


# SRĪ BHĀSHYAM

**Vol. II—Chaps. II—IV**




सत्यमेव जयते

SRĪ BHĀSHYAM

TRANSLATED INTO ENGLISH

BY

DIWAN BAHADUR V. K. RAMANUJACHARI



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**Vol. II—Chaps. II—IV**


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## AT KUMBAKONAM

1930

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सत्यमेव 1680

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
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
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# ERRATA—SRĪ BHĀSHYAM

## CHAPTERS II, III & IV

<i>Reference</i> PAGE	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
452, under <i>sūtra</i> 7, line 4	If you recognise, that	Delete comma
457, line 7	sub-section 1	sub-section 2
486, line 5 from the bottom	the atme is	the atma is,
554, line 8	<i>paṣupata</i>	<i>pūṣupata</i>
579, line 7	views	view
586, line 3	<i>chando</i>	<i>chāndo</i>
601, line 8	<i>sūtra</i> , (II-2-3)	Delete brackets
604, line 15	2 (i)	2
607, line 6	The opponent, expla- nation	The opponent's ex- planation
660, line 5	परामिध्यानात्	परामिध्यानात् ।
687, 19—21	I meditate on the great <i>Purusha</i> , Who shines like the sun, and Who has a body made of a substance other than matter. Meditating on Him one	I know this, <i>viz.</i> , meditating here on that great <i>Purusha</i> alone, who shines like the sun, and who is far remov- ed from <i>tamas</i> , one

<i>Reference</i>	<i>For</i>	<i>Read</i>
PAGE		
707, line 4	meditated	meditated on
766, line 7	in (IV—1-3)	Remove the brackets
787, line 4	<i>mṛitya</i>	<i>mṛityu</i>
798, line 9	heaven (see	heaven see (
817, note, line 4	<i>prayāgas</i>	<i>prayājas</i>
865, note (2), line 2	in his body	insert a comma after body
872, last line but 4	vessels	vessel
884, line 6	appear	appears



सत्यमेव जयते

## CHAPTER II

### SECTION I

IN the first chapter it was established that the highest *Ātmā* was the only cause of the evolution of the universe. The purpose of the second chapter is to refute the objections which are or may be urged against this conclusion. The first section deals with the objections of those outside the *vedic* fold ; the second demolishes the theories of evolution put forward by them ; and the last two sections remove the doubts felt by those within the *vedic* fold. The first two sections deal with the question from the point of view of the cause, while the remainder deals with it from the point of view of the products, and show that they have evolved in response to the will of the highest *Ātmā*, omitting of course those things which the *upanishads* state to be eternal. In the first two subsections the objection is answered that the theory of evolution is inconsistent with the *sāṅkhya* and *yoga*

systems. The remaining eight sub-sections reply to the arguments urged.

### SUB-SECTION 1

1. स्मृत्यनवकाशदोषप्रसङ्ग इति चेन्नान्यस्मृत्यनवकाशदोष-  
प्रसङ्गात् ।

If it be contended " This will result in the charge of ignoring the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*," the reply is " No ; it will result in the charge of ignoring other *smritis*."

The *vedāntin* raises an *objection* : He argues thus : It was decided in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *veda* should be ignored (*Intro.*, para 10). The *sāṅkhya* replies : This conclusion holds, when a text of the *veda* is capable of itself of conveying its meaning. But in the *vedānta* the matter is difficult to understand ; and it cannot be stated for certain that this is the meaning in a particular place. To rely on the *smṛiti* of the great seer, and in case of conflict with the *veda*, to treat the latter as meaning something else is not objectionable. *Kapila* fully accepts the various *karmas* taught in the earlier part of the *veda* as the means to one's advancement, like *agnihotra*, *darśa pūrṇamāsa*, *agnishṭoma* and the like ; and he is described in all sacred literature as our best friend. His *smṛiti* has been written with the special object of pointing out the highest good, and its means. Without its help we, who have read but little, and are of dull intelligence, cannot ascertain the meaning of the *vedānta* ; if we take the

superficial meaning, we shall have to ignore the whole of that *smṛiti*. *Objection*. By following this *smṛiti* the *smṛitis* of *Manu* and others, which state the highest *Ātmā* as the only cause of the evolution of the world, will have to be ignored. *Reply*. Those *smṛitis* elucidate the earlier portion of the *veda* treating of *dharma*, and will serve their purpose; but this *smṛiti* treats only of truth; and if it be not accepted, it will become wholly useless. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra*.

The second half of the *sūtra* gives the reply. The other *smṛitis* are the *smṛiti* of *Manu*, *bhagavad-gītā*: *mahābhārata*, *viṣṇu purāṇa*, and *āpastamba dharma* (1).

(1) These *smṛitis* teach the following:

*Manu*.—He begins with the statement 'This was in the condition of *tamas*'; and then observes 'When the time for creation came, *Bhagavān*, who exists of himself, appeared in the form of *avykta*; and in order to make the universe of diversity appear, He moved *tamas* and willed to appear as *mahat*, *ahankāra*, and the great elements. He considered; and desiring to create diverse products from His own body, He created first the materials for making the egg-shaped universe, and gave them the capacity for its formation (I-5, 6 and 8).

*Bhagavad-gītā*.—I am the place from which all the worlds go forth; the place in which all the worlds dissolve (VII-6). I am the place from which everything goes forth; and everything acts as directed by Me (X-8).

*Mahābhārata*.—The question is put 'All this world consisting of movables and immovables—from whom was it created; and at the time of rest to whom does it go; tell me this, grandfather'. The reply was—"Nārāyaṇa, with the world as His body, without limitations, and eternal."

The authors were our best friends, and their works follow the teaching of the *veda*, and were written to elucidate its meaning. The ignoring of them will result, if we follow the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*, which conflicts with *vedic* teaching. And this will be a very serious offence. Elucidation means to bring home the meaning conveyed; and this cannot be done by a work which conflicts with it.

2. The remark that these works serve another purpose cannot be admitted. They enjoin *dharma*s as the worship of the highest *Ātmā* (1); but unless they describe the highest *Ātmā*, who is to be worshipped, their injunctions will serve no purpose. Even the

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“From Him *avykta* with the three *guṇas* came forth”; *avykta* is dissolved in *Brahma*, known as *Puruṣa* and without action.”

*Parāṣara*.—The world came forth from *Vishṇu*; it rests on Him alone; He sustains and destroys this world; He is the world (I-1-32).

*Āpastamba*.—All living beings are the bodies of Him, who abides in the cavity of the heart, who cannot be injuriously affected, and who is free from blemishes; . . . from Him all bodies come forth; He, the root, ever exists, and undergoes no destruction.

(1) This is stated as follows :

Man reaches the goal, worshipping with his own *karma* (work) that Being, from whom all that lives comes forth, and by whom all this world is pervaded (*bhagavad-gītā*, XVIII-46): Meditate on *Deva Nārāyaṇa* in bathing and in other actions; by doing so one attains the world of *Brahma*; and he does not return here (*i.e.*; to *samsāra*) (*dakṣa smṛiti*). Those men, that intent on doing their *karma*, worship you in order to be released, overcome all this *māyā*, (*vishṇu*, V-30-16).

*karmas*, that yield fruits to be gathered by men of the world here, or in *svarga*, are His worship (1).

3. The praise of *Kapila* in sacred literature does not count for much. *Bṛihaspati* is cited in sacred literature as an example in referring to those that possess extraordinary learning; and if the opponent's argument were valid, the *veda* should be elucidated by the athiestical *lokāyata* written by him.

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*Opponent.* *Kapila* saw by the merit of his *yoga* things as they are: The next *sūtra* replies:

2. इतरेषांचानुपलब्धेः ।

But because it (what *Kapila* saw) was not seen by others.

Many like *Manu*, who by the merit of their *yoga* perceived the true nature of *tatvas*, high and low, and who are well known in the *veda* as the authors of works that serve as medicine for the ills of all the world, did not see truth as he saw it. His perception being opposed

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(1) Those that worship other beings with love and fervour, they too worship Me alone; but not in the manner directed by the *veda*. For, I am the Being worshipped in all the *yajnas*; I alone give the fruits; but they do not know me as I am; they therefore lose the full benefit of the worship (*bhagavad-gītā*, IX-23 and 24); *Achyuta*! you who are in the forms of all *devas*, you are ever worshipped with *yajnas*; you alone receive what is offered to *devas* and *pitṛis*; you who bear the forms of the *pitṛis* and *devas* (*vishṇu*, V-20-95).



to the *veda*, was due to misapprehension. The conclusion as to its teaching arrived at cannot be shaken.

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## SUB-SECTION 2

### 3. एतेन योगः प्रत्युक्तः ।

By this the objection to the rejection of the *yoga smṛiti* is answered.

The reason for adding a *sūtra* on this point is thus explained : *Yoga smṛiti* recognises the existence of an all-controlling Being ; it enjoins meditation taught in the *upanishads* as the means to release ; and its author is the four-faced one, whose special function is to spread the knowledge of the whole of the *veda* in the world. It may be presumed therefore that his *smṛiti* should be followed. The *reply* is that it teaches that matter evolves without being directed by the highest *Ātmā* from within ; that it regards Him as only the operative cause ; and that in the meditation, which it teaches, and which is differentiated from other meditations by the objects on which the mind dwells, the *jīva* is not regarded as ruled by Him from within, and *Brahma* is not regarded as being the material cause of the world and as the seat of all good qualities. The teaching is therefore opposed to the *veda* ; and it may be presumed that the four-faced one also, being a *jīva* in bondage, was influenced by the *guṇas-rajās* and *tamas*. His *yoga smṛiti* should therefore be rejected like his *purāṇa*, which labours under the same defect.

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## SUB-SECTION 3

## 4. न विलक्षणत्वादस्य तथात्वं च शब्दात् ।

No; because this (the world) is dissimilar; and this is taught in the *upanishads*.

The opponent, having failed, now resorts to argument. The conclusion that the world is a product that has evolved from the highest *Ātmā* is not sound. This world, consisting of matter and *jīvas*, is perceived to be non-intelligent, impure, subject to another's control and full of suffering. The highest *Ātmā*, on the other hand, is described by you as all-knowing, as opposed to all evil, as the ruler of all, and as full of bliss. The world is thus entirely dissimilar to *Him*. How can it then come forth from *Him*? On this point one need not depend upon sense-perception only; the dissimilarity is seen from the *veda* also—

The intelligent and the non-intelligent (*āna.*, VI-3); So those *bhūtas* (including the organs) rest on the *jīvas*, and the *jīvas* on *praṇa* (the highest *Ātmā*) (*kaushī.*, II-6); On the same tree man, immersed, grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects. When he sees the other, the ruler of all, pleased with his actions, and sees His greatness to be such and such, his grief passes away (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-2); The *ātmā*, who is ruled, is bound from his desire for enjoyment (*śvetā.*, I-8).

It is observed that a product is not dissimilar to its cause. Examples. A jar is similar to the lump of earth from which it is made (1), and a ring is similar to the

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(1) In support of the contention that the world-cause should be similar to the world, and that *pradhāna* should be that cause in accordance with *Kapila's smṛiti*, the need of

piece of gold, that is its cause. Hence, the world, that is dissimilar to *Brahma*, cannot be a product made from Him, and *pradhāna*, which is similar to the world, should be accepted as the cause in accordance with the *smṛiti* of *Kapila*.

2. Here three objections are raised, which the opponent answers :

(i) When it is decided from the *veda* that *Brahma* is the only cause of the universe, it should be accepted that the universe too, which has come forth from Him, possesses intelligence. It exists in jars and the like, but is dormant, as the attribute *jñāna* of a *jīva* is dormant, when he sleeps or falls into a trance. This is the distinction between intelligent beings and non-intelligent objects. Hence, the universe is not dissimilar

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*tarka* is emphasised by the opponent. He observes : Though the *veda* is independent authority, and deals with matters beyond our senses, it should nevertheless use *tarka* ; for all sources of knowledge (*pramāṇa*), only when helped by *tarka*, enable one to arrive at a decision in some matters. *Tarka* is a help to a source of knowledge, and determines that it shows a particular thing, by discussing either its nature or the materials, from which that thing is known. It is known also as *ūha*. Its utility is common to all sources of knowledge ; but testimony needs it specially in all cases, as its meaning depends upon certain conditions—viz., (i) The sentence must be complete, and should not need another word to convey its meaning ; (ii) the words that make up the sentence should be spoken at the same time ; and (iii) it must not state what is impossible. *Manu* points out its value thus—‘One that examines with the help of *tarka* knows *dharma* ; but not others.’ The *veda* also, when it enjoins *manana* (thinking), refers to fixing its teaching in the mind with the help of *tarka*.

to *Brahma*. *Reply*. This is not a sound view. Intelligence is never observed in jars and other objects ; and this proves that it does not exist at all. For the same reason it cannot be contended that they have the capacity to possess intelligence. For, when a capacity does not produce an effect at any place and at any time, how can it be said to exist ? Further, when it is known that the *veda* shows *Brahma* to be the material cause of the universe, one may state that jars and other objects possess intelligence in a dormant condition, or that they have the capacity for it. When this fact is known for certain, one may state that the *veda* shows *Brahma* to be the material cause of the universe. This will be arguing in a circle.

(ii) What is meant by similarity between the cause and the product, by the absence of which you state that *Brahma* cannot be the material cause of the universe. Does it refer to agreement in all respects or in any one respect ? The former alternative will not do ; for then the relation of cause and product cannot subsist. In a jar made of a lump of earth, the lump condition does not continue. The latter alternative also should be given up ; for the universe and the highest *Ātmā* agree in being substances that exist. *Reply*. They must agree in that respect, by which the cause is distinguished from other substances. The character, by which a piece of gold is distinguished from a lump of earth, continues in the ornaments made of it. Here the highest *Ātmā* is opposed to all evil, is

all-knowing, is full of bliss, and controls all ; while the world is just the reverse.

(iii) The relation of cause and product is found between things, that are dissimilar : from the intelligent *jīva* hair, nails and teeth, which are non-intelligent, come forth ; from a lump of non-intelligent cow-dung the intelligent scorpion is generated ; from the intelligent spider the non-intelligent web issues forth. *Reply.* In all these cases the relation of cause and product is found in the non-intelligent element only.

A by-stander offers an explanation. What is regarded as non-intelligent does possess intelligence. The *veda* says “To him the earth said” ; “water desired.” “These *prāṇas*, quarrelling as to who was the greatest among them, went to the four-faced *Brahmā*.” Those, that read the *purāṇas*, speak of rivers, seas and hills also as possessing intelligence. The opponent replies :

### 5. अभिमानिव्यपदेशस्तु विशेषानुगतिभ्याम् ।

But here reference is made to controlling beings (*devatās*). This is known from the epithet applied, and from the entry of these beings into them.

Every material thing is under the control of an intelligent being known as *devatā* ; and the words ‘earth,’ and ‘water’ refer to the beings that control them. In the *chāndogya* reference is made to fire, water and earth in the words, “These three *devatās*”

(VI-3-2). The epithet *devatās* shows that the term 'earth' denotes not merely earth, but also the being that controls it. 'All *devatās* quarrelled as to who was the greatest among them.' 'Those *devas* knowing greatness to be in *prāṇa*.' Also, "Agni, becoming speech, entered the mouth; the sun, becoming the sense of sight, entered the eyes; *vāyu*, becoming *prāṇa*, entered the nostrils" (*aitareya*, 1-2-4). Hence by the use of the epithet and by the statement of entry of beings into what they control, it should be decided that reference is made to these beings in the texts quoted.

The objection raised in the first *sūtra* therefore remains.

These two *sūtras* state the objection of the *sāṅkhya*. The next *sūtra* is the reply of the author of the *sūtras*:

### 6. दृश्यते तु ।

But it is seen (the relation of cause and product is seen in things entirely dissimilar).

A worm springs from a fly, which is dissimilar.

*Sāṅkhya*.—Have I not stated that the relation of cause and product appears in the non-intelligent element only; and that there is therefore similarity. *Reply*. True, you did say so; but the similarity which you have in your mind, does not exist. You apprehended that if similarity in any particular were accepted, everything would be similar to everything else, and that everything could be made of everything else. You therefore

stated that there must be similarity in a character by which the cause is distinguished from other things. This restriction is not found in the example given. For a common character, such as is seen in a lump of earth and a jar, or in a piece of gold and a crown, is not found in the fly and worm, or in the cow-dung and scorpion. Hence, the universe may evolve from *Brahma*, though it is dissimilar to Him.

On the receipt of this reply, the opponent raises two objections, which are stated and refuted in the next three *sūtras*.

7. असदितिचेन्न प्रतिषेधमात्रत्वात् ।

If it be contended "The product was previously non-existent," the reply is—"No; because the need for similarity only is denied."

The first objection is this: If you recognise, that the world may evolve from *Brahma*, who is dissimilar, then the cause and the product being different substances, the world did not exist in *Brahma*; and you give up your theory that a product exists in its cause. *Reply*. It is not so; what was denied in the preceding *sūtra* is merely the view that the cause and product should invariably be similar; but it was not stated that the product is a substance different from the cause. The view that *Brahma*, the cause, becomes by evolution the world, which is not similar to Him, has not been abandoned. In the instance given, though the fly and

worm are dissimilar, they are one substance, as are an ear-ring and the piece of gold of which it is made.

The second objection is stated :

8. अपीतौ तद्वत्प्रसङ्गादसमञ्जसम् ।

If your view be accepted, in dissolution and evolution,

(1) undesirable things must result as in the world.

The *veda* will become mere prattle.

The meaning is: if the cause and the product be admitted to be one substance, then *Brahma* becomes the world in evolution, and the world becomes *Brahma* in dissolution; and all the conditions belong to Him alone. The impurity of matter and the misery of the *jivas* must be found in *Brahma*; as the character of the ear-ring is found in the piece of gold. *Vedic* texts, which in one place state that *Brahma* is ever pure and bliss, and in another place that He is not so (2), cannot be regarded as anything but absurd.

(1) Though the *sūtra* refers to dissolution only, the intention is to refer to evolution too; for it is preceded by dissolution; for in the texts 'Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1); Before creation this was *ātman*; one only (*aitareya*, I-1-1); we see that dissolution is first described and then evolution.

(2) Who knows everything and every (attribute) of everything (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-10); He is free from *karma*, and free from old age and death (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5); He has no body or senses; His equal or superior is not seen (*śveta.*, VI-8); of them one eats the ripe fruit (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-1); The *ātman*, who is ruled, is bound from his desire for enjoyment (*śveta.*, I-8); grieves, bewildered with the attraction of worldly objects (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-2).



2. *Objection.* As *Brahma* is the cause and the product only as clothed in the matter and *jīva* elements, which form His body, the faults pointed out pertain only to these elements, but do not affect *Brahma* in either condition. *Reply.* The relation of body and *ātmā* does not subsist between the universe and *Brahma*; for the matter and *jīva* elements cannot be the body of *Brahma*. A body is the means for experiencing the fruits of *karma*-pleasure or pain; it is the seat of the senses, and is supported by *prāṇa* with its fivefold activity; and it is an aggregate of earth and the other elements. A body of this description only is well-known to be a body in worldly usage and in the *veda*. *Brahma* has no *karma* (1) and has not to experience its fruits; His enjoyment does not depend upon the help of the senses; and He has no *prāṇa*. Hence the matter and *jīva* elements cannot form His body. Among these elements there are many things that do not come within the definition of body. Straw and wood, among the unintelligent products formed out of the compounded five elements, and the finest forms of the uncompounded elements are not the seat of the senses; and the latter are not aggregates of earth and the other elements; in the case of the *jīva*, who is only *jñāna* (shining

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(1) He is free from *karma*, and free from old age (*chāndo.*, viii-1-5); The other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-1); He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and He takes; but has no hands or feet (*śveta*, III-19); He is indeed without *prāṇa* and without mind (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-2).

substance) none of these things is possible ; much less his being a body.

3. Here the objector puts forward other definitions of body. First, a body is the place, in which one has experience (*bhoga*). *Reply*. A house is a place, in which one experiences pleasure and pain ; this would be a body under your definition : but it is not known to be a body in worldly usage. *Objector*. That place is a body, remaining in which alone one has experience of pleasure and pain. *Reply*. When one enters the body of another, and experiences pleasure and pain, that body is the seat of his experience ; but it is not known to be his body. In regard to *Brahma*, whose bliss exists of itself, and is eternal and unlimited, the matter and *jiva* elements cannot be the invariable seat of His enjoyment. The same objection holds to the definition of body as the mere means of experience.

4. *Another definition*. That is a body of a person, on whose will its existence as an object, its continuance and movements depend. As on the will of *Brahma* the existence of all objects as objects, their continuance and movements depend, they form His bodies. *Reply*. Even this is not sound. Objects known as bodies do not depend for their existence as objects on the will of their owners ; the movements of a body affected by illness do not depend upon the will of its owner ; the continued existence of a dead body does not depend upon the will of the departing *ātma* ; an image depends upon the will of an intelligent person for its coming into existence, for its continuance and movements ; but it is not known as

his body ; and finally the *jīva* being eternal, his existence as a *jīva* does not depend upon the will of *Brahma* ; and he cannot be His body.

5. *Objector.* That is a body of a person, which is supported and controlled by him alone, and which exists for his service only. *Reply.* Action answers this description ; but it is not a body. Further, it is stated that *Brahma* has no body. ' Without a body, He dwells in bodies ; enduring He is present in perishable things (*kāṭha.*, 1-2-22) ; He is without hands or feet ; but he goes and takes ' (*śveta.*, 3-19). Hence, the relation of body and *ātmā* between the universe and *Brahma* is impossible, and even if it be possible, the imperfections resulting from connection with a body cannot be escaped from. If therefore the *upaniṣads* state Him to be the material cause of the universe, they will become absurd.

To this objection the next *sūtra* replies.

### 9. ननुदृष्टान्तभावात् !

But no ; because an analogy exists in explanation.

The same Being may exist in two conditions ; and yet the elements, to which good and evil pertain, may be different ; and an analogy in explanation of this may be pointed out. *Jīvas* dwell in material vehicles ; and the changes that take place, as they grow—youth, manhood, old-age—relate to the vehicle, not to the *ātmā* within ; perception of things, and experience of pleasure and pain pertain to the *ātmā*, but

not to the body. And the expressions used 'He is born a *deva*; he is born a man; and the same man was a baby; he is now a youth; and hereafter he will be old' have their primary meanings. For the *ātmā* clothed in a material vehicle is called a *deva* or man. This will be explained in chapter III, section 1, sub-section 1. Similarly, though *Brahma* changes from one condition to another, the existence of good or evil in one or another element is fixed. *Brahma* has matter and *jivas* as His bodies, and He is their *ātmā*. Expansion and contraction of consciousness take place in the *jiva* element; and the changes from the subtle to the gross condition and back again to the subtle condition occur in the matter-element. But these defects of the body do not touch *Brahma*, the *ātmā*. And omniscience and bliss belong to Him and not to His vehicles.

2. The objection stated by the opponent in paras. 2 to 5 under the preceding *sūtra* is not sound. All the *upanishads* state everything to be the body of the highest *Ātmā*, whether it be a material product or a *jiva*; and whether it be in the subtle or gross condition. See the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7). This mentions material products and *jivas* one by one, and states them to be the bodies of *Brahma* (1). The

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(1) Who stands in earth; . . . whose body the earth is; . . . who stands in *viñāna* (*jiva*); whose body *viñāna* is; . . . who stands in *ātmā*; whose body the *ātmā* is.

*subāla upanishad* follows the same course, and closes with the remark 'He, the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, etc., (1). The same teaching is given by the *smṛitis* (2). In the world also the term 'body' (*śarīra*) is not confined, like the term jar, to objects possessing the same form; but it is used to denote objects entirely different from one another in form, like insects, flies, snakes, men, beasts and the like; and it cannot be said that it is used in a secondary sense. Hence the connotation of the term should be determined, so as to cover all the cases, in which the term 'body' has been used either in the world or in the *veda*.

3. The definitions given by you do not satisfy this condition, as shown below :

(i) A body is that, which helps one to enjoy the fruits of past *karma*. This definition has been framed so as to cover the cases of *jīvas*, that are bound; but it is not applicable to *Brahma* or freed *jīvas*; for their bodies are taken up at their mere pleasure, but not for working out *karma*; and they have no *karma*. That freed *jīvas* take up bodies at their mere pleasure is

(1) Who moves within earth; whose body the earth is; . . . he, the inner ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, dwells in the highest heaven; has a shining body; has no equal or superior. He is *Nārāyaṇa*.

(2) All the world is your body (*rāmāyaṇa*); which water is the body of *Vishṇu* (*vishṇu*, II-12-37); all that is indeed the body of *Hari* (*Ibid.*, I-22-38); all those are His body (*Ibid.*, I-22-86); He considered, and desiring to create diverse products from His body (*manu.*, I-8); 'His body' means subtle matter, which forms His body.

known from texts like 'He becomes one' (*chāndo.*, vii-26-2).

(ii) A body is a compound of earth and other elements. This does not cover the case of *Brahma*, the bodies taken up by whom in *avatāra* are not so made (1).

(iii) A body is what is supported by *prāṇa* in a five-fold form. This does not cover the case of the vegetable kingdom; for though *prāṇa* does exist in vegetables, yet it does not assume a five-fold form in them. If the definition be merely that which is supported by *prāṇa*, it will leave out the *jīvas* and *prakṛiti*, with its products *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, ether, air, fire, water and earth, which are all bodies of *Brahma*.

(iv) A body is the support of the senses. If this means the possession of senses or motor organs capable of producing sensation or action, the definition does not include the case of *Ahalyā*, and others, who were turned into stones or logs of wood as punishment for past sins. If it means merely the possession of the senses, or motor organs, it will exclude the bodies of *Brahma* referred to under the preceding head.

4. A proper definition, which will cover all cases, is the following: A body is that substance, which an intelligent person in every way supports, controls and uses for his own purposes, and which exists only to serve him. To this definition a few objections have been raised. First, it will not apply to a diseased body,

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(1) The body of the highest *Ātmā* is not an aggregate of the elements (*mahābhārata*).

which its owner is unable to control? *Reply.* The power to control exists; but it is for the time being obstructed.

*Example.* Fire has the power to burn but owing to obstruction this may not be observed sometimes. Secondly, the definition does not cover a dead body. *Reply.* On the departure of the *jīva* the body begins to decompose, and will soon disappear. Because a portion of what was previously a body remains, it is referred to as a body.

5. Hence, as everything in the universe is in every way supported and controlled by *Brhama* for His own purposes, and as it exists only to serve Him, it forms His body. The text “Without a body . . . in perishable bodies” (*kātha.*, I-2-22) denies the existence of a body brought about by *karma*; but it has no reference to the body formed of the universe; for everything is stated to be His body in the *upanishads* referred to above. This will be explained in the sub-sections that follow. These two *sūtras* state what will be proved in sub-section 7 of this section.

#### 10. स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ।

And because the opponent's theory is faulty.

The theory of evolution of the universe from *Brahma* should be accepted, not merely because it is free from defect; but also because evolution from *pradhāna* is objectionable.

According to this theory evolution cannot take place. In this theory the *jīva* is not subject to change, and is mere *jñāna* (a shining substance); but by the near presence of matter, he regards its attributes as

belonging to himself; and this delusion brings about evolution. What is this near presence of matter? Does it mean its mere existence, or some change in it, or some change in the *jiva*? The last alternative must be ruled out, as the *jiva* does not change. The second alternative is equally untenable; because the change is the effect of the *jiva's* delusion, and cannot therefore be its cause. The first alternative, if admitted, would mean that even the freed *jiva* will be deluded. This matter will be explained more fully under chapter II, section 2, *sūtra* 8. Hence the *sāṅkhya's* theory must be abandoned in favour of the theory of the *upanishads*.

### 11. तर्कप्रतिष्ठानादपि ।

Also for the reason that no final conclusion can be reached by mere argument.

The *buddhist*, the *nyāya*, the *jaina*, the *sāṅkhya* and the *yoya* schools, depending on mere argument, demolish one another. It may therefore be concluded that it is profitless to depend upon mere argument.

### 12. अन्यथानुमेयमिति चेदेवमप्यनिर्मोक्षप्रसङ्गः ।

If it be stated "the theory can be maintained with fresh arguments not open to the criticisms levelled against it," the reply is "even so there will be no escape."

It may be presumed that persons may exist in other places or at other times, who are cleverer in argument; and that they will demolish his pet theory easily. Hence, in matters which are beyond the senses, one must depend on testimony alone; and resort to argument merely for its elucidation. This is stated by *Manu*



‘He who examines the teaching of *dharma* given in the *veda* and in the *smṛitis* with arguments (*tarka*) which are not opposed to the *śāstra* in the form of the *veda*, knows *dharma*, but not another who does not do so (XII-106).

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#### SUB-SECTION 4

### 13. एतेन शिष्टापरिग्रहा अपि व्याख्याताः ।

By this (refutation of the *sāṅkhya* theory) the arguments of the remaining schools also, which are not based upon the *veda*, are refuted.

The need for this additional *sūtra* arose from the agreement among a number of schools that *atoms* (*parama āṇu*) are the ultimate cause, and from the possible contention that the argument relating to it cannot be so easily dismissed. The *reply* is that in spite of agreement on this one point there are irreconcilable differences as to the nature of the atoms. For instance, there are the following views: that they do exist, and that they do not exist; that they are *jñāna* (shining things), and that they are *jada* (not shining things); that they exist only for a minute and then perish, and that they are permanent; that they are of one character, and that they combine inconsistent characters; and that they are real, and that they are unreal. The remark that it is futile to rely on mere argument is fully justified.

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## SUB-SECTION 5

The *sāṅkhya* appears again and pleads: In *sūtra* 9 of this section it was stated that *Brahma* has bodies made of matter and *jivas*; that He is the cause, when the elements of His body are in a subtle condition; and that he becomes the universe, when they come into a gross condition. If *Brahma* had bodies, he must, as the *jiva* does, experience pleasure and pain, that are caused by the possession of a body, and this cannot be avoided.

2. He anticipates an objection. This question was settled in *sūtra*, I-2-8. He *replies*—no. What was settled in that *sūtra* was that *Brahma* does not become liable to suffering on the ground that He resides within the body of another for the purpose of being meditated on; but here *Brahma* has a body of His own like a *jiva*; and the possession of a body must subject its owner to the experience of pleasure and pain. The changes undergone by the body may not touch the *ātmā* within it; but every one has seen that a *jiva* experiences pleasure, when the elements of his body are well-balanced, and pain when they are out of gear. And this is confirmed by the *veda*.

From one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart; and one that is without a body they do not touch (*chūndo.*, VIII-12-1).

Hence on the theory that *Brahma* in a body formed of matter and *jivas* is the world-cause, there will be no distinction between His nature and the nature of the *jiva*. On the theory that *Brahma* alone is the cause, like

the lump of earth and the piece of gold, all the undesirable results that attend on the world must be found in Him. The *sāṅkhya*'s theory is therefore preferable. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra* :

14. भोक्तापत्तेरविभागश्चेत्स्याल्लोकवत् ।

If it be said "By *Brahma*'s becoming liable to the experiencing of pleasure and pain, there will be no distinction."

And the *reply* is stated in the second part :

There is distinction, as in the world.

*Reply.* There is difference between the natures of *Brahma* and of the *jīva*. The possession of a body by a *jīva* does not of itself carry with it a liability to suffering, that is brought about by disturbance in the elements of his body. It is a consequence of *karma* in the form of good or evil deeds. The text quoted refers to a body brought about by *karma*. There are other texts, which state that a freed *jīva* "appears as one ; appears as three" (*chāndo.*, VII-26).

If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his mere will the fathers come up (*Ibid.*, VIII-2-1). There he enjoys Him all round, eating, playing and amusing himself (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-3).

These texts mean that he may take one or three bodies, or as many as he may desire ; and yet this is not accounted as an evil. Similarly, *Brahma* being without good or evil, possession of the universe for His body brings with it no liability. In the world those that obey the king's commands are

in his good grace and are happy ; and those that disobey them incur his displeasure and suffer. But the king himself, though he dwells in a body, is not like the one set or the other ; for he is not subject to any one's command. Similarly here. The *jīva* is subject to *Brahma*'s commands, and is happy or the reverse, according as he is in harmony with them or not. But *Brahma* is not subject to any such liability.

Compare with what *Dramiḍa* states “ When a king stays in an unpleasant place abounding in mosquitoes, and full of trouble, as he is fanned by some one, he is not touched by any inconvenience ; he protects his country ; and has enjoyments with fragrant substances not available to others. Similarly the Lord of all the worlds, with fans in the form of His power whirling round Him, is not touched by imperfections ; He protects the world of *Brahmā* and other worlds, and has enjoyments not available to any other.” Evolution of *Brahma* in His substance, like the lump of earth and the piece of gold, is not admitted ; and the remark on this point needs no reply. Our authority is the texts stating that He does not change, and that He is free from imperfections.

*Criticism.*—This *sūtra* has been interpreted differently by others. They say ‘ If *Brahma* be the material cause of the universe, this doubt will arise, *viz.*, the person who enjoys (*bhoktā*) will not differ from what is enjoyed (*bhogyā*). They proceed to show by the analogy of the sea appearing as waves and foam, that they do differ. This interpretation is unsound. *Brahma* becomes the

universe under the influence of *avidyā* (ignorance) in the view of one of them ; by contact with an *upādhi* in the view of another ; and owing to an innate capacity (*śakti*) in the view of the last. In their views the first view will not arise : for *Brahma* affected in any one of the three ways is *bhoktā*, and the *avidyā*, *upādhi* or innate *śakti* is the *bhogyā* ; and these being different from one another, one cannot be the other. None of them states that *Brahma* changes in His substance ; for they accept the view stated in *sūtra*, II-1-35, that the *jīva* and his *karma* have had no beginning. If His change in substance be accepted, the doubt cannot occur to any one ; for a lump of earth differs from the *jar* made out of it ; and a piece of gold differs from a bracelet made out of it ; similarly, the *bhoktā* and *bhogyā* may appropriately differ. If the substance changes, the objection stated in *sūtra* 8 of this section will remain ; for *Brahma* Himself will be the *bhoktā* and *bhogyā* ; and the reply given in the succeeding *sūtra* will not apply.

सम्यगेति ननु

#### SUB-SECTION 6

1. In *sūtra* II-1-7 it was assumed that *Brahma*, the cause, was not different from the universe, the product. This point is now taken up and proved. This is known as the *sat-kārya* theory. The opponent is the *vaiśeṣika*. He recognises the lump of earth as cause, and the jars and other vessels as products ; but he regards the products as different from the lump of earth.

His arguments are as follows: (i) Consider a lump of earth and a jar, or a piece of cloth and the threads, of which it is made. There is first difference in perception. The perception of the cause and the perception of the products are not alike. (ii) There is difference in the names by which they are known; for the threads are not spoken of as the piece of cloth; nor is the piece of cloth spoken of as threads. (iii) There is difference in the uses to which they are put; for the lump of earth is not utilised to fetch water; nor is a wall built with the jar. (iv) There is difference in time; the cause exists first, and the products come subsequently. (v) There is difference in form; the cause is in the form of a lump; and the product has a large body and bottom. Similarly, while the lump of earth remains, the jar is spoken of as having been destroyed. (vi) Difference in number is also seen; for the threads are many and the piece of cloth is one. (vii) As everything exists under the *sat-kārya* theory at all times, the division into permanent and impermanent will disappear. (viii) And finally, the activity of the person, who makes the jar, will be fruitless; for if the cause itself be the product, what is there to be produced with his activity? The reply may be given that though the product exists, the activity of the maker is necessary to help the product to do its work. Then the activity of the maker should never cease. It may be explained next that the product existed before; but was not manifest; and that it is made manifest through the activity of the maker. Then the activity would be fruitful; and the division into

permanent and non-permanent becomes intelligible. This explanation cannot be accepted. Has this manifestation (*abhivyakti*) always existed, or did it exist, but was non-manifest, or is it newly made? In the first alternative the product under consideration must ever be manifest. In the second alternative another manifestation is required to make *abhivyakti* manifest, and this needs another manifestation, and so on *ad infinitum*. In the last alternative the theory, that a thing exists but merely changes its condition, is abandoned. Further, if the activity of the maker makes the product manifest, the activity for making a jar manifest should make other products also manifest. For, in things that are admitted to be the means of making other objects manifest, as a light, no limitation is seen as to the objects to be made manifest. Does not a lamp lighted for the sake of the jar show other objects as well? Hence the activity of the maker becomes useful only by originating a product, which did not previously exist. For these reasons the theory put forward fails.

2. The *vaiśeṣika*, having thus made out his case to his own satisfaction, next answers the objections that may be raised from the other point of view. First, a lump of earth is taken to make a jar; and a piece of gold to make an ornament. Thus a definite cause produces a definite effect; and does not this prove the *sat-kārya* theory? *Reply*: no; for the definiteness of the cause may be explained as due to the capacity of each cause to produce its own product. Next, on your own theory the purpose of the activity of the maker cannot

be explained. Is the activity applied to the product, or to something else? The first alternative does not hold, as the product does not exist before it is made. In the second alternative, the activity applied to threads may be expected to produce a jar; for so far as the product is concerned, it makes no difference, where the activity is applied—to a lump of earth or to threads; both being different from the product. *Reply.* The activity of the maker is applied to that cause, which has the capacity to produce the desired product; it is not therefore wasted.<sup>1</sup>

This view of the opponent is refuted in the *sūtra*:

15. तदनन्यत्वमारम्भणशब्दादिभ्यः ।

That the universe is not different from *Brahma* is shown by the text containing the term *ārambhaṇa* and other texts.

These texts show that the universe consisting of the matter and *jīva* elements does not differ from *Brahma*. In the *chāndogya*, chapter VI, the father taught his son what is stated in the *sūtra*. Bearing in mind the fact that the whole world evolved from *Brahma* alone, and that the product is not different from the cause, he asked him whether he had been instructed in the knowledge of that Ruler, by knowing whom every thing would be

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<sup>1</sup> Here the original brings in *Śankara* to criticise the opponent. This gives a loophole to *Vāchaspati* to come in and state his own theory, viz., that he who is under the influence of *avidyā* is not *Brahma*, but the *jīva*, and that the *jīva* is a condition of *Brahma* Himself. This theory is criticised by *Śankara*, and his criticism is criticised by the opponent. All this as not relevant to the sub is omitted here. But it is embodied in



known. The son, not knowing the fact, asked how by knowing one thing another thing could be known. To explain his meaning the father gave three illustrations, which men in the world perceive. Of these the first was this 'My dear, by knowing one lump of earth all that is made of it is known'. The meaning is that the various vessels made of the lump of earth, being of the same substance as the lump, by knowing that lump they are all known. As the *vaiṣeṣhika* holds the view that a product is a different substance from the cause, to refute this view he appealed to ordinary perception in these words.

For facility of speech (and handling) the lump of earth assumes different forms and receives different names ; but the truth is only that all this is earth. (VI-1-4).<sup>1</sup>

So is it seen by all ; and the vessels are not perceived to have been made of another substance (1).

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(1) The first four words in the text are—*vūchā ārambhaṇam, vikāro nāmāttheyam*. The first term means 'for speech' ; the termination shows purpose ; and the other part of the word indicates not merely speech, but also action following it. When it is said 'with the jar bring water,' the action stated follows. The root in the second word means to touch ; and the termination refers to the object of the action. The meaning therefore is—the earth, which was in the condition of a lump, appears in a new form with a large body and a large bottom ; this change and the name 'jar' arising from this change, are touched, *i.e.*, attained by the lump.

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<sup>1</sup> The original here quotes the texts of the *chāndogya*, that bear on the point, and adds that similar texts also in other *upanishads*, are intended by the author. The quotation is omitted, as they are considered further on one after another.

2. The objection of the *vaiṣeṣhika* may be replied to thus: The differences in perceptions, names and the like may be referred to the different conditions of the same substance. A person, say A, B, is one, and referring to the conditions, through which he passes, it is said 'he was a boy; he is now a man; and he will become old', and all the differences apply to his conditions. It was stated that while the earth remains, we speak of the jar as being destroyed, and that therefore the product is different from the cause. This objection is removed by admitting that origination and destruction mean that the same substance that is the cause comes into particular conditions. Thus when two halves of a jar are first made of a lump of earth, and they are then joined together to form the jar, the condition of the half-jar is its origination and the destruction of the lump-condition; the condition of the jar is its origination and the destruction of the half-jar condition, and so on. As objects assume their new conditions through the activity of the maker, that has its use. The objections in regard to manifestation do not call for a reply, as the theory of manifestation is not put forward.

3. *Vaiśeṣhika*. When you say that a condition appears in an object, that was not there before, you admit origination of a non-existing thing. Does not this amount to the abandonment of your theory?

*Reply*. Though we accept the origination of conditions, there is no conflict with the *sat-kārya* theory; for what exists originates.

*Vaiṣeṣhika*. You say what is contradictory, when you state that what previously existed comes into existence.

*Reply*. This objections arises from ignorance of the nature of origination and destruction. The attainment by a substance of a new condition is the destruction of the substance in the previous condition; and the origination of the substance in the new condition. As the substance, that comes into all the conditions, exists, the *sat-kārya* theory is not affected.

*Vaiṣeṣhika*. If the conditions, that did not previously exist, newly come into existence, you accept my theory.

*Reply*. In your theory, does origination originate or not? If it does not, but previously existed, you accept the *sat-kārya* theory. If it originates, you will need a second origination to account for the first, and so on *ad infinitum*. Under the *sat-kārya* theory the conditions cannot be perceived separately from the object, of which they are the conditions, nor can they act apart from it. Hence origination, destruction and the like relate to an object in a particular condition. The theory does assume the origination and destruction of the conditions, and only affirms the permanency of the object. As the half-jar condition is abandoned and the jar-condition is attained, the condition of oneness is abandoned, and the condition of manifoldness is attained. This condition is abandoned and the condition of oneness is re-attained.

4. The same teaching is conveyed by other texts :

(i) Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only ; one only ; without a second (VI-2-1).

The term 'this' refers to the world now seen to possess different forms and to bear different names. It was one only before creation ; because it was without name and form ; and being omnipotent, *Brahma*, who evolved as the world, could not suffer another to direct the evolution. There was therefore no second then. This text also establishes the identity of the cause and the product.

(ii) He willed 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve' (VI-2-3).

First He became fire, water and earth, and then by mixing them in different ways, He became the many things—movable and immovable—which constitute the universe. Hence the universe, the product, is none other than *Brahma*, the ultimate cause.

5. Here a doubt may arise—how all that has been stated (1) could have happened.

It is therefore added :

(iii) That same *devatā* willed, I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jiva*, and make diverse names and forms. I will make each of them a triple compound (VI-3-2 and 3).

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(1) *All that has been stated—Brahma*, denoted by the term *sat*, is all-knowing, the possessor of an unfailing will and without any imperfection ; how could He be the

By the term “these three *devatās*” reference is made to the whole of non-intelligent matter, beginning with the three elements—fire, water and earth. Into this *Brahma* entered along with the *jivas* as their inner ruler. ‘Making names and forms’ means making the products of evolution assume diverse forms and receive diverse names. This work resulted from the entrance into the products of evolution of both *Brahma* and the *jivas*. That *Brahma* entered the *jivas* and the universe as the *ātmā* is clear from the *ānandavalli* text ‘Having created it, He entered into the same ; having entered, He became *jivas* and material products (VI-2)’. Hence every thing, composed of matter and a *jiva*, whether in the subtle condition known as the cause, or in the gross condition known as the product, is the body of *Brahma* and He is its inner ruler. This fact stated in the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7) is recalled here. The doubt stated will disappear with this explanation.

*Brahma* remaining as the *ātmā* of the *jivas* and material products, and names and forms being formed as stated, *Brahma* Himself with the intelligent and non-intelligent objects forming His body is denoted by

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universe, which is fit to be referred to as this in the text. “This was *sat* only.” How could the universe denoted by the same word *sat* be one by the absence of names and forms ; and how could it dispense with the help of another to direct its evolution? How could the very same will to become many as the universe in the form of diverse movable and immovable objects? and how could He create as He willed?

the term 'universe'. Hence the texts quoted in para 4 state what is very appropriate. The changes of substance that take place in the matter element and the unwelcome experiences of the *jīva* element-pertain to the bodies; that *Brahma* remains free from imperfections, and the seat of good qualities is fully settled. This will be stated presently in *sūtra*, II-1-22.

6. Finally, (iv) 'All this is identical with that (*Sat*) (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7). This states that all the world composed of matter and *jīvas* is identical with *Brahma*; and the *upanishad* concludes with the injunction "That thou art". In other places in the same *upanishad* and in other *upanishads* also oneness of *Brahma* and the universe is stated (1), and the perception of difference is condemned (2). The text, that the ignorant man perceives more than one thing, and that the wise man sees one thing only, shows that the truth is that *Brahma* and the universe are one (3).

(1) *The texts are*: All this indeed is *Brahma* (*chāndo.*, III-14-1); when the *Ātmā*, dear, is seen, heard about, thought on and meditated on, all this is known (*bṛihad.*, VI-5-6); All this is the *Ātmā* (*Ibid.*, VI-5-7); *Brahma* Himself is all this: *Ātmā* alone is all this (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2).

(2) All this will overcome him, who sees all this elsewhere than in *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-5-7); Here there is no difference whatever; he attains *samsāra* after *samsāra*, who perceives difference as it were (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-19); Where one perceives difference as it were, then one sees another; but when everything is *Ātmā* alone to him, then whom will he see with what (*bṛihad.*, VI-5-15).

(3) Here the original gives a summary, which is as follows—*Brahma* Himself, having the *jīvas* and material

*Criticism*—Others explain the *sūtra* differently: They observe 'The product does not differ from the cause; for in truth there is no such thing as product different from the cause; all objects are perceived and spoken about owing to *avidyā*. In the products—jars and plates formed from a lump of earth, the cause—we see only the earth; nothing more than this. The products serve only for speech and action, and are unreal; the earth alone, which forms the cause, is real. Similarly, the whole world other than *Brahma*, the cause, who is *nir-viśeṣha* and mere *chit*, viz., *ahamkāra* and the rest serves only for speech and action, and is unreal. *Brahma* alone, the cause, who is merely *sat*, is real. Hence, as no product exists other than the cause, the product is not different from the cause. This view is

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products as His bodies, and appearing for that reason as the *jivas* and material products, is at all times denoted by every word. At one time His body (matter and *jivas*) becomes so subtle, that it cannot be stated to be different from Him even as His body. *Brahma* in this body is *Brahma* in the causal condition. At another time the same body becomes so gross, as to be fit to appear in diverse forms, bear diverse names and to be dealt with in diverse ways. *Brahma* in this body is *Brahma* in the evolved condition. Hence the universe, the product, is not different from *Brahma*, the cause. The natures of the *jivas* and material products forming His body and of *Brahma*, the *ātman*, differ from one another, as taught by a hundred *upaniṣads*, whether the condition be the causal or evolved condition; hence imperfections and good qualities pertain each to their own element in the aggregate. This has been stated in *sūtra* 9, *supra*.

unsound. For what is real and what is unreal cannot be identical. If they were, *Brahma* would be unreal, or the universe would be real.

Another view on the same subject is thus stated : The product also is real ; *Brahma* and *jivas* are not really different ; the apparent difference has been brought about by *upādhi*. The difference and no-difference between *Brahma* and matter—both are real. This view also is unsound ; for in this theory there is no object other than *Brahma* and *upādhi* ; *Brahma* has no parts, that can be separated one from another. Hence the *upādhi* must contact *Brahma* Himself, and His substance itself assumes by a change undesirable aspects. It may be urged that there is a capacity in *Brahma* which changes, but not His substance. Assuming that this is so, as the capacity and *Brahma* are not different, there will be conflict with the texts that state the *jiva* to be subject to *karma* and *Brahma* to be free from it, and also with the texts that state matter to be subject to change and *Brahma* to be free from this liability.<sup>1</sup>

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The opponent asks. The differences in perceptions and the rest appear to relate to different conditions of the same object in the case of childhood, youth and the like. In the case of earth, wood, gold and the like they appear to relate to differences in substances. In

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<sup>1</sup> Here the original criticises the theory of *Yādava prakāśa* in detail. This is omitted here, but is embodied in the 'Three Tatvas'.



regard to a lump of earth and a jar, which are respectively cause and product, how is it decided that they relate only to differences in the conditions of the same object. The next *sūtra* replies :

### 16. भावेचोपलब्धेः ।

And because in the product the cause is perceived.

For, the perception is in this form—"This ear-ring is gold"; and no other material is so perceived in it. Hence, as the same person is now a child and then a young man, the material, that is the cause, changes its condition and is said to be a product. Even the *vaiśeṣika*, who regards the product as a different substance from the cause, does recognise changes of condition; and if the perception of different forms, the calling by different names, and the differences in the uses to which the products are put, can be explained with reference to change of conditions, the assumption of a different substance, which is not perceived, cannot be justified. Assumption will be very necessary, when no explanation is available; but as pointed out, an explanation is possible here.

2. An *objection* is raised. When one sees a cow and says "This cow is that," referring to another cow seen before, it is the *jāti* (common character) that is recalled; and the same may be the case here. *Reply*. A second article possessing the *jāti* is not seen here. What is perceived is a single article of the class gold existing as cause and as effect.

3. A further *objection*: The ear-ring is different from the gold; which as the *samavāyi* cause (that of which a thing is made) continues in the product; and it is therefore recalled. *Reply*. If the gold were different from the ear-ring, the perception would be—‘There is gold in this article,’ as one says, ‘there is water in this jar’. The perception is, however, ‘this ear-ring is gold’.

4. A still further *objection*: In the generation of a scorpion from a lump of cow-dung, no one sees the cow-dung in the scorpion. *Reply*. Even there earth, which has become the cow-dung, is perceived. The *vaiśeṣika* must admit that earth continues as the *samavāyi* cause in the scorpion, and this explanation we will accept.

5. In smoke, the effect of fire, the fire is not perceived. *Reply*. Be it so; but this is no objection; for there fire is only the operative cause; and the smoke comes forth from the undried fuel put into the fire; and this is confirmed by the fact that the smell of the fuel and of the smoke is the same. The conclusion is that as the cause is perceived in the product thus ‘This is that alone,’ the differences in perceptions and the rest are due to differences in conditions only, and that therefore the product is not different from the cause.

### 17. सत्त्वाच्चापरस्य ।

And because in the cause the other, the product, exists.

‘Exists in the cause’ means exists in the causal condition. Thus, in the world it is usual to say “All these—jars and other products—were in the forenoon merely a lump of earth.” And in the *veda* it is stated “Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only ; one only ; without a second ” (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1).

18. असद्व्यपदेशान्नेति चेन्न धर्मान्तरेण वाक्यशेषाद्युक्तेः शब्दान्तराच्च ।

If it be contended “No ; because it is said to have been non-existent then,” the reply is “no. Because reference is made to the existence in another form. This is seen from the remainder of the sentence, from arguments and from other statements ”.

The opponent disputes the statement made in the preceding *sūtra*, and points to the following statements :

First in the *veda*. Before creation this was only *asat* (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1) ; Before creation this was indeed *asat* (*ṣatapatha brāhmaṇa*, VI-1-1) ; Before creation this was indeed nothing whatever (*yajur*, 2nd *aṣṭaka*, 2-50).

In the world also “all these—jars and other products—did not exist in the forenoon”. *Reply*. The objection is not sound. The term *asat* (non-existent) and these statements have reference to the absence from the products of the forms, in which they are now seen. They existed in other forms ; they do not mean that the objects did not exist as you think. The terms *sat* and *asat* refer to the attributes of a substance. The attribute *satva* (*sat*-ness) is name and form. *Asatva* (*asat*-ness) is the reverse, the subtle condition without name and

form. Hence, the statements mean that what is now seen with diverse names and forms did exist before, but in a subtle condition, without names and forms.

*Question.* How is this known? *Reply.* First, from what follows the third of the texts quoted; which is this "That, existing indeed as *asat*, resolved' I will become.'" This indication of resolving shows that the term *asat* did not refer to non-existence, and that the thing did exist. As all the texts should agree, the term *asat* has the same meaning in the other texts also. Secondly, a lump of earth is shaped in a particular manner with a large bottom and body; and the new form assumed helps us to speak of it as a jar. Before this shape was given, the material did exist, but in another form. When the jar is broken into two pieces, the material is in a different condition; and it is said that the jar does not exist. This broken condition of the material is the non-existence of the jar; and there is no such thing as non-existence (1) of a thing as alleged by the *vaisheshika*. For such a thing is not perceived, and it need not be assumed for facility of

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(1) *No such thing as non-existence.* The *vaisheshika* classifies all nameable things into seven groups, one of which is *abhāva* (non-existence). Of this there are four varieties, one of which is *prāk* (previous) *abhāva*, which is the non-existence of a product before it is made, and another is *dhvamsa* (destruction) *abhāva*, its non-existence after it is destroyed. The text denies that these varieties exist. The previous *abhāva* of a jar is the lump of earth, and the *dhvamsa* *abhāva* of the lump is the jar.

speech ; as the condition of the broken jar is sufficient for the purpose. And lastly, there is the statement already quoted “ Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only ; one only ; without a second ” (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1). There non-existence was objected to in these words ‘ But my dear, how could this be so ; ’ and it was decided ‘ But this was *sat* alone, dear, before ’. This is very clearly stated in the text ‘ Then this was indeed *avyākṛita* (without name and form) ; the same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms ’ (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7).

This sub-section closes with two illustrations as to the conclusion—that the product is not different from the cause :

### 19. पटवच्च ।

And like a piece of cloth.

Threads arranged in a particular manner form the product known as cloth, and in this new condition they serve particular purposes. Similarly *Brahma* coming into a gross condition is called the universe.

### 20. यथाचप्राणादिः ।

And like *prāṇa* and its modifications.

An atom of air (*vāyu*) enters the body, and performing different functions is known by the names *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *samāna*, and *udāna*. In the same way one and the same being is *Brahma* in the subtle

condition, and is the universe in the gross condition, appearing as diverse things movable and immovable (1).

## SUB-SECTION 7

### 21. इतरव्यपदेशाद्विताकरणादिदोषप्रसक्तिः ।

If *Brahma* be stated to be the other (*i.e.*), the *jiva*, He will be open to the charge of not having done what was good for Himself, and the like.

This *sūtra* states an objection raised by the opponent. It was stated in the preceding sub-section that *Brahma* and the world are one. From this he argues that *Brahma* and the *jiva* must be one, as stated by the texts "That thou art (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7); This *ātmā* is *Brahma* (*bṛihad*, VI-4-5). But as the *jiva* is known to be the seat of endless sufferings of various kinds (2), it follows that *Brahma* has made misery for Himself. If He were ignorant or impotent, one can understand the position; but he is stated to be both omniscient and omnipotent. How does it happen that He has not made a world full of bliss, and that on the other hand He has created a world, which is the reverse? It cannot be

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(1) The first illustration is from the world; and shows that many things assume the condition of oneness; while the second is from the *veda*, and shows that one thing exists in the condition of many.

(2) *Sufferings of various kinds.* Those arising from the body (*ādhyātmika*), those arising from *devas* (*ādhidaivika*) and those arising from the elements (*ādhibhautika*).

maintained that He has done so for mere pleasure ; for no one in his senses will cut off his own hand even in play. The *vedāntin*, who asserts that, the world and *Brahma* are one, throws overboard the texts showing the *jiva* to be other than *Brahma* ; for if difference be true, then one-ness of *Brahma* and the world cannot also be true.

2. *Bhāskara* comes forward with an explanation. The texts affirming difference refer to difference created by *upādhi* ; the texts affirming oneness refer to the natural no-difference. The opponent *replies*. You should explain whether *Brahma*, the world-cause, un-contacted by *upādhi*, knows the *jiva* to be not different from Himself by nature or not ? If He does not, His omniscience disappears ; if He knows, as the *jiva* is not different from Himself, he must know his suffering to be His own suffering ; and the charge that knowing this he did not make what was good for Himself, and that He made what was not good cannot be escaped from.

3. *Śankara* next explains. The difference between the *jiva* and *Brahma* is made by *avidyā* ; and the texts affirming difference relate to it. The opponent *replies*. If the *avidyā* be in the *jiva*, the alternatives mentioned in the criticism of *Vāchaspati's* theory hold ; (see the Three Tatvas) ; as also the inferences that follow therefrom. If the *avidyā* be in *Brahma*, as He shows Himself without help, He cannot perceive *avidyā* ; nor evolve the world, which can happen only under *avidyā*. *Śankara*. —The light is prevented by *avidyā* from appearing.

*Reply.* This will mean that the light disappears ; hence, as light alone is *Brahma*, He will disappear.

4. Hence the theory that *Brahma* is the world-cause is absurd.

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The next *sūtra* replies :

## 22. अधिकं तु भेदनिर्देशात् ।

But *Brahma* is other than the *jiva* ; because difference from the *jiva* is expressly stated.

Difference from the *jiva*, who is fit to experience suffering arising from the body and the rest. The following are the statements :

Who stands in the *ātmā*, who is within the *ātmā*, whom the *ātmā* does not know, whose body the *ātmā* is, and who rules the *ātmā* from within, He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-26) ; meditating on the *ātmā* and the Ruler as being separate, one secures the grace of the Ruler, and by this means becomes immortal (*śvetā.*, I-6). He is the ultimate cause who is the lord of the *jivas*, who are the lords of the mind and the senses (*Ibid.*, VI-9) ; Of them one eats the ripe fruit ; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*Ibid.*, IV-8) ; Both are unborn ; but they are respectively all-knowing, and ignorant ; ruler and ruled (*Ibid.*, I-9) ; Embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21) ; The all-knowing *Ātmā*, having mounted, on him (*Ibid.*, VI-3-35) ; From this the owner of *māyā* creates this universe ; and in it another is bound, deluded by *māyā* (*śvetā.*, IV-9) ; He is the lord of matter, and of the dwellers in bodies, and the controller of the *guṇas* (*Ibid.*, VI-16) ; Who, being Himself eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those, that are eternal, intelligent, and many (*Ibid.*, VI-13) ; Who moves within *avykta*, whose body *avykta* is, whom *avykta* does not know ; who



moves within *akshara*, whose body *akshara* is, whom *akshara* does not know, He, the inner Ruler of all beings, is free from *karma*, dwells in the highest heaven, has a shining body, and has no equal or superior, He is *Nārāyaṇa* (*subā*).

### 2.3 अश्मादिवच्च तदनुपपत्तिः ।

It is inappropriate for the *jīva* to be *Brahma*; as inappropriate as for a stone and the like to be *Brahma*.

A stone, a bit of fuel, a pot-shred, a blade of grass and other non-intelligent objects can never be identical with *Brahma*; for they are very inferior things, and the seats of ever-occurring changes; while *Brahma* is without change of substance, the enemy of all blemishes, the one seat of good qualities, different from everything else, the possessor of unlimited *jnāna* and bliss and the lord of diverse and endless objects under His control. The inappropriateness is equally great in the case of the *jīva* too, who is fit to experience endless misery and is like a glow-worm; while *Brahma* is as stated above the enemy of all blemishes and is the seat of endless good qualities immeasurably high. Wherever a word denoting a *jīva* is put in apposition with the term *Brahma*, the identity should be explained as in *śūtra*, I-4-22. The *jīva* is a body of *Brahma* as stated by the text 'Whose body the *ātmā* is, and *Brahma* is his *ātmā* for that reason. Hence the words in apposition denote *Brahma* appearing as the *jīva*. Hence there is no conflict with the statement of difference; on the other hand it explains it. The conclusion reached in the preceding sub-section

refers to the oneness of *Brahma* and the world, understanding each of these terms to mean an aggregate made of *Brahma*, the *jivas* and matter. The aggregate in a subtle condition is *Brahma*, and the same in the gross condition is the world; and as the former evolves as the latter, *Brahma*, the cause, and the world, the product, are said to be one. The nature of matter is to change; of the *jiva* to suffer; and of *Brahma* to be the seat of good qualities; they remain without being confounded. In this view conflict with any *vedic* text is avoided. Even in the condition of oneness stated in 'Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only' matter and *jivas* existed as the body of *Brahma*, but in a subtle form. This must be admitted on the authority of *śūtras* 34 and 35 *infra*. The absence of diversity is explained by the absence of names and forms.

*Criticism.* Others explain *śūtra* 22 differently, as referring to the condition of the *jiva* himself, when he is freed from *avidyā*. Nothing stated here will fit in with their view; for in the *jiva* in that condition the following attributes do not exist—omniscience; being the highest ruler; being the cause of all objects; being the *ātmā* of all; the controlling of all; and the like. It was by this feature that the difference of *Brahma* from the *jiva* was proved by the texts quoted. But in the view of these commentators all these are made by *avidyā*. *Sankara*—*Īṣwara* under the influence of *avidyā* differs from the *jiva*, as the shell-silver differs from silver, and this is proved. *Reply.* This is not what the author of

the *sūtras* proves by this *sūtra* ; for at the outset he announced that enquiry into *Brahma* should be made ; he has shown that the *upanishads* prove Him to be the cause of the world's evolution and the rest ; and what he does in this place is to answer the objections that the conclusion established conflicts with *smṛitis* and is opposed to valid arguments. The *sūtra* therefore does not deal with difference made by *avidyā*.

*Sūtras* 8 and 9 of this section (sub-section 3 *supra*) repeat what is settled in this sub-section ; what was done in that sub-section was merely to show that the relation of cause and product may subsist between dissimilar things. The seventh *sūtra* repeats what was settled in sub-section 6 ; the reconciliation of texts affirming difference and no-difference is made in this sub-section.

#### SUB-SECTION 8

सत्यमेव जयते

#### 24. उपसंहारदर्शनान्नेति चेन्न क्षीरवद्वि ।

If it be contended, " No ; as a maker is seen to work with instruments," the reply is " No. He evolves like milk."

It has been established that the highest *Ātmā* may be the *ātmā* of all, and at the same time different from every thing else. It will now be shown that by mere will He may create the world of diversity ; for He has an unfailing will.

In the world persons, capable of making this thing or that, are seen to require the necessary instruments. Though they have the capacity, they utilise some instruments, and only then are they seen to make products. Those, that have not the capacity, are unable to make them, though they have all the instruments. Those, that are capable, make them utilising the instruments. This is the only difference. This fact must apply to *Brahma* also. Though omnipotent, he could not have created the universe for want of the necessary instruments (1). That He was without them follows from the statement that before creation there was only *Sat*? The second part of the *sūtra* furnishes a reply. Every thing, capable of producing another thing, does not require instruments. Milk, for instance, becomes curd, and water freezes; and no instrument is needed by either. Similarly, *Brahma* can evolve as the world without any help; because He is omnipotent. *Question.* Is not a drop of buttermilk dropped into the milk to convert it to curd? *Reply.* It is not necessary. It is done merely to quicken the change, and to bring about a particular taste. The *sūtra* has the particle *hi*, which draws attention to a well-known fact. It has been put in to show that the objection is frivolous.

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(1) *Question.* How can this doubt arise? The need for instruments is perceived in persons of limited capacities. How can this be put forward in the case of the omnipotent *Brahma*? *Reply.* The doubt may be felt by some person of dull intelligence; and it is removed by the *sūtra*.

## 25. देवादिवदपि लोके ।

And like the *devas* in their world.

The *devas* in their world by mere will create what they require. Similarly *Brahma* creates the whole world by mere will. That the *devas* have got this power is known from the *veda*; and the same authority shows that *Brahma* can create by mere will. The mention of *devas* is to serve as an illustration, so that the point may be easily grasped.

The following are other illustrations: a piece of magnet attracts iron by mere proximity; the spider weaves its web; and seers possessing abnormal powers do what they like. Finally—and this the opponent must admit—the *jiva* by mere will moves his limbs. *Brahma*, of whom the universe is a body, can likewise bring about what He pleases by mere will.

## SUB-SECTION 9

सत्यमेव जयते

## 26. कृत्स्नप्रसक्तिर्निर्वयवत्वशब्दकोपो वा ।

The whole of *Brahma* must be expended; or the texts teaching His indivisibility must be ignored.

Before creation *Brahma* was one only, that is, He did not consist of separable parts (1); and could not be

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(1) Before creation, my dear, this was Sat only (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1); Before creation, this was indeed nothing whatever (*yajur, ashtaka*, II-2-50); Before creation this was *ātma* only; one only.

divided into *Brahma*, the *jivas* and matter. When He became many in evolution, it is stated that He became ether, air and other non-intelligent products, and also sentient beings from the four-faced one to the lowest worm. Then one of two things must have happened—either the whole of *Brahma* was expended in the creation of products; and nothing remains. Or He consisted of elements, of which the intelligent element evolved into the beings mentioned; and the non-intelligent element into ether, air, etc. But this will be opposed to the teaching of indivisibility.

2. The following explanation may be given. The cause was *Brahma* with the *jivas* and matter in a subtle condition as His body; and the product is the same *Brahma* with the same elements in a gross condition. This explanation will not do. The *ātmā* element also, *i.e.*, *Brahma*, is admitted to have evolved; and there is no escape from the objection. Being indivisible, when He became the inner ruler of one product, there would be no inner ruler of other products. Nor can it be maintained that *Brahma* not expended in the evolution remains. Hence, the theory of evolution of *Brahma* as the world is absurd.

The next *sūtra* gives a reply :

27. श्रुतेस्तु शब्दमूलत्वात् ।

But because the *veda* teaches so; and because this is a matter to be known only from testimony.

There is no absurdity as alleged. The *veda* teaches that *Brahma* is indivisible, and that from Him this world of diversity comes forth. In a matter to be learnt from the *veda* facts must be accepted as stated. *Question.* How can even the *veda* state what cannot co-exist, like the statement 'one wets with fire'. The second part of the *sūtra* meets this objection. *Brahma*, being known only from the *veda*, is unlike everything else ; and one may believe that He possesses unique powers ; He should not be tested by any co-existence that may be observed in the world.

## 28. आत्मनि चैवं विचित्राश्च हि ।

Similarly in regard to the *jiva* too. The powers of different things are, as is well-known, different.

The opponent seeks to fasten on one thing the peculiarities observed in an entirely different thing. If this attempt be permitted, then the attributes observed in matter, a jar for instance, may be looked for in the *jiva*, who is of an entirely different nature, and who is eternal ; and it may be stated that like the jar he is also perishable. But this is not so ; because their natures are different. This is stated in the second part of the *sūtra*. Fire and water differ from one another ; and their attributes—heat and cold—are peculiar to them. Similarly, in *Brahma* who is different from things seen in the world, powers not observed in them exist by thousands. This is stated by *Parāsara*—

*Brahma* being without the qualities *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*, being full of everything that one may need, not being subject to *karma*, and being unfit to be connected therewith, how is it admitted that He created the world and the like.

This question being put from what is seen in the world, the following reply was given—

The capacities of all objects cannot be perceived from the sources from which they are known. Hence *Brahma* has capacities pertaining to His nature, that are utilised in creation, as fire has the capacity to heat (*vishṇu*, I-3-1. 2 and 3).

The *veda* too has this text—

Where was the forest, what was the tree from which *Brahma* made heaven and earth? Oh, wise men, what was the instrument which He, who supports the worlds, used; ask, considering with your mind.

The reply was

*Brahma* was the forest, *Brahma* was the wood, from which He made heaven and earth; you wise men, I say this to you having decided with my mind; *Brahma* bearing the worlds used *Brahma* (i.e., Himself) (*yajur*, *aṣṭaka*, 8-76 and 77).

The objection made from what is seen in the world cannot come down on *Brahma*, who is an unique Being.

## 29. स्वपक्षदोषाच्च ।

And because the opponent's theory is faulty.

*Pradhāna* (matter), which is the final cause on the opponent's theory, is not different from things seen in the world; and the arguments drawn from observation may be applied to it. *Pradhāna* is indivisible; how can



it evolve into *mahat* and other products and begin to make the world of diversity? *Sāṅkhyā*—It consists of three elements—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Question*. Is *pradhāna* a group of the three elements, or a product made of them? In the latter alternative, there will be conflict with your theory that *pradhāna* is the ultimate cause; and conflict with the number of the *tatvas* that you accept. In the former alternative, as the three elements are indivisible, and as products are formed by the accretion of a portion of one thing to a portion of another, they cannot by coming together produce any gross substance. The same impossibility will be found on the other theory, that atoms are the final cause; for, they are indivisible, and have no sides like finite things, to which they can attach themselves. The union may take place either by one atom attaching itself to one side of another atom or by becoming one with the other completely. The former is not possible as the atoms are not many-sided. In the latter case the coming out of a gross thing is impossible.

### 30. सर्वोपेता च तदर्शनात् ।

And *Brahma* possesses every power. And this the *veda* teaches.

His power is said to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature; also His capacity to know (*jñāna*), to support and to create and destroy (*śveta.*, VI-8); He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst. Showing thus that He is an unique Being, the *upanishad* states that He has an un-failing will (*chāndo.*, VII-1-5); see also *Ibid.*, III-14-2.

### 31. विकरणत्वान्नेति चेत्तदुक्तम् ।

If it be contended “No; because He is without senses or organs of action,” the reply is “This has been answered.”

The following objection is raised: There is a text that states that *Brahma* has no senses or organs of action. “He has no body and no organs” (*ṣveta.*, VI-8). Though He is an unique being and omnipotent, yet for want of the organs of action He cannot begin any work. The second part of the *sūtra* states that the answer to this objection was given in *sūtras* 27 and 28; and this is also what the *upanishads* say—

He sees, but has no eye; He hears, but has no ear; He goes and he takes, but has no hands or feet (*ṣveta.*, III-19).

The unique Being known only from the *veda* is competent to do everything even in the absence of the necessary instruments.

### SUB-SECTION 10

### 32. न प्रयोजनवत्त्वात् ।

No; because there must be a purpose for the evolution.

Though *Brahma*, being an unique Being, has the capacity to do everything, and can therefore Himself create the world of diversity, yet He cannot be the cause; for there must be a purpose for such creation. A person consciously begins a work

either for himself or for another. Now, *Brahma* cannot work for Himself ; for He has by nature whatever one may desire ; and there is nothing, which He has not and which He has to gain by the evolution. Nor can He be said to work for others. Being Himself full, He must work for others merely from a desire to benefit them. How can He, being full of mercy, create a world so full of endless misery of many kinds arising from residence in a womb, with old age, death, and hell. On the other hand one, that is actuated by mercy would make a world full of happiness alone. Hence, having no purpose to serve, *Brahma* could not have been the world-cause.

To this objection the next *sūtra* replies :

### 33. लोकवत्तु लीलाकैवल्यम् ।

But mere amusement as in the world.

In the world kings, who rule over earth consisting of the seven islands, and who possess power in full, are seen to play with balls for mere amusement. So does *Brahma* for no purpose other than amusement only create, sustain and destroy the world with His mere will. He is said to be full of objects of desire. This means that when He wishes a thing, it is attained ; not that everything is ever present.

### 34. वैषम्यनैर्घृण्ये न सापेक्षत्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति ।

No partiality or cruelty ; because reference was made (to the *karma* of individuals) ; and it is so stated.

The world contains numerous differences. There is first the broad distinction of *jivas* into *devas*, men, brute creation and the vegetable kingdom. Next, among men themselves some are high ; others are low ; and others still occupy a middle position. This reveals partiality. Because intense suffering is caused to most persons, *Brahma* must be devoid of mercy. To this objection the *sūtra* replies—no ; there is neither partiality nor cruelty. *Brahma* is the common cause ; but the differences are due to the *karmas* of the individuals. And this is stated by the *upanishads*.

One that did good deeds attains a good body ; one that did evil deeds attains a bad body. One does good deeds, having done good deeds in the past ; one does evil deeds, having done evil deeds in the past (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5). This is also stated in the *vishṇu purāṇa*. 'In the creation of products He is only the *nimitta* ; for the principal cause is the *karmas* of those that are created. Leaving out the mere *nimitta*, nothing whatever is needed ; each object becomes an object from its *karma* ' (I-4-52).

### 35. नकर्मविभागादिति चेन्नानादित्वादुपपद्यते चाप्युपलभ्यतेच ।

If it be contended "No *karma* ; because *Brahma* alone existed then," the reply is "No ; because the *jivas* and their *karmas* have had no beginning ; And the existence of one being only (in spite of this fact) can be explained ; and their pre-existence is taught."

It was stated in the preceding *sūtra* that in the creation of differences reference was made to the *karmas* of individuals. The opponent states that before evolution commenced there were no *jivas* ; for the text

'Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only' states that there was no division and therefore there were no pre-existing *karmas*. How can it be said that the differences in creation were due to *karmas*? This objection is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*, and is refuted in the second part. If *jivas* existed at the beginning, how can this fact be reconciled with the remark that only *Sat* remained then? Thus—the *jivas* were then without name and form, and were so subtle that they could not be described as separate from *Brahma* even as His body. If this explanation be not accepted, this undesirable result will happen. Some persons would lose the benefit of what they have done, and others would reap what they have not sown. That *jivas* have had no beginning is known from the following text :

He, who is fit to become all-knowing, is not born, nor does he die (*kaṭha*, II-18).

That evolutions follow one another in a stream, and that this stream has had no beginning is stated in the text. "The creator made the sun and the moon, as before" (*nārā.*, 1-38). The text—"Then this was *avyākṛita* indeed ; the same by itself was made into the universe possessing diverse names and forms" (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7) teaches that merely the making of names and forms took place, and that the *jivas* themselves were not made. This is also stated in the *bhagavad-gita*. Matter and the *jiva*—know both to have been without a beginning (13-19). Hence *Brahma* alone was the world-cause ; for He is an unique Being ; He is

omnipotent ; His purpose is mere amusement ; and He created differences in accordance with the *jīvas'* *karmas*.

### 36. सर्वधर्मोपपत्तेश्च ।

And because all the attributes would be appropriate (only on the theory that *Brahma* is the cause).

All the attributes pertaining to the world-cause described already and to be described as inapplicable to the *pradhāna* of the *sāṅkhya* and to the atoms of the *vaiśeṣika* and others are applicable to *Brahma*. He alone is therefore the world-cause. This *sūtra* concludes the reply to the opponents' objections.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।



सत्यमेव जयते

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## CHAPTER II

### SECTION II

WE have established *Brahma* as the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the universe ; we have also answered the objections raised by opponents. In order to strengthen the theory of evolution from *Brahma*, rival theories not based on the *veda* will now be examined, and refuted. Otherwise, persons of dull intelligence, not knowing that they are based on specious arguments, might regard them as supported by proper authority, and their regard for the theory based on the *veda* might suffer diminution. Hence, for the purpose of refuting those theories this section is begun. The *sāṅkhya*'s theory of evolution is first taken up ; for it accepts the *sat-kārya* theory, and enumerates twenty-four *tatvas* or substances, as the *upanishads* do ; and there is therefore greater risk of its being mistaken for one of the accepted systems.

#### SUB-SECTION 1

From *sub-section* 5 of chapter I, section 1, the *sāṅkhya* has been with us ; but it was only shown

hitherto that *vedic* texts do not state his theory. That theory is now examined. There is therefore no room for thinking that there is repetition.

