

1707:

on which he order'd Count *Tilly* to advance with the Horse, and engage him till the Army came up; but the Country wherein *Vendome* was, being full of Inclosures, *Tilly* could not come at them for Want of the Foot, who were a great Way behind; so that they could not come time enough to his Assistance, by which *Vendome* march'd off at his Leisure. The Duke finding the Foot fatigued with their Night-March, order'd the Army to incamp, and the Horse to get Forrage; which *Vendome* perceiving, thought the Duke had given over his Design; therefore encamp'd at *Seneff*, two Leagues from us.

When the Duke found he halted so near him, as soon as it grew dark he march'd again towards him; but it now fell a raining to that degree, that our Men could hardly stand under it; however we made a Shift to get up with them by the time it was Day, which *Vendome* little expected, who immediately struck his Camp, and march'd off in great Confusion: but, as the Rain continued with Violence, so that the Infantry could neither keep their Arms dry, nor come up to assist the Cavalry, otherwise he would have paid for his halting at *Seneff*; he therefore made never another Halt till he got within his Lines at *Mons*, from whence he did not stir more this Campaign. The Duke finding the Enemy gone off, and the Rain continue, turned to the Right, and encamp'd at *Sonier*, and tho' it was not more than two Leagues from our former Ground, the Horse marching before the Foot, made the Ground so miry, that a great many Men perish'd in the Sloughs; and it was three Days before the last of our Foot got up. Our Army lay here Weather-bound a full Month before we could get hence; and as nothing of Consequence happen'd after, I end this Campaign.

1708.

The *French King* finding he could do nothing in *Flanders*, resolv'd on trying what he could do with the *Pretender* in *Scotland*; the disaffected Party of that Kingdom having often solicited him to send the *Pretender* to them, on which they would do Wonders: this put Old *Lewis* on fitting out a Squadron of 24 light Ships at *Dunkirk*, commanded by the *Chevalier Forbin*, who in the Beginning of *March* sail'd with the *Pretender* and a Body of Troops towards the *Firth* of *Edinburgh*.

England had timely Notice of their Design, and had order'd Sir *George Byng* with a good Squadron to watch *Forbin's* Motion; however, could not prevent his sailing out of *Dunkirk*, and had got 18 Hours start of him: Sir *George* follow'd, keeping along the *English Coast*, *Forbin* having kept on the other Side the Channel along the Coast of *Holland*.

There was upon this Occasion 10 *British* Battalions from *Flanders* order'd to embark at *Ostend* on board Transports, and sail under Convoy of Admiral *Baker*, who had ten Men of War for that Purpose. We sail'd to *Tiunmouth*, where we lay on board, waiting the Event of Sir *George*, who had by this time got near the Mouth of the *Firth*: But *Forbin* keeping on the opposite Shore, when he stood over, found he had overshot his Post, wherefore was forced to tack to recover it: but, as he was just upon standing in to the *Firth*, he perceived Sir *George*, upon which he tack'd again, and crowding all the Sail he could, stood away towards the Coast of *Denmark*; and having clear light Ships, out-sail'd Sir *George*, and got back to *Dunkirk*. Thus ended this famous Expedition, after which our ten Battalions sail'd back to *Ostend*, and landed the 14th of *April*.

In the Beginning of *May* the Duke assembled the Army at *Tarleank*, between *Louvain* and *Brussels*, where

where he waited for the coming of Prince *Eugene*, who was on a full March from the *Rhine* with 30,000 Germans to join him. 1708.

Old *Lewis* having fail'd in his *Scottish* Expedition, had now form'd another Project to be transacted in the *Netherlands* this Campaign; wherefore he had augmented his Army to 110,000, with whom *Vendome* encamp'd between *Soniers* and *Chirre*: Here the Duke of *Burgundy* came, and took the Command of the Army, who was accompany'd by the Duke of *Berry*, and the *Pretender*, under the Title of the *Chevalier de St. George*: On *Vendome's* advancing to *Soniers*, the Duke march'd to *Hall*, in order to cover *Brussels*, on which he thought the Enemy had a Design.

The Project that he thought had been concerted in the Court of *France* for the Operations of this Campaign was this: The Elector of *Bavaria*, when Governor of the Low Countries, had liv'd after a most profuse Manner, which gained much on the Affections of the People, especially among the Ladies, and still kept up a secret Correspondence among them; and had now brought Matters to bear, that the Magistrates of most of the Towns were to deliver them up to the *French*, whenever their Army appeared before them.

My Lord *Marlboro'* (whose Intelligence in the Court of *France* never fail'd him) had timely Notice of all this, wherefore it was that he had sent to Prince *Eugene* to come to his Assistance. *Burgundy* had the Command of the *French* Army, yet the Management was wholly in *Vendome*; so, according to the above Scheme, towards the latter End of *June*, he decamp'd very silently, upon beating Tattoo, and never halted till he came before the Gates of *Ghent*, which the Magistrates threw open to him, and receiv'd Lieut. Gen. *Lamott* with 20,000 Men,

1708. Men, 5,000 of which he sent that Night to *Bruges*, which did the same.

Vendome puff'd with this Success, march'd next Morning to the *Scheld*, in hopes to get into *Oudenarde* after the same Manner; but my Lord *Marlboro'* was before-hand with him there: for, next Morning, after *Vendome* had stole this March of him, he decamp'd, and follow'd as fast as he could, and got to *Oudenarde* before him; upon which *Vendome* crossed the *Scheld* at *Gaver*, thinking to get home that Way. Upon the Duke's coming to *Oudenarde*, he order'd Bridges to be laid over the *Scheld*, a little below the Town, and the Foot to pass as they came up, while he at the Head of the Horse pass'd thro' the Town, and drew up between *Vendome* and home, who begun now to wish he had never undertook their fine Project, and was at a Loss what to do: to return to *Ghent*, was to be penn'd up in a Corner of the Country, and cut off from his Garrisons; and he knew the *Germans* would join the Duke in a few Days; he therefore resolv'd to stand a Battle; and tho' he was at least 10,000 Men stronger than the Duke, yet he would not venture to attack him, but drew up his Army behind a strong Piece of Ground, having the *Scheld* with a great many Inclosures on his left, with the Village *Greenbeim* in the Front of the Inclosures, from whence was a marshy Ground full of Trees and Brush-Wood, which extended to a rising Ground, whereon was a noble Plain, on which he drew up all his Cavalry interlined with some Foot: Behind the marshy Ground, and so on to the *Scheld*, he drew up all the rest of his Infantry, and placed in the Village some Foot and Dragoons; he also caus'd a great many Trees to be cut down in the marshy Ground, to obstruct our Passage.

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This was the Disposition *Vendome* had made of his Army. 1708.

The Duke ranged the greatest Part of his Infantry from the *Scheld*, along the marshy Ground ; and in the Plain drew up all the Cavalry, keeping with him 15 Battalions of the *Dutch* Foot under the Command of the Prince of *Orange*. Before the Duke had form'd his Lines, Prince *Eugene* came up in Person, but had left his Troops two Days March behind.

The Battle began by attacking the Village near the *Scheld*, which being advanced something from their Line, they quitted with little Opposition ; upon which our Infantry acted on the marshy Grounds, and attack'd their main Body of Foot, who stood their Ground with great Resolution ; at the same time our Cavalry on the Plain advanc'd on theirs with such Resolution, as made them give Way at once : nor did they make one brave Charge all this Day, but still gave Ground as our Horse charged them. Our Infantry here engaged theirs ; so that they gave no Disturbance to our Horse, who also shrunk back with their Horse : thus we kept pressing on them in the Plain till we drove them past the marshy Ground, they never making one gallant Push all this While : at length our Horse drove resolutely in upon them, which entirely broke them, and put them to the Rout ; nor could all their Generals get them to rally again, so as to give the least Assistance in helping to bring off their Foot, those of their Foot in the Plain undergoing the Fate that attend all Foot in the like Case.

Their Infantry that defended the marshy Ground behaved very gallantly, insomuch that our Foot could not force them from thence, till the Prince of *Orange* came on their Flank with the 13 *Dutch* Battalions he

1708. had with him; and they seeing their Horse drove out of the Field, made down to the Inclosures on the *Scheld*, where our Horse could not come at them, nor could the Foot follow them, being very much fatigued; however, they pour'd their Fire in upon them as they were going off, which did great Execution.

Vendome with his shater'd Troops made the best of his Way to *Ghent*, nor did he think himself safe till he had got thorough the Town, and encamp'd along the Canal to *Bruges*. There were kill'd and taken of the Enemy about 10,000; and were it not for the Inclosures along the *Scheld*, hardly any of their Foot would have got off.

Our Foot suffer'd most on this Occasion; nor did the Duke pursue them much further than the Field of Battle, on which we lay all Night.

Next Day a Detachment was sent to secure the Enemies Lines at *Warneston*. The Germans being arriv'd, our Generals resolv'd on the Siege of *Lisle*; a bold Undertaking: Whereupon we marched, and invested that famous City: However, the Marshal *Boufflers* found Means to throw himself with a good Body of Troops into it; so that the Garrison consisted of 14,000 effective Men, besides a great Number of the Inhabitants, who did good Service during the Siege. The Out-Works and Fortifications, together with the Citadel, were *Vaubon's* Master-Piece, whereon he had exerted the utmost of his Skill, and was said to be a hazardous Undertaking of our Generals.

The second of *August*, O. S. our Army fate down before *Lisle*; Prince *Eugene* undertook the Siege with 50 Battalions and 40 Squadrons (our Regiment being one, wherein we suffer'd very much) while the Duke

Duke of *Marlboro'* with the rest of the Army cover'd him. 1708.

The *French* Court, who expected great Matters from this Campaign, were very much surpriz'd and chagrin'd on the Defeat of their Army at *Oudenard*; but were Thunder-struck when they found their Lines demolish'd, and their beloved City of *Lisse* invested: Whereupon they immediately ordered the Duke of *Berwick* to march with a strong Detachment from the *Rhine* to the *Netherlands* to assist *Vendome* in raising the Siege. *Berwick* came, and encamp'd between *Doway* and *Tournay*, to cover that Part of the Country from our Parties.

I shall take no Notice of the Progress of this famous Siege, more than the Stratagems used by the Generals on both Sides; the one for carrying it on, and the other for raising it. *Vendome* lay encamp'd on the Canal (from whence the Princes of the Blood, with the *Chevalier*, went home by the Way of *Newport*) till the Arrival of the Duke of *Berwick*, at which time he march'd thro' *Ghent*, and keeping the *Scheld* on his Right, marched up that River, till he came near *Tournay*, where he cross'd it, and join'd *Berwick*: and now being much superior in Numbers, gave out, that he would oblige our Generals to raise the Siege; whereupon he advanc'd towards the Duke, upon which Prince *Eugene* came and join'd him with what Troops could be spared from the Siege, leaving the Prince of *Orange* to command in his Absence. *Vendome* advanc'd within Cannon-shot of the Duke, and fell to cannonading each other with great Fury for the whole Day after; on which he retired at a small Distance: upon which the Duke caused an Intrenchment to be thrown up in the Front of his Camp, to prevent any sudden Surprise, and Prince *Eugene* returned again to the Siege. In a few Days

1708. Days after, *Vendome* advanced a second time, which brought Prince *Eugene* again from the Siege, and both Armies fell again to cannonading, which continued till Night; when they lay on their Arms till Morning, at which time our General expected to be attack'd, but they fell to cannonading again. Our Generals finding this wasted their Ammunition much, and that our Men were pretty well cover'd by the Intrenchment from their Fire, therefore grew sparing of it. This *Vendome* very well knew therefore, when we abated in our Fire, and that it would be too hazardous to attack us: besides, he found no Ardor in his Troops to it; he therefore formed a Design for cutting off our Communication from our Garrisons on the other Side the *Scheld*, from whence we had all our Stores and Provisions; he therefore drew off in the Night, and marched to the other Side of the *Scheld*, and ranged his Army along the Banks of that River, and threw up a strong Intrenchment all the Way to *Oudenard*, carrying it round the Town by *Gaver*; by which he effected his Design, and was confident our Army could not subsist long before *Lisse*: but the Duke foreseeing the Difficulties that would arise from thence, had sent an Express to *England* for Lieut. Gen. *Earl*, who at this time was embark'd with 6000 Men for *Spain*, and lay Wind-bound, to sail to *Ostend*: so the Wind that prevented his sailing to *Spain*, brought him to *Ostend*, with a great Quantity of Stores and Provisions; as also great Quantities sent from *Holland*; from whence he sent, soon after his Arrival, a large Convoy of all manner of Necessaries, which were much wanted at the Siege: On which the Duke march'd with the Covering-Army to *Resflare*, to facilitate the Convoys that were to come from *Ostend*, whence he sent Major-Gen. *Webb* with 6000 Men to bring up
this

this first Convoy. *Vendome* saw that the Fate of *Lisle* depended in a great measure on its Arrival; wherefore he ordered Lieut. Gen. *Lamott* to march with 24,000 Men to intercept it. *Lamott* came up with *Webb* at the Wood of *Winnendale*, who drew up his Men to all the Advantage the Ground would admit of. *Lamott* fell to cannonading him, but *Webb* ordered his Men to lie flat on the Ground; by which the Cannon did little, or no Hurt: after this *Lamott* attack'd him several times, and was as often repuls'd.

