

tained it by courage and exploit. We established over the Asiatics an ascendancy founded on superior energy and skill in every mental and bodily exertion.

Whether it be for the interest of England, every circumstance considered, to retain her Indian possessions, is a question too intricate and important for me to determine; but it appears an irrefragable truth, that if we are to exist at all in India, it must be in the character of a great, warlike and territorial power—a power at all times able to exalt our allies, and to depress our enemies. We may farther venture to assert, that if any other system be adopted, it will in fact prove an absolute surrender of that country.

The means by which it is yet conceived practicable to reform our civil and military establishments having been expressed at large in my annexed correspondence with the
Board,

Board, it is unnecessary to enumerate them at present: one thing however is indisputable, that if Government hope to preserve a shred of their Indian empire, not a moment must be lost in correcting the alarming outrages under which it labours;—in removing those causes of dissention that threaten its existence;—in reforming those abuses, civil and military, by which its strength has been wasted, and its power decayed; and in bringing every man, measure, and resource, of those distracted settlements, into one decided point of obedience, co-operation, and effect.

Could we flatter ourselves, that there is yet vigour, union, and integrity enough in the nation, to atchieve such a re-establishment, it would not be chimerical to indulge the most exalted expectations.—The intrinsic value of those possessions would then be fully known to us. We should then recognise the inestimable benefits, of which an equitable and united Government could render them produc-

tive beyond all aggregate resources in the British empire. The countries subject to our influence under any administration that did not openly cherish discord, and exult in malversation, would yield an annual revenue of 10,000,000*l.* sterling, and would increase in value with every subsequent improvement. The manufactures of those countries, if at all encouraged, would afford employment for the whole commercial stock of England. The shipping* engaged in that trade would swell into a formidable arma-

* At present the India ships are mere trading vessels, without force, discipline, or defence; and in time of war are in danger of falling a prey to every well-armed privateer. But the slightest observation must suggest, that they ought to be all constructed on the principle of two-deckers, as the Dutch India ships are, and, improving on that model, that they should be well armed, completely manned, and subject to naval officers under the articles of war. In that event, whenever they had their war complements and instructions on board, they would form a fleet superior to any probable attack. If it should ever be judged expedient to build ships of force in India, a whole navy might be constructed at Bombay, and at other places on the Malabar coast, where Teak timber abounds.

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ment for the national defence. The resources or finance of those establishments, where 1000*l.* can hardly be raised at this moment, might be fixed on to secure a basis as to support a pile of public credit, more wonderful than that of London or of Amsterdam, and enriched by a circulation more extensive than the whole exchange of Europe.

To crown the series; were it possible for us ever to be consistent, ever to be upright, ever to be trusted, or ever to be trust-worthy in the East; I may venture to assert, that the idea suggested in my annexed letter to the Board, of granting permanent support to the Gentoo interest throughout the Peninsula, in opposition to their invaders and oppressors, would unalterably attach the great mass of the inhabitants to our cause, and leaving their native Rajahs in the full interior direction of their districts, would afford us a voluntary

tary contribution more than sufficient to defray the whole ordinary and contingent charges of our Indian establishments. An efficient re-espousal of the cause and interests of the great Mogul, and of the Mussulmen who predominate north of the Peninsula, is by no means incompatible with that system, and in the present state of the northern countries, would render us the immediate Paramounts of Indostan.

Thus, my Lord, I have presumed to lay before you a sort of Mosaic tablet of our past proceedings and present state in India. The component parts are not fitted and disposed with the skill and ingenuity of a professed artist; they are only passing sketches, whose utmost effect will be produced, if they exhibit to your nice discernment, any justness of perspective or accuracy of delineation. In the whole course of my observations I have endeavoured to represent men and things in their true proportions,

portions, and to place them in their relative positions. Having freely expressed my sentiments on points of such importance to the British Empire, I should not take the liberty of submitting them to your Lordship's inspection, were I not persuaded that they convey a faithful portraiture of the subject in its real aspect; and that they tend to confute the fallacies of some former productions, which seem pencilled by a biassed hand, to mislead the national judgment, and deceive the public eye.

With every sentiment of attachment and respect, I have the honour to be, &c.

L E T T E R II.*

*To Lord MACARTNEY and the SELECT
COMMITTEE of Fort St. GEORGE.*

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

BEFORE I embark for Europe, allow me to express my best acknowledgements for the approbation with which you have distinguished me, since I have had
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* This Letter was begun in India, and it was my wish to have delivered it as a sort of *compte rendu* to the Board of Madras, before my departure from that country. Having been prevented however by unavoidable business and severe illness, from fulfilling my intention, I left a copy of it at the Cape of Good Hope, to be forwarded from thence to Fort St. George; but that copy had not reached
Madras

the honour to command the troops and garrisons south of the Coleroon.—Permit me farther to obtrude on your Lordship and the Board, a brief relation of my proceedings in the command of the southern forces, and of other incidents material to the welfare of your southern territories. Independently of an impulse to state the particulars of my conduct while entrusted with a public charge, I cannot think of leaving India, without presenting to you in one view the merits of the southern army the difficulties under which it laboured, and the services it has performed.—I flat-

ter Madras when Lord Macartney sailed from thence. Since that time I have made many alterations and additions, still preserving the form of address in which the Letter was originally written. This circumstance has betrayed me into several violations of official propriety, in explaining to the Board various incidents and local particulars, with which they were previously acquainted ; but without a detail of this nature, the work could hardly have been rendered intelligible to the generality of European readers. In its present form, a copy has been sent to the Court of Directors, that it may be forwarded to Fort St. George, in order to be entered on the records of that presidency.

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ter myself also, that the circumstances in which I acted, enable me to form an unbiased statement of resources as they exist in those southern countries, of embarrassments as they have been felt, and of transactions as they have been conducted ; affording at the same time, well-grounded hopes, that, by speedy measures of reform, what is beneficial may be improved, and what is amiss may be corrected *.

To introduce more distinctly the narrative of military proceedings that occurred during my command †, it may be necessary to solicit your attention to a detail of the misfor-

* The efforts made by Lord Macartney's government to restore the safety of the Southern Countries, were exemplary and successful ; but the confusion in which the war and other circumstances had involved those territories, rendered it impracticable to carry into immediate execution a complete and general system of reform.

† I proceeded to the Southward in October 1782, in the command of the King's troops on that station ; and in May 1783 was appointed to succeed Colonel Lang, in the general command of the forces south of the river Coleroon.

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tunes which previously to your President's arrival in India had almost entirely exhausted the resources and ruined the inhabitants of every district south of the Coleroon.—Your possessions in that quarter are of sufficient magnitude and value to call forth the most vigorous endeavours for their protection; but such was their condition when you assumed the government, that, without your opportune attentions, they must inevitably have been severed from the English dominions.

Those territories, in my opinion, had not obtained their due share of estimation under any former Government: divided into various districts, held by different tenures, and occupied by tribes at variance with each other, many parts of them remained uncultivated, and almost unexplored. Nor was it practicable for the most enlightened of your servants, to form a just appreciation of the benefits they afford,

afford, until, by the assignment of the Nabob of Arcot's revenues to the Company, you were invested with the internal management of those countries*.

From the river Coleroon, their northern boundary, which divides them from the Nabobship of Arcot, to Cape Comorin, the southern extremity of the Peninsula, is not less than 300 miles; and from the sea which forms their limits on the east, to the countries of Caroor and Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, and the Rajahship of Travancore, upon the west, is on an average at least 150 miles. Immemorial mismanagement, and late disaster, have hitherto rendered those countries unproductive; but under a system in any

* The assignment was concluded in the end of the year 1781, between Mahomed Ally and Lord Macartney's government. Previously to that arrangement, the Company's servants were not allowed to interfere in the territorial affairs of the Nabob.

degree permanent, and founded on the equitable principles that have hitherto directed the conduct of your Lordship and the Board, they would undoubtedly yield an annual revenue of 1,000,000*l.* sterling.

