

appeared but two practicable movements of sufficient moment to make Tippoo raise the siege of Mangalore: the one was, to move by Coimbatour, Settimungulum, and the pass of Gudjeretty, which leads up the ghats or mountains on which the kingdom of Mysore is elevated, directly to Mysore fort and Seringapatam: the other was, to move against Palagatcherry.

The design I had formed of moving to Tippoo's capital, with a view of forming a permanent establishment, has been already stated. For this purpose, an intermediate place of strength and resources was required, to serve as a magazine of stores and provisions for the prosecution of our undertakings, or to secure a retreat if necessary. Neither Coimbatour, though the capital of a rich Rajahship, nor Settimungulum, nor Ardenelli, which are the principal forts in the direct road from Daraporam to the city of Seringapatam, were of sufficient  
strength

strength to justify our trusting any of **them** as our main deposit. For the unexpected loss of such a magazine, while the army might be several hundred miles advanced in an enemy's country, surrounded by a formidable force, might have subjected us to disasters, of which the English armies, defeated and taken prisoners during the war, were melancholy remembrancers.

Palagatcherry held forth every advantage, being a place of the first strength in India, while its territory afforded a superabundance of provision\*. The mountains that bound the pass which it commands, are strengthened by thick forests and surrounding woods; and the intersections of the Paniani river, through deep rice grounds, concurred to enable a small body of infantry to defend

\* Palagatcherry was completely rebuilt by Hyder since the war of 1767 with the English, and was furnished with all the advantages of European construction and defence.

the territory against any number of horse. It farther commanded the only practicable communication between the coasts of Coromandel and Malabar, and promised us possession of all the countries from Tritchinopoly by Daraporam, in a track of more than 200 miles.—It opened the means of supply from Travancore, Cochin, and other places on the Malabar coast.—It afforded confidence to the Zamorin, and other disaffected Rajahs, from Cochin to Goa, who were struggling to shake off the yoke of Hyder.—It left us at liberty to disguise our movements, and to proceed either by the route of Coimbatour and Gudjereddy, or by Calicut on the Malabar sea, and the pass of Damalcherry, to the siege of Seringapatam.—It was besides of such intrinsic consequence to the Mysore Government, that the reduction of it could not fail to weigh essentially in the negotiations for peace then said to be in agitation, and promised to make Tippoo  
Sultaun

Sultaun raise the siege of Mangalore in order to oppose our further progress.

We advanced from Pylly on the twenty-second of October, reduced the forts of Cumalum, Chuckligerry, and Annamalley, and passed through a rich country, abounding with dry grain \*, cattle, wood, and rice fields. At Palatchy the ground attains its highest elevation, and the streams run east and west to the Coromandel and Malabar seas. During our whole march through this part of the country, the flank brigade under Captain Maitland, moved constantly in front, occupied positions, and secured provisions for the army.

From Annamalley our progress became truly laborious, being obliged to force our way through a forest twenty miles in depth, extending thirty miles across the pass of Pa-

\* Dry grain is that which grows without flooding the land, cholam, natcheny, cumbo, gram, doll, &c. whereas rice requires at certain seasons to be under water.

lagat. Our object was to reach Colingoody, a post on the western side of the forest, within fifteen miles of Palagatcherry. The frequent ravines required to be filled up before it was possible to drag the guns across them,—innumerable large trees which obstructed the passage, required to be cut down and drawn out of the intended track, and then the whole road was to be formed, before the carriages could pass. The brigades were distributed to succeed each other at intervals, preceded by pioneers, in order to clear what the advanced body had opened for the guns and stores that were to move under cover of the rear division.

While we were thus engaged, an unremitting rain, extremely unusual at that season, commenced. The ravines were filled with water,—the paths became slippery,—the bullocks lost their footing,—and the troops were obliged to drag the guns and carriages across the whole forest. I

forced on with the advance to Colingoody, in order to make the necessary arrangements with the people of the Zamorin, who had prepared for the future subsistence of the army. The dispositions of the inhabitants towards us, and their means of supply, exceeded our most sanguine expectations. The Zamorin's Vakeel informed the Bra- mins, that we were friends to their cause, and earnest to deliver them from the yoke of Hyder; that we only wished to receive the public proportion of the grain, but none from individuals; and that any person belonging to the camp who should attempt to plunder, would be hanged in front of the lines. On hearing these declarations, they testified the strongest satisfaction; and their confidence increased when they found that the first offenders were executed.—The rains continuing fourteen days without intermission, the passage through the forest became daily more distressful, and the troops were exposed in their whole progress,

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gress, without the possibility of pitching tents, or of procuring for them either cover or convenience.

Colingoody is fifteen miles from Palagatcherry, and the road lies entirely through rice grounds, with intersecting ridges covered with cocoa and other trees. The water and embankments necessary for the cultivation of rice, render it difficult for guns to pass, and impracticable for cavalry to act. As soon as a sufficient force got through the wood, the advanced corps moved to the bank\* of the Paniani river, within random shot of the works of Palagatcherry, where we took a secure position, and prepared to invest the place. My Bramin Harcarrahs† had executed a model of the fort in clay, a work at which they are extremely dexterous; and on all hands we had received accounts of it that appeared

\* November 2d.

† Harcarrahs are people who give intelligence, show roads, &c.

exaggerated; but a near inspection of its strength impressed me with serious apprehensions that much time might be wasted in its reduction.

On the fourth of November, the main body of the troops, not including the rear division, arrived at our position on the river, which we passed next day, and encamped about two miles east from the fort, across the great road that leads from Combatour. The engineers' stores arrived, and a post for them was established, where all the preparations for a siege were collected. As our next object was, to circumscribe the besieged, and accelerate our approaches, with this view we occupied the pettah, or open town, on the east and north faces of the fort: and on each of these faces carried forward an attack. During the whole period of our approaches, and in the construction of our trenches, parallels, and batteries, the besieged kept a continued fire on our covering and

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working



working parties. The battering train and stores, however, under cover of the fourth brigade, reached our encampment on the 9th, after a succession of toil that would appear incredible if recited in detail.

Apprehending much delay from the strength of the works, and the obstinacy of the defenders, especially if they should force us to approach by sap to the crest of the glacis, and to proceed from thence by regular gradations across the ditch, we resolved at a seasonable opportunity to attempt the gateway. We found it so strongly flanked and fortified, that it appeared almost secure from any attack; however, having no draw-bridge, we founded our hopes of accelerating the siege on this circumstance. We did not therefore permit any heavy metal whatever to be fired till the thirteenth, when we opened with twelve guns and four howitzers from two batteries at 400 yards distance from the east and north faces of the fort,  
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and before sunset the defences were so much damaged, that the fire of the besieged considerably abated.

The particulars of our attack, and the surrender of the place during the night, which are explained at full length in my letter of the 15th of November, were not more fortunate than unexpected. We found the fort covered by a respectable glacis, with a good covertway; a very broad and deep ditch, completely reveted; a large berme, and a very strong commanding rampart. The figure of the fort was nearly quadrangular: the dimensions of its faces were 528 feet by 432: each angle was defended by a capacious round bastion with nine embrasures, and a bastion of a similar construction on the centre of each curtain. It had only one entrance, passing through three gateways, mounted a great number of guns upon the works, and contained a garrison of 4000 men.

On the night of the thirteenth, Captain Maitland, with a part of the four flank battalions, took the advantage of a heavy rain to drive the besieged from the covert-way. Being so fortunate as to succeed, he pursued them within the first and as far as the second gateway, where he was stopped, but maintained his ground with great spirit and ability until a reinforcement arrived. This mode of attack so much alarmed the enemy, that they called out for quarter, and put us in possession of a fort capable of making a long and desperate resistance. We found 50,000 pagodas in the place, besides a very large supply of grain, guns, powder, shot, and military stores.