The Duke having an Account of the March of *Lamott*, ordered Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* with a Body of Horse to the Succour of *Webb*; who, upon the hearing *Lamott*'s Cannon, made all the Haste he could to *Webb*'s Assistance; on whose appearing *Lamott* left the Field with great Precipitation, leaving all his Cannon; and this grand Convoy arrived safe, which may be said was the taking of *Lisle*. *Webb* gain'd great Honour by this gallant Action, tho' a great deal was owing to *Lamott*'s ill Conduct; and *Webb* spoil'd all, by boasting too much of it.

Boufflers having been too profuse of his Ammunition at the Beginning of the Siege, began now to want Powder; who found Means to acquaint *Vendome*, who could find no other Way of supplying him, but by ordering the Duke of *Luxemburg* with 2000 choice Horse, each of them taking 100 lb. of Powder behind him, and so to make a bold Push for throwing themselves into *Lisle*: whereupon they advanced with great Boughs in their Hats along the Causeway that leads from *Doway*; and marching in great Order up to our advanc'd Guard, who, upon challenging them, answered, they were *Germans* of our Army, that had been on an Out-Command, and were returning with Prisoners they had taken; upon which

1708. which the Officer let them pass : but coming to the next Guard, the Officer examining them more strictly, they then clapp'd Spurs to their Horses, and rode by the Guard as hard as they could drive towards the Town ; but the Officer firing on them, gave the Alarm ; so all that were in their Way turn'd out, and fell firing at them, killing a good many of them, and setting Fire to their Baggs of Powder ; however, the foremost drove on, so that near 1000 of them got into the Town in a Cloud of Smoak ; for riding in a Crowd, the Baggs which our Men had set Fire to, set Fire to others, by which a great many were blown up ; those that were behind made backwards to *Doway* : but a great many were kill'd before they got clear of our Camp. This Affair happened the very Day of *Winnendal* Fight.

There came two other Convoys safe from *Ostend*, which did the Business, and that was all ; for soon after *Vendome* found Means to cut off our Communication with *Ostend*, by taking the Post of *Leffingen*, and then cutting the Dykes, laid all that Country under Water : but this was too late, for *Boufflers* was, on the 12th of *October*, obliged to surrender the Town, and retire with his Garrison into the Citadel, having not above 5000 fit for Service.

About this time the Elector of *Bavaria* with 12,000 Men came before *Brussels*, expecting that the Inhabitants would rise in his Favour : but tho' their Inclinations were good, yet seeing how Matters went, kept them quiet ; and Count *Pascal* the Governor, with a Garrison of 5000 Men, behaved with great Bravery. The Elector made a Lodgment on the Counterscarp, and a Breach in the Wall ; but by a vigorous Sally of the Garrison, he was drove from the Counterscarp with a considerable Loss. The Duke hearing the Elector was fate down before *Brussels*,

sels, resolved on the Relief of it; therefore marched towards the *Scheld*, leaving Prince *Eugene* in Possession of the Town of *Lisle*, to carry on the Siege of the Citadel. 1708.

Upon the Duke's approaching the *Scheld*, he made two Detachments, one under the Command of the Earl of *Orkney*, and Count *Loatain*; the other under Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* and Brigadier *Evans*: the former march'd to *Gaver*, the latter to *Kirkhoven*, where they both pass'd the *Scheld*, without the least Opposition, to the great Shame of the Arms of *France*, and Surprize of all Men; upon which the *French* abandon'd all their mighty Works they had thrown up along that River, some making towards *Tournay*, but the greatest Part towards *Ghent*, leaving most of their Cannon behind them. The Duke march'd with the Main of his Army to *Kirkhoven*, where having pass'd the *Scheld*, he march'd to *Brussels*; but, on the Elector's hearing he had pass'd the *Scheld*, he stole off in the Night, and made the best of his Way to *Namur*, leaving all his Cannon, Ammunition, and Wounded behind him. Soon after this *Boufflers* surrendred the Citadel of *Lisle*, and *Vendome* march'd home by the Way of *Newport*, leaving *Lamott* with about 20,000 Men to defend his new Conquest of *Ghent* and *Bruges*: but the Duke dislodg'd him from thence before he put the Army into Quarters; for he sat down before *Ghent* on the 7th of *December*, and on the 24th *Lamott* surrendred, having Liberty to march home after *Vendome* with all his Troops. Thus ended this great and long Campaign, with Disgrace and Mortification to the *French* Court.

This was a very wet Spring, our Army could not take the Field till the latter End of *May*. The Duke open'd the Campaign near *Mennin*, where Prince

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Eugene 1709.

1709. *Eugene* join'd him with his *Germans*, our Army being upwards of 100,000, advanced to the other Side of *Lisle*.

The *French* King being displeased with the Conduct of the Duke of *Vendome*, sent this Year the Marshal *Villars* to command in his Stead, who drew his Army together at *Pont a Vendine*, within the new Lines they had thrown up last Winter. Our Generals advanced and encamp'd within less than two Leagues of him, and rode out next Morning to take a View of his Situation, which made him believe they design'd to attack him in that Post; wherefore he sent immediately to *Tournay* and *Doway* for a great Part of the Troops that garrison'd those Places, to join him.

Upon our beating Tattoo this Evening, Orders came along the Line for us to strike our Tents, and march. This made us believe that our Generals did really design to attack their Lines next Morning; but on our marching off to the Left, which was quite the contrary Way, we could not tell what to think of it; yet, when Day appear'd, were not a little surprized to find ourselves before the City of *Tournay*, which we immediately invested. This was no less a Surprize on *Villars*, especially since he had drain'd the City of the best of its Troops, there being not above 5000 Men left to defend the great Number of Works that were about it; nor was it now in the Power of *Villars* to return those Troops.

SIEGE of TOURNAY.

This was a nice Finesse of our Generals, worthy a Remark. The *French* Court was surprized when they heard of it, wherefore they sent Marshal *Boufflers* with a Reinforcement of Troops from the *Rhine*, to join

1709.

join *Villars*, by which his Army was 15000 more than ours. I shall not take Notice of the Progress of the Siege, more than that Prince *Eugene* undertook it, while the Duke cover'd him; (our Regiment, tho' employ'd in the Siege of both the Town and Citadel of *Lisle*, was also at the Siege of both Town and Citadel of this Place, and were great Sufferers at both.) The Marquis *De Surville*, who commanded, surrendred the Town on the 19th of *July*, and retired into the Citadel; which is certainly one of the best fortify'd Places by Art that is in the World, there being more Works a great deal under Ground than above, which made our Approach very difficult; insomuch that we were obliged to carry great Part of our Works under Ground, by which, and the springing their Mines, we lost great Numbers of Men: However, they having but a slender Garrison, their Men were fatigued out of their Lives, so were obliged to surrender on the 22d of *August*.

This important Place being taken, our Generals design'd on *Mons*; in order to which the Prince of *Hesse* was sent with a strong Detachment before to dislodge a Party of Dragoons that were posted near *Mons*, the Army marching soon after him; but, upon the Approach of the Prince, the Dragoons drew off - - - When *Villars* found *Tournay* invested, he pass'd the *Scharp*, and encamp'd between that River and the *Scheld*, and marched that Way, in hopes of getting thither before them: but finding they had got before him, he stopp'd short at *Malplacquet*, and finding it a strong Situation, resolv'd upon maintaining that Post, in order to give what Disturbance he could in our carrying on the Siege: whereupon he immediately fell to work in throwing up a strong Intrenchment, and cutting down Trees in the Wood

1709. that cover'd him, laying them across to prevent our coming at him.

Our Generals finding *Villars* possessed of this Ground, resolv'd to dislodge him : they march'd up to him the same Afternoon, and after taking a View of his Situation, were for attacking him at once ; but, as our Right Wing and some Battalions that were left to level the Works of *Tournay*, were not yet come, and the Day far spent, they deferr'd it till Morning : however, both Armies cannonaded each other with great Fury, and *Villars* kept his Men at Work all Night ; so that in the Morning his Army seem'd to be drawn up within a strong Fortification. His Right was cover'd with a Morass with Intrenchments and Hedges before him ; in his Left he had the Wood of *Sart*, and along his Front were several Woods interspersed with Trees cut down, and Intrenchments thrown up one within another ; in-somuch that it was generally believed our Generals would not venture to attack them ; and especially since they could carry on the Siege of *Mons* without coming to that Extremity : but wanton with Success, our Troops come up, on the 31st of *August*, O. S. and the Attack was made about half an Hour after Eight in the Morning. General *Schulemberg*, with the *German*s on the Right, attack'd the Left of the Enemy in the Wood of *Sart* ; the Duke of *Argyll*, with Part of the *British* Troops, attack'd the Intrenchments about *Tanniers*. Lieut. Gen. *Witbers*, with the Right of the *British* and Auxiliaries, attack'd those about *Blarengiers* and *Malplacquet* ; and the Prince of *Orange* at the Head of the *Dutch* attack'd their Right, and those in the Wood of *Lamert*.

Thus was *Villars* attack'd by our Infantry in all Parts at once, our Cavalry drawn up close in the Rear, till our Infantry, after a long and bloody Dispute,

1709.

pute, broke in upon them in all Places, and put 'em to the Rout; at which time the Cavalry fell on them, and made a most terrible Slaughter: however, tho' *Villars* behaved with great Courage and Resolution, and was carry'd wounded out of the Field, yet *Boufflers* made a gallant Retreat towards *Quesnoy*, and drew within their Lines that were between that Place and *Valenchnis*. Our Generals had enough of this Battle; for they did not offer to pursue, after we had drove them a little Way from their Works, but rested satisfy'd with being Masters of the Field. It was the most desperate and bloody Attack and Battle that had been fought in the Memory of Man; and both our Generals were very much blam'd for throwing away so many brave Men's Lives, when there was no Occasion: It was the only rash Thing the Duke of *Marlboro'* was ever guilty of; and it was generally believ'd that he was press'd to it by Prince *Eugene*: and this very Battle gave the Duke's Enemies a Handle to exclaim against him, in saying he was a Man delighted in War, and valued not the Lives of Men.

The Battle lasted from Eight in the Morning till Three in the Afternoon. The Loss was computed to be near 18,000 kill'd and wounded on each Side; but we took a great many Prisoners, with all their Artillery. After the Battle we invested *Mons*, which surrendred the 9th of *October*, and then both Armies went into Quarters.

Our two Generals, resolv'd to push on the War in these Parts, assembled the Army near *Tournay*, in the Beginning of *April*, before the *French* could get into the Field; by which we pass'd their Lines, on the 9th, at *Pont a Vendin*, without the least Opposition, from whence we march'd to the Plains of *Lens*.


1710.


1710.

Villars at this time was assembling his Army behind the *Scharp*; but on our advancing towards him, he retired with Precipitation behind the *Sensett*, leaving some of his Tents and Baggage behind him: on which we invested *Doway*, in which and Fort *Scharp* were a Garrison of 1000 Men, commanded by Lieut. Gen. *Albergotty*, an old experienced Officer.

Soon after *Doway* was invested, *Villars* having got all his Army together, drew from behind the *Sensett*, and encamp'd on the Plains before *Arras*; and, according to the *French* Way of Gasconading, gave out, that he would make our Generals repent their sitting down before *Doway*: upon which the Duke drew the Covering-Army on the Plains before *Doway*, and made a Disposition for receiving him, whilst Prince *Eugene* was carrying on the Siege.

Villars advanc'd within Cannon-shot of us, and made a Shew of attacking us, on which Prince *Eugene* join'd us with what Troops could be spared from the Siege; but they soon found this was only a *French* Air of *Villars* to retard the Siege: whereupon the Duke order'd a slight Intrenchment to be thrown up in the Front of his Camp, and Prince *Eugene* return'd to the Siege, and *Villars* march'd back to the Plains of *Arras*. Notwithstanding *Albergotty* made a very gallant Defence in disputing every Inch of Ground, and making several desperate Sallies, in which great Numbers were kill'd on both Sides; yet he was obliged to surrender both the Town and Fort *Scharp*, on the 15th of *June*. This Siege was no sooner over, tho' *Villars's* Army much out-number'd ours, than he retir'd behind the *Sensett*, so that there was no coming at him, nor laying Siege to *Arras*: on which our Generals laid Siege to *Bethune*, which surrendered the 20th of *August*. After which we invested

vested both *St. Vincent* and *Arre* at the same time. 1710. 
The first of these Places surrendred in a short time;
but *Arre*, very strong by Art and Nature, held out
a long Siege, and did not surrender till the latter End
of *October*; *Villars* all the while never offering to
stir from behind the *Senset*. This Siege over, both
Armies went into Quarters.

I am now come to the last Campaign the Duke 1711. 
of *Marlboro'* ever made. Our Affairs in *England*
having taken another Turn, the Queen, soon after
the Death of her Bosom-Friend, the Prince of *Den-*
mark, was so infatuated as to change her old trusty
Ministry, and brought in a Sett of vile Creatures,
that were entirely in the *Pretender's* Interest, who
overturn'd all that had hitherto been doing; and tho'
France was reduced to the last Extremity, and not
able to hold out another Campaign, yet did these
perfidious Men prevail so far on this weak Woman,
the Queen, as to court *France* for a Peace, in order
to bring in their beloved *Chevalier*: But this being
foreign to my Purpose, I shall wave that Matter, and
return to our Campaign. In order to which, the
Duke of *Marlboro'* shew'd some of the finest Schemes
and Turns in War, that is to be found in History;
therefore I shall be the more particular in relating it
according to the best of my Judgment and Know-
ledge.

