



V I E W
OF THE
ENGLISH INTERESTS
IN
I N D I A.

ORDER OF BATTLE.

Of the British Army in the Southern Provinces of India formed September 25. 1783 and commanded by

Colonel Fullarton.

First Line.

Colonel Stuart.

3^d Brigade.

1st Brigade.

2nd Brigade.

Lieut. Col. Kelly
Lt. Bannerman, B. Major.
Lt. Battersby, 2. M. Brigade.

Lieut. Col. Elphinstone.
Lt. Bordes 101st Reg. B. Major.
Lt. Pallas 2. M. Brigade.

Lieut. Col. M. Kinzie.
Lt. Jackson, B. Major.
Lt. Gordon, 2. M. Brigade.




Second Line.

Colonel Forbes.

Aid de Camp Lieut. Allen.

4th Brigade.

Lieut. Col. Bruce.
Lt. Muirhead, B. Major.
Lt. Latta, 102^d 2. M. Brigade.



Pioneers C. Ebert. Tinnevely Troop.
En. Cunningham. Cap. Hammond.

Cavalry.

General Staff.
Adj. Gen. Cap. Orum.
D. Adj. Gen. Lieut. Beale.
Q. M. Gen. Cap. M. Cloud.
Deputy. L. Chomley.
1st Aid de Camp. Cap. Moody.
2^d D. L. Agnew.
Sec. L. Futenham.
Commissary. M. Orpin.
Pay Master. Digby.
Surgeon Major. Gorton.

Extract.

75 th Reg.	831
102 ^d D.	845
101 st D.	845
15 th & 16 th Bat.	414
Madras.	294
Artillery.	408
1 st Battalion.	868
2 ^d	678
6 th	881
7 th	639
8 th	679
9 th	618
15 th	698
16 th	671
16 th	608
19 th	468
21 st	689
22 ^d	906
23 ^d	610
24 th	692
Topiques.	460
1 st Infantry.	775
Secondly.	480
Grenadiers.	460
Pioneers.	147
Tinnevely Troop.	65
Cavalry.	251
Total.	13636

The above Total, exclusive of
Mogully Horse & Public Followers.

Artillery.

Iron { 5-20
4-8
6-10
28-6
12-3
4-12
4 Howitzers
60 Pieces.

A
V I E W
OF THE
English Interests in India;
AND AN ACCOUNT OF THE
MILITARY OPERATIONS
IN THE
Southern Parts of the Peninsula,
during the Campaigns of 1782, 1783, and 1784.

IN TWO LETTERS;
Address'd to the Right Honourable the Earl of,
and to Lord MACARTNEY and the SELECT
COMMITTEE of *Fort St. George*

BY
WILLIAM FULLARTON of FULLARTON, M P.
F.R.S.S. of London and Edinburgh, and late Commander
of the Southern Army on the Coast of Coromandel.

L O N D O N
PRINTED FOR T. CADELL IN THE STRAND; AND
W. CREECH, EDINBURGH.
MDCCLXXXVII.

T O
THE RIGHT HONOURABLE
THE MEMBERS
OF THE
BOARD of CONTROUL.

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

AS your Right Honourable Board is invested with the controlling power of this country in all matters of Eastern regulation, I take the liberty of inscribing to you the following Account of the Operations of the Southern Forces on the Coast of Coromandel, and a View of the English Interests in that quarter of the Globe.

The

The remarks which I now presume to lay before you, are the result of personal observation, unbiassed by prejudice or partiality; and it will afford me the most unfeigned satisfaction, if any thing contained in these pages shall prove at all deserving of your consideration.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,

MY LORDS AND GENTLEMEN,

Your most obedient

and very faithful Servant,

W. FULLARTON.

ADVERTISEMENT.

IN order that the local descriptions and military operations mentioned in the following Work may be rendered more intelligible, Mr. FADEN, Geographer to His Majesty, has completed a Map of the Southern Provinces of India, from Madras to Cape Comorin, on a large scale, according to the Plans of Colonel Kelly, Captain Wiesebe, and other accurate Surveyors.

In this Map, the movements of the Southern army, during the Campaigns of 1782, 1783, and 1784, are faithfully traced, and the errors of former Topographers are carefully corrected.

respect and veneration which impress me when I venture to address your Lordship.

If the expedition in which my regiment embarked had been suffered to pursue its original object, the tenour of our operations might have afforded a narrative not undeserving your attention; but our after-destination against the Cape of Good Hope, our progress from thence to India, and our subsequent proceedings there, furnish so inferior a subject of communication, that I should have been unwilling to intrude upon your serious engagements, had not the state of our East India possessions become an object of general importance to this country.

Although these considerations and your Lordship's goodness may incline you to receive indulgently such observations as my recent opportunities suggest on this subject, it is far from my intention however to tres-

pass upon your patience, with any detail of particulars relating to myself, or to the events that preceded my arrival in the East, farther than to request your perusal of the papers inserted in the Appendix. My chief object is to lay before you an unbiassed statement of recent occurrences in India, and of our actual situation there.

The principal exertions during the concluding period of the war with Tippoo Sultaun, were made by the forces south of the river Coleroon, which I had the honour to command; and our operations were so intimately connected not only with those on the Malabar coast, but with all the transactions that occurred within the range of hostility, that no just view could be given of the one, without a corresponding statement of the other.

In my address to the Government of Fort St. George, the distressful condition in

which I found those countries when appointed to the southern command, is faithfully related ; the rise and progress of military measures in the southern countries, as well as their interruption by a pacification with Tippoo Sultaun, are likewise recapitulated ; the local mismanagement and inherent grievances that have reduced our affairs upon the Coast to the last symptoms of decay, are afterwards explained ; and my observations conclude with suggesting such measures of reform as appear indispensable to the preservation of India.—A copy of that narrative accompanies this Letter, together with several authentic communications necessary to elucidate the subject.

You have heard much, my Lord, and read more, of the misgovernment in India. There have been declamations without end on the peculations of the Company's servants,—and acts without number to retrieve,

trieve, if possible, the Company's affairs: but these declamations have only tended to ascertain the rhetorical estimation due to the persons who delivered them,—and those acts have too frequently confirmed the evils they were meant to remedy.

In treating of this subject it never should be forgotten, that the leading principle of all Eastern institutions is permanency; but the principle, or at least the practice, of all English politics in India, has been productive of the most pernicious instability. By the first, laws, manners, rites and regulations are handed down from age to age undiminished and unaltered;—by the second, the general order and arrangements of the country are torn asunder with capricious innovation: and to enforce a system so destructive of the dearest tenets of the natives, the continued operation of violence is required.

