

Extract of Letter from the Governor-General and Council, in their Secret Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 21st November, 1774, from paragraph one to nineteen inclusive, and postscript of the 6th of December, 1774, relative to differences of opinion in the Supreme Council on Political Affairs. Received in London, 24th June, 1775.

To the Honorable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honorable United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies;

HONORABLE SIRS,

**T**HIS will accompany our proceedings in the Secret Department, which, by the abolition of the Select Committee, will from this time comprehend the complete minutes of the political transactions of your administration here.

2. The shortness of the period which has elapsed since we took upon us the management of your affairs, has not left room for many external occurrences; yet we find, that our Consultations have not been unfrequent, and that the relations we are sorry to say it, have not been formed in that harmony, which was the object of your instructions and our wishes, could it have been maintained, duty we owe to you and our own characters, in asserting the opinion which we are now dictating.

3. The proceedings are very full on the subjects which have been discussed, and contain the minutes, assents, and dissents at length on every difference of opinion throughout bore always a relation to one or more points of the Rohilla Expedition, you will find we were always decided in the same proportion. And as, in this case, it would have been more proper to have concurred in a general letter of arguments and opinions, we have now sent you simply a letter of advice, comprehending resolutions of the Court, and proceedings for the reasoning on both sides.

4. In our first consultation in this department of the Governor-General's, & respecting the political affairs, delivered in at the preceding meeting, in the then carrying on against the Rohillas in the opinions on its necessity and propriety, the Board, consisting of the Commanders in Chief, thought it necessary, for better elucidation of the whole of the original correspondence, to send a copy of the same to the Resident at the Vizir's Court, and

conjunction with him; and it was resolved to request the Governor-General to lay it before the Board accordingly. \*

\*Appendix,  
No. 2.

Appendix,  
No. 3.

5. The Governor-General and Mr. Barwell dissented from this resolution, and the former, at a subsequent meeting, delivered in a minute, † declaring, that he meant to lay before the Board such parts of Mr. Middleton's and Colonel Champion's correspondence, as related to the conduct of public affairs; but as some of the letters might contain things, in the course of a free and personal communication, which might not be proper for a public record, he begged leave to decline laying the whole of them before us.

Appendix,  
No. 4.  
Appendix,  
No. 5.

† Appendix,  
No. 6.

6. On this refusal, a formal protest ‖ was entered against it by General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis. Mr. Monson thereupon moved † for the recall of Mr. Middleton; and it was determined by the same majority, that he should accordingly be recalled, and ordered to repair forthwith to the presidency, bringing with him the whole of his correspondence during his residence at the court of the Vizir. At the same time it was resolved † to appoint Colonel Champion, or the commanding officer of the Brigade, to treat with the Vizir in his room. Against both these resolutions the Governor-General protested, and Mr. Barwell also dissented from them.

(Appendix,  
No. 7.

7. In consequence of these resolutions, the Commander in Chief produced at next meeting some propositions, § which he offered as the ground work of the instructions which it would be necessary to send to Colonel Champion. These were fully debated in a subsequent Consultation, and they were in general agreed to with small variation, the Governor-General and Mr. Barwell objecting to many parts of them, and entering minutes accordingly; while, on the other hand, the Commander in Chief, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, either jointly or separately, recorded their sentiments in the same manner.

\*Appendix,  
No. 7.

8. The instructions \* agreed on, and which were actually sent to Colonel Champion, or the officer commanding the second Brigade, were in substance, after acquainting him with the recall of Mr. Middleton, and with his own appointment to treat with the Vizir, to direct him immediately, on the receipt of the letter, to wait on the Vizir, and to demand payment of the 40 lacks due to the Company for the aid they furnished him in the Rohilla war, and of such other sums as would be then due in virtue of his other engagements; and we empowered him to liquidate and settle all accounts between the Company and the Vizir which might be unsettled at that time.

At the same time that we enjoined him to make this immediate demand for the money, it in his discretion, should he find it impossible for the Vizir to comply, to demand so far as to accept of any part, not less than 20 lacks in ready-money, or a bond, or agreement, for payment by instalments for the remainder, at the rate of twelve months for the last.

If the Vizir should refuse to comply with the above demands, the commanding officer was to enter a protest against him, and, within 14 days from the receipt of the letter, to retire with the army under his command, and withdraw into the

territories. Should he comply, as far as his circumstances would admit, conforming to the directions, that in case the Colonel was only to withdraw the army within a certain distance, and to continue it there for the defence of the Vizir's ancient dominions, otherwise, he was to retire into the Company's territories, as

the directions of caution and respectful moderation, and to communicate them to the Vizir, and as to his danger or difficulty might attend it.

On the 15th, advices arrived of an end being put to the war, and Fyzulla Cawn, who agreed to lay down the arms, and to deliver up the treasure which he had with him, and to leave him in possession of a small district, the rest of the country he contented to hold dependent on the Vizir. We were further informed that the Vizir proposed to assign over 15 lacks

15 lacks of rupees, which he was to receive from Fyzulla Cawn in lieu of one half of his treasure, into the hands of Colonel Champion, in part payment of what he owed to the Company, and to set out immediately for Fyzabad to take measures for discharging the rest; and we learnt at the same time, that Colonel Champion determined to march back with the brigade to Raigaut, nearer to the frontiers of Oud, and there to quit the army, and to leave it under the command of Colonel Galliez, the next senior officer. We also received letters from Mr. Grady, whom Mr. Middleton had sent to Fyzabad to receive the money on account of the cession of Cora and Illahabad, which the Vizir had ordered to be paid there before he left the army, advising, that he had actually received 10 lacks of rupees, and was arrived with it at Patna, where he stopped to receive 5 lacks more, which was to be paid him on the same account by the Raja of Benares.

14. On receipt of these advices, finding the Vizir was in all probability at Fyzabad, we thought fit to alter our former instructions so far, as to direct Colonel Champion, or the commanding officer, to leave the army, and repair to that capital, to wait on the Vizir in execution of his former instructions; but to reckon the 14 days, prescribed for the retreat of the army, from the day of his meeting with the Vizir.

15. At this time the Governor-General proposed \* also, for the consideration of the Board, whether, seeing that the Vizir had actually put himself in the way of discharging No. 7. his engagements to the Company, and that the army had come so much nearer to his frontiers, it might not be proper to suspend the former peremptory orders respecting the demands upon him, and the with-drawing of the troops; but it appearing to the majority, that there were no circumstances in these events that rendered the former orders improper, the Governor's proposal was not assented to.

16. Since that time we have received no further advices of any consequence from these parts.

17. Some time ago, at the requisition of the Vizir, the Governor permitted Captain Brooke to accept the command of a partizan corps in his service, which he proposed to raise and employ as occasion should require.

18. Although this did not coincide exactly with the ideas of the majority, respecting the part which we ought to take in the Vizir's military enterprizes, yet the Board, out of respect to the Governor-General, whose word was pledged to the Vizir for the permission to Captain Brooke, thought fit to confirm it; and the former instructions given to Captain Brooke, which are in the Consultations here referred to, appearing to us clear and proper, we also gave our approbation to them.

19. Thus having informed you of the material transactions at our Board in relation to the Rohilla expedition, which alone has hitherto divided our councils, we once more beg leave to refer you to the proceedings and minutes for the reasonings at length, by which the different opinions were supported; submitting the whole to your impartial judgment and decision.

Postscript; dated 6th December, 1774.

The Governor-General has this day delivered in a separate address to you, which goes a number in the packet, as does one jointly addressed from General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis; a minute of Mr. Barwell's upon the subject also makes a number in the packet. These will all be recorded on the Consultations after the close of this packet.



# Letter from General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and Mr. Francis.

Fort-William, 30th November, 1774.

General Clavering, Mr. Monson, and Mr. Francis, lay before the Council the following address to the Court of Directors, which they had drawn up in the shape of a letter, and which they desire may be upon record as a minute from them.

It touches them with the highest concern to see that things are reduced to so unfortunate a situation, that a justification of their conduct must of necessity carry with it, and can only be supported by a strong and deliberate censure of the preceding administration. They would not have sacrificed, as they have done, their own happiness and peace of mind to so painful and laborious a discussion, if they had not been thoroughly convinced, that the questions agitated in the following address to the Court of Directors affect the very vitals of this state, and that, sooner or later, they must be the subject of a severe parliamentary inquiry.

The whole of these papers, as they apprehend, must, in obedience to the Act of Parliament, be transmitted by the Court of Directors to one of His Majesty's principal Secretaries of State.

J. CLAVERING.  
GEO. MONSON.  
P. FRANCIS.

## To the Honorable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the Honorable United East-India Company.

Fort-William, 30th November, 1774.

GENTLEMEN,

1. **I**T will be the duty of the late President and Council to transmit to you a complete state of your affairs, in every branch of their administration, up to the period at which they resigned the government. From that time you will be regularly informed by the official letters of the Governor-General and Council, of every material occurrence and transaction which may have taken place since our arrival.

We are now to lay before you the reasons which we think oblige us to address you in this letter; and we make it our earnest request, that you will not only receive those reasons with candor and indulgence, but that you will consider the substance of this letter with serious attention. The questions which will necessarily arise out of it, and which are the subject of your immediate deliberations, are, in our judgment, so important to the preservation of your territorial acquisitions in this country, and so essential to the British Empire in India may depend upon the decision of

... since our arrival here has been so totally engrossed in instant business, that it has not been possible for us to acquire a knowledge of the internal state of these provin...



than that which your Governor-General has been pleased to communicate to us. We do not therefore pretend to give you any information from ourselves on this head, or to answer personally for that which you will receive, either from the present, or the late Administration. Before we have time to compare representations with facts, we cannot pretend to enter minutely into any question concerning the accuracy of the information transmitted to you by the late President and Council, or laid before us by the Governor-General. At the same time, in withholding our assent in many cases, it has not been our meaning to dispute or distrust the state of facts as they have been represented to us; on the contrary, though we thought it prudent to suspend our final judgment, until we should be possessed of lights sufficient to authorize us to speak with some degree of certainty, we were inclined to receive those which were given us with a presumption in favour of their truth and exactness.

4. You will observe, that what we have said relates to the internal state of the country, and to the measures pursued by the late President and Council in the management of your revenues, the produce of the collections, the conduct of your trade, and the government of the people. In these articles we would gladly encourage a hope, though we do not venture to suggest it to you, that your expectations may not be disappointed. Our present address will be confined to the consideration of the new system of external policy, in which we found the late Administration had engaged the Company, and of which neither you nor we had any knowledge or suspicion when we left England. On this subject we shall deliver our thoughts to you with that clearness and precision which arises from knowledge in point of facts, and from absolute conviction in point of opinion.

5. Let us begin with assuring you, that we came into this country impressed with the highest idea of the character of our colleagues, and of the wisdom and ability with which your affairs had been conducted under Mr. Hastings. We came determined, as far as that idea could found a determination of future conduct, to unite heartily with him in the support of his administration. The trust reposed in us by the Legislature, our duty to you, and the consideration of our own personal ease and happiness, did all equally concur in leading us to cultivate the friendship and confidence of our colleagues, and to promote, as much as possible, a general harmony in our Councils. Yet you will see, upon the face of our first consultations, that the majority of the Board have already resolved on some measures of the greatest importance, in direct contradiction to the opinion of your Governor-General, and that this difference of opinion has been attended with dispute and altercation between us.

6. It is in order to avoid a continuance of altercations, highly painful to ourselves, and by which the moderation and gravity of our debates is liable to be interrupted, our minds heated, and the progress of public business retarded, that we have thought it expedient to address you in this separate letter. You cannot but be sensible of the impossibility of forming a general letter for the signature of a Council divided into two opinions, diametrically opposite to each other, upon the subject and materials of it. From the knowledge we have of the sentiments of the Governor-General, we are convinced that every paragraph would be the subject of a debate, in which one part of your Council would affirm, and the other would deny; and that such debates could not fail of being attended with distress to every member of the Council, and with the greatest inconvenience to your affairs. At the same time we understand, and are determined to adhere to the established forms of communicating the proceedings of the Council to our Superiors. We hope indeed, that so extraordinary an occasion of departing from them, as we fear we do in the form of this address, will not present itself hereafter.

7. The situation of the Company's political affairs, with the actual state of the provinces in point of defence against invasion or insult, must at all events have formed one of the first and principal objects of our enquiries. We should have been happy in finding these important objects so honorably and securely provided for, as to have permitted us to turn our thoughts immediately to the internal circumstances and condition of this Government. We flattered ourselves that we should find peace in India; or at least that, if hostile measures had been adopted by your servants against any of the powers of this country, they would appear to be founded on the necessity of defending your own possessions, or those of your allies, and on the general principles of policy and justice.

8. Long before this letter can reach England, you will have been informed of the engagements entered into by the late Administration with Sujah Dowla, and the assistance given him to invade and subdue the Rohillas. The first accounts we heard of these trans-

factions filled us with anxiety and surprise. We thought it our duty to enquire minutely into them, not only for your information, but for our own direction; and we shall now lay before you the result of our enquiries. We propose that this letter, with the papers annexed to it, shall contain a complete representation of the state of the engagements with the Vizir, as far as they appear, and of the conduct of the late President and Council on this occasion, as far as it hath fallen within our knowledge. We lament the necessity to which we are reduced, of looking back with disapprobation to any former measures; and heartily wish it were possible for us to vindicate our own conduct, without condemning that of the preceding Administration.

\* Appendix, No. 18, AA 2 9. You will observe by the Governor-General's minute of the 4th of October, 1773, that the enterprise against the Rohillas furnished the first occasion of his interview with the Vizir; yet in the treaty concluded between them at Benaris on the 8th of September 1773, no mention or intimation whatsoever is made of this intended expedition. The treaty is confined to the sale of Korah and Illiabad, and to the pecuniary terms on which the Company should yield him the assistance of their arms, conformably to the *defensive* system established by the treaty of 1765, and now extended to the territories which he had acquired by purchase. The conquest, and, as it has since appeared, the ruin and extirpation of a brave and independent, though, from the nature of their constitution, a weak and divided nation, who, so far from having ever been considered as the natural enemies of the Company or of the Vizir, were included but the year before in the line of defence against the Marattas, was resolved upon in a private conversation between your President and Sujah Dowla, from which the Commander in Chief was expressly excluded, and to which no other member of your Administration was privy, though Mr. Lawrell, Mr. Vanstuart, and Mr. Secretary Stewart were upon the spot. When you are thoroughly informed of all the circumstances and consequences of this transaction, you may perhaps agree with us in thinking, that it was not of a nature to be supported by any ostensible motives, or to bear the appearance of a formal treaty.

|| Appendix, No. 8.

10. When Mr. Hastings returned to the Presidency, he made a report to the Board of his negotiations with the Vizir. As this paper is very long, and as it has already been transmitted to you in the consultations of the 4th of October, 1773, we shall only beg to enclose a copy of one paragraph, || there being no other part of the report that has relation to the present subject; we mean, however, to annex complete copies of every other document to which we refer. The whole of the papers entered on your records will be highly worthy of your perusal. Those which we have selected for the immediate illustration of this letter are entire. On matters of such delicacy and moment, we will not trust ourselves with the partial power of extracting.

11. Mr. Hastings's report abovementioned is dated the 4th of October, 1773. He therein states to the Council, that the Vizir was at first very desirous of the assistance of an English Force to put him in possession of the Rohilla Country, but that he afterwards laid aside the design; and that the measures to be pursued for *his security* on that quarter must be determined by future occurrences. The President thereupon observes, "That he was pleased that the Vizir had urged the scheme of this expedition no farther, as it would have led our Troops to a distance from our own borders, which he would wish ever to avoid, though there were powerful arguments to recommend it."

† Appendix, No. 18, Q

12. When you refer to the short paragraph from which these passages are taken, you will be led to conclude, that the President had communicated to the Council the whole of what had passed between himself and the Vizir on the subject of the Rohilla Expedition; that the project of the Expedition was laid aside; that he had entered into no positive engagements on this subject; and that the question, whether the Vizir should or should not be assisted in attacking the Rohillas, whenever it should recur, would be open and entire for the decision of the Board. You will soon find, however, that much more had passed on this subject than Mr. Hastings at first thought fit to impart to his Council; and that his communications to them were very gradual and reserved. The secret, of the important business transacted between the Vizir and Mr. Hastings, appears to us to have been equally withheld from the Court of Directors. In the Letter of the 12th October, † 1773, in which the treaty of Benaris is communicated to you, there is not one word, nor the most distant intimation, expressive of the private engagements contracted at the same instant by Mr. Hastings for invading the Rohillas. You could not possibly understand from that Letter, or from any of the papers annexed to it, that "The Expedition against the Rohillas remained only suspended; or that he had given the Vizir every reason to expect, that whenever it could

" could again be with prudence resumed, and he desired it, it should be undertaken ; " yet a packet was dispatched to England, on purpose to inform you of the result of the President's negotiations at Benaris. Subsequent events however soon obliged Mr. Hastings to give farther explanations of his conduct.

12. The Vizir, who was supposed to have laid aside all thoughts of the Expedition against the Rohillas, appears to have resumed them suddenly. About the middle of November he sent up his requisition for assistance in that project. The President laid it, with an explanatory minute of his own, before the Select Committee, by whom the business was referred to the Council at large. Their resolution to comply with that part of the Vizir's requisition which related to the invasion of the Rohillas, is annexed to the enclosed copy of the President's minute of the 26th of November, 1773. \* He therein states, for the first time, the verbal engagements which he had entered into with the Vizir, the embarrassing situation to which he was personally reduced, and how much he was hampered by them. He then recommends an expedient, which he thinks calculated to remove all difficulties. That we may not interrupt the narrative part of this Letter, we shall reserve another place for our observations upon the arguments and opinions advanced by the President. The expedient proposed was, to consent to the Expedition on such beneficial terms to the Company, as might be likely to make the Vizir relinquish the design rather than agree to them. This idea was adopted by the Council, who professed themselves sensible of the embarrassment which the President lay under from what had passed on the subject between him and the Vizir at Benaris. They accordingly agreed to the proposed Letter, † (enclosed No. 3,) the conditions of which, as they observe, " If accepted, would undoubtedly secure the greatest possible advantages from such an enterprize ; but they appear to them more calculated to drive the Vizir into a refusal, which is what they trust in, as it's most probable and almost infallible consequence, and which they wish for, as the proper result of this proposition, in the present circumstances of affairs."

\* Appendix, No. 9.

† Appendix, No. 10.

13. This, Gentlemen, is all the approbation which the President's conduct receives from his own Council, and all the sanction which they give to his engagements. *They concur heartily in wishing to avoid the Expedition proposed, and declare it to be their wish and expectation, that the Vizir may be driven to a refusal of the conditions, notwithstanding those conditions would secure the greatest possible advantages to the Company.* Such an assent to a measure of such critical importance, especially from a Council, which had not lately been accustomed to differ from their President, is, in our opinion, equivalent to the most solemn condemnation.

14. At the same time that the Letter, as agreed on, was sent to Sujah Dowla, to be transcribed and signed by him, a provisional order for the march of the Brigade at Dinapore was dispatched to the Chief at Patna, to remain in his hands, in case the Vizir should accept the terms, and require the Brigade to join him. When you consider the reluctance with which the measure is adopted, you will rather expect that the execution of it should be retarded by farther consultations, than that it should be forwarded by this extraordinary precaution.

15. At this stage of the transaction, the first advices, dated 17th of January 1774, from the Secret Department, inform you, that " It was with pleasure they found the plan they had adopted answer so completely to their intentions. The Vizir, on receipt of the President's Letter, written agreeably to the resolution of the Board, returned an immediate answer, declining their assistance in his distant expeditions on the conditions they required ; but at the same time desiring the Brigade might be held in readiness to march, whenever he should find it necessary to call on them for the defence of his own Dominions." They add, that " This affair being happily terminated in the manner they wished, they shall now remain spectators only of the operations of the different powers in those distant parts; preserving however a watchful eye over the course of events, that they may be prepared to interpose, whenever the interests of the Honorable Company are likely to be affected by them." That, " With this view, they shall, in compliance with the Vizir's request, hold one Brigade in readiness to march to his assistance within his own Territories, including the provinces of Corah and Allahabad : and they acknowledge they shall not be sorry to find that he calls for them on his footing, as they shall then be eased of so considerable a part of the military expence, and have the discipline of the troops preserved, in an actual service, at so little distance from our own Territories."



