therefore the impropriety of that man's talking of virtue, who would meaſure every great evil by pain.

XXI. And indeed the Epicureans, thoſe beſt of men, for there is no order of men more innocent, complain, that I take great pains to enveigh againſt Epicurus, as if we were rivals for ſome honour or diſtinction. I place the chief good in the mind, he in the body; I in virtue, he in pleaſure; and the Epicureans are up in arms, and implore the aſſiſtance of their neighbours, and many are ready to fly to their aid. But as for my part, I declare, I am very indifferent about the matter, let it take what turn it may. For what! is the contention about the Punick war? on which very ſubject, tho' M. Cato and L. Lentulus were of different opinions, there was no difference betwixt them. Theſe behave with too much heat, eſpecially as the cauſe they would defend is no very reputable one, and for which they dare not plead either in the ſenate, or aſſembly of the people, before the army or the Cenſors: but I will diſpute this with them another time, and with ſuch temper that no difference may ariſe, for I ſhall be ready to yield to their opinions when

founded on truth. Only I muſt give them this advice; That was it ever ſo true, that a wiſe man regards nothing but the body; or, to expreſs myſelf with more decency, has no view but to pleaſe himſelf, or to make all things depend on his own advantage; as ſuch things are not very commendable, they ſhould confine them to their own breaſts, and leave off to talk with that parade of them.

XXII. What remains is the opinion of the Cyrenaics, who think that men then grieve when any thing happens unexpectedly. And that is, indeed, as I ſaid before, a great aggravation; and I know that it appeared ſo to Chryſippus, "Whatever falls out unexpected "is ſo much the heavier." But the whole does not turn on this; tho' the ſudden approach of an enemy ſometimes occaſions more confuſion than when you expected him, and a ſudden ſtorm at ſea throws the ſailors into a greater fright than when they foreſaw it, and it is the ſame in many caſes. But when you carefully conſider the nature of what was unexpected, you will find nothing more, than that all things which come on a ſudden appear greater; and indeed upon two accounts: The firſt is, that you have not time

to

to conſider how great the accident is; the next is, when you are perſuaded you could have guarded againſt them had you foreſeen them, the misfortune ſeemingly contracted by your own fault makes your grief the greater. That it is ſo, time evinces; which, as it advances, brings with it ſo much eaſe, that tho' the ſame misfortunes continue, the grief not only becomes the leſs, but in ſome caſes is entirely removed. Many Carthaginians were ſlaves at Rome, many Macedonians when Perſes their king was taken priſoner. I ſaw too, when I was a young man, ſome Corinthians in the Peloponeſus. They might all have lamented with Andromache,

All theſe I ſaw——

But they had perhaps given over lamenting themſelves, for by their countenances, ſpeech, and other geſtures, you might have taken them for Argives or Sicyonians. And I myſelf was more concerned at the ruined walls of Corinth, than the Corinthians themſelves were, whoſe minds by frequent reflection and time had acquired a callouſneſs. I have read a book of Clitomachus which he ſent to his captive citizens, to comfort them on the ruin of Carthage; there is in it a diſputation wrote by Car-

Carneades, which, as Clitomachus ſaith, he had inſerted into his commentary; the ſubject was, *Whether a wiſe man ſhould ſeem to grieve at the captivity of his country?* you have there what Carneades ſaid againſt it. There the philoſopher applies ſuch a ſtrong medicine to a freſh grief, as would be quite unneceſſary in one of any continuance; nor, had this very book been ſent to the captives ſome years after, would it have found any wounds to cure, but ſcars; for grief, by a gentle progreſs and ſlow degrees, wears away imperceptibly. Not that the nature of things is altered, or can be, but that cuſtom teaches what reaſon ſhould, that thoſe things loſe their weight which before ſeemed to be of ſome conſequence.

XXIII. It may be ſaid, What occaſion is there to apply to reaſon, or any conſolation that we generally make uſe of, to eaſe the grief of the afflicted? For we have this always at hand, that there is nothing but what we may expect. But how will any one be enabled to bear his misfortunes the better by knowing that they are unavoidable? Saying thus ſubſtracts nothing from the ſum of the grief: it infers only that nothing has fallen out but what might have been thought of; and

and yet this manner of ſpeaking has ſome little conſolation in it, but, I apprehend, not much. Therefore thoſe unlooked for things have not ſo much force as to give riſe to all our grief; the blow perhaps may fall the heavier, but whatever falls out doth not appear the greater on that account; no, it is becauſe it has lately happened, not becauſe it has befallen us unexpected, that makes it ſeem the greater. There are two ways then of diſcerning the truth, not only of things that ſeem evil, but of thoſe that have the appearance of good. For we either enquire into the nature of the thing, what, and how great it is, as ſometimes with regard to poverty; the burden of which we may lighten when by our diſputations we ſhew how very little, how few things nature requires, or without any ſubtle arguing we refer them to examples, as here we inſtance in a Socrates, there in a Diogenes, and then again that line in Cæcilius,

Wiſdom is oft conceal'd in mean attire.

For as poverty is of equal weight with all, what can be ſaid, why what was borne by Fabricious ſhould be inſupportable by others? Of a piece with this is that other way of comforting, that nothing happens but what is common

common to human nature: now this argument doth not only inform us what human nature is, but implies that all things are tolerable which others have borne and can bear.

XXIV. Is poverty the ſubject? they tell you of many who have ſubmitted to it with patience: Is it the contempt of honours? they acquaint you with ſome who never enjoyed any, and were the happier for it; and of thoſe who have preferred a private retired life to public employs, mentioning their names with reſpect: they tell you of the verſe of that moſt powerful king, who praiſes an old man, and pronounces him happy, who could reach old age in obſcurity and without notice. Thus too they have examples for thoſe who are deprived of their children; they who are under any great grief are comforted by inſtances of like affliction: thus every misfortune becomes the leſs by others having undergone the ſame. Reflection thus diſcovers to us how much opinion had impoſed on us. And this is what that Telamon declares, "I knew my ſon was mor-"tal;" and thus Theſeus, "I on my future "miſery did dwell;" and Anagoras, "I knew "my ſon was mortal." All theſe, by frequently reflecting on human affairs, diſcovered that

that they were by no means to be eſtimated by vulgar opinions: and indeed it ſeems to me to be pretty much the ſame with thoſe who conſider beforehand as with thoſe who have their remedy from time, excepting that a kind of reaſon cures the one, the other is provided with this by nature; diſcovering thereby, that what was imagined to be the greateſt evil, is not ſo great as to defeat the happineſs of life. Thus it comes about, that the hurt which was not foreſeen is greater, and not, as they ſuppoſe, that when the like misfortunes befal two different people, he only of them is affected with grief on whom it lights unexpectedly. So that ſome, under the oppreſſion of grief, are ſaid to have borne it the worſe on hearing of this common condition of man, that we are born under ſuch conditions as render it impoſſible for a man to be exempt from all evil.

