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No. 1.

Foreign Office, 17th October 1872.

EARL GRANVILLE TO LORD A. LOFTUS.

HER Majesty's Government have not yet received from the Cabinet of St. Petersburg communication of the Report which General Kaufmann was long since instructed to draw up on the countries south of the Oxus which are claimed by the Ruler of Afghanistan as his hereditary possessions.

Her Majesty's Government have awaited this communication in full confidence that impartial inquiries instituted by that distinguished officer would confirm the views they themselves take of this matter, and so enable the two Governments to come to a prompt and definitive decision on the question that has been so long in discussion between them.

But as the expected communication has not reached them, and as they consider it of importance both for the maintenance of peace and tranquillity in Central Asia, and for removing all causes of misunderstanding between the Imperial Government and themselves, I will no longer delay making known through Your Excellency to the Imperial Government the conclusion at which Her Majesty's Government have arrived after carefully weighing all the evidence before them.

In the opinion then of Her Majesty's Government the right of the Ameer of Cabul (Shere Ali) to the possession of the territories up to the Oxus as far down as Khoja Saleh is fully established, and they believe, and have so stated to him



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through the Indian Government, that he would have a right to defend these territories if invaded. On the other hand, Her Majesty's authorities in India have declared their determination to remonstrate strongly with the Ameer should he evince any disposition to overstep these limits of his kingdom.

Hitherto the Ameer has proved most amenable to the advice offered to him by the Indian Government, and has cordially accepted the peaceful policy which they have recommended him to adopt, because the Indian Government have been able to accompany their advice with an assurance that the territorial integrity of Afghanistan would in like manner be respected by those Powers beyond his frontiers which are amenable to the influence of Russia. The policy thus happily inaugurated has produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in the countries where it has long been unknown.

Her Majesty's Government believe that it is now in the power of the Russian Government by an explicit recognition of the right of the Ameer of Cabul to these territories which he now claims, which Bokhara herself admits to be his, and which all evidence as yet produced shows to be in his actual and effectual possession, to assist the British Government in perpetuating, as far as it is in human power to do so, the peace and prosperity of those regions, and in removing for ever by such means all cause of uneasiness and jealousy between England and Russia in regard to their respective policies in Asia.

For Your Excellency's more complete information I state the territories and boundaries which Her Majesty's Government consider as fully belonging to the Ameer of Cabul, *viz* :—

(1.) Badakshan, with its dependent district of Wakhan from the Sarikal (Woods Lake) on the east to the junction of the Kokecha River with the Oxus (or Penjah), forming the northern boundary of this Afghan province throughout its entire extent.

(2.) Afghan Turkestan, comprising the districts of Kunduz, Khulm, and Balkh, the northern boundary of which would be the line of the Oxus from the junction of the Kokecha River to the post of the Khoja Saleh, inclusive, on the high



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road from Bokhara to Balkh. Nothing to be claimed by the Afghan Ameer on the left bank of the Oxus below Khoja Saleh.

(3.) The internal districts of Aksha, Seripool, Maimenat, Shibberjan, and Andkoi, the latter of which would be the extreme Afghan frontier possession to the north-west, the desert beyond belonging to independent tribes of Turcomans.

(4.) The western Afghan frontier between the dependencies of Herat and those of the Persian province of Khorassan is well known and need not here be defined.

Your Excellency will give a copy of this despatch to the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 2.

St. Pétersbourg, le 7 Décembre, 1872.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW to COUNT BRUNNOW.—(Communicated to EARL GRANVILLE by COUNT BRUNNOW, December 29.)

VOTRE Excellence a déjà reçu copie de la dépêche de Lord Granville du 17 Octobre que Lord A. Loftus nous a communiquée d'ordre de son Gouvernement.

Elle a trait aux affaires de l'Asie Centrale.

Avant d'y répondre, il est nécessaire de rappeler la marche de nos pourparlers avec le Cabinet Anglais sur cette question.

Les deux Gouvernements étaient animés d'un égal désir de prévenir entre eux tout sujet de dissentiment dans cette partie de l'Asie. Il voulaient tous deux y établir un ordre de choses qui y assurât la paix et consolidât leurs relations d'amitié et de bonne intelligence.

A cet effet ils étaient tombés d'accord sur l'opportunité de laisser subsister entre leurs possessions respectives une certaine zone intermédiaire qui les préservât d'un contact immédiat.

L'Afghanistan ayant paru devoir remplir ces conditions, il avait été convenu que les deux Gouvernements emploieraient l'influence dont ils disposent sur les Etats placés dans leur voisinage afin d'empêcher toute collision et tout empiétement en deçà ou au delà de cette zone intermédiaire.



Il s'agissait seulement d'en tracer la limite précise pour que l'entente des deux Cabinets fut aussi complète en pratique qu'elle l'était en principe.

Là des doutes s'élevaient.

Le fondateur de l'Etat Afghan, Dost Mohammed Khan, avait laissé après lui une confusion qui ne permettait pas de prendre pour base l'extension territoriale acquise à de certains moments pendant son règne par l'Afghanistan.

On était en conséquence convenu de s'en tenir aux territoires qui auraient jadis reconnu l'autorité de Dost Mohammed et se trouveraient encore aujourd'hui en la possession effective de Shir Ali Khan.

Il restait à constater cet état de possession avec l'exactitude désirable.

A cet effet il était nécessaire d'avoir des données locales positives qui manquaient aux deux Gouvernements à l'égard de ces contrées lointaines et imparfaitement connues.

Il fut convenu que le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan serait chargé de profiter de sa résidence à proximité et de ses relations avec les Khanats voisins, pour faire recueillir tous les renseignements qui pouvaient éclaircir la question et permettre aux deux Gouvernements de se former une opinion pratique en pleine connaissance de cause.

Tel est, M. le Comte, ainsi que votre Excellence s'en souviendra, le point où en étaient arrivés nos pourparlers avec le Cabinet Anglais.

Conformément à ces décisions M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann avait pris les mesures possibles pour procéder à cette investigation préalable. Mais la difficulté des distances, l'extrême complication des points à élucider, le manque de sources authentiques et l'impossibilité d'une enquête directe, ne lui ont pas permis de remplir cette tâche avec la promptitude que nous aurions désirée non moins que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique. De là les retards que signale la dépêche de Lord Granville.

Toutefois nous avons déjà fait observer que ces retards provenaient de l'attention sérieuse vouée par le Cabinet Impérial à cette affaire. Il eut été facile de se borner à des notions recueillies à la légère et qui plus tard seraient



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devenues la source de malentendus. Nous avons préféré étudier consciencieusement la question, puisqu'il s'agissait de donner une base solide et durable à l'organisation politique de l'Asie Centrale et aux bonnes et amicales relations que, sur cette base, les deux Gouvernements avaient en vue d'établir entre eux pour le présent et pour l'avenir.

Au commencement du mois d'Octobre dernier, le Ministère Impérial avait été dans le cas d'annoncer à Lord A. Loftus et à votre Excellence que le Conseiller d'Etat actuel Struve, chargé de ces investigations, venait enfin d'arriver à St. Pétersbourg, et qu'aussitôt que les matériaux rassemblés par lui auraient été élaborés, le résultat en serait communiqué au Cabinet de Londres.

