

File No.

2/439

Collection No.

19 506 (Nov.)

33

Pros.
Serial Nos.

Subject.

China & Tibet

III 44-33

Previous References.

Later References.

Note on China & Tibet

The Chinese Government having replied to our last note, we have to consider what further steps we should take in this matter. There is no immediate hurry about sending a reply to the Chinese Government. But we have to send immediate instructions to Shri B.W. Han as to what he should do in the event of Tibet's appeal being brought up before the Security Council or the General Assembly.

2. The content of the Chinese reply is much the same as their previous notes; but there does appear to be a toning down and an attempt at some kind of a friendly approach.

3. It is interesting to note that they have not referred specifically to our mission at Lhasa or to our trade agents or military escort at Yangtse etc. We had mentioned these especially in our last note. There is an indirect reference, however, in China's note. At the end, this note says that "As long as our two sides adhere strictly to the principle of mutual respect for territory, sovereignty, equality and mutual benefit, we are convinced that the friendship between China and India should be developed in a normal way, and that problems relating to Sino-Indian diplomatic, commercial and cultural relations with respect to Tibet may be solved properly and to our mutual benefit through normal diplomatic channels." This clearly refers to our trade agents and others in Tibet. We had expected a demand from them for the withdrawal of these agents etc. The fact that they have not done so has some significance.

4. Stress is laid in China's note on Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, which we are reminded, we have acknowledged, on Tibet being an integral part of China's territory and therefore a domestic problem. It is however again repeated that outside influences have been at play obstructing China's mission in Tibet. In fact, it is stated that liberation of Changtu proves that foreign forces and influences were inciting Tibetan troops to resist. It is again repeated that no foreign intervention will be permitted and that the Chinese army will proceed.

5. All this is much the same as has been said before, but it is said in a somewhat different way and there are repeated references in the note to China desiring the friendship of India.

6. It is true that in one of our messages to the Chinese Government we used "sovereignty" of China in relation to Tibet. In our last message we used the word, "suzerainty". After receipt of the last China's note, we have pointed out to our Ambassador that "suzerainty" was the right word and that "sovereignty" had been used by error.

7. It is easy to draft a reply to the Chinese note, pressing our view-point and countering some of the arguments raised in the Chinese note. But, before we do so, we should be clear in our own mind as to what we are aiming at, not only in the immediate future but from a long term view. It is important that we keep both these view-points before us. In all probability China, that is present-day China, is going to be our close neighbour for a long time to come. We are going to have a tremendously long common frontier. It is unlikely, and it would be unwise to expect, that the present Chinese Government will collapse, giving place to another. Therefore, it is important to pursue a policy, which will be in keeping with a long term view.

8. I think it may be taken for granted that China will take possession, in a political sense, at least, of the whole of Tibet. There is no likelihood whatever of Tibet being able to resist this or stop it. It is equally unlikely that any foreign power can prevent it. We cannot do so. If so, what can we do to help in the maintenance of Tibetan autonomy and at the same time avoiding continuous tension and apprehension on our frontiers.

9. The Chinese note has repeated that they wish the Tibetan people to have, what they call, "regional autonomy and religious freedom". This autonomy can obviously not be anything like the autonomy, verging on independence, which Tibet has enjoyed during the last forty years or so. But it is reasonable to assume from the very nature of Tibetan geography, terrain and climate, that a large measure of autonomy is almost inevitable. It may of course be that this autonomous Tibet is controlled by communist elements in Tibet. I imagine however that it is, on the whole, more likely that what will be attempted will be a pro-communist China administration rather than a communist one.

10. If world war comes, then all kinds of difficult and intricate problems arise and each one of these problems will be inter-related with others. Even the question of defence of India assumes a different shape and cannot be isolated from other world factors. I think that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may have to face any real military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war in the foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors. In peace, such an invasion would undoubtedly lead to world war. China, though big and internally big in a way, amorphous and easily capable of being attacked, on its sea coasts and by air. In such a war, China would have its main front in the South and East and it will be fighting for its very existence against powerful enemies. It is inconceivable that it should divert its forces and its strength across the inhospitable terrain of Tibet and undertake a wild adventure across the Himalayas. Any such attempt will greatly weaken its capacity to meet its real enemies on other fronts. Thus I rule out any major attack on India by China. I think these considerations should be borne in mind, because there is far too much loose talk about China attacking and overrunning India. If we lose our sense of perspective

and world strategy and give way to unreasoning fears, then any policy that we might have is likely to fail.

11. While there is, in my opinion, practically no chance of a major attack on India by China, there are certainly chances of gradual infiltration across our border and possibly of entering and taking possession of disputed territory, if there is no obstruction to this happening. We must therefore take all necessary precautions to prevent this. But, again, we must differentiate between these precautions and those that might be necessary to meet a real attack.

