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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT REPORT
ON CHIN LUSHAI HILLS
SEPTEMBER, 1892

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FOREIGN DEPARTMENT,

N 68 Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration.

gestion for consolidating under one administration the entire area inhabited by Lushais and cognate tribes was receiving our serious consideration.

2. We forwarded, with our despatch in the Military Department, No. 28, dated the 24th February 1892, a copy of the Proceedings of a Conference, which sat at Calcutta in the beginning of the present year, for the discussion of questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai Hills.

3. We have now the honour to submit for Your Lordship's information a copy of the orders* we have passed on the proposals put forward by the Conference.

* Proceedings in the Foreign Department, No. 1823-E, dated the 26th July 1892.

N 12-12

Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration.

No. 12.

Field Operations.

No. 3318-B., dated Simla, the 5th November 1891.

From—MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. COLLEN, Secretary to the Government of India,
Military Department,

To—The Quartermaster-General in India.

I am desired to forward, for the information of the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying memorandum prepared in this Department on the military situation in Eastern India and Burma, and to state that among the questions dealt with therein the following appear to call for settlement:—

Assam and Manipur.

- (1) Completion of the road from the Brahmaputra to the Chindwin.
- (2) Question of the distribution of the troops in Assam and Manipur.
- (3) Development of volunteers in Assam.

Lushai Land.

- (4) Question of locating any troops in this part of the country.
- (5) The position between Fort Tregear and Haka.
- (6) Withdrawal of the Surma Valley Police Battalion from the Cachar and Sylhet districts to the Northern Lushai Hills.
- (7) Question of increasing the Assam frontier police.
- (8) Occasional march of troops through the Lushai country.
- (9) Necessity for the construction of roads and paths in Lushai-land.
- (10) Question whether any remedy should be applied in order to obviate the disadvantage of Lushai-land and the Chin Hills falling under three separate civil administrations and three separate military commands.

2. It has been suggested that, if opportunity presents itself, these questions and any others requiring settlement might be advantageously discussed in Calcutta during the coming cold season at a Conference of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Commissioner of Chittagong, and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District, and I am to say that steps will be taken to enquire if the various authorities concerned are of opinion that this course of action would facilitate decision on these questions.

No. 13.

Field Operations.

Memo., No. 3230-B., dated Fort William, the 6th November 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,

To—The Home Department.

The undersigned is directed to transmit, for consideration in the Home Department, a memorandum prepared in this Department on the military situation in Eastern India and Burma, together with a copy of a letter addressed

* No. 3215-B., dated the 5th November 1891.

to the Quartermaster-General in India,*
detailing questions which appear to call

for settlement, and adverting to the advantages that might be derived from a discussion of these and other questions, in Calcutta, during the approaching cold season, at a Conference of the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Commissioner of Chittagong, and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District.

3. The undersigned is to enquire whether the Home Department is of opinion that this course would facilitate decision on the questions referred to.

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3. If the Home Department concurs in the advisability of holding the proposed Conference, the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Chief Commissioner of Assam will be addressed on the subject.

No. 14.

Memo., No. 1832, dated Calcutta, the 14th November 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Home Department.
To—The Military Department.

In reply to the office memorandum from the Military Department, No. 3220-B., dated the 6th instant, the undersigned is directed to say that the Home Department concurs in the proposal to hold a Conference in Calcutta during the ensuing cold season at which the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Commissioner of Chittagong and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District should be present to discuss certain questions connected with the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

No. 15.

Telegram, No. 3617-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
To—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department.

Conference will assemble in Calcutta shortly to discuss various matters connected with military situation in Assam, Manipur and Chin-Lushai country. Members, Lieutenant-Governor, Bengal, Chief Commissioner, Assam, Commissioner, Chittagong, and General Officer Commanding Presidency District. Burma is being asked to depute an officer to attend, and it is proposed Sir James Dorman should represent Madras as regards Chin Hills. Do you agree?

No. 16.

Special and Miscellaneous.

Telegram, No. 3618-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
To—The Chief Commissioner of Burma.

Conference will assemble in Calcutta shortly to discuss military situation and other matters in Assam, Manipur and Chin-Lushai country. Members, Lieutenant-Governor, Bengal, Chief Commissioner, Assam, Commissioner, Chittagong, probably Sir James Dorman, and General Officer Commanding Presidency District. Can you send a representative?

No. 17.

Special and Miscellaneous.

No. 3621-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I am desired to forward, for the information of the Lieutenant-Governor, a copy of the correspondence marginally noted, regarding the assembly of a Conference at Calcutta for the discussion of the military situation and other matters in Assam and the Chin-Lushai country. It is proposed that the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Commissioner of Chittagong, Sir James Dorman as representing Madras, and the General Officer Commanding Presidency District should be invited to attend, and I am to ask that Sir Charles Elliott may be moved to say whether he will be able to be present at the Conference, and whether the attendance of the Commissioner of Chittagong is, in his opinion, necessary and could be arranged for.

Memorandum on the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.
To Quartermaster-General in India, No. 2313-B., dated 5th November 1891.
To Home Department, No. 2320-B., dated 6th November 1891.
From Home Department, No. 1892, dated 14th November 1891.

Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration. B 9-11

No. 9. No. 61 (Political), dated India Office, London, the 17th September 1891.

From—The Secretary of State for India,

To—The Government of India.

I have considered in Council the letter of Your Excellency's Government, No. 191 (Financial), of the 14th July, in which you submit for my approval the measures taken to secure the proper administration of the Southern Lushai Hills, which have recently been taken under control and constituted a separate charge under the Government of Bengal.

2. The cost is seemingly disproportionate to the area and population, but you cannot, you inform me, after careful consideration, suggest any means of diminishing it.

3. I approve of your proceedings, understanding that the present proposals are to be regarded as temporary.

4. The existing arrangements, under which these newly incorporated tracts are administered partly from Bengal, partly from Assam, and partly from Burma, according to the province to which each portion is adjacent, were no doubt necessary, in the first instance, as a temporary expedient, but I shall be glad to learn that the suggestion contained in the last sentence of your letter, for consolidating under a single authority, subject to the control of one administration, the entire area inhabited by Lushais and cognate tribes, is receiving your serious consideration.

5. The expediency of adopting such a course when feasible is obvious.

No. 2050-E., dated Simla, the 21st October 1891.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing is forwarded to the Department of Finance and Commerce for information, with reference to the endorsement from that Department, Despatch from Secretary of State, No. 61 (Political), dated the 17th September 1891. No. 2045, dated the 14th July 1891.

No. 10. No. 2408-E., dated Fort William, the 12th December 1891.

From—G. R. Iawin, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

In continuation of the letter from the Government of India in the Foreign

* No 1678-E., dated the 19th August 1891.

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India has accorded his sanction to the proposals made in Financial despatch† No. 191, dated the 14th July 1891, for the administration of the newly-formed charge of the South Lushai Hills as a temporary measure.

Department noted in the margin,* I am directed to state, for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India has accorded his sanction to the proposals made in Financial despatch† No. 191, dated the 14th July 1891, for the administration of the newly-formed charge of the South Lushai Hills as a temporary measure.

† Copy enclosed for His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor's information.

No. 11.

Special and Miscellaneous.

Memo. No. 3656-B., dated Fort William, the 16th December 1891.

From—The Officiating Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,

To—The Foreign Department.

* To Quartermaster-General in India, No. 5315-B., dated the 5th November 1891.

To Home Department, No. 3230-B., dated 6th November 1891.

From Home Department, No. 1632, dated the 14th November 1891.

Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 3617-B., dated 14th December 1891.

Telegram to Chief Commissioner of Burma, No. 3618-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

To Government of Bengal, No. 3621-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

To Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 3622-B., dated the 14th December 1891.

Forwarded* for information.

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2. I am to add that, as it is understood the Chief Commissioner of Assam will visit Calcutta shortly, it would probably be convenient if the Conference could be held at a very early date.

No. 18.

Special and Miscellaneous.

No. 3622-B., dated Fort William, the 14th December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

To—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

I am desired to forward a copy of the correspondence marginally noted, regarding the assembly of a Conference at Calcutta for the discussion of the military situation and other matters in Assam and the Chin-Lushai country. It is proposed that the Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the Commissioner of Chittagong, Sir J. Dornier as representing Madras, and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District shall be invited to attend the Conference, and it will probably be arranged that this should take place during Mr. Ward's approaching visit to Calcutta. I am therefore to enquire whether it will be convenient for the Chief Commissioner to attend the Conference at that time.

No. 19.

Telegram, No. 2488-E., dated the 18th December 1891.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Chief Commissioner, Bangoon.

2488-E. Please see Military Department telegram No. 3618-B. of 14th Military Conference. It would be well to take this opportunity of considering some scheme for the gradual assimilation of politico-civil administration of Chin-Lushai country by Burma, Bengal, and Assam with view to facilitating ultimate consolidation into one charge. Bengal and Assam are being asked whether they can arrange for attendance of officers with good local knowledge of their respective tracts and sufficiently acquainted with details of present system of administration. Can you manage this?

No. 20.

Telegram, No. 2442-E., dated the 19th December 1891.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta,

To—The Chief Commissioner, Shillong.

2442-E. Please see Military Department letter No. 3622-B. of 14th Military Conference. It would be well to take this opportunity of considering some scheme for the gradual assimilation of politico-civil administration of Chin-Lushai country by Burma, Bengal, and Assam with view to facilitating ultimate consolidation into one charge. Bengal and Burma are being asked whether they can arrange for attendance of officers with good local knowledge of their respective tracts and sufficiently acquainted with details of present system of administration. Can you manage this?

No. 21.

Telegram, dated the 21st December 1891.

From—The Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Bangoon,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

264. Your 2138-E. Chief Commissioner cannot possibly spare an officer with local knowledge until the column work is over.

[04]

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated Simla, the 8th May 1892.

From—J. P. HEWITT, Esq.,

To—SIR MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

His Excellency desires me to inquire how the consideration of the recommendations of the Conference on questions relating to Lushai land is proceeding, and when the case is likely to come before him.

Extract from a letter from Sir C. A. ELLIOTT, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, to the Viceroy, dated Darjeeling, the 19th June 1892.

Your Excellency may remember how at our Chin-Lushai Conference Mackenzie repudiated the idea that there was any evidence that the Lushais were playing off one Administration against another. Will you please read the enclosed diary* from Captain Shakespear as bearing on this point? He is very discouraged and alarmed, and wants to throw up his post. I am a little disappointed in him, but he has had great difficulties to contend with, and his part of the country seems more subject to fever than McLab's or the Haka and Fort White side. I trust you will soon come to some decision on the future administration of this country. It is a very severe burden and source of anxiety, and I venture to think the shoulders of the Bengal Government are somewhat overlaiden already without it.

Extract from a letter from the Viceroy to Sir C. A. ELLIOTT, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, dated Simla, the 26th June 1892.

The Lushai question, after a good deal of inter-departmental discussion and noting, came up for discussion in Council yesterday. We have settled that the whole of the Lushai country, with the North Arakan Hills and the Chittagong Hills, are to be transferred to Assam. You are to be consulted as to the possibility of also transferring the Chittagong Division, and you will of course have every opportunity given you of saying your say as to the location of the boundary throughout its course. We do not propose to deprive Burma of its China for the present.

[DEMI-OFFICIAL.]

Dated the 27th June 1892.

From—C. J. LYALL, Esq.,

To—SIR MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

With reference to the decision arrived at in last Thursday's Council regarding the transfer to Assam of South Lushai land and certain parts of the Chittagong Division in Bengal, I write to say that it is understood in this Department that we shall have an opportunity of seeing the draft letters to Bengal and Assam before they issue. The proposals deal with territory other than the Hill Tracts, and Foreign Department is concerned only with the latter.

Dated Simla, the 6th July 1892.

From—J. P. HEWITT, Esq.,

To—SIR MORTIMER DURAND, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

I send the enclosed for information.

Dated Calcutta, the 2nd July 1892.

From—SIR C. A. ELLIOTT, K.C.S.I.,

To—THE MARQUESS OF LANSDOWNE, G.O.M.C.

I am much obliged by your letter informing me of the decision of Council about the Lushai Hills. As far as Bengal is concerned, I am relieved, but I regret the separation of the Chins from the Lushais, as I fear it will be productive of future mischief of the kind indicated in the diary I lately submitted to Your Excellency. As to the cession of Chittagong to Assam, I have always advocated it, and the early construction of the railway makes it even more desirable than before. But I could not advise making over the Chittagong Hill Tracts without Chittagong. No doubt a portion of the tract was once Lushai land, but the majority of the people are quite unconnected with Lushais. They are Chakmas, Mags, Buddhists, and are accustomed to look to Chittagong for their sense of government. It would unsettle them dreadfully to transfer their allegiance to an officer at Aijal or Langlet. I presume that I shall have an opportunity of representing this officially.

{ DRAFT-OFFICIAL. }

Dated Simla, the 16th August 1892.

From—J. A. CRAWFORD, Esq.,
To—W. R. WARD, Esq., C.S.I.

The Bengal Government have asked for instructions in regard to the transfer of the Southern Lushai Hills to Assam, and we have informed them that instructions will issue on receipt of a further report from you. It is understood that your reply to Foreign Department letter No. 514-E., dated the 17th March 1892 has been delayed in consequence of McCabe's departure on furlough, but I am now to enquire whether you expect shortly to see your way to submitting recommendations on the subject.

Dated Simla, the 15th August 1892.

From—J. A. CRAWFORD, Esq.,
To—The Hon'ble H. J. S. COTTON, C.S.I.

With reference to our telegram No. 1412-E., dated the 8th August 1892, I am to explain, for the information of His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor, that the Assam report in connection with the transfer of the Southern Lushai Hills has, it is understood, been delayed in consequence of McCabe's departure on furlough. Mr. Ward is being asked how soon the report may be expected, and we shall communicate with you officially on the subject as soon as possible.

Dated Comilla, the 16th August 1892.

From—SIR C. A. ELLIOTT, K.C.B.,
To—SIR MONTAGUE DUNN, K.C.B., C.S.I.

Captain Shakespear is at Simla, and, if he has not called on you, will soon do so, and I hope you will see him and hear his views about the South Lushai District, and the necessity for an expedition there in the cold weather, and of an early settlement of the question of transfer. It is now two months nearly since His Excellency the Viceroy informed me it had been decided in Council, but we have had nothing official except an extract from Proceedings in a form I had not seen before and which hardly looked official. It contained no instructions or order. If I am to be responsible for next cold weather's operations, I ought to know in good time, and to arrange about transport and supplies and a military force. Shakespear will want some help to enable him to subjugate the villages which rose against him last March and April; he cannot do it with his military police alone. I will not write more because I hope he will tell you everything you want to know. I am glad that though married he intends to stick to the work.

Sorry to hear your brother is still suffering from his wound. You must be very busy with North-Western Frontier affairs. Do not neglect our wants which though less important are still serious.

K. W. No. 3.

Note on our dealings with savage tribes, and the necessity for having them under one rule.

I have often wondered whether we are quite wise in at once imposing, as we do, on the savage tribes whom the march of events brings under our sway, a tribute, however nominal, in token of their submission. In some cases tribute has never before been levied at all, and in others so irregularly by the former masters of the country that it has almost ceased to be recognized as such. As for instance, the tribute levied by the Burmese in the Bor Khamti country. When I visited the Khamtis in 1886, I was told that several years had elapsed since the last tribute had been paid or any Burmese official had visited them, and although they recognized Thebaw to a certain extent (the old Khamti Raja said as long as we were friends with Thebaw he was friends with us), yet they were practically independent. In remote districts the "paramount power" is a term utterly meaningless to the inhabitants who regard the officer visiting them to enforce their submission as some strange independent chief out on a raking expedition on his own account. The Chinese thus regarded General Symons' expedition. The world for them extends only as far as the most distant village they have raided or the nearest Burmese settlement, and no further, e.g., the threat of the Alais and Daphne to raid "as far as Tampus and take captive that Queen yu" (the Deputy Commissioner) "are always building about." And when the white chief, who, at the head of a well armed force, has raided successfully on them and enforced their so-called submission, disappears below their horizon, they trouble themselves no more about the terms of their "submission," which word to them merely implies the means by which they get rid cheaply of an

unpleasant visitor; and they are surprised and irritated when next cold season some small official appears to demand revenue.

We had a striking illustration of this last spring, when some Burman headmen attempted to collect tribute in the Chinbok Hills, and were refused; necessitating little expeditions against the Chins, with loss to ourselves and them.

We were told in the reports of these proceedings that "these Chins appear to be utter savages, as peculiar in their dress and habits as they are indecent according to European ideas." But notwithstanding these lamentable shortcomings, we expected them to be fully abreast of European ideas in other respects, and to show an intelligent appreciation of the advantage to themselves of being taxed to swell the revenue of the Empire, and to submit cheerfully to such an infliction. Unless this was what we expected, it was a futile proceeding to send a Burman headman to collect tribute, and the question arises whether at this early stage of our relations with these tribes, and especially with tribes not actually in contact with our settled districts, it is worth while to "enforce their submission," or to insist on their paying tribute, till they realise that certain advantages result to them from our rule, on witnessing its effects among their more civilised neighbours. Raids on protected villages should be most promptly and severely punished, but till these Chins know more of the unity and permanency of the British rule, it might be well not to harass them, nor provoke them to acts which will necessitate reprisals. Mr McCabe reports that one of the causes which led to the Lushai rising in September 1880 and the death of Captain Browne, was the question of revenue, which might have been left till he had acquired a little more influence over his subjects. The tribute no doubt is only nominal, but it serves to irritate them, as they have been hitherto entirely independent; and they do not see what they gain by paying tribute to some official in whom they do not recognise the representative of a great power, but only a small extortionist working in his own interest. Mr Murray lately expressed an opinion that the submission of the Howlongs to Captain Shakespear was only a farce, and that if he has to exact revenue or labour they will be in arms very soon. Captain Shakespear says Mr Murray's opinion is not to be lightly disregarded, but hopes that he over estimates the danger. When the tribes begin, however, to realize that the British Government is something above and beyond the officials and the sepoy whom they see, and that it really has the power to enforce its decisions, then they welcome the superior authority which can and will put down railing and keep the peace among them; and in return for this they feel that the rulers have a right to demand something as tribute or revenue.

Their customs from time immemorial have obliged them to raid for slaves and hawks, and no one village or tribe can be the first to set aside these customs, though they acquiesce when a superior power forbids indulgence in them. Some among the more enlightened Nagas said to me years ago, having seen something of the peace reigning under our rule—"Many of us wish the British Government would take us over and force us to cease raiding on each other, and put a stop to our blood feuds. We cannot initiate a peaceful movement ourselves, as a village or tribe preaching and trying to practise universal peace and good-will, would be marked for destruction by its neighbours."

But if we took them in hand, they would say with the Curate in the Hail Ballade :

"For years we've longed for some
Rescue for this revelation.
Now at last it's come
We do it on compulsion."

As in the East so in the West, and we find the Deputy Commissioner, Hazara, protesting against demanding ready tribute from the Akasias, as it would send them again into opposition, or if accepted, its realisation hereafter could not be guaranteed; and the effect would be worse than if we had never demanded it.

Another thing which strikes one in reading the reports from the different political officers in the Chin-Lushai Hills, is that they are labouring under considerable difficulties in consequence of the whole country not being under one administration. The Chin-Lushai Hills abound in instances of difficulties having been caused by the three Governments of Bengal, Assam and Burma having jurisdiction in these hills. In 1880 the Lushais could not be dealt with by Assam as usual, because the force advancing under General Tregear was acting from Bengal. A village on the Cachar side called Thauruma was exceedingly insolent and threatening and would have been punished but that the attack was countermanded at the last moment by a telegram from Bengal sent under a misapprehension of the true state of affairs. The Lieutenant-Governor admitted the mistake, but added that he was not altogether sorry for it. Thauruma, however, concluded that we had abandoned the attack through fear, and the incident was no doubt another of the causes leading to Captain Browne's death.

During the expeditions of 1880-80, the Chins were quick enough to perceive that our Generals were working under different orders, and they could not help playing them off one against the other, with a certain amount of success, as our knowledge of the country and its inhabitants was very limited and careful enquiry should have preceded any decision as to jurisdiction. After the Fort Tregear column had left Haka, we had some Tlan Tlang Chiefs going to General Symons and asking him to allow certain villages to remain under Tlan Tlang and be controlled from Haka. General Symons consented pending enquiry, and Captain Shakespear regretted this action as he felt sure that the difficulty of obtaining a satisfactory hold over

the Chiefs would be increased; and so it proved, and the villages had eventually to be placed under Fort Tregear. In a very recent diary again, Captain Shakespear, complains of certain of his Chiefs going to have some matter settled at Haka. He says "I cannot make out Tingtus going to Haka as he must have known I should see him righted. There is something behind this which he thought the Haka Sahib would not know about, but which I should." Captain Shakespear also complains that he is not supplied with the diaries of other political officers in the Chin-Lushai Hills, and so cannot know what is going on, nor form an opinion as to the probability of the stories he hears from other parts. The hillmen know that their immediate and visible rulers owe allegiance to three separate great chiefs, whom they hear of as the Lord of Assam, the Lord of Burma and the Lord of Bengal, and they do not understand that these three Lords in turn owe allegiance to a higher than they, nor that they all work together for the good of the Empire. This is contrary to all their experience.

Much trouble has arisen by reason of the same villages being known to Burma by different names to those given to them by Chittagong; and Chiefs having an account to settle with Burma have made their peace with us on the Chittagong side, whence they look for protection against any retribution to be exacted by Burma. The three Governments are often at variance as to the policy to be adopted towards certain tribes, and very often doubtful to which jurisdiction certain villages belong, and it seems, in my humble opinion, imperative that, for a speedy and satisfactory settlement of the whole Chin-Lushai district, it should be formed into a Commissionership, or Chief Commissionership, the head of which should be responsible only to the Government of India. The officer appointed should have great personal knowledge of hillmen, and great experience in dealing with them. He should be active and energetic enough to travel freely and frequently throughout the hills: he should be firm but conciliatory and easily accessible, so as to become a living personality among his wild subjects, and not the vague and shadowy beings to whom at present questions vitally affecting the tribes are referred, of whom the tribes themselves know nothing, and whom they probably only regard as convenient political Mrs. Harries. Butler, McCabe and Williamson have shown us how vast is the influence which can be acquired by men such as I have above described, who have been known, as Butler was among the Angamis, by the name of "Apo,"* to whom these savage children could carry their troubles and their differences, and who were able and willing to make themselves a terror to the evil-doers while protecting and rewarding those that did well.

* "Apo" father. "Apo, Idol" - Father Johnny, was the Angamis' name for Captain Butler. He was born in Assam where his father held a high position in charge of the hill tribes and was known as a child as "Johnny," and by the name of "Johnny Sahib" he was hailed on his return to Assam by those natives, great and small, who had known him as a boy.

1st October 1893

R. O. W.

Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration. B 22-22

No. 22.

Telegram, dated the 23rd December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Shillong,
To—The Foreign Secretary, Calcutta.

3841-P. Your telegram 2442-E. of 19th. Have just returned Shillong and seen Military Department letter referred to. Have been obliged postpone visit Calcutta owing to necessity discussing Provincial Contract here with Comptroller. May possibly visit Calcutta about 20th January to discuss Contract with Financial Department, and if considered necessary could arrange to do so. Shall certainly visit Calcutta about last week in March. I suggest Conference taking place then, and McCabe should certainly be invited to attend; impossible for him attend now; he has been some time away from Lushai and has already started on his way back; has important work on hand there, which cannot be postponed.

No. 23.

Special and Miscellaneous.

Memo. No. 45-B., dated Fort William, the 8th January 1892.

From—The Officiating Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,
To—The Foreign Department.

* Telegram from Government of Madras, No. 7178, dated 16th December 1891.
Telegram from Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 249, dated 16th December 1891.
From Government of Bengal, No. 3957-P., dated 21st December 1891.
Telegram from Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 2442-P., dated 23rd December 1891.
Extract from semi-official letter from Mr A. Macdonald to the Viceroy, dated 19th December 1891

Forwarded * in continuation of Military Department memorandum No. 3656-B., dated the 16th December 1891.

No. 24.

Telegram, No. 7178, dated the 16th December 1891.

From—The Secretary to the Government of Madras, Military Department,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Your 3617-B. Madras Government agree to nomination Sir James Dornier for Conference in Calcutta. His Excellency has been informed.

No. 25.

Telegram, No. 249, dated the 16th December 1891.

From—The Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Your 3618-B. Chief Commissioner suggests that General Stewart, Commanding Burma District, might be asked to attend the Conference.

No. 26.

No. 3957-P., dated Calcutta, the 21st December 1891.

From—H. J. S. Corrow, Esq., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, Political Department,
To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

I am to acknowledge your letter No. 3631-B., dated the 14th instant, enquiring whether the Lieutenant-Governor will be able to be present at a Conference shortly to be held at Calcutta for the discussion of the military situation and other matters in Assam and the Chin-Lushai country, and whether the attendance of the Commissioner of Chittagong is, in His Honour's opinion, necessary, and could be arranged for.

B-9-22-Sept.

№ 26-28 Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration.

2. In reply, I am to say that Sir Charles Elliott contemplates making a tour in Orissa during February next, and is therefore not likely to be in Calcutta during that month, but that he will be very glad to attend the proposed Conference if it is held at any time when he is at the Presidency. Mr. Oldham, the Commissioner of Chittagong, is now on a tour in the South Lushai Hills, and could be recalled without inconvenience, but if the Conference were deferred till March it is possible that he could then be present.

3. I am to add that the Lieutenant-Governor has reason to believe that Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, will also not be able to be in Calcutta till the close of the cold weather.

№. 27.

Telegram, No. 3842-P, dated the 23rd December 1891.

From—The Chief Commissioner of Assam, Shillong,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Your letter 3622-B., dated 14th. Have sent following message to Foreign:—Message *begins*. Your telegram 2442-E. of 18th. Have just returned Shillong and seen Military Department letter referred to. Have been obliged postpone visit Calcutta owing to necessity discussing Provincial Contract here with Comptroller. May possibly visit Calcutta about 20th January to discuss contract with Financial Department, and if considered necessary could arrange to do so. Shall certainly visit Calcutta about last week in March. I suggest Conference taking place then, and McCabe should certainly be invited to attend; impossible for him attend now; he has been some time away from Lushai and has already started on his way back; has important work on hand there which cannot be postponed. Message *ends*.

№. 28.

Extract from a demi-official letter from Sir A. Mackenzie, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Burma, to the Viceroy, dated Rangoon, the 19th December 1891

About the Chin-Lushai Conference, if it is (as the telegram to me states) to discuss only the military situation, then General Stewart would represent Burma better than any other. He knows my views, and I think accepts them. If the subject-matter of discussion is to be the future administration of the whole Chin-Lushai country, the case would be different, and a very large problem would be opened. Of course it is inconvenient that three different Local Governments and one Native State should be concerned in the management of the same great block of hills. But it is a mistake to treat the tribes inhabiting these hills as though they were one and the same people. Ethnologically they may be so, but politically they are a congeries of independent, and even hostile communities, looking out of their hills towards the plains from which they severally draw their surplus of salt and (hitherto) of slaves. The Chins on the east look to Upper Burma; those on the west to Sandoway, Kyaukpyu, and Akyah. In all three of these districts we have Chin communities under settled administration and paying regular taxes, as well as a fringe of hill Chins who are more loosely managed. North of Akyah we have the Arracan Hill Tracts, the Superintendent of which manages a protected circle of hills with a definite administrative border, beyond which lies a tract of almost unexplored country inhabited by Shindoon, etc., geographically belonging to Arracan, but politically more important to the Chittagong Hill Tracts than to us. (The tribal raids and movements from this tract are generally northward.) When I was at Akyah last week, the Superintendent of the Arracan Hills met me. He wants a large increase of his armed police, and proposes to advance the limit of his effective jurisdiction to march with that of Chittagong. As far as Burma is concerned, there is no need of this. The Shindoos don't trouble us, but it is quite certain that the country under Fort Tregear will not be safe while a fringe of unrestrained savagery lies outside it. I told the Superintendent to arrange to meet Lieutenant Pugh in February and discuss with him the requirements of that part of the hills.

Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration E 28-29

If, however, the Government of India is going to consider in a comprehensive way the whole question of administering the Chin-Lushai tract, it may be desirable to raise wider issues than any hitherto proposed. Were it not that Bengal is already so large, I should myself be inclined to suggest the re-transfer to Bengal of the whole Arracan Division. We have to keep a Commissioner there now, because the tract is so isolated from the rest of Burma that it could not be managed as a part of any of our Divisions, but it would, I should think, be easily enough managed from Chittagong, and certainly I would place the whole of the Chittagong and Arracan Hill Tracts under the same control.

Perhaps the idea is to place the whole Chin-Lushai country under one officer. As far as I am concerned, I should only be too glad to get rid of the Chin Hills as well as of Arracan, but, in the present state of communications, I do not see how any such plan would work. I am inclined to think that the China to the east of the watershed (or of a line to be settled) must, for some time to come, be controlled from Burma. The Baungshis, Chinboks, and other tribes to the south would certainly have to be so. But if the Arracan Hills, the Chittagong Hills, and the Lushai country were all under one administration probably it would be advantageous. The funds might be got, as before suggested, by abolishing the Commissioner of Arracan and incorporating that Division with Chittagong. The Arracanese are more Bengali than Burman in many ways, and large tracts in Akyah are actually held by Chittagonians. I found that I was the first Chief Commissioner who had been in Akyah and Kyaukpyn during the past eight years. The Burma Inspector-General of Jails has apparently never been to Sandoway. It is clear that the Division has had very little attention paid to it by Burma hitherto. Burmese officials object to serve there. It is in fact linked to Burma by very loose bonds.

I really do not know whom I could send to Calcutta to discuss the administrative question, if it is to be discussed. Sometimes, my Chief Secretary, would be the best man, but all the threads of our frontier work are in his hands, and it would be most inconvenient to spare him. His Under Secretary is a new man, and the office here is too feeble to be trusted even for a day. At the Conference could wait till March I might be able to run across myself for a week, and, if large questions are to be raised, it would be best that I should hear what is proposed, and have my own say. But if only military matters are at issue, I would, as already mentioned, send General Stewart. He knows much more about them than Sir J. Dornier.

No. 29.

Special and Miscellaneous

No. 248-B, dated Fort William, the 21st January 1892.

FROM—MAJOR-GENERAL E. H. H. COLLEN, Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department,

To—The Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

I am directed to inform you that the Governor-General in Council has decided that a Conference shall be held in Calcutta on or about the 25th instant, to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Lushai and Chin Hills.

2. The Conference will consist of the following:—

The Hon'ble the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

The Chief Commissioner of Burma.

The Chief Commissioner of Assam.

The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

The Quarter-Master-General in India.

N 28-30 Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration.

3. The Government of India, I am to say, have no desire that the scope of the enquiry and discussion should be closely limited; they would wish that a free interchange of opinion should take place among the members of the Conference, in respect to the extent of the inconvenience arising from the present condition of things under which the Chin-Lushai country is dealt with by three civil administrations and three military commands.

4. It will probably be desirable to ascertain at the outset of the enquiry whether the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented, whether it is desirable to make a change, and what remedies would be practicable. Assuming that a change is desirable, it would be for the Conference to point out the tribes which could be conveniently placed under one control, and the administration to which they should be transferred, unless it were to appear preferable that a separate administration should be formed for their government. Upon the recommendations to be made on this question, many others will depend; and it will probably be necessary to decide whether there should be one chief of the civil administration and one military commander, or whether the two duties should be combined in one man; what civil staff should be employed; the number of districts into which the tract with which it may be found practicable to deal should be divided; the boundaries and head-quarters of the central authority; the limits of the control of the military commanding officer, and the force which should be at his disposal; the strength, organisation, and distribution of the police force, and its relation to the military force; the arrangements to be made for commissariat and transport; and the kind of taxes or service which should be imposed on the people of the country to be administered.

5. There would also be other questions which the Conference may desire to consider, such as the strength of the garrison at Manipur with reference to its relations with the hill tribes; the completion of communications between India and Burma and Manipur, as well as through the Chin-Lushai Hills; the strength of the garrison of Assam in its relation to Lushai; and the construction of roads in Lushai-land and the Chin Hills.

6. In conclusion, I am to say that it is not supposed that the Conference will be able to dispose finally of all these problems, but the Governor-General in Council trusts that they may be able to lay down the outlines of the policy to be followed. A conclusion might thus be arrived at on the main points without any very protracted discussion; and if this were approved, the details could be worked out and elaborated by the local officials.

Copy of the foregoing forwarded, with the remark that the first meeting of the Conference will take place at 12 o'clock (noon) on Monday, the 25th January 1892, at the Military Department, 6, Esplanade East, to—

The Hon'ble Sir Charles Alfred Elliott, K.C.S.I.

His Excellency Lieutenant-General the Hon'ble Sir J. C. Dornier, K.C.B.

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, K.C.S.I.

W. B. Ward, Esq., C.S.I.

Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I.

Major-General E. H. H. Collen, C.I.E.

Major-General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., R.E.

No. 30.

Special and Confidential.

Office Memo. No. 738-B, dated Fort William the 25th February 1892.

From—The Offg. Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Military Dept.,

To—The Foreign Department.

With reference to the correspondence ending with Military Department letter No. 246-B, dated the 21st January 1892, the undersigned is directed to

From the Secretary to the Chin-Lushai Conference, No. 4, dated the 19th January 1892, and enclosure.

transfer to the Foreign Department, for consideration, in communication with the Home Department, the papers marginally noted, being the Proceedings of the Conference recently assembled at Calcutta for the discussion of various questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai country.

2. A copy of a despatch received from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India on this subject and of the reply * thereto is also forwarded.

* No. 180, dated the 24th December 1891.
No. 25, dated the 24th February 1892.

No. 21.

Chin-Lushai Conference.

No. 4.

FROM

THE SECRETARY, CHIN LUSHAI CONFERENCE,

TO

THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA,
MILITARY DEPARTMENT.

Fort William, the 29th January 1892.

SIR,

I AM directed to inform you that in accordance with the orders of the Governor-General in Council conveyed in the Government of India letter in Military Department No. 218-B, of 21st January 1892, the following members of the Conference assembled in Calcutta on 25th instant to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Chin and Lushai Hills :-

The Hon'ble Sir Charles Alfred Elliott, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

His Excellency Lieutenant-General the Hon'ble Sir J. C. Dormer, K.C.M.G., Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Burma.

W. E. Ward, Esq., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Assam.

Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Major-General E. H. H. Collen, C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Major-General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., R.E., Quartermaster-General in India.

2. I am directed to forward herewith certain resolutions passed by the members of the Conference, bearing on the present condition of things under which the Chin-Lushai country is dealt with by three different administrations, and suggesting certain changes in the administration of the tract, with a list of replies to the various points raised for discussion in para. 4 of the Government of India letter above mentioned.

3. I am also to submit a Minute laid before the Conference by Sir Alexander Mackenzie with a note from Sir Charles Elliott relating to so much of the Minute as deals with the question of the practical inconvenience resulting from divided administration, and a rejoinder thereto from Sir Alexander Mackenzie.

I am,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

(Signed) H. W. G. COLE,

Secy., Chin-Lushai Conference.

ho 32.
Chin-Lushai Conference.

No. 3.

Fort William, the 29th January 1892.

At the final meeting of the Chin-Lushai Conference held at Fort William, on 29th January 1892.

PRESENT :

The Hon'ble Sir Charles Alfred Elliott, K.C.S.I., Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal.

His Excellency Lieutenant-General the Hon'ble Sir J. C. Dormer K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief, Madras.

Sir Alexander Mackenzie, K.C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Burma.

W. E. Ward Esq., C.S.I., Chief Commissioner of Assam.

Sir Henry Mortimer Durand, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

Major-General E. H. H. Collen, C.I.E., Secretary to the Government of India, Military Department.

Major-General Sir James Browne, K.C.S.I., C.B., R.E., Quartermaster-General in India.

The following Resolutions were passed :—

1. The majority of the Conference are of opinion that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country known as the Chin-Lushai Hills should be brought under one Administrative head as soon as this can be done. They also consider it advisable that the new Administration should be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of Assam. Sir J. Dormer and Sir Alexander Mackenzie would defer any final decision as regards the eastern part of the tract till further information is obtained.

2. The Conference is not prepared to assert that this step can be taken immediately. As matters now stand, the difficulties of communication, of supplies, and of transport are very serious, and it will in any case be necessary to suspend action until after the close of the present cold season's operations in the Chin and Lushai Hills.

3. The first thing to be done for the control of this tract is to improve the communications between the important places such as Cachar and Aijal, Aijal and Lungleh, Aijal and Manipur, and the posts situated respectively on the eastern and western side of the tract. The opening out of these lines is a work of pressing importance. The necessary commissariat staff should also be provided to arrange for transport and supplies, till the tract is able to provide them for itself.

4. The Conference is of opinion that the boundaries of the new administrative area should be, generally speaking, the boundaries of the tract occupied by the savages newly brought under British control, but the details of those boundaries can only be settled after consultation with local officers.

5. The Conference is agreed that North and South Lushai, with such portions of the Arracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined, should be placed under Assam at once on condition that—

- (1) complete transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai, are provided ;
- (2) funds are granted for road and telegraph from Aijal to Lungleh.

(Signed)	C. A. ELLIOTT.
„	J. C. DORMER, <i>Lieut.-Genl.</i>
„	A. MACKENZIE.
„	W. E. WARD.
„	H. M. DURAND.
„	E. H. H. COLLEN.
„	JAMES BROWNE, <i>Maj.-Genl.</i>

Questions raised in Military Department letter No. 248-B, dated the 21st January 1892, for members of the Chin-Lushai Conference to consider, and their replies.

Question (1).—Whether the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented, and whether it is desirable to make a change, and what remedies would be practicable?

Reply.—The majority of the members of the Conference are agreed that the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented. Sir James Dornier does not concur in the above opinion as far as regards military matters. Sir Alexander Mackenzie holds by the opinions set forth in his minute, a copy of which is attached to these Proceedings.

The Conference is of opinion that it is desirable to make a change in the present system of administration. The most practicable remedies are dealt with in the answers to the questions which follow, and in Resolutions 1, 3, and 5.

Question (2).—Assuming that a change is desirable, will the Committee point out the tribes which could be conveniently placed under one control, and the administration to which they should be transferred, unless it is considered preferable that a separate administration should be formed for their government?

For the answer to this question see Resolutions 1 and 4.

Question (3).—Whether there should be one chief of the civil administration and one military commander, or whether the two duties should be combined in one man?

Reply.—The Conference considers that there should be one civil officer in chief control, the military authorities acting on his requisition. It does not advocate that the two duties of chief of civil administration and of the military commander should be combined in one man.

Question (4.) What civil staff should be employed?

Reply.—The Conference is of opinion that, if the Chin Hills are left with Burma, nothing more is wanted for North and South Lushai than a political officer with head-quarters divided between Fort Aijal and Lungleh and an assistant political officer at each of these posts subordinate to the political officer.

If the Chin-Lushai Hills are combined into one administrative area there should be one civil administrator, called (say) the Commissioner of the Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts. The whole tract should be divided into districts or political agencies, immediately subordinate to the Commissioner.

In this case probably four districts or political agencies would be necessary in the first instance, say—(1) North Lushai (Fort Aijal), (2) South Lushai (Lungleh), (3) North Chin (Fort White), (4) South Chin (Haka). As communications improve, these four districts might be reduced to two districts with two sub-divisions.

Question (5).—The number of districts into which the tract, with which it may be found practicable to deal, should be divided.

Reply.—This question has been answered in the reply to No. 4.

Question (6).—The boundaries and head-quarters of the central authority.

Reply.—As to boundaries see Resolution 4. The Conference considers that it would be premature to settle the head-quarters at present.

Question (7).—The limits of the control of the military commanding officer and the force which should be at his disposal.

Reply.—The Conference is of opinion that no separate military commanding officer for the whole tract should be appointed unless the higher military authorities deem it necessary. As regards the force, it considers that at present there should be three regiments located in the eastern hills to be reduced hereafter if military police battalions are raised in these hills. In addition to this it would be desirable that two Pioneer regiments with four companies of Sappers should be attached to assist in the construction and improvement of communications; the whole military force to be under the General Officer Commanding North Eastern Frontier District. No military force is needed in the western hills, where there are already military police, with the exception of a regiment of Pioneers and two companies of Sappers.

Question (8).—The strength, organisation, and distribution of the police force and its relation to the military force.

Reply.—The Conference is of opinion that the head-quarters of each district or political agency should have a military police battalion under a Commandant and Assistant Commandant or 2nd-in-Command, who would be under the orders of the District or Political Officer. Four police battalions, two for the Lushai and two for the Chin Tracts, would appear necessary. Commandants of military police should be immediately subordinate to the District or Political Officer. Periodical inspections of the police battalions as to purely military efficiency, equipment, training, &c., to be made, should the Commissioner desire it, by the military Commanding Officers, who would report direct on these matters to the Commissioner, sending a copy of the report to the General Officer Commanding North-Eastern Frontier for information. Every effort should be made to raise the police battalions from indigenous matter such as Manipuris, Lushais, Kukis, &c.

Question (9).—The arrangements to be made for the commissariat and transport.

Reply.—The Conference is of opinion that the necessary commissariat staff should be provided to arrange for the transport and supplies till the tract is able to provide them for itself, also that complete transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai, should be provided at once. The Conference is of opinion that further details should be suggested and discussed by local officers.

Question (10).—The kind of taxes or service which should be imposed on the people of the country to be administered.

Reply.—The members of the Conference are of opinion that taxation should be imposed which should be paid by everybody and should be systematic. The taxation may vary according to local custom and necessities, but must include house-tax. The tax should be generally paid through chiefs of villages, who will be responsible for collection, and will receive commission.

Question (11).—Strength of the garrison at Manipur, with reference to its relations with the hill tribes.

Reply.—The Conference does not for the present recommend any reduction in the garrison of Manipur.

Question (12).—The completion of communications between India and Burma via Manipur, as well as through the Chin-Lushai Hills.

Reply.—The Conference considers that every effort should be made to complete communication between—

(1).—Fort Tregear, Haka, and Burma.

(2).—Haka and Fort White.

(3).—Fort White and Manipur.

(4).—Fort White and Burma.

(5).—Fort Aijal and Lungleh.

(6).—Fort Aijal and Manipur.

(7).—Fort Tregear and Falam.

(8).—Haka and the Baungshe country.

The Conference understands that the cart-road to Manipur will in all probability be completed next cold weather, and that it has already been decided that this road should be carried on to Tamu and Kendat or Yazagyo.

Question (13).—The strength of the garrison of Assam in its relation to Lushai.

Reply.—The Conference has no remarks to make on this question.

Question (14).—The construction of roads in Lushai-land and the Chin Hills.

Reply.—This question has been replied under No. 12.

Question (15).—Any other questions which members of the Conference might consider it desirable to discuss in connection with Chin-Lushai affairs.

Reply.—The Conference thinks that the transfer of the South Lushai Hills with its avenue of access through Chittagong leads to the suggestion that the Chittagong Division be transferred to Assam. An additional argument in favour of this suggestion is that the projected Assam-Chittagong Railway will then be entirely in the Assam jurisdiction.

(Signed)	C. A. ELLIOTT.
"	J. C. DORMER, <i>Lieut.-Genl.</i>
"	A. MACKENZIE.
"	W. E. WARD.
"	H. M. DURAND.
"	E. H. H. COLLEN.
"	JAMES BROWNE, <i>Maj.-Genl.</i>

Note by the Quartermaster-General in India.

I have signed the above replies so as not to delay the case, but I would remark that there is some mistake in the reply to question No. 7, which as far as Sappers and Pioneers are concerned in no sense expresses my opinion. The utmost that the military authorities can give would be the equivalent of one regiment of Pioneers and of two companies of Sappers for the whole of the Chin-Lushai tracts.

(Signed) JAMES BROWNE, *Maj.-Genl.*

Minute by the Chief Commissioner of Burma.

The first question for consideration is—

"1. Whether the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented, and whether it is desirable to make a change and what remedies would be practicable."

I can well imagine that difficulties have arisen from a divided administration in respect of the hills lying between Assam and Bengal, though no evidence has been laid before the Conference on this point. But I know nothing of the existence of any such difficulties as between Bengal and Burma—difficulties I mean so great and insuperable as to warrant a disturbance of existing arrangements. The country between our Fort White Chins and Lushai-land is at present altogether unexplored. We do not know as yet whether any trouble is caused to either Bengal or Assam by tribes likely to fall within the ultimate sphere of Fort White influence. That country is being explored this cold weather, and there is nothing to prevent a suitable apportionment of it hereafter, should this be found desirable. Leaving out of sight for the present the case of the Arracan Hill Tracts, the only point where the Burma and Bengal Administrations actually touch is on the western limit of the Tlangtang country. Here it was represented by Bengal in 1890 that five villages in the Darjow loop of the Koladyne river, which had been the source of all the raids in the Chaima Valley, had on the ground of their supposed subordination to the Tlangtangs—a tribe under the Haka Political Officer—been attached to Burma, when they could more easily and naturally be controlled from Fort Tregear. The Burma Administration surrendered these villages to Bengal and severed their connection with the Tlangtangs altogether. This is the only case regarding which I can trace any correspondence, and it can hardly be said to have caused difficulty, for Burma yielded without demur all that Bengal desired. The wide and sweeping assertions in the memorandum signed R. G. W. ought to have been supported by specific instances. The *only* such case quoted is this Tlangtang incident.

2. Having said thus much to clear the ground, I am prepared to admit freely that it is most necessary that the policy followed in dealing with the tribes of the Chin-Lushai highlands should be as far as possible identical. It is always easy for the Government of India to enforce, if necessary, such an assimilation even if the local administrations held divergent views. But here again I must enter a caveat. It is by no means certain that the local circumstances are precisely identical east and west of the Yomas, and it might be positively mischievous to assume that they are so. Thus for instance as regards the question of the form which tribute or revenue payment should take, the Burma local officers contend that the Bengal arrangements would not in all respects suit the Chins on the east. With reference to a proposal made by Bengal that Mr. McCabe's plan of levying a certain quantity of rice from each house and ten days' forced labour from each able-bodied man should be extended to the Burma Chins, the Haka Political Officer represented that to levy dues in grain would cause unnecessary hardship to villages lying at a distance from the post, pointing out moreover that grain was not so plentiful in the villages on the Burma side, and that the villages there are permanent, while their cultivation is often ten to fifteen miles away from the permanent village. With respect to *corvée*, he remarked on the difficulty of supervising and turning such labour to useful account. As regards the Fort White Chins, Captain Kundall, an officer of great judgment, wrote as follows:—

"The suggestion that each house should pay a certain quantity of rice towards tribute is, I think, going too much into details, and the system which obtains at present in these Northern Chin Hills involves less trouble and causes the incidence of the tax to fall on those who are best able to bear it, by making the chiefs of tribes pay a certain tribute either in mythuns or elephant tusks. The poorer people do not possess such things, so the chiefs themselves have to pay. The knowledge that mythuns and tusks will be demanded if any troubles occur makes the chiefs keep a better watch over the actions of their people. Moreover, the people are extremely poor, and do not grow rice, but live on millet, Indian-corn and sweet potatoes and beans. As regards exacting so many days' labour from each man, this would not, in my opinion, answer in the Northern Chin Hills. The Chins about here, if properly handled, are capable of giving better service than forced cool labour. I can get them by hundreds to work and work cheerfully *for pay*, but they are not of a temperament to submit tamely to anything like a demand for free labour. I am of opinion

that out of these warlike tribes here we could in time raise a fine loyal body of frontier police who would be a terror to Lushais, Tashons, Hakas, and dacoits, and so we should put them to a better use than by forcing them to supply us with free coolly labour. The Siyams in particular fought obstinately and bravely for their little tract of country for eighteen months, even when the other tribes abandoned the struggle. When they did submit it was a submission by no means dishonourable to them, and I should be very sorry to think that they were to be subjected to such a humiliation as forced labour, and I do not think the plan would answer."

3. I quote these opinions merely to show that we must not too hastily assume that we can summarily and easily bring all the local arrangements into line. I do not myself entirely concur in all that Captain Randall says. For my own part I am in favor of imposing a regular house-tax on all villages to bring home to the Chins the fact of their allegiance and dependence, making the chiefs responsible for its collection and payment, but I am very doubtful about forced labour. I believe our best policy is to pay reasonably for any labour we require, but to make villages keep roads and paths clear within their several local areas.