Of those territories, the Rajahship of Tanjore is the most fertile*;—it is watered by a multiplicity of streams, which by means of embankments and reservoirs, are diverted into every field;—it annually affords two or three luxuriant crops of rice;—the forests abound with valuable trees;—the country is overstocked with sheep and cattle;—and formerly teemed with an industrious race, who were expert in agriculture, and habituated to manufacture:—while such are the natural benefits it enjoys, that no spot upon the globe is superior in productions for the use of man.

* The following geographical remarks, which have been inserted since the Letter was originally written, would have been superfluous, if meant only for the Board.

You

You are well apprized, however, that from the establishment of the reigning family of the Maratta race in 1765* to the present period, there has been such a progressive diminution of cultivation, that the annual produce of late years is less by fifty per cent. than it was a century ago.—As Europeans never interfered in the management of that country, and as it has been seldom ravaged or invaded, its decline must be attributed to the malversation of its Maratta or Gentoo administration: but even in its impoverished state†, it used to produce, before the late war, about seventy-five lacks of cullums of rice, worth about eleven lacks of pagodas, or 440,000*l.* sterling:—of this, 160,000*l.* was paid as tribute for your protection, agreeably to the stipulation of 1776, after the last siege

* The country of Tanjore contained 5753 towns and villages at the time when the Maratta government was established.

† See the annual statement of Tanjore produce, in the Appendix.

of Tanjore, when the Rajah became a tributary of the Company.—The difficulties that occurred in reducing that capital, the strength of the works, and obstinacy of the defenders, evince its importance in a military view*:—neither do the inferior forts, and the rivers, rice fields and embankments that intersect the country, afford less eminent advantages in the moment of invasion.

The state of Tritchinopoly, extending from the western limits of Tanjore along the Coleroon, which divides it from the Carnatic on the north, till it reaches Tippoo's dominions on the west, near Caroor and Dindigul, including a range of fifty miles by forty, is circumscribed on the south by the country of Tondiman, and by the woods of Nattam inhabited by Col-

* Tanjore was supposed to contain 100,000 inhabitants previously to the destruction that followed Hyder's irruption.

leries.—Though less valuable than the country of Tanjore, the vicinity of the Coleroon still renders it extremely productive of rice. Under the Nabob Mahomed Ally's management, the expences of collection absorbed the greater part of the revenue arising from this territory, which is at present let to a renter under the assignment of the Nabob's revenues to the Company for about ten lacks of rupees, or 100,000*l*. In prosperous times, however, it possesses the means of extended cultivation, and consequent increase of revenue. The size and situation of the city, the abundance of subsistence in the district, and the long residence of the Nabob Mahomed Ally's second son the Ameer UI Omrah at that place, have rendered it the favourite establishment of the Mussulmen to the southward of the Coleroon. The two great Pagodas of Jumbakistna and Seringham, on the adjacent island of Seringham, command the veneration of Gentoos; while every spot on that

island on the opposite or northern side of the Coleroon, about Semiaveram and Volkondah, as well as on the plains of Tritchinopoly, are recorded for the bloody contests of Chunda Saheb, Astruc, Clive, and Lawrence, and mark with classical reverence the scene of those achievements. But above all, it becomes important in a political and military view, as the strongest and most advanced garrison upon your frontiers towards the territories of Mysore, and the best position for cantoning your army, in order to menace that power*.

The country of the Collieries, including the territories of Tondiman, Mellore, and Nattam, extends from the sea-coast to the confines of Madura in a range of sixty miles by sixty-five †. With the exception of
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* See my Letter to the Board, dated the 26th of April 1784.

† Tondiman is less uncultivated than his neighbours, and has at all times proved himself the most faithful adherent

some spots which have accidentally been cultivated, it is overgrown with thickets, and inhabited by savage tribes. Before that country can be rendered valuable, the woods must be cleared, the strong holds occupied, and the Colleries compelled to relinquish their predatory habits: for, in its present condition, fertile tracts are lost to cultivation, and the wild inhabitants, amounting to 30 or 40,000 men in arms under different Chiefs, are ever ready to increase the public danger in the moments of hostility.

The territory of Shevigunga, or the Little Marawa, stretches from the sea-coast on the east, to the districts of Mellore and Madura on the west, and from the country of Tondiman and the Nattam Colleries

herent of the Nabob and of the Company. The father of the present Chief, by his firmness and attachment, in the days of General Lawrence, supplied the force at Trichinopoly with provisions, at a time when their cause seemed desperate. And the Nabob, sensible of the obligation, ever afterwards exempted him from tribute.

upon the north, to the territories of the Great Marawa on the south; containing about fifty miles in length and forty in breadth. The soil in general is unfriendly to the growth of corn, though not quite destitute of running streams or artificial reservoirs; but the country is overgrown with thorns and bushes. The woods of Calicoil extend nearly forty miles in circumference. They are secured with barriers, and other defences around the fort of Calicoil, which is situated in the centre of the thickets, and considered as a refuge from exaction or invasion. These woods, and the surrounding country, abound with sheep and cattle:—the inhabitants are numerous, and can bring 12,000 fighting men into the field, armed with swords, pikes, spears, and firelocks. Though less barbarous than the Colleries their neighbours, yet arts and industry have made little progress among them. The
country

country is capable of great improvement, but at present hardly yields more than five lacks of rupees to the Rajah, who pays one lack and 75,000 rupees to the Nabob of Arcot*. The Rajah is of the Taver family, and a descendant of the sovereigns of the Great Marawa, from which Shievingunga was separated at no very distant period. At the reduction of this territory in 1773 by General Joseph Smith, the Rajah having been killed, his widow, then with child, and some of the leading people of the country, escaped into the Mysore dominions, and there lived under the protection of Hyder Ally, until the commencement of the late war. During that period, the country was managed by a renter; and, in quiet times, the people acknowledged themselves to be tributaries of the Nabob Mahomed Ally. But while their woods and barriers are suffered to remain, their disaf-

* Mahomed Ally.

section may be dreaded on the first prospect of their profiting by disturbance.

The Great Marawa, or Rajah of Ramnad, occupies a country fifty miles in length, and thirty in breadth, extending from the boundaries of Shevigunga and Mellore upon the north, to the sea upon the east and south, and to the confines of Tinivelly on the west.—Nature has been little more propitious to this principality, than to that of Shevigunga; yet arts and industry have made superior progress.—The country is well peopled, the inhabitants are civilised, and the villages full of weavers, who manufacture the cottons produced by the adjacent lands. The city of Ramnad, where the Rajah usually resides, is large, and respectably fortified. The sea-coast is skirted with a track of open woodland, that shelters innumerable herds of cattle. The revenues are equal to five lacks of rupees a year, and the tribute to the

the Nabob is one lack and 75,000 ruppes. The reduction of the country in the year 1773 by General Joseph Smith, and a garrison of the Nabob's troops constantly stationed in the capital, have deprived the native prince even of personal freedom. Still however he is venerated by Gentoes, on account of his high descent, and as the guardian of the sacred waters and Pagoda of Ramiferum.

I come now to the state of Madura, bounded by Mellore on the east, by the Nattam Collieries on the north, by the country of Dindigul, belonging to Hyder, on the west, and by Tinivelly on the south. Its territory is not more than forty-five miles in length and thirty-five in breadth, and its annual revenue is diminished to 34,000*l*. When the Gentoo Rajah Trimalnague reigned there in the last century, his territories extended over many parts of the southern countries. His treasures were
great,

great, and the monuments of magnificence left by him, which are hardly surpassed in any age or country, still remain a melancholy contrast with present poverty and depopulation. The gallant resistance made by Mahomed Iffoof, when he disclaimed allegiance to the Nabob Mahomed Ally, is a sufficient proof that when the works are in repair, this place may be defended against the most powerful Indian enemy; while its vicinity to the country of Dindigul, belonging to Tippoo Sultaun, renders it a position of capital importance in the event of any future operations against that power.

