain of urban and rural self-government is the great training ground from which political progress and a sense of responsibility have taken their start, and we feel that the time has now come to quicken that advance, to accelerate the rate of progress, and thus to stimulate the sense of responsibility in the average citizen, and to enlarge his experience.

The subject was most carefully considered by the Decentralization Commission a few years ago, and Lord Hardinge's Government made a pronouncement* upon the recommendations of that commission, but we have thought it right in the altered circumstances to consider the subject afresh, and to emphasise once more the great importance that we attach to progress in this domain. A subject which ranges from the great municipal corporations of the presidency towns down to the humblest village punchayat in remote rural areas, involves in its examination much minute detail, with which we would not burden a despatch of this length and importance. But in regard to the general principles which should be followed in the development of local self-government we would draw your attention to a memorandum, which was sent by His Excellency the Viceroy to the heads of provinces, and which forms an appendix to this despatch. The main principles set forth in that memorandum have met with general acceptance and we now recommend them for adoption, while, as regards its eighteenth paragraph, you have lately approved† the general principles which we propose to lay down, so far as these relate to the functions of local bodies with respect to education, and these have now been published. We fully recognise, however, that it will not be possible to make all the injunctions of the memorandum of absolutely uniform application, and we are therefore willing to reserve to the local governments the power to modify their application in specific cases, and for special reasons.

Advance in this domain has always found a prominent place in the programmes of reform which eager Indian politicians are wont to press upon our attention, and we believe that the principles that we lay down in our memorandum are such as will command the approval of all who are interested in the welfare of the country.

ADMISSION OF INDIANS TO THE HIGHER RANKS OF THE ADMINISTRATION.

37. The second road of advance lies in the domain of the more responsible employment of Indians under Government. This is a very important line of progress. Administrative experience not only sobers the judgment, and brings with it appreciation of the practical difficulties in the way of the wholesale introduction of attractive reforms, and theoretical ideals, but it will also equip India with an increasing number of men versed, not only in the more humdrum details of day-to-day administration, but in the whole art of government. The services of these men will not be lost to the country by their retirement; on the other hand, they will constitute a source of experience and training from which excellent and tried material for legislative assemblies may in future be drawn.

With the progressive increase in the number of educated young men in India seeking honourable and dignified employment, the question of securing their entry in larger numbers into the Indian Civil Service, and other important public services, has with the passage of time become increasingly insistent. The Public Services Commission of 1886 had opened the door to the development of provincial services in the various departments of

* Education Department Resolution, No. 5557, dated the 28th April 1915.

† Secretary of State's despatch No. 131 Public, dated the 18th August 1916.

Government, but the progress attained did not keep pace with the demand, both for larger and for more responsible employment. It was in response to this demand that the Royal Commission on the Public Services in India was appointed in 1912. The publication of the report of that commission has now been sanctioned by yourself, and its recommendations should be before the public about the same time as this despatch is leaving our hands.

38. The fact that the whole subject has so recently been under investigation by a responsible body of men representing many shades of opinion, and that their proposals require careful consideration by the local governments and ourselves, precludes us from making any immediate and specific recommendations regarding the reconstitution of the different services, or as to the fresh opportunities which may now be made open to Indians, both for entry into them, and for rising to the higher appointments which they severally offer. In these circumstances we are obliged to confine ourselves to enunciating certain general principles, and we would formulate these for your acceptance in the following four propositions :—

- (1) It is essential to the progress of India towards the goal which we contemplate that Indians should be admitted in steadily increasing proportion to the higher grades of the various services and departments, and to more responsible posts in the administration generally.
- (2) This policy has indeed received recognition in the past, but in deciding upon the further advance that is now possible, the Government possess a great advantage in having at hand the recent report of the Royal Commission on the Public Services and their detailed recommendations regarding these several services. But the circumstances and considerations arising out of the war, and the loyal support which India has rendered to the Empire during this period of crisis, must also constitute an important factor in the consideration of the advance now to be made.
- (3) The public interests no doubt require that the public services shall be filled by competent men, but in pursuing this object, we must have regard, as has been laid down in the cognate matter of local self-government, not merely to considerations of departmental efficiency, but to the training of Indians to administer their own affairs. Full opportunity for Indians to qualify themselves for the more important posts in the public services, and to demonstrate by faithful and meritorious service their fitness for still more responsible duties, must be one of the guiding principles of our administration.
- (4) It must, however, be recognised that intellectual qualifications, combined with physical capacity should not be the sole tests for admission to important posts in the public services. Due regard must also be given to such considerations as character and the hereditary connections of candidates, both with the Government, and with the people with whom their work will mainly lie; while, in the present conditions of India, it is essential that there should not be an undue predominance of any one caste or class.

39. While we have to be content at present with laying down the general propositions formulated above, there is one most important recommendation falling within this domain of advance which we can place before you without waiting for the results of our examination of the Royal Commission's report. As you are aware, the inclusion of an Indian member in the executive councils both of the Government of India and of those provinces enjoying the form of council government was a very important feature in the reforms introduced by Lord Morley and Lord Minto in 1909-1910.

In the case of the Imperial Executive Council we do not at present propose any* change, but we think that the time has now come to modify the executive councils of provinces, which now enjoy this privilege, so that half the members

* Our Honourable Colleague Sir Sankaran Nair is of a different opinion on this point, *vide* his separate Minute.

(not including the head of the province) shall be Indians. In the Presidency Governments of Madras, Bombay and Bengal, the simplest method of effecting this object will be by raising the strength of the council (again excluding the head of the province) from three to four, thus providing for the inclusion of two Indian members. In Bihar and Orissa, and in the United Provinces (where we hope soon to see an executive council shortly established), as well as in all other provinces on which such councils may hereafter be bestowed, we prefer to leave the actual strength of the council an open question for the present, merely predicating the general principle that of the colleagues associated with the head of the province, half the number shall be Indians. This principle would, of course, receive equal application whether the head of the province is given four councillors or two.

FURTHER STEPS IN POLITICAL PROGRESS.

40. The third road mentioned in our goal formula lies within the domain of the legislative councils. Of all the various spheres into which our recommendations fall there is none in which a large advance is so hotly urged by advanced political opinion in India, as in the direction of giving larger powers to legislative councils, on the plea that they are representative assemblies which voice the popular will, and therefore that they should exercise not merely influence upon, but real authority over, the will of the executive government. There is also no subject which gives rise to so much difference of opinion, not only among the most experienced officers of Government, but also among Indians themselves.

41. In their origin these councils were first called into existence to form bodies of advisers to the various governments, imperial and provincial, when legislative work was in hand. These advisers were few, and were at first selected entirely by nomination.

The reforms instituted by Lord Lansdowne in 1892 introduced for the first time an elective element into these councils, and gave them the privilege of interpellation, as well as a right to discuss the annual budget, but without the power to amend it.

Seventeen years later the Morley-Minto reforms completely revised the constitution of these councils, by expanding them numerically and by increasing the number of their elected members, as well as by enlarging considerably the constituencies which these latter represented; they added to the right of interpellation by permitting resort to supplementary questions; they gave the right to move resolutions both in connection with the provincial budgets, and on other topics of public interest; and last, but not least, they provided for a majority of non-officials in the provincial legislative councils.

42. Only seven years have passed since these important and far reaching reforms were introduced, and had it not been for the special circumstances arising out of the war, we do not think that a strong case would have existed for any immediate alterations in the new system, other than minor improvements in practice and procedure which the experience of the last seven years might have suggested. But having regard to the situation developed by India's attitude during the war, on which we have throughout this despatch so often and so earnestly dwelt, and also to the fact that we now propose to lay down both an ultimate goal and the various roads which lead to it, we feel that it would be most inexpedient to adopt a rigid attitude in relation to the demands pressed upon us, and to refuse to assent to any further progress in this third domain of advance.

43. In this domain the main lines of possible advance are three in number:—

First, the re-arrangement of the existing constituencies and broadening of the franchise so as to make the elected members more really representative;

secondly, an increase in the proportion of elected members so that the council shall contain an elected majority; and,

thirdly, an expansion of the constitutional powers of the councils.

To take the last point first, it must be remembered that, apart from the right of interpellation by individual members, the powers of the councils are two-fold. In the first place, the council has full control, as a legislature, over the law-making activities of Government, for no Government bill can pass into law without being supported by a majority in the council. And private bills if passed by the council also become law unless vetoed by the head of the province, or by the Governor General, or, at a final stage, by the Secretary of State. In the second place, the legislative councils can at present pass resolutions, either in respect of the budget or in regard to matters of general public interest. Constitutionally, however, these are not in any way binding on the government: they are requests which can be acted on or not as it may think fit.

We do not recommend any immediate expansion of these powers in the direction which a number of "progressive" politicians desire. We have no wish to develop the councils as *quasi*-parliaments. Nor are we prepared at present to give them anything in the nature of direct financial or administrative control; this may we think come at some later stage of their political evolution, but we have no doubt that the time for such an advance is not yet. There is much to be done in the way of political training, and towards the inculcation of a real sense of administrative responsibility, before any forward step can be taken in this direction; and, above all, it is essential to attempt the task of making the elected members of the councils representative of India in the truest sense. As these are now constituted, the members are returned by such restricted constituencies that it is clearly impossible to suggest that they represent any considerable body of the people at large. We desire therefore to confine the immediate political advance on this road to what has already been indicated in clause (c) of our formula (paragraph 35 of this despatch), that is, to paving the way for an ultimate enlargement of constitutional powers of the councils through an increase in the elected element, and a material expansion of the constituencies. Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, dissents from the opinion expressed in this paragraph.

44. The present constitution of the provincial legislative councils is based upon a system of representation of classes and interests which at present consist of basic constituencies representing landholders, groups of district boards, and groups of municipal townships. The three presidency corporations return special representatives, but, except in their case no individual town or city has its own special member. In two provinces, municipalities and district boards, are themselves grouped together. To these basic classes are added representatives of universities, chambers of commerce, trades associations, and other like communities, the members returned being in the great majority of cases elected, but in some few instances nominated. On these constituencies have been super-imposed certain special Muhammadan electorates.

45. The electoral bodies vary very greatly not only in different provinces, but in respect of different classes and interests, and in many instances the body of electors is ridiculously small. For example, in Bombay, the members to represent the district board and municipal groups are not elected even by the members of these boards and committees, but by a limited number of delegates elected by those members. In no province does the franchise for these constituencies go lower than the comparatively few members who have seats on the boards and committees. Instances of the small constituencies now existing will be found in Appendix II.

The landholder electorates are also in many cases extremely restricted. They are in most provinces based on assessment to a certain sum of land revenue, or in Bengal and Behar road cess, but in some instances, notably in Madras, property and income from land form alternative qualifications.

In respect of Muhammadans, the necessity for devising special electorates, in place of the utilization of machinery already to hand in the shape of exist-

ing bodies, institutions, and associations, or by the adoption of standards such as the payment of land revenue, has resulted in the creation of special franchise lists reaching much lower down in the social scale, and in property qualifications, than any of the other constituencies, with a result that in many provinces there are persons with certain property or educational qualifications who have a vote if they are Muhammadans, but not if they belong to any other creed. This system has resulted in serious anomalies which excite the jealous comment of other communities. And there is the further valid grievance that Muhammadans, besides voting in their own special constituencies, also vote in the general electorates, to counterpoise which these constituencies were themselves created.

46. The great varieties of franchise in the different provinces, as well as in the constitution of the actual electorates, can only be disentangled by an analysis of the complicated regulations dealing with these matters in the several provinces, and we do not propose to enter into a minute discussion of them. But it is obvious that, in such small electorates as at present exist, personal inducements, and personal pressure, can be, and sometimes are, brought to bear upon the voters to an extent that is most undesirable. There are also other restrictions in respect to candidates for election which certainly require reconsideration. For example, the requirement, that candidates to represent municipal and district board constituencies should themselves have served for at least three years on such boards, has the effect both of disqualifying certain eligible persons who have for various reasons not taken part in the work of these boards and committees, and also of causing the boards themselves to be utilised for political purposes, and without regard to the class of work for which alone they exist. These are all matters on which there appears to us to be special need for reform.

47. We do not think it necessary at this stage to discriminate minutely between the composition of the actual councils as now existing. In all of them (except in Burma, where the circumstances are quite special, and the Lieutenant-Governor has appointed a committee to consider the question of enlargement of the local council), there is already a majority of non-officials. In some provincial councils this non-official majority has been slightly increased in practice through official seats being left vacant, or by the nomination of non-officials in the place of officials. But the non-official majority is made up of nominated, as well as of elected members, and only in Bengal is there a bare majority of elected members over all other interests. There is a strong demand in "progressive" circles for a large increase in the elected members of these councils, and it is contemplated, in the schemes put forward by political associations, that elected majorities should be large ones, and that the members returned by electorates composed of Indians should largely preponderate over all other interests. Heads of local governments have been privately consulted in this matter, and we find that great differences of opinion exist both among them and among their immediate advisers, whom in their turn they, with our permission, took into consultation.

48. After careful consideration we have come to the following general conclusions on these matters :—

- (1) There should be an elected majority in the councils : each local government to consider and suggest what the size of this majority should be in its own province. In the event of any particular local government considering that an elected majority is undesirable in its province, it would have to demonstrate clearly the reasons for that opinion.
- (2) There should be a wide extension of the franchise in the various provinces, adapted to their local circumstances, so that the members of their councils shall be returned by really large constituencies.

- (3) As to the system of electorates, some of us regard one based primarily on territorial units as *prima facie* more convenient than one of purely class constituencies, as tending to give greater play to local interests and ideas, and larger weight to the landed interests which are so enormously preponderant in the India of today. We are not all equally convinced regarding the relative merits of either system, upon which the opinions of those whom we have confidentially consulted also differ, but with the exception of our Honourable Colleagues Sir Reginald Craddock and Sir Sankaran Nair, we agree that the question is one on which discretion may be left to each local government to determine for itself whether to adopt territorial constituencies, or to retain class and interest electorates, or to combine both systems as they may find most suitable after full consideration of local circumstances.
- (4) The adoption of these views would probably require an enlargement—in some cases it may be a considerable enlargement—of the numbers of the existing councils, and legislation to this end would be necessary and desirable.

It will thus be seen that we hold that there can be no uniform system that must apply to every province regardless of its state of progress and its local conditions. Such a method would either force the less advanced provinces into changes for which they are not yet ripe, or conversely, and more probably, keep back the provinces which are politically more advanced. We are therefore prepared to agree, where necessary, to marked differences between province and province in the composition of the councils, the extent of the elected majority and the constituencies and electoral franchise upon which these councils are based. Our Honourable Colleague Sir Reginald Craddock differs from us, however, on two points. While not objecting to an elected majority, he is entirely opposed to the enlargement of the present statutory limits of the larger councils, and he is so convinced of the necessity of maintaining class representation, that he is not willing to allow to local governments the option of adopting the territorial system. He has explained his reasons in a separate minute. Our Honourable Colleague Sir Sankaran Nair on the other hand, would make the territorial system universal. We do not wish to lengthen this despatch by including in it further arguments on these subjects, but in fairness to the advocates of a system of territorial electorates, we attach as Appendix III extracts from a memorandum which was circulated to heads of governments by His Excellency the Viceroy. These extracts state the case for the territorial system, and may be of assistance to you in forming your own conclusions on the subject.

49. On the question of Muhammadan representation we are again unanimous that, whatever system of general constituencies is adopted, where Muhammadans have special constituencies marked off for them, they should not also have a vote in the general constituencies, and that the franchise conditions should be the same for Muhammadans as for others. We have considered the question whether we are definitely bound by Lord Morley's promise of 1909 that Muhammadans should have larger proportionate representation than their numbers would warrant, and our conclusion is that all that Lord Morley's promise requires is that, when Muhammadans are in a minority in a province, their representation on the legislative councils should be somewhat higher than the number which a strict numerical proportion would give them. But it is not necessary in allotting special constituencies to go appreciably beyond the numerical proportion in the matter of seats. The balance can be made up by nomination, and local governments would be instructed accordingly. With this last conclusion the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair disagrees.

When Muhammadans are in an electoral majority in a province they do not need special protection, and whether they are or are not in such a majority

must of course be determined by the electoral rolls, and not by the census statistics. On this point also Sir Sankaran Nair dissents.

50. The concession of separate representation to Muhammadans encourages applications from other communities for similar recognition. There is, however, no other community for which the case is equally strong over India as a whole, and on general principles we do not regard with favour any proposal to extend a system of proportionate representation to classes other than the Muhammadans. But if, in any particular province, the local government is able to demonstrate a case for exceptional treatment—as might for example occur in respect to Sikhs in the Punjab—we consider that the proportionate representation for any community thus singled out should follow the same lines as those determined for the Muhammadans.

51. There are some other matters relating to provincial councils upon which suggestions have been made at various times. The power of veto on legislation now vested in the head of a province, and in the Governor General, must, it is urged, often prove useless because the only alternatives are the rejection of a measure generally beneficial, or its acceptance with the inclusion of some very undesirable clauses. There is no halfway house between total acceptance and total rejection. It has therefore been suggested that the constitution might provide for a power of partial veto under which the Governor General or the head of a province might excise offending clauses without sacrificing the bill itself. We have considered this suggestion, but have decided to reject it. It would open the door, under the cover of this partial veto, to amendment by the executive of bills passed by a legislative council. The use of such a power of amendment might be open to serious objection, and there are no precedents, that we can discover, that would support such a proposal. We think, however, that it would be desirable, following Australian and South African precedents*, to give power to the head of a government to return a bill to his legislative council with an intimation that he cannot accept particular clauses, but would pass the bill if they would consent to omit them. We think also that a similar power might be given to the Governor-General at a later stage when a provincial bill comes up to him for acceptance.

The present regulations provide for a term of three years as the life of the various legislative councils. Circumstances may be conceived in which a council had ceased to fulfil properly the functions for which it existed. To meet such a contingency it would seem to us desirable that a power of dissolution, within the ordinary term of the council's duration, should reside with the head of a local government. There are some precedents for this power in the constitutions of some of the crown colonies, notably Malta, Jamaica, and the Barbados, Bahamas, and Bermudas Islands.

52. Although, as already indicated, we are not prepared at the present time to enlarge the constitutional powers of the legislative councils, there is one matter, in which the non-official element might be taken more into the confidence of the executive government. At present there are finance committees in the provincial legislative councils, which consist, as a rule, of even proportions of officials nominated by Government and of non-official members selected by their colleagues, and these deal, though subject to the ultimate discretion of Government, with a portion of the provincial budget. That portion is, however, a relatively small one, consisting of what is called the unallotted expenditure of the province, from which category are excluded those amounts which are considered definitely earmarked for existing establishments, or for schemes which have already received the approval of the Secretary of State and the Government of India, or which are under correspondence with these authorities. Non-official members complain, and not unreasonably, that this exclusion leaves very little scope for advice, since the really

* 63 and 64 Victoria, Cap. 12, Section 58.
9 Edward 7, Cap. 9, Section 64.

important matters are taken out of the cognisance of the finance committee because the local government is already committed. We think that it would be preferable to have two or three non-official members of the council (elected for the purpose by their colleagues) associated with the government as advisers in the preparation of the provincial budget as a whole. The full council would of course still possess the power of passing resolutions on matters appertaining to the budget, and of dealing, on its legislative side, with bills which embodied additions to, or modifications of, local taxation.

53. There are other matters in which the non-official members of these councils complain of restrictions now placed upon them, for example, the admission of proposed questions and resolutions, and the procedure relating to private bills. When a general reference is made to local governments regarding the proposed reform to which we have asked your general agreement, we shall be prepared to consider how far it is possible to relax any restrictions which in actual practice have been found to be needlessly irksome, but we do not at present propose to examine this matter in detail. We think, however, that a tendency sometimes shown by non-official members to constitute themselves an organized Opposition to a government in power might be diminished if greater scope were allowed for the free expression of individual official opinion with regard to a resolution or bill which did not involve vital issues. We should thus encourage greater freedom of discussion, and divisions which followed the rigid line of official and non-official would be less frequent. This is not a matter which affects the regulations; it lies entirely within the discretion of the government, but it has a certain bearing on the subjects that we have under our consideration.

54. We desire to emphasize the fact that the proposals which we have made in regard to the provincial legislative councils do not apply to the Imperial council. On the short experience gained since the Morley-Minto reforms were introduced, we do not think it advisable to modify the constitution of that Council for the present. It will have been seen from what has gone before that our object is gradually to work up to a state of affairs in which the constitution of the provincial legislative councils will come to justify an expansion of their powers and functions, and we must wait until this development has taken place before we can safely contemplate any serious modification in the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council. That council is *sui generis*. It is concerned with the affairs of British India as a whole. It may often have to deal with matters of grave importance, such as the army and the higher finance, as well as with the control of the great imperial departments. Its business sometimes touches upon the interests of the Native States, and may also be concerned with matters affecting the relations of India, both with Great Britain and with other parts of the Empire.

These considerations will not necessarily preclude us later on from considering some slight changes in the actual constitution of the Imperial Council, such as might be required, for example, to give further scope for the representation of special interests and communities; but such changes form no part of our schemes for constitutional reform, and will be separately dealt with on a convenient opportunity. Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, as his separate minute shows, dissents from this opinion, and would like to see some modifications also in the constitution of the Imperial Legislative Council as part of the scheme of reforms.

DIFFICULTIES IN THE ADVANCE.

55. Before we bring this despatch to a close there is one aspect of the advance towards the goal of our formula which is, perhaps, the most important of all. We have defined the goal, we have described the roads of advance that lead to that goal, we have pointed out the domains in which these lie, and we have indicated the immediate steps in advance that we desire to take along each road. We must now make a few observations upon obstacles that

have to be surmounted, before the roads become free and open to even greater progress in the future.

The first of these obstacles is ignorance, which can, as we have stated, only be removed gradually by "the improvement and wide diffusion of education". As you are well aware, great efforts have been made of recent years to extend education, but the wide diffusion that we seek is still a long way off. Even more pressing is the question of its improvement. Impatient reformers appear to us to lay an excessive value on quantity, and to attach insufficient weight to the quality of the education imparted. They point reproachfully to the small percentage of literates which the census figures disclose, and urge upon us an immediate campaign to banish illiteracy from the land. They are apt to overlook that the mere multiplication of schools without regard to the efficiency of the teachers, and the suitability of the curricula, will not by themselves suffice to batter down this formidable obstacle in the way of progress. In our judgment, the system of education in this country requires the most patient reconstruction. The distinctions which now mark off the stages between the primary and the middle courses, between the middle schools and the high schools, and between the high schools and the colleges, are still not suitably adjusted. Sound middle vernacular studies are often rejected by parents for their sons in favour of a smattering of English, and boys, who would better be engaged in learning in the schools, enter the universities before they are educationally qualified.

