

as Paymaster and Store-keeper of a garrison, Paymaster and Commissary of an army, Resident with a country prince, Superintendant and Collector of a province, or Chief of a subordinate settlement in the regular gradation towards Council and Committee. In each of these employments, the current transactions are more weighty, the responsibility more immediately personal, and the duty more comprehensive than usually fall to the lot of any unexalted individual in England. It is in your power to direct towards important public purposes those useful qualifications, and to do away any existing imperfections.

Once more allow me to repeat the assertion, that no servant in the civil department, entrusted with the charge of military stores in a garrison, nor any one holding an appointment with an army, should be suffered to consider himself as independent of the Commandant. While

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sanction is given to so unwarrantable an assumption, nothing but negligence and discord can take place. For experience ascertains, that the main contentions in India have arisen from the collision of interfering pretensions. These cannot exist, where the mutual relations of obedience and command are accurately defined. Every officer obeys, with satisfaction, the orders of your Board as the ruling power of the country ; but very few submit without reluctance to the mandates of subordinates. When military men, therefore, have had transactions only with the Board, your intentions have been cheerfully fulfilled : whereas, in all instances of inferior interference, ruinous dissensions have been generated. Let me add, that the strong enforcement of obedience by military trial, renders them more prompt and useful instruments of public duty, than those of the other service, who are under no control, and who, by hazarding an eventual but improbable dismissal,

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may commit repeated acts of disobedience with impunity.

Thus far my observations have immediately referred to abuses in your military system; but what avails the improvement of that system; which is only useful to protect your possessions, if waste and devastation are suffered to render them hardly worth protecting, and unequal to support the force on which their safety must depend? You have seen misery in its worst aspect, the misery of famine, abundantly predominant within the bound hedge of Madras: you have seen, under your own walls, the infant dying for want on the breast of his mother; the old and the young, the parents and the children, mingling their last groans, and expiring in your kennels: you have seen whole families of spectres in human shape, digging in the entrails of a dead carrion, and, when these means have failed, surrendering themselves with a truly Asiatic

apathy to the wild dogs and vultures that waited to devour their carcases: you have seen, for months together, a hundred bodies daily covering your streets, with circumstances of horror too shocking to enumerate* ! Nor is it within the bound hedge of Madras only, that the internal wasting of the country can be traced: during twenty-seven months of continued movement through a large extent of your dominions, the duties of my station familiarized me with the whole gradation of territorial abuses, neither less palpable nor distressful than those with which you yourselves are personally acquainted.

* Every practicable effort was made by Government and by individuals to relieve the distresses of the wretched natives, who flew from all quarters of the Carnatic to take shelter under the walls of Madras. Thousands of them received daily distributions of rice, and many more were conducted, at the public expence, to the northern provinces, which had suffered less than the Carnatic by the calamities of war.

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It has been already stated, that the ravages of the enemy are by no means the greatest evils of which those countries have complained. While the territorial management of the countries now assigned to the Company, remained with the Nabob, the oppressive practices undoubtedly prevailed that multiply exaction through every Eastern Government. Indefinite claims and arbitrary impositions fell heavy upon the Polygars, and other tributaries. The Head Renters and Amuldars of districts, as well as all inferior instruments of collection, were impelled to harass the inhabitants, not only to satisfy their own rapaciousness, but to feed the avarice of their superiors; for they knew that the only tenure by which they held their appointments, was the frequent repetition of a bribe. The finances of the Durbar were involved by an unmethodized expenditure, and wasted on worthless Europeans at home and abroad. At length the disbursements essential to the current busi-

ness of the country were totally obstructed, and the urgent claims of powerful individuals introduced the destructive practice of granting Tunkaws or assignments on particular districts. In consequence of which, the holder of the Tunkaw is vested with the power of collecting the amount of his assignment within a certain space and period by the most outrageous means.

A band of ill-regulated soldiery and burdensome retainers consumed the produce of the country, and disturbed the labours of the farmer and manufacturer. These causes of defalcation in the Nabob's resources, at a moment when the exigencies of the late war demanded the utmost energy, afforded the strong argument of urgent necessity for transferring his territory and revenues to the uses and direction of the Company. The truth and justice of these arguments must of course remain, as long as the necessity on which they rest.

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At the same time it should not be forgotten, that during the government of the Nabob, no European whatever, excepting those in his service, was permitted to have any influence in the country. The English, therefore, were exempted from the odium of personal interference, or rather the rod of Moorish despotism was contrasted with the milder attributes supposed to characterise an English administration.

When the Company assumed the sovereignty, the transfer of authority from the established ruler to an alien power, no doubt, impressed the natives with distrust; in lieu of which your Committee of assigned revenue have, by their eminent exertions, substituted confidence and security. They have abolished the destructive grants of Tunkaws, and other abuses in the country management;—they have exhibited great ability, as well as unblemished integrity;—and they have rendered the revenues ex-

tremely productive in most unprosperous times. It was not however possible for them entirely and immediately to repress the misconduct of inferior instruments*, who are eager to perpetuate oppression, and to enforce unusual measures by unprecedented means. The situation of the country rendered it necessary to continue the practice of renting extensive districts to the highest bidder: although every precaution was adopted to prevent the abuse of power, still the collections could not be enforced, unless an unrestrained authority were vested in the Renter. His object too frequently is, to take advantage of the present moment, and, doubtful of futurity in a country at all times liable to fluctuation, to ransack and embezzle, that he may go off at last enriched with the spoils of his province. The fact is, that in every part of the peninsula where the Renters are established, not only

* The Black agents, who manage the whole detail of collection in the different districts.

the Ryot and the husbandman, but the manufacturer, the artificer, and every other Indian inhabitant, is at the mercy of those ministers of public exaction*.

The established practice throughout this part of the peninsula has for ages been, to allow the farmer one half, of the produce of his crop, for the maintenance of his family and the recultivation of the land, while the other is appropriated to the Circar. In the richest soils under the Cowle of Hyder, producing three annual crops, it is hardly known that less than forty *per cent.* of the crop produced has been allotted to the husbandman: yet Renters on the coast have not scrupled to imprison reputable farmers, and to inflict on them extreme severity of punishment, for refusing to accept of sixteen in the hundred as the portion out of which they were to maintain a family,

* While Tinivelly remained under the superintendence of Mr. Irwin, that province formed an exception not less pleasing than exemplary from those general observations.

to furnish stock and implements of husbandry, cattle, feed, and all expences incident to the cultivation of their lands. But should the unfortunate Ryot be forced to submit on such conditions, he has still a long list of cruel impositions to endure:—he must labour weeks after weeks at the repair of water-courses, tanks, and embankments of rivers;—his cattle, sheep, and every other portion of his property is at the disposal of the Renter, and his life might pay the forfeit of refusal. Should he presume to reap his harvest when ripe, without a mandate from the Renter, whose Peons, Conicoplys, and Retainers attend on the occasion, nothing short of bodily torture and a confiscation of the little that is left him could expiate the offence:—Would he sell any part of his scanty portion, he cannot be permitted while the Circar has any to dispose of:—Would he convey any thing to a distant market, he is stopped at every village by the Collectors of Sunkum or Gabelles, who exact a duty
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for every article exported, imported, or disposed of. So unsupportable is this evil, that between Negapatam and Palagatcherry, not more than 300 miles, there are about thirty places of collection; or, in other words, a tax is levied every ten miles upon the produce of the country. Thus manufacture and commerce are exposed to disasters hardly less severe than those which have occasioned the decline of cultivation.

