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


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1889

THE HISTORY OF GREECE





THE
HISTORY OF GREECE

FROM
ITS COMMENCEMENT TO THE CLOSE OF
THE INDEPENDENCE OF THE
GREEK NATION

14369

BY
ADOLF HOLM



TRANSLATED FROM THE GERMAN

IN FOUR VOLUMES

VOL. III

THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C. UP TO THE DEATH OF ALEXANDER



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PREFACE

THE present volume deals with a period of Greek history which derives its special interest from the much-contested importance of a few prominent men. I have endeavoured to substantiate the view which I take of them. For Demosthenes and Philip the chief requisite was a detailed investigation of their careers, based upon the authorities, an investigation which in the case of the former has not led me to the favourable results which historians generally arrive at. For Alexander, on the other hand, the main thing was his position in Greek history in general. In repeatedly pointing out that he must be regarded not only as the founder of a new epoch, but also as the fulfiller of hopes which had long been cherished by the best men in Greece, and as a genuine Greek himself, I believe I am only doing him justice.

As regards the narrative in general, in this, as in the preceding volumes, I have aimed at conveying an idea of the real character of the Greeks. This involved utilizing the results of special studies, and that I have mostly attempted with numismatics in the present volume also. In such matters, of course, details are all-important. But nowadays

they predominate almost too much, and the result not unfrequently is that antiquity itself disappears in the mass of antiquities. To guard against this, I have always tried to emphasize what is characteristic, and at the end of the volume I have added a few brief notes on Greek public law, which are intended to be an attempt to pave the way in the case of Greece for what has been accomplished in such brilliant fashion for Rome. Hitherto the real knowledge of the Greek state-system has not nearly kept pace with the study of state antiquities.

There will be no lack of mistakes and inequalities in this volume also. The criticisms which have appeared on the second volume, the kindly tone of which I gratefully acknowledge, I have tried to profit by as much as possible in the third.

A. H.



NOTE

THE translators wish to express their obligation to the Author for some corrections and additions, and they have also to thank Mr. Frederick Clarke, late Taylorian Scholar in the University of Oxford, for thoroughly revising the MS. of their translation, and correcting the proofs.

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CHAPTER I

THE SUPREMACY OF SPARTA — CYRUS AND THE TEN THOUSAND — WAR BETWEEN SPARTA AND PERSIA — AGESILAUS IN ASIA. 403-395

IN the preceding volume we traced the history of Athens up to the time of her liberation from the yoke of the oligarchs and of Sparta; we must now see how the city, which brought the Peloponnesian War to so brilliant a close, used her considerable power in a wider sphere of action.

As a matter of course Sparta did what was necessary to secure the fruits of her victory. But she did more, she tyrannized over her allies. As early as 403 the Thebans and Corinthians refused to follow the lead of Sparta, which would not put up with the influence of Thebes or Corinth either in Greece itself or in the colonies. At the outset this was mainly the fault of Lysander, who had not only brought about the victory but was the first to direct the policy of Sparta after it was won.¹ As we have seen, he established executive bodies in the places which had been wrested from Athens; these bodies were devoted to him and to Spartan interests, and in most instances consisted of ten men. They generally received a Lacedaemonian division under the command of a Harmost by way of support. They governed in the same fashion as the Thirty in Athens and, like the latter, made themselves and Sparta objects of detestation.

This in the long run was to the detriment of Sparta; but Lysander was the first to suffer from it. For his own fellow-countrymen, who approved of his system as such and acted in much the same way after his fall, grew jealous of him. They did not forget that he had accepted honours which should only have been paid to a god. The oligarchy instituted by him in Samos had actually given his name to festivals which had hitherto been held in honour of Hera. In comparison with this the regular court which he held in Samos and his patronage of writers who flattered him, such as the Epic poet Choerilus, attracted little notice. The authorities at Sparta had reason for thinking him a second Pausanias, and it was natural that they should try to oppose him in every way. A military colony planted by him in Sestos was withdrawn; his friend Thorax, who commanded in Samos, was put to death on a charge of embezzlement, and he himself was recalled to Sparta. He made his appearance there with what purported to be a letter of recommendation from Pharnabazus, but when it was opened it proved to be an accusation which the satrap had cleverly substituted for the laudatory letter read to Lysander, the wily Spartiate being thus outwitted by the still wilier Persian and made an object of ridicule to his fellow-citizens. This convinced him that he must bow to the storm for the present, and he applied for permission to go on a pilgrimage to Zeus Ammon which he had vowed to undertake. His request was granted and he left Sparta.

Sparta was thus freed for the moment from a man who under existing circumstances could only be a source of danger to his native city. We have no information as to the date of his return; at any rate he took no ostensible part in the events which followed, although they concerned his old friend Cyrus. The latter desired the support of Sparta to enable him to overthrow his brother, King Artaxerxes. On the death of her husband Darius, their mother Parysatis had tried to make Cyrus king, who

was her favourite and the younger of the brothers ; but this was frustrated by Tissaphernes, who afterwards poisoned Artaxerxes' mind with the suspicion that Cyrus was plotting against his life. The king wanted to put his brother to death, and on one occasion was with difficulty prevented by Parysatis from slaying him with his own hands. In spite of this Cyrus had returned to Asia Minor as governor, but Tissaphernes followed him thither in order to watch over his actions. Cyrus now aspired to the throne, and with this object began to enlist mercenaries as the nucleus of a large army. In consequence of the numerous domestic revolutions that had taken place there were at that time numbers of able-bodied Greeks in search of employment, and 13,000 of them took service with Cyrus. His chief recruiting officer and leader was the Spartiate Clearchus, a man of the stamp of Lysander, an old admiral and harmost of Sparta (see vol. ii. p. 499). He had established himself as tyrant in Byzantium in spite of the veto of the Ephors, but was afterwards expelled from this important city by the Spartans themselves, who could not tolerate such misconduct. Cyrus, however, was not content with mercenaries, who had flocked to his standard, with the connivance of Sparta but on their own account, from Greece, especially from Arcadia and Achaia ; he wanted official support from the government of Sparta, which owed him such a large debt of gratitude. The Spartans were not prepared to consent to this, but as they were bound to fulfil their obligations to Cyrus, and besides might count on great advantages in the event of his success, they helped him in secret as much as they could. They despatched 700 hoplites under Cheirisophus, who were nominally to co-operate with Cyrus in an expedition directed against some pirates, but could afterwards of course be used by him at his discretion.

In the spring of 401 Cyrus took the field with his army,² 100,000 Asiatics and 13,000 Greek mercenaries, among them 11,000 hoplites. No one knew whither they were going.

The mercenaries, who at first were deceived by the route taken, which pointed to a northerly destination, became reconciled to the hazardous undertaking when the real destination was revealed, better terms being promised them than before. The force marched from Sardis, at first in an easterly direction to Celaenae, then in a large semicircle to the north and south-east through Phrygia and Lycaonia to Tyana in Cappadocia, and finally due south through the passes of Cilicia to Tarsus. From here Cyrus skirted the Gulf of Issus, by the route which Alexander afterwards followed, and then proceeded through the desert to the Euphrates, which he crossed at Thapsacus. He then followed the left bank of the Euphrates southwards to the suburbs of Babylon. Up to this point Artaxerxes had allowed his enemy to approach unmolested, but he now attacked him in the plain between the Euphrates and Tigris, near Cunaxa, with vastly superior forces—400,000 to 900,000 men, according to various sources. In spite of this Cyrus might have won the day if he had advanced with less impetuosity and had been more ably supported by Clearchus. The latter, however, who should have supported Cyrus' attack on the centre, where Artaxerxes was stationed, instead of this defeated the enemy's wing which confronted him and pursued it too far. Consequently he was not on the spot at the decisive moment when Cyrus charged Artaxerxes, whom he intended to kill with his own hand, and Cyrus lost his life. Thereupon his Asiatic troops took to flight; but the Greeks stood firm, repulsed the royal army once more, and were so conscious of their power that they even attempted to dispose of the Persian throne. But the Persian Ariæus, to whom they offered it, declined the proposal. They then compelled the Persians to make an agreement as to their return march, and did not lose heart even when their generals were put to death by the craft of Tissaphernes. The wise counsels of one of them, the Athenian Xenophon, a pupil of Socrates, restored their

confidence. They selected Cheirisophus as general, and began their retreat amidst a swarm of foes, Xenophon acting as adviser and doing his best to maintain their courage and discipline. They could not return by the way they had come, as they would have been overwhelmed in the vast plains by the superior force of the enemy. They had to march northwards across mountain ranges to the Black Sea, through a hostile country, the roads of which were entirely unknown to them. And the retreat was one which had no resemblance to that of Napoleon from Russia or that of the Athenians from Syracuse. But that this was the result, that it was not a march to destruction but to victory, was due not to chance but to the merit of the men who accomplished it. Even granting that in the two instances quoted exposure to heat and cold was more fatal than in the retreat of the Ten Thousand, and that the Syracusans and Russians were more formidable opponents than the Persians, yet the country which the Ten Thousand had to traverse was more unknown to them than Russia was to the French, and the march was a longer one. It lasted eight months. Their route led them first along the left bank of the Tigris, northwards through the mountains of the Carduchi (Kurds). Then, harassed by the wild and warlike Carduchi in the rear, and by the troops of Orontes in front, they crossed the Centrites (now Buhtanshatt), the boundary river between the Carduchi country and Armenia, and made their way, amid severe privations and hardships, through the snow-clad mountains of this district west of Lake Van, till in the month of February or March, 400, they arrived at Trapezus, and greeted the long looked-for sea with the joyous cry of "*θάλαττα, θάλαττα!*" This march perhaps shows the character of the race in its most favourable light, more than any other exploit of the Greeks. Although they had joined the standard in the hope of gain, they obeyed freely-chosen leaders; they remained loyal to their nationality, even in their religious

ceremonies, which they continued to perform as if they were in Greece. They presented a firm and united front, and so triumphed over every obstacle. It is worthy of note that, although they were commanded by a Spartan, an Athenian kept them together; and he did it in genuine Greek fashion, by the example of his own personal bravery and by a proper use of the art of speech. Hence the retreat of the Ten Thousand proves that in the year 400 the Greeks were just as little degenerated as a hundred years previously. These mercenaries were by no means the moral flower of the nation; and if a chance collection of men like this behaved in such an exemplary manner, what might not be expected from the Greeks as a whole, if they were well led? The retreat is also a proof that democracy was after all the best constitution for the Greeks; for freely-rendered obedience, secured by the oratorical power of an energetic man, was the salvation of the Ten Thousand.

When the force, to the number of over 9000, reached the sea, the real dangers which had threatened them from the barbarians were succeeded by petty but all the more vexatious annoyances from the country folk and nominal friends. For the Spartans, who at this time were powerful in the country round the Bosphorus, put every possible obstacle in their way in order not to wholly lose the favour of the victorious Artaxerxes. They were dragged hither and thither in the neighbourhood of Byzantium, under all kinds of pretexts, with the result that they marched from place to place, first on their own account, and then in the service of the Thracian Prince Seuthes, until finally they once more turned their arms against Persia.

The reason for this was that war had after all at last broken out between Sparta and Persia. Tissaphernes, by way of reward for his achievements, had been sent to Asia Minor again as satrap of Greater Phrygia and Ionia, and as Karanos of Further Asia. He now undertook to incorporate all the

Greek cities on the coast into the Persian empire, and with this object began by laying siege to Cyme. The Greeks of Asia Minor thereupon asked the Spartans, as the leaders of the whole of Greece, for help. Like Croesus on a former occasion, the Ionians now recognized the Spartan supremacy over Greece. The Spartans took the Ionians under their protection. Persia had behaved in too contemptible a manner; an empire which 10,000 foreigners had been able to march through would not, thought the Spartans, be in a position to offer resistance. They therefore sent orders to Tissaphernes, as they had formerly done to Cyrus, to leave the Greeks alone, and when this injunction was of course disregarded they despatched Thimbron to Asia with an army consisting of Lacedaemonians, some other Peloponnesians and Athenians. About 8000 men of the Cyrus expedition who joined them were valuable auxiliaries. Some successes were actually achieved. Part of Aeolis was conquered, and the descendants of Demaratus and Gongylus who were settled there joined the Greeks. But on the whole the result did not correspond to their anticipations. What had been achieved under the stress of necessity and by freely elected leaders could not be attained under the command of a Thimbron, who besides allowed his troops to ill-treat their own allies. His successor Dereyllidas (after the autumn of 399), who was called Sisyphus on account of his wiliness, accomplished somewhat more. He disarmed Tissaphernes by means of a treaty, and wrested the whole of Aeolis from Pharnabazus in eight days, whereupon the latter also concluded a truce with him. He protected the Thracian Chersonese by erecting a wall, captured the city of Atarneus, and finally, by his resolute attitude at the meeting of the rival armies in the valley of the Maeander, induced Tissaphernes and Pharnabazus to conclude a longer truce with him (397). The idea was to negotiate quietly for a peace in which the Greek cities of Asia Minor should be recognized as independent.³ This was a good beginning, but it was not

maintained in the same spirit. The Spartans did not put forth all their strength against Persia. They wanted to use their power to obtain absolute control of Greece; they desired, in other words, to carry out Lysander's system without Lysander. They thought that they were strong enough to oppose Persia and their own adversaries in Greece with success at the same time. They began by paying off an old score. The Eleans had thwarted them in many ways in the course of the Peloponnesian War. They were now to receive chastisement for this. They were called upon to set their Perioeci at liberty, and when this was refused the Spartans invaded Elis. The Eleans sought aid from Sparta's enemies. But no one stirred, while their subjects as well as their neighbours in Arcadia and Achaia took advantage of this excellent opportunity to join in the attack. For two years (398-397) King Agis devastated the Elean territory with Lacedaemonians and allies, among whom were Athenians, and at last Elis, which was torn by internal conflicts into the bargain, had to make up her mind to surrender not only Lepreum, which had always resisted her rule, but also Triphylia, the coast line including Pheia and Cyllene, and the district of Acrorea on the Arcadian frontier. The Eleans, however, did not lose their presidency of the Olympian games (397).¹

Agis did not long survive these successes. After offering a tenth of the spoil at Delphi he died in the year 397 B.C. A dispute now arose in Sparta as to who should succeed him, whether it should be Leotychides, a youth of fifteen, who called himself his son, but was regarded by many as the child of Alcibiades, or Agesilaus, brother of Agis and son of Archidamus, who was about forty-four years of age. Xenophon has concentrated the points of the controversy into a short dialogue. No one appears to have believed in the legitimacy of Leotychides. But clever people might have used him as a means of gaining power for themselves, and consequently there was a party which favoured his claims. Besides this

Agesilaus' lameness was against him, a defect which was considered unbecoming in a king of Sparta. Diopithes therefore, who was versed in the science of omens, urged that an oracle of Apollo had declared against a halting reign in Sparta. But Agesilaus had a powerful supporter in the still influential Lysander, who replied that Apollo was right in referring to the disadvantages of a halting reign, but that he did not mean a king with a lame foot, but a king who was illegitimate and not of royal extraction. This carried the day, and the Spartans elected Agesilaus.

Agesilaus was a brave, simple and affable man, who had always behaved in the way expected of a genuine Spartiate. And he maintained this blameless conduct throughout his whole life. So far as we know he never came into conflict with the Ephors, who were the real political leaders of the city. If he influenced the policy of Sparta, he managed to do it without giving offence to anybody. Lysander no doubt had only supported him because he thought he would find him a pliant tool. But the wily Spartan was as completely deceived in Agesilaus as he had been in Pharnabazus. Agesilaus possessed the important characteristic of being always equal to the situation. A capable and unassuming citizen in private life, as king he did not relax in his obedience to the Ephors, but with every one else he upheld the royal dignity, and this Lysander was soon destined to experience, to the great satisfaction of the Spartans.

Soon after his election Sparta was menaced by a great danger. As the king was offering sacrifice, all the omens pointed to a great calamity, and shortly afterwards a man came to the Ephors and informed them that a certain Cinadon, a Spartiate, but not one of the *ῥητοῖσι* or peers, consequently a man who was probably too poor to pay his contribution to the Syssitia, was at the head of a conspiracy. He said that Cinadon had told him to count the enemies in the market-place of Sparta when it was full of people; the appellation

of enemy he gave to the kings, the Ephors, the Gerontes, and other members of the privileged class. They amounted altogether to about forty out of the 4000 present, consequently to one in a hundred. He added that Cinadon had used similar language to many people. All the Helots and Perioeci, he had said, would be glad to get rid of the handful of Spartan leaders, and were even ready to eat them alive. When he was asked where the arms would come from for carrying out the rebellion, he replied that the conspirators possessed arms, that they were to be had in all the ironworkers' shops, and that every workman had his iron tools. The Ephors determined to get rid of this dangerous individual. They knew him well, for they had often employed him on confidential missions. They therefore sent him out of the city with a Scytale, but gave him an escort which took him prisoner on the road and brought him back to Sparta; an arrest in Sparta itself would have been too hazardous a proceeding. He was brought to trial, scourged through the streets of the city in order to inspire the disaffected with terror, and put to death with his fellow conspirators.⁶

We have lost sight of affairs in Asia for the space of a year and must now return to them. There had been a pause in the war between Sparta and Persia at the end of the year 397 and the beginning of 396; but in the summer of 396 it broke out afresh. Xenophon gives the following account of it. A Syracusan named Herodas came to Sparta with the story that he had heard and seen in Phoenicia, that a Persian fleet of 300 triremes was being equipped, but that its destination was unknown. It was naturally assumed that these preparations were aimed at Sparta. This turned out to be the case, and the following was the chain of causes which led up to it. After the battle of Aegospotami the Athenian Conon had fled to Evagoras, king of Salamis in Cyprus, a potentate who was very friendly to the Greeks, and from there he offered his services to Artaxerxes when the latter became involved in war

with Sparta. Sparta having supported Cyrus, it was natural for an Athenian to side with Artaxerxes. Through the agency of Pharnabazus he received a commission to collect a fleet for the Persians in Caria and Lycia.

The information brought by Herodas threw the Spartans into a state of considerable excitement. On the whole a patriotic feeling prevailed in the Peloponnese. The poet and musician Timotheus was at that time arousing the enthusiasm of the Greeks by his *Persæ*. Lysander proposed to send Agesilaus with thirty Spartiates, 2000 Neodamodes, and about 6000 allies to Asia. He hoped to regain his own influence abroad and to reinstate the decarchies which had been abolished by the Spartans, for he thought that Agesilaus, who owed him so much, would follow his advice. It was fortunate that Egypt had just revolted; this prevented the Persians from making such a display of power in Asia Minor as would have been possible under other circumstances. Agesilaus set out and took Lysander with him among the thirty Spartiates. Athens, Thebes, Corinth, and Argos sent no contingents. The king was desirous of beginning his campaign in a specially solemn manner. He went to Aulis and intended, like a second Agamemnon, to offer a sacrifice there for a prosperous voyage to Asia. The Boeotarchs, however, had heard of his intentions, and as he would not sacrifice according to the customs of Boeotia, they had the offerings thrown from the altar in his presence. The king protested and sailed for Asia in an angry mood and anxious about the issue of an expedition commenced under such bad auspices. An army inferior in numbers to the body of mercenaries which had accompanied Cyrus was not calculated to inspire Persia with terror, or worthy of claiming to succeed Agamemnon.⁶

Tissaphernes, who was not prepared for a regular war, now declared his readiness to allow the Greek cities of Asia Minor to retain their autonomy, if the Persian king would permit it. The truce was to continue until an answer was received

from him. Meanwhile he sent to Susa for reinforcements. Agesilaus agreed to the armistice and took up his residence in Ephesus (396). Here matters came to a rupture between him and Lysander. The latter became an object of general attention; everything centred round him, as he was so well known in Asia, and no one paid any heed to Agesilaus. The king put an end to this rather humiliating state of affairs in a very simple manner. He decided every case against the views expressed by Lysander, with the result that the latter began to feel uncomfortable and asked to be employed on other service. His request was granted, and he gave proof of his capacity by inducing a lieutenant of Pharnabazus, one Spithridates, to revolt from Persia. Meanwhile Tissaphernes on the arrival of his reinforcements threw off the mask and ordered Agesilaus to leave Asia. Thus war broke out afresh. Tissaphernes thought that Agesilaus would move in the direction of Caria, and he collected the main body of his army there, leaving his cavalry in the valley of the Maeander, in the hope that he would be able, in case of need, to crush Agesilaus with this arm alone. The latter, however, did not advance against him immediately. After a reconnaissance in a northerly direction, which convinced him that he must have cavalry if he wished to win the day, he procured them by a device which was afterwards imitated by the elder Scipio in Sicily. He allowed the natives to furnish substitutes and horses in lieu of the personal service which had at first been demanded of them. Ephesus, where he spent the end of the winter of 396-5, resembled a camp, somewhat like Syracuse a short time previously, when Dionysius was preparing for his great campaign (see Chapter xi.) Such of the enemy as were captured he exposed naked, in order that their white skins might show how effeminate and little to be dreaded these Asiatics were. In the spring he took the field and gained a complete victory over the Persian cavalry on the Pactolus. This victory, it is true, did not place the neighbouring Sardis

in his power, but was the cause of the death of Tissaphernes. For Parysatis, the implacable persecutor of every enemy of her beloved Cyrus, made the king believe that Tissaphernes was a traitor, and the king consequently sent his Chiliarchus or Vizier Tithraustes with orders to remove him. The order was carried out; Tissaphernes was arrested and executed at Celaenae (395). Tithraustes now thought, with truly oriental naïveté, examples of which have also been seen in Europe, that as the disturber of the peace had been removed, the Greeks might go home, they having done their duty. Sparta's wishes, he announced, would be complied with; the cities were to retain their autonomy, provided they paid their tribute to the king. Agesilaus gave the proper answer, that he must await orders from Sparta. Tithraustes then suggested that he should spend the time in Pharnabazus' province. Tithraustes of course was not sorry that his colleague should have this advantage. Agesilaus fell in with the proposal and marched northwards. Meanwhile the fleet also was increased and placed under his command, and he entrusted it to his brother-in-law Pisander. It had been of considerable size before, but had accomplished nothing of importance. In 396 the Spartan Pharax had left Rhodes with 120 ships and surprised Conon, who at that time had only forty ships in the port of Caunus. Conon, however, fought his way out. After this Pharax was not even allowed to re-enter Rhodes, the island revolted from Sparta, and Conon captured a convoy on its way to the Spartans from Egypt. The Spartan naval force under Pisander was now reinforced by 120 more ships.⁷

Thus the Spartans began to take up a threatening attitude towards the Persians both by land and sea. Tithraustes accordingly came to the conclusion that Persia would be in a better position if she could stir up their own countrymen against the Spartans. Sparta had but few friends left in Greece. If the numerous Greek states, which had been insulted and humiliated by Sparta, and were willing and

ready to rise against her, could be placed in a position to do so by subsidies of money, it was more than doubtful whether the Spartans, who had to contend with conspiracies at home into the bargain, could continue the war in Asia.

NOTES

Authorities for the period 403-362. The principal one is the *Hellenica* of Xenophon, Books 3-7. This historical work has been comprehensively and accurately criticized by Breitenbach in the introduction and notes to his edition, 2 vols. Berl. 1874; for the second half of this period (387-362) the researches of von Stern, in his *Geschichte der spartan. und theban. Hegemonie*, Dorp. 1884, are important for the prominence given to Xenophon's merit as well as for other reasons. In these books Xenophon is as impartial as is possible for a writer who had taken part in the events narrated. For his life cf. A. Roquette, *De Xen. vita, Königs*. 1884. Xenophon, however, according to many critics is supposed to display partiality, and two alleged sins of omission are in particular quoted as proof of it: (1) He does not mention Epaminondas and Pelopidas often enough or early enough, the former not till 7, 1, 41, the latter only in 7, 1, 33; (2) he does not refer to the founding of Megalopolis and Messene. But these omissions are not the result of partiality. The scanty reference to the two Thebans is due to the fact that Xenophon, with his old-fashioned republican feeling, which finds expression, for instance, in Demosthenes (c. Aristocr. 198), prefers to mention the community (οἱ Θηβαῖοι) rather than their generals, and also to the peculiarity that he never gives any prominence to persons unless he has to describe individual traits of their character from his own experience. In narrating the preservation of Sparta (6, 5, 30-32), where later writers, even opponents of Sparta, are full of praise of Agesilaus, he does not mention him at all; he does not even mention his own son on the occasion of the latter's death, which was so famous in antiquity. This being the case, it is quite possible for him to say "the Thebans" without wishing to disparage Epaminondas. In omitting the exploits of Pelopidas in the north he has at all events not injured the fame of Thebes. His non-mention of the founding of Megalopolis and Messene is certainly a defect, but it is not caused by partiality. Xenophon had no gift for universal history, and only related events of which he believed he had some special knowledge. But many passages in his history prove that he was impartial: (1) As regards Thebes, his splendid eulogy of

Epaminondas, 7, 5, 8, 18 seq. (2) As regards Athens, his recognition of the ability of Iphicrates. (3) As regards Sparta, his blame of the oppression of Thebes, which an enemy of Sparta could not have expressed better, 5, 4, 1; the description of the inglorious march of Agesilaus through the Peloponnese, 4, 5, 18; the account of the intrigues which, owing to Agesilaus' weakness of character, brought about the acquittal of Sphodrias, 5, 4, 25-34; his description of the feebleness of Sparta, when the Thessalians appealed for aid, 6, 1, 2 seq.; his repetition of the truths which Autocles tells the Spartans, who can make no reply to them, 6, 3, 7,—and many other instances. See also Chapter xii. Xenophon is a candid, amiable writer, who as a genuine Socratic eschews all phrase-making, and his critics themselves recognize his excellence by reproducing his best narratives at length.

The next authority in point of importance is Diodorus, whose books Nos. 14 and 15 deal with this period. Diodorus, whom I have already discussed in vol. ii. p. 106 seq., aimed at writing a general history in annalistic form. But his chronology is often useless (in these two books among others) for the following reasons: (1) His year is an impossible one, because he heads it with the names of Athenian archons and Roman consuls who did not hold office during the same period. If, as sometimes happens, the year begins nine months before the archon's entrance into office (vol. ii. p. 110) the confusion is still greater. If he had only adopted a rule and begun and ended his year always at the same time, it would not have been so bad. But he has not done this; his nominal years embrace every possible division of time, months or years indiscriminately (cf. notes to Chapter v.), and we can never conclude from the fact that he relates a definite event in a definite year that it happened at that date, even in his own opinion. (2) What, however, makes his year such a chronological monstrosity is that he never really tried to write as an annalist, but on a distinct system, that is, in accordance with the internal connection of events. This is why he often brings the history of several years into one year, and the heading of archons and consuls often has no internal connection with what is narrated under it. It merely marks divisions in his books.—This criticism of Diodorus' deceptive chronology leads us to his merits as a writer, to his endeavour to grasp the hidden relations of things. But we must go a step farther. He not only pursued a system, he was also an artist—a point which does not seem to have been hitherto noticed. He was guided in his choice and arrangement of materials by artistic principles. His division into books is regulated by their contents. Each possesses an internal unity, which is produced by the pro-

minence given to one or more personalities or incidents. Events which have but slight connection with these are treated with greater brevity, because each book must not exceed a certain length. And as the world, the history of which Diodorus relates, is divided into three parts, the East, Greece Proper, and the West, of which the first and second are closely connected, and as first the one and then the other assumes greater prominence, it follows that the events of the section which happens to be less prominent at the moment are treated in less detail by him than they really deserve. Of the books which describe the fourth century, the 14th (404-387) centres in the history of the elder Dionysius; the 15th (386-361) relates the rivalry of Thebes, Sparta, and Athens; in the 16th (361-336) Philip is the chief character; in the 17th (335-324) Alexander predominates to such an extent that during these twelve years the general history of Italy and Sicily is omitted. This circumstance has given rise to the conjecture that we have not the complete text of Diodorus' 17th book; cf. Droysen, *Hellenismus*, 1, 2, 369, and Grosser, *Croton*, 1, 64. Even if this be so, the principle to which I have referred would still hold good. There cannot be much missing from Bk. 17, and in other books the omissions are perceptible enough. The special attention paid by Diodorus to Dionysius in the 14th book makes him pass over the accession of Agesilaus to the throne, which after all was a noteworthy event. Because Greece proper chiefly occupies him in Bk. 15, he has no space to say much of Dionysius, who must, however, have done a good deal at that time, while as regards Dionysius the younger he reserves everything for Bk. 16, and does not mention him till the year 359, when he had been nine years on the throne. Even the number of the chapters devoted to the great divisions of the world is instructive as to the character of Diodorus' work. In the 14th book the West takes up sixty-eight chapters, and Greece and Asia only forty-nine, of which moreover thirteen are devoted to the Retreat of the Ten Thousand. In the 15th book, on the other hand, the West receives only ten chapters to the eighty-four on the East. In Bk. 16 the West obtains thirty-one to the sixty-seven given to the East. Hence in many years neither East nor West are mentioned at all, not because nothing happened in that part of the world to interest Diodorus, but because he cannot spare the space for it. In the 14th book nothing happens for four years in the East (398, 397, 389, 388), while in the 15th book this section of the world is only unnoticed for two years (384, 379) and the West, on the other hand, has twenty years disregarded out of twenty-six. In Bk. 16 the West is not mentioned in twelve years out of twenty-four, the East in only two. Whether these considera-

tions increase the value of Diodorus as a historical authority is another question. The selection and arrangement of material in the 14th book, with which we are concerned in chaps. 1-4 and 11, present a kind of artistic balance in the comparisons of similar phenomena in the East and in the West—tyrants in both quarters, wars with Persia in the East, with Carthage in the West. The conclusion of the book is written for effect. Three important events, which mark the success of the barbarians and tyrants, are described in the same year: the King's Peace, Dionysius' victory over Rhegium (immediately after he had been derided at Olympia, so that he should not be successful at every point), and the sacking of Rome by the Gauls (cc. 110-117). The 14th is the despots' book. Many of the details in Bk. 14 are wrong, e.g. the date of the rule of the Thirty, and particulars of the Boeotian and Corinthian Wars, the battle of Coronea for instance. According to c. 35 Anytus and Meletus were put to death ἀπέρτοι! For Diodorus' mistakes in Bk. 15 see notes to Chapter v. In the 14th book, apart from the history of Sicily, the accounts of events in Asia and the north are useful (cc. 39, 79, 82).

There remains the question of the authorities which Diodorus himself used. The answer to it is certainly of very little practical use, since we know too little of Ephorus and Theopompus, who are the principal writers in question, to be able to say that this or that is to be received or rejected because it comes from Theopompus or Ephorus. But science cannot accept these considerations of utility as decisive. The proof of the existence of a lost author in an extant one is a scientific problem. But in this investigation of sources critics should have proceeded from the known to the unknown, and should have begun by ascertaining the methods of Diodorus himself. His choice of language and mode of describing certain facts which are repeated should have been examined, and if differences in these respects were discovered in different parts of his work, the origin of such differences should have been inquired into, and then perhaps diversity in the authorities used by him would have become apparent. But this plan has hitherto been too little pursued. A noteworthy beginning, however, has been made by L. Bröcker, *Untersuchungen über Diodor, Gütersl. 1879*, and *Moderne Quellenforscher und antike Geschichtsschreiber, Innsbr. 1882*. Stern, *Theopompus eine Hauptquelle Diodors, Strassb. 1889*, proceeds in a more one-sided fashion. Cf. generally Bauer's *Jahresb. über Griech. Geschichte, Calvary, 1889*. In the following remarks, by taking a subject frequently treated by Diodorus, the description of battles, I will endeavour to show in what way he worked. The result will be of value for the use of

Diodorus. I take as a basis the descriptions of the battles of Plataea and Leuctra, which some writers have pronounced to be alike and others very different. The truth is that the two battles have been described by Diodorus in such a way that the different progress of each is clearly discernible, but that he has embellished them both with the same flowers of speech, which convey the impression that the course of events in each was similar. In this respect the following passages from cc. 11, 31, 32 (Plataea) and 15, 55, 56 (Leuctra) correspond. At first the two armies fight bravely: γενναίως ἀγωνιζόμενος (11, 31); ἐκθύμως ἀμφοτέρων ἀγωνιζομένων (15, 55); then comes the change brought about by the deaths of Mardonius and Cleombrotus: ἔως μὲν οὖν συνέβαινε τὸν Μ.—προκινδυνεύειν, εὐψύχως ὑπέμενον τὸ δεινόν (11, 31); ἔως μὲν οὖν ὁ βασιλεὺς ἔζη—ἀδελος ἦν ἡ ῥοπή (15, 55); ἐπεὶ δ' ὁ τε Μ. ἀγωνιζόμενος ἐκθύμως ἔπεσε—πρὸς φύγην ὤρμησαν (11, 31); ἐπὶ δ' οὗτος πάντα κίνδυνον ὑπομένων—ἥρωικῶς μαχόμενος—ἔτελεύτησε—νεκρῶν πλῆθος ἐσορεύθη (15, 55); ἐπικειμένων δὲ τῶν Ἑλλήνων (11, 31); ἐπικείμενοι τοῖς φεύγουσι (15, 56). The plan is the same. Similar phrases, however, occur in most of the battles described by Diodorus in Bks. 11-17, of those used for Leuctra the following two especially: (1) that for a long time ἀδελος ἦν ἡ ῥοπή τῆς νίκης, and (2) that at first αἱ τε σάλπιγγες ἐσήμαινον παρ' ἀμφοτέροις τὸ πολεμικὸν καὶ συνηλάξαν αἱ δυνάμεις, on which point Schubert (Agathokles, 20) is to be corrected; he thinks he recognizes the hand of Duris in these trumpet-blasts, whereas they have already appeared in 13, 45, where Duris cannot be the foundation of the narrative; they are part of Diodorus' idea of a battle. Almost all the battles and sieges in Bks. 11-17 are on the same plan as Plataea and Leuctra. The descriptions are never exactly alike; the central facts are always different, as the battles themselves were, but these main facts Diodorus regarded as raw material, which he thought would be unpalatable to his readers unless he seasoned it and dished it up with the same condiments. Every regular battle begins with trumpet-blasts and shouting; then all fight bravely, and the issue is doubtful; 'many' are killed and 'a good many' wounded; then, if it can be managed, the leader of one army falls (for without this there would be no reason why one side should get the better of the other), and then this army takes to flight pursued by the victors. A proper battle is bound to have these three accompaniments:—noise, bravery, and good luck. This holds good for the period from 480 to about 320, and for Asia, Greece, and Sicily. As it is impossible that a single authority could have been available for this period and these different parts of the

world, the inference is that Diodorus was not a mere copyist; he must have worked up the language of his authorities. We cannot say from whom he borrowed his fine phrases and his regulation battle; if from Ephorus, then Theopompus and Timaeus had to undergo the same treatment when they were made use of. In Bks. 18-20 the language is much less stereotyped; 16, 41-52 is also of a different character. Diodorus evidently did not proceed on the same methods in every part of his work, a fact which is also not unimportant. Here and there we can prove the origin of the authority used by Diodorus. Xenophon 4, 2 and 3 is the original source of Diod. 14, 83, 84, which appears from the agreement in the sequence of the events narrated, an agreement not warranted by the facts. Diodorus relates the following in the same order as Xenophon: the battle at Corinth (Xen. 4, 2, 9-23); the march of Agesilaus to the northern boundary of Greece proper (Xen. 4, 3, 1); the battle off Onidus (Xen. 4, 3, 11); Agesilaus at Coronea (Xen. 4, 3, 15).

We come to the final question—What is the value of Diodorus for us? In his chronology he almost always presents problems which have to be solved with the aid of passages in other writers; his chronology is only trustworthy in cases where a detailed narrative is spread over several years, as in Sicily. As regards facts, he is indispensable for Sicily, supplementary for Greece, and of great value for Asia. His importance, apart from his material, which is often valueless, lies in the fact that he is a writer of universal history, and that he groups his details with a certain amount of skill. See the notes to Chapter xv. His omission of a fact proves nothing, owing to the principles which I have described as guiding him in the division of his subject-matter. This point has to be kept in view also for Roman history. We can never conclude from the fact that an event is not to be found in Diodorus that it did not happen.

Plutarch's biographies of Lysander, Agesilaus and Artaxerxes contain many passages which illustrate the character of individuals. The Artaxerxes is an excellent account of the despotism of Persia; Ctesias, who is unreliable in other respects (definitive condemnation in Spiegel, *Iranische Alterthumskunde*, 2, 242-244), was well informed on these matters; cf. Haug, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in der Lebensbeschr. der Griechen*, Tüb. 1854; also Smyth, *A Study of Plutarch's Life of Artaxerxes*, Leipz. 1881, and Mantey in the *Progr. Greifenh.* 1888. His Lysander contains valuable information about Lysander's projects and death, the latter probably from Boeotian sources. Theopompus is probably used a good deal in his Agesilaus; Sachse supposes Ephorus, *Die Quellen P. in der*

Lebensb. des Agesilaos, Schleiz, 1888. For Plutarch's habit of paying less attention to sequence of dates than to connection of subject, see below note 1.

Of the works of Cornelius Nepos the Thrasybulus, Conon, Iphicrates, Chabrias, Timotheus, Datames, and Agesilaus belong to this period. The numerous historical mistakes in these biographies have been set forth by Nipperdey in his larger edition (2nd ed. by Lupus, Berl. 1879). Justinus, end of Bk. 5 and Bk. 6, is almost wholly useless. There is much useful matter in Polyænus, on whom cf. Meibner, Ueber den Werth und die Quellen der Strategemensamml. Polyæni, Supplementary vol. No. xiv. of the Jahrb. f. class. Phil. pp. 419-688.—The inscriptions, C. I. A. vol. ii.; the most important are in Dittenberger and Hicks.

Of modern historical compilations of the period down to 362 B.C. may be mentioned: Lachmann, Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des pelop. Krieges bis Alexander, Leipz. 1839, Sievers, Geschichte Griechenlands vom Ende des pelop. Krieges bis zur Schlacht bei Mantinea, Kiel, 1840, as well as the work of von Stern, referred to on p. 14. Cf. also for details the above-mentioned edition of the Hellenica by Breitenbach, and the notes to the 6th edition of Curtius' Gr. Gesch. Blass also, Die griech. Beredsamkeit, Bd. I. und II., enters into much detail. For the whole of this volume cf. lastly the copious collection of materials in Hermann's Staatsalterth. § 169 seq.

1. Unjust rule of the Spartans, Xen. 3, 5, 11 seq. Cf. vol. ii. of this history, p. 533.—For Lysander see Plut. Lys. 18-22. In Miletus he promised on oath to spare the leaders of the demos, and when 800 of them left their hiding-places on the faith of this promise, he handed them over to the oligarchs, who put them to death. Lysander outwitted by Pharnabazus, Plut. Lys. 20: πρὸς Κρήτα κρητίζειν ἡγνόει and οὐκ ᾔρ' Ὀδυσσεὺς ἔστιν αἰμύλος μόνος. That Lysander did not go to Libya before he returned to Attica, as Plutarch (Lys. 21) asserts, is proved by Grote, 5², 149; there was not sufficient time for it.

2. Xenophon's Anabasis is of course our authority for the expedition of Cyrus and the retreat of the Ten Thousand. Diod. 14, 19-31 has a somewhat different account, which can be traced through Ephorus to Sophænetus, who no doubt is referred to in Anab. 5, 8, 1. Cf. also Neubert, De Xen. anabasi et Diodori de Cyr. exped. etc., Leipz. 1881. For Clearchus, cf. Wildt, De Clearcho, Köln, 1882.—Of modern writers cf. for geographical and military purposes the works often quoted by von Treuenfeld in Der Zug der 10,000 Griechen, Naumb. 1890, of Ainsworth, Koch, Strecker (1886), Hertzberg (also in Pauly's R. E. 1, 933-38), the

passages in Rüstow-Köchly, Grote, and Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, 2, 434-458.—The name Cunaxa only occurs in Plut. Art. 8.

3. For the state of Sparta at that period cf. Bazin, *La république des Lacéd. de Xénophon*, Par. 1885, and Fleischanderl, *Die spartan. Verfassung bei Xenophon*, Leipz. 1888.—For Tissaphernes cf. Nicolai, *Die Politik des Tiss.* 1869. For the affairs of Asia in the fourth century cf. also P. Krumbholz, *Die Asia minoris satrapis Persicis*, Lips. 1883.—Thibron and Dercyllidas (also Dercyllidas) Xen. Bk. 3 and Diod. 14, 35-38. Xenophon (3, 1, 10 seq.) gives a charming account of the way in which Dercyllidas made game of the wicked Midias.

4. War with Elis, Xen. 3, 2, 21-31; Diod. 14, 17, 34, the notes of Breitenbach to Xen. 3, 2, 21, and those of Curtius, 3, 744. According to Pausanias, 5, 4, 8 and 6, 2, 8, the Eleans celebrated a victory gained over the Spartans at Olympia by erecting a trophy there, which Gardner, *Coins of Elis*, Numism. Chron. 1879, p. 241, thinks is referred to on a beautiful Elean silver coin, which Head also reproduces, H. N. 355, No. 233. The Nike has a palm branch in her hand.

5. Agesilaus. His accession, Xen. 3, 3, 1-4; Plut. Ages. 3; Lys. 22. Can the Diopithes who interpreted the oracle be the same Diopithes who accused Anaxagoras in Athens more than 30 years previously. Modern writers on Agesilaus: Hertzberg, *Das Leben des Königs Agesilaos II.*, Halle, 1856, and Rec. by Herbst, N. Jahrb. Bd. 77; also Hertzberg in Pauly's R. E. 1², 4; Buttmann, *Leben des Agesilaos*, Halle, 1872.—Many writers endeavour to find more in Agesilaus than there is proof for. At first he is said to have had Panhellenic ideas, but afterwards to have become a convert to a utilitarian Spartan patriotism. If, however, we bear in mind that he was over fifty years of age when this change is said to have occurred, it is more probable that his conduct throughout is explicable on the theory that he was a model Spartan, who always obeyed the orders of the Ephora. He was always a 'utilitarian.'—Conspiracy of Cinadon, Xen. 3, 3, 4-11.

6. Sacrifice at Aulis, Plut. Ag. 6.—War in Asia, Xen. 3, 4; Plut. Ag. 6 seq.; Lys. 23, 24.—Lysander was one of the 30 Spartiates sent as *σύνβουλοι* to the king. According to Plut. Ag. 8, Agesilaus humiliated him by appointing him his *κρεοδαίτης* (a court official, something like the German 'Truchsess') and saying *τῶν οὖν θεραπεύεσθαι τὸν ἐμὸν κρεοδαίτην*. Xenophon joined Agesilaus at this time.

7. For the position of Tithraustes as Chiliarch, see Nep. Con. 4 with the note by Nipperdey, and note 4 to Chapter xxvii. of

this volume. Death of Tissaphernes, Xen. 3, 4, 25 ; Diod. 14, 80. —The Spartan fleet, Xen. 3, 4, 28, with the notes of Breitenbach ; Diod. 14, 79.—Conon and the Persians, Diod. 14, 39 ; Plut. Art. 21 ; Ctes. 62, according to which Ctesias, Artaxerxes' physician and the subsequent historian, conducted the negotiations between Conon and the king. He also acted as Persian agent in Sparta and Rhodes. Evagoras as go-between for Conon and the king, Paus. 1, 3, 1. The statement of Herodas in Xen. 3, 4, 1 makes Tissaphernes the chief instigator of the naval war, while, according to Nep. Con. 2, he had an understanding with Agesilaus. Evidently a game of intrigue on a grand scale, the details of which we cannot now unravel, was being played at that time in Asia Minor, and these manœuvres of every man against his neighbour continued up to the downfall of the Persian empire. The remark of Xenophon 3, 4, 18 is characteristic of the Spartan mind : ὅπου γὰρ ἄνδρες θεοὺς μὲν σέβονται, τὰ δὲ πολεμικὰ ἀσκοῦν, πειθαρχεῖν δὲ μελετῇεν, πῶς οὐκ εἰκὸς ἐνταῦθα πάντα μετὰ ἐλπίδων ἀγαθῶν εἶναι. Piety, military exercises, and obedience to orders are the foundations of a sound state.

CHAPTER II

INTERNAL CONDITION OF THE OTHER GREEK STATES, ESPECIALLY OF ATHENS—CONDEMNATION OF SOCRATES

AMONG the rivals of Sparta in Greece Athens held the first place. She was by no means so weak as might have been expected after the severe defeat she had suffered. Her commerce, the basis of her strength, had taken a fresh start. For a long time the trade of the Aegean Sea had centred in Athens, and although the monopoly which had brought so much life into the Piræus no longer existed, and the enfranchised cities and islands could trade with whom they liked, still many of the inhabitants from force of habit took their wares to Athens, where they were still sure of finding a good market. The Athenians were thus able gradually to recover from the injuries which they had received. The influx of people set in motion by Lysander in order to compel the city to capitulate, had been followed by as decided an emigration. There being few cleruchies left, all those who had sufficient strength went as mercenaries to Asia or other countries, wherever war happened to be going on. Conon had shown them the way. By this means Athens was purged of many dubious elements, and the condition of those who remained behind was materially improved.

It was a great advantage that the oligarchic party, which had so long been the source of the greatest difficulties, had destroyed itself by the bad use which it had made of its

power. In the fourth century we find no trace in Athens of the fear of falling into the hands of the oligarchs or of the Spartans, of the apprehension which from the time of Cimon to that of Critias had kept the minds of the Athenians in a state of perpetual agitation. The Hetairiae have disappeared. Everybody is either content with the democracy or at all events takes good care not to let his dislike appear in action. The democratic constitution is never called in question. It also conduced to internal peace that Alcibiades, the man whose restless ambition had caused the worst complications, was no longer alive. He had been assassinated during the rule of the Thirty at Melissa in Phrygia by order of Pharnabazus, as he was on his way to the Persian king. The men who were sent on this errand set fire to the house in which he was living and shot him from a distance when he was escaping from it. Accounts differ considerably as to the immediate cause of his assassination, as is natural in an event of this kind. This much is certain, that every power at that time, the Spartans and the Persians, Agis and Lysander, the Thirty and Cyrus, hated the man who had played fast and loose with every one of them, and so he was bound to fall. The only place where his life would have been in safety was Susa, at the court of the king, the protector of all Greek renegades, and that is why he wanted to take refuge there. His death was a loss to no one, and a positive gain to Athens. For otherwise he might perhaps have returned there once more, and he could only have brought confusion in his train. What Athens needed now was hard work, and not adventurous plunges into the unknown, such as appealed to the brilliant genius of an Alcibiades.¹

As a matter of fact it was no easy task to set their house in order, especially to settle the legal questions relating to the possession of property. The victims of the Thirty had not only been injured in their civil rights but had also lost some of their property. The same point arose in Athens as in all

Greek states to which fugitive citizens returned. The latter demanded compensation for their losses. If, however, their property had been purchased in the meanwhile by others, were these bound to restore it without receiving an indemnity? If all the acts of the oligarchs were to be declared null and void, the discontent would have only become still more general. This state of things has given rise to difficulties in all countries and in all ages. It is therefore greatly to the credit of Athens that she extricated herself from this embarrassment more successfully than many other Greek cities. The new measures adopted in Athens did not fan the flame of discontent. The actual credit of keeping the peace belongs to the democratic leaders of the State, to Thrasybulus and his colleagues, who personally set an excellent example by abandoning all claim to compensation for the property of which they had been deprived by the Thirty. By this means the zeal of others in asserting their rights was moderated and the way was paved for friendly compromise.

The statute law also required examination. It was easy enough to say that the old enactments were to come into force again, but here too the practical difficulties were considerable. Legislation had often been effected by *psephismata*, many of which were in conflict with each other. It was therefore high time to take in hand a revision of them. On the motion of Tisamenus the *nomothetae* were appointed for this purpose. To arrive at a proper decision they availed themselves of the assistance of a small number of persons who were specially versed in such matters. Among these was a certain Nicomachus, a man unworthy of the confidence reposed in him, who unduly delayed the completion of the task. Many foreigners had crept into the register of citizens. The old law of Solon was therefore enacted, which prescribed that only those who belonged to the community on the father's and mother's side should be Athenian citizens.

These reforms were carried in the year of the Archon

Euclides (Ol. 92, 4 or 403-2 B.C.), which consequently forms an important epoch in Athenian history. It is also remarkable as the year in which the official use of the Ionic alphabet was commenced on the motion of Archinus; this alphabet had special letters for long vowels and double consonants, which the old Attic alphabet did not possess. About this time too the old payments to citizens for attendance in the theatre and for serving in the law-courts and on the Council were re-introduced, and soon afterwards payment for attendance in the Assembly was enacted by Agyrrhius. All this proves that the finances of Athens were once more in a satisfactory condition.²

In the period immediately subsequent to Euclides political influence was mainly in the hands of Thrasybulus, who had rendered most signal service in the liberation of the city. Next to him Anytus, the accuser of Socrates, Agyrrhius, to whom we have just referred, and lastly Cephalus and Epicrates, are mentioned as popular leaders. Cephalus was a first-rate orator and always deliberate in action; he was able to boast at the close of his political career that he had never even been accused of bringing forward an unconstitutional measure. Epicrates was distinguished by a Spartan simplicity of dress and manner.³

With the exception of Thrasybulus all these men were without genius, quite average individuals, but acceptable to the people for that very reason. Under the circumstances this was as it should be. The problem set before the Athenians was not to create new institutions, but simply to restore such of the old ones as were serviceable, and for this purpose genius was not so much needed as industry and love of order. The finances had to be carefully administered if the debts left by the oligarchs (100 talents) were to be met, ships of war built, the arsenal put in proper order, and the people paid as well. And the leaders of the Athenian democracy achieved all this. They ruled in a spirit of moderation. It would

have been well if they had observed this moderation in the ideal sphere also. But the enemies of the political aristocracy extended their persecution to the aristocracy of the intellect, as is proved by the prosecution of Socrates.⁴

Socrates had spent many years wandering about his native city, a statuary by profession but also a self-constituted admonisher of his fellow-men, who urged them to reflect on their daily life, devoid of ambition and self-seeking himself, performing his duties as a citizen loyally and fearlessly, ugly in person but attached to all that was beautiful, surrounded by enthusiastic friends, most of them young men, stared at by the crowd as an eccentric individual, and regarded with some suspicion, as if his behaviour were not so innocent as it appeared to be. He certainly was extremely obnoxious to many Athenians. He stood about in the streets and cross-examined people, not on the news of the day or city gossip, which would have been acceptable to most of them, but on their conception of the duty of man, and if in so doing he administered an indirect reproof to them, they thought it unseemly in the highest degree. It also happened occasionally that he proved to a citizen that he was bringing up his children badly, and when the father afterwards saw that his son was following the advice of Socrates in preference to his own, he became enraged with the tiresome busy-body, who pretended to know nothing himself. His worst crime, however, was his reputed hostility to the democracy. Hitherto he had passed through all the political revolutions of Athens unscathed; now that the democracy was re-instated, he was accused by Meletus, Lycon, and Anytus of introducing new gods and corrupting the Athenian youth. The jury of more than 500 who were impanelled for the trial found him guilty by the small majority of five votes. His accusers had demanded the punishment of death in case of a verdict of guilty. A condemned person, however, was entitled to make a counter-proposal with regard to his sentence; and it is supposed,

looking to the smallness of the majority which had returned the verdict, that if he had demanded a lighter punishment, the jury would have consented to it. Instead of this he asked to be entertained in the Prytaneum—the highest honour which could be paid to an Athenian citizen. This was regarded as an insult to authority, and although in the end he intimated his willingness to pay a fine of thirty minae, sentence of death was voted by a larger majority than the verdict of guilty. The sentence, however, could not be carried out at once, because the sacred ship had just started for Delos for the festival of Apollo, and no execution could take place in Athens until it returned. The consequence was that Socrates remained in prison for thirty days. He refused all offers of assistance to escape, declaring that he considered it wrong to withdraw from the jurisdiction of his native city. He enjoyed his usual intercourse with his friends, and shortly before his death conducted the sublime dialogue on the immortality of the soul which is recorded by Plato in his *Phædo* (396).

There is not a shadow of proof that the charges preferred by his accusers had any foundation. It is true that Socrates often referred to a *daimonion*, or divine voice, which frequently warned him what to avoid; but as he never tried to convert any one to a belief in his *daimonion*, it is not true that he introduced new divinities. On the contrary, he was a zealous worshipper of the Athenian gods. Nor could any reasonable being assert that he corrupted young men; as a matter of fact he only did them good service. The narrow-mindedness of the reigning democrats, who made Socrates responsible for the crimes of his brilliant pupils, Alcibiades and Critias, cost him his life. Intrinsically his execution was an act of absolute injustice. Externally, from the point of view of formal law, it is beyond the reach of criticism, for the reason that the Athenian Heliasts were bound to decide solely in accordance with their own convictions, and the life of every individual was in the hands of the Athenian state. Socrates also proved

by his refusal to escape that he was, according to ancient ideas, just as good a citizen as his accusers. It is clear that the latter prosecuted him because they considered him a dangerous enemy of the democracy. Anytus was one of the chiefs of their party. Among the 550 or so jurymen, however, besides the zealous democrats and pious folk who were made to believe that Socrates really wished to introduce a new deity, there may also have been many persons to whom the philosopher had become obnoxious by reason of his interference in their family affairs.

It was also of no use to Socrates that the Delphic oracle had some time previously, at the instance of Chacrophon, declared him to be the wisest of the Hellenes. When it did not fall in with their views, the Athenians paid as little attention to the Delphic oracle as the other Greeks; and no one was entirely wrong in disregarding it, for it had occasionally made religion the tool of self-interest. Besides this, wisdom and piety are not the same thing.

As a result we find that men of widely opposite views united in condemning Socrates to death. In spite of this the popular conscience might have been aroused in good time, if his character had been rightly known. But this was not the case. The caricature of him presented by the comedy was better known than his real worth. He was out of the common run, and men of this stamp had become objects of detestation to the democrats of Athens since the days of Alcibiades and Critias. During the next few decades no man of genius enjoyed any permanent influence in Athens.

The execution of Socrates is regrettable for the sake of Athens, which was incapable of taking full advantage of the virtues of her great citizen; it is not regrettable in the interests of mankind, who cannot but gain by the death of a martyr, and still less is it so in the interests of the great man himself, who could not have met with a nobler end. He died true to his duty, as he had lived. His life and teaching have

borne splendid fruit. His disciples made varied use of the stimulus which they derived from him and of the instruction which he imparted to them, some of them being influenced by its practical and others by its theoretical side. His life has ever been a model of virtuous conduct. He is the true type, as conceived by Kant, of the man who without pride in his own knowledge follows the monitions of the voice within him. The *daimonion* of Socrates is a precursor of Kant's categorical imperative.

It is usually asserted that the Athenians repented their treatment of Socrates. But there is no indisputable proof of this. It is possible that many persons may have changed their minds; but on the whole it is probable that in Athens, where executions were not unusual occurrences, the same importance was not attached to the incident which we rightly assign to it. The attention of the Athenians at that time was chiefly directed towards restoring the peace and prosperity of the city. They were successful in restoring its prosperity, although a commercial city rose to power at this juncture which proved a serious rival to Athens. This was Rhodes, which was colonised jointly from Lindus, Ialysus, and Camirus in 410, after the revolt of the island from the Athenians. But the position of Rhodes made it devote its energies in the first instance to intercourse with the south-eastern part of the Mediterranean and the interior of south-western Asia Minor. Circumstances produced a considerable development of traffic in this quarter, and consequently a new centre of commerce could be formed here without the older ones losing much at first.⁵ Later on a different state of things prevailed, and the trade of Rhodes in time far outgrew that of Athens. But at the period of which we are writing Athens was still a commercial city of the first rank, and besides this its ever-increasing celebrity as an intellectual centre of Greece continued to attract well-to-do foreigners, and in so doing promoted the prosperity of its citizens. On the whole we may say that a

community has hardly ever recovered so quickly from crushing defeats or effaced the traces of them so speedily as Athens did after the year 400 B.C.

Very different was the position of the city which had most contributed to the downfall of Athens. Corinth had helped Sparta to humiliate Athens and had counted on the gratitude of the Spartans in return. But the latter complied with none of the wishes of the Corinthians. Corinth claimed supremacy in the western seas, but Sparta took it for herself. Corinth wanted to rule in Coreyra, and to hold a position of importance in Syracuse, but Sparta would not permit either the one or the other. For Coreyra retained her independence, while in Syracuse Sparta protected the tyrant opposed by Corinth. Thereupon the Corinthians sided with the opponents of Sparta and, as we shall shortly see, actually gave up their political independence for the sole purpose of being able to inflict all the more injury on Sparta. Their commerce, however, which was chiefly with the west, did not suffer in these unsettled times, as is shown by the wide diffusion of the Corinthian types of coinage even in that period.⁶

Of the other more important Greek communities Argos retained its old position as the leading state of the second rank. On the other hand Thebes rose to unexpected eminence. We have already seen on several occasions that she was in process of vigorous development. She had joined in the hatred of the Spartans and Corinthians against the Athenians, and even wished to annihilate Athens. But now such a revulsion of feeling had taken place among the Thebans that they resisted Sparta when she seemed to be growing too powerful, and unhesitatingly and openly opposed the ablest of the Spartans, Lysander and Agesilaus. This rupture with Sparta was due, as in the case of Corinth, to chagrin bred of disappointed hopes. Thebes had expected to be rewarded for her support by receiving the absolute hegemony of Boeotia, and Sparta in her arrogance refused to consent. The result

was that in the year 400 parties once more fell into the old grouping of the period subsequent to the Peace of Nicias.

The reason, however, why Thebes was able to make such a display of power as she shortly afterwards did was that she developed an intellectual aristocracy and placed her destiny in its hands. Athens maintained her former position by abstaining from everything out of the common. Thebes on the other hand became greater than she had ever been because she implicitly followed the lead of men of genius. The three Greek states which henceforward take the front rank may be thus characterized: Sparta is an oligarchy, which continues to possess able statesmen; Athens is a democracy with an enterprising people bent on managing their own affairs and averse to following the advice of the same men for any length of time, however capable they may be; finally Thebes is also a democracy, but animated with an entirely different spirit, a democracy which obediently carries out the measures proposed by a few admittedly able men.⁷

NOTES

The authorities for the condition of Athens at the beginning of the 4th century include the orators, especially Lysias, for whom cf. Blass, *Attische Beredsamkeit*, I., and the exhaustive introduction and commentary in Frohberger's edition, Leipzig, 1871.—Of modern writers, see Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, Vol. I. Bk. I. and J. Beloch, *Die attische Politik seit Perikles*, Leipzig, 1884.

1. For the death of Alcibiades, Nepos, Alc. 10, Plut. Alc. 38, and Just. 5, 8, who perhaps follow Theopompus; Diod. 14, 11, perhaps following Ephorus. The celebrity of Alcibiades is attested by the fact that the Romans erected a statue to him by the side of one of Pythagoras, Plut. Num. 8. For his personal appearance see Baumeister, *Denkm.* p. 46.

2. The refusal of Thrasybulus and Anytus to accept compensation, Isocr. c. Callim. 23.—For Nicomachus Lys. or. xxx. and Frohberger's introduction.—For the reforms made in Euclides' year of office, Gilbert, *Staatsalt.* 1, 151; Curtius, G. G. 3⁶, 45 seq.;

735, 736; Hermann, Staatsalt. § 168. Payment of citizens, Gilbert, 1, 325 seq. Payment for attendance in Assembly, introduced by Agyrrhius, Schol. Ar. Eccl. 102. Classification of the Heliasts, Wachsmuth, Stadt Athen, 2, 377.

3. For the popular leaders in Athens after 400 a.c., Beloch, cap. vii., esp. p. 116 seq.

4. Condemnation of Socrates. A powerful stimulus to its discussion was given by Forchhammer, *Die Athener und Socrates, die Gesetzlichen und der Revolutionär*, Berl. 1837. The latest work on the subject is G. Sorel, *Le procès de Socrate*, Par. 1889. Windelband, *Gesch. d. alten Philos.* p. 191, sums up the case briefly and correctly.—The trial of Socrates turned on questions of fact. Had he introduced new gods, or corrupted young men? He had done neither. Consequently the most that the supporters of the majority of the Athenian Heliasts could say was that the jury had doubtless taken a wrong view of the facts, but that they had yielded to an instinctive feeling that the importance claimed for personal judgment by Socrates constituted a danger to the State. As a matter of fact he was an advocate of impersonal judgment, and besides it is not likely that the jury had any idea of either the one or the other. The following is an important point not noticed by other writers in connection with this trial. The verdict of the Athenian Heliasts in Socrates' case was not attended with the dangerous consequences which a similar verdict would have in modern societies. It formed no precedent, because the Athenians did not recognize precedents in their legal system. They had no legal science. Jurisprudence is a creation of the Roman aristocracy. In Greece the judges decided each case by a short syllogism, they never gave reasons for their decisions, and excluded advocacy on principle if not in practice. Every accused person is not a legal specialist. Non-admission of advocates as a matter of principle is therefore equivalent to individual treatment of each case, accompanied by a disregard of all legal principles which are not inscribed in the heart of every man. This is also the reason why there was no court of appeal or revision. I cannot here go further into the importance of this fact in the history of civilization. In the case of Socrates and his condemnation its significance is this, that no Athenian came to the conclusion that because Socrates was condemned to death people who acted in a similar way should receive similar treatment.—On the other hand, it must be admitted that when he had once been found guilty, there was nothing unusual in the punishment of death. The penal code in Greece was in the embryonic condition of self-defence on the part of the State, and a self-defence conducted with weapons the simplicity of which

rivalled their severity. There were only two forms of punishment, death or money fine; imprisonment was simply a means of extorting the latter. The only state in which exile appears to have been recognized by law as a substitute for capital punishment was Sparta, especially in the case of kings (Xen. Hell. 3, 5, 25). This accounts for the enormous number of political executions in Athens, of course of responsible leaders, one good result of which was that there were none of the wholesale butcheries which we find elsewhere, in Coreyra and Argos for instance. In Athens the ordinary citizen and subject was after all better protected by law than in any other large Greek state. Enemies no doubt were badly treated.

5. Rhodes, cf. vol. ii. p. 486. Synoecismus Diod. 13, 75; Str. 14, 654, 655; Arist. Or. 43. The new city was located 80 stades from Ialysus, and was on such a large scale that according to Arist. the citadel was *πεδίων καὶ ἀλσῶν μυστή*. Cf. Kuhn, *Entsteh. der Städte der Alten*, pp. 209-221; Schumacher, *De republ. Rhodiorum*, Heidelb. 1886.—The importance of Rhodes as a commercial city is shown by the introduction of a Rhodian standard of coinage, for which cf. Chapter iii. note 11, and Chapter xxi.

6. The Corinthian coins, the so-called *Pegasi*, were minted as early as the fifth century in the Corinthian dependencies of Anactorium, Leucas, and Ambracia (cf. vol. ii. p. 323), but without the Koppa, which was the mark of Corinth itself. In the fourth century they were coined in other Acarnanian localities, in Coreyra (after 338), some places in Epirus, Illyria, Bruttium, and Sicily, the place of coinage being denoted by the addition of different letters of the alphabet. Cf. Imhoof-Blumer, *Münzen Akarnaniens*, Vienna, 1878, and Head, H. N. 341.

7. The state of feeling in Thebes can be gathered from Plut. Lys. 27, where her ideal aspirations are expressed in the *ψηφίσματα πρέποντα καὶ ἀδελφὰ ταῖς Ἡρακλείους καὶ Διονύσου πράξεσιν*—the national deities of Thebes, who had filled the world with their heroic exploits.—For the practical motives of Theban policy see below, notes to Chapter vi.

CHAPTER III

PERSIA ASSISTS THE ENEMIES OF SPARTA—THE WAR IN
THE ISTHMUS OF CORINTH AND AT SEA—HALIARTUS—
CNIDUS—CORONEA—LECHAEUM—IPHICRATES. 395-392

IN the year 395, to which we now return, the condition of Greece was a highly peculiar one, there being a marked discrepancy between appearances and the reality. Sparta seemed to be the strongest, but her power rested on a very unstable basis. Her existing constitution was only maintained by force and fraud, and she owed her political position to her allies. The most powerful of these, however, had now revolted from her. The position of Greece was, as regards its component parts, similar to that of the German Confederation. There were two great states, three states of the second rank (Thebes, Argos, and Corinth), and a number of minor states. It was only by the aid of an overwhelming majority of the second and third-rate powers that Sparta had been able to vanquish Athens, and she was bound to treat the states of the second rank with consideration if she wished to maintain her position. It was necessary for her to concede a definite sphere of authority to Corinth and Thebes—for Argos always held aloof—to induce them to let her have a free hand in other matters. And since the rise of Lysander she had neglected to do this. Her policy was to degrade Thebes and Corinth to the position of petty states. Hence the dissatisfac-

tion of both communities and their readiness to make common cause with Athens and Argos against Sparta. A spark was only wanting to make the conflict blaze forth.

This was the state of affairs when the Persians intervened. They had come to the correct conclusion that if Greece was able to use her own peculiar resources, her genius and her fighting power, against Persia, the latter could probably counteract them to a certain extent by means of its money, which from of old had had a great attraction for the Greeks. More than 60 years before Megabazus had spent Persian money in Sparta to no purpose, and yet Persia had subsequently reduced Egypt by force of arms (vol. ii. p. 145); now that the power of the East had waned, the darics of Tithraustes met with greater success. The Persians made use of the Rhodian Timocrates, a native of the city which had just been founded and shortly afterwards came to the front as a great trading centre between Asia and Europe. Timocrates brought with him 50 talents to Greece for distribution among leading men, with the view of making them stir up their fellow-citizens against Sparta.¹ In Thebes Persian money was taken by Androclidas, Ismenias, and Galaxidorus, in Corinth by Timolaus and Polyantes, in Argos by Cylon; according to Xenophon's statement no one in Athens took it; it was said, however, of Cephalus and Epicrates that they had accepted bribes from the Persians. At all events the Athenians as well as the others entered readily into Persia's plans at that time. The money of Persia was useful for raising mercenaries and building fortifications. By this means Spartan valour could be encountered with some prospect of success.

The Thebans placed themselves at the head of the movement. They formed a regular league of Asiatic cities, and stirred up enemies against Sparta in Greece itself. They skilfully set in motion a war between Phocis and the Opuntian Locrians, in which Sparta was bound to join out of sympathy, they themselves invading Phocis as allies of the

Locrians. The Phocians demanded help from Sparta, and the Spartans readily acceded to the request, as they were angry with Thebes for her repeated acts of hostility. Sparta's intention was to strike a great blow at Thebes. She was in such a hurry that Lysander was despatched in advance to collect Phocians and others and to rendezvous at Haliartus, where King Pausanias was to arrive on a certain day with the Lacedaemonian levies. Thebes now sent envoys to Athens to represent how favourable the present opportunity was for attacking Sparta. The Spartan allies, they said, were as ready to secede from Sparta as the members of the Athenian league had been to leave Athens thirty years previously. Athens might now become more powerful than ever; hitherto she had only controlled maritime states, now she might aspire to be master of the Peloponnesians. It may be doubted whether the Theban ambassadors really used this language. It is hardly likely that Thebes should have offered the Athenians the supremacy of Greece nine years after Lysander had triumphed over Athens. Of course Thebes did not mean it seriously, still her envoys may have talked in this way in order to persuade Athens, and the latter profited by the jealousy of the old allies, much as France, after having just suffered a crushing defeat, was able to exercise a decided influence on the whole of Europe by means of Talleyrand at the Vienna Congress. Athens made a defensive alliance with Thebes against the Spartan attack. Thrasybulus, who had been cordially welcomed by the Thebans, proposed the alliance, and the people gave their consent. Argos and Corinth became parties to it.

The war did not turn out as the Spartans wished. Lysander did not remain quietly at Haliartus, but attacked the place, which was fortified; the Thebans hastened to the rescue, Lysander fell in the action and his troops took to flight. After a time Pausanias arrived with the Peloponnesian forces, and demanded the body of Lysander as he was bound to do.

But the Thebans, whose courage was revived by the advent of assistance from Athens, declared that they would only give it up when the Spartans left the country. We have already seen them at Delium (vol. ii. p. 379) as masters of the art of making religion subserve political purposes and defeating the living enemy by means of the dead. The Spartans came to the conclusion that they were not in sufficient strength to hazard a battle, and they actually returned home, somewhat ignominiously escorted by the enemy. Pausanias was now condemned to death, and went into exile at Tegea.

After the death of Lysander the Spartans discovered that he had been harbouring far-reaching schemes for the overthrow of their constitution. The kingly dignity was to be open to all Spartiates, *i.e.* to himself. A document was found which he had had drawn up by a certain Cleon on the subject. Agesilaus wanted to publish it, but the Ephors prevented him. The sudden death of Lysander thus preserved Sparta from disturbances.²

Meanwhile Agesilaus had made some further progress in the north of Asia Minor.³ Spithridates, who had gone over to him, had also secured him the friendship of the king of Paphlagonia, Otys or Cotys, but the good understanding with these Asiatics did not last long. The chief of the thirty Spartiates who had accompanied Agesilaus, Herippidas, offended Spithridates and Cotys by withholding from them their proper share of some booty, and the two went off at a moment's notice to join the king again. This misfortune, however, was not followed by others. On the whole Agesilaus was able to feel confident that he would succeed in alienating many potentates and peoples from Persia, and in repulsing possible attacks of larger armies, so that he might still have hoped for a brilliant career in Asia. At this point he received an order from the Ephors to return home and save Sparta from the danger which threatened her. He had to obey. He took

with him the contingents he had collected in Asia and marched through Thrace into Greece.

The Spartans had meanwhile to a certain extent succeeded without assistance. The allied force, consisting of Thebans, Athenians, Corinthians, and Argives, had formed the plan of attacking them as near the Laconian frontier as possible, at a point where but few allies would have joined them. But they did not fall in with them till near Corinth, on the banks of the rivulet Nemea.⁴ The Spartans, Eleans, Sicyonians, Epidaurians, Troizenians, and Halieans numbered 13,500 hoplites, with 1300 cavalry and light troops; there were also some Arcadians and Achaeans with them, the number of whom is not stated by Xenophon. The enemy's hoplites comprised 6000 Athenians, 7000 Argives, 5000 Boeotians, 3000 Corinthians, 3000 Euboeans, besides 1550 cavalry and a large number of light-armed troops. The Spartans were commanded by Aristodemus, who represented King Agesipolis, the young son of Pausanias. They fought with equal bravery and skill and defeated the enemy. But the victory was not attended with decisive results. The Spartans were marching towards central Greece, and in spite of the victory could not reach their destination, as the enemy still blocked their advance. When the route by Corinth itself was closed, there were two roads left from the southward to the Isthmus, the one east and the other west of Corinth. The eastern route, which led northwards across the mountain range of Oneum between Corinth and the Saronic Gulf, or along the coast near Cenchreae, must have been so strongly defended that the Spartans did not even attempt to make use of it. They consequently took the western route, which led by Nemea. Beyond this, however, they were checked by the long walls which connected Corinth with its port Lechaëum. They did not venture to deliver an assault and remained in the Peloponnese, waiting for Agesilaus to make a diversion in their favour from the north.

At Amphipolis the king was met by Dercyllidas, who informed him of the victory of Sparta near Corinth.⁵ Agesilaus now made an extremely skilful march through Thessaly, which was hostile to him, and even repulsed the famous cavalry of the country. As he was on the point of offering battle to the allies at Coronea, he received news of a severe reverse. The Spartan fleet had been defeated by the Persian under Conon off Cnidus. Pisander, who, as we know, had been placed in command of the fleet by Agesilaus, had, according to Diodorus, eighty-five ships, while Pharnabazus and Conon had more than ninety. Besides this most of the Spartan ships are said to have made for the open sea at the critical moment of the attack. Pisander himself fell in the action.⁶ Almost simultaneously with the arrival of this bad news an eclipse of the sun took place (August 14, 394). Either of the contending parties might have regarded this as an inauspicious omen, and the Spartans would certainly have so regarded it if they had heard of the battle off Cnidus. Agesilaus therefore concealed the issue of the naval battle from his troops, giving out that Pisander had fallen, but that the Spartans had won the day. The Spartans now went into action full of confidence and gained a victory, although not without difficulty. Agesilaus offered a tenth of the spoils to the god at Delphi, amounting to 100 talents. He then, says Xenophon, went home by sea. This is a significant statement. The king did not march home across the Isthmus because he felt himself unable to force a passage by this route. The Spartans had thus hoped in vain for the arrival of Agesilaus, while the victorious soldiers of Sparta, who had marched by land from the Hellespont to Boeotia through a number of hostile peoples, were obliged in the end to embark on board ship to reach the Peloponnese. This took place barely ten years after the great humiliation of Athens. Sparta was victorious in the Peloponnese and in Boeotia, at Corinth and at Coronea, but neither of the

two victorious armies could cross the Isthmus which lay between.

The Spartans ought never to have let Corinth, which was the key of the Peloponnese, slip out of their hands, if they wished to be supreme in Greece. As it had been lost, it had to be recovered, but this was more difficult than ever at the present juncture, for the city had in the meanwhile been closely bound to the opponents of Sparta by means of a remarkable measure. After the democratic party in Corinth had rid themselves of their chief opponents by a treacherous massacre at the festival of the Euclea, they declared Corinth to be united with Argos, and the two cities henceforth enjoyed civil rights in common. This was a novelty in Greece. The three towns of Ialysus, Camirus and Lindus, which had coalesced into the city of Rhodes, had been more closely connected than were Corinth and Argos. The measure might have been regarded as the beginning of better times for Greece, as the end of the system of petty states, if it had been anything more than a party move, and as such of no real permanence. How the community of civic rights was practically carried out we do not know; but we may conjecture that it did not satisfy even its authors. A time-honoured system of independence cannot be swept away by a simple resolution.

The Isthmus being by this means completely estranged from the Spartans they were obliged to strain every nerve to recover it, and consequently the war from this point became a "Corinthian" war, i.e. it turned on the possession of the Isthmus and of Corinth. Those among the Corinthians who were devoted to Sparta and had fled from Corinth, by no means abandoned the hope of regaining the city. They placed themselves in communication with such of their party as had remained in Corinth as well as with the Lacedaemonians quartered in Sicyon, the leader of whom, Praxitas, moved a body of his own people with some Sicyonians and Corinthian

refugees into the space between the long walls. They maintained their position there in the face of vigorous attacks from the opponents of Sparta who were in power at Corinth, and the latter sustained a severe defeat, actually losing the town of Lechaëum to the Spartans, although they kept the harbour. Praxitas now pulled down portions of the long walls and thus secured an easy route across the Isthmus, which he used for making incursions into the territory of Megara, for fortifying several places there and garrisoning them with Peloponnesian troops. He did the same in the territory of Corinth, and then returned home. The position now for a time was as follows: the Spartans had their headquarters in Sicyon, and the allies theirs in Corinth, the Spartans being able to fight their way across the Isthmus, while the allies possessed in Corinth an excellent base from which they inflicted injury on the Spartans and their supporters over a wide extent of country.⁷

The allies carried on this war chiefly by means of mercenaries. Their commander-in-chief was the Athenian Iphicrates, a man of high standing, who soon acquired the reputation of being the ablest general of his age.⁸ The employment of mercenaries met the requirements of the day in two ways, in the first place because it gave occupation to a number of able-bodied men who had nothing to do at home, and secondly, because states, whose citizens had more money than love of fighting, could wage war in this fashion. There were certain districts of Greece which had long supplied mercenaries, notably Crete, Arcadia, Achaia, Acarnania, and Aetolia, and the best mercenaries still came from there. The majority of them were by no means a set of uncivilized cruel men who indulged in the commission of crimes as a set-off to the implicit obedience required of them; they valued their honour like the Swiss and German *landsknechte*. Their discipline was a matter regulated by custom, but their equipment left something to be desired. The ordinary armour of a hoplite was

little suited to them. They had more camping in the open and more forced marches than the armies composed of citizens, in a word they were professional soldiers, whose home was in the camp. Their arms had to be suited to these requirements. Iphicrates devoted his attention to this, and his improvements made an epoch in the history of Greek warfare. He introduced a lighter covering for the feet, and a smaller round shield, but, on the other hand, gave the soldiers longer spears and swords. Troops equipped on his system were generally called peltasts. They were more mobile than the hoplites, and above all more adapted for surprising the enemy from an ambuscade, in fact for the mode of warfare practised by Demosthenes in the fifth century. Iphicrates achieved great results in the fighting round Corinth. He not only commanded the neighbourhood of the city by means of his active troops, he made raids as far as Phlius and even into Arcadia. The portions of the long walls pulled down by Praxitas were rebuilt, and the Spartans once more prevented from crossing the Isthmus.

The Spartans now sent Agesilaus once more to the front, as he seemed to be the only man capable of restoring their supremacy. He stormed the long walls, on the same day on which his brother captured the harbour of Lechæum with the ships anchored there. By this means, as Xenophon says, he re-opened the gates of the Peloponnese to the Spartans. He soon availed himself of this exit to undertake some expeditions, which, although of slight importance in themselves, are related by Xenophon because they supply him with an opportunity of giving greater prominence to his royal friend's methods of action. He advanced to the Isthmus, and interrupted the Argives as they were celebrating the Isthmian games. He then held the festival himself, but when he had retired the Argives celebrated it over again, and, as Xenophon relates with a touch of humour, some competitors had the satisfaction of winning the same race twice in the same year. Agesilaus

then made a raid into the territory of Piræum, which projects into the Gulf of Corinth and belonged to the Corinthians, and took the garrison prisoners. This expedition was intended to be a menace to the Boeotians, and had the desired effect, for envoys from Boeotia and elsewhere came to Agesilaus to enquire on what terms Sparta would grant them peace. As, however, he was about to give his decision, news of a great calamity was brought him. A Spartan regiment, or *mora*, had been annihilated at Lechæum in the following manner. There were a number of Amyclæans in the garrison of Lechæum. In accordance with an ancient custom, they were bound, if possible, to celebrate the festival of Hyacinthus at Amyclæ, and they had set out for home with this object, their comrades escorting them for part of the way. As the latter were returning to Lechæum they were attacked by the peltasts of Iphicrates, and in defending themselves against these light troops they shared the fate of the Spartans in the island of Sphaacteria; they were worn out by repeated attacks, and a great number—about 250—fell. On receipt of the news Agesilaus wanted at first to set out at once for Lechæum, but when he heard that the dead had already been recovered, he remained some time longer in Piræum. He then marched southwards, left another *mora* in Lechæum, and returned to Sparta. But, as his friend Xenophon relates, he had such a dislike of the malicious talk of ill-natured people that he passed through the cities of the Peloponnese by night and avoided Mantinea altogether. Iphicrates' mercenaries won great fame by this victory over the Spartans, and people began once more to have a poorer opinion of the Spartans, as they had done after the taking of Sphaacteria.

In narrating the incidents which occurred near Corinth we have followed Xenophon in leaving on one side other important events which took place about the same time at sea and on the shores of the Aegean, and we must now take up the account of them. As Xenophon does not state the years

accurately, the contemporaneousness of the two series of events is not free from doubt, and that is why we, like him, relate what happened in the east separately, although much of what took place near Corinth would only be fully intelligible if we knew how matters stood at the same moment farther east. In consequence of the naval battle off Cnidus the Spartans had in the first place entirely lost their supremacy in the Aegean, and it is evident that this contributed to make the passage across the Isthmus so difficult. Pharnabazus and Conon sailed through the Aegean, and liberated the states which had been oppressed by Sparta. According to Diodorus, first Cos, then Nisyrus, Teos, Chios, Mytilene, Ephesus, and Erythrae went over to them. From Ephesus Pharnabazus went by land and Conon by sea to the Hellespont, where they wrested everything as far as Sestos and Abydos from the Spartans under Dercyllidas. These last were no doubt extremely important positions, as they secured the passage to Asia. We also know from fragments of documents which have come down to us that Chios and Phaselis concluded treaties with Athens.⁹ This happened in 394, but in 393 events of still greater importance took place. Pharnabazus and Conon sailed with some Persian ships across the Aegean to Melos, then to Pherae on the Gulf of Messenia, where they laid waste the coast-line, next to Cythera, where they installed the Athenian Nicophemus as harmost, and finally to the Isthmus, where Pharnabazus concluded a treaty with the representatives of the enemies of Sparta and gave them money. He then returned to Asia, while Conon went to Athens with his permission and with a supply of his money, and rebuilt the long walls and those of the Piraeus. The Thebans co-operated in this, sending 500 bricklayers and stone-masons, and other cities did the like.¹⁰ Thus Athens was once more completely secured against attack, and placed in a still better position for carrying out a great policy. It was a strange thing, and a sign of the increased power of the king, that a

Persian fleet should again appear on the shores of Greece, as it had done 87 years before. Conon also endeavoured to render service to his native city in other ways. By means of his friend Evagoras of Salamis he tried to get Dionysius of Syracuse on the side of Athens, the powerful ruler whose influence was felt everywhere, even in the east. But in this he was unsuccessful, and his zeal for Athens in the end only exposed him to suspicion and persecution on the part of the Persians.

The result of all these campaigns and negotiations was that Sparta completely lost her supremacy in Greece, that the Spartans could hardly stir a finger, that Athens once more breathed freely, that Argos became more powerful than she had ever been before, and that Thebes opened up relations with states in the distant east, which she afterwards made the basis of far-reaching plans.¹¹

NOTES

With regard to the chronology of events from 395-386, great uncertainty prevails; cf. Breitenbach, *Introd.* to vol. ii. of his edition of the *Hellenica*, v. Stern, p. 7, Beloch, *Att. Politik*, pp. 346-359, and Brückler, *De chronol. belli Corinthiaci*, Halle, 1889. The difficulties are due to the fact that Xenophon, who is our principal authority, begins with the events in Greece (4, 2-7), and then takes those which occurred at sea, with the exception of the battle off Cnidus which is interpolated previously (4, 3, 10-13), whereas in reality the two series of events are parallel to each other and extend over several years; thus the date of the battle off Cnidus can alone be fixed by means of the solar eclipse of Aug. 14, 394, as at the beginning of August 394. In other respects nothing is known as to the parallelism of the events at sea and by land, while modern estimates for the latter vary by about two years. Beloch (p. 348), it is true, believes that Grote (v. 238) has decided the point. But Grote's estimate is based upon the assumption that the discontent of the Corinthians (Xen. 4, 4, 1) could not have found expression till 392, because Pharnabazus improved the position of Corinth in 393. Nevertheless this discontent may be placed with Breitenbach in 393, before the arrival of Pharnabazus, and then the Isthmian Games (4, 5, 1) may after all be those of

392. The incidents at sea are susceptible of better chronological arrangement; cf. von Stern, p. 7.

1. Discontent of Sparta's allies: *ποίας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἢ τιμῆς ἢ ποίων χρημάτων μεταδόσκουσιν αὐτοῖς*; Xen. 3, 5, 12.—Timocrates took fifty talents with him, Xen. 3, 5, 1; somewhat different totals given in Plut. Art. 20 and Ages. 15. According to Paus. 3, 9, 4, Cephalus and Epicrates accepted money.—Fragments of the treaty between Thebes and Athens, C. I. A. 2, 6 = Ditt. 51.

2. Death of Lysander, Xen. 3, 5, 19; his projects, Plut. Lys. 25, 26, 30.

3. Fighting in the north of Greece, Diod. 14, 82.—The ruler of the Paphlagonians, who, according to Xen. Anab. 5, 6, 8, possessed a large force of cavalry, is called Otys in Xen. Hell. 4, 1. Meeting of Agesilaus and Pharnabazus, Xen. 4, 1, 29-40.

4. Battle at Corinth, Xen. 4, 2, 9-23. Monument of the Athenian Dexileus who fell in this battle, in the Ceramicus, Curtius, Arch. Anz. 1863, p. 103, Ditt. 55. Other Athenian *ἱππεῖς* who fell, Ditt. 56. Cf. C. Curtius on the Athenian cemetery outside the Dipylon, in the Archäol. Zeitung, 1871.—The Athenians and Argives also defeated the Spartans at this time in a battle at Oenoe, which was commemorated by an offering at Delphi (Paus. 10, 10, 3), and by a painting in the Stoa Poikile in Athens; cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 2, 521.

5. Dercyllidas called *φιλαπόδημος* by Xen. 4, 3, 2; Agesilaus marched in the enemy's country *ὥσπερ ἂν πάρθενος ἢ σωφρονεστάτη προβαίνει*, as Xenophon (Ages. 6, 7) neatly remarks.

6. Naval battle off Cnidus, Xen. 4, 3, 11, 12. Diod. 14, 83 is confused; cf. Breitenbach on Xen. *ibid.*

7. Struggle for the Isthmus; changes in Corinth, Xen. 4, 4 seq.; Diod. 14, 92. According to Xen. 4, 6, 1, the Achaeans took Calydon at this time: *πολίτας πεποιημένοι τοὺς Καλυδωνίους*.

8. For Iphicrates see Rehdantz, Vitae Iphicratis, Chabriae, Timothei, Berol. 1844; Bauer, Griech. Kriegsalterth. in I. Müller's Handbuch, 4, § 49.

9. Alliance of Athens with Eretria probably at this time, Köhler, Mitth. 2, 212; Ditt. 52.—Conon honoured by the Erythraeans as *εὐεργέτης*, Ditt. 53. The relations of Athens with Phaselis were arranged on the model of those with Chios, C. I. A. 2, 11 = Ditt. 57. Conon's great achievements, Isocr. Phil. 63, 64.

10. For the building of the Athenian walls, see fragments of an inscription of the *τοιχοποιοί*, Köhler, Mitth. 3, 50 seq. Cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 1, 579 seq., 2, 187 seq. and 2, p. iv.

11. Relations between Athens and Dionysius, Lys. de bon.

Aristocr. 19 seq., C. I. A. 2, 8 = Ditt. 54. In consequence of the rise of Greece against Sparta and of the battle off Cnidus, a league was concluded by several Greek cities, the existence of which is only known to us through coins. Waddington was the first to deal with the subject in the *Revue Numismatique*, 1863; he was followed by Head in his treatise on the Coins of Ephesus, 1880; and by Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies grecques*, 1883, p. 311, who made known the coin of Iasos in question; see Head, *Hist. Num.* in various passages and other writers. That Rhodes, Cnidus, Iasos, Samos, and Ephesus belonged to a league is proved by the inscription ΣΥΝ on these coins. They all have on the one side the infant Heracles strangling the serpents, and on the other the tokens of the various cities, a rose for Rhodes (H. 540), a head of Aphrodite for Cnidus (H. 524), a head of Apollo for Iasos (H. 528), a lion's mask for Samos (H. 516), and a bee for Ephesus (H. 495). Waddington has expressed the opinion that the *συνμαχία* was probably formed after the battle off Cnidus, and in point of fact Ephesus, Iasos, and Cnidus would hardly have been in a position to join a *συνμαχία* of this kind after the King's Peace, i.e. about 377. But there are other similar coins, only without the ΣΥΝ. In what relation do these stand to the former? They are as follows:—Thebes; silver coins with the Boeotian shield, and electrum coins with the head of Dionysus (Head, 297, and his Coins of Boeotia, pp. 40, 41). Croton; silver coins (H. 28). Zacynthus (H. 360); also silver. Lampsacus; gold coins (Gardner, Types of Greek Coins, pl. xvi. 8). Cyzicus; electrum (Wadd. Rev. Num. 1863, pl. 10, 6). Of these the Theban are extremely important, as they disclose a state of facts hitherto imperfectly noticed by historians. The type of the serpent-strangling Heracles is an ancient Theban one which occurs as early as the fifth century, Br. Mus. Central Greece, pl. xii. 7. The *Symmachia* therefore borrowed it from Thebes. This point has been noticed. But an examination of the weight of the coins reveals more. The silver coins of the league are, as Head tells us in the above passages, Rhodian tridrachmae, which weigh as much as 178 grains, but they are also, as Herr Six informs me (cf. Six, *Monn. grecques inéd.* Num. Chron. 1888, p. 107) of the Boeotian standard, as being Aeginetan didrachmae into the bargain (cf. vol. ii. of this history, p. 227, and Head, *Boeot.* p. 41; 186.8 gra.) The remarkable coinage of a tridrachma is therefore explained by the close connection of the league with Thebes. This also accounts for Thebes coining electrum pieces at this period, which as a rule was only the custom in Asia Minor. Thebes, it is evident, used Persian gold for turning out coins which made her name and badge better known in Asia, and

the Rhodian Timocrates, who brought the gold, was the agent between Thebes and Rhodes. I go a step further and thus explain the origin of the Rhodian standard. The Rhodians came to the conclusion that it would be a good thing to have closer relations with continental Greece, where the Aeginetan standard was in force, and they introduced a coin which could be adapted to this standard. Lastly, the existence of relations of a very intimate kind between Thebes and Rhodes after the year 394 enables us to understand how it was that Epaminondas was able to apply to the Rhodians at a later period (Diod. 15, 79). Under the circumstances the idea of a Theban maritime supremacy was not quite so absurd as it appears intrinsically.—We now come to Lampsacus, Cyzicus, Croton, and Zacynthus. It is quite possible for the coins of Lampsacus to belong to the category which we have been discussing. Of the rest, Herr Six informs me that Cyzicus probably adopted the Heracles type at a later period, but with the addition of Iphicles, consequently with a distinction. In the coins of Zacynthus the attitude of the serpent-strangling Heracles is different. I would point out that at all events the adoption of this type may be considered as an indication that the cities in question wished to make known to the world at large their aspirations towards freedom, and that if we are to look for a later period which would be consistent with such a state of things, it must be that subsequent to 377, when a league was also formed against Sparta. And this league, according to the document discussed in Chapter xvii (C.I.A. 2, 17 = Ditt. 63), was also joined by *Ζακύνθων ὁ δῆμος ὁ ἐν τῇ Νύλλῃ*. Thus our Zacynthian coin may be a coin of this separate Zacynthian community. There remains Croton. In this connection it is remarkable that according to Theocr. 4, 32, relations of an unexplained nature existed between Croton and Zacynthus. True, Croton, as I shall explain in the notes to Chapter xi., had probably lost its independence by 377. But my object is simply to establish the intimate relations existing between Croton and Zacynthus, and I believe that the Heracles coin of Croton may have been minted at a somewhat earlier date, about 390, when Croton was beginning to be on its guard against Dionysius and an Italian league was being formed against him.—In the first half of the fourth century a strong movement in the direction of liberty passed over the Hellenic world, and the diffusion of the symbol of the serpent-strangling Heracles from Rhodes to Croton is an interesting trace of it. Just as the barbarians assisted each other from Susa to Carthage, so the Greek lovers of freedom gave each other mutual support; and symbols like the serpent-strangling Heracles and the Heracles fighting the lion, to which I shall refer in the notes

to Chapter xi., are indications of it.—It is well known that there was a painting by Zeuxis representing Heracles strangling the serpents. But there were other figures in it, and the painting cannot have had any influence on the design of these coins, for the reason that the Theban coin (Centr. Gr. xii. 7) is older than Zeuxis. There is a bronze in Naples which resembles the type of these coins: Baumeister, *Abbild.* p. 721, and see notes to Chapter vi.—According to Head (p. 314), the Athenian gold coinage also begins about the year 394, another trace perhaps of the gold of Tithraustes, of Timocrates and of Conon.—There is a great charm in making use of the science of numismatics to enrich the history of Greece, and if eminent numismatists like Waddington, Imhoof, Six, and Head take the lead with ascertained facts and trustworthy combinations of facts, it is permissible for others to try and complete their discoveries by the addition of further historical data, and make them more accessible to non-experts. There is more history in these studies than in many a laborious criticism of authorities.

CHAPTER IV

SPARTA COURTS THE FAVOUR OF PERSIA—EXPEDITION OF
AGESIPOLIS AGAINST ARGOS—EVAGORAS—DEATH OF
THRASYBULUS—ANTALCIDAS—THE KING'S PEACE.
392-386

THE Spartans had fared badly, as they thought, only because their enemies in Greece had formed an alliance with Persia and taken money from the king. It was therefore necessary to detach this ally. They determined to make peace with Persia, provided the latter would ensure them the supremacy of Greece. The liberty of the Greeks of Asia Minor was an admirable and desirable thing, but it was more important for the Spartans that they should themselves retain their control of the European Greeks. In return for this they were ready to surrender their Asiatic kinsmen to Persia. They made overtures to this effect in 392, to Tiribazus, Karanos of Further Asia, through their envoy Antalcidas. The Athenians despatched Conon to counteract his mission, and envoys also came from Thebes, Corinth, and Argos. Antalcidas declared that Sparta had no objection to the Greeks of Asia being subject to the king of Persia, but that the islands and all other Greek communities must be independent. The old friends of Persia could make no objection to the first proposition, but the second was bound to displease them, for in the mouth of a Spartan it meant for Thebes the loss of her supremacy over Boeotia, for Argos her separation from

Corinth, for Athens the abandonment of her newly-recovered allies, perhaps even of her ancient possessions of Lemnos, Imbros, and Seyros. Tiribazus met the efforts of the Greeks with an attitude of apparent indifference, saying that he would report thereon to the king; he, however, gave Antalcidas money, and threw Conon into prison. The latter's career was now at an end, and he died soon afterwards in Cyprus.¹

The king listened to the report of Tiribazus, but did not decide in accordance with Sparta's wishes. Instead of doing so he sent Struthas, who favoured Athens, to Further Asia in place of Tiribazus. The Spartans therefore once more resorted to intimidation; Thibron again proceeded to Asia and devastated the valley of the Maeander. He was, however, surprised and slain by Struthas in the year 391.

It was probably a little before this that the Athenians, when they saw that Persia and Sparta were drawing nearer to each other, had attempted to come to an understanding with the Spartans themselves, the orator Andocides having gone to Sparta with this object. An agreement had actually been arranged there on the following conditions: Athens was to retain Lemnos, Imbros, and Seyros, her long walls and her fleet; Thebes was to give up Orchomenus and Argos to abandon Corinth. But the Athenian people did not ratify this agreement, which was also displeasing to the Argives. Shortly afterwards, however, they were obliged to submit to these very terms.²

The war therefore continued, although we cannot fix the dates of its various incidents with accuracy. The Spartans endeavoured to uphold their prestige as much as possible, Agesilaus and Agesipolis giving active help. At the request of the Achaeans, who had occupied Calydon, Agesilaus marched thither to defend it against the Acarnanians, and took a large quantity of booty, with the result that the Acarnanians joined the Spartan league when he threatened to return. Agesipolis took the field against Argos. He was

inspired with a keen ambition to do as much for Sparta as his famous colleague, and he executed a very clever *coup*. The Argives had adopted the peculiar custom of beginning the celebration of the month Carneus whenever they were engaged in a war with the Dorians for which they were not prepared, because it was not lawful for a Dorian to go to war in that month. The result was that the side which took the offensive was seized with qualms of conscience and withdrew. The Greek religion, which was essentially a state-religion, made tricks of this kind possible (see vol. ii. p. 403). Agesipolis, suspecting that the same practice would be resorted to in this campaign, if he carried out his intention of attacking the Argives unexpectedly, procured a declaration beforehand from Zeus at Olympia to the effect that arbitrary postponements of sacred months were not entitled to consideration from other states, and obtained a confirmation of it from the son of Zeus, the god of Delphi. His previsions were justified, for on invading Argolis he was met by two heralds with wreaths on their heads who notified to him the sacred truce of the Carneus. But to their dismay he replied that he was not bound to pay any attention to it and continued his advance. He did not, however, accomplish much. The omens were unfavourable. He tried to interpret an earthquake in his camp as a sign of encouragement from Zeus, but afterwards when the sacrificial victims were found to have no lobes to their livers, he marched out of Argolis without even garrisoning any fortified place, as Sparta had always done on other occasions. The Spartans never achieved much against Argos, even when everything appeared favourable at the start (see vol. i. p. 430). They must have had a superstitious respect for the eldest son of Aristomachus.⁸

In Asia too and on the Aegean Sparta at first fought without much success. We saw that Rhodes had revolted from Sparta as early as the battle off Cnidus (see p. 13 of this volume), but the discontented aristocrats applied to Sparta,

and she sent eight ships under Ecdicus and Diphridas, who also took with them Thibron's troops, but in spite of this they were unsuccessful. The democrats held their own. Thereupon the Spartans despatched Teleutias, who had hitherto been in command in the Gulf of Corinth, with his twelve ships to Asia. He took reinforcements with him from Samos, relieved Ecdicus of the chief command, and had the good fortune to capture ten Athenian vessels under Philocrates, which were to have reinforced the troops of Evagoras of Cyprus. Evagoras, however, happened to be at war with the Persian king at that moment, with the singular result that the Athenians, who were allies of the king, aided his enemy, while the Spartans, who were at war with Persia, did their opponent a good turn by weakening his other antagonists. This must have been an inducement to the king to take a more favourable view of Sparta's proposals.⁴

The change in the relations of Evagoras with Persia had arisen out of the following circumstances. He was recognised as king of Salamis, but endeavoured to extend his rule over other cities in Cyprus. Thereupon the inhabitants of Amathus, Soli, and Citium complained of him to the king, who commissioned Hecatomnus, the suzerain of Caria, and Autophradates, satrap of Lydia, to make war on him. He now asked the Athenians for help, and the latter granted it without reflecting that, in so doing, they were bound to forfeit the goodwill of their protector, the Persian king. But after losing their fleet under Philocrates, they gave up the idea of assisting Evagoras, and devoted themselves to extending their own power. They despatched a fleet of 40 ships under Thrasybulus, with the ostensible object of relieving their friends in Rhodes. But Thrasybulus engaged in an enterprise of more profit to Athens. He sailed (probably in the year 389) to regions which were of greater importance to Athens than Rhodes,—to Thrace and the Hellespont. He brought over Thasos, Samothrace, the Thracian Chersonese,

Tenedos, Byzantium, and Chalcedon to the Athenian side, and farmed out the tolls taken in the Bosphorus on exports from the Pontus to the advantage of Athens (cf. vol. ii. p. 498). After doing this he proceeded southwards again. In Lesbos Mytilene was friendly to Athens, while the other places in the island were attached to Sparta, who had installed Therimachus as harmost there. Thrasybulus defeated him and thus established the supremacy of Athens in Lesbos. After having won over Clazomenae and Halicarnassus, he was in a position to sail for Rhodes. But before doing so he wanted to raise money on the coast of Asia Minor. This brought him to Pamphylia, a country in which his friend Alcibiades had resided in the year 411 (see vol. ii. p. 495). Here he was surprised at night by the Aspendians and slain in his tent. Such was the inglorious end of the man who had liberated Athens and was endeavouring with skill and success to restore her to her former greatness.

In spite of his brilliant achievements the Athenians had eventually become dissatisfied with Thrasybulus. His opponents took offence at his self-assertion and accused him of aiming at a *tyrannis*—the charge, it is true, being confined in the first instance to a *tyrannis* abroad. When his campaign came to such a melancholy termination, his friend and colleague Ergocles was recalled and accused of embezzlement of the money which had been collected. Suspicion easily attached to the proceedings in the somewhat adventurous expedition to Pamphylia. He was condemned and executed. The money in question, however, was not found in his possession, and consequently another of his friends, the trierarch Philocrates, was prosecuted. Agyrrhius, a democrat of a more radical type, was despatched to the scene of action in place of Thrasybulus.⁵

The Athenians had now recovered the command of the Hellespont, the basis of their maritime supremacy. This boded ill for Sparta, who, while continuing her endeavours to gain

Persia to her side, desired to put an end to this state of things by her own efforts. The Ephors accordingly sent another harmost named Anaxibius to the theatre of war. He was a man who had behaved badly to the Ten Thousand, but was now in favour with the Spartan authorities. He did a good deal of damage to the Athenians from his base of operations at Abydos, and they sent Iphicrates to oppose him, who carried out one of those stratagems of which he was a master. Iphicrates was stationed in the Thracian Chersonese, Anaxibius in Asia. The Spartan had made an expedition from Abydos to Antandros, and was returning thence in careless security. Iphicrates, however, had secretly crossed over to Asia and placed himself in an ambuscade. From it he fell upon Anaxibius, who met his death fighting like a brave Spartiate, and thereby enabled some of his troops to escape to Abydos. The result was that the Spartans accomplished but little in Asia. But to make up for it they harassed Athens all the more effectively from Aegina with the assistance of the Aeginetans. The Athenians therefore made a descent upon Aegina and built a fort there. Afterwards, however, when the Spartiate Gorgopas came to Aegina and assumed the command, the Athenians evacuated the island. This took place in 389.

In the year 388 the fighting on the Hellespont and on the coast of Attica continued in the old way, the Athenians gaining the advantage in the former district, and the Spartans in the latter. Antalcidas was now admiral-in-chief on the Hellespont, but he seems to have paid more attention to diplomacy than to warfare, and his lieutenant Nicolochus was blockaded in Abydos by the Athenians. Gorgopas, however, followed the Athenian commander Eunomus from Aegina to the coast of Attica, and even took four of his ships. Thereupon the Athenian Chabrias, who here appears for the first time, defeated the Spartans by means of a cleverly-planned ambush, and killed Gorgopas. It was the new kind of warfare which, inaugurated by Demosthenes in the fifth century,

and now systematically developed by Iphicrates, once more proved successful. It now comes more and more into vogue and for a time quite ousts the old mode of fighting with hoplites, in which the Spartans, the Thebans, and the Athenians had formerly shown such skill. The new style, in which stratagem played the chief part, was eventually learnt by the Spartans, whose attempts in this direction at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War did not meet with success (see vol. ii. p. 339). Telementas, brother of Agesilaus, came to Aegina in person, and played the Athenians a trick which was worthy of Iphicrates. He persuaded his soldiers to make a sudden attack on the Piræus, which was prepared at night time and carried out at daybreak. The Spartans actually forced their way into the harbour of Athens, destroyed as much material of war as they could, took some triremes in tow and captured some fishing-boats on the coast, the crews taking the Spartan ships, as they sailed leisurely out of the Piræus, for an Athenian fleet, and quietly allowing them to approach.⁶

But all these operations would not have brought matters to an issue. This result was obtained, just as in the Peloponnesian war (see vol. ii. p. 500), by the diplomatic activity of Sparta, who had secured two powerful friends, the one in the East and the other in the West, and with their support inspired all the other Greeks with so much apprehension that they accepted the terms she demanded. These allies were the king of Persia and the tyrant of Syracuse. The Spartans had relations of old standing with both powers; those with Dionysius had never been disturbed, those with the Persian monarch were now placed on their former footing.