12. If we really feared an attack and had to make full provision for it, this would cast an intolerable burden on us, financial and otherwise, and it would weaken our general defence position. There are limits beyond which we cannot go at least for some years, and a spreading out of our army in distant frontiers would be bad from every military or strategic point of view.

13. In spite of our desire to settle the points at issue between us and Pakistan, and developing peaceful relations with it, the fact remains that our major possible enemy is Pakistan. This has compelled us to think of our defence mainly in terms of Pakistan's aggression. If we begin to think of, and prepare for, China's aggression in the same way, we would weaken considerably on the Pakistan side. We might well be got in a pincer movement. It is interesting to note that Pakistan is taking a great deal of interest, from this point of view, in developments in Tibet. Indeed it has been discussed in the Pakistan press that the new danger from Tibet to India might help them to settle the Kashmir problem according to their wishes. Pakistan has absolutely nothing in common with China or Tibet. But if we fall out completely with China, Pakistan will undoubtedly try to take advantage of this, politically or otherwise. The position of India thus will be bad from a defence point of view. We cannot have all the time two possible enemies on either side of India. This danger will not be got over, even if we increase our defence forces or even if other foreign countries help us in arming. The measure of safety that we get by increasing the defence apparatus is limited by many factors. But whatever that measure of safety might be, strategically we would be in an unsound position and the burden of this will be very great on us. As it is, we are facing enormous difficulties, financial, economic, etc.

14. The idea that communism inevitably means expansion and war, or to put it more precisely, that Chinese communism means inevitably an expansion towards India, is rather naive. It may mean that in certain circumstances. Those circumstances would depend upon many factors, which I need not go into here. The danger really is not from military invasion but from infiltration of men and ideas. The ideas are there already and can only be countered by other ideas. Communism is an important element in the situation. But, by our attaching too great importance to it in this context, we are likely to misjudge of the situation from other and more important angles.

15. In a long term view, India and China are two of the biggest countries of Asia bordering on each other and both with certain expansive tendencies,

4

because of their vitality. If their relations are bad, this will have a serious effect not only on both of them but on Asia as a whole. It would affect our future for a long time. If a position arises in which China and India are inveterately hostile to each other, like France and Germany, then there will be repeated wars bringing destruction to both. The advantage will go to other countries. It is interesting to note that both the U.K. and the U.S.A. appear to be anxious to add to the unfriendliness of India and China towards each other. It is also interesting to find that the U.S.S.R. does not view with favour any friendly relations between India and China. These are long term reactions which one can fully understand. Because India and China at peace with each other would make a vast difference to the whole set-up and balance of the world. Much of course depends upon the development of either country and how far communism in China will mould the Chinese people. Even so, these processes are long-range ones and in the long run it is fairly safe to assume that hundreds of millions of people will not change their essential characteristics.

16. These arguments leads to the conclusion that while we should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that, then both our present and our future are imperilled and no distant power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly.

17. We cannot save Tibet, as we should have liked to do, and our very attempts to save it might well bring greater trouble to it. It would be unfair to Tibet for us to bring this trouble upon her without having the capacity to help her effectively. It may be possible, however, that we might be able to help Tibet to retain a large measure of her autonomy. That would be good for Tibet and good for India. As far as I can see, this can only be done on the diplomatic level and by avoidance of making the present tension between India and China worse.

18. What then should be our instructions to B.N. Rau? From the messages he has sent us, it appears that no member of the Security Council shows any inclination to sponsor Tibet's appeal and that there is little likelihood of the matter being considered by the Council. We have said that are not going to sponsor this appeal, but if it comes up, we shall state our view-point. This view-point cannot be one of full support of the Tibetan appeal, because that goes far and claims full independence. We may say that whatever might have been acknowledged in the past about China's sovereignty or suzerainty, recent events have deprived China of the right to claim that. There may be some moral basis for this argument. But it will not take us or Tibet very far. It will only hasten the downfall of Tibet. No outsider will be able to help her and China, suspicious and

5
apprehensive of these tactics, will make sure of much speedier and fuller possession of Tibet than she might otherwise have done. We shall thus not only fail in our endeavour but at the same time have really a hostile China on our door-step.

19. I think that in no event should we sponsor Tibet's appeal. I would personally think that it would be a good thing if that appeal is not heard in the Security Council or the General Assembly. If it is considered there, there is bound to be a great deal of bitter speaking and accusation, which will worsen the situation as regards Tibet, as well as the possibility of widespread war, without helping it in the least. It must be remembered that neither the U.K. nor the U.S.A., nor indeed any other power is particularly interested in Tibet or the future of that country. What they are interested in is embarrassing China. Our interest, on the other hand, is Tibet, and if we cannot serve that interest, we fail.

