THE CARNATIC: AND MYSORE
ABOUT 1780
Scale: 1 Inch = 105 Miles

Golconda
HAIDARABAD
NIZAM
Guntur
Masulipatam
R. Krishna
R. Krishna
R. Tungabhadra
Bellari
Guti
Chitaldrug
R. Hagri
MYSORE
CARNATIC
COROMANDEL COAST
MADRAS
Yellur
Kaveripak
Arcot
Pollilur
Conjeveram
Arni
Chengalpat
Wandewash
Jinji
Pondichery
Pt. St. David
Cudalur
Porto Novo
Devikota
Marikal
Tanjur
Negapatam
Bangalur
Ambur
Mongalur
Seringapatam
Maisur
KURG
Kananor
Mahe
Kalikat
Kaveri
Koimbatur
Trichinopoli
Dindigul
MALABAR COAST
COCHIN
TRAVANCORE
C. Comorin
Trincomalee
CEYLON

Methuen & Co.

CHAPTER VI

THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN FRENCH AND BRITISH

(*Map III.*)

The coming World-contest.

ABOUT the time when Nadir Shah was sacking Delhi, Robert Walpole in England was lamenting the violent outburst of public feeling which plunged the country into a struggle with Spain. That Spanish war was in a way the beginning of the fierce contest for dominion beyond the seas, which terminated after a complete triumph of the British in the Peace of 1763. Commercial rivalry with Spain in the South Seas, colonial rivalry with the French in North America, and commercial rivalry with the French in India, induced wars which by sea, or on the American continent, or in India, continued practically without an interval for twenty-four years and ended by giving Britain the complete dominion of the ocean, and expelling the French as a Power from America and India alike.

Summary of the struggle.

When Walpole went to war with Spain very much against his own will, the presumption was strong that sooner or later France would throw her weight into the scale along with the sister Bourbon Monarchy. A secret treaty for the aggrandisement of the Bourbon houses was in existence; and it was the English minister's firm conviction that the combined fleets of France and Spain would prove too strong for that of England. But war, declared against Spain in 1739, was not formally declared with France until 1744; in 1746 Great Britain was finally freed from the haunting spectre of civil strife which had vexed her statesmen ever since the expulsion of James II., by the collapse of the last Jacobite rising; and when a

general peace was concluded in 1748, she had definitely succeeded in holding her own, though no settlement was reached of the questions which had been the ostensible causes of the conflagration. The struggle was renewed in 1756, when the British under the guiding genius of the elder Pitt developed an overwhelming naval supremacy which paralysed the resistance of the French in lands which could only receive reinforcements by sea. Had Britons and French in India been left to fight their quarrels out between themselves, it is at least possible that French, not British, would have become the arbiters of India. But they were not left to themselves; their battles were fought at Quiberon and Quebec as well as at Trichinopoli and Wandewash; and afterwards France was never able to place a rival armament in India.

Prospects of the struggle.

At the time, however, when the challenge was planned, the chances of the issue were extremely doubtful. Had France pursued in the first war, or had Pitt failed to pursue in the second, a vigorous naval policy, the position of affairs might very possibly have been reversed. As it turned out it is hardly too much to say that the British entered upon the inheritance which Dupleix prepared.

Dupleix at Pondichery.

Dupleix had been for some years at Chandernagar on the Hugli when he was appointed to the leading post of Governor of Pondichery in succession to Dumas. There he arrived in 1741. About the time when he was leaving Bengal, Ali Vardi Khan, previously Governor of Behar, had intrigued himself into the position of Nawab of Behar and Bengal. In the Carnatic Dupleix found a new Nawab, Anwar-ud-din, only just appointed by the Nizam, to the exclusion of a family which had held the office for thirty years. A year or two earlier, Nadir Shah had sacked the home of the Padishah himself. The instability of Oriental dynasties, in short, had only just been emphatically and variously illustrated, and the already immense age of the Nizam pointed to a prospect of its further illustration in the immediate future.

The scheme of Dupleix.

Hence two ideas presented themselves to the mind of Dupleix in close association. If the Europeans gave their

minds to doing it they could make themselves the determining factor in the rivalries of natives; if the French got rid of the English they could secure that position for themselves, and if they worked skilfully for that position they would be able to get rid of the English. Further, although in the field Dupleix was not adapted for soldiering, he had an intelligent perception of sundry military principles whereby he formulated the law that the kind of discipline prevailing in the levies of native princes was of very little value against the kind of discipline which prevails among the most inadequate European troops, while the European discipline could be imparted to native troops by European officers.

Check to the British in the Carnatic.

In 1744 France and Great Britain went to war; but the French and British East India Companies' Directors at home were thinking about dividends, not politics, and instructed their officials in India to maintain friendly relations. Their officials in India saw matters in a different light. Governor Morse at Madras, and Governor Dupleix at Pondichery, each meant to use the opportunity for a blow at his commercial rivals. Dupleix, however, had laid his plans: Morse had not. The British at the outset found their intention of marching on Pondichery frustrated by a warning from the Nawab that they would move at their peril: nor had it occurred to any one that such a threat could possibly be defied. Dupleix had taken time by the forelock, and secured the condescending protection of Anwar-ud-din till he himself should be ready to strike.

La Bourdonnais.

This, however, was a merely precautionary move. At that time, the islands of the Mauritius were a French Naval station. The Commander there was La Bourdonnais, a man of great ability and energy. Dupleix had been for some time in communication with him, when an English squadron under Peyton appeared before Pondichery, prepared to ignore—from the sea—the Nawab's prohibition of hostilities. But Peyton had hardly arrived when La Bourdonnais also came on the scene of action with ships and troops. Peyton found himself obliged to withdraw. La Bourdonnais sailed for Madras; the Governor made a vain appeal to the Nawab for the protection previously extended to the French; there

He was no force in the place to resist La Bourdonnais, and in September 1746, after a short bombardment, Madras surrendered. The Admiral had promised that the town should be restored on payment of a ransom; but Dupleix repudiated the terms, declaring that La Bourdonnais had acted without authority. There was a hot altercation, but Dupleix was in the stronger position: and La Bourdonnais's ships were not in a condition to await the approaching monsoon. He had to withdraw, leaving some troops, to the Mauritius—whence he was almost immediately recalled, to be thrown into prison by way of encouragement—and Dupleix took possession of Madras, explaining to the Nawab that this was merely a preliminary to handing it over to him.

captures Madras.

It was not long, however, before Anwar-ud-din came to the conclusion that the presumptuous Frenchman meant to keep Madras himself; whereupon he sent his son at the head of some ten thousand men to compel obedience. Then Dupleix put his theory to the test. The garrison, numbering not more than five hundred men, sallied out against the Nawab's troops, and routed them. Reinforcements, consisting of two hundred and thirty Europeans, and seven hundred sepoys—natives drilled on the European model, and under European officers—were on their way to Madras, and again scattered the native levies. Quite suddenly it was revealed that odds of twenty to one were by no means sufficient to ensure victory against Europeans and sepoys in combination.

Dupleix defeats the Nawab's forces.

Madras had fallen, and its English occupants had been paraded through Pondichery as prisoners of war, but Fort St David, a hundred miles to the south, was standing. Two attempts to capture it were, however, repelled, and the appearance of a small British squadron under Griffin sufficed to check active hostilities without enabling the British to assume the offensive. In June of the following year (1748) the attack on Fort St David was vigorously renewed, but triumphantly repelled by Major Stringer Lawrence who had recently taken over the command. In August a considerable fleet from England commanded by Boscawen appeared off Pondichery, and the French port was besieged. The siege

Defence of Fort St David.

was very ill managed, and the defence brilliantly conducted. After fifty days, Boscawen was obliged to withdraw by the approach of the monsoon — for the harbourage on the Coromandel coast was quite inadequate under these conditions. The raising of the siege was a triumph for the French, whose military prestige was now incomparably higher than that of their rivals and their interest at the Nawab's court proportionately stronger: and the news of the Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle prevented the return of Boscawen when the monsoons should be over.

Defence of Pondichery.

Peace of Aix-la-Chapelle, and restoration of conquests.

One result of the treaty however, was not to Dupleix's taste. In the course of the war, the British in America had taken Louisburg on the St Lawrence from the French: and Dupleix had to give up Madras in India in return for the restoration of Louisburg in Canada.

There was peace between France and England, and the two Companies were no longer at liberty to make war on each other; both however, were bent on carrying on the struggle, and a means of doing so was promptly discovered. But while the British waited upon fortune, Dupleix created his own opportunity.

Rival claimants for the Nawabship.

Anwar-ud-din had been, as we have observed, appointed Nawab of the Carnatic by the Nizam in 1740: displacing a family which, in the person of Sadutūlla, had begun to rule in 1710. Sadutulla had been succeeded in 1732 by his nephew Dost Ali; both had been good and popular governors and the Nizam had not found it convenient to interfere. A few years later, the Marathas raided the Carnatic in force: Dost Ali was killed. His son, Safdar Ali, in turn was proclaimed Nawab. He had two brothers-in-law: one Chanda Sahib, who was able, popular, and bore a very high character. With the connivance of Safdar Ali, who feared Chanda Sahib as a possible rival, the Marathas attacked and captured the latter and carried him off to Satara, where they held him to ransom. He however, in anticipation of disturbed times, had already placed his family in charge of Dumas at Pondichery; a confidence of which, as we have seen, the Governor had shown himself thoroughly worthy. Then Safdar Ali had been assassinated by the other brother-

in-law; the Nizam had considered it time to interfere with a strong hand; Anwar-ud-din was appointed Governor, and Guardian of Safdar Ali's young son, and on the boy's death shortly after was formally made Nawab.

Dupleix and Chanda Sahib.

Thus, when the war between French and English formally terminated in 1748, Chanda Sahib represented the family of Sadutulla, which had during its power endeared itself to the population. He himself was deservedly a favourite with them: but he was a prisoner at Satara. Anwar-ud-din was an old and fairly capable soldier, but was disliked both personally and as a supplanter of the popular house. Chanda Sahib was bound by strong ties to the French. Dupleix conceived the idea of obtaining the release of Chanda Sahib and establishing him on the throne of the Carnatic: and as the first step, provided a ransom sufficient to satisfy the Marathas.

Rival claimants to the Nizamship.

King-making in the Carnatic was the scheme by which Dupleix intended to accomplish his purposes; but circumstances enlarged the scope of his operations. Just at this time the old Nizam Asaf Jah himself died; whereupon the succession was immediately seized by his son Nasir Jang, and claimed by a grandson Muzaffar Jang: who affirmed that the Mogul himself had made the appointment. It was natural that the two claimants, Muzaffar Jang, and Chanda Sahib, should make common cause against the *de facto* Nizam, and Nawab, while Dupleix could support them under colour of loyalty to the Imperial Power. Muzaffar Jang and Chanda Sahib marched into the Carnatic, accompanied by a contingent of French and Sepoys under the able French general Bussy. Anwar-ud-din was defeated and slain at Ambur (July 1749), while his son Mohammed Ali escaped to Trichinopoli: Bussy and his contingent having rendered invaluable service in the fight.

Blunders of the British.

Meantime the British had been wasting their energies in a futile and aimless attempt to restore the incompetent ex-Raja of the little Maratha principality of Tanjur, in the place of his brother the reigning Raja. The attempt failed, and the Company gained nothing but the cession of the fort of Devikōta. Nor could they rise to the occasion when

the successful move of Dupleix ought to have opened their eyes to the necessity for prompt and energetic action. They allowed the fleet and most of the land forces to depart for England; and, in response to Mohammed Ali's appeal for their assistance sent him a hundred and twenty men.

Dupleix saw that the course for his candidates for office to follow was the immediate and complete suppression of Mohammed Ali; which would then enable them to concentrate against Nasir Jang. But Chanda Sahib wasted time in a prolonged attack on Tanjur: so that before he could move on Trichinopoli, Nadir Jang had himself appeared in the Carnatic with a vast army, joined by a British contingent from Madras under Major Lawrence. As the result of an engagement, Muzaffar Jang fell into his uncle's hands and Chanda Sahib had to fall back on Pondichery.

Triumph of Dupleix's schemes.

The resourceful Frenchman however, at once opened negotiations with Nasir Jang, in the course of which he discovered that several of the chiefs were ill-affected towards him. With them he immediately began to intrigue; and while Nasir Jang lay idle at Arcot, made a dash at Masulipatam which was captured, attacked Mohammed Ali and put him to flight, and seized the strong fort of Jinji. Nasir Jang was now disposed to revert to Dupleix's terms, which involved the liberation of Muzaffar Jang and the recognition of Chanda Sahib as Nawab of the Carnatic: but an engagement was brought on by the French force marching from Jinji, which was unaware that the treaty had been actually ratified: Nasir Jang was assassinated on the field of battle: and Muzaffar Jang was again hailed as Nizam.

This took place in December 1749. The result was that Dupleix's candidates now appeared to be completely masters of the Dekhan and the Carnatic, and he himself received the official Nawabship from the Mogul. Nor was the position materially affected by the death of Muzaffar Jang in Jan. 1750 in a skirmish with rebels on his way back to Haidarabad: for Bussy, who was with him, secured the succession to his own nominee, Salābat Jang, whom he accompanied to the capital.

With his instinctive appreciation of the effects of display

on Oriental minds, Dupleix set up a pillar near the spot where Nadir Jang fell recording his own glories, and named the place Dupleix-Fătĕhabad—the city of the Victory of Dupleix.

The turn of the tide.

Mohammed Ali however, was again holding Trichinopoli, and Chanda Sahib marched against him early in 1751. But the tide of Dupleix's success had now reached its highest point.

A new Governor, Mr Saunders, had recently arrived at Madras, who was alive to the immense need of vigorous counteraction to the French. He dispatched reinforcements to the force at Trichinopoli; but, what was of more importance, he gave an independent command to Robert Clive.

Robert Clive.

The founder of our Indian Empire was now in his twenty-sixth year. He had arrived at Madras in the capacity of a "writer"—*i.e.* a junior clerk in the employ of the East India Company—at the age of nineteen. At the first outbreak of hostilities, he had volunteered; when Madras fell, he escaped to Fort St David, in the defence of which, as well as in the operations against Tanjur, he had shown conspicuous bravery and coolness; and was allowed to exchange his writership for a commission in the Company's service. Now his opportunity had come. He pointed out to Saunders that a direct relief of Trichinopoli would be vain, but that a diversion might be effected by a blow at Arcot, the Nawab's capital. Desperately audacious as the scheme was, Saunders resolved to take the risk. With eight officers, only two of whom had been in action before, two hundred British soldiers, and three hundred Sepoys, Clive started on his perilous expedition. So suddenly was the blow conceived, so swiftly executed, that on his arrival at Arcot the garrison was seized with panic and evacuated the fort without a blow.

Capture of Arcot.

The young commander made instant preparations to stand a siege. The fugitive garrison, far more numerous than his own little force, rallied and encamped close by. Clive again surprised them in a night attack, slew large numbers of them, and withdrew without loss.

His specific object was perfectly attained. Chanda Sahib at Trichinopoli immediately divided his forces, (thereby affording considerable relief to the beleaguered troops), in order to send four thousand of them to recover Arcot. These with other detachments collected by the way—including a small body of French from Pondichery—formed an investing army of ten thousand men: with Chanda Sahib's son Raja Sahib in command. For fifty days, Clive with his little force, already much reduced, held the feeble fortifications of Arcot. The fame of the bold defence spread: the native chiefs began to revise their estimates of British enterprise and valour, hitherto painfully low. The sepoys in the little garrison shewed their devotion by offering to live on the water used for boiling the rice in order that the grain might be reserved for the Europeans. Raja Sahib, fearing that relief might come, resolved to storm the place: but Clive was ready. The desperate valour and activity of the besieged completely foiled the besiegers after a hot contest. The siege was raised and Raja Sahib retired. Clive sallied forth and again defeated him at Arni, and yet again, having been at last joined by considerable reinforcements and by a band of Marathas, at Kaveripak: presently thereafter razing Dupleix-Fatehabad to the ground. Defence of Arcot.

The defence of Arcot (1751) was the turn of the tide. The prestige which had hitherto accompanied the French arms was now matched if not excelled by that of the British. A new and brilliant leader had suddenly come to the front, and Stringer Lawrence was just returned to the scene of action. The very able French commander, Bussy, was at Haidaradad; in the Carnatic, Law of Laureston (of an exiled Scottish house)—an admirable subordinate but an incapable chief—was with Chanda Sahib's forces.

Lawrence and Clive proceeded against the investing army before Trichinopoli, where Mohammed Ali had purchased by promises a very unsubstantial assistance from Morari Rao, the Maratha chief of Gūti, and from the Raja—or rather the regent—of Mysore. Trichinopoli was relieved: Law with his army and Chanda Sahib's were manœuvered into an impossible French surrender at Trichinopoli.

position, and compelled to surrender; and Chanda Sahib himself was murdered. If Bussy had secured the Nizam, Mohammed Ali, the British protégé, was at any rate Nawab of the Carnatic (June 1752).

Supersession of Dupleix.

Dupleix however, continued to display an astonishingly resourceful activity in carrying on the contest: nor was it finally the British, but they of his own household, that destroyed him. His imperial schemes awakened no responsive ardour in the breasts of directors at home; but for his enormous personal outlay in giving them effect, they would have broken down long before for want of financial support. The French East India Company resolved to supersede the too enterprising Governor, who returned home in 1754 to meet with nothing but insult and spoliation; leaving a safe commercial gentleman in charge at Pondichery. Both Clive and Lawrence returned to England. The two Companies agreed to interfere no more with native politics. Despite these amicable arrangements, the declaration of war between Britain and France in 1756 caused the renewal of active hostilities in India in 1758: and in the meantime various events had taken place which were not without influence on the course of the last struggle.