Owing to the enthusiasm of the middle classes, and their growing standard of living, there has been during the last few years an unprecedented increase in the number of students receiving higher education, and the demand for greater facilities for this kind of instruction is continuous and insistent. It has not, however, been found possible for the supply of funds, public or private, to keep pace with the rapidity of the demand. In their anxiety to secure the advantages attaching to the higher grades of education, the people are prone to acquiesce in lower standards of efficiency, and any effort which may be made to improve the quality of the instruction imparted is wont to be resented as an attempt to restrict the number of those in receipt of higher education. Nothing is further from our wishes than to impose any such restriction; but, in the present circumstances, the main efforts both of Government and of the public can most wisely be directed towards securing a standard of higher education that shall be comparable to that enjoyed by other nations and in other parts of the Empire.

56. In dealing with elementary education we are similarly confronted with a difficult set of problems. The quality of the teachers, and the proportion of trained men among them, still leave much to be desired, though much has also been done of late years to secure this object; and of the money recently spent for the benefit of primary education a great part has been laid out on improving the training and the prospects of the teachers. There is an increasing desire for elementary instruction, but among the classes actually affected its expression is less insistent and less prominent than that of the middle classes for higher education. There is much leeway to be made up, and the scope for expansion is still very great.

We recognize the great desirability of a wide extension of elementary education, but we cannot yet see our way to make it compulsory. The policy of free education, on the other hand, which has often been urged upon us, does not really connote that it should be free to the locality, but only that it should be free to the pupils. And if the desire for more and still more primary schools is as strong and genuine, as we believe it to be, then it is incumbent on each locality to assist in finding the necessary funds, and to demonstrate, at least within its own limits, the strength and genuineness of this desire. We have recently reaffirmed our policy under which the responsibility for elementary education is laid primarily on local bodies, and we shall look to them to discharge that responsibility to the best of their powers. We shall in our turn freely give,

within the limits of our financial resources, the support and assistance of the Government to bring this kind of education within the reach of all classes of the population.

57. But the removal of ignorance is not to be attained merely by imparting knowledge, that is superficial and often quickly forgotten, to the greatest possible number, but by so teaching the young, boys and girls, that when they grow up to be men and women they may have been trained to think and act by the light of an education that has fitted them for the walks of life in which their lot is cast. Technical education, under which term we include agricultural, industrial, and commercial training, must, therefore, have a large claim on our available funds, and there are many other matters which require early remedial measures. The lamentable backwardness of female education demands our immediate attention, but here we have to contend with many difficulties arising out of existing social customs. The qualifications of teachers of all grades call for early improvement. The lines on which moral influences may be brought to bear on the young scholars and students need careful experiment and definition.

The problems to be solved will not admit of any uniform solution, for they vary in the different provinces, just as the progress already achieved has varied, both in extent and in quality, in different parts of the country, and among different communities. The aims that we have in view cannot be fully secured within a single generation, while our attention and our resources require to be more equitably distributed between the several sides of educational progress than has been the case in the past. The task before us is a long and difficult one. Our motives may, from one standpoint or another, be open to misrepresentation, but we cannot on that account allow ourselves to be diverted from those measures which we feel must, in the long run, offer the best chances of success. This obstacle of ignorance bars the way not to political progress only, but to all that is required to make nations healthy and happy, as well as progressive and prosperous. And it is only by its gradual removal that true progress towards the creation of an enlightened and self-governing people can ever be achieved.

58. In respect to the second obstacle, that of racial and religious intolerance political progress must largely depend, to use the words of our goal formula "upon the softening of racial and religious differences". In this the Government can take no direct part, except by the elimination of any factors within its control which may tend to accentuate such differences, or, to encourage their continuance. But all real progress must come from within, from the birth of a conciliatory disposition among races and sects, as well as from the gradual disappearance of religious bigotry and racial intolerance. Here too, we feel that, as in the case of ignorance, sound education will do more than any other agent.

59. The third and last obstacle delaying approach to the goal is that of political inexperience, and the removal of this also is largely bound up with the spread of good education, and the quality of its results. Moderation, sense of proportion, restraint and balance in public affairs are attributes which go to make up the enlightened and self-reliant citizen. It is only by slow degrees that these qualities can be acquired, and the proposals that we have made for vitalising local self-government, especially in the sphere of rural administration, should greatly stimulate their acquisition.

60. The recommendations that we now have the honour to submit for your acceptance have been made after long and most careful consideration. They represent what, to our minds are the needs and possibilities of the present, and they also prepare the ground for still further developments in the future. We hope that, though they may fail to satisfy the ambitions of impatient idealists, they will be accepted by thoughtful Indians as the genuine expression of a desire to find for India a definite and honourable place within the Empire, to which she may, from this time forth, look forward as the goal of her destiny.

We commend them now to your sympathy, and express the earnest hope that they may meet with your approval.

Our Honourable Colleague, Sir Sankaran Nair, while he endorses all the positive recommendations that are made in this despatch, would desire to go further in several respects than the rest of us consider expedient, and has appended a minute recording his personal views.

We have the honour to be,

SIR,

Your most obedient, humble Servants,

CHELMSFORD.

C. C. MONRO.

R. H. CRADDOCK.

W. S. MEYER.

C. SANKARAN NAIR.

C. H. A. HILL.

G. R. LOWNDES.

G. S. BARNES.

POSTSCRIPT.

We should not ordinarily have wished to make any comment upon the further recommendations that the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair desires to put forward, leaving it to you to consider these upon their merits. But we think that you will agree with us that his presentment of his case is such that we cannot well pass it over in complete silence. We cannot refrain from expressing our regret that our Honourable Colleague should have elected in his Minute to base his recommendations for further reforms upon grievances which find utterance principally in the organs of the Home Rule press in India : more especially since he himself does not assert, and thinks it unnecessary for him to do so, that these grievances may not be exaggerated or even groundless.

It seems to us a matter for some surprise that any large measure of reform should have been urged upon you in this Minute otherwise than upon a respon-

sible assurance that the grounds for the recommendation are, in our Colleague's opinion, well founded. We regret also that it should have been suggested to you, however indirectly, by a member of our Government that these grievances actually exist, and are both widespread and widely felt in India. That they form, and have formed for years past, the favourite theme of a certain class of newspapers you will be well aware; but we believe that their constant reiteration in this way is the only foundation for any general belief in their reality that may be found among the limited public to whom these newspapers appeal.

We are also altogether unable to accept the suggestion that there is any general demand throughout the country for the radical changes which our Honourable Colleague advocates. They are no doubt the cry of certain politicians of the day, but we venture to think that our Honourable Colleague has altogether ignored the far larger, though no doubt less vocal, body of moderate and thoughtful Indians whose views found free expression in the Presidential address delivered by Sir S. P. Sinha before the Indian National Congress in December 1915. We append a copy of this speech to which we have already referred in paragraph 35 of the despatch.

We would also leave it to you to judge how far the immediate acceptance of our Honourable Colleague's political programme would be compatible with the maintenance in India of the supreme authority of Parliament upon which Lord Morley laid such stress in connection with the reforms of 1909.

We need hardly say that we do not accept the description given by our Honourable Colleague of existing conditions as correctly representing the feeling of India, and we are not impelled by a perusal of his Minute either to ask for a greater increase of advance than we have proposed in our despatch, or, on the other hand, to draw back from any part of our recommendations through mistrust of our own reading of the political situation. We therefore adhere to all that we have advocated.

CHELMSFORD.

C. C. MONRO.

R. H. CRADDOCK.

W. S. MEYER.

C. H. A. HILL.

G. R. LOWNDES.

G. S. BARNES.

No.

1916.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

HOME DEPARTMENT.

POLITICAL.

No. 17, DATED DELHI, 24TH NOVEMBER
1916.

(Copy.)

LETTER TO HIS MAJESTY'S SECRETARY OF
STATE FOR INDIA.

SUBJECT.

The recognition of India's Services during the
War, and the lines that her future political progress
will follow.

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Minute of dissent by the Honourable Sir Reginald Craddock.

It is with very genuine regret that I feel myself obliged to differ, however slightly it may be, in regard to any of the recommendations included in so important and noteworthy a despatch. So momentous, however, to my mind, are the issues involved, that I find it impossible to follow my own inclination and sink my personal views in those of my Honourable Colleagues. We have worked long together at the pleasant task of devising our recommendations for a worthy recognition of the loyal part played by India during the war, and of the natural desire felt by her educated sons for some substantial addition to their political stature; and I console myself with the reflection that the points of disagreement are few, and relate to only one out of the sixty paragraphs which the despatch contains. And I can truthfully say that if their views on those points of difference are presently put into effect, and my own apprehensions regarding them are then proved by events to be unfounded, no one will be better pleased than myself. For, like their own, my chief desire is to find, if possible, the safest method and rate of progression by which India may in time come to be governed in accordance with the wishes of responsible representatives of her own people, and conducive to the welfare and satisfaction of the whole of her vast population.

2. The points on which I differ from my Colleagues can be very briefly stated; and though the arguments in support of my own opinions will require some considerable elaboration, I shall endeavour to keep them within as small a compass as is consistent with a clear explanation of the views that I hold and of the grounds upon which I hold them.

My Colleagues express their approval of an elected majority upon the provincial legislative councils, and to this proposition I agree. But they go further, and contemplate with equanimity the expansion of the councils themselves beyond their present statutory limits, with a view to the elected element being very substantially extended, so as to give to that element a fuller play than the present limits permit. To this I cannot assent. I recognize that my Colleagues do not desire to press such enlargement upon the governments of provinces that do not want it, but they are ready to give more latitude in this matter to those that do than I can regard as either prudent or necessary in present circumstances.

3. The existing Act of Parliament allows a maximum of 50 additional members to the larger provinces, and 30 to the smaller ones. Bengal is at present the only province, major or minor, in which constituencies have been formed to supply the full number of statutory seats. In the United Provinces the number is still one short of the maximum, while Madras and Bombay have each six unfilled seats, Bihar and Orissa 9, the Punjab 2, the Central Provinces and Assam 5 each. Burma may be left out of account: it is still in a much earlier stage of development. There is, therefore, some scope in most of the provinces for enlargement even on the present statutory basis, and I am prepared to increase this slightly by a small change in the law which would enable expert members to be nominated outside, instead of inside, their present statutory constitution. These experts should be allowed to speak but not to vote, so that even if they happen to be all officials the influence of the elected members would not thereby be affected. I would also have no objection to some increase to the statutory number of seats in the Punjab or the Central Provinces, the disparity between which and the other larger provinces is not so great as is represented by the present difference in the appointed numerical limits. Beyond these two changes I would not go for reasons which I shall later on explain.

4. The next point on which I do not see eye to eye with my Colleagues is in regard to their attitude towards the introduction of constituencies based on territorial units to take the place of the present constituencies which are based on the representation of classes and interests. The arguments in favour of the territorial system are stated in the extracts contained in Appendix III to the despatch, and although my Colleagues as a whole have decided to adopt a

neutral attitude upon the merits of both systems, and do not seek to force either system upon unwilling local governments, they are prepared to leave the latter as much latitude in the matter, as these may care to ask for. Moreover, it is not only the opinions of my Colleagues that I have to consider (and the Honourable Sir Sankaran Nair goes further than some in supporting this change) but I have to pay regard to the fact that the adoption of the territorial system is likely to become in the near future a prominent demand of Indian politicians when once they realize that the question has become a practical issue, and the advantages that the class to which they belong are likely to derive from it. It is also not merely a comparison of the relative advantages of two systems of franchise that is in issue, but, as I shall endeavour to make clear, the question has a most important bearing upon the approval promised by my Colleagues to a substantial increase in the elected element in the councils, and to any consequential enlargement in the strength of the councils themselves that may result therefrom. In fact the arguments on both these subjects of my dissent are so closely inter-connected, that I cannot entirely separate them from one another.

5. The existing system of representation of classes and interests dates back from Lord Lansdowne's reforms of 1892, when a concession to the elective principle first supplemented individual nomination by Government, and the same system was continued, and its advantages emphasised, both by Lord Minto's Government and by Lord Morley in devising the reforms of 1909. I do not wish to burden the body of this minute by long quotations, and I therefore attach to it a separate annexure containing extracts from older correspondence and speeches of statesmen showing how and why the representation of classes and interests was considered to be the only system practicable in India.

Twenty-five years are but a small period in the constitutional history of nations and it cannot truly be said that fresh and radical revisions of the constitution are in any sense overdue. I do not hesitate to assert that, when Lord Morley and Lord Minto introduced the far-reaching reforms of 1909, every one fully expected that these schemes would continue for at least one or two generations with only such minor amendments in regulations as experience of their working might from time to time suggest. I do not fail to appreciate the new situation created by the war. I have cordially agreed with my Colleagues that the war has changed the outlook of India towards the Crown and towards the British Empire, and this change in the outlook has found full recognition in our despatch by our willingness to declare an appointed goal and to make progress along the roads that lead to its attainment. There have indeed been changes in the outlook. The extreme section who looked for complete independence outside the Empire have changed the spirit of their dreams; the less ambitious who wished for a form of self-government within the Empire have had their hopes and aspirations quickened; educated Indians not of the political world, but none the less eager for India's progress, have been confirmed in their loyal belief in the benevolence and power of the British Government; while, even to the vast masses, who are fed on rumours of the market place, who know no geography and have never seen the sea, and who therefore do not understand the great issues that have been involved, the winning of the war will bring an added confidence in the stability and enduring character of the British Raj and in the *iqbal*, or prestige, of the great Empire which is to them personified in the just and impartial district officers with whom they are most brought in contact. Such is my own analysis of the altered outlook.

But while the war has effected all this, it has not worked a miracle. It has not lifted the pall of ignorance, it has not removed all apathy, it has not reconciled all differences between creed and creed, and between race and race. It has not adjusted the balance between class and class. These all remain just as they were before. The war has changed the outlook towards the Empire, but it has not changed, for indeed it could not, the varied characteristics and habits of thought of the many peoples who inhabit this land. The same problems still press for solution; and, if we ignore these realities, we shall soon find ourselves in deep waters. My own desire for maintaining for a long time to come a system of class representation as the basic constitution of our councils is not a matter of personal preference, or caprice, but is founded on causes that are much deeper than any of the ephemeral considerations which might seem to govern the question.

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6. It is not at all easy to bring to English minds, unacquainted at first hand with India and her problems, a true picture of the circumstances which must determine the form of government that is at present, and for some time to come, essential to the true welfare of the medley of creeds, races, and classes that make up her population. But I shall do my best to make this clear by the use of analogies.

The doctrine of the "balance of power" has now for nearly two centuries been constantly on the lips of the statesmen of Europe, and has determined the diplomacy of the great powers towards one another according as they desire to maintain or upset that balance. The present great conflict has indeed been the outcome of the determination of a great empire to destroy the balance, and to obtain domination over all the rest. In India this doctrine of the balance of power has not applied, as in Europe, to separate states and kingdoms, small or large; for the paramount supremacy of the British Government has precluded all chance of internecine war between them. But, on the other hand, there is in India a balance of power to be maintained not only between various creeds and races, but even more between the various classes of the people, to an extent which can with difficulty be appreciated by a nation which has taken many centuries in her evolution from absolute autocracy to democracy under a constitutional sovereign. In England, as well as in some other states of Europe, the first step in this evolution was the combined resistance of the nobility and aristocracy to the arbitrary exercise of power by the Crown. The next stage, but after a long interval of time, was the effort by the upper middle classes to restrain the domination of the aristocratic classes, and in course of time they successfully established their claims to exercise an influence on the government that should be proportionate to their growing prosperity and importance. The exercise of this influence has gradually distributed itself down through the various strata of the middle classes, but it was only in times comparatively recent that the next great stage in evolution was reached; from which time the assertion on the part of the labouring classes in their turn of their right also to a proportionate share in the direction of the common-wealth became so great a factor in domestic politics. Thus, as each class asserted itself in turn it did not attain complete domination over the others, but secured only its own share of authority, and, though not without some fluctuations, a fair balance between them all has so far been attained.

7. India has known none of these stages or processes of evolution. Whatever claims may now be put forward on behalf of some of her ancient states and dynasties, or her reputed miniature village republics, it cannot be disputed that she had for long been subject to autocracies and despotisms, when the intervention of the British Government brought to a sudden standstill any process of evolution which she might eventually have worked out for herself on her own lines, and imposed upon her a civilization, which was of a totally different type and had reached a totally different stage, to her own. To a series of autocracies of various types and strengths there succeeded one single and supreme benevolent despotism in the shape of British rule, and an entirely new process of evolution was set in motion.

The establishment of the various public offices and courts of justice which formed the prominent feature of the new British administration, expanding almost from day to day, with the increase of territory administered and the growth of complexity in the system of administration, soon created an ever growing demand for officials and clerks for the offices and for judges and lawyers for the courts, and English education began to be eagerly sought for by those of the middle classes who wished to make their living by the pen. In the new process of development thus inaugurated, the nobility, the fighting men, the landholders and the trading classes held aloof, while below, the great mass of cultivators and labourers scarcely paused in their labours to heed the changes that were going on about them.

8. After a period of political gestation which, compared with the slow progress of constitutionalism in self-developed nations, has been incredibly short, and on precedents which are entirely exotic to the soil, we are now being asked by reformers to concede to a small stratum of the middle classes that exercise of powers over the whole of the population which we have hitherto kept in our own

hands. If we were to accede to this demand the balance of power between class and class upon which I have laid so much stress would be entirely upset, and we should be abdicating not to the responsible representatives of a whole and united people, but in favour of a small oligarchy of professional men. Is there anything either in the history of India, or of any other nation, which would justify such an abdication on our part?

9. I fully expect to be told by some critics that I am most needlessly alarmed, and that I am drawing upon heroic arguments from history in order to combat suggestions which are really of comparatively minor importance; and my critics may point to the paragraph in our despatch in which we have ourselves emphasised the inexpediency of enlarging the constitutional powers of the legislative councils, until sufficient time has elapsed to test the value of those changes in their constitutions and in the electorates that the majority recommend. I willingly concede that our intentions are common. The majority of us agree that the time is not yet for bestowing larger powers upon these legislative bodies. We all alike recognise that steps in advance are needed to improve their representative character, and we all alike desire to train them in responsibility. My difference with my Colleagues lies in this, that, whereas they believe that the permissive course which they propose will meet requirements, and involve no serious risks, I, on my side, am equally convinced that the objects desired by them can be otherwise secured, and that the untoward consequences that I have mentioned will be the inevitable result of the latitude which they propose to allow.

10. Let me first take the adoption of territorial units for electoral purposes, a change, which so far as I am aware, has not until lately received much notice in any political programme. To begin with, this is the basis of all representative government; yet, we are agreed that the time for representative government is still far off. If this change were made it would encourage the fiction that the councils have already become representative of the people at large. It would be the first step towards the representation not of classes but of numbers, (and numbers are very formidable in this country) and it would mean the adoption of the very basis on which the franchise in all self-governing countries is founded, and upon which all claims for its extension invariably rest. The supporters of this system believed that it will give greater representation to the land and to other communities which cannot at present make their voices heard on the councils as now constituted. To me these are pious hopes which stand no chance of fulfilment. Surely there is less likelihood of securing men representing the landed interests, for instance, on a general electorate, than in a constituency upon which both the electors who vote, and the candidates for election, must exclusively belong to the landholding class; and it is the same with commerce, or with any other special interest to which it is desired to give special representation. I regard it as certain that these proposed territorial units, so far from giving more representation to other interests, will return men almost exclusively of the lawyer politician class. Some may think that the mere increase in the number of voters will bring into play new considerations and a sense of their responsibilities which will restore the equilibrium between various interests of the community. In the first place, the electors will only acquire responsibility after long experience and training, and when education has had time to broaden their minds and bring to their comprehension the real meaning of the issues upon which the candidates whom they elect are called upon to express their opinion. And, secondly, if it is merely the training of electors that is desired, enlarged electorates on the class and interest system, to which I am quite prepared to agree, will equally well serve as training grounds for responsibility. Resort to the territorial system is not at all essential to secure this object.

Thirdly, I do not think that sufficient consideration has been given to the concrete results of introducing this system. Once numbers, and not classes, become the basis of election there is no limit to the demands that will be made for increased representation. A lower unit than a district can hardly be adopted, and the larger districts will all ask for second representatives; if a town of 50,000 inhabitants is given one member, a town of 200,000 will certainly demand two, if not three. The minorities will begin to clamour for special seats. Muhammadans have in any case to be provided for. And other classes whose claim for representation might have been recognised on a class

system of electorates, will plead that they are being put under a single section of the community. Land and commerce will be loud in their complaints, and it will be no answer to them that they have only themselves to blame.

11. It must be remembered that political influence, under the effect of our artificial elevation of the small class which controls the Press, and almost monopolises public platforms, is rapidly becoming concentrated in a single section of the educated community. The landed aristocracy may still figure prominently at durbars and pageants, but the prestige which they once enjoyed is disappearing. The law and the law courts fetter their freedom in regard to their tenantry, while they shun political publicity, and fear the ridicule and obloquy which may be their lot if they take part in electoral campaigns and voice the conservative views that are held by their class. They shrink instinctively from a prospect of defeat at the polls by self-made men who in their eyes have no family traditions behind them, and they will therefore either refrain as a body from taking any part in such contests, and will leave the field entirely open to the politicians, or individuals may go over to the extreme radical party, and leave their own class in the lurch. These and other complaints of non-representation will result in further seats being superadded to the territorial constituencies, and the result must either be councils swelled beyond all workable dimensions, or discontent among those who find the professional middle classes absorbing all the power.

To sum up, these territorial electorates have not hitherto found a place in the programme of Indian politicians. They are not essential as training grounds for the voters, they will seriously disturb the balance of power between the classes of which the Government is the sole custodian in India; and finally they will encourage a false idea that the legislative councils are already representative assemblies, and bring about not only undue expansion of their numbers in the immediate present, but repeated and ever increasing pressure for their constant further enlargement.

Holding these views, it is impossible for me to give even a conditional approval to a change of which the advantages are to me so theoretical and dubious, and the disadvantages so patent and so grave.

12. I now turn to the question of the elected majority on the provincial councils. Here again my Honourable Colleagues may point to the fact that in our despatch we do not propose any material enlargement of their constitutional powers; but again I must answer that it is not our common intentions but the results which I anticipate from their proposals that I so much fear and disapprove.