Hastings's letter of the 10th shews that Mr. Middleton was then with the Vizier, but it does not appear how long he had been with him. The letter of the 1st of March is docketed No. 3, that of the 29th No. 7; so that there are three letters missing, exclusive of that of the 15th of February, of which mention is made below. The next letter is of so late a date as the 23d of April, giving an account of the battle; but as neither that or any of the subsequent letters are numbered, we cannot discover how many are withheld. It appears plainly, however, that Mr. Middleton had not been silent in the interval; for Mr. Hastings, in his letter to him of the 19th of April, acknowledges the receipt of his several letters from the 15th of February to the 3d of April, therefore if no other are withheld, those two abovementioned are certainly so. The letter of the 15th of February must have been the first letter in the correspondence, as the next date (viz. February the 18th) is docketed No. 2; what the subject of it was can only be matter of conjecture; but it seems to us probable, that it related to the secret instructions which Mr. Middleton had received, independent of his public ones. It is needless to trace the other letters which have been withheld, as it is sufficient for the present purpose to shew, that if the above four letters, of the 15th of February, No. 1, with the numbers 4, 5, and 6, had been produced, we might have been enabled to have formed a competent judgment of the real nature of the engagements with the Vizier.

21. We shall offer but one observation more on the broken state of this correspondence. † Mr. Hastings having alledged, that his chief reason for withholding the above letters was, that they related to a difference between the Vizier and Colonel Champion, it may be necessary to shew, that none of the above four letters could relate to that subject. Mr. Hastings, in his letter of the 22d of May, acknowledges Mr. Middleton's of 23d, 24th, and 29th of April. The date of the first of those letters closes the chasm. The supposed difference could not have been mentioned in any letters written within the period of the chasm, because Mr. Hastings, in the above letters of the 22d of May, after informing Mr. Middleton of the complaints he had received from Colonel Champion against the Vizier, adds, "Your silence on these subjects, with which I can not suppose you unacquainted, &c. &c." This proves the impossibility that any of Mr. Middleton's letters, comprehended in the chasm could relate to Colonel Champion's difference with the Vizier.

22. When you examine the orders successively sent to Colonel Champion, you will find that the Select Committee had consented to extend the operations of your Troops beyond even the line of the Rohilla Dominions. We refer to their proceedings of the 22d of August the 17th of September last. By the first, Colonel Champion is directed to assist the Vizier in reducing the frontier Zemindars, with whom the fugitive Rohillas may take refuge; by the second he is permitted to cross the Ganges, if the Vizier should require it, in pursuit of the remains of his enemies. This last resolution of the Select Committee appears to have alarmed the Board; in consequence of which the Brigade is limited to one day's march on the other side of the Ganges.

23. On the 23d of May the first orders were sent to Colonel Champion and Mr. Middleton to make a demand of the forty lacks then due to the Company, according to the express terms of the Vizier's letters; but that demand, as you will see in Mr. Middleton's letter of the 18th of June, having been evaded by the Vizier, the business was immediately taken up with a greater appearance of firmness by the Government here, though with as little effect.

24. On the 14th of July the Select Committee considering the forty lacks stipulated for the Company as incontestably due, desire the President to cause the demand to be repeated, with a positive declaration of our immediate right to the money. We enclose you a copy of their resolution \*, and of Mr. Hastings's letter to Mr. Middleton on this subject †, in consequence of which the demand was again made by Colonel Champion with as little success as before. In those papers you will see the arguments in support of the demand fully stated, and the Company's right clearly established; on the other hand, you will see and judge of the validity of the Vizier's reasons for not making good this engagement to the Company in the answers of Colonel Champion and Mr. Middleton, to which we refer you. The plain matter of fact is, that on the 10th of this instant (November) no part of the forty lacks had yet been paid.

\* Appendix,  
No. 13.  
† Appendix,  
No. 14.

25. When you compare this delay with the means that the Vizier apparently had in his power to liquidate a much larger account, as well from the plunder of the Country, as from the division of Fyzulla Cawn's treasures settled by the late capitulation, you

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† N. B. The whole of the Governor-General's correspondence with Colonel Champion was afterwards laid before the Board, and is contained in Appendix, No. 19. A. A.—14.



16. The hopes which you probably formed upon the receipt of the preceding Letter, must have been soon disappointed by that which followed it from the Select Committee,\* dated the 17th of March. About the latter end of January, the Vizir, who appears to us hitherto, not so much to have varied, as to have artfully concealed his real intentions about the Rohilla War, sent his Letter to the President, containing the terms on which he accepted our assistance, to the Chief at Patna, with a requisition for the march of the second Brigade, which was immediately complied with. We had rather attribute the apparent changes in the Vizir's resolutions to the duplicity of his character, than suppose it possible that the President was, from the first, acquainted with his real intentions, and that he made use of artifice, to draw or extort from your Council an involuntary concurrence in his measures. Your assistance is proposed to be yielded to the Vizir on terms, professedly so disadvantageous to him, that he cannot be expected to accept of it. That conditional engagement being once extorted from your Council, they can no longer recede from it, when the Vizir almost immediately accepts the conditions.

17. Observing that the Vizir's letter is not an exact transcript of the draught sent him by the President, as it ought to have been, we submit it to your judgment \* how far the alterations are material. But the difference between the accounts given you of the object of the requisition by the Board at large, and by the Select Committee, seems to us very remarkable. The former, in the 5th paragraph of their letter from the Secret Department, dated the 15th of March, 1774, tell you, that "The declared intention of the Vizir on this requisition, is still the conquest of the Rohilla Country." The Select Committee, in the 9th paragraph of their letter of the same date, inform you, "That the Brigade will probably be employed only in protecting his Country, while he is carrying on his operations against the Maratta District." Considering that the Vizir himself expressly says, that *it is his resolution to employ the Brigade in the reduction of the Rohillas*, this last intimation from the Select Committee appears to us wholly unaccountable.

18. We find that the Brigade entered the Rohilla Country on the 17th of April last, and that the united Armies obtained a complete victory over the Rohilla Chiefs on the 23d following. From that time we must refer you to the Letters recorded in your consultations for the farther operations of the Vizir, his barbarous and unnecessary devastation of the country, the cruelty with which he treated his unhappy prisoners, and particularly the brutal outrages offered to their Wives and Daughters, though of the first rank. In the Letters of Colonel Champion you will find a detail of these proceedings, which he calls *wanton enormities*, (uncontradicted, tho' palliated by the Governor's private Agent) which we doubt not will fill you with horror. We enclose copies of three of them †, in order to excite and fix your attention to the rest. One paragraph in that of the 15th of June is so striking, that we cannot forbear inserting it here. "I am most heartily disposed to believe, that the Board did not suspect their orders could have such consequences as have fallen out; they could not have foreseen so sudden and so total an expulsion and downfall of a whole race of people; they could not have supposed that a Man, exalted and supported by British Arms, could pay so very little deference to the advices and counsel of a British Commander; nor was it possible to conceive, that a Man, who had himself tasted the gall of misfortune, should be so totally unmindful of the unbounded and unparalleled grace shewn to him, as to delight in denying a single ray of benevolence to others; such, however, has been the case; and, in due intimation of it, I have discharged that which was incumbent upon me. I too can say that the Nabob, as the Agent of oppression, is alone culpable; but whilst all Asia knows that the English gave him the rod, and whilst they in vain look up to them as those who ought, if not to direct the application, at least to prevent an ill use being made of that rod, will they not reasonably conclude, that the scourges which the Agent gives are connived at? Will they not say, that every English Chief is another Sujah?"

19. These details, Gentlemen, would probably never have reached your knowledge, if we had not called for Mr. Hastings's private correspondence with Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton. Even now, that correspondence is laid before us in so broken and imperfect a state, ‡ and so many Letters belonging to it confessedly withheld, that we do not for ourselves hesitate to conclude, that facts and circumstances, still more atrocious than any that appear, are suppressed.

20. The most important chasm in Mr. Middleton's correspondence is from the 1st of March to the 29th, and from that time to the 23d of April. The first of those Letters is dated at Allahabad; the second from Coreah Kunge, though written only to acknowledge Mr. Hastings's

\* Appendix, No. 18 A A 1.

\* Appendix, No. 11.

† Appendix, No. 12.

‡ Appendix, No. 18, A A 12 & 13.

will not perhaps entertain very sanguine hopes of soon receiving the price of your assistance. At all events we think it must be admitted, that in order to bind the Vizier to a punctual performance of his engagements, it is necessary to express firmness as well as amity in our negotiations with him. Colonel Champion, in his letter of the 12th of June, plainly calls him the most *faithless of men*, and in a subsequent letter adheres to and defends the description. Even Mr. Hastings's private agent, whose inclinations, or instructions, evidently lead him to soften and palliate every representation of the Vizier's misconduct, does not scruple to say, in his letter of the 20th of September last, that "He has experienced much duplicity, evasion, and deceit, in most of his transactions with his excellency."

26. Such is the man, who, as it appears to us, has had the British arms and honor absolutely at his disposal, and dared to tell your Presidency that he is the master of your Army. As Colonel Champion expresses himself, *The British name is in the hand of the Vizier*. Confounded by appearances which we are unable to account for, we look in vain for ostensible causes adequate to such effects, and confess, that every enquiry we make fills us with equal diffidence and surprize. We shall not, however, anticipate any conjectures which may arise in your mind, when you review the whole conduct of this dark mysterious business from first to last, and reflect upon the absolute surrender which has been made, with so little apparent compensation, of your honor and interest to the vindictive or capricious projects of Suja Dowla.

27. When you have united the consideration of the faithless character universally attributed to the Vizier, with the moderation so long, but so ineffectually observed by the late Government in their applications to him, we apprehend that the measures we have since resolved on, to obtain from him something more substantial than promises, will stand justified in your opinion. If those promises were sincere, they ought to be complied with long before Colonel Champion can receive our orders on the subject.

28. We arrived and landed at Fort William on Wednesday the 19th of October. The next day was spent in settling the proclamation of the new Government, which ought not to have been a matter of much debate. At the Governor's desire we then adjourned to the Monday following; but it was not till the next day (Tuesday the 25th) that he gave us any light into the political state of the Country.

29. During this interval we were left in the most anxious, not to say disgraceful situation. Publick report soon informed us of the nature of the enterprizes in which your Troops were engaged. Not receiving the least communication from the Governor-General, either public or private, on this subject, we employed the days of adjournment in examining and collecting as carefully as we could, every information relative to it, with which the records in the secretary's office could furnish us. From this inspection we found the state of facts, up to the time of our arrival, to be exactly what we have represented. We found a third part of your Army engaged in an offensive war, which had carried them to a distance from your own provinces far greater than that of Delhi; and that they were actually stationed at a place so remote, that it is not comprehended within any of the ordinary maps of Indostan. Our alarm and anxiety at sight of this authentic intelligence, can only be equalled by that, which we believe you will yourselves have felt when you first received it. We saw your Provinces stripped of one third of their defence; the lines repeatedly and most peremptorily drawn by you, for the conduct of your servants towards the Princes of Indostan manifestly transgressed; in short the whole defensive system of your wise and pacific policy completely overturned.

30. These were the facts which we were to expect would be explained and accounted for, and which, united with the explanations we might receive of them, were to determine our future measures. In such circumstances, Gentlemen, we appeal not to your candour but to your judgement, and desire that it may be applied to our conduct with rigor and severity.

31. Possessed of the above facts, we still suspended our final opinion of them, until we should hear the arguments by which the measures of the late administration might be defended, and receive an explanation of the motives on which they had acted.

32. On Tuesday the 25th the Governor-General laid before us the enclosed minute,† which he had prepared for our instruction. It appeared to us far from satisfactory, A majority

†This enclosure is part of

dated at Fort William, 30th of November, 1774.

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majority of the Board resolved upon a motion made by the Commander in Chief, that the Governor-General should be requested to lay before us his complete original correspondence with Colonel Champion from the time the Brigade marched, and with Mr. Middleton, whom, till then, we understood to be the Company's Resident at the Vizier's Court. The communication we requested being refused by the Governor-General, for reasons which, in our opinion, so far from explaining, added mystery to the whole transaction; we thought it necessary for our own justification to protest against his refusal. Copies of the Governor-General's minute, and of our protest are enclosed.\* Mr. Monson then moved, that Mr. Middleton, who, though a Company's servant, and paid by the Company, was styled the private agent of the late President, and whose correspondence was withheld from us, should be immediately re-called to the Presidency. This motion being agreed to, produced another minute from the Governor-General, the substance of which shall be considered in its proper place.

contained in appendix, No. 1, beginning at the words, "The next point," and concluding with the words, "calculated to," "contri- bute" (signed) Warren Hastings.  
\* Contained in appendix No. 3, 5, 6.

33. We should have thought it our duty to have proceeded immediately to the recall of the Brigade within the Company's territories, or at least within the original dominions of the Vizier, but for the vehement opposition made to that proposal by the Governor-General. He urged that there were a number of records and letters still to be consulted, particularly such parts of his correspondence with Colonel Champion and Mr. Middleton as he could properly lay before us; and that the perusal of them would probably alter our present opinions. We were sensible that the case required dispatch, yet we yielded to his authority, and deferred the farther consideration of the recall of the Brigade for three days.

34. On Friday the 28th the heads of instructions† proposed to be given to the commanding officer of the second Brigade, were laid before the Board by General Clavering, and the consideration of them deferred, till the Monday following. On that day it was resolved by the majority, that a letter should be drawn up in conformity to the above heads. This letter, of which we enclose you a copy‡, was dispatched on the 4th of November. The arguments by which the resolutions of the majority were opposed or defended, appear fully in the minutes § of the several members entered on your consultations. After the dispatch of our first instructions to Colonel Champion, you will see that the Board have agreed to prolong the term limited for the departure of the Brigade out of the Rohilla Country, in order to give the commanding officer time to go and return from Ramgaut to Fyzabad. As the Vizier had quitted the army before our first letter could be received, this alteration became absolutely necessary. On the 14th of November the Governor proposed that the Brigade should be continued at Ramgaut, until the Vizier's Government should be effectually established in his new acquired possessions. You will see in our respective† minutes the reasons for and against this proposition. It was re-jected by the majority.

† Contained in appendix, No. 7, A.  
‡ Contained in appendix, No. 7, B.  
§ Appendix No. 7, B, C.  
† Appendix No. 7, D E.

35. It will give us the highest pleasure to be able to tell you, that the Vizier has made good his pecuniary engagements to the Company before he received our last requisition. The Governor-General's expectations on this head are very languine; and considering every thing but the character of the Vizier, are undoubtedly well founded. But whether they may be disappointed or accomplished, the propriety of the measures we have resolved on, forms a question totally independent of that event, and must be determined by itself.

36. The general principle on which we have acted, and which we mean to make the rule of our future policy and conduct, is no other than that, which your authority and that of Legislature have equally prescribed to us;—to maintain PEACE in INDIA. The preservation of peace necessarily includes the vigorous defence of your own possessions, with such parts of the dominions of your allies as are guaranteed by treaty. On the other hand it excludes every idea of conquest, either for yourselves or others. Adhering to this system, we never can engage your arms in any offensive operations for the aggrandizement of one Indian State at the expense of another; much less could we have suffered the little States, which at the same time formed your barrier, and looked up to you for protection, to be swallowed up by the great ones. Had we arrived in this country ten months sooner, we should have saved a nation. These are our principles, Gentlemen, let our actions be tried by them.

37. You are now in possession of all the material facts respecting the Rohilla War which have fallen within our knowledge. The country is reduced; your troops have conquered it for the Vizier; to finish the transaction, it only remains that you should receive the price of your services.



38. We shall now lay before you our observations on the conduct and avowed principles of the late President, in the same order in which we have stated the facts. Let us first, however, observe to you, that if the future peace and security of these provinces were not likely, as we think they are, to be affected by the measures of the late Administration, we should not have undertaken the painful office of examining, and censuring any thing concluded before our arrival. We know not what fatal consequences may follow from a false system of policy, already carried into execution in a capital an instance, or how far they may extend. Whatever they may be, or whether they may take place, it is fit that you should know with exactness from what origin they spring. But, besides the consideration of particular measures and their effects, you will find, that here are opinions as well as facts before you; that there are general principles of policy laid down, and general motives of action stated, which for our future guidance you must either approve of or condemn.

39. The President's minute of the 26th of November 1773, begins with saying, "That he has long considered the power of the Rohillas as dangerous to the British, and that as such he wished to see it annihilated." The obvious meaning of this proposition is very different from that which the President himself annexes to it. You will find that, in his apprehension, it was the weakness, not the strength of the Rohillas which rendered them formidable to the Vizier. "The Soubadar of Oude must always be an object of jealousy and enmity to the Rohillas; his power is to be dreaded by them." As Mr. Hastings has explained himself to us, the consequence of their jealousy and dread of the Vizier was, that they were at all times ready to unite with his enemies, and to disturb the peace of his dominions. Admitting this representation to be true, we do not think it follows, that the power of a people, because they are weak, defenceless, because they live in dread of a superior neighbour, should be annihilated.

40. We state the reasoning fairly as we receive it, and shall leave it unaltered. The supposed facts on which it is founded, are contradicted by unquestionable authorities.—Every thing that has been said of the weakness of the Rohillas is indeed strictly true. Your Select Committee, in their letter of the 30th of December 1773, tell you, that, "Of the neighbouring powers, the Marattas only are formidable to your possessions. The rest are weak, and, the Vizier alone excepted, every way inconsiderable." With respect to the Rohillas, we have seen their fate decided in one slight contest, and their country reduced as fast as our army could march over it. But we deny that they were formidable to the Vizier, even in that sense in which the Governor-General understands that a little State may be dangerous to a great one. Though we could support our opinion by a multiplicity of evidence, not to be resisted, we think it sufficient to direct your attention to the following paragraph of Colonel Champion's letter, of the 12th of July last, to Mr. Hastings.—"If strangers, my good Sir, to what has passed in these countries were to read your letter, they would be led to imagine, that the Vizier had been constantly harrassed by the Rohillas; that they had been in use of making continual inroads into his country, and of calling foreign aid to distress him; in short, that without reducing them there could be no safety, no rest for Sujah Dowla; but I have never heard it alleged, even by the Vizier himself, that these people had ever betrayed any indication of a disposition to encroach on him, or give him the smallest cause of distrust." You have a copy of this letter enclosed, and we beg leave to recommend the whole of it to your consideration.

\*Appendix,  
No. 12.

†Appendix,  
No. 9.

41. We return to the President's minute,† which soon explains the true motives and object of the war. "*The situation of the Rohilla Country must make the possession of it always a desirable object to the Vizier.*" As the truth of this assertion is not to be disputed, we shall only observe upon it, that the most barefaced ambition is seldom so explicit. He would obtain, by this acquisition, a compact compact State, shut in effectually from foreign invasions; it would give him wealth, of which we should partake; and security, without any dangerous increase of power; and would undoubtedly, by bringing his frontier nearer to the Marattas, for whom singly he could be no match, render him more dependent on us.—In these lines it appears to us, that there is but one intelligible proposition, viz. that by the conquest of the Rohillas the Vizier would acquire wealth of which we should partake. The expectation of sharing in the spoils of a people, who have given us no cause of quarrel whatsoever, is plainly avowed to be a motive for invading them. We believe there may have been instances of wars undertaken on principles as unwise and as unjust as these, but we doubt whether there ever was



an example of the Chief of a great state professing to reckon the probable acquisition of wealth among his reasons for taking up arms against his neighbours.