C'est pendant que ce travail se poursuivait que nous avons reçu communication de la dépêche de Lord Granville qui nous a fait connaître l'opinion à laquelle le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique a cru devoir s'arrêter sur les points en discussion.

Le Cabinet Impérial se maintenant dans l'esprit de l'accord établi en principe entre les deux Gouvernements, ne se croit pas moins en devoir de transmettre au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique les renseignements recueillis sur les lieux par ordre de M. le Gouverneur-Général du Turkestan, et d'exposer en toute franchise les conclusions qui lui paraissent en découler.

Les unes et les autres sont consignées dans l'office ci-joint en copie que M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann vient de m'adresser et dans le mémoire qui y sert d'annexe.

Je vais les résumer :—

La question qu'il s'agissait de résoudre avait deux aspects.

1. Constater l'état de possession effectif actuel, autant qu'il est possible de l'établir dans ces contrées.

2. Rechercher, en se basant sur ce *statu quo*, la meilleure délimitation à tracer, afin de répondre au but des pourparlers actuels ; c'est-à-dire, d'écarter dans la mesure du possible les causes de conflits et d'empiétements mutuels entre les Khanats voisins, et, par conséquent, de garantir entre eux, autant que faire se peut, l'état de paix que de part et d'autre les deux Gouvernements devraient désormais s'attacher à faire respecter par tous les moyens d'influence dont ils disposent.

Dans ces deux ordres d'idées, il résulte de l'étude qui a été faite :—

1. Qu'au nord, l'Amou-Daria constitue en effet la frontière normale de l'Afghanistan à partir de son confluent avec la Koukcha jusqu'au point de Khodja Saleh.

Sous ce rapport nos données sont d'accord avec l'opinion du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et la frontière dont il s'agit semble d'autant plus rationnelle qu'elle n'offre pas matière à contestations de la part des riverains de l'Amou-Daria.

2. Au nord-est, les données de fait que nous avons recueillies assignent le confluent de cette rivière avec la Koukcha comme la limite des territoires sur lesquels Shir Ali Khan exerce une souveraineté effective incontestable. Au delà de cette limite, et notamment à l'égard du Badakhan et du Vakhan, il a été impossible de saisir les traces d'une semblable souveraineté,—l'ensemble des informations présente au contraire de nombreux indices qui doivent faire envisager ces contrées comme indépendantes. Dans la communication du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique qui nous a été faite au mois de Novembre dernier, on voit que d'après le témoignage du Major Montgomery, l'Emir de Caboul a "une autorité considérable" dans le Badakhan, et que les Afghans ont "aidé Mahmood Shah à renverser le Mir ou chef de ce pays, Jehandar Shah;" mais ces faits eux-mêmes semblent indiquer l'indépendance réelle du Badakhan plutôt que sa sujétion effective à l'Emir de Caboul. Les informations recueillies par M. Struve et consignées dans son mémoire confirment cette conclusion. Elles mentionnent, il est vrai, des interventions de l'Emir Afghan dans les querelles intérieures du Badakhan et des tentatives pour faire payer son assistance par une espèce de tribut; mais on ne rencontre point les signes qui, en Asie, accompagnent l'exercice de la souveraineté, c'est-à-dire, la présence dans le pays d'officiers Afghans, et d'employés pour collectionner l'impôt. Les chefs du Badakhan se sont considérés, et ont été considérés par leurs voisins, comme des chefs indépendants.

Il résulte de là qu'on peut tout au plus admettre que l'Emir de Caboul a cherché à diverses reprises à faire entrer le Badakhan sous sa domination, qu'il a exercé plusieurs fois dans les affaires de ce pays, à la faveur de discords intestins, une ingérence basée sur le voisinage et la supériorité



de ses forces, mais qu'il est impossible d'en déduire l'existence d'une autorité souveraine effective et incontestée.

Quant au Vakhan, ce pays paraît être resté jusqu'à présent encore plus en dehors de toute action directe des chefs de l'Afghanistan.

3. Il reste à examiner si, dans cet état de choses, et vû le but que nous poursuivons en commun, c'est-à-dire l'établissement dans ces contrées d'une paix solide sous la garantie des deux Gouvernements, il convient de reconnaître à l'Emir de Caboul les droits qu'il revendique sur le Badakchan et le Vakhan, et de faire entrer ces deux pays dans la délimitation territoriale de l'Afghanistan.

Tel n'est pas l'avis de M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, et le Cabinet Impérial arrive aux mêmes conclusions.

Dans l'état actuel des choses il n'existe pas de conflits entre le Badakchan et ses voisins. Le Boukhara n'a aucune prétention sur ce pays. Les deux Etats sont d'ailleurs trop faibles, trop absorbés par leurs propres affaires, pour se chercher querelle. L'Angleterre et la Russie n'auraient donc à s'employer que pour maintenir cet état de paix aussi bien entre ces Khanats qu'entre l'Afghanistan et le Badakchan, et cette tâche ne semblerait pas au-dessus de leurs moyens. Il en serait tout autrement le jour où l'Emir de Caboul étendrait son autorité sur le Badakchan et le Vakhan. Il se trouverait en contact immédiat avec le Kachgar, le Kokand et le Boukhara, dont il est séparé aujourd'hui par ces deux pays. Il serait dès lors bien plus difficile d'éviter des conflits provenant soit de son ambition et du sentiment de sa force, soit de la jalousie de ses voisins.

Ce serait fonder sur une base bien précaire la paix qu'il s'agit d'établir dans ces contrées, et compromettre la garantie que les deux Gouvernements seraient appelés à y donner.

Cette combinaison nous semblerait, par conséquent, aller directement contre le but qu'ils poursuivent en commun.

Il nous paraîtrait beaucoup plus conforme à ce but de laisser subsister l'état actuel des choses. Le Badakchan et le Vakhan formeraient ainsi une barrière interposée entre les Etats du Nord et ceux du Sud de l'Asie Centrale, et cette barrière, fortifiée par l'action combinée que l'Angleterre et la Russie sont en mesure d'exercer sur ceux de ces Etats accessibles à leur influence, empêcherait efficacement tout contact dangereux et assurerait à notre avis, dans la mesure du possible, la paix de ces contrées.



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4. Quant aux limites à reconnaître à l'Afghanistan du côté du nord-ouest, à partir de Khodja-Saleh, nos informations signalent également des doutes sur les faits de la possession effective par l'Emir de Caboul des villes d'Akchi, Seripoul, Meimané, Chibirgan, et Ankhoï, qu'il s'agit de faire entrer dans les limites reconnues de l'Afghanistan.

Toutefois, ces pays étant séparés du Boukhara par des déserts, leur annexion au territoire Afghan n'établirait pas les contacts dangereux que nous avons signalés du côté nord-est. Elle ne présenterait, par conséquent, pas les mêmes inconvénients.

Si le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique persiste dans son opinion quant à l'opportunité de comprendre ces localités dans les limites du territoire Afghan, nous n'insisterons pas sur le principe posé; c'est-à-dire, de ne reconnaître comme faisant partie de l'Afghanistan que les territoires ayants été sous la domination de Dost Mohammed Khan et se trouvant aujourd'hui sous l'autorité effective de Shir Ali Khan.

Par déférence pour le vœu du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, le Cabinet Impérial serait disposé à adhérer pour cette partie des frontières au tracé indiqué dans la dépêche de Lord Granville.

Tel est, M. le Comte, le résumé des conclusions que nous croyons pouvoir tirer des données que nous possédons.