20. Therefore, it will be better not to discuss Tibet's appeal in the U.N. Suppose, however, that it comes up for discussion, in spite of our not wishing this, what then? I would suggest that our representative should state our case as moderately as possible and ask the Security Council or the Assembly to give expression to their desire that the Sino-Tibetan question should be settled peacefully and that Tibet's autonomy should be respected and maintained. Any particular reference to an article of the Charter of the U.N. might tie us up in difficulties and lead to certain consequences later, which may prove highly embarrassing for us. Or a resolution of the U.N. might just be a dead letter, which also will be bad.

21. If my general argument is approved, then we can frame our reply to China's note accordingly.

(J. Nehru)
18-11-1950

6
TOP SECRET & PERSONAL.

No 822-DPM/sv

New Delhi,
8th November 1950.

I am sending herewith a copy of the letter which I have sent to the Prime Minister in regard to Tibet. You might also like to see in this connection an appreciation of the Communist policy which was prepared by the Intelligence Bureau in May last and another dealing with the new problems of internal security caused by the Chinese occupation of Tibet which has also been prepared by the Intelligence Bureau. I am, therefore, sending copies of the same. I am also sending a copy of the letter which we sent to the State Governments in July last after the Communist Party had announced its revised programme.

The Honourable
Shri C. Rajagopalachari,
Cabinet Minister,
New Delhi.

Copy.

C O P Y.

SECRET & PERSONAL.

No. 84 -DPM/50
1 Aurangzeb Road,
New Delhi, 7.11.50.

My dear Jawaharlal,

Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.

2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Govt. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Govt. as possible, but I regret to say, that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Govt. have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that, during the period covered by this correspondence, the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that, even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian Camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the U.N.O. and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa.

We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the U.N.O. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history, we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas has been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that Communists are as good as bad Imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon

Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our Western and north-eastern threat to security are still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and north-east--a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern or north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling and the Tribal Areas in Assam. From the point of view of communications, they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is, by no means, close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill-tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was, in no way, friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, therefore, the

situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send to the E.A. Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting Communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc. from them. They had to contend with difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the East or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese Communists and through them to other foreign Communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and Communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated Communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the methods by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problems of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.

6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them:

- (a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
- (b) An examination of our military position and such redistribution of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.

- (c) An appraisalment of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of these new threats.
- (d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence position perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
- (e) The question of Chinese entry into U.N.O. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer. There would probably be a threat in the U.N.O. virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
- (f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontiers. This would include the whole of the border, i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal Territory in Assam.
- (g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the States flanking those areas such as, U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
- (h) Improvement of our communications, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas, and with the frontier outposts.
- (i) Policing and intelligence of frontier posts.
- (j) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyantse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
- (k) The policy in regard to McMahon Line.

5. These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider questions of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g. we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that,

before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem for China and, therefore, might claim its first attention.

6. I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

Yours

Sd/- Vallabhbhai Patel.

The Hon'ble
Shri. Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister of India,
New Delhi.

V.



13
SECRET & PERSONAL

New Delhi,
Nov. 17, 1950.

Returned with the compliments
to Shri H.V.R. Iengar, ICS, Secretary,
Ministry of Home Affairs, to Shri
V. Shankar, ICS, Private Secretary to
the Hon'ble the Deputy Prime Minister
of India.

BNM

My dear Jawaharlal,

Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.

2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but, I regret to say, that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to inatill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that, during the period covered by this correspondence, the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that, even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian Camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the U.N.O. and in securing from the American assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the U.N.O. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism, perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and good-will. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history, we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas has been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have, on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that Communists are as good or as bad Imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our Western and north-eastern threat to security are still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and north-east a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.

4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern or north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling and the Tribal Areas in Assam. From the point of view of communications they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is, by no means, close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloids

prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill-tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was, in no way, friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Russia, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Imper to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting Communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc. from them. They had to contend with difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the East or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese Communists and through them to other foreign Communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and Communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated Communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus arises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the methods by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problems of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.

6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them:

(a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.

(b) An examination of our military position and such re-disposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly

with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.

(c) An appraisal of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of these new threats.

(d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence position perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.

(e) The question of Chinese entry into U.N.O. in view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer. There would probably be a threat in the U.N.O. virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.

(f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontiers. This would include the whole of the border i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal territory in Assam.

(g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the States flanking these areas such as, U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam.

(h) Improvement of our communications, road, rail, air and wireless in these areas, and with the frontier outposts.

(i) Policing and intelligence of frontier posts.

(j) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyantse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.

(k) The policy in regard to McMahon Line.

7. These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider questions of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g. we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem for China and, therefore, might claim its first attention.

8. I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct quick

148
5.

examination of other problems with a view to taking
early measures to deal with them.

Yours

Sd. VALLABHBHAI PATEL

The Hon'ble
Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru,
Prime Minister, India,
New Delhi.

G.

(19)
SECRET AND PERSONAL

DRAFT

821/50m/150
22.7.11.50

My dear Jawaharlal,

Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the Cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I ~~had not~~ ^{was able to} read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should ~~share with you~~ ^{let you know} what is passing through my mind.

