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Imperialism in Modern History

Six Lectures

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PREFACE

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D. G. E. H.

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IMPERIALISM IN MODERN HISTORY.

Six Lectures.

I.—THE ROMAN EMPIRE.

Imperialism is a word to which many and various meanings have been attributed. Some men have regarded it as connoting that aspect of the acquisitive nature of mankind which is dangerous, greedy and deserving of repression. Others have seen in it an ideal of progress, political, economic and cultural; an important step in the higher organization of mankind which is perhaps inevitable as the race progresses. It is a word which is used on political platforms, and in the calmer intellectual atmosphere of the study and the classroom, in the columns of the newspaper, and in the more dignified and less-often read pages of the political philosopher, and its meanings multiply with the diversity of circumstances under which it is employed. I feel therefore that an attempt to trace out some of the more striking examples of the influence of the imperial idea upon the course of modern history may help us to gain a juster appreciation and a clearer conception of what has been and still is one of the greatest political ideals in the world. In doing so, I hope to bring out some of the salient features which have characterised, at different periods and under different circumstances, the attempts of various states to set up a wide dominion and a higher political organization than that of the territorial state or the national state. I shall do this strictly in a spirit of historical inquiry; I hope to treat the subject in as impartial a spirit as may be humanly possible, so that we may think calmly and reasonably upon the affairs of man in a spirit unswept by the stormy winds of party passion, uninfluenced by the raucous cries of political agitation. To-night therefore let us consider together the great Roman Empire which, beginning with the defeat of Rome's commercial rival Phœnician Carthage in the third and second centuries before Christ, attained its first definite imperial organization under Augustus Cæsar (30 B.C.—14 A.D.). Then after two centuries of peace during which Roman civilization, Roman law and order, and the Roman armies dominated the whole Mediterranean world and much else besides, revolution, disorder, and corruption began to set in, barbarian foes began to break in over the boundaries, and, in spite of the work of reorganization carried out by Diocletian and Constantine early in the fourth century, the western half of the Empire fell in the following century leaving the eastern half a Roman Empire only in name. The time at my disposal is short; the amount of material vast. It is necessary therefore for me to limit my survey to certain special features the study of which will help us to concentrate our attention upon the contribution made by Rome to the history of the Imperial idea. These features will be (a) The growth of the Empire,



The Empire at the height of its power, and (c) The causes of its decline and fall.

The City of Rome, founded, so tradition avers, by two brothers, Romulus and Remus, seven hundred and fifty-three years before the opening of the Christian era, lies on the south bank of the River Tiber midway down the western coast of the Italian Peninsula. The Tiber itself flows from the western slopes of the Great Apennine range of mountains which has so often been termed "The backbone of Italy," and this river is called by books of geography "the chief navigable river of the western slope." Early Rome, situated at a spot where the river was easily forded, was a place of commercial importance; there roads met and traders exchanged their wares. Thither wended the stubborn, dull-witted peasant of Latium—the name given in ancient times to the plain south of the Tiber—with his grain or his cattle to exchange them with a keen Etruscan merchant from the north in return for finely carved bronze weapons or tools. The Latins of Latium feared the Etruscans; they feared lest this great nation living in the northern half of the peninsula should one day swoop down upon the defenceless plains south of the Tiber. So they built a great fortress on the summits of seven hills lying to the south of the ford, and Rome became an outpost against the hated Etruscans. But the Etruscans seized the fortress, and for many years Etruscan princes ruled there. They welded the loose confederation of settlers into a compact city-state which they drained and made healthy, and which they beautified with magnificent buildings. They taught the Romans to read and write, using the Greek characters; they gave the Romans a religion that was better than their original animism; and for two and a half centuries the Roman population was Etruscan in civilization, the characteristic features of which it never completely lost. There came a day however, at the beginning of the fifth century B.C. when the great noble families in Rome—called the patricians—banded themselves together to expel the Etruscan King. They were successful; Rome became independent and a Latin aristocracy ruled in the place vacated by the Tarquins, as the Etruscan Kings had been called. Two Magistrates, called consuls, holding power for one year only, were invested with the old royal power. They were elected by an assembly of all those men in the state who possessed a sufficient property qualification to enable them to bear arms—but this body was entirely managed by the patricians, and only patricians could be elected as consuls.

The internal history of Rome for the next two centuries is concerned almost entirely with the struggle—finally successful—of the lower orders, the plebeians, as they were called, to secure political and social equality with the patricians. Three times in the struggle did the plebeians in desperation quit Rome and set up a city of their own outside the mother-city. Their "direct action" undoubtedly served to show the patricians that Rome could not live without her plebeian element, and so in the end step by step the latter won equality.

Externally Rome's energies were alternatively defensive and expansive. At first the Etruscans in the north were a terror by night and a menace by day. Rome therefore was led to coalesce with the



cities of the plain of Latium to form a defensive league, known as the Latin League. Gradually Rome, an equal at first, assumed the leadership in the League. The Etruscans were pushed back, marauding Italian tribes were punished and restrained, and notwithstanding its capture and sack by the Gauls from the region of the Po in 382 B.C. followed by a great revolt of the members of the Latin League, who hated Rome's assumed priority, the plucky city soon entered upon a career of further expansion which made her mistress of the whole of Italy south of the Po. The Samnite peoples of the centre of Italy, were reduced; the Greek Colonies in the south were crushed; and finally when in 280 B.C. the vigorous and able Pyrrhus of Epirus led to the help of the Greeks of Italy an army composed of the best soldiers, and trained according to the most advanced methods of the time, Rome after a period of defeat forced the gallant king to evacuate Italy in 275, and suddenly found herself a great power.

Rome's method of dealing with this huge increase of territory was eminently wise and sane. Had she annexed all the conquered lands, their peoples would have been discontented and alienated, and at a later date in a crisis of Rome's history might have brought about the complete downfall of the new power. Instead of this the subject cities were granted a large measure of self-government; to their citizens was extended the privilege of what is called partial citizenship of Rome by which they were given the protection of the Roman State in carrying on commerce and business, the full rights of a Roman citizen in the law courts, and certain social privileges such as that of intermarriage with full Roman citizens. They in their turn had to subordinate their foreign policy to that of Rome and supply the Roman armies with a certain number of men. In disaffected districts Rome planted colonies of full citizens who spread Roman civilization and influence, and linking up all these with one another and with the mother city there gradually spread over Italy that wonderful system of roads which has led men to say "all roads lead to Rome." So Rome superimposed upon Italy a sort of unity; a political unity, though very far was Italy then from being a nation. Latins, Etruscans, Samnites, Greeks all retained their very diverse languages and customs; there was no general feeling of patriotism for Rome among her subjects, nor did the people of Italy possess any common tradition such as the ancient Greeks in the Homeric poems or the ancient Hindoos in the Vedas. It was not until centuries later that the Latin tongue became common to all the peoples of Italy, and not till then did sentiment enter into the relationship between Rome and her Italian subjects.

The organization of this earliest portion of the Roman Empire was largely the work of the chief deliberative assembly in Rome, the Senate. This body, originally composed of the most honoured patricians, had gradually come under the control of the moneyed classes in Rome. As the old patrician families died out, Roman officials called censors were instructed to fill up the ranks of the Senate with men who had experience as high officials in the state. In the third century before Christ, therefore, the Senate consisted of three hundred Roman citizens who had gained the most experience in government, war or diplomacy. During the next century and a half,



when Rome was conquering and expanding far and wide beyond the confines of Italy, it was the Senate that guided policy, directed strategy, and decided all matters of importance. The consuls and the lesser magistrates in practice became subordinate to the power of this distinguished body of statesmen. There were popular assemblies, such as the Comitia Tributa, the Comitia Centuriata and the Concilium Plebis, but their power and influence waned beside the superior wisdom, statecraft and dignity of the Senate. So the building up of the great Roman Empire was undertaken by the Romans under the leadership of what an American scholar has called "the greatest council of rulers that ever grew up in the ancient world."

By the year 275 B.C. the puny republic on the Tiber had expanded into a great power controlling all Italy, south of the River Po. This fact brought with it a corresponding increase of trade and commerce. Roman ships in large numbers began to ply the calm waters of the Mediterranean and Roman merchants began to interest themselves in trading ventures further afield than Italy herself. Thus was Rome brought into contact with the Phœnicians, the hardy Semitic mariners who for close on a thousand years had carried on the greater part of the Mediterranean trade. Long before Rome ever began to tread the path to greatness these people had explored the western shores of the Mediterranean and founded the great commercial city of Carthage on the northern coast of what is now called Tunis, where it juts out towards the island of Sicily. They had settlements too in Southern Spain where silver was found in abundance, and their long oar-propelled galleys sailed out beyond the Straits of Gibraltar into the unknown sea and northwards to the island of Britain where they exchanged their purple cloth and spices for the tin which was mined by the natives. At first when Rome was weak and poor it had been easy for the Carthaginians to persuade the Roman merchants to limit their enterprises to channels which were not regarded by the former as their special preserve; but once Rome was mistress on the mainland of Italy, Roman merchants were anxious to trade with the busy towns of Sicily, and grew impatient of the restraints imposed upon them by the merchant princes of Carthage. In 264 B.C. the first great struggle with Carthage began. In 241 B.C. Rome emerged triumphant having added Sicily and the neighbouring islands to her empire and with her coffers overflowing with a huge Carthaginian war indemnity. But she had taken also a step the importance of which probably no one realized at the time; she had become a sea power with overseas possessions. She had almost unwittingly entered upon a line of policy from which she could never withdraw and which finally settled her destiny. Henceforth she is to find herself, forced to adopt an ever-widening policy of expansion entailing a series of mighty wars and dazzling conquests which long before the opening of the Christian era made Rome the greatest power the world had ever seen.

Carthage had been defeated, but not conquered. Baffled in Sicily by the Romans, the intrepid Semites turned to Spain as the next field for their overseas commercial progress. Rome, however, treated her beaten rival in most ungracious manner, seized the valuable islands of Corsica and Sardinia from her and arbitrarily increasing her war



indemnity. This resulted in the bitter Second Carthaginian War (218—202 B.C.). After a struggle in which both sides were reduced to the most desperate extremities, Hannibal's great invasion of Italy was broken up and the army of Carthage finally crushed on African soil close to the city herself. This war added Spain to the Roman Empire, gave Rome suzerainty over much of the North African coast, and made her the predominant commercial and naval power in the Mediterranean.

But in the first flush of her success Rome exhibited all the worst vices of the war-profitier. She became greedy for further expansion and greater riches, her merchant princes regarded with envious eyes the revival of the commerce of her twice-beaten rival, while in Italy itself, the usury and greed of the newly-rich caused little by little the destruction of the free yeoman population in the country. These people came to swell the starving, homeless, penniless mob in the capital—a mob with political rights as full citizens of Rome—and in the efforts of political leaders to bribe or cajole the common people by gladiatorial shows, distributions of free corn or of the plunder derived from some conquest we witness the rapid degeneration of Roman public life. The ultimate destruction of Carthage came in the year 146 B.C. The occasion of this dastardly step was a mere pretext. In reality the step was the work of moneyed men behind the government who were able to persuade the Romans into an acceptance of the erroneous economic doctrine that one nation's prosperity necessarily means another's ruin. In plain words it was a political murder, and in the same year the same gang of ruthless financiers persuaded the Roman Senate to murder another great commercial city of whose pre-eminence they were jealous—Corinth.

In the fifth, fourth and third centuries B.C. the Eastern Mediterranean world had developed the highest civilization achieved by ancient man. This Græco-oriental world in the latter half of the fourth century B.C. had been unified under the leadership of the Balkan state Macedonia in the person of Alexander the Great. On his death in 323 B.C., however, his great empire was split up into several divisions whose ceaseless plots, feuds, and wars soon rendered the Eastern Mediterranean lands a comparatively easy prey to a new conqueror from outside. At the beginning of the second century B.C. Rome's freshly-won position made her uneasy and jealous of the power of any state in the Mediterranean who seemed likely to rival her. This fact was the prime cause of Roman expansion in the East.

To the north of Greece lay the great power of Macedonia ruled by Philip who possessed many of the qualities of his mighty ancestor, Alexander. Philip had aided Hannibal the Carthaginian against Rome. Then in the first year of the second century he proposed to the King of Syria that they should jointly crush Egypt and partition its territory. The Roman Senate alarmed lest such a proceeding should raise up a dangerous rival to Rome, plunged headlong into war with Philip, crushed the massive Macedonian phalanx in a great battle at a place called the "Dogs Heads" (197 B.C.) and added a new province to the Roman Empire. Syria's turn came next. Seven years later her undisciplined rabble of oriental troops was cut to pieces by the Roman legions, and Rome ruled Asia Minor up to the River Halys.



A few years later Egypt became a vassal of Rome (168 B.C.). Thus did the East collapse before the first Roman onslaught. In vain did Macedonia and Greece revolt ; a stern vengeance was meted out to them, and thousands of Greek slaves, more cultured and refined than their Roman masters, came to carry out a peaceful conquest of Rome to their civilization.

Having in little more than three generations leapt to a dizzy height of imperial power Rome was faced with a far more difficult problem than that of military conquest. It now behoved the Senate to construct a successful form of administration for the vast territorial acquisitions which had fallen to the Roman eagles. That it was no impossible task had already been demonstrated by the organization of the Persian Empire in the fifth century B.C. by Darius the Great. At first, however, Rome completely failed to give anything like an effective organization to her new dominions. The conquered countries were given the status and title of provinces of the Roman Empire, they were not permitted to maintain their own armies, but came under the uncontrolled rule of a Roman governor backed up by a body of mercenary Roman troops, for Rome's original citizen army was now no more ; in its place she enrolled large numbers of professional soldiers, more strongly attached to their leader than to the state in whose cause they fought, and inspired chiefly by a desire for unlimited plunder. Taxes in the Roman provinces were farmed out by the Equestrian order known by the name of "publicani," and always classified with "sinners" by the writers of the New Testament. The poor provincial who was unable to pay his taxes could borrow the money at an extortionate rate of interest from a publican to whom he became very often a slave. These harpies in their turn having made colossal fortunes returned to the imperial city to form a new and wealthy class which profoundly influenced political life. At first the Roman governor held office for only a year. This he regarded as an unexampled opportunity for unblushing spoliation to prevent which all the laws passed by the Senate were ineffective.

Thus did Rome enter upon her first century of organized imperial power and her last century as a republic. At home also the Senate was equally unsuccessful in the art of government. The foreign wars brought large numbers of prisoners to Italy, who were sold as slaves to become the property of the richer classes. The smaller cultivators were either ousted by competition or bought out of their farms, and soon large portions of Italy were owned by rich nobles who carried on cultivation by means of slave labour. The slaves were treated with the utmost brutality ; escaped slaves infested all the roads as robbers and slave revolts on a large scale in Sicily and South Italy strained to the utmost the powers of the Roman Senatorial Government. Throughout all this the Senate remained supine. Steadily it set its face against reform. Bent on maintaining its own dignity and power at all costs it seems to have lost all sense of its responsibilities as the sole wielder of civilized government in the Mediterranean regions. The brothers Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus tried to win the support of the lowest classes for their comprehensive schemes of reform, but when they proposed to extend to the Italians the full privilege of Roman citizenship, the Senate managed to

discredit and destroy them. Their careers, however, served to demonstrate to the wide-awake politician how unstable was the support of the people and how impossible was the task of the reformer who relied merely upon popular votes. The solution to the difficulty was to be found only in the person of a military commander chosen by the people, but on account of his military power independent of elections and popular fickleness. So at the beginning of the first century B.C. we witness the sudden rise to power of the plowboy Marius, who, after years of failure on the part of the Senate, defeated Jugurtha, Rome's most serious enemy in Africa, and destroyed the great invading force of German barbarians in North Italy. Though successful as a soldier Marius proved a lamentable failure as a political reformer, and was forced to retire in disgrace. He was followed by Sulla, a general with a greater knowledge of statecraft, who saved the Roman Empire in the East from destruction at the hands of the magnificent and able young king of Pontus, Mithradates, and returned to Rome as a Dictator. Sulla, however, made the huge blunder of attempting to reinstate the moribund power of the Senate. For nine years (79—70) the Senate ruled in accordance with the constitutional system drawn up by Sulla, but its neglect to protect Roman shipping from the terrible depredations of the Eastern pirates from Asia Minor led to the election of Pompey by the people as consul with wider military power than any Roman general had ever previously possessed. Pompey cleared the seas, made further conquests in the East and returned to Rome with the highest distinction. There he at once came to loggerheads with the jealous and corrupt Senate, against whom he allied with a rising young follower of Marius named Julius Cæsar and Crassus, the richest financier in the Roman Empire. In 59 B.C. these three men secured control of the Roman government. In the following year Cæsar went off to Gaul to establish the Roman power up to the Rhine (and incidentally, to raid the island of Britain) and to win for himself in the West a glory and prestige as great as those of Pompey in the East. After a series of brilliant campaigns in Gaul extending over a period of nine years, Cæsar suddenly decided to overthrow the Senatorial rule in Rome. Crossing the Rubicon in North Italy he swooped down upon Rome, drove out Pompey and the leaders of the Senatorial party and assumed the rôle of the defender of Rome against the Senate's corrupt authority and Pompey's army. After four years of further campaigning he defeated his great rival and reduced the whole of the Empire to obedience. Then he returned to Rome and had himself made Dictator for life.

This was the end of the Roman Republic. Cæsar at first, however, did not destroy the old republican forms. Senate, Comitia, Consuls, Tribunes, all carried out their functions exactly as they had done previously, but Cæsar possessed all the real power. The others merely carried out his will and registered his decrees. The great Dictator thereupon embarked upon a mighty scheme for the complete reorganization of the Roman Empire. It aimed at a world dominion stretching from the borders of India to the Atlantic Ocean; its conception marks the highest flight of the Roman imperial idea. Cæsar, however, was struck down by the assassin's knife in 44 B.C.



and his successors never seem to have been influenced by such ambitious desires. His death was the signal for the outbreak of another orgy of civil war during which the last defenders of the old republican system were defeated, and the empire of the Cæsars was established by Octavian, the nephew and adopted son of Julius. By the year 30 B.C. this remarkable young man had systematically eliminated all his rivals, and had brought the revolutionary period to an end. He then eagerly and devotedly set himself to give to the Empire a thorough and efficient system of organization. Possessing a nature more subtle than his uncle's and imbued with a very real respect for the antique institutions of Rome he managed to steer a course clear of the rocks upon which the Julian bark had so suddenly foundered. That Julius had meant ultimately to make himself the head of a despotic organization which would have abolished even the forms of the old republic everyone had realized. He had based his power not upon any show of popular favour but upon the hard and unpalatable fact of his military supremacy. Thereby he had outraged the sentiments of the Roman people. Octavian, better known to history as Augustus, the title conferred upon him by the Senate, proclaimed from the first that his government rested upon the consent of the people. Secure in the knowledge that the only alternative to his rule was a renewal of the horrors of revolutionary civil war and that the Romans looked upon him as the restorer of peace and prosperity to the Empire, he veiled the reality of his power by an ostentatious humility and by posing as the champion of the authority of a reformed Senate. He called himself an Official of the Republic ; to his office was given the title of " Princeps "—the first officer of the republic—he held it by appointment from the Senate ; his appointment too was limited to a term of years, after which of course he was reappointed. Thus he rallied round him all classes of opinion, and few indeed were the Romans who realised that the reality of power had passed from the Senate to a monarch backed up by a mighty army of veteran soldiers. But while the attitude of Augustus towards the Senate and republican forms was always characterised by the most ceremonious respect, the Senate was " formed " in such a way as to make it entirely dependent upon the Princeps who gradually concentrated in his person all the powers previously held by the republican officials. To the imperium of a Roman general he added the powers of consul, tribune and finally even those of Pontifex Maximus, or head of the Roman State religion.

But while in Rome herself the Emperor was careful to disguise the real nature of his position, in the Eastern dominions of the Empire, where republican forms of government had never been used even under the Senatorial rule, Augustus ruled as a despot. Egypt, the richest of all provinces, paid no allegiance to the Senate ; here Augustus was regarded as the successor of the Pharaohs and the Ptolemies. Little by little, almost imperceptibly, the conditions in the provinces reacted upon Rome. At first the successors of Augustus modelled their policy on his ; for two centuries indeed the pious fraud was maintained until at the end of the second century A.D. the veil was finally withdrawn and the Emperors from the energetic Septimius Severus onwards stood forth in their true colours as the " single centre and source of political power and action."

The empire over which Augustus held sway was indeed a mighty one. It included the whole Mediterranean coast line ; on the south it was bounded by the great Sahara desert ; its eastern boundary was the Euphrates ; in the north it extended to the Danube and the Rhine ; while its western limits were washed by the Atlantic Ocean. In two directions therefore it was capable of further expansion—the north and the east. Augustus however, found his hands too full with the task of reconstruction to undertake a policy of conquest. He contented himself with establishing his empire on a firm basis by means of sound organization and the maintenance of good defence on the frontiers. For purposes of administration Italy was divided up into a number of districts. The provinces in which it was necessary to keep an army—Gaul, Spain, Syria and Egypt—were directly under the Emperor. They were governed by Proconsular Legates appointed by and responsible to the Emperor ; their administration was honest since for the first time the officials were paid regular salaries and were severely punished by the Emperor if they abused their position or powers. The other provinces, where the maintenance of an army was not necessary, were under the State. Their administration, as previously, was in the hands of proconsuls and proprætors, but the example of the excellent administration of the imperial provinces acted as a check upon their misgovernment, and before long, as the power of the Emperor increased, the distinction between the two almost faded away. The new governors were capable men who realized that good work on their part could not fail to be recognized by the home government. So efficiency and no longer party connections became the criterion in the service of the Empire. National or local sentiment was everywhere respected ; several states were at first left under their national rulers, while distinguished cities such as Athens and Sparta were given a sort of nominal independence. Provinces like Egypt which already possessed highly organized administrations kept them unchanged. For the first time in the history of the Empire the finances of the Empire were properly regulated. A huge census list of the population was drawn up, property was assessed in each province and each man's share of taxation carefully and justly laid down. A limit thereby was set to the depredations of the publicani. The imperial revenue was spent on the maintenance of a standing army of 125,000 men to guard the frontiers, on roads, bridges, aqueducts and public buildings, and on the salaries of what soon became a most efficient civil service. At the present day we often gauge the state of the government of a country by the condition of its money market. It has often been said that the London Stock Exchange is a sort of political barometer. Something similar to this may be said of the bank rate in Rome. At the time of Augustus it gave striking evidence of the success of his rule. During the last years of the republic the rate of interest had been twelve per cent., soon after the establishment of Augustus it sank to four per cent. ; small wonder that during his lifetime he was worshipped as a god by the grateful provincials who more than any others could realize the sterling nature of his government. Small wonder indeed that the Senate on his death decreed him divine honours, and instituted a temple and a college of priests for the new god.



Under the new imperial government the old policy of conquest was discontinued; the early Emperors were eminently moderate and peaceful. "Augustus," says Gibbon in his "Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire" "discovered that Rome, in her present exalted situation, had much less to hope than to fear from the chance of arms, and that, in the prosecution of remote wars, the undertaking became every day more difficult, even more doubtful, and the possession more precarious and less beneficial." He himself limited his martial exploits to the consolidation and strengthening of his extensive and by no means easily defended frontiers. Convinced in his own mind that the Atlantic Ocean on the west, the Rhine and the Danube on the north, the Euphrates on the east and the deserts of Arabia and Africa on the south constituted a series of natural frontiers, he bequeathed to his successors the policy of confining the Empire strictly to these limits. His immediate successors either wisely or through indolence emulated his moderation, and with the single exception of the conquest of Britain, the old aggressive policy was reversed. It became the prime duty of a Roman general to guard well the frontiers entrusted to his care.

Gradually too the privileges of Roman citizenship were extended to all the peoples within the Empire. The racial exclusiveness that had been so marked a feature of the Greek world gave way before the development of a new cosmopolitanism based upon the sense of common citizenship in a great all-protecting power. Everywhere too the Romans impressed the provinces with their sense of order. The tribal warfare of the west, the dynastic struggles of the orient and the devastating intestine squabbles of the Greek cities were alike suppressed, and all men bowed before the majesty of the "pax Romana." Inside the Empire the idea of a brotherhood of man began to grow apace. Instead of the ancient distinction of Greek and barbarian, of Jew and Gentile, Stoicism with its doctrine of a universal system of nature taught that the distinctions between man and man were insignificant beside the fundamental characteristics that are common to the whole race; Christianity with its doctrine of the brotherhood of man taught that in God's politics there was "Neither Jew nor Greek." "That heavenly State", said Augustine of Hippo, "while in pilgrimage on earth calls its citizens from all races and its pilgrim company is gathered from men of every tongue: for it cares not for diversity in manners, laws or administration, by which peace on earth is acquired or maintained. None of these are abolished or destroyed, but they are kept and followed." *Mutatis mutandis* these words might well have been applied to the great empire of which the writer himself was a citizen. The Latin language spread over the whole Roman world causing many of the older dialects to die; a new sense of unity grew up which tended to obliterate tribal and national bounds. As Gibbon has expressed it "the nations of the Empire insensibly melted away into the Roman name and people."