Veuillez les placer sous les yeux de M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique.

En les communiquant à son Excellence, notre intention n'est pas seulement de dégager notre promesse. Nous croyons répondre à la pensée qui a présidé dès le début à l'échange amical d'idées établi entre les deux Gouvernements en cherchant à résoudre de la manière la plus rationnelle une question qui les intéresse également.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, December 7th, 1872.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW TO COUNT BRUNNOW.

YOUR Excellency has already received copy of Lord Grandville's despatch of the 17th October, which was communicated to us by Lord A. Loftus, by order of his Government.



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It refers to the affairs of Central Asia.

Before answering it, it becomes necessary for me to recapitulate the different phases of the negotiation between us and the English Cabinet upon this question.

The two Governments were equally desirous to forestall any cause of disagreement between them in that part of Asia. Both wished to establish such a state of things as would secure peace in those countries, and consolidate the relations of friendship and good understanding between the two Governments.

They had consequently come to an agreement that it was expedient to have a certain "intermediary" zone for the purpose of preserving their respective possessions from immediate contact.

Afghanistan seemed well fitted to supply what was needed; and it was consequently agreed that the two Governments should use all their influence with their neighbouring States towards preventing any collision or encroachment on one side or the other of this "intermediary" zone.

All that remained, in order to make the agreement between the two Cabinets as complete in fact as it already was in principle, was to trace the exact limits of the zone.

It was here that a doubtful point arose.

The founder of the Afghan State, Dost Mahomed Khan, had left behind him a state of confusion which did not allow of the territorial extension which Afghanistan had acquired at certain moments of his reign being accepted as a basis.

It was consequently agreed that no territories should be taken into account, but such as having formerly recognized the authority of Dost Mahomed were still in the actual possession of Shere Ali Khan.

It thus became necessary to ascertain, with all possible accuracy, what were the territories in his actual possession.

For this purpose it was requisite to have positive local data, which neither Government possessed, with reference to these distant and imperfectly-known countries.

It was agreed that the Governor-General of Turkistan should be instructed to take advantage of his residence in the proximity of, and his relations with the neighbouring



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Khanates, to collect all the information necessary to throw light upon the question, and to enable the two Governments to come to a practical decision with the facts before them.

Such was the point, M. le Comte, as Your Excellency will recollect, at which our negotiations with the English Cabinet had arrived.

In conformity with this decision, M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann had taken every possible measure towards carrying out this preliminary investigation. Owing, moreover, to difficulties arising out of the distances involved, the excessively complicated nature of the points to be elucidated, the absence of genuine sources of information, and the impossibility of a direct inquiry, he was unable to accomplish his task as speedily as we, no less than the Government of Her Britannic Majesty would have desired. Hence the delay pointed out in Lord Granville's despatch.

We have, however, already drawn attention to the fact that the cause of the delay is to be found in the serious attention which the Imperial Cabinet devoted to this affair. It would have been easy to rest content with hastily collected notions, which later would have given rise to misunderstandings. We preferred to study the question conscientiously, since it was one of giving a solid and durable basis to the political organization of Central Asia, and to the good and friendly relations, present as well as future, which the two Governments aimed at establishing between them on that basis.

At the beginning of last October, the Imperial Ministry was able to announce to Lord A. Loftus and to Your Excellency that the Councillor of State Struve, to whom these inquiries had been intrusted, had at last just arrived at St. Petersburg, and that as soon as the materials he had collected had been put into shape the result would be communicated to the Cabinet in London. It was whilst this work was going on that Lord Granville's despatch was communicated to us, informing us of the opinion which Her Britannic Majesty's Government has thought fit to form upon the points under discussion.

The Imperial Cabinet, having in view the spirit of the agreement arrived at in principle between the two Governments, none the less thinks it its duty to transmit to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty the particulars col-





lected on the spot by order of the Governor-General of Turkistan, and to lay before them most frankly the conclusions which, in its opinion, are their natural consequences.

These particulars and conclusions are contained in the letter, copy of which is inclosed, which M. l'Aide-de-camp Général de Kaufmann has just addressed to me, and in the Memorandum which forms its inclosure.

I will sum them up :

The question to be settled had two sides—

1. To ascertain the real state of possession at this moment, so far as it is possible to prove it in those countries.
2. Starting from this *status quo* as a basis, to seek for a line of demarcation to be traced, which will best answer the object of the present negotiations; that is, to remove as far as possible all cause of conflict or mutual encroachments between the neighbouring Khanates, and consequently assure, as far as can be done, the state of peace which henceforward the two Governments should respectively use all their influence to cause to be respected.

Looking at the question from these two points of view, its study led to the following conclusions :—

1. That to the north, the Amou Daria forms in fact the proper frontier of Afghanistan from its confluence with the Kouktcha, as far as the point of Khodja Saleh.

So far our data confirm the opinion of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and the frontier in question seems the more reasonable, that it can give rise to no disputes on the part of the inhabitants of the banks of the Amou Daria.

2. To the north-east, the data we have collected give the confluence of that river with the Kouktcha as the limit of the districts over which Shere Ali Khan exercises actual undisputed sovereignty. Beyond that limit, and especially with regard to Badakshan and Wakhan, it has been impossible to find any traces of such a sovereignty; on the contrary, all our information upon the subject goes to prove that these districts should be regarded as independent. In the communication from Her Britannic Majesty's Government, which was made to us in November last, it is seen that, according to the testimony of Major Montgomery, the Ameer of Cabul has "considerable authority" in Badakshan, and that the Afghans have "assisted Mahmood Shah to upset the



Emir or Chief of this country, Jehandar Shah." But these facts themselves seem to point rather to the real independence of Badakshan than to its absolute subjection to the Ameer of Cabul. The information collected by M. Struve, and contained in his memorandum, supports this conclusion. Mention is made, it is true, of interference by the Afghan Ameer in the internal disputes of Badakshan, and of attempts on his part to get his assistance paid for by a kind of tribute; but nowhere are the signs to be found which in Asia accompany the exercise of the rights of sovereignty, for instance, the presence in the country of Afghan officers and of officials to collect the taxes. The Chiefs of Badakshan looked upon themselves, and were looked upon by their neighbours, as independent Chiefs.

It follows that from these facts at the most it may be granted that the Ameer of Cabul has on various occasions attempted to bring Badakshan under his dominion; that he has several times profited by internal discord to exercise over the country considerable control, based on his position as a neighbour and the superiority of his forces, but that it is impossible to deduce from them the existence of a real and uncontested sovereign power.

As to Wakhan, that country seems to have remained up to the present moment even more outside the circle of the direct action of the Chiefs of Afghanistan.

3. We have next to inquire whether or not, in this state of things, and in view of our common object, that is, the establishment in those regions of a permanent place guaranteed by both Governments, it is well to recognize the rights claimed by the Ameer of Cabul over Badakshan and Wakhan, and to comprise these two countries within the territorial limits of Afghanistan. Such is not the opinion of M. l'Aide-de-camp Général Kaufmann, and the Imperial Cabinet arrives at the same conclusions.