This is connected with the name of the sage *Kapila*, and enumerates twenty-five *tatvas* or substances. The first is *mūla-prakṛiti* or *pradhāna*, consisting of three substances known as *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. They are so subtle that they cannot be perceived by the senses ; but they can be described and distinguished one from another only from the effects which they produce. *Satva* is light, enables one to see correctly, and conduces to pleasure. *Rajas* is ever restless, supports things and leads to pain. And *tamas* is heavy, conceals the true nature of things and brings about misconception. These three are substances, but not qualities, as taught by the *upanishads*. In the cosmic condition of general rest the three substances were well-balanced, no one of them being more or less than the others ; and in this condition the aggregate was known as *prakṛiti*. It is described as being one, all-pervading, and eternal, and as devoid of intelligence. It is ever changing and exists for the enjoyment of *jivas*, and helps them to obtain release from bondage. It is the final cause of the universe ; for it is not itself evolved from anything else. From this *prakṛiti* twenty-three substances came forth by evolution, seven of which in their turn produced other substances. They are known as *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, and the five *tanmātras* connected with the five elements known, for want of better terms, as ether, air, fire, water and earth. *Ahamkāra* exists in three forms,



which are respectively known as *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*. The five senses of perception, the five organs of action, and the mind came forth from the *satva* variety; and the five *tanmātras*, which produced the five elements, from the *tamas* variety, the third variety co-operating with the others in the formation of their products. From these sixteen products nothing else comes forth. The twenty-four substances enumerated constituted matter in its various forms. The twenty-fifth is the group of *jivas*, who are not subject to any change. They are not evolved from anything else, and nothing else evolves from them. They are eternal and all-pervading; and the *jiva* in one body differs from the *jivas* in other bodies. They are mere *chit*, which means that they are shining substances. An earthen jar, for instance, standing in a dark place, cannot make itself known; and it needs a light to show its existence. On the other hand a light needs no such help. Similarly, the *jiva* makes himself known without the intervention of anything else. He is therefore said to be *jnāna*. The term 'mere' in the expression 'mere *chit*' conveys the idea that he is not a knower, *i.e.*, that he is not the seat of the attribute known as *jnāna*. He is also devoid of the capacity to act, and does not experience pleasure or pain. Yet owing to the presence of the body in proximity to himself, the *jiva* from ignorance of the real nature of things mistakes the activity of the matter in the form of his body as his own, and fancies that he himself is the actor or enjoyer, as one perceives the red colour of a *japā* flower in a crystal

placed by its side. From this misconception results his bondage; and release is obtained from the perception of the truth. The *sāṅkhya* denies the existence of an all-controlling being.

2. These things the *sāṅkhya* proves by sense perception, inference and *āgama* (*Kapila's smṛiti*). In regard to the *tatvas*, which he proves by sense perception, there is not much room for difference of opinion (1). As to the *āgama* it may be taken to have been rejected by the first chapter of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (Intro., para 10); for it is based on the knowledge of one that was not all-knowing. The inference that *pradhāna* alone is the world-cause is refuted here. This will be in effect the refutation of the whole of the *sāṅkhya's* theory.

3. This is what the *sāṅkhya* states: The whole of the universe must have had a single cause. This view must be accepted. To assume that it has come forth from several causes would never lead to a definite result. Take, for instance, a piece of cloth. It is made up of a number of threads, each thread being contacted on one side by one side of another. Each of these threads was similarly produced from its parts; and

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(1) There is difference of opinion on one point only. In the teaching of the *upaniṣads* each element evolves from the preceding one through an intermediate condition known as *tanmātrā*. Earth comes forth from water through the *gandha tanmātrā*; water from fire through the *rasa tanmātrā*; fire from air through the *rūpa tanmātrā*; air from ether through the *sparṣa tanmātrā*; and ether from *ahamkāra* through the *śabda tanmātrā*. In the *sāṅkhya's* theory all the *tanmātrās* come directly from *ahamkāra*.

each of these parts again form its component elements. Arguing in this manner, one arrives at the atoms (*parama aṇu*); as he should proceed from the known to the unknown, he must presume that the atoms themselves are made up of parts; and that each part of each atom is similarly made up of its own parts. To assume that atoms do not consist of parts would not be correct; for then one atom should be in contact with the whole of another atom; and a thing possessing extension would not emerge. Thus no finality can be reached. It must therefore be assumed that the universe has come forth from a single cause, which is capable of endless transformations, without at the same time losing its own *svarūpa*. This single cause is *pradhāna*, in which *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are in the same proportion. This result is reached as shown below: The universe is constituted of parts, each differing from the others and is therefore a product. Being a product, it must have come forth from a cause possessing the same nature as itself. This is what is seen in the world. Every product comes forth from a cause similar in nature to itself, and it is dissolved in the same. An earthen jar has been made from a lump of clay, and a crown from gold. Now the universe is full of pleasure, pain and misconception, which are the effects respectively of *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. These three elements must therefore have produced the world. In the causal condition, or the condition of rest, there is no activity; and in the active or manifested condition, one or another of these three

elements ever predominates over the others. It may therefore be inferred that in the former condition the three causes were in equipoise. The three elements in equipoise are known as *pradhāna*, which is therefore the ultimate cause. It is appropriate that this should be so; for it exists in every place and at all times. Its products like *mahat* and *ahamkāra*, being limited, cannot transform themselves into the universe. This theory is refuted in the next *sūtra*.

### 1. रचनानुपपत्तेश्च नानुमानं प्रवृत्तेश्च ।

*Pradhāna* is not the cause; because creation is not possible; and action being possible (only under direction).

The theory of evolution is not sound; for *pradhāna* is non-intelligent, and is not directed by one, that knows its nature. Whatever answers this description produces no effect, like mere timber in the making of a car or of a palace; and this is seen in the world. On the other hand, it is perceived that non-intelligent matter, when directed by one that knows its nature, begins to produce a product.

2. *Sāṅkhya*.—What is found in a product is seen to be the cause, like the earth found in a jar. Similarly, *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are found in the products of evolution through the effects, which they produce; and they must be the cause of evolution. *Reply*. The argument is faulty. Put in logical form the argument is this—*satva* and the rest are the world-cause; for they are found in the products. This *hetu*-being found in a product—is seen in the quality white and the *jāti* cow

in an animal of this class, which is a product ; but they are not causes. Hence, the *hetu* is not found only where the *sādhya* exists.

3. The opponent replies.—Reference was made not to a quality or *jāti*, but to a substance ; and gold, which is found in an ear-ring, is its cause. *Satva* and the rest are substances, and being found in products, must be the cause. *Reply*. This explanation does not help ; for *satva*, *rajas* and *tamas* are attributes of substances, but are not themselves substances. They are the attributes of earth and other elements and make them appear light or heavy and the like ; nor are they seen in products as substances as gold is so found. They are well-known as attributes alone.

4. The argument, that to attain finality a single cause should be found, also fails ; for *satva* and the rest are not one, but many ; and it was stated that when equally balanced they constituted *pradhāna*. It will be futile to look for finality by assuming that they are unlimited ; for then they would be all-pervading, and no one of them could predominate over the others, and no evolution could take place. To bring about evolution they must be limited.

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The opponent cites cases in which direction by an intelligent person is not clearly perceived :

## 2. पयोम्बुवच्चेत्तत्रापि ।

If it be said ' like milk and water,' the reply is ' there also ' (the question is under consideration).

The conclusion reached in the preceding *sūtra* is not sound. Milk, for instance, changing into curd, does not require any help from anyone from the first motion to the completion of the product through the intermediate changes ; and rain water, which is of one taste, is of itself converted into the juices of cocoanut, palmyra, mango, woodapple, margosa and tamarind fruits. Similarly, *pradhāna*, being an ever-changing substance, and undergoing like transformations in the condition of rest, undergoes unlike changes in evolution brought about by the predominance of one or another of the *guṇas* ; but never needs any direction. This argument is stated in the *sūtra* and is refuted. In *sūtra* 24 of the preceding section the example of milk was cited ; but the object was to show that there was no need for any instrument to produce the change ; but not to deny the need for direction. For *Brahma* is present in it as stated in the text ' Who stands in water ' (*bṛihad.*, V-7-8).

### 3. व्यतिरेकानवस्थितेश्चानपेक्षत्वात् ।

And because if direction be not needed, the condition of rest cannot be reached.

If *pradhāna* is directed by *Brahma*, it is possible for it to be successively in the conditions of rest and activity, and to evolve into diverse products ; but not otherwise ; for He has an unfailing will. The opponent states that on the theory of direction also there are difficulties. Why does *Brahma* direct the evolution of *pradhāna* ? He has everything that one may desire ; He is full ; His bliss is infinite ; He is free from imperfections ;

and He is unfit to be connected with them. If he created differences, He would be charged with want of mercy. There is therefore objection on each side. His attention being drawn to the replies given in the last preceding sub-section, he turns round and asks again if *karmas* in the form of good and bad deeds of *jīvas* bring about evolution and cosmic rest, why is an *Īṣvara* required to direct? *Pradhāna* itself influenced by *karma* in the form of good or bad deeds may change so as to give to each the fruits of his own *karma*. Food and drink polluted with poison bring on death; while helped by particular medicines they conduce to good-health. Hence the distinction between evolution and cosmic rest, the creation of differences, and the bondage of some by *prakṛiti* and its being the means to release are all appropriate in *pradhāna*, which has the capacity to change in all possible ways. *Reply*. The objection reveals ignorance of the nature of good and bad deeds. What are good deeds and what are bad deeds are known only from the *śāstra*; and the *śāstra* is the *veda*, which has had no beginning or end, which has come down without a break from teacher to student, and which is therefore free from the touch of imperfections characterising statements made by any one. And they are stated to be the worship of the highest *Ātmā* or the reverse; and according as He is pleased or displeased, one is happy or miserable (1).

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(1) This is stated by *Drāmīḍa*—'In order to attain fruits men wish to please *Ātmā* with *karmas*; He being

There can be no charge of partiality, if the facts be known. The highest *Ātmā* has divided *karma* into two varieties—good and bad ; He gives to all *jivas* bodies and instruments suitable to doing them and power to use them at pleasure ; He gives them the *veda* to know His will ; and to enable them to carry it out, He enters into them as their inner ruler, and co-operates with them. The *jivas*, having received their bodies and instruments and therewith the power to control them and being supported by Him, of their own choice do good and bad deeds ; and are rewarded or punished according to their deserts. There is therefore no room to object that the *jiva* has no free-will. Nor can the highest *Ātmā* be charged with being devoid of mercy. Mercy means inability to see another suffering, and a desire to remove the suffering without an eye to one's own good. If it be shown to one, that is determined to disobey Him, it will not be a merit ; on the other hand it will be regarded as impotency. To punish such a person—

संयमनं जयते

pleased is competent to yield the fruits. This is the arrangement stated by the *veda*.' Similarly, the *veda* states—'The supporter of the universe receives as His own worship the deeds of many kinds done or being done under the injunctions of the *veda* and *smritis*' (*nārā.*, I-1-6) ; *bhagavad-gītā*. 'He reaches the goal, who worships with his own *karma* that Being, from whom all that exists comes forth, by whom they exist and by whom they act, and by whom all this world is pervaded' ; "I ever throw into the wombs of persons of *asura* nature those that hate me, those that put forward specious arguments to show that I do not exist, those that knowing me do not yet approach me and those that do not know that I exist" (XVIII-46, and XVI-19).



this alone is a good thing ; otherwise to put down an enemy must be treated as a fault. When an offender gives up the idea of disobedience, with this alone the highest *Ātmā* is pleased, excuses the numberless sins committed by him in countless world-ages, and of such a nature as cannot be put up with, and Himself makes efforts to bestow on him indescribable bliss (1).

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In *sūtra* 2 an example given to show that *pradhāna* could evolve without direction was rejected. In the next two *sūtras* other examples are similarly treated : First, the grass consumed and the water drunk by a cow change of themselves into milk. *Pradhāna* may evolve likewise. Here there is no question of direction by a person that wills. Mere proximity to a *jīva* suffices ; for even when the cow sleeps, the conversion of the grass and water into milk goes on uninterruptedly. It cannot be urged that this case also is included in the enquiry ; for when the effect can be produced without conscious direction, to assume its existence is not legitimate. To this the *sūtra* replies :

#### 4. अन्यत्राभावाच्च न तृणादिवत् ।

Not like grass and water ; because it does not occur elsewhere.

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(1) This is stated in the *bhagavad-gītā*—‘ To those, that wishing to be ever with me meditate on me, I give with love that *buddhi*, with which they will reach Me. To favour them I remain as the subject of their thoughts and with the bright lamp of knowledge I destroy the darkness born of past *karma* ’ (X-10 and 11).

This example does not apply ; for grass and water undirected by an intelligent Being do not change into milk. This is seen in the case of a bull. If the opponent's contention were valid, the grass and water too consumed by the bull or rejected by it would be converted to milk ; but this conversion does not take place. Hence, it is the highest *Ātmā* that wills the conversion in the case of the cow. What was stated in *sūtra 2 supra* is further explained here ; the object being to point out a case in which a change does not take place when it is not directed.

### 5. पुरुषाश्मवदिति चेत्तथापि ।

If it be said " Like a person or a magnet," the reply is " (Not) even there ".

Two other examples are stated here. Helped by a lame man, who is able to see, a blind man, who can walk, acts. By proximity to a magnet a piece of iron is moved. Similarly by the co-operation of *pradhāna* and *jīva* the world evolves. The *jīva* is *jñāna*, but does not act ; while *pradhāna* cannot see, but can act. To this contention the *sūtra* replies. These examples do not help. The lame man sees the road and directs ; and the blind man understands his directions and acts. But the *jīva* of the *sāṅkhya* cannot act and cannot therefore direct *pradhāna*. And *pradhāna*, being non-intelligent, cannot receive any direction and act. Nor does the *jīva* approach *pradhāna* like the magnet ; for as already stated he does not act. If it be said that being present everywhere, he need not

approach, then by his proximity, which ever exists, evolution must be eternal, and there will be no period of rest. The *jīva*, being ever free, there will be no bondage and no release.

### 6. अङ्गित्वानुपपत्तेश्च ।

And because it is not possible to attain predominance.

In the condition of cosmic rest all the three substances—*satva*, *rajas* and *tamas*—are in equipoise ; and unless this is disturbed, and one or another of them predominates, there can be no evolution ; for so states the *sāṅkhya*. If the disturbance could take place without direction from an intelligent being, evolution would be eternal (1).

### 7. अन्यथानुमितौ च ज्ञात्विद्योगात् ।

In inferring differently too ; the capacity to know being wanting.

If the opponent should say—‘ I will give up these arguments, which are shown to be unsound, and adopt another and better inference, and prove that *pradhāna* can evolve without guidance,’ the reply is that the same faults must recur ; for *pradhāna* has not the capacity to know.

### 8. अभ्युपगमेऽप्यर्थाभावात् ।

Because even admitting its possibility, there will be no use.

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(1) Taking this *sūtra* and the third *sūtra* together, it will be seen that *pradhāna* left to itself must be either in the condition of change or in the condition of rest, and will be powerless to go from one condition to another.

Assume that you can establish your point as proposed. Even then it will serve no purpose. According to your theory *pradhāna* serves for the enjoyment of the *jiva* and helps his release. But the *jiva* is mere *chit* ; he does not act ; he does not undergo any change ; he is pure, and for that very reason he is ever free. It is not possible for him to see *pradhāna* and derive enjoyment ; and as there is no bondage, there is no need for release. If nevertheless he experiences pleasure and pain by the proximity of *pradhāna*, as this proximity ever exists, he can never be released.

### 9. विप्रतिषेधाच्चासम्बन्धसम् ।

And because it is full of inconsistencies, it is not a sound theory.

The *sāṅkhya* states that *prakṛiti* (matter) exists for another, i.e., for the *jiva* ; it must therefore be an object that can be seen, and that can yield enjoyment ; and the *jiva* must be one that sees, directs and derives enjoyment. In the same breath he states that he is ever without change, and that he is mere *chit* ; hence he cannot act ; for action is change of condition ; and he cannot see, direct and enjoy. Here is a contradiction.

*Sāṅkhya*. There is really no contradiction. *Prakṛiti* being in the presence (*sannidhi*) of the *jiva*, there is mutual *adhyāsa* that is, the activity of matter is perceived in the *jiva*, and his intelligence in matter ; and this is misconception. Hence the *jiva* sees, directs and enjoys, though in reality he is without change and does not act.

*Reply.* This explanation is untenable. *Adhyāsa* is the perception by an intelligent person of the attribute of one object in a different object. This perception is a change of condition, and is not possible in one that never changes. Nor is it possible in matter; for this perception is an attribute of an intelligent person; and matter possesses no intelligence.

*Sāṅkhya.* The mere existence of matter in the presence of the *jīva* will suffice. He need not see it.

*Reply.* This also is untenable, for the same reason, *i.e.*, as he never changes. If nevertheless *adhyāsa* can take place, it must ever occur. That presence (*sannidhi*) cannot help has been already stated (*vide sūtra* 10 of the preceding section).

2. *Another contradiction.* The *sāṅkhya* states that matter is the means by which the *jīva* attains release; and also that he is ever free. Hence what is bound, adopts the means to release and attains release is matter alone. If the latter statement be correct, how can matter be said to serve the *jīva*?

3. *A still further contradiction.* Matter is said to withdraw from sight the moment it is seen by a *jīva* in its true nature, thinking 'I have been seen'. This is unsound. The *jīva* being ever free, and never changing, never sees matter; nor can matter see itself, being without intelligence; and cannot think 'I have been seen'.

*Sāṅkhya.* Mere presence (*sannidhi*) is perception.

*Reply.* As the presence ever exists, matter must be ever perceived; and it cannot be said to withdraw from sight.

*Sāṅkhya.* There is a presence (*sannidhi*) other than the substance of matter, which newly comes into existence.

*Reply.* Even this is not possible in one that never changes. Further, if perception in the form of presence be the means to release, the same must be the means to bondage also; and bondage and release will ever happen.

*Sāṅkhya.* Misperception is the means to bondage; the perception of an object as it is is the means to release.

*Reply.* Both kinds of perception do not differ from the presence; and both bondage and release will ever happen. If the presence be not permanent, but newly comes into existence, we ask what is its cause. If you mention something as the cause, we ask again what is the cause of that cause; and this will lead to the *ad infinitum* difficulty.

*Sāṅkhya.* The mere existence of matter is the presence.

*Reply.* Then as matter is eternal, bondage and release will ever occur. Hence owing to these and other contradictions, the *sāṅkhya's* theory is unsound.

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*Criticism.* The objections urged apply with greater force to *Śaṅkara's* theory; for his *Brahma*, like the *jiva* of the *sāṅkhya*, is *kūṭastha*, i.e., He never changes; He is ever *nir-viśeṣa*, self-proved and mere *chit*. Hence he cannot see *avidyā*, and *adhyāsa* will not be possible. There is this difference. In order to limit birth and

death to particular individuals, the *sāṅkhya* accepts the view that the *jīvas* are many ; but this is not accepted by *Śankara*. Hence if one person dies, all others must cease to exist at the same time ; but this is not in accordance with facts.

*Sankara*. In the *sāṅkhya*'s theory *prakṛiti* and bodies made of it, are real ; but in my theory *prakṛiti* and the bodies made of it are all unreal. Hence one *jīva* will suffice.

*Reply*. Whether *prakṛiti* be real or not, a Being that never changes, that is mere *chit* and shines without help, cannot see anything other than himself. If matter be unreal, its first perception and the subsequent nullification of the perception being accepted, the absurdity is still greater. In the theory of *Bhāskara* too contact of *Brahma* with *upādhis* will be impossible, as He is of this nature (1) and the theory is therefore unsound.

## SUB-SECTION 2

We stated that the *sāṅkhya*'s theory was untenable, as it is based on specious arguments, and as it is full of contradictions. We proceed to show in this sub-section that the *vaiśeṣika*'s theory of evolution from atoms is also untenable.

This is based on the *sūtras* of *Kanāda*. It recognises the existence of the five elements, earth, water, fire, air

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(1) *Is of this nature*—is ever without change. To contact an *upādhi* is a change, and it is therefore impossible.

and ether, all of which except the last are formed each from its own atoms (*parama aṇu*). Ether is one and indivisible; it is eternal and pervades all space. The mind is atomic, and is eternal, each *jīva* being furnished with a mind to serve him as an instrument of knowledge. The senses of perception—those perceiving smell, taste, colour and touch—are products respectively of the four elements, earth, water, fire and air; and they do not come from the subtlest variety of *ahamkāra* as in the *sāṅkhya*'s theory. The sense of hearing is the ether itself limited by one's ear. The *vaiśeṣika* does not recognise the existence of *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, the five *tanmātras* and the organs of action. The evolution of earth, water, fire and air from their atoms proceeds on this plan. Two atoms unite and form two-atom compounds; and three of these compounds unite together to form what is known as *tryaṇuka* (three two-atom compounds). From these secondary compounds the elements are formed by aggregation. The atoms move towards one another and form compounds prompted by *adṛiṣṭam*. The *jīvas* do *karmas* (action) to procure fruits of various kinds. And as the *karmas* disappear quickly, something relatively permanent is needed to intervene between them and the fruits, and to wait till the time for yielding them arrives. This something is known as *adṛiṣṭam* (unseen); and it is recognised by the *mīmāṃsaka* also under the designation of *apūrva* (new). The same need does not arise in the *vedānta*, as there is *Īśvara*, who sees the *karma* of each and gives him its fruit. Now, as evolution is for the



benefit of the *jīva*, his *adṛishta*s move the atoms to form compounds of various kinds and furnish him with a body. The *sāṅkhya*'s criticism of the evolution of the universe from atoms is recognised; and to avoid the difficulty pointed out, it is assumed that the atoms are eternal, indivisible and without parts.

This theory is criticised in the next *sūtra*:

### 10. महदीर्ववद्रा ह्रस्वपरिमण्डलाभ्याम् ।

Like the evolution of *tryaṇuka* from *dvyaṇuka* and of *dvyaṇuka* from *paramāṇu*, the rest of the theory is unsound.

The *sūtra* assumes that this theory is untenable, and proceeds to state that other minor items of this theory are also untenable. First, as to the theory of evolution itself. It is seen in the world that a number of threads uniting with one another yield the product—a piece of cloth. This union is brought about by one side of a thread being joined to one side of another thread, and in this it is implied that each thread has six sides. The formation of compounds from atoms must proceed on the same plan, and it must be assumed that atoms also have six sides. Otherwise, being indivisible, one cannot be united to another to form a compound of any size; and from even a thousand atoms a compound exceeding one atom in size cannot emerge (1)

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(1) This needs explanation. When several parts are put together to form a whole, each part is in contact with another, the place of contact being a portion of the part. If atoms unite to form compounds, one atom must contact another at a portion of its surface. But being indivisible, it

Hence, evolution would be impossible. If it be admitted that atoms also have six sides, they must consist of parts, each of which is made up of similar parts; and these again must be similarly produced. Proceeding in this manner, there will be no end. The theory therefore fails.

2. The subject of atoms should be examined a little further. Both the *mīmāṃsaka* and the *vedāntin* recognise the existence of atoms as the smallest unit of extension; and their atoms are the small specks of dust seen flying about in a bundle of sun-beams, which stream into a dark room through a window. The *vaiśeṣhika* goes further and sub-divides each of these atoms into *dvyaṇuka* or two-atom compounds, and each of these again into *parama aṇu*s. This sub-division rests on this inference, *viz.*, the atom seen in the sun's rays is made up of parts; for it is a substance seen by the eye, like a jar. He requires an ultimate cause, that does not consist of parts. His *parama aṇu* is not made up of parts and is indivisible; but this has nowhere been seen. In making an assumption one should be guided by what one actually sees. As a theory of atoms this is cumbersome, as it assumes two kinds of smaller atoms,

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cannot do so; and must contact it throughout its surface. Then the two atoms will cover the same space as one atom. This objection is disregarded in cases in which the contact of an indivisible object with objects consisting of parts is accepted on proper authority. But when the *vaiśeṣhika* puts forward a theory based on mere speculation, the objection may be legitimately urged. His assumption of the existence of *parama aṇu* is of this character.

while the atoms seen in the sunbeams suffice for all purposes.

3. *Vaiṣeshika*. A mustard seed and a hill differ from each other by the small or large number of their parts ; and if the smallest atom should consist of numberless parts, there would be no difference between the seed and hill, as each will consist of numberless parts. Hence, some limit to the smallness of size must be accepted. *Reply*. If the smallest atoms do not consist of parts, there will be no objects exceeding the smallest atom in size ; and the mustard seed and hill will not exist. Further, though the mustard seed and hill consist of numberless parts, there is a difference between them. The mustard seed has numberless parts no doubt ; but the hill consists of numberless parts of the size of the mustard seed, each of which consists of endless parts. Again, a fortnight and a month consist each of numberless parts ; and yet even you must admit that they differ. You recognise *jāti* as being found in all the individuals of a class ; and though the members of each class are numberless, yet you recognise a higher and a lower *jāti*, the *jāti* in jars being the lower and the *jāti* in the element earth being the higher ; and these *jātis* are therefore different.

*Vaiṣeshika*. What shall we do ? *Reply*. Accept the theory taught in the *upanishads*.

*Criticism*. This *sūtra* has been interpreted by others as refuting an objection to the theory of evolution of the world from *Brahma*. This is unsound, and will be a repetition. The objections raised by several opponents

were answered in the preceding section ; and their theories are now refuted in this section. That evolution of the world from an intelligent Being is possible was proved in sub-section 3 of that section.

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What are the other things that are unsound in this theory ? The author proceeds to point them out.

### 11. उभयथाऽपि न कर्मावस्तदभावः ।

In either view there will be no motion of atoms (towards one another) ; hence no formation of compounds of atoms.

In this theory the atoms should move towards one another ; this motion leads to the union of two atoms ; these compounds form other compounds ; in this manner the world is formed. The question is—how is the first motion in each atom caused. The *vaiṣeṣhika* states that this is caused by *adrishtam*. Now the *adrishtam* must be in the atom or in the *jiva* ; and the *sūtra* states that in neither case will there be motion.

2. Being generated by the *jivas*' good and bad deeds, the *adrishtams* cannot be in *parama āṇu*. If they were, they must ever lead to creation. The *adrishtams* in the *jiva* cannot bring about motion in the *parama āṇu*. If the *adrishtams* in the *jiva* move the *parama āṇus* through the *jiva*, who contacts them, then the stream of *adrishtams* being permanent, there must be creation at all times.

*Vaiṣeṣhika.* *Adṛishtams* must mature before they yield their fruits. Now some *adṛishtams* yield their fruits at once; some in another life; and some in another *kalpa* (world-age). Hence there is no risk of eternal creation. *Reply.* To bring about the creation of the world at the same time, it must be assumed that all the *adṛishtams* of all the *jivas* mature at the same moment, and that this maturing is of the same kind. This is, however, an impossible task. The *jivas* are numberless; each produces numerous *adṛishtams* by actions of various kinds; and they do not act in concert or at the same moment. It cannot therefore be imagined that all these *adṛishtams* mature at the same moment, and that the matured fruits all tend to creation. For the same reason the dissolution of the world at the same time, and the waiting of the *adṛishtams* to mature till the life-time of *Brahmā*, the creative agent, comes to end are also out of the question.

*Vaiṣeṣhika.* *Īśvara's* will gives a capacity to the *adṛishtams*, and they join together and cause motion in the *parama aṇus*. *Reply.* The existence of *Īśvara* in your theory rests on mere inference. It has been shown in chapter I, section 1, sub-section 3 that the inference fails. Hence your theory of evolution of the world from the motion in *parama aṇus* fails (1).

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(1) If the *adṛishtaṃ* can create the world, there is no need for an *Īśvara*; and the attempt to prove His existence by inference will be useless. *Vaiṣeṣhika.* The *adṛishtams*, being non-intelligent, must be moved by an effort of *Īśvara*. *Reply.* This effort being non-intelligent,

## 12. समवायाम्युपगमाच्च साम्यादनवस्थितेः ।

And because *samavāya* is accepted; as the same reason applies; and as there will be want of finality.

The *vaiśeṣhika* states that *samavāya* (1) exists and that it is eternal. It is the relation of the whole to its parts, of a substance to its attributes or actions, of an individual of a class to the generic character. Its

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another effort will be needed to move it; this will need another and so on *ad infinitum*. *Vaiśeṣhika*. The first effort of *Īśvara* will suffice. *Reply*. We plead that similarly the *adrishṭams* of the *jīva* will suffice, though non-intelligent; an *Īśvara* is not needed.

(1) The *vaiśeṣhika* enumerates six things in addition to substances (*dravya*), viz., *guṇa* (quality), *karma* (action), *jāti*, *samavāya*, *viśeṣa* and *abhāva* (non-existence). Of these *jāti* is stated to be one, to be eternal and to be found in all the members of a class; such is the peculiar feature of the class; but *jāti* is considered to be different from it. In criticising *Śaṅkara's* theory in the 'Three Tatvas' it is shown that the assumption of *jāti*, which is not perceived by any one, is unnecessary, and that whatever purpose is to be served by *jāti* will be served by the peculiar feature of the class. *Samavāya* is dealt with here. *Viśeṣa* is an attribute that is found in the *parama āṇu* and serves to distinguish one *parama āṇu* from another. It is not perceived; and the assumption of its existence rests on the same ground as the assumption of *samavāya*. It fails for the same reason. *Abhāva* was referred to under *sūtra* 18 of chapter II, section 1 (page 481), and it was shown that such a thing as *abhāva* does not exist. The result is that there are only three classes—*dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*; as the last two are aspects of *dravya*, the only proper division is into *dravya* and what is not *dravya*. This is the division adopted by *Sri Desika* in the *nyūya siddhānjana*.

existence is assumed in order to explain why two particular things are always found together, one resting on the other and qualifying it. The same need exists for explaining why this *samavāya* is found in the things to which it is related; and a second *samavāya* must be assumed to satisfy this need; this will lead to a third one and so on *ad infinitum*.

*Vaisesika*. It is the nature of *samavāya* to be always found with another; there is therefore no need for a second *samavāya*. *Reply*. It is the nature of qualities and actions to be always found with substances, and of *jāti* to be always found in individuals of a class. Why should the existence of an unknown thing as *samavāya* be assumed, and why should it be then stated that such and such is its nature? The assumption of a new thing is cumbersome and unwarranted.

The objection pointed out is found in *samavāya* whether it is eternal or not. If it be eternal, there is another objection, which is stated in the next *sūtra* :

### 13. नियमेवच भावात् ।

And because (what is connected with *samavāya*) must be eternal alone.

*Samavāya* being a relation, if it were eternal as alleged, the things with which it is connected, *i.e.*, the world, must be eternal also; and there would be no need to prove the existence of *Īsvara* or to assume that atoms exist and form the world.

#### 14. रूपादिमत्त्वाच्च विपर्ययो दर्शनात् ।

And because atoms are said to possess colour and other attributes ; the reverse of what is intended ; being so seen.

The atoms (*parama āṇu*) are of four classes corresponding to the elements earth, water, fire and air, and are said to possess the attributes smell, taste, colour and touch. They are at the same time described as being eternal, subtle, and indivisible. But this description cannot be correct ; for whatever has colour and the other attributes is seen to be perishable and to have been made, like a jar, from causes that are similar ; and as already stated in making an assumption one should proceed on what is seen. Hence it is not possible to assume a thing as possessing a particular character that appeals to one.

To ward off this attack it may be stated that the view that atoms possess colour and other attributes will be abandoned. The next *sūtra* replies :

#### 15. उभयथाच दोषात् ।

And because in both ways it is faulty.

It has been pointed out that the possession of colour and other attributes by atoms conflicts with the view that they are eternal. Their being devoid of the attributes will conflict with the other view that the colour and other attributes of products come from similar attributes of the cause, and the earth and other elements



will be without smell, taste, colour and touch. Thus, in either way the theory is faulty.

### 16. अपरिग्रहाच्चात्यन्तमनपेक्षा ।

And because it has not been accepted, it should be completely ignored.

In the *sāṅkhya* theory one or two elements are acceptable, like the *sat-kārya* theory ; but in this theory of the *vaiśeṣika* there is nothing, which those that follow the *veda* can accept (1).

## SUB-SECTION 3

We have refuted the theory of the *vaiśeṣika* that the universe comes forth from *parama āṇus*. We pass on to the *saugata*, who holds the same theory of evolution. There are four schools, which together go by the name *saugata*. The first school, that of the *vaibhāṣika*, recognised the reality of the external world, consisting of the four elements—earth, water, fire and air—and of their compounds. Both the elements and their compounds are aggregates of atoms. The reality of the inner world also was recognised, and it consisted of streams of perceptions, feelings, or thoughts, in which each perception, feeling or thought is followed by a like

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(1) The *vaiśeṣika*'s views regarding the *jīva* are opposed to the teaching of the *upaniṣads*. He regards him as *jada*, i.e., as not capable of showing himself without help. He is a knower ; but his knowledge comes, only when he contacts the mind ; *jñāna* is not his inseparable attribute. These views are refuted in the next section.

perception, feeling or thought. The existence of both the worlds might be proved by sense perception and by inference. The second school, that of the *soutrāntika*, held the view that the external world was not capable of direct perception, and that its existence was inferred from the perceptions which it produced. The third school, that of the *yogāchāra*, denied reality to the external world. There was nothing outside corresponding to perceptions; what was perceived by the senses was unreal like dream perceptions. All the three schools agreed in teaching that everything, which they recognised, existed only for a moment, and that it was replaced by another thing exactly alike. They denied the existence of ether, of the *jīvas*, and of *Īśvara*. The last school, that of the *mādhyaṃika*, denied the existence of everything.

*Vaibhāṣika and soutrāntika schools.* To deal first with the two schools which recognised the reality of the external world. The following is what they stated: The earth-atoms possess colour, taste, touch and smell; the water-atoms exhibit colour, taste and touch; the fire-atoms have only colour and touch; while touch is the only quality of the air-atoms. Each group of atoms coming together produces its own element. From these elements other aggregates are formed, known as the body, the senses, and objects of sense enjoyment. Within each body is a stream of perceptions, feelings or thoughts, which stream is an apprehending entity, and which is the *ātmā* of the body. With the agencies described all operations in the world proceed.

*Sūtras* 17 to 26 demolish the momentary character of external objects alleged by the first two schools of *saugatas* :

17. समुदाय उभयहेतुकेऽपि तदप्राप्तिः ।

In the aggregates formed by both classes the production of the world does not result.

It is stated that atoms form by aggregation earth and other elements ; and that these elements similarly form the bodies of *jivas*, their instruments, and objects of sense enjoyment. The *sūtra* states that by the aggregates of both kinds the aggregate known as the world cannot be formed. For the atoms and the elements are held to have a momentary existence only. The following questions rise to one's lips. The atoms and the elements, which perish in a moment—when do they begin to unite ; when do they unite ; when do they become objects of perception ; and when do they become fit to be taken up or thrown away ? Which knower—*ātmā* touches what object ; what object does he know and when ; and who takes up what object perceived, and when ? On this theory he that has touched an object has disappeared ; and the object touched has gone ; similarly, he that has seen an object is no more, as also what has been seen. How can one know what has been touched by another ; and how can one take up what another has known ? The *saugata* explains : Each stream of momentary objects is one. *Reply*. This will not help, so long as you do not admit that there is some one other than the streams, who is permanent

and connected with each of the streams. Also, perceptions—individual perceptions or streams of perceptions—are not the *ātmā*. The *ātmā* is the ‘I’ and is the knower.

18. इतरेतरप्रत्ययत्वादुपपन्नमिति चेन्न संवातभावानिमित्तत्वात् ।

If it be said “As each produces another, what has been stated is appropriate,” the reply is ‘No; because they are not the cause of aggregation.’

The *saugata* offers an explanation. Though all objects are momentary, yet *avidyā* will show all this to be appropriate. *Avidyā* is misconception, *i.e.*, the thought that a thing is permanent, eternal, and pleasant, while it is momentary, perishable and unpleasant. This produces desire and aversion; from this the shining of the *chitta* (mind) takes place; from this again come thoughts and their products and earth and other products possessing colour; from them mind and the five senses; from them bodies; from them experience of pleasure and pain and the rest. Then follow *avidyā* and the rest in the same order, like a wheel turning round and round, and this has had no beginning. What has been described cannot take place without the aggregates—the elements and their products. The *sūtra* states this explanation, and then replies: *Avidyā* and the rest cannot keep the elements and their products in the condition of aggregation. The notion that shell-silver is silver does not make two pieces of shell-silver aggregate. Further, as he, that has the *avidyā*, and regards a momentary thing as permanent, perishes that moment, who is it

that is the seat of desire and aversion? So long as you do not accept a permanent being, who is the seat of desire and aversion, as long will you be unable to maintain that these feelings continue.

### 19. उत्तरोत्पादे च पूर्वनिरोधात् ।

And because when the succeeding thing comes into existence, the preceding one disappears.

This is another reason for the universe not coming into existence on the *saugata*'s theory. In a stream of jars, each of which exists for one moment only, when the jar of one moment appears, the jar of the preceding moment has gone; and it cannot be the cause of the appearance of that jar. What is its cause? It cannot be non-existence (*abhāva*); for then everything may appear at every place and at every moment. Next, it cannot be existence of the jar in the preceding moment; for then the jar of the preceding moment may cause the appearance in the succeeding moment of objects in the three worlds, as a cow, a buffalo, a horse, a wall, a stone and the like. Next, it cannot be the existence of a like object in the preceding moment; for then the jar of one moment may cause the appearance of all the jars in all places. Next, it cannot be maintained that the existence of a jar of one moment causes the appearance of one jar only; for then it cannot be known which appears out of those in all places. If the reply be—the jar that appears in the place, where the jar of the preceding moment stood, is produced by the jar, it will be an admission that that

place is not momentary. Further, it cannot be known that a jar stood at a particular place ; for after the eye is turned to the jar, it disappears before it can be known.

20. असति प्रतिज्ञोपरोधो यौगपद्यमन्यथा ।

In the absence of the preceding thing there would be conflict with (the *saugata's*) statement ; otherwise both would be seen at the same time.

In the preceding *sūtra* one absurdity was pointed out, and here others are mentioned. It was stated that in the absence of the preceding thing the succeeding one cannot appear. If it appeared in the absence of a cause, everything may be produced everywhere and at every moment. This is not the only difficulty. The *saugata* states that four things are necessary for perception, of which the object to be perceived is one ; and this implies that the object remains for one moment after the eye is turned towards it. If it does not (and it cannot remain on this theory), then there will be conflict with the statement. To ward off this attack, if it be assumed that, while the jar of one moment remains, the jar of the next moment appears, then both the jars, one of which is the cause and the other is the product, should appear at the same time ; but this is not seen. And the theory of momentariness will be abandoned. To obviate this last objection, if it be stated that an object is seen at the same moment at which the eye is turned towards it, the relation of cause and effect will cease, as the effect should follow the cause.

## 21. प्रतिसंख्याप्रतिसंख्यानिरोधाप्राप्तिरविच्छेदात् ।

Neither variety of destruction can happen ; because the substance remains.

In the two preceding *sūtras* the creation of an object out of nothing was disproved ; and in this *sūtra* it is shown that an existing object cannot be completely annihilated. The *saugata* distinguishes between two kinds of destruction—the gross one, which all can see, when a jar is destroyed by the fall of a hammer upon it ; and in which the stream of like substances comes to an end ; and the subtle one alleged by him, which takes place every moment in a stream of like substances, and which cannot be seen. The *sūtra* states that neither of them can happen ; for an existing object cannot be completely annihilated. The creation and destruction of an object mean only change of condition of an existing substance ; and the substance itself, capable of this change, is one and is indestructible. This was established in chapter II, section 1, sub-section 6.

*Saugata.* When a lamp is extinguished, complete destruction is observed ; and it may be presumed that the same thing happens in other cases also. *Reply.* In jars and cups, which are broken, and cease to exist as jars and cups, the earth, of which they were made, is perceived to continue ; and it is decided that the destruction of an existing substance is merely a change of its condition. This conclusion is extended to the case of the lamp ; and it is inferred that the flame of the lamp has assumed another condition, which being subtle cannot

be perceived by the naked eye. In the case of the jars and cups the recognition of the continuance of the earth not being nullified, its suppression is not legitimate. For one should proceed from the known to the assumption of what is unknown, and not ignore the known.

## 22. उभयथा च दोषात् ।

And because in both ways the theory is faulty.

The *saugata's* position disproved in the last three *sūtras* is that creation is possible out of nothing, and that what has been created may become nothing. From this position absurd results follow. What is made out of nothing must be nothing; for the cause and product should be similar, like a jar and a lump of earth, or a crown and a piece of gold. The universe should therefore be nothing; but this is not perceived by any one, nor is it admitted by the *saugata* himself. Next, after one moment the whole world would be nothing; and if it comes into existence again, it would be nothing as just stated.

## 23. आकाशे चाविशेषात् ।

And in regard to the element ether (the theory is faulty; for) no difference (in perception).

This question of the existence of the element ether comes in incidentally; for it is regarded as non-existent by the *saugata* along with the others; and this view is now refuted. Like earth and other elements, which are admitted to be positive substances, the element ether



(*ākāśa*) is perceived, and this perception is not subsequently nullified. And it is thus perceived—‘There the hawk falls; here the vulture’; and ether is the place where these birds fall. The existence of the element ether is thus recognised. *Objection.* Ether is the non-existence (*abhāva*) of the elements—earth, water, fire and air. *Reply.* This view is incorrect. Non-existence is of four kinds. When an object is made, there was its non-existence before that moment, and when it is destroyed, there is after that moment non-existence of another kind. After the object is made and before it is destroyed, neither variety can exist. Neither can therefore be predicated of ether, while these elements exist; and the world will be without ether. The third variety occurs when it is said ‘A is not B’; and non-existence of A is in B, and non-existence of B is in A. Similarly, if ether be not the others, this non-existence must be in each of the other elements; but not elsewhere; but it is seen in the interspaces among them. The last variety is utter non-existence, which cannot be stated while the other elements exist. Hence, the element ether is a positive substance. As *abhāva* (non-existence) is only change of condition of an existing substance, the element ether cannot be mere negation. Though in itself it has no colour of its own, and though it is not perceptible to the eye, both are facts, as what is seen is the element compounded with the others.

#### 24. अनुस्मृतेष्व ।

And because of recognition.

An object seen before is thus recognised—‘ This is that only.’ Its existence in two different moments proves its permanency. *Saugata*. The perception of oneness is a misconception engendered by likeness between two different objects as in the case of the flames of a lamp. *Reply*. This explanation is untenable ; for the oneness of the perceiver, who is duped by the likeness, is not admitted. It will be no explanation to reply that one sees an object to be the object or like the object seen by another. The opponent, who refers to misconception engendered by likeness, unwittingly admits that the same person perceives the object on both the occasions. In regard to the flames of a lamp there is reason to hold that they are different ; but in the case of a jar there is no authority to hold that the jar of one moment is different from the jar of the next moment. If such an authority existed, you may assume that the jars of two different moments are recognised as one owing to their likeness.

2. *Saugata*. I will prove by sense perception and inference that *jars* exist only for a moment. First as to sense perception. Here is a jar existing at the present moment. Sense perception distinguishes it from the jar of the preceding moment and from the jar of the succeeding moment, in the same way as it distinguishes a blue thing from a yellow thing. In other words the jar of this moment is a different substance from the jar of the preceding moment and from the jar of the next moment. Next, inference is as follows : A jar exists only for a moment ; for it has existence, and is capable of doing an

action. What is non-momentary, as the horn of a hare, has no existence and is incapable of doing an action. Here no example is given of the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya*; but a negative example is stated in which the absence of the *sādhya* is accompanied by the absence of the *hetu*. This raises a presumption that where the *hetu* exists, there the *sādhya* also is present. The example selected is the horn of a hare, which has no existence, and which may be said to be anything—momentary or non-momentary, and it suits the *saugata* to take the latter view. Again, in a jar which is destroyed by the fall of a hammer, its existence at the moment is seen and along with it perishability. Therefore, the jars of the moments preceding the moment of destruction were also perishable; for they were jars existing at the moment.

3. The attempts to prove the momentariness of objects in the external world (1) are futile. The differentiation effected by sense perception of an object of the present moment from the objects of other moments does

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(1) The *saugata* appears to have caught the idea of momentariness of things from a burning lamp. It is admitted on all hands that though the flame appears to be one, it is really a quick succession of many flames, each flame being started by the contact of fire with a portion of the wick, and going out by the burning up of that portion and the consequent cessation of that contact. Owing to the rapidity with which each flame is replaced by another, the flames of the lamp appear to be one. The *saugata's* contention would be that as momentary coming into and going out of existence is seen in this case, it may be assumed to exist in other cases also.

not prove it to be a different object. It shows only its connection with the present moment, and does not preclude its connection with other moments also. The proof by inference fares no better. Two facts were adduced in proof of the momentariness of a jar. We will use them to show that it is relatively permanent. Thus, the jar is permanent ; for it exists, and is capable of doing an action. What is not permanent does not exist, and is incapable of doing an action, as the horn of a hare. The fact that an object is capable of doing an action proves of itself that it does not exist merely for one moment. For a thing that comes into existence and disappears the next moment can never do any work. It may be noted that the *hetu* proves the reverse of what is intended. The second proof by inference must share the same fate. When the jar is destroyed by the fall of a hammer, the destruction is brought about by a visible cause, and it may be affirmed that the jars of the moments preceding the moment of destruction remained in the absence of a similar cause of destruction. *Saugata*. The fall of the hammer was not the cause of destruction, but it merely started a stream of unlike existences in the form of broken pieces. *Reply*. To reach the condition of broken pieces is itself the destruction of the jar, as has been shown in sub-section 6 of chapter II, section 1. *Saugata*. Destruction is other than coming into the condition of broken pieces. *Reply*. The fall of the hammer is the cause of destruction, as it follows immediately on the fall of the hammer. This is appropriate.

4. Hence, by recognition objects are shown to be relatively permanent; and this cannot by any means be ignored. It shows that an object connected with two points of time is one; to say that it shows something else is to assert that the perception of the blue colour, for instance, relates to some other colour. Those, that assert the existence for a moment only of a person who perceives and of the thing perceived, cannot accept inference as a source of authority; for to draw an inference one must have perceived the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* and must remember it when he sees the *hetu* in a place; and these things will be impossible in their view. Similarly, they cannot say 'This exists for only a moment' and then adduce the *hetu*; for at the very moment, in which he makes the statement, he ceases to exist. It is not possible for one to complete what another began; for he does not know it.

### 25. नास्तोऽदृष्टत्वात् ।

What is non-existent cannot be the cause; for this has not been seen.

Under (1) *sūtra* 19 at the end of the explanation it was pointed out that after one's eye is turned to an object, if it disappears, it cannot be known. The *soutrāntika* comes forward to dispute the statement. This is what

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(1) Hitherto the views of the *vaibhāshika* and *soutrāntika*, who recognise the existence of the external world, were criticised; and the criticism applies equally to both. In this *sūtra* the view of the latter that the external world can be known only from inference is dealt with.

he states. The non-existence of an object at the moment for knowing it does not prevent its being known. To be the object of knowing is merely to be the means of knowing. *Objection.* The eye and other senses are the means of knowing. Are they the objects known. *Saugata.* An object bestows its character on cognition, and thus causes knowledge of itself. This is what I meant. Hence, when the object disappears, its previous existence and what it was are inferred from its character imparted to the knowledge. Here, the *yogāchāra* of the third school comes forward with an objection. An outside object is not necessary ; for one knowledge imparts its character to the next one. The *soutrāntika* replies. In a stream of perceptions marked by the blue colour a perception marked by the yellow colour cannot find a place without the intervention of an yellow object. Hence differences in perceptions are brought about by the differences in objects themselves. This contention of the *soutrāntika* is refuted in the *sūtra*. The particular character of a perception cannot be the character of an object that has disappeared and has ceased to exist. For, such a thing has not been seen. When an object disappears, its attribute cannot be seen in another object. A reflection on a mirror subsists only so long as an object is present before it ; but not after it has moved off. Even there it is not the attribute only that appears ; the object too is reflected. Hence the peculiar character of a perception imparted to it by an object needs the existence of the object at the moment of knowing it.

## 26. उदासीनानामपि चैवं सिद्धिः ।

And even to those that sit still fruits will come on this theory.

This *sūtra* points out one more flaw in the theory of both schools. In the world one makes efforts to procure a good or avert an evil ; but if everything exists only for a moment, and if objects, the efficacy imparted to persons, and meditations do not continue in succeeding moments, there is nothing to be sought by effort. Hence, fruits must come without a cause ; and those that sit still may reap the fruits of this world or of the next, or even attain final release.

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SUB-SECTION 4

In this sub-section the view of the third school of the *saugatas*, known as the *yogāchāra*, is dealt with. The tenets of this school are that outside objects have no existence, and that perceptions alone are real. To these remarks certain objections are raised, which the *yogāchāra* meets. *First objection.* One perception is distinguished from another by the objects perceived ; how can they be denied ? *Reply.* Perceptions have forms of their own, as objects are said to have, and distinguish themselves from one another without any outside help. The difference among perceptions depends upon *vāsanā*, which means that one perception perfumes another similar perception that follows it, so as to form a

stream ; and the perfume of one stream is different from that of another. Hence there are streams of perceptions differing from one another. *Second objection.*

How does the perception of a different kind arise ?

*Reply.* The last perception in a stream of perceptions gives rise to a different perception ; and it is capable of doing so. *Third objection.* Why is it said that the characters of a mustard seed and hill, which are outside, appear in the perceptions that are inside ? *Reply.* Objects become fit to be spoken about by the shining of perceptions. This must be admitted ; otherwise the distinction between what shines without help and what needs help will disappear, and in order to shine it must have a form ; without a form it cannot shine. There is but one form that is seen ; and it belongs to perception. Its appearance as the form of an outside object is illusion. This is proved also by the fact that perception and the object are invariably perceived together. Hence, the object is not different from the perception (1).

2. Further the assumption of the existence of outside objects is not legitimate. One, that recognises their existence, must admit that in the perception of a jar the perception has the form of the jar. Forms in perceptions being admitted by both sides, while all speech is possible with reference to them alone, why should outside objects be assumed to exist ?

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(1) When one sees two moons owing to a defect in the eye, the two moons are always seen together ; and for this reason the second moon does not differ from the other.



This view is refuted in the next *sūtra* :

27. नाभाव उपलब्धेः ।

No non-existence : because it is seen.

To deny the existence of objects other than perceptions is not possible ; for perception is seen as possessing this character—to make it possible for a knower-*ātmā* to speak about a particular object. Every one, as is well-known, perceives thus—‘I see a jar’. This act of perception is connected with a person as perceiver and with a thing as its object ; and it is vivid perception, of which all the world is witness. For one with this very evidence to allege that perception alone is real must expose him to the derision of the whole world.

2. The opponent’s argument, that perception and object being invariably perceived together, the quality blue and its perception do not differ, is untenable. It conflicts with his own statement ; for being together in the perception must result from difference in the objects seen. The perception makes an object fit to be spoken about ; how can it be identical with the object ?

3. Again, *vāsanā* cannot be alleged in regard to perceptions, which completely disappear every moment, and which therefore do not possess a permanent form that may continue in all the perceptions in a stream. How can a perception be perfumed by another that has disappeared ?

4. Hence, differences in perceptions are due to differences in objects ; and they are brought about by the connection of the attribute *jnāna* with objects ; and

this connection is in the form of contact, as *jñāna* is a substance, being an inseparable attribute of a *jīva*, as light is an inseparable attribute of a flame.

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The opponent cites the case of dream perceptions, and contends that like them the perceptions of the waking condition, which perceptions of the outside world are, do not rest on anything. This is refuted in the next *sūtra* :

28. वैधर्म्याच्च न स्वप्नादिवत् ।

And not like dream perceptions ; for there is a difference.

Dream perceptions are caused by a drowsy mind, and are nullified, when one rises from sleep ; while perceptions of the waking condition are the reverse. Your attempt to prove that knowledge of all kinds is without any foundation is futile. For the inference, by which this is to be proved, would be of this form—‘knowledge’ is without foundation ; because it has the character of knowledge. Now, the knowledge to be obtained from this inference, being covered by the general term ‘knowledge,’ must also be without foundation, and would serve no purpose. If to obviate this defect, it be thought that it rests on a solid basis, then the *hetu* would be found in this knowledge, and the *sādhya* would be absent from it. Hence, the argument would be faulty, as the co-existence of the *hetu* and the *sādhya* is not invariable. The attempt therefore fails.

## 29. न भावोऽनुपलब्धेः ।

No existence ; because it is not seen.

Knowledge, not resting on a thing as its object, does not exist ; for it is nowhere seen, *i.e.*, knowledge without a person that knows, and an object known. Even dream perceptions do not rest on nothing. What is seen in dreams is created by the highest *Ātmā* so as to be experienced only by the dreamer and that only for the time being. This will be explained in chapter III, section 2, *sūtra* 3.

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SUB-SECTION 5

This sub-section deals with the last school of *saugatas*, that of the *mādhyamika*, whose argument is as follows : That the world is a void is the final decision of the *saugata* system. The teaching had to be suited to the capacity of students ; and external objects were accepted, and the theory of momentariness was added ; but as a matter of fact neither knowledge nor the external world exists. 'There is nothing' is the truth, and to become nothing is release. Such was the view of *Buddha*. And that is proper ; for nothingness does not need any cause to produce it ; for it exists of itself. It is only for *sat* (what exists) that a cause should be searched. Now, how is *sat* caused ? The cause cannot be anything that exists ; for a jar does not come from a lump of earth, as it is, *i.e.*, without its being worked up. It cannot be anything that does not exist. When

the lump of earth disappears, the jar that comes out of nothing must be nothing. Next is *sat* (what exists) made by itself or by another? It cannot be the former alternative; for then the product would depend upon itself as cause; and it would serve no purpose, as it already exists. The latter alternative too will not do; for if another can make it, then anything can come out of anything else, there being no difference in the matter of being another. As nothingness has no origin, it is not liable to destruction. Hence nothingness is the truth; and the notion of origination, destruction, existence, non-existence and the rest is mere illusion.

Here an objection is raised by *Śankara*. There can be no illusion without a real base on which it rests. Hence something must be accepted as real. *Reply*. You accept an illusive world, though the *avidyā*, which causes the illusion, its resting on *Brahma*, and His perception of it are all unreal, and though it is opposed to what happens in cases of illusion (1). Similarly with an unreal base illusion may happen.

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(1) In the typical case of illusion—the mistaking of shell-silver for silver—the cause is twilight; it affects the shell-silver, and prevents its being clearly seen; and there is also a person who sees and is deluded. In *Śankara's* theory the cause is *avidyā*, which is unreal; it cannot affect *Brahma* as alleged, as He is light (*prakāśa*) and can shine without any help; and being destitute of attributes, He cannot see. Nevertheless he states that *Brahma* sees an unreal world. It is open to the *mādhyaṃika* to retort that if *Śankara* may disregard the necessary conditions, he may also do the same.

This theory is refuted in the next *sūtra* :

30. सर्वथाऽनुपपत्तेश्च ।

And because in every way it is inappropriate.

The nothingness, which you have in view, cannot be established, whether we consider the sources of authority or what they prove. First, the terms 'exist' and 'does not exist' and the perceptions with which they are connected refer only to particular conditions of an object that exists. (See *final decision* in chap. II, sec. 1, sub-sec. 6.) Hence, when it is stated that nothing exists, it amounts to saying that everything exists; but in a particular condition. Next, the statement that nothing exists is made on some authority; and the reality of that authority is admitted. If this be not so, there is no proof; and everything is real.

SUB-SECTION 6

In this sub-section the theory of the *ārḥata* or *jaina* is examined; for he too states that the world has evolved from *atoms*. The *jaina* states that this world, consisting of *jivas* and what are not *jivas*, is without a superior Being who controls and guides it. There are six classes of substances: (i) *Pudgala*<sup>1</sup>—substances possessing colour, smell, taste and touch, and consisting of atoms (*parama anu*) and of their aggregates—earth, water, fire and air,

<sup>1</sup> The matter in the original is re-arranged and is presented in a form in which it can be easily understood.

the bodies of living creatures, and places of enjoyment. The atoms are not of four classes as in the *vaiṣeṣhika* and *saugata* theories; they are of one class only, and the other elements are formed by change of condition. (ii) Ether, which is one and is of infinite extent. (iii) Time, which is an atomic substance, helping us to speak of the past, the present and the future. (iv) *Dharma* and (v) *adharma*, which are substances extending everywhere, and which are respectively the cause of motion and of immobility. (vi) The *jivas*, who see, know and experience pleasure, and are capable. They are of three classes; first, there are those that are bound. What bind them are of eight classes. Four of them obstruct the appearance of the four qualities that pertain to the *jivas* by nature. The remaining four bring about the formation of their bodies, help their continuance, attach the *jivas* to them, and make them experience pleasure and pain or feel indifference. Next, there are those that do *yoga* (meditation) and have succeeded in their efforts. Lastly, there are those that have become free by the disappearance of desire and aversion and have attained their true nature. Of the six substances, the atoms occupy the smallest extent of space, and ether is of infinite extent. The remaining occupy an intermediate position, this remark applying to the *jivas* also. There is another classification from the point of view of the *jiva's* release; (i) *jivas*; (ii) whatever serves for their enjoyment; (iii) the senses serving as instruments of enjoyment; (iv) what binds them; this has been already explained; (v) ascetic practices helping to bring about

*moksha* (release) and to be learnt from the teaching of *arhat*; (vi) meditation with the senses reduced to inactivity; and (vii) *moksha*.

The peculiar feature of this theory is that every substance is said to possess contradictory qualities—existence and non-existence, permanency and impermanency, oneness and separateness (1). To explain that such a thing is possible it is further stated that each substance has two aspects—the aspect as substance, and the aspect as condition. In the former aspect all objects are real, permanent, and one, and in the latter aspect, they are the reverse—*i.e.*, they are unreal, impermanent and many. The conditions are said to be existing and non-existing.

This theory is criticised in the next *sūtra*.

### 31. नैकस्मिन्नसंभवान् ।

Because they are impossible in the same thing.

It is not possible for contradictory qualities like existence and non-existence to co-exist in one and the same object, as impossible as for light and shade to co-exist. An object, which is in the condition denoted by the term exists, cannot at the same time be in the reverse condition denoted by the term 'does not exist'.

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(1) The possession of contradictory qualities is justified, on the plea that all objects exist in seven forms: (i) they exist; (ii) they do not exist; (iii) they exist and do not exist; (iv) they cannot be described. This last feature is added to the first three forms, and we have three more classes.

For a substance to be the seat of changes known as origination and destruction is to be perishable. How can the reverse—to be eternal—be found in it? Being the seat of incompatible attributes, like the peculiar characters of a horse and of a buffalo, constitutes difference between two objects; and oneness is the reverse. How can difference and oneness co-exist in the same thing?

2. Time appears as an aspect of substances; and it is unnecessary therefore to speak of its separate existence or non-existence and the like or to answer any objections that may be urged. *Question.* If time be not a separate substance, how shall we explain the following statements—‘Time exists; time does not exist.’ *Reply.* *Jāti* (the peculiar feature of a class) has no separate existence; and yet we are able to explain the statements ‘*jāti* exists; *jāti* does not exist’. The same method may be followed.

3. *Question.* You reject our view; yet you state that *Brahma* is one only, and that yet He is everything also. *Reply.* He is all material products and all *jivas*, as they form His bodies; and this is possible, as He is all-knowing, and omnipotent, has an unfailing will, and is an unique Being. The bodies are entirely different from the *ātmā*; and their attributes also differ.

4. The *jivas* and the other substances that you mention are not the conditions of one substance; you cannot therefore state that they are one as substance, and separate as conditions. *Jaina:* Each of these six substances is one in its own nature as substance, and separate in regard to its own conditions. *Reply.* Then



this will conflict with your statement that everything is everything else ; for no one substance is identical with another. The criticism stated in sub-section 2 of the evolution of atoms undirected by an all-Ruler applies here also.

In the next three *sūtras* the view that the *jīva* is neither infinite nor atomic, but that he is of middle size is refuted :

### 32. एवंचात्माकात्स्न्यं ।

And on this theory no fullness of the *ātmā*.

It is stated that the *jīva* is of the size of his body. When one, that was in an elephant's body, leaves it to enter the body of an ant, only a portion can go in, and what is in the ant's body will not be the full *ātmā*.

The *jaina* tries to get over this difficulty by assuming that the *jīva* is capable of contraction and expansion, and that by a change of condition the whole of him goes in. This explanation is next criticised :

### 33. न च पर्यायादप्यविरोधो विकारादिभ्यः ।

And the difficulty does not disappear even by alteration of condition ; because change and the rest will result.

By the term 'change' reference is made here to origination and destruction ; and these carry with them existence for a limited period of time and incapacity to

know, and to benefit by one's knowledge. The *jiva* would then be reduced to the condition of an earthen jar.

**34. अन्त्यावस्थितेश्रोमयनित्यत्वाद्विशेषः ।**

Because the last size remains and both the *ātma* and the size are eternal ; there is no difference.

The first portion of the *sūtra* repeats the *jaina's* explanation, which is that the natural size of the *jiva* is the last size, *i.e.*, that attained in final release ; that this remains, as no more body is taken up ; and that both the *jiva* and his size in the condition of release are eternal. The second portion of the *sūtra* replies. Then this eternal size must have existed before ; and the view that the *jiva* is of the size of his body is abandoned.

SUB-SECTION 7

We have stated that the theories of *Kapila*, *Kaṇāda*, *Sugata* and *ārghata* should be ignored by those that aspire for release, as they are unsound, and as they are not based on the *veda*. In this sub-section it is stated that the *āgama* of *Paṣupati* is opposed to the *veda*, that it is unsound, and that it should therefore be ignored :

**35. पत्युरसामञ्जस्यात् ।**

The *āgama* of *Paṣupati* should not be regarded with respect ; because it is unsound.

There are four schools that follow this *āgama*, and all of them describe *tatvas* and the means for attaining the fruits of this world, enjoyment in the other world, and final release differently from the *veda*. They distinguish between the material and operative causes of the universe, and regard *Paśupati* as the operative cause only. And the practices which they recommend conflict with one another and are opposed to the *veda*. The four schools are ; *kāpālas*, *kālāmukhas*, *pāśupatas*, and *śaivas*. Of them, *kāpālas* observe ‘One, that knows the nature of the six *mudrikas*, and also what *paramudrā* is, and meditates on the *ātmā* seated in *bhaga* posture, attain bliss’. A necklace, finger-ring, ear-ring, a bead worn on the tuft of hair on the head, ashes and the holy thread—these are said to be the six *mudrikas*. “One whose body wears these is not re-born here.” The *kālāmukhas* state the following to be the means to the attainment of all fruits here or in the other world : To eat out of a human skull, to bathe with the ashes obtained by cremating corpses, to put it into the mouth, to bear a stick, to fill a jar with toddy and to worship a *devatā* in it, and the like. The *pāśupatas* state that five things should be known for release from bondage : (i) *kārya*—the five elements and their attributes—colour and the rest—thus ten *tatvas* ; (ii) *karāṇa*, the five senses, the five organs of actions, three inner senses in the form of the mind, *buddhi*, and *ahamkāra*, thirteen *tatvas* ; (iii) *yoga* or meditation ; (iv) *vidhi*, which includes the following—to bathe in ashes ; to lie down on ashes ; to laugh aloud ; to sing and dance as

one pleases without reference to the rules laid down for them; to make a sound like the bellowing of a bull; (the last four practices should be gone through away from the resort of worldly men); to recite *mantras*; to prostrate before a superior being; to appear like one asleep, while being wide awake; to shake the body as if suffering from disease; to walk limping; to indicate on seeing a young and pretty woman that one is in love with her; to act like one without discrimination, and do what the world will condemn; and to speak incoherently, and (v) complete disappearance of suffering; and the acquisition of the following capacities—to see or hear or touch things that are subtle, that are at a distance and that are separated by intervening objects; to go with extreme quickness; to direct all bodies and senses by mere will and without any bodily action; and to control everything even though the body and senses are inactive (1). In the *āgama* of the *śaivas* the following things appear: to wear a bracelet of *rudrāksha* round the wrist; to mat the hair on the head with a cohesive substance: to use a skull; to bathe in ashes; and the like. It is also stated that a member of any caste may by a particular action become a *brāhmaṇa*, and may attain the status of the last stage of life—‘By mere entry into *dīkshā*, one becomes a *brāhmaṇa* in a moment; by doing the *kāpāla-vrata* one becomes *yati*’ (one that has renounced the world).

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(1) The *pāṣupata*'s statement has been added from the *naya mayūkha malikā* of Appaya Dīkshitar.

The *sūtra* condemns this *āgama*. From *sūtra* 31 the word *na* meaning no is brought down. The meaning of the *sūtra* is that the view of *Paṣupati* should not be respected ; for it is unsound. This arises from the fact that each school condemns the others. One instance will suffice. Though ashes are used by all, one school uses the ashes of the burning ground ; while the *paṣupata* obtains it by begging in the houses of householders. *Paṣupati's āgama* is also opposed to *vedic* teaching in regard to the *tatvas*, meditation and *āchāra* (right conduct). The *veda*, on the other hand, teaches that *Nārāyaṇa* alone, the highest *Brahma*, is both the material and operative causes of the universe ; that only meditation on Him is the means to release ; and that the help to meditation is the performance of the duties prescribed in it for each caste and each stage of life (1). And this is different in the *āgama*, which must therefore be neglected.

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(1) The authority for these statements is the following texts :

(i) *As to the highest tatva.*—The being stated to be the highest *Brahma* is *Nārāyaṇa* ; the highest *tatva* is *Nārāyaṇa* ; the highest fire is *Nārāyaṇa* ; the highest *ātmā* is *Nārāyaṇa* (*nārū, anu*, 11).; He willed 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve' (*chāndo.*, VI-2-3) ; He desired 'I will become many ; and to that end I will evolve' (*āna.*, VI) ; He of himself made Himself. (*Ibid.*, VII.)

(ii) *As to meditation being the only means to release.*—I meditate on that great *Purusha*, shining like the sun, and having a figure made of a substance other than *taṃas* (matter) (*puru*) ; meditating on Him here in this

2. *Opponent.* Do not the terms *sat*, *brahma*, *ātmā*, *ṣambhu*, *ṣiva* and others occur in *vedic* texts? how can *Nārāyaṇa* be said to be the highest *Ātmā*? *Reply.* The eleventh *anuvāka* of *taittirīya*—*nārāyaṇam* has for its special purpose the teaching as to ‘who is the highest *devatā*’; and it should be followed in understanding other *vedic* texts. In the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* there is the injunction—He makes the offering with a *juhū*; it only mentions the instrument for making the offering, but not the wood of which it should be made. This is done by another text ‘He whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood’; and the first text is understood with reference to the second. Similarly certain texts mention various *devatās*—such as *prajāpati*, *ṣiva*, *indra*, *ākāśa* and *prāṇa*—as objects to be meditated on; and this is their only purpose. But who these *devatās* are must be ascertained from the texts, which have no purpose other than to determine the nature of these *devatās*; and it is the *anuvāka* referred to; and it shows that these *devatās* represent *Nārāyaṇa*, who is their inner ruler; and He it is that should be meditated on in the form of those beings. This point was explained in sub-section 11 of chapter I, section 1. The following text from the *mahopanishad* begins with this statement—“*Nārāyaṇa*,

manner, one becomes immortal; no other path lies to the goal. (*Ibid.*) Similarly all other *vedic* texts.

(iii) *As to the helps to the meditation.*—Him *brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yūgas*, by the making of gifts, by *tapas* and by fasting. (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); Desiring this fruit alone (the highest *Ātmā*) men renounce the world (*Ibid.*).

alone was ; no *Brahmā* ; no *Īṣāna*” ; and goes on to state. “ He found no pleasure in being alone, *etc.*” *Nārāyaṇa* mentioned in this creation-text as the world-cause is referred to in other creation-texts by the general terms *sat*, *brahma*, *ātmā* and others. See note on page 51. Hence the highest *ātmā* is *Nārāyaṇa*, and not *Paśupati*.

The next three *sūtras* criticise the view that *Paśupati* is only the operative cause, and that his existence can be proved by inference alone. On this point most of those that stand outside the *vedic* fold are agreed (1).

### 36. अधिष्ठानानुपपत्तेश्च ।

And because direction (of evolution) is not possible.

Those that depend only on inference should follow what is seen in the world, and regard the maker of the world as directing its evolution, as the potter directs the evolution of jars from a lump of earth. But unlike the potter, *Paśupati* has no body ; and only those that have

(1) It is stated that in *śaiva āgama* the authority of the *veda* is accepted ; and yet this fact is ignored, and the existence of *Īṣvara* is sought to be proved by inference. This is probably the reason. If *Īṣvara* be accepted as taught in the *veda*, as the world-cause is referred to in creation-texts by the term *Nārāyaṇa*, and as this name is peculiar to *Purushottama*, He must be accepted as *Brahma*, the world-cause. This conclusion being unwelcome to the *śaiva*, the fact is concealed, and recourse is had to proof by inference. (*Naya mayūkha mālikā*.)

bodies are seem to be able to direct. *Opponent.* Possession of a body by *Īṣvara* must be admitted. *Reply.* No ; if he had a body, it must have consisted of parts ; and whether it was perishable or not, there are insuperable difficulties, which cannot be got over. See chapter I, section 1, sub-section 3.

### 37. करणवच्चेन भोगादिभ्यः ।

If it be said ' Like (the *jiva*) directing his instruments,' the reply is—' No ' ; because enjoyment and the rest would follow.

The opponent states : The *jiva* experiencing pleasure and pain controls his body and instruments without a body ; and *Īṣvara* may similarly direct the evolution of the universe without a body. This explanation is first stated in the *sūtra*, and is then refuted. The direction by the *jiva* is for the purpose of experiencing the fruits of his past good and bad deeds ; and his power to direct comes from his *adr̥ṣṭam* in the form of those deeds. The same result must apply to *Paṣupati* also, *i.e.*, he must be subject to *karma* and experience its fruits.

### 38. अन्तवत्त्वमसर्वज्ञता वा ।

Liability to destruction and incapacity to know everything.

If *Paṣupati* were subject to *karma*, the results stated in the *sūtra* would also follow.

In *pūṛva mīmāṃsā*, I-3-2, it was decided that a *smṛiti* opposed to the *veda* should be neglected ; and this sub-section would seem to be unnecessary. But the intention



is to show that the *āgama* of *Paṣupati* is opposed to the *veda*, and to give the warning that one should not be deluded by the mention in it of certain *dharma*s, that are not opposed to the *veda*.

### SUB-SECTION 8

The subject of this sub-section is the *āgama* known as *pāṇcha rātra*, which was taught by *Nārāyaṇa* Himself, and which points out the way to the highest good. The author of the *sūtras* defends the *āgama* from the view that it is on a par with the *smṛiti* of *Kapila* and the rest, and that it should be rejected as authority.

The doubt arises from one or two apparent inconsistencies with the *veda*, which are stated in the two following *sūtras*:

39. उत्पत्त्यसंभवात् ।

Because origination is not a fact.

Here is a text:

From *Vāsudeva*, the highest *Brahma*, the final cause, the *jīva*, known as *Sankarshana* is born; from *Sankarshana* mind, known as *Pradyumna*, is born; from him *ahankāra*, known as *Aniruddha*, is born.

The mention of the birth of the *jīva* here is opposed to the *veda*, which states that he is eternal—"The *jīva*, who is fit to be all-knowing, is not born; nor does he die" (*kāṭha*, II-18).

## 40. नचकर्तुःकरणम् ।

Nor the instrument from the doer.

The coming of mind from the *jīva* is not correct ; for it comes from the highest *Ātmā*. “ From Him come forth *prāṇa*, mind and all the senses ” (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-3). As the *āgama* teaches what is opposed to the *veda*, its authority is denied.

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The explanation of these inconsistencies is given in the next *sūtra* :

## 41. विज्ञानादिभावे वा तदप्रतिषेधः ।

As they are the all-knowing cause, the authority of the *āgama* is not repudiated.

The terms *sankarshaṇa*, *pradyumna*, and *aniruddha* denote the highest *Ātmā*. *Vāsudeva* Himself out of love for those that call on Him for help, appears in these forms of His own will in order to make it possible for them to approach Him. The terms *jīva*, mind and *aḥamkāra* denote these Beings, as they control them, as *ākāśa* and *prāṇa* denote the highest *Ātmā*. There is therefore no inconsistency, and no need to question the authority of the *āgama*.

The authority for these statements are the following :

(i) That is an *āgama*, from which comes meditation on the Being in four forms as a thing to be done, meditation by *brāhmaṇas* with the names appropriate to each form, and coming to them in the order in which they (the meditators) become fit (*paushkara*) ;

(ii) The highest *śāstra*, of large size, gives discrimination to the *brāhmaṇas*, who worship the Being bearing the names *sat*, *brahma*, and *vāsudeva*; it is *Brahma-upaniṣad* (giving instruction about *Brahma*) (*sātvata*);

(iii) By the worship of *Vibhava*, *Vyūha* is reached; by the worship of *Vyūha*, the highest *Brahma* known as *Vāsudeva*, the subtle form, is reached.

(iv) Because the unchanging highest *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*, is well attained from this *śāstra* with knowledge and *karma* (*pañśkara*).

The first text, though intended to explain how *pāñcharātra* came to be known as an *āgama*, shows that *Brahma* exists in four forms. The second text states that meditation on the four forms is meditation on *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*. In *Vāsudeva* the six qualities—*jñāna*, *bala* and the rest—appear in full; He appears as subtle (*sūkshma*), *vyūha* and *vibhava*. *Vibhavas* are *avatāra* forms like *Rāma* and *Kṛishṇa*; *vyūhas* are *Vāsudeva*, *Samkarshana*, *Pradyumna*, and *Aniruddha*; *Sūkshma* is the highest *Brahma*, known as *Vāsudeva*, and only possessing the six attributes. This distinction appears in the third text. Those, that love Him, worship one of these forms of *Brahma* in accordance with their own fitness, and reach Him as stated in the last text.

Thus there is no inconsistency with the *veda*; on the other hand the *āgama* describes what is stated in the *vedic* text 'He is not born; yet he is born in many forms' (*puru*). That is, *Brahma* takes up forms of His own will, prompted by love of those that come to Him; and this is His birth. Hence the authority of

the *āgama*, that elucidates this text, cannot be said to be repudiated.

#### 42. विप्रतिषेधाच्च ।

And in the *āgama* itself the origination of the *jīva* is denied.

The nature of *prakṛiti* is thus described :

It is without intelligence ; it exists for others ; it is eternal ; it ever changes ; it has three *guṇas* ; it forms the bodies of those that have *karma*. The connection between it and the *purusha* (*jīva*) is by his direction of *prakṛiti* ; for he is without a beginning and without an end ; this has been decided to be the truth (*parama samhitā*).

The eternal existence of the *jīva* being similarly stated in other *saṃhitās*, the origination of the *jīva* is repudiated in the *pāncharātra āgama* ; there need be no doubt in the matter. References to the *jīva*'s birth and death will be explained in the next section (*sūtra* 18) so as to agree with *vedic* statements. The *jīva*'s origination being denied even there, the doubt as to the authority of the *āgama* arising from this is completely removed.