For the first two centuries of its existence the reorganized empire enjoyed peace and prosperity. Frontier fighting indeed there was on the Rhine and the Euphrates, and on one occasion just before the death of Augustus the Roman armies which had unwisely pushed beyond the Rhine on a punitive expedition were cut to pieces by the



fierce German tribes who constituted an ever-present element of danger on the northern frontier. But such things hardly affected the profound calm of the Empire itself. Piracy had been crushed out of existence on the Mediterranean ; in fact Rome had ceased to maintain a war fleet. Good order too prevailed in the city and the provinces, so that few troops were quartered through the country. Gibbon in surveying this period wrote these significant words. "If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian (96 A.D.) to the accession of Commodus (180 A.D.). The vast extent of the Roman Empire was governed by absolute power, under the guidance of virtue and wisdom. The armies were restrained by the firm but gentle hand of four successive emperors, whose characters and authority commanded involuntary respect. The forms of the civil administration were carefully preserved by Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian and the Antonines, who delighted in the image of liberty, and were pleased with considering themselves as the accountable ministers of the laws."

Hadrian himself developed further the Roman central administration by the organization of governmental business into departments, by sweeping reforms in the system of taxation, and by great works of defensive fortification on the more exposed frontiers in North Britain and Gaul. During his reign too we witness great steps being made towards the unification of law throughout the Empire. Under the Republic the Romans, in view of the fact that large numbers of foreigners who resorted to the city for trade and other purposes were subject among their own people to laws very different from those of Rome, had established a special court under a Prætor Peregrinus for dealing with cases in which these people were concerned. In this court gradually a body of law grew up known as the Jus Gentium (the Law of Nations) based very largely upon the principles of equity. The Romans until the days of the emperors were still governed in accordance with the ancient Law of the Twelve Tables, which with the growing complexity of society had become out of date and unfair in its operation. The Emperors attracted to their court the finest legal minds of their day who expanded the narrow city law of Rome along the lines of the Jus Gentium into a vast imperial code which was sufficient to meet all the varying needs of the Mediterranean world. This has been judged by posterity to be the greatest work of the Roman genius and Rome's most valuable contribution to the world. Where the old tribal customs were coarse, conservative and crude, the law developed by the Imperial jurists was refined, just and humane. At a much later date—in the sixth century—it was codified by the Eastern Emperor Justinian and has become the basis of most of the modern legal systems of Europe. This system of imperial law was one of the most potent unifying forces in the Empire. At the same time, however, the Emperors were wise enough to leave local laws untouched where they did not conflict with the wider interests of the Empire at large.

As time went on the organization of the Empire grew increasingly more complex, the power of the Senate declined, and the Emperors



took no further trouble to disguise the reality of their despotic rule. A bureaucratic governing class arose and with it we may observe a tendency of the local communities to depend more and more upon the Emperor himself and to lose all interest in public affairs. Life began to centre in towns, luxury grew apace and the sense of responsibility for public welfare waned—a very serious cause of the decline of the Empire. Citizens no longer entered the ranks of the army which was recruited chiefly from the outlying provinces, and before the end of the second century, comprised a very heterogeneous collection of nationalities. This was also a disturbing feature. But at the same time a restlessness began to appear among barbarian hordes outside the limit of the Empire. The Germans in the North and the Parthians in the East began actually to break in on the frontier. In the reign of Marcus Aurelius (161-180 A.D.) it is significant that although the Empire could win huge victories over the Teutonic invaders in what we now call Bohemia, it could not clear them out of that region. The barbarians had begun to settle inside the Roman Empire. Marcus Aurelius even legalized their settlement by recognizing them as farmer colonists. Thus before the opening of the third century A.D. the great movement had begun which was ultimately to engulf the western half of the Empire.

In the third century the signs of decline are evident. Farming declined, much land went out of cultivation, great land-owners bought out smaller proprietors and the villa system under which the Republic had replaced the free cultivators of Italy by slave labour on a vast scale, spread over Gaul, Spain and Great Britain. In the great cities there was a scarcity of food and people began to complain of the high cost of living. Under the debasing influence of city life to which gradually most of the country people were attracted, marriages decreased in number and the population of the Empire shrank. Financial difficulties grew thicker; there seems to have been a lack of precious metals which was not only disastrous to business but caused a serious shrinking of imperial revenues at a time when the cost of Government was greater than ever. The Government resorted to the dangerous practice of debasing the coinage. At the end of the third century the copper coin called the "denarius" was debased to about one-fortieth of its value under Augustus. The Army unable to get its pay became demoralised; its numbers were made up increasingly of barbarians—Germans and Illyrians—whose discipline left much to be desired; in fact the old method of fighting by legions disappeared. The barbarians preferred to fight according to their own method.

There was in the constitution of the Empire one glaring weakness. No legal method existed for choosing an Emperor; at the death of every emperor there was a break in the continuity of authority, which weakened the central power by the successive struggles which so often broke out. The Army began to realize that this flaw in the imperial organization gave it an unexampled opportunity for playing the part of an emperor-maker. In the third century therefore the revolutionary tendency again fixed its tentacles on the Roman state. Assassinations and depositions of Emperors became common while in the provinces the barbaric soldiery set up puppet emperors who fought among themselves for supremacy. Between 193 A.D. and 285 A.D. the



Principal troops set up no less than eighty pretenders in the highest power in the Empire. It seemed as if the western half of the Empire would split up into separate kingdoms. This tendency, however, was checked by the two great emperors, Diocletian (284-305) and Constantine (306-337). The former localised authority by appointing four co-emperors to rule in the four prefectures into which he divided the Empire. The provinces were grouped into dioceses under special governors, while provincial business was organised in the hands of a vast number of graded officials. An official hierarchy was thus created the cost of the upkeep of which was enormous. Taxes were multiplied to such an extent that the position of the middle class became intolerable; liberty and free citizenship disappeared from the state wherein every detail of life was under the scrutiny of government officials whose particular job it was to see that no man deserted his profession or trade in order to escape the crushing burden of taxation. The effect of this was markedly felt in the realms of literature and art. The Romans lost their creative ability in every branch of life, the individual became a mere cog-wheel in the huge state machine. At the same time the emperor's position became orientalised. He began to deck himself in gorgeous apparel copied from Persian fashions; his divinity began to be more and more emphasised and his court became the centre of pomp and ritual behind which the person of the sovereign receded further and further from direct contact with the subject.

Constantine carried this policy still further. Roman titles, survivals of the old republican days, were graded into a system of nobility of which the emperor was the fountain head. With the growing orientalising tendencies in the monarchy we may also observe the shifting of the centre of gravity in the Empire from Rome to the East. The Balkan Peninsula became the centre of power. Constantine, who realized this fact, signalized the tendency by building a magnificent new Rome on the European side of the Bosphorus. By the year 330 the city of Constantine, called Constantinople, had usurped from Rome the position as capital of the Empire. From this time the decline of the west grew more rapid than ever, the emperors from Constantinople, busied with the pressing affairs of the east, had neither the time to spare to deal with the west nor the understanding of its problems that was necessary for successful rule. Theodosius indeed at his death in 395 A.D. so far realized this fact as to divide the Empire up between his sons, Arcadius and Honorius, who ruled in Constantinople and Rome respectively. The imperial authority in the west, however, was simply the sport of barbarian generals and in 476 A.D. both the Western Empire and its emperor disappeared in the welter of the great Teutonic invasions which both were unable to check.

It is interesting to note that coincident with the fall of Rome, the eastern portion was reorganized by a strong series of emperors and entered upon a new lease of life in which many excellent features of the old Roman Empire were preserved. Especially is it noteworthy that it was one of the Eastern Emperors, Justinian (527-565 A.D.), through whom Rome's richest legacy—codified Roman law—was transmitted to posterity. Justinian's "Digest" which represented the administrative experience and practical genius of the most successful



rulers of the ancient world is still the basis of many of the legal systems in vogue among the civilized peoples of to-day.

We have now briefly traced and surveyed the development of Roman Imperialism, its rich flowering time and its decline. From its earliest aggressive beginnings imperialism gradually became a great force for the Romanization and unification of the whole Mediterranean world on the basis of universal citizenship and the rule of law. At first under Augustus and his more immediate successors its eminent moderation, wisdom, and efficiency saved civilization in Europe from relapsing into chaos and held forth to the world the great political ideals of order and cosmopolitan equality. In fact, the very foundations of human life and society seemed bound up with the eternal dominion of Rome.

But the Roman Empire was not the "last word" in the history of the world. There had existed from the earliest times in the Roman social system elements of decay which presented an insoluble problem to even the wisest emperors. The inroads of the Teutonic barbarian hordes merely put the finishing touches to a gradual movement towards extinction which had long been in operation. With the end of imperial rule in the west, however, the influence of Rome did not die; much of it revived under the fostering care of the Christian Church, which after its recognition by the Empire in the fourth century, made the city of Rome its centre, and modelled its organization upon that of the Empire. The mantle of Augustus fell upon the shoulders of the successors of Peter, and in my next lecture I hope to show you how profoundly this fact influenced the thought and politics of the new Europe which was gradually built up from the ruins of the Roman Empire.

II.—MEDIÆVAL IMPERIALISM.

When we use the term " Mediæval " in History we think of a period that is midway between two others in historical development. In Indian History the Mughal Period is usually termed " Mediæval," whereas in European History we apply the term to the period from the fall of the Western Roman Empire to the Renaissance. Historians who desire to make a more exact definition of the period find themselves involved in all sorts of controversies regarding dates. Some for instance would date the mediæval period from the death of Theodosius in 395 A.D. ; others from the deposition of the last Roman Emperor of the West—Romulus Augustulus—in 476 A.D. Then as to the end of the period there are also differences of opinion. The Renaissance is a very wide term connoting a movement which lasted considerably over a century. Many dates therefore have been suggested as suitable to mark the point where the transition from mediæval to modern becomes most acute. The year 1461 saw the accession of Louis XI of France and Edward IV of England, monarchs of an essentially modern type. The year 1492 saw the first voyage of Christopher Columbus to America and the capture of the last Spanish territory that remained in the hands of the Moors—Granada. In the year 1494 there began the first of a series of French invasions of Italy which were so marked a feature of the politics of the sixteenth century. All these and many others are used by various historians to mark the end of the Middle Ages. In dealing with the subject we have now before us, however, we may express the bounds of our period in very general terms and chronologically speaking we may say that it began in the fifth century A.D. and lasted until the fifteenth century.

Before giving you the plain story of the development of the Imperial Idea in the Middle Ages let me prepare your minds by a few general statements that will help you to get the right atmosphere. Roman Imperialism was eminently practical; it came as the result of events, and it concerned itself actually with the administration of vast territories and heterogeneous races. Mediæval Imperialism was entirely ideal, and was almost completely divorced from practical politics. It aimed at restoring the old Roman Empire in the West and rehabilitating it in the sacerdotal vestments of the Church of Rome. It was based upon the conception of the fundamental unity of the peoples of Europe and the desire of the mediæval church to embody this conception in a great Holy Roman Empire, as it was called. Men's minds in the Middle Ages in Europe were essentially concrete; they could not understand ideas except by symbols. So it was that in the midst of the diversity and chaos which succeeded the fall of the Roman Empire this ideal of unity arose and attained concrete expression in the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire. The Holy Roman Empire itself was the most unreal empire the



world has yet seen; some modern writers have taken a delight in saying that it was neither "holy" nor "Roman" nor even an empire. Its study belongs rather to the realms of political theory than to those of history, and it would be possible to study all the events of the Middle Ages without making any reference to the phrase. On the other hand, without a thorough study of the foundation and development of this empire and of the ideas underlying it it is impossible to understand mediæval man and his mental world.

The disruption of the Roman Empire in the West occurred mainly in the 5th century A.D. when the barbarian nations settled in its lands and finally deposed its last puppet emperor. These peoples were almost entirely of Germanic or Teutonic origin; some came in by breaking over the Rhine frontier, others by way of the Danube and the Balkans. Italy fell to the Ostro-Goths (the eastern branch of the great Gothic race), Spain and South Gaul to the Visigoths, North Africa to the Vandals, Britain to the Angles, Saxons and Jutes, Eastern Gaul to the Burgundians and North Gaul to the Franks. Many of these people were heathen, their religions ranging from the lowest type of Animism to the highly-developed and imaginative polytheism of the founders of England. But the Vandals, Burgundians and Goths, at the time of their entry into the empire, were rapidly being converted to a form of Christianity called after its founder Arianism. They found this a simpler religion, in which there was no doctrine of the Trinity—the great stumbling block to their undeveloped intelligence. Now this a most important point. These people were in most cases a conquering minority situated among a numerically vastly superior conquered majority of Roman provincials who preferred the orthodox Trinitarian doctrine so jealously guarded by the head of the Church in Rome. The situation of the conquerors therefore was always precarious, since the Roman Church and its clergy throughout the West—the least corrupt element in the Roman world—remained hostile towards them, and were ever ready to intrigue against the followers after heresy. The Franks on the other hand were pagans when they entered the Roman Empire. Their method of gaining entrance into the empire was different from that of all the other invaders. Whereas Goths, Burgundians and Vandals had made national migrations on a huge scale from their original homes the Franks never severed their connection with their German lands from Cologne along the lower Rhine to the North Sea. This territory remained always their nucleus from which, as they expanded outward, they could draw constant reserves of man-power. Thus these tall fair-haired spear-men (as their name signifies) retained their early warlike vigour, and while the other invaders were speedily enervated by their contact with the decadent Roman civilisation, the conquering career of the Franks was unchecked until they had brought under their sway nearly every Teutonic tribe in Europe, and the imperial diadem crowned the brows of their mightiest war-leader.

The Franks first attacked the Roman Empire in 489 A.D. Their earliest endeavours, under their able and unscrupulous young king Clovis, led to the expansion of their dominions around the Rhine



as far south as the Bay of Biscay. In the process of expansion they came into contact with, and adopted, the Christian Religion. Clovis was married to a Burgundian princess, who, although her people were Arians, belonged herself to the orthodox Catholic faith. Through her instrumentality her rough uncultured husband was led to believe that the God of the Christians would give him surer success in battle than would his tribal gods Woden and Thor. In 496, so the story goes, while fighting a terrible battle with another Teutonic folk of South Germany, in fear of defeat he called upon the name of Jesus Christ and promised, if victory were vouchsafed, to be baptised as a Christian. The event proved successful, and Clovis with 3,000 of his braves was baptised into the orthodox Catholic fold.

In the light of the development of the mediæval imperial idea, the importance of this step cannot be overestimated. By accepting the Catholic religion Clovis shut himself out from the great circle of Arian States in Italy, Spain and Africa, but at the same time he realised that the success of his empire depended mainly upon the development of understanding and co-operation between his Frankish people and the orthodox Catholic Roman provincial population of Gaul. What he did not realise, however, was that by taking this step he cemented an alliance between his nation and the popes of Rome which was ultimately to lead the Frankish nation to an undreamt-of destiny. It was the alliance of the Franks and the pope which in the eighth century caused the revival of the imperial idea with the foundation of the Holy Roman Empire.

Under Clovis and his house the Franks constituted not a united kingdom but rather a collection of tribal principalities held together by allegiance to the single dominant family of the Merovings. When in the eighth century the last feeble members of the old royal house lived secluded from their people and unable by physical and mental weakness to undertake the task of ruling the warlike Frankish tribes, their authority fell into the hands of the great household officials, called Mayors of the Palace, of the Austrasian (or South German) branch of the Frankish people.

Two great Mayors of the Palace, Pippin of Heristal and Charles the Hammer, not only became themselves the real leaders of the nation, but succeeded in establishing so firm and unified a government at home, that once more the Franks began to be bitten by the fever-mosquito of foreign ambition. It was at this moment that the occupant of the Apostolic See of Peter in Rome conceived the idea of using the ambition and strength of the Franks for his own schemes.

In the days when the Roman authority in the West was no more, and when in the welter of barbarian invasions all that Rome had stood for—law, order and civilisation—seemed to have gone to the wall, the Roman Church alone maintained alight the flickering flame of culture amidst the black darkness of barbarian ignorance and superstition. Everywhere the clergy were the only defenders of the poor and oppressed. Everywhere they were the necessary councillors of kings and princes. The superstitious imagination of the barbarians wove round the church and its priests a halo of magic and awe which gave to them a dignity and influence such as they



had never enjoyed under the empire. As the empire fell into the hands of the new nations, and as their kingdoms in turn dissolved, the church, with its organisation modelled upon that of the old Roman Empire, clung ever more closely to the ideal of unity. The centre of that unity was Rome. In the cities the ecclesiastical unit was the bishop who ruled over his diocese. These in their turn were grouped into provinces under a metropolitan bishop. Great cities gave a special importance to their bishop who under the designation of patriarch exercised wide powers over his other colleagues. Among all these the Roman patriarch, an equal at first, had gradually assumed the chief place. Such a development was of course only to be the chief place. Such a development was of course only to be expected. He was the bishop of the Eternal City, the successor of St. Peter, and his church stolidly maintained its orthodoxy, never veering from the straight and narrow path, while most of the other patriarchal sees at one time or another lapsed into heresy. When the Roman imperial authority was finally gutted in the West, the Pope of Rome, as the Bishop had begun to call himself, was left unchecked by an emperor, and with not a rival bishop in the Latin-speaking world.

The Ostro-Gothic kingdom which had been set up in Italy by Theoderic the Great at the close of the fifth century failed lamentably to maintain itself against the hostility of the Catholic population and church in Italy, and the attacks of Justinian's brilliant general Belesarius from Constantinople. But the Eastern Empire having reconquered Italy from the barbarian was in turn unable to hold its new acquisition against the attacks of a fresh nation of Teutonic barbarians, the Lombards. These people, so we are told by the monkish chronicles of the time, were the most cruel and repulsive of all the Teutonic peoples. In the sixth and seventh centuries they tormented the Popes of Rome by their continual hostility, and it was in vain that Rome sent repeated requests for help to Constantinople. In the eighth century, too, a development occurred in Constantinople that completely alienated her church from that of Rome. The Emperor Leo the Isaurian, born among the mountains of Asia Minor where the simpler forms of the Christian faith were prevalent, viewed with alarm the use of symbols and worship of images in the Catholic Church. He had come into contact with followers of Islam whom he had heard criticize the Christian Church as idolatrous. He therefore decreed the abolition of images and their worship from all the churches of the Empire. This decree excited in the minds of the Italian Catholics a fierce resentment. They rose in rebellion, slew the imperial viceroy, and asserted their right to retain the form of worship dear to them, (726 A.D.). This afforded an excellent opportunity to the Lombards for extending their power. They fell upon those portions of Italy which they had not yet conquered, and only their King Lindprand's reverence for the majesty of the Roman See prevented them from capturing the great city. These calamities led the Roman Popes to search for a champion whose service could be relied on. Across the Alps in Frankland there was just the man. Charles the Hammer had in 732 rolled



back the Spanish Musulmans at Poitiers and delivered Christendom from the horrors of a great raid. To him the pope in his extremity applied for aid. Charles was willing to give it, but died before he could obey the pope's call. His successor, Pippin the Short, in deposing the last shadowy king of the Meroving line, and making himself king over a united Frankland, bound himself by closer ties to Rome by wearing a Roman diadem at his coronation and accepting at the hands of the church the old Hebrew rite of anointing. It was not long before he was called upon to give a practical demonstration of his friendship for the pope. Twice was he summoned to defend Rome against the assaults of the Lombards. Twice did he lead his shaggy warriors over the Alps to the assistance of the pope, and when at last Rome was saved, a grateful pontiff bestowed upon the rough Frank the title of Patrician. This word "Patrician" had been under the Republic a generic term applied to the members of the noble families of Rome. In course of time, having lost its original meaning, it was adopted by Constantinople for use as an imperial title, a rank bestowed on the highest class of provincial governors, and signifying a dignity next only to those of emperor and consul. Legally the pope had no right to confer it upon his Frankish champion; there was, however, no one in the West to dispute the legality of the pope's action. In practice the king acquired a greater distinction in the eyes of his people, the pope bound closer to himself a valuable protector.

It was in the reign of Pippin's greater son Charles that this development achieved its completion. Once more did the Lombards assail Rome. This time the Frankish ruler not only defeated the attempt, but deposed their king and himself assumed the Lombard crown. In Rome herself the new king was received with the highest honours, and for a quarter of a century the government of the city was carried on in his name. When in 796 A.D. Leo III ascended to the chair of Peter, sedition began to lift its head in Rome. In 798, while the pope was walking in a solemn religious procession to the church of St. Lorenzo, armed ruffians in the pay of one of the political factions attacked him, wounded him and left him for dead. He managed, however, to escape and fled into North Germany, where Charles was engaged upon the thorough subjugation of the Saxons. By this time Charles was the greatest ruler in Christendom. Not only did he rule the Lombard kingdom of North Italy, but he had extended his power over all the Teutonic peoples in Western Europe. From the north of Spain to the Baltic Coast as far as the Oder, from the Breton peninsula to the junction of the Danube and the Save, the sword of the mighty Frank had carved out for him a wide dominion upon the conquered peoples of which he forced the Christian religion. Such was the paladin of the church to whom the dismayed pope fled in 798. Charles sent him back to Rome with a strong escort and promised himself to follow at a convenient opportunity. Then in 799, when the Saxon war had been concluded, the Frankish warriors under their greatest leader once more threaded the passes of the Alps and descended upon the fair plain of Lombardy.



In the Autumn of the year 800 A.D. the Frankish host entered Rome; the affairs of the pope were settled, and good order restored. Then after a stay of a few weeks in Rome Charles on Christmas Day went to hear mass in the Church of St. Peter. There, at the close of the reading of the Gospel, as Charles knelt in prayer beside the high altar, the pope suddenly without any warning came from his seat and placed upon the Frankish monarch's head the Imperial Crown of Rome. The assembled multitude of Franks and Romans sent up a great shout of acclamation, using, according to the old chronicler, these words: "To Charles Augustus, crowned by God, the great and peace-giving Emperor, be life and victory." Thus the imperial authority was revived in the West in a union of the Teutonic North with the Romance South which strove to realise once again the glories of the Roman Empire.

This striking event, which historical writers have called the central point of the Middle Ages, was the result of one of the most curious, and at the same time most interesting, mental delusions that have ever influenced mankind on a vast scale. It arose from the fact that after the Roman power died out in Western Europe no one could make himself believe that the Roman Empire had really perished. Men had grown accustomed to look upon the Roman dominion as eternal, as bound up with the very foundations of civilised society. That with the barbarian invasions entirely new forces had come into being, which were ultimately to produce an order of things far grander than the Roman Empire, was absolutely incredible not merely to the Roman provincials themselves, but even to the Teutonic invaders who were destroying the old order. But it was to the teaching and activities of the Roman Church that the survival of the old Roman imperial idea was especially due. To the believing Catholic of the West the phenomena of history presented no difficulties. His mind did not analyse the results of observation and experience. All he did was to accept certain basic principles to which all observation and experience could be approximated and in the light of which they could be easily explained. Let me quote you a short passage from one of the ecclesiastical writers of the time: "We," he says, "who are instructed in the science of truth by the Holy Scriptures, know the beginning of the world and its end." Everything, you see, was perfectly simple; it was revealed by God to the believer. Then the mediæval churchman went a step further. He noticed that at the very moment in the history of ancient Rome when Augustus was laying the foundations of the Empire and spreading the blessings of peace and order, Christianity was born into the world. Thus indeed was the will of God manifested to men. The great Empires of antiquity—Egypt, Babylon, Persia and Macedon,—all had had their day and passed away. But the Roman Empire was to be eternal, since through it alone could order be maintained and the teaching of Christ spread throughout the world. "Continue," cried a Romanised Gaul who wrote just after the sack of Rome by the Visigoths in 410 A.D., "continue to give laws which will last into Roman centuries. Alone thou needst not fear the fatal distaff." So it was that the very men who witnessed



the collapse of Rome before the barbarian on slaught refused to regard events in their true perspective and pursued after the dazzling mirage to which their eyes were directed by the Roman Church. Gradually therefore in the minds of churchmen the idea began to grow that the authority once wielded by the emperors in Rome had passed into the hands of the Bishop of Rome, and men began to dream of the establishment of a great Christian Empire in the West that should be essentially a continuation of that of Augustine and Constantine. You will find ideas of this sort expressed in Augustine's famous treatise, "The City of God." Now Charles the Great was familiar with that work. It is more than possible that long before his coronation at Rome he had dreamed of becoming the head—the Augustus—of such an empire. His policy had certainly tended that way. But it is certain, too, that his coronation by the pope took him somewhat by surprise. Eginhard, the contemporary biographer of Charles, says that the latter often said afterwards that had he known what was the pope's intention on that famous Christmas Day, he would not have entered the church. The pope undoubtedly anticipated Charles's plans in this matter. It is fairly certain that Charles had decided upon one of two courses; either to unite the East and the West by a marriage with the widowed Empress Irene who was reigning in Constantinople, or before assuming the imperial crown to secure his recognition by the Eastern potentate as Roman Emperor. That the pope should so suddenly butt in upon this scheme caused him no little annoyance, especially since his transformation from Frankish king to Holy Roman Emperor seemed to have been done by the authority of the Roman pontiff. The Imperial Crown actually was merely so much tinsel; his new dignity did not give him anything in the sphere of political power which he had not possessed before. His greatness was Frankish; the reality of his power rested upon its Frankish foundations. But the new dignity involved him in a vast number of new difficulties. There was at that time in the Frankish kingship no rule of primogeniture. When a monarch died his domains were divided equally among all his sons. Charles himself at first had shared the Frankish dominions with a brother until the latter's death. The first problem therefore that came to the fore was this: how could the Frankish custom of partition be reconciled with the fundamental unity and indivisibility of the Roman Empire?