The Beginning of *May* our Army rendezvous'd
near *Doway*, where both our Generals came to the
Head of us; but our Cabinet-General at Home,
and the Court of *France*, had so concerted Matters,
that broke all the Measures our Generals had taken for
putting an End to the War this Campaign; for *France*,
instead of sending a powerful Army into the *Nether-*
lands, to withstand our two Generals, order'd only
between 80 and 90,000 under *Villars* to guard the

1711. new Lines they had thrown up last Winter, having sent all the Forces they could spare to the *Rhine* from all Parts, in order to send the Elector of *Bavaria* with a Body of Troops into his own Country; as also for disturbing the Election of the present Emperor *Charles* the Sixth, which was to be held at *Frankfort* this Summer. This oblig'd Prince *Eugene* to march with his Troops with what Expedition he could to the *Rhine*; and our Ministry, to prevent the Duke from doing any thing against *Villars*, sent for about 6000 of our *British* Troops to go upon their famous *Canada* Expedition; so that my Lord *Marlborough* was left alone with an Army not quite 75,000, and notwithstanding *Villars* was more than 10,000 more than the Duke, yet he had positive Orders from his Court not to hazard a Battle, unless it were in Defence of his Lines, which was now the last Barrier *France* had on their Side to cover their Country; for old *Lewis*, at this Time, having coin'd a new Army of *French* Guineas, fought his Battles with much more Success in our Cabinet, than his Army could do in the Field; wherefore all that *Villars* could do was to keep the Duke of *Marlborough* out of his Lines, which considering the Strength and Nature of them, one might imagine was no great Hardship upon him, for they were the strongest that ever *France* had, being just on the very Brink of the Kingdom.

Soon after Prince *Eugene* march'd off, the Duke advanc'd into the Plains of *Lens*, having his Left within half a League of *Doway*, in Hopes it might tempt *Villars* to draw out of his Lines, and give him Battle on these Plains; but *Villars* took Care to observe his Orders, and would not stir a Foot from thence, whereupon the Duke form'd one of the noblest

blest Schemes that ever was projected by a General, which was as follows. 1711.

That Part of *Villars's* Lines wherein he lay encamp'd, had a large deep Morafs in the Front of them, near an *English* Mile over, which was occasion'd by the *Sensett* branching out in several Channels from *Arras*, which made this Morafs extend all the Way from thence to *Bousbain*, over which were two Causeways, for the Conveniency of the Country People. *Villars* had these in his Front, and on our Side of one of 'em was a strong Fort call'd *Arleux*, in which he kept a strong Garrison. The Duke wanted to have *Villars* himself demolish this Fort. He saw he could take it when he pleas'd, and demolish it when he had done, but he knew as soon as he was march'd from thence, *Villars* would soon come and rebuild it; but should he pretend to fortify it, then he expected as soon as he was march'd off, *Villars* would come and retake and demolish it. According to this Scheme the Duke made a Detachment of as many Battalions and Squadrons as were requisite for that Purpose, under the Command of Lieutenant-General *Rantzau*, an old experienc'd Officer; and order'd that this Detachment should incamp on the Glacis of *Doway*, two small Leagues from *Arleux*, there to lie till Matters were got ready for the Siege. The Lieutenant-General thinking the Detachment safe under the Cannon of *Doway*, took up his Quarters in Town, as did also the commanding Officers; and those that lay in Camp took Example of their Commanders, and thinking themselves secure, were not troubled about keeping such Out-Guards as were necessary.

Villars having an Account of the careless Encampment of this Detachment, sent a good Body of Horse and Dragoons over the Causey of *Arleux*, and from

1711.

from thence when it grew duskish march'd with all the Silence imaginable towards our Detachment, so that about One in the Morning he took them Napping, without being challeng'd by one Centinel, fell in upon the right Flank of the Horse, where they made great Havock; but the Quarter-Guards of the Foot, taking the Alarm, fired at them: This alarm'd the Foot, who running to Arms even in their Shirts, attack'd them with the greatest Fury, and put a Stop to their advancing any further than the Horse; but had they not fallen to plunder as they did (a bewitching Thing to all Soldiers, whereby many a Battle has been lost, and brave Designs frustrated) they might have cut the whole Detachment to Pieces, and have had the Plunder when they had done. *Villars* finding the Foot had got to their Arms, order'd his Men to retire, who did with little or no Loss to themselves, but had kill'd and wounded a great many of our Troopers, and carried off most of their Horses.

This was the only Affront the Duke of *Marlborough* receiv'd during the whole War, nor indeed could the Blame be imputed to him. However, this may be a Caution to all Officers from the General to the Subaltern, never to think themselves too secure, let the Command be what it will; for could any Thing seem more so, than this Detachment, that was under the Cannon of such a fortified Town as *Dorway*, and our grand Army incamp'd so near them? which makes good the old Proverb, *Security dwells next Door to Ruin*.

The Duke was not a little ruffled on this Occasion, nor was *Villars* less elated, or the *Paris* Gazettes wanting in magnifying the Thing, and founding the Praise of *Villars*.—However, this Mouthful of Moon-shine did not last long. In a few Days after the Duke order'd the same Detachment to march and
lay

lay Siege to *Arleux*, who made themselves Masters of it in about eight Days. *Villars* with the whole French Army, then within a Mile of 'em, stood looking on this Fort being taken. The Duke seem'd very intent in having the Breaches repair'd, and new Works added to it, and appointed Engineers to see those Things done. However, in a few Days after, the Duke leaving but a slender Garrison therein, yet made a Shew of repairing the old and going on with the new Works. He march'd the Army fifteen Leagues on a Stretch away to the Right, pitching his Camp at *Coat* near *Hesden*, and gave Orders to the Army to lay in good store of Forage; but we were no sooner sat down in this Camp, but an Express came from the Governor of *Arleux*, that *Villars* had besieged him; and as the Breaches were not repair'd, nor any thing done for strengthning it, he must be obliged to surrender, unless he was soon relieved. On which, the Duke order'd Lieutenant General *Cadogan* to march with forty Squadrons, and all the Grenadiers of the Army, to the Relief of *Arleux*; but by the Time *Cadogan* got to *Lens*, he had an Account that *Arleux* was taken, and that the Enemy were hard at Work in demolishing it. Thus far the Duke succeeded in his Scheme; but on the Return of *Cadogan*, he seem'd very much chagrind, and said he would be revenged on *Villars*, and attack him in his Lines. By this Time, *Villars* having attended the Duke in his March hither, was encamp'd between the Head of the *Senset* and *Hesden*, where there was neither River nor Morass, but a plain champaign Country; but then the Lines were prodigious strong, with a double Faussée before them: And *Villars* hearing that the Duke resolved to attack him, made all the Preparations he could for giving him a warm Reception. He not only drained the Garrisons of

1711. of *Arras* and *Cambray*, of whatever Men could be spared, but he also drew all the Troops that were in the Lines far and near to join him; and being puffed with his late Success, wrote to his Master to let him know, that he had now brought the Duke of *Marlborough* to his *Ne plus ultra*, which was the Duke's *Motto*.

In the mean Time, the Duke seem'd very peevish, and would see but little Company, and seemingly resolved upon attacking *Villars*. In order to which, he drew off the heavy Baggage, with four Battalions and twelve Squadrons, to take Care of it, and to march towards *Dorway*. Two Days after, he sent off all the heavy Train with more Battalions and Squadrons, and the Day following he sent off all the Train (to four of the lightest Field Pieces) with all the Lumber of the Camp, and more Battalions and Squadrons, not leaving so much as a Coach or Chaise for himself or any General Officer. In this flying Condition he next Day march'd the Army to *Villerbrulen*, within a short League of *Villars*, who was now satisfied that the Duke was in earnest; for we had no sooner arrived at their Camp, but the Duke gave Orders for the Horse and Dragoons to cut Fascines. Early next Morning, being the twelfth of *July*, O. S. the Duke and most of the General Officers rode out at the Head of eighty Squadrons and all the Grenadiers of the Army, to take a View of the Lines and of *Villars's* Situation.

Brigadier *Durell* commanded our *British* Grenadiers, of whom I desired Liberty to ride out with the Duke, who readily consented. The Duke, with a Crowd about him, rode as near the Lines as their Cannon would permit; along which he rode a League and half, having a fair View of them, and the Nature of the Ground before them. He often stoppt, and

and shew'd the General Officers how he would have the Army drawn up before Day next Morning, and pointing with his Cane to the several Places the Attacks should be made. This he spake openly in the hearing of all about him, and as it were with a Confidence of Success; when at the same Time, every one with him were surprized at this rash and dangerous Undertaking, and believed it proceeded from the Affront *Villars* had put upon him, and the ill Treatment he had of late received from the Queen and her Ministry, which had now made him desperate. After he had made his Observations, and given such Orders as he thought fit, he return'd to Camp, and gave Orders for the Army to prepare for Battle.

The Duke was no sooner return'd to Camp, but *Cadogan* slipt privately away, taking with him only forty *Hussars*; and now both Armies were full of the Event of the next Day. The Enemy long'd for its coming, that they might have some Satisfaction for the many Affronts they had received. On the other Hand, Things on our Side had a quite different Effect; we knew our Artillery was gone off, the Army weaken'd by several Detachments sent with it, and the Enemy reinforced, so that they were double our Number. Yet for all this, we still had Hopes that the Duke had something more in his Head than we could penetrate into. At length Tattoo beats, and before it had done, Orders came along the Line, to strike our Tents immediately, and in less than half an hour, the whole Army was on their March to the Left. This surprized us all, nor could any of the Generals imagine the Design of it.

We continued our March all the Night, favour'd with a full Moon and fair Weather. About Break of Day, the Duke received an Express from *Cadogan*, that he and Lieutenant-General *Hompesch*, Go-

1711. { verner of *Doway*, had, a little before One o' Clock, pass'd the Causey of *Arleux* without Opposition, and were actually in Possession of the Enemies Lines; upon which, the Duke, who kept at the Head of our March, expecting the Event, rode off with all the Horse and Dragoons of the Left Wing; sending Orders to every particular Regiment, to continue their March with all the Expedition they possibly could. This was surprizing indeed, a Thing none ever dream'd of. When *Villars's* Spies brought him an Account of our Army being on their March to the Left, he believed it to be a Feint of the Duke's to draw him off from the Post he was in, so that he did not stir from thence till he had an Account of *Gadogan's* passing the Lines at *Arleux*. This was no less a Surprize to the Marshal, than it was to us; it put him beyond his Reason, he immediately put the Army on their March, while he with only one Hundred choice Dragoons, rode off like a Man distracted, to see how Matters were at *Arleux*. Thus he rode, without any Consideration, till he fell in with *Gadogan's* advanced Guards, not knowing where he was, till he perceived them surrounding him; and having now no other Way to escape being taken, he order'd the Dragoons to throw themselves into the Ruins of an old Castle that was at Hand, while he with only two more, rode thro' an Opening of our Horse, who not minding him, follow'd the Crowd, by which he escaped; but the Dragoons were all made Prisoners without firing a Shot.

Our Army continued marching with all the Expedition we possibly could, every Regiment making the best of their Way, without minding their Order of March, or waiting for those that fainted, or dropt behind. The Enemy did the same; so that it was a perfect Race between both Armies, in trying who should

should come first up with *Cadogan*; but as we had the Start, so we kept a Head of them, though they had the shorter Cut. When we came on the Plains before *Arzass*, our Foot march'd within View of the foremost of their Horse, and sometimes within a Mile of each other; and nothing could prevent our coming to Blows, but the *Scharp* which we past at *Vitry*, the *Senfet*, and *Morais*, that was now between us; and as we kept a Head of them, so we join'd *Cadogan* before they could come up to disturb him. But more than one half of our Foot dropt behind; nor did they all come up till two Days after; several fainted and died by the Way: But as our Right Wing of Horse brought up the Rear, so the Duke sent them Orders to see all the Foot before them. This was a March full 13 Leagues.

Now the Manner of *Cadogan's* passing the Lines is as follows. The Duke having carried on his Scheme as above, to his reconnoitring the Lines, and *Cadogan's* slipping out of the Camp, who made all the Haste he could to *Dorway*, where he arrived a little after Ten at Night, and found Lieutenant-General *Hompesch*, on the Plain before the Town, at the Head of 22 Battalions and 40 Squadrons (who were mostly the Troops the Duke sent off, under Pretence of guarding the Lumber of the Camp) whereupon they march'd directly to *Arleux*; where there being none to oppose them, they laid Planks, and repair'd such Places of the Causeway as *Villars* caused to be broke down, upon his marching from thence, and so entered the Lines. Thus was this noble Scheme as well executed as projected, which was entirely the Duke's own framing, and let none into the Secret, but the Field Deputies, Prince *Anbault* the *Prussian* General, *Cadogan*, and *Hompesch*. He had also contrived Matters so, as to have the Advantage of a full Moon and

1711. and a fine Night. *Cadogan* would have found it a difficult Task to repair, and the Army to pass the Causey in a dark Night. Providence seem'd to favour the Design.

