notion, even of an orator either accuſing or defending, without being ſpurd on by anger. And though it ſhould not be real, they think his words and geſture muſt carry the appearance of it, that the action of the orator, may excite this paſſion in his hearer. And they deny that any man was ever ſeen, who doth not know what it is to be angry: and they name what we call lenity, by the bad appellation of indolence: nor do they commend only this luſt, (for anger is, as I defined it above, the luſt of revenge) but they maintain that kind of luſt or deſire, to be given us by nature for very good purpoſes: that no one can execute any thing well *but what he is in earneſt about*. Themiſtocles uſed to walk in the publick places in the night, becauſe he could not ſleep: and when aſked the reaſon, his anſwer was, that Miltiades's trophies kept him awake. Who has not heard how Demoſthenes uſed to watch? who ſaid it gave him pain, if any mechanick was up in a morning at his work before him. Laſtly, That ſome of the greateſt philoſophers had never made that progreſs in their ſtudies, but from an ardent deſire. We are informed that Pythagoras, Democritus, and Plato, viſited the remoteſt parts of the world; they thought that they

ought

ought to go where ever any thing was to be learned. Now it is not conceivable that theſe things could be affected but by the greateſt ardour of mind.

XX. They ſay that even grief, which we deſcribe as a monſtrous fierce beaſt, and to be avoided as ſuch, was appointed by nature, not without ſome good purpoſe: that men ſhould lament when they had committed a fault, well knowing they had expoſed themſelves to correction, rebuke, and ignominy. For they think thoſe who can bear ignominy and infamy without pain, are at liberty to commit what crimes they pleaſe: for with them, *reproach is a ſtronger check than conſcience.* From whence we have that in Afranius, borrowed from common life, for when the abandoned ſon ſaith, wretched that I am! the ſevere father replies,

Let him but grieve, no matter what the cauſe.

And they ſay the other diſeaſes of the mind have their uſe; pity incites us to the aſſiſtance of others, and to alleviate the calamities of men, who undeſervedly fall into them: that even emulation and defamation are not without their uſe; as when you ſee one attain what

what you cannot, or obſerve another on a footing with yourſelf: That, ſhould you take away fear, you would ſupplant all diligence in life; which thoſe uſe moſt who are afraid of the laws, and the magiſtrates, who dread poverty, ignominy, death, and pain. But when they argue thus, they allow of their being retrenched, though they deny that they either can, or ſhould be pluck'd up by the roots: ſo that their opinion is, that Mediocrity is beſt in every thing. When they reaſon in this manner, what think you? do they ſay ſomething or nothing? *A.* To me they ſay ſomething, I wait therefore to hear what you will ſay to them.

XXI. *M.* Perhaps I may find ſomething: but this firſt, do you take notice with what modeſty the Academicks behave themſelves? for they ſpeak plainly to the purpoſe. The Peripateticks are anſwered by the Stoicks, they have my leave to fight it out; who think myſelf no otherwiſe concerned than to enquire after probabilities. The buſineſs is then, if we can meet with any thing in this queſtion that touches on the probable, beyond which human nature cannot proceed. The definition of a perturbati-

on, as Zeno, I think, has rightly determined it, is thus. That a perturbation is a commotion of the mind againſt nature in oppoſition to right reaſon; or ſhorter thus, that a perturbation is a more vehement appetite; that is called more vehement which is at a greater diſtance from the conſtant courſe of nature. What can I ſay to theſe definitions? the moſt part of them we have from thoſe who diſpute with ſagacity and acuteneſs: ſome indeed, ſuch as the *Ardours of the mind, and the Whetſtones of virtue*, ſavour of the pomp of Rhetoricans. As to the queſtion, if a brave man can maintain his courage without becoming angry; it may be queſtioned with regard to the Gladiators: though we obſerve much reſolution even in them; they meet, converſe, they agree about terms, ſo that they ſeem rather placid than angry. But let us admit ſome Placideianus of that trade, to be in ſuch a mind, as Lucilius relates of him,

If for his blood you thirſt, the taſk be mine,
His lawrels at my feet he ſhall reſign;
Not but I know before I reach his heart,
Firſt on myſelf a wound he will impart.
I hate the man, inrag'd I fight, and ſtrait
In action we had been, but that I wait

Till

Till each his ſword had fitted to his hand,
My rage I ſcarce can keep within command.

XXII. But we ſee Ajax in Homer advancing to meet Hector in battle chearfully, without any of this boiſterous wrath, who had no ſooner taken up his arms, but the firſt ſtep he made inſpired his aſſociates with joy, his enemies with fear: that even Hector, as he is repreſented by Homer, trembling condemned himſelf for having challenged him to fight. Yet theſe converſed together, calmly and quietly, before they engaged; nor did they ſhew any anger, or outragious behaviour during the combat. Nor do I imagine that Torquatus, the firſt who obtained this ſurname, was in a rage, when he plundered the Gaul of his collar: or that Marcellus's courage at Claſtidium was owing to his anger. I could almoſt ſwear, that Africanus, whom we are better acquainted with, from the freſhneſs of his memory, was no ways inflamed by anger, when he covered Alienus Pelignus with his ſhield, and drove his ſword into the enemies breaſt. There may be ſome doubt of L. Brutus, if, through infinite hatred of the tyrant, he might not attack Aruns with more raſhneſs, for I obſerved they mutually

killed each other in cloſe fight. Why then do you call in the aſſiſtance of anger? would courage, ſhould it not begin to grow mad, loſe its energy? What? do you imagine Hercules, whom the very courage, which you would have to be anger, preferred to heaven, was angry when he engaged the Erymanthian boar, or the Nemeean lion? or was Theſeus in a paſſion when he ſeiſed on the horns of the Marathonian bull? Take care how you make courage to depend in the leaſt on rage; when anger is altogether irrational, and that is not courage which is void of reaſon.

XXIII. We ought to hold all things here in contempt; death is to be looked on with indifference; pains and labours as tolerable: when theſe are eſtabliſhed on judgment and conviction, then will that ſtout and firm courage take place: unleſs you attribute to anger what ever is done with vehemence, alacrity, and ſpirit. To me indeed that very Scipio who was chief prieſt, that favourer of the ſaying of the Stoicks, *that no private man could be a wiſe man*, doth not ſeem to be angry with Tiberius Gracchus, even when he left the conſul in a languiſhing condition, and though a private man himſelf command-

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ed, with the authority of a conſul, that all who meant well to the republick ſhould follow him. I do not know whether I have done any thing in the republick that has the appearance of courage, but if I have, I certainly did not do it in wrath. Doth any thing come nearer madneſs than anger? which Ennius has well defined, the beginning of madneſs. The changing colour, the alteration of our voice, the look of our eyes, our manner of fetching our breath, the little command we have over our words and actions, how little do they partake of a ſound mind? what can make a worſe appearance than Homer's Achilles, or Agamemnon during the quarrel. For as to Ajax, anger drove him into downright madneſs, and was the occaſion of his death. Courage therefore doth not want the patronage of anger, it is ſufficiently provided, armed, and prepared of itſelf. We may as well ſay that drunkenneſs, or madneſs, is of ſervice to courage, becauſe thoſe who are mad or drunk, do a great many things often with more vehemence. Ajax was always brave, but moſt ſo when in a paſſion:

The greateſt feat that Ajax e'er atchiev'd
Was, when his ſingle arm the Greeks relieved.

Quitting the field; urg'd on by riſing rage,
Forc'd the declining troops again t'engage.