The last but not the least considerable of your southern territories is Tinivelly, which is divided by a ridge of inaccessible mountains on the north from the wild valleys of Watrap and Outumpollam belonging to Tippoo Sultaun. It stretches to the confines of Madure and Ramnad on the north-east and east, reaches to the sea upon the south,

south, and borders on the west with the Rajahship of Travancore, both terminating near Cape Comorin. Its surface is generally flat from the sea coast, till it approaches the mountains on its northern boundary. Nature has been peculiarly bountiful to this province:—The rivers by which it is intersected, ensure luxuriant crops of rice, and the driest parts yield cotton in abundance. The productions that enrich the neighbouring island of Ceylon would flourish here, and might render us the rivals of the Dutch in the cinnamon trade: but the particular tenure under which Tinivelly has been held, the convulsions it has endured from the first intrusions of the Mussulmen in the course of this century, and the depravity of its rulers, have counteracted the benefits of nature. Even when a native Rajah governed this province, the flat and open country only was reduced, and was let for specific sums to great renters, who were invested with

with despotic powers, and harassed the peaceful subject; while various leaders, possessing considerable territory, maintained armed force, and withheld their stipulated tribute on the first appearance of disturbance. These chiefs, who at present amount in number to thirty-two, are capable of bringing 30,000 brave though undisciplined troops into the field; they have also fortified towns and strong-holds in the mountains, whither they retire in cases of emergency.

Beside the territory that these chiefs, who as well as their subjects are called Polygars, possess under the range of hills that forms the northern boundary of Tinivelly, many of them hold ample tracks in the flat and cultivated country. Adverse to industry, they suffer their own possessions to remain waste, while they invade each other, and plunder their industrious neighbours. Such is the dread of those ravagers, that every district

district in the province has been forced to purchase their forbearance by enormous contributions. In this situation, you have rather cause to wonder that your superintendant, Mr. Irwin, should have been enabled to procure so large an increase of revenue, than that the produce of this country should in no recorded period have born any proportion to its natural advantages.

The preceding observations can only be considered as a hasty outline of the Company's possessions south of the Coleroon; which, in extent, are nearly equal to the Carnatic; but in point of soil, water, situation, and capability of improvement, surpass any district under your control.

The calamities with which the invasion of Hyder Ally in 1781 overwhelmed the Carnatic, fell heavily upon the southern countries. No sooner had the multitudes

under that ravager poured down from the mountains of Mysore, than desolation extended across the Coleroon. Thousands of his plunderers overran the countries of Kivelore, Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Madura. A most luxuriant crop, with which the ground was at that time covered, was instantly swept off, and every water-dyke and embankment totally destroyed. The inhabitants who escaped the sword, sought shelter in the forts; where, adding misery to distress, they perished in the streets; while the whole country, laid waste by fire and sword, exhibited the sad reality of a general conflagration. At length Hyder, having left nothing to destroy in the Carnatic, and regardless of our force, which from the time of Colonel Baillie's defeat had never ventured from its encampment near Madras, resolved to lead in person his victorious army to the southward. After remaining some weeks encamped within random shot of
Tanjore,

Tanjore, he proceeded to invest Trichinopoly, and threatened to fill up the ditch with his Moormen's slippers. The repeated checks sustained by the Company's troops in that quarter, the corps that Hyder had cut off, and the forts he had reduced, spread so general a consternation, that the important and defenceless garrison of Trichinopoly seemed ready to surrender. In that event the southern countries must have submitted to his power, had not the repulse of Sir Eyre Coote's army against Chilumbrum elated Hyder with the hopes of defeating the only force that could endanger his conquest. This induced him to renounce more solid, though less brilliant prospects, and to fight the battle of the 1st July 1781 at Porto Novo.

Notwithstanding his ill success in that engagement, and his personal absence from the southward, our affairs in that quarter still remained in great confusion. The Tan-

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jore country was occupied by the enemy, who secured its crops and cattle, repulsed the Company's troops at Tricatapooly, Putticottah, and Trivelore, and confined them within the fort of Tanjore. There, the granaries were empty, the Rajah's subjects disaffected, and he himself accused of negotiating with Hyder, and of introducing arms clandestinely into his palace. He likewise suffered the whole crops of his country to be collected by the enemy, while he resisted every solicitation to fill his magazines, and provide for impending events.

The defeat of Colonel Braithwaite in February 1782, and the loss of his detachment (attacked by a powerful army under Tippoo Sultaun), would have proved a deadly blow, had it not been warded off by the active abilities and conciliating manners of Mr. Sullivan, to whom the safety of Tanjore and of all the southern provinces was
then

then justly ascribed. The subsequent capture of Colonel Horne, proceeding to the southward from the Presidency with military supplies, added extremely to the distress and embarrassment experienced at Tanjore. In the provinces south of Tanjore and Trichinopoly, the prospect was not less alarming. The Great Marawa country was infested by a host of rebels under Maupely Taver, a relation of the reigning family, who over-ran the territory, occupied its best positions, and for many months invested the garrison of Ramnad.

The Little Marawa country was controlled by Perry and China Mordeen, who after the murder of the late Rajah in 1773, had fled to the protection of Hyder, and returning at the time of his invasion, maintained the country under his authority, keeping the infant Rajah a state-prisoner, and ravaging the territories of the Company and Nabob.

The districts of Madura, Mellore, and Palernery, were so harassed with Colleries, Polygars, and the enemy, that your troops and subjects were often attacked within range of the forts, and the sentries fired at on the works. All the Polygars of Tinivelly were in rebellion, and closely connected with the Dutch government at Colombo, from whence attempts were meditated, in conjunction with them and with Maupely Taver, to reduce those countries and the Marawa dominions. Near 100,000 Polygars and Colleries were in arms throughout the southern provinces, and, being hostile to Government, considered public confusion as the only safeguard against punishment. To repress these outrages, and to retrieve your affairs in the present exigency, your southern force was inadequate. The treasury was drained,—the country depopulated,—the revenues exacted by the enemy,—and the troops undisciplined,

ciplined, poorly fed, and unsuccessfully commanded*.

The complicated dangers arising from this situation of the country induced you, in September 1782, to send a reinforcement of Europeans and Artillery to the Southward, under the command of Colonel Lang. You were led to hope that this detachment, when reinforced by the troops to be collected from every quarter of the South, might have materially promoted the views of Colonel Humberstone, who was then at Paniani, preparing to proceed against Palacatcherry, and to penetrate into Coimbatour, according to the plan suggested by Mr. Sullivan, approved of by your Lordship and the Board, and afterwards carried into

* Such was the state of affairs to the Southward when Lord Macartney's Government commenced, and for some time afterwards authority in military matters was vested in Sir Eyre Coote by the Supreme Board; but as soon as that authority was restored to the Governor and Select Committee, they made the most meritorious efforts to provide for the safety of the southern countries.

execution by myself. But from a variety of circumstances it happened, that the operations of Colonel Lang were confined to the reduction of Caroor, Aravarcourchy, and Dindigul. Being limited in his movements to those districts of the enemy, and to the track between Negapatam, Tanjore, and Trichinopoly, the southern countries continued nearly in their former state of desolation. Many as the representations were that reached your Board on this subject, it would have been desirable for you in person to have beheld the malversations that had been committed, the miseries that were endured, and the patience of your subjects under unsupportable grievances.