Bussy at Haidarabad.

Salabat Jang, the last Nizam placed on the throne by the turn of fortune's wheel, had retired to Haidarabad in the spring of 1751, and Bussy had gone with him. The succession was of course disputed by a brother, who bribed the Peshwa (now definitely supreme in the Maratha confederacy) and the Bhonsla to attack the Nizam; but Bussy's military skill, his troops, and his artillery, played havoc with the invaders, who were finally conciliated by a cession of territory. Shortly afterwards, a similar cession—that of the Northern Sarkars or Circars, a large and rich district—was made to Bussy himself for the maintenance of his forces. In 1755, the Nizam made an expedition to the south against Morari Rao and the Mysore Raja, in which Bussy again illustrated the invincible superiority of European methods in the field. Attempts were made to upset his influence, but they were foiled, and in 1757 he was still supreme at Haidarabad. But in 1757, Clive also was back in India; not in Madras, but

occupied with the conquest of Bengal, which placed new and immense resources in the hands of the British Company.

Renewal of hostilities.

It was generally understood in 1756 that war was soon to be expected in Europe, and the attitude the Companies would adopt towards each other in India was uncertain. Clive, returning to India after a visit to England where he had been very warmly received, intended himself and was intended by the Directors in London, to take active measures for counteracting Bussy at Haidarabad; but found himself precluded from so doing by the convention between the Governors in the Carnatic. Having first, with the aid of Admiral Watson, suppressed a piratical chief named Angria, at Geriah on the west coast, he was at the end of the year dispatched to Bengal on account of the proceedings of the Nawab of that province. During previous disturbances, Calcutta and Chandernagar had abstained from hostilities, but on the news arriving (1757) that war had been declared, Clive at once seized the French settlement. Bussy was not disposed to weaken his grip on Haidarabad in order to contest the position in Bengal: and hostilities in the south only reached an acute stage with the arrival of Lally.

The last phase.

The chances of the French in India depended on two things—persistence in the policy of Dupleix, and support from France on a scale equal to that given to the British by the home authorities. But Lally was ordered to leave the native courts alone, confining himself to direct contest with the British; while the inauguration of Pitt's aggressive naval policy very soon ensured full occupation in the West, for any ships that could make their way out of French ports; France was not willing, and lacked the power if she had been willing, to do more than let the forces actually in India win if they could. The opposed forces on the spot at the beginning of 1858 were not unequal; but the French were fighting in isolation, the British with almost unlimited reserves from England to bring up if required; and time after time the French operations were baffled by the appearance of an unopposed British squadron.

An Lally.

Lally arrived in India at the end of April 1758. An

Irishman, born in exile, the son of one of the valiant defenders of Limerick, he had served brilliantly in the armies of France. But his valour in the field was counterbalanced by a disposition so overbearing and tactless that his officers could hardly keep on terms with him. Many of them were in a habitual state of practical if not technical mutiny, and the Natives were enraged by his total disregard for the sentiments prejudices and principles which were a part of their being. The labour and the supplies readily provided for the diplomatic Dupleix were grudgingly and with every possible evasion and delay extracted by Lally.

Yet he began successfully enough with an attack on Fort St David; which should have been able to hold out indefinitely, but surrendered within a month. He could not however, get money from the civil authorities at Pondichery; so attempted to acquire the sinews of war by compelling the Raja of Tanjur to pay moneys due. The Raja resisted; Lally was on the verge of capturing the town and burning his last cartridge in doing so, when a British squadron appeared off Karikal, at the time Lally's military base. He had to leave Tanjur, and hurry back to Pondichery, while D'Aché, in command of the French squadron with which he had arrived, declined to do battle with the British and withdrew to the Mauritius.

Frustration of Lally's plans.

Lally now summoned Bussy and the troops from Haidarabad and the Sarkars to his assistance. Bussy obeyed the order, and his obedience destroyed the last chance of carrying out the Dupleix policy. Lally laid seige to Madras in December; but there was a sufficient garrison, with Lawrence in command. After two months siege, Lally was about to storm; when once more a British squadron appeared on the scenes, a panic seized Lally's troops, and he was obliged to retire precipitately to Pondichery, leaving many of his guns behind. (Feb. 1759).

In this year, Lally paid the penalty for withdrawing Bussy from Haidarabad, and the officers and troops from the Sarkars. To them he might have looked for the supplies and the money which were not forthcoming in the Carnatic. Bussy's influence with the Nizam amounted to very little

when the great soldier and his forces were at a distance and in a subordinate position: the Sarkars, instead of feeding the French, fell a prey to their opponents. The immense value of that district was apparent to Clive at Calcutta; and in spite of his seemingly precarious position there, he dispatched Colonel Forde, in the autumn of 1758, with every available soldier, on an expedition against Masulipatam; trusting to his own prestige, and his own unmatched audacity and resourcefulness, to maintain his position in Bengal. Forde conducted his operations with brilliant success, and though the Nizam at last moved in support of the French, Masulipatam was taken in April before he arrived. Consequently the Nizam, instead of attempting force, transferred his alliance to the British and made over formally to them the territories previously granted to Bussy. Capture of Masulipatam by Forde.

Meantime Lally, with troops ragged, half-starved, and more than half-mutinous, was quite unable to operate effectively in the Carnatic. Here towards the close of the year, the command of the British was taken up by Colonel Eyre Coote, a brilliant officer sent down from Bengal by Clive, who had recognised his abilities at Plassey. Coote recovered Wandewash, which had been occupied by the French. Lally's attempt to recapture it resulted in the battle of Wandewash (Jan. 21, 1760) which was practically decisive. Coote had under his command rather less, Lally rather more, than 2000 Europeans. There was also a much larger body of Sepoys and Marathas present, but these took practically no part in the engagement. The fight was well contested but the British victory was complete. Bussy himself was among the prisoners. One after the other, the French posts fell into the hands of their rivals. Pondichery itself was invested in October, and surrendered in January (1761); and although the trading stations were restored to the French as trading stations when the Peace of Paris was concluded in 1763, they were dismantled and made permanently useless for military purposes. Twenty years later, in the hour of Britain's worst peril, it seemed for a moment possible that a blow might be struck for France; twenty years after that again the shadow of Napoleon vexed the souls of Indian

Eyre Coote.

Wandewash.

statesmen; but the question whether France or Britain should dominate India ceased in actual fact to be a question from the hour of Lally's final failure.

Fate of Lally.

For Lally himself, with his valour, his arrogance, and his great talents, France reserved a fate appropriate to the successor of La Bourdonnais and Dupleix. Slandered by his own countrymen, he returned to Paris, to be flung into the Bastille, and later executed with extreme ignominy: a doom more shameful to France than even that of Admiral Byng to England, ten years before.

Map IV.



Methuen & Co.

CHAPTER VII

THE CONQUEST OF BENGAL

(*Map IV.*)

THE wars in which the British were engaged in Southern India for fifteen years, from 1746 to 1761, were directly or indirectly waged against a rival European Power. Neither British nor French had levied war directly upon any Native State; in form they had only lent their help to one or another of rival factions within a State, where the legitimate sovereignty was in dispute. The primary purpose was the suppression of a commercial rival: the secondary purpose, influence at Native Courts.

Different nature of the contest in Bengal.

In Bengal, however, the situation from the outset was quite different. The commercial rivalry of French and British settlements was but an accident in a greater conflict. The British as a grievously insulted Power attacked the Power which had insulted them, overthrew it in the field, and found themselves with no alternative — even had they desired one—to the substitution of their own effective dominion for that which they had demolished. We have noted already how substantially their conquest aided them in the last phase of the struggle in the Carnatic: yet in itself it was not part of that struggle, but was the first positive step in the direction not of influence but of dominion.

Position of the Nawab of Bengal.

Between the time of Nadir Shah's invasion and the collision between the Bengal Court and the British, the position of affairs in Hindostan had not materially altered except for an increased definiteness in the independence of the provinces. The Maratha chiefs who supported the Peshwa had marched up to the banks of the Jamna. The Berar Raja, otherwise known as the Bhonsla, had penetrated

Oudh and Bengal and threatened Calcutta. The assassination of Nadir Shah had enabled Ahmed Khan, chief of the Abdali tribe of Afghans, to become Ahmed Shah the king of Kabul, and, in virtue of incursions which led to another sacking of Delhi, more or less the acknowledged lord of the Panjab and Sirhind. Safdat Ali, Wazir and Nawab of Oudh, had dropped the functions of Wazir and confined his energies to securing the practical independence of his province. Ali Vardi Khan had made himself Nawab of Bengal and Behar, and come to terms with his dangerous neighbour of Berar. No one in Hindostan attached political significance to the British and French factories at Calcutta and Chandernagar; even the startling developments of 1747-1751, amounting in the Dekhan to a revelation and a revolution, had hardly been recognised in their full importance when Ali Vardi Khan died in 1756, and was succeeded by his youthful grandson, the incapable and unspeakable Suraj-ud-daulah.

The British at Calcutta.

Fort William, the British settlement in Calcutta, was in singularly incompetent hands. In spite of repeated and pressing advices from the Directors in London, the Governor, Drake, had completely neglected the defences of the fort, and even in immediate anticipation of a Franco-British War made only the most elementary provision for contingencies; doubtless reckoning that Fort William and Chandernagar would keep the peace between themselves as they had done before.

Suraj-ud-daulah.

Suraj-ud-daulah had a singularly keen scent for treasure. The breath was hardly out of his grandfather's body when he sent from Mūrshidabad to Calcutta to demand the person and the property of a wealthy Hindu recently arrived there; following this up by an order to demolish the fortifications. By way of reply to a remonstrance, the Nawab commanded his army to march on Calcutta. Drake and the military commandant stole out in boats to the British ships on the Hugli; the ships dropped down the river and left the factory to its fate; after a brief but hopeless resistance, Fort William was captured on July 21, 1756. Then ensued the ghastly tragedy of the Black Hole. The prisoners—a hundred and forty-six of them—were thrust into a room where they had about two square feet apiece for standing-room, and nothing

The Black Hole.

but a small grating to let in air. It was in Calcutta and it was midsummer. When the survivors were allowed to stagger out in the morning there were one hundred and twenty-three corpses in the chamber.

Early in August the hideous story reached Madras. Two months later Clive and Admiral Watson, fresh from destroying the pirate Angria, sailed for Bengal to exact restitution and reparation from the Nawab: on December 15 they came with their ten ships to Fulta on the Hugli, where Drake was lying. The fort of Baj-Baj was promptly captured; on Jan. 2 the avengers were in Fort William. A week later the fort of Hugli was taken. The Nawab's troops scattered before them. Within a month the Nawab had collected his forces, marched on Calcutta, suffered considerably from an assault conducted by Clive (which was deprived of its full effect and almost converted into a disaster by the rising of a fog), fled back to Murshidabad, and concluded a treaty of restitution and compensation. The punitory expedition.

Now Suraj-ud-daulah had been possessed with a conviction that the Europeans were to be utterly despised; in the course of these two months that opinion had been rudely shattered; consequently, while he publicly cringed to Clive, privately he began to entreat for assistance from the French at Chandernagar and in the Sarkars. A combined movement against the British in Bengal might have very serious results; and the official news that war had broken out between France and Britain decided Clive and Watson to strike at Chandernagar forthwith. In spite of the remonstrances of the Nawab, they proceeded against the French settlement, capturing it after a gallant resistance, and securing some five hundred prisoners (March 23). If Bussy in the Sarkars had been doubtful before whether to listen to Suraj-ud-daulah, this success settled the question. There could be no co-operation from Chandernagar, and his troops would be of more use in the Dekhan. Intrigues of Suraj-ud-daulah.

To decide on the course next to be followed was no easy matter. There were urgent reasons for withdrawing from Bengal and concentrating troops in the Dekhan for the coming struggle. But to do so would involve leaving the The British dilemma.

British settlement again in the hands of the incapable Drake, and at the mercy of the Nawab, whose promises depended for their value entirely on the presence of fear, while he was very indignant at the disregard of his authority shewn in the attack on Chandernagar. How was he to be muzzled, so as to make the desired withdrawal of troops possible?

The practical answer was given by the Nawab's own ministers. A monarch so bloodthirsty, so capricious, and so greedy, made every man's life uncertain. His commander-in-chief Mir Jafar, and his chief financial advisers, conceived the idea of deposing him and placing Mir Jafar on the throne with British assistance. Communications were opened between the conspirators and the British through the agency of the Hindu Amin Chand, popularly known as Omichund. It is commonly believed that European diplomacy consists largely of skilful lying; Oriental diplomacy may be said to discard truth altogether. The general principle which has guided the British in dealing with Orientals is that of being absolutely straightforward, standing fast by every pledge, and securing confidence by force of frankness. The only alternative course is to accept not the European but the Oriental standard, and act down to it. On this one occasion Clive adopted the latter course. It is not impossible to find excuse for the theory of meeting guile with guile and treachery with falsehood; but morally it cannot be justified, and its expediency is more than doubtful in the long run. Sometimes, however, it is a policy which succeeds.

Conspiracy against Suraj-ud-daulah.

It succeeded now. In the early stages of the intrigue, it was only so far called into play that the British maintained in their correspondence with the Nawab an air of unsuspecting friendliness, while they were as a matter of fact arranging with his courtiers for his overthrow. The huge act of deception was perpetrated in dealing with Omichund. When the crafty Hindu had all the threads of the plot in his hands—when it was in his power to shatter the whole scheme by a word to Suraj-ud-daulah—he suddenly put forward the most extravagant demands as the price of silence, requiring their embodiment in the treaty to be drawn up

The Red and Black Treaties.

between the British and Mir Jafar. To refuse meant ruin: to submit to so vast a levy of blackmail—considerably over a quarter of a million sterling—seemed preposterous. The Calcutta Council accepted Clive's method of solution. Two copies of the treaty were made, one of which, written on red paper, contained Omichund's clauses: the other copy omitted them. The red treaty only, signed by the members of Council, was shown to the Bengali who did not know that one signature, that of Admiral Watson, had been deliberately forged on his refusal to set his hand to the fraud. The other parties to the contract signed the White Treaty (May 19), the Mussulmans swearing on the Koran to be faithful. Omichund was satified.

The gage of battle.

Then Clive's tone to the Nawab changed. He wrote, setting forth the British complaints, and announced that he was coming with his men to Murshidabad to take the opinion of the Nawab's council or Durbar thereon. After which virtual declaration of war, the Nawab with his army moved downwards and Clive with his army upwards towards Plassey.

Clive's letter was despatched on June 13, and he commenced his march the same day with his whole force—1,100 Europeans, double that number of sepoys, and ten guns. On the 18th, Katwa, with a fort and granary, was reached and seized. Then came a pause. There were rumours of Mir Jafar's defection. The monsoon set in stormily. Advance meant triumph or annihilation. Retreat meant collapse. There remained the alternative of entrenching at Katwa, and negotiating with the Marathas—with a risk of Bussy intervening. Clive hesitated for long. On the 21st he called a Council of War, and announced that his own vote was against advancing. Eleven of the council supported him: seven, headed by Eyre Coote, voted against him. Clive retired, and spent an hour by himself debating in solitude. The promptings of audacity gained the day. He returned to camp, and simply announced that the advance would be renewed next morning.

Clive's only Council of War.

A stream lay on the British front which was crossed at an early hour. Messages, reassuring but not convincing, came from Mir Jafar. The army went forward, reaching Plassey

Arrival at Plassey.

after midnight; when the presence in the immediate neighbourhood of the enemy, supposed to be some miles off, was discovered. The British, who had had a drenching and fatiguing march, bivouacked as best they might in a grove. With the early dawn Clive drew up his men; Europeans in the centre, sepoys on the wings. Facing these were fifty thousand men; of these fifty thousand, how many were going to fight, how many to desert, how many to stand by and wait on events, no one knew.

There were fifty French with the Nawab; at 8 o'clock on the morning of June 23, 1757, their cannon began the fight on which the destinies of Bengal depended. A cannonading duel was kept up for three hours, and still Mir Jafar made no sign. Clive prepared to maintain a defence throughout the day, and trust to darkness and relaxation of discipline in the enemy's camp to enable him to make a successful night attack. But early in the afternoon, some movement was evidently on foot in the Nawab's army. Then the French were seen to withdraw from their position; it was promptly seized by a British officer, a move which made a general engagement inevitable: Clive turned a heavy fire on the enemy's guns, throwing them completely out of action: then his whole line advanced. The rout of the Nawab was immediate and complete; so prompt was the flight, that only five or six hundred of his army fell, the victors losing but seventy men. The Nawab escaped at speed to Murshidabad: not feeling safe there, he attempted further flight in disguise, but was recognised, brought back to his capital secretly, and then flung into prison and murdered by the son of Mir Jafar. A body of French troops had been on their way from Patna to join the Nawab, but in the light of recent developments they turned and were chased over the frontier by Eyre Coote. To the general astonishment, the revolution was not succeeded by a massacre; and Mir Jafar must have been immensely relieved to find that Clive was carrying out the bargain as if he had fulfilled his own part to perfection. On June 27th he was proclaimed Nawab in Murshidabad, and the British were virtually lords of Bengal. The hapless Omichund was calmly thrown over. The shock, when he

Victory of Plassey.