Share

2. I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Govt. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese ^{Govt.} as possible, but, I regret to say, that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Govt. have tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intentions. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instil into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that, during the period covered by this correspondence, the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught ^{on} into Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgment, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of

of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible ^{person} believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. ^{Therefore, if the Chinese} ~~Whoever~~ ^{may} put faith in this, must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that, ^{even though} when we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them," this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian Camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into the U.N.O. and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the U.N.O. In spite of this, China is not convinced about our dis-^{ness}interestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, ^{suspicion of our motives} of fear. I doubt if we can go any further than we have

perhaps mixed
with a little
hostility.

done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.

3. In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history, we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas has been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about our frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to

be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along ^{the} Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have, on our side of the frontier, a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans or Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that Communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include important parts of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and Communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the Western Powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes ~~them~~ ^{it} ten times more dangerous. ~~Under~~ ⁱⁿ the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our Western and north-eastern threat to security are still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after ~~many~~ centuries, India's

defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and north-east ~~and~~ a Communist China which has definite ~~me~~ ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us. [4. Let us also consider the political conditions on this ^{potentially} ~~now~~ troublesome frontier. Our northern or north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, the Darjeeling and the Tribal Areas in Assam. From the point of view of communications they are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost ~~in~~ ^{unlimited} an ~~undefined~~ scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is, by no means, close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not ~~not~~ been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill-tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors have been in touch with them, but their influence was, in no way, friendly to

India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force; it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, the Soviet Russia, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgment, therefore, the situation is one in which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policy to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.

5. Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting Communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature etc. from them. They had to contend with difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the East or with the long seaboard. They ~~were not able to~~ shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese Communists and through them to other foreign Communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and Communists would

I have already
sent a letter to
Sardar Vallabhbhai
Patel regarding
this intelligence
Bureau's
appreciation
of this matter

now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated Communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the methods by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problems of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred. [6. It is, of course, impossible for me to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the ^{problem} ~~ques-~~ ^{questions} which, in my opinion, require early ^{solution} ~~answer~~ and round which we have to build our administrative or military ~~XXXXXXXXXX~~ policies and measures to implement them:

(a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.

(b) An examination of our military position and such redistribution of our

forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.

(c) An appraisalment of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of these new threats.

(d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence position perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.

(e) The question of ^{Chinese} entry into U.N.O. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claims any longer. There would probably be a threat in the U.N.O. virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.

(f) The political and administrative steps which we should take ^{to} in strengthening our northern and ~~southern~~ north-western frontiers. This would include the whole of the border i.e. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the Tribal Territory in Assam.

(g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the States flanking those areas such as, U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam.

(h) Improvement of our communications, road, rail, air and wireless ^{with} these areas, and the frontier outposts.

(i) Policing and intelligence of frontier ~~outposts~~.

(j) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.

(k) The policy in regard to McMahan Line.

5. These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider questions of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g. we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer ~~relations~~ ^{association} with Burma in order to strengthen the latter ~~inter~~ in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem for China and, therefore, might claim its first attention.

6. I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.

Yours

H.M.

24
SECRET.

(24)

**NEW PROBLEMS OF INTERNAL SECURITY CAUSED BY
THE CHINESE OCCUPATION OF TIBET.**

India occupies a very important position in the general pattern of world communism and next only to Russia and China. As early as 1923 Lenin after posing the question "Can we save ourselves from the impending conflict with these Imperialist countries", gave the answer in the following words: "In the last analysis the upshot of the struggle will be determined by the fact that Russia, India and China account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe and it is precisely this majority that during the past few years has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity so that in this respect there cannot be the slightest shadow of doubt what the final outcome of the world's struggle will be. In this sense the complete victory of Socialism is fully and absolutely assured". Lenin also said that the shortest way to Paris was through Peking and Delhi. In 1924 Moscow declared that India must stand at the head of free Eastern Republics. This view has been reiterated by Soviet leaders since 1923 on numerous occasions and even as late as 1949 Malenkov, the Communist leader next only to Stalin in Soviet Russia, stressed this aspect of the revolution. In fact, India is considered to be the pivotal point round which the South East Asia and the Middle East Asia must revolve not only because of her strategic position but also on account of her vast resources, man-power and moral influence. In articles published in the "Problems