Then too, if Rome was the seat of the imperial dignity, Frankland was certainly the source of power. Possibly the acute mind of the new emperor foresaw in some vague apprehensive way that the necessity of keeping up the imperial dignity would involve future generations of Franks in a useless struggle in Italy. To us at the present day the incompatibility of the Teutonic monarchy with the Roman imperium is obvious; but it is problematical if anyone in 800, save possibly Charles himself, could realise that fact.

During the fourteen years which elapsed between the coronation of Charles and his death the busy emperor devoted himself with almost superhuman energy to the task of organising his empire. The



Teutonic nations within the empire were allowed to retain their customs, their hereditary chiefs and their assemblies of free men. The districts of the empire were placed under royal officials named "counts"; these men in their turn were kept in order by royal commissioners called "Missi Dominici" who were sent to all parts of the realm to investigate and report on all important matters to the emperor. In order that there should be no collusion between the counts and the missi the circuits of the latter were changed each year.

In the realms of culture Charles attempted much. Painfully conscious of the backwardness of the Frankish nation, Charles founded monasteries and schools, attracted scholars to his court at Aachen, encouraged a more civilised style of architecture in Frankland by the importation of Italian architects, pushed on the study of the classical Latin language, and did his utmost to raise the general level of education throughout the Teutonic world. In view of the circumstances of his coronation it is interesting to note that he specially instructed his son and successor, Louis the Pious to take his crown from the High Altar and crown himself. Louis, however, was too devoted a follower of the church to adhere to his father's instructions.

That this great Frankish Empire which he had built up would not long remain intact after his death seems to have been foreseen by Charles. The ancient Frankish custom of partition was too strong for even Charles himself to break. Then too the administrative genius of the Romans had not descended upon the Teutons at this early date in their history, and only a man of gigantic powers such as Charles could directly govern such a huge area as his empire covered. The tendency of the age was towards the localisation of authority. When the reins of power were in the weak hands of the priest-ridden Louis the Pious, the central authority failed to maintain internal peace and order, the counts became more important in their local areas and tended to make their own power hereditary. Everywhere the great landed proprietors became the real rulers of the people. In the ninth century the black ships of the Northmen raided all the coasts and rivers of Europe, and the successors of Charles were unable to cope with the new danger. Then it was the landed proprietors in each neighbourhood who built castles wherein the people about them might take refuge and organised the mobile forces of cavalry with which to undertake the speedy defence of threatened districts. These in return for the protection they afforded to the people of their districts forced them to become their dependents, submit to their justice, follow them to battle, or cultivate their lands. So developed that social order of the Middle Ages, based upon the local tie of lord and man, which has been at a later date called Feudalism. The tours of the Missi Dominici became less and less frequent, their controlling power less and less effective, until before the end of the ninth century the real rulers of Teutonic Europe were the local magnates, lords of the manors, bishops or counts. Nominally they owed allegiance to the emperor; in practice they were independent princes, ruling their districts partly by their



own sweet will, partly through the traditional local customs peculiar to each region.

It must also be remembered that the difficulties encountered by the central government in the way of establishing a well-regulated state were in those days quite insurmountable. The old Roman roads and bridges had fallen into decay, and the Teutons knew not how to repair or conserve them. Moreover the supply of precious metals in Europe was almost exhausted. It had been getting scarce in the later days of the Roman Empire. The Holy Roman Emperor therefore could not secure the services of an efficient body of officials, nor could he support a standing army with which to check the insubordination of ambitious officials or restless nobles. He paid his officials by grants of land over which they soon became feudal lords. He drew his armed forces from this same feudal class, which therefore concentrated in its own hands the sole military power in the land. Everywhere there sprang up the grim castles of feudal lords who could flout the central authority with impunity.

This tendency to disruption was made all the stronger by the ambitions of the sons of Louis the Pious. As early in the reign as the year 817 they forced him to partition his territories among them. Before his death in 840 no less than six different partitions of Frankland were made. Finally in 840 that part of Frankland which is included in modern Germany went to the emperor's second son, Louis; the western part, including modern France and Burgundy, went to the youngest son, Charles the Bald, while the eldest son, Lothair, upon whom descended the imperial dignity, had to rest content with Italy and the middle portion of territory stretching from the Alps to the North Sea between the more compact territories of his brothers. His attempts at asserting his authority over his brothers led to an alliance on their part. After defeating Lothair they forced him in 843 to accept the famous Treaty of Verdun which with some slight adjustments perpetuated the arrangement already arrived at on the death of Louis the Pious. The importance of this treaty lies in the fact that it definitely exposed the unreality of the Holy Roman Empire, since not only had the emperor no authority within the dominions of his brothers, but his portion of land stretching from Rome to Holland had no natural unity of language and custom. On the other hand, in the territories of Louis and Charles the Bald we may discern the faint beginnings of the national states of Germany and France.

After the treaty of Verdun we come upon a tangled period in the history of the empire during which the imperial sceptre passed from one branch of the Carolingian family to another, and the tendency to split up into national divisions became more pronounced. Finally, in 887, when his disgusted people deposed Charles the Fat, the feeble great-grandson of the great Emperor, the imperial title was assumed by an illegitimate scion of his house. This man, Arnulf by name, ruled only the German portion of the Empire. Italy sank into chaos, Burgundy set up an independent dynasty, while Western Frankland after a century of indecision set up the Capetian monarchy and severed itself from the empire. Feudalism was



rampant, and the vision of a universal Christian Empire seemed almost obliterated.

With the tenth century, however, the royal power in Germany came into the possession of the dukes of Saxony, hard fighters, who drove back the fierce Magyar tribes that threatened their eastern borders, and restored order in the country. Had they confined the sphere of their activities to Germany, a united German nation might have come into being at an early date and the whole course of European history been changed. But the second Saxon king, Otto the Great, became infused with the idea that the empire of Charles the Great could be revived. His ardour too was stimulated by the fact that the beautiful young widow of a recent puppet king of Italy needed a champion to save her from the attentions of her husband's successor. The chivalrous king therefore in 951 crossed into Italy, forced its king to become his vassal, and married the forlorn lady. Not long afterwards ambassadors came from the pope to offer Otto the imperial crown if he would undertake the reorganisation of Italy and save that tortured land from the feuds of a host of petty feudal princes. Otto did not hesitate. In February 962 he was crowned Holy Roman Emperor in Rome by Pope John XII.

So once more did a Teutonic ruler strive to restore to Europe the ancient glories of Rome. But what a revival! The Roman people were a turbulent rabble, the very scum of the earth. In Italy all central control was gone. Germany was feudalised. The pope, who crowned the new emperor, was the grandson of the notorious libertine Marozia, and was himself possibly the most vicious and immoral man who ever degraded the priestly robe. Not long after the coronation the emperor was obliged to summon a special synod of the church to depose its unworthy head, who was soon afterwards stabbed to death by the husband of a woman he had seduced. It was an empire without central organisation. Otto had no power whatever in Italy except when he led his Saxon veterans into the plain of Lombardy. His visit to Rome was always the signal for revolt on the part of the citizens, and bloody fights took place within the city walls. Only in Germany could the emperor enjoy any real authority, and even there the increasing feudalisation of society severely limited his scope. Nevertheless as a soldier he was successful and added much territory to his empire. The kingdoms of Burgundy, Bohemia, Poland, Denmark and Hungary acknowledged his overlordship, though he never recovered for his empire the commanding position in Europe which had been enjoyed by Charles the Great. His mastery over the pope was complete, yet though he always regarded himself as Defender of the Holy Roman Church, he was not inspired by the same religious ideals as his great predecessor. To his eminently practical view the vision of a great Christian super-state remained a mere ideal. His empire established within narrower limits than that of Charles was more German than Roman in its outlook. His aim was to reduce the forces of disorder and bring back peace, prosperity and Roman learning to Europe, but above all he confined himself to what was possible in practice. Had Otto's wise policy been followed by his successors doubtless



this new Roman Empire based upon the united strength of the German nation would have proved a great force for uniting and civilising Europe.

Unfortunately, for the new Roman-Germanic Empire the grandson of Otto, the third of that name, who came to the throne in 983, was a visionary idealist who aimed at once more making Rome the capital of a world empire. Instead of devoting his energies to the good governance of Germany, he took up his residence in Rome and indulged in all sorts of extravagant fancies. Entirely oblivious of the real conditions prevalent in his empire, he lived in the past, reviving the titles and pretensions of an age which had no affinity with his own. The result was that the stern feudal barons of Germany, who no longer felt the restraining hand of a strong king, gained a practical independence which they never completely lost. When in 1002 this curious idealist came to a premature grave, not only did his bubble schemes perish, but he left the German kingship weak and threatened by the growing forces of disorder. Another ruling house, however, the Franconian, soon sprang up in Germany which made itself more powerful even than Otto I had been. Under a king of this line, Henry III (1039-56), the revived empire became once more a great force in the politics of Europe, feudal disorder was checked, Italy quietened, and Rome reduced to obedience. Henry found the papacy disputed between three rival claimants, all of whom he deposed. Then having appointed a respectable German bishop as Pope, he set himself to reform the Church. His power, however, was so great, and so sternly and unswervingly did he wield it, that church and nobles alike were alarmed. When therefore Henry died in 1056 leaving only an infant son, both church and nobles set themselves to win their independence.

In the eleventh century a new spirit was gradually making itself felt in the church. From the little monastery of Cluny in France were coming pious saintly men who preached all over Europe a great spiritual revival. Establishing everywhere monasteries governed according to the strict Cluniac rule they gave the Roman Church a new sense of its lofty purpose and a new feeling of responsibility. They taught that the highest ideal of a churchman should be to live a life in complete imitation of Jesus Christ. The church, they held, should not dabble in the things of the world; its realm is the soul of man. But just as the soul of man is higher than his body, so is the church's authority higher than the authority of kings and princes.

At the time when Henry III was busy reforming the Papacy, these ideas were gaining ground in Rome; from that time onwards for many years a series of popes infused with Cluniac ideals ruled in Rome. These men felt that the control exercised over them by a strong emperor like Henry III was degrading. They felt too that it was degrading for the bishops and abbots of the church to be appointed—as they were all over Europe—by kings and princes. They therefore resolved to emancipate the church from its dependence upon laymen. In 1059 Pope Nicolas III decreed that henceforth popes should be chosen only by the representatives of the Roman



clergy while Hildebrand, the greatest of all the Cluniac reformers, who became Pope Gregory VII in 1073 forbade the clergy to receive their offices and lands from laymen of any kind.

This policy brought the popes to loggerheads with the emperors, and so a great struggle broke out between Empire and Papacy which finally reduced the power of the former to a mere shadow, though during the process the papacy lost the high spiritual character which had at first infused it. The weak emperor Henry IV was the first to take up the cudgels against the new papal claims. Rebellions among the German baronage, however, brought his power toppling to the ground and in 1077 Europe saw the spectacle of the emperor standing for three days barefoot in the snow and clothed in the garb of a pilgrim outside the castle of Canossa waiting for the papal pardon. Finally at the Concordat of Worms (1122) Henry's son and successor arranged a compromise with the pope which left the real victory in the latter's hands.

The twelfth century witnessed an even more bitter struggle. This time it was Frederick Barbarossa, the most brilliant of all the German Holy Roman Emperors, who crossed swords with the see of Peter. Anxious to make effective once more the authority which Henry III had lost over Italy, and stung to the quick by a letter from the English Pope Hadrian IV in which the pope hinted that the emperor held his crown as the gift of the Papacy, Frederick spent the whole of his reign (1152—1189) in fruitless endeavours to check the pretensions of the Papacy. Again and again was his control in Germany weakened by the necessity of leading great expeditions into Italy. There the growing cities of the Lombard plain, stimulated by the pope, defeated the flower of the German chivalry at Legnano (1176) and laid the foundations to an independence that no mediæval emperor from that time was able to overthrow.

In the thirteenth century the last phase of the struggle was fought out. By this time the feudal princes of Germany were to all practical purposes independent of all control and the country had entered upon a state of disunion which lasted until the middle of the nineteenth century. North Italy also was independent. So Frederick II, an emperor only in name, had hardly the slightest vestige of power outside his little state of Naples and Sicily which he had inherited as a family possession. In this phase the pope was the aggressor. His aim was to destroy the last shred of imperial power in Italy in order that he himself might gain political ascendancy in the peninsula. The emperor, a man with views more enlightened than those prevalent in the Middle Ages and somewhat of a free-thinker, was branded by the church as an apostate, a crusade was proclaimed against his family, the Hohenstaufen, and although he himself managed to hold his own against the pope, after his death in 1250 his successors were in a very few years completely extirpated by the papal armies.

So fell the Empire. Never again could it hope to dominate Europe as in the days of Charles the Great; never again could it even hope to rule Germany successfully. For a time anarchy reigned supreme in Germany, then after a period of "fist-rule" as the



Germans call it, a new king, Rudolph of Hapsburg, was elected in 1273. From his time onwards German kings continued to call themselves Emperors. Few of them, however, ever went to Rome to be crowned by the pope. None of them had any power even in Germany outside his own family possessions. In the fifteenth century the dignity of Holy Roman Emperor became practically hereditary in the Hapsburg family of Austria. There it remained an empty meaningless survival until Napoleon in 1806 forced its last Hapsburg possessor to resign it, and the great anachronism after one thousand and six years of existence came to an end.

For all practical purposes the Mediæval Empire ended in 1250. The organisation of Europe on the vast scale dreamed of by the imperialists of the Middle Ages was in those days impossible. Men's minds were local; the people of one locality called those of the next locality "foreigners"; the customs of each tribe were jealously guarded against all invasion from without. Under such circumstances there could be no real empire. Then too in the Middle Ages the first faint streaks of the dawn of nationalism were beginning to appear in the sky. German, Frenchman, Spaniard, Englishman, Scotchman and Italian, each was beginning to feel a certain something which marked him off from the other, and while each desired some sort of political unity that would burst the fetters of feudalism the tendency of the Middle Ages was towards national unity rather than imperial unity. Finally, when in 962 the empire was reorganised on the narrower but firmer basis of the German kingdom, papal hostility and the task of holding Italy were too much for Germany. As the late Lord Bryce has well put it: "The German kingdom broke down beneath the weight of the Roman Empire. To be universal sovereign Germany had sacrificed her own political unity and the vigour of her national monarchy."

The Holy Roman Empire was the special creation of circumstances and of the mediæval mind. In the first place it originated in the desire of early mediæval man to escape from the awful chaos which succeeded the fall of the Roman Empire. In the second place it arose among men whose minds were not primarily concerned with the ordinary facts of life. Their method of thought was almost entirely deductive and idealistic. Starting with vague generalisations whose truth they did not investigate and whose scope they did not define, misled by fanciful analogies and high-sounding phrases, they gradually argued out for themselves a system of life which had not the slightest connection with reality. So they arrived at the philosophical basis of the empire in this way: "God, the absolutely One, is before and above all the World's Plurality, and is the one source and one goal of every Being . . . Divine Will is ever and always active in the uniform government of the World, and is directing all that is manifold to one only end . . . An Order consists in the subordination of Plurality to Unity, and never and nowhere can a purpose that is common to Many be effectual unless the One rules over the Many . . . Not otherwise can it be in the Social Order of Mankind . . . Mankind is one 'mystical body' . . . Therefore that it may attain its one



purpose, it needs one Law and one Government"; I quote these words from Gierke's "Political Theories of the Middle Age." The inference then was that in the Holy Roman Empire the one Law and the one Government were given by God to mankind.

But from the time of the Cluniac Reformation onwards a new step was added to this argument. Man's nature is dual: it consists of Body and Soul. There must therefore be a rule for men's bodies as well as for their souls, but just as the Soul is superior to the Body, so is the ruler of the Soul superior to the ruler of the Body. Thus the Pope, who is God's vicar in matters spiritual is superior to the Emperor, who is God's vicar in matters temporal. There you have the simple statement of the sovereignty of the church as it was conceived in the Middle Ages. This was the fundamental point at issue between Pope and Emperor.

But while Popes and Emperors quarrelled, and philosophers wove new theories; while Canon jurists exalted the power of the Pope and Roman jurists that of the Emperor; the imperial power died and national monarchies came into being. European man began to open his eyes and regard the world about him. He saw that in spite of its protestations of spirituality the Papacy had become almost entirely a political institution. So the shocked moral consciousness of man began to demand a religious reformation. This matter too was taken up by the national states and national reformed churches came into being. At the end of the Middle Ages, therefore, both the political and the spiritual unity of Europe were broken up. At the same time America and the Cape Route to India were discovered, and in the rivalries among the nations for overseas trade and markets a new stage in the history of the Imperial Idea was reached. Finally, at the beginning of the sixteenth century the discovery by Copernicus, that the earth so far from being the centre around which all the universe moved, was itself a small planet revolving around the sun, completely knocked the bottom out of both the mediæval Empire and the mediæval Papacy.

III.—MERCANTILE IMPERIALISM.

In the Middle Ages in Europe literature, art and learning were almost entirely concerned with things European, and especially with the Catholic Church and the Holy Roman Empire. Europe to the European was the World. Few people desired exact knowledge of anything outside. There were few travellers; voyages were mainly coastal or of short duration, geography as a science was unknown, and the shape of the earth was merely guessed at, though those who guessed nearest the truth went in danger of their lives, since the opinion they held was heresy of the deepest hue. It is true, however, to say that quite early on in the Middle Ages Europe was interested slightly in the East. Luxuries such as spices, silks, ivory, etc., came from the East by driblets, along the overland caravan routes or through the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, to the Levantine ports of the Eastern Mediterranean, whence Venetian and Genoese galleys distributed them to various Western ports. The Crusades, too, had awakened some interest in the East. Generally speaking, however, practically nothing definite was known by Europeans of the world outside their own continent and the Mediterranean area.

It was in the 13th century that men's minds began to cease building castles in the air and come down to earth and to the much more difficult study of the actual world about them. If you are to write—like some mediaeval writers—long and erudite treatises on the number of angels that can at any given moment stand together upon the point of a needle, a knowledge of deductive logic coupled with a study of mediaeval church literature is sufficient for your needs; but you will have contributed nothing to the advancement of knowledge. If, however, like Copernicus, you are anxious to find out something of the true nature of the relationship of this earth with the Universe, you do not study church literature, and deductive logic is only a minor aid to your work. You have to rely upon observation and experiment, upon exact calculations, and you have to start from premises that can be scientifically proved. In the one case you deal with abstractions and you deduce ideas from premises that you make no attempt to prove; in the other case you are dealing with reality and the actual world. That is the fundamental difference between the mediaeval and the modern mental outlook. We can trace the first faint beginnings of the modern outlook upon things in the 13th century when Roger Bacon asserted that the earth was spherical in shape and Marco Polo wrote his book describing his own travels in China. These two men stirred up an interest in geography in Western Europe such as had never been felt previously. At the same time the development of towns and the middle class led to a great increase of trade; with the growing complexity of life too luxury and the demand for articles of luxury grew apace. Eastern trade, therefore, became of ever increasing importance to Europe.



In the 14th century, however, with the advent of the Ming dynasty, China was closed to the outside world. Almost at the same time the Ottoman Turks began their great series of invasions into Eastern Europe which not only gave them Constantinople in 1453 but placed them astride of the main routes of European commerce with the East. Just at the time when Europe was demanding more Eastern commodities than ever before, the trade was throttled by the Turkish onrush. Europe therefore had to discover a new route to the East.

The result was that with the 15th century Europe entered upon a period of discovery and expansion which completely transformed the aspect of the world and opened up a field of rivalry and a desire for empire among the European nations of a totally different nature from anything hitherto. In this movement the Portuguese were at first the leaders. Urged on by Prince Henry the Navigator, who so far from wishing to promote navigation, hoped to Christianise North-West Africa and thus attack the Muslim world on the flank, the Portuguese built themselves ocean sailing ships and explored the coast of West Africa as far as Cape Verde. Soon after his death they reached the coasts of Sierra Leone, whence gold dust and negro slaves were to be had. In 1487 Bartholomew Diaz rounded the Cape of Good Hope. Finally in 1498 Vasco da Gama sailing by the Cape route reached the coast of India at Calicut and established direct trading relations between India and Portugal.

It was not before the Portuguese began to build up for themselves a great trading empire in the Indian Ocean. They soon controlled the chief Indian ports where they bought commodities in the name of their King to be shipped to Lisbon. In the early years of the 16th century this extraordinary empire based purely upon trade and sea-power was organised by Alfonso de Albuquerque who captured Goa on the West Coast of India and established it as the centre of the new Portuguese Dominions. Next he captured Malacca which controlled the gateway to the rich Spice Islands of the Malay Archipelago. This operation placed in the hands of Portugal the Spice trade—the richest trade in the world in those days. Albuquerque also established a trading station at the ancient port of Hormuz near the entrance of the Persian Gulf, which gave to the Portuguese control over the whole import trade from India to Persia, and to much of the trade from India *via* Mesopotamia to the Mediterranean. Strong Portuguese posts too were garrisoned and maintained in the Red Sea and at intervals along the East Coast of Africa. In the Far East trade was opened up with China and Japan. For over three-quarters of a century the whole trade between Europe and the East was in Portuguese hands, and Lisbon was the commercial capital of the world.

Albuquerque had hoped to build up a great land empire in the East; he introduced Portuguese colonists and encouraged their inter-marriage with the native peoples. But the existence of a dense population and organised kingdoms prevented him from realising this part of his ideal. The basis of the Portuguese empire therefore was sea power. As long as the Portuguese naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean was maintained her empire, which was really nothing more than a vast trading monopoly, was safe. The trade itself, however, was a



royal monopoly ; no private enterprise was allowed. While therefore much wealth came into the home country it was used not in the interest of the economic development of the nation as a whole, but merely to strengthen the power of the monarchy. The country itself remained poor, and its strength was soon overtaxed by the effort to maintain so widespread an empire.

While the Portuguese were busy developing their commercial empire in the Indian Ocean, Spanish enterprise had led to the discovery of the New World. In October 1492 Christopher Columbus, a Genoese sailor in the pay of Isabella of Castile, had landed on one of the Bahama Islands and, although ignorant of the true nature of his discovery, had laid the foundations of a new empire for Spain. Although he made three more voyages to America, and actually touched mainland, he died in the firm belief that he had merely reached the eastern coast of the continent of Asia. Other explorers following in the wake of Columbus explored all the larger islands in the Gulf of Mexico. In 1513 Vasco Nunez de Balboa crossed the Isthmus of Panama and for the first time European eyes viewed the western limits of the vast Pacific Ocean. Seven years later the bravest of all the early explorers, Magellan, sailed down the coast of South America, rounded its southernmost point, and without any knowledge of his whereabouts, without map or chart, pushed boldly out into the Pacific ultimately reaching the Philippine Islands and the Malay Peninsula. There he was slain by the spear of a native, but his sailors navigated his vessel "the Victoria" back to Spain by the Cape of Good Hope route and completed the first circumnavigation of the globe performed by man.