XXIV. Shall we ſay then that madneſs has its uſe; examine the definitions of courage? you will find it doth not require the aſſiſtance of paſſion. Courage is then an affection of mind that bears all things with ſubjection to the chief law; or a firm maintenance of judgment in ſupporting or repelling every thing that has a formidable appearance, or knowing what is formidable or otherwiſe, and by maintaining invariably, ſuch a ſenſe of them, as to bear them, or deſpiſe them; or in fewer words according to Chryſippus: for the above definitions are Sphærus's, one of prime ability in defining, as the Stoicks think: but they are all pretty much alike, they give us only common notions, ſome one way, and ſome another. But what is Chryſippus's definition? Fortitude, ſaith he, is the knowledge of all things that are bearable: or an affection of the mind, which bears and ſupports every thing in obedience to the chief law of reaſon, without fear. Now, though we ſhould take the ſame liberty with theſe, as Carneades uſed to do, I fear they will be the only philoſophers: for which of theſe definitions doth

doth not explain that obſcure and intricate notion of courage which every man conceives within himſelf? which being thus explained, what can a warrior, a commander, or an orator want more? and no one can think but that they will behave themſelves couragiouſly without anger. What? do not even the Stoicks, who maintain that all fools are mad, *make the ſame inferences?* for take away perturbations, eſpecially a haſtineſs of temper, and they will appear to talk very abſurdly. But what they aſſert is thus: They ſay that all fools are mad, as all dunghills ſtink; not that they always do ſo, but ſtir them, and you will perceive it. Thus a hot man is not always in a paſſion; but provoke him, and you will ſee him run mad. Now, that very anger, which is of ſuch ſervice in war, what is its uſe at home with his wife, children, and family? Is there then any thing that a perturbed mind can do better than that which is calm and ſteady? or can any one be angry without a perturbation of mind? Our people then were in the right, who, as all vices depend on our *morals*, and none is worſe than a teſty diſpoſition, called angry men alone *moroſe*.

XXV. Anger is in no wiſe becoming in an orator; it is not amiſs to affect it. Do you imagine I am angry when I plead with unuſual vehemence and ſharpneſs? What? when I write out my ſpeeches after all is over and paſt? or do you think Æſopus was ever angry when he acted, or Accius was ſo when he wrote? They act indeed very well, but the orator better than any player, provided he is really an orator: but then they carry it on without paſſion, and with a compoſed mind. But what wantonneſs is it to commend luſt? You produce Themiſtocles and Demoſthenes: to theſe you add Pythagorus, Democritus, and Plato. What do you call ſtudies luſt? now ſhould theſe ſtudies be the moſt excellent turn, as thoſe were which you mentioned, they ought however to be compoſed and tranquil: and what kind of philoſophers are they who commend grief, than which nothing is more deteſtable? Afranius has ſaid much to their purpoſe,

Let him but grieve, no matter what the cauſe.

But he ſpoke this of a debauched and diſſolute youth: but we are enquiring after a conſtant and wiſe man. We may even allow a centurion, or ſtandard-bearer to be angry, or any

others

others, whom, not to explain the myſteries of the rhetoricians, I ſhall not mention here, for to touch the paſſions where reaſon cannot be come at, may have its uſe; but my enquiry, as I often aver, is of a wiſe man.

XXVI. But even emulation, detraction, pity have their uſe, why ſhould you pity rather than aſſiſt, if it is in your power? Is it becauſe you cannot be liberal without pity? we ſhould not take cares on ourſelves upon another's account; but eaſe others of their grief if we can. But that detraction, or that vicious emulation, which reſembles a rivalſhip, of what uſe is it? Now emulation implies being uneaſy at another's good, and that becauſe he enjoys it. How can it be right, that you ſhould voluntarily grieve, rather than take the trouble of acquiring what you want to have; for it is madneſs in the higheſt degree, to deſire to be the only one that has it. But who can with juſtneſs ſpeak in praiſe of a mediocrity of evils? Can any one in whom there is luſt or deſire, be otherwiſe than libidinous or deſirous? or not be angry, where anger is in any degree? or where any vexation is, not to be vexed? or where fear is, not to be fearful? Do we look then on the

libidinous,

libidinous, the angry, the anxious, and the timid man as wiſe? Of whoſe excellence I could ſpeak very largely and copiouſly, but to be as ſhort poſſible. Thus, that wiſdom is an acquaintance with all divine and human affairs, or a knowledge of the cauſe of every thing. Hence it is, that it imitates what is divine, and holds all human concerns as inferior to virtue. Did you then ſay that it was your opinion that ſuch a man was as naturally liable to any perturbation as the ſea is expoſed to winds? what is there that can diſcompoſe ſuch gravity and conſtancy? any thing ſudden or unforeſeen? How can any thing of this kind befall one, to whom nothing is ſudden that can happen to man? Now as to their ſaying that redundancies ſhould be pared off, and only what is natural remain; what, I pray you, can be natural, which may be too much? All theſe proceed from the roots of errors, which muſt be entirely plucked up, and deſtroyed, not pared and lopt off.

XXVII. But as I ſuſpect that your enquiry is more with regard to yourſelf that the wiſe man, for you allow him to be free of all perturbations, and would willingly be ſo too.

Let

Let us ſee what remedies may be applyed by philoſophy to the diſeaſes of the mind. There is certainly ſome remedy; nor has nature been ſo unkind to the human race, as to have diſcovered ſo many ſalutary things for the body, and none for the mind: ſhe has even been kinder to the mind than the body, in as much as you muſt ſeek abroad for the aſſiſtance the body requires, the mind has all within itſelf. But by how much more excellent and divine the mind is, it requires the more diligence, which, when it is well applied, it diſcovers what is beſt; when neglected, is involved in many errors. I ſhall apply then all my diſcourſe to you; for though you appear to enquire about the wiſe man, your enquiry may poſſibly be about yourſelf. Various then are the cures of thoſe perturbations which I have expounded; for every diſorder is not appeaſed the ſame way, for one medicine muſt be applied to one who mourns, another to the pityful, another to the perſon who envies; for there is this difference to be maintained in all the four perturbations; we are to conſider, whether the cure is to be applied, as to a perturbation in general, that is all contempt of reaſon, or vehement appetite: or whether it would be better directed to particular

ticular perturbations, as to fear, luſt, and the reſt: whether that is not to be much affected by that which occaſioned the grief, or whether every kind of grief is not to be entirely ſet aſide. As ſhould any one grieve that he is poor, the queſtion is, would you maintain poverty to be no evil, or would you contend that a man ought not to grieve at any thing? Certainly this is beſt; for ſhould you not convince him with regard to poverty, you muſt allow him to grieve: but if you remove grief by particular arguments, ſuch as I uſed yeſterday, the evil of poverty is in ſome manner removed.

XXVIII. But any perturbation of the mind of this ſort, may be as it were, wiped away by this method of appeaſing the mind: that is, by ſhewing that there is no good in what gave riſe to joy and luſt, nor any evil in what occaſioned fear or grief. But certainly the moſt effectual cure is, by ſhewing that all perturbations are of themſelves vicious, and have nothing natural or neceſſary in them. As we ſee grief itſelf is eaſily ſoftened, when we charge thoſe who grieve with a weakneſs, and an effeminate mind: or when we commend the gravity and conſtancy of thoſe

thoſe who bear calmly whatever befalls them here, which indeed is generally the caſe with thoſe who look on theſe as real evils, but yet think they ſhould be borne with reſignation. One imagines pleaſure to be a good, another money; and yet the one may be called off from intemperance, the other from covetouſneſs. But the other method and addreſs, which, at the ſame time that it removes the falſe opinion, withdraws the diſorder, has more ſubtilty in it: but it ſeldom ſucceeds, and is not applicable to vulgar minds, for there are ſome diſeaſes which that medicine can by no means remove. For ſhould any one be uneaſy that he is without virtue, without courage, void of duty, and honeſty: his anxiety proceeds from a real evil, and yet we muſt apply another method to cure to him; and ſuch an one as all the philoſophers, however they may differ about other things, agree in. For they muſt neceſſarily conſent to this, that commotions of the mind in oppoſition to right reaſon are viſious: that even admitting thoſe things not to be evils, which occaſion fear or grief; nor thoſe good which provoke deſire or joy, yet that very commotion itſelf is vicious: for we mean by the expreſſions magnanimous and brave, one who is reſolute,

ſedate,

ſedate, grave, and ſuperior to every thing in this life: but one who either grieves, fears, covets, or is tranſported, cannot conſe under that denomination; for theſe things are conſiſtent only with thoſe who look on the things of this world, as an overmatch for their minds.