XXV. For this reaſon Carneades, as I ſee it in our Antiochus, uſed to blame Chryſippus for commending theſe verſes of Eurypides:

Man doom'd to care, to pain, diſeaſe, and
ſtrife,
Walks his ſhort journey thro' the vale of life:
Watchful attends the cradle and the grave,
And paſſing generations longs to ſave:

Laſt

Laſt dies himſelf: yet wherefore ſhould we
mourn?
For man muſt to his kindred duſt return;
Submit to the deſtroying hand of fate,
As ripen'd ears the harveſt-ſickle wait.

He would not allow a ſpeech of this kind to avail at all to the cure of our grief, for he ſaid it was a lamentable caſe itſelf, that we were fallen into the hands of ſuch a cruel fate; for to preach up comfort from the misfortunes of another, is a comfort only to thoſe of a malevolent diſpoſition. But to me it appears far otherwiſe; for the neceſſity of bearing what is the common condition of humanity, makes you ſubmit to the gods, and informs you that you are a man, which reflection greatly alleviates grief: and they do not produce theſe examples to pleaſe thoſe of a malevolent diſpoſition, but that any one in affliction may be induced to bear what he obſerves many others bear with tranquillity and moderation. For they who are falling to pieces, and cannot hold together thro' the greatneſs of their grief, ſhould be ſupported by all kinds of aſſiſtance. From whence Chryſippus thinks that grief is called λυπην, as it were λυσις, *i. e.* a diſſolution of the whole man. The whole of which I think

may

may be pulled up by the roots, by explaining, as I ſaid at the beginning, the cauſe of grief; for it is nothing elſe but an opinion and eſtimation of a preſent acute evil. Thus any bodily pain, let it be ever ſo grievous, may be tolerable where any hopes are propoſed of ſome conſiderable good; and we receive ſuch conſolation from a virtuous and illuſtrious life, that they who lead ſuch lives are ſeldom attacked by grief, or but ſlightly affected by it.

XXVI. But if to the opinion of evil there be added this other, that we ought to lament, that it is right ſo to do, and part of our duty; then is brought about that grievous diſorder of mind. To which opinion we owe all thoſe various and horrid kinds of lamentations, that neglect of our perſons, that womaniſh tearing of our cheeks, that ſtriking on our thighs, breaſts and heads. Thus Agamemnon in Homer and in Accius,

Tears in his grief his uncomb'd locks.

From whence comes that pleaſant ſaying of Bion, that the fooliſh king in his ſorrow tore away the hairs of his head, imagining that being bald he would be leſs ſenſible of grief. But whoever acts thus is perſuaded he ought

to

to do ſo. And thus Æſchines accuſes Demoſthenes, of ſacrificing within ſeven days after the death of his daughter. But how rhetorically! how copiouſly! what ſentences has he collected? what words doth he throw out? You may ſee by this that an orator may do any thing, which no body would have approved of, but from a prevailing opinion, that every good man ought to lament heavily the loſs of a relation. Hence it comes, that ſome, when in ſorrow, betake themſelves to deſarts; as Homer ſaith of Bellerophon,

Wide o'er the Ælean field he choſe to ſtray
A long, forlorn, uncomfortable way!
Woes heap'd on woes conſum'd his waſted heart; Pop. Il. B. vi l. 247.

and thus Niobe is feigned to have been turned into ſtone from her never ſpeaking, I ſuppoſe, in her grief. But they imagine Hecuba to have been converted into a bitch from her rage and bitterneſs of mind. There are others who love to converſe with ſolitude itſelf, when in grief, as the nurſe in Ennius,

Fain would I to the heavens and earth relate
Medea's ceaſeleſs woes and cruel fate.

XXVII.

XXVII. Now all theſe things are done in grief from a perſuaſion of the truth, rectitude, and neceſſity of them; and it is plain, that it proceeds from a conviction of its being their duty; for ſhould theſe mourners by chance drop their grief, and ſeem more calm or chearful for a moment, they preſently check themſelves and return to their lamentations again, and blame themſelves for having been guilty of any intermiſſions from their grief. Parents and maſters generally correct children not by words only, but by blows, if they ſhew any levity when the family is under affliction, and as it were oblige them to be ſorrowful. What? doth it not appear, when you ceaſe of courſe to mourn, and perceive your grief has been ineffectual, that the whole was an act of your own chooſing? What, ſaith he in Terence who puniſhes himſelf, *i. e.* the ſelf-tormentor, "I am perſuaded I do leſs injury to my ſon "by being miſerable myſelf." He determines to be miſerable; and can any one determine on any thing againſt his will? "I ſhould think "I deſerved any misfortune." He ſhould think he deſerved any misfortune, were he otherwiſe than miſerable. Therefore you ſee the evil is in opinion, not in nature. How is it,

lament not. How ſhall we account for this? Becauſe that opinion is not fixed to that kind of evil: it is not our opinion that it is right meet, and our duty, to be uneaſy becauſe we are not all wiſe men. Whereas this opinion is ſtrongly affixed to that uneaſineſs where mourning is concerned, which is the greateſt of all grief. Therefore Ariſtotle, when he blames ſome ancient philoſophers for imagining that by their genius they had brought philoſophy to the higheſt perfection, ſays, they muſt be either extremely fooliſh, or extremely vain: but that he himſelf could ſee that great improvements had been made therein in a few years, and that philoſophy would in a little time arrive at perfection. Theophraſtus is reported to have accuſed nature at his death for giving to ſtags and crows ſo long a life, which was of no uſe to them, and for giving ſo few days to men, where it would have been of the greateſt uſe, whoſe days, had they been lengthened, the life of man would have been provided with all kinds of learning, and with arts in the greateſt perfection. He lamented therefore that he ſhould die juſt as he had begun to diſcover theſe. What? doth not every grave and diſtinguiſhed philoſopher acknowledge himſelf ignorant of many things? and that there are many

many things he muſt learn over and over again, and yet, tho' theſe are ſenſible that they ſtick in the very mid-way of folly, than which nothing can be worſe, are under no great affliction, becauſe the opinion that it is their duty to lament never interferes. What ſhall we ſay of thoſe who think it unbecoming in a man to grieve? amongſt whom we may reckon Q. Maximus, who buried his ſon that had been conſul, and L. Paulus who loſt two ſons within a few days of one another. Of the ſame opinion was M. Cato, who loſt his ſon juſt as he was deſigned for Pretor; and many others, which I have collected in my book of *conſolation*. Now what made theſe eaſy but their perſuaſion that grief and lamentation was not becoming in a man? Therefore as ſome give themſelves up to grief from an opinion that it is right ſo to do, they refrained themſelves from an opinion that it was wrong: from whence we may infer, that grief is owing more to opinion than nature.

XXIX. It may be ſaid on the other ſide, Who is ſo mad as to grieve voluntarily? Pain proceeds from nature; which you muſt ſubmit to, agreeable to what even your own Crantor

teaches, this preſſes and gains upon you unavoidably. So that the very ſame Oileus in Sophocles, who had before comforted Telamon on the death of Ajax, on hearing of the death of his own ſon is broken-hearted. On this alteration of his mind we have theſe,

Shew me the man ſo well by wiſdom taught
(That what he charges to another's fault)
When like affliction doth himſelf betide,
True to his own wiſe counſel will abide.