In my letters to your Lordship and the Board on this subject, it appeared necessary for me to be minute in a description of the place, because its consequence and local situation were not accurately known to Europeans. This fortress commands

mands a fertile and extensive district, the adjacent forests abound with the finest Teek timber\* in India, and the river Pani-ani is at hand to float it to the Malabar sea. Palagatcherry, from its position, equally menaces the possessions of Tippoo on the western coast and towards Mysore by the route of Combatour and Gudjerredy; while the movements of the southern army, almost without money or subsistence, except what we procured on our march, afford sufficient proof, that magazines of grain established there would enable armies to penetrate with confidence and security from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, and thus bring the military resources of Madras and Bombay into one point of union and effect.

On the surrender of Palagatcherry, the place was garrisoned by the nineteenth

\* Teek timber is equal, if not superior, to Oak for the purposes of shipbuilding. There is likewise a great quantity of Sandal-wood in the neighbourhood.

battalion, with a few Europeans and some irregulars under Captain Dewar, one of your ablest officers. The heir apparent of the Zamorin left his retirement in the woods, and remained with me during the siege. In answer to his urgent solicitations, that we should restore him to the dominions of which Hyder had deprived his family, I declared, that in the event of our moving by Calicut, we might hope to effect his re-establishment there; and that in the mean while he should be reinstated in the territory of Palagat, an ancient dependency of the Zamorins,—requiring only from him, that he should furnish grain for the army while in that vicinity, without any other obligation, until the conclusion of the war, or until your Government should make some regular agreement with him.

To establish more fully the Zamorin's authority, and to afford him the necessary support in his present situation, a  
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large body of Bramin Harcarrahs, who had constantly remained with me in camp, were employed, and proved not only of great service in the business of intelligence, but of material influence in conciliating the Gentoos. Accompanied by them, we frequently rode through the adjacent villages, assembled the head people, and assured them of protection. During these proceedings I maintained a correspondence with Brigadier General Macleod, Colonel Campbell, and the Residency of Telicherry, intimating my intention of approaching their coast, and assuring General Macleod of my earnest wish to co-operate with him in every measure that could tend to advance us in full force against Seringapatam. Having heard that there was abundance of battering guns and military stores at Telicherry, I wrote for such supplies as could be spared, offering to move down to Paniani or Calicut, and to proceed to Seringapatam, either by the pass of Damalcherry, through the country of  
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our friends the Nyars, or else to return from Paniani or Calicut to Palagatcherry, and from thence by Coimbatour, as he might judge most eligible.

The Admiral Sir Edward Hughes being then at Telicherry with the squadron, I entreated him to send a vessel with stores to Paniani, and, in order to guard against disappointment, dispatched messengers to Cochin, to secure an ample supply at that place. General Macleod with his distinguished liberality of character assured me, that in the event of my moving towards him, he would unite in prosecuting the movement to Seringapatam, without taking any advantage of his seniority, and without interfering in the command of the southern army. Finding, however, that his army could not be put in motion in less than two months, for want of bullocks and conveyance; that no substantial stock of military stores could be expected at Telicherry;

and that we should meet with extreme obstruction in our progress through the deep and intersected routes leading from Palagatcherry to Calicut; we resolved to rely on Cochin for supplies, and to prosecute our measures by Coimbatour, still preserving the utmost union of operation with the Malabar army.

We arrived before Coimbatour on the twenty-sixth of November, having been annoyed with rockets on the march, by a very large body of horse. Finding that there was no glacis, we proceeded immediately to erect a battery, but before we had effected a breach, the Killidar\* surrendered; and on this occasion we treated him and his garrison with the utmost kindness, as we had before done those of Daraporam and Palagatcherry. A great quantity of ammunition, stores, and grain, were found in the fort; and the adjacent grounds were co-

\* *Commander of the fort.*



vered with abundant crops. The possession of this town, being the capital of the greatest antient Rajahship in the country, promised eminent advantage; for although not remarkable on account of its military strength, it is held in higher estimation than any other place belonging to the Mysooreans in the Payen Ghaut, or country below the mountains.

We now arrive at the most interesting moment of the war. The garrison of Mangalore, under its inestimable commander Colonel Campbell, had made a defence that has been seldom equalled and never surpassed. With a handful of men worn out by fatigue and famine, he resisted for many months a formidable army under Tippoo Sultaun. The whole power of that prince, assisted by the science of his French auxiliaries, could not force a breach that had long lain open, and he was repulsed in every attempt to carry it by storm.

Tippoo's

Tippoo's army, particularly the cavalry, had suffered greatly by a perseverance in the siege during the whole period of the rainy season. The interior affairs of his dominions, being unsettled since his recent accession, were in extreme confusion. His failure against Mangalore had encouraged the Corga Rajah, a powerful Chief under the mountains that separate the Malabar country from Myfore, to assert independency by arms; while every other ancient Rajah on the Malabar side of India from Goa to Cochin, was eager to repel the tyranny of the Myfore Government, to which the whole of that extensive coast no longer owned subjection.

General Macleod at the head of the Malabar forces, strong in Europeans, artillery, and native corps, supported these Rajahs, and laboured with his usual energy to complete the system that he had materially promoted. There was likewise a force  
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acting under General Jones, against the Cudapah country, or northern possessions of Tippoo Sultaun, where his power was ill established; and the army under my direction was perhaps the strongest force belonging to Europeans that had ever been employed in India. The countries we had reduced extended 200 miles in length, from the district of Trichinopoly on the east, to Ramgarry, thirty miles west of Palagatcherry, afforded provisions for 100,000 men, and yielded an annual revenue of 600,000*l.*, while every necessary arrangement had been made for the regular collection of these resources.

The fort and pass of Palagatcherry secured our western flank, and the intermediate position of General Macleod's army between that place and Tippoo's main army at Mangalore, together with the singular combination of ravines, rivers and embankments that intersect the Malabar countries,

tries, and the mountains that divide them from Myfore, through which the passes were occupied by our friends the disaffected Rajahs, rendered it almost impracticable for Tippoo to move in that direction against our new acquisitions. To attack them by a movement through the passes of the Ghauts, on the eastern flank towards Salem and Erode, supposed a circuit of five or six hundred miles from the position of Tippoo's army before Mangalore. His movements therefore against these acquisitions could only be attempted by the central pass from Myfore at Gudjereddy, which is not fifty miles in front from Coimbatour: and the possession of that pass assured us an immediate access to the capital of Tippoo's kingdom, commanding a communication with our new acquisitions, and with the Company's southern provinces. Besides, as far as the system of defending front flanks and rear can ever be extended from the position of an army to the topographical

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cal circumstances of a country, it would enable us to secure those territories from any considerable irruptions. At this period too, the chumba or great crop throughout the country was upon the ground, and, independently of the magazines in our front, promised ample provision.

The Corga Rajah had repeatedly promised us supplies from his country, extending within thirty miles of Seringapatam. These promises were confirmed by the Zamorin, who had abundantly furnished us with grain at Palagatcherry. This Prince likewise engaged for the assistance of all the Malabar Chiefs, commanding the ghauts or mountains that bound Myfore upon the west; and convinced us that they were not only willing to provide for us during the siege, but to form magazines in strong positions among the mountains, and to join us with 20 or 30,000 Nyars if required.