XXIX. Wherefore, as I ſaid, the philoſophers have all one method of cure; that nothing is to be ſaid to that, whatever it is, that diſturbs the mind, but concerning the perturbation itſelf. Thus, firſt with regard to deſire, when the buſineſs is only to remove that, the enquiry is not to be, whether that be good or evil, that provokes luſt; but luſt itſelf is to be removed: ſo that whether honeſty is the chief good, or pleaſure, or whether it conſiſts in both theſe together, or in the other three kinds of goods, yet, ſhould there be in any one too vehement an appetite of even virtue itſelf, the whole diſcourſe ſhould be directed to the deterring him from that vehemence. But human nature, when placed in a conſpicuous view, gives us every argument for appeaſing the mind; and to make this the more diſtinct, the laws and conditions of life ſhould be explained in

in our diſcourſe. Therefore it was not without reaſon, that Socrates is reported when Euripides acquainted him with his play, called Oreſtes, to have begged that the three firſt verſes might be repeated:

What tragic ſtory men can mournful tell,
What e'er from fate or from the gods befell,
That human nature can ſupport——

But in order to perſuade thoſe to whom any misfortune has happened, that they can, and ought to bear it, it is very uſeful to ſet before them others who have borne the like. Indeed, the method of appeaſing grief was explained in my diſpute of yeſterday, and in my book Of conſolation, which I wrote in the midſt of my own grief, for I was not the wiſe man: and applied this, notwithſtanding Chryſippus's advice to the contrary, who is againſt applying a medicine to the freſh ſwellings of the mind; but I did it, and *committed a violence on nature*, that the greatneſs of my grief might give way to the greatneſs of the medicine.

XXX. But fear borders upon grief, of which I have already ſaid enough: but I muſt ſay a little on that. Now as grief proceeds

ceeds from what is preſent, ſo fear from future evil: ſo that ſome have ſaid that fear is a certain part of grief: others have called fear the harbinger of trouble; which, as it were, introduces the enſuing trouble. Now the reaſons that make what is preſent tolerable; make what is to come of little weight: for with regard to both, we ſhould take care to do nothing low, or groveling, ſoft or effeminate, mean or abject. But notwithſtanding we ſhould ſpeak of the inconſtancy, imbecillity, and levity of fear itſelf, yet it is of greater ſervice to deſpiſe thoſe very things we are afraid of. So that it fell out very well, whether it was by accident or deſign, that I diſputed the firſt and ſecond day, on death and pain; two things that are the moſt dreaded: now if what I then ſaid was approved of, we are in a great degree freed from fear. And thus far, on the opinion of evils.

XXXI. Proceed we now to goods, *i. e.* joy and deſire. To me indeed, one thing alone ſeems to take in the cauſe of all that relates to the perturbations of the mind, that all perturbations are in our own power; that they are taken up upon opinion; and are voluntary.

voluntary. This error then muſt be diſcharged; this opinion removed: and as with regard to imagined evils, we are to make them more tolerable, ſo with reſpect to goods, we are to leſſen the violent effects of thoſe things which are called great and joyous. But one thing is to be obſerved, that equally relates both to goods and evils: that, ſhould it be difficult to perſuade any one, that none of thoſe things which diſturb the mind are to be looked on as good or evil, yet a different cure is to be applied to different motions; and the malevolent is to be corrected by one way of reaſoning, the lover by another, the anxious man by another, and the fearful by another: and it were eaſy for any one who purſues the beſt approved method of reaſoning, with regard to goods and evils, to maintain that no fool can be affected with joy, as he never can have any thing good. But at preſent, my diſcourſe proceeds upon the common received notions. Let then honours, riches, pleaſures, and the reſt, be the very good things they are imagined: yet a too elevated, and exulting joy on the poſſeſſing them is unbecoming; though it were allowable to laugh, a loud laugh would be indecent. Thus a mind enlarged by joy, is as blameable as a contrac-

diction of it in grief: and longing is of equal levity with the joy of poſſeſſing; and as thoſe who are too dejected, are ſaid to be effeminate, ſo they who are too elate with joy, are properly called light: and as envy partakes of grief, ſo to be pleaſed with another's misfortune, of joy; and both theſe are uſually corrected, by ſhewing the wildneſs and inhumanity of them. And as it becomes a man to be cautious, but it is indecent to be fearful; ſo to be pleaſed is proper, but to be joyful improper. I have, that I might be the better underſtood, diſtinguiſhed pleaſure from joy. I have already ſaid above, that a contraction of the mind can never be right, but an elation may: for the joy of Hector in Nævius is one thing,

'Tis joy indeed to hear my praiſes ſung
By you, who are the theme of honour's tongue.

But that of the character in Trabea another. *The kind Procureſs, allured by my money, will obſerve my nod, will watch my deſires, and ſtudy my will. If I but move the door with my little finger, inſtantly it flies open; and if Chryſis ſhould unexpectedly diſcover me, ſhe will run with joy to meet me, and throw herſelf into my arms.*

Now

Now he will tell you how excellent he thinks this:

Not even fortune herſelf is ſo fortunate.

XXXII. Any one who attends the leaſt to it will be convinced how unbecoming this joy is. And as they are very ſhameful, who are immoderately delighted with the enjoyment of venereal pleaſures; ſo are they very ſcandalous, who luſt vehemently after them. And all that which is commonly called love, (and believe me I can find out no other name to call it by) is of ſuch levity, that nothing, I think, is to be compared to it; of which Cæcilius——

I hold the man of every ſenſe beriev'd,
Who grants not love to be of gods the chief:
Whoſe mighty power whate'er is good effects,
Who gives to each his beauty and defects:
Hence health and ſickneſs; wit and folly hence
The God that love and hatred doth diſpenſe!

An excellent corrector of life this ſame poetry! which thinks that love, the promoter of debauchery and vanity, ſhould have a place in the council of the Gods. I am ſpeaking of comedy: which could not ſubſiſt

at all, but on our approving of theſe debaucheries. But what ſaith that chief of the Argonauts in tragedy?

My life I owe to honour leſs than love.

What then? this love of Medea what a train of miſeries did it occaſion? and yet the ſame woman has the aſſurance to ſay to her father in another poet, that ſhe had a huſband

Dearer by love than ever fathers were.

XXXIII. But let us allow the poets to *trifle:* in whoſe Tables we ſee Jupiter himſelf engaged in theſe debaucheries: apply we then to the maſters of virtue, the philoſophers, who deny love to be any thing carnal; and in this they differ from Epicurus, who, I think, is not much miſtaken. For what is that love of friendſhip? how comes it, that no one is in love with a deformed young man, or a handſome old one? I am of opinion, that this love of men had its riſe from the Gymnaſtics of the Greeks, where theſe kinds of loves are free and allowed of: therefore Ennius ſpoke well;

The cenſure of this crime to thoſe is due,
Who naked bodies firſt expos'd to view:

Now

Now ſuppoſing them chaſte, which I think is hardly poſſible; they are uneaſy and diſtreſſed, and the more ſo, as they contain and refrain themſelves. But to paſs over the love of women, where nature has allowed more liberty; who can miſunderſtand the poets in their rape of Ganymede, or not apprehend what Laius ſaith, and what he would be at in Euripides? laſtly, what the principal poets and the moſt learned have publiſhed of themſelves in their poems and ſongs? What doth Alcus, who was diſtinguiſhed in his own republick for his bravery, write on the love of young men? for all Anacreon's poetry is on love. But Ibycus of Rhegium appears from his writings, to have had this love ſtronger on him than all the reſt.