When, as a result of these and other voyages, the Spaniards realised that a huge new continent was within their grasp, soldiers, adventurers, and priests began to flock across the Atlantic to the lands of the Caribbean Sea. In 1519 Hernando Cortez, a Spanish conquistadore, with a small band of men, advanced into the heart of Mexico, destroyed the powerful Aztec Empire and enslaved its people. There they found enormous stores of gold and silver which had been accumulating for at least seven centuries, and at Potosi, mines of the precious metals of a magnitude never before even dreamt of. Not long afterwards a still wealthier empire was discovered in Peru, which was conquered with extraordinary ease by Pizarro in 1532 with a force of only 183 soldiers. Thus from these new conquests a fabulous stream of wealth began to pour year by year into the coffers of Spain. In 1542 this huge new empire was organised by the Emperor Charles V. A council of the Indies sitting permanently at Madrid controlled with extreme severity and rigidity all the Spanish colonising and commercial activities in the New World. Colonial governors were appointed whose duty it was to render complete the mastery of the Crown over the sources of wealth in their provinces ; trade between the colonies and other nations was forbidden ; even Spaniards themselves could only trade thither by royal license, while all ships going to or coming from America were forced to use the port of Seville where they could be under the strict supervision of the Spanish government. It was not long therefore before the Spanish empire became, like the Portuguese, a huge royal monopoly run not for the economic good of



Spain but in order to promote the power of the monarchy. In 1493 in order that there should be no clash of interests between the two newly developing powers, Pope Alexander VI, the notorious father of the still more notorious Cesare Borgia issued a bull declaring that while Portugal should be allowed a monopoly of the trade of the African Coast, Spain might approach the field of oceanic enterprise only by the westward passage. Spain and Portugal therefore by the Treaty of Tordesillas fixed the meridian of longitude 370 leagues east of the Cape Verde Islands (about 430 long. W. of Greenwich) as the boundary line between their respective spheres of interest. Thus, in effect the whole of the overseas trade and enterprise outside Europe was reserved exclusively in the hands of Portugal and Spain. At first there was no opposition to this arrangement. During the 16th century however as the English, French and Dutch began to develop their mercantile marines and widen the scope of their commercial undertakings they chafed more and more at the artificial restraint imposed upon their trade expansion by the award of Alexander VI. Early in the period Cabot for England and Verazzano for France had explored the coast of North America. English and French fishers too had made their way to the rich cod banks off the coast of Newfoundland; Jacques Cartier had explored down the estuary of the St. Lawrence and had given the name of Canada to the land he found to the north of that great river; but France was too busy with foreign wars and intestine strife to undertake any real expansion before the end of the 16th century, while England did not begin to challenge the Spanish dominion until the second half of that century. The 16th century therefore witnessed the rise of two great commercial empires deriving their wealth from stations overseas beyond the confines of Europe and organised rather for the promotion of the power of the central governments, than for their own inherent economic welfare. At the end of the century, however, the English, French and Dutch were attacking the Spanish and Portuguese monopoly of trade and were beginning to found overseas trading stations as markets for their own manufactured goods, and as places whence they might draw stores of the raw materials that they themselves were unable to produce. The history of European colonial and commercial enterprise in the 16th and 17th centuries is the history of their attempts to get overseas markets. This of course is a form of imperialism—for the purposes of this lecture I have called it "mercantile imperialism" since it was primarily concerned with overseas expansion for mercantile ends.

Now, this type of imperialism has played a great part in the history of the modern world and is worthy of a much more detailed and more careful study than I can possibly present to you in the short space of one hour. It developed especially in Portugal, Spain, England, France and Holland. I have shown you in a sort of vague introductory manner the sort of thing it was in the case of the early empires of Portugal and Spain. I wish now to limit myself more specially to the development of Mercantile Imperialism in England and France.

In the 16th century the spirit of nationalism was arising in Europe. The old cosmopolitan ideals centering around the Empire and the Papacy had broken down completely and national monarchies,



independent of all control from outside, and internally stronger and more despotic than any of the mediaeval monarchies, were the order of the day. These monarchies derived much of their power from this growing desire for national independence and self-sufficiency which had began to be evinced generally throughout Europe. In England in the 16th century nationalism was particularly vigorous, and as dreams of conquest in the fair fields of France began to fade away with the coming of the far-seeing Tudor kings so attention was increasingly drawn to the development of sea power. National independence could only be built up upon the basis of a strong navy. By the strategical use of a navy a foreign enemy could be prevented from landing on English shores. England therefore first began to develop her sea power under the Tudors from motives of self-defence and political freedom.

When, however, England found herself becoming more and more antagonistic towards Spain because the latter thwarted her trading ambitions stimulated by the recent discoveries in America, English shipping both mercantile and naval was consciously developed in order to build up a powerful overseas commercial empire. This was the aim of Englishmen from the days of royal Elizabeth onwards throughout the 17th and most of the 18th centuries. During that time English empire-builders gradually worked out a scheme of governmental regulation of and interference with all the economic activities of the nation which recent economic writers have called the "Mercantile System." This system aimed primarily at the promotion of national power and self-sufficiency. At first it concerned itself with shipping and trade on a national basis; in the 17th century, however, its scope was extended to include all the newly developing overseas colonies and trading stations of England. Finally, in the reign of Charles II, at the time when Colbert was engaged upon a similar task in France, the Restoration statesmen set themselves systematically to regulate all the economic activities of the empire in order to weld England and her overseas possessions into a powerful self-sufficing entity all the various parts of which should be economically interdependent and complementary.

In the Mercantile System shipping was of primary importance. From as early as the time of Richard II English statesmen devoted especial attention to the creation of a large mercantile marine which would be useful not only for purposes of trade but also as a naval reserve in time of war. The principle first adopted in this connection was that of the protection of national shipping from foreign competition by means of Parliamentary legislation. So we have the Navigation Acts. The first Navigation Act was passed early in the reign of Richard II. It provided that "None of the King's subjects shall carry forth nor bring any Merchandises, but only in ships of the King's Allegiance." But this was found to be impracticable since there were not sufficient English ships to carry on the trade. It was therefore modified considerably in practice but the principle remained and with certain fluctuations was followed by later monarchs until the time of Elizabeth when for a time, owing to the opposition of the Queen and Burleigh, the policy was discontinued.

Henry VII strove to protect English merchant shipping by treaties



with foreign powers. He also built standard ships which he hired out to shipping firms, whom he encouraged to improve their own ships by offering bounties on the construction of all vessels with a heavier tonnage than his own standard ships. Henry VIII was intensely interested in ship-building. In 1514 he established Trinity House, the famous school for pilots at Deptford. He built new harbours, improved old ones, fortified the Thames against pirates and made great efforts to increase England's supply of naval stores and materials for ship-building. But numbers of ships and quantities of material are of little value to a nation unless it has good experienced seamen. In the 16th century when an increasing proportion of Englishmen were beginning to adopt a sea-faring life, it was discovered that the sea-fisheries were of exceptional importance as a nursery for seamen. In the days when England was Roman Catholic Lent and the numerous fast days, when only fish was eaten, created a continuous and general demand for fish. When, however, with the coming of the Protestant Reformation in the reign of Edward VI, it was no longer compulsory to eat fish, it was felt that the fishery trade might fall into decay. The government, alarmed lest this should weaken England's mercantile marine and naval power, went to the extraordinary length of passing a law in 1549 enacting that fish must be eaten instead of meat on Fridays, Saturdays, Ember Days, vigils and during Lent. This "Political Lent" was for many years rigidly enforced. The disobedient were fined ten shillings and had to suffer ten days' imprisonment for the first offence. Often the punishment was more severe, and even brutal. Elizabeth's great minister, Burleigh, carried this policy still further. He increased the "fishdays" by adding Wednesday to the list and in many other ways systematically promoted the development of England's maritime power. The most spectacular result of this naval policy on the part of England was the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The English ships in this famous encounter were larger in numbers, more heavily armed, and their guns had a longer range than those of Spain. True it is that they were smaller in size than the Spanish galleons; but whereas the latter were chiefly huge transports not built for naval warfare, the English boats were the most seaworthy and the best navigated vessels in the world.

Another very important side of the Mercantile System was what is known as the Bullionist Policy. This was based upon the idea, developed in Spain at the time of her early exploitation of the New World, that bullion actually constitutes wealth. Spain developed her Empire purely upon this idea. To her the possession of vast stores of bullion at a time when for centuries it had been very scarce in Europe meant power. The Spanish colonists therefore devoted themselves almost entirely to mining for precious metals; they relied on the mother country for all their supplies of food and other necessities of life. Spain however, could not supply all their needs; prices rose enormously, and the other European countries were able to undercut Spanish merchants in the home markets. The Spanish government tried on the one hand to prevent the colonies from trading with any other nation, a proceeding which crippled the Empire economically and brought it to loggerheads with England; on the other hand it strictly forbade export of bullion and hoarded a large share of the



produce of the American mines. While therefore the government almost prevented the circulation of new coin in Spain itself, an enormous amount of bullion was smuggled out of the country and went into circulation in Europe generally through the usual trade channels. This sudden influx of bullion into Europe caused something like an economic revolution; the value of money sank to about one-fifth of what it had been before the coming of the American bullion supply. But Spain soon lost all the advantages she had at first reaped from her new source of wealth. Simply because of the fact that her Empire could not live on its own resources, the money found its way out of Spanish hands into the pockets of the Dutch, Venetian, and English traders upon whom she was dependent.

England owned no gold or silver mines, but she adopted the Bullionist Policy chiefly for reasons of national—and later imperial—safety. To meet any sudden emergency, especially in case of war, a good supply of bullion was absolutely essential for the purpose of raising and equipping armies and fleets. A government amply supplied with specie was in those days powerfully fortified for or against foreign aggression. England's method of gaining possession of stores of bullion is known as the "Balance of Trade Policy." It consisted in the encouragement of Trade with countries who exported less to England than they imported from her. In this way, it was argued, the balance of trade would be favourable to England, and this balance, said the economists, would be paid up in bullion by the country against whom it operated. Trade therefore was encouraged with such nations as Spain, Portugal, and Holland whose imports from England were appreciably greater than their exports to her. On the other hand the balance of trade with France was most unfavourable to England. In the 17th century therefore efforts were made to prevent all trade between the two nations. In 1678 an Act of Parliament prohibited the import of French goods into England for three years and laid it down that "all and every importation and importations or vending or selling or uttering or retailing of any French wines, brandy, linen, silks, salt or paper, etc., . . . shall be and is hereby declared and adjudged to be a common nuisance to this Kingdome in general and to all His Majestyes subjects thereof." (30 Car. II, c. i.). Before the end of the century the tax on French goods was raised to 50 per cent. and finally in the following century to 75 per cent. Adam Smith estimated that in the 18th century the only trade between England and France was that of the smuggler.

The third great point in the Mercantilist programme in England was the necessity of governmental action to ensure an adequate independent national food supply and employment for the whole population. The government from the time of Elizabeth onwards strove to induce farmers to grow as much corn as possible by giving a royal bounty on every quarter of wheat exported from the country. The increase of corn production, it was hoped, would foster the growth of a strong healthy yeoman population, which itself was very desirable for military purposes. The employment of the population was stimulated by the fixing of standard wages in all trades by the justices of the peace in every county, by the great Statute of Artificers of Elizabeth's reign, which provided practically a complete labour



code for the country, and by keeping out of the English market all goods that competed with home manufactures. At the same time commercial treaties, which had in view the provisions of markets abroad for English manufactures and the protection of English merchants trading abroad, were made with foreign powers.

From as early as the reign of Henry III in the 13th century it had been fairly generally recognised that forcing trade could be best carried on by means of privileged companies chartered and granted a monopoly by the state. The first association of merchants of this type was the company of the Merchants of the Staple which exported wool from England to Flanders. But the most important of the early companies was that of the Merchant Adventurers. This Company, which grew up out of the old Mercers' Guild, received a charter from Henry IV in 1407. Their object was to establish themselves in foreign cities especially in Flanders and Germany and carry English trade beyond the seas as widely as possible. "Their history," says Sir Charles Lucas, "is typical of English methods, private initiative obtaining Royal licence but not asking for State Funds, energetic, enterprising, aiming directly at private gain, and in doing so promoting national interests." When in Tudor times the English government became inspired by the principles of Mercantile Imperialism we witness a great development of the chartered company system. This was regarded as the simplest expedient by which the state could control and direct foreign trade in its own interests. The methods employed by the Merchant Adventurers to push English trade in Europe were copied by the new companies, organised upon a similar basis, which grew up in the 16th century to carry English trade beyond the limits of Europe to the East Indies, to North America, and, as was fondly hoped though never realised, to far-off Cathay (China). Thus the Muscovy Company, founded in 1553, strove to discover a North-East passage to China. It failed in this; but succeeded in establishing organised Anglo-Russian trading relations. In 1579 the "fellowship of Eastland Merchants" received a Royal charter for trading to the Baltic. Frobisher's attempts in 1576 to discover a North-West Passage to China led to the grant of a charter in 1577 for the formation of a Company of Cathay. In 1581 Elizabeth concluded a commercial treaty with the Sultan of Turkey and at the same time by charter conferred upon a company of merchants exclusive privileges for carrying on trade to Turkey. These merchants in 1592 became the famous Levant Company. When William Hawkins demonstrated the commercial value of the slave trade between Africa and the Spanish American colonies, a "Syndicate of Adventurers to Guinea" was formed in London for undertaking the management of this enterprise. In 1588, the year of the Armada, this company was reconstituted as the African Company and was given by the crown exclusive privileges between the rivers Senegal and Gambia in West Africa. The greatest of all the chartered companies, the East Indian Company, was founded on the 31st of December 1600. This has been called "the grain of mustard seed which grew into the great tree of the British East Indian Empire."

What has been said of the East Indian Company may be applied in a general sense to all the chartered companies. They were the



original seed of the British Empire. When Englishmen in the later years of the reign of Elizabeth began to entertain projects of colonisation in America, when the famous half-brothers, Humphrey Gilbert and Walter Raleigh, made their plans for the development of Newfoundland and Virginia, colonial ventures were promoted, financed, and managed by companies chartered by the Crown. Such were the unsuccessful ventures of Gilbert and Raleigh ; such too were the more successful ventures which led to the foundation of the permanent colony of Virginia in 1606, the New England colonies between 1620 and 1650, Newfoundland (1612), Nova Scotia (1621), Barbadoes (1624) and the other British settlements in the West Indies during the first half of the 17th century. Each colony had its origin in a company chartered and granted exclusive privileges by the Crown. Even the voyage of the Mayflower, which bore the Pilgrim Fathers to New Plymouth in 1620, was financed by a company, at first private, but later chartered like the rest. So the organisation and principles of the trading company were applied by Englishmen to their earliest steps in Empire building.

As the 17th century progressed the Mercantile policy became in the hands of the Stuarts and their ministers more and more concrete and definite. The Stuarts were imperialists. Watching the extension of English trade in the Indian Ocean and the development of sturdy colonies in North America and around the Caribbean Sea, the Stuarts began to conceive the possibility of building up England and her overseas colonies and trading-stations into a powerful self-sufficient commercial empire, systematically regulated and dominating the seas. The early Stuarts, James I and Charles I, made intermittent attempts to develop the necessary administrative machinery and naval forces for carrying this idea into effect. In 1622 a standing committee was appointed to advise the King's Council on all matters relating to trade and the colonies. On the death of James I, his son Charles revived this committee which met at intervals until the year 1638. He also by his famous attempt to raise ship-money strove to put on the sea an English navy that should defend the main trade routes between England and the continent. The Navigation Acts too were revived and attempts, without exception unsuccessful, were made to include the colonies within their scope by excluding foreigners—and especially the Dutch—from trading with them.

The work of Charles I in this direction was cut short by the outbreak of the great Civil War, but after his execution the Commonwealth government continued along the lines of his policy. In 1649 the Council of State appointed another special committee to deal with commercial and colonial matters. Throughout the Commonwealth period colonial administration was guided by these "Committees for Trade and Plantations," as they were called. The Commonwealth statesmen also recognised the importance of the Navy, the administration of which was tremendously improved. More than half the national revenue was spent on the Navy in the days of Cromwell's regime. But the most important imperialistic move made by the Commonwealth was the passing of the famous Navigation Ordinance of 1651. This Act not only applied the principles of the earlier Navigation Acts to the Colonies, but it also for the first time initiated

a continuous and comprehensive policy which became the basis of England's imperial system from that day until the American Declaration of Independence in 1776. It prohibited the introduction into England or her dominions of the goods of Asia, Africa or America, except in English ships, built, owned, commanded and chiefly manned by Englishmen. In the same way, no European goods might be imported into England or her dominions in any but English ships or the ships of the country which produce them. This Act was especially aimed at the Dutch, who during the first half of the century had become the greatest carriers of sea-borne goods in the world, and who by supplying the English colonies with all their necessities, prevented the development of trade between them and the mother country. It brought about the first of three great naval wars between England and the Dutch, but as a measure for promoting trade between England and her colonies it was unsuccessful since the wants of the latter were so numerous that the English mercantile marine was not large enough to cope with them. The Act therefore was not very rigidly enforced. It served to point the way along which, according to the ideas of the age, the path to Empire must be trodden.

The torch of imperialism which dropped from the lifeless fingers of Cromwell was taken up and borne aloft by the statesmen of the Restoration period. With the year 1660 in English history we enter upon a period of marked expansion and exuberant vitality in which the chief interests of England were more and more centered upon sea-power, commerce and colonies. Up to this time while attempts had been made to develop certain lines of imperial policy according to settled principles no really coherent system had been devised for regulating and correlating all the activities of the various sections of the Empire; this was the work of Charles II and his ministers. Historians have in the past emphasized too much Charles's indolence, his intrigues with Louis XIV of France, and his dealings with the fair sex. Those of us, however, who have studied the naval and colonial policy of his reign have been much impressed by his efficiency as a man of business and his colossal ambitions as an imperialist. The Earl of Clarendon, his Chancellor, wrote these significant words in "The Continuation of his Life"—"Upon the King's first arrival in England, he manifested a very great desire to improve the general traffic and trade of the kingdom, and upon all occasions conferred with the most active merchants upon it, and offered all he could contribute to the advancement thereof." This is no empty praise. Clarendon was always strictly fair in his estimation of character. During Charles's reign the English mercantile marine nearly doubled itself. English colonial trade between 1660 and 1700 rose from £800,000 a year to £1,750,000 a year.

The earliest efforts of Charles II's government in this direction were devoted to devising an imperial commercial code and to organising an efficient administrative system. The great Navigation Act of 1660 revived the Navigation Ordinance of 1651 and added to it certain new regulations of the highest importance known as the "Enumerated Articles Clauses." These provided that sugar, tobacco, cotton-wool, indigo, ginger, fustic and other dyeing woods produced by English colonies were to be shipped by the colonies only to



England or her dominions. In this way it was hoped that England would become the great centre to which all the chief raw materials of the Empire would be shipped, and from which they could be distributed to the world generally. In the opinion of Professor Egerton this rule was the first definite statement of the theory underlying the whole of Mercantile Imperialism, that colonies existed only for the benefit of the mother country.

In 1663 the Commercial Code was further strengthened by the "Act for the Encouragement of Trade," better known as the "Staple Act," which prohibited the colonies from importing any European goods except through England. This Act had in view not purely the well-being of English merchants and shippers, but also the provision of imperial defence. It aimed at centralising the trade to and from the colonies in a few clearly marked routes radiating from England; the trade could thus be more easily defended from pirates or an enemy power. In 1673 the code was completed by the "Act imposing Planting Duties" which laid export duties on goods shipped from one colony to another, exactly as would have been necessary to be paid on them had they been shipped to England. The regulations embodied in these three Acts of Parliament were what we may call the economic framework of the old colonial system. Throughout the Stuart period they were systematically enforced. In the 18th century the colonies, especially those of North America, complained bitterly of them and the Whig Governments from 1714 to 1760 purposely allowed their wholesale evasion. It was the attempt of George III once more to put them into practice that led to the American revolt and the disruption of the old Empire.

On the administrative side Charles II revived the Committee for Trade and Plantations to deal with colonial matters. Colonial work was done almost entirely through the Privy Council which in every case referred it to the committee. In the time of Cromwell it had been customary for the Committee to confer with colonial merchants when any important point cropped up and specialist advice was needed. In Charles II's time this method was developed to a more definite stage by the appointment of an advisory board of merchants and colonial experts to which the Committee could refer for advice on any colonial matter. This board was known as the Council for Foreign Plantations. This was the method which, with certain fluctuations and modifications, lasted well into the next century. We are told by John Evelyn in his Diary that Charles II himself often came into the Council to hear its debates, while in 1672 the philosopher, John Locke, was its Secretary. The Council as a body was dissolved in 1675, but its work was carried on by nine "Lords of Trade" by whom in practice all colonial matters were decided, though officially everything was done in and by the Privy Council of the King.

Colonies were governed by a Governor appointed by the Crown. He was assisted by a naval officer whose business it was to see that the Laws of Trade and Navigation were carried out. He examined ships' papers and cargoes and sent regular reports home to England of all ships and cargoes arriving and departing. In each colony, too, a "collector" was appointed to supervise the collection of customs duties. The Governors and their subordinate officials kept the home



Government well informed regarding colonial matters. The Privy Council Records and the State Papers literally teem with reports from colonial officials. Thus was the Stuart system of "Thorough" applied to the administration of England's Old Empire. The basis of the system was economic: it was deemed the primary function of a colony to supply the mother-country with goods which she could not herself produce. There was, however, to be no competition within the Empire. Virginia was the centre of the production of tobacco; therefore Ireland and the West of England were not allowed to grow the fragrant weed, and when they objected, soldiers were sent to pull up the plant from their fields. On the other hand the New England colonists whose climate forced them to go in for the same sort of products as England herself found their economic development almost crippled by the regulation that no goods should be manufactured in America that might be made in England. This was in fact the keystone of the arch of colonial regulations. Yet it must be remembered that colonial products which did not run counter to those of England were given considerable preference in the English market where they could easily outsell the foreigner. The chief sufferers were the New England colonies—their grievance, as I have pointed out earlier, was the chief underlying cause of the American Revolution.

Simultaneously with Charles II's systematic regulation of the English Empire the great minister Colbert was engaged upon a similar task in relation to the French Empire. Jean Baptiste Colbert, who in 1661 succeeded Mazarin as chief minister to Louis XIV, worked out a comprehensive plan for the reorganisation of France and her colonial Empire on mercantilist lines. When he took up the seals of office he found France's industry and commerce in a deplorable condition, the Crown on the verge of bankruptcy, and the navy and mercantile marine almost non-existent. To remedy such a condition of affairs was in the words of the late Sir John Laughton, "a task compared with which the cleansing of the Augean stable might be considered the amusement of a summer afternoon." In the West Indies France possessed several prosperous settlements, on the West Coast of Africa French trading posts were established, and in Canada a moderately large colony was in the early stages of its existence. The carrying trade between all the French colonies and the mother-country was almost without exception in the hands of the Dutch. The goods of the Orient came to France only by way of Holland and England who had by this time supplanted the Portuguese in the trade of the Indian Ocean. For fish and naval stores also France depended upon the Dutch.

In 1664 Colbert's plan for the regeneration of France was ready for application. First he reconstituted the finances of the Government. In this department he did so well that he was soon able to realise a surplus of revenue of 45 millions of francs. Next he organised the French "Conseil de Commerce" to advise the Government upon all matters relating to trade and colonies. With the help of this body of experts he set himself by state aid to restore the agriculture and industries of France and create new industries. At the same time he protected the home producer by imposing a very high protective tariff



on all foreign manufactured articles. He meant to make France independent of the foreigner; so heavy in fact was the duty on foreign manufactures that their import almost ceased.

It was to the development of French overseas commerce, however, that Colbert gave the chief place in his scheme of Mercantile Imperialism. This he set himself to build up by means of great state-aided monopolistic companies. Colbert's companies were not concerns of private enterprise like the English chartered companies. They all owed their origin to the great French minister; their finances were chiefly subscribed by the Crown; their activities were under the direction and control of the Government; and they all formed part of a systematic scheme for making France and the French Empire the most powerful trading concern in the world. To this end Colbert organised the West Indian Company to regain for France sole control over the trade of the French West Indies and to develop French trade with Spanish America. The East India Company, it was hoped, would enrich France by establishing direct commercial relations between her and the East. The Company of the North was founded to break down the Dutch monopoly of the Baltic trade and fisheries and win an entrance into them for Frenchmen. In order to get naval stores the Company of the Pyrenees was organised to bring timber, pitch, and tar from the mountain slopes to the French ship-yards. As the French sugar and tobacco plantations in the West Indies needed supplies of negro labour, an African Company was formed to render the plantations independent of the Dutch for their supplies of African negro slaves. Possessing a long Mediterranean coast line France, thought Colbert, ought to dominate the trade of that sea. He therefore organised a Levant Company to compete with the Dutch and English companies. The internal affairs of all the French colonies were under the intimate supervision of the home government; even a great colony like Canada was allowed no voice whatever in its own affairs. Everything had to move and have its being in the exact and proper place assigned to it in Colbert's scheme.