Now when they urge theſe, their endeavour is to evince, that nature is irreſiſtible, and yet the ſame people allow, that we take greater grief on ourſelves than nature requires. What madneſs is it then in us to require the ſame from others? But there are many reaſons for taking grief on us. The firſt is from the opinion of ſome evil, on the diſcovery and perſuaſion of which, grief comes of courſe. Beſides many people are perſuaded they do ſomething very acceptable to the dead when they lament over them. To theſe may be added a kind of womaniſh ſuperſtition, in imagining that to acknowledge themſelves afflicted, and humbled by the gods, is the readieſt way of appeaſing them. But few ſee what contradictions theſe things are charged with. They com-

commend thoſe who die calmly, but they blame thoſe who can bear the loſs of another with the ſame calmneſs; as if it was poſſible that it ſhould be true, as lovers ſay, that any one can love another more than himſelf. There is indeed ſomething excellent in this, and, if you examine it, no leſs juſt than true, that we ſhould love thoſe who ought to be dear to us, as well as we love ourſelves; but to love them more than ourſelves is impoſſible; nor is it deſirable in friendſhip that I ſhould love my friend more than myſelf, or he me: this would occaſion much confuſion in life, and break in upon all the duties of it.

XXX. But of this elſewhere: at preſent it is ſufficient not to lay our miſery to the loſs of our friends, nor to love them more than, were they ſenſible, they would approve of, or at leaſt more than we do ourſelves. Now as to what they ſay, that ſome are not at all eaſed by our conſolations; and moreover add, that the comforters themſelves acknowledge they are miſerable when fortune varies the attack and falls on them, in both theſe caſes the ſolution is eaſy: for the fault here is not in nature, but our own folly, and much may be ſaid againſt folly. But not to admit of conſolation

ſeems to beſpeak their own miſery, and they who cannot bear their misfortunes with that temper they recommend to others, they are but on a footing with the covetous, who find fault with thoſe that are ſo; as do the vain-glorious with thoſe of the ſame turn with themſelves. For it is the peculiar characteriſtic of folly to diſcover the vices of others, forgetting its own. But ſince we find that grief is removed by length of time, we have the greateſt proof that the ſtrength of it depends not merely on time, but the daily conſideration of it. For if the cauſe continues the ſame, and the man be the ſame, how can there be any alteration in the grief, if there is no change in what occaſioned the grief, nor in him who grieves? Therefore it is from daily reflecting that it is no evil for which you grieve, and not from the length of time that you have the cure of grief.

XXXI. Here ſome talk of moderate grief, which, ſuppoſing it natural, what occaſion is there for conſolation? For nature herſelf will determine the meaſure of it, but if it is in opinion, the whole opinion may be deſtroyed. I think it has been ſufficiently ſaid, that grief ariſes from an opinion of ſome preſent evil, which

which includes this, that it is incumbent on us to grieve. To this definition Zeno has added very juſtly, that the opinion of this preſent evil ſhould be recent: Now this word *recent* is explained thus, not that alone is recent which happened a little while ago, but, as long as there ſhall be any force or vigour or freſhneſs in that imagined evil, ſo long it is entitled to the name of recent. As Artemiſia the wife of Mauſolus king of Caria, who made that noble ſepulchre at Halicarnaſſus; whilſt ſhe lived, ſhe lived in grief, and died of that, being worn out by it, ſo that that opinion was always recent with her: but you cannot call that ſo, which in time decays. Now the duty of a comforter is, to remove grief entirely, to quiet it, or draw it off as much as you can, to keep it under, and prevent its ſpreading, or to divert it. There are ſome who think with Cleanthes, that the only duty of a comforter is to prove, that it is by no means any evil. Others, as the Peripateticks, that the evil is not great. Others, with Epicurus lead you off from the evil to good: ſome think it ſufficient to ſhew, that nothing has happened but what you had reaſon to expect. But Chryſippus thinks the main thing in comforting is, to remove the opinion

opinion from the perſon who is grieving, that to grieve is his bounden duty. There are others who bring together all theſe various kinds of conſolations, for people are differently affected; as I have done myſelf in my book Of conſolation: for my own mind being much diſordered, I have in that, every method of cure. But the proper ſeaſon is as much to be watched in the cure of the mind, as of the body; as Prometheus in Æſchylus, on its being ſaid to him,

I think, Prometheus, you this tenet hold,
That all men's reaſon ſhould their rage controul:

anſwers,

Yes, when one reaſon properly applies,
Ill tim'd advice will make the ſtorm but riſe.

XXXII. But the principal medicine to be applied in conſolation, is to maintain either that it is no evil at all, or a very inconſiderable one: next to that is, to ſpeak to the common condition of life, and with a view, if poſſible, to the ſtate of the perſon whom you comfort particularly. The third is, that it is folly to wear himſelf out with grief which can avail

nothing. For the advice of Cleanthes is for a wiſe man who wants none; for could you perſuade one in grief, that nothing is an evil but what is baſe, you would not only cure him of grief, but folly. But the time for ſuch doctrine is not well choſen. Beſides, Cleanthes doth not ſeem to me ſufficiently appriſed, that affliction may very often proceed from that very thing which he himſelf allows to be the greateſt misfortune. As was the caſe with Alcibiades, whom Socrates convinced, as we are told, that there was no difference betwixt him, tho' a man of the firſt faſhion, and a porter. Alcibiades being uneaſy at this, entreated Socrates with tears in his eyes, to make him a man of virtue, and diſmiſs that baſeneſs: What ſhall we ſay to this Cleanthes? Was there no evil in what afflicted Alcibiades thus? What ſtrange things doth Lycon ſay? Who to aſſuage grief makes it ariſe from trifles, from things that affect our fortune or bodies, not from the evils of the mind. What then, did not the grief of Alcibiades proceed from the vices and evils of the mind? I have already ſaid enough of Epicurus's conſolation.

XXXIII.

XXXIII. Nor is that conſolation much to be relied on, tho' frequently practiſed, and ſometimes has its effect, viz. That you are not alone in this; it has its effect, as I ſaid, but not always, nor with every perſon; for ſome reject it, but much depends on the application of it; for you are to ſet forth, not how men in general have been affected with evils, but how the men of ſenſe have borne them. As to Chryſippus's method it is certainly founded in truth; but it is difficult to apply it in time of diſtreſs. It is a work of no ſmall difficulty to perſuade a perſon in affliction that he grieves, merely becauſe he thinks it right ſo to do. Certainly then, as in pleadings we do not ſtate all caſes alike, but adjuſt them to the time, to the nature of the ſubject under debate, and the perſon, thus in aſſuaging grief, regard ſhould be had to what kind of cure the party will admit of. But I know not how we have rambled from what you propoſed. For your queſtion was concerning a wiſe man, with whom nothing can have the appearance of evil, that is not diſhonourable: or at leaſt would ſeem ſo ſmall an evil, that by his wiſdom he ſo over matches it, that it quite diſappears; who makes no addition to his grief through opinion:

who

who never conceives it right to torment himſelf above meaſure, and wear himſelf out with grief, which is the meaneſt thing imaginable. Reaſon however, it ſeems, has evinced, tho' it was not directly our ſubject at preſent, that nothing can be called an evil but what is baſe; and by the way, we may diſcover, that all the evil of affliction has nothing natural in it, but is contracted by our own voluntary judgement of it, and the error of opinion. Therefore I have treated of that kind of affliction, which is the greateſt, the removing of which has made it of little conſequence to look after remedies for the others.

