

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

ARCHÆOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA

CENTRAL
ARCHÆOLOGICAL
LIBRARY


ACCESSION NO. 14052

CALL No. 954.082 / Hal.

D.G.A. 79.









A
View of the
MONUMENT

Erected at
CALCUTTA, BENGAL;

To the
Memory of the Sufferers
in the
Black-Hole Prison,

June 1756.

To
The Memory
of

Edw.^d Fyfe, W.^m Badlie, Esq.^r The Rev.^d Jervas Bellam,
Maj.^r P. Jenks, Reveille, Linn, Coates, Nallicourt, Job. T.
Jenks, E. Page, S. Page, Grub, Street, Harrod, P. Johnstone,
Ballard, A. Drake, Cassie, Knapton, Gooding, Dowl. Den
cymple, Captains Clayton, Buchanan, Witherington
Lieut.^s Beane, Hays, Blagg, Simpson, J. Bellamy, Es
q.^r P. Ward, Scott, Hastings, C. Wedderburn, Dum
blotin, Sea Captains Hunt, Osburn, Parnel, Majo.^r
re, Leach, Stevenson, Guy, Porter, Parker, Gauder, Ber
del, Atkinson, who with sundry other Inhabitants
Military and Militia to the Number of 223 Persons,
were by the Tyrannic Violence of Surajud Dowla
Suba of Bengal, Suffocated in the Black Hole Pri
son of Fort William in the Night of the 20th Day of
June, 1756, and promiscuously thrown the succeed
ing Morning into the Dutch of the

Devotion of the Poor
You
Have been created
By
Their Surviving Fellow Sufferers,
J. Z. HOLWELL.

Front of the Monument . . .

This Horrid Act of Violence

was as Ample

as deservedly revenged

one Surajud Dowla,



by her Majesty's Arms, &c

under the Conduct of


Vice Admiral Watson and Col! (live

Anno 1757

Reverse of the Monument



see First



203.C.3. 2

INDIA TRACTS.

NOT TO BE ISSUED

NOT TO BE ISSUED

BY

X R 31

Mr. HOLWELL, and Friends.

152521
CONTAINING

- I. An Address to the Proprietors of East-India Stock; setting forth, the unavoidable Necessity, and real Motives, for the Revolution in Bengal, 1760.
- II. A Refutation of a Letter from certain Gentlemen of the Council at Bengal, to the Honourable the Secret Committee.
- III. Important Facts regarding the East-India Company's Affairs in Bengal, from the Years 1752 to 1760, with Copies of several very interesting Letters.
- IV. A Narrative of the deplorable Deaths of the English Gentlemen who were suffocated in the Black Hole in Fort William, at Calcutta, June 1756.
- V. A Defence of Mr. Vansittart's Conduct.

ILLUSTRATED WITH

A FRONTISPIECE, representing the Monument erected at Calcutta, in Memory of the Sufferers in the Black Hole Prison.

The SECOND EDITION, Revised and Corrected, with Additions.

954.082
HOL

LONDON:

Printed for T. BECKET and P. A. de HONDT, near Surry-Street, in the Strand. M DCC LXIV.

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY NEW DELHI.

Acc. No

14052

Date

31. 12. 1970

Call No.

954. 282 / Vol -





T O

SIR WILLIAM BAKER, Knt.

WILLIAM MABBOT,
AND
JOHN PAYNE, } Esqrs.

GENTLEMEN,

THE following small Tracts, in consequence of unprovoked injuries, were hastily thrown together, during the late clamorous disputes between Directors, Proprietors, and Candidates for the management of East-India affairs at home and abroad.—How they came to be so hastily produced, and as hastily published, it seems requisite I should explain a little more at large.

AT the beginning of these intestine broils, I was determined to avoid engaging on either side; and, to shun solicitation, I disposed of all the stock I stood possessed of, without retaining as much as might entitle me to a single vote; so truly desirous I was to enjoy in quiet that peaceful retirement, I had dearly purchased at the expence of so many difficulties, mis-

ries,

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL
LIBRARY NEW DELHI.

Acc. No.

14052

Date

31. 12. 1977

Call No.

954. 282 / Vol -





T O
SIR WILLIAM BAKER, Knt.

WILLIAM MABBOT,
AND
JOHN PAYNE, } Esqrs.

GENTLEMEN,

THE following small Tracts, in consequence of unprovoked injuries, were hastily thrown together, during the late clamorous disputes between Directors, Proprietors, and Candidates for the management of East-India affairs at home and abroad.—How they came to be so hastily produced, and as hastily published, it seems requisite I should explain a little more at large.

AT the beginning of these intestine broils, I was determined to avoid engaging on either side; and, to shun solicitation, I disposed of all the stock I stood possessed of, without retaining as much as might entitle me to a single vote; so truly desirous I was to enjoy in quiet that peaceful retirement, I had dearly purchased at the expence of so many difficulties, mis-

ries, and heavy misfortunes as fell to my lot, while in the service of the Company.

SUCH, I say, were my resolutions, to which I should most strictly have adhered, if I had not found my character first indirectly, afterwards openly attacked, by the basest calumnies which were levelled against me in a manner, sudden, unmerited and unexpected.

UNDER these circumstances, there was a necessity of speaking for myself, and, which was still more unpleasing, I found myself likewise constrained to enter upon my vindication without delay. — The pungency of these accusations — the precipitancy of the times, and a disposition to take every thing for granted that was not immediately refuted; obliged me not only to dispatch them as quickly as was possible, but also to produce them in like hurry to the publick eye.

It was from these accidents, which I could not either foresee or avoid, that they came into the world not so well digested, and with much less accuracy, than the candid part of mankind have a right to expect in every production that claims their consideration, and is submitted to their judgment.

To the same causes I may very justly refer those errors of the press, which were in some of them so numerous as scarce

to leave the sense intelligible ; to say nothing of other mistakes in orthography and diction, all arising from the utter impossibility of allowing me time requisite to revise and correct the proof sheets.

IT is from a just sense of these involuntary imperfections, that I have been led to review, to reform, and to cast into somewhat a different shape, these little pieces, that were thus exposed ; and to render them still clearer and more satisfactory, I have added some other Tracts, which, however seasonable, I had not the leisure to prepare, and which, from my observing the obscurity arising from their omission, I conceived it my duty to add as soon as opportunity would permit.

My narrative of the fatal catastrophe at Calcutta, and that unexampled scene of horror to which so many subjects of Great Britain were exposed in the prison of the Black-Hole, has so close a connection with one of the pieces that precede it, as scarce to require an apology for reprinting it in this edition ; prefixing, as a frontispiece to the Volume, a Print of the Monument which I erected, at my own expence, to the memory of those unhappy sufferers.

MANY, if not most of the matters contained in these sheets, are to you, Gentlemen, very well known, as having been of-

ten the subject of your deliberations; and, therefore, to whom could I so properly address them as to yourselves? — Two of you first incited my endeavours, and directed my labours for the Company's interest. — Mr. Payne, with the same distinguished zeal, encouraged and supported them; a zeal truly disinterested, for I was a stranger to you all; so that you could have no motive to the favour you bestowed, and the protection you so generously afforded me, except the warm and pure regard which you ever shewed, rather than professed, for that respectable body, whose concerns were then committed to your care.

You have, Gentlemen, frequently done me the honour to say, I did not disgrace your patronage, or disappoint your favourable expectations: to me this was the most ample reward — but I could not help thinking there yet remained something due on my part; and that I ought to attempt the justifying your choice to the knowing, the ingenuous, and the judicious world.

THIS became more especially incumbent on me, when I found Envy and Malice arraign the character of him, whom you had espoused, and whom you had so long honoured with your friendship. — This, I thought, I could not better effect than by publishing the following Pieces.

WITH all possible submission, I lay them in their new dress before you, as thereby I am favoured with what I have long and ardently wished, an opportunity of giving this publick testimony of a grateful heart, for the many and repeated proofs I have received of your respectable patronage.

I am,

GENTLEMEN,

Mount Felix,
Walton upon Thames,
July 3, 1764.

Your most obliged, and
most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. HOLWELL.



With all possible solicitude, I lay claim to them now and
before you, as thereby I am favoured with what I have
and ardently wished, an opportunity of giving the
testimony of a grateful heart for the many and repeated
I have received of your respectable patronage.

I am,

GENTLEMEN

Your most obliged and

Wm. Bell
Wm. Bell
Wm. Bell

most obedient humble servant

J. S. HOLT



AN
ADDRESS
TO THE
PROPRIETORS of EAST INDIA STOCK;
SETTING FORTH
The unavoidable NECESSITY and real MOTIVES
FOR THE
REVOLUTION in BENGAL, in 1760.

By JOHN ZEPHANIAH HOLWELL, Esq;

AN

A. D. R. E. S.

TO THE

PROPRIETORS OF EAST INDIA STOCK

SETTING FORTH



REVOLUTION IN BENGAL, IN 1760.

BY JOHN ZEPHANIAH HOWELL, ESQ.

[5]
AN

S 22

A D D R E S S

TO THE

PROPRIETORS of EAST INDIA STOCK.

GENTLEMEN and LADIES,

I KNOW not any body of people in the kingdom so much to be pitied, or so deservedly the object of attention, at this period, as yourselves: strangers to the secret springs and workings of the great machine you are embarked in, you must be also strangers to the nature of its defects, and incapable of applying proper remedies to its irregular, and consequently destructive motions.

Those intrusted with the conduct of your concerns at home, distracted and divided in their councils; your Agents abroad, in the same unhappy divisions and animosities; a general Court at hand, where it is to be feared, not one in a hundred of you will be able to form any clear idea of the matters to be discussed: What salutary effects then can be expected from its resolutions, in your present uninformed state?

I will not begin so endless a work as the investigating, from their original source, the various combined causes, which gave rise to these dissensions, as it would answer no one useful purpose at present: an honest indignation, and true regard for the welfare of the Company provokes my pen, to rescue you from impressions, the best and most sensible are sometimes liable to, from misrepresentation, artful invective, plausible, specious, though fallacious argument, and cruel insinuation; enough of these are, at this particular juncture, thrown out to amuse and blind you, by some no better acquainted with the subjects they write and speak on, than most of yourselves.

The productions of paltry scriblers are below mine, and every gentleman's notice, (such as appeared in a late evening paper) but when men of sense, virtue and character, and others who have possessed high and distinguished stations and emoluments in your service, join the cry, and help to keep up and increase this anarchy in your affairs, it is time to guard you, not only against the venom of their pens, but their tongues also; for, from them there may be danger.

That your affairs have been brought to the brink of ruin, is most certain, and possibly by this time (tho' God forbid) you may not have a foot of land, nor a rupee of property, in the three provinces of Bengal; a dismal and alarming prospect.—The question is, What is the real and more immediate cause of this melancholy situation? If you hearken to the present torrent of abuse, you will be told, the revolution which deposed Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, and set up his son-in-law, Kossim Aly Khan, in the year 1760, is stained *with unparalleled infamy*, and is the cause of every subsequent mischief to you: you are further told, this change will be explained to you *from the most undoubted authority, and unanswerable arguments*: but nothing of this kind yet appears to enlighten you.

From another quarter you are informed, your Court of Directors are culpable.—Those who shoot in the dark, may fire boldly indeed, not being immediately liable to discovery; but then they may be sometimes liable to mistake their aim—the charge against them is couched in the following terms: “Your Court of Directors at home, pleased with the present advantages, never examined the means by which they were obtained, or whence the necessities arose that were pleaded in excuse of the revolution.”—I should be grieved you could imagine I am set down to form an apology for the whole conduct of your Court of Directors.—Far be it from me—but as I know their judgment on, and sanction given to this revolution, were the result of mature examination, both as to the means, and necessities that produced it, it would be dishonest in me not to say so; and I will venture to pronounce, that before I close this Address to you, yourselves will acquit them of this charge, and be convinced their conduct, as to this particular transaction, was strictly consistent, not only with your interest, but honour—nor will I doubt, but this revolution will, in the sequel, reflect honour and credit on every one of your servants who had a part in it.

To vindicate the revolution of 1760, is the task I now impose upon myself, not only for your information, (though I confess that to be a moving, and at this time a very essential consideration) but also in justification

cation of myself, who, it is very well known, had so large a share in it, and in defence of one of the best and most capable servants you ever had abroad. Justice to his merits exacts this testimony from me, though he superceded me in the government of your presidency of Bengal—I conceive Mr. Vansittart's character, on this occasion, injuriously traduced; he is not here to vindicate himself; it is therefore incumbent on me (who only can) to do it; the more especially, because if any just censure lies against him, on account of this revolution, it is owing to the representations laid before him by me, touching the state of the Company's affairs at the period he came to the government.

Previous to laying proofs and vouchers before you, it will not be amiss, to say what I tend to prove. I therefore set out with these positions: First, That the distressed situation of your affairs, as well as impending ruin of the provinces, made it unavoidably necessary to divest Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan of power to do greater mischiefs, as by a series of mal-administration and cruelties he had well nigh brought himself, his family, the provinces, and the Company, to destruction; so that it became a reproach to the English name and arms to support his tyrannic government any longer. Secondly, That Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan was guilty of a breach of every article of the offensive and defensive treaty made with him in the year 1757, when he was by us promoted to the Subaship of Bengal.—Thirdly, That your honour, and the honour of the nation, remain inviolate, and stand unimpeached by this revolution, though the contrary has been so industriously insinuated.

This contest is reducible to a very narrow compass.—If the deposing Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan was a just and necessary measure, every subsequent opposition to it must be wrong, and highly detrimental to your interest, trade, and possessions; on the contrary, if you deem the deposing Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, an unjust and unnecessary measure, the restoring him must be right, in the eye of strict justice, provided such restoration is so circumstanced, as to be brought about without the manifest hazard of ruin to your affairs. On this we join issue, and proceed to our proofs. In order to which, a short introduction to facts will be needful.

In August 1760, Henry Vansittart, Esq; arrived at Fort William, Bengal, and received the government. Your affairs, as well as the state of the provinces, being in a most ruinous, intricate, and disjointed situation, Mr. Holwell thought it an indispensable duty on him, to draw up such a clear representation of these matters as should afford that gentleman an immediate general idea of our political state at that period—which he accordingly

cordingly did, in the following terms, introduced by a short address to your secret Committee.

To the Honourable HENRY VANSITTART, Esq; &c. Members of the Select Committee.

Hon^{ble} Sir and Sirs,

AS my health, and the consideration of other circumstances, will soon oblige me to request permission of the Board to resign the service, I beg leave, previous to that step, to accompany this short address with such remarks and memorials, as may convey to the Honourable the President, (so lately arrived among you) a knowledge of the present state and situation of the Company's affairs, as they stand connected with, or are dependant on, the country government of Bengal.

I have the Honour to be, &c.

I. Z. H.

M E M O R I A L.

TO form a judgment of the present state of things at Bengal, it will be needful to have a retrospect to the late revolution of the year 1757, when necessity, and a just resentment for the most cruel injuries, obliged us to enter on a plan to deprive Surajud Dowla of his government, which was accordingly done, and Mhir Mahomet Jaffier Aly Khan, fixed by us at the head of the provinces, on certain conditions, and under a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive.

A short space fully proved how unworthy the family thus raised to the Subaship were: the conditions of the treaty could not be obtained from the Suba, without, in a manner, being extorted from him; and by a thousand shifts and evasions, it was plain, no single article would ever have been complied with, had the Suba been invested with sufficient power to prevent it, or could he have divested himself of his own fears and apprehensions from our resentment.

Tunka's on the lands were, however, granted for payment of the stipulated sums, at stated times, by which the Roy Royen, (or Collector of the Revenues) and the Dewans, Mutfoodies, &c. (dependents of that office) with every harpy employed in the Zemindary or lands, became our implacable enemies; and consequently,

A party was soon raised at the Durbar, headed by the Suba's son Mhiran, and Raja Raage Bullob, who were daily planning schemes, to shake off

off their dependance on the English, and continually urging to the Suba, that until this was effected, his government was nominal only. The Suba, something irritated, by the protection given to Raja Doolubram, better known by the name of Roy Doolub, and weak and irresolute in himself, fell too soon into these sentiments.

The first step taken to accomplish this scheme of independance, was, to assassinate and cut off, under one pretence or another, every minister and officer at the Durbar, whom they knew were attached to the English: to this purpose, Coju Haady, and Cossim Aly Khan, first and second Buxey, were assassinated in November and December 1758. After many attempts made on the persons of Rheim Khan and Golam Shaw, his uncle and brother, they were at last obliged to seek an asylum with the Shaw Zadda, 1759. Roy Doolub's son and four brothers were proscribed, on no other cause, but his known inviolable attachment to us; this family would have fallen a sacrifice had they not been rescued out of the Suba's hands by force of arms. Omhir Beg Khan would, from the same cause, have suffered the same fate, had he not given his solemn engagement to quit the kingdom, which he accordingly did, in a miserable state of health, and lived only to arrive at Bufforah.

The next project of the Durbar, appeared (by every subsequent concurring circumstance) to be a secret negotiation with the Dutch, for transporting troops from Batavia into these provinces, that with their united force a stop might be put to the power of the English. This scheme was conducted by Raja Raage Bullob, on the part of the Suba, and by Fookru Toojaar Khan (better known by the name of Coja Wazeed) on the part of the Dutch, about October or November 1758, the period when the Decan expedition took place under Colonel Forde, and your garrisons were much reduced.

Soon after the provinces were invaded by the Shaw Zadda, (undoubted heir to the Mogul empire) on the side of Patna, and Colonel Clive, with the English troops and Seapoys, joined the Suba and his army, and by forced marches preserved Rajah Ramnaran (Nabob of Patna) steady in his duty, and arrived just in time to save that city and province, and drive the Prince beyond the river Kurrumnassa, and brought the Budgepoore, &c. countries under subjection.

The Prince, more than once, wrote to the Colonel, offering any terms for the Company and himself, on condition the English would quit the Suba, and join his arms; but the Colonel, thinking it incompatible with our treaty of alliance, gave the Prince no encouragement.

At the end of the campaign, in June 1759, the Colonel returned to us; and about the same time, the Suba and young Nabob Mhiran arrived at Muxadabad: both, now, with full conviction of our firm attachment to his government and family, and of our religious regard to treaties. What sense they retained of these obligations, and how long, will appear by and by.

The Suba and his son, thinking themselves now better established in the government, and screened by such a powerful support as our arms, set no bounds to their cruelties, oppressions, and exactions from those who had any thing to be plundered of; and these barely received a check, from the frequent and severe remonstrances of Colonel Clive to the Suba, on a conduct, which he foretold him, *must, from the general detestation of his people, end in the destruction of himself, family, and country.*—His troops clamorous for their pay, whilst the Suba, in place of appropriating the sums he had acquired, by repeated assassinations, to the just demands of his Jummautdars and troops, lavished the same in boundless extravagancies.

About the latter end of July 1759, the young Nabob arrived in Calcutta, on a pretended visit to the Colonel; but the real design was, to negotiate, if possible, the surrender of Roy Doollub, and two or three other articles, given him in charge by his father; such as, giving up the Tunka lands on security,—borrowing a large sum of money:—but in these the son proving unsuccessful, a member of the Board and Select Committee, was, at his desire, sent to accompany him to the city, to reconcile the Suba to the negatives his son had met with at Calcutta, and at the same time to intimate to him the advice we had received, that a large armament was fitting out at Batavia, destined for Bengal, and to know his resolution, in case that force arrived in the river.

He was not to be reconciled to the refusals his son had met with, but determined to try his own power, and declared his intention to visit the Colonel himself in September, (which he did, but with no more success) he seemed to make light of the intelligence touching the Dutch armament, and not to give much credit to it, though he discovered great perplexity; however, he wrote a letter to the Colonel, demanding our assistance, by virtue of the treaty of alliance, in case the Dutch troops came into the river.

The armament from Batavia arrived during his visit at Calcutta; his stay after that was short, his mind seemed much embarrassed, and his whole subsequent conduct gave most undoubted proofs, that the Dutch force

force was arrived at his invitation ; that such were the sentiments of Colonel Clive and his Council, appears from the narrative of our contest with the Dutch, November 1759, transmitted to the Court of Directors, and to our several Admirals : a perusal of this narrative will convince the impartial, that the Suba's behaviour on this occasion, was a most flagitious breach of the treaty of alliance ; and that no terms whatever should have been preserved with him after such treachery and ingratitude ; to which we may add, by way of illustration, the subsequent farces carried on between the Nabobs and the Dutch, even until the month of July 1760, as set forth in the several letters between Mr. Holwell and the Resident at Morad-Baag, on this subject, to which I refer ; where it will appear most manifest, that the Suba's real intentions never were to oppose these people, though he was from time to time calling upon us, and demanding assistance, by virtue of the treaty of alliance subsisting between him and the English :—witness the private orders and instructions given to his son-in-law, Mhir Mahomet Cossim Aly Khan, so opposite to the public orders given to amuse and deceive us, when he was sent down to demolish the new works at Chinsura, the apparent delay in which drew much censure upon that General, until the truth was known.

In the beginning of the year 1760, the Shaw Zadda invaded the provinces again, with a force more respectable than in the preceding one, both in troops and commanders, by the revolt of Comgar Khan, Golam Shaw, Rheim Khan, and others ; the Suba, by this time, having made himself and family so universally hated, that we may justly say, there was hardly a man in the province that did not wish success to the Prince.

Colonel Clive resigned the government early in February 1760, about which time the Morattors entered the province from the southward, and penetrated Burdomaan country, making a considerable diversion in favour of the Prince ; the Suba demanded a body of our troops, Seapoys and field artillery, for defence of his country, to join his army under the command of Mhir Cossim Aly Khan ; which were granted :—but here the service expected, and intended by this united force, was intirely frustrated, by the pusillanimous and contradictory orders from the Suba to that General, which ended at last in commanding him to advance towards Cutwah, for the defence of the city, in place of ordering him to march to the southward, against the Morattors, to drive them out of the country ; and this in opposition to the strongest remonstrances made against it, by Mr. Holwell and Mhir Cossim Aly Khan : thus the country fell a-prey to the Morattors, and a total stop was put to the collection of our Tunkas, on which was our dependence and expectation, for the service of the year. (*Vid. Military Correspondence, Feb. and Mar. 1760.*)

Our troops, under command of Major Caillaud, in conjunction with the Suba's army, commanded by his son Mhiran, had taken the field some time before Colonel Clive's departure for Europe, and shaped their rout towards Patna, whilst the Suba remained in the neighbourhood of Rajamaal, a check upon Cuddeim Hossain Khan, Nabob of Purnea.

A regular and particular detail of the transactions of this laborious campaign, will not be expected here, as the progress of it will present itself in the course of the military correspondence, laid before the Select Committee; therefore general remarks on the success, effects, and probable consequences, will suffice.

This campaign, like the former ones, produced no definitive action, or stroke, to lay the least foundation of peace to the provinces: in the course of it, three morally sure, and important opportunities, were lost by the cowardice of both Nabobs.—The first, when Mhiran refused to join Major Caillaud with his horse, in the immediate pursuit of the Prince, when defeated near Patna.—The second, when the Suba refused to comply with the Major's request and demand, to cross his horse over Burdooan river, to attack the Prince, when united with Subabut, the Morattor general.—And the third, when in the last pursuit of Cuddeim Hossain Khan, the young Nabob refused to lead or detach his horse to the Major's assistance, by which a general action might have been brought on; but on the contrary, kept himself encamped above a mile in the Major's rear, as if his intentions were to leave our troops, without horse, a sacrifice to the enemy.

On the near approach of the Major to Patna, he received a Phirmaund from the Prince, of which he advised the Board, and promised to forward a copy; but no wonder that, in the course of so extraordinary and fatiguing a campaign, it should escape his memory.—On the Shaw Zadda's arrival in the Bierboheen country, (after the unexpected march he formed upon his defeat near Patna) the President received intelligence that the Suba had actually a Vackeel in his camp; and that he was negotiating a separate treaty for himself. This appeared to have so dangerous a tendency, that any means were eligible to obtain the truth.

The late President, by a third hand, caused Asud Jumma Khan, Raja of Bierboheen, and his uncle Comgar Khan, to be wrote to, on this subject of the Suba's Vackeel and treaty.—This soon produced a Phirmaund from the Prince, inclosing copy of the Suba's Arzdasht. The President made no reply to the Phirmaund, but returned a short one to Comgar Khan's letter, (which accompanied the Phirmaund) intimating, that copies were of little validity, where originals were in being.

A few days before the Prince began his retreat from the hills, the President received a second Phirmaund from him, inclosing original Arzdasht from the Suba.—All that can be said for or against belief being given either to the authenticity of the copy or the original, will appear on the face of the correspondence, in two letters from the President to the Major, under dates the 22d and 24th of last April, and to Mr. Hastings the Resident at Morad-baag, the 20th of the same month: to these, we may further remark, that if they were forgeries, they have yet corroborating signatures of truth; and the whole tenor of the Suba's conduct most exactly tallies with the terms of the Arzdasht (or petition). But to resume the course of the campaign to the present time.

Patna is relieved and secured for the present—Cuddeim Hossain Khan is deposed from his government of Purnea, and drove out of the country, but with all his treasure and valuable effects, to the reproach and infamy of the young Nabob's memory; so that after the rains he will easily join the Prince, with the essential sinews of war, money, the only thing he stands in need of to enable him to harass the provinces five years longer.

The young Nabob is taken off by lightening,—and our troops are gone into quarters, after having done as much or more than could have been expected from men so wretchedly supported, by those for whose preservation they endured every distress and fatigue, and braved variety of deaths.—

The Prince has found means to preserve himself and forces, a footing on this side the Sone, and in the neighbourhood of Patna: it is said, Comgar Khan has forsaken the cause of the Prince, which appears most improbable; not only on account that he has no other chance for reimbursing himself, but perseverance; but also, because we have undoubted intelligence that 3000 of his troops have joined his nephew, Asfud Jumma Khan, who has thrown off his allegiance to the Suba.—These troops are certainly lodged, to make an early and important diversion, at the opening of the next campaign, by entering the Burdomaan country as soon as the Prince begins to be in motion to the northward; and thus our supplies from thence will be again cut off, and the Company's affairs reduced to the last extremity of distress, unless the approaching ships of the season relieve us, or the whole Tunka's on those lands be collected during the rains.—The latter is hardly possible, and the former carries very little probability with it.—The last proposal from the Suba, to pay our balances, and resume his lands, is devoutly to be wished, but it is to be feared he has no meaning in it.

The various reasons urged against supporting the present government longer, on the plan we have been sometime pursuing, to the heavy injury of the Company, with various expedients to rescue them from their manifest approaching ruin, are set forth at large, in the military correspondence—in letters from the President to Major Caillaud, under dates the 24th and 25th of May, and 14th of June, and 3d of July;—to Mr. Amyat, under dates the 25th and 30th of May, and 1st July; to Mr. Hastings, under dates the 24th of May, and 30th of June, and 5th and 8th July.

The sudden death of the young Nabob, if made a proper use of, seems to point out a middle way, if things are not gone too far already, to admit any other alternative than divesting this family from the government altogether.—Vide the President's letter to Mr. Hastings, of the 16th July, and to Major Caillaud, of the 26th, on the subject of a successor to the young Nabob's posts.—

I. Z. H.

The foregoing Memorial, we believe, would carry sufficient conviction with it, to establish our three positions, were we to go no farther:—the facts there stated are faithfully recited, and without exaggeration: if they are not, we are open to detection, from one side or other of the present division in the Court of Directors; there are leading members, in both parties, who can have recourse to the face of their records of consultations and committee proceedings.

As the several charges laid against Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, in this Memorial, may, by being too much divided, not appear so clear and intelligible as we could wish, though sufficiently so for whom it was then drawn; we shall, for your more ready comprehension, throw the whole into a regular connection as follows:—That, very soon after his advancement, he resolved to reduce that power which raised him to wealth and princely grandeur.—That, in order to effect it, he began (by base assassinations, or other methods) to cut off, and drive out of the provinces, every officer and person of importance whom he had the least cause to surmise favoured our interest, or were attached to us.—That he had been scarce seated in his government, when he entered into a secret negotiation with the Dutch, to introduce an armament in the Provinces, to counteract and destroy our power and influence;—a measure as wicked as foolish.—That he was guilty of the deepest deceit and treachery towards us, his benefactors and allies, in repeated instances.—That, whilst our officers and troops were suffering every distress, and hazard of their lives, in defence of him, his son, and country, our commander in chief was basely and treacherously deserted,

deserted, at three different periods, by father and son.—That he meditated a separate, secret, treaty with the Shaw Zadda, and offered to sacrifice us to the Prince, but was not (happily for us) believed, or heard.—That the whole term of his government was an uniform chain of cruelty, tyranny and oppression.—That (over and above what is charged against him in the Memorial) he meditated, and was near carrying into execution, an infamous secret treaty with the Morattors, which would have proved the total destruction of the country, if it had not been timely prevented.—That he threw every possible lett and hindrance in our way, in the collection of our Tunka's.—That he encouraged, and winked at, the obstructions given to the free currency of our Calcutta Sicca's ; by which, at times, the Company suffered heavy losses.—

Each of these charges is a violation of that treaty, which put Mhir Jaffer Aly Khan in possession of a government of more value than many kingdoms of Europe, supported by us at the expence of our blood, until it became a scandal and reproach to our name and nation.—But it is time we proceed to other proofs than bare assertions : These we shall take from the correspondence so often referred to ; and if, in the several vouchers we exhibit to you, some parts of your affairs should be laid more open than you, or rather your Court of Directors, wish—the necessity must plead our apology ; faithfully assuring you, that we will only touch on such matters as may be absolutely requisite to support our charge.

Governor Clive departing for Europe the 8th of February, 1760, Mr. Holwell succeeded by his rank to the government ; the established committee entrusted with the conduct of all political occurrences, with the country government, consisted of the President, Peter Amyatt, Esq; Major Caillaud, W. B. Sumner, Esq; and W. Macguire, Esq. The Major and Mr. Amyatt absent, the one in the field, the other chief at Patna.—We shall open our proofs with a letter from the President to the Major, and that gentleman's answer, as the correspondence between Mr. Holwell and Major Caillaud was only on public affairs, which having long ceased to be of a secret nature, we think we cannot be justly accused of any breach of propriety in publishing any part of that correspondence which the public information calls for ; especially, as whatever we shall produce from this quarter, will redound to that gentleman's honour.

TO JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

S I R,

Fort William, the 15th of February, 1760.

I Congratulate your success in the reduction of Cuddiem Hossien Khan, the particulars of which I received from the Nabob, and dispatched them

them immediately to the Colonel, though fear too late for his receiving that satisfaction: he was a good deal anxious on this head, as he feared it might have been the cause of delaying your advance towards Rajah Ram-narain.

Subut at the head of about 3000 horse and a few foot, has advanced as far as Midnapore, and given a general alarm to the country; they demanded their chout; if they come with further views, their designs are not yet manifested.—Rumor, without any foundation, says, that Roy Doolub has encouraged their march; be it so or not, I have thought it necessary to have a more than usual watchful eye over him at this juncture.—I have wrote the Nabob on the subject of the Subut's advance; and gave it him as my opinion, that as he has now nothing to apprehend from Purnea, he should return to his capital.—If you judge the service to the northward will admit of such a step, you will enforce it. Your correspondence will ever afford a real pleasure to him, who is with much esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

I. Z. H.

To the Honourable J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq; President and Governor of Fort William.

Sir,

Camp Shabsadapore, Feb. 27. 1760.

I Have been honoured with your obliging favour of the 15th instant; you may be assured of finding in me a punctual correspondent, both from inclination and duty.

The part of your letter, Sir, with regard to Roy Doolub, I have answered fully in the general letter which accompanies this.—I should have first wrote on the subject, had you not prevented me; and am almost convinced, that, on further examination, we shall find that both your suspicions and mine are true and just: indeed the Letter to the Shaw Zadda, of which I send the copy, would be quite sufficient to condemn him, were it not that there is a possibility of its being formed by the Nabob on purpose; *who is, from principle, very capable of doing that, or any other infamous action to gain his ends.*—I shall, however, suspend my judgment, until your examination is over.—The precautions you have taken were highly judicious; for though the proofs against him may not, on trial, appear so clear as we could wish for our satisfaction; yet he is still a person to be suspected, and of consequence cannot be too narrowly or strictly watched.

Your

Your opinion, with regard to the Nabob's return to the Capital, agreed perfectly with mine; I had advised him to that step before the receipt of your letter, and have since enforced it on your judgment:—he may easily, if he pleases, put an end to this beginning of trouble, if he will pursue the proper methods, and pay them their chout; but indeed, so dilatory is his conduct in every respect, and particularly where payments of money are to be made, that I suppose he will put it off, until they come with such a force as will oblige him to it, but that not until they have done as much damage to the country as will amount to double their tribute regularly paid.

The more I see of the Nabob, the more I am convinced, that he must be ruined in spite of all our endeavours, if he doth not alter his present measures.—He is neither loved nor feared by his troops or his people; he neglects securing the one by the badness of his payments, and he wants spirit and steadiness to command the other.—As no one knows him better than you, Sir, no one is more proper to give him the necessary advice on the occasion; nor can you too forcibly or frequently represent to him, the fatal consequences, if he persists in his folly. Believe me, Sir, with truth and respect,

Your obedient and obliged humble Servant,

J. C.

Our reason for introducing the first of these letters is for sake of the reply, and to do honour to the good sense and penetration of that gentleman; who could so early, and on so short an intercourse with him, form a consummate judgment of that weak and infatuated man; in which he had cause to be confirmed, day by day.—We have only further to remark, on the subject of this letter, that on the strictest examination into the supposed letter of Roy Doolub to the Shaw Zadda, said to be intercepted by the Suba's Harkarahs, (or spys) it was proved a palpable forgery of the Suba, to get him delivered into his hands; hoping thereby to get the plunder of a Corore of Rupees.—An attempt similar to this, he made in Colonel Clive's time, against the same person, but was shamefully detected; and sure, none but him could ever have thought of it again.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS, Resident at Morad Baag.

Sir,

Fort William, 22d Feb. 1760.

I Wrote by the Nabob's Harkarahs last night, and this morning received your favour of the 18th, and observed, by the Nabob's repeated anxieties concerning Subut, that his intelligence on that head is very imper-

fect; it is true he has possessed himself of Midnapore, but as yet there appears not the least foundation for his supposed advance to the city:—He himself remains at Midnapore, some of his people are advanced to Chundercona, and a very few to Bowannypore, but not a man of his one foot to the northward of that place: if he ever had any design of marching to the city, the advance of our troops to join Cossim Aly Khan, and my putting Roy Doolub under an arrest, may probably have put a stop to it, though it never appeared to me he had forces with him equal to such an attempt.—Things thus circumstanced, I must differ from you in opinion touching Cossim Aly Khan's march to the city with our troops; as it appears to me more eligible, that he throws himself between them and the city at as great a distance from the latter as possible, by which step he will have it in his power, either to march down and force Subut to quit Midnapore, or retreat towards the city at last; but it is very clear to me, Subut will withdraw as soon as Cossim Aly Khan begins his march.—
I am, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, 24th Feb. 1760.

LEST the general confusion, and apprehensions of the approach of Subut and his Morattors, which now reign in the city of Muxadabad, should spread to the northward, and affect your operations, I judge it necessary you should be acquainted with the real state of this circumstance.

On the Nabob's departure from the city, Subut began his march from Ballasore, and after a short conflict with Koosall Sing, possessed himself of Midnapore, and sent small detached parties to seize on the country round him; one of which advanced as far as Chundercona, and another as far as Bowannypore, where they still remain without a man advancing a foot further to the northward; his whole force consists of about 1000 vagabond horse, and half as many foot: This force, by the timidity of some, and roguery of others at the city, has been magnified to ten times the number; and fear has taken such total possession of the people there, that they imagine him and his troops within an hour's march of them; our Gentlemen at Cossimbuzar, and Morad-baag, seem, by their letters, to be also under the greatest apprehensions.—Cossim Aly Khan, who has just now taken his leave of me, takes the field to-morrow with about 1500 of the Nabob's troops; we have judged it necessary, at the Nabob's request, to re-inforce him with the detachment intended for you, and 100

Euro-

Europeans more, 200 Seapoys, and two field pieces: the whole have been encamped some days at the French gardens, and I doubt not but their first motion will restore the tranquillity of the city and country. I am most truly, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

We propose by these two letters to point out the pusillanimity and folly of the Suba, in ordering the troops under Cossim Aly Khan to march towards Cutwah and the city, by which unfortunate measure, the Burdoo-man country was abandoned, and left a prey to Subut and his handful of raggamuffin Morattors, to the irreparable stain and disgrace of the Suba's government, and heavy distress of your servants; whose whole dependance for supply was from the Tunkas (or assignments) upon that district—as before remarked in the Memorial.—

TO MR. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Fort William, 8th March, 1760.

I Had yesterday your favour of the 28th, still on the subject of Roy Doolub and Rajaram, in which I find the Nabob's intelligence is as bad as it has been hitherto, with respect to Subut and his Morattors, who have gained some footing in the country, and eclat from no cause, but the Nabob's supineness and contradictory orders to his son-in-law Cossim Aly Khan.—You mention the Nabob's having sent a Harkarah with your letter, who had seen Rasbeharry, &c. in Subut's camp, but no such Harkarah is come, and there was very good reason for it; he had imposed on the Nabob; and the fellow who brought your letter, tells me, the other was ordered to accompany him, but left him after they were dispatched; he believed he went to Subut's army—the same intelligence I had sent me in an anonymous letter from Ballasore, respecting Rasbeharry, &c. and of Roy Doolub's having sent Subut money, for which I could not, on the strictest enquiry, find the least foundation.—On my first intelligence, I ordered Rasbeharry to be brought before me; he has been long dangerously ill, and I could venture to swear he has never been out of Calcutta since November. On the receipt of your letter, I had him brought to me yesterday again at the manifest hazard of his life.—From the palpable falsity of this intelligence, let the Nabob judge of the rest, and let him be satisfied, that let who will be with Subut, neither Roy Doolub nor Rajaram shall have it in their power to injure him.—I have turned all his armed people out of the settlement (excepting a few for the service of his Tuzsaconna and Ginanah) they are both under the strictest guard, and at his own request, to quiet the Nabob's suspicions, he moves this day into a

house next to the Armenian Church—he writes me to put Roy Doolub in fetters, a disgrace I cannot think of inflicting, without being guilty of a breach of the sacred laws of protection granted him, unless a proved violation on his side justifies it; in that case, I will not only put him in irons, but send him directly to the Nabob.—It has been hinted to me, whether by the Nabob's authority or knowledge I will not say, that a present of four Lack was ready for me, provided I would deliver him up, or that I might make my own terms. Should any intimation of this kind be insinuated to you, I request you would return the same reply I did, that I would not be guilty of such an action for four Corore.—I am, Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

TO JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, 11th March, 1760.

I AM favoured with yours of the 27th ult. With respect to my sentiments of Roy Doolub, you have them in part in our public letter of this date; to which I will here add, that I am very sensible there are probable appearances that he has given some underhand encouragement, both to the Shaw Zadda and the Morattors; yet whilst proofs are not plain against him, I think we cannot proceed further than we have, consistent with the first plan of politics we set out with when this man had our protection given him. One ruling motive to the Nabob's having him in his hands, is most certainly his wealth; but he is still swayed by a much greater, to wit, that we should not have so strong a check over him as our detention of Roy Doolub ever will be. The protection given him is (next to our troops) the best security we have for the Nabob's good behaviour. The letter referred to in the general letter, was one sent down to the Colonel; it was said to be wrote by Roy Doolub to Coja Huddy; the purport to cut the Nabob off,—but the Colonel assured me the forgery of the letter was so palpable and scandalous, that it ought to destroy the credit of any future attempts from that quarter; and such are the reasons assigned this year, in the select Committee's letter to the Company, for the protection granted and continued to Roy Doolub, that we cannot consistently or prudently give him up, without the most glaring proofs against him. The judgment you have formed of the Nabob is too just; weakness, irresolution, suspicion, and (consequently) cruelty, form his disposition. What but the issue you predict, can result from these, when joined to a most ungracious and insolent demeanor, which has made him universally hated and despised? We must however support him and his government as long as we possibly can, without involving ourselves and employers in

his

his ruin : when this appears, it will be time to think a little further, as I judge there is no treaty subsisting between us can exact that sacrifice.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

TO PETER AMYATT, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, 11th March, 1760.

FORGIVE my late reply to your favour of the 24th ult. You know the plague and hurry attending the dispatch of our last ship, and will therefore attribute my neglect to the real and only cause, and not as proceeding from any disregard of your obliging letters, for which I request you will accept my very sincere thanks ; and permit me to assure you I shall receive your correspondence and commands with much pleasure, and be glad, on my part, in every shape, to promote every view you have or may have, either to the public or your own private advantage. Your situation, I believe, has been disagreeable enough ; by express intelligence this morning, I learn, the Prince has escaped the Major's vigilance, and is advancing this way, and that the Major is marching back to secure the passes. In this I fear the Prince will have too much the start of him ; should this prove the case, matters will begin to grow serious, and the face of things in this province require your early sentiments on this subject. I intreat you esteem me with great truth. Sir,

Your most obedient Servant,

J. Z. H.

TO Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Calcutta, 15th March, 1760.

I Yesterday received your letter of the 11th from Cossimbuzar, advising me of the intended march of the Nabob to Sukragully. I wrote you I think the 12th at night, and enclosed you a letter to the Nabob, and copy of it for your perusal, as also copy of Subut's letter to me, which I inclosed to the Nabob. I have kept in readiness 200 Europeans more to join Capt. Spears, being hourly in expectation of the Nabob's instructions to be joined by his command ; but as yet I have not had a line from him on the subject of the Shaw Zadda's unexpected motion towards the passes. Cossim Aly Khan with Capt. Spear's command, was at Burdwan yesterday ; if he continues thus dilatory and inactive, and I receive no demand for troops from the Nabob, I will certainly send Capt. Yorke with a separate command of 3 or 400 Europeans, field artillery, and seapoys, directly into the Kirpy country, where our Gomaftah and Aurungs are

daily

daily plundered. I long for further advices from you. We have no intelligence from the Major, later than the 6th from Deuniapore.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Calcutta, 21st March, 1760.

FROM the accounts I have had from the Commissary and Capt. Spears, the monthly expences of this expedition cannot be less than 50,000 rupees. You estimate wrong in supposing the force less than one-fourth of the Major's. It exceeds his in Europeans, and is on the whole one thousand; therefore request you will press the Nabob, as the state of our treasury is very low, by our continual current expences, and total stop to our Tunkas. These you are to observe, are the incident charges of the expedition, exclusive of the pay of the troops. And I once more request you insist on the Nabob's making an immediate remittance, to enable me to support the expedition, or he will lay me under an unavoidable necessity of recalling the troops into garrison. He writes me to order the troops to join him. I have already advised him those orders are sent to Capt. Spears, the moment he receives his summons; in contradiction to this, I last night received a letter from Mr. Watts, of the 18th at night, informing me that Cossim Aly Khan had just then received orders from the Nabob, to march against Subut, and prevent, if possible, his advance to Breeboon. His irresolution and supineness, I much fear, will prove his destruction at last, in spite of our utmost endeavours to save him. I see it will behove us to think of guarding against our being involved in the same ruin.

I am from good authority informed, that the Nabob has dispatched a trusty person with an abject petition to the Prince, who was, the 23d of the Moon, at Deingeer; that the person and petition is there with him. The purport of the petition runs thus: "*That on advices reaching him that the Morattors intended to enter the country by the way of Patna, he had sent his son and the Major to oppose them; that it never was his intention to oppose his Majesty's arms, to whom he was an old professed slave; but by the evil counsels of Rajahram, Narain, his son Mhiran, and the Major, had acted contrary to his intentions and orders; and that if the Prince desired it, he was ready to surrender himself to his pleasure.*"

If these are his tricks, you will, I doubt not, think with me, it is time we should look to the Company and ourselves. What makes me the less hesitate in my belief of the above, is my knowledge of his scheme of sending Jaffier Cooley Khan on the like errand, before the Colonel went, which he then dropt on a threatening letter from the Colonel, which by his order I dictated to the Moonshee. I am Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

TO CAPTAIN SPEARS.

Sir,

Calcutta, 22d March, 1760.

VARIOUS difficulties intervening, have retarded the march of your reinforcement under Capt. Fischer until now; though I think this evening or to-morrow morning will be the latest of their stay. The artillery and seapoys have been crossed these two days. Capt. Fischer will have orders to take the nearest rout to join you at Burdoman; but as I have reason to think you may by this time be joined by the old Nabob, and are advancing to the southward or south-west, you will be careful from time to time to dispatch advices to Capt. Fischer of your intended rout. It would not be amiss if you report this reinforcement much stronger than it is. You have given me no advice of your having received the commission I sent you, empowering you to hold general court-martials. Agreeably to your request, I have given Mr. Watts permission to pay the recruits the remainder of the bounty-money, if you and he think it absolutely necessary. Dr. Steward is appointed an additional surgeon for your command. Notwithstanding the orders you have already received, should you, upon any unforeseen emergency, receive orders from Major Caillaud to join him, you are to pay immediate obedience to such orders, or any others you may receive from him, touching the conduct of, or conducting the troops under your command. And here I think it necessary to explain to you, that although, as auxiliaries to the Nabob, you are to pay regard touching the destination of your troops for the defence of his government; yet should you see a probability of your coming to action with any of his enemies, you are, with respect to a proper disposition of your troops, to pay no regard to any orders you may receive from him on that head; but in conjunction with your Captains and Officers, in a council of war, determine on such dispositions as are most likely to give success and honour to the arms of your country. If the Nabob and his army join you, you are to take the most particular care to have no communication whatever between his troops and yours; to which end you must always encamp at proper distance from him, and by no means, in the usual course of your march, permit his troops to take the lead, unless you judge it

it necessary at any time, that advanced parties of his cavalry should precede your van. You are not only ever to be on your guard against a surprise from the enemy, but also against treachery from the Nabob himself; for which precaution I have my particular reasons: but you are likewise to have the strictest guard upon yourself, that no suspicions of this kind escape you unto any one, unless you should have cause sufficient to lay them before a select council of war, consisting of your Captains only.

I heartily wish you a successful campaign, and expect to have as frequent intelligence from you as possible. Sir,

Your most humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. HUGH WATTS.

Sir,

Fort William, 29th March, 1760.

I Have before me your favours of the 20th, 21st, and 24th instant. The Nabob's inconsistencies and irresolution continue very uniform, and will in the end prove his ruin, unless he has better luck than he deserves. By a letter I have just received from him, he now seems to think the Prince will enter by the way of Bierboon and Lecra Koonda, and tells me he intends joining your party soon, and will advance that way to oppose him. I enclose you copy of the letter I dispatched some days ago to the Rajah of Bierboon, and have by Capt. Fischer sent you a supply of 15,000 sunwad rupees.

I have wrote this morning to the Nabob, enjoining him to secure some advantageous post near Burdwan, where he may have it in his option to fight or not, and with equal facility stop the advance of the Prince from Bierboon, or of Subut from the southward; but by no means to be provoked to fight before the Major joins him. If the Nabob advances beyond the Dummadah, the party of Morattors which fell on your rear, will most probably push for the city, where their 600 will, in the fears of the people, swell to as many thousands. As to the Subut, I think I can depend on the intelligence I have of his having taken the road from Bissnapore towards Bydenaut, to join the Prince. I have wrote however to the Nabob, and advised him, should he hold his resolution of marching with our troops to Bierboon, to take care that he leaves a trusty and capable officer, with as strong a body of cavalry as he can spare, at Cutwah, to defend that key to the city; and to the same purport I shall directly dispatch a letter to the Roy Royen. I am, Sir,

Your most humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To

TO CAPTAIN MACKLEAN.

Sir,

Fort William, March 30, 1760.

IN consequence of your address to the Board from Gangam, under date the 7th instant, which reached us the 24th, I judged you within a few days march of Calcutta, and dispatched to you a letter the 26th at night, advising you that Major Caillaud, with our forces, were in the field, somewhere about the Bierboon country; and that you should follow all such orders as you might receive from him, whether with respect to joining him with your command, or otherwise respecting the conduct of your march. By a letter received late last night from our resident at Cuttack, I have the pleasure of knowing you were arrived within half an hour of that city, which makes it needful I should give you a short state of things, as they are now circumstanced, for the guidance of your future conduct.—The Shaw Zadda, with a considerable army, chiefly horse and without artillery, is advanced at the back of the hills, with intention to enter this province by the way of the Bierboon or Patchect, to subvert this government. Subut (whose force is lately much increased by meeting no opposition to the southward) at the head of 5 or 6000 Moratta horse, is in possession of Midnapore, Kirpy, and all that part of the country; and I hear is advancing with the greatest part of his force from Bisnapore towards Bydenaut, or Bierboon, to join the Shaw Zadda. Major Caillaud, with the main body of our troops, in conjunction with the young Nabob and his forces, is in pursuit of, and close in the rear of the Shaw Zadda's army. The old Nabob, with the rest of the forces of the province, are at Boodeegaam, in the road to Bierboon, to oppose the Shaw Zadda in front, whilst the Major presses his rear. A body of 500 Europeans, as many Seapoys, and 6 field-pieces, are under the command of Capt. Spear, near the city of Burdwan, the capital of Burdoman, and are to march and join the old Nabob; and have, I conclude, by this time joined him. A detachment from Subut, of about 800 horse, are in the neighbourhood of Burdoman, with intention to harass the rear of Capt. Spear, and retard as much as possible the junction of his troops with the old Nabob's. From this disposition of the enemy, it will behove you to advance with the utmost care and circumspection; and as you have only horse, without artillery to encounter, you need not be apprehensive of any thing, but a surprize or treachery from the part of Subut; against which, you must be ever on your guard. Our Resident at Cuttack advises me Subut's Dewan has supplied your party with provision, &c. This amicable appearance carries suspicion with it; as any assistance given you from a friendly motive, is, at this juncture, against the real designs and views of his master: therefore be assured they

are meditating the gaining some advantage over you, or at least will attempt to bring about a desertion of your people.

We have already given orders for our resident, Mr. Rogers, to withdraw himself and the Company's effects on your arrival; both him and those you will take with you, and direct your march without loss of time towards Ballasore, and from thence to Midnapore; from this last-mentioned place you will have a fair and open road to Burdaman. Should you, on good intelligence, find it practicable to make a successful attack on Midnapore, and dispossess the Morattas, without the loss of time or risque of a reduction of your people, you will do an acceptable service to the Nabob; but you are by no means to take this, or any other step that can long retard your march to Burdaman, where you are to halt until you receive further orders, either from myself, Major Caillaud, or Capt. Spear. If you find you have it not in your power (from causes unknown to me) to follow implicitly the foregoing instructions, you will then proceed according to your own discretion, and as the exigencies of your situation may require, taking care to give me frequent advice of your intended rout and determinations. I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

J. Z. H.

TO MR. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Fort William, 1st April, 1760.

I Enclose you copy of mine of yesterday, and wait an express answer from the Nabob, as I judge Macklean's party marched from Cuttack the 23d: I will suppose him advanced this day about Midnapore. The Major's and Spear's command having exhausted our military camp stores, occasioned many unforeseen difficulties in the dispatch of the reinforcement under Captain Fischer, who will encamp at Niah Serai, I judge, this afternoon. As I received an alarm from Captain Spear, that the Shaw Zadda was within two or three days march of the Nabob, I sent positive orders yesterday to Captain Fischer, to make forced marches, with his cannon and ammunition only, to join him, and to leave his spare stores, tents, &c. to follow him; for the security of which, I have this day dispatched twenty Europeans and twenty Seapoys more to join the escort; with orders to follow Fischer's rout, with the utmost expedition. The advance for this expedition must be sent directly here, as I have supplied the Commissary and Paymaster largely, and we much want cash for our current expences. I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, April 5th, 1760.

I Have the pleasure of receiving yours of the 27th ult. from Oparabaund, and by advices from Mr. Hastings, of the 2d instant, may venture now to congratulate your having some rest from your labours, which I am sure have been severe enough. Your junction with the old Nabob and Captain Spear's command, will, I imagine, determine the Prince's retreat to the southward, as it must extinguish the hopes he may have cherished of acting offensively in this province; and as I judge by the time this reaches you, you will have settled the future operations of this campaign, I request you will favour me with the result of your Council, as soon as you conveniently can, and point out in what manner we can promote them from hence. I am, with perfect regard, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

The eight preceding letters are recited in confirmation of some parts of our Memorial, and introductory and explanatory of others, and withal to give you a general idea of the campaign of 1760.

To the Hon^{ble} JOHN Z. HOLWELL, Esq; President and Governor of
FORT WILLIAM.

Sir,

Camp at Burpore, 6th April, 1760.

MY last was dated the 24th Inst. Yesterday we marched about five corse, and this day three; which brought us so near the enemy as to expect they would come and give us battle; but finding about noon they did not advance, I desired the Nabob to march on towards them, but he said the day was too far spent, and his people too much fatigued. The Prince is encamped near the Damoudah river, about three corse from us, and I hope tomorrow we shall bring him to an engagement. The Maharattas are encamped very near him. I have the honour to subscribe myself, with the most perfect respect and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

J. C.

To the Hon^{ble} JOHN Z. HOLWELL, Esq; President, &c. Gentlemen of
the Select Committee at FORT WILLIAM.

Hon. Sir and Sirs,

Camp at Belgass, April 8th, 1760.

MY last to the President was dated the 6th Inst. in which I informed him of my hopes of coming next day to an engagement with the enemy, who were encamped on the other side of the river Damoudah;

and we should have succeeded according to my wish, could I have persuaded the Nabob to cross the river, or send over a large body of horse to keep them in play, until we should get up with them. But to neither of these would he consent, and all we could do was to get near enough to their rear to cannonade them. This they did not stand long, but soon got out of our reach, and pursued their march towards Bisnapoore, and, by the intelligence we received last night, are encamped seven corse from us. Thus all hopes of bringing them to another engagement, this campaign, are now over. We have lost the only opportunity we had, nor indeed can we expect much to improve opportunities, while we have to do with men, who are as ignorant as obstinate, and whose troops are under no order or command. I have the honour to be, with the most perfect respect and esteem, Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

J. C.

To the Hon^{ble} J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq;

Sir,

April 10th, 1760.

THE Shaw Zadda was within three corse of us this morning, but having early intelligence of our approach, has repassed the river Damoudah, and I suppose by this time is far enough from our reach.

I must frankly own, the motives of the Prince's present actions are quite a mystery to me; and as I cannot form the least probable judgment of them myself, I will not even pretend to conjecture what may be the event of them. Both the Nabob and him seem equally to avoid fighting, and there is no knowing in what manner to proceed, or what plan previously to determine on, while the Nabob continues to act so irresolutely, and while his pusillanimity prevents his exerting himself as he should do, on the fairest occasions which can offer. I have the honour to be, with the most perfect respect and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

J. C.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, 7th April, 1760.

I Am now forced to touch upon a subject, which appears to me to require our greatest attention. Some days ago I wrote to Mr. Hastings, concerning an information which was given me, that the old Nabob had sent a trusty person with a submissive Arzgee to the Shaw Zadda, in which he exculpated himself, by throwing the whole blame of the opposition made

made to his arms, on the machinations of the English: Mr. Hastings, in his letter in answer to mine, seemed to think it impossible such a step could have been taken by the Nabob, or indeed that he could have sent any Arzgee at all: however, in a subsequent letter from him, of the 27th, he finds out that an Arzgee was sent, though different in purport to that I informed him of. As I thought it most essential to us, to trace, if possible, the truth, I employed an emissary to Comgaar Khan, the consequence of which has been a Phirmaund from the Shaw Zadda, inclosing copy of the old Nabob's Arzgee to him, with an apology for not sending the original. A copy of the copy I send you inclosed, and request your sentiments, how and in what light this appears to you. If the copy is authentic, the case is plain, that this man for whom we have drawn the sword, would not scruple, if driven to any extremity, to make his peace by the sacrifice of his protectors. The Phirmaund, I suppose, differs little in matter from that he sent you; he reminds me of the obligations the English lay under to his ancestors, and offers a *carte blanche* for the Company, provided we will draw our forces off from *doer of evil*, and join them to his standard; which, he advises me, he has at present fixed at Seegur, and in a few days after purposes to erect it in Morshadabad, &c.

I enclose you a copy of a letter, sent the old Nabob by the Colonel, which I dictated to the Moonshee, by his order, a few days before his departure for Europe, on being informed the Nabob intended sending a messenger and petition to the Prince.

Whether this is a real copy or not, I will not say; though I firmly believe it true; that an Arzgee has been sent is allowed; and if it contained not matter detracting and injurious to us, why was it sent without being communicated to you by Mhiran, or to Hastings by the Nabob?

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

TO JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, April 9th, 1760.

LAST night I received your favour of the 4th, from Mungol Koot. I think, from your mutual advance to each other, you must have, before this, obliged the Prince to make some decisive motion. I must confess I have no idea that he will stand a battle with you, and yet believe he harbours some hopes of a general defection of the Nabob's troops, though at the same time he deceives himself, if he imagines even this could be of any real service to him; if he fights, it is from the melancholy reflection of this being his *ne plus ultra*; and that if he does not

now

now make a push, he will be deserted by Comgaar Khan and the rest of his followers, and be without any reasonable hopes of having any powers whatever to join and follow his future fortunes.

In mine of the 3d and 5th, I enclosed you copies of my instructions to Captain M'Lean; as he is advised of the situation of the enemy, I conceive he will naturally bend his march towards Injilee, and advance towards us as far East as he can, and keep the course of the river.

I confess myself something impatient to have your sentiments on mine of the 7th. I have returned no answer to the Prince's Phirmaund, but have replied to Comgaar Khan's letter, and intimated to him, that I can put no faith in copies; but that if he will send to me the Subah's original Arzgee, I shall then be able to form a judgment. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Fort William, April 15, 1760.

I Most heartily pity the embarrassed situation you must necessarily be in, with people who manifest themselves unworthy that government they have usurped. I must confess, the Nabob's whole conduct appears to me much more mysterious than that of the Prince; circumstanced as he is, he must plan various schemes, and from the nature of things, his councils must be attended with much confusion and irresolution. The Nabob's backwardness to engage him appears to me absolutely unaccountable, unless it arises from some secret negotiations, which it is possible he may be carrying on with the Prince, to make his own peace at the expence of his friends. I should not think myself justified in this conjecture, nor have given credit so readily to the petition sent by him to the Prince, (copy of which I sent you on the 7th) did I not know him capable of anything ever so unworthy and treacherous. By letters from Mr. Amyatt, I learn Abdallah has gained another victory over the Vizier and his friends the Morattors, and that the Vizier and the young king Shaw Jehawan have sheltered themselves with the Jauts: this intelligence has, I doubt not, reached the Nabob, whose weak and cowardly imagination probably suggests some turn from that victory in favour of the Prince, and therefore thinks it necessary to temporise. These are surmises of my own, and possibly may have no foundation; they call, however, for some attention. The parts acted by both the old and young Nabob, in the recent contest with the Dutch, ought ever to awaken our apprehensions, and urge our being on our guard

guard against the politics of an Indostan Durbar; the more especially, as we see the party round the Nabob, who we know would cut our throats if they could, obtain every day more power and influence over his Councils; men, who being raised as he himself was, from the dirt, can never vary the complexion of their groveling genius. Dispositions, such as you, Sir, have now (unhappily) to deal with, can only be worked on by the most peremptory dictates. The Nabob must be urged (I intended to say forced) to something decisive, or in a short time his country will be worth nothing to himself or any body else. I hitherto avoided writing to him on his late unaccountable and provoking conduct. My wish and intention is, that you should have every weight your present post and situation requires; your sway and influence over the Nabob is, at this juncture, of the utmost importance to the Company's affairs; and it is your own fault if you are not invested with such authority as yourself can wish. I therefore request you will, without reserve, point out to me, if any additional power or instructions to you, to act independently of the Nabob, (which we, as a Committee or Board, can invest you with) will conduce to the good of the service, and be a means of enforcing your salutary councils to the Nabob, and it shall be forthwith transmitted to you.

I am, Sir, your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon^{ble} J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq; President and Governor of FORT WILLIAM.

Sir,

Camp at Dignagur, April 15, 1760.

IN order to come at the truth, with regard to the Nabob's Arzgee to the Prince, Mr. Hastings had recourse to the Nabob's Persian writer; a man who hath, on many occasions, given him proofs of attachment and fidelity. The moment he set his eyes on the paper, he declared it to be a forgery. May I beg leave to refer you to Mr. Hastings for the reasons he gave for it; as that Gentleman's knowledge in the language will enable him to give you a clearer idea of these distinctions in address and stile of their letters, than I can pretend to. For my part, I own after Mr. Hastings had repeated them to me, they were so satisfactory as to convince me the probability of its being a forgery was greatly in the Nabob's favour.

Two days before I received your letter, Sir, the Nabob and his son were with me, and I found the old man big with something that he did not know well how to begin breaking to me. I helped him forward all I could by those kind of assurances which often open the hearts of men; and he then told me he had wrote to the Prince, and had received an answer, such a one as gave him hopes, with other circumstances, that the

Prince

Prince might be inclinable to treat and put himself perhaps in his power ; but that he knew he (the Prince) would not do this, without I would be security for his safety. The Nabob was desirous to know, in such a case, how I would act ; but the main drift of the discourse was, to find out how far I would be consenting to give him an opportunity of displaying the true eastern system of politics, by cutting him off. You may easily, Sir, guess my answer, that I was ready to do every thing for his service consistent with the honour of my country, and the sacred regard we gave to our word ; and besides, if the Prince made any address to me on this subject of security, I must first have your orders and instructions in this affair. And thus the conversation ended.

I made it my business afterwards to enquire among some of the Nabob's people, on what grounds he founded these hopes of getting the Prince in his power ? but they all assured me, as I suspected, that they were no more than the idle reports of some of his minions, who knew such stories would be well received and credited, and so found advantage in flattering his foolish hopes.

It is a very unfortunate circumstance that we have to do with a weak man, who neither from principle nor merit deserves the dignity of the station in which we have put him, and in which he would not remain twenty-four hours, if we were to withdraw our protection from him, and on which he so much depends, that I am obliged to give him a guard of Seapoys for the safety of his person. It doth not appear to me, however, in justice or in reason, that we ought to support him in the pursuit of unjustifiable measures ; such as he follows in regard to not discharging the vast arrears due to his troops, who to a man have publicly declared, they will not draw their swords in his cause, and that only their fears of us prevent their using them against him. The consequence will be, as to his part, that while he is not afraid of his head he never will satisfy them ; and to us, that tho' we may protect him from immediate danger to his person, we must relinquish the hopes of seeing the country free from troubles, while he keeps a body of troops that he will not pay regularly, and over whom he consequently hath no command. This rotten system still we might in some measure support, were we always assured none but the country powers would disturb us : but it is more than probable that the French or Dutch, if not both, may some time or other renew their attempts to be concerned, and with how much the more probability of success from the distracted state of the country while the Nabob continues to govern it so ill.

The first opportunity I propose representing all this to him in the strongest light I possibly can ; and should our opinions agree, I should take it as
a favour

a favour if you would inclose a letter from yourself to him, on the subject; I will deliver it, and take that opportunity as the best to try what can be done by working on his fears, the only way indeed I am convinced of managing him to our own advantage and his good. In particular, Sir, you will be pleased to inforce the payment of his troops, by hinting, that if he delays it, I have your orders not to prevent them taking their own measures.

To-morrow Captain Knox's detachment marches. The Prince is certainly gone back, and we talk of nothing but the pleasures of the great Rumnah first, and then of an expedition against the Purnea Nabob to conclude the campaign. As this last step is absolutely necessary, I shall do all in my power to prevent the former obstructing it; with what success, we shall soon know. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient and most humble servant,

J. C.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, 22d April, 1760.

I Have the pleasure of your two favours of the 15th and 17th, and must take a farther day to reply to them more circumstantially. For the present, I enclose you a Letter to the old Nabob to the purport of your request, and with it a copy for your perusal, and I hope approval. It contains, I think, nothing but what should at all events be urged to him at this juncture. Something must be done, and soon, to recover the currency of the trade of the provinces, or the Company must be lost; the sale of their woollen goods, copper, &c. exports is totally obstructed; their investments in consequence of this, and the unavoidable stoppage of the Tunkas wholly at a stand, and not more than a Lack and half in the treasury: Particulars you should be necessarily acquainted with, as they arise from the perpetual troubles of the country, perpetuated, I may say, by the wickedness as well as weakness of those who govern it.

To give you what are still my sentiments on the Nabob's Arzdasht to the Prince, and my reasons for those sentiments, I now enclose you a copy of my reply to Mr. Hastings on that head; and think my judgment of this affair more confirmed from the circumstance recited in your favour of the 15th, to wit, the Nabob's having acknowledged to you his writing to the Prince, and that his replies gave him hopes he was inclined to treat. The carrying on this concealed correspondence with the Prince I cannot look on in any other light than as the highest infringement of that respect and deference due to your station, and the treaty subsisting between us.

And here it becomes needful, Sir, to remark, it is full time the Nabob should be convinced he should not look on you as an officer sent implicitly to submit to his orders or sentiments, but as his coadjutor and protector in the war. And should, at any time, his wretched politics dictate measures, which appear in your opinion destructive of the general end proposed, I hope, and doubt not, but you will think yourself fully authorised peremptorily to over-rule them, without losing time in application here, as I am very well satisfied we may depend on the propriety of your conduct in the command you are invested with.

I have the honour to be, with very real esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

This letter affords you a genuine picture of the distressed state of your affairs at this period.

TO MR. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Fort William, 20th April, 1760.

I Have your favours of the 13th and 14th, accompanied by your translation of the Suba's Arzdasht to the Prince, and your sentiments thereon. Though I confess your reasoning and conclusions in favour of the Suba's innocence, carry probability with it, they appear not to me convincing, nor square with my mode of thinking on this subject, for the following reasons: That the Nabob's Moonshee should, on the instant, pronounce it a forgery, amounts to no proof of its being so; that the Nabob had sent such an Arzdasht to the Prince, and that it was enclosed by the latter to me, was the discourse of the Buzar two or three days before it reached me. If you remember, I hinted in a former the intimation I had received of it; so that I may justly suppose the Moonshee was well prepared against a surprize, and consequently ready to disavow it and pronounce it a forgery, which he seems by your letter to have done, even before he gave it a perusal. The variation of its diction, and deviation from the usual form of the Nabob's addresses, appear to me equally inconclusive, as it is not at all improbable these might be done with design to plead and invalidate, in case of its coming to our knowledge. Whether this Arzdasht was sent by the Nabob or not, it is impossible to say with any precision; but this I am clear in, that it contains the very dictates of the hearts of the minions about him, and of course his own; and the very pleas he would have made use of in his justification, if success and victory had attended the Prince. These striking considerations, joined to the whole tenor of his conduct respecting the Dutch, &c. joined to his holding any correspondence

dence at all with the Prince without our knowledge and approval, leaves my judgment of this in the same state it was; though, at the same time, I see it must rest here for want of more sufficient proof. I am, Sir,

Your most humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Fort William, 24th April, 1760.

Sir,

I Long much to have your sentiments on the subject of mine of the 22d and yesterday. I have just now had the pleasure of yours of the 20th from Goperra, and think it necessary to advise you I last night received a letter from the old Nabob, chiefly to request that I would order Captain Macklean and half his troops to be entered in his service and pay: A request which can with no propriety whatever be complied with (in which opinion I dare say I shall meet your concurrence.) To this effect I now write him, and enclose you copy of my letter, that you be upon your guard when he touches you on that subject, which I suppose he will.

I think I have already intimated to you, I made no reply to the Phirmaund sent me from the Prince, but that I answered Comgaar Khan's; the contents of my letter to him were literally this, "That I had received the Phirmaund, and pitied the Prince's unhappy situation and misfortunes of his royal house; that he (Comgaar Khan) was no stranger to the ties and obligations which bound us to support Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan and his government; that copies amounted to no proof, but that if his original Arzdasht was sent me by the Prince, I should then know what judgment to form of it." With this answer I dispatched the Prince's messenger, and the same time sent two of my own Harkara's to return with an answer, in case the Prince thought proper to give me one. On the 16th they were returned to me with a second Phirmaund from him, and a reply from Comgaar Khan, as also two letters from him, one for Rajaram Harkara, and the other from Nund-comar, in the district of Seergur. The Harkaras were seized, stripped, kept prisoners 24 hours, plunder'd of the Phirmaund and letters, and then dismissed. I have taken every means possible for the recovery of the papers, but fear I shall fail in it, which gives me no small vexation, as I am almost convinced they contained the original Arzdasht, with possibly some other pieces of the Nabob's concealed correspondence with him. The Harkaras left the Shaw Zadda at Gorrea Hottea, his troops much distressed for provisions, &c. He was then halting for Subut, whom he left at Jamgam with 3000 Moratta horse, and had the day my people came away received an express from the north-west from some Rajahs who were advancing with troops

to join him, and who pressed the Shaw Zadda's speedy advance towards Patna, on which the Prince sent a messenger express to hasten Subut. On the other hand, it is conjectured, that the Prince's march to Bahaar is a feint only; that his intention is to lie perdue amongst the hills, and as soon as the combined troops are advanced to the northward, return suddenly into this province and surprize the city; and that in this case, the Dutch will declare for him, and join him. This system I would certainly adopt, was I the Shaw Zadda—however, on the whole, you will be better able to judge of these matters than I can at present. I am, with perfect esteem, Sir,

Your humble servant,

J. Z. H.

You have now before you all that has been said on the subject of the Suba's concealed Arzdasht, to the Prince, upon which you will form your own judgment.—True, we have been robbed (literally so) of absolute proofs in this charge—but if the strongest presumptive ones, supported by a thousand corroborating evidences in the Suba's conduct, have any weight, our proof is sufficient to claim belief:—the intermediate letters from our last remark but one, speak for themselves, and fully prove the cowardice, or treachery, or rather both, at the river Dummodur.

TO MR. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Calcutta, April 25, 1760.

I Have your favour of the 20th, on the subject of the Nabob's having a considerable part of our troops in his pay, service and constant attendance on his person: three days past, I received a letter from him on the subject, to which I yesterday inclosed my answer, in a letter to Major Caillaud, with a copy of mine to the Nabob, for his perusal. To our complying with this request of the Nabob, I think there are strong and manifest objections; the most important of which is, that such a step will, I am convinced, lay the foundation of his independence. The 22d, I wrote a long letter to the Nabob, touching the payment of his troops, and necessity for his disbanding his rabble of Burkundassies, and the greatest part of his useless cavalry: the letter I inclosed to the Major, with a copy of it; confer with him as soon as you can, and request he will communicate to you the purport of those letters.—Two reasons can only be urged in favour of the request now made by the Nabob; the reducing his immense expences, and at the same time those of the Company, by such a reduction of troops now in their pay: to accomplish the first, complying with his request is needless, because, though the troops continue in our pay and dependence on us, yet they will be always at his call and service;

vice ;—and when this campaign is ended, we can, with much propriety, ease the Company by a reduction of the Seapoys to 2000 picked men, which Colonel Clive had determined, if he had staid. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, May 2d, 1760.