*Further objections*. Here is a text from the same *āgama* :

*Śāṇḍilya*, unable to perceive the highest goal from the *vedas* and their *angas*, learnt the *pāncharātra*.

This shows that this *āgama* is opposed to the *veda*. *Reply*. Here the intention was merely to praise the *āgama*, not to condemn the *veda*. *Illustration*. The *agnihotra* offerings may be made either before or after

the sun rises ; and to praise the making of the offerings after the sun rises, the making of the offerings before is condemned in the following text :

Those, that make the *agnihotra homa* before the sun rises, speak untruth every morning (*aitareya brāhmaṇa*).

Another *illustration*. In the *chāndogya*, chapter VII, considered in chapter I, section 3, sub-section 2, *Nārada* enumerates the branches of learning that he had studied, including the four *vedas*, and observes “ I know, revered sir, only the texts, but do not know the *ātmā*.” The intention was to praise the *vidyā* taught in that chapter, but not to condemn the *vidyās* taught in other places.

2. Another and a better explanation : *Nārada* was unable to perceive the highest *tatva* taught in all the *vedas*, and their *angas*, and he therefore applied for instruction on the subject. The same explanation applies to *Śāṇḍilya* also. That this is so appears from the mention further on of the Being taught in the *upanishads*, viz., *Brahma* known as *Vāsudeva*. The *veda* being difficult to understand, the teaching of the *āgama* was begun, so that the meaning might be easily known. This is stated in the *parama samhitā*.

“ I have learnt, revered sir, the *vedas*, their *angas*, the *angas* of *angas*, their commentaries, and I have heard from my teacher the meaning of the *angas* along with logic. But in all of them I do not clearly perceive in any place the means by which the highest good may be attained.” “ The all-knowing *Bhagavān Hari* took the essence of the *vedānta*,

and out of mercy towards those that love Him reproduced it, so that it might be easily understood." Clearly—free from doubt.<sup>1</sup>

3. Certain commentators have explained the four *sūtras* of this sub-section as denying authority in regard to certain portions, that in their opinion conflict with the *veda*. Their explanation is not in accordance with the wording of the *sūtras*, and is opposed to the intention of their author. After writing the *sūtras*, stating the rules for the interpretation of the *vedānta*, he wrote the *mahābhārata* to elucidate the *vedic* teaching, a voluminous work consisting of a hundred thousand *grandhas* (a *grandha* is equal to 32 syllables). In a portion of this known as *moksha dharma* he begins with this question :

If the householder, the student of the *veda*, the forest-dweller, or the mendicant desires to attain the highest goal, which *devatā* should he worship ?

He then at great length describes the teaching of the *pāncharātra āgama*, and closes with the following remarks :

"Churning with my *buddhi* the voluminous *bhārata* with its hundred thousand *grandhas*, this has been taken out of it, as ghee is taken out of curd. As butter is in curd ; as the *brāhmaṇa* is among biped animals ; as the *āraṇyaka* is among the *vedas* ; as nectar is among herbs (this is the best part in the *mahābhārata*)" ; "This great *upanishad*, containing the teaching of the four *vedas*, and

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<sup>1</sup> The meaning of the verse is explained in the original with many epithets. It is omitted here, as the substance has been given.

teaching *karma yoga* and *jñāna yoga* (1), is known as *pāñcharātra*. This is the good sought by worldly men ; this is *Brahma* ; this is the highest goal ; it includes the four *vedas* ; this very teaching will be your guide."

In the *bhīṣma parva* also ' By *brūhmaṇas*, *kṣatriyas*, *vaiśyas*, and *śūdras*, bearing His marks, *Mūdhava* (the husband of *Mahā Lakṣmī*) should be served and worshipped, following the ritual taught in the *sātvata* by *Samkarshaṇa* '.

How can *Bādarāyaṇa*, the foremost among those that know the *veda*, after saying all this, condemn the *sātvata śāstra* (i.e., the *pāñcharātra*), which deals with *Brahma* taught by the *upanishads*, and known as *Vāsudeva* and describes how He should be meditated on and worshipped ?

4. *One more objection.* Here is a verse from the same *moksha dharma*.

*Sāṅkhya*, *yoga*, *pāñcharātra*, the *vedas*, *pāṣupata*—do these point to one thing as the ultimate *tatva*, or do they point to different *tatvas* ?

This shows that all these should be treated with respect ; but in the *sūtras* the *śāṅkhya* and *yoga smṛitis* and *pāṣupata āgama* are condemned. *Pāñcharātra* being mentioned along with them should share the same fate. *Reply.* No ; it should not be placed on a par with the others. The meaning of the question is : Do they point to one *tatva* or to different *tatvas* ? In the former case what is that one ? In the latter case, the *tatvas* pointed out must be opposed to one another ; and the ultimate *tatva* cannot be all of them ; some one of them must be

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(1) The original has the terms *sāṅkhya* and *yoga*. They refer to *jñāna yoga* and *karma yoga*. Compare with *bhagavad-gītā* III-3.

accepted. Which is it? The following reply was given. "Know these works to express different views." It was then pointed out that the authors of the *sāṅkhya* and *yoga smṛitis* and the *pāṣupata āgama* were *Kapila*, *Hiraṇyagarbha*, and *Paṣupati* respectively; that the *vedas* were not made; and that the "the author of all *pāncharātra āgamas* was *Nārāyaṇa* Himself". It was then added:

In all these works examining with proper arguments, it will be seen that the ultimate *tatva* is *Nārāyaṇa*."

The meaning was this: the three works were human productions; while the *veda*, not having been made, is free from the touch of misconception and other blemishes. These works conflict with one another, and teach what is opposed to the perfect *veda*; if they be understood as they are, they cannot claim any authority. If one examines them with the help of the arguments stated in the *sūtras*, he will perceive that the *pradhāna*, *puruṣa* (*jīva*), *Paṣupati* and other *tatvas* have an existence only as being the bodies of *Nārāyaṇa*, who is known in the *upaniṣads* as *Brahma*; *Pāncharātra āgama* was taught by *Nārāyaṇa*; and it describes His nature and the mode of meditating on Him. How can anyone regard it as being like the other works?

5. The same thing is stated in another place in the *moksha dharma*:

Thus the *sāṅkhya*, *yoga*, the *veda*, and the *upaniṣads* point to the same *tatva* and are therefore one work; and this is said to be *pāncharātra*.



This means: The twenty-five *tatvas* mentioned in the *sāṅkhya smṛiti*, the mode of doing *yoga* (meditation) with its helps in the form of *yama*, *niyama* and the rest, and the *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* are all accepted; and they are connected with *Brahma* thus: The *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya* are directed by *Brahma*; *yoga* is meditation on *Brahma*; and the *karmas* are the worship of *Brahma*. This is the work done by the *upanishads*, which point out the existence of *Brahma*, and state what He is. The very same thing is elucidated by *Nārāyaṇa* Himself, who is no other than *Brahma*. In the *sūtras* themselves what has been condemned is not the twenty-five *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*, but their being undirected by *Brahma*. In the other two works what was rejected was the view that *Īṣvara* is merely the operative cause, the placing of *Paśupati* above *Nārāyaṇa*, and the practices that are opposed to the *veda*; but the utility of *yoga* (meditation) and the existence of *Paśupati* were not denied. This conclusion is stated in another verse of the *moksha dharma*.

*Sāṅkhya*, *yoga*, *pūncharātra*, the *vedas* and *pāsupata*—these are authorities in regard to *Ātmā*; they should not be nullified with specious arguments.

This means that only the *tatvas* mentioned by them should be accepted, but that they should not be wholly rejected like the works of the *saugata* and the *jaina*. This verse should be thus understood, so as to agree with the conclusion stated in the previous paragraph.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

## CHAPTER II

### SECTION 3

IN the preceding section the theories of the *sāṅkhya* and others, who are outside the *vedic* fold, were shown to be unsound, on the ground that they rested on specious arguments, and that they were full of contradictions. To show that the theory taught by the *upanishads* is free from contradictions and other blemishes, the mode of evolution of the world will be examined in this section. The products of evolution will be taken up one by one, and shown to have come forth from the highest *Atmā*, and directly from Him.

#### SUB-SECTION 1

The first sub-section deals with the element ether.

The first *sūtra* states the *first view* :

#### 1. न विद्यदश्रुतेः नान्यमेव जयते

Ether (*ākāśa*) is not produced ; because there is no *vedic* text (stating its having been produced).

The doubt is whether ether is produced or not. The *first view* is that it is not.

Mention would be made of what is possible ; but the origination of ether being as impossible as the sky to flower, it is not mentioned. For as it does not consist of parts, and as it fills all space, its origination, like that of the *jiva*, cannot be explained. Hence in the *chāndogya* (chapter VI, sec. 2), where evolution is described, reference is made only to fire, water and earth as having been produced ; and there is no mention of ether.

2. *Ojection.* Here are some texts :

From that *Ātmā* ether came forth (*āna.*, I-2) ; From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water and the all-supporting earth (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-3).

*Reply.* Because they conflict with the reasons assigned, they should be regarded as nullified. The reasons are non-mention in the *chāndogya* supported by argument ; while the texts cited are opposed to the argument.

The next *sūtra* gives the *final decision* :

2. अस्ति तु । सत्यमेव जयते

The origination of ether does exist.

The *veda* teaches what is beyond the senses ; and it is therefore competent to state that ether is a product, though this cannot be known from other sources. A matter known from the *veda* cannot be set aside by an inference with the *hetus* mentioned. In regard to the *jiva*, his being without parts is not the cause for his not being made. This will be shown further on.

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The opponent disputes the conclusion ; and the next *sūtra* states his contention :

### 3. गौण्यसम्भवाच्छब्दाच्च ।

(The text as to the production of ether) should be understood in a secondary sense ; because it is impossible, and because of a text.

The first thing produced being fire, ether is not a product. And there is testimony confirming this presumption. “ The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*)—this is imperishable ” (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-3).

Here the opponent anticipates an objection which may be urged. In the *ānandavallī* text but one verb *sambhūtaḥ* (came forth) is used, and that in the first clause ; in the other clauses it has to be added. The word should therefore be understood in the same way. How can the same word be understood in its primary sense with reference to fire and water, and in a secondary sense with reference to ether ? He replies in the next *sūtra* :

### 4. स्याच्चैकस्य ब्रह्मशब्दवत् ।

It may happen to the same verb ; like the word *brahma*.

The word *brahma* occurs in a secondary sense, meaning matter in the *muṇḍaka* (I-1-10). “ From Him came forth this *brahma*, name, form and *annam* ” ; and in its primary sense in the preceding verse (I-1-9). “ By *tapas* *Brahma* evolves.” Here the word *brahma*

is repeated; but in the *ānandavalli* text the verb *sambhūtaḥ* has to be carried over from the first clause to the subsequent ones; for the clauses run as follows:

From that *Ātma* came forth ether; from ether air; from air fire; from fire water; from water earth.

But this makes no difference, as the denotation of the word is repeated, as when the word itself is repeated.

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The next three *sūtras* reply:

#### 5. प्रतिज्ञाऽहानिरव्यतिरेकात् ।

The declaration will not become nil, only when ether is not different (from *Brahma*).

This attempt of yours to understand the *ānandavalli* text in a secondary sense so as to agree with the *chāndogya* is futile. For, the latter *upanishad* itself tacitly admits that ether is produced. For, it starts with the declaration that by knowing *Brahma* everything is known. This implies that everything has evolved from *Brahma*, and ether can be no exception. It is only then that the declaration may be taken as established.

#### 6. शब्देभ्यः ।

From other texts.

That as a product ether does not differ from *Brahma* is established from the following texts of the *chāndogya*.

Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only; without a second (VI-2-1); All this is identical with that (*Sat*) (VI-8-7).

The affirmation that before evolution commenced there was only *Sat* shows that ether did not then exist as ether, and that it is a product subsequently formed. The express mention in more than one text of ether being a product cannot be nullified by the non-mention of ether in another text. The mention of the origination of fire does not show that ether is not a product.

### 7. यावद्विकारं तु विभागो लोकवत् ।

And all things being affirmed to be products, the evolution of ether (from *Brahma*) follows ; as in the world.

From the text ' All this is identical with that (*Sat*) ' ether also appears to be a product. When it is said in the world, ' All these are the sons of *devadatta*, ' and then some are mentioned as having been born from him, it follows that the others not mentioned are also born from him. Similarly here also. What then becomes of the text " The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*) --this is imperishable " ? *Reply*. It must be understood that they exist without destruction for a very long time, as the *devas* do (1).

(1) The objection answered in this sub-section was raised by the *vaiseshika*. His argument is this. Ether is not produced ; because it is not made up of parts. The reply is that no substance, whether made up of parts or not, is merely produced. The substance always exists ; and when it changes its condition, and becomes fit to receive a new name, it is said to have been made. The opponent does admit the coming of things without parts into a new condition ; e.g., ether is without parts ; and from a condition without sound, it comes into a condition in which sound is manifested. The *jiva* also is without parts ; and he is

## 8. एतेन मातृश्चा व्याख्यातः ।

This explains that air also is a product.

The same reasons, as have been urged in the case of ether, apply to air also. A different *sūtra* has been made as to air, as reference to it is made in a succeeding *sūtra* :

## 9. असंभवस्तु मतोऽनुपपत्तेः ।

Being a non-product applies to *Sat* only ; because it is inappropriate in others.

This follows from the declaration that by knowing *Brahma* everything can be known. Hence everything other than *Brahma* has evolved from Him. The special treatment of ether and air is in illustration of this fact. Hence, *avyakta* (matter entering on evolution), *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, *tanmātras* and the senses—all have evolved. The first two are the first and second modifications of matter ; and the *tanmātras* are the stages immediately preceding the evolution of the great elements—ether, air, fire, water, earth.

## SUB-SECTION 2

We have seen that all things other than *Brahma* are products. The next question for consideration is

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according to the opponent without the attribute consciousness ; yet in certain conditions consciousness appears. Hence, ether may be produced, and in the *vedic* texts it is enumerated along with other things which are admittedly produced. Hence the statement as to its being produced cannot be treated as a dead letter (*adhi.*, 226).

whether each product has come forth from the next preceding one without the intervention of *Brahma*, or from *Brahma* Himself appearing in that form.

The first three *sūtras* state the *first view* :

10. तेजोऽतस्तथाह्वाह ।

Fire came forth from it (air). So is it stated.

The statement is “ From air fire ” (*āna.*, I-2).

11. आपः ।


Water also from it—(fire).

‘ From fire water ’ (*Ibid.*) ; It (fire) created water (*chāndo.*, VI-2-3).

12. पृथिवी ।

Earth also from it (water).

From water earth (*Ibid.*), ‘ That (water) produced *anna* ’ (*chāndo.*, VI-2-4).



How can the word *anna* denote earth as presumed by this quotation ? The next *sūtra* replies :

13. अधिकारूपशब्दान्तरेभ्यः ।

From the context ; from the reference to colour ; and from other texts.

The context, in which this clause occurs, describes the evolution of the great elements ; and the term *anna* must therefore denote earth. *Anna* is food, and food of every kind is produced by earth ; and on the theory



that the cause and its product are one, the term *anna* may denote earth. Next, reference is made to colour in the following text, which occurs further on :

The red colour of burning fire is the colour of fire ; its white colour is the colour of water ; its black colour is the colour of *anna* (*chāndo*., VI.4-1).

Here the term *anna* must denote earth, which is of the same kind as fire and water. Lastly, the parallel passage of the *ānandavallī* has “ From fire water ; from water earth ”.

The opponent concludes with the following remarks: The mention of fire, water and earth being illustrative, the same reasoning applies to other things also, as *mahat*, and *ahamkāra*. Each product evolves from the next preceding one, and there is no objection in understanding the texts as they are stated. The highest *Ātmā* is the cause of all indirectly.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra* :

14. तदभिध्यानादेव तु तद्विद्मत्सः ।

But *Brahma* alone is the direct cause of every product ; because of His mark, *viz.*, willing.

The willing is the willing “ I will become many ”. Fire and water are stated to have so willed, and to have produced water, and earth. This not being possible to non-intelligent things like fire and water, those terms denote *Brahma* appearing as fire and water. The same

reasoning applies to all other products. In *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* and *subāla upanishad* it is stated that all things are the bodies of *Brahma* and that He is their *ātmā* (1).

### 15. विपर्ययेण तु क्रमोऽत उपपद्यते च ।

And the different order (of the products) (can be explained only by their coming forth) only from Him. And this is appropriate.

A different order is stated in the following text of the *mundaka*, while the correct order of evolution is *avyakta*, *mahat*, *ahamkāra*, ether and so on :

From him came forth *prāṇā*, mind, all the senses, ether, air, fire, water and the all-supporting earth (II-1-3).

This order will be appropriate only if each product came forth from *Brahma* appearing in the form of the next preceding one. If He were only the indirect cause, the statement of evolution immediately from Him would be nullified, and this *mundaka* text therefore confirms the conclusion in *sūtra* 14.

### 16. अन्तरा विज्ञानमनसी क्रमेण तद्विष्णुादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

If it be contended "Evolution is in the order stated; the mind and senses evolve between *prāṇa* and the elements, because of the mark that they are mentioned along with them," the reply is 'no; because of non-difference'.

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(1) Who stands in earth; Who stands in water; Who stands in fire; Who stands in air; Who stands in ether; and so on. Whose body the earth is; . . . Whose body *ahamkāra* is; Whose body *buddhi* is; Whose body *avyakta* is.

The opponent contends that the *munḍaka* text does not support the conclusion in *sūtra* 14 as stated above. For it lays down the order of evolution. The five elements are stated here in the same order as in the *ānandavallī* text. Because the mind and the senses (which is the meaning of the term *viñāna* in the *sūtra*) (1) are mentioned in the same text along with them, this is a sufficient mark for inferring that the senses evolve from the mind, and the mind from *prāṇa*. The *sūtra* states this contention, and then gives the reply. Because the words "From Him came forth" should be connected with every product mentioned in the text without difference. This would mean that every product came directly from *Brahma*. Hence direct evolution from *Brahma* is what is taught; but not order (2). For it would conflict with the order mentioned in

(1) The term *viñāna* means the instrument by which a thing is known. It therefore means the senses here.

(2) *Objection*. The two words may be connected with every product; but this will not help you. For, the word translated by the words 'from Him' may also mean 'from it'; and the word 'it' may be taken to refer to what precedes in each case. Then the first clause would mean 'From Him (the highest *Ātmā*) came forth *prāṇa*'; the second clause 'From it (*prāṇa*) came forth mind'; the third clause from it (mind) came forth all the senses, and so on. *Reply*. This explanation is unsound. First, the same word would be understood differently in each case. And this would not be legitimate, when it can be taken to mean the same thing in all cases. Next, when evolution may be understood either directly or indirectly, the former should be preferred.

another *upanishad* (1). Hence all products come forth from *Brahma* appearing in the form of *avyakta* and the rest. The words *ākāśa*, *vāyu* and the rest denote the highest *Ātmā*, who is the *ātmā* of these products.

Here, another objection is raised. If every word thus denotes *Brahma*, then the ordinary meanings of words settled by usage will be departed from: This is replied to:

17. चराचरव्यपाश्रयस्तु स्यात्तद्व्यपदेशो भाक्तस्तद्भावभावित्वात् ।

When by words ordinarily denoting movable and immovable things, those things only are denoted, the denotation is incomplete; for its being complete depends upon the existence of the knowledge that those things are the aspects of *Brahma*.

Words denote not only those things, but also *Brahma*, who appears as those things. Hence, when they denote those things merely, the denotation is, as it were, broken. Until one is taught the *upanishads*, he does not know *Brahma*, whose aspects those things are; for He is not known from the sources of knowledge, from which the aspects are known. Words will denote *Brahma*, when it is known that He appears as those things, and that they are His aspects. Till then worldly men will use words in incomplete senses to denote those things merely.

(1) The earth is dissolved in water. . . . *Tamas* becomes one with the highest *Deva* (*subāla*). This lays down another order.

2. Another and better explanation : The words “*vyapadeṣo bhāktah*” in the *sūtra* are split up thus : *vyapadeṣah abhāktah*. The meaning of the *sūtra* will then be : When by words ordinarily denoting movable and immovable things, *Brahma* is denoted, the denotation is not broken (*i.e.*, it is complete) ; for their capacity to do so comes from the presence of *Brahma* in those things. That *Brahma* is in every thing is known from the text regarding the making of names and forms.

### SUB-SECTION 3

The next thing taken up for consideration is the *jiva* : Is he made like ether or not ?

*First view.* It is declared that by knowing one, *i.e.*, *Brahma*, everything will be known ; and this will have a meaning, if the *jiva* also be made. Next, it is affirmed that before creation there was only one ; and this being *Brahma*, the *jiva* could not then have existed. Lastly, there are the following texts which state that like ether the *jiva* also was made :

From whom the producer (*prakṛiti*) of the world was born, He created the *jivas* along with water (*i.e.*, with the elements) and sent them to earth (*nūrū.*, I-4) ; *Prajāpati* created *prajāṣ* (*i.e.*, *jivas*) ; All these beings, my dear, have their root in *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7). From whom these beings are born (*brigu.*, I-1).

As the creation of the world is thus stated, the creation of the *jivas* included in the world follows.

*Objection.* How can this be. The *jiva* is stated to be *Brahma*; and *Brahma* is eternal. Hence, the *jiva* must be eternal.

*Reply.* Ether and the rest are said to be *Brahma* in the texts—All this is identical with that (*Sat*); All this indeed is *Brahma*. They also will become eternal in your views. This has been shown to be not the case.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

18. नात्मा श्रुतेर्नित्यत्वाच्च ताम्यः ।

The *ātmā* is not produced; because such is the *vedic* statement; and because he is stated by them to be eternal also.

The statement is “The *jiva*, who is fit to become all-knowing, is not born, nor does he die” (*kātha.*, II-18); There are two unborn; they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant (*śveta.*, I-9). His being eternal is also stated: “Him, who being eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired to those that are eternal, intelligent and many (*ātmās*) (*kātha.*, V-13); He is unborn; undying; ever-existing and ancient; he is not killed, when the body is killed” (*kātha.*, II-18).

2. *Objection.* If the *jiva* be not produced, how is the declaration explained that by knowing *Brahma*, the cause, everything, which is a product, is known? *Reply.* Thus: The *jiva* also is a product; and the product and cause are not different.

*Objection again.* Then you admit that he is produced like ether and the rest. *Reply.* No; a thing becomes a product by a change of condition, and this

applies to the *jiva* as to other things. But there is this difference between him and ether. The latter changes its condition to such an extent, that it is regarded as another substance and receives a new name. The *jiva* is not subject to a change of this kind ; his changes of condition being merely the expansion and contraction of his attribute *jnāna*.

3. This needs explanation. The *upanishads* teach the existence of three *tatvas* with natures different from one another—that which is an object of enjoyment, the enjoyer, and one that controls both. They deny in regard to the enjoyer origination similar to what occurs in objects of enjoyment, and affirm that he is eternal. They deny in regard to the controller origination of the kind found in objects of enjoyment, and being the seat of undesirable things as the enjoyer is. They describe the controller to be eternal, to be free from blemishes, to be ever all-knowing, to have an unfailing will, to be the lord of the lords of the senses (*jivas*), and to be the lord of all. They state also that in all conditions *jivas* and matter are His bodies, and that He is their *ātmā*. He therefore ever appears as *jivas* and material products. At one time these bodies of *Brahma* become so subtle that they cannot be spoken of as separate from Him. *Brahma* appearing in the forms of *jivas* and matter in this condition is in the causal condition. At another time the bodies of *Brahma* become gross ; they appear in diverse forms and receive diverse names. *Brahma* appearing in the forms of *jivas* and matter in this condition is in the evolved condition. When

He changes from the former to the latter condition, the matter-element, which was without sound and other attributes, changes in its substance, and becomes possessed of sound and other attributes, in order that it may become objects of enjoyment. The *jīva*-element undergoes changes in its attribute *jñāna*, which expands in such a manner, that he may experience the fruits of *karma*. The controller-element also changes His condition, being now clothed in the other elements in this condition. This change from one condition to another is common to all the three elements.

4. The texts quoted in the *first view* and in para 1 of the *final decision* may now be reconciled. The statement that by knowing one thing all things will be known, and the examples which follow it, have reference to this change of condition of the three elements. The texts quoted in the *first view* refer to the *jīva*'s coming into a body or departing from it, as the connection with a body makes his attribute *jñāna* expand, and his severance from it makes it contract. Connection with a body is said to be birth, and separation from it is said to be death. The texts quoted in para 1 of the *final decision* refer to the absences in the *jīva* of changes in substance similar to those found in the matter-element. The texts regarding the controller refer to the absence of changes of both kinds in Him. "He, the great *ātmā*, is free from birth, old age and death ; He is immortal ; He is *Brahma*" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). The statement that before creation there was one



only refers to the absence of diverse names and forms. This is so stated : " This was then *avyākṛitam* (without diverse names and forms" (*Ibid.*, III-4-7). (1) ; (2).

5. The explanation on the last point agrees with that given by other commentators. Of them one states the *jīva* to be *Brahma* under the influence of *avidyā* ; in the view of another he is *Brahma* contacted by an

(1) In note (1) on page 571, it was stated that all things are eternal, and that a thing does not come newly into existence. Why is eternity again asserted of the *jīva* ? Does it not follow from what has been stated ? *Reply*. What is stated is true. The author of the *sūtras* wishes to repel the impression that like ether the *jīva* also changes and receives a new name. As possessing a body, the *jīva* is called a *brāhmaṇa* or *kṣhattriya* ; but in his own nature, no change takes place fit to be given a new name. He is always a knower, and sees himself (*adhi.*, 225).

(2) On this subject there are various theories as shown below : (i) The body itself is the *jīva* ; then he is born ; and had no previous existence. This view is untenable, as a baby, as soon as it is born, wishes to drink the mother's milk. How can this be, if it had no existence before. The dweller in the body regards it as 'mine,' as he does a house in which he dwells, and the feeling is not an illusion. On the other hand the confounding of the *ātmā* with the body is due to ignorance ; (ii) The *ātmā* is other than the body ; but he exists only as long as the body lives ; (iii) The *ātmā* is a succession of perceptions (*dṛṣṭi santāna*) : (a) It is eternal according to one school of *buddhists* ; (b) It remains up to dissolution and then perishes, according to another school ; (iv) The *ātmā* remains up to the attainment of release, according to the illusionist, and then it becomes *Brahma* ; (v) The *ātmā* is a product of evolution, *Sat* assuming that form, as the sea becomes foam. All these views may be held to be refuted on the authority of *vedic* texts (*adhi.*, 227, 228 and 229).

*upādhi*, that is real; and the last regards him as a product of *sat*, the latter appearing by evolution in three forms as enjoyers, objects of enjoyment and controller. Though at the time of cosmic rest *avidyā*, *upādhi* and *śakti* (capacity to appear in the three forms) exist, they yet explain the existence of one thing only as we do; for they admit on the authority of *sūtras* II—1-34 and 35 differences among *jivas* and the existence of the streams of their *karmas* without a beginning. There is this difference between them and ourselves. In the view of one *Brahma* Himself is deluded; according to the second the *upādhi* being real, and having had no beginning, *Brahma* Himself is bound; for, there is nothing in this theory other than *Brahma* and *upādhi*. In the theory of the last *Brahma* Himself evolves into different forms; in the form of the *jiva* He experiences undesirable fruits of *karma*; and though in the form of the controller, He need have no experience, being all-knowing, He must regard the *jivas* as not different from Himself and must therefore Himself experience the fruits of *karma*. We, on the other hand, recognise that *Brahma* is clothed in the *jiva* and matter elements, whether they be in the subtle or gross condition. He is therefore ever free from the touch of every imperfection. He has an unfailing will; and is the seat of endless, infinite, auspicious qualities. The changes in substance and the sufferings pertain to the elements, which form His bodies. Our theory is therefore perfect.

## SUB-SECTION 4

Being on the subject, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to examine the nature of the *jīva*. What is he— Is he mere *jñāna* (shining) in his *svarūpa* without the attribute *jñāna* as stated by the *sāṅkhya* and the *saugata*, or is he a *jāda* (not shining) like a piece of stone, and a knower, *jñāna* coming to him occasionally as stated by the *vaiśeṣika*; or is he ever a knower in his *svarūpa*?

*First view: sāṅkhya's.* He is mere *chit* (light); for so say *vedic texts*: The *mādhyaṇdina's* text 'Who stands in *ātmā*' is read by the *kāṇva* thus—'Who stands in *viñāna*'; '*viñānam* does *yajna*; and does *karma* also (*āna.*, V-1). He is *jñāna* in his nature in reality; and is extremely pure (*viṣṇu*, I-2-6). These show that his nature is mere *jñāna*.

*Vaiśeṣika's.* If it be admitted that the *jīva* is by nature both light and a knower, as he is everywhere, he would be perceived everywhere and at all times. If he could see by nature, his senses would be purposeless. During sleep and trance, while the *jīva* exists, *jñāna* is not observed; and in the waking state, if the conditions are available, he is seen to know. Hence, his nature is not *jñāna*; nor is he knower by nature; for *jñāna* is an accident.

2. It must be admitted that he is present everywhere. An object to be enjoyed by a *jīva* is produced at a distant place; and this must be due to connection with his *adr̥ṣṭa*; and this connection would not be

possible, unless he were present at that place, as *adṛiṣṭa* inheres in him. The *jīva* being thus omnipresent, his perception, and experiencing of pleasure and pain at all places may be explained by the going of his body to those places; and it is unnecessary to assume that the *jīva* himself goes from place to place. In this view two assumptions are necessary—that the *jīva* is atomic, and that he moves from place to place, while there would be one assumption only in the view that he is omnipresent. The latter view, being simpler, should be accepted in preference to the other.

3. The absence of *jñāna* during sleep is stated by *vedic* texts—"He (the sleeper) does not now know himself 'I am this' nor these beings" (*chāndo.*, VIII-11-1). Similarly in final release "When he departs, there is no *samjñā*" (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-12). Here the opponent uses the term *samjñā* as meaning knowledge, whereas it means confounding the *ātmā* with the body. The reference to *jñāna* in the *viṣṇu purāṇa* text as pertaining to nature should be understood in a secondary sense; *jñāna* is a peculiar attribute of the *jīva*.

*Final decision* : This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 19. ज्ञातृत्वे ।

The *ātmā* is a knower surely; because of the *vedic* statement (1).

(1) The *sūtra* has *ataḥ eva*, which means 'for the very same'. The intention is that the term *gruteḥ* occurring in the preceding *sūtra* should be added in this *sūtra*. The texts relied on in both the *sūtras* being different, the

A knower,' but neither mere *jñāna* nor *jaḍa* (not shining). The *vedic* statements are :

*Chando.*, (i) He, who perceives 'I smell this' is the *ātmā*; the nose is for smelling (VIII-12-4); (ii) He sees with the mind (the attribute *jñāna*) these noble qualities, that are in *Brahma-world* and rejoices (*Ibid.*, verse 5); (iii) Who has unchanging objects of desire and whose will is never frustrated (*Ibid.*, VIII-7-i); (iv) He does not think of this body lying by the side of (weeping) relations (*Ibid.*, VIII-12-3); (v) One who sees (*Brahma*) does not see death (*Ibid.*, VII-26-2); (vi) Who is the *ātmā*? The *puruṣa*, who is a knower, shining, and who abides within the heart in the midst of the senses, is the *ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-7); (vii) By what means, my dear, can he see the knower (*Ibid.*, IV-4-14); (viii) This *puruṣa* ever knows; (ix) He is indeed a seer, hearer, smeller, taster, thinker, knower, doer, a shining *ātmā*, a *puruṣa* (*praṣṇa*, IV-9); and (x) In the very same way these sixteen parts of this seer (*Ibid.*, VI-5).

The *vaiśeṣika's* view that the *jīva* being omnipresent, if he were a knower, he should see everywhere, and always is replied to in the next *sūtra* :

## 20. उत्क्रान्तिगत्यागतीनाम् ।

Because going out of the body, going and returning (are stated).

The *jīva* is not omnipresent; he is a mere atom. If he were omnipresent, the actions stated in the *sūtra* could not take place. Going out of the body is thus

reason assigned in that *sūtra* is not to be applied here. For a precedent as to this mode of application of a term see chap. I, section 2, *sūtra* 16 and the note thereunder.

stated (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2). "With that light this *ātma* gets out through the eye, through the head, or through other places in the body." Going is thus stated (*kaush.*, I-9). "Those, that depart from this world, all of them go to the moon alone." Returning is thus stated (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-6). "From that world he returns to this world to do actions."

## 21. स्वात्मनाचोत्तरयोः ।

The last two actions (can be effected) by the *ātma* alone.

It is possible to explain the going out of the body by stating it to be separation from the body of one that remains where he is. But the going and the returning cannot be so explained. The *jīva* himself must go and return (1).

## 22. नाणुरतच्छूतेरिति चेन्नेतराधिकारात् ।

If it be contended, 'He is not an atom; because he is said to be great,' the reply is 'No; because the context refers to the other' (*Brahma*).

A *bṛihad āraṇyaka text* (VI-3-7) begins with these words "The *purusha* who is a knower, shining and who abides within the heart in the midst of the senses". The reference here is clearly to the *jīva*. Towards the close these words occur "He (the Being described) is great,

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(1) See the last two sentences of para 2 of the *first view*. Going being stated by the *veda*, the only assumption is that the *jīva* is an *atom*. Hence the simplicity claimed for the rival view disappears; and this is opposed to the *veda*.

unborn ; He is *Ātmā*" (*Ibid.*, VI-4-22). The opponent regards this as referring to the *jīva* and contends that the term 'great' shows that he is not an atom. The *sūtra* states the contention and replies. The *upanishad* did begin with the *jīva* ; but in the middle (VI-4-13) the subject was changed, and *Brahma* was brought in thus "Whose *ātmā* is known in its true nature and is thought on continuously". The verse quoted refers therefore to *Brahma*, and the greatness is His greatness, not of the *jīva*.

### 23. त्वशब्दान्मानाभ्यां च ।

From the use of the word *anu* and mention of dimension.

The word *anu* (atom) is expressly stated, "That *ātmā* is *anu*, and should be perceived with a pure mind, the *ātmā* in whom *prāṇa* remains in five forms" (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-9). A thing as minute as an atom is taken, and its size is predicated of the *jīva*. "If the hundredth part of the end of a hair be divided into hundred parts, the *jīva* should be known as one such part (*ṣveta.*, V-9). He is seen to be of smaller size ; for he is of the size of the pointed end of a goad (*āra*)" (*Ibid.*, V-8). Hence, the *jīva* is only an atom.

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By these four *sūtras* the opponent's view that the *jīva* is omnipresent has been refuted. His objections are now answered in the next three *sūtras* : If the *jīva* be an atom, how can he perceive what goes on throughout the body ?

## 24. अविरोधश्चन्दनवत् ।

There is no difficulty, on the analogy of sandal.

A drop of sandal oil placed on one place in the body produces a pleasurable sensation throughout. Similarly, the *jiva* abides in one part of the body, and perceives the sensations in every part of it.

## 25. अवस्थितिवैशेष्यादिति चेन्नाभ्युपगमाद्भृदिहि ।

If it be contended 'There is a difference'. (The sandal oil being dropped on a definite part of the body and the *jiva* not being so), the reply is 'No'; It is admitted that the *jiva* abides in a definite part of the body. And that part is in the heart.

The *jiva* is stated to abide in the heart 'This *ātmā* is in the heart' (*prasna.*, III-6); 'The *purusha*, who is a knower, shining, and who abides within the heart in the midst of the senses, is the *ātmā*' (*brihad.*, VI-3-7). This analogy has been mentioned to show that the *jiva* abides in a particular part of the body. There need be no such limitation in regard to the sandal oil.

The author states his own theory :

## 26. गुणाद्वा लोकवत् ।

But (the *jiva* perceives) with his attribute ; like light.

The *jiva* with his attribute *jnāna* perceives what goes on throughout the body, as the light of a precious stone, the sun and the like, which are in one place, spreads all round. As the light is to a lamp, so is the



attribute *jnāna* to the *ātmā*. It may exist elsewhere than in the *ātmā* also (1).

The texts quoted by the *sāṅkhya* in the *first view* are next explained in four *sūtras* and those quoted by the *vaiśeṣhika* in the fifth *sūtra*.

### 27. व्यतिरेको गन्धवत्तथा च दर्शयति ।

*Jnāna* differs from the *jiva*, as smell differs from earth. And it is so stated.

In perceiving the smell of earth, it is known to be its attribute, and its difference from earth follows. Similarly, in the perception 'I know' *jnāna* is known as the attribute of the knower; and it therefore differs from him. The *upanishad* states this "This person is ever a knower." The emphatic particle *eva* (only) is added to the verb here, and conveys the idea that the person is never a non-knower; added to the person, it would mean that no other person is a knower.

### 28. पृथगुपदेशात् ।

Because it is described as separate.

It is described as separate from the knower. "The *jnāna* of the knower does not perish" (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-30).

### 29. तद्गुणसारत्वात् तद्व्यपदेशः प्राज्ञवत् ।

But because *jnāna* is his essential attribute, he is known as *vi-jnāna*. Like *prājña* (*Brahma*).

(1) By *yoga* the *jiva* may become capable of extending the attribute so as to reach a number of bodies.

Because bliss (*ānanda*) is the essential attribute of *Brahma*, He is denoted by that term. "If that unlimited *ānanda* does not exist (*āna.*, vii-1); He perceived that *ānanda* was *Brahma*" (*bhṛigu.*, VI-1). *Ananda* (bliss) is His essential attribute. This is seen from the texts 'That is one *ānanda* of *Brahma* (*āna.*, VIII-4); meditating on the *ānanda* of *Brahma*, one does not fear anything' (*āna.*, IX-1).

Another instance—*Brahma* is called *jñāna* in 'Unchanging, shining (*jñānam*) and without limitations is *Brahma*' (*āna.*, I-1). From the *muṇḍaka* text "He knows everything" (I-1-10) and from the *ānandavalli* text "with *Brahma*, the all-knowing" *jñāna* is known to be His essential attribute.

### 30. यावदात्मभावित्वाच्च न दोषस्तदर्शनात् ।

And because it remains his attribute so long as he remains, there is no objection. Similar usage is seen.

*Jñāna* is never absent from the *jīva*; hence in denoting him by the term *vijñāna*, there is no objection. Similarly, cows are denoted by the term 'go,' which term connotes an attribute, as this is never absent from them. The *jīva* is denoted by the term *vijñāna* for another reason; that is, because He shines (1).

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(1) *Shines*—*jñāna* means what shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about. Both the *jīva* and his attribute possess this character, the *jīva* showing himself, and his attribute showing other things. When the idea that this is done without any help is added, they are said to be *svapprakāṣa* (self-proved).

This is indicated by the particle *cha* (and) in the *sūtra* (1).

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What has been stated in *sūtra* 30 is objected to on the ground that *jnāna* is absent in deep sleep. The next *sūtra* explains :

**31. पुंस्त्वादिवत्त्वस्य सतोऽभिव्यक्तियोगात् ।**

But it does exist, and becomes manifest (in the waking condition) like virile power.

Virile power exists in all males even in infancy ; but it is not then manifested. This power depends upon the existence of one of seven elements, which always make up a body "The body is made up of seven *dhātus* (element), has three impurities, comes from two sources, and is a modification of four kinds of food." Similarly *jnāna* exists at all times as an attribute of the *ātmā* ; but in deep sleep outside objects are not perceived, and it is not therefore manifested then. The absence

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(1) (a) The illusionist states that the *jīva* is *jnāna* (shining), while the *vaiśeshika* asserts that he is a knower, not by nature, but only when he contacts the mind. Both, being stated by the *upanishads*, are accepted impartially. Against the former it is held that he is a knower also ; and against the latter that he knows always and by nature.

(b) If the *jīva* is self-proved, why does he not shine always ? In reply we ask whether the opponent refers to distinct or indistinct shining. If he refers to the latter, he should know that he always shines indistinctly ; if he refers to the former, it is true that he does not shine distinctly in sleep ; because *jnāna* then contracts and does not grasp outside things.

of *samjñā* referred to by the *vaiṣeṣhika* does not mean the absence of consciousness, when the *jīva* becomes free. If this were correct, the text would conflict with the other texts quoted in the final decision under the first *sūtra*. It means that the *jīva* no longer confounds himself with the body, and no longer regards its birth and death as his own birth and death.

Having established his own theory, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to criticise the rival view that the *jīva* is omnipresent :

### 32. नित्योपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यप्रसङ्गेऽन्यतरनियमोवाऽन्यथा ।

Otherwise, there should be ever perception and ever non-perception; or one of them would ever happen to the exclusion of the other.

‘Otherwise’—if the *jīva* were omnipresent. This is what is observed in the world: The *ātma* is perceived within the body, and not outside. The cause of this perception and non-perception is the *ātma* himself. Three alternatives are possible. First, if the *ātma* were the cause of both, being omnipresent, he must be perceived and not perceived at all places and at all times. Secondly, if he were the cause of perception only, for the same reason his non-perception outside the body, which is a fact, would not happen at any time. Lastly, if he were the cause of non-perception only, his perception within the body, which also is a fact, should not occur at any time. It will not be possible to the opponent to state ‘It is the nature of the *ātma* to be

perceived within the body, and to be unperceived outside of it; for one and the same object cannot be perceptible in one part and imperceptible in another part. This expedient is available to us who do not hold the *ātmā* to be omnipresent.

So far as to the *sāṅkhya*. Now to the *vaiśeṣika*, according to whom the *ātmā* is *jaḍa*, and sees only when he contacts the mind. Being omnipresent, he is in contact with every mind and with every body and at all times; and no *adṛiṣṭa* can be shown to limit the *ātmā* to one mind and one body (1).

#### SUB-SECTION 5

In this sub-section it is considered whether the *jīva* is a doer, or whether he remains without action as stated by the *sāṅkhya*, and yet fancies that he acts, while the actors are really his body, his senses or the *guṇas* of the body.

*First view.* The *jīva* is not a doer; for doership is denied in the following text, as birth, death and all other

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(1) Pursuing the same plan, it may be asked whether the mind and body are the cause of perception only, or of non-perception only or of both. In the first alternative, the *ātmā* must see everywhere; and his not seeing, where his body is not present, which is a fact, will not happen. In the second alternative, he cannot see anywhere at any time, and his seeing, where his body is present, which also is a fact, will not happen. In the last alternative, he must see and not see at the same time, which is absurd.

attributes of matter are denied : “ If the killer thinks ‘ I will kill him ’ and if the killed thinks ‘ I am killed,’ neither of them knows. This one does not kill ; nor is that one killed ” (*katha.*, II-19). Similarly, the *bhagavad-gītā* states “ In regard to actions done by the *guṇas* of the body, each in its own way, one, that has forgotten himself by confounding himself with the body, thinks ‘ I am the doer ’ (III-27). When the seer does not perceive a doer other than *guṇas* (*Ibid.*, XIV-19) : The body is said to be concerned, when the body or the senses act ; the *purusha* is said to be concerned, when pleasure and pain are experienced ” (*Ibid.*, XIII-20). These verses show that the *jīva* in his nature is not a doer ; that the notion that he does is illusion ; that he has merely to enjoy ; and that action pertains to matter in the form of his body.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 33. कर्ता शास्त्रार्थवत्त्वात् ।

(The *jīva*) is a doer, in order that the commands and prohibitions of the *veda* may serve a purpose.

The *jīva* alone is the doer ; not the *guṇas*. The commands are like these : “ Let one that desires *svarga*, do *yāya*. Let one, that desires release, meditate on *Brahma*.” They are addressed to one, that desires to enjoy either fruit, and that will experience it eventually, and direct him to adopt the means pointed out. If the *guṇas* were the doers, how could another be commanded ? The object of commands is to induce one to act ; and this is done by creating an impression on his

mind. Matter and its modifications, being unintelligent, cannot be moved in this manner. Hence, the commands will serve their purpose, only when the intelligent *jīva*, who will enjoy the fruits of action, is the doer. This is stated “The fruit of obeying a command is reaped by one that sets things in motion”.

The texts quoted in the *first view* do not support it. The first text states that the *ātmā* being eternal can never be killed, and that therefore the impression of both the killer and the killed is erroneous. In the second text it is stated that in actions of worldly men the doership of the *jīva* is brought about by his connection with his *guṇas*, and that it is not caused by his nature. The verse thus discriminates between what happens and what does not happen, and assigns doership only to the *guṇas*. It is so stated in the very same work. “Attachment to the *guṇas* and their effects causes his birth again in good or evil wombs” (*Ibid.*, XIII-21). See also the following verses: ‘The body, the *ātmā*, the five organs of action, *prāṇa* and *Īṣvara*, the fifth, in the list of causes. Whatever work of body, tongue or mind, good or evil, a mortal begins, these five are its causes. This being so, whosoever for lack of knowledge sees himself as the sole cause, does not see correctly’ (*Ibid.*, XVIII-14, 15 and 16). Here the doership of the *ātmā* is taken as a fact; and it is stated that while action depends on five things beginning with the body and ending with *Īṣvara*, one, that thinks that he alone is the doer, does not see correctly.

### 34. उपादानाद्विहारोपदेशाच्च ।

Because of using the senses and of the statement of his amusing oneself.

A *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text (IV-1-18) cites the analogy of a great king, and states “In the very same way he takes hold of these senses, and moves about in his own body according to his pleasure.” This shows that the *jīva* acts in these two ways—moving the senses, and moving in the body.

### 35. व्यपदेशाच्चक्रियायां न चेन्निर्देशविपर्ययः ।

And because he is said to be agent in action. If not, the term would be in a different form.

In the *ānandavallī* text “*viज्ञāna* (the knower) performs *yajnas* (offerings) and does worldly acts also” (V-1) the *jīva* is said to be the doer. *Objection.* By the term *viज्ञāna* mind or *buddhi* is meant, and not the *jīva*. *Reply.* Then the form of the term would be *viज्ञānena* (instrumental, instead of the nominative, case), as mind is an instrument.

सत्यामेव जपने

Having established his position in these three *sūtras*, the author proceeds in the next three *sūtras* to show some absurdities in the *first view* :

### 36. उपलब्धिवदनियमः ।

No limitation of enjoyment; as in regard to perception.

In *sūtra* 32 of this section certain absurdities were pointed out in the theory of the *jīva*'s being omnipresent.



Similarly, if matter were the doer, not the *jiva*, as matter is common to all *jivas*, all actions must bring enjoyment to all ; or to no one. The *jiva* being assumed to be omnipresent, proximity to matter is common to all ; and for the same reason any attempt to limit enjoyment with reference to the mind will be futile ; because each mind will be in contact with all.

### 37. शक्तिविपर्ययात् ।

Because the capacity for enjoyment would disappear.

If matter were the doer, as one other than the doer cannot enjoy the fruit of the action, matter alone would have the capacity to enjoy. The *jiva*'s capacity for it would disappear, and with it the evidence for the existence of the *jiva* himself, the opponent's position being that he exists, because he is the enjoyer.

### 38. समाध्यभावाच्च ।

And because *samādhi* (meditation) will be impossible.

Meditation enjoined as the means to release would fall to matter ; and as the meditation is in this form " I am other than matter," matter cannot do meditation of this kind.

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The opponent asks—if the *jiva* is the doer, will he not always act and never cease ? The last *sūtra* replies :

### 39. यथाच तक्षोभयथा ।

And in both the ways, like a carpenter.

Though the *jiva* commands all the organs of action, he will act or refrain from action as he pleases, as a carpenter does, though he has all his instruments. If matter were the doer, being non-intelligent, it must always act; for there will be nothing to restrain it like absence of desire for enjoyment.

### SUB-SECTION 6

In this sub-section the question is considered whether the *jiva's* doership depends upon *Brahma* or is independent of Him.

*First view.* It is independent of *Brahma*; otherwise commands and prohibitions would be purposeless; for he, who is competent of his own will to act or not to act, should be commanded.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra*:

40. परात् तच्छ्रुतेः ।

That (the *jiva's* doership) comes from *Brahma* alone; because it is so stated.

The statement is:

He has entered into men and controls them; He is the *ātmā* of all (*yajur*, *āraṇyaka*, III-11-10); Who stands in the *ātmā*, who is within the *ātmā*, whom the *ātmā* does not know, whose body the *ātmā* is, who rules the *ātmā* from within, He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-26); I am seated in the heart of every one; from Me flow remembrance, knowledge, as well as inability to see (*bhagavad-gītā*, XV-15); The ruler of all has mounted all beings on the wheel of the body, and living in their hearts. He makes them go round and round with the help of attractive sense objects (*Ibid.*, XVIII-61).

If this be so, the commands and prohibitions of the *veda* will become purposeless. The next *sūtra* explains :

41. कृतप्रयत्नापेक्षस्तु विहितप्रतिषिद्धावैयर्थ्यादिभ्यः ।

But *Brahma* awaits the effort made by the *jiva* ; in order that injunctions and prohibitions may not become purposeless.

In every action *Brahma*, the inner ruler, looks for the effort made by the *jiva* and giving His assent, makes him do it. For, without this assent, the *jiva* can do nothing (1).

*Question.* Why does *Brahma* look for the *jiva's* effort? The reply is given in the *sūtra* itself. When property is jointly owned by two persons, one of them cannot give away his share to a third person without

(1) The control of the *jiva's* doership by the highest *Ātmā* should be examined at some length. A father divides some property between two sons, and leaves them free to utilise their portions as they please. One of them quickly squanders it, while the other improves it ; and each reaps the fruit of the use made by himself and he alone. Similarly, the highest *Ātmā* gives to all *jivas* alike instruments in the form of body, mind and senses, and the capacity to think and act ; and for this reason their doership in general depends on the highest *Ātmā*. Their doership in regard to individual acts also depends on Him ; for they need his assent. In making the choice, however, they possess freedom and become subject to injunctions and prohibitions ; and freedom means that when they have the capacity to act in accordance with their wishes, no one prevents them. Though they depend upon the highest *Ātmā* as explained, they alone reap the fruit of their choice ; and this has been shown by an example. The assentor is not touched by the fruits, as He is the ruler, and as the same authority, by which He is known, states that He is so.

the other's consent; and as he procures the consent, its fruit belongs to himself. Similarly, here though both the *jiva* and *Brahma* must join in the act—one by making the effort and the other by giving assent—yet the fruit of the action is reaped by the former alone. In regard to the effort to do an injurious act, the giving of assent by one able to prevent it does not indicate want of mercy (1). See under *sūtra* (II-2-3).

2. The opponent observes “ You say that *Brahma* awaits the *jiva's* effort. But the following *kaushītaki* text contradicts this statement.

For it is He alone that makes one do a good deed, whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds; it is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom He wishes to lead downwards (II-64 and 65).

This text means that *Brahma* of His own motion desires to lead one to do a good or evil deed. *Reply*. This does not apply to all persons. If one be exceedingly loyal, *Brahma* creates a liking in him for very good actions, which will eventually lead to His being reached. If he be exceedingly disloyal, he creates a liking in him for actions that are the reverse. These are therefore exceptional cases. *Bhagavān* states this Himself:

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(1) When one chooses to do something injurious to himself, does it indicate the possession of mercy in one who, though able to prevent it, gives His assent? *Reply*. It is giving him the fruit of his choice; and mercy is shown by the excuse of serious misdeeds on the appearance of obedience even to a small extent.

I am the place from which every thing goes forth; and everything acts as directed by me. Knowing Me in this manner, wise men are filled with love and meditate on me. To those that wish ever to be with Me and meditate on Me I give with love that *buddhi* with which they will reach Me. To favour them I remain as the subject of their thought, and with the bright lamp of knowledge, I destroy the darkness born of past *karma* (*bhagavad-gītā*, X-8, 10 and 11).

As regards those that are disloyal, He observes :

They state that the universe was not made by *Brahma*; that it does not rest on Him; and that it is not controlled by Him (*Ibid.*, XVI-8). They hate Me, who abide in their bodies and in the bodies of others; and not willing to put up with My existence, they urge false arguments to show that I do not exist (*Ibid.*, 18).

Having thus described them, He states :

I ever throw into the wombs of persons of *asura* nature those that hate me, those that put forward specious arguments to show that I do not exist, those that knowing Me do not yet approach Me, and those that do not know that I exist (*Ibid.*, 19) (1).

स्यमेव जने

(1) *Question*. Does not the highest *Ātmā* give the *jiva* a body of a particular kind and place him in an environment suited to his past *karma*. Does he not bind the *jiva* by this means. *Reply*. (i) The highest *Ātmā* shows no particular desire in the matter. Having an eye to the existing *karma* of the *jiva*, he wishes to make him experience pleasure or pain, and makes objects of enjoyment appear before him; but this is not done from any intention of making him do any new *karma* to procure some other fruit. A person lights a lamp, so that another may see a jar; if a third person also sees the jar, the first must be said to have been indifferent as regards this third person; for he neither makes him see or prevents him. Similarly,

## SUB-SECTION 7

In this sub-section the question is considered whether the *jiva* completely differs from *Brahma*, whether he is *Brahma* deluded, or limited by *upādhi* (real limiting substances), or whether he is a part of Him. The doubt arises as statements made by *upanishads* vary: *Question*. This question was discussed and settled in chapter II, section 1, sub-section 7. Why is

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the highest *Ātmā* is indifferent, while the choice is made; and it is this that constitutes the *jiva*'s freedom.

(ii) The highest *Ātmā* acts like a king, who gives his minister the necessary means, and leaves him free to act, and who himself does nothing. Freedom is not incompatible with subjection to another; for this incompatibility is not observed in the case of the minister.

(iii) The *jiva* is no doubt subject to previous tendencies, and is led by the desire which they produce; but he is not driven like wind or water. The springing up of a desire does not destroy his capacity to act. A person has a desire for the food placed before him; if he knows it to be mixed with poison, he is seen to overcome the desire to take it. Another going to gather fuel, when he learns how a great treasure may be got, gives up his task. Similarly, when the *jiva* becomes aware of the sin which he will commit, or of some great fruit which he may get, he can control his desire and is therefore free. Like a tendency leading him to do what is pleasant, there are tendencies that will make him avoid what is unpleasant. He is therefore capable of suppressing a desire to abstain from doing what is enjoined or to do what is prohibited; and if he disregards the evil consequences and does not suppress it, this will constitute his wrong-doing; and he becomes liable to punishment. It is because beasts are unable to see the consequences of obeying or disobeying the commands of the *veda*, they are not subject to it.

a new sub-section needed. *Reply.* True ; the conclusion therein arrived at, being impugned with reference to conflicting texts, is re-affirmed here by showing that the *jīva* is a part of *Brahma*. Until this is shown, the facts that the *jīva* is not different from *Brahma* and that *Brahma* is other than he will not rest on firm ground.

*First view.* (i) The *jīva* completely differs from *Brahma* ; for the text ‘Two are unborn ; they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant, ruler and the ruled’ (*ṣveta.*, I-9), shows them to be different. The texts affirming oneness of two beings so entirely different should be understood in a secondary sense ; for understanding them literally would be as absurd as to say that one wets with fire.

2. (i) Here an objection is raised : The *jīva* is a part (*aṃṣa*) of *Brahma* ; for so is it stated. *Reply.* This is not a correct view. The term *aṃṣa* means a part of a substance. If the *jīva* were a part of *Brahma*, his imperfections would redound on *Brahma* ; and He is not divisible ; if he were, a bit of Him might be said to be the *jīva*.

3. (ii) The *jīva* is *Brahma* Himself deluded ; for the texts “That thou art (*chāndo.*, VI-8-7) ; This *atmā* is *Brahma* (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5) state the *jīva* to be *Brahma*. Texts affirming difference repeat what is known from sense perception, and are nullified by the texts quoted. These are not *anyathā-siddha*, i.e., they cannot be explained away ; while the former texts are *anyathā-siddha*, i.e., they may be explained as affected by *avidyā*, as sense perception is.

4. (iii) The *jiva* is *Brahma* Himself limited by beginningless *upādhis* ; for the same reason, *viz.*, that the *jiva* is stated to be *Brahma*. The *upādhis* cannot be regarded as due to delusion ; for bondage and release cannot be explained in that view.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

42. अंशो नानाव्यपदेशादन्यथा चापि दाशकितवादित्वमधीयत  
एके ।

A part (of *Brahma*) ; because he is said to be different and also one. Some read “ *Brahma* is fishermen, cheats and the like ”.

Both sets of statements are found—that the *jiva* is different from *Brahma*, and that he is *Brahma*. The former set of statements distinguishes them thus : One creates, and the other is created ; one controls and the other is controlled ; one is all-knowing, and the other is ignorant ; one is independent and the other is dependent ; one is pure and the other is impure ; one is the seat of all good qualities and the other is the reverse ; one is master and the other is servant ; and the like. The statement of oneness is made by the texts quoted in para 3 of the *first view*. The followers of the *atharva veda* describe *Brahma* thus “ *Brahma* is these fishermen ; *Brahma* is these slaves ; *Brahma* is these cheats ”. Here oneness is stated, as *Brahma* is all these (1).

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(1) It is usual to identify a person with some one who is superior to him ; ‘ He is *Vishnu*. ’ Here the reverse is the case. It cannot be explained as implying praise. Hence, the oneness stated must be accepted as a fact.



Now, in order that both the sets of texts may have their primary meanings, it must be admitted that the *jīva* is an *aṁśa* (part) of *Brahma*.

2. The argument in para 3 of the *first view* is not sound. The facts stated in the difference-texts are beyond the cognition of sense-perception and are not repeated: *viz.*, that the *jīva* is created, and controlled by *Brahma*; that he forms His body; that he exists for His sake; that he is supported by Him; that he is protected by Him; that he is destroyed by Him; that he meditates on Him; and that he attains what he desires, including release, through His grace. The difference between the *jīva* and *Brahma* indicated by these facts must be accepted as real. They cannot be explained away as the opponent suggests.

3. The opponent explains: The texts referred to convey this teaching—*viz.*, though *Brahma* is by nature one, and is mere *chit*, yet He regards himself as being different. He wills to become many and creates ether and the other elements; He enters into them in the *jīva*-condition; He makes various beings appear with diverse names and forms; He reaps the pleasure and pain yielded by the enjoyment of numberless objects thus made; He remains in them without enjoyment and controls them as their inner ruler; being in the *jīva*-condition He meditates that He and *Brahma* in the casual condition are one; He is released from *samsāra*; and He makes the *veda*, which teaches the way to such release; He thus deludes himself. *Reply.* If this were

a correct view, the texts would resemble the ravings of a lunatic.

4. The view in para 4 of the *first view* also is unsound ; for the relation between the *jīva* and *Brahma* stated in para 2 above would be meaningless ; and this is a sufficient reason. The opponent, explanation will be as absurd as to say that the same person, that has one foot in a house and the other outside it, becomes the controlled in regard to the foot in the house, while he remains the controller in regard to the other foot.

#### 43. मन्त्रवर्णात् ।

Because it is stated in the *mantra*.

The *mantra* runs thus :

A part (*pāda*) of Him is all beings (*puruṣha sūkta*). The plural is used because the *jīvas* are many. The singular *aṁṣa* in *sūtra* 42 and the singular in *sūtra* 18 have reference to the class. The authority for this is *ṣvetāśvatara* (VI-13).

Him, who being eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those that are eternal, intelligent and many.

This shows that *Brahma* is different from the *jīvas*, and that they are many and eternal. This being so, though the *jīvas* are alike in their nature, as being intelligent and shining beings, their difference from one another is perceived by those able to see them as they are.

#### 44. अपि स्मर्यते ।

It is also taught in the *smṛiti*.

Thus—

one remaining a part (*aṃśa*) of myself, under the influence of beginningless *avidyā* becomes a *jiva* in the world of the *jivas* (*bhagavad-gītā*, XV-7).

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If the *jiva* be a part of *Brahma*, the imperfections of the *jiva* will redound on *Brahma*. This view is refuted :

45. प्रकाशादिवत् नैवं परः ।

Like light and the like ; the highest is not so.

The *jiva* is a part of *Brahma*, as light is part of a luminous substance like fire or the sun. Other instances are the following : The characteristic form of a cow or a horse, the white or dark colour of objects and the bodies of *jivas* in their embodied condition. The inseparable distinguishing attributes in these cases are the parts respectively of the animal, the object or the *jivas*. The term *aṃśa* means a part of a thing ; when that thing has certain distinguishing attributes, which cannot ordinarily be separated from it, they form its parts. So do competent men distinguish the parts, which are attributes, and the part to which they pertain. When two things are thus related, their natures differ. These remarks apply to the *jiva* also. He is a part of *Brahma* in the sense of being an attribute of Him, and his nature differs from His nature. This is what is meant by the latter half of the *sūtra*. As the light differs from the luminous substance, so does the *jiva* differ from *Brahma*. The texts stating difference refer to this

difference in their natures ; while the other set of texts expressing oneness has regard to the *jivas*’ being inseparable attributes of *Brahma*. In the texts ‘That thou art ; This *ātmā* is *Brahma*’ the words ‘thou,’ and ‘this *ātmā*’ denote *Brahma* with *jivas* as His bodies ; the words ‘that’ and ‘*brahma*’ denote Him directly ; thus the two sets of words denote the same thing.

#### 46. स्मरन्ति च ।

And the *smṛiti*-writers have confirmed this.

Reference is made to *Parāṣara* and others. They have confirmed this mode of reconciling the difference between the two sets of texts, and have assimilated the relation of the *jiva* to *Brahma* to the relation of light to a luminous body, to the relation of attribute to a substance, and to the relation of the body to the *jiva*.

As the light of a fire standing in one place spreads all around, so the *śakti* (*jivas*) of the highest *Brahma* pervades all this world (*viśvā*, I-22-56) : All that is the body of *Hari* for the coming into existence of whatever is created by all living beings (*Ibid.*, 38).

The term ‘and’ (*cha*) in the *sūtra* shows that *vedic* texts also like ‘whose body the *ātmā* is’ (*bṛihad.*, V-7-26) refer to this.

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It may be asked—If all *jivas* are parts of *Brahma*, seeing that they are all alike in being *jñāna* (intelligent and shining beings) and in being controlled by the same ruler, why are they not given the same treatment ? But only some are permitted to learn the *veda* and carry out

its teaching, but not others. Only some may be seen or touched ; but not others. The next *sūtra* explains :

47. अनुज्ञापिहारौ देहसम्बन्धाज्ज्योतिरादिवत् ।

Permission and prohibition are due to connection with a body. Like fire and the like.

Fire is of the same kind, whether it be procured from the house of one learned in the *veda* or from the cremation ground ; but the former is preferred, and the latter is avoided. Similarly, food given by one of *vedic* lore is permitted, but not that of a sinful one. Similarly here.

In the last five *sūtras* the author shows how his own explanation is free from any objection and how the others are faulty :

48. असन्ततेश्चाव्यतिकरः ।

No mixing up (of enjoyments) ; because the *jivas* are not all-pervading.

Though the *jivas* are of the same kind, as being *aṃśas* of *Brahma* and for other reasons, they differ from one another ; and being atoms in size, the *jiva* in one body is other than the *jivas* in other bodies. Hence the enjoyment of one is not mixed up with the enjoyments of others. On the theories of others the enjoyments of the *jiva* and of *Brahma* or of the *jivas* among themselves must be mixed up. To show this defect, the author of the *sūtras* states that his own theory is free from it.

49. आभास एव च ।

And it is a specious argument and no more.

The argument, by which the non-mixing up of enjoyments is sought to be explained on the theory that the *jīva* is *Brahma* deluded, is an argument only in appearance. *Brahma* being light, indivisible, and of the same nature throughout, it must be shown first how this self-proved light is prevented from appearing, and then how limitations differing from one another are made by *avidyā*. This attempt fails. *Brahma*, though limited by many *avidyā*-made limitations, being Himself one, the mixing up of enjoyments cannot be avoided. The term 'and' (*cha*) in the *sūtra* draws attention to the conflict with *vedic* texts (1).

In the other theory that the *jīva* is *Brahma* limited by real limiting things, it is explained that the limiting things differ because of an *adṛishta* in each, which has had no beginning. The next *sūtra* deals with this explanation :

#### 50. अदृष्टानियमात् ।

Because the *adṛishta*s are not differentiated.

The *adṛishta*s themselves inhere in the substance (*svarūpa*) of *Brahma*, and there is nothing to differentiate them. The difficulty therefore remains ; because it is not possible for the limiting things or the *adṛishta*s to cut up the substance of *Brahma* by their connection with it.

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(1) The texts are—meditating on the *ātmā* and the ruler as different ; both are unborn ; but they are respectively all-knowing and ignorant (*śveta.*, I-9) ; Of them one eats the ripe fruit (*muṇḍa*, III-1-1).

## 51. अभिसन्ध्यादिष्वपि चैवम् ।

And in regard to willing also there is similar non-differentiation.

If the *adrishtas* be differentiated with reference to willing, the willing being that of *Brahma*, and He being one, non-differentiation cannot be got over.

## 52. प्रदेशभेदादिति चेन्नान्तर्भावात् ।

If it be said "owing to differences of places," the reply is "no; because all places are contacted by limiting things".

The opponent explains: The substance of *Brahma* is one indeed; and cannot be cut up; and it contacts various limiting things; yet the places of contact being different, there is differentiation in enjoyments. *Reply.* The limiting things may move about from place to place; and all places will be connected with all of them. The result will be the same. Though the limiting things are connected with different places, as they are all places in *Brahma*, the suffering of each place belongs to *Brahma* alone.

In *sūtras* 32 and 36 the defect in the theory of the *jiva's* omnipresence held by those outside the *vedic* fold was pointed out; here *sūtras* 49 to 52 expose the error of those that accepting the authority of the *veda* maintain that all *jivas* are one.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

## CHAPTER II

### SECTION 4

In the preceding section the evolution from the highest *Ātmā* of ether and all other products was established ; and it was shown that the *jīva*, though a product of evolution like the rest, did not change in his substance like ether. In this connection the *svarūpa* of the *jīva* was considered ; and it was shown that he knows and acts, and that he is a part (*aṁṣa*) of *Brahma*. In this section the evolution of his instruments, the senses and *prāṇa*, is considered.

### SUB-SECTION 1

The question for consideration is whether the senses are evolved like the *jīva* or like ether.

*First view* : The senses evolve like the *jīva* ; the *sūtra* states this :

I. तथा प्राणाः ।

Similarly *prāṇas*.



The term *prāṇa* in the plural refers to the senses ; and the *sūtra* states the view of the opponent that like the *jīva* the senses are not produced. What is the reason ? As the non-origination of the *jīva* is known from the *veda*, so is the non-origination of the senses learnt from the same authority (1). The authority is the *satapatha* (VI-1-1).

Before creation this was *asat* indeed. Then they said "What existed then." "Before creation *rishis* ever existed indeed." They asked—"Who were those *rishis*." "*Prāṇas* were the *rishis*."

This shows that the senses existed before creation. This text cannot be explained so as to mean that they existed for a long time ; like the texts relating to ether and air—"The fluid is air and ether (*antariksha*)—this is imperishable' (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-3)"; the *devatā vāyu* (air) does not set"; for they are stated to have existed, when the whole world was dissolved. The texts affirming origination of the senses should be explained, like similar texts regarding the *jīva* :

*Final decision.* The senses are produced like ether ; for in the texts "Before creation, my dear, this was *sat* only (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1) ; Before creation this was *Ātmā* indeed ; one only" (*aita.*, I-1), it is stated that there was only one before creation. In the *muṇḍaka* text "From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind and all the senses" (II-1-3) their origination is taught ; and they

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(1) The authority for holding the view that there is no origination, mentioned in *sūtra* 18 of the preceding section, is applied to the case of the senses by this *sūtra*.

could not have existed before. The case of the senses differs from that of the *jiva* ; for there are no texts as in his case denying origination and affirming eternal existence. In the text relied on in the *first view* reference is made by the term *prāṇa* to the highest *Ātmā* alone, and the term *prāṇa* denotes Him by well-established usage (See *sūtra*, I-1-24). The term *rishi* (seer) is appropriate only in the all-knowing Being, and not in the non-intelligent senses, which are not seers, but only instruments in perception (1).

## 2. गौण्यसम्भवात्तत्प्राकृष्टेः ।

(The plural of the term *prāṇas*) is secondary ; because of impossibility ; this again because He is stated to have existed before.

Because it is stated that there was one only before evolution, the existence of many was impossible, and the plural ending should be ignored (2) (See Intro., para 34). And that one is known to be *Brahma*.

## 3. तत्पूर्वेकत्वाद्वाचः ।

Because words must be preceded by the objects which they denote.

(1) There is no *sūtra* here stating the *final decision* as in other cases. The reasons stated follow from the nature of things, and were intended by the author of the *sūtras*. They are not stated in the next *sūtra* ; for it is concerned only with the explanation of the plural ending of the world *prāṇas*.

(2) See Introduction, para 34. In the word *pūṣān* the plural ending being unsuitable is ignored ; and the *mantra*, in which the word occurs, is recited without change.

Before evolution commenced, there was no differentiation, and there was no object with a form and a name (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7). Hence speech and other senses did not then exist, as they had no work to do. The word *prāṇa* should denote the only thing that did exist, viz., *Brahma*.

## SUB-SECTION 2

How many are the senses? The doubt arises from different statements in the *veda*. The opponent states his view :

### 4. सप्तगतेर्विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

They are seven; because that number is said to go about, and because seven are specified.

Seven senses only are said to go about in the worlds with the *jīva*, when he comes to birth, or when he departs.

From Him come forth these seven worlds, in which wander the *prāṇas*, that are placed seven and seven (in the various parts of the body) and that during sleep come to the cavity of the heart (*munda.*, II-1-8).

The word 'seven' is repeated to indicate that each person has seven senses. Seven senses are also specified.

When the five senses (*jñāna*) remain still with the mind, and *buddhi* does not work, that condition is said to be the highest going (*kaṭha.*, II-6-10).

The going towards release on the abandonment of motions within the body is described in the verse as the

‘highest going’. From these texts and the mention of the term *jnāna* in the second text, it may be concluded that the *jīva*’s instruments are seven—ear, skin, eye, tongue, nose, (1) *buddhi* and mind, and only seven.

2. *Objection.* Reference is made to others as being instrumental in the perception of objects thus—“Eight are the *grahas* (instruments of perception) (*bṛihad.*, V-2-9); The *prāṇas* located in the head are seven; two are below.” And in other texts describing *prāṇa* as many as fourteen are stated, including with those already stated the following—speech, hands, feet, excretory organs, sex organ, *ahamkāra* and *chitta*. How can it be said that the number is only seven? *Reply.* They are not stated to go about with the *jīva*. Owing to the very slight service which they render to him, they are termed *prāṇa* in a secondary sense.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the next *sūtra*:

### 5. हस्तादयस्तु स्थितेऽतो नैवम् ।

But there are hands and other (organs of action), which are needed while he is in the body. Therefore not so.

These organs are required by the *jīva* as his instruments for enjoyment, and their functions differ from those of the senses. The work, which they do, like taking up a thing and the like, is seen like the work done by the senses of perception. They also exist and should not be regarded as non-existing. Hence, the

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(1) The first five words refer to the senses, which are located in the organs of the body mentioned.

number is eleven. The mind thinks, resolves and attaches itself to something and receives the names. *chitta*, *buddhi* and *ahamkāra*; but the mind is one. In thinking the mind is helped by previous tendencies; in resolving by the element *mahat*; and in forming attachments by the element *ahamkāra*. Adding the five senses and the five organs of action the number is eleven (1). When a higher number is stated, reference is made to the different functions of the mind; and when a lower number is stated, reference is made to the particular functions then under consideration (2).

### SUB-SECTION 3

#### 6. अणवश्च ।

They are atoms.

*First view.* The senses are all-pervading; for it is said "All those are alike; all are unlimited" (*bṛihad.*, III-5-13).

(1) This number is stated; These *prāṇas* in the *jīva* are ten; *ātmā* (mind) is the eleventh (*bṛihad.*, V-9-4). The senses are ten and one; those that are perceived by the senses are five (*bhagavad-gītā*, XIII-5). Some say that the senses come forth from *rājasa ahamkāra*; but they come forth from the *sātvika ahamkāra*; they are ten and the eleventh is mind (*viṣṇu*, I-2-49).

(2) All the eleven agree in being products of the finest variety of *ahamkāra*. The mind is singled out as being the leading sense among them. The sensory organs are distinguished from the motor organs, because each set has its own functions.

*Final decision.* The senses are atoms.

It is stated "When *prāṇa* follows the *jīva* out of the body, all the *prāṇas* follow it and get out of the body" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2). From this mention of going out of the body, it is clear that the senses are of limited dimension. When they go out, they are not seen by by-standers. Hence they are subtle (1). The text quoted in the *first view* refers to meditation on the senses as possessing the capacity to do very many things.

## 7. श्रृंग ।

And the principal *prāṇa* (is produced).

In the colloquy of the *prāṇas prāṇa*, the vital principle, is decided to be the principal, as it helps the continued existence of the body. This *prāṇa* also originates. Because the existence of one thing only before evolution is affirmed; because in the text "From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind, and all the senses" (*munḍa.*, II-1-3) it is said to have evolved like the elements; and because there is no text denying its origination. It may be thought that the text "That one with *svadhā* (the goddess *Lakshmi*) breathed, but without air" refers to breathing, the function of *prāṇa*; but it is not so.

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(1) Though they are of limited size, they can in the absence of obstruction grasp numberless things, as the light of a lamp does. The term 'atom' as applied to the senses, means that they are of limited dimension, but that they are not sufficiently gross to be capable of being perceived. They are not like the *jīva* of the smallest size possible; this is accepted having regard to a particular text.

Reference is made, not to the *jiva*'s instrument *prāṇa*, but to *Brahma*; for the text itself states 'without air'.

The fact stated in the *sūtra* follows from the preceding *sūtras* and for the reasons given therein. This *sūtra* has, however, been added merely for the purpose of the next *sūtra*.

#### SUB-SECTION 4

The question for consideration is whether *prāṇa* is mere air, the second of the great elements, or its movement, or air alone modified in a particular way.

*First view.* It is air alone; for it is stated "which is *prāṇa*, that is air". Or as air in itself is not well-known to be *prāṇa*, and as it is well-known to denote breathing, it is its movement.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra*:

8. न वायुक्रिये पृथगुपदेशात् ।

It is not air; nor its movement; because it is separately mentioned.

The statement is made in the *munḍaka* text quoted under the preceding *sūtra*. For the same reason—*i.e.*, its separate mention—*prāṇa* is not the movement of air. For the actions of fire, water and other elements are not mentioned in the text along with them as separate substances. The text quoted in the *first view* means that air by a change of condition becomes *prāṇa*; but that it is not a new substance like fire and the rest. The purpose of the text is to show this fact. That

*prāṇa* is not movement of air is also clear from usage. Referring to breathing, it is said *prāṇa* moves about. In other words the word is used as denoting a substance, which moves about.

9. चक्षुरादिवत् तत्सहशिष्टादिभ्यः ।

Like sight and other senses ; because it is taught along with them and for other reasons.