XXXIV. Now we ſee that the loves of theſe were libidinous. There have ariſen ſome amongſt us philoſophers, (and Plato is at the head of them, whom Dicæarchus blames not without reaſon) who have countenanced love. The Stoicks in truth ſay, not only that their wiſe man may be a lover, but they alſo define love itſelf to be an *endeavour of making friendſhip from the appearance of beauty.* Now, provided there is

any one in the nature of things, without ſolicitude, without deſire, without care, without a ſigh; ſuch an one may be a lover: for he is free from all luſt: *but I have nothing to ſay to him*, as luſt is my ſubject. But ſhould there be any love, as there certainly is, which is but little ſhort, if at all, of madneſs, ſuch as his in the Leucadia:

Should there be any god whoſe care I am,

it is incumbent on all the gods to ſee that he enjoys his amorous pleaſure.

Wretch that I am!

Nothing truer, and he ſaith very well.

What, are you ſane, lamenting at this rate?

He ſeems even to his friends to be out of his ſenſes? then how tragical he becomes!

Thy aid, divine Apollo, I implore,
And thine dread ruler of the watry ſtore.
Oh! all ye winds aſſiſt me.

He thinks the whole world ſhould be overturn'd to help his Love: he excludes Venus alone as unkind to him. Thy aid, O Venus, why ſhould I invoke? he thinks Venus too much employed in her own luſt, to have regard to any thing elſe, as if he himſelf had not

not ſaid, and committed theſe ſhameful things from luſt.

XXXV. Now the cure from one affected in this manner, is to ſhew, how light, how contemptible, how very trifling he is in what he deſires; how he may turn his affections to another object, or accompliſh his deſires by ſome other means, or that he may entirely diſregard it: ſometimes he is to be led away to things of another kind, to ſtudy buſineſs, or other different engagements and concerns: very often the cure is effected by change of place, as ſick people, that have not recovered their ſtrength. They think an old love may be driven out by a new one, as one nail drives out another: but he ſhould be principally adviſed, what madneſs love is: for of all the perturbations of the mind, nothing is more vehement; though without charging it with rapes, debaucheries, adultery, or even inceſt, the baſeneſs of any of theſe being very blameable; yet, I ſay, not to mention theſe, the very perturbation of the mind in love, is baſe of itſelf, for to paſs over all its mad tricks; thoſe very things which are looked on as indifferent, what weakneſs do they argue? "*Affronts, jealouſies, jars, parlies,*

"*wars, then peace again. Now, for you to*
"*aſk advice to love by, is all one as if you*
"*ſhould aſk advice to run mad by.*" Now is not this inconſtancy and mutability of mind enough to deter one by its own deformity? We are to demonſtrate, as was ſaid of every perturbation, that it conſiſts entirely in opinion and judgment, and is owing to ourſelves. For if love was natural, all would be in love, and always ſo, and love the ſame object; nor would one be deterred by ſhame; another by thought, another by ſatiety.

XXXVI. Anger too, when it diſturbs the mind any time, leaves no room to doubt its being madneſs: by the inſtigation of which, we ſee ſuch contention as this between brothers.

Where was there ever impudence like thine,
Who on thy malice ever could refine?

You know what follows: for abuſes are thrown out by theſe brothers, with great bitterneſs on every other verſe; ſo that you may eaſily know them for the ſons of Atreus, of that Atreus who invented a new puniſhment for his brother:

I who his cruel heart to gall am bent
Some new, unheard of torment muſt invent.

Now

Now what were theſe inventions? hear Thyeſtes.

My impious brother fain would have me eat
My children, and thus ſerves them up for meat.

To what length now will not anger go? even as far as madneſs. Therefore we ſay properly enough, that angry men have given up their power, that is, they are out of the power of advice, reaſon, and underſtanding: for theſe ought to have power over the whole mind. Now you ſhould put thoſe out of the way, whom they endeavour to attack, till they have recollected themſelves; but what doth recollection here imply, but getting together the diſperſed parts of their mind? or they are to be begged and intreated, if they have the means of revenge, to defer it to another opportunity, till their anger cools. But the expreſſion of cooling implies, certainly, that there was a heat raiſed there in oppoſition to reaſon: from whence that ſaying of Archytas is commended: who being ſomewhat provoked at his ſteward, How would I have treated you, ſaith he, if I had not been in a paſſion?

XXXVII.

XXXVII. Where then are they who ſay that anger has its uſe? can madneſs be of any uſe? but ſtill it is natural. Can any thing be natural that is againſt reaſon? or how is it, if anger is natural, that one is more inclined to anger than another? or how is it, that the luſt of revenge ſhould ceaſe before it has revenged itſelf? or that any one ſhould repent of what he dad done in a paſſion? as we ſee Alexander could ſcarce keep his hands from himſelf, when he had killed his favourite Clitus, ſo great was his compunction! Now who, that is acquainted with theſe, can doubt but that this motion of the mind is altogether in opinion and voluntary? for who can doubt but that diſorders of the mind, ſuch as covetouſneſs, a deſire of glory, ariſe from a great eſtimation of thoſe things, by which the mind is diſordered? from whence we may underſtand, that every perturbation is founded in opinion. And if boldneſs, *i. e.* a firm aſſurance of mind, is a kind of knowledge and ſerious opinion, not haſtily taken up: diffidence is then a fear of an expected and impending evil: and if hope is an expectation of good, fear muſt of courſe be an expectation of evil. Thus fear and

other

other perturbations are evils. Therefore as conſtancy proceeds from knowledge, ſo perturbation from error. Now they who are ſaid to be naturally inclined to anger, or pityful, or envious, or any thing of this kind; their minds are conſtitutionally, as it were, in bad health, yet they are curable, as is ſaid of Socrates, when Zopyrus, who profeſſed knowing the nature of every one from his perſon, had heaped a great many vices on him in a publick aſſembly, he was laughed at by others, who could perceive no ſuch vices in Socrates: but Socrates kept him in countenance, by declaring that ſuch vices were in him, but he had got the better of them by his reaſon. Therefore as any one who has the appearance of the beſt conſtitution, may yet be more inclined to ſome particular diſorder, ſo different minds may be differently inclined to different diſeaſes. But thoſe who are ſaid to be vicious, not by nature, but their own fault; their vices proceed from wrong opinions of good and bad things, ſo that one is more prone than another, to different motions and perturbations. But as in the body, an inveterate diſorder is harder to be got rid of, than a perturbation; and a freſh

freſh tumour in the eyes is ſooner cured, than a defluxion of any continuance is removed.

XXXVIII. But as the cauſe of perturbations is diſcovered, all which ariſe from the judgment or opinion, and *volitions*, I ſhall put an end to this diſcourſe. But we ought to be aſſured the ends of good and evil being diſcovered, as far as they are diſcoverable by man, that nothing can be deſired of philoſophy greater, or more uſeful, than what I have diſputed of theſe four days. For to a contempt of death, and the few enabled to bear pain; I have added the appeaſing of grief, than which there is no greater evil to man. Though every perturbation of mind is grievous, and differs but little from madneſs: yet we are uſed to ſay of others, when they are under any perturbation, as of fear, joy, or deſire, that they are moved and diſturbed; but of thoſe who give themſelves up to grief, that they are miſerable, afflicted, wretched, unhappy. So that it doth not ſeem to be by accident, but with reaſon propoſed by you, that I ſhould diſpute ſeparately of grief, and of the other perturbations: for there lies the ſpring and head of all our miſeries: but the cure of grief, and of other

diſorders

diſorders is one and the ſame, in that they are all voluntary, and founded on opinion; that we take them on ourſelves becauſe it ſeems right ſo to do. Philoſophy promiſes to pluck up this error, as the root of all our evils: let us ſurrender ourſelves to be inſtructed by it, and ſuffer ourſelves to be cured; for whilſt theſe evils have poſſeſſion of us, we can not only not be happy, but even not be right in our minds. We muſt either deny that reaſon can effect any thing, when, on the other hand, nothing can be done right without reaſon; or ſince philoſophy depends on the deductions of reaſon, we muſt ſeek from her, would we be good or happy, all helps and aſſiſtances for living well and happily.