YOUR favour from Maraud-Baag, of the 28th ult. I had the pleasure of receiving late last night, and find the situation of things between the two Nabobs just as I surmised.—Having occasion to reply to a letter of the young Nabob's, I take the opportunity to urge the necessity of his remaining in the city, but touch the subject in such a way, as to carry the appearance of the highest compliment to his prowess. That one of them should keep the city is absolutely necessary, and a security to them both, as well as the province. I know but of one way to keep them steady, with respect to the operations of this campaign, and that a very short one: when the measures determined on are in your judgment absolutely needful and proper, just signify to them, that if they are not immediately carried into execution, you will march to Calcutta, and leave them to fight their own battles, and pursue their own councils: I will engage you have no further trouble with them ;—and I dare say, Sir, you are by this time convinced, that had they been treated in this way, on the defeat of the Shaw Zadda, above, and in the fortunate conjunction of attacking and destroying him so lately lost (in both which your judicious resolutions and advice were over-ruled) there had been a happy end to the troubles of the country.

That part of my letter to the Nabob you object to, has been wrong translated and explained to you; the utmost I intimated on that head was, "That as the season was so far advanced, one moment of it was not to be spent unprofitably."—By which I intended to prevent the Nabob's idling his time away in the pleasures of the Rumna and the city, of which you yourself seemed apprehensive.

I am, with sincere esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, May 5, 1760.

I Take this juncture of complying with a recommendation left me by Colonel Clive, in favor of Cossim Aly Khan, and have wrote the Nabob.

Nabob on the subject; copy I inclose for your perusal.—I have, I think, with good reason, many doubts touching the integrity, as well as capacity, in these times, of Rajah Ramnarain, and every principal person under him, and am sure the Nabob should change hands there. If your sentiments do not run counter to mine in this particular, I shall receive as a favor, your interesting yourself in behalf of Cossim Aly Khan.

I am ever, with sincere esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Calcutta, May 6, 1760.

I Have already intimated to you the very low ebb of the Company's treasury; their whole investments at the Arungs are at a stand; and without considerable supplies, we shall not in one month more have sufficient for even the current expences of the Factory.—We were yesterday under the necessity of recommending to the Gentlemen of Cossimbuzar, their endeavouring to take up the money there on the Company's account, for the use of the silk investments; as also to the gentlemen at Ducca, to the same purpose, for the carrying on their investment. These considerations will, I doubt not, be sufficient to awaken your attention, respecting the expences of the parties under Spears and Fischer, on account not a Rupee has yet been remitted to us. Therefore I am obliged to press your obtaining at least one lack of Rupees on this account, and that you will send it down with the utmost expedition: should it exceed the sums disbursed, which I am sure it will not, the Nabob shall be duly credited for it. Suffering him thus to run in arrears, in this article of field expences, is the very worst system of politics we can adopt; and an effectual stop must in future be put to it, by insisting on an advance before our troops leave the garrison. Without this precaution, the Company must suffer great distress and difficulties in the conducting their mercantile affairs, as we find so little dependance on the punctuality of the Nabob's re-imbursing us. I wrote you very pressing on this subject the 23d ult. of which you have hitherto taken no notice. The repayment of the 200,000 Rupees lent the Nabob by Mr. Manningham, on the Company's account, must be demanded in the most urgent terms; and if you think it is not in his power to advance that sum, a fresh Tunka on the Kistnagur Country must absolutely be insisted on—I mention this country in preference, because the remaining ballances to be collected from it are now but small.

We

We have the greatest reason to complain of the Nabob's injurious behaviour, respecting his obstructing the collection of our Tunkas, both in the Burdowan and Kistnagur Countries: from whence I am informed, by Mess. Watts and Howit, that his people are, by every oppressive measure, extorting that money which should pay our Kistebundees. I have wrote the Nabob and the Roy Royer warmly on the subject, and I request you remonstrate against it in the strongest manner.—And that you signify to the former, without the least reserve, that I absolutely will not suffer a single Rupee to be carried out of those countries, whilst we have any the least claim upon them. And demand likewise, that he immediately order his people to withdraw from thence, or I will, without any ceremony, drive them out.

The necessity of the Company's affairs is such, that I have been obliged to apply to the Seats for a loan of 10 or 15 Lack, which they, under various pretences, have refused: I judged their own security, as well as an opportunity of obliging the Company, would have influenced their ready compliance; but herein I judged ill. However, I doubt not but an occasion may offer, for manifesting a proper resentment to that house for this refusal.

I request your speedy reply to this, and am, as ever, most truly, Sir,
Your most humble servant,

J. Z. H.

TO JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Calcutta, May 8, 1760.

Sir,

MY last were under date the 2d and 5th instant. In the former I inclosed, for your perusal, translation of a private letter from Mr. Bisdorn, with copy of my answer. I now forward to you, translate of his replication. After you have considered them, I request you will favor me in returning them.

What weight or dependance can be laid on the sentiments or assertions contained in those letters from the direction of Chinsura, you will be as capable of judging as I am; and I should be extremely glad of your thoughts on this subject:—for my own part, it appears to me, that the Nabob, with respect to the Dutch, is in a pursuit very wide of the road we have pointed out to him; and in which we ought not, nor can, from any justifiable cause, countenance him. That they should be so far disarmed of any means or power of raising disturbances in the country becomes absolutely necessary, both for his security and our own:—but beyond

yond this, that we should suffer his extorting sums of money from them (which can answer no useful purpose to us, but on the contrary, reflect dishonour on the power and influence we are supposed to have over him) is a measure which I really think will not give credit to our name or arms; and which we cannot too soon disclaim and object to. In these sentiments, I dare say, I have your private concurrence; and I must confess, I see no public motive which can fully vindicate our even winking at any oppressive or iniquitous designs, levelled against these or any other individuals under his government; because, whatever odium may fall on him, the world will bestow, and that justly, a large proportion on us, as knowing he dare not meditate practices of this kind, but under the sanction of the alliance between us: let us, therefore, for our own sakes, and to preserve as much as we can the peace of the country, insist on the execution of the plan laid down to him; but oppose that measure which the Nabobs, in place thereof, seem to have only in view, the plundering their possessions; and by this laudable opposition evince them and the world, it is not our wish or aim to injure them in their trade, rights, or properties; but to divest them only of that power which they so lately though impotently, employed to the subversion of ours.

I am, as ever, with much esteem, Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

P. S. To what I have before urged, I may add the driving the Dutch to a desperate extremity, by laying such heavy and exorbitant demands on them, which they cannot in nature comply with, will answer no end, at least no good one; for they will have no resource left, but joining, at all events, the Nabob's enemies with the whole force they can collect together.—I have wrote the Nabob on this subject; copy of the letter I inclose you, and forward another to Mr. Hastings, by these Coffids.

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Calcutta, June 13, 1760.

BY express yesterday from Dacca we have advice, that the Suba has taken off Allyverdee and Shaw Amet Khan's Begums.—He sent a Jammaut-daar and 100 horse, with orders to Jesseraut Khan to carry this bloody scheme into execution, with separate orders to the Jemmaut-daar, in case Jesseraut Khan refused obedience: he refused acting any part in the tragedy, and left it to the other; who carried them out by night about two miles above the city in a boat, tied weights to their legs, and threw them over-board: they struggled for some time, and held by the gunwall

gunwall of the boat, but by strokes on their heads with Latties, and cutting of their hands, they sunk.—These are the acts of the Tyger we are supporting and fighting for. I am,

Your obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon. JOHN ZEPH. HOLWELL, Esquire.

Sir,

Maraud-baag, June 21, 1760.

THE relation transmitted to me in your letter of the 13th, of the murder of the two Begums, filled me with horror and astonishment; but how were those sensations increased, when upon inquiry I was told, that not only the two wretched sufferers above-mentioned, but the whole family, to the number of nine persons, had undergone the same fate. I will not mention their names, till I have undoubted proofs of the truth of my intelligence, which I wish (though I cannot expect it) I may find not so bad at last as it has been represented to me.—How this circumstance escaped my knowledge, I know not. It was not indeed an event to be learned from inquiry, and possibly the infamy of the fact might have made my friends, who were in the secret, neglect to speak to me upon a subject which, from our particular connections with the Nabob, and his intire dependence on our power, could not but reflect dishonour upon the English name. I have hitherto been generally an advocate for the Nabob, whose extortions and oppressions I imputed to the necessity of the times, and want of œconomy in his revenues;—but, if this charge against him be true, no argument can excuse or palliate so atrocious and complicated a villainy, nor (forgive me, Sir, if I add) our supporting such a tyrant.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, most faithful servant,

WARREN HASTINGS.

The advices sent from Dacca touching these murders, were dispatched immediately after the first rumour of the deed; and from thence, as usual, imperfect: subsequent advices brought the true state of that execution, as follows:

Gossîeta Begum, widow of Shaw Amet Jung;

Emna Begum, mother to the Nabob Surajud Dowla, and widow to Geynde Amet Khan;

Morad Dowla, the son of Patsha Kooly Khan, adopted by the Shaw Amet Jung;

Lutsen Nessâ Begum, widow of Surajud Dowla;

Her infant daughters by Nabob Surajud Dowla.

These unhappy sufferers perished all in one night at Dacca, in the manner before-recited, with about twenty of their women of inferior note.—It was said Alleverdy Khan's Begum by some means escaped this massacre of her whole family.

A conceived though groundless jealousy of Morad Dowla's making his escape from his confinement in Dacca, was the cause of this infernal carnage.

In the list of the Subah's assassination given in the Memorial, these were omitted :

Abdel Ohab Khan, way-laid and murdered by the Subah's order, on the Ramna, on pretence of a conspiracy, in March 1760.
Yar Mahomet, a favourite of Surajah Dowla, assassinated in presence of Mhiran, April 1760.

TO MR. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Fort William, May 8, 1760.

YOUR favour of the 3d I received only yesterday; and, out of the fulness of my heart, I wrote to you the 6th, on the obvious near approach of the unsurmountable difficulties I shall have to encounter, in conducting the Company's business for the current year.—The apology you make for the Seats, and they for themselves, we must submit to; but though they may hold good respecting the large loan I requested of them, yet had they been inclined to have shewn a readiness to oblige the Company, they would at least have made a tender to me of such a sum as they could have spared with convenience to themselves. One reason they alledge to me for their refusal is, their having refused the Nabob, which I now find had not a word of truth in it. Had they complied with my request, it would have armed them with the best reason they could have urged for not complying with his demand; and it would have been incumbent on us to screen and protect them from any violence intended against them.—A time may come, when they may stand in need of the Company's protection, in which case they may be assured they shall be left to Satan to be buffeted.

I observe what you say, respecting your having advanced the 25,000 Siccas to Capt. Fischer, for the payment of his separate detachment.—The troops must be paid beyond doubt, but if we are immediately laid under the necessity of again disbursing the sums we receive from the Nabob

bob on his account, where will be the end of our expences? and how are the Company to be re-imburfed at laft, if he is fuffered thus to be in arrears to us? A ftop muft be abfolutely put to this fystem, and foon: I therefore request you will communicate this, and my laft letter to you on this fubject, to the Major; and that fome effectual means may be directly adopted, to free us from this tax, fo greatly detrimental at prefent to our affairs. If time is given to the Nabob until the campaign is clofed, I know the infuperable trouble we fhall have in recovering a rupee from him. If fomethings is not done fatisfactory to us, I fhall be under the neceffity of laying a representation before the Board, who are, I know, very well inclined to come to refolutions which will be moft ungracious to the Nabob in his prefent fituation.

Request the Major will communicate to you mine of this date, on the Nabob's conteft with the Dutch. I am, Sir,

Your moft obedient humble fervant,

J. Z. H.

TO PETER AMYATT, Efquire.

Sir,

Fort William, 11th May, 1760.

I Have the pleafure of your letters of the 23d and 25th ult.—Matters now, I think, grow critical on your fide; the Prince in your neighbourhood, and, I fear, between Knox and the city, into which he will, I imagine, find no fmall difficulty to throw himfelf, without fighting under many difadvantages, though I hope you are ftrong enough for an occafional fally to favour any attempt he may make for your relief.—Notwithftanding the Prince's junction with Mr. Law's inconfiderable force, I muft confeß my apprehenfions for the city, are greater from treachery within, than from any attempts they can make from without, whilft Knox and his party are fo near them. I have no better opinion of Ramnarain's integrity in the caufe, than I have of his fpirit and capacity; and the moft gracious manner his brother and Molydore were difmiffed by the Prince and Comgaar Khan gives ftrong caufe of fufpicion: therefore you cannot be too much on your guard againft Ramnarain, as well as thofe who have the chief pofts under him; and if Molydore, Donceram, and one or two more of them, were fuprized, feized and fecured, I doubt not but it would fecure the fafety of the city. Whether a ftep of this kind would be practicable, you are a better judge than I can poffibly be. If Knox makes his way into the city, you will be ftrong enough to take the abfolute command of it yourfelf, which I would by all means recommend to you, and the fame time fecure thofe you have reafon to think difaffected. Ramnarain's backwardnefs to op-

pose the advance of Mr. Law's party, which I learn from yours to the Major of the 25th ult. evinces that he intends ill, or has no command over those under him; and consequently he is, in either case, most unworthy the trust he possesses, and the sooner he is divested the better.

Let me hear from you by every possible opportunity, and believe me truly, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To JOHN CAILLAUD, Esquire.

Sir,

Fort William, 24th May, 1760.

LAST night a letter from the Committee was dispatched to you, in which you had the Gentlemen's general sentiments only on the state of things, without descending to the particular causes of these sentiments which require elucidations.

The success of Capt. Knox justifies and does honour to your recommendation and our appointment, and gives quite a new aspect to the late desperate state of affairs in the province of Bahar; where I think the force under Captain Knox, if continued at Patna, will, with the assistance of Ramnarain, be amply sufficient to preserve the tranquillity of the country and safety of Patna during that period, as also to take the field when the season permits, to quell, or rather prevent, any commotions which may be attempted the next year by the Prince against the Suba's government.—We are averse, for two important reasons, to you (or your troops) being farther distant from us than the Purnea country, each of which I will speak distinctly to.

If we have any thing to apprehend from without, either from French or Dutch, we are to expect it from this time to the remainder of the S. W. monsoon; therefore it becomes an essential consideration, that our forces are kept as much within call as the nature of the present service will admit of, still giving a preference to ourselves, and the second place only to the defence of the Suba and his government; he must himself concur and submit to the utility of this precaution for his own sake, his safety depending absolutely on ours, and on the force we have to impede the entrance of any European power whatever in his country from any other quarter: I think he need be under no apprehension for these five or six months at least.—And I hope there is yet time to accomplish the Suba's just pursuits against Purnea, and for your return to us with the troops, when the rains set in; a circumstance which leads me to my second reason.

Though

Though the Prince, by this year's invasion, has benefited himself and followers no more than by the last yet the consequence has been equally fatal to the country, or rather more so.—The large share of injury the Company suffers in their affairs, by the annual continuance of these troubles, calls for our most serious consideration, as I see no end to them whilst we support the present system, so obviously tending (and that not by slow degrees neither) to our employers ruin. To obviate this, some measures must be adopted; in concerting of which your presence with us and counsels are absolutely necessary, as soon as the present exigencies of things can admit of your absence from the troops.—This moment I am interrupted by letters from Mr. Amyatt of the 14th, one to the Committee, the other to myself; in both which he lays such stress on the necessity of being reinforced by Europeans and Seapoys, that I fear it must over-rule all I have urged in this and my last paragraph, and after all oblige your march to Patna, with what force you think can be spared from the Purnea expedition; or whether you may not think it eligible to take the whole with you, and defer that expedition for the present. The seeming resolution the Prince has taken, not to quit the province of Bahar, and the increase of his army, are strokes we could not reasonably have expected after the repulses he received at Patna. By letters of the 12th from thence they advise us, the Prince and his army were retreated nine corse towards Tikara; by those of the 14th, only three; just to get clear of sallies from the city. Mr. Amyatt seems to write under the greatest apprehension as well for the country as the Company's investment of Salt-Petre, &c. Measures for the security of that must at least be entered on, though, for my own part, I fear if the Prince has really resolved to keep on this side the Soan, and is proceeding, as Mr. Amyatt represents, succours will arrive too late to prevent mischief. I will directly summon a meeting of the Select Committee to reply to Mr. Amyatt's letter, and transmit you their sentiments for your conduct.

Since writing the above, I have received another Phirmaund from the Prince, inclosing the original Arzdasht of the Nabob, the truth of which appears to us to carry much probability, which is all I shall at present say to it. What follows are the sentiments of the other gentlemen of the Committee, as well as my own.

Hitherto our conduct in supporting the Suba's government can hardly be vindicated to our employers, the more especially since his flagrant and known breach of the treaty last year, not only by his invitation of the Dutch forces from Batavia, but by his shameful and insincere conduct and dealing with us after their arrival, and to this hour respecting that people, the weakness and inconsistency of his whole politics during the course of
this

this campaign, joined to the repeated cruelties, murders, and oppressions, daily committed by him or his son on individuals,—the universal detestation of his government throughout the provinces,—the obvious certainty of these troubles in the country continuing without interruption, whilst this family exists at the head of it; all these, with many other considerations which I could enumerate, demonstrates, we cannot longer, consistent with what we owe to the Company, to natural justice, and propriety, and to the English name, support a system of usurpation and tyranny, which reflects dishonour on it, and must, if persisted in, involve our honourable employers and our colony in a speedy ruin.—The more we see of this government, the more is verified your own just observation at your first knowledge of it, That it is rotten to the core: What then can be expected from a system rotten to the very heart of it, in every sense—Ruin must attend the family, in spite of our efforts to save them; and we must as assuredly be partakers in a greater or less degree thereof—to say nothing of our drawing our sword in support of such a system, against the legal, tho' unfortunate Prince of the country, from whom every advantage and emolument we can wish for the Company, is tendered to us, without limitation.—This being the case, we are most anxious for two or three days conference with you, if possible. We think, if there appears an absolute necessity for it, that you may dispatch 150 or 200 Europeans, and 4 or 500 Seapoys, to reinforce Patna; and wish you could, under the pretence of soliciting a further supply of troops, or sickness, or any other cover which may occur to you, leave Capt. Yorke with your detachment, and return to us, if for twenty-four hours only.—If you find this impracticable, without raising suspicions, which may have consequences we cannot foresee, then favour me with your sentiments as soon as possible without reserve. I am, with the most perfect confidence and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Honourable J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq; President and Governor of Fort William.

Sir,

Camp at *Balkissens Gardens*, 29th May, 1760.

I AM honoured this day with your favour of the 24th instant. My last letters of the 24th, and those of yesterday, of the 28th, contain all I can urge in favour of our return to Patna with the young Nabob—you seem also convinced of the necessity of it, since the receipt of Mr. Amyatt's letters: I shall be glad to find it further confirmed by the sentiments of the Select Committee.

I am

I am not master enough of the subject, to know how the Company's investment of Salt-petre will be so much hurt this year; and that you fear succours will arrive too late, to prevent much mischief; but this I am very confident of, that if we do not send succours, the whole province may be lost, and many years investments to come.

I will endeavour now, Sir, to reply as fully as I can to the subject on which you desire so earnestly to know my sentiments; and hope what I have to say will so fully satisfy you, that I need not at least leave the army until the campaign is quite concluded, as I think it cannot be done without prejudice to our affairs.

Bad as the man may be, whose cause we now support, I cannot be of opinion that we can get rid of him for a better, without running the risk of much greater inconveniencies attending on such a change, than those we now labour under.—I presume, the establishing tranquillity in these provinces would restore to us all the advantages of trade we could wish, for the profit and honour of our employers; and I think we bid fairer to bring that tranquillity about, by our present influence over the Suba, and by supporting him, than by any change which can be made.—No new revolution can take place without a certainty of troubles; and a revolution will certainly be the consequence, whenever we withdraw our protection from the Suba:—we cannot in prudence neither, I believe, leave this revolution to chance— we must in some degree be instrumental to bringing it about.—In such a case, it is very possible we may raise a man to the dignity, just as unfit to govern, as little to be depended upon, and in short, as great a rogue as our Nabob; but perhaps not so great a coward, nor so great a fool, and of consequence much more difficult to manage.—As to the injustice of supporting this man, on account of his cruelties, oppressions, and his being detested in his government, I see so little chance, in this blessed country, of finding a man endued with the opposite virtues, that I think we may put up with these vices, with which we have no concern, if in other matters we find him fittest for our purpose.

As to his breach of his treaty, by introducing the Dutch last year, that was never so clearly proved, I believe, but as to admit of some doubt;—Colonel Clive, before he left the country, seemed satisfied that what was suspicious in his conduct in that affair, proceeded not from actual guilt, but from the timidity of his nature.—But if we still suspect him from further circumstances, we always have it in our power to put it to the test at once, by making him act as he ought, whether he will or no.

With regard to drawing our swords against the lawful Prince of the country; no man can more pity his misfortunes than I have done, nor would any one be more willing and happy to be instrumental in assisting him to recover his just right;---but such a plan is not the thought of a day, nor the execution of it the work of a few months;---there is a powerful party still remains;---the Vizier, with the Maharattas and Jutes, who, notwithstanding the constant success of Abdallah against them, still make head against him; and such are their resources and their numbers, that I believe they will at last oblige the Patans to leave the country; for though they cannot beat them fairly out of the field, they bid fair to starve them out of the country.

You have, no doubt, received advice from Mr. Hastings, that Abdallah hath sent orders to the several powers, to acknowledge the Prince King of Indostan, by the name of Shaw Allum;---rupees are struck by his order at Bannarras and Lucknow, in that name;---orders are also given to Sujah Dowlatt, to accept the post of Vizier; and our Nabob hath got, it is said, instructions to acknowledge him, and pay him the obeisance due to the King of Kings, as he is stiled.

If we were perfectly sure Abdallah would remain, as he says, until he saw the Prince well fixed on the throne, and the peace and tranquillity of the country restored, we might, I think, all joined together, be a match for the Maharattas;---but we must be well assured that Abdallah will heartily enter, and when entered, will firmly support the cause:---for should this appointment of his be no more (as it is possible) than a finishing stroke, to end his expedition with the eclat of having given us a Mogul, and when a certain number of the country powers had entered into the alliance, he should think of a return to his own country, and leave us to fight it out with the other contending party, I fear the Vizier and the Maharattas would be too strong for those who remained of the alliance, supposing them to be the Ruellahs, and Sujah Dowlatt, and the Nabob of Bengal.---However, supposing all this should take place, why may it not be done with our Nabob in our hand, still his friends and his protectors?

I am this instant favoured with yours of the 25th; and I find by your postscript, that your opinion and mine, with regard to the Prince, do not differ much. I have no objections to follow the plan you propose:---let Mr. Hastings sound the old Nabob, and I will go to work with the young one, who joins me this day.

We may continue our march on to Patna.---The rains will give us time to negotiate, to see we go on sure grounds, and make such a plan of the alliance,

alliance, as will do us honour, and be an advantage to our country and our employers ;---but let us not abandon the Nabob.---Besides the reasons I have urged above, one more still remains, which I believe will have some weight, and make us cautious how we attempt, without very strong and urgent reasons, any change in the present system.

You are well acquainted, Sir, with the cause which first gave rise to the present share of influence which we enjoy in this part of the Mogul's empire:—a just resentment for injuries received, was the first motive which induced us to make a trial of our strength ;—the ease with which we succeeded enlarged our views, and made us cheerfully embrace all opportunities of increasing that interest and influence, both on account of the advantages which accrued from it to the Honourable Company, as likewise the hopes that it might in time prove a source of benefit and riches to our country.—Such were, I believe, the motives of Colonel Clive's actions during his administration ; such, I believe, were the views of the Honourable Company, when they solicited and obtained Colonel Coote's regiment from the Government ; and such, I am certain, is the plan which the Colonel proposes, on his return, to pursue and to support, in hopes to convince the Ministry and the Company, as he is convinced himself, that if they please to support his project, it will prove of the greatest advantage to the public.

If I have stated our situation right, it follows, I believe, of course, that we are bound with vigour to work on the same plan, to act on the same principles, and to keep up the system as perfect and entire as it was left in our hands ; that whatever resolutions the Nation or the Company may come to, on Col. Clive's representations, they may not be disappointed, by finding here (at least through our faults) any very material change in our situation, power, or credit.

One word more. All we can wish to do is, not to suffer the Nabob to impose on us, and to check every beginning of an independence he may endeavour to assume :—let us consult and improve on every occasion that offers, the honour and advantage of our employers, and the increase of their trade and credit ; and not let them suffer any additional expence, on account of pursuing any plan, or supporting any system whatever.—By acting thus, I think we cannot err ; we run at least no risk ; and I believe the Company's affairs may be conducted by us under this Suba, as much to their advantage and credit, as any other whom a revolution may place in the government.

Inclosed, I have the honour to send Mr. Amyatt's last letter, received this morning. We have had, as you will see, another brush with the Prince's troops, and with great success: however, if the other plan goes on, we must put an end to this fighting system, and talk coolly on affairs.—I shall expect the favour of your opinion with great impatience; and have the honour to assure you that I am, with perfect respect and esteem,

Sir, your most obedient and most humble servant,

JOHN CAILLAUD.

It is worth remarking, that in this letter we see many specious arguments in favour of still preserving this system; apologies are made for the Suba's cruelties and oppressions; and even an attempt made to extenuate his conduct in the Dutch affair, by attributing it to his timidity.—Howsoever Colonel Clive was actuated to declare afterwards, the sentiments set forth in this letter, yet the Memorial sent to the Company (sometime after it happened) carried the testimony of conviction, (to his having called in the Dutch) signed by Colonel Clive and his whole council. Possibly we may be wrong; but still we will not hesitate to say, that neither the pen nor tongue of a Cicero should influence us to think, the most atrocious crimes and cruelties can admit of palliation, let the complexion or principles of that government be what they will,—much less vindicate the supporting such wickedness, let the advantages be ever so great to ourselves.—But waving here these, and several other parts of this letter, we beg leave to refer you to our answer immediately following, where we think we have rendered the whole invalid.—It is more worthy remark, that all the arguments so forcibly urged there, vanished on Governor Vansittart's arrival at Fort William—without, as we remember, any material alteration in the face of affairs;—for, after the flight of Cuddeim Hossein Khan, the rains set in, and a stop was put to all operations of the field.—It is true, things were growing worse and worse;—but that was no more than was foreseen long before, as appears from Mr. Holwell's repeated and urgent representations, on his part, as well as on that of the Committee, though then without obtaining any due influence: nor will this be much wondered at, when we unmask the cause. The Major having undoubted reasons to expect a change in the government of Calcutta, and that Mr. Vansittart would probably arrive with us in July, or sooner; it is but rational to think, that the Major rather chose to be joined with Mr. Vansittart, with whom he had been long connected in friendship, (than with Mr. Holwell, who was in a manner a stranger to him) in the subversion of a government which he saw must inevitably be brought on, but at the same time thought would admit of delay. This must have been the plan of thinking adopted by him then, or his subsequent conduct in falling immediately into, and having so principal a
part

part in deposing Mhir Jaffier Khan, must appear wholly unaccountable. —Messrs. Holwell, Sumner, and Mac-Gwire, the majority of your Select Committee, very clearly saw through this disguise; for they too had received intimation of Mr. Vansittart's appointment; and convinced that nothing could be effectually pushed by their majority in the Committee, without having a concurrence from the heart with the Commander in chief of your forces in the field, contented themselves with remonstrances on the unhappy situation of your affairs;—having no other alternative in their power. To the truth of this, we venture to refer to Mr. Sumner, now in England.

Here we will beg leave to say publicly, what we have often said in private to some of your Court of Directors; If you would have your affairs conducted properly in Bengal, give your Commander in chief, rank, title, emoluments, any thing to make him respectable in the eyes of that government, and your own forces;—but give him not a vote in your Committees or Councils:—recent and melancholy proofs evince the impropriety of doing it.—There will ever be one set of political views in the cabinet, and another in the camp; and this inevitably must be the case:—if it had not been so, you would, in the month of May or June 1760, have been yourselves Subas of Bengal, and now in possession of between two and three millions sterling *per annum*.

TO JOHN CAILLAUD, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, June 14, 1760.

MANY of the various reasons you assign for our supporting this government, at all events, I should most readily submit to, were we at the same time in any situation of supporting and conducting the Company's affairs with success and honour, or indeed of conducting them at all. They are burthened with a military force at the expence of near 50,000 Rupees each month, their bare pay, besides the immense charge of military stores, &c. The charges of their works, one month with another, amount to from 70 to 90,000 Rupees. The Company's great support, at this time, will be expected from their Bengal investments; and if we return them this season one ship's compleat cargo, it will be the utmost the present prospect promises: for some time the business at their different Arungs has been at a stand; they have in a manner lost their silk investment for this season.—The balance of their treasury, one lack and half only, without any hopes of a material supply, we having used every means in our power to borrow on their account without success: In hourly expectation of their credit suffering further disgrace, from our inability

ability to answer the several bills drawn on us from different quarters ; in less than the space of one month a disgraceful stop must be put to the progress of our new works ; and I declare to you, I see not where we shall get money for the pay of our troops in garrison, and much less for the service of the marine, and other current expences of the Presidency.— I have no doubt but you will give due weight and attention to the foregoing real state of the Company's affairs ; and from thence be convinced, that the support of the present system, until the Company's pleasure is known, will reduce us to no system at all ; the more surely so, as we have so little foundation to expect any supplies at all from them, by the ships of this season.

Had it ever been my wish or intention to have taken our support from the present Nabob, and transfer it to any other, your arguments, in that case, would have all the weight with me they so greatly merit ; but, I think, on a representation of mine to you, and the copy of mine to Mr. Amyatt, you will see that was not my aim ; for I concur minutely with your objections to such a step, and am very clear we should not mend our situation by a revolution in favour of any other, who would, as you truly observe, prove as bad as the present, and probably worse :—But my views for the Company went much higher. That the country will never be in a settled, peaceful state whilst this family is at the head of it, is a position I lay down as incontestable ; and that until the country enjoys that state, the Company's affairs must, in consequence, be daily approaching to certain ruin : I therefore judge we could never be possessed of a more just or favourable opportunity to carry into execution, what must be done, I plainly see, one time or other, if the Company have ever a secure footing in the provinces, to wit, Take this country into their own hands, limiting ourselves to the province of Bengal only, or extending our views to those of Bahar and Orixá, as on future debate might be thought most eligible. The situation of the Prince at present is such, that I am sure he would readily and thankfully hearken to an overture from us, and without hesitation, grant a Phirmaund appointing the Company perpetual Subas of the province. His two Phirmaunds to me, as I before advised you, offered a Carte Blanche for the company ; and I dare say, that to you was of the same tenor. With respect to the validity of receiving a Phirmaund from him, I cannot think it possibly liable to impeachment ; That he is the legal heir to the empire is beyond contradiction ; that Abdallah has proclaimed him Emperor, by the name of Shaw Allum, ordered Siccas to be struck in his name, and called him to the throne, are truths which now I believe will admit of no doubt. But, on supposition things should come to the worst, and the issue of them at last prove in favour of Shaw Jehawn, I conceive it would very little affect us, when
once

once in possession of the provinces; for let the lot of empire fall to whom it will, the regular remittance of the stipulated revenues of the country, from which that court had hardly benefited since the time of Sujah Khan, would secure a confirmation, from whatever Prince fills the throne, if his eyes are open to his own interest.

The foregoing favourable circumstances considered, together with the present state of the Company's affairs, and the many just causes and provocations we certainly have against supporting this government any longer, can we, consistently with our duty to the Company, disregard an overture, which in fact came first from the Prince, so immensely advantageous to their affairs—and redounding so greatly to their honour?—and by which we should be sufficiently enabled to prevent the French ever regaining a footing in Bengal, or even an entrance to the country?—Circumstances we have most to apprehend from, of any thing that can possibly happen to the molestation and destruction of the Company's influence and concerns in India; for in such an event, we can, from experience, judge the assistance we should receive from the present government.

I have this moment received your favour of the 10th from Hybut Gunge, and think five or six days will bring you near the city. As nothing material has happened, your obliging apology for not writing more frequently, was needless, for I can very soon account for every moment of your time, in such troublesome and forced marches.—I observe the first discouragements which check the Prince's hopes; and yet I think if he gives us the Subadary, promotes Mhir Jaffier and his son to some considerable posts, and takes them and their troops with him, and is joined by 4 or 500 of Europeans, with 2 or 3000 Seapoys, and a good field artillery, the result would be in his favour; and that, with these helps, he would gain the throne of his ancestors:—for though after the late success of the Morattors against Abdallah's Visier, it might be imprudent in Sujah Dowlet to advance to the southward; yet when he was joined by the Prince, with a formidable force, there would be no objection to Sujah Dowlet's joining him with his whole power, in his march to Delly.—Think, Sir, how glorious a circumstance for our Company and nation, to be aiding in so just and honourable a service! and what might they not both expect, if the Prince was established on the throne of Indostan; an event which appears to me a moral certainty, by such a coalition as is just hinted at above.

If matters should chance to come into treaty, a ratification of Colonel Clive's Jagier must not be forgot.

I am with real esteem, Sir,

Your obedient humble Servant, J. Z. H.

How far his Lordship's prior and subsequent treatment of Mr. Holwel, merited this tender consideration, we leave to his Lordship's breast ;—and only remark, that this thought never occurred to his bosom friends, when they had it in their power to have screened him from much trouble and more anxiety.

TO PETER AMYATT, Esq;

Sir,

Calcutta, 30th May, 1760.

SINCE mine of the 25th, I have received a letter from Mr. Hastings, enclosing abstracts of one from Jugul Kiffore, the Nabob's agent at Delhi, to the Nabob, advising him of the Shaw Zadda being actually proclaimed King, and called to the throne by Abdallah; and that the Vize-rut was sent to Suza Dowla, who has already struck Siccas in the Prince's name. If this incident is really fact, which appears probable enough from the many particulars recited in Jugul Kiffore's letter, our proceedings will require the nicest conduct at this conjuncture; and as we have hitherto opposed his arms, we must atone in future for such opposition, by making our force as serviceable to him as possible,—even by joining him with such part of them as we can possibly spare, to assist him in securing the peaceable possession of the throne; provided we can thereby gain some essential point, which we must now most assiduously pursue, for the Company's benefit; the success and accomplishment of which will greatly depend on yours and the Major's address, to whom I shall enclose copy of this, that you may act in concert on this occasion for the public good.—

On supposition that the Prince is recognized Emperor by Abdallah, I do not see how we can, consistent with our duty to the Company, to natural justice, or sound politics, support this family any longer against the Prince, without the most flagrant breach and violation of the laws of nations: Whilst his right remained doubtful, a pretext barely plausible remained for our conduct; but this recognition of the Prince by Abdallah, and the principal Omrahs of this empire, divests us even of that pretext; and our persisting will lay us, I fear, not only liable to censure from the Company, but from the whole world.

That the Suba will labour to exculpate himself, by throwing the odium of the resistance made to the Prince in these dominions on us, I have not the least doubt; of which there needs no stronger proof, than his secreting this extraordinary event, which on the instant he should have had communicated to me, by virtue of the treaty subsisting between him and the English; for all the intelligence of this affair I have from Mr. Hastings

ings only, who obtained the copy of Jugul Kishore's letter from the Moonsee, contrary, he believes, to the Suba's intentions;—so that, on the whole, we may reasonably conclude, he is well advanced by this time in making his peace with the Prince at our expence, and possibly at the price of the Company's ruin;—in which he must be countermined without loss of time, and every piece of treachery carefully guarded against, which either he or his son, we know, are capable of projecting against our troops, or us. I yesterday received a letter from the old Nabob, desiring me to order part of Captain Fischer's command to Midnapore, for the security of that place, and collection of the revenues; which in my answer I absolutely refused, alledging for reason that his own people were fully equal to that service, and that I could not think of making any further dispersion of our troops, at a time when we might daily expect an enemy in the river.—We cannot be too much upon our guard against this government, at this very critical period, for I perfectly know it capable of the most superlative baseness and treachery.

All these particulars premised and duly considered, the plan for our immediate conduct obviously presents itself. The Prince's resentment to this family is such, that I am convinced the first overture from us would be most readily embraced by him and his Ministers, that now we shall have it in our power to make our own terms for the Company; and that if we lose this opportunity, it is evident to me we shall never get another; and that the Company must ever remain on the most precarious and dangerous footing in this country.

The terms to be laboured for, which now occur to me, are, 1st, The Subadary of Bengal, comprizing Siccli-gully, or Telliagurry, for the Company.—2d, Their Governor, for the time being, to bear the title of Suba, or Nizam of the provinces.—3d, Mr. Law and his troops to be delivered up to us.—4th, No other European power whatever to be allowed to hold or maintain a fortification or troops in the province.—5th, An absolute grant, or phirmaund, for the security of our Salt-petre farm, free from all caveats and difficulties.—6th, A ratification of our treaties with Surajad Dowla, and the present Suba; and full indemnification and acquittal to the Company, for all our antient phirmaunds, grants, and privileges, and full confirmation of the same to the Company.—8th, A letter to be obtained from the Emperor to the King of Great-Britain, setting forth the particulars of all these grants to his subjects.

On our side we engage, 1st, To make due and regular remittance to court, of the stipulated revenues of the province.—2d, To quit the protection of the present family in the government.—3d, To pay obedience

dience to all orders issuing from the throne ; and 4th, To join the Prince with all the troops we can possibly spare from the defence of the Company's possessions : but this last article to be avoided, if practicable.

If you, jointly with Major Caillaud, think the foregoing plan can be carried into execution, consistent with the Company's safety and advantage, the same shall be laid before the Board, and proper powers transmitted to you if it meets with their approval. If you judge it impracticable, favour me with your sentiments, and point out what other probable scheme we can adopt, to extricate the Company's affairs from the difficulties and obstructions they labour under.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To the Hon^{ble} JOHN ZEPH. HOLWELL.

Sir,

Camp at *Paunch-ruckee*, 26th June, 1760.

SINCE I had the pleasure to apprize you of Captain Knox's success against Caudim Hossien Khan, I have crossed the river with the Nabob, and have been in full pursuit of the same enemy for several days past. Encumbered by his treasure, and a great quantity of baggage, he was very much impeded in his retreat, and retired so slow from us, that yesterday morning, after a march of six hours, we found ourselves in sight of his rear-guard. Advised of our approach, he had then just struck his camp, wherein he left twelve very small pieces of cannon ; and without seeming to observe us, continued on his way about three cofs further, with our army following him. At the extremity of a large plain, bordered by a thick grove, and three or four villages, which covered part of his troops, he made a halt, and drew up his cannon. We did the same upon the plain, and a mutual cannonading ensued. Previous to this, I had sent repeated messages to the Nabob (who remained a considerable distance in our rear) immediately to dispatch a body of cavalry, to stop them and keep them in play, and not suffer so fair an occasion to be irretrievably lost ; urging, at the same time, how impossible it was for men on foot, fatigued with a long march, to attempt to pursue horse : but he continued deaf to my remonstrances, and instead of sending me the least assistance, formed his troops above a mile in our rear, and there waited looking on until the enemy quitted the field. From the commencement of the cannonading until the firing ceased, it was about four hours. Little execution was done on either side. Two or three times they appeared in a large body, coming down upon us ; but on our advancing, immediately retreated. We drove them from the villages, and they abandoned

abandoned to us seven more pieces of cannon, and as many camels loaded with rocketts. During the action, which very probably was a feint, for that very purpose, they found means to unload all their hackeries of their treasure, Genanah, and other valuable effects, to place them upon camels and elephants, with which they went off, and are now far enough out of our reach. All their empty hackeries they also left behind them. Nothing could induce the Nabob, even after all was over, to send a body of horse to intercept them in their retreat, which might have been effected with very little hazard. I marched seven cofs after them this morning, but found they had left their camp, and departed in the night. I have the honour to be, with equal respect and esteem, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble Servant,

JOHN CAILLAUD.

TO PETER AMYATT, Esq;

Sir,

July 1, 1760.

IN expectation of hearing more particularly from you, on the Major's arrival with you, I deferred hitherto replying to your favour of the 12th; but now tender you my best thanks for that, and another of the 19th, with its duplicate.

We may say, very truly, that we have not gained much by this wild-goose campaign. The Prince and his friends have gained less, except we toss them a drubbing or two into their scale. Knox is a brave fellow, and I dare say the Major will finish Cudheim Hossien Khan, as you phrase it, if he does but stay, and give him as fair an opportunity. But pray, after all, what is to be the end of all these marches, counter-marchings, drubbings, &c.? Methinks we seem so keen after this royal game, as never once to recollect, that the Company must starve, if we find them no other amusement; we will suppose Cudheim Hossien Khan finished, and the Prince driven out of the country, with all his adherents, until the rains break up; when, in all human probability, the same royal hunt begins again, and so on, *ad infinitum*, whilst the Company have nothing but ruin in prospect. No money, no goods, no credit even with *that government* we are supporting; which on the contrary, in place of advancing, in this distressed state of our affairs, obstructs and embarrasses us on every occasion, in the collection of the Tunckas which are our due, and is capable of refusing us a perwannah for a year or two's chinam to finish our new works. And to form to you a compleat idea of Mahomet Jaffier Aly Khan, he is now, at this very juncture, whilst we are risking our own throats to save his, in secret negotiation with the Morattors, to introduce a body of 25 or 30,000 of them into the provinces. He has agreed to pay them 12 lack

in three months; a considerable sum was near being advanced to them, when he was informed I had intelligence of it, and then he dropped it. Mus-saloode Mahomet Khan was dispatched to Cuttack, with two other Morrators, to finish this business.

I am sorry the Major's sentiments and yours seem to differ from my own, respecting the necessity we are under of supporting this government, at all events and in all circumstances. I must confess, my reason is not at all convinced of this obligation. If this must hold until the Company's pleasure be known, it can hold on no other terms, than the Nabob's making over some other parts of the country, that will fully reimburse the expence of the troops; for by Heaven! we shall not be able to pay them two months longer. I am truly, Sir,

Your most obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. H.

To Mr. WARREN HASTINGS.

Sir,

Fort William, 16th July, 1760.

YOUR obliging letter of the 12th reached me only this morning, as also yours to the Select Committee. The sudden death of the young Nabob is very striking, and must, I think, occasion commotions in the provinces. Had Providence thought proper to have appointed, by the same flash, Rajah Raagebullub to attend him to the other world, the country would have had a double benefit. Mhiran's troops, returning under his command, I think will prove bad politics. He has been at the bottom, the great cause of the long dissensions between Mhiran and his father; and the young Nabob's troops, we pretty well know, have neither affection for the old Nabob, nor can put faith or confidence in him. My reign is short; (I conceive Mr. Vansittart will arrive with us in ten days the farthest) however, short as it is, I would willingly employ the last hour of it for the advantage of the public: shall therefore transmit with this that advice to the old Nabob, which appears to me most essential for his service at this juncture, and what will, I think, prove most conducive to the settling the peace and tranquillity of his country. Copy of my letter to the old Nabob I inclose you; my plan, you will observe, is short, and easily to be effected, now his son is gone—to wit, to throw himself into the arms of Mhir Cossim Aly Khan and Roy Doolub; and dismiss from his Councils those two vipers, Aga Salah of Cuttack, and Rajah Bullob, as well as that infamous instrument of his cruelties, Chuccon.

You will signify to the Nabob, that, on the receipt of your letter, I paid every customary compliment to his son's memory, such as minute guns, co-

lours

lours of the fort and ships hoisted half mast, &c. and have wrote him also a separate letter of condolance on this melancholy occasion. I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. H.

P. S. You will observe, that in my letter to the Nabob, I have as yet only mentioned Cossim Aly Khan to him.

Thus far advanced, we think it essentially proper to lay the whole progress of this révolution before you, even to the minutest circumstance.

To give governor Vanfittart a full knowledge of the present situation of the provinces, and state of the Company's affairs, the correspondence and memorial were preferred to his perusal and consideration, together with all letters received, as well from the country powers as others. The result was a declaration from him, that one or other of Mr. Holwell's plans must be pursued, without loss of time, to save the Country and Company from impending ruin.—Colonel Caillaud was immediately ordered from Patna to join our councils—he arrived. Three or four days produced, from the governor, a long statement of the present face of affairs, and the necessity of adopting measures therein proposed, which were in a manner literally taken from the correspondence and memorial, and obtained the sanction and concurrence of Colonel Caillaud, and the majority not only of the committee, but of the council also.

At this period Mr. Holwell received frequent letters from Mhir Mahomet Cossim Aly Khan, containing the strongest professions and assurances in favor of the Company, if, by our support, he was promoted to the succession of the Dewannee, and other posts enjoyed by the late Chuta Nabob, his brother-in-law. These letters were duly communicated to Mr. Vanfittart, to whom he likewise wrote, but with more reserve, imagining Colonel Caillaud had swayed him in favor of Rajah Raagebullob, though without any real ground for such suspicion. These matters being debated in committee, it was judged eligible to obtain permission for Cossim Aly Khan's paying a visit to Calcutta; a circumstance he himself had intimated, in a letter to the governor and Mr. Holwell; the times gave good pretence for it, to wit, adjusting the operations of the next campaign, and finally settling the accounts of the Tunka's. To gain this point, the Governor and Mr. Holwell wrote to the Suba, with good success; Cossim Aly Khan had permission to come to Calcutta, and left the city some days after, and arrived with us about the 20th of September.

The usual ceremonies over, he had a private conference or two with the Governor; but still forming doubts of his being influenced by Colonel Caillaud, kept himself much on the reserve: the Governor expostulated with him on so improper a conduct. To this he replied, that he had the strongest reasons to conclude the new Colonel was his enemy; and therefore desired Mr. Holwell might be deputed to have a conference with him, to whom he could open his whole heart with confidence and freedom; to which the Governor gave a ready assent.

Mr. Holwell being well apprized that Coja Petrusé (to whom the Company owed much in the last revolution, but much more in this) had the greatest weight with, and influence over Cossim Aly Khan, had secured him on the side of the Company; and at a private interview with him, at Mr. Holwell's garden, on the same day of the conference between the Governor and Cossim Aly Khan, Mr. Holwell formed a rough plan of the terms which must be insisted on for the Company, in lieu of the protection and support given to Cossim Aly Khan; which Petrusé engaged he would promote, to the utmost of his power and influence.

The next morning, the 24th of September, Mr. Holwell communicated his conference with Petrusé, and laid the rough plan before the Governor and Select Committee, who approved of it, with little variation; and the 25th was appointed for the conference between him and Cossim Aly Khan — They met at seven, and about nine Mr. Holwell received a message from the Governor, intimating, that the Select Committee was going to sit, and would continue sitting until he joined them with the result of the conference.

After the usual compliments, and many grateful acknowledgments on the part of Cossim Aly Khan, for the many instances of friendship he had received from Mr. Holwell, during his government, the scene in point opened; when, with very little hesitation, he discovered his views were more extensive than had been imagined. He urged the repeated treacherous conduct of the Suba and the late young Nabob to the English, who had been not only their Creators, but their support and preservers; expatiated on their cruelties and murders, and the universal abhorrence of the people against the Suba and his house; dwelt much on his personal ingratitude to himself, in two attempts which he had made on his life, at the instigation of the late young Nabob;—exclaimed against the secret negotiation he had carried on with the Shaw Zadda and the Dutch;—communicated the private orders he had received from the Suba, when he was sent down against the Dutch, to favor them, in contradiction to the public ones, transmitted by the Suba at that time to Mr. Holwell; closing this introduction with saying,

saying, that the Suba was incapable of government; that no faith or trust could be put in him; and that, if he was not taken off, it would never be in his power to render the Company those services which he had so much at heart.

Mr. Holwell, who little expected a preliminary of this kind, expressed much astonishment and abhorrence at the overture—and replied, “ That howsoever little the Suba deserved consideration, yet that the honor of the Company, and the English name, forbid our hearkening to any attempts against his life or dignity; that care would be taken, neither he nor his evil ministers should in future have power either to injure him, the Company, or his Country, in the manner he had already done; but that unless he (Coffim Aly Khan) dropped all mention, as well as every intention and attempt of the measure he had intimated, the conference must end there.” To this he acquiesced, but with evident dissatisfaction of countenance; and only added, that as he had no support but the English, he must submit to their measures; but feared Mr. Holwell was not so much his friend as he hoped and expected.

This obstruction being removed, business and much altercation took place; none present but Coffim Aly Khan, Mr. Holwell, Coja Petrushe, and Coffim Aly Khan's head Moonshe (or Persian secretary); and after debate on each article, the following were agreed to.

1st, That Coffim Aly Khan shall be invested with the Dewannee, be declared Chuta Nabob, and successor in the Subaship to Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan, and enjoy all the posts possessed by the late young Nabob.

2d, That all acts of the government shall run under the seal of, and in the name of, — Mhir Jaffier Aly Khan; but the executive power should rest in Coffim Aly Khan; the dignity of the Suba to remain inviolable in the person of the former, with an allowance of one Lack of Rupées per mensem, for the support of his household, &c. expences.

3d, That Coffim Aly Khan shall pay and make good the balance of the Tunka's, as lately adjusted with Omid Roy, on the part of Jaffier Aly Khan.

4th, That the Company shall keep up a standing force, for the defence of the government and provinces, consisting of 8000 Seapoys, 2000 European Foot, 2000 Country Cavalry, and 500 European Horse.

5th, That

5th, That to enable the Company to keep up the above standing force, the countries of Burdomaan, Midnapore, Chittyang, and half the annual produce of the Chinam at Sillet, shall be ceded to the Company in perpetuity.

The above five articles contain the full tenor and essentials of the treaty, though not a literal copy of it.—A sixth article, pressed by Mr. Holwell, That Cossim Aly Khan should concur with the English in acknowledging the rights of the Shaw Zadda to the throne of Indostan, was left dormant, and to be adjusted as future events should point out.

By one o'clock in the afternoon, Mr. Holwell attended the Committee, with the articles agreed to by Cossim Aly Khan, which met the unanimous approval of the members. At this committee it was moved and requested by the Governor, and backed by the Committee, That Mr. Holwell would accompany the Colonel (who was ordered to return to Patna) as far as the city, with joint powers from the Committee, to carry the foregoing articles into execution amicably, if possible, otherwise to force the Suba to a compliance. To this purpose they were to be accompanied by a detachment of 200 Europeans, 4 pieces of field artillery, and 5 or 600 Seapoys, under the command of Major Yorke, on pretence of reinforcing the troops at Patna.

This service was peremptorily refused by Mr. Holwell, for the following reasons:—First, He saw no sufficient necessity for it. Secondly, He was pre-determined to resign the service as soon as the treaty was signed. Thirdly, He must have been second only in the commission with the Colonel; a character he could by no means submit to, under a gentleman he had so lately commanded; a circumstance which would have rendered Mr. Holwell of little weight or consequence at the city.—On his refusal, the Governor declared he would go up himself with the Colonel, on pretence of paying the first visit to the Suba.

The 26th and 27th of September passed in conferences between the Governor and Cossim Aly Khan, in drawing the treaty out fair, and adjusting measures touching the carrying it into execution. The 27th, at night, a Committee was held at the Governor's house, and the treaty interchangeably signed by the Committee on the one part, and by Mhir Mahomet Cossim Aly Khan Bahadr on the other. The 28th, he made an entertainment for the Governor and Council; and the 29th, in the morning, took his leave, and departed for the city.—The same morning Mr. Holwell took his leave of the Board, and resigned the service.

Major Yorke, with his detachment, marched a few days after, with instructions to arrive at the city a day or two after Cossim Aly Khan, that he might be near enough to protect him, if there should be occasion. The Governor and the Colonel followed soon after, and arrived at the city with the detachment, and took up their quarters at Moradbaag, on the opposite side of the river to Moorshadabad.—But here we will take up the thread of this detail from Mr. Vansittart's own words, in his remonstrance to the Board of Calcutta, of which we luckily have a copy, beginning where he leaves off, with the murder of Aly Verrdee Khan's family, already spoken to.—

“ Executions of this kind had made the Nabob the dread or the detestation of all good men ; and he necessarily became a prey to people of mean extraction and abject dispositions, who knowing that a government so managed could not stand long, sought only to make themselves rich by oppressions of all sorts upon the country and inhabitants. To the heavy taxes laid by them on markets, is ascribed the present unusual scarcity and dearness of provisions at the city, the capital of a country once esteemed the most plentiful in the world. The persons who have had the chief share in this bad management are, Keenooram, Moniloll, and Checon, all of low birth, and the two first the menial servants of Jaffier Aly Khan, before he came to the Subahship. These managed so, as to engage him continually in idle or vicious amusements, keeping him by that means in utter ignorance of his affairs, and in a state of indifference as to their success. No money came to his treasury, at the same time nothing was paid to his army, insomuch that his troops mutinied, and surrounded his palace in a tumultuous manner, threatening to take away his life ; which they certainly would have done, had not his son-in-law, the present Cossim Aly Khan, become answerable, and paid them a very large sum out of his own treasury. This happened last June : and if the imminent danger with which his person was threatened on this occasion, awakened him for a moment, no sooner was it removed again to a distance, than he fell back into the lethargy which had so long possessed him ; the same unworthy ministers remained still his only counsellors, and continued in the management of his affairs to the last day of his administration ; which he left in so confused and impoverished a state, that in all human appearance another month could hardly have run through, before he would have been cut off by his own Seapoys, and the city became a scene of plunder and disorder, the Nabob having made no further provision for the payment of the long arrears due to his people, after Cossim Aly Khan had freed him from his former extremity. This
“ danger

“ danger he could not but foresee, and more than once declared his apprehensions, yet had not the power to exert the necessary means for preventing it, but sunk the deeper into dejection.

“ Besides this intestine danger to which the government was exposed, two armies were in the field, and waiting only the fair weather to advance, the Shaw Zadda towards Patna, and the Beerboon Rajahs of Bissenpoor, Ramgur, and the other countries bordering upon the mountains, were ready to shake off their dependance, and had already offered considerable supplies to the Beerboon Rajah. The Rajah of Carruckipoor had committed open hostilities, and taken possession of all the country about Bogglepoor, which entirely stopped the communication between the two provinces on that side of the river; in a word, the whole country seemed ripe for an universal revolt, those parts only excepted, whose natural weakness or neighbourhood with the city intimidated them from taking up arms. To encounter all these difficulties, there was nothing but troops without pay, from whom therefore no great efforts could be expected: of this a very recent instance occurs in the detachment which was ordered against the Beerboon Rajah, three months before the Nabob's abdication, but never advanced more than three cofs from the city; in which situation it continued upon my arrival there.

“ All who are now in Bengal, and acquainted with the transactions of the government, will bear witness that this is a true description of facts: and all who are convinced of the facts, will certainly agree, that affairs were at an extremity no longer to be neglected without manifest danger of having the provinces over-run, and the trade entirely ruined. I was resolved therefore to use my utmost endeavours to get these bad ministers removed; and judging it might be difficult to prevail on the Nabob to part with his favourites without some degree of violence, I brought with me a detachment of Europeans and Seapoys, under pretence of sending them with Colonel Caillaud, to reinforce the army at Patna.

“ I arrived, with the Colonel, at Cossimbuzar, the 14th of October, and the next day the Nabob paid us a visit. The 16th we went to the city and returned the visit: on the 18th, the Nabob came to Moradbaag, by appointment, to talk upon business. In the conversation which I had with him, in the two former meetings, I had taken occasion to represent to him, in general terms, the bad management of his ministers, the miseries and universal disaffection of the country, and

“ and the desperate state of his, as well as the Company’s affairs. In order to give him a more full and clear view of the evils brought on through the weakness of his administration, and to point out the means for their removal, I had prepared three letters, which, after a short and friendly introduction, I delivered to him; of which translations are hereunto annexed.

“ The Nabob seemed much affected by the perusal of the letters, but endeavoured more to put an end to the conference, than to propose a remedy to the evils. I, however, prevailed on him to send for his dinner to Muradbaag, and in a manner insisted on his coming to some determination for the immediate reform of the government. At length, he confessed himself, through age and grief for the late loss of his son, incapable of struggling alone against so many difficulties. He desired he might have time to consult with his friends. I told him, the men with whom he had lately advised were not his friends, but his greatest enemies; that his returning again into the midst of them, would only be the means of augmenting his difficulties; that he had much better take the assistance of one from among his relations, on whose true attachment and fidelity he might more safely rely. He named five or six, and amongst them Cossim Ally Cawn. I asked him, which of that number was most fit to assist him in his present exigencies? He replied, without any hesitation, that Cossim Ally Cawn was the most proper; nevertheless, it was with the utmost difficulty I could prevail on him to send for him, and so very late that, before Cossim Ally Cawn could arrive, the old Nabob was so extremely fatigued, and in such a state of anxiety, that I could not refuse his return home to take his rest. I was convinced indeed, it was to no purpose to detain him, for such was the jealousy he discovered with respect to Cossim Ally Cawn, that I saw he never would consent, without some sort of force, to give the other the means of restoring order to his affairs. An hour or two after the Nabob’s departure, Cossim Ally Cawn arrived, and seemed to be extremely apprehensive, that the Nabob, instead of trusting him with the management of his affairs, would endeavour by some means or other to get rid of him. I agreed therefore in opinion with him, that he should not go to the Nabob’s house, until measures were taken for his security. We resolved, however, to give the Nabob the next day, the 19th, to reflect upon the letters before-mentioned, in hopes that he would propose some means of regulation. I heard nothing from him all day, but found by my intelligence, that he had been in council with his old advisers, Keenooram, Monilot and Checon, whose advice I was sure would be contrary to the welfare of the country in general,

I .

“ and

“ and that of the Company in particular. I determined therefore to act
 “ immediately on the Nabob's fears. There could not be a better oppor-
 “ tunity than that the night of the 19th afforded, it being the conclusion
 “ of the Gentoo feast, when all the principal people of that Cast would
 “ be pretty well fatigued with their ceremonies. Accordingly I agreed
 “ with Caillaud, that he should cross the river with the detachment, be-
 “ tween three and four in the morning, and having joined Cossim Ally
 “ Cawn and his people, march to the Nabob's palace, and surround it
 “ just at day-break, being extremely desirous to prevent any disturbance
 “ or bloodshed. I wrote a letter to the Nabob, a translation of which is
 “ annexed, and delivered it to the Colonel, to send in to him at such a time
 “ as he should think most expedient. Measures were taken, at the same
 “ time, for seizing the persons of Keenooram, Monilot and Checon, my
 “ intention being only to remove these three unworthy ministers, and
 “ place Cossim Ally Cawn in the full management of all the affairs, in
 “ quality of deputy and successor to the Nabob. The necessary prepara-
 “ tions being accordingly made with all the care and secrecy possible, the
 “ Colonel embarked with the troops, joined Cossim Ally Cawn, with-
 “ out the least alarm, and marched into the court-yard of the palace
 “ just at the proper instant. The gates of the inner court being
 “ shut, the Colonel formed his men without, and sent my letter to the
 “ Nabob, who was at first in a great rage, and long threatened he would
 “ make what resistance he could, and take his fate. The Colonel for-
 “ bore all hostilities, and several messages passed between him and the
 “ Nabob. The affair remained in this doubtful state about two hours,
 “ when the Nabob, finding his persisting was to no purpose, sent a mes-
 “ sage to Cossim Ally Cawn, informing him, he was ready to send him
 “ the seals and all the ensigns of dignity, and to order the Nobut to be
 “ struck up in his name; provided he would agree to take the whole
 “ charge of government upon him, to discharge all the arrears due to
 “ the troops, to pay the usual revenues to the King, to save his life and
 “ honour, and give him an allowance sufficient for his maintenance. All
 “ these conditions being agreed to, Cossim Ally Cawn was proclaimed,
 “ and the old Nabob came out to the Colonel, declaring, that he de-
 “ pended on him for his life. The troops then took possession of all
 “ the gates, and notice being sent to me, I immediately repaired to the
 “ palace, and was met by the old Nabob in the gateway. He asked, if
 “ his person was safe, which seemed now to be all his concern. I told
 “ him, that not only his person was safe, but his government too, if he
 “ pleased, of which it was never intended to deprive him. The Na-
 “ bob answered, that he had no more business at the city; that he should
 “ be

“ be in continual danger from Cossim Ally Cawn; and that if he was
 “ permitted to go and live in Calcutta, he should be extremely happy
 “ and contented. Though I could not help lamenting his sudden fall, I
 “ was not sorry for this proposal, as I knew affairs would be much better
 “ managed without him; and his retaining a share of the authority
 “ (however small) could not fail to cause such perplexities, as might
 “ prove, in so critical and dangerous a juncture, of the worst conse-
 “ quences to the administration. Cossim Ally Cawn was accordingly
 “ seated on the Musnud, and I paid him my congratulations in the usual
 “ form. All the Jemmadars and persons of distinction at the city came
 “ immediately, and made their acknowledgments to the new Suba; and
 “ in the evening every thing was as perfectly quiet, as if there had
 “ been no change. The people in general seemed much pleased
 “ with this revolution, which had this peculiar felicity attending it,
 “ that it was brought about without the least disturbance in town, or a
 “ drop of blood spilt.

“ The Nabob did not think himself safe even for one night in the
 “ city. Cossim Ally Cawn supplied him with boats, and permitted him
 “ to take away as many of his women as he desired (which he did to
 “ the number of about sixty) with a reasonable quantity of jewels. I
 “ furnished him with a strong escort of Europeans and Seapoys, and in-
 “ tended to lodge him at Herajeel, but he would not trust himself there,
 “ and begged he might sleep in his boats close to Muradbaug, which he
 “ accordingly did. He continued at Muradbaug the next day, and in
 “ the evening I visited him with Colonel Caillaud. He appeared then
 “ pretty easy, and reconciled to the loss of a power which he owned to
 “ be rather a burthen than pleasure, and too much for his abilities to
 “ manage since the death of his son; and the enjoyment of the rest of
 “ his days in security, under the English protection, seemed to be the
 “ chief object of his wishes.

“ On the morning of the 22d, he set out for Calcutta, and arrived
 “ there on the 29th. He was met by a deputation from the Council,
 “ and treated with every mark of respect due to his former dignity.”

And now having compleated our task, we think it necessary to request
 your indulgence for any inaccuracies and imperfections that may appear in
 this hasty performance, begun only the *last Saturday*, and printed the Wed-
 nesday after, under many difficulties, by the attacks against this revolution
 appearing so late; which has laid us under the necessity of omitting, for
 want of time, many other material vouchers: however, we think we have

fully evinced the indispensable necessity which moved your servants to this measure ; and hope we have cleared it from the imputation of *unparalleled infamy*, and the many other indecent and unbecoming reflections thrown out by hot-brained resentment against it.—If we have done that, and enabled you to judge, at the ensuing crisis, with candour and propriety—our labour is not in vain.—If we have not, we are sorry we have given ourselves and you this useless trouble.—A few short reflections, and we come to a close.—Had the heads of father and son been taken off at the period of the Dutch contest, in November 1760, as justice and honour called for ; (and why it was not done, let the world judge) and that opportunity taken of acknowledging the Shaw Zadda, and receiving the Subaship of Bengal from him for the Company ; (or the next opportunity, when urged by Mr. Holwell)—happy would have been the issue to the Company and the nation ! happy would it have been for those individuals, who, unfortunately misled, since died, butchered in your service ! happy would it have been for those, who, in miserable times, succeeded to Colonel Clive and his Council, doomed to support a government that proved a disgrace to our name and arms ; and that too with inadequate resources. On the whole, we hope we shall not be thought too presuming, if we venture to draw one general conclusion for you and ourselves, to wit—*That Mbir Jaffier Aly Khan, and his Son Mbiran, were more deserving a halter than a Subaship of Bengal.* Not that we would be thought, in this, to detract from the Treaty of 1757, to which we give the high merit due to it, at that fatal, melancholy period.

Mount Felix,
Walton upon Thames, Surry,
Feb. 22, 1764.

J. Z. HOLWELL.

P O S T S C R I P T.

SINCE closing the foregoing address, a Pamphlet is come to our hands, bearing the title of "A Letter to the Honourable the Secret Committee for Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies," signed by six Gentlemen of your Council of Fort William.

After we had taken the trouble of perusing this piece, we made some inquiries how the Public came by it? and learnt that it was privately compiled abroad, and transmitted to England to a relation of one of the Gentlemen who signed it, to be delivered to the Court of Directors here; who, as we are informed, refused taking any notice of it, as it did not reach them by the usual and proper channel. If our information in these particulars is just, we cannot help thinking the method taken by these Gentlemen was deficient in equity and generosity; for, to lodge an accusation when the accused have no opportunity of vindicating themselves, is unprecedented. Such we conceive to be the case respecting Mr. Vanfittart; and we cannot help applauding the justice of your Court of Directors, for their candid behaviour in giving no countenance to a proceeding so irregular. With regard to the pamphlet itself, we cannot think the Publisher of it a friend to the parties concerned; or if he is, he has certainly judged ill in throwing it out at this juncture. We flatter ourselves, this performance will not have weight enough to influence you, when you compare it with the facts and evidences laid before you in the foregoing Address: but this also we submit to your impartial judgment—borrowing a paragraph from the Advertisement prefixed to that Letter, as apt to our purpose, with a little variation.

"But though the wisest and best may sometimes differ in points of so interesting a nature, yet it is from Facts and Arguments (*drawn from those Facts*) alone, that the Impartial ought to decide."

Mr. HOLWELL's
REFUTATION
OF A
LETTER
FROM CERTAIN
Gentlemen of the Council at BENGAL,
TO THE HONOURABLE
The SECRET COMMITTEE.

SERVING
As a SUPPLEMENT to his ADDRESS to the
PROPRIETORS of EAST-INDIA STOCK.

ADVERTISEMENT.

THE following Letter is published to enable the Proprietors of India Stock to judge of the primary cause of the present commotions in Bengal, and of the true motives for deposing Jaffier Aly Cawn.

The friends of the Gentleman who accomplished that revolution, have handed about an apology for so extraordinary a step: It cannot then be deemed improper to make public the reasons on the other side.

If names ought to have any weight in determining questions of this kind, there are two subjoined to the present Letter, those of * Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, which have a Title to command the highest veneration from every lover of his country. Both of these Officers have performed actions which might vie with the most brilliant of antiquity.

Nevertheless, it is with equal justice acknowledged, that after the stroke was struck, some gentlemen approved of what had been done, who bear the fairest and most amiable characters.

But though the wisest and the best may sometimes differ in points of so interesting a nature, yet it is from facts and arguments alone that the impartial ought to decide.

* The first of these Gentlemen, by his able and spirited conduct, on the coast of Coromandel, did honour to himself, his country and her arms, and so we will suppose the other would have done, if fortune had ever given him an opportunity; which she certainly did not, as will appear in another place.

TO THE HONOURABLE
The SECRET COMMITTEE

For Affairs of the Honourable United Company
of Merchants of England trading to the East-
Indies.

Copy.

HONOURABLE SIRs,

I. **I**T gives us the greatest concern to be obliged to address you, in the manner we are now under the necessity of doing; but as we have publicly declared our dissent from the late revolution in the kingdom of Bengal, and expressed our entire disapprobation of the measures pursued consequent thereto; it is our duty to acquaint you with our reasons for having differed in opinion from the gentlemen who were accessory to that revolution, lest ill-minded people should represent our opposition as a faction, instead of owing its rise, as it really does, to our strict regard to what we think conducive to the honour of our country, and the interests of our employers. Had the whole Board been consulted, we dare assert, this measure would have been rejected by the majority; and we humbly refer to you, whether the opinion of every member thereof ought not to have been taken by the president, before he ventured upon so bold a step as the subversion of a government.

REFUTATION.

1. It is very manifest, these gentlemen could be under no *concern* at all, upon this occasion; because they knew they were under no *necessity* of addressing the Secret Committee in this *clandestine* manner; the Board of Calcutta being always open for every remonstrance of their servants; through which channel they are conveyed to their honourable employers at home: but these gentlemen were sensible, that if this regular and usual method had been taken, it could not come home without a vindication annexed, which would have rendered

dered this performance invalid, and have frustrated all the expectations they had from it; imagining some stain, from the dirt they throw at the revolution of 1760, must stick when there were none at hand to wipe it off. The ill-judged zeal of their friends in giving it to the Public, is a step was never intended by the Compilers; they flattered themselves it might possibly operate in the dark, but if it ever saw the light, they knew it was open to detection and confutation in all its parts. Here let it be remarked, that Messrs. Vansittart, Caillaud, Holwell, Sumner, and M'Guire, were not only a majority of the Committee but of the Council also. Pray was the Council consulted in the revolution of 1757? We say—No.—Nor had they any right to expect it; for they could not be capable judges.—Nor were there any public objections made to this revolution at the board, before Messrs. Amyatt and Ellis took their seats, and Major Carnac was returned to the settlement.

2. You were informed, last year, of the surprising revolution in favour of Mir Mahommed Cossim Aly Chan, which would necessarily be represented in the most favourable light, by the gentlemen who promoted it. But whatever judgment you may have been led to entertain of the measure, from their account of it, we cannot but think you will judge as ill of it as we do, when you are truly informed of the circumstances with which it was attended, the manner in which it was executed, and the steps that have been since taken to support it: Of these we will give you as succinct an account as possible.

REFUTATION.

2. The gentlemen who promoted that revolution stood in no need of false colouring to recommend it. The whole chain of events, which made the measure (of divesting Mhir Jaffier of power to do greater ills) indispensably necessary, were minutely transmitted to the Court of Directors: they examined, they saw the necessity, they approved, and shewed a needful and just resentment to those who rose in opposition to it.