1949

of Economics" in Moscow, it ^{was} ~~has been~~ stated that during the period between the first and second world war, China was in the vanguard of the revolutionary movement of the peoples of the colonies and semi colonies and now during the period between the second and the third world war, it ^{is} ~~is~~ India's turn to take its place. Consistent with these steadfastly held ideas, the USSR and International Communists can never give up their ambition of converting India into a Communist State and in fact they can never feel secure in their Socialism as long as India does not accept and practise the same creed. Just as India's struggle for freedom culminated not only in the achievement of independence for India but also for many neighbouring countries, and it is India's example which is inspiring freedom struggles in other colonial countries in Asia, similarly there is no doubt that India's conversion to the Communist faith will also develop all the neighbouring countries in communism. So long as India holds out these countries can also hold out, but if India goes they cannot resist. The International Communism therefore must do everything possible to convert India to communism. There is no question of their deviating from this idea by any amount of negotiation or diplomatic pressure. In all Cominform and Russian authoritative publications and even in the publications of the satellite countries, India has been described to be a colonial state, groaning under the heels of the Anglo-American Imperialists and the 'Nehru' Government as their lackeys. The Indian Communists have been repeatedly told to unite all progressive classes against the 'Nehru' Government, create agrarian troubles and initiate armed struggles which have been held to be the only way in which national liberation can be achieved. All groups in the Communist Party in India have accepted this directive and are trying to pool all their strength to follow it by creating new Telanganas

everywhere and put the countryside progressively on the rails of armed struggle. As has been seen repeatedly in the past, Russia and her satellites are quite willing to negotiate on their own terms but they have always achieved their aims by the application of force only.

2. [Soviet Russia now feels that India will be more swayed by the influence of China than of Russia and Mao Tse Tung will make a better leader for the Indian masses than even Stalin can. It is with this object that the Peking Liaison Bureau was established last year, that Mao Tse Tung has been given a dominating voice in the affairs of India and Far East and that the Indian Communists have been told by numerous Communist publications, as well as by the Cominform, in clear unambiguous words, to follow the China way to victory. If therefore the occupation of Tibet by the Communist forces gives to the world Communism any strategical and tactical advantages of furthering the cause of communism in India, all such advantages will be exploited legally and illegally to the fullest extent without any consideration for international conventions and even though the Chinese Government may continue to remain superficially in the friendliest terms with the Indian Government. And the occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communists does open up vast possibilities for creating internal disorders and disruptions within India.

3. Up till now India's northern frontier from Ladakh in the west to the Sadiya Hill Tracts in the east has been free from any dangers of external invasion or from even any subversive movements fostered by external forces. With Tibet as a weak and autonomous country, giving many facilities to India which no other independent country would give, India could rightly feel absolutely secure about its northern frontier and this sense of security ~~had been~~ ^{is best in} was reflected in all the policies followed with respect to this northern frontier and actions taken for its security in

these areas and on the understanding that no danger would come to India from the north very little security measures have been taken which in the altered circumstances will be found to be completely inadequate.

4. Within our borders in all these frontier areas live races and tribes who have been practically semi independent and who by religious, linguistic, cultural and ethnical ties are bound more with Tibet than with India. In fact, the hill tribes of the Sadiya Hill Tracts, the Bhutanis, the Sikkimis or the Ladakhis have little affinity with the Aryans of the Gangetic and the Brahmaputra Valleys. The tribes living in the Sadiya Hill Tracts have never been properly subordinated and India exercises only nominal authority over them leaving them free to live their own lives. If given a choice to affiliate either with India or with Tibet, under existing circumstances they are almost sure to vote for Tibet and not for India. Bhutan's foreign affairs are controlled by India, but this has been possible only because Bhutan's other neighbour, Tibet, was weak. With a new and aggressive Tibet under China's guidance there is every likelihood that Bhutan will change her attitude towards India and by all standards the Bhutanese are more akin to the Tibetans than to the Indians and given the freedom of choice there is no doubt in which direction her choice will lie. Sikkim is inhabited by a large number of Tibetans and ^{members of} the ruling family have all their marriage ties with the Tibetans. There is little to distinguish between the Sikkimese and the Tibetans. Kalimpong and Darjeeling were originally parts of Sikkim and a fair proportion of the population in these areas also consists of the Sikkimese and the Tibetans. Nepal, which forms the frontier with Bihar and U.P., has got a regime which is extremely unpopular and where the ruling family is sitting on the top of a volcano which may burst out at any moment. Similarly, Ladakh

is more a part of Tibet than of India.

5. [With an aggressive Chinese Communist Government in Tibet, intent on furthering the creed of International Communism in India and holding the belief that World Communism and so Communism in China can never be safe unless India becomes a Communist country and following the basic Communist creed that the International proletariat (which in other words means the Soviet and the Chinese Governments) must assist the peoples of all Colonial countries (which include India) in their fight for national liberation (which in India means the overthrow of the 'Nehru' Government), every method will be adopted to disrupt the integrity of India and what will be more opportune and easy than to foster trouble in these frontier areas where India's administrative control is not strong and where her cultural influence is less. All these tribes living the frontier regions will be directly encouraged to agitate for independence so that they can later be drawn into the Communist fold. Russia's method of solving the problem of small nationalities has been extremely successful and it appeals to all under-civilized tribes and races. Communist China has successfully prosecuted the same policy within its own frontiers and India must be prepared to meet this challenge. There are large numbers of Gurkhas who are residents of Tibet and just as the Chinese formed a Tibetan Liberation Army, similarly they after the occupation of Tibet will form a Nepalese Liberation Army and attempt to liberate Nepal where the present rulers can show very little resistance. There is reliable information that the Nepalese Communists are trying to go into Tibet to contact the Tibetan and Chinese Communists. Even on the eastern frontier of Assam, China claims the northern triangle of Burma, which is inhabited by the Kachins, as part of her