Next Morning, the 14th, we found *Villars* with his Army drawn up in Order of Battle, about half a League in our Front, with his Right towards the Works of *Cambray*, his Left cover'd by a Morass, and along his Front were several deep hollow Ways. Our Army lay here on their Arms three Nights, waiting for the coming up of the last of our Men; *Villars* not in the least offering to disturb us, but seem'd satisfy'd in stopping us here; for we could not advance, without forcing him to a Battle to very great Disadvantage: nor could we move to the Right, for the Garrison of *Arras*, which would be too great an Undertaking, considering the Difficulties that would attend the besieging it: and on our Left lay the River *Scheld*, about a League and half from us, which being deep and ouzy, was dangerous to pass in the Face of so numerous an Army; and to return would be altogether as dangerous, besides the Disgrace. Whereupon the Duke's Enemies in the Army, who became Creatures of the Ministry, began to arraign his Conduct in not considering these Difficulties, particularly the Lord *North*, tho' in our passing the Lines, run out mightily in Praise of the Duke; but now he, and others of our Time-serving Gentlemen, began to rail heavily against the Duke. But my Lord *Marlboro'* soon stopp'd their Mouths, and convinc'd them, that he had not only consider'd all their supposed Difficulties that should arise upon this Occasion; but that he had carry'd his Scheme so far, as to the securing a Post in this important Pass into *France*; whereupon the Day after all our Army had got over the Pass, he march'd in Order of Battle at

Noon-

Noon-Day over a fine Plain towards the *Scheld*, along the Front of *Villars's* Army, who now and then saluted us with a Cannon, as our Army came to the *Scheld*. The Duke drew them up facing *Villars's* Right Wing, where both Armies stood looking on each other, while our Bridges were laying, which took us till near Sun-set, at which Time the Duke finding *Villars* did not offer to stir from his Ground, he order'd the Army to pass. Gen. *Ross* with the Right Wing of Horse, and some Grenadiers were order'd to bring up the Rear; and by the Time it was Day-Light, our Army was pass'd, the Bridges taken up, and we on a full March to *Bouchain*.

Villars not offering the least Attempt to disturb us in passing, which shews what a Terror the Duke of *Marlboro'* struck into *France*, who were but the other Day the Bullies of all *Europe*; and it also shews, that all their former Conquests were not so much owing to the Bravery of their Troops, as to the Perfidiousness of their Grand Monarch.

Bouchain being the Post which my Lord had fix'd upon, is strongly situated in this great Morass that was the Barrier of the Kingdom, at which Place the *Scheld* and *Senset* joins; wherefore, for carrying on the Siege, he was obliged to divide his Army. He therefore the next Morning after he came before it, order'd Bridges to be laid on the *Scheld* and Morass below the Town: and Gen. *Fagel*, with 30 Battalions and 40 Squadrons, to pass over, in order to carry on the Siege on that Side, which was the most commodious Part to be attack'd, and also for keeping open our Communication with *Doway*, and other Garrisons on that Side.

Villars, to prevent our taking *Bouchain*, exerted the uttermost of his Skill. The Day we came before it he march'd his Army on that Side the *Scheld*, and

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encamp'd

1711. encamp'd with the greatest Part along the River, as near *Bouchain*, as the Morafs and the Duke's Army would permit him; the other Part he pass'd over the Morafs and *Sensett*, and encamp'd them on the Height of *Waversbein*, within less than a League of *Bouchain*, where they fell immediately to work in fortifying that Post with a very strong Intrenchment round the Top of that Hill, from whence they had a Communication-Line thro' the Morafs along the *Sensett* to the Town, by which *Villars* propos'd to prevent our carrying on the Siege on that Side. When the Duke first saw *Villars* take Post on that Hill, he thought it was with Design to fall upon *Fagel*; whereupon he order'd him to march back the same Evening he had pass'd (our Regiment was here with *Fagel*) and early next Morning Lieut. Gen. *Cadogan* with 20 Squadróns, and 16 Battalions, was order'd to join *Fagel*, and march to the other Side again. *Villars's* Men continued hard at Work all the Night and next Day on the Hill of *Waversbein*; whereupon the Duke seeing that Post would be very troublesome to us in carrying on the Siege, order'd the next Morning all the Troops on this Side to march, and dislodge those on *Waversbein*. When we were got near the Intrenchments, several Companies of Grenadiers were order'd to march away to the Regiment to the Top of the Hill, in order to attack that Part of the Works. When we were got thither we were posted in a standing Field of Wheat, within less than 80 Paces of them, where we waited for Orders to begin the Attack. I must confess I did not like the Aspect of the Thing; besides, we thought the Duke had kept on the other Side to observe *Villars*, lest he should attack his Camp while we were attacking the Intrenchments: But while I was thus musing, up comes the Duke alone, and placed

placed himself a little on the Right of my Company, from whence we had a fair View of most of their Works. ^{1711.} Certainly, nothing ever gave me more Pleasure than the Sight of the Duke at this Juncture: he staid about five or six Minutes, and return'd; during which Time, I was in much more Pain for him than myself: for we plainly saw their Cannon pointed upon him, and the Intrenchment as full of Men as it would hold, and only waited their coming on.

But my Lord had not been longer gone than he stood by us, when Orders came for us to draw off, which we were not long about; and before the Enemy perceiv'd us going off, we were got so far down the Hill, that we were under their Fire before they let fly at us, so that we got off without the Loss of a Man, tho' they pour'd Vollies of great and small Shot after us. All the rest of the Troops drew off at the same Time, after whom they also fired their Cannon with great Fury, and kill'd several Men. The Duke ordered the Troops to march faster than ordinary, to get out of Reach, which *Villars* perceiving, drew out all the Horse he had there, and pressed hard upon our Rear; this made us still make the more Haste till we had got on the other side a rising Ground that was before us; when we passed the Right of it, the Duke seeing *Villars* still pressing on, ordered all his Squadrons to face about; and as soon as *Villars* appear'd on the Top of the Hill, they charg'd him with such Resolution, that they broke through those that first appeared, and had certainly either kill'd or taken *Villars*, had not a Brigadier, who seeing his General in this Danger, come up with fresh Squadrons to his Relief, which sav'd the Marshal, but the Brigadier and his Squadrons paid dear for it; for he was desperately wounded and taken Prisoner, and most of his

1711. Men cut to pieces, and *Villars* with the rest of his shattered Squadrons scour'd back as fast as they could. This Brigadier, when *Vendome* commanded, had taken *Cadogan* Prisoner on a Foraging Command, and had treated him with great Civility; and now *Cadogan* having it in his Power, made a suitable Return; he sent him in his Coach to his own Quarters, and there had all the Care that was possible taken of him, till he was thoroughly recovered and cured of his Wounds, and then sent back.

As soon as this Flourish of *Villars* was over, the Duke call'd all the Ingeniers together to know whether they could carry on the Siege without removing the Enemy from *Wavershein*; to which all answered in the Negative, except Col. *Armstrong*, who said that it was to be done, and that he would undertake the most difficult Part. The Duke knowing the Capacity of the Man, was very well pleas'd, and bid him proceed; for he was resolv'd to have *Bouchain*, cost what it would; all that he had done would have signified nothing without it.

Upon which ten Battalions, and as many Squadrons were ordered to march as soon as it was dark, into the Valley that was between the rising Ground on our Side and *Wavershein*, where we stood to our Arms all Night, while Col. *Armstrong* with 5000 Workmen were throwing up Works on the rising Ground behind us. When Day began to appear, we were ordered to draw out of the Valley; the Horse march'd straight to their Ground, and the Foot into the Works that were thrown up, where we were surprized to find a noble large Redoubt with a double Faussée before it, the Standard of our *British* Train flying, and a Battery of 24 Cannon mounted, with which the Colonel saluted the Enemy at *Wavershein*; he had also carried on an Intrenchment from this Redoubt

doubt down to the Morafs, which was a prodigious Work for in one Night.

Our ~~ten~~ Battalions were reliev'd in the Evening, at which Time we pitch'd our Tents, which was the first Time our Regiment had done so since we march'd from *Villarbrulin*, this being the 25th of *July*. Colonel *Armstrong* having finish'd his Work, proceeded with a Line of Circumvallation, from the Redoubt round our Camp to the Bridges below the Town, and so round the Duke's Camp, till he brought it to the *Scheld* above the Town; after which, with great Labour and Fatigue, and a vast Number of Fascines, he carried this prodigious Work through the Morafs, tho' the Enemy by shutting up the Sluice of *Bouchain* had rais'd an Innundation therein; and, having laid Bridges both over the *Scheld* and *Senfet*, he attack'd and drove the Enemy out of the Communication Line, and so clos'd his Circumvallation, by which all Relief was cut off from *Bouchain*. This was a most surprizing Undertaking of the Colonel's, who by constant Application finish'd it in less Time than could be imagined, by which he deservedly gain'd great Applause. And now the Communication between *Wavershein* and the Town being cut off, we open'd our Trenches, and in less than three Weeks the Governor was obliged to surrender, the Garrison being made Prisoners of War, notwithstanding our Trenches were cannonaded, as well from *Wavershein*, as the Town.

Thus ended the Duke of *Marlbro*'s last Campaign, which may truly be reckon'd amongst the greatest he ever made.

And now, after this great Man had reduced the Common Enemy of *Europe* to the last Extremity, had taken the last Barrier of his Kingdom, which lay now open to the Allies, his Army dispirited, and

1711.

their Courage, and his whole Nation in a most miserable Condition; I say, after he had done all these great Things so much to the Honour of the *British* Nation, was he ignominiously traduc'd, ~~and~~ turn'd out of all Employ, and even forc'd to fly his Country, of which he had been so great an Ornament; and this done by a Set of vile profligate Men, who had insinuated themselves into the Favour of the weak Queen, and were at this Time carrying on a scandalous underhand Treaty with the Grand Enemy of *Europe*. But I am here wandering out of my Way, so shall leave that ungrateful Subject, and proceed to the last Campaign of this War.

1712.

In the Beginning of *May*, the Duke of *Ormond*, a good-natur'd, but a weak and ambitious Man, fit to be made Tool of by a Set of crafty Knaves, came over Captain General in the Room of the Duke of *Marlbro'*, and assembled the Army near *Doway*, where Prince *Eugene* came with a much greater Number of *Germans* than he had had at any time before, so that our Army consisted of 295 Squadrons, and 145 Battalions, which amounted to 122,000 fighting Men. Prince *Eugene* at his first coming had some Intimation from *England* that the Duke was not to act against *France*, on account of a separate Peace between *England* and *France*, which was near a Close; upon which the Prince went to the Duke, and desir'd to know if he had such Orders, that he might take his Measures accordingly. The Duke assured him, that his Orders were as full as ever the Duke of *Marlbro's* were; and that he was ready to march against the Enemy when he pleased. The Prince was highly pleased at this; so three Days after, being the 1st of *May*, our whole Army march'd, and passing the *Scheld* a little below *Bouchain*, we advanc'd and encamp'd at *Selemvery*, near the Borders of *Piccardy*.

1712

cardy. Villars was at this Time encamp'd with his Left at *Cambray*, and his Right extending along the *Scheld* towards the upper End of that River, whose Army did not exceed 100,000. — Upon our coming to this Ground, the Duke and Prince agreed to ride out next Morning to take a View of *Villars's* Situation. Accordingly Orders were given for all the Grenadiers in the Army, and 100 Squadrons to march by Break of Day, in order to cover our Generals; and according to these Orders we march'd. Our *British* Grenadiers being on the Left, advanced into *Piccardy*, where we found nothing but empty Houses, the Peasants being all fled with their Effects; but upon our returning to Camp in the Evening, we found the Face of Affairs quite chang'd from the glorious Expectation of marching towards *Paris*, to that of a full Stop put to our Career; for our Managers at Home being apprehensive that the Duke's Ambition might prompt him to do something that might overturn all their Measures; therefore they sent Sir *Thomas Hanmer* Express to the Duke, with Orders for him not to act against *France*, until he received further Instructions. Sir *Thomas* thought to have overtaken him at *Doway*; but when he came to *Tournay*, he had an Account that the Army decamp'd that Morning, and were in a full March towards *France*: This made Sir *Thomas* speed away from thence; so that it was One in the Morning before he arriv'd at the Duke's Quarters. — The Duke sent the Prince an Account of his Orders, and desired to be excus'd, in that he could not ride out with him according to Promise. Thus ended the Glory of the *British* Arms after a most inglorious Manner.

It has been much disputed, Whether the Duke of *Ormond*, upon so extraordinary an Occasion, might not

1712. have refus'd obeying those Orders Sir *Thomas* brought, considering they were not sign'd by the Queen, but only by *Bolingbroke*? However, be that as it will, had the Duke done as his brave Father the Earl of *Offory* did at the Battle of *St. Dennis*, near *Mons*, who at that Time commanded the *British* Troops under the Prince of *Orange*, and having received positive Orders from King *Charles II.* not to engage in any Action against *France* while the Treaty of *Nimeguen* was carrying on, which Orders he shew'd the Prince: After some Time the Prince sent for him, and told him he designed next Morning to attack the Enemy, and desir'd to know what he would do upon that Occasion. To which the Earl answer'd, Your Highness knows my Orders; yet when-ever I see you engag'd, I will not look on, but will rather lose my Head than the Honour of my Country; and accordingly, next Day, he, at the Head of the *British* Troops, did Wonders. And what was the Consequence? why truly the King would not venture to call him publicly to an Account, lest he should incense the Nation, who glories in nothing more than the Behaviour of their gallant Troops; and tho' he got a private Reprimand from the King, yet he had the Thanks and Approbation of the whole Nation; and had the Son follow'd the Example of his brave Father, pray who durst have call'd him to an Account, when it was evident the Consequence must have turn'd to the greatest Advantage, both to the Nation and common Cause of *Europe*? But alas! this weak Man was strangely impos'd upon by the Lord *Bolingbroke*, who not only made him his Tool, but had also impos'd both on the Queen, and the whole Nation, by his base underhand Dealing with *France*, and his bringing about that scandalous Treaty of *Utrecht*.