Mahomed

Mahomed Ally, and other distinguished leaders, had been executed in the camp of Tippoo, for exciting disaffection. A recent conspiracy had occurred in Seringapatam, menacing the releasement of the English prisoners, the exclusion of Tippoo's family, and the re-establishment of the antient Rana, or Gentoo sovereign of Mysore. In addition to this enumeration of advantages, we had every reason to rely on the Gentoo or Canara race forming the great mass of inhabitants in Mysore, who had unequivocal proofs of my earnest zeal to support their interests and favourite family; while every circumstance of present situation or of future prospect seemed to mark this interesting moment as the crisis of the war.

The troops were immediately provided with ten days grain, the carriages repaired, the departments arranged, and the army prepared to march.● My design against the

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forts and magazines of Settimungulum and Ardenelli \*, was communicated to your Board ; and from thence it was my intention to push forward to the city of Seringapatam with the utmost rapidity that could be united with precaution. Exulting in the bright perspective that lay before us, we felt a painful eagerness for the moment of departure ; our expectations, however, of restoring the English name and consequence in India were of short duration.

Your Lordship and the Board had judged it expedient to delegate your powers of negotiation to commissioners, who were to treat of peace at the Durbar of Tippoo Sultan. Invested with full authority by your Board to give what instructions they thought proper to all troops of the English em-

\* Settimungulum is situated on the banks of the Cavery, below the pass of Gudjerreddy. Ardenelli stands on the top of the ghauts, on the elevated flat or table land of Mysore.

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ployed against the Mysoreans, they proceeded to the camp of Mudeen ul Deen Cawn near Arnee in the Carnatic. Between that place and Atcherry Waukum they received intelligence, that in consequence of information from the Residency of Telicherry, intimating to me a renewal of hostility on the part of Tippoo Sultaun against Mangalore, the army under my command had moved into the enemy's country, and had reduced Palagatcherry. After many compliments to my own conduct and exertions, they directed me forthwith to restore all posts, forts, and countries lately reduced, and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the twenty-sixth of the preceding July. This letter reached me on the twenty-eighth of November, two days before my intended march towards Gudjereddy and Seringapatam. Neither feeling myself at liberty to disregard an order so peremptorily conveyed, nor to fulfil the utmost extent of its literal signification, I



stated to them the benefits of our position, and the menacing appearance on the Malabar coast; transmitting at the same time similar communications to your Board, and intimating my intention of remaining at Coimbatour until I should be farther instructed. My Aid de Camp, Captain Moody, with the same view, proceeded to Madras; and was fully qualified by knowledge and ability to explain our situation, and to prove that a movement to Seringapatam would endanger the throne of Hyder.

During the succeeding interval, every moment was employed in adding to the fulness of our equipment. Rochin Cawn, the commander of Tippoo's army in the country of Coimbatour, was informed, that we would observe the cessation till further orders\*. Captain Maitland, with the flank

\* Habits of intercourse took place between Rochin Cawn's camp and ours, of which there had been no example between contending armies in India.

brigade,

brigade, proceeded to Dindigul and Tanjore, in order to bring supplies of stores from the southern garrisons. Mr. Digby, Paymaster in camp, whose zeal and public talents have on all occasions been conspicuous, went to procure money at Tinivelly, and to concert with Mr. Irwin, Superintendent there, a permanent mode of remittance and supply : and as soon as this reinforcement should be ready to move towards us, it was my intention to fall back and cover the junction. In the mean time the third brigade was detached by Palagatcherry to Cochin, where the Governor had prepared for us a considerable stock of arrack, stores, and ammunition ; while the main body of the army remained at Coimbatour, ready to oppose the enemy. But these and all similar arrangements were rendered abortive by your minutes of consultation dated the fifth of December, directing me to fulfil the order of unqualified restitution enjoined by your Deputies, as the preliminaries of negotiation

with Tippoo Sultaun. These papers reached me about the middle of December, and a few days afterwards I received from the Commissioners another letter, repeating their instructions.

We had entirely consumed the grain in Coimbatour, and all that was ripe in the adjacent fields. We were not at liberty to move in our intended course, nor to look for new supplies, which would have been considered as an infraction of the cessation; it therefore became necessary to return to Palagatcherry, where the troops received grain to subsist them as far as Trichinopoly and Madura, a distance of two hundred miles. On the twenty-eighth of December, the army advanced towards the southern countries; and at the same time three battalions under Captain Wheeler were detached to escort the stores from Cochin, with directions to evacuate Palagatcherry, and to join us by the route of Annamalley and Pylney, close to the  
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the mountains. On our second march we were visited by the Rev. Mr. Swartz, whom your Lordship and the Board requested to proceed to Seringapatam as a faithful interpreter between Tippoo and the Commissioners. The knowledge and integrity of this irreproachable Missionary have retrieved the character of Europeans from imputations of general depravity. A respectable escort attended him to the nearest encampment of the enemy; but he was stopped at Settimungulum, and returned to Tanjore. I rejoice, however, that he undertook the business; for his journal which has been before your Board evinces, that the southern army acted towards our enemies with a mildness seldom experienced by friends in moments of pacification. From him also you learned, that this conduct operated on the minds of the inhabitants, who declared that we afforded them more secure protection than the commanders of their own troops.

The army had now been fed for many months entirely at the expence of the enemy; and directions were given, that all grain found in the country should be served out to the troops in lieu of batta \*, thereby saving to the Company an advance of nearly 500*l.* per day for the whole time the army was so subsisted, and leaving the troops to make their after-claims, in case they should expect to receive that grain on the footing of capture †.

On the fourth of January 1784, the army arrived at Ayryacotta. Colonel Stuart with the main division proceeded to

\* Battas is the extra sum allowed to troops over and above their pay, in lieu of subsistence while in the field.

† Some other armies had charged the Company with the batta due to every soldier in the field, notwithstanding that a sufficiency of grain had been seized for the maintenance of the troops. Thus the amount of the grain found was diverted from public saving to the benefit of individuals. If I had permitted this practice, the Company would have lost 200,000*l.*

Caroor,

Caroor, on the borders of the Trichinopoly country; Colonel Forbes with a strong force, remained in the districts of Daraporam and Dindigul; while Colonel Kelly, with another division, advanced to Cavanore on the borders of Madura and the Marawas. This distribution was intended to relieve your provinces from the burden of subsisting too large a proportion of troops. At the same time the divisions were so stationed, as to overawe every district to the southward, and to form the army on the shortest notice, in the event of a renewal of the war against Tippoo Sultaun.

Having proceeded with the Cavanore division, as the most central situation, to the southward, these arrangements were hardly finished\* when I received your orders to reassemble the army, and to pre-

\* On the twenty-fourth of January 1784.

pare for a recommencement of hostility. You likewise directed me to retain possession of Palagatcherry, in case by any accident it should have been restored. I instantly issued orders to all the garrisons and stations to augment our equipment; wrote to Mr. Sullivan, Mr. Hippisley, and the other Gentlemen in the civil departments, intreating them to procure bullocks, gunney bags, and money for the pressing exigencies of the army: and farther made a circuit of the southern countries to accelerate these preparations. From Ramnad I went to Tinivelly to forward the business of money and conveyance, collecting for us there by Mr. Irwin; and from thence wrote to the Zamorin, exhorting him to retain Palagatcherry, which he had occupied after it was abandoned by Captain Wheeler. Captain Agnew was soon afterwards dispatched with a party of Sepoys, to solicit four battalions from the Rajah of Travancore, who very graciously complied with  
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my request; and by means of that assistance, Captain Agnew would no doubt have enabled the Zamorin to maintain the place, had not the Zamorin\* and his adherents, despairing of support, abandoned the fort, and retired to their recesses in the mountains.

