

THE LUSHAIS 1878-1889

Mizoram State Library

17947



PIPERA ELM PRIVATE LIMITED

ON BEHALF OF


TRINITY RESEARCH INSTITUTE

AMZAWI

MOZAMAM

THE LUSHAIS

1878—1889



FIRMA KLM PRIVATE LIMITED

ON BEHALF OF

TRIBAL RESFARCH INSTITUTE

AIZAWL — MIZORAM


Mizoram State Library
17947



Printed and Published by FIRMA KLM PRIVATE LIMITED
CALCUTTA-700 012 on behalf of Tribal Research
Institute, Aizawl, Mizoram.

First Indian

Reprint : 1978



Printed at GRAPHIC ART PRESS
30D, Diamond Harbour Road
Calcutta-700 060
Phone : 771372

A Note

For facilities of scholars engaged in research on various aspects of Mizo Culture and History, this rare book is reprinted by the Tribal Research Institute, Aizawl, with the help of grants received from the Department of Education, Govt. of Mizoram.

Tribal Research Institute
Aizawl

Dr. (Mrs) N. Chatterji
Senior Research Officer

Contents

Part I. Frontier Defence		Page
Chapter I	Our Outposts	1
Chapter II	Hill Tippera Posts	6
Chapter III	Extra Precautions	10
 Part II The Lushai Chiefs		
Chapter IV	Relations of the Lushais with each other	18
Chapter V	Relations of the Lushais with the Howlongs & Sylus	30
Chapter VI	Relations of the Lushais with the Suktes	37
 Part III. Our Relations with the Lushais		
Chapter VII	The Bazars	41
Chapter VIII	Our Policy regarding Settlers & Refugees	76
Chapter IX	Misc Matters & Points of Policy	90
Chapter X	Relations with Individual Chiefs	108
 Part IV.		
Chapter XI	Relations of Manipur with the Lushais	139
 Part V.	 The Lushai Routes	 154

THE LUSHAIS.

PART I.—FRONTIER DEFENCE

CHAPTER 1—OUR OUTPOSTS

1. Before the expedition of 1871-72, the Lushais, the Howlongs, and the Sylus used to raid on Cachar and Sylhet through Cachar on Hill Tippera and through Hill Tippera into Sylhet. After the close of the expedition, when the line of policy to be adopted was laid down by the Government of India, it was decided that our Sylhet and Cachar frontier should be protected by a line of posts, and that the responsibility for the defence of Tippera should rest with the Raja, who should also be called upon to co-operate effectually in the establishment of a defensive line in order to bar the door of access through his territory to our districts.

Policy laid down after expedition of 1871-72—Frontier to be defended by line of posts.

2. When it came to fixing the position of our outposts in Cachar and Sylhet, there was a considerable difference of opinion as to the line to be adopted. Two lines were suggested, which were known as the Outer and Inner Line.

Difference of opinion regarding the line of outposts to be adopted.

Sir Frederick Roberts, who had been Deputy-Quartermaster General in the Cachar column of the expeditionary force, recommended an advanced line of posts, which, beginning at Mynadhar on the east of Cachar, should extend, through the Bhubans, Monierkhal, Bongkong, Kolosib, Bhoirabitala, and Jhalnachera, to the Chattachura Peak (old position down south),

from whence it would turn southwards to the Sorphnel Peak in Lushai-land, and from there run past Sirthay Tlang and the Chittagong Frontier to Tulukme in Aracan.

The local authorities, i. e., the Commissioner of Dacca and the Brigadier-general Commanding the North-eastern Frontier, on the other hand, recommended an Inner Line, which should follow very much the positions of our present posts.

Arguments in
favour of the
Outer Line.

3. Sir Frederick Roberts explained his views as follows :—

“Taking the Cachar frontier first, and travelling from east to west, we find that protection is required from the Barak river to the Chattachura Peak, between which the following ranges of hills run parallel to each other, and nearly at right angles to the line of defence, viz., the Bhubans between the Barak and the Sonai ; the Lungmai between the Sonai and the Rukni ; the Rengti between the Rukni and the Dhaleswar ; and the Hachik between the Dhaleswar and Hill Tippera. It is along the crests of these hills that the Lushais have invariably approached when raiding on the teagardens of Sylhet and Cachar, and it is on these hills therefore that our posts should be established. . With the solitary exception of the one near Chattachura, all our posts have hitherto been situated in valleys between these ranges, and have evidently been selected more with a view of giving confidence to the planters and their coolies than for the purpose of repelling raids. No communications exist from one to the other, and they are all so overlooked that the Lushais have had no difficulty in determining when and where attacks could best be

made. From these ridges an extensive view can be obtained of the surrounding country."

Arguments in
favour of the
Inner Line.

4. The arguments adduced by the local officers in favour of the Inner Line are shown in the following extract :—

"The first objection to the system of having all the posts on the tops of the ridges of the hills is the great scarcity of water, which is known to be a peculiar feature of these hills. The next is the very large number of men who will be required to hold so many posts and the expense of provisioning them and keeping open the roads connecting them with each other and with the station of Cachar. But the most serious objection to the scheme of posts as laid down by Colonel Roberts is that it encloses an enormous tract of virgin forest and swamp within the line of defence separating the posts from the nearest tea-gardens or villages. No one, it is believed, is so sanguine as to hope that raids can be prevented by a line of posts located in a jungle, where the eye cannot penetrate twenty yards in any direction ; and the results of placing our outposts on the hill tops on the lines recommended by Colonel Roberts would be that the Lushais would slip past our guards without the smallest difficulty, their scouts watching carefully when the road was clear of the patrol ; and the first intimation the outposts, say of Kolosib or Bongkong, would receive of an attack on Jafirbund or Loarbund would probably reach them two or three days after the occurrence was known in Cachar."

5. At the time Sir Frederick Roberts made his proposals, the eastern portion of Hill Tippera had not

Reasons for abandoning the line by the Hachik range. been surveyed ; and when this was done, in the following cold season of 1872-73, it was found that the hilly tract south of Sylhet was almost entirely uninhabited to a considerable distance west of the Hachik range, and that there were no unknown tribes living there who could have committed the raids on Sylhet in former years. It was also shown conclusively that a line of outposts on the Hachik range could only be kept up at an enormous cost, which the Hill Tippera State could not support, and that such a line would be almost certainly useless if established.

6. On the Chief Commissioner of Assam expressing a decided opinion in 1874 in favour of the Inner Line of out- posts in Cachar as opposed to the Outer Line, the Government of India signified its approval to the proposals he advocated. The question of the Sylhet line of posts was not settled till 1876, in which year it was decided to adhere to the line previously existing with some slight modifications, due mainly to the advance of cultivation.

Both the Sylhet and Cachar outposts have been retained up to the present day in much the same positions as they occupied in 1874.

7. The present positions of our southern outposts in Sylhet and Cachar and their strength in the cold weather, are shown in the following table :—

	Subadars.	Jemadars.	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Total.
Jhirighat	2	12	14
Mynadhar	2	20	22

References—Paragraphs 1 to 6.—Files 37 of 1874, 326 of 1875, 158 of 1876 and 108 of 1877. Mackenzie pages 489, 482, 490.

	Subadars	Jamadars	Havildars	Sepoys	Total
Monierkal.....	2	20	22
Noarbund.....	1	2	20	23
Jhálnacherra...	1	3	29	33
Chattachura...	1	2	20	23
Oliviacherra....	2	20	22
Lakhimamla....	2	20	22
Fatehkuli.....	1	2	19	22
Adampur.....	2	20	22
Total.....	<u>1</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>21</u>	<u>200</u>	<u>225</u>

with a reserve in Silchar averaging about 230 of all ranks The following table shows the strength of the reserve on the 1st January of the last four years :—

	Suba- dars.	Jama- dars.	Havil- dars.	Sepoys.	Buglers.	Total.
1st January 1886 ..	1	5	24	201	6	237
Ditto 1887...	2	6	17	162	5	192
Ditto 1888...	1	5	17	212	4	239
Ditto 1889 ..	1	4	19	229	4	257

In the rains, the outposts of Jhirighat, Mynadhar, Monierkhal, Jhálnacherra and Oliviacherra are abolished, and the remainder reduced to the following strength :—

	Havildars.	Sepoys.	Total.
Noarbund.....	2	10	12
Chattachura	2	16	18
Lakhimamla	1	10	11
Fatehkuli	1	10	11
Adampur.....	1	10	11
Total.....	<u>7</u>	<u>56</u>	<u>63</u>

There is no instance on record of Lushais coming

into the plains in numbers between May and October with hostile intentions. But between those months they occasionally come into Silchar with messages from their chiefs, and also sometimes occupy huts in the low hills south of the district for purposes of collecting rubber or hunting, in numbers of from 5 to 25 men.

Patrol communication is kept up regularly between adjoining posts.

CHAPTER II.—THE HILL TIPPERA POSTS.

8. In 1874, when the Maharaja of Hill Tippera was called on to adopt measures with a view to strengthen-
Hill Tippera ing our line of posts and protecting his
outposts. own territory, he, acting on the advice of the Political agents, offered to establish three outposts along his northern boundary, where it marched with Sylhet. The chief Commissioner of Assam was consulted, but was not in a position to offer an opinion till 1876, when he recommended the establishment of the posts at the places suggested by the Hill Tippera authorities. The following extract, in which the Chief Commissioner signified his concurrence, is taken from the report submitted by the officer specially deputed to enquire into the question of the Sylhet outposts :—

“I have read the correspondence about the Tippera outposts very carefully, and have made enquiries at every post near the Tippera frontier ; and I have come to the conclusion that it is not advisable to trust to the Raja’s posts in the very slightest degree, and our plan of defence should be complete without them. If they

should ever be established at the points Mr. Power (the political Agent of Hill Tippera) has chosen, they might be of use in giving intelligence to the Sylhet outposts, in which each is linked ; and I would have regular patrols between our guards and the Raja's ; but I would only depend on his men for information they might be able to give, and not for defensive purposes. Intelligence is much wanted on the Sylhet part of the frontier ; for, as far as I could make out, there is no sort of intercourse between the Lushais and people on the Sylhet frontier."

The Government of India in June 1877 approved of the posts being established at the places named, where they have remained up to the present time, viz , Dharmanagar, Koilashur (or Chirakuti), and Kamalpur ; and in consequence of a very unfavourable report which had recently been furnished by the Political Agent, at the same time expressed an opinion that, in selecting the sepoy's for garrisoning these posts, the Raja should be advised by the Political Agent, who should also insist upon the men being properly disciplined, equipped, and punctually paid. Notwithstanding these precautions, it appears from a report submitted by Mr. Daly, Commandant of the Frontier Police, in 1886, that the post had lapsed into a very unsatisfactory condition.

9. In August 1887, the government of Bengal asked the Chief Commissioner's opinion on a proposal of the Commissioner of Chittagong to abolish the Hill Tippera outposts at the three places above named. The Commissioner alleged that they looked

Proposal by
Commissioner
of Chittagong
in 1887 to abo-
lish the Hill Ti-
ppera outposts.

more like a line of outposts to watch our line on their west than a line to defend their territory and Sylhet from the Lushais ; and he also said that the Maharaja kept up "advanced posts of hillmen further inland and that he thought it would suffice if "in the event of any raid taking places, these hill levies should give prompt intelligence to the nearest British frontier post."

10. The Deputy Commissioner of Sylhet and Commandant of the Frontier Police, who were consulted by the Chief Commissioner, both thought that the outposts might be abolished ; but the Deputy-Commissioner qualified his opinion with the suggestion that the Maharaja's responsibility for raids through his territory should be maintained, and that the advanced posts of hillmen should be kept up, and be required to report suspicious movements among the Lushais to the nearest British post.

The Chief Commissioner replied to the Government of Bengal, in February 1888, as follows :—

"In reply, I am to say that Mr. Fitzpatrick finds it was admitted on all hands, after the close of the Lushai campaign, that the Tippera State was bound to take its share in the protection of this frontier, that the posts it question were established by it at the instance of the British authorities after the fullest discussion of the question, and that the Chief commissioner does not think they should be altogether abolished."

"The Chief Commissioner, however, thinks they might be reduced in strength, say, to a guard of 12 or 15 men each. It was scarcely hoped at the time they were established that they should be of much service

for the purpose of actual resistance ; for that it was apprehended we should have to look to our own posts within the frontier, and this has proved to be the case. On the footing on which they are at present maintained by the Tippera State, they should be, as appears from a report recently received from Mr. Daly, Commandant of the Surma Valley Frontier Police Battalion of little or no use for the purpose of defence ; and it is to be feared that they are less likely now than before to be put on such a footing as would make them really efficient for this purpose.

“But it was considered at the time they were established that they would be useful as advanced posts of observation, which would communicate with our outposts, and the Chief commissioner thinks they could be made very useful in this way under a regular system of patrolling between them and our outposts ; while, if they were altogether abolished, not only should we be deprived of a source of information, but further it is to be feared that the Tippera State would completely lose whatever little sense it has hitherto displayed of its responsibility in connection with the protection of this frontier. Mr Fitzpatrick feels sure that in the absence of some establishment of this sort we should never get a word of information from that quarter as to the movements of the Lushais.

“In conclusion, I am to express a hope that, if the strength of the posts is reduced to the extent above suggested, the guards maintained there may be put on such an improved footing that they could at least usefully co-operate with the men of our outposts in the

event of a raid. They should receive distinct orders to communicate with the patrols of the nearest Sylhet posts, which daily pass them from within the frontier, and impart to them any information they may have regarding the movements of the Lushais. If his Honour the Lieutenant-Governor will cause orders in this sense to be issued, the Chief Commissioner will see that the needful orders are given to the Frontier Police in Sylhet."

When the outposts were first started, the nominal strength was fixed at 30, 35, and 40 men respectively.

11. The Bengal government, on being put in possession of the Chief Commissioner's views, submitted proposals for patrol communication, and orders were issued in accordance with these proposals to our own frontier posts in Sylhet in January last. Certain spots and days of the week are fixed for meeting and interchanging news.

Establishment
of patrol com-
munication be-
tween our posts
and those of
Hill Tippera.

CHAPTER III.—EXTRA PRECAUTIONS.

12. In the cold weather of 1883-84 there was a general feeling on the southern frontier, especially on the Cachar side, that the Lushais intended to raid on our territory. A description of what occurred at the time will be found in paragraph 101 of this Note. Some of the rumours spread were exaggerated or untrue, as was afterwards discovered ; but at the time there was a very real panic among the Kuki punjis and tea-gardens along the Cachar frontier, and it was considered by the authorities advisable to take precautions. In Cachar, a

Precautions
taken during
the Lushai
scare of 1883-84

body of 150 Frontier Police was pushed forward to Noarbund, to which place it was calculated intimation could be sent in six hours from Monierkhal or Chatta-chura, and in ten hours from Jhalnacheria ; and in Sylhet the Fatehkuli outpost was strengthened, and a wing of a native regiment sent to Fenchuganj. The Bengal Government was also moved to put the Hill Tippera authorities on their guard. As no further news of an alarming nature was received, the wing remained at Fenchuganj, and was finally withdrawn without advancing beyond that place.

The Rai Bahadur was sent up to Sonai Bazar in May 1884 to enquire. He reported a disturbed condition among the Lushais, and a probability of raids, which were however more likely to be made on Hill Tippera than in our territory. It was considered that a display of force was advisable ; and in the following cold season the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar accordingly marched along the frontier of the district from Jhalnacheria to Tipaimukh with 150 Frontier Police. The demonstration was said to be effective, and was followed by the arrival of deputations from different chiefs.

13. In December 1888, when raids Occurred on the Chittagong frontier, and when the disturbed condition of the outlying tribes rendered it possible, though not likely, that some of the many marauding parties might penetrate to our frontier, the Chief Commissioner discussed the question of more effectually protecting our districts with the local officers, and decided on taking the following precautions :—

(a) The out posts at Mynadhar, Monierkhal, and

Noarbund were strengthened by 5 men each, thus raising their garrisons to 2 havildars and 25 sepoy. This was done with the object of enabling them to send out without risk small detachments to neighbouring gardens, or to patrol in parties of some little strength.

- (b) A new outpost was established at Burancherra of 2 havildars and 15 men, to guard the new road through the Katakhal reserve. No stockade was erected for this outpost, but the guard occupied a garden godown.
- (c) The Chattachura guard was strengthened by 5 men, in order to enable it to assist in protecting neighbouring gardens.
- (d) A body of 60 Frontier Police under a subadar was marched along the Sylhet frontier to the Adampur post, whence it returned and took up a central position among the Sylhet outposts until the middle of March.

It was considered that the Sylhet outposts were too far from Silchar to be strengthened, in case of necessity, from the head-quarter reserve, and that the presence of the detachment in Sylhet would in other ways have a good effect.

14. The Chief Commissioner also considered it desirable to ascertain what aid was to be had from the Hill Tippera authorities, and the Bengal Government was asked what steps the Maharaja was taking to strengthen his defences, both on the east against the Lushai country and on the

Hill Tippera
called on to
co-operate.

north, where the Sylhet district was liable to be raided on through his territory. A reply was received, which showed that the Maharaja had strengthened the outposts in the south of his territory, but no information was obtained regarding precautions on his north and east. On the 12th March, the Government of Bengal telegraphed, in answer to a telegram from us, evoked by the necessity of withdrawing the Frontier Police detachment in Sylhet, to the effect that, as the raiding season was now over, special precautions seemed at present to be needless. The Sylhet detachment was then withdrawn.

Recently, a communication was received through the Bengal Government, which said that the same care had been taken for the protection of the northern as for the eastern and southern frontiers of the Tippera State ; that the outposts at Dharmanagar, Chirakuti, and Kamalpur were kept up with a strength of 39, 42, and 34 respectively ; and that arrangements had been made for the speedy conveyance of intelligence from the interior. The Assistant Political Agent at Agartala was, however, of the opinion that though the guards were of sufficient strength they were lacking in efficiency.

15. It was also thought advisable to draw the attention of the Manipur Durbar to the possibility of Lushai raids this season, and to enquire if they had any information on the subject. The Political Agent was requested to ascertain what posts or guards they had at present in the neighbourhood of Tipaimukh, and to suggest to the Durbar the desirability of strengthening them. It was found that there were no outposts nearer to the frontier than the thanas along

Manipur also
addressed.

the Cachar-Manipur road, which were all about three days' march from what the Manipuris considered to be their Lushai boundary. Of these thanas, the majority were only dak stages, the only important ones being Kalanaga, about 20 miles from Jhirighat, and Kowpum, about 42 miles from Manipur. Kowpum was in a plain, and fairly defensible ; but the stockade at Kalanaga had been allowed to rot, and could be easily surprised. The Durbar, however, promised to repair and strengthen it. The Political Agent also reported that there were several Kuki and Sukte villages south of the Manipur road, who were supposed to act as guards against Lushai inroads. The two principal of these are Sangam and Khongyang.

The only information that the Durbar had received was a report from Sangam that the Lushais were threatening to attack their village, and it was supposed by the Durbar that Poiboi's clan was referred to.

A suggestion that the Manipur State should send a force in the neighbourhood of Tipaimukh was objected to by the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar, on the grounds that it would be of no real use, and would be certainly regarded by the Lushais as a threat.

16. On first receipt of the information that dak communication was interrupted and that two Nagas had been shot at by Lushais near Kalanaga at the end of last May (see paragraph 133 below) the Political Agent telegraphed to report the occurrence, and to ask that the Cachar police might patrol the road up to Kalanaga and escort the mails until the Manipur sepoys could reach the spot.

Recent precautions, May and June 1889.

A force of Frontier Police was accordingly sent out

from Cachar and stationed at Makrong nadi, and strong patrols were told off to accompany the dak either way to Jhirighat and Godownghat. On the first intimation reaching Manipur, the Maharaja sent off 50 men to the scene of the outrage, and shortly after despatched 100 more to establish a post to the south of the Government road on the path leading from Nongjaibang thana to the Lushai villages.

On the arrival of the Manipur force the Frontier Police guard was withdrawn, but it was considered advisable to keep up our outpost at Jhirighat during the rains. The necessity of maintaining the latter guard had previously been thought of, owing to the uneasiness evinced by the inhabitants of the small punjis near this part of the frontier during last cold weather (see paragraph 95).

In submitting his report on the occurrence, the Political Agent stated his opinion that the Maharaja did not exercise any sufficient control over the villages lying in the south-west of Manipur, and said that there was no outpost south of the road, and that the thanas along it were in an utterly defenceless state. He also reported that, notwithstanding the promise given last cold weather, he had found the Kalanaga thana untouched when he passed by it in May last, and that only 11 sepoy were then stationed there. The Maharaja was at once asked to take measures to permanently strengthen this stockade.

It was again considered necessary to address the Maharaja after the recent Kamaldhar raid (see paragraph 133 below), with reference to the unprotected and disturbed condition of the country in that direction ;

and the Political Agent was then informed that we look to the Maharaja to keep order across the frontier, and that the Chief Commissioner would be glad to know that efficient arrangements are made by him for keeping himself fully informed of what goes on there from day to day and for protecting the people.

17. In the beginning of last month (June 1889), the Manager of the Dhubidhar Tea Estate represented that the attack on the Kamaldhar village and the firing at a Naga on the Manipur road proved that Lushais could pass through the jungle at this time of the year ; and he asked that a guard might be kept up at Mainadhar during the rains. The Chief Commissioner was of opinion that the Manipur State should afford protection from the danger threatened, which came from the Manipur side of the Barak ; and the Political Agent was again desired to impress on the Durbar their responsibility for movements of Lushais or others on their side of the frontier, and to ask that a detachment of 25 men might be sent from the new outpost near Nongjaibong to a place somewhere near the river opposite Mianadhar. The Durbar have promised to send the outpost. They also report that the Lushai path to Nongjaibong is no longer passable.

18. At the same time, Mr. Fitzpatrick considered the question as to the advisability of keeping up all the southern outposts in Sylhet and Cachar during the present rainy season ; and after consulting the

Brigadier-General, came to the conclusion that it would be sufficient to increase the guards at Chuttachura and Futèhkuli to their cold weather strength. Except in the case of Mynadhar and Jhalnacherra, neither the local authorities nor the planters had asked for any action of the kind to be taken ; and, as regards Jhalnacherra, the application, which was submitted some time ago and was admittedly based on the unfounded apprehensions of the garden coolies, was subsequently withdrawn. There were also serious objections to posting the guards at this season of the year, not only on the ground of the hardship it involves to the men and the very serious risk of health and life in outlying malarious places, but also because of the panic which any such unusual step is likely to create, especially among the coolies of the tea garden. Irrespective of these arguments, it was considered that there were no reasonable grounds for an apprehension of a raid. The Lushais are unlikely to start on any expedition before they have finished the reaping of their jhums, which occupies them well on into October ; and, like all other hillmen, they dread the climate of the plains in the rains. All previous experience shows that they do not commit raids in the rainy season. Mr. Fitzpatrick has, however, recorded his opinion that all the outposts should be fully manned by the 1st October in the coming cold weather.

The position of our frontier at the time of sending this note to press is therefore as follows :—

- (1) A guard at the hot-weather strength is kept up at Jhirighat.
- (2) Mynadhar itself is unguarded, but is protected by a Manipur outpost on the oppo-

side of the Barak.

- (3) Monierkhal, Jhalmacherra, and Oliviacherra are left unguarded.
- (4) Adampur, Lakhimamla, and Noarband are kept up at the ordinary strength of the rainy season.
- (5) Chattachura and Fatehkuli are raised to the ordinary cold-weather strength of 23 rank and file.

PART II.—THE LUSHAI CHIEFS, THEIR RELATIONS WITH EACH OTHER AND WITH OTHER TRIBES.

CHAPTER IV.—THE RELATIONS OF THE LUSHAIS WITH EACH OTHER

19. The following table shows the present positions of the Lushai villages, and the number of houses, the number of fighting men, and number of guns in each village, as ascertained by the Rai Bahadur on his visit to Changsil Bazar in January last :—

List showing number of houses in each Punji as given by Thalien Mamri, Lanvung Mantri, and Singapa Lushai.

Description of sites.	Name of the chiefs and punjis	Number of houses	Number of fighting men	Number of guns
West bank of Dhaleswar river, Thiltaka hill, west bank of Dhaleswar river and the most northerly point, one day's Lushai going from the mouth of Gutur river towards the south and one day's going from Changsil Bazar to-wards north-west.	Baniathangi Rani's punji, and her brother's son Thankupa Raja.	200	180	20

Description of sites.	Name of the chiefs and punjis	Number of houses	Number of fighting men	Number of guns
Adjacent to Baniathangi Rani's punji Thelteka hill.	Lalsabuta Raja's punji Tolera Raja lives here	150	120	10
Saitla hill, one prahar north-east of the above punji.	Minthang Raja's punji	100	80	5
One prahar west of this, Thingmuna hill.	Lenkhar Mantri's punji ...	100	90	10
Two day's south-west of Changsil Bazar, Ryek hill	Sailenpui Raja's punji, and his son Lal Lu ia's punji	400	300	80
East bank of Dhaleswar river				
Two days south of Changsil Bazar and two days south-east Sailenpur's punji, Lunghten hill	Lengpunga Raja's punji (Zara knaga lives in this punji)	500	40	100
West Bank of Sonai river and east bank of Dhaleswar river South of Rengti hill, and the most northerly point, one day south of Kalasib, Bhukmaituak hill.	Deceased Thampilal's son Dausuma Raja's punji	50		4
One day south of this punji and one prahar from the mouth of Khulicherra of Dhaleswar river, Rengtir Malbhum hill.	Lenkhunga Raja's punji (his brother Daukhuma lives here)	200	180	40
In and near the range of Lungmai hill.				
Two prahars south-west of Sopai Bazar, Lungma's hill.	Thangula Raja's punji .	100	80	25
Two prahars south-west of this punji and one day from Changsil Bazar, Sentlang hill.	Khalkam Raja's punji ..	500	400	100

9269.

[20]

Location of sites.	Name of the chiefs and punjis	Number of houses	Number of fighting men	Number of guns
One day south of this punji, Durtlang hill.	Lalpima Raja's punji (his brother Savunga lives here) (Lalsavongga)	150	120	40
One prahar west of this punji, Bhagantlang hill.	Thalien Mantri's punji	50	40	10
Two prahars south of this punji, Thantril hill.	Thanruma Raja's punji.....	400	300	30
One day south of this punji, Hulangaunun hill	Thanbang Raja's Punji	60	50	5
	Lengpunga Raja's punji lies two prahars south of this punji			
East bank of Sanai river. Two prahars south-east of Sonai Bazar, Tharilen hill.	Poiboi Raja's punji (this year Lalhei (Lalhi) Raja has joined this punji and Poiboi's son Lalruya also lives here)	400	350	100
One prahar south of this punji, Bai-tulsun hill.	Lalbura Raja's punji.....	300	250	60
One day south-east of Poiboi's punji, Balpui hill.	Lengkam Raja's punji.....	450	400	110
Two prahars from Lalbura's punji on the south, Darlang hill.	Bungteya Raja's punji.....	300	200	40
One day south-east of this punji, Maite hill.	Bungteya's mother punji (Dautau Raja's son). Kairangga lives here.	150	125	40
To prahars south of Lengkam Raja's punji, Salchal hill.	Lalruma Raja's punji.....	100	80	15

Description of sites.	Name of the chiefs and punjis	Number of houses	Number of fighting men	Number of guns
One prahar south of Poi-boi's punji, Lunpher hill.	Poi-boi's mother's punji (Lalhanga Raja lives here.)	150	110	30
Bhuta's sons. Four days south-east of Changsil Bazar, and three days south of Sonai Bazar, Rullam hill.	Lunglema Raja's punji with his half brother Laloya his cousin Thangvraga's son. Thandang lives here.	300	250	125
Two days east of this punji, Kahai hill.	Kairuma Raja's punji	400	350	140
Two prahars south of Lungama's punji and four and a half days from Changsil Bazar Khabal hill.	Nikama Raja's punji.....	200	150	50

The distance from one place to another recorded in this table is according to Lushai going.

20. The relationship which the chiefs in the above table bear to each other is shown by the following tree, in which the names of existing chiefs are entered in *italics*. It will be observed that, with the exception of Minthang, Dausuma, and the two Mantris, all the Lushai chiefs are more or less related to each other.

21. There are two parties in Lushai-land, generally alluded to in correspondence as the Eastern and Western clans, who are at feud with each other, and have been for many years. The progress of this feud showing the Chiefs who took part in it since its first commencement, is briefly sketched in the following paragraphs.

22. For the first three years, after the expedition of 1871-72, the Lushais seem to have remained quiet, as no rumours of hostilities found their way to Cachar ; and though in January 1875 vague reports were received of hostile movements among the more Southern Chiefs, actual fighting is said not to have occurred.

Early in 1877, fighting seems to have broken out for the first time, the cause of quarrel being the right of ownership to certain *jhum* lands, which different parties were approaching from different ends. Several encounters appear to have taken place. In the first, the belligerents were Khalkam and Poiboi ; in the second, which occurred in February of that year, Lalbura was the aggressor and Sukpilal the person attacked ; while on the third occasion, in the following April. Poiboi and Sukpilal were the contending parties. In the last encounter Sukpilal is said to have lost two followers. Further, some men were said to have been captured by the one side, and some mithans seized by the other.

23. At this period, the Eastern and Western Chiefs are spoken of as being divided into two parties for the first time. On the eastern side were Lalbura, Poiboi, Lengkam, Chunglena (since deceased), and Bungteya with Bhenkuia (a northern Howlong, since deceased), Savunga (a Sylu), and Sringalbura (unknown) ; while on the western side were Sukpilal (since deceased), Khalkam, Lengpunga, and Sailenpui with the minor Chiefs Darmangpui (died in 1881), Mintang, Thangula, Sunga (formerly a dependent of Sukpilal's step-mother), Pibuk (since

deceased), and Kantangpui.