4. With due allowance made for local peculiarities, the general lines of policy should, however, as already said, be identical throughout the hills. The lines of sound policy in these hills are after all neither obscure nor complex. There would probably be no great difference of opinion between myself and Mr. Ward on that matter. But there are, in my opinion, insuperable difficulties in the way of placing the whole of the Chin-Lushai highlands under our administration just

the permanent settlements are the relations of the Chins in the hills to the people of the plains of Burma. I protest against my being compelled to enter into correspondence with an outside administration on every little matter of business that must spring up in the process of working the Eastern Chin Hills and the plains below with their interwoven interests and complications. Let me settle my own Chins in the first instance at any rate, and when we have got the marches into order, then it will be time enough to consider whether these highlands can be amalgamated with those to the west. My own belief is that it will then be found unnecessary to make any change, and that it will always be found easiest to manage the Burma Chins from the Burma side with which they trade and the language of which many of them understand. At present I do not see how it is physically possible for one officer to control the tribes east and west of the Yomas. His correspondence will have to go round by Chittagong and Rangoon unless every letter is to be escorted by a company of soldiers. He will not himself be able to move without strong escorts and an adequate transport. It is ten days' march from Haka to Tregear. The country is a most difficult one to move about in.

5. I would leave it an open question whether the Eastern Chins should eventually be placed under the officer in charge of North and South Lushai. It may be found that there is in the unexplored country west of Fort White a sort of tribal watershed, that the Eastern Chins have really no sort of connection with those to the west. If after we have settled the tribes and ascertained their local circumstances it is found desirable to place them under the Lushai Political officer, by all means let this be done. But I object to committing myself absolutely to a course that may turn out to be unnecessary or even undesirable in the light of further knowledge.

6. I would therefore myself very strongly urge that for the present only those Chins and Lushais who are included within the North and South Lushai districts, and the Arracan Hill Tracts, or as we should say in Burma, all tribes west of the Yomas and north of the Lower Koladyne, should be brought under our administration. We know that these tribes hang together, and that they can be brought forthwith under one superior officer.

7. I propose also to make over the Arracan Hill Tracts District to the new jurisdiction for these reasons. Within its nominal boundaries lie a number of tribes who are a source of constant danger to the South Lushai District, and who ought

to be controlled from Fort Tregear. It would strengthen the hands of the officer in charge of this southern section to have under him all the cognate tribes right down to the Lower Koladyne, and he would by taking over the Arracan Hills bring within his own control the only possible line of communication and supply for all this southern section of the hills. Our Akyab officers would lend him every assistance, but at present there is difficulty in getting the Superintendent of the Arracan Hills and the officer at Fort Tregear into *rapport*. The importance of carrying out the transfer suggested is made clear in a demi-official letter from Captain Shakespear to the Superintendent of the Arracan Hills of the 19th October last, which I have with me.

8. It is, as I explained at our first meeting, quite out of the question to cut out from Burma the Chins of the hills and valleys bordering on the Pakokko and Minbu Districts. If the Eastern Chins under Haka and Fort White are ever made over, the boundary line must be drawn south of the villages of the Baung-shes, or of any independent villages near them. The Chinboks, Chinbons, &c., must remain under Burma.

9. The second question in the schedule, *viz.*,—

(2).—Assuming that a change is desirable, will the Committee point out the tribes which could be conveniently placed under one control, and the administration to which they should be transferred, unless it is considered preferable that a separate administration should be formed for their government? has been largely answered above. It links itself closely to question 6, which is—

(6).—The boundaries and head-quarters of the central authority.

At our last meeting it was assumed that the Chief Commissioner of Assam could perhaps most conveniently take over and manage the whole Lushai tract as constituted above. It appears to me very inconvenient that a long spit of Assam should run down between Bengal and Burma. I also venture to remind the Conference that the Commissioner or officer placed in direct superior charge of the hills will for six months of the year have absolutely nothing to do. Neither he nor his subordinate officers will be able to move about these hills in the rains. Again, I think it desirable that the Commissioner in the hills should, if possible, have control over his bases and lines of communication and supply. Briefly, therefore, what I would suggest is that Bengal should make over the Chittagong District, the Chittagong Hill Tracts District, and Hill Tipperah to Assam, and that a Commissionership should be formed under Assam embracing these tracts—the North and South Lushai Districts and Cachar and Sylhet. The Commissioner would not, I think, have a too heavy charge;—if it were so, Cachar and Sylhet might perhaps go out, but I would myself retain them. He would have useful occupation for his recess season, and could devote his open season to his frontier districts, keeping the work of his subordinates under close control all the year round. His head-quarters would be at Chittagong which will, with the proposed railway, be the natural port of Assam. A glance at the map will show how natural and feasible is the arrangement I suggest. The cost of the new frontier Commissionership is at once met by the absorption of the present Chittagong Commissioner.

10. It may be said that the new Commissioner would be unable to devote that constant attention to and to exert that personal influence over the hill tribes which is required for their civilisation. As to this I think we should clear our minds of cant. It is a false analogy to instance the work done by Butler and Williamson in the Naga and Garo Hills as representing exactly the kind of work to be done by the new Commissioner. The area within which Butler and Williamson exerted their personal glamour was extremely small and limited. The personal influence of the Lushai Commissioner will become woefully attenuated, if he is expected to spread it over all the tribes from Monierkhal to Dalekmal. He can only work through subordinate officers, each of whom will no doubt within his own jurisdiction strive to exercise a personal influence and paternal control. The work of the Commissioner will be to homologate policy, to supervise and direct, and by annual meetings with the local officers and chiefs, to maintain a close *rapport* with the local work. I see no

reason why a Commissioner at Chittagong, relieved of Noakholly and Tipperah, should not be able to manage under Assam the frontier division suggested.

11. I may observe in passing that I think it would lead to difficulties to have the Chittagong Hill Tracts District under a different jurisdiction from that of the Lushai Hills beyond. I have no time to work this out in detail, but my recollection of the past history of these hills leads me to this conclusion.

12. As I have proposed to leave the Eastern Chins outside the new jurisdiction, I feel that I need scarcely trespass on the province of the Chief Commissioner of Assam, by volunteering advice on the matters raised in the following questions of the schedule :—

(3).—Whether there should be one chief of the civil administration and one military commander, or whether the two duties should be combined in one man?

(4).—What civil staff should be employed?

(5).—The number of districts into which the tract, with which it may be found practicable to deal, should be divided.

(7).—The limit of the control of the military commanding officer and the force which should be at his disposal.

(8).—The strength, organisation, and distribution of the police force and its relation to the military force.

(9).—The arrangements to be made for the commissariat and transport.

I will only say that I think military police battalions organised on our Burma model but with a stronger staff of European officers for detached service, will probably be found the cheapest and most efficient force. I have eliminated the Eastern Chin Hills, but if they are to come in contrary to my views, I may note in passing that I entirely accept General Stewart's estimate as set out in his note of the 7th January (copy attached) that we require about three regiments, each 650 strong, to reduce the Eastern Chins to order, hold the lines of communication and garrison the hills for the present.

13. My views on the 10th question as to—

The kind of taxes or service which should be imposed on the people of the country to be administered—

Have been incidentally given in the earlier part of this note. The authorities must be largely guided by local circumstances, but every village should be made to pay a stated house-tax.

14. About the next question—

(11).—The strength of the garrison of Manipur with reference to its relations to the hill tribes—

I can give no opinion. Manipur ought to be made to control effectively the Kuki tribes lying between the Kanhow country and the Manipur valley, and a definite limit of jurisdiction ought to be settled in that quarter. I hope to know where this limit should run, if Mr. Carey succeeds in working his way through to Manipur this season.

15. The point raised in questions 12 and 14—

(12).—The completion of communications between India and Burma *via* Manipur, as well as through the Chin-Lushai Hills:

(14).—The construction of roads in Lushai-land and the Chin Hills—
is perhaps the most important of all. I concur with the following remarks of General Stewart on this matter so far as the Burma side of the hills is concerned :—

"What are wanted in these hills and valleys even more than troops are roads. When a road is made connecting Tamen, Auktaung, Yamagyo and Kalemyo, we shall not have much of raids into the Kubo and Kalé Valleys. Equally when a good mule-track connects Fort White with Haka, with extensions northwards through Tiddim, Tsungzaung, Mwelpa to join the Manipur road, and southwards to Shangkwa and through the country of the Baungshes, we shall hold the tribes on the Letha Range, and even beyond the Nankathe river in subjection. Lateral roads from the crests of the mountains to the valleys must also be made."

The most important thing is to get the country between the Lushai districts and the Letha range surveyed. Then we should run cross-roads connecting the chief posts on the Bengal side with those on the Burma side. This is an essential preliminary to handing over the Burma Chins to any one Hill Commissionership. I doubt, however, myself, as already intimated, whether such a transfer will eventually be found necessary once if the tribes are thoroughly dominated and settled.

We shall have Fort White and Haka connected this season, and a strong permanent post placed at Falam—the Tashon Ywoma. Falam would be the headquarters of the Burma Political Officer, and the point to which roads from Aijal and Tregear should converge. Tregear and Haka should be linked and also Aijal and Fort White.

I strongly recommend that a regiment of pioneers should work in the hills on the Burma side, and another on the Bengal side, for some years to come. I believe that the military police might also be got to work as pioneers, if they received working pay of four annas a day, and that in this way, with the aid of paid local labour, a large amount of road-making might be done.

16. On question 13—

(13).—The strength of the garrison of Assam in its relation to Lushai—
I have nothing to say.

The 27th January 1892. } (Signed) A. MACKENZIE,
Chief Commissioner, Burma.

P. S.—I wish to add that I cannot admit the strength of the arguments urged by the Quartermaster-General that not only should the Eastern Chins but all the country over which they have ever raided be brought under the Hill Tracts Commissioner. It appears to me to be going too far to suggest that on account of a mere temporary evil—raids—which we intend to put a stop to and are putting a stop to, a number of law-abiding Burman villagers should be separated from the district to which they naturally belong, and made to carry their appeals to an officer in the hills, 70 miles away, through tribes who will for long years be to them a source of terror even after actual raids cease. We are pressed with supposed analogies from the North-West Frontier. Nothing is more dangerous than to discover analogies when you only know one out of the two sets of facts to be compared. I agree that the true way to stop Chin raids is to get behind the raiding tribes, and this is just what we are doing by placing posts at Tiddim, Fort White, Falam, Haka, &c. It does not strengthen our cheek one whit to post an Assam officer also behind our posts.

A. M.



Note on the garrison required in the Chin Hills

referred to at para. 19 of Sir Alexander Mackenzie's Minute.

Since my letter No. 970-Camp, of the 2nd March 1891, in which my proposals for the future garrison on the Chin Hills was submitted, the situation has considerably changed.

2. The operations of the season 1891 came to a close for the most part successfully on the Fort White side; the Kanhowe, after Captain Runda's operations in that country, gave in their submission and have not since given any trouble.

3. It was found impossible to visit the country of the Nwengals beyond the Nankathe owing to the lateness of the season and to the necessity for the withdrawal of the 24th Gurkhas. On the Haka side the people of Thetta submitted after the second expedition to that place, as did also Thurka, which village had previously proved recalcitrant, but the attack on Lieutenant Mocatta's column by the Tlantlangs as it returned from Tao, showed how uncertain—indeed, how treacherous—is still the temper of the Chins, and how necessary it is still to maintain a garrison of sufficient strength to crush any possible opposition.

4. The Chief Commissioner was good enough to approve of the proposals I made in the above-mentioned letter, and the Government of India to sanction my recommendation that the future garrison of Burma should stand at 17 regiments of Native infantry.

5. I need not here refer to any portion of that garrison, except to those troops occupying the Chin Hills, and to state briefly what my proposals then were—as under.

I proposed that for military administration the Chin Hills should be divided into two sections—Northern and Southern—the border line between the two sections being the Nankathe river.

6. In each of these sections I placed one obligatory post, the garrison of which should, as far as possible, be maintained at 400 rifles.

Northern section—Fort White.

Southern section—Haka.

In addition to these obligatory posts on the mountains, I recommended that in the Kubo Valley, the posts of Tamu, Khampat, and Yazagyo should also be obligatory, and that the garrisons of all posts, to provide for sickness as well as for the possibility of detaching small detachments on punitive expeditions, should be as under—

Haka	400
Fort White	400
Auktaung	200
Yamgyo	100
Tamu	100
Yawdwin	150
New post on the hills	100
Total						1,450

or two full regiments. I also proposed that the supports to the above on the lines of the communications should be—

<i>Northern Section.</i>					
No. 4 Stockade	50	} rifles.	
No. 3 Stockade	50		
Kalemyo	300		
Monywa	400	rifles, reserve for the Kubo Valley.	
<i>Southern Section.</i>					
Rawan	100	} supports to Haka.	
Khan	100		
Gangaw	200		
Pauk	300	} supports to Yawdwin.	
Pakokku	300		

The actual distribution of the troops would be as follows :—

<i>Northern Section.</i>					
Fort White	400	} One regiment, 39th Garhwalia.	
No. 4 Stockade	...	} supports	50		
No. 3 Stockade	...		50		
Kalemyo	...		300		
Tamu	100	} One regiment, 5th Madras Infantry.	
Auktaung	...	—	200		
Yasgyo	100		
Monywa	...	(support)	400		
<i>Southern Section.</i>					
Haka	400	} One regiment, 12th Burma.	
Rawan	...	} supports	100		
Ken or Sihaung	...		100		
Gangaw	...		200		
Yawdwin	150	} One regiment, 28th Madras Infantry.	
New Post	100		
Pauk	200		
Pakokku	...	reserved	350		

and as a reserve for the whole, I proposed that two regiments should be quartered between Myingyan and Thayetmyo.

7. Since then, however, we have had the experience of one season's operations and their effect, and, what is more, we have had the unfortunate experience of keeping up those posts in the valleys throughout another unhealthy season, and the time seems to have arrived for consideration whether, for the purpose of anticipating the occasional raids of wild tribes from the hills into the valleys, which have occurred in past years, it is worth while for Government to continue to incur the expense of guarding those valleys, and still more whether it is worth while, or, in the cause of humanity, whether it is fair to continue to condemn soldiers, even for a short period, to service in so deadly a climate.

8. Writing as I do from memory, without statistics before me, I cannot say for certain what have been the total casualties by death and disease in the two regiments which have lately occupied the Kubo, Kale, and Yaw Valleys, but I have called for them, and will submit them, if possible, before the Conference closes.

I can, however, remember that the deaths alone in the 5th Madras Infantry since it went to the Kubo Valley in March 1891 have numbered two British officers and upwards of 110 rank and file, and in the 28th Madras Infantry one British officer (the colonel) and upwards of 70 rank and file.

9. The extent of the sickness in the 5th Madras Infantry may be further emphasised by the statement that it arrived from India under 600 strong, out of which above 100 died, and that a week ago I could not find 250 healthy men in it to send to Port Blair, and that I was forced to send some weakly ones to fill up the required number, the whole of the rest, with the exception of the band and drums, having been invalided to India, or in hospital at local quarters.

10. The position of the obligatory posts was decided on the knowledge that those were the points which the civil authorities considered it was most necessary to guard, and I have done my best to supply the requisite troops.

With what difficulties I have had to contend in my endeavour to meet their views, the civil authorities have no notion. My experience now forces me to the conviction that it would be better to let the hill tribes raid a village or two, and to wait the opportunity to punish them hereafter when communications are more open, than to put Government to the expense of maintaining troops in those remote and sparsely populated valleys, and to condemn officers and men to sickness and death in so deadly a climate.

11. The local civil officers (I mean the Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner) are, I believe, much averse to the withdrawal of troops from the Kubo and Kale Valleys, and have protested against my strong recommendations to this effect. They have, I conclude, good ground for their protest, but I believe the Chief Commissioner is willing to withdraw the garrisons of Auktaung, Khampat, and Yasgyo before the rains set in, and I trust this measure may not be delayed beyond that period.

12. If this measure is decided on, it becomes necessary to consider what number of troops will in future be required on the mountains and on the approaches to them, and where they will be located. I would place them as follows:—

	Rifles.
Tiddim	100
Fort White	400
Midway between Fort White and Haka, say, Falam	400
Haka	400

Considering the question according to the sections, as was done in my former recommendation of March 1891, I would place the whole force as under:—

Northern Section.

Tiddim	100	
Fort White (lines of communication)	400	
No. 4 Stockade	50	650
No. 8 Stockade	50	
Kalemyo (a base of supply and Commissariat depot)	50	
Midway between Fort White and Haka at, say, Falam	400	

Southern Section.

Haka (lines of communication)	400	650
Hanta	100	
Rawvan	100	
Sihaung	50	

13. It will be noticed that Falam is added to the posts on the crest of the mountains, and this will in all probability become the most important of all the hill posts and the head-quarters of the western frontier of Burma.

Hanta, too, is a new post, being on the road now under construction from Sihaung to Haka. When that line is open, it may be possible to withdraw the post at Rawvan and to abandon the present route to Haka *via* Rawvan, Yokwa, and Swetet.

14. There are two other places which also require consideration, namely, Tamu in the north and Yawdwin in the south.

I do not think the civil authorities would like to abandon Tamu altogether, and seeing that it is the frontier post of Burma-Manipur, it may still have some importance. Much of this might depend on the state of feeling in Manipur, of which I have no knowledge, but at all events I trust this post, if still considered of importance, may not be held between the months of May and November inclusive, for it is difficult of access, its climate is very malarious during the rainy season, and it has been the death-bed of two British officers during the last few months.

15. As to the necessity for maintaining troops in Yawdwin, I do not feel able to judge either; but as the tribes in the vicinity have not much military character, I should hope its retention as a military post might not be continued after this season, for it has probably the most deadly climate in the valleys.

16. From the above distribution, it will be seen that I have placed in the mountains nearly three regiments, calculating each regiment at 660 strong. Experience tells me that this is the outside strength we can count on for any length of time; any way the extra 250 must be considered a reserve to meet emergencies in the way of sickness and to provide for small expeditions, which may occur at any moment. The regiments I would destine for those duties are—

Northern Section.

Fort White and communications	10th Burma.
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Midway.

Falam	39th Garhwalia
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Southern Section.

Haka and communications	13th Burma.
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17. The above is the distribution of troops I would now propose with the force at my disposal. In the dropping season of 1892-93 the 39th Garhwalis will return to India. A further distribution will then become necessary, and it is confidently hoped that a considerable reduction may then be possible.

18. Before concluding this note I would like to state that what are wanted in these hills and valleys more than troops are roads. When a road is made connecting Tamu, Auktaung, Yazagyo, and Kalemyo, we shall not hear much

of raids into the Kubo and Kalè Valleys. Equally, when a good mule-track connects Fort White with Haka with extensions northwards through Tiddim, Taungzaing, Mwelpi, to join the Manipur road, and southwards to Shurkwa, and through the country of the Baungahés, we shall hold the tribes on the Letha range and even beyond the Nankathè river in subjection.

19. Lateral roads from the crests of the mountains to the valleys must also be made, for although, as the Chief Commissioner has remarked, the fact of having troops behind the villages of the habitual raiders would have a deterrent effect, still it would be as difficult without roads to punish the raiders from the posts on the crests as it has been hitherto from the valleys. Indeed, I may say more so for the higher up one gets, the more inaccessible seem to be these mountains, and it is to be remembered that cooly transport is not permanently maintained or always available, and consequently troops could not move beyond a short distance from their posts.

20. But what I conceive to be the most important subject in connection with the garrison of the Chin Hills is the necessity for considering, with more earnestness, the proper housing of the troops. I do not think Government can be aware of the hovels occupied by officers and men at old Fort White, Nos. 3, 4, and 5 Stockades, when I visited those places in December 1890, and I do not think much has been done since. The Chief Engineer of Burma is fully alive to this necessity, but it is impossible to do anything without money, and the proposals made for the accommodation of the garrison of Burma have continually to be shelved or postponed in consequence of reduction made in the grants for military works.

21. I have one word more to add, i.e., that the proposals I have herein made are based on the supposition that the operations of the season, which have just commenced, are successful throughout, and that the anticipations of the Political Officers as to the subjection of the tribes about to be visited are realised. There seems no reason to suppose it will be otherwise, but if the powerful tribes of the Tashons and Yahaos put forth that strength which they are said to contain, the present situation might be changed, and the employment of a still larger force become necessary.

ON THE CHINDWIN RIVER, }
The 7th January 1892. }

R. C. STEWART, *Maj.-Genl.*

Chin-Lushai Conference.

SIR A. MACKENZIE surprised me by the note which he read at the Conference yesterday, and which contained an assertion to the general effect that no great practical inconvenience had resulted from the divided authority in the Chin-Lushai Hills, as only two cases had occurred in which complaints had been made of quarrels or raids between the tribes under the authority of Haka, and the Lushais under Lungleh or Aijal, and that in his opinion there was little or no communication between the tribes under Haka and the tribes under Lungleh. (I quote from memory, and trust I am representing him accurately.) I stated at once that this was entirely opposed to the impression created in my mind by reading Captain Shakespear's diaries. I have since called for the file in order to verify this impression, and I make the following extracts from it.

2. In 1890 it was strongly felt that the system on the opposite side of the Koladyne was different. Captain Shakespear wrote (4th September 1890):—"The two systems cannot work side by side. It is evident that peace and order cannot exist west of the Koladyne, if east of that river the old state of things is allowed to continue. . . . This points irresistibly to the necessity of placing all officers entrusted with the control of these tribes under the orders of a single authority." Mr. D. R. Lyall wrote (16th September 1890):—"It is obviously a one-sided arrangement if the people under the influence of the Bengal Government are not allowed to raid, while those under Burma are not forbidden to do so."

3. On the 21st and 22nd October 1890, Captain Shakespear's diary refers to a raid projected from the Chin side of the Koladyne by a party of 80 men under Vongthu, which turned back because the omens were not favourable. "Tingtus asked me several times to allow him to attack Vongthu. He says Vongthu has attacked him before, and their recent attempt proves they are not inclined to be friendly in spite of their submission to General Symons, and so he wanted to attack them. Of course I refused to allow him, but at the same time I must say it is a little hard on our people if we stop them settling matters in their own way, and yet the villages nominally under Haka are allowed to send out raiding parties whenever they like." Mr. Lyall, in forwarding this on 5th November, says:—"It is impossible that good government of the new territory should go on, if different degrees of influence are exercised by Bengal, Burma, and Assam." And again on 6th November, he writes:—"It is clearly an absolute necessity that the Chiefs on the Burma side should be made to understand fully that raiding must cease, and that the British rule is paramount." These expressions, from so experienced an officer as Mr. Lyall, are hardly compatible with the belief that the danger of raiding between the savages under Burma and under Bengal is a chimera and may be treated as a negligible quantity.

4. Again, on 31st May 1891, Mr. Murray writes from the Chittagong Hill Tracts:—"A great deal will depend on whether the Haka authorities keep a firm hand on these tribes who have constantly raided into the Chaima Valley, or not. . . . These tribes know the routes across to the south of the Chittagong Hill Tracts perfectly; and in the event of their wishing to raid, they will actually seize on this one weak point on the frontier line (i.e., the place where the Ruma outpost was) for their purpose." A more direct contradiction of Sir A. Mackenzie's impression, that the tribes under Haka never raid westward, can hardly be conceived.

5. In his diary of 7th June 1891, Captain Shakespear writes:—"The whole of the villages round Tregear want to move on to the Mamte Hill. This is partly due to the scarcity of jhum land near their present sites, and partly, I regret to say, to their desire to get further from the Pwis across the Eastern Koladyne, who this year have been extra active."

6. *Captain Shakespear's diary, 28th June.*—"About two months ago, four men of Jaduna's were killed by people from the village on the Powta Hill, which is east of Dow, and said to be four days' Lushai-going from Tregear. I do not

know the name of the Chief, but will try to ascertain. A Chief named Chambiga is mentioned as being badly disposed towards us, and to be inclined to attack villages in our territory. The village is said to consist of a thousand houses and to be six Lushai marches from Jaduna's."

7. *Diary of 14th July.*—"I received a most extraordinary letter from Mr. Macnabb, the Political at Haka. He says the Chief of Sangao has gone to him to settle a dispute between Vantura and him. The Chief of Sangao is Tingtun, a man who has always behaved well. . . . I am nearly sure there is something behind this, which he thought the Haka Sahib would not know, . . . but which I should . . . Mr. Macnabb raises again the old claims of Haka and other villages to levy tribute from villages under us." Sir A. Mackenzie will, I am sure, admit that the claim to take tribute implies the habit of raiding in order to enforce the tribute.

8. *Diary of 25th July.*—"There is no doubt that Yatung and all his people" (that is, the Sangao village under Tingtun, mentioned above) "have been accustomed to pay tribute to Haka."

9. *Diary of 17th August.*—"Mr. Tayler has returned from Sangao, and has sent in a most satisfactory report. He enquired carefully into who is the real Chief of Sangao, and according to the information received by him, there is no doubt that Tingtun is the real Chief, and that tribute had only been paid when it was demanded personally in force by Tai-herr, the Haka Chief. In fact, it was simply blackmail levied by the stronger."

10. *Diary of 25th August.*—"The interpreter who went with Mr. Tayler tells me that only about four months ago Tai-herr came on a pony and exacted tribute from all the villages. . . . I think the Haka Political might be asked to order Tai-herr to refund the amount taken, and to abstain from all such proceedings in future."

11. *Diary of 8th and 10th October.*—"Mr. Hutchinson has received news that some men of Patleia's village who were returning from Aijal direction were attacked near the Tyao by Jahows, and two of them killed. . . . Patleia with some 50 warriors had gone off in search of the murderers, and had not returned. I have wired to Haka, under whom the Jahows are."

12. *Diary of 7th November.*—"As to the attack on Patleia's men, I cannot find the name of the village mentioned in Mr. Macnabb's diary, but will communicate with him. I consider it very necessary that we should this year obtain full satisfaction for acts of violence committed by tribes east of the Koladyne and Tyao; if we are not able to do this, I do not think we can expect the people to feel much confidence in our rule."

13. I trust I have extracted enough to show to Sir A. Mackenzie the danger of attempting to prove a negative. It seems clearly established that raids from tribes under Haka upon tribes under Lungleh are of frequent occurrence, and have occurred quite recently; that the savages are thoroughly alive to the advantage of playing off one administrator against another; and that my most experienced officers are strongly convinced of the necessity of uniting all authority in Chin-Lushai land under a single head. I may add that I have not had time to make a thorough examination of the diaries, and have selected these extracts rather as specimens than as an exhaustive list of the passages which support my views.

Note by the Chief Commissioner of Burma.

SIR CHARLES ELLIOTT has handed me a note on the minute which I put in yesterday. In this he entirely misapprehends, and unintentionally therefore misrepresents my position. What I said was that no *evidence had been laid before the Conference* to show that *insuperable* difficulties had arisen owing to the fact that some tribes were under Haka and some under Tregear. I pointed out that this was the only point where the Bengal and Burma jurisdictions happened at present practically to merge. I said the only case known to me on this part of the frontier was that of the five villages in the Darjow loop of the Koladyne, and I explained that we had at once solved that difficulty by making over the villages to Bengal. I also stated orally in Conference that I was most anxious to make over to the management of Fort Tregear any villages or tribes that could more naturally be managed from that post. The Conference will remember that I repeatedly *pressed* the transfer of a large tract south of the Blue Mountain (of which Sir Charles Elliott had apparently never heard) because I know that they were and are a source of danger to the South Lushai district.

The tribes to which Sir Charles Elliott refers in paragraphs 2 to 4 of his note are precisely the tribes which we have either already made over or which I have proposed to make over to Tregear.

I nowhere said that the "tribes under Haka" never raided westward. I said we had no evidence before us of any such raids from the tribes *north* of Haka and *east* of Falam and Fort White. I have therefore never attempted to prove the negative, or to run the logical risk from which Sir Charles Elliott seeks to warn me.

As regards his paragraphs 6 to 12 both Captain Shakespear and Mr. Macnabb are keen frontier officers, and I should be very sorry to be bound by what either of them enters in his daily diary. I have certainly had no complaints from the Bengal Government about "habits of raiding," and I am quite ready to take immediate steps to place any tribes or villages that trouble Tregear and can be more easily controlled thence under that post. I can say no more than this, but I must have clear facts to go upon. I am not disposed to advocate administrative changes on the basis of impressions and *obitu dicta* in diaries.

20-1-92.

A. MACKENZIE,
Chief Commissioner.

P.S.—I wish to add that Mr. Cole has kindly pointed out to me that in Lushai the officers have managed to go about in the rains. On the Burma side this has not been possible save within easy reach of our posts. The military authorities do not like troops moving during the rains, and, I think wisely, object to their doing so.

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No. 38.

No. 199 (Military), dated India Office, London, the 24th December 1891 (M-9958)

From—The Secretary of State for India,

To—The Government of India.

I have considered in Council Your Excellency's Military despatch dated 14th October 1891, No. 208, supplying information in reference to the present occupation of the Chin-Lushai country, and stating that the question of the permanent garrison will be postponed until the end of the ensuing cold weather when you will be in a better position to form an opinion as to the requirements of the case.

2. As regards the Northern Lushai Hills you are of opinion that it is not desirable to employ regular troops to garrison unhealthy districts requiring numerous small detachments, but that it is preferable to concentrate them in central and generally healthy positions, leaving all detachment duties and the suppression of minor disturbances to the police. In this view I fully concur.

3. Assuming that it may be necessary to occupy the Lushai Hills permanently, I would invite Your Lordship's attention to the possibility of simplifying the administration of this territory. At present it is occupied and administered partly by Assam, partly by Bengal, and partly by Burma, there thus being three different Governments with three separate police and military organizations, dealing with a small tract of territory inhabited by homogeneous tribes. I would suggest for the consideration of your Government that, after further experience, it may be found practicable to have only one administration and one military police battalion for the whole tract. So long as the country is occupied by troops, the disadvantages of the present tripartite division of authority may not be very great, but this would certainly be a source of embarrassment when military or civil police take the place of the troops.

No. 39.

No. 28, dated Fort William, the 24th February 1892

From—The Government of India, (Military Department),

To—The Secretary of State for India.

We have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's Military despatch No. 199, dated the 24th December 1891 (M-9958), in paragraph 3 of which attention is drawn to the present tripartite division of authority in the Lushai Hills, and it is suggested that, instead of the present system under which this territory is administered, partly by Assam, partly by Bengal, and partly by Burma, it may be found practicable to have but one administration and one military police battalion for the whole tract.

2. In reply, we have to inform Your Lordship that the subject has been receiving our attention, and, in connection therewith, we have the honour to forward a copy of the Proceedings of a Conference recently held at Calcutta for the discussion of questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai country. The whole question is now under our consideration, and we shall address Your Lordship again on the subject as soon as a decision has been arrived at.

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No. 40.

List of enclosures to letter No. 29 (Military), dated the 24th February 1892, from the Government of India in the Military Department to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Serial No.	Number and date of paper.	From whom or to whom.	Subject.
1	No. 248-B., dated 21st January 1892.	To Government of Bengal and others.	Conveying the decision of the Governor-General in Council convening a Conference for the discussion of certain matters connected with the control of the Lushai and Chin Hills.
2	No. 4, dated 29th January 1892, and enclosures.	From the Secretary, Chin-Lushai Conference.	Forwards resolutions passed by the members of the Conference, together with a Minute by Sir Alexander Mackenzie, and a note from Sir Charles Elliott, in connection with the control of the Chin-Lushai Hills.

J. E. BROADBENT,
Depy. Secy. to the Govt. of India,
Military Department.

No. 41.

No. 516-E., dated Fort William, the 17th March 1892.

From—G. R. IAWIN, Esq., Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Assam.

I am directed to forward the Proceedings of the Chin-Lushai Conference of which you were a member.

2. I am to request that you will be good enough to favour the Government of India at your early convenience with an expression of your views as to the steps which should be taken to give effect to the last resolution of the Conference, *viz.*, that North and South Lushai with such portions of the Arracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined should at once be placed under Assam upon certain conditions.

3. The Governor-General in Council will be glad to learn what establishments you would require for the administration of this tract and for conveying supplies from Cachar to North Lushai. The Government of Bengal will be asked to state the establishment required for provisioning South Lushai from Chittagong.

4. I am at the same time to inquire whether you can form an idea of the expenditure necessary to construct a road and a telegraph line from Aijal to Lungleh.

5. The Chief Commissioner of Burma is being separately addressed as to the portion of the Arracan Hills Tract which could, in his opinion, be with advantage placed under the new administration.

No. 42.

No. 594-E., dated Fort William, the 29th March 1892.

From—W. J. CURRIE, Esq., Deputy Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Burma.

I am directed to forward a copy of the Proceedings of the Chin-Lushai Conference of which you were a member.

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2. With reference to the last resolution of the Conference, viz., that North and South Lushai with such portion of the Arracan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined should at once be placed under Assam under certain conditions, I am to request that you will favour the Government of India at your early convenience with an expression of your views as to the portion of the Arracan Hill Tracts which could be with advantage placed under the new administration.

No. 43.

No. 595-E., dated Fort William, the 29th March 1892.

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

Letter to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 616-K., dated the 17th March 1892.

Copy forwarded to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal for information.

No. 44.

No. 549—2 C.-1, dated Rangoon, the 26th April 1892.

From—C. G. BAYNE, Esq., C.S., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma,

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

The Chief Commissioner thought it desirable to obtain confidentially the opinions of the Political Officers at Haka and Fort White on the suggestion pressed at the Chin-Lushai Conference that the whole Chin-Lushai country should be placed under one administration. I am now directed to submit copies of notes by Messrs. Carey and Macnabb dealing with the question. Nothing could more clearly show the tribal separation existing between the main body of the Central and Northern Chins and the Lushais under Assam than the fact that the tribes on this side have been so far unaffected by and to all appearances are in ignorance of the serious rising now going on to their west.

No 45.

[CONFIDENTIAL.]

Demi-official letter from B. S. CARY, Esq., Political Officer, Fort White, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma,—dated the 4th February 1893.

You have asked me in a note, dated the 13th February, to report on the practicability of working the Eastern China under Assam.

In reply I have the honour to inform you that I consider the plan impracticable for some years to come, and advisable never.

Presuming that a Commissioner controls the united Chin-Lushai tract, his headquarters would be naturally central. It will take three years to make the roads passable in the rains from the Chin posts to his headquarters as the roads will not run parallel with the hills, as is the case from Manipur to Haka, but across the hills and khuds as from No. 2 stockade to old Fort White. Bridges will have to span all streams; rivers and streams rise as much as 15 and 20 feet in the rains.

The telegraph line for three years will be unreliable as China, from motives of vengeance and cupidity, will continually destroy the line; and during the rains this will be a most serious matter as large parties will have to be sent out frequently into the malarious jungle to repair the damage, a proceeding which will provoke an enormous amount of sickness and death.

Chin dák-runners would naturally carry the mails; but, should a tribal dispute occur, the members of the various clans will be afraid to enter each other's tribal limits, and troops would have to be called on to take the weekly mail or the urgent letter and, in consequence of the tribal dispute, would have to go in strength as the rival clans, maddened with drink and carried away by the excitement of the feud, would be equally liable to fire on the troops as on their enemy; so letter-carrying, in case of a feud or sudden quarrel, might either be at an end or would entail much trouble and an equivalent amount of sickness to the troops.

Again, there are only five months in the year during which active work can be done in these hills. Naturally all punitive and other expeditions will take place during these months, and it is then that Political Officers wish to be in close communication with their superiors, but it is exactly during these five months that the Commissioner will be touring through the length and breadth of his charge, and it will be no easy task to communicate with him should some

should the telegraph wires
through the limits of each
is at Howbi Peak; he sends

an important telegram to Tiddim (by runner), 80 miles; the telegram is wired to Haka, where the Commissioner is supposed to be, but in reality he has suddenly gone off in the Aijal country, it will be too late by the time the wire reaches the Commissioner as the Political Officer would have in the meantime settled the matter according to his own views.

Finally, the variety of tongues, the natural dissimilitude of the mode of earning livelihood, the total absence of sympathy between the Chins and the Lushais, and the different trade routes which these tribes respectively use, coupled with the amazing difficulties of road and telegraphic communications, fully convinced me that the Chins should remain undisturbed under Burma, an arrangement which, in my opinion, is not only to the benefit of the Chin, but is imperative for the good interests of Burma.

Having so far merely given my reasons for stating that it is impracticable to place Chin land under Assam, I venture to express my views as to why Chin land should remain under Burma.

I gather that the ceding of the Chin Hills is not by any means a *fait accompli*.

To show the force of my arguments I shall quote from various records, all of which I have found in Sir Alexander Mackenzie's book on the North-East Frontier.

It appears that because Upper and Lower Lushai and the two Chin districts happen to respectively belong to three different Administrations, and because the Central Chins and Southern Lushais have had a few squabbles, the conference, or rather the majority of the conference, decided that forthwith Chins and Lushais should be included in one division, under one Administration, without ever going into the most important details as to the relations of the Chin to the Lushai, the Chin to Burma, and the Lushai to Assam.

The Chin has nothing in common with the Lushai or Assam, but belongs to Burma, whilst the Lushai tract can conveniently be placed under Assam. It is on record that as far back as 1871 "The Deputy Commissioner of Cachar is "regarded throughout Lushai country as the Burra Sahib" (page 160, last two lines, North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal).

The Northern and Central Chins border on Burma; they have always owed a nominal allegiance to the Kalè Sawbwa, and even after the British occupation in 1886 the Tashon Chiefs and the Sawbwa were on very good terms. The Siyins and Kanhaws were tributary to Kalè and years ago were subjected to much harsh treatment at the hands of the Shans, but obtaining guns they got out of hand and harassed the valley, but their object was rather to get loot and capture Shans to do their menial services than as warfare against the State. (I suggest that Mr. Burne be called on to report as to the position of the Chins in regard to the Kalè Sawbwa).

Pemberton in his Report on the Eastern Frontier, pp 119 and 120 (page 163, North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal) wrote:

"The district of Kule. * * * * * The present Sawbwa Chieftain tributary to Ava, is a Shan * * * * * that portion of his subjects who reside in the plains is almost entirely composed of Shans, while those on the hills west of Kule are all Kyens, or wild mountain tribes, who tender but a very imperfect submission to his authority. The force kept up by the Kule Raja principally consists of these Kyens."

Again in 1873 it is recorded (page 168):

"The Manipur Durbar had been very anxious to get Yatole, the Rajah of the Sooties (Kanhaws), to come in from across the boundary and make him also take an oath of allegiance to the Maharajah (Manipur) * * * * * Colonel Thompson dissuaded them from this as he thought such a proceeding might lead to a complication with Burma. He told them also that he could not recognise the authority of the Kanhaw Rajah."

Again, according to the treaty of 1834 (ceding the Kulo valley to Burma), Captain Pemberton in his report, dated the 19th April 1884, fixed the Kanhaw territory as part in Manipur and part in Burma.

Again—

"In November 1872 Colonel Mowbray Thomson, the Officiating Political Agent reported that from an examination of Pemberton's map and treaty of 1884 the country inhabited by the Sooties clearly belonged to Burma and that in his opinion the Manipurites had no right to make war in that direction, but that, if threatened or injured by the Sooties, they should refer their grievances to the Burmese Government through the Government of India (page 172, North-Eastern Frontier of Bengal)."

Again—

"From Captain Pemberton's map published in 1835 and in a demi-official letter to the Chief Secretary to Government, dated the 9th September 1828, he (Pemberton) believed that the Kanhaws were tributary to Kule and had continued so for many years."

The above extracts agree with what I have learnt here, and without hesitation I state that the Chins were tributary to the Shans, hence to the Burmese Government; and I fail to see why Burma should give away its Chin subjects to Assam any more than its western Shan States.

Captain Yule wrote:

"The Burman is himself nowhere a dweller in the mountains, though girt round with "a noble mountain barrier."

This is very true; hence Burma has a defensible frontier, and I can imagine nothing more injurious to the peace of a valley than having its boundary line running at the foot of the hills instead of along the top of the hills. The butt of a bamboo walking-stick is cut below the knot and the stoutest part retained, so with a boundary the hill should be the extremity not the plain.

When the British annexed Upper Burma, the local Government realised that, having taken the province, it had accepted the responsibility of keeping unruly tributaries in order and, instead of adopting the half-hearted policy which was practised for years in the Naga hills, sent a large expedition to Chin land in 1889, and 1890, 1891, and 1892 have all witnessed the same strong and unswerving policy. The Chin hills have been formed into two districts of Burma, with Civil, Military, and Public Works Officers; and it has been the aim of these officers not to conquer the Chins, but to gradually bring them back into their old state of subordination to Burma, and to this end trade routes have been opened out and friendly intercourse between the Chins and Shans encouraged.

The Chin has many relations in Kalè (the tame Chin); his markets have always been in Kalè; his only trade routes lead him to Kalè; and now that raiding has been stopped I find that the Burmans and Chins are mixing rapidly.

It is an entirely mistaken idea that Burma is subjugating an alien tract. Government is merely redeeming its own, or, in plain words, ruling Chin land with a firmer hand than the Sawbwa did.

I have tried to show that it is impracticable for Assam to work Chin land, also that Chin land is as much part of Burma as the Shan States, Karen Hills, &c., and also that all the Chin sympathies and associations have always been with Burma and not with Lushai or with Assam, and I will now show that it is more simple and convenient to work this tract from Rangoon than from Shillong, Chittagong, or a central Chin-Lushai headquarters.

The telegraph line joins from Fort White to Kalè, and I have almost ensured its not being tampered with by the Chins (this has taken two years), so I am always in touch with the Secretariat in the open season as well as the rains.

The road to Kalè runs through the Siyin country only before reaching Burma, so there is no fear of tribal disputes interfering with the mail service, which is now most regular.

For years this regular service cannot be depended on between here and Aijal, here and Tregear, and here and Haka.

If a robbery in Kalè occurs and the offenders are traced to my jurisdiction, the Kalè Subdivisional Officer and I settle the matter without causing more trouble to Government than the reading of the occurrence in my diary; but, if Chin land is placed under Assam, a border crime will lead to endless correspondence.

Burma must have a boundary somewhere, and because it is convenient to place the two Lushais under Assam I see no reason for pushing back the Burma boundary into the plains and including in Assam a tribe, every sympathy of which is with Burma, and changing a state of affairs which up to date promises every satisfaction to Burma as well as to the Chin and which has not so far caused the slightest injury or annoyance to Assam or Lushai land.

If Chin land is left with Burma and the two Lushais placed under Assam, there will be but two Administrations interested, which is a very different matter to three Administrations, each having a finger in the pie; and I am convinced that, if the Chin and Lushai officers have frequent personal intercourse, and a generous exchange of views by letter is resorted to, all petty grievances or supposed grievances will be cleared away and both Governments will be fully satisfied.

Until there is some direct proof that the Chin's interests are identical with the Lushai's and that it is detrimental to the good Government of the Lushai tracts leaving the Chins under Burma, I shall retain my opinion that the present state of affairs is beneficial to the Chin, satisfactory for Burma, by no means injurious to the governing of Assam or the Lushais, and, with all due respect to the opinion expressed by the majority of the members of the conference, I feel that it is desirable to leave well alone.

Demiofficial letter from Lieutenant D. J. C. Macnane, Political Officer, Chin Hills, to the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma,—dated Haka, the 7th April 1892.

In returning the papers concerning the Chin-Lushai conference I would explain that I purposely delayed the answering of your question until I had visited the Tashon and Yahow country and so seen all the country under my charge before I offered an opinion. What I have seen but the more confirms me in my opinion that it is not at present feasible to work the Eastern Chin Hills under Assam. The Tyao var, our boundary with the North Lushai Hills, as well as the Koladyne, our boundary with the South Lushai Hills, are for many months in the year impassable. Likewise, the Fort White charge is cut off from the rest of the hills by the Nankathè, and even our main lines of communication with Burma can scarcely be used in the rainy season. The Chief Commissioner has in his minute so fully set forth the arguments against working the Eastern Chin Hills under Assam and placing them all under one man, that I can advance but few fresh arguments. The following are, I think, the most important :—

1. From the physical difficulties of the country and the great want of communications it is impossible for one man to satisfactorily control all the Chin-Lushai Hills. Such a Commissioner would have for choice of immediate headquarters Haka, Fort White, Fort Tregear, and Aijal and from none of these points could he satisfactorily work the others.

2. The chief argument in favour of the proposed change is it appears to have one man thoroughly and personally conversant with all the tribes in the Chin-Lushai Hills, their manners, customs, character, and country and so secure an uniformity of policy. I do not think that it is at present possible for any man to fulfil these ~~conditions~~ *conditions*.

3. The tribes in these hills are widely separated in their interests and are not as a whole bound together by any common ties or interests, the very existence of some tribes being unknown to others. Thus no headquarters could be selected which all the Chins regard as a natural centre of influence and authority. The nearest approach to such a centre of influence is Falam, and it is close to the Burma frontier. Owing to the number of dialects in the Chin-Lushai Hills another difficulty arises: the interpreters even speaking a variety of languages. Thus the interpreters through whom such a Commissioner would deal with the people, would speak some dialects of Assam or Chittagong, some Manipuri, and some Burmese, so that even after long experience no one could get in direct touch with all of them.

4. Again, Chins and also, I suppose, Lushais are much influenced by their relations with the plains people with whom they come into contact. Years ago Burmans helped the Chins to drive the Lushais to the west of the Tyao var and the Chins helped the Burmese to resist our entry into the Yaw valley in 1886 and 1887. The annexation of Upper Burma was a matter of vital interest to the Chins, some of whom had even visited the Court at Mandalay; but I doubt whether the Lushais ever heard of the event. Political events of importance in Burma, such as a rebellion, would find their echo in the Chin Hills. All their trade is with Burma, and they have no relations with or trade routes to India. Thus the interests of the Eastern Chin Hills cannot be separated from those of Burma with convenience.

5. Our knowledge of many of the Chin tribes is at present so new and so imperfect that it is premature in my opinion to attempt to bring them under one administration. We could not even fix as yet (questions of existing communications apart) on the best central position with certainty, nor can we yet judge whether the position of the headquarters of such a charge would best be placed

in the geographical centre of the hills, or at the chief village of the most powerful tribe.

6. Supposing the Eastern Chin Hills were placed under Assam, all its communication would be through another province, i.e., Burma, and would not this arrangement be more impracticable and cause more complications and vexatious correspondence between different Administrations than at present exists?

For the above reasons I am of opinion that it is physically, geographically, and practically impossible for one man to satisfactorily work the Chin Hills for the present. This is forcibly pointed out by the Chief Commissioner, Burma, in paragraph 4 of his minute, and also by Mr. W. E. Ward, c.s.i. In paragraph 10 of the same minute Sir Alexander Mackenzie advances another strong argument against the practicability of all the Lushai-Chin Hills being administered under Assam by means of a Commissioner. His personal knowledge and personal influence over the hills would be, for reasons I have already stated, at least for some years to come, very small indeed.

The Chins understand and are afraid of the central authority in Rangoon, which they know conquered Upper Burma and now their own country, and doubtless the Lushais have the same general feeling towards India. It strengthens my hands considerably to be able to refer to the "Shinpahra" at Rangoon in my dealings with them; but they would not understand a Commissioner. It has taken us three years to convince the Chins of the power of the Chief Commissioner at Rangoon; it would take more to convince them of the authority of the Commissioner as all stores and troops would continue to come from Burma, and Burma they would still regard as the immediate centre of all our power and resources.

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No. 47.

Telegram Nos. 980-E—981-F, dated the 30th May 1892.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—{ the Chief Commissioner of Assam, Shillong.
the Chief Commissioner of Burma, Rangoon

119-E. When may we expect reply to letter 514-E. of 11th March in connection with resolutions of Chin-Lushai Conference?

No. 48.

Telegram, dated the 31st May 1892.

From—The Secretary to Chief Commissioner of Assam, Shillong.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

2423-P. Your telegram 980-E., dated the 30th May. Report of McCabe is awaited, which he has promised to submit on his return to Aijal, probably in another 15 days on conclusion of present expedition.

No. 49.

Telegram, dated the 2nd June 1892.

From—The Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, Rangoon.

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

145. Your 981-E. Reply to letter 594-E. of 29th March goes by mail of 3rd June.

No. 50.

No. 69—1-B-8, dated Rangoon, the 3rd June 1892.

From—C. G. BAYNE, Esq., C.S., Officiating Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, Political Department.

To—The Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department.

