THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS OF Marcus Tullius Cicero.

IN FIVE BOOKS.

A New Translation.

By A GENTLEMAN.

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BOOK I.

On the Contempt of DEATH.

I. AS I am, at length, entirely, or to a great degree, freed from the fatigue of defending clients, and the duties of a ſenator, I have recourſe again, BRUTUS, principally on your advice, to thoſe ſtudies which were never out of my mind, but neglected at times, and which after a long interval I have reaſſum'd: And ſince the reaſon and precepts of all arts which relate to living well, depend on the ſtudy of wiſdom, which is call'd philoſophy, I have thought of illuſtrating this in the Latin tongue, not, becauſe philoſophy, could not be under-

ſtood in the Greek language, or by Greek maſters, but it was always my opinion, that we have been more happy at inventing than the Greeks, or that we have improved on whatever we have received from them, which they have thought worthy their care and pains: For with regard to manners and œconomy, family and home affairs; We certainly now manage them with more elegance, and better than they; but our Anceſtors have, beyond all diſpute, form'd the republic on better laws and cuſtoms. What ſhall I ſay of our military affairs, in which, as our anceſtors excell'd them much in valour, ſo more in diſcipline: As to thoſe things which are attained not by ſtudy, but nature, nor Greece, nor any nation, is comparable with them; for with whom was there that gravity, that ſteadineſs, that greatneſs of ſoul, probity, faith? ſuch diſtinguiſhed virtue of every kind, as to equal them with ours? Greece excell'd us in learning, and all kinds of litterature, and it was eaſy to do ſo where there was no competition; for amongſt the Greeks their poets were the ancienteſt ſpecies of their learned. Of theſe Homer and Heſiod were before the foundation of Rome; Archilochus, in the reign of Romulus. We received poetry much later, Livy gave us a fable near five hundred and ten years after the building of Rome, in

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the conſulate of C. Claudius, the ſon of Cæcus, and M. Tuditanus, a year before the birth of Ennius, who was older than Plautus and Nævius.

II. It was therefore late before poets were either known or received amongſt us; tho' we find in the origin that the gueſts uſed to ſing, at their entertainments, the praiſes of famous men, to the ſound of the flute; but a ſpeech of Cato's ſhews ſuch to have been in no great eſteem, in which he cenſures Marcus Nobilior, for carrying poets with him into his province: for that conſul, as we know, carried Ennius with him into Ætolia. Therefore the leſs eſteem poets were in, the leſs were thoſe ſtudies purſued: Not but, had there been amongſt us any of great abilities that way, they would not have been at all inferior to the Greeks. Do we imagine that, had it been commendable in Fabius, a man of the firſt quality, to paint, we ſhould have been without many Polycletes and Parrhaſius's: Honour nouriſhes art, and glory is the ſpur with all to ſtudies; thoſe ſtudies are always neglected, which are a kind of diſgrace to any. The Greeks held vocal and inſtrumental muſick as the greateſt erudition, and therefore it is recorded of Epaminondas, who, in my opinion, was the firſt man amongſt the

Greeks, that he play'd excellently on the flute; and Themiſtocles ſome years before was deemed ignorant becauſe he refuſed at an entertainment to play on the harp. For that reaſon muſicians flouriſh'd in Greece, and it was a general ſtudy; and whoever was unacquainted with it, was not look'd on as fully inſtructed in learning. Geometry was in high eſteem with them, therefore none were more honourable than mathematicians, but we have confin'd this art to bare counting and meaſuring.

III. But on the contrary, we ſoon entertain'd the orator; no ways eloquent at firſt, but proper enough for an harangue, he ſoon became eloquent; for it is reported that Galba, Africanus, and Lælius, were men of learning; that even Cato was ſtudious, who was an age before them: Then ſucceeded the Lepidus's Carbo, and Gracchus's and ſo many great orators after them, even to our times, that we were very little, if at all, inferior to the Greeks. Philoſophy was at a low ebb to this preſent time, and had no aſſiſtance from our own language, which I have undertaken to raiſe and illuſtrate; that, as I have been of ſervice to my countrymen, when employ'd in public affairs, I may, if poſſible, be ſo to them in my retirement: In this I muſt take the more pains, becauſe

cauſe many books are ſaid to be written inaccurately, by thoſe excellent men, but no great ſcholars: For indeed it may be that a man may think well, and yet not be able to expreſs politely his thoughts; but for any to publiſh his thoughts which he can neither methodiſe, nor illuſtrate, nor entertain his reader, is an unpardonable abuſe of letters and retirement: They therefore read their books to one another, and are never taken up by any but thoſe who claim the ſame privilege of writing. Wherefore if oratory has acquired any reputation, from my application to it, I ſhall with more pains open the fountains of philoſophy, from which flow'd all the advantages of the other. But,

IV. As ARISTOTLE, a man of excellent parts, abundant in all knowledge, being moved at the glory of the rhetorician Iſocrates, commenced a teacher of youth, and join'd philoſophy with eloquence: So it is my deſign not to lay aſide my former ſtudy of oratory, and yet employ myſelf in this greater and more fruitful art; for I always thought, that to be able to ſpeak copiouſly and elegantly on the moſt important queſtions, was the moſt conſummate philoſophy; to which ſubject I have ſo diligently apply'd myſelf, that I have already

ventured to have ſchools, like the Greeks: As lately when you left us, having many of my friends about me, I attempted at my Tuſculum, what I could do in that way; for as I formerly practiſed declaiming, which nobody continued longer than myſelf, ſo this is to be now the declamation of my old age. I ordered one to propoſe ſomething he would have diſcuſs'd: I diſputed on that, either ſitting or walking, I have compil'd the ſchools, as the Greeks call them, of five days, in as many books; it was in this manner. When he who was the hearer, had ſaid what he thought proper, I diſputed againſt him; for this is, you know, the old and Socratic method of diſputing againſt another's opinion; for Socrates thought the probable might thus the eaſier be got at. But to give you a better notion of our diſputations I will not barely give you an account of them, but repreſent them to you as they were carried on; therefore let the introduction be thus.

V. *A.* To me death ſeems to be an evil. *M.* What, to thoſe who are already dead? or to thoſe who muſt die? *A.* To both. *M.* It is a miſery then, becauſe an evil? *A.* Certainly. *M.* Then they, who muſt ſoon die, and who muſt die ſome time or other, are both miſerable? *A.* So it appears to me. *M.* Then all are miſerable?

A. Every

A. Every one. *M.* And indeed, if you are conſiſtent with yourſelf, all that are already born, or ſhall be, are not only miſerable, but always will be ſo; for ſhould you maintain thoſe only to be miſerable, who muſt die, you would not except any one living, for all muſt die; but there ſhould be an end of miſery in death. But ſeeing that the dead are miſerable, we are born to eternal miſery; for they muſt of conſequence be miſerable, who died a hundred thouſand years ago; or rather all that have been born. *A.* So indeed I think. *M.* Tell me, I beſeech you, are you afraid of the three headed Cerberus below, the roaring waves of Cocytus, the paſſage over Acheron, Tantalus expiring with thirſt, while the water touches his chin; or Siſyphus,

Who ſweats with arduous toil to gain
The ſteepy ſummit of the mount in vain?

Perhaps too, you dread the inexorable judges, Minos and Rhadamanthus, before whom nor Craſſus, nor M. Antonius can defend you; nor, ſince the cauſe lies before Græcian judges, Domoſthenes. But you muſt plead for yourſelf before a very great Aſſembly: You dread perhaps theſe, and therefore look on death as an eternal evil.