Mir Jafar proclaimed Nawab.

found that he had been tricked and was to receive nothing, turned his brain.

Supremacy of Clive.

Although Mir Jafar was Nawab, all power was in the hands of Clive. In the eyes of every native he was incomparable, invincible; his personal prestige was without parallel. With a word he might have doubled or trebled the immense sum allotted to him from the royal treasury; others of the English received vast gifts; the compensation awarded to the Company was ample.

His government of Bengal.

For the next two years and a half Clive found his hands full. Mir Jafar expected to reap the benefits of royalty in the ordinary Oriental fashion, but the natives found in Clive a protector not to be trifled with. He restrained the Nawab; he quelled revolts almost with a word. He never played any man false except Omichund, and that single lapse from rectitude appeared to the native mind so entirely normal that it in no way injured his repute. About the end of the year, an invasion was threatened by the Nawab of Oudh; but the danger was quelled by the mere approach of Clive. The task of at once controlling and conciliating the natives was singularly difficult; happily the British officers at Calcutta were so far from being jealous of him that when a singularly clumsy scheme of government omitting him entirely was propounded from London, they practically combined to subordinate themselves to their great chief; the Directors shortly afterwards making the *amende* for their blunder and appointing him Governor with many compliments.

Invasion by the Shahzada repelled.

In 1758, Clive despatched to the Sarkars the expedition under Forde, whose successful course has already been narrated. The risk he ran thereby was illustrated early in the following year by the reported advance of the Nawab of Oudh in conjunction with the Shahzada, the heir of the Mogul (afterwards Shah Alam), upon Patna. Mir Jafar wanted to buy them off. Clive would have none of it. The Shahzada promised the Englishmen unlimited territory for his support: Clive declined. With four hundred Europeans, two thousand five hundred sepoys, and some troops of the Nawab's, he marched four hundred miles in twenty-three days to the relief of Patna which was holding out stoutly.

The Shahzada's army scattered, and he himself fled. Clive accepted as a reward what is known as his jaghir, the quit-rents of the districts granted to the Company on Mir Jafar's accession.

Collision with the Dutch.

This took place about the time when Forde was capturing Masulipatam. Later in the year there was to be still another episode of conflict with a European power—the Dutch this time. The story illustrates the idea hitherto prevalent that the Commercial Companies were quite entitled to wage war with each other irrespective of the amicable relations of their respective governments. The Dutch at Chinsura were not profiting by the British ascendancy. Mir Jafar, who was very ill pleased at his practical subordination, entered on an intrigue with them: in consequence of which, a fleet of seven Dutch ships from Batavia appeared in the Hugli in October. They required a free passage up the river to Chinsura: Clive, suspecting their purpose and the good faith of Mir Jafar, was still uncertain how to treat the ships of a professedly friendly nation, when they gave him his cue by seizing some English vessels. Forde, back from the Sarkars, attacked the Chinsura garrison; on the river, Captain Wilson with three ships attacked the seven Dutchmen. Both actions were brilliantly successful. The Dutch had to sue for Clive's protection against the Nawab's son who was possessed with a natural desire to trample on the unsuccessful, whom he had previously intended to help: and the Dutch opposition was terminated by a treaty under which they acknowledged their aggression, made due compensation, and agreed to maintain no more than one hundred and twenty five soldiers in Bengal.

Departure of Clive.

This for the time concluded Clive's sojourn in India. In February (1760) he sailed for England, though he was still to return once more for a salutary if brief visit.

CHAPTER VIII

TRANSITION

(*Maps I. and II.*)

WHEN Clive left Bengal, and the struggle between French and English on Indian soil was virtually over, the Company had not yet acquired Sovereign rights. The rulers of Bengal and of the Carnatic were both in effect the servants of the Company's Servants; the British had suddenly taken undeniable rank as a military Power; but technically their lands were held by them as *semindars*, *i.e.* landholders paying rent to the crown; and their dominion was the ascendancy of advisers who can compel obedience. Both Bengal and the Carnatic remained in form Native States. The exercise of the avowed dominion begins with the Governor-Generalship of Warren Hastings; the interval is a transition period, to a large extent chaotic, but with the elements of order emerging. A period of transition.

In the two preceding chapters, we have followed the first steps by which the British Power was established in India between 1745 and 1761. Before proceeding to its further stages, we have to observe the developments which took place among the Native Powers during the same period; culminating, in 1761, in the crushing blow dealt to the Marathas by Ahmed Shah Durani, at Panipat in Hindostan, and the seizure of the throne of Mysore by Haidar Ali, creating a new and aggressive military Power in the South.

Nadir Shah, the Persian, after his sack of Delhi, developed the worst characteristics of Oriental Tyranny. A few years later, he was assassinated; and in the resulting confusion Ahmed Khan, chief of the Abdāli tribe of Afghans Ahmed Shah Durani.

made himself master of Kabul, and re-established an independent monarchy there. For some superstitious reason, he re-named his tribe *Durāni* instead of Abdali; in consequence of which he became known indifferently as Ahmed Shah Abdali or Durani. He led a series of invasions into the Panjab and Sirhind between 1749 and 1759 with by no means uniform success, but with the result that the Panjab became practically a province of the Kabul Monarchy, instead of the Mogul Empire.

Progress of the Marathas.

In the meantime the Maratha dominion was increasing. The Berar Raja had obtained the cession of Orissa, and levied chauth from Bengal and Behar. The Peshwa, Balaji Rao, secured recognition as the head of the whole confederacy, with Ṣivaji's descendant at Satara for a figure head. His armies pushed up to the banks of the Jamna; his brother Ragonath Rao, commonly known as Ragoba, marched into the Panjab, and for a time expelled the Durani Governor. In the South, while Bussy remained with the Nizam, neither the Peshwa nor the Bhonsla could operate effectively against that monarch; but the withdrawal of the Frenchman at Lally's call increased Maratha activities, and produced the cession to them of further territories; though when they invaded the Mysore district, they found their match in Haidar Naik—afterwards known as Haidar Ali—the Mussulman adventurer who had become chief of the Mysore army. Nevertheless, the Marathas' domain was now so vast, the dread they inspired so great, that they had begun to count upon establishing a Hindu Empire on the ruins of the Mogul dominion. Fortunately, their challenge was taken up by the Durani: the Mohammedan and Hindu Powers met in the tremendous shock of Panipat. The Marathas were shattered: the campaign cost them 200,000 men: and though they remained collectively the greatest Power in the Peninsula, the danger of their overwhelming predominance was indefinitely postponed, and rivalry among the great chiefs for supremacy within the confederacy was renewed. The Peshwa, Balaji Rao, died shortly, and was succeeded by his energetic and capable son, Madhu Rao; whose supremacy however, was less assured than his father's had been.

Battle of Panipat.

On the other hand, the victorious Durani made no attempt to organise a State in the North-West, but retired across the mountains, carrying away loot, and leaving behind Governors to exact tribute. It may here be remarked that a colony of tribesmen from the Afghan borders had a few years before established themselves under the name of Rohillas in the district west of Oudh known as Rohilkhand as masters of the Hindu population. The services rendered by them to Ahmed Shah at Panipat confirmed their position in Rohilkhand, while establishing a hostile tradition between them and the Marathas. The Mogul himself—now that same Shah Alam whom Clive had dealt with as Shahzada—while his authority continued to be recognised as Padishah and titular head of the whole Empire, was practically without territories of his own, or means of enforcing his decrees. Results of Panipat.

About the same time Haidar Naik compelled the Raja of Mysore—a Hindu State which had never hitherto played more than a very minor part—to abdicate in his favour; and assumed under the name of Haidar Ali a Sultanate which his genius rapidly transformed into a great military Power. Rise of Haidar Ali.

In 1765 Clive, returning to Bengal, obtained from the Mogul, then residing at Allahabad, two decrees: one of them constituting the Nawab of the Carnatic independent of the Nizam, to whom he had hitherto been technically subordinate; the other bestowing on the English as from the Imperial authority the Sarkars which had been held since 1759 as from the Nizam.

Thus in the south there existed four military Powers; the British of the Madras Presidency with the Carnatic virtually under their control: the Puna branch of the Maratha confederacy: the Nizam: and Haidar Ali. The conduct of affairs by the Madras authorities was consistently incompetent. The Nizam, the Peshwa, and Haidar were in a perpetual condition of forming and dissolving various combinations against each other; the British making treaties with one or the other, of which the intention was to avoid military operations and the practical outcome was to drag them into war in support of one or other ally. Nor had The Madras Government.

they the firmness to make an independent stand, but habitually found themselves making concessions which were repaid by desertion as soon as the tug of war commenced; even agreeing to pay the Nizam a heavy rent for the Sarkars in spite of the Mogul's decree. Although the military skill of the British commander, Colonel Smith, enabled him to win victories in the field, he was so hampered by the civil authorities that those victories could never be turned to account; and in 1769 mismanagement had reached such a point that Haidar dictated the terms of an accommodation under the walls of Madras, at a time when Smith, if he had been allowed to act, was in a position to inflict certain defeat upon him.

By this treaty the British bound themselves to assist Haidar in case he should be attacked by the Marathas or the Nizam; but when in the following year the Marathas did attack him, they refused assistance on the ground that the provocation had been Haidar's. The Mysore Sultan had much the worse of the encounter, and he never forgave the British for what he regarded as a treacherous desertion.

Renewed advance of the Marathas.

The Marathas, who had somewhat recovered from the blow at Panipat, again began to assert their dominion in upper Hindostan about 1769, and two years later restored Shah Alam to the throne at Delhi. They then proceeded to attack Rohilkhand, retiring presently on the promise of a payment by the Rohillas of forty lacs of rupees (£400,000), guaranteed by the Nawab of Oudh, who felt himself very seriously menaced by the proximity of the Marathas. Out of this transaction a little later arose the Rohilla war of which we shall hear in the time of Warren Hastings.

Outside of Bengal then the positive changes during this transition period are the development of a new military power in Mysore, the extension of Maratha ascendancy, and the decline of the Nizam; negatively, the check to the Marathas inflicted by Ahmed Shah, and the diplomatic failures of the Madras Government, who lost with the native princes much of the prestige which had been gained by the overthrow of the French.

We can now follow the course of events in Bengal, and

the influences connected therewith in London, which led up to the first experiment in British Government carried out under Lord North's Regulating Acts.

Clive's departure for England in February 1760 was the signal for the commencement of a period of grave misrule in Bengal.

In spite of his absence, the military prestige of the British was well maintained during the first months by Colonels Calliaud and Knox; Shah Alam having again invaded the country and laid siege to Patna, and being thoroughly routed by them.

British misgovernment in Bengal.

The position at Calcutta was one offering immense temptations to the Council in charge. Clive was gone: three or four more of the most capable officers were withdrawn on account of differences with the Directors; Vansittart, the Governor, though well meaning, had neither the nerve nor the weight for anything in the nature of a crisis. Uncontrolled, the Company's servants scandalously abused their position. They were preposterously underpaid: private trading had always been looked to, to supplement their incomes, and they neglected the Company's interests for their own. The Company had trade privileges and exemptions from duties: the Company's servants claimed those privileges and exemptions for themselves, and their native agents. The agents behaved as if the Company's troops were at their beck and call, exercising every form of oppression in the certainty of immunity from punishment. The extortion of presents from wealthy natives was carried to an outrageous extent. The Council, so far from interfering, were the worst offenders; Vansittart found only one man, Warren Hastings, who was disposed to support him in resisting the majority. Mir Jafar, his treasury depleted by the loss of revenue as well as by the extravagant expenditure, was unable to pay the Council's claims, and was compelled to abdicate in favour of his son-in-law Mir Cassim.

Revolt of Mir Cassim

Mir Cassim, once in power, resolved to free himself from the intolerable yoke laid on him by the British: but he worked warily. He privately drilled an army on the sepoy model. Finding that he could not enforce the trading duties

against the British he removed them altogether, so that the British were no longer at an advantage. By the abolition of wasteful sources of expenditure, he found sufficient means to discharge his actual obligations. By 1763 he had immensely improved his position, and was then allowed by Vansittart, despite the protests of Colonels Coote and Carnac, to fall upon the native Governor of Patna and others, and fill his own coffers at the expense of theirs. Matters came to a head when Ellis, in charge of the factory at Patna, seized the town, and was in turn seized and imprisoned with his companions. The Council declared war on Mir Cassim, proclaimed Mir Jafar once more Nawab, and advanced against the reigning ruler, who was defeated after a hard battle. Mir Cassim in consequence massacred his prisoners at Patna, and when that place was captured escaped over the border to Shuja Daulah, the Nawab of Oudh.

Munro's victory at Buxar.

Some months later Shuja Daulah resolved to invade Bengal. A mutiny among the sepoys was sternly crushed by Major Munro, who had the ringleaders blown from guns: and later in the year marched against Shuja Daulah on whom he inflicted a complete and crushing defeat at Buxar, or Baksar (Oct. 1764), which he followed up by marching on Allahabad; thereby impressing on the Nawab the folly of making war against the British, and bringing Oudh into the sphere of British ascendancy.

In January Mir Jafar died, and his son was proclaimed Nawab: then, happily for the good name of the British,

Return of Clive to India.

Clive himself reappeared in May as Governor, with absolute freedom of action, only nominally fettered by a Council of four members chosen by himself.

The Augean stable.

It was evident that the servants of the Company must either have adequate provision made for them by the Company, or must be expected, whether with or without permission, to make provision for themselves from other sources. A strong Governor might keep them within bounds; but there would be no permanent improvement until the temptations to misconduct were removed. Clive acted with his accustomed energy. Orders were issued forbidding the Company's servants to receive presents or to carry on private trade.

The native agents were forbidden to trade under colour of the Company's authority. By way of compensation, the profits of the trade in salt of which the Company had the monopoly were to be added to the salaries of the officers. Every civilian in Bengal was furious; but it was no use to be furious with Clive.

Suppression of the military opposition.

The military body in turn had its collision with the Governor: with the usual result. Extra pay, known as "double batta," had been awarded to the officers as a temporary grant after Plassey; they had grown to regard it as a right. In January (1766) double batta ceased by Clive's order. The officers agreed among themselves to resign in a body on June 1st, demanding the restitution of double batta. They were astonished to find that Clive was quite prepared to accept all their resignations, re-officer his army, and inflict condign punishment not only on them but also on any of the Company's civilian servants who countenanced them. Ringleaders were placed under arrest and shipped off to England. Of the rest, those who were prompt to own their folly, were for the most part reinstated. Clive had dealt with the crisis in such a manner as to win a victory not less complete, and not less honourable, than that of Plassey.

It is to be observed that Clive had arrived intending to abolish the salt monopoly altogether; he retained it, that the profits might be used in the manner explained. This arrangement was cancelled by the directors; who made an increase in the salaries, but not a sufficient one. As a consequence neither private trading nor the receipt of presents disappeared, but continued to be abuses for several years, though not on the same scale as before.

The army in Bengal was also re-organised on the basis of an establishment of 3000 Europeans, with Sepoys in due proportion formed in three brigades.

Clive and the Diwani.

Clive's first reform was in the direction of controlling the Company's servants. The second was the reconstruction of relations between the Company and the Bengal Government. Hitherto, the Council had imposed their will upon the Native Government, but had entirely refused responsibility.

Clive now accepted from the Padishah the *Diwani, i.e.* the control of the revenues of the Province. The Company themselves were to be responsible for collecting and administering the revenues, subject to specific payments to the Padishah and the Nawab, the army being removed from the control of the latter. They thus became not only virtual but responsible rulers of the country, at the same time acquiring a source of ample and legitimate revenue.

Clive's attitude to the Mogul.

In the next place, Clive had to lay down the lines of foreign policy. The first article therein was the recognition of the Padishah's formal authority: the power of appealing to the Imperial decrees, and so providing the Company with a legitimate backing. On this ground, the proceedings of August 12, 1765, are of special importance. On that day Clive met Shah Alam, and received from him not only the Diwani of Bengal, but also the cession of the Sarkars, besides obtaining the separation of the Carnatic from the Nizam's dominions. The titles of the Viceroys being held also from the Mogul, repudiation of the title conceded by him to the Company would be formally an act of rebellion on their part.

Clive and the Country Powers.

Next, Clive recognised in the Marathas the most formidable Power in India; while he was of opinion that the territories now in the hands of the British were as much as they could properly manage. Further conquests were not to be thought of. Consequently the Berar Raja, whose territories lay between Bengal and the southern British districts, was to be conciliated; the payment of chauth was to be conceded in return for zemindari rights in Orissa. The Peshwa was to be balanced in the Dekhan by support of the Nizam, and Maratha aggression on the N.W. was to be held in check by the establishment of Oudh as a buffer State. By all Oriental precedent, the British after the battle of Buxar had not only the power, but also the right, to take possession of that province. Instead, Clive reinstated the Nawab, only the districts of Allahabad and Kora being ceded and then transferred by him to Shah Alam.

Clive's achievement.

Clive had returned to Bengal in May 1765; he left it finally in January 1767. In those two years he had not

provided the country with a permanent Constitution; yet it would be hard to overrate the value of his services during that time. He terminated the anarchy and oppression which he found, and would have done so still more effectively if his measures had not been in part overridden by the directors. He put the Company's servants in a position to learn how the country ought to be governed; he curtailed expenditure; he laid down the rules for the definite foreign policy which he initiated, the soundness of which is beyond question; and he did it all in the teeth of the most rancorous opposition and insubordination, absolutely for the public good, with no sort of advantage to himself, and at the cost of raising up a host of bitter enemies whose malignity pursued him to the end of his life. Not his own countrymen only, but the natives of India, and most among them those of Bengal, owe an incalculable debt to Clive, the "daring in war," daring in peace, "fearfully courageous."