The advanced section of Indian reformers asks for councils of at least 100 members, and I do not think that the kind of representation which my Colleagues recommend can be secured with a lesser numerical strength than 70 to 75 members. Upon such councils it is impossible to provide more than some 15, or at the very utmost 20 official seats, and that only to the prejudice of the work of inspecting officers whose duties require them to go on tour. I cannot bring myself to imagine non-official majorities of this overwhelming nature remaining content to see the executive government disregarding their resolutions and vetoing their private bills. Nor do I see how Government can pass its own legislative measures if the non-officials choose to oppose them, or to include in them amendments which nullify their purpose. It appears to me at least that all legislative business might soon come to a standstill. To these objections, those who support this drastic proposal reply that the newly constituted constituencies, and the representatives that they will return, will themselves bring into the councils both that conflict of interests, and that sense of responsibility, which will secure the Government against all risk of a determined opposition to all those of their measures which should command the support of reasonable men. These appear to me to be unduly sanguine hopes, which depend for their realization upon hypothesis and not upon past experience. These hopes indeed place reliance upon that very balance of power between classes which, as I have endeavoured to demonstrate, cannot exist unless it is buttressed by the Government itself.

13. We have, in one of the early paragraphs of our despatch, referred to the existence of political agitators and extremists in many provinces; we

have before us the spectacle of the Home Rule League and the schemes of many ardent reformers, the avowed object of which is to secure full control by these councils over the executive, and, I ask myself, do these afford any encouragement to the view that large non-official majorities on the councils will refrain from pressing to the full the opportunities that we are rash enough to give them? I do not think that history affords any instance of a Government that is in a permanent minority in its own legislative assemblies, and I can see no reason why we should expect that this experiment will succeed in India. The appetite for power will grow with the opportunity for its gratification, and even if, here and there, a few members are returned who thwart the ambitions of advanced politicians by their support of the government, good care will be taken that after the next elections the councils will see them no more. I do not at all wish to be misunderstood regarding the professional middle classes. They are fully entitled to their own share of seats, indeed it is part of my contention that in the present circumstances of India the great majority of the men who now, and for a long time to come, are likely to find seats on the councils must be drawn from the classes of lawyers, journalists, and professional men. They are the men who can speak and write most fluently, they revel in the arts and can best tolerate the buffets of electioneering campaigns, they captivate the minds of the youthful and immature, in whom they will find zealous canvassers, and their every day relations with numbers of people, as pleaders to their clients, will ensure to them an influence which no other class can at present command. And they will monopolise both the influence and the seats unless Government adopts measures to hold the balance even. It is not that I seek in the least to disparage the men of these classes. They have produced from their ranks individuals of great intellect, and high character. Some, however, are blinded by their own ambitions. Others, who sincerely believe that, if they could secure control over the management of affairs, the condition of the country would be materially benefited, have not the experience either personal or inherited which might sober their judgment. They therefore urge upon the Government counsels of perfection, and specious schemes of theoretical reform, without pausing to examine the many objections that stand in the way, or even the facts and arguments upon which their recommendations are supported. But the sincerity of their motives does not affect the duty of the Government towards the people with whose welfare it has become charged, and does not impose upon it any obligation to part with its control to persons not yet fully qualified either to represent the people at large, or to take over the powers and duties of the present custodians.

If I did not believe that these things will right themselves some day I could not have been a party to the main proposals of our despatch; but the process will be long and tedious, and the precipitate grant to so small an oligarchy, drawn almost solely from one small section of a class, that is itself only one among many others, of even the power to impede the Government and to block its measures, will not, I believe, further the real progress which we all alike desire. Rather is it likely to provoke great friction or even disaster, and, perhaps, to set back the clock of progress for a very long time. Believing all this, I cannot express my assent to such a course.

14. I may be asked, if I am so strongly opposed even to such permissive action as my Colleagues contemplate, why I am prepared to agree to an elected majority at all. To this I must answer simply that these councils already contain non-official majorities, and that I am willing to transfer nominated seats to election. My agreement is also subject to the understanding that the electorates, however much enlarged, continue on the present basis as electorates constituted to represent the principal classes and interests to be found among the community. On this basis I look for some conservative leaven upon the councils, which can for the present be obtained in no other way. With this leaven, and with a small elected majority only, the desired balance of power can be retained, while the grant of that majority, even though it be small, will be an earnest to the people most interested that we are anxious to pave the way for more extensive, if gradual, reforms. In order, however, to obtain the election of persons of weight and standing, I would not allow a vote to any one below 25 years of age, for it would be absurd that our electorates should be swamped by callow students who are at the mercy of noisy demagogues. In the case of the landholding electorates, as well as on some commerce electorates that I would introduce, I would also insist upon the qualification for the candidate being much higher than that required for the

voter. In these constituencies at least we must see that the profession politicians do not creep in by the mere possession of a few acres of land, or by some minor interest in a commercial concern. I would lay stress upon this commercial representation, not because India's commerce as a whole is not represented by the great chambers of commerce of the presidency towns and other large trade centres, but because there is need upon the councils of some representatives of the Indian trading classes. When the results of an extended franchise, and of a small elected majority, have been watched for a numbers of years, and in a variety of weathers, calm and rough, then will arrive the time once more to count up the progress, and to estimate what further advance is possible in the direction of representative institutions. But, for the present, we shall continue to see the most conservative people in the world returning mainly men professing the most democratic sentiments.

15. Lastly, I may be asked why if my Colleagues do not wish to force new systems upon any provincial government that is reluctant to accept them, I in my turn should wish to deny permission to those Governments which might like to try them? Having already pointed out what dangers in my opinion lurk behind these apparently harmless suggestions, I scarcely think that further answer to this question is needed. For I should first have to be convinced by such Governments that the dangers which I apprehend do not exist, and until I am converted I could not agree. I fear that however much they might believe that, in spite of large elected majorities on their legislative councils, they would retain the whole substance of executive power in their own control, they will find that it is the substance that they have parted with, and only the shadow that remains in their possession.

And while I do not object to such relative differences as are possible within the scope of my proposals, say between provinces so dissimilar as Bombay and the Punjab, I should certainly find objection to any striking departure being made by one single province at this early stage in the constitutional life of British India. All experience shows that a constitution granted to Bombay could not for long be refused to Madras, or Bengal. The pressure of the demand would be too great to be withstood, and the other provinces would not be slow to follow. It must be remembered that the refusal to one province of political privileges granted to another cannot be defended on the mere preference of the local government of the day, but must be justified by concrete differences in their circumstances which admit of the clearest public demonstration. This would certainly not be the case with the changes now in question. One might distinguish a presidency town from other cities in India, but what justification could there be for giving to Poona what was denied to Lahore, or to Ahmedabad what was considered unsuitable for Cawnpore? While, as to districts in India, their state of enlightenment does not vary according to the province to which they belong, but on entirely different considerations which may be found in any and every province.

16. No trustee of costly, delicate and complicated machinery would willingly place it in the hands of novices who might damage it irretrievably, whether it were from curiosity, want of skill, or bad intent; these must first go through a long apprenticeship in training and trustworthiness, and they must fully understand the delicacy and complication of the machinery. No sanguine hopefulness about their probable genius for mechanics will justify him in risking so precious a charge (a charge which is really not his to risk) in their hands until he has some sure and certain proof of their mechanical proficiency. And so it is with India, and with the delicate machinery of government that we now control. It is not ours to hand over for rash experiment, it may be, to a political caucus which may damage it beyond repair. We hold it in trust for the owners, still not of age, who are the whole people of India, and not merely for the few small and inexperienced shareholders who have just come of age and want to take over the control of the machine. When the majority of the owners of that machinery are grown up, and have gained the wisdom to select their own agents, then we may with a clear conscience and good hope assent to the transfer.

These are the points of difference between myself and my Honourable Colleagues, and these are the reasons upon which I base my dissent. On all else I do most thoroughly agree with them.

DELHI ;
24th November 1916. }

REGINALD CRADDOCK.

ANNEXURE TO SIR R. CRADDOCK'S MINUTE OF DISSENT.

PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS REGARDING LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS, AND RELATING TO THE REPRESENTATION OF CLASSES AND INTERESTS.

Extracts from Lord Dufferin's Minute attached to the Government of India's Despatch of the 6th November 1888.

"Though it is out of the question either for the Supreme or for the Subordinate Governments of India to divest themselves of any essential portion of that Imperial authority which is necessary to their very existence as the ruling Power, paramount over a variety of nationalities, most of whom are in a very backward state of civilisation and enlightenment, there is no reason why they should not desire to associate with themselves in council in very considerable numbers such of the Natives of India as may be enabled by their acquirements, experience and ability to assist and enlighten them in the discharge of their difficult duties."

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"By this means the field of public discussion will be considerably enlarged, and the various administrations concerned will be able to shape their course with the advantage of a far more distinct knowledge of the wishes and feelings of the communities with whose interests they may be required to deal than has hitherto been the case; for those wishes and feelings will be expressed, not, as at present, through self-constituted, self-nominated and therefore untrustworthy channels, but by the mouths of those who will be legally constituted representatives of various interests and classes, and who will feel themselves in whatever they may do or say, responsible to enlightened and increasing sections of their own countrymen."

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"Though we are adopting the 'elective' principle to a modified extent, we must remember that in India, as it exists at present, no real 'Representation' of the people can be obtained; all that we hope to do is, by associating with ourselves in the task of administration a considerable number of persons selected and elected from the educated classes, to place ourselves in contact with a larger surface of Native opinion and to multiply the channels through which we may make ourselves acquainted with the wants and feelings of the various communities for whose welfare we are responsible."

Extract from the report of the Council Committee, attached to the same despatch.

"We consider that.....provision should be made for the appointment of representatives of the more important interests which exist in the country. Taken in their broadest aspects, these are (a) the interests of the hereditary nobility and landed classes, who have a great permanent stake in the country; (b) the interests of the trading, professional and agricultural classes; (c) the interests of the planting and commercial European community; and (d) the interests of stable and effective administration." * *

"We are fully aware that in India at present there can be no such thing as popular representation as understood in Western countries; but we think it desirable that in appointing members to the council we should not rely solely on nomination; and that some approximation should be made to the elective principle."

Extract from Lord Lansdowne's note interpreting the Mandate of Parliament in connection with the Indian Councils Act of 1892.

"(1) It is not expected of us what we shall attempt to create in India a complete or symmetrical system of representation.

- “(2) It is expected of us that we shall make a *bonâ fide* endeavour to render the legislative councils more representative of the different sections of the Indian community than they are at present.
- “(3) For this purpose we are at liberty to make use of the machinery of election wherever there is a fair prospect that it will produce satisfactory results.
- “(4) Although we may to this extent apply the elective principle, it is to be clearly understood that the ultimate selection of all additional members rests with the Government, and not with electors. The function of the latter will be that of recommendation only.”

Extract from the Government of India's Despatch to the Secretary of State of the 26th October 1892.

“It appears to us that, having in view the numerical limits before referred to and their necessary consequence and the paramount necessity of giving to all important interests in the country as much representation in the councils as is possible, the first point for determination is the nature and number of the interests which should be represented. Indian society, from historical causes to which we need now not refer, is essentially a congeries of widely separated classes, races and communities, with divergencies of interests and hereditary sentiment which for ages have precluded common action or local unanimity. Representation of such a community, upon such a scale as the Act permits, can only be secured by providing that each important class shall at least have the opportunity of making its views known in the council by the mouth of some member specially acquainted with them. Where such a representation can be secured by the common action of any such bodies as are referred to in Lord Cross's despatch, we are prepared to resort to the method of entertaining an expression of their views and recommendations in the manner suggested by him; but outside such bodies it is clearly necessary to reserve the power of nomination by less formal methods for classes which, though of importance in the community, are not in numerical preponderance or are unaccustomed to act together.”

Extract from the Report of the Committee which considered Lord Minto's Proposals in 1906.

“When in 1893 the councils were enlarged and the elective principle introduced, it was recognised that territorial representation was unsuited to India, but an endeavour was made so to constitute the electorates that all the more important classes and interests should as far as possible be represented * * * * *. The results have not justified the expectations formed. Most conspicuous of all has been the failure of the District Boards to fulfil the expectation that they would represent the landed interests..... It is apparent that the elective system has given to the legal profession a prominence in the provincial councils to which it is not entitled, while it has signally failed to represent the more stable elements of the community.”

Extract from the Despatch to the Secretary of State of the 21st March 1907.

“We are no advocates of representative Government for India in the Western sense of the term: it could never be akin to the instincts of the many races composing the population of the Indian Empire. It would be a Western importation uncongenial to Eastern tastes The Government of India must remain autocratic and the supreme power must be vested in British hands and cannot be delegated to any kind of representative assembly..... The proposals, which we recommend for your provisional acceptance represent an advance in the direction of associating the people of India with ourselves in the work of legislating and administration. They may fairly be described as an attempt to give to India something that may be called a constitution framed on sufficiently liberal lines to satisfy the legitimate aspirations of all but the most advanced

Indians, while at the same time enlisting the support of the conservative element of Native society.....not an experimental makeshift, but a working machine representing all interests that are capable of being represented, and providing for an adequate expression of the sentiments and requirements of the masses of the people and in particular of the great agricultural class forming two-thirds of the entire population.”.

Extract from a Circular reference made in the light of Lord Morley's Criticisms of the 24th August 1907.

“It is the desire of the Governor-General in Council that the legislative councils in India should now be enlarged to the fullest extent compatible with the necessary authority of the Government. He desires, moreover, that these bodies should be so constituted in respect of non-official members as to give due and ample representation to the different classes and interests of the community. In carrying out this system, which the Government of India agree with Lord Lansdowne's Government in regarding as the only one in any way applicable to Indian conditions, they consider it essential that the Government should always be able to reckon on a numerical majority, and that this majority should be strong enough to be independent of the minor fluctuations that may be caused by the occasional absence of an official member. The principle of a standing majority is accepted by the Government as an entirely legitimate and necessary consequence of the nature of the paramount power in India, and so far as they know it has never been disputed by any section of Indian opinion that does not dispute the legitimacy of the paramount power itself. That is not an open question; and if two men are not able to wield one sceptre, it is idle to dissemble that fact in constructing political machinery. The question then arises, what number of official members of the requisite standing and experience can, without detriment to the public service, be spared from their regular duties for attendance in legislative councils? The enlargement of the councils is certain to add considerably to protraction of debate, thus entailing larger calls upon the time of their members. The necessity of maintaining an official majority thus implies the necessity of limiting the number of non-official members; and the problem which faces the Government of India now, as it faced Lord Lansdowne's Government 15 years ago, is how to provide for the due representation, within the narrow limits thus imposed, of the vast diversity of classes, races, and interests in the Indian Empire.”

Extract paragraphs 18 and 19 from the Despatch of the Government of India to the Secretary of State, of 1st October 1908, submitting their final proposals after the opinions elicited had been considered.

“18. *Principle of representation.*—We have carefully considered the proposals of local governments on the subject and the large body of non official opinions submitted. In our judgment these papers bear out to the fullest extent the conclusion that representation by classes and interests is the only practicable method of embodying the elective principle in the constitution of the Indian legislative councils. A great array of authorities may be cited in support of this opinion. Twenty years ago, in the course of the discussions leading up to the report of Sir George Chesney's Committee, Mr. (now Lord) MacDonnell, then Home Secretary to Lord Dufferin's Government, said in a note which was forwarded to the India Office :—“The process of modifying the existing constitution of the councils should proceed on a clear recognition and firm grasp of the fact that India is a congeries of races, nationalities and creeds, widely differing *inter se* in a variety of ways.” On the same occasion Sir George Chesney expressed similar views, and Sir Charles Aitchison observed that “the division of the people into creeds, castes and sects with varying and conflicting interests” rendered representation in the European sense an obvious impossibility. A passage in Lord Dufferin's minute annexed to the Government of India's despatch of the 6th November 1888 describes the population of India as “composed of a large number of distinct nationalities, professing various religions, practising diverse rites, speaking different languages, while many of them are still further separated from one another by discordant prejudices, by conflicting social usages, and even antagonistic material

interests. This opinion is not confined to Englishmen, but is shared by competent Indian observers at the present day. In a recent address to a modern political association on the duty of patriotic Indians, His Highness the Aga Khan has given emphatic expression to similar sentiments. "In India," he says, "no such union as is essential to the creation of a strong, independent, homogeneous state is possible without centuries of consolidation. Even if we assume that the forces tending to unification are quickened by the machinery of modern civilisation, generations must pass before India is a nation. In very truth we can detect signs of the advent of that unity which is the first essential to the creation of a modern state."

19. These views receive striking independent confirmation from the debates in Parliament on the Indian Councils Bill which became law in 1892. In the Upper House Lord Ripon referred to the extreme difficulty of "selecting men who represented the various classes of the community, and the various sections of opinion, as well as the various localities of India." Lord Kimberley said—"The notion of a Parliamentary representation of so vast a country—almost as large as Europe—containing so large a number of different races is one of the wildest imaginations that ever entered the minds of men." He went on to emphasise the necessity of ascertaining the feelings of "a most important body.....the Mahomedans of India. If you were to be guided entirely by the Hindu popular opinion you would find yourself in great difficulty." Lord Northbrook considered that provisions should be made "for the representation of different classes of people—people of different races and different religions." In a later stage of the discussion Lord Kimberley agreed with Lord Northbrook, and observed—"It has been found in this country not very easy to protect the interests of minorities by any contrivance that can be devised; but there must be found some mode in India of seeing that minorities such as the important body of Mahomedans, who are frequently in a minority in parts of that country, are fully represented." In the House of Commons the weightiest utterance was that of Mr. Gladstone, who referred to the difficulty of introducing the elective principle "in an Asiatic country like India with its ancient civilisation, with institutions so peculiar, with such diversities of race, religions and pursuits." He also drew attention to "the danger of having persons who represent particular cliques or classes or interests and who claim the honour of representing the people of India," thus anticipating the observation, now made by the Bombay Government, that "the educated classes, although a very small minority, appear to claim to represent the interests of all sections of the people, and are inclined to oppose any measures which appear likely to lessen their influence." Mr. Samuel Smith spoke of "the endless shades of caste, race, and religion in India"; Sir William Plowden and Sir Richard Temple followed in the same strain; and the latter observed that "in fixing the ratio of Members, the interests to be represented, and the classes which constitute the bulk of the people, ought to be the determining factors rather than the population."

Extract from Lord Morley's speech in the House of Lords on the 17th December 1908.

Parliament was asked "in a very definite way, to introduce election working alongside of nomination with a view to the due representation of the different classes of the community,"

* * * * *

"If I were attempting to set up a Parliamentary system in India, or if it could be said that this chapter of reforms led directly or indirectly to the establishment of a Parliamentary system in India, I, for one, would have nothing at all to do with it. I do not believe—it is not of very great consequence what I believe, because the fulfilment of my vaticinations could not come off very soon—in spite of the attempts in Oriental countries at this moment, interesting attempts to which we all wish well, to set up some sort of Parliamentary system—it is no ambition of mine at all events to have any share in beginning that operation in India. If my existence, either officially or corporeally, were to be prolonged 20 times longer than either of them is likely to be, a Parliamentary system in India is not at all the goal to which I would for one moment aspire."

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Minute of dissent by the Hon'ble Sir C. Sankaran Nair.

1. I agree with the proposals in the despatch for increasing the pay and pensions of the rank and file of the Indian Army and for the better education of their children, also for the grants to be made to them. I would emphasise the necessity of opening a higher military career to Indians. I agree in the earnest recommendation regarding the necessity of Indian representation, in some definite form in the Imperial Council otherwise than by the Secretary of State, or any person appointed by him in England. With all that is said about indentured emigration and cotton excise duties I cordially agree. I endorse the recommendation about a liberal administration of the Arms Act and about the removal of the existing racial differences in respect of its administration. I agree with all that is said about the necessity of accelerating the rate of progress in the domain of Local Self-Government. I heartily join in the recommendation to provide an equal number of European and Indian members in the Provincial Executive Councils. I agree fully with the recommendations to give an elective majority in the Provincial Legislative Councils, to extend the franchise in the various provinces, and for a system of territorial in preference to purely class constituencies. I agree also with what is said about Muhammadan representation, with a slight difference hereafter referred to.

Recognizing that these proposals taken together will constitute an appreciable advance, I have signed the despatch. But there are important reasons which compel me to write this minute of dissent. Before doing so, I should like, if I might without impertinence or impropriety, to say that the country will be deeply grateful—for the opinion so forcibly expressed in the despatch and with which I fully concur that the existence of a few anarchists should not be allowed to stand in the way of any reform that might be necessary.

2. I feel however that the despatch does not attach sufficient weight to the value and the necessity of Indian co-operation in the interests of good government and general progress. It views not with trust and confidence but with alarm the growth of representative institutions. The movements symptomatic of such dissatisfaction as undoubtedly exists in the country even in the minds of loyal and moderate persons are scarcely referred to or attributed to the right causes, and a general impression is left in one's mind that conditions exist which necessitate measures on the part of Government which in my opinion will conduce neither to peace nor prosperity. The despatch gives no indication of the necessity of reforms from the Indian point of view, nor are the measures of reform advocated, though good as far as they go, likely in my opinion to ensure such improvement in the administration of the country as will satisfy educated opinion.

We must realize the conditions which have given birth to the demand for Self-Government or Home Rule and any reforms which we recommend must be based on a true estimate of such conditions. The educated classes as a body have loyally agreed to avoid raising any controversy likely to embarrass the British Government during the progress of the war. But there is considerable dissatisfaction in the country and there are certain facts which cannot be ignored.

3. In the words of an experienced Lieutenant-Governor: "however skilled and benevolent our rule, it is an alien rule, and as such it will yearly become more difficult and its mistakes more conspicuous." It is carried on by foreigners, who keep themselves practically aloof from Indians during their stay in the country, and after their term of service, have no further direct interest in the country which then loses the benefit of their knowledge and experience. It cannot be denied that in India large masses of the people are in a chronic state of grinding poverty; arts and industries are in the most backward condition; education, such as there is, is confined to a small section of the people and the condition of the country as a whole compares unfavourably with that of any other

part of the civilized world. Ever since 1885, when the Indian National Congress held its first meeting at Bombay, the condition of the country has been discussed by the Indian National Congress, the Industrial Congress, the Provincial and the District Congresses and latterly the Moslem League at their annual sessions, and by Indian politicians in the Legislative Councils after the introduction of the elective element therein. Eminent Indian publicists, notably Dadabai Nowrojee, Romesh Chunder Dutt, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale have dwelt upon the alleged shortcomings of the administration. They have been supported by not a few Englishmen including members of the Indian Civil Service. The official replies to their criticisms have failed to convince the popular mind. All these have generated and confirmed the belief not only in the reality of the evils complained of but in the responsibility of the existing system of bureaucratic administration for their continuance. At the same time other great movements have come into existence generating a sentiment of nationalism both amongst Hindus and Muhammadans, a pride in their past, a feeling of self-respect, a consciousness of their increasing capacity to deal with the great problems of government.