§VI. *A.* Do you take me to be mad enough to give credit to ſuch things? *M.* What? do you

you not believe them? *A.* Not in the leaſt. *M.* I am ſorry to hear that. *A.* Why, I beg? *M.* Becauſe I could have been very eloquent in ſpeaking againſt them. *A.* And who could not on ſuch a ſubject? or, what occaſion is there to refute theſe monſters of the poets and painters? *M.* And yet, you have books of philoſophers full of arguments againſt theſe. *A.* Idle enough truly! for, who is ſo weak as to be concern'd about them? *M.* If then there are none miſerable in the infernal regions, there muſt be none there. *A.* I am altogether of that opinion. *M.* Where then are thoſe you call miſerable? or what place do they inhabit? if they are at all, they muſt be ſomewhere? *A.* I indeed am of opinion, they are no where. *M.* Therefore there are none ſuch. *A.* Even ſo, and yet they are miſerable for this very reaſon, that they are not at all. *M.* I had rather now that you had been afraid of Cerberus, than to ſpeak thus inaccurately. *A.* Why ſo? *M.* Becauſe you admit him to be, who is not, where is your ſagacity? When you ſay one is miſerable, you ſay ſuch an one is, when he is not. *A.* I am not ſo abſurd as to ſay that. *M.* What is it you ſay then? *A.* I ſay, for inſtance, that Craſſus is miſerable in being depriv'd of ſuch great riches by death. That Cn. Pompey was

ſo,

ſo, in being taken from ſuch glory and honour; upon the whole, that all are miſerable who are deprived of this light. *M.* You are come about to the ſame thing, for to be miſerable, implies an exiſtence; but you juſt now denied that the dead had any exiſtence; if they are not, they can be nothing, and if ſo, not miſerable. *A.* Perhaps I do not expreſs what I mean, for I look upon this very thing not to exiſt, after having been, to be very miſerable. *M.* What, more ſo, than not to have been at all? therefore, thoſe who are not yet born, are miſerable, becauſe they are not; and we ourſelves, if we are to be miſerable after death, were miſerable before we were born: But I do not remember I was miſerable before I was born; but I ſhould be glad to know, if your memory is better, what you recollect of yourſelf, before you was born.

VII. *A.* You are pleaſant; as if I had ſaid, they are miſerable who are not born, and that they are not ſo who are dead. *M.* You ſay then, that they are ſo? *A.* Yes, becauſe they are moſt miſerable not to be, after they have been. *M.* You do not obſerve, that you aſſert contradictions; for what is a greater contradiction, than that ſhould be not only miſerable, but ſhould be at all, which is not;

not; when you go out at the Capene gate, and ſee the tombs of Calatinus, the Scipio's, Servilius's Metellus's, do you look on them as miſerable? *A.* Becauſe you diſtreſs me with a word, henceforward I will not ſay they are miſerable in general, but miſerable for this, that they are not. *M.* You do not ſay then M. Craſſus is miſerable; but only miſerable M. Craſſus. *A.* Evidently ſo. *M.* As if it did not follow, that whatever you declare in that manner, either was, or was not. Are you not acquainted with the firſt principles of logic? for this is the firſt thing they lay down, Whatever is aſſerted, (for ſo I render the Greek term ἀξίωμα, I may expreſs it otherwiſe when I ſhall find a better) is therefore aſſerted becauſe it is either true or falſe. When therefore you ſay miſerable M. Craſſus, you either ſay this, that M. Craſſus is miſerable, that ſome judgment may be made whether it be true or falſe, or you ſay nothing. *A.* Well then, I now own that the dead are not miſerable, ſince you have drawn from me a conceſſion, that they who are not at all, cannot be miſerable. What then? We that are alive are we not wretched, ſeeing we muſt die? for what is there agreeable in life, when we muſt night and day reflect that we may inſtantly die?

VIII.

VIII. *M.* Do you not then perceive how great an evil you have deliver'd human nature from? *A.* By what means? *M.* Becauſe, if to die is miſerable to the dead, to live would be a kind of infinite and eternal miſery: Now I ſee a goal, which when I have reach'd, there would nothing more to be feared; but you ſeem to me to follow the opinion of Epicharmus, a man of ſome diſcernment, and ſharp enough for a Sicilian. *A.* What opinion? for I do not recollect it. *M.* I will tell you if I can, in Latin, for you know, I am no more uſed to bring in Latin ſentences in a Greek diſcourſe, than Greek in a Latin one. *A.* And that is right enough; but what is that opinion of Epicharmus?

M. I would not die, but yet
Am not concerned that I ſhall be dead.

A. I now recollect the Greek, but ſince you have oblig'd me to grant that the dead are not miſerable, proceed to convince me, that it is not miſerable to be under a neceſſity of dying. *M.* That is eaſy enough, but I have greater things in hand. *A.* How comes that to be ſo eaſy? and what are thoſe things of more conſequence? *M.* Thus: becauſe if there is no evil after death, death itſelf can be none; for what ſucceeds that immediately, is a ſtate

where you grant there is no evil; ſo that to be obliged to die can be no evil; for that is to arrive there where we allow no evil is. *A.* I beg you will be more explicit on this; for theſe ſubtle arguments force me ſooner to a conceſſion than conviction: But what are thoſe more important things you undertake? *M.* To teach you, if I can, that death is not only no evil, but a good. *A.* I do not inſiſt on that, but ſhould be glad to hear, for ſhould you not prove your point, yet, you may prove that death is no evil: But I will not interrupt you, I ſhould like to hear a continued diſcourſe. *M.* What, if I ſhould aſk you a queſtion, would you not anſwer? *A.* That has pride in it; but I would rather you ſhould not aſk, but where neceſſity requires.

IX. *M.* I will comply with you, and explain as well as I can, what you require; but not like the Pythian Apollo, that what I ſay muſt be infallible; but as a mere man, endeavouring at probabilities, by conjecture, for I have no ground to proceed further on, than probability. Let them deal in demonſtrations, who ſay, they can perceive things as they are, and who proclaim themſelves philoſophers, by profeſſion. *A.* Do as you pleaſe, we are ready to hear you. *M.* The firſt thing is to enquire

quire, what death, which ſeems to be ſo well known, is; for ſome imagine Death to be the ſeparation of the ſoul from the body; ſome that there is no ſuch ſeparation, but that ſoul and body periſh together, and that the ſoul is extinguiſh'd with the body. Of thoſe who admit of the ſoul's ſeparation, ſome are for its immediate departure, ſome that it continues a time, others for ever: There is great diſpute even what the ſoul is, where it is, and whence it is deriv'd: With ſome, the heart itſelf ſeems to be the ſoul, hence the expreſſions, out of heart, bad hearted, and of one heart; and that prudent Naſica twice conſul, was call'd Corculus, *i. e.* wiſe heart; and Ælius Sextus, a man of noble heart. Empedocles imagines the heart's blood, to be the ſoul; with others, a certain part of the brain ſeems to be the throne of the ſoul; others neither allow the heart nor a certain part of the brain to be the ſoul; but ſome would have the heart to be the ſeat and manſion of the ſoul; others, the brain. Some would have the ſoul, or ſpirit, to be air, as we generally do; the name ſignifying as much, for we ſay to breath, to expire, to be animated, &c. and the Latin word for the ſpirit implies breath. The Soul ſeems to Zeno the Stoic, to be fire. But what I have ſaid of the heart's blood, air, and fire, are general opinions; the reſt are tenets of particulars,

culars, of which there were formerly many amongſt the antients.