XXXIV. There are certain things uſually ſaid on poverty, others on a retired and undiſtinguiſhed life. There are particular treatiſes on baniſhment, on the ruin of one's country, on ſlavery, on weakneſs, or blindneſs, and on every incident that can come under the name of an evil. The Greeks divide theſe into different treatiſes and diſtinct books: but they do it for the ſake of employment: not but diſputations are full of entertainment, and yet as phyſicians in curing the whole body, help the leaſt part that

is affected, ſo philoſophy, after it has removed grief in general, if any other deficiency exiſt; ſhould poverty bite, ſhould ignominy ſting, ſhould baniſhment bring a dark cloud over us, or ſhould any of thoſe things I juſt mentioned appear, it applies to each its particular conſolation: which you ſhall hear whenever you pleaſe. But we muſt have recourſe to the ſame fountain, that a wiſe man is free from all evil, becauſe it is inſignificant, becauſe it anſwers no purpoſe, becauſe it is not founded in nature, but opinion and prejudice, but a kind of courting grief, when once they have imagined that it is their duty to do ſo. Subſtracting then what is altogether voluntary, that mournful uneaſineſs will be removed; yet ſome little anxiety, ſome ſmall remorſe will remain. They may indeed call this natural, provided they give it not that horrid, ſolemn, melancholy name of grief, which can by no means dwell with wiſdom. But how various, and how bitter are the roots of grief! Whatever they are, I propoſe, after having felled the body to deſtroy them all, and if you approve of it, by particular diſſertations, for I have leiſure enough, whatever time it may take up. But it is the ſame with all uneaſineſs, tho' it appears

pears under different names. For envy is an uneaſineſs; ſo is emulation, detraction, anguiſh, ſorrow, ſadneſs, tribulation, lamention, vexation, grief, trouble, affliction and deſpair. The Stoicks define all theſe, and all thoſe words I mentioned belong to different things, and do not as they ſeem, expreſs the ſame things; but they are diſtinct, as I ſhall make appear perhaps in another place. Theſe are thoſe fibres of the roots, which, as I ſaid at firſt, were to be cut off, and deſtroyed, that not one ſhould remain. You ſay it is a great and difficult undertaking, who denies it? But what is there of any excellency which has not its difficulty? Yet philoſophy undertakes to effect it, provided we accept of the cure. But ſo much for this: the others, whenever you pleaſe, ſhall be ready for you here, or any where elſe.

The End of the third Book.

THE

THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS OF Marcus Tullius Cicero.

BOOK IV.

On other Perturbations of the MIND.

I HAVE been apt to wonder, Brutus, on many occaſions, at the ingenuity and virtues of our countrymen; but nothing has ſurpriſed me more than thoſe ſtudies, which, tho' they came ſomewhat late to us, have been tranſported into this city from Greece. For the auſpices, religious ceremonies, courts of juſtice, appeals to the people, the ſenate, the eſtabliſhment of horſe and foot, and the whole military diſcipline were inſtituted as

early as the foundation of the city by royal authority, partly too by laws, not without the aſſiſtance of the Gods. Then with what a ſurpriſing and incredible progreſs did they advance towards all kind of excellence, when once the republick was freed from the regal power? Not that I propoſe to treat here of the manners and cuſtoms of our anceſtors, the diſcipline and conſtitution of the city; for I have elſewhere, particularly in the ſix books I wrote on the republick, given a very accurate account of them. But whilſt I am on this ſubject, and conſidering the ſtudy of philoſophy, I meet with many reaſons to imagine that thoſe ſtudies were brought to us from abroad, and not merely imported, but preſerved and improved; for they had Pythagoras, a man of conſummate wiſdom, in a manner, before their eyes; who was in Italy at the time L. Brutus, the illuſtrious founder of your nobility, delivered his country from tyranny. As the doctrine of Pythagoras ſpread itſelf on all ſides, it ſeems probable to me, that it reached this city: and this is not only probable, but appears to have been the caſe from many remains of it. For who can imagine, that, when it flouriſhed ſo much in that part of Italy which was called Greece,

Greece, in ſome of the largeſt and moſt powerful cities, in which, firſt, the name of Pythagoras, and then theirs who were afterwards his followers, was in ſo high eſteem, who can imagine, I ſay, that our people could ſhut their ears to what was ſaid by ſuch learned men? Beſides, my opinion is, that the great eſteem the Pythagoreans were held in, gave riſe to that opinion amongſt our anceſtors, that king Numa was a Pythagorean. For being acquainted with the diſcipline and inſtitutes of Pythagoras, and having heard from their anceſtors, that the king was a very wiſe and juſt man, and not being able to diſtinguiſh times that were ſo remote, they inferred from his being ſo eminent for his wiſdom, that he was a hearer of Pythagoras.

II. So far we proceed on conjecture: As to the footſteps of the Pythagoreans, though I might collect many, I ſhall uſe but a few; becauſe that is not our preſent purpoſe. Now as it is reported to have been a cuſtom with them to deliver certain abſtruſe precepts in verſe, and to bring their minds from ſevere thought to a more compoſed ſtate by ſongs and muſical inſtruments: ſo Cato, a very ſe-

rious author, ſaith in his Origins, that it was cuſtomary with our anceſtors for the gueſts at their entertaiments, every one in his turn, to ſing the praiſes and virtues of illuſtrious men to the ſound of the flute: from whence it is clear that poems and ſongs were then compoſed for the voice. Though that poetry was in faſhion appears too from the laws of the twelve tables, wherein it is provided, that none ſhould be made to the injury of another. Another argument of the *politeneſs* of thoſe times is, that they played on inſtruments before the feaſts held in honour of their Gods, and the entertainments of their magiſtrates: now that was peculiar to the ſect I am ſpeaking of. To me, indeed, that poem of Appius Cæcus, which Panætius commends ſo much in a certain letter to Q. Tubero, has all the marks of a Pythagorean. We have many things derived from them in our cuſtoms: which I paſs over, that we may not ſeem to have learned that elſewhere which we look on ourſelves as the inventors of. But to return to our purpoſe. How many great poets as well as orators have ſprung up among us? and in what a ſhort time? ſo that it is evident, that our people could attain any thing as ſoon as they had an inclination

nation for it. But of other ſtudies I ſhall ſpeak elſewhere if there is occaſion, as I have already often done.