Antalcidas returned from Susa with Tiribazus, bringing a message from the king, the purport of which we shall soon hear. The royal command, however, would have been futile had not the Spartans gained a certain superiority in the war at the last moment. And they were indebted for this state of things to the Persians and to Dionysius. True, Antalcidas

on his arrival at Abydos took eight Athenian ships without resistance, but he was then joined by some Persian vessels and 20 Sicilian ships, and was able to blockade the naval force of Athens in the Hellespont with a fleet of more than 80 sail. The Athenian fleet could not come to the assistance of Athens if she required it. This placed the Athenians in an embarrassing position, and they resolved, no doubt recollecting their sufferings after the battle of Aegospotami, to accept the terms which they had refused a few years before. We may presume that many Athenians had grown weary of the war, which they had undertaken at the instigation of Thebes, and which had been more troublesome to them than to the Thebans. Argos also submitted, and consequently the success of the king's message was assured (386). It ran as follows :—" King Artaxerxes thinks it right that the cities in Asia and the islands of Clazomenae and Cyprus should belong to him, but that the other Hellenic cities, small and great, should be independent, with the exception of Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, which are to belong to the Athenians as before. The king and his allies will make war on all those who refuse to accept this peace." All the Greeks took the oath to maintain the peace. The Thebans, it is true, asked to be allowed to swear to it on behalf of the Boeotians, that is to say, Thebes wished to have the other Boeotians recognized as her subjects. But one of the main reasons why Sparta had invoked the assistance of Persia was in order to deprive Thebes of her supremacy over Boeotia. Thebes had begun the Corinthian war, and Sparta was determined that Thebes should pay for it. Agesilaus made preparations for a campaign against Thebes, whereupon the Thebans gave way and declared that they would respect the independence of the Boeotian cities. The Argives gave up Corinth. This peace, which was called the King's Peace or the Peace of Antalcidas, remained the basis of Hellenic unity up to the time when the Macedonians introduced a complete change.⁷

The King's Peace may be regarded as a faithful reflection of the balance of power in Greece during the first half of the fourth century B.C. The idea of liberating the Greeks of Asia Minor had been abandoned. In Greece itself there was no state superior to all the rest; consequently the peace said that all should be independent. But next to Sparta Athens was the most powerful, and she might have been able to oppose the peace; this is vouched for by the privileged position accorded to Athens alone. Athens was the only state allowed to have foreign possessions. Including these it was the largest state next to Sparta in territorial area. For Lemnos has an area of about 300 square miles, Imbros of 160, and Scyros of 120, which, added to the 1500 of Attica, gives Athens a territory of about 2000 square miles. Of the more important Greek states Sparta alone had more than this; excluding Messenia, she had over 2500 square miles, and including Messenia more than 3750, almost double the total of Athens. Argolis, it is true, is reckoned at about 2500 square miles, but this estimate includes the territory of Corinth and that of the independent cities of the Acte. Thebes, if she had possessed the whole of Boeotia, would have had only 1600 square miles, and without Orchomenus, etc., much less. The feeling of the citizens of Athens corresponded to her position. They were conscious of considerable strength, and soon set to work to reconstruct their league, which was by no means prohibited by the terms of the peace. For independent cities were at liberty to conclude such alliances as they liked, and Sparta did so to a considerable extent. The head of the league had only to declare that its members were absolutely free; Sparta always said this, and indeed allowed her allies a certain degree of autonomy. From a superficial point of view, however, the peace was a reverse for Athens, and they punished some of their political leaders severely for it. From henceforward Callistratus was the most influential man in Athens. He was a nephew of the strong democrat Agyrrhius, and no doubt a

democrat by conviction into the bargain. But he proved complaisant to Sparta because circumstances demanded it, and Sparta in return improved the position of Athens with regard to Boeotia by letting the Athenians have the city of Oropus.⁸

It was a great pity that the peace was carried and dictated by Persia, by a state whose power had long consisted solely in its money. As a matter of fact, Persia had imposed the peace only by withholding money from Thebes, Argos, and Athens, and continuing to give it to Sparta. This was equivalent to saying that the Greek state which received the largest presents of money from Persia should control the others, which was a humiliation for Greece in two ways. For it gave a monarch who had been unable to defeat ten thousand Greeks a right to interfere in the affairs of Greece on the appeal of one Greek state or even without it, and Persian money counted for more in the eyes of the Greeks themselves than their own strength.

Sparta was a decided gainer by the King's Peace, and Thebes the greatest loser. The next step was that Thebes received positive ill-treatment at the hands of Sparta, and this gave rise to fresh changes of paramount importance.

NOTES

1. Antalcidas' mission, Xen. 4, 8, 12 seq.—Conon had made himself very popular in Athens. He had presented the Athenians with 50 talents, Nep. Con. 4; entertained all the citizens, Athen. 1, 5; built a temple to Aphrodite in the Piræus to commemorate the victory off Cnidus, Paus. 1, 1, 3; its site is now established, Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen. 2, 120. The Athenians put up a bronze statue to him and to Evagoras, near the Zeus Eleutherios and the *σφοδὸν βασιλεῖος*, Demosth. 20, 70; Isocr. 9, 57; Paus. 1, 3, 1.—Tiribazus no doubt opposed Conon from jealousy of Pharnabazus.—For the subsequent history of Conon see Diod. 14, 85; Nep. Con. 5; Isocr. 4, 154; Lys. 19, 39, 41.—Struthas and Thibron, Xen. 4, 8, 17-19.

2. For the so-called Peace of Andocides, which historians, with the exception of Philochorus, do not mention, and which is placed in 392, 391, or 390, cf. Kirchner, *De Andocidea tert. orat.*, Berol. 1861; Blass, *Griech. Bereds.* 1, 281 seq., 319 seq.; Beloch, *Att. Pol.* 123, 124; von Stern, 8.

3. Campaigns of Agesilaus in Acarnania, Xen. 4, 6 and 7, 1; cf. Breitenbach's edition of Xen. *Hell.* vol. 2, lxxxiv.—For these countries cf. the recent comprehensive work, Oberhummer, *Akarnanien*, Ambrakia u. s. w. im Alterthum, München, 1887.—Campaign of Agesipolis against Argos, Xen. 4, 7, 2-7. It took place in 390 or 389.

4. Rhodes, Teutias, etc., Xen. 4, 8, 20-24.

5. For Evagoras see Scharfe, *De Euag. rebus gestis*, Monac. 1866; Erich, *De Euag. Cyprio*, Berol. 1872. See also Chapter xxi. of this volume.—Exploits of Thrasybulus, Xen. 4, 8, 25-30; Diod. 14, 94-99; he wins over Thasos, Dem. 20, 59, the Hellespont, *ibid.* 10, 60. Cf. also the *Inscr. C. I. A.* 2, 92; 2, 14; Swoboda in the *Mittheilungen*, 7, 174; Köhler, in the same, 7, 313; von Stern, 11; Beloch, 345, 346.—The proceedings of the Athenians against the friends of Thrasybulus are gathered from the speeches of Lysias against Ergocles and Philocrates. Cf. also Hermann, *St. A.* § 169.

6. Anaxibius, Xen. 4, 8, 31-39. Events in Aegina, Xen. 5, 1. Nicolochus, Xen. 5, 1, 6, 7.—Chabrias' earlier achievements, Diod. 14, 98; 15, 2; Theop. fr. 111; Dem. 20, 76; Nep. Chabr. 2; brief summary by Breitenbach in his notes on Xen. 5, 1, 10. Chabrias had done Evagoras good service.

7. Events in Athens before the acceptance of the King's Peace, Xen. 5, 1, 25-30. It was at this time that the Athenians commended the Parian Phanocritus, who reported to them the enemy's movements on the Hellespont: inscription discussed by Foucart, *Rev. Archéol.* 18, 399; *C. I. A.* 2, 38 = Ditt. 58. An alliance concluded between Athens and Chios immediately after the peace, *C. I. A.* 2, 15 = Ditt. 99.—The peace is called ἡ βασιλείως εἰρήνη or ἡ ἐπὶ βασιλ. καταπεμφθεῖσα εἰρ., afterwards ἡ ἐπ' Ἀνταλκίδου εἰρήνη; cf. Xen. 5, 1, 36; the peace generally, Xen. 5, 1, 29-31. Its final acceptance probably does not date before 386, according to Swoboda, *Mitth.* 7, 174 seq., on account of an alliance concluded between Athens and Clazomenae in 387-6, which could not well have happened after the peace.—The position of Clazomenae is shown by Lebas, *Voyage, Itinéraire*, Pl. 72.—The words *προστάται γερόμενοι τῆς εἰρήνης* (Xen. 5, 1, 36) do not denote the executors of the peace, as is generally assumed; the title *προστάτης* has only a moral significance and confers no privileges; see notes to

Chapter xxix. This is of importance in estimating Sparta's position.—As regards the conditions on which the Thebans were admitted to the peace, the following is to be noted. The Thebans ἤχθουν ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν ὀμνῖναι, Xen. 5, 1, 32, i.e. to be treated like the Spartans, who also took the oath for their allies. If, in spite of this, Agesilaus rejected their demand, he was right, because the Thebans did not recognise the autonomy of their Boeotian allies, whereas the Spartans did so with theirs. He therefore stipulated that they should first swear αὐτονόμους εἶναι καὶ μικρὰν καὶ μεγάλην πόλιν; and in the end they actually declared ὅτι ἀφίωται τὰς πόλεις αὐτονόμους (§ 33). Does it not follow from this that they were then allowed to take the oath ὑπὲρ πάντων Βοιωτῶν?

8. For the punishment inflicted on Athenian statesmen in consequence of the peace, cf. Beloch, 130. Agyrrhius and Thrasybulus of Collytus were imprisoned, Dem. Timocr. 134; the following were executed:—Dionysius, Dem. περὶ παρ. 180; Nicophemus and Aristophanes, Lys. 19; Epicrates and Phormisius, Dem. *ibid.* 277. It is certain that Athens was not quite in the position of 404, and might have offered resistance. But it was for that very reason that she obtained such good terms, which Sparta had already conceded to Andocides.—The estimate of territorial areas follows Beloch, Bevolk. der griech. und röm. Welt, Leipz. 1886, caps. 3-5.

CHAPTER V

ARROGANCE OF SPARTA—MANTINEA, PHLIUS, OLYNTHIUS,
THEBES. 385-379

As soon as the King's Peace had given the Spartans a free hand, they proceeded at once to make the Greek states of the second and third rank feel their power. They repeated the policy of Lysander in an intensified form, in spite of the warning given them by the Corinthian war. They had learnt little and forgotten nothing. Now that Persia was on their side and the Isthmus open, no one, they thought, was in a position to resist them.¹

They began by taking measures against the Mantineans in 385. Sparta accused them of having sent grain to the Argives, of having on some occasions actually refused to take the field when Sparta had ordered them to do so, of having on others obeyed with a bad grace, and generally of harbouring unfriendly sentiments. The demand was that they should pull down their walls. The Mantineans refused, whereupon the Lacedaemonians declared war. Agesilaus begged to be relieved of his command, saying that the Mantineans had once (seventy years before) rendered his father good service against Messenia, and that he would therefore prefer not to march against them. His scruples were pronounced to be justifiable, and Agesipolis had to assume the command. He performed his task brilliantly, and here, too, as in the war against Argos, had a lucky inspiration. The circumvallation

of the city not having the desired effect of starving out the inhabitants, for the Mantineans had plenty of supplies, he dammed up the river Ophis,² which flowed through Mantinea, at the point where it left the city, with the result that the water rose inside and undermined the walls, which were built of unburnt brick, so that they began to collapse. The Mantineans propped them up, but one of the towers threatened to fall, whereupon they surrendered. The conditions imposed were that they should leave the city and live in villages as they had done in times past. They were obliged to submit. The leaders of the democrats in Mantinea were afraid that the Spartans would put them to death, and asked Pausanias, father of Agesipolis, who was living in Tegea, to intercede for them. He did so and their lives were spared. They marched out of the city unharmed, to the number of sixty, between two lines of armed Spartans. The Mantineans settled in four villages, and, according to Xenophon, being freed from the rule of their demagogues, led a happier life on their estates than they had hitherto done.

The second city to experience the power of Sparta was Phlius, in the year 384. The Spartans compelled the Phlians to readmit the exiles, who were of course aristocrats. Their property, which had been confiscated, was to be restored to them, or an indemnity paid to them by the state. This arrangement contained the germ of fresh complications which were not long in making their appearance.³

But before this an opportunity of displaying still greater energy presented itself to Sparta. In 383 an embassy arrived from the Thracian cities of Acanthus and Apollonia, complaining of the high-handed proceedings of the Olynthians. The latter, according to the envoys, had induced a number of neighbouring cities of the same origin to join them on condition of living under common laws and enjoying common civic rights. They had even liberated some Macedonian cities from the rule of king Amyntas, among others the large city

of Pella. Amyntas was within an ace of losing the whole of Macedonia. The Olynthians had also summoned Acanthus and Apollonia to join the league with their troops, and threatened them both with war in case of default. They already had a force of 800 (?) hoplites. Envoys from Athens and Thebes were on the spot in order to conclude an alliance with Olynthus. If they once got possession of Potidaea, they would obtain the whole peninsula which was cut off by it. You decline, said the envoys to the Spartans, to let Boeotia unite, and now a far greater power is forming in the north which is able to attract the independent peoples of Thrace, to create a fleet and procure gold from the Thracian mines. There is time for Sparta to prevent it; but if once the other cities are attached to Olynthus by ties of family and property, it will be too late. The Spartans acceded to their request for help.

We have no further information concerning the constitution of the Olynthian league, which must have been founded after the close of the Peloponnesian War. The common family and property rights, to which the Acanthians refer, is the Roman *connubium et commercium* (the Greek *ἐνὶ γαμία καὶ ἔγκτησις*), which does not imply a complete union of two states. But the assertion that the cities enjoyed the same laws and common civic rights no doubt points to some special arrangement, resembling the absorption of Corinth in Argos. At any rate it was a novel and highly creditable attempt on the part of the Greeks to do away with the isolation of their cities. The flourishing condition of the Chalcidian league—for this was its name—is shown by its beautiful coinage, while, on the other hand, contemporary Acanthian coins prove that Acanthus protested against the union of the Chalcidians in this fashion.⁴

The Spartans decided on a great campaign in Thrace, and in accordance with the tendencies of the age, which laid great stress on proper military organization, they allowed their

allies to provide money instead of men, if they preferred to do so. For every soldier that was not forthcoming his state had to pay a stater (two drachmae) a day. This was sufficient for the pay and keep of a mercenary. Sparta had turned her military experience in Asia to good account. But a campaign on a large scale, such as was contemplated, required time for preparation, and the Acanthian envoys were in a hurry. Consequently Sparta determined as a preliminary measure to despatch 2000 Neodamodes, Perioeci, and Sciritae to Thrace under Eudamidas. But even this number could not be collected at once, and Eudamidas started with a smaller force. The rest were to follow under his brother Phoebidas.

On his arrival in Thrace Eudamidas placed garrisons in the towns which asked for them, recovered Potidaea and used it as a base for operations against Olynthus. Phoebidas, however, did not reach Thrace at all. On his march northward he came to Thebes, in the summer of 383, and pitched his camp outside the city near the gymnasium. Here he was visited by Leontiades, the leader of the Spartan party in Thebes, and one of the two polemarchs of the city. His colleague Ismenias was head of the rival faction, composed of those who were in favour of a powerful Thebes with authority over the whole of Boeotia. It was singular that the two chief magistrates of the same city should belong to opposite parties, animated with a deadly hatred for one another, but the fact proves that the two parties were pretty evenly matched. Leontiades offered to surrender the Cadmea, the citadel of Thebes, to Phoebidas, stating that the opportunity was a favourable one, for the festival of the Thesmophoria was being celebrated and the citadel was occupied exclusively by women. The men, he added, would be taking a rest at noon, which would make it all the easier for Phoebidas to obtain possession of the citadel without fighting at that time in the day. The Spartan general agreed to the proposal, rightly

assuming that in occupying the Cadmea he would fulfil one of the dearest wishes of his fellow-countrymen, viz., to punish Thebes for her arrogance. Leontiades conducted the Spartans into the citadel, and then proceeded to the council-chamber, where he arrested Ismenias. The opposite faction was intimidated, and 400 of them left the city. The rapidity of Leontiades' action had evidently made it impossible for them to unite for the purpose of resistance. The news created great joy in Sparta. The question, however, arose whether it was right to take advantage of the stratagem. Agesilaus, the political oracle of Sparta, helped his fellow-citizens over this difficulty. He said that it was lawful for a Spartan to do the state a good turn on his own responsibility. This gave the matter a personal complexion. Instead of asking whether the Cadmea was to be given back, the question was whether Phoebidas should be punished, and it was decided that he should pay 100,000 drachmae (16 $\frac{2}{3}$ talents) for his arbitrary proceeding, evidently to the Spartan state. That was all. The Cadmea was not given back. If the fine had been enforced, which no doubt was not done, the exploit of Phoebidas would have secured Sparta a highly important fortress, and a large sum of money into the bargain. The next step, however, was to get rid of Ismenias, and to accomplish this the same mockery of judicial procedure was resorted to as had been used against the Plataeans sixty years previously, on that occasion at the solicitation of the party which was now to be crushed. The judges—three from Sparta and one from each of her allies—held that Ismenias was a friend of the barbarians, and had joined the king of Persia for money, that he and Androclidas (see p. 36) were the authors of all the misfortunes of Greece, that he had done a great deal of mischief, and for all these reasons deserved the penalty of death. He was executed. Sparta's conduct in this matter is so unjust that even Xenophon, who dislikes expressing an opinion, has censured it. The Spartans certainly ought to have been

ashamed of pronouncing it a serious crime for a Theban to do what they had done themselves, and of condemning a man to death because he had anticipated them in the idea that the salvation of Greece must come from the barbarians.

Teleutias now (382) proceeded to Thrace in lieu of Phoebeidas, who seemed to be in his proper place in Boeotia. Teleutias entered into relations with Amyntas and Derdas, prince of Elimia. He was at first successful, but was slain in 381. Agesilaus himself took his place.⁶

Shortly afterwards troubles broke out again in the Peloponnese (381). The Phliasians had given general dissatisfaction. The returning exiles complained that they had not received the compensation which they had claimed, and demanded the appointment of impartial foreign judges on the pretext that the local judges were partisans. The authorities of Phlius would not consent to this, whereupon the malcontents appealed to Sparta, after Agesipolis had started for Thrace. Agesipolis had evidently considered the pretensions of the exiles to be exaggerated. In his absence the decision rested with Agesilaus alone, and Agesilaus favoured the complainants. Each of the two kings, it appears, had *protégés* in the allied communities; Agesilaus protected the Mantineans, Agesipolis the Phliasians. War was declared against Phlius, whereupon the Phliasians intimated their readiness to satisfy the claims of their fellow-countrymen. But this was not enough for Agesilaus; he required guarantees. The Phliasians asked what kind of guarantees he meant, and Agesilaus replied that he referred to the occupation of the acropolis of Phlius by the Spartans. Consequently Phlius was to be treated like Thebes. The Phliasians resolved to stand a siege. In the course of it Agesipolis died near Aphytos in Thrace in the summer of 380, and in accordance with Spartan custom his corpse was preserved in honey and brought to Sparta for burial. The Phliasians held out longer than was expected, because they put themselves on half rations towards the close

of the siege. But they were obliged to yield at last. They hoped to escape Agesilaus' severity by announcing their willingness to negotiate the terms of surrender in Sparta. But Agesilaus managed to get the negotiations entrusted to himself. He decided that fifty exiles and fifty other Phliasians should settle which Phliasians should be executed, that these hundred should frame a new code of laws for the city, which was to maintain a Spartan garrison for a period of six months (379).

Olynthus also was compelled to surrender by famine and became a member of the Spartan league (379).⁶

Thus the Spartans had attained their object in the Peloponnese, in central Greece, and in northern Greece, and their power seemed more securely established than ever. But they conferred no benefit on Greece by these victories, least of all by that over Olynthus. Olynthus had made a praiseworthy attempt to discard the old traditional isolation for a confederacy of cities, which might have served as a model for all Greece. The Spartans prevented the attempt from having this result, and thus arrested the peaceful development of Greece. In doing so they merely played into the hands of Macedon. The conquest of Olynthus was Philip's greatest step to power, and although that city was once more at the head of a Chalcidian league when Philip attacked it, there is no doubt that the league would have been more powerful and more capable of resistance if the Spartans had not interrupted its development. But the bitter cry of the Acanthians, that the Olynthians in their accession of strength might be able to obtain possession of Thrace, create a fleet and work the gold mines, cuts the sorriest figure of all. The power which one Chalcidian city grudged to another was afterwards monopolized by Philip.

NOTES

For this and the next chapters (v.-xi.) our principal authority is Diodorus (Bk. 15), whose eighty-four chapters dealing with the East and Greece contain a great number of errors, which have been discovered by von Stern (see p. 14) and by Pohler, *Diodorus als Quelle zur Geschichte von Hellas*, 379-362, Cassel, 1885; cf. also Schaefer, *Demosthenes*, 12, 16, 17. Pohler endeavours to prove that Unger's theory of the identity of the commencement of Diodorus' yearly histories with the beginning of the Macedonian year, supposed to have been taken from Ephorus (i.e. three-quarters of a year before the accession to office of the Athenian Eponymos, vol. ii. of this history, p. 110), is applicable to Bk. 15 of Diodorus, and so tries to justify the inclusion of the various events in the different years. As this method would make the chronology trustworthy, we must test Pohler's assertions. First of all it appears that his basis is weak, for he wants to prove that Ephorus is the authority, but to attain this object avails himself not only of Unger's theory of the Macedonian year, but of the older theory as well, according to which Ephorus did not trouble his head about years at all. On p. 16 Ephorus is said to write "with reference to related subject-matter, without any regard for other contemporary events, in a connected narrative often extending over several years," and on p. 81—"we have long been familiar with the grouping of events according to their subject-matter in unchronological chapters as a criterion for the use of Ephorus." According to this the hand of Ephorus is recognizable in cases where there is no chronology at all, as well as in cases where incidents of the previous winter appear in the narrative of the year. It is obvious that the first criterion destroys the second. But the following criticism of Diodorus, 15, 25-50, following Pohler, which is also of some value for history itself, shows that the second criterion (Unger-Pohler) does not in itself hold water. The first year, Diod. 15, 25-27, can be explained by the Unger-Pohler theory; ostensibly dealing with 378-7 B.C., it may begin with the winter of 379. But the second year, Diod. 15, 28-35, embraces, according to Pohler himself, no less than two and a half years from the spring of 378 to the autumn of 376 (Pohler, 20); in reality however it includes much more, for the attempts of Athens to induce the allies to revolt (c. 28), need not have begun, as Pohler (p. 21) thinks, after the declaration of war mentioned in c. 29. Chios and the rest might have joined Athens at an earlier date. The words *ἀεὶ μάλλον*

αἰχμαλώτους in c. 28 in fact point to a good many years. I shall return shortly to the narrative of this year. Pohler himself, however, oversteps the limit of his year with March 378 (invasion of Sphodrias in c. 29, cf. Pohler 22); nominally it includes 377-6, and, according to his theory, should not begin till the autumn of 378. The third year, Diod. 15, 36, 37 (B.C. 376-5), does not begin till the autumn of 376 (Pohler, 28), while according to the theory it ought to begin with the autumn of 377, and finish with the autumn of 376. The fourth year, Diod. 15, 38-40 (375-4), extends to the summer of 373 (Pohler, 32), while according to theory it should run from the autumn of 376 to the autumn of 375. The fifth year, Diod. 15, 45-47 (374-3)—according to Pohler the interference of Timotheus in the quarrels at Zacynthus occurred "in May or June 374," which makes the narrative of this year go back right into the period dealt with by a previous narrative. The sixth and seventh years, Diod. 15, 48, 49 (373-371); in the first year we have only the destruction of Helice and Bura, and in the second the peace congress, in both years, according to Pohler himself (39), the correct chronology, and not that attributed to Ephorus, being observed. The new theory consequently only holds good in one case out of seven.—On the other hand, the correctness of the old theory (arrangement according to subject-matter by Ephorus) is shown by an examination of the second period (Diod. 15, 28-35), which also clearly exhibits the peculiar and indisputable value of this kind of history. The following are the contents of the section:—gradual establishment of the Athenian league; attack of Sphodrias upon Athens; Thebes enters the league, which is more vigorously organized; naval campaigns of Chabrias; the Spartans also reconstruct their league; Agesilaus proceeds to Boeotia, where Chabrias opposes him; Phoebidas is killed at Thespieae; Agesilaus again fights without success in Boeotia; Chabrias is victorious off Naxos. Thus the supposed history of the year 377-6 contains a systematic narrative of the consolidation of the power which Sparta and Athens had founded and of their struggles with each other, Athens being led by Chabrias and Sparta by Agesilaus, and the latter being inferior to the former. Thebes remains in the background. This "history of a year" is nothing more nor less than a small historical work of art, which possesses considerable value as a picture of a great conflict from a special point of view (the historian places Thebes altogether in the background as compared with Athens and Sparta), but is worthless for chronological purposes. A brief table of contents of the seven historical years of Diodorus also exhibits the systematic nature of the plan: 1. Secession of Thebes. 2. Athens and

Sparta, Chabrias and Agesilaus. 3. Chabrias is active in the East, Timotheus in the West; Thebes takes Orchomenus. 4. Peace on the proposal of the Persians, who wish to make use of Greece against Egypt; Thebes declines to join the peace; democratic disturbances occur in the Peloponnese. 5. Persia makes war on Egypt, in the course of which Iphicrates distinguishes himself, the third great Athenian general thus coming to the front. Disturbances in parts of Greece not previously mentioned, especially in Zacynthus, Corcyra, and Boeotia. 6. Signs and wonders. 7. Peace without Thebes. At the head of each of these sections, which both singly and together form an artistic whole, Diodorus has put a date, which simply denotes the march of time generally.—On the other hand, Diodorus makes many mistakes in points of detail in his xvth Book, for which I refer especially to von Stern. For c. 12 see below, note 2. In c. 26 the official mission of the Athenian general Demophon is incorrect. For c. 27, see Chapter vi. of this volume. For cc. 28, 32-34 see von Stern, 79 and 88. In c. 34 the naval battle off Naxos is incorrectly narrated, von Stern, 83. For inadmissible details in cc. 38-40 cf. von Stern, 93 seq. For cc. 45-47, cf. von Stern, 87, 102, 103, 113. For the battle of Leuctra, see notes to Chapter viii. and von Stern, 135, 142 seq. For the mistakes in cc. 59, 61-63, 67-69 (Theban campaigns in the Peloponnese) cf. von Stern, 149, 158, 159, 169, 174, 185, 186, 189, 190. For c. 72 see notes to Chapter ix.; for cc. 82-89 notes to Chapter x.—For Plutarch, see notes to Chapter vi. His life of Epaminondas is unfortunately lost.

1. According to Xen. 5, 2, 1, the intention of the Spartans was to punish the allies who had adopted a hostile attitude.

2. Diod. 15, 12 has a misstatement as to the course of the Ophis, which, it is true, was afterwards used as a trench; cf. Fougères, Fouilles de Mantinée in the Bull. de Corr. hell. 14, 65. For an alleged battle near Mantinea recorded by Plut., Pel. 4 and Paus. 8, 8, 5 and 9, 13, 1, see von Stern, 36, 37.

3. Phliasian affairs, Xen. 5, 2, 8-10; 3, 10-17. A plan of the valley of Phlius, showing the importance of the citadel, is given by Lebas, Itinéraire, Pl. 33.

4. The embassy of the Acanthians and Apollonians, Xen. 5, 2, 11 seq.—The Chalcidian league, cf. Kuhn, Die Entstehung der Städte der Alten, Leipz. 1878, p. 283 seq.; Gilbert, Griech. Staatsalterth. 2, 197, 198. For the coins of the Chalcidian league, Head, H. N. 184. They were of gold, silver and copper, and had a head of Apollo on the obverse, a lyre or tripod on the reverse, and were stamped ΧΑΛΚΙΔΕΩΝ with the name of an official and ΕΠΙ. There was thus an official of the league, who no doubt was

a strategus. Acanthus at that time coined obols with the same types, but with the word *AKANΘΙΩΝ*.—For the relations of the Chalcidians with Macedonia, cf. von Stern, 31, Swoboda, *Vertrag des Amyntas mit den Chalkidiern in the Archäol.-epigr. Mitth. aus Oesterreich*, Bd. 7, 1883, and the inscription on the subject in Ditt. 60. Here too we see the antagonism between Acanthus (with Amphipolis and the Bottiaeans) and the Chalcidians. Cf. also Diod. 14, 92 and 15, 19, 21.

5. The surprise of Thebes, Xen. 5, 2, 24-36. At that time Thebes had two polemarchs, at others probably three: cf. von Stern, 34, following Preuss, *Quaest. Boeot. Lips.* 1879. It is usually assumed, in contradiction to Xenophon, that this surprise had been planned in Sparta. Xenophon (5, 2, 36) passes a just verdict on Leontiades.

6. The war against Olynthus, Xen. 5, 2, 24, 37-43; 3, 1-9, 26. Von Stern (39) proves that the chronology of this war cannot be safely accepted.

CHAPTER VI

BOEOTIA—THE EMANCIPATION OF THEBES—SPHODRIAS.
379, 378

THE spell under which Greece had lain for seven years was broken by Thebes, which now for a brief period assumed the leadership of the nation. Boeotia is a district with which we are not sufficiently acquainted. The early history of the country would no doubt account for its great importance in the fourth century B.C. and the short duration of this importance, but this history is unfortunately too obscure. So much, however, is certain, that the Boeotians present marked contrasts of character. In politics we find a passionate striving for unity side by side with an equally strong leaning towards independent city-life, while in the moral sphere the idealism of a large minority is confronted by the materialistic tendencies of the majority. These contrasts indicate great vigour of character. There is more in the Boeotians than meets the eye in the ordinary course of affairs.

Boeotia, as we saw in the first volume of this history, is one of the oldest centres of civilization in Greece, and only Argos and Thessaly can be compared with it in this respect.¹ Argos never attained to historical importance, and the aspirations of Thessaly, to which we shall soon refer, were nipped in the bud by unfavourable circumstances. Of the three states in historic times, Boeotia alone exercised a decided political influence in the fourth century B.C. Boeotia, like Argos and

Thessaly, was a collection of cities differing widely in character. Four or five distinct groups can be distinguished in the country. The first is formed by the cities in the north round Lake Copais. At its head was the city of Orchomenus, of ancient renown, Haliartus, Coronea, and Chaeronea also having many points of connection with it. A second group is controlled by Thebes. In the east Tanagra possesses a special character, in the west Thespieae and in many respects Plataea. This grouping seems to be connected with difference of origin. Orchomenus was Minyan, and probably had relations with Thessaly. It held aloof for a long time from the other cities. Even at the date when the Homeric catalogue of ships was written it formed a separate state, which, it is true, was so small that it only included Aspledon. Yet of the places mentioned above after Orchomenus Chaeronea was closely connected with it as late as the fifth century, while Copae, which lay on the road from Orchomenus to the Euripus, must certainly have been dependent on the Orchomenians at an earlier date. In the case of Haliartus and Onchestus there is less indication of close connection with Orchomenus; yet, although they were situated in the interior, their principal object of worship was Poseidon, and Onchestus was the head of an amphictyony embracing remotely distant cities, so that here too we may possibly have traces of the seafaring Minyae. Thebes was admittedly influenced by the Phoenicians in legend, and probably was so in reality. The south-west of Boeotia, Thespieae and the neighbouring places, is said to have been inhabited by Thracians. Besides this, Thespieae was on close terms of friendship with Athens, which is said to have supplied the founder of the city. In this part of Boeotia was Helicon, the mountain of the Muses, whose cult was also regarded as connected with Thrace. Close to the southern border of the Thespian territory, however, lay Mt. Cithaeron, the seat of the worship of Bacchus, and this cult too seems to have come from Thrace. Yet Bacchus was also highly

honoured in Thebes, which besides him regarded Heracles as its tutelary god. Thus we can distinguish a Minyan, a Phoenician, a Thracian and an Attic element in Boeotia, with, it is true, undefined geographical boundaries. Finally, a remarkable feature is supplied by the number of cults of infernal deities scattered about Boeotia, that of Amphiaraus at Oropus and Thebes, of the Cabiri at Thebes, and of Trophonius at Lebadea; the graves of Rhadamanthus and Tiresias were shown at Haliartus; Heracles was said to have ascended from the nether world with Cerberus at Lebadea.

The Boeotian conquest produced an aristocracy throughout the country, which, however, appears not to have discarded local tradition but on the contrary appropriated its claims in places which had formerly been of importance, and showed no inclination whatever to submit to the supremacy of a single city, even when that city was also ruled by the immigrant Boeotian nobility. Hence the general resistance to unification and to Thebes. In Orchomenus, for instance, it was not only the descendants of the ancient Minyae who were antagonistic to Thebes; it was quite possible for the Aeolian Boeotians, who settled there and no doubt succeeded to the power of the Minyan race, to be enthusiastic defenders of the ancient greatness of the city which they had taken.

A federal constitution was formed, but the Boeotian city which had long been and always remained the most powerful of all, the city of Thebes, aspired to more than the mere leadership of a federation. She endeavoured to make the other cities politically dependent on her, and to control or have a preponderant voice in their common affairs, a policy which was strenuously resisted by the others.

The Boeotian league is supposed to have consisted of fourteen members in ancient times; subsequently there were only seven cities entitled to a vote—in addition to Thebes probably Orchomenus, Haliartus, Coronea, Copae, Thespieae and Tanagra. The league was controlled by Boeotarchs, who were

seven in number in later times. But we do not know what authorities passed resolutions binding on the whole body. Thucydides refers on one occasion to four councils; but their organization is unknown. Thebes joined the Persians in the year 480, and had to pay dearly for it. But she soon recovered her position. In battle she displayed great vigour and activity both in the *Pentecontaetia* and the Peloponnesian War, her energy being at first on a par with and afterwards superior to that of Athens. In the intellectual sphere Thebes, like the rest of Boeotia, had a poor reputation with her Attic neighbours, but this was certainly unmerited. The Boeotians were not so alert in mind as the Athenians, but they were assuredly quite as profound. They produced the oldest poet next to Homer and the greatest lyric poet of the Greeks. In the plastic arts Boeotia certainly does not attain the level of many other Greek districts; it is only on the Attic border that Tanagra and Eleutherae, the possession of which was disputed by Boeotia and Attica, have acquired fame, the former by its terra-cotta figures and the latter as the birth-place of Myron. There was a depth and earnestness in the Boeotian character, which was specially favourable to certain branches of the poetic art; the country which practised the cults of the nether world was also the home of Pindar. That women were more respected in Boeotia than in Athens, which is really only a credit to the Boeotians, is proved by the fact that besides the famous Corinna of Tanagra, Myrtis of Anthedon is also mentioned as a lyric poetess. Boeotia, it is true, did not stand alone in this respect, for poetesses also appeared in Sicily and in Argos towards the close of the sixth century, but none are met with in Athens. Evidence of the intellectual tendencies expressed in the serious character of Boeotian poetry and the high position assigned to women in Boeotia, is also supplied by the fact that Pythagoreanism, when persecuted in Lower Italy, found a home in Boeotia and especially in Thebes. At the beginning of the fourth century B.C. Thebes

produced men of pure and lofty character, and to them she owes her brief period of power. Bravery had always been one of her characteristics. The battles of Coronea and Delium (vol. ii. p. 379) and the fighting at Syracuse (vol. ii. p. 476) are a proof of it. But she displayed cruelty in her treatment of the neighbouring Boeotian cities who opposed her political projects, and by this conduct she herself to a great extent destroyed the successes which she had gained at the outset. Her demeanour in the heyday of her greatness reveals the darker as well as the brighter sides of the Boeotian character. Another reason, however, why interest attaches to the history of Boeotian aspirations towards unity is that it presents a picture in miniature of the course of similar aspirations in Greece generally.

The Spartans were in occupation of the Theban citadel, and their party controlled the city. But the refugees plotted the downfall of the hated tyrants; they met in Athens and quietly made their preparations. Their leaders were Mellon and Pelopidas. Many of the friends of liberty had remained in Thebes, with Charon at their head. It was useless, as they knew perfectly well, to attempt open force; the only way was to surprise their opponents. But this could only be done by having a friend in their camp. The exiles won over a certain Phyllidas, the secretary of the Polemarchs Archias and Philippos. They were kept informed by him of the doings of the authorities, and so were able to make their arrangements with greater confidence.

In the month of December 379 Mellon and Pelopidas with their accomplices came secretly to Thebes, and concealed themselves in Charon's house for a night and a day, according to Xenophon. The plan was to surprise and kill the two polemarchs and Leontiades. The polemarchs were on the point of celebrating the conclusion of their term of office by a banquet. Phyllidas, who enjoyed their full confidence, had promised to bring to them some women, the most beautiful in

Thebes, and in the evening he introduced a number of conspirators disguised as women into the hall. Plutarch adds that shortly before they entered Archias received a letter which, as was ascertained afterwards, contained a warning of the impending danger, but that he put it on one side with the words, "business to-morrow." The polemarchs were stabbed to death by the conspirators, who then gained admission into the house of Leontiades and killed him too. Many of their party were in prison; they procured an entrance into the prison on the pretext of delivering a criminal, killed the gaoler and liberated the prisoners. They then seized the arms which were hung up as offerings in the public porticoes, and posted themselves in fighting array in the Ampheum. At daybreak they made known what they had done, and the majority of the Thebans joined them. There still remained, however, the difficult task of capturing the Cadmea, which was occupied by the Spartan garrison. The latter of course was determined to resist, but hoped to obtain help from Plataea and Thespieae, where the Thebans were detested, and sent messengers to those cities. The Plataeans came but were repulsed, while Thebes was strongly reinforced from Athens, who in this way repaid the Thebans for the assistance formerly rendered by them to Thrasybulus. Two of the Athenian strategi even took part in the expedition, although without orders from the Assembly and against the wishes of the majority of the Athenians, who were opposed to a war with Sparta, because the Spartan supremacy in Thebes had procured them two advantages, the restoration of Plataea and the acquisition of the frontier-city of Oropus. Thereupon the Spartan harmost in command of the Cadmea came to the conclusion that his position was untenable under the circumstances. He surrendered the citadel to the Thebans and marched out of the city, the Thebans pulling their fellow-countrymen who wanted to withdraw with the Spartans out of their ranks and killing them before his eyes. Cleomenes

in days gone by had behaved just as badly to his Athenian friends. On his arrival at Sparta he was condemned to death and executed. A Spartan army then invaded Boeotia, not under Agesilaus, who begged to be excused on account of his age, but under Cleombrotus, the brother and successor of Agesipolis. He marched by way of Plataea to Cynosephalae near Thebes, where he waited for sixteen days to see if the Thebans would come out to deliver battle. As they showed no inclination to do so, he returned, leaving a Spartan garrison in Thespieae under the hardest Sphodrias with orders to protect the interests of Sparta in that quarter.²

In the meanwhile a complete revulsion of feeling had taken place in Athens. The Athenians put the two strategi, who had taken part in the relief expedition against the garrison of the Cadmea, on their trial, and condemned them. One was executed, and the other made his escape. This proves that Athens wished to be friendly to Sparta. But these good intentions were frustrated by the action of Sphodrias and the Spartans themselves. In 378 Sphodrias suddenly invaded Attica, intending to make himself master of the Piræus. But he only got as far as the Thriasian plain (near Eleusis); at this point he was frightened at his own boldness and retraced his steps, not, however, before he had laid waste the country districts of Attica. Three Spartan envoys happened to be in Athens at this moment staying with their *proxenos* Callias. The Athenians put them in prison, but on the envoys declaring that they knew nothing of Sphodrias' intentions, and besides giving assurances that the Ephors had not planned the attack, as the condemnation of Sphodrias would very soon show, the Athenians set them at liberty. Sphodrias, however, was not punished, because, according to Xenophon, Agesilaus, whose vote was of great importance, was influenced not to vote for his condemnation by his son Archidamus, the friend of Sphodrias' son. And as Cleombrotus was all along favourable to Sphodrias, the latter had no powerful opponent

and was acquitted. It was asserted in antiquity that Sphodrias was persuaded to invade Attica by the Thebans, whose great object was to produce a rupture between Athens and Sparta. Certainly the unsuccessful *coup* was of no use to any one but Thebes, as Athens was forced out of her vacillation and obliged to join the Thebans, and it is of course possible that the Thebans resorted to a stratagem of this kind. If, however, Sphodrias had not been by nature as foolish as he was ambitious, he would never have attempted to emulate the success of Phoebeidas.³ For the position in this case was entirely different. Even if he had taken the Piræus it would only have been a beginning of difficulties for Sparta, difficulties too of quite a different kind to those which were encountered in Thebes.⁴

NOTES

1. Although we can form a satisfactory idea of the Boeotian standard of civilization, it is hardly possible to do so as regards the relations of parties in Thebes. It appears, however, that their centre of gravity did not reside in the constitutional question of a democracy or an aristocracy, but in a question of power—the dependence or independence of Boeotia. Any party which ceased to aspire to supremacy over Boeotia incurred unpopularity in Thebes. The states which favoured the aspirations of Thebes in this direction were popular, and Thebes formed alliance with them. It was for this reason that Thebes joined Persia in 480, and in 479 allied herself with Sparta who had wished to annihilate her, and not with Athens who had protected her, simply because Sparta had no objection to her taking Boeotia, while Athens was opposed to it. A reaction set in as soon as Thebes' pretensions were thwarted, firstly, after the Peace of Nicias on account of Panactum (vol. ii. p. 385), and again in a more marked form in 404, owing to the policy long pursued by Sparta and inaugurated by Lysander, that Sparta and no other state should have subjects. This turned Thebes into an enemy of Sparta, and the aristocrats installed by Phoebeidas fell victims to the general discontent; they had left Plataea and Thespiae their liberty and so wounded the pride of Thebes. Epaminondas also kept himself constantly in power because he was in favour of the subjection of Boeotia. Then Philip was

popular in Thebes as long as he let the Thebans have Boeotia. As soon as the point became doubtful, Demosthenes enlisted their sympathies for Athens by abandoning Boeotia to Thebes.—For art in Boeotia see Curtius, G. G. 3⁶, 771.

2. The liberation of Thebes. The authorities are Xen. Hell. 5, 4, 1-10, Plut. Gen. Socr. Plut. Pelop. 6-11. For criticism of these authorities see Queck, *De fontibus Plut. in vita Pelop.*, Dramburg, 1876; Hanake, *Plutarch als Bioter*, Wurzen, 1884, and von Stern, *Xenophon's Hellenika und die boiot. Geschichtsüberlieferung*, Dorp. 1887. Von Stern assumes that Plutarch used the Boeotians Dionysodorus and Anaxis in the Gen. Socr., and Callisthenes in the vita Pelop., the latter having already himself made use of the two former. Besides these Nepos, Polyaen, 2, 3, 1, has some extraordinary misstatements. Diod. (15, 25), expresses himself only in general terms. Xenophon and Plutarch are the two real authorities. The former is sober, the latter enthusiastic. Modern writers have in the main followed Plutarch more than Xenophon, because they consider the latter biased by partiality. But this is not the case, as von Stern, for instance, has proved at p. 44 of his history. I do not, however, agree with his contention that Plutarch may not be used to supplement Xenophon. Xenophon himself says (5, 4, 7) that οἱ μὲν said this and οἱ δὲ that. Xenophon and Plutarch select their facts on different principles. Consequently the remark recorded by Plut. Pel. 10—*εἰς αἰπὺν τὰ σπουδαῖα*—may be historical in spite of von Stern, 55. True, Archias, as von Stern remarks, has just shown signs of uneasiness, but drunken men do not always act logically. On the other hand, we might treat the narrative in Xen. 5, 4, 6 as suspicious owing to the words *ἐκάλυψε παρ' ἐκδορῶν*, as involving a reminiscence of Herod. 5, 20 *παρίκει Πέρσῃ ἀνδρὶ ἄνδρα Μακεδόνα*. But people act similarly in similar cases. Diodorus (15, 27) uses his rhetoric to give a grand imaginary description of the defence of the Cadmea.—According to Isocr. Plat. 12, the Thebans made overtures for peace in Sparta at that time.

3. Sphodrias. Instigation by the Thebans is assumed by Xenophon and Plutarch (Pel. 14; Ages. 24). According to Xen. 5, 4, 20, they actually bribed Sphodrias. Cf. von Stern, 67. The Boeotians seem to have been proud of their cunning.

4. The history of Boeotia in the fourth century is reflected in its coinage, for which cf. Head, *Coins of Boeotia*, Lond. 1881 (Num. Chron.). From 395-387 we find coins of the league, electrum and silver, stamped ΘΕ. From 387 (Peace of Antalcidas) up to about 374 nearly all the Boeotian cities coined money: Chaeronea, Copae, Coronea, Haliartus, Lebadea, Mycalessus, Erchomenus (*sic*), Plataea

(now for the first time), Tanagra, Thespiæ, and Thebes. From the liberation of Thebes to the battle of Chaeronea Thebes alone has a mint, the types being the Boeotian shield, an amphora with names of magistrates, perhaps of the Polemarchs (Head, p. 61).—Gardner (Types, p. 111), who regards Myron as the great Boeotian artist, ascribes several Boeotian types of coins of the fifth century to his influence, especially those with pictures of Heracles (pl. iii. 44-48).

CHAPTER VII

RISE OF ATHENS BY MEANS OF THE FORMATION OF A NEW
LEAGUE—THEBES MAINTAINS HER POSITION AGAINST
SPARTA—CHABRIAS—TIMOTHEUS—JASON OF PHERÆ.
377-374.

ATHENS took advantage of the liberation of Thebes and the foolish conduct of the Spartans to make herself still more independent of Sparta than she was already. In order to understand what now took place we must cast a glance at the events of the last few years.

The restoration of the importance of Athens in the Aegean was begun by Conon (394) and continued by Thrasybulus, probably in 389. Treaties had been concluded about these dates between Athens and various cities of Thrace, Asia Minor and the Islands, by which Athens obtained rights similar to those which attached to her old supremacy. She had even begun once more to conduct politics on a grand scale by endeavouring to initiate friendly relations with Dionysius of Syracuse. In all these undertakings she had received material support from the protection afforded her by Persia. True, the King's Peace was a blow for Athens, but it left her with certain advantages. She retained Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros, and silently assumed the right of concluding special alliances with non-Asiatic communities. By means of her general Chabrias she even interfered in Egyptian affairs. Egypt had revolted from Persia and was governed

by native potentates, in 387-369 by Nektanebos I., who was in alliance with Evagoras. When the Cypriot prince once more submitted to the King after a fruitless struggle, the Persians were enabled to resume the offensive with greater energy against Egypt, which had of late offered them a successful resistance. Thereupon Nektanebos collected a large army of mercenaries, and placed them under the command of Chabrias, who had already been in the service of Evagoras. Of course it was not Athens who sent him to Egypt; Chabrias went on his own responsibility. But still it was significant for the fame of Athens and a token of her power that an Athenian general should take the command of the Egyptian army. It is true he did not remain there long, for the Persian king compelled the Athenians to recall him.¹

In this way Athens had once more entered on an ambitious policy, and when Sparta was humbled in Boeotia, she proceeded to the actual formation of a new league. Everything had been prepared for it and it was really only the last step which was taken in the year 377. It is, however, probable that if Sparta had not injured her own interests and incurred the enmity of Athens by a misuse of her power, the latter would simply have pursued the policy adopted by Conon and Thrasybulus, and have concluded a close alliance with as many maritime states as possible, like the old league in the days of Pericles and Cimon, whereas the rise of Thebes and the conduct of Sphodrias forced her into another direction. For the idea of the new league was that it should embrace the whole of Greece, with the object of protecting every state against oppression by Sparta. A league of this kind would attract members at once, but had no intrinsic probability of permanency. Being an alliance formed for the preservation of liberty it was bound to be of a different character to the old league. We have some knowledge of its constitution from a popular resolution passed in 377 on the motion of Aristoteles of Marathon, which enounces the principles professed by

Athens. In this resolution its object is expressly stated to be the maintenance of the independence of Greece against Sparta. But the Greeks of Europe and the Islands were alone in question. The document recognizes the King's Peace and the supremacy of Persia over the Asiatic Greeks in so many terms. Besides, as the Athenians had given great offence to the members of the league in the fifth century by settling cleruchies in their territory, it was a prudent step to state expressly on this occasion that they would not attempt to acquire any land there. The grant of a constitution to the league was a complete novelty, rules being provided for giving effect to its resolutions. These rules too were extremely remarkable. The league was divided into two parts, consisting of Athens and the rest of the allies. The latter formed a *sunedrion* in Athens in which Athens herself was not represented. The decisions taken by the *sunedrion* either on its own initiation or on the motion of Athens were submitted to the Athenians, their assembly having the power to accept or reject them. The league consequently could not carry any proposal of which Athens disapproved, and conversely, Athens could not impose any policy on the league to which the majority of its members were opposed. It follows from this that Athens was still in a privileged position, but not absolute mistress, as she had been in the fifth century. Nevertheless, there are many indications that she aimed indirectly at the old supremacy. A tribute, or *phoros*, was not demanded, but contributions, *suntaxeis*, were levied, which was the same thing in reality; all that was done was to avoid the name, which had become an object of detestation. The members had to provide ships and fighting men, but any city that wished to purchase exemption from this liability could do so. This too corresponded to the system of the preceding century. As regards the judicial supremacy of Athens, facilities were provided for the renewal of the old state of things, individual states not being prohibited from making agreements with

Athens on this point. Thus the Athenians directed their efforts towards forming another empire within the circle of the great federation of liberty. The league, however, also imposed greater burdens upon the city of Athens. And in the same year in which it was founded the direct tax or *eisphora* was readjusted (see Chapter xiii.) This source of revenue, which was distasteful to the citizens, became more and more needed.

The copy of the Athenian resolution in question which has come down to us contains also the names of the cities which gradually joined the league. It included originally Chios, Mytilene, Methymna, Rhodes, and Byzantium, consequently the most important islands on the Asiatic coast and the greatest city of Thrace. Subsequently it was joined by Tenedos, Chalcis, Eretria with other Euboean communities, and Thebes. The adhesion of Thebes was of the greatest significance; it showed that the league was not intended to represent purely maritime interests, but that it was designed, as Thebes had proposed before the battle of Cnidus, to embrace the whole of Greece. Of course matters never got so far as this, and Thebes was the last state to dream of conceding such an amount of influence to the Athenians. She soon became too powerful to be willing to play a subordinate part of any kind to any power, least of all to Athens. The island communities and Thracian cities were the next to join, then communities and potentates from the west, such as Coreyra, the Acarnanians, the Cephallenians, the Molossian princes Alcetas and Neoptolemus, and lastly the community of Nello in Zacynthus. In all about seventy communities and nations joined the league.²

Its weak point lay in its admitted object of preserving the independence of Greece against Sparta. The question arose—was it to come to an end when Sparta had ceased to be an object of apprehension? In point of fact it soon fell to pieces. Here we have additional proof that fear of immediate and

urgent danger could carry the Greeks a certain distance along the road to union, but that the cessation of this pressing need forthwith revived the inborn and ineradicable love of uncontrolled independence.

In the political events of the following period the league hardly comes to the front, although as a matter of fact it supplied Athens with some of the power which she now displayed. Sparta, Athens, and Thebes are the states which act and whose interests clash, and thus set in motion the whole of Greece. This time Sparta was the offended party, but unable to bear the injury done her, and therefore renewing the war. Subsequently it was the Thebans who would not remain at peace. Athens throughout played the part of the quiet spectator who concentrates his resources in order to be able to interpose his authority between the heated antagonists. The war between Thebes and Sparta consequently constitutes the main interest of the history of the next few years.

The Spartans also reorganized their league at this period. They divided it into nine parts, of which two were formed by the Arcadians, a third by the Eleans, a fourth by the Achaeans, a fifth by Corinth and Megara, a sixth by Sicyon, Phlius and the cities of the Acte, a seventh by the Acarnanians, an eighth by the Phocians and Locrians, and the ninth by Olynthus and the other Thracian allies. By this means they hoped to be able to vanquish Thebes or at all events to inflict severe punishment on her.³

Cleombrotus having unsuccessfully invaded Boeotia in the year of the liberation of Thebes, Agesilaus was now obliged to take the field against Thebes (378). Xenophon has narrated this campaign of his patron in detail, but has omitted to state that the Athenian Chabrias achieved the greatest success on the side of Sparta's opponents. A curious feature of the campaign was that the Thebans entrenched the most valuable part of their territory with palisades and a ditch, evidently not feeling strong enough to encounter the dreaded Spartans

in open battle. The fighting therefore went on round these entrenchments, and the successes of Agesilaus consisted chiefly in laying waste the country and capturing booty. On his return home he left Phoebidas in Thespieæ, but the latter lost his life in an engagement with the Thebans, with the result that the zeal of the party devoted to the liberation of Boeotia increased throughout the whole country. In the autumn of 378 another Spartan *mora* was despatched by sea to Boeotia, and in the spring of 377 Agesilaus went there again himself. He fought with skill against the Thebans, who for a time actually suffered from scarcity of provisions. Finally, however, he fell ill, and in 376 Cleombrotus went a second time to Boeotia.

As no particular success had been achieved on land, the allies of the Spartans urged them to try their luck once more against Athens at sea, representing that the defeat of the latter would facilitate the capture of Thebes. Sparta consequently despatched a fleet of sixty triremes under Pollis, which, in fact, inflicted great injury on the Athenians. The ships with grain from the Pontus could not get farther than Geraestus in Euboea. Athens now roused herself and equipped a fleet, with which Chabrias defeated the Peloponnesians off Naxos. This was a considerable achievement, for the special reason that it was the first genuine Athenian victory at sea for a long time, for Conon's victory off Cnidus had been achieved with Persian forces. The victorious general was loaded with honours by his fellow-countrymen. He then continued the war on the Thracian coast, while Timotheus, Conon's son, a brave and cultivated man and an able general, altogether more of an aristocrat than a democrat, sailed with another fleet round the Peloponnese into the Ionian Sea and actually captured Corcyra. As he allowed the Corcyreans to retain their aristocratic constitution and behaved in a friendly and affable manner to all with whom he came in contact, this was an inducement to many other communities to join Athens. Timotheus also

defeated the Peloponnesian fleet under Nicolochus off Alyzia (375).⁴

The Spartans were mistaken in their idea that the naval campaign would facilitate their struggle against Thebes; on the contrary, their want of success at sea helped to improve the position of the Thebans. The latter effected about this time the confederation of the greater part of Boeotia. Pelopidas defeated the enemy in a famous engagement at Tegyra (375) with the 'Sacred Band' under his command. In 374 the Thebans took the offensive and made a raid into Phocis. The Spartans sent aid to the Phocians, but farther northwards, in spite of their new organization, which embraced the Thracian cities, they were powerless, and had to admit it themselves. Polydamas, the most influential man in Pharsalus, came to Sparta, explained the position of Thessaly to the Spartans and appealed for assistance. He said that the most powerful individual in those parts was Jason the ruler of Pherae, the successor of the able and despotic Lycophron, a man of uncommon ability, who had already collected a large army and subdued many Thessalian cities. He now demanded the submission of Pharsalus; when that was accomplished he could attain his object and become Tagos of Thessaly. He had, however, declared that he wished to become master of Pharsalus by peaceful means, but that if it would not join him then he would be obliged to force it to do so, and in that event, said Polydamas, the Pharsalians would be lost. Sparta was the only power which could help them, and Jason himself had urged him to apply to Sparta. He did not disguise the fact that in his opinion Jason was a very enterprising man who contemplated the conquest of the Persian Empire, the internal weakness of which had been revealed by the expedition of the Ten Thousand. The Spartans expressed regret at their inability to help him, and Polydamas returned to Pharsalus, which submitted to Jason. The latter was now recognized as Tagos of Thessaly and

formed an army of 8000 cavalry, 20,000 hoplites and innumerable peltasta. It is a labour, remarks Xenophon, even to enumerate the cities which supplied them. Under Jason's leadership Thessaly might have played an important part in the world.⁵

In refusing to interfere in the affairs of Thessaly Sparta had admitted that she no longer felt strong enough to face all her enemies at the same time. On the other hand, Thebes became too powerful for the Athenians. The latter therefore opened negotiations with Sparta, which were conducted on the Athenian side by the aristocrat Callias. A peace was actually concluded in 374, but Xenophon says nothing about its terms. Diodorus' account of it seems to indicate that he has confused this peace with that of 371. Thebes was to be included in the peace as an ally of Athens, as soon as the *synedrion* accepted it. But we do not know whether this took place or not.

NOTES

1. Egypt. Chabrias, Diod. 15, 2-4, 8, 9, 18, 29. Polyb. 39, 1, 2. Schol. Ar. Plut. 178. Cf. Wiedemann, Aegypt. Gesch. 2, 702, 703.

2. For the Athenian league of 377 cf. Busolt, Der zweite athenische Bund, N. Jahrb. 7, 663 seq.; Lenz, Das Synedrion der Bundesgenossen etc., Königsb. 1880; Höck, Der Rath der Bundesgenossen etc. N. Jahrb. Bd. 117; Schaefer, Demosthenes, 1, 29; von Stern, 76; and the 'Handbücher' of Gilbert and Busolt.—As early as 380 the Athenians have attained such power that Athens ἀμφοβηταὶ τῆς ἡγεμονίας, Isocr. Paneg. 16, 20. The same author (114) foreshadows the abandonment of cleruchies. For the *psaphisma* published ἐνὶ Ναυρωίκου ἀρχοντος see Schaefer, De soc. Athen. in tab. publ. inscriptis, Lips. 1856; C. I. A. 2, 17; Ditt. 63; Hicks, 81; cf. Wachsmuth, Die Stadt Athen, 2, 427. Of historians Diodorus (15, 30) is the only authority; his chapters 28-35 are extremely valuable.—Cf. also Curtius, G. G. 3⁶, 759, 760, and Foucart in the Bull. de corr. Hell. 1889, p. 354 seq. Members were added to the league in the east chiefly by Chabrias and to a lesser extent by Timotheus, in the west mainly by Timotheus. There is no reference to the league on coins.—Delos came under

the sway of Athens about 377, Schoeffer, *De Deli ina rebus*, Berol. 1889, p. 56.—The relations of Athens with Thrace, from the year 378 are dealt with by A. Höck, *De rebus ab Atheniensibus in Thracia etc. gestis*, Kil. 1876, 4.

3. The organization of the Spartan League, Diod. 15, 31. Campaigns, Xen. 5, 4, 34-36. Achievements of Chabrias in 378, Diod. 15, 32. Good behaviour of Chabrias' troops; his statue, Diod. 15, 32, 33, Nep. Ch. I (with Nipperdey's note), Polyæn. 2, 1, 2. Bad spirit among the Spartan troops in 377, Plut. Ages. 26. Diod. (15, 27) wrongly places the march of the Thebans to Thespie at too early a date; he anticipates his narrative in c. 33.

4. Battle off Naxos, Xen. 5, 4, 61; Diod. 15, 34; Plut. Phoc. 7, with discrepancies. Honours for Chabrias, Dem. Lept. 84-86; Chabrias in Thrace, Diod. 15, 36; Timotheus in the west, Xen. 5, 4, 64; Diod. 15, 36; Isocr. 15, 121 seq. For Timotheus see notes to the next chapter. Tegyra, Diod. 15, 37; Plut. Pel. 16, 17; von Stern, 89.

5. Polydamas in Sparta, Xen. 6, 1, 2. For Lycophron, Curtius, G. G. 3^o, 328, 766; Jason, *ibid.* 766, 767. The peace, Xen. 6, 2, 1; Diod. 15, 38; cf. von Stern, 93 seq. For the constitution of Thessaly see Hermann, *Staatsalterth.* § 178.

CHAPTER VIII

THE RISE OF THEBES UP TO THE BATTLE OF LEUTRA— EPAMINONDAS. 374-371

HARDLY was the peace concluded when it was broken again.¹

Before Timotheus sailed home from the west, he landed some Zacynthian exiles in Zacynthus. The ruling party in the island took this amiss and complained to Sparta, with the result that the Spartans declared the peace at an end. They had evidently not yet arrived at a full consciousness of their weakness. With the aid of Corinth, Leucas, Ambracia, Elis, Zacynthus, Achaia, Epidaurus, Troizen, Hermione, and Halieis, they collected a fleet of sixty sail and despatched it to Corcyra, whither they also asked Dionysius to send assistance. The question at issue was therefore once more the command of the Ionian Sea, just as at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, and it may be assumed that a revival of the old self-assertion of the Corinthians prompted the renewal of the war. The allies besieged Corcyra, which appealed to Athens for aid. The Athenians entrusted Timotheus with this mission, but he lost so much time in making preparations, that he was removed and the supreme command transferred to Iphicrates. The aristocratic Timotheus easily became an object of suspicion to his democratic fellow-citizens. Iphicrates collected seventy ships, and sailed with them to the west in the year 373.²

In the meanwhile the Coreyreans were at great extremities. It seemed indeed so certain that they would have to surrender that the Spartan admiral-in-chief Mnasippus grew careless—the conduct of Sparta's superior officers was as far removed from perfection then as formerly at Plataea for instance—and did not even treat his mercenaries with the consideration due to persons of such importance. They, therefore, performed their duties so badly that the Coreyreans noticed it from the city-walls and made a vigorous sortie, in which Mnasippus himself lost his life. When the defeated Spartans heard that Iphicrates also was advancing against them, they embarked in all haste and sailed away, leaving behind them, as Xenophon says, a quantity of grain and wine and many slaves and sick. The dispositions made by Iphicrates on his voyage westwards and at Coreyra were so excellent that Xenophon, who is a judge in these matters, gives loud expression to his delight at the skill and vigilance of his famous countryman. On reaching Coreyra Iphicrates captured ten Syracusan triremes, which were just arriving, incorporated the Coreyrean vessels in his own fleet, and finally sailed to Acarnania and Cephallenia, where he exacted money contributions. This took place in 372. Timotheus had been impeached for breach of duty in November 373, but after lengthy judicial proceedings, in which his friends, Jason of Pherae and Alcetas the Molossian, took great trouble on his behalf, he was acquitted.³

If everything had passed off satisfactorily for the Athenians in the west, the position on their frontier was not so favourable for them. In that quarter Thebes, their ostensible ally, gave them great anxiety. Thebes was endeavouring to subjugate the minor Boeotian cities. Some of these, however, were situated on the Athenian border, and served the Athenians as a buffer against Thebes, which as a rule had only been friendly to Athens when she felt herself weak. The Plataeans had already left their city and taken refuge in Athens. Thespieae was now in danger as well.⁴ The Phocians,

who at this time were equally friendly to Athens and Sparta, were also molested by the Thebans. Under these circumstances would it not be wiser, thought the Athenians, to put an end to further encroachments by concluding a general peace and to come to terms with Sparta for that object? If the two leading powers were united, would not all the rest have to follow suit? Sparta would eventually be obliged to see the force of this. Athens took the initiative by sending envoys again to Sparta and inviting the Thebans to do the same (371). The Athenian envoys were Callias, who had concluded the peace two years before, Autocles, Demostratus and the demagogue Callistratus. In Sparta Callias was the first of the Athenian envoys to speak, evidently in the absence of the Thebans. He addressed the Spartans with the complacency peculiar to him, recalling the old connection between his own ancestor Triptolemus and Heracles. Next came Autocles, who argued that Sparta's conduct, which ran counter to the principles of independence professed by all the Hellenes, which Sparta herself was always preaching to the rest of the world, was really the cause of her having so many enemies in Greece. The last speaker was Callistratus, who as a practical man explained to the Spartans that the best course was for Sparta and Athens to come to terms, in order that they both might feel safe, *i.e.* be supreme, the one on land and the other at sea. The Spartans saw the force of these remarks after their experiences at Corcyra, and both sides agreed to a general peace on the basis of the autonomy of all Greek communities established by the King's Peace. Sparta promised to recall the harmosts still posted in other cities, and to bring her fleets and armies home. If any state acted in contravention of these stipulations, joint war could be waged against it after special agreement for that purpose. The agreement of Sparta and Athens was decisive; every state accepted the peace. It now had to be signed and attested on oath. The Spartans did this for themselves and their allies collectively;

the Athenians swore for themselves, and their allies did the same severally. Among these were the Thebans. But on the following morning the latter demanded permission to insert the word 'Boeotians' instead of 'Thebans' in the text of the treaty. Thereupon Agesilaus declared that he could not allow this, and the Thebans, who would not give way, left Sparta, regarded by the rest as disturbers of the peace.⁵

These proceedings were remarkable in many ways. The objection to allowing the Thebans to alter their signature was that if they had written 'Boeotians' instead of 'Thebans' their claim to supremacy in Boeotia would have been recognized, and neither Sparta nor Athens would consent to this. Besides Agesilaus no doubt hoped that if the Thebans were vigorously opposed, they would give way, as they had previously done on the occasion of the King's Peace. But on this occasion Thebes remained firm. She had in the meantime become more powerful and more self-reliant, while Sparta had grown weaker, and the leading statesmen of Thebes had adopted the subjection of the whole of Boeotia as an essential part of their political programme.

Thebes in short wished to become a power of the first rank, as Athens and Sparta had long been, and she could only attain this position by gaining possession of the whole of Boeotia, which, as we have seen, was about the size of Attica or Laconia. As the Boeotian cities were really only fragments of a whole homogeneous in many respects, did it not seem reasonable that all the Boeotians, if they wished to cut a figure in the world, should be more closely united, i.e. should be more under the control of Thebes. No doubt in the interests of Boeotia they ought to have held this view, but if they did not do so and preferred to retain their old privileges, they infringed none of the principles which were sacred to the Greeks, and if the Thebans thereupon resorted to force, it was they who violated the rights handed down from antiquity. Of course concentrations of this kind have

often been carried out by force, and if the conquered gradually submit, then the matter is at an end so far as history is concerned; but if they refuse to submit, at all events it is impossible to say that they are technically in the wrong. And in this instance even on the merits of the case right was by no means entirely on the side of Thebes. If the Orchomenians and Plataeans submitted to Thebes they no doubt increased the power of Boeotia, but in doing so they postponed the unification of Greece to a more distant period. For the result was that Sparta and Athens became still more incensed against Thebes, and it was impossible for Thebes to overcome both these states. A Boeotia united by violent means was consequently only a new instrument for the further disintegration of Greece. The defenders of the course pursued by the Thebans take their stand on the admittedly lofty character of Epaminondas. But the magnanimity of one man is no guarantee for the future. Besides, in Greek cities a change of constitution meant as a rule exile if not death to the defeated party. Hence the citizens of the smaller Boeotian cities, who, both as regards politics and civilization, could look back upon an independent and not inglorious past (see above, Chapter vi.), were not so entirely in the wrong when they resisted Thebes, and the Greeks who did not wish to see this city take the lead in Boeotia could oppose the pretensions of the Thebans without being guilty of unpatriotic conduct.

The task of checking the aspirations of Thebes was readily undertaken by the Spartans. Nevertheless for the moment they as well as the Athenians carried out the terms of the peace. The latter recalled Iphicrates, and restored all booty captured after the ratification of the peace. The Spartans in like manner withdrew their harmosts. Cleombrotus, however, was still in Phocis with an army, which was to be used for subduing the Thebans. The question arose whether it ought to proceed to Sparta and be despatched afresh from there. Cleombrotus applied for instructions. In Sparta a

certain Prothous gave advice to the effect that the army of Cleombrotus should be disbanded, that the contributions of the allies should be collected in the temple at Delphi, and that the Thebans should then be proceeded against, in case they continued to oppress other Greeks. But the Spartans decided that Cleombrotus should attack the Thebans without further delay if they did not leave the Boeotians alone. Xenophon remarks that their evil genius led them to this decision; modern writers too consider Sparta's action to have been unjust, and are of opinion that they should have followed the advice of Prothous. But the action taken by the Spartans was perfectly correct from a formal point of view. They recalled their army from Phocis, and if on the way home it inflicted punishment on Greeks who were oppressing other Greeks in contravention of the peace, that was no violation of the spirit or the letter of the peace. Evidently the Spartans were afterwards sorry not to have sent a larger force against the Thebans, and so hit upon these formal scruples. In this instance their evil genius did not tempt the Spartans to commit a breach of the law, but it certainly misled them as regards the importance of the enemy. Cleombrotus called on the Thebans to leave the other Boeotians in peace, and on their refusal he invaded Boeotia. He first of all marched by way of Thisbe to the harbour of Creusis, in order to secure his communications with the Peloponnese, captured twelve Theban triremes there, and then took up a position for battle at Leuctra. It was here that Epaminondas, the general in command of the Thebans, won immortal glory.

Epaminondas was born about 418 B.C. He came of an influential but not wealthy family, and was highly cultivated. It is related that he was specially versed in the 'musical' arts, and the ancients have mentioned the names of the various individuals who gave him instruction in cithara-playing, in singing and in dancing. In gymnastics he gave the preference to running; like Alexander the Great he avoided

the rougher exercises of the palaestra. Of great importance was his initiation into the doctrines of philosophy by a follower of Pythagoras, the Tarentine Lysis, whom he valued so highly that he afterwards kept him always in his house. This instruction must have specially developed the element of nobility in his character in the direction of humanity, which, according to the accounts of the ancients, specially characterized Epaminondas. All that is recounted of him, his earnestness, his reserve in speech, his love of truth, his unremitting endeavours to improve the Thebans, give him a resemblance to Pericles, whom he surpassed in being not only the greatest Greek general, but one of the greatest generals of all time. He was also more fortunate than the great Athenian in always having at his side, at the council-board and on the battle-field, a congenial friend, Pelopidas, whose warlike impetuosity and knowledge of every detail of active service fitted him, as leader of the famous Sacred Band, to be the best supporter of Epaminondas in the execution of his great projects. Epaminondas and Pelopidas stimulated the somewhat ponderous Boeotian character into more rapid action, which produced brilliant results. Few historical figures, in ancient or modern times, have been the subject of such a consensus of appreciation as Epaminondas, and he has been justly regarded as the best representative of the Greek character in the fourth century, inasmuch as Alexander the Great, who equalled him in native nobility of disposition, was betrayed into more than one discreditable action by the peculiar circumstances in which he lived. That Epaminondas wished to make Thebes great is much to his credit; the means employed by him were as lofty as those adopted by other able Greeks for their native cities, and as for the welfare of the whole of Greece, at any rate he devoted as much thought to it as an Agesilaus or a Demosthenes. We must remember that according to Greek ideas the welfare of Greece consisted above all in the independence of its various states.⁶

Xenophon relates that the omens for the battle on the Spartan side were all unfavourable. This of course was said afterwards, but his additional remarks that the Spartans began the battle after carousing at their midday meal, and that the Peloponnesian cavalry was distinctly inferior to the Theban, are probably true. Besides this the Peloponnesians, when advancing to the attack, drove back with their light-armed troops a portion of the enemy's army, which was leaving the field, into the main body and so increased its strength. But the chief cause of the Theban victory was the peculiar tactics observed in their battle array and attack. While the Peloponnesians, in accordance with ancient custom, were drawn up twelve deep throughout, Epaminondas had immensely strengthened his left wing, which he specially destined for the attack, and drawn it up fifty deep. We have seen that the Thebans were twenty-five deep at the battle of Delium (vol. ii. p. 378). The object of Epaminondas was to rout the enemy's best troops, which were posted with Cleombrotus on the right wing, by the weight of his onslaught and so decide the battle. This disposition is called the oblique or wedge-shaped, which last expression is to be understood in the sense that the advancing body was to act like a wedge which is driven into the hostile mass. Tactics of this kind are based on a thoroughly sound principle, but their execution requires a general who has his troops absolutely in hand, which was rarely the case in the citizen armies of the Greeks. The citizen was ready enough to advance in rank and file, and the commanders knew how to conduct a simultaneous forward movement, but to keep back one part of the front rank while the other part was being pushed forward, with the risk of the enemy making a front attack on the weaker body, or a flank attack on the section which had been pushed forward, was what an ordinary Greek general could neither conceive nor carry out with success. Neither the ability of the generals nor the discipline of the ordinary hoplites was suffi-

cient for this. Thebes, however, was then in the fortunate position of having the best disciplined troops and the best general. The Theban attack, in which Pelopidas distinguished himself with his Sacred Band, met with brilliant success. Cleombrotus fell and with him 400 out of 700 Spartiates. Yet the Spartan army retreated in good order with the body of Cleombrotus to the camp from which it had started. But they were unable to make a fresh advance to recover the other dead bodies which they had been forced to leave behind, and so they sent a herald and begged for their surrender. This was equivalent to an acknowledgment of defeat, and the Thebans erected a trophy on the battle-field. They then announced their victory to the Athenians and to Jason of Pherae.⁷ The Athenians were by no means pleased at the success of the Thebans, who had the assurance to appeal to them for assistance as allies, as if Thebes had not cut herself off from the league, and Sparta were not the proper state to prefer such a request. The Athenian Council made no reply to the Thebans, and did not even give the envoys the customary invitation to a public banquet. Jason came in great haste with an army to Boeotia, but when the Thebans asked him to join them against the Spartans he refused, and advised both parties to conclude a provisional agreement. This was done, and the Spartans were in consequence allowed to retire. But they trusted to the rapidity of their own movements more than to the oaths of the Thebans, and started home on the following night. At Aegosthena in the territory of Megara they were met by Archidamus, who was advancing with a large army. The Spartans had borne the unexpected calamity with great dignity. The news had arrived just as the Gymnopaedia were being celebrated. The Ephors thereupon ordered the gay festival, in which choral dances alternated with gymnastic exercises, to be continued as if nothing had happened. The wives of the fallen uttered no cry of mourning, and the

foreigners present in Sparta were astonished to see the relatives of the dead going about with cheerful faces, and the relatives of the survivors dejected, for the former had died for their country, while this good fortune had been denied to the latter. The old discipline had not disappeared in Sparta. Archidamus, son of Agesilaus, was sent with the oldest soldiers (up to sixty years of age) to Boeotia; they were joined by Tegeatae, Mantineans, Corinthians, Sicyonians, Phliasians, and Achaeans. When Archidamus met the force returning from Leuctra, he took it to Corinth and then disbanded the army.

The battle of Leuctra had a great moral significance in two respects. First as to Sparta. The Spartans had been vanquished in open battle. On the surface it was only an unimportant defeat. The Spartans had left their camp, attacked the enemy, and been repulsed, but had held their camp and then retreated. And if they had not accepted the permission to retire wisely offered them by the Thebans, the arrival of Archidamus would have altered the whole position. But their confidence was gone, and this moral side of their defeat is as important as it is significant. Their power was not broken; their defence of Sparta showed that. But they no longer felt themselves born conquerors, and this was noted by the rest of Greece. The battle of Leuctra, however, is just as remarkable regarded from the victors' point of view. The Thebans had won the day by their own manly vigour and not by the help of mercenaries. For the first time for a long while a military force rivalling the Spartans had arisen in Greece, and had added fresh lustre to the fame of Greek valour. Besides, no general as able as theirs had yet been seen in Greece, not even in Sparta.

The Thebans were a rising nation, full of enthusiasm, inspired with a consciousness of fighting for a just cause, admirably disciplined, and led by the first general of the age. They were so to speak the youth of Greece, starting

into fresh life, and taking up arms against the old, and, what was still more serious, gradually dwindling Spartans.

NOTES

1. The peace broken, Xen. 6, 2, 3. For the reasons which induced the Spartans to put an end to it so speedily, cf. von Stern, 103. As regards the importance of Coreyra, cf. Xen. 6, 2, 9, and Thuc. 1, 36, also A. Höck, *Die Beziehungen Korkyras zum zweiten athen. Seebunde*, Husum, 1881.

2. Diodorus (15, 46, 47) has some curious remarks on the events in Coreyra. His statement (15, 47) that Timotheus was first deposed and afterwards reinstated must be rejected, following von Stern, 107.

3. Iphicrates was not so cautious as Timotheus, cf. Polyaen. 3, 9, 30.—For the trial of Timotheus, cf. von Stern, 116. Timotheus, who was a wealthy man and a friend of Socrates and Plato, was also eloquent and might have combined the offices of statesman and general in the old fashion, if the jealousy of the Athenians had not prevented it. Cf. Blass, *Griech. Bereds.* 2, 49 seq., and Cless in *Pauly's Realenc.* vi. 2.

4. The occupation of Plataea must have taken place in the winter of 373-372; cf. von Stern, 118. The same writer assumes (119) that Thespieae was also occupied by the Thebans at that time, the inhabitants being distributed among various villages. In this way he tries to reconcile Xen. 6, 3, 7 with Paus. 9, 14, 2.

5. Peace congress at Sparta, cf. esp. von Stern, 123 seq. Xenophon is our authority; Plutarch embellishes. On the first day the Thebans signed as members of the Athenian league. Afterwards they came to the conclusion that it would be better if the word 'Boeotians' were substituted for 'Thebans,' and demanded *μεταγράψαι ἀπὸ Θεβαίων Βοιωτούς*. But Sparta would not consent to this. It may be asked how Sparta could act in this way, the Thebans having been permitted to swear to the King's Peace *ἐνὶ πᾶντων Βοιωτῶν* (Xen. 5, 1, 32; see notes to Chapter iv.)? But they had only been allowed to do so on declaring that they would not meddle with the Boeotians, and this they were now unwilling to do. Sparta's conduct was therefore consistent.—The maintenance of the peace was left to *βουλευμένοις* (Xen. 6, 3, 18); there was therefore no coercion, just as in the case of the King's Peace.—For the centralization of Boeotia, see Gilbert, *Staatsalterth.* 2, 50.

6. Epaminondas. Special works of modern writers: Du Mesnil, *Ueber den Werth der Politik des Epaminondas*, *Histor. Zeitschr.*

1863; Pomtow, *Leben des Epaminondas*, Berlin, 1870.—For Pelopidas, Vater, *Leben des Pelopidas*, N. Jahrb. f. Phil., Supplementbd. VIII. 1842.—It would be unjust to forget that the rest of the Boeotians were historically in quite a different position in regard to Thebes compared to that of the inhabitants of Attica and Laconia in regard to Athens and Sparta. Thebes treated the Plataeans and Orchomenians much as the Spartans treated the Messenians.

7. The battle of Leuctra is exhaustively discussed by von Stern, 133 seq. On his criticism of Diodorus' narrative (15, 51-56) at p. 142 seq. we may remark that the fact that Ephorus wrote a universal history is no obstacle to the assumption that Diodorus took this detailed description from Ephorus; for Diodorus was the first to write a regular universal history. Polybius' criticism (12, 25) shows too that Ephorus went into great detail. We may accept the Boeotian source assumed by von Stern for the chapters of Diodorus (51-54) which contain the preparations for the battle. The description of the battle itself however (cc. 55, 56) has the usual battle-phrases of Diodorus, which are more probably due to Ephorus.—According to Paus. 4, 26, 5, the Thebans immediately after the battle of Leuctra invited the Messenians who were living in Africa, Sicily, and Italy to return home. Von Stern (167) considers this far-sighted policy as improbable.—Cf. also Curtius, G.G. 3^d, 762, 763.

CHAPTER IX

THEBES INTERFERES IN THE AFFAIRS OF THE PELOPONNESE
AND MACEDONIA—MEGALOPOLIS—MESSENE. 371-367

AFTER Archidamus had retired into the Peloponnese, the Athenians came to the conclusion that the overthrow of the Spartan power, though unwelcome in itself, after all had the advantage of giving them an opportunity of increasing their own. Athens was still in a position of inferiority to Sparta in this respect, that while the Athenian allies had each sworn separately to the King's Peace, the Spartan allies had not been called upon to do so. Sparta had been the spokesman for her own following. Consequently if the Peloponnesians also swore to the peace, Sparta would be humbled somewhat more and the prestige of Athens be increased. To bring about this result the Athenians summoned a congress to Athens to ratify the peace. Xenophon says that all the states attended and took the oath, with the exception of the Eleans. Does this mean that the Thebans came too? Evidently not. This congress (371 or 370) was a great triumph for Athens. The policy which Pericles had in vain attempted (vol. ii. p. 237) was now carried out—a congress of the Greek states had sat at Athens for the maintenance of a general peace. The Athenians could even go so far as to send deputations throughout the whole of Greece, to administer the oath to the various communities.

But all this oath-taking was merely a show performance,

which had no influence whatever on the actual course of events. As a matter of fact the old party struggles continued, and the question was whether Sparta or Thebes was to be the more powerful. In northern Greece Thebes had been so for some time in consequence of the battle of Leuctra. The Peloponnese was now the centre of dispute and here too the agitation was immense. There were risings of the democratic party, which was hostile to Sparta, in all parts of the country. In Argos the excitement was so great that at first a number of wealthy people and afterwards some popular leaders were put to death. But it was the events in Arcadia which particularly affected the general situation.¹

The Mantineans, who had been condemned by the Spartans to a peasant life, resolved to rebuild and fortify their city. This decision shows how low Sparta's prestige had sunk. The Spartans put a good face on the matter and declared that if the Mantineans would only wait a little while, they would help them in the work. The Mantineans, however, preferred to trust to themselves and their own friends, and began to build the walls at once. Several communities assisted them, and Elis actually contributed three talents in gold. The movement now spread still further in Arcadia. It was not enough to restore old cities; it was deemed expedient to build new ones in places where there had never been any. Tegea was most prominent in this respect. All that Xenophon states on this subject is that the democrats of Tegea conceived a plan for conferring greater unity on Arcadia by means of a general assembly of all the Arcadians voting resolutions which were to be binding on the various communities. The rival party was opposed to this, and fighting took place in which the democrats were eventually victorious; they captured their opponents, who had fled to the temple of Artemis in Pallantium, brought them to Tegea, and there put them to death. Xenophon says nothing about a new city being founded in Arcadia. A new city, however, was built about this time.

It was called Megalopolis, and its foundation is variously dated from 371-368 by ancient historians. The assemblies of all the Arcadians were to be held in this city; it was also to have a special body of citizens, the inhabitants of the neighbouring valley of the Helisson, the Maenalians, Parrhasians, Aegytes, Eutresians, and Cynurians, who were to quit their villages and live in the 'great' city, which had a circumference of 50 stadia. This also took place under pressure from the democracy. The whole Arcadian community, which was to meet periodically in Megalopolis and to decide questions of peace or war, was styled the 'Ten Thousand.' Evidently every Arcadian who attended at Megalopolis was entitled to vote. A standing army of 5000, the so-called Eparittoi, was also formed. All the grand dreams of Arcadian unity and centralization, however, came to nothing, although the Ten Thousand occasionally passed resolutions. Even the Maenalians, Parrhasians, and others, who were driven out of their country holdings into the new capital for the benefit of the ideal state, were not at all pleased with being made happy in this way. The city, as is pointed out, was favourably situated for trade; but if the Arcadian peasants did not want to become traders, what was the use of its good position? Besides, the city was not founded for the sake of trade, but to provide south-western Arcadia with a stronghold against Sparta. It is true that the city, which lay in a plain, was not much adapted for defence. The founding of Megalopolis, which instead of a 'great city' became a 'great desert,' was not a successful venture.²

The defeated aristocrats of Tegea fled to Sparta, and the Spartans despatched Agesilaus to attack Tegea. The Mantineans wanted to come to the assistance of the distressed city, but they had troubles of their own. Orchomenus, which was unfriendly to them, was collecting a force of mercenaries, the Spartans also threatened them, and the inhabitants of Heraea and Lepreum joined the Spartans. The Mantineans encoun-

tered the Orchomenians with success, but Agesilaus then advanced into the territory of Mantinea, and the city might have been in a bad way if the king had made an attack at once. But he refrained from so doing and returned to Sparta at the expiration of three days. Spartan honour was saved. They had offered battle on Mantinean territory, and it was not their fault if the challenge was not accepted.³

But support now came to the Arcadians from a powerful quarter. A Theban army under Epaminondas and Pelopidas advanced into the Peloponnese. Athens was unwilling to assist the Arcadians, but Thebes gladly took the opportunity of paying out the Spartans for their old transgressions (370). True, the Thebans found Arcadia evacuated by the enemy and might have returned home, as the primary object of the campaign had thus disappeared. But the Arcadians and Argives begged them to take the opportunity to invade Laconia, and Epaminondas readily consented, although by so doing he was obliged to prolong the command entrusted to him by Thebes on his own authority. The fact was that the opportunity of injuring Sparta was too favourable to be neglected. It was not likely that Theban troops would be so close to Sparta again for some time to come. It is true there was the danger of Athens cutting off their retreat, but this danger always existed. The allied forces therefore advanced into Laconia, the Thebans by Caryae, the Arcadians by Oea. It was here that Ischolaus and the Spartiates under his command died a hero's death. The allies now took Sellasia and marched on Sparta, which had never seen an enemy so close. The Spartans, who were admirably led by Agesilaus, decided to arm some of the Helots, a dubious measure, which however turned out well. Help also came from Phlius, Corinth, Epidaurus, and Pellene. The enemy passed by Sparta and were repulsed at Amyclae. Thus the main *coup* miscarried. But the hostile force proceeded to Helos and Gytheum and captured them, and Epaminondas then took an

important step, which Xenophon has omitted to mention; he restored Messenia to its old position. He could not have devised a better way of injuring Sparta. The Messenians had never abandoned their attachment to their ancient home; even in Naupactus and Cephallenia they always lived in the hope of being able to return to Messenia. As soon as Thebes became powerful they had joined her standard. Revolts in the country aided Epaminondas in his undertaking. Messenia arose once more as a free state, and was never again subjugated by Sparta. Its independence was assured by the founding of the new city of Messene, close to the site of the ancient stronghold of Ithome, which was so famous in the first Messenian war. The city had a circumference of 40 stadia. The carefully constructed walls are still partly standing, and the northern Arcadian gate is a model of its kind.⁴

When the Athenians heard of all these events, the feeling which had long possessed them, that matters could not go on as they had done without Thebes becoming far too powerful, grew so strong that they determined to oppose a barrier to her further progress. Spartan envoys came to Athens and urged the same policy, while a Corinthian as well as a Phliasian of the name of Procles spoke in the same spirit. Iphicrates advanced into Arcadia, but turned back when he found that the Arcadians, Argives, and Eleans had returned home. He might now have barred the Theban passage across the Isthmus, but he did not do so; the Thebans returned home by way of Cenchreae. Xenophon blames him for this, but perhaps high considerations of state were at the bottom of it. On his arrival in Thebes Epaminondas was brought to trial with his fellow-generals for his arbitrary prolongation of his command, but was acquitted on his proudly referring to the brilliant success he had achieved.

The events just related carry us into the beginning of the year 369. Soon afterwards a fresh Spartan embassy arrived at Athens to arrange the details of the alliance between the

two cities. The Phliasian Procles made the sensible suggestion that Sparta should have the command on land and Athens at sea. But the Athenian Cephisodotus was of opinion that in that case Sparta would command the best Athenians and Athens the most inferior Spartans, and by means of this feeble joke he carried a resolution that each state should have the supreme command alternately for the space of five days on land as well as at sea. In this way of course nothing could be accomplished either at sea or on land. No doubt the Athenians did not care much about it.⁵

In the summer of 369 Epaminondas again marched into the Peloponnese, and forced a passage by the Oneum range, where, according to Xenophon himself, the Spartan polemarch failed to do his duty. Soon afterwards the auxiliaries sent by Dionysius to the Spartans arrived in the Peloponnese. They consisted of Celts, Iberians, and about fifty horse, transported on board twenty triremes. The Thebans occupied the plain between Corinth and Sicyon, but the Sicilian troops inflicted so much damage on them that they returned home. The fifty horsemen created great sensation by their tactics.

Now that fortune seemed to be deserting the Thebans, the union among Sparta's enemies ceased. The Arcadians thought that they could achieve as much as the Thebans. The Mantinean Lycomedes told them that they were really the strongest race in the Peloponnese, and that it was therefore not right for them to be always contributing to the greatness of others, first of all the Spartans and now the Thebans, and invariably to their own detriment. Xenophon says that as a matter of fact the Arcadians made nothing of storms, or mountains, or long marches when fighting had to be done. They were more hardy than most of the other Greeks, who as we know employed them as mercenaries. In their inflated mood they no longer deferred to the wishes of Thebes, and they offended the Eleans by refusing to restore Triphylia to them.⁶

While, as Xenophon says with a shade of irony, each of the allied states was trusting in its own power, Philiscus, tyrant of Abydos, came to Greece on a mission from the Persian satrap Ariobarzanes (368), with the object of making peace—a Persian bent on reconciling the Greeks was a novelty. This time a meeting was held at Delphi. Congresses in Sparta and Athens had effected nothing. In view of the sacred character of the spot a meeting in Delphi would not in itself have been inappropriate. But a greater mockery of the state of affairs in Greece could hardly have been devised than a congress at Delphi, presided over by an Asiatic tyrant provided with Persian money; it was only surpassed by the Theban congress of the year 367. No result was achieved at Delphi. It appeared, however, that Sparta was still in favour with Persia, for Philiscus declared that Messenia ought to be restored to the Spartans. The war was therefore continued. Dionysius of Syracuse now intervened with great vigour, sending a second body of auxiliaries. The allies disputed as to the best mode of employing them. The Athenians wanted them to march against the Thebans who were engaged in Thessaly, while the Spartans were for using them in the Peloponnese. Sparta's wish was complied with. Archidamus captured Caryae with their help, and then invaded the Parrhasian territory of Arcadia, the district which had assumed a new aspect owing to the founding of Megalopolis. Here he was met by the Arcadians and Argives near Medea. Cissadas, Dionysius' general, now declared that the period of his mission had expired, and he actually withdrew. But on the way he was attacked by the Messenians, and Archidamus was assailed by the rest of the enemy, whereupon the Spartans and the Sicilians joined forces again and won a brilliant victory. Not one Lacedaemonian was slain, but the enemy lost a great number. When Agesilaus and the Gerontes and Ephors heard the news in Sparta they all wept for joy, and

by a rhetorical antithesis it was styled the tearless victory. Xenophon remarks that the Thebans and Eleans were as much pleased at the defeat of the Arcadians as the Spartans. Friendly relations now sprang up between Athens, as Sparta's ally, and Syracuse, which found expression in decrees in honour of Dionysius, which are still extant, and led to a formal alliance between the two states. Syracuse and Persia were consequently both working in Sparta's interests at this time. A change took place in the following year. Persia forsook Sparta for Thebes, and Syracuse declined so much in political importance owing to the death of the old tyrant that she soon was unable to protect herself.⁷

We have already noticed that Theban influence also made itself felt in Thessaly. We must take our narrative of these events, which are only imperfectly treated by Xenophon, from other sources.

Jason of Pheræ had become Tagos in Thessaly. He had created a large force, with which he intended to attack Persia. In the year 370 he determined to make a great show at the Pythian festival, and so inaugurate a national war. He had compelled the communities subject to him to supply oxen, sheep, goats and swine for a sacrifice at Delphi, and although the contribution of each community was only a small one, over 1000 oxen and more than 10,000 other animals were brought together. He had offered a golden wreath as a prize for the finest ox—a sort of ancient cattle-show. His intention was to enter Delphi with an army. But his ambitious schemes only provoked the violent hatred of his rivals. As he was holding a review of his cavalry seven young men set upon him and assassinated him. Some of them took refuge in Greek cities, where high honours were paid them. The greatness of Thessaly, which had barely dawned upon the world, was now at an end for ever. Under Jason's leadership the country might have played the part that afterwards fell to Macedonia. His brothers Polydorus and

Polyphron became *Tagos*. They were tyrants of the usual type. Polyphron murdered his brother and reigned for a year, until he was killed by Polydorus' son Alexander, who then became *Tagos*, a troublesome one, as Xenophon says, for his people, and a troublesome enemy of the Thebans and afterwards of the Athenians. He reigned eleven years, and was murdered in 358-7 at the instigation of his own wife.⁸

The opponents of Alexander of Pherae applied in the first instance to Alexander of Macedonia, son of Amyntas, and when he only pursued his own interests in Thessaly, they turned to Thebes. Thebes sent Pelopidas to Thessaly with an army. The Macedonians now withdrew from Thessaly, abandoning the cities of Larissa and Crannon, which they had garrisoned. Alexander's office of *Tagos* was now at an end; he confined himself henceforth to Pherae. The constitution of the Thessalian communities was reorganized. Up to this point Pelopidas had done good work, but he now interfered in the affairs of Macedonia. In this country there were at this period two claimants for the throne, Ptolemaeus Alorites and Alexander, and Pelopidas intervened in favour of the latter. Thebes thus became as deeply involved in northern as she already was in southern politics (369). Interference of this kind is characteristic of the age, and proves that the ablest and most enterprising Greeks of the first half of the fourth century had not sufficient scope at home, and required a larger field for their energies. Asia would have supplied them with this; but they preferred to fight among themselves instead of uniting against Persia. The districts of the north continually occupied the energies of Pelopidas, to the detriment of Thebes. In 368 the Thessalians again complained of Alexander of Pherae. Pelopidas thereupon returned to Thessaly, this time without an army, thinking that his own personal influence would be paramount. He did not even remain there, but proceeded to Macedonia, where his

presence was required, King Alexander, the friend of Thebes, having been murdered by Ptolemaeus, and the latter in his turn being threatened by a certain Pausanias. Ptolemaeus had appealed to Iphicrates, who was cruising in the neighbourhood with some Athenian ships, and Iphicrates had interposed on his behalf. Pelopidas now thought it incumbent on him to prevent Athens from becoming too powerful in Macedonia; he collected a force of mercenaries and marched into Macedonia with them. Ptolemaeus, however, persuaded them to desert, and Pelopidas was thus forced to become the friend of his enemy, and, as it was euphemistically described, to assure Ptolemaeus of Theban protection. He then returned to Thessaly, where he marched against Pharsalus with a fresh body of mercenaries, in order to capture the families of the deserters which were living there, and so punish the latter for their disloyalty. Happening to meet Alexander of Pherae again, he went unarmed into his camp, thinking that his personal influence would suffice to make the tyrant change his mind. But Alexander took him prisoner, thus securing an excellent mode of bringing pressure to bear upon Thebes. He proposed an alliance to Athens with the same object; Athens agreed and sent ships and soldiers to Thessaly under Autocles. It was at this juncture that the Athenians wanted to have the Sicilian troops sent to Thessaly. Thebes of course exerted herself to procure the liberation of Pelopidas, but the generals Cleomenes and Hypatis, who were despatched on this mission, were so unsuccessful that their army was only saved by Epaminondas, who was serving in it as a common soldier. He was subsequently sent to the scene of action as general, and procured the release of the famous prisoner from Alexander, probably at the beginning of the year 367.

This was the end of Pelopidas' adventurous campaigns in the north. They showed that Thebes possessed a superabundance of genius and courage, but that her material resources were not on a par with them. In the Peloponnese she

produced permanent results; her connection with the north did no good to Greece either at this time or subsequently.⁹

NOTES

1. Congress in Athens, Xen. 6, 5, 1-3. Cf. von Stern, 149.—Rebuilding of the walls of Mantinea, Xen. 6, 5, 3-5.—Orchomenus surrenders to the Thebans, Diod. 15, 57 (see also notes to Chapter x.) The Thespians were probably expelled about this time, von Stern, 152.—Internal disturbances in the Peloponnese, Diod. 15, 40, 57, 58.

2. Arcadian affairs, Xen. 6, 5, 6-22; Diod. 15, 29; Paus. 8, 27, 2.—Megalopolis (Gk. *ἡ μεγάλη πόλις*) Kuhn, Entstehung der Städte der Alten, Leipz. 1878, p. 222 seq. For the date of its founding, Paus. 8, 27 (Ol. 102, 2 = 371), Marm. Par. (102, 3); Diod. 15, 72 (103, 1); and von Stern, 157.—According to Pausanias (*l.l.*) two Arcadians, named Lycomedes and Hopoleas, a Tegeate and a Mantinean took part in its founding. The latter, in spite of Diod. 15, 59, was the more important man. The Possicrates and Theoxenus mentioned by Pausanias perhaps appear as ΠΟ and ΘΕ on coins of the Arcadian league minted in Megalopolis, Head, H. N. 373.—According to Plut. c. Col. 32, Plato sent Aristonymus to the Arcadians *διακοσμήσοντα τὴν πολιτείαν*. According to Paus. 8, 27, 2 there was a certain Hieronymus among the founders who subsequently became a partizan of the Macedonians; perhaps this refers to Aristonymus, Schaefer, Demosth. 2, 171.—For the position of Megalopolis see Bursian, Geogr. 2, 225 seq. Baed.² 312.—Afterwards it was said: *ἐρημία μεγάλη ὅστιν ἡ μεγάλη πόλις*. The founding of Megalopolis was simply a means of combating Sparta; the upper valley of the Alpheus was to be withdrawn from Spartan influence.—The *μύριοι Ἀρκάδων*, who appear as late as 224 B.C. (Hermann, Staatsalt. § 177), assembled according to Paus. (8, 32, 1) in the Thersilium; Diod. 15, 59 says that Lycomedes the Arcadian *ἔπεισεν ἐς μίαν συντέλειαν ταχθῆναι, καὶ κοινὴν ἔχειν σύνοδον συνιστῶσαν ἐξ ἀνδρῶν μυρίων, καὶ τούτους ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν περὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης βουλευέσθαι*. The expression *μύριοι* denoted that they were numerous; it was not an unusual word for the number of citizens in a community. The ideal of Hippodamus was *μύριοι*; a *μυριάνδρος πόλις* was a technical expression for a capital city; *μεγάλη πόλις* and *μύριοι* were cognate expressions, although all the *μύριοι* were not citizens of Megalopolis.—Disputes between the *μύριοι* and Mantinea, Xen. 7, 4, 33. The *ἐπαρίτοι* in Xen. 7, 4, 22, mentioned

in Diod. 15, 62 and 67, received pay, Xen. 7, 4, 33, 44. Resemblance of the new Arcadian institutions to Platonic ideas; the *μύριοι* according to Xen. 7, 4, 33 are *προστάται*, consequently intelligent leaders, the paid *ἐπαῖροι* are styled *δημόσιοι φύλακες* by Hesych.—The concentration in Megalopolis was intended to protect south-western Arcadia against Sparta. The founding of this city shows us that violent methods of centralization were not in themselves repugnant to Greek feeling, and explains how it was possible for tyrants, such as Gelon and Dionysius, to carry them out. Cf. also Gilbert, *Staatsalt.* 2, 124 seq.; the important works on Greek confederations by Freeman, Vischer and others will be noticed latter on. The coins which are found from the sixth century with *ΑΒ*, *ΑΡΚΑ* indicate (even when minted only in Heraclea, Imhoof-Blumer, *Monn. Gr.* 196) aspirations towards unity at an early epoch. The new coin of the league marked *ΑΠ* has the head of Zeus Lycaeus on one side, and a sitting Pan on the other, Head, 373. There is a resemblance to the seated figures in Croton and Pandosia; see Chapter xi. But the centralizing of the coinage did not last long. It was probably in consequence of the battle of Mantinea that the various cities began to issue coins again, among which those of Pheneus and Stymphalus are particularly beautiful. Cf. also Curtius, *G. G.* 3^e, 764, 765.

3. War in Arcadia, Xen. 6, 5, 10-22. According to Paus. 10, 9, 5, a group of statues was dedicated in Delphi by the Arcadians in gratitude for their victory over the Spartans; its inscription has been discovered, Pomtow, *Beiträge z. Topogr. von Delphi*, XIV. 39, and Weil, *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 1889, pp. 818 and 908. The date of the dedication is probably 369.—Petition of the Arcadians rejected in Athens, Diod. 15, 62.

4. The Theban army in Laconia and Messenia, Xen. 6, 5, 22-32. Active preparations of Agesilaus for the protection of Sparta, Plut. Ages. 31; cursory account in Diod. 15, 65—Messene, Paus. 4, 26, 5-27, 5; 9, 14, 2; Diod. 15, 66, 67; Plut. Ag. 34; Pelop. 24; Burs. 2, 165 seq.; Baed.² 363 with plan; Kuhn, 241 seq.; von Stern, 175 seq.—The Messenian coins present a standing Zeus Ithomatas on one side, and the head of Demeter on the other, Head, 361; Gardner, *Types*, pl. viii. 25, 28.

5. Negotiations in Athens, etc., Xen. 6, 5, 33 seq. On Paus. 9, 14, 3, cf. von Stern, 180.—The Theban generals called to account, Paus. 9, 14; dubious details in Plut. Pel. 25; Nep. Ep. 7, 8; Ael. V. H. 13, 42.—Terms of the alliance between Athens and Sparta, Xen. 7, 1, 1-14.—The Thebans unsuccessful at Corinth, Xen. 7, 1, 19; a different account in Diod. 15, 69.—Sicyon joins Thebes, Diod. 15, 69, and von Stern, 185.

6. Lycomedes, reputation of the Arcadians, Xen. 7, 1, 23-27.

7. Philiscus, Xen. 7, 1, 27; according to Diod. 15, 70, he was sent by the King of Persia, who wanted mercenaries. It certainly would have been pleasant for the king if the Greeks had notified their unity to him by placing all their resources at his disposal in return for money. Ariobarzanes and Philiscus made Athenian citizens, Dem. Aristocr. 141; Philiscus, tyrant, murdered at Lampsacus, LL 142.—The tearless battle at Midea or Medea, Xen. 7, 1, 28; Plut. Ages. 33; Diod. 15, 72, where *μύριοι Ἀρκάδες* are killed. His authority no doubt stated that many of the *μύριοι* of the Arcadians had fallen.—Attic decrees in honour of Dionysius, C. I. A. 2, 51 = Ditt. 72; C. I. A. 52 = Ditt. 73 (alliance, Ol. 103, 1).

8. Death of Jason of Pherae, Xen. 6, 4, 28-52. Alexander of Pherae, Xen. 6, 4, 36, 37.—There are no coins of Jason; some of Alexander stamped with his name have come down to us, Head, 261.

9. Pelopidas' boldness and adventures in the north remind us of Marx Meier, the comrade of Wullenweber.—The Thessalian campaigns in Plut. Pelop. 26-29; also Diod. 25, 71, and Paus. 9, 15; according to von Stern all three extracts come from the same Boeotian authority.—Allusion in Dem. Aristocr. 120. It appears that Pelopidas introduced a *κοινόν* in Thessaly on the Boeotian pattern:—*τετράδες* (Pelasgiotis, Phthiotis, Thessaliotis, Hestiaeotis), each with its *πολέμαρχος*, and an *ἄρχων* at the head of the whole; inscription explained by Köhler, Mitth. 2, 201 seq., and Gilbert, Staatsalt. 2, 12. Philip made use of this organization for his own purposes, v. *infra* Chapter xviii.