42. The remainder of the preceding quotation is involved in contradiction and obscurity. The Vizier, it is said, *obtains a complete compact State, shut in effectually from foreign invasion*; yet the same acquisition of territory, which is to give him security, without any dangerous increase of power, undoubtedly brings his frontier nearer the Marattas, for whom he is singly no match, and renders him the more dependent on us. The amount of this argument, as far as we can understand such nice refinements, seems to be, that the Vizier, by extending his frontier, becomes so much the more open and vulnerable to the Marattas; and that by giving him possessions, which he cannot defend without our assistance, his dependence on us is effectually ensured; we fear indeed that there is too much truth in these suppositions, and that the success of the late Expedition will serve only to furnish the Marattas with better means and pretences for attacking our Ally; consequently that it entails upon us a war with that people. But where is that security, that compact State, so effectually shut in from foreign invasions, which the acquisition of the Rohilla Country was to give to Suja Dowla?

43. In many parts of the minute before you, the President acknowledges the doubts and embarrassment of his mind. In our opinion every line of it proclaims the distress to which he was reduced; we shall not therefore be very earnest in pressing our objections upon him. Let us only observe, that we are very sorry to see any mixture of sophistry in the discussion of questions, on which the fate of millions may depend.

44. Besides the forty lacks held out to us, the President insists upon the benefit of your being immediately eased of the burthen of one third of your army, while, at the same time, it is employed usefully for your interests, and conveniently for keeping up its own discipline and practice in war. With respect to all the payments made, or to be made by Suja Dowla to the Company, you may perhaps over-rate your expected wealth, if you do not observe, that the sums stipulated in the several agreements with him are to be paid in Rupees of the currency of Oude, which either have no fixed standard, or whose standard is unknown here. The payments hitherto have been made partly in old and new Benares Rupees, and partly in Vizery Rupees of different years, the intrinsic value of which cannot be computed either from their number in tale, or from their stamp. As a foundation, however, to enable you to judge of the whole value of the several sums received, or to be received from Suja Dowla, whether on account of the fifty lacks stipulated by the treaty of Benares, or of the forty lacks for the Rohilla War, or of the monthly subsidy to the Brigade; we beg leave to state to you, that twenty one lacks of the above Rupees, upon being recoined at your mints, have produced only a sum equivalent to Sicca Rupees, 1, 829, 184. 7. 6.

45. With respect to the relief which the monthly subsidy promises to the Company, we desire that you will suspend your judgment, until we can obtain for you an exact account of the extraordinary expenses of the Brigade since they marched from Dinapore, and which must be defrayed by the Company. This account cannot be made up at present. We are, however, inclined to think, from what we have already heard and seen, that when the extraordinary expenses incurred by the Brigade's being employed on so distant a service shall be taken into calculation, the saving to the Company, in consequence of Suja Dowla's subsidy, will not upon the whole be very considerable. \*If a computation be made of the hire of boats, the price and conveyance of stores and field equipage, Mr. Middleton's ordinary and extraordinary allowances, the pay of a troop of cavalry, raised expressly for this expedition, but not included in the estimate on which the subsidy was settled, the charge of recruiting, with all the train of contingencies, which, in this country particularly attend any distant operations in the field, we shall be justified, perhaps, in foretelling, that the Company will gain as little in point of profit, as they do in point of honor, from the mercenary services to which their arms have been degraded.

46. You have now, Gentlemen, materials sufficient to determine, whether this part of your army have in truth been usefully employed for your interests, and how far the keeping up of their discipline and practice in war, without reference to any just cause of quarrel, is a motive fit to be mentioned for drawing the sword against a nation which never gave you offence, and from which you never could have had any thing to fear.

47. We shall dismiss the President's minute with one general observation. It states no grounds of quarrel whatsoever with the Rohillas, nor does it contain a single word to justify the cause in which your troops were to fight. The President's argument, such as it is, turns solely upon topics of interest or convenience, and the mutual benefits which the contracting parties were likely to derive from the expedition.

48. You have seen with what reluctance the measures in which the President alone ventured to engage the Company were adopted by his own Council. Acting in direct opposition to your orders, and to every authority which they ought to have respected, they could not but be alarmed at the *unusual degree of responsibility annexed to such an undertaking*. — Yet even supposing this difficulty to be removed, there still remained another obstacle, which you will probably have thought could never have surmounted. We mean, the repeated and solemn declarations made by Mr. Hastings and his Council, from the commencement of his government up to April, 1773, of their resolution to adhere invariably to the defensive system prescribed to them by your instructions, of their own hearty approbation of that system, and of their abhorrence of every measure that might tend to implicate the Company in the ambitious views of Sujah Dowlah, or involve you in offensive wars against your neighbours.

\*Appendix  
No. 15.

†Appendix,  
No. 18 A to  
No. 18  
A A 11.

49. We have selected some of the most striking of these declarations,\* and enclose them a number in this packet; begging leave at the same time to refer you to the original letters† in your possession from whence they are taken. Compare the language held, and the measures pursued by your late President and Council up to the treaty of Benares, with every thing that has been said and done by them since Mr. Hastings's return from his secret conference with Sujah Dowlah, and you will find that one system forms a complete and precise counterpart to the other; that the transition they make from one set of political opinions to another is sudden and unprepared; and that they have not even observed the common gradations, by which men, who wish to preserve an appearance of consistency, usually endeavour to introduce and qualify a palpable change of system. It is true, indeed, that the Select Committee in their letter of the 30th of December 1773, desire your explicit commands for their conduct, "With respect to the countries situated beyond the limits of these provinces, and those of your Ally; whether their future operations were to be circumscribed invariably by those bounds, or in what case you would approve and authorize their proceeding beyond them; but you cannot fail to remark, that they do not ask for instructions on this question, until after they have taken their resolution, and actually sent the Brigade to assist the Vizier in an expedition which transgresses all former limits, and which has evidently no plea but convenience, nor any professed object but conquest. In fact, your servants wanted no new instructions from their Superiors. Your orders were clear and precise. They knew your sentiments when they acted in direct contradiction to them.

†Appendix,  
No. 16.  
† Appendix,

50. The proofs of these several assertions are taken from letters and other papers signed by themselves. Among the rest we beg leave particularly to lead you to a comparison of those articles in the instructions given in 1773 to Sir Robert Barker,‡ and in 1774 to Colonel Champion,§ relative to the defence of the Rohilla Country in one year, and to the invasion of it in the next; copies of which are enclosed.

51. It is not the spirit of censure that has drawn us into this painful and irksome discussion. We have no pleasure in condemning when we are unable to correct. But it is material to us to shew, that when we depart from the measures in which we find our predecessors in office immediately engaged, we in effect only revert to that system, for the support of which they had but a few months before most solemnly pledged their faith; and that we are entitled to appeal to their own authority against themselves.

52. When you have maturely considered the nature and circumstances of this extraordinary transaction, as it stood in our view on the 25th of last month, we think you will not be surpris'd at our wishing to see the late President's Secret Correspondence with Colonel Champion, and with Mr. Middleton, whom we then understood to be the Company's Resident at the Durbar. In addition to the reasons given in our protest for desiring a communication of this correspondence, we beg leave to observe, that, as it appears to us, your Council acted contrary to your orders, and to every principle of your government, when they permitted the President to appoint a person to act as his private agent at a foreign Court, with power to carry on a Secret Correspondence with him, even to the exclusion of your Select Committee. The possible consequences of reposing so

58. We content ourselves with opposing facts to these general unsupported declarations. Without looking back so far as General Carnac and General Smith, we observe that Sir Robert Barker was frequently employed by the late President and Council in their political negotiations with the Vizier. Colonel Champion has been repeatedly ordered and instructed by themselves, in the course of the present year, to make a demand of the forty lacks due from the Vizier, which forms the principal object of the commission now intrusted to Colonel Champion. Those officers had no share in the offensive engagements entered into by this Government with Sujah Dowlah, nor were they ever trusted with the secret until the moment of execution. The whole tendency of Colonel Champion's correspondence is to condemn the late offensive hostilities, in which he unwillingly bears a part. In the last instance, it is your military Commander in Chief who proposes the recall of your army, who urges your Council to revert to the defensive system which you have laid down at the basis of our administration, and who wishes to sheath the sword drawn by your civil servants, and by them employed in a cause which he thinks a dishonor to your arms.

59. Mr. Monson, who from his profession, and your appointment of him to the eventual command of your army, must feel himself affected by the reflections thrown upon the military, adopts with warmth the pacific measures proposed by General Clavering, and pledges his honor to you for the constant support of them. If ever these gentlemen should depart from the principles they now profess, they know the sentiments and determination of the youngest of your Council, that, without your express and explicit orders, he will never concur in any hostile project beyond the strict line of defence; that he will never join his name with theirs in the support of any system tending to lessen the dependance of the military upon the Civil Power; but that if such a system should be adopted by them hereafter, (which it is almost indecent to suppose) he will resist their councils with the same firmness and sincerity with which he now applauds their conduct.

60. We hold it beneath us to enter into a refutation of loose invectives or general insinuations. Look to facts, Gentlemen, and we are convinced you will find, that it is your Civil Servants who have involved the Company in offensive wars, and in schemes of conquest, by which no public interest could be promoted.

61. The whole argument for and against the recall of the Brigade from the Rohilla Country, is so fully stated in the minutes of the several members, upon the questions proposed in council by General Clavering on the 28th of last month, that to enter into it here would only be loading you with superfluous repetition. We trust, that when you have maturely weighed the motives and principles on which we have acted, you will not concur with the Governor-General, in charging us with "A breach of faith, which inflicts an indelible dishonor on the English Name." It is our hope, founded on a thorough conviction of having done right, that your precise and peremptory approbation will vindicate our characters from this reproach. We have no idea of national honor independent of justice. But even upon the Governor-General's own principles, we affirm that no part of his agreement with the Vizier has been violated by us, unless it be admitted, that his acceptance of the condition imposed by the Vizier, *that the Brigade should NEVER be recalled without his consent*, constitutes a valid obligation upon the present Government, and that it binds us for ever. To determine our judgment hereafter, we make it our request to you, that you will give us your clear and positive opinion, whether the late President had within himself a power to transfer one third of your army (without any limitation of time, or reserving any right of recall) to the service of a foreign prince; or whether the late Council could of right convey to him such a power? Deciding in the affirmative, you will establish a new principle in the constitution of this Government. Deciding in the negative, you will only affirm, that the representative of a State, let his powers be ever so full, cannot be supposed to have a right to annihilate those of the State he represents.

62. We have but one word more to say upon the justice of that quarrel, which has been adopted here with as much zeal as if it had been your own. We have already observed, that in the President's first minute of the 26th of November 1773, recommending the expedition, no cause of quarrel whatsoever is stated to justify the measure. In that of the 25th of last month, he tells us, that "The immediate plea for these hostilities was the breach of faith with which the Rohilla Chiefs were charged, in the supplies of money afforded by them to the Marattas, against whom they had solicited and obtained the



“ Vizier’s assistance, under a solemn engagement to pay him forty lacks of rupees on the departure of the Marattas, and for refusing afterwards to fulfil that engagement.”

63. Supposing this representation to be exact, we do not understand upon what just principle the Arms of the Company can be employed in enforcing the execution of a contract to which they are not parties, and which they have not undertaken to guaranty. The fact however differs from the representation. The agreement between the Vizier and the Rohilla Chiefs was not concluded till the 17th of June, 1772, sometime after their army had been defeated by the Marattas, and the Rohilla Country totally plundered and laid waste. On referring to the Select Committee’s letter of the 10th of November, 1772, you will find, that on the approach of the rains the Marattas recrossed the Ganges, and have not since renewed their invasion of the Rohillas; who, as far as we can learn, did never receive any direct assistance from the Vizier. He never once had the spirit to face the Marattas in the field; and supposing these people to have been deterred from a second invasion of the Rohillas, it must have been entirely owing to the appearance of your Army under Sir Robert Barker.

64. With respect to the Rohilla Chiefs having entered into engagements with the Marattas, inconsistent with those which they had contracted with Sujah Dowla, we assent to the opinion of the late Select Committee, delivered in the 8th paragraph of their letter of the 15th of January, 1773, “ That the Rohillas had sought their safety in an alliance with the Marattas, to which they were of necessity compelled.” A weak defenceless People, placed between two formidable armed powers, are not to be charged with perfidy; much less are they just objects of a vindictive war and conquest, because their situation involves them in ambiguous measures assumed or relinquished upon the instant, to save themselves from destruction.

65. But while we invalidate the force of this pretended plea, we in reality allow it more weight than it deserves. The truth, Gentlemen, as you well know, is, that the Vizier has many years had it at heart to annex the Rohilla Country to his Dominions; that this has been a favorite object with him, which he was determined to accomplish, *per fas et nefas*, whenever an opportunity should offer. Your letters from hence are filled with proofs of this assertion. Among the rest, it is particularly observable that the late Select Committee tell you, in the 8th paragraph of their letter of the 10th of November, 1772, “ That he was even inclinable to take advantage of the actual distress of the Rohillas, and possess himself of their Dominions the moment the Marattas should be obliged to leave it; and that General Barker was the principal means of diverting him from a scheme, so little consistent with prudence or equity.”

66. Independent of every particular consideration relative to the Rohilla War, you will find that some general principles, equally new and important, have from choice or necessity been introduced into the policy of your Government here. Mr. Barwell has left his deliberate opinion upon record, that “ The preserving to the Vizier the possession of the Rohilla Country is as much an obligation upon the present Government, as the securing to him any other part of his Dominions; and equally within the spirit of the defensive treaty, as if it had been specifically named therein.” We confess that we were as much surprised at the novelty of this doctrine, as we were alarmed at the extent and consequences of it. The engagement with the Vizier expresses no more than that this Government, in return for a subsidy, should lend him a body of their Troops to be employed on a particular service. We have assisted him in attaining a particular object; but it does not follow from that circumstance alone, that we are bound as Guarantees to maintain him in the perpetual possession of it. We neither understand such reasoning in a general view, nor do we in the present instance find it supported by any particular stipulation. Even Mr. Hastings, though he recommends the continuance of the Brigade in the Country of the Rohillas, supports his opinion by other arguments, and does not proceed so far as to avow the extensive Doctrine which Mr. Barwell endeavors to establish.

67. It is proposed to us as a fundamental maxim, that every accession of strength to the Vizier is of course beneficial to the Company. On this principle, his acquisition of Korah and Lillahabad by purchase, his conquest of the Duab with his own forces, and of the Rohilla Country with our assistance, are represented in the light of measures full of utility to the Company. To what length the principle was meant to be extended, or whether any limits whatsoever were meant to be prescribed to the Vizier’s ambition, is more than we are able to determine. Let us only observe to you, that the first of the above



dated at Fort William 30th of November, 1774.

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dangerous a trust in any individual, are too obvious to be mistaken. We think they might with equal right have surrendered every other branch of their administration into the President's hands, and in effect dissolved the Council. The same opinion applies to his Secret Correspondence with the commanding officer of the Brigade, which has not even the pretence of his being a private agent to support it. The apparent chasms in this correspondence, as it stands, will perhaps suggest farther motives to you for regretting that the whole of it is not recorded.†

53. The Governor-General, in his minutes on this subject, complains of our not being satisfied with his solemn declaration to the Board, that he would lay before us every part of the correspondence required, which could give us any information on public affairs; and of our arbitrarily invading the sacred rights of a confidential correspondence. You will judge for us whether we deserve this censure. Until we receive other lights from your authority, we must consider ourselves as bound to the strict execution of a public trust, and not at liberty to repose such a personal confidence in any member of our Board, as would exclude us from a perfect knowledge of his official proceedings. If we are to be satisfied with such share of the Governor's correspondence with your ministers or officers as he shall think proper to impart to us, or as he shall declare to be sufficient for our information, we may indeed, in the present instance, be under the guidance of the best of men; but it is equally possible that a Council, so partially informed, may hereafter be at the mercy of the worst.

54. With respect to the Governor's confidential correspondence with his agent at the Vizier's Court, we are unable to conjecture on what topics it could turn. He has repeatedly assured us, that, previous to the appointment, Mr. Middleton was no otherwise known to him than by his general good character; and that, for his choice of this gentleman, he had no other motive but his acknowledged fitness for the office. Relying on this assurance, we are at a loss to comprehend how any part of a correspondence on public affairs, between gentlemen totally unconnected in private life, can with propriety be withheld from a Council, who, besides the obligation imposed upon them by their own sense of honor, are bound by a specific oath of secrecy to each other.

55. The recall of Mr. Middleton was the inevitable consequence of the Governor's refusing to communicate all his letters to us, and was not intended to throw the least imputation on Mr. Middleton's character. The Governor-General, in his dissent from this resolution, very truly observes, that he is the sole channel of correspondence with the princes and powers of India. He should have added, however, that by your instructions, "All letters to be sent by him are first to be approved in Council; and that he is to lay before the Council, at their next meeting, all letters received by him in the course of such correspondence for their information." We venture to affirm, that this instruction was not newly introduced by you on the appointment of the present Governor and Council, but that it is conformable to the ancient constitution of your Government here; and that, in this respect, the Legislature has made no alteration or addition whatsoever to the powers vested in the Chief, of this Presidency.

56. Mr. Middleton being recalled, it became necessary to appoint some other person to make the demand of the sums due from the Vizier to the Company, and to liquidate that account. The Governor-General declining the nomination, a majority of the Board resolved, that this business should be committed to the officer commanding the Brigade. The appointment was temporary, and meant by us to be confined to a single object. We have repeatedly declared, that whenever it shall be thought proper to appoint a permanent Resident at the Vizier's Court, one of your civil servants should be employed.

57. In the minutes given in by Mr. Barwell and the Governor-General, you will see, that the opposition given to the above resolution, is founded on the supposed impropriety of trusting such a commission to a military officer, and that many general insinuations have been thrown out to the disadvantage of that branch of your service. You are told; that "There is a resolution to throw all power and trust into the hands of a military commander; that it is a declared proof of the prevalence of the military influence; that the advices of the commander of your army are not to be admitted as authentic, since it is his interest to conceal from the knowledge of the Council every circumstance and transaction, which, if known, might subject his conduct to blame, or oppose any design which his ambition, his interest, or prejudices might dictate."

58. We

† The whole of that Correspondence has now been recorded. Vide note at the bottom of page 9.

12th of July,  
1774.  
Appendix,  
No. 12.

measures necessarily makes the King your enemy; since the provinces, which (as the late President and Council observe in their letter to you of the 1st March, 1773) *we have so particularly guaranteed to him, which his own Viceroy, Munnor o' Dowla, at this time puts under our protection*, and which we might have kept in deposit for him, are now irrecoverably alienated; that the second, in all probability, will involve your Ally in a war with the Morattas, in which we fear it will be very difficult, if not impossible for us to stand neuter; and that by the last, as Colonel Champion very accurately expresses himself on this subject, "The line of the Vizier's frontiers is very far extended; a brave race of men, who live in friendship with him, are added to the number of his enemies; his force is but the same as formerly; and whilst the Ganges is fordable in a great number of places, it will serve better as a mark of boundary, than as a cover or defence to his Dominions."

68. These we apprehend are points necessary to be taken into your consideration, before you determine whether the above additions to the Vizier's Dominions be in fact advantageous to your interests, and how far this aggrandizement is to be promoted by us at the risk of making all Indostan your enemies.

69. Another general maxim proposed to us is, that it is highly useful to the Company to hire out their Troops to Suja Dowla, in order to save the expence of their pay, and to preserve their discipline, by keeping them in *the continued practise of war*. The whole of the argument in favor of this maxim is not yet regularly before you; but we fear the time is approaching very fast when the India Company and the Nation will know the extent and feel the force of it. Whatever concealments have hitherto been observed on this subject, we hold it to be our duty to speak plainly to you, that you may be apprised of the danger with which you are threatened, and endeavour to prepare yourselves against it.

70. It has been repeatedly admitted in Council, that the plan for letting the lands has in a great degree miscarried, and that this Country is unable to bear the expence of your Investments, together with that of the civil and military Establishments. We, on our part, besides the urgent distress implied in the violent nature of the remedy, have other general reasons to believe that your revenues are in a state of decline, and that the mischief is not at it's period; in the present state of men and things, we doubt whether it be possible to stop it.