But these form only a small part of the powers with which the Renter is invested. He may sink or raise the exchange of specie at his own discretion, he may prevent the sale of grain, or sell it at the most exorbitant rates: thus at any time he may, and frequently does, occasion general famine. Besides maintaining a useless rabble, whom he employs under the appellation of peons at the public expence; he may require any military force he finds necessary for the business of oppression,

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and few inferior officers would have weight enough to justify their refusal of such aid. Should any one however dispute those powers, should the military officers refuse to prostitute military service to the distress of wretched individuals, or should the civil Superintendant remonstrate against such abuse, nothing could be more pleasing to the Renter, who derives from thence innumerable arguments for non-performance of engagements, and for a long list of defalcations. But there are still some other not less extraordinary constituents in the complex endowments of a Renter; he unites in his own person all the branches of judicial or civil authority, and if he happen to be a Bramin, he may also be termed the representative of ecclesiastical jurisdiction. It would be impertinent to enlarge on the consequences of thus huddling into the person of one wretched mercenary, all those powers that ought to constitute the dignity and lustre of supreme executive authority.

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At the same time it is but justice to remark, that these observations cannot be with truth confined to the countries under Renters appointed in the countries belonging to the Nabob. The interior management and œconomy of Tanjore, in despite of the representations of Mr. Sullivan and the exhortations of Mr. Swartz are still more wretched. So wanton and iniquitous is the sway of despotism there, that the goods of the merchant or carrier are frequently seized by order of the Durbar. If an individual native is incautious enough to display his wealth, the Rajah's ministers seldom rest till he is caught and plundered: whips, scourges, thumb-screws, and other instruments of Indian torture, are daily applied to the unhappy subjects in every Cutcherry, or court of justice, throughout the country. Every one therefore who possesses either gold or jewels, buries them in some secure spot, and entrusts the secret only to the most confidential

tial of his family. Hence almost the whole specie of the country is diverted from the purposes of circulation ; and an enormous annual loss of treasure is thus occasioned by the frequent removal and extinction of families in that distracted territory. By these means the most fertile and once the most populous spot upon the globe, is already marked with the distinguishing features of a desert.

If my information be not incorrect, a survey of the Circars, or northern territory of Coromandel, would also exhibit a melancholy picture. Neither war nor convulsions have afflicted those districts for many years that they have been under the territorial administration of the Company, or of Zemindars dependant upon that authority. Their desolation must therefore be still more unequivocally imputed to internal mismanagement.

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When we recollect the original object of the English settlements in India, the benefits of a commercial intercourse with its once industrious coasts, we find that it has long ago been lost sight of in a multitude of territorial concerns, assumptions of sovereignty, and wanton extension of dominions which our situation renders us unfit to govern. Few of those who are employed in the Company's service will submit to the tedious drudgery of mercantile proceedings; they aspire at fortune through the more magnifying medium of contracts, paymasterships, residencies, and chiefships. The native merchants, Armenians, and others, who conducted the trading business of your Coast, have suffered so severely during the late distresses, as well as by the abolition of confidence and public credit, that they have removed to some less precarious situation, or else remain inactive in the hopes of better times. Neither would the present condition

tion of the Coast admit of any immediate means of re-establishment from commercial exertions; for the staple articles of your commerce are the produce of your lands, and the labours of the manufacturer: the decay and approaching extirpation of that useful class of subjects has been already traced. What then is to constitute the object of exportation? what is to yield the means of circulation, credit, and resource? From the southward you have at present no investment*; in the Carnatic you have hardly the remains of former industry; in the Circars, hitherto undisturbed by any foreign enemy, you find it difficult to load one annual ship for Europe. If the train of this induction be not false,

* These observations concerning the decline of trade and the extirpation of manufacturers, must not be considered as entirely applicable to every spot upon the Coast. There are many villages to the southward, and also to the northward, where there still remains a sufficiency of weavers to form an investment if properly managed; and the French, as well as the Danes, have lately contrived to export considerable cargoes of Coast goods.

what hopes can you entertain of lightening the public embarrassments, while every resource in your Government is wasted ?

Your predecessors left the country expiring under a complication of calamities. That your wisdom and exertions should have found means to prolong its existence under such a crisis, exceeded the expectations of your most sanguine friends, and excites the admiration of your bitterest opponents. You have already applied the firm hand of undeviating retrenchment to every branch of public expenditure, and labouring under unparalleled impediments, you have persevered with a vigor and integrity of which there was no example in the East. By this conduct you may justly assume the merit of preserving the Carnatic, oppressed with the formidable invasion of native and European powers, and the more mortal wounds inflicted by the govern-

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ments that preceded yours. But meritorious as retrenchment undoubtedly is, you feel the inefficiency of that alone to restore the public vigour. Fifty lacks of pagodas remain due by your Presidency, for services actually performed, or value received:—from that sum, when audited, you cannot possibly make any diminution:—to attempt such a measure would forfeit the whole character of Government, or at least would be declaring the Indian Public insolvent, and compelling their lawful creditors into a disreputable composition. You have already heard the clamours excited by supposed injustice in the prosecution of æconomical reform. Too severe a retrospect is not always beneficial, and in the present instance would prove destructive of equity and public faith. Perhaps it may be better to look forward; and instead of invalidating established claims for past services, to take care that every future charge

shall accord with that just proportion which should ever exist between the disbursements and resources of the treasury.

Your debts, on their present footing, are destructive of all public welfare. With the wisdom and vigour which have distinguished your administration, if the Government were in any degree permanent, one year's revenue* of your country ought to equal their whole amount. Under a well-established system of public credit, so inconsiderable a proportional sum, at the close of a calamitous war, would hardly cause a perceptible inconvenience.—But consider to whom, and in what manner this amount, is due:—It has been incurred in a series of five years of protracted and growing arrears, in all the fractions of pay, batta, extra-charges, and allowances to Civilians, Contractors, Soldiers, Sepoys,

* About fifty lacks of pagodas, or 2,000,000*l*.