3. At a time, when there was not the least appearance of a rupture or disgust between us and the Nabob Jaffier Aly Chan; on the contrary, a friendship and harmony subsisted; Mir Cossim Chan, his son-in-law, came down to Calcutta, on some pretence or other, to visit Mr. Vansittart; and having staid a short time, he returned to Morshedabad. A few days after Mir Cossim's departure, Mr. Vansittart went up to Morshedabad, on the pretence of a visit to the Nabob. Colonel Caillaud, with
a party

a party of two hundred Europeans and some Seapoys, attended him ; who, to remove the suspicion which such a force would have necessarily occasioned, it was pretended were going up to Patna, to reinforce the army there. When Mr. Vansittart arrived at Moradbaug, the Nabob paid him two visits, at the last of which Mr. Vansittart, without any previous notice of his intentions, gave him the three letters, mentioned in consultation of the 10th of November, 1760 ; of which copies have been transmitted you. The abruptness with which these letters were presented him, one close upon the other, and the unexpected proposals contained in them, terrified the Nabob ; and he was entirely at a loss how to act, but desired time to consider on what was to be done. Mr. Vansittart, seeing his perplexity, strongly insisted on his immediately naming some person, from among his relations, to take charge of the Subaship ; and very particularly recommended Cossim Aly Chan, who was sent for, and the Nabob was desired to stay till he came ; but Cossim Aly Chan delayed so long, and the Nabob was in such anxiety of mind, and so desirous to be released from the visit, being greatly fatigued, that Mr. Vansittart was obliged, in order to save appearances, to suffer his departure to the palace, after having detained him much longer than his inclination. That night and the day following passed in concerting measures with Cossim Aly Chan, how to put in execution the plan before agreed on in Calcutta ; *a treaty having been signed for this purpose, in September, 1760, while Cossim Aly Chan was down here.* In consequence of these deliberations, our troops clandestinely crossed the river, the next night, under Colonel Caillaud, and being joined by Cossim Aly Chan and his party, surrounded the Nabob's palace. A letter from Mr. Vansittart was sent in to the Nabob, demanding his immediate compliance with what had been proposed to him ; to which the Nabob returned for answer, " That such usage " was what he never expected from the English ; that whilst a force was " at his gates, he would enter into no terms ; and that it was his desire " our troops might be returned to Moradbaug." A message was then sent, informing the Nabob, that if he did not directly comply, they should be obliged to storm the palace. Astonished and terrified by this menace, he opened the gates, exclaiming, " That he was betrayed ; that the Eng- " lish were guilty of perjury and breach of faith ; that he perceived their " designs against his government ; that he had friends enough to hazard " at least one battle in his defence ; but although no oaths were sacred " enough to bind the English, yet as he had sworn to be their faithful " friend, he would never swerve from his engagement, and rather suffer " death than draw his sword against them." So suspicious was he of being sold, that, " He desired to know what sum of money Cossim Aly " Chan was to give for the Subaship, and he would give half as much " more to be continued : he hoped, however, if they intended to dethrone

“ him, they would not leave him to the mercy of his son-in-law, from whom he feared the worst, but rather wished, they would carry him from the city, and give him a place of safety in Calcutta.” This last request of the Nabob’s, the effect of his fear and despair, was immediately laid hold of, and construed in the light of a voluntary resignation. Accordingly, our troops took possession of the palace; Mir Cossim Chan was raised to the Musnud; and the old Nabob was hurried into a boat, with a few of his women and necessaries, and sent away to Calcutta, in a manner wholly unworthy of the high rank he had so lately held; as is also the scanty subsistence allowed him here by his successor.

ANSWER.

3. With regard to this detail of the revolution, we refer to Mr. Vansittart’s Memorial, published in a late Address to the Proprietors; by a candid comparing one with the other, you will be capable of judging which has the greatest appearance of truth and probability.

4. Thus was Jaffier Aly Chan deposed, in breach of a treaty founded upon the most solemn oths, and in violation of the national faith. A Prince of whose friendship and attachment you have had many signal proofs; in whose cause our arms have, with much honour, been employed; and by a firm adherence to whom, the English had acquired, throughout the whole country, so universal a character of fidelity and constancy, that the most perfect confidence was placed by the natives in them.

ANSWER.

4. The misrepresentations of this paragraph, see fully confuted in the said Address.

5. The advantages to be reaped by the Company, from the revolution, were, the grant of the Zamindarries of Burduan, Midnapoor, and Chit-tagong; the payment of the balance due from Nabob Jaffier Aly Chan; with a present of five lack of rupees from Cossim Aly Chan, towards defraying the expences of the war against the French, on the coast of Coromandel. Of these, Mr. Vansittart, on his return to Calcutta, acquainted the Board; and, at the same time, in justification of his proceedings, laid before them a memorial; copies of which were transmitted to you, by the ships of the last season.

ANSWER.

5. See the articles of the treaty in the Address.

6. This

6. This memorial is introduced with a list of crimes laid to Jaffier Aly Chan's charge; which, to those unacquainted with the Eastern governments, will appear deserving of the highest resentment from a civilized nation. Yet such is the state of politics in every Asiatic court, that, through the apprehensions of the Sovereign, and the intrigues and artifices of the great men about him, instances of cruelty and oppression are but too frequent; and even the most beloved among them are too much to be taxed with committing, or at least conniving at, acts of violence; but it should be considered, that many of these are done by persons in power, without their knowledge; and that, as there are no regular punishments for criminals of station, and who may be so powerful that it would be dangerous proceeding openly against them, recourse is often had to the dagger or poison to punish the guilty. This was the case in most of the instances alledged against Jaffier Aly Chan; none of which shew greater proofs of cruelty, than that which Cossim Aly Chan discovered when, being in possession of the palace, he was desirous of making the first act of his power the assassination of Jaffier Aly Chan therein, and was very much displeased, when he found we intended to give him protection at Calcutta. Since his accession to the Subadary, we could produce to you numberless instances of his extortions and cruelties, but that it would run us into an exorbitant length; and he seems to have made the more immediate objects of his ill usage, those who have been the most avowed friends of the English. We shall only particularise Ramnarain, whom he dispossessed of the Nabobship of Patna, in which it was always thought sound policy in us to support him, on account of his approved faith; and he now keeps him in irons, till he has been fleeced to the utmost, when there is no doubt he will be dispatched. Most, if not all those who espoused the English interest, have been laid under the heaviest contributions, and many have died under the force of torture to exact money from them; others have been either basely murdered, or (which is a common practice among Gentoos) unable to survive the loss of honour, have made away with themselves.

REFUTATION.

6. Suppose this to be the case in most Asiatic states, which we believe may be true; is it not equally true that most of Mhir Jaffier's cruelties were carried into execution from the confidence he had in our protection? And shall we not blush for this protection being granted to him so long? Surely if we do not, we ought; for in the truest sense, his cruelties were our own. As to Cossim Aly Khan's being desirous of assassinating Mhir Jaffier, it is a charge we much doubt the truth of, as we never before heard the fact mentioned.

tioned. But that Mhir Jaffier made two attempts to murder Mhir Cossim, was a truth well known, and never even doubted; therefore supposing this charge to be really true, we will not say revenge and resentment will justify the desire he is said to express; but surely it will bear some extenuation, when the provocation is considered. Touching Rajah Ram Narain, the address before referred to will shew, that Mhir Jaffier had resolved to remove that officer from the government of Patna, (as a person not trust-worthy, nor equal to so great a charge) long before Mhir Cossim had any power or influence at the Durbar, it is very well known that Ram Narain was in treaty to deliver the city of Patna to the Shaw Zadda, when Col. Clive's extraordinary forced marches prevented him, and saved the city and the province. With respect to Cossim Aly Khan's putting him in irons, it is very well known that for some years he had rendered no account of the revenues of the provinces of Bahar, on which head Mhir Jaffier often complained to Mr. Holwell, who believes Col. Clive received complaints of the same kind from him, before he left India. These gentlemen know nothing is more common than to put an officer of the revenues in irons, until he delivers in his accounts; nothing further being meant by it than that he should not escape with his embezzlements. That he was not trust-worthy, nor equal to that post, will appear from this very striking circumstance: That when Col. Clive was on his departure, he strongly recommended Mhir Cossim to Mr. Holwell's protection, and at the same time mentioning his distrust of Ram Narain, told Mr. Holwell that Mhir Cossim was the man whom he ought to put into the government of Patna. The rest of the accusations against Mhir Cossim in this paragraph are vague and general, and without one single instance of proof; consequently unworthy notice.

7. It is insinuated in the memorial, that the Nabob's avarice and cruelty had made him the detestation of all good men, and that he was in the hands of bad ministers, under whose mal-administration the country was greatly oppressed: as an instance whereof, the scarcity of grain in the city is produced. To these ministers are ascribed the great difficulties the Nabob laboured under, for want of money to answer the expences of the government, and to pay the army, rendered mutinous for want of their arrears; besides which intestine danger, the provinces were threatened with an invasion by the Shahzadah with a powerful army, and several of the Rajahs and Zamindars, were on the point of revolting, to encounter all which there was nothing but a disaffected army. Mr. Vanfittart appeals to every by-stander for the truth of these facts, and of the imminent peril to which the country was exposed; he declares his intentions were only

to remove the bad ministers, for which purpose he carried up with him the party of Europeans and Seapoys. He proceeds to set forth the manner in which the old Nabob was removed from the government, and Cossim Aly Chan raised. He says, People in general were pleased with the revolution; and makes a merit of its being effected without the least disturbance in the city, or a drop of blood spilt. He concludes with representing the anxiety the Nabob expressed to get from the city, through fear of Cossim Aly Chan; and observes, that he appeared pretty easy and reconciled to the loss of his power, which he owned to be rather a burden than a pleasure, and too much for his abilities to manage since the death of his son: and that the enjoyment of the rest of his days in security, under the English protection, seemed to be the chief object of his wishes.

ANSWER.

7. See Mr. Vansittart's Memorial, and the proofs in various parts of the address in support of it.

8. It is very natural for any person who takes an uncommon step, to endeavour to vindicate himself by the most specious arguments, and the most plausible reasoning he can devise; and nothing less could be expected from Mr. Vansittart, after having brought about so unprecedented a revolution. He has told his story with all the aggravations the nature of it would admit: notwithstanding which, we do not imagine the reasons he has given in support of so violent a measure will prove satisfactory to the world. He takes great pains to blacken Mhir Jaffier's character, in order to prejudice men's minds against him; and lays great stress upon the scarcity of grain in the city; but we apprehend Mr. Vansittart does not judge so harshly from that circumstance, after what he himself experienced last year; for notwithstanding all the care, we are not to doubt, he has taken, grain was never known so scarce in Calcutta before, inasmuch that numbers daily perished.

ANSWER.

8. Not worthy any particular notice.

9. Want of money was the great difficulty the Nabob laboured under; but this did not proceed from any fault of his, but from the distracted state in which the country had been ever since Colonel Clive's departure; so that a very small part of the revenues came into his treasury. The Burdwan and Nuddea countries were assigned over to the Company for the payment of the Nabob's debt. Midnapoor, the frontier to the south-west.

west, was over-run by the Marattas²; Beerboon, and other Zamindaries, with the province of Pura, under Kuddum Hossain Chan, were affected towards the Shahzadah, who had under contribution the whole province of Bahar, except the city of Patna and a small district round it. Chittagong, the eastern barrier, did little more than defend itself against the incursions of the Muggs, inhabitants of Aracan, who used every year to come into Bengal for plunder. There remained only the Dacca province, the districts round Morshedabad, the Radshy and Dinagepoor countries, to supply the immense expence of the war. And here lay the Nabob's distress, that with one fourth part, if so much, of the accustomed revenues, he was obliged to maintain an army greater than any Nabob did before him: and the English army was not the least considerable part of the burthen; for trusting most to them, he paid them first³; which preference was the cause of discontent to the country troops. And though the force we had in the field, against an enemy whom Colonel Clive had, but a very short time before, drove out of the country, far exceeded those the Colonel had with him, yet no material advantage was gained over them, but the country was over-run and ravaged by them, and by frequent marches and counter-marches, our own armies became as destructive as those of the invaders⁴. No wonder then at the perilous condition to which Mhir Jaffier was reduced; to extricate him from which, it behoved us to exert our utmost abilities; instead whereof, he was treated with the greatest indignity by us, and basely turned out of his government.

ANSWERS.

9. ' And were obstructed in the receipts of them by every artifice and finess in Mhir Jaffier's power.

² To what was this owing, but Jaffier Khan's irresolution and pusillanimity?—See the Address.

³ How he paid them, see the Address.—

⁴ The sole cause very well known to these Gentlemen, to wit, defection, cowardice and treachery in Mhir Jaffier and his son, set forth in the Address in three remarkable instances, in any of which, a period might have been put to the troubles, as well as distresses of himself, his allies and his country.

10. To remove bad Counsellors from a Prince is certainly meritorious; but it does not seem to us that any thing was ever designed against the Nabob's ministers; on the contrary, that the sole intent was to displace the Nabob himself, is pretty evident, by the treaty before-mentioned, made in Calcutta¹. Had there been the least attempt to convince him in a friendly manner of any errors in his administration, or of the necessity

of dismissing from his presence those who ill-advised him, it is not to be doubted that he would have hearkened to reason. That he was not obstinate against good advice, may be concluded from the extraordinary influence which Colonel Clive had over him; in proof whereof we need only call to mind how violently he was incensed against Rajah Ram Narain, and Roy Dulub; yet the Colonel, by gentle methods, without having recourse to any other force than that of persuasion, perfectly reconciled him to the former, and obtained his permission for the latter to reside at Calcutta, and bring thither with him his family and effects.

ANSWER.

10. ' See the treaty in the Address, by which it will be pretty evident it never was intended to displace him, but to divest him only of power to bring on the *intire* ruin of the country—and us his allies.—

11. The people in general, very far from being pleased with the revolution, (as alledged in the Memorial) were extremely dissatisfied thereat. Had Cossim Aly Chan been before in esteem among them, or possessed any share of influence or power, they might perhaps have overlooked the circumstance of his rise, and a series of popular actions might in time have reconciled them to the usurpation. But he was despised and disliked before he came to the Musnud, and his behaviour since has been so oppressive and tyrannical, that it could not fail confirming the public hatred of him.

REFUTATION.

11. This man who is said to be in no esteem, but despised and hated, had a Nabobship in the province, was deemed worthy of the Subah's daughter, and by Colonel Clive of the government of Patna; and surely we may, without any offence to these Gentlemen, say, that Colonel Clive was a superior judge in this matter. On the whole, we may justly say, the insinuations thrown out in this paragraph are without foundation, and reflect more dishonour on the authors themselves, than on Mhir Cossim.

12. The little disturbance at Morshedabad upon the occasion, proceeded from the apprehensions all degrees of people were under, from so large a force being brought into the city in the dead of night; and Mhir Jaffer, no ways suspicious of the faith of the English, had taken no precautions for his own security. Such is the superiority of our arms, and so great the dread of our forces in this country, that had we gone openly to work,

we should have met with little or no difficulty ; which renders our having proceeded by stealth and treachery the more inexcusable : and we are truly sorry to have occasion to observe, that the means by which this measure was brought about, have thrown an indelible stain upon our national character, and injured us as much in the opinion of the natives, as it has of all the European colonies in this part of the world.

ANSWER.

12. Let Mr. Vanfittart's Memorial reply to this.

13. It is asserted in the Memorial, that Mhir Jaffier was easy under the loss of his power, which he is said to have owned to have been rather a burden to him : but it is evident, on the contrary, from his declarations since, and his letters to the Company and Colonel Clive, that he was very unwilling to part with his government ; and that he greatly regrets the deprivation of it. He was necessitated, indeed, to submit ; and in hopes of being redressed some time or other by the Company, judging that such a step could never be approved at home, he very wisely chose, rather than trust himself with his son-in-law, to wait patiently for that redress in safety at Calcutta. So far he might appear resigned to his fate ; yet this can never be construed as an abdication of his government, though it has been industriously endeavoured to make the world look upon it in that light.

REFUTATION.

13. What letters Mhir Jaffier might subsequently be influenced to write, we know not—Mr. Holwell, the day after Mhir Jaffier arrived at Calcutta, paid him a visit, and had a private conference of two hours with him,—in the course of which “ he often lamented pathetically “ the loss of his son ; that since he received that stroke, he found “ himself incapable of government, or the things of this world ; “ that the exemplary manner in which God had deprived him of a “ son and successor, had convinced him their sins were great, and “ required expiation ; that he was resolved to expiate them at the “ Tomb of the Prophet, and begged Mr. Holwell would intercede “ with Mr. Vanfittart for a passage to Judda.—At times, he said his “ enemies had injured him in the opinion of the English, from “ whom he thought he had met with hard treatment.” In short, the man who was so lately and justly the object of detestation, was now as real an object of commiseration,—Mr. Holwell applied to Mr. Vanfittart for his passage to Judda, and in the strongest terms enforced the propriety of complying with his request ; foreseeing, that

that if he remained in Bengal, he would ever be an object for a disaffected party to work with. Mr. Vansittart gave his assent;—but some time after, on a representation from the Judda Supra-cargoes, that complaints from him to the Bashaw might involve their ship in troubles, the assent was unhappily withdrawn.

14. We have now, Honourable Sirs, laid before you a true account of the revolution. The projectors perhaps thought the advantages it was to bring the Company, would be a sufficient atonement for the measure, and ensure them the approbation of their masters. It is true the Company have a considerable addition of territory, and do now receive a large yearly revenue; but as great, if not greater advantages might have been procured by more honourable means: and the present tranquil state of the country, which secures to the Company, as well as the Nabob, the full enjoyment of their revenues, is not the effect of Mhir Cossim Chan's Nabobship, but of an event which would equally have happened, had Jaffier Aly Chan been continued on the Musnud, as can be easily made to appear.

ANSWER.

14. There appears a mystery at the close of this paragraph totally unintelligible: possibly we may have it explained by and by.—We will not attempt it here.

15. Soon after Cossim Aly Chan was fixed in the Nabobship, the Company were nominally invested with the Zamyndaries of Burdwan, Midnapoor and Chittagong: and only nominally; for our first demands upon the two former of these, for the payment of the revenues, were refused.

REFUTATION.

15. This paragraph seems to be a flat contradiction of part of the 14th—for if the Company “now receive a large yearly revenue,” it cannot be properly called a nominal investiture; besides, we know the Company, at the last dispatch of their ships from Bengal, had received for two years revenues from Burdomaan only, 70 lack, or eight hundred seventy-five thousand pounds.

16. So bad an impression of us did the revolution create in the minds of the country people, that the Burdwan Rajah, who, in Jaffier Aly Chan's time, had often expressed his earnest desire that the Company might continue to collect the revenues of his district, as they had all along

done, on account of the Tuncawks, and that they would procure the Zamyndarie for themselves from the Nabob; yet after the breach of our faith to the old Nabob, concluding no reliance was to be placed in our engagements, he immediately flew off from his former declarations, and instead of acquiescing under our government, he began to act in open rebellion; he stopped our trade, raised a large force, invited the Marattas into his country, with-held the payment of his revenues, and acting in conjunction with the Beerboon Rajah, he espoused the cause of the Shah Zaddah, with whom he entered into correspondence.

ANSWER.

16. The Burdwan Rajah was yearly fleeced by Mhir Jaffier, therefore no wonder he wished to be rather under the jurisdiction of the English.—His rebellion was of short continuance, being presently reduced, as well as the Beerboon Rajah, by our troops under the command of Major Yorke;—but these two Rajahs defection proceeded from a cause very remote from what it is here ascribed to; and which these Gentlemen seem wholly strangers to, as we shall make appear presently.

17. Several other Zamyndars who had remained quiet whilst Jaffier Aly Chan was Nabob, now finding the government overset, thought themselves at liberty to withdraw their allegiance, and would not acknowledge Mhir Cossim, but joined the Shah Zaddah; whose party, by these frequent defections, was strengthened with supplies both of troops and money, and whose followers were greatly encouraged by his having been able to maintain his ground, and continue in our dominions the whole preceding campaign, in defiance of the English army.

REFUTATION.

17. Here it is but just to apologize for these Gentlemen's ignorance in affairs, for Messrs. Coote, Ellis and Carnack were not in Bengal, during the progress of those events which occasioned the unavoidable necessity of divesting Mhir Jaffier of further power;—and coming to the board with an unhappy disposition to oppose every thing that had been done, because they had no hand in the doing them, they had no methods to pick up materials but from the Bazzars and public reporters of detraction. As for Messrs. Batson and Verelst, they were not of the Committee, and consequently could know nothing of the political system; so that amongst the six Gentlemen who sign this letter, one only of them could possibly know any

thing of the matter; and he but imperfectly, by being so far absent from the center of our Councils.—

18. The Nabob's troops were rendered quite mutinous by the news of the revolution. They declared they knew nothing of Cossim Aly Chan, and that now they had lost their old master, they were without hopes of being paid any part of the immense arrears due to them; and nothing less than the extraordinary assiduity and influence of Mr. Amyatt, who was then chief at Patna, could have prevented them from proceeding to extremities.

REFUTATION.

18. No wonder the troops grew mutinous on the news,—though not out of affection for their old master, as is here unjustly insinuated; for it is very well known his troops would have taken his head long before this, if he had not been protected by ours. The truth is, Mhir Jaffier was in large arrears to them, which they imagined they should lose by the revolution; but as they were soon satisfied in this point, all disturbance subsided.—

19. In this situation were things when Colonel Caillaud left Patna, and Major Carnac received the command of the army from him. The Major saw it was impossible for the country to support itself against such a combination of difficulties, and that if a decisive blow was not soon struck, the Shah could not fail to have immediate possession of all. He therefore determined to bring the Prince to an action as speedily as possible; and after securing Patna by a garrison, to prevent its being plundered by that rabble of troops whose duty it was to defend it, he pushed on with the English army as fast as he could towards the Prince. He came up with him three days march from the city, the consequence of which brought on an action wherein he gained a compleat victory*, and reduced the Shah in a few days after to the necessity of putting himself under the protection of the English. The Major's success, as it put an end to the hopes of all the rebellious Rajahs and Zamyndars, so it at once quelled all commotions, and established the so long wished for tranquillity in the country; and the different provinces were now brought into order, and rendered in a condition to pay their respective revenues; the Nabob's treasury was enriched, and he was enabled to discharge the arrears of his army, and to advance the money he had engaged to pay the Company.

* This battle was the most remarkable of any which has lately been fought in India, possibly not excepted; and may even be compared to that of Alexander against Porus.

REFUTATION.

19. This paragraph seems big with importance:—We have seen, in many parts of this letter, unjust insinuations thrown out to the prejudice of the then commander in chief of your troops, as if all had not been done which ought, and might have been done with the force he had under his command. We have already, in the Address so often referred to, pointed out the miscarriages of the campaign he commanded, as in truth owing to the cowardice and treachery of the two Nabobs, when, at three critical junctures, a decisive stroke might have been given; but you see it was necessary to depreciate and lessen one character, as introductory to the exaltation of another. Let us see how it will answer the purpose: Major Carnack received the command of the troops from Colonel Caillaud, and with great penetration, “saw it was impossible for the country to support itself, unless a decisive *stroke* was soon *struck*. He pushed on the English army towards the Prince, came up with him, brought him to an action, and—obtained a compleat victory.”—We have marched ourselves out of breath, and will pause a little to let you enjoy the victory—Though your enjoyment will be short; for know, that when the Shah retreated from Burdomaan by the way of Beerboon and the hills, he passed some days with the Rajah of the former, and there concerted the operations of the next campaign, as follows: The Prince was to march to Bahar, and settle himself if possible there, to draw the greatest part of the English forces that way; early in the next season the Morattors were to enter the province of Bengal, and the Rajah of Burdwan and Beerboon were to rise at the same time, and join the Morattors; the Prince was to take the field something earlier, to amuse the English, to avoid coming to any pitched action with them, and watch his opportunity of slipping by them, as he did the year before, and by forced marches (having only horse) join his friends in the Burdomaan; the rendezvous being fixed at Burdwan the capital:—but unfortunately for the unhappy Prince, the two Rajahs premature motions frustrated this well laid plan; for intelligence arriving at the city of this defection, the Subah Mhir Cossim, in conjunction with Major Yorke and the troops under his command, immediately took the field, marched to Boodgaam the frontier of Beerboon, drove a body of the Rajah's troops from thence, and took the place. Here the Subah stayed, and detached Major Yorke to reduce Beerboon, which was soon accomplished, and Nagur the capital taken;—the Burdomaan country reduced also to obedience, and the Morattors drove to the southward.

ward.—Whilst these strokes were given, almost as soon as thought of, the Prince was amusing our army in Bahar; and just as he was meditating his sudden march to the southward, a spy who had made incredible speed (from Major Yorke's camp at Nagur,) reached the Prince, and gave him a particular detail of the disasters attending his friends in that quarter; he immediately retreated from the neighbourhood of our troops, and advanced towards the Sone. Before his retreat he stood a few minutes cannonading, and this was the only semblance of an action, that is to "vie with the most brilliant of antiquity, and compared with that of Alexander against Porus."—— So far was this from a battle, that it was not even a skirmish; the armies were not within musket shot of each other, nor a musket fired on either side, nor a single man killed or wounded, but about eight or nine poor lascars killed by the blowing up of a tumbril. The Prince, the night after his retreat, called a council of war of his ministers and chief officers; and debating on the deplorable state of his affairs, came to a resolution to treat with the English, which he accordingly did; induced to it chiefly, by the information he had received of Mhir Jaffier's being deposed, to whom he had so fixed a hatred, that he swore by his Prophet, he would never quit the pursuit of him whilst he had strength to draw a sword; and in a Phirmaund he wrote upon the young Nabob's death by lightning—he had this remarkable expression,—"that the wickedness of the father and son was so great, God would not trust their punishment to any hand but his own." Thus you have seen, that the defection of the two Rajahs, &c. and the Prince throwing himself under our protection, were due to other causes than of this boasted victory without a battle; causes which these Gentlemen did not or would not know, as they did not make for their purpose. It is also pompously set forth—"That the Major determined to bring the Prince to an action as soon as possible." If there is any merit in this determination, it was due to the board of Calcutta, who had sent *peremptory orders to fight him at all events.*

20. Whatever merit there is then in the present tranquillity, is to be ascribed to our success against the Prince, which, by putting an end to the war in the country, reduced it to a state of perfect obedience. And as all the old Nabob's difficulties proceeded from his dominions being the seat of war, and the default of his revenues on that account, there is not the least doubt, had our arms met with the same success during his government, but that he would have extricated himself with equal ease.

ANSWER.

20. That there is no truth in the whole of this paragraph, is proved in the last remark.

21. After what has been set forth, we believe few will imagine that Mhir Jaffier was deposed by reason either of a want of ability to rule, or of his bad principles. We would willingly indeed suppose, that it proceeded rather from the want of a true knowledge of the country policy, and from an error of judgment, than from lucrative views, had not Mr. Vansittart, and others of the projectors, made no secret that there was a present promised them by Cossim Aly Chan of twenty lack: 'tis true, they make a merit that this was not to be delivered till the Company's debt was paid, and his army satisfied. We have to observe on this occasion, that several of us have had offers from the Nabob of very considerable sums to join in his measures, which we have constantly made public, as well as refused; and if we, who have always opposed those measures, have been thus tried with pecuniary temptations, what may be concluded of those Gentlemen who have supported the Nabob on every occasion?

REFUTATION.

21. The malicious insinuations of this paragraph, are *unworthy Gentlemen*.—We allow this offer (not promise) was made, and unanimously rejected by Mr. Vansittart, and the Committee.—Mr. Holwell was charged with the delivery of this refusal, in these terms—
 “ That we were labouring for the peace and safety of the country
 “ only; and could not, in honour, receive the offer; but that when
 “ the country was settled, the Company's debt payed off, and the
 “ arrears paid to his troops, if he then thought there was aught due
 “ from him, he was at liberty to gratify his friends in what manner
 “ he pleased.”—This is a fact, which we were not ashamed should have a place on the Committee proceedings.—As to the offers made, and refusal of these Gentlemen, we have their ipse dixit only; and we may chuse whether we will believe it.

22. If the Nabob has purchased the power he is invested with, it is to be expected he will of course make the most of it, by extorting money from his subjects, and oppressing every province as much as he can; and as the fate of Jaffier Aly Chan must have convinced him how little we regard the most sacred engagements, he will of necessity endeavour to establish himself on a foundation less precarious than the friendship of the English. That he already begins to do so, is evident from his still increasing the number of his troops (notwithstanding the present tranquillity)
 and

and to render them the more formidable, he is arming and disciplining as many Seapoys as he can procure, in the European manner : and to secure himself as much as possible from us, esteeming his capital Morshedabad (the scene of his predecessor's fall) too near our settlements, he is about erecting a large fort at Rajahmaul, which he proposes to make his place of residence, where he hopes to be out of our reach.

REFUTATION.

22. This paragraph first begs the question, and proceeds to draw conclusions not warranted by it.—Is it to be wondered at, that he should think of securing himself, when he saw a formed opposition in our Committee and Council, from the beginning of his government, which hourly shewed a disposition to affront and insult him, contrary to the repeated remonstrances of Mr. Vansittart, for observing more temperate and pacific measures?—Is it not a known truth, that at the tables of the leaders in this opposition, the very boys in your service were taught to huzza, “ Jaffier Aly Khan for ever ;” and did not Amyatt publicly declare, “ that the moment the breath was out of Mr. Vansittart’s body (who then lay dangerously ill) he would proclaim Mhir Jaffier?”—Could these things be notorious,—and Mhir Cossim not be alarmed for his safety?

23. When any Member of the Board suggests, that the Nabob’s behaviour argues a suspicion of us, for that if he really confided in, and sincerely regarded us, he would not put himself to the unnecessary expence of keeping so large an army in pay, nor treat so ill those who are avowedly our friends ; it is replied, “ That the Nabob is master of his country ; and being independent of us, is at liberty to rule and act as he pleases.” But surely Cossim Aly Chan cannot be more so than his predecessor was : and if it be true that the Nabob of Bengal is independent of the English, and master of his own actions, how can the Gentlemen justify their proceedings against Mhir Jaffier, whom they called to so severe an account for the administration of his own government, as to depose him, tho’ he had not been guilty of any offence to our nation, nor ever deviated from his treaty?

ANSWER.

23. Not worthy notice. See it confuted in a hundred places of the said Address.

24. Instead of checking the overgrowing power of the present Nabob, it is daily promoted ; and he has even the absolute command of our army

at Patna, the Chief there having directions to let him have what number of our troops he pleases to demand, without being allowed to judge of the nature of the service for which they are demanded. This you will observe, Honourable Sirs, in the instructions given to Mr. Ellis, dated the 22d September last, and in the consultation of the same day, where some of our opinions on that procedure are entered. We cannot help expressing how much we fear that an ill use will be made by him of this power over our forces, and that they will sooner or later be employed for such purposes as will render us more odious to the whole country, bring greater discredit upon our arms, and reflect farther dishonour upon our nation.

ANSWER.

24. If the assertions are true that are set forth in this paragraph, we will not attempt to justify what the Gentlemen here complain of; but if *Mr. Vansittart had seen* this accusation, we must suppose he had it in his power to give sufficient reasons for the measure.

25. Notwithstanding this zealous attachment to Cossim Aly Chan, there can be no reason to hope he will act the part of a faithful ally towards us. What dependance can be had on a person who so readily entered into the scheme of deposing not only his lawful master, but his patron, under whose immediate care he was brought up? who shewed so much disloyalty to his natural Sovereign *, the King of Indostan, as to evade even acknowledging him, till he was in a manner obliged to it by our repeated desires? and who betrays a continual distrust of those who have appeared any way attached to us?

REFUTATION.

25. The insinuation, inference and charge against Mhir Cossim, in this paragraph, are equally extraordinary. Surely they here forget the man whose cause they have all along been defending, or they would never have laid themselves open in so palpable a blot. Pray, gentlemen, did not Mhir Jaffier betray his master in the treaty of 1757, and at the battle of Plassey; not only his lawful master, but the grandson of his patron, who had raised him from obscurity to the first posts in the Subaship? Did he not also draw his sword against his sovereign, and infamously project the assassinating him?

* Formerly the Shaw Zadda who was defeated by Major Carnac †, in that famous battle near Patna, as related above, and who, on the death of his father, became King of Indostan, and consequently Sovereign of Bengal, which is one of the provinces of his empire.

†. The Shaw Zadda never was defeated by Major Carnac, nor was there any famous battle between them, or any battle at all, as related above.

26. The Nabob's undutiful behaviour to the King, proceeded in great measure from his jealousy of the regard we professed for him, and his fears that we should reduce his authority, by subjecting the Subaship to its primitive dependency on the Mogul, and obliging him to pay the royal revenues. He therefore set every engine to work to create a rupture between us; he endeavoured to make the King uneasy, and to instil notions into him of his being in danger from us, in order to get him out of the country. He excited a mutiny in the King's camp, which, had it not been for the timely assistance sent by Major Carnac, might have proved fatal to his Majesty. He repeatedly urged Mr. Vanfittart to dismiss him; and forged letters to himself and the President, as from the King, complaining of being forcibly detained by the Major, and expressing his anxiety by not being allowed to leave the country. That these letters were forged, his Majesty hath solemnly declared, by an attestation under his own hand; and testified his abhorrence of so infamous a proceeding. The Nabob, however, at last, so far prevailed, by corruption and intriguing with some of the courtiers, as to bring about what he had so much at heart, the King's being sent away without receiving any assistance from us, or being paid any part of the revenues of this Subaship. This rebellious behaviour of the Nabob justly incensed the King, who declared that he would not suffer him to continue in his Subaship, whenever he had power sufficient to prevent it.

REFUTATION.

26. That the Nabob should be anxious to get the King out of the provinces as soon as possible, we can account for, and justly vindicate, from causes very obvious. But how this laboured paragraph will agree with the violent behaviour of Major Carnac, upon his imagining there was *too great and suspicious an intimacy between the King and the Nabob*, you shall judge from the following recital. When the King was on his visit of leave at the Suba's tent, where a grand entertainment was made for him, some little time before his departure, he withdrew with the Suba into the inner tent, where they held a private conference, and, as afterwards appeared, wrote interchangeably in each other's Koran; which, by the bye, is the strongest and most solemn engagement of amity and friendship in the world amongst Musselmén. The Major, on their coming out, expressed in most loud and vehement terms his dissatisfaction at this private conference, and ordered the interpreter to tell the King his high displeasure; inasmuch that the Suba thought necessary to check his passion, and desired him to recollect he was speaking to the King: To which

he replied, that WHEN HE WAS OFFENDED, KINGS AND NABOBS WERE TO HIM THE SAME.

27. His Majesty, before his departure, gave the most unquestionable proof of his hatred to Cossim Aly Chan, and of his esteem for the English, by the voluntary offer he made them of the Dewanny of Bengal. This post is the collection of the revenues of all the provinces subject to the Nabob, which are to be accounted for with the court of Delhy. It differs from the Subadaree; the latter being the command of the troops, and the charge of the jurisdiction in the provinces, the expences whereof are paid out of the revenues by the Dewan. It was formerly a separate office, but the Nabobs of Bengal, taking advantage of the late commotions in the empire, have assumed it to themselves. From the nature of the office, it is evident that the King, distrusting the Nabob, intended that we should be a check upon him, and be answerable for the revenues, no account of which he could get from Cossim Aly Chan, who detained them for his own use. This appointment would have brought the Company about fifteen lacks yearly, exclusive of the lands of Burdwan, Midnapoor, and Chittagong, which his Majesty also offered to confirm to them; and to establish their interest and influence, not only in these provinces, but as far as the city of Delhy itself, to which place our commerce might then, with the utmost safety, have been extended.

ANSWER.

27. Touching the first part of this paragraph, we refer to our last remark. With regard to the offer of the Dewanee, the objections against receiving it were strong and unanswerable, unless we could have been invested with the Subadaary likewise.

28. It is hard to conceive why so honourable and advantageous an offer should be rejected: it is alledged it would be the source of continual disputes between us and the Nabob, and occasion too great a diminution of his power; but surely this consideration, admitting it to be true, ought not to stand in competition with the honour and interests of the Company, which would be greatly promoted by such an appointment; what renders this refusal the more extraordinary is, that it is well known application was made to the King, soon after Mr. Vansittart's arrival, in Jaffier Aly Chan's time, for the sunads or grants of the province of Bengal, which were actually drawn out to be sent to us; but the revolution, in favour of Cossim Aly Chan, taking place in the interim, an entire stop was put to the negotiation.

ANSWER.

28. The first part of this paragraph is spoken to above. Concerning the last part, we can only say, no grant of that kind was solicited for, whilst Mr. Holwell had a seat at the Board of Calcutta, though it certainly would have been pushed for, and doubtless obtained, if his remonstrances on that head had been hearkened to.

29. The Nabob was so inveterate against all those natives who were known to be in our interest, that he used his utmost endeavours to prevail on Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, to consent to his proceeding to the most unjustifiable severities against them, particularly against Rajah Ram-narain, having offered the Colonel five lack of rupees, provided he would concur in the destruction of that unhappy man, who has since been given up to him by the Board. The Colonel's refusal of this money, we are well convinced, was the motive of his (the Nabob's) unjust suspicion and resentment against him, which appears not only by the Colonel's letters on the face of the proceedings of the Board, but also by Cossim Aly Chan's own declaration to him, that he could not be his friend unless he received his present.

REFUTATION.

29. Not one single or particular instance of these inveteracies against the natives in our interest, but that of Ram Narain, already exploded.

30. The same spirit of resentment, which actuated the Nabob against Colonel Coote, was equally strong against Major Carnac, whom he also endeavoured to buy over to serve his ends, but in vain. The Nabob saw, with a jealous eye, the many distinguishing marks of favour the King conferred on him, and would fain have made a breach between them, which not being able to effect, he wrote several letters of complaint against him to the President, who from prejudice was too much inclined to believe them, and sought all opportunities of blaming his conduct at the Board, and of putting the worst construction upon all his endeavours for the public service, of which many instances could be produced.

ANSWER.

30. These large offers and *conscientious* refusals speak an exalted integrity: they are possibly true too, at least for ought we know: but we think it would have been better if so much had not been said about it; for though we may have implicit faith in these assertions, the wicked world may not.

31. A flagrant injustice was done Major Carnac in calling him away from Patna, when the detachment still left there, was large enough to render the command adequate to his rank, and where he might have been of service: whereas his presence was unnecessary at Calcutta, as the Colonel was going down.

32. A very signal insult offered by Cossim Aly Chan to the English nation, was the intercepting, by his order, a letter which Major Carnac, when commanding the army, had wrote to the King, which the Nabob opened and sent to the President. This letter, with others from the Nabob, was minuted in consultation of the 5th of August, and it was insinuated to contain proof of a plot, concerted between the Colonel, Major, Ramnarain and Shitabray, to create a fresh revolution. Much pains were taken to find out mysterious meanings in the letter, and hints were thrown out to prepossess the Board, that such a combination was actually on foot; however, after the closest scrutiny into the letter, and the strictest examination of Shitabray, who was called down from Patna for that purpose, the Board gave it unanimously as their opinion, that there were not the least grounds to suppose any such combination, the ridicule whereof was so conspicuous, that we do not imagine even those who so seriously promoted the enquiry could ever have believed it.

33. The material part of this letter related to an application, which the Major (by Col. Coote's directions) made to the King, to be put in possession of some fort in Shuja Dowlah's country upon the Ganges; which, had our troops attended his Majesty, as we must have marched through Shuja Dowlah's territories, would have been absolutely necessary for a place of arms, and to keep up our communication. The stopping such a letter, or indeed any one from a person in so public a character as the Major then was, might be of the most fatal consequence, was also a public affront, and one that never was before offered by any Nabob; yet no satisfaction has ever been obtained from him, although wrote to publicly on that head.

ANSWER.

31, 32, and 33. To these paragraphs Mr. Vansittart must answer, *when he has it in his power.*—Until then, we hope the world will suspend their judgment: but if they cannot stay so long, they may form a verdict on the veracity of these, and various other parts of this performance, we believe pretty justly, *from the manner in which it has been transmitted hither.*

34. You will now, Hon^{ble} Sirs, be able to compare the present with the preceding government. So momentous a step as subverting the former

one; we conceive, ought not to have been undertaken till after the most mature deliberation, and from a thorough knowledge of the country, its connections and interests. But this was far from being the case. Mr. Vansittart had only been three months in Bengal, and in so short a space of time can hardly be supposed to have acquired so perfect a knowledge of matters as to be able to determine, that it was absolutely necessary to annul a treaty which had been ratified, in the most solemn manner, by Admiral Watson, and Colonel Clive, together with a regularly-authorized select Committee, guaranteed by the credit of the Company, and the honour of the nation.

REFUTATION.

34. The credit of the Company, and honour of the nation, would have been sunk, the one to ruin, and the other to prostitution, if protection had been longer granted to that monster of iniquity, Mbir Jaffier. See the Address.

35. The gentlemen, who were the promoters of this revolution, have coincided remarkably in each others opinion during the last year's consultations : in return, the President has not failed to shew them partiality, of which we will give you a remarkable instance : notwithstanding, in your letter to this presidency, dated 21 Jan. 1761, you were pleased, in the most positive terms, to order the dismissal of Messieurs Sumner, Playdell and Mac Guire ; yet, on the 10th of August, when, in consequence of Mr. Mac Guire's dismissal, Mr. Ellis was appointed chief at Patna, Mr. Vansittart proposed in Council, that Mr. Mac Guire should remain in the chief-ship till Mr. Ellis's arrival, which could not be effected in less than two months. The question was absolutely put to the Board, but carried in the negative ; the other gentlemen not chusing to be guilty of so glaring a deviation from their masters orders : and at Mr. Vansittart's desire, this proposal of his own was not entered on the face of that consultation. Here it will be necessary also to observe, that Mr. Holwell, after the Hon^{ble} Company had shewn him so plain a mark of their displeasure, as to remove him from the Chair to seventh in council, at first wavered, whether to continue in the service or not, till (as he declared) he had a private conference with Mr. Vansittart ; after which he remained in both council and select committee till the very day on which Mr. Vansittart took leave of the Board, to proceed to Morshedabad, in order to execute the plan which had been formed ; and then Mr. Holwell resigned.

ANSWER.

35. Why it was necessary to bring Mr. Holwell in upon this occasion may not be quite clear : We will therefore elucidate this pas-

sage—It was not enough that Mr. Holwell was included in the many dirty insinuations thrown out in different parts of this elaborate work, against the *projectors of this revolution*, &c. but it was thought *necessary* that *he* should be particularly pointed at, with some invidious mark of their malice; though they had not art enough among them to make it at all poignant.—Mr. Holwell thanks them for affording him this *first* favourable occasion of acknowledging all they say (of him) in this paragraph *is most strictly true*.

Mr. Holwell confesses, that, stimulated by resentment at the ingratitude of his employers, he resolved to quit the service immediately, on Mr. Vansittart's arrival—but pressed by him and the committee to alter his resolves for some time at least—he wavered—and soon after seeing an appearance of some salutary turn to the Company's affairs, he determined to remain, and give his helping hand to it.—This was accomplished—and then Mr. Holwell resign'd.

36. The Armenian ministers of the revolution, Cojah Petruce and Kojah Gregory, are in the highest degree of favour with the Nabob and his adherents; the former resides in Calcutta, retained by Cossim Aly Chan, a known spy upon every transaction of the English, of which he never fails to give his master the most regular intelligence, as was too apparent to both Colonel Coote and Major Carnac, when they were at Patna. The latter of these Armenians has posts of the greatest trust near the Nabob's person; and through the means of these men, the Armenians in general are setting up an independant footing in the country, are carrying on a trade greatly detrimental to our investments in all parts, and commit daily acts of violence, which reflect no small odium on the English, who are supposed to encourage their proceedings.

REMARK.

36. This paragraph requires no answer from us.

37. It is this system of administration which we have constantly opposed, as thinking your affairs could not possibly prosper under it. And you will now be able to account for many differences at the Board, which will appear through the course of our consultations, and which will doubtless surprise you till the real cause is known. As we have hitherto denied our assents to measures, because we deemed them contrary to your interests, though the adopting them would have turned out greatly to our private emoluments; so you may rest assured it shall ever continue an invariable maxim with us, to make your honour and advantage the sole object of our attention.

REMARK.

REMARK.

37. Nor this.

38. You have been acquainted, Honourable Sirs, that the King has applied for your assistance, to settle him on the throne, and to recover such parts of his territories as are still in the hands of rebels. It is our opinion, that we have troops enough to form an army for the enterprize; and as we have no European enemy to fear, the forces requisite for this service can without danger be spared. The Nabob's large army, which is now a burden upon the provinces, and only kept up to screen him from the King's power, and through his jealousy of us, would afford a considerable addition, and at the same time ease the country of an immense expence. Shujah Dowlat, one of the most powerful men of the empire, would join with his forces; besides many other considerable powers, friends to the King, from different parts, would flock to the royal standard, should we ever take the field; and our army most probably (as the King himself has frequently declared) would march to the gates of Delhy without opposition. We most humbly submit to you, whether so glorious an opportunity of aggrandizing the Company in Indostan should not be embraced; and leave it to yourselves to judge of the reputation and advantages which would result to them, if through the means of the British arms, his Majesty should be established on his throne. For want of our aid, he is now actually at a stand, and unable to prosecute his journey to his capital.

But should you be unwilling to extend your connections further up the country, and instead of accepting the Dewanny of Bengal, choose to confine your views to your new acquisitions, and to the trade of Bengal alone, we beg leave to offer it as our opinion, that we ought to maintain an interest in the country, independent of the Nabob, by supporting in power such men as have proved themselves our friends: This will serve as a balance against him, should he entertain evil designs against us.

ANSWER.

38. This has been already spoken to, in a detached Piece, by another hand, intitled, A Supplement, &c.

39. We have now given you a fair relation of things, and, conscious of the goodness of our intentions, we cannot but flatter ourselves, we shall meet with your approbation in the part we have taken. We shall therefore conclude with the assurance, that our endeavours shall never be want-

ing to promote the honour and interests of our Employers, their succe
being the object of our most fervent wishes.

We are, with the greatest respect,
Honoured Sirs,

Your most faithful

And dutiful Servants,

FORT WILLIAM,
11th March, 1762.

(Signed)

EYRE COOTE.

P. AMYATT.

JOHN CARNAC.

W. ELLIS.

S. BATSON.

H. VERELST.

ANSWER.

39. We will close our remarks with one Reflection only.—If the
matters and things here set forth were facts, and essential for the
knowledge of their employers, why were they so long concealed
from them? And why has the whole of it so much the appearance
of *pretences* framed *a priori*, to extenuate a conduct and opposition,
they have (at least five of them) subsequently carried into action?
*and for which their friends, at this critical juncture, thought an apo-
logy absolutely necessary?*

J. Z. HOLWELL.

IMPORTANT FACTS

REGARDING THE

EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S Affairs in BENGAL,

From the Year 1752 to 1760.

This TREATISE contains

An exact State of the COMPANY'S Revenues in that Settlement;

WITH

COPIES of several very interesting LETTERS:

SHEWING PARTICULARLY,

The *Real Causes* which drew on the PRESIDENCY of BENGAL
the dreadful CATASTROPHE of the Year 1756;

AND

Vindicating the Character of Mr. HOLWELL from many scandalous
Aspersions unjustly thrown out against him, in an anonymous Pamphlet,
published March 6th, 1764, intituled,

“ R E F L E C T I O N S

O N T H E

Present State of our EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS.”

IMPORTANT FACTS

REGARDING THE

EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE

FROM THE YEAR 1757 TO 1760.

THE TREATIES CONTAINING

AN ACCOUNT OF THE COMPANY'S REVENUE IN THAT SETTLEMENT;

WITH

COPIES OF SEVERAL VERY INTERESTING LETTERS

RELATIVE TO THE COMPANY'S SHARE

IN THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE
THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE

AND

A HISTORY OF THE COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE
A HISTORY OF THE COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE
A HISTORY OF THE COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE

OF THE EAST-INDIA COMPANY'S SHARE IN BENGALE

ON THE

PRESENT STATE OF OUR EAST-INDIA AFFAIRS.

T O

The Proprietors of EAST-INDIA STOCK,

A N D

The P U B L I C.

THE anonymous Pamphlet, published Tuesday the 6th of March 1764, under the title of "*Reflections on the present State of our East-India Affairs,*" being plainly calculated to answer the purpose of a day only; it should seem hardly worthy your notice: nor indeed should we have thought it worth ours, did it not afford us a favourable opportunity of laying open some material facts, which we think claim your attention, and will deserve your thanks.

The title-page of this Pamphlet says it is wrote "By a *Gentleman* long resident in India;" but surely no *Gentleman* could fall so much below that character, as this anonymous author does, in low personal abuse and scurrility; though the obvious venom of the heart that dictates through the whole, will defend against its influence and intended impressions.—We rather think, from the mixed style, that this production is the joint efforts of *two small geniuses*; the *one*, pert, coxcomical, affecting wit and metaphor; the *other*, of meagre, dusky aspect, *stalking* forth with pompous diction! sounding epithets! long-winded, metaphorical bombast! and tedious declamations!—From the *bilious* complexion of this Shakespear's Cassius, what can flow, but envy, rancour, and *bitterest reflections*? Whether these *things* clubbed their geniuses, or transfused each to other his spirit for this paltry task, is not very material;—none but *they*, or *such-like*, could surely be capable of *such* a performance.

Whatever may have been the Authors intention by the exordium, laboured progress, and conclusion of this anonymous Pamphlet, the whole of this unconnected piece seems huddled together, more particularly to introduce the personal attack in the centre; against this attack we shall chiefly raise our batteries,—previously demolishing some of their scattered out-works, (unsupported by each other) as they fall in our way, and intercept our march.

The

The false and scandalous lights which Anonymous throws on the motives that induced Col. Clive's successor to form some change in the political state at Bengal, are so fully confuted in that Gentleman's Address to you, that nothing more is wanted here, to enforce conviction to honest impartiality. The partial and malicious are not to be convinced by facts or argument; indeed it makes not for their present purpose to own it, though they are: To these we do not write. These are hardy enough to charge this Gentleman (page 37) with forming a scheme to depose Mhir Jaffier, in favour of Mhir Cossim, "almost as soon as he came to power;" though he has proved, beyond contradiction, that he supported Mhir Jaffier with spirit and perseverance, as long as there was a remaining possibility of doing it, almost to the ruin of your affairs; so tenacious was he of the treaty subsisting between the English and Mhir Jaffier, even though *he* had violated every article of it, in effect, by the single step of bringing the Dutch troops into his dominions. This Gentleman has also undeniably proved, that his views for the Company's benefit extended much higher than the system of "*Nabob changing*," which, he saw, could produce no solid and lasting advantage, either to the Company or the Provinces. And he has likewise demonstrated, that he had neither any hand in, nor intention, or wish, to depose Mhir Jaffier in favour of Mhir Cossim; but on the contrary, took every precaution, which his *then* scanty power gave him, for the security of the dignity, person, and property of the former, however little he deserved it.

The partizans of Mhir Jaffier have very studiously evaded owning the charge against him, of bringing in the Dutch forces, foreseeing *that* would silence every attempt urged in justification of him; but here truth and conscience for *once* steps in between *them* and their machinations, and makes them unwarily give up the point, in the following words, page 30, "He was not unacquainted with the designs of the Dutch, and would not have been sorry to have seen an European force introduced into his dominions, to prove a check on the power of those, likely to become his masters instead of his allies. However, his deep respect and awe of Colonel Clive, prevented his acting openly upon this occasion." Here, let it be also remarked, that these partizans, in page 19, set forth, that "This Nabob was *supported with honour* by his *maker*, so long as *he* continued in India." The battle of Plassey gave this man the Subaship in June, 1757. In October, 1758, or thereabouts, he must have planned his iniquitous scheme with the Dutch; as about this time a small vessel was dispatched express to Batavia, and our armament for the Southward was on its departure. That the Dutch would have meditated a scheme of this kind, without the encouragement and participation of the Suba, no one in his senses can believe. Here we see this man hardly established in his

his government, planning to destroy and countermining *that power* which raised him; and this without any shadow of complaint against us, for he had been *supported with honour*. His being only *acquainted* with the designs of the Dutch, without communicating those designs to us, his allies, was virtually a breach and violation of that whole treaty he had so solemnly entered into. That he did not *act openly* on this occasion, was owing only to his fears, and the *deepest* treachery both to the Dutch and us. If the Dutch had proved successful in the river, and on the plains of Bederda, we should soon have felt the effects of his *open* conduct, and not an individual of the colony had escaped slaughter. Let it be remembered too, that by Col. Clive's orders, Coja Wazzeed (a man of family, character, and rank) was taken prisoner, on his passage from Moorshadabad to Chinfura, brought under a strong guard to Fort William, imprisoned there, and died under his confinement. So extraordinary a step would want justification, had not the Colonel received the fullest proof and conviction, that this man (though a pretended friend to the English) was the negotiator with the Suba, on the part of the Dutch, in the treaty for bringing in their forces. In short, let the whole of this transaction be viewed in any light whatever, it would, if these partizans had a grain of modesty and candour among them, utterly silence every plea they have urged in his defence, and pretended commiseration for his misfortunes, thrown out at this period only to answer a poor unworthy purpose.

Page 31 of this Pamphlet exhibits the following: "The superiority of this extraordinary genius, (Col. Clive) predominated so far over that of the Nabob, that when he quitted India, he left this Prince in such a state of dependance, and the affairs of the English in such an exalted and powerful situation, that even the *Kites* and *Owls* that followed, had it in their power to gorge themselves with that prey (M. J.) which being beat down, was at the mercy of, though spared by, this generous Eagle." — Oh! metaphor! how art thou tortured! how art thou prostituted! Let us examine a little what *mercy* this poor prey found, and how *spared*, by this *generous Eagle*? It is confessed, page 19, "that Mhir Jaffier distributed among his new allies *all the treasures* of his predecessor, and mortgaged two of his *richest* provinces to them, for the payment of a farther sum," besides "*large tracts* of land to the Company;" the rents of which were first paid by the Company to him, and subsequently given to this *generous Eagle*. Such was the *mercy* he found, and thus was he *spared*.

It may be said this Eagle *raised the game*, and had a right to *beat it down* as low as he pleased. Suppose it so; let us see the consequences.

Mhir

Mhir Jaffier, thus stripped, had better never been born, or at least never raised to this dignity; for having no treasures of his own, and but small present resources from the revenues of his country, the foundation was here laid of all his future misfortunes. His supplies not being equal to the support of his extravagancies, the pay of his troops, and other absolutely-necessary calls of his government, and he finding himself incapable of relinquishing or retrenching his licentious expences, his affairs fell into that state of ruin and confusion so justly painted by Mr. Holwell in his Address. So that (to pursue this notable metaphor) you see, after all, if the poor *Kites* and *Owls* that followed this *generous Eagle* had been an hundred, there was nothing left for them to gorge, but the *bare bones* of the prey.

With regard to the exalted and powerful situation of the Company's affairs, as pompously recited in the foregoing quotation, the real fact stands thus: When Col. Clive left Bengal, your Treasury was at a very low ebb, and further supplies cut off, before he was well out of the river; but of this you have been sufficiently informed in the Address above referred to. And as to "Col. Clive's extraordinary genius *predominating* so far above that of the Nabob's," we think Mhir Jaffier's introduction of the Dutch forces affords no proof of it.

Leaving the other parts of this Pamphlet to the plain and natural conclusions and sentiments of the Public, we proceed, pursuant to our Title-page, in our promised justification, from materials left with us by this Gentleman on his last departure for India, and others transmitted by him after his arrival there; in the course of which many important circumstances and facts will occur, worthy your consideration, which will throw a new light on some interesting periods in your affairs, and at the same time manifest and illustrate the great and eminent services this Gentleman has rendered you; services so striking, that, though they never obtained common justice or gratitude, from your Court of Directors at home, yet gained him the public thanks of your Bengal Presidency on your behalf, even after he was superceded in the government of your affairs. This Pamphlet is not the only instance of *party rage*, whereby this Gentleman has been basely traduced, and by some even of those in your Direction, who had set their hands to higher encomiums on Mr. Holwell's integrity and abilities, than had ever before been bestowed on any one in your service, and without any the least shadow of cause to impeach his conduct, or alter these favourable sentiments of him. Mr. Holwell himself disdains a reply to the several low attacks, made by malice and envy on his reputation: but on us, his friends, it is incumbent; and we hope hereby to atone for

for our neglect of not doing it long ago, and own our obligation to this anonymous Writer, for giving us so favourable an opportunity.

To clear up, and explain many passages, touching men and things, we think it necessary to introduce our defence, with an account of the disputes in Leadenhall-street, at the latter end of the year 1757, and beginning of 1758; when this Gentleman unhappily (for himself) became the object of contention between two parties in your Court of Directors, and fell a sacrifice to the perseverance of his (and we may truly say your) friends. This just detail was *then* drawn up by one, minutely acquainted with the *concealed*, as well as *open* springs of action at that period, in manner following:

NARRATIVE of the Domestic Wars in Leadenhall-Street, from October 1757, to the 20th of April, 1758.

LIKE Homer, and other recorders of battles, we will begin with a list of the combatants; it will save some trouble in the course of the engagement.

Messrs. PAYNE, Chairman.

2 Burrow	10 Dorrien	18 Plant
3 Jones Raymond	11 Stevens	19 Dudley
4 John Raymond	12 Manship	20 Savage
5 Sir James Creed	13 Hadley	21 Tullie
6 Saunders	14 Chambers	22 Gough
7 Western	15 Impey	23 Phipps
8 Jones	16 Sullivan, <i>Deputy</i>	24 Rous
9 Browne	17 Godfrey	

It was not without much previous debate, heat, and animosity, that the above Gentlemen came unanimously into a scheme for the government of Bengal, by a rotation of four, to wit, Messrs. Watts, Manningham, Becher, and Holwell. The plan was designed as a temporary expedient only, until further advices from Calcutta; the Hardwick carried out these determinations, signed by the whole court, under date the 11th of November, 1757, and harmony seemed again to be established. A general reform of the settlement of Fort William was next taken into consideration, planned and adjusted at various meetings, consisting only of the two chairs, Mr. Holwell and the Secretary. During these operations, Discord again began to exert her influence; and entering the breasts of the Bombay faction, who she knew were ripe for her purpose, urged them to move and insist that another Gentleman should be appointed to succeed

to the rotation of four, in case of death or absence. The Bombay faction, consisting of the Deputy Chair, and the eight immediately following him on the above list, (acting under their General L—w) carried their point in the Committee of Correspondence, by a majority of 6 to 3, Sir James Creed and Governor Saunders being absent. The next Court-day Mr. Payne brought the affair before a full court, where the resolution of the Correspondence was over-ruled by a majority of 15 to 9, as being not only contrary to the determinations unanimously signed to by the Hardwick, but also to the very principle and motives, which urged those determinations. From this hour Peace took her flight from Leadenhall-street, Civil War took place, and Discord reigned with uninterrupted sway.

This defeat of the minority was far from discouraging them. They now, under the auspices of their General, (who was most active behind the curtain) planned a stroke at the rotation itself, which they intended to execute at the next Quarterly General Court; but advices of the revolution in favour of Jaffier Aly Cawn arriving about this time, gave them a plausible opportunity to attempt abolishing the rotation in the Court of Directors, without waiting for the Quarterly General Court. Accordingly, when the Court of Directors met to confer on the advices they had received of the revolution, and unanimously determined to make a compliment of the government of Bengal to Col. Clive during his residence in India, the Bombay faction moved, "that the important change in their affairs at Bengal, made the expedient of the rotation no longer needful, but that Mr. Watts should be appointed to succeed the Colonel."

The majority of 15 (as they stand prior on the list) urged on the contrary, "that as the change regarded the situation of their affairs only, without any sufficient proofs transmitted to them, that gave any more favourable impression of individuals in their service, they judged it premature to make as yet any further alterations in the government of Bengal, the same causes still subsisting which first urged the expedient of the rotation."

This difference of views and sentiments occasioned debates to run to the most violent heights, in the course of which the majority lost all regard to decency and manners; to put a stop to which the Chairman put the question, "Whether Col. Clive should be appointed to the government of Bengal, and the rotation of 4 take place on his absence, as before appointed?" On this, fresh feuds arose; the Bombay faction insisting that the question should be divided. This was opposed by the Chairman, and brought on the previous question, which being put, it was carried against a division of the question 15 to 9. On this the minority no longer

longer observed any measures; Messrs. Sullivan, Godfrey, Phipps, and Plant, quitted the Court, and the rest of the faction refused to ballot.

The majority however proceeded to business, and unanimously appointed the Colonel to the government, and the rotation to take place on his absence. The general letter containing this resolution, and the other general reform of the settlement, was signed the eighth of March, by the 15 only, the minority refusing to sign.

The faction, not a whit dismayed at these repeated defeats, "but, like Anteus, gathering strength from blows," had now recourse to their expedient of the Quarterly General Court, and began to beat up for volunteers amongst the Proprietors. Their General took up his residence, in a manner, for many days in the city, and went about begging single votes, in which he was most industriously followed by his Mirmidons; whilst the majority of 15, conscious of the propriety and integrity of their own conduct, made it a point not to speak to a Proprietor on the subject: A maxim (in politics) founded on a false principle; for when a body of men in power are conscious of the rectitude of their intentions, in any measure adopted for the good of the community, it is incumbent on them to secure that measure by every means possible. This error in judgment of the majority, gave the greatest advantage to the minority. The majority likewise rested in a false security, that a Quarterly General Court, which was not summoned on special affairs, could not go into any matters, but what were regularly brought before them and specified in their summons, the same having no precedent, and being contrary to all propriety, as well as the established laws of the Court; in which, however, they found themselves mistaken. Thus the minority came to the Quarterly Court fully prepared, and with their united force; whilst the majority came totally unprepared, and without any force at all.

Here it is necessary to recite a circumstance, which greatly favoured this attempt of the minority. The rotation was as little relished by the bulk of the Proprietors, without knowing why, or wherefore, as by themselves: It was (as before hinted) with much difficulty that the Bombay faction were brought to assent to it at first, and they were now determined to abolish it, though, with it, they abolished the power, and every effectual authority of a Court of Directors.

The indefatigable activity of the minority, and inactivity of the majority, produced each their adequate effects at the Quarterly Court. The usual business and forms over, Mr. Law began the attack by an invective against the rotation, as being a strange, motley, many-headed monster,

in which he was seconded by Mr. Phipps, supported by Mr. P. Godfrey, in a written speech, which he desired permission to read.

The Chairman, in a short, but strong speech, urged "The irregularity of the Quarterly Court's entering into special affairs, for which they were not summoned; and that a procedure of this kind must have fatal consequences, and end in the utter subversion of the government of the Company's affairs; that the Court of Directors, not suspecting such unprecedented attempts, were not prepared to lay before the Court the reasons which moved them to adopt the expedient now objected to. That the Proprietors had a right to demand a General Court, which he was ready to summon on the shortest warning, and that such their reasons should then be submitted to their consideration."

When the Chairman had ended his speech, Mr. Alexander Hume took up the same side of the question, and moved to adjourn; in which he was seconded by Sir Alexander Grant and a few others, and the question for adjournment being put, it was carried in the negative almost unanimously, but with unheard of clamour and indecency. They then proceeded, in the same temper, to demand the questions should be put, "Whether the rotation of four should be abolished, and the government of Bengal be conducted by a single Governor and Council as heretofore?" And both questions were in like manner carried in the affirmative, Mr. Law and the Court declaring, it was not their intention to interfere in the appointment of such Governor and Council, which they left intirely to the choice of the Court of Directors; and with this gracious indulgence the Quarterly Court broke up: and the minority, as they thought, gained a compleat triumph.

Thus a measure adopted and assented to at the beginning by the whole Court of Directors, and subsequently supported and confirmed by a majority of fifteen, became condemned and abolished, from the minds of the Proprietors being poisoned by every artful insinuation against it, without once hearing a single reason or plea in its defence.

The Minority, notwithstanding their triumph at the Quarterly Court, apprehensive they should gain little by it, whilst the majority of the Court of Directors were against them, began to work with other tools; and agreed to make any concession to Mr. Payne and his friends, provided they would relinquish the single point of Mr. Holwell's having a share in the government of Bengal: It was proposed that he should have rank next to Mr. Becher, with the Chiefship of Cossimbuzar; be one of the Select Committee, and have any emoluments appointed for him, that himself or friends

friends would desire; or if these were not acceptable, that he should be sent to Bombay to succeed Mr. Bouchier, or be appointed Deputy-governor of Fort St. David, and to succeed next to Mr. Orme, who was appointed to succeed Mr. Pigot.

These alternatives were at different times intimated to Mr. Payne and the Majority, (the first before the rotation was fixed, the others after it was abolished) who were steadfast in this reply, "That however Mr. Holwell's services and sufferings merited the notice of the Company, the real interest of their affairs was their first object, and not Mr. Holwell's emotions: That his abilities would be of more use to the Company at Bengal than elsewhere; and that the exigencies of their affairs required his having a share in the government of them."

The Majority of fifteen thinking themselves most injuriously treated by the Minority, and proceedings of the quarterly general Court, were loud in their resentments; and having resolved on a plan for their future conduct, the Chairman summoned a full Court for the appointment of a successor to Colonel Clive, to meet on the 23d of March. The Minority, in the mean time, were assiduous to take off a sufficient number of the Majority, and thought they had succeeded.

It is not difficult to conceive in what temper the Court met. As soon as the Chairman had opened the cause of their meeting, the merits of their servants at Bengal became the subject of debate, and much altercation ensued, not worth reciting. Mr. Peter Godfrey moved, that their servants should be ballotted for according to their ranks in the service, beginning with Mr. Watts; in which he was seconded by Mr. Sullivan, and some others of the Minority. This motion was opposed by Mr. Robert Jones, or Mr. Jones Raymond, (which we cannot recollect) who moved that Mr. Holwell should be first balloted for. Both motions being seconded, brought on the previous question, which was carried in favour of the last motion. Accordingly they proceeded to the ballot, and Mr. Holwell was elected to succeed Colonel Clive in the government of Bengal, fifteen to nine.

This proved a thunderbolt to the Minority, who now found that their violences had promoted, in a higher degree, the very man they had so much laboured to debase. The Deputy Chairman, with the rest of the Minority, made a motion as if they intended to quit the Court; but the former being requested by the Chairman to suspend his resolution and judgment, produced the following letters, which Mr. Holwell had sent into Court to him.

To JOHN PAYNE, Esq; Chairman.

" Sir,

23d March, 1758.

" SOME of my friends flatter me, that the appointment of a successor to Colonel Clive in the Government of Bengal, may probably fall on myself: Should this be the case, I then take the liberty to request, you will please to present the inclosed Address to the Honourable the Court of Directors. Should the information of my friends prove groundless, the inclosed then becomes *impertinent* and useleſs; and as ſuch I beg the favour you will return it to, Sir, Your, &c.

J. Z. H."

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, &c.

" May it please your Honours,

" UNDERSTANDING this day is appointed for the election of a President and Governor of Bengal, in ſucceſſion to Colonel Clive, and learning from the information of my friends, there is a probability your choice may fall upon myſelf; that ſteady zeal for the Company's intereſt, which has ever been the guide of my actions and ſentiments, ſince I had the honour of your ſervice, now urges me to addreſs you with that humble freedom, which my duty dictates, at this critical conjuncture of your affairs in that part of the world.

" During the heaviest weight of my misfortunes and diſtreſſes, I had yet comfort in the reflection of having done my duty in the truſts repoſed in me, but more ſo, that my conduct was honoured with the repeated approbation and ſanction of your Honourable Court.

" In the execution of truſt, it has ever been an inviolable maxim with me, that private intereſt ſhould ever give way to the public utility; a maxim I have often ſealed to, in your ſervice, though to my own coſt; a maxim, which now leads me, contrary to my own private weal, to prevent, it poſſible, your taking any meaſure which may, in its conſequences, deprive you of one of the moſt valuable ſervants you have abroad.

" In the courſe of your affairs, although I have ſometimes differed in opinion from Mr. Manningham, yet I have ever had the higheſt opinion of that gentleman's integrity and abilities, and have not failed doing honour to both on every occaſion; for the truth of which I can appeal to ſome gentlemen who conſtitute your Honourable Court, and to many others, who were lately members of it.

" Permit

"Permit me, Gentlemen, to represent to you, that a servant of Mr. Manningham's character and capacity is not every day to be met with, nor can be parted with at this period, without a certain injury to your affairs: A disregard of his merits, will, in all likelihood, determine his return to Europe; the contrary will as probably determine his stay; and may not only lay a foundation for harmony at home, but for success abroad.

"These considerations, and these only, move me humbly to request, that should the voice of your Honourable Court be in my behalf, I may then be permitted, with thanks and gratitude, and without offence, to decline the honour you intend me, in favour of Mr. Manningham, under whom I am most ready and willing to serve the Honourable Company, as long as his residence in India may be consistent with his health or inclination. I am,

May it please your Honours, &c.

Wednesday,
March 23d, 1758.

J. Z. H."

When Mr. Holwell's Letter was read, the Minority attempted to look wise, shook their heads, and declared they would ballot no more. The Chairman put the question, "Whether the court should proceed to a new ballot in consequence of Mr. Holwell's letter?" which being agreed to, without a ballot, they proceeded, and Mr. Manningham was elected to succeed Colonel Clive, by fourteen only, one of the fifteen having thrown in a negative. The fifteen then balloted for a successor to Mr. Manningham, when Mr. Holwell was unanimously chosen; and Mr. Becher to succeed him: And here the Court stopped.

From the whole tenor of the proceedings of the Minority, it must appear to an impartial eye, that they were actuated by pride, violence, personal connections, and personal resentments, and by their conduct struck at the very principle and foundation of all government; hence they acquired the title of "the Faction," (a circumstance we thought necessary to explain, lest we should be thought to have bestowed it on them in this our narrative only.) They seemed to think they had a right to over-rule the sentiments and resolves of a majority of near two to one against them; or failing here, to throw the affairs of the community they had in trust, into the utmost confusion and difficulties; and this at a time, when dispatch, harmony, and unanimity, were essential to the well-being (we may say, the very being) of the Company: and when examples of this kind were so necessary at home, to influence the same salutary conduct in their servants abroad, which they themselves had, in their letter by the Hardwick, inculcated and commanded in the most lively and enforcing terms that

lan-

language could dictate. The Minority, in consequence of their late defeat, had several private meetings with their General, where it was resolved, as their last resource, to form a Proprietors list of Directors for the ensuing year, in opposition to the House list. Consistent with this resolution, the Deputy Chair and the Minority agreed, that they would not meet the Court, nor assist at forming the House list as usual. The Majority, on this message, met immediately, formed their list, and had it published a day before the Proprietors list came out.

Had the Majority continued the same vigilance in securing the election of their list, they could not have failed effecting it; but here they continued in the same error, and false punctilio of honour, which had occasioned their defeat at the Quarterly General Court; until roused by the activity both publick and private of the Minority, they thought it necessary to exert themselves, when it was too late. Had they begun twenty-four hours sooner, they would have carried their whole list, and the Minority, to a man, had quitted the direction. The last defeat they received was on the 23d of March, from which time they had laboured, without ceasing. The election was to come on the 5th of April, and it was the second, before the Majority attempted to solicit a single vote.