71. The saving of a part of the pay of your Army by receiving subsidies from 'Suja Dowla, is not a natural resource to such a Country as Bengal; at the utmost it can be but temporary; while the mischief which it professes to remedy is permanent and increasing. It supposes your Troops to be employed in the destruction of Nations, from whose prosperity this Commercial Country once derived a constant source of wealth, and whose ruin (though it may furnish an immediate supply of money to your treasury) is infallibly a step to your own.

72. The late Council tell you, in their letter of the 17th of March last, that the ruin of the Jauts was completed by the loss of Agra; that they were stripped of their Dominions, and reduced to a few inconsiderable forts. We hope and presume that Nudjiff Cawn's conquest of the Jauts has not received any direct assistance or countenance from this Government; but we could have wished that some efforts had been made in the way of negotiation at least, to save that Nation.

73. On the whole, we are convinced, that schemes of conquest are eventually as ruinous to the conquerors if they succeed, as they are immediately ruinous if they miscarry. As a measure of finance, they can only be the resource of a Nation that has neither honor nor property to lose. When such a Country as Bengal shall be unable to support itself from the internal resources of it's own produce or industry, we shall look upon it as a symptom of such distress, as threatens the existence of the British Empire in India. And as for the occasional relief that may arise from the success of projects to invade and subdue the neighbouring States, we consider it as a remedy unnatural to the Constitution of Bengal, and more likely to precipitate than prevent the destruction of this Country.

In short, Gentlemen, if the true condition of your Government here has hitherto been concealed from you and from the Nation, it is high time you should be undeceived. The *Summa Rerum* is at stake.

Separate Letter from Gen. Clavering, Col. Monson, and Mr. Francis, dated 30th Nov. 1774.

74. In reviewing this long Letter, we fear that you will perceive upon the face of it many marks of an hasty inaccurate composition; and we wish that the time would permit us to make it more methodical and correct. As for the authenticity of facts, and the substance of the inferences deduced from them, we desire it may be understood, that we willingly pledge our honor, and every thing that can be dear to honest men, for the truth and exactness of this representation, as far as it reaches, of the state of your affairs.

We have the honor to be,

with the greatest respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and

most humble Servants,

J. CLAVERING,  
GEO. MONSON,  
P. FRANCIS.

## Separate Letter from General Clavering, Colonel • Monson, and Mr. Francis.

To the Honorable the Court of Directors for the Affairs of the  
Honorable United East-India-Company.

Fort-William, 30th November, 1774.

GENTLEMEN,

WE have reserved for a separate Letter the mention of a few points, which, though of a public nature, yet having a more immediate relation to our personal conduct, we thought were not of sufficient moment to be mixed with the important business to which our other Letter is confined.

1. IN obedience to the prohibition in the Act of Parliament, we have refused all Nazirs or presents whatsoever. The Governor-General has given his reasons for accepting such Nazirs, and paying them into the Company's Treasury. Mr. Barwell has also given his reasons for accepting Nazirs, and *not* paying them over to the Company. They all appear† in the enclosed extract of the Consultation of the 7th of November, 1774.

† Appendix  
No. 19.

We have constantly accompanied our refusal of presents with an explanation of our motives, and with such assurances of regard, and other marks of respect, according to the rank of the persons, as we are convinced have cleared us from any suspicion of intending to give them offence. We strongly agree with you in opinion, that the receipt of trifling presents, though practised by men of unquestionable honor and upright intentions, forms a precedent very liable to be extended and abused. With respect to the people of the country, we have reason to believe, that they are as well satisfied with our behaviour to them as men can be, who, from the hopes of favour, are reduced to the certainty of justice. Making every allowance for the force of prejudice and custom, they are not so dull as to be incapable of understanding, that it is possible to be their friends without taking their money.

2. We have not yet received a visit which Mahomed Reza Cawn was desirous to pay us. He has been acquitted of the charges brought against him, and is now at large; but



as that acquittal is not yet confirmed by your approbation; as we know nothing of the reasons on which it was founded, and as our receiving and returning his visit might imply, that we are satisfied of his innocence, (against which, however, we do not mean to give any opinion) we thought it safer to decline his visit, until your pleasure concerning him should be known, than to commit ourselves by demonstrations of favour to him, which we might afterwards be obliged to retract.

3. In the establishment of our expenses, and regulation of our families, we apprehend that we have conformed strictly to your intentions, in consulting economy and moderation more than vain appearances. We have long ago determined to follow this plan, as well for our own interest, as for the sake of proposing a useful example to others; but we had, before our arrival, no conception of the degree in which such an example is wanted in this country. Besides the consideration of private distresses to individuals, we are satisfied that the consequences of it affect the public service. Ruinous expenses have a natural tendency to accommodate the minds of men to such measures of recovery, as the same men would probably reject, if they had only a fortune to make, instead of a fortune to repair.

4. You will see upon the Consultations, that we have agreed to the appointment of Captain Brooke to command an independent corps of the Vizier's Troops, to be employed in conjunction with the army under Nudjiff Cawn, in defensive measures only, as the conquest of the Jauts has long since been compleated. In this instance we have yielded, against our strict judgment, to considerations of personal respect to Mr. Hastings. Captain Brooke was sometime ago appointed by him to this employment, and is now, we believe, at the Vizier's Court. To have recalled him from thence could not fail to have been attended with personal pain and offence to Mr. Hastings, which we are determined as much as possible to avoid. We have rested our assent on this single consideration, and left it with him to justify the measure to you. The only restraint we have desired to lay on Captain Brooke (exclusive of what his duty to you of course implies) is, that he shall in no case enter the Country of the Rohillas.

5. Since the drawing up of this and the preceding Letter, we are now informed, for the first time, that Major Polier, who, as we were given to understand by Mr. Hastings, was employed in the Vizier's Country on the surveying service only, joined the army under Nudjiff Cawn, and had a considerable, if not a principal share in the direction of the siege of Agra. The fact not being disputed, we shall think it our duty to enquire, as soon as possible after the departure of this ship, whether Major Polier has acted in this instance with or without permission from hence. The next question will be, under what particular authority and instructions he has acted; and you shall be exactly informed of the results of our enquiries.

+ Appendix, No. 7. F. 6. It only remains for us to apprise you, that the last Minute† from Mr. Barwell was not communicated to us until the night of the 23d instant, though it professes to be an Answer to Mr. Francis's Minutes of the 31st of October. Besides the inconvenience and irregularity of resuming a question at such distant intervals (especially when the measure referred to is not only resolved upon, but executed) we really have not time to continue the debate. We have perused Mr. Barwell's Minute, and are content to leave him in possession of the argument. Mr. Francis, in a separate Minute, § has given him the explanation he desired.

§ Appendix, No. 7. G.

7. Touching matters of fact, we could have wished that Mr. Barwell had been more guarded in his assertions. He is pleased to affirm, that we took our Resolutions "Without taking time to enquire fully into the design and nature of our engagements with the Vizier, and without even reading the Correspondence with Mr. Middleton, which had been called for, and were then laying on the table unopened." As this is only a bare unsupported affirmation, we answer it with a simple denial, supported however by the internal evidence of our several Minutes, and of this dispatch. It is possible we may have erred in judgment; but we think there is no colour for accusing us of having taken our Resolution, without consulting all the records by which it could any way be affected. We think it will require no asseverations on our part to convince you, that the series of facts and opinions which we have had the honor to lay before you, could never have been traced and collected in the manner it has been, if we had not examined the papers which were open to our inspection with more than common assiduity and attention.



Letter from ditto to the Chairman, dated 1st December, 1774.

8. The letters prepared for this dispatch by the late President and Council, in their Secret and Publick Department, have not yet been communicated to us. We therefore cannot pretend to form any opinion concerning the contents of them.

We have the honor to be,

With the greatest respect,

Gentlemen,

Your most obedient and

most humble servants,

J. CLAVERING.  
GEO. MONSON.  
P. FRANCIS.

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Letter from General Clavering, Colonel Monson, and  
Mr. Francis, to the Chairman of the East-India-  
Company, dated 1st December, 1774.

To EDWARD WHEELER, Esq;

SIR,

Fort-William, 1st December, 1774.

THE load of public business, which you will see has fallen heavily upon us, will leave us but little time to acquit ourselves of the personal duties we owe to every gentleman in the direction. We would not omit, however, to offer our sincere congratulations to yourself and Mr. Harrison, on the well deserved honor which has been done you by the India Company. We are happy in seeing that men whom we have so many personal reasons to esteem, are placed in offices, in which they may render the most important services to the Public.

The fatal differences which have arisen almost immediately upon our arrival here between our Colleagues and us, will naturally alarm the Court of Directors. All the observation we shall make upon them here, is, that they arose from the new and unexpected state of things, not from any personal dislike or cause of offence on either side. At the same time it is absolutely necessary you should be apprised, that we are very apprehensive that these unhappy differences will not be confined to a single object.

We fear, that besides the political, they will extend to other important branches of administration. We wait the decision of the Court of Directors upon the great points now before them; and we hope, that, in justice to all parties, it will be clear, precise, and peremptory; and that such a line will be drawn for our future guidance as will leave no possibility of doubt or mistake hereafter.

If the Court of Directors, according to the professed expectations of Mr. Hastings, should approve and confirm the new system of offensive policy adopted here, we may then expect that, on the same principle, other innovations, equally important perhaps in the internal Government will receive the same confirmation.

We, for ourselves, have no idea that the Court of Directors can hesitate about their decision. We have hitherto followed the Company's instructions to their servants here as strictly as possible. If they should think proper to overturn the old system in all its parts,

and to establish a new one in the place of it, which indeed it is almost disrespectful to them to suppose possible, it will then be our duty, either to renounce all the ideas we had already received from them, and adopt new ones as they do, or to tell you honestly, that it will be better for the interest of the Company, that they should appoint other men to carry their new system into execution. 'Till this decision comes, we shall exert our utmost efforts to prevent any material inconvenience arising to the public service from any future disagreement in Council.

As it had been resolved to close the Company's dispatch by the British King on the 30th of November, all our letters and minutes were accordingly prepared, and sealed up yesterday morning.

At a late hour that night, the letters from the late President and Council, in their public and Secret Department, were communicated to us for the first time. You will observe, that the above letters are dated the 17th of October; yet it is to us very evident, from the drift of them, that they have been formed upon a view of certain discussions which have taken place since that time. If they had been prepared, as they profess to be, on the 17th of October, it will be difficult to assign any fair or decent reason for their being withheld from us 'till the moment of the departure of the ship. We, for ourselves, are very much inclined to believe, that it was the sight of the arguments contained in our minutes from the 25th of October to this time, which induced the late President and Council to give their letter a turn of defence and apology; which, though in our opinion very suitable to their conduct, they would not otherwise have adopted.

In point of fact, they forget the date of their letter, when they say in the 23d paragraph, that "They have undoubted although not regular intelligence of the Rohilla War being actually ended, by a treaty between the Vizier and Fyzoolla Cawn." The treaty they allude to was concluded on the 6th of October, on the skirts of the mountains of Tibet; and we affirm, that no intelligence whatever of it's being concluded was, or could possibly be received here before the end of the month.

It is too late for us to attempt to make many particular observations on this new matter by the present ship; perhaps we may do it by the next conveyance; whether we do or not, the Company is in possession of materials sufficient to determine upon the first great question between us and our colleagues.

We cannot refrain, however, from communicating to you the general impression which the style and substance of this letter has made upon our minds. It is that, as, in our opinion, the late Administration have *done* more than can be morally or politically defended; so, on the other hand, they *say* more than wise men would confess. Their letter appears to us to contain a complete self-condemnation. They acknowledge that the actual orders of the Company confined them within the limits of their own and the Vizier's possessions; and that when they first passed the line of the Vizier's dominions, though it was solely upon a defensive principle, to check the progress of the Marattas, yet they did it with extreme diffidence and reluctance. The next measure however proposed to them, from which, one would think (considering the diffidence and reluctance they felt in taking a much more defensible resolution) they would have started back with abhorrence, is to invade and extirpate the very people whom they set out with defending. This they are pleased to call "An uncommon measure, undertaken without positive instructions, at their own risk, with the eyes of the whole nation on the affairs of the Company, and the passions and prejudices of almost every man in England inflamed against the conduct of the Company, and the characters of their servants." Forgive us, Sir, if for a moment we step aside to vindicate the India Company from this daring aspersions. If the mind of almost every man in England was inflamed, it was not against the Company. It was well understood we believe by every man in England, that the real proprietors of stock, who constitute the Company, were sacrificed to private interests; and that, in their corporate capacity, they were much more the objects of national care and compassion, than of national resentment. In this instance, we are not scrupulous of expressing ourselves with a degree of warmth, to which we have never yielded on any other occasion; because we feel for the honor of the Company, and think ourselves called upon to defend it.

The late President and Council are pleased to tell the Court of Directors, that they have undertaken this uncommon measure, not only at their own risk, *but in spite of the suggestions and the checks of self-interest.* Such propositions as these should neither be asserted nor denied without

without strong proofs. We shall therefore content ourselves with observing, that it is not unusual for men to expose themselves to personal hazard where their personal interest requires it; but that to sacrifice self-interest, and to incur a manifest danger by the same act, implies such a strain of elevated virtue, as we believe is very new in the latter part of the history of Bengal, and as we fear we shall be unable to imitate.

We will not weary your patience with tracing this extraordinary letter through all its obscurities and contradictions. We have, however, one remark more to make, which we think too material to be omitted.

The late President and Council refer to a letter from the Court of Directors of 28th of August, 1771, for an implied authority to countenance the late offensive measures. They say, that in that letter, the Court of Directors "Have expressed, in stronger terms than ever they had done before, their intention, in certain cases, of authorising their departure from the defensive principles hitherto recommended and enjoined."

We have looked into the letter above-mentioned, and find, that the offensive measures therein-mentioned had no object in the mind of the Directors, but to repel the invasions of the Marattas; that even these measures were simply in contemplation; and the execution of them, or any step leading to it, positively forbidden, till farther orders. The prohibition then concludes with the following words; "In the mean time, we trust that your sole objects will be the security of our possessions, and those of the powers with whom we are connected, both by treaty and interest; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct, upon the Marattas invading the Province of Korah, we with pleasure approve the measures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depredations; more especially, as those measures are not only justified by necessity, but are within the line which we have prescribed for your conduct in such a conjuncture."

The last argument urged by the late President and Council in their defence, and purposely reserved for the conclusion of their letter, in order to leave a flattering impression on the minds of the Directors, is, "*That they return to a state of peace, with the actual possession, or acknowledged right, of near seventy lacks of rupees.*"

We hope indeed that we are returning to a state of peace, though in fact our hopes on this head are more than balanced by our apprehensions. On the remaining part of the assertion, we observe, that of the forty lacks stipulated for the Rohilla Expedition, and which they mention in another place, *as so much specie added to the exhausted currency of those Provinces*, not one rupee has yet been paid; nor do we think, as things were managed by the late President and Council, it ever would have been recovered. By the remaining thirty lacks must be meant, the saving to the Company on the pay of the Brigade. We have made some general observations on this subject in our letter to the Court of Directors; in this place we shall only take notice, that the saving on the head of pay, even supposing no extraordinary expense to be incurred by the Company beyond the amount of Sujah Dowlah's subsidy, is manifestly over-rated.

The ordinary expense of a Brigade in quarters at Dinapore is computed at 103,059 sicca rupees per month. The second Brigade did not enter into Sujah Dowla's pay till the 24th of February last; and supposing them to continue in it to the end of the present year, the whole saving would in that case be only 1,080,590 sicca rupees. Even the subsidy received from Sujah Dowlah, being spent in his or the Rohilla Country, is of no benefit to these Provinces.

We desire you will be so good as to present our best respects to the Deputy Chairman, and to all the Gentlemen in the Direction.

We have the honor to be,  
Sir, your most obedient and most humble Servants,

J. CLAVERING,  
GEO. MONSON.  
P. FRANCIS.

Postscript.



Governor-General's Appeal to the Court of Directors,

Postscript.

Mr. Hastings on one side, and we on the other, have reciprocally engaged our honor to each other, that we will not write one word upon public business, or in any shape relative to the questions between us to the Court of Directors, or to any Gentleman in the Direction, except what we mutually communicate to each other. We shall accordingly deliver a copy of this letter to Mr. Hastings, and think it probable that it may be recorded.

Letter from Warren Hastings, Esquire, Governor-General of Bengal, to the Court of Directors, dated 3d of December, 1774.

To the Honorable the Court of Directors for Affairs of the Honorable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies.

Fort-William, 3d December, 1774.

HONORABLE SIRS,

THE accompanying sheets were originally begun in the form in which they now appear of a regular minute, intended for a record on the consultations, but to be transmitted also a number in the packet, by the ship now under dispatch, for your immediate perusal. But understanding since, that the members composing the majority of the Council have drawn up a similar appeal, in a letter to your Honourable Court, I consider it my duty to address you in the same form, with the proposed minute as an enclosure, earnestly recommending it to your attention.

In these papers I have confined myself to the subjects on which they were expressly written; namely, the justification of the late campaign, and the examination of the acts of the New Council. Not having yet seen their letter, I cannot reply particularly to any other charge which it may contain; yet I will beg leave to offer a few necessary remarks upon the state of your collections, treasury, and expenses; as these are points on which the enquiries of the gentlemen of the majority, unless conducted with great care, may have misled them; and of which it may be of very material consequence to me, to prevent any impressions which their representations may make in default of more authentic information.

That the collections should be less than they were some years ago, is an unavoidable consequence of the loss of inhabitants, which this country sustained in the dreadful calamity of the year 1770. It must still be the case, in spite of every effort we may make. But the circumstances of this, and of the other causes which have contributed to the reduction of the revenue, (particularly the anticipation of it in the salt districts) have been so often enlarged upon in the letters from the late Administration,† that I will not trouble you with a repetition. The actual receipts of last year (the Bengal year 1180) do however exceed those of the preceding year by three lacks of rupees, exclusive of the profit on the salt trade, which is quite a new fund, and has amounted, independently of the duties, to sicca rupees ten lacks, fifty-eight thousand, two hundred and fourteen; (S. Rs. 1,058,214) and the very voluminous proceedings of the Revenue Council, will evince

† See the following general letters, 3d of November, 1772. Par. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 48. 3d December, 1772. Par. 6.—27th February, 1773. Par. 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 36. 10th November, 1773. Par. 3, 32, 33.—31st of December, 1773. Par. 6, 7, 8, 14. 14th March, 1774. Par. 10.—18th October, 1774. Par. 5.

dated 3d December, 1774.

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evinced how much of our time and attention has been engaged by this branch of your affairs.

The estimates transmitted you by the Resolution, which shew a saving of current rupees twenty-two lacks, ninety-five thousand, seven hundred and seventeen, (C. Rs. 22,95,717) in the civil expenses; and of current rupees twenty-four lacks, forty-three thousand, one hundred and nineteen (current rupees 2,443,119) in the military; and our proceedings in the Board of Inspection, which I beg leave to recommend to your observation, will satisfy you, that our best endeavours have been exerted to establish the system of economy and method which you have so repeatedly enjoined. And as the strongest proof of the success of these our endeavours, and of the prosperity of your affairs, I submit to your consideration the following short sketch of our present resources, compared with our situation a twelvemonth ago.

At the end of August, 1773, our Bond Debt amounted to current rupees, one hundred and twenty-five lacks, fifty-five thousand, six hundred and seven; (C. Rs. 125,55,607) and the temporary loan, which we had with difficulty raised, was barely sufficient to supply our present expenses. The debt is now reduced to current rupees, one hundred and ten lacks, seventy-two thousand, seven hundred and twenty-four, (current rupees 110,72,724). Provision has been made for a much larger Investment than was procured last year; seventy lacks of rupees are to be received from the Vizier, of which the greatest part is now in course of payment; and although we avoided drawing any bills upon you last season, and have strictly confined ourselves this season to the sum limited by your orders, there is at this time a balance of current rupees eighty lacks, forty-nine thousand, eight hundred and six (C. Rs. 80,49,806) actually lying in our treasuries, as particularized in the enclosed account.†

I do not expect that the services on which your military forces have been employed (except in the single instance of the Rohilla War) will be made an article against me; yet I will not leave this subject unnoticed.