English party politics.

The first time Clive returned to England with the laurels won at Arcot, Pitt had not yet won the lead in English politics, though the country was already looking to him as its greatest statesman. During Clive's second sojourn in India, Pitt and Newcastle had made terms with each other, and Pitt had already in 1760 raised Britain from the depths of humiliation to the heights of triumph. Quiberon had been won and Quebec had fallen, before Clive set sail from Calcutta. But he had hardly reached England when the old king died, George III. ascended the throne, and his favourite Bute became a political power. In 1761 Pitt resigned and Bute ruled supreme. Bute made the Peace of Paris, and then the Bedford ministry followed, with George Grenville, Wilkes prosecutions, and the American Stamp Act. While Clive was setting Bengal in order, the Rockingham ministry came in, did what it could to palliate the harm done by its predecessor, and went out again. Clive was still in Bengal when Pitt again consented to take office, was made Earl of Chatham, and then became totally incapacitated by ill-health. When Clive re-appeared in England in 1767, Chatham was still nominal head of a

ministry which was carrying out none of his plans, habitually ran counter to his principles, and was doing everything in its power to undo all that the great administration of 1757-1761 had accomplished. Before 1770 when Lord North began his long and disastrous rule, Great Britain was already being ignored by Europe and defied by her American Colonies.

Attitude of Parliament towards Indian affairs.

It is hardly too much to say that during the whole of this period there were in England only two statesmen with enough imagination to realise either the possibilities or the responsibilities of our newly born Empire in India. Those two were Pitt and Edmund Burke: and to neither of them was it given to control the policy of Britain. Had either been able to do so, the course of events would undoubtedly have been very different. Clive at one time certainly contemplated the transfer of authority from the Company to the Crown—an idea carried out a hundred years later: but at that time he was reckoning on Pitt being the man to carry the scheme through. Pitt himself was in favour of it, and might have done it, but for his break-down. Without Pitt, no one knew better than Clive that it was not possible. To other politicians, India represented in the main two ideas —a country where private fortunes could be made with unequalled rapidity; and a country out of which the Company could suck revenue like a sponge—and sponges may be squeezed. The Company should be taxed to the utmost for its privileges: and the clients of the Great—to whom clients were useful—might at the worst have prosperous occupations found for their sons. In addition to which, the Great themselves, as well as their clients, could arrive at satisfactory understandings with the "Nabobs" —as the gentlemen were called who about this time began returning from the East with defective livers, and swollen money bags.

Directors and Proprietors.

The ultimate control of the Indian Presidencies, the appointment of the officers, and the dictation of policy, lay with the Company's Courts of Directors and Proprietors in London. The Government at Westminster collectively could bring pressure to bear on the Company collectively

by withholding or granting military assistance, by threats of challenging the Company's right to hold territorial acquisitions, by implying that Charters require periodical renewal and may demand modification even between renewals. Individually, politicians might acquire influence by accumulating shares and extending their representation as Proprietors and on the Directorate. It is obvious that such a state of affairs gave almost unlimited play to personal preferences, jealousies and animosities, besides intensifying the normal desire of any Commercial body as such to show the biggest possible revenue from year to year.

Parliament intervenes.

Thus, when a crisis arose in Bengal so serious that Clive's return as virtual dictator was clearly the only chance of averting a huge disaster, Clive's party carried the day triumphantly in Leadenhall Street: but when such a crisis was not on hand, Clive's enemies cancelled a great deal of what he had accomplished—very much as parliamentary factions treated Chatham. At last, however, the chaotic results of the existing method of carrying on the government of the Provinces, made a change absolutely imperative; and the first experiment in Imperial constitution-making was embodied in North's "Regulating Act" of 1773.

North's Regulating Act.

By this Act the authority of the Courts of Proprietors and Directors was retained; but the Government of India was effectively vested in two bodies—a Council, appointed in the first instance by Government, and a Commission of Judges. The Council consisted of five members: the Governor of Bengal became Governor General and President of the Council, the Governor and Council of Bombay and of Madras being subordinated; but the supreme authority was not the Governor General himself, but the majority of the Council for the time being, the majority vote being conclusive. Where the vote was even the Governor General had a casting vote; otherwise, against an adverse majority he was powerless. Warren Hastings, already Governor of Bengal, was made the first Governor General; with one experienced Indian official, Barwell, on the Council. The other three were Philip Francis—almost universally identified with Junius of the Letters—Monson and General Clavering, who were

apparently selected on the ground that they had already prejudged and condemned the opinions and actions of their President for the future as well as for the past.

1774-1784. The new *régime* began with the arrival of the Members of Council at Calcutta in 1774. It was terminated by the India Act of 1784. Outside of India these years were among the most disastrous of the British annals. The war with the American Colonies broke out in 1775. At the end of 1777 it turned definitely against the Mother Country, with the surrender of Burgoyne at Saratoga. Early in 1778 France took up arms in support of the Colonies. In 1779 she was joined by Spain. By land the British were outgeneralled; by sea they were out-numbered. For three years Gibraltar was besieged; it was not till the naval power of the allies was broken by Rodney's victory of the Saints that the country could begin to breathe freely; and before that Britain and the thirteen American colonies had already been irrevocably parted.

CHAPTER IX

WARREN HASTINGS AND THE COUNTRY POWERS

(*Maps I., III., IV., VIII.*)

LORD NORTH'S Regulating Act did not take effect until 1774. Between 1770 and that date events of some consequence had occurred in India. First in time was the great famine in Bengal of 1770, which emphasised the necessity for a strong administration of the Diwani; since it appeared that the English, instead of devoting their efforts to the alleviation of the catastrophe, preferred to use it as a means to their private enrichment by buying up grain and then selling it at a merciless profit. The famine of 1770.

About the same time Shah Alam put himself in the hands of the Marathas by accepting their offer to replace him on the throne of Delhi, contrary to the advice of the Calcutta Council. The Marathas under Sindhia and Holkar took advantage of the position to make themselves masters of the Jamna districts, enter Rohilkhand and threaten Oudh, retiring on the promise of a heavy cash payment. Shah Alam had proposed to reward them by the cession of Allahabad, granted to him by Clive in 1765; but, as this was by no means in accord with the objects for which the grant had been made the British reoccupied the district. Further advance of the Marathas.

In 1772 died the Peshwa Madhu Rao, who had given promise of a great career. His younger brother and successor in the office was assassinated nine months later; according to general belief, by the order of his uncle Ragonath Rao, otherwise called Ragoba. Ragoba became Peshwa: but his predecessor's widow bore a son who was immediately proclaimed Peshwa, and a Council of Regency The Peshwa succession.

was formed at Puna of which the leading spirit was the Nana Farnavis.

Warren Hastings Governor of Bengal.

In 1772, also, the Governorship of Bengal was bestowed upon Warren Hastings, whose abilities had attracted Clive's attention in 1757. He had then been made Resident at Mir Jafar's court; had been honourably distinguished among the Calcutta Council in the evil years for his rectitude and his support of Vansittart; and had subsequently, after an interval in England, held an appointment at Madras.

Shuja Daulah and the Rohillas.

For some time past, Shuja Daulah, the Oudh Nawab, had been hankering after Rohilkhand which lay on his North West frontier. The Marathas had just retired from an incursion thither, and he feared or pretended to fear that the Rohillas would join hands with that aggressive Power and seriously endanger his position. The normal population of the country consisted of quite unwarlike Hindus; the Rohillas, few in number but fine soldiers, had not been in possession for so much as forty years. According to Oriental international ethics, he was quite entitled to turn them out by force of arms if he could: but he wanted the help of the British. A bargain was in process of completion, by which the Allahabad district was to be transferred to the Nawab by the British, and garrisoned by the latter at the cost of the former. Thus a convenient opportunity presented itself for appealing to the British for assistance. To obtain that, he was aware that some plausible excuse beyond mere aggression was needed; and he accordingly supported his application to Calcutta with a moral argument and a material one. The moral one had just enough relation to the truth to pass muster—he averred that the Rohillas had been delivered from the Marathas by the presence of his own army, and the British troops in Oudh, backed by the payment by him of forty lacs of rupees (about £400,000) which they had undertaken to repay; that they had repaid nothing and were intriguing with the Marathas. The material argument was, that the Company would be remunerated in hard cash.

The evidence is obscure; but the fact appears to be that the Nawab had guaranteed the forty lacs, had not paid it

to the Marathas, but had received a first instalment from the Rohillas who were not unwilling to compound. Hastings however was easily satisfied. The security of Bengal depended a good deal on the security of Oudh, which would be very much increased if Rohilkhand and the line of the Ganges were held by the Nawab instead of by a fighting community which might turn its arms against him and help the Marathas to an entry. If the Nawab had a tolerable excuse, the British would have reasonable ground for helping him. The excuse put forward was tolerable. Then the material reasons came in. The Directors in England were bombarding Calcutta with demands for retrenchment and money. Here was an opportunity. The army, which could not be disbanded, would find employment at Shuja Daulah's expense, and there would also of course be a substantial cash payment.

Hastings grants assistance to the Nawab.

The bargain was concluded. Forty lacs were paid to the Company, who were to receive a subsidy for maintaining troops in the Allahabad district. They were to send a contingent to help the Nawab in coercing the Rohillas. The precaution, the need of which has since been fully recognised, of securing control to the British commander, was omitted; and the coercion was carried out with gross and superfluous violence. The Rohillas were crushed, and Rohilkhand became a part of Oudh. On the ground of expediency, there was much to be said in favour of the transaction; and its moral enormity has been absurdly exaggerated. The inducement to Hastings was particularly strong, and it did not occur to his censors in the Company either to restore Rohilkhand to the Rohillas, or to refuse the price of the offence. Macaulay's rhetoric bears little relation to the facts, except in so far as the reigning Rohilla chief happened to be a good ruler. Nevertheless the affair was discreditable. A better case for attacking the Rohillas should have been required, and a strict adherence demanded to the rules of civilised warfare, as a condition of the employment of British troops.

Conquest of Rohilkhand.

The Rohilla war was carried through by Warren Hastings in his capacity as Governor of Bengal; and before his appoint-

ment as Governor-General, the Bombay Presidency had been seduced into mixing itself up with the Maratha affairs—the three Presidencies being at the time independent.

Bombay Council and the Peshwaship.

Madhu Rao Peshwa died in Nov. 1772: his brother Naraian Rao was assassinated in August 1773, when Ragoba became Peshwa. In January 1774, Nana Farnavis and his party set up a Council of Regency on behalf of the expected posthumous son of Naraian Rao; the babe was born in April and promptly proclaimed Peshwa. Ragoba however obtained the support of Sindhia and Holkar, the Malwa chiefs, negotiated with the Bhonsla and the Gaikwar, and finally laid proposals for assistance before the Governor of Bombay. Bombay wanted to acquire the neighbouring ports of Salsette and Bassein, but this was at first too much for Ragoba to agree to. In the meantime, however, the Puna regency had bought over Sindhia and Holkar, while the Bhonsla and the Gaikwar were in no haste to commit themselves to either party. Ragoba narrowly escaped capture, fled to Bombay, and in March (1775) concluded the Treaty of Surat, ceding Salsette and Bassein, assigning some additional territory, and promising an annual cash payment; for which the British were to furnish three thousand troops to aid him. In signing the treaty, Hornby the Governor of Bombay exceeded his authority; as by this time the Presidencies were subordinate to the Governor-General and his Council. A couple of months later there was a sharp engagement at Arras in Gujerat between Colonel Keating and a Maratha force; in which the British, though severely handled, drove the enemy in rout across the Nerbadda—whereby the Nizam was encouraged to give his support to what looked like the winning side.

Treaty of Surat.

Battle of Arras.

A Maratha war was the last thing wanted at Calcutta; but Hastings was aware that Bombay had practically committed him, and that as it was too late to draw back the only safe course was to fight for conclusive victory. Unfortunately, the Council established by Lord North's Act could overrule the Governor-General. There were four members besides Hastings, and three of them acted consistently against him. The Triumvirate—Francis, Clavering and

Monson—quashed the treaty of Surat, and despatched an agent, Colonel Upton, to Puna, to negotiate with the Regency. The result was the new treaty of Purandar (Poorunder), March 1776, which cancelled the pledges given to Ragoba and retained for the British only Salsette and a contribution towards expenses. Treaty of Purandar.

Hastings was at daggers drawn with the Triumvirate: Bombay was furious with them: and in August, dispatches arrived from the Directors approving the treaty of Surat; whereby Bombay was encouraged.

Early in the next year a French adventurer, St Lubin, appeared at Puna promising French assistance; by this time Great Britain was in the thick of the struggle with the American colonies, and the prospect of a French intervention therein was really imminent; the Puna Regency received St Lubin with open arms; and in the meantime Bombay was giving an asylum to Ragoba, contrary to the terms of the Purandar Treaty. Then came more dispatches from the Directors, ratifying the Purandar Treaty under protest, as being now impossible to repudiate except on the ground of infractions by the Puna Government. Meantime, the Maratha chiefs were quarrelling, and Holkar changed sides; while at Calcutta, Hastings at last got the upper hand with his Council owing to the successive deaths of Monson and Clavering. In March (1778), he wrote to Bombay practically authorising war, and prepared to send an expedition across India. In November, a new treaty was made with Ragoba on the lines of the Surat treaty: and then came a disaster. Complications at Puna and Calcutta.

Bombay wished to have to itself the credit of victory. So an expedition started from it in December, without waiting for the Bengal contingent. But the leadership was in hopelessly incompetent hands; having got within twenty miles of Puna, the chiefs were seized with a panic; it was only the brilliant behaviour of the rear-guard under Lieutenant Hartley that saved the force from being cut up; and on Jan. 12 the disgraceful Convention of Wargam, made with Sindhia, threw over Ragoba and gave up everything that Bombay had hitherto obtained. The disaster of Wargam.

France had declared war against Great Britain on behalf of the American colonies in the summer of 1778; affairs were going exceedingly ill in the western hemisphere; and the prospect of French intervention in India had become extremely serious. Hastings was taking energetic measures for strengthening the forces, and an expedition under Goddard was on its way to Bombay, which had got as far as Burhampur (about 100 miles north of Aurangabad) with some assistance from the Raja of Bhopal, and also from the Bhonsla, when the news of Wargam arrived. Goddard at once made a swift march for Surat; covering some 300 miles in 20 days, and by his timely arrival preventing any further disaster. Shortly afterwards Sindhia, who was now aiming at being the arbiter among the Marathas and posing to the British as their friend, allowed Ragoba, who had surrendered to him, to escape to Surat. Nana Farnavis required that Ragoba and Salsette, should be handed over as a preliminary to further negotiations. Goddard replied by making overtures to the Gaikwar, enforced by a military demonstration; captured Ahmedabad in February (1780); and dispersed the troops brought against him by Sindhia and Holkar.

Goddard's march.

A little later in the same year, a detachment was sent from Bengal under Captain Popham to create a diversion in the Northern part of Sindhia's country, at the timely request of the Rana of Gohud; a little principality some sixty miles from Agra on which the Marathas were encroaching.

A diversion in Malwa.

But the sudden and tremendous invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar Ali in July gave the war a new aspect, and we must now turn to the events in Southern India which led up to that great irruption.

Throughout the sixties, as we have seen, the government of the Madras Presidency had been distinguished for its general incapacity; and the close of that decade found both Haidar Ali and the Nizam very ill disposed towards the British Power. Matters were by no means improved during the decade ensuing. The Nawab of the Carnatic or of Arcot—to adopt the more familiar title—a singularly worthless monarch, was very much in debt to the Company, and also to sundry servants of the Company who held security in

The Nizam, Haidar Ali, and Madras.

the way of mortgages on lands and revenues. It seemed good to him that his coffers should be filled by appropriating Tanjur: the Madras Government found it reasonable to support this idea, on the theory that Tanjur might, if treated with sufficiently consistent injustice, become hostile to the British. So at the end of 1773 Tanjur was compulsorily transferred to the Nawab. The proceeding was so shameless that the Directors in London dismissed the Governor of Madras, and sent out Pigot, who had previously done good service in the same position, to replace him. Pigot set about rectifying the prevailing abuses; but in the attempt to override the corrupt coterie at the head of affairs, he exceeded his constitutional powers, and was deposed and imprisoned by the stronger party. He died before the next orders arrived from London, and was presently succeeded in office by Rumbold, who appears to have regarded his position primarily as a cover for the illegitimate acquisition of wealth. Within two years, Hastings as Governor-General had practically suspended him, but not before mortal offence had been given to the Nizam, by cool proposals to ignore inconvenient points in the existing treaties with him. This took place at the beginning of 1779 when the convention of Wargam had just reduced British prestige to the lowest point. Consequently the Nizam devised and set about actualising the project of a great confederacy of all the southern Native Powers against the British.

Increasing power of Haidar Ali.