On the north-east border of the Tinnivelly country, a letter reached me from the Commissioners, dated the eleventh of February near Mangalore, and written in terms which not only marked the enmity of Tippoo, but convinced me that a rupture was unavoidable; and this opinion was afterwards confirmed by a detail of particulars, in a letter from General Macleod. No time was therefore to be lost in ordering the stores to join Colonel Stuart's division near

\* The Zamorin and his followers of the Nyar cast are rigid Gentoos, and venerate the Bramins. Tippoo's soldiers, therefore, daily exposed the heads of many Bramins in sight of the fort. It is asserted that the Zamorin, rather than witness such enormities, chose to abandon Palagacherry.



Caroor, and we marched the same night to Madura.

On my arrival at Covanore\*, I found that fanams†, amounting to a lack of pagodas, had reached the camp from Tanjore. The impatience of the troops for this supply was proportioned to the severity of their distress; excepting the prize-money at Palagatcherry, and the working money to the parties employed on extra labour, no sums had been issued to the army during our whole progress, in crossing and re-crossing India. Unfortunately the coin in which this payment was received, became a more copious source of discontent, than all the hardships they had endured. The star pagoda‡ is understood to be the only legal tender of your Presidency: it

\* Colonel Kelly's division was stationed there: it is on the confines of the Marawa country, less than twenty miles from Madura.

† Fanams are a small coin of different value, composed of silver and copper.

‡ The star pagoda is worth eight shillings.

is not coined to the southward, but its place had usually been supplied by the Porto Novo pagoda, which is less valuable by ten per cent. The Rajah of Tanjore has not exercised the right of coining pagodas, and of late has paid his tribute\* in fanams. The Dutch coinage at Negapatam formerly amounted to four or five lacks of pagodas annually, but this has been discontinued since we got possession of that city. As there is no gold coinage in any other place to the southward, nor any regular circulation of rupees, the whole currency of those provinces, exceeding the pagodas that happen to be in use, consists of fanams; of these every district coins a different sort, and no comparative rate having ever been established between the star pagodas and those inferior coins, their value fluctuates according to the

\* The tribute amounts to four lacks of pagodas, or 160,000*l*.

relative demand, and the coinage of one province is seldom or never at par in another.

Whenever it is known that a large issuing of fanams is at hand, the Shroffs, Soucars, and Dubashes\*, purchase all the pagodas they can procure. Thus the fanams are kept at a high price, till the disbursement has taken place, and the rate is fixed at the current exchange for the day. But no sooner has this fluctuating coin been circulated, than the pagodas come forth, and in forty-eight hours the holders of fanams suffer a depreciation of six, eight, or ten per cent. Still more oppressive is this medium of public payment, when the fanams are issued in a province to which they do not properly belong: for the Tanjore fanam has no regular currency in any

\* Shroffs, Soucars, and Dubashes, are money changers, bankers, and black agents of the Europeans.

other

other province. And this applies to all coins of that description, fabricated in Tritchinopoli, Madura, Tinivelly, Ramnad, and Shevigunga.

The commercial evils from this debasement and diversity of coin are not less considerable. A merchant cannot make a remittance to any place north of the Coleroon, without much trouble and expence in purchasing pagodas, or else by an unreasonable premium to Soucars. The money remitted to the army from Tanjore was issued in Tanjore fanams, at the rate of twenty-two and an half per star pagoda : but when the Sepoys received this money in distant encampments, they found that twenty-four or twenty-five fanams were required for a pagoda there ; nor could they in many instances, without enormous loss, procure the necessaries of life for those uncurrent fanams.

To prevent as much as possible the troops from suffering by a loss upon exchange, which in common justice should fall upon the public, it was proposed to Mr. Sullivan, and immediately acceded to by him, that the paymaster should carry the difference to the account of the Company. It was therefore directed, that the officers commanding divisions of the army, should form a Board to ascertain the loss sustained by each battalion, and Mr. Digby, paymaster in camp, was instructed to give credit to the corps for the amount of loss incurred, agreeably to the general statement transmitted to me by the abovementioned Board.

It appeared requisite to be minute in this recapitulation, in order to impress the necessity of reform in the southern payments. This will be effected, by ordering a large coinage of pagodas, and by establishing a tariff or proportional value between the pagodas and fanams, in the same manner as  
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in England twenty-one shillings are at all times equivalent to a guinea.

My next object was to concert measures with Mr. Sullivan for the safety of the southern countries, while the army should, for the third time, advance into the enemy's dominions. With this view I proceeded to Tanjore, and from thence by Trichinopoly joined the main division at Caroor. You had been pleased to reinforce us from the Presidency with the ninety-eighth regiment, a party of European artillerymen, and some heavy ordnance. Other guns were received from Tanjore, and the exertions of Mr. Sullivan procured us many articles in which we had been before deficient.

During my late progress through the southern countries, Mr. Digby called forth every exertion of his personal credit, and in addition to conveyance for the whole ordnance, ammunition, and stores of the army, he

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had actually provided carriage complete for 300,000 sears of rice; which at the rate of one sear per day for 15,000 men, amounted to twenty days provision, exclusive of other conveyance, amounting to ten days more. The main body of the army was assembled at Caroor, excepting the division with Colonel Forbes, which remained in force at Daraporam, ready to join at the shortest notice. Nothing farther was wanting but specific orders from your Lordship and the Board, or from the Commissioners, to re-commence hostility; and I had still a plan of operations in view, that promised to lead us to the capital of Mysore by a route not less favourable than that which we had been directed to relinquish, in case it should have been judged necessary to renew the war. This event became extremely probable from the recent conduct of our adversaries. Previously to my arrival at Caroor a foraging party had been attacked, and an European officer, who fell into the enemy's hands,

hands, was closely confined at Sankarydurgum. The second battalion had been advanced from General Jones's force to the northward, and was entirely cut to pieces by Tippoo's troops near Cumalum; while Tippoo himself, finding that the southern army was ordered to abandon his country, and that no other force could venture to oppose him, persisted in his investment of Mangalore, and compelled that distinguished garrison to yield at last to the necessity of famine, and surrender the place\*.

Notwithstanding the flagrant treachery by which Mangalore was lost, and the deliberate massacre of General Mathews, with many other captive English officers, the treaty of peace was mutually signed on the eleventh of February, and exchanged between the Commissioners and Tippoo Sul-

\* Colonel Campbell marched off with his few remaining troops to Telicherry, agreeably to the stipulation with Tippoo, and died soon after, worn out with fatigue.



taun\*. The treaty specified the enlargement of the Bushwanna or Amuldar of Palagatcherry, whom we had detained in order to give evidence concerning the murder of a party of Europeans taken prisoners near Palagat, at the time that Colonel Humberstone's army was before that place†. He was sent with an escort to the camp of Nawas Begg, and from thence returned me his thanks for the good treatment he experienced. This was the only subject of Tip-

\* As I have stated at some length the circumstances that led me to consider a continuation of the war as eligible, it might be expected that I should also have explained the many and perhaps unanswerable arguments that induced the government of Madras to adopt a contrary conduct. In addressing that Board, an enumeration of those arguments would have been superfluous and impertinent; but it would be an injustice to the merit of their determination, if I omitted here to remark, that the tenor of instructions from home, the state of negotiations in Europe and the impoverished condition of the Company's territories, concurred to impress the ablest men in India with the propriety and necessity of that measure, which procured to Lord Macartney's Government the warmest acknowledgments and approbation of their superiors.