Every military expedition undertaken during the period in which I lately presided in the Administration, has been concerted for services of solid utility, and calculated for precise terminations.

The campaign of 1773 had the recovery of the districts of Cora for its immediate object, and the application of it to the relief of the Company's wants for its termination; and it was begun and concluded long within the space of a year.

The last campaign has been ended with the most complete success in eight months, and, exclusive of its political effects, has added many lacks to your pecuniary resources.

Even in the less considerable services in which detachments of your forces have been employed, some beneficial end has been carefully attended to; regular plans have been concerted, and steadily pursued. By Captain Camac's operations at Ramgur, that country has been brought into subjection, and a considerable addition of revenue acquired. By the battalion employed in the Jungle-terry, a tract of country which was considered as inaccessible and unknown, and only served as a receptacle to robbers, has been reduced to Government, the inhabitants civilized, and not only the reduction of the revenues, which was occasioned by their ravages, prevented, but some revenue yielded from this country itself, which a prosecution of the same measures will improve.

The Cooch Beyhar Expedition produced its full effects in the settlement of that country; and even the detachments employed against the Seneaffies completely answered the intention for which they were ordered.

Whatever errors may have fallen to the share of the late Administration, I trust that they will not be found in points of real magnitude. As to those which may appear in measures of little moment, such are unavoidable; they are necessary to a Government so constituted, and crowded with objects so various as this has been, the first principle of which is dispatch; and our records are the best evidences of the regard we have paid to this principle. On these too I shall rest for proof, that it will not be my fault if our future records shall present you with minutes of controversy, protests, charges, and recriminations, instead of that rapid progression of business, and cordial attention to your interests,

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† Entered at the close of annexed minute.

## Letter from the Governor-General, dated 3d December, 1774.

even in the anticipation of your commands, which it was my happiness to experience in the labours of the gentlemen who were formerly united with me in the charge of your affairs.

Painful as my situation is likely to prove, and unsuitable to my disposition, it is my determined resolution to retain the place which your favour originally assigned me, and the Legislature has since so honorably confirmed, 'till your justice shall decide between me and my opponents. My only resources are in the knowledge, however imperfect, which a long and local practice in the affairs of this Presidency may have furnished me, and of which the Gentlemen of the Majority, even for their own sakes, will not deny me the application, and in the experience and abilities of Mr. Barwell, whose support I thankfully acknowledge with the more pleasure, as I esteem it to proceed more from a just conviction of the propriety of my conduct than personal attachment.

I beg leave in all submission to observe, that this is not a case to which palliatives can be applied. The Legislature has enacted, that a Council, consisting of five members, should form a general Administration for your affairs in Bengal, and for your political interests in all India. By the manner in which the Parliament thought proper to express the Office of Governor-General, as distinct from the Council, as well as by universal usage, some peculiar power and responsibility seemed tacitly reserved for him above the other members of the Council; but if it shall appear to you, that his authority, as the executive and ostensible instrument of your Government, has been overpowered, and that a majority, consisting of three members of the Council, has been formed, not by an accidental variation in opinion, but by a decided and permanent combination against the other two, it will necessarily follow, that the intentions of the Parliament have been frustrated, and the Council in effect made to consist of three members instead of five; and that therefore nothing but a decisive remedy can restore that harmony to the Government, which is irrecoverably lost to the parts of which the present is composed, and save your property, and the national interests in these provinces from anarchy and ruin.

I will not quit the ground which I stand on in this address, to appeal to the large portion of my life spent in your service, nor to the important trusts in which it was my lot to be employed from the earliest period of it. I rest my cause solely on the measures which have drawn me into my present vindication. I adopted them for your benefit, and for the national honor, and I know they have been productive of both to the utmost reach of my wishes. Relying on your justice, and on the consciousness of my own integrity, I shall wait with patience for your determination on the subjects of this address; nor shall my care be wanting to prevent your affairs from suffering in the long interval which must be unavoidably left to disorder.

If you should judge me fit to be continued in the chief direction of your affairs, I have already said, and yet repeat, that I am willing and desirous to devote what remains of the active season of my life to your service. But allow me, Honorable Sirs, to hope, that I may be furnished with means equal to the responsibility which ought and must be annexed to the first station, whoever shall fill it.

If, on the contrary, it shall be decreed, either by your Honorable Court, or by yet higher authority, that I shall yield my place to any other, I shall submit without a murmur to the sentence; nor shall the severity of it make me lose the sense of gratitude which I feel and owe to the obligations already laid upon me; although it will be impossible for me to forego the conscious pride of having, even in the most obnoxious instances of my public conduct, manifested that principle by an undeviating attachment to the interests of the Company, which I have ever regarded as the interests of my country.

I have the honor to be,

with the greatest respect,

Honorable Sirs,

Your most faithful and

most obedient humble servant,

WARREN HASTINGS,



## Governor-General's Appeal to the Court of Directors, dated 3d December, 1774.

I Have purposely deferred the reply, which I have recorded my intention to make to the Minutes entered by the General and Mr. Francis in Consultation of the 3d instant, because I foresaw, that in the justification of my own conduct from the severe censures which were cast upon it in those Minutes, and in the opinion which it was incumbent upon me to express of the conduct of the majority of the Board, which was the immediate object of them, I should be led into so long a train of arguments and facts, as would require more time to select and arrange them than I could bestow in the daily pressure of current business. I had yet a stronger impulse for suspending so disagreeable a task, in the hope with which I was willing to flatter myself, that some way of accommodation might still be found before the close of the packet, to remove the necessity of entering on a subject, which, in whatever form it might appear, must set my conduct, and that of the other members of the Council, before the Honorable Court of Directors in a point of view to alarming, as to require their most peremptory decision between us, and must of course shut up every avenue to a future cordiality.

Faint as this hope was, I continued to indulge it while a possibility remained of its being accomplished. I now proceed, with whatever reluctance, to the last resource which is left me, an Appeal to the Honorable Court of Directors; on whose justice I throw myself, for the vindication of my own conduct, and the measures of the late Administration, against the reproaches which have been cast upon them; and for the reparation of the violence which has been offered to the authority committed to me by the Parliament of Great-Britain, in the late acts of the majority of the Council.

Mr. Barwell's observations on Mr. Francis's minute being a sufficient refutation of the arguments contained both in that and the General's, I shall decline replying in form to either; but as the Rohilla War has been the declared source of the most violent measures adopted by the majority of the Council, I shall briefly recapitulate the grounds and objects of that enterprise, and then proceed to answer the various arguments which have been urged in condemnation of it.

In the beginning of the year 1772 the Marattas invaded the Country of the Rohillas, which, after a short but ineffectual opposition at Sukkertoll, was left at large exposed to their ravages. The Vizier, alarmed at their approach to the only part of his dominions which was easily accessible by such an enemy, applied with such earnestness to Sir Robert Barker, who was at that time with him, for the assistance of an English Force, and the General thought the necessity so urgent, that, of his own authority, he sent orders to the first Brigade, which was stationed at Dinapore, to march instantly into the province of Oude. The Board disapproving this irregular proceeding refused their confirmation of it, and the Brigade having reached the length of Benares, remained there till the beginning of June, and then returned to its former station. The Vizier availing himself of this movement, offered his protection to the Rohillas, and entered into a general treaty of alliance with the Chiefs of that nation, and a separate one with Hafez Rahmet Cawn, their principal, who, in their name, and with their authority, engaged to pay him 40 lacs of rupees for that support, whenever the Marattas evacuated the country; translations of both treaties are recorded at length in the Consultation of the 23d July, 1772; and the original of the latter is in the actual possession of the Secretary, attested by General Barker, who was present at the ratification of both.

On the approach of the rainy season the Marattas evacuated the country, and the Vizier demanded the stipulated recompense from the Rohillas; but they evaded the payment.

In the latter end of 1772, the Marattas having extorted from the King a grant of the districts of Corah and Kurrah, which had been ceded to him by the Company for the express purpose of maintaining his dignity, were preparing to take possession; and as this acquisition would have made them masters of the whole tract of country lying between the river Ganges and Jumna, and bordering upon the province of Oude, the Vizier again applied for assistance to repel such dangerous neighbours.

The proceedings of the late Council in their Secret Department, of the 1st February, 1773, treat this subject very largely, and shew how much they considered not only the safety of the Vizier, but even of the Company's Possessions, to be endangered by this formidable encroachment of the Maratta State. It was ultimately concluded to comply with

the requisition of the Vizier, by sending the first Brigade for the protection of his dominions against any attempt which the Marattas might make on them; and also determined to prevent their design on Corah, by taking prior possession for the Company, who had certainly the best title to it, when the King could no longer keep it. It was not to be supposed that the Marattas would quietly submit to the loss of a territory which they had used the most perfidious means to obtain; and every precaution was therefore necessary to guard against their efforts to recover it. The Company's Orders of the 28th August, 1771, expressly allowed the necessity of departing, on some occasions, from the limited plan which they had for a long time past enjoined; and in consequence the Rohilla Country, north of the Ganges, was included within the line of action prescribed to the General in his instructions; because if the Marattas, either by the defeat, or, which was as likely to happen, by the desertion of the Rohillas to their cause, should gain a footing in that Country, nothing could oppose their entering into the province of Oude, and laying it waste, in spite of any attempt of our forces united with the Vizier's to prevent them. The Map which accompanies this will demonstrate this truth more powerfully than any verbal argument.

It was not to be supposed that the Marattas, whose ambition for some years past had aspired to universal conquest, and who had extended their arms from the center of the Balaghat, to the northern extremity of Indostan, should sit down contented when they had added the Douab, Corah, and Allahabad to their dominions; on the contrary, there was every reason to apprehend, and it was publicly reported in their own camp, that they would next carry their operations into the Country of the Vizier, and even into the Company's own possessions.

On the grounds which I have described, it was agreed to maintain the province of Corah against the Marattas, and afterwards to extend our arms beyond the prescribed line of the dominions of our Ally into the Rohilla Country, by a discretionary latitude allowed the General as above-mentioned, which he accordingly made use of, by marching the Brigade as far as Ramgaut; and we have the strongest reasons to believe, that it was attended with every immediate advantage which we had projected from such a measure, as the Marattas lay during the whole campaign of 1773 in the neighbourhood of our Army, but without daring either to cross the river, or to approach the borders of Corah; and before the setting in of the rains of that year, their domestic troubles obliged them to return to their own proper dominions.

Of the resolution to enter the Rohilla Country for its defence against the Marattas, the Court of Directors were first advised in the general letter by the <sup>†</sup> of the 31st of March, 1773, which arrived in England long before the departure of the transports.

The effectual protection then afforded the Rohillas, and the departure of the Marattas, having established beyond all contest the right of the Vizier to the 40 lacks which had been stipulated for this important service, and which, by the terms of the engagement, were really due the preceding year, on the retreat of the Marattas from their country, he demanded payment of Hazez Rahmet Cawn, who refused it. The Vizier also accused him of having secretly encouraged the Marattas, and sent them a supply of money; and, if I mistake not, General Sir Robert Barker in some of his letters mentions the same circumstance. The plea of justice thus coinciding with the principles of sound policy, which dictated to the Vizier the necessity of securing himself against the intrigues and perfidy of the Rohillas; who, from their situation, were most capable of hurting him in his contests with more powerful enemies, and from their natural weakness, and the jealousy inseparable from it, would ever seek for their safety in fomenting or joining in attempts against him, he formed the design of invading and reducing their country. As his own strength was unequal to such an undertaking, he solicited the aid of this Government for effecting it, and made an offer of 50 lacks of rupees to be paid on its accomplishment. As this proposal was urged in the warmest terms, both in person to Sir Robert Barker, and in his letter to me, and this had long been a favorite project of the Vizier, the Board judged with me, that it might afford a fair occasion to urge the improvement of our alliance, by obtaining his assent to a more equitable compensation for the expense attending the aid which he occasionally received from our forces, and to free the Company from the embarrassment to which they might be subjected, by retaining the property and possession of the remote districts of Corah and Allahabad. For this purpose, it was agreed that I should write the following letter to the Vizier, which I beg leave to quote at large, because it fixes the source of those engagements, which took place by a progressive train of measures, and terminated in the Rohilla War; and will mark at least, that this was not the effect either of a precipi-  
tate

† N. B. This is a blank in the original; but the letters brought by the ship Hector, dated 31st March, 1773.

dated 3d December, 1774.

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tate and unweighed resolution, or a tame acquiescence in the Vizier's schemes of ambition<sup>s</sup> but the result of long deliberation, originally devised, and consistently employed as an instrument of promoting the interests of the Company, of perpetuating the dependence of their Ally, and converting it to a channel of utility.

Fort-William, 21st of April, 1773.

I HAVE received your Excellency's letter mentioning the particulars of your operations against the Marattas. You promise to the General, that whenever the Marattas should be driven out of the Rohilla Country, and Hafez Rhamet Cawn shall fulfil his agreement of 40 lacks of rupees, you will give half that sum to the Company; and that should the Rohilla Chiefs be guilty of a breach of their agreement, and we will thoroughly exterminate them, and settle your Excellency in the country, you will in that case pay the Company 50 lacks of rupees in ready money, and exempt them from the King's tribute. Upon the same subject the General has also written to me fully. Every circumstance which you have written to me, I consider as a proof of the cordial attachment which subsists between us, and of the confidence and reliance which you place in the friendship of the English Company; but the points which you have proposed require much consideration, and the previous ratification of a formal agreement before I can assent to them, otherwise I might incur the displeasure of my employers. It is true that I have long thought that the union of the Rohilla Country with yours, either by sure and permanent obligation of friendship, or by reducing it to obedience, if they should render such an attempt justifiable by any act of enmity or treachery, would be an advisable point for you to attain; because, by that means, the defensive line of your dominions would be completed, by including within it all the land lying on that side of the river Ganges, and you would be in no danger from an attack on that quarter, whenever the Marattas should commit disturbances in another. But it appears to me, that this is an object not to be attained by an occasional view of that country, and it's distance from the provinces of Bengal, will not admit of the continuance of the English Forces longer than the period which remains of dry weather. You will please to remember they were sent for your assistance, and to defend the province of Corah against the Marattas; thus far only I am authorized by the commands of my superiors to employ them beyond the limits of their own possessions; and even this is the cause of an heavy loss and risk to their affairs; especially in the expenses of their troops and stores, and in the absence of so great a part of their force, which was originally destined for the sole defence of the countries dependent on Bengal. You have frequently repeated in your letters the remarks, that to wait 'till the enemy was at your door, and then to write for the assistance of our forces, would answer no good purpose; but that every year the same cause would require their return to the same service, and pass without effecting any purpose of real advantage. My friend, all this is true; but it proceeds from the want of proper measures having been previously taken, and from the imperfect footing on which affairs between us have been established. The concern which the Company take in your safety, and the duties of friendship which their commands, and our own inclinations equally enjoin us to observe inviolably to their allies, and especially to one so closely united by an approved attachment to them, would not suffer us to withhold our aid when your affairs require it; but it has always been with reluctance that we have suffered the army to pass the frontiers of our own country, because the loss and inconvenience attending it was certain; and although joined with your forces, there is no cause to fear the most powerful efforts of our enemies, yet the events of war are at the disposal of the Almighty; and the only fruits which the most splendid successes can afford us, are the reputation of having maintained the faith of our alliance, in opposition to every incentive of self-interest and self defence. Thus circumstanced, we are precluded from deriving any benefit from your support; and ours can only afford you a relief from present danger, without any provision of future security. For these reasons, I have often wished for a personal interview with you, for the purpose of removing difficulties, and perpetuating the alliance with your Excellency, on terms more suitable to our mutual interests. your Excellency also hath repeatedly expressed the same inclination. I therefore write, that if your affairs will at this season admit of your giving me a meeting, I will hasten to obtain it as soon as I am able after the receipt of your letter in reply to this; if otherwise, I must wait for it at some more distant period, as the affairs of this Government will indispensably require my presence at this place after three or four months, and it is uncertain when I shall again have an interval of leisure for such a journey.



"In the mean time your Excellency and the General are at a great distance from the province of Corah, and the affairs of that province require the presence of a person on the behalf of the Company to regulate and take charge of it, until it shall be hereafter determined in what manner it shall be finally disposed of. I have judged it advisable to depute Mr. James Lawrell, a gentleman of the Council of Calcutta, on this service, and he will set out accordingly in a few days, which I hope you will approve."

The allurements thus held out to the Vizier succeeded. He proposed in reply a meeting with me at Benaris, which took place accordingly. I found him still equally bent on the design of reducing the Rohillas, which I encouraged, as I had before done, by dwelling on the advantages which he would derive from its success, but objecting with great force the orders of the Company, restricting us from such remote schemes of conquest; to which I therefore could not assent, without such conditions obtained in return for it, as might obviate their displeasure, and win their sanction to so hazardous and unauthorized a measure. I fear not to quote these expressions, addressing myself to fair and unbiassed judges, who will not infer my real sentiments from the style and arguments of a political negotiation.

I told him that the Company had drawn themselves into great distress by the enormous load of their military expenses, one entire Brigade being kept up for the sole purpose of maintaining a connexion with him, since it was useless and unnecessary to the protection of our own provinces. That if he wished therefore to avail himself of our aid, either in preventing, or even in repelling the designs of his enemies, he must first agree to bear a more equal share of the burthen of this expense, by paying the whole charge of the forces lent him for this service while they were so employed. To this after much contention, he assented; and the sum of 210,000 rupees, which the General computed to be the amount of the expense, was fixed as the monthly subsidy to be paid for the Brigade, whenever it should pass the borders of the province of Bahar on his requisition. Having obtained this point, which I considered in the light of a perpetual military fund, I easily yielded my assent to the Rohilla Plan, on the stipulation of 40 lacs for its accomplishment, 10 lacs being deducted from his first offer, on account of the difference which had taken place in the subsidy.

This agreement was no sooner made, than he suddenly repented, desired to decline the war with the Rohillas till a more favourable conjuncture, when he should be less embarrassed by other engagements, agreeing, however, to the monthly subsidy, whenever his future occasions should oblige him to require the aid of our forces. Thus the Rohilla Plan remained rather suspended than wholly abandoned, although it was left optional in our Government to reject or assent to it on a future occasion. Messrs. Lawrell and Vanstuart, who were with me at the time, and to whom I made a daily communication in writing, of the substance of every conversation which passed between the Vizier and myself, will vouch for the literal truth of this narrative, as corresponding with what I then repeated to them; and I believe it will appear from it, that although I had not engaged the Government by any express obligation, to comply with any future application of the Vizier to support his pretensions on the Rohillas, yet, as the most essential article of the treaty had originated from this design, and had been yielded to in consideration of my agreement to engage in it, it would have been dishonourable to decline the undertaking, when proposed under circumstances as favourable to its success and the general interests of the Company, as they were when I first offered to engage in it.

Soon after my return to Calcutta the Vizier renewed the proposal for invading the Rohillas, and repeated his desire of engaging in it on the conditions before agreed upon. A variety of arguments concurred to favour it at this particular time, none to oppose it. The Marattas were so much occupied by their own dissensions, that they could not even defend their possessions in the Doab, much less were they likely to interrupt our operations against the Rohillas. The King had no means of interference but by his General, Nudjeff Cawn, for whose attachment we had stronger security in his interest, and in his fear of his rival, Abdul Ahed Cawn, than his master had in his allegiance. The Rohillas were too weak to resist to powerful an attack; and as their country was open and undefended, either by defiles, woods, or fortresses, and in its greatest extent did not exceed 200 miles, its entire subjection did not require any length of time.

To these inducements, which apply only to the success of the undertaking, other motives, equally powerful, engaged our attention to it, as a measure necessary to the interests and safety of the Company.