The distribution of the Gentoos into Talyngas, Malabars, Marattas, Canaras, and Malleallums, as well as into the different sects of Bramins, Rajahpoots, Nyars, and into many inferior subdivisions of merchants, labourers, and artificers, has remained inviolate since the promulgation of the laws of Brimha, whose Shafter contains the ordinances of their faith, and the pandects of their jurisprudence. These institutes have withstood the ravages of time, the irruptions of invaders, and the revolutions to which, in all recorded periods, those countries have been exposed.

The wisdom of the Moorish conquerors of Indostan failed not to preserve this ancient fabric of Indian adoration. In fact, the Mahometan governments apparently reverence the rites of the Gentoos, who still constitute the mass of subjects on the peninsula. Under the Moors, they are liable to oppressions incident to all arbitrary govern-

governments; yet their tyrants have mingled policy with force: and as the Goths adopted the manners of those nations whom they conquered, so the Mussulmen have assimilated with the customs of their Indian subjects. They encourage them in husbandry and manufacture—employ them in their armies—entrust them with their finance—and,* above all, preserve to them the purity of their Casts, the sanctity of their Bramins, and the pomp of their religion. So fully do the Moorish princes feel the necessity of treating with respect those customs and opinions, for which the most timid of Gentoos would sacrifice his life, that Hyder Ally never failed to make large endowments to the chief temples or pagodas. In 1781, when his army invested Tritchinopoly, he waited in person on the Bramins of Seringham Pagoda, with a propitiatory acknowledgment to Vistnou, the tutelary deity of that sanctuary. By these means, in addition to superior talents

in war, and a vigorous administration in peace, the Moors have extended their dominions over the richest parts of the peninsula.

The Portuguese, on the other hand, whose arms and enterprise obtained a geographical extent of territory greater than the circuit of the Roman empire in the days of Augustus, blindly zealous to propagate the Christian faith, found it easier to conquer kingdoms than to subvert established doctrines. By violating the tenets of their subjects, they have ceased to be accounted among the powers of India.

Happily for the English interests, intolerance in matters of religion has not mingled with our Indian policy. But in our civil and military conduct, intolerance has united with instability, to violate the most revered institutions, and to force pacific powers into measures for our extermination.

mination. So fully are these assertions verified by every circumstance attending the origin and growth of our power in India, that on a conviction of our restless and unstable views, was founded the policy of the Mogul, the Nizam, the Marattas, and other states of India, who lately associated to accomplish our destruction.

It is not necessary for me at present to enumerate the various transformations by which the private merchant grew into a powerful sovereign, with formidable armies, large revenues, rich manufactures, industrious subjects, and territories more extensive, populous, and productive than the most flourishing kingdoms of Europe. My intention is, to convince your Lordship that, notwithstanding the enterprise and talents by which various subjects of this country have signalised themselves during the course of Indian operations, no individual efforts
can

can prevent the superstructure from tottering, while the groundwork is so insecure.

In the earliest periods of our aggrandisement Lord Clive exerted his utmost efforts to correct the vices of our Eastern system. His letters to the Court of Directors recommended an economical detail in the departments of public expenditure, a regulated watchfulness over the defensive preparations of the country they had acquired, a constant attention to the commercial purposes of their institution, a rigid justice and inviolable security to their subjects, and a liberal encouragement of industry and cultivation. Above all, says he, you must support a permanent system of conciliatory measures towards the country powers: for while a doubt exists respecting your pacific inclinations, their fears will incite them to form machinations to effect your ruin.

Although

Although the current instructions from home to the different Presidencies have been in unison with these admonitions, our Eastern governors avowedly have disobeyed all orders; they have commenced hostility, negotiated for peace, and renewed the war, just as suited their convenience.

I will not carry you farther back, my Lord, than 1767, when the Government of Madras, after flagrantly offending the Nizam, by occupying the Circars under the pretence of a firman or charter from their then dependant the Mogul, sent a deputation, to submit their claim to the discussion of the very Nizam who was the injured party in the question; and, without satisfying him for the violation, farther than by a huddled compromise to pay him a tribute for the Northern Circars, entered into engagements with him to act conjunctly against Hyder Ally, then invaded by the Marattas. No sooner was this union
formed,

formed, than it was dissolved; and the Nizam separating from the English army under General Smith*, immediately joined Hyder, and continued in hostility against us; but after several unsuccessful engagements, he became weary of the contest, and returned with his army to Hyderabad.

The after-narrative of that disgraceful warfare, as expressed in General Smith's letter to Lord Clive, exhibits the most striking picture of our Eastern councils. There we may learn, by what inverted policy it is possible to defeat the best-founded expectations; to render abortive the exertions of the ablest general, and bravest army;—how an enemy may be reduced, by repeated loss in battle, to propose the most favourable terms of accommodation; and yet, thus weakened and exhausted, how he

* See General Smith's Letter to Lord Clive.

may be enabled to triumph over every disaster.

My reference to these facts is only meant to evince, that the contempt which Hyder Ally entertained for our councils, and his enmity towards our establishment, however ruinous to our interests, originated in our aggressions. We had hardly breathed after the war with Hyder, when the public consternation was excited by unprovoked hostility with the Maratta states, against whom, whatever might be the ostensible pretext, I know not of any subject of complaint, excepting that they held possessions on the Malabar coast, extending from the northward of Surat to the vicinity of Goa; while our Presidency of Bombay, exclusive of their island, were circumscribed within the narrow limits of a factory at Surat, and another at Telicherry. Your Lordship has no doubt observed in the printed
and

and official communications respecting that contest, a mass of incidents, compared with which, the indignities incurred by the Madras Government in the preceding war of 1767 with Hyder, almost cease to appear disreputable*.

Hostilities at last commencing between the English and French, the English were again involved in war with Hyder Ally. Under these circumstances, it became necessary to consider of a pacification with the Marattas. Negotiations were opened; but as we had fought without concert, so we treated without communication. The General negotiates, the Government of Bombay negotiates, the supreme Board negotiates, the Representative of a higher Power negotiates—all differ, all counteract each other; and the Maratta Government found it so impossible to reconcile their contradic-

* See Pechell's account of military affairs at Bombay.
tory

tory propositions, that they continued the war as the only means of security with such unexplicable adversaries. Long afterwards however, on the eve of our dissolution, as the *fine qua non* of our existence in India, they forced us to purchase peace from them, and to restore all the possessions of which we had robbed them, excepting Salcet ; having first wasted the treasures of Bengal, reduced Bombay to a state of insolvency, and exposed our conduct to the whole world, as a lasting monument of perfidy and weakness.