I am directed to acknowledge the receipt of your letter No. 594 E., dated the 29th March 1892, concerning the transfer of a portion of the Arracan Hill Tracts district to the new administration which it is proposed to form under Assam. In reply, I am to submit a copy of letter No. 178—2-91, dated the 6th April 1892, from the Commissioner of Arracan, with enclosure, which contains a report by Mr. Greenstreet, Superintendent of the Hill Tracts, of a tour made by him through the country referred to in the present correspondence. I am also to submit a copy of a map showing the present administrative frontier of the Arracan Hill Tracts.

2. The local officers propose that the boundary line between the Hill Tracts and the area placed under the new administration should be drawn either in the latitude of Sherkor or in the latitude of Sallawa. The former of these two proposals would involve the administration by Burma of almost the whole of the country which has hitherto been treated as beyond the line of administration. The latter proposal would involve the advance of the Burma administrative frontier some 26 miles further north.

3. The Officiating Chief Commissioner does not concur in the recommendations of the local officers. He is aware of no reason why the area administered by Burma in the Arracan Hill Tracts should be advanced northwards. He accordingly recommends that the whole of what is nominally the Arracan Hill Tracts district to the north of the line marked red on the map submitted herewith, should be made over to the new administration.

no 51.

From Major B. A. N. Pansoff, Commissioner of the Arakan Division, to the Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, Burma,—No. 178-2—91, dated the 6th April 1892.

I HAVE the honour to submit diary of the Superintendent, Hill Tracts, Arakan, for February and March 1892, together with a copy of his Judicial Department No. 124 of 1892, dated the 18th March 1892, and to state that I am unable, in the absence of a decent map of the tract referred to, to make any definite recommendation regarding the boundaries to be fixed on between Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Arakan Hill Tracts. As far as I can see, three factors have to be considered, namely, (1) accessibility of tract to nearest post; (2) relation or affinity of tribes to one another; (3) good natural boundaries.

Without further information and fair map it is impossible to, I think, at once satisfactorily decide. I am inclined to think that the Deputy Commissioner's proposition to work the Yallaings, Sabauings, Bokes and Lallaings from the Arakan side, is what will eventually have to be done.

2. I would beg to recommend that the Deputy Commissioner should be allowed to visit the Sabaungs and Lallaings as soon as a suitable opportunity occurs.

3. If the other tribes are of the same stamp as the Yallaings I saw at Paletwa the other day, I think we shall have no difficulty in managing them.

4. In conclusion I would submit Mr. Greenstreet deserves great credit for the careful way he conducted the expedition, and I would request that sanction may be given for the expenditure incurred, namely, Rs. 642-15-0.

no 52.

From R. H. GREENSTREET, Esq., District Superintendent of Police, in charge Arakan Hill Tracts, to the Commissioner of the Arakan Division,—No. 194, dated the 16th March 1892.

I HAVE the honour to report that, in compliance with the instructions contained in letter No. 626-106P., dated the 23rd December 1891, from the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, to your address, copy of which was forwarded to me under your endorsement No. 10-2—91, dated the 4th January 1892, I left this district on the morning of the 21st ultimo and proceeded to Sherkor, at which place I arrived on the morning of the 29th ultimo. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson, Assistant Superintendent of Police, with party, arrived at Sherkor on the following morning and we spent that day and the next at Sherkor talking over matters concerning the Shandu tribes and the country they inhabit. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson's instructions were to propose the "Kula stream" as the boundary line between the Chittagong and Arakan Hill Tracts district, Chittagong administering tribes on the west of the "Kula stream," the tribes on the east being worked from the Arakan side. We were, however, unable to identify any stream of that name. The Klauinghais accompanying Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson said that the Ko-u chaug, the bed of which I had followed from Wandu village, was called by them "Kula chaug;" but as this chaug is a small one and only extends for 8 or 9 miles south, we decided that this could not be the stream referred to by Captain Shakespear, who probably intended the Kuladan river. After talking the matter over with the assistance of the Yallaings and Klauinghais who were present, we came to the conclusion that the country can best be administered as far south as Sherkor including that village and a village on the east of it inhabited by Tlangtang Shandus (Taungmin Wobkes) from the Chittagong side, Arakan administering the country south of this. By this arrangement the Kuladan river north of Abseang or Sallawa and south of Sherkor would be our western boundary, an imaginary line drawn from below Sherkor from the Kuladan east being our northern boundary. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson said that he believed this was the division proposed by Captain Shakespear. By this arrangement the following four tribes of Shandus would have to be worked from the Arakan side:—

(1) Yallaings.

(2) Sabaungs.

(3) Bokes.

(4) Lallaings.

Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson was further instructed to say that, if the Burma Local Government is not prepared to administer the country and exact tribute from the tribes between the Arakan Hill Tracts district and Sherkor during the next 12 months, then the Chittagong authorities propose doing this as it is prejudicial to their working to have a few tribes remaining independent within close proximity to the several tribes who have been brought under control and from whom tribute has been and is being exacted. As to these proposals I venture to make the following remarks:

I understand (a) that it was originally proposed that the Chittagong Hill Tracts authorities should administer the whole of the country inhabited by the Sbandu tribes and (b) that the Chief Commissioner, Burma, favours this proposal. If the Chittagong Hill Tracts authorities are prepared to place a guard considerably further south than Fort Tregear, so that they would be thoroughly in touch with tribes on the northern borders of the Arakan Hill Tracts district and in a position to prevent these tribes harassing our at present imperfectly protected frontier villages, then I consider the proposal to be a good one, and I would recommend our frontier line being drawn at Sallawa, to which place Kaletwa garrison should be moved. If, however, the Chittagong Hill Tracts authorities propose working the tribes on our frontier from Fort Tregear, then in my opinion the proposal is not a good one, for until such time as the Chittagong authorities had by constant punishments brought these tribes on our frontier under control, the residents of our frontier villages would be in a constant state of alarm; we should have no control over the tribes and should get no warnings of impending danger to our villages which the Chittagong authorities could not protect from Fort Tregear, and it would be small satisfaction to us that tribes after having run through and destroyed a few of our villages were several months afterwards, when the matter had been thoroughly brought home to them, punished. It may be argued that this would equally apply if we attempt to work the tribes on our frontier without placing a guard near to the Chittagong Hill Tracts district, but this is not the case. The villages from Sherkor north are inhabited by strong warlike tribes who are perfectly capable of guarding themselves against any danger from the tribes on the south of them, and I know of no instance during the last few years when either of the four tribes, Yallaings, Sabaungs, Bokes, and Lallaings have felt themselves to be in a position or inclined to raid their more powerful neighbours on the north. If it is decided that the country as far north as Sherkor is to be administered from this side, I would say that I anticipate no difficulty in bringing the tribes under control. I cannot, however, speak on this subject with any certainty until I have made acquaintance with the Sabaungs and Lallaings, who are at present strangers to me. I would ask permission to visit them and the Bokes on the first opportunity.

The details of the journey to and from Sherkor will be found in my diary, which is attached. I also forward a rough sketch map showing the route and the approximate position of the Yallaing, Sabaung, Boke, and Lallaing villages. I have sent you my diary in the rough to save delay in copying. I have not filled in the map with mountains and streams, as putting these in by guess work might tend to beautify it, but would not add to its value; also I have no mapping materials. The total cost of coolies, &c., was Rs. 612 15-0. This amount I have drawn and paid out of my allotment under heading of "Political." I hope the expense will not be considered exorbitant, and that it will be remembered that I and my party were travelling in an unknown part of the country, and that it was imperative, if I was to carry out my instructions, that we should be quite independent of the tribes inhabiting it.

I attach a detailed statement of the expenditure.

Since writing the above a party of Yallaings and Kluangghais, the latter from Sherkor village, have come in to Paletwa to visit me from them. I learn that the Napay Siandus, a tribe of two villages situated on the north of the Sabaungs, one hard day's march from Bihri on the Kuladan, have not been visited from the Chittagong side, and I cannot at present say with certainty whether, in the event of its being decided that the tribes between Sherkor and Kaletwa shall be worked from the Arakan side, the Napay Siandus would be inside or outside our boundary. This is a matter which would have to be decided between Captain Shakespear and myself after we have fixed the correct position of the villages. The head Chief of Napays is Maubli, his village consists of, approximately speaking, 100 houses; the other village is situated to the south of it and has also, approximately speaking, 100 houses, the Chief being Nay Lay.

Captain Shakespear has asked me for a copy of my report, and I shall be obliged if you will kindly send him one or return my diary soon, when I will copy it and despatch the same to his address.

Detailed statement of expenditure for a trip to Sherkor and back.

No. of voucher	Particulars.	Amount paid.			Remarks.
		R.	A.	P.	
1	Paid to Yallaing Shandu Khaung as a present	2	0	0	Guide and interpreter.
2	Paid to Linsyan Shandu Khaung as a present	2	0	0	
3	Paid to Heesse Shandu Khaung as a present	30	0	0	
4	Paid Tlangsaung Shandu Khaung as a present	10	0	0	
5	Paid Chief Absaung Khaung as a present	5	0	0	
6	Paid Yabdu presents for showing route to Sherkor	7	0	0	
7	Paid Tince presents for showing route to Sherkor	7	0	0	
8	Paid to 16 coolies from 22nd February to 6th March from Sallawa to Sherkor and back at 5 annas per head	70	0	0	
9	Paid to 33 coolies from 21st February to 6th March from Kalewa to Sherkor and back at 5 annas per head	154	11	0	
10	Paid to 68 coolies from 21st February to 6th March from Kalewa to Sherkor and back at 5 annas per head	818	12	0	
11	Cost of one pig given to sepoys at Yallaing Shandu village	10	0	0	
12	Cost of salt for presents to Shandu	11	8	0	
13	Paid to coolies for conveying urgent telegrams to Head Clerk, Palewa	8	0	0	
14	Paid for two pots of kaung for giving to coolies	2	0	0	
15	Paid to 20 coolies from Palewa to Ngadet for conveying 85 constables and their luggage	5	0	0	
16	Paid to 22 coolies from Ngadet to Daletmè for conveying 85 constables and their luggage	5	8	0	
17	Paid to 19 coolies from Daletmè to Ngadet for conveying 85 constables and their luggage	4	12	0	
18	Paid to 19 coolies from Ngadet to Palewa for conveying 85 constables and their luggage	4	12	0	
	Total	642	15	0	

PALEWA: }
The 18th March 1892. }

R. H. GREENSTREET,
District Superintendent of Police,
in charge Arakan Hill Tracts.

no 53.

Diary of the District Superintendent of Police in charge Arakan Hill Tracts from the 18th February to the 6th March, and from the 17th to the 20th March 1892.

18th.—Mail arrived from Akyab with 18 of the 20 Gurkhas who had been on duty in Akyab hunting the "Minlaung;" they were very fit, but naturally somewhat down in the mouth at having no successes against the dacoits to relate to their comrades who were inclined to chaff them in consequence. The mail also brought a telegram from Captain Shakespeare, asking me to meet his party at Sherkor on the 1st proximo. Replied that I would be there for certain on the 1st or 2nd, and as the Kwemis are at this time of the year all out in their taungyas, I anticipated a difficulty in collecting coolies. Sent revenue clerk Maung Shwe Pa U up to Daletmè and Kalewa with orders to send off the different Taungmins to collect coolies and assemble them at Kalewa. Mr. Buckle's report on his expedition in 1877 against the Yallaings gives the distance from Kalewa to the Yallaings as eight days' march, so as Sherkor is a little more than a day's march beyond the Yallaings, and as part of the road to that village has to the best of my belief never been travelled over by other than locals and there may be difficulties to get over, which will cause delay, determined to leave Kalewa if possible on the 21st so as to prevent any possibility of my missing in delaying the Chittagong party. Assembled the men and found there were 27 men including the party just returned from Akyab available and ordered Jemadar Kaha Singh to start with them for Kalewa first thing tomorrow morning.

Left Palewa with personal kit at 11 p.m.; heavy mist on water, but sufficient moon to enable boatmen to navigate the boats. Called in at Taungmin Taktaung's village and gave him orders to follow on behind and assist the Ngadet Thugyi in collecting coolies.

19th.—Arrived at Daletmè 9 a.m., having changed coolies half-way at Ngadet village. Found Mr. Walter Present, who reported that Shwe Pa U had arrived during the night and he had ordered Taungmins to start at once in their search for coolies. As, however, he did not take steps to see that these gentlemen actually started, the probabilities were that they waited till daybreak, in which case they will not arrive at villages before the men have left for their taungyas. At noon Taungmin Laingtwè came in and reported all men absent from their village. A little cross-questioning brought out that as I expected he

did not leave Daletmé until after daybreak. A large party of Yallaings from head Chief Nautan's village being in Daletmé purchasing salt, arranged with six of them to accompany party and act as guides and interpreters; one of these, an old man by the name of Bichee) I subsequently became great friends with and he was of the greatest assistance to me on the journey. I attribute the fact that Wandu and his people remained in their village to receive me instead of bolting into the jungle to the fact that Bichee was sent on ahead to interview Wandu and to give him a favourable report regarding us.

Left Daletmé at 1 p.m. and proceeded to Kaletwa, arriving there at 5-30 p.m. Maung Shwo Pa U gave an account of his doings; he had carried out all orders satisfactorily, so that there was nothing to be done, but await the arrival of the different Taungmins with the number of coolies each had been ordered to collect. Inspected Government shopkeeper's stores, and as he had been warned early in the month I found ample rations for the party.

20th.—Having spare time on hand inspected men and guard. Jemadar Nason, one Havildar, and 14 files sepoy in parade; all clean and smartly turned out, a great improvement on my last inspection when the appearance of the men was not creditable. I attribute this partly to the fact that the Havildars have been changed, a smart man from head quarters being sent to take the place of Dilbur, who had got rusty during the long period he had been stationed in this guard, and partly to the fact that all ranks now that they are being made into military police are keen in learning their drill and duties. Repairs to buildings and stockade have been completed in a satisfactory manner.

Books not as carefully kept as they might be; the writers throughout the district are a poor lot, being only partially educated Chauughtas, and the writer of this guard is one of the least promising specimens. No crime of any description since my last inspection.

A party of Koons from Sallawa came in with Taungmin Absaung, who is the most influential Taungmin between this and Sallawa. He promised to furnish up to 20 coolies if required. Informed him that I should sleep the following night at his village and make a fair start from there on the morning of 22nd. He promised me every assistance and departed, Taungmin Depee accompanying him with orders from me to make certain arrangements for self and men at Sallawa. I sent up by their boats eight maunds of rice, which will give us less to carry tomorrow. Jemadar Kahu Singh arrived with men and took over rations from shopkeeper, separating them into 30 seer baskets. Taungmin Laingwe with 46 coolies and a few gun-holders arrived. Advanced him money to purchase rations for party, as it is probable we shall find Wandu village deserted on our arrival, and as it is not advisable to be forced to forage round, borrowing rice and paddy in the absence of the owners, I have decided to take 18 days' rations, which will make us independent of outside help. Taungmin Nga Lon and three of his villagers applied for permission to accompany the party and put in a petition for the recovery of 11 captives who were taken away from his village in 1885, his village being situated beyond our frontier, but within sight of the Kaletwa guard. The raiders killed four women on this occasion. It was these men who in 1888 or 1889 captured two of the Sherkor villagers, one of whom was brother of Thombie, the Chief, and brought them in to Daletmé and made them over to Mr. Fanshawe, who kept them as hostages for the return of the captives taken in 1885, until late in 1890, when they were sent round to the Chittagong side; but they did not find out until considerably later on, gave them permission to accompany me, provided they would either bring and carry their own rations sufficient to last the trip, or that they would come as coolies; they decided on the latter.

Remainder of Taungmins came in during the day and by night-time the number of coolies was complete; took a nominal-roll of them and told off 11 gun-holders to accompany coolies. One of the latter made a good beginning by letting his gun off suddenly whilst he was sitting in the middle of the coolies who were having their names called. He said it must be the work of the rats for he had no cap on, as a matter of fact, the gun was cocked and he thoughtlessly laid the end of his lighted cigar on the ripple; fortunately beyond hurting his own fingers, no damage was done.

21st.—By taking seven sepoys from the strength of the Kaletwa guard, I made up my party to one Jemadar, four Havildars, and 30 sepoys; by 7 p.m. men, coolies, and followers were on the move; baggage, sepoys, and the majority of coolies, &c., in boats and the few which the boats would not accommodate following along the east bank of the Kuladan; strong north-easterly wind blowing which made a somewhat heavy ripple on the river. At 7-45 arrived at first and worst rapids. Here I was very nearly capsized last rains. Unloaded boats and leaving the coolies to punt and pull the boats over stones walked along the bank past Kruchuang village until 8-45, when the boats were re-loaded and we proceeded in a north-easterly direction for 20 minutes, when we arrived off Taaten village of 25 houses. Excellent tobacco cultivation along east bank. The footpath, which is called the Shandu road, as it is by this road the Shandus come in to our bazaar, is on the east bank of the river, hence all the villages between Kaletwa and Sallawa are built on the west bank. The villages are not stockaded, but the access to them round corners of rocks is stopped with stockade and spikes, and at these places a kin or guard is usually kept during the dry weather. Proceeded north-east until 8-45, when we came to more rapids and again had to unload the boats. These rapids extended for about $\frac{1}{2}$ of a mile as far as Laingabé village,

the residents of which, having a wholesome fear of being raided, live upon a large rock in the middle of the river during the dry weather and occupy their village on the west bank of the river during the rains. We found them occupying their dry-weather quarters. The north end of the rock has a peculiar defence of bamboo spikes. 10 A.M. to 10-30 A.M. direction north about 1½ miles and then another rapid which took 10 minutes to pull the boats over. At 10-50 halted for breakfast; 11-40 again proceeded and continued in northerly direction, crossing frequent rapids until 1 P.M., when we arrived at Taungmin Ahsaung's village, sometimes called Ballawa. This is the last village on this side of the country; put men up on the beach close to the road we have to start by in the morning, and myself put up in the village. Found Taungmin Dapee and Ahsaung very far gone with kanying; have evidently been having a great drink on the strength of the approaching journey. Ahsaung, however, met me with a plume of feathers in his head and quite the Chief; he made me very comfortable in an empty house and showed me every hospitality. About 55 houses in village.

2nd.—As I expected our first actual start was not an early one, one thing or another detained us, so that it was not until 7-30 A.M. that we actually got away. The party was unavoidably a large one and consisted of myself and Shwe Pa U, Jemadar Kaha Singh, four Havildars, and 80 sepoy; paid Chiefs Laingtwa, Dapee, Aung Hla, and Lotpank, 11 gunholders, three servants, and, excluding my own personal coolies, 117 coolies. Each coolie carried something over 80 seers and the sepoys carried their bedding throughout the first days' march; having unfortunately no beads or similar small articles suitable for bartering or presents I took six baskets of salt. Instead of starting, as did Mr. Buckle's party from the mouth of the Sula chaung we left the Kuladan river about a quarter of a mile below the mouth of the Sula chaung and struck uphill through bamboo jungle (we came back this way also, but from what I afterwards learned the road by Sula chaung is quite as short and is certainly easier going. We were taken this way by Ahsaung, who had got some idea into his head that his villagers would otherwise have had to navigate us up to the Sula chaung). At 8-40 we had crossed the hill travelling north-east and had arrived at the Sawli chaung, a small chaung little known and of no importance; halted 10 minutes to allow coolies to arrive and proceeded along the chaung north-east until 9-5, when we crossed over a small hill and found ourselves on the Sula chaung 9-15. A good deal of water in the chaung, moved along the bank for a short distance, crossing the mouth of the Tanku chaung, after which we crossed the Sula chaung and struck into the bamboo jungle, through which we proceeded until 10 A.M. mean direction north-east by east, when we arrived at the Tao chaung and moved along the bed of it till 10-40, when we halted for breakfast. At 11-40 made a fresh start first along the Tao chaung and afterwards by sides of it through dense jungle. This road appears to be but little used; for, although the footpath is clearly defined, it is frequently blocked by creepers and fallen trees, so that a stooping position is necessary for a great part of the way; direction north. At 12-30 arrived at Rille or Rilleah chaung, followed this for 8 minutes and came upon the Sula chaung which here, having completed its bend to the eastward, takes a straight run to the north. Our arrival disturbed a large snake which Shwe Pa U tells me is called by the Arakanese the "ngan" or goose snake. He says next to the cobra it is the most deadly snake in Arakan. I knocked it over with a charge of No. 4 and stretched it out and measured it, result 11 feet 8 inches. Halted at this spot for night, distance travelled 15 miles. Knocked up light coverings to keep the dew off, and as there were several fresh pugs of tiger and panther about and there was long elephant grass uncomfortably close to the camp lit fires round and arranged for keeping them alight throughout the night. Talk with Bichee and other Yalangs over the fire. Bichee after a glass of grog threw off the reserve he had up to this time maintained, proved himself both intelligent and entertaining. He says we shall arrive at Wundun on the 25th if we travel at the rate we have done today; so, as it is preferable to spend spare time in the jungle to spending it in the neighbourhood of villages, where complications might arise between the locals and my followers, I determined to mark time and make short marches during the next few days.

3rd.—Broke up camp punctually at 6 A.M. and moved along the west bank of the Sula chaung north; 8-40 came upon a solitary tanker bathing in the chaung and giving me a splendid opportunity of a close shot; got down to within 12 yards of it and could see its trunk and body, but not the head, and was creeping to a spot where the jungle between us was less thick when one of the sepoys of the advance guard thinking I could not see the animal began jumping round and hopping with the result that the tanker caught sight of him and struck off into the jungle to the eastward. I thought the elephant would not travel far, and as there was nothing to be gained by pushing on, I could not resist the temptation to follow him, so calling a halt I took four men with me and followed the tracks at a run through open jungle south south-east; jungle swarming with wild fowl and pheasant, which might be expected as I had not got my shot gun with me; came to several wallows where the elephant had stopped a short time, had a rest, and moved on; we were so close up to the animal that the mud off his body was still wet on bushes he had passed through; continued in pursuit for three hours and then called a halt and consulted; the verdict was that the elephant was making straight for his home in the hills to the eastward from where he had come to bathe and feed, so we struck back as hard as we could. It was fortunate I had been taking note of the way we were going for we soon

lost our tracks and without my compass we should have found a difficulty in fetching camp. There were several foot tracks in this forest, and Bichee tells me if we struck east through it for 1½ days we should come to the Bokes. 2 p.m. returned to the spot where I had first seen the tusker and found the whole party and did justice to my breakfast, which was ready. Three Koons came into camp with a letter from Paletwa and three telegrams, two from Pakókku about my meeting Lieutenant Tighe at Matimata on the 1st April and the other about equipment. They might all have awaited my return without loss. Drafted replies and, having paid the Koons, sent them back. 2-30 proceeded alongside Sulla chaung, crossed Taipauk chaung, and at 3-10 brought up for the night: distance 7½ miles. Went out to try and get some meat for all hands; got a steady shot at a sambhur, but hit it a few inches too far back, for, although it was badly hit and lay down close by twice, it made a fresh bolt without giving me another shot, and as it was getting dark I had to return to camp empty-handed much disgusted with my bad luck with the elephant and bad shooting with the Sambhur. Talk with Shandus after dinner over a glass of grog and tried to identify the names of chaungs and places mentioned in Mr. Buckle's report; also tried to account for the very marked difference in the pronunciation of common names by the Shandus on the Chittagong and the Shandus on this side. Failed to arrive at any satisfactory understanding of the subject. It is a matter, however, which will have to be gone into later on as at present I have a difficulty in identifying common names as pronounced by the Chittagong side, and Captain Shakespear no doubt has a difficulty in identifying common names as pronounced by this side. As an instance of this difference take the name of the tribe to which the residents of the Sherkor village where we are now going belong. The people on this side (by this side I mean all tribes south of Sherkor) pronounce the name of the tribe "Klaungshai," whereas the Shandus on the Chittagong side and Captain Shakespear pronounce the name of tribe "Lonshong" and the name of the Taungmin Thongleen. Apart from the difference in the manner of pronouncing common names, the Shandus on the Chittagong side appear to call chaungs, hills, and places by entirely different names to those which the Shandus on this side are familiar with, but I am not certain about this.

24th.—Started punctually at 6 A.M. and proceeded through jungle on the west bank of the Sulla chaung in a northerly direction; saw a couple of sambhur, but did not get a shot at them. At 7-45 crossed the Sulla chaung and at 7-50 arrived at the mouth of the Kinkaw chaung, which Bichee informs me has its source in the Boke country. The Sulla chaung here makes a big bend to the westward, followed along the bed of the Kinkaw chaung for 15 minutes, getting a snap shot at a couple of large ducks at about 50 yards; these are the first wild ducks I have seen since I have been in the hill tracts, and I should like to have got one as a specimen; they were so far off and took flight so quickly that I was unable to identify their species. Left Kinkaw chaung on east and struck through dense jungle, direction north until 9-5, when we again came to the Sulla chaung and halted on it for breakfast. 10-30 made a fresh start, crossing Sulla chaung twice. At 11-20 left Sulla chaung, which here takes another big westerly bend, and struck along the Tonloch (Tinloon) chaung in a northerly direction until noon, when we arrived at the curious overhanging cliff mentioned by Mr. Buckle in his diary of the 30th November 1877: distance 11 miles. Here Bichee recommended a halt, partly because of the good situation, but chiefly because the sky was lowering and he expected rain; so set the coolies to building cover and settled down for the night. 4 p.m. went out to look for meat, but had not gone far when the rain came down, so made a hasty return to camp, where I tested the rain protecting properties of the cliff, carrying all rations and baggage up to the ledge and stowing everything securely under the cliff, where it was quite dry; the rain only lasted for about 1½ hours, and as our beds were made on the shingles we suffered no inconvenience from dampness. To night Talashong, who is Nawtaw's factotum and of some influence amongst the Yallaiings, who had been accompanying the party with his following loaded with salt, was introduced to the grog over the camp fire. He is a sharp intelligent man and would be goodlooking but for a cunning expression in his eyes. He informed me that tomorrow our roads part and that he and his following will leave us. He referred to Thongleen, who is friendly with the Yallaiings and who he said was still in the jungle with the whole village (see my diary, dated the 9th February). He suggested that I should take some steps to settle the difference existing between Thongleen people and the Chittagong Superintendent; informed him that it was no business of mine and that I was not prepared to interfere in his affairs; but that, if Thongleen looking upon me as an uninterested party would meet and accompany me to Sherkor (which I now for the first time realized was his village), he might hear what the Chittagong Officer had to say regarding him, and I would guarantee him a safe return to the jungles or wherever he might wish to go to. Talashong thought this good and said that he himself, with Lesho (Nawtaw's step-brother), would meet me at Sherkor, and he thought if I arrived before the Chittagong party, Thongleen would come in and have a talk with me. He said (which is a fact) that Nawtaw is covered with boils or abscesses and has not moved out of the village for months, otherwise he would come to Sherkor to meet me. Talked matters over *re* the feud between Sabauings and Yallaiings: this feud which commenced two years ago is now at fever point.

28th.—Started sharp at 6 a.m. and continued along the Tenlooh-Tinloon chaung due north, crossing and re-crossing chaung and cutting off the heads in chaung by short cuts through jungle; 7-30 came to the spot where the road to Nawtaw's village breaks off to north-east and waited to allow coolies to come up and to settle which of the Yallaings would accompany our party; naturally they were all keen on getting to their homes in Nawtaw's village. Bichee, however, and three other Yallaings agreed to accompany me and he, having made over his salt to his friends and given several messages for his wife, started off ahead of us, very proud at being entrusted with my gun, which he no doubt found pleasantly light after the basket of salt he had been carrying hitherto; 8 a.m. we left the Tenlooh-Tinloon chaung and struck north-west over a small hill and at 8-30 again came upon the Sulla chaung; leaving it, however, on our left we continued north through jungle and struck the Neepu chaung (did not see the Sulla chaung again, nor could I get reliable information as to its source beyond that it is to the south and west of Wandu village, between which village and it there are two ranges of hills). Followed along the Neepu chaung north north-east until 9-30, when we halted for breakfast; at 10-40 continued along the Neepu chaung until 10-55, when we arrived at a precipitous hill on our left; here Bichee recommended a halt for the night: he said the road struck up and along the range of hills on westward of Neepu chaung and that he was uncertain whether there was water within six hours' journey of us, accordingly settled down and pitched camp for night: distance 7½ miles. Talk with Bichee and Tansi and tried to fix the position of the different Shandus villages on south of Sherkor. Tansi is a Rampi Shandu, son of the head Chief of that tribe. About 30 years ago his father, bringing him down the Kuladan, was attacked by Koons and killed; he was taken captive, but was released a few years afterwards and has since been living with Taungmin Ahsaung. His tribe, which Tansi informs me 30 years ago numbered nearly 100 houses, is now almost extinct. Three or four families have settled down with the Klaungshais and a few families have emigrated Haka way, but after the death of their Chief, they being weak, seem to have had a bad time of it all round. It will be noticed that Mr. Buckle in his report on expedition in 1877 mentions 10 houses of Rampi Shandus living under the protection of Khainoon, the then head Chief of the Yallaings.

As there is but little information on record regarding the Shandu tribes residing between the Arakan Hill Tracts district and the country now worked by the Chittagong Hill Tracts authorities, who have extended their influence and exacted tribute from the people as far south as Sherkor, I took this opportunity of jotting down a few notes, the result of my several talks with Bichee, Tansi, and others.

The Yallaings (sometimes spelt Yaklaings and sometimes Youcklaings; the former spelling is, however, according to the pronunciation common amongst the tribes south of Sherkor and the Kwemees, who meet them on more or less intimate terms at our bazars) is a tribe of three villages, which are each named after the head Chief of the village,—(1) Nawtaw, (2) Wahsaung, (3) Wandu.

(1) Nawtaw is the eldest son of Khainoon, who shortly after Mr. Backle's expedition in 1877 abdicated in his favour. Khainoon is still alive, but very old. Nawtaw has one daughter, but no sons; his step-brothers Lesho and Tainway are the two Chiefs next of importance to him in the village. The village is situated on the east bluff of a range of hills known as the Pathe range and has the Mi chaung flowing below it on the east. There are upwards of 100 large houses in the village, which could approximately put 350 fighting men into the field. Mr. Buckle predicted that the site of the village which he destroyed in 1877 would not be again built upon; but either the custom which he reckoned upon is not strictly observed, or Nawtaw, finding he could not get such a good site elsewhere, procured a dispensation from the nats to forego the custom on this particular occasion, for certain it is that the present village stands on exactly the same site as the one destroyed.

(2) Wahsaung is younger brother of Nawtaw by the same parents. He would be head Chief of the tribe in the event of Nawtaw's demise. His village is also situated on the west of the Mi chaung on Layki Hill. It has 150 houses and is within sight of Nawtaw, but nearly a day's march distant from it in a south-westerly direction. Wahsaung has two sons, Saunglaing and Maunglaing.

(3) Wandu derives his importance from the fact that he married Nawtaw's sister. His village consists of 30 houses and can put approximately 80 fighting men into the field.

The Sabaungs inhabit two villages on the east of the Mi chaung by name Bihri and Bihru. Bihri is the head Chief of the Sabaungs, and Bihru is his first cousin.

Bihri is a village of 150 houses situated on the Mi chaung east about 1½ day's journey from Wahsaung village. Bihru has 100 houses and is situated one day's march to the east of Bihri with a range of hills called the Kaahi hills between them. The history of the feud between the Sabaungs and the Yallaings from the point of view of the latter is as follows:—

Previous to two years ago the Yallaings and Sabaungs were on friendly terms. About two years ago Nawtaw's people had a bad paddy crop and were in consequence put on short commons. Three of Khainoon's (Nawtaw's father) slaves finding their stomachs rebel against this state of things (the probabilities are that under the circumstances they were half-starved) ran away to the Bihri village and placed themselves at the disposal of

Taungmin Bihri. Nawtaw, when he heard where the slaves were, called upon Bihri to deliver them up. He, however, sold the slaves "on the Yaw side." Nawtaw took no action upon this, which makes the following difficult to account for, as shortly afterwards a party of 50 Sabaungs, with Bihru and Bihri at the head, went to the Nibu chaung, where Wandu's village then was, and seeing Wandu's nephew Eku in the jungle cutting bamboo they shot him. Nawtaw on this sent out a large party under the command of his step-brother Taingway, and they made a grand *camp*, for they caught, killed, and scalped 14 women and one man who were weeding the taungyas in the neighbourhood of Bihri village. After this there was a cessation of hostilities between the two tribes until two months ago, when a large party of Sabaungs from the Bihri and Bihru villages attacked Nawtaw's village at night-time and killed four women and a child.

To revenge this Wandu's brother Santlaing with six men went across six days ago to the neighbourhood of Bihri village and waylaid and killed three men, bringing in one scalp. It is now the Sabaung's turn and the Yallaings are keeping their eyes open, expecting every day the return raid and wondering when it will come and who will be the victims.

The Boko Shandus inhabit one village of upwards of 150 houses situated on a high hill in an almost impregnable position on the east of the Mi chaung. The head Chief Naneklay is an infant at present and the affairs of the tribe are managed by Laukhi, who is Naneklay's uncle. The Bokes are our nearest neighbours and have for the last few years given us no trouble, nor as far as I can learn have they any important feuds. The small tribes on the east, however, have no reason to regard them with favour, for at the end of last dry season on the death of their head Chief Laiktu a head-hunting party waylaid three Kaungsus in the jungle and brought in their heads to adorn the funeral, so that the great Chief Laiktu should not be without slaves in the better world. The Lallaings I can get no information about in these parts. As far as I can learn they inhabit two villages to the northward and eastward of the Bokes from whom they are distant about one day's journey, their head Chief is named Tainhara. These four tribes, Yallaings, Sabaungs, Bokes, and Lallaings, are to the best of my knowledge the only tribes of Shandus south of the country administered by the Chittagong Hill Tracts Superintendent.

26th.—Broke up camp at Nipu chaung at 6 a.m. and started to climb hill; the first part on hands and knees, north-west, for 20 minutes, which put us upon the side of the Tungmaw range, followed alongside of hill north till 6-30, from then until 7-45 ascending the whole time, sometimes through bamboo and sometimes through wood jungle, twisting about a good deal, but mean direction north north-east; arrived at clear space on east side of bluff and got a good view round, some smoke visible on the west side of Patti range east south-east, which, Bichee says, is from one of Wahsaung's taungyas. Bichee also pointed out direction of different Shandu villages and gave me a very fair idea as to the lay of them. 8-5 proceeded still in an upward direction north-east and at 8-30 arrived at small hill stream with a little water in it. This stream cannot, however, be relied upon to produce water always at this time of the year. East uphill till 8-40, old zayat 8-40 to 9 a.m. north-west, and 9 a.m. to 10 a.m. north, when we arrived at regular Shandu camping-ground on side of small hill stream; very little water; here we halted for breakfast watching Bichee. I was amused to see him go as he thought unobserved to the roots of an old tree, where on moving the same dry leaves on one side he turned out some hidden boards of tobacco juice, rice, &c., which he left here some weeks ago. Started again at 11-50 and at 12-45 came to large grave of Rampsee Shandu, who died 20 years ago, direction north north-east; from here till 1-10 very stiff climb north north-east, continued in a northerly direction until 2-45, when we arrived at a hill stream and put up for night; distance 17 miles; very cold spot as afternoon the sun is not visible from it; took a few extra precautions to prevent any chance of a surprise during the night as we are very near Wandu.

27th.—Started at 6-5 and struck up out of the hollow we had been encamped in, followed along path at side of hill which twisted about a good deal, mean direction north; 6-40 came to Wandu's last year's granaries; 7-0 sent on two Yallaings to warn Wandu of our approach and followed slowly passing water twice; 7-45 heard the voices of people below us and came to road leading down to village; halted party quietly. Sent Bichee down to tell Wandu what a good lot we were and sat down to await his return; 8-20 guides returned and said Wandu was very grumpy and undecided as to whether or no he should vacate the village, but that he was at present waiting in the village, so giving orders to Jemadar Kaha Singh to await here until he heard the "advance" sounded, I went down with the advance guard of one Sergeant and four files sepoy and Laingtway and Shwe Pa U; descended hill for eight minutes and then struck round to the south for three minutes, when we came in sight of the village gates, about 150 yards up steep hill; distance 4½ miles; climbed this and was welcomed by Wandu and four Chiefs, who led us through six stockaded gates into the village. Between the 3rd and 4th gates was the grave of Wandu's mother, lately deceased, and here was hanging the six days' old scalp taken by Santlaing at his last little venture into the Sabaung country. Having passed through the innermost gate and passed Wandu's house, which covers it, we came to an open space and found from 30 to 40 men sitting round four or five pots of chaung. Wandu offered me some in a claret bottle he had got from Bichee and I found it very good; it was then passed round to the rest of the party. I

said a few words to Wandu explaining my journey and after a little time was glad to see the frightened and suspicious looks which had greeted me on my arrival pass away; then, having cautioned Wandu not to be afraid and explained that I was calling the rest of the party down to in camp, I sounded the "advance" and sent orders to Jamadar to encamp at the foot of the village where there was a suitable site. I then settled the guard down in a small detached house and made myself comfortable in Wandu's house and congratulated myself on having made such a satisfactory entry, for this was the first time Wandu had been visited by European or sepoy. Looking round me, I noticed on the south of the open space between Wandu's house and the rest of the village a barricade of posts; it is behind this that the women and children would be sent on the first alarm, and it is behind this that the last stand would be made by the men in the event of an enemy succeeding in entering the village. The barricade covers the 30 or 40 yards clear space between the gates and the bulk of the village. The approach to the barricade is of course spiked, only a narrow path being left for the villagers. Every possible approach to the village is also covered with spikes or traps. There is a small joom between the road above the village by which we had come and the village. This is also fully spiked, but it is from this joom that the village would have to be covered. Ten markamen from here could clear out the village and prevent the attacking party from being troubled during their stiff climb up to the gates, but the rifles in joom could not touch those behind the barricade; they would have to be dealt with by the party entering the village through the gates. I did not of course notice and think of all this when I first entered the village, but got it down as one never knows when it might be necessary to visit Wandu hostilely when these notes might be useful. I should much have liked to have strolled behind the barricade in question; the arms of the village are I know kept there, and I fancy also some captives. I felt sure, however, that Wandu would resent and be suspicious if I did go in that direction, so restrained my curiosity and am still in ignorance as to which direction the road from the barricade to the chaung below, of which there is certainly one at least, runs.

My kit having arrived, I had breakfast, Langtway and other Taungmins meanwhile making very merry over the kaung outside. I had expressed a wish to Wandu that if I was to remain in his house, his wives and family should return to it, and accordingly when I had finished breakfast, Wandu's two wives were brought to me. They were very frightened and required to be half dragged. They were both ugly, badly dressed, and filthy dirty. By the time they had sampled my liquor their shyness wore off and they began to take stock of the first white man they had ever seen. Wandu then pointed out his brother Santlaing (the scalp hunter) and a few other notabilities. Santlaing, a very repulsive looking gentleman with his cunning face and cock-eyes; if my orders had not been so strict, I should have taken this opportunity of ordering the Yallangs to take no further active steps in their feud with the Sabauangs, and should have sent a similar message to the Sabauangs informing them that I would arbitrate between them and they would have to abide by my decision. I should also have ordered the decoration over the gateway to be removed. Under the circumstances, however, I was compelled to leave the matter alone with the certainty that there will be further bloodshed within the month. I subsequently got Wandu on the quiet and suggested to him that he should in future remove scalp decorations from his doorways when a British officer visits him as they are offensive to our prejudices. Wandu presented me with a cloth and common Shandu bag which, since I subsequently gave him a new flannel shirt and got through four bottles of whisky or gin, and one Madeira, to say nothing of cakes, sweets, &c., I think I may be allowed to keep. A representative from Wahsaung also produced a common Shandu bag.

This afternoon, being anxious to see what firearms Wandu could turn out, I suggested a match between my men and the village. Wandu said he could only muster three good guns and at once produced them (old flintlocks). I accordingly said we would shoot three aside; so, having put up a mark at a distance to suit the villagers, we commenced. My men began and shot very creditably and then the village began, but their guns had evidently been lying by, for beyond fizzing in the pan they did nothing; it was quite five minutes before they could yet their guns to fire and when they did go off the shooting was execrable. I fired off the six chambers of my revolver rapidly, at which they were much fetched. It was fun watching the scramble for the empty cartridge cases. I had intended sleeping the night with the men in camp, but Wandu made such a point of my sleeping the night in his house that I changed my mind and agreed to do so, sent the guard down to the camp. I forgot to mention that Wandu on my first arrival asked me to swear an oath of friendship with him over a pig, but that I refused to do so. My predecessors have been in the habit of doing this, but I consider doing so puts the Government on the level with a petty tribe, so I told Wandu that he must learn to understand that an Englishman's word is sufficient and must consider him as above swearing oaths over slaughtered pigs with every petty Chief he comes across. He then asked to be allowed to swear an oath with Laingtway, which of course I allowed.

Had dinner in the open and all women and children came down to view the stranger; got them to scramble for sweets, and other fun.

Turned in at 8 p.m. Wandu and his family in the two inner rooms; place swarming with rats; an awful night in consequence; just beginning to sleep when reveille sounded.

28th.—Up at 5 a.m. and had chota bazari. Wandu asked to see the men fall in and wanted them brought up to village, but I did not see this and told him to come down. He however sent his family instead; the whole village in fact turned out and came down to see us off, a satisfactory change in the way they behaved on our arrival; put the men through a few simple movements and extended them in skirmishing order; could not, however advance them more than 80 yards because of the spikes. However, the people seemed to enjoy the fun, the bugle especially fetching them. Gave Wandu's two children a couple of rupees to hang round their necks, Wandu two packets salt, his brother one package, and sent one package to Washaung.

Rough bearings and distances from Wandu.

Nawtaw	... N. E. 1 day's journey
Wahsaung	... S. S. E. 1 hard day.
Bihri	... S. E. S. 2½ hard days.
Bihru	... S. E. S. 3½ hard days.
Bokes	... S. E. 3½ hard days.
Wabkee	... N. E. 3½ hard days.

The bearings do not, however, agree with the position; I have approximately placed villages on map. Left at 6-45, accompanied by Wandu's brother Santiang and Salato, his brother-in-law, with three followers. Biches still to the fore; he was very bad last night and unpleasantly demonstrative; struck down through taungyas east; very steep drop to Kau chaung, where we arrived at 7-20; followed Ko-u chaung in a north-westerly direction for one hour, very rough going, high boulders to climb over; 8-20 to 10-40 followed chaung to westward, occasionally twisting round to south; halted for breakfast; range of hills on west of chaung called "Pataw" on east "Sheeku." I forgot to note that the products of Wandu villages are—

(a) Paddy.	(e) Maize.
(b) Yams.	(f) Cotton.
(c) Sugarcane.	(g) Tobacco grown in taungyas.
(d) Peas.	(h) Sesamum.

I have been keeping a sharp look-out for scented and other valuable trees since leaving the Kuladan, but beyond seeing a few cinnamon trees south of Wandu village I have come across nothing. At noon again proceeded until 2-20, direction northward and eastward, when we pitched our camp for the night; distance travelled 12 miles.

29th.—Started 6-5 a.m., crossed chaung and struck into jungle in a northerly direction, and then began steep ascent of hill north-east; at 7-80 met Chief Lesho (Nawtaw's step-brother), Talashoung, and a few followers, who were waiting for me and had brought me a goodly stock of eggs and fowls. After a short talk they preceded me on to the village, where I arrived at about 9 a.m. Found it quite deserted, but with traces of having lately been occupied by five or six persons; two or three wretched looking dogs and a sow with young were the only inmates. The village is a very large one; there must have been upwards of 160 houses, but 20 or 30 of these were burnt down by accident by some of the Chittagong party at their last visit. So much for Naucklay's story (see my diary of 9th February).

A fine view from the north-west end of the village of the Kuladan river, which here takes a big bend to the eastward before continuing its northerly direction; the Ko-u chaung flows into it as also does the Kocho chaung, which comes round Sherkor bluff from the southward and eastward. I did not fancy the village for several reasons, the principal ones being that it was far from water and I could keep no look-out over the coolies and men who went to fetch water and the village was dirty and offensive to the senses. I accordingly fixed on a small piece of flat ground below the village and in sight of the stream and there pitched camp for our Chittagong friends and selves. Yallangs anxious to return, but I persuaded them to wait and see the Chittagong Officer. Lesho again vented the subject of Thongleen and I again refused to interfere in his affairs, but invited him to come in and see me guaranteeing him a safe return. Lesho said that there had been Thongleen villagers in the village before our arrival, but that they had taken the alarm at a messenger who had been sent from the Chittagong Officer with a letter for me. He said that Thongleen, who would probably have come to see me, suspected that the latter was asking me to detain him if he came in; all this was probably bunkum, but it was unpleasant camping alongside an empty village without knowing the local politics and feeling certain that the villagers were watching me from different points of vantage. Before turning in, gave extra strict orders that no stragglers were to leave camp and sepoy to go out in couples and with their arms.

1st March.—Had a Europe morning, sleeping soundly till 7 a.m., when I was awakened with the unpleasant tidings that there was a Chaungtha cooly missing; turned out at once. Enquiry elicited that this man had been a slave at and had escaped from this very village 10 years ago. He had been seen at daybreak sitting by a tree near the servants' quarters and within 10 yards of a sentry. The person who last saw him believed he had gone down to ease nature; be that as it may, he had disappeared. His knife and shawl were on the ground where he had slept. Organised and sent out search parties in every direction. The general

belief seemed that Thongleen's men had been, as is their custom, prowling round in the early morning to pick off stragglers; if this were the case and he were recognized as an escaped slave, his death was certain. I was much concerned about the matter, for beyond searching for him I could do nothing and did not like the idea of returning without him. The idea that he had suddenly started off on his homeward journey without food and leaving his knife and shawl was of course considered, but it seemed preposterous. The idea that Thongleen's men had been lying in wait for this particular man would also not hold water, for the chances were 100 to 1 against his being the first and only man to get up early and go to the jungle. 9 a.m. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson, Assistant Superintendent of Police, and party arrived; met him in the village and he came down to the camp. He had a very fine lot of Gurkhas with him of the real fighting class, a class which we are not allowed to recruit. I told him about the missing cooly and he at once took steps to endeavour to trace him. Jadowa and other Kluangshais who accompanied him gave us but poor comfort, for they on hearing the particulars decided the man must have been killed.—Jadowa, who was subsequently sent out to try and find Thongleen, returned and reported him not to be found. Mr. Hutchinson sent in a letter to his Superintendent reporting the occurrence and asking for orders.

(It may be well to note here that on my return to Sallawa I found the missing cooly safe and sound. I pointed out to him that his escapade might have serious results as Mr. Hutchinson expects orders to hunt down Thongleen in consequence of this affair and former delinquencies. As the cooly could give no explanation of his conduct beyond that he was attacked with a sudden fit of madness I punished him in a suitable manner on the spot.)

After breakfast I called up the Yallaings who were anxious to get back to their village, and introduced them to Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson, informing him that they were anxious to hear about Thongleen's affair and whether they were liable to a hostile visit from the Chittagong side (see my diary of 9th February). Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson, having talked the matter over with me, replied explaining matters between Thongleen and the Government and informing the Yallaings that no tribute would be exacted from them and no unnecessary visits should be paid to them by the Chittagong side until the matter had first been referred to me and I had an opportunity of preparing them for this demand; at this they went away happy. Lesho told me that the road back *via* Nawlaw and Wabauang was as close as the road by which I had come and suggested that I should go back that way and see Nawlaw. I replied that I would probably do so and was much pleased at his proposing it. If I go back that way, I shall get an idea of the lay of the Mithaung, which up to date I have been unable to fix; I shall also see instead of guessing at the locality of the villages on it. The Yallaings before going were told about the missing cooly and were told that, if Thongleen people had in reality killed him or taken him captive, they (the Yallaings) must not harbour them should they retire down south.