Both parties were reported to have fortified their villages and prepared themselves for emergencies.

Lalhai, it was said, preserved a strict neutrality, and was in consequence allowed access to all the bazars.

24. In September 1877, Lengkam attacked Khalkam, and carried off 15 heads to avenge the theft of Fighting in some salt which the latter had taken from 1877 and 1878. him ; and in the following month Lalhai appears to have been drawn into the quarrel against Poiboi, and 35 of his people immigrated to our territory for fear of that chief.

Early in 1878, 12 men of Lalruma's village were caught by Khalkam at the Lengvoi salt springs ; he stripped and let them go. Soon after this, some of Lengkam's people went to the Sonai Bazar, and were caught by Khalkam, who imprisoned them for one night and let them go also. Two days after this, Poiboi and Lengkam attacked Khalkam, burned 10 houses in his village, killed ten men, and took 6 prisoners. In return Khalkam attacked Sengvong (now deserted), a village under Poiboi, and captured 5 women and killed 1 old man.

25. In July and August 1877, both sides appealed to the Deputy-Commissioner, Cachar, for assistance against the other, which was refused ; and at the end of the year they again applied ineffectually to the Deputy-Commissioner to mediate between them.

In October of the following year, Poiboi asked the Deputy-Commissioner for assistance against Lalhai ;

and in December of the same year, Khalkam sent down for aid against the Eastern tribes. In this latter month the mantris of many of the Chiefs were in Silchar, and they were strongly advised by the Deputy-Commissioner to stop their quarrels. The mantris asserted that the constant fighting was highly unpopular among the people and due entirely to the jealousy of the Chiefs. (In this connection also see paragraph 98 below).

26. In April 1879, Lengpunga and one of his brothers started to attack Poiboi and Lengkam, and another party went further south to raid on Lalbura ; but actual hostilities were prevented by the intermediation of Poiboi's grandmother, whose village lay between the belligerents. In June of the same year, Sailenpui and others again started to attack Poiboi and Lengkam ; but they also turned back, this time on account of a rumour that troops were being despatched from Cachar to Tipaimukh.

During 1880, petty raids between the Eastern and Western clans continued ; and in September the Western Chiefs raided on a Rani, whose name was not identified at the time, but who was said to be a partizan of Poiboi and Lengkam, and killed 10 men and carried off a woman captive.

In the beginning of 1881, Sukpibal died, and his death encouraged Poiboi and Lengkam to prosecute

REFERENCES.

Paragraphs 22 to 25.—Proceedings,—February and November 1875, April and May 1877, and April 1879, File 44 of 1877. Deputy-Commissioner's Report for 1877-78.

Paragraph 26.—Proceedings, September 1879 and November 1880. Report for 1879-80.

17947

the quarrel, which it was supposed might otherwise have been settled.

27. In the same cold weather, Major Boyd, Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar, in his report on a recent tour through these hills, enumerated the partisans of the Eastern side as follows :—Chunglena (dead), Poiboi, Lalruma, Lalcheri (unknown), Lalhanga, Bungteya, Lengkam and Lalbura ; and he thought that in the event of further hostilities Lalhai would probably remain neutral.

Shortly after Sukpilal's death, his sons began to look round for external assistance ; and in April of 1881, Sailenpui and Lengpunga entered into negotiations with a Poi Chief who was to help them in attacking Poiboi.

28. It was in this month that Lengkam, Poiboi and Chunglena attacked and burnt the village of Thangula, and killed 150 of his people and took 39 prisoners. The Deputy-Commissioner gave the following account of their subsequent proceedings :—

“The raiders carried with them forty heads of the slain as a trophy, and it is curious to note what they did with these heads on their return to the *punjis*. They all assembled in the village of Chunglena, and there the heads were arranged in a row, and an earthen vessel filled with rice, curry and boiled eggs, and a bamboo *chunga* containing liquor were placed by each head, while the victors drank and danced round them. This food was given, not out of derision, but in order that the disembodied spirits might not haunt the victors, but travel in peace to the city of the dead that

lies in the far south. Subsequently, a small tree was planted in front of the Raja's house, and the heads hung on its branches ; the soldiery then proceeded to dance round the tree, firing blank ammunition at the heads. After this, the fighting-men who had actually brought away the heads were publicly decorated, each man's hair being bound with a thick cord, at the ends of which knots of black and red thread were fastened. These threads are highly esteemed by the Lushais, and are carefully preserved and transmitted to their descendants as proofs of the prowess of their ancestors."

Thangula escaped the massacre and fled to Khalkam's punji ; but shortly after left it on account of the sickness which prevailed there, and sought refuge in Lalhai's village. Lalhai, however, betrayed him soon after to Poiboi and Lengkam, and delivered him over to these Chiefs on their demand ; and Thangula was detained captive for a time in Poiboi's punji, but eventually effected his escape. It is to be supposed from this that Lalhai had decided to throw in his lot with the Eastern clans.

29. Towards the close of the year the Eastern Chiefs attempted retaliatory measures, but without effecting any great counterblow. In October, Khalkam made an abortive attack on Lalhai ; and in December, Thangula and Lenkhunga made a more successful raid on the same Chief, and carried off his two wives, besides securing Rs. 5,000 worth of loot,—ivory, gongs, &c., and Rs. 500 in cash. Khalkam put one of the women in Dausuma's punji, which was then a small village of 25 or 30 houses ; and not long after,

Attempts at
retaliation by
the Western
clans.

Poiboi and Lalhai succeeded in effecting a surprise and rescued the woman, besides carrying off three of Dausuma's men as captives.

Shortly after this the pressure of famine began to be felt, and Poiboi, Khalkam and Lalhai met and agreed to a cessation of hostilities, while they sent to Cachar for food. Peace was maintained until the spring of the following year, when all fear of famine was at an end.

30. During 1883 and the cold weather of 1883-84, rumours of meeting of Chiefs were rife, and it was at one time supposed that they intended to Preparations for fighting in 1884. raid on our territory (see the paragraph below on the Lushai scare), but it was afterwards ascertained that they were more likely to attack each other. A meeting of the Western Chiefs was held at Khalkam's punji, and a proposal to attack the Eastern clans was apparently allowed to drop, because Khalkam at that time was busy moving his village to a new site and required all his fighting men for the purpose. In the early part of 1884, Thangula had his revenge on a mantri of Poipoi, by name Tungalena, who had illtreated him when he was a captive at Poiboi's. He caught the mantri in his own Punji and at once put him to death.

REFERENCES

Paragraph 27.—Proceedings, April and May 1881.

Paragraph 28.—Deputy-Commissioner's Report for 1881-82. Proceedings, June, 1883.

Paragraph— 30 and 31.—Proceedings, November 1884.

31. It was at about this time, i.e. in May 1884, that the Rai Bahadur who was sent up to the Sonai Bazar observed the fact that at that period the common people of both sides went about freely to the bazars and to each other's punjis, and that it was only the Rajas, mantris, and other chief people who were afraid to do so. In the cold weather of 1884, the military promenade along their frontier no doubt diverted the Chiefs' attention from internal hostilities ; for no further news of fighting was received, and from this date all active hostilities appear to have been abandoned by both parties. During 1885, 1886 and 1887, everything was reported quiet ; but owing to the enmity existing between Poiboi and Khalkam, it was considered unsafe to re-open the Sonai Bazar.

32. In October 1888, it was reported that Khalkam had threatened to attack Lalhai, who had been forced to move further west, owing to pressure from the Suktes, and that Poiboi said he would help Lalhai. Further news said that Lalhai had gone to live with Poiboi in the same punji. In the following month the mantris of Khalkam and Thangula declared in Silchar that their masters had no intention of quarrelling with Poiboi ; but in January 1889, Khalkam repudiated his mantri's statements, and objected to Poiboi ; Lengkam or Lalbura having any share in the Sonai Bazar. He also said these Chiefs had moved west and occupied his land ; and it was evident that he still entertained lively feelings of hostility towards them.

33. Thus, though there have been no actual

Present state of feeling hostilities among the Lushai Chiefs since the beginning of 1884, and despite Khalkam's statement to the Rai Bahadur in January last to the effect that he and his brothers were now on good terms with the Eastern Chiefs, there is every reason to believe that there are even now two hostile parties in Lushai land who would be ready to attack each other whenever any great advantage would be gained by doing so, and that the Western party is fairly represented by the first twelve, or perhaps fourteen, villages on the list in paragraph 19 above and the Eastern party by the next seven.


BHUTA'S SONS

Relations of the other chiefs with Bhuta's sons 34. As regards Bhuta's sons, we know next to nothing. In January last when the Rai Bahadur visited the Changsil bazar Khalkam said that in former times Lunglena used to consult him or his brothers in all his movements, but that now he does not. Bhuta himself died long ago in the autumn of 1876. A report reached us, in February 1879, that there had been some fighting, in which the losses on either side were small, between Bungteya, Lalbura and Poiboi on the one side and Kairuma on the other ; and again in January 1881, Lunglena is said to have made a demonstration against the village of Bungteya ; but we have no other information of their relations with the Lushais, and we can only judge from these incidents and also from the fact that men of their villages frequent the Changsil Bazar, that the sons of Bhuta are more or less at enmity with the Eastern Lushais and friends of those living to the west.

CHAPTER V.—RELATIONS OF THE LUSHAIS WITH THE HOWLONGS AND SYLUS.

35. On the relations between the Lushais on the one side and the Howlongs and Sylus on the other, our knowledge is again admittedly defective ; and no doubt the Chittagong authorities would be able to add a great deal to the few items of information that have from time to time filtered through to Cachar. The subject is one of some interest at the present time, inasmuch as it is owing to their connection with these tribes that Khalkam and his brothers have recently been charged with taking part in various raids in the Chittagong direction.

The tree below will suffice to enable the remarks following it to be understood :—



36. From our earlier records it is evident that the Western Lushai Chiefs were always more or less at enmity with the Sylus and How-

REFERENCES

Paragraph 32.—Deputy-Commissioner's Diary, October 1888, Files 399 and 742, of 1888 and 267 of 1889.

Paragraph 34.—Proceedings, February 1879 and April 1881. File 267 of 1889.

long and that during Sukpilal's lifetime neither he nor his sons entered into very close relations with them. In June 1873, it was known that Sukpilal had closed the Changsil Bazar to Bhenkuia, a northern Howlong Chief (died in 1881), and that in consequence the latter had allied himself to Poiboi and sent his men to Tipaimukh ; and in the following month Sukpilal asked us to assist him in attacking Bhenkuia and Savunga, but this request was not acceded to.

We have no information as to how hostilities progressed until May 1876, when we hear of a successful *coup* made by Sailenpui, who seized 35 guns from Bhenkuia's people, in return, it was said, for a similar theft from his men.

37. About this time it would seem that the Western Lushais had joined in common cause with the Sylus of Savunga against Bhenkuia and the Northern Howlongs, and in October of this year news was received that Lengpunga and Laljika had successfully raided on a southern village called Pugying. The village was under Bhenkuia ; and the cause of quarrel was that it was formerly under Laljika, who wanted it back. No resistance was made, and no one was killed , but 40 or 50 of the inhabitants, 36 guns, and much booty were carried off. A month or so after the raid, Sukpilal, Lengpunga, Laljika, Savunga and Bhenkuia all met at Laljika's village ; and it was then decided that Pugying should remain subject to Laljika. Accordingly, all the captives and spoils, except 3 guns and a gong which Sukpilal retained, were returned.

It was also said that on this occasion the dispute

between Sukpilal, on the one side, and Bhenkuia and Savunga, on the other, regarding land, had been arranged and a common boundary decided on. It is evident, however, that the land question was too severe a strain on their friendly relations for the truce to last for any length of time, and in April of the following year news was received that both Bhenkuia and Savunga had allied themselves to Lalbura and the Eastern Lushai clans. Probably as a counterpoise to this alliance, Sukpilal joined league with Saipuia, a Southern Howlong ; and in May 1878, it was reported that four persons had been carried off from Lalbura's village by the latter Chief.

38. In 1880, Bhenkuia and others announced their intention of crossing the common boundary fixed by Sukpilal in 1876, viz., the watershed of the Bolte Tlang, and of cultivating land reserved by the Lushais for their *jhums* ; and Sukpilal's death in the following cold season no doubt encouraged them in taking active measures towards enforcing their demands ; for in February 1881, Sailengpui reported that they were shortly about to advance, and that bloodshed would follow. A letter was sent by the Deputy-Commissioner, Cachar, to the Political Agent, Chittagong Hills, to ask him to restrain the Howlongs and sylus from carrying out their object, and apparently this missive had the desired effect of preventing hostilities, for no further news of fighting was received on this side.

During the following cold weather, the famine had the same subduing effect on these hostilities as it had on the Lushai feuds ; and the sons of Sukpilal ap-

parently maintained a semi-amicable position towards the Southern Chiefs, not allowing them to visit the Changsil Bazar, but suppling them with rice from it and making a profitable trade by retailing it to them at a higher price.

39. Nothing further was heard of fighting between the parties for the next two or three years, and it may be that Bhenkuia's death at the close of 1881 robbed the Southern party of their leader. The land question, however, again cropped up, and was the cause of fresh hostilities. According to the account given by the Lushai Chiefs, an attempt was made to effect a further settlement of the *jhuming* rights on Bolte Tiang hill ; but was brought to a speedy termination by the treachery of Savunga and Lalgura, who murdered one of the four mantris sent by the Lushais to negotiate and turned the others back. The date of this event is uncertain, but it was probably during 1883 ; for in the following year, Lengpunga, out of revenge for the murder, intercepted and seized Rs. 300 worth of presents which Lalgura was sending to a Chief, named Vanhailiang, in order to arrange a marriage between the latter's daughter and his son.

40. In the following year, Sailenpui seized and detained six of Savunga's men who had come up to purchase rice. News of this event was communicated

REFERENCES

Paragraph 36 —Proceedings, November 1875 and June 1876.

Paragraph 37.—Proceedings, November 1876, April 1877, May 1878 and File of 1878.

Paragraph 38.—Proceedings, April 1881.

Paragraph 39.—Deputy-Commissioner's Reports for 1884-85 and 1885-86.

to the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar by the Chittagong authorities ; but in the form in which the Sylus thought fit to put their complaint, the real facts were much garbled. Lengpunga, they said, had sent to Savunga and Dalgura to information that the wedding presents would be returned if messengers were sent to receive them ; and on these Chiefs despatching 11 persons (8 men and 3 women) for the purpose, Sailenpui, they said, had seized and confined them. The Deputy-Commissioner had the six men released ; and in the following September the Chittagong authorities reported that the quarrel between Sailenpui and Savunga had been made up ; and from this date peaceful relations have apparently been maintained by Sukpilal's sons with the members of Savunga's family.

In 1886-87, it was reported that Savunga and Lalgura had left their own punji and started a new one close to Sailenpui's ; but they were attacked when there by two Chiefs, Benkhaia* and Sangchung, of the SemaikachaK tribe (both unknown here), and in consequence took refuge in Sailenpui's territory.

41. In June 1888, intimation was received from Chittagong that Lalgura had taken up his abode near the village of Vanoya's widow (a Sylu), and that Laljika was living in it. It was then said that Bhenkuia's sons intended to attack the village ; but in the following October the Chittagong authorities again reported that the probable raiders were Sukpilal's son Lengpuia (probably) Lengpunga) and Kangsova, a Northern Howlong Chief (probably Khamliena).

Peace arranged
in 1885.

Accusation
made against
Lengpunga
in 1888.

On the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar sending up a messenger to enquire, he was unable to gather any news showing a probability of any of Sukpila's sons raiding anywhere. It was reported, however, that a man of Lengpunga's had fled south to Jatira's punji (unknown here), and, on Jatira refusing to deliver up the man, Lengpunga had seized 9 metnas and killed one of his villagers.

42. In December 1888, it was again reported from Chittagong that Khalkam and Khamliena had committed the raid on Pakuma Rani's village. In the papers, the second Chief's name was inserted as Khamlera, son of Lengma ; but on applying to the Government of India for further information to enable his identity to be ascertained, it turned out that Khamliena the son of Lalgura was meant.

Accordingly the Rai Bahadur was sent up to Changsil in the following January, and got the following explanation from Khalkam, viz , that Sailenpui had married a daughter of Lalgura's some years ago ; that three months previously the latter's son, Khamliena, had gone with ten houses to live in Sailenpui's village, and that Thanthuama, a minor son of the deceased Laljika (brother of Lalgura) with four houses had come to live with Khalkam ; and that it is because of these desertions the people of Lalgura's village have brought the present charges against him Lalgura himself, Khalkam said, was dead.

RELATIONS OF THE LUSHAIS WITH THE POIS OR SHENDUS.

43. So far as our records enable us to form an

opinion, it appears that the Lushai Chiefs have had but little to do with the Pois or Shendus. On only three occasions since the expedition is any mention made of them. The first of these was in September 1876, when Sukpial suspected an inferior Chief, Laltuk, who lived near Bhuta, of inclining to the Pois. Accordingly he and his men equipped for war started for Laltuk's village, but what he did there did not transpire. The second occasion was in May 1878, when it was reported that Sukpial's old village which he left to his son, Lengpunga, had gone over to the Pois, probably with a view to making a joint attack on Lalbura and Poiboi. Nothing further was heard about the matter, and it is probable that the news got muddled in the transmission ; and that the origin of the story was that Sukpial's people had applied to the Pois for aid against the Eastern clans.

The other occasion in which the Pois are mentioned is in April 1881, when the mantri of Lalsavunga visited the Changsil Bazar in company with the mantri of a Poi Chief, and gave out that an arrangement had been made with the Poi Chief to join them

* The Deputy Commissioner Cachar, thought Benkhain might be the same as Vanoya a Sylu, but he died in 1882-83. It may be that the people on Vanoya's village were referred to, as the name of a Chief is often used to imply the men of his village ; and this is especially noticeable in cases where the ruling Chief is an infant.

REFERENCES

- Paragraph 40.—Deputy-Commissioner's Reports for 1885-86 and 1886-87.
 „ 41.—File 742 of 188 and 1,007 of 1888.
 „ 42.—File 1,007 of 1888 and 257 of 1889.
 „ 43.—Proceedings, November 1876, June 1878 and May 1881, and Report for 1878-79.

in a raid on Poiboi's punji—the consideration being Rs 300, which was in course of collection in from Sailenpui, Lengpunga and others.

The Poi alliance does not however seem to have been of much assistance to the Western Chiefs, who at this time were getting much the worse of the quarrel with the Eastern tribes.

Some of the raiders on the chengri valley last cold weather were said to tie their hair on top of their head in front, and if this be the case and if it turn out that Lengpunga also was concerned in the affair, it would seem that he has joined alliance with the Shendus.

Some of the inhabitants of Poiboi's village are said to domiciled Pois.

CHAPTER VI.—RELATIONS OF THE LUSHAIS WITH THE SUKTES

44. Prior to the expedition of 1871-72, the Eastern Lushai Chiefs seem to have been well able to hold their own against the Suktes ; and during the expedition the Cachar column passed, between stations 17 and 18, the Sukte village of Engow, which had been settled there by Vonolel, no doubt from the captives taken in his successful raids. The inhabitants complained of the treatment they experienced at the hands of the Lushais, and were glad to surrender to the British force.

Prior and subsequent to the expedition of 1871-72.

Our operations seem to have broken the power of the Eastern Lushai Chiefs and to have encouraged the Suktes to attack them, for from that time the Suktes have been constantly pressing on the Lushais and

driving them further west. In may 1873, the Rai Bahadur visited the country of the Eastern Lushai and reported that even then not a single Lushai village of importance was left to the east of the track taken by the expeditionary force.

In February 1875, Lengkam sent down information that Manipur was about to attack the Suktes and asked for an order from us to go in at them from his side. For several reasons it was considered advisable to have nothing to do with the matter. In the event of the Suktes defeating Manipur, a not improbable contingency, they would turn on Lengkam, who would then come to us for aid or redress.

Throughout that year reports of hostilities between the Lushais and Suktes were received, and one report said the latter were defeated and had been forced to pay a tribute in guns and cattle. At the same time it was stated that the Lushais were being closely pressed on the South and East by the Suktes, with the result that they were moving North and West.

In the early parts of 1876, rumours were received that a party of Lushais under Bhuta had advanced to attack the Suktes, and had levied tribute from them ; and in November of the same year it was again reported that the Lushais and Suktes were still at enmity, and "ready to kill each other whenever they come into contact."

During 1877 and 1878, we received no intimation of fighting between the Lushais and Suktes, but the Northward movement of the former was again reported. It is possible that there may have been a cessation of the hostilities at this period for in February 1879

it was reported that "the Suktes and Lushais generally seem for once to be on terms of peace with each other."

45. During the cold weather of 1879-80, when the mantris of Poiboi and Lengkam did not attend in Silchar, as usual, to pay their respects to the Deputy-Commissioner, he caused enquiries to be made of those Chiefs, and was informed that the cause of this neglect, was the attitude of the Suktes, which rendered it inadvisable for the headmen to absent themselves from their villages. In this and in the following year, the Lushais were evidently getting the worst of the quarrel ; and in February 1880 news was received from Tipaimukh that the Suktes and brought forward a claim against the Eastern Lushai Chiefs for tribute, which it was said would be resisted, forcibly if necessary, by the Lushais ; while again in January 1881 it was mentioned incidentally that the Suktes from time to time harassed the Lushais and pressed on them from the East.

46. In January 1883, a party of Suktes who were out on a plundering expedition fell upon the Tipaimukh Bazar on the day when the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar happened to be there, and carried off some property and

Hostile
attitude of the
Suktes in
1879-80 and
following years.

Sukte raid on
the Tipaimukh
Bazar in 1883.

REFERENCES

- Paragraph 44.—Proceedings, February and November 1875, March, May and November 1876, and February 1879 Reports for 1874-75, and 1875-76.
- „ 45.—Proceedings, April 1880 and May 1881. File (without number) of 1880, Report for 1870-80.
- „ 46.—June and November 1883.

a boy. An account of this incident has been given under the Tipaimukh Bazar, and from that will be seen that at the time the raid was made the Suktes had probably no idea the Deputy-Commissioner was on the spot, and were merely prosecuting their feuds against the Eastern Chiefs.

47. Perhaps the prompt measures taken to identify the offenders in this case—and the somewhat heavy retribution which they were called on to make—induced the Suktes to abstain from further attacks on our Lushais for the next few years ; for nothing was again heard of them till 1887-88, when the followers of Singkami Raja attacked Lalhai's village, which was then 7 miles south of Tipaimukh, and killed 24 men and women, while the Suktes themselves lost only six men. In Consequence of this raid, both Poiboi and Lalhai moved further west, and in August 1888 it was reported that Lalbura also had moved his punji for the same reason. It is clear that the Lushais think themselves no longer able to cope with their more powerful enemies.

In October 1888, one of the many alarming rumours, to which this frontier seems to be especially liable, was treated with the indifference which it apparently deserved. It appears that some Lushais of Poiboi's and Lengkam's punjis reported to the head-constable at Monierkhal registering station that Jupao, a Sukte Chief, was about to raid on British territory with 1,000 men ; but on Mr. Daly, Commandant, Frontier Police, making enquiries from men of these two Chiefs who were in Silchar, they denied all knowledge of the matter, and no further information has been

received as to how the report arose or on what circumstances it was founded.

PART III.—OUR RELATIONS WITH THE LUSHAIS.

CHAPTER VII.—THE BAZARS.

48. The history of our dealings with the Lushai Chiefs is to a great extent interwoven with that of the markets which our traders keep up in Lushai land, and it will perhaps be best to begin the subject of our relations with the Lushais by a brief narrative of the events connected with each of the three bazars. These are the Tipaimukh Bazar on the Barak, where the Tipai falls into it ; the Sonai Bazar on the Sonai River ; and the Changsil Bazar on the Dhaleswar.

Position of the
bazars.

The precise date of their establishment is unknown, but the latter two are spoken of before the expedition of 1871-72. In the General Administration Report for 1874-75, the following mention is made of them :—

“Three bazars have been established of recent years in the Lushai country, beyond our border, which are supplied with goods by native traders from Cachar. They are increasing gradually in size and importance, but their growth is somewhat checked by the exactions imposed on the traders by the Chiefs.”

THE TIPAIMUKH BAZAR

49. For the first few years after the expedition, the Tipaimukh Bazar appears to have thriven well, and an old Report of 1873 shows that at that period it was even resorted to by men from remote southern villages, such as those of Bhenkuia and Savunga, but

The condition
of the bazar in
earlier years,
1872 to 1875

later on complaints are heard of the failure of the rubber supply and the consequent falling off of trade. In the cold season of 1874-75, it was reported that the whole rubber supply of the Eastern Lushai country was exhausted, and that in consequence the Lushais had to resort to the south of our district and Manipur, where they were seen in considerable numbers tapping the rubber-trees and obtaining the further means for purchasing articles which had then become almost a necessity to them in the shops of the traders at the bazar. Notwithstanding these depredations, it was said that trade was at a very low ebb at this period, and, in May 1875, there were only three shops left at the Bazar.

A request for
more bazars.
Poiboi's warn-
ing to turbulent
Lushais

50. During the course of 1875-76, the Chiefs, Poiboi and Lushai, sent in mantries with *nazars* of elephant tusks to the Deputy-Commissioner, and with the request that new bazars might be established near them. This, however, was refused, as it was considered that the one at Tipaimukh was sufficient.

In the cold weather of that year an incident occurred, which, whatever other aspects it may present, is at any rate illustrative of the desire of the Chiefs to secure the shopkeepers from molestation. On a complaint being made by some of the traders that certain Lushais had attempted to extort presents from them,

REFERENCES

Paragraph 47.—Report for 1887-88. Files 399 and 742 of 1888.

Paragraph 49.—Proceedings, November 1875.

Paragraph 50.—Proceedings, March and June 1876 and File of 1876.

Poiboi at once sent his mantri to the bazar and had the offenders warned ; and in order to deter others from following their example, the mantri left behind him a rope and a stick, with instructions that any quarrelsome Lushai was to be tied with the rope and driven with the stick to Poiboi's village, there receive the punishment which he deserved ; and it was said that the effect of showing the rope and stick to turbulent Lushais at the bazar was in every way satisfactory.

51. In April 1876, there were six shops at the bazar ; but the traders complained that the supply of rubber had fallen off, and that prices were so low that very little profit was derived from the trade in comparison with former years.

And here it may be noted that, except during the first few years after the expedition, when the rubber trees were recklessly overtapped and numbers died in consequence, it has been a constant cry from the shopkeepers that trade is so unprofitable as to render the immediate probability of their permanent withdrawal. The truth appears to be that the earlier years referred to formed a period of a trader's ideal bliss, when the supply of rubber was unlimited, when Calcutta prices were ascendant, and when the Lushais had not yet learnt the value of the article which they were so eager to barter in exchange for the traders' goods. In comparison with those times, the routine trade of later years may indeed have seemed irksome, but there has nearly always been sufficient profit to induce them to venture on, in spite of heavy rents and even personal dangers.

52. At this period it would seem that no fixed

Request to
move the bazar
into British
territory.

rates of the rents to be levied by the Chiefs had been laid down by the Deputy-Commissioner, and that the matter was one between the Chiefs and the traders. In consequence it is perhaps not surprising if the Chiefs were occasionally exorbitant in their demands. Evidence of this is more common later on, and it finally led to the closing of the bazars in 1883. An example occurred in October 1876, when two Chiefs, Lengkam and Tantow, complained of Poiboi's exactions, and explained that, owing to these, the bazar would never flourish where it was. They therefore asked for its removal into British territory, to a spot at the mouth of the Lushai-khal, where the Chiefs would no longer be able to levy rents. Their request was refused, as the Chief Commissioner considered "that a bazar on our extreme border, frequented by people from beyond the limits of our territory, would be a very objectionable feature, and be sure to lead to complications."

In this earlier years, the history of this bazar seems to have been singularly uneventful. In January 1877 there were five shops, and 111 maunds of rubber were taken during that months ; but in March it was again said that trade continued to decrease owing to the exhaustion of the rubber supply. In the same month the Rai Bahadur, in a report on the condition of the Lushais, remarked that one result of the feud between the Eastern and western tribes was that the people of Poibol & c., were not allowed access to the Sonai and Changsil Bazar, nor the people of Sukpilal, Khal-kam, &c., to the Tipaimukh Bazar.

53. The first incident of importance in connection

with this bazar occurred in the following June, when it was deserted by the traders. The reason for their doing so was as follows. The Manipur Darbar applied for and received permission to send a deputation to the Eastern Lushais with a view to securing the maintenance of their peaceable attitude towards that state. A fuller account of the proceedings of this deputation is given in Chapter XI. below, and it is sufficient to state here that it went to Poiboi's village with one of the bazar shop-keepers as a guide, and was well-received by Poiboi, who, however, dissuaded the Manipuris from going on to Lengkam's village, though the latter had sent men to escort them. On Lengkam hearing of their visit to Poiboi, he assumed that an intentional insult was being put upon him, and sent three of his mantris to the delegates, when the latter returned to the bazar, with threatening messages, and was careful to explain that the only reason which exempted them from attack was the presence of "a man of the sahib", i.e., the shop-keeper with their party. The delegates succeeded in pacifying the mantris with presents, and the latter then demanded rent from the traders at the bazar, which was willingly given. Almost directly after another party came down from Lengkam's village headed by some of this household slaves and demanded further *shidha* (rent), saying that Lengkam was convinced from the presence of the shop-keeper with the delegates that the traders were a

REFERENCES

Paragraph 51.—Proceedings, June 1876

Paragraph 52.—Proceedings, November 1876.