All our advices, both public and private, represented the distresses of the Company at home as extreme. The Letters from the Court of Directors called upon us most loudly for ample remittances, and a reduction of our military expenses. At the same time, such was the state of affairs in this government, that for many years past the income of the year was found inadequate to its expense; to defray which, a heavy Bond Debt, amounting at one time to an hundred and twenty-five lacks of rupees, had accumulated. The Board had bestowed much labour and time in the retrenchment of their expenses, but much remained yet to be done; and the regulations which they had already formed, required time to produce any visible effect. By allowing the Vizier the military aid which he required, a saving of near one third of our military expenses would be effected during the period of such a service; the stipulation of 40 lacks would afford an ample supply to our treasury and to the currency of the country; the Vizier would be freed from a troublesome neighbourhood, and his dominions would be made more defensible, while his alliance with the Company subsisted, by being completely shut in between the river Ganges and the mountains; and his dependence on the Company would be increased by that extension of his possessions, as he himself was incapable of defending, even his antient possessions, without our support.

For a more ample discussion of these arguments, I beg leave to refer to the Consultation in the Secret Department of the 26th of November, 1773, in which it was concluded, after a long debate, to consent to the Vizier's requisition. As a precaution against any effects which were to be apprehended from the Vizier's irresolution, the conditions originally accepted for this engagement were dictated to him in the form of a letter to be written by him, in which a clause was inserted, that whether the country was conquered, or a peace concluded between him and the enemy, the stipulation for the payment of 40 lacks should become equally due. Of this engagement I shall speak more hereafter.

On the 24th of February, 1774, the second Brigade arrived within the territory of the Vizier. On the 17th of April the united forces entered the borders of the Rohilla Dominions; and on the 23d of the same month engaged and defeated the Rohillas, with the death of their leader Hafez Rahmet Cawn. From that period the conquest of that country may be dated, no material opposition having been since made.

On the 6th of October the war was finally concluded by the treaty with Fyzoolla Cawn. Fifteen lacks of rupees, which he engaged to pay to the Vizier in ready money, were to be immediately appropriated to the payment of part of the stipulation of 40 lacks due from the Vizier to the Company; and we are informed that the Vizier has returned with expedition to Fyzabad, for the express purpose of discharging the remainder. The subsidy had been punctually paid to the end of September, by the last advices received on that subject from Colonel Champion, dated the 24th of October.

I now proceed to answer the objections which have been urged against the propriety of this undertaking. These may be reduced to the following heads;

- 1st. That it was contrary to the express, peremptory, and repeated orders of the Company.
- 2d. That it was contrary to the repeated declarations and promises of the Board.
- 3d. That it was unjust.
- 4th. That it exposed the Company to the hazard of an indefinite or an endless war.
- 5th. That it might have involved the Company in a war with the Marattas, and may still draw on us their future resentment.
- 6th. That by the removal of a third part of the whole military establishment to so great a distance, our own provinces were exposed to danger.

7. That by aggrandizing the Vizier it might render him a dangerous neighbour, and deprive the Company of the benefits of his alliance.

8. That it was resolved on precipitately without a formal treaty, the conditions of it appearing only in a letter from the Vizier, where they are loosely expressed, and liable to evasion.

9. That the condition which the Vizier expresses, that the Brigade should never depart without his permission, was an instance of arrogance in him, and of an unbecoming submission in the late Administration, and might prove the cause of their being detained for ever.

Vide Mr.

Francis's Minutes, entered in Consultation of the 3d November.

In the above articles I have not confined myself to the public records, but have endeavoured to collect the substance of all I have seen or heard upon this side of the argument, and have chosen to clothe it in my own language; that which I have found prepared for me not being in every instance such as I allow myself to use, even in retaliation of personal injury, much less in application to measures which immediately regard myself.—I shall reply separately to each.

General Letter 11th May 1779, paragraphs 3 & 16.—30th June 1769, paragraph 1 & 3.—Instructions to the Commissioners, par. 2.—General Letter, 15th September 1779, par. 28.

1. I have read over with great attention all the Letters which have been received from the Honorable Court of Directors since the year 1769, and long ago abstracted all the paragraphs written within that period upon the subject of the Company's political concerns, those having been given me for my special guidance in my negotiations with the Vizier the last year at Benares. I find nothing contained in any of these which expressly applies to the case in question. I meet with injunctions to avoid new connexions. "To endeavour to keep peace in Bengal and with the neighbouring powers; and to confine our views to the security and tranquillity of Bengal; not to acquire further possessions; but to advert to the good management of those which we have." "To incline to those few Chiefs of Indostan who are in a condition to struggle with the Marattas. To defend the King's Person, and the districts of Corah and Allahabad; which is mentioned as an exception to their limited plan. To make known to the powers of India, that it is by no means the intention of the Company to encroach upon their neighbours, or to acquire an extension of dominion by conquest. That they regard with a jealous eye the increasing powers of the Marattas; and that it would be bad policy to take part in any operations, which might weaken the few remaining Chiefs who are in a condition to oppose their encroachments." But the following extracts are pointedly apposite to the subject, that I shall take the liberty to quote them at large.

General Letter, 28th August, 1771, par. 45.

"It is with the most serious concern we learn from your late advices, that the incursions of the Marattas had spread such a terror and dependence into the minds of those powers which were the remoter barrier of our possessions, that the irresolution and timidity of the most potent of them have given rise to such successes, as have encouraged the Marattas to invade the dominions of the King, and lay claim to part of the territory of Sujah Dowlah. But the conduct of the Rohillas and Jauts is rather a matter of concern than surprize to us; as the King and Sujah Dowlah neglected that occasion to unite with those powers, effectually to repel the common disturbers of the Empire, and confine them within the limits of their former possessions. To whatever causes this general timidity or supineness may have been owing, we find ourselves equally affected, and the tranquillity of the provinces endangered thereby; but as the projects of the King, or the conduct of the Vizier, are at present too mysterious for us to decide on the motives of their inactivity, and as we know not what alliances may be formed to justify us in carrying our arms beyond the bounds of their dominions, we are prevented from proposing any precise plan for your guidance in this respect; but should your subsequent advices enable us to form a more certain judgment of the expediency of departing from the plan we have laid down, we shall communicate to you by some early conveyance, how far we may be disposed to carry our arms beyond the bounds of the Provinces, or the territories of our Allies, and become the parties in an offensive war. In the mean time, we trust your sole objects will be the security of our possessions, and those of the Powers with whom we are connected both by treaty and interest; and as this appears to have been the guide of your conduct upon the Marattas invading the province of Corah, we with pleasure approve the measures you have taken for defending the dominions of the King and Vizier from their inroads and depredations; more especially, as those mea-



"sures are not only justified by necessity, but are within the line which we have prescribed for your conduct in such a conjuncture."

"The line of neutrality is still recommended; but the Board are authorized to depart from it whenever the interests of the Company shall be endangered, or shall materially require it."

General Letter to Fort St. George, of 24th November, 1772, Part. 10.

The directions promised us in the letter of the 28th of August, 1771, have never yet been sent us, nor have we since received any further lights to guide us on this important subject; which I presume to place to the account of the troubles which have embarrassed the Company at home.

From the above quotations, and the consistency which strongly marks all the orders on this subject, I apprehend it will clearly appear, that the principle primarily insisted upon by the Honorable Court of Directors, respecting their political and military operations, was to avoid the extension of territory; and this we have never attempted.

The prohibition of military expeditions, undertaken beyond the prescribed bounds of their own provinces, and those of their allies, on prudential and cautionary motives, or other causes, independent of territorial acquisitions, is only to be inferred from the tenor and tendency of their reasonings on the former subject. It is evident, that it was not from inattention that their orders never expressed a prohibition of this kind, but that they rather avoided it from a conviction that it might be sometimes necessary, and because it would have been difficult to mark the limitations of it. This conclusion I draw, not only from the two last paragraphs of their orders, which I have quoted at length, and which were dictated by the experience of past advices, and a more intimate consideration of the subject, but even from their orders, so far back as the 30th of June, 1769; in which, having declared against an extension of possessions in the first paragraph, they add in the third their "Opinion, that the most prudent system they could pursue, and the most likely to be attended with a permanent security to the provinces, would be, to *incline* to those Chiefs of Indoitan who yet preserve an independence of the Maratta Power, and are in a condition to struggle with them."

But in the two last of the above quotations there is no occasion of logical surmises to discover the intentions of the Honorable Court of Directors. They tell us plainly, that "it is their wish" "To confine their views to the security of their own possessions and those of their allies; but that they foresee the necessity, in certain cases, of carrying their arms beyond those bounds, and of becoming parties in an offensive war;" and they promise us an early communication of their instructions, with regard to the lengths to which they will allow this doctrine to be extended. In their letter to the Presidency of Fort St. George, they authorize them, in express terms, "To observe no longer the neutrality so heartily wished for by them, in case they should judge it necessary for their interests to depart from it." And it is not to be supposed, that the Court of Directors would recommend one line of conduct for their Government of Fort St. George, and an opposite one for Bengal; much less that they would admit of such a deviation from their former pacific plan, on merely political motives attended with an heavy expense, and yet prohibit it under circumstances, which, in addition to the same motives, have every consideration of economy to recommend it, with the prospect of an increase to their finances, at a time when their distresses both at home and abroad so urgently required such an increase, and their most peremptory commands (as I have already observed) rendered it the first object of our attention.

I presume to affirm, both for myself and the other Members of the late Council, that no period in the Company's Annals has been more evidently characterized by an exact submission to their commands, than that in which I have had the honor to preside in the Administration; and for the truth of this I dare appeal to the Honorable Court of Directors. But in cases to which their commands do not specially apply, to adopt such measures as, at the same time, approach nearest to the spirit of their general instructions, and tend most to the advancement of their interests, is the fairest test both of our obedience and fidelity. We might have suffered the Marattas, under cover of the King's Grant, to take possession of Corah and Allahabad, to have allied themselves to the Rohillas, or established themselves in that territory, and lain with their armies unmolested on the borders of the open country of our Ally the Vizier till they had completed every preparation for invading it. Such a forbearance might perhaps have been vindicated by the plea,

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that

that the Company had promised, at the distance of two years preceding it, to furnish us with their instructions for a different conduct; and that wanting those instructions, we took for our rule their latest orders in the subject; which enjoined us to confine our views to the bare security of our own possessions and those of our allies. This might have been a sure way to guard our characters against legal imputation, although in fact it would have been inconsistent with the security required. But it is not by such cold and prudential cautions that the British Name has acquired such a lustre in India, nor that the British Empire in Bengal is likely to be perpetuated; neither is this the conduct which the Company demands of us; their orders are informed by a more liberal spirit, and allow, in such cases as are not reducible to fixed and invariable positions, a discretionary latitude for the zeal of their servants to exert itself for their security. I cannot better illustrate this, than by the following extract of their general letter, dated the 30th of June, 1769, paragraph 5. "We esteem ourselves bound by treaty to protect the King's Person, and to secure him the possession of the Corah and Allahabad Districts. When we wrote the 11th of November, 1768, we apprehended the consequences of keeping the Brigade at Allahabad would be creating in Sujah Dowlah a jealousy that would involve us in fresh troubles, having at that time no cause to esteem him an enemy; but impressed as you were with an opinion of his hostile intentions and growing strength at the time of the dispatch of the Valentine, we shall not blame your caution for deferring the execution of our orders for its removal, nor shall we at this time attempt to give positive directions for your conduct, which in such critical cases ought seldom to be done, and in which the situation of affairs may be varied by unforeseen events at the very moment we are writing; but having given you, with as much precision as possible, a general view of the system by which we wish to have our affairs regulated, we must leave it to you to improve, to the utmost of your power, every opportunity of drawing towards that point; and whenever you think yourselves obliged for our security, upon emergent occasions, to adopt measures of a contrary tendency, you are to give us very full reasons for such a deviation, and endeavour to return to the path we have marked out as soon as circumstances will admit."

2. The second objection is partly true. The Board have repeatedly declared in their general letters to the Court of Directors their intentions to adhere to the defensive plan recommended to them, and to confine their military operations within the limits of the Vizier's Territories, and such were their determinations when those letters were written; but at those times, they had not fully experienced the inconveniences which attended our engagements with the Vizier in the prosecution of that system, nor had the remedy occurred which since presented itself, in the conditions offered for prosecuting the Rohilla Enterprise, and which has been successfully applied. Our treaty of alliance obliged us to support the Vizier, when his possessions were threatened with invasion, at an heavy increased military expense, and the exportation of our currency with our troops. For three successive years these inconveniences had recurred, and it was impossible to say how often they might recur. At last an occasion took place, when, by a slight deviation from the defensive plan, our alliance with the Vizier might be converted into solid advantages. The employment of our troops made to save near a third part of our military expenses, and the success of their operations to bring a large flow of currency, not only into the Company's Territories, but into their treasury; in effect, the very same reasons which before urged us to shun every military expedition, namely, the expense attending it, and the exportation of our currency, now operated in the contrary direction, and recommended the employment of our army for the purposes of reducing our expenses, and adding to our currency.

The preceding argument respects only the general subject of foreign expeditions. It has been urged also as an argument against the particular case in question, that the Board, when they adopted the measure of the Rohilla War, were themselves convinced of the impropriety of it, from the declaration made by them repeatedly in their letters to the Court of Directors, of their wish and hope that it might not take place. Upon this I beg leave to offer the following reflexions.

A consistency of measures is difficult to be preserved among a body of men, because an accidental majority may occasionally decide for contrary resolutions; yet such a case has never happened at our Board. A consistency of opinions is not to be expected. The proposition for the Rohilla War, after having passed the Select Committee, was debated for three successive days in Council, in which the Board met, as I recollect, both morning and evening to discuss it. No two members agreed exactly in opinion, and it was difficult to reconcile them; at last they came to a final agreement to leave it to me to accommodate my own

own, as nearly as I could, to the collective sense of the whole; which was done with much management, and the proposition was agreed to in the manner in which it stands in Consultation 26th November, 1773.

My sentiments were the same invariably from the beginning, as will be seen from my report to the Board of my proceedings at Benaris, and my minute entered in the Consultation above referred to. Private letters are not commonly admissible as authorities; but on this occasion I cannot produce a stronger, both of my own fixed opinion from the first movement of this proposition, and of the apprehension which influenced the Board, and, I confess, myself also against it, than in the following extract of a letter which I wrote to a gentleman in the direction by the first dispatch after my return from Benaris. "I was glad to be freed from the Rohilla Expedition, because I was doubtful of the judgment which would have been passed upon it at home, where I see too much stress laid upon general maxims, and too little attention given to the circumstances which require an exception to be made from them. Besides this, an opinion still prevails of the Vizier's great power, and his treacherous designs against us; and I cannot expect that my word should be taken as a proof of their non-existence. On the other hand, the absence of the Marattas, and the weak state of the Rohillas, promised an easy conquest of them; and I own, that such was my idea of the Company's distress at home, added to my knowledge of their wants abroad, that I should have been glad of any occasion to employ their forces, which saves so much of their pay and expenses."

When the measure was determined upon, and we had come to a general agreement, I was averse to introduce any new subject of debate, and therefore easily acquiesced in the expression of a wish entertained by the Board, which might be construed as inconsistent with the resolution we had taken. My sentiments of the propriety of the expedition had undergone no change; but I will not deny, that I felt myself influenced by the same fears which operated in the other members of the Council, that the propriety of the measure might not be seen in the same light by our Constituents; which we knew, from the temper of the times, might not only draw upon us their severe resentment, but aggravate the load of popular odium which has of late fallen on their servants; and, if I mistake not, these reasons are assigned in express terms upon our proceedings.

3. The engagements between the Vizier and the Rohillas, which have been already quoted, sufficiently evince the justice of the attack upon them. They agreed to make him an acknowledgment of forty lacks of rupees upon certain conditions; he performed those conditions; and they refused payment of the money they had promised.

4. No political transaction can be mathematically demonstrated to be totally free from danger. The probable advantages must be weighed against the probable disadvantages. When the present measure was undertaken, there was every reason to expect that it would be speedily brought to an happy conclusion; and the event has proved that our expectations were well grounded.

5. The Marattas did not possess, nor had any claim upon any part of the Rohilla Country on the north of the Ganges, when we undertook to assist the Vizier in the conquest of it. They might, with much more reason, have attacked us for opposing them in their designs on the Corah Districts, of which they had obtained a grant from the King; but in fact a timid conduct would have been more likely to involve us in a war with them than either of these measures. Had they been allowed to subdue the Corah District and the Country of the Rohillas, the Vizier's Territory would have been open to their incursions; their numerous horse might have plundered it in spite of the efforts of our infantry; and their continued ravages might have obliged him to come to an accommodation with them, as was once apprehended, on terms which would have afforded them an easy entrance into our own provinces. In short, we are much better secured against their attacks than we otherwise should have been; and the better we are secured, the less will they be disposed to attack us.

6. In reply to this objection, I will in the first place affirm, that, merely for the defence of our own provinces, two Brigades upon the present establishment are sufficient; a third is necessary to add to our influence amongst the powers of Indostan, to support our alliance with the Vizier, and to answer other exigencies which may happen at a more remote period of time. Upon the late occasion, when the Rohilla Expedition was undertaken, our apprehensions of an invasion from the French had entirely ceased; the dissensions among



the Marattas fully employed them at home, and are mentioned among the secondary inducements in favour of the undertaking; there was no other enemy from whom we could have the least apprehension of danger. Such was the occasion to be embraced for effecting our purpose, by a temporary employment of a third part of our forces; and under such circumstances, even without reckoning upon the acquisition which was the immediate object of the enterprise, to reduce the Company's military expenses, by employing that proportion of their troops which was superfluous for the purpose of their own defence, was a great and manifest advantage; but when the stipulated acquisition of 40 lacks, and the political advantages resulting from the measure are superadded, the visionary idea of danger, which did not exist even in imagination at the time the expedition was undertaken, can have no weight as an objection; especially, as from our own knowledge of the open and defenceless state of the Rohilla Country, we were morally certain that the undertaking would soon be brought to an issue. By our ancient treaty with the Vizier we are bound to assist him with our forces within his paternal dominions; and the distance between their borders and the remotest part to which our troops have marched is only 200 miles. I will only add, that so long as no immediate danger threatens our own provinces, it is my earnest wish that one of our three Brigades might constantly be employed with the Vizier; as well to save so large a proportion of expense to the Company, as to prevent the ill consequences of total inactivity to our army.

7. The addition of territory acquired by the Vizier, instead of raising him to be a dangerous neighbour, serves to render him more dependent upon us than before, as he has more occasion for our assistance to enable him to maintain it, and to support him against the claims of other powers. If his increase of wealth be an object of jealousy, let it be considered how largely the Company share in it. From September 1773 to September 1775 the sums we have to receive from him, by our late engagements, amount to 130 lacks of rupees.

8. I have already remarked, that the first proposition for the Rohilla War was made by the Vizier in a letter which I received from him in June 1773; that it was employed afterwards in the negotiations at Banares, as an instrument for winning his consent to the payment of the full expenses of our troops employed in his service; and that it was not finally resolved on till the 26th November, after the most ample discussion in the Select Committee and in the Council; it was not therefore precipitately resolved on. It is true that no formal treaty was executed for the conditions on which we were to assist the Vizier; nor did the occasion, which was only temporary, require it. The multiplication of treaties weakens their efficacy, and therefore they should be reserved only for very important and permanent obligations. The form which was dictated to the Vizier for the letter which was to describe the conditions of this engagement, it is true, is not of itself sufficiently clear; but it is explained by my letter which accompanied it, and the reference therein made to the conditions which had been formerly proposed at Benaris, as they stood in the three first articles of the draft which had been prepared for the treaty before the Rohilla Expedition was suspended. For the fuller elucidation of the subject these articles are here subjoined. The two first had been agreed to by the Vizier; to the third he objected, wishing rather to engage for the payment of the whole sum at once when the conquest was completed. It is fortunate that the latter mode was adopted; the completion of the conquest having been actually effected, and the stipulation, although objected to by the Vizier when first demanded, after the defeat of the Rohillas, having since been acknowledged by him to be due.