III. The ſtudy of philoſophy is certainly of long ſtanding with us; but yet I do not find that I can give you the names of any before the age of Lælius and Scipio: in whoſe younger days we find that Diogenes the Stoick and Carneades the Academick, were ſent embaſſadors by the Athenians to our ſenate. As theſe had never been concerned in public affairs; and one of them was a Cyrenean, the other a Babylonian; they had certainly never been forced from their ſtudies, nor choſen for that employ, unleſs the ſtudy of philoſophy had been in vogue with ſome of the great men at that time: who, though they might employ their pens on other ſubjects; ſome on civil law, others on oratory, others on the hiſtory of former times, yet promoted this moſt extenſive of all arts, the diſcipline of living well, more by their life than by their writings. So that of that true and elegant philoſophy, (which was derived from Socrates, and is ſtill preſerved by the Peripateticks, and by the Stoicks, though they expreſs themſelves

differently in their diſputes with the Academicks) there are few or no Latin monuments; whether this proceeds from the importance of the thing itſelf, or from mens being otherwiſe employed, or from their concluding that the capacity of the people was not equal to the apprehenſion of them. But, during this ſilence, C. Amafinius roſe and took upon himſelf to ſpeak; on the publiſhing of whoſe writings the people were moved, and enliſted themſelves chiefly under this ſect, either becauſe the doctrine was more eaſily underſtood, or that they were invited thereto by the pleaſing thoughts of amuſement, or that, becauſe there was nothing better, they laid hold of what was offered them. But after Amafinius, when many of the ſame ſentiments had written much about them, the Pythagoreans ſpread over all Italy: but that theſe doctrines ſhould be ſo eaſily underſtood and approved of by the unlearned, is a great proof that they were not written with any great ſubtlety, and they think their eſtabliſhment to be owing to this.

IV. But let every one defend his own opinion, they are at liberty to chuſe what they like: I ſhall keep to my old cuſtom; and being

being under no reſtraint from the laws of any particular ſchool, which in philoſophy every one muſt neceſſarily confine himſelf to, I ſhall always enquire after what has the moſt probability in every queſtion, which, as I have often practiſed on other occaſions, I have kept cloſe to in my Tuſculan Diſputations. Therefore as I have acquainted you with the diſputations of the three former days, this book concludes the fourth. When we had come down into the academy, as we had done the former days, the buſineſs was carried on thus. *M.* Let any one ſay, who pleaſes, what he would have diſputed. *A.* I do not think a wiſe man can poſſibly be free from every perturbation of mind. *M.* He ſeemed by yeſterday's diſcourſe to be ſo from grief: unleſs you allowed it only not to take up time. *A.* Not at all on that account, for I was extremely ſatisfied with your diſcourſe. *M.* You do not think then that a wiſe man is ſubject to grief? *A.* No, by no means. *M.* But if that cannot diſorder the mind of a wiſe man, nothing elſe can. For what? can it be diſturbed by fear? Fear proceeds from the ſame things when abſent, which occaſion grief when

preſent. Take away grief then, and you remove fear.

V. The two remaining perturbations are, a joy, elate above meaſure, and luſt: which, if a wiſe man is not ſubject to, his mind will be always at reſt. *A.* I am entirely of that opinion. *M.* Had you rather then, that I ſhould immediately crowd all my ſails? or ſhall I make uſe of my oars, as if I was juſt endeavouring to get clear of the harbour? *A.* I do not apprehend what you mean by that. *M.* Why, Chryſippus and the Stoicks, when they diſpute on the perturbations of the mind, make great part of their debate to conſiſt in dividing and diſtinguiſhing: they employ but few words on the ſubject of curing the mind, and preventing it from being diſordered. Whereas the Peripateticks bring a great many things to promote the cure of it, but have no regard to their thorny partitions and definitions. My queſtion then was, whether I ſhould inſtantly unfold the ſails of my diſcourſe, or make my way out with the oars of the logicians? *A.* Let it be ſo: for by means of both theſe, the ſubject of our enquiry will be more thoroughly diſcuſſed. *M.* It is certainly the better way: and ſhould any

any thing be too obſcure, you may inform yourſelf afterwards. *A.* I will do ſo: but thoſe very obſcure things, you will, as uſual, deliver with more clearneſs than the Greeks. *A.* I will indeed endeavour to do ſo: but it requires great attention, for ſhould you loſe one word, the whole will eſcape you. What the Greeks call πάθη, we chuſe to name perturbations *(or diſorders)* rather than diſeaſes, in the explaining which, I ſhall follow, firſt, that very old deſcription of Pythagoras, then Plato's; who divide the mind into two parts; they make one of theſe to partake of reaſon, the other to be without it. In that which partakes of reaſon they place tranquillity, *i. e.* a placid and undiſturbed conſtancy: to the other they aſſign the turbid motions of anger and deſire, which are contrary and oppoſite to reaſon. Let this then be our principle, the ſpring of all our reaſonings. But notwithſtanding, I ſhall uſe the partitions and definitions of the Stoicks in deſcribing theſe perturbations: who ſeem to me to have been very ſubtle on this queſtion.

VI. Zeno's definition then is thus: that a perturbation, which he calls a πάθος, is a commotion of the mind repugnant to reaſon, and againſt nature. Some of them define it ſhorter;

ſhorter; that a perturbation is a more vehement appetite; but by more vehement they mean an appetite that recedes further from the conſtancy of nature. But they would have the diſtinct parts of perturbations to ariſe from two imagined goods, and from two imagined evils: and thus they become four: from the good proceed luſt and joy: as joy from ſome preſent good, luſt from future. They ſuppoſe fear and grief to proceed from evils: Fear from ſomething future, grief from ſomething preſent: for whatever things are dreaded as approaching, always occaſion grief when preſent. But joy and luſt depend on the opinion of good; as luſt is inflamed and provoked, and carried eagerly to what has the appearance of good; joy is tranſported and exults on obtaining what was deſired. For we naturally purſue thoſe things that have the appearance of good; and fly the contrary. Wherefore as ſoon as any thing, that has the appearance of good preſents itſelf, nature drives us to the obtaining it. Now where this is conſiſtent and founded on prudence, this ſtrong deſire is by the Stoicks called βούλησις, but we name it a *volition*; and this they allow to none but their wiſe man, and define it thus. Volition is a reaſonable deſire, but whatever

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is incited too violently in oppoſition to reaſon, that is a luſt, or an unbridled deſire; which is diſcoverable in all fools. And with reſpect to good, we are likewiſe moved two ways, there is a placid and calm motion, conſiſtent with reaſon, called joy: and there is likewiſe a vain wanton exultation, or immoderate joy, *lætitia geſtiens*, or tranſport, which they define to be be an elation of the mind without reaſon. And as we naturally deſire good things, ſo in like manner we naturally avoid evil. The avoiding of which, if warranted by reaſon, is called caution; and this the wiſe man alone is ſuppoſed to have: but that caution which is not under the guidance of reaſon, but is attended with a baſe and low dejection, is called fear. Fear is therefore an unreaſonable caution. But a wiſe man is not affected by any preſent evil: but the grief of a fool proceeds from being affected with an imaginary evil, on which their minds are contracted and ſunk, as they revolt from reaſon. This then is the firſt definition, which makes grief to conſiſt in the mind's ſhrinking contrary to the dictates of reaſon. Thus there are four perturbations, and but three oppoſites, for grief has no oppoſite.