CHAPTER X

THE CLOSING YEARS OF THEBAN SUPREMACY—PELOPIDAS
IN SUSIA—ARCADIA AND ELIS—BATTLE OF MANTINEA.
367-362

THE aims of Thebes were directed towards what Xenophon, in the language of the time, designated on this occasion as the hegemony of Hellas. The word hegemony was in those days perverted from its original meaning. At first it denoted the supreme command in a war, which, when the whole of Greece was concerned, could only be a war against barbarians. Consequently when there was no such war, there was no need for a hegemon. The expression *prostates*, or leader, had already been used in earlier times as an honourable designation for the leading state in Greece, a position which had been long assigned to Sparta. But the function of the *prostates* was not to command but only to advise, and especially to protect the weak. Besides, in times of peace the distinction had no practical significance. About the year 370, when there was no foreign war to be conducted, the expression 'hegemony of Hellas' would only have had a meaning if there had been an intention of introducing a political constitution for the whole of Greece. But there was no idea of such a thing, and even if it had been contemplated, the leadership of the nation would hardly have been entrusted to Thebes. True, Thebes had behaved like a real *prostates* of Greece in Messenia. She had redressed an old wrong. But

in other quarters she had interfered in the domestic affairs of Greek states more than the Greeks liked, and in this way showed that her aim was not protection but dominion, somewhat like Sparta after Aegospotami. This the majority of the Greeks were determined not to put up with.

As Thebes could not attain her object of giving the casting vote in all disputed questions in Greece by means of her own strength, she turned to the king of Persia, the natural arbiter of the Greeks.¹ Sparta and Athens had done the same thing for many years past. The Spartan Eucles happened to be in Susa at that time, and Pelopidas accordingly went there in 367, whereupon Antiochus from Arcadia, Archidamus from Elis, and Timagoras and Leon from Athens journeyed there too. Pelopidas laid stress on the services which Thebes had rendered Persia from the time of Xerxes to that of Agesilaus (see Chapter I. p. 11), and the Athenian Timagoras seconded his efforts. The king then asked what the Thebans wanted. Pelopidas replied that they demanded that Messenia should retain her independence, and Athens lay up her ships of war. When this was committed to writing as the king's decision, Leon exclaimed to his companions: "By Zeus, Athenians, you must now look for another friend instead of the king." This was brought to the king's ear, and he ordered a rider to be added to the document that "If the Athenians could suggest a juster solution, they should communicate it to him." After that Leon would have nothing more to do with Timagoras; he accused him subsequently of treason in Athens, and Timagoras was put to death. The Elean Archidamus was on the Theban side, but the Arcadian Antiochus refused to accept any presents from the king, and told his superiors, the Ten Thousand, that the king no doubt had plenty of bakers, cooks and cup-bearers, but no men in his establishment, while as for the famous golden plane-tree, presented to Darius by the Lydian Pythius and placed over the royal throne, it was not large enough to shelter a grasshopper.

The Theban envoys returned home, accompanied by a Persian who was bearer of the royal rescript. Thebes summoned a meeting of her allies (in 367), and after the Persian had shown the king's seal and read the letter aloud, the Thebans called upon the representatives of the various states to swear that they would observe the commands contained therein. But the deputies refused. They had come, they said, to receive communications, not to pass resolutions; that was the function of an assembly of the league, to be held in a suitable place, as soon as a question of war arose. The members of the Theban league thus took up the natural position that a hegemony was only to be resorted to in a *casus belli*, and that in that event a special resolution was necessary to decide on future action. The supremacy of Persia was rejected. The Thebans now tried to get the oath taken by means of deputations to the various states. But the Corinthians at once declared that they did not want to bind themselves by oath to the king of Persia. Thus, as Xenophon remarks, the Theban scheme for procuring adherents came to an end. With this failure Thebes had of her own accord descended from the lofty position in which the battle of Leuctra had placed her. At Leuctra she had shown that manly vigour decides the destinies of states. She had now endeavoured to thrust the supremacy of Persian gold upon Greece. Greece had once more lost its moral leader, whom it had scarcely won.

The Thebans were thus obliged after all to compass their object by means of their own resources. They did not shrink from the task, but took action in every quarter. In the Peloponnese Epaminondas had already succeeded in persuading the Achaeans to join the Theban confederation. He had effected this by his good treatment of the Achaean aristocrats.² But it was now asserted by many, especially in Arcadia, that in doing so he had only served the interests of Sparta. Thebes therefore despatched harmosts, who established a strict demo-

cratic régime in Achaia. This aroused discontent. The banished aristocrats returned to Achaia and recovered the country for Sparta. Great confusion prevailed in Sicily; a certain Euphron made himself tyrant, but was expelled the city and put to death in Thebes. Phlius remained loyal to Sparta.³ In the north and east Athens was at first fairly successful. In 365 Timotheus took Samos from the Persian Tigranes, some Athenian cleruchies being sent to the island, and also captured Sestos, Methone, Pydna, Potidaea, and Torone for Athens; but he failed to secure the coveted Amphipolis. Oropus, which was always a bone of contention between Athens and Thebes, fell into the hands of the Thebans in the year 366. In the Peloponnese the Athenians did harm to the Thebans by concluding an alliance with the Arcadians through their representatives, the Ten Thousand,⁴ whereupon Corinth, whom the growing power of Athens inspired with anxiety, withdrew from her alliance with that city. But in a short time the Corinthians became uneasy at their own isolated position, and made peace with Thebes, with the consent of the Spartans. Thebes would have liked to obtain more, viz. an alliance; but the Corinthians could not make up their minds to this. Phlius followed the example of Corinth. It was a sign of Sparta's decline that states like Corinth and Phlius, although thoroughly well-disposed towards her, did not like to remain her allies, simply because they felt that Sparta no longer had the power to protect them.⁵

This state of affairs in the Peloponnese, already complicated enough, assumed a still more unsatisfactory complexion owing to the quarrel between Arcadia and Elis. The Eleans captured Lasium in Triphylia, which the Arcadians had formerly wrested from them. The Arcadians, however, reconquered it, marched up to Olympia and took possession of the festival precincts. They were joined by the Elean democrats, while the Spartans and some Achaeans took the side of the Eleans.

When the time for the Olympic festival of 364 arrived, the Arcadians began it in conjunction with the Pisatae, who had presided over the games in old days. The Eleans, however, sent for help from Achaia and advanced in battle array before the contests were over. The Arcadians took up a position on the banks of the Cladeus with 2000 Argives and 400 Athenian cavalry. In the fight which ensued the Eleans were victorious, and pursued the enemy as far as the great altar of Zeus; at this point they were fiercely attacked by sorties from the porticoes, the council-chamber and the temple of Zeus, and were forced to retreat, and finally they abandoned all attempt to penetrate within the sacred precincts.

The Arcadians now took possession of the treasures in the temple in order to pay the contingent of Eparitoi. The Mantineans considered this a profanation, and many of the Ten Thousand disapproved of it. The result was that as a rule only those who could support themselves remained in the ranks of the Eparitoi, and the force thus acquired an aristocratic almost Laconian character. In consequence those who had laid hands on the treasures of the temple summoned the Thebans to their aid, while the majority of the Arcadians abandoned the struggle and made a peace with Elis. The Theban auxiliaries, however, behaved in a very arbitrary manner in Arcadia. While the Arcadians in Tegea were celebrating a festival to commemorate the peace concluded with Elis, the commander of the 300 Theban hoplites who were in the city arrested the aristocrats who were taking part in the festival and threw them into prison.⁶ But he had only captured a few of the Mantineans, who were the most dangerous of all, and the citizens of Mantinea, who need not have concerned themselves so much about this imprisonment of a handful of their countrymen, as if it involved submission to the yoke of Thebes, demanded that the prisoners should be brought to trial before the Ten Thousand. The Theban commander allowed himself to be intimidated and released the

prisoners, pleading as an excuse for his act of violence that he had been informed that the men had engaged in a conspiracy with Sparta against Thebes. The Arcadians preferred a complaint against him in Thebes; Epaminondas, however, is said to have replied that the man had acted more rightly in arresting the prisoners than in releasing them, because it would have been an act of treason to make peace without the consent of Thebes. If Epaminondas really expressed himself in this fashion, he was wrong according to Greek notions, for the Arcadians were at liberty to put an end to their quarrel with Elis whenever they liked. Of course the rulers of Thebes could not help being annoyed at their influence being disregarded in the Peloponnese, and this would account for the anger of Epaminondas. The Mantineans and other Arcadians, however, came to the conclusion that the Thebans were really only aiming at establishing their supremacy, and they appealed to Athens and Sparta for help against Thebes. The confusion in Arcadia had now reached its utmost limits. No one knew who was master, the Ten Thousand or the individual states, and neither the former nor the latter knew what they really wanted.⁷

This was an inducement to Thebes to intervene with greater vigour than before (362). Things had now come to such a pass that she had not only to subdue enemies, but also to intimidate allies, otherwise the revolt would spread. In the last few years she had strained every nerve to extend her influence, and not without success. In Boeotia itself she had effaced the last traces of resistance by annihilating Orchomenus; some of the Orchomenians were put to death, and the rest sold into slavery. In Thessaly too the Thebans had become supreme, at the sacrifice, it is true, of the life of Pelopidas, who had met his death in 364 in fighting against Alexander of Pherae.⁸ Lastly, they had shown uncommon energy in their bold attempt to wrest the supremacy of the sea from the Athenians. They had built a fleet, and, by

means of the connections formed more than thirty years before, had stirred up the leading allies of Athens, Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium, against the head of the confederacy.⁹ In the midst of these ambitious schemes they suddenly discovered that the Peloponnesians wished to escape from their control, and this had to be prevented at all hazards.

Epaminondas came to the Peloponnesians with some Boeotians, Euboeans, and Thessalians; the Phocians refused to accompany him on the ground that it was a war of aggression, in which they were not bound to co-operate. In the Peloponnesians he was joined by the Argives, the Messenians, and the southern Arcadians, who as neighbours of the Spartans were their enemies. On his march he halted first at Nemea, because he hoped to be able to intercept the Athenian army despatched to the assistance of the Spartans. But the Athenians had chosen to send their troops by sea to the Peloponnesians. Accordingly he advanced to the allied city of Tegea, and Xenophon praises him for drawing up his army in this city, out of sight of the enemy. In point of fact the position was admirably chosen. He had thrust himself between his two most dangerous enemies, Sparta and Mantinea. His first plan was to deal the former a crushing blow from this point. Agesilaus had marched away from Sparta with the Spartan army in a north-westerly direction, so that only a few fighting men were left in Sparta and the road thither from Tegea was open. Epaminondas made a sudden march on the deserted city. And if Agesilaus had not been apprised of it, the Thebans would have captured the city, which would at all events have been a remarkable occurrence, although of no significance for the issue of the war,—something like the surprise of Berlin by Hadik in the year 1757. As it was, Agesilaus arrived there before him, and Epaminondas only captured a portion of the lower city; he did not venture to attack the upper city. Eventually Archidamus inflicted some damage on him with a handful of brave men, and

he retired once more to Tegea, in order to execute a similar manœuvre from there in a northerly direction. He ordered his cavalry to march on Mantinea; perhaps they might succeed in taking it. But the Athenian auxiliaries had just arrived there. Their cavalry at once made a sortie and repulsed the Thebans. On this occasion Gryllus, Xenophon's son, was slain, who was serving with his brother Diodorus in the Athenian cavalry.

Epaminondas now determined to fight a decisive battle with the enemy, who were drawn up near Mantinea. In this battle the Thebans fought with their allies above-mentioned against an army composed of Spartans, northern Arcadians, Eleans, Achaeans, and Athenians, and commanded by an Arcadian. The former were about 30,000, the latter over 20,000 strong. Epaminondas' tactics are much admired by Xenophon. He acted as if he had no intention of making an attack on that day, but was about to encamp, and then suddenly brought his attacking force into line. When the Theban army advanced, the enemy were busy forming into ranks. According to Xenophon's vivid description, Epaminondas' army advanced like a trireme which is going to run down a hostile vessel. As at Leuctra, he opposed his best troops to the best of the enemy, assailing their right wing with his left. His splendid cavalry routed that of the enemy. To prevent the Athenians, who were stationed on the enemy's left wing, from coming to the aid of the Spartans, he made a demonstration against them. In a word, it was a masterly piece of tactics. Epaminondas won the day, but fell in the battle. He lived just long enough to hear that his side was victorious; he then had the javelin drawn from his wound and expired. The Thebans made no use of their victory; their spirit had vanished with the death of their leader. Eventually the Athenians even killed many cavalry and peltasts belonging to the Theban army.¹⁰

Xenophon concludes his account of this battle and his

whole work with the following words :—"The exact contrary of what everybody had expected now happened. For as almost the whole of Greece had met in battle, so every one thought that the victorious side would henceforth be the masters, and the conquered the subjects. God, however, so ordered the event that both sides erected trophies of victory without hindrance from each other, and both as conquerors delivered up the dead and as conquered received them,—both too, while claiming to have won the day, derived no advantage from the battle, neither in point of territory nor as regards dominion. Indecision and confusion reigned even more in Greece after the battle than before it."

A comparison may here be permitted, which will throw light on the situation in Greece after the battle of Mantinea. The surrounding circumstances and the character of the general who falls in the moment of victory recall the battle of Lützen and Gustavus Adolphus. Like Epaminondas, Gustavus Adolphus had undertaken a noble and honourable task, and both devoted themselves to it with lofty enthusiasm and great magnanimity. But both of them were fettered by considerations of another kind. Epaminondas had not only to humble Sparta, he had also to consider the welfare of Thebes; Gustavus Adolphus had not merely to rescue Protestantism, but also to make Sweden a great nation, and with both men home interests occasionally pushed those of the greater cause into the background. Both fought the battle in which they fell after a retreat from points at which they had attempted great things without success. With the death of both the glory of their respective states was really at an end, much more so indeed in the case of Thebes than in that of Sweden. The policy of Sweden after Lützen and that of Thebes after Mantinea lost its old disinterested character. Henceforth the two states pursue a policy of pure selfishness. Sweden's connection with France is a parallel to that of Thebes with Persia.

The life of Epaminondas clearly shows that the good done by an individual is not always in proportion to his personal charm. Epaminondas confronts us as a thoroughly pure, loveable character. He is equally great as a citizen and as a general. He seems scarcely to have had an enemy; even political opponents, like Xenophon, value him highly. But was his active career beneficial for Greece? Assuredly in one point, that he destroyed the predominance of Sparta and restored Messenia to her old position, and thus furthered the liberty of Greece. The ancients lay stress on this as his merit. But his policy in Arcadia was of doubtful value, and as for the unity of Greece, which the Greeks themselves no doubt cared very little about, he did nothing for it, and could not have done anything, with the views which he held. For in annihilating Orchomenus, he only embittered the opponents of Thebes all the more, and in thinking that he could deprive the Athenians of their fleet and found a Theban maritime league, he committed an almost inconceivable error from a practical point of view. Was it possible for Thebes to turn the alliance of cities like Byzantium and Rhodes to better account than Athens had been able to do? Thebes was not even able to make a firm ally of Arcadia. The utterly servile behaviour of Thebes to Persia, the worst blot on her history, may have been due to the more restless nature of Pelopidas; but Epaminondas gave his approval to it. The vaunting ambition of their two great generals dragged the Thebans into enterprises which were beyond their powers. Death perhaps did them both, Pelopidas as well as Epaminondas, a good service in removing them in the full tide of their victorious careers.

NOTES

1. Thebes aims at a hegemony over Greece, Xen. 7, 1, 33. For *ἡγεμονία*, see the close of this volume.—Thebes appeals to Persia, Xen. 7, 1, 33-40.

2. The third campaign of Epaminondas in the Peloponnese, Xen. 7, 1, 41-43.

3. Euphron, Xen. 7, 1, 44-46; 3, 1-12: in 7, 2 Xenophon gives a detailed account of the affairs of Phlius. Diodorus (15, 70) is wrong in his chronology.

4. The Thebans occupy Oropus, Xen. 7, 4, 1; Diod. 15, 76; cf. von Stern, 209. Exploits of Timotheus, Schaefer, Demosth. 1, 100 seq.—Alliance of the Athenians with the Arcadians, Xen. 7, 4, 2, 3.

5. Corinthian affairs, Xen. 7, 4, 4 seq. Corinth, Phlius, and Argos make peace with Thebes; Xen. 7, 4, 10 acknowledges the proper conduct of the Corinthians.

6. For the internal dissensions in Arcadia cf. von Stern, 226. The Athenians send the Arcadians some cavalry to help them against the Spartans; as long as the cavalry did not set foot in Laconia, this step did not involve Athens in war with Sparta. For similar instances see vol. ii. p. 309 and p. 517.—An auxiliary force from Syracuse helps the Spartans to reconquer Sellasia, Xen. 7, 4, 12.—War between the Eleans and the Arcadians; struggle to obtain possession of Olurus (365); alliance of the Eleans with the Spartans; struggle to obtain possession of Cronnus; fighting at Olympia (364), Xen. 7, 4, 13-32. Dispute of the Mantineans with the *μέγιστοι*, Xen. 7, 4, 33.—Events in Tegea, Xen. 7, 4, 36-40.

7. The Arcadians apply to Athens, Xen. 7, 5, 1; Diod. 15, 82.—Fragments of a decree of alliance between Athens and Arcadia, issued some weeks before the battle of Mantinea, under the Archon Molon, 362-61, first explained by Köhler and afterwards printed in the C. I. A. 2, 57^b and 112 = Ditt. 83; cf. von Stern, 238.

8. Destruction of the Orchomenians, Diod. 15, 79; Paus. (9, 15, 3) seems to place it at too early a date; cf. von Stern, 224. O. Müller (von Stern, 223) has suggested that the Orchomenian *ἱππεῖς* were not to blame at all, but were enticed into a trap. According to von Stern (219) the object of the war in Thessaly in 364 was to facilitate the acquisition of maritime supremacy.—Boastfulness of Epaminondas in Aesch. *π. ταραχ.* 32. But is it true?

9. For the endeavours of the Thebans to gain the control of the sea, see von Stern, 216 seq. Cf. also the close of this volume.—According to Pausanias, 9, 23, 8, Larymna, a seaport, joined the Theban side. Theban enterprises, Diod. 15, 78-79: 100 ships; Rhodes, Chios, and Byzantium secede from Athens. There was a ferment too in Ceos, according to an inscription, Köhler, Mitth. 2, 142 = Ditt. 79. Epaminondas himself was in Thrace, where Timotheus had up to that time done good service for Athens; cf. Höck, *De rebus ab Atheniensibus in Thracia, etc.* Kil. 1876, p. 24 seq.—Cf. also Curtius, 3^o, 761.

10. For the account of the battle of Mantinea in Diod. 15, 85-89, cf. von Stern, 233. Diodorus' principal mistake is that he brings the cavalry skirmish in which Gryllus fell and which had nothing to do with the battle of Mantinea into the battle itself. Besides, his description of the battle contains a great deal of misplaced rhetoric, a point which does not seem to have been proved in detail. Epaminondas is riddled with darts, of which he τὰ ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ἐξαιρῶν τοῖς ἡμέτερο τοῖς ἐπιφερομένοις. This is enough to remind us of Baron Münchhausen. If this is nonsense, the passage in 15, 86, that Epaminondas ἔγνω δὲ αὐτοῦ κρῖναι τὸν κίνδυνον and ἔβαλε τὸν ἡγούμενον τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων, is a pointless invention. What was the good of it? The death of a general whose name is unknown to history could not have decided anything. Conduct of this kind on the part of a commander is suited to an Asiatic battle, where everything depends on the life of the king, and the authority of Diodorus must have taken it from a source of that kind. Cf. the battle of Cunaxa (14, 23); of Issus (17, 33); of Gangamela (17, 60); there is some point in it in these cases. But is it likely that Epaminondas risked everything in order to dispose of an obscure worthy who happened to be in command of the enemy? All this justifies the comment of Polybius (12, 23 seq.) on the unintelligibility of Ephorus' description of the battle of Mantinea, that Ephorus had no idea of a land battle; and consequently the general assumption that Ephorus is Diodorus' authority for the battle rests on a good foundation.

CHAPTER XI

SICILY AND ITALY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTH CENTURY — PARALLEL BETWEEN THE EASTERN AND WESTERN DIVISIONS OF THE GREEK WORLD

WE now turn to the western half of the Greek World. In the last volume we saw how Dionysius maintained his rule in Syracuse (404 B.C.) He secured it by fortifying his capital, which included not only the whole of the island of Ortygia, from which he expelled the citizens, but also a portion of the adjoining mainland, consequently of Achradina, and comprised an arsenal and naval port. He had, it is true, to quell a serious insurrection of the Syracusans. But he achieved this by means of Spartan aid, a Corinthian envoy living in Syracuse, who encouraged the citizens' aspirations towards independence, being murdered at the instigation of a Spartan who was also living there. The tyrant then subdued the Sicels and Greeks in the east of Sicily, and settled some Campanian mercenaries in the island. We saw that the weak point of Syracuse as a fortified city lay in the fact that it was to a certain extent commanded by the high ground west of and overhanging Achradina (vol. ii. p. 473 seq.) Dionysius included this high triangular plateau within the line of the fortifications of his capital by building a wall round its sides. He began with the northern wall, which had a length of 30 stades, and was completed by 60,000 workmen in 20 days—a piece of work in the style of the old kings of Egypt. He then, in 399, pre-

pared an enormous quantity of material of war. The first catapults and the first warships provided with five banks of oars are said to have been constructed at this time. He increased his fleet to 310 warships. His aim was not only to maintain his supremacy in Syracuse, but also to put an end to the Carthaginian rule in Sicily. After entering into friendly relations with Messina and Rhegium, and especially with Locri, in the year 397 he called on the Carthaginians to give the Greek cities in Sicily their freedom. On the demand being rejected, he declared war.

He advanced with a large army, mostly composed of mercenaries, to the western side of the island, and conquered the greater part of it. He captured the strongest cities—the mountain-city of Eryx and the immensely strong island-city of Motye, the latter after a siege by means of a dam, related in detail by Diodorus. But these successes were partly due to the unprepared state of the Carthaginians. They now made their preparations, and in 396 came to Sicily with a larger army than Dionysius was able to assemble. On this occasion they took a different route from their usual one. They first proceeded northwards, evidently in order to deprive Dionysius of his support at Messina and in Lower Italy. They captured Messina, defeated the tyrant's fleet in sight of Mount Etna, and blockaded him in Syracuse, where he was exposed to serious danger, as the Syracusans began a fresh agitation and tried to recover their liberty. But Sparta again interposed. A Spartan envoy declared in favour of Dionysius on behalf of his city, and the tyrant had another piece of good fortune, for a plague broke out in the Carthaginian camp and carried off a large part of the army. The tyrant availed himself of the enemy's embarrassment to carry out a skilfully-planned surprise of their fleet and army, and he might have annihilated the Carthaginian force around Syracuse if the success of the moment had been his sole object. But with great cunning he allowed the Carthaginian citizens in the army to escape, thus

securing a support in case he wanted to make peace with Carthage. He took the best mercenaries in the hostile army, the Iberians, into his service. The Carthaginians being shortly afterwards hard pushed by a rebellion among their African subjects, he became for the moment the real master of all Sicily. But he did not make use of his power to drive the Carthaginians entirely out of the island. He abandoned his ambitious plans, the pursuit of which would have only involved him in constant wars with Carthage, wars in which he would often have had to hazard his own existence, for he knew perfectly well that the Syracusans would revolt again if the Carthaginians defeated him. The main point for him was his rule in Syracuse. The Carthaginians, he calculated, would in the long run leave him alone if he did not molest them too much. He therefore turned against those Greeks who were still independent, deeming them to be less dangerous opponents than Carthage, with the object of at all events incorporating a part of Lower Italy in his empire, even if it could not embrace the whole of Sicily.

An opportunity for making war in Italy was afforded him in 394 by a piece of encroachment on the part of the Rhegines, who installed some Naxians and Cataneans, banished by Dionysius, in Mylae on the north coast of Sicily, the modern Milazzo, and attacked the town of Messina, which was subject to Dionysius. But the troops of Dionysius in Messina repelled the attack and conquered Mylae, in 393. Thus Dionysius was at war with the Italian Greeks, while in Sicily he had still to contend with the Carthaginians, and even with some of the Sicel tribes. He achieved no success against Tauromenium, which was occupied by the Sicels, but that was of no importance, and he defeated the Carthaginian Magon. He was thus able to turn his attention to Rhegium.

His first attack failed, and even had the result that the Greeks of Lower Italy became more closely united. There was all the more reason for this, as they were being threatened

from the north by another enemy, a people of Samnite extraction, who were called Lucanians, and had waged war against Thurii as early as the fifth century, at the time when the Spartan Cleandridas, father of Gylippus, was in command of the Thurians. But the resistance of the liberty-loving Greeks was not crowned with success.¹

In 392 Dionysius was prevented by another Carthaginian attack from invading Italy, but this struggle was soon terminated by a peace, in which Carthage recognized the tyrant as ruler of a large part of eastern Sicily. He was therefore able, in 390, to advance once more upon Rhegium, but it was now assisted by the Italian Greeks (with the exception of the Locrians who declared for Dionysius) under the leadership of Croton, so that the tyrant's attack was again a failure. Thereupon he made an alliance with the barbarians against the Greeks, and the Lucanians inflicted a crushing defeat on the Thurians in the neighbourhood of Laos. The Italian Greeks were now no longer able to encounter Dionysius with their old energy. In 389 he renewed the war against them, and defeated them on the river Helleporos in the district of Caulonia. The result of this battle was a complete revolution in Lower Italy. Dionysius captured Caulonia on the Ionian and Hipponium on the Tyrrhenian Sea, brought the inhabitants of these places to Syracuse (388), and gave their territory to Locri, which consequently formed a kind of boundary-line in the empire of Dionysius. Rhegium had to surrender its fleet. He then made fresh demands on the Rhegines, compliance with which would have placed them at his mercy. They rejected them. He then blockaded the city, and forced it to capitulate by famine. Thus the whole southern corner of Italy fell under the rule of that tyrant (387).

His campaigns ended in this way about the time that the Greeks of the East accepted the Peace of Antalcidas. Their acceptance of it was due in no small measure, as we have already seen (Chapter iv.), to the fleet which Dionysius sent to the

assistance of his Spartan allies at this time. He was now at the zenith of his power, supreme in the Greece of the West, as Sparta was in the Greece of the East, and he proved more successful in maintaining his supremacy than his allies, whose power required external support more than his.

For a time we hear nothing of Dionysius, which is partly due to the plan on which Diodorus, our principal authority, arranges his narrative; partly also to the fact that the tyrant, who was now firmly seated on the throne and ruling without opposition, gave the historian, who was specially interested in wars, less occasion for writing about him. Nevertheless he had to fight again with Carthage in 383, which on this occasion attacked him by way of Italy. He, however, shook off the enemy, and the result was the same in 379, when they repeated their attempt and restored the city of Hipponium. In consequence of a pestilence which broke out among them, they returned to Africa. The frequent menace of danger on the side of Italy, whether from Italian powers or from the Carthaginians, inspired the tyrant with the idea of protecting the southern point of Italy by a wall and trench, to be constructed across the narrow isthmus dividing the Lametinic Gulf, north of Hipponium, from the Gulf of Scylletium in the Ionian Sea,—the neck of land to the south of Catanzaro. Yet he encroached beyond this boundary-line, the fortification of which was never carried out, and made himself master of Croton, perhaps in 379, plundered the temple of Hera Lacinia, and gave Scylletium to the Locrians. His sovereignty did not extend further into Italy, but his influence penetrated as far as the Adriatic, where he founded the city of Lissus on the coast of Illyria. He was on friendly terms with Alcetas, prince of the Molossians, who was living as an exile in Syracuse in 385. In 384 his mercenaries actually rescued some Greeks from Illyrian barbarians. He recouped himself for this generous action in the same year by the pillage of the rich temple of Ilithyia near Caere in Etruria. He con-

cluded treaties with the Gauls, who were pressing Rome hard about this time.

The mercenaries were the privileged class in his empire; next came the Syracusan citizens. Individual cities possibly may have enjoyed greater freedom than others, but as a rule he disposed of the life and property of his subjects like a true tyrant. To obtain the money he wanted, he was not above resorting to strange devices, so long as he attained his object by them. Tampering with the coinage and cunningly-devised schemes for plundering private individuals are recorded. The introduction of a uniform coinage into his empire furthered his objects. The silver coinage of all cities subject to him was stopped; the only city with a mint was Syracuse, the coins of which are of the greatest beauty at this very time. Dionysius did a great deal for the material prosperity of his capital, which by his efforts became the greatest city of the Greek world. He possessed the best army and the largest fleet of the age. He was cruel and suspicious, but belonged to the category of tyrants who make merry over the world, like Cleisthenes of Sicyon. The moral weakness of the majority of the men with whom he was brought in contact, only inspired him with contempt. His low opinion of mankind went so far that he embellished his own amateur tragedies with moral sayings, among which was the following: "*The tyrannis is the mother of all injustice.*" On gaining a prize-wreath in Greece for an intellectual performance of this kind, he was as pleased as a child. The Athenians too were polite enough to crown his tragedies, as he had become their ally. The story that out of joy at this tardy recognition—for up to that time everyone who was not afraid of him and even a few of his own dependants had made fun of his bad poetry—he drank so freely as to die from the effects of it, may have been a humorous invention on the part of his contemporaries, who, in the words of the proverb, "He laughs best, who laughs last," were glad to have seen the end of the

blasphemous and arrogant tyrant. For the rest, he was not only the most powerful man but the cleverest politician of his time. He came to terms with the Carthaginians, ruled over Sicily and a part of Lower Italy, and interfered in Greek affairs in such manner that the cause supported by him was usually successful for a longer or shorter period. In 387 he brought about the conclusion of the King's Peace, in 373 he assisted the Spartans against the Athenians, on which occasion, it is true, Iphicrates defeated him; in 369, on the other hand, the Syracusan auxiliaries distinguished themselves in the war against the Thebans who were invading the Peloponnese, and in 368 they helped the Spartans to achieve the great triumph of the 'tearless battle.' Dionysius was valued in Greece whenever he was wanted. Otherwise he was placed in the same category with the Persian king: in the eyes of patriotic Greeks they were the two chief enemies of liberty. This accounts for Lysias proposing at the Olympic Games in the year 388—a proposal which, it is true, was not carried out—to exclude Dionysius from competing for the prize in the chariot-race.²

There were still, however, some independent states in Italy. The most important was Tarentum, which was under the influence of the wise and highly cultivated Archytas, who had been repeatedly chosen strategus, and was a follower of the Pythagorean doctrines. But Tarentum, which became more and more notorious for its luxury, had no intention of crossing the tyrant's path; it was content to maintain its own independence, and that of its nearest allies, by means of mercenary troops. Of these allies Heraclea came first, and then Metapontium and Thurii. On the Tyrrhenian Sea Elea and Neapolis preserved their independence. But all these cities had a hard task in maintaining their position against the rising power of the native Lucanians, who had brought Laos and no doubt Poseidonia too under their power as early as 390, and on the Ionian Sea held the mountainous

country near Croton, the seat of places of remote antiquity, said to have been founded by Philoctetes, such as Petelia, Chone, and Crimisa. It is evident that the Lucanians were on terms of close and continuous intercourse with Dionysius, to whom they appear to have abandoned the city of Croton and the temple of the Lacinian Hera. By their occupation of a tract of country stretching from the Tyrrhenian to the Ionian Sea, they divided the Greeks of Italy at this time into two disconnected sections.³

The events in Western Greece narrated in this chapter have an additional interest of a special kind. They are a somewhat modified reproduction of those in the East. The Greeks of Sicily are attacked by Carthage about the same time that the Persians assume a hostile attitude towards Athens (about 410), but while the latter accomplish little by means of their money, the Carthaginians achieve a great deal with their well-led mercenaries. About the year 400 only the east of Sicily was in Greek hands. But at this stage the colossus of Carthage is confronted by the power of the older Dionysius, who defends Greek nationality but crushes liberty, just as in the East Sparta, the oppressor of the Greeks of Europe, which is in close relations with Dionysius, protects the Greeks of Asia against Persia for a time. And at this point the dates actually correspond. Dionysius begins his great Carthaginian war in 397, the Spartans their war against Persia in 396, when they perceive that the Persians are seriously threatening Greece, and the Persians plan their attack just when the surprised and discomfited Carthaginians have collected their forces and are bent on destroying Syracuse. But while the relations between Persia and Greece in the period now following are to a certain extent known, those between Dionysius and Carthage are much less so. This much however is clear, that from henceforth there is just as little permanent hostility between these two western powers as between Sparta and Persia, and we see that Dionysius

occasionally courts the friendship of Carthage just in the same way as the Spartans do that of the king of Persia. But the nature of the relations of the hostile powers is marked by a great difference in the East and the West. On the whole energy is as much a characteristic of the action of Greeks and barbarians in the West as want of vigour and nonchalance are in the East. National feeling is stronger in the West than in the East; before Dionysius begins his great war against Carthage in 397, the barbarians in Sicily are put to death in a sudden rising, which recalls the Sicilian Vespers of 1282 A.D. In the East the campaigns of Agesilaus are inspired by a certain consciousness of the contrast between Greeks and barbarians; but soon there is not a Greek state to be found there which does not fall down and worship at the shrine of Persian gold. In the West brute force prevails, in the East intrigue. There are still Greeks left in the West and they are combated by Dionysius, just as the independent aspirations of the East are suppressed by the Spartans. But the result in the two cases is different. In the West force remains triumphant. Dionysius is not punished like the Spartans in Thebes and at Leuctra. As a statesman Archytas of Tarentum is only a tame counterpart of his fellow-Pythagorean Epaminondas. Dionysius dies in the zenith of his power, while Agesilaus ends his life in a foreign land as a leader of mercenaries, and the Spartans lose Messenia. Lastly, even the action of the northern races in the East and the West presents a certain analogy; what the Thesalians attempt in northern Greece is accomplished by the Lucanians in Italy.

These points of resemblance in the development of the East and the West are due in the first instance to the similarity of the state of affairs in the two halves of the Greek world. But the two divisions exercise a direct influence on each other. In the first place it is remarkable how individual states and even certain individuals play a part

simultaneously in the West and in the East. In both sections of the Greek world Corinth makes a stand against despotism, in the East against Sparta, in the West against Dionysius (*vide infra*), while Lysander, the master of the East, appears in the West at the court of his kindred spirit, the tyrant of Syracuse. A Spartan named Pollis, who is mentioned as commander of the fleet in the East, also turns up in the West, where he is commissioned by Dionysius to sell the philosopher Plato as a slave. Alcetas the Molossian figures in the history of Dionysius and in that of the East. Conon endeavours to enlist Dionysius on the side of Athens by means of Evagoras, which proves a connection between Cyprus and Syracuse. Pharnabazus makes a present of timber to the Spartans for ship-building purposes, and gives the Syracusan Hermocrates money, and perhaps ships as well, to enable him to take the field again in Sicily. These tangible facts are reinforced by others of a less material kind. For must not the pictures on coins of Heracles strangling the serpents and fighting the lion, which appear about the same time in the East and in the West—the former from Rhodes and Lampsacus as far as Croton, the latter in Tarentum, Heraclea, the Cilician Mallos, and the Cyprian Citium—must they not be regarded as symbols which prove that in face of the attempts to suppress all liberty which emanated chiefly from Sparta and Syracuse, the devotees of freedom in the remotest cities endeavoured, and with success, to get into touch with one another, and that a moral tie formed by the same political ideals united men who had perhaps never seen each other? Lastly, is it too much to assume, considering the fact that Archytas was a Pythagorean, that Epaminondas was brought up by a Pythagorean, and that Dionysius had stubborn opponents in the ranks of the Pythagoreans, that the Pythagorean brotherhood was the refuge of liberty in the enslaved world of Greece, and that its labours were attended with some measure of success? Looking to the remarkable

talent of the Greeks for managing all their own affairs and to their aptitude for making themselves at home in distant countries, such a connection is not impossible in the case of communities who in point of space were far apart.

We now return to Dionysius, to consider the close of his reign and the commencement of that of his son. The old tyrant had in the end become a lover of peace. He composed poetry, and wished to have a court of poets and writers, like the most famous tyrants before him. And a certain number of them did come to Syracuse. True, there were not many real poets in existence at that time. Yet one of the most valued of them lived at his court, the lyric poet Philoxenus, who knew how to vindicate human dignity even to the tyrant's face. The story goes that he was sent to the famous prison of the stone-quarries for making some disrespectful remarks about Dionysius, whose verses he had condemned, but was taken into favour again after a time by the tyrant, and once more honoured with a recital of his poems. Dionysius now looked for some commendation, but Philoxenus, instead of praising the composition or holding his tongue, said to the guards after the royal poet had finished reading, "Take me back to the quarries." Of philosophers there were Aristippus, who played the man of the world, and was well paid by the tyrant for his ironical comments on life and mankind, and Plato, who considered the Athenian people incapable of becoming virtuous, but in spite of all his bitter experiences would not despair of the Sicilian tyrants, father and son. He actually made Dionysius' son-in-law, Dion, a convert to his ideals, but in so doing excited the suspicion of the tyrant, who sent him away. Dionysius, it was said, had him sold as a slave in Aegina by the Spartan Pollis. Like pretty nearly everything else, poetry and philosophy were only of value to Dionysius as objects of ridicule. This being so, Aristippus was the very man for the post of court philosopher, while it required all Plato's ignorance of the world and mankind and all his

kindliness of nature to look for the dawn of a better age from a Dionysius.

When the old tyrant died in 367, he was succeeded by his son Dionysius II. He was twenty-eight years of age, and neither trained nor fitted for the position which fell to his lot. His father from motives of jealousy had kept him away from all positions of influence, and it soon became evident that he was unable to govern an empire which was firmly established but encompassed by a spirit of mistrust and only maintainable by force. His kinsman Dion negotiated a satisfactory peace with Carthage, and thus Dionysius II. might have enjoyed a peaceful rule. He was not, however, fitted even for government in times of peace. It is true he had sense enough to see that a ruler requires knowledge, and he was desirous of acquiring it. Dion conceived the idea of utilizing this want to further a bold scheme. Plato was recalled to Syracuse. Through his influence, thought Dion, the tyrant might perhaps become a model prince; at all events it was not impossible that his presence might have some beneficial results. He returned, and in a short time the Syracusan court, following the tyrant's example, was deep in the study of geometry and drawing circles and rectangles in the sand; Dionysius II. even repeated the famous maxim of his father: The *tyrannis* is the mother of all injustice. But he loved a life of pleasure still better, and he grew tired of geometry and philosophy. Thus the practical politicians of the tyrant's court, who had been pushed into the background for the moment, gradually regained their ascendancy. The statesman and historian Philistus, like Dion a scion of the royal house, but a decided adherent of despotic rule, became the favourite adviser of the young prince, and Dion was sent into exile, as a supposed intriguer who wanted to place himself upon the throne. Plato was detained at Syracuse for a time and then also dismissed. Dion went to Greece, where he lived as a wealthy private individual and enjoyed universal respect. Plato,

however, was summoned to Syracuse once more, and the philosopher actually went for the third time to the 'Charybdis,' back to the city which had been a source of so many disappointments to him. But he met with the same treatment as on the two former occasions. They grew weary of him. But this time a worse fate seemed to threaten him, for the tyrant's mercenaries had conceived a great dislike for the reformer of the world, and it was feared that they would murder him. The philosopher was a prisoner in the palace gardens in Syracuse. At this point Archytas of Tarentum managed to procure him an honourable dismissal from Dionysius. Plato returned to Greece, and saw his friend Dion at the Olympic Games of the year 360. Dion was advised on many sides to return to Syracuse for the purpose of overthrowing Dionysius. Plato dissuaded him from attempting it, but we shall see that Dion followed the other advice, and what was the issue of his undertaking. In the main the condition of the West about 362 B.C. resembles that of the East,—confusion and disorder prevail in every quarter. Sicily was divided between Dionysius and the Carthaginians, but the rule of Dionysius had so little vigour that a change was bound to occur before long. The southern extremity of Italy was subject to Dionysius; then came a tract of country in the possession of the Lucanians, and beyond that the territory of a few independent states, of which Tarentum alone was of any importance.

NOTES

For Sicily our chief authority is Diodorus, Bks. 14 and 15. But it is only in Bk. 14 that he writes of Sicily in detail, in Bk. 15 he neglects it, because in the period between the King's Peace and the Battle of Mantinea the East principally occupies his attention. Only occasional reference is made to Italy.—Of modern works cf. for Sicily, Holm, *Gesch. Siciliens im Alterthum*, Bd. 2, Leipz. 1874; Meltzer's *Gesch. der Karthager*, Bd. I, Berl. 1879, and Cavallari-Helm, *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa*, Pal.

1883, German translation by Lupus, *Der Stadt Syrakus im Alterthum*, Strassb. 1887. For Lower Italy there is no reliable general history; for Fr. Lenormant's books on the subject, which should supply the place of such a work, cf. vol. i. of this history, pp. 300, 301. On the other hand the copious articles by Lorentz on Tarentum, quoted in the same place, are extremely accurate.—In the case of Sicily I abstain almost entirely from quotations, in view of the above-mentioned works; as regards Italy, wherever quotations are useful in accordance with the above, I generally make them in connection with the numismatics of the different cities, for which Head's *Historia Numorum*, Gardner's *Types*, various writings of Imhoof, and the work on Tarentum by Evans quoted below, are rich mines of information.

1. For the Lucanians cf. Nissen, *Italische Landeskunde*, I. 533 seq. Their appearance so early as the fifth century is only mentioned by Polyæn. 2, 10, 2, and Frontin. 2, 13, 2 in the histories of Cleandridas; in Diodorus they do not appear till the year 393 (14, 101).

2. The character of the *tyrannis* of Dionysius is exhaustively discussed in my *Gesch. Sic. im Alt. Bd. 2*. J. Beloch, *L' impero Siciliano di Dionisio*, Roma (Lincei) 1881, gives some additional facts. The main point, however, of his work, the attempt to prove that the *tyrannis* of Dionysius was a sort of constitutional empire, is a failure, as I have shown in detail in my *Rec. der Abh. in Bursian's Jahresber.* 1881. The Greeks, who were compelled to put up with so many tyrants, never admitted that the *tyrannis* had even a semblance of justice. It remains outside the Greek constitutional sphere as an ἀρχὴ ἀντιεὐθύνος.

NUMISMATICS.—In the period from 415-405 B.C. the Sicilian cities vied with each other in the art of die-cutting. For the names of the die-cutters cf. Weil, *Die Künstlerinschriften der Sicilischen Münzen*, Berl. Winckelmannspr. 1884. The most famous are—Heraclidas in Catana, Euclidas, Euaenetus, and Cimon in Syracuse, the two last of whom originated the splendid Syracusan decadrachmae. The characteristic features of the Sicilian coins are the pictures of two-horsed and four-horsed chariots and of river-gods and nymphs (especially Arethusa in Syracuse). The destruction of Selinus, Himera, Acragas, and Gela from 409 onwards, and the subjugation of the eastern half of the island by Dionysius, had the result that hardly any one but Dionysius possessed a mint in Sicily; Dionysius allowed no other silver coinage in his empire, and with the aid of some of the above-mentioned artists he maintained the fame of the Syracusan coinage. Cf. Holm, *Gesch. Sic. im Alt. II.* 174. The Syracusan coins were imitated by the Carthaginians in the west of

the island. There was a city coinage, however, in Panormus, Eryx, Motya, and Segesta; the year 409 B.C. is assumed to mark the commencement of the decay of Segesta, but there is no foundation for the assumption. The tetradrachmon of Segesta, with the picture of the hunter holding up one foot (Head, 145), seems to suggest artistic relations with the die-cutters of Lower Italy (*v. infra* on Croton and Pandosia). I draw attention here to the mythical relations between Segesta and the country of Philoctetes in Italy, which was in the neighbourhood of Croton and Pandosia, and where the city of Crimisa recalled the river Crimisia near Segesta.

3. Italy, south-western peninsula, now called Calabria. Its history in the first half of the fourth century is reflected in its numismatics.—**RHEGIUM** was conquered by Dionysius in 387 (Diod. 14, 111). Up to that time it had turned out fine coins, which, after the liberation of the city from the *tyrannis* (in 461 B.C.), ceased to be stamped with the hare and team of mules which were in vogue under Anaxilas, and received the Samian type, which had been customary before the time of Anaxilas, of the lion's mask on the face and on the reverse a seated figure, which is usually, like the corresponding figure on Tarentine coins, designated as Demos, a theory which Head, however, controverts. In later times Pegasi in the Corinthian fashion appear in Rhegium; this consequently begins under the influence of Timoleon, who according to Plut. Tim. 9, 10 met with a specially friendly reception in Rhegium.—**LOCRI** had no mint at this period, whether in consequence of strict legislation or of its dependency on Syracuse is unknown.—**HIPPONIUM** was a Locrian colony, near Monteleone, Str. 6, 256. The oldest coins of Hipponium, belonging to the fourth century, are of bronze with the superscription **VEIP** (with an Oscan V), which shows that they were not coined until the city had lost its original Greek character. Early coinage was thus quite as little known at Hipponium as at Locri. The following considerations indicate the probable date of its commencement. We have only a few historical notices of Hipponium. It was destroyed in 388 by Dionysius and its territory given to the Locrians, Diod. 14, 107. In 379 it was restored by the Carthaginians, Diod. 15, 24. It was captured by Agathocles, probably in 294 (Diod. 21, 8), but recovered its liberty. That is all that has come down to us. Still we may conjecture that when the Carthaginians withdrew, probably in 379 or soon afterwards, Hipponium again became subject to Dionysius. But no coins with Oscan lettering would have been minted under his rule. These, therefore, belong to the period after 356, in which year the empire of Dionysius fell to pieces. Oscan influence may soon

have asserted itself then. The Romans named the place Vibo Valentia; the inscription VEIP points to the fact that the name Vibo comes from the Oscana. See also notes to Chapter xxviii.

We now pass to the next large city, CROTON. According to D. Hal. 20, 7, this city, as well as Rhegium, was for twelve years under the rule of Dionysius; it may therefore be assumed that Dionysius conquered Croton twelve years before his death, i.e. about 379. According to Liv. 24, 3 the *ars* was *per dolum capta* by Dionysius. The coins of Croton in earlier times have as a rule only the tripod of Apollo; eventually (about 400, to judge from the style of the art), a seated figure appears here too of Heracles, the founder of Croton, and by the side of the tripod is Apollo slaying the Python. We also find the head of Hera Lacinia and that of Apollo. The coins which follow—Apollo's head with tripod on the reverse—recall, according to Head 83, the electron coins of Syracuse, which come after 345 (Timoleon), so that those of Croton cannot be dated between 370-330, as Head (l.l.) says, but must be as late as about 345. Consequently in Croton too the coinage probably stopped with its conquest by Dionysius, and did not recommence immediately after the death of the old tyrant. Crotoniate coins with the serpent-strangling Heracles have been discussed in the notes to Chapter iii.—TERINA was a colony of Croton (Plin. 3, 10; Steph. Byz.); according to F. Lenormant, Gr. Gr. 3, 98 seq., its site was between Bagni di S. Eufemia and the sea. It has exceptionally beautiful coins with the head of the nymph Terina and a seated figure, Nike or the Siren Ligeia. Head (96) and Evans ("The Horsemen of Tarentum," 41) say that Terina was given to the Locrians by Dionysius in 388; but Diod. 14, 106, 107 states this only of Hipponium and Caulonia. According to Head (l.l.) the Triquetra on the third-stater pieces of Terina indicates the Sicilian rule (of Dionysius) over the city; but is it likely that Dionysius would have allowed coinage here and nowhere else? And was the Triquetra the token of Sicily under Dionysius? On the other hand tradition says that Terina was conquered by the Brettii in 356, Diod. 16, 15. Next come Corinthian staters, which Head (98) places between 388 and 356. But how can the influence of Corinth be assumed under the tyranny? Cf. Head, 86. Why should the Corinthian style in Terina not have begun in Timoleon's time? Terina was destroyed by Hannibal, Str. 6, 256. Rathgeber (Grossgriechenland und Pythagoras, Gotha, 1866) gives detailed conjectures about Terina; cf. Grosser, Kroton, Heft II. Preface, Minden, 1868.—Of the neighbouring TEMESA (now Mattonate, according to Lenormant, Gr. Gr. 3, 93), Str. 6, 255

says *Λυσιώνων κτίσμα*, ὥστερον δὲ καὶ Αἰτωλῶν μετὰ Θόαντος, οὓς ἐξέβαλον Βρέττιοι, and later *Λοκρῶν τῶν Ἐπιζεφυρίων ἐλόντων τὴν πόλιν*. When the Locrians took Temesa is unknown to us. There is no doubt a legendary connection between Temesa and Locri, Paus. 6, 6, 2 seq., but the coins reveal it much more as regards Croton—coins, for instance, which have the tripod of Croton on the one side, and on the other the helmet, the token of Temesa, Head, 80. They belong to the fifth century; there is certainly no coin of Temesa of a later date than 388. Temesa of course came under the sway of Dionysius. Mattonate, by the way, lies to the north of Bagni di S. Eufemia, which would make the more northerly city connected with Locri, and the more southerly one with Croton. The localities might, one would think, be determined with greater accuracy.

CAULONIA was on the Ionian Sea to the north of the river Sagras, called *Ἀχαιῶν κτίσμα* in Str. 6, 261. Its site is placed near Castelvetera to the north of Locri (Gerace). It was destroyed by Dionysius in 389, and given up to the Locrians, Diod. 14, 106. Strabo (l.l.) says that Scylletium (now Squillace, exhaustively discussed by Lenormant, Gr. Gr. 2, 329 seq.) which lies to the north of Caulonia and was subject to the Crotoniates and of which there are no coins extant, was also given by Dionysius to the Locrians. The peculiar coins of Caulonia—a man with outstretched arms, reverse, a stag—only go down to 389.

In the interior, westward of Croton, lay PANDOSIA, on three hills by the river Acheron, according to Str. 6, 256 *μικρὸν* above Consentia. The exact spot is not yet proved. Lenormant's determination of the site (Gr. Gr. 1, 454), accepted by Head (90), rests, as I have shown in my review of Lenormant's book in Bursian's *Jahresbericht*, 1881, on a series of superficial coincidences. The name of the city is Thesprotian; the founders therefore probably came from Epirus. I cannot find any record of the story that Pandosia was captured by the Brettii soon after 400, as Head (91) asserts. The coins of Pandosia appear to be not much later than about 379, at which time its neighbour Croton was probably conquered by Dionysius. Lenormant (l. 443) speaks of league-coins of Sybaris and Pandosia; he has probably confused Pandosia with Poseidonia. The beautiful coins of Pandosia indicate relations with Croton. In the latest coins, which probably date about 400, the obverse has the full-face head of Hera Lacinia, just as on the corresponding coins of Croton (Head, 82 and 90). The full-face position of heads on coins belongs, as is well known, to the period about 400. On the reverse is a seated figure, as on the coins of Rhegium and Croton; in Pandosia it is Pan.

The neighbouring CONSENTIA (Κοσεντία), modern Cosenza, according to Strabo 6, 256 = μητρόπολις Βρεττίων, has bronze coins, which Head places in the period about 356. The Brettian coins, which bear the inscription BPETTIΩN, do not begin till after 300 B.C. For the Brettii see Chapter xxviii. Petelia, the modern Strongoli, the capital of the Lucanians (Str. 6, 254), also does not coin till later.

We now come to THURII, on the borders of Bruttium and Lucania. This city suffered a great defeat at the hands of the Lucanians at Laos in 390, Diod. 14, 102 (no record of its capture as Christ, Gr. Litt. § 201, says), and in consequence its power decreased. In 356 or somewhat later it was subdued by the Brettii, at the same time as Terina and perhaps Hipponium, Diod. 16, 15. Lenormant (Gr. Gr. 1, 311) has confused the history of Thurii, and in so doing has led others into errors. This much is certain, that the destruction of the independence of Thurii cannot be placed before 356. This is also shown by a consideration of its coins, which have the head of Pallas with the Attic helmet on the obverse, and the butting bull on the reverse, and extend into the fourth century, perhaps to 356. But the special coinage of the Thurians does not come to an end even in 356, with the conquest by the Brettii, for two Thurian coins, reproduced in Coins of the Ancients, pl. 34, 22 and 45, 18, are distinctly later than 356, the former certainly belonging to the fourth century, the latter to the third. The independence of Thurii in the beginning of the third century is also shown by the fact that in 289, according to Liv. Epit. XI., the Romans assisted the Thurians against the Lucanians. The conquest by the Brettii cannot therefore have deprived the Thurians of their independence for any length of time.—In Thurii we see the transition from the condition of Bruttium to that of Lucania. The cities of Bruttium were checked in their development by Dionysius, as were the cities of Sicily, and hence their coinage ceases in 388—Rhegium, Croton, Terina, Temesa, Caulonia; Locri and Hipponium had not yet begun. On the other hand, the cities of Lucania were no doubt hard pressed by the Lucanians, but they retained their independent existence. Thurii was not conquered by the Brettii till 356, and even then was not permanently subdued.

The next place in Lucania, as we go farther along the Ionian Sea, is HERACLEA, north of the mountainous country which comes close to the sea at the 40th parallel, and which is the conjectural site, according to Strabo (6, 263), of the *φροίριον* Lagaria, a supposed colony of Epeus and the Phocians. At all events no Greek community of any importance arose here. The Greeks preferred the

low country, and founded Heraclea (mod. Policoro) to make up for Siris, the city of ancient renown. According to Str. 6, 280 the place of the *παρίγυρις* of the Greeks was in the territory of Heraclea before the appearance of the Molossian Alexander. Lenormant (Gr. Gr. 1, 168) says that after his death it fell into the hands of the Lucanians. What authority is there for this? Head's correct remark (59), "but it does not appear to have been deprived of its autonomy," rightly deprives Lenormant's assertion, which Head accepts as true, of its value. The beautiful coins of Heraclea have the head of Pallas (Head's Fig. 34 is pronounced by him in the *Coins of the Ancients*, pl. 24, 11, to be a Nike, and a Pallas of this kind would be unusual), mostly with the Athenian helmet, and Heracles either seated or fighting with the lion. The seated Heracles belongs to the category of figures with which we have become acquainted in Croton and Pandosia, and in Segesta, and which we shall find again in Taras (Evans, pl. I. 12). These somewhat more animated seated figures, which have or hold some object in front of them, appear to belong to the period about 400. Evans (*Horsemen*, p. 53) finds a "memory's sketch of the Theseus of the Parthenon pediment" in the seated figures of Heraclea, Croton, and Pandosia. The Heracles strangling the lion probably points to the league of freedom of the cities of Lower Italy, the *παρίγυρις* of which was referred to above. The same group is found in Taras, and in the East at Mallos in Cilicia (Imhoof) and at Citium in Cyprus (Six); even here the type is probably not entirely unconnected with freedom. See also the notes to Chapter xviii. This is a parallel to the type of Heracles discussed in Chapter iii. and mentioned above in connection with Croton.

METAPONTUM is not very prominent in the history of the fourth century, and accordingly its numismatics do not exhibit any striking features. Its development was evidently a continuous one. The token of the city, an ear of corn, appears even at this period; on the other side is Apollo, or Heracles, or the river Achelous in human form with bull's horns. The coins with female heads mentioned by Head (63) as belonging to Period III. (400-350), to which various names are affixed, such as Hygieia, Homonoëa, Damater, seem also to prove that Metapontum enjoyed a fairly uninterrupted development in the first half of the fourth century, and perhaps even later.

Next comes TARENTUM, on the coinage of which we now possess an excellent monograph by A. J. Evans, *The Horsemen of Tarentum*, Num. Chron. 1889, pp. 1-229. Evans treats the period with which we are dealing as "the age of Archytas 360-345," pp. 45-63. It was, to judge by the coins, a time of peace for Tarentum as it

was for Metapontum. Taras sits quite tranquilly on the dolphin; the rider seldom has a weapon in his hand. Of small coins besides Tarentine litrae, Attic obols occur (diobols Head, 54), which have the Pallas head on one side, as in Thurii, and on the other Heracles strangling the lion, as in Heraclea; they are therefore memorials of the above-mentioned league of the eastern cities of Greater Greece. Evans (p. 53) ascribes the introduction of this type to the artist who indicated his name by Φ and worked for Heraclea, Thurii, Terina, and Neapolis. Poole discerns in it the influence of Attic art. If we add to these observations what we know of the history of this age from other sources, we may assert that two currents are visible in western Greece during the first half of the fourth century, one of which, of an autocratic character, has its centre in Syracuse, and the other, allied to freedom, in the league of cities which extend from Thurii to Taras. We may further maintain that Heracles, who appears on the coins in the twofold character of a serpent-strangling and lion-slaying hero, is the tutelary deity of the league, and that the league, while it certainly has a political connection with Thebes, from an artistic point of view seems to have cultivated closer relations with Athens.

We pass over the shores of the Adriatic, where the Greek element does not appear in the coinage at this time, and turn to the west, to the districts lying on the Tyrrhenian Sea.

The Greek city of LAOS, the ancient connection of which with Sybaris is attested by its coins, was Lucanian in 390, cf. Diod. 14, 101. As the inscriptions ΣΤΑ and ΟΥΤΙ appear on some of them, and these abbreviations evidently stand for names like Statius and Opsius, unquestionably of Oscan origin, these coins were probably minted under Lucanian rule. They are without the inscription ΛΑ, which is found on other bronze coins of this kind.

ELEA, on the topography of which we now have Schleuning's paper, Velia in Lukanien, Jahrb. des arch. Inst. IV. 3, pp. 169-195, held out against (*ἀντιρροχόν*) the Lucanians according to Str. 6, 252, that is, maintained its independence. The token of the city of Elea was a lion, the same as that of Massilia, which like Elea was a Phocaean colony. A lion exactly like this also appears on some old coins of Heraclea (Coins of the Ancients, 15, 5), which Head places before the year 400. From about 400 onwards we have Eleatic coins with a Pallas head and Attic helmet and owl, Head, 75. Does this warrant the assumption that Elea had relations with the league of cities on the Ionian Sea and with Athens as well? It seems far from improbable.

POSEIDONIA became Lucanian, according to Strabo 6, 252, when,

is not stated, but probably about 400. That the Lucanians did not take Elea, which was nearer the centre of their power, was probably due to the stronger position of that city. Elea was like Phocaea a rocky fortress, Poseidonia like Sybaris a city of the plain. The appearance of a full-face head of Hera on the latest Poseidonian coins (according to Strabo l.l. Hera Argeia was worshipped at the mouth of the Silaros) justifies the conjecture that Poseidonia did not lose its independence much before 400. The full-face type of the Hera head was transmitted also to the coins of the Campanian cities of Phistelia, Hyria, and Neapolia, Head, 68.

There remains Campania, where the Greek element at this time was much weakened from a political point of view, Cyme having already ceased to exist as an independent Greek city. This, however, did not materially check the predominance of Greek culture in Campania. Even at this period very beautiful Greek vases appear to have been manufactured in Cyme, *v. infra* Chapter xxix., while the coins reveal the presence of Greek civilization in places which are almost unknown from other sources and were probably not Greek.

NEAPOLIS enjoyed an uninterrupted existence as a Greek city at this time, although with an admixture of Oscan elements. The types of the coins of this city are a female head with a fillet or a Pallas head with Attic helmet on the obverse, and a bull with a human head on the reverse, the latter being perhaps a representation of Dionysus. The full-face head which also occurs here is mentioned above. The alliance of Neapolis with Rome, which left the city complete freedom, appears to have had no influence on its coinage. As Imhoof-Blumer (*Zur Münzkunde Grossgriechenlands*, Vienna, 1887, pp. 222 seq.) has shown, the coins of the Campanians referred to by Head (H. N. 27) were minted in Neapolis and not in Capua, as had been hitherto assumed.

The numismatics of HYRIA have presented many problems. The site of the city has not been exactly determined, but it was probably in the neighbourhood of Nola, many writers even considering it as the original of that city. The last detailed discussion of the subject is by Imhoof-Blumer (l.l. pp. 206 seq.), who has shown that the coins, the inscription of which hitherto read as *Senser* (Head, 36) is in reality *Fenser*, belong to Hyria. He thinks the word is connected with the name *Veseris*, which seems to occur in Liv. 8, 8 as the name of a city. The coins of Hyria have the Pallas head with the Athenian helmet or the full face of Hera on the obverse, and the Campanian bull on the reverse. Head (32) places these coins from 420-340.

Still further in the interior, on the river Volturnus in Samnite

territory, were ALIFAE and PHISTELIA, which minted coins of Greek workmanship but with Oscan inscriptions in the first half of the fourth century. Alifae is the modern Alife; the site of Phistelia is probably in the neighbourhood of Telesse, cf. the *Hist. u. philol. Aufs.* dedicated to E. Curtius, Berl. 1884, pp. 245-258, by Dressel, who has discussed all these questions in detail. Some of the coins of Alifae have the Pallas head and the Campanian bull, Head, 26; for those of Phistelia see the remarks on Poseidonia above. One has the inscription Upsia, Dressel, 253; cf. the note on Laos above.

For Archytas, cf. the article in Pauly's *R. E.* 1, 2, 1481-83, and Lorentz, *De civit. vet. Tar.* Numb. 1833, pp. 38, 39. According to Diog. Laert. 8, 79 he was strategus six or seven times, although the Tarentines did not as a rule appoint the same man for a second time to this office. Strabo 6, 280 says that he *προέστη τῆς πόλεως πολὺν χρόνον*.

CHAPTER XII

LITERATURE AND ART IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTH CENTURY B.C.

THE intellectual life of Greece in the first half of the fourth century moves on much the same lines as in the preceding period, but with certain deviations, which are characteristic of the age and its aspirations. Several of the branches of culture which flourished with such splendour in those days now cease to bear notable fruit, while others exhibit a brilliant development. Among the former poetry comes first, among the latter prose. The class of poetry which was composed for the whole people came to an end; learned poetry, which is destined for smaller circles, for reading and not for recital to a large audience, was only just coming into existence. This distinction between the two kinds of poetry is not as a rule specially noticed in histories of literature, which treat poetry of the same species—epic, lyric, and dramatic—as similar in character because it has come down to us in the same way. The distinction, however, is of great importance. With the Greeks poetry is originally the expression of a festal mood, and intended to be enjoyed in common. This is why it is associated with music. Although poetical works were written at an early period for the purpose of being read, that is, for solitary enjoyment, they were only exceptions; pleasure shared with others was the predominant object. The gatherings at which the art of poetry was enjoyed might

be of a religious or secular character; but even in the latter case they were in some way or other connected with religion. As poetry therefore was an accompaniment of certain solemnities of a definite character, it was not absolutely free in the choice of its form of expression. More than this, its actual existence was not an entirely independent one. For if the interest in these ceremonies disappeared, the poetry itself became extinct. In this way epic poetry died out with the cessation of the interest taken by well-to-do classes in large social gatherings, where the audience wished to listen to the legends of antiquity. Lyric poetry thrived and faded in proportion as certain festivals and assemblies were popular or neglected. Finally the drama was closely connected with the habits and customs of the Athenian people. This explains why epic and lyric poetry and tragedy underwent no further development in the period now occupying our attention. People when they met did not want to hear them, but required something different. The conception of poetical composition as a formal principle had not yet made its appearance. People had not arrived at asking the question—what subject can I treat in this or that metre? This is especially noticeable in the case of tragedy, which only existed as a component part of a public festival. Here not only certain forms, but also certain subjects had been handed down, from which no deviation was admissible. The old myths were treated again and again and, as the modern poets could not for this reason alone compete with the old ones, the famous old pieces were even brought on the stage again, their performance being regulated subsequently at Athens by the Athenian statesman Lycurgus. It would therefore serve no good purpose in a chapter like the present, in which we are dealing with the intellectual culture of Greece, to give a list of tragic poets about whom we have after all no accurate information. Another circumstance which contributed to the decline of interest in tragedy was that

the instruction of the people, which in the fifth century had been undertaken by poetry, was now, owing to the philosophical movement which had engrossed public attention, effected in a more direct and varied manner by prose, as we shall see a little further on.

On the other hand, the comedy, which aimed at providing amusement, was still in process of development. It gradually abandoned the chorus and the parabasis, gave up taking a side in politics—the democracy became aware that the comedy had its dangerous side—and confined itself to delineating manners and character. This species of comedy became afterwards famous under the name of the ‘new’ comedy. Its productions at the time of which we are writing are styled the ‘middle’ comedy, but this middle comedy has no really distinctive character. The most important of its poets were not Athenians; Anaxandrides was a native of Camirus, Alexis of Thuri, and besides the latter belongs rather to the following age. The comedy became a product of the whole of Greece. Lyric poetry blossomed once more for the last time; Philoxenus, who stayed at the court of Dionysius of Syracuse, composed dithyrambs. Timotheus distinguished himself as a musician. He was an innovator in his art; this was the reason why in Sparta the Ephors cut several of the strings of his cithara; the cithara, they held, should have its old number of strings and no more.

This is all we can say about the poetry of this period. It is true that all its productions have perished; but even if they were extant it is not likely that there would be much more to say about them in a general history of Greece like the present. The importance of the literature of this epoch does not lie in its poetry but in its prose. Prose achieved great success in three branches—in history, in rhetoric, and in philosophy. In all three new creations were produced by eminent writers, whose works have come down to us.

The prose of this period was swayed by the representatives

of the new culture, with whom we became acquainted in the preceding epoch, by the rhetoricians and by Socrates, the latter having influenced history as well as philosophy. Prose had many peculiarities at this time, a fact which might even contribute to its being regarded as a substitute for poetry. A prose composition, as we shall shortly see, might be almost as great a work of art in point of form as a poem. But as a general rule it was the requirements of practical life which prose endeavoured to satisfy.

The great prose writers of this age, Lysias, Isocrates, Xenophon, and Plato, possess in addition to this a special importance as the representatives of the main currents of the intellectual life of the time in Athens and in Greece generally, so that we can judge by them to what extent the aspirations of educated Greeks diverged in this period. All four were Athenians, but only two of them, Lysias and Isocrates, devoted themselves to Athens, and Isocrates after all really laboured far more for the whole of Greece. The idea of Greece as a whole was always present to the mind of the two others, although in quite a different manner. Lysias is a man who applies oratory directly to practical life; Isocrates is a rhetorician who endeavours to promote the welfare of the whole of Greece by recommending sound political principles; Xenophon is an adherent of Sparta; Plato is a thinker who would fain remodel every state and convert them into ideal communities. Lysias is the only democrat of the four; the others are aristocrats.

Let us consider these men separately and take the orators first. Lysias, son of the Syracusan Cephalus, was born probably in Syracuse about 445, but came at an early age to Athens with his father; he subsequently migrated to Thurii and finally returned once more to Athens. His family belonged to the *metoeci* class, and was wealthy. The Thirty Tyrants confiscated their property, and put to death Lysias' brother Polemarchus. Lysias himself supported the Athenian

democrats in their struggle with the Tyrants, in consequence of which Thrasybulus proposed that the rights of an Athenian citizen should be conferred on him. This was, however, prevented by his enemies. He therefore remained, as an *ἰσοτελής* (i.e. subject to the same fiscal burthens as the citizens) metoecus, excluded from active participation in the administration of the Athenian state, and he employed himself henceforth in writing speeches for other people to deliver in their lawsuits; in other words, he practised the not very highly respected profession of a logographer. All his speeches are distinguished by simplicity, clearness, and vivacity; they contain a great deal of matter which contributes to our knowledge of the social and political condition of Athens at this period.

We take this opportunity of briefly mentioning two other contemporary orators. Isaeus, a native of Chalcis, was, like Lysias, a metoecus and a logographer. His special branch of study was private law, and he was an authority in cases of disputed inheritance. He had the reputation of possessing a subtle intellect. Demosthenes learnt his art under him. Of less importance as an orator was Andocides, whom we have already come across in the history of the Peloponnesian War and on one occasion subsequently. He was the man who managed to extricate himself from the affair of the mutilated *Hermæ* by ruining others, and who afterwards was so highly thought of in Athens that he was sent as envoy to Sparta in the Corinthian War.¹

A peculiar contrast to these orators is presented by Isocrates, whose long life extended from 436-338 B.C. In his youth he associated with Socrates, and there appears to have been an expectation at that time that he would devote himself wholly to philosophy. But he preferred a practical sphere of another kind. He had also studied sophistry and rhetoric under Prodicus and Gorgias, and after spending some time in composing speeches for other people, he set up as a teacher of oratory and practical wisdom about the year 390. He did

not travel from place to place like the old rhetoricians and sophists; those who wished to study under him were obliged to come to Athens. He took part in politics, not indeed in domestic policy nor in the quarrels of Athenian statesmen, but in everything which concerned the whole of Greece. He was an enthusiastic advocate of the union of all the Greeks: his conviction was that the various Greek states ought to renounce everything in the nature of a selfish policy, and that fighting the barbarians, *i.e.* the Persians, was the most profitable form of activity for the Greeks. It was on these grounds that during the latter years of his life he was in favour of reconciliation with Macedonia, which had inscribed war against the Persian king on her banners. He died after the battle of Chaeronea, at the age of 98, it is said from voluntary starvation. Isocrates' school was very numerously attended. Like the early rhetoricians and sophists, he took high pay; his fee for a course of three or four years was 1000 drachmae. His school not only produced orators like Lysurgus and Aeschines; he also studied the aptitudes of his pupils, and when he saw that oratory pure and simple did not suit them, he directed their minds to branches of applied eloquence which were better adapted to their capacities. In this way he induced Ephorus and Theopompus to devote themselves to the writing of history. Statesmen also, like Timotheus, were among his hearers. Evagoras of Cyprus sent his son Nicocles to be taught by him, and he was on friendly terms with Archidamus of Sparta, Dionysius of Syracuse, and Philip of Macedon. He not only taught the art of speech, but his great orations, most of which served important purposes, were brilliant specimens of his skill. He treated them as works of art of the highest order, so much so that he is reported to have spent ten years on one of them, the *Panegyricus*. This strikes us as unusual in the case of a prose composition, but there is nothing intrinsically inappropriate in treating it as a work of art, and besides Gorgias

had developed prose in such a way as to justify a writer in devoting a long time to the elaboration of a composition of this kind. One of the most important of the rules which had come into use for artistic prose was that of avoiding the meeting of a vowel at the end of a word with a vowel at the beginning of the next; another rule prescribed the regular construction of periods, so as to make their parts correspond and give them rhythmical expression in meaning and in sound (see vol. ii. p. 431). The most famous speech of Isocrates is the above-mentioned *Panegyricus*, which he intended as a companion to the orations delivered by masters like Gorgias at the festival of Olympia. In it he advises the Greeks to attack the Persians under the leadership of Athens, which is portrayed in contrast to Sparta as the greatest benefactor of Greece. The *Panegyricus*, which was written about the year 380, made its author one of the leading men in Greece. Although he censured Sparta on this occasion, he took her side in 365 by putting a speech into the mouth of Archidamus, to the effect that Sparta need not give up Messenia, because it was the lawful property of the Spartans. He was opposed to Athens making war on Philip for Amphipolis. During the war of the League he published his speech on peace, in which he aims at securing the union of all the Greeks even at the expense of the foreign prestige of Athens. The *Areopagiticus* seems to have appeared shortly after this. In it he advises the Athenians to revert to the constitution which in his opinion had existed under Solon and Clisthenes, urging that all would be better if the Areopagus were reinvested with its ancient power. In 346, immediately after the Peace of Philocrates, he wrote his speech to Philip, to whom he earnestly commends the union of Greece and the war against Persia. Finally, he gave a peculiar summary of his views on politics in the *Panathenaicus* (342-339). In this he abandons the usual form of an oration, for the work eventually breaks into a dialogue. We thus see that this form of com-

position, which was so popular at the time, had a great attraction for him when he was nearly a hundred years old. Isocrates is one of the most remarkable figures of an age which was so rich in great men. He was the first publicist in the modern sense of the word. If his political ideals did not meet with the approval of his contemporaries this only proves that he was in advance of his age. Even Demosthenes afterwards adopted the view of Isocrates, and declared that Athens ought never to rule by force.²

We now pass to the Socratic school, of whose importance as philosophers we can only give a brief estimate here. Xenophon, who was born perhaps about 434, came of a well-to-do Athenian family. He was really, both in body and mind, what so many of his political friends falsely boasted they were, a *καλὸς κἀγαθός*. He was one of the most faithful of Socrates' followers, but the desire for an active life was so strong in him that he went to Asia and joined Cyrus as soon as the democratic régime, with which he had no sympathy, was introduced in Athens. It was he who led the mercenaries over the mountain ranges and through the wild tribes to the shores of the Pontus, and afterwards provided for their safety until Sparta took them into her service. He became the friend of Agesilaus, and returned with him to Greece in 394. At the battle of Coronea he fought against his fellow-countrymen, who had exiled him. The Spartans presented him with an estate at Scillus near Olympia, where he lived the life of a country squire, which was specially congenial to his tastes, up to the time when the invasion of the Peloponnese by the Thebans deprived him of his property (370), and compelled him to go out into the world once more. He retired to Corinth. When the Athenians began to side more decidedly with Sparta, they recalled Xenophon from exile. He did not return to Athens himself, but allowed his sons Gryllus and Diodorus to serve in the Athenian army, and the

former fell in the cavalry engagement at Mantinea. Xenophon died about 359.

Some of his writings are purely historical, others convey practical instruction with a historical background. One of his great merits is that he has handed down to posterity a plain and simple account of the method of instruction and the views of his master in the *Memorabilia* of Socrates. It is a record of conversations. Socrates, as we know, had taught by means of dialogue, and all his disciples developed their own or their master's teaching in the same form. This was the practice of Aeschines, Euclides, and Phaedon; of Antisthenes, the founder of the Cynic school, which inculcated freedom from personal wants, and the teacher of Diogenes, the original philosopher of Sinope; and finally of Aristippus, the founder of the Cyrenaic school, which set up enjoyment as the main object of life. Dialogue became the dominant form of literary art, and fully met the intellectual requirements of the Greeks and particularly of the Athenians, who liked every form of competition and were always delighted to look on and listen when any discussion was going forward. The Socratic dialogue, by the way, hastened the decline of tragedy, a point which does not seem to have been hitherto noticed. For in tragedy, especially since the time of Euripides, it had become more and more essential that the *dramatis personae* should converse in a witty and instructive manner. The story was of minor importance, for after all not much novelty could be presented in it, as the same legends were treated over and over again. The interest consequently centred more and more in discussions. These could now be had at first hand in the schools of philosophy, and every one who could not be present in person at the conversations of the philosophers was able at all events to enjoy their reproduction in the written dialogues. The interest which attached to dialogue is shown, for instance, in the introduction to Plato's *Symposium*. In this way educated people lost their interest in tragedy, which

had quite exhausted its rôle of instructor, and the composition of tragedies almost came to an end.

The fifth book of the *Memorabilia* of Socrates is the *Oeconomicus*, in which admirable views on family life are set forth. This book appears to be a glorification of Aspasia by the side of that of Socrates. When we reflect that Aspasia owed her importance to the protection afforded her by Pericles, it is permissible to consider Xenophon's work as a link intended to connect the two intellectual reformers of Athens, the statesman Pericles and the philosopher Socrates.

Of Xenophon's other writings the purely historical works deserve special mention. His *Anabasis*, as a narrative of events of which he was an eye-witness and which are so interesting in themselves, is the first historical authority which we possess. His *Hellenica* has been the subject of much comment. Its censors have judged it by the standard of subjectivity, but in doing so have forgotten that every historian is entitled to exercise his own discretion in his selection of facts, the number of which is endless. The one thing required is that he must not be inaccurate, and Xenophon has not been convicted of inaccuracy in his narrative of the events of the period extending from 411-362. That he was not far-sighted enough to discern the importance of the building of Messene is matter for regret; other omissions with which he has been reproached are, as we have seen above, excusable (p. 14). No doubt he writes from the Spartan point of view, but he blames Sparta when she deserves it. He never uses such vindictive expressions about any one as Thucydides does of Hyperbolus. It is true that he lacks many of the qualities which make Thucydides a great historian. To master a subject as Thucydides did in the case of the siege of Syracuse, was beyond Xenophon. But then we must remember that he did not aim at creating a masterpiece of art like Thucydides. The latter was a pupil of the rhetoricians, Xenophon belonged to the school of Socrates, and all

who hold that every great man has a groundwork to his character which gives a stamp to the whole individual, will agree that this is true of Xenophon, and will value this groundwork even in comparison with that of Thucydides. Xenophon's importance lies in the fact that he applied the simple love of truth, which is the leading trait of the Socratic teaching, to the narration of history. What chiefly prepossesses us in his favour is his great and genuinely Socratic modesty. A man who had brought the Ten Thousand safely back to Greece might have played a great part in political and military affairs. Xenophon had the brains for it. But he never did so, and, it would appear, never wished to do so, evidently because he had no support from his native city. He might have distinguished himself as a leader of mercenaries, but the career of an outlawed captain of mercenaries did not strike him as a particularly exalted one. Hence the rest of his life was spent in the background so far as politics and military matters were concerned. This modesty, which distinguishes Xenophon as a man, reappears in the historian, who relates what he believes that he knows certainly *sine ira*, if not quite *sine studio*, and to whom we are nevertheless indebted for the only trustworthy and clear account of the period from 411-362.²

We now come to the greatest thinker and writer of the age, and of all Greece. Plato, who was born in 428, came of an aristocratic Athenian family, and was a near relative of the tyrant Critias. He was equally gifted in body and mind, highly cultivated, an enthusiastic disciple of Socrates, and an aristocrat in his political convictions, like so many of Socrates' pupils and so many eminent intellects of the age in general. This was why a political career was impossible for him in his native city, especially after the restoration of liberty in Athens. He travelled a great deal in order to add to his stock of knowledge, visited Egypt, and, as we have seen, endeavoured to put his political ideals into practice abroad, at the court of the Sicilian tyrant, being under the impression

that an absolute monarch would be more ready to follow the dictates of reason than the many-headed multitude. But unfortunately neither the crafty Dionysius I. nor the unstable Dionysius II. fell in with this attempt, in spite of Plato's three visits to Sicily, and we shall see later on that Dion, who entered thoroughly into Plato's ideas, was also unable, with the best will in the world, to achieve any success. The Platonic State was not of this world. The only advantage which Plato derived from his sojourn in the West was that he came into contact with the Pythagoreans in Lower Italy, especially with Archytas of Tarentum, a circumstance which was also of importance for his philosophic views. His two last journeys to Sicily, however, were merely interruptions of his career as a teacher in Athens. About the time of the King's Peace, which it was hoped would give the whole of Greece rest after a long period of strife, he had acquired a property near the grove of Academus at Colonus, and it was in the Academy and in his own garden that he directed the studies and exercises of youthful devotees of knowledge. He died in 347.⁴

In all probability his writings were originally intended to be mere memoranda of actual philosophical discussions. But he must have soon reached the stage of treating them as works of art, which were meant to be enjoyed as such. Ostensibly they were records of discussions conducted by Socrates, but it is not likely that they were all considered to be so. Plato's Socrates is as a rule evidently Plato himself. Plato's justification for adopting this form of composition was that he aimed at writing in the spirit of Socrates and at describing conversations as Socrates had actually held them; and in this way a discussion which really took place may often have formed the basis of Plato's creation. Originally he may have been under the impression that he was writing nothing which Socrates might not have said, but gradually he must have arrived at the conviction that his Socrates discussed many

subjects on which the real Socrates never bestowed a thought. But another excuse might have been pleaded. Socrates never meant to impart knowledge; he had merely shown people how to make inquiry, and this demonstration is also the main point in the Platonic dialogues. In addition to this we can see that a change gradually took place in the mind of Plato himself, and that his ideas underwent modification, and it is therefore clear on the whole that of his extant writings some must bear the stamp of earlier and some of later compositions. But we are still a long way from a chronological arrangement even of the most important dialogues.

Plato's writings abound in special passages of importance; but their main interest centres in his famous doctrine of Ideas. The doctrine postulates two separate worlds, the incomplete world of the senses, and the world of perfect types (Ideas). The problem for a man living in the former world is to attain to, to realize, the latter. Plato assumes that a special faculty of memory enables the human soul to assimilate these types. His view is that the soul contains three parts: reason, will, and desire, and it is the first, the highest of the three, which apprehends the Ideas. How it is able to do this without resorting to perception by the senses, and in what relation the general conceptions derived from such a perception stand to the types or Ideas, on these points no precise explanation is vouchsafed to us. Plato himself never made up his mind about them, and besides the problem as stated by him is evidently insoluble. The brilliant theory, developed in various dialogues, that it is possible for man to apprehend the infinite, although everything which he perceives comes to him through the channel of the senses, is one of the many attempts to grasp the inconceivable, which mankind constantly renews without success. Plato also applied his view of the parts of the soul to mankind as a whole, which, like the individual, is to realize the Ideas, and he founded his political system on it. Just as the individual soul consists of three parts, reason, will, and desire,

so all men collectively are divided into three classes: those who are destined for bodily labour; those who serve the community by their will; and those in whom reason predominates. The first are the common people or workers, the second the warriors or officials, the third the wise men and rulers. According to Plato, in the state as it should be each man uses one of these faculties only, and never any other. This gives rise to castes, in which the individual always remains, and which are even to a certain extent hereditary. Whoever is born a ruler or a warrior becomes and remains such; a man sprung from the labouring caste can never rise above it. Each caste has its own separate education which qualifies it exclusively for its special duties. The system is almost a reproduction of the Indian state with its Brahmans, warriors, and people. Plato expounded these doctrines in his *Politeia*, and endeavoured to describe in detail how the life of such a community would work out in practice. The result is communism and the extinction of all individual liberty. He imagined that these dreams might be realized through the instrumentality of a Dionysius. But in doing so he completely misjudged the Greek character, which was strongly opposed to such absolute control over the whole individual when applied not for practical requirements—the Greeks admitted it in that case—but merely to comply with abstract principles. He also failed to see that, whereas institutions of this kind may perhaps be established in cases where a conqueror is dealing with pliable material, they could never be successful with an ancient and highly civilized people like the Greeks, who were accustomed either to govern themselves or to yield a reluctant submission to tyrants for as short a time as possible. When Plato became convinced, towards the end of his life, that even a tyrant could not found his perfect state, he wrote his *Laws*, in which the ideal commonwealth is modified into a somewhat more possible aristocratic-religious state. His

aphorism, that states will never be happy until their kings are philosophers or their philosophers kings, is very true, but the aspiration which it expresses is seldom realized in practice.

We pass over the subjects of Plato's other dialogues, many of which are well known, such as the *Phaedo* and the *Symposium*. His various doctrines are of little importance for our present purpose; the main point is and always will be the tendency which he represents, the pursuit of the *ideal*, a word created by his philosophy. So long as this tendency endures in man, so long as men strive for things which have never existed in the form which imagination gives them, and which are admittedly never likely to be attained, so long as the pursuit of higher and ever higher aims remains the watchword of humanity, so long will Plato's name be held in honour. The particular doctrines of the philosopher are all the less important in this connection, because he himself was honest enough not always to offer solutions of the problems which he stated. In many of the dialogues the discussion closes with the remark that the subject deserves further consideration. In this Plato is not only a genuine representative of the restless aspiration of the Greek mind, but also, and much more than is usually supposed, a genuine disciple of Socrates, who disclaimed the possession of knowledge. He is so in his 'irony' as well. In reading Plato we are sometimes not sure whether he really intends us to accept the apparent result of the investigation. We do not mean by this that he occasionally made fun of his readers; but he often expresses himself so figuratively that if you were to take everything he says in its literal sense you would be very far from a proper comprehension of him. We must not forget that although poetry as such had ceased to enjoy much popularity, the need for it never ceases to assert itself. And in the period under discussion this want was satisfied by the rhetoricians in point of form only, and not as regards subject-matter. Then came Plato's philosophy, which is often simply poetry in the garb of

prose. That it was sometimes so regarded in antiquity is shown by another circumstance. In the old days tragedies had been grouped into tetralogies. The philosophical discussions of the time replaced the drama for the more cultivated classes to such an extent that even Plato's dialogues were arranged in tetralogies, without much success it is true, for the resemblance between tragedy and philosophical dialogue is after all not so patent that the accidental form assumed by the one is bound to reappear in the other. It was mainly through Plato that the study of philosophy became a favourite occupation of the Athenians and of foreigners staying in Athens. He took care to consult the convenience of his hearers. Socrates had stopped and questioned people everywhere, even in unsuitable places, possibly in the sunshine; Plato laid out a shady spot for the regular pursuit of philosophy. The garden of the Academy and the sanctuary of the Muses became one of the sights of Athens.

Thus Athens by her great thinkers occupied a higher position in the intellectual life of Greece in the first half of the fourth century than she had done in the fifth. A democracy, and a high type of one, she became through Isocrates and Plato the great school of aristocratic culture. The student who wished to investigate the nature of things visited the Academy and philosophized in an informal way with Plato; those who wanted to be well equipped for practical life went to Isocrates and paid him high fees for a regular course of instruction. The aristocratic tendency in literature was dominant in Athens in the fifth century, when she was in her prime and at the zenith of her material and intellectual power, in the age which produced the history of Thucydides, the poetry of Aristophanes, and the teaching of Socrates, but in those days Athens was not visited by so many foreigners as in the fourth century. For at the moment when she reached the climax of her intellectual and artistic greatness, the Peloponnesian War broke out, which kept half the

Greek world away from Athens for more than twenty years. It was only after its close that the whole of Greece could thoroughly enjoy the grandeur and beauty offered by Athens. It may safely be asserted that in the first half of the fourth century Athens was a centre which diffused throughout the world a wealth of ideas unmatched by any single city at any other period of history.

Athens thus reigned supreme in the province of the intellect. It was not so in the preceding century. Then we found six centres of civilization in Greece. But now Sicily is overrun by barbarians and tyrants; in Italy the barbarians are gaining the upper hand; and the Dorian districts of Greece are torn by civil war. There remain only Athens, Asia, Thrace, and Macedonia, but the three last are a long way behind Athens. Still we must not forget Eudoxus of Cnidus, the great natural philosopher who propounded peculiar theories of the universe and was also physician and legislator in Cnidus. In the field of art, however, the position is not quite the same; there Asia is conspicuous. Art as a rule flourishes—we do not say, reaches its highest point, for that is impossible without freedom—where wealth is to be found, combined with good taste. And good taste is a gift which even tyrants may possess and semi-barbarians acquire.

In the brief survey of achievements in the province of art which we are about to give we go back into the fifth century, the last three decades of which we have had no opportunity of discussing with reference to this subject. In the history of art we cannot separate these two periods, the end of the fifth and the first half of the fourth century, because there are not a sufficient number of unquestionable originals at our disposal to make the differences, which undoubtedly do exist, quite clear to us.

The first painter of celebrity after Polygnotus was the Samian Agatharchus, who decorated Alcibiades' house with paintings. It was therefore with him that art began to

work for private individuals. Another step in advance was taken by the Athenian Apollodorus, who was the first to paint good pictures on tablets, and in so doing made painting independent of the building. He was called the shadow-painter, and was therefore probably the first to treat *chiaroscuro* as an essential part of painting, and, as has been said, to bring the third dimension on the surface. These two artists worked mainly for Athens, but with their successors, who were natives of Asia Minor, the art of painting becomes the property of all the Greek races alike. Athens lays less claim to it than Asiatic Greece for instance. The earliest of them, Zeuxis, was a native of Heraclea, no doubt Heraclea on the Pontus; he painted many pictures for Lower Italy, but afterwards lived mostly in Ephesus. He was the first to attempt deceptive imitation of still life. His *Helena*, which he painted for Croton, was famous. If he really painted it from five different models, the fact would prove that he possessed but a moderate insight into the nature of the human body and that of art; but the story is probably one of those well-meant but pointless anecdotes of artists, in which the history of art abounds in all ages. His rival Parrhasius was an Ephesian; the paintings of this master were to be found mostly in the eastern section of the Greek world. He painted mythological scenes, and appears to have often taken the expression of the inner life of the soul for the subject of his work. Zeuxis and Parrhasius both made a display of the wealth which they acquired in the practice of their art. They appear to have lived to about 400 B.C. The Sicyonian school produced two other painters in that age, Timanthes and Pausias. The former was famous for his picture of the sacrifice of Iphigenia, of which the Pompeian fresco, which treats this subject, gives us an idea. Pausias appears to have excelled chiefly in small-sized pictures and in scenes of childhood.

Sculpture attains a high degree of perfection. It is really of Athenian origin, but is more practised in the rest of Greece.

The earliest artist of this age is Cephisodotus of Athens, a fine copy of whose Eirene with Plutus in her arms has come down to us in a marble group now in the Glyptothek at Munich. Next comes Scopas of Paros, who is known to have contributed by his plastic work to the rebuilding of the temple of Athene Alea at Tegea, which was burnt down in 395, and also to have executed statues for the famous Mausoleum, the tomb of Mausolus of Caria, who died about the year 351. This temple was built entirely of marble, and fragments still exist of the sculptures of the pediments, which represented the Calydonian hunt on the eastern and the combat of Telephus with Achilles on the western side. Some slabs of the combats of the Amazons in the Mausoleum which have come down to us are ascribed to Scopas. A marble frieze now in Munich, representing Poseidon and Amphitrite with Tritons, is considered as akin to the art of Scopas, as he is known to have treated this subject, and it was his art which first presented the varied aspects of the oceanic deities. As regards the Niobe group, which was placed in the temple of Apollo in Rome, and of which the statues of Niobe and her children, found in Rome in 1583 and now in Florence, are a fine reproduction, it was an open question even in antiquity whether it should be ascribed to Scopas or to Praxiteles.

Praxiteles, son of the above-mentioned Cephisodotus, excelled especially in the presentment of the youthful body. His most famous statue in antiquity was the Cnidian Aphrodite, depicted in the act of laying her robe on the vessel used for the bath. This work had a determining influence on the development of the Aphrodite type in antiquity; the Venus of Medici and the Venus of the Capitol are traceable to it. Of his statues of Eros those in Thespiæ and in Parium on the Hellespont were the most celebrated, and there are statues now in the Vatican and at Naples which give us an idea of the treatment which characterized them. His Apollo Sauroktonos (Lizard-killer), a motive invented by Praxiteles, is pre-

served in several reproductions. Of the resting Satyr, leaning with his arm on a support, there exists a famous replica in the Capitoline Museum. But we also have an original work of Praxiteles, the Hermes carrying the infant Bacchus on his arm, found in the temple of Hera at Olympia in 1877, on the very spot for which the artist had executed it. Perfection of grace constitutes the main charm of this work. Praxiteles also produced portraits and genre-scenes. His creations fully accorded with the sensuous tendency of the age, and exercised great influence on the further development of Greek art. His sons Cephisodotus and Timarchus were also sculptors. Perhaps the sitting statues of Menander and Posidippus in the Vatican give us an idea of their art. It may safely be said that the art of Praxiteles extends into the second half of the fourth century. We shall have to return to the subject of Greek art in this volume, and will then briefly notice architecture and coinage as well.⁵

From the above remarks it is clear that while the literature of the first half of the fourth century is concentrated in Athens, art is more at home elsewhere, and is most cultivated in countries where there is little love of freedom, as in Asia Minor. Under Persian rule it was quite possible to enjoy an art, the strong point of which did not lie in its intellectual power. A Plato or an Isocrates would have been impossible in Ephesus or Halicarnassus.

NOTES

1. Greek oratory. Best book on the subject: Blom, *Die griech. Beredsamkeit*, 4 Bde, Leipz. 1868; see also the chapters in Sittl and Christ.—Oratory is probably the only branch of literature, the comparative study of which, although indispensable for the proper appreciation of the various works, is still in its infancy. The student who knows little or nothing of the great orators of England and France, can only have an incomplete notion of the shortcomings and merits of the Greek orators. A history of ancient and modern oratory would be peculiarly useful for Germany.

A beginning has been made by Alberti, *Die Schule des Redners*, Leipz. 1890.—Speech-writing for other people, which was customary in Athens, supplied excellent practice in the delineation of character. The composer of a speech which another person was to deliver as if he had written it himself, had to completely identify himself with the speaker to produce a good speech; and as a matter of fact Lysias, for instance, who almost always wrote for other people, was famous for his *ῥητορικά*. It thus became the custom in Athens to study character in this fashion, and this proved advantageous to the comedy in two ways; firstly, because many made a practice of it; and secondly, because the people were entertained by it. When the *ἀδύνατος* delivered a speech (Lys. 24) to secure his daily obol, everybody knew that Lysias had written it; the audience therefore in listening to his speech were enjoying a work of art; the *ἀδύνατος* appeared as an actor in a part written by Lysias. I may add *à propos* of this that Blass (3, 449) does not seem to me to have properly appreciated an argument of Weil in favour of the genuineness of Demosthenes' speech against Olympiodorus. According to Blass its style is not good enough for Demosthenes. Weil considers this characteristic a "rouerie du métier," and Blass remarks that Weil has adduced no proof that Demosthenes or any other great orator ever adopted a bad style as a "rouerie du métier." But when a thing is self-evident, it requires no proof. Demosthenes made Callistratus speak in harmony with his character. If Callistratus was a rogue and spoke bad Greek, Demosthenes, who after all was a logographer, was right in making him speak badly and show his rascality to the world. The display of the latter quality might perhaps have injured him, the bad style would certainly not have done so.—The speeches made in the law-courts and on public occasions were all more prepared beforehand than in the case with us. In the speeches in the courts, which also included many political orations, this was due to the fact that a time limit was fixed for them by the *clepsydra*. The orators could not afford to waste valuable time in answering interruptions. Although they often exclaimed to their opponent: "You may speak against me *ἐν τῷ ἐμῷ ὄδαρι*," this was only a *façon de parler*. In the Assembly, however, the orators were sacred persons while they were engaged in speaking. Hence speeches in antiquity did not assume the form of a dialogue with persons interrupting, which many modern Parliamentary speeches have. Dem. Cor. 52 is an interesting exception.

2. For Isocrates cf. Blass, who deals with all points in detail, Sittl, Christ, Schroeder, *Quæst. Isocrateæ duæ* Traj. 1859, and Oncken, *Isocrates und Athen*, Heidelberg, 1862.—A prejudice

exists against Isocrates in many quarters, because he was not an opponent of Philip, which, according to some people, every upright and sensible Athenian ought to have been. Blass (2, 85) goes so far as to say that Isocrates was not a man of a "lofty" or "vigorous" character, because Philip's "treacherous and cruel conduct" did not prevent Isocrates from "having anything to do with him." We shall see that Philip was neither treacherous nor cruel; so there is no reason why Isocrates should not be considered a lofty character; that his character was a vigorous one is shown by his whole life. As regards purely Greek politics the *Συμμαχικός* is specially thrown in his teeth. If Blass (2, 277) bases his condemnation of this peace oration on that of Eubulus, we shall see that the verdict now usually passed on the latter is also unfounded, and that consequently this is no reason for blaming Isocrates. Besides this, people as a rule quite ignore the fact that when Isocrates is reproached for advising Athens to give up the *ἀρχή*, he is in complete agreement with Demosthenes, whom the very persons who blame Isocrates set up as a model. In the year 341 Demosthenes says (Cherr. 42) to the Athenians: *ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ αὐτοὶ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ καταρχεῖν ἀρχὴν εἰς πεφυκότες, ἀλλ' ἕτερον λαβεῖν κωλύσαι*, etc., on which the Weidmann editors observe: "excellent description of the Athenian national character," a remark which is not quite accurate, for the Athenians were just as good at *πλεονεκτῆσαι* as the other Greeks. Demosthenes, however, praises them because they were supposed to have no aptitude for it; consequently if as early as 355 Isocrates held the view that it was not a good thing to aim at the *ἀρχή*, at a time when this opinion was shared by only a few, he undoubtedly gives proof of a vigorous and lofty character.

3. For Xenophon see pp. 14, 15 of this volume. Xenophon is in such bad odour with many writers that Sittl, for instance, (2, 439) actually makes him a moral reproach out of his Themistogenes (Hell. 3, 1, 2), and on p. 442, note 1, quotes two passages from the Hellenica (2, 1, 31 and 2, 3, 21) stating what is reprehensible in them, although neither contains a word of what Sittl finds in them. There is no defence of Lysander in the first, nor of the Spartans in the second. According to von Stern, Geschichte, etc. p. 47, Vater (Leben des Pelopidas, p. 357) pronounces Xenophon to be simply "disgusting." People praise Socrates, but the writer who has applied the principles of Socrates, truth and abhorrence of rhetoric and sophistry, to history, is supposed to have written a book (the Hellenica) which does not even do credit to his character (Sittl, I. l. 441).

4. Plato is a world in himself and the books about him would fill

a library. The latest discussions of Plato, which also notice the earlier works on the subject, are in the writings of Windelband, Sittl and Christ. How widely careful investigations differ in regard to the chronological order of Plato's writings is shown by the fact that the *Phædo*, which Christ (p. 343) places about 388, was, according to Windelband (p. 226), written about 361.—It is curious though little noticed that Plato, just like Pythagoras in former days, was brought into connection with Apollo; people pretended that he was Apollo's son, Vit. Plat. West. 382 quoted by Roscher, Lex. 2535.—For the student of Greek history the *Politeia* naturally has a special significance among Plato's writings, because it was intended to show what the institutions of the Greek communities ought to have been in his opinion. His model is the idealized Spartan state, which becomes a sheer impossibility through still greater restrictions on freedom. In Plato's *Republic*, as in the *Gorgias* with regard to Pericles (vol. ii. p. 210), the principles of cattle-breeding as applicable to the training of human beings (5, 459) once more come under discussion, and the obliging Glaucon, who manages to say yes to every question in a hundred different ways without wearying Socrates or, owing to the delicate variety of Attic expression, even the modern reader, never asks where these beings are to be found who are so superior to the ἀρχοντες and φύλακες as to be able to superintend their development in the same way as men do that of animals. In spite of similar writings of modern times, such as Thomas More's *Utopia*, Bacon's *Atlantis*, Harrington's *Oceana*, Campanella's *Città del Sole*, and the teachings of a Fourier and S. Simon, Cabet was not able to make a practical success of a state of this kind with Europeans in his Icaria; it has only been done by Jesuits with Indians in Paraguay.—A discussion has arisen as to whether the Academy really lent its aid to the support of monarchy, especially of the Macedonian monarchy, in practical politics. J. Bernays (*Phokion und seine neueren Beurtheiler*, Berlin, 1881) assumes that it did, Gompertz (*Die Akademie und ihr vermeinter Philomacedonismus*, Wiener Studien, 4, 1882) has pronounced against the theory, and corrected some details in Bernays' work. The tendency of the school was naturally in accordance with the master's principles, in favour of a strong government. But clear-headed academicians might after all be in favour of the republic for this reason. Of republicans the Academy produced Phocion and the Byzantine Leon; Dion and Aristonymus were doubtful (v. chap. ix.); Chaeron became a tyrant (Ath. 11, 509). In Heraclea both the tyrant Clearchus and his murderers had been pupils of Plato; Blass, *Tyrannis*, 1, 257, 259. According to Dem. Aristocr. 119, 127, Python and Heraclides, pupils of Plato, mur-

dered Cotys; but Python afterwards joined Philip. Plato no doubt learnt much from the Pythagoreans; but he did not, like them, create a political party intended to intervene actively as such. His aim was merely a propaganda of ideas. Of course it may be said that these ideas were of political importance in Phocion's case; but their application to politics was after all the consequence of Phocion's position in general. Co-operation in the Academy was a very pale imitation of that of the Pythagoreans, who moreover do not seem to have formed such a strictly organized political party in the fourth century as they did in the sixth.—We have styled the fourth century the age of prose in literature, as contrasted with the fifth, the age of poetry. The development of France in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries presents a resemblance. As in Greece the poets—Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes—take the lead in the fifth century, and the prose-writers—Xenophon, Plato, Isocrates, Demosthenes—in the fourth; so in France we have Corneille, Racine, Molière in the seventeenth century, and Montesquieu, Voltaire, Rousseau, and Mirabeau in the eighteenth. The drama is continued in Greece in the fourth century, and in France in the eighteenth, but in a conventional way (Crébillon, Regnard), until the new comedy in Greece and the *comédie bourgeoise* and Beaumarchais in France create a new departure. Prose was of importance in France as early as the seventeenth century, and in Greece in the fifth (Pascal, Bossuet—Herodotus, Thucydides), but the prose of world-wide influence does not appear until the following century in both countries.

5. Researches in the history of Greek art crowd so fast on one another nowadays, owing to the numerous discoveries, that even the best specialists cannot always undertake to make use of them where it would seem desirable. I have therefore been obliged to confine myself to what is strictly necessary in the text. The history of painters has been recently treated in detail by W. Klein, *Studien zur griech. Künstlergeschichte, Archäolog.-epigraph. Mittheil. aus Oesterreich xi. and xii.* For Agatharchus, cf. Klein, 12, 87, where the explanation of the words "*scenam fecit*" in Vit. 7, praef. 11 is to be noted. For Apollodorus, cf. Klein, 12, 101, Zeuxis and Parrhasius, *ibid.* 103 seq. Klein shows it to be probable that Zeuxis came from Heraclea on the Pontus. For Timanthes, *ibid.* 11, 212.—The Crotoniates and Helena, Cic. de inv. 2, 1; Plin. 35, 64. The story had evidently originated in popular gossip, to which the rhetoric of later writers added details. Cf. for this chapter and chap. xxix. the minute references in S. Reinach's *Manuel de Philologie Classique*, vol. ii, Paris, 1884.