It is not an element like fire ; but it is an instrument of the *jīva* like sight and the others ; for in the colloquy of the *prāṇas* it is mentioned along with the sense of seeing and others, which are admittedly the *jīva*'s instruments ; and it will be appropriate to do so, only if it is of the same class as they. It is also specially mentioned as one among the *jīva*'s instruments covered by the term *prāṇa* thus "That which is the principal *prāṇa* " (*chāndo.*, I-2-7).

If *prāṇa* be an instrument of the *jīva* like sight and the rest, it must render some service, as they do ; but this is not seen. Hence it is not fit to be treated like them. To this objection the next *sūtra* replies :

10. अकरणत्वाच्च न दोषस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

The difficulty, that may be imagined on the assumption that it does not serve the *jīva*, does not exist ; for such service is stated.

The service is the supporting of the body and the senses ; and it is thus stated

On the departure of which this body is seen to be most despicable, that alone is the best (*chāndo.*, V-1-7).



Having made this statement, the *upanishad* explains how on the successive departure of speech and the other senses the body and the other senses functioned as before; and how when *prāṇa* began to depart, all the rest were threatened with extinction. *Prāṇa* supports the body in five forms as *prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna* and *samāna*, and serves the purposes of the *jīva*. It is therefore an instrument, no less than the eye and the rest.

Are not *prāṇa* and others enumerated different substances; because their names are different, as also their functions? The next *sūtra* replies:

॥ पञ्चवृत्तिर्मनोवक्ष्यपदिश्यते ।

One with five functions; like the mind; it is so stated.

It is stated:

Desire, resolve, doubt, eagerness, dilatoriness, perseverance, fickleness, bashfulness, thought and fear—all this is mind only (*bṛihad.*, III-5-3).

Here as mind functions in these various ways, desire, resolve and the rest are not substances different from the mind; but they are all the mind itself. Similarly in the same place the following statement is made: “*Prāṇa*, *apāna*, *vyāna*, *udāna*, *samāna*—all this is *prāṇa* only.” Hence *prāṇa* is one; and *apāna* and the rest are its conditions; but they are not different substances.

## SUB-SECTION 5

## 12. अणुश्च ।

And an atom.

As in the case of the senses, it is said to go out of the body.

Him, when he goes out of the body, *prāṇa* follows out of the body (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

Hence it is of the size of an atom. This follows from *sūtra* 6 of this section ; but a doubt is created by the following texts : “ He (*prāṇa*) is equal to these three worlds, equal to all this (*bṛihad.*, III-3-22) ; On *prāṇa* everything rests ; all this is enveloped in *prāṇa*.” One might presume from these texts that *prāṇa* is of large size ; and it is to clear the doubt that a separate *sūtra* has been added. When it is decided from the statement that *prāṇa* goes out of the body, that it is limited in size, these texts should be understood as merely describing its greatness ; because all living beings depend upon *prāṇa* for continued existence.

## SUB-SECTION 6

In the last five sub-sections the evolution of *prāṇa* and the senses, their number and size were described. In *sūtra*, II-1-5 it was shown incidentally that they are controlled by certain *devatās*. The *jīva* also controls them, as they are the instruments of his enjoyment ; this is well-known to every man of the world ; and it is also stated in a *vedic* text.

In the very same way he takes hold of these (*prāṇas*-senses) and moves about in his own body according to his pleasure (*bṛihad.*, IV-1-18).

The question for consideration is whether this control by the *jīva* and by the *devatās* is independent or whether it depends upon the will of the highest *Ātmā*.

*First view.* In regard to the *jīva* it was settled in sub-section 6 of the preceding section that his control is not independent. But in regard to the *devatās* the case is different; for they are worshipped by the *jīva* and give him the fruits that he desires. The highest *Ātmā* having placed them in this exalted position, they control the *jīva's* instruments independently.

*Final decision.* The *devatās* exercise their control subject to the will of the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

13. ज्योतिराद्यधिष्ठानं तु तदामननात्प्राणवता शब्दात् ।

Control (of *prāṇa* and the senses) by *agni* and other *devatās* along with the owner of *prāṇa* (*jīva*) comes about from His will. So does the *veda* teach.

His will—the will of the highest *Ātmā*. *Bṛihad āraṇyaka* chapter V, section 7, states that the highest *Ātmā* controls as the inner ruler the *jīva*, his senses and the *devatās* in the performance of their own work (1). (See *āna.*, VIII-1, and *bṛihad.*, V-8-8) (2).

(1) The texts refer especially among others to fire, air, the sun, the *jīva*, and the eye.

(2) The mention of the *jīva* in the *sūtra* is by way of illustration. In this matter of subjection to the will of the highest *Ātmā*, there is no difference between the *jīva*, and

## 14. तस्य च नियत्वात् ।

And because it (control by *Brahma*) is eternal.

This is a part of the nature of all beings and is therefore a permanent factor. Hence every being exercises control over other things subject to His control. This is due to His entry into every thing for the purpose of control (*āna.*, VI-3-3). This is stated in the *bhagavad-gītā* also "Supporting all this world with a fragment of My power, I remain" (X-42).

## SUB-SECTION 7

## 15. त इन्द्रियाणि तद्व्यपदेशादन्यत्र श्रेष्ठात् ।

They, except the chief *prāṇa*, are denoted by the term *indriya*; because it is so stated.

The term *prāṇa* denotes the senses and *prāṇa*. The question for consideration in this sub-section is whether all of them are denoted by the term *indriya*, or whether the chief *prāṇa* should be left out. The *first view* is that all of them are denoted by the term; for they are covered by the term *prāṇa*, and are the *jīva*'s instruments. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*. The text is

The *indriyas* are ten and one; and five are objects perceived by them (*bhagavad-gītā*, XIII-5).

the *devatās*, however exalted their position may be. The meaning is not that the *devatās* are independent in themselves and that they are subject to the control of the highest *Ātmā* only in their relation to the senses. What is meant is that even their existence depends upon Him. If so, how can there be any doubt as to their control of the senses, or as to control of them by the *jīva*?

## 16. भेदश्रुतेर्वैलक्षण्याच्च ।

Because of separate mention and of difference.

In the text

From Him came forth *prāṇa*, mind, and all the senses (*indriyas*). (*muṇḍa.*, II-1-3).

*Prāṇa* is specified separately from the *indriyas*. Though mind also is mentioned separately, it is stated to be one of the *indriyas* elsewhere—as in the *bhagavad-gītā* (XV-7).

The *indriyas* (senses), with the mind as the sixth.

And they differ in action. In deep sleep *prāṇa* continues to work, while the action of the others is suspended. The senses and the mind are instruments in perception or action, while *prāṇa* supports the body and the senses. Because of this fact—the support of the senses by *prāṇa*—they are denoted by the term *prāṇa*. “All those are the bodies of that only; hence they are called by the name *prāṇa*” (*bṛihad.*, III-5-21). By the term ‘body’ it is meant that their activities depend upon it.

Hence the term is used in its primary meaning as regards *prāṇa*, and in a secondary sense as regards the others (1).

(1) The two reasons stated in the *sūtra* constitute but one reason; and this is the separate mention supported by difference. If the reasons be regarded as different, the *sūtra* must be treated as two instead of being one. Unless difference as pointed out is proved, its separate mention must be justified as in the case of mind. One more reason. *Indriyas* are products of the finest variety of *ahamkūra*, while *prāṇa* is a product of the element air.

## SUB-SECTION 8

In section 3 and in this section up to sub-section 7 evolution of the elements and the *jiva*'s instruments from the highest *Ātmā* was established ; and this is known as *samasṭi* evolution. This sub-section proceeds to consider whether the other variety, known as *vyasṭi*, and consisting in the making of names and forms, is the work of the four-faced one (1) or the work of the highest *Ātmā* appearing as his inner ruler, as He created water and earth appearing as the inner *ruler* of fire and water respectively.

*First view.* It is the work of the four-faced one ; for the text states :

I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jiva* and make diverse names and forms (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2).

The words found in the original are *anena jivena ātmanā*, i.e., by this *jiva-ātmā* ; and they show that a *jiva* was concerned in this work, though the sentence appears to refer to the highest *Ātmā*. He did not will to do the work in His own form ; but in the form of a *jiva*, who is a part of Himself.

2. Here certain objections are stated, to which the opponent replies : (i) The text is of the same form as the sentence 'I will enter through a spy and ascertain the strength of the enemy's force' ; and if it

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(1) The epithet *samasṭi jiva rūpa* is added to the name of the four-faced one. For the meaning of the term and for the reason for adding it see note (1) on page 317.

were understood in the same way, the first person of the verb and the action of the speaker in the form of entry would be understood in a secondary sense. *Reply.* In the example given the king and the spy being different persons, resort to a secondary sense cannot be avoided. But here the *jiva* being a part of Himself, entry by him and the other work would be His own. There is therefore no resort to secondary meanings.

3. (ii) Another objection. The word *saha* (together) should be supplied; and the instrumental case-endings of the three words should be connected with it. The meaning will then be 'I will enter together with this *jiva ātmā*'. *Reply.* The case-ending is added to a word either to indicate that what is denoted by the word is an instrument connected with an action, or because it is joined to particular words like the word *saha* here. According to the grammarian so long as the addition of the case-ending may be explained with reference to the former, resort to the latter is not legitimate. Hence the interpretation suggested will not do.

4. (iii) Still another objection. The three words indicate an instrument. *Reply.* The highest *Ātmā* does two things—He enters and makes diverse names and forms; but in neither of them is the *jiva* a most useful instrument.

5. (iv) A last objection. The *jiva* is concerned with the entry only; and the other action is by the highest *Ātmā*. *Reply.* The two actions should be by the same person; for the original has *anupraviṣya*

(having entered); and the termination in the term indicates this.

6. Hence the interpretation stated in para 1 holds. In order to show that the entry by the highest *Ātmā* was by a portion of Himself, viz., the *jīva*, and not in His own form, reference is made in the third person 'by this *jīva ātmā*'. That the making of diverse names and forms was by the four-faced one is confirmed by the *smṛitis*; for it is mentioned in the place where creation by him is described (1).

*Final decision.* The making of diverse names and forms was by the highest *Ātmā*, and this is stated in the *sūtra*:

17. संज्ञामूर्तिकृत्सिस्तु त्रिवृत्कुर्वत उपदेशात् ।

The making of names and forms was by Him who compounded the elements; so is it taught.

The text referred to is

That same *devatā* willed 'I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jīva*, and make diverse names and forms. I will make each of them a triple compound' (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2 and 3).

This shows that the two operations were the work of one and the same. The compounding of the elements could not have been the work of the four-faced one; for it was only after the elements were compounded and the egg-shaped universe emerged that he appeared on the

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(1) At the beginning he made the names and forms of beings beginning with the *devas*, and determined what work each class should do; this was done with *vedic* texts alone (*viṣṇu*, I-5-63).



scene (1). Hence it was the work of the highest *Ātmā*, and the other operation was therefore by Him alone. What then is the meaning of the expression “By this *jiva ātmā*”? The words *jiva* and *ātmā* being in apposition, the term *jiva* means the highest *Ātmā* appearing in the form of the *jiva*, as the terms *tejas* and *āpah* in the texts ‘That *tejas* willed,’ and ‘those *āpah* willed,’ mean *Brahma* appearing as *tejas* (fire) and *āpah* (water). The making of names and forms was therefore His work appearing in the form of the four-faced one.

In this interpretation the difficulties pointed out in paras 2 to 5 of the *first view* will disappear, and the mention of the making of names and forms in the place, where creation by the four-faced one is described, will receive a natural explanation (2).

The opponent disputes this conclusion, and urges the following reasons: (i) The composition also was by

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(1) The appearance of the four-faced being within the egg-shaped universe is thus stated: ‘In this egg-shaped universe *Brahmā*, the grandfather of all the worlds, appeared.’

(2) The meaning of the text is as follows: I will enter these three *devatās*—i.e., fire, water and earth—clothed with all the *jivas* in their undifferentiated conditions, and will make names and forms; i.e., I will create diverse objects beginning with the *devas* and make their names. For this purpose I will make each of the elements fire, water and earth a compound of the three; for while they remain separate substances, they will be unable to create the diverse products of the world; and by compounding them they will acquire a capacity for such creation.

a *jiva*. Composition is taught as having taken place, after the egg-shaped universe was created, and the *jivas* were made by the four-faced one :

Learn from me, dear, how these three *devatās* reaching the *jiva* become each triple. Food eaten divides into three parts ; of them the grossest part becomes fæces ; the middle part becomes flesh ; the subtlest becomes the mind, and so on. See *Vedic Texts*.

(ii) Similarly, in the previous section of the same *upanishad* it is stated :

The red colour of fire is the colour of the element fire ; the white colour is the colour of the element water ; the dark colour is the colour of the element earth (*Ibid.*, VI-4-1).

Composition is thus shown in the fire made by the four-faced one, and also in the sun, the moon and lightning in the verses that follow. (iii) And composition is also stated after the making of names and forms. See the text quoted in the *final decision* under the preceding *sūtra*.

The next *sūtra* refutes this objection :

13. मांसादिभौमं यथाशब्दमितरयोश्च ।

Flesh and the others are products of earth ; and in the other two cases according to the terms used.

See *Vedic Texts*. In the first verse food eaten is stated to separate into three parts—fæces, flesh and mind, and each of them is said to be finer than the preceding one. If composition were taught here, as the elements earth, water and fire are each finer than the preceding one, and as the products should be like the causes, flesh would be a portion of the element water,

and mind a portion of the element fire. But they are not; for they are stated at the beginning of the verse to be products of earth like faeces. Similarly, in regard to water drunk, and fire (oil or butter) eaten dealt with in the next two verses. The water drunk separates into three parts—urine, blood and *prāṇa*; according to the opponent's view urine would be a portion of the element earth, and *prāṇa* a portion of the element fire; but both are stated to be products of water. The fire eaten separates into bone, marrow and speech; of which the first two would be portions of the elements earth, and water; but they are stated to be products of fire. Next, the opponent's view would conflict with the last verse of the *upanishad*.

Mind, my dear, is a product of food; *prāṇa* is a product of water; speech is a product of fire;

For in his view they would all be portions of fire. Hence, what is shown here is how the three elements already compounded are changed on reaching man into three different products. The composition should have taken place before the egg-shaped universe emerged; for in their uncompounded state they were not able to produce anything (1). Hence the order of

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(1) When the three elements unite with one another, then alone are they able to begin any work; this uniting is composition. This is stated in a *smṛiti* verse: "When the products, beginning with *mahat* and ending with the great elements, remained separate, they had different capacities; and without mixing and combining with one another, they were unable to create the products of evolution. Mixing and combining with one another, they formed the egg-shaped universe" (*viṣṇu*, I-2-53 and 54).

the operations stated in the verse—making names and forms and composition of the elements—is superseded by the order determined by the nature of things. See Introduction, para 26 (iii). The reference to the composition in section 3 of the *upanishad* was for the purpose of making the student form a conception of the operation, as being within the universe he could not be shown the composition in the elements outside of it.

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If earth, water and fire are each of them compounds, why are they referred to by words denoting one element only ?

19. वैशेष्यात् तद्वादस्तद्वादः ।

This denotation is due to the predominance of an element in each compound.

Though each compound contains the three elements, one of them predominates ; and the compound in which earth predominates is earth and so on.

मगवते भाष्यकाय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

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## CHAPTER III

### SECTION 1

IN the first chapter the highest *Ātmā* was established as the only cause of the evolution of the world ; and it was shown that the *upanishads* teach that it is this Being, who is free from the touch of every blemish, and is the seat of infinite good qualities, and who stands apart from every thing else, that should be meditated on by those that desire release. In the second chapter this conclusion was confirmed by answering objections brought forward by opponents, by exposing the flaws in theories not based on the *veda*, and by reconciling apparent inconsistencies in *vedic* statements in regard to the evolution of particular products. The result is to show the highest *Ātmā* as He is. In the third chapter the means of reaching Him, *viz.*, meditations, are examined. One will be induced to commence meditation, when he does not desire anything other than the Being that is to be reached, and longs to go to Him. In order that these may be brought about, the unpleasant experiences of the *jīva* in his wanderings in other worlds

and in the conditions of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep and trance, and the freedom of *Brahma* from them and the possession of good qualities by Him are described in the first and second sections.

### SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section the question is considered whether in going from one body to another the *jiva* goes forth enveloped in the elements in a subtle condition, from which a body may be formed, or not.

*First view.* Wherever the *jiva* goes, he can find the elements in a subtle condition, and he goes on without them.

*Final decision.* He goes on enveloped in them. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. तदन्तरप्रतिपत्तौ रंहति संपरिष्वक्तः प्रश्ननिरूपणाभ्याम् ।

In going from one body (1) to another, the *jiva* goes on enveloped (in the elements in a subtle condition). (This is evident) from the questions put and the explanations given.

See *Vedic Texts*. In the *chāndogya*, chapter V, sections 3-10, *Pravāhaṇa* put five questions to *Śvetaketu*, one of which was

Do you know how in the fifth offering water receives the name *purusha* (man).

In answering this question himself *Pravāhaṇa* compares the heaven-world to a sacrificial fire, into

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(1) The first word in the *sūtra*, *tād*, refers to the term *mūrti* in *sūtra* 17 of the preceding section. It means body.

which what is called *ṣraddhā* is offered by the *devas*—i.e., the *jīva*'s senses ; and this *ṣraddhā* becomes a divine body, known as *soma* king. He then compares *parjanya* (*devatā* in charge of rain), the earth, man and woman to four other fires ; into the first of which the divine body referred to is offered ; and it becomes rain. This is offered into the next fire—the earth, and it becomes food. This is offered into the next fire—man, and it becomes semen. And this semen is offered into the last fire—woman, and it becomes an embryo, and when it grows, it receives the name man. Having given this explanation, *Pravāhana* closes the reply to this question with these words

Thus in the fifth offering water receives the name 'man'.

It is clear from this explanation that in all the five offerings water in a fine condition is the thing offered ; and this water is the five elements in a subtle condition, from which the future body after undergoing these transformations is formed. The *jīva* therefore goes on from one world to another enveloped in these five elements.

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Here the question arises—Why is the *jīva* said to be enveloped in all the five elements, when reference is made to water only. The next *sūtra* replies :

## 2. त्र्यात्मकत्वात् भूयस्त्वात् ।

Because water consists of the three elements ; and because in the compound water predominates.

By the term 'water' reference is made to a compound of all the elements, as water by itself cannot make up the body. It was to make the elements capable of doing so, that they were compounded. And water in the form of blood predominates among them.

### 3 प्राणगतेश्च ।

And because *prāṇa* and the senses are said to accompany the *jiva*.

This is stated in a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text :

When the *jiva* goes out of the body, *prāṇa* goes after him out of the body ; and when *prāṇa* goes out of the body, all the senses go after it out of the body (VI-4-2) (1).

*Prāṇa* and the senses can depart and go after the *jiva* only when there is a vehicle to carry them ; and for this reason also it must be admitted that he goes about enveloped in the five elements.

### 4. अग्न्यादिगतिश्रुतेरिति चेन्नभाक्त्वात् ।

If it be contended " Because going to fire and the rest is stated," the reply is—" No ; because this going is in a secondary sense."

Reference is made here to the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text :

When the speech of this dead person enters fire, *prāṇa* the air, the eye the sun, the mind the moon, the ear the quarters, the body the earth, the *ātmā* the ether, the hairs of the body shrubs, the hairs of the head trees, blood and the seed water, where then is this person (V-2-13).

(1) This is stated in a *smṛiti* text also : ' He draws to himself the senses and the mind, that are in *prakṛiti* (body). When he, the ruler, enters a body, or goes out of it, he goes gathering them up, as the wind gathers scents from flower-beds, (*bhagavadgītā*, XV, 7 and 8).



Here the places to which *prāṇa* and the senses go, when a person dies, are described. They cannot therefore go with the *jīva* as stated in the preceding *sūtra*; and the text therein relied on should be understood differently. To this objection the reply is—no. Because the entering stated here is not literally true. For, the hairs of the body and the hairs of the head do not enter shrubs and trees. Hence *prāṇa* and the senses, which are mentioned with these, do not enter fire and the rest. The statement in the text refers to the departure of the *devatās*, who controlled *prāṇa* and the senses.

#### 5. प्रथमेऽश्रवणादिति चेन्न ता एव ह्युपपत्तेः ।

If it be said "Because the term 'water' is not mentioned in the first offering," the reply is—"No. That alone, and it is only then that (the question and explanation) will be appropriate."

The statement that the *jīva* goes enveloped in water in a subtle condition united to other elements is not correct; for what is offered into the first fire is *śraddhā*; and not water. *Śraddhā* is a state of mind of the *jīva*, viz., eagerness. Hence water is not offered into this fire as assumed. To this contention the *sūtra* replies: Because water alone is indicated by the word *śraddhā*. Otherwise an appropriate reply would not have been given to the question put—"Do you know how in the fifth offering water receives the name *puruṣa* (man)." It is true that at the beginning of the reply reference is made to *śraddhā* as the thing offered; but if the term does not denote water, the question put would refer to one thing and the reply to another. Further, the summing up at

the end of the reply indicates that *ṣraddhā* is water. From the use of the word *how* (*yathā*) the question relates to the transformations of water. The transformations are stated to be the divine body, rain, food, semen and embryo ; and having said this the summing up is " thus in the fifth offering water receives the name man ". Lastly, in the *veda* the term *ṣraddhā* is used to denote water as in the text " He carries water ; *ṣraddhā* indeed is water ".

### 6. अश्रुतत्वादिति चेन्नेष्टादिकारिणां प्रतीतेः ।

If it be said " Because no mention is made (of the *jiva*)," the reply is " No—because reference to those that perform *yāgas* and the rest is observed ".

The opponent again disputes the conclusion on the ground that in this context no mention is made of the *jiva*. What is mentioned is *ṣraddhā* and other conditions of water as offerings made. The *sūtra* replies : In section 10 of the *upanishad*, verse 3, reference is made to those that remain in their villages and perform *yāgas*, carry out works of public utility, give away from their possessions, and do like things without however a knowledge of *Brahma* ; and it is stated that they go to the heaven-world, and become *soma* king, and that when their good *karma* is exhausted, they return and are re-born (1). In section 4 it is stated that when

(1) They that live in the village and perform *yāgas*, carry out works of public utility, give away from their possession and do like things, go to smoke. . . . From the world of the *pitris* to ether ; from ether to the moon ; they become *soma* king. They are the food (*anna*) of the

*śraddhā* is offered into the fire of the heaven-world, it becomes *soma* king. As the texts in both places have the same meaning, it must be understood that the *jīva* invested with a body in the condition of *śraddhā* reappears in a divine body known as *soma* king. Further, a body being by nature a qualifying attribute of the *jīva*, every word denoting it denotes also the *jīva* of whom it is the qualifying attribute. Hence, the *jīva* goes about enveloped in the subtle elements.

Here the opponent makes a last stand, and draws attention to the following sentences in the same section (10) of the *upanishad* :

They become *soma* king ; they are the food of the *devas* ; them the *devas* eat.

He contends that the words ' *soma* king ' cannot refer to the *jīva*. For he is not capable of being eaten. To this the next *sūtra* replies :

#### 7. भक्तंवाऽनात्मवित्वात्तथाहि दर्शयति।

The word *anna* (food) is used in a secondary sense. Because they do not know the highest *Ātmā* ; so is it taught.

Those, that perform *yāgas* and the rest without knowing the highest *Ātmā*, become instruments of the *devas*' enjoyment. Here they perform *yāgas* as their

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*devas* ; them the *devas* eat (verse 4). There they dwell till all the *karma* to yield fruit there is expended. Then they return by the very same path by which they went (verse 5). Whoever eats food, or emits semen, they become those persons (verse 6).

worship. Pleased with this, the *devas* enable them to reach their own world, where these persons have the same enjoyment as the *devas* themselves, and become instruments in their enjoyment. And this is stated :

Now, he that meditates on another being, thinking 'This being is one, and I am another,' does not know. As a beast is (to man), so is he to the *devas*. As many beasts nourish a man, so does each person nourishes the *devas* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-10) (1).

Hence, to signify what a *jiva* becomes—an instrument in the hands of the *devas* for their own enjoyment—the words food and eating are used. They are therefore used in a secondary sense. The eating by the *devas* is merely to be pleased ; this is stated :

The *devas* do not eat ; they do not drink ; seeing that same *amṛita* (nectar) they are pleased (*chāndo.*, III-6-1).

## SUB-SECTION 2

In the preceding sub-section it was shown that so long as *samsāra* lasts, connection with a body cannot be avoided. In this sub-section it will be explained that subjection to *karma*, which leads to such connection, cannot be got rid of. The question for consideration is—when a *jiva* returns from the heaven-world on the completion of his enjoyment, has he any *karma* left or not ?

(1) This is also stated in a *smṛiti* verse : " Those that worship the *devas* go to the *devas* ; those that love Me come to Me " (*bhagavad gītā*, VII-23).

*First view.* He returns with no *karma*; for he has enjoyed the fruit of all his *karma*. This is stated :

There they dwell till all the *karma* to yield fruit there is expended; then they return by the very same path by which they went (*chāndo.*, V-10-5).

The word used in the original is *sampātam*, which means the *karma*, which takes the *jīva* to the heaven-world. This is confirmed by a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text—

Having reached the end of *karma*, which he does here, whatever it be, he returns from that world to this world to do *karma* (VI-4-6).

*Final decision.* He returns with a remnant of *karma*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

8. कृताययेऽनुशयवान्दृष्टस्मृतिभ्यां यथेतमनेवंच ।

On the good *karma* being spent, one returns with a remnant of *karma*; this is known from the *veda* and *smṛitis*. He returns, as he went, and also otherwise.

The *veda* states :

Those, that return here, if they have good *karma*, reach good births—birth as a *brāhmaṇa*, as a *kshattriya*, or as a *vaiśya*. Those, that return here, if they have bad *karma*, reach evil births—birth as a dog, as a hog or as an out-caste (*chāndo.*, V-10-7).

This shows that those that return have still good or bad *karma* left (1). The texts quoted by the opponent

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(1) This is stated by *smṛitis* also—Those, that perform the duties of their caste and stage of life, departing from here, enjoy the fruit of their *karma*, and return with the remainder. By this they attain birth in good countries, castes and families; they have good figure, long

must therefore be understood as referring only to the *karma* which began to yield fruit. For, it is not fit that one *karma* should be wiped out by the experiencing of the fruit of another *karma*. Each *karma* must yield its own fruit or it must be neutralised by penance. The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text also should be explained in the same way.

Those, that return from the other world, come back along the same path by which they went and also otherwise. They went along the path, which are marked by smoke, night, dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southward journey, the world of the *pitris*, ether and the moon. The return journey is from the moon to ether, air, watery vapour, cloud and rain-cloud. As they come down to ether, they return as they went. As they do not return to the world of the *pitris*, the return journey is otherwise.

### 9. चरणादिति चेन्न तदुपलक्षणार्थेति कार्ष्णाजिनिः ।

If it be contended "Reference is made to *charaṇa*" (general conduct), the reply is—"No; it must be understood to indicate *karma*. This is the view of *Kārshṇājini*."

The opponent's argument is this: in the *chāndogya* text quoted the expressions used are 'those that have

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life, learning, wealth, good conduct, comfort and intelligence; those that act in all ways will be the reverse and perish (*Gautama*). When they return with the remainder of the fruits of *karma*, they attain good caste, good figure, good colour, strength, intelligence, knowledge of truth, wealth, the doing of good deeds and the like. This happiness like a revolving wheel is in both the worlds alone (*Āpastamba*).

good *charaṇa* ' and ' those that have bad *charaṇa* ' ; the word *charaṇa* does not denote good or bad deeds ; and it is used in the *veda* and in ordinary literature to denote general conduct (1). Hence the nature of re-birth is determined by general conduct, but not by the remnant of *karma*. The *sūtra* refutes this view. General conduct by itself cannot produce pleasure or pain ; these are the fruits of particular acts, good or bad. Hence the term *charaṇa* must be understood as including good and bad deeds.

### 10. आनर्थक्यमिति चेन्न तदपेक्षत्वात् ।

If it be contended " In this view general conduct would be purposeless," the reply is—" No ; because it is required."

The objection is that general conduct is enjoined by the *smṛitis* ; and that it would serve no purpose, if it did not produce its fruit. This is met by the view that good deeds depend upon general good conduct ; (2) for it is only one, whose general conduct is good, that is fit to do good deeds.

(1) In the world the terms *charaṇa*, *āchāra* (general conduct), *śīla*, and *vr̥tta* are regarded as synonymous ; and in the *veda*, *charaṇa* and *karma* are distinguished thus. " Those *karmas*, that are unobjectionable, should be done ; our good conduct (*sucharita*) should be followed by you " (*taitti., śiksha*, 11-2).

(2) It is so stated—one without *sandhyā* (meditation at sunset and sunrise) is ever impure, and is unfit for all *karmas* (*manu*) ; the *vedas* do not purify one without good conduct.

## 11. सुकृतदुष्कृते एवेति तु बादरिः ।

But according to *Bādari*, *charaṇa* is good or bad deeds themselves.

It is said 'he does (*ācharati*) a good deed ; he does a bad deed'. The root *āchar* indicates *karma*—good or bad deed ; and the use of both *charaṇa* and *karma* in the same text may be explained—one as indicating what is enjoined by a known text, and the other as depending upon a text, the existence of which must be inferred from the good conduct of virtuous men (1). When a word can be understood in its primary sense, it is improper to resort to a secondary sense. Hence *Bādari* is of opinion that the word *charaṇa* in the *upaniṣad* text means good and bad deeds themselves.

The author of the *sūtras* adopts *Bādari*'s view ; and he accepts also the argument in *sūtra* 10—that general good conduct is fruitful in making one fit for doing good deeds.

### SUB-SECTION 3

In the two preceding sub-sections it was shown that a *jiva* in *samsāra* cannot get rid of either connection with a body or connection with its cause, *karma*. It

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(1) This explanation depends on what is known as the *go-balivarda* rule. The order is given 'bring the *go* (cow); bring the *balivarda* (bull)'. Here the first order covers the bull also, as the term 'go' is a general term ; but as the second order, which has been given, should serve a purpose, the term 'go' is understood so as to exclude the bull. This is a case of a general rule and exception.



will be shown in this sub-section that this *karma* is not always good *karma*. The question for consideration is whether the *jīvas*, who do not come within the description of those considered in the last sub-section, go on to the moon or not. The *first view* is stated in the first five *sūtras* :

## 12 अनिष्टादिकारिणामपि च श्रुतम् ।

It (ascent to the moon) is stated regarding others also—those that do not perform *yāgas* and the rest.

By the expression 'Those that do not perform *yāgas* and the rest' reference is made to those that do not do what is enjoined and do what is prohibited. The statement is :

Whoever depart from this world, all of them verily go to the moon (*kaushi*, 1-9).

Here no distinction is made, and all are said to go.

The following objection might be raised. In this view all would go to the moon without distinction—whether they do good deeds or do evil deeds. The opponent replies :

## 13. संयमनेत्वनुभूयेतरेषामारोहावगोहौ तद्वतिदर्शनात् ।

In the case of the others the ascent and descent take place after they have undergone punishment under the command of the *devatā* in charge of death. And it is taught that the sinful go to him.

By the term 'the others' men of evil deeds are indicated. As to their going to the *devatā* in charge of death the authority is

One, that thinks this world does not exist, nor the other, comes frequently under my sway (*kāṭha.*, I-2-6).

#### 14. स्मरन्ति च ।

It is also taught by *smṛiti*-writers—

All these come under the control of *yama* (*devatā* in charge of death') (*viṣṇu*, III-7-5).

#### 15. अपि सप्त ।

And there are seven.

'Seven'—seven hells, mentioned by *smṛiti*-writers as places to which men of evil deeds have to go.

If men of evil deeds go to seven worlds, how do they come under the sway of the *devatā* in charge of death? The next *sūtra* replies :

#### 16. तत्रापि तद्व्यापारादविरोधः ।

Because his activity extends to them also ; no difficulty.

The opponent's argument elaborated in these *sūtras* is now refuted :

#### 17. विद्याकर्मणोरिति तु प्रकृतत्वात् ।

(But the two paths are the fruits) of meditation on *Brahma* and of good deeds ; and they are the topics under consideration.

The opponent's view is untenable. The path of the *devas* is trodden by those that meditate on *Brahma*, and the path of the *pitris* by men of good deeds. Men of evil deeds have no access to either. The former path is closed to them; because they do not meditate on *Brahma*; similarly they do not go on the latter path, because they have not performed *yūgas*, carried out works of public utility, or given away from their possessions. How is this known? *Reply*. From the fact that meditation on *Brahma* is the principal topic in the consideration of the path of the *devas*, and that meritorious works are the principal topic in the description of the latter.

Those, that in this manner meditate on this (the nature of the pure *jiva*), and those, that in the forest meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness, go to light. But they, that remaining in the village perform *yūgas*, carry out works of public utility, give away from their possessions and do similar things, go to smoke; etc.

This being so, the text relied on by the opponent should be restricted to those described in the latter part of this text; it will then mean that all of them go to the moon.

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The opponent asks—if men of evil deeds do not ascend to the moon, the fifth offering being impossible, how can their body be made; for the fifth offering must be preceded by the ascent to the moon. The next *sūtra* replies :

### 18. न तृतीये तथोपलब्धेः ।

In the third (place) no need (for the fifth offering).  
And so it is seen.

By the expression 'third place' men of evil deeds are meant. In their case the fifth offering is not necessary for the making of their bodies. In reply to the question

"Do you know why that world is not filled" it was stated "These petty creatures, that continually return, do not go on either path; they die only to be reborn immediately. This is the third place. Hence that world is not filled" (*chāndo.*, V-10-8).

There is therefore neither ascent to the moon nor descent from it; and the heaven-world is not therefore filled. The reference to the fifth offering is merely to show that when the fifth offering is made, water receives the name man. It does not negative other ways; for it has not been stated to be the only way.

### 19. स्मर्यतेऽपि च लोके । जपने

It is also affirmed by *smṛiti*-writers in the case of some persons in the world.

In the case of some men of meritorious deeds their bodies are stated to have been formed without the need for the fifth offering. They are *Draupadī*, *Dhṛishtadyumna* and the like.

### 20. दर्शनाच्च ।

And this is seen (in the *veda*).

*Vide the chāndogya text*

Of all these beings, those sprung from eggs, those sprung from living beings and those sprung from shoots (*udbhid*), these three only (fire, water and earth) are the causes (VI-3-1).

Of these the beings springing from shoots or from sweat do not need the fifth offering.

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To the doubt, that may be expressed that the last class is not mentioned in the text, the reply is :

### 21. तृतीयशब्दावरोधस्संशोकजस्य ।

The third term (sprung from shoots) includes the class of beings springing from sweat.

The final decision is that men of evil deeds do not go to the moon.

## SUB-SECTION 4

### 22. तत्स्वाभाव्यापत्तिरुपपत्तेः ।

The attainment of likeness to it; because of its fitness.

Under *sūtra* 8 it was shown that a person of meritorious deeds descends from the moon to the ether and from the ether to the air. Having been air, he becomes watery-vapour, cloud and rain-cloud, and then comes down as rain (*chāndo.*, V-10-5 and 6). Here the question for consideration is in what sense does he become ether, air and the rest. Does he become these,

as he becomes *deva* or man, or does he only attain their likeness?

The *first view* accepts the former alternative on the analogy of the *jīva* in *śraddhā* becoming soma king, while the *sūtra* states that the latter is the correct view. The taking up of a divine or human body is for experiencing pleasure or pain. But here there is no occasion for it; and becoming ether and the rest must therefore mean that the descending *jīva* attaches himself to them and becomes like them. Owing to the absence of a gross form, he cannot be perceived to be separate from them (1).

#### SUB-SECTION 5

The next question is—How long does the descending *jīva* remain in contact with ether and the rest, until he reaches the vegetable kingdom? It is answered in the next *sūtra*:

#### 23. नातिचिरेण विशेषात् । जपने

Not very long; because of the statement of a difference.

(1) He is denied the pleasure of taking up ether and the rest as his bodies; for they serve as the bodies of certain *devatās*, who use them for their own enjoyment; and he cannot use them at the same time. Nor can he become the *devatās* themselves; for they were at the beginning of evolution placed in charge of what they control, and will exercise their functions to the very end of the current world-age, and cannot make room for a *jīva* descending every now and then (*Nayamayūkha mālīkā*, p. 237).

Further on the *upanishad* states :

They come down as rain ; they are born here as paddy or *yava* (a kind of grain), herbs or trees, gingelly seed or black-gram and the like. From thence escape is more difficult (*chāndo.*, V-10-6).

From this special mention of greater difficulty it may be concluded that escape from the previous stages is easier and does not take a long time.

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#### SUB-SECTION 6

On reaching the earth is the descending *jīva* born as described under the preceding *sūtra*, or is he merely in contact with what is mentioned ? The *first view* is that as shown by the term *jāyante* (are born) he takes up one of them as his body, as he takes up a divine or human body, when he becomes a *deva* or man. The *sūtra* states the final decision :

#### 24. अन्याधिष्ठिते पूर्ववदभिलाषात् ।

Attached to bodies controlled by others ; because the statement is as in the previous cases.

Where the experiencing of pleasure or pain is intended, there will be mention of the *karma* leading thereto, as in the text

Those that return here, if they have good *karma*, reach good births, etc. (*chāndo.*, V-10-7).

Here no mention of *karma* is made, as it is not made in the case of becoming ether, air, etc. The *karma*, which had to yield fruit, *yāgas*, and the rest, has

been expended by enjoyment in the heaven-world ; and what has yet to yield fruit is referred to further on in the *upanishad* by the expressions “ those of good *charaṇa* and those of evil *charaṇa* ”. And between these two stages there is no *karma*, the fruit of which has to be experienced. Hence, the expression “ are born ” in the *upanishad* should not be taken literally.

### 25. अशुद्धमिति चेन्न शब्दात् ।

If it be contended “ Mixed with sin,” the reply is “ No ; because it is stated ”.

The opponent disputes the conclusion reached, and argues: There *is* cause for the experiencing of pleasure or pain. The *karma* which leads one to the heaven-world for enjoyment—like a *yāga*—is mixed with sin ; for a goat is injured by the offering of its membrane to the *devatā agnīshoma* ; and the prohibition ‘ Do not injure any living being ’ is disobeyed. Here certain explanations are offered to show that no sin has been committed by this offering, and the opponent criticises them as shown below :

(i) The offering, being made under a *vedic* injunction, is an exception to the general rule. *Criticism.* This is not a case of exception. There is a general rule—whatever offering has to be made should be made into the *āhavanīya* fire. In the *soma yāga* a cow, with which the *soma* creeper is purchased, is led seven steps ; and the earth under its hoof at the seventh step should be made into a heap and an offering of ghee should be made on the heaped earth. Here are two injunctions indicating



two places for but one offering ; and owing to this conflict an exception to the general rule is accepted. Here, however, there is no such conflict. The injunction to make the offering states that the offering of the goat serves the *yāga* ; while the general rule attaches sin generally to the injury of living beings ; and the two matters are different.

(ii) The general prohibition refers to cases where one acts from a desire to reap a fruit ; but not to cases where something is enjoined by the *veda*. *Criticism*. Here also the offering is made from desire. The text "One desiring heaven-world should do *yāga* " points out a *yāga* as the means to enjoyment in that world ; and one sets out to do the *yāga* only from a desire for the fruit. In the offering also of a goat's membrane to the *devatā agnīshoma*, knowing it to be serviceable in the doing of a fruit-yielding *yāga*, the sacrificer is led by desire. In this matter there is no difference between an injury done under cover of *vedic* injunction, and that done in the world to attain a personal benefit through an injury. Even in regard to actions, that are thought to be compulsory, the motive is to obtain some fruit, which is held up as superior and imperishable.

Hence, *yāgas* being blended with sin, the descending *jīva* enjoys the fruit of the meritorious element in the heaven-world, and in order to experience the fruit of the sinful element, he is born into the vegetable kingdom. That to be so born is the fruit of evil *karma* is stated :

Man becomes a vegetable, owing to *karma* done with his body (*manu*, I-2-9).

The *sūtra* dissents from this view. The killing of goats in *yāgas* is not injury ; for it leads the goats to the heaven-world. For it is said :

It (the goat) goes up in a shining body to (heaven-world).

An action, which leads to a superior good, cannot be characterised as injury, merely on the ground that it causes a little pain ; on the other hand it should be regarded as a great benefit conferred (1). A medical man, who makes a successful operation on a patient, is hailed as a benefactor and is praised, even though he causes temporary pain.

## 26. रेतस्सिग्योगोऽय ।

There is mention further on of contact with one that emits semen.

The following is the text :

Whoever eats food or emits semen, he becomes that person (*chāndo.*, V-10-6).

The descending *jīva* becomes that person. This cannot be taken as literally true ; and the only way to understand it is to regard him as attaching himself to the person eating the food or emitting semen. Similarly, being born as paddy or *yava* must be taken to mean attaching oneself to the paddy or *yava*.

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
(1) This is stated in a *mantra* 'you are not now killed ; nor are injured. Go to the *devas* alone by easy paths. The *devatā* sun will take you to a place to which men of good deeds go, but not men of bad deeds' (*yajur, aṣṭaka.*, 3, VII-92).

## 27. योनेश्शरीरम् !

It is only after reaching the womb that a body is got.

In all the previous stages beginning with coming to the ether there is only contact ; and a body is attained only in the last stage, *i.e.*, on reaching the womb ; and here it is possible to experience pleasure and pain (1).

भगवते भाष्यकागम्य महादेशिकाय नमः



(1) Thus the descent of the returning *jīva* is described. In the fifth sub-section it is shown that in contact with paddy or *yava* he remains a long time without enjoyment of pleasure. When the corn is cut, the *jīva*, who ensouled it, departs ; but not so the returning *jīva*, who continues while the corn is cut, gathered, dried, put into a granary, husked, cooked and eaten. Having got into a man, he attaches himself to his semen. Even then he may not reach a woman's womb ; for the husband may have no sexual appetite, or the wife may be barren, or her menstrual period may have passed. He must manage to be eaten again by a man with his food. When he gets into the womb at last, he is enveloped by a thin membrane known as the amnion, and the misery of his position may be easily imagined. When the time for coming into the world arrives, he has to squeeze himself and get out through a narrow aperture. The *upanishad* has all this in view, when it states " Let one be disgusted with *samsāra* " (*chāndo.*, V-10-8).

## CHAPTER III

### SECTION 2

HAVING depicted the undesirable plight of the *jīva*, the author of the *sūtras* proceeds to point out the greatness of the highest *Ātmā*. Among this are the creation of a wonderful dream-world, and the receipt of all the *jīvas* in deep sleep. These are referred to in the first two sub-sections. They show incidentally that in the dream-condition the *jīva* remains bound, his real nature being covered up by the will of the highest *Ātmā*. In the deep sleep condition, though he is for the time being without name or form, having no connection with his body, he is not conscious.

#### SUB-SECTION 1

In this sub-section the dream state is taken for consideration.

#### 1. सन्ध्ये सृष्टिराहृदि ।

In the dream state the creation (is by the *jīva*); for so states the *veda*.

Regarding dream (1) a *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text states :

There are in that state no chariots, no chariot-horses, no roads ; but he creates chariots, chariot-horses, roads . . . For he is the maker (VI-3-10).

Here the doubt is whether this creation is by the *jīva* himself or by the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* is stated in this and the next *sūtra*. The creation is by the *jīva* ; for only he that perceives the dream is seen here.

## 2. निर्मातारं चैके पुत्रादयश्च ।

And some state him to be the maker ; and the things made are sons and the like.

Reference is made to the following text from the *kāṭha* :

That *puruṣha*, who is awake, while those (all *jīvas*) sleep, and who creates one *kāma* (object of desire) after another (V-8).

The term *kāma* refers to what is desired. It does not mean mere desire. The objects of desire are sons and the like ; for in I-23 of the same *upanishad* reference was made to sons and grandsons reaching the full age of a hundred years, to cows, elephants, and horses, and to gold as objects to be desired. Hence, the dreaming *jīva* creates the chariots and the rest. And in the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*chāndo.*, VIII, sections 7-12) he is stated to be capable of creating by mere will.

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(1) The term used in the original is *sandhya*, which is interpreted as the place of dreams ; *vide* the text, "*Sandhyam* is the third place of dreams."

Hence even in the absence of the requisite instruments creation is possible by him.

This view is now refuted :

### 3. मायामात्रं तु कात्स्न्येनानभिर्व्यक्तस्वरूपत्वात् ।

But the creation is verily wonderful ; and (it is not possible to the *jīva*) whose nature is not fully manifested.

The expression used in the *sūtra* means mere *māyā* ; and the term *māyā* denotes something wonderful, as in the following verse “She was born in the family of *janaka*, made as if she were the wonderful creation (*māyā*) of the *deva* (*Īṣvara*)”. Here also what is created is wonderful. The chariots, horses and roads cannot be perceived by others ; in that sense they do not exist. But they exist in the sense that they are perceived by the dreamer ; and they come to an end with the dream. And a wonderful creation of this kind is possible only to the omnipotent *Brahma* ; but not to the *jīva*. His omnipotence exists ; but in his bound condition it does not fully appear. In the *kātha* text relied on by the opponent the creation is by the highest *Ātmā* alone. Both in the beginning and ending of the *upaniṣad* the powers to be found only in Him are stated (1) ; and in that text also reference is made to Him. As the *bṛihad*

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(1) Who is awake while those (all *jīvas*) sleep ; He alone is light ; He is *Brahma* ; He alone is said to be immortality. All the worlds rest on Him ; no one excels Him (V-8).

*āranyaka* text conveys the same teaching, the creator is not the dreaming *jīva*, but the highest *Ātmā*.

If omnipotence is natural to the *jīva*, why is it not manifested? The next *sūtra* replies :

4. परामिध्यानान्न तिरोहितं ततोह्यस्य बन्धविपर्ययो ।

By the will of the Supreme is it hidden. From that same cause the bondage of the *jīva* comes about, and his release should result from the same will.

The *jīva* has made a chain of *karmas* reaching to the beginning-less past and is an offender ; and as its result his natural divine power is prevented from appearing (1).

5. देहयोगाद्वा सोऽपि ।

Even this (non-appearance) results from connection with a body.

In the manifested condition the *jīva* is connected with matter in the form of a body ; in the state of rest with subtle matter unfit to take a name and assume a form. In either case the connection with matter brings about the non-appearance of his true nature. To remain awake while all sleep, and to support all the worlds and

(1) When in order to attain freedom from fear he obtains the power to meditate continuously on that Being, who cannot be seen, who has no body, who cannot therefore be described by words denoting attributes, and who has no support, he attains freedom from fear. When he makes even a small break in this, then fear comes to him (*āna.*, VII-2). He alone makes one blissful, (*Ibid.*, VII-1) ; From fear of Him the wind blows (*Ibid.*, VIII-1).

the rest are possible only to the highest *Ātmā*. Hence He creates objects, that last only during the *jīva*'s dream-condition, and that can be enjoyed only by him, so as to make him experience the fruits of very petty *karma*.

It may be thought that power to create the dream-world comes to the *jīva* in the dream-condition. This is next shown to be impossible.

#### 6. सूचकश्च हि श्रुतेगचक्षते च तद्विदः ।

The dream indicates (coming good or evil) as known from the *veda*. And this is affirmed by those that know about it.

This being so, the dreaming *jīva* does not create the things seen in dreams. If he did, he would create only what would indicate coming good. The fact that dreams indicate both good and evil (1) shows that dream creations do not depend upon his will. Hence the creator of things seen in dreams is the highest *Ātmā* Himself.

### SUB-SECTION 2

#### 7. तदभावो नाडीषु तच्छृतेरात्मनि च ।

The absence of dream (*i.e.*, deep sleep) takes place in the *nāḍīs* (blood vessels) and in the *Ātmā*; so is it stated.

(1) This is stated in a *vedic text*—‘while *karmas* are being done for fruits, if one sees a woman in dreams, he should know that the *karmas* will be properly completed (*chando.*, V-2-9); If one sees in a dream a black person with black teeth, he will kill him.’



The place where the *jīva* remains in deep sleep is next considered. Here are the following statements :

When a person sleeps, with his senses drawn in, and free from the turmoils of the day, and sees no dream, he has then entered the blood-vessels. Then no suffering touches him ; for he has then reached Light (*Brahma*) (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-3). Again, When he sleeps and does not know anything . . . he rests in *purītal* (pericardium) (*bṛihad.*, IV-1-19). Again, When this person sleeps, he is then, my dear, united to *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-8-1).

Thus, the blood vessels, the pericardium and the highest *Ātmā* are stated to be the places where the *jīva* rests in deep sleep. The question for consideration is whether he chooses any one of the three places at pleasure, or whether he rests in all of them at the same time. The *first view* adopts the first alternative ; as the places are stated to be independent of one another and as one cannot be in many places at the same time. The *sūtra* takes the latter alternative as the correct view ; for all the three places are specified in the *upani-shads*. When it is possible to take in all the places with reference to the function performed by each, it is improper to assume an option, which nullifies the alternatives not selected for the time being (*Intro.*, para 39). And they do perform different functions, as do a palace, a bed-stead, and a bed to a sleeper. The blood vessels are like the palace ; the pericardium is like the bed-stead ; and the highest *Ātmā* is like the bed itself. Hence, He alone is the immediate resting place.

8. अतः प्रबोधोऽस्मात् ।

Hence the awakening from Him.

The conclusion reached in *sūtra* 7 explains why the *jiva* is said to go forth from the highest *Ātmā* when he awakes—

When they return from *Sat*, they do not know 'We go forth from *Sat*' (*chāndo.*, VI-10-2).

### SUB-SECTION 3

#### 9. स एव तु कर्मानुस्मृतिशब्दविधिभ्यः ।

The same (that went to sleep awakes); from *karma*, recognition, *vedic* statement and *vedic* injunction.

The doubt arises whether the same person that went to sleep rises from it. For he is freed from all limitations, and unites himself with *Brahma*. This is also what happens to a *jiva* released from the bondage of *karma*. Hence one that goes into deep sleep is released; and the *jiva* that appears is some other. This *superficial view* is refuted in the *sūtra*. First, the *karma* done by the sleeper should be experienced by him alone, until he knows the truth and strives for perfection. Next, the person that awakes recognises himself thus "I who went to sleep am the very same that awakes". Next, the *vedic* text states :

Whatever they were before—whether a tiger, a lion, a wolf, a boar, a worm, a moth, a gnat or a fly—that again they become (*chāndo.*, VI-10-2).

Lastly, the injunctions in regard to striving for release will become meaningless, if every person on going to sleep should be released from *karma*. It is not

true that the person going to sleep is released from all limitations, and that he attains his true nature. In regard to such a person it is said :

In truth he does not now (in sleep) know himself thus "I am he"; nor these beings. He has gone to annihilation. I do not see any good in this (*chāndo.*, VIII-11-1).

As to one who is released from bondage it is stated :

Reaching the highest Light, he appears in his true nature . . . He moves about (1) there, eating, playing and rejoicing with women, carriages or relatives (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 and 3).

He becomes his own master (*i.e.*, is no longer subject to the bondage of *karma*). He may move about in all the worlds according to his wish (*Ibid.*, VII-25-2). The seer sees everything; he attains everything in every way (*Ibid.*, VII-26-2). The released *jīva* is all-knowing. Hence, the sleeping person is still within the wheel of births; but for the time being all his instruments of knowledge and action are tired; he is incapable of perception and enjoyment. He finds a resting place in the highest *Ātmā*; and being refreshed, he rises again for new enjoyment.

#### SUB-SECTION 4

#### 10. मुधेऽर्धसम्पत्तिः परिशेषात् ।

In trance one goes half the journey (towards death); because not included in others.

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(1) The term in the original is *paryeti*, which has been interpreted also as enjoying *Brahma* all round.

In regard to one lying in a swoon, the question arises whether his condition is one of those already examined, or whether it is a separate condition altogether. The *first view* is that it is one of the other conditions; for it is so known; and there is no ground for assuming it to be a new condition. The *sūtra* states that the latter is the correct view. It is not the waking or dreaming state; as the person is incapable of perception. It is not deep sleep, as the cause that brings it about is different, like a blow on the head and the like. Nor is it death, as the appearance of the person in a swoon is different. Hence, as it cannot be included in any of these conditions, it must be concluded that it is a different condition altogether. It is a half-way house on the road to death. In death *prāṇa* is completely severed from the body, while in a swoon *prāṇa* remains in the body, but in a subtle condition.

#### SUB-SECTION 5

We have considered the several conditions of the *jīva*, so that one may see his undesirable plight, and become disgusted with it. In order to create a longing to reach *Brahma*, it is shown in this sub-section that the highest *Ātmā* is free from all imperfections, and is the seat of all noble qualities (1).

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(1) Why is this sub-section necessary? Was not this proved in the first two chapters? *Reply.* The means to release are two-fold. One is the highest *Ātmā* Himself, who

The form of the question for consideration is whether the blemishes that attach themselves to the *jīva*, when he is in one of the conditions—wakefulness, dream, deep sleep or swoon, or when he rises from his body in death, will affect the highest *Ātmā* also, when as the inner ruler He abides with him in those places or whether He remains free.

*First view.* He is affected ; because He abides in the *jīva*'s body in those conditions.

2. *Question.* Was it not decided in *sūtras* I-2-8 and I-3-6 that not being subject to *karma*, the highest *Ātmā* is not affected by stay in another's body. Why is the question re-opened? *Reply.* *Karma* connects a person with a body, and produces its fruit as stated in *sūtra* 5 of this section ; and this indicates that connection with a body is undesirable. Otherwise *karma* can itself yield pain without the intervention of a body. The body being impure in various ways, its connection must be undesirable, even to one that is not under the

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takes off the fetters ; and the other is meditation on Him. The former is known as *siddhōpāya*—the means that already exists ; and the latter is *sādhyaopāya*—the means that has to be brought about. To impress this distinction on the mind this sub-section has been added. Further, in the third section of this chapter the various modes of meditation have to be dealt with, which differ with reference to the attributes to be meditated on ; and it is necessary to establish the fact that the highest *Ātmā* is not only free from all imperfections, but that He is also the seat of all noble qualities. For, the opposite view is held by some, which, if correct, would render section 3 of this chapter unnecessary ; as also sections 2 and 4.

sway of *karma*. That the highest *Ātmā* enters the *jīva*'s bodies of His own choice for the purpose of control cannot make a difference. For one to smear himself with pus, blood and the like, even if done by himself, must be unwelcome. The highest *Ātmā* may be the only cause of the evolution of the world ; He may be all-knowing and possess every other noble quality ; yet as He is said to abide in the element earth, the *jīva*, the eye, man's semen and the like, He must be polluted by them.

*Final decision.* The highest *Ātmā* is not touched by any blemish even by his stay in these places. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

॥. न स्थानतोपि परस्योभयलिङ्गं सर्वत्र हि ।

No imperfection in the highest *Ātmā*, even by the places ; for in all texts possession of two-fold marks by Him is stated.

'In all texts'—all texts of the *veda* or *smṛitis*. The marks are freedom from all imperfections, and possession of noble qualities—"He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst ; He has unchanging objects of desire ; and His will is never frustrated" (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5) (1).

(1) See also the following verses : "He has all noble qualities by nature ; he carries out the creation of beings with a fragment of His *śakti*. . . . He is the one seat for the six qualities, *tejas*, *bala*, *aīṣvarya*, *jñāna*, *vīrya* and *śakti*, which are infinite ; He is great among the great ; He is the ruler of superior and inferior beings ; in Him *kleśa* and the rest cannot find a place (*vishṇu*, VI-5-84 and 85). The highest goal, called *Vishṇu*, is devoid of all imperfections (*Ibid.*, I-22-53).

The opponent meets this reply thus : Another text describes the *jīva* in the same terms ; and yet he reaps unwelcome fruit by being in a *deva* or human body. Similarly, two conditions of the highest *Ātmā* may be imagined, in one of which He is in Himself marked by the two marks, and in the other He abides in *jīvas*' bodies, and is polluted by contact with them. This argument is stated in the next *sūtra* and is refuted :

### 12. भेदादिति चेन्न प्रत्येकमतद्रचनात् ।

If it be said "Owing to different conditions," the reply is "No ; because freedom from it is stated in every text.

In the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* (*bṛihad.*, V-7) each verse states that the highest *Ātmā* abides in a particular thing, the element earth, the eye, and the like, and concludes with the remark "This inner ruler is your perfect *ātmā*". The term used in the original is *amṛita*, which may mean immortal, *i.e.*, eternal, if it occurred but once. But it is found in every verse and must mean perfect. Between Him and the *jīva* there is a difference. The former abides within every object of His own will for the purpose of control ; while the *jīva* has no choice, and must enter the body that has been made for him, and must experience the fruit of his past *karma*. For this purpose his true nature is, as has been said already, hidden.

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*Objection.* Choice or no choice ; the nature of things cannot be altered ; and the connection with

matter must subject the highest *Ātmā* to imperfections. *Reply.* No. It is not true that even matter in itself is bad. The same object causes pleasure at one time and pain at another time; and is pleasurable to one person and is painful to another. If this effect were due to the nature of the object, then every object must cause either pleasure or pain at all times and to all persons. But this is not one's experience (1). It must therefore be concluded that the highest *Ātmā* causes an object to appear pleasurable or otherwise according to the *karma* of each individual. But He is subject to no control, and the connection with matter, which in the case of the *jīva* produces undesirable results, only helps Him to control an object as may be necessary in its case, and derive amusement.

### 13. अपिचैवमेके ।

And some (teach) thus.

Some *upanishads* explicitly state that connection with one and the same body is for the *jīva* a source of disadvantage, while for the highest *Ātmā* it is not so. On the other hand it conduces to His glory, following on the exercise of control over all.

(1) This is stated in the following verses : good and bad deeds are called heaven and hell; the same object causes pain, pleasure, envy and anger. Hence how can an object be said to possess but one character? The same thing, having given pleasure, subsequently leads to pain; the same thing first leads to anger and afterwards leads to good will. Hence there is nothing, that in itself is painful or pleasurable (*vishṇu*, II-6-46, 47 and 48).



Two birds, inseparable and possessing similar qualities, cling to the same tree. One of them eats the ripe fruit; the other does not eat, but shines on all sides (*mūṇḍa.*, III-1-1).

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The opponent comes forward with a fresh objection. It has been said that the highest *Ātmā* entered everything, and gave it a name and a form; that He is the *ātma* of that thing. He has therefore a body-divine, human or otherwise, and a name; and like the *jīva* He is subject to *vedic* injunctions and prohibitions; *i.e.*, He is bound by *karma*. To this the next *sūtra* replies:

14. अरूपवदेव हि तत्प्रधानत्वात् ।

That (*Brahma*) is verily as one without form; because of His prominence.

Though He has entered every body, and has thus become connected with various forms, yet He is like one without them; *i.e.*, without the effect produced by the connection. He does not therefore share with the *jīva* subjection to *karma*. For, it is said:

Ether is the maker of name and form; because He is between them, He is *Brahma* (*chāndo*, VIII-14-1).

'Is between them' is untouched by the effect produced by them. He is merely their maker. The *jīva*'s connection with his form is by the experiencing of the pleasure or pain produced by it; and as similar experience does not exist for the highest *Ātmā*, He is unconnected with the form. Injunctions and prohibitions are for those that are bound by *karma*.

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The opponent appears again and observes—The text “Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*” (*āna.*, I-1), states Him to be devoid of attributes and to be mere light (*prakāṣa*). One that is *jnāna* (light) cannot possess *jnāna*. Everything else is expressly denied by texts such as ‘not so, not so’. It must therefore be concluded that the possession of the two marks is a myth. The first point is replied to in the following *sūtra* :

### 15. प्रकाशवच्चैवैश्वर्यात् ।

And like light (*prakāṣa*), so that the texts may not become meaningless.

*Brahma* is admitted to be light, in order that the text quoted may not become meaningless. The same argument compels the admission that He possesses other attributes also. He is therefore omnipotent and all-knowing. He is the world-cause, and the *ātmā* of all things, and He transcends *avidyā* and all other imperfections.

### 16. आह च तन्मात्रम् ।

And (the text) says so much only.

That is, that *Brahma* is *jnāna* (light). The text does not negative other attributes affirmed by other texts, such as omnipotence and the like. The text ‘not so’ will be presently explained.

### 17. दर्शयति चाग्रे अपि स्मर्यते ।

And *vedic* texts show ; and also *smṛitis*.

*Upanishad* texts affirm that *Brahma* is free from all imperfections and is the seat of all blessed qualities.

### *Vedic Texts :*

Him, who is the highest ruler among rulers, and who is the highest *devatā* among *devatās* ; He is the world-cause, who is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jīvas*) ; He has no maker or lord ; He has no body or senses ; no one that is His equal or superior is observed. His capacity (*śakti*) is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds, and to pertain to His nature ; so also His capacity to know, to support, and to create and destroy (*śveta*, vi). He knows everything and every attribute of everything ; His *tapas* is thought (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-10) ; From fear of Him the wind blows ; from fear the sun rises ; It is one *ānanda* (bliss) of *Brahma* (*āna.*, VIII) ; From which speech returns with the mind without reaching (its higher limit), one that meditates on the *ānanda* (bliss) of *Brahma* does not fear anything (*Ibid.*, IX). Without parts ; without action (1) ; free from hunger and the other five evils ; without blemish and without attachment (*śveta*, VI).

### *Smṛiti texts :*

Those among men, that know Me as unborn, as having had no beginning and as the great ruler of the worlds (*bhagavad-gītā*, X-3) ; supporting all this world with a fragment of My power, I remain (*Ibid.*, X-42). With me to direct, *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round (*Ibid.*, IX-10) ; But other than these is the highest *Purusha* ; He is called the highest *ātmā*, who pervading the three worlds, sustains and controls, Himself remaining unchanged (*Ibid.*, XV-17).

He is everything and is all-knowing ; He sees everything ; He has all capacities, all knowledge, all strength and

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(1) ' Without action '—as whatever need be done has been done. ' Without blemish,' *i.e.*, without blemishes like indifference to those that come to Him.

fullness ; He has neither increase nor decrease ; He is his own master ; He has had no beginning ; He has every one in His control ; He is devoid of fatigue, laziness, fear, anger, desire and the like. He is free from blemishes ; He excels all others ; He is free from hunger and the other five evils. He needs no support ; He is imperishable ; His enthusiasm is never impeded (*vishnu*, V-1-47, 48 and 49).

### 18. अत एव चोपमासूर्यकादिवत् ।

And for that very reason comparison with the sun and the rest.

The reason is that He is not touched by the imperfections of the various places in which He abides. A comparison is made in the sacred books between Him and the sun reflected in water, mirrors and the like. As the sun's purity is not thereby affected, so the purity of *Brahma* remains unaffected.

As the ether, though one, appears as many in jars and the like, so *Ātmā*, though one, abides in many things, and is like the sun on sheets of water. The *ātmā* of beings, though one only, remains in all beings ; and is seen as one and as many, like the moon reflected from watery surfaces.

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The opponent points out a flaw in the comparison :

### 19. अम्बुवदप्रहणात् न तथात्वम् ।

But because *Brahma* is not perceived as the sun is perceived in sheets of water, no likeness.

The analogy is not correct. The sun does not really abide in sheets of water, nor the face in mirrors ; and their appearance within them is illusion. Hence their

purity is not affected. But here *Brahma* as a fact abides in earth, and other things ; and His freedom from imperfections does not follow from the analogy.

The next *sūtra* replies :

20. वृद्धिासभाक्त्वमन्तर्भावादुभयसामञ्जस्यादेवं दर्शनाच्च ।

(The comparison is intended merely to deny in respect of *Brahma*) increase and decrease as a result of His abiding in all things. This must be so from the appropriateness of both the comparisons. And this is seen.

The terms 'increase' and 'decrease' denote the imperfections which attach to all things. From the fact that He abides in them *Brahma* is not touched by their imperfections either in His *svarūpa* or in His attributes. The intention in making the comparison with the sun was merely to deny this point. How is it known? *Reply.* From the fact that it is only then that both the comparisons will be appropriate. In the verse quoted (See *sūtra* 18) *Brahma* is compared to ether and to the sun. Ether fills vessels of various sizes—some small, others large ; but it is not affected by their size. The sun, on the other hand, does not enter sheets of water, but appears to be within them ; and though his reflections are large or small, the sun himself remains the same. Similarly, *Brahma* though abiding in things of various forms—in intelligent beings and in non-intelligent things—is not affected by their imperfections, but ever remains the same—the possessor of the two-fold marks.

If the stay of the highest *Ātmā* in all things were unreal, comparison with ether would not be appropriate ;

if it is real, comparison with the sun will be equally inappropriate. Hence an element which is common to both the examples should be found ; and this is being untouched by the imperfections of the objects, in which the ether is or the sun appears to be ; and it is this that is affirmed of the highest *Ātmā*. One is affected by the imperfections of a thing by nearness in place, nearness in time, and nearness in nature. Nearness of the three kinds should combine to make it possible ; and in the absence of one of them no pollution can take place. The sun and sheets of water illustrate distance in place ; and the ether and jars illustrate distance in nature ; and the author's intention is to show that distance in the nature of objects is as good a reason for the freedom of the highest *Ātmā* from the imperfections of the objects as distance in place.

The last portion of the *sūtra* explains that comparisons are made between two things that are not similar in all respects, provided that there is a likeness in that point which is under consideration, *e.g.*, ' The student is like the lion '.

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An objection is raised. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka upanishad* the third *brāhmaṇa* of the fourth chapter begins with the words " There are two forms of *Brahma* " (See *Vedic Texts*). It then describes the whole universe, consisting of the gross and the subtle, as His form ; it states a particular colour for Him and concludes with the teaching ' Not so, not so for there is no other than that '. Here all the forms of *Brahma* described are

referred to by the word *iti* (so), and they are denied. *Sat* alone, in which all the attributes appear, is *Brahma*, and all the attributes, which appear in Him, are imagined by Him out of ignorance of His own essential nature. To this the next *sūtra* replies :

21. प्रकृतैतावत्त्वं हि प्रतिषेधति ततो ब्रवीति च भूयः ।

For the text denies the limitation implied by the preceding description. And it then declares some further attributes.

The interpretation put upon the text 'Not so, not so,' cannot be accepted. After stating certain things as the attributes of *Brahma*, things that are not known by other means as His attributes, will the *upanishad* deny the very same as attributes. This would be like the ravings of a mad man. Among the things mentioned some are no doubt known by other means ; but their being attributes of *Brahma* was never known. Other things were not known either in their *svarūpa* or in their connection with Him. The statement is not therefore a repetition of what was previously known, and their denial is inappropriate. It must therefore be understood that the text denies that *Brahma* is merely what has been stated. Certain attributes of Him were stated. The text says 'Do not think that He is merely as described.' A limitation is implied by the foregoing description, and that is referred to by the word *iti* (so) and is denied. Further, after this denial further attributes of *Brahma* are stated. Hence the expression 'not so' must mean not merely this. The statement of further attributes is in these words :

For there is no other higher than that (*Brahma*) described by the expression 'not so';

higher in *svarūpa* or in attributes.

And His name is the unchanging among the unchanging.

What this means is next explained. "*Prāṇas* are unchanging." By the term *prāṇas jivas* are referred to from their close union with *prāṇa*. They are unchanging, as they do not undergo modifications of substance like ether and the rest. *Brahma* is unchanging among them; because even contraction and expansion of *jñāna* do not take place as among *jivas*. Hence, from this mention of other attributes it must be decided that by 'not so' the denial of all attributes was not intended.

The next *sūtra* confirms the remark that *Brahma* cannot be known except from the *veda* :

## 22. तदव्यक्तमाह हि ।

He (*Brahma*) is not known from other means of proof; for this the *veda* declares.

Thus—

His form does not stand within the scope of sight; no one sees Him with the eye (*kāṭha*, II-6-9). He is not perceived by the eye, nor by speech (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-8).



Another reason is stated :

**23. अपिसंराधने प्रयक्षानुमानाभ्याम् ।**

And (He is seen) in loving meditation ; from the *veda* and *smritis*.

*Brahma* cannot be perceived otherwise :

This *Ātmā* (*Brahma*) cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, by mere hearing many times. Whomsoever he chooses, by him alone can He be reached. To him He reveals His own form (*kāṭha.*, I-2-23). When by the grace of *Īśvara* the mind is purified, then one sees in meditation Him, who is without parts (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-8) ; I cannot be seen in this form, as you have seen Me, either by recitation of the *veda*, by *tapas*, by the making of gifts or by *yāgas*. But by love, not looking forward to any other goal, is it possible for one to know Me, to see Me as I am, and to enter into me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54).

Hence the text considered in *sūtra* 21, which points out the form of *Brahma* for the purpose of meditation, cannot be said to repeat the description of the form ; for it was not previously known.

**24. प्रकाशादिवच्चवैशेष्यं प्रकाशश्च कर्मण्यभ्यासात् ।**

And like *jnāna*, bliss and other attributes ; no difference (between them and other attributes) ; this appears in meditation repeated many times.

Those like *Vāmadeva*, who have direct perception of the *svarūpa* of *Brahma*, perceive not only *jnāna*, bliss and other attributes constituting the *svarūpa*, but also His being clothed in the forms described. As attributes of *Brahma* they are all alike and all are perceived at the same time. This perception takes place in meditation frequently repeated

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The subject is brought to a conclusion in the next *sūtra* :

25. अतोऽनन्तेन तथा हि लिङ्गम् ।

Hence (*Brahma* is clothed) with endless blessed attributes. Only then will the possession of the two marks be appropriate.

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### SUB-SECTION 6

In the preceding sub-section it was shown that the highest *Ātmā* appears in the form of unintelligent matter in the gross and subtle conditions; that this is not His only form by the words 'not so, no so'; and that there is nothing superior to Him. It was also added that He does not change, and that therefore He is unchanging among the unchanging (see under *sūtra* 21). There are certain other texts which explain what is meant by His form "He is the lord of matter, and of the dwellers in bodies; and the controller of the *guṇas* (*ṣveta*, VI-16); Lord of all; controlled by Himself (*narā.*, XI-3); Who, being Himself eternal, intelligent, and one, gives what is desired by those that are eternal, intelligent and many (*ṣveta*, VI-13). The question in what sense matter is the form of the highest *Ātmā* will now be considered, in order to confirm His freedom from imperfections settled in the preceding sub-section. Three alternatives are possible: The highest *Ātmā* and matter are the same substance in two conditions, like a snake when stretched at full length and the same when coiled

up; they are of the same class like a shining substance and its light; and they are two different substances inseparably connected like the *jiva* as decided in chapter II, section 3, sub-section 7. The conclusion to be reached here is that the relationship is as last stated; and this was assumed in chapter I-4-7 and chapter II-1-6, and it was stated that the highest *Ātmā* clothed in the two inseparable attributes in the subtle condition came forth as the universe clothed in the same two attributes, but in the gross condition; and that the two are one. Which of the three alternatives is the correct one? The *first view* is stated in the *sūtra*:

**26. उभयव्यपदेशात्त्वहिकुण्डलवत् ।**

Like the snake and its coil; because both are stated.

The statements are: "*Brahma* only is all this; *Ātmā* only is all this." These state identity. "I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jiva*." This affirms difference. In order that both the sets of statements may have a meaning, it must be assumed that the highest *Ātmā* and matter are really one substance in essence, but in two different conditions like the straight snake and the coiled up snake.

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The second alternative is urged in the next *sūtra*:

**27. प्रकाशाश्रयवद्वा तेजस्त्वात् ।**

Or they are related like light and its seat; possessing the same character—light.

The first alternative—that *Brahma* Himself comes to the condition of non-sentient matter—will conflict with the text affirming difference between them and unchangeability. Hence, the second alternative should be accepted. A shining substance and its light are one in essence, but differ ; for the substance remains in one place, while its light spreads all around. Similarly, *Brahma* and matter are one and yet different from one another.

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The *final decision* is stated :

28. पूर्वावस्था ।

But the relationship is as already stated.

The second alternative also is untenable. To a shining body and its light there is something common ; what is it that is common to *Brahma* and matter ? If it be *brahmatva*, i.e., *brahmahood*, then *brahma* would be an attribute found in the all-Ruler, in sentient beings and in the material universe, as the generic character of horses and cows are found in all the individuals of each class. This would be opposed to all texts of the *veda* and *smritis* and to usage (1).

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(1) A word connoting generic character is put in apposition with another word denoting an individual, as in "broken-horned cow" ; but not words denoting two individuals, like 'broken-horned is hornless'. Now *Brahma* must be a concrete entity or an attribute. If He were the former, belonging to the class of *Īśvara*, *jivas* and matter, He could not be said to be the universe. If He were the latter, He could not be the world-cause and its support ; He could not be all-knowing and the seat of other attributes.

Hence, it is necessary to fall back on the theory stated in chapter II-3-7. It was pointed out in that sub-section that *jivas* are inseparable attributes of *Brahma*. Matter also is an inseparable attribute, and is therefore a part of *Brahma*, which term means an aggregate of all the elements. In this view there are the following good points. Because they are all parts of an aggregate, the statement of oneness is correct literally. As the elements differ among themselves in their *svarūpas* and in their natures, the *vedic* texts affirming difference also are literally correct. And the freedom of *Brahma* from imperfections is preserved. There are several instances of things that are inseparable parts of other things—lustre is part of a gem; generic qualities are parts of individuals making up a class; qualities are parts of the persons or objects that possess them; and bodies are parts (for the time being) of *jivas*. Similarly, *jivas* and matter are parts of *Brahma*.

### 29. प्रतिषेधाच्च ।

And because of denial.

This denial is stated in the following text “He the great *Ātmā* is unborn, never old, and undying (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). By the old age of the body He does not age” (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5). Thus, the changes that take place in unintelligent matter are denied in regard to *Brahma*. The conclusion reached is therefore sound; and the decision in the preceding sub-section remains unshaken.

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## SUB-SECTION 7

It has been shown that the highest *Ātmā* is the material and operative causes of the universe. It will now be considered whether there is any Being greater than He, and certain specious arguments, which are brought forward, will be examined. If such a Being existed, the highest *Ātmā* would not be the highest goal, nor the seat of noble qualities needed for enjoyment of Him. The possession of the two marks settled in sub-section 5 would not then be full. In the immediately preceding sub-section freedom from imperfections was the question considered, and in this sub-section the examination will deal with His being the seat of noble qualities.

*First view.* There is a being greater than the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

30. परमतस्सेतून्मानसम्बन्धभेदव्यपदेशेभ्यः ।

A greater than He ; because of the use of the term *setu* (bridge) and mention of measure, connection and difference.

First “The *Ātmā* is a protecting *setu* (bridge)” (*chāndo.*, VIII-4-1). Here *Brahma* is said to be a bridge ; and a bridge takes one to the farther side of a river. Hence there is something other than *Brahma*, that has to be reached with His help. Further on, it is said “Crossing this *setu* (bridge), the blind man ceases to be blind” (*Ibid.*, VIII-4-2). Here reference is made to crossing *Brahma* ; and what has to be reached is something else. Secondly, *Brahma* is said to be

measured, *i.e.*, limited “*Brahma* has four feet; and sixteen parts”. This reference to limitation implies that there is a being without any limitation, who has to be reached by this bridge. Thirdly, *Brahma* is connected as the means with something to be reached.