We now arrive at the most eventful period that the English have experienced in Asia, surpassing every previous misfortune in the iniquity from whence it sprang, and in the calamity with which it was attended. From the date of the disgraceful treaty with Hyder Ally in 1769, till the year 1780, our rulers in the Carnatic seemed to
have

have forgotten that he ever had invaded them, or rather that he ever could invade them again. The superior genius of Hyder perceived, that the territories and position of the English, as well as their proficiency in military science, would render them desirable allies, and give unequivocal superiority to his forces when conjoined with theirs; but experience proved, that he could not rely on men so disunited and unprincipled. To adopt a neutral system, neither promised security, nor suited his decisive character. What then remained but hostile measures, against a nation with whom alliance or neutrality appeared alike unsafe?—His campaigns during the preceding war exposed their vulnerable parts;—their disregard of military preparation marked out the Carnatic as an inviting field of new acquirement;—and the growing profligacy of each succeeding Government, improving on the rapacity

rapacity of that which preceded it, confirmed the hatred which our previous conduct justified*. Hyder's enmity was roused to indignation by our attack on Mahee, a French settlement under his protection: still more was he incensed at the negotiation with Bazalet Jung, brother of the Nizam, and proprietor of Adoni, by which that prince ceded to the English the Guntoor Circar, upon condition that a force should be employed in his defence.

This stipulated force actually marched under Colonel Harper to Inikonda, in its way to Adoni; but in consequence of various procrastinations so many months were wasted, that Hyder had full leisure to post a strong party at the entrance of the pass near Inikonda. The Colonel, finding the enemy in great strength, and that their orders were to attack the English if

* This was the case, until the unalterable resistance of Lord Macartney checked the progress of venality.

they should attempt to march across Hyder's territory, receded from the enterprise.

Bazalet Jung, on this occasion, experienced the treachery of Europeans ; for, relying on our good faith, he had ceded the Guntoor Circar, and afterwards discovered that the movement of the troops towards him was delusive, and that the delays which enabled Hyder to prevent their march to Adoni, were fraudulently contrived by the Madras Government, in order to defeat the performance of their stipulations. On the other hand, had we fulfilled our engagements with Bazalet Jung—had we marched a respectable army to Adoni, such were the advantages of that situation, that while we could have maintained it, no power in India would have ventured an invasion of the Carnatic ; for Adoni * menaces Mysore, Beddanore, the countries of the Marattas,

* It is superior, in a topographical point of view, to any interior position in the peninsula.

and

and the Decan, while the natural strength of that fortress, and the resources it commands, secure it, if well garrisoned, against any danger from a native power: but all these considerations were sacrificed—Bazalet Jung was displeased—the Nizam offended—and Hyder exasperated.

Every power in India saw the danger that threatened the Presidency of Madras; and the Carnatic was actually over-run by Hyder with an army of 100,000 men, at the very moment when that Government boasted that he durst not meditate hostility. The melancholy and disgraceful events that followed, are too unpleasing to admit of observation. The fate of Colonel Baillie's detachment, and the subsequent retreat of the army to Madras, are fresh in every memory. After the surrender of Arcot and the chief forts to Hyder, he appointed renters—collected the revenues—coined money—and exercised all acts of sovereignty, being *de facto* Nabob of the Car-

natic. It is unnecessary to enlarge on the subsequent transactions: the arrival of Sir Eyre Coote from Bengal—the junction of a detachment from thence with Colonel Pearse—the battles of Porto Novo, Pulaloor, and Shulengur, and the other operations of the Carnatic army; or to recapitulate the successes of the squadron under Sir Edward Hughes*, against Negapatam and Trincomalee, which formed the concluding incidents of the year 1781. It is only meant to offer some remarks on our political situation in those countries, in order to prove the errors of our past conduct, and to suggest what appears to be the least objectionable mode of permanent reform.

* That distinguished Admiral exhibited, in the reduction of those important places, the same superior conduct which he afterwards displayed in his naval actions with the French. 4 11

Having had the good fortune to serve with my regiment on board the squadron during the course of those engagements, I cannot mention the name of Sir Edward Hughes, without expressing the warmest sentiments of attachment and respect, due to such professional merits and inestimable private worth.

In

In this stage of our disasters, the fragments of the Cape expedition arrived at Madras †. It is impossible to impress your Lordship's mind with any adequate representation of the deplorable condition of that Presidency; nor would it be an agreeable task to expatiate on such extremes of human wretchedness as were there experienced. If any scene of danger and distress could insure concord and co-operation among men, the full display of those virtues might have been expected at Madras.

Hyder was in possession of the country—Tippoo about this time cut off our southern detachment with Colonel Braithwaite †—the French were landing a body, apparently of sufficient force to decide the contest. In this situation, our apprehensions of the enemy, as well as the desire of recovering the reputation we had lost, should have excited us to act with cordial effort; indeed, no prospect of defence remained, but in the united energy of every individual connected with our cause.

† February 1782.

Under such circumstances, your Lordship will hardly credit the assertion, that the business of the war was by no means the main *object of attention*. Councils—generals—seamen—soldiers—and civilians—servants of the King, Company, and Nabob, seemed almost to have forgotten that the enemy were at their gates, and that they had any adversaries to contend with but each other.

Such pernicious counteractions, at a moment too when the public distresses ought to have precluded all private contention, excited my surprise. On tracing the source of these disorders, it appeared that they did not originate in any blameable disposition of the parties; on the contrary, the leading characters were distinguished by superior talents, and eminent in the different walks of life to which they belonged. From a discordant principle in the political part of our Indian system arose those evils, which were too inveterate to yield to any palliative expedient. Individuals

are in a great measure out of the question ; for the disunion alluded to, is not the collision of one man, or set of men, against another ; it is not of one period, or of one Presidency ; but it is a general contention—a shock of situations—and a war of departments.

In this critical state of affairs, it was most fortunate for the preservation of our Indian territories, that Lord Macartney had assumed the Government of Madras in the preceding June. From the first moment, he dedicated his time and talents to restrain abuse, with an undeviating vigour and uprightness of intention. Could he have imagined or foreseen the ruin and distraction in which the preceding Governments had involved the establishment, it is not probable that he would have left Europe, to adventure on the manage-

ment of a country so overwhelmed by every species of calamity, that such fortitude, integrity, and perseverance as he possessed, could alone have prevented its condition from becoming irretrievable :— but to a mind like his, when once engaged in an important public object, no difficulty could appear unsurmountable, no combination of embarrassments exceed the reach of his exertions.