The End of the fourth Book.

THE

THE TUSCULAN DISPUTATIONS OF Marcus Tullius Cicero.

BOOK V.

Whether Virtue alone be ſufficient for a happy LIFE.

THIS fifth day, Brutus, ſhall put an end to our Tuſculan Diſputations: on which day I diſputed on your favourite ſubject. For I perceived from that accurate book you wrote me, as well as from your frequent converſation, that you are clearly of this opinion, that virtue is of itſelf ſufficient for a happy life: and though it may be difficult to prove this, on account of the many

many various ſtrokes of fortune, yet it is a truth of ſuch a nature, that we ſhould endeavour to facilitate the proof of it. For among all the topicks of philoſophy, there is none of more dignity or importance. As the firſt philoſophers muſt have had ſome inducement, to neglect every thing for the ſearch of the beſt ſtate of life: ſurely, it was with the hopes of living happily, that they laid out ſo much care and pains on that ſtudy. Now if virtue was diſcovered and carried to perfection by them; and if virtue is a ſufficient ſecurity for a happy life: who but muſt think the work of philoſophiſing excellently eſtabliſhed by them, and undertaken by me? But if virtue as ſubject to ſuch various and uncertain accidents, is but the ſlave of fortune, and not of ſufficient ability to ſupport herſelf; I am afraid we ſhould ſeem rather to offer up our petitions to her, than endeavour to place our confidence in virtue for a happy life. Indeed when I reflect on thoſe troubles, with which I have been ſeverely exerciſed by fortune, I begin to ſuſpect this opinion; and ſometimes even to dread the weakneſs and frailty of human nature, for I am afraid, leſt as nature has given us infirm bodies, and has joined to theſe

in

incurable diſeaſes, and intolerable pains; ſhe might alſo have given us minds participating of theſe bodily pains, and harraſſed with troubles and uneaſineſſes, peculiarly her own. But here I correct myſelf for forming my judgment of the force of virtue, more from the weakneſs of others, or mine own perhaps, than from virtue itſelf: for that (provided there is ſuch a thing as virtue, and your uncle Brutus has removed all doubt of it) has every thing that can befall man in ſubjection to her, and by diſregarding them, is not at all concerned at human accidents: and being free from every imperfection, thinks nothing beyond herſelf can relate to her. But we, who increaſe every approaching evil by our fear, and every preſent one by our grief, chuſe rather to condemn the nature of things, than our own errors.

II. But the amendment of this fault, and of all our other vices and offences, is to be ſought for in philoſophy: To whoſe protection as my own inclination and deſire lead me, from my earlieſt days, ſo, under my preſent misfortunes, I have recourſe to the ſame port, from whence I ſet out, after having been toſt by a violent tempeſt. O philoſophy, thou

conductor of life! thou diſcoverer of virtue, and expeller of vices! what had not only I myſelf been, but the whole life of man without you? To you we owe the origin of cities, you called together the diſperſed race of men into ſocial life, you united them together, firſt, by placing them near one another, then by marriages, and laſtly, by the communication of ſpeech and languages. To you we owe the invention of laws, you inſtructed us in morals and diſcipline: To you I fly for aſſiſtance, and as I formerly ſubmitted to you in a great degree, ſo now I ſurrender up myſelf entirely to you. For one day well ſpent, and agreeable to your precepts, is preferable to an eternity of ſin. Whoſe aſſiſtance then can be of more ſervice to me than yours, who has beſtowed on us tranquillity of life, and removed the fear of death? But philoſophy is ſo far from being praiſed, as ſhe hath deſerved of the life of man, that ſhe is wholly neglected by moſt, and ill ſpoken of by many. Can any ſpeak ill of the parent of life, and dare to pollute himſelf thus with parricide! and be ſo impiouſly ungrateful as to accuſe her, whom he ought to reverence, had he been leſs acquainted with her? But this error, I imagine, and this darkneſs has

ſpread

ſpread itſelf over the minds of ignorant men, from their not being able to look ſo far back, and from their not imagining that thoſe by whom human life was firſt improved, were philoſophers: for though we ſee philoſophy to have been of long ſtanding, yet the name muſt be acknowledged to be but modern.

III. But indeed, who can diſpute the antiquity of philoſophy, either in fact or name? which acquired this excellent name from the ancients, by the knowledge of the origin, and cauſes of every thing, both divine and human. Thus thoſe ſeven Σοφοι as they were held and called by the Greeks, and Wiſe men by us; and thus Lycurgus many ages before, in whoſe time, before the building of this city, Homer is ſaid to have been, as well as Ulyſſes and Neſtor in the heroick ages, were all reported really to have been, as they were called, Wiſe men; nor would it have been ſaid, that Atlas ſupported the heavens, or that Prometheus was bound to Caucaſus, nor would Cepheus with his wife, his ſon-in-law, and his daughter, have been enrolled among the conſtellations, but that their more than human knowledge of the heavenly bodies had tranſferred their names into an erroneous

fable. Form whence, all who were exerciſed in the contemplation of nature, were held to be, as well as called, wiſe men: and that name of theirs continued to the age of Pythagoras, who is reported to have gone to Phlius, as we find it in Ponticus Heraclides, a very learned man, and an hearer of Plato's, and to have diſcourſed very learnedly, and copiouſly on certain ſubjects, with Leon, Prince of the Phliaſii: that Leon, admiring his ingenuity and eloquence, aſked him what art he particularly profeſſed; his anſwer was, that he was aquainted with no art, but that he was a philoſopher. Leon, ſurpriſed at the novelty of the name, enquired what he meant by the name of philoſopher, and in what they differed from other men: on which Pythagoras replied, *that the life of man ſeemed to him, to reſemble that fair, which was kept with the moſt grand entertainment of ſports, and the general concourſe of all Greece. For as there were ſome, whoſe purſuit was glory, and the honour of a crown, for the performance of bodily exerciſes; ſo others were induced by the gain of buying and ſelling, and mere lucrative motives: but there was likewiſe one ſort of them, and they by far the beſt, whoſe aim was neither applauſe, nor profit,*

profit, but who came merely as ſpectators thro' curioſity, to remark what was done, and to ſee in what manner things were carried on there. Thus we come from another life and nature, unto this, as it were out of another city, to ſome much frequented fair: ſome ſlaves to glory, others to money: that there are ſome few, who taking no account of any thing elſe, earneſtly look into the nature of things: that theſe call themſelves ſtudious of wiſdom, that is, philoſophers; and as there it is more reputable to be a looker on, without making any acquiſition, ſo in life the contemplating on things, and acquainting yourſelf with them, greatly exceeds every other purſuit of life.

IV. Nor was Pythagoras the inventor only of the name, but he enlarged alſo the thing itſelf, who, when he came into Italy after this converſation at Phlius, adorned that Greece, which is called Great Greece, both privately and publickly, with the moſt excellent inſtitutes and arts, of whoſe diſcipline perhaps, I ſhall find another opportunity to ſpeak. But numbers and motions, the beginning and end of things, were the ſubjects of the ancient philoſophy down to Socrates, who

was a hearer of Archelaus the diſciple of Anaxagoras. Theſe made diligent enquiry into the magnitude of the ſtars, their diſtances, courſes, and all that relates to the heavens. But Socrates was the firſt who brought down philoſophy from the heavens, placed it in cities, introduced it into families, and obliged it to examine into life and morals, good and evil. Whoſe ſeveral methods of diſputing, together with the variety of his topicks, and the greatneſs of his abilities, being *immortalized* by the memory and writings of Plato, gave riſe to many ſects of philoſophers of different ſentiments: of all which I have principally adhered to that, which, in my opinion, Socrates himſelf followed; to conceal my own opinion, clear others from their errors, and to diſcover what has the moſt probability in every queſtion. A cuſtom Carneades maintained with great copiouſneſs and accuteneſs, and which I myſelf have often uſed on many occaſions elſewhere, agreeable to which manner I diſputed too in my Tuſculum, and indeed I have ſent you a book of the four former days diſputations; but the fifth day, when we had ſeated ourſelves as before, what we were to diſpute on was propoſed thus.