#### The three first articles of the first draught of the treaty:

1. "Whereas the Rohilla Chiefs, in the month of June 1772, entered into a treaty with the Vizier, in the presence, and with the concurrence of General Sir Robert Barker, by which they engaged to pay him 40 lacks of rupees for his assistance against the Marattas, and which treaty they have treacherously broken; it is therefore agreed, that a Brigade of the Company's Forces shall join the Vizier, and assist to punish them; and that he shall pay the whole of it's expense. By a Brigade is meant, two battalions of Europeans, one company of Artillery, and six battalions of Sepoys; and the expense is settled at Sonant Rupees 210,000 per month. The Company's Troops shall not cross the Ganges, nor march beyond the foot of the hills. The Vizier shall retain as his own that part of the Rohilla Country, which lies on the north east side of the Ganges; but in consideration of the Company's relinquishing all claim to share in the said country, although it is to be conquered by their joint forces, the Vizier engages to make them an acknowledgement

" of

“ forty lacks of rupees, and in future to defray the whole expence of the Company’s  
 “ Troops, agreeable to the date above-mentioned, whenever he has occasion for their  
 “ assistance, notwithstanding it is stipulated in the second article of the treaty of Allahabad,  
 “ concluded by the Vizier and the Company on the 16th August, 1775, that he shall pay  
 “ only their extraordinary charges.

2. “ The Vizier may retain the Brigade aforesaid on the abovementioned terms as long  
 “ as he shall require it, unless it shall be necessary to recall it for the defence of the Com-  
 “ pany’s own Territories; and he may employ them for the protection of any part of his  
 “ Country; but they shall be kept together in one body, and not dispersed on different  
 “ commands, except such detachments as the commanding officer shall judge necessary  
 “ in the time of actual service. He may return the whole or part of the said Brigade  
 “ whenever he has no further occasion for their services, and he shall cease to defray their  
 “ expences as soon as they shall enter the province of Bahar. But as the Company  
 “ cannot risk the credit of their arms, by allowing a smaller force to remain with the  
 “ Vizier than half a Brigade, it is provided, that he shall either retain one half of the  
 “ Brigade, or return the whole. Upon their dismissal they shall depart with all con-  
 “ venient expedition; and to prevent any future disputes from arising on this subject, the  
 “ time of their march to the borders of his province shall be computed at the rate of 5  
 “ Cofs per day, from the place where they commenced their march.”

3. “ The Vizier engages to pay the 40 lacks of Rupees, stipulated in the 1st article, by  
 “ monthly payments of 4 lacks, to commence from the end of the month Rabbee ull-  
 “ uwall, or 10th June, 1774; but should any accident (which God forbid) oblige our  
 “ forces to retire from the Rohilla Country, and prevent the Vizier from obtaining  
 “ possession of it, the said 40 lacks shall not be demanded.”

9. It was neither arrogant nor unreasonable in the Vizier to require, that since his entire  
 dependence for the success of the enterprize which he had projected was on the Brigade  
 of the Company’s Forces, the Brigade should not abandon him while he was engaged  
 in it, nor while the issue of it remained incomplete; nor can I devise any other condition  
 which would have removed his apprehensions. If the Board judged the proposition  
 reasonable, it certainly was not unbecoming in them to assent to it. It remains therefore  
 to examine whether it was reasonable, and whether this power granted to the Vizier was  
 liable to danger or inconvenience.

I have already shewn, that the removal of the Brigade to such a distance would not  
 prove of danger to our own provinces, because it was not wanted for their defence; that  
 it would be productive of no inconvenience, because it occasioned an entire suspension of  
 the Company’s payments during it’s employment. It is not to be denied that there are  
 possible cases in which it may be wanted for the protection of Bengal, but these are out  
 of the reach of all probability, and too remote to be quoted as an objection to the present  
 engagement.

I am not apprehensive that the Vizier will insist on keeping the Brigade continually with  
 him, my fears are that he may dismiss it; as there is every reason to wish it’s continuance  
 with him, and none, no not one, for it’s recall. When the Brigade was formerly em-  
 ployed with the Vizier, and the share of it’s monthly expences defrayed by him was only  
 30,000 and afterwards 115,000 Rupees per month, he never shewed any earnestness for  
 it’s continuance with him beyond the duration of the particular service for which it had  
 been wanted, but was ever ready to propose it’s return; it is not likely therefore that  
 he should be more solicitous now for it’s perpetual residence in his country, at an expence  
 to him of 25 lacks a year, which he must pay, and which his income, even with the late  
 additions to it, can barely afford. He knows that whenever he shall require the presence  
 of the Brigade, it will be for our interest to grant it; and he will therefore part with it  
 when his own occasions, which, in this instance, must be confined to the defence of his  
 own dominions, no longer require it, that the charge of it’s maintenance may be shifted  
 from his account to the Company’s, and that he may be subject to that burden only  
 when he is an immediate gainer by it. This may suffice to shew the little risk we ran,  
 had we absolutely engaged the Brigade to him as long as he might chuse to retain it; but,  
 in the present case (as I have already explained in the preceding article) it was under-  
 stood by both parties, and indeed is inseparable from the nature of the engagement, and  
 the original conditions of our mutual alliance, that we might recall it if required for our  
 own protection, not only without any imputation of breach of faith, but (unless it was

done in so precipitate a manner as to defeat the purpose of the expedition) even without affording him a pretext for refusing the payment of the 40 lacks.

I have been thus explicit in vindicating my conduct in relation to the Rohilla War, for the sake of obviating any impression, which a partial representation of this measure may make upon the minds of my employers, as I know that the majority of the Council, which has condemned it, will labour to paint it in the blackest colours which they can lay upon it, as an excuse for the precipitation with which they have proclaimed their reprobation of it, and violated the engagements, on which the right of the Company to participate in the fruits of it's success essentially depended. But it is not on the propriety of my conduct that I shall rest for proof of the impropriety of theirs, which is equally incompatible with the interests of the Company, whether the transactions of the late Administration shall be approved or condemned by our Superiors, whose judgment only can decide upon it. A recapitulation of the principal acts of the new Council will amply suffice for this purpose.

1 Appendix,  
No. 1.

The three members who came passengers on the Ashburnham from England, arrived on the noon of the 19th of October. The next day I met them in Council, which was adjourned to the 24th; both to afford time to Mr. Barwell to join us, and to myself to prepare the business which might be proper for the immediate cognizance of the new Board. To this effect I drew up a minute, describing the nature and state of two subjects, which were undoubtedly the first in point of importance; the establishment of the revenue, and the transactions in our political system. If I could have conceived a more regular, or more candid way of leading the Board into the knowledge of past affairs, without the influence of my own particular judgment or prepossessions, I would have adopted it. This minute I laid before the Council held on the 24th of October. On the 25th the General moved, and the Board (Mr. Barwell only dissenting) resolved to require, that I should produce the whole correspondence between me and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, my Agent at the Vizier's Court, and Colonel Champion, the late provisional Commander in Chief, both official and private, for their inspection. I offered the first, and refused the second, for reasons which appear in my minutes. To what I have already recorded on this subject I will further add, that there are few persons in the service, of any considerable rank or rank in it, with whom I have not maintained that distinct mode of intercourse. My predecessors have ever followed the same rule, and I am persuaded would have thought it a dishonorable breach of confidence, had they inserted on the records of the Company any letters which had been addressed to them as extra-official and private, without the consent of the writers of them. Lord Clive, Mr. Verelt, Mr. Cartier, General Smith, and General Sir Robert Barker, are able to contradict me if I have misquoted their practice; and I shall be glad to appeal to them for the truth of it, if there can be a doubt upon the subject. A circumstance, exactly in point to the present matter of dispute, happened in the course of Colonel Smith's correspondence with the Select Committee in 1766, when, by some mistake, the subject of a private letter from the Colonel to the President was only alluded to in a letter from the Select Committee, upon which occasion the Colonel asserts his sentiments of the sacred rights of private correspondence in the following words; "I have been made accountable to a public Board for an unprejudiced discussion of facts, which ought never to have transpired beyond the breast of the Right Honorable Person to whom, and whom only, they were addressed;" and the Select Committee, by their silence, acquiesced in those sentiments.

The same subject was resumed the next day, the 26th. On my refusal to deliver the correspondence in the manner in which it was required of me, Colonel Monson moved, and the General and Mr. Francis agreed, that Mr. Nathaniel Middleton should be recalled from his station; and it was resolved, by a subsequent resolution of the same majority, that the negotiations of this Government with the Vizier should be thenceforth committed to Colonel Champion, (who ought, by a parity of reasoning, to have been recalled too) or to the officer who, on the receipt of the orders, should chance to be the first in command of the Brigade in the field. To these acts Mr. Barwell and myself dissented; and I entered my protests against all the consequences to which they were liable.

The sentiments and intentions of the majority with respect to the Rohilla War, and the future destination of the Army, were sufficiently manifested in this meeting, and left me less room for surprize at the propositions which were made on the next, which was held on the 28th. These propositions, which had been previously drawn up by the



General, having undergone some alterations in substance and form, stand recorded as follow ;

The General proposes the following questions, viz.

1. " That the demand of the 40 lacks from the Vizier be repeated, and that Colonel Champion, or the officer commanding the second Brigade, be instructed to that effect."
2. " That the Colonel, or commanding officer, be also instructed to make a demand for such further payments as may be due from the Vizier on receiving these instructions, and to liquidate what accounts may be unsettled with him at the time."
3. " That he be further instructed, that although he is to make an immediate demand for the whole 40 lacks, and for such other payments as may be due at that time, yet if he finds that it is impossible for the Vizier to comply with the whole of these demands, he is to receive what can be obtained in ready money, not to be less than 20 lacks, and the rest to be payable in different periods within 12 months."
4. " That the Colonel, or commanding officer, be further instructed, that in case the Vizier shall refuse to comply with these demands, he is to enter a protest against him, declaring that the Company have fulfilled all their engagements with him, and, within 14 days after the receipt of these instructions, to retire with the Army under his command, and withdraw it into the Company's Territories."
5. " That further orders be sent to Colonel Champion, or the officer commanding the Brigade, that after having finished the negotiations for the money now due, he do immediately withdraw the whole of his forces under his command within the limits of the province of Oud ; and that unless the Vizier should require the continuance of the troops for the defence of his original dominions, with the provinces of Corah and Allahabad, he return with them to the Cantonments at Dinapore."
6. " That on quitting the Vizier he shall acquaint him, that the Governor-General and Council propose to appoint a person to reside at his Court ; and to declare that they mean to adhere strictly to the treaties of Allahabad and Banarès till the pleasure of the Court of Directors regarding the latter be known."
7. " That he be further instructed, that if he should apprehend any difficulty, or danger from the Vizier in his retreat, that then he should suspend his declaration, and take the best means in his power for the preservation of the army, and advise the Board immediately of his situation."

I prevailed upon the majority to defer coming to any conclusion upon these propositions till the next Monday's Consultation, this being Friday ; both to allow time for each to come prepared with his opinions upon them, and for the gentlemen of the majority to read all the proceedings which had any relation to the subject, and of which I had furnished them with a complete list of references, in my minute recorded on the Consultation of the 25th.

On Monday the 31st, the Council being assembled, I delivered in a minute, containing my opinion on each proposition ; Mr. Barwell did the same ; both expressed an assent to the three first, but objected wholly to the 4th, 5th, and 7th, and to the last clause of the 6th.

The sum of our objections, to which I crave leave to refer, as the force of them must be lost by an abridgement, was, that the 4th was too peremptory, and left no room for the Vizier to propose any alternative, in case his present means, or future resources, should not enable him to comply literally with the demands which were made upon him ; that the fifth was a direct violation of the engagements which had been formed with him by the last Government, and would afford him a just pretext to declare his also void, and to refuse payment of the 40 lacks, besides the danger of losing the new conquered country by so precipitate a retreat from it ; that the last clause of the 6th was an alarming suggestion of the invalidity of a public treaty, which ought not even to be supposed till it were pronounced by the Company ; and that the 7th left it at the option of the Commander of the Army to declare war with the Vizier.

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## Governor-General's Appeal to the Court of Directors,

The other gentlemen brought no opinions in writing, but resolved on all the propositions, except the last clause of the 6th, which was omitted.

It is proper to remark, that our Army, joined by the Vizier's, had pursued the remains of the Rohilla Forces, which had re-assembled under the command of Fyzoolla Cawn, to the extremity of the country, and continued encamped more than a month within a very few miles of them, which interval had been employed in negotiations 'till the 2d of October, when Fyzoolla Cawn repaired in person to the English Camp, and, as it appears from Colonel Champion's letters, on the faith of some assurances given for his safety. Since the negotiations continued, the enemy remained in arms, and our Army still advanced nearer to them, making preparations for an assault, in case terms of peace could not be agreed on. Thus far our advices had reached us, when the General introduced the propositions abovementioned; yet, at this crisis of affairs, without waiting for the event, which a very few days must have determined, the majority came with their resolutions decided for withdrawing the Brigade from the service in which it was engaged, whether it were completed or not; and to compel the Vizier to the instant adjustment of all his accounts depending with the Company, or to abandon him altogether.

One reason alleged by the majority for the demand which had with so much perseverance been made for Colonel Champion's and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's letters, was, that without them, and especially without those which I withheld from them, their knowledge of the state and circumstances of the Rohilla War, which was to enable them to judge of the propriety of continuing the Army in that quarter, or to determine on its removal, would be incomplete; yet they had neither taken time to read the series of the former political records which I had recommended to their perusal, nor the letters of Colonel Champion and Mr. Nathaniel Middleton with which I had promised to furnish them; although these were surely as necessary for their information as the private letters addressed to me, the contents of which they could not know, and, I had declared to them, contained no information on the points on which they wanted it.

Soon after we heard that the Vizier had consigned over the 15 lacs, which Fyzoolla Cawn had engaged to pay him in ready money, to Colonel Champion in part payment of the 40 lacs due from him, and had hastily set out on his return for his Capital with Mr. Nathaniel Middleton, for the declared purpose of acquitting himself of the remainder; and that the Brigade was in Orders to march back to Ramgaut. Fearing the consequences of the orders which had been lately issued, I thought this a fit opportunity to induce the majority to moderate that for the immediate recall of the Brigade, and proposed, that as our payments were in so fair a channel of acquittance, and Ramgaut lay at little more than 60 miles from the border of the province of Oude, to which they had destined its future station, a discretionary power might now be entrusted to the Commander of the Army to continue it at Ramgaut for a short period, until the Vizier's consent could be obtained for its entire removal, or until he himself should judge that it might leave the Rohilla Country, without hazard of losing it by a fresh invasion or insurrections.

I think it incumbent upon me to remark a small geographical error which I have committed in my report of the situation of Ramgaut, which I found laid down in my own hand writing upon an old map in my possession at the distance which I have described; but having since received a more correct map of that quarter from Captain Rennel, the Surveyor-General, which accompanies these papers, I find that it lies near 40 miles more remote from the Territories of the Vizier; an error of little consequence, I apprehend, to my argument; but I mention it, that it may not be imputed to me as a deception.

My proposal was rejected. For the reasons, both for and against it, I beg leave to refer

\*Appendix, to my minute in Consultation the 8th of November,\* and to the replies of the majority in No. 7. D & E Consultation of the 14th.

As a doubt is expressed respecting the nature of Mr. Nathaniel Middleton's appointment as Resident, or Agent for the Governor at the Court of the Vizier, it is necessary I should say a few words, to reconcile the propriety of styling him my particular Agent, and at the same time considering his appointment in the nature of a public one. By the Company's Orders of long standing, and now repeated, all correspondence with the Country Powers is directed to be carried on by the President; and the intention of appointing a Resident with the Vizier was for the purpose of facilitating and perfecting this correspondence,

accomplished; but to have permitted the Brigade to remain in the Rohilla Country so long as that service, and the engagements subsisting between this Government and the Vizier required it; leaving the responsibility of the measure to the members of the last Administration who formed it, and under whose authority it was brought to the crisis in which the new Government found it.

The same temperate conduct might have been observed with respect to Mr. Nathaniel Middleton; his appointment as Resident on the part of Government at the Court of the Vizier might have been confirmed, but the relation of it transferred from me to the Board at large.

Such a conduct, without the smallest sacrifice either of their integrity or duty, would have accommodated their sentiments to the faith of Government and the consistency of its measures; the alarms unavoidably attendant on a change of Government so totally new would have subsided; the Vizier could have had no pretext to refuse or withhold the sums which were due from him; and the Rohilla War would have ended with honor, with unsullied faith, with the restoration of that lustre to our arms, which an inaction of many years had almost obscured in the minds of the people of Indostan; with a great addition of wealth to supply our impoverished resources; and without a single inconvenience or cause afforded to regret it.

Let the reverse of this conduct be examined in the first acts of the new Council.

By their violent recall of my agent from the Vizier's Court, they have proclaimed the annihilation of my authority in that branch of the Government in which the Company, for obvious political reasons, have ever thought it necessary to invest their Governor with the ostensible power, and which, in their very first orders to the new Administration, they have directed should continue to be conducted through him.

They have disregarded the faith of our engagements, which, even in the most violent resolutions have ever been transmitted as sacred from one Government to that which has succeeded it. They have exposed the conquest which the British arms have acquired for the Vizier to be wrested from him with the loss of our military reputation; they have risked the loss of the pecuniary resources which were stipulated for the Company as the fruits of their successes; and they have precipitately withdrawn the Brigade from the station where its whole expense is borne by the Vizier, to become again an heavy and useless burthen upon ourselves.

† There was an omission in this paragraph, in the original Minute, which the Governor-General has, by a letter to the Secretary, desired may be supplied, and which is done in *Italicks*. But as alterations happened afterwards, respecting the propriety of the Governor's request, the whole is contained in Appendix, No. A A 16.

To these public acts manifesting the temper of their proceedings I may quote another † *proof of a more personal nature, in the minute of one of their number, Mr. Francis, who has descended to brand my conduct with the epithets "Extravagant and mean," and other opprobrious terms.*

It will be difficult to explore the source of measures so uniformly violent and personal, before the Gentlemen could possibly have acquired a knowledge either of the affairs of the Company or of myself, unless we trace it in a preconceived intention to provoke me to a resignation of the Government, or to lead me into a warfare of scurrility inconsistent with my character and station. If these, however, have been the objects of the majority, they will find themselves disappointed; for with respect to the former, I have determined to sacrifice my own feelings, and abide by the decision of my employers, on the appeal which I have made to their unbiassed judgment; and with respect to the latter, I will venture to say, that I shall be armed with a sufficient defence in the exercise of my own moderation. But this very disappointment in the first, and I will suppose grand object of their views, must necessarily occasion a recourse to other causes to vindicate their conduct; and I am ashamed to call the public attention to a subject so exceedingly frivolous, as that which I am now compelled to enter upon in my own further justification. They accuse me of having failed in paying them the honors due to them. Their accusation against me on this head is confined to the following particulars; only 17 guns were fired on their arrival; the troops were not drawn out to receive them; they were met at my own house, and not at the Council-house; there was a delay from Friday till Monday, three days, in the order for issuing the new commissions in Public Orders; and lastly, the proclamation of the new Government was not made with sufficient parade.



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dated 3d December, 1774.

To these five Articles I must reply separately.

1st. The orders given for the salutes were, that seventeen guns should be fired for the Chief Justice and the Judges; the like number for General Clavering; fifteen as ordered by the Court of Directors for Sir Edward Hughes; and thirteen for each of the members of the Board, if they came separately; if they should all arrive at the same time, the highest salute was directed to be fired for the whole; and this was agreeable to the practice which hitherto had been observed; I had no other rule to go by. They did arrive together, and were accordingly saluted with 17 guns.

2d. If they had landed at the fort, the garrison should have been under arms to receive them. It appeared to me unmilitary to draw troops out of garrison to compliment their landing at a distance from it.