CHAPTER XIII

ATHENS ABOUT THE YEAR 360

WE now return to political events. After the death of Epaminondas Athens became once more the capital of Greece. The greatness of Thebes had been chiefly due to her great men, while Sparta had ceased to be her old self since the battle of Leuctra. Athens alone had maintained her position, and now commanded general respect. It was Athens who now took up the impending struggle with the northern king, and who continued it even when the conduct of Thebes had led to Philip's invasion of Greece. We must therefore, before dealing with Macedonia, make ourselves acquainted with the condition of affairs at Athens during the period when a collision with that kingdom was in course of preparation. We will first take a retrospect of the events which have been already narrated.¹

At the time of the liberation of Thebes (379) Callistratus was at the head of affairs in Athens, and although his sympathies were more in favour of Sparta, he remained in power. He helped to found the new league. He co-operated with Chabrias and Timotheus, and then brought about the fall of the latter and put Iphicrates in his place. When Thebes had destroyed Plataea and the peace-congress at Sparta had miscarried, Athens again took the side of Sparta, at the outset with good wishes only, and afterwards with deeds. After the battle of Leuctra the Athenian sympathy for Sparta grew

stronger and stronger, and when Epaminondas marched into the Peloponnese Athens sent Iphicrates to the aid of the Spartans. In 369 the terms of the alliance with Sparta were formally settled. Subsequently when Pelopidas had brought over the Persians to the Theban side, the Thebans took more vigorous measures against Athens. First they captured Oropus, which led to the impeachment of Callistratus and Chabrias for neglect of duty; they were, however, acquitted. Then matters grew more serious. The Thebans actually contested the maritime supremacy of the Athenians, and Epaminondas conducted a successful naval expedition in person, the consequence of which was that Timotheus returned to public life, and served Athens in Thrace. The extraordinary boldness of Epaminondas shook the belief of the Athenians in the capacity of Callistratus, and after an unsuccessful attempt to enlist the Arcadians decisively on the side of Athens, his prestige completely declined. He was not, however, ousted from power until after the battle of Mantinea, which satisfied no one in Greece. The particular occasion of his fall cannot be ascertained, but it would appear to have been chiefly owing to the disasters of Athens in the north. King Cotys established himself in the Thracian Chersonese; the Byzantines, Chalcedonians, and Cyzicenes prevented the despatch of grain to Athens, and the Athenians had to conclude a disadvantageous peace with Perdiccas. The greatest annoyance, however, was caused them by Alexander of Pherae. He had created a fleet which carried on piracy in the Cyclades. He occupied the island of Peparethos, and when the Athenians sent Leosthenes thither, Alexander surprised and defeated his fleet. The tyrant actually repeated the *coup* of the Spartan Telentias by surprising the Piræus, and making a rich booty in the *Deigma*, and at the money-changers' tables. This seems to have turned the scale against the popular leaders. The Athenians were determined to be masters of the sea at all events. Leosthenes was condemned to death,

and fled the country. Callistratus himself shared the same fate. His place was probably taken by Aristophon, an elderly man, who had the reputation of being a friend of the Boeotians. We pause at this point to consider the political condition of Athens.

The constitution of the city was the same as in the time of Pericles. The Council, the Heliasts, and the people had the same powers as then; the only change was in the presidency of the Assembly. This was no longer in the hands of the Prytanes, but a Proedros was chosen by lot from each of the Phylae which were not holding office, and from these Proedri again an Epistates, and he acted as president of the Assembly. The object therefore was to limit the influence of the Council. The popular distrust of leading men and fear of their possible violations of the law had increased owing to the oligarchical intrigues from which the city had had to suffer in the fifth century; hence the responsibility of movers of resolutions and of the generals was more strongly accentuated. The number of prosecutions for maladministration and unconstitutional motions increased. We know that there had never been any lack of instances of popular severity against statesmen; Miltiades, Antiphon, and the generals in the battle off the Arginusae were cases in point. But in the fourth century prosecutions and sentences of this kind became more frequent. Even Thrasybulus was in the end on the point of being impeached; Timotheus only escaped sentence of death in 373 through the intercession of powerful foreign friends; Callistratus, who imprudently returned from exile to Athens, was executed. Thrasybulus' friend, Ergocles, was put to death. After the King's Peace, Dionysius and several other generals or envoys were condemned to death, as were subsequently the two generals who had marched to the assistance of Thebes in 379, Antimachus, Timotheus' colleague, Timagoras, the envoy to Susa, and the general Callisthenes, before the battle of Mantinea. At this time it was more

dangerous than ever to serve the Athenian state as adviser or general; Aristophan had to defend himself against seventy-five prosecutions for illegal motions. He was, however, never condemned, and this at all events shows that the accusations were not always successful. It is said that they were often made merely to fill the public treasury by means of convictions; but that is an exaggeration. For it was generally a case of a party question, in which the object was more the downfall of a hated rival than the enriching of the exchequer. The assertion that sycophants often started accusations of this kind to enrich themselves is just as wide of the mark. No doubt there were men of this stamp, who played upon the fear which quiet citizens had of prosecutions, but it must be borne in mind that in public matters the accuser ran the risk of incurring a money fine of 1000 drachmae if he did not obtain a fifth of the votes, and that deterred many from bringing forward unfounded complaints of this nature. On the whole, the evils connected with public impeachments for violation of the constitution do not seem to have been so great as to outweigh the benefit derived from them, which consisted of keeping the responsibility of movers of resolutions constantly before the public mind. The meetings of the Assembly were by no means so disorderly as to invite comparison with the sittings of certain modern Chambers of Deputies. Of course the proceedings were stormy at times, and a speaker was shouted down when the Assembly did not want to hear him; but as a rule the people were strongly imbued with the feeling that they had to be advised by those who were wiser than themselves, and in times of danger they invariably followed the advice of the man whom they looked up to. Besides, there is no instance of any scandalous act of injustice, like that which followed the battle off the Arginusae, in the fourth century up to the time of the Diadochi. Only those who are ignorant of the Athenian constitution can talk of mob-rule in Athens. How little the mob pushed itself

*to Aristotle's effect
that the Athenians
were not so much
as they were*

forward in Athens is shown by the deliberation held after the capture of Elatea by Philip.

But we must not overlook the dark side of the Athenian constitution. It lay in this, that there was no permanent government in existence to ensure consistency in the decisions taken. In Athens the people themselves ruled. Every measure had to be approved by them; no power on earth could prevent the people from undoing one day what they had done the day before; no power on earth could compel them to weigh the consequences of their resolutions. The decision rested permanently with them, and with them alone. One day they would declare that any one who killed Philip should be given up to justice, and the next day, if it so pleased them, they decreed honours for his murderers—always on the motion and responsibility of one individual. They declared war, and fixed the number of soldiers and ships to be sent to the scene of action, and if they did not assign the requisite money out of definite revenues for this definite object, the resolution could not be carried out, and no one was responsible for its non-execution, as no one could take money out of a fund not set apart for the particular object. Or, again, they sent fleets to sea and armies on campaigns, and after a time ceased to vote them supplies, because there was no money in hand. In that case it might happen that no one would feel under an obligation to press for the supply of funds, for every resolution, even if it was only the necessary consequence of another, required a responsible mover, and no Athenian citizen could be compelled to bring forward a motion. In this way it was possible for the governmental machine to come to a standstill at critical moments, and it occasionally did so, as we shall see from the protests of Demosthenes. These evils were less pronounced when a man who commanded universal respect was leader of the State both in council and in action, and more marked when the statesman who had the most influence at home could not take the command in the field. And

this was mostly the case in the fourth century. The people never really trusted the great generals, Chabrias, Timotheus and Iphicrates; they considered them dangerous to the liberty of the citizens, and hence important proposals generally emanated from others. Phocion, it is true, was almost continually strategus, just like Pericles, and statesman at the same time; but Phocion was not followed as Pericles had been. He always served the people, and hardly ever led them. The strategoi had ceased to hold the position which the people accorded them in the fifth century (vol. ii. pp. 201, 202). The duty discharged originally by the archon and afterwards by the strategus, — of making important proposals, — was now performed by the orator, who held no office either at home or in the field. But we may describe the malady from which the Athenian people was suffering in another way. The inspiration of the moment was too powerful. This was the case in the law-courts as well as in politics. In the courts the decision rested with the Heliasts, whose verdict was final and required no reasons; in politics the Assembly controlled every detail. In the legal sphere there was no appeal to a higher tribunal, in politics there was no body empowered to decide details in accordance with the views of the people. Law and politics thus became a series of isolated measures, which at times lacked all reasonable consistency. The drawbacks of this state of things were most marked in foreign policy, which was often conducted by the Athenian statesmen of the time in a grasping spirit and by sophistical means, with the result that the mistakes committed came home with redoubled force. A defective foreign policy caused the fall of Athens.²

The finances of the State were not in such a good position as in the time of Pericles. True, there were still allies who contributed sums of money; but these contributions could never reach the total of the old ones, and the expenditure was if anything larger than in those early days, as now

war was almost always going on in some quarter or another. Hence the direct tax first levied in the year of the Archon Nausinicus (378-7) had become a permanent institution. As a certain period was always bound to elapse before the taxpayers' contributions fell in, it was convenient to have intermediaries who were responsible to the State in the first instance—groups consisting of a moderate number of contributors, each of which had to collect a certain amount of the whole sum, and in which each stood security for the other. In this way the citizens themselves had an interest in seeing that no one evaded the tax, while the government received the money more quickly, and in a smaller number of payments. These associations, known by the name of *Symmoriae*, had been instituted in 378-7 for taxation purposes. A similar course was soon pursued with regard to the *Trierarchia*. As early as the Peloponnesian War two citizens had been allowed to equip a trireme instead of one, because even then there were not so many wealthy people as formerly. In 357-6 real *Symmoriae*, consisting of more than two members, were also created for the *Trierarchia*.³ *Symmoriae*, however, were not so useful for the *Trierarchia* as for the collection of taxes. The trierarch had had to discharge two obligations: he provided the equipment of the trireme, and commanded it in person. He took pride in his trireme. Under the *Symmoriae* system the trierarchy became mostly a question of money, for the command could only be held by one of the trierarchs, who was appointed by the association and who was consequently responsible not only to the State but also to his colleagues. He had the disposal of the property of others, who, if the ship distinguished itself but was damaged, shared the expense but not the glory. This was calculated to discourage patriotic zeal, and it really seems to have done so. Changes were also made in the administration of the finances at this period. Since the disappearance of the *Hellenotamiae*, there had been no supreme financial controlling office what-

ever, although it would have been of great service. A department of this kind is mentioned in the second half of the fourth century by writers and in documents, under different names it is true, but they must refer to the same office. When was it established? Various conjectures have been put forward on this point. As, however, the most important period in finance is the year of Nausinicus (378-7), in which the league was reorganized and changes made in the system of taxation, it is very natural to conjecture that this high finance official was appointed for the first time on that occasion or soon afterwards.⁴ In one instance he is called "administrator of the common revenues," which is an excellent title for an official who among other things had to receive the contributions of the members of the league. This official was always appointed for a term of four years.

An Athenian empire, of the kind which existed in the fifth century, is not to be found in the fourth. Since the time of Nausinicus the members of the league held a much more independent position as regards Athens by means of the Synedri. They had a legal means of coming to an understanding among themselves, if occasion arose therefore against Athens as well. Besides this the existence of the league was of a very fluctuating kind. Hardly a year can have passed without some city withdrawing from it, in a formal or informal manner, Thebes setting the example in the latter respect, while the old contention so uncompromisingly maintained in the fifth century, that secession was unlawful, was even now reasserted by Athens. This led to conflicts, just as in the fifth century. In one respect Athens acted very wrongly. In the treaty she had promised not to hold any property in the territory of the allies; the detested cleruchies were not to be reintroduced. But although this provision may have been observed as a general rule and in point of form, yet in one important place Athens did actually found a cleruchy, and one of the greatest value.⁵ Samos had joined Athens after

the battle off Cnidus, as is proved by its coinage, but had deserted to Sparta in 390. Subsequently it had even received a Persian garrison. But Timotheus conquered the island in 365, whereupon Athenian cleruchs came there and drove out the old inhabitants, who took refuge in various districts of Greece. When after a long interval, as late as 322, the Samians were brought back to their homes by Perdicas, this proceeding was regarded as a restitution of rights. Apart from this illegal possession Athens was still lawful owner of Scyros, Imbros and Lemnos, which gave her an open route to the Hellespont. In 357 she recovered the Chersonese, with the exception of Cardia. In the Pontus, however, the regions round the Bosphorus were on very friendly terms with Athens, and thus the trade with the Pontus, one of her vital resources, was still in her hands. On the Thracian coast-line she possessed but few places, but the whole country was closely bound up with Athenian interests. Pydna and Methone were her allies, and she asserted her claim to Amphipolis with pertinacity, but never obtained it. Her relations with the northern princes of Thrace and Macedonia varied as in the fifth century. Thus Athens still remained one of the great powers of the East. The number of her triremes was considerable. The official figure was 400, and although this was of course never reached, yet no eastern state could boast of a similar naval power. Her best generals were the three whose names have often recurred in this history: Iphicrates the military reformer, Chabrias the victor off Naxos, and the wealthy and amiable Timotheus, Conon's son, who had brought over many communities to the side of Athens. The campaigns, however, were conducted more with mercenaries than with Athenian citizens.⁶ There were two reasons for this, one of a technical, the other of a more general kind. The technical reason was that war had become an art not only for the generals but also for the individual soldier. This is invariably overlooked, and reproaches are heaped upon the

citizens of Athens, which they do not deserve. If the Athenians wanted to have an Iphicrates for a general, it was necessary to provide him with a serviceable supply of good soldiers, otherwise even he could do nothing. This made mercenaries a necessity to Athens from a technical point of view. The more general reason was that the citizens, who after all had other occupations besides campaigning, could not stand the constant wars. Idling in the market-place was not the exclusive occupation of all the Athenians; most of them had land which they had to look after. The Athenian was quite ready to defend his native city, but for a long campaign in a foreign country he had neither inclination nor capacity. The Athenians were in the same position as the colonial powers of the present day, whom nobody blames for using mercenaries to guard their colonies. A standing army of mercenaries was therefore necessary to Athens for a two-fold reason, and those who blame her for it nowadays are simply echoing the speeches of orators who took no heed of circumstances when it suited the object which they had in view for the moment. To serve as oarsmen—which the Athenians had been in the fifth century—was even now much easier for the citizens than to be soldiers. It is true that the employment of mercenaries and their leaders, which had become a necessity, entailed all kinds of drawbacks. The generals felt that they were indispensable and acted more independently than the people liked; the main object of the mercenaries, who served for money, was to be always provided with a good meal. If no money was forthcoming from Athens, they raised compulsory loans from friends. But at the close of the Peloponnesian War much the same state of things prevailed; money had been collected, that is to say extorted, in every available quarter.

It seems that potentates who wished to keep a standing army not unfrequently applied to Athens for the loan of a general, a practice which increased, if not the power, at all events the prestige of Athens.

If the Athenians of those days were ready to follow their generals only in war, and not in times of peace, yet they honoured them in a manner which must have appealed to an ambitious soldier. Of the few statues of men who had done good service to the State erected in the Athenian market-place about the middle of the fourth century B.C., besides those of the tyrannicides, of Solon and of Evagoras, only Conon, Chabrias and Timotheus are mentioned. The statue of Iphicrates was placed in front of the Parthenon in 371. The great generals were to enjoy honours but not influence. The small number of statues of this kind shows also that at that time hero-worship had not spread to the extent which prevailed fifty years later.

The private life of the Athenians of the fourth century is as well known to us through the orators as that of the fifth century through Aristophanes. We are unable on the strength of this knowledge to agree with those who consider the fourth century a period of decay. Immorality was not more general in the fourth than in the fifth century, nor was luxury. As regards the mode of life of young Athenians there was no difference between the age of Hypereides, who defended Phryne in court, and that of Alcibiades. Luxury if anything had rather decreased, owing to the fact that Athens had ceased to have the great political importance which she possessed in the fifth century. Everything was more in the *petit bourgeois* style than in those days. This fact is generally overlooked. Writers no doubt inveigh against the luxury of this period, but what is quoted in proof of its existence? Alcibiades' establishment and Midias' style of living. But Alcibiades' furniture was sold as early as 415, and the worst that even his enemy Demosthenes can say of Midias is that, besides his house in Athens, he had another fine one at Eleusis, that his wife drove about with white horses, and that he used a silver-mounted saddle. There is no trace of large fortunes. That the Athenians had not lost their moral energy is proved,

according to a general consensus of opinion, by their conduct both before and after the battle of Chaeronea. I refer to this subject in a note.⁷ True, one cause of deterioration of morals had arisen since the close of the century—the increase of sophistry. But the harm done was not so great as it might have been, because Socrates and his school had counteracted the teaching of sophistry. Profound reflections, like those of Plato, and practical instruction, such as Xenophon conveyed in his writings, must after all have exercised a beneficial influence. A people which recognized the lofty principles paraded in Demosthenes' *De Corona* as its own, could hardly have been in a state of moral decay.⁸

That the decline of Athens, of which we hear so much, is little better than a fable, is also proved by a careful study of her domestic institutions as they appear, for instance, in Haussoullier's, Foucart's and other writers' works on the municipal life and religious associations of Attica, based on the orators, the inscriptions and other sources.⁹ These researches reveal the significant fact that a healthy system of self-government had penetrated into the smallest circles of society and held its own in every department, to the good of the State, which, owing to the practice in the work of administration thus obtained by its citizens, could perfectly well exist and to a certain extent flourish as a democratic community. This independence appears especially in the government of the Demes, which formed an excellent school for that of the State. The Deme has its property which it administers itself; its revenues are derived from lands, buildings and taxation. They are spent chiefly on objects connected with public worship. The assembly of the Demotae is supreme; the officials, with the Demarch at their head, are only representatives of the Deme and not its rulers; they are elected or chosen by lot every year. The whole financial administration of the Deme is conducted in the assembly of the Demotae, down to the smallest detail. The habit which each citizen thus acquired

of personally deciding the affairs of the community must have materially facilitated the self-government of the Polis. This makes the possibility of the Athenian democracy intelligible to us. The success attending the administration of the Demes had convinced the Athenians that the Polis also could be governed in the same way.

The habit of self-government found further expression in the many societies which met for definite purposes, and were corporations which could hold property. This had already been settled by Solon's legislation. These societies had, as a rule, a religious centre, like the whole community; the members were united by some worship or sacrifice. They were formed for burials, for navigation and trade, for working mines, even for piracy. Social gatherings also existed. There was a club of wits, which met regularly in the sanctuary of Heracles in the district of Diomea, and was so famous that Philip of Macedon offered a large sum for the minutes of its meetings. Of growing importance were the guilds of actors, who styled themselves artists of Dionysus, or simply artists, and were spread over the whole of Greece. There were travelling companies of actors, and permanent ones in the larger cities. They occur in Athens as early as the naval supremacy of this city, in the fifth century. Since that period their importance appears to have continuously increased. A communication, dated about the end of the fourth century B.C., from the Amphictyonic Council to the Athenian Demos, has come down to us, in which the highest privileges are conceded to these artists: personal inviolability, exemption from taxation, immunity from military service, everything to enable them to perform their sacred office; even for debt actors could only be thrown into prison in certain cases. If any injury is done to a Dionysian artist, the whole city in which it occurs is held responsible. Even in the present day actors and singers are not so privileged as they were then in Greece. Just as actors took Dionysus for

their patron, so the philosophers placed themselves under the protection of the Muses. Plato's Academy, which paid special honour to the Muses and was granted corporate rights, set the example of a permanent association of philosophers. In later times the Museum at Alexandria became the model for societies of learned men. These associations were not founded exclusively for common study; common meals were also specified as an object, and hence the social unions of the present day known as "Museen" are based on Greek models. *"Clubs"* Of course men joined associations for purposes of divine worship without any ulterior object. The religious need was keenly felt and was not fully satisfied by the official cults, whether of the State or of the Phyle, the Deme and the Phratry. As the Greeks regarded religion as a State affair, it was the province of the State, if it thought fit, to allow foreigners to worship the gods in their own fashion. The result of course was that natives also took part in this worship. As early as the fifth century Thracian cults had become common in Athens, owing to the constant intercourse with Thrace, among others that of the goddess Cotytto, whose worshippers were called Baptae. The comic poets made fun of this cult as it were something highly immoral. The worship of Adonis was also widely spread in Athens as early as the time of the Peloponnesian War, and the whole city took part in its celebration. The worship of the Mother of the Gods, which was introduced from Phrygia, was one of the most popular in Athens and the Piraeus. There were *metrea* in both cities. The public documents were preserved in the Athenian *metroun*. At the beginning of the fourth century we find mention of the assembly (*θίασος*) of the worshippers of Sabazios, who was connected with the Mother of the Gods. Demosthenes ridiculed this cult in the course of his invectives against Aeschines' mother. The foreign worships were mostly settled in the Piraeus. An inscription has been discovered there of the year 333, giving permission to some people

of Citium in Cyprus to build a temple to the Cyprian Aphrodite, and, by way of justification of the permission, reference is made to the fact that a temple of Isis already existed in the Piræus. The foreign cults—of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria and Egypt—had this element in common, that their exciting ceremonies threw men into a state of ecstasy, in which the worshipper imagined that he was in closer touch with the deity. The Greeks permitted the public propaganda of such religions. The travelling *Metragyrtæ*, a sort of mendicant friars of low character, who propagated the worship of the Mother of the Gods, were notorious in this respect.

The popularity of all these foreign cults was due to the fact that the Greek religion, which consisted essentially of ceremonies, could no longer satisfy the needs of the people. This was the case everywhere in Greece. The Eleusinian mysteries, which were supposed to offer something of a deeper kind, were of course a State institution in Athens; but even these were insufficient for many persons, perhaps for the very reason that the State conducted them. People wanted personal relations with the deity. The result was that there were all kinds of religious communities in Athens. There were simple adherents of the State religion, very many of whom had an external connection with it through the numerous priesthoods; all the good families belonged to this category. Then there were many, especially in the lower classes, whose spiritual needs were not satisfied by the religious services of the State; they took part in foreign worships. Finally there were many who believed that man could attain to comforting truths by personal inquiry. These joined one of the schools of philosophy, of which the Socratic was the most important.

A proof that a healthy state of things prevailed is that the Athenian citizen still lived a great deal in the country. His property was there. He retained his legal connection

with the Deme in which he was registered, even if he lived and had property elsewhere. He frequently had to associate and do business with his fellow Demotae, and for this purpose certain places in Athens were used as a rendezvous for members of the same Deme, such as a barber's shop in the neighbourhood of the market-place. The city of Athens was the seat of government and of the principal worships, the point of union of all the citizens: the Piraeus was the centre of trade with foreign parts, the home of the merchants, the metoeci and foreigners; Eleusis was a religious centre, where well-to-do Athenians had houses of their own. Finally, there were small fortified outposts in Attica, in which the young men performed their military service. They were the scene of an active garrison life, of which the young soldiers were the most conspicuous element.

Although as regards many aspects of civilized life other Greek cities, even in the East, possessed great importance in those days—such as Byzantium for trade, Ephesus for painting and sculpture, Teos for dramatic art, Halicarnassus, Rhodes and Cos for art, trade and eloquence generally—although the stream of culture, which seemed to flow rather from east to west in the fifth century, now ebbed eastwards again; yet Athens still remains the civil, military and intellectual capital and the true strength of Greece, and is generally recognized as the intellectual centre of the Greek world. At this point, however, the Athenian republic is confronted by a state of an entirely different character, by one of the kingdoms of the north.

NOTES

1. For the internal development of Athens and the state of parties from 379-361 cf. the first volume of Schaefer's *Demosthenes*, 2nd ed. Leipz. 1885, also Beloch's *Attische Politik*, Leipz. 1884.—Attic statesmen of this and the preceding age hurled from power and executed (I quote Beloch for the sake of brevity): 388, Ergocles, a friend of Thrasybulus, Bel. 138; then the men men-

tioned in chapter iv., note 8 ; 379, the generals who went to Boeotia on their own account, B. 138 ; 373, Antimachus, the friend of Timotheus, B. 145 ; 368, Timagoras, envoy to Susa, B. 153 ; 362, Callisthenes, B. 159.—Aristophon was impeached seventy-five times and never condemned, Cephalus was never accused of *παράνομον*, Aesch. Ctes. 194. In the year 359 there were prosecutions about the proceedings in Thrace, Sch. D. 1, 160.—For the Oropian prosecution and the raids of Alexander of Phærae cf. Curtius, 3⁶, 779.—For Aristophon see Dem. Cor. 162 ; Aesch. Ctes. 139 ; cf. Schaefer, Dem. 1, 138 seq.

2. Bribery of the Heliasts (*ἑκαῖσται*) is said to have been introduced by Anytus, Plut. Cor. 14. Cf. Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen*, 2, 374. The venality of the Athenians is placed in its true light by L. Schmidt, *Die Ethik der alten Griechen*, 2, 240 seq.—*ἀριστία*, i.e. suspicion, is recommended to the Athenians as a useful quality by Demosthenes, Phil. 2, 24, and Aristocr. 111. They had a tendency in that direction without this.—It is not democracy in itself which is the cause of the many misfortunes of Athens, but the kind of democracy which the Athenian people wanted and maintained, the 'unmittelbare' democracy, as Schäffle (*Encyklopädie der Staatslehre*, p. 310) calls it, i.e. a democracy with no government apart from the people, and in which the people decides every detail as far as possible. Hence it could never develop into what the English call party government, that is a government with each party alternately in power, a system which presents this advantage, that each party can successively satisfy the various requirements of the State, as is the custom in England. In Athens there never was such a thing as a united coherent party responsible for government measures, but only one individual. The consequence is that in Athens the individual is confronted by the unorganized state, and the result of this is that when there is no commanding personality who possesses the confidence of the people for a considerable period of time, like Pericles or Demosthenes, decisions are apt to proceed from the impulse of the moment, as is shown by the concluding period of the Peloponnesian War. I emphasize this fact because it is generally ignored or not grasped with precision in Germany. Thus Westermann-Rosenberg, commenting on Demosth. 1, 244, say that the examples of Olynthus, etc. ought to have induced the Athenians "to finally exclude this party from the government." A government in the sense of a parliamentary ministry, which could have been turned out of office, did not exist in Athens. Government was carried on by *prophismata* ; any citizen who was not *ἀριπός* could propose a *prophisma*. No one could be "excluded" from this government

by the people. Westermann-Rosenberg make this comment in connection with the Third Philippic, which was delivered in 341. At that time Demosthenes had long had the ear of the people. He could bring forward proposals and convince the people. For the way in which the whole people attended to every detail of the administration, see the interesting commentary by Foucart on a "Décret athénien de l'an 352 trouvé à Eleusis" regarding the mode of consulting oracles, in the Bull. de corr. hell. 1889, p. 433 seq. It must, however, be pointed out that there was much at Athens to lessen the drawbacks of decisions taken on the impulse of the moment. The respect for the νόμοι especially tended in this direction. But as these regulated domestic affairs only, foreign policy was more at the mercy of popular caprice, and hence the defects of the system are most conspicuous in this department.

3. The change from the trierarchy to the Symmoriae seems really to have done harm, for the reasons given in the text, and the defects were not removed even by the reforms of Demosthenes; the Symmoriae are introduced in 357-6, at the beginning of the Social War, and the Athenians are defeated at sea; Demosthenes reformed the Symmoriae probably about 340-339 (Gilbert, 1, 354), and the large Athenian fleet lets Philip's few ships slip through the Hellespont. Schaefer (Dem. 2, 375) calls this "incomprehensible"; it seems to me intelligible enough if we consider that the trierarchs were the representatives of a number of joint-stock companies, whose principal anxiety was not to lose their capital.—It would seem that Athenians who possessed less than 25 minae paid no εὐφορία.

4. The chief finance official was appointed in 378-7, according to Fellner, Zur Geschichte des attischen Finanzwesens, Wiener Akad. 1879. He is styled by pseudo-Plut. Vit. X. orat. in a psephisma of Stratocles *ταμίης τῆς κοινῆς προσόδου*, in inscriptions *ὁ ἐπὶ τῇ διοικήσει*. To what extent views differ as to the date of the institution of this office, see Busolt in T. Müller, 4, 160.

5. For Samos, see Diod. 14, 97; Xen. 4, 8, 23; Gilb. 2, 151; Curtius, G. G. 3, 779, 780. C. Curtius has treated this subject specially in the 2nd Progr. Wesel 1873 and Lübeck 1877.—In 353 Sestos becomes a cleruchy, cruelty of the Athenians, Diod. 16, 34; cf. Schaefer, Dem. 1, 164, and 444. That Lemnos and Imbros became Athenian even earlier than is generally supposed, is noted by E. Meyer, Die Pelasger in Attika und auf Lemnos, Philol. 48, 3. For the relations of Athens with Thrace see the treatise by Hoeck quoted above in the notes to chapter vii.

6. For the behaviour of the captains of mercenaries cf. Demosthenes against Aristocrates. They always wanted to command (Ar. 139); Athens often kept them for the sole purpose of lending

them out again; this at any rate was indirectly useful to Athens (Ar. 104). Thracian potentates at war with one another employed Athenian leaders of mercenaries; Chares took service with satraps; v. *infra* chap. xv. According to Dem. Ol. 2, 28 the Athenian generals liked serving in Asia better than in Europe, the reason being that the booty captured by an Athenian leader of mercenaries in Europe could be claimed by Athens, while in Asia, according to the provisions of the King's Peace, Athens could claim nothing; consequently the generals in Asia had perfect liberty to plunder on their own account. Cf. Dem. Cherr. 24 seq. This state of things should not be forgotten in forming an estimate of Alexander the Great. So long as Asia Minor remained Persian, every man's hand in that country was against his neighbour; Alexander was the first to introduce law and order into that country. For the state of feeling among the allies when ἀπόστολοι were sent out, see Plut. Phoc. 11.—Captains of mercenaries and intriguers like Philiscus were honoured by the bestowal of Athenian citizenship, Dem. Ar. 142.—As regards the composition of the armies Demosthenes comes to a very sensible conclusion; he demands (Phil. 1, 4) that a fourth of the Thracian army should consist of citizens. But he has very strange views as to the duties which these citizens are to perform there. According to Phil. 1, 25 they are to be ἐπόπται τῶν στρατηγούμενων, i.e. watch the actions of their generals. This would have brought about a peculiar state of things; it is clear that Demosthenes had no notion of military matters. In Ol. 3, 30 he says that in former times, when the citizens took part in campaigns themselves, they were masters of the πολίτευομένων, of the statesmen, but that now the case was reversed; a similar statement is made in Aristocr. 209.—Statues in the marketplace and on the Acropolis: Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen*, 2, 308 and 1, 584.

7. Curtius refers to the luxury of Athens in vol. 3, 459, 781. But he only cites what I have quoted in the text and this seems to me not sufficient to justify a charge of luxury. My belief is that the contrary, viz. the comparative simplicity of life at that time, is susceptible of proof. Luxury may have been indulged in by large landed proprietors or by wealthy merchants, and it must have been welcome in Athens. But, as Boeckh, Haussoullier (*La vie municipale en Attique*, Paris 1884, p. 67) and others (see also vol. ii. of this work, p. 388) admit, there were few large properties left in Attica in the fourth century; the one mentioned by Demosthenes (42, 5) as forty stades in circumference is an isolated instance. Trade was active enough, but not so important as in the fifth century. Demosthenes (Aristocr. 208) indulges in general exaggerated

phrases, but gives no facts; cf. Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen*, 1, 606. It is a fact, however, that the great artists of the fourth century, painters as well as sculptors, found more employment abroad than in Athens; what form did the luxury assume then? It is a fact, too, that according to Theopompus (fr. 117, Müll.) Chabrias avoided Athens διὰ τὴν ἀσέλγειαν καὶ διὰ τὴν πολυτέλειαν τὴν αὐτοῦ τὴν περὶ τὸν βίον. The other great generals behaved in a similar way. This was why Chabrias liked to live in Egypt, Iphicrates in Thrace, Conon in Cyprus, Timotheus in Lesbos, Chares at Sigeum. The inference is that a display of luxury was not to the taste of the Athenians. And the testimony is of importance because it comes from Theopompus, an opponent of the democracy, who liked abusing it in every way; cf. chap. xv. note 5. Less luxury prevailed at Athens in the fourth century than in other large cities of Greece. It was intellect which impressed the Athenians, not wealth.

8. Alleged degeneracy of the Athenians. According to Curtius in the fifth as well as the fourth century, about 430 and 360 B.C., a deterioration set in, the symptoms of which were even identical, as the following comparison shows:—

Fifth century, Curtius, vol. ii.

Fourth century, Curtius, vol. iii.

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| p. 428: "Decay," "idle and frivolous city-life." | p. 459: "moral decay." |
| p. 426: "within a short space of time the citizens of Athens became a disorderly mob." | p. 459: "want of dignity" in the citizens. |
| p. 427: "the rising generation who had ceased to frequent the palaestra." | p. 458: "the disappearance of the old manners and customs was accompanied by a marked disuse of gymnastic training." |
| p. 431: "cowardly demagogues," "feuds between orators and generals." | p. 461: "the generals . . . exposed to hostility." |
| p. 426: "participation in public affairs became all the more a pastime of the unoccupied crowd." | p. 459: "the assemblies were resorted to for pastime and amusement." |
| p. 592: "many citizens of high culture held aloof from the assemblies." Hyperbols and men of his stamp were destitute of a "liberal education." | p. 459: "only men destitute of a higher culture and of a liberal education led by popular orators." |

About the years 430 and 360, therefore, perfectly similar signs of moral decay make their appearance. This could only be possible

if a great moral revival had taken place in the interval. In the intervening period the young men must have once more frequented the palaestra, orators and generals must have lived in sweet harmony, and men of liberal education led the people. When did this take place? We are not told. But in that case the description in vol. iii, pp. 458-461 is pointless, and the second period of deterioration about the year 360 is a fiction. Curtius, however, quotes other facts from the fifth and fourth centuries which justify us in drawing conclusions widely different from his. In the fifth century he praises the "moral soundness" of the heart of the community when the Four Hundred were overthrown, in the year 411 (2, 734); in the fourth century he commends the attitude of the people after the battle of Chaeronea, which recalls the periods of the battles of Marathon and Salamis (3, 701). But to whom did the city owe the glory of having behaved so well in such difficult positions? In the year 338 to the democracy, and in the year 411 to the bitterest opponents of the 'liberally' educated oligarchs. The only certainty in this section of Athenian history would therefore be that whenever a distinctly perceptible elevation of moral tone appears, it is due to the democrats. The revolt of the Athenians against the Thirty (vol. ii, pp. 533, 534) proves the same thing, and what is still more remarkable, the history of the third century as well. Droysen (*Hellenismus*, 3, 228 seq.) cannot sufficiently praise the moral condition of Athens in the Chremonidean War (266-263). The people once more display a spirit worthy of Marathon. And, according to Droysen, it is just the 'masses' who behave so well. If therefore it is established that in the serious crises through which Athens had to pass in 411, 403, 338 and 266 it was the democracy which appeared to the greatest advantage (the most striking proof of a servile frame of mind, the 360 statues of Demetrius of Phalerum, was furnished by the citizens of the years 317-307 consisting exclusively of well-to-do men), are we not bound to admit that in those centuries in which many writers, on the strength of general phrases of the orators, pronounce the Athenian people to be in a state of moral decline, it really maintained a high standard of moral capacity? How deceptive the application of supposed signs of deterioration is appears from the two following examples: (1) Curtius (3, 459) adduces as a proof of the degeneracy of the Athenians of the fourth century that the orators appear before the people "actually with bared shoulder." This seems a serious matter. But who did it? Not Aeschines, nor Phocion, nor the partisans of Macedonia, but Demosthenes and his friend, the dissolute Timarchus (Sch. D. 2, 335), and Demosthenes even ridicules those who demand that the orator shall not bare his

shoulder (*περὶ παραπρ.* 251); (2) Curtius says (3, 467): Treaties are now made "without the intention of keeping them." Bad enough, no doubt, but the same thing was done by no less a person than Demosthenes in the case of the Peace of Philocrates (Sch. D. 2, 303). Consequently if these two criteria were of importance, they would prove that it was not the Athenian people who were demoralized, but the anti-Macedonian party. But even that would be an over-hasty conclusion. The practice of concluding a peace, with the intention of breaking it again at the first opportunity, has prevailed in all ages, and the attitude of Demosthenes in his speeches only shows that he excelled and wished to excel Aeschines in the art of *ὑπόκρισις*. But even in more important matters the Athenians at all periods of their history behaved in such a way as to justly incur a similar censure. Examples of attacks of orators on generals occur in the case of Xanthippus' opposition to Miltiades and that of Lysicles to Lysicles, and yet Lysicles is counted a representative of the old school. Lysicles' denunciation of this general in Diod. 16, 88 is not so much a proof of the latter's treachery as a commonplace rhetorical contrast between the general who is still alive and the citizens who have fallen under his leadership. It is just the sort of thing that a man would have to say, without adducing any facts, to hound on the people.—In the preceding passage I believe I have proved two points: (1) that the supposed degeneracy both in the fifth and fourth centuries is impossible. Deviation from the old paths of course occurred in Athens as everywhere else, but it came about gradually. Sophistry and rhetoric promoted it. (2) In Athens democracy is not an element of decay, but on the contrary a factor in the moral preservation of the city. Moral decline appears more in the conduct of individual leaders of the people than in that of the people as a whole. It is a mistake to suppose, as is sometimes done (by Rauchenstein on Isocrates, p. 20, Weidmann and Curtius, G. G. 3^e, 674, 675), that Demosthenes 'ennobled' the Athenian people for a brief space; his own principles were, as we shall see, not always of a lofty kind. It is of some use to point out the true character of the Athenian people in an age in which learned circles exhibit a marked aversion to democracy in general; cf. for instance *Histor. Zeitschrift*, 1889, p. 470, and by way of contrast the remarks of Schmidt, *Ethik d. Griechen*, 2, 250 seq.—The defeat of Athens by Philip was not due to the moral condition of the Athenian people.

9. Haussoullier's book, quoted in note 7, is a very valuable contribution to our knowledge of Athenian manners and institutions. Cf. also Foucart, *Les associations religieuses chez les Grecs*, Par. 1873; Lüders, *Die dionysischen Künstler*, Berl. 1873. The earliest

appearance of the artists of Dionysus seems, according to Toepfler (*Att. Genealogie*, Berl. 1889, p. 183), to be mentioned by *Ath.* 9, 407: καθ' ὃν χρόνον θαλασσοκρατοῦντες Ἀθηναῖοι ἀνῆγον εἰς ἄστυ τὰς νησιωτικὰς δίκας.—For the strictly organized schools of philosophy see von Wilamowitz, *Antigonos von Karystos*, p. 263 seq., and the article *Heros* in *Roscher's Lexikon*, 2534 seq.—For Athenian education see P. Girard, *L'éducation athénienne au 5 et au 4 siècle av. J.-Chr.* Par. 1889. Life in the Piræus and in Athens is described by Wachsmuth, *die Stadt Athen*, vol. II., Leipz. 1890. For the *Metros* cf. the same work, pp. 158 and 327. The city 'μήτηρ' is an unwelcome importation from Phrygia.—The Athenian democratic constitution proves itself a sound one by the fact that it was able to administer the finances of its small associations with integrity. We do not hear in Athens of the misuse of municipal funds for private purposes which has lately come to light in the states of southern Europe, where the moral corruption engendered by centuries of despotism has debased public spirit as well. In contrast to this state of things modern Greece seems to be a worthy follower of ancient Athens, especially in the *λευτοργίαι* of its well-to-do citizens.

Between the Athens of the fifth and fourth centuries there is a difference which is remarkable enough but which generally escapes notice. In the fifth century we find a struggle between oligarchs and the democracy, carried on by the former with violence and intimidation; we need only recall the murder of Ephialtes and of Hyperbolus, the *Hetairiai*, the Four Hundred, and the Thirty. It is a sort of aristocratic mobocracy, which the people counteract mainly by legal methods, in a few instances also by brute force. In the fourth century violence has disappeared. The democracy is thoroughly disciplined; it commits no excesses; riots never occur; the people remain collected, cool and dignified in the most difficult situations; there is no trace of mob-rule. The people act with great severity, but only against responsible leaders. So far it is an ideal state of things. But then comes the dark side of the picture. Everything is decided by the courts, and this is good in itself. But how do things occasionally go on in the courts? The *Heliasts*, who have to apply the laws only in accordance with their own conscience, and who have no notion of jurisprudence, are often bamboozled by the different parties with the aid of sophistically educated logographers and advocates. And this mode of doing

business appears also in politics and in the conduct of foreign affairs, as the following chapters will show. Demagogues, who are simultaneously engaged in composing speeches for money on behalf of any chance person, treat foreign powers as parties to a law-suit. The people are nursed in the delusion that they have only to give a decision and then pay money and provide troops to get what they want; conquest by stratagem, as in the case of Amphipolis, is the favourite mode of action. The rival powers are painted as black as criminals in the dock, and yet the Athenians are just as grasping in foreign affairs as their opponents. Rhetoric and sophistry are far too powerful. But we must remember that the fifth century was the age of poetry, and the fourth that of prose; this was bound to show itself in other departments besides that of literature.

CHAPTER XIV

THE MACEDONIANS

THE most complete contrast to the Athenians within the confines of the Greek world is presented by the Macedonians.¹ We count them as Greeks in the wider sense of the word; their language cannot have differed much from the dialects of Greece, and there is not the slightest reason for assuming that their customs were more unlike those of the regular Greeks than those of the Epirotes or Cretans for instance. But as regards their civilization they represent the extreme end of a chain, the first link of which is Athens. Athens developed certain genuine Greek peculiarities in a marked manner, especially individualism in all departments, from the highest to the lowest, and city organization. In Macedonia, on the other hand, a peasant population is the prevailing element, and the result is that the monarchy and the nobility have a preponderance of power. It has been said that the Macedonians are Greeks who have not got beyond the Homeric standpoint, and there is a great deal of truth in the remark. With Homer, as in Macedonia, personal authority predominates, and there is no such thing as written laws. Alexander's preference for Homer had a deeper root than mere literary taste; he felt himself at home in the Homeric world, which seemed lost in the haze of a distant past to a Demosthenes. We will begin by taking a rapid glance at the peculiarities of the Macedonian country and people.

Thessaly is bounded on the north by a country of precisely similar formation. It is divided from Illyria by the continuation of Mount Pindus. Just as Illyria is in many respects a northerly repetition of Epirus, so Macedonia is a similar counterpart of Thessaly. Epirus and Illyria are a succession of river valleys, each of which has a separate connection with the sea. Thessaly and Macedonia are both great basins formed by connected rivers which have only one exit to the sea. The only difference is that Macedonia is larger than Thessaly and that it contains two large rivers and one small one which form the basin, and which flow into the sea separately, though close to each other. They are the Haliacmon in the south, the Axios in the north, and the smaller Ludias between them. The mouths of the two former are not nine miles apart; the whole therefore forms, as it were, the delta of a single and larger river. The Axios also has an important tributary, the Erigon. East of the Axios watershed runs a chain of mountains which terminate in the promontories of Chalcidice; further east comes the Strymon, and lastly the Pangaeum range, opposite which lies the island of Thasos. From Chalcidice onwards we are in Thrace proper. But the west coast of Chalcidice on the one side and the east coast of Thessaly on the other form the shores of the Thermaic Gulf, in the background of which Macedonia begins. Opposite the Thermaic Gulf are the islands of Sciathus, Peparethus, Icos and other smaller ones, which to a certain extent close the entrance of this bay. The actual coast of Macedonia is not a long one; it extends from Therma on the east to the foot of Mount Olympus on the west. It is true that the cities on it are not originally Macedonian; at all events we know of them only as Greek settlements. Only the interior is wholly Macedonian in early historical times, which of course is quite compatible with the coast having been also Macedonian in remote antiquity. The interior is more open to the sea than Thessaly is through the narrow vale of Tempe, and we may therefore say that it was easier for Macedonia to

take part in the events of the great world than for its southern neighbour. The power which held the interior as well as the coast land of the three rivers, was more tempted to engage in maritime pursuits than the Thessalians, who really possessed good harbours only on the Pagasacan Gulf. The Bottiaeans, who were said to be of Cretan origin, lived near the sea; farther in the interior, in the upper valley of the Haliacmon, were the Elimiotae; the mountain region between the Haliacmon and the Erigon was occupied by the Eordaeans; the Lyncestae dwelt on the Erigon; between the Erigon and upper Axios were the Pelagonians, on the upper Axios the Paeonians, and lastly on the border-land between Upper Macedonia and Illyria as far as the Haliacmon the Orestae. Such were the tribes which were known under the general name of Macedonians.

They were not originally a united state.² In the various cantons chiefs bore sway, some of whom, however, possessed considerable power. To this category belonged the rulers of the Lyncestae, who boasted of their descent from Corinthian Heraclidae. Of still greater prestige were the Argeadae, who probably ruled at first over the Orestae, and who pretended to be Argive Heraclidae, evidently for the sake of the name, and on that account styled themselves Temenidae. The name of the first immigrant of this family was said to have been Caranos, which probably means chieftain. This is the family which in time acquired supremacy over the whole of Macedonia. It founded a capital in Edessa or Aegae on the upper Ludias, not far from the sea, on which the Macedonian princes henceforth looked down. The first Argead who was famous was Perdiccas, after 700 B.C. These kings had not only to contend against the separatist tendencies of the various districts, but also against the attacks of foreigners, especially of the Illyrians. Under Amyntas, the fifth successor of Perdiccas, the Persians tried to subdue Macedonia. On that occasion his son Alexander managed to beat them off. Sub-

sequently, however, in 480, when the Persians overran the country, this same Alexander, who had now become king, joined them, but at the same time was able to impress the Greeks with the idea that he was really on their side. He gave proof of this also by his love of Greek culture. And Greek civilization was by no means something intrinsically foreign to the Macedonians. The latter, who evidently formed a connecting link between the Phrygians and Thracians on the one side and the Epirotes and Thessalians on the other, used coins with Greek inscriptions as early as the sixth century. Alexander took part in the Greek national festivals and was considered personally as a Greek. He removed his residence to Pydna, where he was close to Thessaly. As the Macedonian rulers thus drew closer and closer to Greece in every way, conflicts with the latter could not fail to ensue. They began under Alexander's successors, the most important of whom was the Perdiccas whom we have met with in the history of the Peloponnesian War. He appears to have reigned from 455 to 413. Perdiccas was an extremely cunning and unscrupulous monarch, whose sole idea was to secure and extend his power, and who was alternately on good and bad terms with the Athenians, just as his interests seemed to demand. His successor was Archelaus, who cut his way to the throne by several assassinations, as was the general custom in princely families—the only difference being that he did more in this respect than many others, as he put to death an uncle, a cousin, and a half-brother, the last of whom ought really to have succeeded to the throne. He then ruled with skill and energy, and in accordance with Greek civilization. He built cities, made roads, organized his army, and became especially famous in Greece by attracting poets and artists to his court, like Polycrates, Hiero of Syracuse, the Pisistratidae and other potentates. Agathon, the epic poet Choerilus, Timotheus the musician and the painter Zeuxis visited his court; Euripides died there. His capital was Pella below

Aegae, but he also constructed a fortified place of his own, Dion, at the foot of Mount Olympus. He reigned till 399, when he was murdered. After his death there were once more violent quarrels for the throne. His next successor was his son Orestes, under the guardianship of a certain Aeropus, who was probably a prince of the Lyncestae, a member of a family which was often hostile to the Argeadae. Aeropus murdered the king and reigned himself. He died in 392, and after a period of internal disturbances, which is extremely obscure to us, was succeeded by Amyntas, who appears to have been a great-grandson of King Alexander, so that with him the genuine Temenidaean dynasty seems to have once more come to the throne. But now began a worse period of troubles than ever. Illyrian invasions compelled Amyntas to take flight, and a certain Argæus, of whose descent we know nothing, became king. But two years afterwards Amyntas returned from Thessaly and again resumed the government. He married Eurydice, the daughter of the prince of Elimia. He was in alliance with states who happened to be powerful just then, for a time with Sparta, and subsequently with Jason of Phœræ. Soon after 370 he died leaving three sons, Alexander, Perdicas, and Philip. Alexander succeeded him in the government, but his brother-in-law Ptolemaeus, who was in league with Eurydice, revolted against him. Thebes intervened and Pelopidas brought about a treaty, by which Ptolemaeus received the city of Alorus, but acknowledged Alexander as king. Soon afterwards, however, Alexander was murdered and Eurydice married Ptolemaeus, who now reigned as guardian of Perdicas (368-365). He was attacked by a certain Pausanias. Eurydice took refuge with Iphicrates, who happened to be in the neighbourhood, whereupon others appealed to Pelopidas, who once more effected a treaty which lasted no longer than the previous one. Among the hostages given by Ptolemaeus to the Thebans on this occasion was probably Philip, the youngest brother of the king, who soon

became so famous, and who spent some time in Thebes. In 365 Perdicas murdered Ptolemaeus and reigned alone. He made war on Olynthus in conjunction with the Athenians under Timotheus. But at this point the Illyrians invaded the country and slew the king and 4000 Macedonians. In this way the youngest prince, Philip, became king (359).³ It is true that Perdicas' son, Amyntas, ought really to have taken over the government, but Philip was powerful, and his rival still a child, and in families of this kind they were never so very particular about such matters. It was a great deal that Philip did not put his nephew to death. The omission was corrected by his son Alexander after his accession to the throne. Henceforth Philip is the central figure in Greek history.

The Macedonians were a vigorous peasant race, keen soldiers and hunters. A man who had not killed his boar could not take a seat at a banquet with the men; those who had never slain an enemy wore a cord round their waist. They respected their kings, but sometimes preferred to follow the princes of the various tribes. The nobility enjoyed great prestige; many nobles joined the king's suite as friends (*hetairoi*), so as to be first in sharing danger and booty in his campaigns. This reminds us of the *comitatus* of the Germani. Their manners and customs were rude. The kings often had several wives; some of the latter came from still more uncivilized neighbouring peoples and brought their manners and customs into Macedonia. Their barbarousness was increased by Bacchic ceremonies and mysteries, some of which may have come from Thrace. Drinking was universally prevalent. There is a certain resemblance between the Macedonians and the Germani at the time of the migration of races: great valour, rude customs, and love of drinking are found in both. Such was the people which conquered the Greeks, although under the leadership of kings who were themselves recognized as Greeks.⁴ The conflict originated in a struggle for supre-

macy on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace; thence it penetrated into Greece.

NOTES

1. For Macedonia, see O. Abel, *Makedonien vor König Philipp*, Leipz. 1847; A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, vol. 2, chap. i.; Curtius, *Gr. G.* 3ⁿ, chap. vii. with copious notes; Pauly, *R. E.*, Macedonia.

2. An important passage on the early history of the Macedonian dynasty is Thuc. 2, 99. Two different versions, the Perdiccas legend and the Caranus legend, Curtius, l. l. 773. *Kάραρος* in Asia Minor, Xen. *Hell.* 1, 4, 3.

3. The war in Thrace against Olynthus carried on by Macedonia and Athens is referred to specially by Dem. v. Aristocr. 149 seq.; cf. Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 13, 14. Timotheus captured Potidaea and Torone, Isocr. *Antid.* 108. Athens was unsuccessful against Amphipolis at this time, Schol. *Aesch.* 2, 31. Death of Perdiccas, Diod. 16, 2. For the early part of Philip's career, Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 11 seq. It is not certain when he was in Thebes, Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 13; according to Just. 6, 9 and 7, 5, he was there three years.

4. That the Greeks did not consider the Macedonians as barbarians, although 'Hellenes' and 'Macedonians' are contrasted (Isocr. *Phil.* 19), is proved involuntarily by Demosthenes in *Phil.* 3, 31, where he states that οὐδ' ἀνδράποδον σπονδαίων ἦν πρότερον from Macedonia, which stripped of its rhetoric means that Macedonia did not provide the Greeks with slaves, the reason of which, of course, was that the Macedonians were not counted barbarians like the Thracians, Phrygians, etc.

Crete presents a great contrast to Macedonia in one respect, and many analogies in others; in legend it is connected with Macedonia (the Bottiaean Cretans, according to Strabo, 6, 279). The contrast consists in their form of government: a monarchy in Macedonia, republics in Crete; the similarity is in the low standard of civilization in both countries. In historical times both did nothing for Greek culture in general until the fourth century; Macedonia also did nothing in prehistoric times, but Crete a good deal. The fame of Crete rests on its legendary period; the only two famous Cretans who are mentioned in historical times, Thaletas and

Epimenides, are also more legendary than historical. The Cretans never took part in Greek enterprises. On the other hand, they were very successful in art, in historical times with their beautiful coins, although these, as Head and Gardner agreeing with O. Jahn remark, "always present a substratum of barbarism"; cf. Gardner, *Types*, IX. 1-25, pp. 160-167. These coins exhibit no allusions to historical events, but are of great interest as religious documents. They present gods and heroes unknown from other sources, such as Felchanos (Zeus); the deities have a preference for sitting upon trees; the execution is partly good, partly rough. It is clear that the famous law of Gortyn also has something very primitive about it, and yet it would appear, if Svoronos (in his treatise on the *Λέβητες*, *Bull. de corr. hell.* 1888) is right, to be of later date than the middle of the fifth century *n.c.* Crete is to be compared in Greece with Thessaly, Acarnania, Aetolia, and Arcadia, all agricultural and warlike countries with a comparatively low standard of civilization, while it is a notable fact that both Thessaly and Arcadia, like Crete, set a high value on beautiful coins.

CHAPTER XV

PHILIP OF MACEDON—ATHENS AT WAR WITH HER ALLIES (359-353)

THE new king of Macedonia did not at first seem destined to become more powerful than any of his predecessors. He had to use all his mental ability not to succumb, as so many of them had done, so great were the difficulties which he encountered. On his accession to the throne in 359 he was threatened from abroad by the Illyrians, the Paeonians and the Thracians; in his own country he had a rival in the above-mentioned Argæus, who was supported by the Athenians. But Philip's brilliant natural talents had been developed in the school of adversity and by his residence in Thebes, where he had become familiar with Greek ways and with their splendid military institutions. He at once increased the efficiency of the army by reforms in its organization, especially by the creation of the famous Macedonian phalanx, the weight of which was due to the compact massing of men armed with long lances. He then got rid of Athens for a time by abandoning Amphipolis, which was still coveted by the Athenians, the consequence of which was that if they wanted to obtain possession of the city, they had to apply not to him but to the citizens, who were just as little inclined to surrender their freedom as in former years. He next defeated the claimant to the throne, the Paeonians and the Illyrians, and in doing so actually captured a piece of Illyrian territory. He now devoted

his energies to securing his kingdom in the direction of the sea coast. It was only by possession of this that he could escape the constant interference of the Greeks in the affairs of his own country. But here he was bound to come into conflict with these very Greeks, not only with the independent communities settled there, of which the Amphipolitans and Olynthians were the most powerful, but also with the Athenians, who now attached all the more importance to their influence on the coast of Macedonia and Thrace, because their Asiatic possessions were irrevocably lost to them.¹

In the year 359 the leading statesman in Athens was Aristophon, who endeavoured to maintain the old power and prestige of the city by means of able generals. Of these Timotheus was the most loyal and zealous servant of Athens; others, notably Chabrias and Iphicrates, were more engaged on foreign service. These men had acquired such great fame that other powers wished to make use of them, and they themselves liked to serve foreign states, because they enriched themselves more quickly in this way and could even form small kingdoms of their own, like the Italian *condottieri* in the Middle Ages. Chabrias was much occupied in Egypt; Iphicrates at first in the service of Persia against Egypt and afterwards in Thrace, where King Cotys was his father-in-law. But Aristophon's special favourite was Chares, a man of great strength and daring, who was proud of his scars and gained popularity with the soldiers by allowing them all possible license off the field of battle. Charidemus of Oreos was a man of similar character, who accepted service in every quarter which held out prospect of gain. He also was married to a daughter of King Cotys, and after the murder of this prince he helped his brother-in-law Cersobleptes to keep his kingdom. They fought together against the Athenians, and were successful as long as the latter were led by Cephisodotus. But then Chares was appointed general of the Athenians, and he forced

Cersobleptes to surrender the Chersonese, with the exception of Cardia, to Athens.²

The result, however, was quite different in those parts of Thrace where they had to deal with Philip, in districts which in themselves were not nearly so important to Athens as the shores of the Hellespont, but to which the Athenians clung all the more doggedly because here their honour was at stake. Philip once more attacked Amphipolis, and he did so, it is said, at the request of Athens herself. The Athenians always claimed this city, a claim which was conceded to them by all those powers to whom it did not belong, but not by the inhabitants themselves, who had successfully defended their freedom even against such able generals as Iphicrates and Timotheus. As the Athenians could not obtain the city either by kindness or force, they conceived the idea that Philip should hand it over to them. In return he was to receive the city of Pydna, an ally of Athens, at their hands. Philip had ostensibly agreed to this arrangement. But it had been a secret agreement, the purport of which could not be officially communicated to the Athenian people, because it would have been neither wise nor decent to make public that Athens, in order to gain possession of an important city which did not want to come under her rule, was ready to betray another independent city and her own ally to Philip. Consequently when Philip marched against Amphipolis, the Amphipolitans applied to Athens for help. The Athenians, however, counted on receiving the city at once from Philip, and rejected the appeal of the Amphipolitans. Philip now captured Amphipolis in 357, but kept it for himself, and took Pydna into the bargain, without waiting for the Athenians to give it to him, which certainly would have been extremely difficult for them. The Athenians became greatly excited over this and renewed the war with Philip, in 357. Isocrates appears to have exerted himself to convince his fellow-citizens that there was no valid reason for such a step, and probably his view was the correct

one. At any rate the cause of the renewal of the war—annoyance at the failure of a treacherous design—was not calculated to make the Athenians appear in a favourable light. This was soon brought home to them.³

Discontent had long prevailed among their allies. The original object of the league, protection against encroachment by Sparta, had long since been lost sight of. Athens ought therefore to have spared the feelings of her allies all the more. But she did not do so, and her opponents turned it to account. Thebes in her palmy days had intrigued with all her might against Athens, and now Mausolus, the ruler of Caria, who had removed his capital from Mylasa in the interior to Halicarnassus on the coast, and who influenced not only Rhodes and Cos but even Chios, stirred up disaffection among the citizens of these states. When therefore Athens plunged into a fresh war with Philip out of disappointed ambition, the malcontents thought that the proper moment had come for declaring that they would have nothing more to do with Athens, and they revolted, the movement being joined by the important city of Byzantium besides the above-mentioned states (357). Athens would not let them go. She endeavoured to reorganize her navy by applying the *Symmoriae* system to the trierarchy, and sent fleets to the scene of action. But they were unsuccessful. The best Athenian generals came to an untimely end. First of all Chabrias met his death off Chios. Then a fleet commanded by Iphicrates, his son Menestheus and by Timotheus, joined a second under Chares; but the leaders of the two divisions were so disunited that Chares gave battle alone and was defeated, whereupon he lodged a complaint against his colleagues in Athens to save himself. He was now entrusted with the conduct of the whole war. But he accomplished nothing more, let the enemy do what they pleased, and, as no money was forthcoming from Athens, entered the service of the satrap Artabazus, who had revolted from the king of Persia; by this means, at all events, the general and

his soldiers enriched themselves, and the Athenian people feasted on cattle taken as booty by Chares. The Persian king, however, complained of Chares in Athens, and he was recalled. The Athenians saw that the revolted allies could not be subdued and concluded peace with them, in the year 355 B.C. Thus Athens had lost her best allies by trying to gain more subjects. Rhodes and Byzantium had no doubt become so powerful that their desire to be perfectly independent is quite intelligible; in the course of the fourth century they stood famous sieges with success. Of the other places mentioned Cos was in a specially thriving state, and even Chios remained permanently independent. The issue of the struggle therefore was partly due to the circumstances themselves. Athens still retained a small following, which contributed an annual sum of 45 talents.⁴

This unfortunate war had several consequences. The first was the prosecution of the generals accused by Chares. Timotheus was condemned to pay a fine of 100 talents. He went to Chalcis, where he soon died. Iphicrates and Menestheus were acquitted. But Iphicrates' career was also at an end, for he also died shortly afterwards. Athens now possessed only second-rate generals like Chares and Charidemus, or unpopular ones like Phocion. The second consequence of the defeat was the fall of Aristophon, who retired from the leadership of the people. His successor was Eubulus, who, after the disastrous attempts of his predecessor to maintain the greatness of Athens by means of war, considered that his best policy was to husband the resources of the state, and who only continued the war with Philip where it was unavoidably necessary. The Athenians would have done better to abandon it altogether. It may of course be urged that peace was evidently concluded with the allies for the very purpose of being able to act with all the more energy against Philip. But if that was the intention, it was not carried out. The war with Macedonia, which lasted from 357-346, was not what a

war should be—an acute malady which brings a solution in one way or another. It was a slow fever, which seems of no importance and yet wastes the strength of the patient. It only served to make another conflict, which broke out soon after the first, all the more dangerous to Athens. If Philip had not ended by approaching Thermopylae in 346, the war between him and Athens would have probably dragged on still longer without decisive issue, but with constantly increasing preponderance on the side of Macedonia. Eubulus by the way has in many respects not been done justice to in modern days. I refer to this in the notes.⁵

During the Social War Philip had looked after his own interests well. He had fixed his attention on the cities of Chalcidice, now once more led by Olynthus, all of which lay between Pydna and Amphipolis, the places he had lately conquered, and he offered his friendship to the Olynthians. But they looked on the proposal with suspicion, and applied to Athens for help.⁶

But the Athenians rejected this alliance as well, in 357, and Olynthus came to terms with Philip, who gave the Olynthians the town of Anthemus and even held out to them a prospect of obtaining Potidaea. As the Social War prevented the Athenians from doing anything against Philip themselves, they got others to take the field against him, especially the Thracian Cetriporis and the Paeonian Lyceius. But they failed to accomplish anything, while Philip displayed great activity. He captured Potidaea, and actually gave it to the Olynthians. Crenides, a place founded by the Thasians in the Pangaeus, the auriferous mountain region east of the Strymon, being hard pressed by barbarians, applied to him for aid; he took advantage of this to capture it, and made it into a city to which he gave the name of Philippi (356). He at once set about working the gold mines, and soon this district brought him in a yearly revenue of 1000 talents. But he did not stop here. The forests of the country yielded good

timber; with this he built a fleet, at first it is true consisting only of cruisers, with which, however, he was able to injure the trade of Athens, and by the capture of pirates acquire the reputation of a preserver of the peace on the high seas. The Macedonian ships harassed even the coast of Attica. Lastly, he took Abdera and Maronea in the east, and Methone in the west (353), and now Chalcidice itself was the only one of the neighbouring maritime countries not in his power.⁷ The result of these occurrences was twofold: the decline of the power of Athens and the rise of that of Macedonia. Events had shown that an absolute democracy, like that of Athens, however good a guardian it might be of the freedom of its citizens, was no longer in a position, looking to the advanced state of the art of war and the difficulty of conducting diplomacy with skill and dignity from the market-place, to carry out a vigorous policy with consistency or successfully oppose an adroit and energetic monarch. This was bound to become still clearer if the internal condition of Greece in general deteriorated, a contingency which had already come to pass in the year 353, up to which we have followed the history of Philip.

NOTES

The principal authorities for the history of the years 360-336, Philip's period, are as follows:—

I. The connected narrative of Diodorus in the 16th Book, which is really devoted to Philip. But Diodorus pays more attention to warlike events than to the internal condition of the various states, which was so important just then, especially in the case of Athens, and besides he is inaccurate in many respects even in this book, and that too not merely in chronology. His introduction to the history of Philip (16, 2) is useless. How can Philip, who was born in 383, have been educated with Epaminondas, whose birth took place in 411? When we read that Philip (16, 77), after raising the siege of Byzantium, concludes peace, etc. with the Athenians, this incorrect statement may, just

like the previous one, be due simply to the carelessness of a later writer, in all probability therefore of Diodorus himself. On the other hand, the Peace of Philocrates, which was so important, is not mentioned by him at all. As regards the chronology, I agree with Schaefer (*Dem.* 2, 180 and 181) and others, that what Diodorus relates in 16, 37-40 as the events of a single year must be spread over three years of the Olympiad, or, more exactly, over twenty-four months of these years; then I hold with Schaefer, *Dem.* 1, 486, that the dates of the deaths of Mausolus and Artemisia in *Diod.* 16, 36, must be wrong (cf. however Judeich, *Persien und Aegypten in the 4th Jahr. Marb.* 1889, p. 42); lastly, I think that some occurrences are narrated twice in different years, consequently from different sources, e.g. in chaps. 31, 34, and 39 some things relating to Methone and Oenene, and the first part of the Sacred War; cf. chap. 28 with 25 and chap. 29 with 27. On the other hand, the contents of chaps. 40-51 are very good; the narrative it contains of events in Asia is clear and vivid. But this section too is valueless for chronology. The events in question are said to have happened in 351 and 350. But in reality they occupied a great many more years; in fact we do not even know whether anything of what is narrated there took place in those two particular years. Diodorus had these two years vacant, and therefore filled them up with the history of these events. His account of the Sacred War, and especially of the sieges of Perinthus and Byzantium, is valuable, because we have so little record of them from other sources.—Volquardsen (*Untersuchungen*, etc., p. 107 seq.) has discussed Diodorus' authorities, but not exhaustively; I would merely remark that his ascription of chaps. 40-51 to Ephorus seems to me wanting in probability, because these chapters are not characterized by the usual Diodorian phraseology, which is no doubt derived from Ephorus (instead of the usual οὗς μὲν—οὗς δέ we have here τινὲς μὲν—τινὲς δέ). According to Reuss, *Timaïos bei Plut., Diodor und Dionys. v. Hal.*, *Philol.* 45, the history of the Phocian War in Diodorus is traceable to Timaeus. Cf. also Kallenberg, *Diodor's Quellen im 16. Buch*, *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.* Bd. 135.

II. The orators, especially Demosthenes. From them we learn a number of isolated facts, above all the state of public feeling in those times. The trustworthiness of the orators in regard to facts asserted by them is on the whole not great. This applies not only to Aeschines, of whom it is unhesitatingly assumed; it is equally true of Demosthenes. We know well enough in the present day that statements made by party men in political debates cannot be used as authority for history as a matter of course; but

most critics refuse to apply this criterion to Demosthenes. And yet he himself has contrived not to leave us in doubt as to his veracity. The most striking proof of the fact that his first object in making an assertion is the effect of the moment is the following. In Phil. 3, 15, he refers to the Thracian fortresses, which Philip took from the Athenians, and adds: *εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ὁμομύσκει*, whereas Philip had in point of fact not yet sworn to the peace. And this misstatement cannot be due to a momentary forgetfulness on the part of the speaker, for it refers to a matter which he had discussed in detail in the year 346. On that occasion he had accused his fellow-envoys of having enabled Philip, by not taking the oath from him until they got to Pella, to keep the Thracian fortresses, which he had already captured without breaking his oath. He could not have forgotten this in 341. He stated the untruth, because it now suited him to paint, not the envoys, but Philip in as black colours as possible, the imputation of an act of perjury to Philip of course producing a great effect. If Demosthenes thus openly contradicts well-ascertained facts repeatedly confirmed by himself, it cannot be asserted that a thing must be true because he says it. As a rule of course we cannot prove the inaccuracy of a statement made by him by the fact that he himself asserts the contrary on another occasion; it appears, as we shall see in more than one instance, in another way. Generally speaking, he has no scruples about contradicting himself. Thus in Ol. 1, 29 he states as a maxim of experience the contrary of what he parades as an admitted truth in Ol. 2, 26. Weil, who entirely approves the aims of Demosthenes' policy, styles the methods occasionally adopted by the orator as sheer lying, and is perfectly right in thinking that his profession of logographer prompted him to it (*Harangues de Dém.* p. x.): "Sheltering himself behind his client, for whom he composed the speech, the logographer resorted to all the tricks of the trade without being deterred by any feeling of shame; he became only too familiar with the methods of colouring, arranging and disfiguring the truth as he passed through all the stages which, starting from hyperbole or suppression of fact, insensibly lead to a direct lie. The habits contracted by the advocate followed the orator in his political career, and Demosthenes too (we must admit it, however much we may regret it) occasionally did as the others. In addressing his fellow-citizens he sometimes wilfully perverted the facts, and used falsehood as a means of persuasion." For a man like Demosthenes especially, who practised both professions simultaneously, who was *σύμβουλος* of the people and at the same time composed speeches for an Apollodorus anonymously and for a money payment (chap. xvii.

note 1), it was only too easy even in his political speeches to fall into the practice of lying, which he himself (*περὶ παραπρ.* 184) condemns so strongly. Even the staunchest supporters of Demosthenes therefore cannot blind themselves to the fact that no reliance is to be placed on his assertions. Schaefer (*Dem.* 2, 215) is not certain in regard to a serious charge brought by Demosthenes against Aeschines, whether there is "any foundation of fact for it"; Blass (3, 1, 185) warns historians to be on their guard against Demosthenes, who "does not always represent the facts as they are"; and Westermann-Rosenberg (*Cor.* 121) consider the invective in Demosthenes' speeches a proof of the weakness of his assertions—an admission which carries us a long way. In principle, therefore, all writers are agreed as to Demosthenes' veracity. What an amount of uncertainty is thus introduced into the history of that period is shown by the minute discussion by modern scholars of the facts of a case, *e.g.* the details of the Peace of Philocrates, where it is abundantly clear that two advocates, even when they are on opposite sides, can confuse an issue still more than a single one.—The result is that the speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines (quite apart from the fact that they contain many statements the truth of which is beyond doubt) possess much the same value for the history of the fourth century as Aristophanes has for that of the fifth; they take us into the busy life of Athens; we see what the parties were aiming at and by what means they endeavoured to attain their ends; we are transported into the midst of the people of Athens, who honoured virtue and loved gossip just as much as any other people.—It might be supposed that the introductions and Scholia to the speeches would offer a rich mine of historical material. This is no doubt partly the case; the Scholia to Aeschines contain much useful matter (*Ed. of Aeschines* by F. Schultz, Leipz. 1865); but the old commentators have occasionally done what the Scholiasts of Aristophanes sometimes did, they have tried their hand at guessing, and have not always guessed correctly. Modern criticism has justly noted that three alleged facts, which come exclusively from this source and of which one would be of great importance, are not true, and are deduced only from misinterpreted passages in Demosthenes: (1) the alleged law of Eubulus, so frequently quoted as disgraceful to Athens, which imposed the penalty of death for the offence of diverting the *θεσπικόν* from its proper destination—a statement due to a wrong interpretation of the word *ἀπολέσθαι* in *Dem. Ol.* 3, 120; (2) the alleged concession of independence to all the allies in the peace of 355 in the *Schol. Ol.* 3, 28—a misconstruction of the words *εἰρήνης οἴσους*; (3) the alleged fact that Timo-

theus hanged himself—a mistaken conclusion from Dem. *περὶ πατριᾶς*, 2.—The speeches of Isocrates are a purer but also a much more meagre historical source than those of Demosthenes and Aeschines.

III. Of other writers the following are worthy of notice: some fragments of Theopompus, *eg.* fr. 111, Müll.; fragments of Philochorus; Plutarch, especially his life of Demosthenes, in which he must often have made use of Theopompus, who, it is true, had as little liking for Demosthenes as for other democrats, but would nevertheless be a good authority for the life of a contemporary statesman. Cf. Gebhard, *De Plutarchi in Dem. vita fontibus ac fide*, Mon. 1880, who assumes even Peripatetics to have been his authorities, especially for the private life of the orator; and Sturm, *De fontibus Demosthenicæ historiæ*, Hal. 1881, who also discusses Diodorus' 16th Book. See also the life of Phocion, in which much seems to come from Philochorus, and the *Vitæ X. oratorum*; cf. Fricke, *De font. Plut. et Nepotis in vita Phocionis*, Hal. 1883. Justin (vii.-ix.) has confused and rhetorically disguised much of his subject, so that a commentary of some length would be required to do him justice.

IV. A number of documents; *eg.* C. I. A. 2, 54 = Ditt. 78. Those interpolated in the *De Corona* proved to be forgeries, especially by Droysen, 1839; cf. Weil, *Plaidoyers de Dém.* I, 411 seq.

This being the condition of the authorities, and bearing in mind that the action of statesmen, even when the facts are ascertained, can always be judged in the most varied way, it is to be expected that the accounts of modern writers would exhibit wide discrepancies. This is in fact the case. Here, too, I can mention only the latest works, which take the earlier ones into account. Philip is the central figure of Brückner's narrative, *Phil. und die hellen. Staaten*, Gött. 1837. But the principal work is that of A. Schaefer, *Demosthenes und seine Zeit*, 2nd ed. Leipz. 1885-87, in three volumes, remarkable alike for their accuracy and for the lofty tone of the narrative. The 3rd volume of Blass, *Beredsamkeit der Griechen*, Leipz. 1877-80, is valuable as a contribution to the history of literature and as a collection of materials. The sections in Sittl and Christ which deal with the subject are instructive, as is also Butcher's small book, *Demosthenes*, London, 1881. Lastly, the introductions and commentaries in the edition of Demosthenes by H. Weil (3 vols. Paris, 1881-1886), equally remarkable for its erudition and for its impartial judgment, are valuable, as are those in the German editions of Teubner and Weidmann.—The interest of course centres in Philip and Demosthenes, and the latter especially is the subject of the minutest discussion. This discussion has

resulted in widely different views, mainly for the reason that the moral worth of an individual and the expediency of his career as a statesman are not always in proportion to each other. In antiquity Demosthenes' policy was generally approved, but his moral worth appeared doubtful to many. While a good orator according to the proper view of the Romans ought to be *vir bonus dicendi peritus*, many declared Demosthenes to be a bad man (Quintil. 12, 1, 14—*malum virum accepimus*), a noteworthy verdict when we bear in mind that much was forgiven to the enemies of tyrants. In the present century, on the other hand, such an enthusiastic appreciation of him has sprung up—originated by Niebuhr, who published a German translation of the first Philippic in 1805 with a dedication to the Tsar and compared Philip with Bonaparte, and afterwards fostered by the natural predilection for a republican—that Demosthenes has been pronounced a great and occasionally even a high-principled man. This view is taken by most of the commentators of Demosthenes (with the exception of the more unprejudiced Weil) and by the historians Schaefer and Blass. Philip, on the other hand, is the cruel and faithless prince, who wants to 'ensnare' the Greeks (Weil, in Pauly's R. E. 5, 1474). With Blass, however, the difficulty of maintaining this standpoint is shown by the circumstantial way in which he is obliged to defend Demosthenes. He cannot help admitting (3, 1, 33) that Demosthenes did not always use pure means to attain his ends (for the case that Blass has in his mind on this occasion, that of Apollodorus, v. infra chap. xvii.); but nevertheless he holds that "in a statesman we must look to purity of motive; pure means are not always within his reach." On this point, however, Dahlmann (Oncken, *Zeitalter des Kaisers Wilhelm*, 1, 64) says with more justice: "Every one prides himself on the goodness of his aims, the absolutist as well as the Liberal; for this reason we ought to judge men, not by the vaunted goodness of their aims, but by the means they employ." The supporters of Demosthenes have had to make great exertions to defend his conduct in money matters (Midias, Harpalus), and on this point even Butcher, who is thoroughly favourable to him, expresses himself as follows with reference to the Harpalus affair, even on the assumption that Demosthenes did not take the money for his own personal use (p. 126): "his conduct will not bear to be tried by a high standard." Thus a reaction against the attempted idealization of Demosthenes is now in progress, and to a great extent we have reverted to the view of antiquity, which is that Demosthenes' objects were good, but that he was not always clean-handed in the choice of his means. Some inquirers, however, even doubt the

expediency of his practical aims. This change of opinion has been brought about by individual researches in the last half-century. Besides Böhnecke's *Forschungen auf dem Gebiete der attischen Redner* (1843, 1864) I may mention especially papers by Spengel (*Die δῆμογγοίαι des Demosthenes*, Münchner Ak. 1860), Rohrmoser (*Ueber den Philokrat. Frieden*, Ztschr. f. d. oesterr. Gymnasien, 1874), Weidner (in the *Philol.* 37, and the edition of the *Ctesiphontea des Aischines*), Hartel, Haupt and others who are enumerated by Hermann, *Staatsalt.* §§ 172 and 173. In connected narratives Beloch (*Attische Politik*) and Sittl represent the standpoint of a sober estimate of the facts. It is not out of place to remark that only generally admitted facts have influenced the unfavourable verdicts on Demosthenes, and not statements in the speeches of Aeschines, Deinarchus and Hyperides. A critic who tried to make use of these in the way that the speeches of Demosthenes are habitually used against Philip, would produce a highly exaggerated picture of Demosthenes. I have given the reasons for my own view in the proper passages. Respect for the Athenian people is independent of respect for Demosthenes.

1. In the struggle for the Thracian coast the claims of Athens and Philip were of equal value; Amphipolis had to defend itself oftener against Athens than against Philip. The conquest of the coast-line by Macedonia was just as natural as the loss of its possessions in the north by the Hanseatic League.—The first acts of Philip after his accession are discussed by Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 17, 18. Philip behaved in a friendly manner towards Athens, although the latter had supported Argæus, *Dem. Aristocr.* 121.

2. Charidemus is referred to by Schaefer, *Dem.* 1, 155 seq. 419 seq. Our chief authority for Thracian affairs is the speech of Demosthenes against Aristocrates. The latter had proposed the adoption of unusual measures of protection for Charidemus, a motion opposed in 352 by Euthycles, for whom Demosthenes composed the speech, which is also of importance for our knowledge of the criminal law of Attica. Cf. also the speech of Apollodorus against Pasicles (*Dem. L.*), and for Cardia esp. *Dem. Ar.* 173 seq. with Schaefer *Dem.* 1, 164. All the incidents in Thrace are dealt with in Hoeck's paper mentioned in the notes to chap. vii.

3. The intrigues between Philip and Athens for the possession of Amphipolis, which had joined Olynthus, are mentioned by Theopompus, fr. 189; cf. *Diod.* 16, 4. The ἀπόρητον in *Dem. Ol.* 2, 6 was evidently a reference to Pydna. If agreements of this kind really took place—and modern writers have no doubt about it—Athens was more guilty than Philip, for the latter betrayed no one, while Athens betrayed Pydna, which trusted her;

cf. Schaefer, Dem. 1, 102. The object of this treachery was the possession of Amphipolis. The Athenians might have had this city for an ally; but that was not enough for them. They wanted to get possession of it, because, according to Dem. *περὶ παραπρ.* 137, they regarded it as *δοῦλόν*, in complete contradiction to Greek colonial law. To conquer it would have been extremely difficult for them just at that moment, because they wanted their troops in the Chersonese; consequently Philip was to conquer it for them. And yet Athens is not censured for her double piece of treachery, but Philip is blamed because he would not assist the Athenians in it! Of course it is quite possible that Philip was really to blame for having given his word and then not kept it. But it is not so certain as is generally assumed that it was he who broke his word. No treaty was concluded between Athens and Philip about Amphipolis and Pydna, for an engagement of that kind could have been made only in Athens by the people, and the negotiators were ashamed of consulting the people owing to the stipulation relating to Pydna. How then was Philip to get Pydna? A body of Athenians in their private capacity would have had to take possession of the city by a treacherous *coup de main* and then hand it over to Philip. Otherwise Philip would have got nothing, and he was under no obligation to surrender Amphipolis. But if such an attempt had been made, what awaited the authors of it in Athens? The penalty of death. It is therefore highly probable that it was the Athenians who did not keep the alleged treaty, which was only a verbal agreement. According to Theop. 189 it was only the Athenians who proposed the double act of treachery (Amphipolis and Pydna) to Philip, a view which even Westermann (Pauly, R. E. 5, 1474) adopts to this extent that he believes that Athens "bespoke his co-operation *sub rosa*." The only fact therefore is that the Athenians wanted to make a tool of Philip in a shady transaction and that they were unsuccessful. And this is represented as an entrapping of the lamb by the wolf. Philip was no doubt more wary than the Athenian negotiators. For the views of Isocrates on Amphipolis, cf. Phil. 1 seq.

4. We know little of the Social War. Some of Diodorus' facts (16, 7, 21, 22) are inaccurate; Nepos and the orators are meagre. Of modern writers see Hoeck, 1, 1, 39 seq.; Köhler in the Athen. Mittheil. 6, 21 seq.; and Beloch for the chronology, Att. Politik, p. 361 seq. For the state of feeling among the allies Plut. Phoc. 11; Isocr. de pace, 29; Schaefer, Dem. 1, 165. Mausolus, Diod. 15, 90. The importance of Cos, Diod. 15, 76. The reformation of the trierarchy, Schaefer, Dem. 1, 167, 168. For the inaccuracies of Diodorus, *ibid.* 170. Chares with Artabazus, Diod. 16, 22;

Plut. Arat. 16, and cf. among others Schaefer, Dem. 1, 172. Athens spent 100 talents on this war, Isocr. Areop. 9. The Athenians still received a yearly sum of 45 talents, Dem. Cor. 234. A list of the communities, which as far as we know preserved a connection with Athens subsequently, is given by Schaefer, Dem. 2, 175. As the references to them are casual, and the relations not of the same kind, they give us no idea of the extent of the league after 355. The prosecution of the generals is placed by Beloch, Att. Pol. 364, immediately after their dismissal from office in 356 or 355; most writers place it somewhat later.

5. Eubulus and the Theoricon.—I have not been able to discuss Eubulus at greater length in the text; in a compendious history of Greece he cannot claim more space than is allotted to Callistratus or Aristophon. But I must refer to him in the notes. Erudition is concerned with him, because it is through erudition that he has attained an unmerited celebrity. Eubulus has been for some time past the 'unselige' statesman (Pauly, R. E. 1, 1633), to whom his successor, the patriot Demosthenes, forms a brilliant contrast. This view, of which Schaefer is the chief exponent, rests (1) on the verdict of Theopompus; (2) on an alleged law of Eubulus as well as on the special mode of administering the Theoricon attributed to him; (3) a scrutiny of his other actions. I discuss these points in this order.—(1) The passages of Theopompus quoted in Ath. 4, 166 and in Harpocr. *Εὐβουλος* (fr. 95, 96, Mull.) are somewhat vague as regards the application of Theopompus' words; still it must have been Theopompus who called him *ἄσωτος*, and also *ἐπιμελής* and *φιλόπονος*; at any rate Theopompus said that under Eubulus the Athenian Demos was worse as regards *ἀσωτία καὶ πλεονεξία* than even the notorious Demos of Tarentum, for the latter were after all only gluttons and drunkards, while the Athenians *καὶ τὰς προσόδους καταμισθοφορῶν διατετέλεκε*. Theopompus, however, is open to suspicion on account of his dislike to the democracy, and the comparison which he draws between Athens and Tarentum is absurd, for there is no trace of relaxation owing to luxury in Athens, and expressions like *ἀναδωροτάτη καὶ ῥαθυμοτάτη* are, when applied to Athens, as preposterous as the phrases quoted from Theopompus in Just. 6, 9. The positive charge therefore consists only of this, that the Athenian people received *μισθός*. Now we are aware that this had been done since the time of Pericles; it would therefore be necessary, in order to make it the basis of a charge against Eubulus, to know what worse element he introduced into a long-existing custom. But of this Theopompus says nothing. True, Schaefer (Dem. 1, 200) pretends to know that "before Eubulus"

time moderation was 'probably' observed in the distribution . . . a surplus was out of the question . . . Eubulus increased the revenue of the State considerably . . . Eubulus, instead of forming a reserve out of the surplus for future war emergencies, or spending it on preparations against Philip, distributed it before the Dionysia for purposes of amusement, 'probably' towards the close of his first year of office." The wording shows that part of this is intended to be conjecture; while for what is stated as fact only Philinus in Harpocr. s.v. θεωρικά, is quoted, where, however, we find simply this: ἐκλήθη δὲ θεωρικὸν ὅτι τῶν Διονυσίων ὑπογίων ὄντων δάνειμιν Εὐβούλος εἰς τὴν θυσίαν, ἵνα πάντες ἐορτάζωσι καὶ τῆς θεωρίας μὲν οὐκ ὑπολείπεται δὲ ἀρθνεῖται. All that is said here is that Eubulus did what he was bound to do, i.e. gave the people the festival money, and if the name of Eubulus is mentioned in connection with it, although nothing is attributed to him, which was not always the case, that does not prove that something else must be concealed behind it, but only shows the stupidity of the author who makes the quotation, a stupidity evidenced by the incorrect observation that the word Theoricon comes from Eubulus having done something or other, as if the expression Theoricon had originally arisen in connection with Eubulus. This statement therefore proves nothing, and the passage we have quoted from Schaefer lacks support. But now comes something which is alleged to be still more important. In the year 350 Apollodorus, according to ps.-Dem. c. Neaeram (59) § 4, proposed τὰ περιόντα χρήματα τῆς διοικήσεως στρατιωτικὰ εἶναι, not θεωρικά, a proposal which the people accepted, but which was afterwards declared invalid, during the time when Eubulus was leader of the people. The charge therefore is that Eubulus prevented patriotic reforms. But apart from the fact that we hear nothing of any action on the part of Eubulus in connection with it, which is less significant, the proposal purported to be—a point which is generally not noticed, but which is of great importance—merely an application of the existing law, which provided that the surplus revenues should be στρατιωτικὰ during a war. The question therefore was: was this the case? A war was going on, but was there a surplus? This seems uncertain, for according to Dem. 39, 17 at this time (the year 348 according to Blass, 1, 288; 351 according to others) even the Heliastae did not always receive their full pay. The most obvious assumption then is that the Athenians, as soon as they saw that Apollodorus' motion could not take effect, punished the man who had deluded them with a fair-sounding but impracticable proposal, and who was a disreputable individual into the bargain. This case therefore has nothing to do with the alleged extravagance of Eubulus.—

(2) Eubulus is reproached with his alleged law which imposed the penalty of death for proposing that the *θεωρικά* should become *στρατιωτικά*. But it is now generally admitted that there was no such law, and that its supposed existence was a mistaken conclusion from the word *ἀπολέσθαι* in Dem. Ol. 3, 12, which has only a figurative meaning. Besides this it has not been noticed that as, according to Dem. 59, 4, a law already prescribed when the surplus should be not *θεωρικά* but *στρατιωτικά*, the alleged law of Eubulus is an impossibility. Another charge, however, is brought against Eubulus. According to Aesch. Ctes. 25, Eubulus used his authority to bring about that οἱ ἐπὶ τὸ θεωρικὸν κεχειροτονημένοι ἤρχον τὴν τοῦ ἀντιγραφείου ἀρχήν ἤρχον δὲ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀποδεκτῶν,—καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν ὅλην διοίκησιν εἶχον τῆς πόλεως. This means that the administrators of the Theoricon also united in their hands the other chief financial offices; but it is construed to mean that Eubulus spent more money on festivals than he ought to have done, although nothing is said to that effect. Besides, people forget that the same office with the same powers was administered by Demosthenes, at the time when Ctesiphon brought forward the motion for bestowing the wreath on him, by Demosthenes, who is paraded as the opponent of Eubulus' financial policy! In future therefore when we read in Schaefer that Eubulus "increased the number of holidays" (Dem. 1, 201), that he bought "popularity" by "distributing money from the treasury" (1, 204), we shall know that these are not facts, but only the writer's views. On the other hand, what facts are attested about Eubulus? According to Schaefer, Dem. 1, 204, he built ships, organized the cavalry, raised land and sea forces, erected storehouses and adorned the Acropolis (Dem. 1, 96). How can it be said in the face of this that he used the public funds for "purposes of entertainment" instead of for military equipments? He provided for the festivals, as he was bound to do, and as probably Demosthenes himself did, who tried to screen himself in the Harpalus affair by asserting that he had advanced 20 talents to the Theoricon (vide infra). Demosthenes therefore may boast that he advanced 20 talents for festivals when there was no money in the treasury, and no one blames him for it, while Eubulus is reproached for having spent the *περίοντα* on the amusements of the people, although there is no record of it. Besides, in reference to the Theoricon, we may quote Grote's appropriate remark (Lond. 1888, vol. ix. p. 343), that 'amusement' was a religious duty for the Greeks (*παίζειν*, Herod. 9, 7). The way in which everything is turned against Eubulus is shown by Schaefer's remark, Dem. 1, 213: "It is characteristic of the spirit of this administration (of Eubulus) that none of the great public works which it undertook were com-

pleted. It was reserved for the indefatigable activity of Lycurgus to finish the naval arsenal and other important buildings." But we find in Schaefer himself, Dem. 2, 528, that in the year 399 the building of the docks and the naval arsenal was interrupted for a time "on the motion of Demosthenes," and at least ten talents a year saved thereby. And yet Eubulus is to blame if the buildings are not completed! When it actually turns out that Eubulus' administration was so careful that timber for ship-building purchased by him appears for a long time in the public accounts, this is pronounced to be "almost strange" (Sch. Dem. 1, 213). No doubt it is so of the imaginary Eubulus who has been constructed; but it is essentially in keeping with the real man.—(3) We now come to the other proceedings of Eubulus. He supported the expedition to Euboea, which cost Athens money and citizens. This proves that Eubulus spent money on other objects besides festivals. Demosthenes was opposed to this undertaking, and his supporters approve of this (Schaefer, Dem. 2, 79): "His object must have been that the Athenians should not make common cause with the tyrant, but with the inhabitants of Chalcis." But the men of Chalcis had originally agreed to the expedition (Sch. Dem. 3, 80), and if the interest of Athens demanded it, no blame attached to it. Eubulus' administration, however, was marked by the most successful exploit which the Athenians ever achieved against Philip, the despatch of the fleet to Thermopylae in 352, which compelled Philip to halt at the gates of Greece, and delayed his victory for six years. Demosthenes never did anything of the kind. It is now pretty clear that Eubulus initiated this expedition, for he was the leader of Athens at the time, and Beloch (218) assumes it as a matter of course. Schaefer, however, ascribes the merit to a certain Diophantus, whom Dem. *περὶ παραρρ.* 297, calls an *ἀρχηγός*, together with Callistratus and Aristophon, a passage which, according to Schaefer, 1, 205, "no doubt" refers to that expedition, for which Diophantus moved for a vote of thanks. But why should not Eubulus have originated it? Schaefer thinks that Eubulus could "scarcely" have agreed to it, "for the cost of the undertaking amounted to a large sum," and "fresh complications might have arisen from it." That would apply to the imaginary, but not to the real Eubulus. Eubulus also endeavoured to get on good terms with Cersobleptes, while Demosthenes was then opposed to him. But on Thracian questions it was permissible to hold different views, and Demosthenes himself changed his. Hence Eubulus' preference for Cersobleptes at that time is no reason why we should blame him. Lastly, Eubulus endeavoured to bring about a league against Philip in 348. Now, one would think, his critics will allow that

he behaved well for once in his life. But no; the deed may have been good, but the motives were certainly bad. According to Sch. Dem. 2, 169, Eubulus only wanted "to drag the rest of the Greeks into a war, the burden of which had become intolerable to the Athenians, and the issue of which became more and more serious." And that is not high-mindedness, but egoism. Granted that it was so, yet Eubulus was perfectly right. Why do we want help, except that we do not feel strong enough to stand alone? Demosthenes, at all events, is of this opinion (*De Corona*, 301). The conclusion is that Eubulus behaved like a patriotic citizen on this occasion as well. Nothing more is known of him, except that he was on the side of Aeschines in the prosecution of the envoys, and that in spite of this Demosthenes himself afterwards treated him with respect (*De Corona*, 162).

I believe that I have proved the following propositions in the preceding remarks: (1) Eubulus did nothing worse with the Theoricon, which was the *κόλλα* of the democracy, than any other leader of the democracy, Demosthenes not excepted.—(2) In military preparations Eubulus did just as much as Demosthenes.—(3) Eubulus struck the only effective blow against Philip, in preventing the king from penetrating into Greece in 352.—(4) Eubulus also in other respects worked energetically for Athens and against Philip. Eubulus must not be used as a foil for the brilliant Demosthenes. If Beloch and others have shown that the policy of Eubulus was on the whole judicious, a policy of restraint and economy (Plut. *praec. polit.* 15), yet not without a certain dignity and vigour in defence, I believe I have proved that the accusers of Eubulus have not brought any well-founded charge against him, and in discussing details of history for this purpose, which could be given only in the notes, I also believe that I have presented a picture of the times which may claim to possess independent value.

6. For Olynthus cf. Demosthenes' speeches and the introduction of Libanius and the commentaries of modern writers, especially that of Weil, also Schaefer, Dem. 2, 23, and others.

7. There are coins of Lyceus which have been discussed by Six, *Lyceus*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1875. An Attic inscription (Eph. arch. 1874, p. 451) calls him *Lyppeius*. Six fixes the dates of Lyceus and his Paeonian successors thus: Lyceus about 359-340, Patraus about 339-315, Audoleon about 315-286. For Cetriporis see Sch. Dem. 2, 27; Dittenberger in the *Hermes*, 14, 298, C. I. A. 2, 66^b = Ditt. 89, and Head, H. N. 241.—For the capture of Potidaea by Philip and the gift of it to the Olynthians, cf. the passages quoted by Sch. Dem. 2, 24, 25. Pseudo-Dem. Halonn. 10, complains that in the year 343 Philip took away their

κτήματα from the Athenians living in Potidaea. Otherwise, as Schaefer (l.l.) admits, he treated them well. See also note 2 to chap. xvii.—For the founding of Philippi, Steph. Byz. s.v. Φίλιπποι, Diod. 16, 8, and the other quotations made by Sch. Dem. 2, 25. For the piracy carried on by Philip, his occupation of Halonessus, etc., see Sch. Dem. 2, 28, 29. For Maronea, Dem. Aristocr. 183. For Methone, Diod. 16, 31, 34; Sch. Dem. 2, 30.—The Athenians and Philip in Thrace, Hoeck, l.l. p. 47 seq.

CHAPTER XVI

THE SACRED WAR—BEGINNING OF DEMOSTHENES' CAREER (356-352)

EVEN before the close of the Social War a fresh complication had appeared which was destined to have the worst consequences for the freedom of the Greeks, as it gave Philip an opportunity of interfering in the internal affairs of Greece. The events which have to be narrated in this chapter are, to a certain extent, simultaneous with those related in the preceding one.

The death of Epaminondas had not made the Thebans abandon their ambitious designs. It was, of course, impossible for them to be aware that they owed their extraordinary success mainly to their two great leaders. Thebes still commanded respect; the vigour of the Theban soldiers was unimpaired; why should they then cease to regard themselves as the heaven-sent rulers of Greece? As early as the year 361 they showed that they were not disposed to give up their influence even in the Peloponnese.

A number of the Arcadians who were living together in Megalopolis wished to return to their old homes, but the Thebans would not consent to it. They despatched their general Pammenes to the spot, and he forced the Megalopolitans to remain united. After this display of power in the Peloponnese, Thebes was little disposed to tolerate opposition in her immediate neighbourhood. The Thebans detested the Phocians, who almost always disagreed with them, and had

declined to join in the last expedition of Epaminondas to the Peloponnese. The Thebans wanted to punish them for this, and as the refractoriness of the Phocians on that occasion had been legally unassailable, the Thebans were obliged to find some other handle, and this was easily supplied by the attitude of the Phocians at Delphi. From the earliest times the priests of Delphi had wished to form an independent religious state, and the Phocians had always desired to control Delphi. There was always land belonging to the temple somewhere or other which, according to the assertion of the priests, was being illegally used by somebody. Disputes of this kind could be utilized for international purposes as occasion required. The Athenians had acted in this way against Megara in 432 (vol. ii. p. 313), and now the Thebans seized on the same pretext in order to injure the Phocians. For this purpose they made use of the appropriate instrument—the Amphictyones.¹

It is a peculiar sign of the times that Thebes was willing and able to do this. Her willingness to do it shows that her ambition had not declined, but that her moral force was impaired, for she had recourse to indirect paths which an Epaminondas would perhaps have disdained. But that she could make use of the Amphictyonic League to further her grudges, proves that she controlled it, *i.e.* that Athens and Sparta were for the moment not represented in it. We are familiar with the peculiar composition of this League, which corresponded to the position of affairs in the time previous to the Dorian migration. Things had been left as they were because no change could be effected and because in addition to this it was supposed that the Council had ceased to be of political importance and that it might continue to perform its functions in religious matters. Thus it came about that the Dolopians could attend the meetings with the same rights as Dorians and Ionians. Consequently, when Sparta and Athens were spokesmen for the Dorians and Ionians, majority resolutions of political importance were out of the question; their

representatives prevented them by drawing attention to the consequences at the proper moment. But if they were not represented in the Council, then tribes which had perhaps been powerful 600 years before but now lived in a couple of villages might come forward as religious and consequently as political arbiters of Greece. The Amphictyonic Council, acting under the influence of the Thebans and the Thessalians, who were always hostile to Phocis, did in fact condemn the Phocians to pay a very heavy fine (356) and at the same time increased a penalty formerly imposed on Sparta on account of the occupation of the Cadmea. The Council also had a dispute with Athens at that time. The two last facts explain the first. Sparta which was condemned and Athens which was quarrelling with the League, were of course not represented in the Council for the moment, and, therefore, Thebes could have things all her own way as soon as she had got the Thessalians on her side, as the small tribes were puppets in the hands of the Boeotians and Thessalians who surrounded and oppressed them. True, there were various parties among the Thessalians, and Thebes was not on friendly terms with the tyrants of Pherae; but the internal arrangements of the Amphictyonic League, the nature of which we are obliged to conjecture, doubtless allowed the majority to regard any chance persons as representatives of those members who possessed a vote, and thus the nobles may have been recognized as empowered to nominate the Hieromnemones for the Thessalians. As a general rule the excluded parties did not suffer from being put in the background. But on this occasion things turned out differently, and the result showed what harm ambitious men could do by the abuse of ancient observances. Diodorus says that the allies of the Thebans in the impending war were the Locrians, the Thessalians, the Perrhaebi, the Dorians, the Dolopians, the Athamanes, the Magnetes, the Achaeans, and a few others, while the side of the Phocians was espoused by the Spartans, the Athenians, and a few Peloponnesians. There

is no question of a vote here, but the list shows that the peoples named are considered in their capacity of members of the Amphictyonic League, not as states of military importance, for in that case the mention of the Dolopians would have been meaningless. We have, therefore, the actual grouping of parties in the Amphictyonic Council handed down to us in Diodorus. And it is remarkable that it presents an almost exact repetition of the part which the Amphictyones played in the year 480. At that time the same states were for Persia which were now for Thebes. In 480 as in 356 the states which are not led astray by political and religious considerations of a base character are Sparta, Athens, and Phocis. If the Dorians are cited as favourable to Thebes in 356, that means that Thebes had managed to transfer the votes belonging to the Spartans or Argives to the three villages in the valley of the Cephissus, the inhabitants of which were bound to vote as their powerful neighbours, the Boeotians, wished and ordered. In this way the Thebans, if the Thessalians were on their side, had the preponderance in the Amphictyonic Council, and it may therefore be regarded as probable that, immediately after their victory at Leuctra, they set to work to drive the Spartans out of the Amphictyonic League for the moment by the imposition of a fine, which was impossible immediately after the *coup* of Phoebeidas, and that they did the same thing with Athens soon afterwards. By this means it was possible for them, if warlike measures were inadequate, to attain their object by the aid of religion, the practical application of which to worldly ends was familiar to them (see vol. ii. p. 379, and p. 38 of this volume). The expedient did not actually come into operation until after the death of Epaminondas. In 480 the unpatriotic endeavours of the Thebans and their allies were defeated by the energy of the Spartans and the Athenians; in 356 the result was different. The evil consequences of Theban cunning were revealed to their full extent, when Philip made use of the weapon which the Thebans had taken

out of the sacred armoury for their own benefit. Then it was that Thebes herself had to pay most dearly of all for having trifled with religion.

In spite of all the fair promises they received, most of which came from Athens, the Phocians were really left in the lurch. The assistance sent by Sparta was insignificant, and the Athenians only helped them by naval operations. That the Phocians, under these circumstances, took up the struggle and continued it with pertinacity, is however not to be wondered at. It was the age in which the Greek states which had hitherto stood in the second rank began to assert themselves. In the north the Thessalians attempted it, but failed (p. 112); next the Macedonians tried it with brilliant success; in the interior of Greece the Arcadians rise in arms. All this was a natural consequence of the progressive development of Greece. These races were fresher than the old leading races of the Greeks. Subsequently the Achaeans and after them the Aetolians came to the front. The Phocians, therefore, tried their luck like the rest.

Upon the advice of Philomelus they resolved to refuse payment of this exorbitant fine, and to usurp the protectorate over Delphi by force. Philomelus was elected general, and with him Onymarchus, a man whose family had contributed to the outbreak of the quarrel in a way that is not exactly known. Philomelus secured the approval of King Archidamus of Sparta, recruited mercenaries and occupied Delphi in 355 B.C. On the other side the Locrians, the *protégés* of Thebes, undertook the defence of the Amphictyones, marched against the Phocians and were defeated. The Phocians then expunged the resolutions passed against themselves from the sacred records, and the Pythia approved their proceedings. Each party had thus religious authority for its actions, the Phocians even a better one than the Amphictyones, because the Pythia was on their side, and it now remained to maintain their rights by force of arms. The Thebans and Thessalians prevailed upon

the Amphictyonic Council to decree a sacred war against the Phocians, which resulted in the above-mentioned division of the Greeks into two camps. If Sparta, Athens, and the other Greek communities which had the courage to declare for the Phocians had given them effective assistance, the Phocians would no doubt have held their own and Greece would have been none the worse. But Sparta alone sent troops, and only 1000 men; Athens sent none: her opinion was that the Phocians would be able to give a good account of the Thebans without help, and that the despatch of a fleet to the neighbourhood of Thermopylae, which would prevent the Thessalians from invading Phocis, was an adequate performance on her part.

The Phocians therefore helped themselves after the fashion of those days by collecting a larger and larger force of mercenaries. To pay them they laid claim to the Delphic treasury, at the outset evidently in the form of a loan. This their enemies declared to be a crime against religion. In Greece it was possible for opinions to differ on this question. Temple treasures were always regarded by the Greeks as available for civil purposes. At the beginning of the Peloponnesian War the pious Spartans and Corinthians openly announced that they intended to use the treasures of Olympia and Delphi against Athens, and even the Athenian Thucydides does not stigmatize this as impiety. The Phocians therefore had only to be victorious by the help of the sacred treasures to be also regarded as pious Greeks in the future.