The ravages of the enemy, however, were by no means the greatest evils that those districts had sustained. There were inherent and increasing causes of decline : cultivation was neglected,—the husbandmen were killed or driven off,—the cattle
were

were wild,—and the fields were desolate. Yet over this wilderness, the Renter, the Amuldar, the Monagar, the Tesseldar, and all the instruments of public exaction, tyrannised with unabating rigour. The forts, excepting Tanjore, were neglected and decaying ;—the military stores had been in a great measure expended or embezzled ; and those that now remained were ill constructed and worse arranged ;—the military Storekeepers, Grainkeepers, Paymasters and Commissaries, belonging to the civil service, were habituated to disavow any controlling power in the Commandant of the place ;—nor were the exhortations and example of Mr. Sullivan sufficient to correct the evil. Hence disorder arose in those departments. The civil and military, the King and Company's officers, were at variance. The adherents of the Nabob were loud in their complaints against Europeans, while the Tanjorines extended their aversion to all classes of our countrymen. The large arrears due to the

troops, and other grievances, rendered it impracticable for officers to maintain strict discipline in their corps; as it required the utmost efforts to prevent mutiny among men, who, brave and faithful as they undoubtedly were, could hardly be blamed for clamour and complaint when reduced to procure subsistence by selling their own children!

The discordant powers of the civil servants in the different departments increased the evils already enumerated. Such was the extent of those evils, that the ablest persons at one time despaired of retrieving your affairs in that quarter; nor was it held practicable to maintain the southern army in the field, dispirited by defeat, and destitute of resources*.

* No circumstance could tend more clearly to evince the meritorious efforts of Lord Macartney, than his having been able to retrieve the southern provinces from the wretched condition to which he found them reduced on his accession to the Government.

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Some preceding incidents, however, proved the inefficiency of that defensive system under which the Carnatic war had been conducted, indicated offensive operation as the only means of future prosperity, and confirmed the merit of those endeavours made by your Lordship and the Board to attack the enemy in his own possessions*. On this principle Colonel Humberstone had acted on the Malabar coast. He obliged Tippoo Saib to march across the peninsula, and to retire with loss from

* Lord Macartney's system of promoting offensive operations against Tippoo Sultaun does him peculiar honour; not only on account of the judgment that suggested these ideas, and the vigour with which they were carried into execution in moments of great difficulty, and against the opinions of powerful opponents, but also from the eminent success with which they were attended. Besides directing the southern army to penetrate into the richest possessions of Tippoo Sultaun, his Lordship reinforced the Malabar army under Colonels Macleod and Humberstone, and formed a considerable force in the Northern Circars, under General Jones; thus distracting the enemy's attention, and enabling the English arms to regain their ascendancy,

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the engagement in November 1782 at Paniani*. The subsequent success of General Matthews against Mangalore, Beddano, and the principal forts of the adjacent countries, still farther evinced the wisdom of Mr. Sullivan's opinions, and of Colonel Humberstone's operations. Tippoo was forced to march from Arcot to Beddano; his father's death in December 1782 having made him cross the peninsula from Paniani to Arcot. This event relieved the Carnatic, and was the first circumstance during the war that gave a turn to our affairs. For the movements and counter-movements of the Carnatic army, and even the repeated defeats sustained by Hyder, had proved of little ultimate avail in the decision of the contest.

* It is impossible for me to do justice to Colonel Humberstone as a man and as an officer. A narrative of the services he performed in command of the forces on the Malabar coast, would afford convincing proof of his distinguished military talents, and add to the regret which his untimely loss occasioned in the minds of all who knew his merits and his character.

At

At this crisis it was fortunate for the English interests, that your Lordship and the Board resolved to direct the southern troops to make every effort against the enemy. The first object of my command was to augment our field force, by battalions from Tanjore, Trichinopoly, and Tinivelly. The zealous support of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin speedily enabled me to equip the army, and to prosecute offensive operations ; which your Lordship and the Board judged to be essential to the re-establishment of the public welfare.

The high sense I entertained of the treaty formed by Mr. Sullivan under your Government, for the restoration of the ancient Gentoo family of Mysore, formerly deposed, and still confined by Hyder, was only equalled by my attachment to the system of conciliating all classes of the natives. This was no less congenial with the general tenor of your conduct, than
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with the spirit of Mr. Sullivan's negotiations, and was requisite to give effect to his enlightened views. In support of these ideas, the abilities as well as influence of the Bramins rendered it essential to treat them with particular indulgence; and by similar attentions the numerous Polygars of Dindigul were reconciled to our interests, as has been fully evinced by the supplies derived from those possessions while under our Government.

The dependents of his highness the Nabob* felt themselves extremely humbled by the assignment of his territory to the Company. For however eligible and indispensable this measure might appear on principles of public necessity, it could not fail to deprive his adherents of their power and situation. As far as depended

* As the dependents of the Nabob are in general Mahometans, this observation does not apply to the Gentos, who form the great body of inhabitants in the Nabob's country.

upon

upon me I endeavoured to convince them all, that their wants should be relieved, their rights protected, and their consequence maintained. They were pleased to credit my declarations, and by these means we restrained the dissatisfaction of the inhabitants and native soldiery, many of whom are warmly attached to the Nabob, and were ready to burst forth in the most alarming disorders. The same principle formed the rule of my conduct towards the Rajah of Tanjore and the other chiefs whose countries fell within the limits of my command—conscious, that all our measures respecting the native Princes and their subjects, should be directed by liberal concession and unbiased justice.

My next endeavour was, in conjunction with Mr. Sullivan, to unite all descriptions of men in cordial exertions to retrieve the public interests, and to enure the troops to discipline and enterprise ; without which
they

they neither could be subsisted, nor could we hope for any reputable termination of our ill-fated contest. That these attempts have not proved entirely unproductive of important public benefits, has been repeatedly testified by your Board in terms most flattering to myself.

By the 25th of May, the army marched from Dindigul towards Daraporam, which fell to us on the 2d of June*. That valuable place affords ample supplies of grain

* *The particulars of the attack and surrender of this place are expressed in my Letter of the 2d of June, addressed to the Governor and Select Committee. One circumstance deserves to be mentioned, in order to prove the ingenuity of intelligencers in India. When the army encamped before Daraporam, it was not practicable to approach so near the fort as to determine with precision the most advantageous point of attack; but a Braman Harcarrah explained every particular respecting the position of the works, and the nature of the ground adjoining to the place, in such terms as enabled me to draw a plan from his description. The Adjutant General Captain Oram did the same, from the accounts of another intelligencer. On comparing the two plans, thus drawn from verbal*
informa-

grain and cattle, is capable of considerable defence, and is far advanced in the enemy's country, being equally distant from the two coasts. Although the position of an army there would always be of eminent advantage, it was more peculiarly so when we reduced it, because Tippoo Sultaun had recovered Beddanore, captured General Matthews, and invested Mangalore. The southern army was not in sufficient strength to think of marching to Seringapatam*, and was so far from being able to oppose the whole power of Tippoo Sultaun, that we could not even afford to garrison Daraporam, and were obliged to destroy the fortification. Yet we might assuredly have reduced the rich tract that lies below the

information, we found such topographical resemblance that we marched a body of troops in a dark night, crossed a river, and occupied a strong position within 400 yards of the fort, from whence we erected our batteries and effected a breach.

* The capital of Mysore.

moun-

mountains of Mysore*, which would probably have forced Tippoo Sultaun to raise the siege of Mangalore, and march his main body against us; or if Tippoo had persisted against Mangalore, we should have amply subsisted the army, have reduced a valuable territory, and prepared for more important conquests.