Artificers, Camp-followers, and all descriptions of men connected with the peace or war establishment. If the unfortunate individual, urged by severe necessity, though he must not hope for money, should demand a certified statement, he is harassed with a long and fruitless attendance;—the auditor disputes his vouchers, and contests his claims.—If at length the certificate should be granted, it remains an useless docket; on the credit of which he can neither purchase nor procure one single article of life. Your government has exhibited a political phenomenon, unprecedented in the annals of mankind—a state or public indebted almost to every person in its service, and yet the functions of authority continuing unimpeded by any serious commotion. Several circumstances however have sufficiently denoted the hazard of such a situation. When the embarrassments resulting from a treasury exhausted, a country desolate, and a credit ruined

ruined in the prosecution of a destructive war, impelled you to direct that all allowances of batta should cease, at a period when the arrears of the army and distresses of the country rendered that indulgence peculiarly indispensable, the remonstrances and vigorous measures adopted by the military evinced the public danger of uniting the individuals of a community against the Government. There is but one alternative;—you must either liquidate the arrears due to your establishment, or you must risk the loss of India. If Europe and Bengal unwisely should withhold their aid, that liquidation cannot possibly take place but by the re-establishment of your own credit and finance : these, as well as commerce, are the offspring of cultivation and manufacture, which can exist only by industry and population. Your endeavours to re-establish that natural relation of things have already crowned the measures of your administration ; and when carried to their full comple-

The mode of restoring prosperity to your territories is, in my opinion, extremely simple. These countries experienced the refinements of civil polity and regulation suited to their condition, ages before they even heard the name of European. You have only to restore the general form and tenor of the Indian jurisprudence; and where that system, over-rating the pretensions of superior casts, tends to the violation of natural law and public welfare, there the rigour of Gentoo enactments should be mitigated, without destroying the established order and gradations of the country. Protect the poor from the oppression of the great, restrain the despotic violence of the native leaders, and let every one within the limits of the English influence feel that he is safe in his property, his person, and his life. If this were actually the case, the husbandman, the labourer, the manufacturer, and the merchant would very soon fly from every corner of Indos-

tan, to take shelter under a government that respected the sacred rights and established institutions of their ancestors, while it afforded personal security and independence, the offspring of an English polity,

The country still abounds so much with sheep and cattle, that the full complement for all the purposes of labour and subsistence would soon be procured; the towns and villages would be repeopled, and the fields recultivated with a rapidity unknown in other climates. Such is the natural fertility of those countries, and so strong their propensity to reproduction, that the quick renewal of abundance, industry, and commerce, is the necessary consequence of security; which implies the protection of every one in the possession of his own, by restraining all from the forcible or fraudulent appropriation of that which belongs not to themselves. Neither is the celebrated Dr. Smith's remark less worthy of observ-

observance, that it is the height of impertinence, even for any public body, to interfere in the private concerns of individuals. How much more pernicious must the presure of that system be, which delegates to every subordinate instrument of public authority, that privilege of individual interference, not for public welfare, but for selfish purposes at the expence of the property and industry of the subject!

While the company holds the territorial management of the country, it is to be dreaded that this happy renovation cannot be accomplished; because your civil servants, by the constitution of your establishment, are under no restraint, excepting those of their own sentiments. Every one knows that orders are nugatory where there is no punishment for disobedience, and the severest denunciation of your displeasure against a civil servant, only dismisses him from a service, which the very act that incurs

incurs your censure probably enables and inclines him to relinquish. The expedient of military interference in the business of interior management, is still a more egregious violation of all good policy and public trust. For though military men are far more proper to be charged with specific orders than Civilians, being answerable for disobedience with their lives; yet the exertion of the military arm in the detail of civil regulation implies a total abrogation of all civil rights, and declares aloud that no power prevails but that of force.

You have already found, that ruinous as both these modes undoubtedly are, they seem mild and reputable, in comparison with the only other means of management that it has hitherto been found practicable to adopt with success in any part of India—the delegation of territorial authority to native Agents, and black Renters, who
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have no tie whatever of character, permanency, or situation to restrain them from the commission of outrages too atrocious for any European imagination to suggest. What then remains but to perform an act of equal policy and justice? To redeem the English name from the general imputation under which it labours, of violating the rights and honour of our best adherents, of coveting the possessions of friend and foe*, and of a total incapacity, from situation and constant change of system, to manage what we so unjustifiably acquire? Disprove the allegation, restore the country and the sovereignty to

* The hardships and humiliation which have been endured by the Nabob of Arcot, by the Rajah of Tanjore, by the Nabob of Bengal, and by the Mogul himself, while under the protection of the English, afford the strongest grounds for other Princes of India to dread an intimate connexion with us. At the same time it must be confessed, that many powerful arguments may be adduced for retaining the interior management of the countries within our influence.

its rightful owner the Nabob* ;—emancipate the Rajah of Tanjore, and all other Rajahs, Princes, and Zemindars, belonging to your Coast, from the vexatious interference of the civil, and from the rough assumptions of the military power ;—employ the former in the proper duties of their station, in the business of office and investment ; and in pursuance of your favourite system of retrenchment, reduce their numbers to the proportional diminution of demand for their services. Would they acquire fortune, let them aspire to it, not in the spoils of districts, but in the prosecution of commercial operation : as for the latter, confine them to their garrisons, stations, and cantonments ; suffer them not to be scattered through the country, and remind them that their business is not usury and exaction, but discipline and war. In

* This cannot be supposed to take place until the period for which the Nabob's revenues were assigned to the Company be elapsed, and until the object of that assignment be fulfilled.

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order that this salutary alteration may be attended with popularity and effect, their professional emoluments ought to be sufficient, without any aid from indirect acquirement.

Should the Nabob, the Rajahs, or the Zemindars, take advantage of your indulgencies, and endeavour to withhold their stipulated payments ; shew them that lenity and justice are neither the offspring of indolence nor weakness : but, on the first symptoms of their persistence in such delays, march a body of troops to enforce your orders, make them pay the expences of the expedition, and teach them that you will not suffer intentional misconduct to pass unpunished. You have likewise to restrain every class of Europeans, the merchant only excepted, from mingling with the natives ; for when they are familiarised with our practices, they cease to respect our virtues in the just abhorrence of our crimes.

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Above all, let it never be forgotten, that in the present state of national depravity, wherever a latitude of power is lodged, whether in civil or military hands, the eye of justice must be more piercing, and her sword more severely pointed against delinquency, before you can hope to restrain the repetition of abuse.