In a short time he concluded an arrangement with the Nabob of Arcot, by which the revenues of the countries under his Highness's authority were rescued from mismanagement, and assigned to the Company, in order to support the exigencies of the war.—The security of Madras, which he found actually experiencing the severities of famine, was provided for with the utmost wisdom and dispatch.—The inefficient defensive system on which the war had been conducted in the Carnatic,

tic, he endeavoured to extend into offensive operations, and every effort was made by the Civil Government to enable the Carnatic army to advance into the enemy's possessions of Myfore.—The siege of Negâpatam was undertaken by the direction of the Governor, and proved successful, notwithstanding the opposition against that measure by the Commander in Chief.—Troops were also sent to enable the squadron to reduce and garrison Trincomalee. — The previous extravagance by which the finances of the country had been wasted and public credit overthrown, was restrained by a firm and rigid hand. The most anxious retrenchment was enforced in every department ; not a single malversation, negligence, or abuse, seemed to escape the penetrating observation of the Governor ; who, at a crisis the most distressful and alarming that the English had
ever

ever experienced since their establishment in India, exhibited an assemblage of talents, energy, and rectitude, of which few examples can be traced in any country*.

In order to account for the rise and progress of these dissensions, and of that discordant principle in which they originated, your Lordship will be pleased to recollect, that the spirit of our primary establishment in India knew no power superior to the Company's Government. This authority, perplexed and wavering as it might be rendered by the politics of the different Presidencies counteracting each other, had

* However strong my inclination is to do justice to the merit of Lord Macartney's Government, it would ill become me to attempt a detail of the great and complicated transactions in which he was engaged. Destitute of materials, and unequal to such an undertaking, it only remains for me to express my hopes that his Lordship will be induced to give the Public a history of the important affairs which he conducted with such distinguished ability.

yet

yet somewhat of unity in the idea of its formation ; so far at least, that the native powers, considering the Company as the fountain of all English authority in the peninsula, regulated their conduct by such communications as were conveyed through the medium of the Company's representatives. While this prevailed, the Nabob Mahomed Ally, and other native princes in our alliance, conducted themselves with the utmost deference towards the established Government ; and though at times they were severely pressed by some rapacious members, they felt a degree of security, and enjoyed an intercourse of good offices, that bordered on prosperity.

The errors of the Company's management having attracted the attention of Administration at home. an act of the legislature was passed in 1773, by which the powers of sovereignty were continued in the Company ; but the authority of parlia-

parliament assumed an executive interference in those very powers of sovereignty, by the appointment, recommendation, or confirmation of certain officers of justice, and others to be established in India. The power and dignity of the Crown had, at an earlier period, been brought into direct competition, though not on equal terms, with the power and sovereign authority of the Company. An embassy had been sent immediately from the Crown to the Nabob of Arcot, unavoidably in opposition to the power of the Company. Vehement disputes arose between the Ambassador and the Presidency of Fort St. George. The Governor and Council constituted the regular authority of the settlement, and possessed the powers of administration; while the other claimed superiority as representative of the Sovereign. The Nabob and all the other native princes were perplexed. They had been taught, that in the Company was vested the supreme authority of England, as far as respected

respected India—that no other power had any right of interference there. Now they are told, the Company is nothing more than a private body of merchants, without consequence or consideration in their own country, and who are soon to lose all power and consequence in India.

In this situation of affairs, what shall the unfortunate Nabob believe?—how shall he act?—A host of needy adventurers possess themselves of his confidence, impose upon his credulity, and taint his mind with opinions that have since proved his destruction.

“ Your Highness (say these adventurers)
 “ must shake off your connections with
 “ those traders;—you must now adhere to
 “ the sovereign power and majesty of Eng-
 “ land:—You, Sir, are an independent
 “ prince;—you are guaranteed in your
 “ territory of the Carnatic by the treaty
 “ of Paris;—the kings of France and
 “ Spain have ratified that treaty, and the
 “ king

“ king of England is your protector.—
“ Throw off, therefore, all dependence on
“ the mercantile association.”

You will not be surprised, my Lord, that an Asiatic Prince, who cannot reconcile the contradiction of a body of merchants possessing sovereignty, should have been deceived by language so congenial to his natural propensities ; especially when confirmed by the solemnity of public letters, and an embassy from the Sovereign.

From that moment, his attachment to the Company was shaken :—he spoke lightly of their power, disregarded their servants, and counteracted their intentions.

The Government of Madras resented this defection, and forced him to confess that his new allies were either negligent of their promises, or unequal to resist the Company, in whose hands the executive control still remained.

Since

Since that time, the Presidency of Madras has been a continued scene of counteraction. The Senior Officer of the squadron has usually represented his Majesty at the Durbar, and that situation tends to render him, *ex officio*, an object of jealousy to the Company's Government. The Commander in Chief on shore has likewise held an authority from the Crown, so indefinitely expressed, that he could neither submit to the government without incurring professional unpopularity, nor resist without exciting ruinous commotions.

When Sir Eyre Coote assumed the command of the Carnatic army during the administration of Mr. Smith, he had been suffered to engross the whole direction of the war. The succeeding Government found by these means all power and consequence centered in the General. As the Governor and Council of each Presidency,
by

by the Company's constitution, are the delegates of their authority, it seemed necessary that the Board of Madras should have some control over operations for the conduct and result of which they stood responsible to their superiors.—They represented these circumstances to the Supreme Board, but sentence was pronounced against them, and the General was confirmed in the unparticipated direction of the war. The movements of the army however did not prosper:—the same narrow limits marked their progress:—the same deficiencies of draught, carriage, and conveyance, as well as of grain and money, still frustrated all hopes of profiting by success, and defeated every suggestion of vigorous endeavour.

The Supreme Board, after much acrimonious discussion, revoked their sentence, and replaced the controlling power in the hands of the Madras government: but

another event soon afterwards occurred, which put reconciliation at defiance.—The Supreme Board determine to rescind the assignment of the Nabob's territory to the Company, and to restore his Highness to the management of his own country.—They farther resolve, it is said, to enforce this edict by military power. Sir Eyre Coote is therefore invested with full authority for that purpose, and on his return to the Coast in April 1783, is instructed at all events to carry the order into execution. His death, which happened in the same month, is supposed to have prevented much bloodshed in the settlement: for it is understood that the General was determined to enforce, and the Government to resist, the order of restitution; at a time too, when the country belonged more properly to Hyder and the French, than to either party.