In the meantime, Haidar Ali had been taking every advantage of the Maratha complications. The Marathas were too much occupied with internal rivalries turning on the contest between Ragoba and the Regency, and with the hostilities and negotiations with Bombay and Calcutta, to concentrate against him. So from 1773 to 1779 he steadily enlarged his dominions; not only absorbing minor principalities southwards, but pushing steadily north to the river Krishna. Angry as he was with the British, he was far too astute a statesman to allow his feelings to control his policy, and made repeated overtures to them, which, however, were received with extreme coolness. Then came the prospect of renewed hostilities between France and England, and Haidar

opened communications with the Mauritius. In 1778, war was actually declared. Hastings issued prompt orders for the seizure of all French stations. Pondichery was captured; so was Mahé on the west coast. But Mahé was, in Haidar's view, under his protection; that protection was ignored by the British, and Haidar felt that the cup was full. A few months later the Nizam made his proposals for the great joint attack. The Bhonsla was to deal with Bengal: the western Marathas were to deal with Bombay: Mysore and Haidarabad were to invade Madras. Haidar was prepared to compose his differences. He had for long been building up such an army as no Indian monarch had ever brought into the field before; suddenly in July 1780 the great invasion burst like a tornado upon the Carnatic.

Anti-British combination.

Britain at bay.

Thus, in this summer of 1780 it was not only in India but in every quarter of the globe that Britain was battling for bare life. Since 1775 she had been fighting her American colonies, in whose favour the tide of war had definitely turned with Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga in the end of 1777. In the following spring France had declared war, and appeared capable of keeping the British fleets very thoroughly occupied. By June 1779, Spain had added herself and her fleet to the anti-British combination. It seemed that there was more likelihood of French than of British armaments and reinforcements finding their way to India. And in India itself, the only compensation for the bad business of Wargam had so far been the successes of Goddard in Gujerat and on the Nerbadda; while it appeared that owing to the Nizam's successful combinations, every native army in India was to be hurled simultaneously upon the British.

Invasion of the Carnatic by Haidar Ali.

Madras, with the fatuity which marked its rulers, had made no preparation for the storm. The General in command was Hector Munro, the hero of Buxar—but the energy and ability he had then shown were now no longer forthcoming. For six weeks Haidar and his hordes swept the Carnatic with fire and sword, ravaging and pillaging almost to the gates of Madras, without let or hindrance save for the splendid defence of an occasional outpost, such as that of Wandewash by Lieutenant Flint. At the beginning of September an

attempt was made to unite the main Madras column under Munro with a column from the Northern districts under Baillie; but the incapacity of the commanders allowed Haidar to drive a wedge between them, cut up Baillie's army, and drive Munro back on Madras in precipitate retreat.

In other fields, fortunately, affairs were taking a different course. During the summer Popham in northern Malwa had been operating with success against the Marathas in that region; on August 3rd he, with his subordinate Bruce, startled the Indian world and retrieved completely the fame of the British arms by the brilliant feat of capturing by a surprise the all but impregnable fort of Gwalior. The effect on our prestige was immediate and striking; and the influence on the Confederacy of the change was invaluable. The Bhonsla had never been more than half-hearted and the Nizam was already half repentant. Beyond this, the capture had a most important strategical result, inasmuch as it at once withdrew Sindhia from the south to take care of his own dominions. Goddard's earlier operations had successfully separated the Gaikwar from the Confederacy, so that now the Bombay forces had only the Regency and Holkar to deal with.

The capture of Gwalior.

Results.

This was particularly fortunate, as the affairs of Madras demanded every rupee and every man that Bengal could provide, and Bombay was left entirely to its own resources. The Governor, Hornby, displayed a seasonable energy. Before the end of the year the Konkans were cleared of the enemy by Hartley (who had almost saved the situation at Wargam) and Goddard. In the spring the British met with a reverse in attempting to attack Puna, the credit of which fell to Holkar; but this was counterbalanced by another success in the north. Popham had been inexplicably superseded. In April his successor appeared to be practically at Sindhia's mercy, when by the daring counsels of Bruce a sudden attack entirely reversed the position, and Sindhia's army was completely routed.

Sindhia, whose hostility to the British had never been of an uncompromising character, found Holkar's reputation

greatly raised at the very moment when his own had suffered seriously, and began to look to diplomacy as the means to recover his lost ground. The Bhonsla some time before had come to a private understanding with the British, and was helping rather than hindering Hastings in sending a force overland from Bengal to the Carnatic. In short, after April 1781 actual hostilities with the Marathas practically came to an end.

Eyre Coote in Madras.

In the Carnatic, however, the war with Haidar Ali continued to rage. On the news of the irruption and of Baillie's disaster, Hastings acted boldly and vigorously. Sir Eyre Coote, the victor of Wandewash, now a member of Council and in supreme military command, sailed from Calcutta for Madras, which he reached in November 1780, and the old Sultan of Mysore knew that he had a great soldier matched against him. Coote was scandalously hampered by the incompetence of the Madras authorities and the want of supplies; nor was it till June that he was able to take the offensive. In three months from July 1st, Coote was victorious in three engagements—at Porto Novo, at Pollilur (the scene of Baillie's disaster), and at Solingarh, near Vellur. In June a new Governor, Lord Macartney, arrived at Madras with news that Holland had declared war on England; and Macartney, conscious of the uses to which the Dutch ports might be put under the circumstances, succeeded in raising an additional force, which captured Negapatam in November, and Trincomali in Ceylon in January.

Improved position in the South.

Thus in the fifteen months since Baillie's disaster the position of the British had greatly improved. The Bhonsla had definitely withdrawn from the Confederacy. Sindhia was conducting negotiations on the basis of the Purandar treaty; the Dutch declaration of war had been converted to the advantage of the British; and Haidar Ali, though not expelled from the Carnatic, had more than found his match whenever it had been possible to force an engagement. The cutting up of a detachment under Colonel Brathwaite was counterbalanced by a disaster to Haidar's forces on the Malabar coast, followed by the revolt of the principalities

which he had seized in that region. But it still remained extremely doubtful whether Haidar could be fairly beaten off. Britain's enemies were still facing her on equal terms by sea; and a French fleet, and French troops under Bussy, were a very imminent danger. Already a squadron under D'Orvés had appeared, which, with a more capable commander, might have completely paralysed Coote. Fortunately it had retired, and the British squadron under Hughes was now a fairly strong one.

Suffren and Hughes.

Hardly, however, had Trincomali been taken when a new French squadron arrived, under Suffren, perhaps the best naval commander France ever produced. Four times in the course of the year the two squadrons met and fought stubbornly. In none of the four fights could it be said that either side had inflicted defeat on the other. But Suffren was enabled to throw reinforcements into the Carnatic and to recapture Trincomali, while the operations by land produced little advantage to either side. At the end of the year Coote's health broke down completely; but to counterbalance that, Haidar Ali died at the advanced age of eighty, leaving his son Tippu Sahib to succeed him. This turned the scale as concerned the Marathas. The Puna Government, which had hitherto held back from finally committing itself to peace, signed the proposed treaty forthwith. The arrival of Bussy at Gudalur or Cuddalore early in the year, its investment by a strong British force under an incompetent commander, the return of Suffren on one side and Hughes on the other, pointed to a crisis in which the odds were in favour of the triumph of Bussy and Tippu, when the main hostilities were suddenly terminated by news of the peace between France and Great Britain.

Death of Haidar Ali.

Withdrawal of the French.

Tippu was now the sole open antagonist left. He was on the Malabar coast, and Colonel Fullarton was sent to operate in Mysore, which he did with great success until the Madras Government, in the exercise of its recently habitual functions as the evil genius of the British Power, chose to negotiate with Tippu, and to order Fullarton to cease hostilities and abandon his conquests. The cabal against Hastings in England had by this time gained the day, and the great

Governor-General was unable to compel the obedience of the Madras Government. Tippu succeeded in making it appear that the British had sued to him for peace. The Madras Government succeeded in making it appear that they would submit to any ignominy for the sake of coming to terms.

Treaty with Tippu.

Peace was finally concluded with Mysore on the basis of a general restitution of conquests. The struggle with the Marathas had concluded with the resignation of Ragoba's claims, and the restoration of territories as they were before the Purandar treaty.

The foreign policy of Warren Hastings.

The only addition to British territory in India made in the time of Warren Hastings was that of the zemindari of Benares, ceded by Oudh. But it was the genius of Hastings which mainly saved India at all in a period of extraordinary peril. His own policy was one not of extension or aggression, but of consolidation and conciliation. War was forced upon him by the blunders of Bombay and the blunders of Madras. When he had to fight, his plans were laid with equal audacity and skill, for he knew that in India he must fight to win. The disastrous errors of Bombay were redeemed by the brilliant audacity of Goddard's march across the peninsula, and the no less brilliantly conceived and executed movements of Popham and Bruce in the north. The folly of Madras brought the Southern Powers upon us in a mass at the time when half Europe was attacking us in the west; the skill of Hastings broke up the confederacy by detaching the Bhonsla, neutralising the Nizam and flattering Sindhia. Thwarted at every turn, sometimes by the incapacity and quite as often by the insubordination and rancorous opposition of subordinates and colleagues, he nevertheless maintained the position in India against enormous odds, whilst his enemies made him the mark of every species of obloquy and misrepresentation at home. In his conduct throughout the Maratha and Mysore wars, his worst enemies can now hardly find opportunity for detraction. In the next chapter we shall examine that portion of his public career—his administration in Bengal—for which he has been most severely censured.

CHAPTER X

WARREN HASTINGS, THE COUNCIL, AND THE GANGES PROVINCES

(*Maps I. and IV.*)

THE acceptance by Clive for the Company of the Bengal Diwani in return for an annual payment to be made to the Padishah, failed of the intended effect after Clive's departure. The Company's servants in Bengal had not themselves the knowledge and experience requisite for organising a revenue department, and the authority was placed primarily in the hands of a Native, Mohammed Rheza Khan, with Native revenue collectors. A little later, British collectors were appointed to supervise the natives; but instead of supervising they practically worked with the Native subordinates, to their mutual private profit, and the loss of the Company. It was with the intention of remedying this state of things that Warren Hastings was made governor of Bengal in 1772, being then forty years of age. For the past two years, he had been rendering excellent service in Madras, after an interval of four years spent in England.

Lack of organisation in Bengal.

The rule of Hastings falls into four periods. In the first period, he was Governor of Bengal, and supreme in his province. This lasted from April 1772 to October 1774. In that month, the new members of Council and the four Judges reached Calcutta, and the system devised under Lord North's Regulating Act came into force. From that time until Monson's death in Sept. 1776, Hastings was systematically over-ruled by his Council, nor did he definitely recover control until the death of Clavering, a year later. From 1777 to 1782 he held the supremacy, though with a somewhat uncertain tenure; and again from that time to his

Four periods of the rule of Warren Hastings.

departure from India the attitude of the Directors at home enabled his opponents in India to thwart him at every turn.

Hastings and the Diwani.

In the matter of the Diwani, Hastings took prompt and effective steps. Under the existing conditions the soil was tilled by the *ryots* or peasants, paying rent to the *zemindars* or landholders, who in turn paid a tax or rent to the Government. Between zemindars and Government collectors, it was certain that the amount which reached the treasury was not what it ought to have been; but the data for a new and sound assessment were insufficient. Hastings adopted the plan of putting up the land to competition—making the highest bidders zemindars—for a period of five years. Control of the department, now made more simple by definiteness, was transferred from Murshidabad to the Company's headquarters at Calcutta. At the same time, courts of justice with European magistrates were established in each district, with a court of appeal at the capital. In connection with these reforms, Mohammed Rheza Khan was removed from office, pending inquiry into various charges of peculation which had been brought against him, by order of the Directors; who were ready enough to attribute the deficiencies of revenue to fraud in a Native. The charges were energetically pushed by the notorious Nuncomar (more correctly Nanda Kumar) a high-caste Brahmin who had acquired much power, and wished to supplant the Mussulman; but the completion of the new arrangements preceded that of the investigation, when Mohammed Rheza Khan was cleared of suspicion. Nuncomar however had in the interval succeeded in obtaining for his own son the post of manager to the Nawab's household, or more accurately the household of the Mani Begum, widow of a former Nawab, to whose care the infant ruler was entrusted.

The new Members of Council.

In October 1774, the new members of the new Council reached Calcutta. Without delay the Triumvirate—Francis, Clavering and Monson—proceeded to set themselves openly against Hastings and his loyal supporter Barwell. They condemned everything Hastings had done—the transfer of Allahabad to Oudh, the Rohilla war, the presence of British

troops in Oudh, and the new revenue arrangements. They withdrew the Resident placed by Hastings in Lucknow, the Oudh capital, and sent a nominee of their own in his place. They even demanded to see the private correspondence between the previous Resident and Hastings.

The Council and the Oudh Nawab.

In January, Shuja Daulah died, and was succeeded by Asaf-ud-Daulah. The Begums—Shuja Daulah's mother and widow—claimed not only an immense proportion of the late Nawab's accumulated treasures, but also the revenues of large estates, under a will which was not produced. There were no documents to support the claim; even if there had been it is more than doubtful whether the depletion of the State treasury involved could have been regarded as legal, while its inexpediency was patent. To support the claim of the Begums was to cripple the Nawab. But it was the aim of the policy of Hastings, as it had been of Clive's, to strengthen the Nawab's Government; his vehement opposition to the Begums was enough for the Triumvirate. They were the majority; they compelled the Nawab to submit; they guaranteed the property to the Begums on behalf of the British; and on the plea that Shuja Daulah's death cancelled obligations entered upon to him personally, they required the cession of the zemindari of Benares and an increase of his subsidy on pain of withdrawal of the British troops. As the Nawab's own troops were in revolt for lack of pay, and the Begums had all the money, Asaf-ud-Daulah was wholly dependent on the British troops for the maintenance of his throne, and had no choice but to submit. The responsibility for these transactions lay entirely with the Triumvirate, Hastings being at every point opposed by them; but technically the Triumvirate's doings were the doings of Government.

The attack on Hastings.

The next move was a personal attack upon Hastings. Its interest is, strictly speaking, more personal than political, but it looms so large in the pages of historians as to demand full relation. For it has, in fact, been used to blacken the characters of Hastings and of the Chief Justice Impey, very notably in Macaulay's Essay, whereas the investigations of later judicial enquirers show conclusively that no real reproach attached either to the one or the other.

It had become evident, from the moment of the Triumvirate's arrival, that they were prepared to welcome any sort of evidence which would tend to discredit the Governor-General and to shelter his accusers. Charges against him of having received gratifications—otherwise called bribes—began to appear before the Council. Nuncomar, whose enmity towards him dated back as far as 1764, came forward with a string of charges and documentary evidence of gross corruption, including what purported to be a letter written by the Mani Begum which referred to bribes in connection with the guardianship of the young Nawab. The signature was doubtful; the Begum repudiated the letter; the seal appeared genuine, but a perfect counterpart was subsequently found among Nuncomar's effects. The Triumvirate demanded that Nuncomar should be heard before the Council. Hastings declined entirely to preside at his own trial, refused Nuncomar a hearing, but offered to submit the charges to a Committee. Thrice he broke up the Council, and on his retirement with Barwell the rest carried on the sittings. At last he resolved on a counter-stroke, indicting Nuncomar for conspiracy. The Council ostentatiously took Nuncomar's part.

Nuncomar's charges.

Mohan Persad.

The upshot was doubtful enough, when a *deus ex machina* appeared. For years a legal feud had been carried on with Nuncomar by a native named Mohan Persad. The establishment of the new High Court with its English Judges and English law presented an unlooked for opportunity to this man's legal adviser. The Brahmin was indicted for forgery—a minor offence in the eyes of the Hindus, but a capital one at that date in the view of English law. Nuncomar was tried before the full court, found guilty, condemned and executed.

The execution of Nuncomar.

There is no shadow of evidence that the trial was conducted otherwise than with absolute fairness. The Judges were unanimous; nor is it disputed that the evidence was conclusive. The propriety of the sentence can only be questioned on the ground that it was in accord not with Hindu but with English law; but that fault belonged to the constitution of the Court. There was sufficient reason for

the Council to obtain a respite in order to refer the matter to England; but when the Triumvirate, the friends of Nuncomar, refused to move, it was hardly to be expected that Hastings should go out of his way to protect his own enemy. Nor is there the faintest evidence that Hastings had pulled the strings which set the trial in motion. The circumstances are fully sufficient to account, without any imputations on the Governor-General, for Mohan Persad's action; the charge was brought by him with a vindictive intent, when he realised how much heavier the blow would be in consequence of the establishment of the Supreme Court. Hastings himself made oath that he had neither suggested nor encouraged it. But it fell so pat—it so completely served the purpose of wrecking the attack on Hastings—that the mere human tendency to disbelieve in convenient coincidences remains as a sediment at the bottom of the otherwise empty cup of evidences against the Governor-General.

With Nuncomar's death, the case against Hastings collapsed completely. This took place in June 1775. In the previous March, when the discussions in the Council were raging, Hastings had written to his agents in England authorising them to lay his resignation before the Directors, if his conduct in regard to the Rohillas and Oudh were censured. In May, he had retracted this authorisation; nevertheless his resignation was subsequently submitted, by his agent in England, to the Directors, and acted upon by them.

The struggle on the Council.