Mr. Holwell arrived the 2d of April at Portsmouth, where he received the result of the General Court, which did not break up until two in the morning of the 6th, when the following Gentlemen were declared duly elected :

Messrs. W. Barwell*,	John Dorrien,	F. Pigou,
H. C. Boulton*,	George Dudley,	John Raymond,
John Boyd,	H. Hadley,	Giles Rook,
John Brown,	John Harrison,	J. Rous*,
Chr. Burrow*,	John Manship,	H. Savage,
Sir James Creed,	N. Newnham*,	G. Stevens,
Charles Cutts*,	H. Plant*,	L. Sullivan, Chairman*,
Roger Drake, Deputy*,	T. Phipps*,	T. Tullie*.

By the election of this list, the late Minority gained a sure Majority, both in Court and in the Committee of Correspondence, the members of which are marked *: They lost no time in exercising their new acquired power, in a manner quite consistent with their former violence: They met the 6th, when, after electing their Chairman and Deputy, and appointing the several Committees, Captain Tullie moved, that an express should be immediately dispatched to Portsmouth, to stop the Warren and London, until further orders. This was strenuously opposed by Mr.

Drake

Drake and others ; but was however carried, on a ballot, in the affirmative, fourteen to eight ; upon which the following Gentlemen entered a strong protest on the behalf of the Company, against the injurious detention of their ships so late in the season, and when convoy for them was procured with so much difficulty : viz.

Messrs. Drake,
Burrow,
Newnham,
Brown,

John Raymond
Hadley,
Dorrien,
Stevens.

These Gentlemen would have been joined by Sir James Creed and Mr. Manship ; but the one was confined by the gout, and Mr. Manship's sister lay dead in his house. The express reached Portsmouth the 7th, in the morning, just as the Warren and London were going to sail, under convoy of the Eagle man of war, and Bonetta sloop. It was pretty obvious that Mr. Holwell needed not any very great foresight to predict what would follow, with respect to himself, expecting the utmost effect of united malice and power.

The resolution of detaining the ships being carried, the Chairman proposed proceeding immediately to business ; this was opposed and objected to by Messrs. Drake and Newnham, who urged, that as they could not possibly be supposed acquainted with the grounds, which had occasioned the division between the late Court of Directors, they insisted on reasonable time being given them to consider the subject. This request was, after very high debate, granted, and the 11th appointed for taking into consideration the Bengal dispatches by the Warren and London. Accordingly, like so many Cæsars, they came, they saw, they conquered : For the Chairman, as soon as they were met, produced a short general letter, which he had already prepared for the purpose, consisting of four or five paragraphs only : High opposition arose to this letter from the eight protestors, but it availed little, for the whole received the sanction of the fourteen, and passed into a law, and arrived at Portsmouth the 12th of April. The purport of this general letter take as follows.

“ That having maturely weighed and considered the conduct and merit of individuals, they annul and make void every appointment by the Hardwick's letter of the 11th November, with those by the Warren and London, of the 8th and 23d of March, (Colonel Clive excepted) and do now constitute and appoint the establishment of their Presidency of Calcutta. To wit,

Colonel Clive, President and Governor,
 William Watts, Esq; 2d, and to succeed Colonel Clive,
 Major Kilpatrick, 3d.

Charles Manningham, Esq; 4th, and to succeed Mr. Watts,

Mr. R. Becher, - - - 5th, }

Mr. P. R. Pearkes, - - - 6th, }

Mr. William Frankland, 7th, }

Mr. M. Collett, - - - 8th, }

Mr. J. Z. Holwell, - - - 9th, }

Mr. William Macket, - 10th, }

Mr. Peter Amyat - - - 11th, }

Mr. Thomas Boddam, 12th, }

Mr. Richard Court, - 13th, }

Each to rise and succeed in turn.

“ They likewise revoke and annul all and every nomination to Chiefships, Posts, &c. in their letter of the 8th of March, leaving such appointments to the Board ; with this caution, that capable and faithful servants be sent to Cossimbuzar, best known and most agreeable to the Nabob.

“ They appoint the Select Committee to consist of Messrs. Clive, Watts, Manningham, Becher, and Major Kilpatrick for the time being. Vacancies in this Committee to be filled up by the President and Members. They also advise, that the Secret Committee at home, consists of Messrs. Sullivan, Drake, Burrow, Newnham, and Plant, any three of whom are a quorum.

Signed,

Sullivan,	Boulton,	Tullie,
Cutts,	Dudley,	Plant,
Harrison,	Phipps,	Rooke,
Boyd,	Pigou,	Barwell.
Rous,	Savage,	

N. B. The other ten
 refused to sign.

REFLECTIONS.

The Colonel, in all probability, has, or is near upon leaving India ; Messrs. Watts, Manningham, and Becher, by the restitution of private property, and their other late extraordinary acquisitions, will, it is likely, soon follow him ; in which case it is worth remarking, where the succession takes place, by the foregoing destination ; and we leave it to the world to form natural and obvious conclusions therefrom.

With

With respect to Mr. Holwell, we cannot help observing, that the Majority of the present Court have not preserved even that mask of equity, which they pretended was the rule of their actions: They have given every writer that remained with him in the fort when Calcutta was attacked, two years of his time in recompence of his perseverance and sufferings. His perseverance was surely equal to theirs, and his sufferings eminently superior, and merited some distinction and favour, though ever so small; in place of which, they have stripped him of the post and emoluments they had before appointed him to.

The rash proceeding of the present Majority, in detaining two of the Company's ships, "to gratify private resentment," made a great clamour in the city, and alarmed their best friends amongst the Proprietors; and when their other alterations became public, that not only Mr. Holwell was set aside, but Mr. Manningham also, and that the late Majority had resolved to demand a general Court, the clamour still encreased, at the other end of the town, as well as in the city.

The phrase of "gratifying private resentments," came originally from the Ministry; upon the applications of Messrs. S——n and B——n, for other convoy, which was refused for some time, Lord Anson telling them, that "in place of labouring for the interest of the Company and the Nation, their sole aim seemed to be the gratifying their private resentments, distressing his Majesty's service, and embroiling their Constituents affairs."

How these intestine feuds in Leadenhall-Street must affect the public weal of the Company, and in them the Nation, is but too obvious. The future authority of a Court of Directors can have no estimation, as their orders and resolutions for the government of their affairs and settlements abroad, will be now liable to be canvassed and controuled by every quarterly General Court; and a still worse consequence is, that no Gentleman of independant fortune, worth and character, will ever, on these terms, accept a seat in the Direction.

IT is extremely remarkable, how great the resemblance between the transactions of those times, and the present is: the reflections at the close of the foregoing narrative suiting the one, as well as the other, prove the compiler of it a most judicious prophet, foretelling that the government of your Court of Directors, would be brought to nought by their own self-interested and intestine broils; a prediction now pretty well accomplished.

ed. What then can ensue, but the most alarming confusion in your affairs? But to resume our subject. You here see the most unfortunate of your servants fallen the sacrifice of party fury; and you will also see him in the sequel persecuted, slandered, and superceded in that rank they then allotted him, by every following dispatch, and all from the same rancorous cause, as we shall make appear, when we have done with the pamphlet before us; to which we now return.

In page 37, are the following passages. "After the departure of Colonel Clive, the delicacy that he had used towards him (the Nabob) was intirely thrown aside. His successor in the government, who had been particularly instrumental in bringing down *Sou Raja Dowla*, and consequently, in occasioning the first revolution in Bengal, had arrived at his dignity, contrary to the intention of his constituents, and intirely through the accident of a number of his seniors going home at this time in disgust. Being blessed with a genius, uncommonly fertile in expedients for raising money, and further unclogged by those silly notions of punctilio, which often stand in the way betwixt some people and fortune, he had projected and put in practice several inferior manœuvres; but this *chef d'Oeuvre*, this master scheme, though formed almost as soon as he came to power, time did not allow him the honour of executing." Again page 39, "It must here again be acknowledged, that the Gentlemen in the direction showed so little intention, that the accidental governor should have ever come to that trust, that *they now removed him to be the seventh in council*. Being endued however with a very high degree of what, in some, is called address, enforced by a great share of plausibility in argument, he found these talents of singular use to him on this occasion. His *grand plan* being now almost ripe for execution, could not be concealed from his successor: he wavered some days about continuing in the service of his masters in that *degraded rank*." Again, lower down in the same page and page 40. "But it does not redound much to the honour of *this degraded governor*, nor plead greatly in favour of the disinterestedness of his views, that after *such a stigma, such a mark* put upon him by his superiors, he could (though during his short government he had acquired a handsome fortune) submit to serve in the seventh place, after having been in the first.

The last quotation we shall trouble you with from this anonymous author, is where he makes a blundering abusive apology, for all the abuses he has so lavishly bestowed, almost throughout pages 37 to 41, exclusive of those parts we have already noticed.

Page 40 exhibits as follows, " I should not have dwelt so particularly, " on these seemingly trifling incidents, nor should I have descended so low " as to touch individuals, had I not found it absolutely necessary towards " drawing one *material inference*, which is, that this scheme of Nabob- " changing borrows no lustre from the character of it's original projector." Quere, Who does this pamphleteer mean by the term *original projector*? It cannot be the gentleman we are defending, for he has most fully proved he never projected any scheme of the kind: therefore this intended abuse, can only touch the projectors of the revolution of 1757, as they only were the original schemers of *Nabob-changing*. He pleads *absolute necessity* for drawing one *material inference*, which is no intelligible inference at all, and only proves his ungovernable appetite to slander, but unluckily mistakes the object.

Leaving the continued indecent strain of this author to revert on himself, we shall confine ourselves to those charges against Mr. Holwell, which, with Corinthian front, the author makes to bear the semblance of facts: These are,

First, (Page 37.) that " Mr. Holwell was particularly instrumental in " bringing down the Sou Raja Dowla; and the cause of the first revolution, &c.

" 2dly, That his fertile genius in expedients for raising money, unclogged with any checks or punctilios of honour, or honesty, (for this " is plainly implied, though not so plainly expressed) had projected and " put in practice several *inferior manœuvres*."

3dly, (Page 39 and 40) It seems objected to this gentleman as a crime, that he was *removed to the seventh in Council*; and the terms following, of *degraded rank, stigma, and mark* put him by your Court of Directors, are all very well framed to enforce the opinion, that Mr. Holwell must assuredly have been guilty of some atrocious breach of trust, or other iniquitous conduct in your service, to have deserved being thus *removed* and thus *degraded*; for Anonymous himself, allows him abilities and address, therefore he could not have been degraded for want of capacity to conduct your affairs; the uninformed, though impartial among you, will very naturally conclude there must have been some blemish, some crime, some unfaithfulness in this your servant, that drew on him the high displeasure of your Court of Directors, for they are *honourable men*, and would not, you may suppose, *degrade* any of your faithful servants without sufficient and just reason, because therein they would be guilty of a breach of THAT TRUST, with which they are invested BY YOU.

Now

Now that this gentleman was so treated, is fact; and herein Anonymous for once speaks truth. To be removed, degraded, stigmatized, and marked by our superiors, when done with reason and justice, carries its own vindication; but when done from partial and unjust motives, stimulated by party rage, these stigmas, marks and degradations, reflect not on the *degraded*, but on the *degraders*.

Thus have we inverted the order of our reply, and spoke *first* to the *last* charge; we shall persist in our method, and speak next to the second, which is plainly levelled at this Gentleman's conduct in your Zemindarry, (or Court of Cutcherry at Fort William, Bengal) which has been aspersed, particularly in the year 1758, and never sufficiently cleared up. In order to this, it becomes necessary to give you a short account how it came to pass, that this gentleman was appointed to this post of Zemindar, and likewise to explain to you the nature of the post itself.

Your Court of Directors, about the year 1748, coming to the knowledge of sundry abuses and depredations, made in your annual revenues of the Zemindary at Bengal, by one Govindram Metre, (who had been for 28 years the standing Black Deputy in that office, whilst the head of it was continually fluctuating and changing) and being also totally strangers to the nature of the office; a leading Director of your then Court, having more curiosity concerning this branch of your affairs than the rest, wrote in strenuous terms to a gentleman of high rank in your service there: this gentleman having never past through the office, could not give the satisfaction required; but knowing that Mr. Holwell was on his departure for England, with whom he was upon the strictest footing of friendship, he communicated to him the letter he had received from his patron at home, and being sensible that Mr. Holwell by his knowledge in the language, (and having been many years a member of, and two years at the head of your Mayors Court at Calcutta, where frequently suits were commenced and brought to issue between the natives) had acquired a deeper insight into the nature and frauds of this office, than any other person in the settlement; requested his permission, to refer his friend and patron to him for information, on his arrival in England, which was readily assented to.

In the course of the voyage Mr. Holwell threw into some form, the many materials he had by him respecting this office, and on his arrival communicated them to the Director before mentioned, and to another gentleman, your chairman, without any view, but that of benefiting the Company, as he then, and for many months after, had no intention of ever seeing India again; but finding (as many others who return from India with small fortunes do,) that money does not go so far in England as he
 4 fondly

fondly imagined, he thought it necessary to return and increase his capital, then lying at interest only, in your cash at Fort William.

Thus determined, he applied to the leading gentlemen in your Direction to be sent out in your service; his application met with success, and he was in January 1752 appointed to the post of Zemindar, and 12th in council at Fort William, not to be removed from that post without express orders from home, nor to rise higher in your council. These two restrictions peculiar to this gentleman, were adopted at his own mere motion and request, for the following reasons; first as he was sensible no reform could possibly be made in the office, whilst the head of it was fluctuating by rotation as heretofore, by which custom it sometimes happened that there were two or three Zemindars within the space of one year; by this ill-judged measure, they were unavoidably kept in the dark as to the real state and nature of this office, and a power in perpetuity devolved to the standing deputy, who was always stiled the Black Zemindar: and such was the tyranny of this man, and such the dread conceived of him in the minds of the natives, that no one durst complain or give information against him, howsoever oppressed; and this consideration made it necessary for Mr. Holwell to insist on this person's being dismissed that service the moment he arrived in Bengal, which was accordingly complied with, and orders sent out to commence a prosecution against him. To give you an idea of this prosecution, and the infinite labour it occasioned Mr. Holwell, we shall in its place insert three of his letters to the Board of Calcutta on the subject.

It was thought a seat at the board of Calcutta was necessary to give a proper weight to this officer, in the reform he had proposed making; he desired his rank might be *fixed* youngest in council, as thereby he did not carry out with him the odium of superseding any gentleman in your service.

When this gentleman was sent out your covenanted servant, under the patronage of William Baker, Esq; (now Sir William) and William Mabbot, Esq; your Court of Directors consisted of the following gentlemen, *viz.*

Roger Drake, Esq; Chairman
William Baker, Esq; Deputy
William Mabbot, Esq;
William Braund, Esq;
Chris. Burrow, Esq;
Charles Cutts, Esq;
Peter Ducane, Esq;

Sam. Feake, Esq;
Abel Fonnereau, Esq;
Peter Godfrey, Esq;
Charles Gough, Esq;
John Hope, Esq;
Mich. Impey, Esq;
Stephen Law, Esq;

Nich.

Nich. Linwood, Esq;	William Rider, Esq;
Nathaniel Newnham junior, Esq;	Thomas Rous, Esq;
John Payne, Esq;	Timothy Tullie, Esq;
Henry Plant, Esq;	William Willy, Esq;
Jones Raymond, Esq;	

Here it becomes needful to add a short explanation of the nature of this officer's duty, in quality of Zemindar.

The Zemindar acts in a double capacity, distinct, and independant of each other, (with very few exceptions) the one as superintendant and collector of your revenues, the other, as judge of the Court of Cutcherry, a tribunal constituted for the hearing, trying, and determining all matters and things, both civil and criminal, wherein the natives only, subjects of the Mogul, are concerned. He tried in a summary way, had the power of the lash, fine, and imprisonment; he determined all matters of *meum* and *tuum*; and in all criminal cases, proceeded to sentence and punishment immediately after hearing, except where the crime (as murder) requires the lash to be inflicted until death, in which case he suspends execution of the sentence, until the fact and evidence are laid before the president, and his confirmation of the sentence is obtained. He has also the power to condemn thieves, and other culprits, to work in chains upon the roads, during any determinate space of time, or for life. In all causes of property, an appeal lay to the president and council against his decrees.

Such was the power annexed to this office, when this gentleman was appointed the head of it, and such had it been for a long term of years preceding that period; a power by much too great for any *one man* to be intrusted with. Therefore in the year 1758, at the recommendation of Mr. Holwell, a stop was put to it by the Court of Directors, who appointed three judges of this court, members of the board, in monthly rotation. Before this gentleman took charge of this important post, there never had been any register of causes or decrees kept in English; but from that time, a register of the proceedings was monthly laid before the board at Calcutta, for their inspection, and annually transmitted to your Court of Directors. Here permit us to remark, that though this gentleman was, for the space of four years, (that is, from the beginning of July 1752, to the capture of your settlement) sole judge of this court, not a single complaint was ever preferred against him in his judicial capacity in criminal causes, and *but one appeal* from his judgments and decrees in matters of property, and *of that*, only the half reversed, and the rest confirmed. But the conduct and merit of this gentleman, in this, as well as the other branches of this laborious office, you shall not take upon trust from us his friends, who may be deemed partial,

partial, but shall, in good time, have them from stronger vouchers, and superior judges.

We proceed next to the three letters before mentioned, touching the prosecution of Govindram Metre, and then to convey an idea to you of the duty of the Zemindar, relative to the revenues; and this we shall do in this gentleman's own words, without any abridgment, in a work which he entitled A STATE OF THE REVENUES, transmitted to your Court of Directors in a letter to the board of Calcutta. The work is long, and to some may appear unintelligible and tedious, but to others interesting and curious; howsoever this may be, our plan of defence calls for it, in proof of Mr. Holwell's talents, and his indefatigable and unwearied exertion of those talents in your service.

To the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq; President and Governor, &c.
Council.

Fort William, Aug. 13. 1752.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

THE 20th ult. I thought it necessary to move you that Govindram Metre should give security to the Board for his appearance, on account of some frauds I had traced, regarding the Company's Revenues under his management; and though the short time I have been in the office, and my necessary attendance to the current business of it, will not at present sufficiently enable me to digest all the informations that have reached me, wherein I think the Company have been heavily injured during the twenty-eight years of this man's administration; yet, as far as I am able, my duty tells me I ought to lay before you, without loss of time; the more so, as I am well informed, he is distributing and secreting his ill-got wealth in various places, and by various methods.

The Farms, and monthly charges Jemmidary have first drawn my attention, as they are first in consequence to the Honourable Company: my remarks on the duties on exportation of rice, etlach, fines, &c. I must reserve for a subsequent address; but as Govindram Metre may have the subterfuge to plead, of all accounts of the revenues being passed under the hands of the Zemindars, and lest his glaring frauds should seem tacitly to censure the neglect of those gentlemen, I beg your Honour, &c's leave, previously to obviate that, both by saying, that the accounts, frauds as well as errors, are excepted; and that whilst the post of Zemindary was transitory and fluctuating, and this man invested with power, a retrospection

into the state of the Company's revenues with any material success, would have been morally impossible, ~~as not one~~ of the natives, from the highest to the lowest, durst with impunity have given the least umbrage to him; and it is they only that could have explored the dark and intricate mazes, in which he has so long concealed himself from the eyes and stroke of justice.

Two of the principal farms, viz. the Rice Farm, and Buzar Calcutta, commonly called the Great Buzar, I must likewise reserve for the subject of another letter, and proceed now to the others, whose annual Pottahs, or grants, bear date the first of November; and here I must begin with confessing to your Honour, &c. an error of my own. I always imagined the farms were sold at public outcry, or auction, in the Cutcherry, in the presence of the Zemindar; and think I told as much to some of our Honourable masters, as believing it impossible to be otherwise; but am sorry to say no such essential and necessary method has been practised for these ten years; a circumstance I should not mention here, did not what follows make it absolutely necessary: for, on the contrary, Govindram Metre's house, I find, has, for that space, been the place where the prices have been affixed to each farm, not by auction to the highest bidder, but privately at the prices he chose to take the best of them himself at, under fictitious names; that is, those that would yield the best and most certain profit; and disposed of the others that were more precarious, to his friends and dependants: these prices he reports to the Zemindar for his confirmation, and the several Pottahs are ordered to be drawn out accordingly. Of the farms which he has usually taken to himself under fictitious names, I shall now speak only to the following, viz.

Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar	} In the name of his servant Perethram Huzzurah.
Baug Buzar Haut and Buzar	
Charles Buzar and Haut	} All these in the name of Nilmony Gose, his Brother Sookdeb Metre's grandson.
Haut Cola Buzar	
Douba Parrah	
Suttanutty's Dour Beckry and Koora Pocha	

It may be objected in his favour, that there might be loss on these farms as well as gain; but this objection will avail him little, when I make it appear to your Honour, &c. that he secures his gain as soon as, or rather before, he takes them to himself, by farming them out again to third persons; so that the case stands exactly thus: — This man has an absolute trust and confidence reposed in him, in the disposal of the Company's farms, the best

of which he farms at an under rate to himself, in a fictitious name, and at the same time farms them out again at an immediate gain; a fraud than which I know not a greater. Your Honour, &c. must be sensible how difficult it must be, to investigate a series of accounts and transactions for twenty-eight years past; the forming vouchers for which, have, without controul, remained solely in the power of this man; and whatever evidence might have been against him, as to former times, does possibly now not exist: therefore the utmost that can be done in this case, is to fix him in frauds as near as I can to the present time; and equitably to recommend to your Honour, &c. on behalf of our Honourable Masters, a judgment on the whole of his conduct, from the few specimens I am now going to lay, in as clear a light as possible, before you: and first, I shall prove his having taken the several farms abovementioned to himself at an under rate, in the years 1749, 1750, and 1751, and farm'd them out again at an immediate advance, Soota Nutty Haut and Suba Buzar being farm'd out in the different articles to different people.

Anno. SOOTA NUTTY HAUT.

1749	Farm'd at	3525	Farm'd out again at	4851	Gains per annum	1326
1750	- -	3600	- - - - -	5315	- - - - -	1715
1751	- -	3600	- - - - -	5385	- - - - -	1785

SUBAH BUZAR.

1749	- -	1325	- - - - -	2271	- - - - -	946
1750	- -	1400	- - - - -	2381	- - - - -	981
1751	- -	1400	- - - - -	2672	- - - - -	1272

BAUG BUZAR and HAUT.

1749	- -	775	Farm'd to Kitteram Paul	1200	- - - - -	425
1750	- -	765	to Purpuram	1000	- - - - -	235
1751	- -	765	to ditto	1000	- - - - -	235

DOOBA PARRAH SAYAR.

1749	- -	208	to Harry Kiffon Coyal	437	- - - - -	229
1750	- -	400	to Terra Chund Dutt	474	- - - - -	74
1751	- -	468	to ditto	542	- - - - -	74

KOORA PACHA and DUAR BECKRY SOOTA NUTTY.

1749	- -	162	Farm'd to Satoo Mastry	250	- - - - -	88
1750	- -	152	to Bechue Mundell	270	- - - - -	118
1751	- -	152	to Ditto	270	- - - - -	118

CHARLES BUZAR and HAUT.

1749	- -	378	Farm'd to Kitteram Paul	416	- - - - -	38
1750	- -	240	to Purpuram Sircar	331	- - - - -	90
1751	- -	240	to Harry Kiffon Coyal	335	- - - - -	95

From the foregoing statement, your Honour, &c. may readily judge, how immensely the Company have been injured in the whole of their revenues during this man's long administration; but if we should suppose he has only made this advantage during the ten years last past, that the farms have been in a manner abandoned to his conduct, we shall, by parity of reason, find the Company defrauded, in that space, of no less than the principal sum of Rupees 32813 15 6 in these farms only; but this favourable conclusion he has no right to expect, as I think I shall be able to demonstrate, there is not any one branch of the Revenues wherein he has not been consistent in defrauding, to the utmost extent of his power.

Before I quit this subject, I think it needful to inform your Honour, &c. that Govindram Metre has, this year, by his own authority, levied a tax from the farmers of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the amount of their several farms (over and above the 10 per cent. usually taken from them, as the allowed perquisite of the Zemindar) which he has converted to his own use.

The monthly charges Zemindary, is the next article I shall at present submit to your Honour, &c.'s consideration and censure, under three divisions, viz. servants in monthly pay, charges making and repairing Cutcherries and Chowkey houses, and charges.

In regard to the servants in the Cutcherry, I find the Company has been, time out of mind, defrauded by Govindram Metre, in the monthly sum of 166 Rupees, exclusive of his monthly allowance of 112 8; the particulars of which are, viz.

27 Pikes, 17 always employed in his own service, 3 whose pay he has always received, and 7 his menial servants under this denomination; 27 at 2 Rupees per mensem	54
19 Buckferrias, 14 nominal only, and 5 at his town of Kissen-Poor; for these he receives monthly	59
Boncheram receives no wages, yet charged at	8
Kissen Gofe, Rogu Metre's Cotta servant	5
Ramchurnd Tagoor, another servant of Rogu Metre	3
Barnafa Scatdut, Metre's Maulda Gomastah	5
Tilluckram, under the name of Bredju Mahone	10
6 Gwallers	12
Munkindram Mundell, at Metre's Gottabarry	3
Nunderam Gofe, a gratuity	7
Rupees per mensem	166

In this particular your Honour, &c. observes the Company has been defrauded of Rupees 1992 per annum; and as we cannot reasonably imagine, he was less scrupulous when he was more indigent, so I think it will not be deemed unjust to charge him with this fraud for 28 years last past; and then it will appear, we have here another manifest claim on him, on behalf of our Honourable Masters, for the principal sum of Rupees 55776.

I am next to represent to your Honour, &c. that I have extracted from the monthly charges Zemindary, the expences account, making and repairing the several Cutcherries and Chowkey houses, from February 1747, to March 1752; and find in that space no less a sum to that account, than Rupees 9018 8; a charge most infamous, and self-evident to every member of this Board, when I further inform your Honour, &c. that 5184 8 of this sum is under the head of repairing the great Cutcherry, on which a tythe has not been expended in that time, as I will prove, if needful, from a thousand witnesses; and the same as to the other straw houses, under the denomination of Cutcherry and Chowkey houses; but as I would rather lessen than exaggerate every charge against him, I will suppose the Company defrauded in this period of five years 7000 Rupees only, which, during his administration, will amount to the principal sum of Rupees 39,200.

The charges in repairing the roads, drains and bridges, within the same period of time, I find swelled to the enormous sum of Rupees 7884 15 9; out of which there stands to the account of repairing the Dumdum and Barrasut roads, Rupees 2819; of which, 1036 7 are appropriated to the years 1750 and 1751. Now, to give your Honour, &c. a specimen of his frauds in this part of the monthly charge, I will observe, that the Company is debted by him in October 1751, Rupees 520 4, for the repairs of the Dumdum and Barasut roads; whereas, by the accounts I have laid before me, it appears there was really no more expended on these roads in the years 1750 and 1751, than 342 pound, 6 pund and 10 gundas of Cowries; and these collected from the neighbouring riots or tenants, which has always been practised towards repairing the out-roads of the town (though where a Rupee has been collected, not more than six Annaes have been expended) and the Company besides constantly charged for this article at an immense rate; a double fraud, that merits the highest censure and punishment. From the consideration of these particulars, it is manifest the Company has yearly been defrauded of almost the whole that has been charged on this account, a small expence on building and repairing two or three bridges excepted; which, with the utmost indulgence to Govindram Metre, cannot reduce the fraud within the five years above specified,

specified, to less than 6000 Rupees; and, on the whole of his administration, to the principal sum of 33600 Rupees.

Last year I observe a charge continued for ten months, at the rate of 32 Rupees per menssem, on account of looking after Cutmah's houses: the postways and guard employed for this service, were the monthly servants of the Company; and yet the Company is not only by Metre debted on this account, but I am very credibly informed, he likewise levied the same from the Cutmahs. I mention this article chiefly with a view of demonstrating to your Honour, &c. that every intervening bye-path to knavery has been as regularly traversed and infested by him as the high road of iniquity, in which he has so long and unmolested raised contributions from the Company, as well as from every one of the inhabitants that have unluckily fallen within his gripe, or that of his son Rogu Metre. Instances of this last nature are so many, that by what I have already heard, I fear if I had as many ears as Argus had eyes, they would be much too insufficient to receive them; but those, with the proofs I am possessed of, touching his connections with the common murderers and robbers of the town, I must reserve for a volume by themselves, and close this present remonstrance against him with recapitulating and throwing into one total the foregoing principal sums, for which, I am of opinion, the Company has an immediate and specific claim on him, with interest that may be due thereon; just premising, that as wages are, or at least ought to be, deemed the reward of service and faithfulness; and as this man, in the place of promoting the service of the Company, has, in breach of his trust and duty, injured their affairs by every wicked practice in his power, so I think he has very justly forfeited whatever wages he has received, and therefore submit it to your Honour, &c. whether he should not be mulcted in a sum equal thereto; and as I cannot doubt but I shall meet your concurrence in so equitable a charge, I will add it to the others, viz.

9 years, at 30 Rupees per menssem	—	3240
12 ditto, at 50	— — — —	7200
GOVINDRAM METRE		Dr.
To frauds on the farms held himself	- - -	32813 15 6
To ditto in the monthly charge of servants	- -	55776 0 0
To ditto account charges repairing the Cutcherrys	-	39200 0 0
To ditto account charges repairing the roads, &c.	-	33600 0 0
To ditto account the guard on Cotmah's house	- -	320 0 0
		<hr/>
To the mulct of his wages		161709 15 6
		<hr/>

I beg leave to represent to your Honour, &c. that when the interest which is strictly due to the Company is calculated on the first total, it becomes a sum of no small importance; and therefore I humbly insist, on the behalf of our Honourable Masters, that Govindram Metre be immediately committed to close confinement, until the same is discharged; and that a sufficient military guard be, without loss of time, placed on his several houses; and that his son Rogu Metre be obliged to give good security for his appearance.

On entering my office, I found it heavily burthened with sinecures, perquisites, and unnecessary servants, which I have the pleasure to inform your Honour, &c. stand reduced for this month of August, to the amount of 550 Rupees, amongst which the charge of Pykes was a very needless and considerable one; for of the 143 retained in the service, I found 64, (exclusive of Metre's 27) stationed as a nightly guard to the several inhabitants houses; as I saw no propriety in the Company's bearing this expence (trifling to each individual, but a heavy one to them) I thought it reasonable to retrench that amongst the rest, having still retained the Head Pyke, his 11 Niabs or deputies, and 35 Pykes only, as needful for the service; the Head Pyke still remaining, as usual, security for any night guard he sends, at the request of the inhabitants; and further than this, they are of no use towards the guarding or safety of the town; for, on strict review and muster of the whole body, I could not pick out more than 30 that were trained Pykes, or had any pretension to that title, further than as they (occasionally to pass muster) were loaded with their usual arms. I am, most respectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,
Your most obedient humble servant,

To the Honourable ROGER DRAKE, Esq; President and Governor, &c.
Council.

Honourable Sir and Sirs;

Fort William, Aug. 17, 1752.

AS it appears to me beyond a doubt, that Govindram Metre will not only make every delay in his power, in giving in his answer to the charge contained in my letter, addressed to your Honour, &c. under date the 13th instant, but will, by every art and means, endeavour to take off the evidence against him; I think it extremely necessary now to lay before you the nature of the proofs I have to support the charge exhibited against him; which I request may now be examined before the Board, or a Committee appointed, without loss of time, for that purpose; of which, (as this affair is of no small consequence to the Company) I beg leave to move that the President may be one.

In regard, first, to the farms taken to himself, and farm'd out at an immediate advance, the particulars, as laid before your Honour, &c. I think he will not contest or deny; but if he should, I have the several accounts thereof ready to be laid before you.

Touching the overcharge of servants in monthly pay, I need only refer your Honour, &c. to the Buxey's roll of the Pykes and Bucksferrias, and to the Cutcherry Podar, or Shroff, who is at hand with their several accounts.

The overcharge account repairing the Cutcherrys is so self-evident, that I need only refer your Honour, &c. to your own judgments, but more particularly to the gentlemen who have preceded me in the office.

In regard to the double fraud and exorbitant charge of repairing the roads, I have ready to lay before this Board the Banian's books, employed on this service, and the Head Peon attending him.

Touching the article of Cotmah's guard, I have now this further circumstance to add, that in place of 320 Rupees charged the Company, and collected from the Cotmahs, I am well informed, he exacted from them on this account, October 26, C. Rs. 654. viz.

On account Bolly and Perith Cotmah	—	—	327	0
On account Duloll Cotmah	—	—	163	8
On account Ponchu Cotmah	—	—	163	8
			<hr/>	
			C. Rs.	654 0
				<hr/>

For proof of this article, your Honour, &c. will be pleased to order the Cotmahs to appear before you, and declare, on their oaths, if this fact is or is not as I have represented it.

On the whole of these five articles, I can scarcely think he will be hardy enough to deny or contest any of them, as they each of them almost prove themselves; however if he should, the proofs, I may say, are now in a manner in the hands of your Honour, &c. and you will doubtless take such resolutions therein, as will equitably conduce to the interest of our Honourable Masters.

It is some concern to me, that I should have so far differed in judgment from so great a majority of this Board, when I thought the charge exhibited against Govindram Metre was self-evident enough to enforce the necessity of

of his confinement; but though my remonstrance had not weight sufficient, either to procure that, or even a guard for the security of his effects, yet that must not slacken my endeavours in search of the Company's rights; as I will still hope I shall not always be so unlucky, or so far mistaken in my judgment as to want the approbation and concurrence of your Honour, &c. in what I shall lay before you.

On taking charge of my office, I found the last monthly account of revenues delivered into council was the month of March; on which I thought it expedient to hasten the accounts of April, May and June, as much as possible, but found the delays in Metre without end; when sending for him into the publick Cutcherry, and asking him the reason of these delays, his answer was, That it was occasioned by some articles that he had recollected, which ought to have been brought to the credit of the Company sooner, an account of which he then gave me, to the amount of C. Rs. 2809 3 9, telling me he wanted to bring them to credit in the account of revenues for April; to which I objected, that as he was sensible I had traced those very frauds, and that some of them were five years standing, I could not admit of more being brought to credit in April, than were really the transactions of the preceding year, which I likewise represented to Mr. Manningham, and met with his approval; accordingly, in the accounts revenues for April, laid before your Honour, &c. the 13th instant, Rupees 842 8 of the above sum are brought to credit, so that according to his account delivered me, there remains a ballance due to the Company of C. Rs. 1966 11 9, account frauds confessed, in the several articles of duty on Rice Sallishammah, (or arbitration bonds) Ruffey Sallamy, (or measuring contested grounds) Gur Huzreys (or servants wages forfeited) and Mooriannees, from April 1747, during the several Zemindaries of Messrs. Kempe, Eyles, Cruttenden and Watts; I justly call these frauds confessed, not only as he knew I had traced them, but because I have this convincing argument to alledge, they never would have been brought to credit, but as a consequence of the scrutiny I had begun to make into his conduct; for he had as early as the 29th of June, adjusted the account revenues for the month of April, and closed the credit side of the account; and the whole was wrote fair, and wanted only balancing and signing, and not one of these recollected articles brought to credit. But as almost every hour comes freighted with his frauds, it is my duty to lay them before your Honour, &c. as they occur.

Unteram Dut stood during Mr. Forster's government, a pensioner on the Cutcherry books, at 20 Rupees per mensem, which he received till Mr. Eyles struck him off. In the beginning of Mr. Rooper's Zemindary he was again restored, and received one month's allowance; but since that it has been received by Metre or Rogu Metre, on pretence of a balance due

from Untream to the latter, 24 months at 20 Rupees, which is 460 : for proof of which the Cutcherry Podar, and Unteram are in waiting.

The 15th, Gosebeg Jemmautdaar complained to me, that he had not received a Cowrie of the wages due to him and ten Peons, that were placed as a guard at Govindpoor Gunge in March last, to look after the rice. Recollecting a charge of this kind, I turned to that month's account revenues, and found the Company debted for Rs. 232 10 for this service, account 20 Buckerferrias and two Ponsoys, whereas there were in truth only the Peons above mentioned, and 10 of the Company's Buckferrias from the different Chowkeys on board the Ponsways, and the expence of the Ponsways I find was paid by Moideb Huzzarah ; and though the charge is continued to the Company for two months and four days, yet they were actually no longer on this service than one month and seven days, — as Gosebeg, Sowanny, Ponswaar, and Lallmun Mangu, are now in waiting to prove.

By complaint from Nour Cawn, I find, that in a long family dispute between him and his brother Hassein Cawn's widow, the amount of 2107 C. Rs. has been collected from them both, 200 Sicca Rupees of which were received by Metre on account of duty on raw silk, and the rest in fines neither of which has been brought to the Company's credit. The particulars of this infamous affair are too prolix to enumerate to your Honour, &c. at present, therefore shall only request he may be interrogated as to the fact.

The next article I have to submit to your Honour's, &c. judgment, is of a most flagitious nature, and at the same time, will prove as well his perfidiousness to the Company, as his connection with the common robbers, and murderers, that have so many years infested the settlement : I may too justly say, under his wing and protection, to the lasting stain I fear of our name and government : About the latter end of April 1750, the Head Pyke informed Govindram Metre, that he had taken a notorious Decoyt named Diaram, (commonly called Dia) in the house of one Moideb Cussarry, who was likewise known to be connected with these Decoyts. To give your Honour, &c. the result of this affair in as few words as possible, the Head Pyke was ordered by Metre, to sell Moideb's house and effects, which was accordingly done the first of May, the former for 300 Rupees, and the latter for two, and the amount C. Rs. 500 paid by the Head Pyke by Metre's order to Diaram Gose, his relation, and head writer in the Cutcherry, and the murderer ordered to be released. The proof of these facts are now in writing, and more instances of this nature, I have ready to produce against him, when your Honour, &c. has more leisure than you have at present to receive them, or than indeed I have at present to enumerate them.

I have a single observation to make to your Honour, &c. on two articles contained in Metre's account frauds confessed; Gurr Huzreys from 1747 to 1751, in that space he brings to the credit of the Company on that account 392 8 Rupees: now from the nature of things, this deduction must have been always made, more or less, from the wages of the Buxerries, Pykes, &c.—But what is become of it? for, with the utmost diligence, I can trace no credit given on account of this article.

The article Moorianoos, I believe, may need some explanation, as introductory to my observation on it. On every complaint where a Peon is ordered, he receives from the delinquent or defendant three pund of Cowries a day, one pund of which he keeps to himself, one pund 14 gundas belongs to the Company under the head of Etlack, and the remaining six gundas is daily collected apart, out of which the Etlack Mories or writers, are paid their wages, and the over-plus remains to the Company; on account of this article, Metre in his account frauds confessed, brings to credit 370 Rupees from 1749 to 1751, but as I find no credit given since August and September 1743, on this account, I must conclude a further fraud in this, as well as the last mentioned article: both which I submit to your Honour, &c. judgment.

GOVINDRAM METRE			Dr.
To account Cutmah's guards	—	—	334
To account frauds confessed	—	—	1966 11 9
To account Unteram Dutt	—	—	460
To account the guard at the Rice gunge	—	—	232 10
To account Nour Cawn, and Hossein Cawn's widow	—	—	2107
To account Moideb's house and effects	—	—	500

Principal C. Rs. 5600 5 9

I am most respectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servant.

To the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq; President and Governor, &c.
Council.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Fort William, August 27, 1752.

I Observe that Govindram Metre has (in two letters under date the 17th and 24th instant) put in answer to the two first charges I have exhibited against him, on which I beg leave to remark, that if he is thus per-

mitted to answer in a long and fallacious narrative, to every single charge, I foresee a scrutiny into his conduct may become a work of some years; and will be such a heavy tax on my time, that the needful, and I may say hourly attention to my office, will by no means admit of; because my replying to such answers will be absolutely necessary, or our honourable masters may be imposed on, by the speciousness of their appearance; and my replies may occasion his rejoinders to the end of the chapter. The charges I lay against him consist not in argument, but facts, which it is only incumbent on him to admit or deny. If my informations are wrong, and I fail in the proof of them, he will thereby become sufficiently vindicated; therefore, effectually to put a stop to this tedious method, I will only give your Honour, &c. the trouble of this reply, and in future barely lay before the Committee whatever facts occur to me, subsequent to my present information.

I admit his appeal to the Gentlemen that have filled the station of Zemindar, to be strictly true; and I have long known such application to them, on the sale of the farms, to be his constant method of blinding them, as he well knew none durst give them intelligence of their real worth: His imposition on your Honour, &c. in this argument, I cannot help calling extremely audacious; he says, "he always advised the Zemindars a month before the time of sale, of the utmost price he could get for the farms." — Why, Gentlemen! the Pottahs, by which he farmed out on his own account the farms now under consideration, and which carry an advance (some of them) of 70, 80, and 100 per cent. bear date the same day with those, whereby he calls them to himself, in a fictitious name, at that loss to our honourable employers: can your Honour, &c. want a stronger proof of matchless fraud and iniquity than this? I think not. I dare say I shall meet your concurrence in giving it these just appellations. He further says, he gave more for the six farms in 1749, than was given the year before; this I admit; and must remark his advancing sometimes, in a trifling degree, the prices of the farms, as another artful means of blinding his masters: but his assertion, that he gave more for the six farms the two next years, than he gave in 1749, is far from truth; for I have only to refer your Honour, &c. to my letter under date the 13th instant, and you will observe, for three of them he gives less, nay though he farms two of the three on his own account at a higher rate in 1750 and 1751, than in 1749. As to the deduction of the duffutary, or 10 per cent. for the Zemindar, it does not appear to me in any degree probable, that he would neglect levying this fee from those to whom he rented the farms on his own account; which he might do as justly as he levied the $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. the last year, notwithstanding the reasons by which he attempts to palliate that act of power and oppression. He insinuates my leaving out Haut Cola Bazar

in

in my second list with design, as knowing he lost by that Buzar : that I was not capable of so unworthy a design, is manifest from my mentioning it in my first list ; and 2dly, because I know, and will prove, he neither lost or gained by it in the year 1749 and 1750 ; but that he gained 40 Rupees by it in 1751, when he took it at 177 Rupees, and farmed it out again to Purpuram at 217 Rupees. He may with equal truth say, it is with design, in the calculate of his wages, where I charge him 9696, instead of 8484 ; which is as manifest a mistake, as my leaving out the other Buzar in my second list. " He says, that every Rajah's and Zemindar's Duan, over the " whole kingdom, is indulged with some farms for his own profit ; as he " cannot, from his wages, keep up the equipage and attendance necessary " for an officer in his station." This is calculated to deceive elsewhere, as he must know your Honour, &c. is better acquainted with the nature of this government. We know it is a very usual thing for a Duan, or a Duan's Niab, to represent to their principal, that such or such a farm or portion of land produces such an annual profit, and solicits that he may hold it himself ; but it is as well known, that if he is detected in concealing the real profits, or holds them clandestinely in others names, or is found guilty of oppressing or exacting from the people more than the established duties, the lash, fetters, imprisonment, and confiscation, are the immediate consequence ; one crime fully proved against him implies the whole, and he is treated accordingly. To instance one that Metre is perfectly acquainted with.—About 15 years ago, Sahib Ray was Duan to Kritichund Raja ; this Duan had a Niab, or deputy, named Gopee Sing, who was convicted of holding farms clandestinely, of oppressing the people, and of perpetrating other crimes now laid to the charge of Govindram Metre : his punishment was very remarkable ; for after severely suffering the lash, chains, imprisonment, and confiscation, he was fixed in the public highway, and an order issued for every passenger to kick him on the head, under which miserable situation he expired. As Metre's own confession speaks his having plundered agreeably to the maxims of his own nation, so he himself has pointed out, that the laws of his own nation ought to be the measure of his punishment ; and I am much deceived, if your Honour, &c. will not find in the end, that his crimes are in no shape inferior to those of Gopee Sing's. As to his insinuations touching equipage and attendance, I know not, that from the nature of his employ in this settlement, he was intitled to either, in the sense he would imply : How and by what means he had accumulated a judicial power in the place, ten times greater than nine-tenths of his masters, is a point I will not discuss ; but certain it is, that his acquiring any was foreign to his station, which strictly was no more than a head servant of the Zemindar's, and a superintendant of the writers and other servants employed in the revenues ; which station some one or other must fill, without the least necessity of his gaining power, name,

name, or equipage; at least I will venture to assure your Honour, &c. none shall, whilst I have the honour of being at the head of the office.

Metre objects to my charging him ten years on the six farms; to which I say, that where a fraud of three years is proved upon him, I see no injustice in concluding, that fraud was extended further, when the means were equally in his power, though perpetrated, possibly, by different methods. In this, I am sure, I treat him strictly conformable to his own laws, which himself has pleaded in his favour; but this charge I will further illustrate to your Honour in similar instances, where his clandestine gains have been much greater than those already laid before you. The Nimmuck Mahal, or Salt Farm, was farmed by Narratun Biswas, at 1651 10 6 in the year 1751, under a strict stipulation and order of the Zemindary, that he was to levy a duty on that article only of 15½ annas per cent. when his year expired. Metre sent for one Ramram Bose, whom he took into his service, and placed in the management of that farm, telling him, the duty was now to be collected on the Company's account, with orders to let him know, at the end of two or three months, what it produced: this produce amounting, in the months of November, December, and January, to between 900 and 1000 Rupees, Metre takes the farm to himself, in the name of one Conju Bose; and as an instance of his merit and vigilance, advances to the Company 152 4 3 more than it farmed at the year before; this farm has ever since been in his hands, in fictitious names, at a small annual advance; and he has, according to my information, made in these 10 or 11 years, a profit of at least 40,000 Rupees on this farm: the proofs of this must in some degree rest with your Honour, &c. by strictly ordering the Amdanny and Ruffianny accounts, or imports and exports of that article, to be laid before the Committee. When this farm was last year put up to public sale, by order of Mr Burrow, your Honour, &c. may remark, it rose from 2400 to 4034 Rupees; a strong proof of the frauds committed in it.

The Vermillion Farm produced in 1738, Rupees 412; in 1739 Metre takes it at 200; and it has been in his hands clandestinely, in the names of his servants, ever since, and only raised to 225. His profits on this farm, I am informed, during these 13 or 14 years, amount to Rupees 30,000 at least: the proof of which must likewise, as in the last article, rest on your Honour, &c. by ordering him to lay the accounts of both, on his oath, before the committee.

In the duty on Chinam, timbers, and sale of boats, I find, by extracts from the several Assamcees Books, Rupees 960 2 collected by Connuram Tagoor, from November last to June inclusive, of which there is only brought

brought to credit annually about 300 Rupees; so that there has been an annual fraud in it at least of 1000 Rupees: and I think no body will say or believe, that this servant of Metre's can have secreted this annual sum.

After all; it might have been imagined, that, since the Company had been thus defrauded in the annual sale of their farms, those sums for which they were sold (howsoever less than their real value) would at least have been brought to their credit; but on the contrary, I am sorry to advise your Honour, &c. that has not been the case; for having ordered the best Moories I could employ, to draw out, by way of account current, a statement of the yearly amount of the Pottahs and the credits, as they stand in the monthly account revenues, from 1738 to November 1751, I find no less a sum than Rupees 7219, not brought to credit; so that it is too strictly verified, what I have before asserted, that there has been no method unessayed by this man, where there was a possibility of his injuring the trust reposed in him.

I have nothing more to trouble your Honour, &c. with, in reply to his answer of the 17th, than to aver, he has never been debarred inspecting any book whatever in the Cutcherry, that he might think necessary for his defence; and I have given orders, that he may take any copies from thence he pleases. His letter of the 24th needs no reply, as the confuting it wholly depends on proofs to be laid before the Committee: for my own part, I must once more repeat my opinion, that his frauds are too obvious to afford a doubt; but the most convincing proof of them will appear in the increase of the revenues, which points out to me an expedient for your Honour, &c.'s deliberation, that in my own judgment carries great equity with it, and would save us from a most tedious task, which must result from a particular enquiry into every article of his frauds.

I believe it can hardly be imagined, that, with our utmost vigilance and attention, we shall be able to make so much of the Company's revenues, as has been made of them whilst under his management; notwithstanding which, I would propose, that he give good and sufficient security to refund two-thirds of the medium of the increase on two years revenues, commencing from the first of July last; and the better to estimate in what sum he shall be obliged to give security, I will suppose a medium increase of 30,000 Rupees, (and less, I will venture to say, will not be, and yet the poor in many circumstances relieved) two-thirds of which shall be deemed the sum the Company has been annually defrauded of, whilst the revenues have been under his conduct; hence the security will be in the sum of 560,000 Rupees. I am afraid your Honour, &c. will think me too indulgent

indulgent to Metre in this proposition, as there will be so considerable a loss of interest to the Company: however, I will submit it, as it is, to your determination. Touching the examination in council of Anderam Dut, and Rogu Metre, I beg to be indulged a few words more, just to observe that the contested accounts between them are foreign to my charge; it is enough that it is supported by the confession of Rogu Metre; and the depositions of Anderam Dut, and Bulram Podar; so that I must still be of opinion, the Company have an undoubted claim on Rogu Metre for the 460 Rupees, as neither he, nor any one else, in my judgment, can be justified in making a property of the Company to reimburse themselves, even supposing he had any just demand on Anderam, which I have too much reason to believe was not the case. I remain, most respectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servant,

P. S. Since my closing the above, my Moories have brought me in their report of the deficiencies in the duty on exportation of Rice, by which I find the Company defrauded of Rupees 8605 8 6 from Anno 1738, to April 1752, including 1175 15 6 Rupees, which stand in his account frauds confessed. Permit me to remark, that as Metre has been hardy enough to embezzle such considerable sums on the farms, and on this last-mentioned article of duty on Rice exported, though both under the check of an English register, what bounds can we suppose restrained him during the preceding 14 years on the whole of the revenues, when he had no check at all upon him: for I can trace no Cutcherry accounts prior to 1738. If I ask for the accounts of the Gunge before it was farmed I am told they were washed away in the great storm; and if I enquire for any other accounts relative to the revenues, antecedent to the above year, I am told the White Ants have destroyed them.

I am, (ut supra.)

To the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq; President and Governor of Fort William, &c. Council.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

1st. **I**N obedience to your commands touching our Honourable Masters letter of the 16th January 1752, I now lay before you, the result of my enquiries into the several particulars relative to the office of the Zemindary, and state of the Company's revenues; but as a scrutiny of this kind is intirely new, and accompanied with very few traces to guide me in the

the search, your Honour, &c. I hope will not think I have been tardy in the execution of your orders. As the task assigned me has really been a very heavy, though necessary one, yet I have had this satisfaction attending it, that thereby the Company's revenues will in future be put on such a footing, that it will be scarcely possible for further depredations to be made on them of any consequence, as not only the board, but every succeeding Zemindar, may at any time, and at one view, acquire a knowledge of every branch of the Company's duties. The accounts of which, to the minutest article, are now kept in English, by which means the President and Council will have it in their power, to be a constant check upon the Zemindar, as collector of the revenues, and the Zemindar on the subordinate servants of the Cutcherry, to whose management (from the fluctuating post of the Zemindar, his deficiency in the language, and the want of some work of this kind) the revenues have in a manner been abandoned, though unavoidably so, from the above causes.

2d. A reply to the latter part of our Honourable Masters first paragraph will with more propriety come from your Honour, &c. however I must beg leave just to give you my thoughts on the subject, which possibly may coincide with your own, otherwise you will doubtless reply to it more fully, and correct me where you think I may have erred. As to a rehearing of any matter determined in the Cutcherry, to a certain value, I submit it to your Honour, &c. whether an established order or rule of Cutcherry to this purport, would not be attended with the utmost inconvenience; for as these people are beyond doubt the most litigious people existing, it is as certain that no cause to that value would ever be determined without a rehearing. At the same time, permit me to observe, that it is hardly to be imagined a Zemindar would refuse to rehear any cause, upon proper representations made to him; but our Honourable Masters will be convinced, from copy of the judicial proceedings transmitted them, that the Zemindar who pursues the same method, will need little check on his judgments regarding property; for it will there appear an invariable rule, to have every cause determined by arbitrators of the parties own chusing, unless in claims so obvious as to admit of no contest, such as those arising on mortgages, &c, or those of very small value, where the parties are so indigent as not to be able to pay the fees on the arbitration bonds. And when the arbitrators happen to be equally divided in their judgments, the Zemindar interferes no farther than in nominating an umpire, who shall be acceptable to both parties; but if objected to by either, then each to nominate an umpire, and chance to determine; but an instance of this last kind has not happened since I have been in the office. Wherever it appears that the Zemindary embezzles the Company's revenues, oppresses the people, or is guilty of corruption in his judicial proceedings, our Honourable Masters

have left it to your Honour, &c. the redressing these evils, by suspending him from his post; but an appeal from his judgments I do not think the nature of the office will admit of, as they are put in execution as soon as pronounced; but if your Honour, &c. think otherwise, I shall most cheerfully submit to any orders you shall transmit me on that head. Our Honourable Masters, by ordering an English register of the proceedings and fines to be regularly kept, and from time to time to be laid before you, and directing the assistants to attend on Cutcherry days, appear to me to have been the best checks on the Zemindar that could have been devised; to which permit me to recommend to your Honour, &c. that you issue an order from the board, that no Zemindar in future presume to determine any cause privately at his own house, but in public Cutcherry, as the contrary practice may give a latitude to much iniquity.

3d. Under your Honour's, &c. influence and orders, the intentions of our Honourable Masters as set forth in their second paragraph, are already in part put in execution. The farms have been sold at public outcry, agreeable to their instructions, and the poor are relieved by remitting six of the lowest farms, as producing little more to the Company than discredit. The season being now arrived for measuring the ground, my utmost care and attention shall be employed in putting our Honourable Masters orders on that head in execution. In conformity to your Honour, &c. orders, I have made the strictest scrutiny into the several charges of Banians, writers, and other servants of the Cutcherry, under the denomination of Pikes, Peons, and Buckferries; also the charge of Chowkey Boats; and for the reduction made in these articles, I refer you to the several monthly accounts revenues for July, August, September and October, ready to be laid before you, as soon as the months of May and June are passed in council: I have also made the like scrutiny into the heavy charge of repairing the roads, drains, &c. and making and repairing the several Cutcherry, and Chowkey houses, the exorbitancy of which will best appear from the future charges in these particulars. And to illustrate the benefit arising to our Honourable Employers from your orders touching the monthly charges Zemindary, I beg leave to inform your Honour, &c. that I have taken the medium of the last three years nominal and real current charges of this office, as being the lowest, and find it amount to Current Rupees 29818 per annum: the charge of servants under every denomination and Chowkey Boats stands for October reduced to 1567 Rupees per mensem, (or thereabouts, for it is impossible to specify within five or ten Rupees) or 18804 Current Rupees per annum; to this I will add the large allowance of 1200 Rupees per annum, account repairing the roads, &c. and making and repairing the several Cutcheries and Chowkey houses, and other incidental charges; which makes the whole annual charges Zemindary amount only to 20,004 Rupees,

Rupees, from which I think it cannot vary 200 Rupees. Thus I have the pleasure of demonstrating to your Honour, &c. an annual saving of near 10,000 Rupees. And if the present charge can in any shape, with propriety, be further reduced, my utmost endeavours shall not be wanting. In regard to the last part of this paragraph, and part of the third, I have only to observe to your Honour, &c. for the information of our Honourable Masters, that the Duffutary, or 10 per Cent. on the annual sale of the farms, from the best intelligence I can acquire, has been exacted from the farmers, (I believe with the knowledge of the board) by every Zemindar (Mr. Jackson excepted) as an established fee or perquisite; but how this custom obtained, or by what appointment it became established, I cannot learn. Be this as it may, it will require very few words to demonstrate, the Company have suffered this deduction on their farms for 13 or 14 years, and that they, and not the farmers, have been the losers. The value affixed to each farm has been in current rupees; but the Duffutary collected has been always in Madras Rupees, (the Gunge excepted) which is adding 10 per Cent. upon the Duffutary. This article is now brought to the credit of the Company, and points out another gain of current Rupees 645⁻, as per account sales of the farms 20th October, already before you. I have only to add, that every Cutcherry allowance, fee, and perquisite, formerly appropriated to the Zemindar, are now also duly brought to the Company's credit.

4th, Our Honourable Masters 5th paragraph remains now only to be spoke to, wherein we are directed to transmit them a particular description of the several branches of duty belonging to the Zemindary, with the several articles of revenue, under the inspection of the Zemindar, and explain the nature of them. To make this description the more intelligible, I think it expedient to divide the whole of the Company's revenues under three heads; viz. Ground-rent, Farms, and the several duties arising on articles not farmed, but collected daily, and arising from the current transactions of the Cutcherry. Touching the first head, I imagine I shall have occasion to address your Honour, &c. largely, when I have completed the measurement of the ground; so that what I lay before you now on this subject, I take as standing at present on the Cutcherry books, and would only have it esteemed as a short introduction to that period.

* The town of Calcutta is divided into four principal districts, under the denominations of *Dee Calcutta*, (under which *John Nagore* is included) *Govindpoore*, *Soota Nutty*, and *Bazar Calcutta*; to each of which, and to the great Bazar, are appropriated a distinct Cutcherry, whose accounts are all transmitted to, and center in the great Cutcherry of *Dee Calcutta*. These four districts contain 5472 $\frac{1}{2}$ Bega of ground, (each containing 20 S 2 Cotta)

Cotta) on which the Company receive ground-rent at 3 Sicca Rupees per Bega per annum, some few places excepted, hereafter to be specified, which pay a less rent. Exclusive of the above 5472½ Bega, the Company possess 733 Bega, which pay no ground-rent. The distribution of ground that pays rent, and that which pays none, is as follows, viz.

Ground-rent received on				
Bega Cotta.				
Dee Calcutta	1704	3	Containing houses	3422
Soota Nutty	1861	5 $\frac{1}{2}$	- - - -	2374
Govindpoore	1044	13 $\frac{1}{2}$	- - - -	1753
Bazar Calcutta	560	2 $\frac{1}{4}$	- - - -	689
John Nagore	228	1 $\frac{1}{2}$	- - - -	606
Baag Bazar	57	17 $\frac{1}{4}$	- - - -	173
Lott Bazar	10	9	- - - -	81
Santose Bazar	5	8 $\frac{1}{2}$	- - - -	53
<hr/>				
	5472	0 $\frac{1}{2}$	Potta's, or houses	9451
	733		Each potta or	
<hr/>				
Total of the	} 6205 0 $\frac{1}{2}$			
Company's				
Ground				
<hr/>				

something short of 1 Bega and 15 Cotta of Ground
i. e. 1½ B.

Ground on which no Rent is received.		Bega Cotta
Ground occupied by the Company	}	310 5 $\frac{1}{2}$
Donations - - -		16 11
Churches - - -		7 19
Moors Mosques - - -		15 7 $\frac{1}{2}$
To Gentoo Idols - - -		13 13
Given to sundry Bramins		242
Ditto to the Gentoo Poor		14 12
Ditto to the Moors ditto		30 15
Grounds bought by devout persons to make Tanks	}	62 18 $\frac{1}{2}$
Indulgences - - -		18 10 $\frac{1}{2}$
		<hr/>
Bega		733

Within the Company's bounds, there is also ground possessed by proprietors, independant of our Government, to the amount of about 3050 Bega, according to the exactest estimate I can at present make, viz.

The district of Simlea	-	1000
Molunga	-	800
Mirzapoor		1000
Hogulcourea		250
		<hr/>
B.		3050
		<hr/>

These 3050 Bega, calculated agreeably to the foregoing proportion, will be found to contain 5267 houses; which, added to those under the Company's protection, will make the whole amount of houses 14718. I add them together, because they equally contribute to the consumption of those articles, on which the Company's revenues arise. The independence of the above 4 districts arose from the towns originally belonging to different proprietors; and when the Phirmaund gave us a grant to purchase these towns, with the restriction of satisfying the Zemindars, some of them could not be prevailed upon to alienate theirs: so that in consequence they have remained distinct and independant ever since. The proprietors of the above 14718 houses, for distinction sake, I will call Principal Tenants,

or Holders of Pottas; who have again their lodgers or under-tenants, within the limits of their respective Pottas, in the following proportion on an average, agreeably to the exactest judgment I can make, as well as the best information I have acquired, *viz.* each principal Potta-holder, who possesses 1 Bega of ground, has five under-tenants who hold of him; therefore, adding the 3050 Bega contained in the four independant towns, to the 5472 Bega, the property of the Company, the whole amount of Bega's will be 8522; and this again multiplied by six, will give the number of houses that are properly in Calcutta, *viz.* 51132; and this sum again multiplied by 8, a very moderate estimate of the inhabitants contained in each house, it gives the number of souls in Calcutta, *viz.* 409056 constant inhabitants, without reckoning the multitude that daily come in and return, but yet who add to the consumption of the place. I will trouble your Honour, &c. at present on this subject, no farther than just to reduce the Bega into English measure, and point out to our Honourable Masters the extent of ground they possess in this settlement. The Bega is in length $126 \frac{1}{2}$ feet, which, multiplied into itself, gives 16,002 square feet in a square Bega; an acre contains square feet 43,560: therefore a Bega is to an Acre, as 367 to 1000, or as 11 to 30 the nearest.

5th. The farms come next under consideration; and first of the Gunge, or Mondy Bazar, situated in the district of Govindpoore. Touching this article, I can obtain no accounts prior to the year 1738, all preceding accounts of it being (as I am told) destroyed in the great storm. This farm has produced to the Company, since it was first farmed, as follows, *viz.*

A ^o 1738 — 6501	Brought forward Rs 62641
1739 — 6505	1746 — 13201
1740 — 9025	1747 — 17002
1741 — 6655	1748 — 18203
1742 — 6655	1749 — 14004
1743 — 7600	1750 — 10100
1744 — 8500	1751 — 12010
1745 — 11200	1752 — 22760
<hr/> 62641	<hr/> Current Rs 169921
	The medium 11328 per ann.

The several articles on which a duty is collected at the Gunge, are, Rice, Paddy, Gram, and all other kinds of Grain; as also on Tobacco, Gee, Matts, Poultry, Bay Leaves, Thread, Beeds, Cloth, Oil, Gunnys, Copofs, Seeds, Beatlenut exported: in short, on every article that comes within the denomination of common food, or the common necessaries of life. The duty collected by the Farmer of the Gunge on Rice, at 1 Maund per Rupee,

pee, is the nearest 8 per cent. and on every other article 3 Pices Sicca per Rupee, or 1 Rupee 9 Annaes per Cent. Concerning this farm, I shall trouble your Honour, &c. with nothing more here, as I shall again speak to it in some general remarks on the farms, after I have particularized each of them, to which I shall now proceed in the order of their sales the 20th of October last.

6th. Soota Nutty Market, and Suba Buzar, have yielded, since they were first farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738 --- 3504	Brought forward Rs---	30115
1739 --- 3589	1746---	4172
1740 --- 3397	1747---	4370
1741 --- 4012	1748---	4422
1742 --- 3532	1749---	4599
1743 --- 3758	1750---	4849
1744 --- 3991	1751---	5000
1745 --- 4332	1752---	7510
30115	Current Rs	65037
	Medium per ann.	4835 12½.

Soota Nutta Market is held twice a Week, viz. on Thursdays and Sundays, on which a Duty is collected by the Farmer, viz.

Retailers of Cowrees	Chinam Shops	Cucumber's Shops
Cotton Thread	Tobacco ditto	Fishmongers
Apothecaries Shops	Fire-wood ditto	Trees
Oil - ditto	Straw	Roasted Rice Shops
Hard-ware ditto	Matts	Weavers - ditto
Tyar - ditto	Bamboos	Potters - ditto
Milk - - ditto	Braziers Shops	Salt - - - ditto
Jaggree - - ditto	Beetlenut ditto	Cloth - - - ditto
Sweetmeat - ditto	Greens	Rice - - - ditto
Smiths - - - ditto	Sugar-canes	Venison - ditto
Silversmith ditto	Plantien Shops	Shoe-makers ditto
Beetle - ditto	Tamarind ditto	Paddy

These several articles have an established charge or rate, from one Gunda of Cowries to 6 Pund *per diem*, on each shop, bundle, bag, or piece, according to the different value and species of goods.

Gram, - - -	} Imported from Hougley, and other places up the River, pays 6 Gundas of Cowrees on each Rupee.
Horfe ditto,	
Mustard Seed,	
Wheat, - - -	

Oil,

Oil, Ghee, Gram, Wheat, &c. imported from Arung Gotta, each boat 3 Madrafs Rupees. Gram imported from the country round, pays 6 Pice on each Sicca Rupee, or 3 R. 2 *per Cent*.

Sugar, on each Bag,	-	-	-	2 Annaes,
Ghee, on each Dupper,	-	-	-	6 Ditto,
Honey, on each Ditto,	-	-	-	2 Ditto.

Coarse Ps. goods pay a duty from 4 to 15 Gundas on each piece. Rice retailers pay 15 Chitants; or $\frac{1}{16}$ th of a Seer, on each Rupee worth.

I have been the more particular on this market, that I may not be under the necessity of specifying so minutely the articles on which the duty is collected in the other markets and bazars, as they are nearly the same; and the same estimation of duty will in general hold with very little difference; only, for the information of such of our Honourable Masters as have not been conversant with these parts, I will add, that a Gunda is 4 Cowries, 20 Gundas 1 Pund, 16 Punds 1 Cowand, and 2 Cowands, 10, 12, or 13 Punds, (according to the value of Cowries) make one Rupee Arcot. Soota Nutty market, and Suba Bazar, have been generally held by the same person, as the one may be called the key to the other: and if in different hands, would occasion endless disputes; the articles on which a duty is collected in Suba Bazar are nearly the same as in the market, though in a less quantity, and in a more retail way.

7th. Connected with the foregoing Market and Bazar, are the following seven farms; for they have been generally, for the above reasons, held by the same person, as being all in the district of Sooty Nutty, though sold separately, and now in one lot; viz. Baag Bazar Market, Baag Bazar, Charles Bazar Market, Charles Bazar, Doobaparrah Bazar, Hautcolla Bazar, and Soota Nutty's burthen'd Oxen. These different Markets and Bazars have produced, from their being first farmed, as follows: viz.

A ^o 1738 - 1255	Brought forward	Rs - 11389	
1739 - 1364		1746 - 1560	
1740 - 589		1747 - 1519	
1741 - 627		1748 - 1612	
1742 - 1891		1749 - 1697	
1743 - 1845		1750 - 1732	
1744 - 1879		1751 - 1761	
1745 - 1939		1752 - 2001	
<hr/> 11389		<hr/>	
	Current Rs	23271	Medium 1551 6 4
			per ann.

The duties levied in these Bazars and Markets, as well as the articles on which they are levied, so nearly resemble those already specified, that it is needless troubling your Honour, &c. with the particulars. Soota Nutty's Koora Pacha, or burdened Oxen, is levied as follows:

Every tenant who keeps oxen, to convey merchandize out and into the town, pays the farmer, 8 a. 6 p. per each oxen, per annum; with these exceptions, that those employed in the Salt Trade pay only 6 a. 6 p. per annum each; and those employed to import and export Meal, pay only 3 Annaes Sicca each, per annum.

8th. The Great Bazar, under the district of Dee Calcutta, is farmed out in three partitions, (but generally held by the same person) under the heads of, 1st, Jow Bazary, or duty on greens, fish, roots, pans, &c. common necessaries of life, as to food and utensils. 2dly, Iron, gee, sugar, beetlenut, &c. merchandize. And 3dly, the duty of Koyally or Jouldary. The first of these is farmed in November with the rest of the farms, but the 2d and 3d in April. The Jow Bazary has produced, since it was first farmed, viz.

A° 1738 - 1650	Brought forward Rs - 15536	
1739 - 2029	1746 - 2185	
1740 - 1980	1747 - 2185	
1741 - 1765	1748 - 2285	
1742 - 1804	1749 - 2400	
1743 - 1994	1750 - 2400	
1744 - 2007	1751 - 2600	
1745 - 2307	1752 - 3500	
<u>15536</u>	<u>Current Rs - 33091</u>	Medium 2206 r
		per ann.

The duties collected by the farmer on the above mentioned articles are nearly in the same proportion as specified in my 6th paragraph.

The 2d partition of the Great Bazar is the duty on iron, gee, sugar, &c. the Pattah for which, as well as for the Jouldary, does not expire till April next. This Farm has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738 - 1101	Brought forward Rs - 4568
1739 - 1155	1742 - 1250
1740 - 1156	1743 - 1150
1741 - 1156	1744 - 1200
<u>4568</u>	<u>Carried forward Current Rs 8168</u>

Brought forward Rs - 8168

A^o 1745 - 1320

1746 - 1347

1747 - 1345

1748 - 1345

13525

Brought forward Rs - 13525

1749 - 1367

1750 - 1662

1751 - 2100

1752 - 2100

Current Rs - 20754 Medium, 1383 9 7
per ann.

R. A. P.

Iron pays a duty of - 1 15 3 both when imported and exported.

Ballafore Stone Dishes pay 16 0 0 per 100 Dishes.

Ditto - Ditto Cups, 8 0 0 per 100 Cups.

Beetlenut pays a duty of 1 15 3 per cent. both imports and exports.

Pepper, Copper, Tootenague, Lead, Dammer, Cotch, Chanks, pay a duty of 2 per cent. on imports and exports.

Sugar pays 4 Annaes, per each Oxen Load of 2 Bags.

Gee pays 8 Annaes, 6 Punds per each Oxen Load.

Honey, Wheat and Wax, 2 per cent. on imports and exports.

Oil and Jaggree, 2 Seer, per each Oxen Load, and 5 Pund for each Ox.

Ophirim, 2 per cent.

Rice and Grain imported, 2 Seers, 8 Chittack, per each Oxen Load.

Ditto, Ditto, exported, 1 Seer. 4 Chittack, per Rupee.

Gram, imported, pays 6 Punds, 1 Cowrie, per Rupee.

Turmerick, Ginger, Sandle Wood, Red Lead, Long Pepper, Saltpetre, Lack, Gunnys, &c. sundries, pay a duty 2 per cent.

Tobacco imported, pay 2 Annaes, 3 Ps. per Oxen Load.

Ditto, exported, 2 per cent. and 2 Punds of Cowries for each Ox.

Brafs Plates, pay a duty of 8 Annaes per Maund, on both imports and exports.

10th, The third partition of the Great Buzar, farmed in the Month of April, is the Jouldary, or Weighman's duty, of 1 Seer, 4 Chittacks, per Rupee, levied on all Rice, Paddy, Gram, Wheat, &c. Grain imported in the Great Buzar. This duty has produced to the Company, since the first farming; viz.

A^o 1738 - 726

1739 - 717

1740 - 716

1741 - 731

1742 - 1108

1743 - 700

1744 - 1036

1745 - 1139

6873

Brought forward, Rs 6873

1746 - 1164

1747 - 1164

1748 - 1180

1749 - 1219

1750 - 1337

1751 - 1900

1752 - 1900

Current Rs - 16737Medium 1115 12 2
per ann.