own territory and there are reports that some Kachin leaders have already gone to Yunnan and are receiving training under the Communists, probably to form a Kachin Liberation Army. Burmese Government will be able to offer little resistance to it. If Kachin goes under the Communists, the tribals living in the Naga Hills, Manipur and the Lushai Hills will start trouble because even now the Lushais, the Kukis and the Chins living on this frontier areas are trying for secession of their territories to Burma. They certainly have more ethnical and cultural ties with the population on the other side of the frontier than with the Aryans of India. Even the Ahoms have agitated for linking up with the Kachins to form an independent State. For the sake of her security, India must firmly retain her hold or influence in these areas because once India loses her control her entire belly will be opened up to direct attacks. Militarily also these areas can be held with comparatively smaller forces but once the Communists establish their hold in these areas the defence of the plains will become extremely difficult and will require large manpower. Communists will no doubt arm these tribals and make them the spearheads of their attacks on and frays into India. These areas will then be just as difficult to protect as the N.W.F.P. has been in the past.

6. [With China on India's long unguarded frontier, the Indian Communists will be in a good position to get help by the way of supply of arms, by the infiltration of trained agents and by direct contact with the Chinese Communists. The Indian Communists have been badly mauled during the last 2½ years and they are passing through a difficult period and there is definite information that they are wanting direct guidance from the foreign Communists. So far attempts to make such contacts have to a great extent been countered by Governmental action but with China

strongly entrenched in Tibet it will be extremely difficult to stop this contact. With the commencement of trouble in the frontier areas where India's armed forces will have to be moved, more Telengana struggles will be launched in India itself so as to dissipate India's Armed forces by wide dispersal. Communications and industries will be sabotaged to make the movement of troops difficult and to disrupt India's economy thereby creating wide dissatisfaction amongst the masses. These are not mere speculations because it is known that these firm instructions have been issued by Soviet Russia to the Indian Communists and the circulars issued by the C.P.I. show that the Indian Communists are preparing to carry out these directives. Therefore the occupation of Tibet by Communist China not only raises problems of security from external danger across ^{India's} long and practically unguarded frontiers ^{and} problems of security in the border tribal regions now under India's control but ^{also} very serious problems of internal security in the sub-continent itself. Suggestions that follow for taking measures against this three-fold danger ~~xxxxxx~~ cover many aspects of the problem, many of which are not the concern of the Intelligence Bureau but they are being made to provide material for the M.H.A. to make final proposals to the Government.

7. Administrative Measures.

Sadiya Hill Tracts.

Modern administrative measures should be introduced immediately. The area held by each tribe should be formed into a district and a District officer with all necessary staff should be posted. Police Stations should be opened and instead of continuing the old tribal system of maintaining law and order, modern Police methods of administration should be introduced. District officers should make a detailed survey of the economic needs of the areas under

31
3)

them and see that these needs are met by supplies from India so that economically these areas are tied to India and not to Tibet. Schools should be opened in which the languages to be taught will be both Hindi or Assamese and the tribal so that the inhabitants may gradually forge cultural links with the plains people. Hospitals and dispensaries should be opened and philanthropic missions, such as the Rama Krishna Mission, may be encouraged by payment of subsidies to open centres in these areas. The strength of the Assam Rifle battalions in these areas should be increased and each district should have the minimum equivalent of one battalion with reserves kept at strategic centres. In the Assam Rifles, the recruitment of northern Indians should be encouraged because in any conflict with the tribes the tribal element in these units may not be found to be very loyal, as has been experienced with the Tripura Rifles recently. These regions should continue to remain directly under the Central Government.

Manipur, Lushai and Naga Hills.

The existing administration in Manipur and Lushai Hills should be further strengthened and Police Stations should be opened in the Lushai Hills area. The economic needs of these areas should be studied and met from Indian sources. Indian language should be popularised through schools and other welfare measures should be undertaken. The Naga Hills area, which is at present unadministered, must be brought to the same level of administrations as has been proposed for the Sadiya Hill Tracts. These areas should be under the direct control of the Central Government.

Bhutan.