The restitution of the revenues and sovereignty to the Nabob, will no doubt be opposed, on the former grounds of unwise and prodigal administration; assuredly, however, this evil may be remedied. You will also recollect, that the waste and prodigality of the Durbar arose from the rapaciousness of Europeans, who never ceased to prey upon the Nabob; but misfortune has fallen heavy on the hoary head of Mahomed Ally; the picture of European treachery is drawn in colours too strong to be effaced from his remembrance. At any rate let him be removed
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from the Presidency, the chief seat of intrigue and corruption, and Europeans; let him be re-established in the ancient capital of his Government; let that capital be restored to its former splendor: he will there be rescued from the ruinous intercourse of powerful and designing adventurers, and the country will rejoice that there is again a rightful Sovereign.

But it will be asked, How shall you restrain the Nabob's Government from the detail of individual oppressions, arbitrary exactions, and frequent violations of the rights of property and persons, incident to all Asiatic institutions? To these let me answer, that the protection of the country, and an adequate appropriation of the revenues for the support of your establishment remaining in your hands, it becomes you to preserve a controlling authority sufficient to restrain abuse. The annual amount of sums due, services to be performed, rents
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to be paid to the Circar, and gross produce of every village, or Muganum on the Coast, have been accurately recorded for ages in the Cutcherries, or public Courts of the districts. Should a Manager or Renter exact more than that stipulated or wonted sum, refer to these records as the common and statute law of the country, in all cases of revenue : if the means of private admonition to the Durbar should fail, let your Board or Government be the tribunal before which the cause is cognisable in the last resort ; for it is presumed that no inferior jurisdiction could give sentence between the Nabob and his subjects. Should any servant of the Circar attempt to seize the property, or restrain the person of an inhabitant, let the injured party, if all inferior means of justice fail, have ultimate recourse to the same superior and controlling power : let the rulers and the ruled feel, that under the sanction of an English Government, the poor as well as the rich
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are entitled to protection. It will leave nothing to be added to the merits of your Government, if you curb oppression, and cause the pure streams of English justice to unite with Indian jurisprudence, and both to flow in the channels of sacred, immemorial usage.

It must be confessed, that the power to restrain, implies also the power to commit abuse; and if such ministers of public vengeance as involved the Carnatic in the war with Hyder, were again to constitute the Government, it would be fruitless to suggest a thought of reformation. But this letter is addressed to a Board distinguished by rigorous and persevering integrity: we all know, that your minds cannot be swayed by any improper consideration; and that the animosity of party, though it may distract, has not been able to prevent your earnest endeavours for the public welfare. It may farther be presumed, that the atten-

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tion of the nation is so awake to the state of India, that the succession to the Government in the different Presidencies will henceforth be composed of able and upright men; or else, that all expectation of preserving these settlements will for ever be relinquished.

Another circumstance is particularly deserving of consideration. It is a truth palpable to every mind at all acquainted with political œconomy, that no country whatever is more favourably situated for the support of public credit, and extensive circulation, than India. The mass of treasure has been so widely diffused, the avowed possession of private property is so insecure, and the mode of pecuniary transactions so disadvantageous, that any Government on whose integrity and stability the natives durst rely, might form the greatest bank of deposit on the globe. To the influence derivable from such an institution, would be added

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the benefits of circulating bank or public securities in lieu of specie. Those benefits are proportioned to the extent of country in which such notes or securities can have currency, to the quantity that may be safely issued, and to the length of time that they may remain in circulation, as well as to the gain derivable from the intermediate application of money, when not needed in the bank. The profit on bills of exchange, discounting bills, granting cash accounts, and other operations of banking companies, are also considerable. In all these particulars, India possesses peculiar advantages: the range of circulation is more extensive, the probable period of the notes returning into bank more distant, the rate of money higher, the transactions more numerous, and the profits on each transaction greater than in any other country. Had such an establishment of public security existed six years ago, your Presidency could not have fallen into the state

of degradation which it has experienced; nor would it have been oppressed with a mass of paltry debts, whose amount on their present footing may possibly overthrow the Government; but which, with the aid of such a bank, could not for a moment have obstructed the career of public service. In that event, Hyder, so far from ravaging your country, and menacing you within the walls of Madras, would have been quickly driven from the Carnatic and from his own dominions.

Such an establishment would attach all classes by the ties of private benefit; it would subject to your influence every prince in India, by enabling you to supply his wants, or to support his adversaries, according as his conduct merited your friendship or excited your resentment. If similar proceedings have exalted the Seets and other private Soucars throughout Indostan, to a weight and influence little short of princely power, what might we not

expect from the operation of such a machine, in the hands of a Government whose wisdom, justice, and stability, should entitle it to public confidence*?

If we might venture to suppose that these suggestions should ever grow into effect, we should no longer have occasion to dread the courts of India meditating our expulsion; for the adoption of a system formed on these principles implies such vigour of interior management, such encreasing opulence, such strictness in the detail of expenditure, such respectability of warlike preparation, and so direct a course of liberal policy towards all the country powers, as would either remove their enmity, or else evince their incapacity to subvert a fabric built upon so sure a basis.

* No degree of energy and rectitude in any individual Governor can possibly produce the benefits in question; it is the energy and rectitude of long established system alone, from whence they can be derived.

I have now, my Lord and Gentlemen, laid before you the condition of your southern provinces, and the tenor of public proceedings since you honoured me with that command. After having stated fairly the embarrassments under which we laboured, and the means employed to overcome them, I have dwelt with no less pleasure than acknowledgment on the exertions of Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin at the head of your southern revenues, of Mr. Digby, Mr. Hippisley, and Mr. Orpin, in other departments of civil service; I have repeated the sentiments of obligation due to Colonel Stuart, Colonel Forbes, and the other senior officers of the army, for the strenuous support received from them. It has also been my particular endeavour to impress your minds with a strong and lasting sense of the merits of your southern troops, and I shall feel the highest satisfaction if my representations shall procure for
them

them any portion of your indulgence, due by indisputable claims.

With regard to the observations subsequent to the narrative of those proceedings in which the southern army was engaged, they refer to the causes which occasioned the decline of our affairs upon the Coast, and to the conduct that appears best suited to prevent a repetition of similar disasters. These considerations, and the motives which have induced me to submit my opinion to your Honourable Board, will, I trust, incline you to receive them with indulgence, as the well-intended suggestions of one whose zeal to promote the public service exceeds either his abilities or opportunities of information on this complicated and important subject. Few persons however have enjoyed more favourable occasions of enquiry into the local circumstances of those territories; I am conscious too, that my mind has neither been influenced by preju-

dice nor partiality. It only remains that I should apologize for the tediousness of this address, and repeat my warmest acknowledgments for the very flattering marks of public confidence which you were pleased to repose in me. Most cordially do I wish, as the best expression of my gratitude, that the vigour, ability, and integrity of conduct by which your President has been enabled to preserve the countries under your direction, may procure to you the distinguished honour of retrieving the English interests in the East.

I shall now take my leave of your Lordship and the Board, and bid adieu to the subject of India.

I have the honour to be, &c,

A P P E N D I X.

N° I.