Paragraph 53.—Proceedings, July 1877.

party to the affront put on him. In spite of remonstrances, the traders were put outside their shops, from each of which about four maunds of salt were taken. The traders then deserted the bazar in a body.

54. Matters remained in abeyance till the following January, by which time the Chiefs had leisure to grasp the folly of Lengkam's action. In that month the mantris of Poiboi and Lengkam approached the Deputy-Commissioner with *nazars*, and asked that the bazar might be re-opened, saying that they were empowered to place the matter unreservedly in the Deputy-Commissioner's hands and to abide by his decision. The Deputy-Commissioner, after consulting with the traders, took Rs. 30 from the mantris, and distributed it among the shop-keepers who had been robbed, and "made arrangements for the speedy resumption of trade at Tipai."

The Deputy-Commissioner, in submitting a report on his proceedings, said that the sum paid as compensation was not large, but the instance was important as providing a precedent for the principle that the Chiefs must be held responsible for any acts of petty oppression committed towards our subjects by their followers.

The Deputy-Commissioner's visit to the bazar in January 1881.

55. Six shops were in existence in the following May, but trade was said to be still falling off.

During 1879 and 1880, nothing worthy of record happened in connection with this bazar, except that in February of the former year an application was made by Poiboi and Lengkam that a supply of rice might be

sent up to the bazar, as the inhabitants of one of Poiboi's villages had been unable to cut their crops in the previous year owing to hostilities with the western tribes. The Deputy-Commissioner gave orders to the traders to take up more rice.

In January 1881, the Deputy-commissioner, Major Boyd, visited the bazar. He found that the mantris of Chunglena (since dead), a younger brother of Poiboi who had established a punji within two miles of Tipaimukh, evinced a readiness to assist and protect the traders at the bazar to the best of their power. He noticed that trade, which was entirely in the hands of Manipuris, was "at a very low ebb," and was informed that scarcely any rubber had been brought in that season. The rents were at this time divided between Lengkam, Chunglena, and Poiboi.

On this occasion the Deputy-Commissioner arranged some little differences between the Chiefs and the traders. The traders on the one hand complained that many of the Lushais took their rubber for sale to Lakhipur, and the mantris for their part at once agreed to sell it at the bazar, provided that the same price was paid for it as in Lakhipur. The traders also complained that when taking their monthly rent of salt the Lushais rammed it down with their fists in the basket which formed the standard measure, and after some discussion it was arranged that a basket of salt should be held to mean as much as it could be made to hold by judicious shaking only.

In the following may the traders left the bazar for the time, as trade was completely stopped.

56. In the cold weather of 1881-82, when a

famine was imminent in Lushai-land, traders were encouraged to send up rice, and a Government godown established at the bazar with a guard in charge. The Eastern Chiefs, however, resented the posting of the guard, and professed to be afraid that it would lead to the annexation of their country ; so, after ascertaining that the traders were not alarmed for their safety, the guard was withdrawn, leaving only a head-constable and a native clerk to keep the account of the store-house and to register traffic and report events. The store was withdrawn in June, but the head-constable remained on in charge of the bazar.

57. On the 3rd May 1882, the deceased Chunglena's punji, which, as has been noted above, was only 2 miles from the bazar, was raided on, and lost 25 of the inhabitants in killed, 7 in wounded, and 14 more who were taken away captive. In addition to these losses, Rs. 700 worth of property was looted and 11 huts were destroyed by fire. The raiders were Paithe Kukis, who had some 50 or 60 years previously emigrated into the Lushai country, owing to scarcity of food, fear of the Suktes, &c., &c. Year after year, however, the Lushais became more exacting in their demands on these refugees, whom they regarded as their lawful prey ; and at last the Kukis, about a month previous to the raid, had seized advantage of the weakness and disorganization of the Lushais, from famine, sickness, and internecine feuds, to escape into Manipur. In all, about 3,000 souls, men, women, and children, ran away.

A Government
godown esta-
blished at the
bazar.

The attack on
the Sengvong
punji in 1882,
consequent
alarm of the
traders.

One party was, however, overtaken and attacked by Lengkam at Chibu, and lost 25 killed and 130 taken captive, besides 16 guns and other loot. The survivors made their way into Manipur territory, deposited their non-combatants there, and returned to take revenge by cutting up Chunglena's punji.

The head-constable in charge of the bazar, fearing that it might be attacked, at once sent information to the neighbouring Chiefs, who despatched 5 men with guns to the bazar itself, and 30 more to search the jangal for the raiders.

On the 17th May, Lalhail and the mantris of Poiboi and Lengkam arrived at the bazar, and at the request of the head-constable promised to supply 10 men as a guard ; but on the next-day, on traces being found of the encampment of a large number of men close by, the Chiefs declined to supply any guard, saying they wanted all their men for their own punjis. They begged, however, that a guard of 25 sepoy's might be allowed by the Deputy-Commissioner. Their fears of the Kukis had thus got the better of the fears they entertained regarding our intentions to annex their country, which they were so ready to put forward at the time of the famine.

The Deputy-Commissioner did not recommend the despatch of a guard, as there did "not seem to be the remotest probability of an attack on the bazar ;" and

REFERENCES

Paragraph 54.—Proceedings, March 1878. File of 1878.

Paragraph 55.—Proceedings, September 1878, February 1879, April and June 1881.

Paragraph 56.—Report for 1881-82.

Paragraph 57 —Proceedings, May, June, and July 1882.

the Chief Commissioner accepted this view. It was well known, the Deputy-Commissioner argued, that the bazar was under our protection, and that if any Kukis from Manipur territory attacked it, they would incur the vengeance of the British Government, of the Manipur Durbar, and of the Eastern Lushai Chiefs as well. Though the traders were much alarmed they did not all desert ; out of 36 shops in existence at the time of the raid 17 at once returned, and it was expected that shortly after only the 5 or 6 shops which usually stayed during the rains would be found remaining.

The Lushai Chiefs at first wished to retaliate on the Paithe Kukis, but they soon agreed to waive hostilities and to accept the decision of the British Government if we would undertake to settle the matter. It was accordingly decided to despatch the Rai Bahadur to the bazar to endeavour to effect an exchange of prisoners between the two parties ; but at the time his presence was required elsewhere, and the matter eventually remained over till the following January.

58. In January 1883, the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Knox Wight, went up with the Rai Bahadur. The day after his arrival at the bazar, and before the Chiefs had come down to meet him, the bazar itself was raided on, and the Deputy-Commissioner's party fired at, by a body of men who retreated as suddenly as they had arrived. Luckily, no one was hurt. No one knew who they were, and it was some time before their identity was ascertained ; but they eventually turned out to be a plundering party of Suktes of the Kamhow tribe, and

The Sukte
attack on the
bazar in Ja-
nuary 1883.
Successful pu-
nishment of
the raiders.

were very successfully traced by the exertions of the Political Agent of Manipur and the Manipur authorities. They gave up a boy whom they had taken captive from the bazar, and paid a fine of Rs. 450.

The leader of the raid was found to be one Thangkoiyam, a minor chief of the Kamhaos, whom the Political Agent described as "a harum-scarum sort of young gentleman." He started off from his village with 50 of his men, ostensibly on an elephant hunting expedition, but returned proclaiming a great victory, and that he and his men had successfully looted the *sahib log's* bazar. His conduct appears to have caused some considerable alarm among the other Kamhao chiefs, who fully expected that an expedition would be sent to avenge the raid and who professed their intention of deserting Thangkoiyam if a force did arrive. His cousin Singkami is said to have pointed out the gravity of his offence, and to have taken the captive boy, with a view to returning him. Yatol, also, the head of the tribe, on hearing of the matter, went down at once with 200 of his followers to Singkami's village, to ascertain if the rumour was true, and was said to be very angry with the raiders, and to have forbidden them access to his village. Yatol hung up a gong and planted a flag and an elephant's tusk on the road between the two villages, and it was said that until these articles were removed by yatol none of Thangkoiyam's people dared to go near his village.

On the arrival of the messengers from Manipur, Yatol and Khoodingyam, the two principal Kamhao chiefs, sent in their mantris with an elephant's tusk as a *nazar*, and begged for forgiveness. After some con-

sultation, the Political Agent, with the consent of the Government of India, accepted the fine above mentioned. It was found to be hopeless to expect that the actual raiders would be delivered up, as they would fight for their lives before surrendering, and, if necessary, desert to other chiefs further inland.

For their services in bringing the matter to a successful termination, and thereby avoiding the despatch of an expedition, which at one time appeared imminent, the Maharaja was presented with an Arab horse, and General Bolaram Sing with a General's full dress sword. The Government of India also recorded their opinion that Major Trotter's skilful conduct of the negotiations reflected great credit upon him.

59. After the attack on the bazar, the shop keepers, as might be expected, refused to stay there any longer, and the Deputy-Commissioner brought them all back to Cachar with him. A deputation was shortly after sent in to the Deputy-Commissioner by the Eastern Lushai Chiefs, who pointed out the extreme inconvenience caused them by the absence of the traders. The Deputy-Commissioner, however, explained that the breaking up of the bazar was entirely due to their own negligence in failing to protect it, and that the traders were not inclined to risk their lives again. After consulting their masters, the mantris agreed in June 1883 to the following conditions on behalf of the three

Re-opening of the bazar in November 1883, and subsequent withdrawal in the following year.

REFERENCES

Paragraph 58.—Proceedings, June and November 1883. Deputy-Commissioner's Report for 1883-84.

Chiefs, Lalhai, Lengkam, and Poiboi :—

- (1) That a guard of not less than 40 men armed with guns shall be permanently kept at the bazar.
- (2) That the jangal in the immediate neighbourhood shall be cut down so as to prevent a surprise.
- (3) That neither the Chiefs nor the mantris nor any one else shall on any pretext whatever levy from the traders more than the dues fixed by the Deputy-Commissioner.
- (4) That if any one Chief break the last condition the others will secure reparation.
- (5) That all disputes between the Lushais and the traders shall be referred to the Deputy-Commissioner, and that in no case shall the Lushais attempt to take the law into their own hands.
- (6) That on the violation of any one of these conditions the bazar shall be withdrawn.

When four of the traders returned to the bazar in August under the escort of the Rai Bahadur, they found that nothing had been done by the Chiefs towards carrying out these conditions beyond the commencement of a stockade for the guard to live in. The Rai Bahadur saw only Lalhai, who promised to send men to complete the stockade, but did not do so ; and he had no option but to return again to Silchar with the traders.

In the following October an explanation was submitted by the three Chiefs, which showed that they were not entirely to blame, and that their apparent

negligence to comply with the conditions was because, owing to some mistake, news of the Rai Bahadur's arrival at the bazar had not reached Poiboi and Lengkam. It was then arranged that they should prepare a place for the bazar, erect houses for the shops, and have the guard in readiness, and should send word when these arrangements were completed. It was also agreed that the guard should be reduced in the rains to 15 men.

Accordingly, the bazar was opened in November with two shops ; and in May 1884 it was reported that although there was no regular guard there, the people of the adjoining punjis constantly looked after it. In June 1884, there were still only two shops, and it appears that the traders must have returned altogether shortly after this, owing to the rumours of raids which were rife during the cold weather of 1883-84.

60. After the Deputy-Commissioner's promenade along the frontier in December 1884, the three Chiefs, Poiboi, Lengkam and Lalhai, sent in the usual deputation asking for the re-establishment of the bazar ; and on their swearing to give the necessary protection and accepting the Deputy-Commissioner's terms, traders were sent up in April and May 1885. It was arranged that the Chiefs should forego the money rent and remain contented with the rates of salt and tobacco, as laid down by the Deputy-Commissioner.

Re-establishment of the bazar in 1885. The Chiefs agree to forego the money rents.

61. The bazar remained open during 1885, 1886 and 1887 without anything occurring to disturb the usual course of trade. The

Final closing of the bazar.

number of shops in 1887-88 was three. In that cold weather, the Eastern Lushais began moving further west towards to Sonai, owing to pressure from the Suktes, and the traders complained that business was at an end ; and in August 1888 it was reported that all trade here had ceased, and the bazar had been abandoned.

THE SONAI BAZAR.

62. This bazar, up till the date of its closing in 1884, was mainly under Khalkam's protection, and, unlike the other two bazars, where the profits were divided among several Chiefs, the rents from it seem to have been exclusively appropriated by him. Khalkam, it may be noted, lived until recently on the east bank of the Sonai.

The first mention of this bazar, since the formation of the Chief Commissionership, was in August 1874, when Khalkam and Pibuk (since deceased) each sent an ivory tusk as a *nazar* and asked for a bazar on the Sonai. This was allowed them, and for a time the trade there flourished greatly ; but in April 1875 there were only two shops left, and it was then said that of late trade had greatly fallen off, owing to the supply of rubber being nearly at an end. Nevertheless, in that cold weather, 1874-75, a large number of Lushais came down from the Sonai and Khalkam's village to purchase mithan in North Cachar with the cash which they had

REFERENCES

- Paragraph 59.—Proceedings, June and Nov. 1883. Deputy-Commissioner's Report for 1883-84.
- Paragraph 60 and 61.—Deputy-Commissioner's Report for 1884-85 to 1887-88. File 742 of 1888.
- Paragraph 62.—Proceedings, November 1875.

received from the sale of rubber.

63. Another instance of the rough-and-ready system of justice resorted to by the Chiefs occurs in connection with this bazar. In March 1876 the traders caught some thieves and took them to Khalkam, who punished them by taking away all their property. Khalkam himself went directly after to the bazar, put up a flag, and declared it to be under his own protection.

In April 1886, there were six shops here ; but the traders complained that the supply of rubber had fallen off and that prices were so low that but little profit could be derived in comparison with former years.

64. In January 1877, the Deputy-Commissioner visited this bazar, but failed to see Khalkam, who was unable to leave his village owing to the recent outbreak of hostilities between the Eastern and Western clans. That Chief, however, asked that the bazar might be transferred to a spot some 20 miles below its present site, at the mouth of the Tipai khal, as he thought the present position was too near his village. The request was refused by the Deputy-Commissioner, who thought that Khalkam's object in getting the bazar moved was to prevent our learning too much about his movements.

There were eight shops at the bazar during that month, but no rubber was brought to it. The traders said that both the quantity of rubber and the price received in the Calcutta market were too small to make trade profitable, and they accordingly announced their intention of deserting the bazars for good. At that time it was said that the Lushais had nothing but rubber to

give in exchange for imported goods, though they were beginning to grow a little cotton for export.

65. On this occasion the traders complained of the exactions practised by Khalkam's mantri, Rutton Sing, and said they would not keep up the bazar if he remained in the country. This man was at one time an imported coolie engaged in the Monierkhal tea estate, from which place he deserted and joined the Lushais. His earlier career before his connection with the Lushais cannot have been altogether blameless, for in 1873 he was known to our officers under a triple *alias*. It is more than probable that he had something to do with the first attack on Monierkhal in 1869, and was also said to have been concerned in the second attack on that garden in 1871, but enquiry showed that he could not have been actually present on the latter occasion. He did his best to prevent the Lushais making arrangements with Sir J. W. Edgar on his visit to the country in 1869-70, and he at first refused to come in to that officer during the expedition of 1871-72, and neglected to render any assistance when he did come in. In January 1873, he was caught smuggling lead and steel to the Lushai country, and on being released, owing to the presence of the survey officer in the Lushai country, he spread false reports about our coming to war upon Sukpial. In May of that year the Government of Bengal sanctioned the opening of negotiations with the Lushais for his surrender, but apparently nothing was

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 63—Proceedings, March and June 1876. File of 1876
Paragraphs 64 and 65.—Proceedings, April and May 1877.

done to carry out these, instructions until the Deputy-Commissioner's visit to the country in 1877.

He was at the bazar when Mr. Luttman-Johnson arrived there, and he obeyed that officer's order to return with him to Cachar. Mr. Johnson proposed to retain him and prevent his return to Khalkam, alleging that his influence with the Lushais had always been exerted for our evil. The Chief Commissioner, however, ordered his immediate release :—"With such people as the Lushais" he wrote, "the most complete openness and the most perfectly plain dealing is the only course that can ensure success ;" and he further said that if any complaints were made by the traders they should be treated on general grounds, and should not be used to achieve any special purpose of our own. On his return, Rutton Sing found that it was commonly reported among the Lushais that the Deputy-Commissioner had killed him, and that Khalkam was rather pleased than otherwise at the news of his death, and had confiscated all his property ; and had even given out that if Rutton Singh had lived, he would have punished him for his extortion from the traders. Khalkam appears to have received him back into favour again, but it was always supposed that his future abstention from exactions was induced by the fright he had received on this occasion. He had but little opportunity of working further evil against the British Government before his curious career came to an end from drowning in July 1884.

Khalkam resents Eastern Lushais resenting to the Sonai Bazar.

66. In September 1887, the Tipaimukh Bazar being still closed, Lengkam sent men to the Sonai Bazar to purchase salt

in exchange for wax. On their return they passed through Khalkam's country, and he caught them and appropriated the salt. It was in revenge for this that Lengkam attacked Khalkam, and took fifteen heads.

There were six shops at this bazar in April 1878, and, as usual, trade was said to be falling off.

In December 1878, when the Changsil Bazar was looted, the Deputy-Commissioner thought it advisable to warn the traders at the Sonai Bazar to sell off gradually, and without exciting undue attention, whatever goods they had up there, and then to come down either on the plea of attending the *mela*, or with the professed object of obtaining more goods. There was but little doubt that Sukpilal himself had instigated the plunder of the Changsil Bazar, and had then tried to throw the blame on the Eastern Chiefs, Poiboi and Lengkam ; and the Deputy-Commissioner therefore urged that a similar attack might be made on the Sonai Bazar, and be attributed to the Eastern Chiefs with more colour of probability.

67. In the following month it was, however, reported that the traders were free from fear, as Khalkam was careful to maintain a guard. In that very month the guard succeeded in apprehending three men from Lalbura's village, who had stolen some brass utensils from the shop of one of the traders, and conveyed the culprits to Khalkam for sentence. It is not stated what punishment was inflicted on the thieves, but it was reported that Khalkam returned half the property to the trader and kept half himself, according to the custom of the Lushais.

He posts a guard at the bazar.

Nothing of moment transpired in connection with this bazar during 1879 and 1880. In January 1880, the traders were much alarmed by Rutton Sing, who, acting under Khalkam's orders, deliberately murdered the family of an old woman, accused of witchcraft, within sight of the bazar, cutting down some and drowning others. Having finished this business, he came to the frightened shop-keepers for the usual rent, refraining, however, from any exaction.

68. In January 1881, the bazar was again visited by the Deputy-Commissioner. Major Boyd reported that there were seven shop-keepers, who were men of more substance than those at Tipaimukh, and that there was more trade here than at that place ; but in the following May it was stated that trade had nearly ceased and that only two shops were left, though Khalkam still kept up the guard. At this period the whole of the monthly rent, of Rs. 10 and a maund of salt for each shop, was paid to Khalkam.

69. Another blank occurs in the history of this bazar, which dragged on an uneventful existence for the next three years. Its peace was, however, rudely interrupted in January 1884, when it was looted by the men of Poiboi and his son Lalruia. To explain their action, a reference to past events is necessary. It appears that when Thangula Raja was seized and kept captive by Poiboi, shortly after the occasion on which the former's punji was burnt and 150 of his people massacred (see paragraph 28), he was ill-treated by Poiboi's mantri, Tunglena. Some

The Deputy-
Commission-
er's visit to
the bazar in
1881.

Looting of
the bazar by
Poiboi in 1884,
and withdra-
wal of the
traders.

days before the bazar was plundered, this mantri was caught in Thangula's punji, and was thereupon put to death. In revenge for this Poiboi sent his men to the bazar, with orders to carry off any of Thangula's men they might find. The traders, seeing 15 or 20 Lushais, armed and carrying torches, approaching the bazar at night, ran away into the jangal ; and Poiboi's men, finding no one, appropriated a quantity of salt and other articles to the value of Rs. 309-4 (salt Rs. 178-4, cloth Rs. 131). The traders reported the matter to Thangula, and he sent word to Khalkam and Lenkhunga ; and a guard was furnished. These Chiefs also found a man of Poiboi's and sent him off to his master to ask for an explanation. Poiboi admitted that four of his men had gone to the bazar, and that from a search made in their houses they had taken some salt, but denied that they had taken anything else ; he pleaded his inability to ascertain whether others had taken part in the plunder, declined to inflict any punishment on the offenders, and finally asserted his rights as Chief, and satisfied the ends of justice according to Lushai ideas, by appropriating the salt for himself.

For a month after this a guard of 12 sepoy's of the Frontier Police was stationed in the bazar, but on its withdrawal the traders also came down.

70. About this time much alarm was expressed in Cachar at the attitude of the Lushai Chiefs ; and with

REFERENCES

Paragraph 66.—Proceedings, September 1878 and February 1879, and File 1878.

Paragraph 67.—Proceedings, February 1879.

Paragraph 68.—Proceedings, April and June 1881.

Paragraph 69.—Proceedings, November 1884.

a view to securing peaceful relations and to induce the traders to return to the bazar, the Deputy-Commissioner. Mr. Knox Wight, made a proposal to subsidise the Lushai Chiefs, who were in return to abstain from levying rents from the shop-keepers. He said that as long as the bazars were open we were always able to know more or less what was going on, and the Lushais were compelled to be on their good behaviour ; that at the present time the bazars were broken up ; at Tipaimukh there were only two shops, and the other two bazars had been deserted altogether ; that the shop-keepers had been carefully examined, and the cause of their desertion was not so much a feeling of insecurity as the absence of all trade,—the profits being actually less than the rents which they had to pay to the Chiefs ; and therefore he proposed to pay a fixed annual sum to the Chiefs in lieu of all rents from the shop-keepers. He said that the Chiefs should be made to come in in person to receive their subsidies at a Durbar ; and if at any time any attack or outrage of any sort was made on the bazars, a deduction could be made from the subsidy of the Chief whose subjects were in fault.

71. The Chief Commissioner, Sir Charles Elliott, did not approve of the suggestion. "The system of subsidising frontier tribes has certain advantages", he wrote, "it ought to secure some communication being kept up between us and them and some information being procured as to their feelings and intentions,

Proposal in subsidise the Lushai Chiefs with a view to the re-establishment to the bazars.

The Chief Commissioner's rejection of the proposal.

and it does to a certain degree work in this direction in the case of the Bhutias, the Akas, the Daflas, the Miris, and the Abors. But it did not procure for us any warning of the sudden and unexpected Aka raid which occurred last November, and it has undoubtedly tended in the case of the Akas and the Abors to create a feeling of pride and self-importance which does not tend towards peace. The subsidy or *posa* system does not exist in the case of the Mishmis, Khamptis, Singphos, or the many tribes of Nagas, and it cannot be said that our relations with them are more strained or our information more defective than in the case of the tribes along the northern frontier." Matters at the bazars therefore remained as they were.

72. In July 1884, the mantris of Khalkam and Thaugula came into the station, presented *nazars*, and asked for the re-establishment of the bazar. At that time the Deputy-Commissioner had made his proposal to subsidise the Chiefs, and, the matter being still pending, the mantris were informed that no orders could be passed at present.

The bazar remains closed from 1884 to 1887. Applications from the chiefs to have it re-opened.

In October 1884, two smaller mantris of these two Chiefs came in with the same request. They were told that the chief mantris should have come in.

In December 1884, the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Kennedy, made a military promenade along the frontier, and Khalkam and Thangula were the only two Chiefs of position who did not send representatives to meet him. Further, after the promenade, though the other Chiefs sent in deputations to ask for the reopening of the other bazars (which requests were

granted), these two, who were the landlords of the Sonai Bazar, refrained from doing so. The bazar therefore remained closed.

Nothing further was heard from Khalkam during 1885-86. In July 1885, Lalruia, Poiboi's son, sent two mantris to the Deputy-Commissioner with a *nazar*, and asked that this bazar might be re-established. Mr. Kennedy replied that he could not allow it to be reopened unless Khalkam's mantris came jointly with Poiboi's ; for there was every probability, he thought, of Khalkam looting the bazar to take revenge on Poiboi if the bazar were started on Poiboi's behalf only. Neither party made any further move in the matter during that year.

During 1886-87, Khalkam made one more application for the bazar to be re-started ; but as the Eastern Chiefs did not apply jointly with him, it was considered unsafe to accede to his request.

73. In August 1888, it was reported that Khalkam had moved on to the west bank of the Sonai, and that Poiboi had moved nearer to the east bank. Lalbura also was said to have moved further west, and no doubt Lengkam did the same ; while Lalhail left his own punji and went to live with Poiboi in the latter's village. All these movements of the Eastern Chiefs were brought about through fear of the Suktes.

REFERENCES.

- Paragraphs 70 and 71.—Proceedings November 1884. Letter No 1,067 dated 28th July 1884, to the Secretary, Foreign Department.
- Paragraph 72.—Deputy-Commissioner's reports for 1884-85, 1885-86, and 1886-87.
- Paragraph 73.—File 742 of 1883.

In the same month, August, Lengkam and Poiboi asked for the re-establishment of the Sonai Bazar, and promised a guard for its protection if the traders returned. They said that Lalbura and Khalkam were friends. As Khalkam had moved west of the Sonai, the Deputy-Commissioner was inclined to allow the bazar to be reopened, and he let the traders know they might go up. The traders, however, asked for a Frontier Police guard, and on this being refused, did not make a start.

During November, Khalkam's mantri, Chantanga, came in to Silchar, and promised on behalf of his master to protect the bazar jointly with the Eastern Chiefs. Accordingly, in January 1889, the shopkeepers went up.

74. In the same month the Rai Bahadur had an but in closed
in February interview with Khalkam at Changsil Bazar, and then the latter entirely repudiated his mantri's action. He said that formerly the whole of the Sonai Bazar was exclusively his, and Lenkam, Poiboi, and Lalbura had the Tipaimukh Bazar ; but now these Chiefs had occupied his land and claimed shares in the new bazar also. He declined ever to let these Rajas have any share in the Sonai Bazar or to protect it jointly with them. The Rai Bahadur therefore recommended that the bazar be withdrawn, as otherwise it was probable that the shops would be looted.

The Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Kennedy, was, however, inclined to let the shopkeepers decide for themselves whether they would stay on or not. He said they stayed at their own risk ; that Poiboi and Lengkam had undertaken to protect the bazar ; that Khalkam had only declined to protect it unless he got the whole of

the rents, but that he did not intend to interfere with the shop-keepers, and his interest would tend to make him look after them ; that the shopkeepers could pay rent to whomever they chose ; and that if any dispute arose regarding the division of rent, he, the Deputy-Commissioner, would decide it.

The Chief Commissioner, however, ordered the immediate withdrawal of the traders, and desired that it should be explained to all concerned that the bazar would not be re-opened until all the Chiefs gave a joint guarantee. Mr. Fitzpatrick concurred with the Rai Bahadur in thinking that if it were allowed to remain open, it would in all probability be looted by one side or the other. The traders were accordingly recalled in February.

75. The Chief Commissioner threw out a suggestion that it might be well to establish two bazars on the Sonai,—one to be resorted to by Khalkam's people and the profits to be taken by Khalkam, and the other to be resorted to by the Eastern Chiefs and the profits to be taken by them, each party guaranteeing the safety of its own bazar. The Deputy-Commissioner replied that, as far as he could see, the plan suggested was the only one by which the Chiefs could be bound to protect the traders, and he agreed with the Chief Commissioner in thinking that we should have both bazars or none.

The Chief Commissioner received this report in the middle of May and decided to leave the matter open until the next cold season. In the meantime the bazar remains closed. Khalkam is not much affected

by the closing of this bazar, except that he loses the rents, as he can get all his supplies from the Changsil Bazar, his village being equidistant from either.

THE CHANGSIL BAZAR

Application to
have the Chang-
sil bazar moved
to Guturmukh.

76. This bazar was under Sukpilal's protection as long as that Chief lived, and after his death, in December 1880, the responsibility and profits were divided among his sister and six of his sons.

Sukpilal always admitted his liability for the protection of the bazar and the safety of the traders, and at the same time appears to have been careful to keep it as far as possible entirely under his own direction. In 1873, his fears seem to have been excited by the action of the Southern Chiefs, Bhenkuia and Savunga, and though he at first contented himself with refusing them all access to the bazar, later on he thought best to apply to have the site removed to Guturmukh. At the same time, he asked the Deputy-Commissioner for assistance against these Chiefs. Both requests were, however, refused.

77. In March of the following year, 1874, the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Mc William, visited this bazar, saw the real Sukpilal, and discovered the fraud practised on Sir J. W. Edgar in 1869-70, when a substitute for that Chief was put forward instead of the Chief himself. At this time there were 13 shops going, but the usual cry

The Deputy-
Commission-
er's visit to
the bazar in
1874. He
establishes a
fixed rental.

REFERENCES.

Paragraphs 74 and 75.—File 267 of 1889.

Paragraphs 76 and 77 —Proceedings, April 1874 and February and November 1875.

was made of the slackness in trade. The Deputy-Commissioner found, however, that the traders bought the rubber at an average price of Rs. 27 a maund, and sold it again in Silchar at Rs. 50 or Rs. 60. On this occasion Mr. Mc William induced Sukpial to establish a fixed rental of Rs. 15 a shop per month for himself and 2 baskets of salt a month for Pibuk, Lalchung, and Lengpunga, and 3 baskets for Baniatangi. In consideration of these rents, Sukpial undertook not to levy any fine, cess, or other impost from the traders, and to prevent the other Chiefs from attempting to take any.