On the other hand, the officials compare the present with the chaotic condition of the country when they assumed its government. The older civilians also compare the present with the India of their younger days and rightly point to the progress made in their time. Some of them are even bitter at the apparent ingratitude of the people who, in their opinion, are unreasonably impatient and do not recognise the progress that has been achieved. The people, however, apply to the present a standard of good government which they have been taught to consider as absolutely necessary in the interests of progress. Such government has been promised to them by the people of England who, they believe, are anxious to carry out their promises.

These different standpoints, though not mutually antagonistic, were in any event bound to create friction. But matters have unfortunately gone further. The Indians have come to believe, rightly or wrongly, that the officials are averse to imparting English education or any higher education; to any local self-government worth the name; to the association of Indians with Englishmen in the government of the country and to the removal of any grievance which might interfere with their prestige or emoluments; and it is in some quarters even believed that dissensions between communities, classes and castes are encouraged with a view to maintain the existing order.

The consequent unpopularity of the officials is one of the main causes for the demand for some radical change in the present system of administration.

I would be content with this description of the conditions which exist in the country but I may be permitted to mention a few specific matters in connection with which there is a considerable feeling of bitterness. I do not assert, and it is not necessary for me to do so, that the grievances in connection with these matters may not be exaggerated or even groundless; but the fact remains that the congresses, conferences, and leading Indian politicians, past and present, affirm their reality and the people concerned feel them as real and genuine grievances. It is neither politic nor possible to ignore them. Nor would it be wise to delay all measures calculated to allay these feelings of bitterness.

4. The complaints which are most commonly made in this connection are as follows:—

- (a) The combination of the judicial and executive functions is a serious blot on the administration of criminal justice, and gives rise to a feeling of general insecurity.
- (b) The revenue system of the country which allows the executive government, except in the permanently settled tracts, to raise the revenue by means of recurring settlements without the sanction of the legislature and without the restraints of any statutory rules, contributes to general impoverishment, places the landholders under the control of the executive, drives away capital from the land, and deprives the cultivator of the fruits of his labour.

It is the same system which compels India to export her natural products, when she requires them both for purposes of food and manufacture.

- (c) English manufacturers are unduly favoured by measures which tend to discourage indigenous industries; capital borrowed in England on disadvantageous terms is spent not so much for the benefit of Indian labour and for the improvement of technical scientific knowledge and organizing capacity in India, as for the benefit of English industry and labour; a system of currency prevails, which greatly favours the English capitalist.
- (d) The test mainly applied for appointments in the public services is that of race, not fitness.
- (e) Commercial, scientific and technical education has not been adequately fostered, with the result that India cannot compete with England and other manufacturing countries on fair and equal terms.
- (f) The policy for the diffusion of education initiated by Lord Macaulay and followed for nearly half a century with beneficent results, has been reversed for political purposes.
- (g) Expenditure is wastefully incurred in promoting the interests of Englishmen in the higher services to the detriment of departments which are mainly manned by Indians.
- (h) The trend of subsequent legislation has been to reverse the general policy of local self-government enunciated more than thirty years ago; official control has been enhanced and facilities for popular training have been materially diminished.

5. Many of these charges have been dealt with from the official point of view; and the officials, believing them to have been fully met, consider there are no real grounds for discontent; but the fact remains: the people remain totally unconvinced, and confirmed, therefore in the improbability of reforms under existing conditions. In estimating the present situation, what is material is—not so much how far these charges are true, but how far they have affected the popular mind. The youth of the country accept these charges without hesitation. The English professors, under whom they receive their education, are unable to shake their belief in the reality of their grievances, because they do not possess their confidence and are looked upon as interested parties.

The result is that there is a constant addition to the stream of disbelief in the existing system of administration; and a conviction all but universal has been induced that nothing short of complete self-government will supply any effective remedy.

The expectations raised by events that have occurred during the war and by utterances of responsible English statesmen; the uneasiness caused by various announcements of commercial and industrial policy believed to be prejudicial to India; her threatened degradation in status in the Empire when she may have to exchange England for England and the Colonies as her overlord—all these have aggravated the situation above described.

Leaders of Indian thought see no escape from the position thus created, except by such reforms in the constitution of government as will assure the country that the English people as well as the Government of India are both willing and anxious to remedy all real grievances, and that there is a reasonable prospect of an early settlement of, among others, the outstanding questions mentioned above.

The Memorandum recently submitted by nineteen out of twenty-four elected Indian Members of the Imperial Legislative Council clearly indicates the direction in which Indian opinion asks the Government to move.

It is vital that our recommendations should not disappoint the universally cherished hope that India will, after the war, become an integral and self-respecting portion of the Empire. It is my belief that the recommendations contained in the despatch which I have signed will not bring about the desired assurance, and that nothing short of the administrative reforms which I venture to suggest below will create that confidence and tranquillity which are essential to the future well-being of the country.

6. In that view and with that object I would make the following proposals:—

Provincial Councils.

In the local legislative councils—

- (1) There should be a majority of elected Members, the size of the majority being left to each local government. The system of election should be based primarily on territorial constituencies, such as districts, and ordinarily half the Members of the legislative councils should be elected by such territorial constituencies. There should be a wide extension of the franchise.
- (2) The resolutions of the Council with reference to the budget or relating to matters of general administration should be binding upon the executive government, except when they refer to the pay and emoluments of the permanent services; and in their case also any increase in pay or emoluments or any creation of new appointments in the higher services should be made subject only to the sanction of the Council.
- (3) All the resolutions of the Council in any respect whatever should be subject to the veto of the Governor, the Viceroy and the Secretary of State.
- (4) All the provinces except Frontier provinces should have an Executive Council. Half the members in every Executive Council should be Indians.
- (5) Every Member of the Executive Council should have a right to address the Viceroy or the Secretary of State through the Governor.
- (6) Every head of a province must be a Governor appointed from England.

Imperial Councils.

- (1) Half the Members of the Legislative Council should be elected.
- (2) There must be another Indian Member in the Executive Council. For this purpose an additional membership may, if necessary, be created.
- (3) The Additional Official Members of the Legislative Council should be free to speak out their minds and vote according to their inclination save in exceptional cases.
- (4) In every Department there should be an Indian either as Member, or as Secretary, or as Adviser entitled to place his views before the Viceroy.
- (5) Every Member of the Executive Council should be entitled to address the Secretary of State through the Viceroy.

II.

CONSTITUTION OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

7. The accompanying list will show the present constitution of the legislative councils. The European non-official members generally, if not invariably, vote with the officials. Nominated Indian non-official members are not the class of persons from whom the country expect any real representation of Indian grievances. As for the elected members they are representatives of certain classes and interests, not of the masses or ryots. If it was the intention of the framers of this constitution to bring into the councils men who would represent the wants of the people, it is obvious therefore that the electorates are not so constituted as to carry out that intention. An examination of the accompanying table will amply support this statement, and will also indicate the direction in which reform should take place.

Provinces.	Officials.	Europeans.	Nominated Indian non-officials.	Corporation.	University.	Municipality.	District Boards.	Zemindars and large Landlords.	Muhammadians.	Commerce (Indian).	Total of Columns 2 and 3.	Total of Columns 2 and 4.	Total of Columns 2, 3 and 4.	Total of Columns 5 to 11.	Total of Columns 2 to 11.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16
Punjab ...	11	2(a)	5	...	1	4	5	13	16	18	10	28
Madras...	17	7 (b)	4	1	(i)	9		5	2	...	24	21	28	17	45
Burma ...	9	3(c)	7	12	16	19	...	19
Assam ...	10	4(d)	3	2	2	2	2	...	14	13	17	8	25
Bombay	14	4(e)	11	1	1	4	4	3	4	2	18	25	29	19	48
Bihar and Orissa	18	3(f)	3	5	5	5	4	...	21	21	24	19	43
Bengal	16	8(g)	5	2	1	5	5	5 (h)		5	24	21	29	23	54
United Provinces ...	17	3	8	...	1	4	9	2	4	...	20	25	28	20	48
Central Provinces ...	12	...	4	7(i)		3 (i)	12	16	16	10	26

(a) 1 Ch. of Com., 1 nominated.

(b) C. C.; Trades Association, Plant; University 1 each; nominated 3.

(c) C. C., Trades Association, nominated.

(d) Indian Tea Association 3, nominated 1.

(e) C. C. (2).

(f) Min. Plant. nominated.

(g) C. C. (2); Trades Association, Chittagong Port, Planters—one each elected; jute 1; 2 nominated.

(h) One alternately by the municipalities and the Landholders of the Chittagong Division.

(i) According to the Civil List there are only nine members representing municipalities, District Boards, Zemindars and Landholders.

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It will be seen that the official, European and nominated non-official members of the Councils (columns 2, 3 and 4) outnumber the elected Indian members (columns 3 to 11) of all the classes in every province. Even excluding the nominated members, the officials and Europeans together outnumber the elected members. To my mind this is conclusive to show that there is no effective Indian representation in the Legislative Councils.

I propose next to show that the existing representation by classes and interests and otherwise is totally inadequate for the purpose we have in view.

EUROPEAN MEMBERS.

8. Let us now take one of these classes—the European members. I shall state the Indian view. They are not interested in the general administration of justice in India so far as Indians are concerned. They are tried by different tribunals consisting of their own countrymen; they are not affected by the press laws or any coercive legislation; therefore on the question of the separation of judicial and executive functions and the administration of criminal justice their opinion is generally opposed to the Indian view; the land-assessment question does not appreciably affect them. The question of Local Self-Government scarcely concerns them. Similarly, so far as the question of appointments of Indians to higher posts is concerned, their bias is generally in favour of the appointment of their own countrymen. With reference to the commercial and industrial policy to be followed, their interests and those of Indians are not generally identical. As far as education is concerned, the Anglo-Indians form a special class. They are not as a body interested in the administration of the Salt or Forest laws which are felt to be oppressive, nor to any great extent in the reformation of the Police administration which is one of the crying needs of the country. Their attitude in reference to excise administration has been either indifferent or antagonistic to the Indian view. The result is that on all the great questions which agitate the country the people cannot expect any support from the European members. For all practical purposes therefore, European non-official votes according to the Indian view must be counted as official votes, without official responsibility.

ZEMINDARS.

9. The zemindars are another class to whom special representation is allowed. If the Legislative Councils have done nothing else than to induce the zemindars and the Muhammadans to take interest in public questions, they will have quite justified their existence. In all the questions that directly affect them, the zemindars do not hesitate to speak out their minds. But many of the great questions under discussion affect other classes. Landlords even in England are not generally recognized as competent to speak on the wants of the middle, lower, and the labouring classes. They are no doubt directly interested in questions relating to land revenue assessment. But when revenue is increased, they generally pass on the burden to their tenants. They labour, however, under a great disadvantage. Rent questions and numerous other questions that arise between them and their tenants are in many provinces disposed of by the executive officers and not by the civil courts: with the result that they are greatly under the influence of the executive officers. The zemindars must continue to be represented in the councils as a class. But, it will not be right to rely upon them to voice the needs of the general community.

MUHAMMADANS.

10. Separate representation for the Muhammadans has fully justified itself. It was usual to oppose the various proposals in favour of Local Self-Government: and the appointment of more Indians to higher posts on the alleged ground that the Muhammadans were opposed to them. But now their cultured leaders are as vehement as the other classes in pressing for reforms though the rank and file are not as advanced as the Parsis or Hindus. The time has not come to discard

separate representation in their case. As to the form of representation or the mode of election, the Muhammadans are the best judges and we should conform to their wishes. As they are in a backward condition and behind the Hindus in material prosperity I think in the interests of their political education they should get a larger representation than is warranted by the electoral roll. I would give them seats in proportion to their census numbers which would be more than what they would get under the electoral roll, not on the ground that Lord Minto promised it ; but because in the present peculiar conditions of the Muhammadans it is a just policy. I am unable to agree to any nomination as suggested by my colleagues. It would be a retrograde step. It would not be in pursuance of the policy to educate the Muhammadans and might be considered a device to discount real Muhammadan representation by election.

TRADE AND COMMERCE.

11. Trade and commerce must of course be represented. But Indian trade and commerce must be represented at least on equal terms as English trade and commerce. They too should have the right of electing their own members. It must be remembered in this connection that it is the large trading and commercial interests in the Presidency towns that are now mainly represented.

I have referred to all the special electorates. The class representatives may be trusted to look after the class interests, and as each class is more or less interested in questions which affect the general community, they may be trusted to act impartially except when class interests stand in the way but they are not elected to represent the general community though among these class representatives are persons who, by their eminent public services, have acquired a right to speak on behalf of the general public.

12. I shall refer now to the general electorates.

The Universities.—The Senates contain only between one-fifth and one-tenth of members representing independent electors. *The Presidency Corporations* include members nominated by Government, and a substantial number of Europeans. The other electorate is the *Municipalities and District Boards*. They have on the whole a large percentage of nominated members. They are men elected on other issues to look after sanitation, education, communications in their areas—not for their fitness to deal with questions of the kind I have indicated. The District Boards generally are under official control and many of the Municipalities are under official chairmen. None of these electorates can therefore be reasonably expected to return members whose primary duty would be to agitate in Council for the removal of the general grievances I have referred to.

13. According to the present system, therefore, the persons who are very much in need of representation, the villagers, *i.e.*, the large body of ordinary landholders, the pattadars, ryots holding lands under Government or under the great zemindars, the ordinary traders outside the Presidency towns, etc., are not represented by any electorates. Territorial representation will enable them to make their voice heard, and it is only territorial representation that will enable these middle classes, the ryots, etc., to send their representatives into the Council. This will also get rid of the present system of election by intrigue, etc., and will introduce the healthy system of election on the candidates' political programme openly announced. I think it is, therefore, necessary that we should have territorial representation so far as concerns the main body of the members of the Legislative Council ; whether this is to be effected by the abolition of District Boards as electorates or otherwise is a detail which it is unnecessary now to consider. This question of territorial representation is so very important that it should not be left to the discretion of the local Governments, whether or not it should be given effect to in their provinces.

ELECTED MEMBERS SHOULD FORM THE MAJORITY.


14. The reasons which called the Legislative Councils into existence, *viz.*, to ascertain the wishes of the people through their accredited representatives also require that the majority of the members should be elected. The majority

of the heads of the provinces whom we have consulted are in favour of this view. We want these councils to express the real opinion of the country and this cannot be done if the majority are officials or nominated members. With a permanent majority behind them there is rarely any attempt by the officials to persuade the elected representatives as to the soundness of their views. The elected members feel the hopelessness of their situation. They consider that, however valid their arguments might be, they cannot make any impression on the officials who have come prepared to vote against them. We accordingly keep away from the councils many competent persons who consider their presence useless either in support of or in opposition to Government. The result on public opinion also is deplorable. They feel that there is no attempt to meet the arguments of their representatives in the Legislative Council, and they think accordingly that no arguments are available. Increasing discontent is the result. Again, nothing is more common than for the officials to say that the elected members of the Legislative Councils do not really represent public opinion and that they do not really care for the interests of the masses. This is stoutly denied by the latter according to whom they alone properly voice the grievances of the public. If we have a majority of members who are elected by proper constituencies—this question can easily be settled. Furthermore, there will be genuine attempt on either side to convince the other when it is seen that arguments determine the conclusions. In this connection it is interesting to notice the opinion of a Lieutenant Governor who has had large experience of Legislative Councils that "the Council is useful in bringing together different points of view and in giving to official apologists opportunities which are otherwise lacking, but in training the people for the work of Government it does little or nothing." I do not think any objection would be taken to this proposal, but for the apprehension that the Legislative Councils might acquire a certain degree of control over the executive. This brings us to the question whether we should enlarge the constitutional powers of the Legislative Councils.

CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

15. An elected majority alone in the councils, as now constituted, would not necessarily enlarge the constitutional powers of the Legislative Councils. It would no doubt afford some check to the passing of unpopular laws, but considering the divergent interests represented in the Council, it is very doubtful whether it will be an effective check. We have however to consider this question of the power of Legislative Councils mainly with reference to the budget and to the binding character of the resolutions. I have mentioned what are considered by the people of the country to be some of the evils from which they suffer. If they are real, it is only by enlarging the powers of the councils that they can be remedied. The officials of their own motion can scarcely be expected to remove them. If they are not real, the Governor's power of veto is a sufficient check.

It is to be remembered that taxation is now imposed by one race over another race. It does not comparatively affect the tax-imposing class themselves, or their relatives, or practically their own race. On the other hand, it benefits them as it is spent mainly on the services, so that even if the taxation or the expenditure incurred is proper, the people are often tempted to ascribe it to unfair motives. It is believed that the expenditure is generally increasing for the benefit of English Services and not to meet the real needs of the country as understood by the people, or for carrying out reforms which are urgently needed and which are put off on the ground that money is not available. The expenditure which brings direct benefit to the people (*i. e.*, that on education, sanitation, medical relief) is according to them kept at a low figure and popular opinion is not given effect to. It is believed that the lower ranks in the police, revenue, education, judiciary, etc., departments are starved, while revision brings increase of pay and allowances to the higher ranks. If we want the local bodies to become what we hope they will become, there should be a great readjustment by the elected members of the financial resources between the provincial and the local budgets. Imperial and provincial funds devoted for purposes of education, etc., are lying idle and have not been utilised as they would have been if the elected members had been able to exercise their legitimate influence.



The argument that power should not be given to the Legislative Councils on the ground that they might exercise it unreasonably proves either too little or too much. If it is to be supposed that they would paralyse executive administration, it is equally possible to suppose that they might combine to vote against Government with regard to any necessary piece of legislation. Until it has been proved that the majority of the Council will ever pass any measure which is embarrassing or paralysing to the administration, we have no right to assume that they will do so. On the other hand, I think we will be right in assuming that when and if so many divergent or contrary interests combine, in passing any resolution they are probably in the right, and the official view to the contrary is wrong. We have had legislative councils containing elected members for more than 20 years. It would be a strong argument in favour of not giving any constitutional powers to these legislative councils, if the opponents of reform in that direction were able to pick out even a few resolutions in any of the Legislative Councils in India brought forward by elected members which, if passed, would have proved embarrassing to the executive government. I do not think they will be able to do so. Nor do I think that it is possible to refer to any motion by any of the elected members—not class representatives—which is against the interests of the masses. Nor will it be found that they have opposed any step for that purpose taken by the government. On the other hand on various occasions the elected members have been almost fruitlessly pressing the grievances of the ryots and other landholders upon the Government. Sometimes the Government after opposing their proposals in the Legislative Councils have given effect to them on such widely different questions as finance and jail management. Even when convinced ourselves that the non-official members were wrong in respect of the proposals which they put forward, we have afterwards, at the earnest importunities of some of them, appointed commissions to inquire into the facts alleged, found that their allegations were true and our contentions unsustainable. Motions have been brought forward by elected members before the Legislative Councils which if accepted would have prevented rioting and blood-shed which subsequently occurred, and those resolutions were, in fact, given effect to subsequently. Experience therefore justifies the conclusion that there is no reason to apprehend that the councils will exercise their powers unwisely. Indian Civil Servants of very long experience, governors of Provinces, Members of Parliament, whose voice is listened to with respect, have both publicly and in private testified to the capacity, moderation and wisdom of the Indian leaders. There is no reason to suppose that they will, in future, develop qualities of a different nature.

With all respect to my colleagues I am unable to accept the reasons given in the despatch against the grant of any financial or administrative control. What is put forward as the strongest reason that the elected members are not representatives "in the truest sense" may apply, if at all, to the councils elected under the regulations now in force and for which we ourselves are responsible, but not to the councils to be constituted under our present proposals. If the latter are not sufficiently representative it is our duty to make them so. It is not a fair argument to put forward this ground when we ourselves refuse to take such steps as might be necessary and as are in our power to fulfil the conditions requisite to the grant of control. Moreover, in my opinion, experience has shown that this argument is not valid. The argument based on the want of "a sense of administrative responsibility" ignores the distinction between legislation and administration; the want of Political training, the only other reason given, can be supplied only by the exercise of political powers. The real reason for withholding such control is what is implied in the statement that the councils should not be allowed to develop into 'quasi parliaments', i.e., a distrust of representative institutions. It is unnecessary for me to say that I entirely differ from this view.

I think for these reasons it is essential that the constitutional powers of Legislative Councils should be enlarged.

Every resolution in the Legislative Council may be subject to the Governor's veto. If that safeguard is not enough, and further checks are required it may be provided that so far as the existing services are concerned, it would not be open

to the Legislative Council to interfere with their pay or emoluments ; as for any increase in such pay or emoluments, the sanction of the Council should be necessary. It appears to be indispensable that with reference to certain heads like Abkari, Forests, Salt, Education, Local Self-Government, etc., the Legislative Councils should have absolute powers of control, and I can imagine no conceivable case in which they can do any material harm by the exercise of such powers and in particular when they are subject to the Governor's power of veto. On the other hand, the refusal of such powers, even in such instances which do not concern the peace and security of the country, will intensify the feeling of discontent.

PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

16. It is quite as necessary that the Indian element in the Executive Council should be equal to the European element. As we are unanimous on this point I would not make any further observations.

GOVERNORS.—HEADS OF PROVINCES.

17. In my opinion, it is desirable that the head of a province should be a Governor appointed directly from England. In all questions arising between the officials and the Indians he might be expected to be impartial, whereas a Lieutenant Governor belonging to the same school of thought as the local officials will be inclined perhaps unconsciously to take the same view as the latter. Even if his conclusion is right, it is likely to be attributed to bias or class interest. The Legislative Councils will feel, in the case of a Governor, that their view is impartially considered and when overruled that the veto was due to an honest difference of opinion by an impartial mind. In the despatch the necessity of political training for Indians to be admitted into the government of the country is justly insisted upon. The argument applies with greater force to the case of a Governor, and there can be no comparison between the political training of a person appointed from England and of a person who has spent all his life in India amid unfavourable surroundings. A Lieutenant Governor is likely to have his likes and dislikes on account of his long residence in the country. The chiefs and also the aristocracy prefer a person appointed direct from England and preferably a Nobleman to one whom they have known in the lower ranks of the service. In the case of the head of a province, it is not so much knowledge that is required as capacity to form a sound judgment. All the materials necessary for him to form a right conclusion will be available to him. For analogy, we may refer to Chief Justices appointed from England, who are quite competent to form sound conclusions if cases are properly placed before them. It is, moreover the fact that the people, as a whole, prefer a Governor appointed from England to a Lieutenant Governor appointed in India.

EXECUTIVE COUNCILS IN ALL PROVINCES.