X. The lateſt is Ariſtoxenus, both muſician and philoſopher; he maintains a certain intenſion of the body, like what is called harmony in muſic, to be the ſoul. Thus from the figure and nature of the body, various motions are excited, as ſounds from an inſtrument. He ſtuck cloſe to his profeſſion, and yet he ſaid ſomething, whatever it was, which had been ſaid and explain'd a great while before by Plato. Xenocrates denied that the ſoul had any figure, or any thing like matter; but ſaid it was a number, the power of which, as Pythagoras thought, ſome ages before, was the greateſt in nature: His maſter Plato had imagin'd a three-fold ſoul; the chief, *i. e.* reaſon he had lodg'd in the head, as in a tower; and being willing to ſeparate the other two, he placed anger in the breaſt, and deſire under the præcordia. But Dicæarchus, in a diſcourſe of ſome learned diſputants, held at Corinth, which he gives us in three books; in the firſt of which he makes many ſpeakers; in the other two he introduces a certain Pherecrates, an old man of Phthios, who, as he ſaid, was deſcended from Deucalion; aſſerting, that there is in fact no ſoul; and that it is a name, without a meaning; and that it is idle to ſay, animals,

or

or animated; that neither men nor beaſts have minds or ſouls; and that all that power, by which we act or perceive is equally infuſed into every living creature, and is inſeparable from the body, for it then would be nothing; nor is there any thing beſides one ſimple body, ſo faſhioned as to live and have its ſenſation, from the temperature of nature. Ariſtotle, ſuperior to all both in parts and induſtry, (I always except Plato) having embraced theſe four known ſorts of principles, from which all things deduce their original, imagines there is a certain fifth nature, from whence comes the ſoul; for to think, foreſee, to learn, to teach, to invent any thing, and many others; as, to remember, to love, to hate, deſire, to fear, to be pleas'd or diſpleas'd; theſe, and ſuch like, are, he thinks, in none of thoſe four kinds: He adds a fifth kind, which has no name, and thus by a new name he calls the ſoul ἐντελέχειαν, as it were a certain continued and perpetual motion.

XI. If I have not forgot, theſe are the opinions of all, concerning the ſoul. I have omitted Democritus, a very great man indeed, but who deduces the ſoul from the fortuitous concourſe of light and round corpuſcles, as with them,

them, the crowd of atoms can effect every thing. Which of theſe opinions is true, ſome God muſt determine: The great queſtion with us is, which has the moſt appearance of truth: Shall we determine between them; or return to our ſubject? *A.* I could wiſh both, if poſſible; but it is difficult to mix them; therefore, if without a diſcuſſion of them we can get rid of the fears of death, let us proceed to do ſo but if this is not to be done without explaining the queſtion about ſouls, let us have that now, the other, another time. *M.* I take that to be beſt, which I perceive you are inclin'd to; for reaſon will evince, that let either of the opinions I have ſtated be true, death cannot be an evil: For, if either the heart, the blood, or brain, be the ſoul, certainly, as corporeal, it will periſh with the reſt of the body; if it ſhould be air, it will be diſperſed; if fire, extinguiſhed; if Ariſtoxenus's harmony, diſconcerted. What ſhall I ſay of Dicæarchus, who denies there is any ſoul? In all theſe opinions, there is nothing to affect any one after death; for all feeling is loſt with life, and where there is no ſenſation, nothing can interfere to affect us: The opinions of others are charged with hope; if it is any pleaſure to you to think, that ſouls, after they leave the body, may.

may go to heaven, as their abode. *A.* I have great pleaſure in that thought, and it is what I moſt deſire; but ſhould it not be ſo, I ſtill am very willing to believe it. *M.* What occaſion have you then for my aſſiſtance? am I ſuperior to Plato in eloquence? Turn over carefully his book that treats of the ſoul, you will have there all you can want. *A.* I have indeed done that, and often; but I know not how, I allow of it whilſt I am reading; but when I lay down the book, and begin to reflect with myſelf on the immortality of the ſoul, that conviction vaniſhes. *M.* How comes that? Do you admit it that ſouls exiſt after death, or that they periſh in death? *A.* I agree to that. *M.* What if they ſhould exiſt? *A.* I allow them happy. *M.* If they periſh? *A.* I cannot think they are unhappy, becauſe they have no exiſtence. You drove me to that conceſſion but juſt now. *M.* How then can you maintain any ſuſpicions of death's being a miſery, which either makes us happy, the ſoul continuing; or not unhappy, as void of all ſenſation?

XII. *A.* Explain therefore, if it is not troubleſome, firſt, if you can, that ſouls exiſt; then, ſhould you fail in that, for it is very difficult, that death is free of all evil; for I am not without my fears, that this itſelf is an

evil, I do not ſay, the immediate deprivation of ſenſe, but, that we ſhall be deprived. *M.* I have the beſt authority in ſupport of the opinion you deſire to have eſtabliſh'd, which ought, and generally has, great weight in all caſes. And firſt, I have all antiquity on that ſide; which the nearer it is to its origin and divine deſcent, poſſibly by that diſcerns truth the clearer: This very thing then, was adopted by all thoſe ancients, whom Ennius calls, in the Sabine tongue, Caſci; that in death there was a ſenſation, and that, when men departed this life, they were not ſo entirely deſtroyed, as to periſh abſolutely. And this may appear [illegible] from many other things, ſo from the pontifical rites, and funeral obſequies, which men of the beſt ſenſe had not been ſo ſolicitous about, nor forced from any injury with ſuch ſevere laws, but from a firm perſuaſion, that death was not ſo entire a deſtruction as to leave nothing remaining, but a certain tranſmigration as it were, and change of life; which uſually conveyed the illuſtrious of both ſexes into heaven, confining others to the earth, but ſo as ſtill to exiſt. From this, and the ſentiments of the Romans,

In heaven Romulus with Gods now lives.

Ennius ſaith, on common report: Hence Hercules is held ſo great and propitious a god

amongſt

amongſt the Greeks, from whom we received him, as he is alſo by thoſe who inhabit the borders of the Ocean. Hence Bacchus was deified, the offspring of Semele; and from the ſame illuſtrious fame we receive Caſtor and Pollux, as gods, who are reported not only to have helped the Romans to victory in their battles, but to have been the meſſengers of their ſucceſs: What? Ino, the daughter of Cadmus, is ſhe not called Lucothea, by the Greeks, and Matuta, by us? What? is not all heaven (not to dwell on particulars) fill'd as it were, with the offspring of men?

XIII. Should I attempt to ſearch into antiquity, and produce from thence what the Greek writers have aſſerted; it would appear that even thoſe who are called their principal gods, went from hence into heaven: Examine the ſepulchers of them which are ſhewn in Greece; recollect, as you are initiated, what is delivered in the myſteries? then will you perceive how extenſive this doctrine is. But they who were not acquainted with phyſics, (for they began to be in vogue many ages after) had no higher conviction, than what natural reaſon could give them; they were not in poſſeſſion of the reaſon and cauſe of things; they were often induced by certain viſions, and thoſe ge-

nerally in the night, to think that they were ſtill alive, who had departed from this life. And this may further be brought as an irrefragable argument, that there are Gods, in that, there never was any nation ſo barbarous, not a ſingle inſtance of that ſavageneſs, as to be without ſome notion of Gods: Many have wrong notions of the Gods, that may proceed from bad cuſtoms, yet all allow there is a certain divine nature and energy; nor doth this proceed from converſing together, or conſent of parties; it is not an opinion eſtabliſhed by law; and in every caſe the conſent of all nations, is to be look'd on as a law of nature: Who is there then that did not lament the loſs of his friends, principally from imagining them deprived of the conveniences of life? Take away this opinion, and you remove with it all grief; for no one grieves on his own account. Perhaps we may be ſlightly affected, and uneaſy; but that bitter lamentation, and thoſe bewailing tears have their cauſe from our apprehenſions, that he, whom we loved, is deprived of the advantages of life, and is ſenſible of it. And we are led to this opinion by nature, without learning, or the deductions of reaſon.