Had a talk with Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson on the subject of fixing a boundary between the Chittagong and the Arakan Hill Tracts. The instructions he had received from Captain Shakespear were to propose the "Kula stream" as a boundary, Chittagong taking the west side and Arakan the east side. Unable to identify the Kula stream: the Kluangshais call the Ko-u chaung the Kula, but this is only a small stream which does not extend more than 8 miles south of Sherkor; this cannot be the boundary line which Captain Shakespear proposes. We came to the conclusion that Captain Shakespear's proposals referred to the Kuladan river as the boundary line and, having threshed the matter out, came to the conclusion that the country can be best administered as far south as Sherkor including that village and a village to the east of it inhabited by Tlaing Shandus, Taungmim Wahkee from the Chittagong side, Arakan administering the country south of this. By this arrangement the Arakan west boundary line north of Sallawa and south of Sherkor would be the Kuladan river, an imaginary line drawn from below Sherkor east being the northern boundary: the Yallaings say that there are two well known hills, "Loubok" and Klayklay," with the Tipu chaung running between them on the imaginary line above referred to, which would serve well as boundary-marks, but as we are at present unable to fix the position of these hills with any certainty this matter must stand over. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson is further instructed to say that, if the Burma Local Government is not prepared to administer and exact tribute from the tribes south of Sherkor within the next 12 months, then the Chittagong authorities propose doing this as it is prejudicial to their working to have a few tribes remaining independent within close proximity to the several tribes who have been brought under control and from whom tribute has been and is being exacted.

In the evening we went up to Sherkor bluff and had a look round; from there we could see on the north Site or Maungklaing village inhabited by Kluangshais; we could also see Darjon hill on which Fort Tregear is bearing roughly north-east. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson unfortunately had no map with him and was therefore unable to give me any reliable information as to the position of the different villages between Fort Tregear and Sherkor, nor were we able to identify the "Blue mountain." Mr. Hutchinson thought it was a high peak between Fort Tregear and Sherkor, but was not certain. After returning I have

looked at Sheet 1 "South-eastern frontier" map; convinced that the peak pointed out is the Malsaraimon or Blue mountain.

This evening after dinner we organised a dance amongst the sepoys of both parties, but there was no drum and no liquor, and it took all Mr. Hutchinson's efforts (and he seems a great favourite with the men) to get any warmth out of the dancers.

2nd.—Halted throughout the day talking over matters general and prosecuting enquiries re the missing cooly, of whom it is needless to say we heard nothing. This wretched business quite spoils a meeting which would under other circumstances have been a most enjoyable one to me, for it is not every day that one meets a brother officer in the wilds, and Mr. Hutchinson is *par excellence* good company. Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson interviewed Taungmin Nga Lón and the three other men who had come upon the chance of getting back their relatives, and he promised to do his utmost to get back the captives, but said he could do nothing unless they would remain with him to identify them. After some little demur two of them and a relative who spoke Burmese and Hindustani agreed to accompany the Chittagong party, Mr. Hutchinson promising to look after them and to send them back to their homes via Chittagong. We had arranged to have a shooting match this evening and had made targets and fixed on range, but it did not come off as our friends ran short of rations and had to send a party out to search for paddy, which did not return before dark.

Tribute is collected from the tribes on Chittagong side at the rate of $\frac{1}{2}$ maund clean rice per house per annum; distant villages have the option of paying Re. 1 per annum instead; villages have to feed columns (on payment) and provide coolies.

3rd.—Broke up camp at 6 A.M. sharp. Mr. Hutchinson very courteously fell in his men and presented arms to me on leaving, then after we had each given three hearty cheers we said good-bye and departed. I to get back to the district as quickly as possible for my rations were barely sufficient to take us in and Mr. Hutchinson to go to Wahki's village and there await orders re the missing cooly, regarding whose unaccountable disappearance he was quite as much troubled as myself. (I may here note that on my return I sent urgent telegrams to both Lungleh and Tregear reporting that the cooly had turned up and apologising for the trouble given.)

As already noted I had proposed returning *via* Nawtaw and Wahshaung, but after consulting my orders again, which were distinct and left me no discretionary power, I concluded that I should be liable to blame in the event of any difficulty occurring on the road, under which circumstances I should have found it difficult to prove that I had not gone out of my way. Under the circumstance I did not choose to take the responsibility and gave up with regret the idea of solidifying my friendship with the Yallaings and extending my knowledge of the country and started to return by the route I had come. Coolies had evidently been exerting their imagination re the disappearance of the Chaungtha cooly, for although I had put the local gun-holders amongst them, they were very jumpy imagining a hostile shoulder behind each bush they passed. I regret having to record that the gun-holders were also in a horrid funk and gave but little confidence to the coolies. After half an hour's journey downhill I and main party had got about 200 yards clear of the jungle and on the slope of the taungyas when a shouting of "Shandus" and general confusion in the rear made us double back and we found that one of the coolies had seen a sepoy sitting in the jungle behind a bush and at once bolted with his load spreading the alarm amongst the remainder of the coolies with the result that one of them was disabled for the remainder of the journey with a bad cut in his knee cap. With some trouble I ascertained the party blameable for spreading the scare and proposed making an example of him, but he was such a wretched looking individual that I let him off with a caution, gave the gun-holders a bit of my mind, and threatened to confiscate their licenses on my return if they did not behave better.

Crossing the Ko-u chaung one of the Kwemé coolies fell off a boulder and died instantaneously. When I got to the spot he was quite dead and there was nothing to be done but to tie him up in bamboo matting and carry him in to his friends, who would never have forgiven me if I had buried him in the jungle. I could find no marks of injury in the corpse, the coolies thought he had injured his testicles in the fall.

Halted at 10-40 for breakfast, at 11-45 continued journey; 1 P.M. met a party of Yallaings with a gun and horns. They sat down and awaited our approach, when they followed with the party; 2 P.M. left Ko-u chaung and commenced to climb hill to Wandu, the last part through the taungyas, with the sun beating down, was terribly hard work; the coolies with the corpse could not get up, so I sent on to Wandu for Yallaings to assist them. Arrived Wandu 3 P.M. Wandu came down below to meet me, a considerable improvement upon the way he behaved at our first arrival. He sent down a party of Yallaings to bring up the corpse and treated us right hospitably. I decided upon not putting up with the rats again and settled myself down below the village. After a wash and some tea went up to make my farewells to Nawtaw's wives, whom I treated to some Madeira and cake; they returning the compliment by offering me kaung. Purchased a small quantity of rice from Wandu, also a pig and some fowls for the men. Unlike the Kwemé I found the Yallaings very keen in money and very willing to sell anything they had; they brought down cloths,

bags, yams, fowls, and in fact everything they had saleable and remained in our camp bargaining with sepoys and coolies until 9 p.m., when I turned them all out. I talked to Wandu and the chief men in the village and Nawta's *factotum*, Tala Shuang, who had accompanied me from Sherkor, for about one hour after dinner and tried to give them some information as to Sherkor; he had been more than a guide; had helped me in every way in his power both with information re places and people and specially in coming to good terms from me at Sherkor; he had been more than a guide; had helped me in every way in his power both with information re places and people and especially in coming to good terms with Wandu. I gave him Rs. 20 and an invitation to look me up at Paletwa, when I will treat him right royally (from his point of view.)

4th.—6 a.m. left Wandu purposely taking no villagers as guides as I wanted to visit the joom which covers the village on the west; took notes re position, &c., and continued journey; at 6 a.m. the coolies with corpse had preceded us, leaving by moonlight; 10-40 arrived at breakfast place of 26th and halted for breakfast; 11-45 rear-guard having arrived shortly before again started increasing the strength of the rear guard as I wished to push on without continually halting to let coolies come up; met small party of Shandus returning to the village; the leader who I had met on first arrival at Wandu paid me the compliment of patting my shoulder as I passed and saying I was "good;" 3 p.m. reached Nibu chaung and found the leafed roofs we had left somewhat frizzled by the sun but serviceable; my leg which I had scraped somewhat badly at Sherkor had been knocked about a good deal on the road and was beginning to get inflamed and ugly.

5th.—Started at 5-30 a.m. sharp and got over the ground as quickly as possible; at 8 a.m. arrived at halting-place of 21th under cliff; 9-30 halted for breakfast on Sulla chaung, where we halted for breakfast on 24th; shot jungle fowl. Left 10-15 and cut across jungle to Kinkaw chaung, arriving there at 11 a.m.; 12-45 arrived at place where we saw elephant and halted for half-an-hour; 3 p.m. arrived at sleeping place of 22nd, very tired, having got over 24 miles. After dinner finding there were two Yallangs amongst the Koon coolies called them up and tried to fix the position of tribe, but without much result as the two men had left their tribe many years ago. Started at 5-15 a.m. and struck for the Kuladan, half-way buried the dead cooly about a mile off, and as I had not had any breakfast had a bad 20 minutes getting past. Glad, however, we have got the corpse in all right; arrived at the Kuladan at 11 a.m. and as already noted found the Chaungtha cooly who had disappeared at Sherkor; had breakfast and leaving Shwe Pa U to settle up accounts started in boats for Paletwa, where I arrived at 4 p.m.

6th.—Arrived at Paletwa at 10 a.m.; had breakfast and proceeded on to Paletwa, where I arrived 6 p.m.; good travelling. Nothing worthy of note happened since my departure; leg very bad, so that I shall have to take to my back if I am to be fit enough to go to the Arakan Yomas to meet Lieutenant Tighe towards the end of the month.

PALETWA.
The 13th March 1892. }

R. H. GREENSTREET,
District Superintendent of Police,
in charge Arakan Hill Tracts.

17th.—Mail came in bringing replies to my telegrams to Captain Shakespeare and Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson about the disappearance of the cooly at Sherkor. Glad to find that no harm has occurred in consequence. The former asks me to let the Sherkor people know of his friendly feeling towards them. The latter informs me that he has recovered five of the 11 captives which Nga Lón and villagers have been petitioning about, a very good stroke of business. Of the remaining six captives Mr. Sneyd Hutchinson reports one dead and the other five in Laloya village on the Burma side (Haka side). Wired asking for further particulars re the latter.


20th.—My old friend Bichee with five Yallaing followers brought in Wannu, younger brother of Thongleen of Sherkor with eight Klaungshai followers. They turned up on the range this morning, where 10 of the best shots at headquarters were shooting off a handienp at which we had a small lottery last night. After the shooting I interviewed them in office and gave Captain Shakespeare's message to them. Pointed out to them how very stupid it was of them clearing out of the village and how desirable it was that Thongleen should meet Captain Shakespeare and learn from him what his orders regarding them were. Gave Wannu a letter for Captain Shakespeare and guaranteed that, if Thongleen would go into Lungleh and deliver this letter no harm would come to him. Wired to Captain Shakespeare telling him he might expect to see Thongleen during the next fortnight. Wannu presented me with a Shandu cloth, which I have handed over to be auctioned. The Shandus will remain at Paletwa today, returning towards their homes tomorrow. Questioned them regarding the Lallaings, Napay, and Naraing Shandus; the latter are worked from the Haka side they say; the Napay Shandus are a tribe of two villages, head Chief Manhlee, being Taungmin of one and Naylay being Chief of the other. These two villages have approximately speaking 100 houses each and are $2\frac{1}{2}$ days' journey apart the southernmost one (Naylay) being one day's journey from Bichee (the Sabauing village). The people of both villages drink water from the Kuladan river, which must here take a big

bend to the south. If it is decided that the tribes between Sherkor and Kaletwa are to be worked from the Arakan side it will have to be ascertained which side can best work the Napay Shandus. At present the above is all that I know regarding this tribe. The Lal-laing villages are situated to the northward of the Khaungsoe and the southward and eastward of the Bokes and are not between the Bokes and Sabaung as I had at first been given to understand.

R. H. GREENSTREET.

*District Superintendent of Police,
in charge Arakan Div. Tracts*

The 30th March 1892.



Scale 5 Miles = 1 inch.



Sd: A. H. Green street
Superintendent

13-3-82

OF THE
ARAKAN HILL TRACTS
DIST: AKYAB.

1853 TO 64

Scale 8 Mean = 1.66



Extract from the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1383 E., dated Simla, the 25th July 1892.

RESOLUTION.—In January last a Conference met at Calcutta to examine certain questions relating to the country of the Lushai and Chin tribes. The Governor-General in Council has now considered the report of the Conference, and is in a position to pass orders upon the main points involved.

2. The territory referred to is at present under three distinct civil administrations and three distinct military commands. The northern Lushais are under the Chief Commissioner of Assam and the General Officer Commanding the Assam district, the southern Lushais are under the Bengal Government and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency district, and the Chins are under the Chief Commissioner of Burma and the General Officer Commanding in that province. It has been recognised for some time past, both by the Government of India and by Her Majesty's Secretary of State, that this tripartite division of authority is open to objection, and the main question laid before the Conference was what remedies would be practicable.

3. The final recommendations of the Conference are stated in these words:—

"The majority of the Conference are of opinion that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country known as the Chin-Lushai Hills should be brought under one administrative head as soon as this can be done. They also consider it advisable that the new administration should be subordinate to the Chief Commissioner of Assam. Sir J. Dormer and Sir Alexander Mackenzie would defer any final decision as regards the eastern part of the tract till further information is obtained.

"The Conference is not prepared to assert that this step can be taken immediately. As matters now stand, the difficulties of communication, of supplies and of transport are very serious, and it will in any case be necessary to suspend action until after the close of the present cold season's operations in the Chin and Lushai Hills.

"The first thing to be done for the control of this tract is to improve the communications between the important places, such as Cachar and Aijal, Aijal and Lungleh, Aijal and Manipur, and the posts situated, respectively, on the eastern and western side of the tract. The opening out of these lines is a work of pressing importance. The necessary commissariat staff should also be provided to arrange for transport and supplies, till the tract is able to provide them for itself.

"The Conference is of opinion that the boundaries of the new administrative area should be, generally speaking, the boundaries of the tract occupied by the savages newly brought under British control, but the details of these boundaries can only be settled after consultation with local officers.

"The Conference is agreed that North and South Lushai, with such portions of the Arakan Hill Tracts as may hereafter be determined, should be placed under Assam at once on condition that—

"(1) complete transport and commissariat equipment for supplies from Chittagong to South Lushai, and from Cachar to North Lushai, are provided;

"(2) funds are granted for road and telegraph from Aijal to Lungleh."

The Conference also expressed the opinion that the transfer to Assam of the southern Lushais suggested the further transfer to the same administration of the Chittagong Division.

4. The conclusions at which the Governor-General in Council has arrived in respect of the proposals of the Conference are as follows:—

- (1) The whole of the Lushai country should be under the Chief Commissioner of Assam, and the transfer of the southern Lushais from Bengal to Assam should be made as early as possible. The Chief Commissioner of Assam has already been consulted*

* Foreign Department letter No. 516 E, dated the 17th March 1892, as to the measures necessary to effect this change,

and it is hoped that his reply will shortly be received.

- (2) The Chittagong district should also be transferred from Bengal to Assam, as soon as the settlement operations now in progress have been brought to an end. If the settlement cannot be finished within the current year, or if it is found that there are difficulties in the way of an immediate transfer of the entire district, the sub-division of the Hill Tracts should be transferred in advance of the rest.

- (3) The Government of Bengal and the Chief Commissioner of Assam should be consulted as to the expediency of transferring to Assam the whole Chittagong Division, including the political charge of Hill Tipperah.

- (4) The Northern Arakan Hill Tracts should be transferred from Burma to Assam. The Chief Commissioners of both provinces have

† Foreign Department letters, No. 516 E, dated the 17th March 1892, and No. 593 E, dated the 29th March 1892.

‡ Letter from the Chief Secretary to the Chief Commissioner, No. 69 (Political Department), dated the 3rd June 1892.

already been referred to on this subject, and a reply has been received from Burma,‡ which will be communicated to

Assam. The Governor-General in Council will be glad if the two Chief Commissioners will put themselves into communication and consider the matter, with a view to settling the future position of the boundary between their respective administrations.

- (5) When detailed proposals are submitted to give effect to the five transfers indicated above, viz.—South Lushai, the Chittagong district, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the Chittagong Division, and the Northern Arakan Hill Tracts—they should include careful estimates of the additional expenditure, if any, involved in each case.

- (6) With regard to the Chin Hills no declaration of policy need be made for the present.

ORDER.—A copy of this Resolution is forwarded for information and guidance to the Government of Bengal, the Chief Commissioners of Burma and Assam, and all Departments of the Government of India.

True Extract,

(Sd.) H. M. DURAND,

Secretary to the Government of India.

SEPTEMBER 1892.

Desirability of bringing Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration. E 57-62

No. 57.

Telegram, dated the 1st August 1892.

From—The Chief Commissioner of Burma, Mandalay,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

76. Has it been decided that administration of Chin Hills is to remain with Burma as stated in newspapers? If so, I will prepare fresh scheme for administration of Chin Hill Tracts.

No. 58.

Telegram, dated the 1st August 1892.

From—The Chief Secretary to Government of Bengal, Calcutta,

To—The Foreign Secretary, Simla.

2645-P. We have received a copy of proceedings, dated 25th July, regarding Lushai. Please let me know if we are to expect instructions as to the manner in which they are to be dealt with by Government.

No. 59.

Telegram No. 1438-E., dated the 2nd August 1892.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Burma, Mandalay.

1438-E. Your 76 of 1st. Chin Hills remain under Burma for present. Copy of Government of India Resolution was forwarded to you on 27th July.

No. 60.

No. 1442-E., dated the 2nd August 1892.

From—The Foreign Secretary, Simla,

To—The Chief Secretary to Government of Bengal, Calcutta.

1442-E. Your 2645-P. We are awaiting further report from Assam. Instructions will issue after its receipt.

No. 61.

No. 1480-E., dated Simla, the 9th August 1892.

From—LIEUTENANT H. DALY, Assistant Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,

To—The Chief Commissioner of Assam.

With reference to paragraph 4, clause 4, of the Resolution of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, No. 1383-E., dated the 25th July 1892, a copy of which has already been sent to you, I am directed to forward for your information a copy of the marginally noted letter regarding the transfer of the Arracan Hill Tracts to the Assam Administration.

From the Officiating Chief Secretary to Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 69-1-E-S, dated 2nd June 1892.

No. 62.

No. 155-E., dated Simla, the 23rd August 1892.

From—The Government of India,

To—The Secretary of State for India.

In Political despatch No. 61, dated the 17th September 1891, Your Lordship's predecessor observed that he would be glad to learn that the aug-
E-9.62—Sept.

Proof.

3rd August 1892.

J. A. C.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Despatch submitted in proof.

J. S.—5th August 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Besides the despatch in proof there is also a draft letter to Amam

6th August 1892.

H. D.

Issue to Amam. Clean proof of despatch to Secretary.

6th August 1892.

J. A. C.

[To the Chief Commissioner of Amam, No. 1490-E, dated the 9th August 1892.]

Clean proof as corrected.

11th August 1892.

H. D.

Clean proof below.

J. S.—11th August 1892.

18th August 1892.

H. M. D.

[Proc.
No. 23.]

[To Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 150-E, dated the 22nd August 1892.]

Sir C. Elliott complains that he has received no instructions as to transfer of Lushai Hills.

L.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

We sent Bengal a copy of the recent Resolution regarding arrangements for the future administration of the Chin-Lushai country.

On the 1st August Bengal referred to the Resolution and enquired by telegram when they were to expect instructions as to the manner in which the Lushai hills are to be dealt

Telegram dated the 2nd August 1892.

with, and were told in reply that instructions would issue after we received a report from Amam, which we are still awaiting.

The Amam report is delayed owing to Mr. McCabe's ill-health.

The Private Secretary to the Viceroy may see these papers for His Excellency's information.

J. S.—12th August 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Perhaps we may write demi-officially to Bengal and Amam as suggested in the drafts below. Papers may then go to Private Secretary to the Viceroy for information.

13th August 1892.

H. D.

13th August 1892.

J. A. C.

[Demi-officials to W. E. Ward, Esq., C.B.I., and the Hon'ble H. J. S. Cotton, dated the 16th August 1892.]

To Private Secretary to the Governor-General unofficially.

17th August 1892.

[K. W. No. 2] DEMI-OFFICIAL FROM SIR CHARLES ELLIOTT, K.C.S.I., LIEUTENANT-GOVERNOR OF BENGAL (TO SECRETARY), DATED THE 18TH AUGUST 1892.

Says that Captain Shakespeare is in Simla and will discuss Chin affairs with the Secretary. Complains that he has received no official instructions regarding the administration of the Chin Hills.

See A within.

What is this?

30th August 1892.

H. M. D.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Sir Charles Elliott refers to our Resolution of the 25th July regarding the future administration of Chin-Lushai land.

Mr. Cotton has been told why instructions are delayed.

J. S.—30th August 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

No action appears necessary. I do not know where Captain Shakespeare is, but no doubt he will put in an appearance.

22nd August 1892

H. D.

Yes. I don't see what could be more "official" than our Proceedings about the transfer.

3rd August 1892.

J. A. C.

K. W. No. 2.

[DEMI-OFFICIALS.]

Dated Calcutta, the 18th December 1891.

From—G. R. INWIS, Esq.,

To—H. J. & CORSON, Esq., C.S.

Please see the Military Department's letter to you, No. 3621-B. of the 14th instant, about the Conference shortly to be held here for the consideration of the military situation and other matters in Assam and the Chin-Lushai country.

We might take advantage of the opportunity to hold a small politico-civil Conference at the same time to consider the question of assimilating the administration in all three Chin-Lushai tracts, and so paving the way to their ultimate consolidation into one charge.

I am just communicating, under instructions, with Burma and Assam to ask whether they can arrange for the attendance of some officer with a good local knowledge of their respective tracts and sufficient acquaintance with the present system of administration. Does His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor approve the idea and see his way to having a Bengal representative present at such a meeting?

Please let me have an answer as soon as you can.

Dated the 22nd December 1891.

From—H. J. & CORSON, Esq., C.S.,

To—G. R. INWIS, Esq.

I have shown your letter of the 18th to the Lieutenant-Governor, and he is of opinion that the politico-civil Conference it is proposed to hold regarding the Chin-Lushai tracts may advantageously be merged in the military conference on the same subject; Sir Charles Elliott considers that the most important question in either must be the assimilation of the administration of all three tracts and their consolidation into one charge. We have already written officially to the Military Department that it is not likely that the Commissioner of Chittagong will be able to come to Calcutta till March. For the rest we will endeavour to meet your wishes, but Sir Charles Elliott does not like the idea of two Conferences with different members when apparently one would suffice.

K—9.21—Sept.

{ FOREIGN
DEPT.

LIST OF PAPERS

(To be continued on back, if necessary)

No. 11. - Tel. from the Chief Secy. to the Chief Comm. of Burma, No. 264, dated the 2nd Dec 1950 - Says that the Chief Comm. concurs in an officer with local knowledge to attend the proposed Conference till the work of the column is over.

Originals of these Proceedings

Branch, date, and No.

Brief title of file.

External B. May/95

No. 249/250

Proposal to grant
to Babu Basidanta
Khan Ristich
Engineer of the
S. L. Hill's travelling
allowance at the
ordinary rates
admissible for
an asst. Eng.
of the P. W. D.

W. H. L. May/95 491

No. 22.—Tel. from the Chief Commr., Assam, No. 3841-P, dated the 23rd Dec. 1891—Suggests that the Conference should take place in March 1892, and that Mr. McCabe should be asked to attend.

No. 23.—From the Mil. Dept., No. 35-B., dated the 8th Jan. 1892—Forwards a copy of correspondence regarding the Conference to be held in Calcutta to discuss the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

No. 24-28.—Enclosures.

No. 29.—From the Mil. Dept., No. 248-B., dated the 21st Jan. 1892—States that the Govr.-Genl. in Council has decided that a Conference shall be held in Calcutta on or about the 25th instant, to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Chin-Lushai Hills, and gives a list of the members who will sit in Conference.

No. 30.—From the Mil. Dept., No. 783-B., dated the 25th Feb. 1892—Transfers, for consideration in communication with the Home Dept., the proceedings of the Conference which recently assembled at Calcutta for the discussion of various questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai country, together with copies of despatches from and to the Secy. of State on the subject.

No. 31-40.—Enclosures.

No. 41.—To the Chief Commr. of Assam, No. 516-E., dated the 17th March 1892—Forwards a copy of the proceedings of the Conference, and asks for his views regarding the transfer of certain tracts to Assam.

No. 42.—To the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 594-E., dated the 29th March 1892—Forwards a copy of the proceedings of the Conference, and asks for his views regarding the transfer of a portion of the Arakan Hill Tracts to Assam.

No. 43.—Copy to the Chief Commr. of Assam, under endorsement No. 595-E., dated the 29th March 1892.

No. 44.—From the Offg. Chief Secy. to the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 549—L.C.-1, dated the 26th April 1892—Submits copies of notes by Messrs. Carey and Maonabb, showing that it is impracticable for Assam to work the Eastern Chin Hills.

No. 45-46.—Enclosures.

No. 47.—Tel. to the Chief Commr. of Assam and Burma, Nos. 980-981-E., dated the 30th May 1892—Asks when replies may be expected to letters in connection with resolutions of the Chin-Lushai Conference.

No. 48.—Tel. from the Secy. to the Chief Commr. of Assam, No. 2483-P., dated the 31st May 1892—In reply to above, says that report of Mr. Maonabb is awaited, which he has promised to submit on his return to Aijal on conclusion of present expedition.

No. 49.—Tel. from the Chief Secy. to the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 445, dated the 2nd June 1892—Says that his answer regarding the transfer of the Arakan Hill Tracts to Assam goes by the mail of the 3rd June.

No. 50.—From the Chief Secy. to the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 60—(B.-3, dated the 3rd June 1892)—Communicates the views of the Offg. Chief Commr. regarding the transfer of the Arakan Hill Tracts to Assam.

Nos. 51-55.—Enclosures.

No. 56.—Resolution No. 1333-E., dated the 25th July 1892—Orders on the recommendations of the Conference held in connection with questions relating to the Lushai and Chin tribes. Copies to Bengal, Burma, Assam and all Depts. of the Govt. of India.

No. 57.—Tel. from the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 76, dated the 1st Aug. 1892—Enquires if it has been decided that the administration of the Chin Hills is to remain with Burma. If so, says he will prepare a fresh scheme for the administration of the Chin Hill Tracts.

No. 58.—Tel. from the Chief Secy. to the Govt. of Bengal, No. 2645-P., dated the 1st Aug. 1892—Enquires whether he may expect instructions as to the manner in which the Lushai Hills are to be dealt with by Govt.

No. 59.—Tel. to the Chief Commr. of Burma, No. 1438-E., dated the 2nd Aug. 1892—Says that the Chin Hills remain under Burma for the present.

No. 60.—Tel. to the Govt. of Bengal, No. 1442-E., dated the 2nd Aug. 1892—In reply to tel. No. 2645-P., says that a further report from Assam is being awaited, and that instructions will issue after its receipt.

No. 61.—To the Chief Commr. of Assam, No. 1480-E., dated the 9th Aug. 1892—Forwards a copy of Burma letter No. 69—1B.-8, dated the 3rd June 1892, regarding the transfer of the Arracan Hill Tracts to Assam.

No. 62.—Despatch to Secy. of State, No. 158 (Extl.), dated the 23rd Aug. 1892—With reference to despatch No. 61 (Poldl.), dated the 17th Sept. 1891, forwards a copy of the orders passed on the proposals put forward by the Conference held for the discussion of questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai Hills.

1892
FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

EXTERNAL A.

Pros. September 1892, Nos. 9-62

Desirability of bringing the Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration. Proceedings of a Conference which assembled in Calcutta to discuss the question. Resolution of the Government of India on the proposals of the Conference.

K. W.

EXTERNAL A, SEPTEMBER 1892.

Nos. 9-62.

Desirability of bringing the Chin-Lushai Hill Tracts under one administration. Proceedings of a Conference which assembled in Calcutta to discuss the question. Resolution of the Government of India on the proposals of the Conference.

K. W. No. 1.

PART I.

CHIN-LUSHAI AFFAIRS

[PROG. NO. FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA, NO. 81 (POLITICAL), DATED THE 17TH SEPTEMBER 1891.]

Refers to despatch No. 191 (Financial), dated the 14th July 1891, and approves of the measures taken to secure the proper administration of the South Lushai Hills on the understanding that the proposals are to be regarded as temporary.

Requests to be informed whether the suggestion contained in the last sentence of the despatch above referred to about consolidating the entire area inhabited by Lushais and cognate tribes is receiving serious consideration.

Circulated.

8th October 1891.

H. M. D.

L.

F. S. R.

P. P. H.

D. B.

A. E. M.

H. B.

R. C. B. P.

A copy may be sent to the Finance Department for information. Endorsement put up for approval. We may, with reference to paragraphs 4 and 5 of the despatch, ask the Government of Bengal to report, when practicable, regarding the incorporation of the Lushai tracts under one administration, sending them at the same time a copy of the despatch. Draft put up for approval.

T. G. BALDWIN—16th October 1891.

A. D. M.—16th October 1891.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

The contemplated measure is hardly yet within practical distance, and is one of very great importance. The current cold weather's operations between Burma and Assam will throw a

good deal more light on the subject. We can either await the result of these and then take further steps, or write perhaps demi-officially now to the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Chief Commissioners of Burma and Assam, acquainting them with the general outline of the suggested policy. But before matters go further, the Foreign Secretary would perhaps like to discuss the matter at Calcutta with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and possibly the Chief Commissioner of Assam, while I understand that His Excellency's tour in the current season will include Burma. The subject will no doubt be then discussed with the Chief Commissioner.

We might prepare in the interim a brief history of our present arrangements as far as they have gone: however, as I have already indicated, matters now are in a transition state.

17th October 1891.

A. T.

The latter seems the best course: the copy to Finance however should go.

19th October 1891.

W. J. C.

[Rederment to Finance Department, No. 2048-E, dated the 31st October 1891.]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

This case may be brought up when the Secretary returns to Calcutta.

A. D. M.—22nd October 1891.

23rd October 1891.

A. T.

RECEIVED FROM COLONEL E. G. WOODTHORPE, R.E., C.B., INTELLIGENCE BRANCH.

Note on our dealings with savage tribes, and the necessity for having them under one rule.*

UNDER-SECRETARY.

To see.

26th October 1891.

W. J. C.

Seen. The question of having the Burma, Bengal and Assam tribes under one administration is gradually being worked up. This note should not be lost sight of in connection with the case.

27th October 1891.

A. T.

I re-submit this now, as the Secretary does not return to Calcutta for some time to come.

A. D. M.—29th November 1891.

Have you undertaken in the interim a brief history of present arrangements? Some such précis is wanted for the suggested discussion with the Lieutenant-Governor here and the Chief Commissioner of Assam if he comes here, and should be put up to Under-Secretary. There is little use in my taking up the case for a fortnight or so, and then dropping it.

3rd December 1891.

W. J. C.

UNDER-SECRETARY.

On the last received despatch from the Secretary of State, regarding administrative arrangements or political control in Lushai, it was, I think, noted that a Conference might be held in Calcutta between Foreign, Bengal, Assam, and, if possible, Burma.

Meanwhile nothing was done on the despatch which has not been communicated to Bengal?

24th December 1891.

W. J. C.

EXTERNAL BRANCH (B).

I haven't seen the despatch: where is it?

24th December 1891.

G. B. I.

The despatch is put up, and the précis of present arrangements in the Chin-Lushai tract has been taken in hand.

T. G. BALDWIN—*9th December 1891.*

No copy was sent to Bengal, *vide* notes ending 18th October 1891.

A. D. M.—*9th December 1891.*

Then we had better, in continuation of our No. 1678-E. of the 9th August 1891, say that the Secretary of State has accorded his sanction to the proposals as a temporary measure.

9th December 1891.

G. R. L.

Draft put up for approval.

T. G. BALDWIN—*10th December 1891.*

A. D. M.—*10th December 1891.*

Issue.

No 58, in above collection.

Have we had any answer yet from Burma to our letter about the survey?

11th December 1891.

G. R. I.

* External A., May 1892, Nos. 58-57.

Yes: please see pp.*

T. G. BALDWIN—11th December 1891.

A. D. M.—12th December 1891.

Thanks.

12th December 1891.

G. R. I.

(*Enclosure*)

(To the Chief Secretary to the Government of Bengal, No. 2408 E, dated the 12th December 1891.)

The arrangements at present in force in the Chin-Lushai hills are as follows:—

Chin hills under Burma administration.

In April 1890, the Chief Commissioner of Burma submitted proposals for the political administration of this tract as under—

External A., August 1890, Nos. 221-277.

To maintain a control over the Chins and to conduct our relations with them on consistent principles. For this purpose the appointment of two civil officers under the Chief Commissioner's orders was considered necessary. Messrs. Carey and Ross were selected for this duty, and, in addition to a special allowance of Rs. 200 each per mensem, which was previously sanctioned* for them, they were each to have an Assistant Superintendent of Police (pay Rs. 400) to assist them in their work, and it was proposed to grant these Assistant Superintendents of Police a local allowance of Rs. 100 each per mensem. These proposals were approved in our letter† of the 20th May 1890, and it was added that the allowances were sanctioned provisionally for a year by which time the Chief Commissioner was to submit his proposals for the permanent control of the Chin hill tribes.

Assistant Commissioners, 4th grade, Rs. 450-500.

* External B., March 1890, No. 70-71.

† External A., August 1890, Nos. 221-277.

In May 1891, the Chief Commissioner represented that the arrangements sanctioned in our letter above referred to had worked fairly well, but, as the various tribes had not been brought under complete control, and, as the area of the Chin hills was too extensive to be worked by one officer, he asked that the existing arrangements might be allowed to continue till the end of the current financial year (1891-92), or until such time as he was in a position to propose a change.

External A., August 1891, Nos. 1-3.

This was agreed‡ to and the matter reported§ to the Secretary of State, who conveyed his approval in despatch|| No. 60 (Political), dated the 10th September 1891.

‡ Ibid.
§ External A., October 1891, No. 114.

North Lushai hills under Assam administration.

Political Officer on Rs. 1,000 per mensem. The late Captain Browne was the first officer appointed.

External A., August 1890, Nos. 221-277.

European Doctor—drawing the pay of a 2nd class civil station.

Garrison—three hundred men of the Frontier Police—200 at Fort Aijal, and 100 at Changul—under a military officer with staff allowance of Rs. 200 per mensem, in addition to the military pay of rank.

Transport for garrison—A coolie corps—100 strong—@ Rs. 10 each per mensem with free rations, and a reserve for boat carriage between Jhalnacheria and Changul.

These arrangements were sanctioned in our letter¶ of the 3rd July 1890, with the exception of the question of the eastern boundary (which was deferred until the tract had been fully explored), and the Chief Commissioner of Assam was asked** to furnish a detailed statement of the extra cost involved by the arrangements, but no reply appears to have been received.

¶ External A., August 1890, Nos. 221-277.

** Ibid.

†† External A., August 1890, Nos. 221-277.
‡‡ External A., October 1890, Nos. 263-267.

A report†† was made to the Secretary of State, who approved‡‡ of the arrangements.

South Lushai hills under Bengal administration.

The proposals of the Bengal Government for the administration of this tract will be found in letters*, Nos. 1049 P. and 56 P.D., dated, respectively, the 16th March and 4th June

* External A., September 1891, Nos. 58-59.
1891. Briefly these proposals were as follows:—

To appoint a *Superintendent* exercising general control over all departments on Rs. 700 + 1,000 + local allowance Rs. 150.
Mean Rs. 900. ... Rs. 1,050 per mensem.

The Superintendent to be stationed at Fort Tregear with two Assistant Commandants of Police.

Commandant of Police with one Assistant Commandant at Lungleh—

Pay of Commandant Rs. 700 + deputation allowance Rs. 150
Rs. 850 „ „

Three Assistant Commandants of Police—two with Superintendent at Fort Tregear, and one with Commandant at Lungleh—on following salaries—

1 on Rs. 300	Rs. 300	} 1,025 „ „
2 on „ 250 each	500	
Local allowances of Rs. 75 each	225	

District Engineer (Native) at Lungleh—

Pay	Rs. 250	} 325 „ „
Local allowance	75	

Medical Officer at Lungleh.—

It was proposed to make this a special appointment to be held by a junior covenanted, uncovenanted or warrant officer according to circumstances, and the pay allowed to vary from Rs. 350 to 500 + a local allowance of Rs. 100. ... Rs. 600

In addition to their salary the above-mentioned officers were to draw travelling allowances estimated at Rs. 6,900 „ 6,900

Police—head-quarters at Lungleh.

The strength proposed was 539—native officers and men—but the Lieutenant-Governor hoped to reduce the force to 320 to be distributed as follows:—

Fort Tregear	...	100	} For pay to be given to the Police, please see Mr. Lyall's proposals.
Lungleh	...	150	
Laithuma	...	20	
Dumagri	...	50	
Total	...	320	

Cooly Corps—200 strong for road-making purposes.

Transport—100 mules.

800 bullocks.

175 coolies (permanent).

Taxation—It was proposed to levy a tax of Rs. 1 per house (there are 10,000 houses), the occupants of which were to deliver 10 seers of rice per house at the rate of Rs. 2 per maund.

The expenditure incurred in administering this tract amounts to Rs. 6,17,200, but from this must be deducted the sum of Rs. 1,65,666 (the saving in the police expenditure of the

External A., September 1891, Nos. 58-59.
Chittagong Hill Tracts which is referred to in Mr. Lyall's report.)

These proposals were sanctioned* in our letter of the 27th May 1891, and reported† to the

* External A., September 1891, Nos. 88-89.

† *Ibid.*

Secretary of State, who, in current despatch, No. 61 (Political) of the 17th September 1891, conveyed his approval, and urged the necessity

for consolidating under a single authority, subject to the control of one administration, the entire area inhabited by Lushais and cognate tribes now administered partly by Bengal, Assam, and Burma. In this connection the printed note received from Colonel Woodthorpe may be read.

The question of constructing a road from Chittagong to Burma is being separately dealt with—*vide* External A., May 1892, Nos. 58-57.

His Honour the Lieutenant-Governor advocated the postponement of a regular survey, but considered that advantage should be taken of a tour to be made by Mr. Pughe, Commandant of the Frontier Police, during the ensuing cold season to the south of Lungleh and Fort Tregear, to have a reconnaissance of the country made with the aid of a capable engineer. The Bengal Government asked for the services of a competent engineer for this work for three months, and Lieutenant Boileau, R.E., has been lent to them for duty with Mr. Pughe's recon-

Pay Rs. 515-12-0 + local and other allowance admissible, as well as travelling allowance.

months, and Lieutenant Boileau, R.E., has been lent to them for duty with Mr. Pughe's recon-

T. G. BALDWIN—17th December 1891.

A. D. M.—17th December 1891.

Thank you.

19th December.

G. E. I.

No action can be taken on this till we hear from Assam and Burma, and when final orders have been passed on their letters, we can then answer the Secretary of State. But we might send an *ad interim* reply to Sir S. Bayley?

T. G. BALDWIN—12th April 1892.

Hardly necessary now.

J. S.—13th April 1892.

No.

17th April 1892.

W. J. C.

PART II.

(*Chas h. 118*) FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT, No. 3656 B., DATED THE 16TH DECEMBER 1891.

Forwards, for information, copy of correspondence regarding a proposal to hold a conference at Calcutta during the ensuing cold season to discuss certain questions connected with the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

Submitted.

A. D. M.—17th December 1891.

Send letter to Bengal and telegram to Burma put up. Then re-submit. I am finding out when Mr. Ward is expected.

18th December 1891.

G. R. I.

(*For h. 2*)

(Demi-official to H. J. S. Cotton, Esq., dated the 18th December 1891)

(*Chas. h. 119*)

(Telegram to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, No. 2438 E., dated the 18th December 1891)

Re-submitted as ordered above.

A. D. M.—18th December 1891.

Issue a telegram deferred to Chief Commissioner, Assam, put up. Mr. Ward has changed his plans and probably won't be here till February.

19th December 1891.

G. R. I.

(*Chas. h. 20*)

(Telegram to the Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 2448 E., dated the 19th December 1891.)

(*Chas. h. 21*)

TELEGRAM FROM THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BURMA, No. 264, DATED THE 21ST DECEMBER 1891.

With reference to this office telegram, No. 2438 E., dated the 18th December 1891, says that the Chief Commissioner cannot spare an officer with local knowledge to attend the proposed conference till the column work is over.*

Await replies from Bengal and Assam.

A. D. M.—22nd December 1891.

* Can office give me any idea when this may be expected to be?

22nd December 1891.

G. R. I.

In the absence of our file, which is with the Military Department, office is unable to say definitely how long the column work will last, but it would appear from the letter from Burma (Secret E., March 1892, Nos. 1-51) that the operations will occupy the whole of the open season.

T. G. BALDWIN—22nd December 1891.

A. D. M.—22nd December 1891.

Thanks.

23rd December 1891.

G. R. I.

(Kno ho 2)

[9]

DEMI-OFFICIAL FROM H. J. S. COTTON, Esq., OFFICIATING CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE BENGAL GOVERNMENT (TO UNDER-SECRETARY), DATED THE 22ND DECEMBER 1891.

Says that he has shown Under-Secretary's demi-official of the 18th instant to Sir C. Elliott, who thinks that the politico-civil conference it is proposed to hold regarding the Lushai tracts, may be merged in the military conference on the same subject.

Place with file: I have spoken to Mr. Cotton, and judge from what he says that their letter hardly correctly states Bengal's attitude, which is not really opposed to the sub-committee idea. No orders.

23rd December 1891.

G. R. I.

(Grov ho 22)

TELEGRAM FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM, No. 3841 P., DATED THE 23RD DECEMBER 1891.

Refers to our telegram No. 2449 B., dated the 19th instant; suggests that the conference should take place in March 1892, and that Mr. McCabe should be asked to attend.

I thought so.

24th December 1891.

G. R. I.

Nothing further is to be done in this matter at present?

A. D. M.—31st December 1891.

No, but bring up in 10 days.

31st December 1891.

G. R. I.

SECRETARY.

This must now be submitted to Secretary, who wishes to see General Collen's note.

7th January 1892.

G. R. I.

Seen.

11th January 1892.

H. M. D.

(Grov ho. 23-29)

FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT, No. 86 B., DATED THE 8TH JANUARY 1892.

In continuation of their No. 3856 B. of the 16th December 1891, forward correspondence regarding the conference to be held in Calcutta to discuss the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

No orders seem necessary. The Secretary has the main file, which contains all that he will require to read up for the conference.

J. S.—9th January 1892.

Secretary will want to see Sir Charles Elliott's and His Excellency's notes. Are they in the main file? If not, put them into it.

9th January 1892.

G. R. I.

[8]

SECRETARY.

You saw these papers on the 7th before the file returned to the Military Department, but you may wish to see them again.

J. S.—12th January 1892.

Seen. I should like to see on 20th, with brief note, showing exactly how far we are concerned.

12th January 1892.

H. M. D.

I put up a note separately, which I hope will be of some use to Secretary.

20th January 1892.

G. R. I.

SECRETARY.

1. The Chin-Lushai Conference has to deal with 3 main divisions of territory administered by Bengal, Assam and Burma:—

1. Southern Lushai hills administered by Bengal;
2. North Lushai hills administered by Assam;
3. Chin country administered by Burma.

2. The boundary between No. 1 and Chin land on the east may be taken to be the Koladyne and Tuipui rivers: the boundary between North and South Lushai hills is ethnographical, but geographically it may be taken roughly to be a line drawn east and west through Pukzing and Henkoya.

3. The boundary between North Lushai hills and the Chin country is undefined: part of the intervening country is only being now visited by a party from Fort White on the Burma side.

4. The Chin country is sub-divided into two tracts—a northern controlled from Fort White, and a southern controlled from Haka—by the Nankatte river: the principal tribes in contact with Fort White are the Siyins, the Sagyisings and the Kanhows: under the political control of the Haka Agency are the Tashons, the Hakas, the Yokwas, the Bangshes and, more to the south, the Chimboks.

5. The map in the file shows these divisions more or less.

Establishments, &c., in Southern Lushai hills (Mr. Baldwin has written a very useful paper on this part of the questions which I have summarized for Secretary's convenience)

6. The Southern Lushai hills are held by the frontier police pushed on from the Chittagang Hill Tracts numbering 529 native officers, non-commissioned officers and men.

7. The European staff is one Superintendent, one Commandant and three Assistant Commandants of Police.

8. There are also a District Engineer and a Doctor.

9. The posts held are Jungleh, Tregear—recently, accidentally, burnt down—and Lalthuma with a base at Demagun.

10. It is expected that the police force may ultimately be reduced to 320 strong, but at present it is as above, viz., 529, and the cost of occupation is about 6½ lakhs.

11. Taxation is proposed at the rate of Re 1 per house—estimated number of houses 10,000—per annum. Six days' free labour per house in the year, and a contribution of 10 annas of rice per house per annum, to be paid for at the rate of Rs. 2 per maund. I am not sure whether this has yet been enforced.

12. The Police force sanctioned for the Northern Lushai hills is 300 men, who have been detached from the Burma Valley Battalion, but the local authorities have, in anticipation of sanction, sent up an additional 200 men. The head-quarters are at Aijal, the other posts to be held are Changsal, Saireng, two outposts on the Rengti road and Sonai.

13. The European staff are one Political Officer (Mr. McCabe), one military officer in command of Police, and one Doctor. We have not got details of the cost of occupation as far as I can find.

14. Mr. McCabe, I think, takes taxes at the rates proposed for the Southern Lushai hills; in fact, the scale in the latter was suggested by him.

15. The Chin country is held by troops, having their head-quarters at Fort White and Haka: at each of these places there is a Political Officer and an Assistant Superintendent of Police.

16. No revenue appears to be taken, and we do not know the cost of occupation.

17. The general questions to be brought before the conference are first and foremost the manner in which the three tracts are in future to be civilly and militarily administered.

Should there continue to be three civil political and three military or police commands as now? Has the time come when they can be consolidated into one or not? If it has, should they be placed under one of the local administrations, and if so, which, or under a single officer

directly under the orders of the Government of India? How can the civil and military headship be combined under one officer, if at all? What should be the strength of the garrison in troops and police, what posts should be held, what should be the boundaries of political control, what should be the strength of the civil force, what ~~amt~~ of taxes and services should be imposed upon the people?

18. The Foreign Department is more or less directly interested in every one of these questions.

[I may perhaps venture to suggest that it will probably not be found possible at present to amalgamate the Chin country with the North and South Lushai hills, but that the two latter tracts might be formed into one charge under Mr. McCabe and the Chief Commissioner of Assam. There are no radical differences in the system of administration now followed in the two divisions of the Lushai hills, and Mr. McCabe is, I think, beyond doubt, the most successful administrator who has yet tried his hand in these parts:]

19. Communications will also be a most important subject for the consideration of the conference.

Specific proposals it will, I think, be for the local authorities to make, but it will probably be convenient if I here give the details (as laid before the Home Department) of one which will almost certainly be brought forward by Mr. Ward.

20. As pointed out above in paragraph 12, there are now 500 police in the North Lushai hills, but Mr. Ward reckons that 556 men are really necessary: adding 10 per cent for non-effectives; he wants a total of 622 men for service in Lushai land. He proposes to provide this by making the Surma Valley Police into two battalions numbering, all told, about 1,150 men, and by keeping 530 or so in Cachar, he thinks he can dispense with the wing of native infantry now kept in that district. The proposal concerns Military, Foreign and Home Departments, and is sure to be brought before the conference.

20th January 1892.

G. R. I.

N. B.—In paragraph 99 of his note of the 4th September 1891, General Collen gives a summary of questions for settlement, but they are naturally stated mainly from a military point of view.

(*Per. No. 44-46*) FROM THE OFFICIATING CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BURMA,
No. 549 ¹⁰/₁₀, DATED THE 26TH APRIL 1892.

Submit copies of notes by Messrs. Carey and Macnabb, showing that it is impracticable for Assam to work the Eastern Chin hills.

These notes are sent in confirmation of the opinion expressed by Sir Alexander Mackenzie at the conference of last January—please see Resolutions 1 and 2 passed by the conference.

The notes will be useful when the question is re-opened after operations in the Chin and Lushai hills.

Military Department should see. No orders.

J. S.—5th May 1892.

6th May 1892.

J. L. K.

Military Department unofficially.

Forwards for Military Department to see copies of notes by Mr. Carey, Political Officer, Fort White, and Lieutenant Macnabb, Political Officer, Chin hills, regarding the impracticability of the Eastern Chin hills being administered by Assam.

C. H.—10th May 1892.

G. de RuzP—10th May 1892.

SECRETARY.

Submitted.

10th May 1892.

P. J. M.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

His Excellency the Viceroy enquired about the Chin-Lushai Conference papers lately, and I informed the Private Secretary to the Governor-General that the papers were in the Foreign Department.

12th May 1892.

E. C.

18th May 1892.

H. B.

Foreign Department unofficially.

No present orders.

J. S.—19th May 1892.

20th May 1892.