Not-

Notwithstanding this Disappointment, Prince *Eugene* rode out, and reconnoiter'd *Villars*, who at first Sight of our Troops thought our whole Army was on their March to *France*, which strangely alarm'd him, and thought the Duke of *Ormond* thro' Ambition of Glory had been prevail'd on by Prince *Eugene* to break thro' what he had been assur'd was privately concerted between both Courts; whereupon in a great Hurry he order'd his Train and heavy Baggage to make the best of their Way to the other Side the *Soam*, and was getting ready to decamp; but he soon found out the true Meaning, and was also inform'd by a Courier from the Duke of the Orders he had receiv'd, which put *Villars* into a better Humour. Prince *Eugene* finding how Matters went, resolv'd to make the best of his Time. While the Duke continu'd in those Parts, he therefore propos'd the taking of *Quesnoy* and *Landresis*, and drawing a Line from the latter to *Bouchain*, the which would cover his Garrisons, and also block up *Valenshein* and *Conde*; whereupon he desir'd the Duke would cover him, while he was carrying on those Sieges, which the Duke promis'd to do, so long as he continu'd here, but at the same time told him that he expected Orders every Day for his marching off, and then he must take Care of himself; upon which the Prince march'd to *Quesnoy* with the *German* and *Dutch* Forces; at which time he posted the Earl of *Albemarle* with a Body of 14,000 Men at *Denain*, two Leagues below *Bouchain*, on the *Scheld*, to keep open a Communication with the Garrisons on the other Side, from whence he was to have all his Stores, &c. *Albemarle* fell immediately to work in fortifying his Post, and the Duke lent him as many of his Pontoons as laid two Bridges over the River, Prince *Eugene* having Occasion to make use of his own at the

1712.

the Sieges; so that he left more than laid one Bridge. The same Day the Prince march'd to *Quesnoy*, the Duke with his *British* and Auxiliaries cross'd the *Sele*, and encamp'd at *Chateau-Cambreffis*, which lyes just on the Borders of *Picardy*; here we lay with the *Sele* in our Front till *Quesnoy* was taken. Prince *Eugene* having taken that Place, march'd to *Landresseis*, which was the greatest Oversight that General ever made, considering, that at this Juncture the *French* had deliver'd *Dunkirk* into the Hands of the *English*; that *Villars* was greatly reinforced from the *Rhine*, and all the Garrisons about him; and that the Duke of *Ormond* had receiv'd his Orders for marching off with his Troops.

Next Day, after the Prince sate down before *Landresseis*, the 16th of *July*, O. S. the Duke march'd off with his *British* Troops; but all the Auxiliaries, except two *Holstein* Regiments, one of Foot, and one of Dragoons, refused marching with him; the rest march'd, and join'd Prince *Eugene*. Our first Day's March was to *Uvointeseck*, near *Bouchain*, where a Cessation of Arms between *England* and *France* was declared at the Head of every Regiment; for which the Duke expected great Huzza's, But instead of that, nothing was heard but a general Hiss and Murmur through the whole Camp, which gave the Duke and his Creatures great Offence, and they term'd it the height of Ingratitude, for bringing them from having their Brains knock'd out. *Villars*, the same Day, declared the like Cessation of Arms in his Camp, and sent Officers of Distinction to compliment the Duke upon it. This Evening the Duke sent to *Denain* for the Pontoons he lent the Earl of *Albemarle*; nor could all that either the Earl, Prince *Eugene*, or the Field Deputies say, prevail with him to leave them but for eight Days, and they would lie under

under any Obligation to return them to any Place the Duke should name; but he would upon no Account leave them behind him, so had them taken up, and they met us on the March. Next Day we had a Report, how true I can't say, that two *French* Engineers in Disguise went with those that went to take up the Pontoons; who made such Observations on *Albemarle's* Works, as served their Purpose. However, I cannot believe the Duke knew any thing of it; but his Conduct in this Affair was very much censured, and gave his Enemies a Handle to say, that Matters had been concerted between him and those sent by *Villars*.

Our second Day's March was to *Auchrin*.

Next Morning very early, as we were preparing to march, we heard great firing towards *Denain*; on which we concluded that *Villars* was attacking that Post; which was confirm'd the Day following, by a fullsome Letter from the Marshal to the Duke; wherein, after giving an Account of the Action, and the Success attending it, he then extols the Duke to the Skies, for his consummate Conduct and Courage, his Loyalty to his Royal Mistress's Commands; and concludes, that the Courage of the Allies was gone off with the brave *British* Troops.

This Letter the Duke took Care to have made known to the Army, several Copies of it being handed about, which indeed ought rather to be burnt; for it made those that wish'd well to the Allies believe, that he had not acted fairly by them. 'Tis most certain, that the Want of the Pontoons was the Loss of *Denain*; for Prince *Eugene* having some Notice of *Villars's* Design, march'd the Evening before the Action, with the greatest Part of his Army, from *Landresseis*, and was up Time enough to have suc-

1712. succour'd *Albemarle*; but by the Time he got to the *Scheld*, the Bridge was broke by the Crowd of Baggage they had been sending over; so that he was not able to give *Albemarle* the least Assistance, but look'd on, and saw his Fate. From *Auchin*, we continued by easy Marches to *Ghent*;


Which put an End to this War, and our scandalous Part of the Campaign.




ROSTER GEN: to Detach REGIMENTS

British	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
Prussians	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
Hanover	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
Dutch	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50
Danes	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30	31	32	33	34	35	36	37	38	39	40	41	42	43	44	45	46	47	48	49	50

INCAMPMENT of a REGIMENT of 9 Troops, 50 Men & Horses each.








HOLLOW-SQUARE ATTACK'D
By HORSE on all Sides


BATTALION in GRAND-DIVISIONS HOLLOW-SQUARES &c

Battalion in N^o. 1. 2 Dutch Squares. 3 Square by Grand Divisions.



A BATALION making its 4 several FIRINGS


A



Colonel \odot

Drum^r. \odot

B




Col^t. \odot

D^r. \odot

C




D



Col^t. \odot

D^r. \odot

$\left. \begin{array}{l} A. \\ B. \\ C. \\ D. \end{array} \right\} \text{the } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1 \\ 2 \\ 3 \\ 4^{\text{th}} \end{array} \right\} \text{Fire or Reserve}$



D I S C I P L I N E
 FOR A
 Regiment of FOOT upon ACTION.
 ALSO,
 The most ESSENTIAL DISCIPLINE
 OF THE
 C A V A L R Y.

GREAT Pains have been taken to bring our Troops under one Method of Discipline, but most Officers persisting on having some trifling Motions perform'd after their own Whims, more than the essential Parts of Discipline, *i. e.* how they are to act when they come to face the Enemy. Our last formal piece of Discipline was entitled, *An Exercise for the Horse, Dragoons, and Foot, By Authority*; which Words oblige the whole Army to conform.

It is surprizing, after two such Wars as our Nation have been engaged in, that so poor a Performance should be skreen'd by Authority. And it is strange, that we have nothing relating to Action introduced into our Discipline. How preposterous is it to see some of our *English* Jack-Boot-Men, with all their Accoutrements, perform an Exercise on Foot! Was this ever known to be of Use upon Action? Is it possible for young Gentlemen that never saw any thing

thing of Action, (of whom the Army in a short Time will be compos'd) to form an Idea of Action, out of this Book of Discipline?

Every one will allow, that 'tis absolutely necessary that the Troops should be brought under one Method of Discipline; that when His Majesty shall please to order them together, or a General Officer is to receive them, they may perform a graceful Exercise. And were there 20 Battalions on one Field, they might answer each other in their Firings with all the Regularity imaginable; but then they are not to keep popping by single Platoons.

Discipline of H O R S E.

It is sufficient for them to ride well, to have their Horses well managed, and train'd up to stand Fire; that they take particular Notice what Part of the Squadron they are in, their Right and Left-Hand Men, and File-Leaders, that they may, when they happen to break, readily know to form. Breaking their Squadrons ought to be practis'd in their common Discipline. That they MARCH and WHEEL with a Grace, and HANDLE their SWORDS well, which is the only Weapon our *British* Horse makes use of when they charge the Enemy; more than this is superfluous. The Duke of *Marlborough* would allow the Horse but three Charges of Powder and Ball to each Man for a Campaign, and that only for guarding their Horses when at Grass, and not to be made use of on Action.

D R A G O O N S

Should be well instructed in the Use of Arms, having often Occasion to make use of them on Foot; but when on Horseback, they are to fight as the Horse do.

I shall

I shall be as brief as the Nature of the Subject will admit; nor shall I take Notice of the Manual Exercise, or Evolutions, but refer to the Book of Exercise. I must say, there is no Occasion for puzzling the Soldiers with more Evolutions than is necessary to form the Battalion for Action.

There is not yet any Method found to train up our Infantry for Action in the Field, otherwise than by representing one Battalion engaging another; I shall therefore lay down the best Method I can for that Purpose. In order to which, I must first suppose our Battalion to consist of 800, or 1000 Men. Let us suppose our Battalion drawn up with the Army on the Field of Battle, three deep, their Bayonets fix'd on their Muzzles, the Grenadiers divided on the Flanks, the Officers ranged in the Front; and the Colonel, or, in his Absence, the Lieutenant-Colonel (who, I suppose, fights the Battalion) on Foot, with his Sword drawn in his Hand, about eight or ten Paces in the Front, opposite the Centre, with an expert Drum by him. He should appear with a cheerful Countenance, never in a Hurry, or by any Means ruffled; and to deliver his Orders with great Calmness, and Presence of Mind.

The first Thing the Colonel should do, is to order the Major and Adjutant to divide the Battalion into four grand Divisions, which is to be the Ground-work of all our Performances, of which our *Martinet* gives but a faint Idea. I find he knows very little of the Consequences attending our Grand Divisions; for from them we form our Platoons, our Sub-Divisions in all our Marchings; and from them we form the Hollow Square, as well standing as marching; and that after a much more commodious and readier Way, than the round-about Way now practis'd; for each of our Grand Divisions make a Front of the Square,

so

so that in marching out there, there is no further Occasion for square-marking out the Ground; and the Officers of the Platoons may at once know what Firing they'll be off in the Square, as well as in the Battalion; which will save Time and Trouble. When Pikes were in Use, our Battalions were composed but of three Grand Divisions, *viz.* one of Pikes in the Centre, and a Division of Musketters on the Right and Left of them; but since Pikes have been laid aside, a Battalion cannot be disposed for Action, but by dividing it into four Grand Divisions. Our Battalions thus divided, and each Division distinguished by the

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} 1. \text{ the Right} \\ 2. \\ 3. \text{ the Left} \\ 4. \end{array} \right\} \text{ Division,}$$

Each Division to be divided in four Platoons, which, with the Grenadiers will make up eighteen; but when our Infantry is on the low Establishment, as in time of Peace, our Grand Divisions will admit but of three Platoons to each, and those but small.

The Eighteen Platoons are to be divided into three Firings, so that there will be six in each. And as it is absolutely necessary to have a Fire in Reserve, the Front Rank is to be reserved for that Purpose, which on Occasion will make a fourth Firing; so that the two Rear Ranks are only to go on with the Firings, until the Commanding Officer thinks fit to order the Front Rank to fire, either by themselves, or to go on with the Rear Ranks of their Platoons; all which depends wholly on the Discretion of the Officer that fights the Battalion.

As the Commanding Officer will be exposed to the Fire of his own Men, as well as that of the Enemy,

he is to take special Care that he keep opposite the two Centre Platoons while the other Parts of the Battalion keep firing; and he must also take as great Care, that when it comes to the Turn of the Centre Platoons to fire, that both he and the Drum step aside, and return as soon as they have done, otherwise they must fall by their own Fire.

Note, that the Front Rank of the two Centre Platoons are to fire with their own Platoons, and not to be of the Reserve, or fourth Fire, otherwise the Commanding Officer would have no Shelter from the Fire of the Front Rank.

Upon dividing the grand Divisions into Platoons, place a Serjeant in the Interval of each Platoon, after which the Major appoints the Officers, and tells them what firing they are of, and how they are to behave; he then acquaints the Lieutenant-Colonel, and remaining Part of the Officers, that they are to march to the Rear when the others take their Platoons.

Note that, always upon Action, the Officers of the Platoons are to be posted as near their own Companies as they can, without Regard to Seniority; this being done, the Colonel takes the Management of the Battalion upon himself.