XIV. But the greateſt argument is, that nature herſelf gives a ſilent judgment, in favour of the immortality of the ſoul, in that, all

all are anxious, and greatly ſo, in what relates to futurity,

One plants, what future ages ſhall enjoy,

as Statius ſaith in his Synephebi. What has he an eye to in this, but that he is intereſted in poſterity? Shall the induſtrious huſbandman then plant trees, the fruit of which he ſhall never ſee? and ſhall not the great man found laws, inſtitutes, a republic? What doth the procreation of children imply? the continuing a name, adoptions, the exactneſs in writing wills? what the inſcriptions on monuments, or elogies? but that our thoughts run on futurity? There is no doubt but a judgment may be formed of nature in general, from thoſe of the beſt natural diſpoſitions? and what is a better natural diſpoſition in man, than thoſe diſcover, who look on themſelves born for the protection, preſervation, and aſſiſtance of others? Hercules went to heaven, he never had gone thither, had he not, whilſt amongſt men, ſecur'd that road to himſelf: Theſe are of old date, and have, beſides, the ſanction of religion.

XV. What, do you imagine ſo many and ſuch great men of our republic, who have ſacrific'd their lives for its good, thought that their names ſhould not continue beyond their lives? None ever encountered death for their

country, but under a firm perſuaſion of immortality! Themiſtocles might have lived at his eaſe: ſo might Epaminondas, and, not to look abroad for inſtances and amongſt the ancients, I myſelf might: But I know not how there adheres to our minds, a certain preſage of future ages; and this both exiſts moſt, and appears cleareſt, in men of the beſt parts, and greateſt ſouls. Take away this, and who is ſo mad as to ſpend his life amidſt toils and dangers? I ſpeak of thoſe in power. What were the poets views but to be enobled after death? Whence then have we,

Behold old Ennius here, who erſt,
Thy fathers great exploits rehears'd.

He challenged the reward of glory, from thoſe whoſe anceſtors he had enobled. And thus the ſame poet,

Let none with tears my funeral grace, for I
Claim from my works an immortality.

Why do I mention poets? the very mechanicks are deſirous of fame after death: Why did Phidias include a model of himſelf, in the ſhield of Minerva, when he was not allow'd to inſcribe his name on it? What did our Philoſophers mean, when they put their names to thoſe very books they write on the contempt of glory? If then, univerſal conſent

ſent is the voice of nature, and it is the general opinion every where, that thoſe who have quitted this life, are ſtill intereſted in ſomething; we muſt ſubſcribe to that opinion. And if we think men of the greateſt abilities and virtue ſee cleareſt into nature, as her moſt perfect work; it is very probable, as every great man endeavours moſt for the public good, that there is ſomething he will be ſenſible of after death.

XVI. But as we naturally think there are Gods, and what they are, we diſcover by reaſon; ſo, by the conſent of nations, we are induced to believe, that our ſouls ſurvive; but where their habitation is, and what they are, muſt be learned from reaſon; the want of which knowledge, has given riſe to the infernals, and birth to thoſe fears, which you ſeem, not without reaſon, to deſpiſe: For our bodies falling to the ground, and being covered with earth, from whence they are ſaid to be interred, have occaſioned them to imagine that the dead continue, the remainder of their exiſtence, under ground; which opinion of theirs, has drawn after it many errors; which the poets have increaſed; for the Theatre crouded with women and children, has been greatly affected on hearing theſe pompous verſes,

Lo! here I am, who ſcarce could gain this place,
Thro' ſtony mountains, and a dreary waſte;
Thro' clifts, whoſe ſharpen'd ſtones tremendous hung,
Where dreadful darkneſs ſpread itſelf around.

and the error prevail'd ſo much, which indeed at preſent, ſeems to me, to be removed, that altho' they knew the bodies were burned, yet they conceived ſuch things to be done in the infernal regions, as could not be executed or imagined without a body; for they could not apprehend, how unbodied ſouls could exiſt; and therefore, they look'd out for ſome ſhape or figure. From hence all that account of the dead in Homer; hence my friend Appius framed his Necromancy; hence the lake of Avernus, in my neighbourhood;

From whence the ſouls of undiſtinguiſh'd ſhape,
No mortal blood; ruſh from the open gate
Of Acheron, and to this world eſcape.

And they muſt needs have theſe appearances ſpeak, which is not poſſible, without a tongue, a palate, jaws, without the help of lungs and ſides, or without ſome ſhape or figure; for they could ſee nothing by their mind alone, they referr'd all to their eyes. To withdraw the

evidently be, that ſouls, admitting them to be animals, *i. e.* to breath, or of the nature of fire, muſt mount upwards: But ſhould the ſoul be a number, which it is ſaid to be, with more ſubtlety than clearneſs; or that fifth nature, rather without a name than not underſtood; ſtill it is too pure and perfect, not to get at a great diſtance from the earth. Something of this ſort, then the ſoul is, that ſo active a principle ſhould not lie immerged in the heart or brain; or, as Empedocles would have it, in the blood.

XVIII. We will paſs over Dicæarchus, with his contemporary, and fellow-diſciple Ariſtoxenus, both indeed men of learning. One of them ſeems never to have been affected with grief, as he could not perceive, that he had a ſoul; the other is ſo pleaſed with his muſical compoſitions, that he endeavours to ſhew an analogy betwixt them and ſouls. We may underſtand harmony to ariſe from the intervals of ſounds, whoſe various compoſitions occaſion many harmonies; but I do not ſee how a diſpoſition of members, and the figure of a body without a ſoul, can occaſion harmony; he had better, learned as he is, leave this to his maſter Ariſtotle, and follow his trade, as a muſician; good

good advice is given him in that Greek proverb,

Apply your talents, where you beſt are ſkill'd.

I will have nothing at all to do with that fortuitous concourſe of individual light, and round corpuſcles, notwithſtanding Democritus inſiſts on their being warm, and with breath, *i. e.* having life. But this ſoul, ſhould it conſiſt of either of the four principles, from which we deduce all things, is of inflamed air, as ſeems particularly to have been the opinion of Panætius, and muſt neceſſarily mount upwards; for air and fire have no tendency downwards, and always aſcend: So ſhould they be diſſipated, that muſt be at ſome diſtance from the earth; but ſhould they remain, and preſerve their ſtate; it is clearer ſtill that they muſt be carried heaven-ward; and this groſs and concrete air, which is neareſt the earth, muſt be divided and broke by them; for the ſoul is warmer, or rather hotter than that air, which I juſt now call'd groſs and concrete; which is evident from this, that our bodies compounded of the terrene kind of principles, grow warm by the heat of the ſoul.