In the present state of things there is no dispute between Badakshan and her neighbours. Bokhara puts forward no claim to that country. The two States are, besides, too weak, too absorbed in their own affairs, to wish to quarrel. England and Russia would consequently have nothing to do but to maintain this state of peace as well between these Khanates as between Afghanistan and Badakshan; and this task would not seem beyond their power. Far otherwise would it be the day that the Ameer of Cabul should extend



his authority over Badakshan and Wakhan. He would find himself in immediate contact with Kashgar, Kokand, and Bokhara, from which he is now separated by those two countries. From that moment it would be far more difficult to avoid contests due either to his ambition and consciousness of power, or to the jealousy of his neighbours. This would give a most precarious basis to the peace which it is sought to establish in those countries, and compromise the two Governments who would be called upon to guarantee it. This arrangement would consequently seem to us to go directly counter to the object which they have in common. It would appear to us much more in keeping with that object to allow the present state of things to continue. Badakshan and Wakhan would thus form a barrier interposed between the Northern and Southern States of Central Asia; and this barrier, strengthened by the combined action which England and Russia are able to bring to bear upon such of those States as are accessible to their influence, would effectually prevent any dangerous contact, and would in our opinion secure, as far as anything could do so, the peace of those countries.

4. As for the boundaries to be recognised as those of Afghanistan on the North-West, starting from Khodja-Saleh, the information we have received equally throws doubts upon the *de facto* possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchi, Seripool, Meimané, Chibirgan, and Andkhoy, which it is a question of comprising within the acknowledged boundaries of Afghanistan.

These districts, however, being divided from Bokhara by deserts, would not, if annexed to the Afghan territory, offer the same dangers of contact that we have pointed out on the north-east; and their annexation would not consequently be open to the same objections.

If the Government of Her Britannic Majesty adheres to its opinion of the expediency of comprising these places in the limits of the Afghan territory, we will not insist upon the principle from which we started, namely, that no districts should be acknowledged as part of Afghanistan, but such as had been under the rule of Dost Mahomed Khan, and were at this moment in actual subjection to Shere Ali Khan. In deference to the wish of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, the Imperial Cabinet would be disposed, as far as this portion of the boundary is concerned, to accept the line



laid down in Lord Granville's despatch. Such, M. le Comte, are briefly the conclusions which we think the materials in our hands justify us in forming.

Be so good as to lay them before the Chief Secretary of State of Her Britannic Majesty. Our intention, in communicating them to His Excellency, is not only to fulfil our promise. We believe that in attempting the rational solution of a question which interests the two Governments equally, we are best carrying out the purpose which has animated both ever since their first friendly interchange of ideas.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

(Traduit du Russe.)

St. Pétersbourg, le 29 Novembre, 1872.

GENERAL KAUFMANN to PRINCE GORTCHAKOW.

J'AI l'honneur de soumettre ci-près à votre Altesse un mémoire sur la question de la frontière septentrionale de l'Afghanistan. Ce mémoire a été élaboré sur la base des quelques données et matériaux que j'ai réussi à réunir, dans le courant des deux dernières années, au sujet de la situation des affaires sur la frontière de l'Afghanistan et du Boukhara et sur les Etats indépendants du cours supérieur de l'Amou-Daria.

Ces données, je l'avoue, sont loin d'être complètes.

L'investigation ou l'observation personnelle, exercée sur les lieux mêmes, est en Asie Centrale l'unique moyen d'obtenir des éclaircissements sur une question quelconque, soit de politique, soit de géographie. Je n'ai pas, jusqu'ici, eu recours à ce moyen. L'envoi d'un employé Russe dans ces contrées, fût-ce même sous prétexte d'une mission scientifique, aurait pu jeter l'alarme dans l'Afghanistan et aurait éveillé des soupçons et des appréhensions de la part du Gouvernement des Indes. J'ai dû éviter tout ce qui aurait pu nuire, en quoi que ce fût, l'état satisfaisant de nos relations établies à la suite de l'échange d'idées amical et sincère qui a eu lieu entre le Gouvernement Impérial et celui de Sa Majesté Britannique.

J'ai déjà eu l'honneur de communiquer à votre Altesse mon opinion sur une des causes de la fermentation des esprits dans les Khanats de l'Asie Centrale limitrophes et voisins de la Russie. C'est que tous nos voisins, et particulièrement les Afghans, sont pénétrés de la conviction qu'entre la Russie et l'Angleterre il y a une inimitié qui, tôt ou tard, nous amènera à une rencontre avec les Anglais en Asie.

En me conformant aux intentions et aux vues du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères je me suis attaché à faire disparaître ce spectre d'un conflit, soi-disant imminent, des deux grandes Puissances. Dans mes relations avec le Kokand et le Boukhara, et surtout dans mes lettres à Shir Ali Khan, j'ai toujours parlé de la conformité de vues et de l'amitié qui existe entre nous et l'Angleterre, et je me suis attaché à démontrer que ces deux Puissances, la Russie comme l'Angleterre, sont également soucieuses de la tranquillité des contrées et des populations qui se trouvent dans le rayon de leur influence et de leur protection. Voilà la raison qui, jusqu'ici, m'a déterminé à ne pas envoyer sur les lieux des employés dans le but d'obtenir des éclaircissements sur les questions qui m'étaient posées par le Ministère Impérial.

Cette situation est tout aussi avantageuse pour nous que pour l'Angleterre. Mais elle peut changer du moment où l'on garantirait à Shir Ali Khan ses possessions dans les limites proposées actuellement par Lord Granville dans sa dépêche à Lord A. Loftus, en date du ⁵/₇ Octobre dernier. Une pareille garantie lui donnerait un prestige considérable, et il tâcherait immédiatement de s'emparer *de facto* des territoires qui lui auraient été ainsi concédés. Avant tout, son attention se tournerait du côté du Badakchan et du Vakhan, butin le plus facile et le plus abordable. Par l'acquisition de ces deux territoires il prolongerait sa ligne de contact avec le Boukhara, et il se trouverait côté-à-côté avec le Karatéguine, d'où le Kokand est à portée de main. Enfin, il toucherait, sur ses confins nord-est, aux possessions de Yakoub Bek. Voilà un chemin qui mène tout droit à une collision avec la Russie.

Si le Gouvernement Britannique est en effet animé du même désir que nous de maintenir la paix et la tranquillité intérieures dans les Khanats qui nous séparent des possessions Anglaises dans l'Inde ; si les Anglais veulent ajouter foi à nos sincères protestations que nous ne songeons même

pas à entreprendre quoi que ce soit d'hostile contre leurs possessions de l'Inde, le simple bon sens devra leur suggérer la nécessité de reconnaître l'indépendance du Badakchan et du Vakhán, tant par rapport à l'Emir de Caboul que par rapport à celui du Boukhara.

(Translated from the Russian.)

St. Petersburg, November 29th, 1872.

GENERAL KAUFFMANN to PRINCE GORTCHAKOW.

I HAVE the honor to submit to Your Highness herewith a Memorandum on the question of the northern frontier of Afghanistan. This Memorandum has been compiled on the basis of such data and materials as I have succeeded in collecting in the course of the last two years, on the subject of the state of affairs on the frontier of Afghanistan and Bokhara, and the independent States on the upper course of the Amou-Daria.

I confess that these data are far from being complete.

Personal investigation and observation, exercised on the very spot, are in Central Asia the only means of obtaining enlightenment on any question whatever, political or geographical. I have not as yet had recourse to these means. To have sent a Russian official into these countries, even on the pretext of a scientific mission, might have created a panic in Afghanistan, and would have awakened suspicions and apprehensions on the part of the Government of India. It was my duty to avoid anything that might in any way have disturbed the satisfactory state of our relations as established by the friendly and sincere exchange of ideas which has taken place between the Imperial Government and that of Her Britannic Majesty.