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VII.

VII. But they would have all perturbations depend on opinion and judgment, therefore they define them more cloſely; not only the better to ſhew how blameable they are, but to diſcover how much they are in our power. *Grief* then is a recent opinion of ſome evil, in which it ſeems to be right, that the mind ſhould ſhrink and be dejected. *Joy*, a recent opinion of a preſent good, in which it ſeems to be right, that the mind ſhould be tranſported. *Fear*, an opinion of an impending evil, which we apprehend as intolerable. *Luſt* an opinion of a good to come, which would be of advantage was it already come, and preſent with us. But whatever I have named the judgments and opinions of perturbations, their meaning is not that merely the perturbations conſiſt in them; but the effects likewiſe of theſe perturbations: as grief occaſions a kind of painful remorſe. Fear, a recoil or ſudden eſcape of the mind: Joy, a profuſe mirth: Luſt, an unbridled habit of coveting. But that *imagination*, which I have included in all the above definitions, they would have to conſiſt in *aſſenting without warrantable grounds*. But every perturbation has many

parts

parts annexed to it of the ſame kind. Grief is attended with enviouſneſs, (I uſe that word for inſtruction ſake, though it is not ſo common; becauſe envy takes in not only the perſon who envies, but the perſon too who is envied.) Emulation, detraction, pity, vexation, mourning, ſadneſs, tribulation, ſorrow, lamentation, ſolicitude, diſquiet of mind, pain, deſpair, and whatever elſe is of this kind. Fear includes ſloth, ſhame, terror, cowardiſe, fainting, confuſion, aſtoniſhment. In pleaſure they comprehend, a malevolence that is pleaſed at another's misfortune, a delight, boaſting, and the like. To luſt they aſſociate anger, fury, hatred, enmity, diſcord, wants, deſire, and the reſt of that kind.

VIII. But they define theſe in this manner. Envying, they ſay, is a grief ariſing from the proſperous circumſtances of another, which are no ways detrimental to the perſon who envies: for where any one grieves at the proſperity of another, by which he is injured, ſuch an one is not properly ſaid to envy. As when Agamemnon grieves at Hector's ſucceſs: but where any one, who is no ways hurt by the proſperity of another, is in pain at his ſucceſs, ſuch an one

one envies indeed. Now that emulation is taken in a double ſenſe, ſo that the ſame word may ſtand for praiſe and diſpraiſe: for the imitation of virtue is called emulation: but that ſenſe of it I ſhall have no occaſion for here; for that carries praiſe with it: Emulation is alſo grief at another's enjoying what I deſired to have, and am without. Detraction, and I mean by that jealouſy, is a grief even at another's enjoying what I had a great inclination for. Pity is a grief at the miſery of another, who ſuffers wrongfully: no one grieves at the puniſhment of a parricide, or of a betrayer of his country. Vexation is a preſſing grief. Mourning is a grief at the bitter death of one who was dear to you. Sadneſs is a grief attended with tears. Tribulation is a painful grief. Sorrow an excruciating grief. Lamentation a grief where we loudly bewail ourſelves. Solicitude a penſive grief. Trouble a continued grief. Affliction, a grief that harraſſes the body. Deſpair, a grief that excludes all hope of better things to come. What is included under fear, they define to be ſloth, which is a dread of ſome enſuing labour: ſhame and terror, that *affects the body*; hence bluſhing attends ſhame; a paleneſs and tremor, and chattering of the teeth, terror: Cowardice, an apprehenſion of

of ſome approaching evil: dread, a fear that unhinges the mind, whence comes that of Ennius,

Then dread diſcharg'd all wiſdom from my mind:

Fainting is the aſſociate and conſtant attendant on dread: Confuſion, a fear that drives away all thought. Aſtoniſhment, a continued fear.

IX. The parts they aſſign to pleaſure come under this deſcription, that malevolence is a pleaſure in the misfortunes of another without any advantage to yourſelf: Delight, a pleaſure that ſoothes the mind by agreeable impreſſions on the ear. What is ſaid of the ear, may be applied to the ſight, to the touch, ſmell, and taſte. All of this kind are a ſort of melting pleaſures that diſſolve the mind: Boaſting is a pleaſure that conſiſts in making an appearance, and ſetting off yourſelf with inſolence. What comes under luſt they define in this manner. Anger is a luſt of puniſhing any one we imagine has injured us without cauſe: Heat is anger juſt forming and beginning to exiſt, which the Greeks call θύμωσις: Hatred is a ſettled anger: Enmity is anger waiting for an opportunity of revenge:

revenge: Diſcord is a ſharper anger conceived deep in the mind and heart: Want, an inſatiable luſt: Deſire, is when one eagerly wiſhes to ſee a perſon who is abſent. Now here they have a diſtinction: Deſire is a luſt conceived on hearing of certain things reported of ſome one, or of many, what the Greeks call predicated; as that they are in poſſeſſion of riches and honours: but want is a luſt for thoſe very honours and riches. But they make intemperance the fountain of all theſe perturbations: which is an abſolute revolt from the *mind* and right reaſon: a ſtate ſo averſe to all preſcriptions of reaſon, that the *appetites* of the mind are by no means to be governed and reſtrained. As therefore temperance appeaſes theſe deſires, making them obey right reaſon, and maintains the well-weighed judgments of the mind; ſo intemperance, which is in oppoſition to this, inflames, confounds, and puts every ſtate of the mind into a violent motion. Thus grief and fear, and every other perturbation of the mind, have their riſe from intemperance.

X. Juſt as diſtempers and ſickneſs are bred in the body from the corruption of the blood, and the too great abundance of phlegm and bile; ſo

ſo the mind is deprived of its health, and diſordered with ſickneſs from a confuſion of depraved opinions, that are in oppoſition to one another. From theſe perturbations ariſe, firſt, diſeaſes, which they call νοσημάτα; in oppoſition to theſe are certain faulty diſtaſtes or loathings; then ſickneſſes, which are called ἀῤῥωστήματα by the Stoicks, and theſe two have their oppoſite averſions. Here the Stoicks, eſpecially Chryſippus, give themſelves unneceſſary trouble to ſhew the analogy the diſeaſes of the mind have with thoſe of the body: but overlooking all that they ſay as of little conſequence, I ſhall treat only of the thing itſelf. Let us then underſtand perturbation to imply a reſtleſneſs from the variety and confuſion of contradictory opinions, and that when this heat and diſturbance of the mind is of any ſtanding, and has taken up it's reſidence, as it were, in the veins and marrow, then commence diſeaſes and ſickneſs, and thoſe averſions which are in oppoſition to them.