XIX. I add, that the ſoul may the eaſier eſcape from this air, which I have often named, and break thro' it; becauſe nothing is ſwifter than

than the ſoul; no ſwiftneſs is comparable to that of the ſoul; which, ſhould it remain uncorrupt, and without alteration, muſt neceſſarily be carried with that velocity, as to penetrate and divide all this region, where clouds, and rain, and winds are formed; which by means of exhalations from the earth, is moiſt and dark: Which region, when the ſoul has once got above, and falls in with, and perceives a nature like its own, being compounded of thin air, and a moderate ſolar heat, it reſts with theſe fires, and endeavours no higher flight. For when it has attained a lightneſs and heat like its own, it moves no more, balanced, as it where, between two equal weights. That then is its natural ſeat where it has penetrated to ſomething like itſelf, where wanting nothing elſe, it may be ſupported and maintained by the aliments, which nouriſh and maintain the ſtars. As we are uſed to be incited to all ſorts of deſires, by the ſtimulus of the body, and the more ſo, as we envy thoſe who are in poſſeſſion of what we long for, we ſhall certainly be happy, when with this body we get rid of theſe deſires and provocatives; which is our caſe at preſent, when, diſmiſſing all other cares, we curiouſly examine and look into any thing; which we ſhall then do with greater eaſe; and employ ourſelves entirely in viewing and conſidering

conſidering things; becauſe there is naturally in our minds, a certain inſatiable deſire of ſeeing truth; and the very region itſelf, where we ſhall arrive, as it gives us a more intuitive view of celeſtial things, will raiſe our deſires after knowledge. For this beauty of the heavens, even here on earth, gave birth to that philoſophy, which Theophraſtus calls an inheritance, both from father and mother; greatly raiſed by a deſire of knowledge. But they will in a particular manner enjoy this, who, whilſt inhabitants of this world, inveloped in darkneſs, were deſirous of looking into theſe things with the eye of their mind.

XX. For, if they now think they have attained ſomething, who have ſeen the mouth of the Pontus, and thoſe ſtreights, which were paſſed, by the ſhip called Argo, becauſe,

From Argos, ſhe did choſen men convey,
Bound, to fetch back the golden fleece their prey.

Or they, who ſaw the ſtreights of the ocean,

Where the ſwift waves divide the neighbouring ſhores,
Of Europe, and of Africk.——

What kind of ſight then, do you imagine that to be, when the whole earth is viewed? not only in its poſition, form, and boundaries; thoſe

thoſe parts of it that are habitable, but thoſe alſo that lie cultivated, thro' the extremities of heat and cold: For what we now ſee we do not view with our eyes; for body itſelf has no ſenſation: But as the naturaliſts, nay, even the phyſicians aſſure us, who have opened our bodies, and examined them; there are certain perforated canals, from the ſeat of the ſoul to the eyes, ears, and noſe; ſo that frequently, when either prevented by meditation, or the force of ſome bodily diſorder, we neither hear nor ſee, tho' our eyes and ears are open, and in good condition; ſo that we may eaſily apprehend that it is the ſoul that ſees and hears; not thoſe parts, which are but windows to the ſoul; by means of which the ſoul can perceive nothing, unleſs ſhe is on the ſpot, and exerts herſelf. How ſhall we account, that by the ſame power of thinking, we comprehend the moſt difficult things; as colour, taſte, heat, ſmell, and ſound? which the ſoul could never know by her five meſſengers, unleſs every thing was referred to it, and ſhe was ſole judge of all. And we ſhall certainly diſcover theſe things, clearer, and more perfect, when the ſoul, diſengaged from the body, ſhall arrive there, where nature leads; for at preſent, notwithſtanding nature has contrived, with the greateſt

greateſt ſkill, thoſe canals, which lead from the body to the ſoul; yet are they, in ſome way or other, ſtopped up with concrete and terrene bodies: But when we ſhall be nothing but ſoul, nothing will interfere, to prevent our ſeeing every thing as it is.

XXI. It is true I might be very large, did the ſubject require it; on the many and various objects the ſoul will be entertained with in thoſe heavenly regions; when I reflect on which, I am apt to wonder at the boldneſs of ſome philoſophers, who are ſo ſtruck with the knowledge of nature, as to thank, in an exulting manner, the firſt inventor of natural philoſophy, and reverence him as a God: For they declare themſelves freed, by his means, from the greateſt tyrants, a perpetual terror, and a fear that moleſted them, by night and day. What is this dread? this fear? what old woman is there ſo weak as to fear theſe things, which you, forſooth, had you not been acquainted with phyſics, would ſtand in awe of?

The hallow'd roofs of Acheron, the dread,
Of Orcus, and the pale ſejour of the dead.

And doth it become a philoſopher to boaſt that he is not affraid of theſe, and has diſcovered them to be falſe? Hence we may know how acute they were by nature, who without learning, had given into theſe

theſe things. They have gained, I know not what, who have learned, that when they die, they ſhall periſh entirely; which being admitted, for I ſay nothing to it, what is there agreeable or glorious in it? Not that I ſee any reaſon, why Pythagoras's and Plato's opinion might not be true: But ſhould Plato have aſſigned no reaſon, (obſerve how much I eſteem the man,) the weight of his authority would have born me down; but he has brought ſo many reaſons, that, to me he appears, to have endeavour'd to convince others; himſelf he certainly did.

XXII. But there are many who labour the other ſide of the queſtion, and condemn ſouls to death, as capitally convicted; nor have they any better argument, againſt the eternity of the ſoul, than their not being able to conceive a ſoul without a body; as if they could really conceive, what it is in the body; its form, ſize, and ſeat: That were they able to have a full view, of all that is now hid from them in a living body, the ſoul would be diſcernible by them; or, is it of ſo fine a contexture, as to evade their ſight? Let thoſe conſider this, who deny they can form any idea of the ſoul, without the body, if they can conceive what it is in the body. As to my own part,

when I reflect on the nature of the ſoul, I am more diſtreſſed, to conceive, what it is, in the body, a place that doth not belong to it, than what it is, when it leaves it, and is arrived at the free Æther, its own habitation, as it were. Could we apprehend nothing but what we ſee, certainly we could form no notion of God, nor of the divine ſoul, freed from body. Dicæarchus indeed, and Ariſtoxenus, becauſe it was hard to underſtand the ſoul, and its properties, aſſerted there was no ſoul. It is indeed the difficulteſt thing imaginable, to diſcern the ſoul, by the ſoul. And this, doubtleſs is the meaning of the precept of Apollo, which adviſes every one to know himſelf. I do not apprehend his intention to have been, that we ſhould inform ourſelves of our members, our ſtature, and make; nor doth Self imply our bodies; nor do I, who ſpeak thus to you, addreſs myſelf to your body: When therefore he ſaith, know yourſelf, he ſaith this, Inform yourſelf of the nature of your ſoul; for the body is but a kind of veſſel, or receptacle of the ſoul: Whatever your ſoul doth, is your own act. To know the ſoul then, unleſs it had been divine, would not have been a precept of that excellent wiſdom, as to be attributed to a God; but ſhould the ſoul not know what

what itſelf is, will you ſay, that it doth not perceive itſelf to be? that it has motion? on which is founded, that reaſon of Plato's, which is explained by Socrates, in Phædrus, and inſerted by me, in my ſixth book of the Republic.