† This party was put to death by the express order of Tippoo Sultaun,

poo who had not been immediately released, although nearly 10,000 prisoners had been taken by us during the operations of the southern army. The Commissioners also directed me to restore the forts and countries of Caroor and Daraperam, but to retain possession of Dindigul, and to station a strong force there until the English prisoners should be actually enlarged.

No time was lost in evacuating the specified countries; and on the first of April Colonel Forbes's division moved to Dindigul, and Colonel Stuart fell back from Caroor upon the province of Trichinopoly, with instructions to deposit all the stores and heavy ordnance of the army in that garrison. While we remained at Dindigul, the troops in that quarter suffered a continuation of fatigue, and were obliged to march seventy miles to the head of the Outumpollum valley, to receive the grain necessary for their current subsistence.

In obedience to your orders desiring my opinion on the most advantageous mode of reforming and arranging the southern forces, I had the honour, on the twenty-sixth of April, to express my sentiments on that important subject\*, and stated that the vicinity of Trichinopoly was the most eligible position for a cantonment, where a strong force, complete in every circumstance of field equipment, should at all times be stationed;—that the great deposit of military stores and provisions should be formed there, with the field and battering train, pioneers, and main body of the southern artillery;—that the Commandants of corps should be charged with the carriage of their battalion-tents, stores, and ammunition, as well as rice, if requisite, at the usual rates specified in the Company's regulations. It was also suggested, that whenever military aid should be found necessary

\* See that Letter in the Appendix.

for the interior business of the country, the civil Chiefs, Residents, and Superintendants should address their applications, not to the subordinate officers casually employed in the different districts, but to the Southern Commander, in order that the requisition might be complied with from the main station or cantonment of the southern forces. By these means the troops would be preserved in a constant state of discipline, the jarings incident to the detail of subordinate interference between civil and military would be avoided, and every corps would have a rotation of detachment duty. An immediate reduction of Peons, Ty-nauts, and other irregulars, was also recommended, to the amount of 10,000 men; from whence a monthly saving of 25 or 30,000 pagodas would arise. I flattered myself, that the adoption of arrangements proposed in that letter would have removed the deficiencies under which the southern forces labour; and that, in the event of

hostility in that part of India, they would have added such vigour to your operations as would have precluded a renewal of those calamities which occurred during the Carnatic war.

By the end of May, it became impracticable to sustain so large a force in the Dinidigul country. A strong garrison was therefore left in that fortress, and the division was withdrawn towards Madura, where the Europeans and some native corps were cantoned. As soon as the review of the battalions was finished, which had engaged me for several months, three battalions were detached under Captain Wheeler to the Tinivelly country; and, at the same time, it became necessary for me to move thither in person in order to arrange a permanency of payment and supply for the troops in that province. Some occurrences which happened there respecting the Polygars, Catambominaigue, and Shevigherry, were immediately

diately communicated to your President ; and evinced the refractory disposition of that race. From Tinivelly I proceeded by Negapatam and Tanjore to Trichinopoly, in order to provide by personal endeavours for the distresses of the troops.

It now remained for me to undergo a duty more painful than all the embarrassments hitherto experienced. Your Lordship and the Board found it requisite to order a reduction of many thousand independents, and other southern irregulars, who had been raised by his Highness the Nabob Mahomed Ally. During the whole period of misfortunes to the southward, they still bore the rigour of distress with a resignation, unknown to Europeans. Among these men, there were the most respectable soldiers of the east ; some of them had followed their fathers into the Carnatic, in the days of Dooft Ally, and Anwaradeen Cawn : others had remained in  
the

the service since the days of Chunda Saheb, and the deposed Rana or Gentoo queen of Trichinopoly. Many of them had continued since the campaigns of Lawrence, Clive, and Ifoof Cawn, in a constant series of military duty. To these wretched adherents, an average of twelve months pay was due. The misfortunes of the times rendered it impossible to discharge those claims, for the regular corps of the army were not less in arrears: under such circumstances, to turn them loose to misery, while the country was in a state that could afford them no relief, would have distressed the most unfeeling mind. They assailed me daily with their sufferings, and the only expedient was adopted, that promised to combine the duties of obedience with the obligations of humanity, by directing the officers commanding the corps of those irregulars, to furnish me with rolls, containing the names of each black officer and Sepoy under their command, specifying

ing the length of service, and arrears of pay; in order that each of them might receive a certificate of his demand on the Company, to be countersigned by the officer, and by the commandant of the garrison with which the corps corresponded; and at the same time desiring a particular recommendation of every individual who had any pretension to indulgence.

This being finished, our next object was, to disband the raw and undeserving rabble, who had been collected during the distracted period of the southern affairs. They were ordered to receive on the first of each succeeding month, thirty days subsistence in grain, until their arrears should be discharged. The ancient and respectable part of those corps, were to be continued on the rolls, until we should be able to procure some adequate provision for so deserving a class of public servants. In neither instance however,  
did



did my endeavours prove effectual. The latter class of venerable veterans remains unprovided for; and the monthly issuing of grain depending on your renters and civil servants, it was not within the limits of my power to enforce performance. So much was it neglected by the renter of Trichinopoly, that after my departure from the southward, these unfortunate victims, impelled by hunger, were driven to such excess in their endeavours to procure relief, as obliged the military commandant to repress them by force of arms.

To these painful incidents were added, the claims and distresses of the army encamped near Trichinopoly. The troops were accustomed to endure twelve or fourteen months arrears with unexampled forbearance, and the public followers, attendants on the army, had long been strangers to any coin; when to this was added, a failure of their daily allowance of grain

grain in lieu of batta, their case would have been truly desperate, had not Tondiman advanced a month's provision for their relief. Such were the abuses of the renter at Trichinopoly, that in a favourable season the place was menaced by famine. His disinclination to have a division stationed in the district, suggested so strange a mode of effecting their removal. But by this machination any troops less patient than ours would have been excited to revolt; and the fort of Trichinopoly would have fallen to Tippoo, if he had thought proper to invest it at the moment.

So urgent was our distress that I found myself obliged, without any previous communication, to disperse the troops in quest of subsistence; the 78th to Tanjore, the Hanoverians towards Tripatore, a large body of Sepoys towards Madura, and other battalions to Mellore and the Marawas.— At the same time the 101st, and soon after the

the 98th, were ordered to the Presidency, to embark from thence for Bengal in their way to Europe.

Your Lordship and the Board were fully impressed with the necessity of reducing the public followers and field establishment of the army, in order to lighten the burden of expenditure, and to liquidate part of those arrears already incurred; but the protraction of the treaty with Tippoo unavoidably induced you to defer that measure, until the mutual restitution of Amboor and Dindigul should be effected. That event at last took place, while his cruel massacre was strong in every memory, while his insulting treatment of those whom he released excited general indignation, and while his detention of 200 \* English

\* He had made them be circumcised and enrolled in his service.

prisoners

prisoners seemed to preclude all pacific expectations\*.

I hastened to Fort St. George, to lay before your Right Honourable President, a faithful statement of your southern affairs; of our proceedings and expenditure; as well as to explain the meritorious conduct of the troops in that quarter, and the eminent exertions made by Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of the civil departments; to prove that even their abilities had not been able entirely to correct the evils hitherto inherent in the southern system; and to point out resources for the speedy liquidation of the army arrears; it was my

\* I must again be permitted to remark, that such were the embarrassments and distress under which the different Presidencies laboured, that, notwithstanding these incidents, the treaty of peace with Tippoo Sultaun was generally considered as a measure eligible for the English interests in India: It is also a prevalent opinion, that if the negotiations had not been conducted under some unfavourable circumstances, the distinguished knowledge and abilities of Sir George Staunton were peculiarly adapted to procure the most beneficial terms.

inten-

intention from thence to have embarked with my own regiment for Bengal, where I should have been senior officer of the King's service, and second in command on that establishment; but I could not think of withdrawing from the southern station while any thing remained for me to represent in behalf of your southern forces.