Govindpoore Market, Beggum Bazar, and Gostollab Bazar, are fold in one lot, and have been generally held by the same person, as lying nearly contiguous to each other. They have produced to the Company, since their being first farmed, as follows, viz.

A° 1738 - 992	Brought forward, Rs 9906
1739 - 1058	1746 - 1567
1740 - 1150	1747 - 1708
1741 - 1096	1748 - 1868
1742 - 1106	1749 - 2048
1743 - 1468	1750 - 2100
1744 - 1468	1751 - 1905
1745 - 1568	1752 - 2305
<hr/> 9906	<hr/> Current Rs 23407 Medium 1560 6 4

Govindpoore Market is held twice in a week, viz. on Tuesdays and Saturdays; and the articles on which a duty is levied by the Farmer are nearly the same as in Soota Nutty Market; the duties from 4 Gundas to 6 P. 10 G. on each piece, bundle, basket, or shop, per diem, according to the different value, consumption, or estimation of the goods.

12th, *Loll Buzar*, and *Santose Buzar*, situate in the district of Dee Calcutta, have yielded to the Company; viz.

A° 1738 - 1584	Brought forward, Rs 14823
1739 - 1780	1746 - 1635
1740 - 1857	1747 - 1560
1741 - 1640	1748 - 1720
1742 - 1792	1749 - 1840
1743 - 2255	1750 - 2000
1744 - 2255	1751 - 2090
1745 - 1660	1752 - 1855
<hr/> 14823	<hr/> Current Rs 27523 Medium 1834 12 9
	per ann.

The articles and duties nearly the same as already particularized in the other Bazars.

13th, *Nimmuck Mobul*, or the *Salt Farm*, situated in Soota Nutty, has produced, since it was first farmed; viz.

A° 1738	=	316	Brought forward, R°	10498	
1739	-	607	1746	-	1900
1740	-	723	1747	-	2001
1741	-	1651	1748	-	2025
1742	-	1651	1749	-	2100
1743	-	1825	1750	-	2400
1744	-	1825	1751	-	4030
1745	-	1900	1752	-	5150
		<hr/>			<hr/>
		10498	Current R°	30104	Medium
					2006 14 11.

The duty levied on Salt imported and exported, at 3 Pice Sicca per Rupee, or 3 Rupees 2 Annaes per Cent.

Jouldary, or Weighman, 6 Annaes Sicca per Maund.

On Oxen employed in this service, 1 Rupee per 20 Oxen.

Retailers of Salt pays 2 Annaes Sicca per $\frac{1}{2}$ Maund.

There is an exemption on all Salt imported on account of Coja Wazeid, who pays only 1 Rupee per $\frac{1}{2}$ Maund, both on Salt imported and exported.

The whole duty levied on Salt amounts to 3 Rupees 15 Annaes per cent.

14th, *Dee Calcutta's Market*, and the Duty on the Roads, and Salt in Baskets, have produced, since it was first farmed; viz.

A° 1738	-	578	Brought forward, R°	4652	
1739	-	577	1746	-	513
1740	-	605	1747	-	597
1741	-	605	1748	-	648
1742	-	412	1749	-	682
1743	-	700	1750	-	703
1744	-	475	1751	-	715
1745	-	700	1752	-	620
		<hr/>			<hr/>
		4652	Current R°	9130	Medium,
					608 10 8

Dee Calcutta Market is held in the Chourangey Road, leading to Collegot. Articles and Duties as in other Markets already specified. The duty on the Roads had its rise on this occasion: Collegot Market and Govindpoore Market being held both on a Saturday, numbers of the tenants resorting to Collegot Market, to the injury of that at Govindpoore, it was found necessary to check this resort, or counterbalance it, by levying a tax on every article imported from Collegot, in proportion to that levied on

the same articles at Govindpoore Market. The Duty on Salt imported in baskets on Cooleys heads, is 7 G. $\frac{1}{2}$ of Cowries, and one handful of Salt: and when refold or exported, it pays a duty to the Salt Farm, of 3 Pice Sicca, per Rupee.

15th, *Sam Buzar*, and *New Buzar*, both situated in Dee Calcutta, and now thrown into one lot, have produced to the Company, since they were first farmed, as follows; viz.

A ^o 1738 - 1237	Brought forward, R ^s 13304	
1739 - 1340	1746 - 2233	
1740 - 1391	1747 - 2434	
1741 - 1427	1748 - 2483	
1742 - 1450	1749 - 2483	
1743 - 1895	1750 - 2833	
1744 - 1993	1751 - 4600	
1745 - 2571	1752 - 4500	
<hr/> 13304	<hr/> Current R ^s 34920	Medium 2328 Ann.

16th, *John Buzar*, and *Burtholla Buzar*, situated in Dee Calcutta, and, from their neighbourhood, united in one Farm, have produced as follows, viz.

A ^o 1738 - 550	Brought forward, R ^s 4586	
1739 - 577	1746 - 600	
1740 - 576	1747 - 602	
1741 - 576	1748 - 725	
1742 - 576	1749 - 624	
1743 - 577	1750 - 1324	
1744 - 577	1751 - 1124	
1745 - 577	1752 - 1836	
<hr/> 4586	<hr/> Current R ^s 11421	Medium, 761 6 4

Articles and Duties as in other Bazars.

17th, The *Glass-Makers* Farm has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows; viz.

A ^o 1738 - 142	Brought forward, R ^s 2598	
1739 - 149	1746 - 380	
1740 - 287	1747 - 380	
1741 - 478	1748 - 400	
1742 - 220	1749 - 400	
1743 - 506	1750 - 500	
1744 - 396	1751 - 550	
1745 - 420	1752 - 865	
<hr/> 2598	<hr/> Current R ^s 6073	Medium 404 13 10. To

To the Farmer is granted the sole right of manufacturing this Article; and whoever is proved to set up any shop, or otherwise interfere in it, without his licence, is liable to fine and imprisonment.

18th, The *Vermilion-Farm* has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A ^o 1738 - 225	Brought forward, R ^s 1775
1739 - 200	1746 - 225
1740 - 225	1747 - 225
1741 - 225	1748 - 200
1742 - 225	1749 - 200
1743 - 225	1750 - 200
1744 - 225	1751 - 200
1745 - 225	1752 - 900
<hr/> 1775	<hr/> Current R ^s 3925 Medium 823 1.

The sole manufacturing this Article is also granted to the Farmer, as above.

19th. The *Caulker's Farm* has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A ^o 1738 - 863	Brought forward, R ^s 7691
1739 - 864	1746 - 800
1740 - 991	1747 - 800
1741 - 991	1748 - 800
1742 - 991	1749 - 500
1743 - 1100	1750 - 500
1744 - 991	1751 - 525
1745 - 900	1752 - 730
<hr/> 7691	<hr/> Current R ^s 12346 Medium 823 1.

The right of exercising the Ship-Caulker's business is solely invested in the Farmer, who gives his licence to the Workers, and receives a stated tax from them of 1 Pund of Cowries per diem, and 10 Gundas on each Rupee their labour produces.

20th. The *Tobacco Shops* were not farmed till the year 1740, since when they have yielded as follows, viz.

A ^o 1740 - 150	Brought forward, R ^s 1008
1741 - 143	1747 - 143
1742 - 143	1748 - 143
1743 - 143	1749 - 123
1744 - 143	1750 - 148
1745 - 143	1751 - 123
1746 - 143	1752 - 200
<hr/> 1008	<hr/> Current R ^s 1888 Medium 125 13 6

The Farmer has the sole right of vending this article in the Bazzars, and no shop can sell it that is not licensed by him.

21st. *Bang Shop's Farm* has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A ^o 1738	-	1101	Brought forward, R ^s	12742	
1739	-	1101	1746	-	1900
1740	-	1521	1747	-	1900
1741	-	1599	1748	-	1700
1742	-	1700	1749	-	1700
1743	-	1980	1750	-	1700
1744	-	1840	1751	-	1725
1745	-	1900	1752	-	1730
		<hr/>			<hr/>
		12742	Current R ^s	25097	Medium
					1675 2 1 An.

This Farm is conducted on the restrictions with the Tobacco Shops.

22d. The *Farm of the Chest-Makers* commenced not till the year 1748, and has yielded as follows, viz.

A ^o 1748	-	-	-	-	50
1749	-	-	-	-	60
1750	-	-	-	-	70
1751	-	-	-	-	72
1752	-	-	-	-	75
					<hr/>
			Current R ^s	327	Medium per Ann. 65 6 4

Every person employed in this business, is in the service of the Farmer, or works by his licence.

23d. The *Red-Lead Farm* has subsisted only since 1746. The article of Lapis Tutia is now, for the first time, added to it; the Farm of the Red Lead has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A ^o 1746	-	-	-	-	201
1747	-	-	-	-	201
1748	-	-	-	-	251
1749	-	-	-	-	121
1750	-	-	-	-	121
1751	-	-	-	-	130
1752	-	-	-	-	245
					<hr/>
			Current R ^s	1270	Medium per Ann. 181 6 10

The sole right of this Manufacture is appropriated to the Farmer, nor can any one engage in it without his licence, for which he receives 2 Rupees per Menssem for each Furnace.

24th. The *Dammur* and *Oakum* was first farmed in the year 1746, and has produced, viz.

A°	1745	-	-	-	336
	1746	-	-	-	400
	1747	-	-	-	424
	1748	-	-	-	436
	1749	-	-	-	500
	1750	-	-	-	540
	1751	-	-	-	680
	1752	-	-	-	940

Current R' 4256 Medium per Ann. 523

The sole right for vending these articles is invested in the Farmer, and none can deal in them without his licence.

25th. *Dee Calcutta* and *Govindpoore's* burdened oxen have produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A°	1738	-	-	192	Brought forward, Rupees	1554
	1739	-	-	133	1746	- - 230
	1740	-	-	192	1747	- - 230
	1741	-	-	192	1748	- - 240
	1742	-	-	175	1749	- - 300
	1743	-	-	220	1750	- - 350
	1744	-	-	220	1751	- - 192
	1745	-	-	230	1752	- - 575
				1554	Current Rupees	3671 Medium,
						244 11 8

Every person who keeps oxen for burden, within the districts of *Dee Calcutta* and *Govindpoore*, pays annually a tax to the farmer, of six Annas each.

26th. *Dee Calcutta* and *Bazar Calcutta's* ferry-boats have produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A°	1738	-	-	153	Brought forward, Rupees	1233
	1739	-	-	154	1746	- - 155
	1740	-	-	155	1747	- - 155
	1741	-	-	155	1748	- - 155
	1742	-	-	155	1749	- - 155
	1743	-	-	155	1750	- - 168
	1744	-	-	151	1751	- - 164
	1745	-	-	155	1752	- - 105
				1233	Current Rupees	2290 Medium,
						152 10 8

The farmer of the ferry-boats of Dee Calcutta and Bazar Calcutta receives,

For each passenger, four Gundas of Cowries.

For each basket of greens, &c. ten Gundas.

For each cow, calf, horse, &c. one Pond.

27th. *Fire-Work* farm has produced, since it was first farmed, as follows, viz.

A ^o 1738	-	-	64	Brought forward, Rupees	517	
1739	-	-	70	1746	-	56
1740	-	-	72	1747	-	65
1741	-	-	72	1748	-	66
1742	-	-	75	1749	-	42
1743	-	-	56	1750	-	59
1744	-	-	59	1751	-	42
1745	-	-	49	1752	-	150
			<hr/> 517	Current Rupees	<hr/> 997	Medium,
						<hr/> 66 7 5

The manufacturing and vending all fire-works are invested in the farmer, who gives his licence to others, on receiving a consideration satisfactory to the parties.

28th. Connected with Suba Bazar, were two small Bazars, the one situate at Harry Naut Duwan's stairs, and the other at Patrea Got, or the Stone stairs; these were always the perquisite of the Zemindar's Banian, and produced annually to the Company from 95 to 99 Rupees; they have now, by your Honour, &c's permission, been thrown into one farm, under the title of Ram Bazar, and produced, the 20th of October, 510 Rupees for the present year.

29. The duty on chinam and timbers imported, is now, for the first time, by your permission, farmed out, on representation of the frauds committed by the collectors of this duty, (vide proceedings Zemindary, under date the 8th instant;) it has sold this year for Current Rupees 437, more than double what has ever been brought to credit. The farmer levies two per cent. on all chinam and timbers imported.

30th. The purchasing and vending old iron, tea-cattys, and old nails, was first farmed Anno 1751, for Rupees 60; its Pattah expired the first instant, and then sold for Rupees 565.

I have

I have now gone through the several branches of the Revenues, contained under my second head of the farms, and beg leave to lay before your Honour, &c. at one view, in what degree they have increased, from the year 1738.

Anno 1738	-	-	-	22865
1739	-	-	-	24236
1740	-	-	-	27495
1741	-	-	-	26143
1742	-	-	-	26196
1743	-	-	-	30222
1744	-	-	-	31547
1745	-	-	-	35764
1746	-	-	-	36721
1747	-	-	-	41154
1748	-	-	-	43120
1749	-	-	-	39166
1750	-	-	-	37666
1751	-	-	-	44941
1752	-	-	-	60599

And supposing the remaining two partitions of the great Bazar fell in April next for 5000 (which is the least I will suppose) your Honour, &c. will have the pleasure of seeing the farms under your influence produce 65599 Rupees, a further gain to our Honourable Masters (for this year at least) of 20658. We see above, the farms, since 1738 to 1751 inclusive, have increased (within a trifle) in a duplicate proportion; and how the net balance of the revenues annually paid into the treasury will answer this proportion, is a circumstance I will beg leave to discuss, when I have gone through my third head of those articles not farmed out, arising from the current transactions of the Cutcherry.

32d. The third head of the revenues consists in the following articles, viz.

- | | |
|--------------------------------------|-------------------------------------|
| 1. Duty on piece goods. | 10. Mortgage bonds. |
| 2. Fines. | 11. Marriages. |
| 3. Etlack. | 12. Ruffley Sallamy. |
| 4. Sale of boats and sloop. | 13. Sallamy on sloop. |
| 5. Sale of slaves. | 14. Mooriannees. |
| 6. Pottahs. | 15. Duty on exportation of liquors. |
| 7. Arbitration bonds. | 16. Licence for a treat. |
| 8. Commissions on recovery of debts. | 17. Order for beat of drum. |
| 9. General releases. | 18. Duty on exportation of rice. |

All which I shall explain to your Honour, &c. as distinctly as possibly I can; as there is not one of them, in which there has not been manifestly very considerable frauds committed by some body or other; and must unavoidably be so, without the utmost vigilance of the Zemindar.

33d. The Company levy a duty of two per cent. on all piece-goods sold in the Bazars, which are not imported under their duffick. To point out the frauds committed by the collectors of this duty, I shall take the produce arising from May 1749, to April 1752, as they exceed former credits.

ABSTRACT of the duty on Piece-Goods, as taken from Account Revenues.

				Brought forward, Rupees				952	9	0
1749. May	75	0	0	1750. May	21	8	0			
June	75	0	0	June	77	3	0			
July	35	0	0	July	30	2	9			
August	52	0	9	August	31	2	9			
September	35	15	3	September	59	7	3			
October	71	8	3	October	75	10	0			
November	174	11	6	November	171	5	6			
December	116	3	6	December	44	9	6			
1750. January	35	14	9	1751. January	66	11	9			
February	77	0	6	February	43	3	0			
March	40	11	0	March	60	11	6			
April	163	7	6	April	270	7	0			
<hr/>				<hr/>				952	9	0
								951	15	3
								1904	8	3

and I am not free from suspicion of some frauds yet in this duty, notwithstanding the strictest eye I have been able to keep on those intrusted with the levying it.

Anno 1752.	July	-	-	58	9	9
	August	-	-	252	11	9
	September	-	-	191	10	3
	October	-	-	321	5	3
	November	-	-	303	7	3
				<hr/>		
Current Rupees				1127	12	3
				<hr/>		

34th. The article of fines is a very important one in the Company's revenues, if duly brought to their credit; this method of punishing, as well as the lash, is so essential a one, in the nature of the country government, that there would be no order or rule preserved amongst the natives without them. The original institution of fines in all countries was doubtless with a design of correcting the manners of the people; of being a check on such kind of rogueries as did not require the lash or other corporal punishments; and consequently, of being a defence to the property of honest men: but I am sorry to say, I have too much reason to think these intentions have been kept very little in view; and a power assumed to inflict fines, and oppress the people, where by no means it ought to have been allowed; and which has been raised from motives much worse, and applied to baser uses, than were the crimes for which it was imposed. Your Honour, &c. have had some instances of this kind laid before you; and I do not want materials to point out many more to you; but to what end? The nature of this branch of the revenues will not admit of an annual estimate to be made on it, with any degree of exactness, as will, pretty nearly, the foregoing article of piece-goods; whose yearly imports, I believe, do not vary greatly. However, I shall lay before your Honour, &c. the produce arising on this article, from May 1746, to April 1751, inclusive.

ABSTRACT of FINES, as taken from the monthly account Revenues, viz.

				Brought forward, Rupees 1800 3 0			
1746.	May	157	5 0	1747.	May	349	4 3
	June	115	15 0		June	232	0 0
	July	27	10 3		July	103	1 0
	August	1116	1 3		August	97	15 9
	September	146	2 0		September	58	12 6
	October	97	11 0		October	132	10 9
	November	8	2 3		November	131	11 6
	December	10	4 3		December	100	8 3
	January	0	0 0		January	10	1 9
	February	22	7 9		February	31	4 3
	March	51	4 9		March	0	0 0
	April	47	3 6		April	0	0 0
<hr/>				<hr/>			
1800 3 0				1247 5 6			

Brought forward, Rupees 3047 8 6 Brought forward, Rupees 5188 9 6

1748. May	151	10	6	1750. May	7	1	0
June	338	13	0	June	0	0	0
July	33	9	0	July	0	0	0
August	52	11	9	August	60	9	3
September	45	8	9	September	6	1	9
October	141	13	9	October	112	3	9
November	109	11	0	November	50	11	0
December	122	4	9	December	0	0	0
January	25	8	3	January	8	0	3
February	109	6	9	February	0	0	0
March	10	2	0	March	18	2	0
April	37	3	9	April	137	12	3
			1178 7 3				400 9 3
1749. May	173	7	9	1751. May	36	11	3
June	59	0	9	June	73	7	6
July	33	12	6	July	18	12	9
August	141	2	0	August	80	1	6
September	102	10	6	September	409	15	0
October	114	15	0	October	197	0	0
November	151	15	9	November	201	6	6
December	10	13	6	December	92	6	3
January	25	7	0	January	37	1	9
February	222	2	6	February	6	7	6
March	0	0	0	March	132	12	3
April	36	2	6	April	917	9	3
			1062 9 9				2203 11 6
			5188 9 6	Current Rupees			7892 14 3

By the foregoing abstract, there appears to be fines brought to credit in the account revenues, current Rupees, 7892 14 6, in the space of six years. I will submit it to your Honour, what proportion this bears to the fines that have really been imposed and levied in that time. I will suppose by other authority than that of the Zemindar for the time being; who, in a multitude of instances, I dare say, was totally a stranger to this piece of iniquity; and when I inform your Honour, &c. that I have brought to the Company's credit on this article, the last five months, current Rupees 3171 14 6, I must not appear before you as having acted with greater severity than any of my predecessors; as this is an article I would by no means should increase the Company's revenues: but the cause of this very extraordinary difference arises from this, that what fines are imposed, are now in truth brought to credit. They are before your Honour, &c. I think I have been studious to observe as much lenity in them,

them, as the nature of the offence could with propriety admit of. If it should bear a different aspect, it lies in your breasts to remit and relieve any whom you may judge to merit your indulgence.

ABSTRACT from the Register of Fines, viz.

Anno 1752.	July	-	-	166	9	9
	August	-	-	339	1	9
	September, 19 days			341	2	9
	October	-	-	1035	9	6
	November	-	-	1289	6	9

Current Rupees	-	3171	14	6
----------------	---	------	----	---

35th. Though I have already explained what is meant by that branch of the revenues called Etlack, in my address to your Honour, &c. under date the 17th of August, 1752, I yet think it necessary to repeat here what I then said on the subject, that in this work every article of the revenues may have due regard paid to it. On every complaint registered in the Cutcherry, a Peon is ordered on the defendant, in cases of debt; or on the delinquent, in case of assaults, or other abuses. The Peon receives three Punds of Cowries per diem; one Pund, fourteen Gundas of which are brought to the credit of the Company, under the head of Etlack: one Pund is the Peon's fee, and the remaining six Gundas were set apart; out of which the Etlack Moorries, or writers, were paid their wages; and the overplus, called Moorriannoes, sequestered to uses I am a stranger to. The article of Etlack has always been a heavy tax on the poor, from whom it has chiefly been collected; whilst those who could by any means obtain favour were excused, though well able to pay it. The contrary method I have pursued, as much as possible; and your Honour, &c. will observe in the Zemindary, how frequent occasions I meet with to remit this fee to the poor, as well to those who are released from the prisons, as those whose disputes are determined without imprisonment. The Cutcherry prison Etlack fees, and Catwall prison Etlack fees, amount each to three Punds of Cowries per diem, from each prisoner; the whole of which is brought to credit. The Etlack fees have, by some Zemindars, been raised to four Punds per diem, and by others reduced to two; the present establishment appears to me the most eligible medium, as the former would be a very heavy oppression on the poor, and the latter would too much tend to keep up that litigious spirit in the people, which possibly is not equalled by any race existing. What injury the Company may have sustained in this branch, I shall submit to your Honour, &c. judgment, by the following abstracts of the former and present credits.

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT of ETLACK FEES, from May 1746, to April 1752, inclusive.

Brought forward, Rupees 7311 9 3

1746. May	187	2	9
June	160	13	3
July	182	0	6
August	162	6	9
Sept.	128	11	9
October	214	0	6
Novem.	175	2	0
Decem.	146	7	6
January	191	3	9
Feb.	136	4	3
March	146	14	9
April	205	5	3

2036 9 0

1749. May	334	14	3
June	356	5	9
July	259	8	0
August	407	15	9
Sept.	401	0	6
October	341	10	0
Novem.	484	1	0
Decem.	375	13	6
January	406	6	6
Feb.	373	12	6
March	390	13	3
April	371	12	6

4504 1 6

1747. May	164	5	3
June	147	2	0
July	238	10	9
August	255	3	0
Sept.	176	14	0
October	140	2	3
Novem.	150	5	0
Decem.	217	15	0
January	143	15	0
Feb.	142	5	6
March	129	15	0
April	184	9	3

2091 6 0

1750. May	429	11	6
June	377	12	6
July	387	11	9
August	375	8	9
Sept.	315	3	0
October	357	3	0
Novem.	370	13	0
Decem.	377	3	6
January	386	1	9
Feb.	299	12	9
March	290	11	0
April	386	14	9

4354 11 3

1748. May	114	9	3
June	116	1	6
July	135	6	9
August	273	4	6
Sept.	285	5	6
October	329	6	9
Novem.	349	15	3
Decem.	265	10	3
January	379	1	3
Feb.	273	1	3
March	296	12	3
April	364	15	9

3183 10 3

1751. May	310	5	9
June	189	8	3
July	208	1	0
August	150	5	6
Sept.	23	9	6
October	34	0	0
Novem.	34	11	6
Decem.	79	8	6
January	80	2	9
Feb.	54	8	3
March	106	11	0
1752. April	136	2	9

1407 13 9

7311 9 3

Current Rupees 17578 3 9

ABSTRACT

ABSTRACT of ETLACK FEES, from July to November, 1752.

Anno 1752.	July	-	-	-	-	208	5	6
	August	-	-	-	-	424	15	9
	September	19	days	-	-	262	2	3
	October	-	-	-	-	427	12	9
	November	-	-	-	-	453	9	3

Current Rupees 1776 13 6

On the sale of houses, boats, floops, and all sums recovered by decree or award in the Cutcherry, the Company draw a commission of five per cent.

On every slave brought and registered in the Cutcherry, the purchaser pays duty to the Company of four Rupees four Annaes.

On every Pattah granted, the Company receives a salamy of four Rupees four Annaes.

On all arbitration bonds entered into by appointment, in the Cutcherry, each party pays 20 Punds of Cowries.

On every general release executed by order of Cutcherry, each party pays eight Annaes.

For every licence of marriage, the Company receive three Rupees Sicca from each party; but the poor are often remitted this fee.

On all disputes between the Company's tenants, touching the property of ground; where there appears cause for measuring their respective grounds, each party pays a ruffey salamy of one Rupee.

On every new floop built by the natives, the Company receive a salamy of 50 Rupees to 100 Rupees, according to her burden.

On every mortgage bond registered in Cutcherry, the Company receive from the mortgager five per cent. on the sum advanced by the mortgagee.

On all rice exported, the Company's duty is 1 Seer 8 Che. per Maund, and has produced for the last six years, from Rupees 1129, to Rupees 4537, per annum: total on the whole six years, 18979 Rupees. The usual

usual season for exportation, are the months of August, September, December, January and February.

The whole amount of the Moorianne Cowries is now brought to credit, distinctly from the Etacks; and at a medium produces the nearest four Rupees per diem, or 120 Rupees per mensem, or 1440 per annum; the servants wages employed on monthly pay, in the branch of Etacks, comes to Rupees 44; so that here is a demonstrative gain of Rupees per annum 912, and points out a very considerable sum the Company have been injured in this seeming trifling article of Moorianne, which I can trace only brought to credit to the amount of 20 Rupees in two months, anno 1742.

On importation of Batavia and Armenian Arrack, not again exported, the Company receive a duty of two Rupees and four Annaes, per leager.

On every order for public notice by beat of drum, account the loss of slave, cow, horse, &c. the Company receive one Cowand and one Pund of Cowries, from the party requesting such public notice.

36th. Thus, I think, I have laid before your Honour, &c. every branch of duties and revenues relative to the Zemindary, John Nagore excepted; but if my future knowledge in this intricate branch of the Company's business should point out to me wherein I have been defective, I shall beg leave from time to time to represent it to the Board, as well as every other method whereby the revenues may still be improved or put on a better footing. The produce arising on the daily current business of the Cutcherry, you will observe to spring from articles, that in their nature are so precarious, as to make it impracticable the forming any exact estimation of the gain that may result from them, so that I will only compare the credits of last year, in the same months with those since I have had the honour of filling this post.

DAILY COLLECTIONS.

Anno 1751.	July	-	474	15	0
	August	-	482	11	0
	September		724	13	3
	October		788	6	0
	November		634	5	0
Current Rupees			3105	2	3

DAILY COLLECTIONS.

Anno 1752.	July	-	717	8	0
	August	-	1556	8	3
	Sept. 19 days		1667	7	6
	October		2245	13	9
	November		2798	11	3
Current Rupees			8986	0	9

Your

Your Honour, &c. are sensible I began not to act in the office till near the middle of July, and that my attentions to the frauds of the under servants in the Cutcherry must have been greatly taken off by the scrupulousness you ordered into the conduct of Govindram Metre, so that for the first month or two, it must not be wondered at, if I could not arrive at a proper knowledge of the current business. However, it is now clear to me, that the advance on the daily collections Cutcherry, at the lowest estimate, will considerably exceed 1000 Rupees per mensem, or 12000 Rupees per annum; and I shall beg leave to close this head, with throwing into one total, the demonstrative future annual gain to the Company, resulting from your Honour, &c. salutary orders and influence.

By charges Zemindary reduced	-	Rupees	10000	per Annum.
Advance on the sale of the farms	- -		20658	for this year.
The duffutary paid into the treasury	- -		6457	
Daily collections Cutcherry increased	-		12000	
			<hr/>	
Current Rupees			49115	
			<hr/>	

37th. The out towns of Banian Pooker, Pugg la Danga, Tenggra and Dullond, obtained first a place in the revenues, June anno 1746, under the general head of John Naggore; they contain 228 Bega, 1½ Cotta of ground, for which the Company pay one Sicca Rupee per Bega per annum. John Naggore seems to have produced annually to the Company, arising on the different articles of ground-rent, salamys on Pottas, burdened oxen, markets revenues from June 1746, to May 1752 inclusive, viz.

Anno 1746	- - - - -	674	14	9
1747	- - - - -	1010	3	9
1748	- - - - -	1249	5	3
1749	- - - - -	1182	5	9
1750	- - - - -	1354	5	9
1751 to May 1752	- -	1500	11	9
		<hr/>		
		6971	15	0

Deduct ground-rent paid the Rajah, and other Zemindars.	}	1506	6	9
Charges repairing John Nagore's roads, Cutcherry and Chowkey houses, for which the Company are only debted in their account revenues.				
		311	14	0

Brought forward, Rupees 6971 15 0

Deduct further charges, as per Metre's letter to the Board, under date 3d November, account Salamys and presents made the Rajah for his 42 Bega of ground, which, as Metre asserts, is thrown into the charge of repairing roads and bridges.	}	964 0 0
---	---	---------

2782 4 9

Current Rupees 4189 10 3

That the Company have had equal justice done them in this, with every other article of their revenues, will appear to your Honour, &c. beyond a doubt, from the following produce during the five last months, without any new tax or imposts laid on the tenants; and I will venture to promise these towns shall be more beneficial to our Honourable Masters, as soon as the more important concerns of the office will give me leisure to visit them, and make a more particular scrutiny into them.

Net produce of John Nagore, Anno 1752.

July	-	-	-	-	152	15	3
August	-	-	-	-	175	10	9
September	19	days	-	-	129	0	6
October	-	-	-	-	548	9	9
November	-	-	-	-	118	4	6

Current Rupees 1124 8 9

I cannot with propriety quit John Nagore, without advising you that application has been made to me, by one of Rajah Kissen Chund's Gommastahs, for an annual Salamy, or present (exclusive of the ground rent) paid on account of the 42 Bega of ground the Company hold of him, in the out towns; to which I have given for answer, that no such charge appears on the Company's books, and that I could by no means admit of it, as it was highly derogatory to their honour, in which I hope I meet your approval; and submit it to your Honour, &c. whether this charge of Govindram Metre's, is not demonstratively calculated only to make up his fallacious accounts of repairing the roads; for himself holds of the Rajah, to the amount of about 2000 Bega of ground, in his different possessions at Charnock, Kissenpoor, Balegoffy, and Hocul Koorea, for which an annual salamy from him, may have been necessary; but I trust your Honour, &c. will not suffer the Company to be saddled with a charge, that I am convinced was never paid on their account, and which would be so extremely dishonourable

dishonourable for them to submit to. To which permit me to add, that if this annual Salamy and present had been actually paid, there is not a shew of reason why the Company was not openly charged with it, which they have not been.

I must now carry your Honour, &c. back to my 31st paragraph, in which I give you, at one view, the annual increase on the sales of the farms from 1738, by which it appears they were increased in anno 1751, in very near a duplicate proportion, and from thence it might naturally have been expected, the annual net balance paid into the treasury, would have increased in the same proportion, as the same causes which influence the advance on the farms, must from the nature of things equally influence every other branch of the revenues, viz. the increase of inhabitants, and consequently the greater consumption of every article on which the revenues arise, demonstrable from the immense difference in the Bazar prices of them, even to the lowest root or herbage which enter into the food of the common people; but how unaccountable must it appear, when we find that so far are the annual net balances paid into the treasury, from being increased in their duplicate proportion, that, by the following abstract from the general books, we find they have not increased in any proportion at all, but the contrary.

ABSTRACT of the net balances of the Revenues, paid annually into the treasury, from April 1738, to April anno 1752, inclusive.

1737, to 1738	- -	26206	6	6	1744, to 1745	- -	39202	14	0
1738, to 1739	- -	39273	13	3	1745, to 1746	- -	32858	11	0
1739, to 1740	- -	42518	1	3	1746, to 1747	- -	34755	7	9
1740, to 1741	- -	38062	13	0	1747, to 1748	- -	30124	13	6
1741, to 1742	- -	35656	13	0	1748, to 1749	- -	37679	7	3
1742, to 1743	- -	37267	10	0	1749, to 1750	- -	46461	1	0
1743, to 1744	- -	44249	13	6	1750, to 1751	- -	39449	13	3
					1751, to 1752	- -	34506	15	0
		263235	6	6					
							295039	2	9

By casting out the middle year 1744 to 1745, your Honour, &c. will observe that the net produce of the revenues in the first seven years, exceeded the net produce in the latter seven years by Rupees 7399 2 9, which at first sight would appear an incident very amazing, when we see the farms increased in a duplicate proportion; but when you consider the foregoing sheets, and the scenes so lately laid before you, I believe the causes will be too obvious longer to occasion any great wonder, or to require my giving you the trouble of a farther explication; therefore should now relieve you by closing this very long address, did not a letter laid before the Board by Govindram Metre, under date the 20th Novem-

ber, loudly call for a reply from me, which I cannot more properly convey to you than in the channel of this work, as it is so pertinent to my subject. Your Honour, &c. was pleased the ult. on motion from a member of the board, to order Metre to be called before the council, and asked how it came to pass, the farms sold so much higher this year than they did the last? I will not enquire what motive urged this question at this particular juncture, only with all submission say, it never could have been moved for, or granted with less propriety; for these reasons: It is no longer ago than the 11th October, that a majority of the Board voted (in my humble judgment, contrary to the very nature and essence of trust and servitude, as well as to Metre's own concession) that Metre was not from the nature of his office in trust for the Company; then, to what end this question? for as he was deemed not in trust, he consequently could not be deemed accountable: Why, Gentlemen, was not this question asked him the last year, when on Mr. Barrow's knowledge of his being the farmer, the Salt Farm was sold at public outcry, and produced 1600 Rupees more than it did the year before? Why was he not asked the like question, when, on the same intelligence, Mr. Manningham, by previous and public notice given of the sale of the two latter partitions of the great Bazar to the highest bidder, obtained 1000 Rupees more for it than it produced the preceding year? Had you, Gentlemen, been less attentive to whatever causes urged this motion and question, you would have been more so to what has been before you, and would have been sensible that the farms (the Gunge excepted) were so far from selling at an advanced rate this year, that in truth they have sold for less than they did the preceding one, though Metre, and not our Honourable Masters, was the gainer; which gain the majority voted he was not accountable for. Had due regard been paid to my letter of the 13th August, your Honour, &c. would have recollected that Soota Nutty market, and Suba Bazar, with their dependant seven farms, sold in 1749, 1750, and 1751, (the years Metre confesses he held them in fictitious names) as follows, wherein I shall beg leave to remind you at one view of the Company's credits, Metre's gain, and the sales for the present year.

Company's credits.		Confessed to be resold by Metre on his own account for	Sales 20th October 1752. Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar.
Soota Nutty Haut, and Suba Bazar, bought by Metre.			
Anno 1749	Rupees 4850	Rupees 7122	Rupees 7500
1750	- - 5000	7696	
1751	- - 5000	8057	
Seven dependant farms.		Seven dependant farms.	Seven dependant farms.
1749	- - 1523	2303	
1750	- - 1557	2075	2001
1751	- - 1625	2147	

It is pretty plain, I believe, now to your Honour, &c. what little real foundation there was for this question at the juncture it was moved for, and granted; and I wish it may not appear something strange to our Honourable Employers, that, instead of it, Metre was not asked, how the above farms the three last years came to sell for so much more on his own account than he favoured the Company with? Had you, Gentlemen, done me the honour of asking me the question you put to Metre (to whom I must think it more properly belonged) I should, in few words, have informed you of two very obvious causes, which I conceive occasioned so much more to be brought to the Company's credit on their farms this year than was the last, or any heretofore, viz. 1st, Public and unbiassed sale to the best bidder. 2dly, Metre not having it in his power to keep the Salt Farm, the Great Bazar, the Vermillion Farm, Soota Nutty Haut, Suba Bazar, the seven Dependant Farms, &c. in his own hands, at what price he pleased. Your Honour, &c. must smile when you reflect on the labour Govindram Metre has taken in his said letter of the 20th November, to account for a fact that does not exist, since I have proved, and he has confessed, the above farms sold last year in reality for Rupees 693 more than they have this; which verifies a conclusion I have made elsewhere, that notwithstanding our utmost assiduity, it will hardly be in our power to make that gain on the Company's revenues, that he has done whilst under his conduct: the above farms were those only I was then enabled fully to detect him in; but I will conclude similar methods were used in the disposal of the rest, as they have sold this year at a proportional advance on the credits of last year. To conclude, I will suppose the fact which Metre would account for; and yet the solution which he has so artfully and speciously drawn out, must appear to have no solid foundation on the slightest examination; for it is impossible the dearness or cheapness of grain can much influence the rise or fall of the revenues, though the duty is collected on the gross sales; for if this is enhanced by a year of scarcity, a year of plenty will make the balance nearly equal to the farmer, by the larger quantity imported: for his position, that the consumption must be nearly equal, is also very fallacious, or we should not have beheld the multitude we have this season dead, and dying in our streets, or the many thousands of walking skeletons this scarcity has produced; nor should I have been witness to so many afflicting instances of parents selling their children for a Rupee a-piece, or giving them away for want of food to support them, if the consumption had been nearly equal. But facts speak themselves: it is evident this scarcity has not influenced the revenues, or if it has, that in truth it has influenced them in a sense opposite to what he would prove, as the farms produced more last year, though grain, at the

time they sold, was more than as plentiful again than it has been this year; that the Gunge should sell for so much more this year than ever it did, is to me not so astonishing, as that it has not always produced it very nearly, at least for many years last past. The annual imports of rice to the Gunge, from the best information I can acquire, amount at least to 400,000 Maunds, on which the farmer's duty on the importer of 9 Pice Sicca per Rupee, and his duty from the buyer of Koyally of 1 Seer. 4 Ch. per Rupee, comes to 7 Rupees 13 Annaes 1 per cent. estimating 1 Maund per Rupee; and if we add the Poudary, Foorea, and the duty of 3 Pice Sicca per Rupee on the articles specified in my 5th paragraph, we shall find, on an average, that the farmer collects above 9 per cent. on the whole of the imports at the Gunge; but if we estimate only on the 8 per cent. the nearest which he collects on rice, we shall find his duty on 400,000 Maunds, at 1 Maund per Rupee, will yield 32,000 Rupees. Eight years out of 15 that the Gunge has been farmed, it has been held by Metre wholly or in part: And further, to disprove his reasons in the above-mentioned letter, he pays for it in 1747, Rupees 17,002, though rice was from August to December, from 1 Maund to 1 Maund 15 Seer. per Rupee; and the year following he pays 18,203 Rupees for it, and rice from 33 Seer. 1 Maund 10 Seer. per Rupee; and though I believe there never was a greater prospect of plenty than the ensuing year promises, yet it has sold for Rupees 22,760, which is quite sufficient to evince, that other causes than dearth or cheapness of grain, &c. have influenced the rise and fall of the revenue. What those were, and the farther investigation of them, I must submit to your Honour, &c. as well as the redress I must humbly insist is due on the behalf of our Honourable Employers. That injurious advantages have been made of their revenues, I have proved beyond a doubt; on you, Gentlemen, it lies to determine where, and to what uses they have been sequestered. I am most respectfully,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servant,

Fort William,
15th December, 1752.

J. Z. H. Zemin.

BY the foregoing state of your revenues Zemindary, you see, that in the very infancy of Mr. Holwell's reform, an increase in this branch to the amount of 5000 l. is demonstrated; which, year by year, still swelled, and produced in April preceding the capture of Fort William, 10,000 l. per annum gained and saved to the Company, by the fair sale of the farms, reduction of unnecessary charges, and the collections of their Cutcherry being duly brought to credit. Mr. Holwell, in his sentiments laid

before your Directors, only pointed out an increase of 30,000 Rupees per annum; but on his arrival in India, and dismissal of the standing Deputy (against whom now every mouth was opened) every day produced discoveries of frauds committed in every branch of this complicated office for 28 or 30 years preceding; for proof of which we need only mention to you, that under this Gentleman's administration, there was paid net money into your treasury 114,000 Rupees for every 12 months, and that there was a moral certainty the credits of the year 1756, (when your presidency was taken) would have yielded net 120,000 Rupees; a striking difference, when you see this office never before, on a medium, produced you more than 40,000 Rupees per annum.—Here was a very important addition to your estate, when considered (as it really was) an addition in perpetuity.—Let us only estimate it at 10,000 l. per annum for 30 years, you see an accession of 300,000 l. and at the same time you will see how immense the loss you have sustained, whilst that arch plunderer Govindram Metre was entrusted with the executive power of this office.—After all, the term so often made use of, *increase of the revenues*, has been improperly applied; for as Mr. Holwell very justly observes in several of his letters to us, he cannot so properly be said to have increased your revenues Zemindary; for, on the contrary, he rather reduced them by abolishing six of your farms, which, he thought, dishonoured you, and oppressed the poor under your protection;—his merit consisted only in the reform of the office, and taking care that the real produce of the revenues arising from it, were honestly and duly brought to your credit.—

Hear the sense of your Court of Directors on this acquisition, and their sentiments of this Gentleman's integrity and abilities, in their several general letters to the board of Calcutta.

GENERAL LETTER per Ship Pelham, under date 23d January, 1754.

PAR. 69. " Mr. Holwell has fully answered our expectations, in regulating and conducting the office of Zemindar; and has, by the considerable increase of the revenues, resulting from his good management, and by transmitting to us, such a clear and intelligible account of the nature and state of them, convinced us of what we long suspected, that we have been most grossly imposed on in this branch of our affairs."

PAR. 74. " Mr. Holwell's whole conduct in this affair has been entirely to our satisfaction; and his abilities, zeal, and application to serve us are so sufficiently apparent, that we are satisfied it will be in his power, if no
" obstructions

“ obstructions are thrown in his way, to prove himself a very valuable servant to the Company; we shall therefore expect, as you value our future favour, that you give him not only all necessary countenance and assistance in his particular station of Zemindar, but also in whatsoever he shall point out, or intimate, may be of service to the Company, in any other branch of our affairs.”

Par. 76. “ We must here remark, that the office of Zemindar is of so complicated a nature, and the business so various and burthensome, that it is almost impossible it should be conducted under the direction of one person; you are therefore to consider, whether it may not be divided into several branches, to be managed by different persons; and, if you think such an alteration may be of general utility, you are to point out the proper methods of carrying it into execution. In proposing such a division, we have a view not only to the general utility, which may be the result, but likewise to ease Mr. Holwell, as far as is consistent, from the heavy load of business he labours under, that we may have the benefit of his abilities, in other material branches of our affairs.”

When this letter, and that of the 31st, which immediately follows, were dispatched to Bengal, your Court of Directors consisted of the following Gentlemen, viz.

William Baker, Esq; Chairman,	Stephen Law, Esq;
Richard Chauncey, Esq; Deputy,	Nicholas Linwood, Esq;
William Braund, Esq;	William Mabbot, Esq;
Robert Booth, Esq;	John Payne, Esq;
Christopher Burrow, Esq;	Henry Plant, Esq;
Charles Cutts, Esq;	Thomas Phipps, Esq;
Peter Ducane, Esq;	Jones Raymond, Esq;
Abel Fonnereau, Esq;	Thomas Rous, Esq;
Peter Godfrey, Esq;	Whichcot Turner, Esq;
Charles Gough, Esq;	Timothy Tully, Esq;
John Hope, Esq;	William Willy, Esq;
Michael Impey, Esq;	James Winter, Esq;

GENERAL LETTER per Ship Eastcourt, under date the 31st January, 1755.

PAR. 73d. “ We have, with great attention, perused and considered Mr. Holwell's state of our revenues at Calcutta, Mr. Frankland's remarks, Mr. Holwell's reply, and the other papers relative thereto; and we must, “ in

“ in justice to Mr. Holwell, acquaint you, that he accounts for the mistakes which have happened in that state, in a manner that convinces us they were mere inadvertencies, and no ways calculated to impose upon us ; — that he has evidently increased our revenues to a very considerable amount, without imposing any new duties, or oppressing the poor, but on the contrary, several old duties have been abolished, and the poor in many instances relieved. And we must, as a further piece of justice to him, add, that the insinuations of his raising his own character with us at the expence of the reputations of other Gentlemen who preceded him in his office of Zemindar, are entirely without foundation. In short, his integrity, capacity, and application, have rendered him so well worthy our notice, that we are determined most heartily to countenance and protect him in all his endeavours to serve the Company.”

Par. 74. “ It was very natural to expect, when a piece of such importance as Mr. Holwell’s State of Revenues was laid before you, which was so long ago as the 17th. of December, 1752, that you should have given it a speedy and serious consideration, in order to have informed us of your sentiments, upon an affair of such a complicated nature ; but how great is our disappointment and surprize to find you have not, from that time, to the dispatch of the Falmouth in the beginning of March last, considered it at a board, so as to come to any resolution or opinion for our information ; but have transmitted to us the remarks of one member only ; who, notwithstanding what you say in your letter of the 4th January, 1754, does not appear upon the face of any of your consultations, to have been authorized to collect and make remarks for your information, as ought to have been done, if you intended to have proceeded with any regularity in an affair of such consequence ; and it is very observable, that those remarks were designedly, as we have reason to believe, delivered in so late in the season, as rendered it extremely difficult for Mr. Holwell to reply to them in time, to obviate the impressions they might have made on us, to his prejudice. But however well qualified Mr. Frankland may be, to execute a work of such a nature, it ought to have been the business of a committee, regularly appointed for the purpose, and not the result of the voluntary enquiry of one person only ; and we shall be greatly disappointed, if we do not find you took that method upon the departure of the Falmouth, so as that we may receive, by the next ship at farthest, a full and satisfactory account of your proceedings and sentiments upon this affair.”

Par. 94. “ Mr. Holwell has highly merited our particular notice and encouragement, and the least that we can do for him, is to let him rise in our service, equally with the rest of our servants ; we do therefore

“ hereby annul and make void the restriction of our commands, of the
 “ 8th January, 1752, by which he was fixed as 12th and last in council,
 “ and to remain so without rising to a superior rank therein; and we direct,
 “ that on receipt of this, Mr. Holwell take rank, and his seat at the board,
 “ according to the time of his arrival at Bengal, in the same manner as
 “ if no such restriction had been made; that is to say, next below Mr.
 “ Matthew Collet; but however, it is our meaning and direction, that
 “ Mr. Holwell do still continue Zemindar, and that he is not to quit that
 “ post without our leave.”

GENERAL LETTER per Ship Ilchester, under date the 25th March,
 1757.

PAR. 156. “ Having with great attention considered the state of our
 “ Zemindary, during the time it has been under the management of
 “ Mr. Holwell, it is apparent to us from the accounts you have transmit-
 “ ted, that our revenues in Bengal have been greatly increased, and that
 “ this has been done without imposing any new duties, or oppressing the
 “ poor; if it had been otherwise, you would, and ought to have given
 “ us the necessary informations. With respect to the judicial part of his
 “ office, we must take it for granted, that he has acted with the greatest
 “ integrity and lenity; as there appears nothing to the contrary upon the
 “ face of your consultations, where we must have found it, had there been
 “ any reasons to have appealed from his decrees.”

Par. 157. “ Considering therefore the great service Mr. Holwell has al-
 “ ready done, and the further service we have the greatest reason to be-
 “ lieve he will still render to the Company; we do agree to allow him an
 “ additional salary of four thousand current Rupees per annum to his for-
 “ mer one of two thousand Rupees, making together the sum of six thou-
 “ sand current Rupees a year, to commence from the date of this
 “ letter; this salary is to be paid him so long as he continues in the
 “ post of Zemindar, and is to be in lieu of all fees and perquisites
 “ whatever; but it is our pleasure he continue in the rank and standing
 “ in council he shall be in at the time this letter shall come to your
 “ hands, and not rise to a higher station therein without our further
 “ orders.”

The Gentlemen who composed your Court of Directors at the Ilchester's
 Dispatch were as follows, viz.

Roger Drake, Esq; Chairman,
 Peter Godfrey, Esq; Deputy,
 William Barwell, Esq;
 H. C. Boulton, Esq;
 John Boyd, Esq;
 Nath. Newnham, jun. Esq;
 Thomas Phipps, Esq;
 Which. Turner, Esq;
 Charles Gough, Esq;
 Robert Jones, Esq;
 John Payne, Esq;
 Jones Raymond, Esq;

Robert Booth, Esq;
 Christopher Burrow, Esq;
 Charles Chambers, Esq;
 Sir James Creed,
 John Dorrien, Esq;
 John Manship, Esq;
 Henry Plant, Esq;
 Thomas Rous, Esq;
 Henry Savage, Esq;
 Lawrence Sullivan, Esq;
 Timothy Tullie, Esq;
 Maxim Western, Esq;

You have already seen in the Narrative before inserted, what various fortunes and difficulties Mr. Holwell had to encounter towards the end of the year 1757, and beginning of 1758, and how at last he was disposed of, and appointed, by 14 of the new Directors succeeding in April 58, 9th in Council at Bengal, ~~invested~~ of his post, and the salary to which in March 1757 he had been allotted by 10 of these very 14 who now degrade him. —

Messrs. Baker, Chauncy, and Mabbot, who had particularly patronized and supported him, had already quitted the direction of your affairs; Messrs. Payne, Jones Raymond, Newnham, Jones, Drake, with most of the 15 who had promoted him in 1758, soon after disqualified themselves; so that Mr. Holwell found himself abandoned to the rage and power of that faction, who had ever shewn the strongest propensity to his ruin, though every man of them had repeatedly given the sanction of their hands to his acknowledged *zeal, integrity, and capacity*.

Thus circumstanced was Mr. Holwell, when the necessity of recovering a lost and broken fortune, as well as constitution, forced submission; he returned in the Warren, Captain Glover, for Bengal, where he arrived with unabated zeal for your interests: and with this noble and elevated sentiment, (frequently expressed in his letters to us) “that it would be cruel
 “and unjust, a whole body of people, and many among them widows
 “and orphans, should suffer for the ingratitude, partial and self-interested
 “views of their *trustees*; and that he had in his heart (and hoped ever
 “should) always made this just distinction between the body of Proprietors, and their Directors.” — A short period gave him an opportunity of manifesting this principle.

The lands ceded to the Company by Jaffier Aly Khan, distinguished by ✓

the name of the 24 Purgunnahs, had been held in the Company's hands, and in the space of 16 months had produced net about 384,000 Rupees, exclusive of 222,000 for Col. Clive's Jagire. — This small produce, from so large a territory, drew Mr. Holwell's attention; he reflected, that if the trifling district of the Zemindary of Calcutta was capable of yielding a net profit of 120,000 Rupees a year, that of the 24 Purgunnahs ought to yield more than double what it appeared to do. — Upon this reflection, he laboured to acquire the real value of those lands, which, after about three months indefatigable private search, he effected, and found the same chain of rogueries here, that he had traced in the Zemindary Calcutta; and that their specific worth greatly exceeded his first conjecture.

The board of Calcutta seemed sensible that some other measure must be adopted, than that of keeping these lands in the Company's hands, but were greatly divided in opinion which to chuse, among the many expedients proposed.

Mr. Holwell, thus fully armed, threw the following letter into the board.

To the Worshipful Charles Manningham, Esq; &c. Council.

Worshipful Sir and Sirs,

Calcutta, June 11, 1759.

I Beg leave to trouble you with a few sentiments on the disposal of the Company's lands, which has for some time past been the object of our councils; the subject is of importance to our Honourable Employers, and cannot be too much deliberated upon.

I believe we are all unanimous in some circumstances which more particularly require our attention in this affair, to wit, the honour of the Company, the acquiring a perfect knowledge of the value of the lands, the making this branch of the revenues less complicate and intricate, as well as less expensive in the collecting; — but with respect to the means, we seem not quite so clear. — Any one gentleman declaring fully his opinion on your consultations, may possibly make us unanimous here also.

The step we are already determined in, of divesting the farmer of all power in the royalties and judicial authorities of the Purgunnahs, bids fair for the security of the Company's honour; as these articles heretofore, being also farmed, became the source of heavy cruelties and oppressions on the tenants. — But still there seems to be something wanting, to give us a perfect security in this particular; — and that is, to take the utmost care in our power, that the whole body of the lands do not, by any junto or private

private confederacy, fall into the hands of people with whom we should not trust any part of our own fortunes or confidence. I am urged to this precaution, from the proposal laid before you the fourth instant, by six or seven conspicuous natives of the settlement, of an advance of 110,001 Rupees on the whole lands. With respect to their proposal, I will only add an offer of 10,000 Rupees more per annum, on their terms: — Not that I wish myself, or any one else, in possession of them on terms so vague and artful.

That keeping the lands in our hands will never lead us to a knowledge of their real value, is now (to me) proved beyond contradiction. — Some of those who signed the proposal of the fourth are well conversant in the nature of their undertaking; and better judges still (as I am informed) are concerned, tho', as yet, they act behind the curtain; and to me it is inconceivable, that these Eastern Machiavels in finesse would offer such an annual advance, without a moral certainty of adequate gain. In this position I am still more confirmed, by the advance offered from other quarters, on distinct and garbled parts of the Purgunnahs, which in fact exceeds the others.

If we have been hitherto kept so far from the knowledge of the real value of these lands, after 16 months possession, what are we to expect, when, from the course of the service, they are no longer under the conduct of the present collector, whose knowledge in this branch must be greatly superior to any gentleman that succeeds him; and whose vigilance in the execution of this trust cannot be exceeded. From the experience I have had in infinitely a less, tho' similar object, I know it is impossible for any one gentleman, with the most extensive talents and integrity, to superintend this revenue in such manner as to prevent the company being injured; his attention cannot be every where; confidence must be placed in a multitude; and it happens most unluckily, that this confidence centers from necessity in a race of people, who, from their infancy, are utter strangers to the very idea of common faith or honesty.

The other plan of disposing of the lands to the multitude of people who have offered an advance on particular parts of each Purgunnah, I have strong and equal objections to. I am sensible these objections should have been laid before you sooner; and would, had I thought myself sooner master of the subject. — We know not what or who these people are. I foresee a very great risque of deficiencies in the rents, as well as much confusion and needless expence entailed on this expedient, and ourselves removed as far as ever from gaining a knowledge of the real value of this new and important acquisition. On the whole, therefore, I am of opinion, that
there

there is no effectual method to arrive at this knowledge, and make the lands yield every advantage to our Honourable Employers; but by putting them up to public auction, in single Purgunnahs, under the restrictions already published. — People of substance will be the only bidders for an entire Purgunnah; the bad and unprofitable parts will go with the good and valuable, and the risque of deficiencies in the rents be guarded against; the expences of collecting will, in a manner, be reduced to nothing, and this branch of the service be rendered less complicated and intricate, by our having 25 purchasers only to account with us, in place of 5 or 600.

I am, with respect,

Worshipful Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servant,

J. Z. Holwell.

This letter lay for consideration, the Board suspending their final resolution until they were joined by Governor Clive, who was then absent. On his arrival Mr. Holwell communicated to him the result of his researches, touching the Purgunnahs; and at the same time laid before him the following estimate he had formed of their real value, and the means by which he had acquired his knowledge.

A moderate ESTIMATE of the value of 24 PURGUNNAHS.

Magra and Satull	-	-	-	Sicca Rupees	130,000
Azeemabad	-	-	-	-	90,000
Mora Goffee	-	-	-	-	90,000
Mydon Moll, Ekubberpore, Pycha Koolee	-	-	-	-	90,000
Burridge Hotee, Ektearpore	-	-	-	-	75,000
Gurr	-	-	-	-	15,000
Hoteagur, Myda	-	-	-	-	35,000
Ballea, Bussundree	-	-	-	-	70,000
Calcutta, Amirpore, Maanpore, Pykon	-	-	-	-	65,000
Shawpore, Shawnagore, Karry Jurce, Duccan Sagur	-	-	-	-	28,000
Cofspore	-	-	-	-	10,000
Northern Purgunnah	-	-	-	-	52,000

Sicca Rupees 750,000 per annum.

The first time the council met, the debate upon the Purgunnahs was resumed, and Mr. Holwell's letter of the 11th of June read a second time, when Governor Clive did him the honour to declare the reasons he gave for putting those lands up to public sale were unanswerable; which concurring with the sentiments of the Board, it was unanimously resolved to throw the Purgunnahs

Purgunnahs into 15 lots, and farm them out for three years certain to the highest bidder at public auction, reserving to the Company the royalties of the lands, as the judicial power, fines, confiscations, buried treasures, &c. &c. — They were accordingly sold, and produced seven Lack, sixty-five thousand, seven hundred Sicca Rupees, 15,700 Rupees beyond what Mr. Holwell had estimated they would produce per annum. Let us add the produce of the royalties, very moderately estimated at one Lack and a half a year; the whole gives 9 Lack 15,700, besides the value and produce of a large tract of land, taken from the Purgunnahs next adjoining to Calcutta, to enlarge its bounds. We will not say what thanks were due, on this occasion, to the zeal, integrity, and capacity of the gentleman we are defending; we leave that to your candor. — These were the *inferior Manœuvres* which the anonymous propagator of scandal, in his pamphlet of March 6th, sarcastically mentions as reflections upon this gentleman's character. — But we do not stop here: — We proceed to shew you, his attention and capacity was not confined to this branch of your revenues and lands only; in order to which, we shall insert the following letter from Mr. Holwell, to a gentleman who, a few years past, was at the head of your affairs at home; to whose integrity, abilities and application you stand, we will be bold to say, as highly indebted, as to any gentleman that ever sat in your direction — We have his permission for this liberty; and indeed, the inserting it is, in some sort, necessary to confirm and explain facts just now recited, that you may not think we have picked them up to answer any present purpose.

TO JOHN PAYNE, Esq;

Dear Sir,

Calcutta, Dec. 30, 1759.

TO shorten my remarks on the important subject of your lands, I inclose you copy of my letter to the council, of the 11th of June, when the Colonel was upon the Patna expedition; it then produced no other effect than postponing our resolves until his arrival; when the affair being resumed, he did me the honour, with the rest of the board, of thinking my reasons for a public sale of the lands, by auction, unanswerable, and the same was resolved on unanimously; the event more than answered my expectation. I had taken great pains in ferreting out the real value of the lands, which was covered with almost impenetrable obscurity and difficulties; and by an estimate I gave the Colonel at his return, ventured to pronounce they would yield at least seven Lack and a half; and the total of their sales, on the 31st of July, amounted to seven Lack, sixty-five thousand seven hundred Sicca Rupees, exclusive of several reserves in favour of the Company, such as a considerable tract of land taken from the Purgunnahs

nahs adjoining to Calcutta, to extend its bounds; and all advantages resulting from holding the royalties and judicial proceedings, &c. in our hands, on the Company's account; so that I judge, the whole produce of these lands (the before-mentioned reserves included) will be annually between nine and ten Lack, the sum I think I guess'd they would produce, when once in conference with you upon this subject. From this the Colonel's Jaggier, of two Lack twenty-two thousand Rupees, being deducted, there will remain a net annual revenue to the Company of about seven Lack eighty thousand Sicca Rupees per annum, on the same lands which yielded net to the Company, the last year when the revenues were collected on the government's plan, only three Lack, eighty-four thousand, or thereabouts, as you will learn from the accounts of this revenue, now transmitted to the Company. I see the Court of Directors stare with astonishment at this increase; you will stare too, my dear Sir, as a proprietor. — Methinks I hear them and you cry out, What the devil became of this difference the last year, as it must have been collected, beyond the possibility of a doubt; or from whence can this advance answer to the present farmers? The answer is easy and obvious — the difference fell short in its way to the Company's treasury, by the self-same roads your former revenues were dissipated, prior to my beginning the reform in your Zemindary — by the harpies employed in collecting. It may be farther asked, as the difference is so important and striking, How comes it to pass, that no retrospection seems to have been thought of? Here, I answer for myself: — I fought the Company's battles for a series of five years, and what encouragement and reward I received for it in the end, you and the world have seen; the old farms producing an advance, on an average, of 46 per cent. at their first fair sale, was proof enough of former frauds, the more so, as this advance increased every year, and the other branches in proportion. As your former Zemindars could not justly be deemed culpable in that case, from the frequent changes in the post; so in the present, no blame properly falls on your collector, the trust being too extensive and complicate for the due execution and attention of any one man existing; though the frauds here are equally obvious from the extraordinary increase at a fair and public sale, where the farmer was laid under every possible check and restraint, that can either prevent his debasing the lands, or oppressing the tenants; and yet there is a moral certainty of profit to him at the expiration of the three years; and that they will then yield a further increase to the Company. — But not to lose sight entirely of a retrospection; I, for my own part, think, that at present the operators are too well prepared for a scrutiny they must for many months have expected; they have been in absolute possession of all accounts and papers relative to the lands, and have cunning enough to take care these accounts shall tally with the credits: besides, should we even succeed in our proofs, we should find this plunder divided

divided into such a multitude of hands, our gain at last would be only our trouble for our pains. That I should have no stomach to take the lead in an enquiry of this nature, you will readily account for; and if I do not, I am sure no body else will. It appears incumbent on Mr. Frankland, if on any body, to account to the Company for the extraordinary difference between the present sales and his last year's collections; but this I conceive he will hardly think worth his while so near his departure; and no body knows better than himself the small probability of its being attended with success, or credit, or thanks from his employers, who have, I believe, pretty well cooled the zeal of their servants for attempts of this kind. The very detection of frauds, and increase of the Company's revenues, tho' founded on the principles of faithfulness, honour, equity, and humanity, were (by fools, influenced by knaves) brought in bar against my receiving the reward and commiseration, which justice extorted from them in favour of the most junior servant in the Presidency.

Before I entirely quit my subject of the lands, I must clear up to you a circumstance that may possibly be cause of wonder to you, viz. by what means I arrived at their real value. — In the first place, I had long and full conviction that the same system of frauds and chicane ran through every Zemindary of the provinces; and from a general knowledge of the countries granted to us, it appeared to me most astonishing, they should yield no more than was brought to the Company's credit, at the close of the year, in April last; when so small a territory as Calcutta produced, on a scrutiny and reform, an increase of 73 to 80,000 Sicca Rupees per annum. — I tried various means to trace out a satisfactory reason, and to account to myself for it, but without success, until I learnt, by accident, that three or four of the old standers, employed as tax-gatherers and writers in the Purgunnahs, had been dismissed, at the instigation of the new operators. I sent privately for one or two of the most creditable of them, and enquired into the cause of their dismissal; and this brought on an opening of the whole scene, and gave me sufficient foundation for forming my letter of the 11th of June: had that failed in bringing the lands to a public sale to the highest bidder, I had formed my resolution to lay the lights I had received before Mr. Frankland (from which I knew, on the whole, he was kept in the dark) and if this had fallen short of my views, I should then have laid them before the Council; but by the issue I have the pleasure of seeing the Company in possession of pretty near the value of this princely acquisition, without being myself involved in debates and contention. Thus, Sir, having made you master of this subject in as short a detail as possible, I shall close it with this remark, that the same chain of frauds runs through the revenues of the whole empire, but more particularly in these three provinces, to the heavy annual loss of the crown, a circumstance which

may, in a future favourable conjuncture, be well worth consideration; at present we have but to ask and have, a more easy acquisition of the Subadary than that we have already obtained of the Purgunnahs; but the times are not yet ripe for so great a grasp, nor have we sufficient strength to hold it; tho' it is certain, were we Subas of the provinces, the Emperor would regularly receive more than double the revenues these provinces ever produced to him; and the East-India Company become, in a short time, the richest body of subjects in the world.

Little need be said with respect to your Import Warehouse. On my taking that charge, I found my predecessor, Mr. Becher, had left me little or nothing to reform or regulate; for which the Company and I owe him thanks. That you may be convinced the sales of their imports have not suffered under my conduct, I inclose you copies of the only two made since my being at the head of this office; the second sale's falling something short of the first, must be attributed to the quantity of goods of the first sale laying on the merchants' hands, at the period appointed for the second, occasioned by the long alarm of the Shaw Zadda's advance into the provinces, which put a total stop, for some months, to the trade of the country; and for some time to the provision of your arung investments.

You will find by this ship's advices, the board have made pretty free with your orders, touching the sea customs; the present times, in fact, not admitting the carrying them to a greater height, without a risque of the total loss of trade to your settlement. As the customs and duties are now stipulated, I judge they will, with vigilance, produce a very acceptable revenue to the Company. It is the very worst policy in the world to load trade with the utmost duty it will bear, or to push up the sales of either your lands or imports to their greatest value; an opening for a fair profit should ever be left to the merchant and farmer, or the consequence, in the first instance, will be an illicit trade, oppressions on the tenants, and no sales at all of your imports of woollen goods, &c.

I really want courage to touch, or animadvert on your immense standing expences, as I see not any present plan we can fall on for the reduction of them.

You will remember, Sir, that, from a rough calculate I made at home of receipts and disbursements, I pronounced the gentlemen here had been too hasty in their advice to the Court of Directors, that they should want no supplies of money for three years. We have felt the consequence of that precipitate paragraph, and were reduced to the necessity of opening the treasury doors, in August last, for the supply of Madras and our current service.

service. We took this opportunity of reducing the usual interest of nine per cent. to eight; it was proposed to reduce it to six per cent.; but had we persisted in that, we might have shut our doors again; for since the large sums remitted the last year, money has recovered its former value from its scarcity, as every thing else does.

I am, Sir,

Your most obliged humble servant.

We shall add one remark only on this subject of the Purgunnahs, and that from good authority, viz. that there was a moral certainty of yet a very considerable advance upon the next sale, for they were not at the first sale, pushed up to their utmost value, but a latitude left for the farmer to make a handsome profit, which we have good assurance was the case, one lot excepted, which was purchased too high by a spiteful competition between two of the natives. The farmers, for their own sakes, will improve the lands and revenues; and consequently their value at the next sales must be enhanced, which we hope has so proved for your sakes; and we doubt not but the *Manœuvres* of our friend hitherto, will reflect honour upon his character, in place of the insinuated reproach of this *anonymous slanderer*; and that his first charge, which for certain reasons we speak to last, will appear to be equally false and scandalous.

This charge, so boldly asserted against Mr. Holwell, is, in its nature, of so black a dye, that did we think there was a shadow of foundation for it, we should blush to take up the pen in his defence. — Lest you should have lost sight of it, we think it needful to present it again to your view. (*Anon.* page 37.) “ His (Colonel Clive’s) successor in the Government, *who had been particularly instrumental in bringing down Sou Rajah Dowla, and consequently in occasioning the first revolution in Bengal:*” — that is, neither more nor less, than without reserve, charging Mr. Holwell with being the cause of all the desolation and misery which overwhelmed your settlements in 1756. Let *this Prober*, as he somewhere calls himself, answer this charge to the *Prober of all Hearts*, whilst we, from the materials in our power, proceed in our defence against it.

And here it is with the deepest grief and concern we find ourselves obliged to open a wound, which we hoped had been closed for ever; but thus pressed, thus stimulated, what can we do? Shall we abandon our friend to the impressions of this infamous accusation, when we know the rectitude of his heart and conduct? Forbid it, Truth! forbid it, Justice! The real causes of that calamity and ruin have been long hid from the public, under the *veil* of secrecy, in Leadenhall-street. We will unfold

no more of it than friendship exacts from us.—There was a period when justice to individuals should have moved your Court of Directors to have laid the whole before you, but partial views forbade it. It has plainly appeared to you, by the Letter of the 25th of March, 1757, that Mr. Holwell was then marked for destruction; the force of evidence and facts could not withhold the applauses and acknowledgments due to his merit and services, but the clogg in council was again put on, which was so politely and justly taken off in 1755. This was a favour not much coveted by him; but, when granted, did him honour. Greater dishonour was the consequence, when this restriction was again imposed upon his rising. It did, as was plainly intended, lessen him in the eye of the natives and your servants abroad, and sufficiently declared the sentiments of that Bombay Faction, which soon after obtained the lead in your Direction. But to resume our subject.

Mr. Holwell obtaining his liberty at Moorshadabad, promised, (in a short letter he wrote to the two other Presidencies of Bombay and Madras) that he would transmit to the Company a particular account of the *real causes*, which drew on your Presidency of Bengal such fatal calamities. Accordingly, at Fulta, he made good that promise in the following letter, addressed to your Court of Directors, through the channel of your Council there. Little did he then think he should ever have occasion for, or be under a necessity of producing it in his own vindication.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England, trading to the East-Indies.

Honourable Sirs,

Fulta, 30th Nov. 1756.

IMmediately on my being released from my imprisonment and fetters at Muxadabad, I addressed your two Presidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George, on the subject of the loss of your possessions in these parts, under date the 17th of July last, and again on my arrival at Houghly, under date the 3d of August, when I duly forwarded to them duplicates of those I dispatched from Muxadabad, and requested the advices I gave there might be transmitted to you by the most expeditious conveyance; and at the same time referred to a particular narrative of the causes, and various accidents, which brought on the heavy loss you have sustained: this I promised to forward as soon as my health would enable me. The slow recovery of my sight, much impaired by the shock and injury my nerves suffered that fatal night in the Black Hole, and from being exposed to the sun on my passage to Muxadabad, must plead my pardon for your not receiving the narrative I promised, by the ship dispatched, I understand

stand some time this month, from your Presidency of Fort St. George, and by which I am sensible you will receive many different narratives and accounts of the causes of our misfortunes; leaving those to your impartial consideration—I sit down to discharge this part of my duty, humbly intreating you will believe me determined to pay the strictest regard to truth, to the best of my knowledge; and that I will not, by any representation, either in reasoning or facts, endeavour to mislead your judgments, or influence them either in favour of myself, or to the disavowal of any one else, further than justice to myself, and the state and nature of things, will make it unavoidable; shunning, as much as possible, any repetition of matters already transmitted you in my letters of the 17th of July, and 3d of August last, which I request may be kept in your view, as I do not find cause to retract any essential part of them.

2d. Mahabut Jung (better known by the name of Ally Verdy Cawn) demising on the 9th of April last, was succeeded in the government of the Subaship by his grandson Surajud Dowla, without opposition, excepting from the young Begum, relict of Shaw Amet Jung, uncle of Surajud Dowla. This Princess, foreseeing her liberty and the immense wealth of her lately-deceased husband, would fall a sacrifice to the new Suba, had meditated for some time the raising another to the Subaship, and with this view retired, before the death of the old Suba, to her palace, (some distance from the city,) named Mootee-Giel, with Raagbullob, the Dewan of her late husband, Nazzur Aly Cawn, and others the most faithful of her officers and domestics; where she fortified herself, and raised some troops to oppose the succession of her nephew. When the dispute was near coming to extremities, the old Begum, relict of Ally Verdy Cawn, interposed with her mediation, by which, and the promises of Surajud Dowla, that the Princess should remain in full possession and security of life, liberty, and property, she was prevailed on to disband her troops, submitted to the banishment from the provinces, Nazzur Aly Cawn, and two other officers, and returned to the city; where she was no sooner arrived than she was made a prisoner, and her palaces and possessions seized and confiscated to the Suba's use.

