

P R E F A

THE present war between Spain and France has been by one class of writers as unjust, while another class has on grounds of expediency and justice, however, of the latter as of the former description with the supposition, that or peace rested with the moment; and they supposed determined by the course of hostilities, by all circumstances under which rendered it an evil of Great Britain than peace been; a position which

though it is certainly advise-
 choose the less, yet, as it
 ascertained which of the
 of the less; and as the can-
 happen to associate themselves.
 nance of peace, must be try-
 ed before they can even balance
 nities which are inseparable from
 extraordinary that a defence
 position, which, though true
 act, may be doubtful in its ap-
 ould not have produced uni-

therefore, the question of
 perhaps an unanimity
 let us try the
 on another ground, and
 the British Government
 ever to prevent a rup-
 If *this* question be de-
 ive, no further vindication
 can

PREFACE

can be necessary. Not
 but likewise in a moral
 our part, will, then be just.
 ever doubt may be entertain
 fulness of commencing hostil
 mere motives of policy or expedie
 rational man will deny, that it is la
 repel an unjust aggression. It is not
 the bare circumstance, that the public d
 clation of war proceeded from the part
 France, which will warrant us to say th
 France was the aggressor. In the year 1756,
 the great King of Prussia declar
 war on
 Austria; yet he was properly not the aggress
 for, because he had receiv
 certai
 infor-
 mation that within a fe
 he
 him-
 self would be
 ed
 1 con-
 junction with Russia.
 Since
 then, the very same eu
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 subject has been fully
 thought applicable likewise
 National Convention

PREFACE.

against Great Britain on
 y 1793, the question of
 must be determined by the
 act of the two Governments,
 that declaration. With this
 the following history has been writ-
 It commences with the celebrated
 nce at Pillnitz, in August 1791;
 cause at that time the first coalition
 against France was in agitation: and as it
 continued to the declaration of war, it
 comprises an important period of eighteen
 months, the events of which must finally
 decide the question, "Who were the ag-
 "gressors?"

The following work
 s b may perhaps expose
 charge of prolixity: but
 falsehood is so blended
 random reports are adopted
 and history itself has

PREFACE.

been almost converted into fable, appeared absolutely necessary, in enforce conviction. I have made therefore, throughout the whole, advance on a single fact, without giving it by unanswerable authority have not only grounded this history on authentic documents, but have every where presented those documents to the view of the reader. Further, to preserve diplomatic accuracy as much as possible. I have generally quoted French documents in the original language. The whole, therefore, is an official report, in the strictest sense.

As the *Moniteur* was the official paper during the period which this comprises, and the French themselves cannot appeal from what which I took was, to examine it, from August 1793, and to trans-

PREFACE.

rench politicks had any reference,
 r indirect, to Great Britain. I then
 se to the most celebrated publi-
 of the French republicans Brissot,
 Chauvart, Dumouris, &c. and
 y the two collections which contain
 ivate correspondence of Danton
 the War Minister Pache and General-
 da, a correspondence which, though
 nderally known, throws great light on
 ese subjects. I have likewise con-
 the Memoirs of the Marquis de
 ally Tolendal's Defence, of the
 ants, the Memoirs of Bertrand de
 lle, and the collection of pieces pub-
 defence of Louis XVI, not with
 w of copying *opinions*, but of extract-
 7 which the authors were compe-
 st to Authentic Correspond-
 s with the French Minister
 s, has afforded very ma-
 igitating the motives

PREFACE.

by which the French rulers were actuated in their conduct towards Great Britain : and it has furnished, likewise, much valuable information in regard to the real sentiments entertained by the British Government on the subject of a war with France. These sentiments have been further developed, not only from his Majesty's speeches and the parliamentary debates, but from the *measures* which were adopted by Ministers, and which stand recorded either in official notes or authentic journals. The diplomatic papers which are quoted in this history, are taken partly from the *Moniteur*, and partly from the two *Annual Registers* ; treaties, whether of peace, commerce, or alliance, are quoted from the accurate collection of professor Martens at Gottinge. Various other works have been occasionally consulted, the reader will find in this history.

PREFACE.

To the pains which I have taken in the search of materials, I have endeavoured to add a fair and candid use of them. I have asserted no document, and no fact, which had come within my knowledge, and I believe I have overlooked nothing of importance, whether favourable or unfavourable to either party; and that what I have asserted, is indisputably true, the reader himself will every where perceive, from the authority quoted in favour of each assertion. Whether I have been guilty of error of judgment, and have drawn false conclusions from true facts, is a matter which the reader will likewise easily determine; as he is put in possession of all those premises which will enable him to judge for himself, and is therefore in less danger of receiving a false bias.