XXIII. That which is always moved, is eternal; but that which gives motion to another, and is moved itſelf from ſome other cauſe, when that motion ceaſes, muſt neceſſarily ceaſe to exiſt. That, then alone, which is ſelf-moved, becauſe it is never forſaken by itſelf, muſt continue to be always moved. Beſides, it is the fountain and beginning of motion to every thing elſe; but whatever is firſt, has no beginning, for all things ariſe from that firſt; itſelf cannot owe its riſe to any thing elſe; for it would not be the firſt, had it proceeded from any thing elſe. If it had no beginning, it never will have end; for the original being extinguiſh'd, itſelf cannot be reſtored from any thing elſe, nor produce any thing from itſelf; inaſmuch as all things muſt neceſſarily ariſe, from that firſt cauſe. Thus it comes about, that the beginning of motion muſt ariſe from itſelf, becauſe it is itſelf, moved by itſelf; and that can neither have a beginning, nor ceaſe to be; otherwiſe the whole

heavens would be overſet, and all nature ſtand ſtill, nor be able to acquire any force, by the impulſe of which, it might be firſt ſet in motion. Seeing then it is clear, that whatever moves itſelf, is eternal; can there be any doubt that the ſoul is ſo? for that is inanimate, which is moved by an external force; but every animal is moved by an interior force, and its own. For this is the peculiar nature and power of the ſoul; which, if its the property of the ſoul alone, to have ſelf-motion, certainly it never had a beginning, and is eternal. Should all the lower order of philoſophers, for ſo I think they may be called, who diſſent from Plato and Socrates, and that ſchool, unite their force; they never would be able to explain any thing ſo elegantly, nor even underſtand, how artfully this concluſion is drawn. The ſoul then perceives itſelf to have motion, and with that perception is ſenſible that it is moved, by its own, and not the agency of another; and it is impoſſible that it ſhould ever forſake itſelf; from whence ariſes eternity, unleſs you have ſomething to ſay againſt it. *A.* I ſhould myſelf be very well pleaſed, not to have a thought ariſe in my mind againſt it, I am ſo much inclined to that opinion.

XXIV. *M.* I appeal to you, if theſe arguments that prove there is ſomething divine in the ſoul, are not as ſtrong? which divine properties, could I account how they begun, I might alſo, how they might ceaſe to be; for I think I can account how the blood, bile, phlegm, bones, nerves, veins, all the limbs, and ſhape of the whole body were concreted and made; nay, the ſoul itſelf, was there nothing more in that than a principle of life, might be put upon the ſame footing, as a vine or tree, and accounted for as naturally; for theſe, as we ſay, live, Beſides, were deſires and averſions all that belonged to the ſoul, they are but in common with the beaſts; but it has, in the firſt place, memory, and that ſo infinite, as to retain numberleſs things, which Plato would have to be a recollection of a former life; for in that book which is inſcribed Menon, Socrates aſks a child ſome queſtions in geometry, of meaſuring a ſquare; his anſwers are ſuch as a child would make, and yet his queſtions are ſo eaſy, that anſwering them, one by one, he is as ready, as if he had learned geometry. From whence Socrates would infer, that learning implies only recollection, which he explains more acurately, in the diſcourſe he held, the very day he died; for any one

entirely illiterate, to anſwer a queſtion well, that is propoſed to him, manifeſtly ſhews that he doth not learn it then, but recollects it by his memory: Nor is it accountable any other way, how children come to have notions of ſo many and ſuch important things, as are implanted, or as it were ſealed up in their minds; which the Greeks call common notions, unleſs the ſoul before it entered the body had been well ſtored with knowledge; for he holds that not to be, which has a beginning and ending; and that alone to be, which is always the ſame; as what he calls an idea, we a quality. The ſoul then ſhut up in the body, could not diſcover, but brought with it, what it knows: So that we are no longer ſurpriſed at its extenſive knowledge; nor doth the ſoul clearly diſcover its ideas at its firſt reſort to this troubleſome and unuſual dwelling; but after having refreſhed and recollected itſelf, it then by its memory recovers them; therefore to learn, implies only to recollect. But I am in a particular manner ſurpriſed at memory; for what is that by which we remember? what is its force? what its nature? I am not enquiring how great a memory Simonides may be ſaid to have had; how great Theodectes? how great that Cineas, who came ambaſſador here from Pyrrhus?

hus? or lately, Charmadas; or very lately, Sceptius Metrodorus; how great our Hortenſius: I ſpeak of common memory, and principally of thoſe, who are employed in any conſiderable ſtudy or art, of the capacity of whoſe minds it is hard to judge, they remembered ſo many things.

XXV. SHOULD you aſk what this leads to? I think we may underſtand what that power is, (for Plato conſtantly maintains the body to be nothing) and whence we have it. It certainly proceds neither from the heart, nor blood, nor brain, nor atoms; whether it be air or fire, I know not, nor am I, like thoſe, aſhamed to own where I am ignorant, that I am ſo. Was it poſſible to determine in any doubtful affair, I would ſwear that the ſoul, be it air or fire, is divine. What? I beſeech you, can you imagine, ſo great a power of memory to be ſown in, or be of the compoſition of earth? or this dark and gloomy atmoſphere? tho' you cannot apprehend what it is, yet you ſee what kind of thing it is, or if not that, yet you certainly ſee how great it is. What then? ſhall we imagine, there is a kind of meaſure in the ſoul, into which, as into a veſſel, all we remember is poured? that indeed is abſurd. How ſhall we form any idea of the bottom, or any

of

of ſuch a ſhape or faſhion of the ſoul? or how any at all of its holding ſo much? Shall we imagine the ſoul to receive impreſſions like wax, and memory to be marks of the impreſſions made on the ſoul? Whate'er be the characters of words, what of things themſelves? or where is that prodigious immenſeneſs as to give impreſſions to ſo many things? What, laſtly, is that power which diſcovers, and is called invention. Doth he ſeem to be compounded of this earthly, mortal, and periſhing nature, who firſt invented names for every thing, which with Pythagoras is the higheſt pitch of wiſdom? or he, who collected the diſperſed inhabitants of the world, and called them together into ſocial life? or he, who confined the ſounds of the voice, which are infinite to the marks of a few letters? or who obſerved the courſes of the planets, their progreſſive motions, their laws? theſe were all great men; but they were greater ſtill, who invented food, raiment, houſes; who introduced civility amongſt us, and armed us againſt the wild beaſts; by whom being civilized and poliſhed, we proceeded from the neceſſaries of life, to its embelliſhments. For we have provided great entertainments for the ears; by inventing and qualifying the variety and nature of ſounds. We view the ſtars as well

well thoſe that are fixed, as what are called improperly wandering. The ſoul that is acquainted with their revolutions and motions, acquaints itſelf that it is like his, who deviſed thoſe ſtars in the heavens: For when Archimedes deſcribed in a ſphere, the motions of the Moon, Sun, and five Planets, he did the ſame with Plato's God, in his Timæus, who made the world; he adjuſted motions of different ſlowneſs, and velocities, in one circle. Now allowing that what we ſee in the world, could not be effected without a God; Archimedes could not have imitated the ſame motions, in his ſphere without a divine ſoul.

XXVI. To me indeed, it appear, that thoſe ſtudies which are more known, and in greater eſteem, are not without ſome divine energy: So that I ſcarce think a poet who produces an approved poem, to be without ſome divine impulſe on his mind; or that oratory, abounding with ſonorous words, and fruitful ſentences, could flow thus, without ſome greater force. What then is philoſophy? which is the parent of all arts, but as Plato ſaith, a gift, as I expreſs it, an invention of the Gods? This taught us firſt, the worſhip of them: Then juſtice, which ariſes from men's being form'd into

into ſociety: next modeſty, and elevation of ſoul. Philoſophy diſperſed darkneſs from our ſouls, as it were from our eyes, enabling us to ſee all things that are above or below; the beginning, end, and middle of every thing. I am convinced entirely, that what could effect ſo many, and ſuch great things, muſt be divine. For what is a memory of words and things? what alſo invention? even that than which nothing greater can be conceived in a God! for I do not imagine the Gods to be delighted with nectar and ambroſia, or with Juventas, preſenting them with a cup; nor do I pay any attention to Homer, who ſaith that Ganymede was carried away by the Gods, on account of his beauty, to give Jove his drink. Too weak reaſons for doing Laomedon ſuch injury! Theſe were mere inventions of Homer, who gave his Gods the imperfections of men. I wiſh he had given men the perfections of the Gods! thoſe perfections I mean of uninterrupted health, wiſdom, invention, memory. Therefore the ſoul is, as I ſay, divine; or as Euripides more boldly expreſſes it, a God. And thus if the divinity be air or fire, the ſoul of man is the ſame: For as that celeſtial nature has nothing earthly or humid; ſo the ſoul of man is alſo void of all theſe: But if it is of

that

that certain fifth nature, firſt introduced by Ariſtotle; both Gods and ſouls are of the ſame.