3d. The new Suba having, on his succession to the government, sent advice thereof, with a seerpaw, (or dress) to Shoucutjung, his cousin, the Nabob of Purranea: this latter returned the seerpaw, and disavowed submission to him as Suba of the Provinces; asserting his government of Purranea to be left by Ally Verdy Cawn independant of him. This occasioned the resentment of Surajud Dowla, who resolved to reduce him by force, and after he had laid the storm the young Begum had attempted to raise against him, he immediately marched against Shoucutjung with a strong army, which had been raised by the old Suba, foreseeing the difficulties

culties his grandson would have to encounter after his death. Here I must leave the Suba on his march, and go back in point of time to matters no less necessary to investigate the real causes of his subsequent march to Calcutta; which is so blended with some incidents attending the late change and government at Muxadabad, that it is impossible to give a distinct view of the one, without a short recital of the others.

4th. On the death of Shaw Amet Jung, (more generally known by the name of Newaris Mahomet Cawn) and during the life of the old Suba, Surajud Dowla, who had in effect the reins of government in his hands, long before the decease of his grandfather, seized on Raagbullob abovementioned, the chief officer of Shaw Amet Jung, and by imprisonment and other despotic and severe methods, endeavoured to force from him a confession and discovery of Shaw Amet Jung's riches; but the minister, faithful to his deceased master, could not be brought to any confession injurious to the interest of his surviving family, and after a few days sufferings, obtained his liberty by the intercession of the young Begum, with her father and mother, Ally Verdy Cawn and his Begum: but Raag Bullob being sensible the resolution he had shewn for the interest of the family of his deceased master, (between whom and Surajud Dowla there had been a long hatred and animosity) would never be forgiven by Surajud Dowla, thought it incumbent upon him to provide as well as he could for the safety of himself. And in resentment for the usage he had unjustly received for his integrity to the young Begum, readily entered into her councils to oppose the succession; and finding the death of the old Suba was near at hand, and recollecting his own family and greatest part of his wealth were exposed to danger at Dacca, his first care was to draw them to a place of security; in order to which he applied to Mr. Watts, your Chief at Cossimbuzar, telling him his family were going from Dacca to worship at Jaggernaut, and should take Calcutta in the way; requesting, at the same time, that they might there find a proper reception. Mr. Watts accordingly wrote to the President, and I think to Mr. Manningham, to much the same effect. These letters arrived during the absence of your President at Ballisore, and much about the time that Kiffendas, the eldest son of Raagbullob, and the family reached Calcutta, from Dacca; at least I know no otherwise, for in the evening, I think, of the 13th of March, my people at the Waterside Chowkeys brought me intelligence, that Raagbullob's family was arrived from Dacca, and that they had received orders from Mr. Manningham for their admittance, who having occasion to summon a Council the next morning, for the dispatch of the Negrai's supplies, shewed me Mr. Watts's letter to the President, who likewise communicated the same to me on his return to the settlement. This letter, I now understand, the President has lost amongst the

the rest of his papers; though I often since the commencement of our troubles, as he must recollect, urged to him the necessity of preserving it in his own and our vindication: however, as I had twice perused it, and had since occasion enough to retain in my memory the first impressions I had received of it, I can venture to assert it was near the following purport:

“ That he, Mr. Watts had been applied to by Raagbullob, the Chuta Begum’s Dewan, who advised him that his family had left Dacca with intention to go to worship at Jaggernaut, and should take Calcutta in his way, and requested he would write to their Governor touching their reception there, and that they might be supplied with boats, or aught else they might have occasion for on their expedition; that in compliance with Raagbullob’s intimation and request, he wrote, and recommended his family’s being received with all possible respect and regard, not only on account of his influence with the Chuta Begum, but as his power at Dacca might be of the utmost consequence to our Honourable Masters affairs there.”

In consequence of this recommendatory letter, and the reasons urged by Mr. Watts, they were received in the settlement, and treated with all possible regard. Whether Mr. Watts knew, or can be supposed to have judged, that Raagbullob’s family going to Jaggernaut to worship, was a pretence only to facilitate their obtaining a protection in Calcutta, I cannot say; but I recollect the President’s communicating to me another letter he received from Mr. Watts, about the time that the death of the old Suba was deemed inevitable, wherein he recommended it as expedient, “ That Kissendafs, and the rest of Raagbullob’s family should have no longer protection in Calcutta, as it was very uncertain what turn things would take after the decease of the Suba.” The President will, I doubt not, do me the justice of acknowledging I enforced this salutary advice, and pressed more than once the dismissal of this family, foreseeing they would be demanded; and Mr. Manningham and myself had many uneasy conferences on the protection being continued to them, fearing it might be productive of troublesome consequences, and possibly embroil us with the new government, should they remain in the settlement until the Suba’s decease. Why the President delayed their dismissal, I am at a loss how to account for; but certain it is, had they been obliged to quit the place, a handle would have been taken away from many, who have been too ready to urge and maintain the protection given to this family as the greatest, nay, the sole cause that drew on us the Suba’s resentment; which I doubt not of convincing your Honourable Court is very distant from the truth. Their dismissal, however, would have saved us from
a most

a most difficult situation which we presently fell into; for we no sooner received advice of the death of Ally Verdy Cawn, than we had notice also of the stand made against Surajud Dowla's succession, by the young Begum and her party, of which Raagbullob was the chief minister and favourite of his mistress; so that it became at that juncture a dangerous step to the Company's interest to turn his family out of the settlement, the more especially as for some days advices from all quarters were in favour of the Begum's party. Notwithstanding which, as the new Suba has been proclaimed in the city, the President wrote the usual congratulatory letter to him, which was favourably received.

5th. Here it becomes needful to recite, that some little time before the old Suba's death, the President received a private letter from Mr. Watts to the following purport: "That there was a multitude of the government's spies at Calcutta; that the small strength of its fortifications and garrison, and the easy capture of it, were the public discourse of the city and durbar; and that it behoved Mr. Drake to be upon his guard, and by some means prevent the government's spies bringing daily intelligence to the durbar of the weak situation of the place." This letter the President communicated to me, and gave me orders, as Zemindar to make a strict enquiry after such as might justly be suspected, and that had no real call of business in the place; and also that I would issue orders to the several Chowkeys, or places of guard, to admit none to land, or be admitted into the town without his orders. These instructions I immediately obeyed, and several suspected persons were, in consequence of them, turned out of the place, and none admitted without a strict examination.

6th. On Raagbullob's withdrawing himself, with the young Begum, to Mootee Giol, Surajud Dowla dispatched Naran Sing, brother to Rajaram, the Fowzdaar of Midnapore, to Calcutta, with a perwannah, the contents of which were, to demand Kissendass and his family to be delivered up between eight and nine in the evening of, I think, the 14th of April. The President being at Barasut, and Mr. Manningham at his country residence, Omychund came and advised me that Naran Sing had got, in the disguise of a European dress, into the settlement, and had the Suba's perwannah to demand Raagbullob's family, and was at his house asking, Whether I would permit his bringing him to visit me? As he had got entrance into the place, I thought it advisable to see him, and Omychund brought him accordingly in about half an hour. I received him with the respect due to a brother of Rajaram, an officer in much trust and confidence with both the late and present Suba; he tendered me his perwannah, but I excused myself from receiving it, as it was addressed to the Governor, who I told him would be in town in the morning,

morning, on which he took his leave well satisfied. In the morning early I sent for the Jemautdaar of the Chowkey where Naran Sing landed, and was going to punish him for admitting any one in the settlement without orders, when he informed me that Naran Sing came in the disguise of a common Bengall Pykar; that he opposed his landing, but that soon after Omychund's servants came to him with a message, signifying that he was a relation of his house, and that he might admit him. Soon after, on advice that the President was returned to town, I waited on him with the report of this transaction, and found with him Messieurs Manningham and Frankland; we were all a good deal embarrassed how to act on this occasion, that the same reasons that before forbid the family's being turned out of the place, after the Suba's death, still subsisted equally strong against delivering them up, as the contest was yet undecided between Surajud Dowla and the young Begum. The result at last of our deliberations was, that as Naran Sing had stole like a thief and a spy into the settlement (and not like one in the public character he pretended, and as bearing the Suba's orders) the President should not receive him or his perwanah; which resolution was put in execution, and the President sent one of his Chubdaars to him, with orders to quit the settlement, which he did: and instantly letters were dispatched to Mr. Watts to advise him of the affair, with instructions to guard against any ill consequence which might arise from it.

7th. The foregoing is, Honourable Sirs, a faithful narrative of the protection given to Kiffendass, the son and family of Raagbullob, which has been industriously and maliciously by some, and erroneously by others, circulated as the principal cause of the loss of your settlements in Bengal; an event which, I will soon demonstrate, had much deeper and more remote foundation: for on your Chief's at Cossimbuzar making a proper representation of this affair at the Durbar, it hardly occasioned any emotion or displeasure in the Suba, nor ever had a place in any of the subsequent complaints forwarded to us, through the channel of that subordinate.

8th. The probability of a breach with France had been the subject of discourse for some time, before it was confirmed to us by the arrival of your letter on the Delawar; and as about the same time we received news of the taking Gyria by his Majesty's Squadron, both became the subject of much speculation at the Durbar, where the military and naval strength of the English in India were greatly exaggerated, and no small pains taken to instil a dread of it into the government; and if the agents for the French East-India Company (whose garrison at Chandanagore did not, at this period, amount to 50 men) were not at the bottom of these reports, it is at least, I hope, no breach of charity to conclude, they used

every means in their power to confirm them; at least such was our information, when it was confidently asserted in the Durbar at Muxadabad, and gained belief, that the English had sixteen ships of war, and a strong land-force coming to Bengal.

9th. On the receipt of your letter by the Delawar, we began to put the settlement into as good a posture of defence as we could; and as the parapet and embrazures, as well as the gun-carriages of the line to the westward of the fort, were much out of repair, they became the first object of our attention; a number of workmen were employed, and I believe the parapet and embrazures (the greatest part of which we were obliged to pull down) more than half run up, when the President was surprized with a perwanah from the Suba, to the following purport:

“ That he had been informed we were building a wall, and digging a large ditch round the town of Calcutta: That he did not approve of our carrying on these works without his permission: And ordered Mr. Drake to desist immediately, and destroy what he had already done.”

10th. The French having strengthened their fort by an additional bastion, which they had at this time completed, received, at the same juncture we did, a perwanah to the like effect; both of them having been dispatched by the Subah, as he was on his march against the Purranea Nabob; and the answers to them reached the Suba on the same day at Rajamaal, a city about three days march from Muxadabad; and the French, by the completion of their bastion, being enabled to desist immediately, answered him accordingly; assuring him at the same time, that they had built no new works, and had only repaired one of their bastions which had been injured by lightning: With which answer he appeared satisfied.

11th. The reply your President returned to the Suba's perwanah, was, to the best of my remembrance, as follows:

“ That the Suba had been misinformed in respect to our building a wall round our town, and we had dug no ditch since the invasion of the Moratters, at which time we executed such a work at the particular request of our inhabitants, and with the knowledge and approbation of Ally Verdy Cawn; that in the late war between our nation and the French, they had attacked and taken the town of Madras, contrary to the neutrality we expected would have been preserved in the Mogul's dominions; and that there being at present great appearance of
“ another

“ another war between the two crowns, we were under some apprehensions they would act in the same manner in Bengal; to prevent which we were only repairing our line of guns to the water-side.”

It is fruitless now to wish this answer had been debated in Council before it was sent, where I think much impropriety would have appeared in it, as the whole of it had a tendency to confirm the Suba in a belief of those insinuations, which had been already conveyed to him, that the war between us and the French would probably be brought into Bengal, besides its carrying a tacit reflection on the Suba's want of power or will to protect us. The consequence was adequate, for he was much enraged at the receipt of it, and immediately ordered your factory at Cossimbuzar to be invested; which was accordingly done on the 22d of May, by Roy Dullob, of which we received advice from the gentlemen there the 25th, and several other subsequent letters, informing us of additional forces being added on the factory, from time to time, and that they expected every moment to be attacked; and that the Suba was on his march to Muxadabad. The subject matter of complaint, assigned in every letter, still regarded the new works we were carrying on in Calcutta.

12th. On the first advice received from the gentlemen at Cossimbuzar, we forwarded to them a copy of the President's answer to the Nabob's perwanah, and in our several dispatches recommended to them to use every salutary means in their power to put a stop to the Suba's resentment, and obtain a currency to our business, (which was now obstructed at every subordinate and arung). We directed them to assure the Suba we were carrying on no new works; that we had dug no ditch; that our enemies had misrepresented us; that if he gave no credit to our assertions, we intreated any one he could confide in to inspect them, and wrote the Suba repeated letters to the like purpose. We likewise gave the gentlemen instructions to remonstrate and expostulate strongly against this hard treatment, and to endeavour to trace out, if possible, whether one or other of the European nations was not at the bottom of it, with intent to embroil the Company's affairs, and benefit those of their employers, and to use all means of knowing from his ministers if the Suba's intentions were to extort a sum of money from us (conformable to the unjust and usual method of his predecessors;) withal giving them positive orders to make no concession, or give any promise touching the demolition of our fortifications.

13th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you see us reduced to the necessity, either of resisting the arbitrary orders of the Suba, or of abandoning and leaving open your Presidency to the mercy of the French, contrary to your

your orders and intimation to us by the Delawar; for to all our remonstrances we could receive no satisfaction from the gentlemen at Cossimbuzar, but was still advised, the Suba insisted on our demolishing our new works, (when in fact we had made none) and fill up a ditch we had never dug.

14th. Under date, I think, the 1st of June, we received a letter from your Chief and Council at Cossimbuzar, advising, that Roy Doolob had told Doctor Forth, that the Suba's resentment was caused only by the draw-bridge and works we had built at Baagbazar, and the octagon which Mr. Kelsall had rebuilt in his garden: And that if we would write the Suba we would demolish those works, the forces would be immediately withdrawn: And the gentlemen likewise enforcing this as a necessary and effectual expedient to put an end to the troubles, we in full council took it into consideration; and reflecting on the heavy loss and disadvantage you would sustain in your investment, by the continuance of the stoppage of your business, and judging these works and draw-bridge at Baagbazar so far detached, as to be of little use in the defence of the place against an European enemy, we unanimously agreed and determined, to promise the demolition of them, and the octagon at Mr. Kelsall's garden; and to that purport, as soothing a letter as could be indited was instantly drawn up, to the Suba, from the President, and inclosed to Mr. Watts and his Council, to whom we also wrote, advising them of our compliance and readiness to demolish those works which had given him displeasure. Triplicates of this arasda's and letter we dispatched in four hours, to arrive in thirty-six hours; and ordered a large reward to the Cossids if they arrived in the time.

15th. We received another short letter under the same date, viz. the 1st of June, wherein the gentlemen informed us, the forces on the factory amounted to 12,000, with a train of artillery, and that positive orders were arrived to attack it, requesting they might be reinforced with an hundred men; on which a council was summoned, their request taken into consideration, and the five Captains called in, and desired to give their opinion, whether it was possible this reinforcement could be thrown into the place? They withdrew, and after debating it amongst themselves, gave us their opinion in writing, declaring the thing impracticable, and that the force the gentlemen had in the fort was, in their judgments, sufficient to defend it against the troops brought against them. This opinion we immediately dispatched to them, directing them, if they were attacked, to make as good a defence as they could; and when they found they could defend the factory no longer, to make the best retreat in their power: but I believe neither this letter, nor some of our preceding ones, reached

reached the gentlemen, the Suba having for some days cut off all correspondence between us; a plain indication that an accommodation was not the mark he aimed at.

16th. On the 6th of June we had a rumour of Cossimbuzar's being taken by the Nabob, which was confirmed to us the 7th, by a letter from Mr. Matthew Collet, your second at that factory; which, according to my best recollection, expressed as follows:

“ That upon the Nabob's repeated orders to his Generals to attack
 “ the factory, unless the Chief went in person to him, Mr.
 “ Watts, by the advice of his Council, thought it more advise-
 “ able to go to the Nabob, than risk involving the Company in a
 “ war with the Government; that he accordingly did so on the
 “ 2d of June, and on coming to his presence was made a pri-
 “ soner, and orders sent for Mr. Collet, (and I think Mr. Batson)
 “ to attend him; likewise to sign, jointly with Mr. Watts, a ma-
 “ kulka, (or obligation, with a penalty annexed) which order
 “ they obeyed; but in place of being set at liberty, upon signing
 “ the makulka required, Mr. Collet was sent back to the factory,
 “ with directions to deliver it up to Roy Doolob, which he was
 “ obliged to comply with, and was then giving up the account
 “ of the cannon, ammunition, and military stores; that the fac-
 “ tory was not plundered, and the Nabob was determined to
 “ march to Calcutta with his whole army, estimated then at
 “ 50,000 men, besides a large train of artillery.”

The reasons which swayed Mr. Watts to quit his government at such a juncture as that, and trust himself in the hands of the Suba, (on whose character or principles no reasonable faith could be had) without any proper security, hostage, or safeguard for his person; or those which urged Mr. Collet to follow his example, when he knew his Chief was made a prisoner; and that consequently the trust, command, and government of the factory, fort, and garrison, devolved upon himself; or why this your settlement was thus given up, without a single stroke being struck for it, I am totally a stranger to, and can only hope, for their sakes, and the honour of their country, they have, or will justify their conduct to you in those particulars. I will not subscribe to the opinion of our five Captains, as already recited, and say their force was sufficient to resist and defend the place for any long time against the Suba's army; but had it been defended at all, he could not have attacked and taken it, without the loss of time, many of his people, and probably some of his principal officers. A stroke of this kind might have had happy consequences to your affairs;

affairs; it might have inclined the Suba to an accommodation, by cooling still more the zeal of his ministers, generals, officers and people, who almost to a man were averse to this expedition against the English, as well knowing the consequence would be as fatal to his country as to us, tho' he succeeded in it. A defence of only twenty-four hours would, in its consequences, have retarded, in all probability, his march to Calcutta for many days, and would have been a point gained to us of the utmost importance, by having more time for the completion of many requisites, which for want of it we were obliged wholly to neglect, or they remained unfinished at the time we were actually invested. A detention of his army before Cossimbuzar for two or three days, would have brought on dirty rainy weather in his march towards us, and incommoded him greatly, as well in the passage of his troops and cannon, as in the attack of our settlement; whereas, by the easy possession he acquired of Cossimbuzar, he was enabled to march against us without loss of time, or obstruction from the weather, which afforded not a drop of rain through the march and attack of Calcutta; but on the 21st, at night, whilst I was prisoner in the camp, it rained heavily, and dirty weather succeeded for many days after, during which his musquetry, being all matchlocks, would have been rendered in a manner useless. We should also have had an important succour, in the arrival before the fort, of the Success galley, the Speedwell, and Bombay frigate; these vessels having passed Tanners the 19th and 20th, and joined the Dodaly and the rest of our fleet about Govindpore, after they had fell down from the fort, though before it was surrendered. Many more are the advantages I could enumerate, which would have resulted from the smallest defence and resistance made at Cossimbuzar, and can only regret now its not having been done; repeating my hopes, the gentlemen in trust there will give you sufficient reasons why it was not done. Their treatment could hardly have been worse, had they been obstinate in its defence; they themselves being continued prisoners in the Suba's camp, under many hardships, until, I think, the latter end of June; their effects plundered, and the gentlemen in the factory, *viz.* Messrs. Hugh, Watts, and Chambers, with the whole garrison, put in irons, and sent to the common prison at Muxadabad; the fate Messrs. Batson, Sykes, Hastings, and Marriot, would have undergone, had not luckily the two former made their escape, and the two latter been at the Arungs.

17. On Cossimbuzar's being invested, we wrote to the several subordinates, and to all our Gomastahs at the several armies, advising them of the several proceedings, and to be upon their guard, and hold themselves in readiness to retreat with the Company's effects, &c. and on intelligence of the capture of the place, and the Subah's march to Calcutta, we sent them orders

orders to withdraw, and join us with all expedition. But these orders were too late, excepting with respect to your factory at Luckypore, as I have already intimated in my letter of the 17th July. Mr. Boddam, your Chief at Ballifore, received our orders in time to withdraw himself, with the few soldiers he had there, and about 6000 Rupees of your effects; the remainder, to the amount of about 40,000, were sequestered, and your factory-house in part only demolished at Ballasore; but Bulramgurry, by its situation, having escaped the government's notice, and by the prudent conduct of Mr. John Bristow, (left Resident at Ballasore by Mr. Boddam) is still retained. Myself and Mr. Boddam were dispatched to take a formal possession of it the 18th September, and to negotiate other matters, which will be transmitted on the face of our Futla consultations; and we have thought it necessary to nominate Bulramgurry your Presidency, being divested of every other possession you had in these provinces. But to resume my narrative: Dispatches were likewise forwarded express to Bombay, Fort St. George, and Vizagapatam, the 8th of June, for a reinforcement of troops, stores, &c. and succours demanded of the French and Dutch settlements on this river; the success of which last negotiation you have likewise in my said letter of the 17th July. The militia were under arms for the first time the 7th June, something too late, I am afraid you will say, to be of much service, just coming to action.

18. I am now, Honourable Sirs, come closer to the unravelling the real causes which stimulated the Suba to the lengths he has proceeded against us: How far my conjectures and assertions will be supported by a probable system of politics in him, and by the tenor of his own conduct considered together, I humbly submit to your judgments. And first, I beg leave to remark on the three articles contained in the Makulka, which your Chief and Council were obliged to sign in the Suba's camp, when before Cossimbuzar; the terms of which were, *viz.*

- “ That we should not protect the King's subjects.—That we should
- “ not misuse the liberty of our dusticks, by covering the trade of
- “ the native merchants.—And that we should refund and make
- “ good whatever sum it should be proved the King had been de-
- “ frauded of in his revenues and duties by this practice; and that
- “ we should demolish our fortifications.”

These, Honourable Sirs, are the purport of the three articles of the Makulka, howsoever I may have varied the wording of it, by not having it before me. Had the Suba any intention of being satisfied with our concession to these articles, he certainly would have rested here; your Chief, Council, fort and garrison of Cossimbuzar were in his possession; the
Gentlemen

Gentlemen had signed and executed the obligation demanded of them ; he knew their signing of it was not valid or binding without our approval ; and if he had ever inclined to an accommodation, he would have transmitted the terms they had complied with, and at least have desisted until our reply could have reached him, in place of cutting off, for some days, the means of all correspondence or intelligence between us and your factory ; and marching directly against us, without ever replying to, or taking notice of many Arasidassies received from us : But the truth is, his jealousy of the independant power of the Europeans in his country was at this juncture confirmed, which he was determined to reduce ; and being sensible ours was the most formidable to him, we became the first objects of his just politics. To support this my conclusion, I must here refer to three letters, which Wazeed's Gomastah in my presence read your President, (copies of which, I believe, are in Mr. Drake's possession) addressed to his master Wazeed, from the Suba, all three, to the best of my remembrance, bearing date in May last. In each of these, he avows his intention to reduce the power of the English, forbids his interfering on their behalf, asserting his having long intended it, and swears by God and his Prophets, that he will drive them out of his country, unless they are satisfied to trade in it on the footing they did in Jaffier Cawn's time (by which he meant before the time the Honourable Company obtained their Phirmaund). Your fort at Cossimbuzar, (esteemed by all judges more regular and tenable than that at Fort William) so near his capital, appeared too dangerous a hold, at a time he was influenced to believe our strength in India was four times more formidable than it really was ; and that we were on the eve of a French war, which would be probably brought into his country : Consistent with this was his expression of resentment, at Rajamaal, on receipt of your President's letter : " Who shall dare to think of commencing hostilities in my country, or presume to imagine I have not power to protect them ? " And it was current in the mouths of all degrees, when I was at Muxadabad, that Mahabut Jung had long meditated to destroy the forts and garisons of the Europeans, and to reduce their trade on the footing of Armenians. And here I hope it will not be deemed impertinent, if I recite, verbatim, the last discourse and council which Mahabut Jung gave his grandson, a few days before his death ; and which I had from very good authority at Muxadabad, after my releasement.

" My life has been a life of war and stratagem : For what have I
 " fought, for what have my councils tended, but to secure you,
 " my Son, a quiet succession to my Suba-dary ? My fears for you
 " have for many days robbed me of sleep. I perceived who had
 " power to give you trouble after I am gone hence. Hossein
 " Cooley Cawn, by his reputation, wisdom, courage, and affection
 " to Shaw Amet Jung, and his house, I feared would obstruct your
 " government.

“ government. His power is no more. Monichund Dewan,
 “ whose councils might have been your dangerous enemy, I have
 “ taken into favour. Keep in view the power the European na-
 “ tions have in the country. This fear I would also have freed
 “ you from, if God had lengthened my days.—The work, my
 “ Son, must now be yours: Their wars and politics in the Telinga
 “ country should keep you waking: On pretence of private con-
 “ tests between their Kings, they have seized and divided the
 “ country of the King, and the goods of his people between them:
 “ Think not to weaken all three together. The power of the
 “ English is great; they have lately conquered Angria, and posses-
 “ sed themselves of his country; reduce them first; the others will
 “ give you little trouble, when you have reduced them. Suffer
 “ them not, my Son, to have fortifications or soldiers: If you do,
 “ the country is not yours.”

19th. How consistent the Suba has been in his adherence to this last
 counsel of his grandfather, we have woefully felt; but that we were not
 solely the objects of his resentment and designs, is evident: His perwanah
 to the French was dispatched the same day with ours: When he marched
 against us, he sent perwanahs to both French and Dutch, with orders to
 provide; and join him with ships, men, and ammunition, to attack us by
 water, whilst he attacked us by land: They refused; in consequence of
 their refusal, he invested their several forts and factories, and demanded
 an exorbitant sum from each. The French were glad to accommodate
 matters for the payment of three Lack and half of Rupees; the Dutch for
 four Lack and half, after having had, for a day and half, a body of the
 Suba's troops in their settlement, waiting orders to attack it, and a man
 stationed with an ax in his hands, to cut down their flag-staff and colours.
 The French had not money to pay the mulct laid on them, but gained
 Roy Doolob to become their security: The Dutch were reduced to im-
 mediate payment; and both did then, and ever since have been obliged to
 endure the most audacious and exasperating insults, from the lowest Peon
 in the service of the government. That there was this difference in the
 sum extorted from them has been accounted for, (how justly I will not
 say) by the supplies of ammunition given the Suba privately by the agents
 of the French at Chandanagore. The thing, however, was verified by
 two of our ships, who brought us intelligence, that the French, by night,
 crossed over 200 chests of powder to the Suba's army, lying near Banka
 Bazar.

20th. Still consistent with the last advice of Mahabut Jung, he appeared
 at Rajamal satisfied with the answer from the French Directeur; though

no one can imagine his intelligence was such, that he was really imposed on as to the pretence of repairing the damage they had sustained by lightning; he manifested sufficiently his resentment and intentions against both French and Dutch; but their time was not yet come; it was not his business to have the three nations to encounter at once, but to compromise, at the present, for as much as he could get from them; but that the French were, and still are, the next object of his arms, will not admit of doubt, no more than that he would have proceeded immediately against them, had not his advices from court obliged him to proceed against Shocut Jung, the Purrahea Nabob, as an object more important; for when I was twice conducted into his presence, after the surrender of the fort, his first question to me was, "Will you all engage to join me against the French?" Uniform has been the conduct of the government to another part of Mahabut Jung's advice; for though liberty of trade is granted to the Danes and Prussians, yet they are prohibited fortifications or garrisons. And in further proof of the resolution of the government to divest the Europeans of their forts and garrisons, and that we were the objects of his policy, and not of his resentment only (from either one particular private cause or other, that may be transmitted you) I may justly add, the apprehensions of the French and Dutch themselves, who, on the first approach of our troubles, sent strenuous dispatches to their Principals at Batavia and Pondicherry, for the most expeditious supplies of men, ammunition, &c. and I doubt not it will be soon their turn to regret the having so quietly given us up as a sacrifice, unless the Suba should be vanquished in his present expedition against Shocut Jung.

21st. The 3d instant (November) a Perwannah reached the Dutch, from the Suba's camp—demanding them to join him against us, with threatnings if they refused; and the same day, a Perwannah came to the French factory, purporting that the Suba was informed they were carrying on their fortifications, and if they did not immediately desist, he would pass through the Dutch factory and settlement, and with their (the Dutch) soldiers destroy their fort, and drive them out of the country, as he had done the English; and the government has already obliged the French to take down their colours erected on the bounds.

22d. I believe, Honourable Sirs, it will by this time appear clearly evident to you, that the governing principle in the Suba was political, and the real object of his proceedings the demolition of your forts and garrisons, as his demands always expressed; not that I will be hardy enough to aver, he had no concurring subordinate causes, that had a specious colour of resentment; and this reflection leads me to consider the other two articles of the Mackulka, as their being inserted carry the appearance of complaint, though

though never before urged by him in any of his demands, as transmitted us by your servants at Cossimbuzar.

23d. That the abuse of Dusticks should be one cause of complaint, I am not surprized at: the face of your consultations just before the dispatch of your last year's ships, will give you, Honourable Sirs, my sentiments of the ill use made of this indulgence to your servants; my motion and minutes on this subject were, after the dispatch of your ships, taken into consideration, and such remedies and checks resolved on, as were judged might put a stop to the abuse.

24th. That we should not protect the King's subjects, is an article will bear a much larger discussion. This prohibition, in the extent it might have been carried by the government, whenever it was inclined to obstruct your business or plunder your merchants, would have rendered your trade most precarious; had the article been explained so as to prohibit our giving protection to those who were actually servants to the government, or others not born in or for a term of years settled under our colours, it would, I think, have carried nothing unjust or unreasonable in it; but that was by no means the real intention of it. The article had a latitude in expression, that would include your merchants and inhabitants whenever the Suba or his ministers were pleased to call on them; a call they would never fail in, on some pretence or other, whenever they had got any thing worth taking; so that in truth it would have been as impossible for us, consistent with your interests, to have subscribed to this article, as to the other, regarding the demolition of your fortifications; and the most favourable terms intended for us (which I could with the utmost diligence learn when at Muxadabad) were, that if we had paid an implicit obedience to the Suba's commands, by delivering our forts, and dismissal of our garrisons, we should then have been permitted to trade, on paying Armenian duties; admitting a Fowzdaar into your settlement on the part of the government, and relinquishing to them all duties of consulage, revenues, &c.——Terms scandalous and injurious to your honour as well as commerce; terms which we could never have submitted to, even if we had received no alarm from the side of France, without sacrificing the rights of your Phirmaund, giving up every part of our trust, and breaking through your repeated standing orders for more than 30 years past.

25th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, it will appear to you, that submission could not have been paid by us to two articles of the Mackulka, executed by your Chief and Council of Cozimbuzar, and that we had many months before guarded against (as much as in us lay) the complaint laid in the third; if the honours and consciences of men were to be influenced by

checks the most binding and solemn: But it is plain the two articles of complaint were at the last inserted, to give a colouring for enforcing the third and only one (our fortifications) the Suba until then insisted on, and had really in view. I am sensible, no small pains will be taken to throw the rise of your misfortunes here, on every cause but the right.

26th. From the appearance of the Suba's letter to Governor Pigott, your President seems to be solely culpable in drawing on his resentment, but neither justice nor probability will justify the conclusion. Angry he certainly was, at the terms of this letter; but had not his resentment been much deeper founded, the terms of this letter, or the error of one of your servants, would never of itself have provoked him, or can vindicate the cruel destruction both public and private, attending his proceedings, which fell equally heavy, as well on the natives, subjects of the Mogul, as on yourselves and us; and the immense plunder of Calcutta, we know, was one no small subordinate motive (instilled into him by one or two harpies in confidence about him) for his march against us, at a time when he was rapaciously plundering wherever he could; amassing wealth to enable him either to buy at Court his confirmation in the Subaship, or keep such a standing force on foot, as would secure it to him, in spite of any opposition or orders from thence.

27th. That matters might have been accommodated with the Suba, for a sum of money, as was effected by the French and Dutch, I am likewise sensible will be strongly alledged against us; but by whomsoever it is, I will be bound to say, they are either ignorant of the chain of politics and circumstances which influenced and led him on, or never reasoned or thought upon them. The Suba's whole conduct opposes this allegation; his ministers were by our orders founded on the alternative, and your Chief and Council of Cossimbuzar assured us, that he had declared money was not the thing he wanted, but that we should desist from our fortifications, and destroy our new works, &c.

28th. The protection granted the family of Raagbullob, (of which I have already given a faithful account) will, I also know, be urged with circumstances that never existed, as matter of heavy complaint against us, though the Suba never (that came to our knowledge) made complaint about it. I will not vindicate the protection being continued to them until the decease of the old Suba; I have already, and I think justly condemned it; but (this excepted) I will hope the circumstances attending and urging it, will be sufficient to extenuate that part of our conduct.

29th. I am informed it has been cruelly asserted, and published by the French, that the bringing down the Nabob and his army, and the desertion of the fort, &c. had been long a concerted scheme of the President and the rest of the Gentlemen of Council who went off in the shipping, and they mention in proof, as a corroborating circumstance, myself and the other Gentlemen of Council being left a sacrifice behind, (who they say used generally to oppose their measures) with this addition, that they had embarked and carried off with them the greatest part of the wealth of the settlement. Howsoever little right these gentlemen have to expect a vindication of their conduct from me, yet here common justice to them forbids my silence, and urges me to defend them from a charge, which I believe from my heart to be infamously false, not only as to the act but the intention; nor would I even repeat a libel so scandalous and untrue, had I not received information that some of your own servants had forwarded from your subordinate (for want of a better) the publick narrative the French in Bengal sent to their superiors, of the capture of Fort William; in which narrative I hear the above cruel charge has a place in nearly the same terms I have recited it, with many other causes assigned for this misfortune, equally void of probability or truth.

30th. It will by some, I doubt not, be represented to you that Omychund was at the bottom of all the Suba's councils and proceedings against us; the part he really acted under cover, in this affair, is difficult to distinguish and point out; that he was much chagrined at the little influence he had in the settlement for a few years last past, is most certain; in applications to the Durbar, (wherein he usually was the acting person between the Company and the Government) little use had been made of him, possibly more had been better.—Be this as it will, it is most certain, he had no general weight for these four or five years, beyond what his wealth gave him, so that his name and reputation became lessened in the eye of the government as well as in Calcutta. Picqued at this, and implacable in his resentment, it is not improbable he worked with some instruments of the Durbar, to embroil us in such a manner as would make his mediation and assistance necessary, and thereby regain his credit and influence with both; little imagining things would go the length they did; in which it must have been most evident to him, his own large possessions would be equally the Suba's prey, with yours: that he advised the dispatch of Naran Sing, to demand Raagbullob's family, and introduce him into the settlement, will not I think admit of doubt, no more than that he deeply resented his being turned out of it again. His endeavours with Wazeed, to mitigate things, when he really found they were coming to extremities, was I believe sincere enough until his imprisonment by the President, an act of his power and sole authority,

rity, for which the pretence made use of was, in my judgment, by no means sufficient; the correspondence detected between him and Rajaram Harkarah, (the Suba's head spy) which was read in the presence of many of us, contained in our opinions nothing to vindicate it, nor had your President even the consent or approbation of his Council for this step, or did he, that I remember, ever require it. On his imprisonment, his head Jemmautdaar Jaggemant Sing stabbed himself, and set fire to his master's house, and some of his women either butchered themselves, or were butchered by others in the family, which became a scene of much horror and confusion. It can hardly be doubted that Omychund became desperate in his resentments, and it is probable enough he expedited the march of the Suba's army, then advanced, I think, as far as Banka Bazar; and it is likewise probable, that he then sent him the real state of the fort and garrison, and afterwards might (as has been generally suspected) from time to time have given him intelligence; but this is all conjecture; we only know, that his Jemmautdaar just now mentioned, surviving the wounds he had given himself, was put upon his horse, and joined the Suba, whom he informed of the transaction relating to his master's imprisonment; and when the enemy was repulsed at Baagbazar, he led the van of the army to the eastward, and directed them to the avenues by which they entered the next day.

31st. From others, I believe, you will be told, that the dismissal of your Dadney Merchants was one cause of our misfortunes, arising from their endeavours at the Durbar to embroil your affairs at the Arungs, as conducted by your own Gomastahs, hoping thereby to get the Dadney readmitted, and themselves reinstated; nay some, I have been informed, have been hardy enough to urge and assert that the large increase of your revenues Zemindary was another very principal cause, which drew the Suba's attention on the settlement, though themselves, your President and Council, and I believe the greatest part of the Subadary, as well as my Honourable Masters, know the credits of that branch were only increased without any innovations made in the branch itself; but to its loss and disadvantage. Many more causes and reasons equally substantial will, I doubt not, be assigned and transmitted to you by such busy and very short-sighted politicians as these strangers to real ones; they think they shall not appear of any importance, unless they assign some, no matter how incongruous: but you will now have materials enough before you to form your own judgments. I think my conclusions on every cause that can be alledged for the extraordinary and unprecedented conduct of the Suba, have facts and probability to support them: To you, Honourable Sirs, I humbly submit them, with this one conclusion more, that your situation in these provinces on a re-establishment will be such as to admit

of only two alternatives; that you must in future, either keep such a fortification and garrison, as will at all times be sufficient to force your trade against the opposition and extortion of the Government; or reduce your commerce to the footing of the Prussians and Danes, &c. without forts and garrisons at all, and on payment of the lowest duties that can be stipulated.—The immunities and privileges granted you in your Phirmaunds, you find now are of no validity without a military expence (more, I fear, than equivalent) to put them in force; but on this subject it will be my duty, to give you my sentiments on another occasion more at large, whilst at present I resume the thread of my narrative, broke off at the surrender of your fort and factory of Cossimbuzar; the easy capture of which, concurring with the Suba's intentions beyond his expectations, not only gave the finishing stroke to his resolves, but expedited and facilitated his march to Calcutta; which leads me to a consideration of the immediate causes of its sudden reduction, most needful to be known to my Honourable Masters; as the rocks and quick-sands on which we have unhappily struck and split, being fairly and candidly laid down, may prevent a second wreck of your estate and trade.

32d. These causes I will beg leave to investigate under three general heads:—1st, The state of our fortifications and garrisons: 2d. The state of our ammunition, guns, and military stores: and, 3d. the several errors and miscarriages arising from a deficiency (or rather a total want) of military knowledge or order.

33d. To the first article of my first general head, it will not become me to add much more than I set forth in my letter before you of the 17th July, addressed from Muxadabad to your other two presidencies of Bombay and Fort St. George. The nature and extent of the power given to the Committee of Fortifications, Messrs. Drake, Watts, Scot and Manningham, we have ever been kept strangers to; but I will venture to conclude, that had the money which was expended on the redoubt, drawbridge, &c. erected at Baagbuzar, and that which was meditated to be spent on the circuit of the ditch beyond our bounds, as also that which was disbursed on the batteries, &c. raised on the Suba's approach, been timely appropriated to the demolition of the houses round us, to have given a proper esplanade to the northward, eastward and southward of your fort, the sinking a ditch round it well palisaded, it had been employed to a more important use and purpose, and have been a sufficient discouragement to the government to have prevented any project or hopes of attacking of it, with any probability of success—I am sensible it will be urged, the government would have never suffered these measures; a reasoning *ex post facto* will not invalidate my conclusion; for
had

had it been thought of, or carried into execution, at the commencement of the old Suba's sickness, when every thing at the Durbar was in confusion, and both parties there employed on their own schemes and designs, the work might have been effected without let or hindrance; a Perwanah might possibly have reached us, to prohibit our proceeding, but no troops could have been sent against us, whilst the attentions of the clashing interests at the Suba's court were taken up in securing each their own safety on his demise. What might have been done during that favourable interval is sufficiently evident, from the almost inconceivable useless works which we accomplished during the space of a few days only; and the same plea which your president urged in his letter to the Suba, subsisted equally at the beginning of the old Suba's sickness, when we had reason enough to be alarmed by the approach of a war with France. The ruinous state of the line to the westward of the fort, had been a reproach to our settlement, and to every thing bearing the name of fortifications for more than two years, and was in just and strong (I will not say in very decent) terms represented in a letter to the Board, by Mr. Jasper Leigh Jones the Captain of your train, I think in April or May 1755, but no steps were taken to repair it until we had reason hourly to expect the enemy at our doors. The whole easterly curtain had been for many years in so ruinous a condition as not to bear a gun; one we fired from it, a three or four pounder, as I remember, which made its way through the terrace; through this curtain from the principal gate to the north-east bastion, were struck out five or six large windows, so many breaches made for the enemy, in a quarter too where we were most liable to be attacked; and to sum up the whole, the new Goodowns to the southward, had rendered your two southerly bastions useless to each other, and to the whole southerly face of the fort, which could not be flanked by a single gun from either bastion:—From a consideration of these circumstances, joined to the incumbrance of the church and houses round us, and the other wants and disadvantages mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, it is self-evident, the place could not have held out an hour against an European enemy.

34th. The state of your garrison comes next under view; a subject on which I could wish my duty to your service would permit my silence, as truths disagreeable to me in the recital, and very unpleasing to you to hear, must arise from the smallest scrutiny made in it. It is most ungrateful to a benevolent mind, to rehearse the faults which may be justly charged even against the living, much more so against the dead, become so in a great measure by their own errors, and want of knowledge in the duties of their profession; but the choice and appointment of commanding officers in your garrison, is now become so important a consideration

ration to the well being of your service, that none who would have any claim to your favour, or would be deemed faithful to the trust you have reposed in them, can be vindicated in concealing the truth from you.

35th. Your five commanding officers were Commandant Minchin, Captains Clayton, Buchanan, Witherington, and Grant; each of these gentlemen (Captain Clayton excepted) had seen service, either in Europe or on the Cormandel coast: Touching the military capacity of our Commandant, I am a stranger. I can only say, that we were unhappy in his keeping it to himself, if he had any; as neither I, nor I believe any body else, was witness to any part of his conduct, that spoke or bore the appearance of his being the commanding military officer in the garrison. Whether this proceeded from himself, or his not being properly supported in his rank, I cannot say; but such, I have heard, has been his allegation and plea for his supine remissness, at a juncture which required the exertion of every quality he could have been master of. Your President, I remember, spoke to me more than once with much uneasiness, at the beginning of our troubles, on the indolence of the Commandant, and seemed to think of breaking him; had this measure been carried into execution, it had been better for the service, and I think, for that gentleman too; the disgrace would have been less, I believe, in the opinion of all mankind, than that which falls on him by his quitting the fort and garrison in the manner he did, whilst he bore the character of commanding officer in it; but the mischief was, we could not have stopped here: the next gentleman in command to him had never seen any service, and I am sorry to say, demonstrated his want of the most essential requisites of a soldier. Had both these gentlemen been set aside, and the next in command preferred to the commandantship, it would have promised a happier issue for them and us; and most assuredly, this was not a time to have regarded forms or ceremony. Remissness, or a deficiency of military knowledge in commanders, when coming to action, are equally fatal in their consequences, and are ever the parents of neglects, confusion and disorders; and troops, I believe, are hardly ever known to do their duty, unless where they have an opinion of, as well as love for their commanders. That neither was the case, with regard to the two gentlemen above-mentioned, I believe the whole settlement can witness with me, and they were in no higher degree of esteem with their subalterns than with their soldiers. The preferring Captain Buchanan, who was next in command to them, would have obviated all the disadvantages we labour under in this particular; a gentleman whose character as a man, and a soldier, deserved a better fate than the unhappy one which befel him, by the errors and misconduct of others: the vacant companies

would have been filled up with those, we had good reason to think (and who indeed proved themselves) brave officers.—The next in command to Captain Buchanan, in the battalion, would then have been Captain Grant; a gentleman who had, during his stay in the garrison, remarkably exerted himself in every duty which could have been expected from him, and demonstrated no want of either spirit or military skill, but much the contrary. The Captain of your train was a laborious, active officer, but confused; and would, I believe, have few objections to his character, diligence or conduct, had he been fortunate in having any commander in chief to have had a proper eye over him, and to take care that he did his duty. Here we had a fatal instance of a remissness in command, for that we had neither a sufficiency of ammunition, &c. nor that good, was doubtless as much the fault of those above him, (whose duty it was to have inspected his conduct) as his; but as this poor gentleman fell a sacrifice, as well to his own, as to the errors of others, they should be touched as lightly as possible.

36th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have given you as faithful a picture of the commanders of your five companies as I can draw, or as I believe can be drawn by any body else: three of them, my wretched companions in the Black-hole, perished there, as did also all your brave subalterns, (Ensigns Walcot and Carstairs excepted) where I will leave them, and proceed to consider your troops in garrison; consisting as already mentioned in my letter of the 17th July, by the muster-rolls laid before us, about the 6th or 8th of June, of 145 in battalion, and 45 of the train, officers included, and in both, only 60 Europeans. We were taught to believe, there were at all your subordinates, at least 200 men, the best of our garrison, *viz.* at Cossimbuzar 100, at Dacca about 40, at Luckypore 30, and at Ballasore about the same number; but it is certain the numbers there barely exceeded one hundred: Whether two hundred ought to have been there, I am not master enough of the subject to declare; so am obliged here to refer to your President, for your further satisfaction; who (or in his absence your second) had always the inspection of the rolls, and mustering the men. Of these handful of troops in garrison, there were not five that had ever, I believe, seen a musket fired in anger. Had the militia of the place been (agreeably to your orders per Godolphin, anno 1751) regularly trained to arms, they might at this juncture have been a most seasonable supply; but this essential regulation, I am sorry to say, was totally neglected, so that when we came to action, there were hardly any amongst the Armenians and Portuguese inhabitants, and but few amongst the European militia, who knew the right from the wrong end of their pieces. From the militia, about 65, chiefly Europeans, entered volunteers in the battalion, (most of them your own cove-

nanted.

nanted servants) in whose just praise, I can hardly say enough. They sustained every hardship of duty, greatly beyond the military themselves; their address in the use of their arms was astonishing, the short time there was to train them considered; and though their bravery may have been equalled, I am sure it has not been exceeded, by any set of men whatsoever. A considerable body of these, were on the Saturday morning relieved from duty, and were gone on board the ships to deposit their papers, or on other occasions relative to their private affairs; as were likewise on the like call, many of the militia, with four of their officers, to wit, the reverend Mr. Mapletost Captain-lieutenant, Captain Henry Wedderburn, Lieutenant of the first company, and Ensigns Sumner, and Charles Douglas, all of them gentlemen who had failed in no part of duty, either as officers or soldiers, in the defence of the place; so that there is no reason to doubt the veracity of their own assertions, in which they are joined by the volunteers: "That they, had no intention, but to return to the defence of the place, until they saw your President, Commandant Minchin, Captain Grant and Mr. Macket, quit it (Messrs. Manningham and Frankland having quitted it before) and a general retreat rumoured:" and indeed, immediately after, all means of returning were cut off from them, by the falling down of every ship, vessel, and boat. Thus, Honourable Sirs, you see our garrison, small as it was, reduced and weakened, both in its strength, officers and councils, in a very important degree, to the disheartening those who stayed, and encouragement of the enemy; and when it is considered, those remaining, including officers, volunteers, soldiers and militia, did not exceed one hundred and seventy men; and that of those there were twenty-five killed, and about seventy wounded, before noon the 20th, and the whole exhausted of their strength, by continual duty and action, and our people of the train reduced to fourteen only; it would not, I hope, have been wondered at, had we surrendered your fort without parley or capitulation, though it is certain we should not have surrendered ourselves, had not our own people forced the western gate during the parley; for having no dependance on the clemency of the enemy we had to deal with, we had meditated, in case the St. George with her boats failed us, the forcing a retreat that night, through the southerly barrier by the river-side, and to have marched until we came under cover of the ships, then lying before Surman's garden's; imagining the enemy would be too much employed on the plunder of the fort, to have molested us greatly in our retreat.

37th. On the second general head I shall have little to say. That we had not powder sufficient, and that we had, not good; that we had hardly any shells fitted, or fuzees fitted to them; that there was hardly a carriage that would bear a gun; that the 50 fine cannon you sent out three

years ago, 18 and 24 pounders, lay neglected under your walls ; and that we were deficient in almost every kind of military stores, are all truths, will not admit of any dispute ; but who is properly accountable for these defects, or under whose immediate care or inspection they were, or ought to have been, must, Honourable Sirs, be determined by yourselves.

38th. I am come now to my third and last general head, Our own errors ; a subject, I am sorry to declare, too fruitful of matter, though bearing great extenuation, when it is considered, we had in truth no military head to guide us ; and that I may be as little tedious a possible, I will wave the rehearsal of our smaller errors, and keep to those more capital ones, which variously, in my judgment, contributed to the loss of your settlement, and were the causes of embarrassing and preventing our general retreat, with the public and private effects deposited in your fort ; and I shall recite these in order of time as they happened, that if due heed be paid to them, the like misfortune may be avoided in future.

39th. Our first capital error was, the neglecting taking possession of Tanner's Fort, on our provisions being prohibited the settlement, and when there was no force or troops there to have opposed us ; this measure in our first council of war, I moved and urged, with every argument in my power, should be done with 25 or 30 men, and a party of Buxerries, and that a battery of six guns should be immediately erected there towards the northward or land-side. In this motion I was strongly seconded by Mons. la Beaumes, and I think Captain Grant only, and consequently it was over-ruled. The utility I thought evident ; it would have secured provisions from the other side of the river, or the Suba must have divided his force ; it would have secured the retreat of the shipping ; it might have been a retreat to ourselves, or if at last drove from it, we had it still in our power to destroy it, in such a manner as to have rendered it useless, and prevent its proving a troublesome thorn in our sides, which it may possibly yet be, if ever we advance again to retake your settlement, as our ships must pass within almost pistol-shot of it. The Gentlemen saw the utility of this measure too late ; our ships were sent down to attempt the possession of it ; a great deal of ammunition was fruitlessly thrown away against it ; our ships received much damage, and were obliged to make an inglorious retreat, to the no small encouragement of the enemy and our disgrace : and to sum up all the misfortunes attending this error, our ships in their flight, with that part of the colony who left the fort, were, from the fire they were obliged to sustain from this fort, and the little order observed amongst themselves, thrown into such confusion that several ran a-shore, and some, the richest in the fleet, fell into the enemy's hands, and were plundered.

40th. Our second capital error, with our small and untrained garrison, was, I conceive, raising the three advanced posts and batteries to the northward, eastward, and southward, and the gaol, which answered no purpose, but exhausting, harrassing, and destroying the few people we had. If we, in place of this measure, had kept our force more united, withdrawn Picard and his party from Baagbazar, and taken possession with our musquetry of the church, the Company's, Messrs. Cruttenden's, Eyres's, and Omychund's houses, the enemy could not have approached us without infinite loss, and with hardly any probability of success. From these posts, close under the cover of our guns, our troops could hardly have been attacked, much less been dislodged, as we had sufficient proofs afterwards when the out-posts were withdrawn; or if there had appeared a necessity of abandoning them, their retreat to the fort was secure; considerably less than half the troops stationed at the out-posts would have been sufficient for this service, and this important consequence had followed, a regular relief for duty, of which we had none, as things were unhappily conducted, nor would that infinite confusion and disorder in the fort have ensued, which did on withdrawing these batteries; the fort had been in a manner left defenceless for the support of them, and little benefited by the return of troops, fatigued and hardly able to stand.—You have, Honourable Sirs, an exact plan of your settlement, and of every house in it, on inspection of which, you will, at one view, see the inutility of these three principal out-posts. That to the northward was erected to defend the pass between the corner of Mr. Griffith's house and the river-side, a precaution totally useless, as you will find Mr. Griffith's house, your salt-petre Godowns, and the whole street were commanded by the guns on the north-east bastion, within less than musket-shot of your fort. That to the east-ward, at the Court-house, you will find commanded by the battery over the eastern gate, and from the old and new south-east bastions within musket-shot. That to the southward was not indeed commanded by any gun from the fort, but field-pieces advanced a few paces without your eastern gate, would not only have commanded that, but the other two principal avenues to the fort, if the battery on the gate, and the north east bastion had not been deemed a sufficient defence against the approach of the enemy; and had they advanced by the ditch to the southward of the burying-ground, and up the avenue between that and my house, or penetrated through the burying-ground, we still had nothing to apprehend from them, as the whole square between the southerly face of the fort and the hospital, and gate of the burying-ground, was commanded not only by the new south-east bastion, but by seven four pounders on the new Godowns, and our small arms from thence and the Company's house. Had the disposition I have mentioned been made, and the walls of the Lot Baag and those opposite the Com-

pany's house been levelled, it is more than probable the Suba at last would have been obliged to retreat with his army; for it is plain he had none with him capable of erecting any battery that could have hurt us, (that which did us most damage being our own 18 pounders turned against us from the Court-house) and with their small arms, there was hardly a possibility of approaching near enough to have affected us.—My conclusions, Honourable Sirs, are on this head, the result of reason, and a late fatal experience, and not of art, for I am no soldier; but I cannot help thinking such would have been the salutary disposition, had we been happy enough to have had a soldier at the head, or a chief commanding officer in any degree skilled in the art of defence; but, in place of it, lines were formed, which required ten times the number of men to defend: lucky we were in having an enemy who had as little skill and address in the attack, as we in the defence, and much less resolution, or on the night of the 16th or 17th, they might have entered at four different posts, and cut off the retreat to the fort of each of the five advanced batteries (including Baagbazar and the gaol) for not a gun could have been fired to cover their retreat, but must have been equally levelled at our own troops as at the enemy. In the avenues between Messrs. Coale's and Omychund's houses we sunk a ditch and threw up a bank within, which post, for want of people, was trusted to the guard of four pykes only. The importance of this post will appear in a moment, (from the plan of your settlement before you) through which the enemy might have thrown ten thousand men into the very center of our lines, before, or as soon as we could have known any thing of the matter. In the avenue north of the Court-house Tank or pond was another ditch sunk, which, from the same cause, was little better defended than the former. From the south-east angle of the park, to the corner of Mr. Lascell's house, was a third, defended by a corporal and six men. The fourth was at the entrance into the square of the Lefler Tank, Mr. Putham's house, and defended by a detachment from the south advanced battery; at neither of these four intermediate posts were planted a single cannon, and they might have been forced in the night, without the loss of ten men to the enemy, and the neglect of it cost them some thousands. I am the more particular on this subject, in proof of the error I have here censured, because, from the plan before you, you will be convinced, that the forcing any one of them in the night, would have intercepted the retreat to the fort of the troops stationed at all the advanced batteries, and caused the immediate surrender of the fort; and points out, not only the danger and inutility of these batteries, but the impropriety of forming an extent of line we had not men to defend. And to compleat our blunders in engineering, a trench was sunk through your park, from North to South, within little more than half musket-shot of your bastions, the earth of which proved
(after

(after the advanced batteries were withdrawn) a secure breast-work to the enemy, and from whence they did us the greatest injury with their small arms. We were, it is plain, engineers in theory only, with the additional misfortune, that those in superior command either had no judgment in the direction, or did not chuse to show it, whilst others who had probably better, could not with propriety interfere; to which I may add, we had neither time for projection or execution; a still further proof we should have remained satisfied in occupying the houses round us, and trusted to our fort only.

41st. A third error, and which I esteem a capital one, was the neglecting to attack the rear of that body of troops which supported the enemy's 12 pounder, in the attack of the gaol the 18th. This body consisted of 5000 chosen men and officers. The troops that defended this post sustained the enemy's attack for some time in the open road, before the gaol, with two field-pieces and their small arms; but being entirely open to the enemy, and having some killed and several wounded, they were obliged at last to retreat under cover into the gaol with their field-pieces, having before prepared two embrasures for them in the wall, which commanded the avenue through which the enemy was advancing, and the post was obstinately and gallantly defended for a great while, under the command of *Monf. la Beaume* and *Ensign Carstairs*. During the attack of this post, and just after the troops retreated into the gaol, we projected at the center advanced battery, the attacking the enemy in the rear, with 25 or 30 men and two field-pieces, to be marched from the North battery, whilst we advanced two more from our post, with all our infantry and militia, and joined the troops at the gaol to make one general sally and attack on them in front, whilst the detachment from the northward fell on the rear by order of *Captain Clayton*, who commanded at the center advanced battery. I wrote strenuously to the President, to let him know our intentions, and requested he would instantly order the detachment, with a couple of field-pieces, to advance into the middle road on the enemy's rear; to which we received answer, "That it was impossible, there were not men to send." The error I censure on this incident, is the not sufficiently considering the importance of it, and the troops that might have been without danger or inconvenience detached on this service, had the North advanced battery been divested entirely of the musketry stationed there, and with the volunteers sent out, the post would have run no risque, whilst there remained only a single officer, and people of the train sufficient to attend the battery; or on the march of the detachment, (if it had been judged necessary) that battery might have been reinforced with a detachment of the militia from the fort, as ours at the center battery had been the 17th at night, under *Ensign Charles Douglas*, when *Captain Clayton* was ordered.

dered on a piquet of 50 men, to secure the retreat of Lieutenant Blagg, and the troops from Baagbazar; or some people might have been draughted off from the south advanced battery, which had not once been (nor was likely to be) attacked: the misfortune of this neglect will best appear from the almost certain consequences which would have attended the carrying it into execution. There was no impediment that could have obstructed the detachment's arriving directly close on the back of the enemy, who would have been between two fires, without hardly a possibility of a tithe of the whole body escaping a repulse and slaughter, which, I am convinced, would have struck such a panick into the enemy as, in all human probability, had obliged the Suba to have retreated, and dropt his designs against us.—Touching this error, I am far from blaming the President; I only regret his misfortune of having no commanding military officer near him, who could have seen at first sight, and convinced him of the important use this fallly would have been to the service.

42d. The abandoning the center advanced battery, at the Court-house, has by some been asserted as the cause of the loss of the fort, and consequently comes under the head of our errors, and requires consideration in the fourth place, the more so as I am convinced much stress will be laid on this cause, by those who are totally strangers to the situation of things at that battery, or the reasons which made it needful to abandon it.—This post was commanded by Capt. Clayton as eldest Captain (next to the Commandant) myself as Captain of the first company of militia, was stationed under him. At this battery, with a detachment of the militia, we had on the whole, including officers, battalion volunteers, militia, and train, about 90 men and 15 Buxerries, two six pounders mounted on the battery, two field-pieces, and two 18 pounders.—From the most superficial view of this post, it was evident, to any capacity, that the enemy would never venture to make an open attack against it; our musketry, for this reason, became useless at the battery; the manifest and only service that could be made of them, was stationing them in the houses round us which commanded the battery, and the lesser avenues leading to it; but this very important step not seeming to be attended to by Captain Clayton, myself, and Captain Henry Wedderburn my Lieutenant, took the liberty to represent to him, the utility and absolute necessity of this measure. Piqued, I fear, that a thing so obvious did not occur to himself, he replied, there were not men enough; he would not weaken his post; though this most certainly was the only means of strengthening it. As often as we urged it, he persisted in his error; the consequence was natural; the enemy benefited by our neglect, took possession of every house round us, and of the play-house also, after the gaol was abandoned in the afternoon, and from thence by half past four in the afternoon, were breaking out several loop-holes bearing on our battery. About this

this time the enemy had forced the pass by Mr. Putham's house, and had got in multitudes within our lines; they had obliged the detachment from Captain Buchanan's post, under Lieutenant Blagg, to retreat to the South battery. They had also obliged the guard by Mr. Laffell's house (which we from our post had reinforced with two Serjeants and 20 men) to retire, and were seemingly advancing to attack our post in flank, through the Lell Baag, and intercept our retreat; but having brought one of the 18 Pounders to bear upon them, and sweep the whole easterly side of the lesser great Tank, we stopped their career with much slaughter; the fort at the same time keeping a warm fire upon them from the bastions. Thus circumstanced, Captain Mayton ordered me (I think about five in the afternoon) to go down to the fort, and represent the state of the battery, and receive orders, whether the post should be withdrawn or maintained. The orders were to withdraw it immediately, and spike up the cannon we could not bring off. I returned with these orders, and, to my astonishment, found the two 18 pounders, and one of the six pounders on the battery spiked up, and the post in such confusion as bars all description. There was nothing could have prevented our bringing off the cannon, and making the most regular and soldier-like retreat, had we been commanded by an officer of resolution and judgment; but as it was, our retreat had more the appearance of a confused rout, bringing off only one field-piece, and the cannon spiked with so little art, that they were easily drilled and turned against us. The orders for withdrawing this post circumstanced as it then was, carried the utmost propriety with it (the enemy having then made lodgments in the theatre and houses close round us) for though with our cannon and cohorn shells advanced without the battery, we dislodged the enemy from two of the houses, to wit, Mr. Bouchier's, and that formerly belonging to Mr. Twiss; yet, in an hour more, not a man could have appeared on the battery, or stirred in or out of the Court-house, without being a dead-mark to the enemy; to say nothing to our people's having been needlessly fatigued and harrassed, to such a degree, that I believe, in two hours more not a man of us would have had strength enough to have walked to the fort. On the orders being issued for abandoning our post, precipitate orders were sent to Captain Buchanan, and Captain-lieutenant Smith, immediately to withdraw from the other two advanced batteries, and spike up their cannon. The reason pleaded and urged in defence of this hasty step, was the absolute necessity of doing it as soon as the center battery was withdrawn. To this I am obliged to object, as a reason very insufficient: if any reasons at all subsisted, for their being erected and maintained prior to the withdrawing the center battery, they subsisted as much, if not more, afterwards; at least, there was no cause in nature for the order for spiking up the cannon. The South advanced battery had never been attacked, the northerly had, in the morning, and repulsed the enemy; the only circumstance to be apprehended, was the retreat of the

troops being cut off, which was easily guarded against, as we knew the enemy was within our lines. A reserve battery had been thrown up across the principal south avenue, just opposite to the Company's house, and close under the cover of the guns from the two southerly bastions, with intention that Captain Buchanan's command should retire to it with its cannon, in case he was obliged to retire from the advanced battery at the bridge; but this was never thought of. At this reserve battery they could not be attacked, without infinite loss to the enemy; nor flanked from the entrenchment cut through the park or Lott Baag, which, in its whole length, was scoured by our small arms from the church; that and Mr. Eyre's house being taken possession of on abandoning the center battery, which likewise secured the retreat of Captain-lieutenant Smith's command; so that there could be no reason of quitting either of these posts in the precipitate manner they did, which was the cause of infinite confusion amongst ourselves, and of no small encouragement to the enemy, and proves a support to the censure I think I have justly passed on our second capital error, that it had been a happy incident if these out-posts had never been thought of. I must not quit this subject, without doing particular justice to Lieutenant Blagg and 10 of our volunteers, (eight of them your covenanted servants) viz. Messrs. Law, Ellis, Took, N. Drake, Charles Smith, Wilkinson, Dodd, Knapton, William Parker and Macpherson; these Gentlemen were detached from Captain Buchanan's post, to sustain a Serjeant and 16 men posted in Mr. Goddard's house, to defend the post at Mr. Putham's, and threw themselves into Captain Minchin's house, from the top of which they made a great slaughter of the enemy; and when that post was forced, the Serjeant and his men made a precipitate retreat to the battery, without once thinking of the Gentlemen posted at Captain Minchin's, where these had a long and bloody conflict with a number of the enemy, most unequal, and at last forced a retreat, glorious to themselves, but with the loss of two of their small detachment, viz. Messrs. Smith and Wilkinson, who by mistake were separated from the body; the first refused quarter, and killed five of the enemy before he fell; the other called for quarter, but was denied it, and cut to pieces.

43d. I have now brought you, Honourable Sirs, to the fifth and last act of our tragedy of errors, which brought on as fatal and melancholy a catastrophe, I believe, as ever the annals of any people, or colony of people, suffered since the days of Adam; to wit the Governor, Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, Macket, the principal officers, and a considerable part of the colony, abandoning your fort, effects and garrison, with the ships and vessels, whereby the retreat of those who remained were to all intents and purposes cut off, to the number of about 170 persons, and left a sacrifice to an exasperated and merciless enemy; amongst those four of your council, a great number of your principal and valuable covenanted servants, three military Captains, several

several Commanders of ships, eight or nine commissioned officers, many of the principal inhabitants, and others. Our proceedings in this distressful situation, I have in few words summed up in my letter of the 17th July from the capital of the province, which I beg leave to repeat here, lest that letter by any accident should not have reached you. "Mr. Pearke's waving his right of seniority, he, and the gentlemen in council, with the unanimous approval of the gentlemen in the service, the garrison and inhabitants, elected me their Governor and Administrator of your affairs during the troubles, and suspended your President, and Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Mackett, from your service, for their breach of trust; as also the military officers who accompanied them." In my letter above referred to, I indiscriminately blamed the whole who had left us, in which I may well be excused, for I had it not then in my power to make the just distinctions and exceptions I have here already done; for, in truth, it can be incumbent only on your governor, and commander in chief, and the gentlemen of council, and the officers who accompanied him in this defection, to vindicate, if possible, this piece of conduct; nor can it be wondered at, that those neither in trust nor command, should quit a cause, where those who bore the highest distinctions in both, deserted it: That the fort was not tenable, is a truth cannot be contradicted, any more than that a general retreat, with all its effects public and private, might, with ease, have been effected, had those on whom it rested done their duty. When I mention a general retreat, I would be understood to mean no more than the European inhabitants, the garrison and their families; as for the multitudes of others that were (by an infatuation not to be accounted for) admitted into the fort, to the number of 6000 at least, they must have been abandoned; they would have suffered nothing by being left behind, and would have caused much embarrassment and distress to the whole by being embarked. As I have before done justice to the officers of militia and others, who were embarked without (I am convinced) having any intention of abandoning the fort, I must in this place likewise render justice, to the best of my knowledge and information, to the character of one of your Board, Mr. William Mackett: This gentleman had the command of the second company of militia, and went to see his lady (and children) on board the *Dodaly* the 18th at night, where he left her dangerously ill about 11, and returned to the fort, though the strongest persuasions, I am well informed, were used to detain him on board. Could any consideration or plea have been prevalent enough to shake that of honour, the situation of this gentleman's family, joined to those persuasions, would have determined his stay; but he returned to the duty his honour called him to, and with the consent and approbation of Mrs. Mackett. Early on the morning of the 19th, the President, Mr. Mackett, the Reverend Mr. Mapletost, myself and others, were employed in cutting open the bales of cotton, and filling it in bags, to carry upon the parapets; then (I recollect) Mr. Mackett intimated to me

the unhappy condition he left his lady in the preceding night, and expressed his desire and intention to step on board for five minutes, to see her : That this was the sole motive of his going, without any design of abandoning the fort, I am convinced of ; and is, I think, proved by the whole of his behaviour during the siege, and his return to the fort from the Dodaly the preceding night. With equal pleasure I would embrace any, even probable, appearance to justify the conduct of your other servants in higher trust ; against whom, I with more real concern say, the charge lies too heavy and obvious to admit of extenuation. The proof, and supporting this charge, I could wish a task imposed on any body else ; but unluckily, none but myself is equal to it, as none can be so well acquainted with the circumstances attending it ; and however galling the remembrance of my own chains, sufferings and losses may be, they shall not influence me to deviate from truth, though such remembrance may urge me to terms of seeming bitterness, hardly unavoidable, when those sufferings can be attributed to nought but the unaccountable conduct I am now impeaching—a conduct which (however palliated by a thousand frivolous reasons) will justly lay your president and Mess. Manningham and Frankland open to the censure of breach of trust, of the highest imprudence and inconsistency, and prove them strangers to the very dictates of humanity.