For the next twelve months, the struggle between Hastings and the majority of his Council continued; his arrangements establishing district courts of justice were cancelled, and the jurisdiction was restored to the Nawab's officers; Mohammed Rheza Khan being reinstated to that end. The difficulties of the Bombay Government with the Marathas narrated in the previous chapter at this time offered the principal problem, the Surat treaty having taken place while the Nuncomar affair was in progress, and that of Purandar in the March following. Much of the Council's time was also occupied in conflicts with the Supreme Court, to which we

shall presently revert. Monson's death in 1776 gave Hastings predominance in the Council, and in the following year came the information from London that the resignation of Hastings had been accepted, that a Mr Wheler was appointed to take his place, and that Clavering was to act in the interval. Hastings repudiated the resignation; he and Clavering issued antagonistic orders to the Military, who supported Hastings, and each claimed to act as Governor-General; finally the question was referred to the arbitration of the Judges, who unanimously decided in favour of Hastings. Shortly afterwards, Clavering died; Hastings was confirmed in his office by the Directors and Wheler arrived to take Monson's place, the fifth seat on the Council being filled by Eyre Coote as military member. The re-establishment of Hastings was probably in part due to the disastrous turn of events at this time in America, which made the maintenance of a strong chief in India the more imperative.

Hastings predominant.

The change inaugurated the third phase of Hastings's Governorship—the second after he became Governor-General. It is necessary to observe that broadly speaking, his rule coincides in time with that of North's ministry in England. Burgoyne's surrender at Saratoga corresponded with Clavering's death at Calcutta: from that time till Rodney's victory of The Saints in 1782, the war by sea and land went steadily against the British, and Hastings was not only left to his own resources in combating the coalitions of Native Powers, but was expected to find profits for the Company to pay in to the Treasury.

The Revenue Board.

Two reforms he was enabled by his newly acquired superiority in the Council to carry out. The first was the establishment of a Board for the systematic examination of land tenures, and for the provision of a sound basis of assessment—a matter of the utmost importance, where the Government revenue is in the main derived from land. The second was the reconstruction of military arrangements in Oudh—the first example of the "Subsidiary Alliances" which later developed into an immense instrument of ascendancy. Under treaty, the Oudh Nawab was bound to maintain an army for the defence of the Ganges provinces: assisted by a

The Subsidiary Alliance with Oudh.

brigade of the Company's troops. It was now arranged that the Nawab should have an army drilled, officered, controlled and paid by the British, who in return were to have the revenues of certain districts allotted to them for that purpose. Systematically applied, it is easy to see that such an arrangement would have far-reaching effects, practically turning the Native ally into a protected instead of an independent State, while in effect adding the allotted districts to the Company's territorial possessions.

Now also Hastings was enabled to deal with one of the most serious problems created by North's Regulating Act—the position of the Supreme Court.

The Supreme Court.

From the outset this was a most extraordinary anomaly. The device of a Council ruling by a majority vote was sufficiently strange; but on to this North had tacked a High Court, consisting of four judges to administer the law, without defining the relations between them and the Council. The Court then declared that its members were responsible to the Crown at home, and to no one else, though they were acting in a country where professedly the Nawab was sovereign, subject to a sort of undefined allegiance to the Padishah; while the *de facto* ruler, controlling the military forces, which are the ultimate sanction of every government, was the Council. The Court claimed the right of haling all cases before itself, constituted itself a general authority for hearing and deciding on all complaints, and refused to recognise any superior authority. The Company's servants up-country, and the zemindars, found themselves liable to be dragged down to Calcutta every time that it suited an honest or dishonest person to make a charge frivolous, fraudulent or genuine. Such a state of affairs was manifestly intolerable. Hastings at an early stage endeavoured to urge upon Lord North the need of terminating it by the definite assertion of the sovereignty of the British Crown in the Company's territories; but North was not the man to carry out such a scheme. At last matters reached such a pitch that Hastings, despite his personal friendship with Impey, was forced to join with Francis in asserting the authority of the Council; the process of the Court was disregarded by

Contest between the Court and the Council.

order of the Council, backed by the troops; the Court issued writs, summonses, and fulminations against the Council and its abettors, who ignored them. The remedy was devised by Hastings.

Hastings's arrangement.

The Council had seen fit to restore the Nawab's criminal jurisdiction in the districts of the Provinces, the civil and fiscal jurisdiction being combined in the hands of the Company's revenue officers. Hastings now separated the civil and the fiscal, established civil courts in the districts, and transferred the appeal, which had lain to the Council, to a Court of Appeal—the "Sadr Diwāni Adālat"—in Calcutta, and offered the position of chief in this court and general supervisor of the system to Impey as an officer under the Company. Impey accepted, the deadlock was removed, and it was immediately found that the new system promised to work very satisfactorily. Hastings has been charged with giving, and Impey with receiving a bribe. But the plain fact is that a compromise between the two rival authorities was the only available method by which either could escape without discredit from an impossible situation, and the compromise was acted upon loyally and judiciously, and entirely to the public advantage.

Two more episodes of his Governor-Generalship were afterwards used against Hastings with great effect, and do, as a matter of fact, illustrate the great difficulties of his position and the undesirable expedients which he was forced to adopt—not in any sense to his personal advantage, but to obtain the funds without which the position in India would have been untenable. These are the affairs of Benares and of the Oudh Begums.

The Raja of Benares.

Benares was transferred to the British on the accession of Asaf-ud-Daulah, which in effect meant that the Raja of Benares paid a tax or tribute to the British instead of to the Nawab. The title of Raja does not imply independence; there is no precise European equivalent; it was borne both by independent sovereigns and by vassals of the great potentates. The Raja of Benares held his province by a sort of feudal tenure analogous to, but not identical with, the mediæval tenures of the West. Thus it is clear that while

under ordinary circumstances he was liable for the amount of his tribute or rent and no more, he was also in time of war, or under other extraordinary conditions, liable to be called on for additional contributions by his superior, the rights having been surrendered by the Oudh Nawab to the British. It was a matter of course in the East that any vassal thinking himself strong enough to resist such claims should do so; but so far as the term legal is applicable to rules depending for their enforcement mainly on the relative strength of the individuals concerned, the claims to extraordinary aids were legal.

Hastings and the Raja.

Now the Raja, Cheyt Singh, was quite strong enough to have resisted pressure from the Oudh Nawab; pressure from the British was another matter. In 1778 Hastings, embarrassed by the financial strain of the Maratha troubles, demanded an extra contribution of five lakhs—£50,000—from Benares. This was paid. The demand was renewed next year, and again paid, but only after much delay. Then a contingent of horse was called for, but not provided; and the suspicion grew very strong that between Haidar Ali and the Marathas, Cheyt Singh thought the British were sufficiently deep in difficulties to warrant him in an attempt to throw off the yoke. Hastings, on the other hand, considered that the utmost severity was needed in dealing with any sort of recalcitrancy under such conditions, and that the Raja might very well be compelled to pay heavily, to the advantage of the Calcutta coffers. Therefore, instead of modifying his demands, he ordered Cheyt Singh to pay a fine of fifty lakhs, and proceeded to enforce the demand in person, entering the Raja's territory with what was, under the circumstances, a very small escort. The Raja was placed under arrest in his own capital; thereupon his soldiers rose and cut up the sepoys; he himself escaped to one of his fortresses; and Hastings had to effect a rapid withdrawal to Chunar, a few miles down the river. From thence he conducted operations and carried on business with extraordinary coolness and vigour. The nearest detachments of troops were ordered up, and Hastings was lucky in having Popham to command them. The district

The Benares insurrection.

had broken into a flame, but it was quenched with great promptitude and skill. Cheyt Singh fled to Bandelkhand, and a new Raja was set up, whose family still hold the position. It was while at Chunar that Hastings carried on those negotiations with Sindhia which led definitely to the Maratha's adoption of a friendly policy.

The Oudh Begums.

At Chunar also the Nawab of Oudh came to see him. Hastings wanted money from the Nawab, whose subsidies were much in arrear, and Asaf-ud-Daulah took the opportunity to point out that while he had none, the Begums had plenty which really belonged to him. It was only the British who prevented him from claiming his own, and if he did claim it, and get it, the British could have a share. It was true that the British had guaranteed the Begums their jaghirs or estates: but this had been done in despite of Hastings, and there was a plausible case for maintaining that the Begums, by fostering the Benares insurrection and acting against the British, had forfeited the support promised. Hastings was quite satisfied with the argument, which afforded fair justification for withdrawing British protection from the Begums; but he went further, ordered the Nawab to seize forcibly not only the jaghirs, but also the treasures in the palace of Faizabad (the abode of the Begums), used the Company's troops, and sanctioned a severity and a violence in carrying out the programme of compulsion which were an outrage to European ideas though mild enough according to Oriental practice. The Begums, however, were granted an abundant pension, while the Nawab was enabled to pay up his arrears.

Warren Hastings: his principles and character.

Hastings acted with his eyes open; he reckoned on being held up as an object of horror to the British public; and he accepted the obloquy for himself that the State might have the gain. In the case of Nuncomar, the worst that can be said of Hastings is that he did not go out of his way to be magnanimous. In fact, magnanimity appears to have been the great want of his character. To friends he could be generous, towards opponents he came perilously near to being vindictive. He treated the politics of India as a matter of business in which there was no room for senti-

mental considerations. The three episodes on which hostile historians fasten are the Rohilla war, and the affairs of Cheyt Singh and of the Oudh Begums. It is probable that in each of these cases Hastings honestly persuaded himself of the justice of his course. In none of the three is it possible to find a hint of any personal benefit to himself as a motive. By all three, the Company profited greatly. On each of the three occasions revenue was raised which was imperatively needed in order to avert disaster, and each time it was obtained from parties whose supposed hostility to the British gave the exactions the colour of reasonable if severe penalties. To a man endowed with a larger natural magnanimity, the penalties would have seemed extortionate, and the proof of the justifying hostility inadequate; yet it is extremely doubtful whether such a man would not have failed where Hastings succeeded, under the actual conditions. The difficulties were enormous; the stake was enormous; European dominion among Orientals was in its infancy. We have learnt by experience that European rulers must apply European standards to the ethics of government; but Clive in one notable instance had deviated from that rule and declared ever after that he had taken the right course. Hastings was satisfied to know that not the most enlightened of Orientals would have had a moment's scruple in taking the course which he took. The British reaped the advantages, and Warren Hastings paid the penalty. In 1785 he returned to England, and was attacked with all the virulence of Francis, the dramatic sensibility of Sheridan, and the moral lightnings of Edmund Burke. The exigencies of party politics turned the scale with Pitt and Dundas; Hastings was impeached; and although after some years the Lords gave him honourable acquittal, the man who saved India and whose departure from Bengal was genuinely lamented by the natives, is still, to the eyes of many of his countrymen, presented as the type of all that a pro-consul ought not to be.

Clive after his retirement from India became the target of the bitterest animosity in England. Warren Hastings was impeached. Wellesley was censured. Lord Hastings died the victim of unwarranted attacks. Later years have not

been lacking in parallel cases. The treatment by the British Nation of the men who have to solve the problems of government in remote territories is scarcely a source of self-congratulation. Perhaps the best that can be said for it is, that at the worst it has never been quite so scandalous as the treatment of La Bourdonnais, of Dupleix, and of Lally.

BOOK III

EXTENSION OF SUPREMACY

CHAPTER XI

NEW CONDITIONS: CORNWALLIS AND SHORE

(Maps III. and VIII.)

Growth of the British Power.

FROM the foregoing chapters, the reader will have learnt, if indeed he had not previously realised, the intimate relation between the course of events in India and occurrences in the West. The first stage of our struggle on Indian soil and in Indian waters had been one of rivalry with France: its outcome had depended less on the comparative capacities of French and English in India than on the naval contest fought out for the most part in European seas. As its result, the French rivalry was permanently removed from the effective to the merely potential sphere; so that the British were enabled to reap unchallenged the fruits of Clive's triumphs in Bengal. In the second stage, the British were involved in prolonged complications with the Country Powers, in which they were forced to depend entirely on their own resources in India; and to strain those resources to the very uttermost, because the Mother Country chose to involve herself in a conflict with her own American colonies, which expanded into a struggle for life against the combined forces of France and Spain.

Throughout both phases, the chief authority in India was perpetually hampered by the authority in Leadenhall Street, which in its turn was largely manipulated according to the exigencies and the varying influences of parties and groups at Westminster, which cared little and knew less about the actual conditions prevailing in Hindostan and the Dekhan. The genius and resolution of Warren Hastings achieved victory in the face of difficulties to which almost any other man would have succumbed; but at the cost of such mis-

representation and vilification of that great statesman that it has taken the best part of a century to restore—and not even now completely to restore—the good name of which he ought never to have been robbed.

Mutual influence of events in East and West.

From the peace of 1783 till the outbreak of the war with the French Republic in 1793, and indeed for some years longer, affairs in India ceased to be affected directly by the European relations of Great Britain. Then, as the vast designs of the new Military Chief of France began to be revealed, the idea of French intervention again assumed huge proportions in the eyes of Indian statesmen, and dominated their policy, until that Titanic career was checked by Nelson and finally broken by Wellington. But if European international politics cease for a time to influence the policy of Indian Governors, the period before us opens with a parliamentary struggle at Westminster as a factor of primary importance: Indian affairs playing a very large part therein. For it is a mutual influence that we have to recognise: the influence of India in England, as well as that of England in India.

The long and disastrous government called Lord North's, but in truth that of King George III. himself, had at last given place to a Whig Administration: but when after a few months Lord Shelburne became its head, parties broke up and the famous Coalition ministry resulted—the ministry in which Fox and North, who held no political principles whatever in common, combined to drive out Shelburne. It was recognised on all hands that a new system must be introduced in India, and the Coalition Government brought in an Indian Bill.

Fox's India Bill.

It was manifest that whatever the new Constitution for India might be, two things were absolutely necessary. The Governor-General must have immense latitude of action; and political control could no longer be allowed to rest in the hands of a body of men who in the nature of things could not depose Dividends from being their first and second and third consideration. Government must assume a largely increased share of the responsibilities. Fox's bill however, while covering these two points, included as a cardinal

part of it a proposal which aroused the passionate opposition of the King, the Company and every politician who was not in the Coalition. Control was to be vested in a body of seven commissioners, appointed for a term of four years by the legislature; who should not only dictate policy, but should hold the bestowal of all appointments in their hands. The patronage of the Crown, and the patronage of the Company were annihilated; and to make matters worse, even the commercial management was to be transferred to a new body not elected by the Company but chosen by the legislature—that is, by Government—from among the Proprietors. A storm of opposition arose; it was a trick, men said, by which ministers hoped not only to enrich their own followers forthwith, but to acquire during the four years ensuing such a force of "Nabobs" behind them as would give a permanent control over parliamentary elections. Secure in a big majority, ministers defied the storm; their Bill went triumphantly through the Commons; but the King, in flagrant violation of constitutional practice, gave the Peers to understand that he would regard their votes as personal to himself. The Lords threw out the Bill; the King required the resignation of ministers; to the general astonishment, the young William Pitt accepted the leadership, and fought almost single-handed for three months against the banded forces of the ablest debaters and most experienced parliamentary hands; while his popularity rose, the majorities against him diminished, and the mockery of his antagonists gave place to alarm. In March 1784, parliament was dissolved: when the new one met, Pitt's minority had been turned into an overwhelming majority.

Pitt's India Bill.

The regulation of Indian affairs was now in the hands of Pitt and his right hand man Dundas. The India Bill brought in by them supplemented by a declaratory Act a few years later, remained the instrument under which our Indian possessions were governed, with minor modifications, until the extinction of the Company in 1858.

The vital features of Pitt's India Act were these. Each of the three Presidencies of Bengal, Madras and Bombay, was to have its own Governor, and its own Commander-in-

Chief, and two other members of Council; but the Governor and the Commander-in-Chief of Bengal were to be supreme also over the other two provinces. The Governor-General had very full powers, which were so far increased at the insistence of Lord Cornwallis that he could act on emergency without his Council. He was, however, to abstain from compromising alliances without directions from home. The Directors retained their patronage, and their general power of issuing instructions; but they were subordinated to a parliamentary Board of Control, changing with the ministry of the day, with a minister at its head, having access to all correspondence and general powers of supervision. Thus while the Directors retained the bulk of the patronage, the Board of Control—in other words the ministry—could exercise a very effective share therein (utilised, as some complained, by Dundas, who was first President of the Board, to inundate India with Scotsmen) and practically had the most important appointments in its own hands.

Lord Cornwallis.

The first Governor-General appointed under the new system was Lord Cornwallis; a man whose sterling character and high ability were sufficiently demonstrated by the fact that he retained the entire confidence of the public in spite of his having been in command at Yorktown when it was forced to surrender, and thereby end the effective contest between Britain and the American colonies. The office of Governor-General was held *ad interim* from the recall of Hastings to the arrival in India of Cornwallis in September 1786 by Sir John Macpherson. It had been intended to appoint Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras; but the claims to authority which he desired to have formally ratified were made an excuse for cancelling the appointment, which was unpopular, although the same claims were conceded to Cornwallis. The final appointment was made in accordance with the rule generally but not quite universally recognised thereafter, that while the Council should consist of Indian experts, the Governor-General should be a man trained in another arena.

Cornwallis reached India in September 1786, with the avowed intention of carrying out a policy not of expansion

but of consolidation and retrenchment. Like not a few of his successors, however, he found that, opposed as he might be to British aggression, anti-British aggression demanded a response more stringent than diplomacy; and that in India, the policy of restoring conquests after victory is not understood, but regarded as an invitation to challenge a fresh contest at a convenient opportunity.

The Powers in the Dekhan.