The terms were, however considered by the Chief Commissioner to be high, and the Deputy-Commissioner was urged to get them reduced when an opportunity offered. Mr. Mc William again referred the matter to Sukpial, and in May succeeded in inducing him to still further reduce the rental from Rs. 15 to Rs. 10.

78. Sukpial's action in this matter met its reward in the following cold season of 1874-75, when there was a scarcity of rice throughout the Western side owing to the crops having been utterly destroyed by rats. In order to supply food to the Chiefs, the Deputy-Commissioner submitted a proposal, which met with the Chief Commissioner's approval, to establish a special rice bazar for the time being at either Pakwamukh or Guturmukh, to both of which places large boats could go without trouble. He had usually made it a condition with the traders that a certain quantity of rice or dhan should be sent to the bazar with each batch of goods, but they avoided taking more than

Establishment
of a rice bazar
at Guturmukh.

they could help, owing to the trouble of loading and unloading the small boats at the rapids.

79. In the following year, nothing worthy of record occurred in connection with this bazar. In April 1875, there were 18 shops in existence ; and in April 1876 13 shops ; but the traders continually complained that trade was in a very low state, and that there was but little rubber to be procured.

This bazar was again visited by the Deputy-Commissioner, Mr. Johnson, in February 1877, and he found only six shops left. In the preceding month, 60 mauhds of rubber had been taken ; but the traders said the supply was not sufficient to make business profitable, and also that the market price of the article had so far declined that they intended to withdraw from the trade for good.

Notwithstanding these complaints, the bazar continued to flourish ; and eight shops were reported to be in existence in April 1878.

80. In November 1878 this bazar was looted. It was commonly supposed that the affair was contrived

at Sukpial's instigation in order that the site might be transferred to Guturmukh ; and if this was the case, it is satisfactory to know that he only earned the well-merited reward of his duplicity. According to the traders' report, one evening after dusk some 8 or 9 Lushais appeared, armed with daos and guns, and after shouting "Fly ! the enemy, Poiboi's people are coming", fired three or four shots, which had the desired effect of frightening the shopkeepers into the

Deputy- Com-
missioner's
visit to the
bazar in 1877.

Looting of the
bazar in 1878.
The traders
come down.

jangal. The traders say that in their absence the shops were looted, and that they lost in goods and cash over Rs. 3,000. One of the traders made his way to Sailenpui's village, and that Chief despatched a body of men 200 or 300 in number, the first thing next morning, "to fight Poiboi's men ;" but on their arrival at the bazar, Sailenpui's warriors came to the conclusion that no enemy had been there, for the enemy they said would have burned the houses and killed the men, whom they could easily have found if they wanted to. Two days afterwards, the traders came away with rafts "heavily laden with their property."

81. In the enquiry which followed, Sukpial at first endeavoured to throw the blame of the attack on the Eastern tribes ; but this was not believed, and he was called on to pay a fine of Rs. 1,000 to Government and to agree to remit future shop rents to the same amount before the bazar would be again re-opened. He then complained that the robbery was a false charge got up by the gomastas to cheat their principals, and that he had not really taken a pice ; but he endeavoured to raise the amount of the fine. He at first-imposed a house-tax on his subjects for the purpose, but this plan had to be abandoned owing to the opposition of his people, who contended that, as the Chiefs themselves realised handsome profits from the bazar, they, and not the community at-large,

Payment of fine
by Sukpial,
and re-esta-
blishment of
the bazar.

REFERENCES

- Paragraph 78 —Proceedings, April 1879 and February and November 1875.
 „ 79,— „ June 1876, May 1877, September 1878.
 „ 80 and 81,—Proceedings. February, April, May and June 1879.

were the proper persons to make good the sum demanded by Government. He then obtained contributions of Rs. 100 from each of the tributary Chiefs,—Sailenpui, Lengpunga, Lengkhunga, and Baniatangi, and Rs. 60 from Khalkam,—and paid the sum thus realised, together with Rs. 100 from himself, to the trader sent up by the Deputy-Commissioner to receive the fine.

Bhi, although Sukpial paid the fine. he still maintained that he was not concerned in the robbery. The view taken by the traders can be gathered from the fact that in their eagerness to get the bazar re-opened, they were willing to advance Rs. 500 to the mautris to pay off the fine. Mr. Mc William recommended that none of the money should be paid to the traders, as they would be compensated by the remission of the bazar dues promised, and that the balance of the fine might be remitted ; and to this latter proposal the Chief Commissioner agreed, in consideration of the deference paid by Sukpial to the orders of the Deputy-Commissioner. The fine was paid in April 1879, and the bazar was shortly after, re-established.

82. Sukpial died at the close of 1880, and in the following February the bazar was again visited by the Deputy-Commissioner. Major Boyd found that the traders had recently been subjected to a considerable amount of petty extortion, one shop-keeper, whose accounts he investigated, having paid at the rate of Rs. 45 per mensem for the previous four months. Sailenpui, it was said, scrupulously refrained from making any extortionate

The Deputy-Commissioner visits the bazar in 1881, and re-establishes a fixed rental.

demands himself, and he, on the Deputy-Commissioner's representation, promised to confer with the other Chiefs in order to remedy the evil complained of. After a time he induced them to enter into an arrangement, readily agreed to by the traders, by which the following Chiefs shared a monthly total of Rs. 69-2 in cash and kind :— Lalsavunga, Thanruma, Lengpunga, Sailengpui, Baniatangi, Lengpunga and Zarok. Lalsavunga ætat 2, as the heir of Sukpilal and the head of the late Chief's village, was allotted the largest share. It was said the rent was still very high compared with the other bazars, though the profits were much greater.

83. Nothing further worth recording transpired in connection with this Bazar till June 1884, when the traders left in either because the Sonai Bazar had recently been looted, or,—and this seems to be the more probable reason,—because trade ceased to bring in sufficient profit. The traders themselves alleged the latter reason ; and, being carefully examined by the Deputy-Commissioner, succeeded in explaining to his satisfaction that the profit to be made was actually less than the rents which they had to pay to the Chiefs. The Western Chiefs were evidently extremely anxious to have the bazar re-established, and after the Deputy-Commissioner's promenade in the following December, the mantris of Lengpunga, Lalrhima, Thanruma, Sailenpui, and Baniatangi came in, presented *nazars*, and, after the further reference to their masters, eventually acceded to Mr. Kennedy's terms. These were that all money rents should be abolished, that the traders should be protected, and

With drawal of the traders in June 1884, and their return in March 1885.

that the following tolls, to be taken monthly from each shop, should not be enhanced without the Deputy-Commissioner's consent :—Lalrhima, Lengpunga, sailenpui, and Thanruma, each 15 seers of salt and 30 tobacco leaves ; Lenkhunga and Baniatangi $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers of salt and 30 tobacco leaves ; and Zarok 5 seers of salt. Traders were accordingly despatched in March 1885, and the bazar has continued to flourish uneventfully ever since.

84. In 1886-87, both the traders and the Chiefs asked for more shops to be started, but their request was refused on the ground that trade was too small for more than the three already in existence, and that if others were added the bazar would only be working for half the year, and we should for the other half be deprived of an useful means of acquiring information. It was observed, however, that several parties of Lushais came to trade in the Hailakandi bazars, saying that the one at Changsil was insufficient, and in consequence two more shops were added to the Changsil Bazar in the following year. The privilege of possessing these new shops was keenly competed for by our traders not only on account of the profit to be derived from them, but also because of the facilities which they afford for the collection of old debts which most of the applicants were said to have outstanding in Lushai-land.

The Rai Bahadur visited the spot in January last,

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 82.—Proceedings, April 1881.

„ 83 and 84.—Deputy Commissioner's reports from 1884-85 to 1887-88.

and received no complaints from the shop-keepers. This is now the only bazar in existence in Lushai-land. "In addition to the trade at these bazars," Mr. Kennedy writes, "there is an increasing trade in bamboos, cotton, and such country produce which the Lushais bring down into British territory by the Sonai and Daleshwar, returning with salt, tobacco, and utensils. Lushais are now constantly seen in the Cachar bazars in the cold weather even so far north as Silchar and Lakhipur. The trade was in full swing till January last, but the Rai Bahadur's visit to Changsil in that month frightened the Lushais, and the trade for the year came to a sudden end."

IMPORTANCE OF MAINTAINING THE BAZARS

85. The conclusion to which one is forced to come after a perusal of the history of these bazars is that the importance of maintaining them is very great, and that our generally successful dealings with the Lushais since the expedition of 1871-72 have to a great extent been dependent on their existence.

Importance of
the bazars.

Apart from their being a valuable means of communication (and this alluded to in paragraph 97), their presence undoubtedly influences the Chiefs in maintaining friendly relations with us. They not only supply a regular revenue to the Chiefs, but they enable the Lushais in general to acquire most of their wants at very little cost and trouble, *viz.*, that of collecting wax, tea-seed, and rubber in the jangal, and of cutting bamboos and other forest produce. Perhaps the most remarkable features in all our dealings with these tribes is the dread of the Chiefs lest the bazars should be

closed, their willingness to send guards for the protection of the traders, and their readiness to make reparation to traders, and obedience to the Deputy-Commissioner's views regarding such reparation, in the few cases where it has been necessitated.

It appears, however, that at times their importance has been over-estimated. In 1876 and 1877, two successive Deputy-Commissioners reported that the rubber supply was about to fail, that the bazars would thereupon be closed, and that in consequence raids on our territory would shortly recur. It can hardly be said that the prophecies are borne out by subsequent events. In refuting these views in 1877, the Chief Commissioner wrote :

"Colonel Keatinge does not endorse Mr. Luttman-Johnson's desponding views regarding the trade with the Lushais, nor does he consider that a mere cessation of the India-rubber trade will cause a renewal of raids. A repetition of these raids need only be anticipated, Colonel Keatinge thinks, when the lessons of the expedition of 1871 have been forgotten, or when we again submit to them without prompt reprisals."

Again, in 1884, the Deputy-commissioner was of opinion that, owing to the closing of the bazars and cessation of trade, we might shortly expect a renewal of raids ; but, though the Sonai Bazar has been closed ever since (with the exception of one month during last cold season), and though Khalkam and Thangula, who are immediately concerned with it, can fairly be classed among the least well-disposed of all the Chiefs towards us, there has never since that time been any suspicion that they intended to spoil our territory.

CHAPTER VIII.—OUR POLICY REGARDING SETTLERS AND REFUGEES.

86. The southern boundary of the Cachar district was defined and gazetted under the Inner Line Regulation in August 1875, and is now marked by 46 boundary-pillars, which are inspected nearly every year and kept in good order. A pass is granted to persons allowed to cross the Inner Line at a fee of 8 annas for each pass.

The Cachar-
Lushai
boundary.

No Inner Line has been laid down on the east side of the district, for the reasons shown in the following extract :—

“It may be objected that the proposed line may be turned by proceeding round its terminal point at Mynadhur. But the Chief Commissioner holds that any one who evades the restrictions of the Regulation by turning the line must be held to be subject to its penalties just as if he actually crossed it.”

Besides the Inner Line, three points have been fixed and marked by pillars on the Tipai at Tipaimukh, on the Sonai at Kulicherramukh, and on the Dhaleswar at Bhoirabicherramukh, below which the taxation of our traders, wood-cutters, &c., by the Lushais is prohibited. These points are beyond the Inner Line, and were laid down in order to avoid any complications arising with the tribes from their claims to tax our subjects. The pillars were in good order in December 1884, when the Deputy-Commissioner inspected them and had them

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 86 —Proceedings, January, August, and October 1875.
Letter No. 87, dated 4th January 1875, to the Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department, File No. 9 of 1875 and File No. 15 of 1876.

repaired.

87. The policy regarding immigrant settlers and refugees on this frontier is governed by Circular No. 28C.T., of the 13th March 1874. This circular states that a frequent cause of raids by hillmen is a grudge against their fellow clansmen who have sought refuge in our territory. To obviate this, settlers are at first required to remain in the vicinity of an outpost till their case is enquired into. If the enquiry shows that they have in no way incurred the enmity of their fellows they may be allowed to settle where they like ; but if it is found that they have committed some serious offence, and refuse to abide by any reasonable settlement which may be proposed, they should not be allowed to settle in our territory, which is not to be made a refuge for the criminal population of the surrounding hills.

If it be found that the refugees have committed no serious offence, but have fled through fear of enmity, they should be located within 5 miles of an outpost and not within 20 miles of the hills from which they have descended. The only exception to this is when the refugee joins a large community of his own clansmen who are able to offer him protection.

88. No trouble seems to have been experienced at any time from refugees and settlers along the western part of the frontier line ; but in the extreme east of the Cachar district, where there are a number of Kuki settlements, the question of the disposal of refugees has been continually cropping up from 1874 to the present time.

Tantow's Case.—The settlement of petty villages near to and beyond our boundary discouraged.

The first instance of this kind in our records is of May 1874, when a petty. Chief named Tantow asked for the Deputy-Commissioner's permission to build a village near Tipaimukh. He had shortly before been ousted out of his own village of Senvong by Poiboi, who made his own relation, Chunglena, Chief in Tantow's place. Owing to Lengkam's exertions on his behalf, Tantow was allowed to retain possession of half the village ; but Lengkam strongly advised him to establish a new village further north, and it was with this object in view that Tantow sought the Deputy-Commissioner. The Deputy-Commissioner granted him permission, and advised him to commence building the new village at once.

The Chief Commissioner, however, pointed out that the Deputy-Commissioner's line of policy was not without its anxieties. Tantow, if attacked in his new position, might look for protection to the Deputy-Commissioner, or might take refuge in our territory or Manipur.

"The Chief Commissioner," the letter ran, "would not encourage the settlement of villages nearer to our boundary. The same reasons which render it inexpedient to encourage settlements within our boundary, render it also inexpedient to encourage them near our boundary. The Chief Commissioner would like to see a margin beyond our boundary between it and habitation such as there is now on this side of it, and would certainly not encourage the tribes to encroach on the margin of uninhabited forest."

It was fortunate therefore that Tantow did not avail himself of the Deputy-Commissioner's offer ; and as

nothing was heard of him again for some time, the Deputy-Commissioner concluded that he and his people had been absorbed by Poiboi or Lengkam.

89. In January 1876, he, however, again turned up and informed the Deputy-Commissioner that he

Tantow *jhums*
within our
territory : the
Chief Commis-
sioner prohibits
such action in
future.

had now, with Poiboi's consent, established his punji on the Telang Hills, not far from Tipaimukh. Later on the

Deputy-Commissioner ascertained that he and, another petty Chief named Changa had begun to make *jhums* just below

Tipaimukh, and within the jurisdiction of

Cachar, and the Chiefs then stated their wish to be allowed to settle where they were. The Deputy-Commissioner asked for orders as to whether they should be allowed to remain where they were, whether house-tax should be levied from them, and whether a guard should be sent out in the cold weather for their protection. He enunciated his views in the following extract :—

“The matter is one which should be decided,—whether we are to have a hard-and-fast boundary extending from Tipai to Chattachura, beyond which we are on no account to allow the Lushais to settle ; or whether they should be allowed with certain restrictions to settle within those limits. Tantow would, I feel sure, bring his punji into Cachar, if he received the slightest encouragement ; whilst our Kukis are—some of them—now applying to cross the Inner Line and *jhum* in the country between that and the Lushai country. It is rather difficult to decide which policy to adopt ; on the one hand, it seems to be almost impossible to keep the

Lushais for ever at arms's-length and to stem the tide of immigration which is undoubtedly setting in to the north ; while, on the other, if we admit them within our frontier, we should certainly be involved in some of the Lushai quarrels. When the rubber fails, it seems likely that the Lushai trade will in a great measure cease, and then we must not be unprepared for raids. For this reason, it might be well to have a buffer of friendly Lushais established in the south of Cachar, who would be in constant communication with us and might in time settle down and use the plough ; but, as said before, the step is a hazardous one, and might embroil us with the Lushai Chiefs,"

In reply to this, the Chief Commissioner said that he wished the policy laid down in Circular 28C.T., of the 13th March 1874, and letter No. 630, dated the 1st June 1874 (quoted in the preceding paragraph) to be strictly adhered to. He then wrote as follows :—

"The settlement of parties of these border tribes within our boundaries is to be altogether disallowed, except after permission duly asked and obtained, and on sites specially assigned to them for the purpose, which in accordance with former instructions should be at a considerable distance from our frontier.

" *Jhuming* within our border should be strictly prohibited, and as far as possible prevented, both with a view to the integrity of our boundary and the preservation of our forest. The object the Chief Commissioner has in view is the maintenance of a belt of uninhabited forest along our frontier to obviate the chances of disputes arising between communities settled at short distances from one another across the

border, and to prevent our becoming involved in the feuds and disputes of these uncivilized tribes."

As regards Tantow's particular case, if the *jhums* were only being commenced, he was to be required to withdraw at once ; but if cultivation was in progress he was to be allowed to cut the crops, but was to be charged a double tax for having occupied the land without permission.

90. The Rai Bahadur went up in July 1876 to collect the tax, which was paid after some demur ; but
 Tantow's people seek refuge in our territory, Poiboi claims two guns brought with them. Tantow signified his intention at the time of retiring further south after the crops were cut, and he appears to have taken this step in the following cold weather, with the result that might have been expected.

In March, 22 families from his punji emigrated into Cachar and reported that Tantow himself had been seized and confined by Poiboi, but that he had been again released at the instance of Lengkam, and would probably soon follow them into our territory. For themselves, they said, they could no longer tolerate the constant oppression they suffered at the hands of Poiboi and Lalhah, and had consequently fled for good from Lushai-land. They were located for the time in the Akhai Kuki punji on the west bank of the Barak near the mouth of the Jhiri River, where they were anxious to stay with their friends,—the refugees being

REFERENCES.

- Paragraph 88.—Proceedings, June 1874 and November 1875, Letter No. 630, dated the 1st June 1874.
 Paragraph 89.—Proceedings, June 1876. Letters No. 406, dated the 12th May 1876 and No. 2,036, dated the 26th May 1876.

Thadoe Kukis and not Lushais ; but the Deputy-commissioner expressed a wish to assign them a location elsewhere in the beginning of the next cold weather. It was supposed they would be able to obtain employment in their temporary home from the Bhubander and Dhubidhar Tea-gardens.

In the following cold weather, Poiboi made a claim for two guns brought down by Tantow's people, and the Deputy-Commissioner thought it advisable to take possession of the guns, pending his enquiry into the claim.

Tantow himself did not seek our protection, but eventually made his way into Manipur in 1882, and settled down there among the Paithe Kukis who attacked the Sengvong punji (see paragraph 57 above). The Kukis carried off his daughter hostage at the sacking of the village, and expected a large sum for her release, and were consequently much disappointed at Tantow's unexpected determination to desert the Lushais and throw in his lot with them.

91. In 1875 the question again arose as to what line of policy should be adopted regarding the location of independent villages close to our frontier, owing to a wish expressed by Khalkam to establish a punji on the Lungmai range, about a day's journey south of Bongkong. The Chief-Commissioner agreed with the Deputy-Commissioner in thinking that a large village of a powerful Chief within an easy distance of the frontier would be a kind of hostage for good behaviour. We could raid upon him, with supplies for a few days only, without risk or difficulty. The

Policy regarding powerful villages near the frontier.

Chief-Commissioner further said that, roughly speaking, he would not object to the establishment of villages at a distance of 10 miles from our frontier. This, of course, did not refer to fugitives, who, it was pointed out, are always a permanent source of irritation to their more powerful enemies, and if followed by them give rise to serious political complications.

Scattered instances of immigration into our territory in the years 1877 to 1881 and disposal of the immigrants.

92. In each of the five years—1877 to 1881—small parties of refugees sought safety in our territory, and were disposed of in various ways ; some being turned back, others being allowed to stay in the Kuki punjis near our frontier, and others again being despatched to North Cachar.

The first occasion was in october 1877, when 35 men of Lalhais punji ran away from fear of Poiboi, and took refuge in the village of Mantringkup close to the Monierkhal guard. The village was a small one, with only 21 houses. On the provisions of the Circular of March 1874 being brought to the Deputy-Commissioner's notice, he pointed out that the Lushais in question were formerly under Mantringkup ; that they had no personal quarrel with Poiboi ; that Poiboi was distant more than 20 miles from Mantringkup's village ; and that the village was less than 500 yards distant from the Monierkhal outpost.

Again, in December 1878, six Lushais came down from Senvong, a village under Poiboi, and asked for a guard to protect them from Lalhais. The Deputy-Commissioner sent them back and advised them to go to Poiboi for protection, and he also sent a message to Lalhais and advised him to make peace with the Senvong

people.

In November of the following year, Khalkam's mantri—Rutton Singh—killed two men, four women, and three children of a Rangkhal Kuki punji subject to Khalkam, because one member of the family had been suspected of witchcraft; and in consequence of these murders, and through fear lest a similar fate might befall themselves, a man and his wife and four children fled from this punji a month afterwards and sought refuge in our territory. They were allowed to proceed to a relative in the Abong punji in North Cachar.

In the following December (1880), 10 men, 7 women, and 19 children of the same punji fled into Cachar and asked for permission to dwell in the village of Mantringkup. The Deputy-Commissioner, however, found that they wished to enter into communication with other friends of theirs in Khalkam's punji, who also wished to escape if they could; and he accordingly deported them also to the Abong punji in North Cachar.

In June 1881, 28 immigrants from Thangula's punji sought refuge in our territory after the latter's village was destroyed, and were sent to join Mantringkup who in the previous month had followed the former refugees to the North Cachar Hills, and had settled down in the neighbourhood of Nemotha.

REFBRE .CES.

Paragraph 90.—Proceedings, August 1876, April 1877, and September 1878. Diary of Political Agent, Manipur, for November 1882.

Paragraph 91.—Proceedings February 1875.

92.—File 44 of 1877. Proceedings, February 1879, February 1880, January and June 1881 File of 1880.

Shortly after this, 22 more refugees from the same village came in, and were allowed to settle in the Kuki punji on the Dharmiakhall grant. This must have been very near to, if not the same site as, that on which Mantringkup's old village was. There is nothing to show why this last batch was allowed to settle here, instead of being deported to North Cachar.

During the Lushai famine of 1881-82 a very different kind of emigration set in, and many Lushais came into Cachar in search of food and work ; and, though the majority returned on the cessation of famine, it was supposed that there were still 1,000 of them settled in Kuki punjis in our territory in June 1882.

93. With the exception of Poiboi's demand for the guns taken by Tantow's people, we had up till the end of 1883 been saved from any complications arising from the presence of Lushai refugees in our territory ; but in December of that year, Khalkam and Thangula brought a false charge against some Kukis of the Akhai punji (referred to above), in the Bhuban Hills, of murdering four of their men. The deputation was informed by the Deputy-Commissioner that all our punjis would be searched for tidings of the missing men, but that any attack on punjis in our territory would be an attack on the British Government, and would lead to the destruction of the raiders. The deputation then hinted that they must have blood for blood, and spread this rumour far and wide among the Kukis in our territory. The latter deserted their punjis and fled to the jangal. Even so far north as the Akhai punji, three small outposts

First instance of complications, in 1884, and consequent break-up of the Akhai punji.

were prepared by the Kukis. On the Rai Bahadur proceeding to Sonai Bazar in May 1884, he found that the charge was a false one made against these four men of the Akhai punji, because they had assisted in capturing Thangula some years previously. To get possession of them, Thangula, on the advice of Rutton Sing, directed this mantri to charge them with murder.

In his report for the year 1884-85, the Deputy-Commissioner wrote :

"I had hoped to have sent up to North Cachar nearly 100 houses of Lushais from the Akhai punji in the Lower Jiri Reserve during the year ; but though I broke up that punji I was unsuccessful in inducing the Lushais to proceed to North Cachar. The bulk of them went over to the Manipur side of the Barak, but some thirty houses have settled on the Sonai."

94. In the cold weather of 1885-86, a small Kuki punji was discovered close to the Monierkhal outpost, in which a few Lushais were living. They had fled from Lushai-land, and, being afraid of being followed up, kept regular watch and ward every night at the approaches to the village. The Deputy-Commissioner ordered them to move north of the Barak at once ; but on their representing the great hardship they would endure if transplanted at a season too late for *jhuming*, and as they were backed up in their statement by the Kuki headman of the village, and as the Deputy-Commissioner thought the season for raids was past, he allowed them to remain where they were for the rains. His orders, however, were that they should move without fail in the following October.

The Monier-
khal punji,
1886.

When the time came, they all obeyed the order, except 14 houses ; and these were allowed to remain where they were on condition that two of them did scout duty for the Frontier Police outpost at Monierkhal, and that they ceased to post sentries to watch the approaches to their village, this latter procedure being considered likely to invite attack from the Hill Lushais.

95. During the cold season of 1888-89, a general feeling of uneasiness was evinced in our Kuki punjis on the Monipur border near Jirighat and Baladhan, consequent on the immigration from Manipur of a number of Naga and Kuki refugees, some of whom stopped in the punjis on our side near the frontier, though others went on to North Cachar. These refugees were afraid of being attacked by men from the punjis on the Manipur side in consequence of private quarrels, and the Deputy-Commissioner had several requests for guns by the inhabitants of the punjis in our territory. In January he thought it advisable to station a guard of one havildar and five sepoy in the Choor punji for a fortnight, and this measure had the desired effect of quieting the minds of the people.

The political Agent on his visit to Jirighat last December enquired into one charge brought by the

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 93.—Proceedings, May and November 1884 Deputy-Commissioner's report for 1884-85.

Paragraph 94.—Deputy-Commissioner's reports for 1885-86, and 1886-87.

95.— Ditto political Report for 1888-89, and Political Agent's diary for December 1888 and January 1889.

Digli Kuki punji on the Cachar side of the Barak against Pukhun Kuki on the Manipur side. Pukhun admitted having a quarrel with Digli, but said he had no intention of attacking him, and denied that he had killed three Kukis of another punji, as alleged by the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar.

The Political Agent was also able to throw some light on the emigration towards North Cachar, which appears to have somewhat frightened the Kukis in our territory. The Manipuri subadar at Jirighat saw 50 Khongyang Kukis from a village south of Kala Naga pass through, in the month of December, on their way to Ngeute, near Baladhan, where a brother of the Khongyang Chief was to marry a daughter of Kala Raja. The havildar also seemed to think that a larger party had gone by some other way. The Chief returned with his bride in the beginning of January.

96. In April last, an event occurred which would appear to confirm the fears entertained by our Kukis. A Kuki from a Manipur punji situated about a mile from the Barak reported to the inhabitants of the Kamaldhar punji that a man of his village had been killed in the *jhums* by Lushais. About a fortnight afterwards the inhabitants of the Kamaldhar punji, a small village with only five houses situated on the Manipur side of the Barak, near its juncture with the Jhiri, became suddenly alarmed and fled across the Barak to the Naraindhar garden, in our territory. They, however, returned the next day to recover their property, and while doing so a woman was killed and her husband so severely wounded that he died the same evening. On the two

The Kamaldhar
aid and flight
of the survivors
into our terri-
tory.

following days shots were again heard in the direction of the Kamaldhar punji, and three headless bodies were picked up in the river near Naraindhar and Alni.

At the time of writing this note it has not yet transpired who the raiders are. (see paragraph 133 below). The matter is still under investigation, but in the meantime the refugees have taken up their abode in Mangtilen Raja's punji near Dharmiakhal.

It has, however, been decided that at the commencement of the next cold weather the Deputy-Commissioner shall visit all these frontier punjis and force all refugees and doubtful characters to come further within our frontier, or go up to North Cachar. There is considerable difficulty reported in keeping a proper watch over these small frontier punjis. owing to their extremely shifting character.

CHAPTER IX.

MISCELLANEOUS MATTERS AND POINTS OF POLICY

Our means of communication with the Lushais. The bazars, the mantris, and our political establishment.

97. The traders at the bazars have always proved one of our principal sources of news in Lushai-land, and information regarding internal movements of the tribes is generally first received through them.

Since these bazars are, under favourable circumstances, kept up all the year round, we could rest assured that, as long as they were open, any important information would always be conveyed in due course to the Cachar authorities. It is no wonder, therefore, that the different Deputy-Commissioners have always been so anxious to see the bazars kept open, and, when they have been closed, to see them re-established.

Apart from the bazars, our means of communication with the Lushais is decidedly inadequate. There are no regular *kotokis* here, like those in the Assam Valley, men who would be jointly chosen by the Chiefs and the Deputy-Commissioner, a separate man being told off to each Chief with orders to be in constant communication with the villages of his particular Chief, and to ascertain all his movements and dealings generally. The system was perhaps thought of in 1872, when the Deputy-Commissioner stationed a Cachari in Sukpial's village, but the man behaved badly, and, was withdrawn. Our means of intercourse is confined to messengers. When the Chiefs have anything to ask or communicate, they send in mantris ;

and when we have anything to find out or enquire into, we send up one or more of the Political establishment attached to the Deputy-Commissioner's Office.

The mantris have hitherto been considered a reliable mode of intercourse, but our faith in them received a somewhat rude shock last cold weather. Khalkam's mantri promised on behalf of his master to jointly protect the Sonai Bazar with Poiboi and the other Eastern Chiefs ; but on Khalkam being himself referred to, he denied all knowledge of the agreement, and declined to undergo the responsibility involved.

Since this occurrence, the Chief Commissioner has authorised the Deputy-Commissioner to procure signet rings for the Chiefs, of an inexpensive and unmistakable kind, without which no mantri coming from a Chief would be dealt with, and the possession of which by a mantri would hold the Chief absolutely bound by all the mantri might say or do.