18. I am also of opinion, for similar reasons, that in all the provinces, except perhaps the frontier province, we ought to have executive councils. It is practically impossible for one man properly to carry on the government of a province consisting of millions of inhabitants. Where there are no councils the Secretaries, in effect, exercise the powers which elsewhere are exercised by the Members and it is not denied that in the Punjab, United Provinces and Central Provinces there are men quite as competent as in the other provinces to be made councillors. There is no objection except what is based on financial considerations suggested against their appointment as councillors. In my opinion this objection has not much force. Unlike the autocracy of a Lieutenant Governor a Council Government conduces to independence of spirit among the people and prevents personal dislike of the head of the Government when it exists from degenerating into ill-will against the Government itself.

PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY.

19. I cannot leave the question of the provincial governments, without referring to the question of provincial autonomy. According to the Delhi Despatch, it

was intended "gradually to give the provinces a larger measure of self-government" that they might be "autonomous in all provincial affairs." The object of it was to satisfy "the just demands of Indians for a larger share in the government of the country." The devolution of powers, therefore, by the central government must be accompanied with larger powers to Indians. I am unable to accept any interpretation other than that supported by the words which I have quoted above (see paragraph 3 of the Despatch). The question of provincial autonomy was not dealt with by Lord Hardinge's Government for the first time. It was advocated by the late John Bright and it underlay the proposals of Lord Mayo's decentralization scheme. Most of the questions that I have referred to can be dealt with by the local Governments.

III.

IMPERIAL COUNCILS.

20. In considering any proposals about the Imperial, Executive and Legislative Councils, it must be borne in mind that the duty of governing India is really vested in the Secretary of State (see, in particular, sections 2, 20 and 21 of the Government of India Act, 1915), and the Government of India are in every respect under his control. The Secretary of State has to defend every measure relating to India in Parliament, and he is accountable to Parliament. Reasons of policy which had their origin in the inadvisability of entrusting a foreign bureaucracy with absolute control over the people of the country apparently account for this. It also shows that any relaxation of his authority must be in favour only of the people of the country when they become fit to exercise such powers. It is surely desirable, under these circumstances, that the Secretary of State also along with the Viceroy and the Executive Council must, not only for arriving at sound conclusions, on the various questions that come before them but also for testing Indian political capacity be kept well informed of the popular opinion on any proposed measure. For this purpose neither the Executive nor the Legislative Councils are properly constituted.

IMPERIAL EXECUTIVE COUNCIL.

21. An Indian is brought up in a different environment from an European. He looks at questions from a very different stand point, and on many important questions he is likely to take very different views from his colleagues; there are wide and various differences amongst Indians themselves. It is surely reasonable, therefore, under these circumstances, that there should be at least more than one Indian Member in the Executive Council. Two Indian Members if possible belonging to different communities, and belonging to different schools of thought, would be able to represent Indian opinion in the Executive Council and to the Secretary of State far more effectively than one Indian Member and his English Colleagues. However much the latter might try to ascertain Indian views, channels of information available to the Indian Member are not open to them; nor can they enter into Indian feelings and thoughts in the same intimate manner. I, therefore, venture to suggest the addition of another member to the Executive Council. The fact that there is no majority in the Viceroy's Legislative Council of elected members strengthens the plea for the creation of an influential Indian element in the Executive Council. It is obviously necessary that a Member should have the right—not only when he writes a minute of dissent to a despatch but in every instance—to place his views before the Secretary of State of course through the Viceroy. Not only should there be at least two Members, but it is necessary also that there should be Indians in every Department to place before the Viceroy and the other members, if necessary, the Indian point of view on every question. Ordinarily a member is concerned only with the administration of his own department, and he deals with other questions some of them of the greatest importance ordinarily dealt with in another department only when and if they are referred to the Council for consideration by the Viceroy. The power to call for records is of no use when he is not aware of their nature. The reasons which

induce the Members of Government to accept the proposals finally adopted are fully given in the notes recorded by them in circulation and not always in the Despatch to the Secretary of State. Those notes are not forwarded with the Despatch. It would be well, in these circumstances, that there should be an Indian in every Department whether as Member, Secretary, or adviser to lay before the Viceroy, or the Secretary of State all the arguments from the Indian point of view which may have a bearing on the question for decision.

IMPERIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL.

22. A consideration of the present constitution will prove clearly that the general community, or the masses, as opposed to the classes and special interests, have no effective or indeed any representation in the Imperial Legislative Council. Having regard to the fact that the elected members now entirely, and even after any reconstitution of the local councils would, mainly, consist of representatives of classes and interests, —though direct representation to some extent at least is very desirable—I think we can safely increase this number so as to constitute them a moiety of the council. It would be noticed that this moiety will include European members who may be counted as officials for this purpose and, considering the divergence of interests represented by these members, there is scarcely any possibility of a combination against the Government. The nominated officials should be free to speak and vote as they like in all but exceptional instances. If on account of the official additional members or the European members voting with the elected members a majority is secured, in the case of any particular resolution, it is very probable that the Government in that case is wrong, and it would be open, even in that case, for the Viceroy or the Secretary of State to veto the resolution, if necessary. I do not think there can be any harm therefore in making these small changes which seem to me to be not open to the objections advanced in the Despatch.

23. I recognise that all questions relating to the Army, Navy, and generally to the defence of India, should be decided finally by England, and that the charges to be paid by India should also be settled by England. This, however, makes it very necessary that no decision should be arrived at except after a full and impartial consideration of the Indian claims. The Indians now consider that the charges levied from India are unduly heavy and, in some instances, extortionate. They are settled in a manner that does not command the confidence of the people. My proposals, if carried out, will ensure a comparatively fair hearing and full consideration. The opinion of the members of the Legislative Council, both officials and non-officials being absolutely free to speak and vote as they like, must necessarily carry great weight. Similarly any protest raised by the Indian members of the Executive Council when they agree with the Legislative Council is bound to receive full consideration at the hands of the Secretary of State. Many of the Viceroys have noticed that the Secretary of State is often powerless against the English Treasury but it would be more difficult for the latter to disregard the view of the Government of India when they are supported in this manner by the Legislative Councils.

There is another class of cases in which also India must leave the decision of the question to the Imperial Government. Where in any particular instance the latter has determined upon a certain line of policy to be followed by the Empire as beneficial to the interests of the Empire as a whole, India should be bound to accept that policy though it might be detrimental to her own interests. In those cases also and for the same reasons India's claims must be fully considered; and I think such hearing will be ensured by some scheme similar to what I have set forth.

There are questions relating to expenditure and taxation which do not concern England and with reference to which the Government of India take the *same view* as the people of India. Now if we have a Council of the kind suggested of officials and non-official elected members expressing freely their opinions; if any question is in addition pressed upon the attention of the Secretary of State by the members of the Executive Council and by the Indian members in particular, it may well be that the interference of the Secretary of State would become very rare.

In the innumerable cases in which Indian or European opinion differs from the Government of India, it is surely desirable that the Legislative Councils should be able to speak with a voice which will command the respect of the Government and the Secretary of State. It may well be doubted whether the Bengal Partition Act would have become law if such a free Legislative Council as I have suggested and two Indian Executive Council Members of different schools of thought had existed then to warn the Viceroy and the Secretary of State of the strength of Indian feeling and opinion and the unfortunate consequences that were certain to follow. In varying degrees the same argument applies to all cases in which there is marked difference between Indian and official opinion. When such difference of opinion arises on a question where the interests of the people and the Services are in apparent conflict, it would be very valuable to elicit the opinion of a properly constituted Legislative Council. Any attempts to avoid the expression of such opinion will be regarded as a confession that the official view will not bear scrutiny—and this will tend to enhance the official unpopularity. In the numerous cases in which the Indians believe that the interests of India are sacrificed to the interests of England or any class in England, it must be very valuable to have the opinion of a free and properly constituted Legislative Council and of Indian representatives in the Imperial Executive Council. The protest of a legislative council, as now constituted, may be brushed aside as not representative of the true feelings of the people. The protest of their own countrymen who compose the executive council cannot carry the matter very much further. It is only strong Indian protest backed up by official concurrence which will awaken England to the dangers of a policy which will alienate Indian opinion from her.

The necessity becomes equally apparent when we have regard to financial questions. I shall not recapitulate the reasons which I have already put forward when discussing the same question with reference to the Provincial Legislative Councils. Indian opinion is not well put forward before the Government of India and the Secretary of State and will never be without better representation in both the executive departments and the Legislative Councils. The protection afforded to Indian interests by the Financial Department though important is inadequate. It is only the tax-payer representatives who can sufficiently check the growth of unnecessary expenditure. Moreover official opinion in the Legislative Council itself may not be united and the Legislative Councils as enlarged with increased Indian representation might reasonably be expected to lead to economy, retrenchment and reform.

There seems to be scarcely any doubt that India's interests are sure to be affected by the reconstruction of the Empire after the war. It is therefore very desirable that India should be able to make her own voice heard. This can be done only by increasing the Indian element in the Imperial Executive Council and the Indian elected representatives in the Imperial Legislative Council.

I am aware it will be said that the logical consequence of my arguments requires that the elected members of the Imperial Legislative Council should form the majority and that there must be more than two Indians in the Executive Council. This may be so ; but I would wait and watch the course of events. It is for many reasons desirable to proceed slowly and after realizing the consequences of every forward step.

VOLUNTEERING, ETC.

24. The only other questions that I propose to refer to are those about volunteering and about the admission of Indians to the higher ranks in the army. I think there should be a clear promise in any pronouncement after the war about the admission of Indians into the higher ranks. About volunteering, with all respect to my colleagues, I must say that the reasons given in the despatch for not conceding at present their claims do not seem to me to be satisfactory. The claim of the whole country for volunteering must not be confused with the claim of certain races now excluded to be allowed to enlist in the army. When it is said that the Indians are not debarred from defending their country because they are admitted into the regular army it is ignoring the distinction between the rights or duties of a

citizen volunteer and the obligations of a common soldier in the regular army. The two matters are entirely different. If a general assurance is given that the Indians will have their due share in the defence of their country, *i.e.*, by being enlisted in the regular army as the despatch recommends it will be treated by the country as a refusal to admit the prayer for volunteering, which to me seems a matter of regret. It is said that there are certain proposals according to which the volunteer corps might disappear. They are not yet before the Government of India so far as I know, and it does not appear that these proposals have yet assumed a form which would justify us in postponing the consideration of this question. If any general assurance, as is suggested in the despatch, is to be given only after the war, it is obvious that there is sufficient time for us to make some definite proposal.

25. Again, in view of certain recent events, I think it necessary to emphasise the attitude of India that she will view with alarm and dismay any control of her affairs or policy by the Dominions unless her own elected representatives are also members of the Imperial Assembly which contain the Dominion representatives. Indian representation, desirable even otherwise, is indispensable in case of Dominion representation. If this is granted, India would welcome the opportunity for co-operation with the Dominion representatives.

26. While I entirely agree with what is said in the despatch about the necessity of accelerating the rate of progress in Local Self-Government, I cannot help giving expression to my doubts, due to our past experience, whether our despatch will have any greater effect than the declarations of policy by Lord Ripon or Lord Morley. Sound principles promulgated by one class for the benefit of another when they prejudicially affect the former are almost always wanting in what Burke calls the "executive principle." If we leave it to the local Governments to disregard these principles with only the obligation to state their reasons, years hence our successors will, I am afraid, be under the same necessity in which we are placed of impressing upon the local Governments the necessity of carrying out the principles formulated by Lord Ripon. Our despatch is also likely to be misunderstood as opening a door to the creation of more appointments for the exercise of Government patronage.

27. In conclusion I must express my regret that this note has run to such a length. But the questions involved are so important and the occasion so momentous that I feel I should not have done my duty either to the Government or to the Country if I did not place on record what I consider to be the Indian point of view, as fully and as clearly as lies in my power.

DELHI;

24th November 1916. }

C. SANKARAN NAIR.

APPENDIX I.

MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY TO HEADS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS.

General Principles which should be observed in the Development of Local Self-Government.

The first and foremost principle, which was enunciated in Lord Ripon's Self-Government Resolution of May 1882, and was not long ago emphasised by Lord Morley, is that the object of local self-government is to train the people in the management of their own local affairs, and that political education of this sort must take precedence of mere considerations of departmental efficiency.

Paragraph 33 of Lord Morley's Despatch of 27th November 1908, No. 193-Public and Paragraphs 4 and 5 of Lord Crewe's Despatch No. 83 of 11th July 1913.

2. It follows from this that local bodies must be as representative as possible of the people whose affairs they are called on to administer; that their control over the matters entrusted to them shall be real and not nominal; and that they must not be kept in leading strings, but must learn by making mistakes and profiting by them. Government interference should therefore be reduced as far as possible.

3. In considering the general steps desirable to give effect to these main needs it will be convenient to take as a basis the most important recommendations of the Decentralization Commission, which were examined, and for the most part endorsed, by the Government of India Resolution on local self-government policy of 28th April 1915. (The framers of that Resolution usually saw the right path to follow; but they were often content to let the local governments travel by it or not as these thought fit.)

4. The Decentralization Commission proposed that municipal boards or councils, and rural boards—district and sub-district—should ordinarily have a substantial elected majority, nominated members being limited to a number sufficient to provide for the due representation of minorities and official experience. In paragraph 6 of the Self-Government Resolution* the Government of India approved this policy as regards the municipalities, subject to the proviso that, where its success might be doubtful, it should be introduced gradually. As regards rural boards, they merely observed (paragraph 27) that local governments in general were in sympathy with the commission's proposal. We think that, as a general principle, the commission's proposals should be accepted and pressed upon the local governments, with the corollary that the franchise should be sufficiently low to obtain constituencies which will be really representative of the body of the rate-payers. We recognize that a full elective system analogous to that which obtains in the West cannot be immediately or universally applied, but we regard it as the end to be kept in view and worked up to. And as regards the special representation of minorities, where this is necessary, we should prefer, when that is possible, that this should be by some system of communal or proportional representation rather than by nomination. As regards the special representation of official experience, we consider that this might often be adequately attained by the nomination to the board of men possessed of such experience for purposes of advice and discussion, but without the right of vote.

5. The commission desired that the municipal chairman should ordinarily be an elected non-official, that Government officers should not be allowed to stand for election, and that if a nominated chairman was required, an official should be selected. The Government of India (paragraph 8 of the S.-G. Resolution) accepted this, subject to the following qualifications:—

- (a) In the special cases in which it is necessary to nominate the chairman (election being the ordinary method) discretion should be reserved to local governments to nominate non-officials as well as officials.

* Hereafter referred to, for brevity, as the S.-G. Resolution.

- (b) Boards should not be absolutely prohibited from electing officials, though the election of an official should be a special matter requiring confirmation by the Commissioner or some higher authority.

We can accept these provisos on the understanding, as regards (b), that the election is by non-official members.

6. The commission, however, indicated that in the larger cities it would be desirable to adopt the practice which has worked with success in the city of Bombay, where, in order that the large amount of everyday administration necessary should be efficiently carried on, this is placed under the control of a special nominated commissioner, who is however subject to the general control of the corporation and of its standing committee. This proposal (commended in paragraph 9 of the S.-G. Resolution) is a sound one. So long, however, as the executive officer of a city is protected from the possible caprices of a council or board by provisos requiring that, though his nomination may be by the board, his appointment should be approved by Government, and that he should not be removed without the sanction of the Government—unless, say, by a three-quarters vote of the board—it will not be necessary to require that he should be a Government official. Competent men might be obtained who have not been, or who no longer are, in Government service.

7. As regards rural boards, the commission found that in practice the Collector was nearly always the president of the district board, either *ex-officio* or by nomination, or by election, and that sub-district boards were also as a rule presided over by official subordinates of the Collector. For the reasons given in paragraphs 795-7 of their Report, the commission held that it was desirable that the presidency of rural boards should continue to vest in the Collector and his assistants, but they added that the vice-presidents should be elected non-officials.

The Government of India in paragraph 28 of the S.-G. Resolution accepted the view of the commission above cited, with which they said that all local governments were in agreement. (This appears to have been an error so far as the Central Provinces were concerned.) They added, however, that they would have no objection to non-official chairmen being retained where they already existed, or freshly appointed where a local government or administration desired to make the experiment. Statistics which have been compiled in the Education Department show that at present out of 191 district boards, only 13 have non-official presidents (elected), all but one of these being in the Central Provinces and the remaining one in Bihar. As regards sub-district boards, out of a total of 525 the chairmanship of 41 (mostly in Bengal) is held by elected non-officials, and of 20 (nearly all in Madras) by nominated non-officials. In Madras this is a recent departure, since, when the commission sat, the sub-divisional officer was universally the sub-district board president. It appears too that the Bombay Government now propose, as an experiment, to have non-official presidents on some of their district boards.

8. The circumstances of district boards and of large sub-divisional boards, such as those in Madras, are of course materially different from those of municipalities, since they need much more time and widely extended travelling on the part of the head of the board if the work is to be done at all properly. We would therefore not compel any province which desired to act on the views of the Decentralization Commission on this subject to depart from them; but* the provinces might well be urged to start, wherever possible, the experiment of non-official, and preferably elected, presidents or chairmen. In that case, however, we think it is essential in regard to district boards, and sub-district boards which deal with large areas, that, as in the case of large cities, the ordinary official work should be largely in the hands of a special executive officer whose appointment should require the approval of Government and who should not be removable in ordinary circumstances without Government sanction. Also if such a board, wishing to save the expense of a special officer, or desirous of remaining under the presidency of the Collector or of one of his assistants, should wish to elect such an official, we think that, as it will

* This passage might have been better worded thus :—

“but the Provinces might well be urged to appoint, wherever possible, non-official, and preferably, elected presidents or chairmen.”

ordinarily contain a substantial elected majority, its wishes might be acceded to, subject to the condition we have indicated in the case of municipalities (paragraph 5).

9. The commission were of opinion that municipalities should have full liberty to impose or alter taxation within the limits laid down by the municipal laws, but that the sanction of an outside authority to any increase in taxation should be required where the law did not prescribe a maximum rate. The Government of India, in paragraph 17 of the S.-G. Resolution, expressed general sympathy with the commission's recommendations. They thought, however, (1) that power to vary any tax might be reserved by such local governments as are unable to accept in full the recommendations of the commission, and (2) that in the case of indebted municipalities the previous sanction of higher authorities should be required to any alteration of taxation.

The first of these provisos practically renders the general principle nugatory, as it enables a local government to decline to act upon it, and we think this should now be given up in the case of boards which contain substantial elected majorities. The second is, of course, sound in cases where the Government has lent money to a municipality, or guaranteed repayment of its loans; and in that case its sanction should obviously be required to any alteration of taxation which might reduce the municipality's resources. Subject to this proviso, we think it is most important that municipal boards should be allowed to vary taxation as proposed by the commission. If they pile on the rates too much, their constituencies can call them to account, provided that, as we consider essential, the constituencies are so organised as to be really representative of the body of the rate-payers. Moreover, there will be the power of intervention to which we refer in paragraph 17, in cases of grave abuse.

10. The bulk of the income of rural boards is derived from a cess levied upon agricultural land over and above the land revenue, with which it is collected, and not usually exceeding one anna in the rupee ($6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.) on the annual rent value or on the land revenue, according to the circumstances of the province. Since 1905 this income has been specially supplemented by a Government subsidy, amounting in the aggregate to 25 per cent of the cess receipts.

Subject to an exception in regard to railway construction, referred to in paragraph 31 of the S.-G. Resolution, and which has been accepted, the Decentralization Commission held that district boards should not be empowered to raise the land cess beyond the above mentioned limit, for the reasons set out in paragraph 774 of their report.

In paragraph 30 of the S.-G. Resolution the Government of India observed that "under present conditions any proposal to raise the limit imposed by the existing law would require the previous sanction of the Government of India. Such proposals would need the most careful consideration on the merits, and the Government of India do not consider it necessary for the present to make any pronouncement on the subject." Under the general principle indicated in respect of municipalities, this reservation may be accepted as regards alteration of the existing law, but once that law has been altered, district boards should be empowered, as in the analogous case of municipalities, to raise the land cess to the full limit which the new law allows. It may be observed that the commission's recommendation that district and rural boards should enjoy the full amount of the land cess has now been acted up to—*vide* paragraph 21 of the S.-G. Resolution.

11. The commission proposed that, if a municipal or rural board has to pay for a service, it should control it, and that where it is expedient that the control should be largely in the hands of Government, the service should be a provincial one. "The Government of India, while not prepared to accept the proposal in full, have approved it in a somewhat modified form.* They consider that charges should be remitted in cases where a local body contributes to Govern-

* Paragraph 19 of S.-G. Resolution.

ment for services inherent in the duty of supervision and control by Government officers, or for services which cannot be expediently performed except by Government agency. For example, Government may properly cease to charge for clerical establishments in the offices of supervision and control, or for the collection of district cesses which it is clearly expedient to realise along with Government revenue." We might in this respect well go the whole way with the commission in accordance with the general principle that, if local bodies have to raise funds for any particular object, they should have the control of these. If a board is to provide, for instance, for civil works or medical relief it ought to have real control, subject to such general principles as the Government may prescribe, but should not be under the constant dictation of Government Departments in matters of detail.

12. We similarly endorse the recommendation in paragraph 778 and paragraph 834 of the commission's report that the system of requiring local bodies to devote fixed portions of their revenues to particular objects of expenditure should be done away with as unduly limiting their freedom of action—subject, as indicated by the commission, to outside intervention in cases of grave neglect or misfeasance—*vide* paragraph 17 *infra*. Of course, if the Government give a grant for a particular object, the money must be applied thereto, but we endorse the commission's recommendation in paragraph 837 of their report that grants-in-aid should normally take the form of a lump grant, or a percentage contribution towards specific services, rather than more definitely earmarked. If again funds have been raised locally for particular objects, they must necessarily be applied to such objects.

13. "Commenting on the minute control exercised in some provinces over municipal finance, the commission recommended that municipalities should have a free hand with regard to their budgets; the only check required should, they thought, be the maintenance of a minimum standing balance to be prescribed by the local government. They acknowledged that relaxed control might lead to mistakes and mismanagement, but they were of opinion that municipal bodies could attain adequate financial responsibility only by the exercise of such powers and by having to bear the consequence of their errors. Further checks would be provided by the control which local governments would exercise over loans, and by the power which should be reserved to compel a municipality to discharge its duties in case of default." The Government of India, in noticing exceptions suggested by various local governments, said that they would accept these reservations for the present, but they nevertheless regarded the recommendations of the commission as expressing a policy to be steadily kept in view and gradually realised, and we desire to press for its full realisation as soon as possible.

A similar recommendation was made by the commission in respect of rural boards, and the Government of India considered that the present restrictions on the powers of the boards with regard generally to budget expenditure should be gradually relaxed with due regard to local conditions and requirements. Here, again, we should press for the policy of the commission, subject only (as in regard to municipalities) to control, in the case of rural boards which are indebted to Government.