J. L. K.

The military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

The time seems to have arrived when it is necessary to consider the

* This note has necessarily taken some time to prepare, as I have not been able to devote much time to it continuously, but I believe I have brought it up to date.

general military situation in Eastern India and Burma, and I venture to submit the following note* on the subject, in the hope that it may be of some use to the Government of India and the Commander-in-Chief in their discussion of the various questions which sooner or later will press for settlement. Within the last few years a great change has come to pass in the easternmost portion of the Indian Empire. Six years ago the province of British Burma was practically bounded on the north by a frontier line running but a short distance in advance of Thayetinyo and Tounghoo, while Assam and Burma were separated by mountain masses inhabited by savage races, with whom our only contact was one of conflict from the western side and from Eastern Bengal. Assam and Eastern Bengal were guarded by military posts from the incursions of the wild tribes inhabiting the ranges of hills which trend from the mountainous country containing the sources of the Irrawaddy and the Brahmaputra, down to the Aracan Hills on the east shore of the Bay of Bengal. The tribes of the Garo, Khasia, and Jaintia Hills, the wedge of hilly country thrusting itself westwards from the main mass, had also to be coerced and pacified. But whether we had to deal with the Naga Hill tribes in the north, or with Lushais in the south, the natural policy was the repression of incursions, the despatch of punitive expeditions, and the establishment of posts and garrisons to prevent the tribes of the hills from raiding against our own subjects in the plains. This state of things is now in process of rapid change. Upper Burma has been annexed; the country is in contact with Assam on the west; the dominating territory of Manipur is garrisoned by a British force, while in the south the Chin-Lushai country has fallen under British control, and the Bengal outposts of Forts Lungleh and Treggar in Lushai-land connect with the Burma military posts of Haka and Fort White in the country of the Chins. The lines of communication between Assam and Burma, if not yet practically developed for military and commercial objects, will soon pass into the domain of practical purposes. Mogaung, the projected terminus of the Mu Valley Railway now under construction in Burma, will be under two hundred

† According to the map and to the new line.

miles† from the existing Dibrugarh-Makum line in Assam; this latter

line will be joined by the Chittagong-Assam line at Makum Junction, and if the reconnaissance of 1888 justifies the belief that it is possible to unite the Assam and Burma Railway systems on the northern line, we may have in the near future the Bengal, Assam, and Burma Railway systems in connection, and tapping the trade of Western China.

2. The project of a road from the Brahmaputra to the Chinlwin has received the general approval of the Governor-General in Council, subject to conditions as to ways and means. Discussion has taken place, whether on the western side it would be better to establish railway communication at least to the foot of the hills, at the point where the Kohima-Manipur Road leaves the low country, and it has now been decided to push on the projected Gauhati-Lumding junction portion of the Assam-Chittagong Railway, so that, by means of a branch line to Nihuguard, we may save the enormous expense of a metalled road *via* Golaghat and Dimapur, and obviate the necessity for constructing a railway from Kukilamukh on the Brahmaputra, or of laying down an extension of the Jorhat State Railway. As regards the roads, the Public Works Department are making arrangements to start work at once from Nihuguard, *via* Kohima to Manipur; and although it will be a work of time, this road will be continued to Tamu and eventually to the Chinlwin, so that here again we may look to road, and possibly even railway, communication *via* Manipur, between Assam and Burma, before many years have passed. With respect to the Silchar-Manipur route, although it is shorter than the Kohima route, the ascents and descents are so severe, and the district through which it passes is so unhealthy, that it is doubtful whether it can be considered at the present time as anything more than an alternative military line of communication to Manipur, although, until the Gauhati-Lumding line of railway is completed, we shall have to keep up this route as a practicable one for military purposes, and it is even possible that the Silchar-Manipur Road may become a permanent alternative route to Manipur. Silchar itself, although important in many ways, is at present somewhat isolated. There is a steam service which stops at Fenebaganj, 70 miles off, during eight months of the year, so that troops and supplies have to be sent in country boats from Fenebaganj to Silchar for those months, as there is no road the whole way between the two places.

3. In the great tract of mountain country inhabited by the Lushais on the western side and by the Chins on the eastern side, we have not yet succeeded in discovering a good line for a road. The route from Fort Langleh to Fort Haka is practicable for such bodies of troops or police as we may have to send along it for local purposes; but so far as we know, it is not likely ever to become a road of imperial importance, and the opinion of those best qualified to judge is that a road in this part of the country must be sought further south. The Chief Commissioner of Burma has just been asked whether the Chin country may be reasonably expected to be sufficiently tranquillised by next November to admit of a survey for a road being undertaken, as Sir Charles Elliott considers that there is not likely to be any difficulty on the Bengal side in making such a survey. It has been decided not to carry the telegraph line through between Forts Tregear and Haka, so that, except the sea line to Rangoon, the telegraphic connection between India and Burma is by the Kohima-Manipur route. As regards railway communication, it seems not improbable that the construction of the Chittagong-Assam Railway may eventually lead to an Arakan Railway connecting with the Burma system over some pass in the Arakan Hills, and it was with this idea I suggested some time ago that a railway reconnaissance should be made. A railway over the Arakan Hills would bring Lower and Middle Burma into land communication with Lower Bengal, and already the Chief Commissioner has proposed a line from Samon to Myingyan, whence it would

be extended to a point opposite Pokoko (see Appendix A). Before many years have elapsed, we may look to having unbroken railway communication from our most advanced position on or beyond the north-west frontier to Burma, and to the frontier of Siam, by the union of the India and Burma Railway systems, giving us the power to transport troops from one end of the country to the other to meet the dangers which may threaten it from the contiguity of Russia on the north-west and France on the south-east of the British Empire in India.

4. Such being the aspects of the railway and road questions in the present and future, it is expedient to enquire how we stand at this moment as regards military strength in these eastern portions of the Empire, for upon the lines of communication, roads, railways, and telegraphs, and upon the armed power of the British Government, the peace of these countries must depend for many years to come.

5. In Assam a great tract of country, rich in resources, has a frontier of hundreds of miles and is in contact with peoples with whom we have had constant conflict, its normal garrison is four battalions of Native infantry, numbering about 3,500 men, and 2,500 frontier police. Practically Assam is guarded by a few posts north of the Brahmaputra, and on the western side of the hills between Assam and Burma, by a system of police posts supported by small garrisons of regular troops. The occupation of Manipur by its present strong garrison is a temporary measure, and including Manipur, the additional garrison of Assam consists of two Bengal regiments, the 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas, and 36th Sikhs, with a mountain battery [No. 8 (Bengal)]. Manipur, Kohima, and Konyak at present absorb three battalions and the mountain battery, so that for the whole of the Bhutan frontier (except at Baza which is administratively in Bengal and is garrisoned by a wing of the 9th Native Infantry, the other wing being at far-off Dornada in the Presidency District), for the northern frontier above Sadiya, and for the other portions of the western border, and for the interior of the country, there are but three battalions of Native infantry. The occupation of Manipur, however, has no doubt had a tranquillising effect on the hill peoples, and we may expect that this will have even a greater effect in the future. In Lushai-land we hold the country by a few police posts in the hills.

6. It cannot therefore be said that, looking at these countries from the western side, we are in great military strength. Burma, on the other hand, has a large military force of 18,700 British and Native troops, and some 15,000 military police, making a total of 34,200, to be reckoned as constituting the garrison of Burma. But these troops and police are spread over an immense area, and a glance at the map will show what an enormous extent of country has to be guarded, how great is the work of keeping quiet the people whose previous history is one of anarchy, and in guarding those portions of the country which march with China and with Siam on the north-east and east, while behind the weak State of Siam lie the Indo-French possessions, a possible source of trouble to us in the future, as completing the circle of the east and the west, and perhaps destined to reproduce in the East the rivalry of England and France in the West. It can therefore hardly be wondered at that the dividing mountain ranges between Burma and Assam have not up to the present time been approached to any great extent from the Burma side. Still much has been done in the subjugation and pacification of the Chins in the country we speak of as the Chin Hills; and although it would be useless to conceal that a great deal more has to be effected before the ideal of civil administration has been reached, yet so far we have been generally successful in the establishment of some kind of order among those who have always been the terror of the Burmese dwellers in the plains, holding, as we do, Haka, Fort White, and the stockades with a Bengal regiment, a detachment of Madras troops, a few sappers, and a couple of mountain guns.

7. With the prospect therefore of the practical fulfilment of the projects for the lines of road and railway communication sketched in the preceding paragraphs, we shall have to consider how this mountainous country between Assam and Burma can be occupied so as to dominate the tribes which inhabit it, and how far we can substitute for the border posts a system of military garrisons from north to south by which the country on either side can be commanded and controlled. In fact, we must establish ourselves on the hill-tops instead of sitting in the shadow of the mountains in the low-country. It may not be near enough to discuss at this moment, but we may look for a garrison on the mountains near Makum in the north; we have already one in the commanding portion of Manipur, while in the south a strong position on the mountains between the Lushai and the Chin Hills, on the Lungleh-Tregear-Haka line, might control both the Lushais and the Chins. We have made one great step in the military occupation of Manipur; it has now to be determined what shall be the strength of the garrison of that place, and the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief for the strength of the troops to be maintained at Manipur are about to be made. As regards Lushai-land, an opportunity is afforded by the request of the Secretary of State to be informed what are to be the future military arrangements for the Chin-Lushai country, while the strength of the future garrison of Burma has been of late much under the consideration of the Government of India, and the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, has only now again raised the question of withdrawing more troops to that presidency.

8. The time is therefore favorable for approaching this important subject; and although, as administrative matters, each of these questions will be dealt with separately in the Military Department and submitted to Government separately, it seems appropriate to bring together in one paper such facts as bear upon the consideration of the question as a whole, with especial reference to the change which has taken place within the last few years in the relations of the British power to the hill country of Eastern India and Burma.

9. It is proposed to take Manipur, Assam, Lushai-land, the Chin-Hills, and Burma generally in order to explain the discussion which has taken place in regard to the military situation in connection with these portions of the country, and to show what is the military strength at present available.

MANIPUR.

10. The military importance of the position of Manipur has long been recognised by civil and military authorities, and the fact that it occupies a central position between the Naga Hills District and Naga tribes on the west and north, and Kukis, Lushais, and Chins on the south, and that it is placed in a commanding position on the route from Assam to Burma, sufficiently demonstrates its advantages for military occupation. As to the country north of Manipur and described as the "Naga Hills," we know very little about it, except that portion which has been brought under British administration. The prominent fact, however, is that Manipur has in the past exercised considerable influence on the hill tribes, both north and south, and that if British control, backed by a garrison, be exerted from that position, we may expect the best results in the future.

11. There is no geographical difference between the hilly portions of Manipur and the country lying south of it, which is occupied by a collection of cognate tribes who, whether they be Lushai or Kuki, or Chins of various denominations, are, like all hill peoples, accustomed to make frequent raids against their richer neighbours in the plains. Although there is no natural line of demarcation among the various tribes

of this southern country, yet, owing to the manner in which we have come in contact with them, and, owing also to the political divisions of our Empire, we have divided the portion of the country occupied by those tribes not completely subjugated into the two divisions of Lushai-land and the Chin country, the latter of which is included in the Upper Chinthein District of Upper Burma.

12. There can be no question of the strategical importance of Manipur and a considerable garrison will have to be stationed at or near that place. The road from the Brahmaputra (part of it by rail probably), *via* Kohima to Manipur, will be pushed on eventually to Tamu and the Chinthein, and already public discussion is beginning to take place as to whether we shall not have to connect the Assam-Chittagong Railway with the Burma system either existing or planned. With a sufficiently strong garrison at Manipur, we shall be able to command a great deal of the Naga Hill country which has proved to be difficult to control, and at the same time we shall have the power of moving down upon certain portions of Western Burma which have hitherto been somewhat inaccessible, provided that in both cases we perfect our communications. In this view it seems an absolute necessity to complete the road from Nichuguard to Manipur, Tamu, and Chinthein as soon as possible. And when we have the power of moving rapidly eastwards we shall also be able to descend into Assam by the Kohima route or in course of time to influence the Lushais and Chins southwards. If it be the case that in the population of Manipur, reckoned at from 250,000 to 270,000, there are some 80,000 to 90,000 Nagas and Kukis, it is obvious how important it is that we should hold a strong position at Manipur with a view to eventually controlling these tribes, and in the course of time bringing the whole under the peaceful sway of British dominion. Briefly, the military occupation of Manipur secures the highway between Assam and Burma; assists in the consolidation of the north-east frontier, and will in time effect the control of country from the Brahmaputra to the Chinthein. We should not, however, fail to be on our guard against any outbreak of the Nagas, for even when we were in force at Manipur there were threatenings of an attack at Moriani, 50 miles east of Golighat, and a detachment of the 36th Sikhs had to be sent there; while lately there have been sanguinary disturbances between the Nagas and Manipuris of a kind we shall have to suppress if we desire to retain our position at Manipur.

13. It has now been decided by the Proclamation of the 21st August 1891 that the State of Manipur will not be annexed, but that Native rule will be established under such conditions as the Governor-General in Council may consider desirable: the proposals of the Commander-in-Chief regarding the garrison of Manipur will shortly be laid before Government, and it is not therefore necessary to say anything more on this portion of the subject, but the question of Manipur must unavoidably be again introduced in detailing the discussion which has taken place regarding the garrison of Assam.

ASSAM.

14. Assam has an area of 46,341 square miles, and according to the census of 1891 (provisional totals) a population of 5,424,190. It is bounded on the north by Bhutan, on the north-east by a number of savage tribes, the Akas, Daphlas, Abors, &c., and on the east and south-east by a mountainous little-known country, the southern portion of which have been subjected to British influence. East and south of Assam are Manipur and Lushai-land, while in Assam we must include

the following hill districts, the inhabitants of some of which are as yet imperfectly subjugated ; these are the Naga Hills, North Cachar, the Khasia and Jaintia Hills, and the Garo Hills.

15. The district of Cachar deserves especial consideration in its position as regards both Manipur and the Northern Lushai Hills. It is a great tea-producing district, and it is said that at least 50,000 Manipuris labour in the gardens, while it has relatively a large European population ; it is, however, very open to raids from the Lushais, and the population of Manipur requires to be watched. Silchar is about 160 miles from Tamu by the direct route, and ninety to a hundred miles from Manipur. In view of the difficulties of the road to Manipur, Silchar must always be an important point, and one which must be guarded.

16. Assam has hitherto been garrisoned by a system of outposts supported by garrisons. The three Assam local regiments (Gurkhas) and the one Bengal line regiment, and the military police with their headquarters in the larger inhabited centres, have a large part of their force distributed in detachments of varying strength.

17. The question of the military requirements of the Assam administration has at various times been under the consideration of the Government of India, and the last redistribution of troops in that province was sanctioned in May 1890. But the recent outbreak at Manipur, the necessity for its continued military occupation in some strength, and the change which is coming over our relations with the hill tribes of the eastern frontier, point to the necessity for dealing afresh with this question ; and in order to arrive at a just idea of the military requirements of Assam and of the garrison to be maintained, it seems necessary to review the discussion on this question which has taken place in the past.

18. Twelve years ago, i.e., when the special commission of 1879 assembled to enquire into the organisation and expenditure of the army in India, the military force in Assam consisted of four regiments, two stationed at Shillong one at Dibrugarh, and one at Cachar. These regiments furnished detachments for Gauhati, Jaipore, Golaghat, and Sadiya, and also manned fourteen of the 50 frontier posts. In addition to this force, a portion of the local police (about 1,900 men) were armed with rifles and were employed in guarding jails and treasure, furnishing escorts, and holding the remaining 36 frontier outposts ; in other words, their duties were almost entirely of a military nature. The Chief Commissioner, Sir Stuart Bayley,

Vol. I, Appendices to Army Commission Report, 1879 (pages 8 to 22).

pointed out the inconveniences and objections in the existing system, and expressed his opinion strongly against the employment of troops on this petty detachment duty. It seemed to him that, theoretically speaking, this sort of small outpost duty was strictly and properly work for an armed frontier police, not for disciplined troops organised on the regimental units. He considered the legitimate duty of the military to be that of an armed reserve, collected at convenient central stations, whence they could be sent to support the police, on an emergency, or to undertake the brunt of any hostile expedition outside our own territory ; and in support of his views as to the proper distinction of duties, he referred to the Chittagong Hill Tracts and the Arakan frontier where the circumstances were almost identical with those of the Assam frontier, but where the outpost duty was wholly taken by the armed police. Sir Stuart Bayley therefore proposed to relieve the military of the entire outpost duty of the province, and to substitute frontier police constables for sepoy, and thus to effect a saving of Rs. 157 on each man employed, the annual cost of a constable being

Rs. 180 (excluding pension charges) as against Rs. 337 for a sepoy. To attain this object, however, it was suggested that the existing frontier police should be increased by 1,000 which would raise the total strength of the force to 3,000 men. If this were done, the Chief Commissioner said that two regiments could, with perfect safety and unquestionable economy, be sent free from Assam, the two remaining regiments being considered ample as a garrison, and these two regiments be proposed to distribute as follows :—

One full regiment at Shillong.

One regiment { 400 men at Sadiya.
 { 400 men at Cachar.

With these as the stations for the central reserve, the maintenance of any other cantonments would eventually become unnecessary. The proposed changes, it was contended, involved a more efficient and scientific system of frontier defence, with a very substantial saving (nearly three-and-three quarters lakhs) in expense, including the abolition of the brigade staff.

19. The Army Commission in dealing with this subject remarked as follows in para. 64 of their report :—“ The Chief Commissioner of Assam points out the unsystematic way in which military and police are mixed up at the frontier posts, and the evils of the present arrangements. A reserve (*i.e.*, one-and-half battalions of Native infantry and one-third of a Native mountain battery) at Shillong, with strong half battalions garrisoning Sadiya, Buxa, and Cachar (or altogether three battalions, and the artillery suggested) will, with the police force contemplated by the Chief Commissioner, provide for the defence of the frontier; while arrangements must be prepared to despatch a body of troops from the central reserve in Calcutta in case of extensive operations. We agree with the Chief Commissioner that the duties now imposed upon the troops are not consistent with the maintenance of efficiency and discipline, and are not the proper duties of the regular army; small isolated outposts should be made over to the police.”

20. The Home Department notes attached to Military Pro. A, March 1883, Nos. 381-83, show that the proposals of the Army Commission were referred to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, in March 1880, for report as to how far his scheme for increasing the frontier police could be modified. To this reference Sir Stuart Bayley replied that owing to the necessity for maintaining some central position on the Naga Hills in order to control the Angamis, he was unable to reduce by a single man the estimated number (about 3,000) of frontier police proposed in the memorandum which he submitted to the Army Commission. The matter then remained in abeyance till February 1882, when Sir Donald Stewart, after a

Pro. A, Mar. 1883, No. 381.

tour in Assam, submitted a note regarding the re-organisation and distribution

of police with reference to the military command of the Eastern frontier district. In this note, the late Commander-in-Chief alluded to the necessity for giving the Assam police force an organisation of a more military character than had hitherto obtained, for improving their training and equipment, and for separating them from the troops throughout the various outposts; and he further remarked :—“ It is desirable at once to reconsider carefully the distribution of police outposts and of military supports throughout Assam and Cachar on the understanding that duties, which come within the proper sphere of police duties, shall not be performed by the troops, and that the latter are held in readiness to meet attack at any point along the frontier line. This should, I think, be done by the

Chief Commissioner and the Brigadier-General commanding the district, in concert, their detailed proposals being submitted as soon as possible." The Chief Commissioner also submitted to the Government of India, in the Home Department, his proposals in regard to the re-organisation of the Police Department in Assam, and the result of the discussion which took place was that the Home Department, with the concurrence of the

Pro. A, Mar. 1885, No. 388.

Military Department, informed the Chief Commissioner that "His Excellency in Council is advised that by relieving the troops of all outpost duty, it will be possible to withdraw from Assam the Bengal Native regiment now stationed at Cachar, and it is estimated that an annual saving of approximately Rs. 40,000 would thereby be effected. This sum, if so made available, the Government of India would not object to place at your disposal in order to enable you to carry out to such extent as may be possible the reforms which you recommend."

21. The withdrawal of this regiment, however, was not carried out, and nothing further transpired till

Pro. A, July 1886, No. 1642.

Sir Frederick Roberts re-opened the question of redistribution in January 1886. His Excellency invited attention to the remark made by Sir Donald Stewart in 1872 (quoted above), and represented that there was no longer occasion for the employment of troops in the Naga Hills, and that the positions which it might be desirable to retain upon that part of the frontier could most advantageously be held as police outposts. He was of opinion that in view to the exigencies of service upon the Eastern frontier, and to the probability of intercourse between Upper Burma and Assam, it was desirable to locate the regiment then employed in the Naga Hills at Shillong. The concentration of two regiments at that place, it was said, would allow of an efficient reserve being at all times available for frontier service, and would

Pro. A, July 1886, No. 1646.

result in substantial economy. The Chief Commissioner, Mr. Ward, on being consulted through the Home Department, said that the Commander-in-Chief's proposal was one which he could not accept, because, in his opinion, the military occupation of Kohima would be necessary for some years to come. The Angami Nagas had recently given very distinct evidence that they were far from being civilised, and Mr. Ward was inclined to think that if, after the withdrawal of the regiment, they chose to rise against us and attack Kohima, the frontier police would find it a difficult matter to hold their own against them. Captain Ploverden, Commandant of the Frontier Police, Naga Hills, said: "I have no faith whatever in the complete submission of the various Naga tribes to our rule. I believe as long as we are strong enough to thrash the strongest combination they can bring, they will remain quiet and peaceable subjects, for no men are more careful of their personal safety than Nagas; but should they be exposed to the temptation of trying conclusions against a small number of men, it will, in my opinion, be an irresistible one." Mr. Ward further desired to remind the Government of India that the main object of the recent re-organisation of the frontier police of Assam was to relieve the military of *outpost duty*, and that it was, so far as he had been able to ascertain, never contemplated, either by the Government of India or by Mr. Elliott, that the frontier police should ever displace the military either from the province, or from any districts in the province, except Cachar; and even with regard to this station, Mr. Ward did not consider it a proper time to deal with the

question of withdrawing the regiment located there. In a despatch of 25th May 1886, he said: "When things have settled down into their normal state, and Burma does not require to borrow military strength from us, then I have no objection to the withdrawal of one regiment from the province, provided that the military see their way to carrying out all the duties they are carrying out now." In view of these objections, the Government of India decided to take no action in connection with the Commander-in-Chief's proposal to withdraw the Kohima regiment to Shillong, and the question of reducing the Assam garrison was again dropped "for some time to come."

22. About the same time that the above decision was arrived at, the Quartermaster-General submitted the Commander-in-Chief's proposals for the redistribution of the garrison of India, and with regard to Assam, His Excellency suggested the following arrangement:—

Regiments, Native infantry—

Shillong	1½
Dibrugarh	½
Kohima	½
Cachar	1
Manipur	½
Total				4

23. Under this arrangement, the garrisons at Dibrugarh and Kohima were to be reduced by half a battalion each, and then two half battalions posted to Shillong and Manipur, respectively. The cost of these changes was estimated at Rs. 50,000. The Government of India, however, considered that it would be premature to discuss the question of

Pro. A. Nov. 1886, Nos. 483-91.

the garrison of Assam until peace was established in Burma.

24. A separate proposal of minor importance, viz., the desirability of entirely withdrawing the detachments of Native infantry from the posts at Jowai, Tezpur, and Udalgiri, was referred to the Chief Commissioner for report as to what increase would be necessary to the strength of the frontier police if the military were relieved of the charge of Tezpur and Udalgiri, and what extra cost the substitution of police for troops would involve; Jowai being excluded by the Home Department from consideration, as it did not come within the purview of the original scheme for the organisation of a frontier police force for Assam. Mr. Ward replied that it was absolutely necessary to hold Tezpur with some sort of force during the time when the Bhutias and Dandhas visit that place. In 1883 Mr. Elliott withdrew the military altogether from Tezpur, and almost immediately the Akas raided on Balipara, necessitating the despatch of an expedition to punish them. Large numbers of Bhutias also frequent the annual fair at Udalgiri, and Mr. Ward was of opinion that if the military were relieved of the charge of Tezpur and Udalgiri the existing frontier police in the Darrang District would have to be increased from 67 to 200 of all ranks, at a cost of Rs. 23,280 per annum, as against Rs. 7,560. The Home Department then informed him that it was not intended to reduce the military garrison of Assam, and that there would therefore be no occasion to incur any additional expenditure on account of extra police until the actual necessity arose for relieving the military of the charge of the outposts in question.

Pro. A. Apr. 1887, No. 1828.

25. Shortly after the above communication was made to the Chief Commissioner, the Commander-in-Chief renewed the discussion, and proposed the following redistribution, "so soon as the 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry can be spared to return from Burma to the province of Assam :—

Shillong District Head-Quarters.

One-and-a-half battalions, Gurkha light infantry (head-quarters of two battalions, two mountain guns attached).

Dibrugarh.

Half battalion, Gurkha light infantry, head-quarters at Shillong).

Manipur.

Head-quarters and half battalion, Gurkha light infantry, with two mountain guns attached.

Kohima.

Half battalion, Gurkha light infantry, with two mountain guns attached (head-quarters at Manipur).

Cachar.

A battalion, Bengal infantry.

26. His Excellency did not think it desirable to suggest a reduction of the troops allotted to Cachar, but he thought that a half battalion would suffice to garrison Dibrugarh and to hold the outpost of Sadiya, and that the necessity for maintaining a considerable military body at Kohima no longer existed, the Naga population having become accustomed to British rule; indeed he looked forward to the time when it would be possible to hold Kohima as a police outpost and to entirely withdraw the military garrison located there. Manipur was proposed as a new station in consequence of its increasing importance and also on account of its value as a controlling position upon the direct route to the Chindwin Valley in Upper Burma; and in placing the head quarters of one of the Gurkha battalions at Manipur, Sir Frederick Roberts expressed a hope that a smaller detachment than four companies would even at that time be found sufficient by the Chief Commissioner for the requirements of Kohima.

27. These proposals were submitted after communication with the civil and military authorities in Assam. General J. J. H. Gordon, Commanding the Eastern Frontier District, dealt with the subject at con-

Pages 6 to 9 of correspondence.
Pro. A, Apr. 1886, No. 3220-24.

siderable length in a memorandum dated the 12th August 1886, in which

he criticised the existing arrangements, and indicated the lines on which the troops and transport under his command should be redistributed. "Manipur," he said, "is a central position of much strategical importance, situated midway between Cachar and the Chindwin River (Burma); it commands the roads to Burma, Cachar, and Kohima. The establishing of a reserve there would give us such a point of vantage over the Naga, Kuki, and Lushai tribes as would render them powerless for raiding on the valleys, and enable us to enforce our authority at all seasons of the year. It affords us the right path by which to strike at their centres, a standing menace which would have a very quieting effect, and tend to permanently secure submission. With a garrison at Manipur controlling the tribes, there would be no need for troops in Cachar; and as it is connected with Kohima by a well-traced hill road, 87½ miles long, easily capable of being made fit for carts, it would form a superior base to Golaghat for that place and free it from its violation. Kohima under these conditions might with safety and advantage form a strong outpost from Manipur garrison.

Under present circumstances, Kohima is treated as if in an enemy's country. It is provisioned to stand a siege, is cut off from its base at Delaghat during the rainy season by a malarious belt of forest, and its garrison is stronger accordingly than is absolutely necessary; but with support and transport ready at Manipur to move up promptly, this state of affairs would be completely changed, and I am confident that the effect on the Nagas, to control whom the Kohima garrison is maintained, would be that of increased strength on our front on seeing the conjunct on with Manipur and its troops." General Gordon also proposed that the troops at Manipur should be supplied with full transport, i.e., for one-and-a-half battalions. As the central position on the main communication with Burma, he considered it the best place for locating the bulk of the transport of the eastern frontier district, the remaining transport for half a battalion being equally divided between Dibrugarh* and Shillong.

28. The Chief Commissioner, to whom General Gordon's memorandum was forwarded for opinion before transmission to Army Headquarters, said that the time had hardly yet come for formulating the military requirements of Assam, in view of the altered circumstances produced by the annexation of Upper Burma. The existing distribution of the force, he said, was fixed strictly with a view to meet local requirements, and not in prospect of such a contingency as that of the despatch of a force from Assam to operate in Burma. He therefore did not consider the existing distribution unsuitable. With regard to Manipur, Mr. Ward thought that, apart from political consideration, there was some obvious and very serious objections to so large a force as a regiment-and-a-half, with a corresponding transport establishment, being located at that station, and to its being made the head-quarters of the force detailed to keep order in the Naga Hills. "Manipur," he said, "is a very poor and difficult country, with a scanty population and no surplus food supply. It has no roads practicable for carts, and all supplies for the troops would have to be imported by mule and coolie carriage from Cachar, 120 miles distant, itself a thinly-peopled district, on which the burden of supplying carriage to the small detachment hitherto stationed at Manipur already press so heavily that the Chief Commissioner (Mr. Ward) could hold out no hope of the Deputy Commissioner being able to supply any more coolies for transport in Manipur territory, except in an extreme emergency."

29. These objections General Gordon dealt with in a separate memorandum. He said:—"Manipur is poor only from the nature of its repressive and exclusive government. Its resources are great, but are lying dormant, and must remain so while traders from outside are not allowed to settle in Manipur, and practically prohibitive restrictions are placed on the inhabitants leaving the country. It is not a difficult country. It is entered from Kohima by an easy road, on cart-road gradients, which only requires widening for cart traffic. The road through the valley, 33 miles, is on the dead flat, and is a good one. A good mule road has been made in extension to the banks of the Chinlwin in Burma, and a cart-road trace, on easy gradients, is now being cut. A good route also exists from Cachar. In fact, Manipur, as regards roads, contrasts favourably with parts of Assam * * *. Surplus food supply was found to exist even on our sudden demand in summer, a considerable quantity of rice *dhall*, *ghee*, potatoes, salt, &c., having been purchased locally for the troops. With warning and premeditated arrangements, a large quantity could be obtained. Wheat or *atta* and *ghee* would have at first to be imported, just as in

done in Assam; but Colonel Johnstone, Political Agent at Manipur for nine years, and intimately acquainted with the country, expressed to me his opinion that demands for troops, if given in time, would bring forth a supply. Fish, vegetables, and other kinds of food are abundant and cheap. Manipur, as a location for troops, would provide a far better food supply than Kohima, and for local supply is superior to Shillong; rice at Kohima costs about Rs. 12 a maund, at Shillong Rs. 6-8, at Manipur Rs. 1-8. Wheat could be grown in Manipur; a small quantity is grown. *Chees* could be produced to meet a sale. Expensive barracks are not actually necessary. Hut barracks suitable to the climate would suffice. Road-making is cheap in Manipur, and very good labourers available."

30. On receipt of this correspondence, the Military Department asked for the Chief Commissioner's opinion on the Commander-in-Chief's proposals,

Pro. A, Apr. 1898, No. 3221.

and, in reply, Mr. Ward said he would raise no objection to the proposed redistribution though he would have preferred to see a full regiment (but would certainly not support any proposal to place a smaller detachment than four companies) at Kohima, bearing in mind that Kouma also required a military detachment; he would also have been satisfied with half a regiment at Cachar. It was further remarked:—"The Nagas are no doubt getting more accustomed to our rule every year, and it is for that reason that the Chief Commissioner consents to the regiment at Kohima being reduced by a wing; but the Angamis are a warlike race, and it will be some years before they will have lost their savage instincts; and so long as they are savages they cannot be trusted to be always peaceful. It is for this reason that Kohima must continue for some years to come to be a military centre, and, bearing in mind its isolation, it would not, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, be safe to have a smaller detachment there than four companies."

31. This change in the views previously expressed by the Chief Commissioner paved the way to a settlement of the question, and the

Pro. A, Apr. 1898, No. 3232.

Government of India therefore approved of the garrisons proposed by the Commander-in-Chief for Dibrugarh, Kohima, and Cachar, but deferred a final decision with regard to Shillong and Manipur. Sir George Chesney in his note of the 6th February 1898, said:—"I think it would be

Page 4 of notes.

Pro. A, Apr. 1898, Nos. 3220-24.

premature to construct permanent buildings at Manipur just yet, there being no certainty that this place will be permanently occupied by our troops. But half battalions might be granted. Nor do I think that we are in a position which would justify us in finally locating an additional half battalion at Shillong, and therefore the expenditure proposed on this head also might be held back for the present at any rate." This view was accepted by Government. The effect of the new distribution is shown below:—

	Existing garrison battalions.	Proposed garrison battalions.	Sanctioned garrison battalions.
Shillong 1	1½	1
Dibrugarh(a) 1	½	½
Manipur (b)	½	0
Kohima 1	½	½
Cachar 1	1	1

(a) The removal of the depot 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry, from Kohima to Dibrugarh, was also sanctioned (Pro. A, April 1898, No. 3236).

(b) Since the operations in Upper Burma, some troops were stationed at Manipur, but it had no recognized position. The head-quarters and about 400 men of the 44th Gurkha Light

32. Ten months after the above redistribution was sanctioned, the
 Letter from the Quartermaster-General in India, No. 183-B, dated 4th February 1899, (Pro. A, February 1899, No. 2091).

Commander-in-Chief enquired whether any decision had yet been arrived at regarding the garrisons of Shillong and Manipur. Brigadier-General Norman, Commanding the Assam District, said that for some time it would be necessary to have troops at Manipur, as twice in 1888 detachments had to be sent from there to act against the Chins, and twice 1897 detachments were employed against pretenders to the throne of Manipur. He added that, owing to rice being cheaper at Manipur than at Kohima, it was a more economical arrangement to have half a regiment at Manipur and the other half at Kohima, than the former arrangement of having a whole regiment at Kohima, and no troops, except the Political Agent's escort, at Manipur. Under these circumstances, the Government of India sanctioned the retention of half a battalion of Native infantry at Manipur as a permanent arrangement, provided the Chief Commissioner of Assam had no objection. Orders regarding Shillong, however, were again deferred. The Chief Commissioner (Mr. now Sir Henry Fitzpatrick) did not quite concur in the proposed arrangement. In a letter, dated the 28th March 1899, his Secretary said "it would be more in accordance with the views of the local authorities to have a whole regiment at Kohima, than a wing there and a wing at Manipur, and the reasons for this view have been strengthned since the recent addition of territory to the Naga Hills District, which makes it more difficult than ever to maintain a reserve of military police at Kohima. If, however, it is not permissible to re-open this question, the Chief Commissioner gladly accepts, as the next best alternative, the permanent location of a wing at Manipur." General Norman's letter recommending the location of troops at Manipur was forwarded as a reply to the Chief Commissioner, and he was further informed that the question of allotting a full battalion to Kohima would be reconsidered by the Government of India when Assam regained its normal garrison of four battalions. About this time the wing of the 41st Gurkhas serving in Burma was on its way back to Assam, and the Commander-in-Chief proposed to locate two companies at Manipur and two at Shillong. The Government of India sanctioned this arrangement provisionally.

Pro. A, Feb. 1899, No. 2092.

Pro. A, May 1899, No. 247.

Pro. A, May 1899, No. 248.

Pro. A, May 1899, No. 246.

33. In the cold season 1899-90, Sir Frederick Roberts visited Assam and personally discussed, with the Chief Commissioner and the Brigadier-General commanding, the question of the troops in that district, and as the result of that discussion His Excellency (Mr. Quinton and Brigadier-General Collett commanding) proposed the following normal distribution:—

Pro. A, June 1899, No. 1751.

normal distribution:—

Shillong.

One regiment of Gurkha light infantry, head-quarters and wing of light infantry, and two guns.

Dibrugarh.

Half battalion, Gurkha light infantry, and two guns.

Kohima.

One regiment, Gurkha light infantry, and two guns.

Cocher.

One regiment of Bengal infantry.

Manipur.

One hundred rifles, under two Native officers, as the escort, to be furnished from Kohima or Chin might be most convenient.

34. The difference between this distribution and that proposed by the Commander-in-Chief in 1887 (see para. 25 *ante*) was only with respect to Kohima, where His Excellency now proposed to locate a whole battalion, instead of half a battalion at that place and half at Manipur; he also adhered to his original garrison of one-and-a-half battalions at Shillong. The Commander-in-Chief's proposals were entirely accepted by the Government of India, and sanction was accordingly conveyed in

Pro. A, June 1890, No. 1762.

Military Department letter No. 803-C, dated the 10th May 1890.

35. It will be seen from the above that the military strength in Assam has undergone no special change since the Army Commission of 1879 submitted their proposals, although the distribution of the troops in that district has been somewhat altered. Now, however, that the situation on the frontier has assumed a new aspect, the subject of the military requirements of the Assam Administration will necessarily have again to be considered by the civil and military authorities.

36. Previous to the outbreak at Manipur, the four battalions of Native infantry in Assam were distributed as follows, *i. e.*, on the 1st June 1890 :—

Strength of military force—

Shillong, { 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry	...	837
{ 44th Gurkha Light Infantry	...	481
Jowai, 43rd Gurkha Light Infantry	...	26
Sadiya, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry	...	102
Dibrugarh, 42nd Gurkha Light Infantry	...	807
Golaghat, 44th Gurkha Light Infantry	...	7
Kohima, 44th Gurkha Light Infantry	...	191
Konoma, 44th Gurkha Light Infantry	...	62
Cachar, 40th Bengal Infantry	...	711
Manipur, 44th Gurkha Light Infantry	...	186
Jhalnacierra, 40th Bengal Infantry	...	154
Total	...	3,814

37. The military police, with their head-quarters in the larger inhabited centres, furnished detachments for the various outposts on the frontiers of Assam. The strength of this force on the 1st July 1890 was as follows :—

Strength of military police—

Surma Valley Battalion	...	802
Lakhimpur Battalion	...	750
Naga Hills Battalion	...	664
Garo Hills Battalion	...	241
Darrang Detachment	...	67
Total	...	2,524

38. The strength and cost of the Assam military police on the last day of each of the years 1888 and 1889, were—

Sanctioned strength of all ranks,	{ 1888	...	2,566
	{ 1889	...	2,524
Actual strength of all ranks,	{ 1888	...	2,573
	{ 1889	...	2,465
Rs.			
Cost	{ 1888	...	4,99,167
	{ 1889	...	4,94,116

39. In April 1890 the General Officer Commanding Assam District reported that it had been decided, with the concurrence of the Chief Commissioner, to reduce the outposts on the Cachar frontier to those shown below—

	Sepoys.
Ballalban*	13
Jhingbat*	10
Neabund*	11
Chatt gherra*	16
Sakbimaula*	10
Fatekul*	10
Adampur*	10
Jhalnacherat†	146

40. In the Garo Hills and Lakhimpur the military police had been reduced owing to the formation of a civil force in the former district and to the strengthening of the armed civil police in Sibsagar. The organisation and distribution of the military police in North Lushai and Assam in April 1891 is shown in Appendix B.

41. The strength of the military force in Assam on the 1st June 1891 is shown in the distribution return as follows :—

Shillong, ...	{ 30th Sikhs†	402
	{ 42nd Gurkhas	145
	{ 44th Gurkhas	386
Jowai, 44th Gurkhas		26
Sadiya, 36th Sikhs†		52
Dibrugarh, ...	{ 36th Sikhs†	282
	{ 42nd Gurkhas	104
Golaghat—Manipur line	{ 42nd Gurkhas	167
	{ 43rd Gurkhas	14
Kohima, ...	{ No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	46
	{ 13th Bengal Infantry	80
	{ 42nd Gurkhas	414
	{ 43rd Gurkhas	153
Konoma, 42nd Gurkhas	{ 44th Gurkhas	51
		62
Gaujong, 3rd Bengal Infantry		26
Cachar, ...	{ 3rd Bengal Infantry‡	33
	{ 18th Bengal Infantry§	658
Manipur, ...	{ No. 8 (Bengal) Mountain Battery	210
	{ 1st Battalion, 2nd Gurkhas	665
	{ 43rd Gurkhas	730
	{ 44th Gurkhas	454
Jhalnacherat, 18th Bengal Infantry	{ 2nd Battalion, 4th Gurkhas¶	559
		26

Total military force (including No. 8
Mountain Battery) ... 5,747

* Furnished by military police.
† Furnished by 40th Bengal Infantry.
‡ Temporarily retained in Assam.

§ Has returned to Fort William.
¶ Two companies in Kohima.
¶ Has returned to Sakchi.

42. In a statement, dated the 3rd July 1891, received from the Chief Commissioner, Assam, the present strength of the local military police force is shown as follows :—

Surma Valley Battalion	830
Lakhimpur Battalion	759
Naga Hills Battalion	648
Garo Hills Battalion	210
Darrang Detachment	67
Total	2,532

43. There is one other point which I venture to think may properly be mentioned in this place in connection with the strength of the Assam garrison, i.e., whether the local Assam regiments might not be so far decentralised as to take an occasional tour in other stations. Although the re-organisation of some years back, when the 1st and 2nd Assam Light Infantry and the Sylhet Light Infantry were transformed into the 42nd, 43rd, 44th, (Assam) Regiments of Bengal Infantry, and later on into Gurkha regiments, effected a great improvement in what were then confessedly very inferior corps, it is questionable whether it is a good thing for other officers or men to keep these corps entirely to Assam stations. True "localisation" does not mean that corps are to be kept for ever and a day in one particular locality, but rather that they should have a regimental home whence all the regimental machinery can be worked, and to which they can return after a desirable change to distant places where they are brought into contact with other troops. The difficulty would be that these Assam regiments draw a local allowance which would have to be continued to them. They might, however, be occasionally employed in Burma, as has been done for field service.

44. Assam itself has an enormous frontier, and numerous savage tribes over whom influence has to be exercised. Many expeditions have taken place in this region; thus in 1863-64 we had the Buxton War; in 1875-76 we were engaged with the Daphlas; in 1876-78 in the Garo Hills; in 1879-80 in the Naga Hills; and in 1883-84 against the Akas, while we have had a great deal of trouble at one time or another with the Abors and the Mishmis. Short accounts of these expeditions are given in Appendices C to F to this note.

45. There can be little doubt that the present garrison of Assam, even with the frontier police, is but a small one to hold a long line of frontier, to be *en evidence* in the interior of the province, as well as to occupy Manipur. The Bhutan Frontier is but weakly guarded. There is a wing of a Native infantry regiment, drawn from the Presidency District, at Buxa, and before the Manipur Expedition there was a detachment at Dewangiri, but apparently there are no troops there now. Waa wards, Darjeeling has a mountain battery, while Gnathong and Gauntok in Sikkim are held respectively by 100 men of the Liverpool Regiment from Dinapore, and two companies of 170 men of the 18th Bengal Infantry from Silebar in the Cachar District. It seems necessary to consider the Tibetan and Bhutan Frontiers together, because there are symptoms of these people making common cause, and because troops drawn from Assam are serving in Sikkim which is in the Presidency District, while troops from the latter district are serving on the Bhutan Frontier.

46. In a previous note on the weakness of the provincial garrison, I pointed out the difficulty of re-inforcing the outposts in Sikkim and on

the Bhutan Frontier from Calcutta or from Assam, and although the intelligence received about the alleged assemblage of Bhutias in conjunction with the calling to arms of the Tibetans is not regarded as correct, it seems of sufficient importance to mention what was reported.

47. On the 23rd April enquiries were addressed to Major Woodhouse, commanding at Baxa, asking him what truth there was in the rumoured Tibetan rising. He replied, that the interpreter at Chunabattia stated that according to the reports of reliable Tibetan traders from three to five thousand Tibetans were assembled at Phari, and that the fighting-men of the Bhutias had been called in and were collected at Paro, Kimpoo, Wauguphodan, Ponakha, Doogydgong, and Tongsa. As many as 9,000 were said to be awaiting the result of negotiations between the British and Tibetan Government; and the report was that Tongsa Pillor, the moving spirit among the Bhutias, had been promised territory equal in value to the British subsidy by the Tibetan Government. A man was sent to verify these rumours reported that arms were being manufactured and stored in Bhutan, and men collected. He was unable to state their numbers. Arrangements were made to ascertain what was actually occurring at Phari, and Mr. Paul then stated that the reports appeared to be incorrect.

48. A more recent report from Major Woodhouse, dated the 30th May 1891 (received with Quartermaster-General's No. 1524-1, dated 11th June), shows that the spy despatched to Phari returned to Baxa on the 27th May, and reported that at Thimphoo he heard that a consultation of the Bhutia chiefs would take place at Pimithang (between Thimphoo and Paro) on the 14th June 1891, to settle who was to be Dob Raj, and also to decide the nature of the reply to be sent to the Tibetan Government relative to the Bhutias joining the Tibetans against the British; that on his way back from Phari he was accompanied by a Bhutia officer who had a letter for the Paro Penlow from Tong Dape Kador, informing the Penlow that the Bhutan Government must join the Tibetans against the British, and that the subsidy of Rs. 50,000 at present received yearly from the British Government would be paid by the Tibetans; that up to the present the Tongsa Penlow had sent evasive replies to the Tibetan Government about taking the offensive against the British, and that if it is decided to assist the Tibetans, the Tongsa Penlow, after the meeting of the chiefs, would go to Tibet in August 1891.

49. The Lama of Chunabattia reported to the Deputy Commissioner that in February last he heard that the Tibetans had been pressing the Bhutan Government (i.e., the Tongsa Penlow) to join with them against the British, proposing to attack both in the Darjeeling side and in the direction of Chunabattia; he also heard from some of the Dharm Raja's men that troops were collected at Ponakha, Tongsa, Paro, Thimphoo, and Wandichowlang.

50. Whether the reports received are true or false, it does not seem beyond the range of probability that Bhutan should have watched the Sikkim campaign and subsequent events with special interest, or at all unlikely that the Tibetans sent overtures to the Bhutias. These people have no real knowledge of the power of the British Government, they live in a paradise of self-conceit and self-importance, and the memory of the Bhutan War has probably faded away.

51. It may be mentioned here that the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District was asked by telegram on the 26th April whether he considered, with reference to the reported concentration at Phari, that

the garrisons of Baga, Guathong, Palong, and Gantok, could hold out, if attacked suddenly, until reinforcements could reach them, and whether there was a sufficient supply of ammunition and food in each place. The last phase of the question is that the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District has reported that he considered the garrison at Guathong should be strengthened, but it is understood that the Government of India are disposed to let things remain as at present pending the completion of the negotiations with the envoys of Darjeeling.

52. It will be seen from the foregoing that, assuming at least one-and-a-half battalions of regular troops will be required for the garrisons of Manipur, Kohima, and Konoma, and taking the normal garrison of Assam at four battalions, there would only be two-and-a-half battalions available for the northern and north-east frontiers, to protect them against the Bhutias, the Akas, the Daphlas, and the Abors: to provide for Cachar and a support for the Northern Lushai country; and to furnish a central reserve at Shillong, from which the outlying portions of Assam could be supported, or disturbances in the Garo, Khasia, and Jaintia Hills suppressed. The proposal which General Collett has made to remove the Surma Valley police battalion from Cachar and to place it in the Lushai Hills will no doubt be carefully considered, but Cachar can hardly be left without some military police in addition to the line battalion which he proposes to concentrate at Bilehar. The frontier police would be absorbed in the following way:—The Surma Valley battalions will be practically taken away for duties in Northern Lushai-land; the Naga Hills battalion will be fully employed in these hills; the Garo Hills must be controlled by the small Garo Hills battalion (229), so that for the northern and north-east frontier there remain only the Lakhimpur battalion (758) and the Darrang detachment (67). Sikkim and Northern Assam with Tibet and Bhutan in their front or flank will be garrisoned by a handful of troops, while Assam itself can only manage to provide a few police outposts along this extensive frontier. These considerations seem to point to the necessity for increasing the garrison of Assam; and that a larger increase than one battalion may not be necessary is due to the fact that we have a force of volunteers in that part of India, ready and able to maintain order or to repel incursions on their property. An instance occurred only the other day when the "Darrang Mounted Rifles" assembled to protect the frontier from a raid which the Akas were reported to be about to make. The strength of the volunteers in Assam is about 600, distributed as follows:—

Surma Valley Light Horse	250
Sibsagar Mounted Rifles	110
Darrang Mounted Rifles	50
Lakhimpur Mounted Rifles	100
Nowgong Mounted Rifles	40
Shillong Volunteer Rifles	30
Gauhati Volunteer Rifles	30

The European population of Assam according to the census of February 1891 is not yet known, but in May 1890, the Chief Commissioner of Assam reported that there were about 400 men fit for the duties of volunteers or reservists, who had not enrolled themselves as such; the census of 1891 will probably show higher results. The development of the volunteer movement by liberal encouragement is much to be desired; it is a cheap and powerful addition to the garrison of Assam.