The Political establishment attached to the Cachar Deputy-Commissioner's Office consists of a Political Assistant on Rs. 50 per mensem, a Political jemadar on Rs. 20, and three Political peons on Rs. 8 each. The Political Assistant is a nephew of Rai Hari Charan Sarma Bahadur, who was formerly the Tahsildar of Hailakandi, and who for his good services during the expedition was awarded the honorary distinction affixed to his name and a grant of land, and was further promoted to the rank of Special Extra-Assistant-Commissioner. The Rai Bahadur retired on pension in

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 96.—File 465 of 1889.

Paragraph 97 —File 267 of 1889.

1885, but consented to proceed up to Changsil Bazar last January at the Chief Commissioner's request in order to enquire into the raid on the Pakuma Rani's punji in which Khalkam had been accused of taking part. For this service he was awarded a further grant of land on a reduced timber valuation. He is frequently referred to in this note as "the Rai Bahadur," by which designation he is generally alluded to, whether in official correspondence or otherwise.

His nephew has the advantage of knowing the language well and of the prestige attached to his uncle's name. The Political jemadar is also highly spoken of.

It has been the custom to send up some of the Political establishment every year to the bazars to interview the Chiefs and ascertain information regarding internal affairs. It is usual to send a small guard with the Political Assistant, in order to secure respect and not as a means of protection. Thus, when the Rai Bahadur went up last January, he took a guard of 10 sepoys with him. When the Deputy-Commissioner or an European Officer goes up, he is generally accompanied with from 30 to 50 sepoys.

98. Though it may be said the policy maintained by us regarding the internal affairs of the Lushais has been to leave the tribes as far as possible to manage their own affairs, yet efforts have been made by our officers from time to time to mediate between contending parties.

In the early days of the Chief Commissionership, references and applications to the Deputy-Commissioner appear to have been more common than in recent

years. This was no doubt owing to the uncertainty of the Chiefs as to the position we should take up after the expedition of 1871-72, and whether we should lend our aid and assistance to any one or no one.

In July 1877, Sukpial and the Western Chiefs asked for our assistance against the Eastern Chiefs, and this was followed by a deputation from the Eastern Chiefs in the following month to ask for aid against the Western tribes. Both requests were refused, and it was explained to both parties that Government would not assist either side. Both sides were however advised by the Deputy-Commissioner to make peace.

Perhaps it was in consequence of this advice that in November of that year and in the following January the two parties applied to the Deputy-Commissioner to mediate between them. The Chief Commissioner directed that a safe meeting ground in Cachar should be offered to them for the object of securing peace, but neither side availed themselves of the opportunity thus presented. It was Major Boyd's opinion that no Chief would take advantage of this offer till his power had been thoroughly broken, and he further much doubted whether any result would follow from a meeting composed of the mantris only ; for it could not be expected that the Chiefs themselves would come down. He would, however, continue to advise peace, but he thought little would come of doing so from a distance, and that the only means of compromising the quarrel would be to define on the spot the limits in the disputed tract of *jhum* land to which each Chief's cultivation should extend.

In 1879 and 1880, it was reported that both sides

were tired of fighting, but that a false pride prevented either of the contending parties from making the first overtures. It was said that all would be heartily glad if some authority, whom all would recognize, could be found to intervene between them. No opportunity of effecting a mediation appears to have subsequently offered, though our officers thenceforth kept the matter in view. Major Boyd had hoped to have arranged a compromise between the two parties during his tour in 1881, but Sukpial's death immediately before he started so encouraged the Eastern tribes that all hope of doing so was lost. Again in 1883, one of the objects which Mr. Knox Wight probably had in view when he proceeded to the Tipaimukh Bazar was to effect a mediation between the contending parties in Lushai land, but as has been narrated elsewhere in this note, an attack on his camp by Suktes necessitated his withdrawal before he had begun to open negotiations.

Not only have we refused assistance in connection with inter-Lushai quarrels, but also in other cases, between Lushais and other tribes, where our aid has been invoked. In 1874, Sukpial ineffectually appealed to us for aid against Bhenkuia and Savunga ; and in 1875, when Lengkam heard that Manipur was about to attack the Suktes, he asked us to order him to assist from his side. In the latter case, it was decided to have nothing to do with the matter ; apart from any general considerations of policy, there was the probability that the Manipuris would be driven back by

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 98.—Proceedings, February 1875, March 1878. April 1881, June 1882, and May 1883. File of 1878.

the Suktes, and that the latter might then turn on the Lushai Chief, who would appeal to us for aid and redress.

Again, in 1879, permission was refused to Sailenpui to attack the Suktes; but the circumstances under which this offer was made were altogether different. The matter is referred to in more detail in paragraph 106 below.

In 1881, some of the many Kuki refugees from Lushai-land who had sought safety in Manipur come to Silchar, and asked permission of the Deputy-Commissioner to pass through Cachar, in order to attack Lalbura. Permission was, of course, refused, and the men were ordered back to Manipur.

One instance occurs in which success attended our efforts at negotiation. In May 1882 the Eastern Lushais wished to retaliate on certain Kukis, who had fled from Lushai control, and after taking up their dwelling in Manipur, had attacked a Lushai village; but, on the Deputy-Commissioner forbidding them to retaliate by raiding on Manipur territory, they agreed to abide by his decision if he would undertake to mediate between them and their foes. When the Deputy-Commissioner went up partly for this purpose to the Tipaimukh Bazar, in 1883, he was unable to enter into negotiations owing to the attack on his camp by Suktes; but it was ascertained that his interference had the desired effect of preventing a renewal of hostilities. It was said that the Kukis had sent a deputation to Lengkam with the message that "there was in future to be peace between the Lushais and the Paites. Neither was to attack the other, as such were

the orders of the Burra Sahib and Manipur."

The Lushais also sent a return deputation to Manipur in November 1882, with the object of arranging an exchange of captives and of putting matters on a satisfactory footing between themselves and the Kukis (see paragraph 127 below).

99. In the early part of 1875, large numbers of Lushais came down and cut rubber in our territory and in Manipur between the Jhiri river and Tipaimukh. The Manager of the Dhubidhar garden thought he saw from 500 to 1,000 Lushais thus engaged. On the Manipur frontier some alarm was experienced and the despatch of the Kamhao expedition was postponed, and precautions were taken for protecting the Government road and the adjoining villages, owing to the large numbers of Lushais who were camped out in detached parties. It was soon found that no hostile movements were intended ; and so far as our frontier was concerned, the Lushais, when forbidden to cut more, disappeared from the neighbourhood of the guards and gardens, though it was stated that possibly they continued to cut rubber in places where they were not seen. It was supposed they did not know they were doing wrong, and they justified their action by pointing out that what they cut they sold to our traders.

There is a strong suspicion that a great deal of the forest produce which the Lushais export is obtained from Manipur territory and from our forests, but the information available in our records is not sufficient to do more than to merely draw attention to the subject. Possibly the Forest Department have more to say in the

matter. In 1881, the Deputy-Commissioner, after a visit to the Hills, wrote :—

“There can be no doubt that by far the greater part of the rubber sold by the Lushais is obtained in Manipur territory and in the Inner Line Forest Reserve. It is not, I think, desirable to interfere with the Lushais in this matter ; to cut off their supply of rubber, small as it is, would cause them great privation, and would immediately result in the closing of the bazars.”

When the Raj Bahadur on his visit to Changsil in February 1884 made enquiries into the extent of the ivory trade, he found that no elephants had been killed nor ivory sold by the Lushais for some time past. Nevertheless, maunds and maunds of ivory were sold in the Cachar bazars, and the traders said they got it from Lushais. The Deputy-Commissioner was of opinion that the elephants were killed by Kacharis and Kukis in the Inner Line Reserve. Eighteen carcasses of tuskers, he said, were found by the Superintendent of Kheddass, who was at the time hunting the tract.

In 1884-85, when it was decided to send a Frontier Police force to promenade along the Inner Line from one end of the frontier to the other, one of the objects of the march was to ascertain to what extent the Lushais entered the reserved forest and tapped rubber trees, hunted elephants, &c. The Deputy-Commissioner thus reported on this subject :—

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 99—Proceedings, February and March 1876, April 1881, May 1884, and March 1885.

"On all parts of our route, we came on small shanties, evidently erected by hunting parties. The only part of our route where we found no such traces was the part between the Sonai and the 15th Camp (immediately before reaching Lalhais punji). It was here we also saw the only rubber trees we met with."

The Lushai 100. The following description of
Famine of the famine is taken from the Chief
1881-82. Commissioner's Resolution on the Cachar
General Administration Report for 1881-82 :—

"The famine arose, according to the concurrent testimony of all persons concerned, from the depredations of rats. In the previous season the bamboos had seeded, and the supply of food thus provided caused an immense multiplication in the number of rats, who, when they had exhausted the bamboo-seed, fell upon the rice crops and devoured them. The earliest indication of the distress was the immigration of some eighty families from the village of Khalkam, followed by other subjects of Eastern Chiefs first, and afterwards of the Western Chiefs. But, though they were later in immigrating, it was the western villages which suffered most, and by far the largest number of refugees came down the valley of the Dhaleswari past Jhalnacherra. At first, their advent created considerable alarm among the tea-coolies and some Managers of the gardens near their route ; but it was soon found out that they were peaceably inclined, and were only anxious to earn a livelihood, either by the sale of bamboos and forest produce, by labour, or by begging. In order to facilitate the former end, the duty charged at the forest toll-stations on foreign timber and produce was taken

off ; and employment was offered both by the Forest Officer on clearing forest boundaries and by several Tea Managers on cutting down the jangal on their grants. The Lushais, though not accustomed to hoeing or road-making, are skilful in jangal-clearing, and accepted work readily when offered them on high wages. But, besides this form of relief, it was necessary to make provision for supplying food in Lushais land to those who were unable or unwilling to emigrate. Traders were encouraged to send up rice to the two chief marts of Tipaimukh in the east and Changsil in the west ; the Protection of a body of Frontier Police was promised them ; and to Government store-houses were opened at Tipaimukh and Guturmukh, a place rather lower down the river Dhalleswari than Changsil, and to the north of it. These store-houses were not to compete with traders in selling, but to act as reserves in case the traders' stores fell short ; and from them loans were to be made to the Chiefs, or to men for whom the Chiefs guaranteed that they were unable to buy from the traders.

"One visit was paid by the Special Extra-Assistant-Commissioner, Rai Hari Charan Bahadur, to Tipaimukh and two (on the second of which he was accompanied by Mr. Place, Sub-Divisional Officer of Hailakhadi) to Guturmukh. In the course of these visits it was ascertained that the eastern part of the country had suffered least from the famine ; partly no doubt from natural causes, and partly because, being stronger and more warlike, the Chiefs had stores of plunder to fall back upon. These Chiefs resented the posting of a guard at Tipaimukh, and professed to be afraid that it would

lead to the annexation of the country ; so, after ascertaining that the traders were not alarmed for their own safety, the guard was withdrawn, leaving only a Head-Constable and a native clerk to keep the account of the store-house and to register traffic and report events. On the western side the Chiefs and their people were poorer and the scarcity more severe ; and here much gratitude was expressed for the assistance given by Government, and much friendliness shown towards Mr. Place, who was asked to enter and visit the villages, an invitation seldom given to an Englishman, whose visit is believed to be generally followed by cholera.

“As the season advanced, there was no increase in the pressure felt, but the contrary ; and many of the Lushais who had entered Cachar and settled temporarily Kuki villages there, began to return in order to prepare their own lands for cultivation.

“The quantity of rice and paddy exported to Lushai-land was about 18,000 maunds and 2,000 maunds respectively, while nearly 1,000 maunds of rubber and 425,000 bamboos were brought down. The value of the imports is estimated at Rs. 61,800, and of the exports at Rs. 42,700 ; the difference between the two figures being covered by the cost of freight and the profits of trade. Besides this, Government purchased and sent up about 2,500 maunds of paddy, which was either sold to traders or advanced to the Chiefs and the persons vouched for by them.

“The total expenditure incurred by Government on famine relief was Rs 2,240 ; of this Rs. 1,100 was for purchase of paddy and rice, and Rs. 1,040 for

boat-hire, *i.e.*, freight of the paddy and visits of super-
vising officials. Rs. 1,040 were recovered from the
sales to traders, leaving Rs. 1,200, the net expenditure
of Government. Some of this, but not much, may be
recovered from the recipients of loans. The policy of
giving grain only in the form of a loan, and on the
guarantee of a Chief, was adhered to ; not so much in
the hope that much money would be received back, as
in the view of preventing too indiscriminate appli-
cations for help from being made."

Strange as it may seem, the advent of rats appears to be a recognised calamity among the inhabitants of the hills to the south of Cachar and Manipur. In paragraph 78 above a previous instance of their appearance in the western Lushai hills is given, and the following extract from Colonel McCulloch's report on Manipur in 1858 shows that the Kapui Nagas to the south of the Cachar-Manipur road were living in dread of a similar visitation :—

“Another calamity consists in the visits of immense quantities of rats. These, in their progress destroy everything before them, they nip down the standing corn, ascend the granaries, fill the houses, and leave nothing behind them fit for human subsistence. Neither fire nor water stops the progress of the innumerable host.”

101. On the 27th December 1883, two deputations from Khalkam and

REFERENCES

Paragraph 100.—McCulloch,

Paragraph 101.—Proceedings, November 1884, letters No. 1,196, dated the 10th June 1884, and No. 1,067, dated the 28th July 1884

Lenkhunga were received by the Deputy-Commissioner in Cachar.

The proceedings of the first deputation have been narrated in paragraph 93 above ; it made a false charge of murder against some Kukis in the Akhai punji, and was informed by the Deputy-Commissioner that, though he would have all our Kuki punjis searched for the missing men, the Kukis charged with the crime could not be given up, and that any attack on them would be considered an attack on the British Government. It was then hinted that the Lushais must have blood for blood, and that possibly they would out of revenge kill some Kukis. The deputation spread this rumour far and wide, and a general panic ensued among the cowardly Kukis, who deserted their punjis and fled to the jangal. Even so far north as the Akhai punji there were no less than three small outposts prepared by the Kukis.

The circumstances connected with the second deputation are as follows. One of the Kukis of the punji near the Chattachura outpost had a dog which strayed to another punji close by, where it was fed and kept by a Lushai settled there. Some time afterwards, one of Lenkhunga's men passed the punji and bought the dog. He was taking it back with him, when he met the original owner, who snatched away the dog's string from the Lushai's hand, and illtreated the Lushai by beating him about the back and face with the handle of a dao, and also threatened to cut his throat. The Lushai went to complain to his Chief, who sent him back with two of his principal mantris and four others. These seven went to the Kuki's punji and demanded

satisfaction, saying that Lenkhunga was coming to cut up the place. The Kukis reported the matter to the Subadar of the guard, who advised some amicable arrangement ; but, as the Lushais were violent and demanded Rs. 1,000, or threatened they would raid in default, he sent them all in to the Deputy-Commissioner.

At the same time, information was received from another source that a big council of all the Western Chiefs had been held at Khalkam's punji ; and that the Chiefs had decided to attack all the Kuki punjis in Cachar and take vengeance for the alleged murder of the four Lushais.

On the Sylhet side, it was reported that the Lushais were collecting near Koileshar. Subsequent information received from the Bengal Government showed, however, that the Sylhet reports were based on nothing more substantial than a vague rumour of a Kuki outbreak, originated by the intrigues of a relation of the Maharaja.

The precautions that were taken for the protection of Sylhet and Cachar have already been detailed in paragraph 12 of this note.

In February 1884, the Rai Bahadur was despatched to Changsil Bazar to make enquiries. He found that the most Westernly Chiefs, *i.e.*, those about the Changsil Bazar, were well-intentioned and profuse in their expressions of gratitude to Government on account of past favours. He also found no signs of any hostile intentions, and that Khalkam was fully occupied in preparing to meet an attack from Poiboi.

It was considered advisable that he should then visit the Sonai Bazar. He there found that the meeting

of the Chiefs referred to was composed of Khalham, Lenkhunga, Baurhuma, Dausuma, and Lengpunga, who had assembled at Khalkam's punji for a puja. A proposal was then made to attack Poiboi ; but since Khalkam could not spare any of his men just then, as he was building a new punji, the project was abandoned.

The Rai Bahadur's report on the state of feeling among the Lushais was far from satisfactory. Paragraph 9 of the Deputy-Commissioner's letter embodying his report ran as follows :—

“The Chief mantris pointed out the state of destitution in which the Lushais now find themselves. They have lost half their numbers by plague, pestilence, and desertions. Many of their fighting men have deserted or died. They are hemmed in on all sides. Bengalis no longer keep up the bazars, nor do woodcutters go and fell timber in Lushai land ; even the rubber which once afforded ample means of subsistence is failing ; from overtapping the trees have died out, and there is no longer a supply. The result is that the Lushais have now no means of raising money wherewith to purchase the articles that they have been accustomed to of recent years, such as salt, tobacco, cloth, &c. They have no means of maintenance, and are very restless. The Chiefs consequently request the Burra Sahib to make some sort of arrangement whereby the Lushais may be able to maintain themselves. They intend, they say, to send a deputation for this purpose to me in Silchar.”

It was also said that all the Lushai Chiefs were in active search for guns, gunpowder, bullets, sulphur,

and flints. They asked the Rai Bahadur for a supply of flint-stones, as their's had worn out by use or become broken. They said they had sent men to Manipur to purchase flint-stones; but the Maharaja had refused to give them, necessary first to obtain the consent of the Government. The Political Agent, who was written to subsequently regarding this matter, reported his ignorance of the facts stated, but he added that the Durbar might have kept it concealed from him.

The Deputy-Commissioner was of opinion that the feelings of the Lushais were not in any way hostile to our Government, but the real state of affairs, he said, was ascertained by the Rai Bahadur privately from an old friend of his,—one Chang Tanga of Thangula's punji. This man said that the Lushais were really in a great state of destitution; that they had sold off all their property in the famine; and that unless they made a raid somewhere and obtained plunder, they would have no means of acquiring property, of defending themselves from attack, and of maintaining themselves in case of any calamity such as famine.

He thought it was unlikely that a raid would be made on the Cachar side, as the bazars would be stopped, the roads closed, and the source of supplies cut off. But, sooner or later, he thought, a raid would be made in the direction of Koileshar.

The Deputy-Commissioner believed the state of affairs thus disclosed to be extremely probable; that the rubber and ivory trade were practically extinct; that the *jhums* were becoming exhausted; that the

bazars had become closed ; and that it was impossible for him to order the traders to return, as he was satisfied they could not do so profitably as long as the Chiefs imposed the usual rents. He therefore made the proposal to subsidise the Chiefs, which is described, together with the Chief Commissioner's rejection of the scheme, in the Chapter on the Sonai Bazar.

The Chief Commissioner recommended that a display of force should be made instead. The following is an extract from his letter to the Government of India :—

“Mr. Wight believes that the Lushais are hard pressed by want ; that their *jhums* are exhausted, and the supply of ivory and rubber is dying out. The latter may be the case ; but the exhaustion of *jhums* is a cry which is often heard and hard to prove, and the Chief Commissioner does not place much faith in it. With a thin population of 16,000 (3,250 houses according to Mr. Wight) in an area of about 60 miles by 45, or 2,700 square miles, the *jhums* are inexhaustible ; only about 25 square miles could be *jhumed* annually, and in ten years the bamboo forest has grown up again. A tenth part of the area would support this population in comfort.

“It does not follow from this that they are willing to support themselves by steady agriculture. It is very likely true, as Mr. Wight says, that the Chiefs are restless and discontented, that they miss the income from shop rents and from trade, and that their minds are bent on plunder and war. But if this is the case, the grant of a subsidy is hardly advisable. It would only be attributed to fear and weakness, and

would encourage a spirit of haughty insolence, as it has done among the Abors. Not subsidy, but force and punishment are required to quell the spirit of plunder. The Chief Commissioner's recommendation is that a display of force should be made by the Frontier Police during the next cold weather."

The Government of India approved of Sir Charles Elliott's recommendations, and a military promenade was made from one end of the Cachar frontier to the other, from Chattachura to Tipaimukh, and was followed by excellent results. The impression made upon the Lushais was testified by the numerous deputations from the Chiefs which subsequently came to the Deputy-Commissioner in Silchar. A further result is shown in the following extract from the General Administration Report of the Deputy-Commissioner for the year 1884-85 :—

"The Lushais have devoted themselves to agriculture and did not think of war. The violent strains which their country underwent during the famine had almost entirely destroyed their exchangeable products, and they found that there was no ivory, no gong, no precious amber necklet which they could hope to sell in times of extreme necessity. The forest also appeared to have ceased from yielding a desirable quantity of rubber. Their number also was reduced owing to deaths by pestilence and migration to Manipur and Cachar. There were therefore only two means left,—either to raid against their neighbours and live upon plunder, or to seek redress in agriculture ; and it appears that they preferred the latter course."

CHAPTER—X

RELATIONS WITH INDIVIDUAL CHIEFS.

In the following paragraphs a brief note is made of the circumstances which have come to our knowledge regarding each of the individual Chiefs.

102. Baniathangi Rani lives on Thiltaka hill, on the west bank of the Dhaleswar ; one day's journey southwards, Lushai going, from the Baniathangi mouth of the Gudur River, and one day's journey, Lushai going, in a north-westerly direction from Changsil Bazar. She is a sister of Sukpilal's and her nephew Tangkupa Raja lives with her. She succeeded her mother Pibuk as head of the village on the latter's death in March 1877. There are said to be 200 houses, 180 fighting men, and 20 guns in her village at the present time. The principal mantri is Palai, who speaks Bengali very fairly. Since Sukpilal's death, in the end of 1880, she has had a share in the responsibility and profits of the Changsil Bazar. In 1885, her share was fixed at $7\frac{1}{2}$ seers of salt and 30 tobacco leaves per shop, per month, which is the same as that taken by Lenkhunga, but less than that by Lengpunga, Sailenpui, Lalrhima, and Thanruma, who each get 15 seers of salt and 30 tobacco leaves.

Her disposition towards our Governments is probably of a friendly nature ; but our dealings with her, as well as with most of the other Chiefs, have been few and far between. Such as they are given below.

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 102,—Proceedings, April 1879, April 1881, Deputy-Commissioner's report 1884-1885. File 267 of 1889.

RULING FAMILIES OF LUSHAI CHIEFS

SAILOO FAMILY

CHUNGLUNGA

ROUNA

LALLULLA

(Lalul)

PATEN FAMILY

Lalpuilena

Lalsavunga

(Lalsavoong)

Vanhallen
(Vonotel)

Lengkam
(Lenkom)

Daulan
Deouti
(Dead)

Kairanga

Labura
(Laboora)

Bungteya

Polboi

Laluma
(Lalroom)

Chunglena
(dead)

Thandang
(Thondong)

Taenga

Lalhanga

Lalpunga
(Lalpoong)

Thanbunga
(Thancheya)

* PATEN FAMILY

LALPULEN

Kala

Minthang * CHENGKHA FAMILY

Lallenvunga.
(Lallingvoom)

Mangpor
(Mongper)

Mura
(Mora)

Sukpilal
Thanban
(Thombom)

Minthang

Ronpung
Banlatangi.
(Rouna)

Vompilat.
(Vompilat)

Thangula

Banruma

Latheri
(Lalhi)

Lalchung.
(deed)

Lalluia

Sailenpui
Thanruma
Lalrima
Lalsaranga.
(Savunga)

Thankupa
Zarok
(Zorock)



Tolera
Lalsavuta

Thanbura

enkhunga Doukuma

* CHENGKHA FAMILY

CHAKBENGA



In January 1875, she and Sukpilal sent in mantris with a tusk to Cachar ; and asked that more rice might be sent up, as their crops had been eaten by rats on the ground before being cut. The Deputy-Commissioner made them a present of rice, and also asked and obtained the Chief Commissioner's permission to establish a rice bazar at either Pakwamukh or Guturmukh.

In February 1877, the Deputy-Commissioner marched through her village (then Pibuk's), which had 100 houses, and through Sanga's village with 200 houses. Sanga was said to be a sort of dependent of Pibuk, Pibuk's mantris accompanied the Deputy-Commissioner for two or three days on his journey from the Changsil to the Sonai Bazar, and Sanga behaved most hospitably, sending rice, firewood, sweet potatoes, & c., to the Deputy-Commissioner's camp, for which he would not take payment.

In July 1877, Baniathangi sent down an elephant tusk and joined with Sukpilal and Sailenpui in asking for our aid by furnishing arms and ammunition to punish Lengkam and Poiboi. It was explained to the mantris that the latter Chiefs had faithfully kept their treaties with us, and that we were now asked to commit a breach of faith.

In 1878-79, when the Changsil Bazar was looted, her mantri, Darkulsuna, came down with the traders and tried to persuade them to get the bazar moved to Guturmukh ; and she also subsequently sent her mantri down with Sukpilal's and others to beg for it to be reopened, and also paid Rs. 100 out of the fine imposed by the Deputy-Commissioner.

In 1881, the Deputy-Commissioner passed through her village and saw Baniathangi herself. "The interview," he wrote, "was of the briefest, as Baniathangi merely advanced to the doorway and then abruptly disappeared. It must be admitted that some apprehension regarding her personal safety in the presence of a European is excusable in the daughter-in-law of Lalchokla, and I was agreeably surprised in learning that Baniathangi had consented to see me at all."

In January 1885, she, with the other four principal Chiefs interested in the Changsil Bazar, sent in her mantris and prayed for its re-establishment; and in January last, on the Rai Bahadur's visit to Changsil Bazar, she sent in her mantri to him with a nazar of a cloth and a goat.

She is now about 58 years of age, and is tall and stout.

103. Lalsavuta Raja lives on the west bank of the Dhaleswar adjacent to Baniathangi's punji. Tolera, his brother, lives with him. They are sons of Sukpilal. We have had no dealings whatever with Lalsavuta, who is probably still quite a child. Neither he nor Tolera have any share in the bazar. The latter came to see the Rai Bahadur at the Sonai Bazar in May 1884. The village is small and unimportant, containing 150 houses, 120 fighting men and 10 guns.

104. Minthang Raja lives on the Saitla Hill which is said to be 3 hours' journey, Lushai going north-east of Baniathangi's punji. Unlike nearly all the other Lushai Chiefs, he

Lalsavuta.

Minthang.

is not one of the decendants of Lalal.

His village was visited by the Deputy-Commissioner in 1874, when, owing to reports spread by one Bumpo, a Cachar Kuki, to the effect that we carried cholera about with us, some difficulty was experienced in getting access to it. Further enquiry into Bumpo's business revealed the fact that he was trying to organise a dacoity to loot the garden at Doarbund in revenge for the destruction of a mithon belonging to his village by the garden manager, but no one had agreed to join him. Bumpo himself was sent down to the station to await the Deputy-Commissioner's return ; but the apprehension of the Lushais who always have a great dread of cholera, were aroused, and various attempts were made to turn the Deputy-Commissioner back from his proposed visit. Three days before he started, Minthang sent word that he was engaged in puja and would be unable to see the Deputy-Commissioner ; and when he had proceeded some way on the road towards the village, 7 of his people met the Deputy-Commissioner and advised him to turn back, as a mantri had died the previous night, and the Chief could neither see the Deputy-Commissioner, nor speak to him, nor let him go into the punji. A quarter of a mile from the punji the party were requested to halt, and the Chief came out. He said that the village could be seen from the outside and he did not see what object the Deputy-Commissioner had in entering. The Rai Bahadur accordingly announced

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 103.—Proceedings of November 1881.

Paragraph 104.—Proceedings April 1874, Report the 1880-81.

that the Deputy-Commissioner was highly displeased, and was going away, and this threat had the desired effect of procuring an entrance.

In April 1880, Lalapa, Minthang's mantri, offended Government by demanding revenue from some of our wood-cutters who were working within the Inner Line forest reserve. He was at the head of a party of Lushais who had come down to collect rubber when he fell in with the wood-cutters. The Deputy-Commissioner, on hearing of the matter, reported it to Sukpilal, who promptly fined and personally chastised Lalapa.

Minthang has a small village with 100 houses, 80 fighting men, and 5 guns. He has always been held to be a partizan of the Western Chiefs in their feud with the Eastern.

105. Lenkhai Mantri lives on the Thingmuna Hill, which is three hours' journey, Lushai going, west of Minthang's punji. He is a son of Bangopa, an old mantri of Sailenpui.

He met the Deputy-Commissioner early on his march in December 1884, and accompanied him for some way. Of him the Deputy-Commissioner wrote :— "Lengkai I like very much. He had a clear open countenance, and was a willing youth, and of great assistance to me in the way of scouting and finding out the best paths to pursue. I gave him with pleasure some presents when we parted, and he promised to pay me a visit in Silchar." His village also is a small one, with 100 houses, 90 fighting men, and 10 guns. He may be expected to follow Sailenpui's lead in any matter of importance.

106. Sailenpui Raja lives on the Ryek Hill, two

days' journey, Lushai going, south-west of Changsil Bazar. His son Lalluia and Khamliena Sainenpui Sylu live with him. He or his people took part in some of the raids on our territory shortly before the expedition of 1871-72. It was not generally supposed at the time that he or his father had any share in them ; but that this was the case was proved in January 1884, when a woman was brought down from Lushai-land by the Rai Bahadur, who had been instructed by the Deputy-Commissioner to make enquiries regarding British captives, of whom there were even then supposed to be some retained by the Lushais. This woman said she had been captured in one of the raids on our territory, and she maintained that she was carried off by men of Sainenpui's punji. While she remained in Lushai-land, she was forced to say she had been carried off by Bhenkuia ; but on her return to the plains she made another statement, which the Deputy-Commissioner, who examined her carefully, fully believed. She was returned to her home in Sylhet.