14. The commission proposed that the existing restrictions on municipalities, which require outside sanction for works estimated to cost more than a certain amount, should be removed, but that Government should scrutinise and sanction estimates of projects to be carried out from loan funds. The Government of India observed that "the majority of the local governments are prepared to relax the existing rules in the direction of giving more freedom to municipal boards. The Government of India are in favour of extended freedom subject, where necessary, to proper precautions against extravagant and ill-considered projects." Here, again, what is necessary is to press for relaxation of unnecessary control and not to make it a matter of local option.

15. The commission made a similar recommendation in respect of rural boards, on which it was remarked, in paragraph 34 of the S.-G. Resolution, that "in the opinion of the Government of India, which has the general support of local governments, the grant to rural boards of full powers in the allotment of funds and the passing of estimates cannot, for the present at least, be conceded, but the extent of the necessary financial control might depend in the case of rural boards on the competence of the staff employed, and where this varies, it would not be desirable to lay down hard and fast rules for the whole province." We should now go beyond this vague pronouncement, and ask for definite indication that, allowing for the necessarily different circumstances of different rural boards, there will be a material advance in the direction of the commission's proposal.

16. "It was recommended by the commission that the degree of outside

Paragraph 23 of S.-G. Resolution.

control over municipal establishments should be relaxed, that the appointment of municipal secretaries, or other chief executive officers, of engineers and health officers, where these exist, should require the sanction of the local government in the case of cities, and of the Commissioner elsewhere, and that the same sanction should be required for any alteration in the emoluments of these posts, and for the appointment and dismissal of the occupants. As regards other appointments, they proposed that the local governments should lay down for municipal boards general rules in respect to such matters as leave, acting and travelling allowances, pensions or provident funds and maximum salaries, and that their sanction should be required for any deviation therefrom. Almost all local governments (it is said in the S.-G. Resolution) have expressed general approval 'of the commission's ideas'—and these should now be emphasised with a view to their being worked up to.

The same applies to the establishments of rural boards, in respect of

Paragraph 35 of S.-G. Resolution.

which the commission made similar recommendations, and the Government of India came to the same conclusion.

17. As regards outside control, "the commission thought that the

Paragraph 24 of S.-G. Resolution, and paragraphs 802-3 and 860-61 of Commission's Report.

Collector should retain certain powers, given under the existing Acts, *e.g.*, the power to suspend in certain cases the operation of municipal resolutions, and that the commissioner should be able to require a municipality which had neglected a particular service to take such action as he may consider necessary. The local governments generally and the Government of India are of opinion that special powers of outside control are necessary and should continue."

Paragraph 36 of S.-G. Resolution.

The commission also recommended that the special powers of control over rural boards vested in outside authorities under the existing Acts should continue, and local governments in general and the Government of India accepted this view.

We must certainly maintain such ultimate powers of intervention, which are in no way peculiar to India, and which carry out the view expressed in paragraph 17 of the Ripon Resolution of 17th May 1882, that the control of Government over local bodies should be exercised from without rather than from within. But as has been remarked at the outset, the general principle should be to let local bodies make mistakes and learn by them, and not to interfere except in cases of really grave mismanagement. Another safeguard, which would in many cases prevent penal action from outside, would be the power, to be exercised by Government, of dissolving a municipal council or rural board and requiring fresh election.

18. There are a variety of other matters on which the commission made recommendations, but we do not think that it is necessary to discuss these here as general principles. For instance, we need not dogmatise on the methods by which municipal revenues should be raised; on the precise distribution of duties between local bodies and the Government; or on the areas and powers of sub-district boards, and the division of functions between these and the district boards, and so forth. These are all matters, which, though important

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in themselves, do not admit of uniform treatment, and may well be left to the local governments.

As regards education again, we have just addressed the Secretary of State as to the proper functions of local bodies in respect of this most important matter.

19. Nor does it seem necessary to lay down any general principles in regard to embryonic municipalities whether these be styled notified areas, or village unions as in Madras, or town *panchayats*, as the Decentralization Commission suggested. Many of the bodies dealing with these areas will in due course develop into municipal councils, but until they are fit for this stage, they must obviously be subject to greater control and be less non-official in character. It might often be desirable, for instance, that the chairman should be a non-official. Their development may be left to local governments, subject merely to the general instruction that they should be allowed as full discretion as is possible, and that their powers should be gradually enhanced.

20. As regards *village panchayats*, the crucial point is that the Decentralization Commission, in their proposals in this respect, were not contemplating an additional machine for the promotion of local self-government in the sense used in Lord Ripon's Resolutions and subsequently; but desired to develop the corporate life of the individual villages and to give the villagers an interest in, and some control over, local village affairs. Consequently they made a clear distinction between the *panchayat* organisation they recommended and artificial union agglomerations such as those referred to in paragraph 698 of their report. The latter may be quite useful as an adjunct to local self-government in Lord Ripon's sense of the term by affording smaller administrative areas in that connection than those administered by, say, *taluk* boards, but this has really nothing to do with the development of individual village corporate life. See in this connection the following sentence from paragraph 699 of the report—"The common traditions of the village, the fact that its inhabitants are largely connected by ties of blood and caste and by many interests in common and the measure of corporate life still existing in the Indian villages, which is shown occasionally by voluntary taxation for special purposes, warrant action of this description,"—*i.e.*, that subsequently proposed by the commission. We think that this is a sound distinction, and that, in dealing with the principles governing general proposals in respect of *panchayats*, we should confine ourselves, like the commission, either to individual villages or to villages which are so closely connected that their people habitually act together.

21. The commission recognised, however, most clearly (paragraph 701 of report) that the different character of the villages not merely in different provinces but in single provinces and even within parts of these would require the *panchayat* policy to be taken up cautiously and gradually, and that we would emphasise. At the same time it is essential that some effort should be made in this direction. Similarly, while the commission indicated certain general functions and powers which might be allotted to *panchayats*, they were careful to explain (paragraph 707) that there should be no question of devolving these on any uniform system. As they said, functions must be gradually and cautiously assigned, and they must vary with the circumstances of the locality and with the manner in which the *panchayat* discharges the duties first placed upon it. The general functions proposed, subject to this caution, are summarised in paragraph 37 of the S.-G. Resolution, which also indicates the extent to which the local governments were willing to accept them, while in paragraph 39 the Government of India were content to leave the matter in the hands of local governments and administrations, indicating only certain general principles in which they thought that advance was most likely to be successful.

22. As regards these general principles, we would modify paragraph 39 (1) by saying that the area should normally be the village unless, as above stated, villages are so closely connected that they may be treated as one; and we should omit paragraph 39 (7) on the ground that at the present stage it is not

desirable to make any rigid classification of the connection of *panchayats* with other administrative bodies, from which indeed they should be kept apart as much as possible, while the way in which they do their work should be tested by inspections by the administrative district staff. Also at the outset, such control as is necessary in the way of replacing incompetent *panchayats* or *panchayat-dars* should be exercised by the local revenue officers, provided these be of higher grade than that of *tahsildar*.

23. As regards constitution, the points to which we attach most importance are the association of the principal village officers whether they be hereditary headmen and accountants or, as in the north of India, *lambardars* with the *panchayats*, and an informal election of other members by the villagers themselves. We would, however, let the *panchayat* choose its own president; he need not necessarily be the village headman, as suggested in paragraph 704 of the Decentralization Commission's Report. Of the possible functions, the most important are to our mind, village sanitation, village education, in the directions indicated in paragraph 712 of the Decentralization Commission's Report; and jurisdiction in petty civil and criminal cases. For the last matter, however, it is most desirable that the *panchayat* should be as a rule a body representing a single village, otherwise you will lose the great safeguard for proper disposal of such cases, *viz.*, local public opinion. It should also be permissible—though not, as the commission suggested in paragraph 719 (1) of their report, universally necessary—that the *panchayat* should receive some portion of the land cess raised in their villages. Further, we are prepared, differing from the Decentralization Commission in this respect (paragraph 718 of the Report), to allow them voluntary powers of supplementary taxation, the proceeds of which would be devoted to the special purpose or purposes for which the tax was levied.

24. The legislation required to call these *panchayats* into existence should be as simple and elastic as possible, the fullest scope for details being left to rules, which will be gradually evolved and be improved by experience.

25. We recognise the impossibility of any universal enforcement of a *panchayat* system, by reason of the different circumstances prevailing in different tracts, in some of which indeed there are no regular villages at all. It is essential, however, that an effective beginning should be made where possible, and if the Government of Burma (see paragraph 37 of the self-government resolution), or that of any other province where there is still some real village life, thinks that these recommendations are unsuited to its local circumstances it will be open to it to put forward alternative proposals.

26. Nor do we in any way wish to prevent the establishment of "unions" or "circles" for local self-government purposes. As observed in paragraph 20 *supra*, these may be a very useful adjunct to district and sub-district boards, relieving them of duties which can be better discharged by committees dealing with smaller areas. Such bodies would be specially useful and desirable in tracts in which it is found impossible or premature to establish a *village-panchayat* system.

APPENDIX II.

STATEMENT RELATING TO PROVINCIAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCILS.

This appendix is concerned with the constitution of the (additional) members only. The number of *ex-officio* members varies according to the system of government. It includes the head of the province, the members of the executive council, and in Madras and Bombay, the Advocate General. In the provinces where there is no council government, the head of the province is the only *ex-officio* member.

2. The table at the end of the appendix shows the constitution of the various provincial legislative councils : their statutory maxima : their actual numbers at present : the present proportion of elected members in the councils : the number of elective constituencies ; and the average number of voters in those elective constituencies which consist of (a) landholders, (b) municipalities, (c) local boards and (d) Muhammadan electors.

3. Under the head *special constituencies* are included :—

- (a) Universities (5).
- (b) Chambers of commerce (9).
- (c) Trades associations (4).
- (d) Planting communities (6).
- (e) Port Commissioners (1).
- (f) Mining community (1).

Of these the smallest constituency is that of the Port Commissioners, Chittagong (9). Besides this there are about 15 special constituencies of less than 100, and the remainder are over 100. The largest is the Bengal tea planting community (219). These special constituencies are from their nature limited, and, with the exception of the universities and the Port Commissioners of Chittagong, are designed to obtain representation upon the councils of certain trading and industrial interests which have already formed representative bodies of their own in the shape of chambers or associations. They thus form ready made constituencies which ensure that the persons returned to the councils are truly representative of the interests concerned.

4. There are only two electorates, the Muhammadan electorates in Bombay and Bengal, where the average number of voters exceeds 1,000. In all the other electorates there is only one instance (landholders in Madras) where the number of voters averages over 500. The municipal and local board constituencies in Bombay and the United Provinces are particularly small.

Over the whole of India, there are some 33,000 voters on the general constituencies electing to 120 seats. Of these a little under 16,000 elect to 21 Muhammadan seats, rather less than 7,000 voters return 25 landholder members, and the remainder, 74 seats belonging to the municipal and local board interests are filled by the suffrages of about 10,000 men.

ected members are returned.

Name of Province.	AVERAGE NUMBER OF VOTERS PER CONSTITUENCY IN				
	Muhammadans.	Landowners' constituencies.	Municipal constituencies.	Local boards constituencies.	Muhammadan constituencies.
(1)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)
Madras	2	532	271		665
Bombay	4	363	66	49	1,273
Bengal	5	124	183	223	1,069
Bihar and Orissa	4	57	119	52	300
United Provinces	4	398	63		393
Punjab	Not known		...
Burma
Central Provinces	357	161	144	...
Assam	2	96	59	108	594

(a) The figures show the actual strength on 1st April 1916, with the exception of those which show the actual strength on 1st April 1916.

(d) Includes a Berar constituency the member for which is nominated to the council after election.

(e) Although three members from Berar are nominated to the Central Provinces Council, they are really elected members returned by constituencies in Berar, this device being adopted as Berar is not legally a part of British India.

APPENDIX III.

BEING EXTRACTS (PARAS. 9 TO 14) FROM A MEMORANDUM CIRCULATED TO HEADS OF LOCAL GOVERNMENTS BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE VICEROY.

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9. The present proposal therefore is to sweep away this complicated and anomalous system of class interests, based mainly on what are practically pocket boroughs, and to substitute large constituencies primarily based on recognised territorial units, such as districts, and with the franchise pitched sufficiently low to admit of considerable bodies of voters. Under this system the agricultural element would obtain its fair weight, while candidates would have to come into the open and be returned on their political views instead of by their energy in private canvassing. Under such a territorial system the largest cities, representing the distinctly urban areas, would of course have separate representation, and other municipalities can safely be left to make their weight felt in district or other territorial areas. As stated too in paragraph 7, special seats would still be reserved for universities, chambers of commerce and the like, while the question of special minority representation in respect of Mahomedans, &c., will be dealt with later on.

It may be pointed out in this connection that, even if the class system were continued, it would be necessary, in order to apply it properly and in view of the predominantly agricultural character of India, to give the largest share of the elected members to the landed interests, whose electors ought, it is considered, to represent not merely large landholders, but the most substantial of the actual cultivators. That being so, it would in itself be necessary to sub-divide the landed representation according to territorial areas, just as under the present system the representation of municipal and district boards is similarly sub-divided. Territorial representation is thus in no way a revolutionary departure. It is merely the fuller application of a system which already exists in the background.

10. It may be argued that under such a system much the same class of people would be returned as previously. The first elections might indeed produce this result, but as time went on the leaven of the new electors would work, and the result would be members who were much more fully representative of local interests and aspirations. Even if the same men were returned, they would have different classes of constituents to look to and would, as is the case with politicians elsewhere, shape their views and professions accordingly. But even if it were to happen that the same men would be returned, expounding the same ideas, at any rate it would be known that they voiced the opinions of large electorates instead of pocket-boroughs and the Government would have to adjust its appreciation of them accordingly. Lastly the territorial system would in time develop healthy rivalry and divergence among members returned by it, with reference to conflicting claims from various areas in respect of matters such as administrative improvement and economic development.

11. As regards franchise conditions, this is a matter which must necessarily be discussed with local governments, and the prescribed qualifications may, and probably must, vary in different provinces. But speaking broadly, any general constituency should be considered an unsatisfactorily small one which did not include about 3,000 voters. In the present circumstances of India, there must necessarily be a fairly high property test, but this should not be unduly restrictive. All persons, for instance, who pay income-tax, *i.e.*, who possess an income outside the land of at least Rs. 1,000 per annum, should certainly be included. People who get an analogous income from the land should also of course be admitted, as likewise men who could make up the prescribed limit, partly by their income from the land and partly from other sources.

Ordinarily the land revenue assessments would be a convenient franchise basis in the case of the agricultural population, but this would not be a fair

criterion in the case of constituencies which include big *zamindaris*, where there are a number of substantial landholders who have no direct revenue connection with the Government. While land revenue assessment would, *per se*, be an automatic test, there would seem to be no reason for preventing a man who does not pay it from showing that he nevertheless derives an analogous income from the land. Also, where the land revenue test is taken, it ought to be remembered that, while in *ryotwari* provinces the general theory is that the Government takes half the net profits from cultivation, in practice it takes considerably less than this, and that should be considered in fixing a property test corresponding to the payment of income-tax. Indeed, it would probably be just that the balance should be struck rather in favour of the Agriculturist, who has so much less opportunity of making his voice heard, and as already indicated (paragraph 9) measures should be adopted which would bring into the electorates men of the substantial *ryot* class.

12. It would also be desirable to supplement property qualifications by others. For instance, a liberal educational franchise should be allowed, going down, it may be, as far as persons who have passed a "vernacular final" and have thus obtained what may be considered a satisfactory middle-school education. Persons who have individually deserved well of the State as evidenced by the bestowal on them of titles, European and Indian, should also be admitted. Further, as regards the property qualifications, it should be borne in mind that in the case of a Government pensioner his existing pension represents roughly not more than half what he at one time got in Government service. Consequently, in the case of these people, one-half the property qualification exacted for others should be allowed.

13. The question has been raised as to whether Government officials should have votes in the council elections. The principle should of course be emphasised that a Government official should not present himself as a candidate or take any active part in an election, or in any way influence the voters, and this policy should be rigorously enforced. But it would be unreasonable to deny the official in his private capacity his ordinary rights as a citizen.

14. What the areas of the general constituencies proposed should be, would obviously be matters for the local governments to determine. But speaking generally, the districts would form the natural units, though small districts might occasionally be grouped together, while a very large or populous district might return more than one member by sub-division or otherwise,

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APPENDIX IV.

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS OF SIR S. P. SINHA DELIVERED AT THE BOMBAY SESSIONS OF THE INDIAN NATIONAL CONGRESS ON THE 27TH DECEMBER 1915.

BROTHER-DELEGATES, LADIES AND GENTLEMEN, —

I return you my profoundest acknowledgment of gratitude for the high and honourable position to which you have called me. It is a peculiarly responsible position, for this year the task of delivering the annual message of the Indian National Congress is beset with special difficulties. The atmosphere created by the titanic struggle overshadowing the entire civilised world is not helpful to the calm and dispassionate consideration of our many complex and delicate national problems. And my task is made all the more difficult as the cruel hand of death has removed from our midst, within a few months of each other, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, Pherozeshah Mehta and Henry Cotton—three of our most beloved and sagacious leaders whose counsels would have been of incalculable value to us to-day and whose loss we all so deeply mourn.

Would that this task had been committed to some one more competent than myself. Willingly would I have avoided it,—gladly would I have remained for the rest of my life, as I have been in the past, a humble camp-follower of the Congress.

You know that I did not seek this position any more than I had sought that other exalted position which it fell to my lot to occupy a few years ago as the first Indian member of the Viceroy's Executive Council. I pray I may not be misunderstood, for I say this is no boastful spirit but in all humility. For no one is more conscious than myself that my appointment as Law Member was not due to any extraordinary personal merits of mine. No one knows it better than myself that that honour was conferred not so much on me personally as on the Indian National Congress, in recognition of the justice and moderation of the claims it had persistently put forward for over a quarter of a century on behalf of the people of India.

For myself, I had never dared to aspire to the chair of Macaulay and Maine any more than I ever dreamt of occupying this chair hallowed by its association with some of the most devoted workers in the cause of our Motherland. In both cases, I yielded to a sense of supreme duty. And on this occasion, I cannot do better than what I did on the other, *viz.*, to invoke aid from on high that I may do nothing and say nothing which will compromise the rights and best interests, the honour and the dignity, of my country.

The King-Emperor.

My first duty today is again to lay at the feet of our august and beloved Sovereign our unswerving fealty, our unshaken allegiance, and our enthusiastic homage. His Majesty has been with our soldiers on the battle-field. His son shares with them all the hardships of war. And we desire to express our gratitude to Almighty God for shielding our beloved Emperor and enabling him to endure with fortitude the physical suffering inseparable from his recent accident and restoring him to devoted people in renewed health and strength. Long may he live to lead his people and promote their happiness and prosperity.

The War.

The question which, above all others, is engrossing our minds at the present moment is the war, and the supreme feeling which arises in our minds is one

of deep admiration for the self-imposed burden which England is bearing in the struggle for liberty and freedom, and a feeling of profound pride that India had not fallen behind other portions of the British Empire, but has stood shoulder to shoulder with them by the side of the Imperial Mother in the hour of her sorest trial. In the great galaxy of heroes, in the imperishable Roll of Honour, there are now, and there will never cease to be, beloved Indian names testifying to the fact that our people would rather die unsullied than outlive the disgrace of surrender to a bastard civilisation. Our conviction is firm that, by the guidance of that divine spirit which shapes the destiny of nations, the cause of right will ultimately prevail and the close of the struggle will usher in a new era in the history of the human race.

Brother-delegates,—My next duty is to convey our unstinted admiration and our heart-felt gratitude to those of our brethren who have been shedding their blood in the battle-fields of Europe, Asia and Africa, in defence of the Empire. The war has given India an opportunity, as nothing else could have done, of demonstrating the courage, bravery and tenacity of her troops, even when pitted against the best organised armies of the world, and also the capacity of her sons of all classes, creeds and nationalities to rise as one people under the stimulus of an overpowering emotion. That the wave of loyalty which has swept over India has touched the hearts of all classes had been ungrudgingly admitted even by unfriendly critics. The Bengalee is just as anxious to fight under the banner of His Majesty the King-Emperor as the Sikh and the Pathan, and those of them to whom an opportunity has been given to serve either in ambulance, postal or despatch work, have shown as great a disregard of danger and devotion to duty as others employed in the more arduous work of fighting. India has arisen to the occasion, and her princes and peoples have vied with each other in rallying round the imperial standard at a time when the enemies of the Empire counted on disaffection and internal troubles. The spectacle affords a striking proof as much of the wisdom of those statesmen who have in recent years guided the destiny of the British Empire in India as of the fitness of the Indian people to grasp the dignity and the responsibilities of citizenship of a world-wide empire. Nor must we forget to tender to the families of those who have laid down their lives in the glorious cause our sincere and respectful sympathy.

Brother-delegates,—Doubts have been expressed in some quarters as to the wisdom of the Congress assembling while the war is still going on. It has been suggested that discussion of political problems might be misconstrued as an attempt to advance individual national interests at a time of imperial stress. I do not think that such apprehensions are well-founded. If we had any doubt as to the ultimate success of England, we might well hesitate to discuss questions which can only arise after the war is over and peace is concluded. We want to make it perfectly clear, if we have not done so already, that there is no one among us willing to cause the slightest embarrassment to the Government. We seek to make no capital out of the service so ungrudgingly rendered by our countrymen to the Empire. There is not, I trust, a single person in our camp who expects reforms as the price or the reward of our loyalty. That loyalty would indeed be a poor thing if it proceeded from a lively sense of favours to come. Nor could any serious and responsible Indian publicist advocate that, as the result of the war, there should be a sudden and violent breakage in the evolution of political institutions in India. The problem before us is how, without asking for any violent departure from the line of constitutional development which farsighted statesmen, English and Indian, desire for India, we can still press for a substantial advance towards the development of free institutions in this country. It is our earnest hope that the spontaneous outburst of loyalty throughout the country has dispelled for ever all sense of distrust and suspicion between ourselves and our rulers, and that, after the war is over, British officials will consider it their duty not so much to administer our affairs efficiently as to train the people themselves to administer them, and that, with this change of spirit, the people also will begin to look upon these officials as zealous co-adjutors in the task of their political self-development.

Brother-delegates,—This brings me naturally to what has been a burning topic in the Congress for many years, which has led to bitter differences and

fierce dissensions, and with regard to which you are entitled to ask my views—our political ideal, our duties in the present, and our prospects in the future.

Our Ideal—Self-Government.