The principal bridge to immortality who shines like a fire that has burnt its fuel (*sveta*, VI-19); He is the bridge to immortality (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-5).

Hence, there is something higher than *Brahma*. Lastly, difference between *Brahma* and something higher is stated :

One reaches the *puruṣa*, who is higher than the high (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-8); He who is higher than the high, and greater than the great (*nārā.*, 1-5); By that *Puruṣa* all this is filled; that, which is beyond Him, is without form and without suffering (*sveta*, III-9 and 10).

Now follows the refutation :

### 31. सामान्यात् ।

But (the term *setu* is used) in the sense of likeness.

He protects the world as a bund protects; but He is not stated to be a means of reaching some particular thing. For, further on these words occur “ so that these worlds may not be confounded ”. Taking the etymological meaning also, the term means—He who binds to Himself the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without confusion. The word *tirtvā*, which in the *first view* was rendered into ‘crossing,’ means reaching, as in the sentence “ He crosses the *vedānta*,” which means that he has completely learnt the *vedānta*.

### 32. बुद्धयर्थः पादवत् ।

The limitation is for the purpose of meditation ; as in the case of feet.

The object of the limitation implied in the texts ‘*Brahma* has four feet,’ and ‘sixteen parts,’ and ‘one foot of him is all beings’ (*chāndo.*, III-12-6) is that one should meditate on *Brahma* in that form. The text “Unchanging, shining, and without limitations is *Brahma*” (*āna.*, I-1) shows that *Brahma* in Himself is without any limitations. And the same Being is stated to be the world-cause in the texts “From that same *Ātmā* ether came forth” (*Ibid.*, 1-2) ; and “He willed ‘I will become many’” (*Ibid.*, 6-2). In the text

Speech is one foot ; *prāṇa* is one foot ; the eye is one foot ; the ear is one foot (*chāndo.*, III-18-2) ;

the reference to speech, *prāṇa*, eye and ear as the feet of *Brahma* is for the purpose of meditation. So here also.

How can *Brahma*, who in Himself is unlimited, become limited even for the purpose of meditation ? The next *sūtra* explains :

### 33. स्थानविशेषात्प्रकाशादिवत् ।

With reference to the places (specified) ; as in the case of light and the like.

The *sūtra* relates to the example mentioned in the preceding *sūtra*. When some places are specified, as the tongue, *prāṇa*, eye and ear, as connected with it, even an unlimited thing may be thought on as limited. Light,



ether and the like, though spreading everywhere, are thought on as limited, with reference to their connection with a window, a vessel and the like.

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The third argument is next dealt with :

### 34. उपपत्तेश्च ।

And it is appropriate.

The argument urged was that the statement “ He is a bridge to immortality ” connects *Brahma* as the means with something to be reached, and that that something is different from Him. This is denied. *Brahma* Himself is to be reached ; and He is also the means. And such a thing is not inappropriate. “ This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, by mere hearing many times. Whomsoever He chooses, by Him alone can He be reached ; To him he reveals His own form (*kaṭha.*, I-2-23). This states that *Brahma* can be reached by no other means.

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The last argument is dealt with in the next *sūtra* :

### 35. तथाऽन्यप्रतिषेधात् ।

Similarly, because another is denied.

In the *muṇḍaka*, in which the text “ one reaches the *Purusha* who is higher than the high ” is found (III-2-8), another being higher than the highest *Ātmā* is expressly denied.

There is no other superior to Him in whatever way it may be considered ; nothing is subtler than He ; nothing is larger than He (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-7). This may be seen in other *upaniṣads* also : “ There is no other higher than that (*Brahma*) described by the expression ‘ Not so ’ (*bṛihad.*, IV-3-6). Again “ No one controls Him ; His name is great glory ” (*nārū.*, I-9).

And He is stated to be the material cause of the world after this—“ All moments came forth from the *Purusha* with the brilliance of lightning (*Ibid.*, 1-8) ; He churned the elements and both these (heaven and the intermediate world) ” (*Ibid.*, I-9). The text “ From the elements (water) came forth *Hiranyagarbha* ” (*Ibid.*, I-11) recalls to one’s mind the *Purusha*, who is the world-cause.

*Question.* What then is the being referred to in the text “ That which is beyond Him ” (*ṣveta.*, III-10).

*Reply.* This text is preceded by another—

I meditate on that great *Purusha*, who shines like the sun, and who has a body made of a substance other than matter. Meditating on Him alone one overcomes death ; no other path to the goal exists (*Ibid.*, 8).

Having stated this, the next verse explains :

There is no other superior to Him ; nothing is subtler than He ; nothing is larger than He ; He stands in heaven unbending like a tree prominent ; by this *Purusha* all this is filled (*Ibid.*, 9).

This verse declares that this *Purusha* is the highest Being, and that all others cannot be superior. Then comes the verse under consideration, which concludes the teaching with a statement of the reason therefor. It should be rendered as follows : “ That Being, who is

the highest, He alone is without form and without suffering. Because it is so, those alone that meditate on Him become immortal ; others reach only suffering." On any other rendering the text would conflict with verse 8, in which the subject is introduced, and with verse 9, which follows it. The other text may be explained similarly, *viz.*, "one reaches the *Purusha* higher than the high and standing in heaven" (*munda.*, III-2-8). In the same *upanishad* (II-1-2) reference was made to "Him who is higher than what is higher than *akshara*". The term *akshara* denotes matter, which is indestructible, though continually changing its form. What is higher than this is the *jivas* without name and form ; and higher than they is the *Purusha* referred to as possessing invisibility and other qualities. The same *Purusha* is referred to in the text under consideration.

In the preceding five *sūtras* the view that there is a higher than the highest *Ātmā* was criticised ; in the next an authority in support of the *final decision* is stated :

36. अनेन सर्वगतत्वमायामशब्दादिभ्यः ।

That everything is pervaded by Him is indicated by words denoting extension.

This is proof that there is no being higher than the highest *Ātmā*. The words are :

By that *Purusha* all this is filled (*śveta.*, III-9) ; Whatever in this world is seen or heard about. *Nārāyaṇa*

pervades all that inside and outside (*narā.*, XI); Who is eternal, omnipresent, and all-pervading, because of His highly subtle nature and the wise perceive Him to be the material cause of all that exists (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-6).

The following texts also are contemplated “*Brahma* alone is all this; *Ātmā* alone is all this”.

### SUB-SECTION 8

So far in the first two sections of this chapter the following points have been settled: The *jīva* is full of blemishes, whatever be his condition; the highest *Ātmā*, who is to be reached by him, is free from all imperfections; He is the seat of all noble qualities; and He is higher than any one else. In the next section meditation on the highest *Ātmā* has to be dealt with; and in this sub-section it is shown that those that do the meditation attain the fruit known as *apavarga* (i.e., reaching Him) only from Him. Being on the subject, and the same reason applying, the author of the *sūtras* states that such fruits as are attainable here or in the heaven-world by adopting the means declared in the *veda* come only from Him (1).

#### 37. फलमत उपपत्तेः ।

Fruit comes from Him (alone); because it is appropriate.

(1) There is an object in describing this point in general terms; for one that desires release should meditate on this point also.

For He alone is all-knowing, all-powerful, and supremely liberal. Those, that worship Him with *yāgas*, gifts, *homas* and the like, receive from Him enjoyment here or in the heaven-world. Those that meditate on Him attain their own nature. *Karma*, being non-intelligent, and transient, cannot bestow the fruits to be enjoyed at some future time. He alone is able to give the fruits.

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The bestowal of fruits by the highest *Ātmā* was made to rest on the unfitness of *karma*, and on the capacity and willingness of that Being. The next *sūtra* states that there is express statement on the point.

### 38. श्रुत्वाश्च ।

And because it is so stated.

In the following texts :

He, the great *Ātmā*, unborn, is the giver of food, and the giver of wealth (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-24) ; For, He alone gives bliss (*āna.*, 7-1). सकामेव जयते

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The next *sūtra* states the *first view* :

### 39. धर्मं जैमिनिरत एव ।

For the very same reasons the giver of fruits is *dharma* ; so *Jaimini* thinks.

For the same reasons—because it is appropriate and because it is taught in the *veda* ; and *dharma* is *karma* in the form of offerings and gifts, or of meditation. For in the world actions like ploughing and making of

gifts directly or indirectly bring about their own reward without the intervention of any being. The *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* may not directly yield fruits ; but they may do so indirectly through what is called *apūrva* ; and this is appropriate. The *vedic* injunction “ Let one that desires the heaven-world do *yāga* ” mentions *yāga* as the means of reaching the heaven-world. As it will not endure till the fruit is gathered, it is assumed that *apūrva* intervenes.

The *final decision* is reiterated in the last *sūtra* :

40. पूर्वे तु बादरायणो हेतुव्यपदेशात्।

But *Bādarāyaṇa* leans to the former view ; because the causes are stated.

The former view is that the highest *Ātmā* alone gives the fruits. The *vedic* texts, which enjoin particular *karmas*, refer also to certain *devatās* like *Agni*, *Vāyu* and the like as being pleased with the *karmas* and as giving the fruits desired.

Let him, that desires prosperity, offer a white goat to *Vāyu*. For *Vāyu* is a quickly-acting *devatā*. One should approach *Vāyu* alone with his own share ; and he himself leads the sacrificer to prosperity.

Here, though the text explaining how the *yāga* helps in the attainment of the desired fruit is *arthavāda*, it is needed by the injunction-text as pointed out at length in chapter I-4-7, and should not be set aside as added for another purpose. When the mode of attaining the fruits is expressly stated, to abandon it, and to

assume the coming into existence of an *apūrva*, which is not stated in the *veda*, is improper, and right-minded persons will never accept this view.

*Objection.*—*Apūrva* is not assumed ; but it is denoted by the termination of the verb in the injunction-text. *Reply.* The termination points out that the action denoted by the root (which is the worship of the *devatās*) should be done by the person, that desires the fruit. This is the recognised meaning of the termination, and is approved by the grammarian. Nothing else, which is unseen like *apūrva*, is denoted by it. In this contention there are two assumptions instead of one—first, the *apūrva* and next that it is denoted by the termination.

Now, this and other texts state that *Vāyu* and other *devatās* give the fruits sought. And the highest *Ātmā*, as the inner ruler of the *devatās*, receives the worship and yields the fruits (1). It is so taught :

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(1) The following objection may be raised : If the highest *Ātmā* is pleased and gives the fruits, there are difficulties. First, when the principal *karma* is done immediately after the *prayāja* offerings are made, though other subsidiary *karman*s remain to be done, the fruit of the principal *karma* should be bestowed ; for being omnipotent, His grace cannot remain even for a moment fruitless. Next, there is a rule that one that parades his performance will make the *karma* incapable of producing fruit. Now, the fruit cannot be delayed to see if the sacrificer offends against this rule ; for the highest *Ātmā* being completely independent, His grace should become fruitful at once. If the fruit be given, and the offence be committed subsequently, it will reveal ignorance on the part of the highest *Ātmā* that He did not foresee this. Hence the help of *apūrva* should be

The supporter of the worlds receives (1) as His worship all the *karmas* taught in the *veda* and *smṛitis*, which have been done or which are being done in many ways (2); He alone is *agni*; He is *vāyu*; He is the sun; He alone is the moon (*nārā*, 1-6 and 7); Who stands in *vāyu*; whose body *vāyu* is; Who stands in *agni*; who stands in the sun (*antaryāmi brāhmaṇa*, *bṛihad.*, V-7); Whosoever loves whatsoever body of Mine and wishes to worship it with fervour, I Myself make his fervour continue to the end. With such fervour he labours for the worship of that body of Mine, and obtains from the worship the desires that he sought; but they are given by Myself (*bhagavad gītā*, VII-21 and 22); Those that worship the *devas* go to the *devas*; those that love Me come to Me (*Ibid.*, VII-23); For I am the Being worshipped in all the *yāgas*; I alone give the fruits . . . They reach the *devas*; who will to worship the *devas*; they reach the *pitṛis* who will to worship the *pitṛis*; they reach the *bhūtas*, who will to worship the *bhūtas*; but those, that do the same actions with the will to worship Me in the forms of the *devas*, *pitṛis*, or *bhūtas*, come to Me (*Ibid.*, IX-24 and 25).

In the world also men obtain various objects by cultivation of land and other occupations, and attend upon the king with those objects either through his servants, or directly. The king, being pleased, gives

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sought. It must be assumed that when all the *karmas* are done—principal and subsidiary—and no cause exists for the destruction of the principal *karma* by parade, the highest *Ātmā* is pleased. If this be so, the *apūrva* being required necessarily, why should intervention by the highest *Ātmā* be assumed? *Reply.* The difficulties raised do not exist, as the *devatās* take the place of the *apūrvas*; and when they are pleased, and there is nothing to cancel their grace, the highest *Ātmā* comes forward and rewards the worshipper.

(1) As being the yielder of the fruits of *karmas*.

(2) In many ways—as being connected with *Agni*, *Indra* and other *devatās*.



them what they desire in accordance with the attention paid to him by them. This is what is seen. The *upanishads* teach the existence of *Purushottama*, who is beyond the capacity of every other source of knowledge, who is untouched by *avidyā* and by every other imperfection, and who is the seat of endless, infinite, noble qualities, pertaining to His nature ; They show that *yāgas*, making gifts, and *homas*, are His worship, as also to praise, to fall down before Him, to recite His names, to place flowers at His feet, and to meditate on Him ; and that worshipped by these means, He gives either enjoyment here or release from bondage to *karma*. This view of the *upanishads* is thoroughly sound.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।



## CHAPTER III

### SECTION 3

IN the two preceding sections so much was stated as would frighten one in regard to the horrors of hell, and in regard to the ever going to, and returning from, the heaven-world, and would create a strong desire to reach the highest *Ātmā*. In this third section the various meditations, by which He is reached, are examined to determine whether a *vidyā* of the same name, occurring in two or more *upanishads*, is the same or different. In the former case the qualities of the highest *Ātmā* enumerated in all the *upanishads* should be combined in meditation ; while in the latter case only those qualities are to be taken into consideration, that are specified in the particular *upanishad*. This point will be stated in *sūtra* 5.

#### SUB-SECTION 1

सत्यमेव जयते

In this sub-section the tests are pointed out by which it may be determined whether a *vidyā* of the same name enjoined by two *panishads* is the same.

This question was considered in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* ; and it was settled that the same *karma* was enjoined by two texts, if the fruit to be attained, the form of the *karma*, the injunction regarding it and the name of the *karma* be the same. See Introduction, para 16. The question for consideration here is whether this decision applies to *vidyās* also taught in the *upanishads*.

*First view.* The decision does not apply. When an injunction is repeated, and there is nothing to distinguish it from the same injunction previously given, it must relate to a different *vidyā*. Similarly, if the injunctions be found in two contexts, the difference of *vidyā* follows as a matter of course (*Vide* Introduction, para 15-ii and vi). If this be so in regard to the same branch of the *veda*, how can there be any doubt when a *vidyā* is taught in different *upanishads*? In the *muṇḍaka* it is stated :

Let one teach this *brahma-vidyā* to those only, by whom *śirovratā* has been properly done (III-2-10) ;

and this injunction is repeated in the next verse to the student. This restriction of this *vidyā* to the followers of the *muṇḍaka upanishad*, who alone perform this ceremony, will become intelligible, if the *vidyā* taught in the *upanishad* be a different one. If it were identical with a *vidyā* taught in other *upanishads*, then as the ceremony would be an *anga* of the *vidyā*, it must be performed by others also ; and the limitation enjoined would not be appropriate. Hence the *vidyā* taught in the *muṇḍaka* is not the same as the similar *vidyā* in other *upanishads*.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. सर्ववेदान्तप्रत्ययं चोदनाद्यविशेषात् ।

The *vidyā* enjoined in all the *vedāntas* is one, if the injunction and the rest do not differ.

The same decision applies to the *vidyās* taught in the *upanishads* also. Take the *vaiṣvānara vidyā* taught in the *chāndogya* and *agnirahasya*. See the *Vedic-Texts* under chapter I, section 2, sub-section 6. The injunction is the same, being given by the words *upāsita*, *vidyāt* and the like, all of which mean 'meditate'. The words 'and the rest' in the *sūtra* refer to the form, the fruit and the name of the *vidyā*. The form of the *vidyā* is determined by the object to be meditated on ; and this being *vaiṣvānara* in both places, the form is also the same. So also the name and fruit of the *vidyā*, the latter being the reaching of the highest *Ātmā*. Hence, the *vidyā* is recognised as one in both the *upanishads*.

सत्यमेव जयते

The next *sūtra* states the objection urged in the *first view* and refutes it :

2. भेदान्नेति चेदेकस्यामपि ।

If it be contended " No ; because of difference " ; the reply is " Even in the same *vidyā* " (there may be repetition).

Repetition without difference and a new context will be necessary, when the person, to whom a *vidyā* is taught, is different. But where the person, who receives

the teaching, is one, and it is repeated without difference, or the subject is introduced in a new context, then because the repetition or the new context cannot be explained otherwise, the subject-matter is assumed to be different; and then the *vidyā*, the form of which depends upon the subject matter, differs.

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The next *sūtra* replies to the other objection in the *first view*:

3. स्वाध्यायस्य तथात्वे हि समाचारेऽधिकाराच्च सववच्च तन्नियमः ।

To secure such qualification for one's *veda*; and so is it stated in the work named *samāchāra*: and this restriction is like the restriction of the *sava* offerings.

The objection is not valid. For, the ceremony referred to does no service to *vidyā*, and is not therefore its adjunct (*anga*). On the other hand it imparts to a follower of the *munda* a qualification for learning it. This is known from the direction addressed to the student—"This should not be learnt by one that has not performed the ceremony (*munda*., III-2-11). The ceremony is therefore connected with the learning of the text of the *veda*. The expression '*brahma-vidyā*' in the text quoted in the *first view* therefore means the learning of the text of the *veda*; but not meditation on *Brahma*. This view derives support from the statement in the treatise known as *samāchāra*, which states: "This too is explained by the ceremony connected with the *veda*." The work gives full directions in regard to

the ceremony known as *ṣirovrata*; and taking up another ceremony it makes this statement. The meaning is that it should be done in the same manner as *ṣirovrata*. In applying the same mode of performance to the new ceremony it uses the expression *veda-vrata*, i.e., *vrata* or ceremony connected with the *veda*. As to the restriction to those that do the ceremony, there is a precedent in the restriction of the *sava* offerings, beginning with the *sapta-sūrya* and ending with the *ṣatodana*, to a single fire in the case of the followers of the *atharva veda*, instead of being made into three fires as is usual. The restriction applies to them only, as the other restriction does.

#### 4. दर्शयति च ।

And the *veda* declares this.

Having brushed aside the objections raised, the author of the *sūtras* cites a *vedic* precedent to show that the same *vidyā* may be taught in two *upanishads*. The *chāndogya* (VIII-1-1) teaches a meditation on the small ether in the heart of man and on the qualities that are within it. "What is within it should be sought." To the query "What is in it, that should be sought" (*Ibid.*, 2), the reply is given that they are eight qualities beginning with freedom from all *karma* (*Ibid.*, 5). The *taittirīya* refers to this declaration, and states "In that is a small ether, free from grief; what is within it should be meditated on" (*nārā.*, 10-23). It thus teaches meditation on the highest *Ātmā* and on His eight qualities. This is possible only, if the *vidyā*

taught in both the places is one ; for then the qualities mentioned in both the places should be combined.

Having thus confirmed the unity of *vidyā* under certain conditions already taught in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*, its practical effect is next stated :

### 5. उपसंहारोऽर्थाभेदाद्विशेषवत्समाने च ।

*Vidyā* being the same, the *guṇas* should be combined ; because they serve the same purpose. Like the *guṇas* mentioned in the injunction-texts.

When a *vidyā* taught in two places is the same, the *guṇas* mentioned in one place should be added to those specified in the other place also. The former set is useful to the *vidyā* and has therefore been mentioned in connection with it. The second set also is similarly useful, and should be combined in doing the meditation.

### SUB-SECTION 2

In this and following sub-sections certain *vidyās* will be examined to see whether the reasons stated for recognising them to be the same *vidyā* exist. The first *vidyā* to be considered is that known as *udgītha vidyā*. *Sāman* is the name given to certain *mantras*, which are in verse and are sung ; and *udgītha* is the second out of five parts into which every *sāman* is divided ; and it is sung before certain offerings of *soma* juice are made in a *soma yāga*. A meditation on *udgītha* is taught in the

*chāndogya* and in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (See *Vedic Texts*).<sup>1</sup> The *devas* wished to overcome their enemies, the *asuras*, by this *vidyā*, and succeeded; and it is stated that whoever does this meditation similarly overcomes his enemies. The termination giving the injunction is not found in the texts; but as meditation is said to be the means to a fruit, it is assumed that an injunction exists. The *udgitha vidyā* is for the purpose of a *kratu* (offerings); and it enables the reaping of the fruit without obstruction. It cannot therefore yield any fruit of its own; and the mention of the fruit is treated by the *mīmāṃsaka* as mere praise. But it was settled in chapter I-2-3, page 261, that the fruit mentioned in an *arthavāda* may be accepted, provided that the fruit is not opposed to the fruit of the *kratu*. The question for consideration is whether the same *vidyā* is taught in the two *upanishads*. The *first view* is stated in the *sūtra*, and the argument, that may be urged for the *final decision*, is anticipated and is replied to:

#### 6. अन्यथात्वं शब्दादिति चेन्नाविशेषात् ।

If it be said—‘Not one; because the description is so’;  
the reply is—‘No; because there is no difference.’

The *vidyā* is one. For in both the *upanishads* the *udgitha* alone is to be meditated on as *prāṇa*; the fruit is the same—the overcoming of enemies. The form of meditation is also the same, as the object to be meditated on is one—*udgitha* to be looked upon as *prāṇa*;

<sup>1</sup> The original states the narrative contained in both the *upanishads*; but as this will be found in the ‘*Vedic Texts*,’ it is omitted here.



and the injunction is the same, as the terms conveying it have the same meaning ; and the name is the same, *udgitha vidyā*.

2. Here an objection is raised from the point of view of the *final decision*. No ; the form of meditation is different. In one place *prāṇa* was appealed to and requested to sing the *udgitha* ; and *prāṇa* did so. Hence the singer was meditated on as *prāṇa* ; and in the closing words reference is made by the term ' so ' (*evam*) to the singer of the *udgitha* and meditation on him is enjoined. In the other place it is expressly stated that *udgitha* that was sung was to be meditated on as *prāṇa*. Hence the form of the *vidyā* is different ; and the identity of the injunction and of the rest does not count for anything. For there must be agreement in all the four respects ; and non-agreement even in one respect will lead to difference.

3. The opponent replies. No ; for in both the places the beginning announces *udgitha* as the means of overcoming enemies ; and according to the well-known rule giving prominence to the beginning in the determination of a doubtful point (See Introduction, para 24) the reference to the singer in the text "*prāṇa* sang on their behalf " must be taken to refer to the *udgitha* itself, not to the *udgātā*, the singer. In other words the term denoting the singer should be understood in a secondary sense as in the sentence " Food cooks ". Then the form of the *vidyā* would be the same, and the two *vidyās* would be one and the same.

The *final decision* is next stated :

7. नवा प्रकरणभेदात्परोवरीयस्त्वादिवत् ।

But no ; because the contexts are different. Like *parovariyastva*, i.e., being higher than the high.

The two *vidyās* are different. For, in the *chāndogya* the meditation is on the syllable, known as *praṇava*, which should be prefixed to the *udgitha* and which is therefore a part of it. The *upanishad* begins with the injunction.

Meditate on this syllable, which is a part of *udgitha* and adds

Description of meditation on this syllable follows (I-1-10).

Then comes the second section of the *upanishad*, which is the subject under consideration. Hence, the object to be meditated on is not the whole of the *udgitha*, but only a part thereof—the syllable referred to. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, however, there is no similar beginning to limit the signification of the term to a part, and reference must therefore be taken as made to the whole of the *udgitha*. Hence the two contexts differ. Another reason is that while in the *chāndogya* the meditation is on a part of the *udgitha*, in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* it is on the singer of the whole. Hence, the forms of meditation and the *vidyās* are different.

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In the *first view* reference was made to the beginning rule. The explanation given here does not conflict

with it. If the singer of the *udgītha* be meditated on, as *udgītha* is what is sung, it is necessarily required ; and it may be regarded as the means of overcoming enemies. It is this that is stated at the beginning of the narrative.

2. On this point the *sūtra* adds an illustration. In the same *upanishad* (See *Vedic Texts* under chapter I-1-7) meditation on the same syllable as the highest *Ātmā* is enjoined in two sections ; and yet it is directed in section 6 that He should be thought of as a *Purusha* shining like gold, and in section 9 as higher than the high. The two *vidyās* are therefore different. Similarly here.

#### 8. सज्ञातश्चेत्तदुक्तमस्ति तु तदपि ।

“If that (oneness of *vidyā*) be stated ; because of name” the reply is—The same name is applied, even though what is enjoined differs.

Oneness of name is not conclusive. The name *agnihotra* is applied to the offering made every day throughout life, and also to the offering made in a *satra yāga* daily for a month and then discontinued (Introduction, para, 15-vi). The name *udgītha vidyā* is similarly applied to many meditations described in the first chapter of the *chāndogya*.

#### 9. व्याप्तेश्च समञ्जसम् ।

And because it extends to the whole of the chapter, it is all right here.

It, *i.e.*, the injunction (to meditate on the syllable, a part of the *udgītha*), Hence it must apply to what is

in the middle. A term denoting a whole often indicates a part only, *e.g.*, The cloth is burnt, meaning only a part.

### SUB-SECTION 3

The next *vidyā* considered is *prāṇa vidyā*. It is described in the *chāndogya* and *bṛihad āraṇyaka upanishads* (See *Vedic Texts*). *Prāṇa* is to be meditated on as being the oldest and the best, and as possessing certain other qualities, which are found in speech, eye, ear and mind ; for *prāṇa* supports the body and the organs specified, and enables each organ to perform its own function. In the *kaushītaki brāhmaṇa* also meditation on *prāṇa* as being the oldest and the best is enjoined ; but the qualities of speech, eye, ear and mind are not stated as connected with *prāṇa*. The doubt here is whether the *vidyās* are the same or different. The *first view* is that the *vidyās* differ ; for the form of the *vidyās* differs. Though *prāṇa* has to be meditated on in both the places as being the oldest and the best, yet in one place the qualities of speech, eye, ear and mind enter into the meditation as connected with *prāṇa* ; in the other they do not enter. The next *sūtra* states the *final decision*. The *vidyās* are the same. Those that follow the *kaushītaki brāhmaṇa* should therefore meditate on the qualities of speech, eye, ear, and mind as connected with *prāṇa*.

#### 10. सर्वाभेदादन्यत्रेमे ।

Because of non-difference in anything ; these qualities should be added in the other place.

‘In the other place’—in the *prāṇa vidyā* of the *kaushitaki*. Why? Because all the reasons urged for regarding *prāṇa* as the oldest and the best are the same in both places. These reasons are that *prāṇa* supports the body and the organs, and makes each organ capable of performing its own function. This was tested by each organ going in succession out of the body for a time; yet the body remained with the other organs, and their functions went on as usual. But when *prāṇa* began to go out, all the organs became paralysed and powerless to do any work. Then speech, eye, ear, and mind stated that they all depended on *prāṇa*, and that their own qualities belonged to *prāṇa* alone. A similar statement by speech and the rest is not found in the *kaushitaki brāhmaṇa*; but this does not make a difference.

It is stated that speech and the rest, possessing their peculiar qualities mentioned in the *upanishad*, depend upon *prāṇa* for the performance of their functions. This shows that *prāṇa* is the cause of the senses possessing those qualities. And this alone is the connection of *prāṇa* with those qualities.

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#### SUB-SECTION 4

Another matter, which is subsidiary to *prāṇa-vidyā*, will be taken up presently. In the preceding sub-section it was decided that *prāṇa*'s being the oldest and the best cannot be meditated on without meditating on the

other attributes, and that these other attributes should be added in the *prāṇa vidyā* of the *kaushītakis*. It will now be established that those attributes are to be meditated in all *brahma-vidyās*, without which it is not possible to think of the *svarūpa* of the highest *Ātmā* (the substance, the seat of the attributes).

*First view.* The attributes in question should not be added, where they are not mentioned. There is no ground for doing so ; and only those attributes should be meditated on, that are mentioned in a context.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### ॥. आनन्दादयः प्रधानस्य ।

(In all meditations on *Brahma*) bliss and other attributes should be meditated on ; because (*Brahma*) the principal object of meditation does not differ.

The term *abhedāt* is brought down from the preceding *sūtra*, and the meaning will then be as stated. There are certain qualities, without which one can never think of *Brahma*. Bliss is one of these, and the others are stated in the definition of *Brahma*—" Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma* " (*āna.*, I-1). In every *vidyā* on *Brahma*, as the object of meditation is the same, and as attributes do not exist apart from an object, His qualities referred to should be meditated on.

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Certain other qualities are stated in the *upaniṣad* further on (V-2 and 3) " Pleasure is his head ; *moda* is his right wing ; *pramoda* is his left wing ; *ānanda* is his trunk ; *brahma* is the tail that supports them all " (See

*Vedic* Texts and note under the verse). Are these also to be meditated on? For, the reason given applies; as like bliss and the other qualities they cannot exist apart from Him. The next *sūtra* says no:

12. प्रियशिरस्त्वायप्राप्तिरूपचयापचयौ हि भेदे ।

Having *priya* for the head and the rest do not come in; for with difference of members, there would be thickness and thinness.

For they are not attributes of *Brahma*; they will not therefore be included in the enumeration of the essential attributes, that should come into meditation; they are elements only to make up a representation of *Brahma* in the form of a human being. If He had different members, such as head, wings and tail, some would be large, and some small; some would be thick, and some thin, and this would conflict with the text already quoted as to His unchangeability, and with the text which states that He is neither stout nor lean.

There are certain other qualities of *Brahma*, such as the power to control, generosity (1), and compassion, which similarly cannot exist apart from Him. Are they from this fact to be meditated on in every *vidyā*, even though they are not mentioned in connection with it? Because they are numberless, it will be impossible to meditate on them all. The next *sūtra* explains:

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(1) The original has two words *gāmbhīrya* and *audārya*, both of which mean generosity; but there is a shade of difference between them. See note (1) on page 141.

### 13. इतरेत्वर्थसामान्यात् ।

But the others only ; because they are like the object.

The others—those first mentioned, *viz.*, bliss and the rest—come into all *vidyās*. For, one cannot perceive *Brahma* without perceiving those qualities also. Meditation on Him must therefore include meditation on them also. *Brahma*, stated to be the world-cause, is defined as being *satya* (unchanging), *jñāna* (shining), *ananta* (without limitations), and *ānanda* (bliss). His substance (*svārūpa*) can be described only with reference to these qualities, and in order to perceive this *svārūpa*, they must come into the meditation. But the other qualities, like the power to control and the like, are not needed to perceive Him. And though they cannot exist apart from Him, yet they must be meditated on only in those *vidyās*, in connection with which they are specified.

If having *priya* for the head and the rest are not attributes of *Brahma*, why is He represented as something, which He is not ? There must be some purpose to be served by this representation, as in the representation of the *jiva's* body as a chariot in the *kāṭha valli* (See chap. I, sec. 4, sub-section 1) ? But this does not, however, appear. They must be regarded as the attributes of *Brahma*. The next *sūtra* replies :

### 14. आध्यानाय प्रयोजनाभावात् ।

For meditation ; for ther is no other purpose.



Meditation is enjoined in the text "One who meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest". For this purpose it is necessary to form a conception of Him, who is bliss ; and He is divided into *priya*, *moda*, *pramoda* and *ānanda* (all varieties of joy), and these are represented as head, the two wings (*i.e.*, hands) and trunk. Similar representations have been described and for the same purpose in the case of *annarasamaya*, *prāṇamaya*, *manomaya* and *viññānamaya* (*āna.*, sections 1 to 4). The attributes under consideration do not enter into the perception of Him.

### 15. आत्मशब्दाच्च ।

And because the term *ātmā* is used.

That the representation of *Brahma* in this manner is for easy comprehension will be evident from the application of the term *ātmā* to Him in the text.

There is a Being known as *ānandamaya*, who is other than this *viññānamaya* and who is within it. He is the *ātmā* (*āna.*, V-2).

An *ātmā* has no divisions as head, wings and tail.

In the previous sections of the *upaniṣad* (sections II-2 and III-2) the term *ātmā* has been applied to *prāṇa* and mind, which are not *ātmās*. How can it be decided that in the text quoted under the preceding *sūtra*, the term really denotes an *ātmā* ? The *sūtra* replies :

### 16. आत्मगृहीतिरितरवदुत्तरात् ।

The term *ātmā* refers (to *Brahma*) as in other places ; from what follows

In the text under consideration the term *ātmā* does refer to *Brahma*, as in texts like the following: "Before creation this (world) was *Ātmā* indeed ; one only ; He willed I will create the worlds" (*aita.*, I-1-1). And this is supported by what follows: "He (the Being full of bliss) desired 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve'" (*āna.*, VI-2).

### 17. अन्वयादिति चेत्स्यादवधारणात् ।

If it be said '(one cannot be sure of this) ; because the term was previously applied to what was not *ātmā*,' the reply is—'There is certainty ; because of the affirmation.'

At first there is the text "From that *Ātmā* came forth ether" (*āna.*, I-2) ; and He occupies the mind. This idea of the highest *Ātmā*, as the world-cause, was transferred in succession to *prāṇa*, to mind, to the *jīva* and finally to the Being of bliss ; and there it rests ; because there is nothing beyond. This is confirmed by the subsequent passage quoted. Thus, the application of the term even in the beginning to things, which are not *Brahma*, was from the notion that they were. Hence, the conclusion is free from all flaws (1).

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(1) This is what the opponent means. From the beginning rule (Intro., para 24) a subsequent text should be understood as to agree with a text at the beginning ; the meaning of the latter cannot be settled with reference to the former. In the reply attention is drawn to what precedes even the beginning ; and it is shown that the succeeding text does not nullify the text at the very beginning.

## SUB-SECTION 5

In this sub-section the question in *prāṇa vidyā* left over for consideration in sub-section 3 is taken up. In both the *upanishads* (See *Vedic Texts* under sub-section 3) after prescribing a meditation on *prāṇa* as the oldest and the best, water is mentioned as the clothing of *prāṇa* (*chāndo.*, V-2-2) and (*bṛihad.*, VIII-1-14).<sup>1</sup> The question for consideration is whether what is enjoined is *āchamana*, or meditation that the water sipped in *āchamana* is the clothing of *prāṇa*.

*First view.* In the *mādhyaṇdina* reading the termination denoting injunction is found in connection with *āchamana*, but not in connection with meditation. Hence, one *āchamana* being prescribed by the *smṛitis* as a part of the taking of food, another *āchamana* is enjoined as subsidiary to *prāṇa vidyā*. This view is taken on the strength of the injunction. The reference to the clothing of *prāṇa* is mere praise.

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Why then is the term *ātman* applied to other things? The reply is that the application was that they were the highest *Ātmā*; and in each case by showing that there was another within it, the conception was withdrawn from it, and was fixed on this inner thing; and this went on till the *ānandamaya* was reached. As there was nothing within Him, other than Himself, and as He is said further on to have willed, the conception that He is *ātman* and the highest *Ātmā* became established.

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<sup>1</sup> The original quotes portions of the *upanishads* bearing on the point. As they are stated in 'Vedic Texts,' they are omitted here.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 18. कार्याख्यानादपूर्वम् ।

A new thing (is enjoined) ; because it is the business of the *veda* to enjoin what has not been taught already.

The *sūtra* takes the latter view ; because this has not been taught already. The *veda* serves its purpose, only when it teaches something to be newly done. As to *āchamana* it is already enjoined by the *smṛitis* ; and referring to the water sipped under this injunction, it is taught that the water should be regarded as the clothing of *prāṇa*. This appears from the sentences at the beginning and end. In the beginning there is the query of *prāṇa*. “What will be my clothing” and the reply is “water is the clothing”. The closing words of the *upanishads* state “They clothe (*prāṇa*) with water” and “They make that *prāṇa* other than naked”. Hence in the *chāndogya* reference is made only to clothing with water ; but not to *āchamana* (1).

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(1) Preceding this topic there is the injunction that the food offered to all animals should be meditated on as the food of *prāṇa* ; and by the side of this another meditation on the water sipped in *āchamana* as the clothing of *prāṇa* is clearly intended. The termination denoting injunction is found in connection with *āchamana* only in the *mādhyandina* text, but not in the others. Hence the conclusion stated stands.

## SUB-SECTION 6

In the *śāṇḍilya vidyā* taught in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* and *agnirahasya* a meditation is prescribed on the highest *Atmā* as abiding in the heart of man, and as possessed of certain attributes.<sup>1</sup> The question for consideration is whether the same *vidyā* is taught in the two *upanishads*.

*First view.* Though there is agreement in respect of the fruit, the injunction and the name of the *vidyā*, its form differs; for in one place reference is made to the possession of an unfrustrated will, and in the other to being the controller of all, the lord of all and the supporter of all by will. Hence they are two *vidyās*.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 19. समान एवं चाभेदात् ।

And the set of qualities being thus the same (the *vidyās* are one); because there is no difference.

The same set of qualities is stated in both—perceivable with a pure mind, and having a brilliant body; and the following addition is made. In one “He controls all; He is the lord of all; and he supports all this, whatever exists”. In the other “with an unfrustrated will”. These additions do not differ. The addition in one place is an amplification of the addition made in the other. For, having an unfrustrated will, the

<sup>1</sup> The description of the *vidyā* in the original by quotations is omitted here, as it is given in the ‘Vedic Texts’.

highest *Ātmā* controls all and supports all by His will. Being the lord of all is also useful ; for the control over one, that is not His own, may suffer obstruction occasionally ; but as everything is His own, He may control them at His pleasure. Hence, the form being the same, the *vidyā* is one (1).

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### SUB-SECTION 7

See *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (*Vedic Texts*), which describes meditation on the unchanging *Purusha* in the sun's orb and on the unchanging *Purusha* in the right eye as having a body made up of three *mantras*. Two secret names are stated—*ahar* of the former and *aham* of the latter ; and meditation on these names is subsidiary to the other meditation. The question is whether each name is connected with the *Purusha* in regard to whom it is stated, or whether both may be connected with either indifferently.

*First view.* The Being to be meditated on is the same—the unchanging highest *Ātmā*, whose body is made

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(1) Here, the opponent may contend—Both the *upaniṣads* are portions of the same branch of the *veda* ; and the repetition in one of what is stated in the other without any difference cannot be explained as in *sūtra* 2 with reference to difference in the persons learning the *vidyā*. Nor is it possible to justify the repetition as serving some purpose. Hence there are two *vidyās*. *Reply.* The repetition serves the purpose of explaining what is stated briefly in one place, and it is usual to mention a thing briefly and then to explain it.

up of the three *mantras*; and as He is connected with both the places, He is one; the form of *vidyā* is therefore one, and the fruit and the rest are also one. The *vidyā* is therefore one; and the names may be meditated on in the *vidyā* on one or the other *Purusha*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

## 20. सम्बन्धादेवमन्यत्रापि ।

Similarly elsewhere also; because of the connection.

The reasoning in the preceding sub-section is applied here by the opponent. There, as the same attributes were found in the object of meditation, it was held that the form of meditation was the same, and that the attributes mentioned in both places should be combined. Similarly, the object of meditation being the same here also, both the names should be combined in each meditation. The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra*:

## 21. न वा विशेषात् ।

But no; because of difference.

The object of meditation differs. Though it is the highest *Ātmā* in both the *vidyās*, He is to be meditated on in one as being in the orb of the sun; and in the other as abiding in the right eye of man. Hence the form of the *vidyās* differs. In the *śāṇḍilya vidyās* the place of meditation does not differ; for in both it is the heart.

## 22. दर्शयति च ।

And the text shows this.

This—that the attributes mentioned with reference to the orb of the sun and with reference to the eye should not be combined. The text is

That which is the form of that *Purusha* (*purusha* in the sun's orb), the very same is the form of this *Purusha* (*purusha* in the eye) (*chāndo.*, I-7-5).

This special application of the form indicates that the form of the first mentioned does not apply to the next one of itself, and that the two *Purushas* are different (1).

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#### SUB-SECTION 8

The following text occurs in the *yajur veda*. “By *Brahma* invincible powers have been obtained; this invincible *Brahma* pervaded heaven before (the birth of *Indra*); *Brahma* appeared before all beings; who is fit to quarrel with this *Brahma*”. Here two attributes are mentioned—obtaining invincible powers and pervading heaven; but not after commencing description of

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(1) What is stated above requires some explanation. The meaning of the opponent is that the beginning and end are alike, and that the name being one, *viz.*, *vyāhṛiti vidyā*, the meditation is one, and that therefore the *vidyā* may be done in one place or another, and with either name. The *final decision* denies that the beginning and the end are alike. The beginning mentions two persons; and this number indicates difference in the principal object of meditation. In the end also the fruit of meditation on the *Purusha* in the sun's orb is stated, and after finishing this, the other *vidyā* is dealt with.



any particular *vidyā*. Are they to be included in every meditation? The *sūtra* says no:

### 23. सम्प्रतिबुद्ध्याप्यपि चातः ।

The obtaining of invincible powers and the pervading of heaven (should also be restricted); for the same reason.

Even though the text is not connected with any particular *vidyā*, and the attributes should therefore be included in all, yet because the places differ, the attributes should be restricted (1). Why? Because in *vidyās*, in which the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as abiding in a small place like the heart, it is not possible to think of Him also as pervading heaven. The other attribute, being connected with it, shares the same fate.

2. *Objection.* In the *śāṇḍilya vidyā* and *dahara vidyā* considered in chapter I-2-1 and I-3-5, in both of which the highest *Ātmā* abiding in the heart is

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(1) For a precedent see *pūrva mīmāṃsā*, III-6-1. The text 'He, whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, does not hear unpleasant statements, occurs unconnected with any place in which a *yāga* is enjoined.' The question was considered whether this applies equally to *prakṛiti* and *vikṛiti yāgas*. (For the meaning of these terms see Introduction, para 31.) It might be thought that as the *juhū* is used for making offerings in both, the injunction applies to both. This was the *first view*. The *final decision* is that it applies to *prakṛiti yāgas* only. For in a *vikṛiti yāga*, the *juhū* finds no place, before the ritual of a *prakṛiti yāga* is adopted for the *vikṛiti yāga*; and when this adoption is made, the condition that the *juhū* should be made of *parṇa* wood will come along with the *juhū* from the *prakṛiti yāga*.

meditated on, the following descriptions occur—"larger than the earth," and "As large as this ether is, so large is the ether within the heart". How is it possible to meditate on Him as being in the heart and at the same time as being larger than earth or ether? *Reply.* The large size is not intended to form a part of the meditation. The fact that in Himself He is without limitation is stated (1).

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### SUB-SECTION 9

This deals with *puruṣa vidyā* taught in the *chāndogya* and *taittirīya upanishads*. See *Vedic Textst.*

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(1) *Another objection.* Among the attributes, which should enter into every *vidyā*, as stated in sub-section 4, that of being without limitations is one; and in this is included absence of limitation in place. How is it possible to think of this aspect in the *śāṇḍilya* and *dhāra vidyās*? *Reply.* As the highest *Ātmā* is by nature all-pervading, this aspect may be thought on by one at the same time, as he thinks that out of infinite mercy He is present in his heart to help him. There is no incongruity in this; one aspect pertaining to nature and the other due to a limiting place. If the meditation were as stated by the text under consideration, there would be two limitations—one by the size of the heart, and the other by the size of earth or ether; and the resulting sizes would conflict. This reply removes a still further objection. The text under consideration describes the highest *Ātmā* as He is; no meditation is stated; and there is therefore no room for any enquiry. *Reply.* In the case of a Being, who is omnipresent, the statement that He pervades heaven can serve no purpose other than that He should be meditated as so limited.

The question for consideration is whether the *vidyās* differ or not.

*First view.* They are one. First, the name is the same, *viz.*, *purusha vidyā*. Next, meditation on the attributes of a person as the parts or adjuncts of a *yajna* is taught, and this is the same in both; hence the form is the same. In the *taittiriya* no fruit is mentioned. But in the absence of a conflicting fruit (for that would lead to a difference in the *vidyās*), the oneness of name and form makes one recognise the *vidyā* as one; and as what is not mentioned in one place may be supplied from another, the fruit stated in the other *upanishad*, which is itself the fruit of *purusha vidyā*, should be added in the *taittiriya*. The result is that the same fruit is connected with the *vidyā*. Hence, the same *vidyā* is taught in both the places (1).

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(1) *Objection.* At the end of the *upanishad* this statement is made: "He attains the greatness of *Brahma*." How can it be said that no fruit is mentioned? *Reply.* A mere meditation on man is not meditation on *Brahma*; and the fruit referred to as stated is inapplicable to it. As *Brahma vidyā* is dealt with in the preceding section of the *upanishad*, the sentence should be taken out and added therein.

See the precedent in *pūrva mīmāṃsā*, III-3-13. A text prescribing three *upasads* for a *soma yāga* with one *sutyā* day, and twelve for *ahīna yāgas* occurs in a place that deals with the *jyotishṭoma yāga*. A *sutyā* day is the day in which the offerings of the *soma* juice are made. There is only one such day in the *jyotishṭoma yāga*; and a *yāga*, in which there are more than *sutyā* day up to twelve, is known as *ahīna*; and this is its recognised meaning. It is therefore decided that the portion of the text prescribing twelve *upasads* for *ahīna yāgas* should be taken out of the context.

*Final decision.* The *vidyās* differ. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

24. पुरुषविद्यायामपि चेतरेषामनाम्नानात् ।

And in *purusha vidyā* too (the *vidyās* differ) ; because what is stated in one place is not stated in the other.

Thus in the *taittirīya* the parts of the day—morning, midday and evening—are stated to be *savanas* (See note in *Vedic Texts*) ; while in the other man's life-period divided into three parts are to be so regarded. Next hunger, thirst and abstinence from sexual intercourse are to be looked upon as *dīkshā* according to the *chāndogya* ; but this is not found in the other. On the other hand the meditator should think of himself as the *yajamāna* (doer of *yāga*), and his faith as the wife according to the *taittirīya* ; but this is not taught in the other. Hence the form of *vidyās* differs.

2. Similarly the fruit also differs. In the *taittirīya* in the preceding section one is asked to offer himself to *Brahma* in these words—"Offer yourself with the *praṇava mantra* saying 'For you, the great *Brahma*.'" This is a *brahma vidyā* ; and its fruit is next stated "He reaches the greatness of *Brahma*". Then follows the section dealing with *purusha vidyā*. It means that the person who does the meditation should also meditate on himself as *yajna*, *Purusha vidyā* is therefore a *vidyā* subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*, and has the same fruit as the other. For the rule is that when a thing is mentioned without fruit by the side of another with fruit, the former is subsidiary to the latter. The *purusha*

*vidya* in the *chāndogya* yields as its fruit the attainment of a full life. As both the form and fruit differ the two *vidyās* are not identical (1).

### SUB-SECTION 10

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that the *purusha vidyā* taught by the side of a *brahma vidyā* was connected with it as a subsidiary *vidyā*. The opponent in this sub-section proposes to extend this rule to certain *mantras* and to certain *karmas*, which are stated in

(1) *Question*. Why is reaching the greatness of *Brahma* stated at the end of the section of the *upanishad* dealing with *purusha vidyā*. *Reply*. The mention of the fruit in the former section is to show that one, that desires it, should carry out the injunction, as in the text "He that desires *svarga* should do *yāga*". In the next section the subsidiary meditation is described; and the fruit of the *brahma vidya* with its helper is stated at the end.

*Question again*. Why is this sub-section added. The only thing common to the two *vidyās* is the name, while the difference in the form is patent. *Reply*. The intention is to show that the *nyāsa vidyā* in the *taittirīya* is the principal, and that the *purusha vidyā*, which follows it, is subsidiary to it.

*One more question*. If the meditator in the *purusha vidyā* is to meditate on his belongings as parts of *yajna*, why are certain things like the *chāturmāsya*, which are not parts of *yajna*, mentioned in the *upanishad*? *Reply*. The intention is merely to praise one that does the *nyāsa vidyā*. In this view there is no *vidyā* in the *taittirīya*; and the oneness contended for in the *first view* fails.

*upanishads* by the side of *brahma vidyās*. They are as follows :

(1) Pierce through the bright body (of my enemy); pierce through the heart (*atharva upanishad*) ; (2) *Deva, savitah*, permit the *yajna* to be done (*sāma veda*) ; (3) *May Mitra* be the yielder of happiness to us ; may *Vāruṇa* be the yielder of happiness (*taittirīya*) ; (4) You are a horse white, green and blue (*śāṭyāyanin*). The *aitareyins* begin their *mahāvratā brāhmaṇa* thus ; “*Indra* killed *vṛitra* and became great” : The *kaushītakis* also begin the same with the text—‘*Prajāpati* is the year ; this *mahāvratā* is his *ātmā* ; and the *vājasaneyins* begin the *pravargya brāhmaṇa* with the words “*Devas* performed *satra*.”

The question for consideration is whether those *mantras* and *karmas* are connected with *brahma vidyās* and serve them or not.

*First view.* They are so connected ; for they are taught together in the same place.

2. An objection is raised—They are connected with *karmas*, each with each, by authorities like *ṣruti*, *linga* and *vākya*, all of which are stronger than the authority known as *sthāna* or place. The first text is a prayer to a *devatā* in a *yāga* done for destroying one’s enemy ; and the *mantra* is connected with it from the capacity (*linga*) of the term ‘pierce through’. Other *mantras* are similarly connected by *linga* or *ṣruti*. The *karma* known as *pravargya*, though described without reference to anything else, is known to be subsidiary to *jyotishtōma* from the text “They do *pravargya* before *upasad*” ; and *upasad*, as is well-known, serves the *jyotishtōma yāga*. In the same way the *karma* known as *mahāvratā* serves what is known as *gavamayana*.

How can they be said to be connected with *brahma vidyās*?

*Reply.* Be this as it may (1). The text no. 3, and the corresponding *mantra* 'may he guard us together' have no use elsewhere, and being included in the *upani-shads*, where *vidyās* are taught, they must be subsidiary to *vidyās*. Hence these *mantras* should be utilised in all *vidyās*.

*Final decision.* They are not subsidiary to *vidyās*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

## 25. वेद्यार्थभेदात् ।

Because they are for destruction and other purposes.

The first text is applied to a *karma* to bring about the destruction of one's enemy; and the use of the other texts is stated by the objector in paragraph 2 of the *first view*. This is patent. Similarly the third text

(1) Though they are connected with *karmas* as stated, they may yet be connected with *vidyās* also, so that their inclusion in the *upani-shads* may not become useless. There is a precedent for this in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. There is a direction to build the place for the *āhavanīya* fire with specially-made bricks so as to be of the shape of a bird; and one is directed to do the *jyotishtōma yāga* with this fire. Here the direction, which is *vākya*, nullifies the place (*sthāna*) authority, which connects *jyotishtōma* with a fire-place made in the usual way as described in that context. Yet this latter fire becomes also useful, when the brick-made fire is not resorted to. Similarly here. *Reply.* This explanation is untenable. To apply the *mantras* to *brahma-vidyā*, it will be necessary to resort to secondary meanings; but the words themselves indicate connection with particular *karmas*, but not with *vidyās*; and this cannot be got over (*bhāva*).

and the text quoted by the opponent in the same paragraph are connected with learning the text of the *veda*. For, further on in one of the *mantras* the following words occur: "I will recite *ṛitam* (1); I will recite *satyam*"; This is stated in beginning the learning; and when it is closed for the day, the words are 'I recited *ṛitam*. I recited *satyam*'.

In the other *mantra* the latter portion is "May the text recited by us (teacher and student) be bright (*i.e.*, efficacious). May we not dislike each other". These marks clearly connect the *mantras* with learning the text of the *veda*. This is done by the teacher's reciting a text and the students' repeating it after him.

2. The argument in paragraph 2 of the *first view*, that the inclusion in the *upanishads* indicates a connection with *brahma vidyā*, is not correct. The inclusion is for another purpose. They have to be recited in the day, and in a desert place, where they will not be heard by women and by those that have not gone through the *upanayana* ceremony. As the *upanishads* are of this description, the *mantras* and the portions dealing with *pravargya* and *mahāvratā* find a place in them.

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### SUB-SECTION 11

The following texts state that one, that does *brahma vidyā*, should include in it the thought that he

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(1) The terms *ṛitam* and *satyam* refer to the texts, as they are unchanged either in the letter or in meaning.



abandons his *karma*, good and bad deeds, and that they go to his friends and enemies respectively. They are :

(i) Shaking off *karma*, as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rāhu* (in an eclipse) and throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma*-world, the purpose of my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, VIII-13-1); (ii) Then the meditator, shaking off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-3); (iii) His sons take his property; his friends his good deeds; his enemies his bad deeds (*śāṭyāyana*); and (iv) Then, he shakes off good and bad deeds; his dear cousins take the good deeds; his enemies his bad deeds (*kaushītaki*).

Thus, the abandonment of *karma* is stated in two texts; its going to friends and foes in one; and both in the last. Meditation on both points should form part of all *vidyās*. For, the meditator, whatever be his *vidyā*, in reaching *Brahma* should shake off his good and bad deeds, and what is shaken off should go to some one (1). The question for consideration is whether the meditation may be on one or the other point or on both at pleasure or on both without option.

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(1) The mention of both the points is for the purpose of meditation, like the place, in which the object of meditation should be located, and like His attributes. The purpose is not merely to state the fruit; for in the *śāṇḍilya vidyā* it is stated: 'Departing from here, I shall reach Him' (*chāndo.*, III-14-4). Here meditation on one variety of fruit is enjoined; in the first text this is connected with the abandonment of good and bad deeds; and in the fourth text this again is connected with their disposal. Hence both points should be included in meditation.

*First view.* The former is the proper alternative ; for, the points are stated in various ways. Their combination in every *vidyā* could not have been intended ; for as this would follow from the fourth text, the reference to them in the other texts would serve no purpose. This objection cannot be got over on the plea that the teaching is conveyed to different students ; for the only case in which this will be a satisfactory explanation is stated in *sūtra* 2 of this section—i.e., repetition without difference ; but here the statement is not the same. Nor can the objection be answered with reference to difference in *vidyās* ; for it has been stated to be a part of every *vidyā*.

*Final decision.* Both points should be meditated on in every *vidyā*. The reason is stated in the *sūtra* :

26. हानौ तूपायनशब्दशेषत्वात्कुशाच्छन्दस्तुत्युपगानवत्त-  
दुक्तम् ।

In the mention of abandonment (the other is implied) ; for the text as to disposal is subsidiary to the other text ; as in the case of *kuṣṇ*, metre, *stotra* and *upagāna* ; this is stated.

The meaning is that, when only one point is mentioned (1), the other also is meant ; and that both should be combined. Because the texts as to the disposal of the good and bad deeds supplement the information conveyed in the other set of texts ; and this is

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(1) The term *hānau* (in the abandonment) is intended to include the other, i.e., the disposal also. Hence when one of them is mentioned, it should be combined with the other.

appropriate ; the former set explains what becomes of the *karma* when abandoned. It does not matter that the two sets are found in different places. There are precedents for this in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* : There is the text “*kuṣas* are parts of a tree” ; another text states “*kuṣas* are parts of the *udumbara* tree ; and the latter text is taken to explain the former. The term *kuṣā* means pegs used by the *udgātā* in counting the number of times songs are repeated (1). Next, the text “with the metres of the *devas* and *asuras*” does not state the order in which they should be taken. The term *devāsura* in the original is a compound ; and though its members occur in a certain order, a rule of grammar requires that the word with fewer syllables should come first. The order in the compound is not therefore conclusive. Another text is needed ; and this is found in another place thus : “The metres of the *devas* come first.” Next, the text ‘Let him cause the *stotra* of the *śodāṣi graha* (2) to be commenced with gold,’ does not state when this should be done. Another text

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(1) In a *soma yāga* the *udgātā* and his two assistants have to sing certain *mantras*, which are known as *stotras*. Each verse sung is known as *stotrīya*, and in each *stotra* there should be a fixed number of *stotrīyas*, nine, fifteen, seventeen, or twenty-one. In many cases, there are only three verses and therefore only three *stotrīyas*. The number required is made up by repeating the *stotrīyas*. There are three rounds, in each of which one *stotrīya* is sung more than once, and the others but once.

(2) In a *soma yāga* the juice of the *soma* creeper is offered in small cylindrical vessels, known as *grahas*. Of these many are offered after the *udgātā* sings a *stotra* and

states "when the sun is half set, he causes the *stotra* of the *shadoṣṭi graha* to be commenced". Lastly, the general permission to the helpers in a *yāga* to sing with the *udgātā* 'ritviks sing along with the *udgātā*' is limited by the text "The *adhvaryu* shall not sing".

If it be not admitted that one text in one place stating a thing in general terms can be explained or limited by another text in another place, it must be assumed that option is given to the meditator; but its exercise is objectionable, as long as any other course is open; and this principle is laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (X-8-1). See Introduction, para 36. Thus the texts mentioning only abandonment of *karma* and only its going to others form a connected whole; and as neither one nor the other by itself exists, there is no room for the exercise of option. The mention of both in the *kaushītaki* is explained with reference to the difference among the persons taught.

सत्यमेव जयते  
SUB-SECTION 12

In the preceding sub-section reference was made to the abandonment of good and bad deeds by a meditator. When does this take place? Is it partly at the departure from the body, and partly on the way to the highest heaven, or wholly when he departs?

the *hotā* recites a *śastra* (a number of verses from the *ṛik veda*). The sixteenth offering thus made is known as the offering of the *shodoṣṭi graha*.

*First view*: It is the former alternative; for so is it stated. The *kaushitaki* begins with these words:

He reaches the way known as the *devayāna*, and goes to the world of *agni*

and concludes thus:

He comes to the stream *virajā*; he crosses it with his mind (*i.e.*, an effort of the mind); then he throws off good and bad deeds.

This is authority for the abandonment on the way. On the other hand the time is stated to be the moment of departure (see the first text quoted in the preceding sub-section from the *chāndogya*); also the *ṣātyāyana* text, which shows that it takes place at the same time as the sons take the property of the departed. Hence a part is abandoned at the time of departure from the body, and the remainder on the way.

*Final decision*: The whole of the *karma* is abandoned at the time of departure from the body. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

## 27. साम्परायेतर्तव्याभावात्तथाह्यन्ये ।

(The abandonment of *karma* takes place) at departure; because of the absence of enjoyment; for so others declare.

Because after such departure there is no more fruit of good or evil deeds to be expended by enjoyment. The only thing that remains is the fruit of *brahma vidyā*, *viz.*, the reaching of *Brahma*. And this is what some *upanishads* say:

One that is without a body welcome and unwelcome things do not touch (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-1); For him there is

delay only so long as he is not released (from the body). Then he is united to *Sat* (*Ibid.*, VI-14-2); This *jiva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appears in his own form (*Ibid.*, VIII-12-2).

## 28. छन्दत उभायाविरोधात् ।

(The text to the contrary should be interpreted) at pleasure, so that both may not conflict.

Reference is made to the *kaushitaki* text quoted in the *first view*. In the preceding *sūtra* the decision was arrived at from a consideration of the nature of things. In order that this decision and the text may not conflict, the last part of the text 'He throws off good and bad deeds' should be placed before the beginning, as the sentence stands at present. This follows the rule stated in Introduction, para 26 (iii).

Here the opponent comes forward with an objection :

## 29. गतेर्यवत्वमुभयथाऽन्यथा हि विरोधः ।

The text regarding going on the path will have a meaning only (on the hypothesis of *karma* being abandoned) in both ways. Otherwise, there will be contradiction.

If all *karma* is left behind at departure, even the subtle body must disappear. Then the *jiva* by himself cannot go, being a minute atom; and the capacity to do anything at will has not yet come.

The next *sūtra* replies :

30. उपपन्नस्तद्वक्ष्यार्थोपलब्धेर्लोकावत् ।

The theory is appropriate ; because the fact of a released *jiva* being connected with a body is seen ; as in ordinary experience.

The theory that all *karma* is left behind at departure is appropriate. Because it is known that a *jiva*, that has left all *karma* behind, and has attained his own nature, may still have a body. Referring to one, that has reached the highest Light and attained his own nature, it is said :

There he enjoys Him all round ; he eats, enjoys (as he pleases) ; he amuses himself with women, carriages, or cousins (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 and 3) ; He becomes free, and he can go about at pleasure in all worlds (*Ibid.*, VII-25-2) ; and He appears as one ; appears as three ; as five (*Ibid.*, VII-26-2).


Hence, one, whose *karma* has disappeared, may retain the subtle body and proceed on the *devayāna*. *Question.* But does not even the subtle body go with the *karma*, which brought it into existence ? *Reply.* It remains owing to the peculiar merit of the *vidyā*. The *vidyā* did not bring it into existence ; but it retains it in order that the *jiva* may perform the journey. Such a thing is seen in the world. People dig a tank for irrigation ; and even when this purpose has been served, and the motive for the excavation has disappeared, the tank is retained in a good condition for drinking purposes.

The opponent raises another objection : If what is stated be a fact, how does it happen that the sage *Vasishṭa*, for instance, who had seen the highest Being, entered into another body, when he died, and experienced pleasure at the birth of a son and grief at his death ? The next *sūtra* replies :

### 31. यावदधिकारमवस्थितिराधिकारिकाणाम् ।

Those, holding certain offices, have some *karma* left, so long as the office lasts.

It is not asserted that every wise man abandons good and evil deeds at death. This is true only of those that depart from the body to enter on the *devayāna*. *Vasishṭa* held an office in the economy of nature ; and he did not enter on the *devayāna*, when he died ; because his office had come to him as the fruit of *kurma*, and it continued. This *karma* remains as long as the office lasts (1).



### SUB-SECTION 13

In the *upakosala* and other *vidyās* journey on the *devayāna* is described. See *Vedic Texts*. Is progress on

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(1) It should be noted that though no *karma* is left at the point of death that will yield fruit, there is still some small portion, which prevents the full expansion of the attribute *jñāna*. Even this disappears, when the highest *Ātmā* is reached.



this path limited to those that do these *vidyās*, or is it common to them and all others also ?

*First view.* It is limited ; for it is not mentioned in connection with other *vidyās* ; and there is no authority for extending it to them (1).

*Final decision :* There is no limitation. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 32. अनियमस्सर्वेषामविरोधशब्दानुमानाभ्याम् ।

No limitation. If common to all, there will be no conflict with the *veda* and *smṛitis*.

Those that do all *vidyās* have to go along the same path. If this were not so, there would be conflict with the teaching of the *veda* and the *smṛitis*. The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* states " Those that thus meditate on this (the

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(1) *Objection.* *Chāndogya*, V-10 and the corresponding portion of the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* (VIII-2) bring up before the mind all other meditators. *Reply.* It is not made out that they do so. If the path were common to all, why is the description in chapter V-10 of the *chāndogya* repeated in chapter IV, section 15 of the same *upanishad* ? The explanation that the students were different cannot be put forward, as the repetition occurs in the same *upanishad*. It cannot be contended that progress on the path is taught in one place and that it is repeated in the other ; for there is no ground for determining which place teaches for the first time and which repeats the teaching. The purpose of the repetition cannot be to praise the path, as in the preceding section the fires told the student " your teacher will teach you the path " (*chāndo.*, IV-14-1). See *Vedic Texts* under chapter I-2-3. This shows that the teaching was not complete without instruction on this point, and that it is therefore peculiar to that *vidya*.

nature of the *jīva*) (1), and those that in the forest meditate on *Brahma* (*Satyam*) with eagerness, go to light" (VIII-2-15); and the *chāndogya* has the same teaching (V-10-1). Here the terms used in the original are *satyam* in one, and *tapas* in the other. The former term denotes *Brahma* from *vedic* usage—"Unchanging, (*satyam*), shining and without limitation is *Brahma*" (*āna.*, 1-1); and "*Satyam* alone should be meditated on" (*chāndo.*, VII-16-1). The other term *tapas* should have the same meaning, as the two texts convey the same teaching (2). The *bhagavad gitā* is to the same effect: "The light of fire, the day, the bright fortnight, when the moon waxes, the six months of the sun's northward progress—men that meditate on *Brahma* go on this path and reach *Brahma*" (VIII-24).

2. The repetition on which the *first view* relies is for the purpose of praise. This is evident from the reference to the performance or non-performance of the obsequies of the departed. See the text under consideration in *Vedic Texts*. Or the purpose was to add the information that those that go on the path do not return (3).

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(1) The first clause refers to those that do the five-fires meditation described in that place; and the second clause to those that meditate on *Brahma*.

(2) Meditation with eagerness is stated elsewhere after referring to meditation on *satyam* "Eagerness should be obtained" (*chāndo.*, VII-19).

(3) The meditation on the abandonment of *karma* at the point of death, on its going to friends and foes,

## SUB-SECTION 14

See the texts in *Vedic Texts* under chapter I-2-5 and chapter I-3-3. They refer to *Brahma* by the term *akshara*, and deny of Him a number of attributes that are found in *jivas* or matter. The effect of this is to affirm that He cannot be touched by any imperfection, and that His nature is unique. The question for consideration is whether this nature should be included in all *brahma vidyās*, or only in the *vidyā* in which it is stated.

*First view.* Only in the particular *vidyā* in which it is mentioned. There is no authority for importing into a *vidyā* the attributes that constitute the form of another *vidyā*; and being in the form of denial, the attributes denied cannot be useful like bliss and other attributes in the perception of *Brahma*. It is only when the substance has been grasped with their help, that these attributes can be denied; for it is not possible to make a denial, unless the subject regarding which it is made is present.

*Final decision:* Meditation on this nature of the highest *Ātmā* should form part of every *brahma vidyā*. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

and on the progress on the *devayāna* are subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*. But as they partake of the nature of meditation, they are included in this section; and the intention is also to distinguish these subsidiary meditations from certain *karmas*, which are also subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*, and which are dealt with in the next section.

### 33. अक्षरधियांत्ववरोधस्सामान्यतद्वावाभ्यामौपसदवत्तदुक्तम् ।

The conception of *Akshara* enters into every *vidyā* ; because He is the same, and the attributes come into His perception. Like the *mantras* of *upasad* ; it has been stated.

Because the object to be meditated on in all *vidyās* is the same, *viz.*, the highest *Ātmā* ; and because also in the perception of that object the nature declared by the denials comes in. An object is perceived by perceiving its specific character, *i.e.*, that character by which it is differentiated from everything else. The possession of bliss and the other attributes stated in sub-section 4 does not by itself bring before the mind His specific character ; for they are found in *jīvas* also. To bliss and the rest should be added incompatibility with all imperfections. This feature is not found in the *jīva*, who, though without imperfections in himself, is fit to be connected with them. This trait, which is needed, is the reverse of the attributes found in this universe consisting of matter and *jīvas* ; and it is stated in the two texts cited.

The *sūtra* adds an illustration to show that attributes are inseparably connected with the seat of them. In a *soma yūga*, in which the offerings of the *soma* juice are repeated on four days, and which is connected with the name of *Jamadagni*, a subsidiary *karma* known as *upasad* is done on twelve days ; and the principal offering in it on each day is a cake of fried rice flour. This is prescribed in the *yajur veda*, while the *mantras* for making the offerings are stated in the *sāma*

*veda*. The *mantras* have to be recited in an undertone like *mantras* in the *yajur veda*, while those of the *sāma veda* are recited in a loud tone. This follows the principle laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (1).

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Here the opponent raises an objection. The object meditated on in every *brahma vidyā* being the highest *Ātmā*, and He being the seat of numberless attributes, which are inseparably connected with Him, they would all come into every *vidyā*, and their limitation to particular *vidyās* would be futile. The next *sutrā* replies :

### 34. इयदामननात् ।

So much only ; for meditation.

Only those attributes come into all *vidyās* without which the highest *Ātma* cannot be perceived ; and they are those stated in sub-section 4 and in this sub-section. All other qualities should be taken into account only in those *vidyās*, in which they are specially mentioned.

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(1) The principle referred to is as follows : In the *karma* known as *ādhāna* (establishing the three fires) certain *sāma mantras* have to be sung. The *karma* is the principal one, and the singing of the *sāman* is subsidiary to it. As subsidiary things should follow the principal, the *sāman* should be sung in an undertone, as *mantras* in the *yajur veda* are ; and not like verses in the *sāma veda*, which should be recited in a high tone (Intro., para 24). *Ādhāna* is enjoined in the *yajur veda* (III-3-2).

## SUB-SECTION 15

See *Vedic* Texts. *Yājñavalkya* was questioned by two persons. The question was the same—

Tell me about Him, who is *Brahma* in the primary meaning of the term, who is eternal and omnipresent, and who is the inner ruler of all.

The answers were different—To *Ushasta* it was

He, who with *prāṇa* does the work of *prāṇa*, is your *Ātmā*, abiding within all

and other words to the same effect. To a further question from the same person, the answer was

Do not see him that sees, do not hear about him that hears, do not think about him that thinks, do not meditate on him that meditates.

The answer to *Kahola*, the other questioner, was

He is the inner ruler of all, who transcends hunger and thirst, grief and confusion, old age and death.

Here the question for consideration is whether one *vidyā* is taught or two *vidyās*.

*First view.* Two *vidyās* are taught ; for their forms are different ; and this follows from the different replies given, though the question was one. In the former reply the worker with *prāṇa* is stated to be the *ātmā* within all, and in the latter one that is without hunger and the rest. Reference is made in the former to a *jīva*, who breathes, and who is other than the body, the senses, the mind, *prāṇa* and the attribute *jñāna*, and in the latter to the highest *Ātmā*, who is other than the *jīva*, and who is without hunger and the rest.

2. Here a question is put to the opponent. How can a *jīva* be the *ātmā* within all? *Reply*. The *jīva* has a number of elements forming his body ; and he is within them and controls them all. It is no doubt true that this is a limited control ; but there is no help for it. If it be assumed out of a predilection for unlimited control that the highest *Ātmā* is referred to in the first reply, the difference in the replies cannot be got over. The first answer refers to the *jīva* ; for breathing with *prāṇa* can never apply to the highest *Ātmā* ; the latter reply refers to Him ; for He is without hunger and the rest.

The *sūtra* states this *first view* and then rejects it :

35. अन्तराभूतप्राप्तवत्स्वात्मनाऽन्यथाभेदानुपपत्तिरिति चेन्नाप  
देशवत् ।

If it be said—"The first reply about being within all pertains to the *ātmā*, the owner of the group of elements ; otherwise impropriety in the form of different replies" the reply is—No ; like the teaching (in *sad vidyā*).

The *final decision* is stated in the last part of the *śūtra* : Only one *vidyā* is taught. For in both the places the question and answers relate to the highest *Ātmā*. First as to the question. The term *brahma*, though denoting Him only, is sometimes applied to the *jīva* also in a secondary sense. To distinguish Him from the *jīva*, the epithet *sākshāt* (directly) has been added. The term *aparokshāt* means one, that is present in one's view ; and this will be possible only, if he is connected with all places and with all times ; it is appropriate

only in the highest *Ātmā*, who is stated to be without limitations in the text “Unchanging, shining and without limitations is *Brahma*” (*āna.*, I-1). And being within all is also true only of Him; for He is stated to be in everything, beginning with earth and ending with the *jīva* (*bṛihad.*, V-7-7 to 27). Next, the first reply also relates to Him. It refers to one that does the work of *prāṇa*, using it as an instrument, and to one that does this at all times, and not only during waking moments. Such an one is *Brahma*, not a *jīva*; for in deep sleep he does not do this work. *Ushasta* did not grasp the full scope of the answer. He thought that mere working with *prāṇa* was meant, and that this was found in the *jīva* also. He therefore questioned again. *Yājñavalkya* replied giving an unmistakable mark, that separates Him from the *jīva*; and that shows that reference was made to one that does the work *prāṇana* (breathing) without any limitation—‘Do not look upon the *jīva* as He that does the work *prāṇana*; for he is dependent upon the senses for seeing, hearing, thinking and meditation; and in deep sleep and in trance he cannot direct *prāṇa*.’ And the text “Who will attain worldly pleasure (*anyāt*), who will attain the bliss of release (*prāṇyāt*), if this limitless bliss does not exist” (*āna.*, VII) shows *Brahma* alone to be the cause by which all beings live. This is true of the second reply also. For the transcending of hunger, thirst and the rest is His specific attribute. In both the places the closing of the teaching is the same —“Other than He is miserable”.



The repetition of the question and reply is for the purpose of showing that the highest *Ātmā*, who makes all beings breathe, is beyond hunger, thirst and so on. The *sūtra* refers to a parallel case in the *sad vidyā*. That *vidyā* begins with the question of the father. "Did you enquire about that *Ādeśa* (all-controller), etc." *chāndo.*, VI-1-3); and the son asked "Will you yourself, revered sir, tell me" (*Ibid.*, VI-1-7). Again and again he said "Revered sir, teach me further" (*Ibid.*, VI-5-4). The father replied every time, giving further information regarding *Sat*. Similarly here.

Here the opponent shifts his ground, and states that even so, the *vidyās* must differ. In one place the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā* as causing all beings to breathe; and in the other as being beyond hunger, thirst and the rest. The attributes being different, the form differs, and the questioners also differ. The *sūtra* replies :

36. व्यतिहारो विशिषन्ति हीतरवत् ।

The instructions given to them should be interchanged.

The replies differentiate the object of meditation (from the *jīva*) as in the other place.

The *vidyās* do not differ; for the questions and replies deal with the same Being; and the term conveying the injunction is used only once, after the reply to the second questioner—'Hence the meditator should attain *pāṇḍitya*, and be like a child.' It is therefore concluded that the two sections of the *upanishad* form

a connected whole. First, both the questions refer to the highest *Ātmā* viewed as the inner ruler of all. The word *eva* (only) added in the question of *Kahola* indicates that he referred to the same Being viewed in the same aspect as *Ushasta* did. In both the replies the same Being in the same aspect is stated. As meditation is to be on this aspect only, the form of the *vidyā* is the same. *Yājñavalkya* taught *Ushasta* and *Kahola* how this object should be differentiated from the *jīva*. For this purpose he referred first to the aspect of making all beings breathe; next to the aspect of transcending hunger, thirst and the rest. It was his intention that each should view *Brahma* in the aspect pointed out to the other, in addition to that in which He was presented to himself. By this means each would perceive *Brahma* as differentiated from the *jīva*. Hence the attribute that enters into the *vidyā* is that He is the inner ruler of all. The other two features pointed out serve merely to explain it.

2. *Question*. If this be so, why should two aspects be stated to differentiate the highest *Ātmā* from the *jīva*? *Reply*. The aspect presented to *Ushasta* did not satisfy *Kahola*, who wished to know an aspect which could never be found in the *jīva*; and *Yājñavalkya* knowing his thought replied.

3. In the *sad vidyā* by the questions and replies repeated several times the same Being was differentiated in several ways. The object was not, however, to require the disciple to meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as

clothed in a new attribute at each step. Similarly here also.