V.

V. *A.* I do not think virtue can poſſibly be ſufficient to a happy life. *M.* But my Brutus thinks ſo, whoſe judgment, with ſubmiſſion, I greatly prefer to yours. *A.* I make no doubt of it, but your regard for him is not the buſineſs now, but what I ſaid was my opinion: I want you to diſpute on that. *M.* What! do you deny that virtue can poſſibly be ſufficient for a happy life? *A.* It is what I entirely deny. *M.* What? is not virtue ſufficient to enable us to live as we ought, honeſtly, commendably, or laſtly, to live well? *A.* Certainly ſufficient. *M.* Can you then help calling any one miſerable, who lives ill? or any one whom you allow to live well, will you deny to live happily? *A.* Why may I not? for a man may be upright in his life, honeſt, praiſe-worthy, and therefore live well, even in the midſt of torments, but a happy life doth not aſpire after that. *M.* What then? is your happy life left on the outſide of the priſon, whilſt conſtancy, gravity, wiſdom, and the other virtues are ſurrendered up to the executioner, and bear puniſhment and pain without reluctance? *A.* You muſt look out for ſomething new, if you would do any thing. Theſe things have very little effect on me, not merely from their being common,

but principally, becauſe, like ſome certain light wines, that will not bear water, theſe arguments of the Stoicks are pleaſanter to taſte than ſwallow. As when the aſſemblage of virtue is committed to the rack, it raiſes ſo reverend a ſpectacle before our eyes, that happineſs ſeems to haſten on, and not to ſuffer them to be deſerted by her. But when you carry your attention off from theſe fancies, to the truth and the reality, what remains without diſguiſe is, whether any one can be happy in torment. Wherefore let us examine that, and not to be under any apprehenſions, leſt the virtues ſhould expoſtulate and complain, that they are forſaken by happineſs. For if prudence is connected with every virtue, prudence itſelf diſcovers this, that all good men are not therefore happy, and ſhe recollects many things of M. Attilius, Q. Cæpio, M. Aquilius: and prudence herſelf, if theſe repreſentations are more agreeable to you than the things themſelves, pulls back happineſs, when it is endeavouring to throw itſelf into torments, and denies that it has any connection with pain and torture.

VI. *M.* I can eaſily bear with your behaving in this manner, though it is not fair in you to

to preſcribe to me, how you would have me diſpute: but I aſk you if I did any thing or nothing the foregoing Days? *A.* Yes, ſomething was done, ſome little matter indeed. *M.* But if that is the caſe, this queſtion is routed, and almoſt put an end to. *A.* How ſo? *M.* Becauſe turbulent motions and violent agitations of the mind, raiſed and elated by a raſh impulſe, getting the better of reaſon, leave no room for a happy life. For who that fears either pain or death, the one of which is always preſent, the other always impending, can be otherwiſe than miſerable? Now ſuppoſing the ſame perſon, which is often the caſe, to be afraid of poverty, ignominy, infamy, or weakneſs, or blindneſs, or laſtly, which doth not befall particular men, but often the moſt powerful nations, ſlavery; now can any one under the apprehenſions of theſe be happy? What? if he not only dreads as future, but actually feels and bears them as preſent? let us unite in the ſame perſon, baniſhment, mourning, the loſs of his children; whoever is in the midſt of this affliction is worn with ſickneſs, can he be otherwiſe than very miſerable indeed? what reaſon can there be, why a man ſhould not rightly enough be called miſerable, that we ſee inflamed

flamed and raging with luſt, coveting every thing with an unſatiable deſire, and the more pleaſures he receives from any thing, ſtill thirſting the more violently after them? And as to man vainly elated, exulting with an empty joy, and boaſting of himſelf without reaſon, is not he ſo much the more miſerable, as he thinks himſelf the happier? Therefore, as theſe are miſerable, ſo on the other hand they are happy, who are alarmed with no fears, waſted by no griefs, provoked by no luſts, melted by no languid pleaſures that ariſe from vain and exulting joys. We look on the ſea as calm when not the leaſt breath of air diſturbs its waves, ſo the placid and quiet ſtate of the mind is diſcovered when unmoved by any perturbation. Now if there is any one who holds the power of fortune, and every thing human, every thing that can poſſibly befall any man as tolerable, ſo as to be out of the reach of fear or anxiety: and ſhould ſuch an one, covet nothing, be lifted up by no vain joy of mind, what can prevent his being happy, and if theſe are the effects of virtue, why cannot virtue itſelf make men happy?

VII.

VII. *A.* One of theſe is undeniable, that they who are under no apprehenſions, no ways uneaſy, who covet nothing, are lifted up by no vain joy, are happy: therefore I grant you that: and the other I am not at liberty to diſpute; for it was proved by your former diſputations that a wiſe man was free from every perturbation of mind. *M.* Doubtleſs then the diſpute is over. *A.* Almoſt, I think, indeed. *M.* But yet, that is more uſual with the mathematicians than philoſophers. For the geometricians, when they teach any thing, if what they had before taught relates to their preſent ſubject, they take that for granted, and already proved: and explain only what they had not wrote on before. The philoſophers, whatever ſubject they have in hand, get every thing together that relates to it; notwithſtanding they had diſputed on it ſome where elſe. Was not that the caſe, why ſhould the Stoicks ſay ſo much on that queſtion, whether virtue was abundantly ſufficient to a happy life? when it would have been anſwer enough, that they had before taught, that nothing was good but what was honeſt: this proved, the conſequence would be, that virtue was ſufficient to a happy life: and how

as

as follows from the other, ſo if a happy life conſiſts in virtue, nothing can be good but what is honeſt: but they do not act in this manner: for they have diſtinct books of honeſty, and the chief good: for though it follows from the former, that virtue has force enough to make life happy, yet they treat the other diſtinctly; for every thing, eſpecially of ſo great conſequence, ſhould be ſupported by arguments which belong to that alone. Have a care how you imagine philoſophy to have uttered any thing more noble, or that ſhe has promiſed any thing more fruitful or of greater conſequence: for, good Gods, what doth ſhe engage, that ſhe will ſo accompliſh him who ſubmits to her laws, as to be always armed againſt fortune, and to have every aſſurance within himſelf of living well and happily, that he ſhall in one word be for ever happy. But let us ſee what ſhe will perform? In the mean while I look upon it as a great thing that ſhe has promiſed. For Xerxes who was loaded with all the rewards and gifts of fortune, not ſatisfied with his armies of horſe and foot, nor the multitude of his ſhips, nor his infinite weight of gold, offered a reward to any one who could find out a new pleaſure: which when diſcovered

covered, he was not ſatisfied with; nor can there ever be an end to luſt. I wiſh we could engage any one, by a reward, to produce ſomething the better to eſtabliſh us in this.