What, to begin with, should be the political ideal of India? To some, the raising of this question may seem to be unnecessary and at best academic and, to others, positively mischievous. To me, however, it seems that the greatest danger in the path of the future well-being of the country is the want of a reasoned ideal of our future such as would satisfy the aspirations and ambitions of the rising generations of India and at the same time meet with the approval of those to whose hand our destinies are committed. It is my belief that a rational and inspiring ideal will arrest the insidious and corrupting influence of the real enemies of our Motherland, even if it is not able to root out from the land that malignant mental disease which has been called anarchism and whose psychology it is so difficult to analyse. It must be obvious to all sincere and impartial judges that no mandate whether of the Government or of the Congress will be able to still the throbbing pain in the soul of awakening India, unless the ideal which is held up by the Congress and accepted by the Government commends itself first to the heart and then to the head. It seems to me, brother-delegates, that the only satisfactory form of self-government to which India aspires cannot be anything short of what President Lincoln so pithily described as "government of the people, for the people, and *by the people*".

When I say this, I do not for one moment imply that the British Government is not the best Government we have had for ages. We have only to look round to see the manifold blessings which have been brought to this country by that Government. But as a British Premier early in this century very truly observed, "good government cannot be a substitute for self-government". Says a recent writer in a well-known British Periodical: "Every Englishman is aware that on no account, not if he were to be governed by an angel from heaven, would he surrender that most sacred of all his rights, the right of making his own laws..... He would not be an Englishman, he would not be able to look English fields and trees in the face, if he had parted with that right. Laws in themselves have never counted for much. There have been beneficent depôts and wise law-givers in all ages who have increased the prosperity and probably the contentment and happiness of their subjects, but yet their government has not stimulated the moral and intellectual capacity latent in citizenship or fortified its character or enlarged its understanding. There is more hope for the future of mankind in the least and faintest impulse towards self-help, self-realisation, self-redemption than in any of the laws that Aristotle ever dreamt of". The ideal, therefore, of self-government is one that is not based merely on emotion and sentiment, but on all the lessons of history.

I believe in all sincerity that such has been the ideal which the British Government itself has entertained and cherished almost from the commencement of British rule in India. Generations of statesmen have repeatedly laid down that policy, solemn declarations of successive sovereigns have graciously endorsed it, and Acts of Parliament have given it legislative sanction. I will not burden my speech with quotations from these: they will all be found in previous Presidential addresses. But, with your leave, I will quote only one passage from a speech of John Bright delivered at Manchester on the 11th of December, 1877: "I believe it," said John Bright, "that it is our duty not only to govern India well now for our sakes and to satisfy our own conscience, but so to arrange its government and so to administer it that we should look forward to the time when India will have to take up her own government and administer it in her own fashion. I say he is no statesman—he is no man actuated with a high moral sense with regard to our great and terrible moral responsibility—who is not willing thus to look ahead and thus to prepare for circumstances which may come sooner than we think and sooner than any of us hope for, but which must come at some not very distant date."

It is, however, unfortunately the fact that a few years ago unhappy statements and even actions of responsible statesmen gave rise to a widespread suspicion among large classes of people in all parts of India that there was a change of policy—a deliberate intention to retrace the steps. That this suspicion is not wholly without foundation will appear from the estimate of an eminent French publicist who cannot be charged with either lack of admiration for the British administration of India or an excess of sympathy for the Indian reform party. This is what M. Chailley says (I am reading from page 188 of the translation by the present Finance Member, Sir William Meyer): Had England taken as her motto, India for the Indians, had she continued following the ideas of Elphinstone and Malcolm to consider her rule as temporary, she might without inconsistency grant to the national party gradual and increasing concessions which in time would give entire autonomy to the Indians, *but that is not now her aim.*" (The italics are mine). Does any reasonable man imagine that it is possible to satisfy the palpitating hearts of the thousands of young men who, to use the classic words of Lord Morley, "leave our universities intoxicated with the ideas of freedom, nationality and self-government," with the comfortless assurance that free institutions are the special privilege of the West? Can any one wonder that many of these young men, who have not the same robust faith in the integrity and benevolence of England as the members of this Congress, should lose heart at the mere suspicion of such a policy, and, driven to despair, conclude that "the roar and scream of confusion and carnage" is better than peace and order without even the distant prospect of freedom? Fifteen years ago, Lord Morley said: "the sacred word 'free' represents, as Englishmen have thought until to-day, the noblest aspiration that can animate the breast of man." And to-day, millions of Englishmen are freely sacrificing their lives in order that others may be free: therefore, an Englishman will be the first person to realise and appreciate the great insistent desire in the heart of India, and I for myself say with all the emphasis and earnestness that I can command that if the noble policy of Malcolm and Elphinstone, Canning and Ripon, Bright and Morley, is not steadily, consistently and unflinchingly adhered to, the moderate party amongst us will soon be depleted of all that is fine and noble in human character. For my part, I believe with the fervour of religious conviction that that wise and righteous policy is still the policy of the great English nation. When His Majesty sent us his gracious message of sympathy and later on of hope, what do you think he meant but sympathy for our political aspirations and hope for their ultimate fulfilment? As late as the 8th day of October this year, His Excellency the Viceroy, addressing a large number of representative officials at the United Service Club of Simla, said:—

"England has instilled into this country the culture and civilisation of the West with all its ideals of liberty and self-respect. It is not enough for her now to consider only the material outlook of India. It is necessary for her to cherish the aspirations, of which she herself has sown the seed, and English officials are gradually awakening to the fact that high as were the aims and remarkable the achievements of their predecessors, a still nobler task lies before them in the present and the future in guiding the uncertain and faltering steps of Indian development along sure and safe paths. The new rôle of guide, philosopher and friend is opening before you and it is worthy of your greatest efforts. It requires in you gifts of imagination and sympathy, and imposes upon you self-sacrifice, for it means that slowly but surely you must divest yourselves of some of the power you have hitherto wielded. Let it be realised that great as has been England's mission in the past, she has a far more glorious task to fulfil in the future, in encouraging and guiding the political self-development of the people. The goal to which India may attain is still distant and there may be many vicissitudes in her path, but I look forward with confidence to a time when, strengthened by character and self-respect and bound by ties of affection and gratitude, India may be regarded as a true friend of the Empire and not merely as a trusty dependent. The day for the complete fulfilment of this ideal is not yet, but it is to this distant vista that the British official should turn his eyes, and he must grasp the fact that it is by his future success in this direction that British prestige and efficiency will be judged."

These noble words of Lord Hardinge, which must still be ringing in our ears, are not the idle speculations of an irresponsible enthusiast, but the well-considered pronouncement of a statesman who, after guiding the ship of state during a period of unprecedented storm and stress, sends forth this message both to his own countrymen and to us. Lest there be any among us of so little faith as to doubt the real meaning of those memorable words, lest there be any Englishmen inclined to whittle down the meaning of this promise, I hope there will be an authentic and definite proclamation with regard to which there will be no evasion, no misunderstanding possible. So far as we the people are concerned, there is no real reason for mistrust, for this policy proclaimed so long ago and repeated so recently has been fruitful of innumerable beneficent results. Officials, even the highest, may sometimes have spoken or even acted in a different spirit, but England always did and does still consider it her glorious mission to raise this once great country from her fallen position to her ancient status among the nations of the earth, and she enjoins every English official in India to consider himself a trustee bound to make over his charge to the rightful owner the moment the latter attains to years of discretion.

But are there any among us who, while accepting His Excellency's message of hope, are disposed to demur to the qualification therein expressed, namely, that the goal is not yet? If so, I do not hesitate to express my entire disagreement, because I would sooner take the risk of displeasing than injuring my beloved countrymen. I am fortified in my opinion when I find that almost every prominent leader of the Congress has laboured to impress upon all true lovers of our country that the path is long and devious and that we shall have to tread weary steps before we get to the promised land. "Day will not break the sooner because we get up before the twilight." The end will not come by impatience. I maintain that no true friend of India will place the ideal of self-government before us without this necessary qualification. It inevitably makes passionate youth, anxious to avoid the steep and weary path, take to dangerous and even fatal short-cuts, for it is unfortunately true that impetuous youth finds it easier to die for a glorious ideal than to live and work for it with steady patience and persistent self-sacrifice. I yield to none in my desire for self-government but I recognise that there is a wide gulf between desire and attainment.

One Goal One Path.

Let us argue out for ourselves freely and frankly the various ways by which we can obtain the priceless treasure of self-government. It seems to me that it is possible only in one of the three following ways:

Firstly, by way of a free gift from the British nation.

Second, by wresting it from them.

Third, by means of such progressive improvement in our mental, moral and material condition as will, on the one hand, render us worthy of it and, on the other, impossible for our rulers to withhold it.

Now, as to the first, the free gift. Even if the English nation were willing to make us an immediate free gift of full self-government—and those who differ most from the Congress are the first to deny the existence of such willingness—I take leave to doubt whether the boon would be worth having as such, for it is a commonplace of politics that nations like individuals must grow into freedom and nothing is so baneful in political institutions as their prematurity: nor must we forget that India free can never be ancient India restored. Such a vision, as has been justly remarked, could only be realised if India free from the English could have stood in a tranquil solitude or in a sphere of absolute isolation, but unfortunately the hard facts of the modern world have to be faced and India, free from England, but without any real power of resistance, would be immediately in the thick of another struggle of nations.

As to the second, I doubt if the extremest of the extremists consider it feasible to win self-government immediately by means of a conflict with the British power. Such a conflict is impossible, if not inconceivable: and I

cannot imagine any sane man thinking that assassinations of policemen and dacoities committed on peaceful un-offending citizens will do aught but retard progress towards our goal. Such acts, if they proceeded from any considerable section of the people, would only emphasise our absolute incompetence for self-government, which demands the highest qualities of patient preparation and of silent and unobtrusive work in every aspect of our social and political life. Fortunately, acts like those I have mentioned are reprobated throughout India. They may appeal to the perverted imagination of misguided youth, but are abhorrent to the sober sense of the great mass of the great peoples of India. They alienate not only the sympathy of those Englishmen whose support would be invaluable to our cause both in India and in England, but they provoke the bitterest resentment among our own people who naturally shrink from an ideal where lawlessness is likely to have sway. On your behalf and my own, I express my utmost and unqualified detestation of these lawless acts, and I fervently appeal to all sections of our people to express in unmistakable language their abhorrence of these dastardly crimes which besmirch the fair fame of our country and I pray to them so to co-operate with the authorities as to render their detection and punishment absolutely certain.

Brother delegates,—We are left, therefore, with the third alternative as the only means of attaining the goal of self-government. Before I deal with it, let me remind you of a parable in Mr. Edwin Bevan's thoughtful little book on *Indian Nationalism*. He likens the condition of our country to that of a man whose whole bodily frame, suffering from severe injuries and grievous lesions, has been put in a steel frame by a skilful surgeon. This renders it necessary for the injured man, as the highest duty to himself, to wait quietly and patiently in splints and bandages—even in a steel frame—until nature resumes her active processes. The knitting of the bones and the granulation of the flesh require time: perfect quiet and repose, even under the severest pain, is necessary. It will not do to make too great haste to get well. An attempt to walk too soon will only make the matter worse, and, above all, the aid of the surgeon is indispensable and it is foolish to grudge the necessary fee.

When we ourselves have so far advanced under the guidance and protection of England as to be able not only to manage our own domestic affairs, but to secure internal peace and prevent external aggression. I believe that it will be as much the interest as the duty of England to concede the fullest autonomy to India. Political wiseacres tell us that history does not record any precedent in which a foreign nation has with its own hands freed from bondage a people which it has itself conquered. I will not pause to point out, what has been pointed out so often, that India was never conquered in the literal sense of the word, and, as very properly observed by the late Sir John Seeley, India is not a possession of England in the sense of legally being a tributary to England any more than any of her colonies. I will not wait to examine the cases of French Canada and the Boer Republics in South Africa to whom free institutions have been granted. But has there been a situation before this in the history of mankind like that of India to-day? Has there been a nation whose ideas of political morality have ever reached those of the great English nation? Has there been another nation which has fought so continuously and strenuously for the freedom and liberty of other nations as the English? My faith is based not on emotion, not on unreasoning sentiment: it rests on the record of what has already been achieved by the undying labours of farsighted English statesmen and noble-hearted Indian patriots, both those who are still working for the cause and those whose labours are done and whose spirits hover over us to-day and guide and inspire us. The East and the West have met—not in vain. The invisible scribe who has been writing the most marvellous history that ever was written has not been idle. Those who have the discernment and inner vision to see will know that there is only one goal and there is only one path.

The regeneration and reconstruction of India can take place only under the guidance and control of England, and while we admit that the goal is not yet,

we refuse to believe that it is so distant as to render it a mere vision of the imagination. We deprecate the impatience of those who imagine that we have only to stretch our hands to grasp the coveted prize. But we differ equally from those who think that the end is so remote as to be a negligible factor in the ordinary work of even present-day administration. It seems to me that, having fixed our goal, it is hardly necessary to attempt to define in concrete terms the precise relationship that will exist between India and England when the goal is reached. Whatever may be the connection of India with England in the distant future, her impress on India could never be effaced and the inter-communion of the spirit and the breathing of new life into India by England will be a permanent factor which could never be discounted. Autonomy within the Empire is the accepted political faith of the Congress, and I find it difficult to believe that our patriotism and our love of country cannot be reconciled to the picture of the future which generous statesmen like Lord Haldane draw, in which Englishmen and Indians will be fellow-citizens of a common empire and of a common and splendid heritage, all of us bringing our special talents to bear co-operatively for the common good of the whole. For the attainment of this great ideal, our first great duty is the exercise of the difficult but indispensable virtue of patience. There is no royal road to that goal, and we must all patiently, persistently and strenuously co-operate in all measures necessary for that purpose. Some of these can be undertaken only by the Government others will depend on ourselves alone, but none will bear fruit without a spirit of mutual trust, toleration and forbearance. In order to foster this spirit so far as we, the people of India are concerned, it is vitally necessary to admit them, in an ever-increasing measure, to direct an active participation in the higher work of government in all its branches, civil as well as military, executive as well as judicial, administrative as well as legislative. It is cruel calumny which asserts that, when asking for the expansion of the powers of our Legislative Councils for the appointment of Indians to the Imperial and Provincial Executive Councils, for the admission of a larger number of Indians to the Indian Civil Service and all other branches of the higher public services the Indian national Congress asks only for honors and appointments for the members of the educated classes. It may be that some of those who still persist in repeating this libel on the intelligence and patriotism of this country in good faith believe it to be true. If so, they have failed to take note of well known facts, namely, that Congress leaders like Telang, Tyabji, Krishnaswamy Iyer and other accepted high office only at considerable personal sacrifice, and that others had to refuse because they could not afford to make the necessary sacrifice. These critics have neglected to read the literature of the Congress. In any case, they have missed the point of it all, namely, that these measures are advocated only as means to an end. They are valuable chiefly because they concede the demand of the people for direct and active participation in the work of Government, not merely as tools and agents, but as members of the Government itself. They are valuable only in so far as they tend to identify the people with the Government, and enable them to think of the Government as their own and not as an alien bureaucracy imposed on an unwilling people by a conquering nation. We can afford to treat the taunts of these unfriendly critics with contempt, but there is another school of critic whose counsels are more seductive though not more sound. These insist on the impotence of the Reformed Legislative Councils, whose resolutions they ridicule as mere pious wishes. They see no good in the powers of interpellation and discussion of the budget. They treat the admission of one Indian into each of the existing Executive Councils as a matter of no consequence, because it has not produced immediate or far-reaching changes in the ordinary routine of administration. They insist that even a liberal and philosophic historian like Viscount Bryce has pointed out that no more in India than in the Roman Empire has there been any question of establishing free institutions, either for the country as a whole or for any particular province; and that the Council Reforms of 1861, 1892 and 1909 were merely intended to give opportunities and means for the expression of Indian opinion and not to give any real power to the people. Well, it does not require much political acumen to discover that we in India are yet a long way off from free institutions and that the reforms so far

effected have not yielded any real power to the people either in the Imperial or in the Provincial Councils. But it is my firm belief that the privileges already acquired, if used with industry and moderation and tact, will in no distant future receive considerable enlargement, and we must continue to press for further expansion in all the directions I have mentioned, undeterred by the criticism of the one and the cynicism of the other. We shall continue to urge the enlargement of the powers and modifications of the constitution of the Legislative Councils. We shall continue to ask for larger and yet large admission of Indians to the higher ranks of the public services in all its branches and we shall claim these not as mere concessions but as a gradual fulfilment of solemn pledges for the progressive nationalisation of the government of the country. We shall continue our labours till really free institutions *are* established for the whole of the country,—not by any sudden or revolutionary change, but by gradual evolution and cautious progress.

What the Congress wants.

When I accepted my nomination for this chair I knew—as all of you must have known—that I was not likely to be able to suggest any specific measures of reform other than those so long advocated by this Congress. But I felt—I trust without undue presumption—that having been in the inner Councils of the Government for however short a time, it was peculiarly my duty to act as your spokesmen on this occasion. It is in that belief that I appeal to the British nation to declare their ungrudging approval of the goal to which we aspire, to declare their inflexible resolution to equip India for her journey to that goal and to furnish her escort on the long and weary road. Such a declaration will be the most distinguished way of marking their appreciation of India's services and sacrifices—her loyalty and her devotion to the Empire. Such a declaration will touch the heart and appeal to the imagination of the people far more than any mere specific political reforms. These latter may fall short of the high expectations raised by utterances of the responsible English statesmen as to the future place of India in the Empire and they may cause general disappointment. But an authoritative declaration of policy on the lines I suggest will, without causing such disappointment, carry conviction to the minds of the people that the pace of the administrative reforms will be reasonably accelerated and that henceforth it will be only a question of patient preparation. The most appropriate opportunity for such a declaration will be the moment when the victory of England and her Allies will establish for ever the triumph of free institutions over old-world doctrines of military absolutism.

Let me not be misunderstood. I do not say that all that is wanted, all that would satisfy us, is a mere declaration of policy : what I do say is that there should be a frank and full statement of the policy of Government as regards the future of India, so that hope may come where despair holds sway and faith where doubt spreads its darkening shadow, and I ask that steps should be taken to move towards self-government by the gradual development of popular control over all departments of Government and by the removal of disabilities and restrictions under which we labour both in our own country and in other parts of the British Empire.

I have great pleasure in availing myself of this opportunity to acknowledge with gratitude two recent measures which, though not exactly steps towards self-government, amount to some recognition of India's place in the Empire. The first, thanks to the statesmanlike efforts of Lord Hardinge, is the partial amelioration of the condition of the Indian emigrants in South Africa, and the other is the acceptance by Lord Hardinge's Government of my friend the Hon. Mr. Shafi's resolution for an official representation of India at the Imperial Conference. I would, however, venture to suggest that in addition to the official representative, one or two of the Indian Princes who have rendered such conspicuous service to the Empire might fittingly represent the great Continent of India. The delegation of one or two distinguished Indian Chiefs to the Imperial Conference will, in addition to other honors no doubt in store for them, be a just recognition of their pre-eminent services and will gratify public opinion throughout the length and breadth of India.

Coming to domestic politics, I do not think it necessary that I should on the present occasion deal in detail with the various concrete measures which the Congress advocates as an effective advance towards self-government on lines suited to India's special requirements. A decisive advance towards provincial autonomy, the liberalisation of the Council Regulations, establishment of elective as opposed to non-official majorities, an increase of their powers of control, specially in regard to finance, a larger representation of Indians in the various executive Councils as also in the Council of the Secretary of State, the admission of larger numbers of Indians to all the higher branches of the public services, the long-delayed separation of judicial and executive functions, the expansion of primary, scientific and technical education, the abolition of indentured labour and the improvement of the position of Indians in other parts of the Empire—these are reforms which have long been urged and which will be dealt with by you, I have no doubt, so far as you think necessary. I am afraid, however, most of them must stand over for adjustment till peace is in sight. For myself, I will be content with dealing as shortly as I can with three specific matters which have become increasingly urgent and with regard to which there is a practical unanimity of opinion. They are :—

Firstly—the question of commissions in the army and military training for the people.

Secondly—the extension of local self-government.

Thirdly—the development of our commerce and our industries including agriculture.

Commissions in the Army and Military training.

There can be, I venture to think, no true sense of citizenship where there is no sense of responsibility for the defence of one's own country. "If there is trouble, others will quiet it down. If there is riot, others will subdue it. If there is a danger, others will face it. If our country is in peril, others will defend it." When a people feel like this, it indicates that they have got to a stage when all sense of civic responsibility has been crushed out of them, and the system which is responsible for this feeling is inconsistent with the self-respect of normal human beings.

I shall be the first to acknowledge that various steps have been and are being taken by the Government to promote the right spirit of self-help in the country, but I feel and I feel strongly that hitherto the Government has not only ignored but has put positive obstacles in the way of the people acquiring or retaining a spirit of national self-help in this the most essential respect.

For what is the present condition of things? Except certain warlike races like the Sikhs and Rajputs, the people generally are debarred from receiving any kind of military training. Not only are they not allowed enlistment in the ranks of His Majesty's Army, but they are even precluded from joining any volunteer corps. Even with regard to the classes of men—Sikhs and Rajputs, Gurkhas and Pathans, etc.—who are taken into the regular army for the simple reason that the number of English troops is not in itself sufficient to maintain peace and order in this country—even with reference to these classes it is an inflexible rule that though they may now obtain the highest badge of valour *viz.*, the Victoria Cross, not one of them can receive a Commission in His Majesty's Army irrespective of birth or bravery, education or efficiency.

While the humblest European and Eurasian and even the West Indian Negro has the right to carry arms, the law of the land denies even to the most law-abiding and respectable Indian the privilege of possessing or carrying arms of any description except as a matter of special concession and indulgence, often depending on the whim and caprice of unsympathetic officials.

To my mind the mere statement of the present system ought to be sufficient to secure its condemnation.

Let me proceed to state shortly what changes we consider essential to remedy this state of things.

1st. We ask for the right to enlist in the regular army, irrespective of race or province of origin, but subject only to prescribed tests of physical fitness.

2nd. We ask that the commissioned ranks of the Indian Army should be thrown open to all classes of His Majesty's subjects, subject to fair, reasonable and adequate physical and educational tests. We ask that a military college or colleges should be established in India where proper military training can be received by those of our countrymen who will have the good fortune to receive His Majesty's Commission.

3rd. We ask that all classes of His Majesty's subjects should be allowed to join as volunteers, subject of course again to such rules and regulations as will ensure proper control and discipline, and

4th. We ask that the invidious distinctions under the Arms Act should be removed. This has no real connection with the three previous claims, but I deal with it together with the others as all these disabilities are attempted to be justified on the same ground of political expediency.

Let us pause for a moment and consider the objections that are generally brought forward against the first three proposals.