It is necessary to strengthen Bhutan's ties with India by changing the treaty, if possible, and placing more advisers in the Bhutan administration. More outlet for Bhutan's trade with India may be created at Government's initiative instead of leaving it to private enterprisers. Education and medical missions may open schools in Bhutan just as Christian Missions have been educating the tribals, aborigines and backward people in India and China for over a century. The new treaty should have a clause to enable India to post troops in Bhutan for protecting her from external dangers if such a ^{provision} ~~provision~~ does not already exist.

Sikkim.

India's control in this territory may be further tightened and the Sikkim Congress group, which owes allegiance to the Indian National Congress, may be encouraged. Here also, under Indian Government's efforts educational and medical missions may be established to forge more closely Sikkim's ties with India. Administration may be brought to the level of an Indian district. A strong contingent of troops should be posted in Sikkim as the highway from Tibet to India traverses Sikkim before entering Darjeeling district.

Nepal.

India's present treaty with Nepal allows for consultations in case of external danger. The present Nepal Government certainly does not welcome communism in its territory but is hardly in a position to resist Communist aggression. Therefore the Nepal Government will probably be only too willing to accept India's assistance in warding off this external danger. For improving internal resistance, a more democratic set-up is necessary. The consultations may give India facility to ask Nepal to allow her army to be trained by Indian officers in the same way as the Russians

are training the Czech and the Polish armies. India should provide equipment to the Nepalese army.

Kumaon Hills, Garhwal Hills and Himachal Pradesh.

The administration in these areas should be tightened by posting executive officers where there are none and opening up more Police Stations. The economic needs of these areas should also be studied and properly met and educational and medical facilities should be extended.

Ladakh.

The administration here should also be brought to the same level as in rest of India and police stations should be opened in this Valley. Economic, educational and medical measures may be taken as in the other areas.

b. Defence.

The Defence Department must be considering problems from its own angle but what needs to be emphasised is that the Communist world understands force and nothing else. They will be willing to negotiate but will follow Bismark's policy of always keeping a million bayonets behind to support their discussions and agreements can be reached only on their own terms. The defence needs of Assam, Bhutan and Sikkim, as well as Nepal, have to be closely studied. The presence of strong units ready to strike back will not only discourage any aggressive acts from across the border but will also keep the hostile elements within our own frontiers under subjugation.

c. Intelligence.

For both defence and internal security purposes, India should be in a position to collect reliable intelligence of Communist activities in China, Tibet, Burma, Nepal and all the frontier regions and their possible repercussions in India proper. For this purpose

the following measures are suggested:-

(i) Inside Tibet.

It is presumed that China will allow an Indian Consulate to work either at Lhasa or at Gyantse. There should be posted to this Consulate an Intelligence Officer of the experience of an Assistant Director of the Bureau. As Tibet cannot be immediately drawn behind an impenetrable iron curtain, the possibilities of collecting intelligence in that country will be great. This post should be linked with the Intelligence post at Kalimpong. Details of developing this intelligence and communication will be worked out in detail and are beyond the scope of this note.

(ii) Inside China.

There should be an Intelligence Officer of the rank and experience of Assistant Director in our Embassy in Peking with assistants in Shanghai, Hongkong and other places where we have Consulates or other offices. It will be impossible for the Embassy Officials without an Intelligence Officer to get full intelligence of intentions or contemplated actions which may be contrary to India's interest. In the present case of the invasion of Tibet the shortcomings of system of collecting intelligence by the Indian Embassy in Peking has been only too evident. In China also the possibilities of setting up a good intelligence system are good.

(iii) Inside Burma.

In the Indian Embassy in Rangoon should be posted an Intelligence Officer of the rank and experience of an Assistant Director, With the large Indian population practically all over Burma, a good intelligence system can easily be established. A branch will have to be opened in Kachin area. Links will be with the S.I.Bs. at Calcutta and Shillong. Details will be worked

out separately. (The British have their intelligence organisation both in China and Burma).

Q (iv) Inside Bhutan.

An Intelligence Officer of the rank of a D.C.I.O. should be posted here and may be attached to any mission which India may establish at Punakha. This post will be linked with the post at Kalimpong. Border watch posts will have to be established ^{in the north} to prevent infiltration.

(v) Inside Nepal.

An Assistant Director from the Bureau has already been posted at Khatmandu. In the consultations which Nepal Government will have with India, it may be decided that this officer should have full assistance of the Nepal authorities and would liaise fully with them. As the danger from Communists is same both to India and Nepal, therefore co-operation on this aspect should not at all be difficult. Our Embassy at Khatmandu is already in radio-telephonic communication with Patna and this post will be linked with our post at Patna. Nepal will have to be persuaded to open border watch posts ^{in the northern frontier}.

(vi) Within Indian Frontier.

A scheme for establishing frontier watch posts was prepared in the Bureau and approved by both the M.H.A. and M.E.A. The implementation of this scheme was however kept in abeyance due to financial reasons and also because it was believed that China would not take any immediate aggressive action against Tibet. As however the situation has radically changed, this scheme should be sanctioned immediately. It visualises the opening of watch posts all along the Indo-Tibetan border. ^{to} guard all ^{the} ^{forward} areas.