When he finds there is no avoiding coming to Battle, he is to order the Soldiers to lay down their Knapfacks, Tent-poles, and what is cumbersome, and the Serjeant sends them to some Place out of the Way, where a Serjeant with a few Men takes Care of them. If we win the Day, they will be safe; if not, 'tis no Matter what becomes of them.

When this is done, he, either by Word of Command, or the Signal of Drum, orders the Officers to take their Platoons; and when the Word *March*, or Signal of Drum is given, they march into the Intervals, and the Lieutenant-Colonel, and other Officers,

H

march

march at the same time to the Rear. The Lieutenant-Colonel, or, in his Absence, the eldest Captain, posts himself eight or ten Paces from the Rear Rank opposite the Center, the rest of the Officers posting themselves four Paces from the Rear Rank, extending to the Right and Left to cover the Battalion, where they will be of as great Use as those in the Front, in seeing that the Soldiers keep up in their Ranks and do their Duty. The Ensigns that carry the Colours ought to be able-body'd Men, who are to post themselves in the Centre Rank, on the Right and Left of the two Centre Platoons, as they are mark'd in the Plan of the first Firing, which shews the whole; they are to carry the Colours always well advanced. When Musters fall into their Platoons, the Serjeants that were plac'd there fall into the Intervals of the Rear Rank, where they are to be assisting the Officers in seeing the Platoons do their Duty; the remaining Part of the Serjeants are to post themselves on the Flanks and in the Rear between the Officers and Soldiers, where they will be also of great Use in seeing the Soldiers do their Duty. The Drums are to be divided into three Parts, on the Right and Left, and behind the two Centre Platoons, all to range in a Line with the Serjeants, but not to Beat without Orders. The Major and Adjutant having seen all these Matters settled, post themselves on the Flanks, from whence they are to observe, as much as in them lies, the Behaviour of the Battalion, but to take great Care that they ride not into the Front while the Battalion is firing.

Our Battalion being thus form'd for Battle, and as it were riveted together, so that no Soldier can possibly misbehave, but there will be an Eye presently upon him; and nothing but the Want of Care and Resolution in the Officers can make a Battalion thus form'd

form'd miscarry, unless over-power'd by Numbers, or some unforeseen Accident.

Before we enter upon Action, I must first take Notice of one Thing, hitherto overlook'd by all; that is, the Use of the **DRUM** on many more Occasions than is generally made of it. For Instance, it is not every Commanding Officer that has a Voice capable to go through the Management of a Battalion when in common Exercise, much more in the Hurry of Action. Would it not be a Shame for him to order the Major or Adjutant, in the Day of Battle, to fight the Battalion, and he only a Cypher at the Head of it, and pretend he has not a Voice to go thro' it?

I am sorry to say there has always been too many indolent Sparks in the Army, who would think it very hard should a diligent experienc'd Officer be put over their Heads.

I was once at a Review, when the Commanding General of the Troops was reviewing a Regiment of Foot, where were present the Colonel, Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and most of all the Captains, and yet not one of them capable of going thro' the Discipline of the Regiment, of which the General very justly took publick Notice.

This is only a Hint, to caution our young Gentlemen, even from the Colonels themselves to the Ensigns, that none of them may think themselves above learning their Duty. I am for introducing the more frequent Use of the Drum, as well upon Action, as in the common Exercise of a Regiment, to assist the Voice.

Suppose the Commanding Officer should happen to be killed, the Voice of him that supplies his Place may be so different from the other's, that it may occasion a Confusion; whereas the Drum is always the same, and much easier heard and understood, especially

cially when the Men are train'd up by, and constantly us'd to it. A great deal more might be said in Favour of this warlike Instrument ; however I would not be so understood, as that the Drum is wholly to be depended on. No, I am only for introducing the more frequent Use of it purely to assist the Voice ; for the Commanding Officer must, on all Occasions, first apprize both Officers and Soldiers what they are about to do, and when he has done that, proceed as he shall think fit, either by the Word of Command, or by the Drum ; so that, I say, 'tis absolutely necessary for the Soldiers to be train'd up by both, since 'tis impossible that any Inconveniency can accrue thereby, and that it is most certain it may, on many Occasions, be of great Use ; wherefore I see no Reason why our Infantry should not be train'd up by the Drum, as well in their Firings, or rather more, than the Manual Exercise ; so that, as it often happens in the Hurry of Action, when it is not possible for the Voice to be heard, that then the Drum will be of the greatest Consequence.

Use of the DRUM in Action.

Suppose that the Signal for Battle is given : Upon this the Colonel orders his Drum to beat a Ruffle, which is as much as to say, *Take Care* ; and then saying something to encourage and excite the Men to the Performance of their Duty. This may seem ridiculous by some, yet I know 'twill animate and raise an Emulation among the Soldiers, especially when they have a LOVE for their OFFICERS. I cannot but take Notice of some Gentlemen, who instead of treating their Men with GOOD NATURE, use them with CONTEMPT and CRUELTY ; by which those Gentlemen often meet with their FATE in the Day of Battle,

de, from their own Men; when those Officers who, on the other hand, treat their Men with JUSTICE and HUMANITY, will be sure, on all Occasions, to have them stand fast by them, and even interpose between them and Death.

The Colonel having thus spoke cheerfully to the Men, he then gives the Word, MARCH; at which time the Drum beats to the March: and when the Battalion has got within four or five Paces of him, he turns to the Enemy, and marches slowly down (we will suppose to his opposite Battalion) till he finds they begin to fire upon him; upon which he orders his Drum to cease beating, and turning to the Battalion, gives the Word, HALT; and then orders his Drum to beat a Preparative, upon which the six Platoons of the first Firing make ready, as in Figure A, as does also all the Front-Rank, except those of the two Centre-Platoons, on which the two Rear-Ranks close forward, keeping their Thumbs on the Cocks, and their Arms well recover'd; and the Front-Rank kneels, placing their Butts on the Ground by their Left-Feet, where all are to wait for the next Word of Command, or Signal of the Drum, from the Colonel himself; for we are not now to fire by single Platoons, as is generally practis'd at Reviews, which will not do when we come to engage the Enemy; nor will they carry such Weight with them, or do near the Execution that six Platoons will do, when pour'd in all together upon them: wherefore, 'tis the Colonel himself must give Orders for firing the Platoons, and not the Officers belonging to them, who are only to see that the Soldiers do their Duty, and observe such Orders as the Colonel shall give, whether by his Voice, or the Drum. And let no one say, what Occasion is there for Officers to the Platoons, when they are not to give the Word

of Command? But let them consider, that both Officers and Serjeants will have enough to do to take Care that their Platoons perform their Duty in every Respect; and when they find it requisite, they are to tell them softly what they are to do, but so as none must hear them but their own Men; and if they perform this well it will be sufficient, and will contribute much towards the Behaviour of the Battalion. The Commanding Officer is the best Judge when they are, or are not to fire; for, tho' our Platoons are made ready, yet perhaps the Enemy by this time may have retreated, and got out of Reach of our Shot: whereupon, instead of going on with our Firing, the Colonel orders them to half-cock their Fire-locks, &c. and proceeds in marching after them, rather than throw away his Fire, which would in Course be done, were the Officers of the Platoons to give the Word of Command for their Firing, as is done on Reviews. But let us suppose the Enemy stand their Ground, or perhaps advance to meet us; upon which our six Platoons being made ready, as above, and waiting the Colonel's Orders, who, if he finds his Voice not sufficient to go thro' his Business, he then orders his Drum to beat a Flam; at which time the Front-Rank drop their Muzzles to the Ground, and the two Rear-Ranks present. Now the Officers and Serjeants of these Platoons are to take great Care that the Soldiers level well their Arms, so that their Fire may have Effect on the Enemy; as also caution them to wait the next Signal of Drum (here the Men ought in training them to be us'd to that of recovering their Arms sometimes instead of firing, which will make them take Care in waiting for Orders to fire.)

The Platoons being presented, the Colonel orders the Drum to beat a second Flam, on which they fire,

fire, and immediately recover their Arms, fall back, and load as fast as they can; which the Officers and Serjeants are to see done without Hurry or Disorder. The Front-Rank remain with their Thumbs on the Cocks, and Muzzles to the Ground.

As soon as the first Fire is made, the Colonel, without making the least Stop or Hesitation, orders his Drum to beat a second Preparative, on which the six Platoons of the second Fire make ready, and go on, as in Figure B: when they have fir'd he immediately beats the third Preparative; on which the six Platoons of the third Fire make ready, and proceed as in Figure C. And thus the Colonel continues his Firings standing, without Intermission between them; and if he sees Occasion for firing his Front-Rank, he then gives the Word, FRONT-RANK, TAKE CARE, PRESENT, FIRE, as in D.

Let us suppose that the Enemy be returning their Fire, and obstinately maintain their Ground: In this Case the Colonel is to advance upon them; in order to which, he is first to apprize the Battalion of it, on which the Front-Rank stands up, keeping their Arms well recover'd: He then orders the Drum to beat a Preparative for the Platoons of the first, or next that are to fire, to make ready; which being done, he gives the Word MARCH; and when the Battalion has got within two Paces of him, he turns to the Enemy, and advances in this Posture till he comes so near as he intends. Note, the nearer he approaches the Enemy, the nearer he is to keep to the Battalion; otherwise he would be a particular Mark to them; and then, if he finds they stand their Ground, he gives the Word HALT, on which the Front-Rank kneels, and the Rear-Ranks of the Platoons that are to fire, close forward; he then orders the Drum to beat a Flam, on which the Front-Rank drop their

Muzzles, and the Rear-Ranks present; and on the next Flam they fire; and so he continues his Firings as fast as he can, until he obliges them to give Way, or perhaps, seeing us advance upon them, after the above Manner, they have already given Way. It is not possible to foresee what may happen at this critical Juncture, nor to lay down Rules how to proceed, but must leave it to the Discretion of the Commanding Officer to act as Things may offer, or according to such Orders as he may receive from the General. However,

I will suppose that the Enemy has given Ground, and put themselves on the Retreat, and are marching off as fast as they can; and consequently faster than we can propose to follow, and keep our Order, which we must not break upon any Account; so that all the Colonel can do on this Occasion, is to keep firing after them so long as his Shot will reach them, and then leave them to the Horse. Thus much for Battalions firing Standing and Advancing.

How to act, if obliged to Retreat.

This is a Matter of the greatest Consequence, and requires the greatest Conduct in a General, as well as Resolution in both Officers and Soldiers; for the least Mismanagement puts all into Confusion, especially among the Infantry, the Officers of whom will find it a very difficult Matter to keep the Soldiers from breaking, especially if they are hard press'd by the Horse; and if they are once broke, not a Man in ten escapes: however, Resolution and good Orders have surmounted great Difficulties.

In this Case, according to what I propos'd, I shall only touch upon the Retreat of our single Battalion upon this grand Occasion, viz. when our Colonel

Colonel finds the Army giving Way, he then orders the Battalion to face to the Right about, upon which the Drum beats the Retreat. On this Occasion the Generals are to draw as many of the Infantry together as they can, and also of the Cavalry, to assist the Infantry in getting off: But, as I am on the Retreat of our single Battalion, so I shall proceed only upon it. Our Battalion being now on the Retreat, we are to march as fast as we possibly can, so that we keep our Order, and avoid Confusion, until we are got out of Reach of our Enemies Foot, the Lieut. Colonel and Officers in the Rear leading them with their Pikes under-hand. But those Officers to the Platoons are to carry their Pikes upright in their Hands, by which they'll have much better Command of them, than either by trailing, or having them pinn'd to their Shoulders. As soon as we have got on the Retreat, the Colonel's Drum ceases beating, but still keeps by him; and the Lieut. Colonel gets a Drum by him, who is now to beat the Retreat. While the Lieut. Colonel thus leads the Battalion, the Colonel keeps a watchful Eye on the Enemy; and the Major, Adjutant, and spare Serjeants, are to take great Care that no Disorders happen on the March. If the Colonel finds the Enemy pressing upon him, he orders his Drum to beat a Preparative, on which the six Platoons or next Firing makes ready. (Note, that no one of the Front-Rank make ready but what belongs to the Platoons that are to fire.) The Platoons being made ready, they immediately face to the Left about, at which time the Front-Rank kneels, placing their Butts by their Left-Feet, and the Rear-Ranks close forward, keeping their Arms well recover'd.

The Lieut. Colonel is to take no Notice of this, or any other Preparative, but continues on his March, unless

unless the Colonel sends him Orders to the contrary. The Officers and Serjeants, that are on the March with the Battalion, are to take great Care, that they keep open the Intervals of the Platoons that are firing, until they return; nor must the Colonel keep them too long abroad, but make them fire, if there is Occasion, as soon as possible, and then march them briskly back, keeping their Arms well recover'd till they get within their Intervals, and then load. Thus the Colonel keeps firing, and the Battalions marching, until we have got out of Reach of the Enemies Foot. We are not to lose Time, which upon this Occasion is very precious, by halting, and facing about, but to make the best Haste we can to get clear; for, if we do not out-march the Foot, pray what must be the Consequence when both Horse and Foot are up with us? Why truly, we must either stand to be cut to Pieces, or throw down our Arms, and call for Quarters, which in a manner will be much the same: for, upon all warm Pursuits there is but little Quarter to be expected. Wherefore, the first Thing we have to do is to out-march the Enemies Foot; and when once got out of their Reach, if we have but Resolution to keep our Orders, our Fire will keep off any reasonable Body of Horse, especially when any Number of Battalions get together; for too often the Horse take Care of themselves on these Occasions, and leave the Foot to do the same.