Into the details of the working of Colbert's system time does not permit us to go. It was inevitable that this new Mercantile Empire should clash with England and the Dutch—in every direction France was economically antagonistic towards these two nations. Had Louis XIV consistently followed out the policy of Colbert all might have gone well for France. Like modern Germany, however, he forsook the path of economic gain for that of military glory and territorial ascendancy in Europe. This brought about the great combination of European powers which checked the ambitions of France in the War of the Spanish Succession (1701—1713). It remained for England in the "Seven Years' War" (1756—1763) to destroy the French overseas Empire which at so many points thwarted and threatened her own Empire. This she was able to do chiefly because of the excellent naval policy laid down by the Restoration navy men, and especially by Samuel Pepys, the diarist. The French navy, so brilliantly created by Colbert, was in the 18th century neglected by the corrupt administration of Louis XV, and proved hopelessly inferior to that of England. Sea-power therefore decided the conflict.



But soon after the collapse of the French Empire England's old imperial system also perished. In 1776 two staggering blows were dealt to it by the American Declaration of Independence on the one hand, and the publication of Adam Smith's "Wealth of Nations" on the other. This epoch-making work of Political Economy analysed the principles of the Mercantile System and gave the whole weight of its verdict against them. As its name implies, the book taught that in the economic sphere the wealth of nations and not the power of nations should be sought. This, said Adam Smith, could only be achieved by allowing the economic activities of man free scope unchecked by any Government regulations. Gradually, therefore, under the influence of statesmen like the Younger Pitt, Huskisson and Sir Robert Peel, who had imbibed the views of Adam Smith, the mercantile policy was discontinued and the more modern type of English imperialism developed which I shall deal with in the sixth lecture of this course.

Mercantile Imperialism served its generation. Under the circumstances existing in the 16th and 17th centuries it was a perfectly natural development. When, however, colonies were no longer in their childhood and were anxious to escape from the leading strings fastened to them by the mother-country, the days of systematic regulation were past. In trade too the more modern world is no longer concerned, as were the Mercantilists, with the interests of the producer exclusively, but rather with those of the consumer.

IV.—BONAPARTISM.

In the days of Louis XIV, who reigned from 1643 to 1715, France made an almost successful bid for world dominance. Colbert organised her naval, mercantile and industrial resources so well that by the end of the 17th century she seemed likely to outrival both England and Holland as a great commercial empire. But the desire of Louis XIV to win territorial supremacy in Europe at the expense of the old Hapsburg dominions, which were contiguous with France, caused the downfall of French imperialism under the House of Bourbon. France could not successfully pursue two entirely different ideals—mercantile imperialism and European ascendancy—at the same time. One or the other only would have been sufficient for her energies.

The gross extravagance entailed by the grandiose policy of Louis XIV, coupled with the appalling ineptitude of his successors Louis XV and Louis XVI, brought the French monarchy towards the end of the 18th century to the brink of bankruptcy. In 1789 Louis XVI in order to seek the assistance of the French nation to solve his financial difficulties summoned the States General, the old representative assembly of France, which had not met since 1614. At once all the pent-up political feeling in France found voice. In the winter before the first session of the States General something like 40,000 political meetings were held while thousands of political pamphlets poured from the presses and were distributed all over the country. The French Crown was the most despotic institution in Europe. The nobility not only were almost free from direct taxation themselves, but were able to oppress the peasantry by all manner of vexatious survivals of feudalism. The French peasant had to grind his corn in the lord's mill, press his grapes in the lord's wine-press, pay forced labour and all sorts of tolls and dues. It was estimated that of the peasant's earnings only about one-fifth went into his own pocket. The church too was unpopular. Its vast wealth and the luxurious lives of its higher clergy were considered to be nothing short of a grave public scandal. The economic system of France was fast bound by the regulations of the government and of numerous guilds. France was, as Arthur Young said, a "museum of economic errors." For years French philosophers had pointed out the mistakes in the administration and organisation of France. The physiocrats taught the doctrines of Free Trade; Voltaire used his scathing pen to pour contempt upon the various public and religious abuses, while Rousseau in his work entitled "The Social Contract" declared that all government rested upon the consent of the governed. When, therefore, it was known that the government was on the brink of a financial crash, all the discontented elements in the state felt that with the reappearance of the States General a new era of reform was ushered in.

In the States General, however, the Commons and the Lower Clergy combined in the hope of outvoting all the rest of the deputies.



When they were opposed by the king, they registered a solemn oath not to dismiss until they had given France a reformed constitution. They forthwith called themselves the "National Assembly." When the government still adopted a reactionary attitude and began to concentrate troops in Paris, the Parisian mob made themselves master of the city and captured the great State prison, the Bastille, the symbol as they thought of their servitude to despotism. Louis XVI on hearing the news of the fall of the Bastille said: "Why, this is a revolt!" "No Sire," replied a gentleman of the court, "it is a revolution."

The National Assembly having swept away all feudal privileges, all nobility, and in fact having destroyed the old social order of France, declared "the natural, inalienable and sacred rights of man" and proceeded to construct a constitution. The great leader of the moderates, however, Count Mirabeau, died; the King made a foolish attempt at fleeing from the kingdom; the National Assembly came to loggerheads with the mob of Paris; thousands of refugee nobles began to stir up foreign intervention, while power passed into the more violent political clubs. Instead of constitutional government therefore the King and Queen were executed, war was declared on all governments, the extremist leaders Robespierre and Marat and the mob of Paris instituted a "Reign of Terror", and thousands of French men, women and children were sent to the guillotine. In place of religion a Goddess of Reason was first enthroned in the cathedral of Notre Dame in Paris. This, however, was pronounced by Robespierre to savour too much of aristocracy. "If God did not exist" he said, "it would be necessary to create him." So he created a thing called a "Supreme Being" and himself presided over a festival in its honour. At the same time a law was passed making proof of guilt unnecessary in trials. Prisoners henceforth were condemned to death in batches. Friends and foes alike were struck down. At last, however, France could stand this sort of thing no longer. Robespierre and his associates in July 1794 were arrested and suffered the same death as the thousands they themselves had doomed. So ended the Reign of Terror. A French artisan, gazing upon the dead body of the great tyrant, exclaimed: "Yes, there is indeed a God."

The reaction against the Terror came very speedily. The extremist clubs were closed, the laws against the aristocracy and priests were withdrawn, and the moderates were once more admitted into the Government. Soon a new constitution was proclaimed consisting of a two-chambered legislature, and an irresponsible Directory of five members at the head of the executive.

At the time of the execution of Louis XVI, France was at war with Prussia and Austria, whose invasion of French soil had been checked by two battles, Valmy and Jemappes. The royal tragedy was the signal for the rise of the First Coalition of Austria, Prussia, England and Holland against France. France replied to this by a general levy of all citizens and by organising the whole nation as a vast military machine. Holland was overrun and subjugated. Prussia threw up the sponge and withdrew from the contest. Spain joined France. By 1796 only Austria and England were left to carry on the war. England in those days possessed no really effective land



forces for European warfare but at sea she was everywhere victorious over the combined French, Spanish and Dutch navies. The Directory therefore decided to make a great attack upon Austria. The campaign was to hinge upon an attack through Italy into the south of Austria. In the early months of 1796 the French War Office was at work planning the campaign and mapping it out. A young artillery officer named Napoleon Bonaparte was employed as draftsman for the construction of the necessary military maps. Him, Carnot, the great organiser of the French military efforts, with unerring judgment selected for the execution of the great design, and appointed commander-in-chief of the Army of Italy.

This young man, who at the age of twenty-seven leapt to the dizzy height of commander of an army corps, was a Corsican by birth, who had been educated in French military schools, famous then as the best artillery schools in the world. At first he had entertained the notion of joining the English East India Company. When, however, in 1793, the Corsicans rebelled and proclaimed their independence of France, Bonaparte had fled from his native island to France, joined the Jacobin club, and posed as a follower of Robespierre. On the latter's fall he transferred his affections to the Directory. He first attracted attention to his ability by reducing the royalist town of Toulon in the very teeth of a powerful English fleet. Later, on October 5th, 1795, he had brilliantly suppressed a dangerous attempt at insurrection in Paris. In the spring of the following year the eagle eye of Carnot singled him out to lead the French armies into Italy.

Italy then was divided into ten states. The south was dominated by the House of Bourbon, the centre by the Pope, and the north by the Hapsburgs of Austria. It was because of this Austrian domination in North Italy that Italy had to be considered by France in a campaign which aimed at capturing the Austrian capital city of Vienna. As planned by Napoleon, the campaign involved the co-operation of three separate French armies converging upon Vienna. One was to set out from Belgium through Germany; another was to cross the Rhine at Strassburg and march along the valley of the Danube, while the third under Napoleon was to drive the Austrians out of North Italy and attack into Austria on the left flank of their lines of defence against the first two. Military critics at the present day are of opinion that this was the most brilliantly conceived of all Napoleon's campaigns. But the execution of exactly-planned co-operating movements by the two armies advancing in Germany was too much for the more limited abilities of their commanders, both of whom were foiled by the Archduke Charles of Austria. Not so with Napoleon. Proclaiming himself the champion of Italian liberty and nationalism, he won a series of wonderful victories against the Austrians and in 1797 began to advance on Vienna. Austria was forced to sign the humiliating peace of Campo Formio.

Then under the guise of the restorer of Italian liberty he began to organise northern and central Italy as republics dependent upon France. This was his first step towards his own supremacy in France. He soon found that the Italians were absolutely unfitted to enjoy even the mere semblance of liberty allowed by him to the new republics he had just set up. In a letter written to Talleyrand at the time he



said: "You little know these people. They do not deserve to have forty thousand French killed for them . . . you imagine that a superstitious, cowardly, pantaloon people can be made to do great things by liberty." A little later he wrote to the Directors: "I know that it costs nothing for a handful of talkers to wish for a universal republic . . . it is the soldier who founds a republic and it is the soldier who maintains it." If Napoleon had ever been a sincere believer in republicanism and democracy, and it is doubtful, certainly his experience in Italy decided him against them. He realised that all the experiments in constitutional government that were being tried in France as a result of the revolution were doomed to failure. The upheaval had been too great. Only a vigorous power wielded by one strong man could give torn and distracted France the binding force she needed. That one strong man, he said to himself, must be Napoleon Bonaparte. Here you may observe the inception of the political doctrine of Bonapartism which has played so important a part in the history of France since the Revolution. Bonaparte's earliest expression of his ideas on this subject is probably to be found in a letter which he wrote to the Directors in May 1797: "Do you suppose", he wrote, "that I triumph in Italy for the glory of the lawyers of the Directory, a Carnot or a Barras? Do you suppose that I mean to found a Republic? What an idea! A Republic of thirty millions of people! With our morals, our vices! How is such a thing possible? The nation wants a chief, a chief covered with glory, not theories of government, ideological essays that the French do not understand. They want some playthings; that will be enough; they will play with them and let themselves be led, always supposing they are cleverly prevented from seeing the goal towards which they are moving."

The peace of Campo Formio concluded by Napoleon with Austria in October 1797 marks the first stage of this new French imperialism, The Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium) and the Ionian Islands in the Mediterranean were ceded to France. The new Cisalpine Republic of North Italy was placed under the protection of France. By a secret article Austria promised to favour the attainment by France of the Rhine frontier so strenuously sought by her ever since the days of Henry IV. Thereafter Napoleon could boast that the so-called "scientific frontier" of France (the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees), for which Henry IV, Richelieu and even the Grande Monarque Louis XIV himself had fought in vain, had been won by his arms. In 1797 Holland also was included in the French Empire. In 1795 France had conquered the Dutch, and true to the principles of the Revolution had organised Holland as the Batavian Republic—nominally free, in reality dependent upon France. In 1798 two more republics were set up as the result of the progress of the armies of France; Rome and Switzerland, both closely dependent upon their conqueror.

Already, however, his romantic imagination had begun to weave gaudy dreams of Eastern conquest. Egypt was to be his next objective. France was to dominate the Mediterranean Sea. The Ottoman Empire was to be up-rooted, Syria invaded, and then even India might fall to the invincible sword of the new Alexander. Thus should



the power of England be destroyed. But more than that, Napoleon himself might become the possessor of an oriental empire which would enable him to dictate to the world. At first, however, his plan was to deal a blow at England, and it is significant that the army with which he set sail for the conquest of the land of the Pyramids was named "the army of England." The expedition was a failure. Had France possessed a navy strong enough to hold the Mediterranean, success was almost assured. Unfortunately for Napoleon, Nelson by shattering the French fleet at the Battle of the Nile and Sir Sidney Smith by driving back the French army from Acre, successfully put a stop to this curious oriental adventure.

During Napoleon's absence in Egypt things had not gone too well for France in the European war. Another great coalition—the second consisting of Great Britain, Russia, Austria, Turkey, Naples and Portugal, had been built up through the unceasing labours of William Pitt. The Austrian armies under the Archduke Charles advancing along the upper Rhine had inflicted severe defeats upon the French, while in North Italy the allied Austro-Russian victories had brought about almost a complete collapse of the French power. When therefore in October 1799 Napoleon managed to elude the English fleet and return to France—though without his army—he received a joyous welcome. Mr. H. A. L. Fisher in his first lecture on Bonapartism quotes the following extract from the memoirs of a Frenchman living at the time. "Every peasant I met in the fields, the vineyards, and woods, stopped and asked me if there was news of General Bonaparte, and why he did not come back to France. No one inquired after the Directory."

Napoleon realised that the great moment had come for him to make himself master of France. France needed a dictator. No constitutional Government could possibly cope with the problems that needed solution. The Republic had completely failed to restore internal order in France; robber bands were everywhere the terror of the countryside, conscripts were refusing to serve in the army, unblushing corruption reigned among all classes of officials, the state was bankrupt, laws were disobeyed or disregarded, while chronic civil war reigned in forty-five of the Departments. When on November 9th, 1799, Napoleon dissolved the Directory, drove out at the point of the bayonet the council of Five Hundred, and established a provisional government with himself at the head, his action was universally approved. This indeed was the deathblow of the Republic; from this time onwards until 1814 Napoleon was the ruler of France and the French Empire.

The time, however, was not yet ripe for the establishment of an Empire in name. A new constitution, therefore, was promulgated and the semblance of constitutional rule was maintained by the creation of a three-chambered legislative body, the powers of which were so carefully balanced as to make them absolutely ineffective in practice. All real power in the state was placed in the hands of a First Consul, Napoleon, and two others. The First Consul himself nominated the members of the chief legislative body, the Senate, all officials were responsible to him; he initiated all legislation. This was the culmination of the French Revolution. The people who paid lip-service to



"Liberty, Equality and Fraternity," after ten years free enjoyment of their ideal, willingly bowed their neck to the yoke of a brilliant personality who came to save them from their own errors. This is one of the great ironies of history. Probably it was a fortunate thing for France that Bonaparte himself was not a Frenchman; he was thus all the better able to stand outside the bounds of party or creed: he was also peculiarly fitted to understand both the good and the bad qualities of the French temperament. Cold by nature and almost entirely lacking in sentiment, Napoleon knew exactly how to win the hearts of the most sentimental nation in the world. He collected around him a band of experts by whom all the great problems of French Government could be dealt with in a scientific manner. Everything passed through this "great central laboratory of Government" as the Council of State has been called. Gradually as a result of the almost superhuman energies of the First Consul, who even when on campaign kept in intimate touch with all the details of home administration, France began to recuperate.

But it was in the military sphere that the result of Napoleon's return to France was soonest felt. The campaign of 1800 was one of great triumph. Italy was reconquered in a day by the magnificent victory of Marengo; Austria was reduced to impotence by another great defeat in Germany; gradually all the allies of England were forced to lay down their arms. In 1802 therefore Great Britain herself made the Peace of Amiens with Napoleon. This new series of victories confirmed France's hold on Italy and the Rhine Frontier; it also gave Napoleon a much-desired breathing space for setting the internal administration of France upon a firm basis. But the Peace of Amiens as has well been said, "settled no principles and solved no problems; it was a patched-up affair which was doomed to speedy failure." Napoleon knew this; he was not anxious for a lasting peace. He merely wanted time in which to set his house in order.

Nothing displayed the genius of Napoleon to greater advantage than his work of internal reorganisation in France. The whole system of local government was remodelled and completely centralised. Departments were placed under prefects, "arrondissements" under sub-prefects and communes under mayors. The elected local bodies set up by the Revolution lost all their powers. In their place these prefects, sub-prefects and mayors who were appointed by, and responsible to, Napoleon, were the sole local authorities. Taxation was taken out of the hands of the local bodies and placed in the hands of government officials appointed and paid by the central power in Paris while the establishment of the Bank of France in 1800 was a government measure which did much to improve the economic condition of the country.

One of the most famous institutions connected with the name of Napoleon in France is the great Civil Code of law which was instituted under his régime. For centuries it had been the ambition of Frenchmen to achieve legal unity—"one weight, one measure, one law," as they expressed it. The Revolution had swept away all the obstacles to the achievement of this ideal—provincialism, feudalism, class privileges and the influence of the Church. In 1793 the government had appointed a small committee to codify French law.



After the battle of Marengo Napoleon gave his attention to this question. A committee of four eminent lawyers was set up by him to complete a scheme for the Code within four months. On January 1st, 1801 the draft of the Code was printed and circulated to the law courts for opinions. For three months it was thus examined and commented upon. Then it was submitted to the Council of State for final construction. Napoleon himself presided at most of the sittings of the Council and took a leading part in the debates from which the finished Code finally issued. Mr. Fisher in his section on the Code in the Cambridge Modern History has constructed from eye-witness accounts a vivid picture of the proceedings of the Council. He thus describes the entry of Napoleon: "A clink of arms, a roll of the drum under the arcades, and then, as a door opens, and the usher calls, and the councillors rise in salutation, the master steps briskly up to his green table on the dais, nods to Cambacères on his right, to Lebrun on his left, signs to his Council to be seated, and with his 'Allons, messieurs, commençons' sets the debate aflame." The Code which resulted from these labours, though in many ways faulty, hurriedly constructed, and autocratic in spirit, possessed the rare virtues of conciseness and extreme clarity. It perpetuated just that amount of the work of the French Revolution which Napoleon thought fit—civil equality, religious toleration, the freedom of land from feudalism, public trial, and the jury system. But in civil law it gave to women a place much inferior to that of man, and it made no provision for the growth of an industrial society stimulated by the economic policy of Napoleon. Capital could be as tyrannical as it pleased: nowhere in the Code was any protection against exploitation offered to the working classes. Company law remained in its old-fashioned pre-revolution state and was in no way amended to suit the changed conditions brought about by the extension of the industrial revolution to France. Yet if the new law was despotic in France, in the conquered parts of Europe—especially South Germany and Italy—into which Napoleon introduced it, it stood for liberty, for there it superseded the most appalling and intricate mass of conflicting feudal customs, antique city laws and tyrannical regulations. The real soundness of the work of the French lawyers who built up this great legal monument may be gauged from the fact that the Code Napoleon is still to-day the basis of much of the law of Continental Europe.

The Revolution had made a farce of religion in France. Since the breakdown of the "Reign of Terror" however, there had been a steady reaction towards the old Catholic faith, accompanied by a growing desire on the part of Frenchmen to see the old church once more set up as a great national institution. It was indeed noteworthy that the anti-religious movement had been of a very superficial character indeed in the provinces whose real opinions were not reflected in Paris. Since 1791 the Church had been a State-department, its clergy being under a "civil constitution" and paid by the State. At least half of the French clergy had refused to accept the "civil constitution", and although severely persecuted, they had managed to hold out against the government as its implacable opponents. France indeed was for years distracted by this controversy. At first sight one would have considered Napoleon to be hardly the right man



to bring religious peace. When in Egypt he had professed sympathy with Islam. His chief officials too were notorious for their opposition to the Church.

Napoleon, however, decided that the new autocratic and centralised state he was creating would not be sufficiently compact nor would its works run smoothly enough without religious peace and a strictly subservient church. As one historian has aptly put it: "The spiritual wants of the public, the craving of the poor for religious consolation, were made the pretext for introducing the new theological policy." "The people," said Bonaparte, "must have a religion, and that religion must be in the hands of the Government." So came about the famous agreement between France and the Pope known as the Concordat of 1801, by which the Pope's nominal authority was restored over the French clergy while all real power remained in the hands of the State. The Church became more than ever a State-department. Its function was to promote the ends of Napoleon's policy, to preach the doctrine of non-resistance to government and veneration to the person of Bonaparte. The village priests had even to read out to their flocks Napoleon's despatches from the front.

Education too was recognised and made a purely State institution. "So long," said Bonaparte, "as people are not taught from childhood whether they are to be republicans or monarchists, Catholics or free-thinkers, the State will not form a nation; it will rest on vague bases and be constantly subject to change and disorder." So, according to Napoleon, it was the duty of the State to fashion the minds of its citizens from childhood upwards. At the head of the whole system was a single "University of France" administered by officials appointed by Napoleon. This body controlled all education in France—higher, secondary, primary, and technical. Its supreme object so far from being that of the advancement of knowledge consisted in keeping from the young mind all those studies which might undermine its loyalty to France and Napoleon. The teaching of the political and moral sciences was severely restricted; history might only be studied from books written under Government direction. On the other hand mathematics were considered safe and useful, medicine absolutely necessary, and physics worthy of encouragement.

A similar control was exercised over the Press and the Stage. Everything came under the lynx-eyed supervision of Napoleon and his police. Poetry was silenced, criticism died, and the best French writers lived in exile.

Such was the Bonapartist state; fashioned by a master mind out of the chaos of the Revolution; based, we may say, on the principle of efficiency under the all-directing activity of an autocratic central power. Where indeed are the "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity" so loudly proclaimed but a few years previously? All three had been cast down before the altar of Efficiency. "I do not believe", said Napoleon to Berlier, "that the French love liberty and equality. The French have not been changed by ten years of Revolution. They are like the Gauls, proud and fickle; they have only one sentiment, honour." This sentiment Napoleon set himself to fulfil by the creation of the Legion of Honour, of a new nobility, and finally in 1804 by the transformation of the Consulate into the Empire. The new Charlemagne



was then crowned in Paris with all pomp, but on this occasion the mistake of 800 was carefully avoided, the Pope, specially imported for the occasion, was not allowed to crown the new Emperor who placed the crown on his head with his own hands.

Meanwhile, however, the threatening attitude of Napoleon in Europe and the Mediterranean had led to the outbreak of hostilities once more in 1803. At first England was Napoleon's sole adversary, but soon the diligence of William Pitt had added Russia, Austria and Sweden to the scale and the Third Coalition had come into being. Napoleon's design was to strike first a great combined naval and military blow at England. Then having speedily subjugated the the nation of shop-keepers, and made himself master of England's colonies and trade, he could deal with Europe in his own time. This plan was rudely shattered by Calder's victory off Cape Finisterre and Nelson's off Trafalgar (1805). But before the last-named battle had been fought Napoleon had given up his idea of invasion of England in order to pursue a policy of continental conquest. First he crushed Austria. Two great victories at Ulm and Austerlitz (1805) knocked her out of the coalition and forced her to agree by the Treaty of Pressburg to give up all her old Italian dominions and recognise Napoleon as King of Italy. To allies of Napoleon such as Bavaria and Wurtemberg she had to cede most of her German territory. Next year Prussia, hitherto neutral, decided to enter into the arena of war. She had just begun to realise the menace of Napoleon's power. But at the same time she did not realise her own weakness with a corrupt old-fashioned administration, a feeble army, which still clung to the methods prevalent in the days of Frederick the Great, and a common people still in the grip of serfdom. In October 1806 the Prussian armies were crumpled up by Napoleon at Jena and Auerstadt, Berlin was entered, and the royal family fled to Russia. In the following year a tremendous struggle took place between the French and the Russians culminating in the terrible battle of Friedland which was a victory for Napoleon. Russia too gave in; not because she was really beaten. She was anxious to divert her arms to the conquest of Turkey. The Treaty of Tilsit was therefore made between the Czar and Napoleon. Russia was to support France in the West, Napoleon was to give Russia a free hand in the East. Napoleon was indeed master of Europe—if we except England. After the treaty of Pressburg Napoleon had reorganised Germany. The Holy Roman Empire was abolished and a Confederation of the Rhine under French protection was set up. This included states like Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse, and almost a dozen smaller ones, and constituted one of the first steps towards the modern movement for German unity.