As to the right to join the ranks, irrespective of race or province of origin objections are put forward, firstly, that not all the races of India provide good fighting material and that many of them lack the physical courage necessary for the army. And, secondly, that many of them are neither willing nor anxious to join the ranks or to enter the army in any capacity.

The last may be dealt with in a few words. We are asking for a right, and if it turns out that some of us and even all of us are not willing to avail ourselves of that right,—well, there will be no compulsion on them to do so, and nobody will be the worse of because of the right. On the contrary, it will remove a grievance bitterly felt and loudly complained of and will redound to the credit of Government.

As regards the first objection, *viz.*, the want of necessary martial spirit in certain classes or races, it requires more serious consideration. The argument is this: the country can afford to keep as a standing army only a certain number of trained soldiers and officers and it must get the best it can for the money it spends, and if certain races are unfit by reason of inherent want of courage for the profession of arms, the state would naturally select its soldiers from other classes. So say our opponents.

Taking it at its full strength, this argument has its limitation. For you cannot govern a State on exactly the same principles as you manage a shop. You may get better value for your money by getting as your soldier an Afridi or a Pathan or any non-British subject, but by excluding the Parsi, or the Madras, or the Bengali, you create a feeling of grievance, if not of actual resentment, which is certain to cause serious embarrassment in the work of general administration. You render it impossible for the excluded classes to consider themselves as *equal* subjects and citizens responsible for the defence of the country, and you fail to foster that spirit of self-help and that sense of self-respect among those very classes which is essential to attain the goal of imperial unity.

Hitherto I have proceeded upon the assumption that some of the races in India are lacking in the physical courage necessary for the profession of arms. But, I ask, is it a correct hypothesis? Is it true that the Bengali—I am taking him as a type only—has not and will never have the requisite physical courage? The theory was started by Macaulay in his too sweeping condemnation of the people of the Gangetic delta, forgetting that the Bengal peasantry has always been a sturdy and virile class, particularly in tracts not touched by malaria. But take even the professional or educated classes in Bengal. A good many of them, who enlisted under conditions of

great personal sacrifice, are at the present moment working in Mesopotamia in an Ambulance Corps, and I am confident all British officers in that theatre of war from the General in Command downwards will tell you that not a single man in that Corps has proved himself deficient either in physical courage or in endurance.

Take another example nearer home. There is a body of public servants much misunderstood and therefore very often much maligned. I know there is a prejudice against them. I refer to the Bengali officers of the C. I. D. of the Police. Ask any Englishman in Bengal you like, from His Excellency the Governor downwards, and I am sure he will tell you there is not one among those officers who does not unflinchingly face death daily and hourly for the sake of duty and loyalty and, let me add, that he does so, often in spite of much obloquy and great discouragement.

I take leave to point out, therefore, that it is not correct, at any rate at the present time, to assert of any sections of the Indian people that they are wanting in such physical courage and manly virtues as to render them incapable of bearing arms. But even if it were so, is it not the obvious duty of England so to train them as to remove this incapacity as they are trying to remove so many others, especially if it be the case, as there is some reason to believe it is, that it is English rule which has brought them to such a pass? England has ruled this country for considerably over 150 years now, and surely it cannot be a matter of pride to her that at the end of her period the withdrawal of her rule would mean chaos and anarchy and would leave the country an easy prey to any foreign adventurers. There are some of our critics who never fail to remind us that if the English were to leave the country to-day, we would have to wire to them to come back before they got as far as Aden. Some even enjoy the grim joke that were the English to withdraw now, there would be neither a rupee nor a virgin left in some parts of the country. For my part, I can conceive of no more scathing indictment of the results of British Rule. A superman might gloat over the spectacle of the conquest of might over justice, and over righteousness, but I am much mistaken if the British nation, fighting now as ever for the cause of justice and freedom and liberty, will consider it as other than discreditable to itself in the highest degree that, after nearly two centuries of British Rule, India has been brought to-day to the same emasculated condition as the Britons were in the beginning of the 5th century when the Roman legions left the English shores in order to defend their own country against the Huns, Goths and other barbarian hordes.

In asking, therefore, for the right of military training, we are only seeking to remedy the results I have described. We are seeking to regain our lost self-respect and to strengthen our sense of civic responsibility. We are seeking to regain the right to defend our homes and hearths against possible invaders, should the strong protecting arm of England be ever withdrawn from our country. It is no mere sentiment that compels us to demand this inalienable right of all human beings, though sentiment has its undoubted place in the scheme of every government. Some day or other, our right arm may be called upon to defend all that man holds most precious. For who will venture to prophesy that sooner or later there may not be another such conflict as is now convulsing the world, when there may be new alliances and fresh combinations and when England may not have the same allies and advantages as she has now?

I have endeavoured to prove that neither of the objections which are generally put forward against our claims to enlistment in the army is tenable. I have tried to show the justice as well as the necessity of our demands.

In the face of what has happened in the present war, it is no longer correct to say what Lord Bryce said in 1912. This is what Lord Bryce said:—"To England, however, apart from the particular events which might have created the snapping of the tie and apart from the possible loss of a

market, severance from India need involve no lasting injury. To be mistress of a vast country, whose resources for defence need to be supplemented by her own, adds indeed to her fame *but does not add to her strength*. (The italics are mine). England was great and powerful before she owned a yard of land in Asia, and might be great and powerful again with no more foothold in the East than would be needed for the naval prestige which protects her commerce."

The resources for defence which India possesses even now do add to the strength of England as has been so amply proved in the present war. This strength could be multiplied a hundred-fold were our claims ever conceded. For, if the people of India are allowed and trained to bear arms, what nation is there on the face of the earth whose strength would compare with that of England? Nor is there any reason for apprehension that such concessions would be a source of internal danger. If the Sikh, the Gurkha, the Mahratta and the Pathan—good and valiant soldiers as they are—are found to be loyal and law-abiding, there is no reason to think that the case would be otherwise with the other races when admitted to the same status and privileges. Besides, we are only asking that the privileges are to be granted subject only to such conditions, rules, regulations and safeguards as to ensure proper discipline and control.

In the case of Volunteers also, they will be similarly subject to all proper safeguards and restrictions which will be for the Government to lay down.

Subject to such safeguards, the ranks of volunteer corps will afford, without any risk whatever to the Government or the people, an outlet for restless energies which now find doubtful and dangerous channels.

In making these demands, I know I raise as large a question as the formation of a national militia. I desire frankly and freely to meet the criticism that such an army, with a preponderance of the Indian element, may be turned against the British Government. I venture to submit in reply that anarchists and seditionists may succeed in winning over an ignorant and mercenary army, but they will never succeed in winning over a truly national army, drawn from a people made increasingly loyal by the spread of education and liberal self-governing institutions. Of course, I am not suggesting that the army should be *nationalized* in a day any more than that the government of the country should be nationalized by a stroke of the pen. But I urge in all humility that the time has come for making the beginning of a National Army in India. The tremendous shock with which every part of our world-wide Empire has realised the prime necessity of maintaining an army large enough for its defence and protection renders it imperative that a strong National Army should be raised and maintained in every part of India.

The opening of a military career will fire the imagination and stimulate the virility of India in a way that nothing else can do. And is it too much for India to expect to be treated in the same way as Russia treats her subject races—especially after the proof she has given of the prowess of her sons and their devotion and their loyalty to the imperial standard?

Reason and convenience, justice and necessity, all support every one of the claims I have ventured to put forward; and if a definite advance is not made in these respects, it will be difficult to believe that the war has changed the *angle of vision* of our rulers. It will be impossible to retain faith in what was proclaimed by the present Premier, Mr. Asquith, "that the Empire rests, not upon the predominance, artificial and superficial, of race or class, but upon the loyal affection of free communities built upon the basis of equal rights."

I now come to the last but not the least important of our claims in this respect, *viz.*, that the invidious distinctions under the Arms Act should be abolished. Sentiment as well as reason alike recommends it. Not only will the galling sense of racial inferiority and the overt imputation of universal disloyalty be removed by such a measure, but people will also get rid of onerous

disabilities in the way of defending themselves against the attacks of wild animals as well as lawless human adversaries.

Local Self-Government.

Now we come to the subject which has given rise to a considerable discussion among us. If ever we attain our goal of self-government, it will not be merely through the expansion of Legislative Councils and their powers, nor yet through the admission of more Indians to Executive Councils or the establishment even of a national militia, though all of them have no doubt their proper use and importance in the scheme of our national progress. It will come in a very great measure with the advance and development of local self-government. When people generally so far understand their civic rights and duties as to be able to manage their own communal business, their roads and drains, their tanks and wells, their schools and dispensaries, it will no longer be possible to keep them from controlling the higher work of administration. Indeed, it is not always possible to do the latter satisfactorily without having served a full term of apprenticeship in the former, and I cannot do better than remind you of what was said by Mrs. Besant in her address to the Congress last December, while supporting the resolution on Self-Government: "The training for self-government is of vital import to the nation to-day. For the government of States is at once a science and an art: and in order that it may be worthily exercised, the lesson must be learnt in local self-government, then in provincial autonomy, and finally in the self-government of the nation: for the work of governing is the most highly skilled profession upon earth

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What then should you do? You should take part in the local government wherever it is possible. As it is, take it and practice it, for you will gain experience and you will gain knowledge; and only that experience and knowledge will guide you when you come to speak in larger councils and to make your voice heard over vast areas. So I would plead to you to face this drudgery. It is drudgery, make no mistake; understand the details of local administration and understand how to manage your own drains, particularly your waterworks. Those are the alphabets of self-government: and unless you go through that drudgery, no amount of enthusiasm and love for the country will make your administration a success."

No less emphatic was the advice of one of our most revered leaders of the Congress, Sir Subramania Iyer, as President of the Reception Committee of the last Congress. If this is the view of our leaders, the views of Government are no less clear. We need not go further back than the memorable Resolution of 1882 of Lord Ripon. You will remember what a generous scheme of local self-government was there laid down "to foster sedulously the small beginnings of independent political life." It will take me long, and it will hardly be profitable, to trace the history of the failure, the dismal failure, of that scheme. But I may be pardoned for pointing out that the failure was due neither to the Government of India, nor to the local Government, nor yet to the civil service in India, as is sometimes hastily assumed, but, so far at any rate as Bengal is concerned, to the whole frame-work of the scheme being changed by the Secretary of State for India in Council, in spite of the protests and objections of the authorities in this country.

Lord Ripon's Resolution laid down the following fundamental principles:—

1. That the Local Governments should maintain throughout the country a network of Local Boards charged with definite duties and entrusted with definite funds.
2. That the jurisdiction of the Primary Boards should be so limited in area as to ensure both local knowledge and local interest on the part of each of the members.
3. That there should be a preponderance of non-official members to be chosen by election wherever possible.

4. That Government control on these bodies should be exercised from without rather than from within, non-official elected chairmen acting, wherever practicable, as chairmen of the Local Boards.

The Decentralization Commission in their Report dealt with the matter at some length and also made some definite recommendations.

Lord Morley in his Reform Despatch dated 27th November, 1908, said :—
“The village in India has been the fundamental and indestructible unit of the social system surviving the downfall of dynasty after dynasty. I desire,” said Lord Morley to the Viceroy, “Your Excellency to consider the best way of carrying out a policy that would make the village a starting point of public life.”

We have next the Resolution of Lord Hardinge's Government dated 1st of May, 1915, dealing with and assenting to many of the recommendations of the Decentralization Commission. We are, therefore, in agreement with Government as to the importance of local self-government. It is a matter of further general agreement that the re-development of the village as an administrative unit has been brought within the range of practical politics by the spread of the co-operative movement. I find from the report of Sir E. Maclagan's Committee on Co-operation in India that primary societies have grown from 832 in 1905-07 to 11,566 in 1913-14, the number of members from 88,582 to 661,859, and the amount of working capital from nil to 46,427,842 rupees. The report states :—“no one reading these figures can fail to be struck by the magnitude which the growth has already attained or to be convinced that the movement has taken firm root. Societies are now so spread over all parts of India and the advantages which their members are obtaining are so patent that it is impossible to doubt that the movement will eventually attain dimensions compared to which its present size will appear negligible. As a consequence, there will undoubtedly arise, through the medium of co-operation, a powerful organisation formed of those agricultural classes, who are at present inarticulate through want of education and cohesion.”

Local self-government, supplemented by the spread of the co-operative movement, will gradually solve many of our most difficult problems—such as primary education, small industries, improved agriculture, indebtedness of the peasantry, rural sanitation and so forth, and to this we must devote our best energies and attention in the immediate future, bearing in mind that we have got to build from the village upwards.

Here is a vast field in which we can in co-operation with the Government work heart and soul for the amelioration of the condition of the masses of our people. It has been forcibly pointed out by that good friend of India Sir Daniel Hamilton that the development of the co-operative movement in the villages requires thousands of men. The civilians who have been in charge of this movement have done wonders considering their numbers. They deserve the very highest praise, but their numbers are far too few. 12,000 village banks seem a large number to have been started in 10 years, but, at the same rate of progress, India will not have been covered with village banks for another 400 or 500 years. Is the great industry of India, agriculture, to wait all this time before it is provided with a banking system? Are the 250 millions of Indian cultivators to go on paying 30, 40 and 50 per cent. for their finance for hundreds of years to come, while the rest of the civilised world gets all the money it wants at 3, 4 and 5 per cent? What India wants is more men to develop co-operative credit and she must have them. The men are there, hundreds of them being turned out of her colleges every year with nothing to do, with nothing to look forward to. And every Indian will join in the expression of the hope that we shall soon see established in every province of India schools for the training in co-operative methods and co-operative finance of the best of India's young men, who will carry the co-operative flag into every village of India, and wage war on the darkness and the ignorance and the poverty which exist to-day and which are in a large measure due to want of co-operation. In the same connection, my friend Sir Theodore Morison has

gathered from official reports highly interesting illustrations which Co-operative Credit societies are giving to the self-culture of the people. In one instance, a man of middle age learnt to read and write slowly to keep the accounts of the bank of which he was President, and, though his first efforts were painfully hard to decipher, he persevered to such good purpose that his books are now the best kept in the Punjab. In another village, the President and officers of the bank had acquired such influence that they had reconstituted the ancient authority, of the village Panchayat for settling local disputes, with the result that litigation, which had been the curse of the place before, has now much decreased.

While I gratefully acknowledge the efforts now being made by the Government in all provinces for well and truly laying the foundations of local self-government, I cannot help regretting that the Resolution of the Government of India of last summer does not go far enough or even as far as Lord Ripon's Resolution of 1882 in the direction of recommending less official control and a greater extension of the elective principle, both as regards members and chairmen of District Boards. Let not our rulers forget that "self-government implies the right to go wrong for it is nobler for a nation as for a man to struggle towards excellence with its own natural force and vitality, however blindly and vainly, than to live in irreproachable decency under expert guidance from without."

It is not possible for us any more now than it was for Lord Ripon in 1882 to lay down any hard and fast rules which shall be of universal application in a country so vast and in its local circumstances so varied as British India. All we can do is to ask that the principles laid down by Lord Ripon of undying memory should be generously given effect to, *viz.*, distinct funds with distinct duties, not too large administrative areas, more and more of elections (both of members and chairman) and less and less of official control from within. From our side, schemes for different provinces have been put forward from 1870 downwards. I will mention only those of the late Mr. Malabari, Mr. R. C. Dutt and Mr. Gokhale. Schemes have also been prepared from the official side in almost all the different provinces—Bengal, Bombay, Madras, the U. P., the Punjab and the Central Provinces. It ought not therefore to be difficult in the existing state of the land to make an effective advance at once on an adjustment of these different schemes—and, if it is made in the right spirit, I feel confident that the ultimate success of local self-government in India is absolutely certain.

It is for us to co-operate whole-heartedly with the officials for the success of the different measures of local self-government which are already being undertaken in the different provinces. Let us not assume, as we are sometimes unfortunately inclined to do, that the civilians will be loth to part with the powers which they have hitherto possessed. Let us in justice to the Indian Civil Service remember that the members of that distinguished body have never spared themselves in the service of India. Let me also implore my friends of the Indian Civil Service not to commit the mistake of looking upon the educated Indian as out of touch with his less favoured countrymen or trying to keep the latter down for his own personal profit and advancement. Let us look upon each other as willing and necessary co-adjutors for the advancement of India in every department. Let us not rail at the mote in our brother's eye without considering the beam that is in our own. Let neither of us indulge in prejudice or fretfulness, but work in friendly co-operation for the progress and prosperity of the teeming millions of India.

Development of our Commerce, Industries and Agriculture.

Whatever difference of opinion may exist as to whether India is growing richer or poorer under British Rule, there is none with regard to her extreme poverty. And there can never be political contentment without material prosperity shared by all classes of the people. And what the District Administration Committee of Bengal quotes with approval, as regards Bengal, namely, that our industrial backwardness is a great political danger, applies in fact and in reality to the whole of India.

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No one will be disposed to question the fact of this amazing backwardness. Rich in all the resources of nature, India continues to be the poorest country in the civilized world. The result is that an unhealthy political activity has arisen among certain classes of the people. As the District Administration Committee of Bengal says: "This unrest compels Government to take repressive measures,—a regrettable necessity which makes all the more desirable the adoption of those remedial and beneficent measures which will afford the most certain cure of the worst evils of the situation while proving that Government is no less determined to create prosperity than to maintain order."

What are these " remedial measures " ? Technical schools and even technological institutes are not enough. These have in all modern States generally followed and not preceded the development of industries and manufactures. The first step taken by Japan was to start factories, either financed by Government or with Government control and managed by experts from abroad. In India alone, with the exception of spasmodic efforts, the Government adheres to the exploded *laissez faire* doctrine that the development of commerce and industry is not within the province of the State.

It is high time that this policy were abandoned. The necessity of carrying on demonstration work in agriculture, the greatest industry of the country, on a commercial scale, is admitted by all, and it is only where this principle has been put into practice that agricultural improvements have been taken up by the people. Similar results will follow if the same policy is pursued with regard to other industries and manufactures. They have followed whenever such experiments have been undertaken by the Government, as in the case of aluminium and chrome-tanning in Madras.

The time is singularly opportune. The war has put an end to the enormous imports of German and Austrian goods and Japan is already making great efforts to capture the trade which by right ought to be ours.

I have neither the knowledge nor the capacity to go into details, and I rejoice that the experts at the Congress of Indian Commerce were able to point out specific ways and means by which the Government can assist us in this respect. But I will venture to say that the solution of the problem can no longer be safely postponed. And it will test, as no other question has done, the altruism of English statesmanship, for in promoting and protecting Indian industries it may become necessary—it *will* become necessary—to sacrifice the interests even of English manufacturers.

A Programme of Self-Help.

Brother delegates,—Hitherto I have been dealing with measures that can be undertaken only by the Government, and in doing so I have incidentally mentioned the various ways in which we ourselves must act and move forward. Indeed, the field for such work is so vast as to render it impossible of definition. Primary education, improvement of agriculture and industrial expansion, improvement of rural as well as urban sanitation—there is work enough and to spare for every one of us. And how much could we not do by our own efforts, if only we cared to organise ourselves. I venture to suggest that we, in this connection, should lay down a constructive and continuous programme of work in all these directions as a part of our Congress activities, and that Provincial and District Committees all over the country should occupy themselves throughout the year in some one or more of these manifold directions, so as to show the achievement of some result, however small, however insignificant, at the end of each year. For instance, while waiting for the establishment of a system of free and compulsory primary education, let each District branch of the Provincial Congress Committees be able to show that they have either directly or indirectly contributed to the establishment of ten, or even five, or even two primary schools in their district during one year. Similarly, we might very usefully and profitably extend our activity in supplementing the work of the District Local Boards and in spreading among our rural popula-

tion some elementary knowledge of hygiene and sanitation and in organising relief for local and provincial distress, if and when need be.

For this kind of self-help, the first requisite is to raise funds for the propaganda. Are we willing to do so? I confess to a feeling of diffidence, for though friends and leaders like Allan Octavian Hume have repeatedly asked us to make permanent provision for the work of the Congress, both here and in England, their advice seems to have fallen on absolutely deaf ears. Sir S. Iyer suggested last year that a body of Congress supporters should be brought into existence, each member thereof paying a subscription say of Rs. 25 per annum. He very modestly presumed that it would not be difficult to find in each province a few hundred of such subscribers, and he suggested that the funds so raised should be held and administered by a few trustees duly appointed, who should further be clothed with a corporate character by registration under the law so as to make them really competent to receive and hold, for the Congress, donations and endowments, which he hoped would not be long in coming. That is still to come. Let us, at this Congress, wipe out the reproach that moderate Indian opinion only devotes a few days to public business in order to have the right during the rest of the year not to think any more about it. Let us engrave in our hearts the advice which Mr. Hume gave us in 1904 when he said: "As for yourselves, stop foolish quarrels and depressing rivalries, substitute close and loyal co-operation and reasoned and constant action, give freely your time, your money and your hearts; speak little and do much". Let us begin to deal with the concrete problems of civic life on the basis of ascertained and accepted facts, and in order that our beloved institution, the Congress, may be a living actuality, let us begin by collecting first the funds which are indispensable for the carrying on of its work. It is my hope that this Congress may be a fertilising stream of steady effort fed by the spirit of service and sacrifice and spreading far and wide the blessings of peace and prosperity. If in speaking to you to-day—and I spoken freely and frankly—I have succeeded in the smallest possible measure in advancing the object of the Indian National Congress and in appealing successfully, in however small a degree, to the better mind both of England and India, I shall consider my humble labours to have been more than amply recompensed.

Our Future.

And now, brother-delegates, I have placed before you, to the best of my light, what the Government should do for us and what we should do for ourselves, so that we may have an India of the future answering our ideal, satisfying our aspirations, and rising to the height of our noblest emotions.

And towards this end the war is rapidly helping us onward. In the midst of the carnage and massacre, there is being accomplished the destruction of much that is evil and there is the budding forth of much that will abide. False pride and aloofness are giving place to union and genuine co-operation between those whom nothing before now seemed able to draw together. Protestant and Catholic, Churchman and Dissenter, Hindu and Moslem, Englishman and Indian, Colonial and coloured peoples are offering their daily worship not in separate sanctuaries but under the improvised shelter of the trench or the barn, animated by the same faith and trusting in the same inspiration. A new spirit of self-sacrifice, a new interest in the weak and suffering is abroad: self-indulgence is giving place to self-sacrifice, and throughout the British Empire there is prevailing an atmosphere of good-will and mutual service and esteem. It seems to me that, under the benign dispensation of an inscrutable Providence, we shall emerge into a new era of peace and good-will, and our beloved Motherland will occupy an honoured place in the Empire with which her fortunes are indissolubly linked, and we shall be the free and equal citizens of that great Empire bearing its burden sharing its responsibilities, and participating in its heritage of freedom and glory as comrades and brethren.