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*Question.* How is it known that in the *sad vidyā* too the same *vidyā* is dealt with, when the questions and answers are different? The *sūtra* replies:

**37. सैव हि सत्यादयः ।**

The same Being; for the statements beginning with 'This is true' (*satya*) are repeated in every reply.

The same Being, that is denoted by the term *sat*, and that is the final cause, is held up as the object of meditation in all the sections beginning with the ninth. For, the statements made in the text "All this is identical with that; this is true; He is *ātmā*" are repeated in all the sections; and the teaching is brought to a close.

*Criticism.* Some commentators treat *sūtras* 36 and 37 as forming two separate sub-sections. They consider the following text in the first sub-section "Revered *devatā*, 'I am thou'; revered *devatā* 'Thou art I'; hence I am he; and he is I". They state that the text directs that the *jīva* and *Brahma* should each be regarded as the other. This view should be rejected; for the text does not teach any new thing. The identification of *Brahma* with everything is already known from the texts "All this is indeed *Brahma*; All this is identical with that (*Sat*); That thou art". It is not a correct view that *Brahma* should be thought on as the *jīva*, and that the *jīva* should be thought on as *Brahma*. The

only correct view is that *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of all, and is therefore the *ātmā* of every *jīva*. One should therefore meditate on *Brahma* as his *ātmā*. This will be taught in *sūtra* IV-1-3.

2. They consider the following text in the second sub-section: 'He that meditates on that (the heart) as the great, respected, first-born, *satya*, *Brahma*.' The term *satya* means the Being, who appears as *sat* (the unlimited ether and air), and as *tyad* (the limited fire, water and earth) (*vide brihad.*, VII-5-1). This text enjoins meditation on the heart as *satya*. They regard this meditation and the meditations considered in sub-section 8 *supra* as one. This view also is incorrect. It has been shown already in that sub-section that there are two meditations on the *Purusha* in the sun and on the *Purusha* in the eye. The meditation on the heart has a form of its own, and will yield a separate fruit—*viz.*, the winning of these worlds; and it is therefore complete. In the other two meditations *Brahma* should be meditated on as having three *mantras* as parts of His body; and their fruit is destruction and abandonment of *karma*. Hence the form and the fruit are different. How can the meditation on the heart and the other meditations be one?

3. The commentators explain: The meditations are one; the fruit in the form of the destruction and abandonment of *karma* is not the fruit of the meditation; it is the fruit of an *anga*—*i.e.*, a subsidiary part. *Reply*. There is no authority for regarding it as such.

4. Further explanation. The authority is that the *vidyās* are one. *Reply*. This would mean : If it be decided that the meditations are one, the fruit in question will be the fruit of a subsidiary part ; if the fruit be decided to be of this character, the meditations will be one. This would be arguing in a circle.

5. For this and other reasons the two *sūtras* should be treated as has been done by us.

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### SUB-SECTION 16

The *dahara vidyā* is taught in the *chāndogya* and *bṛihad āraṇyaka upanishads* thus :

There is in this city of *Brahma* a dwelling place in the form of a small lotus. The small ether (*ākāṣa*) within it and what is within it—both should be sought and be meditated on (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-1) ; He that was described as the great unborn *Ātmā* lies in the ether (*ākāṣa*) within the heart of him, that was referred to as possessing the attribute *jnāna* and as dwelling in the midst of *prāṇas*. He has every one in His grip ; He controls every one (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22).

Here are there two *vidyās* or is there one *vidyā* only ?

*First view*. There are two *vidyās* ; for, the object to be meditated on is—in one case *ākāṣa*, and in the other He that lies in *ākāṣa*. The attributes also differ ; for in one they are the eight qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*. and in the other having every one

in His grip and the rest. Hence, the forms being different, the *vidyās* are different.

*Final decision.* The *vidyā* is one. This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 38. कामादीतरत्र तत्र चायतनादिभ्यः ।

The attributes are *satyakāma* and the rest in that place and in the other ; because of the mention of abode and the rest.

The form of the *vidyā* is the same ; for in both places the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as possessing the quality of being *satyakāma* and the other qualities. This is known from the mention of His dwelling in the heart, and of His keeping the worlds like a bund from being confounded (See *Vedic Texts*). From these marks the *vidyā* is recognised as one. The attributes mentioned in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text are particular varieties of the attribute of being *satyasan-kalpa* (having an unfrustrated will), which is included in the eight qualities enumerated in the other. Hence the attribute of being *satyakāma* and the others mentioned along with it enter into the *vidyā*. Thus the form is the same. The fruit also is the same, as shown by the following texts “ Reaching the highest Light, he attains his own nature ” (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2) and “ He that thus meditates becomes *brahma*, who is free from fear ” (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-25). He becomes like *Brahma*. The term *ākāṣa* denotes *Brahma* in the *chāndogya* (*vide, sūtra*, I-3-13) ; and in the other the element ether. From the mention of the attributes the Being that lies in the *ākāṣa* is decided to be the highest *Ātmā* ; and *ākāṣa*, in

which He lies, must be ether. Compare with the text of *nārāyaṇa* "The small ether within it" (*anu.*, 11).

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The opponent disputes the correctness of the conclusion reached. This is his argument. You assume that the object of meditation possesses certain qualities ; but as a matter of fact they are not found in Him. This is affirmed by the texts, which precede and follow verse 22 under consideration :

In this (*Brahma*) there is no difference whatever ; one that suspects even a small difference in Him attains *samsāra* after *samsāra* (verse 19) ; This unlimited, unmoving *Brahma* should be meditated on as possessing oneness (verse 20) ; That *ātmā* is to be described by no, no (verse 22).

The object to be meditated on is therefore without any quality (*nir-viśeṣa*). Hence the attributes mentioned in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text are stated only to be denied, as grossness and subtleness are denied by the *upanishad* in another place. For the same reason the qualities mentioned in the *chāndogya* are not real. In *vidyās* done to attain release these attributes should therefore be ignored (1).

Hence the *vidyās* differ. The next *sūtra* gives a reply :

### 39. आदरादलोपः ।

No ignoring of the attributes ; because they have been enumerated with earnestness.

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(1) The opponent's meaning is that in the *chāndogya* the meditation is on *Brahma* as possessing attributes for securing certain inferior fruits. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* it is on *Brahma* in His real nature as having no attributes.

They have been enumerated with earnestness as the attributes to enter into meditations done for obtaining release. Thus :

What is within it should be sought (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-1) ; He is *Ātmā* ; He is free from *karma* ; He is free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst ; He has unchanging objects of desire ; and His will is never frustrated (*Ibid.*, VIII-1-5) ; He has every one in His grip ; He controls every one (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22) ; He is the ruler of all ; He is the lord of beings ; He is the protector of beings ; He is the protective bund that keeps the worlds from being confounded (*Ibid.*).

Similar descriptions are found in other *upanishads* also. These attributes are not known from any other source, as the attributes of *Brahma* ; hence the view that they are stated here merely to be denied is untenable. The intention of an author may be known from several marks, of which one is stating a new thing ; and this mark is present here. Next, the *chāndogyā* prescribes meditation on *Brahma* as possessing the eight attributes stated, and blames one that does not so meditate

Those, that meditate here on the *Ātmā* and on those unchanging divine qualities and depart, can wander at will in all the worlds ; Those, that without meditating here on the *Ātmā* and on those unchanging divine qualities depart, cannot wander at pleasure in all the worlds (VI-1-6).

This is another mark of the interest taken by the *upanishad* in this matter. The other *upanishad* exhibits the same interest by mentioning the power of control again and again. This is a third mark. Now how can the *veda*, which loves us more than a thousand parents,



teach with interest, like one that deceives, the possession by *Brahma* of qualities, that are unreal, that have to be ignored, and that cannot be known by any other means? Men are already bewildered by being carried on the whirlpool of *samsāra*; and how can it be thought that it further deludes them (1)?

(1) The absurdity of the opponent's position may be exposed as follows :

*Opponent.* The mention of attributes is to delude.

*Reply.* The denial of attributes is from the same intention.

*Opponent.* The *veda*, which has undertaken to teach what is good for us, cannot delude.

*Reply.* This remark applies also to mention of attributes.

*Opponent.* The mention of unreal attributes is for the purpose of securing particular fruits.

*Reply.* The denial of attributes is for the same purpose. The possession of attributes is a true fact.

*Opponent.* Meditation as without attributes being for the attainment of release, the negation of attributes states the true fact.

*Reply.* Meditation as possessing attributes being for the attainment of release, the affirmation states the true fact.

*Opponent.* That meditation as possessing attributes leads to release is a statement springing from an intention to delude.

*Reply.* The same remark applies to the other statement.

*Opponent.* It is not appropriate that the *veda* should delude, having undertaken to teach us what is good.

*Reply.* This applies to the mention of attributes also.

2. *Question.* How then are the texts quoted by me to be explained? *Reply.* The texts denying difference and affirming oneness show that all things are products of *Brahma*; and that they are therefore identical with Him. It is therefore enjoined that they should be seen as one in this respect. After teaching this, the *upanishad* proceeds to condemn the seeing of the world as consisting of independent parts, as was previously supposed. In the other text also by the word *iti* reference is made to the form of the material world perceived by other means; and this form is denied of *Brahma*. This therefore differentiates Him, the inner ruler of all, from the world. This point is developed immediately after:

He is other than those that can be perceived by other means; and He is therefore not perceived; He is other than those that fall to pieces; and He does not therefore fall to pieces; He is other than those that are attached; and He is therefore not attached; He is other than those that suffer; and He does not therefore suffer, nor perish (verse 22).

A similar description is found in the *chândogya* also:

By the old age of the body He does not age; by the killing of the body he is not killed. This city-like *Brahma* is not subject to change. In Him all divine qualities are contained (VIII-1-5).

This text shows *Brahma* to be different from everything else, and to be the seat of the qualities mentioned.

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The opponent raises another objection. The text quoted as conferring on the meditator the capacity to

wander at will in all the worlds adds—" If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his mere will the fathers come up ; and joining them he is respected " (*chāndo.*, VIII-2-1). This is a fruit desired by bound *jivas*. Those that desire release and the attainment of *Brahma* should not meditate on Him as possessing qualities. Also, the fruit of *Brahma vidyā* is to attain one's own nature. The next *sūtra* replies :

#### 40. उपस्थितेऽतस्तद्वचनात् ।

(The fruits referred to are those to be reaped) by one reaching *Brahma* and he does so from that fact ; so it is stated.

The statement is thus made :

This *jiva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light and appears in his natural form. He (who is reached) is the best of all persons. The *jiva* (on going thither) enjoys Him all round ; he eats, enjoys (as he pleases) ; he amuses himself with women, carriages or cousins ; he does not think of this body lying by the side of (weeping) relations (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2 and 3). He becomes his own master ; and he can wander at pleasure in all the worlds (*Ibid.*, VII-25-2).

This point will be fully dealt with in the next chapter. Hence the conclusion reached in the first *sūtra* remains unshaken.

#### SUB-SECTION 17

This text occurs in the *chāndogya* :

Meditate on this syllable (known as *pranava*), which is part of *udgītha* (I-1-1).

The singing of the *udgitha* (See *Vedic Texts*) is a part (*anga*) of a *soma yāga*. The question for consideration is whether this and similar *vidyās* are essential parts of a *soma yāga*.

*First view.* They are. For the *vidyā*, though not enjoined in the earlier portion of the *veda*, in which *soma yāga* is prescribed, is connected with the singing of the *udgitha*, which is enjoined as an essential part of the *yāga*. In this manner the *vidyā* also becomes an essential part of the *yāga*. There is a precedent for this conclusion. The text 'with *juhū* make *homas*' is found where *soma yāga* is prescribed; and *juhū* is thus connected with the *yāga* as an instrument. Another text states that the *juhū* should be made of *parṇa* wood; and this is not connected with any *karma*; yet this feature of the *juhū* is connected through it with the *yāga*. Similarly here. The *udgitha vidyā* should be done as a part of the *yāga*; and no separate fruit is needed as a motive for its being done.

2. *Objection.* A fruit is mentioned in the last verse of the same section of the *upanishad*; The *udgitha-vidyā* is not therefore an essential part of the *yāga*: *Reply.* It is mere praise (*arthavāda*). For an essential part of a *karma* cannot be connected with a separate fruit (1). Here the fruit is stated in the last verse,

(1) This follows the rule laid down in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. *Juhū* is an instrument with which offerings are made; and a text states that it should be made of *parṇa* wood. The text adds the following as a fruit to come from this "He, whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, does not

while the *vidyā* is enjoined in the first verse. And there is no connection with the injunction text, as in the following text—"For one that desires cows, in the vessel in which cows are milked" (1). Further, there is a mere statement of what will happen; but there is no injunction. Hence, the *vidyā* should invariably be done in every *soma yāga*.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

41. तन्निर्धारणानियमस्तद्दृष्टेः पृथग्यप्रतिबन्धः फलम् ।

The meditation (on *udgītha*) is not compulsory; so does it appear from *vedic* text. Fruit separate—*viz.*, non-obstruction.

The *vedic* text in support of the option to meditate or not to meditate is as follows :

With the help of this (the syllable) both do their work—one that thus meditates on that, and one that does not meditate (I-1-10).

This recognises the singing of the *udgītha* without meditating on it. If the meditation were an essential part of the *yāga*, its non-performance would be inappropriate.

hear unpleasant statements". This is mere praise. For, it is not stated that the fruit should be brought about; there is the mere statement that he does not hear. The injunction is therefore for the benefit of the *yāga*. In regard to what exists for the benefit of a *yāga*, there is no question what is its fruit? It is concerned only with the helping of the *yāga*. The mention of the fruit is therefore *arthavāda* (IV-3-1).

(1) See Introduction, para 25.

*Question.* Why is it then enjoined? The injunction should point to a fruit. *Reply.* When the *udgitha* is sung with the meditation, the *yāga* becomes more efficacious; and this is a fruit different from the fruit of the *yāga*. This is stated:

Whatever is done with meditation, with eagerness, and with knowledge of everything being ruled from within by the highest *Ātmā*, that alone becomes most efficacious (I-1-10).

What is becoming most efficacious? *Reply.* The fruit of the *yāga*—going to the heaven-world—is not obstructed and delayed, as it is often obstructed, by the need of a more powerful *karma* to yield its own fruit. The meditation on *udgitha* removes the obstruction; and this fruit is different from that of the *yāga* itself. And this is stated in the *sūtra*. Though the fruit is stated in an *arthavāda*, it may be connected with the injunction (1). The conclusion is that the *vidyā* is not an essential part of the *soma yāga*, as filling the milking vessel is not an essential part of the *darṣa* and *pūrṇa-māsa ishtis* (Introduction, para 25).

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#### SUB-SECTION 18

In the *daharu vidyā* meditation should be on the highest *Ātmā* [referred to as the small ether (*ākāśa*)] in the heart of man, and on His eight qualities as stated in

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(1) See the footnote on page 92, the portion dealing with the second text.

the text "Those that meditate here on the *Ātmā* and on these unchanging divine qualities and depart, etc." (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-6). See *Vedic Texts*. Here meditation on the *Ātmā* is first prescribed, and then a separate meditation on the qualities. The question for consideration is whether in the meditation on each quality meditation on the *Ātmā* also should be repeated as possessing it or not.

*First view.* Repetition is not necessary ; for the qualities pertain to the same *Ātmā* ; and He can be meditated on but once.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

#### 42. प्रदानवदेव तदुक्तम् ।

Only as in making offerings ; this is stated.

Meditation should be repeated. Though the small ether is the seat of all the qualities, and meditation on Him has been done already, yet His aspect in His nature merely is one thing, and the aspect as invested with each quality is another ; and the injunction as to the second meditation refers to Him in these words "He is free from *karma*, free from old age, etc." (*chāndo.*, VIII-1-5). Hence the meditation on each quality should be on the small ether as possessing the quality ; and meditation on the *Ātmā* is therefore repeated. The *sūtra* gives an analogy. Offerings are made "to *Indra* the king," "to *Indra* the supreme ruler" ; and "to *Indra*, master of himself". Though the *devatā* is the same, the aspects in which offerings are made to him differ ; and the offerings are repeated.

This is stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*. "The *devatās* are different ; because the aspects differ."

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### SUB-SECTION 19

In the *taittiriya-nārāyaṇa* the *dahara vidyā* is stated in verse 23 of section 10, and then follows the eleventh section—See *Vedic Texts*. The question for consideration is whether this latter section is connected with that verse, and determines who the particular Being is, that is meditated on in that *vidyā*, or whether it is independent, and performs the same duty for all *vidyās*.

*First view.* The former is the correct view ; for the preceding section refers to *dahara vidyā*, and this section mentions the lotus-like heart, and thus connects the two sections as dealing with one subject only (1).

*Final decision :* The latter section is independent. The reason is stated in the *sūtra* :

#### 43. लिङ्गभूयस्त्वात्तद्वि बलीयस्तदपि ।

Because the marks are many ; it is stronger ; that also is stated.

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(1) The texts are — "There is a small, pure lotus in the middle of the city (human body), which forms the palace of the highest *Ātmā* ; and in it is a small ether (*gaganam*) which is free from grief. What is within it should be meditated on (X-23) ; "The heart like a lotus bud with its tip downwards" (XI).



The section exhibits many marks—that is, there are many sentences, which take the terms used in many *vidyās* to denote the object of meditation, such as *akshara*, *śiva*, *śambhu*, *param brahma*, *param jyotis*, *paratatva*, *paramātmā*, and the like, and state that they denote *Nārāyaṇa*. This shows that the Being, who is meditated on in all *vidyās*, who is quite unlike the *universe*, and who is bliss, unchanging, shining and without limitations, is *Nārāyaṇa*. The sentences, which state this, are numerous; and being the authority known as *vākya*, they possess greater force than mere context or *prakaraṇa* (See Introduction, para 18 (iii) and (iv) and 19). When it is thus settled that this section is common to all *vidyās*, the *dahara vidyā* being one of these, and *Nārāyaṇa* being therefore the object of meditation in that *vidyā* also, the reference to that *vidyā* becomes intelligible.

2. *Objection.* In the first verse of this section the words are in the accusative case, and must be connected with the injunction to meditate given in the preceding section. *Reply.* No. For, in the term *upāsitavyam* (should be meditated on) used in the injunction, the termination indicates the object of meditation and words in the accusative case will not be appropriate. Also, an examination of the verses, that follow it, shows that the accusative case is used in the sense of the nominative case. The verses are 2, 4, 5 and 12. This will be clear when the original is examined. If the objection be accepted, it will be necessary to regard the nominative case in all these verses as used to mean the

accusative case, and to supply the term *upāsita* (meditate) to govern the words in the accusative case. Hence the objection should be over-ruled.

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### SUB-SECTION 20

In the *agnirahasya*, which is learnt by those that learn the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, a *kratu* (1) is first described, in which the fire that receives the offerings is placed on an altar made of specially-made bricks piled one over another so as to represent the figure of a bird. This will be referred to as brick-made fire. In this *kratu*, which occupies several days, the offerings of the *soma* juice, which constitute the principal *karma*, take place on the last day; and they consist of several operations—the crushing of the *soma* creeper, taking its juice and placing the vessels in their places, the singing of *vedic* verses by one set of helpers, which are known as *stotras*, the recitation of verses by another set known as *śastras* and making the offerings. Then the *agnirahasya* goes on to prescribe certain meditations in imitation of the *kratu*. In these there is no action whatever; but every article, every instrument and every manual operation is mere thought. In this thought-made *kratu*

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(1) *Yāga* is one offering made to a *devatā*; *kratu* is a *karma*, in which many offerings are made to many *devatās*. *Soma yāga* is a *kratu*. The term is also used to denote meditation; hence a *kratu* proper is often described as *yajna kratu*.

the fires to receive the offerings are the mind, speech, *prāṇa*, eye, ear, organs of action and the stomach ; and all the activities of each of these are to be regarded as the operations in the real *kratu*—the taking of the *soma* juice, singing *stotras*, reciting the *ṣastras* and making offerings. And this is to be done throughout one's life. For convenience one fire may be taken—the mind-made fire. That this fire partakes of the nature of meditation is undoubted. The question for consideration is merely whether it is of the nature of action by entering into a real *kratu* consisting of actions, or whether it is of the nature of *vidyā* by entering into a *kratu* consisting of thoughts only. The first two *sūtras* put forward the former view ; and the next five *sūtras* refute the same, and establish the latter view.

#### 44. पूर्वविकल्पः प्रकरणात् स्यात्क्रियामानसवत् ।

An alternative to the previous one ; from the context (*prakaraṇa*) it is of the nature of action ; like the *mānasa* operations.

The mind-made fire requires a *kratu*, into which it can enter ; but where it is described, there is no injunction to do a *kratu*. The preceding chapter refers to a brick-made fire, and this fire, being invariably connected with a *kratu* consisting of action, is brought up before the mind. It may therefore be concluded that option is given to perform the *kratu* either with the brick-made fire or with the mind-made fire ; and that therefore the latter is of the nature of action. There is a precedent for regarding what is really of the nature of meditation, as partaking of the nature of action by entering into a real *kratu*.

In a *kratu*, known as *dvādaśāha*, in which the offerings of the *soma* juice are repeated on twelve days, on the eleventh (1) day known as *avivākya* all the operations are carried on mentally, including the taking of the *soma* juice, the placing of the vessels in their places, the singing of the *stotras*, the reciting of the *śastras*, the making of the offerings, the bringing back of the vessels to the *hotā*, and the drinking of the remainder of the juice by the helpers concerned. They are thus of the nature of thought only, and yet as they form a part of a real *kratu*, they are held to be of the nature of action. Similarly here also.

#### 45. अतिदेशाच्च ।

And because the fruit of the brick-made fire is extended to the mind-made fire.

This *sūtra* gives an additional reason for the conclusion stated in the preceding *sūtra*. The text is "Of these each one by itself is as capable as the preceding one". This means that whatever capacity there is in the brick-made fire will be found in the mind-made fire. Hence, as the two fires do the same work, either may be resorted to. And as like the other it helps in the performance of the *kratu*, it is auxiliary to it, and is of the nature of action.

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(1) The day known as *avivākya* is the tenth day of the *daśarūtra*, which consists of all the days of the *dvādaśāha* except the first and the last. The *avivākya* day is therefore the eleventh day of *dvādaśāha*.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra* :

46. विद्यैवतु निर्धारणादर्शनाच्च ।

But it is of the nature of meditation only ; because it is so affirmed, and because it is seen.

The view put forward is rejected ; for the mind-made fire is connected with a *kratu*, which is itself of the nature of meditation. It is so affirmed in the following text :

They are made with *vidyā* alone ; for with *vidyā* alone of one that thus meditates these are made.

As the activities of the mind cannot be built up like bricks, it is evident that the fire is made of thought only, and that it is of the nature of meditation ; yet the affirmation here by the particle *eva* (only) of the very same fact is intended to show that it has this character from its connection with a *vidyā*-made *kratu*. A *kratu* of this kind, which the mind-made fire serves, is stated in the very same place.

They (the fires) were established by mind only ; by mind alone the altar was made ; by mind the *soma* juice was taken in them (mind-made vessels) ; by mind *stotras* were sung ; by mind *ṣastras* were recited. Whatever *karma* is done in a real *kratu*, whether the principal offering or anything auxiliary to it, all this was done by mind alone mentally in those mind-made fires.

This shows that the *kratu* also is of the nature of thought.

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The opponent disputes the correctness of the reply ; on the plea that there is no injunction to do the *kratu*.

that no reference is made to fruits, and that the context relates to a *kratu* consisting of operations in a brick-made fire. The next *sūtra* replies :

47. श्रुत्यादिबलीयस्त्वाच्च न बाधः ।

And the conclusion is not affected ; because *śruti* and the other authorities are of greater force.

The conclusion—that there is a *vidyā*-made *kratu*, and that the mind-made fire is connected with it—is not affected ; for the context cannot prevail over *śruti*, *linga* and *vākya*. See Introduction, para 19. *Śruti* has been already quoted under the preceding *sūtra*. *Linga* is as follows :

In regard to one that thus meditates all persons at all times make them, even when he sleeps.

This making of the fires by all beings takes place at all times and is done by the mind ; while the brick-made fire is made by a limited number of persons working for a limited time only. The mind-made fire cannot therefore enter through its work into a *kratu* consisting of actions. This indicates that it must enter into a *vidyā-made krātu*. The same text is also a *vākya*, which means two words connected together.

The other two arguments are next met :

48. अनुबन्धादिभ्यः प्रज्ञान्तरपृथक्त्ववद्दृष्टश्च तदुक्तम् ।

Because of the adjuncts ; like the difference of other *vidyas*. And it is seen ; it has been stated.

The conclusion is supported by the adjuncts of the *kratu*; and they are the taking of the *soma* juice in vessels, the singing of the *stotras*, and reciting of the *sastras*.

By mind the *soma* juice was taken in them (mind-made vessels); by mind *stotras* were sung; by mind *sastras* were recited.

This *vidyā-made kratu* differs from a real *kratu*, as other *vidyās* like the *dahara vidyā* differ from it. The existence of a *vidyā-made kratu* being established, the injunction to perform it may be assumed; and it is seen in other places that an injunction is assumed from a text which has the appearance of a repetition. This is stated in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* (1). The fruit is stated in the text "Of these each one by itself is as capable as that preceding one". This means that whatever fruit is yielded by the brick-made fire through its own *kratu*, that is yielded by the mind-made fire through its own *kratu*.

सत्यमेव जयते

The argument in the second *sūtra* of the *first view* is next refuted:

(1) In connection with an offering in the case of a dead person, the following text occurs—"Holding the *sumid* (twig) below, he should follow; for he holds it over it in connection with offerings to the *devas*." The particle *hi* occurs (in the original) in the second clause, which shows that it is a repetition. Nevertheless, as the holding of the twig over the *juhū* has not been enjoined elsewhere, an injunction is assumed; and the particle *hi* is ignored (III-4-5).

#### 49. न सामान्यादप्युपलब्धेर्मृत्युवन्नहिलोकापत्तिः ।

No; because extension of incidents may relate to likeness in any respect whatever; because it is known as in the statement that one is like Death; no need to go to his world.

When certain incidents of one thing are extended to another thing, it is not necessary that there should be likeness in other incidents also. The two things may be alike in one respect only, *i.e.*, the one to which reference is made. Here is an analogous case "That *purusha*, that appears in that orb, is Death indeed". The incident of destruction alone is extended, as there is similarity in that respect. It does not follow that He should go to the world of Death.

#### 50. परेण च शब्दस्य ताद्विध्यं भूयस्त्वात्वनुबन्धः ।

And by the section that follows, the terms denoting the mind-made and other fires should be understood as stated. The addition in the *agnirahasya* is on account of plurality.

The second section of the *agnirahasya* prescribes a *vidyā* with a separate fruit; and this is followed by the *aiśvānara vidyā*. Hence it is not correct to say that this portion of the *veda* deals only with *karma*. *Question*. If this be so, *why* was the *vidyā* under consideration not added in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*. *Reply*. Many are the adjuncts of the fire to be imagined in this *vidyā*; the *vidyā* has therefore been added where the fire is described.



## SUB-SECTION 21

## 51. एक आत्मनश्शरीरे भावात् ।

Some (think that only the qualities of the *ātmā*—that he knows, acts and enjoys—should be meditated on in all *vidyās*) ; because he is in a body.

In *sūtra* I-4-6 it was stated that in all *vidyās* on the highest *Ātmā* one should meditate on himself also, and in (IV-1-3) it will be explained that the meditation should be as being ruled by the highest *Ātmā* from within. The question for consideration is whether the meditator should think of himself only as a knower, doer and enjoyer, and as being capable of going to the heaven-world and returning here, or as possessing the qualities enumerated in the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*chāndo.*, VIII-7-1)? The *sūtra* states the *first view*. In the opinion of some the former alternative is the correct one ; for the meditating *jīva* dwells in a body ; and while he does so, what has been stated is his form ; and this is near at hand. By meditating on this form alone it is possible for him to reap the fruit of meditation. It is not necessary for one, that desires the heaven-world, and performs the necessary *karma*, to meditate, while he does the *karma*, on the aspect that he will attain while he reaps the fruit. By meditating only on the qualities of knowing, acting, etc., he may do the means and reap the fruit ; and there is nothing to be gained by meditating on a further set of qualities. That case does not differ from the case under consideration ; and it is sufficient to meditate only on the first set of

qualities. *Objection.* The meditation should be on the form to be reached ; for it is specially stated :

What one meditates on in this world, that he becomes, when he departs from here (*chāndo.*, III-14-1).

*Reply.* It is not so ; the text quoted refers to meditation on the highest *Ātmā* as stated in the text “ How he meditates on Him ”.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra*.

## 52. व्यतिरेकस्तद्भावभावित्वान्तूपलब्धिवत् ।

But no. The reverse (of the present aspect) ; because from meditation on it comes its attainment ; like the attainment of the highest *Ātmā*.

The aspect of the meditator, while he remains bound, should not be meditated on ; on the other hand, the aspect to be attained, when he will become free, should be thought on, while he does the meditation. Because as the text quoted states it is only by meditating on that aspect that it will be attained. It is not correct to say that the text refers only to the nature of the highest *Ātmā*. As the *jīva* is His body, he also enters into the meditation. In other words, the meditation should be on the highest *Ātmā* with the *jīva* as his body, the *jīva* being clothed in freedom from *karma* and in the other seven qualities stated in the teaching of *Prajāpati* ; and the highest *Ātmā* in this very form is to be attained. Hence it is stated “ By meditating in this manner I will, on going from here, attain that world ”. Hence the *jīva* should be meditated on in the aspect that is to be attained,

2. The last term in the *sūtra* gives an illustration. The attainment of the highest *Ātmā* taught is in the aspect that pertains to Him by nature. Similarly, the attainment of the *jīva* too is in the aspect that pertains to Him by nature.

3. This case should be distinguished from the case of one striving for the heaven-world. The latter should meditate only on his present aspect as knower, doer and enjoyer. This is an *anga* of the *karma*; and *karma* alone is enjoined as the means to the fruit desired, by the text "one that desires *svarga* should do *yaga*". To know that he is different from his body, that he will live after death, that he can go to the other world, and that being a knower, he can experience the happiness that he will find therein—only so much is necessary to give him a qualification for performing the *karma* leading to the future fruit. Here it is different.

#### SUB-SECTION 22

### 53. अङ्गावबद्धास्तु न शाखासु हि प्रतिवेदम् ।

Meditations connected with subsidiary parts of *kratus* are not limited to the *śākhās*, in which they are taught. They extend to every *śākhā* (*veda*).

Meditations are taught in various places as connected with certain subsidiary parts of *kratus*, like the *udgītha vidyā* (see chapter III-3-17). The question for consideration is whether a meditation enjoined on the

*udgitha* in one *śākhā* (1) is limited to that *śākhā*, or whether it extends to all *śākhās* in connection with the *udgitha* in those *śākhās*. This is taken as a typical case. This was settled at the outset by sub-section 1 ; but a doubt arises on the ground that the *svaras* (2) differ in different *śākhās*, and that the *udgithas* therefore differ. The *first view* is that the meditation is limited to the *śākhā*. The injunction ‘ meditate on the *udgitha* ’ is in general terms. In the same *śākhā* an *udgitha* with *svaras* peculiar to itself being found near it, the injunction should be taken as referring to that particular *udgitha* (3). Hence the meditation should be confined to the *śākhā*, in which it is taught.

This doubt is removed by the *sūtra* : The meditation is attached merely to the *udgithas* ; and this is done by the authority known as *śruti*. Hence, wherever the *udgitha* is found, there meditation is attached to it. The *udgithas* in the different *śākhās* do differ by the way in which they are recited ; but as reference is made to

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(1) *Śākhā* is a branch of the *veda*, like the *kāṇva* and *mādhyaṇḍina śākhās* referred to in the discussions in chapter I, section 4, sub-section 3. The text of the *veda* is the same in both, though there are minor variations.

(2) *Svara* is the variation in tone in the recitation of *vedic* texts. For certain syllables the voice is raised ; for some it is lowered. In singing *sāma mantras* there are seven *svaras* corresponding to the seven notes in the musical scale.

(3) In the world, the order in general terms ‘ Bring the cow ’ is carried out by taking a particular cow near at hand. See note (1) on page 51.

them in general terms, all of them come up before the mind ; and there is no authority for confining the meditation to a particular *udgītha* (1). In cases in which *karmas* prescribed in different places are held to be one *karma* on the principle stated in Introduction, para 16, the *karma* in all the places is brought up before the mind at the same time ; and its subsidiary parts like the *udgītha* are also present before the mind ; and there is no difference among them in this matter. Hence there is no ground to justify a limitation to one (2) place only.

#### 54. मन्त्रादिवद्वाऽविरोधः ।

And like *mantra* and the rest. There is no difficulty.

The *kratu* referred to in various *śākhās* being one, the *mantras* relating to it mentioned in particular *śākhās* are applied in all *śākhās* by *śruti* and other authorities. Similarly, the meditations, though mentioned in one, are common to all *śākhās*. By the term "The rest "

(1) In the order 'Bring the cow' as all cows, wherever they may be, cannot be brought, the term 'cow' is limited to a particular animal. This is not done by the presence of an animal near at hand. Here, there is no similar difficulty ; and the term *udgītha* brings up all the *udgīthas* as a matter of course.

(2) In the injunction 'Do *yāga* with a *paṣu*' the term *paṣu* is restricted to a goat, as this animal is mentioned in the *mantra*, with which the *hotā* is addressed ; but here there is nothing to limit the application to a particular *udgītha*. The case is analogous to the injunction "Do *yāga* with *vr̥thi* (paddy)". The term *vr̥thi* refers to the class, and not to a particular variety (*adhi*),

reference is made to *jāti* (class characteristic), qualities, number, likeness, order, material and *karma*.

### SUB-SECTION 23

In the *vaiṣvānara vidyā* dealt with in sub-section 6 of section 2 of chapter I (see *Vedic Texts*) the highest *Ātmā* is to be meditated on as possessing a body of which the heaven-world, the sun, air, ether, water and earth are parts, corresponding to the head, eye, *prāṇa*, waist, bladder, and feet of a human body. The question for consideration is whether the meditation should be on the parts of the body separately, or upon the whole body, or whether it should be in both the ways.

*First view.* The meditation should be on the parts of the body separately; for at the outset the teacher referred to the parts and to the fruit of meditation on each part thus :

The *ātman*, on whom you meditate, is *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*. . . . He, that thus meditates on *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, eats food and sees dear things; and a son comes into his family with the brightness of meditation (*chāndo.*, V-12-1 and 2).

Similarly in regard to the other parts. Also in each of these meditations on the parts the object of meditation is stated to be *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*. The meditation on the whole stated at the end is merely a summary of the teaching previously imparted.

2. Another view is that meditation should be both on the parts and on the whole ; for a separate fruit is mentioned for the meditation on the whole thus :

Though *Vaiṣvānara* surrounds everything, and is not therefore limited, yet he that meditates on Him as thus limited by heaven and earth, eats the food that is in all worlds, in all beings, in all *ātman*s (*Ibid.*, V-18-1).

There is the analogy of the *bhūma vidyā*, in which meditation on name and many other things is first described with a separate fruit for each, and then meditation on *bhūmā* is taught with its own fruit. There all the meditations, including the last, are admitted to be prescribed. Similarly here also.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

55. भूम्नः ऋतुवज्ज्यायस्त्वं तथा हि दर्शयति ।

Appropriateness of the whole ; as in the *kratu* ; for so it is shown.

What is intended is meditation on the whole only. For the *upanishad* forms a connected whole. See the narrative<sup>1</sup> in *Vedic Texts* under chapter I-2-6. Six students wished to know *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, and going to *Aṣvapati* they requested him to teach them, saying “ You now meditate on this *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*. Teach us about Him.” He complied with the request, concluding with the words quoted in para 2 of the *first view*. The *upanishad* therefore forms a whole, teaching but one meditation. This being so, the meditations on the parts

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<sup>1</sup> Here the original states the narrative ; but as it is stated in the “ *Vedic Texts*,” it is omitted here.

must be presumed to be mere repetitions (*anuvāda*) of parts of the meditation on the whole. The fruit of meditation on the whole is the enjoyment of the highest *Ātmā*; and to show that in this fruit enjoyment of every kind to be found in all places and at all times is included, the fruits of meditation on the parts were stated. The intention is not that these part-meditations should be done. If this were intended, the unity of the context would be affected. The *sūtra* mentions an analogy. The injunction is given that on the birth of a son the father should offer to *Vaiṣvānara* a cake of rice flour baked on twelve *kapālas* (flat, circular pieces made of earth and burnt). Parts of the same offering are referred to in these words "What is baked on eight *kapālas* becomes *gāyatrī* and purifies him, giving him the brightness of *vedic* learning," and this is followed by similar statements regarding cakes baked on nine, ten, and eleven *kapālas*. It has been decided (*pūrva mīmāṃsā*, I-4-12) that the texts form a connected whole, that but one offering should be made, with a cake baked on twelve *kapālās*, and that the reference to other cakes is merely praise of the twelve-*kapālās*-cake.

The *upanishad* goes on to state the evil consequences of meditations on parts thus :

Your head would have fallen off, if you had not come to me ; You would have become blind, if you had not come to me, etc. (*chāndo.*, V-12-2 and V-13-2).

This shows that this case is not analogous to *bhūma vidyā* ; for no evil consequences are to follow from meditations on name and the rest. The meditation on *bhūmā*



is praised as yielding very superior fruit, and to justify this praise other meditations with inferior fruits are described. This does not affect the unity of the context, the principal being meditation on *bhūmā*, and the other meditations serving to enhance its importance.

#### SUB-SECTION 24

In this sub-section the *vidyās* for consideration are (i) all *brahma vidyās* (1), the fruit of which is the reaching of the highest *Ātmā*, and (ii) *vidyās* like *prāṇa vidyās*, that deal with one matter and yield one fruit. The question for consideration is whether they are one or whether they are different. The conclusion to be reached here was accepted tentatively in the previous sub-sections; and the discussions proceeded, whether a particular *vidyā* came under the rule laid down in the first sub-section.

*First view.* The *vidyās* are one; for the object of meditation is one; and as this constitutes the form of the *vidyā*, the form is the same, as also the fruit.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra*:

#### 56. नानाशब्दादिभेदात् ।

(They are) different; for the words and the rest differ.

(1) Like *sad vidyā*, *bhūma vidyā*, *dahara vidyā*, *upakosala vidyā*, *śāṇḍilya vidyā*, *vaiṣvānara vidyā*, *ānandamaya vidyā*, and *akshara vidyā*. They may be taught in one *sākhā* or in many *śākhās*; all of them are considered here.

The words 'the rest' refer to repetition, number, subsidiary part, context and name (See Introduction, para 15). Here these reasons exist for holding one *vidyā* as differing from another. The terms *veda* and *upāsita*, enjoining meditation, do denote continuity of thought, and this thought is of the highest *Ātmā*; yet the mind has to dwell on Him as possessing this or that attribute stated in the context. In one case it is being the sole cause of the evolution of the world; in another it is possessing freedom from *karma* and the other seven qualities; and so on. Hence, the *vidyās* differ. Also, the fruit in the form of reaching the highest *Ātmā* being stated in a particular context, the need of the injunction is satisfied, and the *vidyā* becomes complete. Hence the *vidyās* are different (1). This subject is dealt

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(1) In the text the difference among *brahma vidyās* was based on difference of form and difference in the fruit. It may also be caused by difference in other respects. The *nyāsa vidyā* is taught in *taillirīya-nārāyaṇa* thus: "Unite yourself, pronouncing the syllable (known as *praṇava*)."  
The term used here is *yujita*, while the terms used in regard to other *vidyās* are *veda*, *upāsita*, etc. Thus the terms differ. The names are different; it is *nyāsa vidyā* here, and others have their own names. The form of this *vidyā* is the highest *Ātmā* standing in the place of other *vidyās* and giving the person, that throws himself at His feet, the fruit of those *vidyās* without any further effort on his part. This is not the form of the other *vidyās*; for the meditator has to think of Him as possessing this or that attribute prescribed for them. In regard to the fruit also there is difference in that one, that does the *nyāsa vidyā*, may reach the highest *Ātmā* whenever he wishes it, while the other has to wait till the *prārabdha karma* has been expended, i.e., *karma* that has begun to yield fruit. Lastly,

with in the *pūrva mīmāṃsā*; and a separate sub-section here is unnecessary; but the author of the *sūtras* wishes to refute the view that *upanishad* texts do not deal, as the means to release, with mere knowledge to be imparted by *vedic* texts. If this were correct, all the labour spent on this section of the *sūtras* would be thrown away.

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### SUB-SECTION 25

In the preceding sub-section it was settled that *vidyās*, the fruit of which is to reach the highest *Ātmā*, are different. It will now be considered whether a person may combine two or more of them, and whether there is any use in doing so, or whether it will suffice to do any one of them.

*First view.* The combination also has its use. It is seen that different injunctions are carried out by one, though they contemplate but one fruit. *Agnihotra* and *darsa-pūrṇamāsa* yield each the same fruit, *viz.*, *svarga* (heaven-world); and yet they are combined, so that more of it may be enjoyed. Similarly two or more *vidyās* may be combined, so that one may be with the highest *Ātmā* for a longer time and enjoy Him to a larger extent.

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the qualification also differs; for the *nyāsa vidyā* is for one that has not the requisite knowledge, or capacity, or cannot brook delay in the attainment of the fruit. Hence *nyāsa vidyā* differs from all others.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 57. विकल्पोऽविशिष्टफलत्वात् ।

Any one of them at one's option ; as the fruit does not differ.

By all *vidyās* the same fruit is reaped—*viz.*, enjoyment of the highest *Ātmā*, who is bliss without limit to its excellence. This is stated in the following texts—“One that meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest” (*āna.*, I-1) ; That is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma* ; and this is shared by one that knew the *veda* and was not distracted by desires, *i.e.*, by one that has become free (*Ibid.*, VIII) ; and when the meditator sees the *Purusha*, shining like gold, the material and operative causes of the world, and its ruler, then he shakes off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter, attains the highest likeness to Him (*munda.*, III-1-3). Thus the highest *Ātmā* is in the enjoyment of bliss without limit to Himself and to others. If this fruit can be attained by one *vidyā* only, what is the need for another ? Hence no combination is required. In the case of other fruits, like *svarga* (heaven-world), there is limitation in place, in time and in their nature. It is possible to increase the quantum of enjoyment in place or time ; and one that desires this increase may combine many *karmas*. Here there is no such need. All *vidyās* on *Brahma* lead to enjoyment by removing the obstacles to enjoyment in the form of *avidyā* and beginning-less *karma*.

58. काम्यास्तु यथाकामं समुच्चीयेरन्नवापूर्वहेत्वभावात् ।

But meditations aiming at worldly objects of desire may be cumulated or not at pleasure ; because the former reason does not hold.

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SUB-SECTION 26

It was decided in sub-section 17 that meditation on the *udgītha* is not compulsory. The opponent disputes the correctness of this decision and urges certain further arguments, which are examined here. The decision depends on the question whether meditation on the *udgītha* is for the purpose of the *yāga* or whether it benefits the *yajamāna* (one that does a *yāga*). In the former case the meditation would be a part of the *yāga* through the *udgītha*, and would be compulsory ; in the latter case it may be done or not at the option of the *yajamāna*. The opponent's view is stated in the first four *sūtras* and supported by arguments :

59. अङ्गेषु यथाश्रयभावः । न्यसे

Meditations on the adjuncts of *kratus* are parts of them, as are the adjuncts on which they depend.

First, the sentence containing the injunction does not state the fruit of the meditation ; and it has to be gathered from another sentence at the end of the section of the *upanishad*. This case is therefore not analogous to the case of the milking vessel :

In a *chamasa* carry the water (for *pranīta*) (to the north of the *āhavanīya* fire) ; for one that desires cows in the vessel in which cows are milked.

Here the fruit in using the milking vessel is stated in the injunction text itself; but in the case under consideration it is merely “meditate on the *udgitha*”. As the *yāga* (*darsa* or *pūrṇamāsa*) may be done without the milking vessel, its use is not for the performance of the *karma*; but it only benefits the *yajamāna*. Hence it is not a part of the *karma*. The right analogy is furnished by the *juhū* referred to in the text—

He, whose *juhū* is made of *parṇa* wood, does not hear unpleasant statements.

(*Juhū* is an instrument used in making offerings). Here not hearing unpleasant statements does not at first sight appear as the fruit; and it is not stated in the first clause, which contains the injunction. It is therefore regarded as helping the performance of the *yāga*, and the second clause is held to be *arthavāda*. In the case under consideration the fruit of the meditation to make the *yāga* most efficacious is stated in another sentence; and the statement is not in the form of an injunction. Hence this statement is *arthavāda*, as not hearing unpleasant statements is. Hence, as the *udgitha* is part of the *kratu*, and is invariably sung in it, so the meditation also, which depends on the *udgitha*, forms part of the *kratu* and should be invariably done.

### 60. शिष्टेऽथ ।

And because of the injunction.

Secondly, the injunction is merely ‘meditate on the *udgitha*’. There is no mention in it, as in the case of the milking vessel, of a special qualification on the part

of the *yajamāna*, which would limit the meditation, and connect it with the qualification. The meditation is therefore a necessary part of the *udgītha*.

### 61. समाहारात् ।

Because of rectification.

Thirdly, the text "From the place of the *hotā*, *udgītha* without meditation is rectified" (*chāndo.*, I-5-5) indicates that meditation on the *udgītha* by the *udgātā* is always required. For the text states that when the *udgātā* fails to meditate, the defect is rectified by the *hotā*, when he utters the syllable known as *praṇava*.

### 62. गुणसाधारण्यश्रुतेश्च ।

And because the seat of the meditation, *i.e.*, the syllable known as *praṇava*, is stated as going everywhere.

This statement is thus made :

With it the *karma* enjoined by the three-fold *veda* proceeds ; with *praṇava* the *adhvaryu* says *āśrūvaṇa* : with *praṇava* the *hotā* recites *śāstra* ; with *praṇava* the *udgātā* sings *stotra* (*chāndo.*, I-1-9).

Here the term '*tena*' (with it) refers back to what has been mentioned before, *i.e.*, *praṇava* with the meditation. Hence, the meditation being ever found with *praṇava*, it is an adjunct of the *kratu*, as the *udgītha* is

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This view of the opponent is rejected in the next two *sūtras* :

### 63. न वा तत्सहभावाश्रुतेः ।

But no; because their going together invariably is not declared.

Here the second argument—that stated in *sūtrā* 60—is met. It is true that in the injunction there is no mention of a special qualification; but this is stated later on at the end of the section, by pointing out that the *kratu* becomes most efficacious, when meditation is done. If therefore the *yajamāna* desires to reach the fruit of the *kratu* quickly, he should arrange for the meditation being done. Meditation on what? On the *udgitha*, which is found in the context. The conclusion therefore is that meditation on the *udgitha* yields a fruit different from the fruit of the *kratu*. It cannot therefore be an adjunct of the *kratu* (1).

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(1) Whether a thing enjoined is connected with a fruit does not depend upon the mention of the fruit in the injunction text or not. It depends upon the quickness in perceiving the connection between the two. In the case of the *juhū* the connection between its being made of *parṇa* wood and the fruit mentioned in the same text is not quickly perceived; for the condition that it should be so made is not expressly stated to be the cause, and 'not hearing unpleasant statements' to be its effect; further, this fruit is stated not in the first clause that gives the injunction, but in a clause that follows it. Hence owing to the delay arising from both these causes 'being made of *parṇa* wood' is connected with the *juhū*, and through it with the *kratu*; and it is decided that it is for the performance of the *kratu*; and the mention of the fruit is treated as *arthavāda*.

In the case of the milking vessel (*go-dohana*) the fruit is mentioned in the injunction text itself; and the



2. The arguments stated in *sūtras* 61 and 62 may be replied to as follows: If the *yajamāna* makes up his mind at the outset that the fruit of the *kratu* should not be obstructed, and if the *udgātā* fails, the *hotā* rectifies it. If the *yajamāna* does not desire it, there will be no defect to be rectified. The text 'with *praṇava*, the *adhvaryu*,' etc., does not refer to *praṇava* along with meditation. It refers to the syllable alone. On the other hand, there is a *linga* in support of the *final decision*. This is next stated:

#### 64. दर्शनाच्च ।


And because the *upanishad* shows this.

only defect is that it is not expressly stated to be produced by the use of the milking vessel. The connection between the milking vessel and the attainment of the fruit has to be inferred. But as there is only one cause of delay, the use of the milking vessel and the fruit are connected. The use of the vessel is not therefore for the *kratu*, but for the *yajamāna*. In the case under consideration also there is only one cause of delay. The fruit is expressly stated to be produced by the meditation; and the only defect is that it is not stated in the injunction text. The case being therefore analogous to the milking vessel, the meditation is connected with the fruit, but not with the *udgītha*.

The case under consideration differs from the case of the *juhū* for another reason. In the case of the *juhū* there is a need—of what wood it should be made; but the *udgītha* does not need meditation; for it may be sung without it. 'Being made of *parṇa* wood,' not being action, needs a *kratu*, into which it may enter; but meditation being itself action does not need it; but may connect itself with a fruit directly. Hence the *juhū* and 'being made of *parṇa* wood' are connected with each other. In the case of the *udgītha* and meditation, neither needs the other. Therefore, the meditation is not its *anga*.

The text is “ The *brahmā* that knows this, saves the *kratu*, the *yajamāna*, and all the helpers ” (*chāndo.*, IV-17-10). There is room for this saving, only if the *udgātā* is not bound to meditate on the *udgītha*. This mark is sufficient to show that the marks stated in *sūtras* 61 and 62 are generally, but not invariably, found.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः



## CHAPTER III

### SECTION 4

*Brahma Vidyā* has been considered. In this section the helps to it will be examined, including the *karmas* enjoined in the earlier part of the *veda*.

#### SUB-SECTION 1

This is preliminary. The question for consideration is whether man's goal comes from meditation or from *karma*, of which meditation is an adjunct. The final decision is stated in the *sūtra*:

#### 1. पुरुषार्थोऽतश्शब्दादिति बादरायणः ।

From it (*i.e.*, meditation) man's goal comes ; because *vedic* texts state this. This is the view of *Būda-rāyaṇa*.

The texts are:

One that meditates on *Brahma* reaches the highest (*āna.*, I-1). I know this, *viz.*, meditating here on that great *Purusha* alone, who shines like the sun, and who is far removed from *tamas*, one becomes immortal; no other path lies to the goal (*purusha sūkta*—20); similarly, the meditator is released from name and form, and reaches the *Purusha*, who is greater than the great, and who abides in heaven (*muṇḍa.*, III-2-8).

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*Jaimini* disputes this conclusion ; and his arguments are stated in *sūtras* 2 to 7 :

## 2. शेषत्वात्पुरुषार्थवादोयथान्येष्वितिजैमिनिः ॥

Because meditation serves *karma* ; the mention of fruit is *arthavāda*, as in other cases. This is the view of *Jaimini*.

In *Jaimini's* opinion these texts are intended to show what is the real nature of the *jīva*, who does *karma*. Meditation thus gives the doer of *karma* the necessary qualification for doing it ; and through him it serves *karma*, and becomes a subordinate part thereof. As it cannot have a separate fruit of its own, the mention of the fruit in these texts is mere *arthavāda* (praise). 'As in other cases'—the cases referred to in the following *sūtra* of *pūrva mīmāṃsā*—"In the cases of substances, qualifications and actions, which serve something else, the mention of fruit is *arthavāda* (praise)."

2. The *vedāntin* raises two objections: In the following *sūtras* it was stated that a Being other than the doer of *karma* is to be reached by one desiring release, and that He is placed before him for meditation by *vedic* texts: I-1-17 ; I-1-18 ; I-2-3 ; and I-3-17. In *sūtra* II-1-22 it was pointed that the same Being, that is referred to in the text "That thou art," is other than a *jīva* ; and it was explained in *sūtra* I-4-22 how words in apposition as in this text should be understood. How then can the view stated in paragraph 1 be maintained ? *Reply*. In the very texts, on which you rely, there are indications that *karma* is more important than

meditation. By the light of these indications words in apposition are understood as affirming the identity of *Brahma* and the *jīva*. Hence the texts of the *vedānta* teach merely that the *jīva* in his nature is other than his body.

3. Secondly, the statement that the texts give a qualification to a *jīva* is not sound ; for he does worldly acts as well as those enjoined by the *veda* ; and he is not connected only with the latter. *Reply*. The doing of worldly acts is possible by one that does not know that he is other than his body ; but in regard to *karma* enjoined by the *veda* the doer should know that he is other than the body, and that he is eternal ; and this knowledge is needed for such *karma*.

4. Hence meditation, entering into *karma* through the doer, is a part of *karma*.

These indications are stated in the next five *sūtras* :

### 3. आचारदर्शनात् ।

Because it is seen in the practice (of those doing meditation).

*Aṣvapati*, who was foremost among those that did *brahma vidyā*, and who was approached by certain seers for instruction on *Ātmā Vaiṣvānara*, said “ Revered sirs, I am going to perform a *kratu* ” (*chāndo.*, V-11-5). The *smṛitis* state that *Janaka* and other persons, who were foremost among those that meditated on *Brahma*, were ever engaged in the performance of *karma*. “ *Janaka* and

others attained their goal with *karma* alone" (*bhagavad-gītā*, III-20). Having knowledge of the *ātmā*, and doing *brahma vidyā*, he performed very many *yajnas* in order to remove *mṛitya* by *avidyā* (*viṣṇu*, VI-6-12).

#### 4. तच्छ्रुतेः ।

Because it is declared by the *veda*.

The text is:

That which is done with meditation, with eagerness, and with knowledge of everything being ruled from within by the highest *Ātmā*, that alone becomes most efficacious (*chāndo.*, I-1-10).

It cannot be urged that this text is limited by the context to *udgītha*; for *śruti* is of greater force than the context. The text therefore applies to all *vidyās*.

#### 5. समन्वारम्भणात् ।

Because of the statement that they contact (a departing *jīva*).

The text is:

Him meditation and *karma* contact and go with him (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

This co-existence should be explained by the subordination of meditation to *karma* for the reason stated.

#### 6. तद्वतो विधानात् ।

Because *karma* is enjoined to one that has it (meditation).

The text is:

After learning the *veda* in the house of the teacher in accordance with the rules, and when time could be

spared from his service, let the student perform the ceremony known as *samāhvartana* and live in a family, etc. (*chāndo.*, VIII-15-1).

Then he is required to do *karma*. This injunction is given to one that has learnt the *veda*, and the learning includes a knowledge of not merely the text, but of its meaning also. Hence *brahma vidyā* is connected with *karma* for its service, and cannot yield independent fruit.

### 7. नियमात् ।

Because of the restriction imposed.

The text is :

Let one desire to live a hundred years only doing *karma* here (*Īṣavasya* —2).

The meaning is that the whole life should be spent in doing *karma* alone.

*Jaimini's* view is first refuted, and it is next shown in six *sūtras* that the texts quoted do not support him :

### 8. अधिकोपदेशात्तु बादरायणस्यैवं तद्दर्शनात् ।

But a Being, other than the *jiva*, is mentioned in the texts ; and this is *Būdarayāṇa's* view. This appears from the *veda*.

The texts quoted under the first *sūtra* refer not to the *jiva*, the doer of *karma*, but to *Brahma*, who is differentiated from him by being opposed to imperfections of every kind, and by being the seat of numberless noble qualities without limit to their excellence. The indications stated will be replied to presently. The object

of meditation is a Being other than the *jiva*. This appears from the following texts :

He is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst; He has unchanging objects of desire; and His will is never frustrated (*chando.*, VIII-1-5); He willed—'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve; He created fire (*Ibid.*, VI-2-3); who knows everything (*muṇḍa.*, I-1-10); His capacity is heard to be superior, to be of many kinds; and to pertain to His nature; also His power to know, to support, and to create and destroy (*ṣveta.*, VI-8); It is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma* (*āna.*, VIII); One, that meditates on the bliss of *Brahma*, from which speech returns with the mind without reaching its higher limit, does not fear anything (*Ibid.*-9); He is the controller of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings; He is a protective bund (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); He, the world-cause, is the lord of the lords of the senses (*jivas*); no maker or lord of Him exists (*ṣvetā.*, VI-9); By the unobstructed command of that *Akshara*, *Gārgi*, the sun and the moon stand supported; by the unobstructed command of that *Akshara* heaven and earth stand supported (*bṛihad.*, V-8-8); From fear of Him the wind blows; from fear the sun rises; from fear of Him fire and *Indra* (go about their business); death, the fifth, runs about (*āna.*, VIII-1).

These texts, enjoining meditation, show that the highest *Ātmā* is free from the slightest touch of any imperfection; that He is the seat of endless, noble qualities; that He by mere will and for mere amusement evolves the universe, sustains it and dissolves it in the end; that He is all-knowing, and omnipotent; that the higher limit of His bliss cannot be thought of or described; that He is the lord of the *jiva*; and that He controls everything. These attributes can never be found in a *jiva*, whether he is bound or has become free. The texts do not therefore contain any reference



to the *jīva*, the doer of *karma*, who is like a glowworm, and who is fit to be affected with *avidyā* and other imperfections. The *vidyās* cannot therefore be connected through him with *karma*, as being made of *parṇa* wood is connected through the *juhū* with a *yāga*. Hence, the fruit in the form of attaining the highest *Ātmā* stated in the description of *vidyās* flows from the *vidyās* themselves, and its statement is not *arthavāda* as thought by *Jaimini*.

### 9. तुल्यन्तु दर्शनम् ।

Non-practice of *karma* is as much seen as its practice.

This disposes of the text quoted in *sūtra* 3. Here is a text "We are seers descended from *Kāvasha* ; for what purpose should we learn the *veda* ; for what purpose should we do *yāgas*" ? Seeing that *karma* is abandoned by some, that do meditation, it should be concluded that meditation is not an adjunct of *karma*. If it were, how could *karma* be given up ? *Question*. How are the doing of *karma* by some, and abstention from it by others to be reconciled ? *Reply*. Thus, when *karma* is done without an eye on its fruit, it serves meditation ; and its performance is appropriate. This will be pointed out in *sūtra* 26. But *karma* done for fruit obstructs meditation on *Brahma*, the only fruit of which is release from the bondage of *karma*, and its abandonment is equally appropriate

### 10. असार्वत्रिके

It does not apply to all *vidyās*.

The text referred to in *sūtra* 4 applies only to meditation on *udgitha*. The term *yad* (that) must refer to something already mentioned; and that something is *udgitha*, which is referred to at the outset in the injunction "meditate on the *udgitha*". What is done with meditation is referred to by the term *yad* (that), and it is said to be most efficacious. The text is not to be understood to mean "That which is done is done with meditation (1)".

### 11. विभागश्चतुर्विंशति ।

Division as in hundreds.

Meditation and *karma* produce different fruits, as explained under *sūtra* 9. The former goes with the departing *jīva* to yield its own fruit, *viz.*, to make him resume it in the next birth, and practise it, till it becomes perfect; and *karma* does the same, *viz.*, to remove any obstructions in such resumption. Though the two go together, they are divided in their action. There is the analogous statement "one that wishes to sell land and precious stones is followed by two hundred rupees". This means that one hundred is for the land and one hundred for the precious stones.

### 12. अध्ययनमात्रवत्तः ।

(The injunction to do *karma* is given) to one that has merely learnt the *veda*.

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(1) The opponent's meaning is: the term *vidyayā* (with meditation) is *śruti*, and it has greater force than the context. *Śruti* is the capacity of a single word; and here the term *vidyayā* has no capacity to connect *vidyā* with *karma* as a subsidiary part, unless the sentence be as pointed out.

This deals with the text quoted in *sūtra* 6. The term “learning the *veda*” means only learning the text. The injunction to learn the *veda* is fully carried out, when the text has been learnt; it does not require him to know its meaning also. When the text has been learnt, as it teaches *karmas* as means to fruits, one of his own motion takes up an enquiry to determine what it exactly teaches. Then, if he desires worldly fruit, he seeks to know *karma*; if he desires release, he essays to find out all about *Brahma*. This text does not therefore make meditation an adjunct of *karma*.

Assume, however, that the injunction to learn the *veda* is not fully carried out, until the meaning also is known. Even then, meditation is not an adjunct of *karma*. A knowledge of the meaning of the *veda* is different from meditation. One learns how the *karma* known as *jyotishtoma* should be done; but this knowledge is different from its actual performance, which alone leads to fruit. Similarly, one's knowledge of the nature of the highest *Ātmā* and of the mode of meditation on Him is different from the meditation itself, which alone leads to the attainment of the goal. Hence, the injunction to do *karma* not being conveyed to one that does *brahma vidyā*, this *vidyā* is not connected with it as its *anga*.

### 13. नाविशेषात् ।

Because it is not particularised.

Here the text quoted in *sūtra* 7 is considered. There is nothing in it to show that the *karma* enjoined

is a means to fruit directly—*i.e.*, independently of meditation ; and it may be understood to refer to such *karma* as will serve meditation. In the case of *Janaka* and others referred to in the verse of the *bhagavad gītā* under *sūtra* 3 meditation continued till they departed from this world, and *karma* served such meditation. The opponent therefore draws no support from this text.

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Having thus answered the opponent, the next *sūtra* explains the meaning of the last text :

#### 14. स्तुतयेऽनुमतिर्वा ।

Only to praise meditation is permission given.

The text occurs in the *Īśāvāsya*, which begins with the statement “ All this is pervaded by the all-Ruler ”. The context therefore relates to meditation ; and in order to praise it merely the statement is made that one may do *karma* throughout life. By the peculiar merit of the meditation, even though one should ever do *karma*, yet he will not be polluted by it. The remainder of the text shows this “ If you live thus, and not otherwise, you, who find no pleasure in worldly matters, will not be stained by *karma* ” (verse 2).

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Having thus demolished the opponent, the next three *sūtras* support *Bādarāyaṇa*'s view :

#### 15. कामकारेणचैके ।

And some (state abandonment) at pleasure (of the householder's stage by one doing *brahma-vidyā*).

That is, those, that follow certain *śākhās*, teach that one may at pleasure give up the life of a householder (and with it its *karma*), if he practises meditation on *Brahma*: "What shall we do with children, who have this *Ātmā* in the place of this world" (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22). This text, permitting one, that meditates on *Brahma*, and is disgusted with the world, to abandon the life of a householder, and with it its *karma*, proves that meditation on *Brahma* is not an adjunct of *karma*. If it were, one that meditates could not make this renunciation at his pleasure.

#### 16. उपमर्दं च ।

And the destruction (of *karma* by meditation is taught).

Taught in every *upaniṣad*. *Karma* is the root from which all the sufferings of the bound *jīva* come, and is in the form of good or evil deeds. Its destruction by *brahma vidyā* is thus taught: "His *karmas* are destroyed, when the Being is seen, compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior" (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-9). Such destruction would be inappropriate on the theory that meditation subserves *karma*; for a subordinate part cannot destroy the principal *karma*.

#### 17. ऊर्ध्वरेतसु च शब्दे हि ।

And *brahma vidyā* is found in those, that have taken the vow of celibacy; for it is stated in the *upaniṣad*.

Such persons, not leading a householder's life, cannot do *agnihotra*, *darsa*, *pūrṇamāsa* and the rest,

This proves conclusively that meditation is not an adjunct of *karma*.

This last *sūtra* raises a controversy as to whether the *āśrama* (stage of life) of persons, that have taken the vow of celibacy, is recognised. The *first view* is: there are no such stages; for the injunction is "one should do the *agnihotra homa* as long as he lives"; *Smritis*, that teach differently, are no authority. To meet this objection the *sūtra* adds the second sentence. In the *veda* itself the *āśramas* are recognised. The texts are:

There are three seats of *dharma* (*chāndo.*, II-23-1); These that in a jungle meditate on *Brahma* (*tapas*) with eagerness (*chāndo.*, V-10-1); Desiring this same fruit they renounce the world (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22).

The injunction to do *agnihotra* throughout life is directed to those, that are not disgusted with life.

This answer does not satisfy *Jaimini*, who tries to explain away the texts: *सत्यमेव जयते*

### 18. परामर्शं जैमिनिरचोदनाच्चापवदति हि ।

It is mere repetition of what is otherwise known. *Jaimini* thinks so; because there is no injunction; and the *veda* forbids it.

In these texts there is a mere statement of the stages of life. For, there is no injunction. The context begins with the text "There are three seats of *dharma*" and praises meditation on *Brahma*, which is the subject under consideration. It closes with the words "One

that meditates on *Brahma* attains immortality". Hence, the stages are stated for that purpose, but not for directing one to go into them. In the second text also mention is made of them in order to teach the path known as *devayāna*. There is no injunction either here. There is also prohibition of any stage other than that of the house-holder ;

He, that gives up the sacrificial fire, is indeed one that destroys the virility of the *devas*.

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The next *sūtra* refutes *Jaimini's* arguments :

19. अनुष्ठेयं बादरायणस्साम्यश्रुतेः ।

The *āśramas* should be held ; so *Bādarāyaṇa* thinks ; because similarity (to the house-holder's stage) is stated in the *upanishad*.

The opponent admits that the house-holder's stage should be held. The other stages are exactly in the same position ; for reference is made to the three seats of *dharma*s, in order to praise one that meditates on *Brahma* ; and this reference applies to the other stages as well as to the house-holder's. *Opponent*. The reference to the house-holder's stage pre-supposes that that stage exists. *Reply*. This argument applies to the other stages also, if the thing be looked at without prejudice. See the duties enumerated in the context. *Opponent*. The duties mentioned relate only to the house-holder ; and *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and *brahmacharya* (leading a student's life) are found only in him. *Reply*. This is not so ; for the

seats of *dharma*s are stated to be three in number, and they are divided thus :

*Yajnas*, recitation of the *veda* frequently and making gifts form the first ; *tapas* alone is the second ; the student, that lives in the house of his teacher, and uses up his body completely in his service, is the third.

This mention of the number and division of the duties would be inappropriate, if only the house-holder's stage existed. Hence the proper explanation is as follows : The first three duties pertain to the house-holder (See *Vedic Texts*, and the notes thereunder). *Tapas* is the duty of *vaighānasas* and of those that have renounced the world ; for it is their prominent function. The term *brahmacharya* denotes the disciplined life of the student, that has taken the vow of life-long celibacy. The term *brahma samsthā*, occurring further on, means from its etymology meditation on *Brahma* ; and this may be found in all the stages. Among those found in all the three stages those that meditate on *Brahma* attain immortality ; but those that do not do so reach worlds, in which the fruit of good deeds is experienced.

This is very clearly stated in the *vishṇu purāṇa* :

The place to be reached by *brāhmaṇas*, that perform the *nitya* and *naimittika karmas*, is the place of *Bhṛigu* and other *prajāpatīs* ; that to be reached by *kshattriyas*, that do not run away from the battlefield, is the place of *Indra* ; that to be reached by *vaiśyas*, whose mind finds pleasure in their own duties, is the place of the *maruts* ; that to be reached by persons of the *śūdra* caste, that perform the service of the other castes, is the place of *gandharvas*. . . Students that dwell in the houses of their teachers reach



the same places as those reached by men that renounce the world. Forest-dwellers go to the place of the seven *ṛishis*. House-holders go to the place of *prajāpatīs*; those that renounce the world to *satyaloka*. Those, that meditate on certain things as *Brahma*, attain the imperishable place known as *viṣṇu-pada* (above the place of *Dhruva*). But those, that look to *Brahma* alone, and ever meditate on Him, go to that highest place, which the dwellers in the highest heaven (see I-6-34 to 39).

These verses state the fruits to be attained by those that are in the several *varṇas* (castes) and stages of life, without doing *brahma vidyā*. These fruits go up to the world of the four-faced one. The last verse beginning with 'But those' refers to the attainment of *Brahma* Himself by those that do *brahma vidyā*.

The conclusion is that the other stages are on a par with the house-holder's, and that one may hold them also. In the other text also "Those that in the jungle meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness" the existence of the stage, in which *tapas* is the prominent duty, (and this is indicated by the term 'in the jungle'), is presumed; and it is only then that the *devayāna* can be taught with regard to it.

In the preceding *sūtra* the opponent's view that the texts under consideration merely state the existence of the stages was accepted, and a reply was given. The next *sūtra* explains that the texts do enjoin the holding of them :

## 20. विधिर्वाधारणवत् ।

Injunction only; as in the case of *dhūraṇa*.

The following text relates to offerings to be made when a sacrificer's body is cremated :

Let him follow, holding the *samid* (a twig of the *palāṣa* tree) below the *juhū* ; for he holds it above for the *devas*.

In this text, though the second clause has the form of a repetition (*anuvāda*), it is accepted by the *mīmāṃsaka* as an injunction, on the ground that the holding of the *samid* above has not been taught elsewhere. Similarly, here also it should be assumed that an injunction is given, for the reason that the stages have not been taught elsewhere.

2. Hitherto the opponent's statement was accepted ; and the question was discussed ; but there is express injunction in the *upanishad* of the *Jābālas* :

Let one, completing the student's life, become a house-holder ; from the house let him become a forest-dweller ; and then renounce the world ; or also otherwise ; he may renounce from the student's stage, or from the house or from the forest. On the very day, on which he becomes disgusted with the world, let him renounce it.

It being thus established that there are stages other than the house-holder's, the texts describing one's indebtedness, and his life-long performance of *agnihotra*, and the text prohibiting the abandonment of the fires should be understood as applying only to those that are not disgusted with the world. There are other texts that teach that those meditating on *Brahma* should perform *karmas* to the end of life. They pertain to the duties of their own *āśramas*.

## SUB-SECTION 2

This sub-section and the next come in only incidentally. The *chāndogya* has this text:

This *udgitha*, the eighth, is the best of essences ; it is the highest ; it deserves the place of the highest *Ātmā* (I-1-3).

Is this description intended merely to praise the *udgitha*, or is it to be meditated on as the best of essences? (1) The latter view will be shown to be the correct one. Taking that view it was pointed out in sub-sections 17 and 26 of the preceding section that the meditation was for the benefit of the *yajamāna*, and that its doing was therefore optional.

*First view.* The description is mere praise. For, referring to the *udgitha*, which is an adjunct of a *kratu*, it is said to be the best of essences. In the text "This (earth) is the *juhū* ; the heaven-world is the *āhavanīya* fire," the earth is said to be the *juhū*, and the intention is merely to praise it. Similarly in this case also. This view is stated in the first part of the *sūtra*, and then follows its refutation.

### 21. स्तुतिमात्रमुपादानादिति चेन्नापूर्वत्वात् ।

If it be said " Mere praise ; because reference has been made to it," the reply is—No ; because it is new.

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(1) Though the question is considered with reference to the *udgitha*, the decision applies to all texts, that are similar, and deal with adjuncts of *kratus*.

*Final decision.* It is not mere praise. Praise is given in one of three ways: (i) by stating a quality known already from some authority; (ii) by stating a quality not previously known; (iii) or by adopting a secondary meaning, when the quality brought up by the primary meaning is unsuitable. Not one of these ways is applicable here. It is not known from any other authority that *udgitha* is the best of essences. If it were, reference might be made to the fact, and an idea of its importance created. The second way will not do either; for *udgitha* is not really the best of essences; this quality is not suitable to the *udgitha*; and it cannot therefore be stated in regard to it; and such statement will not constitute praise. Nor will the third way apply as in the text quoted in the *first view*. It occurs where *karmas* are prescribed, and it is possible to connect it with the *juhū* and say that it conveys praise. But here there is no injunction in the context in regard to the singing of *udgitha*, with which the text in question may be connected. It is not legitimate to take out this text, carry it to where the *udgitha* is prescribed, and connect it with the injunction. Without doing this it is possible to explain the text as prescribing a meditation on the *udgitha* as the best of essences. The fruit of such meditation will be that the *karma* will become most efficacious.

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In the preceding *sūtra* it was stated that there was no injunction near at hand to sing the *udgitha*. In the next *sūtra* it is shown that there is an injunction to

meditate on it; and this is an argument in support of the *final decision* :

## 22. भावशब्दाच्च ।

And because there is a term which denotes action.

In the term *upāṣṭa* (meditate) the termination giving the injunction is joined to the root, which denotes an action; and an injunction to meditate is therefore given.

### SUB-SECTION 3

Most *vidyās* are introduced by a narrative. The description of meditation on the highest *Ātmā* in the form of *Indra* begins with the words “*Pratardana, Daivodāsi* went to the abode dear to *Indra*”; the *sad vidyā* with the words ‘There was one named *śvetaketu*, the sun of *Aruṇi*’; and so on. The question for consideration is: What purpose do the narratives serve? Are they to be recited by the *hotā*, one of the helpers, just before a particular offering is made in a horse-sacrifice, or are they intended to help in the teaching of particular *vidyās*.

*First view.* The former alternative is the correct one. The injunction to recite the narratives is thus given :

Recite narratives in the *pūriplava śastra* (1).

(1) *Pūriplava* is the name of a particular *śastra* recited by the *hotā* in the *aśvamedha*. *Śastra* is the name given to verses of the *ṛik veda* recited by the *hotā* or one of his assistants before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made.

The time for recitation is next stated :

When the king has been anointed, and when wearing clothing made of gold and silk, he has taken his seat to the south of the *āhavanīya* fire with his sons and ministers, the *hotū* should recite *pūriplava*.

The term narrative (*ākhyāna*), being general, includes the narratives in the *upanishads* also. *Objection* : The second text is thus continued.

On the first day recite the narrative beginning with 'Manu, the son of *Vivasvān*, the king'; on the second day that beginning with *yama*, *vaiśvata*; on the third day that with the words *varuṇa*, *āditya*.

Hence the narratives should be those mentioned in the remainder of the text. *Reply*. No. A statement made at the beginning should not be restricted with reference to the remainder of a text. The narratives being thus connected with the horse-sacrifice, they cannot serve *vidyās* also; for this would be opposed to the principle laid down in chapter III-3-10.

This view is stated in the *sūtra* and is then refuted :

### 23. पारिप्लवार्था इति चेन्न विशेषितत्वात् ।

If it be said "They are for *pūriplava*," the reply is "No; because they are particularised".

It is not possible to recite all the narratives; and the word 'all' at the beginning has to be restricted (1).

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(1) At the close of a *soma yūga* the *soma* juice that remains is poured into the *droṇa* pot, and is offered into the *āhavanīya* fire. This is known as *hāriyojana graha*. After the offering, what remains is drunk. Regarding this a text states "Now (*atha*) in regard to this *hāriyojana* all

In determining how this should be done, help is obtained from the remainder of the sentence. The narrative to be recited will then be only those mentioned in it (1); and the narratives in the *upanishads* will be left alone.

## 24. तथाचैकवाक्योपबन्धात् ।

And similarly because they are connected (with injunctions) so as to form a whole.

This is an additional reason for the *final decision*. The narratives and the injunctions, which follow, are connected and form a whole. In the *yajur veda* (I-5-1) the story is stated that *agni* cried, and that his tears became silver. Being impure for this reason, the placing of silver on the *barhis* and its being given as reward are prohibited. This story is connected with the prohibition, and explains why it is given. Similarly, the narratives in the *upanishads* are connected with injunctions to meditate. Hence, they are for the purpose of helping in the teaching of the *vidyās* concerned.