the subject has one. Indeed, it is to write a history of two living persons, without attaching one's self to either, is impossible, he who possesses such

such indifference, must be destitute of that energy, and of that spirit of perseverance, which are requisite in the collecting and the arranging of the materials for an history. With regard to myself, I honestly confess, that I am sincerely attached to the present Administration, and that I take a decided part with it on the subject of the following history, not on account of any personal connections, for I have not the honour of being acquainted with any one of the members of it, but because a full investigation of the subject, to which the following history relates, has convinced me, that not the British Ministry, but the French rulers alone, were the authors of the war. Shall *the taking a decided part*, then, after an examination of the whole evidence on both sides, be termed *partiality*? If this be admitted, the decision of every court of justice must be partial. But an historian must have already collected his materials, before he begins

compose his history ; he must already, therefore, have formed a decided opinion on the result of those materials. Consequently, even if throughout the whole of his work he appears more attached to one party than to another, yet, if he suspended his judgment till his collection of data was as complete as he could make it, that subsequent attachment can never deserve the appellation of prejudice or partiality. His judgment, indeed, may be erroneous, but so may the judgment of a man who is possessed of a stoical apathy, or an absolute indifference.

That historian alone can properly be called partial who *sets it* with the determination to justify, *it all events*, a particular party ; who knowingly suppresses facts and documents which are unfavourable to it, and thus, by presenting his readers with a mutilated picture, deprives them of the power

power of forming a true judgment of the whole. This method has been very successfully practised during the present war, both at home and abroad: for, as most men want either the leisure, or the inclination, or the opportunity, to collect for themselves all those facts and documents which are necessary for the forming of a right judgment on a controverted point of history; they are seldom aware of the defectiveness of that information which an author thinks proper to lay before them; they fancy themselves in possession of every thing requisite for the illustration of the subject, and deduce, therefore, an inference diametrically opposite to that which they would have deduced, had they been enabled, by a complete representation of the whole picture, to make a due estimate of the respective parts. Whether the following history be likewise chargeable in this respect, the public will easily deter-

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mine, because every thing which appears in the least unfavourable to the British Government, has been already collected with great diligence; has been industriously propagated, and is generally known. Indeed, had I been resolved, at all events, to justify the present Administration in regard to the origin of the war, I should no where have been even tempted to suppress a single circumstance, which, when viewed alone, appears to be unfavourable to it. For in every instance a bare comparison with the actions of the French rulers is sufficient to vindicate the measures of the British Government; and the only reason why these measures have been thought exceptionable by so many well-meaning men, has been the want of an historical parallel between the conduct of the French Government on the one-hand, and that of the British Government on the other, representing in what manner the former

former necessarily occasioned, and fully justified, the latter.

The history, now presented to the British public, I wrote originally in German,* a language, which a long residence in the University of Leipzig, has rendered as familiar to me as my own. A desire of rescuing my native country from the calumnies of some German journalists, had induced me, at the beginning of the year 1798, when the attention of all Europe was engaged with the threatened invasion of Great Britain, to draw up a short Essay, in the form of an Epistle, to a literary friend at Weimar, in which I endeavoured to shew, that whatever might be the issue of the important, and then doubtful conflict, the blame

* It was published at Leipzig, in February 1799 under the title *Historische Uebersicht der Politik Englands und Frankreichs*.

of its origin attached only to the rulers of France. This Essay was printed in the German Mercury * for March, 1798; and, as the period of the publication was very unfavourable to the author, the expectations of those who were attached to the French cause being at that time very high, it was not to be expected, that these journalists, who had asserted, that the coalition against France in 1791, was formed by the intrigues of the British Cabinet, that the French rulers were solicitous for peace, but that the Ministers of Great Britain, through mere hatred of the new republic, had resolved, at all events, to commence hostilities, and had so confidently repeated these assertions during several years, till at length they were received in almost every part of Germany, and

* Der neue Teutsche Merkur. It is published monthly at Weimar: and the editor is the celebrated Wieland.

PREFACE.

in the adjacent countries, as indisputable truths,* it was not to be expected, that such men, under such circumstances, would silently permit the oracular authority, which they had so long enjoyed, to be questioned by a writer, who had given no proofs of experience in political history. The opposition, which was made, especially by one of them,† determined me, therefore, to bring

* An intimate friend in Leipzig, a man, in other respects extremely well informed, and moreover well affected toward Great Britain, said to me a few months before the present history (in German) left the press: "I heartily wish you success, but I fear you have undertaken a desperate cause." But he is *now* of opinion that the cause is perfectly good.

† Mr. Archenholz, formerly an enthusiastic panegyrist of Great Britain, and who, even expressly said, in his *Annals of the British* "the British Ministers did *not* wish for peace," has since induced him so vehemently to the contrary, is best known to himself.

PREFACE.

the question at once to an issue, by laying before the public all the facts and documents, arranged in historical order, which concerned the relative Politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the coalition in 1791, to the declaration of war against Great Britain in February 1793.