But it was just at this moment of triumph, when Europe was as clay in the hands of the conqueror, that he himself instituted movements which were ultimately to encompass his ruin. In the 18th century there had been little patriotism or national sentiment in Europe. Peoples had been regarded as the perquisites of dynasties to be divided, exchanged, and haggled over without any regard to their own interests or desires. But the initial success of the French revolutionaries and the doctrines they had preached had sent a gleam of hope to all oppressed peoples. The work of Napoleon in spreading

more efficient methods of Government beyond the confines of France had been eagerly applauded at first. When, however, the powers of the Third Coalition were at his feet and it was seen that he was remodelling the map of Europe purely in the interests of himself and his family, the feeling of patriotic opposition began to grow. Up till the time of the Treaty of Tilsit it is a notable fact that Napoleon's triumphs had been so striking chiefly because his opponents were not peoples but governments. After Tilsit we come upon a new period during which gradually the outraged national sentiment of Europe rises up against Napoleon and engulfs him.

Thus the Batavian Republic was converted into the Kingdom of Holland and given to Bonaparte's brother Louis. The Bourbons were driven out of Naples which was given to another brother Joseph, and later Joseph was transferred to Spain and Murat, Bonaparte's brother-in-law, succeeded him in Naples. What remained of the old kingdom of Poland, added to the Polish territories of Prussia, was made into the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.

But probably the greatest cause of the growth of patriotic sentiment in Europe opposed to the Bonapartist régime lay in the so-called "continental-system" organised by Napoleon against England. Nelson's great victory at Trafalgar had destroyed the French and Spanish navies as effective fighting forces. England therefore was geographically outside the scope of Napoleon's endeavours. She could harass him at any point, and, worst of all, her riches were the links which bound together every coalition against him. She must be brought to her knees by a gigantic trade boycott extending over the whole of Europe. So the famous decrees published first at Berlin in 1806 and later at Warsaw, Milan and Fontainebleau, declared England to be in a state of blockade, ordered that no European nation should trade with her or receive any of her ships or merchants in its ports. England must be starved out; if her fleet could not be driven from the seas, her possession of it must be rendered as valueless as possible.

Don't allow yourselves to think that these decrees were "the gratuitous insolence of overweening pride", and that Napoleon was powerless to carry them out in practice. Had Europe, sublimely submitted to the dictation of Napoleon, the continental system would have been quite successful and England would have been crushed. Even as it was the system inflicted tremendous hardships on England and precipitated more than one economic crisis. From 1809 to 1814 England may be justly described as economically only just keeping her head above water. But if England suffered greatly her sufferings were small beside those of France and the rest of Europe. Even in France protests against it were loud; but in Europe a spirit of revolt began to grow which Napoleon could never check. First Portugal and Spain revolted against the system and called in the help of England; so began the famous "Peninsular War" in which Wellington taught Europe that Napoleon was not invincible. The "Spanish ulcer", Napoleon called it, because it so effectively drained away his resources of men, money and material. Then in 1809 Austria rose against Napoleon. "Soldiers!" ran the proclamation, "the freedom of Europe has sought refuge under your colours. Your

triumph will loose her fetters." In a great battle at Aspern on the Danube Napoleon received a severe check ; North Germany, urged on by the patriotism of men like the statesman Hardenberg or the poet Schiller, was on the brink of revolt, and British forces were despatched to seize Antwerp. But Napoleon was not yet beaten. The Austrians were crushed at Wagram and forced to make the disastrous peace of Vienna, by which, while forced to give up much of her territory to Russia and Bavaria, Austria had to promise to adhere strictly to the continental system.

But even then the system could not be maintained. The Pope refused to obey it and was made a prisoner. Even Bonaparte's own brother Louis, King of Holland, protested against it and finally resigned his crown in disgust. All Napoleon did was to increase the number of his annexations of territory in order to make French control over European commerce more effective. But this could not go on for ever. In 1812 the crash came. Russia threw up the Treaty of Tilsit and the great " Wars of Liberation " began. Napoleon returned from his disastrous Moscow expedition to find every nation in Europe except Turkey leagued against him. His power was broken in the great " Battle of the Nations " fought at Leipzig in October 1813, and after making a magnificent strategic retreat before overwhelming numbers, he was forced to abdicate his crown and retire to the island of Elba in the Mediterranean Sea. Legitimate rulers were restored to France, Spain, Holland and Sardinia, the Pope returned to the Vatican, the monarchs and the diplomats repaired to Vienna to effect the settlement of Europe after its long period of turmoil.

But the Bourbon Louis XVIII who was restored to the throne of France made himself from the start intensely unpopular by his pre-Revolution attitude towards all political questions. It was not long therefore before Napoleon escaped from Elba and came back to France as the champion of the Revolution. " I come to deliver France from the emigrants," he said, " I am sprung from the Revolution. I am come to save the people from the slavery into which the priests and the nobles would plunge them. Let them beware, or I will string them up on the lantern." France believed Napoleon. Europe did not. Once more did the nations of Europe fly to arms against the great tyrant, whose ambitions were crushed for ever in the titanic struggle of Waterloo. Thence he went into perpetual exile in the Atlantic island of St. Helena. There possessing the rare opportunity of leisure he began to review his past career and to compose a sort of apology for his life in a series of conversations with his two friends Las Cases and O'Meara who committed them to writing. He was, he said, the Messiah of the Revolution ; his Empire had been a kind of republic based on the democratic principle. With regard to Europe his aim had been to carry out a federation of modern enlightened states revolving about France. He had defended the principle of nationality, always loved peace—his wars had all been forced upon him by the forces of reaction in Europe—Waterloo in ruining his liberal Empire had been the greatest blow to the progress of European civilisation and order. Despotism, he said, was only a temporary measure on his part. Eventually he had meant to relax it. " I asked

for twenty years ; Destiny only gave me thirteen. I regarded myself as the Constituent of France."

So grew up the Napoleonic legend, and the political doctrine of Bonapartism. Its growth was fostered by the French historians, Thiers and Thibaudeau and by his nephew Louis Bonaparte, son of the once king of Holland. He in 1839 published a little book entitled "Napoleonic Ideas" which strove to identify the name of Napoleon with liberalism, the principle of nationality and the defence of religion. The book appeared at a time when the monarchy of Louis Philippe was becoming deservedly unpopular combining a reactionary internal policy with a ludicrously unsuccessful foreign policy. France began to realise how fervently Bonapartist she really was. When therefore in 1848 revolution swept Louis Philippe off his throne, a new republic was set up at the head of which by a majority of over seven million votes Louis Bonaparte was elected president. He believed himself to be a "man of destiny" born to realise the great ideal of Bonapartism—liberal imperialism. It was not long before he had converted France into an Empire and himself into its Emperor. He won over the army by the glamour of his name and the proletariat by promises of prosperity and reforms. "The name Napoleon," he said "is a complete programme in itself: it stands for order, authority, religion; the welfare of the people at home, national dignity abroad."

At first he was successful. Abroad the national spirit of France was gratified by her success in the Crimean War, at home industry and commerce developed fast—though it must be admitted that this was rather the result of natural circumstances. Vast public works were carried through, education was improved, the question of the housing of the lower classes was examined, benefit societies were organised, while the court in Paris eclipsed all others in Europe for brilliancy. At first too Napoleon's policy in Europe was conspicuously liberal. As a genuine respecter of the principle of nationality he supported Serbia and Roumania in winning their complete independence of Turkey. In 1859 he took up the cause of Italian nationality and by his victories at Magenta and Solferino over the Austrians freed North Italy from alien dominion. Shallow observers began to speak of his Empire as rivalling that of his mighty uncle. More acute ones like Bismark attributed his success to good fortune and saw in the new adventurer a man of "a great though concealed incompetence". The truth of their view was demonstrated between 1860 and 1870 when the whole card-built edifice came crashing to the ground. Meddlesome and rash the Emperor rushed from one mistake in foreign policy to another and completely lost sight of his original doctrines of liberalism and nationality. Thus he made Germany his implacable enemy by opposing the movement for German national unity on the ground that it would menace France. He lost the sympathy of Italians by opposing full Italian unity on the ground that as head of Catholic France he could not allow the Papal states to be taken from the Pope. When the Poles sought his aid in their national movement against Russia, he made half promises which he soon withdrew, leaving them to be crushed helplessly by an angry Russia. Then he interfered in Mexican affairs sending a French army to set up there a Roman Catholic Empire—a ghastly failure. Then



came the final tragedy in 1870 when Bismarck having diplomatically isolated the upstart Emperor dealt him the *coup de grace* at Sedan. "When the news of Sedan was telegraphed to Paris," says Mr. Fisher, "the Empire fell suddenly, without noise, without a hand to help it, or a voice raised in its defence."

Both Napoleon I and his nephew Napoleon III owed their success to the fact that they offered to France an escape from anarchy, a vigorous government, and military glory. Only the most dazzling personal gifts could possibly maintain such an Empire. The first Napoleon possessed them; but he outraged the sentiment of Europe. Louis Napoleon was a man of very ordinary ability who broke down completely under the strain of the position he was forced to maintain. With him died the Bonapartist idea as an effective political force in Europe. That idea had in practice been found to mean wars and constant rumours of wars, meddling interference with the affairs of other nations, and the persistence of despotism under the name of liberal imperialism. Frenchmen too have never forgotten that it was Bonapartism which lost them Alsace-Lorraine in 1871.



V.—GERMAN IMPERIALISM.

One of the most important movements of the 19th century was the attainment of political unity by Germany. For a thousand years Germany had been divided. Ever since the break up of the original Empire of Charles the Great in the 9th century A.D. Germany though nominally a political unity had been little more than a mere geographical expression. In the 10th century Otto I, in the 11th century Henry III and in the 12th century Frederick Barbarossa had made almost superhuman efforts to gain effective control over the whole German people. Two circumstances, however, had rendered all their attempts fruitless: in the first place the growth of feudalism had been a serious factor in promoting separatist tendencies, while in the second place the attempts of German kings to make real their authority as Holy Roman Emperors, and especially their disastrous attempts to keep Italy and the Pope in subjection, had frittered away their resources and left them powerless to check the great territorial princes of Germany. At the end of the Middle Ages Germany was split up into over 300 separate states, all of which nominally owed allegiance to the personality known as the Holy Roman Emperor: but in reality all were sovereign and independent. Great families like the Hapsburgs of Austria, the Wittlesbachs of Bavaria or the Hohenzollerns of Brandenburg had in later days striven for territorial ascendancy in Germany. The 17th and 18th centuries in German history are mainly a record of dynastic rivalries pure and simple. The rights of peoples were entirely disregarded; every political and economic factor was looked upon merely as a pawn in an elaborate game of chess played with varying skill by German princelings and European powers. Gradually two powers came to the fore, the Archduchy of Austria and the Margravate of Brandenburg. The former was the family possession of the House of Hapsburg, the latter of the House of Hohenzollern. Austria was anxious to dominate Germany, but at the same time her chief line of policy was one of expansion into the un-German lands of Bohemia, Poland, Hungary and North Italy. From the middle of the 15th century the Austrian Hapsburgs had possessed the much coveted imperial title in Germany, but their devotion to the task of consolidating their dynastic interests especially in Hungary and Italy coupled with their chronic feud with the Bourbons of France had rendered impossible in practice the realisation of their nominal power as Holy Roman Emperors.

In the 17th century Brandenburg-Prussia occupied an almost unnoticed position in European politics. Before 1701 it had neither national organisation nor army. Its people were hopelessly poor, bound to the soil by the ties of feudalism, uncultured and ignorant. They fought as mercenary soldiers in all the armies of Europe, the serfs on feudal estates being sold in batches to European Governments by needy Prussian nobles. In the 18th century, however,



Prussia became one of the leading nations in Europe. For this somewhat sudden leap to the front rank of powers she was indebted to the labours of three men of exceptional ability and personality—Frederick William, the Great Elector, King Frederick William I and Frederick the Great. Now modern German imperialism was the creation of Prussia. Its traditions were based upon Prussian traditions. In the first place, therefore, if we are to understand this modern German imperialism, which was one of the chief factors influencing the course of world history between 1870 and 1918, we must pay some attention—very slight in a lecture of this type to the three men who created Prussian traditions.

Frederick William, the Great Elector, born in 1620, succeeded to the Electoral dignity in Brandenburg-Prussia in 1640 when the dying embers of the Thirty Years War were being fanned afresh by France and the agonies of Germany prolonged. His dominions were scattered; they had been terribly ravaged by the great war; he had no money with which to raise an army of defence; his land was dominated by the nobility and the country gentry who jealously defended their feudal privileges and thereby rendered all enlightened government impossible. He therefore decided that the salvation of his state could only come from a despotic government backed up by an all-powerful army. This he set himself to create. First he destroyed the representative bodies that limited his sovereign power. Then he founded the first standing army possessed by the House of Hohenzollern—a force of 3,000 men. Later, however he raised it to 26,000 men and 72 guns. With this he soon made himself absolute master of the country. His rule may be characterised as a mixture of savage energy and enlightened ability the results of which were nothing short of astounding. He promoted agriculture and industries in order that his people might the better bear the cost of maintaining his army. His method of doing this was to import from Holland skilled engineers who drained swamps, farmers and gardeners to improve cultivation. It was incumbent upon every peasant to lay out a garden, and he might not marry until he had planted at least six oak trees and six fruit trees. When Louis XIV persecuted the French Protestants the Great Elector, recognising in them a fine industrial element lacking in his own country, offered them a home in Prussia, part payment of their travelling expenses, freedom of settlement, and free citizenship. He even bought empty houses for their reception. Before the end of the 17th century there were over 12,000 French refugees in Brandenburg-Prussia, while at the end of the Great Elector's reign it was estimated that one-fourth of the inhabitants of Prussia were foreign immigrants, while the population had increased by about 50 per cent.

King Frederick I succeeded the Great Elector in 1688. At first he was the Elector Frederic III, but in 1701 he assumed royal power. He was a worthless ineffective ruler who was exceptionally conceited. His son Frederick William I was one of the greatest rulers who ever bore sway on German soil. A recent English contributor to the "Nineteenth Century and After" writes: "He was the organiser, the disciplinarian, the schoolmaster, the true



maker of modern Germany." The personal character of this extraordinary man has to a certain extent obscured the real value of his work. Greedy, coarse to a surprising degree, not only uneducated but a man who detested the very word 'education,' brutal and domineering, he was brimful of energy and cunning, while he passionately loved order and organisation. His great aim was to administer Prussia autocratically and devote every ounce of his powers of body and mind to make his country great. His interest and interference extended into every sphere of national life. He even prescribed the sort of sermons to be preached in churches and ordered that in every one the duty of paying taxes punctually was to be emphasised among the duties of the subject. He prohibited newspapers on the ground that they were unnecessary and mischievous.

But he created a magnificent army of nearly 90,000 men, the most perfectly drilled and equipped force in Europe, as his son and successor Frederick the Great early showed. He also created the German administration and Civil Service—extremely bureaucratic but conscientious, honest and competent. He himself drew up the most minute and comprehensive regulations for it with his own hand. Here is an example of them: "In summer the ministers shall meet at 7 o'clock in the morning, and in winter at 8 o'clock. The meeting shall not break up until all the matters which are to be discussed and decided upon have been disposed of. Not a single document must be left over for another day." If the ministers had to work later than two in the afternoon dinner was provided for them. Here is the King's regulation on this subject: "The head cook must at every sitting inquire at eleven o'clock through a servant whether he should provide dinner or not. Now we order herewith that in case dinner should be required by the ministers and high officials there shall always be four good dishes, namely a good soup, a good piece of boiled beef with vegetables, a good dish of fish, and a good piece of roast beef, mutton, or veal. In addition there should be a quart bottle of good Rhine wine for every person. However, the bill of fare should not always be the same. There should always be a change of dishes. The food should always be the same as that which is put before their Majesties themselves." If a minister were late he was heavily fined; if he missed a sitting without permission, he was liable to lose six months' pay. If he repeated the offence the penalty was summary dismissal "for as we pay our ministers and councillors they must work." In order that the Civil Service should maintain its efficiency and honesty, a special body called the "Fiskalat" was created to watch and report upon the work of all officials. To the chief of this body Frederick William wrote: "You shall not spare any one, whoever it may be, even if it be my own brother." Modern German imperialism has derived much of its strength from the thoroughness and industry of the German people. These qualities have been of set purpose implanted into their subjects by Prussian rulers from Frederick William to Bismarck. The soil did not naturally produce them. Frederick William more than anyone else disciplined the Prussian people. He disciplined government, army,



industry, education (though he despised it), and religion, and he did everything in the interests of efficiency.

Frederick the Great, who succeeded Frederick William in 1740, built upon the foundations laid by his father. He expanded his territory and more than doubled his resources by the forcible acquisition of Silesia from Austria; subsequently he won the Seven Years' War after a terrific struggle, and raised his country to the very front rank of European powers. Unlike his father he was a man of culture and education, a diplomat and a strategist. He still further militarised the Prussian state. For democracy he had not the slightest sympathy. It was undisciplined and inefficient in his eyes. He believed in an efficient military monarchy acting for the good of the people and glory of the state. Mirabeau once said that the great national industry of Prussia was war. This was undoubtedly true. All internal reconstruction and organisation was undertaken by the Prussian monarchs with a view purely to strengthening their military power and pushing their small state by sheer force to the forefront in Europe. When Frederick the Great wrote in his "Essay on the Forms of Government": "As all the wheels and springs of the watch serve together the single object of measuring time, all the springs and wheels of a Government should be so arranged that all the departments of the national administration work together with the single aim of promoting the greatest good of the State," by the greatest good of the State he meant its power, influence and glory—he was not thinking of the individual happiness of its members. His policy aimed at making the whole Prussian nation act like a single man at the command of its sovereign. Efficiency therefore became the motto of Prussia and has ever since remained so. When Frederick the Great died in 1876 he left the Kingdom of Prussia nearly doubled in size and more than doubled in population.

He was succeeded, however, by a weak monarch Frederick William II whose reign demonstrated the fundamental weakness of the type of autocracy built up by his predecessors, *viz.*, that if you organise your government in such a way that everything depends upon the will and personality of one man, that one man must be efficient or the whole edifice will crash to the ground. Such was the case with Prussia during the Napoleonic wars when the French not only entered conquered Berlin in triumph but sent the sword and sash of the dead Frederick the Great to Paris as trophies. The War of Liberation, however, and the subsequent campaign of Waterloo restored much of Prussia's old prestige. When therefore the epoch-making Treaty of Vienna completed the settlement of Europe after the devastations of the Napoleonic era, and established the constitution of Germany as a loose federation of 39 sovereign states—the Germanic "Bund"—although Austria was nominally president of the confederation a greatly enlarged Prussia was in point of actual power and resources her equal. These two states dominated the politics of Germany at the beginning of the present era, which, we may say, dates from the overthrow of Napoleon. During the fifty-years from the Treaty of Vienna to the Franco-Prussian War two great movements for national unity were being



worked out in Italy and Germany. The former was one of the most romantic movements recorded in history. The figures of Mazzini and Garibaldi stand out with all the grandeur of the heroes of ancient Greece. "It was," wrote Lecky, "the one moment of 19th century history when politics assumed something of the character of poetry." The movement for German unity on the other hand though lacking in romantic associations had far greater political results for both the German race and Europe at large. There was at the outset in Germany a more definite feeling of unity than in Italy but it was opposed by Austria and all the smaller states of the Germanic "Bund." Prussia only was thoroughly anxious to see German unity an accomplished fact. The history of the movement, therefore, centres around Prussia and the gradual Prussianisation of Germany.

The Germans soon realised that the loose federation created by the Treaty of Vienna was hopelessly unsatisfactory. It provided no real guarantee for national defence, no real basis of unity and left the country at the mercy of the forces of reaction and autocracy. From 1815 to 1848 the influence of the great Austrian statesman Metternich was all powerful in Germany. An aristocrat and a conservative of the old school he crushed with unrelenting severity every glimmer of popular feeling and every sign of an awakening political consciousness. "By the help of God," he boasted, "I hope to defeat the German revolution just as I vanquished the conqueror of the world." He therefore persuaded the German federal Diet, a weak ineffective body, to extinguish the liberty of the Press, transfer the control of all Universities (the hot-bed of all sedition!) to Government officials, to prohibit the formation of political societies and the holding of public meetings, and to establish a central commission to ferret out and destroy all democratic agitators. Everywhere in Germany the sinister influence of Metternich was successful in repressing all forms of agitation. Even the mildest movement was regarded by him as "unpardonable error" and ruthlessly crushed. In 1833 the discovery of a plot to blow up the Diet at Frankfort led to the culmination of the "Metternich system" when at a conference between the Emperor of Austria, the Tzar of Russia and the Crown Prince of Prussia these three princes, at the instigation of the Austrian statesman, agreed to unite in a mutual league for the suppression of Liberal movements not only in Germany but in Europe at large.

The only really hopeful movement in the direction of German unity during this period was that which produced the great fiscal reform known as the Zollverein or "Customs Union."

German trade had for centuries been rendered almost impossible by the customs duties imposed by every state. A vast army of officials had to be maintained. Economic development was strangled, and inter-communication was practically non-existent. In the movement for a Customs-Union Prussia led the way. In 1818 she established internal free trade between her various provinces. Between 1819 and 1836 every German state except Austria followed her example. All gave up their antiquated and oppressive fiscal systems and arranged a common external tariff. The result was



astounding. Railways, roads and canals began to grow with extraordinary rapidity; the relations between the several German states grew increasingly more cordial and the sentiment of unity received a marked impulse. The greatest result of the Zollverein, however, lay in the fact that it gradually gave Prussia the lead in Germany. Austria had at first refused to enter the union; too late she awoke in 1852 to the fact that in so doing she was voluntarily abdicating her dominating position in Germany. By that time Prussia's influence was strong enough for her to bring about the exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein. This was the first real step towards the complete Prussianisation of Germany.

The Metternich system crumbled up suddenly in 1848. Metternich had not realised that if he sat too long upon the safety valve of German opinion the whole boiler ultimately must burst. The year 1848 was one of revolution all over Europe. The spark which lighted the train of gunpowder came from Paris where with the sudden expulsion of Louis Philippe a republican government was once more set up. At once the rulers of the smaller German states made haste to grant constitutional government to their peoples. Revolution, however, broke out in Vienna causing the flight of Metternich to England, while insurrections in Bohemia and Hungary caused the abdication of the Emperor Ferdinand. In Berlin too disorder broke out and Frederick William IV was forced to grant constitutional government. He also promised to assume the leadership "of a free and new-born German nation." At the same time the states belonging to the Zollverein decided to summon at Frankfort a Parliament of representatives of every state of the Germanic Confederation elected on the basis of manhood suffrage. The new parliament decided that Germany should become a Federal State under an Emperor. On March 28th, 1849, the imperial crown was offered to Frederick William IV of Prussia. Austria, however, was no longer in the throes of revolution. The insurrections in Bohemia and Hungary had been checked and the Hapsburg Empire reconstituted. She stoutly opposed the policy of the Frankfort Parliament. Frederick William was unwilling alike to challenge Austria and to accept his crown from a democratic body. The scheme therefore fell to the ground. After a period of confusion the "Bund" was restored and reaction once more set in in Germany. Once more it seemed as if the sentiment of unity had blazed up only to be effaced by the old traditional separatist tendencies. The Frankfort Parliament had raised high the hopes of Unionists. But not in such a manner was Germany's destiny to be worked out. It was to be the work of one gigantic genius, Prince Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck, a hater of democracy, a despiser of parliamentary government, an aristocrat of Prussian birth, whose aim was to win German unity by the subjection of its rulers and peoples to the military and administrative yoke of Prussia. It was the supreme achievement of Bismarck to create an Empire and a nation. If we judge men by the measure of success they achieve, then we must accord to Bismarck a place among the greatest statesmen in the history of the world. Born in 1815, the year of Waterloo, Bismarck after the usual university career entered



the Prussian Civil Service. But its monotony disgusted him and he speedily resigned his position and retired to the privacy of his father's estate. There he studied public affairs and took a keen interest in all political movements in Germany. He also busied himself with mapping out the full programme of his future career. It is interesting to note that he carried it out almost to the letter.