VIII. I wiſh ſo indeed: but I want a little information. For I allow, that in what you have ſtated, the one is the conſequence of the other, that as if what is honeſt, is the only good, it muſt follow, that a happy life is the effect of virtue: ſo that if a happy life conſiſts in virtue, nothing can be good but virtue. But your Brutus on the authority of Ariſto and Antiochus doth not ſee this: for he thinks the caſe to be the ſame, even if there was any thing good beſides virtue. *M.* What then? do you imagine I ſhall diſpute againſt Brutus? *A.* You may do what you pleaſe: for it is not for me to preſcribe what you ſhall do. *M.* How theſe things agree together ſhall be enquired ſomewhere elſe: for I frequently diſputed that with Antiochus, and lately with Ariſto, when, as general, I lodged with him at Athens. For to me it ſeemed that no one could poſſibly be happy under any evil: but a wiſe man might be under evil, if there are any evils of body or fortune. Theſe things were ſaid, which

which Antiochus has inſerted in his books in many places: that virtue itſelf was ſufficient to make a life happy, but not the happieſt: and that many things are ſo called from the major part, though they do not include all, as ſtrength, health, riches, honour, and glory: which are determined by their kind, not their number: thus a happy life is ſo called from its being in a great degree ſo, though it ſhould fall ſhort in ſome point. To clear this up, is not abſolutely neceſſary at preſent, though it ſeems to be ſaid without any great conſiſtency: for I do not apprehend what is wanting to one that is happy, to make him happier? for if any thing is wanting, he cannot be ſo much as happy; and as to what they ſay, that every thing is called and looked upon from the greater part, may be admitted in ſome things. But when they allow three kinds of evils, when any one is oppreſſed with all the evils of two kinds, as with adverſe fortune, and his body worn out and harraſſed with all ſorts of pains, ſhall we ſay ſuch an one is little ſhort of a happy life, not to ſay, the happieſt? This is what Theophraſtus could not maintain: for when he had laid down, that ſtripes, torments, tortures, the ruin of one's country, baniſhment, the loſs of

children

children had great influence as to living miſerably and unhappily: he durſt not uſe any high and lofty expreſſions, when he was ſo low and abject in his opinion.

IX. How right he was is not the queſtion, he certainly was conſiſtent. Therefore I am not for objecting to conſequences where the premiſes are allowed of. But this moſt elegant and learned of all the philoſophers, is not taken to taſk when he aſſerts his three kinds of good, but he is fallen upon by all for that book which he wrote on a happy life, in which book he has many arguments, why one who is tortured and racked cannot be happy. For in that he is ſuppoſed to ſay, that ſuch an one cannot reach a complete happy life. He no where indeed ſaith ſo abſolutely, but what he ſaith amounts to the ſame thing. Can I then find fault with him to whom I allowed, that pains of body are evils, that the ruin of a man's fortunes is an evil, if he ſhould ſay that every good man is not happy, when all thoſe things which he reckons as evils, may befal a good man? The ſame Theophraſtus is plagued by all the books and ſchools of the philoſophers, for commending that ſentence in his Calliſthenes.

Fortune,

Fortune, not wiſdom, rules the life of man.

They ſay never did philoſopher aſſert any thing ſo languid. They are right indeed in that: but I do not apprehend any thing could be more conſiſtent: for if there are ſo many good things that depend on the body, ſo many foreign to it, that depend on chance and fortune, is it not conſiſtent, that fortune, who governs every thing, both what is foreign and what belongs to the body, has greater power than counſel, or would we rather imitate Epicurus? who is often excellent in many things which he ſpeaks, but quite indifferent how conſiſtent, or to the purpoſe. He commends ſpare diet, and in that he ſpeaks as a philoſopher, but it is for Socrates or Antiſthenes to ſay ſo, not one who confined all good to pleaſure. He denies that any one can live pleaſantly, unleſs he lives honeſtly, wiſely, and juſtly. Nothing is more ſerious than this, nothing more becoming a philoſopher, had he not applied this very thing to live honeſtly, juſtly, and wiſely, to pleaſure. What better, than that fortune interferes but little with a wiſe man? But doth he talk thus, who had ſaid that pain is the greateſt evil, or the only evil, and who might be afflicted with the

ſharpeſt

ſharpeſt pains all over his body, even at the time he is vaunting himſelf the moſt againſt fortune? Which very thing too, Metrodorus has ſaid, but in better language: I have prevented you, Fortune, I have caught you, and cut off every acceſs, ſo that you cannot poſſibly reach me. This would be excellent in the mouth of Ariſto the Chian, or Zeno the Stoick, who held nothing to be an evil but what was baſe; but for you, Metrodorus, to prevent the approaches of fortune, who confine all that is good to your bowels and marrow; you who define the chief good by a firm habit of body, and a well aſſured hope of its continuance, for you to cut off every acceſs of fortune? Why you may inſtantly be deprived of that good. Yet the ſimple are taken with theſe, and *from ſuch ſentences great is the crowd of their followers.*

X. But it is the duty of one who diſputes accurately, to ſee not what is ſaid, but what is ſaid conſiſtently. As in the opinion which is the ſubject of this diſputation; I maintain that every good man is always happy, it is clear what I mean by good men: I call thoſe both wiſe and good men, who are provided and adorned with every virtue. Let us ſee

then who are to be called happy? I imagine, indeed, thoſe, who are poſſeſſed of good without any allay of evil: nor is there any other notion connected with the word that expreſſes happineſs, but an abſolute enjoyment of good without any evil. Virtue cannot attain this, if there is any thing good beſides itſelf: for a crowd of evils would preſent themſelves, if we allow poverty, obſcurity, humility, ſolitude, the loſs of friends, acute pains of the body, the loſs of health, weakneſs, blindneſs, the ruin of ones country, baniſhment, ſlavery, to be evils: for to conclude, a wiſe man may be in all theſe and many others: for they are brought on by chance, which may attack a wiſe man; but if theſe are evils, who can maintain a wiſe man to be always happy, when all theſe may light on him at the ſame time? I therefore do not eaſily agree with my Brutus, nor our common maſters, nor thoſe ancient ones, Ariſtotle, Speuſippus, Xenocrates, Polemon, who reckon all that I have mentioned above as evils, and yet they ſay that a wiſe man is always happy; who if they are charmed with this beautiful and illuſtrious title, which would very well become Pythagoras, Socrates, and Plato, they ſhould be perſuaded, that ſtrength, health,.

health, beauty, riches, honours, power, with the beauty of which they are raviſhed, are contemptible; and that all thoſe things which are the oppoſites of theſe are not to be regarded; then might they declare openly with a loud voice, that neither the attacks of fortune, nor the opinion of the multitude, nor pain, nor poverty, occaſion them any apprehenſions, and that they have every thing within themſelves, and that they hold nothing to be good but what is within their own power. Nor can I by any means allow the ſame perſon, who falls into the vulgar opinion of good and evil, to make uſe of theſe expreſſions, which can only become a great and exalted man. Struck with which glory upſtarts Epicurus, who, with ſubmiſſion to the gods, thinks a wiſe man always happy. He is much taken with the dignity of this opinion, but he never would have owned that, had he attended to himſelf: for what is there more inconſiſtent, than for one who could ſay that pain was the greateſt, or the only evil, to think that a wiſe man ſhould ſay in the midſt of his torture, How ſweet is this! We are not therefore to form our judgment of philoſophers from detached ſentences, but from their conſiſtency with

themſelves, and their common manner of talking.

XI. *A.* You engage me to be of your opinion; but have a care that you are not inconſiſtent yourſelf. *M.* By what means? *A.* Becauſe I have lately read your fourth book on good and evil: in that you appeared to me, when diſputing againſt Cato, to have endeavoured to ſhew, which with me is to prove, that Zeno and the Peripateticks differ only about ſome new words; which allowed, what reaſon can there be, if it follows from the arguments of Zeno, that virtue contains all that is neceſſary to a happy life, that the Peripateticks ſhould not be at liberty to ſay the ſame? For in my opinion, regard ſhould be had to the thing, not to words. *M.* What? you would convict me from my own words, and bring againſt me what I had ſaid or written elſewhere. You may act in that manner with thoſe who diſpute by eſtabliſhed rules: we live from hand to mouth, and ſay any thing that ſtrikes our mind with probability, ſo that we only are at liberty: But becauſe I juſt now ſpoke of conſiſtency, I do not think the enquiry in this place is, if Zeno's and his hearer Ariſto's opinion be true, that nothing

nothing is good but what is honeſt, but, admitting that, then, whether the whole of a happy life can be reſted on virtue alone. Wherefore if we certainly grant Brutus this, that a wiſe man is always happy, how conſiſtent he is, is his buſineſs: for who indeed is more worthy than himſelf of the glory of that opinion? Still we may maintain that the ſame is moſt happy; though Zeno of Citium, a ſtranger and a mean coiner of words, has inſinuated himſelf into the old philoſophy.