(vii) Within India.

The intelligence set-up inside India is good and is well posted with the activities of the Indian Communists. Improvements are constantly being made. No

special step is therefore necessary. All Branches will be alerted to be more vigilant about Communist activities. All attempts to establish Telangans must be frustrated by resolute and timely action. Gun-running must be stopped because without arms liberation armies cannot be set up. Every action should be taken to prevent contacts between the Indian and the Chinese Communists. (Dange has been found to be in contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi). China's invasion of Tibet should be exploited to prove the aggressive intentions of Communist China.

(viii) Registration of Tibetans & Chinese.

The Chinese are already being registered and the registration of Tibetans, who will become Chinese nationals after China occupies Tibet, should also be undertaken immediately. Restrictions should be placed on their

35/A

9 A. Communications.

In the frontier regions, except near Kalimpong and Gangtok (Sikkim) road communication is extremely difficult and consists mostly of foot or mule tracks and there is no telephone or telegraphic communication. For developing proper security measures it is necessary to open up roads in all these areas and also have a net-work of telephone and telegraph lines and wireless stations. The utility of well-developed communications in subordinating hostile tribes was well demonstrated by the policy which the British Army followed in the N.W.F.P. Actually on many occasions in the past the need for improving communications in these inaccessible areas was recognised by the Government but as there was no immediate danger to India's security from across these frontiers any expenditure incurred on this work was probably considered to be uneconomic. However, these communications are very necessary for security purposes in the changed circumstances and therefore the development of both road and tele-communication should be undertaken without delay.

of aggression is present; but these areas, like Telangana, may be important from internal security point of view. But for internal security work and even for operations against armed Communists and operations on the frontier tribal areas

-13-

special step is therefore necessary. All Branches will be alerted to be more vigilant about Communist activities. All attempts to establish Telangans must be frustrated by resolute and timely action. Gun-running must be stopped because without arms liberation armies cannot be set up. Every action should be taken to prevent contacts between the Indian and the Chinese Communists. (Dange has been found to be in contact with the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi). China's invasion of Tibet should be exploited to prove the aggressive intentions of Communist China.

(viii) Registration of Tibetans & Chinese.

The Chinese are already being registered and the registration of Tibetans, who will become Chinese nationals after China occupies Tibet, should also be undertaken immediately. Restrictions should be placed on their movements in and out of India and it will be necessary to exercise strict vigilance over the large Chinese population in India and make them conform to all the restrictions which the Act imposes. This may look to be too drastic but proper discretion can be utilised in making the movements of innocuous Chinese as easy as possible whilst exercising real surveillance over the suspects.

10. Other Measures.

With the Chinese army in Tibet, which is used to fighting in mountainous territories, probably certain regrouping of India's Armed Forces will be necessary. As these are however limited, unless new units are raised, which will mean incurring large expenditure, withdrawals have to take place from Commands where no external danger of aggression is present; but these areas, like Telangana, may be important from internal security point of view. But for internal security work and even for operations against armed Communists and operations on the frontier tribal areas

areas, regular army is not necessary, nor is it advisable to dissipate the Army's strength in this way. Military Police Units of the type, which have been raised in Bihar, U.P., W.Bengal, Madras and Delhi and also the C.R.P. and which are already operating in Hyderabad, should be sufficient to deal with these internal disorders and for maintaining vital communications. It is therefore necessary to examine urgently the question of increasing the Armed Police strength in U.P., Bihar, Bengal and Assam, increasing the strength of the Assam Rifles, Tripura Rifles and raising new Units as Manipur Rifles and increasing the strength of the C.R.P. The expenditure incurred on maintaining such Military Police will be much less compared to that of maintaining the same number of troops and for the purpose for which they are intended they will be equally effective. This will leave the Army to concentrate itself on its training and fighting external aggression, if that contingency arises, and for which preparations have to be kept ready. Details of these internal security forces can be separately worked out.

11. This note is not meant to be alarmist but only for the purpose of suggesting precautionary measures for meeting the dangers which are inherent in Communist China's occupation of Tibet. As has been stressed at the beginning, International Communists can never give up their idea of drawing India within their fold and can never feel secure till they have succeeded in achieving this object and therefore they will follow every method possible, legal or illegal, conforming or not conforming to international conventions to further their aims and experience has shown in Korea and Indo-China that Chinese Communists are quite prepared to give material aid to the local Communist Parties in the latter's attempt to seize power by force. The

measures suggested are meant to resist the implementation of any such aggressive intentions. Some of the measures, suggested above, such as setting up better administration in frontier areas and efficient intelligence organisations in the frontier regions and outside our frontiers will take a long time for full implementation and therefore decision about the measures necessary may be taken immediately so that no further time may be lost in making a start with those of the suggested security measures which are approved.