I have already had the honor of communicating to Your Highness my opinion as to one of the causes of the excited state of public feeling existing in the Khanates of Central Asia bordering on Russia. That is, that all our neighbours, and particularly the Afghans, are filled with the conviction that there exists between Russia and England an enmity which, sooner or later, will lead us into a conflict with the English in Asia.



In conformity with the intentions and views of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, I have applied myself to dispel this bugbear of an impending conflict between the two great Powers. In my relations with Kokand or Bokhara, and, above all, in my letters to Shere Ali Khan, I have always spoken of the similarity of views and of the friendship existing between ourselves and England, and I have applied myself to the task of demonstrating that these two Powers, Russia as well as England, are equally solicitous for the tranquillity of the countries and peoples which lie within the radius of their influence and protection. It is this reason which, up to the present time, has determined me not to send officers into those parts with the object of obtaining information respecting the questions put to me by the Imperial Government.

This state of things is quite as advantageous for us as for England. But it is liable to change should once the possessions of Shere Ali Khan be guaranteed to him within the boundaries proposed at the present moment by Lord Granville in his despatch to Lord A. Loftus of the 17th of October last. Such a guarantee would give him a considerable prestige, and he would immediately attempt to seize, *de facto*, the territories thus conceded to him. First of all he would turn his attention towards Badakshan and Wakhan as the easiest and most attainable booty. By the acquisition of these two territories he would prolong his line of contact with Bokhara, and would find himself side by side with Karateguina, whence Kokand is within easy reach. Finally, his north-western boundary would touch the possessions of Yakoub Bek. Here is a road which would lead him straight into collision with Russia.

If the English Government is really animated by the same wish as ourselves to maintain internal peace and tranquillity in the Khanates which separate us from the British possessions in India; if England will give credit to our sincere protestations that we are not dreaming of any hostile enterprize whatever against her Indian possessions, common sense ought to suggest to her the necessity of recognising the independence of Badakshan and Wakhan, equally in the interests of the Ameers of Cabul and of Bokhara.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

(Traduit du Russe.)

MEMORANDUM.

DANS le sens rigoureux du mot, les possessions de l'Emir Shir Ali Khan ne s'étendent à l'est que jusqu'au méridien du point de jonction de la rivière Koukteha avec l'Amou-Daria. Cette ligne sépare le Badakchan et le Vakhan de la province de Koundouz, qui fait incontestablement partie des domaines de Shir Ali Khan. Elle a été annexée à l'Afghanistan il y a une vingtaine d'années par le fils de Dost Mohammed, Mohammed Afzal Khan, qui était à cette époque gouverneur de Balkh. Afzal Khan, comme nous l'apprend une communication Anglaise, a fait une tentative infructueuse de s'emparer de Badakchan, qui a eu cependant pour conséquence que le Mir de Badakchan, pour assurer la sécurité de son domaine, s'est engagé à payer à Dost Mohammed Khan une contribution annuelle de deux roupies par feu et à lui livrer les gisements de rubis et de lapis-lazuli situés dans ses Etats. Cependant, cet engagement ne fut point rempli; la mort de Dost Mohammed suggéra aux chefs du Badakchan, peu désireux de se soumettre au Caboul, l'idée de rechercher la protection de Boukhara. L'Emir Seïd Mouzaffar déclina cependant toute immixtion dans les affaires du Badakchan, non point qu'il considérait ce pays comme une dépendance de l'Afghanistan, mais par la raison qu'à cette époque il suivait avec anxiété les progrès de nos armes dans l'Asie Centrale et se préparait à marcher contre le Kokand.

Djandar Shah, qui gouvernait à cette époque le Badakchan, était un souverain complètement indépendant et tous ses voisins le reconnaissaient comme tel. Il s'était mis en rapports d'amitié avec Mohammed Afzal Khan, et avec Abdourrahman Khan son fils, et ne leur payait aucune redevance. Lorsque Shir Ali Khan, victorieux d'Abdourrahman Khan, eût occupé Caboul et Balkh et se fut rendu maître de tout l'Afghanistan, il envoya une ambassade à Djandar Shah, en l'invitant à confirmer les engagements qu'il avait contractés autrefois. Djandar Shah répondit par un refus. Alors Mahmoud Shah, son neveu, secondé par les troupes Afghanes, renversa son oncle, se constitua maître de Faïzabad, ville principale du Badakchan, tandis que son frère cadet Mizrab Shah s'emparait de Tehaiab, chef-lieu de la province de Roustakh. Aujourd'hui les deux frères

paient à Shir Ali Khan, comme par reconnaissance de la co-opération qu'il leur avait accordée, une contribution annuelle de 15,000 roupies (9,000 roubles). Toutefois à l'exception d'un très petit nombre d'aventuriers Afghans, on ne rencontre dans le Badakchan ni employés ni troupes de l'Emir de Caboul, et le peuple lui-même déteste les Afghans.

Ces notions, fournies par Abdourrahman Khan et recueillies en partie de la bouche des envoyés du Serdar de Balkh qui vinrent à Tachkend, se trouvent confirmés par le récit d'Alif Bek, ex-gouverneur de Sarikoul (province du Kachgar, limitrophe du Vakhan), qui se présenta à Tachkend au mois d'Août de cette année. Il a ajouté que Djandar Shah, le maître légitime du Badakchan, qui s'était réfugié d'abord à Boukhara, était retourné dans la suite, par Samarkand et Kokand, à Chougnan.

Un semblable état de choses dans le Badakchan démontre en toute évidence que l'Emir Shir Ali Khan ne saurait prétendre à la possession du Badakchan, comme à un héritage qui lui aurait été légué par Dost Mohammed Khan, et que son autorité ne s'est pas encore établie à Badakchan; Mahmoud Shah et Mizrab Shah, les maîtres actuels du Badakchan, ne se considèrent point comme Beks de l'Emir de Caboul, et s'ils lui paient une redevance c'est dans l'intérêt de leur propre sécurité et pour se mettre à l'abri des coups de mains des brigands de Koundouz. De plus, ils ont encore à redouter leur oncle Djandar Shah.

Rien ne porte à croire que la position des affaires à Badakchan puisse changer dans un proche avenir en faveur de Shir Ali Khan, et il est certain que l'état actuel des choses dans cette contrée répond, à peu de choses près, aux vues que nous poursuivons dans l'Asie Centrale de commun accord et après une entente préalable et volontaire avec l'Angleterre. Rien ne présage non plus la possibilité d'une collision entre l'Afghanistan et le Boukhara du côté du Badakchan; l'Emir Seïd Mouzaffar n'élève point de prétentions à la possession de ce pays. De même Shir Ali Khan, qui maintient à grand-peine un semblant d'autorité à Badakchan, n'est point en mesure aujourd'hui d'exercer une influence quelconque sur les affaires de Kouliab et de Hissar, les villes de Boukhara les plus proches de Badakchan. La reconnaissance officielle par la Russie et par l'Angleterre des droits de Shir Ali Khan sur ce pays porterait aussitôt ce souverain à employer tous ses efforts pour se fixer à Faizabad et dans le Roustakh, et du moment où il y parviendrait, une



collision s'ensuivrait inmanquablement entre l'Afghanistan et le Boukhara. Il suffira de citer à l'appui de cette prévision que l'ancien Bek de Hissar, qui s'était révolté contre l'Emir Seïd Mouzaffar en 1869 et qui en 1870 s'est réfugié dans l'Afghanistan, a déjà fait des tentatives pour rentrer en possession de sa province avec l'aide des Afghans, auxquels il promettait l'entière soumission à l'Emir de Caboul de toute la province de Hissar et de Kouliab. Si cette combinaison n'a pas été mise à exécution, il faut l'attribuer à ce que l'autorité de Shir Ali Khan était nulle dans le Badakchan, et que l'Emir ne disposait dans cet état d'aucun moyen d'agression.