XII. Yet the majeſty of this opinion is due to the authority of Plato, who often makes uſe of this expreſſion, *that nothing but virtue can be entitled to the name of good:* agreeable to what Socrates ſaith in Plato's Gorgias, when one aſked him, if he did not think Archelaus the ſon of Perdiccas, who was then looked on as the moſt fortunate perſon, a very happy man: I do not know, replied he, for I never converſed with him. What is there no other way you can know it by? None at all. You cannot then pronounce of the great king of the Perſians, whether he is happy or not? How can I, when I do not know how learned, or how good a man he

is? What? Do you look on a happy life to depend on that? My opinion entirely is, that good men are happy, and the wicked miſerable. Is Archelaus then miſerable? Certainly, if unjuſt. Now doth it not appear to you, that he placed the whole of a happy life in virtue alone? But what doth the ſame ſay *in his funeral oration*; for ſaith he, whoever has every thing that relates to a happy life ſo compact within himſelf, as not to be connected with the good fortune of another, or on the bad, and not to depend on what befalls another, or under any uncertainty, ſuch an one has acquired the beſt rule of living: this is that moderate, that brave, that wiſe man, who ſubmits to the gain and loſs of every thing, eſpecially his children, and obeys that old precept; ſo as never to be too joyful or too ſad, becauſe he depends entirely upon himſelf.

XIII. From Plato therefore all my diſcourſe ſhall be deduced, as it were, from ſome ſacred and hallowed fountain. Whence can I then more properly begin, than from nature, the parent of all? For whatſoever ſhe produces, not only of the animal kind, but even of the vegetable, ſhe deſigned it to be perfect in its reſpective

reſpective kind. So that among trees, and vines, and thoſe lower plants and trees, which cannot advance themſelves higher from the earth, ſome are evergreen, others are ſtripped of their leaves in winter, and warmed by the ſpring ſeaſon, put them out afreſh, and there are none of them but what are ſo quickened by a certain interior motion, and their own ſeeds incloſed in every one as to yield flowers, fruit, or berries, that all may have every perfection that belongs to it, *provided no violence prevents it.* But the force of nature itſelf may be more eaſily diſcovered in animals, as ſhe has beſtowed ſenſe on them. For ſome animals that can ſwim ſhe deſigned inhabitants of the water; ſome that fly to expatiate in the heavens; ſome creeping, ſome walking; of theſe very animals ſome are ſolitary, ſome herding together; ſome wild, others tame, ſome hidden and covered by the earth; and every one of theſe maintains the law of nature, confining itſelf to what was beſtowed on it, unable to change its manner of life. And as every animal has from nature ſomething that diſtinguiſhes it, which every one maintains and never quits: ſo man has ſomething far more excellent, though every thing is ſaid to excell by compariſon: But the hu-

man mind as derived from the divine reaſon, can be compared with nothing but with God himſelf, if I may be allowed the expreſſion. This then when improved, and its ſight, ſo preſerved, as not to be blinded by errors, becomes a perfect underſtanding, that is, abſolute reaſon: which is the very ſame as virtue. And if every thing is happy, which wants nothing, and is compleat and perfect in its kind, and that is the peculiar lot of virtue; certainly all who are poſſeſſed of virtue are happy. And in this I agree with Brutus, even with Ariſtotle, Xenocrates, Speuſippus, Polemon, to me ſuch only appear completely happy: for what can he want to a compleat happy life, who relies on his own goods, or how can he be happy who doth not rely on them?

XIV. But he who makes a threefold diviſion of goods, muſt neceſſarily be diffident, for how can he depend on having a ſound body, or that his fortune ſhall continue? but no one can be happy without an immovable, fixed, and permanent good. What then is this opinion of theirs? So that I think that ſaying of the Spartan may be applied to them, who, on ſome merchants boaſting before him, that he could diſpatch ſhips to every maritime coaſt;

coaſt; replied, that a fortune which depended on ropes was not very deſirable. Can there be any doubt that whatever may be loſt, cannot be of the number of thoſe things which complete a happy life; for of all that conſtitutes a happy life, nothing will admit of growing old, of wearing out or decaying, for whoever is apprehenſive of any loſs in theſe cannot be happy: for the happy man ſhould be ſafe, well fenced, well fortified, out of the reach of all annoyance; not under trifling apprehenſions, but void of all. As he is not called innocent who but ſlightly offends, but who offends not at all: ſo is he to be held without fear, not who is in but little fear, but who is void of all fear. For what elſe is courage but an affection of mind, that is ready to undergo perils, as well as to bear pain and labour without *any allay of* fear? Now this certainly could not be the caſe, if any thing were good but what depended on honeſty alone. But how can any one be in poſſeſſion of that deſireable and much requeſted ſecurity (for I now call a freedom from anxiety a ſecurity, on which freedom a happy life depends) who has, or may have a multitude of evils attending him? How can he be brave and undaunted, and hold every thing as trifles

which

which can befall a man, for ſo a wiſe man ſhould do, but who thinks every thing depends on himſelf? Could the Lacedæmonians without this, when Philip threatened to prevent all their attempts, have aſked him, if he would prevent their killing themſelves? Is it not eaſier then to find a man of ſuch a ſpirit as we enquire after, than to meet with a whole city of ſuch men? Now if to this courage I am ſpeaking of, we add temperance that governs all our commotions? What can be wanting to compleat his happineſs who is ſecured by his courage from uneaſineſs and fear; and is prevented from immoderate deſires, and immoderate inſolence of joy, by temperance. I could ſhew virtue able to effect theſe, but that I have explained the foregoing days.

XV. But as the perturbations of the mind make life miſerable and tranquillity renders it happy: and as theſe perturbations are of two ſorts, grief and fear proceeding from imagined evils, immoderate joy and luſt from the miſtake of what is good; and all theſe are in oppoſition to reaſon and counſel; when you ſee a man at eaſe, quite free and diſengaged from ſuch troubleſome commotions, which are ſo much

much at variance with one another, can you heſitate to pronounce ſuch an one a happy man? Now the wiſe man is always in ſuch a diſpoſition: therefore the wiſe man is always happy. Beſides every good is pleaſant; whatever is pleaſant may be boaſted and talked of; whatever is ſo, is glorious; but whatever is glorious is certainly laudable, whatever is laudable is doubtleſs too, honeſt; whatever then is good, is honeſt. But what they reckon good, they themſelves do not call honeſt: therefore what is honeſt alone is good. Hence it follows that a happy life is compriſed in honeſty alone. Such things then are not to be called or held for goods, amidſt the abundance of which a man may be moſt miſerable. Is there any doubt but that one who enjoys the beſt health, has ſtrength, beauty, has his ſenſes in their utmoſt quickneſs and perfection; ſuppoſe him likewiſe, if you pleaſe, nimble and alert, nay, give him riches, honours, authority, power, glory; now, I ſay, ſhould this perſon, who is in poſſeſſion of all theſe, be unjuſt, intemperate, timid, ſtupid, or an ideot; could you heſitate to call ſuch an one miſerable? What then are thoſe goods, in the poſſeſſing which you may be very miſerable? Let us ſee then if a happy life is not made