53. It has not been forgotten that if pioneers are sent to make the road from Nishugard to Manipur, they will for the present constitute an

addition to the military strength ; this will, however, only be a temporary addition, and the object of this paper is rather to draw attention to the requirements of Assam for some years to come. The questions, therefore, which will have to be decided in communication with the Commander-in-Chief, and after considering the views expressed by the local civil and military authorities, are,—what is to be the future permanent garrison of Assam, having special regard to the demands of Manipur and the frontier of Assam, is the northern frontier to be strengthened, can any steps be taken in the north-east portion of Assam regarding the future military position in that part, and communication with Burma, does the frontier police require to be increased, and, lastly, would not the military qualities of the Assam local regiments be improved if they could be occasionally sent to Burma stations? The construction of the Bengal-Assam Railway would greatly strengthen the military position in Assam, and it is satisfactory to know that the Garo-Goalundug Junction line will be commenced in the old weather of this year, and that our main link in the chain of communication from the Brahmaputra to the Chindwin will be by railway.

LUSHAI-LAND

54. The region of the Lushais or Kukis is so closely connected with the Chittagong Hill Tracts, that it seems necessary to allude briefly to the position of this district. Hill Tracts and Aiyah form its boundaries on the north and south, but on the eastern frontier, some 190 miles long, is the Lushai country. It once was a military police force (strength about 6500), chiefly Chakmas, who its headquarters at Ringmali, was maintained for the protection of our subjects from Lushai raids. The history of our relations with the Lushais for the last quarter of a century has been that of a series of raids by the Lushais on the Chakma, Manipur, and Chittagong borders, a punitive expedition, the effect of which lasted for some time further on, and further expeditions, until by the establishment of posts and roads we have at last occupied a position by which we may hope to secure an efficient control of the country.

55. Before passing to the consideration of our present hold of the country it is not without interest to note that in 1872, after the conclusion of the Lushai Expedition of 1871-72, in which the present Commander-in-Chief took a prominent part, he proposed a line of sixteen posts, six to ten miles apart, to meet the frontier, to be connected by good roads. Only five of these posts were constructed and no good roads, so that until lately this part of the country was insufficiently protected against the savage tribes living beyond the borders.

56. The country of the Lushais, or Kukis, has Chakma and Manipur on the north, on the south the Arakan hilly region, on the east, the Chin Hills of the Upper Chindwin District of Burma, and on the west the Chittagong Hill tracts. In the easterly part of the country the Shens are found, and these again merge into the Chins, while some consider that the dividing line between the Shens and the Chins is the Blue Mountains and the river Tui Pt.

57. British influence has lately been exercised on the Lushais or Kukis from three different directions and has placed us in a position to act against them from three sides, instead of having to maintain numerous posts on the frontiers of Chakma, of the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and of Arakan, we have now established a line of posts running east and west through the country, and another line starting from the first one as a base and perpendicular to it, running due north to the Cachar District.

58. With the greater influence the British Government will then exert exercise over Manipur, Lushai-land will be compressed from four sides—from Cachar and Manipur, from Chittagong, and from Burma. Instead

therefore of the Lushais acting outward against our subjects, the controlling power will now be able to act upon them both from the exterior and interior, and thus bring the influence of a peaceful power upon the whole of this region. The lines of control are—

- (1) *From Chittagong via Rangamati, Demagiri, Guard and Lungleh to Fort Tregear.*—The establishment of posts at Lungsin, Lalthuma, Fort Lungleh, and Fort Tregear, taking up the line Rangamati and Demagiri, is one of the fruits of the late Lushai expedition. In January 1891, two companies of Gurkhas were withdrawn from Fort Tregear which is at present held by military police. The nearest military support to this police line would be Fort Haka whence troops could hardly be spared, while their advance might in case of trouble be liable to molestation from the Chins.
- (2) *The Northern Lushai line consists of Fort Aijal, Sairang, Chansil, and Jhalacherra.*—In January 1891, the posts were garrisoned by 100 of the 43rd Gurkhas and 450 of the Assam Military Police, while there was a column of 300 of the 45th Gurkhas available for operations in Northern Lushai-land. The regular troops have since been withdrawn and the posts are now held by about 500 of the Assam Military Police. The nearest supporting military force to these is local police detachments is the Silchar garrison, some 700 strong.

59. Starting from the Silchar side there are two routes by which to reach Changail and Fort Aijal, either by the road under construction, and the so-called "Bengali ridge" (a ridge which General Collett pointed out last February has no existence), and which crosses seven distinct watersheds, or by the valley of the Dhaleswari.

60. From Silchar to Changail is 120 miles by road and 93 by the river route. This "road" is a six-foot bridle-path, but it is hoped that it may be widened in the coming season. It is a work of urgent necessity, as the river is described as a long and dangerous defile. From Changail to Fort Aijal (18 miles) an old Lushai track has been widened, and General Collett strongly advises a road being made. As he says, the work of the frontier police will now be among the Lushai villages instead of in protecting the tea-gardens of Sylhet and Cachar.

61. The military police posts at present maintained in the Cachar District and in the whole of the Lushai country are as follows:—

<i>Cachar.</i>			
Silchar (head-quarters)	134
Gaujong	26
Jharighat	7
Jhalacherra*	18
<i>Northern Lushai hills.</i>			
Distributed between Aijal, Changail, and Sairang			551
<i>Eastern Lushai hills.</i>			
Fort Tregear	133
Fort Lungleh	127
Lalthuma	35
Lungsin	10
Demagiri	107
On command and leave, &c.	117

* In April 1890 the Government of India approved of the location of a garrison of one British officer, three Native officers, and 100 rifles of the 60th Bengal Infantry at Jhalacherra for the protection of the Cachar frontier, but the military garrison of this post was relieved by military police at the end of May 1891, at General Collett's request, on the ground of the unsuitableness of the outpost.

The posts in Cachar and the Northern Lushai hills are garrisoned by the Assam frontier police, and in the Eastern Lushai hills by the Chittagong Hill Tracts frontier police.

62. General Collett has proposed that the whole of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion should be transferred from Silchar to Fort Aijal, and that its connection with the Cachar and Sylhet districts should be severed. In this view, he recommends the following distribution of the battalion :—

	Fighting-men.
Aijal garrison	200
Aijal moveable column	200
Saireng post	20
Changail post	100
Jhalnucherra post	20
Two posts on the Bengti road	40
Posts to be hereafter established in Eastern Lushai	100
	<hr/> 680
<i>Add—</i>	
5 per cent. for sick	34
10 per cent. on leave	68
	<hr/> 782
Present established strength of battalion	797
Surplus	<hr/> 15

63. General Collett considers the above to be a suitable garrison for the Northern Lushai Hills, and for the next few years, at all events he does not think that it should be less, because the outbreak which took place last year was directly due to the small number of troops with which we attempted to hold the country. It has not been possible yet to determine the position of the new post in the Eastern Lushai country, but he thinks it will probably be somewhere near Bungteya's village, which is central and about three marches from Aijal. But, wherever it is placed, it should not, General Collett thinks, consist of less than 100 rifles, and a good road with a bridge over the Sonai will have to be made from it to Fort Aijal, with which place it should also be in heliographic communication. General Collett is moreover of opinion that all military and police reserves and outposts west of the Dholesari river should be withdrawn, that the Doarbund reserve and Noarbund outpost should be withdrawn; he would leave the Monierkhal and Mainadhur outposts for the present, and only retain 20 rifles at Jhalnucherra. He considers that the two or three outposts which it may still be necessary to maintain on the north and east of the Cachar district should be taken by the military, and that the treasury and jail guards at Silchar should be taken by the civil police or by a detachment from Aijal.

64. The above proposals meet with the Commander-in-Chief's support; but the opinion of the Chief Commissioner of Assam has not yet been received on them; he has informed us that he has then under consideration, and that the proposals embrace the abolition of all the police posts in Cachar, except in the North Cachar sub-division.

65. It will be seen therefore that practically no troops whatever are intended to be placed in Lushai-land. The disadvantages of employing detachments of troops are obvious; on the other hand it will be remembered that the military supports are a long way off and would have to

march through difficult country if any disturbances took place with which the police were not competent to deal, and it seems reasonable to ask if we are not going a little fast in withdrawing all troops from a country over which we have but lately acquired control, and that but an imperfect one. It may therefore be suggested whether a healthy position cannot be found between Fort Tregear and Haka, which would dominate both the Lushais and the Chins, where some troops could be stationed even if it were not considered desirable to place any in the Northern Lushai Hills.

66. The transformation of some of the Assam frontier police into a regular regiment, naturally suggests itself; the services which these *quasi*-military bodies have rendered of late years would receive a fitting reward in this way, and the army would secure another excellent Gurkha battalion, while the civil authorities would be able to recruit their police up to the necessary strength. The regiment might be stationed in the position above suggested, and by marching through the country in the cold weather would impress the Lushais with our military strength. We have of late years acquired a great tract of country; and we can hardly hope to control the wild peoples of this tract without an adequate military force near at hand. The cost of one expedition in money, in the hostility engendered, and in the loss of life, would pay for a good number of troops and police for many years.

67. If, however, it be considered undesirable to increase the army, on account of the expense, then I venture to suggest that it should be discussed whether a stronger military police force should not be enrolled. A great want also is good roads and paths, and this is a question which requires early and earnest consideration. In any case, it is submitted that the movement of troops from Haka to Fort Tregear and *vice versa* when

* Colonel Evans and part of the 43rd Gurkhas marched about 300 miles through the Northern Lushai Hills last spring, thus showing the Lushais that their remote villages were not inaccessible to the troops.

reliefs have to take place, to or from India, and the occasional march of troops through the Lushai country* will have a very advantageous effect upon the Lushais. The fact that Lushai-land and its neighbour, the Chin Hills country, fall under three separate civil administrations and three separate military commands, constitutes a serious disadvantage, but does not admit of a remedy unless the Government are prepared to revise entirely the civil and military arrangements which at present exist.

CHIN HILLS.

68. It will now be convenient to glance at the distribution of troops in the Chin Hills. It has been remarked in para. 56 of this note that the Shendus and the Chins are believed to merge into each other; and the fact seems to be that these tribes are called Shendus or Chins according to the views of the civil administration which deals with them. For our purposes, however, we may agree to call those peoples the "Chins" who have been described as inhabiting the eastern slopes of that portion of the great range of hills dividing India from Burma, which is bounded by the river Myitha, a tributary of the Chindwin which it enters at Kalemyn. The various tribes of Chins take their names apparently from their villages, so that we have the Yokwa Chins, the Haka Chins, the Tashon Chins, while the Baungshé Chins (the term Baungshé some think is the Burmese synonym for Shendu) embrace the two first named. South of the Baungshés are the Chinbók Chins. In this hill-country we have

† See Intelligence Branch Hand-Book of the Lushai country, 1899.

had several small expeditions and numerous conflicts† since the annexation of Upper Burma, and so far from this state of things being ended, the

Chief Commissioner of Burma has quite recently declared that extensive operations will be necessary next cold season to reduce the Chins to obedience.

69. According to the latest information received from the General Officer Commanding Burma District, dated the 23rd June 1891, the distribution of the troops in the Chin Hills is as under:—

NORTHERN SECTION.

Fort White.

39th Bengal Infantry	...	183
4th Madras Pioneers	...	58
Two companies, Sappers and Miners	...	245

Tiddin.

39th Bengal Infantry	...	98
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No. 4 Stockade.

4th Madras Pioneers	...	58
Sappers and Miners	...	15

No. 3 Stockade

4th Madras Pioneers	...	38
Burma Sappers	...	63

No. 2 Stockade.

Burma Sappers	...	50
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SOUTHERN SECTION.

Haka.

39th Bengal Infantry	...	216
4th Madras Pioneers	...	101

Bwetet.

39th Bengal Infantry	...	50
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Rawvan.

4th Madras Pioneers	...	98
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70. The above is the total strength inclusive of sick, but does not include the posts in the Kubo, Kale, Myitha, and Yaw Valleys. Since the date of the report all the sappers, except 48 at Fort White, have been withdrawn from the Chin Hills. These garrisons do not correspond with the strength of the authorised garrisons, and it seems advisable that the question of the future garrison of the Chin Hills should receive special consideration.

71. Although it is desirable to separate the questions regarding the Chin Hills from the more general considerations regarding the garrison of Burma, the former are so bound up with the latter in the discussions which have taken place between various authorities, and necessarily depend so much upon the conclusions which may be arrived at in respect to the garrison of Burma generally, that it is difficult to mark any dividing line between them. The portion of Burma coterminous with Manipur and Lushai-land is included in the Upper Chinthein district which forms part of the Myingyan district of the Burma command. The Myingyan command extends from Thayetmyo in the south to the police station of Homalin, 80 miles north of Kandat. It has apparently no actual northern boundary, is bounded on east by the Chinthein, while its western boundary is the Koladyne river, and further south the Arakan-Yoma. The Myingyan command extends over a vast area, and include

a large population; on the 1st February last, the garrison of the Mying-

*At that time the 2-4th Gurkhas and a wing of the 4th Madras Pioneers under orders for India were present in the command, though the relieving regiments had arrived.

yan command consisted of 5,972* troops and about 5,000 military police. This area, especially in the western and northern portions, is far from being

completely subdued.

72. The question of the general military situation in Burma has been lately much under discussion, and the points at issue will be dealt with hereafter; for the present it may be well to consider what has been said by the responsible local authorities regarding the force required for the Chin Hills. In a report, dated 2nd March 1891, the General officer commanding says, that the experiences of the preceding few months had made it evident that the arrangements for the protection of the frontier posts at Haka and Fort White on the withdrawal of the troops employed in the Chin-Lushai Expedition of 1890, had been insufficient; and General Stewart makes some very appropriate remarks which may be introduced in this place.

73. It was then considered that our relations with the Chins were sufficiently well established to admit of leaving a small garrison at each post, namely, one regiment between them, with a long line of communication very lightly held back to the river bases at Pokoko and Myingyan. No account was taken of the possibility of hostilities, nor of the occurrence of unusual sickness among the garrison.

74. The troops suffered so much from sickness, that, early in October 1890, with the exception of some 300 Gurkhas at Haka, who were fit for active operations, the garrisons in the hills and on the line of communications were barely effective for self-defence. In November 1890, the 2-4th Gurkhas had to be relieved by the 2-3rd Gurkhas from India. This relief was especially fortunate as well as the arrival somewhat earlier of a wing of the 4th Madras Pioneers, and a company of sappers, as the Chins commenced raiding all along the border from Tamu in the north to Yawdwin on the south, and had not these fresh troops been available, reinforcements could only have been obtained elsewhere in Burma with great delay and difficulty. As it was they did not arrive in time to prevent an attempt being made on Thetta, nor were they strong enough to furnish the complement for the several columns organised to punish the raiders. The 2-4th Gurkhas had to be detained to assist in carrying out the punitive expedition. The troops actively employed on the 2nd March 1891, were—

Two companies, Sappers and Miners.

2-4th Gurkhas.

39th Garhwalis.

Wing, 4th Madras Pioneers.

13th Burma Infantry.

28th Madras Infantry.

200 men, 32nd Burma Infantry.

The 2-4th Gurkhas were under orders to return to India in April, the sappers and miners were to spend the summer at Mandalay, and the 32nd was to go to Thayetmyo for training, leaving only three regiments on the frontier and involving a repetition of the arrangements made in 1890, which proved a failure. General Stewart expressed himself as strongly of opinion that resting satisfied with such dispositions would only be to court disaster.

75. The experience of 1890 shows that it is imperatively necessary to be prepared to meet the contingencies of sickness on the one hand, and of hostility on the part of the Chins on the other. General Stewart has

put forward a scheme for the occupation of the Chin frontier and its communication by four regiments with two in reserve, and has detailed the distribution he proposes as follows:—

"In addition to Haka and Fort White the following may be considered obligatory posts which it will be necessary to hold under the same conditions, namely:—

Kubo Valley
Auktaung or Karupat. | Tamu.
Yazagyo
Yaw Valley.

Yawdwin and probably one or more advanced posts.

"These conditions can only be fulfilled by their having adequately strong garrisons, at starting, namely:—

	Rifles.
Haka	400
Fort White	400
Auktaung	200
Yazagyo	100
Tamu	100
Yawdwin	150
New Post	100
Total, two full regiments	1,450

"The extent of frontier is divided by the Nankathe river geographically, and to some extent ethnographically, into two sections, which may be designated as the Northern or Fort White Section and the Southern or Haka Section, the former including the Siyin, Sagyalang, and Kaibow tribes, with the Kubo and Kala Valleys as their objective in all raiding operations, and the latter Tashon, Haka, Yokwa, and Baungabe tribes who raid on the Myitha Valley and lower down the Chinbok tribes which raid on the Yaw Valley.

"The supports to the obligatory posts abovementioned would occupy posts on the line of communications, namely:—

Northern Sections.

Supports to Fort White—	
No. 4 stockade	50
No. 3 „	50
Kalemyo	350
Support to the Kubo valley—	
Monywa	400

Southern Sections.

Supports to Haka—	
Kim	100
Gungaw	200
Supports to Yawdwin—	
Pauk	200
Pakoke	350

"The actual distribution of the troops would be as follows:—

Northern Sections.

One regiment, 39th Garhwalis—	
Fort White	400
No. 4 stockade	50
No. 3 „	50
Kalemyo	350
} Supports. {	

One regiment 15th Madras Infantry—	
Tamu	100
Auktaung	200
Yazagyo	100
Monywa, support	400

Southern Sections.

One regiment, 12th Burma—

Haka	400
Rawvan			100
Kan or Sibauug	} Support.	{	100
Gungaw			200

One regiment, 24th Madras Infantry—

Yawdwin	150
New Post		...	100
Pauk	200
Pokoke (reserve)	350

"The two regiments quartered between Thayetmyo and Myingyan might be regarded as a reserve for the whole.

"In estimating the garrisons the strength of regiments has been taken at 800 rank and file, but as a matter of fact the average strength of regiments in Burma is seldom over 700, and out of this allowance must be made for casualties, for sickness, regimental employ, band and drums, &c. So that instead of 800 rifles, 600 rifles would be the maximum number that it would be safe to calculate on, and this would make the number of regiments really available equivalent to three only instead of four."

It will naturally strike anyone, who considers the question, how differently it is proposed to treat the Lushais and the Chins, the former to be controlled by police only, while the latter are deemed to require four battalions of regular troops, equal to the whole normal garrison of Assam. The reason may be found in the fact that we have long been in contact with the Lushais, while the Chins, the terror of the Burmese, have only recently felt the power of the British Government. At the same time it seems to be a question for consideration whether a somewhat different distribution of force might not be made so as to provide for a more complete control over the whole Chin Lushai country.

BURMA.

76. Previous to the annexation of Upper Burma, the normal garrison of British (now Lower) Burma was about 2,000 British and 3,000 Native

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troops. In June 1886, a redistribution of the garrison of India was suggested, and, with regard to Burma, the following strength was proposed in the Quartermaster-General's Department:—

Three British infantry regiments at 1,012 =	...	3,036
Eight Native ditto at 832 =	...	6,656
One Do. cavalry	...	498
Two mountain batteries	...	240
Two garrison batteries	...	240
One Native mountain battery (to be raised)	...	169
Total	...	<u>10,839</u>

77. This force was to be distributed between Mandalay, Kenda, Bhamo, Yemethin, intermediate stations, Rangoon (normal garrison to be increased by a half battalion of British infantry and a half battalion of Native infantry), Moulmein, Port Blair, and Camorta; Thayetmyo and Tounghoo were proposed to be abandoned. The Government of India, however, considered it desirable to postpone the consideration of this question until peace was established in Burma.

78. The question of the strength of the garrison of Burma has necessarily been frequently under discussion. After the first occupation of

Upper Burma, when affairs appeared to be more settled, considerable reductions were made, but in a very short time a reoccurrence of disturbance took place, the districts were over-run by dacoits and insurgents, and large reinforcements had to be sent in 1886. But after the operations of the cold season of 1886-87, the country quieted down, and, owing to this and to the increase of military police, it was possible to somewhat reduce the number of troops. A statement of the number of batteries and regiments in Burma since 1886 is given in Appendix G.

79. Since 1886 the garrison of Burma has been considerably reduced. The artillery has been reduced from eight to five batteries, the cavalry have been withdrawn, and the Native infantry has dropped from 24 battalions to 16½. (See Appendix H.) The total garrison in Burma before

* Given in Appendix I as 15,381 and the Manipul disturbance was 15,030* different month was taken. troops and fifteen to sixteen thousand military police, a force which has to guard 156,000 square miles, 69,000 of which have only very recently been added to our Empire, and the inhabitants of which are still only partially subjugated. The present strength of the whole Burma garrison is 5,263 British and 13,365 Native troops, giving a total of 18,628. (See Appendix I.) The total strength of the military police is (1st August 1891) —

Upper Burma	14,460
Lower Burma	1,113
Total	15,573

80. The question of the garrison of Burma is being dealt with separately in the Military Department; but the discussion of last spring may be here alluded to. On the 5th March, His Excellency the Viceroy expressed his opinion that the present condition of Upper Burma was not such as to justify any material diminution of the force now in the country, and the discussion terminated for the time being with the Order in Council of the 21st March, conveying the decision of the Government of India that they were prepared to increase the garrison of Burma by two battalions including the wing of the 4th Madras Pioneers temporarily detached, but that they would prefer not to carry this into effect until the cold weather of 1891-92 on account of possible sickness, and that if the Chief Commissioner should later in the year consider it absolutely necessary to have an aggregate increase of three battalions, the Government would be prepared to send a third battalion.

81. In discussing the situation in Burma, General Stewart has pointed out that the recent disturbances in Wundwin, Mogaung, and Mainglaing prove the necessity for being prepared at all times to place troops in the field for active operations and consequently of having garrisons sufficiently strong not only to overawe an excitable population within our own borders but strong enough also to detach portions for punitive expeditions. General Stewart's view which was previously expressed by Sir George White has been fully borne out.

82. It was necessary to despatch a column from Tamu to form part of the punitive expedition against Manipur. The Chins in the neighbourhood of Haka were disturbed, and it is now proved that the attack of the Klang-ylang Chins was at least in sympathy with the revolt in Manipur. Meanwhile three columns have been operating under General Wolsley in the Mandalay command, and there are still many parts of Upper Burma and its frontiers in which active operations may become necessary at any time.

83. General Stewart in March 1891, considered the then garrison of the Mandalay command at the lowest limit consistent with security, and that it allowed no margin for any unusual contingency; it was then as regards Native infantry at a strength of five battalions. The acquisition of Wuntho necessitated its occupation for some time so another regiment became necessary; this deficiency was supplied temporarily by withdrawing a regiment from Lower Burma, giving six Native infantry regiments to the Mandalay command. Six Native infantry regiments were considered equally indispensable for the Myingyan command (four regiments being required for the Chin frontier), and five for that of Lower Burma, making a total of seventeen regiments for the entire Burma district.

84. The distribution of Native infantry proposed by General Stewart was as follows :—

Mandalay District.

				<i>Battalions.</i>
Bhamo	1
Shewbo (Head Quarters)	}			
Kyaukmyasung				
Thabeit-Kyin		1
Tigyaing				
Mandalay	2½
Maymyo	4
Wuntho country	1
				6
				—

Myingyan District

Chin frontiers	...	—	...	4
Thayetmyo	1
Myingyan	}			
Pagan		1
Minbu				
				6
				—

Rangoon District.

Rangoon	1½
Toungthoo	1
Meiktila	1
Shan States	...	—	...	1
Moulmein	}			
Port Blair		1
				5
				—

85. At the beginning of 1890, the Commander-in-Chief of the Madras Army recommended that sixteen regiments should be maintained in Burma, pending the formation and training of the three new Burma regiments. General Stewart has included these regiments in the garrison he recommends, but the circumstances which have arisen since the commencement of 1890 have, he considers, conclusively proved that the estimate then formed of the condition of affairs both on the Chin frontier and our northern and north-eastern frontier was somewhat optimistic, and that it is absolutely necessary to maintain an attitude of constant watchfulness and

preparedness in order to guard against sudden outbreaks which if they secured an initial success, would become highly dangerous. This end can only be reached by having mobile troops constantly ready for their immediate suppression.

86. The Chief Commissioner of Burma thoroughly agreed with General Stewart, and in his letter of March 14th, 1891, expressed his opinion as follows:—The insufficient garrison of the Chin Hills caused great inconvenience and some loss of prestige, the Tamu Valley was left unprotected, and this resulted in the raiding of Puthawa, the Haka garrison was so weak that the expedition to Thetta had to be postponed for several months and when undertaken, the force sent was insufficient to secure the object in view. At Lawda in the south the garrison was for a long time so weak as to be practically useless. The Chief Commissioner further expressed his opinion that the garrison of Burma as regards Native infantry (seventeen regiments) proposed by General Stewart was moderate, and that the country between Burma and Chittagong ought to be permanently opened up and the whole of the intervening tribes brought under control. At the same time the garrison of the rest of Burma could not safely be reduced. He is favor of dealing firmly with all the tribes within our recognised boundary and obliging them to pay a small tribute for each household.

87. In a Minute dated the 29th April 1891, Sir Alexander Mackenzie says:—

"All the local authorities from Sir Charles Crosthwaite and General Stedman downwards have agreed that it is no longer necessary in the southern, eastern, and (southern districts of the) central divisions to maintain such a large force of military police as we have hitherto kept up. It will not do to make too hasty reductions or run any risks, and I have no intention of doing so. But I have no doubt whatever, that reductions, —material reductions, are possible and safe.

* * * No reductions can be thought of in Katha, the Ruby Mines, or Bhamo. On the contrary we have yet to subdue to law and order by far the greater part of the Bhamo district. For this, including as it does the establishment of posts to control the Jade and Amber Mines tracts, the effective domination of the Kachins within our border, the garrisoning of strong posts on the Irrawaddy to guard the road from China, and prevent incursions of Chinese-Shan raiders, we must certainly strengthen our Bhamo Military Police Battalion. The Momeik country will add a company or two to the Ruby Mines Battalion. Wundwin will necessitate a slight strengthening of the Katha Battalion. The Upper Chindwin will require some new posts. In Mandalay alone are some reductions feasible. * * *. But I must repeat that nothing certain can be said on this head until the reports called for have been received."

88. Sir Alexander Mackenzie is favorably disposed towards the conversion of military police into local regiments, because he regards the present position of the military police as distinctly unsatisfactory, and as even a possible source of danger. He, however, points to the cheapness of the police as compared with the regimental organisation, and says, that for the present he should prefer to maintain the military police battalions in the northern part of Upper Burma, but to strengthen their European staff.

89. In Appendix J will be found some useful information regarding the military police in Burma. It will be seen that the strength of the military police on the 1st January 1890, was between 18,000 and

19,000; it is now 15,573; and, if some 1,800 men are to be transferred to the two new local Madras battalions, that will mean a further diminution of numbers (unless the police is recruited up) to an establishment of under 14,000 men for Upper and Lower Burma.

90. When Sir Charles Crosthwaite as Chief Commissioner of Burma in September 1889 proposed the formation of a reserve of military police for service in Upper Burma, he said, that experience had shown that it was not always prudent to rely on the apparent tranquillity of a district or to reduce the force in too sudden or too evident a manner. The withdrawal of a post had been followed on several occasions by the burning of the vacated huts by the local characters by way of bravado. Although such incidents were more ridiculous than serious, they afforded substance for mischievous rumours and gave an opportunity to those who find their occupation in disturbing the public mind. For these reasons, he considered that the reduction of the police force should be carried out in a gradual manner and in such a way as to render it easy to retrieve a mistake at once and without difficulty.

91. In connection with the amalgamation of certain military police battalions in Burma, Sir Charles Crosthwaite in September 1890 remarked, that no inconvenience or loss of efficiency had resulted from the amalgamation of the Yemethin, Meiktila, and Kyaukse battalions, and that the improvement in communications, as well as the absolute restoration of order, enabled him to proceed further in the same direction. When the Mu Valley line was completed, a further large saving would be possible, and in Sir Charles Crosthwaite's opinion it was beyond doubt that the construction of railways was the chief means of introducing economy in the administration of Burma. Although this subject falls to be dealt with in the Home Department, I have noticed it as the military police is really an important part of the military strength of Burma, and I think we should be quite sure of our ground before any large reductions are made.

92. During the rainy season a temporary distribution of Native infantry has been made (see Appendix K), but the main question remains to be settled.

93. The most recent opinion expressed by Sir Alexander Mackenzie as to the military requirements of Burma, is contained in a telegram dated the 20th August 1891, in which he strongly deprecates the proposed reduction of the garrison of Burma to thirteen battalions as altogether premature. He does not consider that the occupation of Manipur has sensibly affected the position in Burma, or that Manipur was ever a factor in estimating the military strength of the province under his administration. In his opinion, and in that of General Stewart—an opinion which, as already pointed out, was expressed by them in March last—seventeen battalions of native infantry are necessary for Burma, and the additional reasons now given are that extensive operations will have to be undertaken next cold weather to reduce the Chin and Kachin tribes, to obtain hold over the Jade Mines, the Amler and rubber tracts, to explore the Hukong valley, and to open communication with Assam. The Garhwalis are required for Haka and Fort White; the Pioneers are absolutely necessary for the construction of roads in the Chin Hills, and ought, it is said, to be raised to a full regiment rather than be reduced; and an additional mountain battery is also urgently required. The Chief Commissioner is arranging to transfer sixteen companies of military police to the army, and is willing that the two local regiments to be thus formed

should be reckoned among the seventeen battalions required for Burma, but he considers the proposals of the Madras authorities premature and altogether inadequate.

94. The actual garrison of Burma consists of—

Three garrison batteries, Royal Artillery,
One mountain battery, Royal Artillery,
One native mountain battery,
Two companies, Madras sappers,
One company, Burma sappers,
Five battalions, British infantry,
Two battalions, Bengal infantry (including the 39th Garhwalis',
Ten-and-a-half battalions, Madras infantry (including a wing
of the 4th Madras Pioneers),

Four battalions, Madras infantry (local Burma regiments),
or a total of 5,265 British and 13,365 Native troops.

95. It has lately been decided by the Government of India that two more Madras infantry regiments should be converted into Burma local regiments, making a total of six local regiments; that the limit shall be seven, but that the question of raising the seventh battalion shall stand over for the present. We are in communication with the Chief Commissioner and the Madras Government on the subject, and, as above-mentioned, the former has said that he will be able to supply sixteen companies of military police for the purpose.

96. On the general question of the strength of the Burma garrison, there are two points to be specially considered—(1) the addition of another mountain battery; this is so far disposed of that His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has decided to see if another mountain battery can be sent from India, even if it is not wanted longer than the cold season; this can no doubt be sent if urgently required by the Chief Commissioner; the question of raising another battery, or of localising an existing one, has been postponed for the present; (2) the number of Native infantry battalions to be retained in Burma. Here the Chief Commissioner and General Stewart maintain their position as required, while the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, apparently considers that thirteen battalions are sufficient. The Government of India have promised to send three additional battalions, i.e., to maintain seventeen in all, if the Chief Commissioner considers that they are absolutely necessary; the question therefore seems to be, how many battalions can Madras give for service in Burma, besides those (six) battalions which are, or are to be, local, or are any to be supplied from Bengal.

97. It is also of great importance, however, to decide as exactly as possible upon the whole of the future garrison of Burma, and upon the distribution of all arms, throughout the country, because the expenditure on barracks and military posts is very large, and it is most necessary that no money should be spent on these without a clear understanding as to the permanency, so far as can be foreseen, of the arrangements proposed. I have ventured to express my opinion, on several occasions, that past experience should make us very careful in reducing the strength of the Burma garrison; the great responsibilities of the Government of India are developing in the north and eastern parts of Burma; and their policy is to bring under control the hill-country between Burma and Assam.

98. His Excellency the Viceroy in a note of 8th September 1889, spoke of the impossibility of allowing the Chin-Lushai tribes to relapse

again into barbarism, and said that he had always hoped that one of the first results of our entry into the China country would be the creation of arterial roads traversing it from east to west ; again, in a note of 26th August 1890 His Excellency pointed out the necessity for retaining a sufficient number of commanding positions for enforcing our hold on the country by occasional military " promenades," and, above all, by improving communications. The responsibilities involved in Burma and in the country between Burma and Assam cannot be fulfilled without an adequate military force.

99. Among the questions dealt with in the foregoing pages, which appear to call for settlement, the following may be stated :—

Manipur.

- (1).—Strength of the garrison at Manipur.
- (2).—Completion of the road from the Brahmaputra to the Chindwin.

Assam.

- (3).—Question of increasing the garrison of Assam.
- (4).—Question of employing Assam regiments occasionally in Burma.
- (5).—Development of volunteers in Assam.

Lushai-land.

- (6).—Question of locating any troops in this part of the country.
- (7).—Suggestion regarding the position between Fort Tregear and Haka.
- (8).—Withdrawal of the Surma Valley Police Battalion from the Cachar and Sylhet Districts to the Northern Lushai Hills.
- (9).—Question of forming a regular Gurkha battalion from a battalion of the Assam Frontier Police.
- (10).—Alternative proposal for a stronger military police force.
- (11).—Suggestion for the occasional march of troops through the Lushai country.
- (12).—Necessity for the construction of roads and paths in Lushai-land.
- (13).—Question whether any remedy should be applied to the disadvantage of Lushai-land and the China Hills falling under three separate civil administrations and three separate military commands.

Chin Hills.

- (14).—Determination of the garrison of the Chin Hills, and re-distribution of military forces in the whole of the Chin-Lushai country.

Burma.

- (15).—Question of the future strength of the garrison of Burma.

100. In conclusion, it is submitted that it might be considered whether it would not be expedient to hold a conference at Calcutta in the coming cold season to settle such of the above questions as cannot be at once decided ; how that conference should be composed depends upon the decision of the Government of India in regard to the particular points to be discussed ; but even if Burma be treated separately on account of the intended visits of the highest authorities to that country, it might

still be advantageous that the Chief Commissioner of Assam, the General officer commanding, and the Commissioner of Chittagong should confer with the Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District on the military and police requirements of those parts of the Assam and Bengal territories which I have dealt with in this note.

E. H. H. C., 4-9-91.

I have read this most interesting note with great care, and think it should be sent unofficially to His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

2. I am not in a position to offer any opinion upon the details at present, but I will venture to make the following general remarks.

3. It does not seem to me that it would be a wise policy to post more troops in stations a long way apart along the Tibet-Bhutan frontier. I believe that the right way to hold a country like Assam is by small police posts with small moveable columns of troops completely equipped for rapid advance at a few strategical points, and to reinforce these troops from Bengal, if necessary, which in the case of Assam we can do rapidly by river transport.

4. I believe that the occupation of Manipur in force after our recent complete subjugation of that State will exercise a very calming effect upon Lushais, Nagas, and Upper China.

5. Better road communication between Manipur and the Chindwin seems a necessity.

6. Roads through the Chin and Lushai Hills would be worth very many troops.

7. As regards the sufficiency of the garrison of Assam and Burma, we should, I think, accept the proposals made by the General officers commanding, when they are in accord with the Chief Commissioner.

8. The local authorities, civil and military, know better than we can possibly know at Simla what they have to fear, and with what means they feel sure of being able to overcome resistance.

H. B., 13-9-91.

To His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, unofficially, through the Quartermaster-General.

E. H. H. C., 14-9-91.

To Quartermaster-General in India, unofficial No. 2601-B, dated 15th September 1891.

I have, under Your Excellency's orders, addressed Government in the Military Department officially, urging the importance of energetic action on the road-construction between Nigatong and Manipur, as the first step towards connecting the Brahmaputra with the Irawaddy and Chindwin Rivers. The proposals of the General officer commanding and the Chief Commissioner of Assam have also been officially communicated, with Your Excellency's recommendations, as to the future garrison of Assam.

2. Speaking as an engineer, I would venture to remark that there are enormous difficulties in establishing any system of roads which would intersect the system of hills, which run from north to south in parallel ridges, in the country east of Chittagong and south of Sylhet. I am inclined to think our system of roads in the Lushai country would be ultimately in the shape of roads going north and south between and not across the hills, and taking off from the proposed Assam-Chittagong Railway at different points like Comilla, Hajiganj, Sylhet, Silchar, &c.

With this railway, roads on this system will repay themselves, not only as railway leaders for forest produce, but as military arteries for subjugating the country. Without such a railway, we could not afford to make more than a road or two across the ridges from east to west, like the road from Chittagong to Haka; and whilst their construction and maintenance would be enormously costly, they would not give us a really reliable command of the country. With the railway constructed, it would probably be possible to make ten miles of good roads running in the Lushai country from north to south, for the same price as it would cost to make one mile of good road from east to west and across the ridges. The Chittagong-Assam Railway will in the long run be the best policeman for these uncomfortable and unsatisfactory savages.

J. B., 16-9-91.

His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief.

My opinion on this case is given in the subjoined note.

F. S. B., 28-9-91.

NOTE BY HIS EXCELLENCY THE COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF.

General Collett's able note deals with a very important subject, and one which requires to be considered with much care and deliberation. I do not propose, therefore, to do more at present than remark in somewhat general terms on the questions he has raised, reserving detailed suggestions and recommendations until such time as the various points can be discussed separately.

2. Taking the questions then as enumerated by General Collett in para. 99 of his note, I would remark as follows:—

(1) *Garrison of Manipur, and*

(3) *Garrison of Assam.*

I fully concur in the views expressed by the Hon'ble Member as to the best means of garrisoning countries such as Assam, many parts of which are jungly and unhealthy, and which, being but recently brought under British influence, still require numerous small detached posts. Outpost duty of this kind is a work for which police are specially suited; regular troops should be concentrated in support at central points; to employ them doing the work which can be equally well done by police is merely to fritter away our strength, and to use an unnecessarily expensive means of accomplishing the end in view.

3. I have already submitted to Government my views regarding the garrison for Assam and Manipur during the ensuing cold season, when ^{the Commander-General's letter No. 4400-2, Distribution of Army, dated 24th September 1891.} forwarding Major-General Collett's letter No. 516-M of the 28th July,* and I am of opinion that for some time to come a force similar to what I then recommended will have to be employed. It should, I consider, in conjunction with the military and civil police, suffice to maintain order and to furnish any moveable columns required for the punishment of refractory tribes. As our communications improve, our position will still further be strengthened; but even as things are, I do not think more troops are required.

4. I would not allow the possibility of a combination between the Tibetans and the Bhutaneses to influence to any great extent our decision regarding the future garrison of Assam. I do not imagine that the inhabitants of either of these countries are likely, at present at any rate, to venture on any offensive action against us; and should they do so, we must trust to our political officers receiving early notice of their intention.

This should not be difficult to arrange, and I think we may fairly count upon not being taken entirely by surprise. It seems to me, moreover, that in the event of an incursion of either Tibetans or Bhutanese, our proper course would be to push up troops by rail from Calcutta to Darjeeling or to Kuch Behar. An advance through Sikkim from the former place would effectually cut off any party of Tibetans which might have entered Bhutan; while from the latter, Bhutan itself could be threatened. Our action on the Assam side should be chiefly defensive; and for this we have, I think, enough troops available; it would, I believe, be extremely difficult for large numbers to assemble near that frontier without our receiving sufficient warning to enable us to concentrate an ample force at the threatened point.

5. I would, however, again urge the desirability of hastening on the completion of barracks for a half battalion of British infantry on the Lebong Spur at Darjeeling; leaving questions of economy and sanitation out of sight (though from both these points of view what I advocate seems desirable), I believe that the political effect of the knowledge that an additional force of British troops was almost on their frontiers would be very great both in Tibet and also in Bhutan. Moreover, we should then be enabled to dispense with such strong garrisons at Gnathong and Guntok as we should otherwise require. As regards the exact numbers of troops required to hold these posts, I would prefer to postpone an expression of opinion until the conclusion of the negotiations now being carried on with the Chinese representatives at Darjeeling, as much will depend upon the nature of the agreement concluded with them.

6. (2).—*Completion of the road from the Brahmaputra to the Chin-dwin.*—I have already urged upon Government the necessity of the rapid completion of the road communications between Nigriting and Manipur, and I am entirely of opinion that these should be continued from Manipur to the Chindwin, *via* Tamu, as rapidly as possible. I know of no means more likely to have a quieting effect on that part of the country.

7. (3).—*The employment of the Assam regiments in Burma.*—As long ago as 1878 I recognised the desirability of employing the Assam regiments on field service outside their own province, and when in command of the column in the Karam Valley, I applied for the services of the 44th Assam Light Infantry; the proposal received the sanction of Government, but had to be abandoned owing to the regiment being required against the Nagas. Since then I have lost no opportunity of giving these regiments every chance of seeing active service. At the end of 1885, immediately after assuming the command in this country, I proposed that one battalion should march *via* Tamu and Kenda to Burma, as I believed that the effect of a force operating from the north-west would be of great assistance to Sir Harry Prendergast; and, although the proposal was at the time negatived by Government on the score of expense, troops have been on two subsequent occasions moved along this road. Since 1886 the three Assam regiments have been employed in Burma, and I believe have thereby gained considerably in efficiency. The Government of India may rest assured that I shall in the future continue to recommend the constant employment of these regiments, as I fully realise how much they have suffered from want of opportunity of being associated with other troops. There are, however, difficulties in the way of their employment in other parts of India during peace time, on account of the special Assam batta which they receive, whilst expense forbids their presence at large camps of exercise. Should pecuniary considerations admit, I would gladly see them taking part in the next expedition on the North-West Frontier. One of them has already been told off for service on mobilisation being ordered.

8. (5).—*Encouragement of the volunteers in Assam.*—I fully agree with General Cullen that we should do our utmost to avail ourselves to the full of the source of strength offered by the volunteers. The recent conduct of the Surma Valley Light Horse and the Darrang Volunteers shows that they are by no means an unimportant factor in the general question under consideration. One main object which I had in view in visiting Assam in 1890 was to inspect the volunteers, and it was a source of great regret to me that, owing to an accident, I was unable to be present at their camp of exercise. I have frequently advocated a liberal policy towards volunteers, and I will cordially support any proposals tending to show them that their services are appreciated.

9. (6).—*Location of troops in Lushai-land.* (7).—*Question of a position between Fort Tregear and Haka.* (8).—*Withdrawal of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion from Cachar and Sylhet to the Northern Lushai Hills.*—As I have said above, I am not in favor of employing regular troops for garrisoning unhealthy districts requiring numerous small detachments. I would prefer to see troops concentrated in central positions selected chiefly on account of being healthy, and would leave detachment duties and the suppression of unimportant local disturbances to the police. In this view I am entirely in favor of the head-quarters of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion being transferred to Aijal. Cachar and Sylhet are no longer our frontier stations, and should be left to the care of the civil police. The regiment at Cachar is at hand to support the police in the event of any extensive rising, and the surest guarantee of tranquillity in the district between Cachar and Aijal seems to me to consist in the fact of a self-contained force (and such the military police are as regards the semi-savage tribes) being stationed at the latter place. Should the Chief Commissioner of Assam not have some very strong objection to this proposal on civil grounds, I would carry it out with as little delay as possible. A similar policy seems desirable in the eastern part of Lushai-land: troops concentrated at healthy points; police on outpost duty. I shall be prepared to submit detailed proposals hereafter.

10. (9).—*Formation of a regular Gurkha regiment from a battalion of Assam police, or (10).—The strengthening of the police force.*—I am in favor of the latter alternative. An increase to our strength in this direction is beyond all question desirable, having regard to our increased responsibilities consequent on our assumption of the direct control of the Manipur State, and I think this increase should take the shape of one or more additional battalions of police. I would again repeat that the work for which they are required is one legitimately falling to police, and the latter can perform it less ostentatiously, and quite as effectively as regular troops: the raising of a police battalion, moreover, attracts no undesirable notoriety; it is far easier to accomplish, is more rapidly completed, and is much cheaper.

11. (11).—*Occasional march of troops through Lushai-land.*—In this proposal I quite acquiesce. I would take every opportunity of letting the troops see the country and of showing them to the natives.

12. (12).—*Construction of roads and paths in Lushai-land.*—It is almost a truism to say that roads mean increased facilities for preserving order, and therefore for economising troops, and in fact in semi-barbarous countries they do much more, for by bringing the wild tribes into more close contact with the sobering influences of civilization, and making them alive to the advantages of a peaceful career, they at the same time reduce the probability of physical force being required. I imagine that in no country is this more likely to prove true than in the land of the Lushais, a district hitherto probably worse off for communications than almost any

part of our Indian Empire, and where until very recently the inhabitants had little intercourse with one another, and none with the outside world. I agree with Sir James Browne as to the general line of the route; they should be branches running southward from the Assam-Chuttanggong Railway, parallel to the mountain ranges of which the country is composed.

13. (13).—*The disadvantages of the Chin and Lushai countries being under three separate civil administrations.*—This is no doubt a large question, but it is an important one, and I think its solution should be attempted. It is hardly possible to bring the whole of these districts under one Government, as the frontier line between India and Burma must cross them, but I would certainly wish to see the Government of Bengal relieved of all connection with their administration. Without wishing to express a definite opinion on a question so largely influenced by political and civil considerations, I am under the impression that a partial solution of the difficulty at present experienced is to be found by transferring to Assam that portion of the Bengal Province south of Hill Tipperah (i.e., the Chuttanggong Hill Tracts). Bengal has at present little interest in Lushai affairs, she would then have none, and it appears to me that this district has much more in common with the neighbouring Lushai Hills than it has with the Garoes district; without such a transfer it is impossible to exclude Bengal from coming into contact with the Lushais. There may of course be two political reasons why what I suggest should not be carried out, but from the military point of view it has much to recommend it. As things are at present the territories of these three administrations are gradually approaching one another at haphazard, according as a military expedition starts from one or other province. This obviously cannot last; boundaries must conform to geographical features, and, when possible, to ethnological divisions, and the question must be faced ere long. What I propose would at any rate have this advantage; that it would bring our relations with Nagas, Kukis, Manipuris, Tipperah, and Lushai under one administration. Whilst the country is in its present unsettled state, the Chief Commissioner of Burma must have a voice in our relations with the Chins; but later on, when these shall have been thoroughly subjugated, and the question has become merely one of the best methods of conducting the civil administration of a settled province, it seems probable that the mountain range bordering the Chinmaw Valley on the west will form the most convenient boundary between Assam and Burma.

14. (14).—*Garrison of the Chin Hills, and (15).—Garrison of Lurwa.*—I would prefer to postpone the question of the permanent garrison of the Chin Hills and Burma until the end of the ensuing cold weather. We shall then be better able to form an opinion as to what is required in the former district after the conclusion of the operations which are at contemplation, with a view to its more complete subjugation. I shall also myself, I hope, have had the opportunity of discussing the question of the garrison of Burma with the local authorities; meanwhile I would certainly not reduce the troops in either country; I feel sure we have none too many.

15. A conference, such as that proposed by General Cullen in the last paragraph of his note, seems desirable and would doubtless tend to hasten on a settlement of many of the questions under consideration.

F. S. R., 26-9-01.

Secretary, Military Department,—I return you this case with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief's printed note on the subject. Would you kindly let me have a copy of your printed note for record in this office?

J. B.

C. M. S. Secy.

25.9.01

Unofficial from Quartermaster-General in India, No. 731-A, dated 29th September 1891.

Conveys an expression of the Commander-in-Chief's opinion on the question of the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

Submitted.

G. DE-RNZ-P., 3-10-91.

P. J. M., 3-10-91.

Deputy Secretary.

A. C. T., 5-10-91.

Secretary.

In submitting these papers, and with reference to para. 3 of the Hon'ble Member's note of 13th September 1891, I may perhaps be permitted to explain that I never doubted the wisdom of the policy which was carried into effect some years back, viz., outposts to be held by police, central supports by regulars. But I did draw attention to the weakness of the long frontier from Baza to Sadiya, with nothing but a few police, comparatively speaking, and no troops at all north of the Brahmaputra between those two stations; the difficulty of reinforcing that part of the frontier is apparent from a glance at the map.

E. H. H. C., 5-10-91.

Hon'ble Member.

These notes should be seen by His Excellency the Viceroy.

H. B.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

Seen.

L., 8-10-91.

Are any steps to be taken in respect to the conference at Calcutta?

E. H. H. C., 11-10-91.

Hon'ble Member.

Secretary,—Please take steps.

H. B., 12-10-91.

Please draft to Quartermaster-General, Chief Commissioner of Assam, and Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal. To the former we should detail the measures which might be considered by the conference. Copies of the Secretary's memorandum may be sent demi-officially to the Chief Commissioner and the Lieutenant-Governor.