44th. In what degree either of the above-named gentlemen may appear less culpable than the others, or really are so, is not my business to determine ; this, Honourable Sirs, I will leave to your judgments and sentence, whilst I give you as faithful a statement of the facts, as in my power ; that Mess. Manningham and Frankland's falling down from the fort with the Dodaly, and refusing to return to it, and join our Councils the night of the 18th, though more than once summoned to it by your president, were the primary causes of all the confusion that ensued, will, I think, hardly admit of contest : The defence these Gentlemen make to exculpate themselves, stands on the face of the Fulda consultations of the 14th of July last, and is replied to by me, on my return from Ballasore, in a letter to the board at Fulda, under date the 25th of October last, a copy of which I hereunto annex ; the departure of the Dodaly (of which those gentlemen were part owners) and their refusal to return, were the cause of jealousies and fears, which otherwise would never have existed ; and the garrison were well vindicated in their conclusions, that when gentlemen, who bore the most distinguished characters both civil and military, had quitted and refused to return to their trust, and duty, every man was providing for himself the best he could. The Captain of the Dodaly exculpates himself, by producing from your president an order of the 15th of June, purporting, that he should obey all such orders as he should receive from himself or Mr. Manningham ; and these Gentlemen take the advantage of this order, to prove
their

their power, and extenuate their departing with the ship; a power which devolved to Mr. Manningham for quite another purpose, and cannot be wrested, with either truth or propriety, to the purpose it is now produced to serve, as your president can well witness. The inspection and necessary orders to be issued in matters relative to the Marine, was offered and undertaken by Mr. Manningham, to ease the president, and not with the intention that he should be thereby impowered to distress him and the garrison with the defection of that ship, and of quitting a trust which opened the way, and was, I believe, in some measure, the cause of your president's quitting his trust also on the succeeding morning, though I offer it not in sufficient vindication of a conduct not to be vindicated in one who bore the character of governor and commander in chief of your fort and garrison. That things were in the utmost confusion I admit; that no proper order, rule or command was observed, is most true; that the proceedings of Messrs. Manningham and Frankland were suspicious and alarming, I grant; but on whom will all this reflect and recoil? Had, on the first refusal these gentlemen made to join our councils at this important juncture, the ship been remanded back, under the cover of our guns, and a detachment sent to bring them to their duty, in place of their being suffered to wait for one to defend the ship from the hazard they themselves had brought her into, without orders or knowledge of any one in the garrison, the measure would have spoke the governor and commander in chief; a thousand mischiefs had been avoided, nor he himself reduced the next day to the unhappy dilemma which at last ended in his following their example, to the destruction of those left behind; and with the knowledge, that neither the Company's treasure, books, or essential papers were embarked, no more than the immense property then deposited in the fort, consisting of your own effects and of a multitude of others, left miserable and indigent by the desertion; in having all means cut off from them of saving it, and with those very ships that were employed and detained for its preservation. Fortitude is not given to every one; and I may most justly plead excuse for any failure arising from our want of military knowledge; it could not be expected from us, but every act of common prudence will: If the lives of so many brave and valuable men, who perished by this conduct, merited no regard, the gentlemen's own support with their Employers depended on their having a regard to their effects entrusted to their charge; as treasurers, it was incumbent chiefly on them to see that the treasure was embarked; this was a measure judged eligible in a Council of War, before the fort was judged not tenable, and sure ought immediately to have been carried into execution. That Cooleys could not be obtained to carry that and the Company's books off, as alledged on the face of the Fulta consultations, must appear to every body then in garrison, and indeed to the whole world, a pretence to palliate a needless panic, disorder and neglect. That money

and effects were that night embarked, is a truth known to every body; and on supposition there was not a Cooly in the fort, a single Topaz could have embarked the last year's books, the consultations and essential papers. But it must appear a fact beyond contradiction, that these, and every thing else, were sacrificed and abandoned to the consideration of these gentlemen's own safety; though that no ways endangered, but from the steps taken to secure it; for had we been joined in our councils, and the ships continued under the protection of our guns, or brought back, and any the least command exerted, we had it in our power to leave the Suba the bare walls of your fort only, without a gun in it that would have been of any use to him, or injury to us or the shipping. Had we remained united in our force, and proper spirit shewn, and examples made, what could have been apprehended from a few drunken Dutch soldiers, or a few seditions among the rabble of the militia; the president, council, officers, gentlemen in the service, volunteers, and principal inhabitants, were surely more than equal to quell any tumult that could have been raised by those, to have obstructed an orderly retreat with every thing of value deposited in the fort. Had this been done with proper coolness and resolution, and the whole colony proceeded as early in August as the fleet could push out to Fort St. George, with the effects, public and private, immense had been the gain to both; there proper measures might have been expeditiously consulted and adopted, for the re-establishment of the settlement; and the remains of our shattered and distressed colony would have found repose and shelter: this step would have been eligible, even in the wretched circumstances they retired; but the misfortune is, errors are fruitful, and generally beget one another; the panic which seized the gentleman in command, never lost its influence; the little saved was, in the general confusion, lost at Tanners and Buzbudgea; and in place of continuing their rout to Fort St. George, the alternative of residing at Fulta was determined on, and such advices forwarded to that presidency by Mr. Manningham, as made it a case of necessity to remain there, under such disadvantages and distresses as I believe hardly ever a wretched people laboured, and at an immense expence to yourselves in supporting the colony, and freight of ships for their reception and defence; part of your expence, indeed, daily lessened, by the multitude of deaths here, which has proved a grave to a large portion of the colony, and to more than half the detachment and officers, sent under Major Kilpatrick; all which might have been avoided by a prudent procedure to Madrafs, as above. Why this was not done, in preference to the advices sent, and our miserable residence here, I am a stranger, and have not yet received or heard one tolerable reason to support the measure. It has been alledged, the quitting the river would have been giving up the cause; had this been done, it would have been only giving up a cause already lost, and which they themselves had first abandoned: the fleet's quitting the river, would have lulled the enemy

enemy into a security which would greatly have facilitated the retaking your settlement; whereas our residence in it has kept them on the alarm, and preparations are made for the defence of it, which probably would never have been thought of. Nor is it possible, in my conception, to account for this strange perseverance in misery, and heavy charge to yourselves, but from two motives, which swayed the councils of those gentlemen who had quitted your fort, garrison and effects, whilst they bore the characters of command in it. Conscious and self-convicted of a conduct not to be vindicated, it became necessary that one of their own body should be dispatched to give the first impression of it; had they proceeded with the colony, a hundred mouths would have been open to report their conduct as well as their own. This, Honourable Sirs, must, I think, have been the principle they acted on, to allow them the shadow of consistence; if the gentlemen support their remaining in the river from other even probable reasons, I will be the first to retract my sentiments; not my sentiments alone, but that of near the whole colony. More, I think, I need not say in support of my charge against these gentlemen; that they justly incur the censure of breach of trust, have acted with the greatest imprudence, and been consistent in nothing but errors, from the first moment they meditated abandoning your fort in the manner they did. It remains only that I prove they might safely have retrieved this unhappy step, by a return to it with all the ships; and that, by this neglect, they not only further merit the censure I have already passed on them, but that of being strangers also to the very dictates of humanity.

45th. The Dodaly (with Messrs. Maningham and Frankland) and some other vessels, fell down the river the 18th at night. Your president, with the rest of the ships, vessels and boats, followed them the 19th, about nine in the forenoon; they lay in sight of our fort, and flag flying, until the 20th. About 11 in the forenoon, we saw the St. George, our last resource, was a-ground, and could not come down to our succour, and heard us engaged with the enemy during all this period. — They knew the desperate state they had left and abandoned us in, without all possibility or means to escape or retreat; and this their own doing: They were sensible, we had not ammunition to defend the fort two days, or, if we had, that our strength, with continued fatigue, watching, and action, was exhausted, and that we were reduced to the wretched alternatives of either sacrificing our lives, by resolving to die sword in hand, or surrender ourselves to an enraged and merciless enemy; and yet neither ships, vessel, or boat, were sent to favour our retreat, enquire what was our fate, or whether we existed, or had perished. To palliate this, (I believe, unequalled inhumanity) the danger of returning with the ships has been, I hear, alleged. — Capt. Grant, in his letter to us, in vindication of himself, the 20th August, asserts, he more than once urged your President to move up with all the ships and

sloops before the fort, once in the presence of Capt. Young, Commander of the *Dodaly*, who represented it as a dangerous attempt. I submit it to you, honourable Sirs, to determine, whether your President ought to have remained satisfied with an answer of this kind, or whether the ships would have run greater risk in moving up to the fort, than they did in moving down from it; or if there actually had been danger in the attempt, of which there was not even the shadow, whilst we remained in possession of the fort, was the preservation of so many brave and valuable men as were cooped up in it, with your treasure, effects, books, &c. of such small estimation with gentlemen, as not to merit one attempt to retrieve them, though even this attempt had been attended with danger? But it has been urged, that they were at no certainty whether we were in possession of the fort, or not; and by some conjectured, that we had surrendered, or the place had been taken by assault, and that the flag was only kept flying by the enemy to decoy the fleet back. — But if these were the doubts that actuated them, why did they not satisfy themselves? A single sloop or boat sent up the night of the 19th, might have hailed us from the bastions, without risk, even if the place had been in possession of the enemy, the contrary of which they would have been ascertained of and the fleet might have moved up that night. This motion would have put fresh spirits into us, and given dismay to the enemy, already not a little disheartened by the numbers slain in the day when dislodged from the houses round us, and otherwise, particularly by our shells and cannon at *Lady Russell's* and the Court-house. Had the ships moved up, and our forces reunited, and part of the ammunition on board them been disembarked for the service of the fort, the Suba might at last have been obliged to retreat with his army, or at worst the effects might have been shipped off the 20th, even in the face of the enemy, without their having power to obstruct it, and a general retreat made of the whole garrison, as glorious to ourselves, all circumstances considered, as a victory would have been; the Gentlemen would then have found a plan ready formed, to the minutest circumstance, for a general retreat, that would have been attended with no disorder, confusion, or difficulty, if proper resolution and command had appeared: Had your President, as was incumbent on him, hoisted his flag on board the *Dodaly*, of which he was likewise part owner, and moved up even the 20th, not a man or vessel but would have followed him, and he would then have been early enough to have given a new face to things; but, in place of that, he rendered himself totally inexcusable, by not only quitting us himself, but in telling others, and amongst them some of the Officers of the Militia then on board the *Dodaly*, That the retreat was general; thereby cooling the resolutions and endeavours of those who were returning to us, and had never once entertained a thought of quitting the fort. The want of boats has been another cause alleged for

for a general retreat not being practicable. Were there any grounds for this assertion, where did the fault lie? Though there might have been few boats at the Crane Gat, when the President went off, yet it is a known truth, that the wharfs to the right and left were lined with them, and that not one of them stirred from the shore, until immediately after he put off, when they all rowed across the river, most of them with grain on board; and this desertion occasioned by neglect of the obvious measure of having a sufficient guard over them. But to obviate every excuse that can possibly be urged against the facility with which we could have made the retreat general, I will suppose there had not a country-boat existed, those belonging to the ships, and the small craft, brought close in shore would have been amply sufficient to have embarked the effects, garrison, and their families, which we had not at all despaired of effecting, even with the Saint George's three or four boats, (had she happily come down to our succour) and the assistance of Captain Witherington's pinnace, then lying at the Crane. But, in short, Honourable Sirs, it is not to be wondered at, that, in a panick such as evidently possessed those in the chief command and direction, means the most obvious should either not occur, or be neglected; nor that handles, the most weak and improbable, should be laid hold of, to extenuate the conduct resulting from it: As such I think myself justified, in treating every reason advanced in vindication of these gentlemen quitting the fort in the manner they did, and not returning, when it was so demonstrably in their power, and thereby losing the means of saving your treasure, books, and effects; of preserving the lives of the many gallant worthy men, who perished in their defence, and thus fell a sacrifice; of preventing the tears of the fatherless children and widows, left destitute and unhappy, as well as those of the many parents and relations, deprived thus of the ornaments of their families, in the miserable deaths of a number of the most promising youths you ever had in your service; and lastly, of saving myself, and others, your faithful servants, from chains, shame, and imprisonment, with other distresses and sufferings hardly to be described.

46th. This subject, Honourable Sirs, disagreeable as it is, I must not quit, without speaking to an aspersions which has been spread in the fleet, and I doubt not elsewhere, that "those who were left behind, and some of the principal of them intended going, had not the means of doing it been cut off from them, and so made a virtue of necessity." This assertion I will venture to term bold as well as base, being founded on the conjecture only of some, with important hopes to reduce others on a level with themselves; the intentions of the heart are impenetrable but to the breast it dwells in, therefore I can only say, I solemnly believe that not a man left in the fort had any intention or design of quitting it, but in a general retreat, nor could ought be discovered in their behaviour, that either

did then or could since give me cause to alter my sentiments. As to myself, against whom I don't question but this slander is chiefly aimed ; it has also been as audaciously said, that I was not only privy to your president's going away, but was to have gone with him ; of both he has honourably and publickly acquitted me ; my knowing myself free from this scandalous imputation of intending to quit your fort (otherwise than in a general retreat) is not enough, it is my duty to convince my Honourable Masters likewise, that such could not be my design ; if it had, my motives were superior, the means equally in my power, and the reflection less in proportion to the less command and trust invested in me. These gentlemen declare they embarked no private effects belonging either to themselves or constituents. The Diligence Snow now lying at my Gat, I sent orders the 18th afternoon from the outer battery, to embark my cash, plate, essential papers, and some jewels, in all to the value of about fifty to fifty-two thousand Arcot Rupees, which was done by my own people, my servants having before brought me word every Cooley in the settlement was employed in emptying the rice boats at the factory, so that they could not get people to carry them to the fort, where most people's valuable effects were deposited ; my Godowns being unfortunately full of heavy and cumbersome goods, there was no possibility of embarking them, or depositing them in the fort, and my house so far detached as surely to be one of the first possessed and plundered by the enemy, which so happened. — Had my intention been to abandon the settlement, the temptation was great, and still greater, as the whole remains of my fortune then in Calcutta were embarked, the means in my own hands, the vessel under no command but my own, without any possibility of my being obstructed the whole night of the 18th, or the morning of the 19th. If such had been my design, I might have laid hold of the pretence to accompany Mrs. Drake, and the ladies embarked on board the Diligence, about eleven the night of the 18th, or afterwards, when I requested and sent Monsieur Le Beaume, with three of my servants to embark on board that vessel, for the greater security of her and the ladies. Such were the opportunities, and such were the temptations I had to have quitted your fort, but the thought never entered my breast, nor of any one else, with the certainty of the retreat being general the succeeding night ; and that I neither did go, nor had a sentiment that tended to it, I am still happy in ; and notwithstanding all my sufferings ; and with this reflection, that had I gone, I had in all human probability saved the above remains of my fortune, which fell a prey to the enemy the 21st, at Buzbudgee, without any one friendly, humane, or salutary step being taken by the fleet or those who commanded in it to preserve the Snow : The officer on board, having weighed in the general rout, and accompanied the other ships without my orders or knowledge. As to our having “ made a virtue of necessity,” these gentlemen should be the last to re-
proach

proach us, or take advantage even in expression of the necessity they had reduced us to; that any has assumed a virtue from it, I do not believe; we did our duty and no more, in defending your property as long as was in our power, which certainly is a virtue comparatively considered, with respect to those who did not do so.

47th. Thus, Honourable Sirs, I have with strict truth to the utmost of my knowledge and remembrance, traced out and laid before you, the causes and various capital errors, which occasioned the loss of your Presidency and settlements in these provinces. Necessary as it has been, I am sensible by what I feel myself on this subject, how unpleasing to you, therefore will not give you further pain, than in the addition of a few lines, explaining the manner your fort was taken, on which I find I have in my letters from Muxadabad and Hougly, been rather too short.

48th. Having been pressed at different times on the 20th, by the gentlemen of council and others, to throw out a flag of truce, I opposed it as much as possible, foreseeing the little utility would arise from it, considering the enemy we had to deal with, and that they were as perfectly acquainted with our distressed situation, as we ourselves; however, to quiet the minds of every body as much as in my power, I caused a letter to be wrote the 20th, early in the morning, by Omychund, who was left a prisoner in the fort of Raja Monick Chund, to the following purport. "That, as he and
" his house had always been a friend and tenant to the English, we hoped
" to experience it on this occasion, and that he would use his influence with
" the Suba, to order his troops to cease hostilities; that we were ready to
" obey his commands, and persisted only in defending the fort, in prefer-
" vation of our lives and honours." At this period I was at no certainty of the Suba's being at the siege in person, and all the hopes I had from this letter, or a flag of truce, was to amuse them until the St. George came down, and that we might have the night to make our general retreat in. About noon, as I before observed, the enemy were repulsed from the attacks they made this day to the northward, and a cessation on both sides ensued for more than two hours, and not one of the enemy to be seen; the gentlemen of council, officers and inhabitants, still pressing me, I was prevailed on to consent to a flag of truce being thrown out before dark. About four in the afternoon, word was brought me that one of the enemy was advancing with a flag in his hand, and called to cease firing, and that we should have quarter if we surrendered: this was judged a favourable juncture to answer it with a flag of truce; accordingly I repaired with the flag on the original S. E. Bastion, where Captain Buchanan was then posted, and ordered firing to cease. I had a letter prepared with me, addressed to Roy Doolub, general of his forces, importing an overture to cease hosti-
lities,

lities, till the Suba could be wrote to, and his pleasure known. This letter I threw over the ramparts, and hoisted the flag of truce on the bastion; the letter was taken up by the person who advanced with the flag, who retired with it: soon after, multitudes of the enemy came out of their hiding places round us, and flocked under the walls; a short parly ensued, I demanded a truce to hostilities, until the Suba's pleasure could be known; to which I was answered by one of his officers from below, that the Suba was there, and his pleasure was that we should immediately strike our colours and surrender the fort, and ourselves, and that we should have quarter. I was going to reply, when at that instant Mr. William Bailie, standing near me, was slightly wounded by a musket-ball from the enemy, on the side of his head, and word was brought me that they were attempting to force the S. W. barrier, and were cutting at the eastern gate. On being ascertained of this, I ordered Captain Buchanan to point a cannon from the Bastion, which flanked the eastern curtain, and told them to withdraw from the walls, or I would instantly fire amongst them; they withdrew, and I immediately took down the flag of truce, and stepped to the parade to issue orders for a general discharge of our cannon and small arms. The moment I arrived there, Captain Dickson, (who now commands the Lively Grabb, at present in your service) and just after him Ensign Walcot came running to me, and told me the western gate was forced by our own people and betrayed. I instantly sent Ensign Walcot with orders to see if there was no possibility of securing it again; he returned and told me it was impossible, for the locks and bolts were forced off. On this I returned to Captain Buchanan's post, and found some of the enemies colours planted on the bastion. I asked how he came to suffer it; he replied he found farther resistance was in vain, for that the moment I had left him, advice was brought him of the Western gate being betrayed, and turning myself I saw below multitudes of the enemy, who had entered that way, and others who had scaled by the S. W. bastion, and the new Godowns, that Bastion and the barrier, as I afterwards learnt, having been deserted the time the western gate was forced. To the first Jammautdaar who scaled at the S. W. Bastion I advanced, and delivered my pistols; he told me to order instantly our colours to be cut down; I replied, I would give no such orders, they were masters of the fort, and might order it themselves; he demanded my sword, I refused delivering it, but in presence of the Suba, on which the Jemmautdaar carried me round the ramparts, opposite to where the Suba was below, without the walls, from thence I made him the customary Salaam, and delivered my sword to his Jammautdaar; the Suba from his litter returned my Salaam, and moved round to the northward, and entered the fort by the small western gate. I had three interviews with him that evening, one in Durbar. At first he expressed much resentment at our presumption, in defending the fort against his army with so few men, asked

why I did not run away with my governor, &c. seemed much disappointed and dissatisfied at the sum found in the treasury, asked me many questions on this subject, to all which I made the best reply that occurred; and on the conclusion he assured me on the word of a soldier, that no harm should come to me, which he repeated more than once. The consequence proved how little regard was to be paid to this assurance, for I was with the rest of my fellow sufferers, about eight at night, crammed into the Black-Hole Prison, and past a night of horrors I will not attempt to describe, as they bar all descriptions. On the ensuing morning, (the 21st June) I was taken out from amongst the dead, and again carried before the Suba, more dead than alive; he seemed little affected when I told him the miserable catastrophe of my companions; he answered me, by saying, he was well informed there was an immense treasure buried or secreted in the fort, and that I was privy to it, and commanded me to point out where it was hid, if I expected favour (one of his Jemmutdaars had told me on the way the cause of my being sent for, and advised me to make a full discovery, or that I should be shot off from the mouth of a cannon the next half hour.) I urged every thing possible against the information he had received, or that if such a thing had been done, I was totally a stranger to it; but all I could say seemed to gain no credit with the Suba, who ordered me a prisoner, under charge of one of his generals, Mhir Modun, and with me Messrs. Court, Walcot and Burdet, as intimated in my letter from Muxadabad, to which letter I beg leave to refer for the account of our subsequent sufferings, and to subscribe myself, with the most perfect respect and duty,

Fulta, Nov. 30th,
1756.

Honourable Sirs,

Your ever faithful and obedient humble servant.

Mr. HOLWELL's Minute and Dissent in Council, the 20th of August, 1756, at Fulta, referred to in the preceding letter of the 25th October.

MR. Holwell observes that we have a bill before us, amounting to Arcot Rupees 64662 8 Annaes, on account of expences and damages of ship Dodaly, commencing 9th of June, 1756.—He further remarks, that the charge of this ship is founded on her being taken up for the defence of the Company's fort, effects, and settlement; but that she abandoned such defence, by falling down from the fort and settlement, without orders, the 18th of June at night; to which he cannot help attributing all the misfortunes which ensued.—He therefore dissents to any payment or consideration being made by the Honourable Company, on account of her expence, loss or damage charged in the said bill, except for provisions, &c. for the use of the Company's servants on board.

Mr.

Mr. HOLWELL's Minute on the Fulta Consultations, at his first joining the Agency at that place.

Fulta, 13th August, 1756.

CAPTAIN Dugald Campbell's commission being tendered to Mr. Holwell to sign, he refused the same, and requested the gentlemen would please to excuse his not signing that, or any other paper whatsoever, in the present state of the government of affairs, for the following reasons :

1st. He conceives that when the Honourable the late President, and Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket abandoned the fort and garrison of Fort William the 18th and 19th of June last, and quitted the defence of these and the Honourable Company's effects, they did, by such act, to all intents and purposes, divest themselves of all right or pretensions to the future government of the Company's affairs, or the colony.

2dly. That on the said abdication of the Honourable the late President, and Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket, the remaining gentlemen of Council (the only government then subsisting) did, with the unanimous approval of the garrison, officers, &c. elect and appoint, in council, him, Mr. Holwell, governor of the fort and garrison, and administrator of the Company's affairs during the troubles ; his right to which latter appointment, he does not think the gentlemen at present constituting the Agency have any just power to divest him of, or withhold from him ; howsoever, and under whatsoever other head the remainder of the colony, who are not servants to the Company, may think proper to dispose of themselves.

3dly. That the late President, and Messrs. Manningham, Frankland, and Macket being (justly as he conceives) the 19th of June in council, suspended the Honourable Company's service, he thinks this act alone sufficient to divest them of all future rule in any matters relative to the Company's affairs, until their pleasure from Europe be known. The more especially as the said suspension met with (as he is informed) the approval and assent of Messrs. Watts and Collet, in their disavowing any subjection to be due to the orders of the Agency, issued to them from Fulta ; a confirmation of the suspension by six members, the majority of the whole Council.

4thly. That in consequence of the before-recited transaction, he thinks Mr. Peter Amyat (the senior servant of the Company then present) was
on

on his joining the fleet with his factory of Luckypore, the only person invested with any just title or authority to conduct the affairs and concerns of the Company, and to associate with him as many of their servants next in standing to him, as he thought necessary, until the arrival of the gentlemen of the board of Calcutta, who lay under no censure or suspicion from the service.

5thly and lastly, That, to avoid the further embroiling his Honourable Employers affairs, by raising feuds and differences, which might ensue by his openly and publicly asserting and claiming his undoubted title to the administration of them, he submits such his just right to the breasts of the Agency themselves, and will quietly abide by their determination; but cannot, by any act of his own, either wave such his just title, or admit any just authority to be invested in the Agency; a character assumed, in his absence, without right; and permitted by the indulgence only of the remainder of the colony, and now continued, as he conceives, to the prejudice of the rights of himself and others. He therefore thinks himself justified in refusing to sign any paper or consultation whatsoever, which he cannot do consistently with himself, as he cannot consider himself in any other view, or point of light, than in that in which the last subsisting government of Fort William placed him; but shall, notwithstanding, be always ready to devote his person and counsel to the interest of his Honourable Masters affairs, wherever they call him. To that purpose shall duly attend the councils of the Agency, agreeably to the request of the Honourable the late President made to him in writing the 12th instant.

Copy of the President's Letter abovementioned, to Mr. Holwell.

To JOHN Z. HOLWELL, Esq.

Sir,

HAD not our boat been so extremely leaky, I purposed doing myself the pleasure of waiting on you this morning.

We have concluded to meet on shore, on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays. It will be an infinite satisfaction that you will be pleased to join us, particularly to me who esteem your advice, and who am, very truly,

Your most obedient humble servant,

Thursday, 12th Aug. 1756.

(Signed)

ROGER DRAKE, junr.

N. B. Some few days subsequent to the above transaction, the Agency thought it highly essential to elect and constitute a Secret Committee; and urging

urging to Mr. Holwell, that the good of the service required his being one of that body ; but that such election was impossible, unless he receded from his resolution of not signing ; he therefore was prevailed upon to recede from that part of his minute only, on the above consideration, and to evince that no private motive or resentment could sway him to any determination detrimental to his employers service. The Committee was accordingly appointed, consisting of the President, Major Kilpatrick, and Mr. Holwell.

To the Honourable Roger Drake, Esq; &c. Council at Fulta.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Fulta, Oct. 25, 1756.

ON a late perusal of your Fulta consultations of the 14th of July, I find myself called upon (amongst others of the surviving members of the Council of War, held in Calcutta the 18th of June last) to attest the assertion of Messrs. Manningham and Frankland, touching their being ordered by that Council of War, " To embark the European women on board the *Dodaly* and *Diligence*, with a detachment of 30 men to guard the said ships, with directions to move the *Dodaly* clear of the small craft, with which she was incumbered, and of the enemy's fire." Most sorry I am, gentlemen, to find myself obliged to speak on a subject so very disagreeable to my memory ; but the whole proceedings of that council appearing to my conception of so extraordinary a nature, joined to the consideration of my minute and dissent in Council of the 2d September last (against any allowance being made the owners of the *Dodaly*, for her loss and damages) that I cannot remain silent without incurring my own censure, as well as the imputation from you, of much injustice in my minute above referred to. Thus far I thought it necessary to apologize for giving you trouble at this juncture, and shall, with your leave, proceed to speak with that strict regard which every gentleman owes to truth, not only to the particulars I am called on by those gentlemen to attest, but to the whole proceedings of that Council of the 14th July ; and consider the defence Messrs. Manningham and Frankland there make, for depriving the Company's forts, effects and garrison, of the succour of that ship ; and then submit the justice of my said minutes and dissent, to the determination of yourselves and my Honourable Employers.

That the European women were ordered to be embarked by the Council of War of the 18th, is true ; but that Messrs. Manningham and Frankland should embark them, was no part of the order ; those gentlemen tendered themselves for that service, to which none objected publicly, though myself, with many others, thought their stations, both civil and military, were of such importance as might well have excused them from that service.

That

That there was any particular order relative to the Diligence, I do not remember; and think I can truly attest the contrary: Mrs. Drake, Mrs. Mapletoft, Mrs. Coales and Mrs. Wedderburn, with their families, being embarked on board that vessel, was purely the result of my own advice to them, imagining the Dodaly would be extremely crowded, and they had my order to be received on board, the ship being under my direction.

That a detachment of 30 men was ordered for the defence of these ships, I do not remember; and should certainly have objected to any such measure, had it been proposed whilst I was in the council of war, as it certainly was both imprudent and needless: Imprudent, as it would have been a considerable weakening a fatigued garrison who had barely a relief from duty; and needless, whilst the ships remained under the cover of our fort.

That those gentlemen had directions to remove the Dodaly clear of the small craft, with which she was incumbered, and the enemy's fire, are assertions to me totally new; and I can truly attest was no part of the order of the council of war, nor know I from what quarter such directions went; but if she really was incumbered with small craft, there would surely have been more propriety in moving them, than her: or on supposition propriety was attended to, yet surely whatever directions those gentlemen had, did not, nor could imply, that they were to remove her as low as Mr. Margas's house; a station where she was more exposed to the enemy's fire, had they taken the advantage, deprived of the benefit of our guns and small arms, and rendered useless, as to the defence and succour of the settlement; and contrary to Mr. Manningham's express promise to me, that she should not stir from under the cover of the fort.

Touching the other part of the charge laid against those gentlemen, by the colony, as a just objection to Mr. Manningham's being sent to the presidency of Fort St. George, viz. that of their refusing joining the Councils when sent for, I can form no judgment, further than I can collect from the defence of those gentlemen as entered in the consultation of the 14th July, being a stranger to the nature of the orders the President sent by Captain Wedderburn, and subsequently by Mr. Holmes, for their return to the fort.—I was myself but just come in from the center battery, when the Council of War in the evening of 18th was called, and having been the preceding night and day exhausted with continued fatigue, without rest or food, as soon as the Council of War broke up, I retired, in hopes of getting a little repose; not doubting but the resolutions of it would have been strictly obeyed, which were, that the European women, the Com-

pany's treasures, and, I think, their essential books and papers, should be embarked that night on board the *Dodaly*; but whether this last was entered on the minutes of that Council, I cannot be positive; but perfectly recollect a discourse I had with Mr. Manningham on the propriety of it, just as the Council broke up; and indeed, I ever thought, until I joined your Councils here, that both the treasures and books had been embarked. And here I cannot omit remarking, that better no reason at all had been given, for the neglect of a measure of such importance to the Company, than that which stands on the consultation of the 20th of August. But it is time I come to consider the pleas made use of by Messrs. Manningham and Frankland, for their not returning to the fort; which are, "That a little after one in the morning, Mr. Lindsay came on board, and informed them, he left a general assembly sitting; that the Captain of the artillery reported there was not two days ammunition; that many of the military and militia were in liquor, and mutinous; that it was the unanimous opinion the fort was not tenable; that a retreat was resolved on; that Mr. Holwell was strenuous for its being made immediately, and opposed by Mr. Baillie particularly; that the whole of the common people were in confusion; and that nothing was determined on." Without, gentlemen, my entering particularly into the merits of these pleas, let us consider the weight of those Gentlemen's seats in Council, and their importance as bearing the names and authority of Field-officers, and Colonels, and Lieutenant-colonels of the militia; and, I think, an impartial eye will at first sight pronounce, that there was not one of the pleas urged by them, in defence of their not returning into the fort, but should have urged their immediate rejoining our Councils, though they had no orders from the President for that purpose, in place of waiting on board for the detachment, and removing the *Dodaly* a second time that night, as low as Govindpore; running that ship, and the ladies on board, into ten times the risque from the enemy. They ought rather to have returned with the ship, on the flood, under our guns, to have favoured the embarkation of the Company's books and treasures, (which they knew were not on board) and the retreat of the garrison. Mr. Lindsay informed them the Council was sitting; that our councils were divided; and that when he left the fort, all was in confusion and nothing was determined on, which was true; the Council not breaking up until near four in the morning, without any thing being resolved on, but deferring the retreat, without, in my judgment, a single reason being urged in defence of it. The present weight and authority of those Gentlemen, might have made our Councils unanimous, or, have given a happy majority for a general retreat, have prevented the unhappy defection of the President, the officers, and part of the garrison the next morning; and have been the cause of saving the publick and private property.

perty lodged in the fort, as well as the lives of many who fell a miserable sacrifice by our retreat being cut off; the primary cause of which, I must still attribute to the retreat of that ship, to Mr. Margals's house and Govindpore on the night of the 18th, without order or the knowledge of any one in the garrison. It was urged, I know, and asserted by Mr. Frankland in Council, the 2d September, when I entered my minutes and dissent to the payment of the Dodaly's loss and damages; that those Gentlemen had orders for moving the ship down. And I beg leave to remind you, that I asked the President, touching this assertion; who, in your presence, declared he neither gave such orders, nor knew of any such being given. Therefore, on the whole, I hope I stand vindicated in your judgment, for such my dissent, as it is to me not a little astonishing, how the Gentlemen, composing that Council of the 14th July, could unanimously, on the defence before them, pronounce it as their opinions, that those Gentlemen had cleared themselves of the charge laid against them, in that letter signed, as I am informed, by the greatest part of the colony.

I am, with respect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servant.

The last letter but one, though delivered in to the Board in November, 1756, did not receive any answer until the last of January, 1757, two days before the Syren packet had her dispatches for Europe, (in which sloop Mr. Holwell took his passage, for the perfect recovery of his health) when the President, and three other gentlemen of the Council, thought proper to answer some parts of it, chiefly relative to themselves. As Mr. Holwell had no opportunity of noticing those productions abroad, he applied to the Court of Directors, on his arrival here in July, 1757, and was indulged with the perusal of them, and threw in a reply. We have no copy of those gentlemen's several answers; but as we dare aver the quotations taken from them, which Mr. Holwell thought worthy reply, are faithfully transcribed in this his replication, we shall not hesitate to insert it.— Upon the face of the whole, you will be fully enabled to form, and pass an impartial judgment, on the charge laid against this Gentleman, of being *particularly instrumental in bringing down Sou Rajah Dowla, &c.*

To the Honourable the COURT of DIRECTORS.

May it please your Honours,

London, August, 1757.

HAVING perused the several Addresses of Messrs. Drake, Watts, Becher, and Collet, in answer to different parts of my Address to your Honourable Court, under date, Fulta, the 30th of November, 1756, I find myself under the necessity of making a short reply to each, and most humbly tender my thanks for the opportunity you have indulgently

granted.—Mr. Becher, by a penetration very commonly assumed (as Mr. Drake justly observes) subsequent to events, sets out with asserting, “That the first admission of Kissendas and his wealth was wrong; that Raagbullob’s family was out of the government, and of no consequence at the time Mr. Watts wrote the recommendatory letter concerning him, and that he had been no friend to the English, but on the contrary, had given much trouble to us, and that there was no probability of the success of the young Begum.” To these I beg leave to reply, and say, That though the admission of that family no ways touches me, (it being an act of Mr. Manningham’s, the Provincial Governor, even without my knowledge) yet I do not think it was wrong, as things were then circumstanced. The importance and consequence of that family, must have been better known to Mr. Watts than to Mr. Becher; and though the former parts of Mr. Watts’s letter to the President are disavowed, which I think he might, with a better grace, have acknowledged; yet, at the close of what he gives your Honours, as the purport of them, he says, that “Raagbullob had been useful to us, and might be more so;” which speaks a flat contradiction to the sentiments of Mr. Becher, touching the regard due to that family from us. Whether there was or was not a probability of the Begum’s success, was not the matter in point, nor is a bit cleared up by Mr. Becher’s conjecture; that such was our intelligence, as set forth in my letter, is fact; not only the letters which came daily to Omychund, but to many of the other merchants and residents at Calcutta, that kept a correspondence with the Durbar and city, intimated the probability of her success. These were daily brought to the President for his perusal, and many of them read in my hearing. Mr. Becher then proceeds to say,

“That Naran Sing was sent to demand Kissendas and his wealth, which the English unjustly detained from him.—Cannot account for his coming in disguise;—believes he did not, and is confirmed in that belief by Mr. Holwell’s own account of the affair,—who does not intimate this disguise gained credit with him;—expresses and repeats his astonishment why the affair of Kissendas and the messenger was not laid before the Council, and that Messrs. Drake, Manningham, and Holwell should assume a power no ways delegated to them, &c.” (This last circumstance is echoed to by Mr. Watts, in his letter before your Honours.)

How Mr. Becher could represent that Naran Sing was sent to demand Kissendas and his wealth, unjustly detained by the English, carries not that needful precaution with it, incumbent on every gentleman who thinks himself obliged to censure the conduct of another. The detention of any matter or thing can never in propriety of speech, be asserted

or implied before a demand made.—Kissendas had been admitted into the settlement, as some hundreds of others had been in my remembrance, who had connections with the government. Roy Doolob, Rejah, Morrickhund, Futtica Ghund, and many others had, time out of mind, houses established in your settlement. The arrival of Naran Sing was the first demand made on account of Kissendas; therefore our being charged with unjustly detaining him or his wealth, prior to their being demanded, which the above assertion intimated, if it carries any meaning at all, is, I conceive, both unjust and improper. I am sorry to observe that gentlemen, in the course of their arguments, make use of such parts only of my address to your Honours of the 30th of November, as seem to support their own conjectures; was it not so, Mr. Becher could never have been at a loss to account for the disguise of Naran Sing, nor would have been at all puzzled to find which disguise I gave credit to. In my 9th paragraph Mr. Becher would have found, that an order had been published that none should be admitted into the settlement without a strict examination. This was well known at Hougley, the last place Naran Sing left, several inhabitants of that city having been refused admittance, and others turned out, who were judged to be the spies of the government. This was reason sufficient to determine Naran Sing's stealing into the place in disguise. In my forty-first paragraph, where I form a judgment of Omychund's conduct, I expressly say, that his bringing Naran Sing down will not admit of dispute; therefore, though I do not as expressly say I gave credit to his coming in the disguise of a Bengal Pykar, yet it was obvious such must have been my belief, by my implied conclusion of Omychund's deceit. This circumstance of the disguise may, at first sight, be deemed a matter not worth giving your Honours trouble; but the purpose it is brought to serve urges my speaking to it, because, if this gentleman can strip us of the disguise he thinks he divests us of, the reasons for our subsequent conduct to Naran Sing, must, he then thinks, appear without foundation. Why the admission of Kissendas, and expulsion of Naran Sing, were not laid before the Council, Mr. Becher might have easily answered himself, if he had been disposed to think a little deeper on the subject. The admission of any one into the settlement was never, that I have known, a matter judged necessary to be laid before the Council; the President having ever had a power lodged in him in matters of this kind. The expulsion of Naran Sing, consistent with the conduct deemed necessary on the occasion, would not admit of time for the Council's meeting. Naran Sing was every moment expected within the fort. Had the President either seen the messenger, or his purwannah, the measure resolved on could not have been carried properly into execution. Besides, in my 13th paragraph, Mr. Becher might have seen, that when I attended the Governor with the account of the preceding

ceeding night's transaction, I found Messrs. Manningham and Frankland with him; the measure resolved on was during Mr. Frankland's stay, and unanimously our opinion, who were in fact a majority of the then members of the Council.—So that I hope, on the whole, your Honours will not think this charge of an assuming power, any ways material against us, or deserving your censure; nor did a single member of the Council, which met the same morning, object to the step taken; but on the contrary, as Mr. Drake truly asserts, expressed their approval of it. To close my remarks on this part of Mr. Becher's letter, I must with Mr. Drake say, that as that gentleman was resident with leave in Calcutta, and not exempted, though excused, from his attendance on Councils, if the admission of Kissendas, &c. was, in his opinion, a wrong measure, and obviously injurious to the interest of his employers, it was his duty to have attended, or even demanded a council, and objected thereto; in not doing it, he in fact became more deserving censure than ourselves, who were of a contrary opinion, and can only be accused of an error in judgment.—Mr. Becher next

“ Refers to the Nabob's letter to Mr. Pigot, as proof that the de-
 “ tention of the Nabob's subjects was the cause of our misfor-
 “ tunes;—that means were neglected to mollify the Nabob, why,
 “ he knows not;—is persuaded money would have satisfied him;
 “ —believes it was never attempted;—that we refused the me-
 “ diation of Wazeed;—that it was not the intention of the
 “ government to divest the Europeans of their fortifications, he
 “ thinks is proved by the Nabob's only fleecing the French
 “ and Dutch, when he had it so evidently in his power to have
 “ taken their factories;—that in not doing it, he did not act con-
 “ sistent with Ally Verdy Cawn's advice;—says, he was informed
 “ Naran Sing took the opportunity of the resentment the Nabob
 “ shewed on the receipt of the Governor's answer, to represent
 “ the treatment and insult he had received in Calcutta;—and
 “ that he does not admit Ally Verdy Cawn's speech to be ge-
 “ nuine.”

Permit me, Honourable Sirs, to refer in my turn to the Nabob's letter to Mr. Drake, as a more authentic voucher for the cause of our misfortunes than that to Mr. Pigot; which evidently appears calculated as an apology for a conduct, he knew was not to be defended, nor by the English to be looked over. In his letter to Mr. Drake, he mentions the article of our fortifications only; the answer to it is agreed on all hands to have been the principal cause of his resentment and passion at Rajamaal: If Naran Sing really took this opportunity, it can only be deemed a secondary cause, which might help to keep up the first impression of resentment conceived at the

Pre-

President's reply. Mr. Becher asserts, he was informed Naran Sing took this opportunity, &c.—May it please your Honours, to hear what Mr. Watts says on this subject, in the third paragraph of his letter before you, where he first recites, that he had, by proper application, hushed up the affair; but that “*possibly*, when the Nabob received the Governor's letter, “ which so incensed him, Naran Sing *might* take that opportunity,” &c. So that allowing that for fact, which in truth has no proof at all, the utmost that can be made of it will fall greatly short of Mr. Becher's supposititious principal cause of our misfortunes: To which let it be remembered, that the Nabob, in the letter to Mr. Pigot, referred to by Mr. Becher, artfully avoids mentioning the cause, he had all along assigned to us, for his resentment; though he had, twenty days prior to the dispatch of that letter, made it the principal article of the Machulka executed by Mr. Watts, to wit, the demolition of our fortifications. The conclusions drawn by Mr. Becher, and also by Mr. Watts, that money only was wanted; and that it was never the intention of the government to divest the Europeans of their forts, by the Nabob's fleecing only the French and Dutch, are equally fallacious, and can proceed only from wilful or real ignorance of the state of the country, and the Nabob's fresh intelligence, which called his speedy return to Muxadarad from Calcutta. The Nabob of Purranea's troops were in motion on the Malda Creek, from the mouth of which it was easy, in the Suba's absence, to cross over to the island of Cossimbuzar; therefore the Nabob could not, with safety or prudence, engage in any new enterprize against the French and Dutch, that would possibly hazard his quick return. That money would have satisfied him, but that it never was attempted; that means were neglected to mollify him; that Wazeed's mediation was rejected; are all conjectures, and assertions, urged against known facts, not to treat them more harshly, which they certainly deserve. Mr. Becher's sentiments of Ally Verdy Cawn's speech, in which also Messrs. Watts and Collet concur, I will beg leave to speak to in my following reply to those Gentlemen.

Your Honours will have the goodness to recollect, that when I addressed you, the 30th November, I had no consultations, or other vouchers to refer to; so that the utmost I could do, in the recital and dates of such papers as were addressed to the board, during the troubles, was to consult the memory of Mr. Secretary Cooke, as well as my own, which I did. If I erred in the purport of the letter from Mr. Collet, advising of the loss of Cossimbuzar, it appears however it was not in any very essential circumstance; whether Mr. Watts alone signed the Makulka, or Messrs. Collet and Batson with him, is not very material. Mr. Collet denies his having wrote that he was delivering up the factory; but admits that he gave an order to the officer to deliver the cannon and ammunition to Roy Dullob; which I be-

lieve.

lieve will be deemed as like a delivery of the factory as possible. This Gentleman, in his 2d paragraph, says, "Mr. Holwell insists much that they ought to have made some defence:". To which I reply, I have not insisted at all on it, nor once used the word Ought, on this occasion, and refer your Honours to my letter. Further separate or distinct reply this Gentleman's answer does not call for.

Messrs. Watts and Collet charge me with labouring to arraign their conduct; I am not conscious I deserve it, and therefore disavow the charge. In my letter of the 30th November, I barely set forth the advantages which would probably have resulted from the smallest defence of Cossimbuzar; I have not even said, they *could* or *ought* to have defended it; but on the contrary hoped, and that sincerely too, they had reasons sufficient to vindicate their not defending it; these reasons they had transmitted to your Honours.—I conceived it also their duty to have laid them before the Board on joining our councils at Fulta; this conduct would possibly have prevented much altercation and writing, and at the same time have demonstrated they had made no representation to your Honours, in which they feared a detection.—Mr. Watts (to whose answer I come now more particularly) is pleased to say, second paragraph;

"That he never heard of Raagbullob being imprisoned, till after the
 "old Nabob's death; wonders where Mr. Holwell picked up his
 "intelligence, &c.——denies the purport of the letters recom-
 "mending the reception of Raagbullob's family, as set forth by me
 "in my seventh paragraph;—gives a recital of the said letters,
 "leaving out those parts he imagines might throw any blame upon
 "himself;——admits the purport of the letter he wrote the Presi-
 "dent, as quoted by me in my eighth paragraph;——never heard the
 "Begum would get the better;——wonders again where Mr. Hol-
 "well got his intelligence;——admits Mr. Holwell's fifth para-
 "graph;——never imagined a loose abandoned woman could stand
 "in competition with Surajud Dowla, &c."——

Touching the imprisonment of Raagbullob, I will not at this distance contend with Mr. Watts; that he was some time under the restraint of a strong guard, after the decease of his master, is fact;—that he did not discover his wealth to the old Nabob, unless in some trifles, plainly appears from hence, that the Nabob did not get at the knowledge of his uncle's capital wealth, until after his return to the city from Calcutta.—Mr. Watts's admitting my fifth paragraph is the strongest proof against himself I can possibly produce; for in that very paragraph, the resolution Raagbullob had shewn for the interest of the family, is urged by me as a reason for his never being forgiven by Surajud Dowla:—And lower

down, "That, in resentment for the usage he had unjustly received for his integrity," he joined the young Begum's councils. Therefore, on what foundation Mr. Watts attempts here to invalidate my intelligence, and at the same time accedes to my fifth paragraph, which demonstrably supports that intelligence, is something unaccountable.—Touching my misrecital of his letters in favour of the reception of Raagbullob's family, I will only say, that no self-consideration could possibly sway me to deviate from truth. I never condemned, nor do now, the recommendation transmitted in their favour by Mr. Watts; I thought, as things were circumstanced, he was vindicated in urging their reception, and have therefore said, he might, with better grace, have owned his instances in their favour were in stronger terms.—"*My only view was to justify the Gentleman who received them, being myself noways concerned in that transaction.*"—However I will for once suppose, his letters were as he recites them, which he closes by saying,—"*Raagbullob had been of use, and might be more so.*" These expressions are sufficient, in my opinion, to justify Mr. Manningham's receiving his family.—But wholly to refute Mr. Watts's representations on these heads, I must observe, that he admits "He did write the Governor to turn them out, (as I have set forth in my eighth paragraph) the moment he suspected any ill consequences might attend their longer residence in Calcutta."—Now permit me, Honourable Sirs, to enquire, what could be the motives which urged Mr. Watts to the contrary measures, of first recommending their reception, and afterwards their expulsion?—Mr. Watts acknowledges, "*Raagbullob had been useful, and might be more so.*"—That he could be more useful, was not in nature, but in consequence of his mistress, the young Begum's success; if there was no probability of her success, Mr. Watts becomes unpardonable in recommending, in any shape, the family, or any part of the family, to be received in the settlement, as he knew Raagbullob would be highly obnoxious to the succeeding government of Surajud Dowla.—Thus it will be manifest to your Honours, that this Gentleman's injudicious attempt to censure my intelligence, has thrown his own conduct into a difficulty, which might otherwise have escaped notice; but this instance will not appear single.

That Mr. Watts never "heard the taking of Gyria and naval strength of the English were the occasion of much speculation at the Durbar," I am inclined to believe, or he certainly would have taken some pains to have set both in a proper light, and prevented their raising any jealousies in the government, which were augmented by the report of the war between us and the French, extending to Bengal. His never hearing likewise, that the report of the sixteen ships of war and a strong land force gained belief at the Durbar, I as readily believe; but can by no means admit, that Mr. Watts's ignorance of these particulars amounts to proof they were not so.

In my tenth paragraph, I set forth the purport of a letter Mr. Watts wrote the President some time before the death of the old Nabob.—This letter Mr. Watts has not disowned, or denied the truth of the contents, as I have recited them.—In it he informs the President, “That there were a multitude of the government’s spies in Calcutta; that the small strength of its garrison and fortifications, and the easy capture of it, were the public discourse of the Durbar and City, &c.”—Discourses of this kind ought to have alarmed Mr. Watts; they were prior to any complaint of the detention of subjects, &c.—His advice to the President, to be upon his guard, was doubtless well judged; but ought he to have rested here? Surely no! It must have occurred to Mr. Watts, that there were extraordinary causes for discourses of this unprecedented nature, which he should have traced to their source, and guarded against them, by an easy refutation of our enemies misrepresentation: Had this been done, he would have found, that a belief of the above-recited reports could alone be the cause of the discourses he transmitted to the President, and of which he confesses his intire ignorance.—The character he is pleased to draw of Angria, and his conclusions from it, appear to me so extremely and obviously weak and unjust, as to require no reply; and the despicable light he represents the Durbar in, shews he has little real knowledge of a people he has so long resided with.

18 The reports above-mentioned, and the public discourses of the Durbar and City which followed, on their gaining belief, without any attempts made to confute them, have so close a connection with the old Suba’s last council to Surajud Dowla, as recited in my 18th paragraph, that I cannot, in a more proper place, reply to the reception it has met with from Messrs. Becher, Watts, and Collet, whose sentiments have a mixture of the solemn and sprightly, not becoming the subject they were treating of, nor the civility or decency due to every gentleman engaged in any point of controversy, as the sum-total of all their opinions does in fact charge me with imposing a forgery on your Honours, that had no foundation but my own invention. This will best appear from the gentlemen’s own words.

Mr. Becher is pleased to say,

“He does not admit of Ally Verdy Cawn’s speech to be genuine;
“that Mr. Holwell, in his distressed situation, was unable to unravel the mysteries of the cabinet, and explore a secret never yet known to any one but himself.”

Mr. Collet is pleased to call Ally Verdy Cawn’s speech a specious fable; And Mr. Watts says,

“The last dying speech of Mahabut Jung, neither I, nor I believe
7 “any

“ any of the factory ever heard of;—nor since from any of the
 “ country-people;—it seems an imitation of Lewis the XIV. to
 “ his grandson, and appears, as Mr. Collet aptly terms it, a specious
 “ fable.”

That Mr. Becher should not believe the speech genuine, I do not much wonder at,—as he seems fully resolved that nothing shall drive him from his adopted principal cause of our misfortunes, the detention of the Nabob's subjects;—in confutation of which I have said sufficient; but the reasons this gentleman gives for his believing the speech not genuine, had been better omitted, for his own sake.—The speech might probably enough have been a secret, whilst it was necessary it should be so; but when I obtained it, that necessity had long vanished, and Mr. Becher might have observed, I say, I had it from good authority, after my releasement, which was more than three months after the period it was uttered, and was no longer to be deemed a mystery of the cabinet, but might be judiciously enough divulged and circulated, as an apology for, and in support of Surajud Dowla's proceedings against the English, &c.—Mr. Becher's opinion, “ that I was unable to *explore* a secret, never yet known to any “ *one* but myself,” I would explain and reply to, could I possibly understand him. Shall only add, for your Honours satisfaction, and in vindication of my own veracity, that I was released the 16th of July, and continued at the Tankfall, and the Dutch and French factories, until the 19th at night; during which period I had frequent conferences with the principal Armenians, and some the immediate servants of the late and present Suba, from whence I had the speech literally as I have given it: and notwithstanding the ingenious ridicule it meets with from Messieurs Watts and Collet, to cover their deficiency in matters which ought to have been known to them, I will not despair of giving your Honours yet more convincing proofs of its being genuine; and that there passed some other transactions, at the Durbar, to which they appear utter strangers, or if known, unhappily for your service and us, were unattended to.

Subsequent to the delivery of my Letter of the 30th of November, I received an intimation of a conversation which had passed between the old Suba, Surajud Dowla, and Mr. William Forth, your surgeon at Cossimbuzar: this conversation appearing to me the strongest corroborating proof of my assertions, on the real cause of our misfortunes,—I requested Mr. Forth would give it me, in writing, which he obligingly did, from Chinsura, under date the 15th of December 1756,—but it reached me not until after my letter was delivered into council: I have had the honour of showing it to your chairman, and now beg leave to transcribe it here, the original being ready for your perusal.—It is as follows.—

SIR,

“ About fifteen days before the old Nabob died, I being obliged to attend every morning to see him, his son came in, and with a face full of resentment and anger, addressed himself to the old man thus :—Father, I am well informed the English are going to assist the Begum.—The old man asked me directly if this was true? I answered, That this must be a malicious report, of some who were not our friends, and done on purpose to prejudice the Company; that the Company were merchants, and not soldiers; and that in all the troubles that had happened in the country, since we had a settlement in it, if he pleased to enquire, he would find, we had not joined any party, or interfered in any thing but our trade; and that the Company had been nigh a hundred years in this country, in which time they never once had a dispute with the Government on that head.—How many soldiers, says he, have you in your fort or factory (Cossimbuzar)? Answer, The usual number, about forty, gentlemen included.—Have you never more? Answer, No.—Only when the Morrattors were in the country; but as soon as they were gone, the soldiers were returned to Calcutta.—Do you know, asked he, if the Dutch and French have any come up?—Answer, I cannot tell.—Where are your ships of war? Answer, At Bombay.—Will they come here?—Not that I know of, there is no occasion for them.—Had you not some here three months ago? Answer, Yes.—There comes one or two yearly, for to carry provisions for the rest of the ships.—What is the reason you have these ships of war in these parts, of late? Answer, To protect the Company's trade, and for fear of a war with France.—Is there war now between you and the French? Answer, No, not at present, but we are afraid it will be soon.—He then turned about to his grand-son, and told him, he did not believe a word of the report he had heard; upon which Surajud Dowla answered, He could prove it. The old man desired I would send our vaqueel to him directly, which having accordingly done; when he returned, I asked the vaqueel what the old man said to him, which was almost word for word that passed with me. Surajud Dowla ordered the vaqueel to attend his Durbar daily, which was accordingly done, agreeably to his orders.” I am, Sir, &c.

William Forth.

Though the report which introduced this conversation was most untrue, yet the interrogatories which followed plainly point out the sentiments of the Durbar; and this, joined to the other public discourses of the Durbar and City, touching the defenceless state and easy capture of Calcutta, as transmitted by Mr. Watts, about this time, to the President,

are, I must again repeat, manifest proofs, that jealousies in the government were the first and principal causes which urged the Suba's determination to divest us of our fortification: and though they may be said not to amount to an absolute proof of the genuineness of the old Suba's speech to his grandson, yet they are strongly presumptive.—But to return to Mr. Watts, whose insinuations and hearsays, from his eighth paragraph, require but short notice.

This gentleman is pleased to say, we had ten times the number of men and stores they had; to which I say, that the difference of our fortifications, and the force brought against us and them considered, we had not even an equality.—In their letter to us of the first of June, they advise of 12,000 troops only brought against them, which Mr. Watts now swells to 30,000. Mr. Watts asks me why I did not continue to defend the factory, when at the time I delivered up the factory, I had five times the number of men they had at Cossimbuzar? Had not Mr. Watts been guided more by malice than truth, in this and his subsequent interrogatories, he would, from the letter he is answering, have found the number left in the factory did not exceed 170; that of these we had 25 killed and 70 wounded by noon, the 20th, and that every man who survived, was exhausted of strength and vigour. In these circumstances, I believe I should be justified to my honourable employers, if I had really delivered up the factory, which Mr. Watts asserts I did, from the account drawn up by Mr. Gray, who, I believe, wrote from the best of his knowledge, though his narrative is in many parts very defective.—Mr. Watts avers, he never heard a syllable of the Back Gate being betrayed, until I returned.—If he had been solicitous to come at the truth, how came he not to apply to Messrs. Walcot and Dickson; they were both at Chandanagore, and are both mentioned by me in my narrative. Mr. Gray mentions in his account, that “some rushed out at the gate towards the river;” it might have occurred to Mr. Watts, [if truth had been his aim, to ask Mr. Gray how they could rush out, the keys being in my possession, and that gate not only locked, but barred and bolted? but these enquiries would not have squared with Mr. Watts's purpose of detraction.—His intelligence, picked up (to borrow his own phrase,) from corporal Angell, is equally authentic; for I solemnly aver, such an incident never happened as the match, &c. though most certainly I should have so acted, had any rashness of that kind been attempted, which could have answered no good purpose before the order was issued for a general discharge, which was then my object, if the Back Gate had not been forced.

Touching Mr. Drake's answer, I find but few particulars that are not fully discussed, in my letter of the 30th of November.—His *misfortunes*,
are

are sufficiently heavy not to bear any addition to the load ; and I could wish he had not obliged me to speak at all.—He remarks, my accusations are confined to my superiors, and not juniors ; intimates, my sophistry only tends to supplant my seniors.—I could appeal to some of your honourable Court, that this is not my talent, and that I am capable of doing justice to the merit of my seniors, though my declared enemies.—Mr. Drake taking advantage of the lost consultations, asserts, the letter to the Nabob was answered in consultation ; in this assertion he should have taken care that no circumstance could impeach his veracity, as effectually as if the consultations could appear against him.—He knows in his heart, that it never appeared in consultation, until after the receipt of the Chief and Council of Cossimbuzar's letter, advising of the Nabob's being incensed at the purport of it, when it was judged necessary to dispatch immediately a copy of it to those gentlemen : had he not been conscious of this, would he have neglected so favourable an opportunity, when he had it in his power of consulting me, and thereby of justly rendering every part of my narrative suspected ?—I was positive and clear in my averment and reasoning thereon, that the answer was an act of his own ; and there were of those members surviving, Messrs. Pearkes, Frankland, Mac-ket, and Mr. Secretary Cooke, to have confuted me ; but in place of this, Mr. Drake prefers the measure of throwing this allegation into his letter, at a time he was sure I should never see it abroad, and imagining possibly that might be the case here.

I did not, 'tis true, mention the 70 men in sick quarters, because, on enquiry, I could not find there was one. The attempt to possess Tan-na-s's, was made some day after my motion in the Council of War was over-ruled. Mr. Drake asserts, all methods were used to send succours to the Fort ; but intimates that Captain Nicholson was the only one would undertake it. Him we never saw nor heard of. On my joining the fleet at Fulta, I did hear he was sent into Govindpore Creek, to burn and destroy the great boats there, that they might not be employed by the enemy, in the attack or pursuit of the ships.

I am, most respectfully, &c.

Having, we think, sufficiently vindicated this gentleman's character from the aspersions in this anonymous Pamphlet, we proceed to exculpate him from reflections no less infamous, scandalous, and (consequently) unjust.

Your Court of Directors, in 1758, that is, the Bombay faction, which composed the majority of that Court, being determined to prevent Mr. Holwell's succeeding to the chair of Bengal, superseded him the very next ship, after his departure on the Warren, in favour of a gentleman who had

had not before been on the the civil list of your servants; and soon after in favour of a young gentleman, Mr. Ellis, whose rank in your service, before the capture of Fort William, entitled him only to the subordinate post of second assistant to this gentleman in the Zemindary; and finally dismissed him from your service, for signing the general letter, per Hardwick and Calcutta. The 147th paragraph of this letter has been often exhibited to you; we are not ashamed to avow it was drawn up by Mr. Holwell, who, in his letters to us, declared, he gloried more in this honest production of his pen, than ever Cicero did in his most famed Orations.

After the very high encomiums bestowed upon this gentleman's zeal, integrity, and capacity, during the space of five years, a treatment so opposite as we have now set forth, called for some excuse and palliation. These were not long wanting. To countenance and give the colour of justice to the most cruel and ungrateful return for his many and eminent services, several charges were raised against him by the majority of the then Court of Directors. Those charges, and Mr. Holwell's reply to them, we lay before you, in two letters addressed to the Board of Calcutta, and leave you the judges between them and him.

To the Honourable Robert Clive, Esq; President and Governor, &c.
Council of Fort William.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Fort William, December, 1759.

THE 132d paragraph of the Supplement to the Honourable the Court of Director's Letter of the 23d of March, 1759, read for the first time the 2d instant, is of so extraordinary a nature, that it cannot too early be spoken to by those who are, or who may be supposed to be pointed at;—for necessary reasons, I beg leave to insert the whole paragraph.

“ We are informed from good authority, that two of our servants, of
 “ considerable rank, actually received from Kissendass upwards of fifty
 “ thousand rupees, for our protecting this person against Surajah Dow-
 “ lah; if this iniquitous transaction should be proved, what an account
 “ have these men to render here and hereafter? For, according to hu-
 “ man conjecture, it was the foundation of your late bloody calamities.
 “ The justice you owe to those murdered innocents, to your employers,
 “ and to your own characters, will not suffer us even to surmise that you will
 “ screen such villainy; you will therefore examine strictly, and immedi-
 “ ately into the truth of this report; give the enquiry preference to every
 “ other concern, and use every justifiable method with Europeans and
 “ natives to come at the knowledge of facts; and should any be found
 “ guilty,

“ guilty, dismissal from our service must not only instantly follow, but
 “ a prosecution on our behalf for damages sustained must be commenced
 “ against him or them in the Mayor’s Court; and whatever precautions
 “ can be used for the security of our demand, we expect, upon this oc-
 “ casion, will be put in force.”

The rectitude of my own heart, joined to the words of considerable rank, had nearly convinced me no part of this heavy charge of iniquity and villainy could possibly be aimed at me; but when I found myself unjustly superseded in the very next paragraph, without any cause given by me, or assigned by the Honourable the Court of Directors, I could no longer remain in doubt that the measure of my persecution was not yet full. And as I find myself doomed sooner or later a sacrifice to private pique and party on one pretence or another, forgive me, gentlemen, if, conscious of my own innocence, I am bold in my defence; I doubt not but each of you will make my case your own. You have been all witnesses of my unshaken zeal for the Company’s interest and welfare, and are likewise witnesses of the returns I have met with;—returns that must alarm each of you who are liable, as well as myself, to have your honour and character stigmatized, by covert insinuations—conveyed into the ready and open ears of credulity, by the tongues of malice and slander. Happy are those few remaining gentlemen who were of council at the period alluded to in the foregoing paragraph, in being able to despise the information, and retire from a service of such precarious tenure, and subject to such cruel aspersions: such should be my conduct also, was it equally in my power; but since that is not the case, and my rank in the service will probably in a short time become really considerable, I hold myself bound to give “you,” gentlemen, every satisfaction in the premises, and to convince you by every means in my power, that if I am one of the two glanced at in the said 132d paragraph, such information, with respect to myself, is groundless, false, and wicked, in the most superlative degree; and I will justly borrow from the said paragraph, and say what an account have those men (the informers) to render here and hereafter, who could from no foundation but that of infamous surmise, or lying report, attempt to blast the fame and integrity of others?—With regard to the Honourable the Court of Directors so readily giving credit and sanction to that information, and their tacit condemnation unheard, (obvious from their 133d paragraph) my duty and respect with-holds my pen, and tells me it is time I should proceed to consider the charge itself, with that freedom which every one owes to the justification of his own character, though I am sensible this freedom (to which the Honourable the Court of Directors are such strangers) will cause my dismissal from the service.

You are told, gentlemen, by the Honourable the Court of Directors, that they are informed from good authority, "that two of their servants," &c. In reply to which, permit me to say, if their authority has been good, common justice to their servants should have urged them to transmit the nature of that authority to you, as well as openly to have named the two servants aimed at here. You would have then had a foundation to proceed on, without being reduced to the necessity, as you now are, of going a hunting both for the accusers and accused; a task that surely never was imposed on any body of gentlemen whatsoever.

You are subsequently told, that the protection given to the person of Kiffendass, was, from all human conjecture, the foundation of your late bloody calamities; if the Honourable the Court of Directors were really sensible, this was the foundation, permit me most humbly to expostulate with them, why their resentment does not openly fall on those two persons, who were more immediately concerned in granting such protection, to wit, on the then Chief of Cossimbuzar, who so strongly urged the necessity of doing it, and the then Governor, who would not withdraw that protection when it became equally necessary? But, Gentlemen, had the Honourable the Court of Directors thought proper to give a preference to facts, in place of all human conjecture, (which is so often subordinate to all human malice and partiality) they would be convinced the protection granted to Kiffendass was not in any the least degree the foundation of your bloody calamities: so that could that iniquitous circumstance of receiving the 50,000 Rupees, be proved against one or two of their servants, their enjoined prosecutions for damages must fall to the ground. The facts above alluded to, which should in justice and propriety have had the preference to human conjecture, are before the Honourable the Court of Directors, both in my address to them of November 1756 from Fulta, and in that of August 1757 at London, which puts it out of their power to say they were strangers to them. The motives which have urged the suppression of these, and many other facts very material for the knowledge of the world, are best known to the wisdom of the Honourable the Court of Directors; and it is my duty to suppose those motives are just, or at least proper to further their particular purposes, which doubtless ultimately tend to the promoting the welfare of the Company committed to their charge. Thus, for instance, I believe many can remember, amongst the multitude of infamous reports spread at Fulta, one was, that three Gentlemen in the service had received from Kiffendass 50,000 Rupees each, and I have no doubt but this assertion was impudently wrote home from various hands: yet now you observe, Gentlemen, it is for the good of the service, that the charge should only be

aimed at two. Public bodies do not deem themselves accountable for the justice and equity of their conduct to individuals under their command; and individuals howsoever injured or oppressed, will be thought audacious if they complain; but as tame submission and silence in this case would justly be construed into guilt, and wear more the complexion of a state of absolute slavery than a voluntary servitude, I would here assert my own integrity and injuries without reserve, were certain poverty and want to be the consequence. The Court of Directors may, if they please, take the Company's bread from me, but they ought not by inuendo and insinuations, couched as they imagine without the letter of the laws of England, divest me of my good name and character, which their 132d paragraph most evidently aims at; and though prudence made it necessary for them to suppress names, yet the manifest tendency of the whole paragraph, is only calculated to give a colouring and introduction to that which immediately follows, wherein not only myself, but seven members of your board, and a multitude of senior servants, all unexceptionable in their characters and abilities, are superseded in open violation of that avowed principle of equity, on which the Honourable the Court of Directors reduced me last year to my rank in the service. But to resume my own vindication, permit me to represent to you, Gentlemen,

That the protection granted to Kiffendass concerns not me more than any other member of the board: that I had never, on my honour, any communication or converse with Kiffendass or with any one belonging to him, prior to my seeing him a prisoner in the factory: That my fortune considered in the year 1752, when I first came into the service, and compared with the public state of it, exposed in our late calamities, will not leave room for the least shadow of a surmise, that it ever had any acquisitions of such a nature, or in such a degree. These, you will say, do by no means amount to proofs; they are negative proofs, however, and what other than negative proofs can be given against a charge so indirect and dark? However, as a further satisfaction to myself, and I hope to you, I entreat, that the solemn oath which I shall annex to this address, may be administered to me in council, as the only additional proof as yet in my power to give you of my innocence in this particular.

Having in a former part of this address mentioned my being most unjustly superseded, it remains incumbent on me to prove this assertion, and however little I may benefit myself by this proof, it may have this use at least, that you, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, and the rest of our fellow servants, may know in future the estimation you ought to put on your having real merit in the service, and in having that merit acknowledged and celebrated by the Honourable the Court of Directors, whose memories on this occasion, I must

must humbly beg leave to refresh, by various extracts from their general letters to this presidency, respecting my conduct in their service.

[Here were inserted the several paragraphs already given you, after the state of the revenues, and then the letter to the Board went on as follows.]

From the tenor of this last paragraph (25th March, 1757) I think I may be justified in saying, that personal resentment, or other private motives, took the rule, and not those of justice and equity, as the acknowledging and rewarding my merit, and at the same time fixing the clog again upon me, which they had so graciously, and for the self-same reasons, taken off in the year 1755, per Eastcourt, implies a most manifest and unaccountable contradiction; however, in the general letter of the 11th of November, 1757, per London and Warren, I am again released from that clog, and appointed one of their four Governors in rotation; and in a subsequent letter by the same ships, on the rotation being abolished, appointed to succeed to the government next after Mr. Manningham; and again by the last letters per London and Warren of the 11th of April, 1758, reduced to my rank in the service, and appointed by the Honourable the Court of Directors to succeed to the Government in turn; and now by the Prince Henry's letter superseded in favour of Captain James Barton, without the Honourable the Court of Directors impeaching, or having cause to impeach, that zeal, integrity, and attachment to the Company, which they so often acknowledged and rewarded. Permit me, therefore, Gentlemen, through the channel of your Board, humbly to represent to the Honourable the Court of Directors, the very hard treatment I have on the whole received, and to hope it will merit their future more favourable consideration, the more especially as it appears that many, I may say most of the gentlemen who have signed the Prince Henry's letter, have also given the sanction of their hands to every paragraph transmitted to this presidency in my favour.

I am, with respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs, &c.

J. Z. H.

Fort William, Dec. 1759.

N. B. The following oath was tendered to, and taken by Mr Holwell in Council the 24th of December, 1759.

"I John Zephaniah Holwell, one of the Council of Fort William, 1756, when Kiffendass, the son of Rajah Bullob, received the protection of this presidency, do solemnly swear that I never did, directly or indirectly, receive from the said Kiffendass, or from any one on his behalf, any the least reward or gratuity, either in money, jewels, or merchandize, for such protection granted the said Kiffendass; and that I never did, on any other pretence or

consideration whatsoever, benefit myself by the said Kiffendafs to the amount or value of one rupee. So help me God.

J. Z. Holwell."

The scrutiny ordered in the before-recited 132d paragraph, was made by Colonel Clive at Moorshadabad, (where Kiffendafs then resided) at the time the Colonel went to take leave of the Nabob, on his departure for Europe. On his return to Fort William, he wrote the following letter to the Board, on the subject of his enquiry.

To the Gentlemen of Council.

Sirs,

23d January, 1760.

"**T**HE justice I owe to my own reputation, as well as my duty to the Company, obliged me, prior to the resignation of this Government, to use my utmost endeavours in coming at the truth of the heavy charge, seemingly contained against Mr. Holwell, in the 132d paragraph of the general letter. Inclosed is the solemn attestation of Kiffendafs; and I make no doubt but that gentleman's innocence will appear as clear to the Court of Directors, as it did to us who were present at, and witnessed the said attestation."

N. B. The gentlemen who witnessed the attestation were,

Col. Clive,

Mr. Pybus,

Col. Ford,

Capt. Carnac.

Major Caillaud,

To the Honourable Henry Vanfittart, Esq, &c. Council of Fort William.

Gentlemen,

24th of November, 1760.

Acept my best thanks for the obliging readiness wherewith you have granted me copies of those paragraphs, in this year's General Letter from England, which relate particularly to myself.

As the Honourable the Court of Directors had long determined me unworthy of succeeding in their service, according to the rank they most graciously allotted me, in their General Letter of the 11th of April, 1758; I could wish they had rested there, without laying me under a necessity of breaking in upon your time at this very busy period, by a needful reply to some very unjust reflections thrown upon me in the 119th and 127th paragraphs of their Letter, under date the 1st of April, 1760. The consideration of that indispensable duty, which binds every Gentleman to the defence of his own character, will, I am sure, be sufficient apology to your Honourable Board, for this intrusion,

Respecting

Respecting the salary I received by appointment of the Board, as annexed to the post of Import Warehouse-keeper, and as being possessed by the same individual nominated to that post, when the Government of Bengal was ordered to four persons, the Court of Directors are pleased to say, "The Gentlemen of Council might mistake their intentions; but that Mr. Hollwell should have acted with more sincerity, because he was perfectly acquainted with the Court's sentiments, and particularly with the motives of their orders, &c." To this I may justly reply, That the sentiments and motives of that Court of Directors were as well, or better known to the Gentlemen of that Council than to myself. I attempted not to surprize them into that measure; I laid what I thought an equitable state of the case before them. They took it into serious consideration, gave a careful perusal to every letter which reached them that year by the Warren; and on the whole, were of opinion, they contained not a syllable that contradicted their giving me that emolument. To this I may add, the Gentlemen of Council would have paid a very bad compliment to the sentiments and motives which dictated the General Letter of the 11th of April, 1758, if they had surmised, the Court's intention was to divest me of any emolument annexed to the post which the rank they deigned to give me regularly brought me to, especially when that Letter not only pushed me from the top of the Council to the bottom, but also divested me of a post which I had filled near five years, and to which the same Directors had but the year before annexed, (to me particularly) a salary of 6,000 Rupees per annum, as a reward for my integrity and just conduct in the due execution thereof.