XXVII. As this is my opinion, I have explained it in theſe very words, in my book Of conſolation. The origin of the ſoul of man is not to be found in any thing earthy, for there is nothing in the ſoul mixt or concrete, or that has any appearance of being form'd or made out of the earth; nothing even humid, airy, fiery; for what is there in ſuch like natures, that has the power of memory, underſtanding, or thought? that can recollect the paſt; foreſee future things; and comprehend the preſent? which are divine properties alone; nor can we diſcover whence men could have theſe, but from God. There is therefore a peculiar nature and power in the ſoul, diſtinct from thoſe natures, more known and familiar to us. Whatever then that is, which thinks, which has underſtanding, volition, a principle of life, is heavenly and divine, and on that account muſt neceſſarily be eternal: Nor can God himſelf, who is known to us, be conceived otherwiſe, than a ſoul free and unimbaraſſed, diſtinct from all mortal concretion, acquainted with every thing, and giving motion to it, itſelf endued with perpetual motion.

XXVIII. Of

XXVIII. Of this kind and nature is the ſoul of man. Should you be aſked then, what this ſoul is? where is your own? or what is it? what anſwer can I make? If I have not faculties for knowing all that I could deſire to know, you will allow me, I hope, to make uſe of thoſe I have. The ſoul is not equal to the diſcerning of itſelf; yet, the ſoul, like the eye, tho' it has no reflex view of itſelf, ſees other things: It doth not ſee, (which is of leaſt conſequence) its own ſhape; perhaps not; tho' it poſſibly may; but we will paſs that by: But it certainly ſees that it has vigour, ſagacity, memory, motion, velocity; theſe are all great, divine, eternal properties: What its appearance is, or where it dwells, is not matter of enquiry: As when we behold, firſt the lucid appearance of the heavens; then, the vaſt velocity of its revolutions, beyond the imagination of our thought; the viciſſitudes of nights and days; the four-fold diviſion of the ſeaſons, adapted to the ripening of the fruits of the earth, and the temperature of our bodies; and then look up to the ſun, the moderator and governor of all theſe; view the moon, by the increaſe and decreaſe of its light, marking as it were, and appointing our holy days; and ſee the five planets, carried in the ſame circle,

divided

divided into twelve parts, preſerving invariably the ſame courſes, with diſſimular motions amongſt themſelves; and the nightly appearance of the heaven, adorned on all ſides with ſtars; then, the globe of the earth, raiſed above the ſea, placed in the centre of the univerſe, habitated and cultivated in its two oppoſite extremities; one of them, the place of our habitation, ſituated to the north pole, under the ſeven ſtars.

Where the cold northern blaſts, with horrid ſound,
Hardens to ice; the ſnowey cover'd ground.

The other, the ſouth pole, unknown to us, called by the Greeks αντιχθονα, other parts, uncultivated, becauſe either frozen with cold, or burnt up with heat; but where we dwell, it never fails in its ſeaſon,

To yield a placid ſky, to bid the trees
Aſſume the lively verdure of their leaves:
The vine to bud, and joyful in its ſhoots,
Foretell th' approaching vintage of its fruits:
The ripen'd corn to ſing, whilſt all around
Full riv'lets glide; and flowers deck the ground.

Then the multitude of cattle, part for food, part for tilling the ground, others for carriage,

for

for cloathing; and man himſelf made as it were on purpoſe to contemplate the heavens and the Gods, and to pay adoration to them; laſtly, the whole earth, and wide extending ſeas, given to man's uſe.

XXIX. When we view theſe, and numberleſs other things, can we doubt that ſomething preſides over theſe, or made them! If they are made, as is the opinion of Plato: Or if, as Ariſtotle thinks, they are eternal; ſo great a work, and ſo great a bleſſing, cannot be ſuppoſed, without a director. Thus tho' you ſee not the ſoul of man, as you ſee not the Deity; yet, as you acknowledge a God, from his works, ſo own the divine power of the ſoul, from its remembring things, its invention, the quickneſs of its motion, and from every charm of virtue. But where is it ſeated? ſay you. My opinion is, in the head, and I can bring you reaſons for my opinion; but of thoſe elſewhere. At preſent, let the ſoul reſide where it will, you certainly have one in you. Should you aſk what its nature is? It has one peculiarly its own: But admitting it to be of fire, or air, it doth not affect the queſtion; only obſerve this, as you are convinced there is a God, tho' you are ignorant where he reſides, and what ſhape he is of;

of; ſo you ſhould be aſſured you have a ſoul, tho' you cannot ſatisfy yourſelf of the place of its reſidence, nor the faſhion of it. In our knowledge of the ſoul, unleſs we are groſly ignorant in phyſics, we cannot but be ſatisfied that it has nothing but what is ſimple unmix'd, uncompounded; which admitted of, it cannot be ſeparated, nor divided, diſperſed or parted, and therefore not periſh; for to periſh implies parting aſunder, a diviſion, a diſunion of thoſe parts which, whilſt it ſubſiſted, were held together by ſome band. Induced by theſe and ſuch like reaſons, Socrates neither look'd out for any body to plead for him, when accuſed, nor beg'd any favour from his judges, but maintain'd a manly freedom, not the effect of pride, but of the true greatneſs of his ſoul; and on the laſt day of his life, he held much diſcourſe on this ſubject; and a few days before he refuſed his liberty, when he might have been eaſily freed from his confinement, and when he had hold, in a manner, of that deadly cup, he ſpoke, with an air of one not forced to die, but as aſcending into heaven.

XXX. For ſo he thought himſelf to be, and thus he harangued. "That there are two "ways, and that the ſouls of men at their de-

"parture

" parture from the body, took different roads;
" for thoſe that were polluted with vices, that
" are common to men, and had given them-
" ſelves up entirely to unclean deſires; blinded
" by which, they had habituated themſelves
" to all manner of debaucheries, or had laid
" deteſtable ſchemes for the ruin of their
" country; took a road wide of that which
" led to the aſſembly of the Gods: But they
" who had preſerved themſelves perfect and
" chaſte, and free from the ſlighteſt contagion
" with the body, and had kept themſelves al-
" ways at a diſtance from it; and whilſt
" on earth, had conformed to the life of the
" Gods; found the return eaſy to thoſe, from
" whom they came." Therefore he relates, that all good and wiſe men ſhould take example from the ſwans, who are not without reaſon, ſacred to Apollo; but particularly, becauſe they ſeem to have received the gift of divination from him, by which foreſeeing how happy it is to die, they leave this world with ſinging and joy. Nor can any one doubt of this, unleſs it happens to us who think intenſely of the ſoul, as is common to thoſe who look earneſtly at the ſetting ſun, to loſe the ſight of it entirely: ſo the mind's eye viewing itſelf, ſometimes grows dull, and for that rea-

ſon

ſon we become remiſs in our contemplation. Thus our reaſoning is carried like one ſailing on the immenſe ocean, haraſſed with doubts and anxieties, not knowing how to proceed, but meaſuring back again thoſe dangerous tracts he had paſſed. But theſe reflections are of long ſtanding, and borrowed from the Greeks. Even Cato left this world, as pleaſed with an opportunity of dying; for that God who preſides in us, forbids our departure hence without his leave. But when God himſelf ſhall give a juſt cauſe, as formerly to Socrates, lately to Cato, and often to many others; certainly every man of ſenſe would gladly exchange this darkneſs, for that light; not that he would forcibly break from the chains that held him, for that would be againſt law; but walk out, like one diſcharged by a magiſtrate, or ſome lawful authority. The whole life of a Philoſopher, is, as the ſame ſaith, a meditation on death.