P. J. M., 15-10-91.

Draft to Quartermaster-General submitted for approval. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and the Chief Commissioner of Assam should

I think so.

A. C. T.

be addressed separately?

P. J. M., 23-10-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Submitted with draft for orders.

A. C. T., 26-10-91.

Secretary.

I have sent copies of my note confidentially to some of the authorities named; but we can hardly ask them to discuss military questions on which His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has already given his opinion. Will Colonel Maitland kindly examine the draft in this light, reading over the Commander-in-Chief's note?

E. H. H. C., 26-10-91.

The draft has been revised as ordered, and purely military questions on which the Commander-in-Chief has given his opinion have been struck out of the list of subjects to be discussed by the conference.

P. J. M., 28-10-91.

Secretary.

We should address the Home Department by official memorandum, sending copy of all notes. Then, if they consent, to the Bengal Government, and also to the Chief Commissioner of Assam in similar terms.

E. H. H. C., 3-11-91.

Revised proof of letter to the Quartermaster-General, and draft of memorandum to the Home Department, submitted for approval.

G. DE RHZ-P., 4-11-91.

To Quartermaster-General in 184a, No. 3214-B, dated 5th November 1891.

To Home Department, No. 3220-B, dated 6th November 1891.

From Home Department, No. 1532, dated 11th November 1891.

In reply to Military Department No. 3220-B, dated 6th November 1891, state that the Home Department concur in the proposal to hold a conference in Calcutta during the ensuing cold season to discuss certain questions connected with the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

SHAMACHARAN, 2-12-91.

Submitted. Please see the Secretary's note above. We are now to address Bengal and Assam on the subject; but I would first solicit orders as to the manner in which this should be done, i.e., whether we should address the Chief Secretaries of the Bengal and Assam Govern-

I think Secretary has written dem-
officially. Draft official letters, please.
P. J. M., 3-12-91.

ments officially, or write demi-officially to the Lieutenant-Governor, and the Chief Commissioner a rect. As we will be seeking the personal assistance of these high functionaries at the conference, the latter course would appear to be the better one.

2. We must also arrange for the presence of the Commissioner of

Letter to Bengal Government will suggest presence of Commissioner, Chittagong and of the General Officer Commanding the Presidency District at the conference. The first must be done through the Bengal Government, and the other through Army Headquarters.

As to General Officer Commanding Presidency District, our No. 3218-B, dated 5th November, is enough for the present. When date is fixed, we can address Quartermaster-General again.

P. J. M., 3-12-91.

It seems necessary also to fix some date, approximately, for the holding of the conference. It is not

We might suggest 15th January and ask Lieutenant-Governor if that date would be convenient.

P. J. M., 3-12-91.

probable that the ability of the Lieutenant Governor, the Chief Commissioner, and the other officers to attend the conference will depend much upon the date upon which it is to be held.

G. DE RHZ-P., 3-12-91.

E. DEB., 3-12-91.

P. J. M., 3-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Draft letters to the Chief Secretary, Bengal, and the Chief Commissioner of Assam have been prepared in accordance with orders, and are now submitted for approval.

2. Since the above notes were written, it has been ascertained that Mr. Ward is about to visit Calcutta; and as that would evidently be a convenient opportunity for holding the conference, the drafts have been made out accordingly.

3. We should perhaps obtain the concurrence of the Foreign Department, officially, to the conference?

P. J. M., 8-12-91.

Secretary.

The Foreign Department may be consulted; and if His Excellency the Viceroy approves, we may ask Chief Commissioner, Burma, to name an officer. If he cannot spare one, I would suggest that Colonel Symons, who knows the Chin Hills well, should be sent to Burma to receive the Chief Commissioner's instructions; he would not be in time to meet Mr. Ward here, but would be able to discuss matters with Sir Charles Elliott and others. We shall have to consult Madras also.

E. H. H. C., 10-12-91.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

Foreign Department should see.

As to Burma, we ought, I think, to telegraph to the Chief Commissioner, telling him that the conference is about to meet, and asking him whether he can send a representative. I would not suggest Colonel Symons, at present.

2. As to Madras, Sir James Dormer is to be here before long, and might I should think, represent the presidency.

L., 10-12-91.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

E. H. H. C., 11-12-91.

To Foreign Department, unofficial No. 3566-B, dated 18th December 1891.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Deputy Secretary.

We may agree in this proposal¹ cordially; it is exactly what we want ourselves—a conference. If we could get Captain Shakespeare and Mr. McCabe here at the same time with one of the Burma Chin Hills political officers, they might be able to work out some concerted system of administration which could be considered by the higher authorities at the conference.

2. Shall we ask Assam, Burma, and Bengal whether they could arrange for this?

G. R. I., 13-12-91.

The Foreign Department agrees to the proposed conference. We would like copies of the notes and letters and telegrams proposing it to the local Governments. We can then take action regarding discussion at the same time of questions of administrative arrangements.

2. The case is marked urgent and sent at this stage for concurrence in the conference. I therefore do not detain it to go into details. I have not before seen General Colleen's note.

The note was sent to Sir Mortimer Durand, I think, but was not referred to the Foreign Department in the early stage, and it dealt chiefly with military questions.

E. H. H. C.

W. J. C., 13-12-91.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Please draft telegrams to Chief Commissioner, Burma and also to Madras.

P. J. M., 13-12-91.

Telegrams have been drafted in accordance with His Excellency's orders of 10th December, and may now issue together with the drafts previously submitted ?

2. May copies of Secretary's note be sent demi-officially to all members of the conference who have not yet been supplied ?
- Not at present. E. H. H. C.

P. J. M., 14-12-91.

Secretary.

Issue letters and telegrams as revised, and then resubmit file.

E. H. H. C., 14-12-91.

Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 3617-B, dated 14th December 1891.

Telegram to Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 3618-B, dated 14th December 1891.

To Government of Bengal, No. 3621-B, dated 14th December 1891.

To Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 3622-B, dated 14th December 1891.

Resubmitted as ordered.

2. Please see Mr. Cunningham's note on page 40, asking for copies of the notes, letters, and telegrams on this file. Shall copies be made and sent now ?
- Yes. E. H. H. C., 16-12-91.
J. C. SMYTH, 15-12-91

Submitted.

2. May these be sent with reference to Secretary's marginal remark above ?

E. DnB., 15-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

This may be done, but file must first go to Secretary, as he ordered it to be resubmitted.

P. J. M., 15-12-91.

Secretary.

To Foreign Department, No. 3656-B, dated 16th December 1891.

Telegram from Government of Madras, No. 7178, dated 15th December 1891.

State that they agree to the proposal that Sir James Dormer should represent the Madras Government at the conference. His Excellency has been informed accordingly.

SHAMACHARAN, 16-12-91.

P. J. M., 16-12-91.

Telegram from Chief Commissioner, Burma, No. 249, dated 16th December 1891.

Suggests that General Stewart, Commanding Burma District, may be asked to attend the conference.

SHAMACHARAN, 16-12-91.

General Stewart might be wired to ?

J. C. SMYTH, 16-12-91.

Chief Commissioner, Burma, nominates General Stewart, Commanding Burma District, to represent him at the forthcoming conference. He may be wired to accordingly. An approximate date appears necessary for assembly of the conference.

E. D&B., 16-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

A General Officer cannot, I think, leave his district, except on privilege leave, or general leave, or court-martial duty, without causing extra expense in the form of an allowance to his *locum tenens*?

P. J. M., 17-12-91.

Accountant-General.

Note by Accounts Branch, Military Department.

If Major-General Stewart is deputed to join the conference in Calcutta, Brigadier-General Wolsley, as the senior officer of the district, must necessarily, it is thought, assume command of the district under Article 146, Army Regulations, India, Vol. I, Part I.

2. He would presumably be gazetted as specially appointed to the vacant command (see foot-note to Article 145) if General Stewart is to be absent for some time. The extra cost in this case would amount to Rs. 1,336-1-0 per mensem on account of compensation for the loss of half staff salary to General Stewart under Article 589, *ibid*.

3. If, however, General Stewart's absence from Burma will not be for long, special arrangements might perhaps be made for the conduct of his duties, with the concurrence of the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, so as to avoid extra expenditure.

W. B., 17-12-91.

H. P., 17-12-91.

Submitted.

J. C. SMITH, 17-12-91.

Burma recommends that General Stewart should be asked to attend the conference for discussion of the military situation on eastern frontier in Chin-Lushai country, &c. This is

*See His Excellency's orders, page 41 of notes.
in reply to our telegram* to Chief Commissioner, asking him whether he could send a representative.

2. General Stewart's absence from Burma on duty would entail some expense, but this might perhaps be arranged as suggested by the Accountant-General.

3. It would seem, however, to be a point for consideration whether General Stewart could be conveniently spared from his command at the present time?

4. Madras has agreed that Sir James Dormer should represent that presidency.

5. Submitted for orders as to General Stewart.

P. J. M., 17-12-91.

Secretary.

The result with in my note of the 4th September 1891, are detailed in page 32, para. 99 of that note. His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief has expressed certain opinions on them in his note of the 26th September, pages 34-34 of the notes.

2. As the matter stands at present, it would seem advisable to define the scope of the discussion which may take place. It will be seen that it was intended to discuss the question of the strengths of the garrisons of Assam and Manipur and of the Chin Hills; also of Burma. Also whether a military position in Lushai-land should be chosen, the construction of roads, the arrangements for the military police &c. The Commander-in-Chief would, however, prefer to postpone the question of the permanent garrison of the Chin Hills and Burma till the end of the cold weather. There is also another very important question raised by me and dealt with by the Commander-in-Chief in para. 13 of his note, viz., the disadvantages of the Chin and Lushai Hills being under three separate civil administrations, and it may be added under three separate military commands. It may possibly be found better to deal with only the Northern and Southern Lushais, etc., at present, and to let the Chin Hills question stand over; but, on the other hand, the want of single political control and civil powers over the whole country is so great that there would be obvious advantages in getting this done within a reasonable time.

3. The question for the consideration of Government is, I think, whether the conference may take up this question of the civil and political administration, as well as of the military commands. It seems to me that it is impossible to take up one without the other. In that case, if His Excellency the Viceroy should approve, I would ask permission to send the papers to Sir Charles Elliott, who might be invited to advise the Government on the scope of the enquiry, both in respect to civil and police matters. Before this is done, however, the Foreign and Home Departments might be asked whether there is any objection to the course proposed.

4. In respect to the deputation of General Stewart, the Government of Madras and the Commander-in-Chief, Madras, would have to be asked whether General Stewart could be spared at this time from Burma. It would seem very inconvenient, and it is thought that it might be decided at once not to call for General Stewart. Sir Alexander Mackenzie would probably wish to send a civil delegate, if he understands that the question of the civil administration is involved. The first thing, however, is, I venture to think, to determine what matters may be taken up by the conference.

E. H. H. C., 19-12-91.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

I have for some time past felt no doubt that it would be necessary to put an end to the state of things under which the management of these tribes, falls, partly to Bengal, partly to Assam, and partly to Burma, and I have recently been in communication with Sir Charles Elliott upon the subject. Unless I am mistaken, proposals for a conference, to be held for this purpose, have already been made. The papers may be sent to him, but Home Department should see first, and with as little delay as possible.

2. It seems to me that the scope and objects of the enquiry should be determined before we proceed further with the selection of the personnel

of the conference, but we ought certainly to secure Mr. McCabe, if possible. He was in Calcutta a few days ago, but has, I think, left.

L., 19-12-91.

Home Department, unofficially.

E. H. H. C., 19-12-91.

To Home Department, unofficial No. 3691-B, dated 19th December 1891.

HOME DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Submitted.

BKPN, 21-12-91.

J. L. M., 21-12-91.

Please see para. 2 of General Collett's note.

2. Home Department may agree to the question of the civil and political control of the Chin-Lushai country being set down for discussion at the conference.

I would respectfully point out, with reference to His Excellency's note, that the question of the administration of the Lushai Hills has hitherto been dealt with entirely in the Foreign Department, and that this department, though able to give a *prima facie* opinion that unity of administration is very desirable, is not in a position to deal with the subject with a full knowledge of all the circumstances.

C. J. L.
P. P. H.

3. Mr. McCabe left Calcutta last Monday (14th December, I think), but he would doubtless be made available, if wired for in time.

P. G. M., 21-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Yes. Mr. McCabe would have to represent the Chief Commissioner at the conference, if it is held immediately, as I understand from Secretary that Mr. Ward's visit to Calcutta is not likely to take place before February.

J. P. H., 21-12-91.

Secretary.

I know nothing certainly of Mr. Ward's intentions. He had meant to come down about Christmas, but thought he would have to change his plans, because he was obliged to break off his tour to visit Shillong in order to consult his officers about the new provincial contract. If asked to come down, however, he could doubtless make it convenient to be here.

C. J. L., 21-12-91.

Honble Member.

I understood that Mr. Ward intended coming to Calcutta early in January, but Sir Charles Elliott is pretty sure to know his latest intentions. I think that, if possible, Mr. Ward should be a member of the conference on this subject, and it would be well to arrange the date with regard to his visit. I fear General Collett has left India.

P. P. H., 21-12-91.

Military Department, unofficially.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT NOTES.

From the Government of Bengal, No. 3637-P, dated 21st December 1891.

With reference to Military Department No. 8621-B, dated 14th December 1891, states that Sir Charles Elliott contemplates making a tour in Orissa during February next, and is therefore not likely to be in Calcutta during that month, but that he will be glad to attend the conference, if it is held at any time when he is at the presidency.

2. The Commissioner of Chittagong is now on a tour in the South Lushai hills, and could not be recalled without inconvenience before March next.

3. Mr. Ward, the Chief Commissioner of Assam, will also not be able to be in Calcutta till the close of the cold weather.

SHIMACHARAN, 22-12-91.

J. C. S., 22-12-91.

Submitted for information.

E. D&B, 22-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Unofficial from Home Department, No. 589, dated 22nd December 1891.

Proposed conference to consider the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

2. Please read the Home Department notes on page 44.

J. C. SMYTH, 22-12-91.

Submitted

E. D&B, 22-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Please see His Excellency's orders of 10th December. The file may now go again to the Foreign Department, who have been supplied with

On return I will show to Hon'ble copies of printed notes and of our Member.

letters and telegrams to local Governments. On return it should be sent to Sir Charles Elliott?

P. J. M., 22-12-91.

Secretary.

E. H. H. C., 22-12-91.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

To Foreign Department, unofficial No. 3725-B, dated 22nd December 1891.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Foreign Department file was submitted to Under Secretary last evening. It is now linked.

A. D. M., 23-12-91.

We have asked Bengal, Burma, and Assam demi-officially whether they could arrange to send, to form a sort of sub-committee at the military conference, a civil or political officer with a competent local knowledge of their respective tracts and well acquainted with the system of administration followed in each of them.

2. Burma has replied that no such officer can be sent till after their Chin columns have concluded their operations.

3. From Mr. Cotton's demi-official,* in the linked file, it will be seen that the Commissioner of Chittagong cannot conveniently come here till March. Assam has not yet replied, but I doubt whether Mr. McNeill could well leave his charge during the cold weather again.

4. The idea of this department was that each of the three civil or political officers would, by means of personal discussion, become more exactly acquainted with what was being done by his fellows in the other two tracts, and that the three should then conjointly consider in what

* Dated 22nd December 1891.

ways and upon what lines the several systems of administration in each province could be assimilated, so as to pave the way for the consolidation of all three tracts into one charge.

5. Their joint recommendations would then be submitted to the chief civil authorities of the three provinces and, if approved by them, action on those lines could be taken at once.

6. It would be for the main conference to decide whether it is yet possible to put the Chins and the Northern and Southern Lushais all under one officer as regards their politico-civil administration.

7. These would, I think, be the scope and objects of the conference and the sub-committee so far as this department is concerned.

8. With reference to Mr. Cotton's letter, I venture to think that the subjects to be considered by the sub-committee could not usefully be placed before a meeting at which General Stewart would represent Burma, and that the time of such a meeting would be wasted, if all the members had to make themselves acquainted with matters of detail which must be of necessity entirely new to some of them.

9. If, as now appears probable, the three political officers cannot conveniently be brought together when the military conference meets, I think there would still be much to be gained by giving them an opportunity of exchanging views and ideas later in the year, say, at the beginning of April, when they would be less urgently wanted in their own districts.

G. R. I., 23-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

W. J. C., 23-12-91.

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 1357-E, dated 23rd December 1891.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT NOTES.

Telegram from Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 3842-P, dated 23rd December 1891.

Repeats a telegram addressed to the Foreign Department saying that he won't be able to visit Calcutta now, but that he might arrange to come about the 20th January if considered necessary. Suggests the conference taking place about the last week in March, when he will certainly visit Calcutta; Mr. McCabe being invited to attend then. Mr. McCabe cannot attend now.

2. Please see from page 44 of the notes.

SHAMACHARAN, 24-12-91.

J. C. S., 24-12-91.

Submitted with reference to Secretary's marginal note, page 45.

E. DaB., 24-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Yes. It is thought we might now reply to Burma regarding General Stewart. It would also appear that the date of the conference must be fixed for March, which would seem to suit all who are to take part in it?

2. The Foreign Department notes show what would be the scope and objects of the conference from their point of view.

P. J. M., 24-12-91.

Secretary.

I think His Excellency the Viceroy would prefer that the conference should take place earlier than March.

2. The papers should now go to the Hon'ble Sir Charles Elliott to see His Excellency's note of 19th December.

E. H. H. C., 24-12-91.

The Hon'ble Sir Charles Elliott.

It seems to me clear that the conference proposed by the Military Department should take place in January. The Foreign Department has proposed a sub-conference of the chief officers serving in the three Lushai or Chin districts, to discuss details and compare experiences, but they cannot well assemble till the marching season is over, and by that time, the Government of India will have moved to Simla, or will be on the point of moving. It is necessary that the main conference which is to deal with questions of principle, should meet first, and that the Government of India should lay down the main outlines of the future administration of this tract, before the local officials can usefully compare notes and prepare a programme as to the details. Mr. Ward can attend about the 20th January, and so can I. If Sir James Dormer can also attend, I would suggest that that date be fixed. As to the scope and objects of the conference, it seems to me that they should comprise the cardinal question of the manner in which the Chin-Lushai tract should be dealt with in future from a military and civil point of view. For example, should it be under three military commands and three civil administrations, as now, or under one; and, if so, which one? Should there be one civil head and one military head in the tract, or should the two duties be combined in one man? If there is one command in the tract, what civil staff should he have under him? Into how many districts should the tract be divided? What should be their boundaries and headquarters, and where should the central authority be? Similarly, as to the chief military officer, what force should he have under him? What should the strength of the police force be, and what relation should it stand in to the military force? What arrangements should be made as to commissariat and transport, and what sort of taxes or service should be imposed on the people of the tract.

2. I do not mean that this conference could solve all these problems, but they could, I think, lay down, the outlines of policy to be followed, and if these are approved by the Supreme Government, the details could be worked out by their local officers at their conference in April or end of March.

C. A. E., 24-12-91.

Sir Frederick Roberts will be here on the 24th January, and I believe Sir James Dormer will come to Calcutta when the Chief is here. It is thought that with His Excellency the Viceroy's approval the conference might be fixed for the 20th January.

2. The orders of the Government of India are now required on—

(1) The composition of the conference.

(2) The scope of the discussion.

3. It is submitted that if Sir Charles Elliott's proposals under (2) are accepted, then the first conference would be properly composed as follows :—

The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal, *President*.

Sir James Dormer.

The Chief Commissioner of Assam.

A civil delegate from Burma.

4. It would not be necessary to have the General Officer Commanding Presidency District, but His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief might wish the Bengal Military Command to be represented by the Adjutant-General or Quartermaster-General, unless His Excellency himself wished to be present.

5. If this be approved, we should get the Chief Commissioner of Burma to send a civil delegate, but we should first send him by wire the heads of the subjects for the conference.

(2).—In regard to the scope of the discussion, it is submitted this might be on the lines proposed by Sir Charles Elliott, with the addition of certain military questions previously stated.

E. H. H. C., 28-12-91.

It concerns both; but as military has dealt with it so far, that department may as well issue the instructions.

It is for orders whether the instructions shall issue in the Foreign or Military Department.

L., 2-1-92.

E. H. H. C., 28-12-91.

Hon'ble Member

The proposals in General Collen's note appear to me the best under the circumstances.

H. B., 31-12-91.

It is understood His Excellency considers that Sir A. Mackenzie should come, and that the Chief Commissioner would be able to come for a week or so.

E. H. H. C., 31-12-91.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

The conference should commence its meetings as soon as the Commander-in-Chief returns to Calcutta. I can see no object in calling it together before his arrival.

2. I have no objection to the composition suggested by General Collen. We can ask the Commander-in-Chief whether he would like to be present himself, or whether he would prefer that the Quartermaster-General should represent him. I think Sir Mortimer Durand should be added, as the Foreign Department is concerned, particularly in regard to Manipur.

3. I have no doubt that Sir Alexander Mackenzie would like to attend himself in preference to sending a representative. I have attached to the file an extract from a letter which he has recently addressed to me, and which is worth referring to. It shows that Burma will probably be reluctant to part with the Chin tribes at present belonging to it. I have told Sir Alexander that I should like him to come here, but that March would be much too late, and I have suggested the 23rd instant.

4. I do not think it will be necessary to limit the scope of the inquiry very closely. What we require is a free interchange of opinion amongst the experts as to the extent of the inconvenience arising from the present

condition of things, and the possibility of finding remedies in the direction suggested by the Lieutenant-Governor in his note. I should be inclined to say that the first point which will have to be considered is whether the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented, and whether it is desirable to make a change. If so, what are the tribes of which the control could be conveniently consolidated, and to what administration should they be transferred. Then would arise questions connected with the relations of the civil and military authority, and as to the staff to be maintained, the division of the districts, and the garrisons of military and police by which they are to be held.

5. I should think that the Conference, if constituted as suggested, would be able to arrive at a conclusion with regard to the main points without a very protracted discussion. The details could be afterwards elaborated by the local officials.

6. I have telegraphed to Sir A. Mackenzie, asking him whether he could be at Calcutta by the 23rd.

L., 2-1-92.

Seen by Hon'ble Member.

Foreign Department, unofficially.—Please return as soon as possible.

E. H. H. C., 2-1-92.

Secretary,—To carry out the wishes of His Excellency the Viceroy.

H. B., 2-1-92.

Foreign Department, }
Home Department, } —Sir A. Mackenzie has telegraphed
 } to His Excellency that he will arrive
in Calcutta on the 23rd.

2. Will Foreign please pass urgently to Home Department.

E. H. H. C., 6-1-92.

To Foreign Department, unofficial No. 41 B, dated 6th January 1892.

The Secretary should see this case early. He will probably wish to study the question.

2. His Excellency the Viceroy has suggested that the Foreign Secretary should be added to the Conference.

J. S., 6-1-92.

Under Secretary.

Pass on to Home Department now. (Will the Military Department be good enough to let us have this case back again as soon as possible so that Sir Mortimer Durand may see the papers?)

O. R. I., 6-1-92.

Home Department, unofficially.

For Hon'ble Member's information.

C. J. L., 6-1-92.

P. P. H., 7-1-92.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

Seen.

H. M. D., 7-1-92.

To Military Department, unofficially, who will no doubt let us have copies of the later notes and papers as soon as they can.

G. B. I., 7-1-92

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 19-E, dated 7th January 1892.

Submitted.

2. A copy of the notes and papers may be given* to the Foreign

* Sent with Military Department memo. Department as requested above. Memorandum put up for signature.
No. 22-B, dated 8th January 1892.

J. C. SMYTH, 8-1-92.

E. DnB., 8-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

Submitted for information and for any further orders that may be necessary. Please see pages 47, 48, and 49 of the notes.

P. J. M., 8-1-92.

Secretary.

Telegram from Government of Madras, No. A, dated 27th December 1891.

In continuation of their No. 7178, dated 15th December 1891, state that the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, is anxious that Major-General Stewart should represent the Burma District in addition to himself, and that the Chief Commissioner of Burma approves of the proposal. Enquire if there is any objection to the proposal, and request to be informed of the probable date of the assembly of the Conference.

SHANACHARAN, 28-12-91.

The file on this subject is with the Secretary. This telegram from Madras may be held over until it is returned.

J. C. SMYTH, 28-12-91.

Bring on file as soon as it becomes available and resubmit.

E. DnB., 28-12-91.

Telegram from General Officer Commanding, Burma District, No. 1056-L, dated 29th December 1891.

Asks for a copy of Secretary's note on the military situation in Eastern India and Burma.

2. Submitted for orders whether it should be given.

SHANACHARAN, 30-12-91.

It has not been decided yet whether General Stewart should join the Conference. It is therefore for orders whether a copy of the Secretary's note should be given to that officer.

J. C. SMYTH, 30-12-91.

For orders.

E. DnB., 30-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

Telegram from Chief Commissioner of Assam, dated 1st January 1892.

Requests that should the Chin-Lushai Conference take place this month, it may be arranged not to have it before the 22nd or 21st at the earliest, as it will be very inconvenient for him to reach Calcutta before that date.

SHANACHARAN, 2-1-92.

Reply that it will be arranged not to take place before 21st or 22nd. Papers are with His Excellency.

E. H. H. C., 2-1-92.

Draft telegram put up.

J. C. SMYTH, 2-1-92.

E. DnB., 2-1-92.

Telegram to Chief-Commissioner of Assam, No. 7-B, dated 2nd January 1892.

67-
(51)

Issue telegrams please.

P. J. M., 1-1-92.

Remarks on draft.

Bengal will be addressed after the instructions are prepared.

P. J. M., 9-1-92.

Telegram to Government of Madras and others, No. 110, dated 9th January 1892.

Telegram to Commander-in-Chief in India, No. 111-B, dated 9th January 1892.

Telegram from Chief Commissioner, Assam, No. 119-T, dated 10th January 1892.

With reference to Military Department No. 110-B, dated 9th January 1892, states that he will attend the Conference.

2. For information.

SHAMACHARAN, 11-1-92.

E. D&B, 25-1-92.

Telegram from Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 10th January 1892.

Requests that the file regarding the Chin-Lushai Conference may be sent to him.

A complete copy of the notes may be sent. The file will be required for further action.

J. C. SMYTH, 11-1-92.

E. D&B, 11-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

Yes, we will say so.

P. J. M., 11-1-92.

Copy of office notes sent.

J. C. SMYTH, 11-1-92.

E. D&B, 11-1-92.

Telegram from Government of Madras, No. 207, dated 11th January 1892.

With reference to Military Department No. 110-B, dated 9th January 1892, states that Sir James Dormer proposes to leave Madras on the 22nd January to attend the Conference, and enquires whether it is to be understood that General Stewart is not required.

SHAMACHARAN, 12-1-92.

Telegram from Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 9th January 1892.

With reference to Military Department No. 111-B, dated 9th January 1892, states that unless the Viceroy wishes him to serve on the Conference, His Excellency would prefer the Quartermaster-General representing him.

SHAMACHARAN, 2-1-92.



The two telegrams entered on the previous page are for orders.

J. C. SMITH, 12-1-92.

General Stewart was nominated by Chief Commissioner, Burma, page 41, notes. With reference to para. 4, Secretary's note, dated 10th December 1891, page 43, the attendance of General Stewart would apparently be inconvenient, as he can ill be spared from his command, and as the Chief Commissioner himself will attend, we may reply to Madras that

General Stewart's attendance will not be required?
Yes. P. J. M., 12-1-92.

2. The Quartermaster-General will doubtless be accepted as representing His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief on the Conference.

E. H. H. C.,

E. DaB., 12-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

P. J. M., 12-1-92.

Secretary.

I submit a draft of instructions to the Conference. It will be for the orders of Government whether this should be recast in the form of a "Resolution." The Home and Foreign Departments should see the draft.

2. Despatch No. 199 of the 24th December, received to-day from the Secretary of State (placed below). The tribes are scarcely "homogeneous," but the Secretary of State is evidently in favor of the abolition of "the tripartite division of authority."

E. H. H. C., 12-1-92.

Hon'ble Member.

I think it would be a great advantage to get General Stewart if he can be spared. I had also hoped General Colleen would have seen his way to take part in the Conference.

2. His Excellency the Viceroy should see the draft.

H. B., 14-1-92.

* Which will these be laid before His Excellency.
the draft ?*

Home Department } —Any re-
Foreign Department } marks as to

E. H. H. C., 14-1-92.

Home Department, unofficially.

To Home Department, unofficial No. 185-B, dated 14th January 1892.

Telegram from Government of Madras, No. 248, dated 19th January 1892.

In continuation of their No. 207, dated 11th January 1892, states that the Commander-in-Chief, Madras Army, hopes that Major-General Stewart may be included among the members of the Chin-Lushai Conference.

2. Submitted for orders. The previous papers were submitted yesterday.

SHAMACHARAN, 13-1-92.

A reply by telegram is asked for.

J. C. SMITH, 13-1-92.

E. DaB., 13-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

Submitted.

J. L. M., 14-1-92.

I have no remarks to offer. Home Department may accept the draft.

Deputy Secretary.

P. G. M., 14-1-92.

Secretary.

J. P. H., 14-1-92.

Hon'ble Member.

C. J. L., 14-1-92.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

P. P. H., 15-1-92.

Seen in Foreign Department. No remarks.

J. S., 16-1-92.

Under Secretary.

This department may accept the draft.

G. R. I., 16-1-92.

Secretary.

I have no objection, but should not the Military Department be represented?

H. M. D., 16-1-92.

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 61-E, dated 16th January 1892.

Submitted.

J. C. SMYTH, 16-1-92.

E. D&B., 16-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

Home and Foreign Departments concur in the draft which has now to be laid before His Excellency the Viceroy.

2. Madras are pressing for orders regarding General Stewart.

P. J. M., 15-1-92.

Secretary.

The draft, which has been seen by the Hon'ble Member, is now submitted for the approval of His Excellency the Viceroy.

E. H. H. C., 15-1-92.

His Excellency the Viceroy.

I would certainly add a representative of the Military Department.

2. It is a pity that General Colten, who has already contributed many valuable suggestions in connection with this subject, is not able to represent the department.

L., 19-1-92.

I have explained to His Excellency that I did not add my own name to the Conference, as I had proposed its composition on 28th December 1891, and did not think it fitting to suggest that I should be serving on it.

2. The letter as now amended can issue.

E. H. H. C., 21-1-92.

Telegram from Commander-in-Chief in India, dated 19th January 1892.

Asks that he might be informed by wire the date on which the Chin-Lushai Conference will commence.

(54)

2. In our telegram of 9th January, the Government of Madras, the Chief Commissioner, Assam, and Chief Commissioner, Burma, were informed, that the Conference would meet on 25th January. The Lieutenant-Governor

* Or Quartermaster-General. of Bengal, the Commander-in-Chief,* and the Secretary, Foreign Department,

require to be informed of the date yet.

J. C. SMYTH, 20-1-92.

See Secretary's orders on linked file.

E. DEB., 21-1-92

The file referred to by Captain DeBrath has the following remarks by the Secretary.—

"The date will be mentioned as the 25th instant in the letter. Please remind me to send a telegram to Commander-in-Chief to-morrow, as I don't think his has been answered

E. H. H. C.

A draft telegram to Commander-in-Chief is put up. The Lieutenant-Governor of Bengal and Sir Mortimer Durand have also to be informed.
This will be done in the letter
P. J. M. 21-1-92.

J. C. SMYTH, 21-1-92.

E. DEB., 21-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

P. J. M., 21-1-92.

Telegram to Commander-in-Chief in India, No 247-B, dated 21st January 1892.

To Chief Secretary to Government of Bengal and others, No 248-B, dated 21st January 1892

The composition of the committee having been settled, perhaps a
* Also to Burma who first made the proposal. telegram may be sent to the Government of Madras,* saying that General Stewart will not be required. The Madras Government have repeatedly enquired on this point.
P. J. M. 22-1-92.

J. C. SMYTH, 22-1-92.

For orders. The telegram from Madras re General Stewart still awaits reply. Draft put up.

Deputy Secretary.

E. DEB., 22-1-92.

Please see draft telegram, which may issue?

P. J. M., 22-1-92.

Secretary.

Yes. I have shown to the Hon'ble Member.

E. H. H. C., 24-1-92.

Telegram to Government of Madras, No. 255-B, dated 24th January 1892.

From Quartermaster-General in India, No. 270-A-Camp, dated 23rd January 1892.

Forwards a copy of a telegram from Sir James Dormer, saying that the steamer having been delayed, he is coming by rail, and will arrive at Howrah on the morning of the 25th instant.

J. C. SMYTH, 23-1-92.

*Sent. 23-1-92

Send a copy at once to Lord William Berosford; also to Hon'ble Member.*

E. H. H. C., 23-1-92.

To the Military Secretary to His Excellency the Viceroy, No. 262-B, dated 23rd January 1892.

Resubmitted.

The telegram to Madras Government regarding General Stewart has been issued. It is for orders whether a similar message should be sent to Burma, who first proposed General Stewart for the Conference (please see Deputy Secretary's order, dated 22nd January 1892, on margin of page 54 of the notes). As General Stewart was proposed by Burma, when the Chief Commissioner, Burma, was not intending to attend the Conference, and as Burma has not pressed for a reply, perhaps the message sent to Madras Government will be sufficient.

J. C. SMYTH, 26-1-92.

Yes, repeat to Burma.

F. DAB, 26-1-92.

Telegram to Chief Secretary, Rangoon, No. 312-B, dated 26th January 1892.

From Secretary of State for India, No. 199, dated 24th December 1891.

The Secretary of State fully concurs in the opinion expressed by the

Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1890, Nos. 345-46.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1890, Nos. 427-28.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1890, Nos. 461-71.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1890, Nos. 997-1003.
Pro. B, Nov. 1891, Nos. 58-71.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1891, Nos. 1143-44.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1891, Nos. 1145-68.
Chin-Lushai Pro. B, 1891, No. 1209.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1891, Nos. 1546-48.
+ Despatch No. 208, dated 14th Oct. 1891.
Chin-Lushai Pro. A, 1891, No. 1548.

Government of India that it is not desirable to employ regular troops to garrison unhealthy districts requiring numerous small detachments in the Northern Lushai Hills, but that it is preferable to concentrate them in central and generally healthy positions, leaving all detachment duties and the suppression of minor disturbances to the police.

2. Assuming that it may be necessary to occupy the Lushai Hills permanently, the Secretary of State invites attention to its present admini-

† Assam, Manipal and Burma.

stration by three different Govern-
ments,‡ with three separate police and

military organisations, dealing with a small tract of territory inhabited by homogeneous tribes. It is suggested for consideration whether, further experience, it may be found practicable to have only one nistration and one military police battalion for the whole tract.

3. The disadvantages of the Chin and Lushai Hills being under three separate civil administrations is one of the questions to be considered by

the Conference about to be assembled to consider the military situation in Eastern India and Burma, &c.

C. H., 14-1-92.

This despatch arrives opportunely, and may be taken as approving in advance any course which may be finally decided on for consolidating the administration of the Chin-Lushai Hills.

2. Reply may be deferred until the general line of policy has been determined by the Conference, and approved by the Governor-General in Council.

P. J. M., 16-1-92.

Secretary.

E. H. H. C., 18-1-92.

Home and Foreign Departments may see this in continuation.

P. J. M., 18-1-92.

To Home Department, unofficial No. 213-B, dated 18th January 1892.

For information. May be passed on to Foreign Department.

J. L. M., 19-1-92.

Through Judicial Branch.

P. A. C., 19-1-92.

P. G. M., 19-1-92.

Deputy Secretary.

J. P. H., 19-1-92.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

Secretary should see.

J. S., 19-1-92.

We have had a similar expression of opinion in a despatch to this department which will come before the Secretary.

G. R. I., 19-1-92.

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 77-B, dated 19th January 1892.

Returns our file regarding the occupation of the Chin-Lushai country, and states that a similar despatch has been addressed to that department.

C. H., 20-1-92.

P. J. M., 20-1-92.

[Proc. No.
29.]

FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT, No. 248-B., DATED THE 21ST JANUARY 1892.

States that the Governor-General in Council has decided that a Conference shall be held in Calcutta on or about the 25th instant, to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Chin-Lushai Hills, and gives a list of the members who will sit in Conference.

22nd January 1892.

H. M. D.

Deputy Secretary to sec.

R. D.—22nd January 1892.

22nd January 1892.

W. J. C.

For information. Under-Secretary to sec.

T. G. BALDWIN—23rd January 1892.

J. S.—23rd January 1892.

25th January 1892.

G. R. I.

[Proc. No.
30-40.]

FROM THE MILITARY DEPARTMENT, No. 733-B., DATED THE 25TH FEBRUARY 1892.

With reference to correspondence ending with their No. 248 B.-of the 21st January 1892, transfer, for consideration in communication with the Home Department, the Proceedings of the Conference which I, recently assembled at Calcutta for the discussion of various questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai country, together with copies of despatches from and to the Secretary of State on the subject.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Our file can't at present be found: even if we had it, I doubt whether we should be in a position to frame any scheme, but as matters stand, it will certainly save time to issue the draft put up to Assam. We are in a separate file asking Bengal to state their commissariat requirements for South Lushai.

If the Deputy Secretary approves the draft to Assam, we can address Burma separately regarding the Arakan Hill Tracts.

After these letters have issued, we can send a copy of the letter to Assam and Bengal, and then let Home Department see what is being done.

18th March 1892.

G. R. I.

18th March 1892.

W. J. C.

[Proc. No.
42.]

[To the Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 516-B., dated the 17th March 1892.]

UNDER-SECRETARY.

Draft to Burma and endorsement to Bengal put up for approval.

J. S.—19th March 1892.

21st March 1892.

G. R. I.

Deputy Secretary.

22nd March 1892.

W. J. C.

[Proc. No.
43.]

[To the Chief Commissioner of Burma, No. 424-B., dated the 20th March 1892.]

[Endorsement to the Bengal Government, No. 425-B., dated the 20th March 1892.]

E—9-23—Sept.

The file may now be seen * in the Home Department, who may be asked to return it early in view of replies being received to our letters to Assam and Burma of the 17th and 29th March 1892.

* Vide Mr. Irwin's note of 16th March.

T. G. BALDWIN—19th April 1892.

J. S.—19th April 1892.

Deputy Secretary.

17th April 1892.

W. J. C.

To Home Department unofficially.

Submitted through Justice Branch.

BALDWIN—18th April 1892.

Seen in Home Department.

J. L. M.—19th April 1892.

Judicial Branch.

C. W. J.—20th April 1892.

SECRETARY.

20th April 1892.

P. G. M

20th April 1892.

C. J. L.

To Foreign Department unofficially.

(K. W. No. 2.) DEMI-OFFICIAL (TO SECRETARY) FROM J. P. HEWETT, Esq., C.I.E., OFFICIATING PRIVATE SECRETARY TO THE VICEROY, DATED THE 8TH MAY 1892.

Enquires how the consideration of the recommendations of the Conference on questions relating to Lushai land is proceeding.

MR. SCOTT.

How does this stand?

8th May 1892.

H. M. D.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

Assam and Burma have been addressed regarding the transfer of South Lushai and portions of the Aracca Hill Tracts to the former. Their replies have not yet been received.

T. G. BALDWIN—9th May 1892.

There was a reply from Burma about the Chin-Lushai country the other day, was there not? Unless Secretary has seen, this portion of the question should also be put up.

9th May 1892.

J. L. K.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

There was a letter from Burma the other day (not a reply to ours) enclosing notes by Messrs. Carey and Macnabb, showing that it was impracticable for Assam to work the Eastern Chin Hills. The Secretary did not see that letter, which has been sent to the Military Department. A copy of Messrs. Carey and Macnabb's notes is put up.

T. G. BALDWIN—9th May 1892.

9th May 1892.

J. L. K.

PRIVATE SECRETARY.

Please see the papers put up regarding the Chin-Lushai Conference. The Chief Commissioners of Assam and Burma are being consulted as to the measures required for carrying out the recommendation of the Conference that all North and South Lushai and a part of Aracca be at once placed under Assam. They have not yet answered.

But the recommendations of the Conference might now be formally Considered* by the Government of India independently of these enquiries. I will submit the same formally. This is merely for information in answer to your enquiry.

* Yes. The sooner the better.

19th May 1892.

L.

11th May 1892.

H. M. D.

Private Secretary to the Governor-General.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

On the 25th February last, the Military Department transferred to the Foreign Department for consideration with the Home Department, the proceedings of the Chin-Lushai Conference that assembled at Calcutta for the discussion of various questions connected with the administration of the Chin-Lushai country.

The principal Resolutions passed by the conference were—

(1) That the whole tract of country, Chin-Lushai hills, should be brought under one administration subordinate to Assam. Sir James Dornier and Sir Alexander Mackenzie considered that a final decision should be postponed, until further information was obtained about the country between the Chin hills and the Lushai hills.

(2) That owing to existing difficulties, it would be necessary to suspend action about bringing the Chin-Lushai hills under one administration, until after the close of the cold season's operations in the Chin-Lushai hills.

(3) That the North and South Lushai hills should be placed under Assam at once, under certain conditions, and that hereafter certain portions of the Arracan Hill Tracts should be added to the combined territory.

As the question in all its details is based upon the decision regarding administration, and as this question is a Foreign Department one, it was considered that the Conference papers might appropriately be transferred to the Foreign Department, the Military Department taking up any military questions which came within their control.

On receipt of the papers by the Foreign Department, the Chief Commissioners of Assam and Burma and the Bengal Government were addressed regarding the transfer of South Lushai and portions of the Arracan Hill Tracts to Assam. We are still awaiting replies from Assam and Burma.

The Home Department have seen what action has been taken.

On the 26th April, Sir Alexander Mackenzie forwarded copies of notes by Mr. Carey, Political Officer, Fort White, and Lieutenant Macnabb, Political Officer, Chin hills, in confirmation of the opinion expressed by him at the Conference as to the impracticability of the Eastern Chin hills being administered by Assam.

These notes will be useful after we have received the reports of the recent operations in the Chin-Lushai hills.

Until then, and until we receive answers from Burma and Assam, I do not see that any further action can be taken by the Foreign Department. But the Home and the Military Departments may see the files for concurrence in what has been done and for approval of the decisions of the Conference. His Excellency the Viceroy should also see the file.

There is no necessity at present—in fact it is not possible—to send a reply to the Secretary of State's despatch No. 61, Political, dated the 17th September 1891, in which His Lordship said that he would be glad to learn that the question of placing Chin-Lushai country under one administrative head was receiving the attention of the Government of India. The Military Department despatch of the 24th February last, forwarding a copy of the proceedings of the Conference, is a sufficient answer to despatch No. 61.

For orders.

J. S.—19th May 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

The action suggested at A of note above seems all that can usefully be done at present.

20th May 1892.

J. L. K.

SECRETARY.

20th May 1892.

W. J. C.

Print up.

23rd May 1892.

H. M. D.

Notes submitted in print.

J. S.—30th May 1892.

SUPERINTENDENT.

* File Part VI of notes.

I have sent a note* to be printed urgently.

8. Mr. Macnabb's letter of 7th April refers in paragraph 6 to Mr. Ward, Ch. 4 Commissioner of Assam, as having also pointed out the present impossibility of having the Chinese under Assam. Have we any such note by Mr. Ward?

8. Office note of 19th May says that Bengal was "addressed" with reference to proposed transfer of South Lushai to Assam. I can't see that we did anything more than send Bengal "for information" copy of our letter to Assam, No. 594-E, dated the 29th March 1892. Is this so?

30th May 1892.

J. A. C.

UNDER-SECRETARY.

Your note in print below.

8. Mr. Macnabb doubtless refers to the reply given by Mr. Ward at the Conference to question (1); please see Mr. Ward's reply.

8. Yes, Bengal was furnished with a copy of our letter to Assam. But we also asked Bengal for an estimate of the establishment in officers, men, and animals necessary on the South Lushai line in future, vide file 1 returned by Military Department.

J. S.—30th May 1892.

Arranged.

J. S.—30th May 1892.

Maps in file.

J. S.—30th May 1892.

30th May 1892.

We should have copies for this file, which please arrange now and supply with requisite maps. My note will be ready directly.

J. A. C.

[Proc. No. 47.]

(Telegrams to Chief Commissioners of Assam and Burma, Nos. 950-951-E, dated the 29th May 1892.)

[Proc. No. 48.] TELEGRAM FROM THE SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM, No. 9483-P, DATED THE 31st MAY 1892.

With reference to telegram No. 950-E, dated 30th May 1892, says that report of Mr. McCabe is awaited, which he has promised to submit on his return to Aijal, probably in another fifteen days on conclusion of present expedition.

UNDER-SECRETARY.

We need not expect the Assam reply before about the middle of July.

J. S.—1st June 1892.

SECRETARY.

And the Burma one will be delayed too.

2nd June 1892.

J. A. C.

4th June 1892.

H. M. D.

[Proc. No. 49.] TELEGRAM FROM THE CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BURMA, RANGOON, No. 445, DATED THE 3RD JUNE 1892.

In reply to telegram No. 951-E, says his answer to Foreign Department No. 594-E of the 29th March 1892, regarding the transfer of the Arracan Hill Tracts to Assam, goes by the mail of the 3rd June.

Await receipt.

T. G. BALDWIN—3rd June 1892.

UNDER-SECRETARY

This is satisfactory ; but the Assam reply will be late.

J. S.—3rd June 1892

3rd June 1892.

J. A. C.

FROM THE OFFICIATING CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BURMA. No. 50-55.] 69-1-B-8, DATED THE 3RD JUNE 1892.

Communicates the views of the Officiating Chief Commissioner regarding the transfer of the Arracan Hill Tracts to Assam

The file is in circulation.

V. G. BALDWIN—10th June 1892. *

J. S.—10th June 1892

To Mr. Crawford with the papers.

11th June 1892

H. M. D.

MILITARY DEPARTMENT

Pro. A, March 1892, Nos. 393-94.

Distribution of Army. Native Army.

Garrison to be maintained in Manipur and at other stations in the Assam Command after the cold season, 1892-93.

From Quartermaster-General in India, No. 4-M-Camp, dated 8th December 1891.

In Pro. A, December 1891, No. 1638, the Government of India an-

Pro. A, Dec. 1891, No. 1637-43.

Pro. B, Dec. 1891, No. 1644-45.

tioned the strength of the garrison of

Manipur being reduced to one-and-a-

half battalions, Gurkha Infantry, after the 15th October 1891, and approved of the following distribution of troops in the Assam Command, viz. :-

Manipur	... 1½ Battalions, Gurkhas, and two guns.
Kohima	... ½ Battalion, Gurkhas, and two guns.
Shillong	... 1 Battalion, Gurkhas, and two guns.
Silchar	... 1 Battalion, Bengal Infantry.
Dibrugarh	... ½ Battalion, Bengal Infantry, from Dina-
	pore.

2. The Commander-in-Chief and the Chief Commissioner, Assam, now recommend that, after the cold season of 1892-93, the garrison of Manipur may be reduced to one battalion, and that the wing thus released be sent to Kohima, as it is certainly very desirable that the Naga Hills should have a full battalion.

3. There is accommodation at Kohima for a full battalion, but quarters for one subaltern and 36 married men will have to be constructed

Quartermaster-General's letter No. 5451.
B. dated 6th November 1891, taken up
under "Native Races. New with Accountant-General."

at a cost of Rs. 5,000 and Rs. 2,434 respectively. The former will be a

Military Works charge, and as regards the latter, the Accountant General has

been asked to enter Rs. 2,500 in the budget provisionally, pending the sanction of the Government of India to the construction of quarters for married men.

4. The question of the re-distribution of troops in the Assam Command will, it is understood, be discussed at a Conference this cold season.

LAKSHMINARAYAN, 17-12-91.

T. W. A., 17-12-91.

The distribution of troops in Assam for 1892-93 should perhaps stand over till the entire question has been fully considered by the Conference about to assemble at Calcutta. We may reply to that effect to Quartermaster-General.

B. DnD, 24-12-91.

Deputy Secretary.

I think so. As regards accommodation, the only requirement* appears to be the married quarters at Kohima. The cost is only Rs. 2,500. The provision of these quarters is being dealt with on a separate file.

P. J. M., 29-12-91.

Secretary.

As the question of the military requirements of Assam has been dealt with at considerable length in my note on "The military situation in Eastern India and Burma," it is unnecessary to enter afresh into its past history; but with regard to Kohima itself, it may be useful to show briefly the various opinions which have from time to time been expressed as to the garrison which should be maintained at that station.