But their position was a difficult one; they had to fight simultaneously against Thessalians and Thebans. Philomelus marched alternately northwards and eastwards, the Athenians evidently helping him in these operations by keeping open the pass of Thermopylae. He routed the Thessalians, but was defeated by the Thebans (354), and to avoid falling into their hands threw himself down a cliff on Parnassus. His successor Onymarchus took what treasure still remained in the temple and coined money with it or gave it away. The enemies of

the Phocians related terrible tales of the employment of this treasure, how Archidamus, the Athenian Hegesippus, and the tyrants of Pherae, Lycophron and Pitholaus, had received large sums of money and how common persons had decked themselves with the sacred golden ornaments, and no doubt all this is true enough. At first the Thebans were so impressed with a sense of their own superiority, that in the year 353 they sent 5000 mercenaries under Pammenes to the assistance of Artabazus, who had rebelled against the Persian king. Pammenes marched by land to the Hellespont, escorted by Philip, who on this occasion took Abdera and Maronea. Thus the understanding between Thebes and Philip became a public matter. After a short time, however, the Thebans saw that they might require their mercenaries themselves, for in 353 Onymarchus defeated the Locrians, and made Orchomenus independent again—a real humiliation for Thebes. The Phocians then had a series of successes and reverses. They were defeated by the Thebans at Chaeronea, but were successful in Thessaly, even against Philip of Macedon, who had been summoned to the rescue by the Aleuadae and who now for the first time, soon after the capture of Methone (p. 214), interferes in the affairs of the Greeks at their own request (353). The Phocians were also victorious over the Thebans, and took Coronea from them (352). But now the reaction set in. Lycophron was unable to make headway against Philip, and recalled Onymarchus with the mercenaries to Thessaly. A great battle was fought on the coast of the Magnes country between Onymarchus and Philip, and the latter won the day. Of the defeated troops some took refuge on board an Athenian fleet commanded by Chares which was sailing near the shore, while about 3000 fell into the hands of the Macedonian king, who had them thrown into the sea as guilty of sacrilege. Onymarchus himself was murdered by his own people during the flight. Philip had his corpse nailed to a cross

(352). The victorious king then liberated Pherae, captured Pagasae, the important harbour of Pherae, and prepared to push forward through Thermopylae to the south. It seems to have been a question even then whether he would exercise a decisive influence on Greece. At this juncture, however, an Athenian fleet made its appearance near the pass with, it was said, 4000 infantry and 400 cavalry on board, and Philip deemed it advisable to withdraw. He retained, however, the territory of the Magnetes and Pagasae and was virtually master of the whole of Thessaly as far as the harbour of Halus on the Pagasaeon Gulf. The Athenians exchanged congratulations and tokens of honour with Phayllus, the successor of Onymarchus. Thus the timely intervention of the Athenians under the command of Eubulus on this occasion saved that part of Greece which lay south of Thermopylae. The Phocians were now confined to the southern field of action, and as the Thebans and Locrians were unable to subdue them, the Sacred War dragged on for some years. Philip put an end to it, but not until six years later, after he had concluded peace with Athens. We must devote our attention again to the position of affairs in this city, where the most zealous opponent of the king of Macedon now made his appearance.

In the year preceding that in which the Athenians at Thermopylae had checked Philip's victorious career for a brief space, they had been invited to interfere in the affairs of the Peloponnese (353). The ruling parties in Megalopolis besought Athens to support them against the Spartans, who wanted to break up the new city afresh. From Megalopolis proceeded a call for help first from one and then from the other side, according as the position of affairs changed. On this occasion, at the beginning of 352, there came forward in the Athenian Assembly as adviser of the people the man who for the space of two decades was destined to exercise the greatest influence on the fortunes of Athens and of Greece—

Demosthenes. It was not his first political speech which he now delivered, but the first which dealt with matters of considerable importance.²

Demosthenes was born in 384, and was the son of a well-to-do armourer, who died when the boy was eight years old. His guardians managed his property so badly, that Demosthenes, who had early developed a taste for oratory and had studied it with extraordinary energy and perseverance, chiefly under the direction of the orator Isaeus, was obliged to bring an action against them for what they had embezzled. He first of all, in 364, sued one of them, named Aphobus, and won the case, without however, as it appears, receiving the amount of his claim in full, because the defendant had recourse to subterfuges. The success of the young man caused a sensation in Athens, and on his devoting himself to regular professional work he found plenty of clients. He adopted the profession of a logographer. It was the rule in Athens that every man should conduct his own case in person before the courts. Any one who could not compose a speech himself had it written for him by another person and then recited it. The judges however might, when a man had spoken in his own cause, allow a friend to make a second speech (*deuterologia*) on his behalf, as *synegorus*, and this permission was as a matter of fact probably never refused. Demosthenes soon set up as a *synegorus* of this kind, that is as a regular advocate, and his fame as an orator constantly increased. Later on he gradually gave up speaking and composing speeches for others, and devoted himself especially to political work as adviser, *symbolus*, of the people. Of the speeches delivered for others at the beginning of his career that against Leptines in 354 is of great value, as it throws light on an interesting aspect of public life in Athens. Leptines had carried a law, according to which, in the interests of the State and of equality, all exemptions from providing choruses and the like which the people had granted to the descendants of men who

had rendered good service to the state, were, with a few exceptions, to be abolished ; personal merit was henceforth to be alone considered in Athens. This law was attacked as unconstitutional and illegal by Apsephion and Ctesippus, and Demosthenes was retained as *synegorus* for Ctesippus, the son of Chabrias, a young man who objected to the loss of his privilege. Ctesippus was a dissolute fellow, and Demosthenes was probably induced to appear for him mainly by his friendship for the widow of Chabrias. But he contrived to present the case from the point of view of principle, of the obligation of the State to keep its promises, and he spoke with ability and vigour. Whether he was successful or not, we do not know. This speech was delivered in court. Demosthenes made his first appearance in the Assembly also in 354. The Persian empire, which had been for a time on the verge of dissolution, was to a certain extent reinvigorated by Artaxerxes Ochus, who had been on the throne since 358, and had also turned his attention to the confusion prevailing in Asia Minor. Chares, who assisted the rebellious Artabazus, was compelled, as we have seen (p. 212), to leave Asia, and Artaxerxes made great military preparations. This led to the opinion in Greece that a campaign against the Greeks of Europe was on foot, and the excitement reached a great pitch, somewhat as in 396, when Herodas came to Sparta (p. 10). Many people, even in Athens, thought that now was the time to form a league against Persia and perhaps actually attack her. In 354 Demosthenes pronounced against this policy in a speech entitled *De Symmoriis*, because the gist of it consists of a proposal for the better organization of these associations of citizens for collecting the money for the fleet, which had been introduced three years previously (p. 211). Demosthenes was of opinion that Athens ought to be in a good state of preparation before she could think of waging war against Persia, and that the existing organization of the *Symmoriae* was inadequate. His proposals were

excellent, but they were not carried into effect at that time. In the meanwhile the warlike zeal of the people abated, and this was evidently one of Demosthenes' objects when he delivered the speech.³ —

When, therefore, the above-mentioned request for help from the Megapolitans reached Athens in 352, Demosthenes expressed himself in favour of complying with it, especially emphasizing the necessity of not allowing Sparta to become too powerful.⁴ He laid down as a principle of sound Athenian policy that both Sparta and Thebes must be kept in a weak state. Nevertheless no treaty was concluded with Megalopolis, and in 351 Thebes herself gave protection to the Arcadian city which she had helped to call into being. The political principles enounced in this speech are commended, but wrongly so if we consider the most important of them, that which gives its character to the speech. The proposition (§ 4) that the Spartans and Thebans must be weak if Athens is to thrive, gives clear expression to the old traditional jealousy prevailing among the Greeks which became the cause of their ruin. It is called the maintenance of the system of balance of power. Such a system may be good if there is no enemy threatening from outside. But in the present case its application, which found expression in a hostile attitude towards Sparta, was wrong simply for this reason, that Sparta and Athens were not only living in peace with one another, but had really common interests in the Phocian question, and it was not wise to oppose a friend in a matter indifferent in itself merely to prevent him from becoming too powerful in general. Demosthenes and the Athenians had no interest in Megalopolis itself; Sparta was not to have the power of breaking up this city solely in order that she might not become so strong as to be able to attack Messene as well afterwards. But was there any prospect of that? In 362 Athens had fought by the side of Sparta at Mantinea against the Megapolitans; had Sparta become so much stronger since

then? And lastly, Demosthenes' proposal had no prospect of success with the Megapolitans themselves, for he so far identified himself with the mood then prevailing in Athens as to state that Megalopolis would be supported by Athens if it would pull down the pillars on which the treaties between Megalopolis and Thebes were recorded. He therefore demanded that the Megapolitans should leave their tried friends, the Thebans, in the lurch, in the hope of being supported by the Athenians, who admittedly had no interest in them. The Megapolitans preferred to rely on Thebes, and had no reason to regret it.

Demosthenes' mistake was that he encouraged the self-importance of the Athenians too much even in questions where greater sympathy with the feelings of their allies would have been more appropriate, and that he awakened in his fellow-citizens the belief that they could still be the arbiters in Greece. He thus offended Sparta in the Megalopolitan affair without good reason. The result was that the Spartans would never become the allies of Athens against Macedonia, although they were enemies of Philip. They probably thought that Athens was still seeking only her own advantage, and that Demosthenes was still pursuing his policy of 352. They held almost entirely aloof from the most important negotiations and events of the years 360-338; all they did was to try to help the Phocians. This absence of Sparta from the political stage is as characteristic a feature of the age as it was, considering the peculiar worth of the Spartans, a regrettable circumstance for Greece (cf. vol. i. p. 184). Hitherto it had never happened that the vital interests of Greece had been decided without the co-operation of Sparta. Even in 350 Sparta was not so weak but that she might have thrown considerable weight into the scale. But she refrained, and the Athenian leaders were not able to induce her to adopt a more public-spirited policy.

The events which we have narrated in this chapter show

that the danger threatening the Greeks from the side of Macedonia was considerably increased by the internal condition of Greece. The old causes of disunion among the Greeks are reinforced by new ones, and particularism increases rather than diminishes. Thebes tries to recover her old position by intrigues, and thus gives the signal for civil war. In this crisis Sparta proves lukewarm, while in Athens we have a man who has begun his career as an "old hand" at oratory—this is what an admirer calls the young man of one-and-twenty—and who continues even as a statesman to write speeches for money, acquiring, although he has no practical knowledge of war, a great influence on public affairs, and using it to fan the old jealousy entertained by the Athenians towards Sparta, at a time when Sparta could only be of service and could no longer do harm. On the other hand, Macedonia, in the affairs of which Athens had interfered in her usual fashion (vol. ii. p. 311), is ruled by an able statesman, who is at the same time a great general, a statesman who not only dislodges Athenian influence on the coast of Macedonia, but who is also drawn by the disunited Greeks into their quarrels, and invited by them to play a decisive part in purely Greek affairs. The fate which awaited Greece under such circumstances, if no special events supervened, could be foreseen even then by experienced observers.⁵

NOTES

1. For the Sacred War Diod. 16, 23-40, 56-60; he makes it last from 355-346. Also Ar. Pol. 5, 3, 4; Duris (fr. 2) quoted in Ath. 13, 560. The Sacred War had been narrated by Theopompus, by Demophilos, son of Ephorus, as a continuer of his father's work, and by Diyllus. Cf. Curtius, 3, 776. Cf. also Holzapfel, Ueber die Abfassungszeit der dem Xenophon zugeschriebenen *πρόποι*, Philol. Bd. 41. Holzapfel places this treatise in 346, others in 357 or 355; see also Schaefer, Dem. 1, 193 and Flathe, Gesch. des Phok. Krieges 1854.—The Phocians for a long time lived so simply that they kept no slaves; Ath. 6, 264. Sparta and the Amphictyones, Diod. 16, 29. Athens had a quarrel

with them in 363, when Athens declared a decree of theirs not to be binding, C. I. A. 2, 54 = Ditt. 78; Sch. Dem. 1, 490. That the maxim "principiis obsta" held good in Amphictyonic affairs, was overlooked by the Athenians both in 355 and in 339, to their own detriment and that of Greece. For the state of things in 480 see vol. ii. of this work, p. 45. Instead of the Athamanes mentioned by Diod. 16, 29, Herod. 7, 132 has the Aenianes, who are probably meant in the passage cited of Diodorus.—Theban inscription on the occasion of the Sacred War Ἀθήναιον 3, 479 = Ditt. 95 (the Byzantines contribute money to the Thebans for the Sacred War). Death of Philomelus, Paus. 10, 2, 4; of Onymarchus, 10, 2, 5. Philip occupies Thessaly, Dem. Ol. 1, 12. Phalaecus designated as τῦραννος in Aeschines 2, 130 seq. Isocr. Phil. 53 has some good remarks on the conduct of the Thebans. Philip had once stayed with Pammenes in Thebes; Plut. Pel. 26; cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 442, and Hoeck, p. 48, for the march of Pammenes through Thrace.—Athens safe from Thebes owing to the Phocians, Dem. περὶ παραπρ. 83.—Phocian coins of the date of the Sacred War, Head, H. N. 288; silver coins with ΦΩ and the head of Apollo; copper coins with ΟΝΥΜΑΡΧΟΥ or ΦΑΛΛΑΙΚΟΥ. Head quotes Plut. Pyth. orat. 16. He assumes (p. 289) that some fine silver coins with a Demeter head on the obverse and the Omphalos and ΑΜΦΙΚΤΙΟΝΩΝ on the reverse were minted in 346 on the occasion of the peace festival.

2. For the various speeches of Demosthenes I refer the reader to the works quoted in the preceding chapter. I draw attention only to matters which are generally not much noticed.

3. It is a peculiarity of the political speeches of Demosthenes that they seldom culminate in definite proposals on the matter directly in hand. This applies to the Olynthian speeches, which deal only in generalities (hence the well-known difficulties of determining their dates), to the Philippics with the exception of the first, to those for the Megapolitans, for the Rhodians, and for the Chersonese. Blass (2, 276, 277) refers to this peculiarity in Isocrates, in whom it is easier of explanation. This deficiency is especially striking in the speech delivered in 351 (or was it earlier? cf. Butcher, p. 43, and Judeich, p. 43) in favour of the independence of the Rhodians, in which Demosthenes (§ 9) advises Ῥοδίωνες ἐλευθερεῖν, but does not say how, which no doubt was difficult enough. It seems as if in this case Demosthenes was endeavouring to moderate the zeal of a large party by agreeing with their views.

4. In the speech for the Megapolitans (353 n.c.) Demosthenes says (§ 8) that Athens could leave Megalopolis to the Spartans, but

that it would not be politic to do so for the reason that Sparta would again become strong and proceed ἐπὶ Μεσσηνίην (§ 4), which would be bad for Athens. In the year 344, on the other hand, he acknowledges, Phil. 2, 13, the rights of the Spartans to Messene. This was because in 344 he wanted to make all the Peloponnesians, even the Spartans, side against Philip. In 344 (Phil. 2, 13) he contests, following the traditional policy of Athens, the right of Thebes to Orchomenus; in 338 he gives it up with the whole of Boeotia to the Thebans. The reason was that he had need of the Thebans in 338. Demosthenes is, as a rule, a thorough opportunist in politics. In the speech for the Megapolitans (§ 4), he says that to Athens, συμφέρει καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους ἀσθενεῖς εἶναι καὶ Θηβαίους, and he says the same in 352 in the speech against Aristocrates (§ 102); only in this way, he remarks, could the Athenians be μέγιστοι. The weakness of Sparta and Thebes, which is useful to Athens, is, according to him (l. 102), effected by this, that to the Thebans Φωκεῖς ἀντιπάλους, τοῖς δ' (Sparta) ἄλλους τινὰς (Messene and Arcadia) εἶναι. Sparta and Thebes, therefore, according to Demosthenes, must always have a thorn in the flesh; then things would go well with Athens. Thus speaks the practical Athenian politician. But he is also an idealist when circumstances seem to require it. In 344, for instance, in the second Philippic (§ 12) he remarks that Athens had never chosen ἰδίᾳ τὸ λυσιστελῶν, like Thebes and Argos had always done. Demosthenes, however, is both idealist and realist in the very same speech, and with a very short interval between. In περὶ παραπρ. 79 he says to the Athenians: You have never rescued the Lacedaemonians nor the καταράτους Εὐβοίας, nor many others, except only ὅτι συμφέρον ἦν σῶς εἶναι τῇ πόλει (Athens); but in § 78, when somebody says: The Phocians are lost, it is true, but Athens has retained the Chersonese, he answers: πρὸς Διὸς καὶ θεῶν, do not allow it to be said that you τῶν ἰδίων τι κτημάτων ὑπεξαιρούμενοι τὴν τῶν συμμάχων σωτηρίαν προήκασθε! In the *De Corona* speech the tone is in general one of magnanimity, the climax of which is reached in the fine and often-quoted passage § 199, according to which the Athenians, even if they knew that they must succumb, would have undertaken the struggle against Philip as a duty. On the other hand, in § 301, there is the passage which is never noticed, in which Demosthenes boasts of προβάλλεσθαι Boeotia for the protection of Athens. If Demosthenes had said this to the Thebans, when he wanted to enlist them against Philip in 338, they would never have listened to him; to be used as a shield, or as we should say as a buffer, was not an alluring prospect. In the eyes of his admirer Blass, Demosthenes, at the early age of

twenty-one, is not straightforward, but "an old hand" (3, 1, 169). Blass is right. He has described the peculiarity of character, which made it impossible for this orator to become a great statesman, admirably. That Demosthenes did not get rid of this characteristic, but further developed it, is proved by the above remarks and by what we shall have to say about him later on. Every great statesman must of course be both an idealist and a realist, but he will not use his principles for momentary effects, as Demosthenes does in *περὶ παραπρ.* 76 and 78. How far the actions of Demosthenes corresponded to his words, is shown for instance by his speech against Midias and its result, for which see chap. xvii. note 1.

5. To throw complete light on the internal connection of the events of this period, an exact knowledge of the relations of the leading powers to each other would be requisite. But we can only obtain a very imperfect idea of them. The chief powers were: Thebes, Athens, Macedonia, Persia; Sparta is of slight importance.—(1) Thebes and Persia. Thebes had long been on friendly terms with Persia; yet in 353 it supported Artabazus against the king, Diod. 16, 34. In 351, however, it sends help to the king against Egypt in conjunction with Argos and other Greeks, Diod. 16, 44, and it receives money from the king, D. 16, 40.—(2) Thebes and Philip. They are on good terms in 357, Diod. 16, 14, through the instrumentality of the Aleuadae. The friendship grows warmer in 353, when Philip *μετακληθείς* comes to the aid of the Thessalians, Diod. 16, 35.—(3) Thebes and Athens. They are rivals in Thessaly as early as 368, Diod. 15, 71, when Athens is in alliance with the tyrant Alexander. The Thebans under Epaminondas want to humiliate Athens at sea as well as elsewhere. In the Sacred War Athens and Thebes are ranged on different sides, but they do not actually fight against each other. In 353 Demosthenes states, in harmony with the views of the Athenians, that Thebes ought not to become too powerful (Speech for the Megapolitans).—(4) Athens and Macedonia. They get into war with each other in 357 about Amphipolis, and remain at war till 346.—(5) Athens and Persia. The Social War is partly due to Mausolus, who is not very loyal to the king and who stirs up Rhodes and Chios. Artemisia, Mausolus' successor, is loyal to the king; cf. the speech in favour of the independence of the Rhodians. Revolt from and reconciliation with the king alternated like the weather in Asia Minor. In 356 the Athenians assist Artabazus, who had revolted from the king, Diod. 16, 22. In 351 Athens, it is true, wishes to have *φιλία* with the king, but she sends him no troops; Sparta acts in the same manner, Diod.

16, 44.—(6) Macedonia and Persia. The struggle between these two does not break out till later. In 341 the king orders his satraps to help Perinthus *παρὶ σθίρα*. But Philip had long intended to carry out Jason's projects against Persia; cf. Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 235.—We may characterize the four powers as follows: Thebes had a great reputation, is very ambitious, is strong in men but generally weak, owing to the hostility of the other Boeotians and its position in the interior; Athens is strong, but prevented from vigorous action by her too extensive foreign connections and by a lack of capable and popular generals; Macedonia has little prestige, but is strong in its fighting men and in its king, without whom, however, it is incapable of action abroad; Persia is a tottering colossus. Consequently we find ambition in Thebes, Athens, and Philip; considerable resources in Athens, Philip, and Persia; genius only in Philip. This enables us to draw conclusions as to the prospects of the three ambitious powers. Those of Macedonia were the best, but only if she had a good king. The three ambitious states intrinsically balanced each other in their relations in and towards Greece; hence a good deal could be done if two of them combined against the third. This was first carried out by Philip and Thebes, which besides relied on Persia, and had an advantageous position as long as it possessed these two allies. The result was that in 346 Athens had to surrender, after first fighting simultaneously against Philip and against her own revolted allies, and then openly against Philip and by diplomacy against Thebes. In 346 Athens had in vain endeavoured to separate Philip and Thebes by enlisting the former on her side, but Philip refused to be drawn from the Theban alliance by the Peace of Philocrates. In 338 Demosthenes endeavoured to win Thebes and make her desert Philip. This succeeded by dint of great sacrifices. Athens and Thebes were now ranged against Philip. But the latter won the day in spite of all. Philip first became powerful by his alliance with the Amphictyones and with Thebes; subsequently he held his ground against the allies by his own strength. The scantiness of the records, however, for the period subsequent to 357 prevents us from adequately appreciating the influence of all these relations upon the various decisions taken by the leading powers; some valuable reflections and conjectures on the subject are to be found in Beloch's *Attische Politik*, Leipz. 1884.

CHAPTER XVII

PHILIP AND THE GREEKS TO THE PEACE OF PHILOCRATES AND THE CAPITULATION OF PHOCIS (352-346)

PHILIP's object was the strengthening and the extension of his power and his prestige; the particular aims of the moment were determined by circumstances. His first task had been to make himself master of the whole Macedonian nation. This he had accomplished. In the next place, he had to defend himself against Illyrians, Thracians, and other barbarians, and secure his position in the direction of the sea at the expense of the Greeks. In this he was constantly engaged. His relations with the Greeks, however, led him far beyond the borders of Macedonia. He became not only entangled in their never-ending quarrels; familiarity with their ideas induced him to adopt higher aims than had hitherto presented themselves to Macedonian kings. For long years the antagonism between Greeks and Persians had been one of the inspiring factors of Greek civilization; now the Greeks vied with each other in serving the Persian monarch. Philip took up the old aspirations of the Greeks which had been driven into the background by internal dissensions. He set before himself the policy which Jason of Pherae had wished to attempt, and which many high-minded men in Greece, foremost among them Isocrates, regarded as the best means of uniting Greece—war with Persia. For this purpose it was necessary that he should be recognized as General of the Greeks; he therefore aspired to the hegemony

of Greece. In itself the hegemony in the hands of a Macedonian king needed to be as little of a supremacy over the Greeks as it necessarily was one in the hands of Sparta, Athens or Thebes. As, however, these states had tried to turn the hegemony into a supremacy, they and the rest of the Greeks were at liberty to conclude that Philip had the same aims, and it was natural that they should resist him. At first, however, Philip was by no means in a position to attempt to exert influence on the Greeks in this direction; he had still to deal with Thrace. He could not allow this country to remain hostile if he wished to cross over into Asia.

In 352 he advanced as far as the Propontis, and actually made an alliance with the Byzantines. He then marched into the neighbourhood of Olynthus, which in the meanwhile had concluded a treaty with Athens, in contravention of the terms of its alliance with Philip, and had thereby come forward as the latter's enemy. Philip now wished to obtain Olynthus and Chalcidice. It was at this point that Demosthenes began his active agitation against the king of Macedonia.¹ In the First Philippic he explained his views as to how Athens should carry on the war against him, the most essential point being that an Athenian army of 2000 men, containing 500 Athenian citizens, should be permanently stationed in Thrace. The participation of the citizens in military service the orator rightly considered of the utmost importance. The Athenians do not appear to have followed his advice; they had enough to do in their own neighbourhood. The tyrant of Eretria, Plutarchus, was an enemy of Philip; they therefore endeavoured to support him against his numerous opponents. This was skilfully carried out for a time by the brave Phocion; but when shortly afterwards, subsequent to Phocion's withdrawal, Plutarchus gave up his own cause as hopeless, the Athenian troops which had remained in Euboea were taken prisoners and had to be ransomed by payment of 50 talents. In the year 349 matters assumed a very serious aspect for

Athens in Thrace as well. Philip demanded of the Olynthians the surrender of his step-brother, who had taken refuge with them, and the Olynthians, who considered a demand of this kind as the first step to servitude, appealed to Athens for help. It was granted them, and Demosthenes took the opportunity to explain to the Athenians once more how they must proceed if they wished to conduct the war with success. In the First Olynthiac he specially urges that the surplus revenues should not be paid to the account of the Theoricon, but to a war account; in the Second he endeavours to raise the spirits of the Athenians by representing that Philip's power rested on a weak foundation, and that the Macedonians themselves were dissatisfied with their king. This depreciation of Philip's importance shows either that the speaker was incapable of grasping the facts of the situation, or that, in order to infuse courage into the Athenians, he resorted to expedients which might be useful for the moment, but which were subsequently bound to injure the cause championed by Demosthenes, for illusions as to the strength of an opponent can only have a detrimental effect. Athens did but little in the war. Chares, who had been sent to Olynthus with 2000 mercenaries, returned to Athens and was replaced by Chari-demus, who achieved some successes in the spring of 348. But Philip took the cities in alliance with Olynthus one after another, some of them by bribery, and invested Olynthus itself. The Athenians now sent some citizen hoplites under Chares to Olynthus; but before they appeared on the scene, the city had fallen into Philip's hands by the treachery of its Strategoi (348). Some of the inhabitants were sold and others given away. Olynthus was destroyed, and with it more than thirty Greek communities.²

This threw the Athenians into a state of great excitement. In 357 the war with Philip had been resumed somewhat precipitately, but no advantages having been derived from it and none being in prospect, they had for some time past entertained

the idea of getting rid of their troubles by concluding a treaty of peace. Overtures had been made to Philip for this purpose through private individuals. But now that they saw that he was becoming more and more powerful and dangerous, they made a start in the opposite direction, and endeavoured to secure allies against him. The attempts in the Peloponnese were unsuccessful; in Thrace an ally was found in Cersobleptes. But although this made things tolerable in the north, in Phocis, the fate of which could not help having an important bearing on the position of Athens, matters grew worse and worse. For a time Phayllus had not only held his own by means of his highly-paid mercenaries, but had even invaded the Opuntian Locris and had captured the city of Naryx, famous as the home of Ajax. But he died shortly afterwards (351), and his successor Phalaecus, son of Onymarchus, after gaining some successes against the Thebans (who in their distress even asked the Persian king for money and actually received 300 talents in return for a contingent of 1000 men for the Egyptian campaign), had taken up a thoroughly ambiguous attitude. What was a general of the Phocians to do? If the temple treasures were exhausted, the mercenaries would take themselves off. It was a war leading to no satisfactory result. The Phocians could never overcome their enemies if Athens did not help them, and Athens was willing to weaken Thebes but not to annihilate her. Thus Phocis was bound to be defeated in the end. Phalaecus therefore was preoccupied solely with saving what could be saved for himself and his friends. He left the Phocians to shift for themselves, rejected the proffered assistance of Archidamus of Sparta, and refused to deliver Thermopylae to the Athenians, which they wished to fortify. He had evidently come to an understanding with Philip, who was now absolute master north of Thermopylae.

Thus danger was drawing close to Greece proper, and Athens was once more confronted with the question as to what conduct she should pursue. For she alone of all the

Greek states, except Phocis, was at war with Philip, and if the king followed up his struggle with the Phocians by marching through the pass of Thermopylae, a movement which an Athenian fleet unsupported by a land force could not be sure of preventing, Athens would be seriously threatened. It was therefore desirable for the Athenians to arrive at some tolerable peace with Philip. And why should a peace of this kind be out of the question? Philip had always declared himself ready to conclude it. The attempt must be made. After some preliminary steps, undertaken by the actor Aristodemus, who was a favourite of Philip's, an embassy of ten men proceeded to Macedonia in February 346, among whom were Philocrates, who had moved the resolution, Nausicles, Aeschines, and Demosthenes. The Athenians were so precipitate that they did not even wait for the safe-conduct which Philip had promised their envoys. It was impossible to show more clearly how much Athens needed and wished for peace. But now begins a period of obscurity. Aeschines and Demosthenes, who at that time were working harmoniously together, quarrelled over these peace negotiations and gave each other the lie in public, with the result that many details are involved in a mystery which will never be cleared up. We therefore confine ourselves to relating the facts which are most important and are beyond dispute.⁵ Philip declared that he would send plenipotentiaries to Athens. Demosthenes thereupon carried a motion for prompt discussion and disposal of the proposals brought by these envoys, Antipater and Parmenio, and the Synedrion of the allies left the wording of the agreement to the Athenians. Consequently the peace in the form proposed by Philip was approved by the Council, and in pursuance of this the motion of Philocrates was submitted to the citizens, that henceforth peace and a defensive alliance should exist between Philip on the one side and Athens and her allies on the other, with the exception of the Phocians and the town of Halus in Thessaly,

in regard to which the Macedonian envoys declared that Philip did not recognize them as allies of Athens. The Phocians had been the bone of contention during the whole war, and Halus was an important harbour on the Pagasæan Gulf. For the rest, each side was to keep what it had at the moment (*status quo*). In agreeing to this Athens relinquished her claim to Amphipolis, which indeed had always refused to become Athenian. In the Athenian Assembly the two points—the abandonment of the Phocians and the alliance with Philip, instead of peace pure and simple—were censured by many speakers, and Demosthenes himself spoke against them. But the following day the peace was after all accepted on Philip's terms, on the advice of Aeschines and Eubulus, subject to the proviso that the Phocians and Halus should not be excluded by name; the declaration of the Macedonian envoys that Philip reserved to himself the right of making war upon them was to suffice (April 16th, 346). Athens ratified the peace by oath. It had been stipulated that each side should keep what it had got. Philip recognised the Chersonese as an Athenian possession, but not certain fortresses which belonged to Cersobleptes and had been garrisoned by Chares. As soon as he had sworn to the peace he would be unable to conquer them; he therefore set to work at once to take them. Hence it was of importance to Athens to administer the oath to the king as soon as possible, and the Athenian embassy, which went after him for this purpose, was interested in finding him as quickly as possible. Demosthenes therefore, who, like Aeschines, again formed part of the embassy, proposed that they should try to find him in Thrace. But the other envoys would not hear of a journey to Thrace. Instead of going there the embassy awaited the king in Pella, the capital of Macedonia, to which place he came after having accomplished his purpose in Thrace. There he took the oath. The Thessalians also swore to the peace, at Phærae, and the Athenian embassy then returned home.

Great satisfaction prevailed at first in Athens. The war was at an end, and besides the Athenians indulged in the hope that Philip would turn his arms, not against the Phocians, but against the Thebans. This hope was unfounded, and if the people cherished it, the sole reason was, according to the subsequent assertion of Demosthenes, that Aeschines had given assurances to that effect. Yet the Athenians declared that the Phocians ought to surrender the Delphic sanctuary to the Amphictyones, and if this was not taking the side of the Thebans against the Phocians, it was meaningless. Demosthenes therefore ought to have opposed this resolution if he really, as he afterwards stated, wished to save the Phocians, but he never did oppose it. In the *De Falsa Legatione* speech he alleges by way of justifying himself that he wanted to speak, but that nobody would listen to him; but this statement is unsupported by proof; the Athenian democracy never refused its advisers a hearing. Demosthenes did not utter his warning at the right moment, and thus left the Athenian people in the unnatural position that they declared officially that the Phocians ought to submit to the Amphictyones, and at the same time expected Philip to attack and annihilate not them but the Thebans.

The inevitable reaction set in at once. While still in Thessaly Philip invited the Athenians to join him with an army, in order to participate in the settlement of Amphictyonic affairs. But they declined the invitation because an orator had deluded them into the idea that Philip intended to retain these troops as hostages. Evidently therefore they no longer believed themselves that Philip was really in favour of the Phocians. At all events Philip, if he had ever thought of changing sides, would have no inducement, after this manifestation of distrust, to be civil to the Athenians at the expense of older friends. He concluded the Sacred War alone. Phalaecus surrendered on condition that he and his 8000 mercenaries might depart unharmed. Philip marched

through the pass of Thermopylae, and summoned the Amphictyonic Council to settle the Phocian affair. They decided that the Phocians were henceforth to dwell in villages and to replace the temple property which they had appropriated by yearly payments of 50 talents; their cities were to be destroyed with the exception of Abae, and Philip was to take their place in the Amphictyonic Council. Thebes was to receive Orchomenus, Coronea and portions of Phocian territory; the Orchomenians and Coroneans were to be sold into slavery. Thus Phalaecus and his mercenaries were treated best; the Phocians, who retained their liberty, although they were supposed to have committed sacrilege, came off fairly well; the Orchomenians and Coroneans, whose sole crime was that they wished to defend their independence, suffered most. Religious considerations proved of an elastic nature, political animosity remained inflexible. It was clear that religion had been only a pretext.⁴ This issue of the Sacred War aroused indignation in Athens, although Philip had only acted within his rights. Athens, they complained, had got nothing, and Thebes a great deal. Athenian envoys, among them Aeschines, were present at the great peace-festival at Delphi; but when, at the beginning of September 346, the Pythian games were celebrated, at which Philip presided, the Athenian deputation to the festival, contrary to all precedent, did not put in an appearance. Once more ill-humour and mistrust were displayed, just as when they refused to send an army to Philip in Thessaly. The king had taken no notice of this, but the Greeks were more sensitive. The Amphictyones requested an explanation from Athens as to whether she did not intend to recognize the reorganization of the League. It would seem that Athens was unwilling to give such an explanation. Thereupon Demosthenes himself advised them to do so, pointing out that otherwise the Amphictyones might declare war on Athens and that a Sacred War would be no light matter, for then

there would be a general combination against Athens. It is supposed that the Athenians succeeded, by the aid of Demosthenes' astuteness, in hitting on a reply which satisfied the Amphictyones while safe-guarding the honour of Athens. This was the end of the Sacred War.

Thus the second act of the drama had been played. The Phocians had been sacrificed to the ambition of Thebes and the selfishness and indecision of the Athenians. Philip had become a member of the Amphictyonic League, and as such possessed a legitimate influence on the destinies of Greece. In Athens this put an end to the political career of Eubulus, whose policy in the opinion of the majority of the Athenians had not been justified by the results. His place was taken by Demosthenes. True, the latter had not been able to put his own policy into practice; on the contrary, the decisions taken had been in accordance with Eubulus' views. But the policy which had prevailed seemed disgraceful to the Athenians, a policy which claimed that its failure—for it had never clearly asserted itself—was an honourable one, and the leader of the opposition, who found fault with what had been done, became more and more the darling of Athens, which saw in him the embodiment of its own ideal. For was he not a man filled with the most ardent enthusiasm for the greatness of Athens, who carried away the multitude by his overpowering eloquence, impressed them by his skill in dialectic which was so highly prized in Athens, and of whom there was no fear that he might make himself tyrant, as he was no soldier? But it was in this very point that lay the dangerous side of his influence. For this was now the position: in Macedonia, which Demosthenes was opposing with all his might, there was unity of thought and execution; on the other side, in Athens, clever plans no doubt, but no one who could convert them into practice in war. Even if Philip remained what he had always been, of what use was it to Athens if Demosthenes approached more nearly to the ideal of a great patriotic orator and a

powerful agitator ! Unfortunately for Athens he was unable to see that a statesman is only justified in agitating for war when the nation which he leads is not only brave and well prepared, but also provided with able generals whom it is able and willing to trust in the event of a war, and that a clear idea of the strength and character of an opponent is one of the essential conditions of ultimate success.

A war with Macedonia, however, and a great war in which not only Athens would be involved, was possible owing to the peculiar position of Thebes. Thebes had instigated the Sacred War in her own interests and had to all appearances finally carried her point, but she had forfeited her position in the Amphictyonic Council, and in so doing had completely sapped the foundations of her power. Before this, after the expulsion of Sparta and Athens, her friends the Thessalians were her only powerful colleagues in the Council ; now the Thessalians were virtually the tools of Philip, while Philip himself held the Phocian vote. The result was that in Thebes too there gradually arose dissatisfaction with Macedonia, to which she apparently owed so much, but which in reality had attained her brilliant position in Greece through the fault of Thebes ; and this dissatisfaction was bound to break out on a suitable opportunity. Then it would be possible for Thebes to unite with Athens against Macedonia. But in that event Athens would require a great general instead of a great orator.⁵

NOTES

1. The Philippics of Demosthenes, Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 59 seq.—Other episodes in Demosthenes' career in this period, as far as they are of interest for the history of civilization. In the years 352-350 occur the speeches of Demosthenes for Phormio against Apollodorus, son of the money-changer Pasion, and for Apollodorus against Stephanus, one of Phormio's witnesses. Demosthenes wrote them in his capacity of logographer. The last invalidates part of what is sought to be proved in the first. As this seemed incompatible with Demosthenes' good name, many modern writers have denied

his authorship of the speeches against Stephanus, *e.g.* Schaefer (Blass, 3, 1, 412). Blass himself, on the other hand, maintains the authorship of Demosthenes for *κατὰ Στεφ. I.* If Demosthenes actually composed the contents of *contra Steph. I.* 83, to refute what he had himself previously written for Phormio (§§ 20 and 22), we can understand how the ancients, alluding to the business of Demosthenes' father, could say (Plut. Dem. 15) that Demosthenes had sold *καθάπερ ἐξ ἐνὸς μαχαιροπωλίου τὰ κατ' ἀλλήλων ἐγχειρίδια*, and can comprehend the repugnance of unbiassed writers to such conduct, which Butcher (Dem. 136, 137) terms "ugly" and as bringing "discredit" on Demosthenes, although he urges by way of excuse for Demosthenes, that he is not acting as an advocate on this occasion, but as an "anonymous writer, making his livelihood by his pen." Performances of this kind must certainly have been highly paid. If Demosthenes, as Blass maintains, really condescended to write the speech against Stephanus for Apollodorus, whose character he tried to destroy in the speech for Phormio, and if he now brands the man whom he invoked as a witness in the former speech as a perjurer, it was done, according to Blass again, 3, 1, 32, because Apollodorus did him the favour to introduce a motion for the better expenditure of the Theorica, which Demosthenes was unwilling to bring forward himself because he was afraid of being punished for *παράνομων*, and Apollodorus, in fact, had to pay a fine of one talent. If this was so, then Demosthenes was a very clever man, but it does not make him a more honourable one. Apollodorus in that case to a certain extent discharged the functions of the nominal editor of a newspaper who undergoes a term of imprisonment for the real editor. People of this sort are paid in money, but not with support in their disreputable private affairs. Weil (Harangues de Dém. p. x.) calls Demosthenes' conduct a "*duplicité, pour laquelle on a récemment plaidé, sans trop y réussir, les circonstances atténuantes*," a remark which takes no notice whatever of the low conduct involved in § 83. It is also very doubtful whether it helps a good measure to be brought forward by a "ruined money-changer's son" (Blass 3, 1, 32) instead of by a Demosthenes. Lastly, we have seen in chap. xv., note 5, that Apollodorus' motion was probably so preposterous that Demosthenes could not have proposed it as a responsible politician. In the year 349 occurs Demosthenes' quarrel with Midias about a box on the ear (*κόνδυλος*), which the latter had given him in public when he was choregus. Demosthenes brought forward a *γραφή*—accusation in the interests of the state—against him, but dropped it and accepted 30 minae from Midias instead. The speech *κατὰ Μετιόριον* is not only rich in rhetorical

figures, Demosthenes boasts repeatedly in it that he is coming forward in the interests of the public, without any *λῆμμα* for himself (for the fine, which Midias presumably would have to pay, went to the state), and asserts in a censorious tone that others in similar cases would have accepted a bribe from their opponent and abandoned the prosecution (3, 20, 28, 29, 47, 103); a man of this stamp *ἡτοίμασεν αὐτόν*. And this *ἀτιμία* was not merely a moral but also a legal one; the abandonment of a *γραφή* undertaken in the interests of the state entailed a penalty of 1000 drachmae. But Demosthenes decided to take upon himself the *ἀτιμία* mitigated in his case by the *λῆμμα* of thirty minae (3000 drachmae). His modern apologists discover political reasons by way of excuse for him. If the legal grounds of the prosecution, which demanded no less a penalty than the death of Midias or the confiscation of all his property, consisted of the two *νόμοι* quoted at the beginning of the speech (§§ 8 and 10), then a correct perception that at the most a small money fine received by the state would have been the result (for these *νόμοι* do not apply to the case in point), may have induced Demosthenes to prefer taking thirty minae himself. The contradiction between the moral indignation and disinterestedness which the speech breathes on the one hand, and the thirty minae taken by Demosthenes on the other, combined with the fact that the speech was never delivered, because Demosthenes took the bribe before the case came on, has caused some surprise. How could Demosthenes allow a speech to be published, to the lofty sentiments of which he gave the lie by his own act? It would seem that he published it to induce his opponent to make a greater sacrifice than he was willing to do at first. His candour goes so far that he adds in § 151 that he had refused Midias' offer to pay him more than the fine would amount to, if he would drop the prosecution. The 3000 drachmae which Midias finally agreed to pay made up to Demosthenes the 2000 drachmae which according to § 80 Midias had once extorted from him for a trierarchy, and enabled him to pay the fine of 1000 drachmae in case it was demanded, of which we know nothing.—For the Olynthiac speeches see Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 118-165, Weil, Unger, *Zeitfolge der vier ersten Dem. Reden*, Münchn. Akad. 1880, and Buran, *Zur Chronol. des eub. Kriege*, etc. Wiener Stud. Bd. 7.—Depreciation of Philip, *Ol.* 2, 15 seq.

That the Olynthians were not the innocent victims of Philip's greed of conquest but began hostilities against him themselves, is proved by Demosthenes himself in the speech against Aristocrates 107, where he says of the Olynthians—*οἱ τί πεποιηκότος αὐτοῖς Φιλίππου πῶς αὐτῷ χρώνται; Ποτίδαιον οὐχὶ τήνικαυτ' ἀπ-*

ἔδωκεν, ἥνικ' ἀποστερεῖν οὐκέθ' οἷός τ' ἦν. ἀλλὰ πρὶν ἡμᾶς πολεμῶν; χρήματα πολλὰ ἀναλώσας ἔλων καὶ ἀποστερεῖν αὐτοῦ εἶχεν, εἴπερ ἐβουλήθη, παρέδωκε. Thus according to Demosthenes himself the Olynthians left Philip and went over to his enemies without his having given them any occasion for it. If in addition to this they gave an asylum to his brother, whom he regarded as his enemy, they displayed twofold enmity towards him. This must also be taken into consideration.—More than thirty πόλεις destroyed in Thrace, Dem. Phil. 3, 26. They cannot all be accounted for, Sch. Dem. 2, 154.

3. The history of the Peace of Philocrates which I have given briefly in the text is generally discussed at length, chiefly owing to the speech of Demosthenes *περὶ τῆς εἰρήνης* and the corresponding speech of Aeschines. Schaefer has devoted 140 pages to the subject (2, 165-304). But the number of well-ascertained facts is small. Demosthenes' speech is so sophistical that it cannot serve as a satisfactory foundation. I mention only a few of the most startling assertions of the orator. According to § 76 πέντε ἡμέραι are said to have been the ruin of the Phocians. But no one could have saved the Phocians in the last five days; they had long since been deserted and sold. According to §§ 147 seq. the Athenians ought to have had better terms than the Thebans, because the latter had often been defeated by the Phocians! According to § 160 Athens is not the vanquished party, but Philip! His treatment of earlier history is shown by § 264, according to which Olynthus dictated the terms of peace to the Spartans in the war narrated by us in chap. v. Commenting on a similar case (Mid. 145) Weil says with justice: "Vollä comment les orateurs écrivent l'histoire!" If Demosthenes misrepresents old and notorious facts in this way what may he not have done with less known ones. The alleged proof of the *δοροδοκία* of Aeschines I refer to in the notes to chap. xviii. In all probability Aeschines said what was not true just as often as Demosthenes. Hence the details of the occurrences cannot now be ascertained. But the known facts are sufficient to show what the conduct of the leading actors was, and I propose to illustrate this in the following remarks as a contribution to the history of civilization. For the sake of brevity I often quote only Schaefer, who is a model of accuracy. I did not read Rohrmose's comments until after my own account was written; I entirely agree with his view. The Athenians wanted peace with Philip and took the first steps thereto (Sch. Dem. 2, 192); they followed these up by sending envoys to the king, before the safe-conduct had arrived for them, so great was their eagerness for peace (ll. 159). Among these

ambassadors, besides Philocrates, were Aeschines and Demosthenes, the latter as a friend of Philocrates. Afterwards Demosthenes vehemently denied (Cor. 21) having had relations with Philocrates, whom he described as a traitor, and who was thereupon impeached by the fiercest of the opponents of Macedonia, Hyperides; but the best friends of Demosthenes do not believe this statement, neither Westermann-Rosenberg (notes to Cor. 21), nor Schaefer, Dem. 2, 196. Hence on this point the much-blamed Aeschines (2, 14, 18, 19, 45) must be held to be in the right. Next the Macedonian envoys came to Athens, and we are so far acquainted with their definitive proposals as to know that the Phocians, the Halians and Cersobleptes were to be excluded from the peace, and both were to keep $\alpha \epsilon \chi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \nu$, i.e. the *status quo*, the so-called *uti possidetis*; cf. the conditions of peace between Philip and the Aetolians in 217 B.C., in Polyb. v. 103: $\omega \sigma \tau' \epsilon \chi \alpha \nu \alpha \mu \phi \omicron \tau \epsilon \rho \epsilon \upsilon \sigma \iota \nu \alpha \nu \nu \epsilon \chi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \nu$. The attempt was now made in Athens to obtain the following alterations in the terms:—the inclusion of the Phocians in the peace as the allies of Athens, and instead of $\alpha \epsilon \chi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \nu$ the insertion of the words $\tau \alpha \epsilon \alpha \upsilon \tau \omega \nu$. But Philip's envoys refused to accept these alterations. The second demand of Athens, $\tau \alpha \epsilon \alpha \upsilon \tau \omega \nu$, involved a claim which in a treaty of peace is either meaningless, or is designed to upset the treaty indirectly, which makes it surprising that so many historians favourable to Demosthenes should regard this demand not only as susceptible of discussion but even as a reasonable one. It was intended to mean (Sch. 2, 228): each party shall have what he is lawfully entitled to. But on this point, what each was lawfully entitled to, dispute and war were going on; consequently a treaty which merely stated that each side was to have what legally belonged to him, would have no power to terminate the war. It is for this very object that combatants enter the region of facts and determine what is henceforth to belong to each party, and this can be done in two ways, by expressly assigning the various subjects in dispute to one of the two parties, or by saying "each party has to keep what he has now got." The latter method was chosen with the words $\alpha \epsilon \chi \omicron \upsilon \sigma \iota \nu$. On the other hand, a clause to this effect: "Each party is to have what he is legally entitled to," has never been accepted by any one in a treaty of peace, except when a court of arbitration is simultaneously appointed, with power to decide the point without appeal. But this is precisely what the Athenians did not want (*vide infra* chap. xviii.) That in spite of this they wished for the clause, was due to the fact that their orators left them in ignorance of its practical value and kept before them only the lofty sentiment that right was to be the basis of the settlement. People in Athens were

always very susceptible to lofty principles. The Athenians, however, perceived that they would not succeed with demands of this kind and they accepted the terms of peace offered by Philip, with the words *ἀ ἐχούσιν* and without the Phocians. They ratified the peace by oath. Philip did the same but only after a considerable interval, after he had captured some strong places in Thrace, which he trusted to retain by virtue of the *ἀ ἐχούσιν* clause and did retain. He then marched against the Phocians and subdued them. The impartial observer comes to the following conclusion: in keeping the Thracian fortresses Philip possibly wrongly interpreted the treaty in his own favour, since *ἀ ἐχούσιν* might mean: what each side had at the moment the peace was sworn to by one of the contracting parties; but Philip was justified in making war upon the Phocians, for he had declared that he did not recognize them as allies of Athens. But what was said by Demosthenes, with whom his modern supporters partly agree? As regards the Phocians, he said that Philip had acted illegally in attacking them, as they were friends of Athens. And Schaefer (Dem. 2, 213, 214) therefore says that Demosthenes believed that the offer of peace and alliance was honestly meant, but that he was disappointed in his belief and for that reason became Philip's enemy. He writes to the same effect on p. 505. But Philip had expressly declared that he reserved to himself the right to make war on the Phocians; the Athenians therefore knew how he would act, and when Demosthenes says in Phil. 3, 11 that Philip marched against the Phocians *ὡς πρὸς συμμάχους*, even Westermann-Rosenberg consider this "not quite honest." Philip was in the right in treating the Phocians as enemies, and the Athenians could expect nothing else. More than this, when Demosthenes demanded that Philip, in spite of his declaration that he would treat the Phocians as enemies, ought rather to protect them, he was asking the king to be disloyal to his allies, the Amphictyones, a disloyalty which could not be excused by other obligations. Philip had obtained admittance into Greece as an enemy of the Phocians; now he was suddenly to change sides and pull the chestnuts out of the fire for Athens! That Philip was believed capable of such conduct in Athens is shown by Aesch. 2, 136: *οὐ πάντες προσεδόκατε Φίλιππον ταπεινώσειν Θυβαίους*; cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 270. According to Demosthenes (cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 271) Aeschines deluded the people into the belief that Philip intended to change sides, whereas he never thought of going over to the Phocians. From Aeschines *περὶ παρατρ.* we certainly get another impression, viz. that the Athenians might really have been able to persuade Philip to take the side of the Phocians if the Theban proxenus Demosthenes had

not prevented it (§ 143). This makes out Demosthenes to have been a secret enemy of the Phocians, of whom he was ostensibly such a zealous supporter. In the year 338 he had certainly, as we shall see, worked in the interests of the Locrians and Thebans, the enemies of the Phocians, and in 330 he says (Cor. 18) that the Phocians were in the wrong. But whether he had adopted this view by 346 we do not know. At any rate it is a fact that intrigue was then rife on all sides and that speculation was going on as to the treachery of others, which appears also from Just. 8, 4. But whatever may have been the truth as to the possibility of alienating Philip from the Thebans, it is certain that Athens could not reproach him if he conquered Phocia, and that Demosthenes was the least justified in bringing such a charge. True, he says in *περὶ παραπρ.* 23, 34, 45 that he had noticed that Aeschines was lying and that he himself wished to warn the Athenians, but that they would not give any one a hearing. This is evidently an untruth; in the days of the democracy the Athenians allowed everyone to speak, and Demosthenes, who gave utterance to the proud boast *ὑμεῖς ἔμοι, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, συμβούλῃ μὲν, κἂν μὴ θέλητε, χρήσεσθε, συκοφάντη δ' οὐδ' ἂν θέλητε* (Plut. Dem. 14), could obtain a hearing whenever he liked. A man of his stamp ought to have spoken at the right moment or kept silence afterwards.

We must now consider the retention of the Thracian fortresses by Philip. Did the *uti possidetis* apply to the first or the second oath? This might be doubtful in itself. But it was not doubtful to Demosthenes; he reckoned its operation from the date of Philip's oath, although he subsequently maintained the contrary. For in the first place he urged that the oath should be administered to Philip with all speed (*περὶ παραπρ.* 164), in which he was perfectly right; and secondly—and this is the best proof—he (Phil. 3, 15) invented the lie that Philip had taken the oath when he captured the fortresses, so clear was it to him that Athens could only make out a claim to these fortresses if Philip had taken them after he had sworn the oath. (I may add that this is irrespective of the fact noticed by Rohrmoser (I.L., p. 799), that the Athenians held these fortresses not as owners but only as allies of Cersobleptes, with whom Philip was not at peace. Athens therefore could lay no claim whatever to them herself.) The legal question therefore being beyond dispute, it is surprising to observe how Demosthenes, with the approval of his modern supporters, has obscured the real state of affairs. He states (*περὶ παραπρ.* 150-153) that if the envoys could not bring about in Pella the surrender of the places taken by Philip in Thrace after the taking of the oath by the Athenians, this would be regarded as a proof of Philip's untrust-

worthiness; in that case they ought to have reported this at once to Athens, in order that she might protect the Phocians, whom Philip would probably attack too. Demosthenes wanted, so he said, to report it, but Philip would not let him go. But how could Philip's doing what he had a right to do be evidence of untrustworthiness? How could the Athenians be apprehensive now for the first time about the Phocians, who had long been in difficulties? Lastly, how could they protect the Phocians at all at this stage? Statements of this kind might be made in a popular assembly, where almost anything can be said about foreign affairs, but they are out of place in history. Demosthenes therefore unjustly accused Philip of breach of faith in carrying out the Peace of Philocrates, and did so in the teeth of his own knowledge to the contrary. Why did he deceive the Athenians in this way? Weidner (Aesch. Ctes. p. 34) and Beloch (Att. Pol. p. 176) have expressed different views. Beloch thinks that Demosthenes only wanted a truce, and therefore needed a pretext for accusing Philip of breach of faith; Weidner says: "Demosthenes wanted to outwit his opponent, and was outwitted himself." A minute consideration of the circumstances would be necessary to arrive at a decision; but cf. chap. xvi. note 5.—The sort of stuff that Demosthenes ventured to impose on his audience is shown *inter alia* in Cor. 19, where he states that the Thebans had already been obliged to appeal to Athens, and that Philip, in order to prevent this, had offered peace to the Athenians and *βοήθειαν* to the Thebans. In point of fact, Thebes had long been in alliance with Philip, and had not the slightest reason to ask Athens for aid just at that time. These were the fables which Demosthenes told the Athenians in the year 330 about the events of 346!

4. Demosthenes' verdict on the treatment of the Phocians by Philip (*περὶ παραπρ.* 64) is endorsed by Schaefer, Dem. 2, 189. In point of fact, there had seldom been such lenity shown after so embittered a struggle in Greece. No executions, no selling into slavery. The Phocians as a peasant people were less injured economically by being transplanted into villages than the Arcadian peasants had been by their compulsory settlement in Megalopolis. We need only recall Athens' treatment of Melos, Scione (Thuc. 5, 22), Mytilene and Sestos (Diod. 16, 34), and the behaviour of Thebes to Plataea, Orchomenus (Diod. 15, 79), and the Lacedaemonians in Heraclea (Diod. 14, 82). Schaefer (Dem. 2, 287) himself acknowledges Philip's leniency.

5. For Demosthenes' speech on the Peace cf. Schaefer, Dem. 2, 296 seq.—The policy of Athens in the year 346 and shortly before that year was defective, firstly, in not giving Phocis vigorous

support at a time when it might have been saved, simply because they imagined that Phocis would dispose of Thebes without assistance, and that both would thus remain weak, to the advantage of Athens. As a matter of fact, Phocis would not have fallen but for the intervention of Philip. But in that case Athens, if she really cared for the Phocians, ought to have made an express stipulation for their security in the Peace of Philocrates. Her failure to do this was a second mistake. True, Demosthenes and his friends asserted that in this connection Athens relied on unofficial assurances of Philip conveyed by Aeschines, and that if these were false, the good faith of Athens had been abused. In putting forward this plea Demosthenes convicts himself and the Athenians of political incapacity. In the year 357 Athens had been, it was alleged, deceived by similar unofficial promises on the part of Philip, and had been deprived of Amphipolis. What then are we to think of statesmen who allow themselves to be led by the nose for the second time by the same man in the same manner. Assuredly they were not in their right place. If these statesmen had invariably practised loyalty and honesty themselves, we might, on the assumption that their blind confidence had been abused, regret that the bad had dealt hardly with the good. If, however, they were not very particular about the truth themselves, as was the case with Demosthenes, it is merely a question of crafty men who have to deal with an opponent of superior cunning. Finally, it is clear that the Athenians were themselves to blame if Philip was unable to be civil to them, although he had wished to be so for some time. He requested them to join him, their new ally, with an army. They refused, because they pretended to be afraid that he would take the army prisoners. (For the way in which Greeks behaved under such circumstances, see vol. ii. p. 68.) A state which thinks and acts in such an unfriendly spirit, cannot cry out about treachery when the offended ally falls back upon the text of his treaty and shows no civility to the offending party.—For the moral responsibility of Demosthenes for the defeat at Chaeronea see chap. xxix. note 1.

CHAPTER XVIII

PHILIP AND THE GREEKS TO THE BATTLE OF CHAERONEA (346-338)

THE Peace of Philocrates was only a temporary cessation of hostilities for the statesmen who were most listened to in Athens. Demosthenes stated pretty plainly in his speech *De Pace* that he only wanted peace in order that Athens might subsequently carry on the war against Philip with greater success. In fact, it was unmistakeable that the king wished to obtain possession of part of Thrace and influence the rest, and in that case the historical position of Athens, which rested on the control, maintained or claimed for the space of two centuries, of the entrance to the Pontus, would be seriously endangered. The Chersonese no doubt might be kept by means of friendship with Philip. But the position of Athens would be still safer, if Philip were overthrown. This was the policy of Demosthenes. The final aim of this party was therefore a perfectly justifiable one in the interests of Athens. And we may go further and say that as occasionally presented by Demosthenes, viz. that Athens should be powerful for protecting but not for domineering over the Greeks,¹ the aim was also an advantageous one for the whole of Greece. But unfortunately Athens' pursuit of it involved the abandonment of another ideal, the maintenance of the dignity of Greece, while Philip found in his avowed object of making war on Persia a justification for his conquests in

Thrace. Of leading Athenians the following belonged to the anti-Macedonian party led by Demosthenes: Hyperides, a man of the world, a brilliant orator and an enthusiastic patriot; Hegesippus and Timarchus, whom we shall soon see at work; and Lysurgus, who belonged to the old nobility, an honest financier and a pathetic champion of the good old days.² At the head of the Macedonian party, that is, of the party which wished to see Athens an ally of Macedonia, because it believed that this was the best security for Athenian interests, was Philocrates, a man of indifferent reputation, and Aeschines, who has been already mentioned.³ Aeschines came of an old but impoverished Athenian family; his father Atrometus had been obliged to make his living as a mercenary, and appears to have returned home with some wealth. Aeschines had enjoyed a good education, had become an actor and afterwards a public scribe, and had since devoted himself to politics. Of his brothers one was strategus several times; another administered the highest financial office of the city for four years, as successor and adherent of Eubulus. Another leader of the peace-party, Demades, did not become famous till after the battle of Chaeronea. The ornament of this party was Phocion, alike statesman and soldier, a rare combination in those days, but with no genius in either department, a pupil of Plato, as an orator distinguished for his cutting brevity, a man who, although highly esteemed as general and always re-elected, was nevertheless in favour of peace with Philip, and who in an age when, according to general assertion and that of Demosthenes in particular, corruption was a widely diffused vice, set a splendid example of honesty and disinterestedness.⁴

Demosthenes opened the party fight by accusing Aeschines of having been bribed by Philip when he was envoy to the king and of having neglected his duty. But he made the mistake of taking Timarchus as⁵ his fellow-signatory of the act of accusation; Aeschines brought a charge of immorality

against Timarchus, in consequence of which the latter was condemned and lost his civic rights. Thus the attack on Aeschines was repulsed for the moment. In the meantime Philip made further progress in Thrace and in Thessaly, and the Athenians exerted themselves in vain to obtain from him better security for their claims in the former country. He also interfered in Peloponnesian affairs, taking Argos, Arcadia, and Messene under his protection; whereupon Demosthenes went to the Peloponnese himself and counteracted his policy there, thus giving the king an opportunity of complaining to the Athenians of him. On this occasion Demosthenes defended his conduct with eloquence in the Second Philippic, and represented Philip as the implacable enemy of Athens. The party struggle was continued by an attack on Philocrates, against whom Hyperides brought a similar accusation to that which was pending against Aeschines. The anti-Macedonian current had now become so strong in Athens that no one would take up the defence of the accused, who escaped certain condemnation by flight. In Athens therefore charges were openly preferred against the king, with whom peace and alliance had just been contracted. Philip, who was not prepared to witness proceedings of this kind without a protest, complained once more to the Athenians by means of a special embassy conducted by Python, and requested them to put forward definite demands, in order that he might know what they wanted of him and be in a position to meet their wishes. Hegesippus now went to Philip and stated to him the two following demands on behalf of the Athenians, that the king should restore to Athens the island of Halonnessus which he had occupied and alter the terms of peace by inserting the words that each party should have "what he was lawfully entitled to." This embassy proved abortive. The alteration in the treaty demanded by Athens Philip was bound to refuse as a serious statesman, as appears from our remarks in the notes to the preceding chapter on the Peace of Philocrates.

This of course aroused the indignation of the Athenian people, which otherwise might have calmed down, and the object of the war-party was attained. The prosecution of Aeschines for the "*falsa legatio*," which at last came on for trial, ended in his acquittal (343). He had called Phocion and Eubulus as witnesses to his integrity.

Philip meanwhile made further progress at various points. He established his brother-in-law, Alexander, king in Epirus, he threatened Acarnania, concluded an alliance with the Aetolians, and he installed a tetrarch over each of the four provinces of Thessaly. Three of these governors were Aleuadae. Henceforth the forces of Thessaly were at the absolute and prompt disposal of Macedonia.⁵ In Euboea Eretria and Oreus obeyed Philip; Chalcis, on the other hand, remained loyal to Athens, and even in the Peloponnese the Athenians maintained their old position. Philip now prepared for a campaign in Thrace; but before setting out he made a fresh attempt (342) to come to an understanding with Athens. He promised to surrender Halonnessus and declared himself ready to abide by the decision of a court of arbitration in regard to the points in dispute, including the Thracian fortresses, and in return he asked for the privilege of sharing in the protection of trade against piracy afforded by Athens, *i.e.* of maintaining a fleet on the Aegean Sea. The way in which Athens received these proposals is known to us from an extant speech which was delivered at this time and is ascribed to Demosthenes, but of which Hegesippus is no doubt the author. It submits Philip's concessions to a severe criticism.⁶ The Athenians declined the offer of arbitration on the pretext that impartial judges could not be found. Of course they could have been found. This refusal shows what Demosthenes' party was aiming at. When one of two opponents demands that each shall receive what it is lawfully entitled to, but, as soon as the other side meets this demand and proposes arbitration, refuses the proposal on the alleged ground that impartial

arbitrators cannot be found, then that party means war. Athens might have secured a guarantee for her rights in Thrace by an honourable peace with Philip, but Demosthenes and his party prevented it, because they hoped that Athens might after all be successful in a war waged at the right moment and under favourable circumstances.

The king now started for Thrace (342). He left his son Alexander, then fifteen years of age, at home as his representative.⁷ He defeated the Thracians and advanced to the Pontus, where Greek cities, such as Apollonia and Odessus (Varna), submitted to him. Meanwhile the Athenians had despatched fresh cleruchies to the Chersonese under Diopithes, who collected contributions from merchant vessels of other states, began a quarrel with Cardia, a free city but under Philip's protection, the possession of which would have been extremely advantageous to Athens, and even plundered places in Thrace which belonged to Philip. When the latter complained to Athens of this, Demosthenes by his speech on the Chersonese managed to secure Diopithes immunity from punishment (341).⁸ Soon afterwards he delivered the Third Philippic, in which he adroitly and vigorously branded Philip as the cause of all the misfortunes of the Greeks, but drew a caricature of his military ability which must have lulled the Athenians into a delusive security.⁹ He also journeyed into Thrace, Illyria, Thessaly and the Peloponnese to work against the king, and actually succeeded in getting the important city of Byzantium, then in alliance with Philip, as well as Chios and Rhodes, to join Athens once more.¹⁰ To the king of Persia he sent a request for money. The latter would not give anything to the city of Athens, but is said to have made presents to individual Athenians. Demosthenes, it was reported, received 3000 darics, and Diopithes certainly accepted Persian money. The latter was allowed to continue his hostilities against Philip.

The king now turned against Byzantium.¹¹ He brought

his fleet into the Propontis, and began by attacking Perinthus, an ally of Byzantium. He laid siege to it according to all the rules of art; but it resisted him, and was saved by aid from Persia. The Athenians now, on the advice of Demosthenes, deemed it expedient to declare that Philip had broken the peace, and that he and Athens were at war with each other (340).

Philip hoped to capture Byzantium in any event, but in this he was disappointed. The Athenians sent Chares and then Phocion to the assistance of the beleaguered city, and the Byzantine Leon, a pupil of Plato, conducted the defence in concert with Phocion in a masterly manner. Philip at last raised the siege and brought his small fleet back to Macedonia, in spite of the Athenians who were watching the Hellespont with their naval force. Anxiety naturally prevailed as to the king's next movements. He took a step which was quite unexpected, and which pleased the Athenians greatly: he undertook an expedition against the Scythians, whose king Ateas was said to have offended him. He might meet with disaster in this quarter, and the Athenians hoped that he would. He was successful, however, in the battles which he fought, but prudently refrained from crossing the Danube and returned to Macedonia through the country of the Triballi, where he was wounded, at the end of the summer of 339. He had evidently undertaken this campaign in order to wipe out the recollection of his reverses before Byzantium and Perinthus by military successes, and in this, it would seem, he completely succeeded.

In the meanwhile Demosthenes had completed the military preparations of Athens. The *symmoriae* for the trierarchies were now so well organized that in the following years no complaints were heard regarding this branch of the administration.¹⁹ The construction of docks and other naval works begun by Eubulus was interrupted in order to apply the money voted for them to other purposes, probably to the

payment of the troops. In 338 Lysurgus was placed at the head of the Athenian financial department and administered it for twelve years with great ability, first under his own name and subsequently under that of others. But with all this expenditure of money and energy nothing was really done beyond laying waste the coasts of Macedonia. Philip pursued a more successful policy. Even at a distance he never lost sight of Greece, and circumstances as well as the peculiar policy of Demosthenes provided him with a good opportunity for interfering in Greek affairs at the close of his northern campaign.

In 340 B.C. Midias, the enemy of Demosthenes (*v. supra* pp. 255, 256), and Aeschines were appointed Pylagorae (assessors) for Athens in the Amphictyonic Assembly. When we consider the great importance which this assembly had recently assumed, it is surprising that the leading statesman in Athens should have allowed his enemies to get into such a position. And in fact Aeschines acted at Delphi in a manner which must at first have been very unpleasant to Demosthenes, but which the latter afterwards turned to account for his own purposes.¹² Aeschines learned that the Amphissaean, who were particular friends of the Thebans, intended to lodge a complaint against Athens about the rehanging of an old Delphic offering, in which the Thebans were described as enemies of the Greeks, and he prepared his defence. When the charge was brought before the Amphictyonic Council, he answered it in Greek fashion by counter-accusations of Amphissa, which was supposed to have cultivated a field sacred to Apollo. There was always material ready to hand for charges of this kind. After a brilliant speech by Aeschines, the Amphictyones decreed execution against Amphissa, and on the Amphissaeans resisting, a League war was declared against them under the presidency of the Thessalian Cottyphus. This decision shows that the change in the constitution of the Amphictyonic League which we have pointed out was making itself felt. Thebes was no longer supreme in it as in 356. She had been so as long as

the Thessalians were her friends; now Philip was master by means of his own vote and those of the Thessalians, Magnetes, Achaeans, and others, who were devoted to him. The result was that the interests of Thebes and the interests of the Amphictyones were no longer identical, and the Amphictyones did not scruple to offend Thebes by an attack upon the Locrians. Religion, which had been abused by Thebes in 356 for political purposes, was now made use of with just as much right against Thebes. Athens might have conducted this Amphictyonic war against Amphissa. In so doing she would have alike satisfied the Amphictyones, preserved her own honour and furthered her own interests. If she had taken this course, Philip would not have come to Greece. But she refrained from all participation in the affair, on the advice of Demosthenes, who was favourably disposed towards Thebes and Amphissa, and who could have been led into this otherwise incomprehensible policy only by the desire to be obliging to Thebes in order to secure that city on the first opportunity as an ally of Athens against Philip. The League war against Amphissa therefore was carried on by others, and in a very lukewarm fashion, which made the Amphictyones appoint Philip, who in the meanwhile had returned from the north, general of the League, probably in the autumn of 339. It was the inevitable consequence of the policy of Demosthenes, who had aggravated the conflict and had now come to the point of risking everything upon a single throw. The summons came very opportunely for the king. He immediately marched southwards and occupied the city of Elatea, which was situated in Phocis on the northern side of the valley of the Cephissus. He thereby threatened first the Thebans, the friends of the Amphissaeans, and indirectly of course the rest of Greece, which viewed the decision of the Amphictyones with disfavour, and above all Athens, the secret friend of Amphissa and the open enemy of Macedonia.¹⁴

At this point comes in the famous narrative of Demosthenes, the passage of the *De Corona* in which he relates in vivid language how the occupation of Elatea became known in Athens one evening, and caused universal consternation, how on the following morning the people assembled for deliberation, but no one ventured to make any proposal until Demosthenes rose and explained the position of affairs. This occupation, he said, was of course a menace to Athens, as she was at war with Philip, but it was especially a menace to Thebes. The Athenians must therefore advance under arms to the Boeotian frontier and send envoys to Thebes to offer their aid to the Thebans. As no one had any other suggestion to make, the people adopted this proposal, which was a dignified continuation of the policy latterly followed, and besides, in its offer of assistance to Thebes, which had not always been a friend to Athens, had a magnanimous character which entirely corresponded with the sentiments of the Athenians. Demosthenes with nine others was entrusted with the conduct of the matter. He proceeded to Thebes, where Macedonian envoys also put in an appearance. The latter demanded, as Demosthenes relates, that the Thebans should at all events allow the Macedonian army to march through their territory, and held out to them the prospect of sharing in the booty, if they would make common cause with them against Athens. In other words, not only Athens but Philip also was suing for Theban support. It might have seemed to the Thebans that the fate of Greece was in their hands. And, in point of fact, this was the case. But we may go farther. They had been the cause of the whole confusion and now they brought it to a pitch. Thebes had instigated the Phocian war; in 353 Thebes had encouraged Philip's progress in Thrace and, in concert with the nobles of Thessaly, had invited him into Greece, and now the Thebans would not submit to be ousted themselves from their position in Greece by Philip. To secure their power they accepted the alliance offered them by

Athens. But they managed to word their acceptance as if they were making a great sacrifice, and obtained a heavy price for their support from Athens. The Athenians declared their readiness to pay two-thirds of the cost of the war, to recognize Thebes as having equal rights with them at sea, to place themselves under the supreme command of Thebes by land, and lastly to concede to Thebes the supremacy over Boeotia, which had so long been stigmatized as unjust. They thus gave way on the most important questions of practice and principle. The alliance between Thebes and Athens made an excellent nucleus, and if the rest of Greece had joined these two states, Philip would in all probability have had to retreat. But the most important Greek states, Sparta, Messenia, Elis, Arcadia, and Argos, held aloof, and only Euboea, Megara, Corinth, Achaea, Acarnania, Leucas and Coreyra sent soldiers. The allies at first obtained some successes over the Macedonian troops. But the despatch of 10,000 mercenaries to the assistance of the Amphissaeans was a dangerous division of forces, and the honour of a golden wreath conferred by the citizens of Athens on Demosthenes as a reward for his zeal in the spring of 338 shows that the crisis was not considered as serious as it really was. Events took a different course from what had been expected. Philip misled Chares into abandoning the passes leading to Amphissa, defeated him and captured Amphissa and Naupactus into the bargain. The king now once more attempted to induce Thebes and Athens to conclude peace, but Demosthenes managed to persuade both cities to continue the war. Thereupon Philip, by a fresh piece of strategy, effected an unopposed march into the plain of Boeotia; his army was now close to Thebes.

The decisive battle was fought near Chaeronea in August or September 338.¹⁵ Philip's army consisted of 30,000 foot and at least 2000 cavalry. The allies were somewhat more numerous. Philip's troops were inured to warfare and led by a single will, that of a man who was a master in

the art of war and had able generals under him, among them his son Alexander. The allies were citizens, warlike and inspired by an ardent love of liberty; the Thebans above all were distinguished for their bravery, and among them again was the famous and valiant Sacred Band of the Three Hundred, who were determined to conquer or to die. The Thebans were commanded by Theagenes, the Athenians by Stratocles, Chares and Lysicles. Of these Athenian generals the first was probably an able soldier, the second hardly more than an ordinary leader of mercenaries, the third was false to his duty, if the court which condemned him after the loss of the battle pronounced a just sentence. The opposing forces in the decisive struggle were equal, but the higher ideal enthusiasm of the allies succumbed to the incomparably superior generalship of the Macedonians. At first the Athenians on the left wing defeated Philip, who was opposed to them, but on the right the Thebans were routed by Alexander. Theagenes fell; the Sacred Band, fighting bravely to the last, was cut to pieces; and then the whole army took to flight. Of the Athenians about 1000 are said to have been killed and 2000 taken prisoners. Demosthenes, who had taken part in the battle as a simple hoplite, was among the fugitives.

The drama was now at an end. Philip had accomplished his purpose. For the first time since the Greeks became a nation, free states of the first rank had succumbed on Greek soil to a hereditary monarch, and this first defeat decided the destiny of Greece. But the defeat was not less glorious for the vanquished than for the conquerors. Over the graves of the fallen Thebans and their allies there was afterwards erected on the battle-field, as an eloquent monument to Greek honour, the figure of a lion hewn out of marble, the remains of which have survived to this day. Well does this battle deserve an imperishable external record, for success is not the true criterion of greatness.¹⁶

NOTES

1. In the *De Corona* speech (305) Demosthenes holds up to Athens the noble aim of protecting the Greek states in such way that all shall be ἐλεύθεροι and αὐτόνομοι. In the speech *De Pace* § 14 seq. he points out that Athens might find other reasons for renewing the war with Philip.

2. For Hyperides, Hegesippus, Timarchus cf. Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 32 seq. For Lycurgus *ibid.* 317 seq.; the edition of the speech against Leocrates by Rehdantz, Leipzig, 1876; Blass; and Droege, *De Lycurgo Athen.*, Bonn, 1880.

3. For Aeschines cf. Sch. *Dem.* 1, 215-258, the edition of the speech against Ctesiphon by Weidner, Berl. 1878, and Blass, 3, Abth. 2. The stories of Demosthenes about Aeschines' parents are now accepted as true by no one, and it is significant for the esteem in which Demosthenes is held by his own supporters, that they explain that he has much more scandal to fling at Aeschines in the *De Corona* speech than in the speech *De Fala. Leg.* It is pointed out (Sch. *Dem.* 1, 226) that Demosthenes had the last word in the *Corona*, and therefore could say what he liked, whereas his assertions in the *De Fala. Leg.* could be refuted by Aeschines who spoke after him.—His ridicule of the *πρωταγωνιστής* Aeschines is well known. It is not generally noticed that this was all the more amusing to the Athenians, because Demosthenes himself wished to be and was a genuine *πρωταγωνιστής* as orator. We know that his reply to the question, what is the most important quality in an orator? was: *ὑπόκρισις*; and to the further question what is the second and third important quality? also *ὑπόκρισις*. How completely the *τραγωδίαν ὑποκρίνεσθαι* engrossed him, is shown by his behaviour after Philip's death and by his remarks just before his own death, *Plut. Dem.* 29.

4. For Demades cf. Sch. *Dem.* 3, 20 seq. For Phocion see the article in *Pauly's R. E.* 5, and Bernays, *Phokion*, Berl. 1881. There are some excellent anecdotes in *Plutarch's Phocion*. Phocion was, according to Demosthenes himself, the *κορὴς* of his speeches. Demosthenes was *ρήτωρ ἄρωςτος, εἰπεῖν δὲ δεινότερος ὁ Φωκίων*. He was strategist forty-five times.

5. For the *παραπρεσβεία* we have the two speeches of Demosthenes and Aeschines, of which the latter is business-like, the former sophistical; cf. chap. xvii. note 3. Demosthenes' attempt to prove the *δωροδοκία* of Aeschines is a complete failure. The solitary fact which Demosthenes brings forward in his long state-

ment is the possession of an estate, the situation of which he does not indicate, and as to which he does not maintain that Philip made a present of it to Aeschines. As Demosthenes wishes to call witnesses from Olynthus, it is presumed that it was in the neighbourhood of that city; according to Schol. Aesch. Tim. 3, it is said to have been near Pydna. That a charge of this kind has no significance is beyond a doubt; and when we see that from § 98 to § 146 Demosthenes exerts himself to show that Aeschines must have been bribed, we conclude that he could not prove that he was so.—For Thessaly, Sch. Dem. 2, 430.

6. According to Beloch, Att. Pol. 211, Demosthenes had succeeded as early as 343-342 in bringing about a regular league against Philip.—The speech *De Halonneso* gives us special information as to Philip's communication to the Athenians before his expedition to Thrace; cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 431 seq.; Blass, 3, 2, 113-121.

7. For the Thracian War, Diod. 16, 71, 74-77; Theop. fr. 244-248, 249*; Anaxim. fr. 11-13; cf. Hoeck page 61 seq., who also discusses the authorities. In Thrace Philip founded the cities of Philippopolis, Calybe (Poneropolis) and Bine. The two last are now considered to have been penal settlements, on account of their names; this seems to me impossible on the face of it. Why should not Bine be a Thracian name, and Poneropolis a Greek witticism on Philip? For Diopithes cf. Sch. Dem. 2, 451; Cardia, Dem. Ar. 182.

8. In the speech *De Chersoneso* expediency is the guiding principle. In §§ 44, 45 Demosthenes wrongly presumes that Philip wishes to conquer Athens. In § 42 Demosthenes says to the Athenians: ἐντὲ γὰρ ὑμεῖς οὐκ αἰτοῖ πλεονεκτῆσαι καὶ κατασχεῖν ἀρχὴν εὐ πεφυκότες, in § 60 on the other hand: ἀρχεῖν γὰρ εἰώθατε. In contrast to Demosthenes, who defended Diopithes, the idealist Burke, in oratory the Demosthenes of modern times, impeached Warren Hastings, who secured the English supremacy in India, because he had acted unjustly in doing so.

9. For the Third Philippic Schaefer, Dem. 2, 469 seq. and Blass, 3, 1, 336.—In Phil. 3, 48, 49 Demosthenes makes an interesting remark to the effect that Philip did not conduct the war in the old Greek fashion. An examination of this statement, which the commentators have not discussed, is of value for history; I therefore make it here as a pendant to my remarks in vol. ii. p. 395. Demosthenes says that Philip did not suspend operations in winter or deliver open battle, but that he fought with light troops and conquered by means of bribery. The facts are as follows. The Greeks had originally a peculiar conception of war; cf. also Polyb. 13, 3. It was a religious ordeal, conducted in accordance

with definite rules; the hoplites were the deciding element; cavalry and *ψιλοί* were only accessories. Argos and Sparta on one occasion even entrusted the decision to 300 picked combatants. An unannounced invasion of a country, even when a state of war existed, was not quite *en règle*; the Argives defended themselves against it by the expedient of suddenly beginning the month Carneus, which was equivalent to saying: It is not lawful for us to fight, so stop your plundering. Fortified places were not taken by storm; the attacking party tried to make a breach in the walls; if this failed, the inhabitants were reduced by famine; if they surrendered in consequence they might be killed or sold as slaves. In the winter there was a suspension of hostilities; the citizens could not take the field the whole year round. All these practices were due to the fact that the Greeks regarded war as a duel, which might be fought out under certain circumstances with great bitterness, but always according to certain definite rules. Croesus, who never expected a winter campaign, also had similar Greek ideas (Herod. 1, 77); but Cyrus had more practical views. Demosthenes in Phil. 3, 48, 49 starts with the correct perception that Philip did not wage war in the old Greek way. In his eyes war was not a duel, but a rough means of attaining practical ends. But Demosthenes has in the first place neglected to observe that the Greeks themselves, and especially the Athenians, had long ceased to entertain this old conception of war, and in the second place he has completely misrepresented Philip's method of warfare. As regards the first point, the use of light troops and the employment of stratagems was introduced by Demosthenes the elder and Iphicrates, who were Athenians; and Syracuse was blockaded in the winter. It may be true that Philip bribed many Greeks, but even in this he was no innovator; Themistocles and Pericles, who were Athenians, were accused long before his time of achieving successes by means of bribery, and no one can have any doubt after reading Thuc. 7, 86 that Nicias made friends for himself in Syracuse by means of money. It is taking a petty view of great events to hold that corruption by Philip had the enormous influence on the decline of Greek liberty which Demosthenes, to whom money dealings were a sort of hobby, attributes to it. Strange to say, the acceptance of bribes from Persia and Harpalus is proved only of Athenian not of Macedonian patriots; Philocrates was condemned *in contumaciam*. Demosthenes is so lavish in his charges of bribery that he even accuses his wealthy fellow-citizens of trying to bribe him (*De Cor.* 103). Consequently Philip was not the only offender in this respect. But he goes so hastily to work with Philip that he accuses him (*De Cor.* 18, 19) of *πάντας παράσσειν*

in the Peloponnese by money after having said a couple of lines before that *εἶς* and *παραχρή* were there already. According to this Philip must have spent his money there from pure love of spending it. The scenting of bribery was a fashionable complaint in certain Athenian circles of those days, just as that of espionage is elsewhere. So much for the first point. With regard to the second, the best proof that Demosthenes has given an entirely wrong description of Philip's method of warfare, is supplied by the battle of Chaeronea. It was not bribery, nor the employment of light troops which decided this battle; the Athenians and Thebans were defeated in a fair fight of hoplites. Demosthenes never grasped the real character of the Macedonian king, and always misrepresented him to the Athenians — a thousand pities for Athens, which followed him, and for the whole of Greece. It is significant that in the year 341 Demosthenes could speak to the Athenians of Philip, the creator of the Macedonian phalanx, as follows: ἀκούετε δὲ Φίλιππον οὐχὶ τῷ φάλαγγ' ὀπλιτῶν ἄγαν βαδίζονθ' ὅποι βούλεται, ἀλλὰ τῷ ψιλοῖς etc.

10. Activity of Demosthenes on his journeys, etc. Sch. Dem. 2, 481 seq.

11. Siege of Perinthus and Byzantium, Sch. Dem. 2, 496 seq., Hoeck, 77 seq. Philip brings his fleet through the Hellespont, Ep. Phil. 16. Declaration of war by Athens, Philoch. 135. Philip's campaign against the Scythians, Sch. Dem. 2, 577 seq. The attitude of Rhodes and Chios, *ibid.* 516.

12. Organization of the trierarchy by Demosthenes, Sch. Dem. 2, 523; Gilbert, St. A. 1, 354, 355. According to Philoch. 135 it was resolved on the motion of Demosthenes τὰ χρήματα πάντ' εἶναι στρατιωτικά.

13. For the quarrel with Amphissa Sch. Dem. 2, 532 seq. A wrong view is generally taken of it owing to the acceptance of unfounded assertions by Demosthenes. The Amphissaeans were Locrians, enemies of the Phocians and friends of the Thebans. Aeschines, in his opposition to the Amphissaeans, was faithful to the old tradition of Athens, of friendliness to Phocis, while Demosthenes, by working for the Amphissaeans, was acting in the interests of the Thebans, and helping people who demanded that Athens should be punished. Demosthenes, who in the speech *De Pace* 19 had warned Athens not to make enemies of the Amphictyones, now did this very thing himself. It is true that he maintains in the *De Cor.* 143 that when Aeschines invited the Athenians to take part in the measures to be adopted against Amphissa, he cried out: πόλεμον εἰς τὴν Ἀττικὴν εἰσάγεις, Αἰσχίνη, πόλεμον Ἀμφικτιονικόν, but if he really did make this

exclamation, he gave utterance to a most audacious falsehood. For by it he imputed to Aeschines what he was doing himself, and what Aeschines was trying to prevent. If Athens had taken the side of the Amphictyones, as Aeschines wished, there would have been no Amphictyonic war for Attica. Athens had a splendid opportunity of obtaining a secure position in the Amphictyonic League; Demosthenes prevented this, and thus brought Philip, the general of the League, into hostility with Attica. This must have been his intention, for he was clear-headed enough to see that if Athens refused to move against Amphissa, the Amphictyones would call in Philip—as indeed they did. He let matters take this course, because he wished to render Thebes a great service and so enlist her against Philip. Perhaps Philip, he may have thought, would in the meanwhile be unsuccessful in Thrace. But whatever may have induced him to take the part of Amphissa, it was he and not Aeschines who brought Philip into Greece. On this occasion too we can observe the crafty method adopted by Demosthenes in important crises, of converting the people to his policy, when this policy was in contradiction to that which had hitherto been pursued. He does not declare his new aims at once; that would have attracted the attention of the Athenians. He begins by only hindering the continuance of the old policy. The Athenians had to omit doing something which might have been expected of them. In this way he had prevented the despatch of an army to Philip in Thessaly, which was incumbent on Athens as Philip's ally, and had subsequently stopped the attendance at the Pythian Games. This annoyed Philip, and the Amphictyones still more so; they showed it to the Athenians, and so made the latter more inclined to turn against the Amphictyones. It was the same in this case. The Athenians do not pronounce officially for the Amphissaeans; they simply take no action against them. In so doing they become mixed up with the Theban and Amphissaeon party, and soon find it quite natural to be fighting on the side of Thebes and Amphissa. By declaring for Amphissa Demosthenes paved the way for the Athenian and Theban alliance. —After the capture of Amphissa by Philip, it was also Demosthenes who prevented the peace, which was still possible and was advocated by Phocion. Here Schaefer (*Dem.* 2, 360) endeavours to justify him as follows: "Any one who knew Philip could be sure that he was less disposed for peace now than ever. . . . With this conviction the Athenian citizens decided to abide by the arbitrament of arms." But in making this remark Schaefer condemns Demosthenes and the Athenians. For peace with the Greeks was undoubtedly an object with Philip, since he needed it

for his contemplated campaign into Asia. It is true Demosthenes (Cherr. 60) says that Philip wished ὅλως ἀνελεῖν Athens; but that this was not the case was proved by the king after the battle of Chaeronea. Weil, *Plaidoyers de Dém.* p. 399, comes to a more correct conclusion: "Croit-on qu'il eût renoncé à son projet de se faire le généralissime, c'est à dire, le maître de la Grèce?" Only the equation, Généralissime = Maître, is unjustifiable. If it had been correct, Demosthenes would no doubt have used this argument too. But he never told the truth, viz. that Philip wanted to become commander-in-chief, for that would not have made the Athenians uneasy; he said what was untrue, and maintained that Philip wished to annihilate Athens. That produced its due effect. For the immediate evil consequences to Athens of this falsehood see chap. xix. note 1. The election of Philip as commander-in-chief against Persia before he had defeated the Greeks, would have been the best means of getting rid of him, and of securing Greek independence at the same time, for at that stage the Greeks might have made their own terms, whereas after Chaeronea they had to accept those of the king.—There can be no denying the fact that Demosthenes is great as an agitator in this very period, from the Peace of Philocrates up to the battle of Chaeronea; he reminds one of Gladstone.

14. The date of the capture of Elatea is disputed. The editor (Hoffmann) of Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 544 rightly remarks: "According to Plut. *Dem.* 18, the expedition to Amphissa would have preceded the occupation of Elatea; but the narrative both in Aesch. 3, 140, 146 seq. and in the *De Cor.* 152 seq. and 216 tells against this, and there are a whole series of events between the conclusion of the alliance with Thebes and the battle of Chaeronea." I should like to call special attention to the words ἐπὶπύρσαι, etc. in the *De Cor.* 152, and also to point out that Plutarch is of no great importance in questions of chronology.—In the year 344 the occupation of Elatea by Philip was longed for by the Athenians, but considered improbable; now Philip did them this favour, but too late.—Remarks of Demosthenes and Phocion on the proper mode of conducting war, Plut. *Phoc.* 16.—The conditions of the Theban-Athenian alliance, Sch. *Dem.* 2, 552.

15. The battle of Chaeronea, 7th Metageitnion 338; but we do not know whether 338 was a leap year; hence it is uncertain whether the day falls in August or September; cf. Götting, *Gea. Abh.* 1, 147 seq.; Curtius, 3, 508. According to Egelhaaf, *Analekten z. Gesch.* p. 45, Philip perhaps kept back the wing which he commanded, in order that Alexander might use the other as a wedge; Köchly und Rüstow, *Griech. Kriegsw.* 232. Some

Acarnanians were with the Athenians in the battle, C. I. A. 2, 121 = Ditt. 109.—For the lion see Baedeker, 163.—Brave in battle, the Greeks were bad generals in a campaign. They ought to have destroyed the Macedonian ships in the Hellespont; they ought not to have weakened their forces by the diversion of 10,000 men to Amphissa, or to have allowed themselves to be outwitted by Philip at the passes into Amphissa and Boeotia. But the last days of the republican splendour of Greece (for powerful Greek republics existed in later times) were highly honourable to the Greeks. Fighting as hoplites they succumbed to superior generalship. Stratagem did not win the day. There is no trace of treachery or bribery. The charge actually brought against Lysicles is unknown to us, Sch. Dem. 3, 75. The passage in Diodorus (16, 88) consists only of empty phrases.

16. In the discussion of the contrast between Macedonia and Greece both sides have gone too far. The supporters of Demosthenes have wrongly asserted that the Greeks were threatened with servitude by Philip. It is clear that the hegemony was the object in view. I have discussed this at sufficient length. But there is this still to be said against the policy of Demosthenes. It virtually amounted to the continuation of the old exploitation of Greece by Persia. Persia gave Greece money; Greece gave Persia its men as mercenaries. In Asia during the war against Alexander the Asiatic subjects of the Persian king—except the Bactrians—did nothing; what was done, was done by the Greeks. This not very honourable state of things for Greece as a political community would have been converted into a permanent system if the policy of Demosthenes had been successful, and civil wars of the worst kind would have resulted from it in Greece itself. For an alliance between Thebes and Athens based on the subjugation of Boeotia by Thebes carried in it the germ of fresh dissensions between the two states.

On the other hand Droysen (*Hellenismus*, 1, 33) goes rather too far in holding that the victory gained by Macedonia over Greece was necessary in the interests of the latter, which was being "paralysed by the petty narrow life of its states." The Macedonian rule brought no improvement in this respect. The pettiness and narrowness remained what they had been; indeed they grew worse rather than better. A voluntary alliance with Macedonia would have been a remedy. If the Greeks had honestly thrown in their lot with Philip and Alexander in the spirit of Isocrates, they would have reaped the advantage of the victory over Asia without the disadvantage of Macedonian rule over Greece, for in that case there would have been no occasion for Macedonian garrisons in Greek territory.

CHAPTER XIX

PHILIP'S LAST YEARS (338-336)

ON the battle-field Philip at first behaved as extravagantly as a barbarian who has gained an unexpected advantage, but afterwards he acted with dignity and wisdom. The Athenians were intensely alarmed at the defeat. Demosthenes had told them that Philip excelled only in stratagem and corruption, and now his phalanx had proved more than a match for those of the free cities. Hyperides went so far as to propose a general arming of slaves. Demosthenes procured his own despatch from the city to buy grain and collect money. There was no hurry for this, for the Athenian fleet had command of the sea, and anybody else would have done just as well; the Athenian generals were always good hands at collecting money. But for keeping up the courage of the people, in case Philip advanced nearer, no one would have been so useful as the popular orator. He ought also, one would think, to have held that his place in this moment of extreme danger was with his fellow-citizens. But he had not the high appreciation of his own value to the city which his modern admirers have. He estimated his financial and mercantile aptitudes higher than his moral influence on the people. If he left the city from fear of Philip—an assertion which cannot be maintained—this apprehension would have been without foundation. Philip respected the energy and decision with which Demosthenes had opposed him, and after all he had

no intention of treating Athens severely, although he inflicted condign punishment on Thebes. For Thebes, like Olynthus, had seceded from him to Athens, while the latter had never concealed her hatred of him. Thebes lost the cities of Orchomenus, Thespiæ and Plataea, which she had treated so ill, and which now recovered their old independence. The Cadmea received a Macedonian garrison; the exiles returned and condemned a number of their opponents to death. Philip, on the other hand, sent word to the Athenians through Demades, who was among the prisoners, that he was willing to offer them favourable terms. He did not wish to drive a city, which could make a long defence and which he honoured as the intellectual centre of Greece, to extremities. The Athenians therefore commissioned Demades, Phocion and Aeschines to open negotiations about the prisoners of war, in the course of which they would perhaps also ascertain the terms which Philip intended to grant to the city. The king released the prisoners without ransom, provided them with apparel, and declared that he would send the bodies of the fallen to Athens, adding that he would communicate his further intentions there. Philip's mission was carried out by Antipater and the young Alexander. The king's terms were as follows: Athens was to retain her freedom, to keep Delos and Samos (probably Lemnos and Imbros too), and to receive Oropus out of the Theban booty. She was to become Philip's ally. This was a second surprise for the Athenians. Demosthenes had told them that Philip wanted to destroy Athens, and now he offered them more than they could have expected. Under such circumstances they had no wish to run the risks of a siege, which they could have stood very well; they accepted peace on these conditions. Nor were they backward in paying homage to the king in their joy at their unexpected deliverance; they bestowed upon him the right of citizenship and erected a statue to him in the market-place. The removal of the two

illusions, first as to the power, and, secondly, as to the intentions of Philip, prevented them from taking a clear view of their position. But their sentiments underwent no change, and when the question of delivering the usual funeral oration over the fallen came forward, they entrusted this honour to Demosthenes.¹

Philip now applied himself to the further settlement of Greek affairs. Chalcis, which he must have occupied by that time, was joined to the mainland by a *tête-de-pont*; he also stationed a Macedonian garrison in Corinth. In this way he could reach every part of Greece by way of Euboea, Chalcis and Corinth, in case Thermopylae was closed to him. Argos received its illustrious scion in a friendly spirit; for the wish of the Argives was now accomplished and a Temenid had become leader of Greece. The Arcadians, Messenians and Eleans also joined Philip, who now turned against Sparta. The latter was unable to defend itself. King Archidamus had left the country, and had met his death in Italy in the service of the Tarentines. But his son and successor Agis upheld the dignity of Sparta. With true Laconic brevity the Spartans replied 'no' to Philip's question whether he might enter their city. He therefore laid waste Laconia, offered them terms which they refused, but made no attempt to occupy Sparta. He deprived the Spartans however of all territory beyond the old Laconian frontier. The east coast was given to Argos, and the territory about the source of the Eurotas to Arcadia. The other inhabitants of the Peloponnese honoured Philip in every way. The Philippeum was erected in Olympia, a circular building with ivory and gold statues of Philip and his parents. In Corinth Philip communicated to the Greeks the outline of an Hellenic league, which was to secure to its members their independence, the continuation of their several constitutions and free navigation of the seas. The delegates, *synedroi*, were to meet at Corinth; the Amphictyones were to constitute the

tribunal of the league. The Greeks, in concert with Macedonia and under the leadership of Philip, were to wage war on Persia as a punishment for the impious deeds formerly committed by the Persians against Greek sanctuaries. In this way the Greeks now entered into the same relations with Philip as the allies had with Athens in the league of 377. This might have been enduring; but could that be said of the Macedonian garrisons in Chalcis and Corinth? True, the new league was better than the old one in this respect, that the war against Persia set before its leader a brilliant patriotic task. But what was the good of that, if the Greeks preferred serving the Persians for money to wresting it from them, as Philip wished, with arms in their hands?

Philip now returned to Macedonia, to make preparations for his expedition to Asia. But he was not destined to carry it into execution. The barbarous spirit which characterized personal intercourse between individual Macedonians, was the cause of his death. He had taken a dislike to his wife Olympias, a woman whose practice of fantastic cults and whose indomitable pride, which led her into the grossest acts of cruelty, sometimes approached to the verge of madness. After forming several connections with other women Philip married Cleopatra, a beautiful Macedonian, on his return from Greece, and at the wedding her uncle Attalus insulted Alexander, saying that he was not the lawful heir, who was yet to be born. Stormy scenes ensued between Alexander and Attalus and also between Alexander and Philip; and Alexander left Macedonia with his mother. But a Corinthian named Demaratus made peace between them and Philip. It was arranged that all discord in the royal family should be removed at Aegae, on the occasion of a great festival, the marriage of Cleopatra, Alexander's sister, to her uncle Alexander of Epirus. But the hand of the assassin put an abrupt termination to the festivities. A young man, named Pausanias, who had been insulted by Attalus and had not been

able to obtain satisfaction from the king, murdered Philip, in July 336. The Lyncestæan princes, Heromenes and Arrhæbæus, were his accomplices. But the general expectation that the kingdom would now be a prey to confusion was disappointed; Pausanias was immediately put to death. Another Lyncestæan, Alexander, was the first to recognize the prince Alexander as king, and the army followed his example.²

Philip only reached the age of forty-seven, and reigned nearly twenty-four years. He was an extraordinary man, remarkably clever and practical, a general and a statesman of the first rank, rough only in his dealings with uncivilized Macedonians, but considerate towards the cultured Greeks, a man of his word and not of a cruel disposition. He accomplished what seemed almost an impossibility and what ordinary cunning could never have achieved; he laid the foundations of Macedonian supremacy over the brave Greeks.³

The causes of the fall of independent Greece are not, as is often supposed, to be sought in a moral degeneration of the people, which had in vain been combated by great and virtuous leaders; they are due to the native character of the people, to which their leaders yielded more than they should have done. These leaders fostered the innate tendency of the Greeks towards isolation of their various communities far too much; hence when the decisive moment arrived, they were not all to the fore. The leaders also instilled into the people the mistaken idea that diplomacy and military preparations were sufficient to obtain success; the result was that at the critical moment the most important factor, a good general, was lacking. The forces of Greece were scattered. The best Corinthian, Timoleon, went to Sicily; the ablest Spartan, Archidamus, fell in Italy, when the battle of Chaeronea was being fought. This is why the independent Greeks succumbed to Philip. But that this defeat was never wiped out, that the downfall of the republics as great powers was a permanent one, was due to something else. It was due

to the fact that the Macedonians grasped and utilized for their own ends the one great principle which holds nations together and which the statesmen of independent Greece had neglected for some fifty years, like the pearl of great price which its lawful owner cannot appreciate and throws away—the principle of nationality. The task set before the Greeks had been that of every nation: the maintenance of liberty at home and of dignity abroad. The first part of it they had always accomplished, the second they neglected in the fourth century. When once they were conquered, the prospect of the triumph of the Greek name in Asia made nearly all the vigorous energetic spirits of the Greek republics swell the train of the Macedonians, and thus it came about that these free states no longer retained sufficient strength to shake off the Macedonian yoke. It was neglect of national feeling which deprived the independent Greek states of their position in the world.

NOTES

1. Projected arming of slaves, Suid. ἀπεψηφίσμενοι; cf. Beloch, *Bevölkerung der griech.-röm. Welt*, p. 98. — The feeling, that the absence of Demosthenes did harm to Athens, is expressed by a decided supporter of his, Herzberg, *Griech. Geschichte*, Halle, 1884, p. 436. In the third century Athens, as we shall see, proved more stubborn in the defence of her liberty under less eloquent statesmen. Schaefer (*Dem.* 3, 26-29) shows how the "magnanimity" of Philip, "which exceeded all expectations," made the Athenians inclined for peace, when they might not only have defended themselves against Philip, but by holding out might have robbed him of "the fruit of his victory" (*Sch.* p. 17). This was precisely the consequence of the untruthful tactics of Demosthenes. Demosthenes had said that Philip wished ὅλος ἀρελεῖν Athens, and instead of this the king was attaching the greatest value to the friendship of Athens. The origins of such an important event as the downfall of Athens must be clearly explained. And there can be no disguising the fact that the shortcomings of the leading statesman of the city are to a great extent to blame. In spite of his skill as an old hand and his dramatic arts (cf.

following note), he might still have been a great statesman, like Napoleon I., whom Pius VII. described as "tragediante," if he had only proved clear-headed and energetic in the critical moment like Napoleon in 1814. But, whether from ignorance of the position of affairs or from miscalculation, he kept the Athenians in the dark as to the aims and resources of the enemy, and when the Macedonian phalanx, which he had disparaged, had vanquished the intrepid Greeks, he set to work to collect grain and money, and left it to others to extricate the city from its embarrassment.—Philip treated Athens with friendliness, not merely from calculation, but from respect for the importance of the city, which he styled τῆς δόξης θέατρον, evidently with reference to the *Panegyricus* of Isocrates (Plut. Apophth. Phil. 11); cf. pseudo-Call. 2, 5. In this he displayed his Greek sentiments. The value which the Greeks set on fame is shown in a characteristic way by Eur. Med. 535, where Jason claims gratitude from Medea for having brought her to Greece, for it was that only which had made her famous:—πάντες δέ σ' ἡσθοντ' οἶσαν "Ἕλληνες σοφὴν, καὶ δόξαν ἄρχες· εἰ δὲ γῆς ἐπ' ἐσχάτοις ὄροισιν ἦκας, οὐκ ἂν ἦν λόγος σέθεν. This was but a poor consolation for the deserted woman, but Euripides wrote the passage for the Athenian public, which regarded itself as the dispenser of fame in Greece.

2. Joy of Demosthenes at Philip's death, in spite of what he had said on a previous occasion in Phil. 1, 11, Plut. Dem. 22 and elsewhere; cf. Sch. Dem. 3, 87-90. Philip giving way to exultation on the battle-field of Chaeronea is less to blame, for he did it in the intoxication of success and altered his behaviour immediately afterwards. Demosthenes, however, made use of the news of Philip's death, which reached him earlier than other Athenians in consequence of his close relations with all the enemies of Philip, to treat the people to a theatrical performance. First of all he simply told them that he had dreamed that the gods had bestowed a great favour on them; then when the news became public property, he appeared in the Assembly in a festal robe with a wreath upon his head, although he was in mourning for the death of his daughter which had taken place seven days previously. The invention and execution of these scenes (Schaefer (90) calls it a piece of "cool calculation") did credit to his talent, but that was all, as they were not necessary. The vision of Alexander in a dream was necessary to Eumenes (Plut. Eum. 13), as he could only compass the fitting up of the generals' pavilion in this way; Demosthenes simply wanted to carry out a favourite theatrical device in real life; ἐπὶ κρήσιν had become a second nature to him. Schaefer (I.L.) passes a very proper verdict on it.

3. Philip's character. The traditional censure of the king from a moral point of view is unfounded, not only intrinsically, but in a special degree if we compare him with his Athenian opponents. Schaefer (*Dem.* 2, 34 seq.) has collected all the material bearing on the subject with his usual care, and it is clear that unproved assertions of Demosthenes (*eg. De Cor.* 65) and verdicts of later writers (*eg. Paus.* 8, 75), which are merely the echo of Demosthenes' charges, have created the impression that he was faithless and cruel (*Blass*, 2, 85). As regards the latter, as a matter of fact he showed more clemency in the treatment of vanquished foes than the Greeks often did. The drowning of the mercenaries in Thessaly was carried out by order of the Amphictyones, who would also have treated the Phocians more cruelly had not the element Philip intervened. His reputation for breaking his word is now so firmly rooted that even the editors of Weidmann's Demosthenes (1, 176) charge him with having done it "time after time," although it is not proved on one occasion. In the affairs of Olynthus it was not he who broke his word; see chap. xvii. note 2. He never practised treachery against his allies, as Athens did against Pydna. Judged by his actions Philip was a humane sovereign, with just that amount of craft which is necessary for a statesman who wishes to carry out a great policy with a small state. He was a master of "a dilatory policy," the employment of which in 357 and 346 drew on him the moral indignation of his Athenian opponents, who were annoyed because he would not allow himself to be outwitted by them, and because he did not, as politicians of a low stamp do and as they expected of him, carry out the opposite of his publicly expressed intention, but did that and nothing else. His genuinely Greek love of fame is pointed out by Demosthenes in the year 349 (*Ol.* 2, 15, 16). For his acts of bribery cf. chap. xviii. note 9. That he was a genius as a statesman and a first-rate soldier is agreed to by all. His chief fault was his want of moderation in drinking.—A sign of the impartiality which is beginning to prevail in the verdict on Philip may be seen in a passage of Gutschmid's preface to Kaerst, *Forschungen z. Gesch. Al. d. Gr.* Stuttg. 1887, p. iii., which is repeated in similar terms in his history of Iran (see below chap. xx.) He there asks: "Whether Alexander may not perhaps have neglected the mission clearly prescribed for his people by the previous course of history, viz. of uniting Greece under Macedonian rule, and whether, instead of continuing the work which his father's clear-headed, steadfast and self-sufficing statesmanship had well-nigh finished, he may not have taken a singularly able people out of their natural groove and dragged them into difficult enterprises."