Notwithstanding this, it must not be supposed that Sainenpui is in any way evilly disposed towards us. On the contrary, there is probably no other Chief who has universally given such satisfaction in his dealings with us ; and though the men of his village may have taken part in raids on our territory, he himself must have been too young at the time to have had any voice in the matter.

He has seen three Deputy-Commissioners ; in 1874, 1877, and 1881. On the first occasion, in 1874, he was overshadowed by the presence of his

father, Sukpila, and no mention is made of him beyond the fact that he was present at the interview. But on the other two occasions he produced very favourable impressions. In 1877, the Deputy-Commissioner wrote:—

“Sailenpui, younger son of Sukpila, who has settled near Changsil Bazar on the west, came down to see me on the 4th; and on the 5th I went up to his village and returned his visit. My relations with this Chief, who is, I am told, Sukpila’s favourite son, were most satisfactory. I explained to him the terms of the *sanad* given to Sukpila in 1869 and the meaning of the pillar I had erected at Bhoirabicherra. He professed himself quite ready to abide by the terms of the *sanad*.”

The village then contained 250 houses, and, the Deputy-Commissioner said that men, women, and children seemed delighted at his visit.

In 1881, at an interview with, the Deputy-Commissioner, Sailenpui asked for his good offices in connection with the *jhuming* quarrel between his tribe and the Howlongs, which he expected would shortly end in fighting. The Deputy-Commissioner offered to give him a letter to the Political Agent of the Chittagong Hill Tracts; and Sailenpui said he would gladly arrange for its speedy delivery, as he thought that, if the Political Agent sent for the mantris of the Howlongs and questioned them, the outbreak would be averted.

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 106.—Proceedings, May 1884. Deputy-Commissioner’s report for 1883-84. Proceedings, April 1874, May 1877, April 1881, June 1876, April 1877, February and May 1879, and November 1883. Files (without number) of 1879, 1880, 1883 and 1884.

Regarding the complaints preferred by the traders, during this visit, of the exorbitant claims for rents which were made by the Chiefs, Major Boyd wrote:—

“Sailenpui, who, I was told, scrupulously refrains from making any extortionate demands himself, and is always ready to listen to any complaint and redress any grievance : trader may have against o.e. of his subjects, promised to confer with the other Chiefs and try to remedy the evil. Sailenpui however, in spite of the position he is rapidly acquiring, is still a young man, and I was not sanguine that his influence would effect the desired result ; I have therefore been agreeably surprised by the information, which has reached me since my return, that he has induced the other Chiefs to enter into an arrangement with the traders.”

Again he wrote : —

“I have been very favourably impressed with what I have seen and heard of Sailenpui, who bids fair to become in time as influential a Chief as his father was. The rapid growth of his village, now the largest in the Lushai country, is to a great extent due to his possessing influential, popular, and sound counsellors in his principal mantris ; but, even with such aid, he would not have risen in importance so quickly had he not been endowed with an aptitude for ruling. During our interview, the crowd of Lushais gathered round the party, preserved a respectful silence ; and, at its close, I complimented Sailenpui on the admirable manner in which order was maintained, and remarked on the contrast between the meeting of that day, and that I had with his elder brother (Khalkam) a week previously.”

Until recently, Sailenpui seems to have been fairly fond of fighting. In 1875-76, he is reported to have successfully taken 35 guns from Bhenkuia's people ; because the latter had formerly taken guns from his men. In April 1877, when Sukpial lost two of his men in fighting with Poiboi, he went to his father's assistance ; and later on in the same year he and his father each sent in an elephant tusk and asked for our assistance to fight the Eastern Chiefs. He has also been embroiled with the Sylus and Howlongs.

It has been noticed above that the Tipaimukh Bazar was attacked by Suktes in January 1883, while the Deputy-Commissioner was there. In the following June Sailenpui sent down a deputation to convey his regret at the attack on the Deputy-Commissioner's camp. According to the Deputy-Commissioner's report, Sailenpui's message ran as follows :—

"In attacking me, his parents (father and mother rolled into one), the Suktes had attacked him, and he must wipe out the insult. He was anxious to get my permission to make war on the offending tribe with his own men and at his own expense, unassisted in any way by us ; and he undertook (if sanction was accorded and no displeasure on our part would result) to lead his men against the tribe and deliver up into our hands the offending Raja."

The offer was of course refused with thanks. The Government of India remarked on the incident in the following terms : "I am also to express satisfaction at the loyal attitude exhibited by the Western Lushais, a result which is creditable to the exertions of the frontier officers."

The offer was probably not so disinterested as it appears at first sight. It would have been impossible for Sailenpui to have marched through the Eastern Lushai country without our aid ; and, even supposing that he came down to Cachar and marched round by our territory and Manipur, he would not have had the least chance of success single-handed against the powerful Kamhao tribe of Suktes to which the raiders belonged. Even if he had been allowed to take the field, he would have been sure to have shortly after claimed our aid to exterminate the Eastern Lushais.

In the end of 1878, the Changsil Bazar was looted, or was said to have been looted, as has been narrated in paragraph 80 above. The probable facts are that Sukpilal tried to frighten the traders, by the dread of attack from the Eastern Lushais, into removing the site of the bazar to Guturmukh ; but, however that may be, the evidence seems to show that Sailenpui had no knowledge of the plot. On receipt of the news of the alleged attack from one of the traders, he at once despatched a body of 200 or 300 fighting men to the bazar, and it is a curious fact that as soon as these men had departed Sukpilal's people began to behave insolently to the traders, and tried to frighten them, but on a small guard being again obtained from Sailenpui, Sukpilal's people behaved properly. Subsequently, however, Sailenpui tried his best to induce the traders to move to Guturmukh.

Notwithstanding that he appears to have had nothing to do with the breaking up of the bazar, he nevertheless paid Rs. 100 of the fine on Sukpilal's demand.

In this report on his tour in December 1884, Mr. Kennedy, in referring to Sailenpui, wrote :—

“He did not come himself to see me, but the fact that Lengkal met me well within our own territory, and accompanied me as far as Kolosib, the point at which we encamped on the Rengtipahar, and that Lengkal’s father (Bangopa, mantri of Sailenpui) came to me at our third camp with a nazar alike show that Sailenpui is friendly, as his father was.”

One other incident should be mentioned in connection with this Chief. In August 1879, the Deputy-Commissioner asked for and obtained sanction to the purchase of two cavalry swords with steel scabbards “for presentation to the two sons of Sukpilal as a return for the Lushai arms that Chief presented to the Chief-Commissioner.” The two sons were Sailenpui and Lengpunga. In June 1883, Sailenpui returned his sword, and the Deputy-Commissioner said Lengpunga would also do the same. The Chiefs represented that the swords were inconvenient and dangerous, inasmuch as they seriously interfered with their movements and prevented rapid motion to the rear, and they asked for a shorter weapon instead. The Deputy-Commissioner procured from them a wooden model of the article they required, which had a blade about two feet or rather less in length, and an inch and a half in breadth ; with no point, and one edge only, and sent it to Calcutta for the weapons to be manufactured.

Sailenpui is one of the most powerful of the Western Lushais, and has 400 houses, 300 fighting men, and 80 guns in his village. In December 1884,

the Deputy-Commissioner heard that he was "immensely fat."

107. Lengpunga Raja lives on Lunghten Hill, on the east bank of the Dhaleswar, to days' Lushai going south of Changsil Bazar, and two days' Lushai going south-east of Sailenpui's punji. His half brother Zarak lives with him.

Lengpunga is the second of the 11 sons of Sukpial now living, and in 1874 Sukpial installed him in his own place, in his most southern village, where he would have to bear the brunt of the attacks from the Howlongs, Sylus, & c., and moved further north himself. Lengpunga appears to have been frequently fighting either with the Eastern Lushais or with the Sylus and Howlongs, and a reference to the chapters on those subjects will show the part he took in connection with them.

He has had interviews with two Deputy-Commissioners, once in 1879 at Changsil Bazar and again in 1881 at his deceased father's village shortly after the latter's death. On the former occasion Sukpial was the centre of interest, but Lengpunga was also guarded by his own men, in order to prevent a possible recurrence of the Lalchokla incident (which Lushai minds dwell on), and had his own mantris with him.

In 1881, he received the Deputy-Commissioner, as has been mentioned above, in Lalsavunga's village, where a few months previously Sukpial had breathed his last. Lalsavunga was an infant at the time. Of this interview, the Deputy-Commissioner wrote :
 "I was particularly pleased with my visit to this village, as it was evident that my coming was generally

regarded as a very welcome event." The following is the Deputy-Commissioner's account of the Durbar :—

"As soon as we had arrived at the *jolbuk* (public room) and taken our seats, Sukpila's sons, Lengpunga, Thanruma, and Lalrhima entered, preceded by men carrying a sofa (which had been presented by the proprietor of one of the shops at Changsil to Sukpila) ; behind them came half a dozen attendants, each bearing a *chunga* about three feet in length of the large hill bamboo ; as the crowd gathered round the outside people pressed forward and attempted to enter the room ; these men turned and ejected the water with which the *chungas* were filled into the faces of those in the front rank ; this proved a most efficacious method of restoring order, and the on-lookers thenceforward evinced a decided objection to venturing within range. The somewhat ludicrous nature of the scene was not lessened by the imperturbable gravity of the Chiefs and by the incongruity between the sofa on which they had taken their seats and their own very scantily-clad persons. Lalsavunga, who I should judge to be little above two years of age, was then introduced ; but showed such distress at the sight of the strangers that he was promptly removed, and was shortly afterwards followed by his brother Lalrhima, a lad of about four years of age.

Lengpunga appeared to be very grateful for the letter which the Deputy-Commissioner had given to Sailenpui for the Political Agent of the Chittagong Hill Tracts. Among the other subjects discussed was the necessity of reducing the bazar rents, and here the Deputy-Commissioner thought Lengpunga appeared

to be very jealous of Sailenpui's authority,

Lengpunga has, and has always had, since his father's death, a principal share in the Changsil Bazar ; and he was one of the Rs. 100 contributors on the occasion when it was looted in 1879, and was one of those who sent in mantris and asked for its re-establishment in the early part of 1885.

He was made a present of a sword, the circumstances connected with which are stated in the account of our relations with Sailenpui.

He is one of the most powerful of the Lushai Chiefs, and has 500 houses, 400 fighting men and 100 guns in his village.

He has lately been accused of implication in the Chengri Valley raid of last cold season, and many of the captives are said to be now in his village. Messengers have recently been despatched to enquire into the truth of the accusation, and the matter is still under investigation.

108. Dausuma Raja's punji is perhaps the most northern of all the Lushai villages. It is situated on the Bhukmaituak Hill between the Sonai
Dausuma and the Dholeswar, one day's journey, Lushai going, south of Kolosib. He is not one of the descendants of Lalul ; and is of very little importance as a Chief, having only 50 houses, 40 fighting men, and 5 guns in his village. He came down to the Changsil Bazar to see the Deputy-Commissioner in

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 107.—Proceedings, April 1874, April and May 1879, April 1881, report for 1884-85.

Paragraph 108.—Proceedings, June 1883, and May and November 1884.

1874, and was then quite a boy, and had little or nothing to say for himself. His village was attacked in 1882-83 by Lalhai and Poiboi, owing to a woman captured from the former's village having been placed there by Khalkam. On this occasion no one was hurt or killed, but the woman was recovered by Lalhai, and three of Dausuma's men were captured with her. He would perhaps attach himself to Khalkam on any important occasion arising.

109. Lenkhunga Raja is a son of Lalchung, deceased, who was the eldest son of Sukpilal. His brother Daukhuma lives with him. His village is situated on the Rengti Malbhum Hill, One day's journey, Lushai going, south of Dausuma's punji; and three hours' journey, Lushai going, from the mouth of the Kulicherra, where it flows into the Dhaleswar.

The village is not a large one, having only 200 houses, 180 fighting men, and 40 guns; but Lenkhunga appears to possess a certain amount of influence. He paid Rs. 100 of the fine imposed on Sukpilal on the occasion when the Changsil Bazar was looted, and he has a share, though not so large as four other of Sukpilal's sons, in the bazar rents.

In December 1882 he joined Thangula in the raid on Lalhai's punji, which is referred to in paragraph 29, and in December 1883 he sent down the deputation which behaved rather roughly in connection with the dog case, which is narrated in the paragraph on the Lushai Scare.

He, however, helped to furnish a guard to the Sonai Bazar, when it was looted by Poiboi's men in

1884.

110. Thangula Raja is a first cousin of Khalkam, and may be expected to follow Khalkam's lead in any important crisis. His punji is situated on Thangula. the Lungmai range, six hours' journey, Lushai going, south-west of the Sonai Bazar. Being one of the most easternly situated of the Western Chiefs, he has borne the brunt of the attacks from Poiboi and his allies, and has suffered accordingly, as a reference to Chapter IV. of this Note will show.

He was at one time taken captive by Poiboi, owing to the treachery of Lulhai, who delivered him up after he had taken refuge in that Chief's village.

He first sent in mantris to the Deputy-Commissioner in 1879, when they presented a tusk.

He was the person who really sent in the deputation to the Deputy-Commissioner in December 1883, complaining of the murder of four of his men (see the paragraph on the Lushai Scare), and, together with Khalkam, was conspicuous in not sending people to meet the Deputy-Commissioner on his tour in December 1884. He has, however, sent in men subsequently, and his attitude on this occasion was perhaps not altogether unwarrantable (see what is said in the next paragraph regarding Khalkam's action on the same occasion).

He has 100 houses, 80 fighting men, and 25 guns in his village, and, as noted above, may almost be regarded as a dependent of Khalkam.

111. Khalkam Raja is probably the most powerful of all the Lushai Chiefs, and it is said that more than half the Lushais that come down the Khalkam.

Sonai river with bamboos, &c, call them selves "Khal-kams men." Rumour asserts that he was wounded either at Tipaimukh or at Kholai, when secretly fighting against us in the expedition of 1871- 72, but the only ground for this accusation is that he was very ill about that time, and no one seemed able to explain his disease.

The earliest mention of this Chief in our records is of May 1873, when he sent an excuse for not going to the Rai Bahadur at Tipaimukh, who had called him to an interview ; and on this occasion, he said that Rutton Sing, whom the Rai Bahadur asked to be delivered to him, was not in his village but in Sukpila's, a statement which was afterwards found to be untrue.

Again in August 1874, when he and Pibuk each sent down a large tusk and asked for the establishment of the Sonai Bazar, the Deputy-Commissioner wrote as follow :—

"I had discouraged traders from going to Lushai hat (Sonai Bazar) since Khalkam commenced to sulk and neglected to visit me, or send messengers to me, when I was at Bepari Bazar (Changsai Bazar) in March."

He again neglected to visit the Deputy-Commissioner in 1877, when that officer halted at Sonai Bazar, alleging that the necessity of defending his

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 109.—Proceedings, April 1879, June 1883, May and November 1884.

Paragraph 110.—Proceedings, April 1879 and June 1881.

Paragraph 111.—Proceedings, August 1874, November 1875, May 1877, April 1878, April and May 1879, April 1881, May 1881, and November 1884. Files 1,007 of 1888 and 267 of 1889.

village against Poiboi kept him away. It was true that he was expecting an attack at that time.

He, However, sent down mantris in April of the following year, and again in the early part of 1879, after the Changsil Bazar had been closed. On that occasion, also, he paid Rs. 60 of the fine imposed on Sukpilal. He was asked to pay Rs. 100, but got off with Rs. 60 on account of expenses connected with his daughter's death.

In January 1881 he was interviewed by the Deputy-Commissioner at his village, and this is the only occasion on which he has seen a European. He sent word to the Deputy-Commissioner at Sonai Bazar that, as he was very ill, he would be unable to go down to the bazar ; but would be glad if the Deputy-Commissioner would go up to his village. He proposed that the meeting should take place in the *jalbuk* (or public room) of the village ; but the Deputy-Commissioner thought it preferable to hold it outside, since, if cholera appeared in the village during the course of the year, it would be put down to him. The Deputy-Commissioner wrote :—

"I learnt subsequently that, in issuing this invitation, Khalkam had acted in opposition to the wish of his mantris and aroused considerable discontent in the village ; and as neither Khalkam nor his mantris appear to me to have their people under thorough control, it is not unlikely that had I entered the village, the meeting might not have passed off without the occurrence of some unpleasant incident, although no openly hostile action on the part of the people was probable."

Again he wrote :—

“On the conclusion of the usual formalities of health-drinking, to which Lushais attach great importance, I endeavoured to enter into conversation with Khalkam ; but found this impracticable owing to the noisy and unruly conduct of the villagers. We then at his suggestion moved some distance from the escort and the crowd, taking with us the Rai Bahadur, one of the mantris, and Rutton Singh ; while some of the villagers were told off to keep the rest from following us by unstinted application of their sticks.”

Nothing of any great importance was discussed at this interview. Shortly after the Deputy-Commissioner's visit there was much sickness in the village, which some of the villagers attributed to the Deputy-Commissioner having been in its immediate neighbourhood ; but the wiser pointed out that there was no sickness in other villages which the Deputy-Commissioner had actually been into.

A full account of Khalkam's connection with the Sonai Bazar will be found in the paragraphs on that bazar. Some stress has been laid on the fact that Khalkam did not send in representatives to the Deputy-Commissioner on his tour in December 1884, nor after the tour was over ; but some allowance should be made for his action on this occasion. The bazar had been closed in the previous year through no fault of his, notwithstanding that he had sent a guard for its protection, and he had sent in two deputations to have the bazar re-opened in the previous July and October without receiving any satisfactory answer.

In March 1884, the Deputy-Commissioner, in

reporting on the state of feeling among the Lushais, and after stating that the Western Chiefs were well-intentioned, went on to say : "The Chief Khalkam, however, and also Thangula, who are nearer to the Sonai Bazar, are of a different disposition. These men seem, to be more blood-thirsty and violent than the others."

Reference has been made in paragraph 101 to the threatening deputation sent by Khalkam in December 1883 to the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar, and it will be seen from paragraph 127 that he shortly after endeavoured to assure himself of the friendship of the Manipur State.

These two Chiefs, Khalkam and Thangula, also neglected to attend the bazar in May 1884, when the Rai Bahadur visited it, alleging an important *puja* as an excuse.

He sent down mantris in 1886-87 ; and again in November 1888 a mantri of his came down to the Deputy-Commissioner, but Khalkam subsequently repudiated this man's actions. The Rai Bahadur had a long interview with him in January last, and ascertained that he had no complicity in the raid on Pakuma Rani's punji with which he had been charged by the Chittagong authorities. Khalkam also gave a reason for the charge being brought against him (see paragraph 42 of this note).

Though Khalkam cannot be said to have gone out of his way to ingratiate himself with our Government, and though he has on several occasions behaved in a manner which would warrant a supposition that he was failing in a due respect to the authority of our

officers, it would be unsafe to conclude without further proof that he is altogether ill-disposed towards us. It may only be the case that he does not place sufficient importance on mere interchanges of civilities from which nothing is to result ; and it may also be mentioned for what it is worth that before the Rai Bahadur went up to see Khalkam in January last, neither he nor the Deputy-Commissioner nor the other Cachar authorities entertained the slightest belief in the report that Khalkam had anything to do with the raid on the Pakuma Rani's punji.

Khalkam has been, until quite recent years, frequently engaged in fighting with the Eastern clans, as a reference to the chapter on that subject will show. He has 500 houses, 400 fighting men, and 100 guns in his village, which is situated on the Sentlang Hill, one day's journey, Lushai going, south-west of the Sonai Bazar, and at a similar distance from the Changsil Bazar. His village is on or near to the Lungmai range, and Thanthuama Sylu lives with him.

112. Lalrhima Raja also lives on the Lungmai range on the Durtlang Hill, one day's journey, Lushai going, south of Khalkam's punji. His brother Lalsavunga lives with him. He is now about 11 years of age, and Lalsavunga about 9 years. Notwithstanding his youth, his village is of some little importance, and he gets a share of the bazar rents similar to that enjoyed by his brothers,—Sailenpui, Lengpunga, and Thanruma. Perhaps his village is managed now by his mother, Sukpilal's widow ; but up till 1885, Thalien Mantri was probably the leading spirit in this community. An account of

the Deputy-Commissioner's interview with these two children has been given in the paragraph above on Lengpunga. There are 150 houses, 120 fighting men, and 40 guns in this village.

113. Thalien Mantri has a village, 3 hours' journey, Lushai going, west of Lalrhima's punji, on the Bhangantlang Hill, which is also on or near the Lungmai range. The village is a small one of only 50 houses, 40 fighting men and 10 guns.

As long as Sukpial was alive, Thalien served as his mantri; and after his death and up to 1885 he appears to have stayed on in Sukpial's village as mantri of that Chief's widow and sons

He throughout acted as Sukpial's agent in connection with the affair at the Changsil Bazar in 1879, and tried to induce the traders to move the site to Guturmukh, and even offered to make good part of their losses if they would do so. It was he also who paid over the fine on this occasion to our agent. He appears, from the following extract from the Deputy-Commissioner's report of that occurrence, to be a man of somewhat irascible temper :—

"The only incident that occurred on the way to Guturmukh was that Thalien lost his temper and fired at a man for not making room for him to sleep the night after they started. The man was not hit, so probably Thalien only meant to frighten him."

He appears to have been of some influence with Sukpial's sons, since after that Chief's death he was seen at the Changsil Bazar with the mantri of a Poi Chief whom Sailenpui and Lengpunga were negotia-

ting with for assistance against the Eastern Lushais.

He came to see the Rai Bahadur in January last at the Changsil Bazar, and was one of those from whom that officer gathered much of his information.

114. Thanruma Raja lives on the Thantril Hill, which is about six hours' journey, Lushai going, south of Thanruma. Thalien's punji, on the Lungmai range.

He is a son of Sukpilal's, and holds a share in the Changsil Bazar equal to Sailenpui's and Lengpunga's. Beyond the fact that he sent in mantris after the Deputy-Commissioner's tour in 1884-85 to negotiate for the opening of the Changsil Bazar, we have no information whatever regarding this Chief, who lives too far south to have much communication with the Cachar plains. He has a large village with 400 houses, 300 fighting men, and 30 guns.

115. Thanbang Raja is also said to live on the Lungmai range, one day's journey, Lushai going, south of Thanruma's punji, on the Hulangaumun Thanbang.

Hill. His punji is said to be about six hours' journey, Lushai going, north of Lengpunga's. I have not been able to identify this Chief with any of those mentioned in the tree given in paragraph 20 above, unless he is the Thanban who is Sukpilal's brother. The village is a small one with 60 houses, 50 fighting men, and 5 guns.

We now come to the Chiefs on the east side of the Sonai river.

116. Poiboi and Lalhai Rajas now live together on the Tharilen Hill, which is on the east bank of the Sonai and about six hours' journey, Lushai going, south-east of Sonai Bazar. Lalhai Poiboi and Lalhai.

is Poiboi's nephew, his mother being Poiboi's sister. It is only during the last year that they have joined punjis. Poiboi's son Lalruia also lives here.

Both Poiboi and Lalhais learnt something of our power in the expedition of 1871-72. Lalhais's village, Kholel, opposed us at the outset, but soon came to terms, which were designedly made lenient ; and his headmen agreed to make themselves responsible for the safety of our communications thereafter, and not only faithfully fulfilled their promises, but did excellent service in other ways up till the close of the expedition. Poiboi's village gave in and paid up the fine inflicted on it, after the affair of Kungnung had shown the Lushais that all further resistance to our advance was hopeless ; and, though it was at one time determined to destroy the village unless Poiboi himself came in and made submission, this decision was eventually modified when the inhabitants in a body solicited for mercy, and when it was known that Poiboi himself had once or twice ineffectually tried to pluck up sufficient courage to appear in person.

Since then, these two Chiefs have throughout behaved in a friendly way, and have shown deference to the Deputy-Commissioner's wishes on all occasions. A reference to the paragraph on the Tipaimukh Bazar will bear out this view.

Allusions to these Chiefs, and indeed to all Lushai

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 113.—Proceedings, February and April 1879 and May 1881.

Paragraph 116.—Proceedings, November 1875, June 1876, August 1877, February 1879, April 1881. March 1885, Reports for 1879-80, and 1884-85.

matters, are more frequent in the earlier records of the Chief Commissionership than in later years ; and up till 1881 they seem to have been regular in sending in their mantris and submitting nazars.

In 1873, when the Rai Bahadur went up to Tipaimukh, both Chiefs sent down mantris to him ; and Lalhai's men especially gave him much useful information regarding Lushai affairs. Poiboi was given a pony in March 1874, when he sent in mantris to the Deputy-Commissioner in Cachar ; and, in October of the same year, Lalhai sent in mantris with a small nazar. Again Poiboi's mantri, who on this occasion also represented Lalhai, visited the Deputy-Commissioner and presented two tusks at the close of 1875.

Poiboi at this period appears to have been guilty of considerable oppression towards a minor Chief, Tantow, whose misfortunes have been narrated in paragraphs 88 to 90 of this note.

In October 1877, some of Lalhai's men left Lushai-land from fear of Poiboi ; and, in January 1879, Poiboi complained that Lalhai was about to attack his village of Senvong ; and altogether the relations between these two Chiefs appear to have been undefined and variable until 1881, when they became allies. An account of the share which they took in the fighting between the Eastern and Western tribes will be found in Chapter IV. above.

Poiboi again sent in mantris in August 1877, and also in January 1879, on the latter occasion in order to refute the charge brought against him by Sukpial of looting the Changsil Bazar ; and when asked in the cold weather of 1880 why he had not

sent in mantris that year, gave a valid excuse for his neglect, in that the attitude of the Suktes rendered it unadvisable for the headmen to be absent from home.

In January 1881, when the Deputy-Commissioner visited Lushai-land, Poiboi sent in mantris to him, and he had an interview with Lalhai, who was then a handsome youth of about 16 years of age, of very fair complexion. Lalhai could not be induced to enter the Deputy-Commissioner's camp, which was close to the village, until the guard had been withdrawn. The Deputy-Commissioner did not enter the village, as he was asked not to, and he attributed their request to fear of cholera, from which the inhabitants of Kholel, Lalhai's subjects, had suffered severely after the expedition of 1871-72.

In May 1884, Lalhai delivered up a man of his village, by name Salmacha, who was accused of murdering a shop-keeper at Lakhipur. The man was convicted at the Sessions and sentenced to death.

Again, in December 1884, on the Deputy-Commissioner's tour, Poiboi sent in a couple of Pois to meet the Deputy-Commissioner, and they accompanied him to Tipaimukh, where Mr. Daly showed them and Lalhai's and Lenkam's mantri how accurately his sepoy's could shoot. On this occasion the Deputy-Commissioner camped quite close to Lalhai's village. Lalhai at first sent messengers to turn the Deputy-Commissioner back and put up a fence across the road near his punji ; but on this being pulled down, he gave no further obstruction, but rendered every assistance, supplying the camp with vegetables, &c., and

he also held a long interview with the Deputy-Commissioner.

In the cold weather of 1887-88, these two Chiefs both moved to the east bank of the Sonai through fear of the Suktes, who had recently attacked Lalhais; and their joint village is now the nearest to the Sonai Bazar, to ask for the re-establishment of which they sent in mantris in August 1888,

They have a powerful village of 400 houses, 350 fighting men, and 100 guns.

Of Lalruia, we have heard little. Formerly he apparently lived in a separate punji called the Darlona punji. One of his men was said to have been connected with the looting of the Sonai Bazar in 1884 and he, it was who sent in mantris with a nazar in July 1885 to ask for the reopening of that bazar.

The incident referred to above, *viz.*, the looting of the Sonai Bazar, was perhaps regarded mainly as an incident in the quarrel between Thangula and Poiboi, and the latter was never apparently called to account for it by us.

117. Lalbura Raja lives on the Baituisun Hill, which is said to be about 3-hours' journey, Lushai going, south of Poiboi's punji. Savunga Lalbura. Sylu, now an old man, lives with him. His village, Chumphai, was destroyed in 1871-72, prior to which it was the most powerful in the country round. Chumsin and his other villages were spared on their acceding without delay or demur to the terms imposed by our troops.

We have had little or no communication with Lalbura since the expedition; and about the only

mention of his having sent in mantris to us was in 1882-83, when he submitted a nazar of an elephant's tusk, and asked to be allowed a share in the Tipaimukh Bazar. The Sukte attack on the Deputy-Commissioner's camp prevented his claim from being enquired into, and he never has actually had any share in the bazar, though it was probably resorted to regularly by his followers.

He, like the other Eastern Chiefs, moved further west in 1887-88 for fear of the Suktes.

In October 1876, he was seen passing the Sonai Bazar going northwards with a party of about 60 armed men for the purpose of hunting. He returned a month or two later, and took rent from each shop in the Sonai Bazar. He was said to be "very black, longer than a Punjabi, strong, and terrible to look upon."

He has had a considerable share in the fighting between the Eastern and Western clans, as a reference to the chapter on that subject will show; and he seems at various times to have been engaged in quarrels with the Sylus and Bhuta's sons.

There are 300 houses, 250 fighting men, and 60 guns in his village.

118. Lengkam Raja lives on the Balpui Hill, one Lengkam day's journey, Lushai going, south-east of Poiboi's punji. He is Lalbura's brother, and had to send headmen as far as Tipaimukh to accompany our troops on their return journey in the expedition of 1871-72.