The decision was soon made: for my work had not long appeared, when the first literary reviews in Germany, though the contrary opinion had, till that time, very generally prevailed, pronounced that the British Government was completely rescued from the charges which had been laid to it, and that the origin, as well as the continuance of the war, must be wholly and solely ascribed to the mad ambition of the French rulers. The journalist, who had so vi-

ilgemeine Literatur-Zeitung, for May

the Göttingen Review (Göttingische

1799, No: 106; and the analysis

rudely attacked the Essay inserted in the German Mercury, has since thought proper to assume a very different tone: he has not ventured any longer to direct his invectives against the British Government, but has turned them against the French Directory: and, though a candid acknowledgment of his errors was not to be expected from a man of his description, yet he has virtually acknowledged his inability to write a confutation.*

which Mr. Genz, the most eminent political writer now in Germany, has given of it in his Historical Journal (*Historisches Journal*), for May 1799. The merits of this valuable Journal are already known in England, from the extracts which have been given of it in the *Mercure Britannique*.

* In one of his journals, which appeared soon after my German work, he said, "that to write a confutation would require more time and labour than he was able to bestow." This shuffling excuse, though it has not the merit of a candid confession, yet, after

The work now presented to the British public, may, in one sense, be called a translation, as it was originally written in German: but as it proceeds from the author himself, it has an equal claim to the title of an original. In fact, it contains not a literal translation, but only the same narrative drawn up in another language, and supported by the same documents. In various places new matter has been added, and several alterations have been made in the arrangement of the materials. On the other hand, all allusions to German writers, with some other passages, which would have been uninteresting, if not unintelligible, to a British reader, have been omitted.

The Appendix, containing a short statement of the attempts made by the British

the violent attack with which he had commenced hostilities, could proceed only from the consciousness of his inability to continue them.

Governor at

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Government to restore peace, is for the very reason, that it is a mere appendix, necessarily less diffuse : but, though the facts are compressed into a small compass, enough is given to enable the reader to form a just opinion on the subject. Authentic documents are here, likewise, invariably adduced in support of each fact.


With great deference I submit the whole to the judgment of my fellow-countrymen ; and if they who have hitherto believed, either that the war might have been avoided, or that peace might have been restored, should be convinced by it of the contrary, that unanimity of opinion, which is so necessary to carry us triumphantly through the present conflict, will be the result of it. Few persons indeed, since the negotiation at Eisle, in 1797, have ascribed the *continuance* of the war to the British Ministry ;

but there are thousands, who still ascribe to them its *commencement*, and consequently consider them as the original authors of every evil, which it has occasioned. If, then, the following history should convince those who still entertain this notion, that it is founded in error, the distrust, which throws a shackle on national energy, will be removed, the public burdens will be borne with patience, from the consideration, that it was not in the power of Government to prevent the cause of them; domestic animosity will cease, and the efforts of every individual, who has not lost all affection for his country, will be directed against the French rulers, as the sole authors, as well as protractors, of the present war.

HERBERT MARSH.

August 4, 1799.

P. S.



P. S. Since the first edition of this work was printed off, a proposal of peace has at length been made by the French Government, on which some observations are made in the Postscript to the Appendix, inserted in the present edition.

March 30, 1800.

CONTENTS.

VOL. I.

CHAP. I.

*CONFERENCE at Pillnitz: and Conduct of
Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against
France, in 1791* - - - page 33

CHAP. II.

*Insurrection of the Negroes in the Island of St.
Domingo. Friendly Conduct of Great Britain
toward France on this Occasion: and Ingrati-
tude of the French National Assembly to the Bri-
tish Government* - - - page 43

CHAP. III.

*Other less important Events, relative to Great
Britain and France, in the Year 1791* page 58

CHAP.

CHAP. IV.

Meeting of the British Parliament on the 31st of January, 1792. His Majesty's Speech. Reduction of the British Forces, both by Sea and by Land. Cessation of the Treaty of Subsidy with Hesse Cassel. Abolition of Taxes to the annual Amount of two hundred thousand Pounds. Falseness of the Assertion, that Great Britain acceded in March, 1792, to what is called the Treaty of Pavia. Measures taken at this Time in France, for an Augmentation of its Forces by Sea as well as by Land - page 66

CHAP. V.

Declaration of War against the King of Hungary and Bohemia. Notification of it to the Court of Great Britain by the French Minister Chauvelin. Determination of the British Cabinet to persevere in the System of Neutrality: and Chauvelin's Letter on this Subject. Letter of Thanks from the King of France to the King of England.

England. Chauvelin's Note to Lord Grenville in which it was requested, that all British Subjects might be forbidden to serve under any foreign Power at War with France. Punctual Compliance with this Request, in a Proclamation of the twenty-fifth of May. Remarks on the Conduct of the British Cabinet page 81

CHAP. VI.

Proclamation of the 21st of May, 1792, against seditious Writings; and Confutation of the Objections which have been made to it page 91

CHAP. VII.