This view of the defunct scholar as to the mission of the two Macedonian kings is certainly in our opinion due to a misapprehension of the position of affairs. In the first place no individual could, in our judgment, have united the Greeks more than they were united at that time, and least of all a Macedonian king; in the second place it is clearly established that Philip regarded his work in Greece as completed, and was preparing to do what Alexander afterwards did; in the third place it is not clear how Alexander and the Macedonians as promoters of the unity of Greece could have spent their time except in fighting the parties who were to be united and who had no desire to be so. The truth seems to be that Alexander did the one thing which might possibly have led to the goal, cf. Isocr. Paneg. 173.—But Gutachmid's views are very remarkable because they show how far scholars of repute have advanced beyond the dogma that Philip was the tempter who seduced the innocent Greeks and plunged them into destruction.

The rest of this volume will be occupied with the history of Alexander, without which the history of Greece would be quite incomplete. It forms a necessary part of that history, because Alexander's achievements constitute the fulfilment of the wishes of many able Greeks. True, Alexander begins a new epoch, but he also closes an old one, and we cannot confine him to that which he begins. Droysen too originally viewed the history of Alexander as an independent section of Greek history. Full justice can only be done to Alexander and Greece when we emphasize the fact that his career was the solution of one of the two problems incumbent on the Greeks, that which related to their prestige abroad. The historian who has recorded the expedition of Xerxes may, nay he must relate that of Alexander as well; otherwise the drama is left without its fifth act. Arrian is to a certain extent the complement of Herodotus. This volume began with the enterprise of the Ten Thousand; it closes with that of Alexander, who carried out what the Ten Thousand failed to accomplish. Between the narrators, too, of the two campaigns, we observe the same connection. Xenophon was the prototype of Arrian. But we must go a step farther. In Alexander's campaign it was not merely a question of the contrast between the East and the West emphasized by Herodotus. The security of a section of the Greek world was at stake. From the very outset (as I have endeavoured, in agreement with E. Curtius, to establish in this

work, vol. i. p. 24, and pp. 74, 75, and as a learned traveller, Count K. Lanckoronski, argues in the supplement to the *Allgem. Zeitung*, 11th April 1890) part of Asia Minor was Greek territory, and in the course of centuries this Asiatic Greece had not grown smaller but had continually increased. These Greeks of Asia Minor, on whom the Athenian and Theban friends of liberty were in a fair way to inflict serious injury, were rescued and led to un hoped-for greatness by Alexander in his pursuit of his father's plans. It is true that his opponents say that Alexander was not a Greek, and that therefore Greek history ends with the battle of Chaeronea. But this is a mistake, as the following chapters will show.

CHAPTER XX

ALEXANDER UP TO THE EXPEDITION INTO ASIA

ALEXANDER was twenty years of age when he ascended the throne. He had brilliant natural gifts, and his father had him instructed by Aristotle, the most learned man in Greece, in all branches of knowledge, for a time in the solitude of a small place named Mieza, so that the youth could devote himself solely to his education undisturbed by the dissolute life of the court. At the same time bodily exercises, which were quite as necessary for a Macedonian as for a Greek, and were only practised in a somewhat different way, were not neglected, and the story of the taming of Bucephalus shows that in these matters too he possessed uncommon skill and energy. He was open in character, very susceptible to and capable of friendship, of an extremely trusting disposition, in contrast to the tendency of the age, which regarded suspicion as the most important quality of a good statesman. In all things he aimed at the highest, he shrank from no exertion, was liable to outbreaks of passion, but able to control them, and candid enough to express his regret when he saw that he had been too hasty. His exterior was attractive; his hair, which rose above the middle of his forehead and fell down at the side, recalled the statue of Zeus; he carried his head somewhat inclined towards the left side.¹

The task which awaited Alexander was a very difficult one. The Macedonian kingdom was powerful, but its power

was not assured ; enemies were on the watch in every quarter. The Illyrians and Thracians were only waiting for an opportunity to attack it ; most of the Greeks wanted to shake off the yoke of the northern kingdom ; Persia had long been anxious about its growth, and some even believed that it had instigated the murder of Philip. Lastly, not even the Macedonians were all united, either as regards ready recognition of Alexander's rights, or in approval of the vigorous policy which Philip had exhibited and which Alexander wished to continue. Had Alexander been ready to listen to advice, he would have achieved nothing of importance. But he followed only his own impulses, and they urged him to attempt the greatest difficulties.

His reign began with severity, even with cruelty. Heromenes and Arrhabæus were put to death. This was in the interest of the State ; but the murder of the little daughter of Cleopatra, Philip's widow, in the very arms of her mother, exceeded all bounds, and was due to the rage of Olympias. Other relatives, who might have set up as pretenders, were also put to death. In the autumn of 336 Alexander marched into Greece. In this quarter Athens was again the centre for any operations that might be undertaken. Demosthenes took charge of the fortification works, and became also president of the *Theoricon*.² Before his term of office had expired a certain Ctesiphon brought forward a motion that he should receive a wreath at the great Dionysia for his admirable administration of the office. But as he had not yet rendered an account of his stewardship, the bestowal of the wreath was unlawful, and Aeschines accused Ctesiphon of violating the law. The result was that Demosthenes did not receive the wreath, and the famous proceedings afterwards ensued, to which we shall refer presently.

Alexander speedily reached Thermopylae, and was confirmed by the Amphictyones in the chief command against Persia. Thereupon Athens despatched an embassy (in which

Demosthenes, although selected for it, did not join for intelligible motives) to present excuses to the young king for not having already offered him the command.³ In this way the Athenians endeavoured to repair the mistake they had made at the death of Philip, they having held a thanksgiving festival and decreed a wreath to the murderer Pausanias on the motion of Demosthenes, although they had only just passed a resolution that any one making an attempt on the life of Philip and then fleeing to Athens should be given up to justice. Alexander overlooked all this. At Corinth the old resolutions in favour of Philip were confirmed by the Greeks, with the exception of the Spartans, who even now preserved their dignity. On the homeward journey the king constrained the Pythia, who was not in the habit of giving oracles on that particular day, to exclaim: "My son, thou art invincible."⁴

But before Alexander marched to Asia, he wished to make the peoples of the north feel his power. In 335 he went over the river Nestus into the Haemus range (the Balkans), in crossing which he had an engagement with the Thracians. They defended themselves by pushing carriages down the narrow gorges through which the Macedonians had to pass, but Alexander made his soldiers construct a roof of shields over which the carriages rolled without doing any harm. Neither the generals nor the armies of the Greek cities were accustomed to perform feats of this kind. The Macedonian army combined the discipline of mercenaries with the devotion of subjects to a revered sovereign, and was thus far superior in military capacity to any army with which it might come in conflict. Alexander next crossed the Danube in face of the enemy without losing a single man: by this means he showed what he and his people were capable of doing in the way of tactics. He now retraced his steps; he had no wish to penetrate farther north. The expedition made a great impression, and before long embassies from various peoples arrived to sue for peace. Alexander returned through the territory of

the Agrianes and Paeonians, and then marched up the valley of the Erigon to Illyria, where he fought to obtain possession of the city of Pelium, which the Illyrian prince Clitus eventually burnt to the ground. The king had thus completed his task in the north; his enemies were cowed.

It was indeed high time for him to move southwards, for Greece was a prey to a dangerous agitation. The enemies of Macedonia had now openly communicated with Persia, where Darius Codomannus had been on the throne since 336 or 335. Darius, who was an honest man, of moderate capacity and about forty-five years of age, had been instigated by the Greeks who had gone over to Persia to support the malcontents in Greece and thus protect his own empire, which was already being attacked by the Macedonian generals who had crossed over into Asia. The Greek Memnon opposed them with some measure of success, and actually took Ephesus with the assistance of some of the inhabitants. But the Persians would be in a worse plight if Alexander came to Persia himself, and to prevent this and to keep Alexander in Europe, Darius supported the Greeks with money. The Spartans took it without any concealment; they of course were not allies of Macedonia. Athens had to proceed with greater caution, and left it to Demosthenes, who was supposed to have a special aptitude for money transactions, to make a suitable distribution of the funds coming from Sardis in the interests of the Perso-Greek *entente* against Macedonia. A great deal of this money went to Thebes. When, therefore, a report was spread in Greece that Alexander had met his death in the north, some Theban fugitives thought that the hour for revolt had come. They returned to Thebes, slew two Macedonian officers, whom they found at night in the lower city, and by means of the assertion that Alexander was dead induced their fellow-citizens to proclaim their independence and even to elect Boeotarchs, a token of the claim to suzerainty over the whole of Boeotia. The Macedonian garrison in the

Cadmea did not withdraw as the Spartans had once done; but the Thebans were not discouraged by this. To the south the Cadmea was bounded by open country. Here the Thebans built a double row of stockades, by which they isolated the Macedonians in the Cadmea. They received much approbation in Greece but no assistance. The Arcadians advanced to the Isthmus, but no farther; Demosthenes sent arms but no troops. This was the position of affairs when Alexander appeared in Boeotia, so suddenly that when he had reached the Copaic Lake people in Thebes were not aware that he had passed Thermopylae. When it was said that King Alexander was on the spot with an army, the reply was: Yes, Alexander, but the son of Aeropus, the Lyncestian. Alexander now hoped Thebes would submit, in which case he would have treated her leniently.⁵ But hatred of Macedonia prevailed. To the demand for surrender the Thebans replied from their walls that whoever would join them and the Persians in delivering Greece might enter Thebes. In spite of this Thebes would have surrendered had the siege lasted longer; but the city was taken by storm on the third day. Macedonian divisions carried the first row of palisades, and after a short struggle the second as well, and on their being repulsed by the Thebans, Alexander intervened in person, drove the Thebans out of their advance-works between the two palisades and forced his way into the city. The garrison of the Cadmea also flung itself upon the Thebans. The Macedonian onset was so fierce that a number of Theban cavalry, who were driven from the outwork into the city, fled without stopping through the opposite gate into the plain and were not heard of again. Over 6000 people were killed and 30,000 taken prisoners. Alexander allowed the Phocians, the Orchomenians, the Thespians and the Plataeans, who had joined him, to decide upon their fate. They condemned Thebes to the punishment which she had meted out to other Boeotian cities. The houses were destroyed; only the

temples and Pindar's house were left standing; the inhabitants were sold into slavery. There were no wholesale executions.

Those Greeks who had wished to assist Thebes now endeavoured to draw a veil over their resolutions. The Arcadians condemned their leading statesmen to death. It was afterwards asserted that the Arcadian army had not advanced beyond the Isthmus, because the grasping Demosthenes had not sent the requisite nine or ten talents. The other Peloponnesians, always excepting the Spartans, showed signs of regret. The Athenians heard of the fall of Thebes while they were celebrating the Great Mysteries, in the autumn of 335.⁶ They interrupted the festival, welcomed the Theban fugitives, and sent word to Alexander by Demades that they were glad that he had returned safely from Illyria and had punished Thebes! So at least says Arrian. Alexander demanded the surrender of his chief foes, Demosthenes, Lysurgus, Charidemus and a few others. The people deliberated on the request. Phocion had no objection; he declared that he was ready, if the safety of the city were at stake, to sacrifice his best friends, and subsequently, as we know, he did sacrifice himself for Athens. Demosthenes pointed out that it was not advisable for the sheep to deliver up the dogs to the wolves. Demades eventually gave the most practical advice. He proposed to ask Alexander to pardon his opponents. The Athenians consented to this, and Demades and Phocion promised the king that these men should be called to account in Athens and be punished according to law. Demosthenes ought to have gone into exile for using the 300 talents of Persian money, but the Areopagus, which was entrusted with the investigation, took no steps whatever. This was a matter of indifference to Alexander: he had more important things to attend to, and besides he was animated by the same respect for Athens as his father Philip, for the city which was the centre of civilization in Greece,

the public opinion of which decided the fame of poets, generals and statesmen. This feeling survived for centuries with all who had any claims to culture, and this is why Athens for a long period of time received better treatment than any other city.⁷

NOTES

The authorities for the history of Alexander have been discussed by the following writers: Sainte-Croix, *Examen critique des anc. historiens d'Alex. le Grand*, Paris, 1804; Geier, *De Alex. rerum scriptor.*, Hal. 1835; Geier, *Scr. hist. Al. M. aetate suppres ill.*, Lips. 1844; Droysen, *Hellenismus*, 1, 2, and conclusion; A. Schoene, *Analekta*, Lips. 1870, and also notices of this work by A. Schaefer in *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.* 1870; Laudien, *Ueber die Quellen z. Gesch. Alex. d. Gr.*, Leipz. 1874; Vogel, *Ueber die Quellen Plutarchs in der Biogr. Alex.'s*, Colm. 1877; Koehler, *Quellenkritik z. Gesch. Alex. d. Gr. in Diodor, Curtius und Justin*, Leipz. 1879; Miller, *Die Alexandergeschichte nach Strabo*, Würzh. 1882; Cron, *De Trogi Pomp. apud antiquos auctoritate*, Strassb. 1882; Fränkel, *Die Quellen der Alexander-historiker*, Berl. 1883; Kaerst, *Forschungen z. Gesch. Al. d. Gr.*, Stuttg. 1887; in a summary way by Gutschmid in his *Gesch. Irans von Al. d. Gr. bis z. Untergange der Arsaciden*, Tüb. 1888, p. 73.—The accounts of Alexander may be divided into two categories. Arrian the Nicomedian, a high official under the Emperor Hadrian, obtained his materials chiefly from Macedonian sources, consequently from official or semi-official records, particularly from the works of King Ptolemy and of Aristobulus of Cassandria; his nickname *νέος Ξενοφών* characterizes his style. It is impossible to distinguish the Ptolemaean and Aristobulian elements in Arrian; he probably took Ptolemy as his authority for military matters and Aristobulus for the rest. Aristobulus, however, used Persian documents captured after the battle of Gaugamela, Arr. 3, 11, 3. Plutarch in his biography, which as usual shows a preference for the personal character of the subject, appears to have made use of Aristobulus, Onesicritus, the *κυβερνήτης* of the vessel on board of which Alexander sailed, and Clitarchus, whom we shall mention immediately; indirectly much of his material is taken from the Peripatetic Satyrus. Clitarchus, for whom cf. Rühl, *Vermischte Bemerkungen*, *N. Jahrb. f. Phil.*, vol. 137, wrote for a Greek public, which liked an attractive narrative; most scholars hold that

extracts from him are preserved in Diod. 17, but Bröcker, *Moderne Quellenforscher*, Innsbr. 1882, raises some noteworthy objections to this view. Diodorus contains much that is useful, even with regard to important facts, *eg.* in c. 17. Clitarchus' account is to be found also in Curtius Rufus and in Justinus, supplemented by consideration of the authorities of the first category. The first category is mostly practical, the second more rhetorical. This supplies a standard for the use of both. If we take the first as a groundwork, the second may be added by way of supplement.—The position of Callisthenes, who set up as a flatterer of Alexander as long as the latter humoured his *amour-propre*, is uncertain; *v. infra* chap. xxv.; cf. Kaerst, p. 78, also Niese, *Ind. Lect. Marb.* 1880.—Alexander made it possible to record his exploits with accuracy by arranging for official notes; cf. Droysen, l.l. To this class belong the records of the so-called *Bematistae* or quarter-masters, the *ἡφημερίδες βασιλικοί*, kept by Eumenes on the model of the Persian Court journal, as also Nearchus' diary of his *παράπλους*. The historical work composed by Chares, Alexander's *εἰσαγγελεύς* (chamberlain), was evidently based on personal experience. The works of Onesicritus and of Anaximenes of Lampsacus (*v. infra* chap. xxv.) did not enjoy a reputation for trustworthiness. The fabulous accounts of Alexander were collected in the pseudo-Callisthenes and in Julius Valerius.—Cf. Schaefer's *Quellenkunde*, I, 65-76; 2, 79, 138, and also the article by Kaerst in *Pauly-Wissowa*, I, 1412-1434, and Niese's work quoted below, I, pp. 3-19. For the fragments of historians of Alexander see the Didot edition of Arrian by C. Müller. Julius Valerius has been edited by B. Kühler, Leipzig, 1888.

Of modern writers two exhaustive works are of special importance: J. G. Droysen, *Gesch. des Hellenismus*, Bd. I, Gotha, 1877 (2nd edition of his *Gesch. des Alex. d. Gr.*), and Grote, vol. x. Lond. 1888. There are also many admirable remarks in Droysen's *Gesch. der Diadochen und Epigonen*. Droysen and Grote take opposite points of view; Droysen is well disposed towards Alexander, Grote dislikes him. But the former seldom gives way to his feelings, the latter often does so. In Grote's eyes Alexander is great only as a general; he tries to argue away all his other striking qualities by the aid of inferior authorities and a skilful use of dialectic. The following are worthy of notice: Spiegel, *Iranische Alterthumskunde*, Bd. 2, and as a short summary the article Alexander in *Pauly's R. E.* I, 2nd ed., written by Krafft and Herzberg, with an appendix on the ancient works of sculpture relating to Alexander by H. Bruun; also the above-quoted article in *Pauly-Wissowa* and B. Niese's *Geschichte der griechischen und makedonischen Staaten seit der*

Schlacht bei Chaironeia, I. Theil, Geschichte Alexanders des Grossen und seiner Nachfolger und der Westhellenen bis zum Jahre 281, Gotha, 1893, a work which determines all the facts with great accuracy and takes the latest researches of specialists into consideration. In the chapters on Alexander I have allowed the narrative vein to predominate. The subject required it, and the nature of the authorities made it possible here. The course of events, as far as our brief account can deal with them, is more clearly established for the history of Alexander than for any other section of Greek history, with the exception of the periods narrated by Herodotus, Thucydides and Xenophon; hence we may use the 'new Xenophon' very much as the old one.

1. I shall deal with Alexander's character in chap. xxvii. Information as to his external appearance is given by the works of art discussed by Brunn; cf. also Koepp, *Alexanderbildnisse*, Berliner Winckelmannsprogramm, 1893.—Alexander was born in 356 on the 6th of Hecatombaeon (Plut. Al. 3), apparently at the time of the burning of the temple of Ephesus. Aristotle was his tutor from Ol. 109, 2 = 343 B.C.

2. Demosthenes was now president of the *θεωρικός*, which before the battle of Chaeroneia had been devoted by him in conformity with the law (*v. supra* p. 224) to the *στρατιωτικός* (Philoch. 135), but now of course was applied to the festivals. Attalus had entered into communication with Athens, Diod. 17, 6. He was put to death by Alexander's orders.

3. The Athenians apologized for not having already offered the *ἡγεμονία* to Alexander, Diod. 17, 2. Resolution against possible murderers of Philip, Diod. 16, 92. Behaviour of Demosthenes and Phocion, Plut. Dem. 23; Phoc. 16; Aesch. Ctes. 77. For the honours granted by the Athenians to Alexander, see Arrian, 1, 1, 3.

4. If Alexander made the Pythia say to him *δνίκητος εἰ ὁ παῖς* (Plut. Al. 14), it was useful to him, because he always remained victorious. When she said to Philomelus *ὅτι ἔξοστιν αὐτῷ πράττειν ὃ βούλεται* (Diod. 16, 27), it was useless to him, because he was defeated. In his expedition to the north Alexander probably crossed the Schipka Pass, reached the Danube at Silistria, and then marched into Thessaly by the pass of Metzowo (Kaerst, Ll. 1414).

5. The topography of Thebes is now settled by E. Fabricius. Theben, Freib. i. Br. 1890. He refers on p. 18 to the storming of it by Alexander. This gives rise once more to complaints of the cruelty of the Macedonians. But the Thebans were killed during the assault, and even in the nineteenth century the inhabitants of cities have not always been spared in similar cases. Grote (IX,

543, Lond. 1888) and Schaefer (Dem. 3, 131) are therefore wrong. Afterwards Alexander was invariably friendly towards Thebans. There is a nemesis in the fact that the city which brought the Macedonians into Greece suffered most at their hands.

6. Schaefer (Dem. 3, 135) passes a just verdict on the conduct of Athens when Thebes was in distress. Athens would not take the field when Thebes needed help, and when Thebes had fallen, she begged "for mercy" (Sch. Dem. 3, 142).—Schaefer (Dem. 3, 145 seq.) has extenuated Demosthenes' acceptance of Persian subsidies at some length. It is true that a citizen may be excused for taking money from the enemies of his state to use it against that state's ally, in whose army his own fellow-citizens are serving—if this object is a very lofty one. But that cannot be absolutely asserted in this particular case. Even Grote (IX, 518) sees evidence of "degradation" of the Greeks in the fact that they had only two foreign potentates to choose between, and that they selected the one "whose headship could hardly be more than nominal." This assumption, however, is not correct. Not Darius himself, but men of the stamp of Mentor and Memnon, who served any one indiscriminately for money, would have become tyrants of the Greek cities, if the hopes of the friends of Persia in Greece had been fulfilled. The gangs at Taenarum would have controlled Hellas. Alexander's victory over Persia at all events put the freedom of Greece in no worse plight than before, and greatly increased her fame. Demosthenes injured himself more than any one else by his useless dealings with Persian money at the time of Thebes' distress. After this his fellow-citizens became more strict with him in money matters, and when at last he made away with funds entrusted to him, no one came forward in his defence and he was condemned; see chap. xxvi.—Athenian embassy to Alexander after the capture of Thebes, Arrian, I, 10, 3; cf. Sch. Dem. 3, 137 seq. Demosthenes' reference to the wolves and the dogs, Plut. Dem. 23.—Charidemus went to Asia, and on telling Darius on one occasion the truth about the Persian troops was forthwith made over to the executioner by the king, Diod. 17, 30.

7. The *Panegyricus* of Isocrates had enormous influence on Philip, Alexander and the most cultivated of their successors; it may be regarded as the expression of the sentiments of the majority of cultivated men in antiquity; it is a counterpart to the famous speech of Pericles in Thucydides.

CHAPTER XXI

THE PERSIAN EMPIRE—THE THREE GROUPS OF THE EASTERN GREEK WORLD

THE empire, the conquest of which Alexander undertook, was at least fifty times as large as his own, and must have numbered twenty times as many inhabitants.¹ It extended from the Hellespont to the Punjab, from Lake Aral to the cataracts of the Nile. It comprised mountain ranges and valleys, deserts and inland seas, fertile corn-land and fragrant Alpine pastures, zones of Arctic cold and tropical heat, men of all kinds of civilization and of every colour, language, and religion. The only tie which held these countries and people together was the will of the king; his word was law. If he were wise he took care to spare the susceptibilities of his subjects, otherwise he had to be prepared for occasional insurrections. Revolts of this kind frequently occurred; perhaps there was always some province or other in rebellion, but that did little harm to the empire, for there was no internal bond between the separate provinces; if one province revolted, that did not concern the others, and even within the confines of the various provinces the internal connection was, with a few exceptions, of a slight description. If a revolt was successful in one province, the worst consequence was that it paid no taxes for some years, and the royal treasury alone suffered from this, if it could be called suffering, for the king was always hoarding money which he scarcely used. Even the

provinces which provided men for the wars, could not plead this as an exemption from payment for those wars. Only the Greek mercenaries employed by the Persians in the fourth century cost money, but not much compared with the exactions of the king. Two circumstances further specially contributed to the preservation of the huge unwieldy mass of the Persian empire. Firstly, no national dynasties appear to have strongly asserted themselves in any important province, except Egypt. Most of them had evidently been extirpated, and so the Orientals, who were accustomed to despotism, were just as satisfied with the Achaemenidae as with any other ruling house; for these sovereigns were not more cruel than was usual in Asia. Besides this there was an aristocracy in Persia, which under certain circumstances could act as a check on any excessive absolutism of its rulers. The second factor which kept the empire together was the practical indifference of the government to everything which did not relate to taxation or military service. The Achaemenidae allowed every tribe to practise the religion and customs which suited them; an exception had been made only in the case of Egypt, to the disadvantage of the Persians. And as not very much money and very few soldiers were comparatively speaking demanded, a Persian subject was not so badly off. The various tribes mostly had an easy life; comparative peace prevailed over an enormous area; and private persons could go about their business without danger. Although, therefore, it was mainly the natural law of inertia which held the empire together, yet some of the elements which aided its rise must have been still existent, otherwise it would have fallen to pieces of its own accord. It had been founded by the vigour and wisdom of two men, Cyrus and Darius. But a more general and more lasting ideal principle had also contributed to the result. The Persians were on a higher level than other Oriental peoples. Their religion was one of the most sublime on the face of the earth.

A people which cherished this faith, and was at the same time brave, still retained, even if the purity of their religion and their courage gradually declined, an intellectual superiority over all the other races. The individual Persian in his great empire was something like the Spartiate in a section of the Greek world. True, in religion the contrast between the Semite and the Persian had to be reckoned with, and it might have been supposed that the ancient Semitic civilization would have stood in the way of the Aryan. But when the Persians obtained power, the religion of Babylon, the most widely diffused of the Semitic religions, had already outlived its strength, and besides Cyrus had been shrewd enough to speak with respect of the Babylonian gods. And as there was no country with natural means of defence in which the worshippers of Bel could have made a stand, the religious contrast between Babylonians and Aryans was not invested with political significance. Instead of this, the Babylonian civilization was assimilated as a learned element by the general civilization of the East. Of the other Semitic peoples, the Jews were not prominent at that time, while the most active of all, the Phoenicians, utilized the Persian empire for their commercial aims; the empire was of value to them and they were not less useful to it. Without the Phoenicians many provinces would have been lost long before.

The Persian rule was in real jeopardy only in places where natural conditions and civilization combined to give strength to the separatist tendencies of the provinces, and this, so far as we know, was chiefly the case in the West, in Asia Minor and in Egypt. The latter had the advantage of possessing an entirely distinct civilization and at the same time a territory which could be easily isolated. Hence it was not difficult to persuade the Egyptian people to unanimous action, and the defence of the country even against large armies was not an impossibility. In Asia Minor, Persian supremacy was endangered for a somewhat different reason. The country was

certainly not as a whole cut off from the empire ; but it contained mountain districts, which could be defended separately, and the proximity of Greece imparted to the inhabitants an intellectual activity which made an existence such as was led by a Babylonian or an Arachosian impossible in the long-run. A Greek was by nature a more restless being than an Oriental ; and even if he did not attempt to embarrass the Persian government, yet his whole demeanour showed what was meant by having a personal opinion, which in Persia was only permitted to the king. And this was the vital defect of the empire. Even the intrinsic superiority of the Persian religion was not of much use to the Persians, because they ruled as despots. Selfishness supplied with every means of indulgence made the Achaemenidae a ruling house differing little from other despotic families of ancient and modern times. Violence and intrigue were rife in the Persian court, as in the courts of all countries in which the free expression of opinion is unknown. A violent end was the rule for sovereigns and princes in Persia. Plutarch's biography of Artaxerxes shows how thoroughly rotten the state of things was in the ruling family. But the complete overthrow of an empire of this kind held together by force, was no easy matter, so long as the same dynasty existed ; it required a powerful attack from without. This was supplied by Alexander.

For eighty years the Persian empire had been tending towards dissolution in the western provinces, which were most exposed to danger. A beginning was made by Egypt, which revolted under Amyrtaeus soon after 410 and maintained its independence for some sixty years. Of Egyptian kings of this period, Amyrtaeus was followed by Psammetichus ; next came Achoris (400-387) and after him Nectanebus (387-369). The revolt of the Cypriote Evagoras from Persia made it easier for the Egyptians to preserve their independence. When Cyprus submitted once more, in 383, the Persians were able to attack Egypt with a larger force, whereupon the latter

appealed for aid to the Greeks.² This resulted in Chabrias being sent to Egypt, but Athens was obliged to recall him, and soon afterwards placed the famous Iphicrates at the disposal of Persia against Egypt. Yet the large army led by Pharnabazus, in which Iphicrates held a high command, accomplished nothing because the satrap did not allow the Athenian a free hand, and the latter returned home, in apprehension of his life. Timotheus, too, who after narrowly escaping condemnation at Athens (373) had assisted the satrap Ariobarzanes against the king (367) and in 365 had acquired Samos for the Athenians, but then entered the service of Persia, achieved no successes against Egypt. In Asia Minor also in the first half of the fifth century revolts of satraps, of Greek cities, and of semi-Greek tyrants, were the order of the day. Thus Orontes in Mysia, Mausolus in Caria, Ariobarzanes in Phrygia acquired fame as semi-independent rulers. The Persians generally got the better of men of this stamp by stratagem. This is shown by the story of Datames, who at first rendered good service to the king, then revolted and at last only succumbed to a trap laid for him by a Persian.³ Persia seemed to be powerless in the open field. In 361 this state of things emboldened Tachus, king of Egypt, who took Chabrias and Agesilaus into his service, to make an attack on Persia. But the attempt failed, as Egypt revolted from him, and chose Nectanebos II. as king. Agesilaus saved the latter's throne. The Spartan king wanted to return home in 360, but died on the journey.⁴

The western provinces were thus as good as lost to the Persian empire, and its own existence seemed in jeopardy. But it was preserved for another quarter of a century by a monarch of great energy, Artaxerxes III., Ochus, who came to the throne in 358, after a comprehensive massacre of the members of his family who had better claims than himself. At first he had great difficulties to encounter. The Phrygian satrap Artabazus, successor of Ariobarzanes

and perhaps son of the famous Pharnabazus, closely connected with Greece by his relationship to the Rhodian brothers, Mentor and Memnon, soon rebelled and was supported by the Athenian Chares and the Theban Pammenes. When defeated he fled with Memnon to Macedonia, but was received into favour again on the intercession of Mentor, who had rendered important services to the Persian king. On the whole, however, the state of things in Asia Minor gave the king less anxiety than that in Syria and Egypt. In Asia Minor the Greek element was important and could as a rule be secured by money and the prospect of influence.⁵ The king even became so powerful there that about the year 354 it was believed in Greece that he would make an attack on that country, an impression which, as we have seen, induced Demosthenes to deliver his speech about the Symmoriae. Farther south things looked more critical for Persia. Cyprus rose once more, and on this occasion even the Sidonians revolted. But Ochus led a large army against them, in which there were 10,000 Greek mercenaries, among them 1000 Thebans under Lacrates and 3000 Argives under Nicostratus. Thereupon Tennes, the king of Sidon, lost heart and concerted treachery with Mentor, the leader of the mercenaries sent to his aid by Egypt. They admitted the Persians into the city. The Sidonians, to avoid falling into the hands of the Persians, set fire to their houses and threw themselves into the flames. Ochus put Tennes to death, as he had no further use for him, but gave Mentor, who was an able man, a command in his army. Cyprus was conquered by the satrap Idrieus of Caria, with the aid of the Athenian Phocion and a certain Evagoras. Ochus now turned his forces against Egypt. Nectanebos at first attempted to defend the line of the Nile at Pelusium; then he withdrew to Memphis, and finally fled to Ethiopia. On this occasion the Egyptians fared even worse than under Cambyses. To show them how much he despised everything Egyptian, Ochus and his courtiers drowned the sacred Apis

bull, and as the Egyptians called him an ass—the animal most abominated by them—he declared the ass to be the sacred animal of the country. The conquest of Egypt took place between 350 and 340.

The interference of the Persians in their affairs, apprehended by the Greeks, did not come to much. In 350 Thebes received money from Persia, and Perinthus was certainly saved by Persian help. But soon afterwards the career of Ochus came to a close. He was assassinated in 338 at the instigation of his minister Bagoas, who first placed the son of Ochus, Arses, on the throne. Then Bagoas murdered him and his family as well, and made a distant relative of the reigning house, Darius, also called Codomannus, king (335). It was in this way that the monarch, who was to be overthrown by Alexander, came to the throne of Persia.⁶

In 335, as a result of Ochus' energy, the Persian empire was to outward appearances in a fairly flourishing condition. Egypt, Phoenicia, and Cyprus were reduced to submission; in western Asia Minor, too, first Mentor and then Memnon restored Persian prestige. Mentor disposed of Hermeias, the tyrant of Atarneus and a friend of Aristotle, by treachery. But the reaction set in under Philip, who despatched Parmenio with a small army to Asia. After Philip's assassination, however, Parmenio returned to Europe, and Memnon reconquered everything which the Macedonians had taken in Asia, except the city of Abydos. But the possession of this spot was of the highest importance, for the Macedonians could now land in Asia at any moment without difficulty from Sestos.

Thus a struggle was impending between two powers which represented two totally different principles. On the one side is a despotism, which holds together enormous tracts of territory for purely selfish purposes; on the other side a king, but a military king, who is bound to distinguish himself personally if he wishes to command respect, who is not always blindly obeyed by his officers and men, a sovereign who has

the same authority as the Germanic kings at the time of the migration of peoples, and who can put to death insubordinate officers, but cannot oppose the wishes of the whole army. On the one side we see degeneracy in the ruling family and a dependence on mercenaries, on the other intrepid personal courage, desire for booty, but booty taken at the point of the spear. And Alexander possesses another great advantage apart from his personal capacity; he is not merely king of the Macedonians, but also the representative of the Greek element, of a loftier, purely human civilization. He feels that he is so and recognizes it as his justification for this war. And though a genuine Macedonian king he is also a genuine Greek. He might be described as Herodotus describes his ancestor and namesake, the king at the time of Darius and Xerxes, as a Hellene and king of the Macedonians.

The position of the Persian empire when it was attacked by Alexander had some resemblance to that of the Roman empire when it was overrun by the Germans. Both empires held together merely by the law of inertia: in both their strength lay not in their native elements, but in mercenaries taken from the very people which threatened the safety of the empire. Just as Germans served the Roman empire as soldiers and generals, and the Romans had no better ones, so the Persian kings relied mainly on Greeks, and rightly so, for no Persian was a match for Memnon in military ability, and the numerous Greek mercenaries served the king loyally. In this way Greece had in a sense become master of Persia before the war had actually begun. But the Greek element had no consciousness of its importance in Persia. It kept the empire going, and was content to receive its pay in return.

But we can go a step farther. The conflict between Alexander and Persia may be treated as a contest between Greeks and Greeks. For not only did the Greek mercenaries constitute the main strength of the Persian army, but the Greek cities of south-western Asia Minor were one of the

principal means of defence of the Persian empire. From time immemorial Greek civilization had been so widely diffused and so firmly established in Asia Minor, that its Greek inhabitants might be called a third of the whole Greek world. In south-western Asia Minor there had arisen an extensive vassal state, Greek in character but very loosely compacted, which as a rule was loyal to Persia and was controlled by the Carian family of Mausolus, who had removed his residence from Mylasa to Halicarnassus and from this convenient point extended his influence over the neighbouring coast-line and islands. On the mainland this state comprised the coast from the promontory of Mycale opposite Samos as far as Lycia, in the interior the lower valley of the Maeander with its southern tributaries, the lower valley of the river Indus, and probably the mountain ranges and valleys of Lycia. Of the maritime cities and places near the coast, besides the Lycian cities, the following belonged to this kingdom: Caunus, Phycus, Cnidus, Ceramus, Halicarnassus, Iassus, Miletus, Myus, Priene; of the cities in the interior: Mylasa, Alabanda on the Marsyas, Tralles and Magnesia on the Maeander. The Carian sovereigns also influenced not only Rhodes and Cos but even Chios. Although these rulers were of semi-Greek descent, yet the civilization of all these districts was wholly or almost wholly Greek, which appears, as we shall see, from the history of art in the fourth century. It is a remarkable fact that at this time the Greek cities of southern Asia Minor far surpass those of northern Asia Minor in the brilliancy of their culture. Only Ephesus, which lies about midway, takes a prominent part in the splendour of the south. In the third century a change takes place. Then Pergamum comes to the front in a striking way; its rulers do even more for civilization than the Carian potentates of the fourth century; this is due to the influence of Europe asserting itself in this quarter, which is so close to the Hellespont. But the Greeks under Carian influence are only a part of the

Greek world in Asia, which extended in the north to Sinope and Trapezus, in the south to Issus, where Alexander won his second victory.

The grouping of Greek civilization in the fourth century differs from that in the fifth. In the last volume (p. 456) we distinguished four currents of civilization in eastern and central Greece: the Ionic, the Aeolo-Doric, the Thracian and the Athenian. In the fourth century, as we pointed out in chapter xii, only three of these can be recognized as clearly distinguishable: the Ionic, which is most distinctly defined in Caria and Ephesus; the Thracian, which spreads over all Macedonia; and the Athenian, which more and more dominates Greece proper. The Ionian and the Thracian lose their variety, the Athenian alone retains its universality. And, strange to say, these three centres of civilization also exhibit a special character in domestic and state policy. The Athenian is republican, the northern on the whole monarchical, the Asiatic, while favourable to city independence, has no aversion to Persian suzerainty. The characteristics of the three sections of central and eastern Greece are, therefore, as follows. The united republics of Greece are animated with lofty ideas of liberty, but they are not on good terms with one another, and are devoid of national inspiration. The Greeks subject to Persia are brave, but too polished and destitute of ideal aspirations in politics. The north, Macedonia, Thessaly, Thrace, is extremely brave, rich in men born to rule, very well led, and its leaders represent the national idea. These peculiarities of the three groups explain the course of history. The Macedonians endeavour to enlist the sympathy of the republican Greeks for their national aims, but are not successful. To attain that object they have to first conquer Greece, which then holds sulkily aloof from the war against Persia. And after that they have to subdue the Asiatic Greeks and the Greek mercenaries of the Persians into the bargain. When this has been done, Persia falls almost of her own accord. Can

we wonder then if the monarchical and not the republican principle issues from all these changes with fresh strength?

NOTES

Authorities. Diodorus, Bk. 16, where, as we have seen, Asiatic affairs are, apart from chronology, well treated in cc. 40-52.—The description of the condition of the Persian empire in Plutarch's *Life of Artaxerxes* is instructive; Haug, *Die Quellen Plutarchs in den Lebensbeschreibungen der Griechen*, Tüb. 1854, has discussed it with knowledge of the subject. Ctesias is the principal authority. The stories in the *Datames* of Cornelius Nepos are characteristic if not trustworthy in details; cf. the edition by Nipperdey-Lupus, Berl. 1879.—Of modern works cf. A. Wiedemann, *Aegyptische Geschichte*, Gotha, 1884; Nöldeke, *Aufsätze zur persischen Geschichte*, and especially Fr. Spiegel, *Eranische Alterthumskunde*, 3 vols. Leipz. 1871-1878.—The inquiries into the coinage system of Asia Minor are valuable; I mention the most recent, some of which are not much known in Germany: Six, *Monnaies des Satrapes de Carie*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1877; *Observ. sur les monnaies phéniciennes*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1877; *Zur Münzkunde Pisiens und angrenzender Länder*, Zeitschr. f. Numism. VI, 1878; *Classification des monnaies de Chypre*, Rev. Num. Par. 1883; *Le Satrape Mazaios*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1884; *Sinope*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1885; *Monnaies Lyciennes*, Rev. Num. Par. 1887; *Monnaies grecques inédites*, Num. Chron. Lond. 1888; Th. Reinach, *Trois royaumes de l'Asie min.* Par. 1889; Babelon, *Les Perses Achéménides*, Par. 1893. Imhoof-Blumer's *Monnaies grecques*, 1883, and Mallos, *Ann. de Numism.*, 1883, belong to this branch of the subject and are a rich mine of information.

1. The internal condition of the Persian empire is known to us not so much from the accounts of Greek historians as from native sources, which indicate the state of affairs in the Achaemenid period; cf. Spiegel, *Eran. Alterth.* Bd. 3. According to them we find three orders in Iran: (1) the order of priests, whom the native authorities call *Athravan*, but the Greek *Magi*, the identity of which with the *Athravan* is not doubted by Spiegel (3, 539-596). (2) The second order is that of the warriors, to which belong the Great King, the kings of certain districts (Spiegel, 3, 613), the nobles and the officials. The kings, however, were admitted into the order of the *Magi*, and conflicts between the spiritual and secular powers were thereby avoided (3, 606). The King is the

shepherd of the people; the Achaemenid kings do not call themselves gods, although they are of divine origin. From Darius I. onwards the Persian kings styled themselves Great Kings and Kings of Kings. The Great King rules absolutely; he keeps as much as possible aloof from intercourse with his subjects. Yet the highest Persian nobles were very near the Great King in point of dignity. Many nobles led a fairly independent life in their strongholds (3, 622); this state of things is observable in Alexander's time, especially in Bactria and Sogdiana.—Darius I. endeavoured to break the power of the lesser kings by the establishment of satraps (Khsathrapāvan, i.e. protectors of the empire). The administration of the empire is discussed by Spiegel, 3, 630 seq.; for the position of the chief minister, cf. *infra* chap. xxvii.—It was the duty of the wealthy Great King to provide public buildings and to bestow gifts on the needy. The third class, which comprised shepherds, peasants, artisans and merchants, is discussed by Spiegel in 3, 654-670; in 671-708 he deals with the private life of the Iranians.—There were but few towns in the interior of the Persian empire; the majority of places were *κῶμαι*, at the most some had a citadel. This is why we find so few names of towns. Even the capitals of Persia proper had no name; Persepolis is called in Arrian 3, 18, 10 Πέρσαι and in 6, 30 τὰ βασίλεια τῶν Περσῶν. Hence it was not very difficult for Alexander to conquer the interior. The towns did not become more numerous until he reached the Indian frontier. Cf. Niese, *Gesch. der griech. und maked. Staaten*, I. 495-497.

2. Whether there were one or two princes of the name of Evagoras in Salamis or Cyprus, appears doubtful. In Diod. 15, 4 (386 n.c.) Evagoras leaves his son Pnytagoras in Salamis and goes to Egypt, but returns, c. 19 (385 n.c.), is murdered by Nicocles, 15, 46 (374), who becomes king in his stead. But in 16, 42 (351 n.c.) Evagoras tries to become king again. Diodorus describes him as τὸν ἐν τοῖς ἐπ' αὐτῷ χρόνοις βασιλευκότα, and no other Evagoras has been mentioned, so that, as some writers have supposed, the above notice of his death may be incorrect. Yet according to 16, 46 (350 n.c.) Pnytagoras retains his position, and Evagoras, who returns to Cyprus, is punished. But the famous Evagoras began his reign about 410; how is it possible then that he can have been invested with ἄλλης ἡγεμονίας μείζονος (Diod. 16, 46) as late as the year 350? From Theopompus, however, we obtain quite a different idea of these matters. Evagoras' murderer is called Thrasydaeus and had been slave to a certain Nicocreon; he also murdered Evagoras' son Pnytagoras. Lastly, we see from Isocrates' letters to Nicocles of Salamis, that Nicocles succeeded

Evagoras, from Arrian 2, 20 and 22 that Pnytagoras was king of Salamis in 332 B.C., and from Plut. Alex. 29 that Nicocreon was ruling there in 331. It is evident from this that we (1) must disregard Diodorus' account of the murder of Evagoras by Nicocles as wrong; (2) assume that Nicocles, Evagoras' successor, was his son; (3) may believe that the Pnytagoras mentioned in Diod. 16, 46 in 350 B.C. is the same who was still reigning in 332; (4) must admit that we know nothing of the Evagoras mentioned in Diod. 16, 42, 46, that we also do not know when the Pnytagoras who was reigning in 351 began his reign, and finally express astonishment at the confusion of names and events. For, according to Theopompus, Thrasydaeus murders Evagoras and his son Pnytagoras to avenge Nicocreon, and yet in 331 a Nicocreon is a successor of a Pnytagoras, and perhaps his son. Now as Nicocles was certainly the son of Evagoras, we may conjecture all the more plausibly on account of the syllable 'Nico' that Nicocreon also belonged to the same family, the members of which, in spite of the philhellenism of some, seem to have wreaked their rage on each other in a truly Asiatic fashion. Nicocles too met with a violent end (Ath. 12, 531), and before the year 354, in which Isocr. Antid. 67 describes him as having reigned for some time. The succession of the rulers of Salamis, as arranged with regard to their coins, is briefly summarised by Head, H. N. 624 seq. Here Evagoras II. is conjecturally placed in the years 368-51. I have gone into this matter in some detail because it is characteristic both of the men of that age and also of the trustworthiness of authorities which intrinsically deserve respect. We see that even contemporaries were not agreed as to matters which might have been accurately known. How then can we arrive at any certainty about them? Cf. Judeich, *Kleinasiatische Studien*, 1892, and Babelon, *LL* pp. cxx. and cxii.; according to the latter Evagoras I. reigned from 411-374, Evagoras II. from 368-351.

3. The romantically embellished biography of Datames by Cornelius Nepos is of value for the history of civilization. Datames, son of Camisares, satrap of Leucosyria, first distinguished himself in the war against the Cadusii (about 387) then under Autophradates in the combats against rebels. After this he took prisoner the rebel king Thuys of Paphlagonia, who boasted of his descent from Pylaemenes, the Paphlagonian leader in Homer, and led him like a wild animal before the King. The King then employed him for a time against Egypt (between 379 and 377); and afterwards against Aspis of Cataonia. He revolted from the King (cf. Diod. 15, 91), who was unable to subdue him by force and therefore resorted to stratagem.

He was assassinated. Cf. Judeich, *l.l.* 190 seq. and Babelon, *l.l.* pp. xxxviii.-xlili.

4. For Egyptian affairs cf. Wiedemann, p. 710 seq. The chronology is wholly uncertain, the conquest of Egypt, which according to Diod. 16, 46 seq. happened in 350, being placed by Unger in 346 and by Nöldeke (p. 78) in 340. That Egypt was not conquered in the spring of 346 appears from Isocr. Phil. 101. Cf. Judeich, *Persien u. Aeg. im 4 Jahrh. v. Chr.*, Marb. 1889.

5. Greeks in Asia. In 397 there were Greek mercenaries in the Persian army, Xen. Hell. 3, 2, 15.—10,000 Greek mercenaries were employed against Egypt about the year 350, Diod. 16, 44.—Despatch of Ephialtes to Artaxerxes Ochus; cf. Schaefer, *Dem.* 2, 483.—Mentor and Memnon *κηδεσται* of Artabazus, *Dem. contra Aristocr.* 157. According to Plut. Al. 21 Memnon's wife was daughter of Artabazus.—A good description of the confusion in Asia Minor about 380 is given in Isocr. Paneg. 160 seq., where the following passage occurs (162): ἀπὸ Κνίδου μέχρι Σινώπης Ἕλληνες τὴν Ἀσίαν παροικοῦσιν.

An idea of the variety of political conditions in the western sections of the Persian empire is given by the coinage of those regions, which exhibits a great independence of a number of small groups. It is generally supposed that in the Persian empire the king kept the gold coinage in his own hands (Lampsacus, for which *vide infra*, belonged to the category of frontier cities which were more Persian in appearance than in reality); he minted the coins called darics, of about 130 gra. English = 8424 gramm., which present the Persian king armed with a bow on the obverse. The king also coined silver, the Sigloi, of 84.37 gra. English weight, in value about $7\frac{1}{2}$ Attic obols; Head, *H. N.* 698, 699. Besides this imperial coinage, however, money was coined in the west, and there only, by cities, potentates, or satraps. In the following notes I give a *résumé* of these coinages, remarking that the standards mentioned in vol. ii. p. 227 are now supplemented by the Rhodian standard (*v. supra*, chap. iii.), the stater of which was a reduced Attic one, of only 115-120 grains, and which was connected with the Aeginetan standard by the fact that three Rhodian drachmae might be considered equal to two Aeginetan drachmae. I begin with the north and include the neighbouring islands, although the King's Peace declared them independent. Cf. Babelon, *l.l.* p. xxi. Besides the king, coins were minted by (1) cities (a narrow strip along the sea from Trapezus to the mouth of the Nile); (2) local rulers;

(3) hereditary satraps; (4) satraps invested with extraordinary powers.

In the TROAD we find coins in the following cities: in Abydos (Head, 468) of the Phoenician standard, with more than twenty different names of magistrates established by Imhoof; in Gergis, the home of the Sibyl, who is portrayed on one side of the small coins with the Sphinx on the reverse; in Neandria, Ophrynum, Rhoeteum, Scamandria (Head, pp. 473, 474); in Sigeum, with the head of Pallas—Sigeum was an old Athenian settlement—silver coins of Attic weight and hectae of electrum.

The island of TENEDOS has fine coins with the double head and the double axe, of the Phoenician standard.

In MYSIA (Head, 446-60), Antandros evidently coined on the Persian standard; Apollonia on the Rhyndacus (Six and Imhoof) on the Persian standard; Astacus and Assos the same; Cyzicus, which continues its electrum coinage for a short time (probably Pharnabazus minted a Daric there, Head, 453), and then coins silver on the Rhodian standard; before this, however (cf. Babelon, p. xxxv.), in the year 410, comes a stater of 212 grains, with the head of Pharnabazus and the inscription ΦΑΡ(N)ΑΒΑ Gargara; Lampsacus, where the electrum coinage is gradually replaced by a gold coinage corresponding to and competing with it. For these splendid coins cf. Head, 457; here also a head of Pharnabazus is conjectured, but wrongly; it is Orontes according to von Sallit, Six and Babelon, l.l. p. lxxiii. For Orontes cf. Judeich, p. 221 seq. following the researches of Th. Reinach. Silver was coined in Lampsacus on the Persian standard; in Parium on the Persian standard; Pergamum had small coins; the city was as yet of no importance. For information as to the coins of the ruling families of Teuthrania (successors of Demaratus), for those of the descendants of Gongylus in Gambeum and Myrina and the coins of Themistocles in Magnesia cf. Babelon, l.l. p. lxxviii. seq.

In BITHYNIA Chalcedon coins on the Attic standard up to about 400; on the Persian standard up to about 350, and afterwards on the Phoenician standard (according to Head, 438). The coinage of Heraclea Pontica, which was constantly increasing in power, entirely follows that of Sinope; the dates of the tyrants Clearchus (364-353), Satyrus (353-347), Timotheus and Dionysius (347-338), who belong to the same family, are distinguished. Some of the coins of the Aeginetan standard are very fine; Timotheus and Dionysius have put their names on the coins; Head, 441. Cf. for the history of this city, Plass, Tyrannia, I, 258 seq., 2, 139.

In PAPHLAGONIA the powerful city of Sinope belongs to this

category; it minted on a reduced Phoenician standard, from about 364-333, however, with names of satraps, which are first written in Greek and afterwards in Aramaic characters; we find the names of Datames, Abdemon and Ariarathes; Head, 434. We may regard these coins as minted also for Cappadocia, where coins of three kinds belonging to the second successor of Datames, Ariarathes I. (cir. 350-322), are still in existence; Head, 631.

In PONTUS we have Amisus (Head, 424) with the Persian standard. The city, according to Strabo 12, 547, was re-colonized by Athenians (when, is unknown) under the name Piræus, and we have, besides coins of Amisus with Aramaic letters, some stamped ΠΕΙΡΑΙΩΝ; Head, 424. Coins of Trapezus on the Persian standard of the fourth century also occur.

LESBOS in general is credited by Head (485) with electronectæ at the beginning of the fourth century; Methymna with silver coins of Phoenician (?) standard for the same period; Mytilene the same with the Persian standard; even the little island of Pordosilene close to Lesbos appears to have had a coinage at that date; Head, 489. Of Aeolian places on the mainland Head (500) ascribes coins of the Phoenician standard of this date to the little town of Gambrium in the valley of the Caycus.

In IONIA, we have electrum coins in Phocæa up to about 350 B.C.; Head, 507. Clazomenæ has fine gold coins which Head (491) places after 387, although Clazomenæ was assigned to Persia in the King's Peace; Lampsacene coins are, it is true, also placed in this period. Clazomenæ also minted silver coins on the Attic standard, among which some beautiful tetradrachmæ are conspicuous, with the name of an artist, Theodotus—a great rarity in the East; Head, 491. Coins of the satrap Orontes are assigned to Clazomenæ or to Tarsus; other coins of the same satrap to Iolla in the neighbourhood of Adramyttium, or to Lampsacus; Head, 455, 491. Lenca, in the neighbourhood of Clazomenæ, founded in 352 by Tachus, and subsequently coming under the jurisdiction of Clazomenæ, has small coins with a picture of a swan, the emblem of Clazomenæ. According to Head (499), the coins of Erythræ do not begin till 330 and are of the Rhodian standard. Teos has coins of the Phoenician standard. Colophon adopts the Rhodian standard; a beautiful coin with a fine Persian head is worthy of notice; Head, 493, fig. 207, Imhoof, *Porträtköpfe*, III. 1; it is usually assigned to Colophon; Six (*Monnaies grecques inédites*, Lond. 1888) assigns it to Iassus, and agrees with de Luynes in thinking that the head is a portrait of the famous Tissaphernes. The Ephesian coins of the Rhodian standard with the letters ΣΥΝ have been referred to above (p. 48). Of the little town of Pygela or

Phygela, south of Ephesus, we have extant coins (Head, 508). Miletus coined in the fourth century on her own standard, but probably borrowed from the Phoenician (Head, 504), if we may judge from a coin which bears the inscription ΕΓ ΔΙΔΥΜΩΝ ΙΕΡΗ, where *δραχμή* is to be supplied, and which is a Phoenician half-drachma. Other coins of the Attic and Samian standards belonging to Miletus are ascribed to the period in which the potentates Hecatomnus and Mausolus ruled there; Head, 503. After that Head (504) assumes that the Phoenician standard prevailed in Miletus from 350-330 B.C. Magnesia on the Maeander has coins of the Phoenician and Persian standard from the middle of the fourth century; Head, 501. Chios has the Rhodian or Phoenician standard; Head, 514. In Samos we have first coins of the so-called Samian standard (see vol. ii. 231), then the league coins of the Rhodian standard (*v. supra*, p. 48). In 365, when Athens obtains possession of the island, the coinage ceases until the return of the Samians in 322. Coins with a picture of the Persian king kneeling to shoot and the name ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΗΣ belong to some Ionian city or other (probably Ephesus, cf. Babelon, l.l. p. lxxviii., and Six, who assumes that this coin was minted from 335-334 in Ephesus through the influence of Memnon and the co-operation of the Ephesian magistrate Pythagoras). The name is no doubt that of a tyrant, like others with ΣΠΙΘΡ; there were two Spithridates in the fourth century, Xen. Hell. 3, 4, 10 and Arr. 1, 12, 8; cf. Babelon, l.l. p. lxxvi., according to whom Spithridates is the latter, the tyrant of Sardis. These coins are of the Rhodian standard.

In CARIA we have the coins with ΣΥΝ of the Rhodian standard (*v. supra*, p. 48) in Cnidus, in Halicarnassus coins of the Phoenician standard, Head, 526; the coins of the Carian sovereigns minted there, I shall refer to immediately. Iassus (Head, 528) has coins with ΣΥΝ, according to Head perhaps of the Persian standard; but might not the coin of 166 grs. be a Rhodian tridrachma—properly of 175 grs.? The Carian rulers (Head, 533) Hecatomnus (about 391-377) in Mylasa, Mausolus (377-351, cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 486) in Halicarnassus, Hidrieus (-341), Ada (-340), Pixodarus (-335), Rhoontopates (-334), Ada for the second time (-334) (cf. Babelon, p. lxxxv. seq., also Krumbholz, *De Asiae min. satrapia*, Lips. 1883, p. 83) minted coins of the Rhodian standard; it is remarkable that a Pixodarus was worshipped as a hero in Ephesus; cf. Roscher, *Lex. Sp.* 2529. Of the Carian islands CALYMNA coins on the Rhodian standard, Head, 534, as does Cos, Head, 535, NISYRUS with a rose referring to Rhodes, but its drachma is of 47 grains. True, this does not prevent the island of Megiste, which was subject to

Rhodes and where a drachma of 46 grains occurs (Head, 537), from also coining on the Rhodian standard, although that would give a tridrachma of 140 grains instead of the normal one of 180. RHODES, which introduced a special standard for its silver coinage, has gold coins of the Euboic standard, Head, 539. All the coins of Rhodes are distinguished for their beauty.

The LYDIAN coinage ceased with the Persian conquest; PHRYGIAN do not appear until the second century B.C.

LYCIAN coins occur after 400 B.C.; but Head (574) is of opinion that they do not go down to the time of Alexander, but that the Carian sovereigns had previously introduced their coins into Lycia. Otherwise it would be very strange that the Lycians should not coin under Alexander, as they had voluntarily submitted to the king, and therefore might expect every consideration from him. In conformity with this we may assume that Lycia was under the rule of the Carian princes, which would also be of interest for the history of art in that period; v. *infra*, chap. xxix. The Lycian coins had the Babylonian standard, Head, 571, yet we have a stater of the city of Phaselis, dated 153, weighing 7 grains. Cf. for the Lycian princes and their coins, Babelon, pp. lxxxix.-cxiii.

On the SOUTH COAST OF ASIA MINOR and a short way into the interior communities of a semi-Greek character extend as far as the eastern corner of the Mediterranean. Thus the hellenizing of the whole of Asia Minor by Alexander and his successors is more easily accounted for. In PAMPHYLIA we have coins of the Persian standard in Aspendus and Side, the former mostly with the inscription ΕΣΤΦΕΝΔΑΙΙΥΣ, the latter with ΣΙΔΗΤΙΚΟΝ, or an inscription in characters resembling the Aramaic; cf. Head, 581 and 586. Beyond Pamphylia, in PISIDIA, the city of Selge, on the river Eurymedon, has, like Aspendus, coins of the Persian standard, mostly with the inscription ΣΤΑΕΤΙΥΣ. On the coins of both cities is portrayed a slinger, because Aspendus recalls σφενδόνη; those of Selge have also two wrestlers on the reverse; the inscription στλεγυς recalls στλεγγίς, strigil, a wrestler's instrument; the real name of the city must therefore have recalled the word *atlenis* still more than Selge, the hellenized form. CILICIA too had coins with Greek inscriptions under Persian supremacy; thus Celenderis, supposed to be a colony from Samos, had coins of the Persian standard, Head, 600; also Mallos, on which Imhoof has published a treatise mentioned above; cf. Head, 605. The coins of Mallos indicate gradually increasing political influence on the part of Persia, but at the same time growing influence of Greek civilization, the figure of the Persian king and certain Greek deities, such as Heracles, Demeter and others, replacing a

winged figure and a swan. Nagidus has fine coins of the Persian standard with Bacchus and Aphrodite, Head, 608; cf. Imhoof, *Monn. gr.* p. 372 seq., and Babelon, p. xxxvii. Soli also has coins of the Persian standard; Issus the same with Greek and Aramaic inscriptions (Head, 604). In Tarsus the following satraps coined in the fourth century:—Tiribazus, Orontas (?), Pharnabazus, Tarcamus (so he is called by Six, Babelon prefers to call him Datames), Mazaeus (Head, 613-616) with inscriptions of their names in Aramaic characters; Tiribazus also coined in Soli. For the widely diffused activity of Mazaeus cf. the above-quoted treatise by Six, and Babelon, pp. xliii.-xlix.

In CYPRUS, for which cf. Six's treatise and Head 620 seq., we have coins at first of the Aeginetan standard (or Persian, Head, 665), which passes into the Rhodian standard in the first half of the fourth century. Salamis has the most important coinage. Some of the inscriptions are in Cypriote, others from about 368 onwards in Greek characters. In the same way the coins of Paphos change from the Cypriote to the Greek characters, cf. Head, 623, who follows Six. For the coins of Soli, cf. Head, 626. On the other hand, the coins of Citium have Phoenician inscriptions; Head, 621: in the fourth century we find coins of this kind with the names Baabram, Demonicus (?), Meleciathon, Pumia-thon. Cf. Babelon, cxiv.-cliii.

In PHOENICIA the Phoenician standard continues to exist (drachma of 56 grains); only Arados adopted the Persian standard. We have coins of Byblos (Head, 668), of Sidon (Head, 670), although Six, who treats this coinage in detail, conjectures that the latter may have been minted in Tripolis instead of Sidon; of Tyre (Head, 674). For the coins of Phoenicia cf. Babelon, p. cliv. seq.; for those of the lords of Hierapolis-Bambyce, and of Gaza and Arabia, *ibid.* xlix. seq. In these districts there were a large number of Greek mercenaries, and this accounts for the frequent imitation of Athenian coins with the Pallas head and owls, although in a very rude style, *ibid.* p. lix. seq.

I may add that Head (739) assumes that gold and electrum coins of the Phoenician standard may have been issued in CARTHAGE, which otherwise had no coinage, after the time of Timoleon.

If we arrange these issues according to their standards, we find that the AEGINETAN standard (194 grs.) was followed by Heraclea Pontica and perhaps Cyprus; the PERSIAN (177 grs.) by Amisus, Trapezus, Chalcedon (and Byzantium), Antandrus, Apollonia on the Rhyndacus, Lampsacus, Parium, Mytilene, Iasus (?), Aspendus, Sigè, Selge, Celenderis, Mallos, Tarsus, Nagidus, Soli, that is to say, the north-western corner and the south coast of Asia Minor,

perhaps also Cyprus; the BABYLONIAN (169 gra.) by Lycia; the ATTIC (135 gra.) by Chalcedon, Sigeum, Clazomenae, Miletus (rulers); the RHODIAN (120-125 gra.) by Rhodes, Cos, Cnidus, the Carian sovereigns, Samos, Chios, Ionian satraps, Erythrae, Ephesus, Colophon, Cyzicus, Iassus, Cyprus; the PHOENICIAN (112 gra.) by Halicarnassus, Miletus, Teos, Phygela, Magnesia, Gambrium, Methymna, Tenedos, Chalcedon, Sinope, Phoenicia and perhaps Carthage. It is remarkable that Miletus follows Phoenicia; we involuntarily recall the old relations between that city and this country shown by the name Cadmus, which is borne in Phoenicia by a hero, in Miletus by a somewhat mythical early historian.

Some beautiful and characteristic coins of Asia Minor belonging to the fourth century are reproduced in Gardner's *Types of Greek Coins*, Pl. x., and discussed on pp. 169-176.

6. The embarrassments of the reign of Artaxerxes II. are arranged by Spiegel (2, 458 seq.) under the four following heads: (1) Relations with Greece (pp. 459-466). (2) The war with Cyprus (pp. 466-469). (3) The war against the Cadusii, a wild mountain people of Gilân, south of the Caspian Sea (pp. 469, 470). Plutarch (*Art.* 24) and Diodorus (15, 8, 10) refer to this war. Artaxerxes is said to have marched with 300,000 foot and 10,000 cavalry into this inaccessible country, in which tropical rains destroyed the roads and bred fevers. Tiribazus saved the king, who was within an ace of being lost, by stratagem; he persuaded each of the two Cadusian potentates to conclude a special treaty with the king without the knowledge of the other. In consequence of this Tiribazus was again received into favour. (4) The Egyptian War (pp. 470-474).

CHAPTER XXII

ALEXANDER IN ANTERIOR ASIA — BATTLE OF THE GRANICUS (334-333)

IN the spring of 334 Alexander set out from Macedonia with about 30,000 infantry and 5000 cavalry, of whom not half were real Macedonians.¹ The rest came partly from the northern races and partly from Thessaly and other districts of Greece. The main body of the army was formed by the heavy infantry and heavy cavalry. The former composed the famous phalanx with its squares sixteen men deep, the lances (*Sarissae*), sixteen feet in length, of the first five ranks projecting beyond the front rank. Most of the cavalry too wore armour, riders as well as horses. When the phalanx could not be brought into action, the lighter-armed Macedonian *Hypaspistae*, corresponding to the peltasts, came into play. The troops destined for skirmishing and for covering the line of march were taken mainly from the northern tribes, such as the Thracians, the Paeonians and the Agrianes. In twenty days the king had reached Sestos, whence the army was conveyed on 160 triremes and a number of transports to Abydos. While on board ship he sacrificed to Poseidon and the Nereidae, and on the Asiatic shore to Zeus, Athene and Heracles. In Ilium too he offered sacrifice as a descendant of Achilles, and laid a wreath upon the grave of that hero, as did his friend Hephaestion upon the grave of Patroclus. He pronounced Achilles fortunate in having found a Homer.

He then continued his march in an easterly direction, and

encountered a hostile army commanded by Persian nobles on the river Granicus.² It consisted of about 20,000 Persian cavalry and the same number of foreign infantry, mostly Greek mercenaries. Memnon had advised the generals not to offer battle, but to lay waste the country; in a pitched battle the presence of the Macedonian king, coupled with the absence of the king of Persia, would give the Macedonians too great a superiority. But the Persian generals thought this advice reflected on their honour, and resolved to fight. With their cavalry they occupied the steep bank of the river, which the Macedonians had to cross under their fire. Parmenio was opposed to an immediate attack, but Alexander declared that after having crossed the Hellespont he could not be kept back by a little river like the Granicus. He had the gift, so valuable to a sovereign and a general, of saying the right thing in a few words; in this respect there was something of the Spartan in him. He ordered his army to cross the river in face of the enemy's cavalry and storm the opposite bank. The cavalry, in accordance with Macedonian as well as Greek practice, was stationed on the wings, the phalanx in the centre. Alexander himself commanded the right wing. Easily recognizable by his brilliant accoutrements and his white plume, he threw himself into the midst of the enemy and made for the Persian generals. His lance was shattered to pieces; his groom's, which he then took, was soon broken in the combat; whereupon one of his *hetairi*, the Corinthian Demaratus, gave him his. With it Alexander bore down Mithridates, the son-in-law of Darius, and then Roesaces, who had cut off a piece of the king's helmet; and just as another Persian noble, Spithridates, was on the point of dealing Alexander a blow from behind, the Macedonian Clitus, surnamed the Black, cut off his hand, and so saved the king's life. Of the Persian cavalry about 1000 were slain, the rest fled. There remained the mercenaries, who were drawn up on one side, the generals having forgotten to use them against the enemy. They were

cut to pieces by the Macedonians, with the exception of some 2000 who were taken prisoners. Of the Macedonian army twenty-five *hetairi* had fallen. Bronze statues were erected to them in Dion by Alexander's orders, as a lasting memorial of their valour. Of the other cavalry about sixty had perished, of the infantry about thirty. That the battle cost the victors so little bloodshed was due, apart from Alexander's excellent generalship, to the fact that they were better armed. They had complete suits of armour and long spears of hardened wood; the Persians had only short javelins. The Persian army at the battle of the Granicus was a mob without a leader, in which each man probably fought to the best of his ability, but without the slightest result. As in 490 and 480, better armament, better leadership and a better spirit won the day. Alexander gave the fallen soldiers an honourable burial; the families of his own men were granted immunity from taxation and from personal service; the wounded he took under his own care. The Greek prisoners were sent to Macedonia for compulsory labour. Alexander sent 300 suits of armour out of the booty to Athens, where they were set up on the Acropolis with the inscription: "Won by Alexander, son of Philip, and the Greeks (except the Lacedaemonians) from the barbarians in Asia." To the Greeks therefore he wanted only to be commander-in-chief, and he still hoped and wished to win Athens in particular to his side. One would certainly have thought that the feeling, that with Alexander a new spirit was moving over the face of the Greek world, would have made some impression on the Athenians. After all there was something novel and grand in the spectacle of a high-minded soldier-king, untrammelled by republican obstacles, waging a war which had so long floated before the imagination of the Greeks as a desirable aim, conducting it with vigour to the honour of Greece and displaying clemency after his glorious victory. One would have thought that the personality of the general, a young man full of enthusiasm for the beautiful,

would have made it possible for the Athenians to waive their objections for the nonce and at last admire grand deeds instead of grand words. But the majority of them could not do so.

The victory on the Granicus was attended with a result which was unprecedented in the history of the struggles between Greeks and Persians. Sardes tendered its submission; the governor himself surrendered. The Asiatics felt the importance of Alexander. The king repaired to the ancient capital of Lydia, restored to the Lydians, as Arrian expresses it, their old laws, and looked for a site for a temple to the Olympian Zeus on the acropolis. At that moment a thunder-shower wetted the spot, and that spot only, on which the royal citadel of Lydia had once stood; the site for the temple was found.³ Alexander introduced a new administration in Lydia, which became a model for that of the other provinces, the military and financial business being entrusted to different officials, whereas under the Persians the satrap had combined all the powers of government of the province in his own person. He then marched to Ephesus, where he re-established the democratic constitution. His next object was Miletus, which had been left in charge of Greek mercenaries. Their leader Hegesistratus at first thought of surrender, and then changed his mind; the Persian fleet was not far off and might help Miletus. But Alexander managed to bring up his fleet of 160 ships first, and his vigorous assault compelled the garrison to surrender. After repulsing a feeble attack of the large Persian fleet, the king sent his own ships home; he did not wish to divide his forces. He now marched against Halicarnassus, where Memnon was in command of barbarians and Hellenes. This time the defence was worthy of the attack. After a fruitless attempt upon Myndus Alexander attacked Halicarnassus itself. The moat, which was thirty yards broad, was filled up and the sorties of the garrison repulsed; a portion of the walls was destroyed by battering-engines. The defenders held out for a time behind a newly-erected crescent-

shaped wall; they then retreated, abandoning the city and taking refuge in the two citadels, where Alexander left them undisturbed for the moment. He installed Ada, daughter of Hecatomnus and wife of Idrieus, as ruler of Caria, and sent home a number of Macedonian soldiers, who had married before starting on the expedition, with orders to return later on with fresh troops to Asia.

Alexander now marched in a northerly direction through Lycia, which joined him, the inhabitants of Phaselis presenting him with a golden wreath. The Aspendians, who at first had intended to submit, but had afterwards changed their mind, were now compelled to pay a fine of 100 talents instead of the 50 originally imposed. His farther progress was impeded by the mountainous nature of the country. The capture of the fortified Telmessus would have delayed him too long. He, therefore, marched by way of Sagalassus and Celaenae to Gordium, the capital of Phrygia, in the winter of 334-333.⁴

That Alexander did not march at once into the interior of Asia Minor after the battle on the Granicus, was due to several reasons. The first was that he had to cripple the power of Persia in south-western Asia Minor before he advanced farther eastwards. But that this was not the only reason is shown by the fact that he neglected to take measures against the Persian naval force, which afterwards did him some harm. For Memnon took Chios by treachery and then attacked Mytilene, but died while besieging this city, to the detriment of the Persian cause. Mytilene surrendered, and was put under the rule of a tyrant. Tenedos, as Arrian expresses it, was compelled to recognize the Peace of Antalcidas. Thus, while Alexander was establishing democracies, the Persians, the hope of Demosthenes, were installing tyrannies and bringing Antalcidas once more into honour. Ten Persian ships even came as far as Siphnos, but fifteen Macedonian vessels sailed out from Chalcis to meet them, captured eight of them, and drove the other two back

to Asia. If Alexander thus neglected the Persian fleet, the existence of Persian troops in Miletus and Halicarnassus could not have been the only reason why he did not march into the interior from Sardes. His special motive for following the coast southwards was that the Greeks lived there, whose liberation had been the immediate object of his expedition. Not till this was accomplished could he proceed eastwards. And his turning aside now in a northerly direction into the interior of Asia Minor, where there were no armies to be conquered, at the risk of giving Darius time to collect a larger force to oppose him, was not due simply to the fact that the rugged coast line of Cilicia was difficult for an army to traverse. The heart of Asia Minor was Phrygia, a region closely connected with Greek civilization in the earliest ages; if this country readily acknowledged him as ruler, much would be gained, not perhaps for the moment, but certainly for the future. In this he was aided by a circumstance which showed his character in a new aspect. Gordium, the capital of Phrygia, contained the chariot in which Gordius, the first king of the country, had made his entry into the city. Its yoke was fastened to the shaft by a complicated knot, and the legend ran that whoever loosened it was destined to be master of Asia. Alexander, not being able to untie it, cut it asunder with his sword, thus showing that action as well as speech did not fail him at the right moment. From Gordium Alexander crossed the passes of Cilicia to Tarsus, which the Persian governor made over to him. Cilicia too was still half Greek. Here he contracted a violent fever by bathing in the river Cydnus. His physician, Philip of Acarnania, gave him a purgative medicine; but just as he was about to swallow it a letter was delivered to him in which he was warned against treachery on Philip's part. He read it, handed it to the physician, and drank the medicine without hesitation. In this way he proved that he was fearless and unsuspecting—a fresh manifestation of his lofty and kingly character.

especially when contrasted with the perpetual suspicion displayed by Orientals. He made another deviation from his route to Anchialus, where the tomb of Sardanapalus was to be seen, who was said to have built Anchialus and Tarsus in one day, and whose epitaph bade men enjoy life, as the other world was not worth troubling about—another marked contrast to Alexander. From Soli he subdued the mountain tribes of Cilicia. He now learned that Caria had joined him, notably Cos, Triopium and Caunus. This was of importance, for the Carians were a brave people and these were places of ancient renown. In the semi-barbarian countries in which he was now staying he always laid stress on Greek manners and customs. Thus at Soli he celebrated Greek festivals and gave the inhabitants a democratic constitution; in Mallus he sacrificed to the hero Amphilochus, son of Amphiaraus, who was said to have visited these regions, and he released the Malli, who claimed to be Argives, from the tribute which they had paid to Persia.

At this point he was informed that Darius was close at hand with his army in an easterly direction, in the level country on the other side of the mountains, and he therefore set out to do battle with him.

NOTES

1. Composition of Alexander's army, Diod. 17, 17. There were not many Greeks in it; of the 7000 *σύντακτοι* infantry some were Thessalians; the Hellenic cavalry besides 1500 Thessalians numbered only 600. According to Diod. 16, 89 and Plut. Phoc. 16 Philip had settled the contingents which the Greeks were to contribute to the campaign; Alexander evidently did not insist strongly on his rights. For the very different way in which Napoleon I., who for a time was compared with the Macedonian kings, got the most out of his German and other allies, see a characteristic remark of his quoted in Oncken, *Zeitalter der Revolution und des Kaiserreiches*, 2, 498, Berl. 1886. The character of Alexander's army is described by Droysen, 1, 1, 165-179. Cf. also Beloch, *Bevölkerung der griech.-röm. Welt*,

Leipz. 1886, pp. 215-222, who proves that there is nothing to be said against Diodorus' statements.

2. Alexander up to the battle of Issus, Arr. I, 11—2, 6.—For his march through Cilicia cf. Th. Bent in the *Athenaeum* of July 19, 1890, pp. 104, 105.—For the sacrifice (I, 11, 6) cf. the notes on the coins in chap. xxvii.—As early as the battle on the Granicus Alexander adopted the proper tactics for defeating Asiatics, viz. by bringing the cavalry to bear. The East has never varied in this respect; its strength lies in its cavalry. Persians, Parthians, Arabs, Huns, Magyars, Turks were all horsemen. It is worthy of note that certain Asiatic methods of warfare have also remained the same, e.g. the *σάγηνες*, which the Persians, according to Herod. 6, 31, practised in the islands of Chios, Lesbos and Tenedos, in these cases with infantry; in open country they of course used cavalry. According to App. Mith. 67, this was done by Tigranes, who surrounded and captured 300,000 men in Cappadocia; and subsequently by Avars, Crim Tartars and Turkomans, the latter even in the nineteenth century; cf. Penz, Beil. 167 of the *Allgemeine Zeitung*, 1889; on one occasion they captured 50,000 persons in the space of a fortnight.

3. So the church of S. Maria Maggiore in Rome is said to have been built on the spot where snow had fallen on the 5th of August.

4. The sites of Telmessus and Sagalassus are described by Count Lanckoronski in the *Beilage* of the *Allg. Zeitung*, 1890, April 14. But why does he say that Alexander took Telmessus? cf. Arr. I, 28, 2. For the site of Telmessus (Termissoi) cf. Murray's *Handbook for Asia Minor*, p. 120, for that of Sagalassus, *ibid.* p. 150.

CHAPTER XXIII

ISSUS—TYRE—EGYPT (333-331)

DARIUS was so impatient to conquer Alexander that he would not await his attack in the flat country east of the mountains, but marched towards the sea-coast to meet him (Nov. 333). The result was that at the same time that the Persian king advanced by the shortest route across the mountains to the point on the coast where he supposed Alexander to be, the latter proceeded by the easier but longer route southwards to the city of Myriandrus, which was on the sea, so that Alexander on his arrival there learned that Darius was behind him. He immediately faced about. He pointed out to his generals that the vigour of their own soldiers and the feebleness of the Asiatics would secure them a victory over the latter, and that the Greeks in Darius' service would not fight as bravely in their capacity of mercenaries as the Greeks in the Macedonian army. He reminded them that the Ten Thousand had conquered the Persians, although they had not the splendid cavalry which the Macedonians now possessed. The Persian army was drawn up in a plain on the shore about three miles broad outside the city of Issus; their front (to the east) was protected by the river Pinarus, and they were about 600,000 strong.¹ The main body of their army consisted of mercenaries, 30,000 Greeks and 60,000 barbarians, called Cardaces, who formed the first line, the Greeks on the right, the barbarians on the left. Behind these the rest of

the army was crowded together in uselessly deep formation. Most of the cavalry were on the right wing close to the sea. Darius made part of the left wing deploy on the hills to the eastward, so that these troops might have fallen on the Macedonian rear, if there had been any generalship on the Persian side. Darius was in the centre of his army in his chariot. Alexander used his centre and right wing for the attack, his left under Parmenio had to remain on the defensive. A few hundred Macedonian soldiers sufficed to hold in check the large force which was making the flank movement on the hills. As at the Granicus, Alexander crossed the stream in full view of the enemy, hurled himself at once with all his force on their centre and broke it up. The enemy's left wing fled immediately; nearer the sea the Greek mercenaries made a better stand, and they would not have been routed so soon, at any rate not without great loss on Alexander's side, had not Darius, as soon as he saw his left wing in full flight, given the signal for the rest to flee. Thereupon the Persian cavalry on the right wing, which had gained some advantages, fled as well. The whole Persian army became a confused mass of fugitives. About 100,000 men, among them some 10,000 cavalry, were cut down. Arrian does not give the number of losses on the Macedonian side. According to Diodorus they were 300 infantry and 150 cavalry. Darius fled at first on his chariot; he then threw away his shield and continued his flight on horseback; it was asserted that relays of mares, which in their anxiety to get back to their foals would gallop faster than horses, had been stationed ready for this purpose. With what contempt must stories of this kind, when they were circulated and apparently confirmed by the actual cowardice of the king, have inspired the Macedonians for everything Persian. The most remarkable part of the booty was the tent of Darius with his mother, wife, two daughters and a young son, whom the king had exposed to danger and then left in the lurch.

An Asiatic conqueror would at once have placed the women in his harem; Alexander treated them with a consideration which recalls the age of chivalry. From the battlefield he proceeded to Phœnicia, where Aradus and Marathus surrendered to him. In the latter city he received a letter from Darius, demanding the restoration of his family and declaring his readiness to form an alliance with the king. Alexander replied that Darius must acknowledge him as master of Asia, the rest would then be arranged; if not, it was open to him to try another battle. Parmenio now marched to Damascus, where he captured much treasure and took prisoners some Greeks who had joined the Persian side. These were a Spartiate, two Thebans and an Athenian, Iphicrates, son of the famous general. Alexander spared them all. The Thebans he released out of pity for the fate of their city, the Athenian for the sake of his name; the Spartiate he at first kept prisoner, but gave him his liberty too after he had gained some more victories.

His plan now was to occupy Egypt as soon as possible, but this was prevented by the resistance of Tyre.² This city had become richer than ever after the fall of Sidon, and imagined it could defy Alexander. The Tyrians had at first sent word to the king that they would obey his orders; but when Alexander replied that he would enter their city to sacrifice to his ancestor Heracles, they declared that they could not admit foreigners into it, that even Persians had not been granted admittance. Alexander could not put up with this, for in that case Tyre would remain independent, and do what she liked with her ships. No doubt he had hitherto neglected the Persian fleet, but to permit its basis and origin, the capital of Phœnicia, to remain independent, was equivalent to allowing the enemy's fleet to exist for an unlimited period, and that this would not do was proved by what had happened meanwhile in the Aegean. True, the result of the battle of Issus was that the Persian fleet, which had once more

appeared at Siphnos, on this occasion with 100 sail, withdrew to Chios; but its leaders had given the Spartan king Agis 300 talents, with which his brother Agesilaus made a descent upon Crete from the promontory of Taenarum, a rendezvous for mercenaries. In itself this was not serious, for Crete was a remote point, and Antipater held Greece proper in check by means of Chalcis and Corinth. But even here the Persian fleet might eventually create disturbances, as the dislike of Macedonia was increasing rather than diminishing among the Greeks. What they expected from the Persians, and what close relations were maintained with the latter, especially in Athens, is shown by the fact that before the battle of Issus it was fully believed there that the moment had come for the Persians to 'trample on' the Macedonians.

Alexander was therefore obliged to take Tyre, and this was no easy matter, for the city lay on an island and possessed ships of war, while Alexander had none ready to hand. Besides, the Persian fleet cruising in the Aegean might come to Tyre's assistance. But Alexander followed the example of Dionysius at Motye; he built a mole from the mainland to the island. That had been easy enough for Dionysius, for he had a fleet and the water round Motye was quite shallow; but Tyre was surrounded by deep sea. When in spite of this the mole approached the city walls, the Tyrians interrupted the works and even destroyed the besieging towers placed on the dam by means of fire-ships. Meanwhile, however, Alexander collected a fleet of 80 Phoenician, 120 Cypriote, 10 Rhodian, and 14 other vessels, which enabled him to attack from the side of the sea as well. The Tyrians at first wanted to have a naval battle, but when they saw the number of Alexander's ships they kept theirs in their two harbours, which faced north and south. Alexander's ships, however, could not get close to the walls of the city, because large blocks of stone were lying in the water in front of them. They had to be dragged out of their place, which entailed much trouble and

fighting. The Tyrians at last attempted another sortie by attacking with their northern fleet the portion of the Macedonian fleet which lay opposite the northern harbour at a time when Alexander happened to be in the south. They had of course the advantage of being able to survey the whole scene of conflict from the city. But although they warned their fleet from the walls in good time, yet Alexander came so quickly to the aid of the threatened squadron that the Tyrian vessels were driven back with loss into the harbour. After this the Tyrians were obliged to confine themselves to the defence of the walls, and these were at last attacked from all sides. On the south the wall had been demolished to such an extent at one point that it was possible to get on what was left of it from the ships by means of ladders. Alexander decided to force his way into the city at this place. But to divert the attention of the inhabitants, he ordered a general attack upon the whole line of wall and upon both the harbours, and while his ships forced the defence of the southern harbour, and penetrated into the northern one, which was left open, he himself with a picked body of men scaled the wall at the point in question and was soon in the city. The butchery was great. The Macedonians were specially incensed, because the Phoenicians had killed some prisoners on the top of the walls and then thrown their bodies into the sea. Eight thousand Tyrians perished; the Macedonians lost four hundred men during the whole siege, among them Admetus, the captain of the Hypaspistae, who had penetrated into the city first by the side of his king. Alexander pardoned those who had taken refuge in the temple of Heracles, among whom were King Azemileus and some Carthaginian envoys. The Carthaginians had behaved differently at the conquest of Acragas; they had put every one to the sword. Thirty thousand Tyrians were sold as slaves. Alexander now celebrated the festival of his ancestor Heracles, and set up the engine which had made the fatal breach as a votive offering in the temple (Aug. 332).

During the siege of Tyre a fresh message arrived from Darius,³ offering Alexander 10,000 talents as ransom for his family, his daughter in marriage, and Asia as far as the Euphrates. "I would accept it if I were Alexander," said Parmenio. "And so would I," retorted Alexander, "if I were Parmenio." He sent back word that it was unnecessary to offer him territory and money; that he would marry Darius' daughter if it so pleased him; and that if Darius wanted anything of him, he could come to him.

The route to Egypt now seemed open, and it was so if Alexander did not halt at Gaza, which refused to surrender.⁴ But the fall of Gaza was necessary for his prestige. The city lay on rising ground some twenty furlongs from the sea, which was shallow there; its walls were lofty and strongly built. The engineers declared that it was impossible to build engines of sufficient height to demolish walls of that kind. The king thereupon threw up an embankment against the wall and began the attack there; but it was repulsed, and Alexander himself was wounded. He now surrounded the whole city with a mound of earth, 250 feet high and 1200 feet broad, but at the same time undermined the wall of the city, presumably at a spot where no embankment had been thrown up. Then the city was stormed, and the fourth assault was successful. The men of Gaza were put to the sword, the women and children made slaves (Nov. 332).

Alexander now marched to Egypt, which the governor Mazaces handed over to him because he could not help himself. The Egyptians always had an antipathy to the Persians; some of the Greek mercenaries who had fled to Egypt from Issus had behaved badly; the satrap had no Persian troops; hence there was nothing left to him but to surrender. Alexander sacrificed to Apis and the Egyptian gods in Memphis, and thus at once secured the affection of the people. But he also paid honours to the Greek deities, by holding an athletic and 'musical' competition. A 'musical' competition consisted

mainly of the performance of dramas. Thus Greek poetry was introduced into the East under Alexander's auspices.

He now sailed down the Nile to the sea and noted a spot on the coast near the town of Canopus which seemed to him suitable for a large city. He immediately marked out the streets and squares, and as his men ran short of chalk they used flour to trace the lines, which gave the soothsayers an opportunity of prophesying the future wealth of the city, which was called Alexandria. From there he journeyed to the oracle of Ammon (Egyptian Amon) in the desert (in the spring of 331). The route must have been perfectly well known, as many had travelled by it for years past; but two serpents are said to have glided in front of Alexander as messengers from the god. He questioned the oracle without witnesses, and, according to Arrian, it gave him the answer which he wished. A rumour spread that it had recognized him as the son of Zeus. Alexander had inherited a good deal of religious mysticism from his mother. The Greeks had long regarded Egypt as the source of profound wisdom, and the oracle of Ammon, which represented the Greek religion in its connection with Egypt, enjoyed great repute throughout the whole of Greece. Was it not natural that the career of Alexander, which seemed to furnish ocular demonstration of what had hitherto been only related of demi-gods, should have suggested to the priests of Ammon the idea that here was a son of the gods come down among men? And was it not just as natural that Alexander himself should be penetrated with the belief that it was as the priests stated? Henceforth he hardly regarded himself as the general of the Greeks, who indeed would have nothing to do with him, but rather as the king destined to be master of the world. Upon his return to Memphis, he reorganized the government of Egypt. He put the civil affairs of the province first under two and then under one nomarch; the troops were placed under several separate commanders. Cleomenes of Naucratis, whom he

appointed administrator of the adjoining districts of Arabia, was entrusted with the collection of the revenues of the province. Arrian considers that this method of governing Egypt foreshadows the system of the Romans, who treated this province with special care.⁵

In Tyre, whither he now returned, he also held an athletic and a 'musical' competition. Envoys from Athens arrived here on the state vessel *Paralus*, and begged for the liberation of the Athenians taken prisoners on the Granicus. He granted this and all their other requests. He then despatched 100 ships to the Peloponnese, where there were still some disturbances. Harpalus, one of his oldest adherents, whom he had appointed treasurer on account of his military incapacity, had fled with the treasure-chest shortly before the battle of Issus; Alexander pardoned him and reappointed him treasurer. Harpalus subsequently made off a second time with a large amount of treasure and created great trouble in Greece.⁶

A move was now made towards the interior of the Persian empire. So far every country which had ever had relations with Greece—Asia Minor, Phoenicia, Egypt—had fallen into his hands. It was now the turn of the regions which the Greeks were acquainted with only as travellers or as soldiers. Alexander was obliged to go on, as Darius was not reconciled to his defeat.

NOTES

1. The battle of Issus, Arr. 2, 6-11. For the surrounding district, see Neumann, *Zur Landeskunde und Gesch. Kilikiens*, IV, Jahrb. f. Phil. Bd. 127. Treatment of the women, Arr. 2, 12; Plut. Alex. 22.—Of the Greek mercenaries in the Persian army 8000 under Amyntas and other generals escaped by way of Cyprus to Egypt, where Amyntas πολυπραγμονῶν τι ἀποθνήσκει ἐπὶ τῶν ἐγχεσίων, Arr. 2, 13; Diod. 17, 48. Correspondence with Darius, Arr. 2, 14. The Greeks in Damascus, Arr. 2, 15. Doings of the Persian fleet in the Aegean, Arr. 2, 13, 4-6. State of public feeling in Athens, Aesch. Ctes. 164, where the word

καταρατεῖν corresponds to the expectation of the Persians (Arr. 2, 6, 5) before the battle of Issus. *καταρατεῖν* is a technical expression: Xen. Hell. 3, 4, 12. The Pompeian mosaic presents the critical moment in the battle of Issus.

2. Siege of Tyre, Arr. 2, 16-24. Glück, *De Tyro ab Al. M. oppugnata*, Königsb. 1886, is valuable as a criticism of the authorities. For the topography cf. Pietschmann, *Gesch. der Phöniciers*, Berl. 1889, p. 64 seq., who makes use of the works of Movers, Renan (*Mission de Phénicie*) and Prutz (*Aus Phönicien*). It is probable that the so-called Egyptian harbour in Tyre was more to the south-east, near the mole, yet Renan's remark quoted by Pietschmann (p. 66) as to the impossibility of reconciling a southern harbour with Arrian's account of the siege, is not very clear.

3. Overtures for peace by Darius, Arr. 2, 25.

4. Siege of Gaza, Arr. 2, 26, 27. Alexander's unworthy treatment of Batis, who had defended Gaza, was related by the rhetorician Hegesias. Grote (Lond. 1888, X, 92) believes it, Droysen does not. A rhetorician is not a safe authority.

5. Alexander in Egypt, Arr. 3, 1-5. Droysen, 1, 1, 304 seq.—Founding of Alexandria, Arr. 3, 1, 2; according to Erdmann, *Zur Kunde der hellenistischen Städtegründungen*, Strassb. 1883, the date should be Jan. 20, 331.—Doings of the Persian fleet, Arr. 3, 2, 3-7; cf. Droysen 1, 1, 313-316.—March to the oasis of Zeus Ammon, Arr. 3, 3, 4; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 316-323. Droysen assumes that the esoteric doctrine of the priests of Ammon rested on the certainty of a future life and the connection of the idea of the priesthood with that of the monarchy. If the priests recognized Alexander as son of Amon Ra (cf. Meyer, *Gesch. Aegyptens*, pp. 252-327, 398) it is possible that Alexander may have honestly accepted it; mysticism of this kind was part of his character. Government of Egypt, Arr. 3, 5; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 324.

6. Alexander's march to the Euphrates, Arr. 3, 6.

CHAPTER XXIV

GAUGAMELA—MARCH TO THE JAXARTES (331-329)

ALEXANDER crossed the Euphrates at Thapsacus without being attacked by the troops stationed there under Mazaeus.¹ He then marched some distance in a northerly direction, turned eastwards when near the mountains, crossed the Tigris and continued his route to the south. At Gaugamela, close to the ancient Nineveh, he fell in with Darius' enormous army, which was composed of the various tribes dwelling between the Jaxartes and the Euphrates. There are said to have been a million infantry, 40,000 cavalry, 200 scythed chariots and 15 elephants; even now there were still Greek mercenaries among them. Darius had selected the field of battle—an open plain, on which the spaces reserved for the scythed chariots had been specially levelled.² Arrived in sight of the foe Alexander first gave his army a rest—if the enemy had chosen the spot, he would choose the time—but he examined the ground to see if ditches or stakes had been dug or placed on it, and then he knew the battle-field as well as the man who had chosen it. Parmenio advised him to make a night attack on the enemy, but Alexander replied: "I do not steal a victory." In his eyes a battle was a contest in the old Greek sense of the word. While Alexander was preparing for battle Darius wearied his troops with constant sentinel duty. He occupied the centre of the line and was surrounded by Persians of the highest rank and

by the Greek mercenaries, on whom he rightly most relied. Bearing in mind that he was outnumbered in the proportion of twenty to one, Alexander formed, in addition to his main line of battle, the left wing of which was again led by Parmenio, a second line, which, drawn up in rear of the first, could, if occasion arose, check any attempted outflanking movement of the enemy. He then began his advance (Oct. 1, 331), bearing to the right along the enemy's front, and looking for a suitable point to break through. Thereupon Darius, who on this occasion really exerted himself to the utmost, made his attack, first sending his chariots against the enemy, and when they did the Macedonians no harm, ordering up his infantry. But this was fatal to him. For as they advanced gaps arose in their ranks, and into these Alexander hurled himself with his mounted lancers and his phalanx. The Macedonians aimed at the faces of the Persian nobles, who were as terrified at this as the Roman aristocrats at Pharsalus. Darius behaved as he had done at Issus, and was the first to fly. This decided the battle. Alexander had still to look after his left wing, which was being rather hard pressed; when, however, the enemy was repulsed in this quarter also, he engaged in pursuit. The battle cost the Macedonians 100 men and over 1000 horses; the Persians are said to have had 30,000 killed and a still larger number made prisoners.

After this Darius was unable to collect another army. He fled across the mountains to Media, where he was safe for the moment, for Alexander had first to subdue Babylonia. It was uncertain whether he would not have to fight for the city of Babylon, but it surrendered; the Babylonians came out to do him homage—a scene depicted in Thorwaldsen's famous relief.³ Alexander rebuilt the shrines in Babylon which had been destroyed by Xerxes and offered sacrifice to Bel in the way prescribed by the Chaldaeans. The government of the province was entrusted to three persons, a satrap, a general,

and an officer of finance. The ancient centre of Asiatic civilization was henceforth devoted to Alexander. He now marched to Susa, where he found 50,000 talents of silver, and some works of art which Xerxes had brought from Greece, among them the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, which Alexander sent back to Athens. In Susa he held a genuine Greek festival, an athletic contest and a torch-race, and then pushed on eastwards (Dec. 331). To reach the high plateau of Iran he had to pass through a wild mountainous region, and to scale several terraces accessible only by narrow passes.⁴ He first forced a passage through the country of the Uxii, and then, following the road which leads from Babehan to Kalah-i-Sefid, came to a narrow mountain pass fortified by a wall, and defended by 40,000 infantry and 700 cavalry. It could not be carried by a direct assault. But Alexander, with a portion of the army, got to the rear of it by a difficult route, while the rest of the force under Craterus attacked the enemy in front; they were dispersed, and the road to Persae or Persepolis, the capital of the province of Persis, lay open. Here the king found immense treasures — 120,000 talents according to Diodorus. Alexander burnt the royal citadel to the ground; by this he evidently wished to signify to the whole of Asia that the splendour and power of Persia were at an end, and that the world now had another master.⁵

After a stay of some length in Persis Alexander proceeded to Media (in the spring of 330). He had heard that Darius wanted to fight another battle with him. But this was not so; the king fled farther north, and Alexander pursued him thither after making some arrangements in Ecbatana (Hamedan). His route lay through the Caspian Passes.⁶ This is a narrow road not leading to the Caspian Sea, but skirting the edge of the plateau of Iran on the southern side of the Elburz range, a chain which runs parallel with the southern shore of the Caspian. He had thus come into the country east of Teheran, the modern capital of Persia. There he

learned that Darius had been deserted by many of his troops and was a prisoner in the hands of some satraps, who wished to make use of his name to continue the resistance to the conqueror, to whom otherwise the Persian king would probably have submitted. The most active of these satraps was Bessus of Bactria. It was of great importance to Alexander to get Darius into his own hands. He therefore accelerated his march, and eventually hurried on with a small force. Bessus had made himself king and was dragging Darius along with him; the Greek mercenaries had withdrawn. At last Alexander overtook the fugitives, who offered resistance for a moment, and then continued their flight after mortally wounding Darius. Darius died before Alexander came up with him (July 330). The conqueror sent his body to Persepolis, where it was buried with royal honours. Hyrcania and Parthia, provinces at the south-eastern corner of the Caspian Sea, now surrendered to Alexander, who, since the death of Darius, might be considered the lawful king of Persia. He marched somewhat farther westwards into the country of the Mardi (now Gilân), a damp forest region on the southern shore of the Caspian Sea. When the last of the Greek mercenaries of Darius, to the number of about 1500, surrendered, he took them into his service, and gave them the same pay which they had received from Darius; some Spartan envoys, however, who were with them, he retained as prisoners. After a fortnight's stay in Zadracarta, the capital of Hyrcania, where he held an athletic contest, he marched farther eastwards. At first he stopped close to the range between Iran and the desert, in the district around Meshed, the sacred city of the Mahommedans, watered by an arm of the river Heri-rud. Here Alexander was in the most northerly part of the province of Aria, the satrap of which was Satibarzanes. The latter submitted and received forty Macedonian Hypaspistae as a guard. The king had decided to march to Bactria against Bessus, when he was

informed that Satibarzanes had put his forty guards to death. He had therefore to subdue the whole province of Aria first, otherwise it would have become the rendezvous of his enemies. This is the most important part of the modern Afghanistan, the position of which between Persia, Turkestan and India gives it such prominence. Alexander hoped to have captured Satibarzanes in Artacoana (in the neighbourhood of Herat), but the satrap escaped to Bactria. Alexander then marched farther southward into the country of the Zarangi, Drangiana, the satrap of which, Barsaentes, one of the murderers of Darius, had fled to the Indians, but was given up by them. Alexander put him to death. This region, on the river Hilmend, in the district of Seistan, famous in later Persian legends, was inhabited in Alexander's time by the Ariaspae, called by the Greeks Euergetae, who gave Alexander a friendly reception. Here the king learned (in the autumn of 330) that one of his most trusted companions, Philotas, the son of Parmenio, had known of a conspiracy against him and had not reported it. In accordance with Macedonian custom he brought him before the court of the army, which condemned him to death.⁷ Alexander, however, was not content with having him killed, he also put Parmenio to death in Ecbatana, although no treason had been proved against him. Meanwhile Satibarzanes, who had appeared on Alexander's rear, was conquered and slain. The king now marched through Arachosia (Candahar) to the north-east, crossed the mountain chain which bounds the valley of the Cophen (Cabul river) on the south, and had now reached, in mid-winter, the southern spurs of the great range of the Caucasus (Hindu-Kush) which separates Iran from Turkestan. About the end of 330 or the beginning of 329 he crossed this chain by a snowy pass at an altitude of 13,200 feet—a march comparable to that of Hannibal over the Alps. Somewhere in the neighbourhood of Anderab he reached the northern country of Turkestan, the western part of which was then as now a

desert traversed only by nomad tribes, whereas the eastern part, on the Oxus and on the Jaxartes, contained more extensive tracts of fertile land than now. These regions were at that time inhabited by highly civilized tribes, Bactrians and Sacae, who held the nomads in check. This country was one of the principal seats of the Persian religion, and Alexander was bound to subdue it if he wished to have a firm hold of Persia. He soon reached the city of Bactra (Balkh), and captured a rocky stronghold which the Greeks called Aornus. After crossing the Oxus he was informed that Spitamenes and Dataphernes were prepared to give up Bessus to him, and Alexander sent Ptolemaeus, the son of Lagus, to fetch him. But the latter had to use force to take Bessus prisoner. Bessus was asked by the king why he had behaved so badly to his master, and he replied: "To gain Alexander's favour." He was scourged and afterwards executed. Alexander next marched by way of Maracanda (probably Samarcand) to the Jaxartes or Tanais, the farthest point he reached in the north, where he founded a city, probably the modern Khojend. His return southwards was hastened by the fact that Spitamenes had attempted to seize Maracanda in his absence. In this Spitamenes was unsuccessful, but he succeeded in destroying a Macedonian division on the Polytimetus (Sarafschan). Alexander's return to Maracanda drove him into the desert.

It was not till he reached these northern regions and India that Alexander had serious difficulties to overcome. Here he had to deal with tribes which were not degraded by despotism, whether as rulers or as subjects.

NOTES

1. Alexander from the Euphrates to the battle of Gaugamela, Arr. 3, 7-10. AL and Parmenio: *αἰσχρὸν εἶναι κλέψαι τὴν νίκην*, Arr. 3, 10. Alexander regarded a battle in the old Greek fashion as an *ἀγὼν*; he was not a leader of mercenaries like Iphicrates.

2. The battle of Gaugamela, Arr. 3, 11-25. They struck at the faces of the Persians with the ξυστροίς; in the battle of Pharsalus too the conquered general was the first to flee. Alexander sees after Plataea, sends booty to Croton, Plut. Al. 34.

3. Alexander in Babylon, Arr. 3, 16. The remains at Susa have now been described by Dieulafoy, *L'acropole de Suse*, vol. i. Par. 1889.

4. For the roads which led to the plateau of Iran, cf. Grote, Lond. 1888, X. 116 seq.; Droysen, 1, 1, 354 seq.; Spiegel, *Eran. Alterthumskunde*, 2, 622 seq.; Stolze, *Verh. der Ges. f. Erdkunde*, Berlin, 1883.

5. Persepolis and Pasargadae have sometimes been regarded as one and the same place; those who consider Pasargadae to be a distinct city, which is more probable, place it either in the neighbourhood of Persepolis or near Fasâ, to the south-west of Shiraz; cf. Spiegel, *Eran. Alterthumskunde*, 2, 616-621, and Nöldeke, *Aufz. z. pers. Geschichte*, Leipz. 1887, pp. 135-146; maps in Justi's *Geschichte des alten Persiens*, Berl. 1879, and in Spruner-Menke IV., where however the scale appears to be wrong. At all events Persepolis can be recognized in the ruins called Tachti Deschamschid, and belonging to buildings dating from the time of the Achaemenid kings. Some distance to the north of these often-described palace ruins are four royal tombs called Nakschi Rستم, and still farther to the north-west, near the modern Murgab, is a building, which from the descriptions of the ancients must be regarded as the tomb of Cyrus. Nöldeke and others consider this the site of Pasargadae, which appears to have been the original capital of the Persians, until Darius I. made Persepolis the capital, which, however, in earlier times was called by the Greeks Persae only; the name Persepolis was probably first introduced by Plutarch. The Greeks first heard of the place through Alexander, which is explained by the fact that Susa was generally the seat of government and of the court.—Alexander's exploit in Persepolis has been much embellished by legend. According to Diod. 17, 70 and Curtius, 5, 6, 6, a massacre took place at the conquest of Persepolis.