Suppose we have got clear of the Enemies Foot; but their Horse having drove our Horse out of the Field, are now marching down upon us; wherefore, to defend ourselves against them, we must think of forming the Hollow Square; but must never attempt it, while the Foot are able to come up with us.

This

This was the Case of the *Dutch* Infantry on the Plains of *Fleury* in 1690, where their Cavalry having misbehaved, left the Infantry to shift for themselves, where Prince *Waldeck*, who commanded the *Dutch* Forces, form'd 16 Battalions into one Square, who made their Retreat over those Plains, till they got under the Cannon of *Charleroy*; notwithstanding all the *French* Cavalry made several Attempts to break in upon them, yet could not, for want of their Foot, that were not able to come up with them. Another Instance of this Kind I was an Eye-Witness of, and that was, when the Duke of *Marlborough*, in 1705, pass'd the *French* Lines in *Brabant*; where, after he had drove the Enemies Horse out of the Field, there were ten *Bavarian* Battalions that stuck together, and form'd themselves into a Square, our Infantry not being able to get up with them; so they defended themselves against all the Cavalry of our Right Wing, until they got under the Walls of *Lo-vain*; which plainly shews, that if a Body of Foot have but Resolution to keep their Order, there is no Body of Horse dare venture within their Fire.

If our Battalion is under a Necessity of forming the Square by ourselves, I presume, any one will allow, that the most expeditious Way, and that which tends to the least Confusion, to be the best; and I believe, when every thing is consider'd, they will find the following Method to be so, *viz.* when the Colonel finds he has no Way to save the Battalion, but by performing the Square, which is not to be attempted but upon the last Extremity, he sends to the Lieut. Colonel to apprize him of it, who immediately orders the Battalion to Halt; which they are to do without altering their Aspect, that no Time may be lost; on which the Colonel, without any more to do, gives the Word, TAKE CARE TO FORM THE SQUARE; and

and then orders his Drum to beat a RUFFLE ; upon which the first Division, which is now on the Left of the Battalion, as they are fac'd, *face to the Right* on their RIGHT HEELS ; the other three Divisions stand fast, until the Drum beats a FLAM ; on which the first Division MARCHES FORWARD, the second WHEELS to the RIGHT by the RIGHT-HAND-MAN of the FRONT-RANK, as they are now fac'd ; the third Division MARCHES DIRECTLY FORWARD ; and the fourth WHEELS *to the Left by the Left-Hand-Man of the Rear-Rank* : so the first Division will take the Ground of the third, and join their three Ranks to the three Files on the Left of the fourth ; and their three Files in the Rear will join the three Ranks of the Right of the second. The third Division marches on until their three Files on their Right are join'd by the three Ranks on the Right of the fourth ; and their three Ranks on their Left join'd by the three Files on the Left of the second, which close the Square ; all which, with a very little Practice, will be found very easy, and ready to perform. The Square being form'd, the Lieut. Colonel goes to that Face of the Square which is towards the Garri-son, or Place we are to march to, on which the Square face all that Way, and so proceed on their March : The Colours and supernumerary Officers get into the Square. The Officers to the Platoons are to march two Paces without their Intervals ; as also the Sergeants within the Square.

The Colonel, who by this time has got on Horse-back, with the Major and Adjutant, are to keep without the Square, to have a watchful Eye on the Enemy ; and to keep the Grenadiers by him, to oppose any small Body that may be for making Attempts, or Feints, to retard our March.

In

In our March, let us suppose that the Enemies Horse are come up with us, and are for attacking us; on this the Colonel sends to the Lieut. Colonel to Halt, he orders his Drum to beat a RUFFLE, on which they FACE SQUARE, at which time the Officers and Serjeants of the Platoons fall into their INTERVALS, and the *Colonel, Major, Adjutant,* and Grenadiers get into the SQUARE, and the *Lieut. Colonel* falls into the CENTRE-INTERVAL of that Face of the Square he leads, that he may be ready to step out, and march again the next Opportunity. On this Occasion our Square is not to fire by Platoons; nor is it possible for the Colonel, or any in the Square, to give Orders and Directions to them to fire. For suppose the Square should (as probably it may) be attack'd on all Sides, those in the Square cannot attend all Parts of it; wherefore the Colonel is to appoint the eldest Officer of each Face of the Square to fight his own Division, who are to ADVANCE two Paces before the Centre-Intervals, and are to fire by Ranks, the Rear Rank first; the Lieut. Colonel fights the Division he is in.

These four Officers have as it were four separate Commands, and are to fight their Divisions as they find themselves attack'd, without waiting for, or taking the least Notice of one another, or even so much as waiting for Orders from the Colonel. The Drum is by no means to be made use of, but all by Word of Command; and the Officers and Serjeants of the Platoons will be of great Use in seeing the Ranks do their Duty, and particularly in levelling their Arms, and waiting the Word of Command from their own Officers.

If we have Resolution to keep Order, and avoid Hurry, there is no reasonable Body of Horse dare venture upon us. It is not to be imagined, how the
Fire

Fire of one Rank will stop and disorder Horſe; and then a ſecond, and a third on the Heels of it will certainly ſend them a packing. Beſides; ſhould the Colonel ſee any one Part hard preſſ'd, he has the Grenadiers to ruſh out, which will be no ſmall Surprize, on them: Nor has it been known, that ever a Body of Horſe alone, without the Aſſiſtance of Foot, brake in upon a Body of Foot, that with calm Reſolution made their regular Fires. So that the Havock which the Horſe generally make among the Foot, is when they find them broke.

The more Battalions that form the Square, makes it ſtill the ſtronger; and then every Commanding Officer fights his own Battalion on Foot, and fires by Platoons, as they ſhall ſee Occaſion; not by the Drum; for whenever the Square is attack'd, they muſt fire by Command.

Suppoſe we have oblig'd the Enemy to keep at a Diſtance; then the Colonel, Major, Adjutant, and Grenadiers, get out of the Square, and the Lieutenant-Colonel, with his Drum, to the Head of his Diviſion, and proceeds on his March; at which Time, the Colonel draws the Grenadiers to ſuch Part as may be in moſt Danger of being attack'd, and then we continue our March until we are out of all Danger.

Thus much for training up a Battalion, for their engaging another in a plain Field; as alſo in making their Retreat from Horſe: In which is ſhewn the abſolute Neceſſity of dividing our Battalions into Grand Diviſions. I am ſurpriz'd the Army does not fall into it; which if they did, I am perſuaded they would ſoon leave off that round-about-way of forming the Square, that is now in Vogue. All that can be alledged for forming the Square after the preſent Manner, is, that they keep a Front of the fourth Part of

the Battalion against the Enemy, to defend them from forming; but surely this is a very weak Argument, unless they first capitulate with the Enemy, to fall upon no other Part while they are forming; if they do, they'll find them in a very unguarded Condition.

Suppose the Enemy to be so near us, when we are about forming the Square, as to make a Push at us while we are forming (which, by the By, ought not to be done when they are so near) but suppose they are, the Thing is so sudden, and so soon perform'd, without facing-about, or running round the Battalion to mark out the Square, that we are form'd before they can tell what we are about; and in Case they should make an Attempt upon us, the Colonel, instead of dividing the Grenadiers to the Angles, draws them together, and makes a moving Front of them, to support any Part that may be in Danger of being attack'd. The Method of firing our Platoons in the Battalion, after the Manner I propose, is undoubtedly the only Way for engaging the Enemy; and when there are any Number of Battalions together for a Review, they may with great Regularity answer each other after that Manner. As to the firing in the Square, when attack'd, there is no other Way to be made use of, than what I have propos'd. The firing of Platoons, as now practis'd, being only adapted for making a Shew on Reviews; nor are the firing by single Platoons in the Battalion, or the Street-firing, of any other Use. Nor can I comprehend what Use any of them can be upon Action. The Manner of forming the Square by Grand Divisions, when the Battalion is faced to their proper Front, is no more than facing the three Divisions on the Left, to the RIGHT-ABOUT, and the Division on the Right to face on their Right Heels to the LEFT; from

from whence they all march, and wheel, and join, as above, and in reducing.

The first Division face on their ~~Left~~ ^{Right} ~~flank~~ ^{the} the RIGHT, the third to the LEFT-OUT, the second and fourth STAND FAST (that is, supposing all to be faced square) and then they all march and wheel to their proper Ground.

It rarely happens, that two Armies meet in a fair Plain, but one or the other takes to some advantageous Piece of Ground, or throws up an Intrenchment to cover them, so that in attacking them there frequently happens great Disorder and Confusion: Wherefore, in this Case, I shall take Notice of another Branch of Discipline, which our authorized *Martinet* knows nothing of, nor has it been practised many Years; a Thing so absolutely necessary, that all Battalions ought to be constantly train'd to the Knowledge of it; nay, even our Horse and Dragoons too; and that is what we call breaking the Battalion, which was much recommended by Duke *Schomberg*. I spoke of it to some good Officers, at the Time the present Discipline was first introduced among our Troops, but they would by no Means hearken to it, lest it might give the Men a Habit of breaking upon every trifling Occasion, which was the Reason of its being laid aside. But as 'tis impossible for Battalions to climb Trenches or Ditches, without breaking, and running into great Disorder, and often several Regiments intermingling together, as I have, upon some Occasions, known it; then, surely, a Method ought to be put in Practice, whereby Battalions may know how they may readily form, and draw up in Order again.

NOTE, In order for reviving this useful Branch of Discipline, the following Particulars are to be strictly observed by all the Officers and Soldiers, whenever the

the Battalion is form'd, whether it be for Action, or ~~for~~ other Occasion (*viz.*) The Officers are to take particular Notice which of the grand Divisions they belong to, and ^{the} which Side of the Colours they are, and who are the Officers on the Right and Left of them; on the exact Observance of this, depends the ready forming the Battalion whenever they happen to break. The Soldiers are also to take particular Notice of which Side the Colours the Division they are in lies; they must likewise take Notice who are the Officers of their Divisions, the Ranks they are in, their File-Leaders, and their Right and Left Hand Men.

This at first may seem almost impossible to bring Men to; but when they are train'd up to it, they will find it as familiar to them as handling their Arms, and a Battalion so train'd will upon many Occasions find great Advantage.

Suppose our Battalion to be thus train'd up, and that upon some Occasion we have been oblig'd to Break, and run into great Disorder, so that Officers and Soldiers are intermingled, and all in Hurry and Confusion; this is a Consequence which frequently attends the Foot, when they attack the Enemy that are posted behind Intrenchments or Ditches, especially after they have got within them; and how is it possible to be avoided, when perhaps the Enemy may have two or three Ditches to retire to, and we pursuing after this confus'd Manner? And suppose that we drove the Enemy out of all their Cover, and are pursuing them into a Plain; the first Thing we are to do is to put ourselves in Order, lest the Enemy's Horse seeing us in Confusion, come and cut us to Pieces. Wherefore when the Colonel finds the Action he's going upon, is like to occasion this Disorder, he apprizes the Battalion of it, and bids them mind their Colours, and keep as close to them as possible. The

Colours ought to be carry'd by *strong Men*, and kept always well advanced, to whom the Colonel gives strict Orders to stick close by him, whatever Way he takes; he also orders two or three of the ablest Drummers, or more, to keep close by him, and at the same Time acquaints both Officers and Soldiers, that whenever they hear the Drums beat to Arms, they immediately repair to their Colours, and whatever Way they find them draw up, or front, they are to range. When the Colonel is for forming the Battalion, he orders the Colours to draw up at their proper Distance the Way he would have the Battalion front, and then ordering the Drums to beat to Arms, the Officers by whom the Battalion is to be guided, immediately range to their proper Distance on each Side the Colours. The Officers Rank being thus form'd, the Soldiers knowing on which Side the Colours they are of, and the Officers they follow, will soon fall into their Places, and the Battalion be form'd in a shorter time than can be imagin'd, that is, when they are once thoroughly acquainted with the Manner. When several Battalions happen to intermingle, as upon these Occasions often happens, the Commanding Officers inclining with their Colours, and Drums beating towards that Part where their Station is to be, will soon bring all into Order. The Major, Adjutant, and Serjeants are to bestir themselves on this Occasion; and when the Battalion is thus form'd, the Officers and Serjeants may soon fall into their Platoons, and the Lieutenant-Colonel and other Officers take their Posts in the Rear.