General Stuart's order on the 31st of May, to march towards him at Cuddalore with the utmost expedition, obliged me to relinquish those advantages. You were pleased to think favourably of my precautions for the defence of Dindigul, which was garrisoned with the sixth Car-

* Extending from Caroor to Combatour, and from the bottom of the hills to the confines of Madura and Trichinopoly. A country abounding in every kind of production for the support of armies, and which may be considered as a chain of magazines established by Tippoo Sultaun for the invasion of the Southern Provinces, in the same manner as the Burmah country may be considered as affording him the means of invasion on the east.

natic

natic battalion; and a body of the Nabob's independents*. Some heavy guns and military stores were likewise thrown into the place, and directions given that grain might be collected, wood prepared, and every effort made to ensure a desperate resistance. The fort of Aravarcourchy† had been destroyed soon after its reduction; and, in obedience to your orders respecting the demolition of Caroor‡, mines were constructed, and the works blown up. My instructions to the southern commandants respecting the distribution of their troops, and preparations for defence, likewise received your commendation.

* Dindigul is situated in a rich valley of the same name, about fifty miles south-west from Caroor. The town is large, and well fortified; its principal strength consists in a very high and almost inaccessible rock, on which there is a fortress that might be rendered impregnable: but the southern army took the place by storm in May 1783.

† Aravarcourchy was taken by assault in April 1783. About 500 people were killed in the attack.

‡ Caroor is a place of very considerable strength, fifty miles from Trichinopoly, on the frontiers of the Mysore dominions; was reduced by the southern army in April 1783, after several weeks of open trenches, and contained great quantities of provisions, stores, and ammunition.

On our arrival at Trichinopoly in June, the troops were supplied with grain, the gun-carriages repaired, cattle collected for the army at Cuddalore, and boats provided for crossing the Cavery and Coleroon, which with two intermediate streams were then unfordable. At Munfurpet on the northern bank of the Coleroon, I received farther instructions from General Stuart to march without delay to Cuddalore. The injunctions of your Board no less pointedly directed me to recross the river, and continue to the southward. But you had been pleased to invest me with a discretionary latitude of acting as exigencies might require; and intelligence had reached me that Suffrein's squadron had anchored at Cuddalore, that a disembarkation of many thousand men was intended, and that the English army was harassed with the duty of the trenches. It appeared therefore to be most congenial with the general tenor of your intentions, that we should march towards General Stuart, being

conscious that the public safety could have no existence if his army were defeated. Colonel Forbes, who remained in command of the southern provinces, inspired every one around him with a full reliance on his zeal and military talents; and I shall ever gratefully acknowledge, that on the first communication of those proceedings, you were pleased to honour me with your approbation.

Upon our arrival within three forced marches of General Stuart's camp, a cessation of hostility with the French was announced, and we returned towards the southward*. The same dispatches intimated General Stuart's suspension, and that General Bruce commanded the Carnatic army. I wrote to General Bruce, offering to make an unexpected movement against the fort of Salem; which secures the most important pass from the Carnatic into Mysore, and contained many months provisions for an army; adding, that nothing would be requisite on

* July 1783.

the part of General Bruce, but to send a force sufficient to garrison the place, until he could move thither with the troops from Cuddelore. The General finding it necessary to reject this proposal, we left him to struggle with his difficulties, and proceeded to Munfurpet.

My intention was to move next day by Tarriore to reinstate your tributary the Rheddey in his paternal inheritance, and to advance against the forts and magazines of Settimungulum, Namcul, and Sankerrydurgum on the north of the Coleroon; from thence to cross the river and besiege Erode, with a view of establishing a strong garrison at that place, and in order to prepare supplies for moving, when sufficiently reinforced, against Seringapatam. But our expectations were disappointed by your intimations of an armistice with Tippoo Sultaun.

During the course of these proceedings, it was found impracticable to carry into
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execution the salutary measures intended by your Board, for the re-establishment of public authority in your southern provinces, which unavoidably remained in their former confusion. The Polygars, Collieries, and other tributaries, ever since the commencement of the war, had thrown off all appearance of allegiance. No civil arrangement could be attempted without a military force, and nothing less than the whole army seemed adequate to their reduction. While such a considerable portion of the southern provinces remained in defiance of the Company's government, it was vain to think of supporting the current charges of the establishment; far less could we hope to reduce the arrears, and to prepare for important operations, in the probable event of a recommencement of hostility. It became indispensable therefore, to restore the tranquillity of those provinces by vigorous military measures,

as the only means that could render them productive of revenue; and in this view, your wise arrangements for augmenting the southern force, proved not less beneficial, than in their influence on the operations against the enemy.

You had been pleased to reinforce us with 500 Europeans and two battalions of Sepoys under Colonel Stuart, immediately after the siege of Cuddalore; another detachment of equal strength marched towards us under Colonel Elphinston. It was my intention to have joined those corps at Dindigul, in order to act against Tippoo, in case he should not accede to the terms proposed; but finding that the detachment could not reach Dindigul for many weeks, it appeared eligible to employ the intermediate space in fulfilling the objects already stated. In concurrence therefore with the requisitions of Mr. Sullivan,

Sullivan*, we proceeded to Mellore, in order to awe the rebellious Colleries of that district. We left a strong body encamped there, and marched with the remaining troops on the 4th of August to Shevigunga, about twenty miles east from thence. The two Murdeens, who rule the little Marawa, fled precipitately with their young Rajah to the woods of Calicoil, and collected their force to the amount of 10,000 men: nor could they be prevailed on to return to their habitations and trust to my assurances.

Besides the immediate discharge of their arrears of tribute, I demanded from their deputies 90,000 rupees, in compensation to the Company for the ravages they had committed; and concluded with declaring, that if these conditions were not fulfilled, we should attack their woods, storm their

* Resident of Tanjore, and Superintendant of assigned revenues of Trichinopoly and the Marawas.

fort, and drive them from the country. Notwithstanding the procrastinating spirit of Gentoos, they paid near 40,000 rupees, and gave security for their remaining debt.

The lenity and dispatch of this transaction (for it was concluded in four days) afforded a cordial satisfaction when contrasted with the circumstances of the expedition in 1773, against this very place. On that occasion the Rajah, trusting to the woods and barriers that surround the fort of Calicoil, and expecting to conclude the business by negotiation, conceived himself in security when the place was surprised, and he was killed on the attack. I rejoiced to mitigate the rigorous treatment which the delinquency of the successor, or rather of his ministers, merited, in consideration of the severities which the predecessor had experienced.

There next remained a more important undertaking. The numerous Polygars of
Tini-

Tinivelly, who had rebelled on the commencement of the war, committed daily ravages from Madura to Cape Comorin. They subdued forts, and occupied districts belonging to the Circar*, or held by a tenure different from their own. Mr. Irwin, superintendant of Madura and Tinivelly, had repeatedly urged me to proceed against the Polygars, in order to restore tranquillity and recover the revenues. It was now for the first time in my power to direct my operations towards that quarter, at a moment when the most powerful of the Polygars in confederacy against your Government, and in alliance with the Dutch, had assembled 12 or 14,000 men, and were actually besieging the fort of Chocumpetty, a Polygar place of some strength, below the hills that form the north-west boundary of the province.

* Circar means the ruling power of the country, and the detail of its revenue.

When

When it was determined that we should march into Tinivelly, during the interval requisite for Colonels Stuart and Elphinston's detachments to reach Dindigul, my object was to strike an unexpected blow, and to intimidate the Polygars into submission. Of all the Tinivelly chiefs, the principal in power and delinquency, excepting Shevigherry, was Catabominaigue: he was personally engaged at the siege of Chocumpetty, from whence his fort of Pandalam-courchy, on the south-east quarter of Tinivelly, is distant more than seventy miles. The usual route to Tinivelly passes by Madura; and the Polygars, hearing of our movement towards Shevigunga, expected us in that direction. To favour this opinion, provisions for the army were ordered to be prepared at Madura; my real intention was perfectly concealed; and we moved off with the force from Shevigunga, in the evening of the 8th of August, to Tripechetty, a place twenty miles distant on the

the southern border of the Mellore country. We there joined the remainder of the army, and leaving the seventh battalion and some irregulars under Captain Oliver to restrain the Colleries at Mellore, proceeded next morning by Pallemery, Pandalgoody and Naiglapour, and reached the fort of Pandalamcouchy on the fourth day, being 100 miles from Shevigunga*.