6. For the Caspian Passes see Spiegel, *Eran. Alt.* 1, 63 and 2, 532. Mordtmann assumes Semnân to have been the scene of Darius' capture and Dauletâbâd that of his murder. Zadracarta is Asterâbâd or was in its neighbourhood, Spiegel, 2, 537. For Hyrcania (Verkâna) and the river Gurgân, Sp. 1, 60; for Parthia, Sp. 2, 630 seq. The capital of Parthia was Hecatompylus, which is either Dameghân or Shahrâd, Sp. 2, 536. For the country of the Mardi, Sp. 2, 538; it is in the neighbourhood of Demâvend. For Gilân and Masanderân, see Sp. 1, 66, 67.—Alexander marched

up the Etrek into the valley of Meshed. Drangiana, Sp. 2, 541; according to Spiegel the Ariaspas are a part of the Drangiani. For the mythical dynasty of the Caianidae in Segestân, especially Zâl and Rustem, cf. Spiegel, 1, 565 seq. Arachotus, Sp. 2, 543. Alexandria ad Caucasum, Sp. 2, 543; the city of Drapsaca may perhaps have been the modern Anderâb, Sp. 2, 544; cf. Sp. 1, 11, and 46.—For the direction of Alexander's march to the north cf. also Droysen, 1, 2, 35 seq. The Bactrians and the Sogdiani, Dr. 1, 2, 38; according to Sp. 1, 403, the Bactrians and Sogdiani spoke an Iranian dialect, and the merchants and farmers in these provinces were also of Iranian descent; they were, however, surrounded by nomads for the most part of foreign extraction, who were called Σάκαι by the Persians. They are a Σκυθικὸν γένος according to Arrian, 3, 8, 3 (according to Herod. 7, 64, the Persians call all Scythians Σάκαι); but they are allies of Darius, Arr. 11. Genuine Turanians, however, are only the peoples designated by the name of Σκύθαι, with whom Alexander fought in the country of the Jaxartes.—The identity of Maracanda with Samarcand is doubted by Spiegel, 2, 546.—Alexander builds seven cities, Sp. 3, 548.

7. Alexander's conduct at the trial of Philotas is strongly condemned by Grote (Lond. 1888), X, 128. He considers Philotas innocent. Of course we cannot say now whether he really was concerned in a conspiracy against Alexander or not. Indications of such complicity are recorded, but they may be exaggerated. There is, however, no intrinsic improbability of his guilt. It is a known fact that many well-born Macedonians were dissatisfied with Alexander, and, moreover, that conspiracies and attempts at murder were not out of keeping with the manners and customs of the Macedonian nobility. Consequently if a military court found Philotas guilty, what right have we to say that its verdict was unjust? Grote is so biased that he never mentions the fact that another general, Amyntas, who was charged with the same offence, was acquitted (Arr. 3, 27), although this shows that the court did not act with precipitation or blindness. Moreover Alexander's systematic decriers have omitted to mention a circumstance which in itself justifies the condemnation of Philotas. Philotas had not discharged the duty accepted by him of reporting the existence of any conspiracy to the king, which even Grote (X, 136) admits to be the case. We have therefore a general in the suite of the king, who is also his commander-in-chief, undertaking to report any conspiracy against him but not doing so, which of course considerably increases the possibility of a successful attempt on the king's life. If conduct of this kind in war time is not to be brought

before a military court, and if a general who acts in this way is not punished, there is an end to all discipline in the army. It is impossible for us to say what punishment ought to have been meted out to Philotas; at all events the Athenians executed generals for less cause. The death of Philotas, therefore, has nothing exceptional about it. On the other hand, the murder of Parmenio was an act of sheer despotism.—For the campaign of Alexander in Bactria and Sogdiana cf. F. von Schwarz, *Alexanders des Gr. Feldzüge in Turkestan*, München, 1893, with maps. It is a very good commentary to Arrian and Curtius.

CHAPTER XXV

ALEXANDER'S CAMPAIGN TO THE HYPHASIS (329-326)

TOWARDS the close of the year 329, Alexander proceeded to Zariaspa, which was in the neighbourhood of Balkh, and went into winter quarters there.¹ Here he was visited by Scythian envoys, who offered him their king's daughter in marriage, and by Pharasmanes, king of the Chorasmians near the Sea of Aral, who begged him to march westwards.² Alexander, however, declared that he would not do so until he had conquered India. While at Zariaspa he adopted several measures for the pacification of the provinces on the northern frontier. In this quarter the resistance was more obstinate than in any other district, and was due not only to the vigorous character of the inhabitants and their attachment to their old religion, but also to the large number of isolated and almost inaccessible mountain fortresses, and to the proximity of the desert, to which the fugitives could escape. Alexander despatched detachments in various directions and also led some of these expeditions in person. At last the Massagetae, with whom Spitamenes had taken refuge, grew tired of the war, and to put an end to it, cut off the head of Spitamenes and sent it to Alexander. The king remained in these regions until the summer of the year 327. He spent the winter of 328-327 in Nautaca beyond the right bank of the Oxus.³ It was here that two remarkable events occurred, the murder of Clitus and the marriage with Roxana.

The former is one of the saddest incidents of Alexander's life.⁴ It is one of the outward signs of the change which had taken place in his character, a change which can be fully accounted for by the influence of circumstances upon his peculiar nature. His rapid conquest of the greatest empire in the world must have increased his *amour propre*. If this was wounded, then his wrath boiled up. He had long been changing from a Macedonian king and a Greek general into a Persian monarch, the god-like position of which must have had a special attraction for a man who declared himself a son of Zeus. After the encouragement given to this frame of mind by the flattery of servile Asiatics and crafty Greeks, contradiction from Macedonian nobles seemed insupportable to him. And these magnates were not inclined to become mere courtiers; they held all the more firmly to their own view. The result was that at a drinking-bout in Maracanda, Clitus, who had saved Alexander's life at the Granicus, not only refused to admit a comparison between the king and the Dioscuri and Heracles, but even praised Alexander's father, King Philip, to his face, declared that Alexander could not be a god, because the gods did everything of themselves, whereas Alexander had won his victories by the aid of the Macedonians, and finally exclaimed that he himself had been Alexander's preserver. Thereupon the king's rage burst forth. Clitus was removed but came back again, and Alexander ran him through with a spear. He was seized with remorse at once and wanted to take his own life, and when prevented from doing this remained without food and drink for three days. He never committed an outrage of this kind again. He had acted in a sudden outburst of passion, and his remorse was so strong that his first step in the path of violence was also his last.

But this did not make him relax in his endeavour to rule Asia in Asiatic fashion, which led to many violent collisions with the Macedonians and the Greeks who resisted it. His partial adoption of Asiatic costume was repugnant enough to

the Macedonians. But a far greater grievance was the low obeisance (*proskynesis*), customary with the Persian monarchs, which he demanded of all, including the Macedonians. This was intolerable to the Macedonians. Modern admirers of Alexander have urged that the adoption of Persian court ceremonial was necessary from a political point of view. No doubt it was a good thing that Alexander should not meet Orientals as a foreigner; but it was very doubtful policy to make the approach to their ways consist of giving up the Greek and playing the despot. It would have been better to have had nothing to do with ceremonies which have never prevented an Oriental from murdering his sovereign, and which consequently were of no real use to Alexander. After all, it was a Greek—Lysander—who had first claimed to be regarded as a god, and it was Greeks who led Alexander in the wrong direction. A bad influence was exercised especially by the sophist Anaxarchus, who when summoned to tranquillize the king after the murder of Clitus, declared that everything which so god-like a being as he did was good. The Olynthian Callisthenes, a relative of Aristotle, who had been sent by his kinsman to the king to write his history, also behaved if not badly at any rate injudiciously. He performed his task in such an extravagant manner as to gain the reputation rather of a panegyrist of the king than of a historian. But he was still more pleased with himself; he, he asserted, was the man without whom the hero could not go down to posterity, and he therefore regarded himself as Alexander's Homer. Callisthenes disapproved of the vanity of the king in wishing to be worshipped, and on one occasion, at a festival, when the others made the genuflection proposed by the Persians present, and were rewarded by a kiss from the king, Callisthenes refused to pay this tribute of respect, and remarked when he received no kiss: "Then I am poorer by a kiss." This annoyed Alexander, and on the discovery soon afterwards of a conspiracy of the royal pages against his life, in which Callisthenes

was supposed to be implicated, he was condemned with the rest and carried about with the army in a cage and died soon afterwards.

The second important event, the marriage with an Asiatic, arose in this way. Alexander was besieging a mountain stronghold in Sogdiana, held by the satrap Oxyartes with his family. It was considered impregnable, and the defenders sent word to the Macedonians that they must learn how to fly if they wanted to get up to it. By the offer of enormous rewards—twelve talents to the first man up, eleven to the second, and so on to the twelfth—the king persuaded a number of soldiers to risk the climb. A few actually reached a point above the fortress itself. Thereupon Oxyartes surrendered. Alexander was so charmed with the beauty of his daughter Roxana that he married her. This was a great step towards the reconciliation of conquerors and conquered.⁵ The marriage has been celebrated by the art of the painter (Sodoma's picture in the Farnesina at Rome). All that is known besides of Roxana in history is that she had a son by Alexander, of the same name, born in 323, that after her consort's death she put to death his other wife, the daughter of Darius, and that she was killed with her son by Cassander in the year 311.

When the northern provinces appeared to be pacified,⁶ Alexander turned in the direction of India (in the spring of 327). There was no strategical reason for undertaking this expedition, and no political one in the proper sense of the word. It was a passion for new and unheard-of exploits which urged the king onwards. He wanted to show that he was really a hero, a new Dionysus or Heracles. He wanted to conquer a country which was sure to be rich in marvels of all kinds. He began his march to India with about 120,000 infantry and 15,000 cavalry.⁷ In the valley of the Cophen (Cabul) he divided his army, sending Hephaestion and Perdicas direct to the Indus to secure the passage of the

river, and proceeding himself through the valleys of the northern affluents of the Cophen. Here he captured a fortress called Aornus, which even Heracles was supposed not to have been able to take, and visited Nysa, said to have been founded by Dionysus near Mount Meros. This was the first place at which they found ivy, laurel, and vines, and festivals were held to Dionysus. The reunited army crossed the Indus, probably at Attock. To the east of this place, between the Indus and the Hydaspes (the modern Jhelum) lay the territory ruled over by Taxilas, who joined Alexander. But on the Hydaspes fighting began again, for this was the kingdom of Porus, who was not inclined to submit. Porus had occupied the eastern bank of the Hydaspes with his army. Alexander could not repeat the exploits of the Granicus and of Issus here. The Hydaspes was not a Pinarus, and Porus was not a Darius. Alexander was obliged after all to 'steal' his victory for once. He misled Porus by marching with the larger part of his army to a distant point where he could cross the river without being seen, and left the division under Craterus opposite Porus, who thought it was the whole Macedonian army, and therefore did not keep an eye on the farther bank. He did not see what had happened till Alexander had crossed; then he sent a division of his army accompanied by his son against Alexander, Alexander defeated it, and Porus's son was slain. He then attacked Porus himself. He was superior to his enemy in cavalry, but there was great danger to the Macedonians in the 180 elephants of the Indian king, owing to the terror which these animals inspired in horses. If Porus had taken the offensive, he would probably have won the day, but he awaited Alexander's attack. Alexander first charged the Indian cavalry near the river and routed them. The elephants were now brought into play and pressed the Macedonian phalanx. But the cavalry outflanked the Indians and drove them into a narrow space, where the maddened elephants became the ruin of their own army. The Indians sustained a

complete defeat, 20,000 men and 100 elephants were killed, the rest became the property of the Macedonians. Porus fled last of all, wounded, upon his elephant. Alexander, who had admired his bravery and gallant bearing during the battle, sent Taxilas after him, to induce him to surrender; but Porus hurled his spear at his pursuer. He would not surrender until he dropped from exhaustion. Alexander asked him what he wanted. "To be treated like a king," replied Porus. "That I will do for my own sake," said Alexander, "what else?" "That includes everything," was the Indian's answer. Alexander, who always respected courage and like pointed replies, restored him his dominions with additional territory, and Porus henceforth remained a loyal ally of Alexander.

Alexander now marched farther eastwards and crossed the Acesines (Chenab) and the Hyraotes (Ravi). Here he was opposed by the Cathaeans, whose fortified city Sangala he took. This brought him to the river Hyphasis (Beas) which now joins the last river of the Punjab, the Sutlej, but which then flowed in a separate bed. Alexander never reached the Sutlej; he wanted to cross it, but at this point the instrument of his power broke in his hands; his soldiers would go no farther. They had probably heard that this was a natural boundary, that farther north near the mountains there was a continuation of fertile country, but that southwards lay a great desert, and when this was crossed that they would find new kingdoms and new peoples with whom there would be endless fighting. They no longer had any inclination for this. Well-nigh eight years of constant warfare was quite enough, and those who had joined the army late, in Bactria for instance, had not even made much booty. It was a wonder that things had gone smoothly so far. Now they were a hundred times farther from Macedonia than Athens was from Thebes. Alexander endeavoured to change their mind by a personal appeal. He pointed out that hitherto they had been always victorious and that they would be so in the future; he appealed

to their sense of honour. For a man of lofty mind, he said, the end of a task can only be prescribed by the nature of it. He then explained his ideas as to future campaigns. They would reach the Ganges, which flowed into the Hyrcanian Sea; after this came the Indian and then the Persian Ocean; then they would come from Libya to the pillars of Hercules, and would thus have conquered the whole of Asia and Libya; if this were not done, the previous conquests would never be quite secure. Alexander waited to see if any one would reply. But no answer came for a long while. What were the soldiers to say to his geographical disquisitions? They knew nothing of these matters and probably suspected that Alexander was in the same predicament, but they could not tell him so. At last one of the chief officers, Coenus, addressed him. He simply said that the army could not go farther. He might have mentioned that seventy days of tropical rain had exhausted the strength of the troops.⁸ When they all exclaimed that they agreed with Coenus, Alexander declared that he would continue his march with volunteers, and withdrew into his tent, where he remained for three days. He hoped that they would yet give way. But they did not. He then consulted the gods, but on the sacrifices which he had performed turning out unfavourable he resolved to return. There was great joy in the camp; the invincible had yielded to his own soldiers. He had twelve altars as high as towers built to mark the limit of his advance, held a gymnastic and hippic competition, and recrossed the Acesines to the Hydaspes, where he completed the building of the cities of Nicaea and Bucephala which had been already begun.

Of the Indian world with its strange character and civilization, of the land of the Sacred Ganges with its shady groves in which the ascetic led a life of contemplation, the land which had produced the varied lore of the Vedas and the long epics of the heroes, which was destined more than two thousand years later to enrich European knowledge with

new and fruitful views—of this Alexander saw only the fringe, the country of the Five Rivers, the Punjab. How keenly must the intrepid and inquiring hero have regretted that he had to turn back at the threshold of what seemed to him a mysterious sanctuary. Who knows whether in India the conqueror might not for a time have given place to the student. He was not permitted to see the wondrous land of Brahma and Buddha, and had to be content with controlling four distinct spheres of civilization, so far as this could be done by a single man: the Hellenic, the Semitic, the Egyptian and the Iranian. And that was more than any one did before him or after him. An empire which embraced these four important groups to the extent that his did was unique in the history of the world, and even for the mighty Alexander the burden of this dominion was too great.

NOTES

1. Cf. Geiger, *Alex. Feldzüge in Sogdiana*, Neust. a. d. H. 1884. It is doubtful whether Zariaspa and Bactra are identical. Grote and Kiepert (§ 59) assume it; Droysen (1, 263) thinks otherwise; he considers Zariaspa to be Andschui, to the west of Balkh (Bactra); Spiegel (2, 553) leaves the point undecided. The intrinsic difference between eastern and western Iran must not be overlooked; the latter was much more infected with despotism than the former; cf. Kiepert, *Geographie*, §§ 56, 57.

2. Pharasmanes mentions the Colchians and Amazons to Alexander as peoples whom he ought to visit. For Chorasmia (*Chvârizm*, i.e. lowlands), the country on the lower Oxus, cf. Sp. 1, 47; Kiepert, *Lehrb. d. alten Geogr.* § 60.

3. According to Spiegel 2, 544 the site of Nautaca cannot be exactly determined; it is usually supposed to be Neksheb or Karshi, to the S.E. of Bokhara.—As regards the stubborn resistance of the Sogdians Spiegel (3, 49) says: "It is not unlikely that religious motives had something to do with the obstinate resistance of the Sogdians, for Spitamenes probably was of the house of Zarathustra and held priestly offices."

4. Murder of Clitus, Arr. 4, 8, 9; Curt. 8, 1, 2; Plut. Alex. 50-52; Droysen, 1, 2, 70 seq.—Fate of Callisthenes and the *παῖδες*, Arr. 4, 10-14; Curt. 8, 5-8; Plut. Alex. 53-55; Dr. 1, 2,

88 seq.—I cannot agree with Droysen (several passages, esp. 1, 2, 17-19; 63; 90; 273) in thinking that Alexander's wish to be revered in Oriental fashion by the Macedonians and Greeks was justifiable. Droysen starts with the assumption that these marks of royal dignity were so necessary in the eyes of the Orientals that Alexander was obliged to demand them from the Macedonians and Greeks as well, to prevent invidious distinctions among his subjects. The mistake in this view is that it is a moral depreciation of Alexander's State, for the position of the Macedonians and Greeks in relation to their king was of a loftier and more dignified character than that of the Persians. Consequently if the former had to be degraded to the position of the latter for the sake of the unity of the empire, then this empire had no *raison d'être* for the outside world. The most that we can do is to make allowances for Alexander's human tendency to err. Droysen says (1, 2, 273 and elsewhere) that his recognition by the Greeks as a god was "the first and most important step towards accustoming the Greeks to the belief in his majesty which was held by the Asiatics, and which he regarded as the main foundation of his sovereignty." This contains the admission in the first place that adoration was indispensable only for Alexander's view, which does not prove that this view was correct. In the second place, Droysen's remark is based on an error with regard to the Greeks. They must have been singular Greeks who would have imbibed a 'belief' in the divinity of Alexander by this means. To the Greeks the *proskynesis* involved no question of belief, but was simply a ridiculous ceremony. *θητηδὲν μὲν ἄνδρα προσκυνοῦντες*, says Isocrates (Paneg. 151) disparagingly of the Persians. And the Greeks were now expected to pay this mark of respect to the king of Macedonia! As a matter of fact these external ceremonies were of no use even in Asia, as is shown by the cases of Bagoas and Bessus. Alexander must have known this perfectly well, and if he ignored it the reason was that he was blinded by an exaggerated idea of his own importance. He might also have reflected that two races of different civilization cannot be blended by degrading the higher and more independent one to the level of the other, and depriving it of the privileges to which it is accustomed. Of course we must not forget that the unprecedented success of Alexander's career may have turned his head, and this may account for his infatuation. That conflicts with the more independent natures broke out so quickly was due to the fact that there were two sides to Alexander's nature; he was not content with being simply a god, he was also a human being who liked to amuse himself with human beings in a human way. He did not

want his divinity to stand in the way of the pleasures of Greek and Macedonian social life; and the two things were incompatible with each other. A monarch who wishes to be regarded as a god must not carouse with those from whom he demands adoration. The Persian kings were aware of this; Alexander disregarded it. The murder of Clitus and the degradation of Callisthenes both took place at drinking-bouts, when the king's boon companions presumed more in their cups than they would have ventured to do when sober. Droysen (1, 2, 15 seq.) combats Aristotle's view that Hellenes ought to rule over barbarians; he does not approve of the Greeks "being able to exploit and impoverish Asia in its defenceless state with their refined selfishness and audacious cleverness," by means of Alexander (16). The Macedonians come off quite as badly, many of them having become "Asiatics in the worst sense of the word" (19). But the *proskynesis* was no remedy for this, either in the case of Greeks or of Macedonians, and those who share Droysen's views on the Greeks and Macedonians would wish that Alexander had never set foot in Asia at all. Droysen has thoroughly grasped the profound meaning of Alexander's efforts, viz. the blending of East and West, but is wrong in defending all the methods employed by Alexander for this purpose. If one nationality invades and conquers another, it does not do so because it considers the other nobler than itself. Consequently the ascendancy of the Greeks over the Orientals was necessary for a time at any rate in Alexander's empire. Alexander in his youthful enthusiasm wanted to be in advance of his age.—For his costume, cf. Plut. de Al. M. Fort. 1, 6.

5. Spiegel (2, 556) says of the stronghold of Oxyartes: "There is a pretty general consensus of opinion that this citadel was near the narrow pass which was afterwards called Derbend Kaluga, east of Kesh. For Kesh see Droysen, 3, 2, 324; cf. also Dr. 1, 2, 77. It is the district south-east of Bokhara, on the southern slope of the range. For the various mountain strongholds conquered by Alexander, cf. Niese, p. 122, n. I.

6. Droysen (1, 2, 28) assumes that Sogdiana and the Trans-Oxus border territory were left almost independent by Alexander. In the same way he created a kind of Indian border-country. Many Greek cities in these northern regions, Dr. 1, 2, 83. In Persepolis Alexander chastises the Persians; in Bactria and Sogdiana he favours the natives, and he continues this policy in the future.

7. For the march to India cf. Lassen, Ind. Alterthumskunde, Bk. 2, the geographical conclusions of which are summarized by

Spiegel, 2, 562 seq.; A. Cunningham, *Ancient Geography of India*, Lond. 1871; Lefmann, *Geschichte des alten Indiens*, Berl.; Grote (*Onckensche Weltgesch.*), pp. 743-755; Lexius, *De Al. M. Exp. Indica*, Dorp. 1887; Schuffert, *Al. d. Gr. ind. Feldzug*. Colb. 1886. Alexander's march from Bactria to the Cabul valley, Droysen, 1, 2, 101 seq. Droysen is uncertain as to which pass Alexander chose; Spiegel (2, 562) thinks it was the Pass of Kawak. For Nysa (Arr. 5, 1), Dr. 1, 2, 109, 110. The Kafirs (unbelievers) who live in these mountains cultivate the vine; cf. Sp. 1, 396 seq.; 3, 51; and the coins of King Agathocles with Bacchic attributes may refer to this people (Head, H. N. 704). For the countries north of the Cabul River cf. Sp. 2, 564. Aornus is Avarana according to Lefmann 745, according to Droysen, 1, 2, 116, it is Ranigard near the mouth of the Cabul River; cf. Sp. 2, 565. At Taxila the army saw "the Indian ascetics for the first time," Dr. 1, 2, 123. Taxila (Takshasila) and Porus (Paura, Paurava, successors of Puru) are names of dynasties, Spiegel, 2, 566; Kiepert, *Lehrb. d. alten Geogr.* § 36; Lefm. p. 746. For the site of the battle with Porus cf. Dr. 1, 2, 129 following Elphinstone, Kabul, 1, 132; Sp. 2, 567; Lefm. 746; Cunningham, 159 seq. 'Cathæan' is probably Indian for 'warrior,' Sangala according to Lassen is Amritair; cf. Lefmann, 749. For the names of the rivers cf. Sp. 2, 570; Kiep. § 36; Lefm. 750. Hydaspes is the Sanscrit Vitastâ, 'the swiftly-flowing'; the Candrabhaga, which sounded like *Σαρδοπάγος*, was renamed by the Greeks *Ἀκεσίτης*, 'healer.' Hyraotes is the Sanscrit Irāvati, mod. Ravi; Hyphasis is Vipāsâ, 'unfettered.' Then came the Cātadru, 'hundred running,' mod. Sutlej, into which flows the Vipāsâ (mod. Beas), the old bed of which is now dry.

8. The rains, Arr. 5, 94; Diod. 17, 94. In Arr. 5, 26, 1 Alexander does not say, as Droysen (1, 2, 157) and Sintenis assume, that work exists for its own sake. No one would have believed him if he had. He says that every task has its own measure, i.e. must be completed. *τέρας* in Arrian means end, not aim. Niese (p. 139) thinks that Alexander did not want to penetrate far into India, and that his speech to the soldiers, as given by the historians, is not genuine, but invented by some rhetorician.

CHAPTER XXVI

CONCLUDING YEARS OF ALEXANDER'S REIGN—AGIS— HARPALUS (326-323)

A RETURN being unavoidable, Alexander determined to turn it to account by exploring and occupying hitherto unknown regions (326). He wanted to see the mouth of the Indus, which he had at first thought was identical with the Nile. He himself with a portion of his troops embarked on the Hydaspes; the rest of the army had to accompany him on both banks.¹ Nearchus was in command of the fleet. Arrian relates that the unwonted spectacle and the noise of the passing ships attracted the neighbouring tribes, and that they struck up their songs as they stood on the banks. Alexander sailed with all speed, as he wished to surprise the Oxydracae and Malli who lived farther down the river. After passing the narrow channel at the confluence of the Hydaspes with the Acesines, he sent on the fleet to the point where the Hyraotes flows into the Hydaspes, and marched through the desert into the country of the Malli. In trying to capture a city here he got into a critical position. The Indians withdrew into the citadel, and Alexander hurried after them with a handful of men and climbed the wall. The ladder then broke and Alexander with a few companions was cut off. Instead of waiting he jumped down and was at first exposed for a time to the enemy's attacks quite alone, and afterwards with those who had followed him,

especially Peucestas, Abreas and Leonnatus. He was wounded in the breast and sank to the ground, whereupon Peucestas held over him the sacred shield taken from the temple of Athene at Ilium, of which he was the bearer. At last some other Macedonians penetrated into the citadel and all its defenders were cut down. The dart had to be cut out of the king's breast. While he was being removed he fainted a second time from loss of blood. The army thought he was dead; great was the joy of the soldiers when he came to them on the Hyraotes, and they saw him wave his hand to show them that it was not a corpse which was being brought to them; and when he reached the shore and actually mounted a horse, the shouts of delight seemed endless. They touched his knees, his hands, his clothes, and threw ribbons and flowers at him. He now descended the Indus into the country of King Musicanus, who submitted, but afterwards revolted and was hanged. Alexander then sent a third of the army under Craterus westwards through Iran and proceeded with the rest by way of Patala, where the Indus divides into two arms, to the sea, in which he observed the phenomenon of the rise and fall of the tide.

He now undertook an unprecedented journey (325). He despatched the fleet by the ocean on a voyage of discovery to the mouths of the Euphrates and Tigris, and took the route through Gedrosia himself with the army, keeping as close to the coast as possible in order to maintain his communications with the fleet. This was a terrible march, as it led through the sandy deserts of Beloochistan, one of the hottest regions on the face of the earth.² It took him sixty days to reach Pura, the capital of Gedrosia, a distance of 500 miles, and the army suffered unspeakable hardships. It was a consolation that this march quite eclipsed the exploits of Semiramis and of Cyrus, the only potentates who according to tradition had taken the route with an army, and the result showed that Alexander was more fortunate than they, for Semiramis was

said to have reached her destination with only twenty soldiers, and Cyrus with only seven, whereas Alexander lost only three-fourths of his troops. It was on this march that some soldiers brought Alexander the only water which could be found in a helmet; he poured it into the sand before the whole army, to show that he did not intend to fare better than his soldiers. On one occasion Alexander himself discovered the path which the guides, who were supposed to know the country, were unable to find. From Pura he marched to Carmania, where Craterus joined him.³ Alexander here offered thanksgiving sacrifices, and took his preserver Peucestas into his body-guard, which had hitherto numbered only seven: Leonnatus, Hephaestion, Lysimachus, Aristonous, Perdiccas, Ptolemaeus, son of Lagus, and Peithon. Nearchus, too, put in an appearance and reported the incidents of his voyage.⁴ From Carmania Alexander proceeded to Pasargadae, where he resumed the government of the empire, which, owing to his long absence, had lost all unity. Gross abuses had crept in. A Mede, named Baryaxes, had proclaimed himself king; the satrap of Persis, Orxines, had plundered some sanctuaries. Both were put to death. Orxines' post was given to Peucestas, who adopted Oriental dress to please the king. The satrap of Susa and his son were also executed for maladministration.⁵

If offenders were punished, the loyal were to be rewarded, and the population of the vast empire made to see that the king valued Asia as highly as Europe. A formal union of these two sections of the globe was carried out on a grand scale at Susa.⁶ Alexander married the eldest daughter of Darius, Barsine (by some called Statira), and also Parysatis, the youngest daughter of Ochus. Another daughter of Darius he bestowed on his friend Hephaestion; Craterus, Perdiccas, Ptolemaeus, Eumenes, Nearchus, Seleucus, and many others, eighty in all, were given Persian ladies of rank for wives. The weddings were celebrated together in one great festival.

Ten thousand Macedonians, who had also married Asiatic women, received rich presents. The people of Asia were thus able to see that Alexander did not despise them. The Macedonians, however, were gratified in another way as well. Alexander heard that many of his soldiers were greatly in debt in spite of all the booty they had made. He ordered all who were in this position to report themselves, stating that he would pay their debts. At first only a few came, because they were afraid of a vexatious enquiry; but when they saw that the king's sole object was to help his followers, all disclosed the amount of their debts, and 20,000 talents were distributed for this purpose, without even a record being made of the names of the recipients. Peucestas, Hephaestion, Nearchus and Onesicritus, the pilot of the royal ship, received golden wreaths.

On the other hand, the introduction of Oriental elements into the army created indignation among the Macedonians. There was already an Oriental division in the cavalry of the *Hetairi*, consisting of Bactrians, Sogdiani, and members of other eastern races, while the *Agema*, the flower of the army, contained a number of Asiatics armed with Macedonian spears. On this occasion 30,000 Asiatic youths were besides selected for admittance into the Macedonian army. This the old soldiers would not tolerate. The discontent broke out at Opis, where the king had gone from Susa by a circuitous route, in July 324. When he informed them in person that he would send the veterans home with rich presents, they all cried out that he might send the whole army home.⁷ Alexander arrested and put to death the loudest of them and endeavoured to pacify the army. He reminded them of the condition in which his father Philip had found Macedonia, and what he had done for it, how he himself had led them to victory in Asia, that he took nothing for himself but shared everything with them, and had undergone more hardships than any of them. "And now you all want to go and leave

your king among the vanquished barbarians! Go, then!" He then withdrew into his tent and remained there for two days. On the third day he summoned some leading Persians on whom he could depend, and declared that they were his kinsmen. The Macedonians had remained on the spot in a state of indecision and perplexity, and had not been able to make up their minds afterwards. When they heard that the king had declared that the Persians were his kinsmen, they gave way to despair, laid down their arms in front of his tent, and announced that they would not leave the threshold until he had taken compassion on them. The king came out of his tent and was addressed by Callines, a noted leader of cavalry: "What distresses us, O king, is that you call Persians your kinsmen, whereas you have never vouchsafed this honour to us." Alexander replied: "You are all my kinsmen, and so will I henceforth call you." At this the soldiers uttered shouts of approval, and a great festival was held with a banquet at which the Macedonians sat next to the king, the Asiatics coming after them. The Greek soothsayers and the Magi poured libations to the gods, and prayers were offered for unity and mutual trust. Nine thousand men are said to have made the drink-offering and raised the hymn of praise together. On this day a reconciliation between Europe and Asia on the basis of mutual respect seemed to be in course of formation.

About ten thousand Macedonians, who were too old or otherwise incapacitated for service, now returned home. They each received a present of one talent. The children which had been born to them in Asia were to be brought up in Asia and sent to their fathers subsequently. These veterans were led by Craterus, who was to replace Antipater as governor of Europe. It was supposed that Antipater had fallen into disfavour, and yet in the year 330 he had rendered the Macedonian kingdom a signal service. Sparta had taken up arms under Agis, and was menacing Megalopolis.⁸ As Athens

also threatened to revolt, the Macedonian supremacy in Greece was in a bad way. Thereupon Antipater hastened to the Peloponnese and defeated Agis, who fell in the battle. He had thus saved the position of Macedonia in Europe. But he was continually quarrelling with Olympias and preferring complaints against her, just as she was always complaining of him. Alexander could not decide against his mother. He once said: "Antipater does not know that one tear from my mother outweighs a thousand of his letters." A change in the government of Macedonia was therefore in the interest of the State. Alexander now proceeded to Ecbatana, where he held a gymnastic and 'musical' competition, and had a drinking-bout with his friends. At this point Hephaestion died so suddenly that the king, who hurried to him on hearing that he was ill, did not find him alive. His grief was unbounded, he could scarcely tear himself away from the corpse. The body was removed to Babylon, and burnt there upon a funeral pile which is said to have cost 10,000 talents.

After Alexander had made a winter campaign (324-323) against the Cossaeans, who lived above Susa, he set out for Babylon, there to prepare for new and greater expeditions. As he approached the city the Chaldean priests came out to meet him, and begged him not to enter the city, as it would not be well for him.⁹ When he refused to believe them, they begged him at any rate to make his entry from the west and not from the east. But he paid no heed to this; he thought that the priests did not want him to enter Babylon at all, because they had neglected his orders to restore the temple of Bel and were afraid of being punished.

In Babylon Alexander found envoys from neighbouring and remote peoples, a brilliant tribute of homage so short a time before his death. There were Greek, Ethiopian, Scythian, Celtic, Iberian, Libyan, Brettian, Lucanian, Carthaginian, Tyrrhenian, *i.e.* Etruscan, perhaps even Roman

embassies. Arrian does not believe that Roman envoys were among the number, because neither Ptolemaeus nor Aristobulus had mentioned it; but it is possible, as is supposed, that these historians included them in the Tyrrhenian deputation. It is clear that the man who had conquered the whole of the Persian empire and more in such an incredibly short space of time, must have been an object of wonder and curiosity to every nation which paid heed to what was going on in the world. What might not the young sovereign yet achieve!

Alexander had originally turned his attention to naval enterprises. He had built ships on the Hyrcanian Sea, which were to explore its limits. In Babylon he found a Phoenician fleet, the ships of which had been transported by land to the Euphrates. Other ships were built in Babylon, and a harbour constructed, capable of containing 1000 vessels. Alexander wanted to conquer Arabia with this fleet, a country the valuable products of which were the subject of exaggerated ideas in antiquity. He first sent three vessels on a voyage of discovery, but none of them carried out the order to circumnavigate Arabia. Alexander himself sailed by the canal Pallacopas to the sea, near which he founded a city. There his turban, the emblem of royal dignity, blew off into the water, and the man who brought it to him tied it round his own head and swam back with it in this position. This was an evil omen for the king; afterwards it was said that this was Seleucus, who subsequently became king of Syria. Alexander's last scheme was a proposed reorganization of his army; the three first ranks and the last rank in the phalanx were to consist of Macedonians with long spears, the twelve inner ranks of Persians with bows and javelins. He evidently wanted to increase the strength of the different corps. The project was not put into execution, nor his plan, conceived about the same time, for bringing Asiatics to Europe.¹⁰

Alexander had already, in 324, made two demands on the Greeks which created great excitement among them. The first was that they should recognize his divinity.¹¹ In what form the request was made is unknown to us, but the recognition was to be an act of state, which was possible in Greece. The Greeks complied; Sparta expressed her consent in truly Laconic fashion as follows: "We permit Alexander to call himself a god if he likes to do so." It is difficult to prove that a thing of this kind was necessary in Alexander's interests; in any case he descended from the first rank among men to the lowest among the gods, and after all he was shrewd enough to know that such a divinity lasts only so long as the power of the man who aspires to it. The second demand was that the Greeks should allow all exiles to return home.¹² This was communicated to them by Nicanor at the Olympic Games of 324. It of course produced great rejoicing among the exiles, of whom there were 20,000 present at Olympia, but it created great discontent in many states. The order was just in itself, but its technical legal basis was more than doubtful, because Alexander was only commander-in-chief and defender of the Greeks, not their law-giver. Hence the execution of it met with difficulties, especially in Aetolia and at Athens, both of which had stolen property in their hands which they would have had to surrender, as the return of the exiles was equivalent to an encouragement to them to demand the property of which they had been deprived. The Aetolians were in possession of the Acarnanian Oeniadae, which they had wrested from its inhabitants about the year 330, while Athens had Samos, which she had occupied by founding cleruchies in 365, 361 and 352, and banishing the lawful owners. On this point, where the interests of 4000 Athenians, who had become landowners in Samos, were at stake, Athens showed more tenacity than in the matter of raising Alexander to the rank of a god. She refused her consent, and an incident occurred

to inspire the Athenians with a belief that Alexander's good fortune was on the wane, and that he might perhaps after all be resisted.

Harpalus, Alexander's treasurer, had decamped a second time, on this occasion with 5000 talents (about £1,200,000). He had collected thirty ships and 6000 mercenaries, and had made his appearance with them in the Piræus in the spring of 324, with the request to be received in Athens; he relied on the fact that he was an Athenian citizen. But the Athenians had rejected his proposal. He had then betaken himself to the rendezvous of rabble of all kinds, the promontory of Taenarum, and there got rid of a good deal of his treasure and of many of his ships as well as of his mercenaries. At this point came the announcement of the return of the exiles, and Harpalus saw that the growing discontent of many Greeks, and especially of the Athenians, was likely to improve his prospects. He went back to Athens and was actually received there, because he now had no troops but only money with him. Another of Alexander's treasurers, Philoxenus, demanded the surrender of Harpalus, but the Athenians refused for the moment and decided, on the advice of Demosthenes, to take him and his treasures into custody until some one was specially commissioned by Alexander to fetch him. They were thus acting within their legal rights and yet doing a clever thing; for what might not happen in the meanwhile? The money was removed to the Acropolis, and Harpalus was placed under surveillance. But one day he disappeared. He went to Taenarum again and thence to Crete, where he was murdered by a confederate of the same stamp as himself. And in the meanwhile the money which was being taken care of in Athens had dwindled in a surprising way. Harpalus had told Demosthenes as member, perhaps president of the special commission for the custody of his treasure, that he still had 700 talents (over £150,000), and the rumour of this spread forthwith; but how much was

really taken to the Acropolis, Demosthenes did not at once make public. It soon transpired that the sum was much less, and finally it turned out that only 350 talents were really there. When and how had the balance, about £75,000, disappeared? Demosthenes, as he was bound to do, demanded an inquiry by the Areopagus; he was ready to die, he is reported to have said, if he could be proved to have stolen anything. The Areopagus, which was composed of elderly men of high standing, held its sittings in secret; they wished to avoid a public discussion of the city's disgrace. One of the grounds of the inquiry was Harpalus' account-book, which his slave cash-keeper had handed over to Philoxenus, and the latter had sent to the Athenians. This dealt with the expenditure up to the delivery of the money into the Acropolis, and showed how much had been deposited there. Many Athenians were noted in it as having received money from Harpalus, but Demosthenes' name was not among them. The slave's account-book could of course give no information as to what had been done with the money in the Acropolis, and why it had dwindled from 700 to 350 talents. On this point the Areopagus was obliged to obtain information from other sources. It did so and made its report, with the result that Demosthenes figured with the sum of 20 talents on the list of those who had taken money from Harpalus. Those who had incurred suspicion through this preliminary investigation now came before the popular court, which for the reasons above mentioned did not enter into any fresh individual inquiry, but merely heard those who came forward as public prosecutors and the counsel for the defendants. The charge against Demosthenes was preferred not only by the philo-Macedonian Dinarchus, but also by Hyperides, a member of Demosthenes' party. Demosthenes admitted that he had taken 20 talents (about £4500) of Harpalus' money, but only as repayment of an advance he had made to the Theoricon, of which he was president. Twenty talents was

enough to supply all the Athenian citizens with festival-money for nearly a whole year. He was found guilty of having been bribed to neglect his duty as custodian of the money, and condemned to pay a fine of 50 talents. On his declaring that he was not in a position to pay, he was thrown into prison, from which he made his escape. Other persons were condemned as well.¹³

The Athenians then begged Alexander not to insist upon his demand for the return of the exiles as far as they were concerned, and the king, who always treated Athens with the utmost consideration, granted their request. It was not until after his death, after the unsuccessful struggle with Macedonia in the Lamian War, that Athens had to give up Samos. Up to that time the Athenians remained in a better position than the rest of the Greeks.

Alexander was not able to carry out any of the great designs which he was still meditating. Soon after Hephaestion's costly pyre had sunk into ashes (May 323) he fell ill of a fever; he died in thirteen days (on the 28th of the month Daisios), after having seen his soldiers defile before his couch on the previous day, and feebly waved them his farewell greeting.¹⁴

With him disappeared the most brilliant personality which the Greek people ever produced.

NOTES

1. Alexander's voyage to the sea, Arr. 6, 1 seq. Alexander wounded, Arr. 6, 6-12.—The Oxydracae and the Malli are the Xudraka and Málava of the Indian Epos, Spiegel, 2, 569, Lefmann 749. The city of the Malli, in which Alexander was wounded, was perhaps Multan, according to Cunningham; cf. Droysen, 1, 2, 183-185.—The Xathrae in Arr. 6, 15 are regarded by some as the Sodrae in Diod. 17, 102; but the former name recalls the Kshatryas (warriors), the latter the Sudras, whom others again identify with the Sogdians, Dr. 1, 2, 190; all this is uncertain. The site of the Sogdian Alexandria is unknown, Dr. 1, 2, 190, Lefm. 752.

Musicanus is a word derived from the name of the country called Mûshika. The tribes in the south were more hostile to Alexander because they were more under the influence of the Brahmans, Dr. 1, 2, 194 seq. The site of Pattala is uncertain, according to Sp. 2, 572; according to Lefmann, 753, it is perhaps Hyderabad. For the eastern mouth of the Indus, by which Alexander sailed, cf. Lefm. 753, who follows Cunningham.

2. March through the desert, Arr. 6, 21 seq.; Dr. 1, 2, 213 seq.; the river Arabius is the modern Purali, cf. Sp. 2, 572. The town of Rambakia, on the site of which Alexander founded Alexandria, cannot be exactly determined, Sp. 573. For Gedrosia, *ibid.* 573. The name Pura is Indian.—Alexander throws away the water, Arr. 6, 26, 3.

3. March of Craterus, Arr. 6, 15, 5; Dr. 1, 2, 199. Craterus evidently marched through the Bolan Pass to Candahar. The importance of this route in the present day is so great that the English have secured it by a railway, and by occupying the fortress of Quettah; a tunnel is now completed west of Quettah, and English troops can be thrown into Candahar at any moment.

4. Voyage of Nearchus, Dr. 1, 2, 225-228 and Niese, p. 152.

5. For the way in which Alexander's ostentatious march through Carmania and his punishment of some satraps can be turned against him, see Grote (X, 180). In Grote's eyes, everything which tells against Alexander is good.

6. The festivities at Susa are discussed by Droysen, 1, 2, 243 seq.

7. Opis = Tell Maudschur, Arr. 1, 2, 257. Alexander's speech in Arr. 7, 9, 10 is pronounced by Grote (X, 184) to be "teeming with exorbitant self-exaltation." Is there an incorrect statement in the speech? If not, the self-exaltation must consist of his having spoken about himself, for he states nothing but facts.—The *συνγεῖς*, Arr. 7, 9, 6. This word was used afterwards to denote men of high rank at the king's court. Cf. Reinach, Mithridate, p. 253.

8. Agis' undertaking is not related by Arrian, but by Curtius 6, 1, by the universal historian Diod. 17, 62-63, and by Just. 12, 1; there are detached references to it besides; cf. Droysen, 1, 1, 395, also 1, 2, 266 seq. The battle of Megalopolis is placed by Niese (I, 497 seq.) in the year 331.

9. The warning of the Babylonian priests (Arr. 7, 16, 5), *μὴ πρὸς ἀγαθὸν οἱ εἶναι τὴν παράδοιν*, is quite in the Greek style; thus the oracles said that it were better something did not happen, *εἰ. μὴ κίνα Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων*.

10. The transformation of the army proposed by Alexander

would have deprived the phalanx of its peculiar character; cf. Dr. 1, 2, 232 seq.

11. Συγχωροῦμεν Ἀλεξάνδρῳ εἰὰν θέλῃ θεὸς καλεῖσθαι, Plut. Apoph. Lac.

12. For the return of the exiles see Dr. 1, 2, 274 seq. As regards the Samians the inscription in Ditt. 119 states that Alexander Σάμιον ἀποδοδοί Σαμίους. How could the commander-in-chief of the Greeks make an order of this kind? cf. Sch. Dem. 1, 99.—The Aetolians in Oeniadae, Plut. Al. 49; Dr. 1, 1, 396.

13. The Harpalus trial. The facts are put together by Schaefer, Dem. 3, 320 seq., and by A. Cartault, De causa Harpalica, Par. 1881. I confine myself to a consideration of the most essential points. (1) Did Demosthenes take any of Harpalus' money? He did, because he admitted it himself, and his defenders also admit it, e.g. Sch. Dem. 3, 323. The sum was 20 talents. It is therefore of no consequence that Harpalus' clerk did not enter Demosthenes' name upon the list of recipients. Demosthenes took the 20 talents when the money was handed over to the Athenian commissioners. (2) The so-called justification of Demosthenes. According to Hyp. Dem. 10, he said: κατακερῆσθαι αὐτὰ ὑμῖν (the Athenians) προδεδανυσμένος εἰς τὸ θεωρικόν—Sch. D. 3, 323—i.e. he had advanced 20 talents to the Theoricon, and had repaid himself out of the Harpalus money. But it is incomprehensible how this can be styled a justification. The Harpalus money belonged to Alexander and was being guarded for him by Athenian commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one (Sch. D. 3, 310); how could one of these commissioners satisfy a claim which he professed to have on the Athenian state by secretly abstracting the sum in question from that money? It is, however, not even likely that Demosthenes ever made such an advance to the Theoricon, for apart from the fact that 20 talents was such an enormous sum for those days that it is difficult to see how Demosthenes himself could have disposed of it with such secrecy, an advance of this kind could have been proved from the accounts of the Theoricon, and in that case the Theoricon would have owed the Harpalus treasure the 20 talents, which consequently would not have been lost. The loan to the Theoricon is therefore a mere subterfuge. The fact remains that Demosthenes appropriated 20 talents which did not belong to him. (3) Why did Hyperides, a patriot, join in the charge against Demosthenes, who belonged to his own party? Demosthenes' defenders say that Hyperides knew that Demosthenes was innocent, but was incensed against him for not acting with sufficient vigour against Alexander. But if Demosthenes himself admitted having taken the money, how

can Hyperides have regarded him as innocent? The reason why Hyperides took steps against Demosthenes is very simple. It would not do to let it be said that the party had committed theft. Demosthenes had probably taken the money for the sake of the party. It had done it no good; and the party could not well leave the defence of its honesty to the philo-Macedonians; Demosthenes had to sacrifice himself, and he did so. And this did not lead to a split between him and Hyperides. Besides, the theory of a false charge of embezzlement against Demosthenes places his character in a very bad light. For if you want to ruin a man by means of a false charge you must take care that it is psychologically justifiable. To accuse Phocion of embezzlement would have been ridiculous. But Demosthenes?

(4) In discussing the guilt of Demosthenes only half the accusation is generally taken into consideration. The full charge is (Vitae X or. 846): αἰτίαν ἔσχεν ὁ Δ. δωροδοκίας καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μήτε τὸν ἀριθμὸν τῶν ἀνακομισθέντων μεμνηνκὸς μήτε τὴν τῶν φυλασσόντων ἀμέλειαν (Sch. D. 3, 322). He was therefore accused of having taken money and of having neglected his duty by not saying how much of Harpalus' treasure was deposited in the Acropolis or that its custodians were not guarding it carefully. And for this breach of duty, which cost the state 350 talents, he was bound to be condemned, even if he had not committed the offence of taking the money himself—which, however, he admitted having done—but had only erred through negligence. Even Schaefer (Dem. 3, 311) can only put forward the following as an apology for him: "We do not know why Demosthenes put off giving this information (how much was really deposited); perhaps he wanted to spare those who had taken presents and make it easier for them to escape public animadversion and punishment by restoring the money." Excuses of this kind show that Demosthenes' conduct cannot be justified. In that case we should have an official honoured by the confidence of the people, aware of the embezzlement of sums entrusted to him and others (there were only 350 talents forthcoming instead of 700) and not denouncing the offence out of pity for the offenders, who are to have time to replace what they have stolen. If this was his intention, he could not help letting the thieves know of it, and in so doing would have become their accomplice. Of course this object would not have been attained, for if the thieves had had an official for their accomplice, they would have taken good care not to disgorge their plunder—as in fact was the case. Demosthenes' alleged good nature would therefore have led only to this result, viz. that thieving would have been carried on more thoroughly. It is quite clear that the wily

Demosthenes did not withhold the information in question out of good nature. This also disposes of Grote's objection (X, 241) that the charge against Demosthenes cannot have been founded on fact, because 350 talents in gold and silver could not have been stolen during their transport to the Acropolis, and Harpalus' treasure was "probably" under the care of the Athenian finance-officials and consequently "not in Demosthenes' department." It was, however, not under the charge of these officials, but of special commissioners, of whom Demosthenes was one; this proves the correctness of the above-quoted accusation, which declares that he was responsible for the ἀμέλεια of the custodians. Besides, Grote's argument would amount to this, that nothing could have been stolen at all, or if it was, only by the regular finance-officials, for the treasure was not only "outside Demosthenes' department" but out of the reach of any private individual. Hence, as theft had been going on, it must have been committed by the regular finance-officials; but they were not accused of it; consequently it was not they who were in charge of the money, but Demosthenes. This makes it clear that as soon as the disappearance of 350 talents became known Demosthenes was bound to be punished, whether he had taken or received money himself or not, and any one who knows the Athenians and their exactness in money matters will come to the conclusion that the man who had put them in the position of having to pay Alexander 350 talents on his demand deserved to be punished by a fine of 50 talents. The Athenians have been known to pronounce sentence of death for a less offence. The infliction of a fine of 50 talents only proves therefore that Demosthenes was treated very leniently, and he was probably so treated because it was known that he had allowed the 350 talents to be taken in order to use them against Alexander. For might not a calamity happen to Alexander in the wilds of Asia. If so, Greece would probably rise? And if part of Alexander's treasure fell into the hands of the Athenians, were they not to make use of it? The State could not do so for the moment (subsequently the balance was used for the Lamian War, Diod. 18, 9; and it must have been a subject of regret then that Demosthenes and others had made inroads on the treasure); Demosthenes, therefore, who was fond of money dealings (see beginning of chap. xix.), usurped the place of the State as he had done before (see chap. xx.) But the affair turned out a failure, and so Demosthenes had to be the scape-goat. He did not remain in prison, according to pseud-Dem. Letter 2, 14 διὰ τὴν ἡλικίαν οὐκ ἂν οἶός τ' ὦν τῷ σώματι τὴν κακοπάθειαν ὑπενεγκεῖν. Every one was agreed that the punishment for the offence committed in the interests of the party

to which the majority of the Athenians belonged ought not to go so far as to endanger Demosthenes' life.—In discussing this matter I have taken no notice whatever of the fact that Hyperides accuses Demosthenes of being in the pay of Alexander; cf. Blass, 3, 2, 65 seq. If Hyperides was right, Demosthenes was one of the most despicable of men. But we must not take such assertions of an orator as gospel truth.

14. Death of Alexander. $\delta\epsilon\chi\iota\omicron\upsilon\theta\alpha\iota$ in Arr. 7, 26 does not mean, as Droysen (1, 2, 339) and the Latin translation of the Didot edition have it, to "stretch out the hand," but to "wave the hand." Cf. Bauer, *Der Todestag Alex. d. gr.* Zeitschr. für d. österr. Gymnasien 1891, pp. 1-13. It was the 29th (last day) of Daisios. Plutarch has passed over the 19th of Daisios in his account.

The concluding remarks of Grote's 94th chapter are worth reading. When, however, he says that "in respect of disposition and purpose no one could be less Hellenic" than Alexander, he is starting from a wrong conception of Hellenism, as will be shown in the following chapter.

CHAPTER XXVII

CHARACTER, ACHIEVEMENTS AND HISTORICAL IMPORTANCE OF ALEXANDER

ALEXANDER was a Greek in the fullest sense of the word. He was a Greek by extraction, for both the Macedonian and the Epirote princes from whom he was descended were regarded as Greeks by the Greeks themselves ; and as for his education, probably no citizen of a free Greek state ever enjoyed such a careful, thoroughly Hellenic training as Alexander did under the tuition of Leonidas, Lysimachus (an Acarnanian) and Aristotle, and scarcely any has done such credit to it. The great Greek statesmen may be divided into two entirely different categories. Those who belong to the one effect their aims by producing conviction in the minds of their fellow-citizens, the others endeavour to impose their will upon the people. Agesilaus, Solon, Pericles, Epaminondas, each in his way a fine representative of Spartan, Athenian and Theban character, are types of the first kind in the three greatest states of Greece. The second class had a difficult part to play in the Greek republics ; it produced the tyrants. To it Alexander belonged. If he had been bred in a Greek republic, he would perhaps have wasted his life in fruitless struggles ; as king of Macedonia he was able to achieve unparalleled success. But although a born ruler he was just as much a Greek as Pericles. For even the tyrants—if we are to count him among them—are part of

Greek history, and Alexander was a better sovereign than any of the Greek despots. He represents the culminating point of Greek civilization in a twofold way, in his achievements and in his character; and the history of Greece without Alexander would be like a body without one of its noblest members. He belongs to the history of Greece if only for this reason that he completely satisfied one of the instincts of the Greeks, that which first made them what they were, viz. the antithesis between Greek and barbarian. The republics had taken money from the barbarians. Alexander brought the Greek name once more into honour in this respect. This alone gives him an honourable place among the Greeks. His subsequent attempt to do away with the antagonism between Greece and Asia from a higher point of view is also a great credit to him.

Alexander therefore interests us in two ways, as a man and as a statesman. And in both respects the picture is a pleasing one, a picture the splendour of which is but little dimmed by its unmistakeable blemishes. As a man Alexander had a characteristic not often met with in people of his position; he was sincere and a lover of truth. He was a good son and a loyal friend.¹ His worst acts were the murders of Clitus and Parmenio. The former he slew in a sudden outburst of rage, and he bitterly repented it; the execution of Parmenio was a bad piece of statecraft, the first and only one of its kind. He also possessed moral purity of character, which was not common in that age. All the prominent men of that time, except Epaminondas, Phocion and Alexander, have been ill spoken of. All meanness was an abomination to him. It is not even quite certain that he was fond of drinking, although he followed Macedonian custom in carousing a good deal, and did himself great harm by it. No doubt he owed much to his excellent education, but without his splendid natural abilities and firm resolve to do his duty, he would not have been the great man that he was.

His personal gifts were accompanied by an uncommon love of work, and as he was confronted by tasks such as had fallen to the lot of no man before him, it is easy to understand that he devoted himself to them and put aside all thought of personal comfort. In his devotion to duty he resembles Pericles, who stands on the same level among the 'counsellors' of the Greeks as Alexander does among their rulers.

Alexander was a soldier and a general in the first place. His greatness in this respect is admitted even by his detractors. If the ability of a general consists of swift discovery and vigorous execution of what is required for victory and of unswerving pursuit of his aim by the best means available, then Alexander was one of the greatest generals that have ever lived. His method was energetic action directed to a single point, and that point the main one; and this is no doubt the best method. In the control of his soldiers he has been rivalled by few generals, and he also knew how to yield to them at the right moment. Only one reproach can be made against him as a soldier, viz. that he risked his life too often. True, he achieved many a success by it more quickly than he otherwise would have done, and we know that even aged generals have occasionally exposed themselves to danger more than was proper. Alexander exhibited prudence when it was necessary, and daring when it led him to the goal.

But Alexander was also a first-rate military organizer.² The basis of the Macedonian army under him as under Philip and again after his death was the Macedonian phalanx—infantry armed with lances sixteen feet long; but Alexander gained his most signal successes with his cavalry, which he must have organized remarkably well. The heavy infantry were called *Pezetairi*, the Macedonian cavalry *Hetairi*. The expression 'friends' denotes the Macedonian soldiers who served the king for friendship's sake, the retainers of the king, who besides called out as many men in his own country

as he liked. But there were also light infantry called Hypaspistae in the Macedonian army. The concentration and authority of the chief command were greater in the Macedonian than in any Greek army, not excepting the Spartan, where, as we have seen, the superior officers were often wanting in discipline. A select body of all classes of troops formed the king's guard, and was called Agema. Distinct from these are the body-guard (Somatophylakes), a small number of men, selected from among the ablest officers in the army; they have rightly been compared to the adjutant-generals of our modern armies. The commands over the various divisions of the army were distributed each time as occasion required. There were also Greeks in the army, but they were mostly professional soldiers. Alexander appears to have taken very few contingents from the various states, with the exception of Thessaly, which he regarded as his own territory. A baggage train accompanied the army. The troops received on an average ten staters (20 drachmae) a month, and their food as well. They could not save much with this, and booty could not be made everywhere. They did not therefore get rich as a matter of course. If the army stayed anywhere for a time, as in Bactria and Sogdiana, the rank and file naturally had a pleasant life. Rewards consisted chiefly of assignments of lands in the neighbourhood of the cities founded by the king. Many soldiers too who had seen long service or were wounded were sent home with gifts from the king.

Alexander won his victories mainly by his cavalry. This was of importance, because the Persians prided themselves specially on their cavalry, and with hoplites they could be defeated, but not pursued and annihilated. With his cavalry Alexander not only defeated the Persians, but demoralized them and destroyed them in pursuit. His tactics were therefore great in every respect.

But Alexander was also an admirable organizer of his

empire.³ He must have had the permanent administration of his conquests in his mind when he first came to Asia, for the arrangements which he made in Sardis after the victory on the Granicus were governed by the same principles which he always followed afterwards. He appointed three different officials there, one as commander of the citadel, a second for the collection of taxes, and a third for the general administration, all of whom were dependent on him alone, but were on an equal footing among themselves. He pursued the same policy in the other provinces, except that in Egypt the machinery of administration was more complicated, besides the satrap, who as chief nomarch was over the nomarchs of the districts, a collector of taxes being appointed, and three military commanders, one for the troops in general, one for the fleet, and one for the Xenoi. This principle of administration introduced by Alexander, the assignment of finance, the army and internal government to special officers, was a decided advance upon the Persian system, which left everything to a single official, the satrap of the province, and exercised control at intervals only by sending round inspectors. Alexander's system protected both government and people better than the Persian one. Alexander sometimes appointed natives as administrative officials (satraps) in the central and eastern provinces. The separation of the financial administration and the chief command of the army from the satrapy, enabled him to gratify the pride of the Asiatics in this way. Yet we note that when a change was necessary Macedonians took the place of the natives. Eventually native governors held office in Media, Persia, and the country of the Paropamisadae. Roxana's father ruled over this northern border territory. Alexander probably thought that the fact of his having chosen a wife from this country was to a certain extent a guarantee of its loyalty to him. Thus we see that in the government of the various provinces Alexander was guided as much as possible by circumstances.

The central government⁴ he organized on Persian principles, with this difference, that he himself interfered more frequently than the Persian kings had done. In this department his principal assistant was Eumenes of Cardia, who is described as his chief secretary. This man was really the Sultan's Vizier, the Kaiser's Chancellor, in a word, Alexander's Prime Minister. He kept the office and all the documents. Alexander had a very high opinion of Eumenes, and the latter deserved it, for he not only had administrative talents but subsequently proved a capable general. Eumenes also was anxious that the power once conceded to himself should not be thwarted by others. Sometimes, however, this happened owing to the high favour in which Hephaestion stood with Alexander. Hephaestion was the king's chief adjutant-general with the title of Chiliarch, that is, according to Persian custom, the monarch's representative or nominal Grand Vizier, while Eumenes, who superintended the details of government, was the real Grand Vizier. This led to friction and even to differences between the minister and the most influential man at Court, between the Chancellor and the Adjutant-General, which the king had sometimes difficulty in composing. The historians of antiquity, who were bred in republican views, were unable to form such a correct idea of these matters and these personages as we moderns, who are tolerably familiar with large administrations and great courts.

We saw that the government of the different provinces was not quite uniform. But we may go further and say that Alexander tried as much as possible to leave the various parts of his empire their old time-honoured peculiarities, so far as was consistent with the interests of his rule. This variety appears especially in the West, with which we are of course best acquainted. He restored the Lydians their ancient liberties; in the Aeolian and Ionian cities, as far as Miletus, he installed popular governments and exempted them from the tributes which they had paid to the Persians. He did this

because these districts had voluntarily submitted to him. He treated Caria differently, Queen Ada being placed on the throne there; the Greeks and semi-barbarians of this region, to whom I have referred in chapter xxi., had to be conquered by war. In Phoenicia he evidently left the kings undisturbed in the places where the Phoenicians had met him in a friendly spirit. His empire may be described as a kind of feudal system, like the German Empire of the Middle Ages, to which it may also be compared in that it strengthened the element of civic liberty. Even the Persians had tolerated almost independent Greek cities; Alexander went further; he founded them in districts where they were previously unknown, and in doing so he promoted not only Greek civilization, but also the spirit of freedom and of self-government in general.

The number of cities founded by Alexander is said to be more than seventy, and this is probably right, even if there is direct proof only as to a few. The name Alexandria is no proof, for later potentates could just as well have called the cities they founded Alexandria as they stamped coins with his name.⁵ In the West we may regard as founded by Alexander the new Ilium and Apollonia in Phrygia, which calls Alexander its founder on its coins. Yet the founding of these cities was probably ordered by him at a later period, after he had left those regions; he does not appear to have begun colonizing till he came into non-Greek countries after the battle of Issus. In this part of the world we find south of Issus on the sea, Alexandria (now Alexandrette) and Nicopolis, in Syria Emathia, which subsequently formed part of Antioch. Tyre and Gaza received fresh inhabitants, some of whom were Hellenes; in Palestine Dium and Pella are mentioned, the names of which betray their Macedonian origin. Apamea near the Orontes may be regarded as a city founded by Alexander, because we know that he erected an altar to the Bottiacean Zeus there. Next comes the famous

city of Alexandria in Egypt, to which we shall refer at length later on. At Thapsacus, where the Euphrates was crossed, Nicephorium was founded; higher up the river on a tributary and on the route which Alexander took was Carrhae, a Greek city, which Alexander seems to have founded. Whether there was a city called Alexandriana on the battle-field of Gaugamela is not quite certain. After this Arrian only mentions cities in the north, but the king probably founded some, although not till later, in the mountainous country between the plateau of Iran and Mesopotamia, for Polybius says that the whole of Media was surrounded by Greek cities. There was a Heraclea in the neighbourhood of Rhagae, and an Alexandropolis in Parthia. Farther north we find Margiana on the Margos (Murghâb), a city afterwards called Antiochia (Merw Schahidschan). When Alexander marched to Aria on account of the revolt of Satibarzanes (see p. 341), he founded Alexandria on the river Herirud, now the important Herat, and a main centre of traffic. Farther south in Drangiana, where the conspiracy of Philotas was discovered (see p. 342), he founded Prophthasia. In Arachosia, whither he then marched, he founded Alexandria, the modern Candahar, and in the country of the Paropamisadae the Alexandria at the southern base of the Hindu-Kush. According to Justinus he built twelve cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, and settled them with soldiers, who, however, subsequently revolted and collected an army of 20,000 infantry and 3000 cavalry. Strabo mentions only eight cities as founded by Alexander in these districts, but we cannot trace even these. We know only of Alexandria Ἐσχατή on the Jaxartes (Khojend) and of an Alexandria Oxiana. Hephaestion founded several cities in Sogdiana on behalf of Alexander. These districts were afterwards full of stories about Alexander, no doubt a proof that the king settled many Europeans there. He founded Nicaea on the Cabul river, and also many cities in the country of the Indus: on the Hydaspes Nicaea and Bucephala, the sites of

which are no longer determinable; on the Acesines Alexandria, perhaps Nasirabad; farther down stream another Alexandria on the Indus, the Sogdian Alexandria; fortresses in the country of the Musicani and in Pattala are also ascribed to Alexander. That many Greeks settled in these border countries, even as early as Alexander, is shown by the fact that independent kingdoms under Greek sovereigns and with Greek civilization existed here for a long time. In the territory of the Oritae, west of the mouth of the Indus, a city was founded by Hephæstion and another by Leonnatus; and perhaps two more in Gedrosia and two in Carmania. The founding of a city on Lake Rumyah near Babylon, which communicated with the Pallacopas canal, and of another Alexandria at the old mouth of the Tigris, on a site now far from the sea owing to the deposits of the river (Mahammerah), was connected with the grand plans which Alexander, as we saw, meditated towards the close of his life, and which included the occupation of Arabia and the development of the delta of the Euphrates and Tigris.

Besides these cities, in founding which it was not necessary according to Greek notions that there should have been no city on the spot at the time, we hear of large bodies of soldiers being moved to particular places.⁶ Thus some Chians were sent to Elephantine in Egypt, and the governor of Samaria was ordered to take 8000 soldiers to Egypt, where they were settled in the Thebaid.

In founding these cities and making these settlements Alexander pursued three objects of a military, economical, and civilizing order.⁷ The military object was the safety of the empire, the economical the security of trade and the development of communications in districts which had hitherto been without them, the third object was to raise the standard of civilization among the native population and promote the union of the East and the West, which last was so dear to him that he even wanted to settle Asiatics in Europe.

Strategic and mercantile considerations also explain the selection of the site of the cities, a point which we cannot specially go into here. The consideration of these aims suggests conjectures as to the internal organization of the cities founded by Alexander, about which we should be so glad to have full information. The citizens must have had some land, which was taken from the former inhabitants of the district. This was simple enough, for Alexander stood in the shoes of the Persian monarch, who could do what he liked with all the property of his subjects. Alexander therefore had a double right to dispose of everything, as conqueror and as king of Persia. When he offered cities to Phocion, he acted as Xerxes did to Themistocles. Some of the land which passed to the new inhabitants had doubtless been royal property; probably only land belonging to temples was left untouched. In this way every new citizen could obtain an allotment. This mode of procedure was not a novelty even from a Greek point of view, for in early times the Greeks had taken land from somebody or other whenever they founded a city. Finally, it is possible that the natives were made to pay some tribute in kind to the new inhabitants.

As regards the constitution of the cities, we may assume from the example of Alexandria in Egypt, that when different nationalities were brought together within the same walls, each section had its special code of laws corresponding to its native customs. The Greeks in Asia must have been organized on democratic lines,⁸ for not only are we told that Alexander reintroduced democracy into the already existing cities of Anterior Asia, but it was in the nature of things that no distinction should have been made between the rights of people who entered a new city at the same time. In Alexandria, in Egypt and elsewhere the Greeks were divided into *Phylae*; in Gaza a council is mentioned. But the rights of the citizens as against the central government were not the same in all cities; in Alexandria they appear to have been very limited.

The names given by Alexander to the newly-founded cities were characteristic and served as a precedent. The most important were called Alexandria, and cities of that name were frequently founded afterwards. It was, however, a novelty to call a city after the name of its founder. Hitherto this had only been done by Philip, Alexander's father, and in a peculiar manner. He had founded a Philippi and a Philipopolis. The latter is not really a proper name; it means the city of Philip; but the former is very strange, and I do not know why this has not been noticed. What does the plural 'Philippi' mean? The founding of the city was of course directed against Athens; the name might have been intended to indicate that Philippi would become more powerful than Athenae. But what did a Greek understand by the word 'Philippi'? Did it mean a number of men like Philip, or the gold pieces which were coined there, and which were called by that name? There must have been some play of words in it. Giving the name of Alexandria to a city was quite a different thing. This form had hitherto been made only from the names of gods: Heraclea (two cities of this name founded in the 5th century), Posidonia or Potidaea, Apollonia, Heraea, Tyndaris, Dium, etc. When Alexander gave the name Alexandria to a city founded by him, he intimated a wish not only to be honoured as a hero—for the founders of cities were that already—but as a god, and the Greeks could not but feel this. We may therefore consider the Egyptian Alexandria, which was founded shortly before the king went to the oasis of Zeus Ammon, as the first. Lysander, as we know, had gone there before him. The priests of Ammon were more amenable in this respect than the priests of Delphi and Dodona, and the oracle at Ammon may have seemed more authoritative for the East than the other two. Alexander's successors continued this nomenclature, and we find cities with the names Seleucia, Antiochia, Ptolemais, etc.

But the founding of these cities was also intended to pro-

mote the union of the East and the West. The old rivalry between Asia and Europe, which had lasted down to the time of Pericles and Herodotus, had been gradually disappearing since the last decade of the Peloponnesian War. Asia learnt the value of Greek energy, and Greece that of Persian money. Especially since Xenophon had shown that Greek soldiers were invincible against barbarians, Persian kings and satraps had taken them into their armies, and they had served them well. We do not hear that they ever committed treachery, at least not the common soldiers, who were as loyal as the Swiss, while the leaders, on the other hand, were ready to change sides. The Greek element had proved itself perfectly trustworthy in the main. How strongly it was represented in the Persian service, has been shown by Alexander's campaigns. At the Granicus there were 20,000 Greek mercenaries; we find mercenaries in Miletus and Halicarnassus; 30,000 Hellenic mercenaries at Issus, and some at Gaugamela; it was Hellenic mercenaries who tried to warn Darius against Bessus, and the last of them, to the number of 1500, surrendered in Zadracarta. It is probably not an exaggeration to assume that Darius had 100,000 Greek mercenaries in his service.⁹ Through them connections of all kinds grew up between Greece and Asia. Mentor and Memnon were related by marriage to Persians of high rank. Consequently, apart from the fact that in Anterior Asia many Greek communities were under Persian rule, the Greeks were intrinsically no longer in a state of hostility to the Orientals.¹⁰ Alexander might have emphasized the antagonism between the two nationalities, and it would seem that this policy would have been in accordance with the teaching of his tutor Aristotle, who held that there was an essential distinction between Hellenes and barbarians. But he did not do so. Perhaps one reason for this was that the Greeks held aloof from enterprises and took advantage of his absence in the far East to create embarrassments for him in the West, while the Asiatics

were only opposed to him on the battlefield. But a reconciliation between the two nationalities must have appealed to his far-seeing mind. His policy, therefore, was to bring about peace between Greeks and Asiatics, and his endeavour to overcome their antagonism is one of his undying merits. True, we cannot sympathize with some of his methods. The adoption of oriental costume was not a bad thing in itself; it might even, as was in fact the case, have been described as a judicious measure from a climatic point of view; but in the eyes of the Greeks, and especially of the Macedonians, it was above all things a sign of a despotic tendency. His claim to divinity cannot be approved, and did not even do him any good. For, with the exception of the Egyptians, the Orientals did not recognize mortals as gods, at the most as sons of gods, and had no scruple about taking the lives of these,¹¹ and the Greeks simply ridiculed such pretensions. Still all this had little or no influence on Alexander's mode of government. He never claimed divine authority for his decisions or his opinions. His life always remained that of a Macedonian sovereign who had received a Greek education. He was the same to the last, an enthusiastic admirer of all the noble aspirations of mankind; he constantly held athletic and 'musical' competitions; he had no intention of giving up Greek culture. In founding so many cities, he recognized the autonomous Greek city-community as the basis of his empire. That empire was made up of the most varied elements. To the Greeks in Europe he was simply leader; in fact the Spartans had nothing to do with him. Some of the Asiatic Greeks too were his independent allies, *e.g.* the powerful city of Heraclea on the Pontus; whole Asiatic tribes led an almost independent life in their mountains. It is not even certain what the general organization of military service was; probably this was a matter the settlement of which he reserved for a future occasion. I refer to Alexander's coinage in the notes.¹²

He was a strenuous promoter of all useful undertakings. The vast treasure of Asia, of which a large amount remained long after his death, was not destined merely to enrich his soldiers or to be the prey of dishonest administrators. Besides the new cities, money was spent on buildings which diffused prosperity. He ordered the restoration of the canal system of Babylonia, the clearance of the outlets of the Copaic Lake, the rebuilding of ruined temples in Hellas, for which he is said to have assigned 10,000 talents. We are told of the construction of a mole at Clazomenae, of an attempt to cut through an isthmus near the same city, and of many other works. The expedition of Nearchus shows that he endeavoured to further the cause of science. In his intercourse with Indian sages he was influenced, not by considerations of utility, but by love of knowledge. He was always open-handed to poets, philosophers and artists, and when we read that Aristotle was granted 800 talents for his researches in natural science, we may, as Droysen (1, 2, 296) rightly says, give credence to the statement, for the reason that the extraordinary range of the philosopher's achievements would be well accounted for by it. In this respect too Alexander was one of the greatest of rulers, which appears all the more clearly when we reflect that he was hardly ever free from actual warfare. Even in the last year of his life he was preparing for fresh campaigns.

The two political tasks of the Greeks were, as we have repeatedly seen, the development of self-government at home and the struggle against those barbarians compared with whom they felt themselves Hellenes. Athens attempted to perform both, but really only solved the first problem. What Athens left undone Alexander accomplished swiftly and brilliantly, and this extraordinary performance is enough to stamp him as a great man. Nor does he forfeit this title by the despotic caprices which he occasionally displays.

The result would in many ways have been different and more

satisfactory if the bulk of the Greeks had shown more sympathy with Alexander's undertaking. If only half the Greeks who served the Persian king for money had joined Alexander, the new states would not have acquired the despotic Macedonian character which was impressed on them. But the Greeks would not take part in the conduct of the campaigns, and so the spoils fell to the Macedonians. Mankind was a loser by it. The Macedonian *Argyraspidæ* behaved worse to Eumenes, who was a Greek although he came from Cardia, than the Greek mercenaries did to Darius. Perdicas was murdered by his own Macedonians. Perhaps the unexpectedly long duration of the Greek kingdoms founded in Bactria and India was due to the fact that the men who held their own there were real Greeks.¹³ In the next volume, however, we shall show how as a rule the character of the empires of the Diadochi is a necessary product of Greek life and Greek thought.

Alexander's extraordinary importance is shown by the legends which have clustered round his name. They begin soon after his death, chiefly in Egypt, and go on throughout antiquity and the Middle Ages. As Alexander's marvellous career was spent mostly in the East, so it is the Easterns who mainly take up and develop the stories about him, while the West enjoys these products of Eastern imagination without adding much of her own to them. The oldest connected example of this kind of literature is a history of Alexander in the Greek language, which was ascribed to Callisthenes and of which a Latin version attributed to one Julius Valerius is extant. According to this romance, Alexander is not the son of Philip, but of an Egyptian king Nectanebus, who escapes from Egypt and goes to Pella in Macedonia disguised as an astrologer. In his first campaigns Alexander takes not only Thebes but Athens as well, and goes to Italy, where the Romans submit to him. His exploits in Asia are intermingled with marvellous adventures; huge ants oppose

the progress of his army ; he reaches the pillars of Hercules ; meets human beings with six hands and six feet ; sees fishes which are cooked in cold water and have a shining stone in their stomachs ; has fights with Centaurs ; we also read of the meeting of Alexander, disguised as Antigonus, with Queen Candace of Meroë, etc. In this romance Alexander dies of poison, but before his death the faithful Bucephalus comes to the king, weeps over him, tears in pieces the slave who had poisoned him, and then expires.

These legends, which evidently originated in Egypt, first spread into the East. The most important connected poetical narrative of the history of Alexander is that of the Persian Firdusi, who, in his story of *Shahnameh*, includes the exploits of the great Iscander. But, in conformity with the nationality of the poet, his hero is not of Egyptian but of Persian descent. The Persian king Darab marries the daughter of king Filigûs of Rûm (Philippus of Rome, i.e. Greece), but divorces her immediately and takes another wife. The son of the first wife is Iscander, that of the second is Dârâ. The point is therefore always that the Orientals do not want to be conquered by a foreign Alexander ; for the Egyptians he must be an Egyptian, for the Persians a Persian. Iscander marches against Dârâ, who is assisted by Fûr of India (Porus), and conquers him. Iscander also proceeds to Mecca, goes to Queen Qidâfa disguised as Nithgûn (Antigonus), and then wanders about the world, the adventures related by pseudo-Callisthenes being divided geographically into expeditions to the four points of the compass. The northerly one goes into the land of darkness under the leadership of the prophet Khidr, who there finds the source of life, while Alexander himself with another division loses his way in the desert. Alexander builds a wall of brass 500 yards high to protect himself against the attacks of Yâjûj and Mâjûj (Gog and Magog) ; and so these monsters with horses' or camels' heads and such large ears that one of them is used as a bed and

the other as a tent, cannot penetrate into Alexander's empire. Râm (Europe) and Iran contend for the corpse of Alexander, who, on the advice of Aristotle, has decreed before his death that the great men of Iran should each receive a portion of the empire; the oracle decides that the body shall rest in Alexandria. Other very similar narratives of the history of the king are found at different periods in Arabian writers, of which that of Masudi is interesting, because in it Alexander is for the first time expressly identified with Dulqarnain, a legendary hero, who first appears in the Koran, where he is said to have built an iron wall between two mountains against Yâjûj and Mâjûj. Dulqarnain is called the two-horned ant, which would be appropriate for Alexander as son of Ammon, although some scholars doubt whether Alexander is really meant by this name in the Koran. If he is, which seems the more probable view, then he was considered as a prophet by the Mahomedans, like Abraham, Moses and Christ, and there is no reason why Mahomet, who endeavoured to adapt his religion to Jews and Christians by recognizing the founders of their religions as prophets, should not have tried to do the same with the Greeks, by taking Alexander, who had been a king, a hero and a god, as their religious representative. Christian Europe borrowed Alexander's story, like others, from the East, and made it one of the most popular cycles in the epic poetry of the various countries. There are several French and German versions of the Alexander legend. The finest is undoubtedly the German one of Pfaffe Lambrecht in the twelfth century, a poem of great power of expression and remarkable tenderness of feeling, in which the fabulous adventures of the hero are related like the *Odyssey* in a narrative, a letter of Alexander, and the hero, after an unsuccessful attempt to force an entrance into Paradise, at last comes to the conclusion that presumption can only keep him farther from his object, viz. admittance into the kingdom of God. In the story of Alexander, the

desire of the West to know the marvels of the East finds its best expression. And so these poems bring us back in a way to the commencement of our narrative of the history of Alexander. Alexander wished to be a second Achilles and longed for a Homer; to the Greeks he was really more than Achilles, to them he was Achilles and Agamemnon in one, and he did more for them than the heroes at the siege of Troy. But it was not the Greeks, who would have little to do with him, but the peoples of Mahomedan Asia and of Christian Europe, the inheritors of the civilizations which he overcame, who supplied the Hellenic conqueror of the Iranians and the Semites with a Homer. Thus only later times have given him what he most longed for, and now, in our critical age, the controversies of historians as to his worth are at all events a tribute to the great man, the only one which we can offer him.¹⁴

NOTES

1. Cf. Götting, *Zur Charakteristik Al. d. Gr.* in his *Gesch. Abh.* 2, 242 seq., and Plutarch's two *λόγοι περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τέχνης ἢ ἀρετῆς* should also be read. According to him (1, 6), Alexander in trying to unite Asiatics and Europeans *πατρίδα μὲν τὴν οἰκουμένην προσέταξεν ἡγεῖσθαι πάντας, ἀκρόπολιν δὲ καὶ φρουρὰν τὸ στρατόπεδον, συγγενεῖς δὲ τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς, ἀλλοφύλους δὲ τοὺς πονηροὺς—τὸ μὲν Ἑλληνικὸν ἀρετῇ, τὸ δὲ βαρβαρικὸν κακίᾳ τεκμαίρεσθαι*. Alexander's relations with his mother are shown by his remark about Antipater, who was on bad terms with Olympias and often complained of her in his reports to the king, viz. that Antipater did not know *ὅτι μυρίας ἐπιστολὰς ἐν δάκρυον ἐξαλείφει μητρός*, Plut. Alex. 39.—His capacity for friendship is exhibited by his relation with Hephaestion, whom von Gutschmid in his *Gesch. Irans* (p. 14) calls a "worthless man," but without justifying his opinion (Plut. Al. 47 does not prove it), while Droysen (1, 2, 311) thinks very highly of him. We must not place Alexander in the same category as the Diadochi and Epigoni, whose leading motive was selfishness, and who aped Alexander.

2. For Alexander's military system cf. J. G. Droysen, *A. des Grossen Armee*, Hermes 12, and H. Droysen, *Ueber A. des Gr.*

Heerwesen und Kriegsführung, Freib. 1885; cf. his *Kriegsalterthümer* in Hermann's *Lehrb. der griech. Antiquit.* 6th ed., and Bauer's *Kriegsalt.* in I. Müller's *Handbuch*, 4, pp. 312-318.

3. Alexander's administration. For the Persian system, which Alexander followed in the main, cf. Duncker, 4^a 534 seq., Spiegel, 3, 628 seq. For Alexander's government of the provinces of Asia Minor, cf. Dr. 11. 231, and his *Beitr. z. Frage über die innere Gestaltung des Reiches A. des Gr.*, *Monatsber. der Berl. Akad.*, 1877.

4. The central government. It is probable that the office of first minister in the Persian empire was a permanent one, consequently that there was a vizier or chancellor. True, the authorities of the 5th and 4th centuries B.C. give no information on the point; yet Spiegel (3, 635) rightly remarks that the first minister of the king of the Persians is doubtless the official styled *ἀξαρπατὴς* in Ctes. Pers. 46, and *ἀξαρπατεὺς* in Hecych., corresponding to the Armenian Hazarapet. He is called chiliarch (*hazar*=a thousand) by western authorities, Nep. Con. 3, and Diod. 18, 48 says: *ἡ δὲ τοῦ χιλιάρχου τάξις ὑπὸ τῶν Περσικῶν βασιλέων εἰς ὄνομα καὶ δόξαν προήχθη*. This is generally but incorrectly interpreted as referring to a purely military office, which it certainly was from an external point of view, and Nipperdey rightly conjectures in his excellent note on Nep. Con. 4 that the Persian chiliarch received this title because he was commander of the 1000 *μηλοφόροι* (Her. 7, 41). Alexander's chiliarchs were also military commanders, but one of them was Hephaestion, and his successor was Perdicas, who afterwards became regent of the empire, and Hephaestion was of higher rank than the other chiliarchs, as he had a special standard. The result is therefore that Alexander also had a chiliarch who was over the others, and it is permissible to consider this chief chiliarch as the successor of the one Persian chiliarch, consequently as the first minister; cf. Dr. 2, 1, 14. Müller (*Islam*, 1, 475, Berlin, 1885) is wrong in deriving the office of vizier from that of the "eyes and ears" of the Persian king; there were several of these. Besides the chiliarch the following were ministers of the Persian king: the chief writer of the Arians, the head of the chancellery and the chief paymaster, who no doubt was also treasurer. The archives of the Great King (*divân*) were connected with the royal treasure, according to Spiegel, 3, 635. We thus obtain a correct view of the position of Hephaestion and of Eumenes. Hephaestion was chiliarch or vizier, Eumenes was *ἀρχιγραμματεὺς* or chief secretary, and the probably somewhat incorrect story in Plut. Eum. 2 shows that he also had something to do with the pay-office and the archives. Consequently Eumenes was a grade

lower than Hephaestion. But as Hephaestion was not a statesman, Eumenes often had to take his place in business matters, and thus became of more importance to the government, which naturally gave rise to conflicts (Arr. 7, 13).

5. Founding of cities. According to Plut. de fort. Al. 1, 5, seventy cities were founded by Alexander. Everything bearing on the subject has been collected by Droysen, 3, 2, 187-254; I cite what is absolutely necessary only, referring the reader to Droysen and to Spiegel. Ilium, Str. 13, 593. — Apollonia in Phrygia, mod. Oluburla, east of Celaenae, according to coins, on which Alexander is represented as *κτίστης*, Dr. 197 and Head, H. N. 589. — Alexandretta and Nicopolis, Dr. 200-201. — Emathia following Liban. Ant. 297 R. in Droysen 201. — Alexander introduced new inhabitants into Tyre and Gaza; but only Gaza is called *πόλις Ἑλληνίς* in Jos. Bell. jud. 2, 6, 3; *βουλή* in Jos. Ant. 13, 13, 3. — For the cities which we may perhaps assume to have been founded in Palestine, see Dr. 202. — Dium, St. B. A. v. — Pella, Str. 16, 752, Dr. 206. — For Alexandria in Egypt see vol. iv. — Carrhae near Edessa called a Macedonian colony as early as 312 B.C. — Alexandriana on the battlefield of Gaugamela, Dr. 210. — Media, according to Polyb. 10, 27, was surrounded by Greek towns *κατὰ τὴν ὑφήγησιν τοῦ Ἀλεξάνδρου*. To this category also belong the cities in the territory of the Cossacana, the Uxii and the Mardi, mentioned by Arr. Ind. 40. — Heraclea near Rhagae, Str. 11, 514; Dr. 212. — Alexandropolis in Parthia, Plin. 6, 113. — Alexandria-Antiochia Plin. 6, 46 is no doubt Merw-Schahidschan, the most important city on the lower Murghâb, in a very fertile region, the oldest city of the district, founded according to the legend by a King Tahmurat; it served as a defence against the Turanian nomads, Sp. 3, 10. — Prophthasia, St. B. A. v. *Φράσα*, renamed by Alexander, Dr. 216: according to Spiegel, 2, 541, it was somewhere in the neighbourhood of Farah, as to which see Sp. 1, 34. — Farther to the N.E. Candahar (Dr. 217 seq.) was probably founded by Alexander, Sp. 1, 28. — The site of Alexandria in the Caucasus is not quite certain; it is not Bamiân, and is at any rate to the north of Cabul, Sp. 2, 543. — Twelve cities in Bactria and Sogdiana, Just. 12, 5; eight according to Str. 12, 517. According to Arr. 4, 16, 3, Alexander dispatched Hephaestion *τὰς ἐν Σογδ. πόλεις σινουκίζεν*. — Alexandria Eschaté, Arr. 4, 4, 1, Plin. 6, 46, probably Khojend, Sp. 2, 548. — At the time of the Emperor Heraclius, Theophylactus 7, 9 refers to two cities founded by Alexander, named Taugast and Chubdan, in discussing which Dr. 224 follows Schott. Stories of Alexander in these regions, Ritter, Asien, 5, 821 seq. — Nicaea, Arr. 4, 22, probably one of the cities which

Alexander founded a day's journey from one another according to Diod. 17, 83; its site is unknown, north of the Cabul river according to Dr. 229.—The exact site of Nicaea and of Bucephala on the Hydaspes unknown, Dr. 230.—Alexandria on the Acesines most likely Wusirabad, Dr. 230.—Alexandria on the Indus, Arr. 6, 15, 2, Dr. 230.—The Sogdian Alexandria, Arr. 6, 16, 4, near the city of Bakkar, where the road to the Bolan Pass begins, Dr. 230. Cities founded at the mouth of the Indus, those in Gedrosia and Carmania, Dr. 231-236.—City near Babylon, Arr. 7, 21, 7, Dr. 237.—Alexandria at the mouth of the Tigris, Dr. 237.—In founding these cities, Alexander fulfilled the justifiable wish expressed by Isocrates (Phil. 120-123). This passage appears to have escaped Grote's notice, otherwise he would not have thrown doubt (X, 206) on the founding of so many colonies by Alexander. Cf. the article in Pauly-Wissowa I. on the cities which bear the name of Alexandria, pp. 1376-1397. Besides the article by Puchstein on the Egyptian Alexandria, we may note that by Andreas on the Alexandria at the mouth of the Tigris, pp. 1390-1395.

6. Chians transported to Egypt, Arr. 3, 2, 7. Soldiers from Samaria to Egypt, Jos. Ant. 11, 8, 6; Dr. 249. Military colonists were called *κάτοικοι*, garrisons *παρεπιδημοῦντες*, the native troops *ἐγχωριοί*.

7. Alexander wished the barbarians to dwell in cities, that they might become agriculturists instead of nomads and *ἔχειν ἐπὶ δὲ δαιμαίνοντες μὴ κακὰ ἀλλήλοισι ἐργάζωνται*, Arr. Ind. 40. This was a truly humane and Hellenic aspiration. For the organization of the new cities see Dr. 3, 1, 32 seq. "It was not the old hereditary monarchy of Macedon, but Greek polity which Alexander introduced into the East," Mommsen, R. G. 5, 450. The question of the land which the settlers must have received is discussed by Droysen, 1, 2, 291. Alexander offered cities to Phocion, Plut. Phoc. 18. As regards natural products, I would point out that Stade, in his *Geschichte des Volkes Israel*, 2, 276, speaks of supplies of oil which the inhabitants of the cities of Syria received from the 'cities,' i.e. the cities had land, the produce of which was shared in by the Greeks who had been received into them.

8. Alexander re-established democracy in many cities of Asia, e.g. in Ephesus, Arr. 1, 17, 10-12 (by which he very much *ἡνδοκίμει*); in Soli, 2, 5, 8. For Alexandria see Dr. 3, 1, 34.

9. Greek mercenaries: at the Granicus, Dr. 1, 1, 194; at Issus, Dr. 11, 258; 8000 Greek mercenaries escape to Greece and enter the service of Agis, Diod. 17, 48; Curt. 4, 1, 39. Greek mercenaries with Darius and Bessus, Dr. 11, 374; in Zadracarta, Dr. 11, 386.

10. According to Strabo 1, 66, some persons advised Alexander to treat the Hellenes as friends and the barbarians as enemies; Aristotle is supposed to have been one of these *παῖς*.

11. According to E. Meyer, *Gesch. Aegyptens*, p. 58, the Egyptians regarded their kings as gods. For the worship of monarchs, see O. Hirschfeld, *Zur Gesch. des römischen Kaiserkultus*, *Sitzungsber. der Berl. Akad.* 1888, July 19th.

12. I now discuss Alexander's coinage. Cf. esp. L. Müller, *Numismatique d'Alexandre le Grand*, Copenh. 1855; Imhoof-Blumer, *Monnaies grecques*, 1883, esp. pp. 118-123; lastly as a short summary, Head, *H. N.* pp. 197 seq. Philip, Alexander's father, had already to a certain extent struck out a new line in coinage. As possessor of the gold mines of Philippi he minted gold coins which at first bore the inscription ΦΙΛΙΠΠΩΝ and replaced the earlier coins of this place, which were stamped with ΘΑΣΙΩΝ ΗΓΗΡΩ, and competed with the darics, but afterwards the name of the city was dropped, and they became imperial coins, Head, *H. N.* 192. Silver coins, however, were coined by Philip on the Phoenician standard (1 tetradrachma = 224 grains), so that 30 drachmae had the value of one gold stater, in the ratio of silver to gold of 1:12½; Head, *H. N.* 196. On Philip's coins we find the head of Zeus, of Apollo and of Heracles, and on the reverse mostly types of the games (teams of horses). Alexander on his accession at first left the coinage untouched; he had not enough of the precious metals to turn out many new coins. When he was in a position to do so, he began, as Imhoof has shown, by striking silver coins with the head of Zeus on one side, and the eagle and thunderbolt with the inscription ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ on the other. The tetradrachmae which belong to this category are also of the Phoenician standard (327 grains), but the drachmae, triobols, diobols and obols are of the Attic standard, which Alexander subsequently followed entirely. This was his chief innovation, the adoption throughout of the Attic standard, for the tetradrachmae as well as the others. There are an immense number of so-called Alexandrian coins, i.e. coins with the inscription ΑΛΕΞΑΝΔΡΟΥ, and with various types: tetradrachmae mostly with the youthful head of Heracles in the lion's skin, rev. Zeus sitting on his throne; gold coins with head of Pallas, rev. a standing Nike; but how many of these Alexandrian coins were minted by Alexander himself, and how many not till the time of his successors, is still an open question with experts. As a rule it is assumed that most of them originated with his successors. During his period of conquest Alexander had at first so many coins of cities at his disposal, and had obtained so many darics as booty, that it was not till later that a

coinage of his own seemed necessary. As regards the types, Gardner's remarks (Types, p. 51) are interesting: "Abandoning Ares and Apollo, the hereditary deities, who appear on previous coins of Macedon, he had selected for his gold pieces Pallas and her servant Nike, and for his silver coin Heracles and the Zeus of Olympia. It looks as if he had wished to enlist in his army of invasion all the greatest gods of Greece who had favoured the Hellenes in those expeditions against Ilium, which he regarded as the prototypes of his own expedition. Pallas had been the chief patroness of the host of Agamemnon, Zeus had awarded it the victory, Heracles had in a previous generation sacked the Trojan city." It may be noted here that Alexander on landing in Asia sacrificed to Zeus, Athene, and Heracles, according to Arr. 1, 11, 6—an excellent example of history and numismatics illustrating each other, which, it appears, has not yet been noticed. "These gods then Alexander placed on his coins, which circulated through the whole extent of Europe and Asia, and these gods the marshals of Alexander inherited from him, as they inherited his military tactics and the lands he had conquered." Alexander's new coinage did not prevent the old coinage of the cities and even of satraps (Mazæus in Babylon according to Six) from being continued. In this direction too Alexander interfered as little as possible with the *status quo*. Cf. also Droysen, l.l. 302-304, also 233, 234; the cities were not bound down to Alexander's standard of coinage. Alexander did not issue bronze coins for the whole empire; his bronze issues were only coined in and for Macedonia; cf. Babelon, *Rois de Syrie*, p. xiii.

13. The results of the conquest of Persia were favourable for that country, according to Spiegel, 2, 581.

14. For the stories of Alexander, cf. Sp. 2, 582 seq. The pseudo-Callisthenes has been edited by C. Müller, after the Didot Arrian, Paris, 1846, and by I. Zacher, *Pseudo-Kallisthenes*, Halle, 1867. See also the *Life and Exploits of Alexander the Great* by E. A. N. Budge, Camb. Univ. Press, 1896, a series of Ethiopic texts edited from manuscripts in the British Museum and in the Bibliothèque Nationale de Paris, with English translation and notes, a splendid work, the publication of which is due to the munificence of Lady Meux; these histories, as the editor remarks, "are not mere translations of the Arabic texts which the scribes had before them, but reflect largely the Christian Ethiopian idea of what manner of man an all-powerful king and conqueror would be." Cf. P. Meyer, *Alexandre le Grand dans la littérature française du moyen âge*, 2 vols. Par. 1886. It is remarkable that in pseudo-Callisthenes Demosthenes delivers a speech in Athens in favour of Alexander.

"In India all recollection of the Macedonian conqueror has disappeared; not a trace of his rule is left in the country," Lefmann, *Gesch. Indiens*, p. 754. Cf. finally the fine passage of Gervinus on the stories of Alexander in his *Geschichte der deutschen Dichtung*, I, 211-231. An advocate of democratic views, he yet expresses himself in the following remarkable way on the importance of Alexander (p. 213): "It is only lately that people have begun to place this extraordinary man in his true light, and we have still to wait for a historian who will form a proper estimate of his relation to history in general. In the East as well as in the West he opened out a new world, and in their poetic creations both have coveted the honour of his birth and of his career, they have associated his name with all that is great, and Christian and heathen poets have thrown open the gates of Paradise to him. Long before Christ appeared, Alexander smoothed the path for the Christian doctrines of the equality of mankind by the way in which he destroyed the prejudices of his Greeks and Macedonians on the subject of a hierarchy of mankind, of Hellene and barbarian, and without the introduction of Greek civilization into the East Christianity would never have been able to take root." In the text of this volume I have been obliged to confine myself to an estimate of Alexander's personal achievements; the last point raised by Gervinus as well as the question of the darker aspects of the imperialism introduced by Alexander belong to the next volume.

Alexander the Great was an anomaly in the fourth century B.C. His was an age of talk, he acted. It was of a sceptical turn and ready to appeal to the petty side of human nature; he had faith, he relied on the noble element in mankind and had no reason to regret it. The combination of almost childlike trust with manly energy, of acute reflection with extraordinary rapidity of action, of perfect intellectual development and love of art and science with a passion for military life and great administrative talent, makes him an unique personality not only in Greek but in all history. He is, as it were, a poetical embodiment of the whole Greek character. He represents the whole course of Greek life, for he has as much of Achilles as of Epaminondas; he has even something of the spirit of Pericles, viz. political insight and love of beauty and truth. In him even more than in Alcibiades nature showed her power, and he did not waste her gifts like Alcibiades; fortified by a good education, which Alcibiades did not enjoy, he was able to devote these gifts to great tasks, and in his short life he did little harm, and much good. Even Mommsen (*Röm. Geschichte*, V, 446) says that Hellenic civilization reached "its highest point" in Alexander.

CHAPTER XXVIII

SICILY AND ITALY

HELLENISM did not make such a brilliant display in the West as in the East; in Sicily it held its ground with difficulty; in Italy it had to beat a retreat.¹

We saw in chapter xi. that Dion, after his banishment from Sicily, was requested by many persons to return to Syracuse to liberate the city; Speusippus, a pupil of Plato, who had also been in Syracuse, conveyed him the invitation of a number of Syracusans. Plato himself did not advise him to go. Dion undertook the expedition, but did not go alone as many had desired; he took with him mercenaries, any number of whom could be obtained at that time (about 360 B.C.) for money. The treasures of Dionysius were a tempting bait for men in quest of booty. In the year 357 he sailed with 800 mercenaries for Zacynthus on board three transports and two thirty-oared ships, with a large store of provisions and arms. He was at first driven out of his course to the great Syrtis, and afterwards landed on the south coast of Sicily near Minoa, a city belonging to the Carthaginians, the governor of which however was a Greek on friendly terms with Dion. The governor did not seriously oppose Dion's landing, and even helped him on his march to Syracuse, which he commenced at once, on hearing that Dionysius happened to be in Italy just then. On the way his army increased to 20,000 men. He entered Syracuse amid the

jubilation of the people; but the citadel, i.e. the island of Ortygia and the adjacent portions of the mainland, was still held by the mercenaries of Dionysius. The latter returned and opened negotiations with Dion, but only for the purpose of attempting a surprise, which was repulsed. He now endeavoured to accomplish his object by other means. Dion of course was his near relative, and the tyrant succeeded in making the people believe that Dion was at heart not a friend of liberty, but a supporter of the *tyrannis*, only on his own account. A Syracusan, named Heraclides, who came to Syracuse with a fleet and mercenaries to take part in the war against Dionysius, became a greater favourite with the people than Dion. A contest for supremacy arose between Dion and Heraclides, while Dionysius was still unconquered. In 356, however, Dionysius sustained a great blow by a defeat at sea, in which Philistus, the well-known historian and a relative of the tyrant, lost his life. Dionysius then fled to Italy, leaving his mercenaries under the command of one of his sons. The Syracusans now thought they could do without Dion and deposed him; he retired to Leontini. But when a captain of mercenaries named Nysius, who had come from Naples, made a successful sally from the citadel into the city of Syracuse, the citizens, who had no other resource, invoked Dion's aid once more, and he drove the troops back into the citadel. In spite of this, however, the public mind was not set at rest. Dion was not popular with all classes, not even when Apollocrates, the son of Dionysius, surrendered the citadel to him in 355. Now was an opportunity for displaying his talents as a statesman. He ought to have pulled down the citadel, and reintroduced a democratic constitution. But he was a disciple of Plato, had a poor opinion of democracy, and wanted to found an ideal constitution, for which purpose he awaited the arrival of some advisers from Corinth, who never made their appearance. On Heraclides becoming more and more obnoxious to him, he allowed him to be put to death.

He had now become a tyrant himself, and the solemn funeral rites which he ordered for the murdered man were only a proof of a weakness of character which utterly unfitted him for such an exalted position. Henceforth he relied more and more on his mercenaries, and very soon on one of them only, his ostensible friend Callippus, an Athenian, who, either of his own accord or at the instigation of others, fostered Dion's suspicions of everybody, isolated him more and more, and finally had him assassinated (in 354). Thus ended the first attempt at reaction against the régime of Dionysius, an attempt which was doomed to failure because it was made by the wrong kind of man and on mistaken principles. If the people were to take an interest in the change, they should have been given self-government, i.e. a democracy should have been introduced; if, however, Dion wished to school them in philosophical ideals and make them happy in that way, he ought at all events to have done something definite and tangible. But to overthrow a tyrant in order to rule as a tyrant himself, and then do nothing but wait, was a policy which seemed incomprehensible and intolerable even to the Syracusans with all their variety of strange experiences.

Callippus reigned during 354 and 353, at first under the mask of liberty—for had he not murdered a tyrant!—and then as a tyrant. He was deposed by Hipparinus, a step-brother of young Dionysius and nephew of Dion. Callippus occupied Catana and subsequently Rhegium, where he was murdered. On his death in 351 Hipparinus was succeeded by his brother Nysaeus until 346, when Dionysius once more obtained possession of the government. Hipparinus, Nysaeus and Dionysius II. were about on a par with each other in incapacity and depravity, and the Syracusans in their despair applied to Hicetas of Leontini, a tyrant, but not so bad in their opinion as Dionysius. Before, however, Hicetas could do anything for Syracuse, a new enemy invaded Sicily: the Carthaginian Magon landed with a large army. His object

was the conquest of Syracuse, and Hicetas joined him. The Syracusans therefore had to look about for aid in another quarter and at a greater distance. Sparta was not to be thought of; she had seldom displayed any interest in republican Syracuse. But Corinth had always done her best for the liberty of the Syracusans, and the latter therefore, in accordance with old Greek custom, appealed for help to Corinth, their parent city.

Corinth was not strong enough, even in the period of peace which succeeded the Phocian War, to send an army to Sicily; but she despatched a general, and this one man accomplished more than a large army. When the citizens were asked who was ready to go with troops to Syracuse, a man of about sixty-five years of age volunteered. This was Timoleon, who twenty years previously had been the object of general sympathy under the following circumstances. He had been a silent accomplice in the murder of his own brother, Timophanes, who had made himself tyrant of Corinth, and on realizing the ghastly nature of the deed afterwards, had withdrawn from public life as having committed too grave a crime to co-operate with honest men in the government of the State. He accepted the post offered to him, hoping that a second and guiltless suppression of a tyrant would wipe out the horror of the first. Hicetas' request to Timoleon not to hurry only increased his zeal; it was evident that Hicetas was afraid of the Corinthian. Up to that time Hicetas had fought with success, and when Timoleon put to sea with ten ships in 344, he had driven Dionysius into Ortygia and the citadel. When Timoleon was at Rhegium, Hicetas and the Carthaginians declared that they would not allow him to land in Sicily. But by outwitting the Carthaginian envoys Timoleon was able to embark, and on his arrival in Sicily he met with a friendly reception from Andromachus, the ruler of Tauro-menium. In the meanwhile the Carthaginians occupied the harbour of Syracuse, and thus the city was in a critical posi-

tion. But Timoleon defeated Hicetas at Hadranon, and after this the whole position changed. He now found allies; even the tyrant of Catana, Mamercus, joined him. When he appeared before the walls of Syracuse, Dionysius, who saw there was no possibility of holding out longer, and who had always preferred idleness to an active life, concluded a treaty with him, by which Dionysius was assured of an asylum in Corinth, and the citadel of Syracuse with its stores of arms handed over to Timoleon. Dionysius lived in Corinth for a long time as a well-known character, and managed to obliterate the memory of his former misdeeds by his eccentricities. In his character of begging priest and schoolmaster he was left unmolested. The "king in exile" was allowed not only to wander about the streets, but also to accompany Philip of Macedon when the latter visited Corinth, on which occasion Dionysius showed by his clever replies that his wit at all events made him a worthy counterpart of the other curiosity of Corinth, the Cynic Diogenes.