Prorogation of the British Parliament on the 15th of June. Speech from the Throne. Chauvelin's Note of the 18th of June, requesting the Mediation of Great Britain. Answer of the British Cabinet. Reflections on this Subject page 111

CHAP. VIII.

ensation produced in France, by the sailing of five Ships of the Line and a few Frigates, from Portsmouth, to perform naval Evolutions in the Channel. Proposal made in the National Assembly of an immediate Armament of thirty Ships of the Line. Chauvelin's Letter to his own Government, containing positive Assurances, that the British Cabinet had no Views of Hostility. Resolution of the National Assembly, that Chauvelin's Letter was satisfactory, and that a naval Armament was unnecessary page 152^m

CHAP. IX.

Recall of the British Ambassador from Paris, after the King of France was dethroned. Examination of the Question, whether this Recall was a Breach of Neutrality toward France. page 159^m

CHAP. X.

French Conquests in Germany, the Netherlands, and Savoy. A French Fleet in the Mediterranean harasses the Coasts of several Italian States. Other naval Armaments in France. Opening of the Scheldt. Decree of the 19th of November, by which Assistance was promised to all Nations, that were willing to take up Arms against their Governments. Deputies from certain British Societies appear at the Bar of the French National Convention, and signify their intention of establishing a National Convention in Great Britain. Encouragement thereto on the Part of the French Convention. Measures taken in Consequence, and Commotions in Great Britain.

page 180

CHAP. XI.

Official Communications between the Government of Great Britain and Holland, on the Progress of the French Arms in the Austrian

d

lands. Uneasiness produced by the Resolution to open the Scheldt. Further Alarm in Great Britain, occasioned by the Decree of the 19th of November, and the concomitant Measures taken by the National Convention, in Conjunction with certain British Societies. Proclamation of the First of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same Date, for the Meeting of Parliament. Spirited Declaration of the Bankers, Merchants, and other Inhabitants of the City of London, in Favour of the Constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and Speech from the Throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal Defence of Great Britain. Reflections on this Subject. - page 239

CHAP. XII.

Decree of the 15th of December, 1792, and the Interpretation of it by the Executive Council. New Exhortation to all Nations who were inclined to Insurrection. Menace in the National Convention of an Appeal from the Government

to the People of Great Britain, with Brissot's Interpretation of it. Barailon's Proposal to except Great Britain from the Decree of the 19th of November, rejected by the National Convention. Circular Letter of the Marine Minister, Monge, to the Inhabitants of the French Sea-Ports, to rouse them to a War with Great Britain, and to attempt the Conquest of it. Attack on a British Ship of War before the Harbour of Brest. Mission of Mr. Genet to the United States of America, with Proposals of an Alliance with France against Great Britain. Order issued by the French Executive Council to General Miranda, on the Tenth of January, 1793, to invade Dutch Flanders and the Province of Zealand, at farthest within twelve Days. Armament of thirty Ships of the Line and twenty Frigates, in Addition to the twenty-two Ships of the Line and the thirty-two Frigates already in Commission, in order to Act against Great Britain

page 312

HISTORY
OF
THE POLITICKS
OF
GREAT BRITAIN AND FRANCE,
FROM THE
TIME OF THE CONFERENCE AT PILLNITZ TO
THE DECLARATION OF WAR AGAINST
GREAT BRITAIN.

CHAP. I.

Conference at Pillnitz : and Conduct of Great Britain in respect to the Coalition against France, in 1791.

ON the 27th. of August, 1791, the Emperor and the King of Prussia signed a Declaration (1) at Pillnitz, by which they agreed to take certain measures in respect to France, provided other powers, whose

(1) The following is the authentic Declaration, contained in the *Mémoires sur la Révolution Française* p^d

assistance had been already solicited, consented to support them. The powers which had been invited to take part with the Emperor and the King of Prussia, were Spain, Russia, England, and the principal states of

le Marquis de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 133, and Marten's *Recueil des principaux Traités*, tom. v. p. 35.

“Leurs Majestés l’Empereur et le Roi de Prusse,
 “ayant entendu les desirs et les représentations de
 “Monsieur Frere du Roi de France et de S. A. le
 “Comte d’Artois, déclarent conjointement qu’elles
 “regardent la situation où se trouve actuellement le
 “Roi de France comme un objet d’un intérêt commun à tous les souverains de l’Europe. Ils espèrent
 “que cet intérêt ne peut manquer d’être reconnu par
 “les puissances, dont les secours sont réclamés, et qu’en
 “conséquence elles ne refuseront pas d’employer conjointement avec leurs dites Majestés les moyens les
 “plus efficaces relativement à leurs forces, pour mettre le Roi de France en état d’affermir, dans la plus
 “parfaite liberté, les bases d’un gouvernement monarchique également convenable aux droits des souverains, et au bien-être de la nation Française.
 “Alors et dans ce cas, leurs dites Majestés l’Empereur et le Roi de Prusse sont résolus d’agir promptement, d’un mutuel accord, avec les forces nécessaires pour obtenir le but proposé en commun. En attendant
 “elles

Italy: but their answers did not arrive till after the Conference at Pillnitz was ended, and the Emperor was returned to Vienna. On the 12th of September, therefore, the Emperor sent for the Marquis de Bouillé, and addressed him in the following terms.