When in 1850 Frederick William IV gave a constitution to Prussia Bismarck was enraged. The organisation of England, he thought, ought not to be imitated by Germany. The greatness of Prussia had been built up by her kings—not by her people. So should it be in the future. Germany should attain to unity and greatness through the Prussian monarchy, not by parliaments and constitutions. "I look for Prussian honour," he said, "in Prussia's abstinence before all things from every shameful union with democracy." Again he said: "Not by speeches and majority votes are the great questions of the day decided . . . but by blood and iron." In private life he was known as "mad Bismarck," a hard rider and a hard drinker. He was, however, too brilliant a man to remain long in private life. In 1851 he was appointed Prussian delegate to the Diet in Frankfort. There he remained for eight years during which he made the acquaintance of all the leading politicians in Germany. He went to Frankfort a pro-Austrian in sentiment. He left it convinced that there was not room in Germany for both Prussia and Austria. "The one constant factor in Austrian policy," he wrote to a friend, "is its jealousy of Prussia." At last his attitude towards Austria became so hostile that the Prussian government in alarm sent Bismarck off as ambassador to Russia—"to cool off on the banks of the Neva" as he himself expressed it. In 1862 he served a few months in Paris as ambassador to the court of Napoleon III where he made a careful study of that "half dreamer and half trickster." In that same year 1862 he was recalled to Berlin as President of the Prussian Ministry and minister for foreign affairs. On the occasion of a visit to London shortly before his return to Berlin Bismarck in an interview with Benjamin Disraeli made the following amazingly frank statement of his future policy: "I shall soon be compelled," he said, "to undertake the leadership of the Prussian government. My first care will be, with or without the help of Parliament, to reorganise the army. The King has rightly set himself this task. He cannot, however, carry it through with his present councillors. When the army has been brought to such a state as to command respect, then I shall take the first opportunity to declare war on Austria, burst asunder the German Confederation, bring the middle and smaller states into subjection, and give Germany a national union under the leadership of Prussia."

In 1862 the Government at Berlin was in the throes of a tremendous crisis. The Prussian Diet was fighting tooth and nail against the vast military reforms suggested by Moltke and von Roon, whose proposals involved a far stricter application of the principle of conscription and a correspondingly greater expenditure of revenue upon the army. The Diet had rejected these proposals, had been dissolved by King William, but the elections had returned an even more hostile Diet. William himself was on the point of abdicating when Roon suggested that he should flout public opinion, appoint



Bismarck as President of the Ministry, and carry through his policy by sheer force.

The plan was successful. For four years after Bismarck's appointment the constitutional conflict went on. The Diet voted year after year against the budget; the government continued to collect taxes and reorganise the army without any constitutional sanction. In the meantime the success of Bismarck's foreign policy began to reconcile people to his internal policy and the tide began to turn. Gradually too he forced the bit between the teeth of the unwilling Prussian people. The thorough-going application of conscription made constitutional government a mere form, since the people could be effectively controlled by the military machine. The press was muzzled and the judicial posts filled with supporters of the Government.

In the field of foreign policy Bismarck's unwavering aim was to isolate Austria diplomatically. He smiled upon the cause of Italian unity so disastrous to Austrian power in Italy. He won the favour of Russia by helping her to suppress the Polish revolt. He caused the final exclusion of Austria from the Zollverein. Finally having allied with Austria to crush Denmark and unite the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein with Germany, and having lured Napoleon III by vague promises to maintain neutrality, he picked a quarrel with Austria over the Schleswig-Holstein question, and in the summer of 1866 completely crushed her in what was popularly known as the "Seven Weeks War." - By the Treaty of Prague which concluded the war Austria was expelled from the German confederation which was formally dissolved and in its place all the German states north of the River Main were united into a North German Confederation under the Presidency of Prussia. The King of Prussia became hereditary president of the Confederation. A legislature was set up consisting of a Bundesrath and a Reichstag, the latter elected by universal suffrage; general conscription was introduced, and most of the states agreed in time of war to place their armies unreservedly in the hands of Prussia.

Too late did Napoleon III realise that he had been duped by Bismarck. He hoped that the Austro-Prussian war would be a long one at the end of which he himself backed up by a fresh and untried army would descend upon the exhausted combatants and force them to accept peace upon his own terms. The Treaty of Prague filled Napoleon with unconcealed wrath. The Prussian victory at Sadowa and the sudden upward leap of the Hohenzollern power upset all his calculations. Bismarck had vaguely promised him a south German state or possibly Luxemburg as compensation for his neutrality; in making the Treaty of Prague, he conveniently forgot his promise to the French monarch. Bismarck realised from the first that Napoleon would prove a real stumbling block to the attainment of full unity by Germany. At a later date he wrote: "That a war with France would succeed that with Austria lay in the logic of history." After 1866 therefore he set himself methodically to isolate France diplomatically. A victory over France would, he knew, be the only successful method of creating among all the German states and peoples the necessary enthusiasm upon



which German unity might be achieved. Bismarck therefore cultivated the friendship of Italy, Russia, England and Austria in order that when Prussia's hour struck France would have not a single ally in Europe. So indeed it turned out. In the great Franco-Prussian War which broke out in 1870 Napoleon III was crushed, Alsace-Lorraine was reunited to Germany (though by this time it had become entirely French in sentiment) and on January 18th 1871 in the famous mirrored hall of the Palace of Versailles Germany was proclaimed a Federal Empire and William, King of Prussia, was hailed as German Emperor. Blood and iron had indeed triumphed where words and speeches had shown themselves of no avail.

The constitution of the newly-created German Empire was modelled upon that of the North German Confederation of 1867. The King of Prussia was to be German Emperor; his Empire was a federation of 25 states and one Imperial Territory, Alsace-Lorraine. The Emperor was commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the Empire. He had control of all relations with foreign powers with whom he could make treaties subject in certain cases to the ratification of Parliament. Parliament consisted of the Bundesrath, made up of representatives of all the federated princes, and the Reichstag, or House of Commons, elected by manhood suffrage. There all imperial legislation was passed, though as each state had its own parliament, there was a strict line of division between provincial legislation and imperial legislation. The declaration of war was in the hands of the Emperor subject to the consent of the Bundesrath. The administration was under the supreme control of the Emperor assisted by an Imperial Chancellor who was responsible not to Parliament but to the Emperor alone. All the various secretaries of state and heads of departments were under the Chancellor; they neither formed a united cabinet as in England, nor were they responsible to Parliament. German Imperialism did not countenance responsible government.

Of the two Houses of Parliament the Bundesrath was the more powerful. Its members were appointed by the rulers of the various states, while their numbers were so arranged as to give Prussia a preponderating influence in the House. Its members were not allowed to vote as they pleased, but only as instructed by the rulers of their several states. Its consent was necessary to all imperial laws. Thus any democratic tendencies in the lower house, the Reichstag, could be easily suppressed by the veto of the upper house. It was the great bulwark of monarchical power and especially of the predominance of Prussia. The Reichstag, the most democratically elected body in Europe, was the least powerful of any popularly elected body in any country. Practically it was only an advisory board with certain limited powers of veto. It had no control whatever over the executive. It was not even as powerful as the English House of Commons in the reign of James I. All real power was vested in the Emperor, the Chancellor and the Bundesrath. Ultimately the mainspring of power within the German Empire lay in the army of Prussia. In England if the ministry does not command the confidence of the House of Commons and



is outvoted on any important question, it must resign and make way for one more in accordance with the wishes of the people. In the late German Empire if the Emperor chose to keep a minister or ministers in office against the wishes of the whole nation and both houses of Parliament he could legally and constitutionally do so. That is the difference between responsible and irresponsible government. The hand of Bismarck was writ large over the constitution of Germany. It was his crowning triumph over parliamentary institutions that he could build up a constitution with a democratically elected parliament which had no controlling voice in the State. Germany therefore was not a parliamentary state in any true sense.

From 1871 until 1914 Germany was unquestionably supreme on the Continent of Europe. But she had won this supremacy at the price of the implacable hatred of France from whom she had seized Alsace-Lorraine, while the subject Danes, Poles and French within the Empire fiercely resented the attempts to Prussianise them and longed for some mode of self-expression. In Germany herself two great problems early demanded the attention of Bismarck. In the first place the victory of Protestant Prussia in Germany and over Austria and France had seriously weakened the cause of Catholicism. The Catholics of Germany were embittered and began to form a strong political party for the restoration of Catholic interests in the Empire. Bismarck, who believed that the Church should keep out of politics, strove to break up this party by forbidding the religious orders to engage in teaching, by expelling the Jesuits from the country, and by subordinating all Catholic clergy and institutions to the control of the State. His policy was a failure and in 1878 he was forced to give in owing to the indefatigable resolution of the Catholic party. From that time onwards the Catholic party—or centre as it was called—was the strongest party in the Reichstag.

The other problem to which Bismarck next directed his attention was that of the growth of Socialism. The two great antagonistic schools of Socialists founded by Ferdinand Lassalle and Karl Marx respectively had sunk their differences and united in 1875. Their demands were then formulated in a political programme which was presented to the German people ; at the same time they organised a political party in 1877 captured twelve seats in the Reichstag and nearly a half million votes in the country. They demanded state ownership of industries, a free state, secret ballot in elections, free education, the protection of the life and health of the worker and woman suffrage. They were strongly opposed to war and to the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine.

At first Bismarck met this new peril to the system he had created by repressive measures. Between 1878 and 1890 fifteen hundred Socialists were imprisoned and nine hundred banished from their native land. But the party continued to grow. In 1890 it had 35 members in the Reichstag representing nearly a million and a half votes in the country. Repression was a failure. At the same time, however, Bismarck attempted to win the working classes by putting into operation many of the proposals of the Socialists. Thus he introduced State insurance against sickness, accident and incapacity.



He became a pioneer of the policy of State Socialism. But the Socialists believed in a democratic government; state socialism left them unsatisfied; and they continued to grow in spite of all measures against them. This fundamental fact regarding the politics of Germany must be realised if we are to understand the success and rapidity of the German revolution of 1918 when the Hohenzollerns fled to Holland and the modern democratic republic was proclaimed.

After the Franco-Prussian War Bismarck's foreign policy lost its original militaristic and aggressive character. Germany had grown great under his guidance by three successful wars. Her unity too was an accomplished fact. He now wished to ensure the permanence of his work. This, he knew with unerring judgment, could only be effected by a peaceful, moderate and conciliatory foreign policy. The desire to avoid making enemies coupled with the promotion of peaceful commercial expansion became the keynote of his policy. In one of the later chapters of his "Memoirs" he thus expressed his view of the policy which the united German Empire ought to pursue: "We ought to do all we can to weaken the bad feeling among the nations, which has been called forth through our growth to the position of a real Great Power, by honourable and peaceful use of our influence, and so convince the world that a German hegemony in Europe is more useful and less partisan, and also less harmful to the freedom of other nations, than would be the hegemony of France, Russia or England." Had Germany consistently followed this excellent advice the Great War would never have been fought. "In order to produce this confidence," he continued, "it is above everything necessary that we should act honourably and openly, and be easily reconciled in case of friction or untoward events." It would have been a good thing for Germany if the ex-Kaiser had learnt these words by heart and repeated them to his ministers every morning before any official business was transacted.

Bismarck in his foreign policy consistently maintained this eminently wise attitude. He urged Prussia to be moderate in her treatment of France, he cultivated the friendship of Austria and of Russia. Thus in 1872 he brought about a meeting between the three rulers of Russia, Austria and Germany wherein they pledged themselves to suppress revolution, to delimit boundaries and to settle the Eastern Question. He soon, however, found out that the interests of the three powers were too antagonistic to admit of the success of such a pact. He therefore began to lean more closely towards Austria until in 1879 he made with her the famous Dual Alliance, a defensive undertaking made because of the mutual fear of Russia entertained by both powers. In 1882 Italy became a third partner to the alliance, and this Triple Alliance remained until 1914 the fundamental fact of the European political situation. But Bismarck's policy though on the surface honest and peaceful was none the less Machiavellian in nature. In order that France might remain isolated in Europe and thus be unable to stir up trouble against the new German Empire Bismarck steadily pursued the policy of stirring up mutual hatred and suspicion among the other nations of Europe. Thus he tried to bring about bad feeling between



France and England by favouring the British occupation of Egypt, between France and Italy by favouring the French occupation of Tunis, and between France and Russia by supporting the cause of republicanism in France.

In the economic sphere the policy of Bismarck was of particular importance. He was essentially a mercantile imperialist of the type which I have described in the third lecture of this series. During his régime German scholars were much interested in the Mercantile System, devoted much time to its study, and wrote many learned treatises on the subject. He wanted to make the German Empire a great self-sufficing unit whose increasing riches and prosperity would serve the great aim of building up German power. So he introduced a scientific protective system of tariffs by which he stimulated internal industries and prevented the competition of other nations in the German home market. Whether the prodigious expansion of German industry since 1880 was due to this protective policy or to natural causes I am not prepared to say, but the Germans themselves generally accepted it as a proof of the wisdom of Bismarck's tariff policy. Bismarck followed up the adoption of the protective tariff and government encouragement of manufactures by the foundation of Germany's colonial empire and the formation of a definite colonial policy. At first he had been opposed to the acquisition of colonies by Germany on the ground that such a development would incur the hostility of other nations. But he gradually realised that in order best to develop her manufactures Germany must have new markets for her products. In 1884 therefore Germany seized a number of pieces of territory in Africa and began her short career as a colonising nation.

In June 1888 a new ruler came to the imperial throne of Germany, William II, the present ex-Kaiser. He was a young man of enormous ambitions and self-confidence, dramatic in his utterance, a military enthusiast, and a supreme believer in his own genius. He differed from the old Chancellor on fundamental points of policy, but above all he was unwilling to efface himself behind the dominating personality of Bismarck. In March 1890, therefore, he dismissed the founder of his Empire, or in other words, as Sir John Tenniel cleverly depicted in *Punch*, he dropped the pilot and himself took over the guidance of the ship of state. He resolved to adopt a more aggressive policy than that of his late minister; nothing short of world dominion was his aim. This was to be achieved through his own despotic dominion over a docile and well-drilled German nation. Bismarck in his retirement regarded this new development with dismay and in newspaper articles and press interviews began to advocate ministerial responsibility and a stronger Reichstag. Too late did he begin to realise what harm an irresponsible Emperor of the type of William II might do to the mighty edifice he had erected. He was unheeded when he unceasingly urged up to the day of his death in 1898 that Germany should follow a moderate and peaceful policy.

William II's first scheme was to obtain the mastery of the Near East. He hoped to secure control over Turkey and the Balkans and thence extend German influence in the direction of the Persian Gulf.



So he cultivated the friendship of the Sultan and secured the right to construct the Berlin to Bagdad Railway. He knew that this orientation of policy could not ultimately avoid conflict with Russia who was naturally jealous of Teutonic influence over the southern Slav nations, but he strengthened his army and put his trust in the God of Battles.

In the second place he was dissatisfied with the German colonial empire. The German colonies, so far from proving a success, could not even pay their way. So he looked with a jealous eye upon French Morocco, Portuguese Angola, British South-West Africa, Belgian Congo, and even upon Brazil. Germany, however, was not a maritime nation, and without a fleet she could never hope to hold a powerful overseas empire. So he decided to create a German navy. "The trident must be in our hand," he said in 1897. Three years later when launching a new battleship the unmistakable meaning of his words gave the other maritime nations ample food for reflection. "The Ocean," he said, "teaches us that on its waves and on its more distant shores no great decision can any longer be taken without Germany and without the German Emperor."

In Germany his policy in spite of the growing political consciousness of the people and the demand for responsible government remained steadily autocratic and reactionary. A firm believer in the Divine Right of Kings, William II made Germany the strongest bulwark against democracy in Europe. Germany grew rich, prosperous, educated and powerful but not free. Mommsen, the writer of the monumental "History of Rome," writing in 1903 said of his own country. "There are no longer free citizens." Such was the imperialism of William II. It was inevitable that such a policy should in the end breed a great war. Russia and France were the first of the nations of Europe to become alarmed at the rattling of the Prussian sword in its scabbard, and in 1897 the alliance against which Bismarck had so long struggled with success was publicly announced on the occasion of a visit of the Tzar to Paris. Great Britain first became conscious of German antagonism on the occasion of the Boer War in South Africa, especially when in 1900 an inspired German professor publicly said: "The German nation . . . has now directed its hate against England." At the same time the frantic efforts made by Berlin to create a great German navy were felt to be a serious challenge to Britain's position as a sea power. A series of studied insults too were heaped upon England and France by the mad monarch whose policy in 1907 caused England to abandon her position of "splendid isolation" and join with France and Russia in the defensive pact known as the Triple Entente. Into the events leading up to the Great War time does not permit me to go. It was the result of the Prussianisation of Germany by Bismarck and of the accession of a monarch of mediocre yet inflammable mind who failed to understand the wisdom of the later policy of Bismarck and prostituted his great achievement for the satisfaction of an overweening ambition. The great weak spot in German Imperialism lay in the fact that the influence of Prussian traditions and statesmanship prevented the development of responsible government and caused the concentration of too much unchecked power



in the hands of the Emperor and the military party. The German nation was drilled by Prussian sergeants, Prussian education, and a civil service based upon the Prussian traditions created by Frederick William I and Frederick the Great, until it became a rich, educated, powerful and ambitious people without political talent, without a true political perspective, and with almost sublime over-confidence in the Heaven-sent ability of the House of Hohenzollern. This was the chief cause of its fall. If one may point to one event in the history of the German Empire which more than any other was pregnant with future disaster I should unhesitatingly point to the dismissal of Bismarck in March 1890.

VI.—BRITISH IMPERIALISM.

Probably in two or three hundred years time when the 19th century can be viewed in its proper perspective, the future historian will say that the most wonderful development in world history during that century was the expansion of European civilisation over a large portion of the globe. In this movement it may truthfully be said that Britain played a leading part, especially during the first three-quarters of the century. Not only did she open out new continents and sub-continents (as the geographers call Canada and India) not only did she develop new trade routes, introduce new means of communication by the application of steam and electricity, but she enriched the life of the world by the foundation of new nations, by the development of responsible government, and in the words of Mr. Ramsay Muir, by "feeling her way towards a mode of linking diverse and free states in a common brotherhood of peace and mutual respect." Thus she has given an entirely new meaning to the word "Empire" and the political ideal "Imperialism."

One of the most interesting factors in the development of the modern British Empire is its spontaneous and unsystematic nature. No great imperialist statesman like Bismark directed under the ægis of the state the expansion of Britain. It was a groping movement somewhat blind and haphazard, influenced by a multitude of various motives, wherein the chief parts were not played by colonial secretaries, parliamentary leaders, or newspaper magnates, but by individual colonists, traders and adventurers. The British statesmen of the 19th century, so far from adopting any conscious policy of imperial aggrandisement, for the most part were averse from expansion on the grounds that it involved responsibilities greater than the nation could bear. England was impelled along her course by circumstances too powerful to be resisted. In the first place the Industrial Revolution which began in England somewhere about the year 1760 led to an unparalleled growth of her trade. Between 1815 and 1878 British trade dominated the world. It demanded new outlets, new raw materials. Hence the foundation of Singapore and the other British settlements in the Malay East Indies during and immediately after the great wars with Napoleon. Hence also the earliest development of Cape Colony in South Africa after its capture from the Dutch in the days of Napoleonic domination. Then too the Industrial Revolution caused a tremendous and rapid increase of population in England at a time when war conditions were giving rise to terrible economic distress. The Government absorbed in the great life and death struggle with Napoleon had neither opportunity nor the requisite economic knowledge to devote to the many pressing social problems. Repression and a savage penal code managed to maintain order but at the same time were instrumental in causing a great movement of emigration and transportation. So we have the



growth of English-speaking Canada and the settlements of Australia and New Zealand. In a sense both these dominions owed their origin to the severance of the United States of America from England in 1783. The original French colony of Canada had been conquered from France by Wolfe in the Seven Years' War. It was small, insignificant and without inherent powers of expansion into the wide and almost uninhabited territories surrounding it. When the War of American Independence broke out Loyalist refugees from the United States, known as the United Empire Loyalists, fled into Canada and peopled Ontario and New Brunswick. Thus Upper Canada, as it was called, became an English-speaking province while Lower Canada, centering round Quebec, remained predominantly French. By the Canada Act of 1791 both provinces were given representative government, though not control over the executive officers appointed by the Crown. As time went on Upper Canada attracted increasingly larger numbers of settlers from England. In fact in the year immediately following the fall of Napoleon at Waterloo, Canada was the "chief colonial outlet for the overflow of British population."

Another result of the War of American Independence was that England could no longer use the Southern States as a dumping ground for convicts sentenced to transportation. By this time the voyages of Captain Cook had led to the exploration of New Zealand and Eastern Australia. When therefore Parliament authorised the Privy Council to select some place as a convict settlement, and Sir Joseph Banks, the famous botanist who had accompanied Cook to Australia suggested Botany Bay as a suitable spot his suggestion was adopted and in 1788 the first batch of convicts landed near the site of the modern city of Sydney.

In India at the beginning of the 19th century political necessity led the East India Company to make annexations, though most people in England were opposed to them on the ground that England ought to keep her hands free from distant entanglements in order all the better to deal with the perplexing situation in Europe created by Napoleon. But Nepaul, the Pindaris and the Marathas had to be defeated and their defeat could lead to only one logical result—the dominance of English power in the Peninsula. This was the work of Lord Hastings between 1813 and 1823. He did not believe in what was called the "forward policy;" his work was not due to any desire on his part to extend British power. Rather was it his firm conviction that only by the development and maintenance of strong and peaceful British control could the real interests of the Indian peoples themselves be best advanced. Then too it was from no greedy imperialistic desire to "grab" that Britain between 1839 and 1849 extended her power over the independent Indian States of the North-West until she reached the great mountain ranges that form India's natural boundary in that region. This was due very largely to the supposed menace of Russia. In the East it was the aggressive policy of the royal dynasty founded by Alaungpaya which by threatening Indian territory led to the series of Burmese wars and the annexation of Assam, Arakan and Tenasserim in 1825, Pegu in 1853 and the remainder of the Burmese Empire in 1886. The expansion of British trade, independent of any settled Governmental policy, led to the



annexation of New Zealand in 1839. Trade between Britishers and the Maoris had existed on a large scale long before this date. Missionaries too had long been settled among the Maoris who on two occasions had asked the British Government to take them under its protection. Britain, however, had refused to enlarge her already, as she felt, overlarge Empire. Her hand was forced by difficulties which arose between private traders and the natives and by the attempt of France to gain possession of the country.

Such were some of the chief motives leading to British expansion in the earlier part of the 19th century. It was a very complex movement into the details of which it is impossible for me to go in the space of one hour. There were individual instances of greed, unfairness or sharp dealing, but speaking generally and in comparison with every other imperialistic movement the world has seen, one can only say that in building up this huge heterogeneous Empire Britain was not inspired by lust for conquest. Rather was the movement due to State necessities, and, as Sir Charles Lucas has said, "the pressure of national instinct." These reasons, I know, are dangerous ones to juggle with. The Hohenzollerns of Germany alleged them in justification of their action in forcing war upon Europe in 1914. They have been often used in support of the most unjustifiably aggressive acts. In the case of British imperialism, however, the presence of the feeling, that Empire involves responsibility and the unwillingness of British Statesman lightly to accumulate new responsibilities, has always operated as a check upon aggressive tendencies. "The main acquisitions," says Sir Charles Lucas, "were made not at the behest of the rulers of England, but rather against their will." Then too the British Empire is not an Empire of subject provinces like the great Empires of history, won, like that of Rome, by force of arms, and maintained purely by force of arms. It is a development of exceeding complexity, in which a new imperial policy, different from anything in the past, has gradually been shaping itself. Responsible self-government has been granted to those dominions of the Empire which have shown themselves fit for it, while in the case of more backward communities efforts have been, and are being, made to raise them ultimately to the status of self-governing dominions enjoying responsible government. We in Burma are about to enter upon a most important stage of this political development. It will not be out of place therefore if I devote a good deal of attention in this lecture to the subject of the growth of responsible government in the British Empire.

Responsible government was first introduced into Britain's overseas dominions as the result of the co-operation of several distinct factors and currents of opinion both in Britain and the colonies. After the American Colonies had successfully proclaimed their independence of England in the 18th century the old mercantile policy of the 16th and 17th centuries, which I described in the third lecture of this course, gradually crumpled up. An entirely new view regarding colonies began to grow up. The French statesman Turgot had said, "Colonies are like fruits; they cling to the mother-tree only until they are ripe." The American Revolution had seemed to justify this remark. It was indeed widely felt all over Europe that ultimately all



colonies would demand and get their independence as soon as they were strong enough to defy the mother-country. The great thing was to arrange colonial policy so that the inevitable parting should come without bitterness. Adam Smith pointed out that as far as trade was concerned the parting might even be advantageous since England's trade with North America assumed far greater proportions after the War of Independence than ever before. So he was led to argue that colonies were of no value to a mother country. "Great Britain" he said, "derives nothing but loss from the dominion which she assumes over her colonies." "Emancipate your colonies," cried Jeremy Bentham, the expounder of the Utilitarian philosophy. These views were very common in England until at least the middle of the 19th century. At an early stage in his career Disraeli called the colonies "millstones about our necks" and the *Times* even went so far as to advocate the cession of Canada to the United States. By doing so, it said England would only anticipate by a few years what must be the inevitable destiny of that colony.