A l'est du Badakchan, dans le bassin supérieur de l'Amou-Daria, se trouve une contrée peu connue, nommée, Vakhan. Ce pays, que l'on désigne parfois sous le nom de Daria-pendj (les cinq fleuves), à cause des cinq principaux confluent donnant naissance à l'Amou-Daria, avoisine au nord le Pamir, qui le sépare du Karatéguine; à l'est il confine avec Sarikoul, qui fait partie des états de Yakoub Bek; au sud il est séparé du Tchitrar (pays complètement indépendant du Caboul) par les montagnes de Nouk-San, qui sont la prolongation orientale du Hindukusch.

Le Vakhan est administré par un chef spécial, mais la pauvreté des habitants et la stérilité du sol de cette région montagnaise l'ont placée sous la dépendance du Badakchan, dont les Beks s'abstiennent, cependant, de se mêler de ses affaires intérieures. Une fois par an le chef du Vakhan fait parvenir aux Beks du Badakchan une certaine somme d'argent; mais il n'existe aucun rapport direct entre ce pays et l'Afghanistan.

Une route reliant Koundouz avec Sarikoul, Yarkend et Kaschgar traverse le Badakchan et le Vakhan. D'après certains renseignements qui sont en notre possession, cette route est plus longue que la route directe de Peschawer à Yarkend, suivie par Mr. Shaw.

Quant à l'Amou-Daria, ce fleuve sert de ligne de démarcation entre l'Afghanistan et le Boukhara sur une étendue approximative de 300 verstes, depuis l'embouchure de la Koukcha à l'est, jusqu'au point où les deux rives du fleuve deviennent Boukhares, et notamment jusqu'au passage de Tchouekha-Gouzar, situé vis-à-vis du village Boukhare Khodja-Saleh qui se trouve sur la droite du fleuve.

Enfin, pour ce qui est de la limite nord-ouest de l'Afghanistan, bien qu'il existe des doutes quant au fait de la



possession par l'Emir de Caboul des villes d'Aktehou, Sarypoul, Maïmané, Chibirgan et Ankhoï, situées à l'ouest de Balkh, on pourrait prendre en considération que toute cette région est isolée des Etats de Boukhara par un désert peu praticable et même en partie par des sables, et que dès lors, de ce côté, une collision immédiate entre l'Afghanistan et le Boukhara serait moins à craindre.

(Translated from the Russian.)

IN the strict sense of the word, the possessions of the Ameer Shere Ali Khan only extend eastward as far as the meridian of the point of junction of the river Koukcha with the Amu-Daria. This line separates Badakshan and Wakhan from the province of Kunduz, which incontestibly forms part of the dominions of Shere Ali Khan. It was annexed to Afghanistan about twenty years ago by Mohammed Afzal Khan, son of Dost Mohammed, who was at that time Governor of Balkh. Afzal Khan, as we learn from an English communication, made a fruitless attempt to seize Badakshan, the consequence of which, however, was that the Meer of Badakshan, in order to secure the safety of his dominions, engaged to pay to Dost Mohammed Khan an annual tribute of two rupees for every house, and to deliver up to him the mines of rubies and lapis-lazuli situated in his territory. This engagement, however, was not fulfilled; the death of Dost Mohammed Khan suggested to the chiefs of Badakshan, who little wished to become subservient to Cabul, the idea of seeking the protection of Bokhara. But the Ameer Seid Mouzaffar totally declined to interfere in the affairs of Badakshan, not because he looked upon this country as a dependency of Afghanistan, but because at that time he was anxiously watching the progress of our arms in Central Asia and was preparing to march against Kokand.

Djandar Shah, who was then ruler of Badakshan, was an entirely independent sovereign, and recognized as such by all his neighbours. He had entered into friendly relations with Mohammed Afzal Khan and his son Abdourrahman Khan, to whom he paid no tribute. When Shere Ali Khan, having defeated Abdourrahman Khan, had occupied Cabul and Balkh, and made himself master of all Afghanistan, he

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sent an Embassy to Djandar Shah, calling upon him to fulfil the engagements which he had formerly contracted. Djandar Shah answered by a refusal. Thereupon Mohammed Shah, his nephew, supported by the Afghan troops, overthrew his uncle and made himself master of Faizabad, the capital of Badakshan; whilst his younger brother, Mizrab Shah, seized Tehaiab, the chief town of the province of Roustakh. The two brothers now pay to the Shere Ali Khan, in recognition of the co-operation which he granted them, an annual tribute of 15,000 rupees (9,000 roubles). With the exception, however, of a very small number of Afghan adventurers, one meets in Badakshan with neither officials nor troops of the Ameer of Cabul, and his people themselves detest the Afghans.

This intelligence, furnished by Abdourrahman Khan, and gathered partly from the lips of envoys of the Sirdar of Balkh, who came to Tashkend, is confirmed by the statement of Alif Bek, ex-Governor of Sarikoul (a province of Kashgar bordering on Wakhan), who presented himself at Tashkend in the month of August of the present year. He added that Djandar Shah, the legitimate ruler of Badakshan, who first of all fled to Bokhara, had afterwards returned by Samarkand and Kokand to Chougnan.

Such a state of things existing in Badakshan clearly shows that Shere Ali Khan could have no pretension to the possession of Badakshan as an inheritance bequeathed to him by Dost Mohammed Khan, and that his authority is not yet established in Badakshan; Mohammed Shah and Mizoul Shah, the actual Rulers of Badakshan, do not consider themselves as Beks of the Ameer of Cabul, and if they pay him tribute it is only in the interest of their own security and in order to shelter themselves from the sudden attacks of the brigands of Kunduz. Moreover, they have still to fear their uncle, Djandar Shah. There is nothing to favour the belief that the state of affairs in Badakshan is likely to change soon in favor of Shere Ali Khan, and it is certain that the present state of things in that country is in accordance, or nearly so, with the objects we have in view in Central Asia in common, and after a previous and voluntary understanding with England. Nor does anything point to the possibility of a collision between Afghanistan and Bokhara on the side of Badakshan; the Ameer Seid Mouzaffar has put forward no pretension to the possession of that country. In the same way Shere Ali Khan, who with difficulty keeps up a show of authority at Badakshan, is not in a posi-



tion at this moment to exercise any influence over Kouliab and Hissar, the towns of Bokhara which lie nearest to Badakshan. The official recognition by Russia and England of the rights of Shere Ali Khan over this country would at once lead that sovereign to make every effort to establish himself at Faizabad and in the district of Roustakh, and should he once succeed, a collision between Bokhara and Afghanistan would become inevitable. In support of this view it will suffice to state that the former Bek of Hissar, who in 1870 took refuge in Afghanistan, after his revolt against the Emir Seid Mouzaffar in 1869, has already made attempts to recover his province, with the assistance of the Afghans, to whom he promised the entire subjection to the Ameer of Cabul of the whole of the Province of Hissar and Kouliab. That this plan has not been carried out must be attributed to the fact that the authority of Shere Ali Khan in Bakakshan was null, and that the Ameer had no means of aggression at his disposal in that State.