समाप्तं ब्रूते

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(*sarva*) to be sure desire to get it." The term *sarva* means every one; but as it is not possible for every one present at the place to drink the juice, the text will admit limitation of some kind; and it is decided that all the helpers in the *soma yāga* partake of the juice (*pūrva mimāṃsā*, III-5-9 and *śūtra dīpikā*, page 288).

(1) The need of the injunction is satisfied by the narratives mentioned in the remainder of the sentence; it is not legitimate to assume that the narratives stated in the *upanishads* are needed in addition for the injunction (*adhi.*, 403).

## SUB-SECTION 4

To return from this digression, which sub-sections 2 and 3 are, to the subject of the stages of those, that have taken the vow of life-long celibacy, and do *brahmavidyā*. As they cannot maintain the sacrificial fires, do the daily *agnihotra* and make the bi-monthly offerings known as *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa*, how is it possible for them to do meditation, of which these are necessary adjuncts? The *sūtra* replies that they may.

## 25. अत एव चाग्नीन्धनाद्यनपेक्षा ।

And for this very reason there is no need to do *ādhūna* and the rest.

The *upanishads* have stated (1) their connection with *vidyā*. Therefore they need not do the *agnihotra* and the rest. The mere duties of their stage will suffice.

## SUB-SECTION 5

In the preceding sub-section it was decided that meditation on *Brahma* may yield immortality without

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(1) The statements are thus made: 'Those that meditate on *Brahma* attain immortality (*chūndo.*, II-23-1); And these that in the jungle meditate on *Brahma* with eagerness (*chando.*, V-10-1); Desiring this same fruit they renounce the world (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22); Desiring which they observe *brahmacharya* (*kaṭha.*, I-2-15). *Brahma-charya* means living in the house of the teacher, abstention from sexual intercourse, and the like.



the adjuncts of *yajna* and the rest. If so, why should it be needed in the case of the house-holder? The *vedic* text on this subject does not make *karmas* a necessary adjunct of *brahma vidyā*; it should be construed merely as creating the desire to do the *vidyā*. The *sūtra* replies :

## 26. सर्वापेक्षाचयज्ञादिश्रुतेरश्ववत् ।

And all are needed; because the text states *yajna* and the rest; as in the case of the horse.

The house-holder being eminently a man of action, there is need for him to do *agnihotra* and all other *karmas*. This is stated :

Him (the highest *Ātmā* described in the preceding part of the verse) *brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yajnas*, by giving, by *tapas* in the form of absence of desire (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22).

The *karmas* enumerated here are stated to be helps to meditation; for the text means—they desire to attain meditation with *yajna* and the rest. It is only when *yajna* and the rest are helps to meditation, that the statement made will be appropriate. In the term *vividishanti* (they desire to meditate), which occurs in the original, the root *vid* means to meditate (a point, which will be explained under *sūtra* IV-1-1), and the termination denotes desire. The general rule is that of the two—the root and the termination—the latter is the more important; but where the termination expresses desire, the prominence is transferred to the root. In worldly discourse also the same rule is followed. In the statements “He wishes to kill with a knife” and “with a horse he desires to

go" the knife is a help to killing, and the horse is a help to going. Similarly, here they wish to meditate, the helps to meditation being *yajna* and the rest. They help in this manner. Meditation must become vivid like sense perception; it must be marked with a high degree of love; it must grow every day; and it should be done throughout life. It is denoted by *dhyāna*, *upāsana* and other terms; and it is other than the mere knowledge of texts. If the *yajna* and the rest are done every day as the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, that Being is pleased, and helps meditation to grow, removing all obstacles.

2. The *sūtra* states an analogy. "As in the case of the horse." A horse, which is the means of locomotion for man, requires its own adjuncts—harness, etc. Similarly, meditation, which is the means of obtaining release, requires the help of the *karmas* that are attached to the house-holder's station.

3. There are other texts on this point:

*Vidyā* (meditation) and *avidyā* (what is other than *vidyā*) one, that knows both these, overcomes impediments (*mṛityu*) by *avidyā*, and reaches *Brahma* by *vidyā* (*Īṣā.*, 11).

Here *avidyā* refers to the *karmas* of the *varna* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage of life); hence 'by *avidyā*' means 'by *karma*'. The term *mṛityu* refers to existing *karma*, which impedes the springing up of *vidyā*. The *avidyā* stated to be the means to the removal of *mṛityu* is what is other than *vidyā*, i.e., *karmas* prescribed. See the following text: "Having knowledge of the *ātmā*, and doing *brahma-vidyā*, he performed very

many *yajnas*, in order to remove *mṛityu* by *avidyā* (*viśṇu.*, VI-6-12).

4. The *karma* that impedes *jnāna* (knowledge and meditation) is in the form of good and bad deeds. Both kinds are denoted by the word *pāpa*; for they impede the springing up of *jnāna* and lead to what is undesirable. *Karma* impedes *jnāna* by making the qualities *rajas* and *tamas* grow; and they will overcome the quality *satva*, which is the means to the springing of *jnāna*. That evil deeds prevent *jnāna* from springing up is thus stated: 'It is He alone that makes one do an evil deed, whom he wishes to lead downwards' (*kaushitaki*). That *rajas* and *tamas* prevent one's knowing a thing as it is, and that *satva* enables him to see it as it is—is stated by *Bhagavān* Himself in the verses beginning with 'From *satva jnāna* comes' (*bhagavad gītā*, XIV-17). Hence, in order that *jnāna* may spring up, evil deeds should be got rid of; and this will be by doing prescribed *karmas* without desiring their fruits. This is stated in a *vedic* text. 'By *dharma* one gets rid of *pāpa*' (*nārā.*, *anu.*, 50). Hence, the *jnāna*, that is the means to the reaching of *Brahma*, *i.e.*, meditation, needs all the *karmas* prescribed for the stage of life.

5. See also the following *smṛiti* texts:

*Yajna*, making gifts, and *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment) and similar *karmas* should never be abandoned, but must indeed be done. *Yajnas*, making gifts and *tapas* purify meditators (*bhagavad gītā.*, XVIII-5). He reaches the goal, worshipping with his own *karma* that Being, from whom all beings come forth, and by whom all this world is pervaded (*Ibid.*, 46).

6. The author of the *vākya* also states that meditation as described comes only from *viveka* and the other qualifications; 'Its attainment is from *viveka*, *vimoka*, *abhyāsa*, *kriyā*, *kalyāṇa*, *anavasāda*, and *anud-dharsha*; it is appropriate that it should do so; and it is so stated by *vedic* texts,' He then explains what these are: (i) *Viveka* is discrimination in regard to one's food. It denotes here bodily purity to be attained from the taking of food not rendered impure by its nature, by the person to whom it belongs and by contact with impure objects. *Ganja* and other intoxicating articles are examples of the first kind of impure food; the food given by persons of evil deeds is an example of the second kind; and food touched by hair and the like is an example of the third kind; (ii) *Vimoka* is the absence of desire and anger; (iii) *Abhyāsa* is the dwelling of the mind on the object of meditation, when one is disengaged; (iv) *Kriyā* is the performance of the five great *yajnas* and similar *karmas* prescribed for the *varṇa* (caste) and *āśrama* (stage of life), so far as this may be possible; (v) *Kalyāṇa* is the following qualities: truth-speaking, rectitude, mercy, willingness to part with one's possessions, abstention from injury of others and absence of undesirable thought. Of these, the first quality is not merely stating a thing as it took place; but it must also be beneficial to others. By 'rectitude' reference is made to perfect agreement of speech and action with one's thought and feeling. 'Mercy' is inability to see another in trouble, and willingness to help him without regard to his own advantage.

Abstention from injury of others should be in every way—by thought, speech and action. The undesirable thought, the absence of which constitutes the last quality, is regarding as one's own what belongs to another; or thought that leads to no fruit; or thought of the injury done by others; (vi) *Ānavasāda* is the absence of *avasāda*, which is depression of the mind caused by difficulty of place or time, or by thinking of past loss or of unwelcome something that is expected in the future; (vii) *Anuddharsha*, absence of undue elation. The conclusion is that if one observes these conditions, and performs the duties of his *āśrama*, meditation will succeed and only then.

7. These qualifications are enjoined by the following texts:

(i) If the food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, continuous meditation will come (*chāndo*., VII-26-2); (ii) With a serene mind, i.e., not agitated by desire and anger, meditate (*Ibid.*, III-14-1); (iii) One that ever meditates on an object, etc. (*bhagavad gītā*, VIII-6); (iv) Be doing *karma* without desiring its fruit; one that does this is the best of those that meditate on *Brahma* (*muṇḍa*., III-1-4); Him *brāhmaṇas* desire to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, by *yajna*, by giving, and by *tapas* in the form of absence of desire (*bṛihad*., VI-4-22); (v) He can be reached by *satya* (*muṇḍa*., III-1-4); That *Brahma*, the fruit, is for those only in whom *tapas*, *brahmacharya* and truth-speaking are established (*praśna*., I-15); (vi) This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by weak persons (*muṇḍa*., III-2-4); (vii) Controlling the mind, controlling the senses (*bṛihad*., VI-4-23).<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Paras 3, 4, 6 and 7 above reproduce the portion of the *Sri Bhāshya* in sub-section 1 of chapter I, section 1, which was omitted (*vide* note on page 81).

8. The opponent may thus reply : In the sentence " with a horse he desires to go," it is seen that the horse is a help to going, but not to the desire therefor. Hence there being no way of getting over this difficulty, it is accepted that the horse is a help to going. Here, however, the statement, being made in a *vedic* text, must be accepted as it is made. *Reply.* The same difficulty is found here also. The desire to meditate springs from a knowledge of the Being to be meditated on ; and it cannot be originated by *karma*. Let the root (vid) in the term *vividishanti* be understood to mean merely to know, as you suggest. One that does *karma* must have an object. If it be to create the desire to know, then he has the desire already, and no *karma* is needed (*adhi.*, 406) (1).

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(1) The opponent explains : The *karmas* enjoined in the text are for the continuance of the desire. At first there is knowledge in general ; this leads to desire to know ; this is followed by *karma* ; and this creates a particular variety of knowledge. *Reply.* If *karmas* were needed for the continuance of the desire, they must be ever done ; and in order to know what they are, an enquiry into *karma* is needed ; but this is opposed to your view (see pages 77 to 79). Assume that the text supports your view. There are many other texts that prescribe *karmas* as helps to meditation ; and it is not possible to deny their existence. These are : " Be doing *karma* without desiring its fruit ; one that does this is the best of those that meditate on *Brahma* (*muṇḍa*, III-1-4) ; When the agitation of the mind is removed by *karmas*, then *jnāna* springs up ; *Janaka* and others reached

## SUB-SECTION 6

27. शमदमाद्युपेतस्स्यात्तथापि तु तद्विधेस्तदङ्गतया तेषामप्यवश्या-  
नुष्ठेयत्वात् ।

The house-holder should in spite of this practise control of the senses, control of the mind, and the rest; because they have been enjoined as its adjuncts, and because they also should be necessarily practised.

The question for consideration here is whether a house-holder should practise these. The doing of *karma* means that the senses and the mind should be active; and their control means that they should cease to work. Hence, the control cannot be practised. This *first view* is refuted in the *sūtra*. The control of the mind, the control of the senses and the rest are necessary. Because they have been enjoined as helps to meditation in the following text :

Hence, one, that knows this, controlling the mind controlling the senses, withdrawing from worldly pursuits, taking good and evil with serenity, and with the mind one-pointed, should see the *Ātmā* in himself (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23).

A serene mind being necessary for making a beginning, and also for perfecting meditation, the points mentioned should be practised. The conflict pointed out between the two sets of helps does not exist; for

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their goal by *karma* alone (*bhagavad gītā*, III-20); He performed very many *yūgas* (*viṣṇu*, VI-6-12).

*Question.* Why is the termination expressing desire added to the root? *Reply.* The intention is to show that meditation on *Brahma* is itself a desirable object (*adhī.*, 407).

they relate to separate matters. The senses and the mind should be engaged in actions that are enjoined ; and their control is in matters that are not enjoined, and that are not in any way useful (1). It may be doubted whether the activity even in actions enjoined will not produce tendencies, which will make the control very difficult. But this doubt is misplaced. As the *karma* enjoined is done as the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, it will secure His grace, and through it it will destroy all those tendencies (2).

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#### SUB-SECTION 7

In *bṛihad āraṇyaka* and *chāndogya* the following texts occur :

By him, that thus meditates on the food of *prāṇa*, no impure food is eaten ; no impure thing is accepted (*bṛihad.*, VIII-1-14) ; and in one that thus meditates nothing becomes improper food (*chāndo.*, V-2-1).

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(1) This question may be put to the opponent—Have not those in other stages to do the duties attached to them, and will not this interfere with the practice of control ? He *replies* : They abandon desire for fruit, and do their duties as worship. We state that this attitude applies to the householder too (*adhi.*, 408).

(2) The point under consideration may be illustrated by what happens in the world. One that knows that he has offended some great man, on whom he depends, has recourse to the means within his capacity to appease him ; and in due course he re-enters on his service. Similarly, each one—the householder as well as the others—essays to pacify his Maker by the duties of his own stage, and in due course reaches Him (*adhi.*, 409).



These texts indicate that one, that meditates on *prāṇa*, may take any food. Is this permission to be exercised by him at all times, or only when there is danger to life? The *first view* is that the permission, being in no way limited, may be utilised at all times. The opponent contends that a general prohibition cannot affect a special injunction, and that it applies to cases not covered by that injunction. See the rule of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* stated in para (ii) of the *first view* under *sūtra* 25 of chapter III, section 1, page 654.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 28. सर्वान्नानुमतिश्च प्राणायये तद्दर्शनात् ।

Permission to eat any food is only, when there is danger to *prāṇa*. And this appears in *vedic* texts.

The *veda* shows that even persons, that meditate on *Brahma*, utilise the permission only when life is in danger. See *Vedic Texts*. One *Ushasti*, foremost among those doing *brahma vidyā*, ate a portion of boiled gram, that was being eaten by an elephant-driver, but declined the drink, offered to him, saying

I should not have lived, if I had not eaten these ; (but when that danger has passed), to drink the impure water (offered by you) would be to yield to desire (*chāndo.*, I-10-4).

If this be the case in regard to one that does *brahma vidyā*, how much more careful should one be who meditates on *prāṇa* only, and whose capacity is very much less ?

### 29. अवाधाच्च ।

And because other *vedic* texts should not be nullified.

Reference is made to a text of the *chāndogya*, which runs as follows :

If the food be pure, the mind will be pure ; if the mind be pure, continuous meditation (on *Brahma*) will come (VII-26-2).

In order that this text may not be nullified, one should understand the texts in question as limited to cases of necessity.

### 30. अपिस्मर्यते ।

This is said in *smṛiti* also.

The text is

If one, being in danger of losing his life, eats food from anywhere, he is not stained by sin, as the lotus leaf is not affected by water.

This applies to those that meditate on *Brahma* as well as to others.

### 31. शब्दश्चातोऽकामकारे ।

And hence texts prohibiting the yielding to desire.

Hence—for the reasons stated in the preceding *sūtras*.

Hence a *brāhmaṇa* does not drink spirituous liquor, thinking “I will not be stained with sin”.

## SUB-SECTION 8

It was stated in sub-section 5 that *yajnas* and the rest should be performed by the house-holder as helps to his meditation on *Brahma*. Should they be done

by a house-holder, that does not aspire for release from *karma* or not? The *first view* is that they need not be. For, as subsidiary to *brahma vidyā*, *yajnas* and the rest should be done; hence one, that does not do it, need not do them; if they should be done as duties of his stage of life, he should do them throughout life. How can the same *karmas* be compulsory and optional at the same time?

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 32. विहितत्वाच्चाश्रमकर्मापि ।

And they (duties referred to in sub-section 5) are the duties of the *āśrama* also (stage of life); because they have been enjoined.

*Yajnas* and the rest should be performed even by the house-holder, that has no aspiration for release. For they have been enjoined by the text “He does *agnihotra* throughout life”; and this includes the *karmas* known as *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa*.

### 33. सहकारित्वेन च ।

They should be done also as auxiliary to meditation.

Because they have been enjoined as decided in sub-section 5. The same *agnihotra* is enjoined to a house-holder for life, and to one that desires the heaven-world, and the injunctions being contained in two different texts, it has been decided that there is no conflict. Similarly here also.

Nor are they different *karmas* in each case.

### 34. सर्वथापि त एवोभयलिङ्गात् ।

In both cases the duties are the same ; because in both the texts the same mark is found.

Whether the duties under consideration are viewed as auxiliary to meditation, or as duties of the *āśrama*, they are the same *karmas* in both the cases. The reason is that in both the texts the injunction is conveyed using the term *yajna*. There is therefore no ground for thinking that the duties in both cases differ. The effect of this is that by doing them once, both the purposes will be served (1).

### 35. अनभिभवं च दर्शयति ।

And the *veda* shows prevention of obstructions in meditation.

The text is “By *dharma* one removes evil *karma*” (*nārā.*, *anu.*, 50). Evil *karma* obstructs the origination of *brahma vidyā* ; and by the performance of *dharma*, *i.e.*, the duties under consideration, the obstruction does not take place. By their daily performance, the mind becomes pure, the capacity to meditate is developed, and meditation grows.

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(1) See the precedent in Introduction, para 37. Here the duties under consideration should be done by the same house-holder, and at the same place and time. As the *prayāgas*, though done but once, serve all the principal offerings, so the duties under consideration, though done but once, serve both the purposes.

## SUB-SECTION 9

Those in the four *āśramas* (stages of life) have been dealt with. The question now considered is whether persons that are without them—those that have completed the student's life, and have not married, or that are widowers—are competent to do *brahma vidyā*, and what are the helps to the *vidyā* in their case.

The *first view* is that they are not competent ; for they do not perform the duties of any *āśrama*, which are the helps needed for the *vidyās*. The *sūtra* states the *final decision* :

**36. अन्तराचापि तु तद्दृष्टेः ।**

Also in those between the *āśramas* (qualification does exist) ; because this has been observed.

Because it is seen that *Raikva*, *Bhishma*, *Samvarta* and others without *āśramas* did meditate on *Brahma*. No one can contend that only the duties of an *āśrama* can help meditation. The text quoted under sub-section 5 mentions the making of gifts and other duties as helps to meditation ; and these are found outside the *āśramas* also. Again, it was shown in sub-section 4 that those, that had taken the vow of life-long celibacy, meditated on *Brahma* with such helps as they could obtain from duties other than *agnihotra* and connected duties. Similarly, persons outside the *āśramas* may practise meditation on *Brahma*, obtaining help from actions that do not pertain to any *āśrama*, as repetition of *mantras*, abstention from food on particular days, making gifts and worship of the highest *Ātmā*.

### 37. अपि स्मर्यते ।

*Smṛiti* also states this.

What was last stated is confirmed by the following text of *manu* (II-87).

One that meditates may without doubt reach his goal even by *japa* (repetition of *mantras*). He may do anything or may not do anything; but if he be the friend of all, he will do his meditation so well as to reach his goal.

### 38. विशेषानुग्रहश्च ।

And help by special acts (is declared).

One is not left to depend only upon argument and the *smṛiti*; there is also a *vedic* text, which runs as follows:

With *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), with abstention from sexual intercourse, with earnestness, and with realisation of their *ātmā* they seek the *Ātmā*, etc. (*praśna*, I-10).

The *karmas* enumerated are not peculiar to the *āśramas*.

### 39. अतस्त्विदं तज्जयायो लिङ्गाच्च ।

Other than this is certainly better; because it is so declared by the *smṛiti*.

“Than this”—than being outside the *āśramas*; the ‘other’ is being in any one of the *āśramas*. The former is a case of necessity; but one, that can afford it, should hold some *āśrama*. Inside the *āśramas* there is scope for many *karmas*, and the help which they render is greater. Outside the *āśramas* there are not many *karmas*, and the help that they render is less. The two

cases cannot be on a par. The *smṛiti* declaration, which is addressed to one that can follow it, is "A *brāhmaṇa* should not remain even for one day outside one of the *āśramas*". A student, that has completed his study and a widower should not remain unmarried, unless they are disgusted with the world. It is a source of danger.

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### SUB-SECTION 10

40. तद्भूतस्य तु नातद्वाचो जैमिनेरपि नियमात्तद्रूपाभावेभ्यः ।

But one that has become that (the holder of an *āśrama* other than the house-holder's) cannot cease to be that. This is the view of *Jaimini* also. Because the *veda* restrains him from throwing up the duties of his *āśrama*.

The question for consideration is whether even one that has elected to remain a bachelor all his life, or a forest-dweller, or one that has renounced the world, may do *brahma vidyā*, when he has fallen from his condition. The *first view* is that he may, like the widower and others dealt with in the preceding sub-section. The *sūtra* replies no. The *vedic* texts, which bear on the subject are :

The student, that lives in the house of his teacher, and uses up his body completely in his service is the third (*chāndo.*, II-23-1); Let him go to the jungle; but never return from it; Having renounced the world, let not one resume the sacred fire.

Hence like the widower these persons cannot remain outside the *āśramas*; and if they do, they will be

disqualified for meditation on *Brahma*. By the reference to *Jaimini*, the author shows agreement by him, and confirms his own view.

The opponent disputes the conclusion reached. He considers that these persons may by some expiatory act purify themselves and become qualified again. Reference is made to an expiatory *yāga* in regard to such persons in chapter VI of the *pūrva mīmāṃsā* dealing with qualifications (section 8, sub-section 4). The next *sūtra* deals with this question :

41. न चाधिकारिकमपि पतनानुमानात्तदयोगात् ।

And not even the expiation referred to in the chapter on qualifications ; because the *smṛitis* declare them to have fallen, and expiation is impossible for them.

The declaration is :

In the case of the twice-born, who having entered on life-long studentship falls from it, I do not see any expiation by which he, the slayer of himself, may be purified.

Hence the expiation mentioned in the *mīmāṃsā* applies to other students.

42. उपपूर्वमपीत्येके भावमशनवत्तदुक्तम् ।

Some hold that expiation exists (as the fall from the *āśrama* is) merely *upapātaka* ; as in the case of eating ; this has been declared.

*Upapātaka* is a minor sin, not included in the five great sins. Some teachers therefore hold the view that the fall may be atoned for by an expiatory ceremony. They point to an analogy. There is a prohibition against drinking spirituous liquor ; and an expiatory ceremony is



mentioned for disobedience ; and this applies to the life-long student as well as to the ordinary student. And this is declared in the following *smṛiti* text :

What has been stated for the student living with his teacher applies to the other *āśramas* also, in so far as it is not opposed to them.

Similarly, here also expiation is permitted, and when the fallen man is purified, the qualification re-appears.

This view is rejected in the next *sūtra* :

### 43. बहिस्तृमयथापि स्मृतेराचाराच्च ।

But in either case such men remain outside (the group of persons that are qualified) ; because of the *smṛiti* and of the practice of good men.

‘In either case’—whether the fall is treated as a great sin or as a minor one. The result is the same ; and the fallen man remains disqualified. Because, as already pointed out, the *smṛiti* states that no expiation is possible for him. A few texts no doubt state that expiatory ceremonies may be resorted to to remove the sin ; but there is no expiation that can render the person so pure as to become qualified for meditation (1).

(1) A *karma* has three-fold capacity : It yields unwelcome fruit ; It obstructs the acquisition of a qualification for doing *karma* enjoined by the *veda* ; and it creates a leaning to similar *karma*. Some expiations destroy all the three capacities ; others some one of these, but not all. Here there is conflict between two texts—that which denies the existence of any expiatory ceremony, and that extending certain expiations. It is therefore decided that the latter text permits purification to the extent of destroying the first capacity, and that the former text preserves the second capacity intact.

There is also the practice of good men, who avoid the fallen men, even though they do the expiatory ceremonies ; and they do not teach them how to do the meditation. The conclusion therefore is that these persons remain disqualified(1).

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### SUB-SECTION 11

This sub-section comes in only incidentally. Reference has already been made to meditation on the *udgitha*, the singing of which is part of a *kratu*. The question to be considered is by whom it should be done—by the *yajamāna* himself or by one of his helpers in the *kratu*.

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(1) *Question by the opponent.* The following text states an expiatory act for those affected with the five great sins, and with minor ones known as *upapātaka* : “ If one sees *Purushottama* from the seat on which He stands up to His head, his great sins are quickly destroyed ; ” why should the destruction of *upapātaka* be specially stated. When meditation on *Brahma* has been established, if the meditator falls from inadvertence, meditation on *Brahma* is stated to be the means for his purification. This is stated by *smṛiti*-writers. Why should there not be expiation similarly in regard to the fallen man under consideration ? *Reply.* We have no right to question the *veda*. Following the *smṛiti* and the practice of good men, the author of the *sūtras* has shown what should be done in this case. We must accept what the *veda* and *smṛitis* teach ; if once we begin to question why they prescribe this or that, the bund for the protection of *dharma*, which has been made, will disappear (*adhi.*, 414 and 415).

*Ātreya* holds the *first view*, which is that it should be done by the *yajamāna*. For from *upanishads* it is observed that the same persons, that perform meditation, reap its fruit. Here it has been decided that the fruit of the meditation—*viz.*, non-obstruction of the fruit of the *kratu*—is different from the fruit of the *kratu* itself, and that it is reaped by the *yajamāna*. Hence it is he that should do the meditation.

2. *Objection*. This case is analogous to that in which, when the *yajamāna* desires cows, water for *pranīta* should be carried in a milking vessel. *Reply*. Here though the fruit, which is separate from the fruit of the *yāga*, is reaped by the *yajamāna*, the filling in of the milking vessel must be done by the *adhvaryu*; for the operations of filling and filling in the milking vessel cannot be separated. In the case under consideration, there is no such difficulty; for while the *udgātā*, sings the *udgītha*, the *yajamāna* may do the meditation. This is stated in the *sūtra*:

44. स्वामिनः फलश्रुतेरित्यात्रेयः ।

(The meditation is the duty) of the *yajamāna*; because meditation and reaping the fruit are declared to be by the same person. So does *Ātreya* think.

The *final decision* is stated in the next *sūtra*:

45. आर्त्विज्यमित्यौडुलोमिस्तस्मै हि परिकीयते ।

It is the duty of the *ritvik* (helper in the *kratu*); so does *Audulomi* think; for he has been bought for doing the *kratu*.

According to *Audulomi* the meditation should be done by the *ritvik*. For, he has been engaged by the promise of a fee to do the *kratu* with all its parts. And this is stated in the following texts: "He requests the *ritviks*"; and "He gives fees to the *ritviks*". Hence, whatever *karma*, whether of the body or of the mind, pertains to the *kratu* should be done only by him. Capacity or the reverse is not the criterion in this case. It is true that the meditation on the *udgitha* is not a part of the *kratu*, but benefits the *yajamāna*; yet it pertains to him as *yajamāna*, and the *kratu* and all its parts should be done by the helpers. Also, the meditation serves a part of the *kratu* to be done by a helper. Hence, it should be done by him. In the *dahara* and other *vidyās*, there is no mention of anything to be done by a helper; and following the rule that the fruit belongs to the performer, they are done by those that wish to enjoy the fruits.

### SUB-SECTION 12

Helps of two kinds have been prescribed in sub-sections 5 and 6; *viz.*, the doing of *yajna* and other duties of one's stage of life, and the control of the mind and the senses, etc. In this sub-section help of a third kind is prescribed, *viz.*, *mauna* (making the mind dwell on the object of meditation, when it is disengaged.) This is referred to in a text of the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*

Hence, a *brāhmaṇa*, should attain *pāṇḍitya* and desire to remain with *bālyā*. Attaining *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā*, he then becomes a *muni* (V-5).

Here the question for consideration is whether like *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā mauna* also is enjoined, or whether the reference to becoming a *muni* is a repetition of what has been stated already.

*First view.* It is the latter. For both the terms *pāṇḍitya* and *mauna* denote knowledge. Hence the expression “becomes *muni*” is a statement of the injunction already conveyed in the expression “Should attain *pāṇḍitya*”. This view is supported by the absence of the termination denoting injunction.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

46. सहाकार्यन्तरविधिः पक्षेण तृतीयं तद्वतो विध्यादिवत् ।

Another help is prescribed to one doing *brahma vidyā* ; like those enjoined and the rest. The third, as it is seen, as an alternative meaning, in those that do meditation fully.

‘Like those enjoined’—in sub-sections 5 and 6, *viz.*, *yajna* and other duties of one’s stage of life, and control of the mind, and the rest. By the words ‘the rest’ reference is made to hearing and constantly thinking on the instruction received. As the first set is prescribed by the texts considered in sub-sections 5 and 6 as helps, and as hearing and thinking, which will be resorted to without an injunction, are accepted as helps, here also a third kind of help is enjoined, consisting of *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna*. The *sūtra* states that *mauna* is a third thing in addition to *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā* ; for the

term *muni* is used to denote also persons like *Vyāsa*, who do meditation fully. The term therefore means to fix the mind on the object of meditation, when it is disengaged. It therefore differs from *manana*, which is to think on the instruction received from a teacher, so that it may be firmly impressed on the mind. It is true that in the text there is no termination indicating injunction ; but because it has not been enjoined already, it must be assumed that an injunction is conveyed. The expression ‘ becomes a *muni* ’ means ‘ he should become a *muni* ’.

The meaning of the text is as follows : *Brāhmaṇa* is one that does *brahma vidyā* ; he should obtain *pāṇḍitya*, i.e., he should know the nature of *Brahma*, to be meditated on, fully and without doubt or misconception ; that is he should obtain a clear and full grasp of the subject, that cannot be attained by hearing and thinking alone. This must come from the predominance of the quality *satva*, which again must come from love of *Brahma* (1). The meaning of *bālyā* will be presently explained. Having attained *pāṇḍitya* and *bālyā*, his mind must dwell on the nature of *Brahma* as it is, in order that he may attain *brahma vidyā*. It is only by

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(1) This point is stated in the following texts : ‘ I cannot be seen in this form as you have seen Me by recitation of the *veda*, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), by making gifts or by *yajna*. But by love, not looking forward to any other goal, it is possible for one to know Me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54). In whom there is superior love for the *Deva* (*śveta.*, VI-23) ; This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, etc.’ (*kaṭha*, II-23).

the attainment of these three things in this manner one attains the *vidyā*. This is stated in what follows: 'Attaining *amauna* (what is other than *mauna*), and *mauna*, he becomes *brāhmaṇa*. By the expression 'other than *mauna*' reference is made to all the other helps; and 'becomes *brāhmaṇa*' means attains *vidyā* fully grown; and this is to be attained with such helps only. Then the question is put "with what does he become *brāhmaṇa*"; the meaning is whether any means exist other than that stated. The reply is—'by which he becomes, by that alone he becomes thus'. The meaning is: it was stated that one becomes *brāhmaṇa* by the helps ending with *mauna*; by this alone he becomes *brāhmaṇa*; but not by any other means. The conclusion is that for all stages of life *pāṇḍitya*, *bālyā* and *mauna* are prescribed like the duties of those stages.

*Question.* In the *chāndogya* one is directed to complete his student's stage of life and live as a householder (See *Vedic Texts*); and the text closes with these words "Thus living all his life, he attains *Brahma*-world and does not return" (VIII-15-1). How is one to reconcile this teaching with what has been stated? The next *sūtra* replies:

#### 47. कृत्स्नभावात्तु गृहिणोपसंहारः ।

Because (meditation) is found in all (the stages), the teaching is wound up with the householder.

For the reason stated, meditation is found in the householder also; and the *upanishad* closes, making

reference to him. The intention is that what is stated should apply to all stages.

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Similarly, in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* the text under consideration is preceded by reference to the state of one that renounces the world thus :

*Brāhmaṇa* should rise from love of son, from love of money, and from love of the world, and live the life of a mendicant.

Though the third kind of help appears to be prescribed to one that thus renounces the world, it applies to all. This is declared in the next *sūtra* :

#### 48. मौनवदितरेषामप्युपदेशात् ।

Like *mauna* ; because the reaching of *Brahma* by those in other stages also is stated.

In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text reference is made to one that rises from all desires, and lives as a mendicant ; and then the helps ending with *mauna* are enjoined. This injunction applies to all stages. For all those in other stages also reach *Brahma* as taught in *chāndogya* itself (II-23-1).

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### SUB-SECTION 13

The expression “Remaining with *bālya*” in the text considered in the preceding sub-section is explained here. The term *bālya* may mean the age of a child or his actions. As the former cannot be attained



by one, the term must be taken to mean a child's actions. The question for consideration is whether the meditator may live like a child, following his desires, wherever they may lead him? or whether he should not parade his learning and worth. The *first view* is that the former alternative is what is intended; for there is nothing to limit the injunction to any particular thing; and a general prohibition is barred by the particular injunction. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*:

#### 49. अनाविष्कुर्वन्नवयात् ।

Without parade; because this alone will fit in.

It is the nature of a child not to show off his powers; and this should be adopted by the meditator. For, this alone will fit with the injunction. Everything else is said to be opposed to *vidyā*.

Who does not desist from evil deeds, the force of whose desire and hate have not abated, whose mind is tossed about by numerous undertakings, and who for that reason cannot steadily maintain his mind on any object—by him He cannot be reached by meditation (*kaṭha.*, II-24); If the food be pure, the mind will be pure (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2).

### SUB-SECTION 14

#### 50. ऐहिकमप्रस्तुतप्रतिबन्धे तदर्शनात् ।

The fruits of this world are reaped immediately, if there be no obstruction. This is seen.

Meditation is of two kinds—the fruit of one is well-being in this world or in the next ; and the fruit of the other is release from *karma*. The question considered in this sub-section is whether the former is reaped immediately after the good deeds are done, or at some other time. The *first view* is that as there is no cause for delay, it is reaped immediately ; for the meditator is reborn with the good deeds previously done. This is stated by *Bhagavān* : ‘ Four classes of persons, that have done good deeds, meditate on Me ’ (*bhagavad gītā*, VII-16). The *sūtra* states that the time for reaping the fruit is not definitely fixed. If the fruit of a stronger *karma* does not intervene, and cause obstruction, the fruit of the meditation is reaped immediately. Otherwise, it is delayed. This fact is admitted in the *veda*. It was shown that when the *udgitha* is sung with meditation, the *kratu*, of which the singing is a part, becomes most efficacious, *i.e.*, that it prevents the coming of all obstructions. The possibility of there being obstructions is thus admitted.

#### SUB-SECTION 15


51. एवं मुक्तिफलानियमस्तदवस्थावधृतेस्तदवस्थावधृतेः ।

Similarly, in regard to fruit in the form of release from *karma*, the time of reaping is not definitely fixed. Because that condition is known.

The same condition exists in this case also. The same condition—the absence of obstruction, or the

ending of the obstruction. The reason for adding a new sub-section is that there is a further doubt in the matter, *viz.*, the actions that help meditation being more powerful, there can be no obstruction. The *reply* is that it is possible that offence previously given to persons doing meditation may cause obstruction (1).

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।




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(1) It may be thought that the last sub-section alone is useful, as it points out that it is possible for meditation to be obstructed in the yielding of its fruit, so that steps may be taken to remove the cause of obstruction. Why is reference made to meditation for worldly fruit? The *reply* is that the intention is to point out the possibility of obstructions there also, and to create a disgust for such fruits; for persons may seek them under the impression that there is no difficulty in the matter (*adhi.*, 423).

## CHAPTER IV

### SECTION 1

IN the third chapter meditation was considered along with the helps thereto. In this chapter the nature of meditation is first examined (1), and then the fruits to be reaped are stated.

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### SUB-SECTION 1

The following texts teach *vedana* "One that meditates (*vid*) on *Brahma* reaches the highest (*āna.*, 1-1); Meditating (*viditvā*) on Him alone, one attains immortality (*śveta.*, 3-8). If one meditates (*veda*) on *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indeed; (*munda.*, III-2-9); When the seer sees the Being with a bright figure' (*Ibid.*,

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(1) It may be thought that the nature of meditation should have been dealt with in the third section of chapter III. True; its inclusion in the chapter on fruits of meditation is to show the following points: (i) Release cannot be attained by any other means; (ii) meditation is indissolubly connected with release; (iii) The attainment of the goal is near at hand; and (iv) The pleasure of meditation is as great as that to be attained in release (*adhi.*, 433).

III-1-3). This text contains the term *vidvān*. These texts prescribe *vedana* as the means to reach *Brahma*. The question for consideration is whether it should be done but once, and whether the injunction is fully complied with thereby, or whether it should be repeated many times?

*First view.* The *vedana* should be done but once. For, the injunctions mention only *vedana*; and there is no authority for its repetition. The case cannot be likened to the husking of paddy (*avahanana*); see note (5) on page 65. There the effect is actually seen; and till the husk is completely removed, the operation should be repeated. But *vedana* does not produce an effect that can be seen; and it need not be repeated. Further, *karmas* like *jyotishtoma*, and the *vedana* prescribed in the *vedānta* form the worship of the highest *Ātmā*; and thus worshipped, He bestows on the worshipper the four kinds of fruits. This was settled in chapter III, section 2, sub-section 8. Hence, like *jyotishtoma*, *vedana* also should be done but once; and this will be a full compliance with the injunctions.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 1. आवृत्तिसकृदुपदेशात् ।

Repetition more than once; because it is so taught.

Because the word *vedana* is used as synonymous with the terms *dhyāna* and *upāsana*. This is known from the fact that in texts teaching *vedana* the three terms are used to denote the same thing. The *chāndogya*, III-18 begins with the words “meditate (*upāsita*) on the mind

as *Brahma* " (verse 1), and closes with the sentence " He that thus meditates (*veda*) shines through his fame as a giver ; warms through his repute as a powerful person, and shines through the lustre born of *vedic* learning " (verse 3). Here the teaching begins with the term *upāsana* and ends with the term *vedana*. In the next example this is reversed. In the same *upanishad* the first section of chapter IV describes *Raikva's* learning thus " What he knows (*veda*), that alone any other knows (*veda*) ; such a person was stated by me " (verse 4). Further on, there is this sentence " Teach me, revered sir, the Being on whom you meditate " (*upāsse*) (*Ibid.*, IV-2-4). Other texts similarly connect *vedana* and *dhyāna*. The teaching conveyed by the text " One that meditates (*vid*) on *Brahma* reaches the highest " (*āna.*, 1-1) is given by other texts thus : " The *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on and should be meditated on (*nīdīdhyāsitavya*) " (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-5) ; and " Then meditating (*dhyāyamāna*) on Him without parts, he sees Him " (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-8). Now, *dhyāna* is thinking continuously, and is not merely a single act of recalling something to the mind. *Upāsana* too has the same meaning ; for the term is used to denote the fixing of the mind on one thing to the exclusion of every thing else. It may, therefore, be concluded that the term *vedana* means continuous dwelling of the mind, the subject of meditation being revolved many times.

## 2. लिङ्गाच्च ।

This is learnt from the *smṛitis* also.

This text is:

A continuous stream of thought without interruption by any other thought is *dhyāna*; and it is brought about by the first six helps (*vishṇu*, VI-7-91).

2. The means to release (*moksha*) is thus shown to be meditation. It should also be continuous without a break, like a stream of oil poured from a cup. This is stated:

If food be pure, the mind will be pure; if the mind be pure, unbroken (*dhruvā*) meditation will come; when unbroken meditation is attained, all knots are cut (1) (*chāndo*., VIII-26-2).

Next, it must become vivid like sense perception. This appears from the following text:

The knots in the heart are cut; all doubts are solved; his *karmas* are destroyed, when He is seen, as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings (*munḍa*., II-2-9).

This being so, in the text 'The *Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, etc.,' the term *drashtavya* shows that meditation denoted by *nididhyāsana* should be vivid like sense perception (2). A thought recalled and revolved in the mind continuously becomes vivid like sense perception.

(1) Knots are *avidyā*, desire and the like, so called from the difficulty in getting rid of them.

(2) In the text '*Ātmā*, dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on, should be meditated on,' the hearing about is not an injunction; for one, that has learnt the *veda*, will perceive that it points out the means to desirable ends; and in order to find out all about them, he will himself go to a teacher to receive instruction. This need not be enjoined. Nor should *manana*, (thinking

3. And this is explained by the author of the *vākya*. ' *Vedana* is *upāsana* ; as it is used to denote the subject of *upāsana*.' He considers the following as the *first view*. 'Think but once ; for the intention of the injunction is thus carried out ; like the *prayāja* offerings, which are made but once for all the principal offerings, (see Intro., para 37). He then states the *final decision* thus : 'It is decided (that the thought should be repeated) ; for the term *upāsana* is used as synonymous with *vedana*. Next, *upāsana* should be unbroken meditation ; for it is seen, and is stated in a *vedic* text.'

4. It has been stated that the means to release (*moksha*) is continuous, vivid meditation. It should be loving meditation also. This is stated :

This *Ātmā* cannot be reached by mere thinking, by mere meditation, or by mere hearing many times ; He is reached by him, whom alone He chooses. To him this *Ātmā* shows Himself (*munda.*, III-2-3).

He chooses him only, who is dearest to Himself. He is dearest to Him, who loves Him beyond measure. *Bhagavān* Himself makes efforts in such a manner, that one that is dearest to Him may reach Him. This is stated by Himself : "To those, that wishing ever to be with Me, meditate on Me, I give with love that *buddhi*, with which they will reach Me" (*bhagavad gītā*, X-10) ; 'I am immeasurably dear to him ; he is

on) be enjoined, as its purpose is to impress the teaching on the mind. Hence, what is enjoined is only *dhyāna* (meditation), and this should be as vivid as sense perception is.



immeasurably dear to Me' (*Ibid.*, VII-17). This means that the continuous, vivid meditation must become immeasurably dear, as the object meditated on is immeasurably dear. It is then that the highest *Ātmā* will choose the meditator, and can be reached by him. This continuous, vivid, loving meditation and this alone is denoted by the term *bhakti*; for it is synonymous with the term *upāsana*. Hence, the *veda* and *smṛiti* state :

By meditating on Him alone, one overcomes death (*śveta.*, III-8); One that thus meditates on Him here becomes immortal; no other path to the goal exists (*puru*); I cannot be seen in this form, as you have seen Me, either by reciting the *veda*, by *tapas* (diminution of sense enjoyment), by making gifts, or by *yajnas*. But by love, not looking forward to any other fruit, it is possible for one to know Me, to see Me as I am, and to enter into Me (*bhagavad gītā*, XI-53 and 54); That highest *Purusha* can be reached with love, that spends itself wholly upon Him (*Ibid.*, VIII-22).

5. *Criticism.* *Śankara* holds the view that the destruction of *avidyā* alone is release (*moksha*), and that it comes about by knowing *Brahma*. This we accept. Let us now consider what this knowing is, which *upani-shads* intend to enjoin as the means of destroying *avidyā*. Is it the mere knowledge conveyed by *vedic* texts, or is it meditation following on that knowledge.

*Śankara.* It is the former.

*Reply.* The knowledge conveyed by *vedic* texts need not be enjoined; it will come to one, that hears the texts. Nor is it perceived that by this alone *avidyā* is destroyed.

*Śankara.* Such knowledge as will destroy *avidyā* does come on hearing the texts; but the perception of differences, which is the effect of *vāsanā* (unfavourable tendency) does not disappear at once; it continues for some time, like the perception of the moon as double by one with a cataract in the eye, even though he learns that there is but one moon. Though it continues, as its root has been cut, it does not bind.

*Reply.* We cannot admit that perception of differences can continue; for its cause also, *viz.*, *vāsanā*, being unreal, has been destroyed by knowledge. The case of the perception of the double moon is not analogous; for the cause of such perception is a real cataract in the eye; and it cannot be removed by knowledge. Hence the perception continues; but as it is known to be misperception on good authority, it will lead to no undesirable result. If you say that the *vāsanā* continues, even after knowledge comes, as there is no other means of destroying it, it can never disappear.

*Śankara.* There is a *vāsanā* engendered and developed by perception of differences; and until this is removed, *vedic* texts will not produce such knowledge as will destroy *avidyā*.

*Reply.* Sentences must convey their meaning, when the necessary conditions exist; it is not correct to state that they will not. We also see that even though an unfavourable tendency exists, such knowledge, as will remove misconception, comes from the statements of reliable persons or from inference. Further, as you consider that knowledge should come through the

destruction of the *vāsanā*, this result can never happen ; the *vāsanā* has been developed during long ages ; and is immeasurably strong ; while the meditation, that should destroy it, being practised for only a short time, is weak ; and it cannot destroy the *vāsanā*.

6. Hence the means to the destruction of *avidyā*, which *upanishads* intend to teach, is something other than the knowledge conveyed by texts. It is what is denoted by words like *dhyāna* and *upāsana*. Here is the authority—

Knowing (*viññāya*), do meditation (*prajñā*) (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-21); Knowing (*anuvidya*), one meditates (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-6); meditate on the *Ātmā* thus I am for thee only (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-6); meditating on Him, one is released from the jaws of death (*kaṭha.*, III-15); meditate only on the *Ātmā*, the fruit (*bṛihad.*, III-4-15). *Ātmā* dear, should be seen, should be heard about, should be thought on, should be meditated on (*Ibid.*, VI-5-6); He should be sought; He should be meditated on (*chando.*, VIII-7-1).

As the knowledge to be gathered from *vedic* texts serves meditation, in the first two texts reference is made to this knowledge by the participles, 'knowing,' and then meditation is enjoined by the other words in the texts.<sup>1</sup>

## SUB-SECTION 2

The question to be considered now is whether the highest *Ātmā*, the object of meditation, should be

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<sup>1</sup> Paras 2 to 6 reproduce the portion of the *Srī Bhāshya* omitted from sub-section I of chapter I, section 1, as stated in a footnote on page 81.

meditated on as different from the meditator, or as his *ātmā*.

*First view.* He should be meditated on as different from the meditator; for He is other than the *jīva* that meditates. This point has been decided in *sūtras* I-1-17, II-1-22, and III-4-8. One should meditate on Him as He is; if the meditation be on Him, as He is not, He will not be reached as He is. For the rule is what one thinks that he becomes (*chāndo.*, III-14-1).

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 3. आत्मेति तूपगच्छन्ति ग्राहयन्ति च ।

(The meditation should be) only as *ātmā*. So have persons meditated in the past, and the *upani-shads* convey the same teaching.

As the person that meditates is the *ātmā* of his own body, so is the highest *Ātmā* the *ātmā* of himself, and meditation should be done in this aspect. For it was in this manner that men of olden times meditated "I am thou indeed, revered *devatā*; thou art I indeed". *Question.* The highest *Ātmā* being other than the meditator, how did they regard Him as themselves? The last part of the *sūtra* replies :

The *veda* makes the meditators understand this point without conflicting with other texts : " Who stands in the *ātmā*, who is within the *ātmā*, whom the *ātmā* does not know, whose body the *ātmā* is, who rules the *ātmā* from within, He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *Ātmā* (*bṛihād.*, V-7-22). All these beings, dear, have their root in *Sat*; they rest in *Sat*; they will be dissolved in *Sat*; all this is identical with that (*Sat*) (*chāndo.*, VI-8-4 and 7); All this is indeed

*Brahma*; for it has come forth from Him; it will be dissolved in Him; it lives by Him (*Ibid.*, III-14-1).

For the reasons stated in these texts, *Brahma* is the *ātmā* of all things—intelligent and non-intelligent. He is therefore the *ātmā* of the meditator.

As each person is the *ātmā* of his own body, and thinks “I am *deva*, I am man”; so the highest *Ātmā* is the *ātmā* of himself, and it is appropriate that he should regard Him as himself. It has been pointed out how every thought of everything extends to the highest *Ātmā* also, and how every word therefore denote Him directly. Men of olden times, accepting this teaching of the *veda*, made the statement quoted above. Hence also prohibition of meditation on Him as another contained in the following texts:

One that meditates on another *devatā* with the thought ‘He is another; I am another’ does not meditate (*bṛihad.*, III-4-10); He does not know the whole truth; meditate on Him only as *ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-7). All things will overcome him, who sees all things else where than in the *Ātmā* (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-6).

2. The injunctions and prohibitions do not conflict with the direction to think of the highest *Ātmā* as different from the *jīva* contained in the text—“Meditating on the *ātmā* and on the Being who controls him as different” (*śveta.*, I-6). For, one meditates on Him as I, on the ground that He is his *ātmā*; and he regards Him as superior to himself, as he is superior to his own body.

## SUB-SECTION 3

## 4. न प्रतीके न हि सः ।

Meditation as *ātmā* does not apply to meditation on *pratīka* ; for it is not *Ātmā*.

Meditation on mind, on name and on similar objects is enjoined in the following texts : “ Meditate on mind as *Brahma* (*chāndo.*, III-18-1) ; He that meditates on name as *Brahma* ” (*Ibid.*, VII-1-5). In these cases is the meditation to be as directed in the preceding sub-section—*i.e.*, as the *ātmā* of the meditator, or no ?

*First view.* As directed in the preceding sub-section ; for the meditation is on the highest *Ātmā* as in the other case ; and He is the *ātmā* of the meditator. The *final decision* is—No. This is stated in the *sūtra* : For mind or name is not the *ātmā* of the meditator. In cases like these the meditation is only on the *pratīka*, but not on the highest *Ātmā*. He enters into the meditation merely as a qualifying attribute (*viśeṣaṇa*). By meditation on *pratīka* is meant meditation on what is not the highest *Ātmā* as the highest *Ātmā*. In this meditation, as the *pratīka* is not the *ātmā* of the meditator, it is not to be meditated on as such.

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*Objection.* Even here the highest *Ātmā* alone is the object of meditation. When this is possible, it is inappropriate to meditate on mind and on other non-intelligent objects, which possess but little power.

Hence, the highest *Ātmā* should be meditated on as mind, as name and the like. The *sūtra* replies :

5. ब्रह्मदृष्टित्कर्षात् ।

Meditation as *Brahma* should be (on objects) ; because of His superiority.

Because *Brahma* is superior to mind, name and the rest ; while they are the reverse as compared with Him. To look upon a king as a servant will be attended with unpleasant consequences, while the reverse will do good.

SUB-SECTION 4

6. आदित्यादिमतयश्चाङ्गउपपत्तेः ।

Meditation on parts of a *kratu* should be only as the sun and other *devatās* ; because to do so is appropriate.

There is this text : “ This being, who warms, meditate on *udgitha* as that being ” (*chāndo.*, I-3-1). In cases like this, when meditation on parts of a *kratu* is enjoined, the question arises—Should one meditate on the *udgitha* as the sun, or on the sun as the *udgitha* ?

*First view.* The latter is the correct form ; for, the rule laid down in the preceding sub-section is that meditation should be on an inferior object as being a superior being. *Udgitha*, being part of a *kratu*, which

is the means to a fruit, is superior to the sun, who has no connection with the fruit (1).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*. It is on the *udgitha* that one should meditate as the sun. Because it is appropriate to regard the sun as the superior of the two. For, *karma* yields its fruit, only as being the worship of the sun and similar *devatās*.

## SUB-SECTION 5

### 7. आसीनस्सम्भवात् ।

Meditation should be done in the sitting posture ; because it is only then (that concentration of mind) will be possible.

One may do meditation, sitting, lying down, standing or walking ; for there is nothing to restrict the choice to one of these postures. In this predicament the *sūtra* intervenes, and throws its weight on the side of the sitting posture. In standing or walking some effort is required ; and lying down may induce sleep. Hence the sitting posture should be adopted. And in order that no effort may be required for holding up the body, some support to the back should also be provided.

### 8. ध्यानाच्च ।

And because what has to be done is *dhyāna* (meditation).

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(1) This is based on the *mīmāṃsaka's* view that *karma* yields fruit, through *apūrva*, but not the *devatā*. See the discussions in paras 5 and 6 of the *final decision* in sub-section I-3-7.



*Dhyāna* has been stated to be the dwelling of the mind on one thing, without the intervention of the thought of anything else. And for this concentration of mind is necessary.

### 9. अचलत्वं चापेक्ष्य ।

And having regard to immobility.

Having regard to immobility, earth, sky and other things are appropriately stated to meditate

Earth seems to meditate; the intermediate world seems to meditate; heaven seems to meditate; water seems to meditate; the hills seem to meditate (*chāndo.*, VII-6-1).

In order to concentrate his mind the meditator should be immobile like the earth and hills; and this is possible only to him that sits down.

### 10. स्मरन्ति च ।

And this is stated in the *smritis*.

It is stated that meditation should be done sitting.

Placing on a pure spot a firm seat for himself, neither much raised, nor very low, and covered over with a cloth, deerskin, and *kuṣa* grass; sitting on the seat, making the mind one-pointed, controlling the functions of the mind and the senses, let him practise *yoga* to reach purity of the *ātmā* (*bhagavad gītā*, VI-11 and 12).

### 11. यत्रैकाग्रता तत्राविशेषात् ।

(The meditation should be done) where concentration of mind is possible; because (the time and place) have not been specified.

No particular place or time has been stated as suitable for the meditation, and there is mention only

of concentration of mind. Whatever place or time is suitable for this purpose, that alone should be selected. The text "On a level place, pure, and free from pebbles fire and sand, etc." (*śveta.*, II-10) refers to a place where alone concentration of mind may be attained; but it does not restrict the choice to particular places; for further on it is said "suitable to the mind," i.e., to concentration of mind.

## SUB-SECTION 6

### 12. आप्रयाणात्तत्रापि हि दृष्टम् ।

(The meditation should be done) till one departs from the world. For there also it is seen.

The question for consideration is whether meditation may be completed in one day, or whether it should be continued every day till death. The *first view* is that as the injunction will be carried out by doing it for one day only, it should be completed on one day (1). The *sūtra* says—'No.' It is seen that meditation

(1) *Objection.* As this text contains no word to indicate an injunction, it merely sums up the teaching with a statement of the fruit. *Reply.* As the injunction has not been given anywhere else, it should be treated as an injunction. *Objection again.* In this text reference is made to good deeds only, but not to meditation. *Reply.* As the good deeds are referred to as the means of reaching the *Brahma-world*, and as they are calculated to make meditation grow, the mention of good deeds implies the continuance of meditation also throughout.

is done from its commencement up to departure from this world, and throughout this period—"Thus living all his life, he reaches the *Brahma*-world" (*chāndo.*, VIII-15-1).

### SUB-SECTION 7

In the remainder of this chapter the fruits of meditation are described. In this section such fruits, as come to the meditator while he remains in his gross body, are dealt with.

The *veda* states that when one has attained meditation, his previous evil *karma* is destroyed, and that subsequent evil *karma* does not attach itself to him. The following are the texts :

As water does not stick to a lotus leaf, so no evil *karma* will stick to one, that thus meditates (*chāndo.*, IV-14-3). The *ātmā* that knows the nature of *Brahma*, on knowing Him is not polluted with evil deed (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-23).

These texts describe non-attachment of subsequent evil deed.

When one knows this and makes offerings, all his evil deeds are burnt up, as the cotton of the *ishika* plant thrown into the fire is burnt up (*chāndo.*, V-24-3); His *karmas* are destroyed, when He is seen, as compared with whom all superior beings appear as inferior beings (*muṇḍa.*, II-2-9).

These texts describe the destruction of past *karma*. The question to be considered is whether it is right to regard these two results as the fruit of *vidyā* or no.

*First view.* They cannot be the fruit of *vidyā* ; for it is said :

*Karma*, the fruit of which has not been experienced, is not destroyed even by the lapse of a thousand millions of *kalpas* (world-age).

As the *vedic* texts conflict with this verse, and as they follow the teaching of meditations on the highest *Ātmā*, they must be regarded as mere praise (*arthavāda*). Nor can they be regarded as enjoining meditation in expiation of evil *karma* ; for they teach the reaching of *Brahma* as the fruit—"One that meditates on *Brahma* attains the highest" (*āna.*, I-1). "If one meditates on *Brahma*, he becomes *Brahma* indeed" (*munḍa.*, III-2-9).

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

13. तदधिगम उत्तरपूर्वाधयोरश्लेषविनाशौ तद्व्यपदेशात् ।

On the attainment of this (meditation) there result the destruction of previous evil *karma*, and the non-attachment of subsequent evil *karma* ; because this is declared.

By the expression "attainment of meditation" is meant the reaching of the stage, in which meditation becomes as *vivid* as sense perception ; for the text is "When He is seen". It is appropriate that these results should flow from *vidyā* ; for it possesses great efficacy ; and this efficacy is referred to in the expressions "No evil *karma* will stick to one that thus meditates" ; and "all his evil deeds are burnt up". There is no conflict as stated in the *first view* ; for the texts relate to different matters. The verse confirms the efficacy of *karma* to produce its fruit ; while the *upanishad*

texts quoted declare that meditation on the highest *Ātmā*, when attained, destroys the capacity of past evil deeds to yield their fruits, and that it obstructs the accrual of similar capacity in regard to subsequent evil deeds. There is no more conflict between them than there is between the capacity of fire to produce heat, and the power of water to allay it.

2. The opponent's view that meditation is not expiation is not correct. It is enjoined merely to destroy *karma*; and when it is destroyed, and the obstruction is removed, the attribute *jñāna* expands of itself; and other fruits come to the meditator in the same way (*adhi.*, 460).

3. What is meant by the non-sticking of evil deeds? Evil deeds produce in a person a tendency to do evil deeds of the same kind, make him unfit to perform the duties imposed upon him by the *veda*, and lead to unwelcome fruit. Obstructing the accrual of this capacity is non-sticking of evil deeds. The destruction of evil deeds is the destruction of this capacity, when it has already accrued. This capacity is the displeasure of the highest *Ātmā*. The meditation is His worship, and removes His displeasure, when it has accrued, and obstructs its accrual, when it has not.

4. This declaration of the non-sticking of subsequent evil *karma* refers, it should be noted, to *karma* done unconsciously. The text "who does not desist from evil deeds, etc." (*kāṭha.*, II-24), indicates that complete withdrawal from evil doing is the means by which meditation may be perfected.

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## SUB-SECTION 8

## 14. इतरस्याप्येवमसंश्लेषः पाते तु ।

In regard to the other also (*i.e.*, good deeds) similar destruction of the previous and non-sticking of the subsequent one. But the destruction takes place, when the body falls away.

The *sūtra* extends to good deeds also the effects stated in the preceding *sūtra* in regard to evil deeds and for the same reason. Good deeds are on the same level as evil deeds as to their antagonism to the fruit of meditation. There is also *vedic* declaration on the point. Referring to both good and evil deeds, it is said "All evil deeds depart from Him" (*chāndo.*, VIII-4-1); "Then he shakes off good and evil deeds" (*kaushitaki*, 1-37). Good deeds also are denoted by the term *pāpma*, as their fruits are unwelcome to one seeking release from *karma*.

2. The need for a new sub-section arose from the fact that good deeds are allowed by the *veda*, and that their fruits are seen to be welcome to some persons. It might therefore be presumed that they are not antagonistic to meditation. This presumption had to be removed.

3. *Objection*: To the meditator rain, food and other helps are desirable, to enable him to complete his meditation, which, as stated, requires certain duties as helps. How can it be said that they are antagonistic to meditation, and that they are destroyed. The last portion of the *sūtra* replies. Such good deeds as yield

fruits, that are helpful to the meditation, are destroyed only after death.

### SUB-SECTION 9

The question is whether in this destruction of the past deeds, both good and evil, all deeds are included without distinction, or only those that have not begun to operate.

*First view.* The first alternative is the correct one ; for the text quoted refers to ' all deeds ' ; and no reservation is made. No *karma* is needed to account for the continuance of the body, as like the potter's wheel set in motion, it may remain from the impetus given to it when it was first made.

*Final decision :* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

15. अनारब्धकार्ये एव तु पूर्वे तदवधेः ।

But the previous *karma*, which is destroyed, is only what has not begun to yield fruit ; because a limit (in the form of delay in the falling away of the body) is stated.

The *statement* is made in the text :

For him (that thus meditates) there is delay only so long as he is not released (from his body) ; then he is united (to *Sat*) (*chāndo*, VI-14-2).

Here a limit is fixed, beyond which the reaching of the goal will not be delayed ; and this limit is the continuance of the body, which was brought about by the *karma*, which has begun to yield fruit ; and this fruit must be experienced.

The opponent's analogy of the potter's wheel does not hold ; for nothing prolongs the life of the body other than the pleasure or displeasure of the highest *Ātmā*, brought about by good or evil deeds ; and there is no authority for believing that anything else exists that will prolong its life.

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### SUB-SECTION 10

The question to be considered in this sub-section is whether *agnihotra* and other duties of one's stage of life should be done. Seeing that even good *karma* subsequently done does not stick to the meditator, and that the duties of the stage of life are included under that expression, if one does not wish to do them, may he cease to do them ? The *sūtra* separates *agnihotra* and other duties of the stage of life from other good deeds, and states that they should be performed.

#### 16. अग्निहोत्रादितु तत्कार्यायैव तद्दर्शनात् ।

But *agnihotra* and the rest (should continue to be done) ; because they are required for its completion. This is seen.

The fact that the fruits do not attach to the meditator does not apply to these good deeds. They must therefore be done ; for they are done only because they are needed to help meditation. This is seen from the text " Him, students of the *veda* wish to meditate on by recitation of the *veda*, etc." (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-22). Meditation becomes every day more



and more powerful by practice ; and in order that this may happen the duties of the stage of life should be daily performed. Otherwise, the mind will become impure, and meditation will become impossible.

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Here a doubt arises : Of the good deeds of a meditator some help *vidyā* ; some have been expended by enjoyment ; and what remains have to be experienced, and this is what has begun to yield fruit. In the text “ His sons take his property ; his friends his good deeds ” to what good deeds is reference made ? The next *sūtra* replies :

17. अतोऽन्यापिह्येकेषामुभयोः ।

Among good deeds previous and subsequent those other than these (considered under *sūtra* 16) indeed exist. This is referred to by the text of some.

There *are* endless good deeds, the fruits of which have been obstructed by more powerful *karmas* ; and the text under consideration refers to them ; as also the text declaring destruction and non-sticking of *karma*.

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The possibility of one *karma* obstructing another already mentioned, is recalled in the next *sūtra* :

18. यदेव विद्ययेति हि ।

“ That alone done with meditation ” (has been stated already).

The text referred to in the *sūtra* (*chāndo.*, I-1-10) states that meditation on *udgītha* removes obstruction

in the way of reaping the fruit of a *kratu*. This indicates that the fruit of one *karma* may be obstructed by other *karma*.

## SUB-SECTION 11

### 19. भोगेनत्वितरे क्षपयित्वाऽथ सम्पद्यते ।

But expending the rest by enjoyment, one then is united (to the highest *Ātmā*).

By the term "the rest" reference is made to the good and evil deeds, other than those that are destroyed by meditation, or that are said not to stick to the doer, *i.e.*, those that have begun to operate. Is one united to the highest *Ātmā*, when the body, in which meditation is attained, perishes, or after other bodies are taken up and thrown away.


*First view.*—The former alternative is the correct one; for it is stated to take place, when the meditator is released from the body. The *sūtra* states that these deeds should be expended by enjoyment. If this can be done while the meditator is in the body, in which meditation is attained, then the result follows, when that body falls. If not, he must take up as many bodies as may be needed to expend them fully. For the *karma* must be expended by enjoyment.

2. The opponent relies on the text "For him there is delay only so long as he is not released"; but this only shows that the *karma*, that has begun to operate, must be expended before one is released; but there is

no mention of a limit coinciding with the perishing of the body (1).

3. The conclusion is: The endless *karmas*, good and evil, that were done in the beginningless past, before meditation was attained, and of which the fruit has not been experienced, are destroyed by the merit of *brahma vidyā*, excepting those that have begun to yield their fruits. The *karmas* done, after it is attained, do not attach themselves to the doer. Of these all good *karmas* go to the friends of the meditator ; and evil deeds to his enemies. The conclusion is therefore sound.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।



(1) The opponent may also derive support from the text —“ This *jiva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light and appears in his natural form (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2). But the term ‘this body’ does not state that release is attained when the particular body falls down at death. For *smṛitis* state that men doing *brahma vidyā* like *Vidura* are reborn. Hence release is attained, when meditation becomes perfect in the last body. The intention in referring to ‘this body’ is merely to compare it to a prison ; this view is confirmed by the *bhagavad gītā* (IX-33), where *Sri Kṛishṇa* refers to the body and observes ‘This world, perishable and full of misery ’ ” (*adhi.*, 471 and 472).

## CHAPTER IV

### SECTION 2

IN this section the mode by which the meditating *jīva* gets out of his body in death is examined. See *Vedic Texts*.

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#### SUB-SECTION 1

The following text occurs in *chāndogya* :

The speech of the person, my dear, that departs (from this world) unites with the mind; the mind with *prāṇa*; *prāṇa* with the element fire; fire with the highest *Devatā* (VI-8-6).

The first sentence is considered in this sub-section. The question is whether reference is made only to the function of the organ of speech, or to the organ of speech itself.

*First view.* Reference is made only to the function of speech. The term used in the original is *sampadyate*, which may mean either dissolution of a product in its cause or merely union; but its usage in the former meaning is more common. Now speech, not being a

product of mind, cannot be dissolved in it. Reference is therefore made to its function ; and as it depends upon mind, it may be said to be dissolved in it.

*Final decision.* This is stated in the *sūtra* :

1. वाङ्मनसि दर्शनाच्छब्दाच्च ।

Speech (unites with) mind ; because this is seen, and is stated in the *veda*.

Speech—*i.e.*, the organ of speech itself—unites with the mind ; for it is seen that when speech has ceased to function, the mind continues to work (1).

2. *Objection.* This fact may be explained with reference to the cessation of the function of speech. *Reply.* What is seen is supported by the text under consideration, which uses the term *vāk* (speech). If the term be understood to mean the function of speech, it will be resorting to a secondary meaning. This is one objection. Another is that if the organ of speech remains, but that its function only has ceased, it must be perceived ; but it is not. Hence it may be concluded that the organ itself is merged in the mind. The term *sampadyate* is used not in the sense of dissolution, but in the other sense of mere union (2).

(1) It is appropriate that what has ceased to work should be merged in what is still active ; as fire, that is quiescent, is dormant within wood, which is variously utilised.

(2) It may be thought that this is not the recognised usage. Be it so. But the *first view* is not free from objection. If the term *sampadyate* be taken to mean dissolution then it is not correct to say that the function of speech is

## 2. अत एव सर्वाण्यनु ।

For the very same reason all the other organs follow it (speech).

Because speech unites with the mind, but is not dissolved in it, all the other organs—sensory and motor—are appropriately stated to follow speech and to unite with the mind. The statement is thus made “ With the senses uniting with the mind without the possibility of their return from it ”.

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## SUB-SECTION 2

### 3. तन्मनःप्राणउत्तरात् ।

That mind (unites) with *prāṇa*; this appears from what follows.

“ That mind ”—the mind united to all the senses. The union is of the mind itself, and not merely of its function.

While the argument in the preceding sub-section applies to this case also, the reason for adding a sub-section is this. From the *chāndogya* text “ The mind,

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dissolved in the mind; for its material cause is the organ of speech itself, while the mind is only the operative cause and dissolution of a product is in its material cause only. Hence, the term *sampadyate* will be used in a secondary sense, as also the term *vāk* (speech) as already stated. The *final decision* is open to criticism on one point only—*viz.*, that a meaning is adopted for the term *sampadyate*, that is not the common one. Hence, the conclusion stated in the *sūtra* remains unshaken. The two reasons stated in it constitute but one reason; for they are interdependent.

my dear, is a product of earth" (VI-6-5), the mind appears to have evolved from earth; and the text "They (water) created earth" (*Ibid.*, VI-2-4) states that earth came from water. Hence one might presume that the mind has evolved indirectly from water. The text "*Prāṇa* is a product of water" (*Ibid.*, VI-6-5) connects water and *prāṇa* as cause and effect, and it may be assumed that in the sentence "the mind unites with *prāṇa*" the term *prāṇa* stands for water; and it may then mean that mind is dissolved in water. To show that this view is erroneous this sub-section has been added. The error will be evident, when it is remembered that the mind evolves from *ahamkāra*, and *prāṇa* is a variety of air. And in understanding *prāṇa* to mean water, the primary meaning of the term is ignored for no sufficient reason. What then is the meaning of the texts quoted? *Reply*. The meaning is that mind receives strength from food, which is a modification of earth, and *prāṇa* from water.

### SUB-SECTION 3

#### 4. सोऽप्यक्षे तदुपगमादिभ्यः ।

It (*prāṇa*) unites with its lord; (this is seen) from its approaching him and the rest.

The third sentence of the text quoted under the first *sūtra* is now considered, *viz.*, "*prāṇa* (unites) with the element fire". The *first view* is that as in the other two cases *prāṇa* unites only with the element fire and for the same reason; *viz.*, the statement in the text.

The *sūtra* states the *final decision*, which is that *prāṇa* first unites with its lord, *i.e.*, the *jīva*, and along with him it unites with fire. Here is an analogy. When it is said that the *Jamna* unites with the sea, it means that it first joins the Ganges, and then reaches the sea. That this is what takes place will be seen from the following texts :

In the very same way all *prāṇas* proceed towards this *ātmā* (*jīva*) at the time of death (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-38). By the expression 'the rest' in the *sūtra* reference is made to the departure of *prāṇa* with the *jīva* :

Him, going out of the body, *prāṇa* follows out of the body (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

Reference is also made to its remaining with the *jīva* :

What is it on the departure of which from the body I also depart, and on the staying of which I also stay (*praṣṇa.*, VI-3).

These are the words of a *jīva*, and reference is made to *prāṇa*. From this intimate connection with the *jīva*, *prāṇa* first goes to him, and with him it unites with the element fire.

#### SUB-SECTION 4

##### 5. भूतेषु तच्छ्रुतेः ।

(It unites) with the elements ; this is stated by the *veda*.

The union of *prāṇa* and *jīva* with the element fire has been stated. Does this union take place with that element only, or with all the elements compounded ?



The *first view* is that it is only with the element fire ; for that only is mentioned. The *sūtra* states the *final decision*. For it is stated :

This *jiva* is " full of earth, full of water, full of air, full of ether, full of fire " (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-5).

This shows that the *jiva* wanders connected with all the elements.

Does *prāṇa* unite with these in order with one of these at each step ? The text quoted will permit of this view being taken. The next *sūtra* replies :

6. नैकस्मिन् दर्शयतो हि ।

Not with one at each step ; for the *veda* and *smṛitis* show this.

For, the elements were unable to do anything, each acting by itself, and they were therefore compounded. This is stated :

I will enter these three *devatās* as the inner ruler of this *jiva* and make diverse names and forms. Of them I will make each triple (*chāndo.*, VI-3-2 and 3).

This states that the elements were compounded in order that they might become fit for the making of diverse names and forms. This is stated in a *smṛiti* also :

When the products, beginning with *mahat* and ending with the great elements, remained separate, they had different capacities. They were unable to create the products of evolution without mixing and combining with one another. Mixing and combining with one another, they formed the egg-shaped universe (*viṣṇu*, I-2-53 and 54).

Hence by the term " fire " reference is made to fire compounded with the other elements.

## SUB-SECTION 5

The question for consideration in this sub-section is whether the mode of departure herein described applies to all equally, or only to those that do not do meditation. The *first view* is that the latter alternative is the correct one. For the meditator is said to attain immortality even while he is here; there is therefore no need for him to depart. This is stated:

When all the desires, that were in his heart, are released, then the mortal becomes immortal; here he enjoys *Brahma* (*brihad.*, VI-4-7).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 7. समानाचासृत्युपक्रमादमृतत्वं चानुपोष्य ।

(The mode of departure) is common up to the beginning of the path. The immortality is merely what is to be attained without burning (the connection with the body).

Even the meditator departs from the body in the manner pointed out, until the path commences, *i.e.*, until he enters the blood vessel. For, it is stated that he too gets out through a particular blood vessel :

There are one hundred and one blood vessels of the heart; of them one goes to the top of the head. He, that rises through it, attains immortality; the other blood vessels are for other ways of getting out (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-6).

As it is clear from this text that even the meditator passes along a particular blood vessel, he cannot avoid departure from the body. The mode of departure is the same, until this point is reached ; for there is no mention of a difference. When the blood vessel is entered, the divergence begins as stated in the following text :

With that light this *ātmā* gets out through the eye, through the top of the head or through other places of the body (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-2).

As this text has the same meaning as the *chāndogya* text, departure through the top of the head pertains to the meditator, and the other ways pertain to the others.

2. This being so, the text relied on in the *first view* must be explained in another way ; and this is done by the second part of the *sūtra*. The immortality referred to is only such as can be attained before the connection with the body and the senses is burnt up ; and this is the destruction of previous *karma* and the non-sticking of the subsequent one. And the enjoyment of *Brahma* here is the enjoyment, that one has during meditation.

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In the next four *sūtras* the same conclusion is supported by other arguments :

३. तदापीतेस्संसारव्यपदेशात् ।

It (explanation offered) holds ; because until *Brahma* is reached, *samsāra* is said to remain.

It will be explained that *Brahma* is reached by going to a particular place by the path known as

*devayāna*. Until then there is *samsāra*, meaning connection with the body. See the following texts:

For him (who thus meditates) there is delay only as long as he is not released (from his body); and then he is united to *Sat* (*chāndo.*, VI-14-2); Shaking off sin as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released from the mouth of *rāhu* (in an eclipse), throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma*-world, the purpose of my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, VIII-13-1).

### 9. सूक्ष्मं प्रमाणतश्च तथोपलब्धेः ।

A subtle body remains; because it is so seen from *vedic* texts.

A subtle body continues on the *devayāna*. For it is said that he enters into a colloquy (1) with the moon; and this implies that he has a body. Hence his bondage has not been burnt up.

### 10. नोपमर्दनातः ।

Hence immortality by the destruction of bondage is not meant.

'Meant'—by the text quoted by the opponent. This *sūtra* is intended to refute the view that one may be released, while he lives in a body here (2). This is opposed to numerous *vedic* texts, such as those enjoining meditation, which continues to the close of one's life,

(1) The meditator has to go to the moon on the *devayāna*; and he is asked by the moon "who art thou" He replies (*kaushitaki*, I-13).

(2) The view that one may be released, while he remains in his body was held by *Śankara*; and it is refuted in sub-section 4 of chapter I, section 1, the refutation being put into the mouth of the second illusionist. The statement

and describing departure from the body, journey on the *devayāna*, and release from all bonds on reaching a particular place. It is also opposed to sense perception.

that one remaining in a body is released is as contradictory as to say 'my mother is barren'; for to be in a body is bondage; being without a body alone is release.

*Śankara.* While one appears to be in a body, if he knows the appearance to be unreal, he is released from the body, i.e., he is a *jīvan-mukta*.

*Critic.* No; if a person is released by the knowledge that the appearance of being in a body is unreal, how can the person be said to be *jīvan-mukta*? What is the difference between this release and the release of one that is without a body? From him too the unreal appearance of being in a body has been removed.

*Śankara.* The appearance of being in a body has been nullified; but it continues like the perception of the moon as double by one with a cataract in the eye. Such a person is *jīvan-mukta*.