The succeeding Commander, General Stuart, was involved in discussions similar to

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those

those between the Civil Government and Sir Eyre Coote. The campaign under that General against Cuddalore, was interrupted by a cessation of hostility between the English and French. Those dangerous neighbours were thus left in possession of a post, the loss of which would probably have obliged them to abandon India, had not the disunion of the ruling and executive powers distracted our measures, and added a farther proof, that under the influence of discordant principles, neither time nor means, circumstance nor opportunity, can ensure success. The General was superseded in the command of the army, called to the presidency, and afterwards returned to Europe.

Sir John Burgoyne succeeded as Commander in Chief of the King's troops.— He asserted powers and privileges that the Government declared to be incompatible
with

with the constitution of the Company. He persisted, and was superseded by a Colonel on the Company's establishment, who, on this occasion, was raised to the rank of Lieutenant General, and Commander in Chief upon the Coast. Sir John Burgoyne, in consequence of this promotion, claimed the exclusive command at least of the King's troops,—and was arrested.

Another General became senior of the King's service, and submitted. The remaining Generals had signed a remonstrance against the violation offered to the royal service by the arrest of their Commanders. Some of them adhered to their declarations, and left the country; others, pliant to the times, enjoyed the benefits of unscrviceable, but not unprofitable, stations.—After this detail, your Lordship will not be surpris'd at any disturbance that has since occurred in those possessions.

It is not within the limits of my purpose to enlarge upon the acts of the legislature now existing, on those that have been proposed respecting India, or on the proceedings of Parliament in their late capacity as a Court of Inquest *.—The pretensions of Governor and Commander still remain in collision with each other;—the King and Company still continue in that country to be contending powers,—while the Company and Nabob are bound over to perpetual variance. Between the civil and military no line is traced; no redress for the latter, no mode of coercion for the former, and the warfare of the Presidencies is extended and confirmed.

My Letter to the Select Committee of Fort St. George contains every other

* Since this paper was written, the powers of Governor and Commander in Chief have been united in the person of Lord Cornwallis, and other important arrangements have taken place for the correction of our Indian system.

material incident respecting the concluding period of the war, the circumstances under which the peace with Tippoo Sultaun was concluded, and the enumeration of internal evils on the coast of Coromandel. In the discussion of those important particulars, I have not hesitated to suggest the detail of means by which alone I conceive it possible to effect a renovation in the East. These observations on the interior misgovernment of the country are, in their general tendency, not only applicable to Coromandel, but to the other Presidencies; and as similar evils operate in each, corresponding remedies must be applied to all.

If our condition be desperate upon the Coast, it will appear not less deplorable in Bengal; when we consider that the decline of that Government has advanced with rapid strides during peace, while Madras has suffered the devastations of war.

But before we enter on a particular view of this melancholy subject, it may be necessary to state the extent and local circumstances of our possessions in that quarter.

The provinces of Bengal, Bahar and Orissa, as possessed by the British, and including Benares*, contain an area of 162,000 square miles; their annual revenues are supposed to have amounted, in happier times, to 5,000,000*l.* sterling, and their population to 11,000,000: the province of Oude and its dependencies comprehend an area of 53,286 square miles, yielded a revenue of 3,500,000*l.* and maintained 20,000,000 of people.

It must be observed, that the Mogul Government in India was a foreign and oppressive government; and consequently, that the countries under its authority were far from having attained their highest period of improvement. It is likewise demonstrable,

* See Major Rennell's *Memoirs*,

that

that Bengal and the lower parts of the other provinces, being extremely fertile, and chiefly adapted to the cultivation of rice, ought to maintain a greater number of people on an equal surface, than any the most fertile country where rice will not grow; because rice yields two or three annual crops, and the average of each crop is comparatively greater than that of any other grain. Let us now compare the produce, population, and revenues of these countries with those of Great Britain, which, according to Major Reynell, contains an area of 96,400 square miles. The population of Great Britain may amount to 8,000,000, and the present revenues are about 14,000,000*l*. By this standard your Lordship will be able to judge of the comparative value of the English possessions in Bengal; and if to those you add the coast of Coromandel, its area being 65,944 square miles, ancient population 9,000,000, and revenue in former times 3,000,000*l*., the aggregate of these territories will form a

dominion nearly equal in revenue, and far superior in population as well as in extent, to Great Britain,—to the richest and most productive kingdom, in proportion to its area, that ever existed in the temperate zones.

In former times the Bengal countries were the granary of nations, and the repository of commerce, wealth and manufacture in the East. Vessels from all quarters poured out their treasures on the banks of the Ganges, and the numberless nations that people the northern regions of Indostan, as far as Cashmire, Lahore and Thibet, including a range of several thousand miles, used to deposit their riches there, as the great mart and centre of their traffick. But such has been the restless energy of our misgovernment, that within the short space of twenty years many parts of those countries have been reduced to the appearance of a desert. The fields are no longer cultivated,—extensive tracts are already overgrown with
thickets,

thickets,—the husbandman is plundered,—the manufacturer oppressed,—famine has been repeatedly endured,—and depopulation has ensued. The districts are farmed out to Renters, or Zemindars,—and the collections, as well as all other business relating to finance, are committed to a Provincial Chief, who reports to the Committee of Revenue. The Renter holds by a precarious tenure, while it costs him so much to procure and maintain his situation, that if his exactions bear proportion to his risk and advance of money, they must be extremely severe indeed. Neither would it suit the views of a Chief to be less industrious in the business of extortion. They must therefore be unusually inexperienced if they do not between them contrive to distress the inhabitants, to ruin agriculture, and to defraud the Government of at least thirty or forty *per cent.* of the stipulated payments. This they manage by statements of approaching want, which they
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themselves have occasioned ; by accounts of provincial works, which are never performed ; by unjustifiable deductions, and by connivance at the defalcations of the managers.

The husbandmen and Ryots dependent on these depredators (compared with whom the feudal Serfs were in a state of freedom) are in their turn happy mortals, when contrasted with the weavers and manufacturers. If the former be plundered of their grain, the chaff at least is left for their subsistence ; but such is the system of commercial regulation that the wretched manufacturers have hardly a resource. The Commercial Chief, to whom they are subject, and who, under the Committee of Trade and Manufacture, is charged with the business of investment, assigns to all the portion of their labour,—by a small advance pretends to an appropriation of their industry,—denies their right to use their ingenuity for their own advantage,—establishes

establishes a ruinous monopoly, by the abuse of power, and treats them as bondsmen toiling for his benefit. The consequence is, desertion among the weavers, a decreasing investment for the Company, enormous acquisition for himself, and a fatal stagnation of all trade and manufacture throughout his district.