3d. If I could have divined their expectations of being received, not at my house, but at the Council house; or if I could have imagined that this was esteemed a matter of any sort of significance, I certainly should have answered their wishes; but the circumstance neither occurred to myself, nor was suggested to any other person. I thought then, and truly I think still, that the deputing the senior member of the Board to wait on them in the river, and attend them to town, and the assembling of all the other gentlemen of the old Council at my house for their reception, ample marks of attention and respect to them.

4th. The delay of three days in issuing the commissions was occasioned by a request of mine, dictated by my feelings on first perusing them. I had before received private intimation of their purport; but my information was not complete; and I was hurt at the extraordinary reduction of my authority which was to take place, and the apparent inconsistency of investing the second person in the Administration with greater ostensible powers than the first. While I was agitated by these considerations, I requested this time to determine within myself, whether I should accept of this new Government, or conclude the period of my service to the Company with the close of the late Administration, before they were published; and when my request was acquiesced in, I did not expect to have found it stated as an exceptionable part of my conduct.

5th. With respect to the want of parade in proclaiming the new Government, the members of the Board have themselves been to blame for any deficiency in this particular. They formed a majority, and might have ordered what pomp and ostentation they pleased; but it is extraordinary that they should agree to measures, and then throw the blame of them upon me. I am averse to parade myself, and have never used it. I proposed a written advertisement, as the usual mode of proclamation here; they thought a military attendance necessary, which was accordingly ordered to attend upon the sheriff, whom I thought the proper officer to publish a Civil Government. But it may be necessary to remark, that if there was any deficiency of respect in my conduct on the above occasion, it could not be personally intended against them, since the new Government was it's object, and I myself had the highest interest in the honors paid to it, being the head of that Government.

Upon the whole I must remark, that I paid them higher honors than had ever been paid to persons of their rank in this country; as high even as had been paid to Mr. Vansittart and Lord Clive, when they came in the first station as Governors; men whose names will ever stand foremost in the memoirs of the people of this country, and who merited as much from their employers as any who have filled or are likely to fill that station. I wrote letters severally to the three Gentlemen at Madras, bespeaking their confidence, as a measure necessary to the safety of the Company. The Board sent their senior member down the river to meet them; and, as a mark of personal respect from me, one of the Gentlemen of my staff attended them; the whole Council assembled at my house to receive them on their landing; what more could I do without derogating from my own rank?—But they seem to have considered themselves as the Government, and to have required the honors done to it entire, to be paid to their own persons; forgetting that they were only a part, and that it was from the head they expected such concessions.

I now once more make my solemn Appeal to the Honorable Court of Directors from the measures already decided by the majority of the Council, and protest against every future act of the same unvaried majority; declaring, that I hold myself no longer responsible

for the consequences which the interests of my employers are liable to suffer, while I am deprived of the means which their commands, which the Parliament of Great Britain, which (if I presume not too rashly on the informations communicated to me) even the gracious intention of my Sovereign have committed in an especial manner to my charge, for the security of those interests, and the support of the national honor and dominion in this great and valuable branch of the British Empire.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Balances in the Treasuries of the Provincial Councils, Khalfah Treasury, and General Treasury, referred to in the Governor-General's Appeal to the Court of Directors, page 25.

Moorshedabad division, 30th September, 1774,	- - - - -	3,77,693	8	11	½
Burdwan - ditto, 30th ditto - - - - -	- - - - -	3,77,057	0	0	
Calcutta Committee, 30th ditto - - - - -	- - - - -	5,58,912	13	13	
Dinapore, - 13th ditto - - - - -	- - - - -	9,74,539	0	8	
Patna, - to 20th September, 1774. Sicca Rupees,	13,11,852	15	9		
Deduct Batta, 5 per Cent. - - - - -	65,592	10	6		
		12,46,260	5	3	
Dacca, - 14th October, - - - - -	- - - - -	1,52,270	9	16	3
In the Treasury at the Resident at the Durbar, 30th September, -	- - - - -	2,19,591	10	15	
		39,06,325	0	12	
Khalfah Treasury					
Ready Money, 28th November -	12,85,847	4	1		
Bills Receivable - - - - -	6,26,001	11	15		
		19,11,848	15	16	
	Sicca Rupees - - -	58,18,174	0	8	
	Batta, 16 per Cent. - - -	9,30,907	13	12	
	Current Rupees - - -	67,49,081	14	0	
Balance in the General Treasury - - - - -	- - - - -	13,00,724	8	0	
	Current Rupees - - -	80,49,806	6	0	

Fort-William, 30th November, 1774,

Errors Excepted,

[Signed] CHARLES CROFTES.



## Extract of Secret Consultations, Fort-William 8th December, 1774.

Mr. Barwell delivers in the following minute upon this occasion, and desires that it may be recorded.

WHEN such formal appeals are made to our Superiors, I cannot help lamenting the occasion from which they proceed, nor repress the deep concern it fixes on my mind to view the prospect before me. When I met Gentlemen, selected by the public voice, to discharge a trust of such national importance, as the superintendence of the interests of the Crown of Great-Britain, and of the East-India-Company, I met them in the sanguine hope, that one spirit would have animated the collective body, and united us so firmly in pursuit of the great objects of our appointment, that dissensions could not have found a place in our Councils. How great then is my unhappiness and disappointment to see in an instant this agreeable, this honorable scene, my imagination formed, prove a chimera, a mere chimera; for on the moment of our entering on the Administration, a scene of contention commenced; and, to my mortification, I found my attention immediately called to measures of the late Government, that could not be retracted, having already operated and produced the beneficial consequences they were planned to effect. We might, indeed, risk these advantages to the State by an ill-timed impatience to contract its political connexions; a risk I deemed incumbent on myself, if possible, to avert; and on mature thought I have no reason to doubt the justness of my sentiments, or the propriety of that support I judged due to the Governor-General in our late debates. My ultimate object was obviously the benefit of the State, not contracted by nice examination of the literal confined meaning of any one particular order, but directed to the general good within our grasp, and offered to us in the state and posture of our political connexions at the time we entered on the Government. Further I considered, and I foresaw no possible advantage to the Nation, or to the Company, in debating the propriety of past measures, submitted long since to our Superiors, and for which neither myself, nor any of the Gentlemen of the present Administration (the Governor excepted) were responsible. The benefits of the measures alone were left to us, unburdened with responsibility; why then not secure them? What necessity for rendering them precarious by a precipitation that appears, in degree, to lose the object, while it inflicts the severest censure on the late Government? A principle of action, that I flatter myself will fully acquit me in the public opinion, whatever decision it may pass on the sentiments I have delivered.

Mr. Barwell's  
minute.

It is with diffidence, and with the utmost deference to the judgment my Superiors may give on a policy that terminates prosperously for their affairs, I adventure to confirm opinions already pronounced. I am conscious it is not my province to take upon me to approve or condemn measures which have come before their tribunal; but this has been rendered unavoidable in the present instance, from their being made the subject of debate. Thus situated, I have carefully considered and weighed every circumstance. I have marked with attention the rise, progress, execution, and happy consequences resulting to this Government from its connexions with the Vizier; and pronounce, from conviction, the late Administration fully justified, and its measures entirely consonant to the first principles of sound policy. As this is my opinion, I must coincide in the Governor-General's Letter of Appeal. It is, from all the information I have obtained, a candid exposition of facts; it is unexceptionable in mode and form, and authorized by the Court of Directors. This, I apprehend, is not the case with the appeal of the Members in opposition; not having seen it, I cannot speak to the matter; but it is at least exceptionable in form, and the first instance, within my knowledge, of a part of the Administration formally separating itself. Opposing sentiments I have often seen recorded on the proceedings of the Council, but I never before saw them addressed to the Direction in Letters from the several Members. I will not therefore attempt to extend known privileges, or to assume new ones to my station. I approve, and would affix my name to the Governor-General's Appeal; but as the request is improper, and its irregularity would determine him to decline it, I take this method of expressing my entire approbation, and joining thus far the Governor-General's Address to the Court of Directors.

Signed,

RICHARD BARWELL.

A true copy,

J. P. AURIOL,  
Assistant-Secretary.

N

## Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General and Council of Bengal, dated 3d March, 1775.

49. **B**Y Letters received over land from our Select Committee at Fort-William, dated the 14th and 19th May, 1774, we are informed of the defeat and death of Hafez Rhamut Cawn, Chief of the Rohillas, and of the probability of that Country being speedily subdued by Sujah-ul-Dowla; and notwithstanding the pecuniary advantages which the Company have gained by the event, we are exceedingly concerned to find, that our Arms have been employed in the conquest of the Rohillas, though we must confess the conduct of their Chiefs, in refusing to fulfil their solemn stipulations with the Vizier, seems to have drawn upon them the calamities they have suffered.

50. After noticing the cautionary terms settled with Sujah-ul-Dowla, previous to the march of our Troops, we can have no doubt of his having fulfilled the conditions of the agreement by which he became entitled to our assistance, and had the object in view been extended no further, than to compel payment of the forty Lacks of Rupees due to the Vizier and the Company for the protection afforded the Rohillas, we should have had less objection to the measure; though we must confess it would have been much more agreeable to us, if the Rohillas had faithfully complied with their engagements, which were entered into for the immediate and mutual defence of the contracting parties, and in which also the interest of the Company was concerned.

51. In a political view, we fear the late engagements with Sujah-ul-Dowla are not altogether unexceptionable; however, as they have been carried into execution, we can only enjoin you to take especial care, that the additional power acquired by the Vizier be prevented from operating to the detriment of the Company. We trust he is now enabled to repel the Marattas in that quarter, should they repeat their incursions, which petty states have not been able to do. His Country must therefore be considered as a barrier to our own Possessions, and the ideas of our having rendered him respectable, and of our friendship being absolutely necessary to his future security, can never be too much inculcated.

52. The treaty of Allahabad compels us to assist the Vizier in defending his Dominions in case they shall at any time hereafter be attacked; but in regard to new conquests, or to any warlike enterprises beyond his own territories, we absolutely prohibit you from employing our Troops on such expeditions on any pretence whatever.

53. We much approve the alteration made in the second article of the treaty of Allahabad, respecting the terms upon which our assistance is in case of necessity to be granted to Sujah-ul-Dowla, as those terms were very inadequate to the service to be performed, and consequently very improper.

From

From the Court of Directors to the Governor-General and Council at Fort-William in Bengal, dated 7th March, 1775.

1. **SINCE** we wrote to you under date of the 3d. instant, we have received two Letters from our President and Council of Fort-William, dated the 22d of August, 1774, and also a Letter from our Select Committee, dated the 24th of the same month.

2. The above advices were sent by the Hawke Sloop, by way of Fort St. George, which vessel arrived at the Cape of Good Hope the 30th December, and they were brought from thence by His Majesty's Ship Intrepid.

3. By the above-mentioned letter from our Select Committee, we are informed that a Brigade of our Troops, which by former advices was expected to have been returned within our Provinces, had nevertheless, at the solicitation of Sujah-ul-Dowla, penetrated into the center of the Rohilla Country on the opposite side of the Ganges. The above advices cannot but alarm us exceedingly; more especially when we attend to the situation and circumstances of the neighbouring powers, and are informed, in the Letter above-mentioned, of the steps taken by the King, and the probability there is of the Marattas being sufficiently disengaged from their intestine broils to turn their arms against our possessions, if they shall deem it for their interest to commit depredations therein.

4. Under the above circumstances, we could not omit the present opportunity of testifying our concern, on finding so considerable a part of our army at such a distance from our territories, and so employed as to render it difficult for them to repair within the Provinces in time to prevent the ravages of an enemy, in case the tranquillity of Bengal should be suddenly interrupted.

5. We therefore direct, that you on no account permit our Troops to remain beyond the line of defence originally settled with Sujah-ul Dowla; but that you forthwith take measures for their recall, in case they shall not be returned before the arrival of these our Orders.

6. And as the hazard to which our possessions are exposed by undertaking such distant expeditions appears to us very great, and the measure so very repugnant to every idea of sound policy, we hereby absolutely restrict you from all attempts of this nature in future; and we positively direct, that you never consent to employ our Troops beyond the limits of our own Provinces, or those of our Ally Sujah-ul-Dowla, including therein such territories only as we are by treaty obliged to defend, in case his dominions shall at any time be actually invaded.

We are

Your affectionate friends,

EDWARD WHEELER,  
JOHN HARRISON,  
T. B. ROUS,  
NATHANIEL SMITH,  
PETER LASCELLES,  
CHARLES BODDAM,  
W. G. FREEMAN,  
JOHN MICHIE,  
WILLIAM JAMES,  
JOHN WOODHOUSE,  
GEORGE CUMING,  
GEORGE TATE,  
JOSEPH SPARKES,  
SAMUEL PEACH,  
JOHN SMITH,  
RICHARD HALL.

London, the 7th  
March, 1775.



Extract of Letter from the Governor-General and Council in their Public Department, dated 4th January, 1775; received per Dutton, 18th July, 1775.

† Appendix,  
No. 20.

18. **T**HE Commissary-General lately returned from the Army, and soon after his arrival addressed † us on the alteration which he conceived his situation had undergone by the late change of Administration, and requested that he might be summoned, as formerly, to take his seat with a deliberative voice at the Board of Inspection; and that he might be put on the establishment as to Salary on the same footing with the youngest member of our Board.

19. We acquainted him through our Secretary in reply, that we did not conceive that we were entitled from the Act of Parliament to admit him to a seat on any condition at our Board; nor did we think ourselves empowered to grant him any greater allowance as Commissary-General than what was enjoyed by the youngest Counsellor on the late Establishment.

‡ Appendix,  
No. 20. A.

20. On this resolution being communicated to him, the Commissary-General thought fit to address ‡ us again, representing that he could not acquiesce in it, as he apprehended he could not answer the original intention of his appointment, if he was debarred the seat he required; and also declared, that he deemed himself entitled to the allowances of the youngest Counsellor on the present establishment; and for these reasons he required our permission to resign the service, and to repair to Europe by the Dutton, to submit his case to your Honorable Court for their final determination.

§ Appendix,  
No. 20. B.

21. We accordingly granted Colonel Maclean the permission he asked for, having first called him before us to examine him concerning some accounts and matters in this Department, § on which we desired information. He attended and gave us the satisfaction we wanted. His examination appears on the Proceedings.

Extract

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the Governor-General and Council of Fort-William, dated 3d March, 1775.

117. **T**HE opinion of our President and Council, on Consultation the 30th October, 1773, respecting the appointment of Mr. Maclean to the office of Commissary-General, the particular definition of his duty, and the settling of his salary and emoluments, are conformable to our orders and instructions on that subject; but we are concerned to find, that the Establishment fixed for that office greatly exceeds our intention, and that Mr. Maclean, in his address to our President and Council, has deviated in two very essential points from the letter and spirit of our said orders and instructions; first, by recommending an expensive establishment, and secondly, by suggesting an improper mode of providing contingent supplies.

118. We observe that the said Establishment consists of

- 1 Deputy, with Major's pay and batta;
- 4 Assistants, with Captain's pay and batta;
- 3 Clerks, at 200 rupees per month;
- 2 Ditto, at 100 ditto;
- 4 Ditto, at 150 ditto;

besides occasional assistance; and we find the above officers are all recommended by Mr. Maclean; and the annual amount of their salaries and office charges, exclusive of his own pay and allowances, are stated at seventy-nine thousand eight hundred rupees.

119. As we have no idea of the necessity of a Deputy Commissary with Major's pay and batta, nor of four assistants with the pay and batta of captains, we direct, that they be forthwith discharged, and that Mr. Maclean be only allowed such clerks as you shall think necessary for keeping the accounts and transacting the business of his office, who are to be appointed from amongst our civil servants not employed in any other department, and to have the same allowances as are usually made to assistants in the Accountant's Office at Fort-William; and we recommend the strictest frugality respecting the number of assistants to be so employed as aforesaid.

120. We are surprized to find that Col. Maclean should have informed our President and Council, that it was our intention to entrust him with the business of providing and furnishing us with any contingent supplies for the army, when it must have been evident, that he was intended to be a check upon the provision of those supplies; and we are equally surprized and concerned to find, that our President and Council upon such information have resolved, "That all contingent supplies, not provided by contract, shall be furnished by the Commissary-General," as he agrees to furnish them considerably cheaper than has been done heretofore.

121. Amongst the articles thus to be supplied, we find Mr. Maclean specifies iron, steel, copper, brails, canvas, wax candles, and wax cloth. — It seems to us very unnecessary that the Company should allow a profit on any of the above articles, as many of them are European Exports, and ought to be supplied from our own stores; but at all events it is very improper that the Commissary-General should be permitted to furnish them on his own account; we therefore direct, that you discontinue this mode of providing contingent supplies, and that on extraordinary occasions, when the exigency of the service shall render it absolutely necessary to purchase any kind or quantity of military stores otherwise than by contract, that they be purchased on the lowest terms possible by a proper person, but not by the Commissary-General. — And we also direct, that the indents of the commanding officer for such stores, the stipulated price, and the vouchers for delivery, be always produced, and submitted to your inspection and approbation, before you pass the accounts in which they

### Mr. Bristow appointed Resident at Sujah Dowlah's Court.

they shall be contained. And we further direct, that the Commissary-General be absolutely prohibited from buying or selling any article of military stores on his own account, or for his own emolument, directly or indirectly, on any pretence whatever.

122. But as it is probable that Col. Maclean, in consequence of the late regulations of our President and Council, may have actually bought military stores with an intent to supply us in manner before-mentioned, we permit you, in such case, to receive the same at prime cost, if they shall appear proper for our service, and if Mr. Maclean shall desire it, and to allow him interest upon the money for the time they shall have been in his possession.

123. We shall not permit the least deviation from our orders and instructions relative to the office of Commissary-General; nevertheless, if Mr. Maclean shall make it appear, after three years service, that he has been the means of retrenching our military expenses, or of effecting savings to the Company, we shall then consider what may be a proper recompence for his particular attention to our interest; but we shall reserve to ourselves the power of rewarding such extraordinary services.

Extract of Letter from the Governor-General and Council of Fort-William, in their Secret Department, dated 4th January, 1775; received in London, 18th July, 1775.

1. **W**E now address you by the Dutton and propose to continue our advices from this department on the plan we adopted for those by the British King, narrating only the resolutions and orders of the Board, and leaving the opinions and arguments of the different members to your judgment, as they will be found on the proceedings sent by this dispatch. We have only to request that you will be pleased to notice, that by the term Board, when we speak of their decisions, we mean only to avoid the invidious expression Majority, which we however only mean to include by the first term. When the Board are unanimous we shall take care to express it particularly.

2. Since our last Col. Champion arrived at the Presidency. Col. Galliez, who succeeded him in the command of the Brigade, duly received our instructions for his negotiations with the Vizier, and, by the latest advices from him, was preparing to carry them into execution. The Brigade was then at Ramgaut, but he proposed to move it immediately down within the limits of the Province of Oude, to remain there 'till he should have finished his negotiations with the Vizier.

3. We do not find that any part of the treasure received by the Vizier from Fuzullah Cawn was paid in to the commanding officer of the troops, as we were given to understand there would. By a letter from Mr. Middleton to the Governor-General we learn, that he (Mr. Middleton) had received from the Vizier fifteen lacks of rupees, and that he was to set out with it for the Presidency as soon as he could procure boats.

4. Mr. Grady is lately arrived safe from Fyzabad with the money entrusted to his charge of the former payment, being ten Lacks of rupees from the Vizier; he left five Lacks at Cossimbuzar by our order, and delivered the remaining five into the treasury here. The Tutaw for five lacks of rupees on Raja Cheyt Sing, which was also delivered to him, was not accepted.

5. It having been resolved that a fixed Resident at the Court of the Vizier should be appointed from the Company's Civil Servants, the Governor-General lately thought fit to propose the Honorable Frederick Stuart for that trust, but the Governor-General's proposition was not agreed to, Mr. Bristow being afterwards proposed by the General, and this proposal obtaining the concurrence of the Board, he was appointed accordingly with a salary and allowances similar to what Mr. Middleton enjoyed in the employment which he held at that Court. The proceedings on this appointment are referred to in the margin.\*

\* Appendix, No. 21.