To the east of Badakshan, in the upper basin of the Amu-Daria, lies a country little known, named Wakhan. This country, sometimes called Daria-pendj (the five rivers), on account of the five principal tributaries which give rise to the Amu-Daria, to the north borders on the Pamir Steppe, which separates it from Karatéguine; to the east it marches with Sarikoul, which belongs to the States under Yakoub Bek; to the south it is separated from Tebitrar (a country completely independent of Cabul) by the mountains of Nouk-San, the eastern prolongation of the Hindoo-Koosh. Wakhan is administered by a Chief of its own, but the poverty of its inhabitants and the barrenness of the soil of this mountainous district have brought it into dependence upon Badakshan, the Beks of which do not, however, meddle with its domestic affairs. Once a year the Chief of Wakhan sends a certain sum of money to the Beks of Badakshan; but there are no direct relations between this country and Afghanistan.

A road passes through Badakshan and Wakhan, connecting Kunduz with Sarikoul, Yarkand, and Kashgar. According to certain information in our possession, this road is longer than the direct road from Peshawur to Yarkand taken by Mr. Shaw.

As to the Amu-Daria, this river serves as a boundary line between Afghanistan and Bokhara for a distance of



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about 300 versts, from the confluence of the Kouktscha on the east up to the point where both banks belong to Bokhara, and especially as far as the pass of Tchouekha-Gouzar, opposite the Bokharan village Khodja-Saleh, which is on the right bank of the river.

To sum up, as far as regards the north-west boundary of Afghanistan, although there are doubts as to the actual possession by the Ameer of Cabul of the towns of Aktchou, Seripool, Maimane, Chibirgan, and Andkhoi, lying to the west of Balkh, it may be taken into consideration that all this region is isolated from the States of Bokhara by an almost impassable desert, and in part even by the sands, and that consequently, on that side there would be less fear of any immediate collision between Afghanistan and Bokhara.

No. 3.

Foreign Office, January 8th, 1873.

EARL GRANVILLE to LORD A. LOFTUS.

HAVING received information from Your Excellency and from Count Brunnow that Count Schouvalow, a statesman enjoying the full confidence of the Emperor of Russia, had left St. Petersburg for London at the desire of His Imperial Majesty, I had the pleasure of receiving his Excellency on the 8th instant.

He confirmed the fact that it was by the Emperor's desire that he had sought a personal interview with me. It had caused great surprise to His Imperial Majesty to learn from various sources that a certain amount of excitement and susceptibility had been caused in the public mind of this country on account of questions connected with Central Asia.

The Emperor knew of no questions in Central Asia which could affect the good understanding between the two countries. It was true that no agreement has been come to as to some of the details of the arrangement concluded by Lord Clarendon and Prince Gortchakow on the basis of Mr. Forsyth's recommendations as to the boundaries of Afghanistan; but the question ought not to be a cause to ruffle the good relations between the two countries. His Imperial Majesty had agreed to almost everything that we had asked.



There remained only the point regarding the provinces of Badakshan and Wakhan. There might be arguments used respectively by the Departments of each Government, but the Emperor was of opinion that such a question should not be a cause of difference between the two countries, and His Imperial Majesty was determined that it should not be so. He was the more inclined to carry out this determination in consequence of His Majesty's belief in the conciliatory policy of Her Majesty's Government.

Count Schouvalow added, on his own part, that he had every reason to believe, if it were desired by Her Majesty's Government, the agreement might be arrived at at a very early period.

With regard to the expedition to Khiva, it was true that it was decided upon for next spring. To give an idea of its character it was sufficient to say that it would consist of four and a half battalions. Its object was to punish acts of brigandage, to recover fifty Russian prisoners, and to teach the Khan that such conduct on his part could not be continued with the impunity in which the moderation of Russia had led him to believe. Not only was it far from the intention of the Emperor to take possession of Khiva, but positive orders had been prepared to prevent it, and directions given that the conditions imposed should be such as could not in any way lead to a prolonged occupancy of Khiva.

Count Schouvalow repeated the surprise which the Emperor, entertaining such sentiments, felt at the uneasiness which it was said existed in England on the subject, and he gave me most decided assurance that I might give positive assurances to Parliament on this matter.

With regard to the uneasiness which might exist in England on the subject of Central Asia, I could not deny the fact to Count Schouvalow; the people of this country were decidedly in favour of peace, but a great jealousy existed as to anything which really affected our honor and interest; that they were particularly alive to anything affecting India; that the progress of Russia in Asia had been considerable, and sometimes as it would appear, like England in India and France in Algeria, more so than was desired by the Central Governments; that the Clarendon and Gortchakow arrangement, apparently agreeable to both Governments, had met with great delay as to its final settlement; that it was with the object of coming to a settlement satisfactory



to both countries, and in a friendly and conciliatory spirit, that I had addressed to Your Excellency the despatch of the 17th October.

The only point of difference which now remained, as Count Schouvalow had pointed out, concerned Badakshan and Wakhan. In our opinion, historical facts proved that these countries were under the domination of the Sovereign of Cabul, and we have acknowledged as much in public documents; that, with regard to the expedition to Khiva, Count Schouvalow was aware that Lord Northbrook had given the strongest advice to the Khan to comply with the reasonable demands of the Emperor, and if the expedition were undertaken and carried out with the object and within the limits described by Count Schouvalow, it would meet with no remonstrance from Her Majesty's Government, but it would undoubtedly excite public attention, and make the settlement of the boundary of Afghanistan more important for the object which both Governments had in view, *viz.*, peace in Central Asia and good relations between the two countries.

As to coming to a decision at an early date, it appeared to me desirable, inasmuch as it would bear a different aspect if arrived at in the spirit with which both Governments were actuated, and not complicated by possible discussions raised in the British Parliament.

I concluded by telling Count Schouvalow that I knew the confidence which was placed in him by the Emperor, and that I felt sure that my colleagues would agree with me in appreciating his visit to England, as a gratifying proof of the eminently conciliatory and friendly spirit with which the Emperor desired to settle without delay the question at issue.

No. 4.

Foreign Office, January 24th, 1873.

EARL GRANVILLE to LORD A. LOFTUS.

HER Majesty's Government have attentively considered the statements and arguments contained in Prince Gortchakow's despatch of the 17th December, and the papers that accompanied it, which were communicated to me by the Russian Ambassador on the 17th December, and to Your Excellency by Prince Gortchakow on the 29th of that month.

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Her Majesty's Government gladly recognize, in the frank and friendly terms of that despatch, the same spirit of friendliness as that in which, by my despatch of the 17th of October, I desired to convey through Your Excellency to the Russian Government the views of that of Her Majesty in regard to the line of boundary claimed by Shere Ali, the Ruler of Cabul, for his possessions of Afghanistan.