“ It was not in my power to converse with
“ you sooner on the subject, for which I
“ had requested your attendance, because I
“ had not received the answers of the Courts
“ of Russia, Spain, England, and the prin-

“ elles donneront à leur troupes les ordres conven-
“ bles pour qu’elles soient à portée de se mettre en
“ activité.

“ Donné à Pillnitz le 27 Août, 1791.

“ Signé, LEOPOLD.

FREDERIC GUILLAUME.”

It appears from this authentic document, that the report of a *partition* treaty at Pillnitz has no historical foundation. Even the six secret articles, of which, however, the authenticity is very uncertain, contain nothing of a partition, either of France or of any other country. See Martens, tom. v. p. 26.

“ principal sovereigns of Italy. At present they
 “ are arrived, and correspond to my wishes
 “ and expectations: for I am assured of the
 “ co-operation of all these powers, *with ex-*
ception to England, which is resolved to
“ preserve the most strict neutrality.” (2)

Here we have a testimony, which places the conduct of the British Cabinet in the clearest point of view. The mere circumstance, that its answer was not received by Leopold before the beginning of September, sufficiently proves, that the British Cabinet took no part in the Conference at Pillnitz: (3)

(2) The Emperor's own words were: “ Je suis assuré de la co-opération, de toutes ces puissances, à l'exception de l'Angleterre, qui est déterminée à observer la plus stricte neutralité.” Mémoires de Bouillé, tom. ii. p. 139.

(3) Another proof, and one too of the highest authority, is Lord Grenville's Dispatch to Lord Malmesbury, dated 20th June, 1797, and printed among the papers relative to the Negotiation at Lisle. In this dispatch

and as the reply to the Emperor's proposal was decidedly in the negative, we have absolute proof that Great Britain had no concern in the coalition then forming against France. No one can object in this instance, that the real views of a cabinet are often at

dispatch. Lord Grenville said: "Your Lordship should
"take this opportunity to explain in the most distinct
"and unequivocal terms, that if any secret treaty was
"in fact concluded at the interview at Pillnitz, be-
"tween the late Emperor and the King of Prussia,
"which is, to say the least, very doubtful in point of
"fact, this at least is certain, that his Majesty was
"no party to such treaty; and not only was not then
"included in it, but has never since adhered to it,
"nor even been apprized of its contents. The public
"Declaration, which was made at that interview,
"shews on the face of it, that his Majesty was no
"party to it; and it is indeed notorious, that it ap-
"plied to circumstances, which were done away
"long before the war broke out between Austria
"and France, and that the subsequent negotia-
"tions for the maintenance of peace between those
"two powers, turned on points wholly distinct from
"those supposed to have been referred to in the pre-
"tended Treaty of Pillnitz."

variance with its protestations, since the answer was given to a question proposed, not by the Court of France, but by the Court of Austria. It is true, that if the British Government had been resolved on a war with France, it would have been consistent with its own interest, to conceal its intentions from its future adversary: in like manner, as the French Government, at the beginning of the American war, continued to give the British Ambassador the most friendly assurances, even after war was resolved on at Versailles. But the British Government could have no interest in deceiving the Emperor: on the contrary, it would have been prejudicial to its own interest, to assure the leader of the coalesced powers, that its positive determination was to preserve a strict neutrality, had it really intended to join the coalition. However, should any one still doubt, whether the dispositions of the British Cabinet were friendly toward France

or not, the answer given to the Emperor proves at least thus much, that Great Britain *at that period* took no part in a coalition against France.

Another very strong proof of this position is contained in a letter written by the King of Sweden, dated 2d of September, 1791, to the Marquis de Bouillé. (4) It appears from this letter that the King of Sweden at that time intended to embark troops, which were to be landed on the coast of Flanders: but he was so far from expecting assistance, that he apprehended even opposition on the part of England, and said, *it would be a grand point gained, if England remained neutral.* (5) Hence it is evident that England no more

(4) This letter is printed in the *Mémoires de Bouillé*, tom. ii. p. 142—145.

(5) His own words were: *Ce serait un grand point que la neutralité d'Angleterre, dont vous me parlez.* Ib. p. 144.

made a common cause with the King of Sweden, than with the Emperor. In fact, the British Government not only refused to join the coalition against France, (6) but

(6) If further proof were necessary, we might quote the authority of the French themselves. The Minister of the war department, in a report delivered to the National Assembly on the 11th of October, 1791, which in the *Moniteur* of the 13th of October occupies four whole columns, described very circumstantially the danger which at that time threatened France from various powers of Europe, and mentioned them by name, but did not say a syllable of England. And Brissot, in his speech of the 20th of October, 1791, was so far from representing the English ministers as encouraging the Princes of Europe to a confederacy against France, as some late writers have done without the least foundation, that on the contrary he spoke of them as mediators, and said, “l’Angleterre était occupée à calmer les esprits de Ratisbonne.” *Moniteur*, 23d October, 1791. But Brissot, it is said, was a friend of the English ministry! Now it must be observed, that this absurd report was first propagated in the spring of the year 1793, at the time that the power of the Girondists was on the decline; when Cambon, a principal member in the opposite party,