Permit me now, My Lord and Gentlemen, to offer my best apologies for the tediousness of this recapitulation.—It exhibits various incidents, in their rise, progress, and completion. In this view, it may prove not altogether uninteresting to that class of public servants who wish to derive after-information from past transactions.—At all events, I presume, it has sufficiently evinced that our endeavours having proved less permanently advantageous than might have been expected, arose from the circumstances under which we acted, and  
can

can neither be attributed to me, nor to the army I commanded.

It is fully known to your Board, that the system of conciliation to which Mr. Sullivan and myself had rigidly adhered \*, does not accord with the opinions of any considerable portion of either service. Various circumstances of contention had for many years excited enmity between the civil and military.—These habits of disunion were greatly strengthened during the government of Sir Thomas Rumbold, when the pretensions of your subordinate Chiefs were either established or confirmed. By the regulations alluded to, the commandant of a garrison or province came under the detail command of the civil Chief. The Chief received reports and paroles, kept the

\* Notwithstanding the dissensions that raged among all ranks of Europeans in India, I had the good fortune to avoid every species of discussion, having neither exhibited a charge, nor been the subject of complaint from any person in the country.

keys of the garrison, and had direction of stores, magazines, and defences in the fort. Hence it happened during the late war, that the command was not delegated to the military officer until the enemy were in motion against the place. Then it was only so delegated, that the Chief might provide for his own safety, and throw the odium of surrender on the Commander. Thus, instead of a regular military control, a systematic animosity prevailed: the magazines were left without grain, the garrisons without stores, and the country so destitute of preparation\*, that on the irruption of Hyder Ally, the forts in the Carnatic fell an easy prey to the invader. These irritations were too frequently increased by military vehemence on the one hand, and by assumptions of the civil service on the other.

As the natives of Indostan have little respect for any but the military character,

\* Before the commencement of the war, the forts throughout the Carnatic were in general under the orders of the Nabob's government.

the

the civil servants, in order to acquire consequence, have usually assumed a superiority over the military. Thus the Chief or Resident was frequently held forth as the Phouzdar or General of the province, who was prevented by greater objects from taking the field, but whose mandates the soldiery were bound to obey. The recent contests between Government and the military Commanders, together with the unusual proportion of king's officers lately employed in India, have unavoidably thrown into circulation a greater mass of opinions adverse to the civil service, and given a greater currency to military pretensions, than could be expected from the officers of your own establishment: to these irritating circumstances has been added, the extreme pressure of personal distress in a pernicious climate, where there is perpetual hostility and continued fatigue.



During the late war, many officers were obliged to sell their furniture and wearing apparel, in order to procure a scanty subsistence; while others could not possibly find means of appearing as became their station. If a pittance of their arrears was to be advanced, it often came attended with circumstances so singularly disreputable, that nothing short of penury could justify the offer or acceptance; if in Company's bonds, they were hardly negotiable; if in Bengal bills, the holders of them lost thirty, forty, or fifty per cent; and if the payment took place in an out-garrison, the discretion or caprice of the paymaster alone determined the mode of payment. Needy officers, at the mercy of such a superior, have frequently submitted to receive a month's arrears in rice, teas, wines, and other merchandize\*. When these and similar incidents

\* The distresses of the country, the want of money, and the calamities of war, rendered it impracticable for the Board

dents recur to your remembrance ; when you recollect how patiently your troops have suffered, and how bravely they have fought ; you will undoubtedly admit, that their present discontents are not ill founded, and that their grievances call loudly for redress.

It is by the good order and efficiency of the military constitution alone, that the English dominions in the East can be preserved. This is requisite, not merely to repel invasion, but for the current business of your possessions, which you have never yet been able to conduct without military power. If therefore, an habitual intervention of the military in detail of civil management, justifies the appellation of military government, there is no country

Board of Madras to prevent these evils ; on the contrary, the important operations effected by that Government, under the pressure of such embarrassments, is one of the strongest testimonies that can be adduced in proof of their talents, fortitude, and exertion.

on earth so peculiarly entitled to that designation as the English settlements in India. Besides, as no country can be more habituated to convulsions, wars, and revolutions, it follows that the public endeavours should be strenuously directed to obtain perfection in the military system.

When we compare the discipline of your troops, and the constitution of your armies, with those of other European powers in India, the superiority is evidently with the English: but when we look back to the days of Clive and Lawrence, to the smallness of their force, and the magnitude of their achievements, we must confess that more recent occurrences have exhibited a mortifying contrast. The history of many years preceding the period of your Government, is filled with the detail of our impolicy. The best regiments of cavalry upon the Coast were driven from the Nabob's service to the enemy. Garrisons  
were

were left destitute of military stores, or provision: shameful aggressions\* were committed against every native power: unjust wars were unskilfully conducted: there were neither preparations, concert, nor precaution: forts fell at the first summons, detachments were cut off, armies were captured, countries depopulated, a ruinous contest† was concluded by a degrading pacification, only to make way for still more humiliating events; the troops were starving, the treasury empty, all credit gone, and all ranks dissatisfied. The empire of opinion, which we had obtained in India, was thrown away; and there remained a manifest impossibility of maintaining the territorial empire in its wasted and distracted condition.

These form but an incomplete enumeration of circumstances that mark the hasty progress of our decline. The Arabs have

\* No faith in our treaties.

† War of 1767 with Hyder.

fallen, the Moors have degenerated, the Portuguese have decayed, the Dutch have dwindled, the French are bereft of territory: all of them have been great and powerful, and conquerors in India; all of them have paid the forfeit of misconduct. The English having attained a loftiness of situation in the East beyond the most aspiring fancy of their rivals, are now precipitating from their elevation; and thus they are leaving a monitory example to all future innovators, that no energy of former achievement or extent of actual power can support a Government while wasting with internal principles of dissolution.

If we are to look for a renovation of the English interests in India, it must arise from such exertions as those of your Right Honourable President. The difficulties with which you have successfully contended, the counteraction you have experienced, and your ability under most perplexing circumstances,

stances, yield a well-grounded expectation, that in the prosecution of a general and digested reform, your labours would be crowned with the utmost brilliancy of success.

Of all the objects within your Presidency, the improvement of your military system is the most urgent and the least difficult. The discipline and manœuvres of the European and Sepoy infantry, as well as of your artillery and the few cavalry in your service, are formed on the best models of Europe; and it is asserted that, before the war, their appearance would have done credit to any service, while their gallantry and endurance form a subject of historical applause.

The officers upon the coast are habituated to act in emergencies with a facility that few subordinate officers in Europe ever  
have

have a prospect of acquiring. Before an officer attains the rank of Captain, he must unavoidably have been often charged with the command of parties on distant marches, in the conveyance of stores, in the guard of posts and strongholds, in the business of collection, and in menacing of refractory Polygars, together with every other series of duty which can occur. From hence it will be found, that there are few services indeed where so many men possess the practical requisites of an officer. How strongly have zeal, knowledge, and ability been exemplified during the late contest, by those who command your Sepoy battalions?—With what address did they soothe the sufferings of their soldiers, relieve their wants, and restrain the well-grounded clamours of men, whom the public necessities had left in extremity of distress! These considerations suggest the benefit of restraining indiscriminate admission into the service,

service, and of selecting a succession of deserving officers for the command of all your corps.