Her Majesty's Government see with much satisfaction that, as regards the principal part of that line, the Imperial Government is willing to acquiesce in the claim of Shere Ali, and they rely on the friendly feelings of the Emperor when they lay before him, as I now instruct Your Excellency to do, a renewed statement of the grounds on which they consider that Shere Ali's claim to the remainder of the line of boundary referred to in my despatch of the 17th of October, to be well-founded.

The objections stated in Prince Gortchakow's despatch apply to that part of Shere Ali's claims which would comprise the province of Badakshan with its dependent district of Wakhan within the Afghan State. The Imperial Government contend that the province of Badakshan with its dependency, not having been formally incorporated into the territories of Shere Ali, is not legitimately any portion of the Afghan State.

To this Her Majesty's Government reply that the Ameer of Cabul having attained by conquest the sovereignty over Badakshan, and having received in the most formal manner the submission of the chiefs and people of that province, had the right to impose upon it such a form of Government as he might think best adapted to the position of affairs at the time. In the exercise of this right he appointed a Local Governor, and he consented experimentally to receive a fixed portion of the revenues of the country, instead of taking upon himself its general financial and other administration. But the Ameer expressly reserved to himself the right of reconsidering this arrangement, which was, in the first instance, made only for one year, of at any time subjecting Badakshan to the direct Government of Cabul, and of amalgamating the revenues thereof with the general revenue of the Afghan State. Her Majesty's Government cannot perceive anything in these circumstances calculated to weaken the claims of Shere Ali to the absolute sovereignty of Badakshan. The conquest and submission of the province were complete; and



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it cannot reasonably be urged that any experimental form of administration which the Ameer, with the acknowledged right of sovereignty, might think fit to impose on Badakshan, could possibly disconnect the province from the general territories south of the Oxus, the sovereignty of which the Russian Government has without hesitation recognized to be vested in the Ameer of Cabul.

Her Majesty's Government have not failed to notice in portions of the statements of the Russian Government to which I am now replying, that its objection to admitting Badakshan and Wakhan to be under the sovereignty of Shere Ali is rested in part on an expressed apprehension lest their incorporation with the remainder of Afghanistan should tend to disturb the peace of Central Asia, and specifically should operate as an encouragement to the Ameer to extend his possessions at the expense of the neighbouring countries. I alluded, in my despatch of the 17th of October, to the success which had attended the recommendations made to the Ameer by the Indian Government to adopt the policy which had produced the most beneficial results in the establishment of peace in countries where it had long been unknown; and Her Majesty's Government see no reason to suppose that similar results would not follow on the like recommendations. Her Majesty's Government will not fail to impress upon the Ameer in the strongest terms the advantages which are given to him in the recognition by Great Britain and Russia of the boundaries which he claims, and of the consequent obligation upon him to abstain from any aggression on his part, and Her Majesty's Government will continue to exercise their influence in the same direction.

Her Majesty's Government cannot however but feel that if Badakshan and Wakhan, which they consider the Ameer justly to deem to be part of his territories, be assumed by England or Russia, or by one or either of them, to be wholly independent of his authority, the Ameer might be tempted to assert his claims by arms; that perhaps in that case Bokhara might seek an opportunity of acquiring districts too weak of themselves to resist the Afghan State; and that thus the peace of Central Asia would be disturbed, and occasion given for questions between Great Britain and Russia, which it is on every account so desirable to avoid, and which Her Majesty's Government feel sure would be as distasteful to the Imperial Government as to themselves.



Her Majesty's Government therefore hope that the Imperial Government, weighing these considerations dispassionately, will concur in the recognition which they have made of Shere Ali's rights, as stated in my despatch of October, and by so doing put an end to the wild speculations, so calculated to distract the minds of Asiatic races, that there is some marked disagreement between England and Russia, on which they may build hopes of carrying out their border feuds for purposes of self-aggrandizement.

Her Majesty's Government congratulate themselves on the prospect of a definite settlement as between the two Governments of the question of the boundaries of Afghanistan, the details of which have been so long in discussion.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Prince Gortchakow.

No. 5.

St. Pétersbourg, le 1^{er} Janvier 1873.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW to COUNT BRUNNOW.—(Communicated to EARL GRANVILLE by COUNT BRUNNOW, February 5th.)

LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS m'a communiqué la réponse du Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique à notre dépêche sur l'Asie Centrale, sous la date du 1^{er} Décembre.

Je joins ci-près une copie de cette pièce.

Nous voyons avec satisfaction que le Cabinet Anglais continue à poursuivre, dans ces parages, le même but que nous, celui d'y assurer la paix et autant que possible la tranquillité.

La divergence de nos vues consistait dans les frontières assignées aux domaines de Shir Ali.

Le Cabinet Anglais y fait entrer le Badakshan et le Vakhán, qui, à nos yeux, jouissaient d'une certaine indépendance. Vu la difficulté de constater, dans toutes ses nuances, la réalité dans ces parages lointains, vu le plus de facilité qu'a le Gouvernement Britannique de recueillir des données précises, et surtout vu le désir de ne point donner à cette question de détail plus d'importance qu'elle ne comporte, nous ne refusons pas d'admettre la ligne de démarcation Anglaise.



Nous sommes d'autant plus portés à cet acte de courtoisie que le Gouvernement Anglais s'engage à user de toute son influence sur Shir Ali pour le maintenir dans une attitude pacifique et insister sur l'abandon de sa part de toute agression ou conquête ultérieure. Cette influence est incontestable. Elle repose non seulement sur l'ascendant matériel et moral de l'Angleterre, mais aussi sur les subsides dont Shir Ali lui a l'obligation. Nous pouvons, dès lors, y voir une garantie réelle pour la conservation de la paix.

Votre Excellence voudra bien faire cette déclaration à M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique et lui remettre une copie de cette dépêche.

Lord Granville y verra, nous en sommes convaincus, une nouvelle preuve du prix que notre auguste Maître attache à entretenir et à consolider les meilleures relations avec le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine Victoria.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, January $\frac{12}{31}$, 1873.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOW to COUNT BRUNNOW.

LORD AUGUSTUS LOFTUS has communicated to me the reply of Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State to our despatch on Central Asia of the 19th of December.

I enclose a copy of this document.

We see with satisfaction that the English Cabinet continues to pursue in those parts the same object as ourselves, that of ensuring to them peace, and, as far as possible, tranquillity.

The divergence which existed in our views was with regard to the frontiers assigned to the dominions of Shore Ali.

The English Cabinet includes within them Badakshan and Wakhan, which, according to our views, enjoyed a certain independence. Considering the difficulty experienced in establishing the facts in all their details in those distant parts, considering the greater facilities which the British Government possesses for collecting precise data, and, above all, considering our wish not to give to this question of detail greater importance than is due to it, we do not refuse to accept the line of boundary laid down by England.



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We are the more inclined to this act of courtesy as the English Government engages to use all her influence with Shere Ali, in order to induce him to maintain a peaceful attitude, as well as to insist on his giving up all measures of aggression or further conquest. This influence is indisputable. It is based not only on the material and moral ascendancy of England, but also on the subsidies for which Shere Ali is indebted to her. Such being the case, we see in this assurance a real guarantee for the maintenance of peace.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to make this declaration to Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, and to give him a copy of this despatch.

We are convinced that Lord Granville will perceive in it a fresh proof of the value which our august Master attaches to the maintenance and consolidation of the most friendly relations with the Government of Her Majesty Queen Victoria.

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