The result of these ideas upon the Government was that in 1782 the separate administrative department for colonial matters "The Board of Trade and Plantations," was abolished and colonial affairs were placed under the control of the Home Secretary. In 1801 they were placed under the control of the Secretary for War. Not until 1854 did the Colonial Office regain its independence. The British Empire, however, did not die a natural death. Instead it entered upon a period of surprising expansion and development which is still in progress. In the first half of the 19th century we witness the triumph of the doctrine of Free Trade in England. Huskisson in the twenties had taken the first real steps in the direction of Adam Smith's ideal. In the thirties and forties the desire for cheap food and cheap labour converted the industrial classes to the doctrine, while the famous budgets of Sir Robert Peel and William Ewart Gladstone completed the downfall of the old system of trade regulation. England's old colonial policy had aimed at so regulating colonial trade as to promote her own power and self-sufficiency. The Free Traders deprecated this policy on the ground that it only hindered trade. Their triumph therefore indicated a change in colonial policy which opened colonial trade freely to the merchants of all nations. Britain began to confine herself to the duty of maintaining peace and law in the undeveloped portions of the Empire.

But while Britain was abandoning her old colonial system new and constructive ideas of imperialism were being developed by a school of Radicals, founded by Edward Gibbon Wakefield, whose views were the result of a thorough study of colonies and colonization and were expressed in Wakefield's book "A View of the Art of Colonization" published in 1847. They held that colonies were of value as places to which the surplus population of a country might be scientifically drawn off, and in which by careful State direction new communities might be established free from the unhealthy conditions prevalent in older ones. They believed too that political liberty should be everywhere developed in the colonies. Their views were expressed by Lord Durham when in 1839 he recommended the grant of responsible government to Canada. In practice their ideas of



scientific emigration were carried out by means of a series of colonizing companies promoted by Wakefield for the settlement of parts of Australia and New Zealand.

The mission of Lord Durham to Canada in 1838 was one of the most important events in the history of the British Empire. The constitution granted to Canada by the Act of 1791 gave representative institutions to Upper and Lower Canada, but no control over the executive. This resulted in the growth of friction between the executives—the governors and their councils—and the elected legislatures, which ultimately led in 1837 to the rebellions of Papineau in Quebec and Mackenzie in Ontario. The risings were easily suppressed, but Britain felt alarmed lest there should be a similar movement in Canada to that which in the previous century had given independence to the United States. Lord Durham therefore with Wakefield and Charles Buller was sent out by the Whig Government of Lord Melbourne to study Canadian conditions and report upon them. Durham had only been in Canada five months when he was recalled in disgrace for his somewhat high-handed treatment of the rebel leaders, but his report upon the causes of unrest and his proposals for the reorganization of the Canadian Government constitute an entirely new departure in colonial policy. The troubles in Canada were due, according to the Report, to the fact that the Canadians had insufficient political liberty. Durham advised that the two Canadas—Upper and Lower—should be united with one Legislature to which the executive should be responsible. "Every purpose of popular control," he wrote, "might be combined with every advantage of vesting the immediate choice of advisers in the Crown, were the Colonial Governor to be instructed to secure the co-operation of the Assembly in his policy by entrusting its administration to such men as could command a majority; and if he were given to understand that he need count on no aid from home in any difference with the Assembly, that should not directly involve the relations between the Mother Country and the Colony." The colonies, he argued, must be made to feel responsible themselves not only for the working of the laws they enacted but also for the general welfare of their whole community. The British Government must keep in its hands all Imperial concerns, but purely local matters must unreservedly be given over to the Canadian legislature. Thus the function of the Governor would be a dual one: in dealing with Imperial matters he would act as an Imperial Officer responsible to the British Government; but as far as Canadian domestic affairs were concerned, his position would be that of a constitutional monarch guided by the wishes of his people as expressed by the elected legislature. These proposals were considered to be nothing short of revolutionary by the people of the time. It seemed absurd after two rebellions to give rebellious provinces control over their own government, and Durham's views were severely criticized. A Canada Act was passed in 1840 uniting the two provinces, but it made no provision for the type of government advocated by the Report. For six years the Tories in England fought hard against the extension of Responsible Government to Canada. At the general election of 1846, however, they were defeated. The Whigs came into office. Lord Grey, a man of



extremely liberal views, became Colonial Secretary and in the following year Lord Elgin, "the wisest and greatest of Governors-General" was appointed to Canada where he introduced the principles laid down in the Durham Report. The success of the introduction of Responsible Government was complete and triumphant. All friction ceased between Canada and the mother-country. The Canadians soon realized, under the able guidance of Lord Elgin, what the Irish are now beginning to realize, that they must themselves keep their house in order, and that they themselves are to blame if they do not do so. The greatest result of this realization of responsibility by the Canadian people was the drawing up by the Canadians themselves, with the cordial co-operation of Great Britain, of a scheme for the formation of a United Dominion of Canada including British Columbia, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island. This was successfully carried through in 1867 and Canada became one of the great states of the world to which later the home government gave control of all the vast undeveloped lands of the North-West. The government of the Dominion, as laid down in 1867, was based upon the English model, *i.e.* the subordination of the executive power to the legislature. A Federal Parliament consisting of the Governor-General, representing the King, the Senate, appointed by the Governor-General for life and the House of Commons elected by the provinces, sits at Ottawa. The executive power is in the hands of a Cabinet chosen from the party commanding a majority in the House of Commons. Parliament and the Cabinet deal with all matters common to all the provinces, such as Public Debt, Taxation, Trade, Defence, Currency, Postal Service, and Native Indian affairs. Each federated province also has its own legislature and executive which deal with purely local matters, subject to the control of the Federal Government which remains the residuary legatee of powers.

Since that day Canada has made remarkable progress. Political life has been vigorous, racial antagonism between English and French has died out, railways have linked up distant provinces, and during the present century the population of Canada has increased by over three million souls. Canada is no longer a colony, she is a nation. The sentiment of Canadian nationality has developed very strongly, especially during the recent war when so many gallant Canadians left home and loved ones to fight in the cause of liberty. In this too they demonstrated the fact that their patriotism is not merely national but imperial. Thus the wisdom of Britain's earliest grant of Responsible Government has been abundantly shown by the birth of a fine vigorous young nation beyond the Atlantic enjoying the free development of its national tendencies, but keenly appreciative of its position as a component part of a great Empire.

The movement which began with Canada, soon extended itself to the great island-continent of Australia. Though the colony originated as a convict settlement, it was not long before free settlers in large numbers began to be attracted to its shores. Especially was this the case in 1851 and 1852 when the discovery of rich deposits of gold caused a tremendous influx of settlers. Gradually six colonies grew up—New South Wales, Queensland, Victoria, South Australia, Western Australia, and the island of Tasmania. In 1840 transportation



was abolished. In 1852 the British parliament astonished the world by empowering the various Australian colonies to elect single-chamber assemblies to decide upon the forms of government under which they preferred to live. All decided to adopt the English model. As a result, therefore, in all the Australian colonies bi-cameral legislatures were established with ministries responsible to them. In 1854 the same system of Responsible Government was granted to New Zealand. At first all the colonies were separate. They possessed no common legal bond of union. Towards the end of the century, however, the question of federation became a very prominent one in Australian politics. The need for uniform legislation on commercial and industrial matters, railways, navigation, irrigation and tariffs was felt. An Australian patriotism was growing up; the predominant feature of the 19th century world—the desire for nationality—had reached the Antipodes. Between 1890 and 1900 the extension of the German colonial empire and the question of the political development of the Pacific regions decided the Australians in favour of federation. In 1898 they drew up a draft constitution; when this was accepted by all the separate colonies it was sent to England and in 1900 by an Act of Parliament became law. By this act a Federal Government was set up consisting of a Governor-General representing the Crown, a Senate elected by the several states and a popularly elected House of Commons. To this body the Cabinet is responsible, but as the states in Australia and not the Federal Government, are the residuary legatees of power, the latter may only wield the particular powers delegated to it by the act of federation. Thus while Canada is a unitary state the Commonwealth of Australia is a loose federation of states each individually jealous of its own rights. The sentiment of nationality is not so intense in Australia as it is in Canada. On the other hand government in Australia is extremely democratic; many interesting modern social reforms have been put into practice, while the Commonwealth has created its own army and navy.

It is in New Zealand, however, that the grant of self-government has produced the greatest political and social progress within the British Empire. Woman suffrage and the referendum have for long been in constitutional practice. Old age pensions were introduced as far back as 1898. Land laws prevent the land from becoming the monopoly of the few. The State owns the telegraphs and telephones, conducts savings banks and life insurance, owns and operates the railways which are run not for a profit but for the service of the community, and has even begun to work some of the coal mines.

In the case of South Africa British policy in the 19th century is open to much criticism. When at the time of the Napoleonic Wars Britain took over Cape Colony its population of 25,000 Dutchmen and French Huguenots was extremely suspicious of British designs and anxious for complete independence. The colony was given the ordinary constitution of a Crown Colony consisting of a Governor appointed in London and a Legislative Council appointed by the Governor, but including unofficial members. This constituted an advance upon the old Dutch method of administering the colony, But the development of humanitarianism in England, the emancipation



of slaves throughout the Empire, and the influence of missionaries who strongly criticized the Dutch treatment of the African negroes not only caused discord to arise between the two peoples but fostered the belief that the Boers could not be trusted to deal fairly with the natives. When in 1836 the Boers trekked away from the English colony and settled beyond the rivers Orange and Vaal, Britain at first left them to themselves. Little by little however the British Government began to appreciate the problem of the position of these new Boer states. On the one hand the home government was anxious not to extend British responsibility in South Africa; on the other missionary influence urged it to protect the natives against possible outrage at the hands of the Boers by asserting its sovereignty over the latter. In 1848 Sir Harry Smith was sent out to the Cape to make a special study of the matter, formulate a policy and take action as befitted the case. On the ground that the independent existence of the Boer States constituted a grave danger to the whites in South Africa Smith decided upon an annexationist policy, enforcing British sovereignty over all the whites and placing British agents among the native tribes for the promotion of peace and good order. Had this policy been strictly adhered to there is no doubt that the South African problem would have been solved at a much earlier date and with much less bloodshed. A firm policy was needed. Between 1848 and 1852 Smith's policy was followed. But at home the politicians of the *laissez faire* school looked with distrust upon a forward policy in Africa, and when in 1851 Smith was involved in a stiff war with the Basutos who had refused to compensate the Boers for stolen cattle, Britain decided that a stop must be put to African warfare. By the Sand River Convention (1852) and the Bloemfontein Convention (1854) independence was thrust upon the Transvaal and Orange River Boer Colonies and the British power "withdrew into its shell south of the River Orange." Lord Grey the then Secretary of State for the Colonies, wrote: "Beyond the very limited extent of territory required for the security of the Cape of Good Hope as a naval station, the British Crown and nation have no interest whatever in maintaining any territorial dominion in South Africa."

But this policy again was not consistently followed, a fact which naturally gave rise to the idea that British policy was dishonest and depended not upon general principles of justice but upon the particular political party in power at Westminster. The attempts of Great Britain to set up a series of native areas under British protection such as British Kaffraria and the Griqualands embittered our relations with the Boers against whom we were protecting the natives. Neither the missionaries, who influenced British policy, nor the Home Government realised sufficiently that these races of the Bantu stock (Kaffirs, Zulus and Matabili) were later comers to South Africa than the white men, were particularly warlike, and constituted a very real danger to the more civilized communities. The Boers really had a grievance. On the other hand though it was undoubtedly the discovery of diamonds which led Britain against her declared policy to extend her power beyond the Orange River, her handling of the native question was due largely to



the spirit of humanitarianism. It was this native question which brought about the annexation of the Transvaal Republic in 1877. The republic, notorious for the atrocities it had committed against coloured men, seemed to Lord Beaconsfield's government in England to be causing a very dangerous movement amongst the Zulus. Its annexation was due to this cause and was followed by war between Britain and the Zulus. But the strong imperialism of the Beaconsfield ministry lent to the proceedings an aggressive air. The Boers therefore rebelled in 1880 and defeated a small detachment of British troops at Majuba Hill. This small reverse could easily have been avenged and the rebel republic defeated had it not been for the policy of the Gladstone Government. Mr. Gladstone, who condemned, the annexation of the Transvaal as unjust, had already, before the war began, been negotiating for restoring to the republic its independence. He refused to allow the defeat to alter his policy and formally recognised the independence of the Transvaal. Undoubtedly as a political move Gladstone's action was a mistake which wrought more harm than good in South Africa; but we cannot refrain from applauding his honesty of purpose and sense of justice in dealing with a very complex situation.

In his treaty with the Transvaal Gladstone had insisted that white men should be allowed free access to and trade with the republic. In 1884 came the great gold rush to the Rand when thousands of Englishmen settled in Boer territory. Their attitude towards the Boers was somewhat aggressive, but the latter treated them with evident unfairness. This was the cause of the Great Boer War in which the Orange Free State and the Transvaal were defeated by Britain and lost their independence. In the peace which was concluded on June 1st, 1902, Britain gave extremely liberal terms to the conquered Boers making them generous money grants and loans to repair the devastations caused by the war. With extraordinary rapidity the Boers were conciliated and in 1906 the British Government went to the perilous length of granting responsible self-government to the Transvaal, and in the following year to the Orange River Colony. It had already in 1872 been granted to Cape Colony, and in 1893 to Natal. In 1910 after submitting the question of Union to a referendum the four states agreed to unite under a single government and the new constitution with the warm assent of the British Parliament came into being on May 31. It is a sure commentary upon the success of British imperialism that the first Prime Minister of the Union Cabinet was General Botha, a former Boer commandant who fought against England in the war. The Union of South Africa is in no sense a federation. The powers of the constituent states are only about equal to those of a County Council in England. The Union Parliament and Cabinet are entirely paramount. Since 1910 South Africa has made great progress in material wealth as also in the spread of modern civilisation and education. But its real success will depend upon its ability to weld together British and Dutch into a common nationality. Without being unduly optimistic we may express a sanguine hope that thanks to the whole-hearted work of reconciled Boers such as Botha and Smuts this is now an almost accomplished development. The



Romans of two thousand years ago coined a political maxim based upon their experience as an Empire-building people. It ran "divide et impera"—"divide and rule." Modern British Imperialism has been the direct reverse of this policy. It has striven to stimulate the growth of larger units wherever self-government has been introduced. Thus it has promoted their power, their sense of self-reliance and their sentiment of nationality. The British Empire indeed has been a great nationalising factor in the world.

But there remain large numbers of protectorates, settlements, garrison and coaling stations in which the institutions of responsible self-government have not been developed. Some of them have representative institutions without responsible ministries, others possess a governor and a nominated council, while still others such as Gibraltar are autocratically ruled by a military governor responsible only to the British Government. These are too numerous and too complex to be dealt within a lecture which must of necessity concern itself chiefly with the bigger questions of imperial policy. It must be understood that Britain does not set out as a fixed principle to confer Responsible Government upon every community within the Empire. Such a policy would be nothing short of disastrous. Many communities in the British Empire have never asked for self-government. In their case it may fairly be assumed that their political development is not sufficiently advanced for them to be able to work responsible government with success. In many of the tropical lands the peoples as yet are in too backward a state to render possible their immediate development as self-governing communities. To them the maintenance of a fixed and unswerving reign of law is as great a political advance as is possible at present.

The case of India, however, stands in a category by itself. In 1858 India passed out of the hands of the East India Company and came under the direct authority of the British Government, while in 1876 it was declared an Empire. Here from a very early date British policy has been influenced by the feeling that the ultimate justification of British rule lay in guiding the peoples of India gradually along the path to self-government. This idea was given voice to as early as 1824 by Sir Thomas Munro, the then Governor of Madras. "We should look upon India," said he, "not as a temporary possession, but as one which is to be maintained permanently, until the natives shall have abandoned most of their superstitions and prejudices and become sufficiently enlightened to frame a regular government for themselves, and to conduct and preserve it. Whenever such a time shall arrive, it will probably be best for both countries that the British control over India should be gradually withdrawn. That the desirable change contemplated may in some after age be effected in India there is no cause to despair. Such a change was at one time in Britain itself at least as hopeless as it is here. When we reflect how much the character of nations has always been influenced by that of governments, and that some, once the most cultivated, have sunk into barbarism, while others, formerly the rudest, have attained the highest point of civilization, we shall see no reason to doubt that if we pursue steadily the proper measures, we shall in time so far improve the character of our Indian subjects as to make them able to govern and protect themselves."



The difficulties in the way of the development of such a policy have been very grave. No other region of the world possesses so many different races, languages and religions, while the caste distinctions existing in India are unparalleled. In such a condition of affairs the most serious danger is that one race would impose domination by force over the less vigorous ones, or that the best organised class would exploit the situation to its own advantage. It has therefore been one great point of British policy in India to act the part of mediator between conflicting racial and religious tendencies, to attempt to give efficacy to a firm impartial law that shall be no respecter of persons and to bring about the co-operation of the public in enforcing the rule of law. Great steps too have been taken in developing the material resources of the country by the maintenance of internal peace, the development of a road system, railways, an efficient postal service, sea-communications with the outside world, by enormous works of irrigation, the spread of modern medical and surgical science, anti-plague measures, anti-famine measures, and the introduction of modern European business and industrial methods. But one of the greatest measures for breaking the barriers of race, religion and caste, and one which has contributed more than any other factor to the development of the modern Indian nation has been the introduction and spread of Western education through the medium of the English language. This has resulted in the rise of an intelligent public opinion in India and in the increasing participation of Indians in the administration of their own country. Of course there have been mistakes, cases of unjustifiable harshness, and abuses of a bureaucratic nature. But in summing up British imperial policy with regard to India in the 19th century we can only honestly say that the word "Empire" has taken to itself a new significance, and has become "not merely domination pursued for its own sake, but trusteeship for the extension of civilization."

The closing years of the 19th century ushered in an era of rivalry among European nations for world power. In the main this resolved itself into a great movement for the control of the unoccupied lands of the world. Thus Africa was completely opened up and partitioned by France, Germany, Belgium, England, Portugal, Spain and Italy. The islands of the Pacific were occupied by the various European nations, and spheres of commercial influence marked out in the Far East. Peoples like the Chinese and Japanese who were not annexed by a great European power found themselves impelled into the full current of world progress and forced to adopt the methods of organization—governmental, military and commercial—of the West. The chief cause of this astounding development, which no man as yet can possibly estimate and the future of which cannot be foreseen, was the great progress of scientific discoveries in the 19th century and their application to industry in such a way as to give man a command over the forces of nature such as he had never before even guessed at. All the parts of the world have thus been linked up by new modes of communication and the face of the world has, within the last fifty years, been entirely transformed. This has meant a corresponding increase of commerce and has tremendously complicated the economics of the world. Economic questions to-day cannot be



regarded from a purely national or European point of view—they affect the whole world. In the case of politics also the recent war has demonstrated in an unmistakable manner that all important problems affect not one or two nations but the whole world.

What effect has this had upon British Imperialism? In the first place the partition of Africa gave enormous increases of territory to Britain. This was due chiefly to the fact that Britain at the outset of the movement was the only country possessing colonies of European race in Africa. The justification for this movement lies in the fact that had Britain not occupied these territories, they would have been seized by some other European power who would have closed their markets to the world and in its dealings with the native peoples might have done what Belgium did in the Congo or Germany in German Africa. British control, though open to a good deal of criticism, has generally meant the protection of native rights and customs, and the free opening of trade on equal terms to all nations. The British control of Egypt came not as the result of preconceived policy, but as the result of a number of quite unexpected events. The work of reconstruction, reorganization and development accomplished by Britain in Egypt has been nothing short of a miracle, and has ultimately resulted in the recent establishment of full self-government and national independence. Whether this will be successful or not it is difficult to say; but we many hope that this land of ancient civilization will before long be fit to play a liberal part among the nations of the great world state which is slowly evolving.

This recent period too witnessed the development of a keener interest in Imperial matters by Britain herself and the appearance of a well-defined imperialist sentiment as an important factor in British politics. The cause of this, I think, may be attributed to the reaction upon Britain of the great wave of imperialism which has swept over the other great powers. The responsibility of defending such diverse and wide spreading regions against the possible aggressive tendencies of other powers agitated the minds of Englishmen, especially when Germany began to make her forward movement in the colonial sphere. The need too for more systematic exploitation of the immense natural resources of the Empire was more keenly felt as commercial competition grew more severe among the greater nations. A school of English historians was founded by Sir John Seely who dealt with the origin and growth of the British Empire as an integral and vital part of the progress of the British race. The jubilees, funerals and coronations of recent British sovereigns have been the occasion of magnificent imperial pageants which have impressed the peoples of the Empire with a sense of its magnitude and diversity. Unfortunately the movement has been accompanied by a good deal of cheapness and by demonstrations of the jingoistic spirit which have only served to obscure the real solid achievement which has taken place.

One important result of this awakening interest in the problems of Empire has been discernible in the attempts of British statesmen and political thinkers to find some workable solution to the problem of the closer organization of the Empire. At the beginning of the present century Joseph Chamberlain, who had made a special study of colonial



matters, advocated the adoption of a Customs Union for the Empire, based upon the idea of the German Zollverein. This, he hoped, would, as in Germany, provided a basis for building up the Empire into a powerful self-sufficing unit. His proposals in fact constituted a modern revival of the principles of Mercantile Imperialism. They became known in British politics under the names of "Tariff Reform" and "Imperial Preference." They were strongly favoured by a group of British economists who were students of the Mercantile System in England and of the 19th century German writers on the subject. Chamberlain's proposals, however, were completely defeated, partly through the opposition of the self-governing Dominions and partly because a majority of opinion in Great Britain was against them. As far as the Dominions were concerned Chamberlain had not reckoned with the tremendous growth of colonial nationalism which would brook no such interference from the Mother Country as was inherent in his scheme.

Another attempt to draw tighter the bonds between Great Britain and the Dominions was made by a society formed for the promotion of Imperial Federation. Thus imperial subjects were to be separated from purely local subjects, the former being dealt with by a central imperial legislature and executive, the latter by the Dominion governments. Again, however, colonial nationalism, fearful of possible encroachment upon local powers from Westminster, has caused the defeat of these schemes whenever they have been introduced at Imperial Conferences. But a further cause of their failure lies in the fact that while in theory they look simple and straightforward, the very complexity of the Empire and its problems renders in practice any scheme of Federation as yet propounded too doctrinaire and rigid to commend itself to the British race.

On the other hand in the matter of Imperial Defence much has been done to develop co-operation between Great Britain and the Dominions. The real solid success of the efforts made in this direction has been surprisingly exemplified in the recent war, wherein the machinery of co-operation in defence built up by previous Imperial Conferences abundantly justified itself.

It seems therefore as if the Empire is now tending to become not a federalised state, as the last generation of Imperialists hoped, but an association of free nations in co-operation for the common ends of promoting peace, mutual defence, and mutual intercourse; the machinery of co-operation being developed by means of the Imperial Conference (a method which has gradually been evolving itself since 1887), resident ministers representing the colonies in London, and subsidiary conferences dealing with important subjects such as Education, Shipping, Forestry, Statistics, Mineral Resources, etc. This seems to be the direction that affairs are now taking. All ideas of imperial union either into a unitary state or a federal one have been rejected by the colonies themselves, "equality of nationhood" being from 1917 the recognised principle.

Meanwhile the last few years have seen the development of Indian nationality as an important factor in imperial politics and the beginnings of the application of responsible and representative government to the Indian Empire. In 1919 the self-governing



Dominions were granted equal status in the Peace Conference and in the League of Nations. More recently India has been accorded that status both in the Imperial Conference and in the League of Nations. We may say then that the basic principle of modern British Imperialism is that of progressive self-government. The results of this policy will be of the utmost importance not merely to the British Empire itself but also to the world in general. What the future holds no one can say. For the present imperial policy is mainly concerned with the problem of Dominion Status in its relation to Imperial Unity, with the development of the machinery of co-operation between Britain and the Dominions, and the relation of the British Group of nations with the League of Nations. It is not so much to say that the immediate and future peace of the world depends largely upon the way in which these questions are solved. Perhaps in closing I may be boldly optimistic in expressing the hope that in the not too distant future an intimate group of self-governing equal nations—Britain, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India and Burma—will be found "acting as the pioneers of the human race in its travel towards the parliament of man and the federation of the world."

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