In Oude, Rohilcund, and all the upper countries within our influence, the natives are, if possible, still more distressed. Various hordes have been driven to despair by hardship and exaction. They have assembled in formidable force, and menaced the whole country:—the husbandman goes to the plough with a firelock over his shoulder, while the Government is too feeble to restrain these outrages, and too much depressed to afford relief.

If we trust to our military on the Bengal establishment for protection against these
alarming

alarming enormities, we shall find, that entire corps have existed on paper, who, exclusive of the Commandant and Staff, never had any existence but on paper; and it will farther appear, that those Sepoys who have a real existence, are neither well disciplined, nor regularly paid. The decreasing produce of the country is consumed by the utmost contrivance of profusion; and so wasteful is the mode of contribution, that the country of Oude, period after period, has fallen into arrears, leaving the exhausted prince without means of supporting his government, or of maintaining his family.

When Lord Clive, by his treaty with Sujah Dowla, restored that great country to its rightful owner, stipulating only in behalf of the Company forty-six lacks of rupees for its military defence*, he meant to proclaim aloud throughout Indostan, the

* To pay a brigade which the Company stations in the province, &c

justice and moderation of English policy, and to convince the country powers, that the Company rather chose to be friends and protectors, than tyrants and usurpers over those they conquered. Little did that superior genius foresee, that by his boasted treaty the treasures of a powerful prince were indirectly to be transferred into a sinking-fund, and his whole dominions converted into an asylum for the sole use and benefit of prodigals and incorrigibles.

It would be a trespass on your patience, my Lord, to expatiate farther on the impolicy by which a country, superior in wealth and means to the whole kingdom of England, has been so speedily precipitated, without convulsion or internal war, into a state of actual insolvency: neither can I, without impertinence to your Lordship's ready apprehension, enlarge upon the strong suggestions that impress my mind with the impending catastrophe, about to close this scene of unexampled depravity.

But the industry of the Supreme Board is by no means confined to Bengal and its adjacent provinces ; they have an extended latitude of power : every other board and presidency is subject to their sway, and their controlling influence pervades the whole politics of India. Without discussing the merits of this unbounded interference, experience has evinced, that in its present modification, it has disconcerted every measure of the other Governments, and sunk them in the estimation of all neighbouring states ; while the Supreme Board stationary in Calcutta has laboured under such impediments of distance, local ignorance and endless avocation, that in every instance where they have descended to such interference, they have exposed themselves to public ridicule ; and after marring the business beyond all chance of remedy, have been forced at last to throw it from themselves upon the presidency, to which from habit, vicinity, and connection it did of right belong.

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At one time, they propose to surrender the whole of the northern Circars to the Nizam for a trifle; at another, they dispatch a negotiator, to offer the rich province of Tinnivelly to the Dutch for less than a trifle, for the use of one thousand Dutch mercenaries!—Fortunately, notice of a Dutch war was received, before this extraordinary treaty could be executed, and the negotiator, Mr. Dighton, got no farther than Madras.—But observe, my Lord, supposing the province of Tinnivelly to yield an annual revenue of 250,000*l.* at twenty years purchase, the property of it is worth 5,000,000*l.* At this rate did the Supreme Board of India, propose to purchase the use of one thousand Dutch mercenaries!—You will hardly require any farther illustration, that though this stationary Board, circumscribed in the means of intercourse and information, and overwhelmed in the interior business of Bengal, cannot easily accomplish any public benefit, by the
latitude

latitude of its control, yet assuredly it is enabled to defeat all useful views of every other Board, to thwart or over-rule all plans of public service, and, in a paroxysm of political phrensy, to make away with half the peninsula.

If it be judged expedient to have a Supreme Board of India, in whom all the controlling powers of Government shall ultimately concentrate, in the name of common sense let it be a Board of Circuit ;—let it be a Board of inspection, as well as of control, composed of members from each presidency, detached from the embarrassments and corruption of provincial regulation :—let it be a Board that can observe with impartiality, judge with accuracy, and act with vigour ;—that can move to any spot in India, where public emergencies are most urgent, and call more immediately for its presence. Thus, and thus only, can it become a Board of extended efficiency either
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to enforce obedience, restrain subordinate misconduct, or unite in one connected series the vast and complicated mass of Indian affairs*.

Leaving this gloomy retrospect, let us consider how we are situated with regard to other powers, and what we are likely to become on the peninsula. The territories of hither India, or what has inaccurately been called the empire of the Great Mogul, extends 1680 miles in length, 1440 in breadth, contains an area of 1,138,400 square miles, and maintains 110,000,000 of inhabitants. Taking the area of Great Britain and Ireland at Major Reynell's estimate of 131,800 square miles, and 10,000,000 of inhabitants, it is nearly nine

* The preceding remarks on the condition of Bengal and its adjacent territories are not the result of personal observation, and therefore may be considered as less deserving attention than those which I have ventured to offer on the affairs of Coromandel. There is little doubt however, considering the natural fertility of those countries, that a mild and permanent administration might soon restore them to prosperity.

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times

times as extensive, and contains eleven times as many people as the three kingdoms.

I will not hazard any calculation of the gross produce and revenue of that empire, but they bear more than a due proportion to this superior population and extent. Its soil affords every article for the subsistence or conveniency of man that can be cultivated in the lower latitudes. It has for ages been the seat of manufacture, industry, and commerce. Its inhabitants are civilised, ingenious and refined, accustomed to war, and proficient in the arts, sciences, and embellishments of peace. With such superlative advantages, no state recorded in the annals of Europe could stand in competition with the Mogul Empire, if such an empire did in fact include under one government the territories to which it gives a name; but the vast tract comprehended under that vague description is parcelled out among a multiplicity of discordant powers, and peo-
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pled by numberless tribes, dissimilar in manners, language, and religion.

If we divide the whole region into 114 geographical parts, we shall find, that of these, something less than one part belongs to the Mogul and his immediate adherents; to the Affgans, Kashmirians, Pitans, Candahars, Sects, Abdallas, and various other northern Hordes, twenty-five parts; to the Maratta States, including Berar, forty-eight; to the Nizam, including Adoni, five and an half; to the Circar of Tippoo Sul-taun, including Cudapah, eight and an half; to the Rajah of Travancore, one; to the English, and their adherents, twenty-eight and an half: the remainder may be assigned to the petty Rajahs, Polygars, and other classes of aboriginal Gentoos, who have hitherto defied the powers of the crescent and the cross, and, under cover of woods, mountains, and inaccessible retreats, have asserted independence.