Daraporam, 1st June 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Have the honour to inform your Lordship and the Board that the army encamped before this place on the thirtieth (afternoon), having made a march of twelve hours. We immediately inspected the ground adjoining to the fort, and at three in the morning proceeded with some
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Europeans and two battalions of Sepoys to take possession of a very strong post on the western side of the river, within three hundred yards of the fort. The men were under cover before daylight; we opened a small mortar battery at eight in the morning, a three gun battery before three in the afternoon, and effected a breach about six o'clock. Parties were sent round the fort and pettah to prevent the escape of the enemy, who did not venture to stand a storm, and the grenadiers entered at day-break this morning.

We have spared the life of every person in the place, and have turned out all the lower class of people; but have thought it necessary to detain some of the principal inhabitants, in hopes of intelligence from them. It is a very extensive place, and capable of much defence. I am happy to inform you, my Lord and Gentlemen, that there is a very considerable magazine of
grain

grain in the fort and pettah, which might prove of essential consequence in the execution of your orders for offensive operations to the westward. A very large army might be subsisted in this neighbourhood for a campaign: there is also a large supply of powder and shot in the magazines here. I shall have the honour to transmit a particular state of the place, as soon as it can be prepared; and shall then take the liberty of submitting to your consideration my ideas of the eminent advantages that will result from the prosecution of your orders to the westward, provided you shall judge it expedient to send such a reinforcement to this army as may enable us to secure some places of importance in the enemy's country, and at the same time to meet his army in the field. Should you, my Lord and Gentlemen, determine in favour of this measure, I may venture to assert that the consequences will not be less beneficial than

honourable: but in the present state of this force, I cannot presume to promise any permanent advantage.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

The Right Hon. LORD MACARTNEY,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N^o II. .

Pandalamcourchy, 13th Aug. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

IN answer to your Letter of the eighth of July, I had the honour on the nineteenth of July to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board of my intention to proceed to Dindigul, in order to wait your farther commands in that place; and on the twenty-fifth and twenty-seventh of July the army marched in divisions from Tritchinopoly by the route of Touracourchy; for there was not a sufficiency of water by the shorter road of Manapar.

At Touracourchy I received a public letter from Mr. Sullivan, containing a formal requisition that I should move the army into the Mellore districts, and from thence
proceed

proceed myself with the detachment to Shevigunga, in order to enforce the payment of the tribute due in that country.

Your Lordship and the Honourable Board, in your Letter of the eighth of July, were pleased to give me a discretionary power of proceeding either to Dindigul or to any other place that might tend most effectually to enable this army to carry offensive operations into execution, in the event of Tippoo's refusing to accede to the terms of accommodation that have been offered to him. In addition therefore to the weight of Mr. Sullivan's arguments on this occasion, and to the respect at all times due to his opinion, I conceived it to be my duty to comply with the requisition in question, as it did not interfere with any orders I had received, but on the contrary tended to promote every object of service that this army could have in view.

We

We arrived at Mellore on the second of August, and from thence proceeded to Shevigunga with an escort, whither two battalions were previously detached. On their approach, the Rajah and his Ministers fled to the woods of Callacoil, and could not be prevailed upon to return; but in the course of four days I was lucky enough, in Mr. Sullivan's name, and with his sanction, to bring them into an arrangement; of which Mr. Sullivan will communicate the particulars to your Lordship and the Board, and which I hope will meet with your approbation.

At Shevigunga I received a public Letter from Mr. Irwin, urging the movement of the army into the Tinivelly country, in order to repress the insolence of the Polygars, and assuring me that by this movement he would be enabled to collect a very considerable sum for the urgent necessity of the troops: about the same time I was
informed

informed that the military stores preparing at Tanjore, and the detachment under Colonel Stuart, could not reach Dindigul sooner than the twenty-fifth of August. I therefore, with the advice of Mr. Sullivan, determined to comply with Mr. Irwin's requisition, and to employ the interval in procuring such supplies for the army as might enable me to carry into execution any orders you may be pleased to give me.

I withdrew the troops from Shevigunga on the eighteenth, and joined the army at Trepatchetty. A battalion was left in Mellore, for the purpose of collection, and the remaining force marched by Pallamerry and Naiglapour to Pandalameourchy, where we arrived yesterday at two o'clock P. M. after marching eighty miles in four days*. The quickness of these marches had not given Catabomanaig time to return from

* The detachment from Shevigunga marched above one hundred miles in four days.

the siege of Chocumpetty; but we found in his fort about two thousand armed men, who shut their gates, and manned their walls against us. I therefore resolved to attack them immediately; for Catabo-manaig was very soon expected himself, with eight thousand men. We opened a four gun battery at four o'clock P. M. breached before seven, and, after a severe contest, took possession during the night. Notwithstanding the precautions that were taken, and the corps that we had stationed on the different faces of the fort, the troops were so fatigued that many of the enemy effected their escape. We have found about fourteen guns and a quantity of powder in the place, as well as some money, grain, and bullocks. The military stores shall be appropriated to the public service, and the other articles distributed to the troops, or destroyed.

During the short time we have to remain in this province, I shall use every effort to execute such objects of service as Mr. Irwin

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shall

shall point out ; for by doing so I have no doubt that the arrangements of the country will very soon be completed by his zeal and abilities, and that the army, which is already largely indebted to his exertions, will be amply supplied with money and means of conveyance, and enabled to reach Dindigul, as soon as the military stores at Tanjore and the detachment under Colonel Stuart, can arrive at that place.

I have now, my Lord and Gentlemen, laid before you the proceedings in which the army has been engaged since I had the honour of addressing you last. It will afford me the most sincere satisfaction, if in these particulars my conduct shall merit your approbation, and in any degree tend to give effect to your intentions respecting the future operations of the southern troops.

I have, &c.

(Signed). W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. the Governor and President,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N° III.

Camp at Shevígerry, 3d Sept. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Had the honour on the thirteenth of August to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board, of the motives that induced me to move the army from Tritchinopoly to Pandalamcourchy, and of the reduction of that place. Since that time I have been constantly employed in using every effort in my power to bring the Polygars into proper terms of arrangement for their arrears, so as to enable Mr. Irwin to settle the affairs of this province to the advantage of the Company, and to supply the army with a sufficient sum for its intended operations. As the Polygars remained extremely dilatory, notwithstanding the reduction of Pandalamcourchy, it was found necessary to march to this place,

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where

where the Shevigerry-chief was joined by Catabomanaig and two other Polygars, and had all together not less than six thousand people. On the approach of the army they retired from the town of Shevigerry to the Comby; a strong hold in the mountains, which never had been attacked, and which they conceived to be impregnable.

Mr. Irwin concurred with me in thinking that a reasonable accommodation would be more for the Company's interest than to reduce the place by storm. On this principle I remained four days in fruitless negotiation with these refractory Polygars, and even submitted to trust myself alone among them, in hopes of bringing their business to an amicable termination. But finding all my efforts ineffectual, I was under the necessity of using force.