The Marathas, as we have seen, made their peace with the British when Haidar Ali died. Tippu, the new Sultan of Mysore had also made his peace some while after; but on terms, and under circumstances which the fatuity of the Madras Government had enabled him to regard and to represent as magnanimous concessions to the humble entreaties of the British. His subsequent conduct showed that he was filled with extravagant ideas of his own power and abilities, and of his rôle as a propagandist of Islam. He forcibly converted tens of thousands of his subjects, Hindus, or Christians, to the Faith, with sundry barbarities; and Nana Farnavis at Puna became seriously alarmed; the more so as the recent proceedings of the British did not point to their taking an active part in keeping the Sultan in check. Now the Nana's theory of allies was that they were meant to serve as catspaws. The most effective catspaws failing, he fell back on the Nizam: who, however, held his own theory *mutatis mutandis*. So the Nizam and the Nana continued to operate against the formidable Tippu, each seeking to shift the burden of work on to the other without prejudice to his own claim on the spoils.

Madhava Rao Sindhia.

The Puna Government had another reason for activity in the Dekhan. Madhava Rao or Madhoji Sindhia in Hindostan was working out a policy of his own. We have already observed, how that able diplomatist had made it his business to fulfil the rôle of conciliator and arbitrator, with a particularly keen eye to his own advantage in every instance. So skilfully had he handled his opportunities that even the disasters inflicted on him by Popham and Bruce had not prevented him from emerging successfully out of the treaty of Salbai with dominions and prestige undiminished. This threatened ascendancy was eyed askance

by the Puna Durbar; none the less as the ambitions of the Gwalior chief became more clearly revealed. The object to which he now devoted himself was in fact the domination of Upper Hindostan, under a specious display of ostentatious personal humility and loyalty to the ghost of an Emperor at Delhi, and the ghost of a Peshwa at Puna, whose ancestors had been served by his own in the capacity of slipper-bearer. The very ingenious pose adopted was that of a mere instrument of the Padishah, who was lord of India, and of his vicegerent, the acknowledged chief of the Marathas. The Panjab was beyond Sindhia's range: the gradual mastery of Mohammedan rivals at Delhi, and of native chiefs in Rajputana, sufficiently occupied his energies. The peculiarity of the position lay however in this: that ostensibly the *Patél*[1] as he was called, assumed no rivalry with other Maratha chiefs, made no attacks on them, and gave them no opportunity for attacks on him. The only method of counter-balancing his power was for them to achieve independent successes in other regions—that is to say in the Dekhan.

Sindhia and the British.

Sindhia's attitude to the British is open to various interpretations. He has been credited with a life-long endeavour to combine the natives of India against them. On the other hand he has been credited with anticipating the attitude adopted in the Panjab at a later date by Ranjit Singh, of seeking a steady alliance with them, much in the same way as he anticipated that astute monarch's schemes of military reconstruction on a European basis. The latter theory appears at least to be nearer the truth than the former. But it is not altogether the truth. In the seventies, the military strength of the British was an uncertain quantity. Well led, they were invincible: but there was no certainty that they would be well led. Sindhia, therefore, was only inclined to oppose them as one who might desire their friendship to-morrow. The vicissitudes of Ragoba's wars, established in his mind two convictions; one, that if they showed military incapacity in one quarter, they were tolerably certain to redress the balance with startling effect in another: the second, that the folly of subordinates could

[1] Patel, sometimes written Potail, is the title of a village head-man.

not cancel, however it might hamper, the supreme capacity of Hastings. Thereupon, his attitude underwent a slight change. He became the friend of the British, with a mental reservation: remaining on the watch for any display of weakness. No sooner was Hastings out of the country, and control for the time vested in Sir John Macpherson, than he put the new chief to the test by reviving the Emperor's claims to tribute. Sir John's reply was decisive, and the demand was promptly withdrawn with explanations. The experiment was repeated with a like result towards the close of the Cornwallis administration. Briefly, if the British should show a becomingly retiring disposition, Sindhia meant to take full advantage of it: but he was quite resolved to have no war with them, to display no active hostility in his own person, unless quite unexpectedly favourable circumstances should arise.

Cornwallis and the Country Powers.

Thus when Cornwallis appeared in India in the autumn of 1786, he found Tippu in the Dekhan waging war with the Nizam and the Southern Marathas, on the whole to the advantage of Mysore, while Madras stood aloof; and Sindhia working out his own private policy in Upper Hindostan. Here, there was certainly no demand for intervention; while a reorganisation of the military establishment in the South was a sufficient warning to Tippu, that if intervention there should become necessary it would be effective. For the time being therefore, peace was restored in the Dekhan, and the Governor-General was able to give his attention to the reform of abuses, and a modification of the treaty with Oudh, where the incapacity and misrule of successive Nawabs was to be a perpetual source of perplexity to one Governor-General after another. On this occasion, the Nawab's Government was hardly touched, but his finances were assisted by a reduction of the subsidy claimed by the British, and by the repudiation on his behalf of the private debts, most of which in fact if not in form were in the nature of outrageously usurious loans.

Reforms of Cornwallis.

The abuses attacked at this time were of the personal kind—jobbery, corruption and extortion. The great weight of Cornwallis's name enabled him to take a firm stand,

and flatly refuse to pay attention to the countless applications which poured in from influential quarters—from the Prince of Wales downwards—for posts for incompetent or worse than incompetent protégés; and even to force upon the Directors what the Governor-General's predecessors had striven for in vain, the appropriation to the Company's servants of salaries reasonably commensurate with the responsibilities of their position.

It was not till 1788 that the relations with the Country Powers began to look threatening. As long ago as 1768, a treaty had been made between the Nizam and the Madras Government, by which the former agreed that on the demise of the then Governor, Basalat Jangh, brother of the Nizam, a district known as the Guntur Sarkar should be ceded to the British. This cession had never been carried out; and Cornwallis, in accordance with instructions from home, having waited till the Nizam was free from the embarrassments of his quarrel with Tippu, now required that the provisions of the treaty should be given immediate effect. To the perplexed astonishment of the British, the Nizam replied by a prompt expression of his readiness to effect the cession, if they would duly carry out their part of the contract, and supply him on demand with forces to recover certain districts usurped—as the old treaty put it—by "Haidar Naik." However awkward or unreasonable now, there stood the obligation by treaty, though in the interval, the British had twice over formally acknowledged Haidar and Tippu as sovereigns of the districts in question. In short, the ingenious ineptitude of the Madras Government twenty years before was responsible for a very awkward situation. The British claim to the Guntur Sarkar had been quite independent of conditions; yet a pledge had gratuitously been given which retained a technical validity, though its fulfilment had been rendered impracticable in the interval.

The Nizam.

The solution found by Cornwallis was a compromise. There was no sort of doubt that Tippu was merely waiting his opportunity to renew hostilities with the British—that their extermination was the object he had most at heart;

Cornwallis's letter to the Nizam.

while Cornwallis was not disposed to take the initiative and make the attack himself. Accordingly he wrote a letter to the Nizam, on July 7th, 1789, explaining his view of the obligation imposed by the treaty. The troops as stipulated were to be supplied to the Nizam, but were not to be employed against any Power in alliance with the British. If the districts named should come into possession of the British by the Nizam's help, they should be handed over to him. A list of the "allies" was appended, in which Tippu was not named. The letter was virtually an undertaking that if the Nizam attacked Tippu, he should have the assistance as stipulated. On the other hand it required the active co-operation of the Nizam, and threw upon him the *onus* of challenging Mysore.

The Governor-General's freedom of action.

The India Act had expressly forbidden the formation of alliances without authority from London; but it was one of the many advantages of the Cornwallis appointment that he could take risks which no other man could have done, and was able to establish invaluable precedents. If a Clive or a Hastings cut through red-tape for the public service he did it at the risk of his own ruin. Cornwallis, without any pretensions to the genius of either of those great men, but with the advantage of a high and unsullied name, was able by sheer force of character and a sound and sober intelligence to achieve such a measure of public confidence as rendered him unassailable. In spite of technical restrictions, he had in fact a free hand, and the precedent greatly increased the freedom of his successors.

Tippu attacks Travancore.

It is impossible to judge whether the letter to the Nizam precipitated Tippu's action: his preparations for a movement were already virtually complete. By the treaty of Mangalur at the conclusion of the last war, Travancore at the extreme south of India, much coveted by Tippu, had been placed under British protection. Now, in spite of warning, Tippu attacked Travancore before the end of December. He was repulsed, and thereupon gathered a great army to effect the desired conquest. The gage of battle was fairly flung down. The Nizam and the Puna Government were both ready to combine in the attack upon him after their own fashion.

The British army was placed under the command of General Medows.

Opening campaign against Tippu: 1790.

Owing to the deliberate, continuous, and criminal neglect of the Governor of Madras, who took an early opportunity of leaving the country, Medows found himself in difficulties from lack of supplies and of transport, very much as Eyre Coote had done in the war with Haidar. The Madras army was to operate on the south of Mysore, while a second army was to march down the coast from Bengal and to co-operate from the North East of Mysore later in the year. Medows in course of time captured Koimbatur (July 1790); but when he attempted to advance through the passes to Seringapatam he was foiled by the superior skill of his opponent and forced to fall back. In August, the Bengal army reached the Carnatic, and in despite of Tippu a junction was ultimately effected towards the close of the year: but the only satisfactory feature of the campaign was the brilliant success of a small detachment on the Malabar coast under the command of Colonel Hartley.

Cornwallis takes the field: 1791.

Cornwallis now resolved to conduct operations in person; for he himself, a distinguished soldier, held the office of Commander-in-Chief as well as that of Governor-General. In February (1791), having concentrated his army at Vellur, some seventy miles from Madras, he marched up to the Mysore plateau, evading Tippu whom he had successfully misled as to his intended route; and captured Bangalur, one of Tippu's most important strongholds, before the end of March. This success had the effect of bringing up the Nizam's army, which had hitherto been amusing itself on the northern borders of Mysore territory, and of encouraging the Marathas who had been similarly employed in a more westerly direction.

But the advance of the Marathas was unknown to the British, and the arrival of the Nizam's forces had enormously increased the difficulty of maintaining supplies, without producing any corresponding advantage. Cornwallis fought a successful action, and arrived before Seringapatam in May: General Abercromby (not Sir Ralph) was on his way up from the Malabar coast: but by this time, men and cattle alike

were in such a condition that offensive operations had become impossible, and Cornwallis was obliged to order a retreat. The arrival of the Marathas did not facilitate matters; in fact they seized the opportunity to ask for funds; and with the implied alternative of their transferring their alliance there and then to Tippu, Cornwallis felt obliged to comply with the demand. The Marathas under their famous leader Hari Pant then retired to the North West, the Nizam to the North East, and Cornwallis himself Eastwards; to spend the remainder of the year in reducing the fortresses of the Bāramahāl district lying between Vellur and Bangalur.

Third campaign against Tippu: 1792.

The Mysore Sultan's calculations were however much disturbed when he found that in the following January the Governor-General was again on the march with an army better equipped with war material and supplies than he had yet brought into the field. This, the decisive campaign, was a short one. The British force was not only the best equipped but the largest that had ever taken part in an Indian Campaign. On February 5th it was before an entrenched position, in sight of Seringapatam. The defences were extraordinarily strong, but the English Chief planned and executed a night attack with entire success. Abercromby was coming up with reinforcements, and Tippu found that his best hope lay in submission. By the terms dictated, nearly half of Tippu's dominions were surrendered, as well as the persons of two of his sons and a heavy indemnity. In spite of the discovery of documents which proved that both the Nizam and the Marathas had been corresponding with Tippu throughout the war: in spite also of the purely imaginary character of the assistance they had rendered: Cornwallis treated the bargain with them as binding, and gave to each one-third of the ceded districts and of the indemnity. The British retained for themselves the Baramahal district, before mentioned, in which were important passes into Mysore, with other regions on the South and the West coast: these last being attached to the Bombay Presidency.

Resulting acquisition of territory.

Approval of Cornwallis's policy.

This acquisition of territory was of course attacked in Parliament, but Cornwallis was triumphantly vindicated, and rewarded with a marquisate. The Statesmen of India and

Westminster alike viewed territorial expansion with no little apprehension. But it was thoroughly understood that there was no one more thoroughly opposed to an aggressive policy than Cornwallis himself: it was felt that if he transgressed his own theory, it was only under the conviction of imperative political necessity. However reluctantly, it had to be recognised that the only way of dealing with a resolutely aggressive Native potentate was to curtail his dominions; whether the districts of which he was reft were taken under direct British control or only under British protection. Where there was no representative of a recognised and long established authority, the presumption was in favour of direct rule rather than the setting up of an authority incapable of maintaining itself unaided; but the decision in such cases could not profitably rest in other hands than those of the supreme British Authority on the spot.

His further reforms.

Not only did Cornwallis conduct a great war to a successful issue, and set a precedent in foreign policy; under his rule were also effected far-reaching administrative changes. These will be examined in detail in later chapters; here it will be sufficient merely to mention the famous "permanent settlement" of Bengal under which the land-revenue was established on a permanent system; the final separation of the functions of Collectors and Magistrates; the re-organisation—with very qualified success—of the criminal courts; and the codification of the law, whereby an extremely elaborate code replaced the simple one previously framed by Sir Elijah Impey.

His retirement.

Cornwallis retired from India at the close of 1793, just after the declaration of war between Great Britain and the Revolution Government in France, of which the only immediate effect in India was the seizure of Pondichery. Loyal, just and resolute, he had confirmed the best traditions of British policy and British character; happy in that free exercise of control which had been so desperately needed by his predecessor, and for the lack whereof that predecessor had won through so hardly, and with eternal discredit to the foes that were of his own household.

The intention of those who had framed the new constitution for British India was, that the Governor-General should be chosen from among men at home who combined a confirmed social position with recognised political talent, strong enough to resist the pressure of private influence, and free from the stereotyped preconceptions likely to be produced by an exclusively Oriental training. But such men were not easy to find, and Cornwallis was actually succeeded by an Indian Official, Sir John Shore: an admirable adviser, who had done excellent service in connection with the land-settlement; but wanting in the vigorous self-reliance required to cope successfully with the complex diplomatic and military problems to which in India the term "Political" is appropriated. His successor: Sir John Shore.

The departure of Cornwallis was followed by a rapid succession of changes in the personnel of the Maratha chiefs. Shore had no confidence in Sir Robert Abercromby, his own commander-in-chief, and was unduly afraid of risking Maratha hostility. In consequence, a good deal of the prestige gained under Cornwallis was lost during his administration. The great Sindhia, Madhava Rao, died in 1794, and was succeeded by a boy Daulat Rao: after two or three changes, a new Baji Rao became Peshwa and the Nana's ascendancy at Puna was very uncertain; Holkar was growing more independent. All were disposed to treat British pretensions with diminished respect. Cornwallis had wished to cap the overthrow of Tippu by a guarantee treaty between the Marathas, the Nizam, and the British, to prevent any of the three being dragged into hostilities with Tippu by one of them, or any one of them adopting an aggressive attitude towards another. This agreement had been avoided by the Marathas who now proceeded to attack the Nizam. Shore persuaded himself that, as the league was broken up, he was not called upon to defend the Nizam, who had to make submission and cede territories to Puna: and that monarch, disgusted by the desertion, attempted to secure his own position by raising fresh troops under the command of a French officer, Raymond, who had already rendered him efficient service. Fortunately the internal Maratha affairs.

partisan troubles of the Marathas called them off from further aggression, and the British saw the necessity of substituting their own support at Haidarabad for the possible dangers of a force under French control.

Sir John Shore in Oudh.

In Oudh, Shore was more successful. The total incapacity of the Nawab kept the whole Province in a state of flagrant mis-government. In 1797 he died, and was succeeded by a reputed son, Wazir Ali. But Wazir Ali's title was challenged, and on enquiry the Governor-General was fully convinced that he was not the son of the late Nawab at all: nor was there any son alive. Sir John accordingly informed Saadat Ali, brother of the late Nawab, that the British intended to place him on the throne, at the same time requiring him to accept a treaty on these terms. A British army of ten thousand men was to be maintained in Oudh, supported by an annual subsidy. The Nawab's own army was not to exceed thirty-five thousand; and he was to have no independent diplomatic relations with other powers. Allahabad was to be in possession of the British. It was a definite assertion of that British supremacy in Oudh which had been implicitly but not explicitly recognised ever since a previous Nawab had been replaced on his throne by grace of Robert Clive. While the arrangements for Wazir Ali's removal were being made, Sir John remained imperturbably at Lucknow, the Oudh capital, calling up no military assistance; being perfectly aware that he might at any moment be assassinated, but that on the other hand a collision between the British and Wazir Ali's followers might set the whole province in a flame. His cool courage triumphed. Wazir Ali's followers fell away day by day; when Saadat Ali arrived at Lucknow, all opposition had been withdrawn without disturbance, and his rival was removed to meditate revenge, on a comfortable pension.

His contest with the Army.

Very different was the Governor-General's management of a preceding episode, to which brief reference must be made. This was the virtual mutiny of the European officers of the Bengal army in 1795-6. The Company's army had in fact been seething with discontent for a long time past. The total military establishment consisted partly of King's

troops, *i.e.* regiments of the Regular army, partly of Company's troops, that is regiments, of which some consisted of Europeans but most of Sepoys commanded by the Company's officers. There was extreme jealousy between the King's officers and the Company's officers, and between the Company's officers and their Civilian fellows, who in their view were unduly favoured as compared with themselves under the new system of payment which Cornwallis had succeeded in introducing. Cornwallis had proposed a scheme for amalgamating the two military branches; but this had not found favour at home; and the expected alternative scheme of re-organisation was so unsatisfactory that the officers united to demand that certain concessions should be guaranteed, failing which they should seize the government. In effect, Sir John and the Commander-in-Chief surrendered at discretion and granted everything in their power. The Ministry in England entreated Cornwallis to save the situation by returning to India, and he agreed; but when he found that Ministers themselves were negotiating with representatives of the Mutineers in London, and were on the point of inviting him to sail with instructions to concede everything, he resigned in disgust. The office of Governor-General was thereupon accepted by Lord Mornington. Shore however had time to retrieve his reputation in Oudh, and to justify the bestowal of a peerage—he became Lord Teignmouth—before Mornington's arrival.