Touching the high resentment of the Court of Directors, at "my weak and presumptuous conduct, for joining in consultation with the Captains and Officers of the Warren, as set forth in the 147 paragraph, I with all humility kiss the rod, and confess it was out of my province to meddle with such a subject. From this step I cannot exculpate myself, but by averring, I had no motive to urge me, but the welfare and safety of the ship, the Company's effects, and the troops on board. This plea, I know, will avail me little before judges, who have already, and at random, loaded me with the heavy charge of influencing the Captain to disobey their orders, from selfish prospects of my own. Surely, Honourable Sir, and Sirs, I shall not give offence, when I say, this charge has neither truth or probability to support it. The Captain and his Officers had formed their resolutions, *a priori*, without my interfering directly or indirectly; so that I cannot be said to have influenced their councils. To this Captain Glover will witness, if he has regard to truth, which I will not doubt: And he was under no obligation of regarding my concurrence or non-concurrence, which I do suppose would not have varied his measures; howsoever that might have been, he intreated me and Captain Drake to hear the reasons which

which determined him to the Bay, and give our opinions thereon; to which we assented: And from the face both of the instructions and orders received from the Court of Directors, and the intelligence received from *Ceylon*, which he had laid before us, I then was of opinion, as I am to this hour, that he and his officers acted a faithful and judicious part; and I scrupled not to sign to that opinion, though I own it was an ill-judged compliance, considering, as the Court justly observes, my "interested situation," when I might have known that every handle which could be trumped up, would be seized on to my prejudice, to give a colour and plea for injustice. Had I not renounced my then selfish prospects, my opinion would have been very different. The Gentlemen themselves knew, they had taken care my selfish prospects at the Bay could be of little estimation to me, and that it was totally a matter of indifference to me or mine, whether I arrived there a month sooner or later. On the contrary, it was to me an interesting event the touching at Madras, as by not doing it I was a loser to the amount of near 2000 *l.* for the truth of which the Gentlemen may, if they please, apply to Messrs. Muilman, Solomon, and Adams of London, to say nothing of some other very selfish prospects which might probably have been the consequence of my touching at that Port; but all these I renounced when the interests of my employers came in competition: And adequate has been my reward, as well in this as in every other endeavour to serve them. — The Court of Directors are pleased to close this paragraph with saying, "They are not willing to remember past transactions; but caution me to be more guarded in future; for perhaps by my influence the distresses of Madras were increased, and an unhappy Commander ruined." That the Honourable the Court of Directors should be unwilling to remember past transactions, (respecting me) I do not wonder at; the reasons are obvious and striking to the whole world! However, I humbly transmit them my thanks for their gracious precaution, which follows *in terrorem*; but I have the pleasure of thinking, that long before this they are convinced it was quite thrown away. That my influence increased the distresses of Madras, and ruined an unhappy Commander; are most severe insinuations, and require distinct paragraphs for reply, as the word — *perhaps*, — by no means extenuates the intended venom of the charge.

It would give me the deepest affliction, had I been the cause of increasing the distresses of Madras, even by an error in judgment. If the Warren's proceeding to the Bay really had that effect, for she had no money, and as I remember but 60 men, it cannot, however be laid at my door, with the least shadow of justice. But I know that (trifling as the number of troops were) the ship's arrival here, at the critical time she did, had a very necessary effect on the Government of the Provinces, which was then

in Secret Treaty with the Dutch, taking the advantage of our great weakness, caused by the expedition to the Southward, under Colonel Ford; and we had great reason to think it gave for some time a very seasonable check to their Councils, as the troops were, with good success, swelled by us to six times their real number.

That I should be deemed the cause of an unhappy Commander's ruin, is a charge which gives me more real concern than any other the Court of Directors have been pleased to load me with. — To wipe off this cruel aspersion, I am under a necessity of transcribing part of Captain Glover's last Letter to me from Madras, under date the 2d of November, 1759, which will, I hope, not only set his own honour and honesty in a clear light, but also further evince, that I had not those selfish prospects in view with which I have been so grossly accused. — After intreating I would write to my friends in his favour, He goes on, " I need not mention to Mr. Holwell what is necessary, as he is a much better judge than I am; and shall only hint one thing that will be of service. — They lay the blame entirely on this, — That you and I were concerned together, and wanted to push for the first ship at the Bay, to make our market; — or this — that you wanted not to come here; and my being a good-natured man (meaning, as I suppose, a soft one, or rather a fool) you over-perswaded me to go immediately to Bengal. Now, Sir, I assure you, that I have acted as an honest man in regard to this affair; and no more than what I ought, as I am very certain of its falshood, and tell every body where I go, that you never was the man that concerned yourself with any thing relating to the ship, or where I went; and that you had concerns at Madras; that you would have been very glad to have gone there, which is, I believe, the truth; and I shall ever abide by it."

The very shameful supposition, which Captain Glover mentions above, of my being concerned with him, and which seems to have been taken up by the Court of Directors, and appears the ground-work of their charging me with these selfish prospects, is almost unworthy my notice, tho' its confutation is in my power, from a thousand proofs. It is only for your satisfaction, Gentlemen, that, on my honour, I solemnly aver, I never had a concern with that Gentleman, directly or indirectly, to the value of a shilling. I am, with true respect,

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your most obliged, and obedient humble servant,

I. Z. H.

In the foregoing letter you see two charges laid against this gentleman, the one touching the salary annexed to the post of Import Warehouse-
Keeper;

Keeper; the other, his influencing Capt. Glover, commander of the Warren, to pass the port of Madras, and stand directly for Bengal. As to the first, a debate in full Council was had, on the terms of the Court of Directors letters, when it was agreed to continue the salary to this gentleman; and it was paid to him accordingly, so long as he remained at the head of that office.

Touching the second charge, let it be remarked, that notwithstanding Capt. Glover had been divested of his ship by the Presidency of Fort St. George, your Court of Directors, on his return home, thought his conduct so justifiable, that he was again restored to a command in your service.

Mr. Holwell (contrary to the laboured intentions of your Court of Directors) arrived at last to the head of your affairs in Bengal. In this capacity, how anxious his situation, (may be seen in his Address) much more to be pitied than envied. Though he was himself, immediately after Colonel Clive's departure, plunged in the heaviest difficulties, to support a government overwhelmed in confusion, and the public transactions of that active and turbulent period were apparently sufficient to employ the attention and genius of any one man, yet did he find leisure (to the loss of his health and peace) to superintend every the minutest branch of your private concerns and interests. He had the address to discover an injurious confederacy in the execution of your new works of fortifications, commenced a prosecution against the parties concerned, disdained a bribe of 10,000 l. to drop that prosecution, and might have gained treble that sum, had he shewed the least propensity to come to any compromise with the delinquents. The frauds he traced amounted to near 50,000 l. the greatest part of which he saw refunded, and security taken for the rest, before he was superseded in your government. For proof of these facts, we subjoin the following vouchers.

COPY of a Minute of Council, the 14th July, 1760, touching Frauds in the new Works.

" The President, during the whole course of this scrutiny, having
 " shewn the most unwearied application in bringing to light the frauds
 " hitherto discovered, and given the highest proof of his integrity, in re-
 " fusing a bribe of eighty thousand Rupees, and paying it into the trea-
 " sury, as a small recompence for the frauds committed."

" Resolved, That the thanks of this Board be returned to him, on be-
 " half of our Honourable Employers."

COPY of 195th Paragraph of Governor Vansittart's and his Council's General Letter to the Court of Directors, under Date the 16th of January 1761.

“ In the former part of this letter, concerning the frauds committed in the new works, we mentioned the sums confessed by Govindram Goze, and Captain Brohier; and that several sums had been paid in, on that account: Besides these, the sum of 80,000 Rupees was privately presented to Mr. Holwell, (supposed by those concerned in the affair) with a view of prevailing on him (who alone was acquainted with the discovery) to drop the prosecution; the sum was paid by him into the treasury, and carried likewise to the credit of — *Over Charges, the New Works, but was not accounted* as a part of the sums for which the delinquents were answerable. Mr. Holwell, through the whole course of this enquiry, shewed a diligence and attention, for which he received the thanks of the Board, and merits likewise your particular notice.”

COPY of Mr. Holwell's last Letter to the Board of Calcutta.

To the Honourable Henry Vansittart, Esq; President and Governor, &c.
Council of Fort William.

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

September 29th, 1760.

“ **T**HE many unmerited, and consequently unjust, marks of resentment, which I have lately received from the present Court of Directors, will not suffer me longer to hold a service, in the course of which, my steady and unwearied zeal for the honour and interest of the Company, might have expected a more equitable return. — Permit me, therefore, Gentlemen, to resign the Service; and at the same time to request the favour of your indulgence to reside in Bengal, until I can fully collect my scattered concerns in trade, previous to my quitting India. — Herein you will lay an obligation on him, who is (with true respect, as well as most sanguine wishes for the honour and success of this Board, and prosperity of the settlement,)”

Honourable Sir, and Sirs,

Your most obedient, humble servant,

J. Z. HOLWELL.

Copy of the Minute in Council of the 29th of September, 1760, on receipt of the foregoing letter.

“ **M**R. Holwell lays before the Board a letter, requesting leave to resign the service, and permission to reside in Bengal, until he can fully collect his concerns in trade.

I i

“ Agreed

" Agreed Mr. Holwell's request be complied with, though the Board
 " are concerned at the departure of so valuable a member. Ordered this
 " letter be entered after this day's consultation."

For the truth of the several facts, vouchers, and quotations, here laid
 before you, we appeal to the records of Leadenhall-street.

Thus have we compleated our undertaking, viz. the Vindication of Mr.
 Holwell's character, and at the same time shewn from incontestible facts,
 the eminent benefits you have received from his steady zeal and integrity;
 benefits that justly demanded your highest notice and gratitude. How
 must your Court of Directors appear (to the impartial?) — They have been
 often lavish of their *public thanks and praises* to some of your servants, whilst
 this gentleman (who from the first to the last hour he had a seat in your
 Councils abroad, never ceased *successfully* labouring for *your good*) was so
 shamefully neglected, nay "evil entreated."

We close this address by a short recapitulation of Mr. Holwell's nine
 years services, and in a just estimate, lay before you at one view the sum
 total added to your estate, for which you are (in some Items *solely*, and in
 the others *chiefly*) indebted to Mr. Holwell's sagacity, integrity and appli-
 cation, viz.

Zemindary Calcutta	- - - - -	10,000
Zemindary of the 24th Purgunnah	- - - - -	60,000
Lands ceded by Mhir Coffin Aly Khan, chief- ly by Mr. Holwell's influence over him	- - - - -	} 700,000

£. 770,000 per annum.

The sum sent to Mr. Holwell's house in his absence on the evening of the
 13th July 1760, to engage him to drop the prosecution of the frauds in the
 fortifications, (the persons who sent it, not precisely known) was by him
 the next morning presented to the Company, and paid into your treasury.
 viz.

Frauds traced and proved by Mr. Holwell, and since brought to your credit	- - - - -	} 10,000
	- - - - -	} 50,000

£. 60,000

We are sensible that the lands ceded by Coffin Aly Khan, have been
 commonly valued only at 600,000 £. per annum, but we know their real
 net value is as above estimated.

A GENUINE
NARRATIVE
OF THE
DEPLORABLE DEATHS
OF THE

ENGLISH GENTLEMEN, and Others, who were suffocated in
the BLACK-HOLE in FORT-WILLIAM, at CALCUTTA, in the
Kingdom of BENGAL; in the Night succeeding the 20th
Day of JUNE, 1756.

IN A LETTER to a FRIEND.

By J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq;

——— *Quæque ipse miserrima vidi,
Et quorum pars magna fui. Quis talia fando,
Myrmidonum, Dolopumvæ, aut duri miles Ulyssæi
Temperet a lachrymis?*

Virg. *Æneid.* Lib. ii.

A GENUINE

NARRATIVE

OF THE

DEPLORABLE DEATHS

OF THE

English Gentlemen, and Others, who were suffocated in
the Black-Hole in Fort-William, at Calcutta, in the
Kingdom of Bengal; in the Night succeeding the 20th
Day of June, 1756.

As related to the World.

By J. Z. HOLLAND, Esq.

As printed by J. DODD, at the
Printers, in Pall-mall, and at the
Printers, in Pall-mall.

Printed by J. DODD, at the

TO THE R E A D E R.

THE following narrative will appear, upon perusal, to be a simple detail of a most melancholy event, delivered in the genuine language of sincere concern, in a letter to a friend; from whom the greatest kindnesses had been received, and in whom the greatest confidence was placed. It was written on board the vessel in which the author returned from the East-Indies, when he had leisure to reflect, and was at liberty to throw upon paper, what was too strongly impressed upon his memory, ever to wear out. If therefore it appears in some places, a little passionate; in others, somewhat diffuse; and, through the whole, tinged with that disposition under which it was written; the occasion, and the nature of the performance, will sufficiently excuse what might have been considered as imperfections, if it had been intended for the public view; and which may perhaps be considered in another light, now, that through a train of unforeseen accidents, it comes to appear in print.

The subject being of a very mixed nature, and something more than a bare relation of private calamity, rendered many people curious to see it, when it was once known, that such a paper existed; and as there was nothing contained in it, that required either much secrecy, or circumspection, it has been freely communicated to several, and amongst those, to some persons of the first distinction; who thought it might gratify public expectation, more especially if it appeared in the same natural and undisguised dress, in which they had seen it; for truth, and more especially so affecting a truth, stands little in need of ornament, and appears to more advantage, the less it is assisted by the arts of writing, to which the author being a stranger, he trusted to his feeling, and endeavoured to express by his pen, the emotions of his heart. He the more readily yielded to this request of his friends, from the following motives, which, as they wrought much upon him, may possibly have some weight with you.

It is somewhat rare, to find transactions of an extraordinary nature delivered circumstantially by those who are not only acquainted with, but were also actors in them, whilst the matter is fresh in their minds, and consequently, when they are fittest to give a clear, connected, and impartial account. This therefore having been his original intention, though
for

for the satisfaction only of a private friend; yet, when called upon to make it public, it appeared to him a very persuasive argument, as he was conscious to himself, that he had written it with the strictest regard to veracity, in every point, and to disburthen his thoughts of that load of affliction, which would have been as intolerable as the misfortune itself, if both had not been qualified by the remembrance of that mercy by which he was delivered, and which seemed to claim a grateful return of public acknowledgment, for so peculiar a deliverance.

He was farther moved, by the consideration that there are some scenes in real life so full of misery and horror, that the boldest imagination would not dare to feign them, for fear of shocking credibility. He thought such scenes as these could not be permitted, by a wise, a beneficent Being, but for the sake of their becoming lessons to mankind; and he therefore concluded, that this intention could never be better answered, than by consenting to render them public; that by this means, a door of hope, and of confidence, may be opened, to such as may hereafter fall under like tryals, by giving them an instance (and sure a stronger cannot well be given), that we ought never to despair, when innocence and duty have been the causes of our distress.

A

L E T T E R

F R O M

J. Z. HOLWELL, Esq; to W^m. DAVIS, Esq;

From on board the SYREN-SLOOP, the 28th of February, 1757.

DEAR SIR,

THE confusion which the late capture of the East-India Company's settlements in Bengal must necessarily excite in the city of London, will, I fear, be not a little heightened by the miserable deaths of the greatest part of those gentlemen, who were reduced to the sad necessity of surrendering themselves prisoners at discretion in Fort William.

By narratives made public you will only know, that of one hundred and forty-six prisoners, one hundred and twenty-three were smothered in the Black-Hole prison, in the night of the 20th of June, 1756. Few survived capable of giving any detail of the manner in which it happened; and of these I believe none have attempted it: for my own part, I have often sat down with this resolution, and as often relinquished the melancholy task, not only from the disturbance and affliction it raised a-fresh in my remembrance, but from the consideration of the impossibility of finding language capable of raising an adequate idea of the horrors of the scene I essayed to draw. But as I believe the annals of the world cannot produce an incident like it in any degree or proportion to all the dismal circumstances attending it, and as my own health of body and peace of mind are once again, in a great measure, recovered from the injuries they suffered from that fatal night, I cannot allow it to be buried in oblivion; though still conscious, that however high the colouring my retentive memory may supply, it will fall infinitely short of the horrors accompanying this scene. These defects must, and I doubt not, will be assisted by your own humane and benevolent imagination; in the exercise of which I never knew you deficient, where unmerited distress was the object.

The

The sea-air has already had that salutary effect on my constitution I expected; and my mind enjoys a calm it has been many months a stranger to, strengthened by a clear chearful sky and atmosphere, joined to an unusual pleasant gale, with which we are passing the equinoctial. I can now, therefore, look back with less agitation on the dreadful night I am going to describe; and with a grateful heart sincerely acknowledge, and deeply revere that Providence, which alone could have preserved me through that and all my succeeding sufferings and hazards.

Before I conduct you into the Black-Hole, it is necessary you should be acquainted with a few introductory circumstances. The Suba* and his troops were in possession of the fort before six in the evening. I had in all three interviews with him: the last in Durbar† before seven, when he repeated his assurances to me, *on the word of a soldier*, that no harm should come to us; and indeed I believe his orders were only general, That we should for that night be secured; and that what followed was the result of revenge and resentment in the breasts of the lower Jemmatdaars‡, to whose custody we were delivered, for the number of their order killed during the siege. Be this as it may, as soon as it was dark, we were all, without distinction, directed by the guard over us, to collect ourselves into one body, and sit down quietly under the arched Veranda or piazza, to the west of the Black-Hole prison, and the barracks to the left of the court of guard; and just over-against the windows of the governor's easterly apartments. Besides the guard over us, another was placed at the foot of the stairs at the south end of this Veranda, leading up to the south-east bastion, to prevent any of us escaping that way. On the parade (where you will remember the two twenty-four pounders stood) were also drawn up about four or five hundred gun-men with lighted matches.

At this time the factory was in flames to the right and left of us; to the right the Armory and Laboratory; to the left the Carpenter's yard: though at this time we imagined it was the Cotta-warehouses||. Various were our conjectures on this appearance; the fire advanced with rapidity on both sides; and it was the prevailing opinion, that they intended suffocating us between the two fires: and this notion was confirmed by the appearance, about half an hour past seven, of some officers and people with lighted torches in their hands, who went into all the apartments under the easterly curtain to the right of us; to which we apprehended they were setting fire, to expedite their scheme of burning us. On this we presently came to a resolution, of rushing on the guard, seizing their scymitars, and

* Suzajud-Dowla, viceroy of Bengal, Bakar, and Orixia. † In council.
of the rank of Serjeant. || The Company's cloth warehouses.

‡ An officer
attacking

attacking the troops upon the parade, rather than be thus tamely roasted to death. But to be satisfied of their intentions, I advanced, at the request of Messrs. Baillie, Jenks, and Revely, to see if they were really setting fire to the apartments, and found the contrary; for in-fact, as it appeared afterwards, they were only searching for a place to confine us in; the last they examined being the barracks of the court of guard behind us.

Here I must detain you a little, to do honour to the memory of a man, to whom I had in many instances been a friend, and who, on this occasion, demonstrated his sensibility of it in a degree worthy of a much higher rank. His name was Leech, the Company's smith, as well as clerk of the parish; this man had made his escape when the Moors entered the fort, and returned just as it was dark, to tell me he had provided a boat, and would ensure my escape, if I would follow him through a passage few were acquainted with, and by which he had then entered. (This might easily have been accomplished, as the guard put over us took but very slight notice of us.) I thanked him in the best terms I was able; but told him it was a step I could not prevail on myself to take, as I should thereby very ill repay the attachment the gentlemen and the garrison had shewn to me; and, that I was resolved to share their fate, be it what it would; but pressed him to secure his own escape without loss of time; to which he gallantly replied, that "then he was resolved to share mine, and would not leave me."

To myself and the world I should surely have stood excused in embracing the overture above-mentioned, could I have conceived what immediately followed; for I had scarce time to make him an answer, before we observed part of the guard drawn up on the parade, advance to us with the officers who had been viewing the rooms. They ordered us all to rise and go into the barracks to the left of the court of guard. The barracks, you may remember, have a large wooden platform for the soldiers to sleep on, and are open to the west by arches and a small parapet-wall, corresponding to the arches of the Veranda without. In we went most readily, and were pleasing ourselves with the prospect of passing a comfortable night on the platform, little dreaming of the infernal apartment in reserve for us. For we were no sooner all within the barracks, than the guard advanced to the inner arches and parapet-wall; and, with their muskets presented, ordered us to go into the room at the southermost end of the barracks, commonly called the Black-Hole prison; whilst others from the Court of Guard, with clubs and drawn scymitars, pressed upon those of us next to them. This stroke was so sudden, so unexpected, and the throng and pressure so great upon us next the door of the Black-Hole prison, there was no resisting it; but like one agitated wave impelling

another, we were obliged to give way and enter; the rest followed like a torrent, few amongst us, the soldiers excepted, having the least idea of the dimensions or nature of a place we had never seen: for if we had, we should at all events have rushed upon the guard, and been, as the lesser evil, by our own choice cut to pieces.

Amongst the first that entered, were myself, Messrs. Baillie, Jenks, Cooke, T. Coles, Ensign Scot, Revely, Law, Buchanan, &c. I got possession of the window nearest the door, and took Messrs. Coles and Scot into the window with me, they being both wounded (the first I believe mortally). The rest of the abovementioned gentlemen were close round me. It was now about eight o'clock.

Figure to yourself, my friend, if possible, the situation of a hundred and forty-six wretches, exhausted by continual fatigue and action, thus crammed together in a cube of about eighteen feet, in a close sultry night, in Bengal, shut up to the eastward and southward (the only quarters from whence air could reach us) by dead walls, and by a wall and door to the north, open only to the westward by two windows, strongly barred with iron, from which we could receive scarce any the least circulation of fresh air.

What must ensue, appeared to me in lively and dreadful colours, the instant I cast my eyes round, and saw the size and situation of the room. Many unsuccessful attempts were made to force the door; for having nothing but our hands to work with, and the door opening inward, all endeavours were vain and fruitless.

Observing every one giving way to the violence of passions, which I foresaw must be fatal to them, I requested silence might be preserved, whilst I spoke to them, and in the most pathetic and moving terms which occurred, "I begged and intreated, that as they had paid a ready obedience to me in the day, they would now for their own sakes, and the sakes of those who were dear to them, and were interested in the preservation of their lives, regard the advice I had to give them. I assured them, the return of day would give us air and liberty; urged to them, that the only chance we had left for sustaining this misfortune, and surviving the night, was the preserving a calm mind and quiet resignation to our fate; intreating them to curb, as much as possible, every agitation of mind and body, as raving and giving a loose to their passions could answer no purpose, but that of hastening their destruction."

This

This remonstrance produced a short interval of peace, and gave me a few minutes for reflection: though even this pause was not a little disturbed by the cries and groans of the many wounded, and more particularly of my two companions in the window. Death, attended with the most cruel train of circumstances, I plainly perceived must prove our inevitable destiny. I had seen this common migration in too many shapes, and accustomed myself to think on the subject with too much propriety to be alarmed at the prospect, and indeed felt much more for my wretched companions than myself.

Amongst the guards posted at the windows, I observed an old Jem-mautdaar near me, who seemed to carry some compassion for us in his countenance; and indeed he was the only one of the many in his station, who discovered the least trace of humanity. I called him to me, and in the most persuasive terms I was capable, urged him to commiserate the sufferings he was a witness to, and pressed him to endeavour to get us separated, half in one place, and half in another; and that he should in the morning receive a thousand Rupees for this act of tenderness. He promised he would attempt it, and withdrew; but in a few minutes returned, and told me it was impossible. I then thought I had been deficient in my offer, and promised him two thousand. He withdrew a second time, but returned soon, and (with I believe much real pity and concern) told me, it was not practicable; that it could not be done but by the Suba's order, and that no one dared awake him.

During this interval, though their passions were less violent, their uneasiness increased. We had been but few minutes confined, before every one fell into a perspiration so profuse, you can form no idea of it. This consequently brought on a raging thirst, which still increased, in proportion as the body was drained of its moisture.

Various expedients were thought of to give more room and air. To obtain the former, it was moved to put off their cloaths. This was approved as a happy motion, and in a few minutes I believe every man was stripped (myself, Mr. Court, and the two wounded young gentlemen by me excepted). For a little time they flattered themselves with having gained a mighty advantage; every hat was put in motion, to produce a circulation of air; and Mr. Baillie proposed that every man should sit down on his hams. As they were truly in the situation of drowning wretches, no wonder they caught at every thing that bore a flattering appearance of saving them. This expedient was several times put in practice, and at each time many of the poor creatures, whose natural strength was less than others, or had been more exhausted, and could not immediately

diately recover their legs, as others did, when the word was given to RISE, fell to rise no more; for they were instantly trod to death, or suffocated. When the whole body sat down, they were so closely wedged together, that they were obliged to use many efforts, before they could put themselves in motion to get up again.

Before nine o'clock every man's thirst grew intolerable, and respiration difficult. Our situation was much more wretched than that of so many miserable animals in an exhausted receiver; no circulation of fresh air sufficient to continue life, nor yet enough divested of its vivifying particles to put a speedy period to it.

Efforts were again made to force the door, but in vain. Many insults were used to the guard, to provoke them to fire in upon us (which, as I learned afterwards, were carried to much greater lengths, when I was no more sensible of what was transacted). For my own part, I hitherto felt little pain or uneasiness, but what resulted from my anxiety for the sufferings of those within. By keeping my face between two of the bars, I obtained air enough to give my lungs easy play, though my perspiration was excessive, and thirst commencing. At this period, so strong an urinous volatile effluvia came from the prison, that I was not able to turn my head that way, for more than a few seconds of time.

Now every body, excepting those situated in and near the windows, began to grow outrageous, and many delirious: *Water, Water*, became the general cry. And the old Jemautdaar, beforementioned, taking pity on us, ordered the people to bring some skins of water, little dreaming, I believe, of its fatal effects. This was what I dreaded. I foresaw it would prove the ruin of the small chance left us, and essayed many times to speak to him privately to forbid its being brought; but the clamour was so loud, it became impossible. The water appeared. Words cannot paint to you the universal agitation and raving the sight of it threw us into. I had flattered myself that some, by preserving an equal temper of mind, might outlive the night; but now the reflection which gave me the greatest pain, was, that I saw no possibility of one escaping to tell the dismal tale.

Until the water came, I had myself not suffered much from thirst, which instantly grew excessive. We had no means of conveying it into the prison, but by hats forced through the bars; and thus myself, and Messrs. Coles and Scot (notwithstanding the pains they suffered from their wounds) supplied them as fast as possible. But those, who have experienced

rienced intense thirst, or are acquainted with the cause and nature of this appetite, will be sufficiently sensible it could receive no more than a momentary alleviation; the cause still subsisted. Though we brought full hats within the bars, there ensued such violent struggles, and frequent contests, to get at it, that before it reached the lips of any one, there would be scarcely a small tea-cup full left in them. These supplies, like sprinkling water on fire, only served to feed and raise the flame. ✕

Oh! my dear Sir, how shall I give you a conception of what I felt at the cries and ravings of those in the remoter parts of the prison, who could not entertain a probable hope of obtaining a drop, yet could not divest themselves of expectation, however unavailing! And others calling on me by the tender considerations of friendship and affection, and who knew they were really dear to me. Think, if possible, what my heart must have suffered at seeing and hearing their distress, without having it in my power to relieve them; for the confusion now became general and horrid. Several quitted the other window (the only chance they had for life) to force their way to the water, and the throng and press upon the window was beyond bearing; many forcing their passage from the further part of the room, pressed down those in their way, who had less strength, and trampled them to death.

Can it gain belief, that this scene of misery proved entertainment to the brutal wretches without? But so it was; and they took care to keep us supplied with water, that they might have the satisfaction of seeing us fight for it, as they phrased it, and held up lights to the bars, that they might lose no part of the inhuman diversion.

From about nine to near eleven, I sustained this cruel scene and painful situation, still supplying them with water, though my legs were almost broke with the weight against them. By this time I myself was very near pressed to death, and my two companions, with Mr. William Parker, (who had forced himself into the window) were *really* so.

For a great while they preserved a respect and regard to me, more than indeed I could well expect, our circumstances considered; but now all distinction was lost. My friend Baillie, Messrs. Jenks, Revely, Law, Buchanan, Simson, and several others, for whom I had a real esteem and affection, had for some time been dead at my feet, and were now trampled upon by every corporal or common soldier, who, by the help of more robust constitutions, had forced their way to the window, and held fast
by

by the bars over me, till at last I became so pressed and wedged up, I was deprived of all motion.

Determined now to give every thing up, I called to them, and begged, as the last instance of their regard, they would remove the pressure upon me, and permit me to retire out of the window, to die in quiet. They gave way; and with much difficulty I forced a passage into the center of the prison, where the throng was less by the many dead, (then I believe amounting to one-third) and the numbers who flocked to the windows; for by this time they had water also at the other window.

In the Black-Hole there is a platform* corresponding with that in the barracks: I travelled over the dead, and repaired to the further end of it, just opposite the other window, and seated myself on the platform between Mr. Dumbleton and Capt. Stevenson, the former just then expiring. I was still happy in the same calmness of mind I had preserved the whole time; death I expected as unavoidable, and only lamented its slow approach, though the moment I quitted the window, my breathing grew short and painful.

Here my poor friend Mr. Edward Eyre came staggering over the dead to me, and with his usual coolness and good-nature, asked me how I did? but fell and expired before I had time to make him a reply. I laid myself down on some of the dead behind me, on the platform; and recommending myself to heaven, had the comfort of thinking my sufferings could have no long duration.

My thirst grew now insupportable, and difficulty of breathing much increased; and I had not remained in this situation, I believe, ten minutes, when I was seized with a pain in my breast, and palpitation of my heart, both to the most exquisite degree. These roused and obliged me to get up again; but still the pain, palpitation, thirst, and difficulty of breathing increased. I retained my senses notwithstanding, and had the grief to see death not so near me as I hoped; but could no longer bear the pains I suffered without attempting a relief, which I knew fresh air would and could only give me. I instantly determined to push for the window opposite to me; and by an effort of double the strength I ever before possessed, gained the third rank at it, with one hand seized a bar, and by that means gained the second, though I think there were at least six or seven ranks between me and the window.

* This platform was raised between three and four feet from the floor, open underneath: it extended the whole length of the east side of the prison, and was above six feet wide.

In a few moments my pain, palpitation, and difficulty of breathing ceased; but my thirst continued intolerable. I called aloud for "WATER FOR GOD'S SAKE:" had been concluded dead; but as soon as they heard me amongst them, they had still the respect and tenderness for me, to cry out, "GIVE HIM WATER, GIVE HIM WATER!" nor would one of them at the window attempt to touch it until I had drank. But from the water I found no relief; my thirst was rather increased by it; so I determined to drink no more, but patiently wait the event; and kept my mouth moist from time to time by sucking the perspiration out of my shirt-sleeves, and catching the drops as they fell, like heavy rain from my head and face: you can hardly imagine how unhappy I was if any of them escaped my mouth.

I came into the prison without coat or waistcoat; the season was too hot to bear the former, and the latter tempted the avarice of one of the guards, who robbed me of it when we were under the Veranda. Whilst I was at this second window, I was observed by one of my miserable companions on the right of me, in the expedient of allaying my thirst by sucking my shirt-sleeve. He took the hint, and robbed me from time to time of a considerable part of my store; though after I detected him, I had ever the address to begin on that sleeve first, when I thought my reservoirs were sufficiently replenished; and our mouths and noses often met in the contest. This plunderer, I found afterwards, was a worthy young gentleman in the service, Mr. Lushington, one of the few who escaped from death, and since paid me the compliment of assuring me, he believed he owed his life to the many comfortable draughts he had from my sleeves. I mention this incident, as I think nothing can give you a more lively idea of the melancholy state and distress we were reduced to. Before I hit upon this happy expedient, I had, in an ungovernable fit of thirst, attempted drinking my urine; but it was so intensely bitter there was no enduring a second taste, whereas no Bristol water could be more soft or pleasant than what arose from perspiration.

By half an hour past eleven the much greater number of those living were in an outrageous delirium, and the others quite ungovernable; few retaining any calmness, but the ranks next the windows. By what I had felt myself, I was fully sensible what those within suffered; but had only pity to bestow upon them, not then thinking how soon I should myself become a greater object of it.

They all now found, that water, instead of relieving, rather heightened their uneasinesses; and, 'AIR, AIR,' was the general cry. Every insult that could be devised against the guard, all the opprobrious names and

abuse

abuse that the Suba, Monickchund *, &c. could be loaded with, were repeated to provoke the guard to fire upon us, every man that could, rushing tumultuously towards the windows with eager hopes of meeting the first shot. Then a general prayer to heaven, to hasten the approach of the flames to the right and left of us, and put a period to our misery. But these failing, they whose strength and spirits were quite exhausted, laid themselves down and expired quietly upon their fellows: others who had yet some strength and vigour left, made a last effort for the windows, and several succeeded by leaping and scrambling over the backs and heads of those in the first ranks; and got hold of the bars, from which there was no removing them. Many to the right and left sunk with the violent pressure, and were soon suffocated; for now a steam arose from the living and the dead, which affected us in all its circumstances, as if we were forcibly held with our heads over a bowl full of strong volatile spirit of hartshorn, until suffocated; nor could the effluvia of the one be distinguished from the other, and frequently, when I was forced by the load upon my head and shoulders, to hold my face down, I was obliged, near as I was to the window, instantly to raise it again to escape suffocation.

I need not, my dear friend, ask your commiseration, when I tell you, that in this plight, from half an hour past eleven till near two in the morning, I sustained the weight of a heavy man, with his knees in my back, and the pressure of his whole body on my head. A Dutch serjeant, who had taken his seat upon my left shoulder, and a Topaz * bearing on my right; all which nothing could have enabled me long to support, but the props and pressure equally sustaining me all around. The two latter I frequently dislodged, by shifting my hold on the bars, and driving my knuckles into their ribs; but my friend above stuck fast, and as he held by two bars, was immoveable.

When I had bore this conflict above an hour, with a train of wretched reflections, and seeing no glimpse of hope on which to found a prospect of relief, my spirits, resolution, and every sentiment of religion gave way. I found I was unable much longer to support this trial, and could not bear the dreadful thoughts of retiring into the inner part of the prison, where I had before suffered so much. Some infernal spirit, taking the advantage of this period, brought to my remembrance my having a small clasp penknife in my pocket, with which I determined instantly to open my arteries, and finish a system no longer to be borne. I had got it out, when heaven interposed, and restored me to fresh spirits and resolution,

* Rajah Monickchund, appointed by the Suba governor of Calcutta.

† A black Christian soldier: usually termed subjects of Portugal.

with an abhorrence of the act of cowardice I was just going to commit : I exerted a-new my strength and fortitude ; but the repeated trials and efforts I made to dislodge the insufferable incumbrances upon me at last quite exhausted me, and towards two o'clock, finding I must quit the window, or sink where I was, I resolved on the former, having bore, truly for the sake of others, infinitely more for life than the best of it is worth.

In the rank close behind me was an officer of one of the ships, whose name was Carey, who had behaved with much bravery during the siege, (his wife, a fine woman though country-born, would not quit him, but accompanied him into the prison, and was one who survived.) This poor wretch had been long raving for water and air ; I told him I was determined to give up life, and recommended his gaining my station. On my quitting, he made a fruitless attempt to get my place ; but the Dutch serjeant who sat on my shoulder supplanted him.

Poor Carey expressed his thankfulness, and said, he would give up life too ; but it was with the utmost labour we forced our way from the window, (several in the inner ranks appearing to me dead standing *.) He laid himself down to die : and his death, I believe, was very sudden ; for he was a short, full, sanguine man : his strength was great, and I imagine, had he not retired with me, I should never have been able to have forced my way.

I was at this time sensible of no pain and little uneasiness : I can give you no better idea of my situation than by repeating my simile of the bowl of spirit of hartshorn. I found a stupor coming on apace, and laid myself down by that gallant old man, the reverend Mr. Jervas Bellamy, who lay dead with his son the lieutenant, hand in hand, near the southermost wall of the prison.

When I had lain there some little time, I still had reflection enough to suffer some uneasiness in the thought, that I should be trampled upon, when dead, as I myself had done to others. With some difficulty I raised myself, and gained the platform a second time, where I presently lost all sensation : the last trace of sensibility that I have been able to recollect after my lying down, was my fast being uneasy about my waste, which I untied and threw from me.

Of what passed in this interval to the time of my resurrection from this hole of horrors, I can give you no account ; and indeed, the parti-

* Unable to fall by the throng and equal pressure round.

nulars mentioned by some of the gentlemen who survived, (solely by the cumber of those dead, by which they gained a freer accession of air, and approach to the windows) were so excessively absurd and contradictory, as to convince me, very few of them retained their senses; or at least, lost them soon after they came into the open air, by the fever they carried out with them.

In my own escape from absolute death the hand of heaven was manifestly exerted: the manner take as follows. When the day broke, and the gentlemen found that no intreaties could prevail to get the door opened, it occurred to one of them, (I think to Mr. secretary Cooke) to make a search for me, in hopes I might have influence enough to gain a release from this scene of misery. Accordingly Messrs. Lushington and Walcot undertook the search, and by my shirt discovered me under the dead upon the platform. They took me from thence; and imagining I had some signs of life, brought me towards the window I had first possession of.

But as life was equally dear to every man, (and the stench arising from the dead bodies was grown intolerable) no one would give up his station in or near the window: so they were obliged to carry me back again. But soon after Captain Mills (now captain of the company's yacht) who was in possession of a seat in the window, had the humanity to offer to resign it. I was again brought by the same gentlemen, and placed in the window.

At this juncture the Suba, who had received an account of the havock death had made amongst us, sent one of his Jemmautdaars to inquire if the chief survived. They shewed me to him; told him I had appearance of life remaining, and believed I might recover if the door was opened very soon. This answer being returned to the Suba, an order came immediately for our release, it being then near six in the morning.

The fresh air at the window soon brought me to life; and a few minutes after the departure of the Jemmautdaar, I was restored to my sight and senses. But oh! Sir, what words shall I adopt to tell you the whole that my soul suffered at reviewing the dreadful destruction round me? I will not attempt it; and indeed, tears (a tribute I believe I shall ever pay to the remembrance of this scene, and to the memory of those brave and valuable men) stop my pen.

The little strength remaining amongst the most robust who survived, made it a difficult task to remove the dead piled up against the door;

so that I believe it was more than twenty minutes before we obtained a passage out for one at a time.

I had soon reason to be convinced the particular inquiry made after me did not result from any dictate of favour, humanity, or contrition; when I came out, I found myself in a high putrid fever, and, not being able to stand, threw myself on the wet grass without the Veranda, when a message was brought me, signifying I must immediately attend the Suba. Not being capable of walking, they were obliged to support me under each arm; and on the way, one of the Jemmautdaurs told me, as a friend, to make a full confession where the treasure was buried in the fort, or that in half an hour I should be shot off from the mouth of a cannon*. The intimation gave me no manner of concern; for, at that juncture, I should have esteemed death the greatest favour the tyrant could have bestowed upon me.

Being brought into his presence, he soon observed the wretched plight I was in, and ordered a large folio volume, which lay on a heap of plunder, to be brought for me to sit on. I endeavoured two or three times to speak, but my tongue was dry and without motion. He ordered me water. As soon as I got speech, I began to recount the dismal catastrophe of my miserable companions. But he stopt me short, with telling me, he was well informed of great treasure being buried or secreted in the fort, and that I was privy to it; and if I expected favour, must discover it.

I urged every thing I could to convince him there was no truth in the information; or that if any such thing had been done, it was without my knowledge. I reminded him of his repeated assurance to me, the day before; but he resumed the subject of the treasure, and all I could say seemed to gain no credit with him. I was ordered prisoner under Mhir Muddon, General of the Household Troops.

Amongst the guard which carried me from the Suba, one bore a large Moratter battle-axe, which gave rise, I imagine, to Mr. Secretary Cooke's belief and report to the fleet, that he saw me carried out, with the edge of the ax towards me, to have my head struck off. This I believe is the only account you will have of me, until I bring you a better myself. But to resume my subject: I was ordered to the camp of Mhir Muddon's quarters, within the outward ditch, something short of Omychund's garden (which you know is above three miles from the fort) and with me Messieurs Court, Walcot, and Burdet. The rest, who survived the fatal night, gained their liberty, except Mrs. Carey, who was too young

* A sentence of death common in Indostan.

and handsome. The dead bodies were promiscuously thrown into the ditch of our unfinished ravelin, and covered with the earth.

My being treated with this severity, I have sufficient reason to affirm, proceeded from the following causes. The Suba's resentment for my defending the fort, after the Governor, &c. had abandoned it; his prepossession touching the treasure; and thirdly, the instigations of Omychund* in resentment for my not releasing him out of prison, as soon as I had the command of the fort: a circumstance, which in the heat and hurry of action, never once occurred to me, or I had certainly done it; because I thought his imprisonment unjust. But that the hard treatment I met with, may truly be attributed in a great measure to his suggestion and insinuations, I am well assured, from the whole of his subsequent conduct; and this further confirmed to me, in the three gentlemen selected to be my companions, against each of whom he had conceived particular resentment; and you know Omychund can never forgive.

We were conveyed in a Hackery† to the camp the 21st of June, in the morning, and soon loaded with fetters, and stowed all four in a seapoy's tent, about four feet long, three wide, and about three high; so that we were half in, half out: All night it rained severely. Dismal as this was, it appeared a paradise compared with our lodging the preceding night. Here I became covered from head to foot with large painful boils, the first symptom of my recovery; for until these appeared, my fever did not leave me.

On the morning of the 22d, they marched us to town in our fetters, under the scorching beams of an intense hot sun, and lodged us at the Dock-head in the open small Veranda, fronting the river, where we had a strong guard over us, commanded by Bundo Sing Hazary, an officer under Mbir Muddon. Here the other gentlemen broke out likewise in boils all over their bodies (a happy circumstance, which, as I afterwards learned, attended every one who came out of the Black-Hole.)

On our arrival at this place, we soon were given to understand, we should be embarked for Muxadabad‡, where I think you have never been; and since I have brought you thus far, you may as well take this trip with us likewise. I have much leisure on my hands at present; and, you know, you may chuse your leisure for perusal.

We set out on our travels from the Dock-head the 24th in the afternoon, and were embarked on a large Wollack§, containing part of Bun-

* A great Gentoo merchant of Calcutta.
capital of Bengal.

§ A large boat.

† A coach drawn by oxen.

‡ The

do Sing's plunder, &c. She bulged a-shore a little after we set off, and broke one of her floor timbers : however they pushed on, tho' she made so much water she could hardly swim. Our bedstead and bedding were a platform of loose unequal bamboos laid on the bottom timbers : so that when they had been negligent in bailing, we frequently waked with half of us in the water. We had hardly any cloaths to our bodies, and nothing but a bit of mat, and a bit or two of old gunny-bag, which we begged at the Dock-head to defend us from the sun, rains, and dews. Our food only rice, and the water along-side, which, you know, is neither very clean, nor very palatable, in the rains : but there was enough of it without scrambling.

In short, Sir, though our distresses in this situation, covered with tormenting boils, and loaded with irons, will be thought, and doubtless were, very deplorable ; yet the grateful consideration of our being so providentially a remnant of the saved, made every thing else appear light to us. Our rice and water-diet, designed as a grievance to us, was certainly our preservation : for, could we (circumstanced as we were) have indulged in flesh and wine, we had died beyond all doubt.

When we arrived at Hougly fort, I wrote a short letter to governor Bisdorn (by means of a pencil and blank leaf of a volume of Archbishop Tillotson's sermons given us by one of our guard, part of his plunder) advising him of our miserable plight. He had the humanity to dispatch three several boats after us, with fresh provisions, liquors, cloaths, and money ; neither of which reached us. But, " Whatever is, is right." Our rice and water were more salutary and proper for us.

Matters ridiculous and droll abundantly occurred in the course of our trip. But these I will postpone for a personal recital, that I may laugh with you, and will only mention, that my hands alone being free from imposthumes, I was obliged for some time to turn nurse, and feed my poor distressed companions.

When we came opposite to Santipore, they found the Wollack would not be able to proceed further, for want of water in the river ; and one of the guard was sent a-shore to demand of the Zemindar * of that district, light boats to carry prisoners of state under their charge to Muxadabad. The Zemindar, giving no credit to the fellow, mustered his guard of pykes, beat him, and drove him away.

* A proprietor of land.

This, on the return of the Burkandafs, raised a most furious combustion. Our Jemautdaar ordered his people to arms, and the resolution was to take the Zemindar and carry him bound a prisoner to Muxadabad. Accordingly they landed with their fire-arms, swords, and targets; when it occurred to one mischievous mortal amongst them, that the taking me with them, would be a proof of their commission, and the high offence the Zemindar had committed.

Being immediately lugged ashore, I urged the impossibility of my walking, covered as my legs were with boils, and several of them in the way of my fetters; and intreated, if I must go, that they would for the time take off my irons, as it was not in my power to escape from them; for they saw I was hardly able to stand. But I might as well have petitioned tygers, or made supplication to the wind. I was obliged to crawl: They signified to me, it was now my business to obey, and that I should remember, I was not then in the Kella of Allynagore*. Thus was I marched in a scorching sun, near noon, for more than a mile and half; my legs running in a stream of blood from the irritation of my irons, and myself ready to drop every step with excessive faintness and unspeakable pain.

When we came near the Cutcherry of the district, the Zemindar with his pykes was drawn up ready to receive us; but as soon as they presented me to him as a prisoner of state, estimated and valued to them at four lack of Rupees†, he confessed himself sensible of his mistake, and made no further shew of resistance. The Jemautdaar seized him, and gave orders to have him bound and sent to the boat: but on his making further submission, and promising to get boats from Santipore to send after us, and agreeing to pay them for the trouble he had caused, he was released, and matters accommodated.

I was become so very low and weak by this cruel travel, that it was some time before they would venture to march me back; and the "hard-hearted villains," for their own sakes, were at last obliged to carry me part of the way, and support me the rest, covering me from the sun with their shields. A poor fellow, one of our Under-Gomastaus of Santipore, seeing me at the Cutcherry, knew me, and, with tears in his eyes, presented me with a bunch of plantains, the half of which my guard plundered by the way.

We departed from hence directly, in expectation of boats following us, but they never came; and the next day (I think the last of June) they

* The name given to Calcutta, by the Suba, after the capture. † 50,000 l.

pressed a small open fishing-dingy, and embarked us on that, with two of our guard only; for in fact, any more would have sunk her. Here we had a bed of bamboos, something softer, I think, than those of the great boat; that is, they were something smoother, but we were so distressed for room, that we could not stir without our setters bruising our own, or each others boils; and were in woeful distress indeed, not arriving at Muxadabad until the 7th of July in the afternoon. We were all this while exposed to one regular succession of heavy rain, or intense sun-shine, and nothing to defend us from either.

But then don't let me forget our blessings; for by the good-nature of one of our guard, Shaike Bodul, we now and then latterly got a few plantains, onions, parched rice, with Jaggree*, and the bitter green, called Curella: all which were to us luxurious indulgencies, and made the rice go down deliciously.

On the 7th of July, early in the morning, we came in sight of the French factory. I had a letter prepared for Mr. Law the Chief, and prevailed with my friend Bodul, to put to there. On the receipt of my letter, Mr. Law, with much politeness and humanity, came down to the water-side, and remained near an hour with us. He gave the Shaike a genteel present for his civilities, and offered him a considerable reward and security, if he would permit us to land for an hour's refreshment: but he replied, his head would pay for the indulgence. After Mr. Law had given us a supply of cloaths, linen, provisions, liquors, and cash, we left his factory with grateful hearts and compliments.

We could not, as you may imagine, long resist touching our stock of provisions; but however temperate we thought ourselves, we were all disordered more or less by this first indulgence. A few hours after I was seized with a painful inflammation in my right leg and thigh.

Passing by our fort and factory at Cossimbuzar, raised some melancholy reflections amongst us. About four in the afternoon we landed at Muxadabad, and were conducted to, and deposited in an open stable, not far from the Suba's palace in the city.

This march, I will freely confess to you, drew tears of disdain and anguish of heart from me; thus to be led like a felon, a spectacle to the inhabitants of this populous city! My soul could not support itself with any degree of patience; the pain too arising from my boils, and inflam-

mation of my leg, added not a little, I believe, to the depression of my spirits.

Here we had a guard of Moors placed on one side of us, and a guard of Gentoos on the other; and being destined to remain in this place of purgatory, until the Suba returned to the city, I can give you no idea of our sufferings. The immense crowd of spectators, who came from all quarters of the city to satisfy their curiosity, so blocked us up from morning till night, that I may truly say we narrowly escaped a second suffocation, the weather proving exceeding sultry.

The first night after our arrival in the stable, I was attacked by a fever; and that night and the next day, the inflammation of my leg and thigh greatly increased; but all terminated the second night in a regular fit of the gout in my right-foot and ankle; the first and last fit of this kind I ever had. How my irons agreed with this new visitor I leave you to judge; for I could not by any intreaty obtain liberty for so much as that poor leg.

During our residence here, we expected every act of humanity and friendship from Monf. Law and Mynheer Vernet, the French and Dutch Chiefs of Cossimbuzar, who left no means unessayed to procure our release. Our provisions were regularly sent us from the Dutch Tankfal* in Coriembabad; and we were daily visited by Messrs. Ross and Ekstone, the Chief and Second there; and indeed received such instances of commiseration and affection from Mynheer Ross, as will ever claim my most grateful remembrance.

The whole body of Armenian merchants too were most kind and friendly to us; particularly Aga Manuel Satoor: we were not a little indebted to the obliging good-natured behaviour of Messrs. Hastings and Chambers, who gave us as much of their company as they could. They had obtained their liberty by the French and Dutch Chiefs becoming bail for their appearance. This security was often tendered for us, but without effect.

The 11th of July the Suba arrived in the city, and with him Bundoo Sing, to whose house we were removed that afternoon in a Hackery; for I was not able to put my foot to the ground. Here we were confirmed in a report which had before reached us, that the Suba, on his return to Houghly, made inquiry for us when he released Messieurs Watts and Collett, &c. with intention to release us also; and, that he had expressed some resentment at Mhir Muddon for having so hastily sent us up to Muxadabad. This proved

* The Dutch Mint near Muxadabad.

a very pleasing piece of intelligence to us; and gave us reason to hope the issue would be more favourable to us than we expected.

Though we were here lodged in an open Bungulo only, yet we found ourselves relieved from the crowd of people which had stifled us at the stable, and once more breathed the fresh air. We were treated with much kindness and respect by Bundoo Sing, who generally passed some time or other of the day with us, and feasted us with hopes of being soon released.

The 15th we were conducted in a hackery to the Kella *, in order to have an audience of the Suba, and know our fate. We were kept above an hour in the sun opposite the gate; whilst here we saw several of his ministers brought out disgraced, in the custody of Sootapurdars, and dismissed from their employs, who but a few minutes before we had seen enter the Kella in the utmost pomp and magnificence.

Receiving advice, that we should have no audience or admittance to the Suba that day, we were deposited again at our former lodgings, the stable, to be at hand, and had the mortification of passing another night there.

The 16th in the morning an old female attendant on *Allyverdy Cawn's Begum* †, paid a visit to our Shaik and discoursed half an hour with him. Overhearing part of the conversation to be favourable to us, I obtained the whole from him; and learned, that at a feast the preceding night, the *Begum* had solicited our liberty, and that the Suba had promised he would release us on the morrow. This, you will believe, give us no small spirits; but at noon all our hopes were dashed by a piece of intelligence from Bundoo Sing, implying, that an order was prepared, and ready to pass the seal, for returning us in irons to Rajah Monickchund, governor of Allynâgore, the name the Suba had given to Calcutta.

I need not tell you what a thunderclap this proved to us in the very height of our flattering expectations; for I was, as to myself, well convinced I should never have got alive out of the hands of that rapacious harpy, who is a genuine Hindoo ‡, in the very worst acceptation of the word; therefore, from that moment, gave up every hope of liberty.

Men in this state of mind are generally pretty easy: it is hope which gives anxiety. We dined and laid ourselves down to sleep; and for my own part, I never enjoyed a sounder afternoon's nap.

* The seat of the Suba's residence in the city of Muxadabad.

† The dowager princess, grandmother of Surajud Dowla.

‡ Hindoo or Gentoo.

Towards five the Shaike waked me with notice, that the Suba would presently pass by to his palace of Mootteejeel. We roused, and desired the guard would keep the view clear for us. When the Suba came in sight, we made him the usual Salaam; and when he came abreast of us, he ordered his litter to stop, and us to be called to him. We advanced; and I addressed him in a short speech, setting forth our sufferings, and petitioned for our liberty. The wretched spectacle we made must, I think, have made an impression on a breast the most brutal; and if he is capable of pity or contrition, his heart felt it then. I think it appeared in spight of him in his countenance. He gave me no reply: but ordered a Sootapurdar and Chubdaar, immediately to see our irons cut off, and to conduct us wherever we chose to go, and to take care we received no trouble nor insult; and having repeated this order distinctly, directed his retinue to go on. As soon as our legs were free we took boat and proceeded to the Tankfall, where we were received and entertained with real joy and humanity.

Thus, my worthy friend, you see us restored to liberty, at a time when we could entertain no probable hope of ever obtaining it. The foundation of the alarm at noon was this: Moneloll, the Suba's Dewan, and some others, had in the morning taken no small pains to convince the Suba, "That, notwithstanding my losses at *Allynagere*, I was still possessed of enough to pay a considerable sum for my freedom; and advised the sending me to *Monickbund*, who would be better able to trace out the remainder of my effects." To this, I was afterwards informed, the Suba replied: "It may be; if he has any thing left, let him keep it: his sufferings have been great; he shall have his liberty." Whether this was the result of his own sentiments, or the consequence of his promise the night before to the old *Begum*, I cannot say; but believe, we owe our freedom partly to both.

Being myself once again at liberty, it is time I should release you, Sir, also from the unpleasing travel I have led you in this narrative of our distresses, from our entrance into that fatal Black-Hole. And, shall it after all be said, or even thought, that I can possibly have arraigned or commented too severely on a conduct which alone plunged us into these unequalled sufferings? I hope not. I am,

DEAR SIR,

Your most faithful and

obedient humble Servant,

J. Z. HOLWELL.

LIST of the SMOTHERED in the BLACK-HOLE Prison (exclusive of Sixty-nine, consisting of Dutch and English Serjeants, Corporals, Soldiers, Topaz's, Militia, Whites and Portugeze, whose Names I am unacquainted with), making on the whole, One hundred and twenty-three Persons.

Of Council.

E. Eyre
Wm. Baillie } Esqrs;

The Reverend Jervas
Bellamy.

Gentlemen in the Service.

Messrs. Jenks
Revely
Law
Coales, Enf. Mil.
Valicourt
Jeb
Toriano
E. Page
S. Page
Grub
Street

Messrs. Harod
P. Johnstone
Ballard
N. Drake
Carse
Knapton
Gosling
Bing
Dod
Dalrymple.

Military Captains.

Clayton
Buchanan

Witherington.

Lieutenants.

Bishop
Hays
Blagg

Simson
Bellamy.

Ensigns.

Paccard
Scot
Hastings

C. Wedderburn
Dumbleton, Enf. Mil.

Serjeants, &c.

Serjeant Major
Quarter-Master Ser-
jeant

Abraham
Cartwright } Serjeants
Bleau } of Militia.

Sea Captains.

Hunt
Osburne
Purnell, survived the
night, but died next
day.
Messrs. Carey
Stephenfon

Guy
Porter
W. Parker
Caulker
Bendall
Atkinson
Leech, &c. &c.

LIST of those who SURVIVED the BLACK-HOLE Prison.

Messrs. Holwell
Court
Secretary Cooke
Lushington
Burdet
Enf. Waleott
Mrs. Carey
Capt. Mills

Capt. Dickson
Mr. Moran
John Meadows, and 12 Mi-
litary and Militia Blacks
and Whites, some of whom
recovered when the door
was open.

A DEFENCE

A
D E F E N C E
O F
Mr. V A N S I T T A R T ' s Conduct,
IN CONCLUDING THE
T R E A T Y of C O M M E R C E
W I T H
M H I R C O S S I M A L Y C H A W N ,
A T M O N G H E E R .

By a S E R V A N T of the C O M P A N Y , long resident in
B E N G A L .

DEFEAT

OF

MR. VANSTATTAR'S CONDUCT

IN CONDUCTING THE

TREATY OF COMMERCE

WITH

MR. COSSIM ALY CHAWW

AT HONG KONG

W. B. BARNARD & COMPANY, 10, NASSAU ST.
NEW YORK

TO THE PROPRIETORS OF EAST-INDIA STOCK.

IN the course of altercation on your affairs at Bengal, many injurious insinuations have been levelled at the conduct and character of the Gentleman now presiding there; amongst these, the greatest stress seems to be laid on two accusations; to wit, the Treaty of Commerce made at Mongheer, and a Model of Cannon presented by Mr. Vansittart to Mhir Cossim Aly Khan. The first of these charges *may be* (in part) founded on ignorance: the second, on premeditated malice only. From both we undertake to exculpate him. Much has been said touching the liberties of the Company's phirmaunds from the Great Moguls, and Confidence asserts they were given up by Mr. Vansittart in the treaty of commerce he concluded at Mongheer. Let us examine this fact first, and clear it of the veil of darkness that covers it.

When Mr. Surman (head of the embassy sent by the Company to the emperor Farrucseer, to solicit the last phirmaund, and explanation of former grants) was on his return to Fort William, he pitched his tents in the neighbourhood of Moorshadabad, and having acquired from the Emperor a title and rank in the list of Omrahs, something superior to that which Jaffier Khan (then Suba of Bengal) bore, Mr. Surman expected the first visit.—Jaffier Khan allowed Mr. Surman's superior title, but considering himself in rank the third Suba of the empire, and Vice-Roy of Bengal confirmed from court, thought the dignity of his post demanded the first visit from Mr. Surman: frequent messengers passed between them, touching this ceremonial, for the space of three days; but neither stooping, Mr. Surman struck his tents, and returned to Calcutta.—Thus an injudicious punctilio in Mr. Surman destroyed all future cordiality with a man, on whom (from the nature and power of his post) so much depended, for the due execution of those phirmaunds granted by Farrucseer.

We grant, that in the original phirmaunds to the Company, there was a general liberty of trade given, without any exemption of particulars; but when this general trade, as well inland as exports and imports, continued

tinued to be exercised by the servants of the Company as formerly, Jaffier Khan presently manifested the resentment he had conceived against the English at Mr. Surman's behaviour to him; and though his predecessors had been troublesome on this head, yet he went much further.

His first operations were, refusing us the right of coinage, and spiriting up the Zemindars, proprietors of the 37 villages on the other side the Ganges; both ceded to the Company by the phirmaund. These Zemindars kept up their demands so high, and started so many difficulties with regard to parting with their lands, that the Company have never got possession of them to this day: from the same cause, their presidency of Fort William was eternally incommoded by a vexatious government's jurisdiction in the very heart of Calcutta, known by the names of Molungah, Simlea, &c.

His next step was to claim an executive right to the trade of three the most staple and lucrative articles of tobacco, salt and beetlenut; alleging, that from time immemorial none had presumed to trade in these three articles, but those who had his particular licence and express purwannah. He signified these sentiments to the Presidency, and prohibited the Company or their servants trading in them for the future.

The Company's servants still persisting to trade in these articles, Jaffier Khan stopped the Company's whole trade and investment for Europe, which could never again obtain a currency, but by the payment of a severe mulct, of one, two, three, and sometimes four lacks of rupees at a time.

The same system of politics was pursued by his successor, until the Company at home being wearied out with continued advices of these contests between the Government and their Bengal servants, came to a resolution of relinquishing their right to the trade of these three articles, tobacco, salt, and beetle nut, for themselves, and strictly prohibited their servants ever interfering in them, on pain of immediate dismissal from their service; and these commands were repeatedly issued by the Court of Directors to their servants abroad. Henceforward the servants were content to trade in these articles under the covert of a Mahometan dustick (or passport). This they did on the best terms they possibly could with the Mahometan merchant, which was generally a consideration of 25 per cent. a consideration very moderate on articles that commonly yield a profit of 80 to 150 per cent. This 25 per cent. was a clear profit, without risque, to the merchant who gave his name, provided he was in favour at the Durbar; but at the worst, he was always able to get off for paying

paying 8 or 10 per cent. customs on the trade he covered, and put the rest into his pocket. Sometimes a joint trade was entered into in co-partnership, though not always in equal proportions.

The continual abuse of the Company's dufficks, by their servants, has been for the space of forty years last past, another great cause for repeated just complaints from the Durbar; for thereby the Emperor was robbed of his legal customs on a considerable proportion of the trade of the provinces.—As the nature of the Company's duffick, and the mischiefs arising from the abuse of it, must be little known to you; a short explanation of both, becomes here absolutely necessary to your information.

The Company's duffick is a passport for their trade, issued under their broad Persian Purwannah seal, or seal of office, signed by the President, and counter-signed by the Secretary to the Council, specifying the quantity, number, package and quality of the goods to be passed by virtue of that particular duffick, clear of all duties, let, hindrance, or obstructions from the Government's guards, and receipts of custom settled on different parts of the rivers and other inland parts of the provinces.—The duffick was also occasionally issued by the chiefs of your subordinate factories, under the same formalities; and whether from the Presidency or Subordinates, always specified the place from whence the goods came, and where destined; and with the particulars before recited, were set forth both in English and Persian, and a register regularly kept of every duffick issued. The duffick was drawn in Persian, as well as English, because at every Government's chowkey there was stationed a Persian Moon-spee (Writer or Secretary) on the part of the Government, who being a stranger to the English language, the Company's trade might otherwise be liable to obstruction, delay, loss and damage, by a longer detention in their boats at sometimes inclement seasons of the year.

Your servants, down to the junior Writer, were entitled to a duffick on application, for the protection of his private trade. The wisdom of first granting this liberty and indulgence, and the continuing it so long after the fatal consequences were visible, are points I will not here discuss. Let it suffice, that I say the abuse of it gave too just a handle to the Government for frequently putting a stop to the provision of your investment in every part of the provinces, for one, two, and sometimes three months together, until bought off by the payment of a high mulct, which generally grew higher the longer a stand was made against it. Thus have I known a contention of this kind, which might easily (in the beginning of an embargo laid on your investment) have been compromised for fifty or a hundred thousand rupees, cost you, at the end of two or three months, three or four lacks. Though the policy of the government

ment was invariable in this particular of the abuse of the dustick, (as formerly touching our trading in the three prohibited articles of salt, tobacco and beetlenut) they never, before the times of the Subas Ally Verdy Khan and Surajad Dowla, meditated the attack and destruction of your forts and garrisons; these had new and particular motives; former Subas, on a transgression either in the one or the other of the two before-mentioned causes, put an immediate stop to the provision of your investments, by laying a prohibition on the weavers and others employed in your manufactures, surrounding your subordinates with guards, and cutting off supplies of provisions, &c. They knew the importance of your investments, and the seasons for the dispatch of it to Europe, and knew also you could hardly sustain yourselves under the failure of one year's returns; all this they were perfectly acquainted with, and therefore knew your servants must necessarily submit, sooner or later, to any terms they thought fit to impose: a consideration also, which should have determined your Presidency to finish every dispute of this kind with all possible expedition. I will not say these exactions would not have been made, had no real cause been given; light pretences are sufficient for arbitrary governments to act upon; but where real cause existed, which (regarding the abuse of the dustick at least) was too truly the case, we cannot surely much wonder at it. But to explain the nature of this abuse of your dustick, so constantly the source of complaints from the durbar:

When youth first embark in your service, at the age of 15 or 16, it cannot be reasonably supposed they set out with any fixed principles of moral rectitude; consequently the good dispositions they may have acquired by a careful education, become too much liable to be perverted, by designing artful men. These young gentlemen, on their arrival in Bengal, entertain a servant, under the denomination of a Banian, who, in the general, soon becomes their master, and continues that power and influence over them, more or less, as long as they reside in India; but more especially, if the Banian happens to be possessed of a capital that can be assisting to his (nominal) master in trade, the young gentleman himself rarely having a capital of his own to begin with.

These Banians are either simply so, or merchants as well as Banians. In general, they have no principle to be the rule of their actions, but gain; this is their sole pursuit, and to accomplish it they stick at nothing, so they can guard against a detection of their rogueries.

If they are Banians simply so called, they are mostly tools of some native merchant, whose principles of rectitude are not a whit better than the Banians.

The Seats (a Gentoo Cast, so called) and the other Company's Dadney merchants, who provided their investments until the year 1753, rarely before that period stooped to be Banians to the gentlemen in your service; but from that period, finding the measure was adopted for providing your investment by your own gomastahs or factors at the Arungs, they condescended to serve either in person or by Banians who were entirely dependant on them.

These Dadney merchants, whilst they continued in that employ, always had the address to bring down their own private goods and merchandize with the Company's, under the cover and protection of the same dustick; but being in the above-mentioned year stripped of that means of eluding the king's duties, they fixed on another which they knew had been for a long term successfully practised by the Banians; that is, covering their trade by the Company's dusticks, obtained chiefly from your junior servants.

Various were the terms of this illicit compact; sometimes the Company's servant was entitled to $\frac{1}{4}$ th, $\frac{1}{3}$ th, or $\frac{1}{2}$ of the profits on the trade so covered. At other times, with sorrow I speak it, your dustick was sold at various prices, from 200 to 25 rupees each; and to such a shameful prostitution did this trade in dusticks come to, that it was no uncommon thing to see on the register a trade of two lack per annum carried on in appearance by persons known never to have been worth five pounds in their lives, nor that had credit to this amount in your Presidency. Sometimes they engaged in a joint trade, the Banian or merchant finding the capital, in the course of which if your servants came in for 1-16th of the profits he was well off, but oftener was brought in debtor.

The Government's spies in the settlement were well acquainted with prostitutions and abuse of the Company's Dustick, and sent daily advices thereof to the Durbar, where it used to be often thrown out in terrorem, "that they had a long Dustick account to settle with the English." — And Surajud Dowla in 1756, declared he would prove from vouchers in his possession "that the English had defrauded the King in his revenues, by covering the trade of his subjects with their Dusticks to the amount of one Corore and a half (one million five hundred thousand pound sterling) in the space of fifty years." Howsoever this charge was exaggerated, it is a truth, that the sum of the frauds arising from this illicit practice must have been very important.

Your Court of Directors were so sensible of the repeated abuse of this indulgence, that I think, there are no less than five and twenty STANDING

ORDERS against it transmitted to your President and Council of Fort William from the year 1702 to 1756, each of these orders directing, on detection, restitution of the King's duties, immediate dismissal from the service, and the aggressor to be sent to England on the first returning ship; but notwithstanding these orders, and the utmost vigilance of your Council abroad to prevent this practice, it was found impossible. The strongest prohibitions, the most solemn oaths, proved ineffectual; and though it was notoriously known, that there was hardly any period of your service, that there were not some of your servants who had no visible means of subsisting, but on this trade of Dusticks; yet, strange to tell! we find few examples made of the aggressors on the records of the Company. This can be accounted for, only from the difficulty of full detection; but surely in this case, where the very existence of the Company was liable to be brought into hazard, strong and glaring presumption of the fact should have been deemed proof sufficient; the more especially, as it was long evident, nothing but examples made of this presumptive proof, would be capable of putting a total stop to a practice that had so often embroiled, and distressed your affairs; and was at last *one* of those causes assigned by Surajud Dowla, for that destruction brought on your Bengal settlements in 1756. These examples should not have been confined to your servants only, but should have been extended to the Black Merchant or Banian, *suspected* of being concerned with them; these should have been banished your settlements, and in flagrant instances delivered up to the government. Three examples of this kind, we dare say, would have effectually put a stop to this mischief for ever: We think some directions to the above purport and intention were sent out by your Court of Directors a few years ago, but they were never put in practice.

To draw our foregoing anecdotes into a smaller compass, we beg leave to remind you, that we have shewn two principal causes that gave rise to every contest which happened between your servants and the Government, down to the time of Surajud Dowla, viz. Your servants trading in the three prohibited articles so often mentioned, and their abuse of the Company's Dustick, both repeatedly forbid by your Court of Directors under the severest and most positive restrictions, and yet both continued, and lately the one of them absolutely avowed, nay, even contended for by some of your servants with indecency, arrogance and violence; to the utter subversion of the laws and natural liberties of a country where you trade upon sufferance; as well as in defiance and disobedience of the reiterated commands of their masters at home.

Let us take a short view of this government in the year 1760, when you saw a Vice Rōy at the head of it, raised by your servants from motives
of

of justice, joined to the necessity of your affairs; confirmed by yourselves in the opinion and judgment of your Directors: Consider this Vice Roy making you princely donations of the most valuable parts of his country; then see your servants aiming to strip him of the remainder, the commercial legal duties which were to be his future support in that government you had promoted him to—now see him driven from two of his provinces for not tamely submitting to arrogant impositions—then surely you will blush for the reproaches so wantonly thrown upon the English name and nation. But to return more immediately to our subject.


Soon after Mr. Vansittart's arrival to the Government of Fort William, such was the licentious conduct of your servants, more particularly at your subordinates, in those articles of trade so often forbid both by the Company and Government, that continual complaints came in of the unbounded violences of them and their agents. Mr. Vansittart plainly saw, unless some remedy was applied, general confusion must ensue. He took a middle road, and formed a judicious plan that all parties ought to have been satisfied with, and, as he expresses it, would have reconciled all differences, if faithfully adhered to on both sides: The liberties of the Phirmaunds touching these contested articles, as well as the whole inland trade, had been given up and relinquished by the Company long ago.—He has the merit of stipulating for the resuming those liberties, and preserving them in perpetuity on terms highly advantageous to every one engaged in it, as we have already made appear. It has been charged against him, that he concluded this Treaty of Commerce without the assent of his Council.—That he was first invested with a discretionary power has been proved beyond contradiction; and though it has been also insinuated, he suppressed and never acknowledged the receipt of a letter sent by the Council, revoking that power, and containing a dissent to the terms of the Treaty transmitted to them by Mr. Vansittart:—yet—if such a revocation and dissent was dispatched, it appears very extraordinary that his enemies have not produced a copy of it, since, in other matters less important, they have been so minute.—Therefore it is no unreasonable conclusion to say, We believe no such letter was ever sent,—or it would certainly have appeared against him.—Another objection has been started against his conduct, for not giving due time for this Treaty taking place.—To this we say, that possibly he thought this licentious contraband trade of your servants required an immediate check.—And as they had engaged in it, in direct breach of their masters orders, and we fear in breach also of their covenants; it was but just they should suffer the consequences, for they surely had no title to indulgence. One objection only, to this Gentleman's conduct regarding this Treaty, remains unanswered; and that is the article by which he gives the decision of disputes into the hands of the Govern-
ment's

ment's officers : but for this error he has so ingenuously apologised himself, that nothing but ill-nature could be capable of continuing it as a charge against him. However, had not the unhappy and ill-judged second deputation taken place, this error might easily have been retrieved, and overruled as soon as the inconveniences had been discovered.

Concerning *the present of Cannon*, (levelled at Mr. Vansittart's reputation only) the charge is so evidently malicious, as hardly to deserve a reply.—It is a notorious truth, that at the capture of Coimbatour and Fort William, the Government had store both of cannon and field pieces with their carriages, which they had six months in their possession.—Surajad Dowla had 20 of the latter so well constructed by his own people, that they could hardly be known from those made in Europe. But we will not affront your understanding, by dwelling longer in the refutation of a charge so repugnant to sense as well as decency.



F I N I S.



N^o 1

5 $\frac{c \times}{41171}$

"A book that is shut is but a block"

CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

GOVT. OF INDIA
Department of Archaeology
NEW DELHI.

Please help us to keep the book
clean and moving.

S. B., 148, N. DELHI.