The Comby is situated in the recess of an amphitheatre of very high rocks and mountains,

tains, and defended in front by a very strong work, mounting eight guns, and covered by four miles of thick jungle, intersected with barriers and ravines; the whole being inclosed from the country with a high embankment.

The attack commenced yesterday morning at seven o'clock. We were so fortunate as to carry the bank, which the enemy had lined with many thousand men, and to drive them into the woods: we then proceeded to cut a road through the jungle, and effected this service in seven hours, under a continual fire of musketry and repeated sallies of the enemy, who were seldom farther from our front than thirty or forty yards, and several times rushed upon our people with their pikes, but were as often repulsed. As soon as we had forced our way to the foot of the high mountain that commands the Comby to the southward, we advanced to gain

gain the summit, and by six o'clock we had driven the enemy from their posts upon the eminence; and from thence we kept up such a fire upon the Comby that they were forced to abandon the place, and to retreat through rocks and thickets, where it was impossible for us to pursue them with any effect: we have found eight guns, three elephants, and a large quantity of grain. I cannot say too much in commendation of the officers and men in this business; and am happy to add, that if we consider the strength of the place, our loss is extremely inconsiderable, as will appear from the enclosed copy of the killed and wounded.

I am in hopes, my Lord and Gentlemen, that this success will bring all the Polygars into an immediate arrangement with Mr. Irwin; for the letter of the eighth of August which I have just received from your Lordship and the Honourable Board,
and

and the approach of the detachment under Colonel Elphinston towards Trichinopoly, renders it impossible for me to think of remaining any longer in this quarter; and I shall in consequence move the army immediately to Dindigul, in order to carry forward those important operations which you have been pleased to direct me to pursue from thence.

I shall think myself particularly fortunate if my movement to the Tinivelly country, and the operations that have taken place since my arrival, shall be honoured with your approbation, and tend to give effect to your expectation from the Southward.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON,

To the Right Hon. the Governor and President,
and the Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N^o IV.

Fort of Palagatcherry, 15th Nov. 1783.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

I Had the honour on the eighteenth of October to inform your Lordship and the Honourable Board, that I had received official information from Tellicherry of a breach of faith, and a recommencement of hostility on the part of Tippoo Saib, against Mangalore. The critical situation of that important place, and the tenor of my instructions, induced me to move towards Palagatcherry, in order to reduce a fort of such essential consequence to the English interests in India, and at the same time to produce, if possible, a diversion in favour of Mangalore.

After various difficulties in cutting our way near twenty miles through the forest
of

of Annamally (a jungle till then considered as impenetrable for an army), the advance of the line reached this place on the second of November; but the badness of the roads and incessant rains prevented the rear of the army with the battering guns from arriving till the ninth. I found the fort covered by a respectable glacis with a good covert way, a very broad and deep ditch completely reveted, a large berme, and a very strong commanding rampart. The figure of this fort is nearly quadrangular, the dimensions of its faces are 528 feet by 432; each angle is defended by a capacious round bastion with seven or nine embrasures, and a bastion of a similar construction on the centre of each curtain; it has only one entrance, passing through three gateways, mounts twenty-nine guns on the works, and contained a garrison of near four thousand men.

On

On the thirteenth, we opened two batteries of six heavy guns each, one on the east and the other on the north face;—the enemy's fire was soon silenced, and their defences destroyed. At night, Captain Maitland, with a part of the four flank battalions under his command, took advantage of a heavy rain to drive the besieged from the covert way. He was so fortunate as to succeed, and pursued them within the first and as far as the second gateway; there he was stopped; but maintained his ground with great spirit and ability, until an addition of troops arrived. The enemy was so much alarmed with this mode of attack, that they called out for quarter, and put us in possession of a fort capable of making a long and desperate resistance.

We have found 50,000 pagodas in the place, besides a considerable stock of grain, powder, shot, and military stores: returns
of

of these articles, together with an accurate plan of the fort, and of the attack, shall be transmitted as soon as they can possibly be prepared; in the mean while a section of the north face is enclosed. Our loss on the occasion was extremely inconsiderable, as you will perceive by the annexed return of killed and wounded.

I have been minute, my Lord and Gentlemen, in the description of this place, because its consequence and local situation are not accurately known to Europeans. The possession of it commands a fertile and extensive district, the adjacent forests abound with the finest teak timber in India, and the river of Paniani is at hand to float it to the Malabar sea. The position of this place equally menaces the possessions of Tippoo on the western coast and towards Mysore, by the route of Coimbatour and Gudgereddy. The movements of this army, almost without money, conveyance,
or

or subsistence, except what we procured on our progress, afford sufficient proof that magazines of grain established here would enable armies to march with confidence and security from the coast of Coromandel to that of Malabar, and thus bring the military resources of Madras and Bombay into one point of union and effect.

I have set the Killidar and the garrison at liberty, with their side arms and private baggage, and am using every effort to put the place into the best state of defence, as well as to prepare every department of the army for more important operations; as I am very lately informed by Brigadier General Macleod, that Tippoo Saib is still blockading Mangalore, and is determined if possible to reduce it. This has induced the Presidency of Bombay to give orders that General Macleod shall use every effort to save that important fortress. I have the honour to forward a letter from General

neral Macleod to the Right Honourable the President on this subject.

The Rajah of Calicut, or representative of the ancient Zamorins, is now with me, and we receive much assistance from the Bramins and other inhabitants of this country, on whom I bestow every mark of favour and protection, in order as much as in my power to preserve the English name from the stain too often incurred by violence and oppression: I have likewise received the strongest assurance of friendship and support from the different Rajahs on the Malabar coast. I have written to Sir Edward Hughes, to Brigadier General Macleod, and to the Chief of Tellicherry, soliciting most earnestly a supply of battering guns, powder, shot, and other military stores, which could easily be sent to me by the route of Calicut. Should these requisitions be complied with, and the war with Tip-
poo

poo be continued, I have little doubt of being able to march to Seringapatam in hopes of deciding this destructive contest at the gates of his capital. But should your Lordship and the Honourable Board decide on measures of immediate pacification, and wish to preserve possession of the country between this place and Trichinopoly, it is easily within my power to fulfil these views, by falling back to Coimbatour and Erode; for these places, in addition to the country already reduced, would add a revenue of 700,000*l.* per annum, and extend the English territory almost entirely across the peninsula.

The very pressing necessities of the officers and troops have obliged me to take upon myself to order a distribution of the money found in the fort, which I am aware is a measure that may possibly involve me in personal inconvenience; but which I presume no person will venture to attribute
to

to any private consideration, when it is explained that I have not, on my own account, received nor stated any charge to the public since my arrival in India; but am applying to the exigencies of the service every fraction I can either borrow or procure.