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acted toward that country with the greatest friendship, as will appear from the following chapter.

in order to accelerate the fall of Brissot, suggested that he was in secret alliance with the English Ministry. The thought was so valuable to the Anarchists, who were then coming into power, that it was seized with great avidity ; and as this party, at the head of which was Robespierre, maintained their authority a considerable time, it was brought by degrees into general circulation, without any one's knowing, or even asking, whence it came. Brissot (*à ses Commettans*, p. 98. Paris, 1793) says : “ Cambon, craint-il la lumiere ? Le mien (c'est-à-dire, bilan) est prêt ; il est, dans un mot—*Rien* ; et c'est la seule réponse que je fais à l'épithète qu'il m'a donnée, *Allié de Pitt*.” In fact, it would have been a very extraordinary alliance, since Pitt's adversaries have claimed Brissot as *their* friend ; and a noble Peer, at the head of the Opposition called him, in his speech of 1st Feb. 1793 (to use the words of the *Moniteur* 10th Feb. 1793) “ un homme aussi vertueux, qu'éclairé, de l'amitié duquel il s'honore.” Brissot's virulent abuse of the English Ministry a short time before the declaration of war, as well as on the day on which it was declared, is likewise not very reconcileable with his supposed friendship for them. But that was mere dissimulation, it is
said.

said. Now if that was mere dissimulation, the Director Barras is likewise attached to the English ministry, and all his invectives are nothing more than a mask, to cover his real friendship. In fact, if another 18th of Fructidor should take place, and the same fate should befall Barras, which he prepared for his colleagues, Barthelemy and Carnot, it would be nothing extraordinary to hear Barras decried as an agent of the British Minister: for it has been the fate of the French rulers, from the beginning of the revolution, to be adored, while in power, and to be calumniated, when fallen.—Lastly in the catalogue of grievances, with which the National Convention on the 1st of February, 1793, accompanied the declaration of war against Great Britain, no charge whatsoever was laid to the British Government, prior to the 10th of August, 1792. See *Moniteur* 3d Feb. 1793. We may be assured, therefore, that the National Convention itself was conscious of the British Government's having no concern in a coalition against France in 1791.

CHAP. II.

Insurrection of the Negroes in the Island of St. Domingo. Friendly Conduct of Great Britain toward France on this Occasion : and Ingratitude of the French National Assembly to the British Government.

TOWARD the close of the summer of 1791, an insurrection broke out among the negroes of St. Domingo, which was so dreadful in its effects that the French inhabitants of the island were reduced to a state of despair. The town of Cape François was surrounded by a formidable army of the insurgents; and the inhabitants had neither a sufficient quantity of arms and ammunition to enable them to defend themselves, nor provisions sufficient to support

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a long blockade. Without speedy relief, therefore, the French colony of St. Domingo must have been for ever lost to France: but from France itself, on account of its distance, speedy relief was not to be obtained. In this distressed situation, the Governor of St. Domingo sent deputies to Lord Effingham, the Governor of Jamaica, to request both provisions and ammunition: and Lord Effingham, with the consent of Admiral Affleck, sent immediately two frigates, the *Daphne* and the *Blonde*, provided with all necessaries, to Cape François, and a third, the *Centurion*, to Port au Prince. The *Daphne* and the *Blonde* arrived at the Cape on the 26th of September. On board the former was Mr. Bryan Edwards, who, in the preface to his *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, has circumstantially described the manner in which the assistance afforded to the distressed colonists was received. "The inhabitants of the town," says Mr. Edwards,

wards, (1) " being assembled on the beach,
 " directed all their attention towards us,
 " and we landed amidst a croud of specta-
 " tors, who with uplifted hands and stream-
 " ing eyes gave welcome to their deliverers,
 " for such they considered us, and acclama-
 " tions of '*Vivent les Anglais!*' resounded
 " from every quarter. The Governor of St.
 " Domingo was at that time the unfor-
 " tunate General Blanchelande, who has
 " since perished on the scaffold. He did
 " us the honour to receive us on the quay.
 " A Committee of the Colonial Assembly,
 " accompanied by the Governor's only son,
 " an amiable and accomplished youth, had
 " before attended us on board the Blonde,
 " and we were immediately conducted to
 " the place of their meeting. The scene
 " was striking and solemn. The hall was
 " splendidly illuminated, and all the mem-

(1) Page 5.

“bers appeared in mourning. Chairs were
“placed for us within the bar, and the Go-
“vernor having taken his seat at the right
“hand of the President, the latter addressed
“us in an eloquent and affecting oration, of
“which the following is as literal a transla-
“tion as the idiom of the two languages will
“admit.”