Timoleon, however, was still very far from a complete success. A force of auxiliaries sent from Corinth was detained in Thurii to help the inhabitants against the Bruttians, and Timoleon himself only escaped by a miracle from being assassinated in Hadranon at the instigation of Hicetas, while the citadel of Syracuse was blockaded by Hicetas and the Carthaginians. But as the enemy were attempting to wrest Catana from Timoleon, the Corinthians made a sortie from Ortygia on Achradina and held it. The Corinthian reinforcements now arrived, and Timoleon was able to confront his two enemies, Hicetas and Magon, with more prospect of success (343). Strange to say, Magon now withdrew, probably owing to the internal affairs of Carthage. His withdrawal made Hicetas' position a critical one. He still held three of the five quarters of Syracuse, but Timoleon by a skilful attack captured them all from him.

Timoleon's first task was to make Syracuse a free self-

governing community. The tyrant's citadel was pulled down, and courts of justice were erected on its site. Syracuse and the other Greek cities of Sicily were almost depopulated; Timoleon took measures to bring the fugitive Siceliots back to their homes. But the organization of domestic affairs had to suffer interruption from formidable wars. First of all, the tyrants of the eastern half of the island were defeated, then operations were directed against the Carthaginians, who in 339 (according to Diodorus' chronology) sent a large army to Sicily. Timoleon could not oppose them with many Syracusan citizens, he had to rely mainly on mercenaries, some of whom mutinied on the march. He met the Carthaginians on the river Crimisus, and completely defeated them. He himself decided the day by an attack of his heavy armed troops upon those of the Carthaginians, who were in large force and brilliantly equipped. A thunderstorm rendered him twofold service by driving into the enemy's face and making the ground slippery, which was a greater drawback to the very heavily armed Carthaginians than to the Greeks. The Carthaginians also had war-chariots, which however did as little harm to Timoleon's Greeks as the Persian chariots a few years later to Alexander's troops.² The booty was enormous. The pursuit of the defeated army was not carried far; Timoleon had to return to the east of the island, where Hicetas was still holding out, and where Mamercus also rose against him, while Carthage sent a fresh army to Sicily, which defeated some of Timoleon's mercenaries. This mishap, however, was interpreted as a mark of divine favour, for the mercenaries came from Phocis, and if Timoleon was rid of these temple-robbers, that was a proof that the gods were propitious to him. He had become a saint to the Sicilians, somewhat like Garibaldi in our days. Timoleon concluded peace with the Carthaginians on terms which were not unfavourable to them: the river Halycus (Platani) was recognized as the eastern boundary of their territory. He then de-

feated the tyrants, and put Hicetas and Mamercus to death.

Timoleon now turned his attention once more to the internal affairs, not only of Syracuse, but of the Sicilian communities in general. The ancient and famous cities of Camarina, Gela and Acragas received new inhabitants, some of whom came from Italy, Greece and the islands. Great restlessness prevailed in the Greek world at this time. People journeyed from east to west and from west to east, served as mercenaries, settled in newly-founded or newly-colonized cities. The Leontinians had to migrate to Syracuse. The removal of populations had become such a matter of custom in Sicily that even the best democrats had recourse to it under certain circumstances.³

Timoleon spent the rest of his life in Syracuse, highly honoured, an arbitrator for the Siceliots and still more for the Syracusans. He died as early as 336. As regards the population and the preservation of Greek civilization in the island, his work had some elements of permanence; on the other hand, the liberty which he introduced was soon destroyed by Agathocles. His is a heroic figure, worthy of a place beside Epaminondas and Alexander. He shared Epaminondas' love of freedom and modesty—he attributed his successes to Automatia, the favour of the gods—and Alexander's successful zeal for the Greek element; his ability as a general he had in common with both. The fourth century B.C. is extremely rich in interesting characters, which is due to the fact that the questions which cropped up had become more special than formerly, and therefore demanded intellectual power of the most varied kind.⁴ Among the statesmen of that age, however, next to Epaminondas, the noblest representative of the old Greek republics, and Alexander, the most brilliant soldier, Timoleon may be considered the greatest; he was the hero of western Greece.

We saw in chapter xi. that at the end of the reign of

Dionysius the Elder, Dionysius and the Locrians who were dependent on him ruled over the southern portion of the western extremity of Italy, the modern Calabria, while the northern portion was under the Lucani, who had mostly settled in the district where Philoctetes is said to have taken up his abode, north of Croton, which perhaps belonged to Dionysius. On the Gulf of Tarentum Thurii, Metapontum and Heraclea were still Greek, the latter entirely dependent upon Tarentum. How far the territory of Tarentum extended, and what Messapian communities were subject to it, we do not know. On the Tyrrhenian Sea Posidonia and probably also Laos had become Lucanian; the Lucanian rule therefore stretched from one sea to the other. In Campania Naples maintained her independence.

The younger Dionysius began his rule in Italy peacefully, as the sons of great warriors generally do. He even restored Rhegium to its old position. He concluded peace with the Carthaginians, continued the war against the Lucani without energy, and founded two cities in Apulia. When Dion attacked him he was in Caulonia on the Ionian Sea. But after his expulsion from Syracuse the natural baseness of his disposition asserted itself, and he maltreated the Locrians terribly. He had been on good terms with Tarentum; this was proved by his gift to the Tarentines of a candelabrum with as many lamps as there are days in the year, and by his granting the request of Archytas to set Plato at liberty. Archytas, who was famous as a Pythagorean philosopher, also stood in good repute as a general and governed the Tarentine state for some time. But after his death the Tarentines ceased to be successful in their wars. They were already notorious for their luxury and effeminacy; deprived of the wise guidance of the great philosopher and statesman, they gave the rein to their indolence and trusted to their wealth more than to their strength. They thought that money would procure them everything, even victory. About Ol. 108, 3

(346-345) they applied to their parent city, Sparta, for a general, just as the Syracusans appealed to Corinth for help about the same time, and no less a person than King Archidamus came from Sparta, bringing mercenaries with him just as Timoleon had done. But Archidamus was no Timoleon, and the Tarentines were more effeminate than the Syracusans, and not in such great straits as the latter, so that they did not even give a particularly warm welcome to their new general. Archidamus fought against the Messapii, and fell in the battle of Mandyrium, it is said on the same day that Philip defeated the Greeks at Chaeronea (338). The conquerors would not even deliver the body of the king to the Tarentines. Tarentum erected a statue to him at Olympia. There were many Phocians too among these mercenaries, and Phalaecus himself came to Italy in quest of booty. Being unsuccessful in this, he went to Crete, the general fighting-ground of adventurers, and there perished, like so many others of his stamp.⁵

About this time, however, a new foe confronted the Greeks of Lower Italy, the Brettians or Bruttians. The first certain reference to this people in history occurs about the 106th Olympiad (356), and they are generally described as a mixture of the original inhabitants of the country and of foreign slaves. According to others they were a branch of the Lucanians. At any rate they rose against the latter as well as against the Greeks. They plundered Terina, captured Hipponium (both on the Tyrrhenian Sea), and threatened Thurii on the Gulf of Tarentum; we have seen that a party of Corinthians, who were destined for Sicily, had first to assist the Thurians against these enemies. The date and place of the appearance of the Bruttians show that it was the break-up of Dionysius' empire which enabled them to assert themselves. The rule of Dionysius is shaken in 357, and the name of the Bruttians appears in 356. They simply take the place of Dionysius in Lower Italy. It is a rise of the native

element as soon as the tyrant, who has destroyed the Greeks of the country, is overthrown, which proves the correctness of the view that they were the original inhabitants. They wanted to conquer Locri, and were unsuccessful; but they probably took Caulonia. Their coins show that they were saturated with Greek civilization, which is intelligible in subjects of Dionysius.⁶

The Bruttians were too far from the Tarentines to be able to threaten them. The Messapii and Lucanians were continually doing so, and the Tarentines therefore soon after the death of Archidamus obtained assistance from another quarter. The peoples to the north of Greece proper had now become powerful, and Alexander, brother of Olympias and king of the Molossians, proceeded to Italy to found a power in the West, as his nephew was endeavouring to do in the East. In 334 he came to Italy with fifteen ships of war and numerous transports. At first he fought against the Messapii, but afterwards concluded an alliance with them. He also fought with the Lucanians and Bruttians, and captured various cities, among others Consentia (Cosenza) and Sipontum near Mount Garganus. He quarrelled with Tarentum, for the reason among others that he wanted to remove the festivals of the Greeks of Lower Italy, which were then held at Heraclea, into the territory of Thurii. The main influence of the Tarentines had been in Heraclea; farther south their prestige was not so great. Soon after this Alexander lost his life in the war against the Lucanians and Bruttians at Pandosia near Consentia; some exiled Lucanians, who were serving in his army, treacherously murdered him as he was crossing the river Acheron. His body was brought by Metapontum to Epirus (330). The Lucanians and Bruttians continued to harass the Tarentines and other Greeks of Lower Italy.⁷

About the same time Greek civilization received another check in Campania through the Romans, who now for the first time, at the close of this period, interfere in the fortunes of

Greece. When Cyme had become Campanian, i.e. Oscan, in 421, Naples had offered the Greeks of that city an asylum, but soon afterwards she too had been obliged to receive Campanians into her community. This involved her in a war with Rome. Rome had accepted Capua and therefore the Campanians as her allies in 343. The result of this was a war between Rome and the Samnites, then another between Rome and the Latins, which latter led to the admittance of most of the Latins to the Roman citizenship. About the same time as Capua, the cities of Cyme, Acerræ and Suessula fell into the hands of the Romans, probably Puteoli (Dicaearchia) as well. Thus the power of Rome was brought close to Naples. The Greeks of Naples had no hostile feeling towards the Romans. But when the neighbouring Campanian city of Nola, with which the Campanian portion of the Neapolitan population maintained close relations, became entangled in war with Rome, Naples was drawn into the conflict and compelled to take the side of Nola, in 328. The Romans advanced against Naples. The city was well fortified, and they besieged it for two years without success. But in the third year they forced an entrance into it with the aid of some leading Neapolitans, and Naples concluded a perpetual alliance with Rome, in which her independence was recognized, with the counter-obligation of supplying the Romans with ships in case of war.⁵

The year in which Rome attained this important position, 326, was that in which Alexander began his return march on the Hyphasis. Hellas therefore at that time extended, leaving the isolated Massalia out of account, from Naples to the Indus, for this was the area covered by the influence of the Greek spirit and the Greek arms.

In this period too, as in the last (chap. xi.), we can detect analogies in the development of the East and of the West. One of them is obvious. The campaign of the king of Epirus quite corresponds to that of the great Alexander. But it is

not improbable that a still more important resemblance exists. We have already noticed at an earlier date simultaneous attacks by Orientals from the East and the West, from Persia and from Carthage, upon the Greeks, in 480 and in 409, and at that time an understanding between the Persians and the Carthaginians is indubitable. Is it not likely that this was also the case in 340? Is it probable that the Carthaginians made their attack on Syracuse, which Timoleon repulsed, without concerting with the Persians, who were then acting with great energy in Anterior Asia under Mentor and Memnon?

We conclude with a general consideration of the position and attitude of the Greeks as regards the barbarians. In this period, as in the previous one, Greece was divided into three groups, the western, the eastern and the central. Eastern Greece, like the western group, had been from time immemorial exposed to great danger from barbarians; the central group, on the other hand, was protected from them by its position, and its development was so vigorous and brilliant that it was able to assist eastern and western Greece in case of need. But all this was suddenly changed directly after 360. Then the Greeks of the central group had their oppressors and succumbed to them. Only these oppressors were not mere barbarians, and the same men who placed serious limits on the republican freedom of the central Greeks, preserved eastern Greece from oppression by the barbarians, and, wherever they came, led the Greek cause to glorious victories. How remarkable it would have been if Alexander of Epirus had done in the West what the Macedonian Alexander accomplished in the East!⁹

NOTES

1. For Sicily see Holm, *Geschichte Siciliens im Alterthum*, Bd. 2; Meltzer, *Geschichte der Karthager*, Bd. 1, Berl. 1879; Cavallari and Holm, *Topografia archeologica di Siracusa*, Pal. 1883, with atlas, German version by Lupus, *Die Stadt Syrakus im Alterthum*, Strassb. 1887.—Special works are mentioned in my *Geschichte Siciliens* and in Meltzer's *Gesch. der Karthager*. When the choice lay between Plutarch and Diodorus as authorities, especially in the history of Timoleon, I have preferred the former. This view is disputed by Chr. Clasen in his critical remarks on the history of Timoleon, *N. Jahrb.* 1886 and 1888; he thinks that Diodorus' account, which is based on Theopompus, is preferable to that of Plutarch, which comes from the partisan Timaeus. But is not the exaggerated story in Diodorus about the fear of the Carthaginians at Lilybaeum, mentioned below, taken from Timaeus?

2. The battle on the Crimisus has this resemblance to Alexander's battles, that Timoleon's victory was decided by a vigorous attack on the enemy's centre. And the Carthaginian hoplites were certainly better soldiers than the Persians. Timoleon's defeat of a people which repeatedly beat the Romans is therefore very creditable, and historians will after all have to admit that Timoleon was a very great general. The difference between Alexander's and Timoleon's tactics consists chiefly in the fact that Timoleon did not win battles with cavalry; and as his cavalry force was small, he was unable to pursue the defeated Carthaginians as vigorously as Alexander did the Persians. This also accounts for the story of the defeated army being so terribly afraid of the wrath of the gods on their arrival at Lilybaeum, that they did not venture to escape by sea (Diod. 16, 81), which, translated out of Timaeus' bombast into plain prose, means that it never occurred to them to escape to Africa, because they saw that they were not molested.

3. The emigration *en masse* from Greece, which chiefly produces bands of mercenaries, began with the Ten Thousand. Then came the numerous mercenaries in Persia, and afterwards those in Phocia. Side by side with these there are migrations from Thrace and from the islands, e.g. from Samos. From 340-338 crowds pour into Sicily, in 334 and subsequently into Asia; then those who have served against Alexander in Persia return to Greece, and rendezvous mostly at the promontory of Taenarum and in Crete. In 322 the Samians return to their homes. The Greeks

were originally and always remained a wandering race. The migrations in the earliest times, then the founding of colonies, then the campaigns of the mercenaries, are a manifestation of one and the same peculiarity of character. And as mercenaries they as a rule maintained their integrity; cf. the conduct of the Ten Thousand and of the mercenaries of Darius when he took to flight. In Phocis too the rank and file seem to have behaved well; no outrages are attributed to them.—For the crowd of *πλανώμενοι* in those days, see Isocr. Phil. 96.

4. The leading figures of the fourth century may be divided into three groups: (1) those who were great in their own particular sphere; (2) those who had greatness accompanied by some glaring defect; (3) the mediocrities. Among the first I would place the following: Epaminondas, pure in character and great as a general (Pelopidas is to a certain extent the completion of him); Timoleon, self-denying and an able general; Alexander, with ideal tendencies, expiating his faults by public repentance, greatest of generals, great as a statesman; Plato, a writer and thinker of the first rank; Xenophon, a lover of truth, devoid of ambition; Agesilaus, the model of a Spartan; Isocrates, the first and greatest publicist of antiquity. In the second group: Philip, a great man, but occasionally betraying the semi-barbarian in personal intercourse; Demosthenes, great as an orator and in his love of Athens, but an arrant sophist and disputant, and, as Weil (*Harangues*, p. iv.) has well said, a man whose soul "*semble avoir perdu l'heureuse faculté de s'épanouir*," without which it is impossible to imagine a great man; Phocion, not statesman enough; Dion, a weak idealist; Dionysius I., great as a ruler, but a bad man. In the third group I would place Aeschines and the rest of the Athenian statesmen and generals, with perhaps a preference for Iphicrates and Timotheus: of Conon we know too little; the same remark applies to Jason of Pherae.

5. For Tarentum cf. Lorentz, *Vet. Tar. res gestae*, I. Evans' paper, *The Horsemen of Tarentum*, Num. Chron. 1889, vols. I, II, which we shall make use of presently, is an important contribution to the history of Tarentum. Phalaccus, cf. Lorentz, l. l. 23. Thibron went from Crete to Cyrene. Taenarum, Crete and Cyrene made the Mediterranean a regular hunting-ground for pirates of all kinds.—Archidamus, Diod. 16, 62, 63, 88; he gives the death of Archidamus first seemingly in 346, and then actually in 338. Mandonium is mentioned as the place of his death, which, according to Liv. 27, 15, should be read Mandyrium.

6. For the Brettians see my *Gesch. Sic.* 2, 200 and 467; Nissen, *Ital. Landeskunde*, I, 526, 535. At page 526 Nissen

gives 452 B.C. as the date of the first appearance of the Brettians, relying on Diod. 12, 22. But Diodorus has the following passage for the year 445: ἐπὶ δὲ τούτων διαφεύγοντες τὸν ἐν τῇ στάσει κίνδυνον Συβαρίται περὶ τὸν Τράεντα ποταμὸν κατέκρησαν. καὶ χρόνον μὲν τινα κατέμειναν, ἔπειθ' ὑπὸ Βρεττίων ἐκβληθέντες ἀγγρέθησαν. The Brettians therefore do not appear as destroyers of Sybaris on the Tracis until after 445, when, we do not know. The Tracis is the Trionto near Rossano. Mannert also (Italia, 2, 119 seq.) has some good remarks on the Brettiana. It has not yet been sufficiently emphasized that the Brettians owe their existence as a political entity and a political power to the break-up of the Dionysian *tyrannis*, which by destroying the Greek element in the south-western peninsula of Italy had directly and indirectly paved the way for the native element. After the fall of the *tyrannis* the only power left in this region was that of the natives, who were called Brettians. But they had been subject to the influence of Greek civilization for a considerable time, and this is why their coinage soon showed that they were imbued with the Greek spirit. Here we see a distinction between the Brettians and the Lucanians, who displayed hostility towards the Greeks from the beginning, and never completely submitted to them. The Lucanian coinage is less Greek in character than the Brettian. The Lucanians secured their liberty themselves; the Brettians became free when their ruler suffered misfortune; otherwise they would evidently have remained a subject race. I therefore disagree slightly with Head (H. N. 77), who considers that the Brettians acquired their civilization as a consequence of their independence. My view supplies a better explanation of this civilization. The Brettians take Terina, Hipponium, and Thurii in the year 356 (Diod. 16, 15), Temesa, according to Str. 6, 255, at a date not exactly determined.

7. Alexander the Molossian in Italy, Just. 12, 2; cf. Dr. 11. 160. His death is related by Livy, 8, 24 in a very corrupt passage, which is completely misunderstood by Lenormant, Gr. Gr. 1, 444 seq. Lenormant's topographical conclusions, which have been accepted by other writers, are based on a superficial reading of authorities.—For Alexander's attempts at organization, see Str. 6, 280, although the fact that the Acalandrus could hardly have flowed in the territory of Thurii makes the passage somewhat suspicious. The union of the Greeks was expressed by a *πανήγυρις*, i.e. only by a festal assembly; it never assumed a definite political form.

8. For Cyme, see Beloch, Campanien, p. 31. For the alliances of Naples with Rome and the topographical and historical

questions connected therewith, cf. Holm, *Ricerche sulla storia antica della Campania*, in the *Archivio stor. per le prov. napoletane*, An. xi. Nap. 1886.

9. The COINAGE of SICILY and LOWER ITALY in this period greatly assists the elucidation of the history of both countries. I can only deal with this subject very briefly, but hope to bring forward something new.—We saw that in Sicily, with the exception of a few copper coins of cities, the elder Dionysius alone issued coins in his dominions; he continued the early coinage of Syracuse, with the woman's head on one side, and the team of horses on the other. The younger Dionysius of course followed his father's example. Then came Dion. The latter may have introduced other coins, and in fact there are coins which may be attributed to Dion, electrum coins with the Apollo head on one side and various types, among others a tripod, on the other (Head, H. N. 156). That these coins were issued by Dion, is not intrinsically improbable, for the reason that there are silver coins of Zacynthus (Head, 360) with the same types and the inscription ΔΙΩΝΟΣ, which were evidently struck by Dion when he collected his mercenaries at Zacynthus (Plut. Dion, 22). This conjecture has been already made by Romano (see my *Gesch. Sic. im Alt.* 2, 462), and I am inclined to agree with it. True, it has been urged against this that Dion's reign in Syracuse must have been too short and too disputed for him to have introduced innovations in the coinage, especially that of an electrum in place of a gold coinage, and these electrum coins are therefore attributed to a later period, while some gold coins with a woman's head on one side and Heracles strangling the lion or an untethered horse on the other, are assigned to an earlier date (Head, *Coins of Syr.* p. 20, H. N. 154). Still after what I have said in the notes to chap. xi., and in view of the fact that the lion-strangling Heracles and the untethered horse are not appropriate emblems of a *tyrannis*, I am not inclined to ascribe these beautiful gold coins to the Dionysian period.—The same considerations have induced Evans (*Syracusan Medallions*, pp. 95, 96) to place these coins with the horse and Heracles strangling the lion in the period subsequent to the Syracusan victory over the Athenians. He describes how this last type, which seems to have originated with Euaenetus, appears in Italy "on the federal coins of the Italian Greeks," and is also used in Tarsus and Mallus; *vide supra* chap. xi. note 3. Cf. also *Zeitschrift f. Numism.* xvii. pp. 167-169, with Pl. X. If the foregoing is subject to much doubt, on the other hand it is certain that silver coins of an entirely new type, which are frequent in Syracuse from this time forward, are due to Timoleon. They are those which have a Pegasus, the symbol of

Corinth, the city of which Timoleon was a native, on the reverse. Some of them have the head of Zeus Eleutherios on the obverse, an appropriate emblem for the liberator, while others actually have the Corinthian type of the Pallas head with the Corinthian helmet. To this period of liberation, however, must be also ascribed the bronze coins which have the head of Zeus Eleutherios or Hellanios or a Pallas head on the face (Head, H. N. 157), and various types on the reverse, among them the thunderbolt, which I shall refer to presently. Thus under Timoleon Syracuse became one of those cities which were politically as well as commercially connected with Corinth; under Agathocles all this was changed. — The definitive overthrow of the Dionysian dynasty, however, is marked by a reaction in favour of liberty not only in Syracuse but throughout almost the whole of Sicily, and this too can be traced and confirmed by the coinage. Under the tyrants, as we saw, only the capital had a mint; but now coining reappears all at once in a number of cities. Thus we find silver coins once more in Acragas, Gela and Leontini, and the latter becomes so closely connected with Corinth that it actually issues Pegasi (Head, 131). Camarina and Messana certainly have a bronze coinage. And this independence revives not only in the Greek cities, but also in those of native origin. Etna, Agyrium and Alaesa put the head of Zeus Eleutherios on their coins; Alaesa, Herbesus and Morgantine have a woman's head, which is proved to be ΣΙΚΕΛΙΑ by a coin of Alaesa. This constitutes the first personification of the island upon a work of art, and that too in a city which wished to be regarded as originally Sikel and not Hellenic (Head, 110). For many of these bronze coins the above-mentioned Syracusan bronze coins of Timoleon were used as material; the Sikel cities placed their stamp over the Syracusan impression, without, however, being able to entirely obliterate the latter, so great was their impatience to announce their love of freedom to the world. The coins of Alaesa, just mentioned, reveal another remarkable fact. Some of them have the inscription ΑΛΑΙΣΙΝΩΝ ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ. There was therefore a league which was evidently under Timoleon's protection, and aimed at the liberation of the whole island; for the same coin which has the inscription ΣΥΜΜΑΧΙΚΟΝ (without ΑΛ), has also the head of Sikelia. — The complete emancipation of Sicily was, however, not carried out; the west of the island remained under Carthaginian influence, and this too is proved by the coins, for in western Sicily the old coinage continued, partly on the pattern of the Dionysian period, with the female head and the team of horses, as at Panormus, for instance. There are also coins of Heraclea Minoa and Eryx with a Punic

inscription; Entella, which was inhabited by Campanians, has some with a Greek inscription KAMIIANQN. Strangely enough these last also have Pegasus or an untethered horse (Head, 120). This horse is therefore regarded by some as an emblem of the tyrant Dionysius.

In ITALY several groups can be distinguished, of which Taras, Thurii, Locri and Neapolis may be regarded as representatives. Here too, as in Sicily, the influences coming from the East, from Greece, are of importance. On the whole, however, there is more continuity in the coinage of Italy than in that of Sicily, and the old systems are more retained. Many cities had escaped the Dionysian *tyrannis*, and these as a rule continued to coin in the old way; and the foreign generals, who might have introduced foreign types, did not do nearly as much in Italy as Timoleon or even Dion did in Sicily; they had of course not come to restore the freedom of the enslaved cities, but only to assist them against the barbarians. Thus these generals did not aid the cause of liberty much, and consequently had less influence upon the coinage than Timoleon, for instance.

TARAS continued to place its horsemen and its Taras sitting on the dolphin on its coins. The differences in the presentment of these types are slight, consisting only of variations in the attitude of the figures and in their accessories, which, however, has given A. J. Evans' minute investigation (see above, p. 411) an opportunity of discovering interesting connections between the coins and history. He ingeniously conjectures, for instance (p. 66), that the Tarentine gold coin, on which the youthful Taras raises his hands in supplication to his father Poseidon sitting in front of him, is intended to denote the city of Taras appealing for aid to its parent city Sparta, for the Poseidon of the promontory of Taenarum was also the god of Tarentum. Evans also conjectures that the premature and regrettable death of the Spartan king in the battle of Mandyrion is indicated on the coin on which Taras is presented in a meditative attitude contemplating a helmet which he holds in his hand (pl. iv. 10, 11), for although the holding of a helmet is not unusual with seated figures, yet in this case there is the additional circumstance that there are two stars near Taras, which might very well be an allusion to the Dioscuri, the protectors of Sparta. The influence of political events on numismatics is shown still more plainly in the period when the Molossian king Alexander stayed in Lower Italy. While his silver and copper coins were struck in Epirus, his gold coins were evidently minted in Italy (Head, H. N. 272). But Alexander also influenced the city coinage of Lower Italy. Thus we have small coins of Rubi

(Ruvo) in Apulia (a city otherwise famous only for the vases found in its tombs), which closely resemble the coins of Alexander (Evans, pl. v. 6-8) and prove that an alliance existed between the king, Tarentum and Apulian cities.—Another Tarentine coin (pl. vi. 3) has ΣΥΜ, which probably refers to this league. A further proof of Alexander's influence is the adoption of the symbol of the thunderbolt, which was an emblem of the Dodonean Zeus (Head, 272) and appears upon coins of Alexander and upon Tarentine coins in Italy. We know from history that Alexander quarrelled with the Tarentines and endeavoured to extend his influence farther westwards. Of this too traces are found in the coinage, for the appearance of the head of Zeus with a thunderbolt below on Metapontine coins of this period (Evans, p. 82, Head, p. 64), as well as what we are about to mention of Locri and Sicily, doubtless refers to it (Evans, p. 87).

In METAPONTUM the coins with the head of Zeus Eleutherios, which Head (64) places before 350, probably belong to this period. Besides this coins now begin with the head of the mythical founder of the city, Leucippus, whose Corinthian helmet gives them a certain resemblance to the Pegasi; on the reverse the ear of corn remains as formerly.

In HERACLEA the old coinage is continued: Athene with the Attic helmet, rev. Heracles wrestling with the lion (Head, 59), but the Corinthian helmet is also found on the head of Athene (Head, 59), which clearly points to the fact that the influence of Timoleon's fame and energy made itself felt here as well as in Metapontum. On the other hand, the two cities are united with Tarentum by the circumstance that the same die-cutter seems to have worked for all three (Evans, 73). Some drachmae of Heraclea have an owl upon an olive branch on the reverse (Head, 59), which shows a connection between the city and the distant city of Elea on the Tyrrhenian Sea, where the same symbol occurs (Head, 75). The coins of Elea have, as formerly, the head of Pallas with an Athenian helmet, and on the reverse a lion rending a stag (Head, 74).

In THURI the earlier coinage was also continued: the head of Athene with Athenian helmet, rev. a butting bull (Head, 72). Thuri fell into the hands of the Brettians about the year 356 (Diod. 16, 15), but must soon have regained its liberty.

In CROTON the silver coins with head of Apollo, rev. a tripod, which Head (83) assigns to an earlier date, must belong to this period (*vide supra*, chap. xi.), as they resemble the electrum coins of Syracuse. After what we have said above, it is possible that they date from the time of Dion, who may have influenced Croton.

Dion sailed from Zacynthus; we find relations between Zacynthus and Croton in earlier times (see notes to chap. v.)

Some coins of HIPPONIU (which was certainly conquered by the Brettians about 356), with the head of Zeus Olympius and on the reverse an eagle on a thunderbolt, are no doubt rightly ascribed by Head (85) to the time of Alexander of Epirus.

The coinage of Locri, which does not begin till the fourth century, evidently after the city had freed itself from the *tyrannis* of the Dionysian dynasty, is of great interest. This city adopts the Corinthian coinage: head of Pallas, rev. Pegasus, which proves the influence of Timoleon's expedition. It is, however, very remarkable that, as it would appear, almost simultaneously with these coins, quite different ones occur in Locri, of different types and different weight. The former are didrachmae of 135-130 grains, the latter from 120 to 115. This last is the Italic standard, such as we find, for instance, in Campania, which makes Head (86) say: "Italic standard for home trade," i.e. for inland, Italian trade. These Locrian coins have a bearded head with a laurel-wreath and the inscription IEYΣ, on the other side a seated woman with a herald's staff in her hand, and the inscription EIPHNH AOKPQN. It is noticeable, and has already been remarked by Head (Coins of Syracuse, p. 33), that this head of Zeus, which possesses the peculiarity of having the neck quite free from hair, occurs in exactly the same style upon bronze coins of Syracuse with the thunderbolt on the reverse, which has led Evans (p. 83) to remark that Syracusan coins of this kind might be a reference to the Molossian king made by the Sicilians, who expected great things from him for their island, a not improbable view. For Locri's relations with Alexander he cites (p. 87) a small silver coin with the thunderbolt and AOK, rev. "the seated Molossian eagle." All these facts justify us in concluding that two influences asserted themselves in Locri, the one, represented by the Pegasus issue, on the side of republican Corinth, the other, which found expression in the coins with Molossian symbols, in favour of a vigorous ruler.

MEDMA, a Locrian colony (Scymn. 307), also coins (1) Corinthian staters (which other numismatists, it is true, as they have only ME, ascribe to Messina); (2) bronze coins (Head, 89). Head says that Medma was taken in 388 by Dionysius and given to the Locrians; I find this related only of Caulonia and Hipponium, Diod. 14, 106, 107, and in Diod. 14, 78, the Medmeans are represented in the year 396 as subject to Dionysius, who transported many of them to Sicily; this statement of Head is therefore probably an oversight.

TERINA (Head, 98) also has (1) Corinthian Pegasi, (2) bronze coins. After what we have said above, we shall probably be right in placing the former, not, as Head does, in 388-356, but about 340. It is true that, according to Diod. 16, 15, Terina was conquered by the Brettians in 356, and it might be said that the Pegasi of Terina ought for that reason not to be placed after 356. But how could Corinthian types have come to Terina so early? Must we not rather assume that Terina freed itself again about 340, under the influence of Timoleon's campaign? Head assumes of Hipponium, which was in an identical position, that it regained its liberty, and the same is also to be presumed of Thurii. Another noteworthy circumstance is that at this time a nymph named Pandina occurs on coins both of Terina and Hipponium, places which lie close to one another.

RHEGIUM has also (1) Corinthian staters, (2) bronze coins at this period. The latter have a full-face lion's head on the obverse, and a head of Apollo on the reverse, and these types also occur on bronzes of Terina, which Head (98) dates about 272, but which no doubt belong to the fourth century, and on bronzes of a small and otherwise little known city, named NUCRIA (Nocera on the Savuto, Lenormant, *Gr. Gr.* 3, 87). Head therefore (89) comes to the correct conclusion that we must assume a close alliance between Rhegium, Terina and Nucria.

Before passing to general observations Campania remains to be discussed. Here NEAPOLIS continues its old coinage, in spite of its alliance with Rome in 326 B.C. NOLA, which was not a city of Greek nationality, but, as the objects found in the tombs prove, of Greek civilization, actually begins to coin now for the first time, silver didrachmae of about 114 grains like Neapolis, and with similar types. And the influence of Greek civilization in these central districts of Italy is so great, that even the Romans do not escape it. They begin to issue their first silver money about 338 (Mommsen), of the same weight as the Campanian didrachmae, with a head on one side and a standing Nike on the other and the inscription ROMANO.

We will endeavour in conclusion to glean some more general results for history.

In the middle of the fourth century the Greeks of Italy and Sicily are in great distress. The power of Dionysius I. had lasted for a considerable period. He had done material service to Greek civilization by maintaining a powerful Greek state in Sicily which opposed a barrier to the Carthaginians, but he had at the same time impaired the moral and intellectual vigour of his Greek subjects by his despotic rule, while in Italy he had enabled the

barbarians by means of the alliance which he made with them, to encroach considerably on the Greeks. But as soon as his incapable son had held the reins of government for a while, misfortune assailed the Greeks of the west from all sides. Dion's efforts were well meant but unpractical, and his weakness only made the confusion all the greater. The west seemed to be in a state of helplessness. But the old country still had a surplus of strength, and hence more than one attempt to save Italy and Sicily proceeded from it. Timoleon and Archidamus made their expeditions about the same time, 345-337. Timoleon's succeeded, Archidamus' failed. True, the results of this failure were not so very disastrous: for the danger of Tarentum, which had summoned Archidamus to her aid, was not so great as that of Syracuse. Nevertheless Italy still required help, and Alexander endeavoured to give it her, about 334-330. But the undertaking of this king was of quite a different character from that of Timoleon or even that of Archidamus. Timoleon had fought for freedom in the noblest sense of the word, Archidamus at all events for the cause of Greek nationality, and if he was seeking his own fame in the contest, yet he certainly also had the welfare of Sparta's colony at heart. The case of the Molossian king was quite different; he was not a republican like Timoleon, nor did he wish to help his kinsmen like Archidamus; he came to Italy to win fame like his great Macedonian nephew, and also to create an empire there as the latter did in Asia. This makes it intelligible that he soon quarrelled with the Tarentines, and then turned farther westwards to find a wider sphere of action there if possible. But it is also intelligible that the fact of his being an energetic monarch did not stand in his way everywhere, that on the contrary it rather encouraged many who were in greater distress than Tarentum, to trust to him. The inhabitants of Metapontum, Locri, Rhegium, Hipponium, Terina and Nucria were evidently in this position, and the coinage of these cities with its Epirote types proves that they placed hopes on him. And besides it is by no means improbable that he inspired hopes farther afield, in Sicily for instance, where, after the death of Timoleon, i.e. about 336, things were in a most critical state. True, all that we know of the condition of Sicily at that time is the little which Diodorus tells us in the introduction to his history of Agathocles, but so much is clear from it that oligarchic insolence was asserting itself in Syracuse, against which a vigorous soldier like Alexander would certainly have proved a good ally for the people; an Agathocles was soon afterwards tolerated for the purpose. In any event foreign aid would have been of service. Timoleon also had been a foreigner.

Timoleon's moral worth, as soon as he was known, commanded the respect of the most shameless, while casual citizens who had attained to public offices were not always obeyed even by all respectable people, and a city which, after years of revolution, had started on a fresh career with an infusion of new blood, still required a strong hand at the helm. This accounts for hopes being placed on Alexander of Epirus even in Syracuse, and for the occurrence in that city too of Molossian symbols, the head of Zeus, the thunderbolt and the eagle on coins, to which Evans (p. 83) has rightly drawn attention.

CHAPTER XXIX

THE CIVILIZATION OF THE AGE

WE conclude this volume with a brief account of the achievements of Greece in the province of the intellect during this period.

We saw in the previous period that the age of poetry was at an end and that the era of prose had begun. In the latter branch of literature, however, we find the same contrast which we met with in politics. Politically Athens represents the standpoint of city liberty, Alexander that of the extension of the power of Greece. But the same man who led Athens into the field against Macedonia, is in literature the chief representative of the art of prose, that is, of the formal side of literature, whereas Alexander's tutor confines his attention to extending the circle of human knowledge. We shall first discuss Attic prose and especially Demosthenes, who comes under consideration here not as a politician, but as an orator, that is to say, as an artist.¹

His writings form the second climax in Greek prose. Just as Plato's style is the perfection of intellectual conversation on the deepest subjects, so that of Demosthenes is the most brilliant example of addresses to a popular assembly or in a court of law. His speeches are monuments of considered art. Modern scholars, taking as their basis the observations of the old theoretical exponents of rhetoric, have studied the oratory of Demosthenes in great detail and with much success, and we

too propose to examine it briefly, because rhetoric is something peculiar to and characteristic of the Greeks and because Demosthenes represents the highest level attained by this thoroughly Greek art. The first thing that attracts our admiration is his use of various forms of speech, such as the Antithesis, the Anaphora (repetition of the same word at the beginning of co-ordinate sentences following one another), the Antistrophe (the same word at the end), the Anastrophe (the final word of a sentence repeated at the beginning of the one immediately following), the Asyndeton, the Polysyndeton (the same conjunction repeated). We also find forms of thought, such as the simple exclamation, the objection to what is said by the speaker himself (Hypophora), the addressing of fictitious persons (Apostrophe), the imaginary speech of other persons (Prosopopœia), the sudden suppression of things which apparently might have been mentioned but which are now only hinted at in a very intelligible way, the breaking-off in the middle of a sentence (Aposiopesis), the correction of an expression (Epidiorthosis), the pretence of a momentary confusion, which produces the semblance of impromptu so useful to an orator, the pretended ignorance of a name, which is also intended to convey the idea that the orator is speaking extempore. Demosthenes is also a master of irony and parody. All these devices can be used by an experienced orator on the spur of the moment, but now we come to arts which prove that Demosthenes polished his speeches more than is thought expedient at the present day. His art has three peculiarities mainly borrowed from Isocrates (see chap. xii.) The first is the avoidance of the Hiatus; the second is the avoidance of the succession of more than two short syllables, which gives Demosthenes' speeches something of the character of the Epos or dramatic dialogue with their dactyls and iambics, whereas lyric poetry, as is well known, has no objection to an accumulation of short syllables. The third is the application of the law of the rhythmical construc-

tion of prose, according to which the periods, which correspond more or less in length, are divided into two or more sections, *cola*, which also correspond to one another, so that the result is an adjustment of balance, which occasionally reminds modern readers of Pindar. On the other hand, Demosthenes is less regular in the arrangement of the whole subject-matter of his speeches. This is especially noticeable in his most famous oration, the *De Corona*, which forms with its antecedents such a peculiar contribution to our knowledge of the civilization of that age, that we must devote some attention here to the whole episode.

The services which Demosthenes had rendered after the battle of Chaeronea in rebuilding the fortifications of Athens, induced a certain Ctesiphon in the year 336 to move for the grant to him of a wreath, which was to be handed to him in the theatre at the festival of the Great Dionysia. Thereupon Aeschines accused Ctesiphon of breaking the law on the following grounds: firstly, that Demosthenes had not deserved the honour at all; secondly, that his failure to render an account of his office made the bestowal of the wreath illegal; and thirdly, that the presentation of it in the theatre was contrary to law in this case. The grant of the wreath was thus prevented until a decision had been pronounced on the charge. This, however, did not take place until after the expiration of six years, in 330, when Alexander was in Bactria with his army. It would appear that Aeschines considered this a favourable moment for attacking Demosthenes; but this was not the case, popular feeling was decidedly on the side of the opponent of Macedonia. The concourse of people to witness the contest of the two most famous orators of the age, was immense, and perhaps two such orators have never again confronted one another. Aeschines was the greater talent of the two, a man who in bearing, thought and mode of expression conformed to all the rules which a teacher of rhetoric could lay down. Demosthenes, on the other hand,

was more than this, he was a genius, an artist of the first rank, who sacrificed every rule to the impression to be produced for the moment, but at the same time contrived to fascinate the artistic Athenian people by perfection of detail. Aeschines begins his speech for the prosecution by pointing out that no motion for the grant of a wreath to Demosthenes could be made until he had rendered an account of his office; he then refers to the illegality of holding the ceremony in the theatre, and finally he argues that Demosthenes did not deserve a wreath. Demosthenes, he stated, had not always been an opponent of Philip, but had brought about the peace in concert with Philocrates, and had not agitated against Philip until later, to preserve his own popularity. Afterwards he had plunged Athens into misfortune by persuading the people to enter into a very disadvantageous alliance with the Thebans when they were threatened by Philip, an alliance which led to the death of many Athenian citizens. He had neglected the opportunity of attacking the Macedonians after the commencement of Alexander's campaign in Asia, which an opponent of the Macedonians, as he professed to be, ought to have done. Lastly, the life of Demosthenes was not of a kind to entitle him to so great an honour.

We do not know what Ctesiphon stated in his own defence. At all events Demosthenes said more than enough for him and for himself. He first of all passes skilfully over Aeschines' statement that he only censured him (Demosthenes) to prove the illegality of Ctesiphon's motion, and asserts that if Aeschines had so much to find fault with in him, he ought to have impeached him long ago. But as Aeschines represents him as unworthy of the wreath, he proceeds to show that he had deserved it for his constant labours for the glory and honour of Athens. He dwells in detail on his services in saving Euboea and Byzantium, and on his reorganization of the trierarchia, but only touches quite briefly on the legal aspect of the question, maintaining that he ought to have

received the wreath for having given the State money for the fortifications, and that no account was required of money given as a present. He then makes a personal attack on Aeschines, dragging his mother especially through the mire, and finally reverts once more to his own energy, commends the Athenians for considering only the justice of the case and not success, and asserts that Athens would have accepted the contest with Philip, even if she had known that she would succumb.

The judges acquitted Ctesiphon, and as Aeschines did not obtain even a fifth of the votes, he incurred a fine of 1000 drachmae. He left Athens, and lived first at Ephesus, then at Rhodes, and afterwards in Samos, where he died.

It is generally acknowledged that Demosthenes' speech far surpasses that of Aeschines as an oratorical performance. With Demosthenes every detail is to the point; he adopts the patriotic tone, in which he excels, with great success, and the invective thrown in for the sake of variety is very entertaining. On the other hand, no one doubts that he was wrong on the point of law, and that Ctesiphon must have been condemned if the jury had not been carried away by their feelings. As regards the attack on Aeschines' mother the verdict was given long ago.

Next to Demosthenes and Aeschines, the famous statesmen Lycurgus and Hyperides were highly prized as orators. Of the former we have the speech against Leocrates, a cowardly fellow, whom Lycurgus pursues with patriotic wrath; of the latter, who was a strong opponent of Macedonia, speeches are gradually coming to light in Egypt in the present day, which prove him to have been a very eloquent man. That he was a skilful advocate is shown by his defence of Phryne.

The oratorical art also invades history in the works of the two pupils of Isocrates, Ephorus and Theopompus. Ephorus of Cyme had been somewhat sluggish as a pupil; he wanted the spur, and his teacher had expressly recommended to him

the composition of history as the line best suited to his capacities. His *historiae* consisted of thirty books, and extended from the expedition of the Heraclidae to the siege of Perinthus by Philip. He is, as it would appear, mainly preserved for us in Diodorus, whose somewhat stereotyped treatment of events probably comes from Ephorus. We have no reason for charging him with partiality in the presentment of his characters. His son Demophilus concluded his father's work.

His fellow-pupil, Theopompus of Chios, was of a different nature; in his case the teacher had to use the curb. He was born in 380, was driven from his home by the democrats and then lived in Athens; he returned to Chios in 355, but after Alexander's death was obliged to go into exile once more and took refuge in Egypt. Where and when he died, we do not know. He repeatedly appeared as a rhetorician and won a prize for a panegyric on Mausolus. He wrote two historical works, a continuation of Thucydides from 410-394, and the history of King Philip, which by means of numerous digressions he turned into a comprehensive work, dealing with the whole of Greece. For him too we have to depend on the writings of others, which however, in accordance with tradition, reveal quite a different personality from that of Ephorus. His style was livelier than the latter's, and he allowed more scope to his own personal impressions in his treatment of events. He was fond of describing manners and customs, and of detecting people's motives; he circulated a great deal of scandal, which is the reason why Athenaeus often quotes him.

We have no right whatever to assert that truth was not the principal object of Ephorus and Theopompus, but their rhetorical method, partly handed down to them by others and partly invented by themselves, is sufficient to show that they are not on a level with Thucydides or Xenophon as original historians.

A marked contrast to these rhetoricians is found in Aris-

totle, whose life is exactly parallel with that of Demosthenes. He too was born in 384, and died in 322. Yet how different were their careers.²

Aristotle's father was Nicomachus, an Asclepiad, physician to King Amyntas II. of Macedonia. He was born in Stagira, probably visited Athens in 367, when Plato was in Sicily, and became his pupil when Plato returned. As he arrived at quite different views from those of his master, it is natural that the accounts of antiquity should have attributed it to a personal quarrel between the two men and have reproached Aristotle with ingratitude. But there is no authority for this. Aristotle himself has stated that for a philosopher love of truth must outweigh love for the master: *Amicus Plato, magis amica veritas*. It is possible that Aristotle founded a school in Plato's lifetime; but if so, it was a school of rhetoric, which art he, in opposition to Isocrates, treated with special emphasis on the real. After Plato's death Aristotle went to his friend Hermias, tyrant of Atarneus in Mysia, who is also said to have been a pupil of Plato, and who was led into a trap by the notorious renegade Mentor and put to death. Aristotle then withdrew to Mytilene. In 345 he was summoned to Macedon by Philip to be tutor to Alexander. Philip's remark to him is well known: "I was glad when a son was born to me, and I rejoice that it happened during your lifetime, for now you can educate him." The education can only have occupied about three years. No special expressions of mutual attachment between master and pupil have been handed down. Yet there can be no doubt of the great influence of the philosopher over his pupil. The young sovereign's enthusiasm for knowledge and its practical application was in any event fostered by his teacher, and it is characteristic that the tutor of the greatest founder of cities in antiquity made the first comprehensive studies of the constitutions of Greek and foreign cities. If Alexander was not considered so good a stylist as his father, this may be due to

the fact that the youth's tutor did not attach great value to the wisdom of Isocrates, and probably did not conceal his poor opinion of it. Aristotle, who looked only to the real himself, in all likelihood directed his pupil's attention to it as well. He remained for a time at the Macedonian court, where he also used his influence for the rebuilding of his native city Stagira, which had been destroyed by Philip. He then returned to Athens. Here he set up as a teacher of philosophy and rhetoric, and delivered his lectures in the Lyceum gymnasium as he walked to and fro, which led to the name of Peripatetic being given to his school. That he had an exoteric and esoteric circle of hearers there, each of which he instructed in a different fashion, is perfectly natural. After Alexander's death residence in Athens was made unpleasant for Aristotle. The hierophant Eurymedon and a certain Demophilus accused him of impiety, because he had composed a hymn in honour of Hermias, who was only a man and not a god. This might have been attended with serious consequences for the philosopher. He therefore withdrew to the city of Chalcis, which was protected by a Macedonian garrison, and died there as early as 322.

Aristotle was one of the most acute and prolific of writers, and the importance of his writings is immense. He traversed the whole field of the human knowledge of that day and advanced the cause of every science. He is the defender of the real as contrasted with the ideal world of Plato, the champion of the "proper mean," upon which his whole scheme of practical philosophy is constructed, as opposed to the onesidedness of the idealist, who recognizes only the highest as true and good. His sense of the value of proportion makes him a genuine representative of the Greek mind (vol. i. p. 3). His "magnanimous man" corresponds pretty closely to what Thucydides relates of Pericles or others of Epaminondas. The form of the writings preserved under his name is not very satisfactory; we do not know whether this is due to bad

copying, or whether, as is more probable, they are not his as regards their form but are note-books of the pupils who attended his lectures. In any case they were not published during his lifetime. His own publications were marked by perfection of form; they were philosophical dialogues, after the fashion of the day. Of many of his works fragments only are extant. To this category belongs the collection of 152 city constitutions; the *Didascalia*, a history of the theatre, based upon documents; collections of manners and customs; an *Alexander* or a treatise on colonies is mentioned. The whole of the later erudition of the Greeks, which usually goes by the name of *Alexandrian*, is founded on him; it is merely an amplification of his thoughts. Aristotle is in literature what Alexander is in politics: they both mark the conclusion of an old period and the commencement of a new one. As in the case of Alexander, his influence on posterity has been immense. It is both of a practical and methodical kind; the former owing to his enormous mass of material, and the latter, because he shows by means of rules and examples how not only philosophy but every science must be studied. His *Logic*, his *Politics*, and his *Poetics* possess authority even in the present day. We shall refer to his *Politics* again at the close of this volume. In the East—a remarkable coincidence with Alexander—Aristotle has become almost more famous than in the Greek world. His works were translated into Syriac and Armenian, and from these languages into Arabic, and he has found notable commentators among Mahomedan savants. Through the translation of the Arabic versions into Latin by Jewish scholars, the Christians of the West became acquainted with Aristotle, and the famous Dominicans, Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, contributed greatly to the diffusion of his works. He was the foundation of the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages. He thus becomes one of the pillars of the Catholic doctrine and of the Papacy, as Alexander is of Imperialism.

Subsequently, in the Renaissance period, the doctrine of Aristotle gives way to that of Plato, to precisely the same extent as in the age of the rise of the Christian philosophy. The reason is that it is not a system which suits an age of enthusiasm. When the heart speaks, then Plato is in the ascendant; when the intellect predominates, then men listen to the philosopher who is the best observer of the real world. His personality has also found its way into the poetry of the Middle Ages, just like his pupil Alexander. The wise Aristotle is outwitted by a beautiful woman.

Compared with the prose, which to some extent took the place of poetry, the poetry of this period does not deserve consideration. The artistic sense of the Greeks found expression during this period in the fine arts—architecture, sculpture and painting.

In architecture central as well as western Greece are surpassed by the East.³ The use of the simpler Doric style yields to that of the more varied and more cheerful Ionic, and a new style begins to assert itself, the Corinthian, the invention of which is ascribed by tradition to the sculptor Callimachus. The Corinthian order was so far as we know first used in the temple of Athene Alea at Tegea, built after OL 96 (398 B.C.), but only in a subordinate fashion, and generally speaking this style was not so prominent as the Ionic in this period. A leading architect of that time was Deinocrates, a Macedonian or Asiatic, who built a great deal for Alexander the Great, and restored the temple of Ephesus, which was burnt down at the time of Alexander's birth. Other notable architects were Pythius, Hermogenes and Argelius or Thargelius. These artists, of whom the first was the most famous, worked chiefly for the south of Asia Minor; to Pythius are ascribed the temple of Athene at Priene and the Mausoleum at Halicarnassus, to Argelius the Asclepieum at Tralles, to Hermogenes the temple of Artemis at Magnesia on the Maeander and the temple of Dionysus at Teos. Who rebuilt the temple

of Apollo Didymæus at Miletus at this period is not known. Of almost all these works, the temple at Ephesus, that at Priene, the Mausoleum, the temples of Magnesia and Teos and of Apollo Didymæus, remains are still in existence, which throw a welcome light on the character of the art of this period. Most of these buildings, that is the temples, cannot be noticed at any length in our brief narrative, but we must say a few words about the Mausoleum, which was considered one of the wonders of the world.⁴ This tomb of King Mausolus of Caria, erected in Halicarnassus by his widow Artemisia about the middle of the fourth century, was 144 feet high, and consisted of a lofty substructure surmounted by an Ionic peristyle temple, with a pyramid of steps for a roof, on the summit of which was a colossal statue of King Mausolus standing on his quadriga. The rich sculptural ornamentation of the building can only conceal the peculiarity of the whole design for the moment; it is a semi-Greek work, with Greek detail applied to a structure conceived in the Asiatic style. The enormous size of the work is Asiatic, as well as its great loftiness. In this connection other writers have already remarked that the Mausoleum has affinity with the tombs of the neighbouring Lycia (the monument of the Nereidae, for instance, which we shall discuss presently), which generally have a sort of temple on the top of a square substructure, so that the whole looks like a tower. This is partly accounted for, apart from the fondness of Orientals for lofty buildings—in Asia Minor towers (*tyrseis*) were the usual form of citadel—by the nature of the country. In Lycia it was necessary to build lofty tombs, if they were not to be completely dwarfed by the rocks which surrounded them. We may, however, assert that this style of construction exercised a great influence upon art generally, a point connected with the importance of south-western Asia Minor in this age, which we have noticed elsewhere. This preference for the tower form spread to Europe and produced, besides

inferior buildings, some very beautiful ones, as for instance the monument of Lysicrates in Athens, which was erected to make a tripod won as a prize visible from a distance (335 B.C.) It is a small round temple with half-columns of white marble on a high massive pedestal. In itself the means is altogether out of proportion to the supposed end, the support of a tripod; but the whole structure is so harmonious that the object is forgotten and the tripod comes to be regarded merely as an ornament of the summit, just as it had been formerly used as a decoration on the pediment of buildings. Thus did Athenian art contrive to extract beauty from this semi-barbarous principle of the tower-shaped building. But the taste for lofty constructions of this kind was displayed then and later in other countries as well. The tomb of Theron in Agragas seems to belong to this period, a sort of storied temple on a massive but somewhat narrow base; the tomb of Micipsa at Cirta and the pillar at Igel near Trèves are of later times. The fundamental idea of the Mausoleum reappears towards the end of the Middle Ages, in the famous tombs of the Scaligers at Verona, for instance, where a comparatively small statue is placed on a lofty structure of varied architectural design. We shall find a brilliant development of this type of south-western Asia Minor in the art of Pergamum. The art of southern Asia Minor had, as is proved by the Heroon of Gjölbaschi and the monument of the Nereidae, hit on the right idea of breaking the monotony of the massive base by surrounding it with a frieze of reliefs; the art of Pergamum managed to apply this principle too in a bold and skilful manner. The art of southern Asia Minor in the fourth century forms to a certain extent a connecting link between the grand art of Athens in the fifth century and the brilliant art of Pergamum in the second century B.C.

In sculpture the most famous name of the age which we are considering here is that of Lysippus of Sicyon, whose career coincides in point of time and has an internal connec-

tion with that of Alexander the Great. He appears to have been alive as late as Ol. 116 (316 B.C.) Lysippus was originally a simple worker in metals, and then made himself an artist by his own studies. In his later career, too, he executed only bronze statues. He must have been one of the most prolific artists that have ever existed, for not less than 1500 works are ascribed to him by the ancients. The number of those known to us, however, is comparatively small. He was the portrayer of the vigorous male body. Of his statues of gods the presentments of Zeus were specially famous; in Tarentum a colossal Zeus 40 yards high by this artist attracted admiration. A copy of a Poseidon by Lysippus in Corinth has perhaps come down to us. It is evident from the nature of his art that he must have executed many statues of heroes, but we only hear incidentally of statues of Heracles. It is supposed that the famous Farnese Heracles in Naples, the sculptor of which was Glycon according to the inscription, is mainly traceable to an original by Lysippus. His Kairos, a personification of the favourable moment, was remarkable, a figure with long hair in front and short hair behind, which was intended to convey the idea that an opportunity once neglected could not again be grasped "by the hair." Great artists may of course indulge in eccentricities of this kind, as a relief from more serious work. At this time art began to make allowance for the appreciation of the individual, which was in the spirit of the age, by showing a preference for portraits. Of living men Lysippus mostly portrayed Alexander, who would not allow any other sculptor to take his likeness. Besides single statues of Alexander he also executed groups, of which two are specially mentioned: Alexander with his comrades on the Granicus and Alexander hunting the lion. Hunting had long been a subject of Greek art; but in unconventional groups it probably came into vogue through Lysippus, and we can understand that it had a powerful attraction for an artist who liked to represent the

body in its vigour. Leochares, to whom we shall shortly refer, assisted him in the above-mentioned group; he seems to have had a special gift for the reproduction of animals. A famous bust by Lysippus was that of Socrates. Lastly, his *Apoxyomenos*, a youth scraping off the dust of the palaestra with a strigil, was in great repute. A marble copy of it is still in existence. In this statue, and probably in all those for which an exact reproduction of the living original was not required, Lysippus in fixing the proportions of the human body departed from the prevailing canon of Polycletus, by making the head smaller in proportion to the rest of the body, which was made more slender. Apart from this point, which is due to change of taste and not to imitation of nature—in the eighteenth century, as is shown, for instance, by Chodowieckis' engravings, a similar slenderness of figure combined with a small head was the fashion—Lysippus may perhaps be described as a realist.

The Leochares just mentioned, who executed statues of Alexander and other living persons and also worked on the Mausoleum, was probably an Athenian. His eagle carrying off Ganymede was celebrated; a copy of it exists in a marble group in the Vatican.

Of the famous sculptures of the period which are still extant, the most important are the reliefs of the monument of Lysicrates. They depict the punishment of the Tyrrhenian pirates by Dionysus. The motives in the presentment of the seated and struggling figures are of great beauty. Then we have remains of the sculptures of the Mausoleum, from the hand of Scopas, Bryaxis, Timotheus and Leochares; some of them have found their way into the British Museum through Newton. Among them a standing male statue, supposed to be that of King Mausolus himself, is specially worthy of notice. There also exist fragments of the frieze-reliefs, representing chariot-races and Amazons fighting with Greeks. Newton also made successful excavations in the neighbouring

Cnidus, which was a very flourishing city in the fourth century. Among the works of art brought from there to London, a fine colossal statue of a seated Demeter and a couching lion are remarkable. The former is traced to the art of Praxiteles, who created his famous Aphrodite for Cnidus. The lion lay on a large marble tomb, the roof of which was formed by an enormous stone; this recalls the grave of Theodoric at Ravenna, and once more conveys the impression of an art which has had to assimilate semi-barbarous elements.

Finally we come to the reliefs of the monument of the Nereidae at Xanthus in Lycia, which belongs to the category of the above-mentioned tower-shaped constructions. It was formerly called the monument of Harpagus, because it was supposed to be the tomb of a Harpagus depicted on it, and was ascribed to the fifth century. Now, however, it is rightly assigned to the fourth century, and is held to be the tomb of the Lycian prince Pericles, who conquered the city of Telmessus about the beginning of the fourth century. The reliefs represent a siege and other battles. The drapery of the detached figures, Nereidae in the act of advancing, recalls that of the Niobids in the Vatican. The building consisted of a substructure, ornamented with rows of reliefs and surmounted by an Ionic Peripteros.

Interesting relics of the art of that period are the terra-cotta figures, of which a great number have been found since 1870, especially at Tanagra. The roads leading out of Tanagra—and several important ones met in this city which was situated in the valley of the Asopus on the frontier of Attica—were found to be lined with numerous tombs, of which no less than 8000 have been opened. Many of them contained painted figures, which average about eight inches in height; and similar figures were also discovered in the ground round the tombs. The inside of some of the graves themselves was covered with painted stucco. As up to a short time ago no

tomb with this ornamentation and containing terra-cotta figures had been opened by trained archaeologists—they had almost all been opened secretly to evade Government interference with the free disposal of what was found—we have no scientific data for determining the period of the execution of the figures, apart from their artistic character, which points to the second half of the fourth century. The figures, some of which are extremely charming, evidently do not represent deities, but men and women as they lived in Boeotia in those days, and they were placed with the dead in order to surround the latter with what had given them pleasure in life, an idea which influenced the furnishing of the tombs from the beginning. The technique and material of the figures are not always the same, and the origin of one kind has been ascribed to Thisbe, quite in the west of Boeotia, and of another to the neighbouring Aulis. Among the figures those of the women are particularly charming, with their quaint hats, their fans, which appear to be made of palm leaves, and their handsome drapery; many seem to represent Boeotian women taking a walk. Similar figures are of course found in tombs elsewhere. Sicilian ones from Solunt near Palermo had been known for some time; recently many have been brought to light in Asia Minor, but they have none of the elegance which distinguishes those of Tanagra.⁵

In coinage all the districts of Greece vie with each other in beauty between the beginning of the fourth century and Alexander's campaigns. Lower Italy can pride itself on the coins of Taras, Heraclea, Thurii, Croton and Terina; Sicily on the famous issues of Syracuse; northern Greece on those of Panticapaeum, Amphipolis, and of Philip of Macedon; in Greece proper those of Thebes, of the Amphictyones, and specially of Elis and Arcadia are distinguished from an artistic point of view. Farther south the peculiar coins of Crete attract attention; Asia displays its art mostly at Cyzicus and Lampsacus, as well as in some coins of the satraps. In some

places, notably in the west, the artists were allowed to put their names on the coins which they turned out.⁶

The most famous name in the painting of this period is that of Apelles, who was an Ionian, a native of Ephesus or Colophon. He was summoned by Philip of Macedon to Pella, and when Alexander began his campaigns, the painter returned to Asia Minor and henceforth resided chiefly in Ephesus. He was Alexander's special painter, and is said to have received 20 talents from the king for a portrait of him. Subsequently, after the death of Alexander, he was able to devote more attention to other subjects, such as those of mythology. His *Anadyomene* was famous, as was an allegorical picture of slander, a canvas with a number of figures, which has been described by Lucian, and which modern painters, among them Sandro Botticelli, have attempted to reproduce from his description. As is proved by the example of Lysippus, a peculiar fancy for speaking in riddles must have prevailed among artists in those days. Apelles is the most famous painter of antiquity; his pictures were distinguished by a remarkable fidelity to nature—at least if we are to place any reliance on the anecdotes of the celebrated painters of antiquity. The only merit which the general public could see in a picture was ocular deception. He was favourably distinguished from Zeuxis and Parrhasius by his modesty, which must have increased his value in the eyes of Alexander.

The most celebrated rival of Apelles was Protogenes, a Carian or Lycian, who preferred Rhodes as a residence. Mythological pictures and portraits of his are mentioned, among them that of Aristotle's mother. He too is said to have aimed at deceptive imitation—with what truth is unknown to us. Many other painters of this period are referred to; among them Euphranor was famous for being also a good sculptor. He painted the portico of Zeus Eleutherios in the market-place of Athens.

The paintings of that age have survived only on vases. They show the refined taste of the period; but it has not been possible to trace any of them to special masters or originals. Some of the vases are decorated with red figures, some with figures of various colours, among which gilding also occurs; there are also vases with figures in relief attached to them and richly painted. The most beautiful have been found in the tombs near Athens, in those of the Crimea and of Campania and Apulia. Among the Apulian vases, many of which are in the Museum at Naples, there are splendid large-sized amphorae with a number of figures. The amphorae of Nola are distinguished by their brilliant black varnish; most of those found in the Crimea were probably brought there from Athens. Among the most beautiful vases which may be ascribed to this period are two in St. Petersburg: that from the collection of the Marchese Campana, said to be from Cyme, with gilded reliefs attached to it representing the Eleusinian deities, and an Aryballos, found in Kertch, with a picture of a hunt, in which Darius and other Persians, whose names are written on the margin, are taking part.⁷

Both before and during Alexander's reign eastern Greece is fully on a par with Greece proper in intellectual culture of every kind, at all events as regards the brilliancy of its achievements. The artistic side of this culture extends into Scythia, for the objects of art found in the tombs of the kingdom of the Bosphorus, especially in the neighbourhood of Panticapaeum, of which those in gold were certainly executed on the spot, mostly belong to the last three decades of the fourth century. Italy and Sicily are not in a fortunate position at this time; they are a prey to wars with barbarians. The West had no room for the slow ripening of scientific or artistic thought in the fourth century.

NOTES

1. I confine my remarks here on Demosthenes to points which have attracted little attention or have been left altogether unnoticed.

(1) Demosthenes as an orator. He is remarkable for not keeping quite clear of what we style rhetorical in the present day, and which neither the Romans nor the moderns know how to avoid. True, he never indulges in empty phrases, never says anything which does not bear directly on the matter in hand, never tries to bring his hearers or his readers into that hazy state of mind in which innuendo or amplification produces vague feeling but conveys no distinct ideas. But he is often sophistical. Even his modern admirers are of opinion that he not unfrequently tries to deceive. Blass (3, 1, 185) finds this natural, because he is an advocate; cf. Bl. 3, 1, 137 and 161. He says that Demosthenes "now and then, in small matters, does not adhere strictly to truth, as for instance when he says that Philip took the Thracian fortresses after he had sworn to the peace" . . . "these are secondary matters, which besides are not used for the purpose of proof, but as it were for an oratorical *crescendo*," Bl. 3, 1, 185. This last remark is certainly not true of the falsehood *εἰρήνην μὲν γὰρ ὁμομύκει* (Phil. 3, 15), which Blass has in his mind, for Demosthenes' whole argument in Phil. 3 turns on the point that Philip said that he was at peace, and yet acted as an enemy. And it would be a serious matter if Demosthenes accused an opponent of perjury in spite of his knowledge to the contrary, simply for the sake of "an oratorical *crescendo*." At all events Blass (3, 1, 85) says very truly: "Demosthenes does not always present the facts as they are; he does not want to trespass on the province of the historian" (we have taken this hint to the best of our power), "and be an impartial party-man." According to this, Blass' verdict on Aeschines (3, 2, 234), viz. that owing to his attempts at deception he was not a *bonus vir*, and consequently not a great orator, is also a condemnation of Demosthenes; and the well-known view of the ancients, that Isaeus and Demosthenes were *ὑποκριταί* even when they were on the right side, comes to the same thing. Demosthenes' masterpiece of sophistry is the third Philippic, so remarkable from a stylistic point of view, with its two glaring untruths about the past (§ 11 *ὡς πρὸς συμμαχίαν* and § 15 *εἰρήνην*, etc.), and the general one, relating to the present, about the nature of Philip's power; see above, p. 277.—A very correct estimate of Demosthenes is conveyed by some remarks of John Morley in his *Burke*, Lond. 1889, p. 184, where he says of

Burke's last writings against the French Revolution : " We deal no longer with principles and ideals, but with a partizan denunciation of particular acts and a partizan incitement to a given policy. We may appreciate the policy as we choose. But our appreciation of Burke as a thinker and a contributor to political wisdom is at an end. He is now only Demosthenes thundering against Philip, or Cicero shrieking against Mark Antony." The majority of German scholars will be horrified at this,—a Liberal statesman who speaks of "only Demosthenes thundering against Philip," as if this thundering against Philip were not the outcome of the highest morality. Most scholars still believe that when a Greek political orator, whose principles they approve, describes his opponent as a rogue, the latter must have been one ; in the present case they believe all the bad that Demosthenes says of Philip. They should read and inwardly digest what one of the leading statesmen of England, Lord Rosebery, says of these matters, in reference to the struggle between Pitt and Fox, in his Pitt, p. 29 : " It is this force of extremes that makes orators, and for them it is indispensable. Few sublime Parliamentary speeches have perhaps ever been delivered by orators who have been unable to convince themselves, not merely that they are absolutely in the right, but that their opponents are absolutely in the wrong, and the most abandoned of scoundrels to boot, for holding a contrary opinion. No less a force, no feebler flame than this will sway or incense the mixed temperaments of mankind." This applies admirably to Demosthenes and Aeschines. Demosthenes was certainly, if not always, at all events occasionally convinced that both Aeschines and Philip were "the most abandoned of scoundrels," and he said so plainly enough of the former ; but it would be rather too naïve of us if we were to repeat it after him more than two thousand years later.—The observance by Demosthenes of certain laws of form has been by no means exhaustively discussed, not even from the point of view of pure erudition. And the subject is not merely one of learned interest. According to Lord Brougham (quoted in Blass, 3, 1, 177) the ancient orators were almost as far behind the moderns in matter as they are in advance of them in form. Lord Brougham further says (Bl. 3, 1, 198) that not a word can be added to Demosthenes without weakening or destroying or damaging the sense, but then he was unable to make a proper application of Dionysius' remark about Demosthenes' attempts at rhythm, because at that time it had not been made intelligible by Blass' examples. But this law of rhythm complicates the question a great deal. For either Demosthenes employed this rhythm in his delivered speeches or did not apply it completely until the speech was published. In

the latter case he was not a perfect orator but perhaps a great writer, in the former the speech did come up to the ideal of a practical oration. Blass (3, 1, 115) has some warrant for saying: "One would be inclined to assert that there is often less difference between Demosthenes' prose and Pindar's lyrics, than between Pindar and Homer," and this refers to the rhythm. But political orations or speeches in a court of law require different treatment from poetry. You can create a state of feeling by poems (Solon), but you cannot propose measures by them. Blass' remark therefore implies censure on Demosthenes as a statesman, always assuming that the rhythm was in the spoken oration, and Lord Brougham's praise is consequently of little value. And the observance of the Demosthenic rules might even be a source of weakness from a technical point of view, from that of good rhetoric. If under certain circumstances seven short syllables in succession produce a striking effect (cf. Pind. Ol. 1, 8), then it is a short-sighted view to forego the possibility of producing a desirable state of feeling by this means. The same observation applies to the avoidance of the hiatus. These refinements came from Isocrates, in whose elaborately polished set speeches they might have been in place, although Isocrates himself at last grew tired of them and wrote in a more unconventional style when he wanted to produce an effect (Phil. 27, 28). But in speeches to a popular assembly or in a court of law rules of this kind are a clog, much as if a modern orator had to deliver a Parliamentary speech in blank verse. The effect which Demosthenes attained was due to other means than the *εραυθμία* of words. A complete adoption of the laws of form observed by Isocrates would have brought Demosthenes to the level of the artists who blindly follow rules invented by others for dissimilar conditions (e.g. the classical tragedy of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with its three unities), and would have made him far inferior to Plato as a stylist. But it is by no means certain that the strict rhythm which shows itself in periods and *cola* really goes beyond the introduction, the conclusion, and certain central portions of Demosthenes' speeches; the Athenians required more variety even in tragedies. The question of Demosthenes' perfection of form is still in an early stage in spite of the researches of Blass, which are excellent but are still, and quite rightly, treated with a certain reserve by scholars.

(2) The *De Corona*. This speech has no logical arrangement like the corresponding one of Aeschines. The greatest trouble has been taken to find one; cf. the acute book by W. Fox, *Die Kranzrede des Demosthenes analysirt*, Leipzig, 1880, and the notes on p. 187 of the Weidmann edition of 1885. These attempts carry so little

conviction that A. Kirchhoff has actually been able to distinguish two drafts of the same speech mechanically welded together in the *De Corona* (Berl. Akad. 1875). The two speeches are there, but for Demosthenes they are one, because logic was not his object but stirring up the feelings of his audience. Not only poets (cf. Boileau : "souvent un beau désordre est un effet de l'art") but orators occasionally attain their object by an apparent want of order, provided the important points crop up again and again and the discussion of them is interrupted by mental *pabulum* of a lighter kind. This, however, is precisely the case with the *De Corona* of Demosthenes.—After the stately exordium Demosthenes discusses a point which is not touched on by the prosecution, the Peace of Philocrates (18-52), and concludes with a sally at Aeschines' expense (*μωρωτός*). He then comes to the point, to the *γραφή*, and first establishes that he deserved the wreath, in doing which he treats of foreign (60-101) and of domestic politics (101-109). Then comes the legal question (110-125), with interpolated abuse of Aeschines (121). The speech should now end, but as Aeschines has vilified him, he must (*δεῖ*) also say what is "strictly necessary" about Aeschines. This begins with the famous invective (127-131); then Aeschines is taken in hand as a politician (132-140), and the assertion is made that he brought Philip into Greece by his treatment of Amphissa (141-159). Demosthenes makes use of this opportunity (*συμβέβηκε* 160) to revert to himself. He relates what he did when Philip occupied Elatea (169 seq., celebrated climax, 179, ridicule of the play-actor Aeschines, 180); interweaves a remark on success, which no one ought to judge by (192 seq.), and says very finely: and even if Athens had known that she would be defeated in the war, she would yet have done her duty and have begun it! In 208 we have the *ne plus ultra* of noble pathos: *μὰ τοῖς Μαραθῶνι προκινδυνεύσαντας*, etc. ("of tremendous effect," "a specimen of sublime style": West-Rosenberg), and immediately afterwards (209) the crowning insult to Aeschines: *ἔπειτ' ὁ κατάρτα*, etc., on which West-Rosenberg remark very aptly: "the orator probably felt that the repetition of the same ideas was making his audience relax in their attention" (but these ideas were "of tremendous effect"!), "and wanted an 'Auffrischung'" (*sic*). Then the serious narrative continues (211), although some pantomime (232) and a good deal of abuse (*αὐτοπραγικός πῖθῆκος*, 242-244) is interpolated for the further freshening up of the audience. He then refers once more to the *τύχη*, and makes this a pretext for an exhaustive tirade against Aeschines and his parents (256-265); in 270, however, he reverts to the *κοινά*, on which he wishes to say 'something' more. But in the meanwhile the audi-

ence is freshened up twice again (284 and 313).—Demosthenes' art in this speech does not consist of a logical arrangement of the whole; every one admits that the speech simply begins over again with § 160. The art consists of this, that the necessary points are repeated, and appropriate episodes inserted between the repetitions; it consists of keeping the audience fresh and freshening them up by alternation of defence and attack, of pathos and abuse, of tragedy and comedy. Demosthenes is a master of *μεταβολαί*, which Isocr. refers to in Phil. 26, and he uses them not only in delivery but in the subject-matter as well. He is Pericles and Aristophanes in one, and this of course pleased the great mass of Athenians. He feels so sure of victory that he does not even answer all Aeschines' charges, and he also feels so sure of his audience that in 208 and 209 he makes the great leap from pathos to bathos which we referred to above. An orator who can change voice, attitude and gesture as rapidly as Demosthenes did with *ἐπεὶ δὲ κατάρπτε* immediately after *μὰ τοῖς Μαραθῶνι* without breaking down, is unquestionably a genuine *πρωταγωνιστής*; cf. Weil's shrewd remark on this passage.—To bring out the full significance of this talent of Demosthenes I refer to an analogous modern case. In his book *Fifty Years Ago*, Lond. 1892, W. Besant quotes from Grant's *Random Recollections* the following description of O'Connell's oratory (p. 134): "One of the most extraordinary attributes in Mr. O'Connell's oratory is the ease and facility with which he can make a transition from one topic to another. 'From grave to gay, from lively to severe' never costs him an effort. He seems, indeed, to be himself insensible of the transition. I have seen him begin his speech by alluding to topics of an affecting nature, in such a manner as to excite the deepest sympathy towards the sufferers in the minds of the most unfeeling person present. I have seen the tear literally glistening in the eyes of men altogether unused to the melting mood, and, in a moment afterwards, by a transition from the grave to the humorous, I have seen the whole audience convulsed with laughter. On the other hand, I have often heard him commence his speech in a strain of most exquisite humour, and, by a sudden transition to deep pathos, provoke the stillness of death in a place in which, but one moment before, the air was rent with shouts of laughter. His mastery over the passions is the most perfect I ever witnessed, and his oratory tells with the same effect whether he addresses the 'first assembly of gentlemen in the world,' or the ragged and ignorant rabble of Dublin." Most orators have a certain manner in which they excel: either pathos, or humour, or perfection of form, or acute logic. Demosthenes, like O'Connell, seems to have been effective

in every style, and, like O'Connell, to have known how to pass at once from one tone to the opposite, a feat which very few speakers can accomplish without offending their audience. The above description of O'Connell seems to me to apply exactly to Demosthenes, when he is smashing Aeschines. Aeschines, on the other hand, had only one manner in which he excelled, the dignified manner.—The *De Corona* speech is, like that *περὶ παραπροβέας*, against which the same reproach of want of order is made (cf. Weil's Notice), a great work of art in its psychologically suitable arrangement, the main object being a crushing success with the audience. Faults of dialectic and moral defects take nothing from the value of a work of art of this peculiar kind. The assertion (244) that he (Demosthenes) was not responsible for Chaeronea, because he was not the general is a mistake in dialectic. I did, he says, only what a *ρήτωρ* can, i.e. make preparations (246). He suppresses the fact that he brought about the war and prevented the peace, without troubling to consider whether Athens possessed generals capable of carrying on the war which he had caused. If this is an excusable piece of special pleading in an advocate, his attempt to conceal the fact that Ctesiphon ought to have been condemned by law is a moral defect in the speech. A democrat should be the last person to make light of any illegality. When Blass (3, 1, 379) holds that the fact that "Aeschines was partly right on the point of law can only seem of importance to the jurist," he underestimates the value of the law. Demosthenes had a better idea of it in his speech against Aristocrates (100, 101), where he himself describes what he does in the *De Corona* as an *ἀναιδεια*. We can understand that Demosthenes resorted to every device of an advocate to win his case, but this is not the proper standard for us. Even if, a point on which we are ignorant, Aeschines was on a lower level than Demosthenes as a man as well as a statesman, still it was the true interest of the Athenian and of every other state to see that the courts did not go behind the clear provision of the law.—In the *De Corona* (280) Demosthenes very skilfully depicts Aeschines as a man who is not in touch with popular feeling.—For Lysurgus, cf. Dürrbach, *L'orateur Lysurgue*, Par. 1890.

2. For Aristotle cf. *inter alia* the exhaustive article by Zell in Pauly's R. E. 1, 2, 1634-99.—The *μεγαλόψυχος*, Ar. Eth. Nic. 4, 3.—W. Hertz, *Aristoteles in den Alexanderdichtungen des Mittelalters*, München, 1890 (Akad.), and columns 1012-1055 by Gereke in Pauly-Wissowa, vol. 2.—The recently discovered 'Aθ. πολ., referred to in vol. ii, p. 463, is undoubtedly the same as the 'Aθ. πολ. of Aristotle cited by ancient lexicographers and scholiasts. The work bears evident traces of having been written between the

years 329 and 322. It is of great value for the history and for the machinery of the Athenian constitution, but leaves scope for many points of detail. The only question can be whether this treatise is from the pen of the great thinker, or whether it was compiled by him from materials collected by his pupils, in which case Aristotle would of course have expressed his political views and given a character of unity to the work. We must, I think, consider the latter hypothesis as probable, both in the case of the *'Aθ. πολ.* and of the other 157 constitutions of the collection. For how could the philosopher, with his exhaustive study of problems of physical science and philosophy, have found time for collecting the materials for a description of the constitutions of so many cities? If on this assumption Aristotle is relieved of responsibility for the individual facts, it also accounts for the possibility of errors slipping into the historical part of the work. It is possible, for instance, that the *'Aθ. πολ.* does not take quite a correct view of Dracon's legislation, or of the career of Themistocles. At any rate we must examine and criticise the historical statements in the *'Aθ. πολ.* just as impartially as those of other writers who were not such great thinkers as Aristotle. The result is that a number of special questions raised by the study of the *'Aθ. πολ.* have to be decided. The shortest and best summary of the materials for them is now to be found in Busolt, *Gr. G.*, vol. 2, 2nd ed. pp. 14-55. To the editions mentioned there, of which that by Sandys is the most useful, must now be added, as the most recent, the 2nd edition by Blass, *Leipz.* 1895.

3. Architecture. Durm, *Die Baukunst der Griechen*, 189-191. The present researches are inadequate for the history of the artists, as appears from Rayet's remarks in *Études d'Archéologie*, 86-169.

4. For the Mausoleum see Baumeister, *Denkm.* 893 seq. New views on the construction of the Mausoleum have now been put forward by Trendelenburg at a meeting of the Berlin Archaeological Society. For Cnidus see vol. i. p. 153.

5. For Lysippus and Leochares see the articles in Baumeister. —For the monument of the Nereidae, Baumeister, 1013 seq. The account of the war waged by the Lycian Pericles against Telmessus is in Theop. 111.—For the figures of Tanagra cf. A. Rayet, *Études d'Archéologie*, 275-324, Pottier, *Les statuettes de terre cuite*, *Par.* 1890, p. 79 seq., and Murray, *Handbook of Gr. Archaeol.* pp. 310 seq.

6. The best collection of the finest types of coins of the fourth century is to be found in *Pl. v.-x.* of Gardner's *Types of Greek Coins*, *Cambr.* 1883, with text. For the names of the die-cutters

see the well-known works of von Sallet and Weil, and especially Syracusan Medallions and their Engravers, Lond. 1892, by Arthur J. Evans, who has arrived at new and highly important conclusions.

7. Painting. See von Rohden's article in Baumeister, esp. pp. 868 seq.—For Euphranor, Wachsmuth, *Die Stadt Athen*, 1, 588 ; 2, 448.—The vases, von Rohden, *Vasenkunde*, in Baumeister, esp. pp. 2002 seq.—The Apulian vases are mostly from Tarentum ; that Cyme could still turn out Greek vases even after 420, we see from Strabo, 5, 243.—For vases generally see also Collignon, *Manuel d'archéologie grecque*, Paris, pp. 294 seq.

GREEK PUBLIC LAW

I. I CONCLUDE this volume with some observations on Greek constitutional law, which may not be out of place at the close of the republican period, all the more as this subject has not been adequately treated hitherto. The conception of the state—*πόλις*—is composed of two factors. The *πόλις* is a community of individuals, independent without and organized within. The former is the *αὐτονομία*; the second arises from the existence of an *ἀρχή*, i.e. of the possibility of commands being given which the citizens have to obey, consequently of a government. Individuals who conduct the *ἀρχή* are *ἐπεύθονοι*, accountable for their actions. In the oldest times the kings were the depositaries of the *ἀρχή*. Their power was limited only by custom and was therefore of a vague character, but here, too, the idea of responsibility was present. At a later period the archons took the place of the kings in Athens, the constitution of which is most accurately known to us; but their powers were gradually much restricted and the sphere of their *ἀρχή* became very small. The real *ἀρχή* was in fact assumed by the people itself, although it always exercised it through individuals only, who were responsible for the measures, *ψηφίσματα*, proposed by them. Cf. vol. ii. p. 198, where it should only have been stated more clearly that a resolution of the *βουλή* was never regarded as a motion but only as an opinion, and that a *ψήφισμα* could proceed only from one and never from several persons, for the sake of responsibility. Consequently in Athens any one who liked could govern, provided he could convince the people; it was a peculiar combination of personal and general government. The *ἀρχή* carried out by officials, the Roman *imperium*, seems to have been reduced to a minimum in Athens after the time of Cleisthenes. The Athenian magistrates had rather a power of removing things, of clearing away obstacles; positive directions, which imposed

obligations on the citizens, were not within their province. Only the people could issue these. Of great importance, however, was the fact that only the whole people was convened for this purpose; there was no representative system, a point specially emphasized by E. Freeman in his *History of Federal Government*, vol. I, Lond. 1863. Only one exception was allowed by the Greeks: laws were passed without the direct co-operation of the whole people; cf. vol. ii. p. 207. Laws were regarded as an emanation of wisdom, which the people presumed to exist only in individuals and not in every member of the community.

3. The fact that the Greeks were without representation in the exercise of their civil rights constituted the main obstacle to a more extended union of Greece, which consisted of a collection of independent states. The basis of public law was the resolutions of those qualified to vote. How could these be obtained in the interests of a league? Were the states to decide? If one state decided differently from another on affairs of common interest, whose view was to prevail? The autonomous states would have been obliged to part with certain rights to representatives, and none of them were willing to do this. In many cases alliances were absolutely necessary, especially in cases of war. But how difficult it was even then to establish a vigorous supreme command is shown by history. Obedience was not always rendered even on the field of battle, as at Plataea for instance. But if it was a question of whole campaigns, then each contingent was responsible only to its own city (vol. ii. p. 404). As a rule the authority of the commander-in-chief was nil. Hence alliances were generally devoid of power, and the Athenians knew what they were about when they changed their *συνμαχία* into an *ἀρχή*. The Spartans acted towards their allies as dictators whenever they could, and Isocrates (Phil. 47) calls the Spartan leadership a *δυναστεία*. Among the Greeks no common undertakings were ever successful without compulsion. Demosthenes (*Ροδ. ἐλευθ.* 29) defines the state of Greek public law as follows: *τῶν δ' Ἑλληνικῶν δικαίων οἱ κρατοῦντες ὀρῶνται τοῖς ἡττοσὶ γίγνονταί*, that is to say, among Greek states the right of the stronger, brute force, prevails. True, the idea of representation was not absolutely unknown in the relations of the *πόλεις* with one another; this is proved by the second Athenian League. But this league too was not tolerated long, and one member of it, Thebes, probably never complied with the resolutions of the majority. In the interests of the allies, therefore, an *ἀρχή* was always to be preferred to a *συνμαχία*. But in the eyes of the Greeks an *ἀρχή* deprived the states so controlled of their *αὐτονομία* (Thuc. I, 139), lowered them. No Greek would put up with this in the long-run.

3. There were, however, districts in Greece in which permanent alliances already existed or were much desired. These were territories not possessed by a single πόλις, but by several, which however considered themselves as belonging to a single ἔθνος. Here the πόλεις formed a κοινόν, which was frequently represented by a συνέδριον. Such districts were Thessaly, Boeotia, Phocis, Achaia, Arcadia, Crete, and others. But the forms of this representation were very varied, and, on the whole, there was no disposition to leave much to the common decision. In Crete, for instance, which was so homogeneous that Aristotle refers to the Κρητικὴ πολιτεία in general, the συγκρητισμός was only thought of in times of danger; at other times the πόλεις of Crete often waged war on one another. Internal wars were not uncommon also in the other districts mentioned above. And they broke out especially when any one of the πόλεις took it into its head to press the union more vigorously. In general, a closer union of autonomous πόλεις was felt to be so little necessary, that Aristotle does not refer to it at all in his *Politics*, which he must have done if it had been considered desirable. He does not discuss the κοινόν. The πόλις, to which he confines himself, must be of such size that the citizens are able to know each other personally; Pol. 7, 4, 7. And his constitutions are meant only for πόλεις of that kind, a point which modern writers invariably overlook, and apply to ἔθνη what he, like all Greeks, intended only for cities. This state of the πόλις inspires him with so little anxiety for the security of Greece that he says (7, 6, 1): the Greek people (ἔθνος) ἐλεύθερόν τε διατελεῖ καὶ βέλτιστα πολιτευόμενον καὶ ἐνδύμενον ἀρχαίαν πάντων, μᾶς τυγχάνον πολιτείας. The passage is of great interest in more than one respect. It shows, first, that Aristotle had no apprehension about the freedom of Greece in spite of Philip and Alexander. The πόλις remained what it was, as long as foreigners did not interfere in its internal affairs, and Aristotle knew that the Macedonians had no wish to do that. True, Plato had despaired of the Greek πόλις, but only because it did not internally satisfy ideal requirements; he too wanted a πόλις of limited extent. In the very period which we are accustomed to regard as the close of Greek liberty, Aristotle reverts to the traditional standpoint of the Greeks; he considers the πόλις quite sufficient for Greek requirements. One thing only it does not supply, and this is the second important point in Aristotle's observation. If Greece wishes to rule over others she must have a common constitution, but he does not state what this ought to be, evidently because he could not form an idea of it. The remark contains an allusion to Macedonia. The Greek πόλεις are able to

make their citizens happy, the gratification of lust of rule they must leave to others. Aristotle was not altogether wrong.

4. When, therefore, an attempt was made to bring about greater concentration in districts where the communities, although independent, regarded themselves as closely connected, there arose the question, how were the common interests to be regulated? The communities were not willing to entrust the latter to representatives. Under these circumstances they usually preferred to assemble from all the cities, and take counsel together and adopt resolutions, consequently to unite the communities of the various πόλεις into one. This was the practice in Aetolia and Achaia, and probably also in Arcadia (*vide supra*, chap. ix.) But it was after all a very imperfect arrangement. For if such a meeting was poorly attended, what moral authority had it? As a rule only the well-to-do citizens undertook the journey to the assembly. In any event these κοινά did not present an internal organic development of the πόλις: they were merely an external conglomeration of different πόλεις. Besides, unions of this nature succeeded only in cases where the population was evenly distributed over the country or over smaller cities. When particular cities predominated, they put difficulties in the way of the whole communities (Arcadia, chap. ix.) Where, however, one predominated, it wanted to seize power for itself, and that gave rise to wars. In Boeotia the Orchomenians, in spite of similarity of race, were politically almost as opposed to Thebes as the Mytilenaeans to Athens. In these districts the permanent repugnance of the smaller states to the predominance of the larger ones led to the use of force by the latter. If the citizens of the smaller states will not submit, let them go! Other people are put in their place. They came back again when opportunity offered, would not cease their resistance, and finally were put to death; Diod. 15, 57, 79.—If then the various districts could not unite, in spite of all their efforts, how was it possible for the whole of Greece to unite? In the former there were after all points of connection, but in the whole of Greece there were none. There never had existed a κοινόν of all the Greeks. The Greeks, as L. Schmidt has aptly remarked, had no Kyffhäuser, and never had a Barbarossa. All attempts of the kind ended in the ἀρχή of a single state, and if the despotisms of Sparta and Athens had been forgotten, the demand of the Thebans, so inconsistent with their claim to be the liberators of Greece, that Athens should draw up her fleet on shore, would have proved that the Greeks could not be brought under an external form of union without unendurable compulsion.

5. The consequences of this want of perception that the πόλις

was not all-sufficing, were bad enough in the ordinary course of events, even when no foreign foe threatened the Greeks. Permanent alliances between πόλεις were quite indispensable. Their duration, however, depended upon the good-will of the parties, who might abandon the alliance at any moment. The leading state had therefore to see that the other communities did not take into their heads to secede; in other words, that the latter had and retained the same interests as herself. These interests might be of a commercial nature, but were mostly political. Aristocracies, for instance, could best rely on aristocracies in the allied cities. If there were none in existence, then they were established, and the party which resisted was banished, otherwise the city in question might revolt. The result was that owing precisely to the absolute independence of each πόλις, the leading city interfered far more often and far more seriously in the internal affairs of the weaker allies than if all Greece had possessed one common constitution. The whole was not organized; consequently the independent parts collided with greater damage to each individual than would have been the case in an organized federation of states.

6. If therefore unity was unattainable in Greece, because an ἀρχή of the whole, of whatever kind, was not tolerated, still a certain unity was regarded as desirable even in the political sphere, and it was recognized that for this voluntary combination a head, an authority, a leadership was a *desideratum*. From the fourth century B.C., when the idea of it occupied all minds, this leadership was called ἡγεμονία. We moderns, in our consideration of Greek history, have given this word a higher significance, and have used it in a more general sense than the ancients themselves. ἡγεμονία in the fifth century denoted only leadership in war, not in time of peace. According to Thuc. 1, 95 seq., after the battle of Mycale the Ionians besought the Athenians to be their ἡγεμόνες against the Persians, as they did not want to leave the ἡγεμονία in the hands of the Dorians, and the Athenians accepted it; Thuc. 1, 96. No doubt even in those days it was recognized that there might be common interests in time of peace also, for which the religious centres, the temples and oracles, did not adequately provide, and the most important of these interests was the protection of the weaker against violence. This was considered to be the duty of the strongest state in Greece. But the state which held this post of honour was not given the title of ἡγεμονία: it was called the προστάντης of Hellas. Thus, according to Herod. 1, 69, Croesus is aware that Sparta προστάνει τῆς Ἑλλάδος, and in 5, 49 Aristagoras says to the Spartans: προέστανε τῆς Ἑλλάδος. The

conception involved in this *προστάταιναι* is seen from the general meaning of the word. The *metoeci* in Athens have a citizen as *προστάτης*, the statesmen are *προστάται τῆς πόλεως*, Dem. Ol. 3, 27, popular leaders *προστάται τοῦ δήμου*, Xen. Hell. 3, 2, 27. According to Arr. Succ. AL 13, Craterus is *προστάτης τῆς Ἀρριδαίου βασιλείας*. The *προστάτης* does not control those "over" whom "he stands"; he represents them, he looks after their interests. This idea, when applied to the whole of Greece, means that Sparta, or whatever state was *προστάτης* of Greece, held as such an honourable position, which involved more duties than rights. That the Greeks continued in the fourth century to connect this idea, which is quite distinct from a *ἡγεμονία*, with the word *προστάταιναι*, can be seen from their writers. Thus Xenophon (Hell. 3, 15, 14) says: *ἐὰν προστῇτε τῶν — ἀδικουμένων*: (5, 1, 36), that Sparta was *προστάτης τῆς εἰρήνης* (see p. 61); Demosthenes (15, 30) says that the Athenians ought to be *κοινοὶ προστάται τῆς ἀπάντων ἐλευθερίας*, and Isocrates uses similar language, *De Pace*, 46. The *προστάτης* of liberty is its protector. This was the point of view of the Greeks; all *πόλεις* are independent; but it is right that a *προστάτης* should be at hand to protect the weak against the oppression of the strong. Thus Dem. Aristocr. 124 says of the Athenians: *τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἐπ' ἐλευθερίᾳ προστάται φάσκοντες*: Dem. Cor. 200. Also of Athens: *ἀξιοῦσα προστάται τῶν ἄλλων*: Isocr. Paneg. 57 to the same effect. Isocr. Phil. 16 says that Philip ought *προστῆναι τῆς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ὁμονοίας καὶ τῆς ἐπὶ τοῖς βαρβάρους στρατίας*: in § 71 he uses the word *ἐπιστάτης* in the same way. According to Xen. Hell. 4, 8, 28, the Mytilenaeans are to be *προστάται* of the whole of Lesbos. Sometimes, no doubt, the word is used as a milder term for ruler, in Dem. Phil. 3, 23 for instance; cf. Xen. 4, 1, 8.—So far as I know, an abstract substantive, derived from the same stem, is not in use at this time to denote the idea conveyed by *προστάτης*. Originally there is no abstract word at all for it; at a later period (Isocr. Paneg. 203) the word *ἡγεμονία* is used in that sense. (Later still *κηδεμονία* is synonymous with *προστασία*, Dexipp. ap. Phot. p. 64.) It is, however, if I am not mistaken, of considerable significance that there is no abstract word derived from *προστάτης*. Such a word would have conveyed the notion of a permanent office; there would have been according to general acceptance a "presidency" of Greece. This is just what the Greeks would not have; the *προστάτης* was to come on the scene only when a need for him existed; what he had to do depended on circumstances. Characteristic of the use of the word *προστάτης* is its altered meaning in the mouth of Procles (Xen. 6, 5, 43), who is persuading

the Athenians to join the Spartans : *τίνας δὲ ἂν παραστάτας ἦδιον τούτων ποιήσαισθε* ; the Spartans, *εἰ πάλιν ἔλθοι τῇ Ἑλλάδι κίνδυνος ὑπὸ βαρβάρων*, are to stand by the side of and not in front of the Athenians.

7. Gradually, however, the feeling made more and more way among the Greeks that a real common constitution would after all have its advantages ; only nobody knew what it ought to consist of. They got so far, however, in this respect as the term *ἡγεμονία*, which had formerly denoted only supreme command in time of war (Herod. 7, 158-160 for instance), and accustomed themselves to saying that a state had or aimed at the *ἡγεμονία* of Greece even in time of peace. The general political meaning of *ἡγεμονία* does not begin till Xenophon, which is not usually noticed, and even he does not use it at once in the *Hellenica*. In 3, 5, 14 *ἡγεμονία* is employed in the military sense, when a prospect is held out to the Athenians of being actually *βασιλέως ἡγεμόνες* against Sparta. In 4, 1, 8 and 4, 2, 13 it is still used in the military signification ; in a purely political sense, that is, the sense favoured by modern writers, I do not find it till 7, 1, 33. Isocrates uses it in the Panegyricus about 380, e.g. in §§ 18, 20 and elsewhere, in the older meaning of leadership in war ; but in § 103 in the political sense ; so also in *De Pace*, 46. In Dem. Cor. 65 it does not refer to the whole of Greece, but is used in its political signification.

The Greeks, therefore, were of opinion that it would be a good thing for Hellas to have a *προστάτης* to protect the oppressed, a *patronus*. But no permanent authority was to be called into being for this purpose. In the fourth century, however, it was found that the *ἡγεμονία*, which originally came under consideration only in the case of general Hellenic wars, was also aspired to in times of peace by individual states, such as Thebes, and people began to accustom themselves to the idea that a single state should always take the lead in politics too. But only in theory ; in practice difficulties cropped up every moment whenever this political hegemony was started. Sparta, the ancient *προστάτης* of Greece, never recognized such a hegemony in others. Athens, on the other hand, submitted for a brief space in 338 to the hegemony of Thebes.

In the next volume we shall meet with further laudable attempts to give greater unity to Greece.

8. An *ἀρχή* of a special kind, however, was always recognized by the Greeks, especially because Athens always claimed it in the fifth and fourth centuries—the *ἀρχή κατὰ θάλασσαν*. This *Thalassocratie* is a political conception which has a long history in Greece ;

it goes back to mythical times ; see vol. i. p. 295. But we know very little of this ancient rulership of the sea ; in particular, we do not know whether the term was intended to denote merely the practical supremacy of one city, or whether certain political rights were permanently connected with this *θαλασσοκρατία* (of which Minoas figures as the mythical founder), as was the case with the Athenian *ἀρχή*. We may perhaps lay stress on the fact that the earlier naval supremacy, the history of which gives rise to much doubt, is described as *κράτος*, i.e. an actual state of things, while that of the fifth and fourth centuries is styled *ἀρχή*, i.e. one sanctioned by law. Both, however, resembled each other in this, that, so far as our knowledge goes, they applied only to the Aegean Sea. The *ἀρχή κατὰ θάλασσαν*—that is the scientific term—was commenced by the Athenians, according to Isocr. Paneg. 72, when the Ionians offered them the command of the Persian War. Athens interpreted this by taking the words *κατὰ θάλασσαν* in their literal sense, and claimed the surface of the Aegean as Athenian property. This is shown by the fact, as we saw in vol. ii. p. 403, that they regarded it as a violation of their territory when the Spartans sent troops to Epidaurus by sea (Thuc. 5, 56), and also by the very severe measures taken by the Spartans at the beginning of the Peloponnesian War, when, according to Thuc. 2, 67 *πάντας ὅσους λάβοιεν ἐν τῇ θαλάσῃ ὡς πολεμίους διέφθειρον, καὶ τοὺς μετὰ Ἀθηναίων συμπολεμοῦντας καὶ τοὺς μὲν μεθ' ἐτέρων*. It was only because the Athenians declared the Aegean to be Athenian territory that the Spartans could go so far as to put to death all the prisoners they took there, and who did not belong to their own side. Any one caught on hostile territory who cannot prove himself a friend, is regarded as an enemy. This conduct of the Spartans was cruel even on this assumption, but would have been a sheer impossibility without it. With the downfall of Athens in 404 her naval supremacy ceased. But she soon renewed her claim to it. This we see from the censure of Isocrates, *De Pace* 13, where it is stated that there are bad men who *λέγειν τολμῶσι ὡς χρὴ τοὺς προγόνους μιμεῖσθαι, καὶ μὴ περιορᾶν ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς καταγελωμένους, μὴδὲ τὴν θάλατταν πλείοντας τοὺς μὴ τὰς συντάξεις ἐθέλοντας ἡμῖν ἱπποτελεῖν*. There was therefore a desire in Athens to bring back the old days when only those who paid *συντάξεις* to Athens as allies could sail on the Aegean ; people who aimed at this still considered the Aegean Sea as Athenian property, or as an Athenian lake, as we should say nowadays. Isocrates, in his speech *De Pace*, advises the Athenians to abandon such claims (c. 21), urging that Athens would only prosper *ἢν παυσώμεθα τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς κατὰ τὴν*

θάλασσαν ἐπιθυμοῦντες. He sees such a great difference between this, in his view, unjust ἀρχή and the just ἡγεμονία which Athens can exercise over the Greeks, that he says in conclusion (c. 47) that Athens must relinquish the ἀρχή in order to obtain the ἡγεμονία ἐς τὸν ἅπαντα χρόνον. This ἡγεμονία must resemble the royal office at Sparta, which can never do wrong, and for which her citizens are glad to die in battle. The true ἡγεμονία consists in ἐφεδρεῖν, and in readiness τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις βοηθεῖν. Athens ought therefore to be προστάτης.

9. We see therefore that as a matter of fact Athens wanted to use her fleet in the fourth century to oppress other people. This explains the possibility of Pelopidas' demand at Susa (Xen. 7, 1, 36): Ἀθηναίους ἀνέλκειν τὰς ναῦς. They were to give up their fleet. To make such a demand on Athens through Persia was as arrogant as it was unpatriotic; for who could supply the place of the Athenian fleet? But if we consider that in the opinion of many Greeks Athens had used it unjustly, we can at least understand the feeling which prompted such a foolish request. The Athenians indeed could still urge that they were after all doing some service to Greece by their ἀρχή κατὰ θάλασσαν. They provided for the security of all who liked to trust to their protection. They fulfilled the wish which had led to the proposal of a congress by Pericles: ὅπως πλείωσι πάντες ἀδεῶς, Plut. Per. 17. But as there were many people in Athens who insisted that this protection should be given only to those who were ready to pay συντόξεις to Athens, the ἀδεῶς πλεῖν became a somewhat dubious matter, and we can understand that the other Greeks were not satisfied. We can also comprehend why Philip, in 342, asked for a share in this provision for the security of the sea: περὶ δὲ τῶν ληστῶν δίκαιόν φησιν εἶναι κοινῇ φυλάττειν τοὺς ἐν τῇ θαλάττῃ κακουργοῦντας ὑμᾶς τε καὶ αὐτόν. Hegesippus declines it, "as implying that the Athenians were not in a position to keep guard at sea without Philip's assistance," as Sch. D. 2, 436 says in a note to the speech De Halonn. 14. The point at issue was not one of 'keeping guard,' but of maritime supremacy. The Athenians did not want to give up the latter by admitting the right of another power to keep a fleet on the Aegean. If they alone had a fleet there, they could exercise their ἀρχή as they chose, in a strict or mild fashion; if there was another fleet there, their ἀρχή would be at an end.

10. The claims of the Athenians and the resistance of the other Greeks thereto recall incidents of both ancient and modern times. Just as the Athenians asserted dominion over the Aegean Sea, so did the Phoenicians claim supremacy over the western half of the Mediterranean and the Atlantic, and Venice over the Adriatic.

But it was mainly the action of the Portuguese, who regarded the Indian Ocean as their property just as the Spaniards did American waters, which led to disquisitions on public law. The Portuguese claims, which were taken over by the Spaniards, were bound to give dissatisfaction to able sailors like the Dutchmen, and Hugo Grotius therefore was acting not merely in the interest of mankind in general, but of the inhabitants of the Netherlands in particular, when he published his *Mare Liberum*, L.B., 1609. The doctrine of the freedom of the seas rightly met with general approval, and the Englishman Selden's *Mare Clausum sive de Dominio Maris*, Lond. 1636, has not been able to impugn it. But in practice the *Mare Liberum* still gives rise to controversy. The latest attempt of the United States to make the eastern half of the Behring Sea an American *mare clausum* is very remarkable. Powerful states are always disposed to obtain for themselves special advantages in this way, and the question of the *Mare Liberum*, which preoccupied the Greeks so much, is still, in spite of Grotius, far from being decided.

END OF VOL. III



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W.

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