The higher orders of your service, no doubt, possess in a still stronger degree the practical advantages now described: but as the military rise in India is by rotation without purchase, it is scarcely possible to become a field officer in less than twenty years. Few constitutions are equal, in that climate, to so long a series of fatigue. Besides, your field officers in general command the considerable garrisons. As they regimentally belong to the four battalions of your two regiments of European infantry, these corps are frequently left to the junior Captains, who are solicitous of procuring appointments to the Sepoys, and take little interest in the discipline of the Europeans. But may not the command of an European corps be rendered permanent and advantageous, like those in England?

May



May not the condition of ancient officers be relieved by the establishment of half-pay, and the permission of selling their commissions? By these means, those who are disqualified for zealous execution of their duty, might retire with a provision for their after-days, and give opportunities of advancement to others more earnest in pursuit of military reputation.

The growing strength and discipline of your enemies, and our late disasters, point out the wisdom of Sir Eyre Coote's requisitions for an increase of Europeans to form the central strength of your armies. He maintained that at least 10,000 Europeans should be constantly complete for service in the three Presidencies. An objection has arisen from the quick mortality occasioning a burdensome demand for new supplies of men; but this may be in a great measure remedied, by salutary preparations for the reception of the recruits from Europe,—by  
stationing

stationing them in healthy quarters, enforcing regularity, and restraining the sale of arrack and other pernicious liquors.

With regard to your Sepoys, the public should be watchful of their discipline, and liberal to confirm their attachment. It is by their good conduct that your settlements have hitherto been preserved, and to them you are to trust for after-stability. That they are partial to your service, is evinced by recent experience. Let them receive the common justice due to every soldier; let them be regularly paid and enabled to subsist their families;—let the wise institution of admitting the children of wounded or deserving Sepoys, to be enrolled and to draw pay from the battalions, be continued; and the Black officers be treated with indulgence and respect. It is farther requisite that the mode of issuing pay be so amended as to remove any possible imputation of fraudulent exactions committed  
against

against the Sepoys, by usurious advances of money in the moments of distress, by undue stoppages for articles which either have not been furnished or are overcharged, and by other unjustifiable practices. In that case we may venture to pronounce, that while their expertness in manœuvre, the interior œconomy of the battalions, and the conduct of their officers, continue to inspire them with a sense of superiority, no probable events can shake their adherence. As the European officers on the Coast are not generally conversant with the country languages, it may be farther proper to direct, that every one aspiring to the command or adjutancy of a Sepoy corps, should first learn the Moorish or Malabar dialect.

Although I cannot persuade myself, that it is judicious to admit Parias\* into battalions with men of reputable casts†; yet

\* Parias are the outcasts of the country, and are held to be impure by the Gentoos.

† Casts mean the different classes or sects to which Gentoos belong.

affuredly the mixture of Moormen, Rajahpoots, Gentoos, and Malabars in the same corps, is extremely beneficial, for it stimulates by emulation, and restrains all dangerous confederacies, which cannot escape the jealousy of contending sects. I have also recommended the corps of Topassees or descendants of Europeans, who retain the characteristic qualities of their progenitors. They form a check upon the other native troops, and are more easily maintained in movements of difficulty; for they eat any food like Europeans, and that corps would also become a nursery for hundreds of children who are yearly lost to the community.

The expences attending your cavalry have deprived you of that essential constituent of an army. Indeed, the strange impolicy which drove four well-appointed regiments from the Nabob's service to that of Hyder, has left you with scarcely a  
suffi-

*sufficiency of horse to form a grand guard in front of your main army.*—All parties admit the necessity of augmenting that branch of your establishment; especially as your enemy\* can bring more than 60,000 horsemen into the field. But the extravagant rates at which your troop horses are purchased, the still more extravagant price at which they are maintained, the unreasonable pay of your troopers, and the lavish allowances to cavalry officers, render it almost chimerical to suggest the means of new modelling that service.

Notwithstanding these objections, a plan had occurred to me, which, if it had been my lot to remain in India, should have been submitted to your consideration, for raising 5,000 horse at a moderate rate.—The troopers to receive only a small proportion of pay more than the infantry, and

\* Tippoo Sultan. The Marattas can bring 100,000, and the Nizam 60,000 horse into the field.

the horses to be fed at a very reduced allowance, without any farther contract, contingency, or extra charge.—Thus the expence of a cavalry establishment would be brought within the limits of the Coast finances. Neither would any engagements on the part of Government be required, except that the officer charged with the execution should be established in one of the great northern stations, and that the Nizam, as well as other country Powers, should admit his agents to purchase horses freely throughout their territories. Lastly, that Government should order all renters and collectors of revenue in the possessions of the Company and of the Nabob not to charge more than eight shillings, or one pagoda *per* 100 measures, for all the gram\* furnished to the cavalry, which, at the rate of one pagoda *per* month, would be an allowance to each horse of more than three measures *per* day.

\* A kind of pulse on which horses are fed in India.

The artillery has become a great instrument of military operations in the system of Indian warfare, and has maintained a reputation hardly surpassed in any service. It may not however be unnecessary to observe, that the augmentation of so ponderous a machinery is attended with unsupportable expence, and obstructs those sudden and unexpected movements by which the great events in India have been achieved. But whether it is to be continued on an extended or contracted scale, the department of stores, artificers, and conveyance, forming the great appendage of the artillery, calls aloud for reformation.

It has already been suggested, that all the corps ought to be equipped with a sufficiency of artificers and conveyance for the repairs and movements of their own baggage, stores, and ammunition. Thus they will be at all times ready for emergencies, and the store department will be relieved

relieved from the embarrassment of carrying musket ammunition, with which it is at present encumbered, as well as with various other articles belonging to the battalions.

The numerous body of *Lascars*, artificers, and other public followers attached to that department, constitute the next object of consideration. They should assuredly be regimented, or formed into corps under the command of European officers, responsible for their conduct, proficiency, and regular receipt of pay. From the want of such an arrangement during the late distresses, all regular disbursements to the troops were impeded, and the public followers were often shamefully neglected. Much benefit would also be derived from separating the complement belonging to the field and battering train; and from establishing in each cantonment a commissary of stores, provided with every article necessary to enable the division to which he belongs,



to move on the shortest notice, without reference to the store-keepers of garrisons, who are not sufficiently under military control to be entrusted with military preparation.

It is farther extremely requisite, that your corps of Pioneers should be encreased, not only for the sake of expertness and dispatch in the preparations of a siege, but to facilitate the rapid movements of your armies. So attentive was Hyder to this branch of his establishment, that he seldom maintained fewer than 5,000 Commooty men, or Pioneers, who preceded his line, cleared the roads, and enabled him to move with a celerity seldom equalled by Europeans.

The abuses\* and deficiencies in your bullock department, have long been the subject of complaint. When Sir Eyre

\* The great mass of army conveyance in India, is performed by bullocks.

Coote in 1782 required 30,000 bullocks, to enable the Carnatic army to move with effect, the total number actually serving with it did not, I believe, exceed 9,000 ; nor has that army ever been able to procure a complement for distant operations. To this cause has been chiefly attributed the failure of the Carnatic war, and indeed the evil in question seems almost beyond a remedy ; for the principal black men, who used to engage their bullocks\* in your service, have been suffered to run muster upon muster in arrears, after spending their stock, and straining their credit on the public faith : and at last, such have been the distresses of the times, with more than twelve months of unliquidated balance due to them, and after having lost many hundreds of their cattle through fatigue and sickness, they

\* The rate at which bullocks are hired for the public service is two and a half pagodas per month for a draught bullock, and two pagodas for a carriage bullock. The southern army hired them for less by a half pagoda per month, or twenty-five per cent.

have been dismissed from the Company's employment.