I have already informed your Lordship and the Honourable Board of the very spirited conduct by which Captain Maitland of the seventy-eighth regiment accelerated the fall of the place. The exertions of Lieutenant Colonel Kelly, during the course of the attack, claim my warmest thanks. Lieutenant Colonel Elphinstone was field-officer of the trenches on the night of the thirteenth, and conducted the operations in a manner worthy of his long service and high military character. It would be difficult for me to do justice to the merits of Colonel Stuart and Colonel Forbes, on this and every other occasion.

Captain Byres the chief engineer is entitled to my best thanks for his labours and ability.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. the President and Governor,
and Select Committee, Fort St. George.

N° V.

Camp at Diadigul, April 26th, 1784.

MY LORD, AND GENTLEMEN,

IN obedience to your orders of the fifteenth of April, I have considered with the utmost attention the important objects held forth by your Lordship and the Board; and I beg leave to assure you of my best efforts to suggest and to promote such measures and arrangements as may tend most effectually to establish a permanent system of protection and defence throughout the southern countries, to reduce as much as may be practicable the military expences of the southern establishment, and to enable the army to assemble and to move with effect on any emergency. These I conceive to be the essential points on which

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you

you direct me to lay my sentiments before you.

With respect to the allotment of troops for the different garrisons to the southward, I presume that two complete battalions in Tanjore, and one in each of the forts of Trichimopoly, Madura, Palamcottah, Ramnad, and Kalicoil, including Tripatore, will be sufficient for the ordinary duties of the place.

It is not in my power at present to consult with Mr. Sullivan and Mr. Irwin on the proportion of troops that they may judge necessary for the collection of revenue in the different districts; I must therefore beg leave to refer in this particular to the opinions which they may transmit to your Lordship and the Board. Should Mr. Sullivan state that the four or five battalions of Tanjore Sebbendies are adequate to the purpose of collection in that country; and
should

should Mr. Irwin be satisfied with two battalions for the current transactions of the provinces under his management; it will next remain to be considered what Sepoy force in cantonment will ensure the safety and defence of these extensive territories. It must not be forgotten that the countries of Trichinopoly, Madura, Tinivelly, and Marawa, contain above one hundred thousand Colleries and Polygars in arms, naturally brave, and habitually impatient of all regular government.

The English possessions and resources to the southward have been so recently endangered and impaired by the rebellious spirit of these savages, that I shall never presume to be responsible for the efficacy of any arrangement of defence, until the most refractory of them are disarmed, their woods and strong holds laid open, and their forts occupied on the very first appearance of disobedience, or disrespect to the Circar.

In conjunction with this primary measure of security, I have no doubt that six battalions of Sepoys, cantoned with an efficient force of Europeans near Trichinopoly, and ready to be detached as occasion might require, would fulfil every public purpose that could occur within the provinces. Here I must observe, that many eminent advantages will arise to the service from this proposed mode of answering all requisitions for troops by detachments from the cantonments, instead of appointing battalions to permanent stations, which impairs their discipline, and is productive of various inconveniencies.

Considering the public interests no farther than as internal and defensive arrangements are in question, it will appear to your Lordship and the Board by this statement, together with the enclosed return of regular and irregular corps serving south of the Coleroon, that four battalions, including the detach-

detachments of the twelfth and eighteenth, can be withdrawn from hence, and that a body of Mogulleys, Independents, Irregulars, and troops belonging to His Highness the Nabob, amounting to ten thousand men, may be immediately reduced: such horses of the Mogulleys as are fit for duty might be purchased for the regular cavalry, and the horsemen, who are in general men of high casts and long service, may be provided for in such manner as may seem best to your Lordship and the Board.

A proportion of the Independents, Irregulars, and Nabob's troops, might be enlisted, or draughted into the regular battalions, and their black officers permitted to remain as supernumeraries on the strength of these corps. Thus the hardships that would befall the individuals by reduction may be obviated, and the regular battalions which have suffered so severely during the

late contest may be effectually recruited, even to the present war establishment of one thousand men for each battalion: from this reduction alone, exclusive of the retrenchment of all field-allowances, an expenditure of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand pagodas per month may be saved to the Company.

Were these arrangements to take place, a rigid system of discipline to be maintained among the troops, the decayed parts of the principal forts to be repaired, and particularly a constant and scrupulous attention to be paid to the state of grain, stores, ordnance, and ammunition in the different garrisons, I should presume that little would seem wanting to the well-being of the provinces, as far as the military are concerned, provided a sufficient fund was appropriated to the speedy discharge of the large arrears so long due to the troops, who have fought patiently

tiently and bravely under an accumulation of difficulties. I must farther beg leave to observe, that in my opinion nothing short of such a provision can secure to us the confidence of the Sepoys, on whose adherence and attachment our permanency in this country must ultimately depend.

Your Lordship and the Board are so fully impressed with the necessity of dedicating the moments of peace to the purposes of preparation, in order to guard against the uncertainty of future events, that I cannot fulfil the duty you have imposed upon me without some observations on the mode by which the southern troops may be enabled to assemble and to move as an army, whenever a renewal of hostility shall render that measure necessary.

If it should appear to your Lordship and the Board, as it does to me, that there is not any place on the coast of Coromandel

from whence an army could commence its operations with more advantage against the Mysoresans, or indeed against the French at Pondicherry, than from Trichinopoly, that garrison will naturally become the repository of all the field and battering train, ammunition, and stores of every denomination, necessary to equip an army for the field: and, for the same reason, as well as for the convenience of the troops, to be cantoned in its vicinity, a very ample magazine of grain and other provisions should be formed there; but the determination of the Renter to counteract any measure of this nature will require the most positive orders from your Lordship and the Board to give it effect.

In order that the troops in cantonment may at all times be ready to move, I conceive that every Captain commanding a battalion should be directed to entertain, at the usual allowances, a number of draught
and

and carriage bullocks, complete with masts, drivers, gunney-bags, nose-ropes and saddles, agreeably to the proportions specified in the regulations for the conveyance of the brigade of guns, and their tumbrils, the tents, stores, and ammunition belonging to his corps; some gun and tent Lascars and artificers ought also to be attached to the battalions; and a sum might be allowed to the officers for furnishing and repairing their own tents, which would greatly relieve the embarrassments of public conveyance in the army: but should any officer ever abuse these indulgencies, a court martial and dismissal from the service would soon remedy the evil. A corps of artillery, complete in Europeans, Gullandars, and Lascars, under the senior officer of artillery to the southward, and a proportion of draught and carriage bullocks for the field and battering train, artificers belonging to the Commissary of Stores department, Dooly Coolies, and public followers

lowers of all descriptions, sufficient to equip the army, according to the strength you intend it to consist of, should constantly be complete in the cantonments: and as well as the bullocks thus proposed to be maintained upon the peace establishment, these followers may be occasionally employed in the carriage of grain and other business of the Circar, on requisition from the senior civil servant of the station, taking care always that the bullocks shall be attended by a guard of the corps to which they are attached. I also conceive, that a corps of pioneers, under the chief engineer, is extremely necessary to remain upon the establishment.