As soon as the line approached the fort, a flag was sent, desiring the headmen to open their gates and hold a conference; they refused. The eighteen-pounders were therefore halted in the rear of an embankment facing the north-east angle of the works; a hasty battery was constructed; and in three hours we were ready to open on the bastion. The works were manned with several thousand people, and every circumstance denoted an intention of resist-

* Fahrenheit's thermometer was frequently above 110 degrees during these marches.

ance. It was material to storm without delay, in order to strike terror by dispatch, and also lest Catabominaigue with his confederate chiefs might hasten to obstruct our operations. We opened on the bastion; but finding ourselves retarded by its thickness, we resolved to breach the adjoining curtain, and to render the defences of the bastion untenable by the besieged. They kept up a constant and well-directed fire, and notwithstanding our utmost efforts, it was dark before a practicable breach was effected. The attack was therefore deferred until the moon should rise. The storming party consisted of two companies of Europeans, supported by the thirteenth and twenty-fourth Carnatic battalions, and continued in the rear of the battery: the cavalry, the first, and light infantry battalions, were posted at right angles with the other three salient angles of the fort, with detachments fronting each gateway, in order to prevent the besieged from receiving supplies, or making

making their escape, while the other troops remained to defend the camp, which was within random-shot.

Our next object was to remove a strong hedge fronting the breach and surrounding the whole fort, as is the practice in the Polygar system of defence. This dangerous service was effected with unusual skill, by Ensign Cunningham, commanding the pioneers; and about ten at night, with the advantage of bright moon-shine, the storm commenced. Our troops, after they gained the summit of the breach, found no sufficient space to lodge themselves; and the interior wall having no slope or talus, they could not push forward from the summit as they advanced. The defenders were numerous, and opposed us so vigorously with pikes and musquetry, that we were obliged at last to retire and reach the battery, with considerable slaughter on both sides. Immediate measures were taken to renew the charge;

charge ; but the Polygars, dispirited with their loss, abandoned the place, and sallied forth at the eastern gate.

The corps posted round the works were so exhausted by the preceding marches, that many of the fugitives effected their escape : the rest were taken prisoners. The breach was covered with dead bodies, and the place contained a large assortment of guns, powder, shot, arms, and other military stores, which were of course applied to the public service : 40,000 pagodas were also found, and immediately distributed to the troops. Your Board were pleased to confirm the distribution, on the footing of prize-money ; than which no measure could more effectually tend to animate the army in our after-operations. Some other facts respecting these transactions, and the treaty between the Dutch Government of Colombo and Catabominaigue (of which the original was taken in his fort), were referred to

to in my letters of the 13th of August, addressed to your Lordship and the Board*.

Having left Captain Jacobs with five companies of the 25th battalion to garrison the place, I proceeded to Palamcottah, in order to inspect the state of that fort; and from thence moved with the army by Shankanakoil to Shevigerry. It was hoped that the reduction of that strong-hold, belonging to the most powerful of all the Polygars, in addition to the fall of Pandalamcourchy, would intimidate the less considerable offenders, and convince the whole confederacy that their treatment would be proportioned to their misconduct. Besides, the outrages committed by the Shevigerry Chief were atrocious, and could not be forgiven without a total surrender of your authority. He had barbarously murdered Captain Graham Campbell, and cut off a detachment

* See the letter of the 13th of August, inserted in the Appendix.

under

under command of that officer. On former occasions, he had beat off considerable detachments, and avowedly protected your enemies, who thought themselves secure in the fort of Shevigerry. He had collected magazines sufficient to supply the Dutch force that was expected from Colombo, as well as to resist the most tedious blockade; for he did not conceive his fort could be stormed, and every circumstance in his conduct marked, that he held himself beyond the reach of military power.

On our arrival before the town of Shevigerry he retired to the thickets near four miles deep in front of his Comby*, which it covers and defends. He manned the whole extent of a strong embankment, that separates the wood and open country; was joined by Catabominaigue, with other associated Polygars, and mustered 8 or 9,000 men in arms.

* A strong-hold in the mountains.

In the present instance lenity would have been accounted imbecility; but the approach of Colonels Stuart and Elphinston to Dindigul, and Tippoo Sultaun's refusal of the proposed accommodation, rendered me extremely anxious to finish this Polygar warfare, in order to proceed towards the enemy's frontiers. The Shevigerry chief and his associates were therefore informed, that we meant immediately to attack the place, unless they would convene the Head Polygars of Tinivelly, amounting to thirty-two chiefs, liquidate all arrears, and refund the amount of depredations committed since the commencement of the war, agreeably to authenticated vouchers in the different districts. It was farther intimated, that if they, on the part of the confederacy, would engage to pay 120,000*l.* in lieu of all demands, their proposal should be forwarded to the superintendant of revenue (Mr. Irwin), and on his acceptance, that the troops

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would

would be withdrawn, and that they would be recommended to forgiveness. They wished to confer with me, but refused to visit me in camp. As their distrust arose from various outrages committed against them by former commanders, instead of increasing their apprehensions by resentment, I proposed to meet them alone and unattended at their own barrier; adding that if any accident befel me, it would not pass unresented. The Shevigerry chief, Catabominaigue, and the deposed Polygar of Chocumpetty, with a large retinue, met me in front of their embankment. Before they finished their explanations, it was dark, and a musket inadvertently fired in the rear alarmed our advanced picket, who thought it was aimed at me. To prevent the ill consequences of that mistake, I took leave of the Polygars, expressing my wish to hear of their acceding to the terms proposed. We refrained from hostility next day, but finding that they trifled with
our

our proposals, the line was ordered under arms on the morning following, and we made the distribution of attack. It proved as desperate as any contest in that species of Indian warfare; not only from the numbers and obstinacy of the Polygars, but from the peculiar circumstances which had acquired this place the reputation of impregnable.

The attack commenced, by the Europeans and four battalions of Sepoys moving against the embankment which covers the wood. The Polygars in full force opposed us, but our troops remained with their firelocks shouldered under a heavy fire, until they approached the embankment; there they gave a general discharge and rushed upon the enemy. By the vigour of this advance we got possession of the summit, and the Polygars took post on the verge of the adjoining wood, disputing every step with great loss on both sides.

After reconnoitring, we found that the Comby could not be approached in front. We proceeded therefore to cut a road through impenetrable thickets for three miles, to the base of the hill that bounds the Comby on the west. The pioneers under Ensign Cunningham laboured with indefatigable industry; Captain Gardiner of the 102d supported them with the Europeans, and Captain Blacker with the third and twenty-fourth Carnatic battalions, advanced their field-pieces as fast as the road was cleared. These were strengthened by troops in their rear, forming a communication with those in front; for this purpose two other battalions were posted within the wood, and as soon as we gained the embankment, the camp moved near it, and concentrated our force.

We continued to cut our way under an unabating fire from 8,000 Polygars, who constantly pressed upon our advanced party,

rushed upon the line of attack, piked the bullocks that were dragging the guns, and killed many of our people. But these attempts were repulsed by perseverance, and before sunset we had opened a passage entirely to the mountain; it is extremely high, rocky, and in many places almost perpendicular. Having resolved to attack from this unexpected quarter, the troops undertook the service and attained the summit. The Polygar parties posted to guard that eminence, being routed, after much firing on all hands, we descended on the other side and flanked the Comby. The enemy seeing us masters of the mountain, retreated under cover of the night, by paths inaccessible to regular troops, and we took possession of the wonderful recess. The particulars respecting ordnance, stores and provisions, found in the place, are stated in my letter of the third of September*. We left the third and ninth bat-

* See Letter of the third of September, in the Appendix.

talions to secure the magazines, and moved the army to Shevlepatore within four marches of Madura, in order to awe the northern Polygars of Tinivelly.