2. When the proposals of the Army Commission of 1879 were

Pro. A. Mar. 1883, Nos. 351 & 88.

referred to the Chief Commissioner of Assam for opinion, Sir Stuart Bayley replied that owing to the necessity for maintaining some central position on the Naga Hills in order to control the Angamis, he was unable to reduce by a single man the estimated number (about 3,000) frontier police which he had proposed for Assam with the view of relieving the military of all frontier outpost duty. Nothing, however, came of this proposal, and nothing further transpired till Sir Frederick

Pro. A. July 1886, Nos. 1642 & 46.

Roberts in January 1886 urged that the positions on the Naga Hills could most advantageously be held as police outposts, and that, in view to the exigencies of Service upon the Eastern Frontier and to the probability of into course between Northern Burma and Assam, it was desirable to locate the regiment then employed on the Naga Hills at Shillong. Mr. Ward, Acting Chief Commissioner, strongly objected to this proposal, and said that the Angami Nagas had recently given very distinct evidence that they were far from being civilised, and that if after the withdrawal of the regiment they chose to rise against us, and attack Kohima, the frontier police would find it a difficult matter to hold their own against them. Captain Plowden, the Commandant of the Frontier Police on the Naga Hills, also had no faith whatever in the cordial submission of the various Naga tribes to our rule. In view of these objections, the Commander-in-Chief's proposal to withdraw the Kohima regiment to Shillong was not accepted.

3. Shortly after this decision was arrived at, His Excellency sug-

Pro. A. Nov. 1886, Nos. 485 & 91.

gested, *inter alia*, that the garrison at Kohima should be reduced to half a battalion, but the Government of India decided to postpone the consideration of the question of the garrison of Assam until peace was established in Burma. The discussion was renewed in July 1897, and the

Pro. A. Apr. 1899, Nos. 320 & 21.

Commander-in-Chief again recommended that the military force at Kohima should be reduced from one battalion to half a battalion, with two mountain guns attached. His Excellency thought the Nagas had become accustomed to British rule, and he further expressed a hope that a smaller detachment than four companies would even at that time be found sufficient for Kohima. Mr. Ward, on being asked for his opinion, said that he would have preferred to see a full regiment at Kohima, but would certainly not support any proposal to place a smaller detachment than four companies at that station, bearing in mind that

Kohima also required a military detachment, and that the Angami Nagas would have to be watched for some years to come. The garrison of Kohima was accordingly reduced to half a battalion.

4) In March 1889, however, the Chief Commissioner (Sir Denuis FitzPatrick) in dealing with the question of the garrisons of Shillong and

Pro. A, May 1889, No. 247.

Manipur said, "it would be more in accordance with the views of the local authorities to have a whole regiment at Kohima than a wing there and a wing at Manipur, and the reasons for this view have been strengthened since the recent addition of territory to the Naga Hills District, which makes it more difficult than ever to maintain a reserve of military police at Kohima." In April 1890 the Commander-in-Chief,

Pro. A, June 1890, Nos. 1761-62.

after personal discussion with the Chief Commissioner (Mr. Quinton), and the General Officer Commanding Assam District (General Collett), proposed a re-distribution of the troops in that province, and recommended that the garrison of Kohima should consist of a *whole* battalion of Infantry and two guns. This proposal was accepted.

5. In September 1891, the Government of India sanctioned the

Pro. A, Dec. 1891, Nos. 1437-43.

proposal put forward by the Commander-in-Chief, in communication with the Assam authorities, that the strength of the garrison to be maintained at Manipur after the 15th October 1891 should be fixed at one battalion and a-half of Native infantry, and also that *half* a battalion should be located at Kohima. General Brackenbury remarked in his note of the 13th September:—"I have no doubt that the occupation of Manipur in force will, on account of the commanding strategical position of that place, enable the garrison of Kohima and Shillong to be safely reduced by half a battalion each."

6. But in a later communication General Collett recommends that the garrison of Manipur may be reduced to one battalion during the cold season of 1892-93, and that the half battalion thus released be stationed at Kohima, which would then have a full battalion. In his opinion "it is certainly very desirable that the Naga Hills should have a full battalion for its garrison, as sanctioned last year (1890) by the Government of India. The Kohima battalion would also act as a convenient reserve for Manipur." The Chief Commissioner "entirely agrees" in General Collett's proposal, and the Commander-in-Chief recommends it for sanction. It will be seen, therefore, from the above, that the present proposal is practically a reversion to the old order of things at Kohima, and it is in con-

* This will cost only Rs. 2,500, it is said. In connection therewith that the question of providing additional accommodation* at Kohima has been raised.

7. The only advantage in the proposed arrangement is that it would allow of the battalion being kept together. Manipur is a better station as a military position, and certainly in the matter of supplies not worse than Kohima. In one article of large consumption, rice is easily procurable at Manipur, while at Kohima everything has to be sent up from below, and the civil population has to be fed. The Naga tribes are controlled not only from Kohima, but by the knowledge of the existence of the force at Manipur, and the Naga Military Police Battalion is an efficient auxiliary to the wing at Kohima. For some time to come there will also be the Madras Pioneers and Sappers on the road. There are

obvious disadvantages in reducing by one-third our garrison of a country so lately in rebellion, and the Government of India may desire to postpone this reduction for another year at least. Opinions have not been at all fixed on this question, whether there should be a whole battalion or half a battalion as Kohima, but the question to consider is whether it is advisable at this moment. The Foreign Department may be asked for their opinion.

E. H. H. C., 9-1-92.

Hon'ble Member.

This might be discussed at the proposed Conference.

H. B., 11-1-92.

Foreign Department, unofficially.

To Foreign Department, unofficial No. 105-C, dated 13th January 1892

No immediate expression of opinion from this department is called for so I merely submit the papers for you to see before the question is brought up at the Conference.

G. R. I., 14-1-92.

Secretary.

H. M. D., 15-1-92.

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 60-E, dated 16th January 1892

Submitted.

T. W. A., 16-1-92.

Re-submitted with a copy of the report of the Conference.

2. In reply to question 11, the Conference does not for the present recommend any reduction in the garrison of Manipur.

T. W. A., 10-2-92.

As the Conference have recommended that the garrison of Manipur is not at present to be reduced, we may reply accordingly to Quarter-master General's No. 4-M-Camp, dated 8th December 1891, that for the present the Government of India are not prepared to sanction any reduction in its strength.

E. DERN., 11-2-92.

Deputy Secretary.

Draft please.

P. J. M., 13-2-92.

Draft submitted for approval, the movement has not been included in the reliefs for 1892-93.

P. J. M., 19-2-92.

Secretary.

Foreign Department,—Do you concur?

E. H. H. C., 22-2-92

Foreign Department, unofficially.

To Foreign Department, unofficial No. 403-C, dated 23rd February 1892.

(- 6 -)

Secretary.

G. R. I., 24-2-92.

Yes.

H. M. D., 25-2-92.

Military Department, unofficially.

Unofficial from Foreign Department, No. 227, dated 25th February 1892.

Issue ?

T. W. A., 26-2-92.

E. D&B., 27-2-92.

1. Quartermaster-General in India, No. 437-C, dated 27th February 1892. Copy to Foreign Department and others.

PART V

[Notes on the Home Department.]

FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF ASSAM, No. 20-P, DATED THE 2ND JANUARY 1892.

Question of the future control of the North Lushai country, and proposed increase of the strength of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion.

In Foreign Department letter No. 1391-E,* dated the 3rd July 1890, the following arrangements, among others, were sanctioned for the control of the Northern Lushai country:—

* External A, August 1890, Nos. 221-277.

- (a) The employment of 300 men of the Frontier Police of Assam to hold the tract of country which was placed under the Chief Commissioner's control.
- (b) The appointment of an Assistant Commandant of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion.
- (c) The organization of a coolie corps of 100 men, and the maintenance of a small reserve of boat carriage between Jhalnacherra and Changail.

It was explained in the Foreign Department letter that the expenditure involved by the administration of the new tract would be borne by Imperial Revenues for the time of the present Provincial contract, and that, on the expiration of this contract, the question would be reconsidered.

In his present note Mr. Ward deals first with the question of the insufficiency of the sanctioned police force for the proper control of the North Lushai country. The question is one for the consideration of the Foreign Department. The Home Department is concerned with the proposals for increasing the strength of the Surma Valley Military Police Battalion as a whole, and dividing the battalion into two portions and also increasing the strength of the Cachar portion.

Briefly stated, the Chief Commissioner's proposals are as follows:—

The sanctioned strength of the police force in North Lushai is 300 men. Since the date of Captain Browne's (the Political Officer appointed by Foreign Department letter No. 1391-E., dated 3rd July 1890) death, and up to the present time, the Military Police garrison has been increased to 500 men. The Chief Commissioner entirely concurs with Brigadier General Collett as to the necessity of maintaining a stronger garrison than 300 men, and after personal consultation with this officer and Mr. McCabe, the present Political Officer, proposes the police force described below for North Lushai. It is explained that the force proposed is necessary not only for defensive purposes but also to enable the Political Officer to promenade through the country, which must be done if he is to keep the Lushais under proper control.

It is proposed that at Fort Aijal the permanent effective force should be 300 men of all ranks, of whom 150 should always be kept at head-quarters, the remaining 150 being utilised as required for promenading. In addition to this the following effective force is required for out-post duty:—

Changail	100
Saireng	20
Two out-posts on the Bengti road which will shortly be completed	40
Junai (to be established)	140

Total

Adopting the principle laid down in paragraph 13 of Mr. (now Sir Charles) Elliott's note of 20th June 1882 regarding re-organization of the Police Department in Assam, that no man should be employed on out-post duty for more than six months in the year, the Chief Commissioner calculates the total force, effective and non-effective, required at present for North Lushai, as follows:—

Out-post duty	260
Reserve for relief, including jail, escorts, etc.	260
Add to bring up to a minimum of 300 at head-quarters	40
	560
Add 10 per cent. for sick, leave, etc.	56
Add buglers	6
Total	622

The present strength of the Surma Valley Police Battalion is 797 men of all ranks. The question arises whether it is necessary or expedient to transfer the whole battalion to Fort Aijal, as recommended by General Collett, when the present requirements there are only 622, including ineffective. On the grounds stated in paragraphs 12 to 15 of his note Mr. Ward

opposed to the transfer, but he says that, leaving aside the whole battalion to Fort Aijal, it is absolutely necessary that the strength of the battalion should be materially and immediately increased.

The portion of the battalion now in Cachar is said to be insufficient. Unless the Military are to be called upon to perform out-post and other civil duties (which is altogether opposed to the policy upon which the whole system of Frontier Police organization in Assam is based), the number of men now required for out-post duty in the Cachar district, including North Cachar, is 167, as shown below :—

Jhalnecherra	26
Jhiringhat	23
North Cachar	48
Baladhas	23
Monier Khal	22
Myadhar	22
Treasury and jail guard at Hailakandi	10
Total	167

If this number is doubled for relief and duties in Silchar and 10 per cent. added for sick and leave, the total force required to be located in Cachar will amount to 371 men, whereas there are at the present moment in Silchar and employed on out-post duty in Cachar and North Cachar only about 140 men of all ranks, effective and non-effective, including men on leave. The result is stated to be that the men in the plains are not only insufficient for the out-post duty required of them in Cachar, there is also no margin for sick and leave, or to enable the Local Administration to send up men to Lushai to take the places of men who, the Chief Commissioner finds, have been there since September 1899, and are naturally much discontented and are clamouring for leave which the Local Administration cannot give them.

The remedy suggested for this state of things is either at once to increase the existing battalion to the number required for hill and plain works, that is to 322 + 371, or say 1,000 men, or to have two linked battalions, one in Lushai with head-quarters at Aijal, and the other in Cachar. The latter alternative is, for the reasons given in paragraph 19 of his note and in Appendix B to that note, preferred by the Chief Commissioner. Under this arrangement, the linked battalions would be placed in charge of two separate Assistant Commandants, and both battalions under the control of one Commandant.

The head-quarters of the Commandant and the Assistant Commandant of the Lushai Battalion would be at Aijal as at present, and the head-quarters of the Cachar linked Battalion would be at Silchar. All recruits for the two battalions would be trained at Silchar, so as to avoid as much as possible the expense of maintaining inefficients in Lushai. With the same object many of the inefficients of the Lushai Battalion might, it is suggested, be drafted down and attached to the Cachar Battalion, and it is explained that volunteers from the Cachar Battalion might be drafted into the Lushai Battalion. The Chief Commissioner says that there are some of the conveniences that would result from having two linked battalions under one Commandant. With a view to avoid a large increase in cost the Chief Commissioner is prepared, if the Government of India so desire, to give up half a battalion of the 18th Bengal Native Infantry now stationed at Silchar, but he points out that, if this is done, he would require to raise the strength of the Cachar Police Battalion from 371 to 510, so as to allow of there always being a police reserve in Cachar of about 250 effectives when 167 men are employed on out-post and about 50 more on other civil duties, such as jail and treasury guards in Silchar treasure and other escorts. This effective reserve, together with the regimental half battalion, will, it is stated, suffice for Cachar in case of emergencies. This scheme, if sanctioned, will result in a saving to Government of a little more than £10,000 a year as shown below.

Present cost of the Surma Valley Military Police exclusive of Lushai.

	Per annum.
	£
Charges	1,80,000
Estimated cost of the present scheme inclusive of all Lushai charges	2,98,500
Increase	1,30,800
Estimated cost of half a battalion of Military	1,48,000
Net saving to Government (say)	10,000

The Chief Commissioner adds that when at Silchar he was compelled to authorize the present Commandant of the Surma Valley Police Battalion to at once recruit 150 more men for that battalion. The sanction of the Government of India is asked to this, and the Chief Commissioner proposes that the cost of the additional recruits should, for the present, be charged to Imperial, as Provincial revenue cannot meet the charge, which is moreover considered a Lushai charge.

The case should first be considered by the Foreign Department from that Department's point of view. The Home Department has, as already noted, to decide the question of increase in the strength of the Cachar portion of the Police Battalion and of the battalions as a whole, the division of the battalion into two portions and the appointment of an additional Assistant Commandant. The present Assistant Commandantship was expressly sanctioned for North Lushai. The new appointment now proposed will require the Secretary of State's sanction. The Military Department will have to be consulted on the proposal of the Chief Commissioner to give up half of the 18th Bengal Native Infantry at Silchar. Finally, the Finance Department

* We may write for it. The proposal is one of a preliminary nature and nothing can be done till after the Lushai conference.

P. J. M.

be telegraphed for.* (Through Public Branch.)

C. C. S.—13th January 1892.

P. A. C.—13th January 1892.

Seen.

J. L. M.—12th January 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Foreign and Military Departments may see with reference to the points specified at the end of the preceding note. The case may then be kept over till after the Chin-Lushai Conference which is shortly to be held. The future of the Surma Valley Battalion and the question whether the cost of the Lushai section of it is to be Provincial or Imperial must depend on the decision to be arrived at by the Conference on the administration of the Lushai Hills. The strength of the police force required in the hills will doubtless be one of the subjects discussed.

2. I venture to think it would be somewhat risky at present and until the matter incorporated Chin-Lushai (and Manipal) has become settled, to reduce the Military Battalion at Silchar.

C. J. L.

3. It is also doubtful whether the estimate of 371 men for the Cachar Division of the proposed battalion of police is not too high. The estimate is based on requirements at outposts.

† Paragraph 17 of Chief Commissioner's note

The Lushai outposts proposed for maintenance are Myndhar and Mosser Khal which take up 4 officers and 40 men. With the new post east of the Surma (paragraph 10 of Mr Ward's note) they should not be required (cf. paragraph 7 of notes).

C. J. L.

disappear. They are no longer on the frontier now, and with a sufficient force in the Lushai Hills they may be gradually dispensed with as police posts. The policy of re-organizing the Surma Valley Battalion according to present requirements is therefore doubtful.

It is only doubtful to the extent of 4 havildars and 40 Sepoys, i.e. (with an equal number for reliefs) 88 officers and men.

C. J. L.

4. General Collet's suggestion was that

Paragraph 20 of his letter. Military Guards in North Cachar (Gangang, Honegong, Baidhan) would be doing duty, long since recognized as detrimental to military efficiency, and for that reason made over to Military Police.

C. J. L.

transferred to Lushai, I venture to think that

I do not agree here at all. Service in so remote, extensive, and inaccessible a tract as Lushai land must always be regarded as a hardship, and the battalion must have a base in a civilized (and tolerably close) country where the men can keep their families. The Bengal Government find that the Chittagong Military Police requires a base at Dacca, the South India police at Bangalore, and so on. We cannot get rid of the base at Cachar, and I submit should not aim at doing so.

C. J. L.

ments we may sanction the addition of 150

It is evidently necessary to sanction this.

C. J. L.

13th January 1892.

P. G. M.

SECRETARY

The first point to be settled is what force of police is required in Lushai land. This is for the Foreign Department to decide, and we cannot determine what addition will be required

to the battalion till this is settled. The matter is bound up with the questions which will come before the Conference. The note might be placed before the conference which might be asked to consider the question of Cachar outposts in connection with the other questions which relate to Lushai land.

13th January 1892.

J. P. H.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

Please see the marginal notes. The papers should, I think, be seen in the Foreign and Military Departments before the Conference (which is to meet, I believe, about the 23rd or 24th instant) assembles.

13th January 1892.

C. J. L.

13th January 1892.

P. P. H.

To Foreign Department unofficially.

Part 17

CHIN-LUSHAI.

His Excellency the Viceroy has directed that the recommendations of the Chin-Lushai Conference shall now be formally considered by the Government of India.

The conference was summoned by Military Department letter No. 248 B, dated the 21st January 1892, and met at the end of January last at Calcutta. The general purpose of the conference was said to be "to discuss civil and military affairs connected with the control of the Lushai and Chio Hills."

2. The territory referred to is at present under three distinct civil administrations and three distinct commands, viz. —

- (a) North Lushai—under the Chief Commissioner and General in Assam.
- (b) South Lushai—under the Bengal Government and the General at Calcutta.
- (c) Chins—under the Chief Commissioner and General in Burma.

It has been recognised for some time past that this "tripartite division of authority" is objectionable and ought to be simplified. In

* External A, September 1891, No. 56.

July* 1891, the Government of India, when recommending temporarily to the Secretary of State for sanction the heavy outlay (over 5½ lakhs) proposed by the Bengal Government for the administration of South Lushai, concluded by observing: "It is probable that ultimately it may be found possible and desirable to consolidate under one administration the whole or the greater part of the territory in the occupation of the various tribes now separately controlled from Bengal, Burma and Assam."

† Political despatch, No. 61, dated the 15th September 1891.

The Secretary of State in reply† approved the temporary arrangements as such, but proceeded to remark:—

"The existing arrangements, under which these newly incorporated tracts are administered partly from Bengal, partly from Assam, and partly from Burma according to the province to which portion is adjacent, were no doubt necessary, in the first instance, as a temporary expedient; but I shall be glad to learn that the suggestion contained in the last sentence of your letter for consolidating under a single authority, subject to the control of one administration, the entire area inhabited by Lushais and cognate tribes, is receiving your serious consideration.

"The expediency of adopting such a course when feasible is obvious."

The Secretary of State reverted‡ to the subject a few months later, with reference

‡ Military despatch, No. 122, dated the 24th December 1891. to the military occupation of the Chin-Lushai country, and expressed his views thus:—

"Assuming that it may be necessary to occupy the Lushai hills permanently, I would invite Your Lordship's attention to the possibility of simplifying the administration of this territory. At present it is occupied and administered partly by Assam, partly by Bengal, and partly by Burma, there thus being three different Governments, with three separate police and military organizations, dealing with a small tract of territory inhabited by homogeneous tribes. I would suggest, for the consideration of your Government, that, after further experience, it may be found practicable to have only one administration and one military police battalion for the whole tract. So long as the country is occupied by troops, the disadvantages of the present 'tripartite division of authority' may not be very great, but this would certainly be a source of embarrassment when military or civil police take the place of the troops."

3. Thus, the first and main question laid before the Chin-Lushai Conference were

§ Paragraph 4 of Military Department, No. 248-B, dated the 21st January 1892. "whether the practical inconvenience of the present system of administration is as great as has been represented, whether it is desirable

to make a change, and what remedies would be practicable."

The conference was unanimously of opinion that change was required in regard to two out of the three territorial divisions under consideration. North and South Lushai, it was held, certainly ought to go under Assam at once, if certain necessary provision can be made for transport and commissariat and a road and telegraph. Together with North and South Lushai, certain portions (to be hereafter determined) of the Arakan Hill Tracts now under Burma should also pass under Assam.

The conference being unanimous on these points, the Chief Commissioners of Assam and Burma have been addressed* with a view to obtaining the detailed information required to give effect to the above proposals. The Government of Bengal and the Chief Commissioner of Assam have also been consulted with reference to the transport and commissariat arrangements required in South and North Lushai. Replies from the two Chief Commissioners (who are being reminded by telegram) have not been received, but it has been ordered† that the consideration of the recommendations of the conference is to proceed independently of the enquiries made. The first question for decision therefore is—Will the Government of India accept, subject to the working out of details, the proposal to place South Lushai and part of the Arracan Hill Tracts, together with North Lushai, under Assam?

* Foreign Department, Nos. 516 H. and 504 H., dated the 17th and 29th March 1902.
† Foreign Department to Bengal, No. 523 H. dated the 17th March 1902.
Bengal to Foreign Department, Nos. 1508 F. and 1507 F., dated, respectively the 25th and 27th April 1902.
‡ Military Department to the Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 5415 D., dated the 29th May 1902.
§ Secretary's note of 11th May approved by His Excellency.

The answer will presumably be in the affirmative. If so, the result is to cut Bengal out altogether from the administrative scheme, and to leave the Lushais cum Arracan under Assam and the Chins under Burma.

4 But the majority of the conference went further, and recorded the opinion "that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country, known as the Chin-Lushai hills, should be brought under one administrative head as soon as this can be done, and that the new administration should be under the Chief Commissioner of Assam."

The minority, consisting of His Excellency Sir James Dormer and Sir A. Mackenzie, would "defer any final decision as regards the eastern part of the tract till further information is obtained."

The Chief Commissioner of Burma goes into the subject at length in his minute of the 27th January. He is prepared to admit freely, with due allowance for local peculiarities, that "it is most necessary that the policy followed in dealing with the tribes of the Chin-Lushai highlands should be as far as possible identical." But he wishes the question whether the Chins on the Burma side should eventually be placed under the same officer as the Lushais to be left quite open. If further experience and information show that such a course is expedient, then, he says, "by all means let this be done." But he does not anticipate that (this course will be found expedient even in the long run.

As regards the present, the Chief Commissioner not only denies that sufficient cause for a change has been shown, but thinks there are "insuperable difficulties in the way of placing the whole of the Chin-Lushai highlands under one administration just yet." These difficulties are briefly that the Chin tribes, which have hitherto had dealings only with Burma, have yet to be thoroughly subdued, and essential surveys and roads have yet to be made.

The Chief Commissioner of Assam, while in favour of ultimately putting the Chins under Assam, agrees with Sir A. Mackenzie that until communications have been opened out this cannot be done. Sir A. Mackenzie's view as to an immediate transfer of the Chins from Burma to Assam seems in fact to have been accepted, for the second resolution passed by the whole conference says—"The conference is not prepared to assert that this step can be taken immediately."

The correctness of the view can hardly be disputed, so that the question to be considered by the Government of India under this head seems now to practically amount to merely this—Is the majority of the conference right in laying down at the present time the general policy—"that it is very desirable that the whole tract of country, known as the Chin-Lushai hills, should be brought under one administrative head," or is the minority right in holding that the ultimate administration of the eastern Chins should be left quite open till at least further information about them has been obtained and their country has been subdued and opened up?

The question as thus put is not perhaps of much practical importance now; for, whichever way it is answered, the action to be taken in respect of the Chins must inevitably be affected by further information and developments. The principle, however, on which the majority insist seems to be best illustrated by one of Sir Charles Elliott's replies to the questions of the Military Department, viz.—"All the savages, whether called Chins, Lushais or other names, who have never come under British control before should be under one officer."

5. In support of his minute the Chief Commissioner of Burma has forwarded* opinions on the proposals of the conference which have been confidentially given by Messrs. Carey and Macnabb, the two Political Officers in the Chin country at Fort White and Haka.

Mr. Carey holds that the plan of putting the eastern Chins under Assam will be "impracticable for some years to come and advisable never." With reference to impracticability in the present, he lays stress on the "amazing difficulties of road and telegraphic communications" with the Chin country. As to the future, Mr. Carey urges that the Chins have nothing in common with the Lushais, and that their historical connection, tribal sympathies, and practical interests are with Burma.

Mr. Macnabb deals chiefly with the present impossibility of making the proposed transfer. Apart from communications, he does not think that one man as Commissioner could be "thoroughly and personally conversant with all the tribes on the Chin-Lushai hills." He also refers to the connection of the Chins with Burma.

The Chief Commissioner observes :—

"Nothing could more clearly show the tribal separation existing between the main body of the central and northern Chins and the Lushais under Assam than the fact that the tribes on this side have been so far unaffected by, and to all appearances are in ignorance of, the serious rising now going on to their west."

6. The information about the Chins is admittedly imperfect, but what there is may, I submit, be regarded as supporting the view taken by the minority of the conference—that no policy should be laid down yet with reference to the future administration of the Chin country now under Burma.

The Secretary of State has written of the Chin-Lushai country on the assumption that it is all inhabited by "cognate" or "homogeneous" tribes. But the local officers on the Burma side assert that the Chins are quite distinct from the Lushais. This is a matter of fact which can easily be put beyond question by further enquiries and experience. The policy which the majority of the conference would lay down seems to be based, as shown above, on the more general ground that three lots of savages pretty close together in a hilly country ought to be under the hand of one expert in dealing with savages. This sort of view is, no doubt, reasonable on the surface, but it may be refuted by more accurate information. There is plenty of time to get this, and meanwhile North and South Lushai, and the Arracan Hill Tracts will settle down together under Assam.

7. The remaining recommendation of the conference which can be to some extent considered is that communications should be improved. This is said to be "a work of pressing importance," and "every effort should be made" to complete communication between—

- (1) Fort Tregear, Haka and Burma.
- (2) Haka and Fort White.
- (3) Fort White and Manipur.
- (4) Fort White and Burma.
- (5) Fort Aijal and Lungleh.
- (6) Fort Aijal and Manipur.
- (7) Fort Tregear and Falam.
- (8) Haka and the Baungshé country.

This is a large programme, though it would only establish communications between essential points. The expense would doubtless be very heavy. As regards one line—from Aijal in North

* Foreign Department, No. 216 E., dated the 17th March 1892.

Lushai to Lungleh in South Lushai—the Chief Commissioner of Assam has been asked* to give some idea of the cost of a road and telegraph. The Chief Commissioners of Burma and Assam might be requested to submit detailed proposals for carrying out the recommendations of the conference under this head. Probably they will want special grants for these works;

† Condition (3) attached to the transfer at once of South Lushai to Assam.

and the conference seems to have recommended a special grant for the road and telegraph from Aijal to Lungleh.

30th May 1892.

J. A. C.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

What the majority of the Conference desired was to lay down the general principle that the Hill Tracts should be dealt with from the inside, and by an administration of their own, not by Burmese and other district officers having their hands full of district work. This principle was repudiated by Sir Alexander Mackenzie, and the majority of the committee wished to assert it. There was no desire to hurry matters, but it was felt that the Government of India had better give an indication of what its general views were, or there would be no chance of the Burmese administration agreeing to part with its China under any circumstances. I still think that the Government of India should aim at bringing the whole tract under one administrative head "as soon as this can be done," and that the administrative head should be an officer whose whole work would consist in managing the hill tribes.

It is quite possible that the Chins and Lushais are very different, but that does not seem to me to be a strong argument against entrusting them to one administrative head. The Chinese and Burmans and Talans and Karens are very different.

The one real argument against setting up a Hilly Tracts administration is the nature of the country, which makes communication very difficult. This was fully recognised by the Conference, and as I have said there was no desire to hurry matters. But the general opinion was that the charge would not be too large for one man to administer when roads had been to some extent opened up, and that the subsequent thorough opening up and settlement of the country would be more rapidly pushed on by an administrative head having his headquarters in the country, itself, and no duties outside it, than by separate administrative heads situated in Calcutta and Rangoon and Shillong.

That at least was what I understood to be the feeling of the Conference. I may add that the recent operations in these hills, notably the march of the Burma column from Fort White to Lunglüh, seem to show that even now communication is not impossible.

31st May 1892.

H. M. D.

I am disposed to favour the view which I understand to have been held by the majority at the Conference, *viz.*, that as a question of principle the whole of these Hill Tracts ought to be under one management, and governed from inside by a single specially selected officer, instead of by several officers belonging to different local administrations.

It has always seemed to me possible that eventually the new district thus created might include everything to the west of the Myittha Valley and of the valley which runs northward from it towards the frontier of Manipur.

But neither the Conference, nor any one else, has proposed that so extensive a change should be made at once, and the only question, I understand, is whether the Government of India should for the present remain content with the comparatively modest re-arrangement (now under discussion with the Local Government) which will give the North and South Lushais and part of the Arakan Hills to Assam, or whether we should commit ourselves definitely to a preference for the policy recommended by the majority. No declaration which we can make upon this point can bind the Government of India, but I should myself prefer to place it upon record that whatever steps are now taken, are taken in the belief that they lead in the direction to which I have pointed above, and that, when communications have been improved, we look forward to a larger and more thorough measure of consolidation.

The proposals for constructing new roads will require discussion in detail. The expense of carrying out the programme mentioned in paragraph 7 of Mr. Crawford's note would be very great. We shall have to do the work gradually.

Circulate (beginning with Sir C. Crosthwaite) and Council.

3rd June 1892.

L.

There are, I think, two points for discussion: (1) what is to be done now; (2) what principle is to be laid down to guide us in forming the administration of the Lushai-China Hills in the future.

I think there can be no question about the wisdom of removing the Southern Lushai country from the jurisdiction of Bengal and of placing the whole Lushai Hills under Assam. The commencement of the Assam-Bengal Railway points, I think, to the expediency of making a further change either immediately or in the near future. The Assam Administration will have the greatest possible interest in the development of this railway and of the port of Chittagong, whereas the Bengal Government will care little for either railway or port; and so far as it is under the influence of the Calcutta mercantile community, it will regard the progress of Chittagong with jealousy. I advocate therefore the transfer recommended by Sir A. Mackenzie of the Chittagong District, Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Hill Tipperah to Assam. I would add also the whole or greater part of the Arakan Hill Tracts from Burma. These transfers would make Assam a compact province with its own port and its own line of railway communication with the sea.

(3) As to the further step of throwing into Assam the Chin Hills now belonging to Burma, it is admitted that this cannot be done at present or until the roads are opened out, without which it would be impracticable for one Commissioner to administer this large area of mountains. The object of adding the Chin Hills to Assam is to unite all the hill tribes

under one Commissioner; and if this could not be done, I presume there would be no advantage gained. The only question then is, whether we should lay down the principle of one hill administration for the future guidance of those who may have to deal with the question.

My opinion is against it. I think it is seldom an advantage to separate administratively parts of a country which are by natural conditions related to, or dependent on, one another. The tract in question is so broad and extensive that there has been no thorough communication from Burma to Bengal. I think it is true that the tribes which raid on Burma and trade with Burmans do not make incursions into the plains on the western side and conversely. It is the interest of Burma to deal with these tribes which must visit the Burman villages on the plains, and will, if permitted, raid on Burma and harbour outlaws from that country. However loyal and zealous the officer placed in charge of the hills may be, the separation of these hills from Burma will inevitably render the Chin tribes less amenable and less disposed to obey the Burman officers to help them to pursue and recover criminals from the hills.

Moreover, all the eastern side of the hills must look to Burma for supplies, reinforcements and for the maintenance of communications with the civilised country below and for postal and telegraph lines. If the Government of Burma has no responsibility for this tract and no interest in it, the officers employed in it will not get much attention paid to their wants. I am arguing on the assumption that the tract will be under the Assam Administration. If it is put under the Burman Administration, the same arguments will apply from the Assam point of view even with greater force as the interests involved on the Assam border are more important.

It may be said that when all the roads are made and a settled government has been for years established, these objections will disappear. It may be so. But that time is so distant that it is not within the limits of a practical discussion.

If the hills are placed under an officer directly subordinate to the Government of India in the Foreign Office, the evils will be doubled as the interests on both sides will suffer. There are, I think, insuperable objections to this course, and not the least is that the Foreign Office has more work than enough at present and has no time to attend to more.

Much has been made of difficulties supposed to have arisen between Burma and Bengal. It was to be expected that when an unknown country of a very difficult character was entered from both sides at once there would arise misunderstandings or conflict of opinions between the officers. These would have arisen equally if both parties had been acting under one Government. As a matter of fact I remember only one case of importance. It is absurd to say that if the officers at Haka and Lungleh had been under one Government, there would have been no complaints such as those enumerated by Sir Charles Elliott in his note

* No. 26 of these Proceedings.

dated 28th January 1892. There was from the first an idea at Fort Tregear, that the action of the Burman authorities was not sufficiently severe, and that the Bengal policy was to some extent counteracted in consequence. The opinion was, I think, erroneous. It gave the however to complaints in the Bengal diaries and expressions of regret at the want of unanimity.

Whatever arrangement is made, the boundaries of Assam and Burma must meet. And if the Chin tribes which are naturally connected with Burma are placed under an Assam officer, there will be more friction and more cause for complaint than if the boundary is drawn within the hills on the line which divides those dealing with Assam from those dealing with Burma. For these reasons I consider that our action should be limited to placing the South Lushai country and the Arracan Hill Tracts under Assam, and to transferring to that province the Chittagong District, Chittagong Hill Tracts and Hill Tipperah, and that we should record no opinion in favour of removing the Eastern Chin tribes from the administration of Burma.

I may add that I think the time has come when these tracts may cease to be treated as foreign territory. The officers in charge of them may be considered ordinary district officers and not as politicals, and the Home Department may assume charge of the control of the administrations dealing with them.

8th June 1892.

C. H. T. C.

I agree so completely with the foregoing note by Sir Charles Crosswaite that I have very little to add. The only point on which I have been unable to form any definite view is the proposal to put the Arracan Hill Tracts under Assam. That a portion of these tracts may be conveniently administered by the Assam officer in charge of the Lushai Hills seems very probable, but I should have thought that, as regards the tracts inhabited by tribes having dealings with and frequently resorting to the Akyah District, there would be nearly the same reasons for placing them under the control of the Burma officers as have been advanced, to my mind conclusively, with regard to the Chins. I understand, however, that the question, how much of the Arracan Hills can conveniently be transferred to Burma will still be an open one, and that the boundary line will not be drawn without the Chief Commissioner of Burma and his officers having local experience being consulted. On that understanding I agree upon this point also.

As additional reasons for the transfer of Chittagong to Assam, I may point out that the work of the Bengal Province is altogether beyond the capacity of one man, and that, to the best of my information, Chittagong has but little in common with the rest of the province. On the other hand, the Assam Province is the smallest we have. The line of rail now about to be commenced makes an early transfer very desirable. The whole line ought certainly to be under one administration. The view that the hill tribes should be under the same admini-

tration as the lowlands to which they resort, whether for friendly or hostile purposes, also favour the transfer, and I am convinced that that is the principle which ought to be adopted.

At the same time the details involved in the transfer of a whole Commissionership from Bengal to Assam will probably occupy time. I do not think there would be any objection to the transfer of the hill tracts being carried out at once in anticipation of the larger change.

While I recognise that the Chins connected with Burma and the Lushais are a few Cachar and Chittagong must be managed and controlled by different officers, responsible respectively to Burma and to Assam, I think they should be allowed considerable latitude as to direct correspondence, and be required to co-operate together with the utmost promptitude and cordiality. I do not think it likely that there will be any serious divergence of opinion on the treatment of the tribes, but if there is, the Government of India will have to step in and prescribe a policy.

I fully agree with Sir C. Crosthwaite that the Lushai and Chin Hills should be treated respectively as district changes. But the district officers should have no other work: anything like the Punjab frontier system would prevent their giving their whole time to the settling down of the tribes, and is strongly to be deprecated. I am not quite sure, however, that their employment should not for some time to come be regarded as political, subject indeed to the immediate direction of the Local Administration but ultimately to control by the Foreign Department. If the Home Department has much more work put upon it, the Member in charge must be relieved of the Revenue and Agricultural Department, and this would involve another Member of Council and an increased expenditure which is precluded by the present state of our finances.

11th June 1899.

P. P. H.

The question is one turning so much on local knowledge that, even if my preconceived opinions had been opposed to Sir C. Crosthwaite's views, I should have felt bound to give way: his arguments are, I think, quite conclusive. I cordially assent to the last paragraph of his note, and would content myself, at present, with reminding my friend, Sir F. Hutchinson, that there is another, and cheaper, way out of the difficulty which he suggests at the end of his note.

11th June 1899.

A. E. M.

I am entirely in accord with the views expressed by the Viceroy in His Excellency's note of the 9th instant, and am in favour of taking the action recommended by the Calcutta Conference regarding the immediate transfer of the Lushai country and the Arracan Hill Tracts to Assam. I would also avail myself of this opportunity to place on record that the transfer is made in pursuance of a line of policy directed towards the eventual concentration in the hands of one single authority of the control of the whole of the Chin-Lushai country.

2. While giving every consideration to the reasons put forward by the Hon'ble Sir Charles Crosthwaite, in support of his opinion that it is undesirable to separate the Chin Hills from Burma, I regret I am unable to concur in the conclusion at which he arrives. One of the principal arguments adduced by my Hon'ble Colleague is the advisability of our being able to coerce the Chins from the side of Burma; whereas to me it seems preferable to employ for this purpose troops placed in the centre of the Chin-Lushai country, supported by other troops located to the westward in the neighbourhood of Chittagong and Cachar—the line through which the recently sanctioned railway will run. The valleys to the east of the Chin Hills are notoriously unhealthy, and during the last few years our soldiers have suffered greatly whenever it has been found necessary to send them into this part of the country. It is quite impossible to quarter regiments permanently in these districts, and I am strongly opposed to any measure likely to result in columns being frequently sent through this pestilential tract.

3. My hope is that, as soon as a sufficient number of troops and police are collected in the Chin-Lushai Hills, and the country is opened out by means of roads, and the tribes have been quarried, that they will settle down into peaceful subjects; but should circumstances render it necessary to undertake operations on a comparatively extensive scale against the Chins, troops could be sent from Burma easily enough, whether these hills were under a different administration or not; but I am decidedly of opinion that the ordinary procedure should be to bring pressure to bear from the opposite direction. In this view I have already

* Not received in Foreign Department.

addressed Government in Adjutant-General's letter No. 2840-B-A, dated 27th May 1899, urging that the head-quarters of the Myingyan Brigade should be transferred to a central position in the Chin-Lushai country, and I trust that this proposal will be accepted, whether the Chins are left for the present under Burma or not.

4. Wherever we may decide to fix the boundary between the two Administrations, some time must elapse before the semi-civilised tribes can be prevented from raiding across it, but it seems to me that the line of the Myittha Valley, as suggested by His Excellency the Viceroy, is likely to prove as satisfactory as any other from this point of view, while geographically and ethnologically it possesses decided advantages.

16th June 1899.

R.

I am in favour of at once placing the whole Lushai country under Assam, and of deciding to transfer the Hill Tipperah and Chittagong district to Assam, as soon as arrangements

can be made. In addition to the reasons given by Sir Charles Croothwaite, I think it very important that the civil arrangements for supply and transport for troops sent as reinforcements at any time to Lushai land should be in the hands of one administration, whether they come from Cachar or Chittagong.

As regards subsequently placing the Chin Hills under the same administration as the Lushai Hills, I agree with His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for the reasons given in his note, that this should eventually be done.

The proposals of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief for placing the troops in the Chin-Lushai hills under one command, with head-quarters in those hills, and directly under the Commander-in-Chief in India, are being considered on a separate file, which will shortly be brought before His Excellency the Viceroy.

18th June 1899.

H. B.

I agree with Sir Charles Croothwaite, and would not at the present time express any opinion as to the expediency of placing the Lushais and Chins under one administrative head.

2. While agreeing as to the expediency of making over the Chittagong District, the Chittagong Hill Tracts, and Hill Tipperah to Assam, I doubt if the proposal goes far enough. I have always looked on it as inevitable that these tracts as well as other Bengal territory lying east of the Megna, should be made over some day to Assam. If any Bengal territory is to be made over to Assam, I think we should transfer at one time all that will require to be so transferred. Bengal and Assam might be consulted on the point.

3. The financial aspect of the question presents considerable difficulty.

We shall lose next year, as compared with this year's Estimates, about 150 lakhs under Exchange and Opium.

I do not see at present how this loss is to be made up, and it may be taken for granted that no appreciable amount of money will be available next year to meet additional expenditure on the Chin-Lushai country.

Before we make any change it will be necessary to have a careful estimate of the additional cost.

21st June 1899.

D. B.

This case was brought up in Council to-day. Ordered :

- (1) That all the Lushai country be transferred to Assam as early as possible.
- (2) That the Chittagong district be also transferred to Assam. If it is found that there are difficulties in the way of an immediate transfer of the district, the Hill Tracts should be transferred in advance of the rest.
- (3) That the Bengal and Assam Administrations be consulted as to the expediency of transferring to Assam the whole Chittagong division.
- (4) That the Burma and Assam Administrations be consulted as to the future position of the boundary between them in the North Arakan Hill Tracts.
- (5) That with regard to the Chin Hills no declaration of policy need be made for the present.
- (6) That an estimate of the cost of the transfers now ordered be submitted to the Government of India.

23rd June 1899.

H. M. D.

K W. DEMI-OFFICIAL FROM C. J. LYALL, ESQ., SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF INDIA, HOME DEPARTMENT (TO SECRETARY), DATED THE 27TH JUNE 1899.

Says that the Home Department should be given an opportunity of seeing the draft letters to Bengal and Assam regarding the transfer to Assam of South Lushai land and certain parts of the Chittagong Division in Bengal.

27th June 1899.

H. M. D.

Under-Secretary.

UNDER-SECRETARY.

The file is with you.

J. S.—28th June 1899.

I have just marked draft to Home Department.

29th June 1899.

J. A. C.

SECRETARY.

I submit draft Resolution. If approved, it should be seen by Home, Military, and Finance Departments before issue.

29th June 1892.

J. A. C.

29th June 1892.

H. M. D.

To Home, Military, and Finance Departments unofficially.

29th June 1892.

J. A. C.

To Home, Military, and Finance Departments unofficially.

[Notes in the Home Department.]

Submitted.

BURIN—29th June 1892.

J. L. M.—29th June 1892.

SECRETARY.

30th June 1892.

P. G. M.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

With reference to that part of the draft Resolution (and the Order in Council) which states as a settled conclusion that the Chittagong District should be transferred to Assam, I would respectfully urge that the Chittagong District is the seat of the Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, and that it would be exceedingly anomalous to transfer it to Assam while leaving the Commissioner to govern the remaining two districts of his Division—Tipperah and Noakhali—from outside the territories of the Local Government to which he and they are subordinate.

This, of course, would not be done. The Commissioner will either become an Assam officer altogether or remain in Bengal, but at some other head-quarters and have nothing to do with the District of Chittagong.

P. P. H.

I would also urge that a difficult settlement of land revenue is now being carried out in Chittagong (where land revenue questions are exceedingly perplexing and intricate) under the direction of Sir Charles Elliott, which it would be very inexpedient suddenly to transfer, in the midst of the operations, to the control of the Chief Commissioner of Assam.

P. P. H.

I would also respectfully represent that, although there would be no objection to, but on the contrary much advantage from, the transfer of the Chittagong Division (Tipperah, Noakhali, Chittagong, containing together 4 millions of people) to the Province of Assam when the railway to be begun this cold weather and carried out, I believe, in about two years, is made, at present Chittagong is very inaccessible from the head-quarters of the Assam administration, and could only be visited by the Chief Commissioner at the cost of giving up his inspections for a considerable time in some other part of the province.

I would therefore suggest that the orders for the present should be confined to directing the transfer of the Chittagong Hill Tracts with South Lushai to Assam, and that the two Governments should be requested to consider the expediency of at some early date (the completion of the railway might be suggested) transferring to Assam the whole of the Chittagong Division. If the two Governments concur in this proposal, detailed suggestions should be called for as to the arrangements which will be necessary to carry it out. I foresee that there is likely to be considerable discussion on many points connected with it, but I abstain from entering into that part of the subject here.

2nd July 1892.

C. J. L.

4 (3) should run :—

The Chittagong District should also be transferred from Bengal to Assam as soon as the settlement operations now in progress have been brought to a conclusion. If the settlement cannot be concluded within the current year, or if it is found that there are other difficulties, etc."

In 4 (4) for "jointly consider the matter," which seems to imply a personal meeting, I would substitute "put themselves into communication."

5th July 1892.

P. P. H.

To Military Department unofficially.

[Notes in the Military Department.]

The draft Resolution below, embodying the decision arrived at in Council on the proposals made by the late Chin-Lushai Conference, is for the concurrence of the Military Department.

J. F. SMYTH—5th July 1892.

G. DE RH&P.—5th July 1892.

K—9-62—Sept.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Submitted.

9th July 1892.

E. D. B.

SECRETARY.

The Military Department will, it is thought, concur in the draft as it now stands

9th July 1892.

P. J. M.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

It seems to me that the points raised by the Home Secretary are covered by the provisions of the Resolution. But at all events the Military Department is not concerned in them specially.

We may agree with the draft.

11th July 1892.

E. H. H. C.

12th July 1892.

H. B.

To Finance Department unofficially.

[Notes in the Finance Department]

Please see pages 88-89 of these notes, and the draft Resolution in print below

The draft will perhaps be agreed to, the word "careful" being inserted between the words "include" and "estimates" in the penultimate line of clause (5) of paragraph 4

A. M.—14th July 1892.

N. G. B.—14th July 1892.

SECRETARY.

14th July 1892.

F. C. H.

HON'BLE MEMBER.

I have also added the words "if any."

15th July 1892.

J. F. F.

15th July 1892.

D. B.

To Foreign Department unofficially.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

The Resolution may now issue?

J. S.—20th July 1892.

SECRETARY.

21st July 1892.

J. A. C.

HIS EXCELLENCY.

The Departments concerned are agreed, and the Resolution may issue

22nd July 1892.

H. M. D.

23rd July 1892.

L.

[Proc. No. 57.] TELEGRAM FROM THE CHIEF COMMISSIONER OF BURMA, No. 76, DATED THE 1ST AUGUST 1892.

Enquires if it has been decided that the administration of the Chin Hills is to remain with Burma. If so, says he will prepare a fresh scheme for administration of the Chin Hill tracts.

Please see the copy of the recent Resolution. The Chin Hills remain under Burma for the present. We may reply in the affirmative?

Draft telegram below for approval.

T. G. BALDWIN—1st August 1892.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

May issue. A copy of the Resolution has been sent to Burma.

J. S.—1st August 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

Telegram may issue. Do you think it worth adding—

"Copy of Government of India Resolution was forwarded to you on 27th July."

1st August 1892.

H. D.

Yes. Issue so.

1st August 1892.

J. A. C.

[Proc. No. 59.]

[Telegram to the Chief Commissioner of Burma, No. 1438-E, dated the 2nd August 1892.]

[Proc. No. 58.]

TELEGRAM FROM CHIEF SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT OF BENGAL, No. 2645-P., DATED THE 1ST AUGUST 1892.

With reference to Resolution dated the 25th July, regarding Lushai, enquires whether he may expect instructions as to the manner in which the Lushai hills are to be dealt with by Government.

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

The Chin-Lushai file was sent to you this morning.

I don't think that it is intended or necessary to send Bengal any special instructions regarding the manner of transferring South Lushai, etc.

J. S.—2nd August 1892.

Issue the telegram below. Deputy Secretary has agreed.

2nd August 1892.

H. D.

[Proc. No. 60.]

[Telegram to Bengal Government, No. 1442-E, dated the 2nd August 1892.]

[Proc. No. 61.]

[To the Chief Commissioner of Assam, No. 1480-E, dated the 9th August 1892.]

ASSISTANT SECRETARY.

The Deputy Secretary ordered that a copy of the Resolution should be sent home.

Beyond the despatch to the Secretary of State and the letter to Assam I do not think any action necessary at present.

The file will be recorded as soon after the issue of these drafts as possible.

J. S.—2nd August 1892.

DEPUTY SECRETARY.

I put up an alternative draft to Secretary of State.

2nd August 1892.

H. D.

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