“We were not mistaken, Gentlemen,
“when we placed our confidence in your
“generosity; but we could hardly enter-
“tain the hope, that, beside sending us suc-
“cours, you would come in person to give
“us consolation. Generous islanders! hu-
“manity has operated powerfully on your
“hearts; you have yielded to the first emo-
“tion of your generosity, in the hopes of
“snatching us from death, for it is already
“too late to save us from misery. What a
“contrast between *your* conduct and that of
“other

“other nations! (2) We will avail ourselves
“of your benevolence; but the days you
“preserve to us will not be sufficient to ma-
“nifest our gratitude: our children shall
“keep it in remembrance. Regenerated
“France, unapprized that such calamities
“might befall us, has taken no measures
“to protect us against their effects. With

(2) What a contrast, likewise, between the conduct
of the English and that of their own countrymen! While the northern district of St. Domingo was in the utmost want of provisions, a French ship arrived laden with meal, from Bourdeaux, but the captain refused to dispose of his cargo, because the colonists were unable to pay him ready money. On this subject a complaint was afterwards made in the National Assembly, in which the following letter from St. Domingo was read, on the 11th of January, 1792. “Les
“paroisses du Nord, manquaient de subsistances.
“Mr. Fournier, commandant le Triton de Bour-
“deaux, refusait de fournir de la farine aux habitans
“de Bongres, parceque ceux-ci épuisés en ce mo-
“ment ne pouvaient lui payer comptant. En vain
“lui avaient-ils rémontré, que son refus de fournir des
“farines allait les exposer aux plus affreux besoins.”

Moniteur, 12th Jan. 1792.

“wha

“ what admiration will she learn, *that without your assistance we should no longer exist as a dependency to any nation !*”

This address of the President of the Colonial Assembly is an unanswerable proof, that the French were at that time indebted to the friendship of the English for the preservation of their valuable colony of St. Domingo. They were under obligations likewise to the British Government: for the Governor of Jamaica would not have ventured to supply the French colonists with arms and ammunition, unless he had been assured, that the dispositions of his cabinet had been friendly toward France. And to remove all doubts on this subject, the British Ambassador at Paris was ordered to notify to the Court of France, that his Majesty approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. (3)

(3) The following is the official note of the British Minister at Paris to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs.

On the 5th of November the note of the British Ambassador was taken into consideration by the National Assembly. (4)

The person, however, who spoke first, proposed neither a vote of thanks to the British Government, nor even to Lord Effingham, but directed his whole attention to the state of the French colony, till Mr. Dubayet reminded him of the obligations which they owed to the generous Governor of Jamaica. (5) Another member of the Assem-

Affairs. "Je crois devoir vous envoyer une lettre de
" Milord Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, en
" date du 7th Septembre. Je dois vous annoncer,
" que le Roi mon maître a bien voulu approuver la
" conduite qu'a tenu le Gouverneur, en envoyant tous
" les secours, dont il pouvait se passer, pour soutenir
" le gouvernement de St. Domingue." *Moniteur*, 6th
Nov. 1791.

(4) The whole debate is contained in the *Moniteur*, 6th Nov. 1791.

(5) "Vous devez jeter vos regards sur la conduite
" de M. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque, digne
" d'une grande nation, qui rivalise avec nous pour la
" liberté. Je demande qu'il lui soit voté des remerci-
" mens."

bly, but a person of so little importance that his name was unknown even to the editor of the *Moniteur*, (6) then proposed a vote of thanks to the British Government: but the motion was seconded by no one in the whole Assembly. Upon this, Mr. Goujon moved, that the thanks of the Assembly should be voted neither to the British Government, nor to the Governor of Jamaica, but to the British *Nation* (7): and this motion passed, with only the following amendment: that Lord Effingham, as a member of the British Nation, was named in particular. (8)

(6) This appears from the circumstance, that after Mr. a mere line is placed, instead of a name.

(7) Je demande qu'il soit voté des remerciemens, non pas au Gouverneur, non pas au Gouvernement Anglois, mais à la *Nation* Anglaise.

(8) Mr. le Président. La motion est faite, à voter des remerciemens à la nation Anglaise, et en particulier à Mr. Effingham, Gouverneur de la Jamaïque.

La proposition énoncée par M. le Président est adoptée.

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This strange behaviour of the National Assembly was by no means calculated to promote that friendship with the British Government, of which they had just received so striking a proof. It was not only absurd to thank a whole nation for an act, in which merely the Government, the Governor of Jamaica, and a few individuals in that island had taken part, but it was ungrateful and affronting to reject the thanks which were proposed, and were really due to the Government of Great Britain. The object, however, which the National Assembly had in view, admits of no doubt; and we may safely conclude, that the system which the French rulers have since followed with so much success, was at that time already adopted. (9)

(9) This system consists in separating the governed from their governors, in exciting the one against the other, that both of them may at last fall a prey to French avarice and ambition. Brissot said: Que

The conduct of the National Assembly was likewise in another respect highly ungrateful; for if the British Ministry had