It was little more than a month since we had left Tritchinopoly. Your authority was re-established throughout the whole track that we had traversed, extending more than 300 miles: and besides the arrangement with the Shevigunga Rajah, we were masters of the two strongest places belonging to the Polygars. We remained some time in expectation of their proposing a general accommodation, but they knew that Tippoo still invested Mangalore, and that we must quickly join the force at Dindigul. This intelligence corroborated their spirit of procrastination. I therefore convened the Vakeels*, whom the chief Polygars had sent to treat with me in camp, and directed them to inform their

* Vakeels are deputies, agents, or ambassadors.

respective

respective principals, that we should leave the province on the twenty-first of September ; adding, that if they did not return to their allegiance, I should make a vow to Siven, the Gentoo god whose attribute is *vengeance*, to march back and spread destruction throughout every possession of the defaulting Polygars: this declaration alarmed the whole assembly. My letters to Mr. Irwin expressed my regret on leaving the province before any settlement was concluded with the Polygars ; and in return he forwarded to me the terms on which he thought it expedient to restore their forts to Catabominaigue and Shevigerry.

Vakeels from these chiefs waited on me at Trimungulum*, and stipulated, in the name of their masters, that they would pay thirty thousand chuckrums† each, in

* Trimungulum is fifteen miles south-west of Madura.

† A chuckrum is somewhat less than a pagoda.

lieu of all preceding claims. They likewise gave their bonds for fifteen thousand pagodas, or 6,000*l.* each, in consideration of the restitution of their forts. Obligations were farther exacted, that the defences of Pandalamcourchy should be demolished, that the guns, stores, and ammunition should be removed to Palamcottah; that the road which we cleared to the Comby of Shevigerry should continue open; that the means of defence should be removed from the place, and that the southern commanders, and the Company's troops, should at all times be admitted within their forts and barriers: I concluded with injunctions to observe a more submissive conduct, if they valued their lives, property, or posterity. As soon as the restitution of the forts and prisoners* could possibly take place, the third and ninth battalions

* Among the prisoners there was a daughter of Catambinaigue, who, as well as all the others, amounting to many hundreds, were treated with the utmost attention.

under Captain Mackinnon, were directed to march from Shevigerry, and to join the force at Dindigul, whither the army proceeded by the route of Madura.

Your Lordship and the Board are not unacquainted with the unworthy practices by which the fertile province of Tinivelly has suffered since the disreputable expedition thither under Maphuze Cawn and Colonel Heron. Their defeat by the Nat Colerics near Madura was not more disgraceful, than the principles upon which that and subsequent armaments against the Polygars have been conducted. Though clear statements and specific charges, leaving no retrospect of exaction, together with simplicity of arrangement, and dispatch in execution, are the great barriers against malversation, the opposite of such conduct constantly prevailed; until your Lordship and the Board assumed the management of those territories, nothing was definite—nothing was

concluded ; partial payments were received ; past claims were left for future settlement ; many months were wasted in fitting out an expedition, and still more in performing slight services. During the whole period of protraction, the Renter, the Amuldar, the Phouzdar, and the European commander, were reaping the harvest of corruption, and sowing for an after-growth of peculation. The Polygars are subtle and acute :—they took advantage of so corrupt a system ;—and, notwithstanding their internal feuds, they united against a common invader. They administered to the avarice of their opponent by bribes, and to his passion for command by procrastination. Thus the province was impaired,—its cultivation failed, —its manufactures diminished ;—every new Collector and Commander entailed new evils, and taught the Polygars to consider their *peshcush** not as a just tribute to their

* *Peshcush* is the sum paid by those who hold of a superior.

sovereign, but as a price to purchase the forbearance of oppressors.

The conduct of Mahomed Iffoof Cawn deserves to be exempted from this general accusation. While he ruled those provinces, his whole administration denoted vigour and effect: his justice was unquestioned,—his word unalterable,—his measures were happily combined, and firmly executed;—the guilty had no refuge from punishment: his maxim was, that the labourer and the manufacturer should be the favourite children of the Circar, because they afford strength and comfort to the public parent; but that the Polygar and the Collery, though equally entitled to truth and justice, have no pretension to indulgence, because they are the worthless prodigals who waste their own means and ravage those of others. “Let them become Zemindars,” said he, “and cultivate their own lands, instead of plundering their industrious neighbours;”
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“ then

“ then they shall be cherished : but while
“ their habit is idleness, and their business
“ devastation, I will treat every one as a
“ public enemy, who wields a pike, or
“ wears the turban of a Polygar.” On
comparing the state of that country with
his conduct and remarks, I found that wisdom,
vigour, and integrity were never more
conspicuous in any person of whatever climate
or complexion.

On my arrival at Dindigul, an order of
encampment was transmitted to your Board
in two lines*, containing one European
and three Sepoy brigades, besides four flank
battalions that acted as a fifth brigade. Our
artillery consisted of sixty-five pieces of
cannon with field-ammunition, and 10,000
battering shot; the engineers' department
was stored with besieging tools and other
implements; the pioneer corps was strengthened;
the cavalry, excepting three troops,
were natives and irregulars; they amounted

* See the annexed Plate.

to 1000 men, and served to flank the baggage on the line of march. The Commissary of Stores department, including the conveyance of artillery, required a numerous retinue of draught and carriage cattle: these we had for several months used unremitting efforts to procure; and by the assistance of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Johnston, in addition to our own exertions, we assembled a greater number of bullocks than ever were attached to any English force in India.

The Agent Victualler was obliged to convey arrack and provisions for 2000 Europeans. But the business of the Grain-keeper was still more embarrassing; where 14,000 fighting men and many thousand public followers* were to be subsisted, without money or other means of supply, except

* The public followers consist of Lascars for the tents, drivers of bullocks, artificers, and doolymen to carry the sick and wounded.

such magazines of the enemy as we were enabled to reduce. It had been the usage of Indian commanders to levy duties on all articles bought or sold in the bazar or market of the army. Under whatever sanction this custom took its rise, it is an odious tax upon the soldier for the benefit of his superior.—I permitted no such practice.

Another material object was the mode and order of marching.—The practice on the coast has been to form the Sepoy corps three deep, and the Europeans two deep, and then to move by files with a strong advance guard, and a still stronger rear guard, in order to cover the carts and other wheeled conveyances that follow the line: the baggage is then disposed of on the right or left flank, according to the nature of the ground over which the army is to pass, and covered by a strong force, to repel the rapid charges of the enemy's cavalry.

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It is asserted that many benefits attend this mode in India ; that if the line is attacked on either flank, it is enabled to form with much celerity by a simple movement of conversion ; and that if a charge be made in front or rear, the corps have only to advance, or countermarch and form a front to the attack. But a large army marching by files is many miles in length, consequently there is little communication between distant parts of the line ; neither can a Commander observe the whole extent, or know the state of different divisions. If in marching by files, a movement to the front or rear is necessary in line of battle or by corps, much time is lost in the manœuvre, and in the precautions requisite in the face of an enemy. The Carnatic army, adhering to this principle, have frequently been cannonaded many hours before they could form the line for action.

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To remedy these evils I proposed to form the army into five divisions, and to dispose them in shape of what in another science is called a quincunx. The European brigade being usually placed in the centre of the line, should form the centre division of the quincunx, with a Sepoy brigade in front, another in the rear, and one on each flank: the battering train and baggage to move under cover of the division least likely to be charged; and the brigades to move, not by files, but in columns, and at such distances, that whenever it may be necessary to form the line to the front, flank, or rear, the centre brigade, and that which is to become the right and left wings, may occupy the whole intermediate space. Thus, if the line be attacked in front, the centre brigade and the two flank brigades immediately form a line to the front, and the advance and rear brigades take their stations either as a second line, as a baggage-guard
and

and a reserve, or to extend the main line. If the line be attacked, or if it be meant to attack on the right or left flanks, the centre brigades, with the front and rear brigades, face to the right and left, and form the line, while the two brigades that were the flank divisions on the line of march are posted as circumstances may require. Thus, in every possible point of attack, the line is quickly formed, the baggage protected, and the army prepared for action.