TO DEFEND A BREACH or ENTRENCHMENT,

Which is perform'd by what we call the Parapet-firing. This, in time of Peace, is wholly laid aside,
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on account of its irregular Firing, and its not making a Figure on our Reviews: However, as it often falls in our Way in Time of War, I think it ought not to be neglected, but practis'd by all Battalions sometimes, tho' upon Reviews it may be omitted, unless the General require it. In this Case our Battalion will be drawn up Six deep, and the Files at such a Distance, as those that fire may have room to load before it comes to their turn to fire again. The Ranks are to keep at two good Paces distance, that the Soldiers may have room to be loading while they keep moving forward. Officers are to be posted in the front Rank, each of them to have six or eight File, at most, under their Command; and in the Interval behind each Officer, as many Officers as can be allow'd, to take Care that the Soldiers keep their Distance and Order, and hand them up from one to the other, till they come to the Officers. The remaining Part of the Officers are to be posted in the Rear, to see that the Soldiers perform their Duty, and avoid falling into Confusion. The Colonel gets the most convenient Place he can, for having a View of the Action; the Lieutenant-Colonel, Major, and Adjutant are to keep moving about all Parts, to prevent Confusion or Hurry; the Drums to keep out of the Way. When the Enemy begins the Attack, the Officers in the Front, without waiting for Orders, or staying for one another, give the Word to the Front Rank to make ready, which being done, he advances with them up to the Parapet, and then gives the Word, *Present*. In this they must be very careful, that the Soldiers point their Arms down to the Enemy, or they will be apt to fire over their Heads; he then gives the Word, *Fire*; which having done, they immediately recover their Arms, and face, upon their right Heels, to the Right about, which bring them opposite the Intervals

of Fire they are to pass through, and then they march briskly, keeping their Arms well recover'd, until they pass the Rear Rank two Paces; then they face again, on the right Heels, to the Right about, which brings them opposite the Rear of their own Files; and then, and not before, they fall to loading, in which they must be sure to ram down their Cartridges, or they will be apt to drop out when they come to present briskly down to the Enemy.

Upon the Front Rank's advancing up to the Parapet, the second Rank marches up to their Ground, and then makes ready, without waiting the Word of Command, where a Serjeant stands to see them do it, and to hand them up to the Officer. Thus when the Front Rank has fir'd, the Second marches up to the Parapet, where the Officer stands to receive them, and give the Word, *Present*, and *Fire*; by which a constant Fire will be maintain'd, and the whole Battalion in constant Motion, and with due Care may be kept in very good Order. There are some who, in performing this Fire, are for having the Ranks, when they have fir'd, to face all to the Right, and to march after one another to the Interval where the Officer stands; but this takes up too much Time, because the next Rank cannot mount the Parapet till the last Man has got off, which makes a Stop in the Firing, and certainly is most subject to Confusion, particularly in taking up their Files, when they come to the Rear, and the Ranks close on each other.

I shall only touch on one Thing more, and conclude.

The Army now abounds most with young Officers, that have not seen any Thing of Action, of whom, in Course, the Whole must be compos'd; wherefore my Design is to inform those Gentlemen, how they are to behave when they come to have separate Com-
mands,

mands, and particularly in marching a Battalion or large Detachment from one Garrison to another, or on such Occasions. We have had several gallant * Officers of long Experience, yet thro' Neglect have had their Regiments or Detachments cut to pieces, and themselves kill'd, or shamefully taken, as they have been marching from one Garrison to another, and that by inconsiderable Parties of Horse, that durst not have look'd them in the Face, had they kept that due Order in their March they ought to have done. Now, to guard against the like Misfortune, and caution all young Gentlemen, who in time may have the like Command, never to think themselves over-secure upon any Duty or Command whatever, especially when there is the least Possibility of an Enemy coming to them; because the Lives of so many Men, and their own Honour, which is much more valuable than Life, as also the Service of the Country, depends wholly upon their Care and Conduct upon all those Commands: and let them not depend too much upon the Care and Judgment of others; for whatever Misfortune happens, the Blame will be laid at their Door,

I will suppose our Battalion to be in Winter-Quarters, and that the Governor has receiv'd Orders to send our Regiment, or a strong Detachment to reinforce one of our Frontier-Garrisons, or perhaps, to escort Provisions or Stores thither; this being a Thing very common in Time of War, the which ought to be managed with Caution and Prudence; for the Enemy never wants having Intelligence of those Things; and, if possible, they'll send out a Party of Horse to intercept us on our March: wherefore the Governor, if he has the least Apprehension of Danger, seldom lets his Orders be known

* *Col. Babington, &c.*

till the Ports are shut, and the Keys brought to him ; then he gives out his Orders for the Battalion to be on the Parade by Break of Day next Morning. 'Tis probable our young Gentlemen will think these sudden Orders very hard : but whoever they are that take the Prosecution on them, must be ready to march at a Moment's Warning.

Our Battalion on the Parade at the Time appointed, the Colonel and all the Officers must not fail to be there at the same time, in order to get out of the Ports as soon as possible, as well to prevent the Men's drinking Drams, as for getting early on the March. The Battalion being ready, the Governor orders the Ports to be open'd, and the Colonel marches out, and draws up again on the Parade, where he's to make a Disposition for his March with all the Dispatch he can, by first drawing out his Advance and Rear-Guards, and then forms his Battalion or Detachment : but, as they are to fall into their March, neither Officers nor Serjeants fall into their Platoons until Occasion offers ; this being done, the Colonel sends off the Advanc'd Guard, the Officer of which is to take Care that he does not keep at too great a Distance, nor yet too near the Battalion ; three or four hundred Paces over a Plain will be sufficient, but less within Inclosures. He's to look often behind him to observe the March of the Battalion, and to halt when they halt ; and when he has got at a little Distance, he then sends off a Serjeant and twelve Men, who are to keep about half the Distance before him as he does from the Battalion, who is also to look often behind him to see that he keeps within Sight of his Officers. They are both to be very careful in looking about them, especially when they come near any Cover, or Rising-Grounds ; and if the Serjeant makes any Discovery of the Enemy,
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he is to fire a Shot, or two, or three, and then retire to his Officer; upon which the Officer is to halt, and acquaint the Colonel; and when the Serjeant has join'd him, if he finds the Enemy advance, he is to retire to the Battalion, and observe such Orders as he shall receive from the Colonel. And as 'tis hardly possible for any but Horse to come to intercept us upon this Occasion, so the Colonel prepares to form the Square, as hereafter shewn.

So soon as the Colonel has sent off his Advance-Guard, he orders the Officer of the Rear-Guard to take Care of the Baggage, or Convoy, and see that they keep good Order in their March, and close to the Regiment. This Officer is also to detach a Serjeant and twelve Men to keep at a proper Distance in the Rear of him, and both of them to look sharp lest the Enemy may lye in Ambush by the Advance-Guard, and come out, in hopes of surprizing us in the Rear, they having no Business to think of attacking us, but by surprizing us on a disorderly March. Nor is it to be conceiv'd what a Panick seizes a Body of Foot when they are surpriz'd after such a manner; nothing but Confusion attends them on such Occasions, and they are cut to Pieces before they can get into Order. Nor, on the other Hand, can it be conceiv'd with what Courage and Resolution a Body of Foot will be animated, when they find themselves in good Order, and Posture of Defence.

The Colonel having dispos'd Matters as above, and given strict Orders to both Officers and Soldiers, that they keep good Order in their March, and not stir from their Divisions, he then marches off in grand Divisions three deep, if the Ground will permit; if not, in half Ranks, which will contain two Platoons; and if the Ground will not admit of that,
he

he then subdivides into Quarter-Ranks, or single Platoons, but never into less: and if he should come to a narrow Pass, or Defile, which will not allow of our marching thus, then the half Ranks of the Platoons double to the Right behind each other; for we are by no Means to break our Platoons any otherwise; and whenever the Ground will admit, they are to march immediately out, and form their Platoons; and as the Ground enlarges, they are to double up into half Ranks, which is the easiest Way of marching: But, if there is any Apprehension of Danger, we are then to march up in grand Divisions, wherever the Ground will allow of it. Note, that the Army always marches six deep; but as we are, on this Occasion, in Danger of being attack'd by Horse, so we are to march in the readiest Posture for forming the Square, or drawing up in Battalion.

Let us suppose our Battalion on the March in grand Divisions over a Plain, with a Drum in the Front-Division, and another in the Rear, beating a March; the Divisions keeping at such Distance as they may have Room to wheel in, either for forming the Battalion, or Square. While we are thus on the March, we will suppose the Colonel has an Account ('tis no Matter whether from Front or Rear) that a Body of Horse are advancing towards us; he orders the Drums to cease beating, and the Battalion to halt; on which the Drum of the first Division comes out to him, he then gives the Word, TAKE CARE TO FORM *the* SQUARE; and immediately after orders the DRUM to BEAT a RUFFLE; upon which the second Division WHEELS to the RIGHT, by the Right-Hand-Man of the first Rank, until their three Ranks on the Left join the three Files on the RIGHT of the first Division; the third Division

MARCHES

MARCHES briskly, until they come to the Ground of the SECOND, and then they begin their Wheel to the LEFT by the LEFT-HAND-MAN of the REAR-RANK; and when they have made their Wheel they edge to the RIGHT, till their three Files on the Right take up the three Ranks on the Left of the first; and the Rear-Division all this While marches briskly, and takes the Ground from whence the second wheel'd, joining their three Ranks on the Right to the three Files on the Right of the second; and the three Files on their Left take up the three Ranks on the Left of the third, which closes the Square. All which, with a little Practice, will be perform'd in a short Time. And in Case the Enemy should be so near as to attempt falling on us while we are forming, the Grenadiers, with the Advance and Rear Guards, are to join, and make Head against them, which will stop any Body of Horse that can possibly be sent out on such Occasions; and when our Square is form'd, the Enemy dare not venture upon us, since they could not surprize us on a disorderly March, which is all the Sign we are to apprehend. Nor has it been known that any on the like Occasion did ever miscarry, but by the Carelessness and Neglect of the Commanding Officers, who have had Tails on their March some Miles long.

THE BAGGAGE must by no Means come into the Square, nor will there be any Danger of it. If they do but keep close to the Square, the Grenadiers, with the Advance and Rear-Guards, will be sufficient to take Care of them. THE ENEMY, when they find us in this Posture of Defence, will soon make off, lest our Frontiers hearing of their being abroad, might send out a superior Force to intercept them. However, we are to continue our March in the Square,

till we get over the Plain, and come up with inclosed Grounds, where the Horse have no Business to come near us; and being come up to those Grounds, we must reduce the Square before they enter them; whereupon the Colonel halts the Battalion, and then gives the Word, TAKE CARE to reduce the Square.

NOTE, That upon Halting we are not to Face Square, but continue as we were on the March, till the Drum beats a RUFFLE; on which the Rear-Division face to the RIGHT-ABOUT; the third face to the RIGHT, and edge away, to get clear to the Right of the Front Division, and the second face to the LEFT; and upon beating the Flam, the Rear-Division marches forward, the third wheels to the RIGHT by the same Man they wheel'd on before; and when they have made half their Wheel, the second begins their Wheel to the LEFT by the same Man they wheel'd on before. When the third Division has made theirs, they march forward after the fourth, to give Room to the second; and when the Major and Adjutant find, that the third and fourth Divisions have got to their proper Distance, and the second made their Wheel, they acquaint the Colonel of it, who then orders his Drum to beat a RUFFLE; upon which the three Divisions in the Rear FACE all to the LEFT-ABOUT; and upon the Drum's beating a MARCH, the whole Battalion marches off at once; and on our entering the enclosed Grounds, we are then to march as the Roads will admit: And tho' we have got clear of the Horse, yet we must still be on our Guard against an Ambuscade. Wherefore we should be much more careful in marching thro' these Grounds, than over the Plain. And tho' it may seem impossible that a sufficient Body of Foot could be sent from the Enemy's Frontiers to way-lay us, yet as they always have a Number of Partizan Parties abroad, who may hear of our March, and so draw together,

gether, and lie hid in some close Cover; and though they durst not openly attempt us, yet if they find us on a careless March, may throw in among us, which would certainly put us under great Confusion; and 'tis hard to say what may be the Consequence; for I have known some of these impudent Fellows, that have lain hid in a Wood, fire upon the Skirt of our Grand Army, as we have been on the March: Wherefore, I say, great Care must be taken in marching thro' inclosed Grounds, where both the Advance and Rear-Guards ought to be more circumspect in looking about them, and send Men off on every Side, to inspect into all suspected Covers. AND THEREFORE I cannot help recommending that most commendable Part of an Officer, of being diligent on all Duties and Commands, and not to trust to others, as I have too often seen among our *English* Gentlemen; and am sorry to say, that I have not known, among all the Nations I have served with, any Officers so remiss on Duty, as the Generality of our Countrymen; who, in other Respects, not only equal, but in a great measure excell. And why should this supine Negligence blast those other heroick Qualifications? And certainly, whenever a Gentleman takes the Profession of Arms upon him, he ought to study all Parts of it, from the Centinel to the General: For there is nothing will recommend him more to his Prince, or General, than that of being known to be an expert and diligent Officer, the which has raised Numbers of Men from private Centinels, to be General Officers; when those who have commanded them, have been at a Stand, and obliged to make their Court to them.

Thus have I gone through these Rules of Discipline, where I hope Hints will be found, that have not yet been touch'd on by any of our modern *Martinets*.

It

It may be expected that I should say something of the Behaviour of an Army in general; but that being an Affair that I can't pretend to, nor is it possible for the greatest General to prescribe certain Rules for fighting an Army; the Situation of Ground, the various Turns and unforeseen Accidents, which frequently and unavoidably attend all Battles, especially when an Enemy do obstinately dispute every Inch of Ground, are Things greatly depending on the ready Genius and Conduct of the General, and the Goodness of the Troops he commands. Besides, in that of one Army attacking another, there is something unaccountable in it; for though the Army attack'd has the Advantage of Ground which they have made Choice of, and very often more numerous in Troops, yet it is rarely known, but the Army which attacks does assuredly get the Victory.

F I N I S.