He can fairly be set down as well-disposed towards us, and has been regular in sending in his mantris. He sent in a fine tusk as a nazar in January

1874 ; and asked for our orders to attack the Suktes in the following cold weather ; and again sent in an elephant's tusk in October 1876. He also sent in mantris in January 1879 to deny his complicity in the looting of Changsil Bazar, with which he and Poiboi had been charged ; and gave the same excuse as the latter. Chief about the attitude of the Suktes for not sending in to pay his respects in the following cold season.

He again sent in mantris to the Deputy-Commissioner's camp at Tipaimukh in January 1881, and two small elephant tusks in December 1884, when the Deputy-Commissioner was again in Lushai-land. He also sent in a mantri in August 1888 to ask for a bazar on the Sonai.

He has taken part in the fighting between the Eastern and Western clans (see the chapter on that subject), and he has had a great deal to do with the Tipaimukh Bazar, in connection with which he has always displayed great deference to the Deputy-Commissioner's wishes.

Perhaps the most unfavourable mention of this Chief in our records is his treatment of the Paithe Kukis, referred to in the paragraph on the Tipaimukh Bazar, who in 1882 deserted the Lushais and emigrated into Manipur territory. The Kukis said that Lengkam in particular had treated them badly, and he it was who followed them up and attacked them at Chibu.

Lengkam is one of the most powerful of the Lushai Chiefs, and has 400 fighting men and 110 guns in his village of 450 houses.

119. Bungteya Raja is said to live on the South Darlang Hill, 6 hours' journey, Lushai going, from Lalbura's punji. We have no information whatever about him except that he appears to have taken part in the feud against the Western Lushais. In February 1879 and again in January 1881 he was reported to be at war with Bhuta's sons. He has 300 houses, 200 fighting men, and 40 guns in his village.

120. Bungteya's mother with her grandson Kairanga live in a village on the Maite Hill, one day's journey, Lushai going, south east of Bungteya's punji. In this village there are 150 houses, 125 fighting men, and 40 guns.

Of *Lalruma*, Poiboi's brother, and *Poiboi's mother*, we know nothing. The former lives on the Saichal Hill, six hours' journey, Lushai going, south of Lengkam's punji ; and the latter's village is on Lunpher Hill, three hours' journey, Lus' ai going, south of Poiboi's punji. *Lalhanga*, a cousin of Poiboi's, lives with Poiboi's mother. The strength of these villages has been given in paragraph 19 above.

121. We have never had any communication with Bhuta's sons also, who had no experience of our power in 1871-72, but the situation and strength of the villages of three of them is given in paragraph 19 above. These three brothers are the

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 117.—Proceedings, May 1877.

Paragraph 118.—Proceedings, February and November 1875, February 1879, April 1881, and March 1885

raiders on Pakuma Rani's punji, and their village and Lengpunga's will probably be the objective points of next season's operations.

PART IV

CHAPTER—XI

RELATIONS OF MANIPUR WITH THE LUSHAIS.

122. The policy to be followed by Manipur with regard to the Lushais was laid down in a letter from the Foreign Secretary to the Political Agent, No. 1,127P., dated the 30th June 1870, of which the following is an extract :—

“It is essential that similar measures for the establishment of friendly relations with the Lushais should be adopted from the side of Manipur, and that the Raja and his subjects should be restrained from committing aggressions on this tribes. I am therefore to request that you will impress on the Raja in the most emphatic manner possible, that, while he should take all necessary measures for the protection of his frontier, no unprovoked aggression on his part can be permitted; and that he must take effective steps to make his subject Kukis understand this, and to punish rigorously any disobedience of these instructions.”

This line of policy was again confirmed after the Lushai expedition. In October 1872, the Government of India referred the Political Agent to the above letter, as showing the general policy to be pursued by Manipur towards the Kukis and Lushais.

Although the Durbar has had but little communication with the Lushais since the expedition, these instructions are still important in so far that they entail on the Maharaja the necessity of protecting his southern

frontier and our eastern flank, and of preventing his subjects located in that direction from committing aggressions on the Lushais.

It may be here noted that the southern boundary of the Manipur State has never been laid down, with the exception of a small portion to the extreme east, which was defined by the Kubo Valley Treaty of 1834. In 1882-83, the Maharaja did make an application, through the Political Agent, to have the southern boundary finally demarcated ; but it was not then considered advisable or necessary to do so. In the event of our being compelled to occupy these hills, it would undoubtedly be desirable to settle a boundary as soon as possible after our advent in the country ; for the Durbar would probably take advantage of the protection afforded by our presence to advance their control far beyond the limit up to which they at present possess any influence.

123. Besides the Kapui Nagas, the population to Kuki and Sakte immigrants settled in the south of Manipur. the south of the Cachar-Manipur road seems to be made up entirely of Kuki and Sakte settlers who have immigrated from the southern hills ; and though these would naturally appear from the scattered nature of their settlements to be easy victims to any marauding parties of raiders, even if they were not an actual source of irritation to their former Chiefs, whom they may have left owing to fear or unsatisfactory complications, they are really a source of protection to the State, especially in places where the Kapui Nagas have in former times been driven away by the Kukis and Lushais.

We know that a large number of these immigrants

deserted from the Lushais after and during the expedition of 1871-72, and that up to 23rd of March 1872, 2,549 souls arrived in Manipur; while two other instances of large immigration have come to our knowledge since then. The first of these was in 1877-78, when parties to the number of over 2,000 persons belonging to the Suktes migrated during the year into Manipur territory, where they settled down on lands allotted to them by the Maharaja in the neighbourhood of Moirang to the south-west of the valley; and the second occasion was in 1882, when 3,000 Kukis, men, women, and children, deserted from the Lushais and were located in sites south of the Cachar-Manipur road. Another instance occurred in 1884, when 180 families of Suktes under Sangam sought refuge in Manipur, and were also assigned lands south of Moirang.

Apart from these sudden irruptions, there is reason to believe that, until quite recent years, there used to be a gentle but fairly constant tide of immigration flowing into the country south of Manipur. In December 1881, and in February and June 1882, the time of the Lushai famine, 180 families in all fled from their own country and settled in Manipur territory, owing to the scarcity of food then prevailing.

124. In January 1875, the Political Agent reported that detached bodies of Lushais had been seen camped

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 122.—Mackenzie, page 161.

„ 123.—Reports for 1877-78, 1882-83, and 1883-84. Diary December 1881 and February and June 1882, Mackenzie, page 460.

Lushais trees-
passing in
Manipuri
forests.

out in several places south of the Government road ; that in consequence some alarm had been experienced ; and that the Manipur authorities had not only taken precautionary steps for the protection of the Government road and the adjoining villages, but had also postponed the despatch of a force which was on the point of proceeding against the Kamhaos. Three days after he again reported that it had been satisfactorily ascertained that no hostile movement of the Lushais was intended, but that their object was merely to obtain rubber and other jungle produce. While admitting the hardship accruing to the Manipur State from the reckless proceedings of the Lushais, who destroyed the rubber trees and spoiled the Khedda operations by frightening away, the elephants, Dr. Brown pointed out to the Durbar that they must perforce make their own arrangements for the protection of their interests, and that our Government had no control except indirectly over the tribes concerned. In reporting the incident to the Government of India, the Chief Commissioner expressed an opinion "that Government could not stand by and see Manipur overrun by a horde of savages, even if their intentions were primarily peaceable, when they caused dilapidation of State property ;" but on being called on for a further expression of his views regarding the line of action to be taken regarding this question, and the general one of the Lushai movement northwards, the Chief Commissioner said he had no proposals to make beyond the negative one of leaving matters alone.

The warning which the Lushais then received

regarding trespass in our territory was probably held by them to apply also to Manipur ; for no further complaints of their depredations are again recorded, and in 1881 Colonel Johnstone thought they must have given up cutting rubber in Manipur territory, since no reports of their doing so had been received for some time.

125. In March 1877, the Maharaja of Manipur reported to the Political Agent that the Kapui Nagas of Kalanaga and other villages lying on the border of the government road wished to go and make peace with the Lushais, so that their fear of them might be removed. Mr. Damant, who had recently been Political Agent, made a note on the subject, in which he said that for some years past the Kapui Nagas living in the villages of Kalanaga, Nongba, Kambiron, Koupum, and other places adjacent to the main road from Cachar to Manipur, had suffered very severely from repeated raids made by Lushais subject to Poiboi, Lalbura, and Lengkam, and that the Manipuri guards at Kalanaga and Koupum had been attacked and defeated on more than one occasion, and had proved quite unable to afford any sufficient protection to the Kapui Nagas ; that, when he was Political Agent, the Nagas had themselves come to him and asked for permission to send headmen to make peace with the Lushais ; but that he had disapproved of the proposal unless the deputation was backed by the Manipuris, as he thought the Lushais thoroughly despised the Kapui Nagas, and if the latter went alone to sue for peace, the Lushais would conclude that the Maharaja did not

care to protect the Nagas, and the raids would become worse than before.

The Maharaja now proposed to send Manipuri officials with the party. The Chief Commissioner did not approve of the deputation, and thought that no negotiations would have any lasting effect as long as the Maharaja failed to protect his country by force of arms, but he authorised the Deputy Commissioner of Cachar to render every assistance to the deputation that did not pledge our Government directly or indirectly.

On the arrival of the deputation at Cachar the Deputy-Commissioner ascertained that one of the Manipuri officials of the party had in the previous year learnt when at Tipaimukh that Poiboi and Lengkam were willing to enter into friendly relations with the Kapui Nagas, and that the deputation had accordingly brought only two mithans as presents for these Chiefs. The Deputy-Commissioner feared that if Lalbura were left out, that Chief would avenge the slight put on him by a raid before many weeks had passed ; but he nevertheless allowed the deputation to go to Tipaimukh to renew overtures with Poiboi and Lengkam, on the understanding that if it were found that the Chiefs were still disposed to enter into engagements, they should then ask for an interview with one Chief and request him to convene a meeting of all the chiefs to consider the question of future relations.

Contrary to these instructions, some of the heads

REFERENCES.

- Paragraph 124.—Proceedings, March and June, 1875, report for 1880-81.
 " 125— " July and August, 1877.

of the deputation obtained the services of one of the shop-keepers at the bazar and went on to Polboi's village, where they were well received and their proposals agreed to, but were dissuaded from going on to Lengkam's village, though that Chief had sent messengers to escort them. This slight offended Lengkam, and he sent mantris to the bazar, who told the delegates that their Chief was exceedingly angry at the slight put on him, and only forbore from attacking the party because "a man of the sahib" (the shop-keeper) was with them. The mantris were pacified with presents, but Lengkam a few days later on looted the shops of the traders at the bazar, saying that he was convinced from the presence of the shop-keeper with the deputation that the traders were a party to the affront put on him.

Shortly after this the mantris of Poiboi and Lengkam arrived at Kalanaga to receive the promised mithans ; but the Manipuris desired to withhold them on the ground that it was no good coming to an arrangement with one or two Chiefs only, and it was not until the Political Agent pointed out the certainty of vengeance if they failed to fulfil their promises that the presents were eventually made.

A further circumstance throws some more light on the proceedings of the deputation among the Lushais. It seems that they endeavoured to persuade Khalkam to accept them as accredited agents of the British Government, and offered themselves as negotiators of peace between him and Poiboi. Khalkam's suspicions were, however, aroused by their asking for a present in consideration of effecting a settlement of the

differences at issue, and the delegates appear to have left the village hurriedly on observing that Khalkam distrusted them.

The orders of the Government of India on the subject were that the Maharaja should be discouraged from sending deputations of this kind, the effect of which might be to cause complications with the tribes on the British frontier, until such time as the Maharaja agreed to the Chief Commissioner's suggestion that he should state on paper the terms he wished to make with the Lushais and should formally engage to abide implicitly by the Chief Commissioner's decision in the event of any subsequent disputes arising.

126. In the cold weather of 1878-79, some Lushais burnt a granary in a Kuki village in Manipur territory and lost one of their number in doing so. Messengers were sent from Manipur to negotiate with the Lushais, who were said to be preparing an attack, and the result was the arrival of a number of Lushai deputies at Manipur, who admitted that they were in the wrong and received presents from the Maharaja. "The case," it was stated, "was satisfactorily and amicably disposed of by the payment of a few rupees." In his report for 1880-81, Colonel Johnstone wrote "the usual friendly deputation of Kapui Nagas, headed by a Manipuri officials, has met the Lushai Chiefs, and presents have been exchanged and entertainments given," from which it would appear that some good result was obtained from the proceedings of the deputation of 1877.

Communica-
tion with the
Lushais in
1878-79 and
1880-81.

127. Mention is made above under the Tipaimukh

Bazar of the emigration from Lushai-land in the early part of 1882 of a number of Paite Kukis and of the causes which led them to desert the Lushais. These people were assigned lands by the Maharaja to the south of the Cachar road, and were given grain to subsist on until they were able to settle down and grow their own crops ; and they were subsequently introduced by the Political Agent to the headmen of the different Kapui Naga villages situated along and about the road, towards whom they swore everlasting friendship and vowed to protect them from the Lushais.

These Kukis gave no trouble in their new country, but on the contrary showed themselves anxious to obey all orders without hesitation. In the beginning of the following November a deputation of Lushais under Poiboi's mantri arrived in Manipur with the object of arranging an exchange of captives and of placing matters on a satisfactory footing between themselves and the Kukis. It seems that the Lushais were in constant dread of fresh attacks, and in consequence kept up an incessant watch and ward, which took a number of men away from their jhums. Numerous consultations were held without any satisfactory result ; for while the Lushais were willing to accept guarantees offered by Manipur, they declared they were not empowered by their Chiefs to give any security on their own part. The Political Agent was, however, asked to bring the Kuki leaders to Tipaimukh in the following cold weather, so that negotiations might be arranged, and this he determined to do, though he was subsequently unable to carry out his intention. Mr. Knox

Wight went there, however, but, as is stated above, had to retire, owing to an attack on his camp by Suktes. No further hostilities were, however, reported between these Kukis and the Lushais.

128. In March 1884, Khalkam and Lenkhunga sent in a deputation to Manipur with the object of ensuring friendship and peaceful relations with that State. It is a curious fact that these two Chiefs who had some three months previously sent in threatening deputations to Cachar, and who are never previously referred to as having entered into negotiations with Manipur, should have chosen this occasion for opening a friendly alliance with the Durbar. The Political Agent was unable to ascertain that they had any ulterior object, but there was probably something more than a mere coincidence in the timing of the two visits.

129. In the cold weather of 1883-84, it was said that six Lushai households, 25 souls in all, emigrated into Manipur from Lengkam's punji. If the emigrants were really Lushais and not Kukis, the incident is worth mentioning as being almost the only one of its kind.

In 1882, Colonel Johnstone wrote that the Lushais did not settle in Manipur ; and he thought it was not to be wondered at that they should avoid the Sukte and Kepui Naga immigrant settlements by

REFERENCES

Paragraph 126.—Reports for 1878-79, 1879-80, and 1880-81.

"	127.—	"	1882-83.
"	128.—	"	1883-84.

which the southern frontier of Manipur was well guarded. At the same time he thought it strange that they had hitherto entirely avoided settling to the south of the road "where virgin soil, their great desideratum, is to be had in abundance." "The reason probably is," he wrote, "that the Chiefs object to allow outlying portions of their tribe to move beyond the limits of their control, also it is possible that the same occult impulse which has moved them thus far prompts them to seek an outlet in some other direction."

130. In January 1883, when the Bazar at Tipaimukh was attacked by Suktes, the Senapati (not the present incumbent) was near by ; and at the time the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar, who at first thought that the raid had been made by the Paithe Kukis settled in Manipur, wrongfully accused that officer of instigating the attack. It was afterwards clearly proved that he could have had nothing to do with the matter, but at the time the Political Agent considered it advisable to order his immediate return. Apparently the Durbar neglected to convey the order ; for in March he wrote from Tipaimukh saying that Poiboi's and Lengkam's mantris had been to see him, and had told him that they would assure the Deputy-Commissioner that he was in no way to blame for the attack on the Deputy-Commissioner's camp or in any way hostile to the Lushais.

In June 1884, the mantris of Poiboi, Lengkam and Lalruia arrived in Manipur, and said that they wished to maintain friendly relations with the Raj, and also with the Paithe Kukis who had deserted from Lushai-

Communica-
tion with the
Lushais from
1883 till the
present time.

land.

No further mention is made of any dealings with the Lushais on the part of Manipur up to the end of the year 1887-88, though it is periodically stated that relations continued to be friendly. It is probable that the Kukis and other settlers keep up communication with the Lushais on their own account. Colonel Johnstone mentions an incident of how, when he was at Leelamong in October 1884, the Koupum Nagas brought him a man—one of their own relations—who had been carried off as a boy by the Lushais, and had only just been redeemed. He still wore his hair long like a Lushai, and might easily have passed as a Kuki.

Now that the Lushais have all moved further west, and are none of them far east of the Sonai, it is to be expected that communications between Manipur and the Lushais, at no time very frequent, will almost entirely cease.

131. In 1886-87, an incident occurred which, though it does not refer to the Lushais, may be briefly

<p>Raid by Manipur Kamhaos on Kapui Nagas in 1886-87</p>	<p>mentioned here as being of the nature of occurrences which are likely to affect the security of our eastern frontier. In September 1886, a series of raids were made on Naga villages near the Cachar-Manipur road by the Kamhao Suktes settled in Manipur. It appears that a Chief of the Khungnung village by name Naokup stopped for a night in the Naga village of Laimanai,</p>
--	---

REFERENCES.

- Paragraph 129.—Diary, April 1883 and report for 1881-82.
 „ 130.— „ March 1883, June, 1884, and October 1884.
 „ 131.—Proceedings, September 1887.

where he fell ill and died shortly after reaching his own home. His death was ascribed to sorcery ; and to punish the villagers for their supposed complicity and also to get heads for the funeral obsequies, the Chiefs of the villages of Khungnung, Sangam, and Laosao set out on the war-path and extended their operations to other villages besides the offending one. Five Naga villages were attacked and 38 of the inhabitants killed and 121 taken captive. A Manipur force proceeded through Moirang to "General Nuthall's camp," by which description the position taken up by general Nuthall during the Lushai expedition of 1871-72 (Chibu) is no doubt referred to, and from there induced the raiders to come in, after some delay, and to give up the captives. The villages concerned in the raid were fined 10 mithans, one elephant tusk, and three gongs, and took an oath "on the Maharaja's big gun and a tiger's tooth" to keep the peace in future. The Political Agent warned them that any repetition of such lawless conduct would be punished most severely, and would lead to their being driven out of the country.

132, In January 1888, when at Kala Naga, the Political Agent learnt that the Kamhaos of Sangam had lately carried off three mithan and had threatened further raids.

In the following April, the murder of three Kamhao Suktes of Sangam's village at the salt wells of Chibu was reported ; and in the following month the Political Agent again reported that some Lushais of Lengkam's punji had killed two Kukis and

Disturbed
condition of
the Manipur
frontier last
cold weather.

carried off another captive from the village of Khonyang near Tipaimukh, and had further threatened to burn Kala Naga unless two buffaloes were given them. The Kala Naga villagers were said to have sent their families away to a place of safety, and the Maharaja sent 50 men to the Kala Naga thana and 10 more to Khonyang to make enquiries. Almost immediately after, in the same month, it was ascertained that the death of the Khongyang men was untrue, and that the first report was founded on the murder of Sangam's three men at the Chibu salt wells. No further information has been received regarding the murder of Sangam's men, but the Durbar think the raiders were Lushais, and probably Poiboi's men.

It should perhaps be mentioned here that the Sangam referred to is the same person who immigrated into Manipur territory in 1884, and is a totally different person to the Singkam Raja, also a Kamhao Sukte, who raided on Lalhais punji in 1887. Singkam's village is two days south of Thedin, one of the principal Kamhao villages.

When the Political Agent was at Jhirighat in January last, the Kukis of a village named Bakal came and complained that, in the previous October, Pahlen, the Sukti Chief, had looted their village and that the Durbar had taken no steps to enquire into the matter. Pahlen's village was said to be three days journey south of Kala Naga. The Durbar promised to have Pahlen sent for, but it does not appear that they did so.

133. In April last news was received that the Kamalhar Kuki punji on the Manipur side of the Barak had been attacked and three of its inhabitants

killed, Up till the present time the raiders have not been identified, but three hypotheses have been started. One is that the inhabitants of the Kamalldhar punji were attacked by their former Chief, who was the Pahlen above referred to, because they had deserted him ; another is that they were attacked by another punji in Manipur territory by name Lengkhum, cause unknown ; and the third is that the Lushais of Lenkhunga or Dausuma committed the raid in revenge for the murder of some of their own men by followers of the aforesaid Pahlen. In the meantime the survivors have sought refuge in our territory, and have been allowed to settle temporarily in a Kuki púnji near the Dharmiakhhal grant (*see* paragraph 96).

On the 24th of May last, as two Nagas were proceeding along the Cachar-Manipur road, and when near the Nongiaibong thana, 11 miles from Jhirighat, they were fired at by four Lushais and one of them was hit. On the thana people hearing the firing they also fired off their guns, and the Lushais then made off. The identity of these raiders also has not yet been ascertained.

134. It will be gathered from the foregoing paragraphs that our knowledge of affairs on this frontier is not altogether as satisfactory as its disturbed condition renders desirable. We have but a very vague knowledge of the position of the Kuki and Sukte villages under Manipur control, and still less of the tribes beyond in the country between the Kamhaos and the Lushais, though the supposition is that they also

The Kamalldhar
case. Nagas
on Manipur
road fired at.

Our ignorance
regarding
affairs on this
frontier

are members of the Sukte tribe.

As regards routes, too, from Manipur territory into this now unknown region (we knew more about its condition in 1871-72) we are also in the dark. We know that a path comes out at Nongjaibong from the Lushai villages, and another path is said to come out at Kala Naga, while Chibu is said to be a place where many routes from the hills converge, but we have no information as to the nature, practicability, or length of the routes, or even to what particular villages they may lead. It is worthy of remark that when Poiboi's, Lengkam's, and Lalruia's mantris came into Manipur in June 1884 they marched along the Government road from Lakhipur.

PART V.—THE LUSHAI ROUTES.

Below is compiled whatever information has been found in our office records regarding routes in the Lushai country.

135. As regards the season for operations, it,
Season for operations. may be noticed that all expeditions, tours, visits, &c., to the country have been confined to the months of November to February as much as possible. This is owing to the belief that the months previous to November are extremely unhealthy, and that this unhealthiness commences again in the middle of March, when the rain generally begins to fall. Apart from the unhealthiness and

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 132.—Diary, January to May 1888, December 1888, and January 1889.

133.—Files 463 and 543 of 1889.

discomfort which it may give rise to, rain in these hills materially affects the progress of troops, rendering the steep paths slippery and impassable, and in some cases, where the route is precipitous (e g., the Dhaleswar Campaign of 1869, when the troops had to turn back), even washing the roads away. Where the route is entirely by water, rain, on the other hand, rather facilitates than impedes progress, and as an instance of this can be mentioned Mr. McWilliam's tour to Bepari Bazar on the Dhaleswar in 1884, when the journey was said to have been shortened by two days owing to the river rising from the rain which they encountered.

On turning back to previous expeditions, we see that Colonel Lister in 1849 went up in the month of January. The expedition of 1869 only arrived at the frontier at the end of February, and experienced heavy rain in consequence ; and, though the left column by the Sonai succeeded after considerable delay in reaching its destination on the 12th March, the central column by the Dhaleswar had to turn back altogether as early as the 7th of that month. When the expedition of 1871-72 was sanctioned, orders were issued that the country should be completely evacuated by the 10th March, on, which date the head-quarters of the Cachar column actually did arrive back in Silchar.

Our own officers have taken their tours in this country in December, January, and February. That of Mr. McWilliam in 1874 was made in March ; but his trip was confined to a journey in boats up and down the Dhaleswar to Bepari Bazar, and, as has been mentioned above, he encountered rain. The following

remarks about the climate of south Cachar are taken from a survey report of 1872 :—

“During the rains and up to the end of September the greater part of the country is under water ; the low-lying valleys and hills are extremely unhealthy, and even the elephants take refuge on the high ranges.”

“In October the drying-up process commences ; but the jangals are still dangerous, and little can be done by the surveyor till the beginning of November. During the latter month heavy fogs, clearing off an hour or two before noon, are very prevalent ; but the country is sufficiently dry to commence work by the middle of the month, and the jangals may be penetrated without risk.”

“December and January are uniformly fine ; the atmosphere is clear, and the climate extremely pleasant. During these two months all instrumental work should, if possible, be completed.”

“Early in February rain may be expected, and the atmosphere becomes hazy and the distant ranges obscured for days together.”

“Heavy rain sets in towards the end of March. The heat becomes offensive, and the jangals, adounding as they do with every description of venomous fly, mosquitoes, and other noxious insects, are hardly tenable.”

“A few clear days may however be obtained after heavy rain before the rivers rise and the country is

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 135.—Report on the survey of the Lushai country in the cold season of 1871-72.

Paragraph 136.—Demi-official information from Mr. Kennedy, late Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar.

otherwise impracticable."

On the whole, there can be no doubt that operations should be confined to the three cold-weather months, December, January, and February, as far as possible.

136. As regards supplies, everything for a large force must be taken from British territory. Supplies. If small forts were stationed in the country, they could be supplied, as in North Cachar, with rice from the neighbouring punjis ; but this would require careful arrangements, and could only be depended on if the Lushai country were regularly brought under our rule.

Rice and a few pulses are procurable at all villages, but the Lushais only bring into the punji 'sufficient for a few days at a time. The rest of their crops they keep either stacked in houses in their jhums or buried in pits to prevent destruction by deer and other animals. To collect rice for a hundred men therefore would require a couple of days' notice.

Besides the above, and a few pigs, fowls, and eggs, no other supplies of any kind are procurable in the Lushai country.

137. Owing to difficulties connected with Carriage. carriage, the river routes would no doubt be resorted to as much as possible by a force entering the country. It is also to be supposed that as many elephants as possible would be employed ; they can do without any other food than the jangal produce which abounds in the Lushai Hills, at any rate for a time ; and they can go almost anywhere where a man can. Even if fighting was expected, or

the road should become impassable in front, they would always be of great use in pushing on supplies from the rear to the more advanced posts.

All requirements likely to be made from the local authorities should be communicated as early as possible in the rainy season. The majority of elephants available in the Surma Valley are used for timber dragging and similar work, are unaccustomed to carry loads, and would require to be trained to this latter work for a short time before being used with troops. Some notice would also be required before boats could be procured, especially the particular kind which are necessary for the shallow waters of the Sonai and Dholeswar. These not only draw very little water, but are made in a particular way so as to withstand the constant grounding, collisions, & c., which are unavoidable in the upper portions of these streams.

It would be advisable for an expedition proceeding up either the Sonai or the Dholeswar (and indeed by any route) to take a supply of dynamite in order to destroy the huge masses of rock which in the higher reaches of these rivers are said to form almost impenetrable barriers.

138. There are five fairly well known routes to Lushai-land from Cachar : (1) by Tipaimukh ; (2) by the Sonai ; (3) by the Dholeswar ; (4) by Kolosib and the Rengti Range ; and (5) by Parsonsib and the Lungmai Range.

The five routes
to Lushai-land.

THE TIPAIMUKH ROUTE.

139. The Tipaimukh route has the advantage over the others in that the water communication by the

Barak is in every way superior to that by either the Sonai or the Dhaleswar. Boats of 50 maunds can go up as far as Tipaimukh all the year round ; and small steamers can go up as far as Alni, and boats of 150 to 200 maunds as far as Tipaimukh, up to the very end of the rains.

The following table shows the stages which were taken by the Cachar column of the expeditionary force in 1871-72, with the distances, the rivers and streams on the road, the latitude and longitude of the halting places, and their elevation. The distance of the first stage, Lakhipur, is taken from Silchar :—

Names of stages.	Distance				Rivers and streams.	Latitude.				Longitude.				Elevation.
	Of stage		Total											
	M.	F.	M.	F.										
	°	'	°	'		°	'	°	'	°	'	°	'	
Lakhipur	14	0	14	0	Barak, a ferry.	24	47	30	93	2	10	700 feet		
Alni Tea Garden	6	0	20	0		24	44	40	93	5	15			
Camp in the Forest	9	0	29	0	Barak, a ferry.	24	36	0	93	6	40			
Bubandhar Tea Garden	10	0	39	0		24	32	0	93	5	30	750 feet		
Mynadhur Tea Garden	10	0	49	0	Barak, a ferry.	24	28	0	93	5	30			
No. 1 Station	5	0	54	0		24	24	10	93	4	0			
" 2 "	6	0	60	0		24	21	0	93	5	0			
" 3 "	9	0	69	0	Barak, a ferry.	24	16	10	93	3	0			
" 4 "	10	0	79	0										

[contd. over leaf]

[contd. over leaf]

[illegible]

As regards the first portion of the route up to Mynadhar, it is the opinion of Colonel Woodthorpe in which I think the local officers now concur, that it would have been better if the force had taken the route from Monierkhal over the Bhuban range instead of the one round by Lakhipur along the bank of the Barak. This latter route he describes as very difficult. Long spurs run down steeply to the water's edge and are separated from each other by deep and boggy ravines covered with the densest jungle. The path is thus continually rising and falling, often as much as 700 feet and always with a very steep gradient, and throughout its whole length there is not, Colonel Woodthorpe says, a single level portion extending to the distance of one hundred yards. The elephants belonging to the force had to be sent along it unloaded, their loads going by boat.