Of these, the Travancore Rajah, the Malabar Rajahs, and such of the interior Chiefs as never had the misfortune of our intercourse, have, I believe, no reason to complain of us ; but every other individual state has been so deeply injured and insulted by the English, that if their resentments be proportioned to their wrongs, they can scarcely ever be effaced.

When the Bengal Government withdrew their covenanted stipend from the Mogul, and forced him, by their usage, to fly from his residence at Ilhabad, and to throw himself upon the mercy of the contending Chiefs and Hordes who infest the environs of Delhi, they should have recollected that, fallen as he is, and diminished in his splendor, he is still of material consequence in the affairs of India, being the acknowledged paramount of all the Mahometan powers in those countries*.

* His late minister Nidziff Cawn had 60,000 horse under his command.

The Affgans, Pitans, Doranies, Abdal-lahs, Condahars, Kashmirians, and other hordes of Muffulmen who people the northern territories of Indostan, are brave and warlike, impatient of peace, and eager for adventure. So unsettled is the present state of all those northern countries adjoining to Bengal, that any resolute leader, black or white, of military reputation, might, on the shortest notice, raise an army of 100,000 men, ready to follow him as long as he could feed and pay them. Even in Oude, near 150 lacks of the revenue cannot be collected, but by the aid of a leader, who constantly maintains 10,000 troops and fifty pieces of cannon ready for emergencies.

The Duab* has been twice farmed out to English gentlemen, on condition that they should raise or employ a force sufficient to collect the revenues of it, with permission, after paying the stipulated sum into

* A province near Oude.

the Nabob of Oude's treasury, to plunder and ransack the districts for their own advantage: but of late it has become the receptacle of the rich and disaffected leaders throughout the country, who fortify themselves there, maintain considerable force, and assert a state of open independence. The followers of Nidziff Cawn, and of other great Chiefs, have hitherto been maintained by quartering different bodies of them on particular districts, with orders to the Commander of each body to collect the revenues of the country, and to subsist his troops by force of arms. But by this outrageous system, those countries are already exhausted, and these destroyers, like the Huns and the Visigoths, must seek for subsistence and plunder in new acquisitions.

If they direct their progress towards Bengal*, they will find that country as open to invasion as it was on the day when we

* Bengal is, however, naturally a strong country.

first took possession of it :—not a fort, not a barrier, not a post to resist their progress, to the very suburbs of Calcutta.

It would ill become me to offer any suggestions unfavourable to the military upon that establishment. Brave and zealous they undoubtedly are, and would probably defeat their enemies as often as they hazarded a close engagement ; but allowing, which is not the fact, that they were neither deficient in Europeans nor in cavalry,—that their Sepoys were in the highest state of discipline, and that the vigor and dispatch of Government, contradicting all former instances, should enable the army to quit their cantonments in the best order on the first notice of invasion ; still we are taught, by recent and severe example, that a force constituted on the principle of our Indian armies, without previous well-concerted measures of defence, cannot possibly protect an extended country from the rapid devas-

tations of hostile cavalry. If they should fail in driving us from the provinces, they are at least sure to enrich themselves with spoil, and to render them, like the Carnatic, a possession scarcely worth contending for.

The same observations apply with equal truth to the Maratta states. Their sentiments towards us are not less justly marked with impressions of resentment. They have repeatedly asserted the claim of Chout or tribute from Bengal, which, in their idiom, is nearly synonymous with impending invasion. Their numbers and co-operation, in contrast with our discordant weakness, ensure them an ample crop of laurels, as soon as they shall resolve to pass the Jumna. With regard to the Nizam, our momentary security is founded on his pacific character. Possessed as he is of a great and fertile sovereignty, ample revenues, and an army of 60,000 troops, which
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he could double with facility on a few months notice, nothing was wanting but determination to have gratified to the full his enmity against the English. When Hyder invaded the Carnatic, the Nizam had only to march a force into the Northern Circars, and those enviable territories must infallibly have reverted to their rightful owner.

But these are inferior dangers, when compared with the strength and menacing condition of Mysore. The recent growth and warlike advancement of that state exhibit a phenomenon unparalleled in history. In the earlier part of this century, when the Delawar or Regent of Mysore marched against Trichinopoly with a great body of horse, their troops were in the lowest stage of military ignorance; and their unskilfulness was only equalled by their pusillanimity. The country was then governed by a native Rajah, the lineal heir of the Musnud. He

was of the Canara cast, and the great body of his people were likewise of Canara or Gentoo descent. They were happy under his government; but they were neither rich nor respectable.

By the ghauts or mountains, on which the table land of Myfore is elevated, it is separated from the Carnatic on the east, from the great plains of Coimbatore on the south, from the Malabar territories on the west, and from the countries of Beddanore and Ghutty on the north.—These ghauts are only accessible at particular places, and oppose no inconsiderable obstacles to the progress of invaders. The situation of Myfore is remote from habitual interference with adjacent powers; its soil is less fertile than the lower countries that surround it, and its inhabitants were not enriched by commerce and manufacture, nor by these means exposed to their more powerful and industrious neighbours.

bours. Under such circumstances, it might have enjoyed its primeval tranquility, had not a superior genius effected a signal revolution in the affairs of that country.

Hyder Naick, or Hyder Ally, the son of a Killidar who commanded a fort of some strength on the confines of Mysore, soon rendered himself superior to all the other commanders in the Mysore service. At the attack of the bloody Choultry on Seringham island, mentioned in Mr. Orme's invaluable history, he particularly distinguished himself, as well as on every other occasion in which he either acted or advised. Without dwelling on the gradations of his conduct, in attaining confidence and elevation, it is enough to say that he rose to be the prime general and chief minister of his master. Clothed with the authority of these employments, and supported by his aspiring talents, he soon left his sovereign nothing but the name,
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and at last doomed him and his whole family to confinement, exhibiting them from time to time in great state, to soothe and please the people, while he in fact transferred the sceptre to his own hands.—He trained his peaceful subjects to the use of arms, by new modelling the military system; by inviting all ranks of Moormen, Rajapoots, and other warlike casts, to join his standard; by encouraging or rather alluring French and other Europeans to enter into his service; and above all, by a course of severe and unremitting duty in the field. He attacked, and successively subdued the numerous Polygars, Chiefs, and petty Rajahs, whose possessions lay within his reach. He extended his views against the countries south of the Ghauts, as far as the confines of Trichinopoly and Madura, on the Malabar coast. He reduced the Zamorin or Sovereign of Calicut, the Rajah of Paligat, the other Malabar Rajahs, and rendered the Rajah of Cochin tributary

tary to his Circar. He conquered Beddalore, Goutty, and Chiteldroog; the countries of Cudapah, Kanoul, and Savanore; thus extending his dominions as far north as Goa on the Malabar sea, and across the peninsula to the country of Palnaud and Ganjam, on the coast of Coromandel.