End of Shore's administration.

The tact, firmness and courage displayed by Sir John Shore in the Oudh affair contrast curiously with his failure in other cases where vigorous action and readiness to accept responsibility were demanded. His persistent avoidance of interference in the Dekhan had only produced in the Nizam an impression that the British Power was but a broken reed, and in the Marathas and Tippu a belief that its decay was setting in only rather more rapidly than was normal among the eternally changing dynasties of the "unchanging East." The delusion was to be ruthlessly shattered by Sir John's formidable successor.

CHAPTER XII

LORD WELLESLEY: (1) 1798-1802

(*Map III.*)

The new Governor-General.

LORD MORNINGTON, better known by his later title as the Marquess Wellesley, was thirty-seven years of age when he was nominated Governor-General of India. He was a brilliant scholar, and had already won considerable distinction as a speaker. On intimate terms with both Pitt and Dundas, he had already been for four years on the Indian Board of Control, and had a thorough knowledge, from that point of view, of Indian politics, as well as of European affairs. The policy of deliberate expansion with which he identified himself was to a great extent engendered by the progress of Napoleon, whose vast designs were beginning to be recognised at the time of Wellesley's appointment.

Indian Foreign Policy.

The dominant conception in Indian statesmanship had hitherto been the preservation of a balance of power between the three great States of Southern India, Mysore, Haidarabad and the Maratha confederacy. The feasibility of that policy, if no external factors were considered, was still doubtful; since it depended largely on the acquiescence of the three Powers, which could by no means be continuously depended upon. Aggression was ingrained in the minds of Oriental princes, as being, so to speak, part of their profession. None would have had the smallest compunction about annihilating another, if the opportunity occurred. Still the effort was made: and so, when Cornwallis had Tippu under his heel, he did not take advantage of the fact to destroy him, but only to reduce his power for independent aggression.

Now, however, the external factor had to be reckoned with. No one could foretell the developments of French power under the guidance of a military genius with an unbridled imagination. If France should succeed in achieving a renewed footing on Indian soil, as the ally of a native Power, the British would certainly have to fight for life. Before Nelson's great victory of the Nile (Aug. 1798) such a consummation was by no means impossible: even after it, the impossibility was very far from clear. To counteract the danger by alliances with Native courts was insufficient, because no Native court could be relied on to maintain an alliance for a day, if any immediate advantage for itself could be acquired by desertion. Hence no opportunity must be lost whereby the British could obtain in the native States a *de facto* military control. This was the more imperative, because each of the States had French officers and sepoy battalions in their service. Madhava Rao Sindhia had achieved the ascendancy, which he bequeathed to the young Daulat Rao, by entrusting his military organisation to a Frenchman, De Boigne: the Nizam, denied assistance by Sir John Shore, had organised a force under the Frenchman Raymond: Tippu had French officers in his pay, and was already very strongly suspected of being in correspondence with France. Finally, Napoleon was now making Egypt his immediate objective; and Egypt was regarded as the halfway house to India.

The danger from France.

Wellesley touched at the Cape on his voyage to India, in February (1798). There he discussed the situation with sundry Indian experts—Lord Hobart, the last governor of Madras; Macartney; and others who had a thorough knowledge of the native courts. Hence when he reached Calcutta in May he was already fully informed of the situation, and was prepared to act with the utmost promptitude and vigour. The danger was much more pressing than had been supposed when he left England, because there appeared to be a further probability that the Afghan monarch of Kabul, Zeman Shah, was about to invade India; and his strength, though after events showed it to have been vastly exaggerated, was believed to be very great, rendering the prospect of his

The situation: 1798.

alliance with the Mussulman zealot at Mysore particularly alarming.

Wellesley had hardly arrived when, in June, a proclamation was printed in Calcutta which had been issued some months earlier by the French governor of Mauritius, inviting French citizens to take service with Tippu, in accordance with proposals received from that monarch. Tippu's intrigues for French assistance were thus no longer a matter of suspicion but of absolute certainty.

Preparations for a Mysore War.

The Marathas were for the time sufficiently occupied with their own rivalries. Tippu required immediate attention; so did the Nizam, lest he should be drawn with his French force into alliance with Mysore. Wellesley forthwith set about preparations for a war with Mysore, and brought immediate pressure to bear on Haidarabad in order to remove danger in that direction. The Nizam succumbed to the judicious vigour of Kirkpatrick and John Malcolm who were sent to negotiate with him. The French corps known as Raymond's was disbanded: a British subsidiary force was substituted, and the Nizam undertook to employ no Europeans without assent of the Company. Malcolm remained at Haidarabad as Resident, his tact and vigilance securing freedom from any further danger in that quarter.

To render Tippu harmless was a much heavier task; involving at least the acquisition by the British of the whole of the Mysore litoral: since, once completely cut off from the sea, the Sultan would not be able to work in concert with the French. The reasons for avoiding a war were sufficiently strong. The Madras authorities, both civil and military were full of apprehension; they remembered how Medows and Cornwallis himself in his first campaign had been foiled in the last war, in spite of the victorious termination of the final campaign. There was still no prospect of efficient help from the Nizam, and a presumption that if the Marathas took a part at all it would be against the British. Wellesley however, had made up his mind: and happily he received dispatches from England which fully supported him. He made strenuous preparations, while pressing Tippu to make an amicable agreement, reject the French alliance,

dismiss all French officers, and accept the presence of a British Resident. As the year went on, he was able to emphasise his representations by reports of French misfortunes in Egypt. His demands were met only by constant evasions. By the New Year, there was still no hint of an accommodation being effected. Wellesley, knowing that the conditions of weather and climate demanded that the campaign should be finished decisively by June, resolved to strike at once.

The Mysore campaign: 1799.

A Bombay army was collected at Kananur on the Malabar coast, close to Mahé, to advance from the West under General Stewart. The main Madras army, commanded by General Harris, and accompanied by the Governor-General's younger brother, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, was to enter Mysore by way of Bangalur. By March (1799) the advance had begun. Tippu, who had shewn a good deal of his father's military capacity on occasion, displayed little of it in this campaign. He attempted to crush Stewart's smaller force on the South West; but when his attack was repulsed after hard fighting, he changed his plans and fell back to oppose the advance of Harris on the North East. He was again defeated, and retired to cover the expected route of the invaders to Seringapatam: but Harris evaded him, by following a more southerly line of march, which afforded better facilities for transport beside simplifying the junction with the Bombay force: and Tippu had to withdraw rapidly to Seringapatam. Early in April, siege works were advanced close to the town; about the middle of the month, Tippu was sufficiently alarmed to open negotiations. But the General's terms were too severe for him, and he rejected them with great indignation. The besiegers, however, were in desperate need of supplies: a protracted siege was out of the question, and on May 4th Seringapatam was carried by storm. The fight was very fierce; great numbers of the defenders were killed, and among them Tippu himself, whose courage at least did not fail him. With the fall of Seringapatam, the rule of the Mussulman dynasty of Mysore was ended.

Fall of Seringapatam.

The Mysore dynasty.

The Mysore war differs from those that follow it in this; that it was a war against a Dynasty, while they were wars with races. The hostility of Mysore to the British ceased with the fall of the house of Haidar Ali. There was no Mysore People with a tradition. But Marathas and Ghurkas and Sikhs retained a national tradition, however their wars with the British might result. In Mysore Haidar himself was but a Mohammedan adventurer who occupied the throne of a Hindu principality and made the neighbouring principalities subject to himself. Tippu has been made the subject of panegyric; but his fanaticism and his cruelties are unquestionable facts, while his virtues appear to be quite apocryphal. The moral claims of any rule obtained by the sword can be tested only by the beneficial character of the government and its power of resistance to adversaries: at least until a considerable period has elapsed since its establishment. But the Mussulman dominion in Mysore lasted for less than forty years. The Sultan's kin were the only losers by its annihilation; and membership of an Oriental royal family carries with it so many risks as to be an extremely doubtful privilege.

Partition of Mysore.

The division of the spoils offered a serious problem. The Nizam had actually given help and was fairly entitled to a share; policy required that the Marathas should be offered a share also. On the other hand, it would be unsafe for the British either to seize too much or to give away too much. The solution arrived at was ingenious.

A large portion of the territory was reserved intact, and the representative of the old Hindu dynasty was made Raja under British protection; that is, under conditions which precluded the protected State from assuming a hostile attitude. The Marathas were offered the north-western districts, on condition of an anti-French alliance, an undertaking to employ no Europeans without the Company's consent, and a promise to guarantee the inviolability of the new Mysore State. They rejected these terms, and the territory was consequently appropriated partly to the British and partly to the Nizam. To the Nizam also were assigned the districts from Chitaldrug to Guti, his boundaries being thus carried some way south of

the line of the Tanghabadra and Krishna rivers, to which they had been driven back by the aggressive Mohammedan chiefs. The British took the lion's share, appropriating all the Mysore litoral and the southern districts below the Ghats as well as the control of the forts commanding the passes, including Seringapatam; the British and the Nizam between them thus almost completely encircling the new Mysore State.

Subsidiary treaty with the Nizam: 1800.

The value of the conquest was completely secured by a further treaty with the Nizam in 1800. That monarch found himself in serious difficulties. He was not strong enough to resist the constant pressure and claims for *chauth* of the Marathas, or to control his own tributaries who found it safer to resist his demands than those of Puna. Hence also his subsidies to the British fell in arrear. He therefore finally accepted British protection. In return for a British force of ten thousand men — available, not as before only in case of open war, but for general defence against aggression — and in lieu of a subsidy for their maintenance, he handed over to the British his share of the Mysore territories; at the same time agreeing to submit all his disputes to British mediation. Thus the only independent Power left in the Dekhan was that of the Marathas; while this immense advance of the British supremacy had been effected in a manner and under conditions of which the legitimacy was beyond dispute; although the Governor-General had carried the theory of his right to act without specific authority to its extreme limits.

Annexation of Surat, Tanjur, and Arcot.

A like extension of supremacy was about to be effected in Oudh; while in the south a supremacy already existing was converted into practically direct dominion. Questions of succession arose at Surat and Tanjur, both small States; in both cases, the British government coupled its recognition of the heir with a treaty which transferred the entire administration civil and military to its own hands. More important was the termination of the system of dual control in the Carnatic. Hitherto, the treaties had provided that the British should protect the Nawab's territories in return for a subsidy: that they should not interfere with his administration; but

that he should have no independent diplomatic relations with other powers. On the failure of subsidies, districts had been assigned as fixed sources from which the payment should be drawn. The Nawabs however continued to sink deeper and deeper into debt, privately, giving mortgages even on the assigned districts; while their general administration was hopelessly incapable; and finally, convincing evidence was produced that the reigning Nawab was in treasonable correspondence with Tippu even at the time of the last war. These discoveries were not hastily acted upon; but in 1801, Lord Clive the Governor of Madras was instructed to make strong representations to the Nawab, Omdal ul Omrah. Action however was suspended owing to the Nawab's illness. On his death in July, there was as usual a disputed succession; and, also as usual, no decisive rule for judging the force of the respective claims. Government could recognise whom it would; and it put a price on its recognition—the acceptance of a treaty. Under this instrument, the entire administration was transferred to the Company, which took over the responsibility for the liquidation of legitimate debts; while the new Nawab kept the title and dignity, and an assignment of an adequate revenue.

Thus in 1801 all India south of the Tanghabadra and Krishna rivers was under direct British dominion; except the new Mysore State and some small principalities which were however effectively under British control: whilst the Nizam's independence had become very little more than a figure of speech. In the same year, the defensive position in Hindostan was secured by the enforcement of a new treaty upon Oudh. There the prevailing conditions were exceedingly anomalous. Oudh lay as a buffer between the British dominion on one side, and on the other Sindhia's dominion, or any invader from beyond the Satlej; whether the Sikhs, who were hardly yet recognised as formidable, or the Afghans who were supposed to be more formidable than the facts warranted. Hence the vital importance of Oudh being thoroughly defensible. Under the existing treaties, a British army was already maintained in Oudh, by means of a subsidy which had been in fact commuted for the cession of territory.

The problem of Oudh.

In addition, however, the Nawab of Oudh maintained an army of his own, over which he could exercise only very inefficient control: so much so that while it was of the utmost importance to keep the whole British force ready for action on the frontier, a large portion of it was required to dominate the Nawab's own troops. Moreover the internal administration of Oudh was conspicuously bad.

New subsidiary treaty with Oudh.

Wellesley then came to the conclusion that the Nawab's own army must be reduced or disbanded and the British contingent increased. This would involve an increased subsidy; which could only be secured, in the existing state of the Nawab's finances, by a cession of territory; the territory required being roughly Rohilkhand and the district known as the Doab lying between the Ganges and the Jamna. The necessity for this arrangement was impressed on Saadat Ali, who protested vigorously against it, and declared that he would abdicate. Wellesley replied that if he abdicated the Government must be handed over entirely to the Company, since, if he with all his experience was unable to cope with the difficulties of the situation, obviously his youthful heir would be no better off. The Nawab withdrew his suggestion of abdication; Wellesley replied that in that case the cession of the districts and the reform of the army must be forthwith carried out, and the right of the British admitted to advise on internal administration, though this had hitherto been expressly negatived in the treaties. Saadat Ali argued that as he was not in arrears with his subsidies, the British had no right to make new demands. The technical answer to him, that there was no security for his solvency in the immediate future, was clearly insufficient. In effect, the Governor-General's real position was that the public safety imperatively required a reorganisation, and since the existing treaty did not provide for it, the Nawab must accept a new treaty whether he liked it or not. The negotiations were entrusted to another of the Wellesley brothers, Henry, afterwards Lord Cowley: and finally the Nawab submitted under protest, declaring that he did so only because it was not in his power to resist.

Peculiar position of Oudh.

The justification of the Governor-General's high-handed action lay in the two principles; that under Oriental conditions, no existing Government in India could be held to have really acquired the full status of what international jurists mean by a State; and that a State in the Oriental sense could not be allowed to subsist on the British border under conditions which made it a standing source of peril. To this it is fair to add that Oudh itself had always stood in a peculiar relation to the British since the battle of Buxar. By all Oriental custom, it had then become forfeit to the British, having been overthrown in a war in which it had openly acted the part of aggressor entirely without provocation; and there was always a tacit sense that while the British had shown a surprising generosity in not claiming the forfeit, their title to do so on occasion still remained morally valid.

Wellesley's schemes against France.

During the first period of his career, the Governor-General's energies were by no means restricted to dealings with the Country Powers. His views of Indian policy had their root in the problem which Bonaparte was presenting to the statesmen of Europe. Having a grasp of the principles of maritime defence, Wellesley would have crippled the activity of the French in Eastern waters by falling upon their naval station at the Mauritius; which they were able to use greatly to the detriment of the traffic round the Cape, and would have become trebly dangerous, if the maritime supremacy of Britain could have been shaken, as a base for attacking India itself. In this, however, he was foiled by the obstinacy of Admiral Rainier, who refused to carry out his instructions without orders from the Admiralty; and the opportunity was lost. Similarly his efforts to make use of Ceylon were foiled by the obstinacy of the Governor, and the refusal of ministers to incorporate that island with the Indian dominions. His activity however was congenially displayed in the dispatch to Egypt in 1800 of an expedition commanded by Sir David Baird. The troops on their arrival found no fighting to do, as their approach decided the French to capitulate to the force from England which was already there. The idea of a combined Franco-Russian invasion overland also led to

the opening of diplomatic relations with Persia, by the magnificently equipped and skilfully conducted mission of John Malcolm to Teheran.

In 1802, however, Wellesley was on the verge of a struggle with the one Power which might, under slightly altered conditions, have seriously contested the British ascendancy in India.

CHAPTER XIII

LORD WELLESLEY: (2) 1802-1805

(*Maps V. and VIII.*)

WELLESLEY'S Mysore policy and his triumph over Tippu had been hailed with universal applause, alike in England and in India. The subsequent application of the same root principle, the flat negation of the ideal of non-interference, was viewed with much disfavour in Leadenhall Street and with only half-hearted approval by the ministry in London. In fact, the Directors and Proprietors were growing distinctly hostile to the Governor-General. Other causes were combining to this end. The Governor-General was exercising patronage extensively. His appointments were indisputably excellent, but the Directors felt that a privilege which they still regarded as their own was slipping from their hands. They required the cancellation of the appointment of Henry Wellesley to the administration of the districts ceded by Oudh, which were afterwards known as part of the North West Provinces; as well as of other appointments; to the extreme disgust of Lord Wellesley. They were indignant with him, because he recognised what had now become the necessity of admitting merchants other than the Company to the privileges of trade; since they believed that their financial interests would suffer by any relaxation of their monopoly. Wellesley perceived the urgent need of educating the Company's servants in India for the performance of their functions as rulers, and on his own responsibility established a college in Calcutta partly for that purpose. The Company demanded the abolition of the college, and only under pressure from the Board of Control assented to its maintenance in an eviscerated form.

Disapproval of Wellesley at the India House.