XXXI. For what do we elſe, when we call off our minds from pleaſure, *i. e.* from our attention to the body, from the managing our eſtates, which we do merely on the body's account; when from duties of a public nature, or from all other employs whatſoever, what, I ſay, do we elſe, but invite the ſoul

to reflect on itſelf? oblige it to converſe with itſelf, and break off its acquaintance with the body? to ſeparate the ſoul from the body; then, what is it but to learn to die? Wherefore, let me perſuade you, to meditate on this, and break off your connection with the body, *i. e.* learn to die. This is to be in heaven whilſt on earth; and when we ſhall be carried thither freed from theſe chains, our ſouls will make their way with more eaſe: For they who are always linked thus with the body, even when diſengaged make very ſlow advances, like thoſe who have worn fetters many years; which when we ſhall arrive at, we ſhall then live indeed, for this preſent life is a death, which I could lament, if I might. *A.* You have lamented it ſufficiently in your book of Conſolation; which, when I read, there is nothing I deſire more than to leave theſe things; but that deſire encreaſes, by what I have juſt now heard. *M.* The time will come, and that ſoon, whether you hang back or preſs forward, for time flies. Death is ſo far from being an evil, as it lately appeared to you, that I ſuſpect, that every thing is a greater evil to man; or nothing a more deſireable good; if we become thereby either Gods ourſelves, or companions of the Gods. *A.* This will not do, as there are ſome who will

not

not allow of it. *M.* But I will not leave off diſcuſſing this point, till I have convinced you, that death can upon no account be an evil. *A.* How can it, after what I have known? *M.* Do you aſk how it can? there are ſuch ſwarms of opponents; not only Epicureans, whom I regard very little, but I know not how, almoſt every man of letters: but my favourite Dicæarchus, is very ſtrenuous in oppoſing the immortality of the ſoul: For he has wrote three books, which are entitled, Leſbiacks, becauſe the diſcourſe was held at Mitylene, in which he would prove that ſouls are mortal. Indeed, the Stoics, give us as long credit, as the life of a raven; they allow the ſoul to exiſt a great while, but are againſt its eternity.

XXXII. Are you willing to hear, even allowing this, why death cannot be an evil? *A.* As you pleaſe; but no one ſhall force me from my immortality. *M.* I commend you indeed for that; tho' we ſhould not depend on our opinions; for we are frequently diſturbed by ſome ſubtle concluſion; we give way and change our opinions in things that are more evident; but in this there is ſome obſcurity. Should any thing of this kind happen, it is

well to be on our guard. *A.* You are right in that, but I will provide againſt any accident *M.* Have you any objection to diſmiſſing ou friends the Stoicks? I mean thoſe, who allow that ſouls exiſt after they leave the body, bu not always. *A.* Yes, thoſe who admit o the only difficulty in this caſe, that ſouls may exiſt independent of body; but reject that which is not only very probable, but the con ſequence of their own conceſſion, that if they may exiſt ſome time, they may ſo forever. *M* You take it right; that is the very thing ſhall we give therefore any credit to Panætius when he diſſents from his Plato? whom he every where calls divine, the wiſeſt, the ho neſteſt of men, the Homer of Philoſophers whom he oppoſes, in the ſingle opinion o the ſoul's immortality: For he maintains wha nobody denies, that every thing which is generated will periſh; that even ſouls are generated, appears from the reſemblance to thoſe that begot them; which is as apparent in the turn of their minds, as their bodies. But he brings another reaſon; that there is nothing which is ſenſible of pain, but may alſo fall ill; but whatever is ſubject to diſorders, is ſubject to death; the ſoul is ſenſible of pain, therefore it may periſh.

XXXIII. Theſe may be refuted; for they proceed from his not knowing, that on the ſubject of the immortality of the ſoul, he ſpeaks of the mind, which ſhould be free of all turbid motion; not of thoſe parts in which thoſe diſorders, anger and luſt, have their ſeat; which he, whom he oppoſes, imagines to be diſtinct and ſeparate from the mind. Now this reſemblance is more remarkable in beaſts, whoſe ſouls are void of reaſon: But the likeneſs in men, conſiſts more in their perſons; and it is of no little conſequence in what bodies the ſoul is lodged; for there are many things which depend on the body, that give an edge to the ſoul, many which blunt it. Ariſtotle indeed ſaith, that all men of parts are melancholy; ſo that I ſhould not have been diſpleaſed to have been ſomewhat duller than I am. He inſtances in many, and as if it was matter of fact, brings his reaſons for it: But if the power of thoſe things that proceed from the body, are ſo great as to influence the mind (for they are the things, whatever they are, that occaſion this likeneſs,) it doth not neceſſarily imply, that a ſimilitude of ſouls ſhould be born. I have done with theſe likeneſſes. I wiſh Panætius could be here; he lived with Africanus; I would enquire of him

which of his family, the nephew of Africanus's brother was like? poſſibly in perſon like his father; in his manners, ſo like the moſt abandoned, that none was more ſo. Who was the nephew of P. Craſſus like, that wiſe and eloquent man, inferior to none: Or the nephews and ſons of many other excellent men, whoſe names there is no occaſion to mention? But what are we doing? Have we forgot, that our purpoſe was, when we had ſufficiently ſpoke to the immortality of the ſoul; to evince, that, ſhould the ſouls periſh, there could be, even then, no evil in death? *A.* I remembered it very well; but I had no diſlike to your rambling a little from your purpoſe, whilſt you was talking of the ſoul's immortality.

XXXIV. *M.* I perceive you have ſublime thoughts, and would willingly reach heaven; I am not without hopes that ſuch may be our fate. But admit what they aſſert; that the ſouls do not remain after death. *A.* Should it be ſo, I ſee ourſelves deprived of the hopes of a happier life. *M.* But what is there of evil in that opinion? let the ſoul periſh as the body: Is there any pain, or indeed any feeling at all in the body after death? no one indeed

deed aſſerts that; tho' Epicurus charges Democritus with ſaying ſo; but the diſciples of Democritus deny it. No ſenſe therefore remains in the ſoul; for the ſoul is no where; where then is the evil? for there is nothing but theſe two. Is it becauſe the ſeparation of the ſoul and body cannot be effected without pain? but ſhould that be granted, how ſmall is that? yet I think that is falſe; and that it is very often without any ſenſe, ſometimes even with pleaſure, and the whole is very triffling, whatever it is, for it is inſtantaneous. What makes us uneaſy, or rather, gives us pain, is the leaving all the good things of life. Conſider, if I might not more properly ſay, the evil; what reaſon is there then to bewail the life of man? and yet, I might, with very good reaſon; but what occaſion is there, when I labour to prove that none are miſerable after death; to make life more miſerable, by lamenting over it? I have done that in the book I wrote, to comfort myſelf as well as I could. If then our enquiry is after truth, death withdraws us from evil, not from good. This is indeed ſo copiouſly handled by Hegeſias, the Cyrenian, that he is ſaid to have been forbid by Ptolemy from publiſhing them in the ſchools, becauſe ſome who heard him, made away