XI. What I ſay here may be diſtinguiſhed in thought, though they are in fact the ſame; and have their riſe from luſt and joy. For ſhould money be the object of our deſire, and ſhould we not inſtantly apply to reaſon,

Socrates's medicine to heal this deſire, the evil ſlides into our veins, and cleaves to our bowels, and from thence proceeds a diſtemper or ſickneſs, which, when of any continuance, is incurable. The name of this diſeaſe is covetouſneſs. It is the ſame with other diſeaſes; as the deſire of glory, a paſſion for women, if I may ſo call φιλογυνειὰ, and thus all other diſeaſes and ſickneſſes are generated. Now, the contrary of theſe are ſuppoſed to have fear for their foundation, as a hatred of women, ſuch as is in the woman-hater of Atilius: or the hating the whole human ſpecies, as Timon is reported to have done, whom they called the Miſanthrope of the ſame kind is inhoſpitality: all which diſeaſes proceed from a certain dread of ſuch things as they hate and avoid. But they define ſickneſs of mind to be an overweening opinion, and that fixed and ſettled, of ſomething as very deſireable, which is by no means ſo. What proceeds from averſion, they define thus: a vehement conceit of ſomething to be avoided, when there is no reaſon for avoiding it; and thus a fixed and ſettled conceit. Now this conceit is a perſuaſion that you know what you are ignorant of. But this ſickneſs is attended with ſomething

thing like theſe; covetouſneſs, ambition, a paſſion for women, wilfulneſs, gluttony, drunkenneſs, luxury, conceit, and the like. For covetouſneſs is a vehement imagination of money, which ſtrongly poſſeſſes you that it is a very deſireable thing: and in like manner they define other things of the ſame kind. The definitions of averſions are after this ſort, inhoſpitality is a vehement opinion, with which you are ſtrongly poſſeſſed, that you ſhould avoid a ſtranger. Thus too the hatred of women like Hippolitus's is defined, and the hatred of the human ſpecies like Timon's.

XII. But to come to the analogy of the ſtate of body and mind, which I ſhall ſometimes make uſe of, tho' more ſparingly than the Stoicks: as ſome are more inclined to particular diſorders than others. Thus we ſay, that ſome are rheumatick, others dropſical, not becauſe they are ſo at preſent, but becauſe they are often ſo: ſome are more inclined to fear, others to ſome other perturbation. Thus in ſome there is an anxiety whence they are anxious; in ſome a haſtineſs of temper, which differs from anger; as anxiety differs from anguiſh: for all are not anxious who are ſometimes vexed; nor are they who are

anxious always uneaſy in that manner: as there is a difference betwixt being drunk, and drunkenneſs; and it is one thing to be a lover, another to be given to women. And this diſpoſition of ſome to particular diſorders, is very extenſive: for it relates to all perturbations; it appears in many vices, tho' it has no name: ſome are therefore ſaid to be envious, malevolent, ſpiteful, fearful, pityful, from a propenſity to thoſe perturbations, not from their being always carried away by them. Now this propenſity to theſe particular diſorders may be called a ſickneſs from analogy with the body; that is nothing more than a propenſity towards ſickneſs. But with regard to whatever is good, as ſome are more inclined to different goods than others, we may call this a facility or tendency. This tendency to evil a proclivity or inclination to expreſs falling: but where any thing is neither good, nor bad, it may have the former name.

XIII. Even as there may be with reſpect to the body, a diſeaſe, a ſickneſs, and a defect; ſo it is with the mind. They call that a diſeaſe where the whole body is corrupted: ſickneſs where a diſeaſe is attended with a weakneſs:

weakneſs: a defect where the parts of the body are not well compacted together, from whence it follows, that the members are miſſhaped, crooked, and deformed. So that theſe two, a diſeaſe and ſickneſs, proceed from a violent concuſſion and perturbation of the health of the whole body; but a defect diſcovers itſelf, even when the body is in perfect health. But a diſeaſe of the mind is diſtinguiſhable only in thought from a ſickneſs. A viciouſneſs is a habit or affection diſcordant and inconſiſtent throughout life. Thus it happens, that a diſeaſe and ſickneſs may ariſe from one kind of corruption of opinions; from another inconſtancy and inconſiſtency. For every vice of the mind doth not imply a diſunion of parts; as is the caſe with thoſe who are not far from wiſe men: with them there is that affection which is inconſiſtent with itſelf whilſt it is witleſs, but it is not diſtorted, nor depraved. But diſeaſes and ſickneſſes are parts of viciouſneſs: but it is a queſtion whether perturbations are parts of the ſame: for vices are permanent affections: perturbations are affections that are reſtleſs; ſo that they cannot be parts of permanent affections. As there is ſome analogy between the nature of the body and mind

in evils, ſo in goods: for the diſtinctions of the body are beauty, ſtrength, health, firmneſs, quickneſs of motion; the ſame may be ſaid of the mind. The body is ſaid to bein a good ſtate, when all thoſe things on which health depends, are conſiſtent: the ſame may be ſaid of the mind, when its judgements and opinions are not at variance. And this union is the virtue of the mind: which according to ſome, is temperance itſelf; others make it conſiſt in an obedience to the precepts of temperance, and a complying with them, not allowing it to be any diſtinct ſpecies of itſelf: but be it one or the other, it is to be found only in a wiſe man. But there is a certain ſoundneſs of mind, which a fool may have, when the perturbation of his mind is removed by the care and management of his phyſicians. And as what is called beauty, ariſes from an exact proportion of the limbs, together with a ſweetneſs of complexion, ſo the beauty of the mind conſiſts in an equality and conſtancy of opinions and judgements, joined to a certain firmneſs and ſtability, purſuing virtue, or containing within itſelf, the very eſſence of virtue. Beſides, we give the very ſame names to the faculties of the mind, as we do to the powers of the body, the

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nerves, and other powers of action. Thus the velocity of the body is called ſwiftneſs: a praiſe we entitle the mind to, from its running over in its thoughts ſo many things in ſo ſhort a time.

XIV. Herein indeed the mind and body are unlike: that tho' the mind when in perfect health may be viſited by ſickneſs, as the body may, yet the body may be diſordered without our fault, the mind cannot. For all the diſorders and perturbations of the mind proceed from a neglect of reaſon; theſe diſorders therefore are confined to men; the beaſts are not ſubject to perturbations, *tho' they act ſometimes as if they had reaſon.* There is a difference too, betwixt ingenious and dull men; the ingenious, like the Corinthian braſs, which is long before it receives ruſt, are longer before they fall into theſe perturbations, and are recovered ſooner: the caſe is different with the dull. Nor doth the mind of an ingenious man fall into every kind of perturbation, never into any that are brutiſh and ſavage: ſome of their perturbations have the appearance of humanity, as mercy, grief, and fear. The ſickneſſes and diſeaſes of the mind are thought to be

harder to pluck up, than thoſe leading vices which are in oppoſition to virtues: for vices may be removed, tho' the diſeaſes of the mind ſhould continue, which diſeaſes are not cured with that expedition vices are removed. I have now acquainted you with what the Stoicks diſpute with ſuch exactneſs: which they call logick, from their cloſe arguing; and ſince my diſcourſe has got clear of theſe rocks, I will proceed with the remainder of it, provided I have been ſufficiently clear in what I have already ſaid, conſidering the obſcurity of the ſubject I have treated. *A.* Clear enough; but ſhould there be occaſion for a more exact enquiry, I ſhall take another opportunity: I expect you to hoiſt your ſail, as you juſt now called it, and proceed on your courſe.