Your instructions of the 18th of August directed me to remain on the frontiers, ready to act offensively, in case of an infraction on the part of Tippoo Sultaun; and for this purpose, the army moved to re-occupy Daraporam. We found that the magazines which we left there in June had been greatly consumed; but there still remained a fortnight's subsistence for the troops.

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From the ultimate object of a movement to the capital of Mysore, we had never deviated. Guns, shot, and stores, had been collected from the southern garrisons, and numerous artificers were employed on our carriages and conveyance. The zeal of Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Irwin, and Mr. Hippisley, had forwarded our views ; and the Rajah of Travancore had been solicited for an advance of stores, in the event of our moving against the southern possessions of Tip-poo Sultaun. This could not fail to coincide with the wishes of the Rajah, which induced him to support Colonel Humberstone on the Malabar coast during the preceding year, and to reinforce his army with several battalions.

A constant correspondence was also carried on with the Zamorin, or ancient sovereign of Calicut, and the other Rajahs on the Malabar side of the peninsula who were disaffected to the Mysorean usurpation ; and

no circumstance was omitted that appeared conducive to the important operation which we had so earnestly in view: but although the army had acquired strength and efficiency, yet we possessed not that fulness of equipment which cannot be accomplished with an empty treasury. Tanjore and Tritchinopoly had not yet recovered from the calamities which they had experienced: the Marawas and Tinivelly were new in their allegiance. Those countries therefore, far from affording sufficient payments for the army, could hardly be supposed competent, under such circumstances, to defray the current charges of their garrisons, although the wise arrangements of your superintendants gave us every reason to expect a rapid increase of revenue.

The gentlemen who zealously supplied us with stores and conveyance, were obliged to employ their personal credit, trusting to the future solvency of Government: the

native troops were twelve months in arrear: our ordnance, though numerous, was of inconvenient calibers: the carriages had suffered by our continued marching: gunney-bags for carrying rice, copper hoops for powder-barrels, cordage for dragging the guns across a country unexplored by armies, and various other articles in the Commissary of Stores' department, were deficient indeed, when compared with the supplies that the Carnatic army daily received from the Presidency. Above all, the want of money rendered it impossible to pay the Head Black Men, who had employed bullocks in the service for such a length of time, that their private funds were exhausted, and their faith in the Company impaired.

During former wars there ever had been frequent payments to the troops, which enabled them to procure supplies from the traders and inhabitants, even in the enemy's country. Under these circumstances, the
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conveyance of many days provision was not indispensably required: whereas the want of magazines and money left us no security of subsistence, except the grain we could carry with us, or seize as we advanced: for this purpose statements were procured of the grain deposited within two hundred miles of our front and flank; and several dred people were employed on that and other business of intelligence.

It was farther necessary, not only to conceal our own intentions, but to discover those of the enemy; for want of similar precautions, three English armies had been cut off or taken prisoners in India.

As no one Harcarrah can possibly keep pace with the rapid movements of the Myfore cavalry, confidential intelligencers were established at every considerable town in the Myfore dominions, as well as in the enemy's camp, and in the Durbars of the Ra-

jahs inimical to Tippoo Sultaun. On the first notice of any material incident, these intelligencers dispatched small cadjcans*, which were more rapidly conveyed to me than any horse could travel, by Tappals or relays of Colliers, stationed at moderate distances, and unsuspected by the enemy. Harcarahs, Peons, lubby-merchants, and Sepoys were also constantly traversing all parts of the enemy's country; others, carrying dispatches to Madras and the southern provinces, to Travancore, to Cochin, to the Malabar Rajahs, to General Macleod at Cannanore, to Colonel Campbell at Mangalore, and to the Residency at Telicherry. The intelligence of every individual was carefully registered, and tended to confirm or to refute the various intimations constantly arriving. By these means, during many months of continued marching through a country almost unexplored, we never once

* Cadjcans are thick leaves, resembling the papyrus, on which the Gentoos write.

failed in our supplies, nor did any material incident escape our knowledge.

The discretionary powers with which your Board invested me, rendered it my peculiar duty to consider the mode of warfare most likely to distress the enemy. The system of a war in India, which is to depend on field operations, must ever be exposed to disappointment. In the war of 1767, General J. Smith pursued Hyder's army in a series of rapid marches, in order to bring him to a decisive action ; but Hyder, after leading him through the Myfore country in various directions, marched past our army to Madras *, and intimidated the Government into a disreputable treaty.

It was obvious that our circumstances did not admit of war on such conditions : that strong forts must be reduced, territories pos-

* Before this event took place, General J. Smith was called to the Presidency, and the army was commanded by Colonel Fitzgerald.

fessed, their magazines and revenues rendered productive ; and that we must proceed by unexpected strides, to such positions as might preserve a communication with our own provinces, forming at the same time regular stages towards the capital of Mysore. This implied that we were to act on the principles of a besieging army, to make lodgments as we advanced, and still to press forward ; to diminish the resources of the enemy, while we increased our own ; to oblige him, either to suffer us to proceed unmolested in the prosecution of operations, of which the ultimate object was the overthrow of his government, or else to compel him, in the obstruction of these proceedings, to afford us the wished-for opportunity of a close engagement in the field. Such was the system on which I proposed to act, trusting that the inefficiency of the opposite or field system, as evinced in the conduct of the war of 1767, and in the late Carnatic war, would be held sufficient to induce a change

, change of measures ; for an army constituted as Hyder's, with a superabundance of elephants, camels, bullocks, and cavalry, must out-march an army formed of infantry like ours,—unqualified by principle and formation to commit the devastation of a Maratta or Mysorean army. Our field operations are neither alarming to the enemy, nor productive of advantage to our own cause ; and our forces, when constituted for field operations only, pass through a country, and leave no vestige of their services.

On the fourth of October I represented our alarming situation, in case Tippoo Sultaun should leave us long in a state of uncertainty ; and added, that to remain upon the frontiers, in expectation of events, would be impossible, for we could not hope to procure more than a month's provision within the district : that to fall back upon the Company's southern possessions, would
frustrate

frustrate your intentions, and exhaust the produce of those countries. Besides, so large an army unpaid and unemployed, is ever at the mercy of the first incident that may occasion discontent. These considerations induced me to solicit from your Lordship and the Board, a latitude of purveyance, even in the enemy's country, in case his protractions should endanger the safety of the troops, so critically situated.

On the sixteenth of October the army marched towards Pylny, about thirty miles south of Daraporam, in order to put the renter of Dindigul's family in possession of their inheritance, or petty Rajahship of Pylny. They assured me of grain and cattle at that place; and this was the last resource we had to expect, without advancing into the enemy's country, or falling back on the southern provinces. Most fortunately, while impressed with the approach of these impending difficulties, an
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official letter from Mess. Frith and Patterson, members of the residency of Telicherry, informed me of a re-commencement of hostility, on the part of Tippoo Sultaun, against Mangalore. I consequently held myself bound by your instructions of the eighteenth of August, to take immediate measures to resent the infraction.

On the eighteenth of October it became my duty to inform your Board, of the embarrassments under which we laboured, and to intimate my intention of moving in full force to the westward. The immediate object of this movement was the relief of Mangalore: the ultimate object was, the reduction of Hyder's family, or at least the attainment of a respectable accommodation. Our expectation of relieving Mangalore, by an actual appearance before the place, was exceedingly remote; for we had not less than 500 miles of an enemy's country to traverse. There
appeared