With these, and other interior acquisitions, the Rajahship of Mysore grew into a powerful state, 400 miles in length from north to south, and near 300 miles in breadth from east to west, with a population of many millions; an army of 300,000 men, and 5,000,000*l.* of annual revenue. These achievements were the result of intrepid perseverance. He next ventured to try his strength with the Marattas and with the English,—though he could not vanquish them, yet he increased in self-confidence, and public estimation. His very failures he turned to account,
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and, like Czar Peter, submitted to be worsted, that he might learn to be superior.

During the long interval of peace with the English, from 1769 to 1780, the improvement of his country, and the strictest executive administration, formed the constant objects of his care. Under his masterly control, they attained a perfection never heard of under any other Indian Sovereign; the husbandman, the manufacturer and the merchant prospered in every part of his dominions; cultivation increased, new manufactures were established, and wealth flowed into the kingdom. But against negligence or malversation he was inexorable. The Renters, the Tax-gatherers, and other officers of revenue, fulfilled their duty with fear and trembling; for the slightest defalcation was punished with the chaubuck*, or with

* The chaubuck is an instrument for scourging criminals.

death.

death. He employed spies and intelligencers in every corner of his own dominions, and in every court of India; and he had other persons in pay, who served as checks upon them, and watched all their operations.

The minutest circumstance of detail, the produce of a crop, the cultivation of a district, the portion paid to the Circar, and that reserved to the inhabitants, were accurately known to him:—Not a movement in the remotest corner could escape him,—not a murmur or intention of his neighbours, but flew to him.—It will hardly appear exaggeration to say, that he was acquainted with every spot, and almost with every person in his empire, when we consider that he was in a continued round of inspection.—In his Durbar, during the hours of business, reports from all corners were received:—his secretaries successively read to him the whole correspondence of the day:—

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to each he dictated in few words the substance of the answer to be given; which was immediately written, read to him, and dispatched.

On his right and left hand, during these hours, were placed bags of gold and silver; out of which, those who brought him intelligence were rewarded by one or more handfuls of coin, proportioned to their deserts; he was accessible to all: every horseman or sepoy, that wanted to enter his service, was inspected by himself; every Jemidar, or officer of any note, was intimately known to him. His troops were amply paid, but not a fraction was lost. Those who supplied his camps, garrisons and cantonments, were all under such contribution, that almost the whole military disbursements reverted to his treasury. There was no contractor bold enough to hazard a public imposition. There was no commander ingenious enough to screen
inability

inability or disobedience, nor a defaulter that could elude detection. He possessed the happy secret of uniting minuteness of detail with the utmost latitude of thought and enterprise. As his perseverance and dispatch in business were only equalled by his pointedness of information, so his conciseness and decision in the executive departments of a great government, are probably unprecedented in the annals of men. Conscious from experience of his own ability, and of the weakness and distraction of the *English*, he planned their extirpation from India. He summoned all the native powers to join his cause:—they hesitated. He determined to act alone—and conquered the Carnatic.

His death, in December 1782, left the accomplishment of his farther designs to his son and successor, Tippoo Sultaun, to whom he bequeathed an overflowing trea-

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fury, which he had filled,—a powerful empire, which he had created,—and an army of 300,000 men, whom he had formed, disciplined, and enured to conquest.

In my annexed letter to the Board of Madras, the perspective of events in the concluding period of the war, as well as the circumstances under which the peace with Tippoo Sultaun was concluded, are faithfully pourtrayed. The subsequent proceedings of our adversary have confirmed the prevalent belief, that the present cessation is only a short respite with a view of afterwards renewing the contest, when, through our negligence and his exertion, he may be enabled to attack us with superior advantage. His conduct has not been equivocal:—his contempt of the English incites him to disdain evasion, and his enmity is a constant stimulus to his hostile preparations. In order more effectually

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ally to complete his arrangements for driving the Christians out of India, he had hardly signed the treaty with our Commissioners, when he solicited all the great Mahometan powers, the Grand Signior himself not excepted, to contribute their assistance in stores, arms and artificers. He established forges, founderies and armories throughout his dominions,—replenished his magazines, which had been exhausted during the war,—and new-modelled his army on the most efficient footing.

While these arrangements are so formidable as to excite well-grounded apprehensions, his public acts and declarations already ascertain their object and direction. He has claimed and menaced the Guntoor Circar, adjoining to the country of Cudapah. If he should be suffered to take possession of that district, the whole northern Circars will unavoidably be severed from the Presidency, and his dominion be extended over

all those valuable provinces. On the other hand, if we resist his assumptions, he hoists his junda*, and renews the war.—And, under some pretence or other, a renewal of the war is unavoidable :—he has sworn to it.—While we, on our part, must wish for that event, if we mean to regain our character, or ever to be numbered among the powers of India.

There was a period when peace and forbearance formed the principle, though they never were the practice, of our Indian policy. In those days, investment only was our object, and the increase of territorial acquisition was reprobated by every faithful and enlightened servant of the public.—Prove yourselves just,—prove yourselves moderate,—evince to all India that you are determined to refrain from conquest,—was the sound and earnest doctrine of Lord Clive to the Directors. Had these tenets

* The banners under which Indian armies fight.

been

been adhered to from the first, our establishments in India would have continued peaceful factories ;—we should have remained expert, successful traders, and never have exposed ourselves as unprincipled usurpers. But, before Lord Clive urged those restrictive sentiments, they were no longer apposite: the pacific mask was thrown aside, and we stood confessed an insidious, warlike and ambitious race. From that moment the name of Englishman impressed the mind of every Indian power with jealousy and apprehension. Our subsequent misconduct and disasters would already have disarmed their resentments, if they could be pacified with less than our destruction. Till of late they hated, but they dreaded and respected us. To judge by our conduct, the *oderint dum metuant* was our favourite motto ; but now they have mingled hatred with contempt. We gained an empire by violence and injustice, it is true ; but we main-