The expence attending cavalry, and the difficulty of procuring an efficient body of them, almost preclude me from any observations on that subject; but if it be your intention to complete that essential constituent of an army, I shall be happy

to

to have your instructions to procure horses from Mysore and other places ; and at all events I flatter myself that you will judge it expedient to encrease, and to form into one regiment, the three troops of regular horse now serving to the southward.

Should these arrangements take place, implying a reduction of ten thousand men, and a removal of four regular battalions from hence, it would be necessary, on the renewal of hostility, to reinforce this side of the Coleroon with a force equal to that now supposed to be withdrawn, and to order an additional body of troops to be raised for the purpose of country duty and collection ; otherwise it would be impossible to render the southern army at all equal to its present strength : but in this event, it will prove of eminent utility to raise regular corps in preference to the rabble of Peons, Independents, Fynauts, and other idlers, who infest the country, disgust the Sepoys, and impede the recruiting of the battalions.

With

With these precautions, my Lord and Gentlemen, I cannot think that any Indian enemy could ever gain such advantages over us, as have, on a late occasion, endangered the existence of the English in the East; for it is evinced by severe experience, that a number of troops alone is of little avail, unless the means, conveyance, and departments that constitute the essentials of an army, are maintained on such a footing of effect as your Lordship and the Board seem determined to establish.

I send this Letter to Mr. Sullivan, that he may forward it with his remarks and emendations. I shall only farther entreat your indulgence for the tediousness of this detail.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

W. FULLARTON.

To the Right Hon. LORD MACARTNEY, K. B.
Governor, President, and Select Committee,
Fort St. George.

N° VI.

*A particular Account of the Tanjore Country,
and of its Product.*

THE Yacojee Rajah was the first man who took possession of the fort and country of Tanjore from a Gentoo king; this event happened on the 7th day of February 1675, dated, in Gentoo, Rauchina Nama Sum vacharum, Magah Sudda Septinee. It appears, from the books which are kept in the palace, that there were 5753 villages, which said villages were divided into the five following subahs or districts; viz.

Subah Trivady,
Subah Combeconum,
Subah Mayaveram,

Subah

Subah Munnargoody,

Subah Pattacotah and Valumputt.

The country produced, in
the year 1675, under the Yaco-
jee Rajah, Paddy Cullums 32,050,000

Yacoojee's eldest son Shaha-
jee succeeded to the govern-
ment; and the country yielded
annually, during a reign of
thirty-six years, Paddy Cullums 32,050,000

Shahajee was succeeded by
his brother Sharabajee, who
held the government eighteen
years; the country produced
annually — — 24,000,000

This deficiency in the revenue
was attributed to the careless-
ness of his manager.

Tugcojee succeeded his bro-
ther Sharabajee, and reigned
six years; the produce of the
country was annually 24,000,000

Tuccajee was succeeded by his son Baba Saib, who lived one year; the lands produced, Paddy Cullums — 20,000,000

At his decease, his wife Surjana took charge of the government for two years; and the produce was, *per annum*, 20,000,000

At her death the son of Sharabajee (called Colerajah) succeeded to the government for one year; the produce was 20,000,000

And Colerajah's successor was Pretab Sing, youngest son of the deceased Tuccojee; he enjoyed the government twenty-four years and a half; his four managers were Annajee Shanjogee, Ragupaty a Yangare, Manajee and the Dobeer; under these four managers the country produced every year 17,000,000

Pretab Sing's eldest son Tul-jajee Maharajah succeeded to the throne; he employed the undermentioned managers; *viz.* Manojee Huffain Cawn, Sure-row Balajee Sinda, Dobeer Giligiliaha, Bachanna Hircar Rangia; the country produced, under these managers, every year, Paddy Cullums — 15,000,000

Some time after this, the Nabob took possession of the country and fort of Tanjore; he appointed the Dobeer to be the sole manager, under whose management the country produced — — — 17,000,000

As soon as the Rajah was restored to his fort and country he appointed Bachana Saula Vencataputty Tondamanapa, Annabochy Naick, Gillanapa, Hircar Rangia; under these

managers the country annually
 yielded — — 15,000,000
 The two last years, I believe,
 it has fallen as low as
 13,000,000.

N. B. The foregoing account was received from an old man, who was a writer under the Dubeer and Manojee in the time of Pretab Sing, father to the present Rajah of Tanjore. It is given literally from the Mahratta Translation.

An Account of the Tanjore Revenues, extracted from the Circar Books in the three last Years of the Rajah's Father's Reign; viz.

In the year 1759 — 32 lack of Chuckrums.

1760 — 33 D°

1761 — 37 D°

In the two first years
of the present Ra-
jah's administration,

in the year 1762 — 28 D°

1763 — 33 D°

1771, being the year of the first
siege of Tanjore, 34 $\frac{1}{2}$ lack of Chuckrums.

During the Nabob's
government in the

year 1773 — 33 $\frac{1}{2}$ D°

1774 — 52 D°

1775, being the year of the Ra-
jah's restoration, the Nabob received, during
the

the time the country was possessed by him,
20 lack of Chuckrumis.

The Rajah received,

in the remainder of

that year, 10 D^r

Lost by a change of

government 10 D^o

In the year 1776 — 26 D^r

1777 — 24 D^r

T H L L N D.

ERRATA.

- Page 25. — 9. *for* against *read* to.
 31. — 9. *for* renovation *read* reformation.
 49. — 3. *for* series *read* system.
 52. — 12. *for* by their usage *read* by their ill usage.
 70. — 17. *for* yet conceived *read* conceived yet. "
 77. — 4. *Note*; *after* business *add* of the service.
 149. — 9. *after* several *add* hundred.

In the Plate of the Order of Battle, for C. Ebert *read*
 C. Everett.

tion, will add, to the merit of having preserved the Carnatic from destruction, the distinguished character of having restored it to prosperity.

It would ill become me in addressing the Government of an extensive country, to enlarge on the detail of means by which this restoration may be effected. Permit me, however, to suggest, that the legislative, judicial and executive regulations necessary to the prosperity of an Indian Government are neither complicated nor refined. There is one maxim peculiarly applicable to that country,—that there is no evil more dreaded than innovation, nor any duty more sacred with the natives than custom. Let this truth then be the unalterable beacon and directory in all plans of renovation respecting India, where the continued repeals and fluctuations incident to European establishments excite the utmost dread and detestation.

The