The path over the Bhubans, on the other hand, is patrolled regularly now by the Frontier Police of the two guards of Monierkhal and Mynadhur, who meet half way, and elephants could certainly go over it. It has recently been realigned, and is said to be passable for ponies, and there is only one portion of it that can really be called steep. It strikes the Lushai path on top of the Bhuban ridge, which would probably be the easiest route for troops to Tipaimukh. The only objection to the route by the ridge would be the scarcity of water in the dry months.

From Silchar to Monierkhal by Sonaimukh would be two marches of 10 and 14 miles respectively, and from Monierkhal to Mynadhar one march of 10 miles. There is a good road from Silchar to Monierkhal.

From Mynadhar to Tipaimukh the road is described by Colonel Woodthorpe to be similar to that between Alni and Mynadhur, precipitous and jungly. The river is crossed in three places by swinging bridges, once at Alni, again at Mynadhur, where the road goes over to the Manipur side, and once again at No. 3 Station, where it comes back to the Cachar side. Tipaimukh is described by every one as an excellent place for a depot, with plenty of camping space.

From Tipaimukh to the Senvong range, two marches further on, the road follows a tolerably easy gradient with jangal of a less impenetrable character than that on the earlier portion of the route. The hill side is of a rocky nature, but was a good deal blasted during the expedition to open the road. Water is procurable at several places. Major Boyd, Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar, visited Tipaimukh in January 1881, and spent some days exploring these roads ; and found that with very little trouble they might again be made practicable. The Senvong range is a long lofty spur with an average elevation of 4,000 feet. Limes, cinnamon, and walnut trees grow in the villages on it.

Stations Nos. 7 and 8 are on the banks of the Tuibum and the Tuitu respectively. The road from the Tuibum to the Tuitu ascends 3,000 feet to the top of a ridge and descends 2,200 feet on the other side.

From the Tuitu the path leads up a steep and narrow spur ascending about 2,300 feet to Pachui (No. 9 station). Nearing Pachui the country becomes more open, the bamboo disappearing and becoming replaced with tall trees, with a few low shrubs and

numerous flowering weeds, such as heliotrope, between.

The road from Pachuito the next station Chipui, 5 miles off, descends about 2,000 feet to the Tipai and rises another 2,200 or 2,500 feet on the opposite side. The climate of Pachui in January is said to be delightful and pleasantly warm during the day, with a refreshing breeze, and with an average minimum temperature of 44° during the night. The only drawback is the dense fog, which lasts till 10 in the morning.

From Chipui onwards the road was not made in 1871-72, and country paths alone were resorted to ; but a few elephants were taken even over these.

The main features of the country over which the road lead after passing Chipui are high hills and ridges, with steep descents to the valleys between. The descent to the Sairumlui between the Chipui and Gnowpa ranges is steep but not difficult. At Gnowpa or Station No. 11 and at Kungnung or No. 12 there is a scarcity of water ; and again the supply is limited between Tulcheng No. 15 and Buljung No. 16, especially at the latter station. The watershed between the valley of the Surma and the valley of the Koladyne is close to and just beyond Buljung.

In case of the road being re-opened it appears doubtful if the route between Sengbong and Pachui, and perhaps even as far as Chipui, should be adopted. Sir. J. W. Edgar suggested that a better alignment would be obtained by descending from Sengbong to the Tuitu at a higher level than in the route taken, and gaining the top of the Kholel range at a part much further north than Pachui, thereby avoiding the crossing

of the steep Parbachung range. The Tipai could then be crossed at comparatively high level near Tingridong and the road brought round to the Gnowpa without having to ascend or descend from the Sairumlui.

We have no information as to what villages would now be met on this route. All we do know is that the Lushais have been driven westwards of it, and that the village of Kairuma, Bhuta's son, is the only one that is likely to be at all within reach of it. Villages of Suktes, and perhaps Pois, would probably be met with.

THE SONAI ROUTE.

140. The Sonai route follows the course of the Sonai River up to the bazar. It was taken by a column of the expeditionary force that went up in 1869, and arrived in the bazar as late as the 12th March, after encountering heavy rain on the journey. The distances by the river are—

	Days.
Silchar	3
Monierkhal to Kulicherra.....	5
Kulicherra to the Sonai Bazar	4
	<hr/>
Total	12
	<hr/>

In the rains boats would go from Monierkhal to Kulicherra in two days. The river is navigable for a few miles only to the south of Sonai bazar. There are one or two large churs at the further end of the route, which form good camping ground. During the rains,

boats of 30 to 40 maunds can go up as far as Sonai Bazar. In the cold weather only the very smallest boats can get up this river.

A brief outline of the proceedings of the expedition of 1869 is given below. The force consisted of 319 rank and file, not counting European and Native Officers, and 2 guns manned by 23 gunners.

Its carriage consisted of 47 elephants, 32 bullocks and 369 coolies. Stores were sent before hand up the Sonai to Nagdigram, and from there pushed on to the next three camps, occupied by 364 men, including guards. The total strength of the column was thus 1,124.

The stages taken by it from Silchar were : —

1. Nugdigram ($14\frac{1}{2}$ miles).
2. Gajalghat (or Punia), 12 to 14 miles.
3. Kulicherra (on the Rukuni).
4. Bongkong.
5. Silghat (or Worsley Camp).
6. Salt Springs.
7. Ram Lakhan Tila on the Sonai.

Boats were sent up the Sonai to meet the force at Ram Lakhan Tila.

From Ram Lakhan Tila an advance was made by detachments in boats to Asn Miah's Khal, the mouth of a small stream flowing into the Sonai below the bazar, and 105 sepoy were conveyed there in two batches, the journey in each case occupying about one day. Of this number 20 were left at the khal and the

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 140.—Report of the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar dated the 14th April 1869.

remaining 85 pushed on to the bazar, and this, with the guns, was the force eventually at the Commander's disposal for dealing any blow that might have had to be inflicted.

The guns were taken up to Sonai Bazar by the river. They were brought up to the bed of the stream where the water was sufficiently shallow and taken round through the jungle when it became too deep. To quote Sir J. W. Edgar's words, this advance of the guns was "in many ways a remarkable march" the river abounding in rapids and deep pools, and being hemmed in-by almost precipitous cliffs.

The force encountered heavy rain, which lasted for a week, from the 1st to the 7th March, and impeded but did not prevent the advance.

Poiboi and Lalhai, Lalbura, and Thangula are the nearest Chiefs now to the Sonai Bazar. Khalkam's punji is also within a long day's journey, Lushai going, from the Bazar. In the event of a force of any size, such as the one taken in the expedition of 1871-72, being sent up in the direction of Sonai Bazar, a combination of this route with No. 5 below would probably be resorted to ; but communication between the two could only be made at Kulicherra under Parsonsib and at Sonai Bazar itself.

THE DHALESWAR ROUTE.

141. The Dhaleswar route is in some ways preferable to that by the Sonai. Larger boats can go by it, and the country along its banks being more open an invading force would be less likely to suffer from attacks. There is only one point, between Bhairabi-

cherra and Guturmukh, on the route up to Changsil Bazar where the river is at all over-shadowed by hills, and it is unlikely that an advance would be opposed so far north as this. Country boats would take from—

Silchar to Jhalnacherra	6 days (by road the
Jhalnacherra to Bhairabicherra	1 day. distance is
Bhairabicherra to Guturmukh	1 „ 52 miles)
Guturmukh to Chota Khayoung	1 „
Chota Khayoung to Kalicherra	1 „
Kalicherra to Harutana	1 „
Harutana to Changsil Bazar	1 „

Total from Silchar to Changsil Bazar 12 days.

The river is navigable for a few miles only beyond Changsil Bazar. Boats of 25 to 30 maunds can be taken up this river in the cold weather and of 80 to 100 maunds in the rains.

In the event of a large force being sent up the Dhaleswar in combination with the land route by Kolosib, communication could be made at only two points after leaving Jhalnacherra, namely Bhairabicherra and Changsil Bazar.

There is however reason to believe that a force following the general direction of the river could make its way up along the banks by land, as this was the course intended for the central column of the expedition of 1869. The first part of the route was reconnoitred then, and we know that in the following year, in February 1870, Major MacDonald with some police and coolies marched by land from Kalicherra—mukh, a place about half way between Guturmukh and

Changsil, to Bepari Bazar, taking four days to do it in.

Mention has been made above of the column that attempted to proceed by the Dhaleswar in 1869. Its strength, as far as can be gathered from the Political Officer's report, was the 44th Regiment and two guns, and the carriage taken was 25 elephants, 24 bullocks, and 571 coolies, besides the artillery and elephants of the 44th, the number of which is not stated. The force collected at Jhainacherra on the 27th February and then proceeded by one long march (17 miles) to Biboncherra, where there was a good camping ground. The first 10 miles of this march, up to Bunderghar, was said to be easy and the last 7 difficult; the next march was to Pukwamukh (8 miles), where supplies for 14 days were collected. It was intended to march from here to Guturmukh, where further supplies were stored under a guard. The ground between these two places was said to be much broken and rocky. Rain began to fall when the force was at Pukwamukh, and the advance was put off for some days; but eventually a start was made. The force marched three miles to the top of a hill, the Mulsata tila, and proceeded along a ridge to the Boolung cherra stream two miles further on. There was a deep descent down to the stream, which was a small one. The water in it had however risen somewhat; and the three elephants with the artillery being unable to clamber up the crumbling banks when loaded, the guns &c., were taken off them and parked on the near bank. The

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 141.—Report of the Assistant-Commissioner of Cachar dated the 7th April 1869. File 1,009 of 1868.

bridge over the stream, a small bamboo one, was also swept away ; and there being no chance of reaching the next camp that day the force returned to Mulsata, where on the 7th March the Medical Officer with the troops submitted a remonstrance on the ground of the failing health of the troops, and the expedition was accordingly abandoned. The Civil Officer with the force wrote : "With fine weather there was nothing to prevent our advance ; it might have been slow, but we were well off for supplies, and near the river."

It may be mentioned here that in December last, when there was a possibility of a small expedition being sent up to Khalkam's punji, which is now about midway between the Sonai and the Dhaleswar, the Chief Commissioner was of opinion that for a force of 400 men the route by the Dhaleswar was far preferable to that by the Sonai. The scheme prepared by Mr. Fitzpatrick at the time from data supplied by the Deputy-Commissioner and the Commandant of the Frontier Police is given below :—

Plan for sending up 400 fighting men from Silchar to Khalkam's Punji by the Dhaleshwar, made out from data supplied by the Deputy-Commissioner and Mr. Daly.

1. The force would be accompanied throughout by coolies sufficient to carry the baggage of 300 fighting men and rations for themselves and these 300 men for four days.

2. They would march by road with these coolies (four marches) to Jhalnacherra, where the boats taking up all the stores except what would be required for these four marches would be awaiting them.

3. The boats would be so far possible of 25 to

30 maunds burthen. Each such boat could carry, besides the boatmen and their rations for the time they would be out, six fighting men, or eight coolies, or 20 maunds of stores.

4. Assuming that a full supply of boats of this capacity could be procured, and allowing seven days to get from Jhalnacheria to Changsil (the destination of the force on the river), 14 days to remain there and 4 days to get back to Jhalnacheria (where provisions could be laid down before the return of the force), in all 25 days, the number of boats required would be as follows :—

(a) For the 400 fighting men, at 6 per boat, 66 boats.

(b) For 210 coolies, at 8 per boat, 26 boats.

(c) For rations for 400 fighting men and 210 coolies for 25 days at $1\frac{1}{4}$ seer each per day = $610 \times 1\frac{1}{4} \times 25$ seers = 19,050 or say, 20,000 seers = 500 maunds = 25 boats.

* I am not sure whether 50 rounds would be enough, and I am not sure of the weight. This would have to be considered further.

D. F.

(d) For spare ammunition* at 50 rounds per rifle (in addition to 45 carried by each man),

i.e., 45 boxes, 3 boats. Total $66 + 26 + 25 + 3$ boats = 120 boats.

5. Besides this, boats would be required for officers and their baggage and coolies and for the two guns and various other things ; and as it is quite certain that we could not get on such short notice nearly the number of boats of the class in question we require, and would have to make up with other boats and dugouts, it would not be quite so simple a matter as

shown above.

6. It should be explained that the 210 coolies to carry the baggage and rations for four days of the 300 fighting men are estimated as follows.

The coolies would be hill coolies, who could carry 30 seers or, if carrying rations which would daily diminish, nearly 40 seers to start with, 5 seers would be allowed each for his own baggage and 5 seers for his four day's rations. Then the baggage coolies would carry 20 seers of baggage or two men's kit each. That would make 150 coolies for baggage. The rations for 300 fighting men for four days would be $300 \times 5 = 1,500$ seers, and 60 coolies, which would be more than enough, would be allowed to carry this.

Should it ever be necessary to establish a depot or standing camp on this route, the mouth of the Saireng river is said to be the most suitable spot and is superior to Changsil.

THE RENGTI PAHAR-ROUTE BY KOLOSIB.

142. Mr. Kennedy, Deputy-Commissioner, remarked in 1885, that besides the three rivers, Barak, Soani, and Dhaleswar, the only important route to Lushai-land was along the Rengti range. It led, he said, to all the leading Chiefs, and was constantly traversed by the Lushais themselves.

This route is a land route, and a force proceeding by it could receive no assistance from the river after passing Bhairabicherra until it arrived at the Dhaleswar a few miles below Changsil Bazar, or at a spot somewhere near Peak Z on the Lungmai range above Sonai Bazar.

The stages from Silchar are :—

To Jalinga	1 day.
From Jalinga to a camp in the Katikhal reserve forest, two or three miles beyond the site of the present forest bungalow	1 ..
„ this camp to Kalacherra	1 ..
„ Kalacherra to Kolosib (15 miles)...	2 days
„ Kolosib to Peak Z	2 ..
<hr/>	
Total	7 days
<hr/>	

Colonel Lister in 1849 marched along the Rengti range to a point a little north of its junction with the Lungmai range, and from there made a rapid march eastward, crossing the Rukni near its source, to Mora's village, which he reached on the eleventh day from Silchar.

Mr. Edgar marched in 1870-71 along this ridge to the same point, and from there struck off to the Dhaleswar River. The following description of the route is taken from the record made by Mr. Burland, who accompanied Mr. Edgar. It will be seen that Colonel Lister's furthest point was reached in five days from Kalacherra, and Changsil Bazar in five days more.

Description of route from Dwarbund to Changsil, recorded by Mr. T. Burland in December 1870.

The 13th December 1870.—From Dwarbund a road

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 142.—Proceedings March 1885. Letter B dated 6th March 1871 from the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division.

to Loarbund garden, passed Noarbund garden on the left hand entered jangal at east boundary of Loarbund garden. From Dwarbund to commencement of jangal two miles.

General course of march

S. 45 E.

5. miles.

Through level forests, crossing small stream frequently to a point three miles from Loarbund. Camped. Water abundant. This stream might be avoided by a track being cut either to the north or south of it.

The 14th December 1870—At one-fourth mile from camp commenced ascending range. The first ascent

General course of march.

1 mile S. 45 E

2 miles S. $22\frac{1}{2}$ W.

1 mile S $22\frac{1}{2}$ E

—
5 miles.

very steep to three-fourth miles. Then easy rise to four miles. Gradual descent to five miles to a stream called Kallacherra, running to eastward. Water very plentiful and good. Knee-deep at foot. Encamping ground very good.

The 15th December 1870.—Path up very steep hill to two miles, easy descent to two and half miles, to a

General course of march.

1 mile S $11^{\circ} 15''$ E.

5 miles S. 20° W.

—
5 miles.

small stream which will probably always contain water at or near crossing place. At two and three-fourth miles a spring of water to eastward of path. At three and one-fourth miles crossed dry bed of water-course. Ground much broken and stony. Camp at six miles. Springs to eastward of camp.

The 16th December 1870.—At two and a half from camp found springs on both sides of path. At three and a half miles water to westward.

General course of march.

9 miles.

S. 10° W.

Ascending gradually to five miles. The last mile very steep. Steep descent to six miles to Kallacherra, a small stream running to north-east. Another small stream joins Kallacherra from north-west. Water will always be found in this stream. Very good camping ground on both sides of it. Easy ascent to seven miles, then slight dip to another stream, Roypacherra. From this stream, rising at first gradually and then very steep hill, to a place called Koloseeb. Camped here. Springs on both sides of camp, but not plentiful. Camping ground not good.

The 17th December 1870.—Descending to one-half miles, where a path branches to westward, leading
General course of march. to Byrabee teela and Pakwa
 8 miles. Mukh. Continued descents to
 S. 18 W. two and a half miles. Rather
 steep rise to three miles and gradual to six miles.
 Descending to camp at eight miles. Springs on both
 sides of camp. Water not plentiful. Camping ground
 bad.

The 18th December 1870.—Very steep ascent to one
General course of march. and three-fourth miles. At two
 S. $\frac{3}{4}$ mile. miles on summit of new range
 N. 22 30 W. 1 „ one seen yesterday to south-
 S. 10 W. 6 miles. east. To five miles nearly level,
 — on gently undulating land. At
 $7\frac{1}{2}$ miles. five one-fourth miles crossed
 — stream running to south-east ; named it Hurreecherra.
 Water good and plentiful, and encamping ground good
 on both sides. At six miles a large spur running in
 from north-west joins range. At six and half miles very
 steep descent. At seventeen and three-fourth miles

level. Encamping ground not good, and water spring on both sides of path, but water not plentiful.

The 19th December 1870. — To six miles path on top of range nearly level, but rather broken and stony. At six and one-fourth miles godown teela, the point occupied by Colonel Lister's force in 1849-50 ; and here he cut a track to Morah's village, which he destroyed. At this place water plentiful to eastward of path. Springs and ground good for encampment. To nine miles road uneven and stony, but in no place steep. Water to eastward of camp not very abundant, and ground not very good.

The 20th December 1870. — Immediately after leaving camp, ascended very steep rise for half mile, then gradual descent to five miles to stream running to westward. Water plentiful and camping ground to south of stream very good (Stockadecherra).

The 21st December 1870. — To one mile slight ascent, then very steep decline to stream running south. Water ankle-deep. Crossed stream and down eastern bank for short distance ; re-crossed to western bank and ascended very steep hill ; at two miles crossed a small stream running to south-east. At four and half miles crossed another stream running west, then

(Note.—The track this march should have been cut south and bad ground and two streams would be avoided.)

ascended very steep hill on the top of which camp at five miles. No water here. Brought up a supply in chungas. Camping ground bad.

The 22nd December 1870.—To four miles path tolerably level. At five miles crossed water—course, with little water running east. At six miles steepish descent to dry bedwatercourse. Then up very precipitous hill, and along top of spur to seven miles encamped

General course of march.

$\frac{1}{2}$ mile S. S. E.

1 „ S. W.

2 miles S. S. W.

$2\frac{1}{2}$ „ S.

—
6 miles.

on top of hill overlooking Dullessury river. No water at camp ; got supply from river quarter mile distant. Camping ground not good.

The 23 December 1870 —Very steep descents to river Dullessury. At one-fourth mile on large peboly chur on east bank river. River here

General course of march.

$\frac{1}{2}$ miles S.

2 miles S. S. W.

1 mile S. S. W.

2 miles S.

—
5 miles.

running to N.-N. W. rapidly. Route along chur to southward to stream which joins river from eastward. Crossed stream and ascended east bank river. To five miles path over very broken difficult ground ; every 200 or 300 yards crossing streams or dry beds of water-courses ; route nearly parallel to river. At five miles again struck river ; on a chur similar to the one crossed this morning ; crossed over to western bank ; ford knee-deep and thirty yards wide. Up river on western bank 200 yards, then re-crossed a ford, same depth and width as last, to large chur on east bank, and on this chur made camp. At south end of this chur a large

stream joins river.

The 24th December 1870.—By boats and rafts to Changsil ; a large flat rock on east bank of river. Time going up from last camp to Changsil 1 hour and 30 minutes. Distance measured on 6th January 1871, 2 miles and 3 furlongs.) Made permanent encampment here on east bank river.

The total time taken from Duarbund to Changsil by Mr. Edgar was 12 days and the distance covered was $74\frac{1}{2}$ miles. After the march, Mr. Burland wrote that, now that the road was known, the time required to perform the journey from Silchar to Changsil by this route would be :—

	Miles.	Days
Silchar to Duarbund	18	1
Duarbund to Katlicherra	10	1
Katlicherra to Kalacherra	12	1
Hurricherra	$16\frac{1}{2}$	1
Stockadecherra	$16\frac{1}{2}$	1
Dhaleswar	12	1
Changsil	$7\frac{1}{2}$	1
<hr/>		<hr/>
Total	$92\frac{1}{2}$	7
<hr/>		<hr/>

When Mr. Burland wrote, the whole route from Duarband to the Dhaleswar was through dense tree and bamboo jangal with but one clear spot in the entire route. There were many very steep places, up or down which baggage animals could not go, but it was supposed that practicable roads could be made round such places after exploration.

The punjis near the route by the Rengti range are

Dausama's, two days' journey south of Kolosib ; and Lenkhunga Raja's, two days' journey south of the last named punji.

THE PARSONSIB ROUTE ALONG THE LUNGMAI RANGE.

143. The Deputy-Commissioner has in a note dated the 24th December 1888 described this route as follows :—

There are two alternative routes as far as Parsonsib, one by water and one by land :—

	Days.
a) By water—	
Silchar to Moniarkhal	3
Moniarkhal to Kulicherra, our frontier line just below Parsonsib	3
Kulicherra to Parsonsib by land	1
b) By land—	
Silchar to Moniarkhal	2
Moniarkhal to Bankong	2
Bankong to Parsonsib	2

On this route it may be necessary to clear the route a little from Moniarkhal to Bankong. From Bankong to Parsonsib the route will lie along the ridge, and will be a good deal among open tree jangal.

From Parsonsib to Chentlang (Khalkam's punji) it will take a force at least six days. On the fourth day the force will pass the old site of Thangula's punji, and, perhaps, the new site also. The route will be along the ridge all the way, and our experience shows us the ridges generally have open tree jangal, so the marching will be comparatively easy.

The above makes it six days by land and seven by water to Parsonsib ; but as all heavy luggage and stores would any way go to Moniarkhal at least by water, the routes are practically the same, and by the Parsonsib route, accordingly, we may estimate it *thirteen* days to Khalkam's punji from Silchar. As far as Parsonsib the river route may be considered absolutely safe.

In the cold weather of 1869-70, Mr. Edgar marched up to Sonai Bazar by this route with Major MacDonald, and the stages taken on that occasion were as follows :—

1. Silchar to Nugdigram.
2. Gajalghat.
3. Kulicherra.
4. Bongkong.
5. Silghat.
6. Salt Springs.
7. Laimington (passing Parsonsib).
8. Langkhal Klong.
9. A point above Sonai Bazar.
10. Sonai Bazar.

From Nugdigram to Gajalghat is about 12 miles ; and from Gajalghat to Kulicherra about the same. This latter march is through fine forest on a well-raised flat country. The march from Kulicherra to Bongkong is short ; and the path first crosses some low hills and

REFERENCES.

Paragraph 143.—File 1,009 A 1888. Letter A dated the 3rd February 1870, from the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar to the Commissioner of the Dacca Division, and Diaries December 1869 to March 1870.

then proceeds along the bed of a stream—the Pancherra—which flows into the Rukni, for some way until the hills are reached.

From Bongkong to Silghat is a long march, and water is scarce.

From Bongkong to Laimington could be done straight in one long march. Between the Salt Springs and Laimington there is a steep ascent to Parsonsib ; but afterwards the road is fairly level. At Laimington there is plenty of water ; but it requires looking for, and is some way from the camp.

From Laimington to Langkhal Klong is three hours' march over level ground with a few ascents and descents. At Langkhal Klong there is water flowing, but some way from the camping ground. From Langkhal Klong the first part of the march is fairly level, but there is a steep hill at the end. One nasty place has to be crossed, over the face of a precipitous hill, where foot-holes had been cut. At the camp above Sonai Bazar there is plenty of running water. From this camp to the Sonai Bazar is a longish march with steep descents. Mr. Edgar took ten days' actual marching from Silchar to Sonai Bazar ; but he said that if he had gone straight the journey would have occupied only eight days, and that troops lightly equipped could by pushing hard do it in five or even in four days.

It is probable that there would be no difficulty in producing this route along the Lungmai range far into the Howlong country, and perhaps even up to the frontier of Chittagong.

CROSS-ROUTES IN LUSHAI-LAND.

144. As regards cross-routes in may be said that, once the intervening unoccupied strip between the Cachar district and the Lushai villages is passed, experience has shown us that there is no very great difficulty in proceeding by village paths, old or new, through any part of the Lushai country. Even where there are no paths these can be cut through the bamboo jungle, and there is no difficulty to be apprehended about water.

The following are the marches in the hills which have been taken by our officers from time to time. As the paths change from year to year, there is no use in giving detailed accounts of them.

In 1869-70 Mr. Edgar, accompanied by Major MacDonald, marched from Sonai Bazar to the Bepari Bazar on the Dhaleswar without experiencing much difficulty. He took five days overland between the two rivers, coming out on the Dhaleswar, some 3 or 4 days' journey by boat, below Changsil Bazar. Again, in the beginning of 1871, the same officer marched from Changsil Bazar to Panchangkai on the Sonai above Sonai Bazar. He accomplished this in three days,—the stages being Changsil to Pulrang $13\frac{1}{2}$ miles ; Pulrang to Nisapui 11 miles ; Nisapui to Panchangkai 6 miles ; total $30\frac{1}{2}$ miles.

REFERENCES

Paragraph 144.—Letters No. A., dated the 3rd February 1870 and B dated the 24th March 1870 from the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar to the Commissioner of Dacca, and diaries January to March 1870.

Letter B dated the 6th March 1871 from the Deputy-Commissioner of Cachar to the Commissioner of Dacca.

Proceedings May 1877, April 1881, and March 1885.

From Panchangkai to Sonai Bazar the distance is about 9 miles, but the water in many places is not more than six inches deep, and a bamboo raft took 6 hours going down.

In 1876-77, Mr. Luttmann Johnson, accompanied by Mr. Savi with 48 Frontier Police and only 14 coolies and four boatmen, marched from Changsil Bazar to the Sonai Bazar in three days. The highest point he crossed was 3,400 feet above the sea.

In 1880-81, Major Boyd marched from Tipaimukh to Changsil Bazar by Sonai Bazar with 50 Frontier Police. He took with him only 70 coolies, having supplies sent to meet him at Sonai Bazar. Sonai Bazar was reached in four days, and Changsil in three days from there.

In 1884-85, Mr. Kennedy, the Deputy-Commissioner, with 150 Frontier Police marched from Jhalnacherra along the frontier to Tipaimukh. His way from beginning to end lay through the uninhabited strip of jangal between our district and the Lushais, and in consequence he had, unlike his predecessors mentioned above, every day to cut part of his road through the dense bamboo forest, and would have had to cut it the whole way but for the great use he made of elephant tracks. He took 17 days marching, *i.e.*, not counting halts, from Jhalnacherra to Tipaimukh.

ROUTES TO THE SUKTES.

145. The little information that we have regarding routes to the Suktes or Kamhaos is rendered comparatively useless owing to the want of a map of this hitherto unsurveyed country. Any expedition now

entering their country would probably do so from Burma, as a small force of 240 men was despatched from that direction last cold weather under Colonel Macgregor and Major Raikes.

When it was proposed to send up an expedition from Manipur in 1883, the Political Agent wrote that the route to be taken to Singkam's village, the objective point, would be as follows :—

	Miles
1. Manipur to Wahbagai	18
2. From there to Sugunu	18
3. „ to Keitheumanbe	10
4. „ „ Tumul	10
5. „ „ Mandingshoi	10
6. „ „ Turel Mapal	10
7. „ „ Yangnung	10
8. „ „ Tuilum	10
9. „ „ Semon	14
10. „ „ Singkam's village	14
Total	124

As far as Yangnung was said to be within Manipur territory.

The following route is taken from the diary of two Manipur officers who visited the Kamhao country in 1887-88 :—

1. Sugunu thana to Kunna river crossing the Chatpi river *en route*.
2. From there to Muntri Tengol
3. „ „ Yangbung, where the river Tilum is.

4. Sugunu thana to Lamvang village, passing Lamkhul Naga village and the Simbhol stream *en route*.
5. " " Kengnam village, passing Kamsal village on the way.
6. " " Phaitoo, crossing the Tisam river and passing the Semong village ; near Phaitoo is another village, Changlem.
7. " " Kamuagai, crossing the Yetsel river and passing the villages of Panglam, Saiyang, Lemyang, and Aimol.
8. " " Tadim river, passing, Selsie, Dolmu, Khulai, and Nungphura villages, and Lalui, Lensang, and Langlai streams.
9. " " Tadim village, passing Yatol's village Thamkal, and Balung village.

Tadim was said to be the principal village of the Kamhaos.

The following account was taken down from a Kamhao Sukte, who visited Manipur in May 1888 :—

1. Sugunu to Longyia, a Kuki village of 40 houses to the S.-E.,
2. From there to Mombi or Lamyang,
3. " " Khubong, a Sukte village of 80 houses. Kengnam village is 7 miles E. of this and Phaitoo is 7 miles N.-W. of Kengnam.

4. Sugunu to Khubong to Mongyen,
from which place all the principal Kamhao villages are
within easy distance ; among them Thamkhal, where
Yatol resides. Bomyang is 7 miles W. of Thamkhal.

Up to Lamyang is said to be in Manipur territory.
The marches are those taken by the Suktes or Kamhaos,
and are at least double what our troops would
accomplish.

REFERENCES.

agraph 145.—File 148 of 1883 and Proceedings June 1883. File 426 of
1888.