XV. *M.* Since, as I have before ſaid of virtue in other places, and ſhall often have occaſion to ſay (for a great many queſtions that relate to life and manners ariſe from the ſpring of virtue) ſince, I ſay, virtue conſiſts in a ſettled and uniform affection of mind, bringing praiſe to thoſe who are poſſeſſed of her; ſhe herſelf, independent of any thing elſe, without regard to any advantage: muſt be

be praiſe-worthy; for from her proceed good inclinations, opinions, actions, and the whole of right reaſon; tho' virtue may be defined in few words to be right reaſon itſelf. The oppoſite to this is viciouſneſs, (for ſo I chuſe to define what the Greeks call κακίαν, rather than perverſneſs, for perverſeneſs is the name of a particular vice: but viciouſneſs includes all) from whence ariſe thoſe perturbations, which, as I juſt now ſaid, are turbid and violent motions of the mind repugnant to reaſon, and enemies in a high degree to the peace of the mind, and a tranquil life: for they introduce piercing cares, afflicting and debilitating the mind through fear; they violently inflame our appetites; occaſioning that impotence of mind, utterly different from temperance and moderation; which I ſometimes call deſire, ſometimes luſt. Which, ſhould it attain its deſires, becomes ſo elate, that it loſes all its reſolution, and knows not what to purſue; ſo that he was in the right who ſaid, that too *great a joy was founded on a great miſtake.* Virtue then alone can effect the cure of theſe evils.

XVI. For what is not only more miſerable but more baſe and ſordid than a man afflicted,

weakened, and oppreſſed with grief? Little ſhort of this miſery is one who dreads ſome approaching evil, and who, thro' faintheartedneſs, is under continual ſuſpence; the poets to expreſs the greatneſs of this evil, imagine a ſtone to hang over the head of Tantalus, for his wickedneſs, his pride, and his boaſting. Folly is puniſhed generally in the ſame way; for there hangs over the head of every one who revolts from reaſon ſomething of this kind, either grief or fear. And as theſe perturbations of the mind, grief, and fear, are of a poiſonous nature: ſo thoſe two others, tho' of a more merry caſt, (I mean luſt, which is always coveting, and empty mirth that is an exulting joy,) differ very little from madneſs. Hence you may underſtand what I mean by calling a man ſometimes moderate, then modeſt or temperate, at another time conſtant and virtuous: ſometimes I would include all theſe names in the word frugality, as the top of all. For if that word did not include all virtues, it would never have been proverbial to ſay, that a frugal man doth every thing right; which, when the Stoicks apply to their wiſe man, they ſeem to exalt him too much, and to ſpeak of him with too much admiration.

XVII.

XVII. Whoever then, thro' moderation and conſtancy, is at reſt in his mind, and in calm poſſeſſion of himſelf, ſo as neither to pine with care, nor be dejected with fear, neither to be inflamed with deſire, nor diſolved by extravagant joy, ſuch an one, is the very wiſe man we enquire after, the happy man: To whom nothing in this life ſeems ſo intolerable as to depreſs him; nothing ſo exquiſite as to tranſport him. For what is there in this life that can appear great to him, who has acquainted himſelf with eternity, and the utmoſt extent of the univerſe? For what is there in human knowledge, or the ſhort ſpan of this life, that can appear great to a wiſe man? whoſe mind is always ſo upon its guard, that nothing can befall him unforeſeen, nothing unexpected, nothing new. Such an one takes ſo exact a ſurvey on all ſides of him, that he always knows how to diſpoſe of himſelf, without anxiety, or any care about this world, and entertains every accident that befalls him with a becoming calmneſs. Whoever conducts himſelf in this manner, will be void of grief, and every other perturbation. And a mind free from theſe, renders men completely happy: where-

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as a mind diſordered and drawn off from right and unerring reaſon, loſes at once, not only its reſolution, but its health. Therefore the thoughts and declarations of the Peripateticks are ſoft and effeminate, for they ſay that the mind muſt neceſſarily be agitated, but confine it within a certain degree. And do you ſet bounds to vice? what! is not every diſobedience to reaſon a vice? doth not reaſon ſufficiently declare, that there is no real good which you ſhould ardently deſire, or the poſſeſſion of which ſhould tranſport you: or any evil that ſhould diſpirit you, or ſuch, that the ſuſpicion of it ſhould diſtract you? and that all theſe things aſſume too melancholy, or too chearful an appearance through our own error? But if fools find this error leſſened by time, ſo that tho' the cauſe remains the ſame, they are not in the ſame manner, after ſome time, that they were at firſt affected; a wiſe man ought not to be influenced at all by it. But what are thoſe degrees we are to limit it by? Let us fix theſe degrees in grief, a ſubject much canvaſſed. Fannius writes that P. Rutilius took it much to heart, that his brother was refuſed the conſulate: but he ſeems to have been too much affected by it; for it was the occaſion of his death:

death: he ought therefore to have borne it with more moderation. But let us ſuppoſe, that whilſt he bore this with moderation, the death of his children had intervened; here would have ſtarted a freſh grief, which admitting it to be moderate in itſelf, yet ſtill it was a great addition to the other. Now to theſe let us add ſome acute pains of body, the loſs of his fortunes, blindneſs, baniſhment; ſuppoſing then each misfortune to occaſion an additional grief, the whole would be inſupportable.

XVIII. The man who ſets bounds to vice, acts like one who ſhould throw himſelf headlong from *Leucate*, perſuaded he could ſtop himſelf whenever he pleaſed. Now as that is impoſſible, ſo a perturbed and diſordered mind cannot refrain itſelf, and ſtop where it pleaſes. Certainly whatever is bad in its increaſe, is bad in its birth: Now grief, and all other perturbations are doubtleſs baneful in their progreſs, and have therefore no ſmall ſhare of infection at the beginning: for they go on of themſelves when once they depart from reaſon, for every weakneſs is ſelf-indulgent, and indiſcreetly launches out, and doth not know where to ſtop. Wherefore

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the difference is ſmall betwixt approving of moderate perturbations of mind and moderate injuſtice, moderate cowardice, moderate intemperance. For whoever preſcribes bounds to vice, admits of a part of it, which, as it is odious of itſelf, becomes the more ſo as it ſtands on ſlippery ground, and being once ſet forward, ſlides headlong, and cannot by any means be ſtopt.

XIX. But what if the Peripateticks, whilſt we ſay that theſe perturbations ſhould be extirpated, not only ſay they are natural, but that they were given by nature to a good purpoſe: they uſually talk in this manner: In the firſt place, they ſay much in praiſe of anger; they call it the whetſtone of courage, and they ſay that angry men exert themſelves moſt againſt an enemy or bad citizen: that thoſe reaſons are of little weight which depend on the reflection, ſuch as, It is a juſt war, it becomes us to fight for our laws, our liberties, our country; they will allow no force in theſe, unleſs our courage is warmed by anger. Nor do they confine their argument to warriors: but their opinion is, that no one can iſſue any rigid commands without ſome mixture of anger. In ſhort, they have no notion,