It was not by such means that the English character became respectable in this country. There was a period no farther distant than the days of General Lawrence, when the natives of Indostan held the engagements of an Englishman to be unalterable; they represented him with all the attributes of prowess in war, and of justice in peace. Thus confidence and veneration were so mingled in their estimation of him, that their sensations of security were stronger under an English authority, than under the best of their native princes. In those days the purse of the individual was ever open to the public exigency, for every individual confided in the faith and credit of the public. It must be confessed that a strict adherence to engagement, and the sanctity of public faith, were never more conspicuous than under your Government,  
but

but unfortunately the misconduct of your predecessors left you destitute of means to maintain that promptitude of disbursement, and liberality of reward, by which the English first rose to elevation in India.

The next material object is, the department of Engineers, including not only preparations for besieging, but the defensive condition of your forts. You have a respectable corps of Engineers, under an officer distinguished for his talents of arrangement. An official enquiry into the actual state and deficiencies of provisions, ammunition, and other military stores, would enable you to ascertain the specific complement that should at all times be preserved in every garrison of Coromandel.

The inspection and descriptive report of all the southern garrisons, which are the most important on your Coast, have long ago been completed ; for, as soon as the army

returned from the enemy's country, Captain Byres\* was requested by me to undertake a survey of Tanjore, Trichinopoly, Madura, Pallamcottah, and Ramnad. This he executed with the utmost ability, and also transmitted to your Presidency a statement of every particular respecting those garrisons, expressed in accurate and comprehensive terms: there remains little farther therefore, except to bestow a similar attention on the other forts, and above all, most rigidly to enforce obedience to such orders, for replenishing the magazines, and augmenting the complement of stores, as your Engineers and a Committee of Inspection may suggest. But vain will these measures prove, unless the stores, magazines, and fortifications, be subjected to severe and periodical examinations, and unless the Commandant of the place be enabled to enforce your instructions. On the other hand, if the military store-keepers and civil managers

\* Chief Engineer to the southward.

be suffered to disregard all orders of the Commandant, in the direction of the magazines, and preparations for defence, assuredly the responsibility in moments of attack should likewise be transferred to them, that there might be some restraint, at least, on their negligence or indiscretion.

The late degrading scenes of surrender without resistance at Arcot, Cuddalore, Permacoil, and almost at every other place\* where the enemy made any vigorous attack, have suggested an æconomical expedient of destroying many inferior garrisons throughout the country. But your Board will recollect, that every thing was venal on the Coast for years before Hyder ventured an invasion;—that he had secretly purchased the Killidarships† of Arnee, Gingee, Carnatic Gur, Thiagar, and various other posts of strength. These he filled with emissaries of his own, who, on

\* Vellore and Wandivash were the only exceptions.

† Killidar is the Moorish Commandant of a place.

his first approach, secured the European officer, if there was one, and surrendered: for those important places were entirely garrisoned by undisciplined dependents of the Nabob. But unless these or similar posts are re-occupied, filled with supplies, and defended by regulars, there can be no security of communication and subsistence; much less can offensive measures be effected from the Carnatic into the enemy's country. It will farther be found almost impracticable to repeople the Carnatic, without forts and strong holds; for the inhabitants fly from situations that afford not protection against predatory cavalry\*.

Besides replenishing these inferior forts, the country cannot be secure without better regulation in your considerable garrisons,

\* On this question it is but justice to remark that the best military opinions are divided; and at any rate there is little doubt, that if there were a respectable body of cavalry on the Coast establishment, the necessity of maintaining the inferior forts would in a great measure cease.

and

and a distribution of your remaining force into three great frontier cantonments. The main or central one in the Carnatic, somewhere between Arcot and Vellore; the second, or southern one, near Trichinopoly; and the third at Ellore, or in some other northern position. The last would enable you to act in defence of the Circars, in conjunction with the Nizam, or against Tippoo's northern possessions of Cudapah and Kanoul, as circumstances might require. Were the main body of your forces thus established in a connected range upon the enemy's frontiers, the movements of the Carnatic army would no longer continue circumscribed and inefficient as they have been; neither would Tippoo dare to penetrate into your possessions, lest you should retaliate with superior facility against his own.

But we cannot expect a permanency of arrangement in the present indefinite state  
of



of military command:—while the power that should direct and the power that should obey are at variance, while the subordinates are at the mercy of contradictory orders from contending authorities,—nothing but counteraction can ensue. The inferior officer looks not to his commander for preferment, nor cares for his displeasure, provided his acquiescence with the civil interest can procure him an appointment. The condition of the Commander is still more humiliating:—without weight to resist the encroachments of the civil service, his opposition only exposes his weakness, and his compliance infallibly forfeits the confidence of the army:—involved in odious discussions, and being overwhelmed with committee business, a very small portion of his thoughts is bestowed upon the duties of his station. Hence, for years past, there have been no regular reviews, no inspection of the troops on the part of the Commander in chief,—no enforcement of the  
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established regulations of the Coast service, and so little encouragement of parade duty, that the discipline of the army depends solely at this time on the meritorious attention of subordinate officers.

There appears but one remedy for these inveterate evils. While the power of a Governor rests upon a different basis from that of a Commander in chief, the passion for superiority will occasion violent and dangerous collision. The mass of the civil service espouse the cause of their Governor; the body of the army range under the banners of their General. The first are able and united;—the others are superior in vehemence and number. The discontented of the civil service make common cause with the military;—the obsequious of the military take shelter under the wing of civil patronage. Hence a general ferment is excited:—The civil service prosecute their measures with methodical assiduity;—  
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the military indulge in clamorous excess. The grounds of discontent are communicated to the numerous attendants who surround all Europeans:—from these they spread through other classes of the natives, and extending over the peninsula involve every Englishman in the hatred and contempt of all India. The Asiatics cannot enter into European distinctions of participated power:—while they behold Generals seizing Governors, and Governors arresting Generals, they necessarily think ill of either situation.

So indispensable in all Eastern Government is power undisputed and control without counteraction, that we cannot hope to see a period put to these calamities until authority shall issue from one source, and flow in one equal undivided stream. Were this the case,—were the powers of Governor and Commander in chief united in the same person, still subjecting all public acts of  
Govern-

Government to the voice of a council or committee, the civil and military would forget their animosities ; and instead of regarding each other as contending squadrons, they would feel themselves confederate forces acting under the same leader. No longer would the deliberative plans for the conduct of a war be thwarted by reluctant execution or actual disobedience, nor the most alluring hopes of decisive enterprise be stifled by the sparing hand that should support them. Neither can it be conceived, that from this amendment any disadvantage would result to the military. At present they have the mortification to behold their leader without power, influence, or respect: in the other case, he would possess them all. Were the same person Governor and Commander in chief, the officer next in seniority would naturally be entrusted with the general conduct of the army, and enjoy consideration due to the second in command

command of a great military establishment. Thus the ungovernable feuds of party would be checked, and there would be some prospect that the public welfare might engage the undistracted attention of those to whom it was entrusted.

With regard to your civil service, it possesses many advantages. The young gentlemen sent out in that capacity are, in general, well educated; and on their arrival at the Presidency, are admitted to assist in the business of the different offices, including nearly the whole detail of public proceedings that can occur in any government. In fact, such has been the salutary operation of these initiations, that your Presidency alone has produced more men of extended capacity in business, than could probably be found in all the public offices of London. These acquirements are extended, as the individual advances in the service. He is successively employed