*Critic.* You cannot allege that the appearance has been nullified; and that it yet continues. In the case of the double moon its appearance is due to a real defect in the eye; this is not removed by the assurance of a reliable person that there is but one moon; and the appearance therefore continues, even though the person's erroneous impression has been removed. But in the case under consideration the knowledge, that removes the misconception, covers everything other than *Brahma*. *Avidyā*, *karma* and the rest, which are the causes of the unreal appearance, have been removed along with that appearance by the knowledge. The view that one may be released while he remains in a body is opposed to *vedic* teaching. "For him there is delay only so long as he is not released (from his body); then he is united to *Sat*" (*chāndo.*, VI-14-2). This shows that the release of one doing *sad vidyā* awaits only the falling away of the body, and thus denies *jīvan-mukti*. It is also denied

## 11. अस्यैव चोपपत्तेरुष्मा ।

The warmth (perceived in some parts of a dying man's body) belongs to the subtle body alone ; and this is appropriate.

When the meditator is about to die, a warmth is perceived in a part of the gross body, which does not pertain to it. If it did, it would be perceived throughout as stated in the text " It heats its body from the foot to the head " (*nārā.*, 11-10). The warmth is therefore due to the subtle body, as it withdraws gradually from the gross body. The conclusion is that until the path is entered, the mode of departure of even the meditator is the same.

The opponent brings up two other texts as expressly denying departure of the meditator. This objection is stated in the next *sūtra*, and is then refuted :

## 12. प्रतिषेधादिति चेन्न शरीरात्स्पष्टोद्दोषेषाम् ।

If it be contended " Departure is denied ", the reply is — " No ; because departure from the *ātmā* is denied ; and this is clear in the text of some."

See *Vedic Texts—bṛihad.*, VI, sec. 4. The first verse states that the dying man takes his senses, and comes out of the heart. The second verse describes the mode

by *Āpastamba*. " Let one abandon the deeds leading to worldly fruits, this world and that world, and seek the *ātmā*. The view that release comes from the knowledge of texts is refuted by texts dealing with release. If release did take place from mere knowledge of texts, one should not then experience pain even here."

of departure ; the fourth verse shows how he attains a new body, and in verse 6 the subject of the departure of one that does not do meditation is brought to a close. Then this text relating to the meditator occurs :

Next, as to one that does not desire. Of him that is without desire, from whom desire has departed, that has no further desire, and whose desire is centred on the *Ātmā*, *prāṇas* do not depart. Being *Brahma* alone, he attains *Brahma* (*bṛihad.*, VI-4-6).

Similar denial of departure is contained in the texts which describe the colloquy between *Ārtabhāga* and *Yājñavalkya* (*bṛihad.*, V-2). Verse 10 refers to the overcoming of death (So the opponent understands the text); and verse 11 runs as follows: " When this person dies, do the *prāṇas* depart from him or no?" To this question the following reply was given " No," said *Yājñavalkya*, " They are dissolved in him ; he swells and inflated lies dead." The opponent concludes that the meditator attains immortality here alone.

The *sūtra* replies that what is denied is the departure of the *prāṇas* from the *jīva*, not from the body. The term *taṣya* (of him) in the first text refers to the *jīva* described in it as without desire, but not to the body, of which no mention is made in the context. *Objection.* By its termination the term *taṣya* indicates merely the connection of *prāṇas* with the *jīva*, but not the place from which departure takes place. That from which the departure takes place is the body alone. *Reply.* When it is said that the *prāṇas* do not depart, one will wish to know the place of departure ; and he will naturally take hold of the *jīva*, who is mentioned

as connected with *prāṇas* and who is at hand, in preference to the body, to which no reference whatever is made. Again, there is no object in understanding the termination to indicate connection of *prāṇas* with the *jīva* ; for this connection is already well-known. The connection in general, which is expressed by the termination, may be taken to refer to a particular form of connection, *viz.*, the place of departure. There is an analogy in the sentence “ He hears of the *nāṭa* ” (dancer), (*nāṭasya*), the meaning being ‘ he hears from him ’. It is unnecessary to discuss the question further ; for in the text of the *māndhyandinas* the *jīva* himself is stated to be the place of departure, the term used being *tasmāt* (from him) instead of *taṣya* (of him).

2. *Objection again.* There was no question whether *prāṇas* depart from the *jīva* ; and its denial would therefore be inappropriate. *Reply.* When it is said “ For him there is delay only so long as he is not released from the body ” (*chāndo.*, VI-14-2), one will carry away the impression that the meditator would reach *Brahma*, when he throws up his gross body, and that then *prāṇas* would leave him. If this were a fact, it would not be possible for him to proceed on the *devayāna* path, and reach *Brahma*. To remove this erroneous impression the *upanishad* declares that *prāṇas* do not depart from the *jīva*. That is, they do not separate from him, until the journey is finished and the goal is reached.

3. The other text, on which the opponent relies, should be explained in the same manner, if it referred to the meditator. But it does not ; for in the questions and



answers preceding the text (See *Vedic Texts*) there is no reference to meditation on *Brahma*. The subjects discussed are the nature of the senses and of the corresponding sense objects referred to by the terms *graha* and *atigraha*, fire being the food of water, the non-separation of *prāṇas* from one about to die, the continuance of the departing *jīva*'s good or evil repute, and his reaching a goal suitable to his *karma*. The words in verse 10 "He overcomes death" states that one that knows water to be the death of fire overcomes fire, but not death. There is therefore no mention here of one doing *brahma vidyā*. The statement that *prāṇas* do not depart from the dying person means that they do not leave him as the gross body does, but that they cling to him as the subtle elements do and go with him.

### 13. स्मर्यते च ।

And it is stated in the *smṛitis* also.

The departure of the meditator through the blood vessel going to the head is thus stated :

There is one among them, which goes upward ; one going by this pierces the orb of the sun, and passing beyond the world of *Brahmā*, attains the highest goal (*yājñas mṛiti*, III-167).

### SUB-SECTION 6

It has been shown that the *jīva* with the senses, the mind and *prāṇa* unites at the point of death with the elements in a subtle condition ; and the view that departure from the body does not happen to the meditator

has been refuted. It will now be considered whether the subtle elements go on to do the work suitable to the *jīva's karma* or meditation, or whether they unite with the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* is that they go on to do their work. For there is no object in going to the highest *Ātmā*, as no pleasure or pain has to be experienced by the *jīva* by doing so. The *sūtra* states the *final decision* :

#### 14. तानि परे तथाह्याह ।

They unite with the highest *Ātmā* ; for so says the *veda*.

For it is said “ Fire unites with the highest *devatā* ” (*chāndo.*, VI-8-6). It should be assumed that a purpose exists in accordance with the *vedic* statement ; and the purpose is to give the *jīva* some rest after the fatigues of the departure. This is analogous to the rest taken every day in deep sleep, and in the dissolution of the universe.

#### SUB-SECTION 7

#### 15. अविभागो वचनात् ।

By ‘uniting’ is meant a union in which the united things cannot be separated ; because this is stated.

This union with the highest *Ātmā*—of what nature is it ? Is it like the merging of a product in its cause as in final dissolution, or is it an intimate union as the union of speech with the mind ? The *first view* is that it is the former, as the highest *Ātmā* is the material

cause of everything. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra*. In the text "Fire with the highest *devatā*" the word *sampadyate* (unites) is brought down from the beginning of the sentence and is added. In the other clauses the term denotes a particular kind of union; and there is no authority for taking it to denote anything else here. Nor is any purpose served at the time of departure by the body being dissolved in the cause. If this were the intention, there would be mention of creation following the dissolution as in other places; but this is not observed.

#### SUB-SECTION 8

The mode of departure from the body of the meditator and of others has been described; and it has been stated to be the same. Now begins the divergence. The further progress of the meditator is stated in the following text:

There are one hundred and one blood vessels of the heart; of them one goes to the top of the head. He, that rises through it, attains immortality; the other blood vessels are for other ways of getting out (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-6).

The question for consideration is whether this text fixes that the meditator should go out through the blood vessels going to the top of the head, and that others should go out through others, or whether he may do so by any other. The *first view* is that the blood vessel is not fixed; for the blood vessels are numberless and very minute; and the departing *jīva* cannot distinguish

the particular blood vessel from the others, and enter it. The text merely states what may happen occasionally. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

16. तदोकोऽप्रज्वलनं तत्प्रकाशितद्वारो विद्यासामर्थ्यात्तच्छेषगयनु-  
स्मृतियोगाच्च हार्दानुगृहीतशताधिकया ।

That place is lit up at the entrance into the blood vessel. Favoured by *Brahma* in the heart, he sees the entrance and goes out through the one hundred and first blood vessel. The favour is secured by the merit of the meditation and the daily thought of the path as a part of it.

The meditator gets out only by the blood vessel, which rises to the top of the head. For, his meditation, being the worship of the highest *Ātmā*, pleases Him ; and being present in the heart, He enables him to see the entrance to the blood vessel, and to pass out through it.

#### SUB-SECTION 9

Getting out of the body, the meditator is said to go on to the sun, along with his rays :

When he gets out of this body, then he goes up only with these rays (of the sun) (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-5).

The question for consideration is whether this limitation is appropriate or not. The *first view* is that it is not ; for when one dies at night, how is he to proceed, the sun's rays being then absent ? The text quoted relates to the case in which such departure is possible. The *sūtra* disposes of this doubt.

### 17. रश्म्यनुसारी ।

He proceeds, following the sun's rays

The meditator goes on only along the sun's rays ; for this is affirmed by the particle *eva* (only). If this were only one of several ways, then the particle would be meaningless. The difficulty pointed out in the *first view* does not exist ; for even at night the sun's rays are available, as one may know from the experiencing of heat during summer. In winter the heat, being overpowered by cold, is not perceived as on a rainy day. The ever-present connection of blood-vessels with the sun's rays is declared in a *vedic* text :

As a long high road enters two villages, this and that, in the very same way these rays of the sun enter two worlds—this and that. They extend from that sun, and enter these blood vessels ; they extend from these blood vessels and enter that sun (*chāndo.*, VIII-6-2).

#### SUB-SECTION 10

To proceed to consider whether the meditator dying at night reaches the highest *Ātmā* or no. The *first view* is 'No' ; for dying at night is condemned, and dying by day is praised.

The day, the bright fortnight and the half-year of the sun's northward progress are praiseworthy to the dying ; the contrary is condemned.

The praise and condemnation are based on the fact that death in the day leads one upward and death at

night leads one downward. Death at night therefore leads one downward, and cannot lead him to the highest *Ātmā*.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

18. निशिनेति चेन्न सम्बन्धस्य यावदेहभावित्वादर्शयति च ।

If it be contended "One dying at night (does not reach *Brahma*)" the reply is "No ; because one's connection with *karma* lasts only as long as the body remains ; and this is shown".

The meditator is released from all *karma* at death. That portion of the previous *karma*, that had not begun to yield fruit, perished when meditation was attained. The remainder lasted only till the last body was thrown away. And any *karma*, that might be done unconsciously since the attainment of meditation, does not stick to him. Thus, there being no *karma*, that can lead one downward, the reaching of the highest *Ātmā* is certain. That this is the case is shown by the following text : " For him there is delay, only so long as he is not released (from the body) ; then he is united to *Sat* ' (*chando.*, VI-14-2). The opponent's text applies to those that do not do *Brahma vidyā*.

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#### SUB-SECTION 11

19. अतश्चायनेऽपि दक्षिणे ।

And for the same reason even in the case of death in the half-year of the sun's southward progress.

The reason urged in the case of death at night applies with equal force to the case of death in the half-year of the sun's southward progress. *Question.* Why then is a new sub-section added? *Reply.* Because there is a further doubt in this latter case. Here is a text which states that one dying in the half-year of the sun's southward progress reaches the moon :

Next one, that dies in the half-year of the sun's southward progress, attains the greatness of the *pitṛis* and becomes like the moon (*nārā.*, *anu.*, 52).

Another text states that those, that go to the moon, return to the earth, when that (*karma*) of those ends ; then they return by the very same path (*chāndo.*, V-10-5). There is also the example of *Bhīshma*, who was a meditator, and who waited for the half-year of the sun's northward progress to die. The conclusion is that one that dies in the half-year under consideration does not reach the highest *Ātmā*.

This doubt is thus removed. One going to the moon returns to earth, only if he did not do *brahma vidyā*. In the case of the meditator the going to the moon is merely for the purpose of taking rest on his way to the highest heaven. For a sentence that follows the text states :

The *brāhmaṇa*, that meditates, overcomes both the greatness of the sun and of the moon, and after that he attains the greatness of *Brahma*.

Even without this text the reaching of *Brahma* is certain ; for, as already stated, there is no more *karma* to bind him. As to the case of *Bhīshma* cited, it should

be remembered that owing to the practice of *yoga* he was able to select the moment of death, and that he waited for the half-year of the sun's northward progress in order to show its superiority to the world.

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The opponent now refers to certain verses of the *bhagavad gītā*, which in his opinion refer to particular times, dying at which the meditator returns to earth. The verses are :

I will declare that path (*kāla*), proceeding along which *yogis* will not return, and that path also from which they will return. The light—fire, the day, the bright fortnight, the six months of the sun's northward progress—persons meditating on *Brahma* go along this path and reach *Brahma*. Smoke, the night, the dark fortnight, the six months of the sun's southward progress—the man of good deeds goes along this path, reaches the light of the moon, and returns. These paths—the bright path and the dark path—followed by the world are considered to be eternal. By one path one does not return ; by the other he returns (VIII-23 to 26).

## 20. योगिनः प्रतिस्मर्यते स्मार्ते चैते ।

And those two paths to be meditated on are taught to meditators.


The verses were not intended to say when persons should die. The object was to tell those that meditate on *Brahma* to include the two paths in their daily meditation. So the subject is concluded :

Knowing those paths, no *yogi* (meditator) is deluded. Therefore at all times meditate on them (*gītā*, VIII-27).



The references to the light—fire, and to smoke are to the two paths—the *devayāna* and the *pitriyāna*. Hence, the reference to time in the opening verse is to the *devatās* in charge of time, who are among those that carry the meditator to his goal. If the term *kāla* (time) were understood in its primary sense, it would be inapplicable to fire.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः



## CHAPTER IV

### SECTION 3

IT has been shown how the meditator gets out of the body at death, and how through the grace of the highest *Ātmā* in his heart he enters on the path to the goal by passing through a particular blood vessel. This path is examined in this section.

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#### SUB-SECTION 1

The descriptions given of this path in the various *upanishads* differ. See *Vedic Texts*. Two texts of the *chāndogya* describe the path thus: Light, day, half-month, half-year, year, the sun, the moon and lightning. The *purusha* in the last takes the *jiva* to *Brahma*. *Bṛihad āraṇyaka*, chapter VIII, section 2, gives the following items: light, day, half-month, half-year, *devaloka*, the sun, and lightning; the *purusha* in lightning carries the *jiva* to *Brahma*-world. Chapter VII, section 10 of the same *upanishad* mentions the following—*Vāyu*, the sun, and the moon. The *kaushitaki* has *agni loka* and the

worlds of *Vāyu*, *Varuṇa*, the sun, *Indra* and *Prajāpati*. The *jīva* then goes to the world of *Brahma*. Hence the doubt arises whether the path beginning with light is the only one prescribed by all the texts, along which the meditator reaches *Brahma* or whether there are other paths with option to the *jīva* to proceed along any one of them. The *first view* is that there are many paths, as their descriptions differ, and as they are independent of one another. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 1. अचिरादिना तत्प्रथिते ।

Along the path beginning with light ; because this is well-known.

This one path alone is described in all the texts ; and the meditator goes by that alone ; for this alone is recalled, when the various descriptions are perused. This being so, it is concluded that the same is described in all the texts with additions or deductions. In the case of meditations, where the intention is ascertained to be to teach but one meditation, the attributes mentioned in one place are taken into account in another. Similarly, in the case of the path, the items mentioned in one place should be taken into consideration in others (1).

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(1) There is this difference between the two cases. In meditations, though the subject is one, as the attributes are endless, it is not possible to meditate on all of them ; and it was settled that meditations are different, when the attributes differ. But in the case of the path, as the items do not exceed twelve at the most, they can be meditated on ; and in accordance with the recognition of the path as one it is decided to be one.

In the *chāndogya* the description in the *upakosala* and five-fires *vidyās* is the same. In the *bṛihad āraṇyaka*, chapter VIII, section 2, the same is repeated with two variations. In the other two texts the items fire and the sun indicate that the path is one.

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## SUB-SECTION 2

The variations are reconciled in this and the next sub-sections.

### 2. वायुमब्दादविशेषविशेषाभ्याम् ।

*Vāyu* after the year. This is known from the general term and the particular term.

Comparing the *chāndogya* texts with the first *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text, it will be observed that the year intervenes between the half-year and the sun in the former, and *devaloka* (world of the *devas*) in the latter(1). The path being one, both the year and the world of the *devas* should be included in it. The question is which should come first. The order is indicated by the case-termination of the term *māsa* (*māsebhyaḥ*) in the two texts and this is *śruti*, and both *śrutis* are of equal validity. But as the terms denoting periods of time are

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(1) The original quotes portions of the four texts at each step; but as they are shown in one place in the *Vedic* Texts, the quotations are omitted here. The items of the path being stated here in the order in which they are enumerated, the discussions may be followed easily.

so arranged, that periods of shorter duration are followed by periods of longer duration, one's mind goes to the year from the half-year. The year should therefore be placed after the half-year. Then will come the world of the *devas*. This is stated in the first half of the *sūtra*.

2. In the second *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text *Vāyu* is mentioned before the sun; while the *kaushitaki* text places him after *Agni*. The order in the latter is the order of enumeration in the text; while in the former the order is expressly stated by the word *ūrdhva* (above). This is order stated by *śruti*, and being of greater validity, it cancels the other order, and *Vāyu* is given a place immediately before the sun. See Introduction, para 26.

3. Thus after the year and before the sun, there are the two items—the world of the *devas* and *vāyu*; and it has now to be considered whether they indicate different things, or one thing only. The *first view* is that they are different. As by the term *ūrdhva* and the termination of the fifth case both are stated to be between the year and the sun, as the order is indicated by *śruti* in each case, and as there is no reason to make a difference, the meditator may go to either. The second half of the *sūtra* states that they are one, and that the meditator after leaving the year should go to *Vāyu*. For, the expression 'the world of the *devas*' refers to *Vāyu* in general terms; as it is stated elsewhere "That which blows is the house of the *devas*". The other term *vāyu* is a particular term, and both indicate

but one *devatā*. The term *vāyuloka* in the *kaushītaki* text should be understood like the expression *agniloka* to mean *Vāyu*, who is a world.

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### SUB-SECTION 3

Take the *kaushītaki* text. The first item is *agniloka* ; and this is synonymous with *archis* (light) in the *chāndogya* text. It therefore comes first. *Vāyu* is placed after the year. The *sun* though mentioned after *Varuṇa*, the order is cancelled by the order indicated by *śruti* in the *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text, and he is placed after *Vāyu* ; thus nine items on the path and their order have been settled. The position of *Varuṇa*, *Indra* and *Prajāpati* mentioned in the *kaushītaki* text has to be determined. Are they to be placed after *Vāyu* following the order of enumeration in that text, or whether they come in after lightning.

The *first view* is as follows : To bring them in anywhere would conflict with the order expressly stated in the texts ; and to place them after lightning would be objectionable, as the *chāndogya* text states that the person in lightning leads the *jivas* to *Brahma*. There is therefore no room for them anywhere ; but as the teaching should not become meaningless, it is necessary to break the order somewhere. Following the order of enumeration, *Varuṇa* should be placed after *Vāyu*. The order between *Vāyu* and the sun being thus broken, *Indra* and *Prajāpati* may as well go in only there.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

3. तटितोऽधिवरुणस्सम्बन्धात् ।

Above lightning *Varuṇa* ; because of the connection between them.

*Varuṇa* is connected with lightning. He is the lord of waters and controls clouds ; and lightning appear in clouds. This connection of lightning with *Varuṇa* is well known in the world and in the *veda*. This is the order suggested by appropriateness, and should cancel the order of enumeration. The function of the super-human personage to carry meditators to *Brahma* should be accepted as subject to intervention by others. *Indra* and *Prajāpati*, having been also mentioned, should find a place ; and should come after *Varuṇa*, on the principle that new comers should come at the end (Introduction, para 27).

SUB-SECTION 4

Who are these—light, day, and the rest up to *Prajāpati* mentioned in connection with the path—are they landmarks on the path, or places of enjoyment, or carriers deputed by the highest *Ātmā* ? The *first view* is that they are landmarks ; for so they appear. When one has to go to a village, directions are given to him as follows : Starting from this go to that tree ; then to that stream ; then to the side of that hill ; and then you will reach the village. Or they are places of enjoyment. For, four of the items are well-known to denote periods of time and cannot appropriately indicate marks on the road ; and the other items do not denote

periods of time. On the other hand they are stated to be places of enjoyment in the following text: 'They alone are worlds—viz., day and night, half-months, months, seasons and years.' This fits in with the description of the path by the *kaushitaki* text, using the term *loka* (world).

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

#### 4. आतिवाहिकास्तलिङ्गात् ।

They are persons deputed to take meditators to *Brahma* ; because there is indication of this.

There is a mark of their being carriers in the text "That person, not human, leads them to *Brahma*" (*chāndo.*, IV-15-5 and 6). This is found at the end of the context ; and as there is no difference in this respect between lightning and those mentioned before, it is concluded that this description applies to all of them. The terms light, day and the rest denote certain *devatās*, who control what is ordinarily denoted by them. This usage is similar to "Earth said to him".

*Question.* If this be so, how can *Varuṇa* and the other two, who come after him, be reckoned as carriers ? The next *sūtra* replies :

#### 5. वैद्युतेनैव ततस्तच्छ्रुतेः ।

After that the carrying is only by the person in lightning ; because it is so stated.



“After that” means after lightning. The text quoted refers only to him. *Varuṇa* and the other two assist him; and for that reason they also are reckoned as carriers.

### SUB-SECTION 5

It has now to be considered who are the meditators that are carried.

#### 6. कार्यं बादरिरस्य गत्युपपत्तेः ।

One meditating on *Brahmā*, the product ; so *Bādari* thinks. In him progress on the path is appropriate.

This *sūtra* states one view. This being, the four-faced one, abides in a limited place, and to reach him, going along a path is appropriate enough. But the highest *Ātmā*, the final cause, the all-knowing, the inner ruler of all, is omnipresent ; and the meditator need not go anywhere to reach Him. For He is ever present with him. What meditation has to do is merely to remove his *avidyā* or ignorance in regard to the highest *Ātmā*. Hence the carriers carry the meditators only to the four-faced one.

#### 7. विशेषितत्वाच्च ।

And because the goal is particularised.

The *bṛihad āraṇyaka* text refers to the worlds of *Brahma* as the place to which the meditator is carried. The word “world” and the plural should be noted ; and they refer to a being living in a particular world. There

is another text, which is clearer still—"I will go to the house in the form of the hall of *Prajāpati*" (*chāndo.*, VIII-14-1). So does one think, that has travelled on the path and approaches the four-faced one.

The holder of this view anticipates two objections : The first objection is that in the *chāndogya* text the expression used is *brahma*, but not *brahmāṇam*, which would be the proper form, if reference were made to the four-faced one. This objection is replied to in the next *sūtra* :

### 8. सामीप्यात् तद्व्यपदेशः ।

But that expression has been used, because of his nearness to *Brahma*.

Because the four-faced one was the first to come forth, he is near to the highest *Ātmā*, and is denoted by the term *brahma*. That this is the proper view is decided for the reasons stated in the two preceding *sūtras*.

सत्यमेव जयते

The second objection is that the person, that goes on the path, attains immortality, and does not return to *samsāra*. This could not happen, if the four-faced one were the goal. For he is a product of evolution and his life being two *parārdhas*, he must perish at the end. This is stated :

All the worlds including the world of *Brahmā* are perishable ; and one that goes to them must return (*bhagavad gītā.*, VIII-16).

One that goes to him must return. The next *sūtra* replies :

### 9. कार्यालये तदध्यक्षेण सहातः परमभिधानात् ।

When the evolved world perishes, along with its lord the meditator goes from thence to the highest *Ātmā*. This is stated.

‘The evolved world,’ the world of *Brahmā*, the four-faced one. ‘Along with its lord’—with the four-faced one, an officer in the economy of nature. He goes when the term of his office expires. He too meditates on *Brahma* in the midst of his duties ; and if the *jīva* too, that goes to him, meditates, they both reach the highest *Ātmā*. Hence the attainment of immortality and non-return to this world, stated as the results to be reaped by going along the path, are appropriate enough. This is known from the following text also : ‘All of them, when the last body falls away, reach the highest Being free from mortality in His world and are released’ (*nārā.*, 10-22).

### 10. स्मृतेश्च । सत्यमेव जयते

And this is stated in the *smṛiti*.

When the time for dissolution comes, all of them along with *Brahmā* enter the highest goal, attaining their true nature (*kūrma purāṇa*).

*Bādari*’s view is that the carriers take only one that meditates on the four-faced one.

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In opposition to *Bādari*’s view *Jaimini* comes forward with his own view :

## 11. परं जैमिनिर्मुख्यत्वात् ।

The goal is the highest *Ātmā* ; this is the view of *Jaimini* ; because this is the primary meaning of the term *brahma*.

In the text “ He takes them to *Brahma* ” (*chāndo.*, IV-15-6) the term *brahma* denotes only the highest *Ātmā* primarily. It is only when it has been decided on sufficient authority that it denotes the evolved being known as *Hiraṇyagarbha*, that the adoption of a secondary meaning is permissible. What has been urged—that to reach *Brahma* progress along the path is inappropriate—is no authority. Though the highest *Ātmā* is everywhere, the meditator should go to a particular place, before his *avidyā* can disappear. As one attains meditation with the help of the duties of his caste and stage of life, and as he needs also purity (*śauca*), right conduct (*āchāra*) and particular place and time, so the perfection of meditation down to the entire disappearance of *avidyā* requires that the meditator should go to a particular place. This is known from the texts describing the path. The objections to the departure of the meditator from the body have been already disposed of. See chapter IV, section 2, sub-section 5.

2. The other argument that the term ‘ world ’ and the plural termination point to a being living in a particular world may be easily disposed of. By a rule of *mīmāṃsā* (See Introduction, para 29-iii) the term *brahma-loka* means *Brahma*, who is the world. When oneness of the thing has been ascertained, the plural should be

ignored as stated in Introduction, para 34. Further, there are many worlds which have been created by the will of the highest *Ātmā*, which pertain only to Him, and which are made of a substance other than matter. That such worlds exist may be seen from the *veda*, the *smṛitis*, *itihāsas* and *purāṇas*.

## 12. दर्शनाच्च ।

And because this is stated.

The *upanishad* shows that one, that gets out of the body through the blood vessel going to the top of the head, and proceeds along the path, reaches the highest *Ātmā*—

This *jīva* rises from this body, reaches the highest *Light* and appears in his own form (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2).

## 13. न च कार्ये प्रत्यक्सिद्धिः ।

And the thought of the meditator is not of what has evolved.

In the text “I will go to the house in the form of the hall of *Prajāpati*” (*chāndo.*, VIII-14-1), the thought is not of the four-faced one, but of the highest *Ātmā* alone. For, the remainder of the text runs as follows :

I am the *ātmā* of *brāhmaṇas*, the *ātmā* of *kshattriyas*, the *ātmā* of *vaiśyas*, etc.

This shows that the meditator thinks that he would be released from all *avidyā*, and that he would be identified with the inner ruler of all. Immediately before this is the following text :

Shaking off *karma*, as a horse shakes off the hair on its body, released from the body, as the moon is released

from the mouth of *rāhu* (in an eclipse), and throwing off the body, I will reach the eternal *Brahma*-world, the purpose of my life having been attained (*chāndo.*, VIII-13-1).

This shows that the world to be reached has not been made. This is the literal meaning of the term *akṛitam* (not made) in the original ; and release from all bondage is expressly stated. Hence, the meditator is carried by the carrying *devatās* to *Brahma*, the highest *Ātmā* alone.

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*Bādarāyaṇa* accepts *Jaimini*'s view and supplements it in the next *sūtra* :

14. अप्रतीकालम्बनान्नयतीति बादरायण उभयथा च दोषा-  
त्तत्क्रतुश्च ।

(The *devatās*) carry all except those that meditate on *pratīka* ; this is *Bādarāyaṇa*'s view. Both the other views stated are erroneous ; and there is the rule that one becomes what he thinks on.

The view that those that meditate on the four-faced one are carried along the path is not sound ; nor is the limitation to only those that meditate on the highest *Ātmā* correct. Those that are not carried are those that meditate on *pratīkas*, i.e., on things other than *Brahma*. Meditation on the four-faced one would be of this class. Under this description come all those that meditate on any product of evolution either in itself or as being the highest *Ātmā*, like one that meditates on *devadatta* as a lion. Only two classes of meditators are carried along the path—those that meditate on the highest *Ātmā* as

stated by *Jaimini*, and also those that meditate on themselves as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest *Ātmā*, their inner ruler.

2. The views of both *Bādari* and *Jaimini* are faulty. The view of the former conflicts with the text "This *jīva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light" (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2); and the other view is inconsistent with the text which states that one that does the five-fires *vidyā* is carried on the path. The text is:

Those that thus meditate on it (the nature of the *jīva*), and those that in a jungle meditate on *Brahma* (*tapas*) with eagerness, etc. (*chāndo.*, V-10-1).

What is stated in this text is justified on the principle "as one meditates, so he becomes". Those that do the five-fires *vidyā* are said to go on the path; and those that go on the path reach the highest *Ātmā* and never return. Hence, meditation on the *jīva* as divested of all material vehicles and as forming a body of the highest *Ātmā* must be recognised. As to those that meditate on names and other products of evolution, they are without either of the meditations mentioned in the *chāndogya* text; they cannot proceed on the path or reach *Brahma*. Their meditation is on something blended with matter, and the principle referred to applies.

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This difference of treatment is shown by the *upaniṣad* itself:

15. विशेषञ्च दर्शयति ।

And the *veda* shows difference.

The text is “ As far as names go, so far is he able to wander at pleasure ” (*chāndo.*, VII-1-5). There are similar statements in the same chapter of the *upanishad* regarding those that meditate on other *pratīkas* up to *prāṇa*. All of them reap fruits of a limited nature, which do not require their going on the path. The conclusion is: The carriers do not carry those that meditate on an unintelligent object or on a *jīva* connected with it, either as *Brahma* or in itself ; they carry those that meditate on *Brahma*, and those that meditate on themselves as divested of material vehicles and as forming a body of *Brahma*.

भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।



सत्यमेव जयते



## CHAPTER IV

### SECTION 4

IN the first three sections of this chapter the abandonment by the *jīva* successively of *karma*, of the gross body and of the subtle body was described. In this last section his bliss without limit and non-dependences on any accidental cause are examined. The first three sub-sections deal with his appearance in his natural form, and the remaining three sub-sections with his power to do what he pleases. Both of them come of themselves, subject only to the control of the highest *Ātmā* (*adhi.*, 518).

#### SUB-SECTION 1

Here is a text:

In the very same way this *jīva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appears in his own form (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-2).

Does this text mean that the person described is again connected with a body to be made like the body of a *deva*, or that his own form appears.

The *first view* is that the freed *jiva* is united to a newly-made body. Otherwise the teaching as to release would point to something undesirable. For, one's natural form in itself is seen to be undesirable. When a person sleeps, and the activities of his body and senses cease for the time being, his natural form by itself does not seem to be what one will desire.

2. At this point two views of one's goal are put forward, which the opponent demolishes. The first view is that the mere removal of grief is the goal reached. This is objectionable. Man desires not only removal of grief, but also the attainment of happiness. The goal stated being devoid of happiness, release would not differ from *samsāra*. And *vedic* texts state that the freed *jiva* attains imperishable bliss.

It is one unit of the bliss of *Brahma* ; and of one that knew the *veda* and was not affected by desires, *i.e.*, of a freed *jiva* ; Attaining *rasa* (*Brahma*), this *jiva* becomes blissful.

3. The second view is that one's nature is mere perception, which is bliss without limit, that it was prevented from appearing by *avidyā* during the life of *samsāra*, and that it emerges when the highest Light is reached. This also is objectionable. The nature, which is perception, cannot be prevented from appearing ; and perception being of the nature of light, its being prevented from appearing, if it were possible, would be its annihilation. Further, mere perception cannot be bliss. What is bliss must be agreeable to one ; it must be bliss to one that can experience it ; but mere perception without a perceiver cannot experience it.

4. In the view that one's natural form is attained, the *vedic* text would become meaningless; for it has ever been with the freed *jīva*. Hence, he is united to a new body made for him. Then the term *abhinishpad-yate* in the original will have its primary meaning; as also the term *svena* (his own); for the *jīva* will attain a body which will be his own.

The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

### 1. सम्पद्याविर्भावस्त्वेन शब्दात् ।

On reaching (the highest Light) own form appears; because the term *svena* is used.

The state, to which one comes on reaching the highest Light, is own form, that then appears. No new form comes into existence. This is indicated by the words 'In his own form' in the *vedic* text. If the freed *jīva* were to take on a form, that did not exist before, and that is newly made, the expression 'in his own form' would become meaningless. For even without this expression the freed *jīva* would according to the *first view* get a body, which would be his own; for he would not be given a body that belonged to another.

The view stated in para 4 of the *first view*, that one's natural form has been ever present, and that the *vedic* text would be without meaning, is refuted in the next *sūtra*.

### 2. मुक्तः प्रतिज्ञानात् ।

The freed *jīva* (is referred to in the text); because it was this that it was proposed to describe.

By the expression 'Appears in his own form' reference is made to one whose connection with *karma* has ceased, who is released from bodies brought about by it, and who appears in his natural form. Hence, though this natural form has been ever present, it was prevented from appearing by *avidyā* in the form of *karma*; and this obstruction is now removed. This is what is meant by the appearance of the natural form. How is this known. In section 7, chapter VIII of the *chāndogya* the teacher proposed to give instruction as to the nature of the *jīva*, released from the waking, dreaming and deep sleep conditions, and released also from bodies made by *karma* and leading to pleasure and pain. Again and again he offered to explain this and concluded with the text under consideration. The word *nishpadyate* is also used in the sense of appearing after some obstruction or difficulty is removed (1) Compare with the sentence 'This point appears from argument'.

सत्यमेव जयते

Next, the argument in para 1 of the *first view*—that one's natural form is not a desirable thing, as might be seen in the deep sleep condition—is refuted.

(1) Even if the terms be understood as the opponent does, the attainment of a new form may be explained. The *jīva's* natural form was under the influence of *avidyā*, and owing to its destruction the same in a pure condition emerges. Another explanation is that his attribute *jñāna* fully expands—a condition that did not previously exist. A still another explanation is that he now fully realises his natural form, which is a new thing (*adhi.*, 523).

### 3. आत्माप्रकरणात् ।

The *jīva* (has a natural form worth striving for) ; this is seen from the context.

In his natural form the *jīva* is known from the context to be the seat of qualities beginning with freedom from *karma*, and ending with omnipotence. This is the text :

The *ātmā*, who is free from *karma*, free from old age, death, grief, hunger and thirst, who has unchanging objects of desire and who has an unfrustrated will, should be sought.

It was explained under *sūtra* I-3-18 that this context relates to the *jīva* and not to the highest *Ātmā*. This natural form was during the stages of *samsāra* prevented by *avidyā* in the form of *karma* from appearing, and when the highest Light is reached, it appears by the destruction of *avidyā*.

This is stated by *bhagavān Śaunaka* :

As by washing a precious stone from dirt, its lustre is not made, so the *jnāna* of the *ātmā* is not made by the abandonment of *karma*. By digging a pond, water is not made ; only what existed before is made to appear ; how can a thing appear, that does not exist ? Similarly, by the destruction of undesirable elements, *jnāna* and other qualities appear, but are not made ; for they are permanent qualities of the *ātmā*.

Hence *jnāna*, bliss and other qualities, that had contracted owing to the influence of *karma*, fully expand on reaching the highest Light, and on the consequent appearance of the natural form ; and it is not inappropriate. Hence the statement made in the *sūtra* is sound.

## SUB-SECTION 2

Does the freed *jīva* see himself as separate from the highest *Ātmā* or as not separate, as being His aspect? The *first view* is that he sees himself as separate from Him. For *vedic* texts and *smṛiti* describe their being together, their being alike, and their possessing like attributes :

He enjoys all divine qualities along with *Brahma*, the all-knowing (*āna.*, I-1 and 2); When the meditator sees the *Puruṣa*, shining like gold, the world-cause and the ruler of all, he throws off good and bad deeds, and free from all touch of matter, he attains the highest likeness to Him (*munda.*, III-1-3); Resting on this wisdom, they have reached My likeness; they do not become the objects of either creation or destruction (*bhagavad gītā*, XIV-2).

The *sūtra* states the *final decision* :

#### 4. अविभागेन दृष्टत्वात् ।

As not separated; because his true nature has been seen.

Owing to the destruction of *avidyā*, the freed *jīva* sees his natural form, in which the highest *Ātmā* is his inner ruler, and he himself is His body and an inseparable attribute (1). This was explained in *sūtra* I-4-22. The freed *jīva* enjoys Him without separating himself

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(1) This is stated in the following texts : “ That thou art; This *ātmā* is *Brahma*; All this is identical with that (*Sat*); All this is indeed *Brahma*; Who stands in the *ātmā*, who is within the *ātmā*, whom the *ātmā* does not know, whose body the *ātmā* is, who rules the *ātmā* from within, He, the inner ruler, is your immortal *ātmā*; He has entered into men and controls them; he is the *ātmā* of all.”

thus—I am *Brahma*. The texts referred to by the opponent state that while remaining an inseparable attribute of the highest *Ātmā*, the freed *jīva*'s nature is similar to His nature ; and that abandoning material vehicles, whether *deva* or human, he becomes as pure as He is. The text about being together refers to his enjoying Him, whose attribute he is, and His qualities. There is therefore no conflict. Because the freed *jīva* is an inseparable attribute of the highest *Ātmā*, the statement that he is not separate from Him, and the remark in *sūtra* 8 *infra* that he can do anything by mere will do not conflict ; nor with *sūtras* II-1-22 and III-4-8.

### SUB-SECTION 3

In sub-section 1 it was decided that the freed *jīva*, appears in his own form. What this is has now to be considered ; owing to different descriptions in the *upani-shads* on this point. The first two *sūtras* put forward divergent views. The first is the view of *Jaimini*, which the *sūtra* states :

#### 5. ब्राह्मेण जैमिनिरुपन्यासादिभ्यः ।

(The freed *jīva* appears) with the qualities pertaining to *Brahma* ; this is the view of *Jaimini* ; because of the description and the rest.

These qualities are freedom from *karma*, and the rest up to omnipotence ; and they are stated as pertaining to *Brahma* in *chāndogya* (VIII-1-5). And these are described as the natural qualities of a *jīva* also

in the teaching of *Prajāpati* (*Ibid.*, VIII-7-1). By the expression 'and the rest' reference is made to certain actions, which flow from the possession of omnipotence, and which are also enumerated in section 12, verse 3, of the same chapter of the *upanishad*. It follows from this that *Jaimini* rejects the view stated in the next *sūtra*, that the freed *jīva* is mere perception.

### 6. चित्ति तन्मात्रेण तदात्मकत्वादित्यौडुलोमिः ।

As mere perception; this is the view of *Auḍulomi*; because that alone is his own form.

The authority for this view is the text:

As a piece of salt has no inner parts, no outer parts; all its parts are salt only; so dear, this *ātmā* has no inner parts; no outer parts; the whole is *prajñāna-ghana* only (*bṛihad.*, VI-5-13); He is *viññāna-ghana* only (*Ibid.*, IV-4-12).

The affirmation of this by the term only (*eva*) shows that nothing else is his natural form. Hence, as he cannot have any attributes, the terms 'free from *karma*, etc.,' indicate that the *jīva* is devoid of change, pleasure, pain and other effects of *avidyā*.

*Bādarāyaṇa* now states his own view and closes the discussion:

### 7. एवमप्युपन्यसात्पूर्वभावादविरोधं बादरायणः ।

Even so, there is no conflict. So *Bādarāyaṇa* thinks; because of the statement that the attributes first mentioned do exist.

'Even so'—assuming that the text states the *jīva* to be mere perception as pointed out by *Auḍulomi*. He may also be free from *karma* and the like stated before; for



the attributes, being stated by a *vedic* text, do exist. When two texts are of equal authority, it is not justifiable to regard one as cancelling the other. *Opponent*. As the attributes conflict with the natural form, they should be regarded as produced by *avidyā*. *Reply*. We ask—there being no difference in the validity of the texts, why should not the reverse be the case? Hence we reject your view. As the particle only (*eva*) cannot be explained without regarding either text as cancelling the other, some other explanation must be found. By the expression ‘even so’ in the *sūtra* the author expresses his dissent from *Audulomi*’s view, that his texts should be understood as he does. *Question*. What then is implied by the particle only (*eva*)? *Reply*. It means that the whole of the *jīva* is self-proved, and that no portion of his *svarūpa*, however small, depends upon anything else for its appearance. This is clear from the text itself. One text refers to the *jīva*’s *svarūpa*, the seat of attributes, and states it to be self-proved; while the other text states that he possesses certain attributes. There is therefore no conflict between the two. A piece of salt has the same taste throughout, as shown by taste; but this fact does not conflict with its possessing a form, colour, and hardness perceived by other senses. In a juicy fruit like the mango there is difference of taste in different parts of it; but in a piece of salt the taste is the same throughout. Similarly, the *jīva*’s *svarūpa* is self-proved throughout. This is the meaning of *Audulomi*’s texts.

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## SUB-SECTION 4

Regarding the freed *jiva* the following text describes certain actions as following from his omnipotence.

There he enjoys Him all round ; he eats ; he enjoys (as he pleases) ; he amuses himself with women, carriages or cousins (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-3).

The question for consideration is whether in reaching cousins the freed *jiva* has to make any effort other than willing, or whether they come to him by merely willing it, as they come to the highest *Ātmā*. The *first view* is that in the world those, that are reputed to possess an unfrustrated will like kings, are yet seen to make some further effort ; and that the freed *jiva* is like them ? The *sūtra* states the *final decision* :

### 8. संकल्पादेव तच्छ्रुते ।

By mere will ; because this is stated.

This is stated thus :

If he desires to see those that were his fathers (in previous births), by his will alone the fathers come up (*chāndo.*, VIII-2-1).

And there is no text that states that some other effort on his part is needed. If it did exist, it might be necessary to understand the particle alone (*eva*) in the expression 'by his will alone,' as it was understood in the expression '*vijnāna-ghana* only'. But there is nothing to obstruct his will (1).

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(1) It cannot be *karma*, as in the *jiva's* bound condition ; for he has no more *karma*. It cannot be the highest *Ātmā* ; for it is only what He desires that will be attempted

### 9. अत एव चानन्याधिपतिः ।

And for this very reason he is not subject to any ruler.

‘For this very reason’—because he is capable of doing what he decides on. The freed *jīva* was subject to control, when he was bound, by having to obey commands and prohibitions of the *veda*; and in that condition exercise of his will except in accordance with those commands and prohibitions was liable to be opposed at every turn. Hence, the text, that teaches that he can now do what he pleases, states that he is freed from this limitation. Hence it is stated ‘He becomes his own master’ (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2). This affirms his freedom only in regard to others than the highest *Ātmā*; but subjection to Him remains unaffected (*adhi.*, 533).

#### SUB-SECTION 5

The next question regarding the freed *jīva* is whether he has a body and senses, or whether he is without them, or whether their possession or non-possession depends upon his will. One view is stated in the next *sūtra*:

### 10. अभावं बादरिराहृद्येवम् ।

Non-possession (of body and senses). This is *Būdari*'s opinion; for so states the *veda*.

The text is :

One, that is in a body, is caught by welcome and unwelcome things ; from one in a body welcome and unwelcome things do not depart ; and one that is without a body they do not touch (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-1).

Stating thus that so long as one is connected with a body, it is impossible for him to avoid pain, the text adds “ This *jīva* rises from this body, reaches the highest Light, and appears in his own form ” (*Ibid.*, VIII-12-2). Thus the *veda* states that the freed *jīva* is without a body.

The opposite view is stated in the next *sūtra* :

११. भावं जैमिनिर्विकल्पामननात् ।

*Jaimini* thinks that he possesses them ; because the *veda* declares manifoldness.

The text is ;

He appears as one ; appears as three ; as five ; as seven (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2).

As the *jīva* is one and indivisible, he cannot appear as many. This must therefore happen through the possession of bodies. The text as to his being without a body refers to the absence of a body brought about by *karma* ; for that alone leads to pleasure and pain.

*Bādarāyaṇa* now states his own view, and closes the discussion on this point :

## 12. द्वादशाहवदुभयविधं बादरायणोऽतः ।

In both ways in the opinions of *Bādarāyaṇa*; for the same reason; as in the case of the twelve-days' *kratu*.

The expression 'for the same reason' refers to 'by mere will'.

The freed *jīva* is without a body, and with a body also. On this view both the texts will be reconciled; for the reason is that he has an unfrustrated will. In regard to the twelve-days' *kratu*, here are two texts "Those that desire prosperity should do the twelve-days' *kratu*" and "If one desires offspring, he should be made to perform the twelve-days' *kratu*". Here the two injunctions point to difference of resolve, according to which the same *kratu* belongs to the class of *satra* or of *ahina* (1), as the case may be.

The next question is whether when he has a body and senses, they are made only by himself. The next two *sūtras* reply :

## 13. तन्वभावे सन्ध्यवदुपपत्तेः ।

(Because enjoyment is possible) in the absence of a body made by himself, as in the dream state.

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(1) In a *satra kratu* the *soma* offerings are made on twelve days or more; in an *ahina* on days from two to twelve. In the former the *yajamānas* are many, the number ranging from seventeen to twenty-four; in the latter there is but one *yajamāna*.

In this case, *i.e.*, when he has no body and senses made by himself, it is possible for him to obtain enjoyment with things made by the highest *Ātmā* ; though omnipotent, he does not make them. As the bound *jīva* enjoys pleasure or pain in the dream state with things made for him by the highest *Ātmā* (see sub-section III-2-1), so the freed *jīva* utilises what things are made by Him and obtains enjoyment.

#### 14. भावे जाग्रद्वत् ।

As enjoyment is possible in the existence (of a body), as in the waking condition.

Sometimes he makes bodies, senses and other means of enjoyment for himself. In this case he obtains enjoyment with them, as the bound *jīva* in the waking condition does. The highest *Ātmā* makes for Himself fathers like *Daśaratha* and *Vasudeva*, acts like a mortal and obtains amusement. Similarly, and for the same purpose, He sometimes makes fathers for the freed *jīvas*. Sometimes they themselves, being omnipotent, make fathers for themselves ; who continue to be part of the instruments of amusement of the highest *Ātmā*.

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*Question.* How can a *jīva*, who is of the size of an atom, regard many bodies as his own. The next *sūtra* explains :

#### 15. प्रदीपवदावेशस्तथा हि दर्शयति ।

He enters them like a lamp ; for so does the *veda* show.

As a single lamp remaining in one place pervades other places with its light, so the *jīva* remaining in one body may pervade all other bodies with his attribute *jñāna*. Even in the same body the bound *jīva* remains in one place, *viz.*, the heart; but with his attribute *jñāna* he pervades the whole body and regards every part of it as his own. There is this difference. The bound *jīva*'s attribute being limited by *karma*, he cannot pervade other bodies in such a manner as to regard them as his own; but when he is freed, there being no such limitation, he may at pleasure enter into all bodies so as to perceive them as his own, and such entrance is not inappropriate. For, this is stated :

If a hundredth part of the end of a hair be divided into hundred parts, the *jīva* should be known as one such part; yet he is capable of infinity (*śveta.*, V-9).

*Karma* determines in regard to the bound *jīva*; only his own will in the case of the freed one (1).

(1) The text quoted raises a doubt: The reference to 'capable of infinity' shows that when the *jīva* is freed, he becomes omnipresent also; he may therefore control every body that he may take up. This view is supported by the fact that when a *jīva* withdraws from a branch of a tree, that branch withers. This view is erroneous. It is the view held by the *jaina*, as pointed out and refuted in chapter II, section 2, sub-section 6. Further, an explanation is available in the example of *Sambhari*, who took up as many bodies, as he had wives. This explanation being available, why should the theory of expansion at the moment be assumed? The withering of the branch may be explained by the withdrawal of the *jīva*'s notion that the branch was his own. This is seen in the case of a piece of land, which one takes or abandons at will; but he does not himself extend to it (*adhi.*, 538 and 539).

*Objection.* It is stated that one that has reached the highest *Ātmā* loses all knowledge of what is within or without. Here is the text:

This *jīva* embraced by the all-knowing *Ātmā*, does not know what is outside, does not know what is inside (*bṛihad.*, VI-3-21).

How can it be said that the freed *jīva* is all-knowing. The last *sūtra* replies :

### 16. स्वाप्ययसम्पत्योरन्यतरापेक्षमाविष्कृतं हि ।

It has reference to one of the two—deep sleep or death. For this is explained in the context itself.

This text does not refer to the freed *jīva*. It states what happens in deep sleep or death. In both of them the *jīva* goes to the highest *Ātmā*, and falls into unconsciousness. That this result follows in these cases and that the freed *jīva* becomes all-knowing is explained by the *veda* itself. Regarding deep sleep it states :

He does not then know himself thus—‘ I am this ’—nor these beings. He has surely reached annihilation. I do not see anything to like in this (*chāndo.*, VIII-11-3).

In the same context referring to the freed *jīva* it states :

He sees with this divine eye—*viz.*, the mind—those divine qualities that are in the *Brahma*-world and rejoices (*chāndo.*, VIII-12-5).

Compare with the following also :

The seer sees everything ; he attains everything everywhere (*chāndo.*, VII-26-2),

which is clearer still. In regard to loss of consciousness in death it is stated “ When they (these elements)



dissolve, he perishes with them" (*bṛihad.*, IV-4-12). The term 'perishes' (*vināṣyati*) means 'does not see'.

### SUB-SECTION 6

The last question for consideration regarding the freed *jīva* is whether among his attainments should be included the activities concerned with the evolution and dissolution of the universe and with the control of everything, which have been understood as relating to the highest *Ātmā* alone. The *first view* is that they are included. For it is stated "Free from all touch of matter, he attains the highest likeness to Him" (*muṇḍa.*, III-1-3). He is also said to have an unfrustrated will; and these will not be appropriate, unless the freed *jīva* has also the control of the world, that is the peculiar function of the all-Controller. Hence he has a share in such control. The *final decision* is stated in the *sūtra* :

#### 17. जगद्व्यापारवर्जं प्रकरणादसन्नित्वाच्च ।

Without the world-activities ; this is seen from the context, and from absence of reference to him.

By the 'world-activities' reference is made to the control of the coming into existence as objects, of the continued existence and of the movements of all intelligent beings and non-intelligent objects. They do not accrue to the freed *jīva* ; but he enjoys the highest *Ātmā* without any limitation. The world—activities have been stated as pertaining to Him. See *bhṛiguvalī*, which enumerates them as constituting a definition of *Brahma*.

If He had to share them with freed *jivas*, it would cease to be a definition. For, a defining mark is found only in that which is defined. See also the texts quoted at the foot of the page (1). In the *antaryāmi brāhmaṇa* the control of the whole world is described as connected with the highest *Ātmā* only. Nor is there any mention made of the freed *jiva* in these places.

The next *sūtra* states an objection, and then refutes it.

### 18. प्रत्यक्षोपदेशान्नेति चेन्नाधिकारिकमण्डलस्थोक्तेः ।

If it be contended "No; because the *veda* states it"; the reply is "No; because reference is made to enjoyments in the worlds of officers in the economy of nature".

The opponent refers to the following texts :

He becomes his own master; the capacity to wander at will in all the worlds comes to him (*chāndo.*, VII-25-2);

(1) Before creation, my dear, this was *Sat* only; one only; without a second. He willed 'I will become many, and to that end I will evolve'. He created fire (*chāndo.*, VI-2-1 to 3); Before creation this was *Brahma*; one only. Being single, He had no greatness. He created superior bodies knows as *kshatra*, excelling everything, i.e., those that are *kshattriyas* among *devas*, *Indra*, *Varuṇa*, *Soma*, *Rudra*, *Parjanya*, *Yama*, *Mṛityu*, *Īśāna* (*bṛihad.*, III-4-11); Before creation this was *Ātmā*; one only; nothing else existed. He willed 'I will create the worlds'; He created these worlds (*aitareya.*, I-1); *Nārāyaṇa* alone was; *brahmā* was not; *Īśāna* was not; these—heaven and earth—were not; no stars, no water, no fire, no moon, no sun. Being single, He found no pleasure. He meditated, and from Him came forth a girl, and the ten senses (*mahopanishad*).

Taking any form that is liked he wanders in these worlds enjoying whatever enjoyment occurs to the mind (*bhṛigu.*, 10-5),

and observes that they clearly teach world-activities as pertaining to the freed *jīva*. The *sūtra* replies: No ; for, these texts teach that when the *jīva* is freed, and his *jñāna* is no longer obstructed by *karma*, he enjoys according to his pleasure the worlds, that are subject to change and are under the control of the four-faced one, and other officers in the economy of nature, and that he obtains enjoyment. They do not refer to world-activities.

*Objection again.* If like the bound *jīva* even the freed one needs the enjoyments to be found in the worlds of change, then his enjoyment, like that of the other, is petty and perishable. To this the next *sūtra* replies :

### 19. विकारावर्ति च तथा हि स्थितिमाह ।

And what is not subject to change ; for the *veda* so teaches his being.

The freed *jīva* enjoys the highest *Ātmā*, who is not touched by any form of change, who is free from all imperfections, and who is the seat of all good qualities and of bliss without limit. This enjoyment extends to all the things controlled by Him and to all His good qualities. As included in this, *i.e.*, the things controlled by Him, the worlds of change become objects of enjoyment to him. That the freed *jīva* enjoys the highest *Ātmā* as thus described is stated :

When in order to attain freedom from fear, he dwells steadily with his mind on this (the highest *Ātmā*) unseen, unembodied, unnamed and unsupported, he will attain freedom from fear (*āna.*, 7-2); He is bliss: for on reaching bliss, one becomes blissful (*Ibid.*, 7-1);

The universe, which is controlled by Him, remains in Him alone:

All the worlds rest on Him; no one excels Him (*katha*, II-5-8).

Hence the freed *jiva*, enjoying *Brahma* along with what He controls, enjoys also what is to be found in the worlds of change in charge of His officers. And no reference is made in the texts to world-activities.

## 20. दर्शयतश्चैवं प्रत्यक्षानुमाने ।

The *veda* and *smritis* show this.

‘This’—that the world-activities pertain only to the highest *Ātmā*.

From fear of Him the wind blows; from fear the sun rises; from fear of Him fire and *Indra* (go about their business); death, the fifth, runs about (*āna.*, VIII-1); By the unobstructed command of that *Akshara*, *Gārgi*, the sun and the moon stand supported (*brhad*, V-8-8); He is the ruler of all; He is the lord of beings; He is the protector of beings; He is the protective bund, that keeps these worlds from being confounded (*Ibid.*, VI-4-22). With Me to direct, *prakṛiti* sends forth from itself the world with the moving and unmoving things. From this cause the world goes round (*bhagavad gītā*, IX-10); I remain holding all this world with a fragment of My power (*Ibid.*, X-42).

2. The freed *jiva*, even though he becomes omnipotent, gets his bliss as a gift from the highest *Ātmā*.

He alone causes bliss (*āna.*, 7-1). By adoring Me with unswerving *bhakti-yoga* one surmounts these *guṇas*, and becomes fit to be *brahma*. For I am the principal

cause of one's becoming *brahma*, immortal and imperishable, of the attainment of never-ending power and of the bliss reached with single-minded devotion (*bhagavad gītā*, XIV-26 and 27).

3. The qualities beginning with freedom from *karma* and ending with omnipotence no doubt belong to the *jīva* by nature; and they appear, when the obstruction that prevented them from appearing, goes; nevertheless the fact that they do so depends on the highest *Ātmā*; as also his eternal existence. That the *jīva* should be eternal is His eternal wish. There is therefore no conflict between their being bestowed by the highest *Ātmā* and their being eternal. Similarly the means of His enjoyment in the worlds of change as well as in the worlds not subject to change, is eternal, as one may learn from the *veda*; because such is His eternal wish. Hence the freed *jīva*'s omnipotence and likeness to the highest *Ātmā* do not extend to the world-activities.

The next *sūtra* explains the scope of the utmost likeness reached by the freed *jīva*.

## 21. भोगमात्रसाम्यलिङ्गाच्च ।

And because of the mark indicating likeness in enjoyment only.

The mark is the statement made in the text:

He enjoys all good qualities with *Brahma*, the all-knowing (*āna.*, 1-2).

The likeness of the freed *jīva* to the highest *Ātmā* is stated in general terms; and here is a particular case

of likeness in the matter of enjoyment. Hence, the general statement should be limited to the particular case, following the rule explained in note (1) on page 51. The freed *jiva*'s likeness to the highest *Ātmā* and the possession of an unfrustrated will should be explained so as to fit in with the control of the world, that pertains to Him alone.

*Question.* If the attainments of the freed *jiva* are the gifts of the highest *Ātmā*, will He send him back ; for He is His own master, and may will the *jiva*'s return. The last *sūtra* replies :

## 22. अनावृत्तिशब्दादनावृत्तिशब्दात् ।

There is no return ; it being so stated.

The *veda* shows that the highest *Ātmā* exists, who is an enemy to all imperfections, and the one seat for all good qualities, who is the cause of the evolution, sustenance and dissolution of the world, who stands apart from all, who is all-knowing, who has an unfailing will, who is full of love for those that come to Him, who is full of mercy, who is without an equal or superior, and who is known as the highest *Brahma*. The same authority states also that He is pleased with the worship of Himself in the form of meditation ; that He removes the meditator's *avidyā* in the form of *karmas* done in the beginningless past, endless, and incapable of being got rid of ; that He gives him bliss without limit in the

form of enjoyment of Himself; and that He will not make him return. The text is:

Thus passing all his life, he attains *Brahma*-world, and does not return (*chūndo.*, VIII-15-1).

This is also stated by *Bhagavān* Himself:

Those great minds after reaching Me do not come again to birth, and take up a body that is perishable and full of misery. For they have reached the highest goal. The worlds, including the abode of *Brahmā* are perishable; and one that goes to them must return to rebirth. But for one that comes to Me, there is no re-birth (*bhagavad gītā*, VIII-15 and 16).

2. And there is no room to suspect that the freed *jīva* will ever return. First, he will not himself desire it; for his bondage to *karma* has been broken; his attribute *jnāna* has fully expanded; his nature is to enjoy the highest *Ātmā* alone; that alone is dear to him; and he is enjoying *Brahma* who is bliss without limit. How can he desire anything else, and make efforts to procure it? Next, the highest *Ātmā*, will never send him back, after having taken immense trouble to get him to Himself; for the *jīva* is immeasurably dear to Him. This is stated by Himself:

To the *jnāni* (one that loves Me for Myself) I am immeasurably dear; and he is immeasurably dear to Me. All these are liberal indeed; but the *jnāni* is in reality My *ātmā*; that is My opinion; for he regards Me only as the highest goal; and his mind wishes to enter upon My *yoga*. One becomes a *jnāni* at the end of many lives (of good deeds), and then comes to Me, with the thought that *Vāsudeva* is everything to him. A great mind of this description is very rare (*bhagavad gītā*, VIII-17, 18 and 19).


And there is no one that can oppose Him, wh he wishes to keep the *jiva* ; for His will is nev frustrated.

The repetition of the *sūtra* is to show that the wo has been completed. All is well.


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भगवते भाष्यकाराय महादेशिकाय नमः ।

श्रीमते वेदान्तरामानुजमहादेशिकाय नमः ।







सत्यमेव जयते

## GLOSSARY

### OF SANSKRIT WORDS USED IN THIS WORK

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- Abhūva.* Non-existence (page 481, note 1 and page 523.)
- Abhivyakti.* Manifestation (page 468).
- Adṛiṣṭa.* The capacity generated in a person that does a *yāga* (page 111, para 2, See also page 517).
- Adhikaraṇa.* Sub-section, containing the *sūtra* or *sūtras* dealing with one topic (page 32).
- Adhvaryu.* One of the helpers in a *yāga*. He does all the manual work, including the preparation of the materials, the handling of the instruments, and the making of the offerings (page 3, note).
- Adhyāyana.* Learning the text of the *veda* (page 67).
- Adhyāhāra.* The addition of a new word (a word not appearing in the previous sentence) to complete the sentence (page 15, para 1).
- Adhyāsa.* The perception by an intelligent person of the attribute of one object in a different object (page 514).
- Agnihotra.* The name for the daily offerings made by a house-holder at about sunrise and sunset (page 442).
- Agnisṭoma.* The name of a soma *yāga* (page 442).

- Ahamkāra*. A product of matter formed from the product known as *mahat* (page 435).
- Aihika*. Fruits to be enjoyed here and now (page 2, para 3).
- Akshara*. A product formed from matter in the subtlest condition known as *tamas* (page 435, note 1).
- Aṃṣa*. Part of a whole; one element in an aggregate of several elements (page 604, para 2).
- Anga and Angi*. What renders a service to another is *anga*; that which receives the service is *angi*. They are also known as *śeṣa* and *śeṣhi* (page 16, para 18).
- Aṇu*. An atom (page 588).
- Anushanga*. The addition of a word appearing in a previous sentence to complete the sentence (page 15, para 17).
- Anūchūna*. One that has learnt the whole of a branch of the *veda* and the six *angas* (page 67, note 2).
- Aṇṇathū siddha*. What may be explained otherwise (page 604, para 3).
- Apaccheda*. The break, which may occur in the procession in a *soma yāya* of the *yajamāna* and five of his helpers starting from the *havirdhūna* to the north-east corner of the sacrificial grounds (page 26).
- Apūrva*. This is the name given to *adṛiṣṭa* by the *mīmāṃsaka*. See under that term (page 13, para 14).
- Arthavāda*. Texts of the *veda*, that praise the *karmas* prescribed by injunction-texts (page 3, note).
- Atharvan*. A portion of the *veda* (page 3, note).
- Atideśa*. The application of the ritual of *prakṛiti yāgas* to those known as *vikṛiti yāgas* (page 26, para 31).
- Avidyā*. In the view of *Śaṅkara* a positive substance that prevents *Brahma* from appearing as He is.
- Avyakta*. A product formed from matter in the condition known as *akshara* (page 435, note 1).

- Avyākṛita*. Matter, which in the subtlest condition is without diverse names and forms (page 582).
- Āchamana*. Sipping water thrice with *mantras*—a ceremony that is a preliminary to all *karmas* enjoined in the *veda* and *smṛitis*.
- Āchāra*. The practice of great *rishis*, who knew the *veda* fully (page 11, para 10).
- Ādhāna*. The establishing of the three fires by a householder, which are prescribed by the *veda* (page 24, para 29-1).
- Āhavanīya*. One of the three fires maintained by a householder under *vedic* injunction (page 21).
- Ākṛiti*. The form that is common to all the members of a class (page 12, para 12).
- Ākshepa*. The reasoning on which the meaning of a word like 'go' is extended to an animal possessing the *ākṛiti* (page 12, para 12).
- Āmushmika*. Fruits to be enjoyed there, i.e., in *svarga* (page 2).
- Ānanda*. Bliss.
- Āśrama*. A stage of life, as the stage of the student, of the householder, of the forest-dweller or of the mendicant (page 76).
- Brahmavidyā*. Continuous, vivid, loving meditation on *Brahma*.
- Brāhmaṇa*. (1) The portion of the *veda*, consisting of commands and prohibitions (page, 3, note).  
(2) One that has learnt a little of the *veda* (page 67, note 2).
- Bhūvanū*. The common element in all finite verbs; it consists of an action, that serves to bring about what is desired (page 12, para 13).

*Bhāvya*. What is produced by the *bhāvanā* (page 12, para 13).

*Bhoga*. Experiencing—either enjoyment of pleasure or suffering of pain (page 455, para 3).

*Bhrūṇa*. One that has learnt the whole of the *veda*, its six *angas* and the *kalpa sūtras*, and teaches the last to others (page 67, note 2).

*Brahma*. A thing which has the attribute of being immeasurably great in its substance, and in its attributes. The Being who answers this description is *Puruṣottama*, the ruler of all (page 60, para 2).

*Brahmacharya*. Leading a student's life (page 796). It also means abstention from sexual intercourse.

*Chamasa*. A four-sided wooden basin with a handle (page 21, para 25).

*Chit*. Light: A thing that shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about (page 107, para 6).

*Darṣa*. The name for three offerings made on the first day after the new moon (page 15, para 16).

*Devatā*. A being superior to man, who receives the offerings made by him, and gives what he desires.

*Devayāna*. The path by which the freed *jīvas* journey to the highest heaven.

*Dharma*. *Karma* prescribed in the *veda* as the means to a fruit—like *yūgas*, gifts, meditation (page 690).

*Gārhapatya*. One of the three fires maintained by a householder (page 18, para 20).

*Graha*. A wooden vessel, in which the juice of the *soma* creeper is received and offered to various *devatās* (page 19, para 22).

*Guṇa*. A quality. When the term is used in the plural, it often denotes the qualities *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas*.

- Hetu.* A thing, by connection with which another thing is known in an inference (page 109, note 1).
- Hota.* One of the helpers in a *yāga*, whose functions is to recite verses of the *veda*, when offerings are made (page 4, note).
- Itikartavyatā.* Offerings, that help the principal offerings in yielding their fruits (page 12, para 13).
- Īśvara.* One that controls. As this feature is found in the highest degree in the highest *Ātmā*, it denotes Him (page 313, para 4).
- Jada.* What does not show itself or other things, and make them fit to be spoken about (page 107, para 6).
- Japa.* Repetition of *mantras* and thinking of their meaning as they are recited (page 819).
- Jāti.* The peculiar feature of a species (page 172, para 7).
- Jiva.* An intelligent being, who is the 'I' in every person.
- Jivaghana.* A bound *jiva* (page 318).
- Jivan-mukta.* One that is released from bondage, while he remains in a body (page 866).
- Jñāna.* A thing that shows itself or other things, and makes them fit to be spoken about. Both the *jiva* and his attribute possess this character, the *jiva* showing himself, and his attribute showing other things (page 591, note 1).
- Juhū.* An instrument for making offerings to *devatās*.
- Kāmya.* A *karma*, that is done as the means to some fruit (page 75, note 1).
- Kapāla.* Small, flat, circular pieces made of earth and burnt (page 773).
- Karaṇa.* The principal offerings, that yield the fruit through an *apūrva* (page 12, para 13). It is known as *vishaya*, when it particularises an *apūrva* (page 129, note 2).

*Karma.* Good and bad deeds done by a *jīva*.

*Kāraka.* The object of an action, the means with which it is done, or the place in which it takes place (page 86 para 2).

*Kārya.* Something to be attained by *kṛiti* (mental effort). It is a *yāga* ; but in the opinion of *Prābhākara* it is the *apūrva* created by the *yāga* (page 85, para 1).

*Kṛiti.* Mental effort in the form of willing (page 92, para 5).

*Kratu.* A *karma*, in which many offerings are made to many *devatās*, like a *soma yāga* (page 759, note 1).

*Lakṣhaṇā.* The extension of the meaning of a word to something connected with it (page 12, para 12).

*Linga.* The capacity of a word to denote something (page 16, para 18—ii).

*Mahat.* A product formed from matter in the condition of *avyakta* (page 435, note 1).

*Mantra.* Texts of the *veda*, recited when a *karma* prescribed in the *veda* is performed (page 3, note).

*Mīmāṃsaka.* One that has commented on *Jaimini's sūtras* (page 4, paras 5).

*Mīmāṃsū.* The examination of the teaching of the *veda* as a whole (page 4).

*Mṛityu.* Matter known as *tamas* ; it is so called, as it is the means of the contraction of the *jñāna* of all *jīvas*, and as this is an unwelcome thing (page 436, note 2).

*Moksha.* Release from bondage to matter (page 53, note 2).

*Naimittika.* A *karma*, that is to be done on the occurrence of a contingency (*nimitta*) (page 75, note 1).

*Nimitta.* A contingency, on the occurrence of which an action should be done (page 130, note 1).

*Nir-viśeṣa.* An object that alone exists, and that is therefore without differences (page 106, note 2).

*Is-ṣreyasa*. The highest good—a superior kind of fruit, that will endure for ever (page 2).

*Īitya*. A *karma* that is compulsory (page 75, note 1).

*Āryudāsa*. Exclusion of a thing from something, that is mentioned, by connecting the particle *na* with a word in the sentence other than the verb (page 30, para 36).

*Paṣu*. A four-footed animal, that is offered to a *devatā* (page 182, note 1).

*Pitriyāna*. The path by which men of meritorious deeds go to the moon.

*Pradhāna*. The cause, from which the universe evolves, which according to the *sūnkya* consists of the three substances *satva*, *rajas*, and *tamas* in equipoise (page 506, para 3).

*Purodāsa*. A ball of fried rice flour to be offered to a *devatā* (page 27, para 31—iii).

*Purushārtha*. A fruit sought by an intelligent person (page 2).

*Pūrṇamāsa*. The name for three offerings made on the first day after the full moon (page 15, 16).

*Pūrva-paksha*. The first or superficial view put forward on a subject (page 32).

*Prakaraṇa*. Two or more sentences connected by mutual need, which makes them a context (page 16, para 15—IV).

*Prakāra*. The aspect, in which an object appears (page 179, note 2).

*Prakṛiti*. A *yāga* for which the ritual is explained in the *veda* in full detail, and from which the ritual for *vikṛiti yāgas* is adopted (page 26, para 31).

*Pralaya*. Complete cosmic rest (page 431, note 2).



- Pramāṇa*. An authority on which statements are accepted, or injunctions are obeyed (page 10, para 10).
- Prasanga*. The receipt of service rendered to principal offerings by an offering of minor importance, that is connected with them (page 30, para 38).
- Pratishedha*. Prohibition conveyed by connecting the particle *na* with the verb in a sentence (page 30, para 36).
- Pratika*. Part of a thing; meditation on *pratika* is meditation on what is not *Brahma* (page 891).
- Prārabdha*. *Karma* that has begun to yield fruit (page 46, para 54).
- Rūḍhi*. Conveying the meaning of words established by usage (page 11, para 11).
- Ṛik*. A portion of the *veda* (page 3, note).
- Rishi*. (1) A seer. (2) One that has learnt the whole of the *veda*, its six *angas* and *kalpa* (page 4, note 4).
- Ritu*. A group of two months (page 436, note 1).
- Ritvik*. A helper in a *yūga* (page 3, note).
- Śastra*. A number of verses from the *ṛik veda* recited by the *hotā* before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made (page 728, note 1).
- Śākhā*. A branch of the *veda* (page 769, note 1).
- Śesha and Śeshi*. See under *Anga*.
- Śruti*. The sound of a word (page 16, para 18—1).
- Śrotriya*. One that has learnt the whole of a branch of the *veda* (page 67, note 2).
- Samasṭi* evolution. Evolution of the great elements and of the *jiva*'s instruments—the senses and the mind (page 627).
- jivas*. *Jivas* without name and form in the condition of cosmic rest, as opposed to *vyasṭi jivas*, which they

subsequently became by assuming names and forms (page 317, note 1).

*Samavāya*. The relation of the whole to its parts, of a substance to its attributes or actions, of an individual of a class to the generic character (page 523).

*Samavāyi* cause. That of which a thing is made (page 479, para 3).

*Samākhya*. The meaning of words by *yoga* or derivation (page 17, para 18—vi).

*Samsāra*. Cycle of births and deaths (page 56).

*Samskāra*. Giving of a fitness for some work (page 66, para 6).

*Saviśeṣa*. A thing that exists along with another thing, or has an attributive, and that is therefore with difference (page 106, note 2).

*Sādhyā*. What is to be proved in an inference (page 109, note 1).

*Sāman*. A portion of the *veda* (page 3, note).

*Siddhānta*. The final decision in a topic under discussion (page 32).

*Smṛiti*. A work written by a great *ṛishi*, who knew the *veda* fully (page 17).

*Stotra*. Certain *mantras* in verse, that are sung by the *udgātā* and his two assistants before certain offerings of the *soma* juice are made (page 728, note 1).

*Sthāna*. Two places in the *veda* connected by mutual need.

*Sūtra*. A short, condensed, yet clear statement in prose (page 4).

*Svara*. The variation in tone in the recitation of *vedic* texts (page 769, note 2).

*Svarūpa*. The substance of a thing, which is the seat of attributes.

*Svarga*. A place of unalloyed enjoyment.

*Śvādhyāya*. The text of the *veda* (page 64).

*Tamas*. Matter in the subtlest condition (page 435).

*Tanmātra*. An intermediate stage, through which one great element passes before it becomes the next element (page 434, note 1).

*Tantra*. The serving of several principal offerings by doing an *anga* once only (page 30, para 37).

*Tapas*. Diminution of sense enjoyment.

*Tarka*. A help to a source of knowledge ; it determines that it shows a particular thing by discussing either its nature, or the materials from which that thing is known (page 448, note).

*Tatva*. A substance, like the twenty-five *tatvas* of the *sāṅkhya*, or like the three *tatvas*, matter, *jīvas* and *Īśvara*.

*Uddeśya*. The subject in regard to which an injunction is given (page 19, para 22).

*Udgātā*. A helper in a *yāga*, whose function it is to sing *vedic mantras* before certain offerings are made (page 4, note).

*Udgītha*. The second part out of five parts, into which every *sūman* is divided.

*Upanishad*. The later portion of the *veda* (page 1).

*Upādhi*. (1) A condition that must co-operate with the *hetu* in producing an effect, when it is present in the examples, but is absent from the subject under consideration (page 110, note).

(2) Matter in an atonic form contacting *Brahma* and bringing about the *jīva* condition (page 477).

*Varṇa*. Caste, as the caste of *brāhmaṇa*, *kshattriya*, *vaiśya*,

*Vāsanā*. Tendency created in a person by thinking or by doing an action.

*Veda*. A book not made by anyone, and regarded as the highest authority among the Hindus (page 1, para 2).

*Vidyā*. Continuous, vivid meditation.

*Vikalpa*. Option to do only one thing out of two or more things enjoined (page 30, para 36).

*Vikṛiti*. A *yāga*, for which the ritual has to be adopted from a *prakṛiti yāga* (page 26, para 31).

*Viśeṣhaṇa*, *Viśeṣhya*. A word, that connotes an attribute, and through it separates an object that has the attribute from other objects. The object separated is *viśeṣhya* (page 102, note 1).

*Vishaya*. See under *karaṇa*.

*Vyashṭi* Evolution. Evolution of products with diverse names and forms (page 627).

*Yajamāna*. One that does a *yāga* (page 15).


*Yajus*. A portion of the *veda* (page 3, note).

*Yāga*. An offering made to a *devatā*.

*Yoga*. (1) Denoting the meaning of a word by its etymology (page 11, para 11).

(2) Meditation. सयमेव जयते

*Yūpa*. A post for tying a goat, that is to be offered to a *devatā* (page 20, para 23).



सत्यमेव जयते