“pensaient les hommes éclairés, républicains avant le 10. Août, les hommes qui voulaient la liberté non seulement pour leur pays, mais pour toute l’Europe ? Ils croyaient qu’on pouvait l’établir partout, *en soulevant les administrés contre les administrans* en faisant voir aux peuples la facilité et les avantages de ces soulèvemens.” Brissot à ses Commettans (Paris, May 1793) p. 81. And that this system was already adopted at the end of the year 1791, appears from Isnard’s speech in the National Assembly on the 5th Jan. 1792. In this speech said Isnard: “Voici l’instant qui peut-être doit décider à jamais des despotes et des nations : c’est vous que le ciel réservait à ces grands événemens : élevez-vous au niveau de vos destinées.” And a few lines after; “Est-il bien vrai qu’un langage national ne serait entendu dans aucune contrée ? Ah sans doute les Anglais feraient un peuple digne de l’entendre.” *Moniteur*, 6th Jan. 1792. This last passage shews likewise that the leaders of the National Assembly even at that time directed their attention to the people of England, who, in consequence of their political liberty, were considered as fitter subjects for French intrigue than the inhabitants of any other country.

thought

though proper to act on the same political principles on which the French Government acted at the commencement of the American war, or to retaliate its unjust aggression, they might, without the least difficulty, have gained possession of the capital of St. Domingo. The French marine was then in such a situation, that it could not have made the least resistance. Ever since the year 1789 the French sailors had been in a continual state of insurrection: (10) almost all the naval officers were dissatisfied, (11) the greatest part of them had ac-

(10) All the documents relative to this subject are contained in the *Mémoires Secrets, pour servir à l'histoire de la dernière année du règne de Louis XVI.* Par A. F. Bertrand de Molleville, Ministre d'Etat à cette époque, (Londres 1797, tom. iii. 8.) tom. ii. p. 315—335.

(11) Bertrand de Molleville (tom. i. p. 291) says: "Un esprit d'insubordination et de révolte s'était manifesté de lui-même dans les principaux ports de mer, et à bord de plusieurs vaisseaux de guerre depuis l'année 1789. Plusieurs officiers avaient été out-

ually quitted the service, and many had already emigrated. Even those who were appointed in their stead returned, almost to man, their commissions, as soon as they received them; (12) and Bertrand de Molleville, at that time Minister of the Marine, as himself acknowledged, that he should have found it difficult at the end of 1791 to have found an officer, who would have accepted the command of a ship of war. (13)

ragés et insultés par les matelots: aussi tous les officiers en général étaient dégoûtés du service, et je crus fermement que le Duc d'Orléans et le Comte d'Estaing seraient les seuls d'un rang distingué qui consentiraient à servir, tant que la marine serait soumise aux nouveaux réglemens."

(12) "La défobéissance et la révolte étaient non seulement tolérées, mais encouragées et regardées comme les marques distinctives du patriotisme: aussi, presque tous les officiers m'envoyèrent leurs commissions dès qu'ils eurent reçu la lettre, par laquelle je leur annonçais leur promotion," *Ib.* tom. i. p. 278.

(13) Tom. i. p. 263, he relates the following conversation, which took place at that period between himself and M. de Narbonne, the War Minister. "Le jour

"où

But even if the French marine had been in the best possible condition, there would have been no necessity for using force, in order to accomplish the end; for the inhabitants of St. Domingo were so exasperated against the National Assembly, to whose proceedings they imputed their disasters, (14)

“ où je parlai au conseil de ce refus des officiers, M. de Narbonne m'entreprit en ces termes.

“ Quoi ! tous les officiers refusent ? c'est donc à dire, “ que si nous avions quelque inquiétude relativement “ aux dispositions de l'Angleterre, et que je vous de- “ mandasse une frégate pour croiser sur nos côtes, “ vous ne pourriez la fournir.

“ Ce ne sont pas les frégates, qui nous manquent, “ répondis-je : mais dans ce moment je serais fort em- “ barrassé pour trouver un officier, qui voulut se charger “ d'en commander une.”

(14) Edwards's Historical Survey of St. Domingo, preface p. 10. They accused particularly those members of the Assembly who call themselves Amis des Noirs, and whose conduct, as well as the effects which it produced, Mr. Edwards has described in ch. vii. See also Bertrand de Molleville Mémoires Secrets,

that all the classes of the whites were disposed to renounce their allegiance to the mother country. "The black cockade," says Mr. Edwards, (15) "was universally substituted in place of the tri-coloured one, and very earnest wishes were avowed in all companies, without scruple or restraint, that the British Administration would send an armament to conquer the island, or rather to receive its voluntary surrender from the inhabitants." Very earnest application was likewise made to the British Ministry, that an armament might be sent to take possession of the country: but no attention was paid to the solicitations of the colonists, till the French Government had

tom. ii. p. 241—245, where an account is given of some papers, found in the hands of the mulatto Raimond, which contained the instructions communicated to the negroes of St. Domingo by the Amis des Noirs during the years 1790 and 1791, in order to excite them to rebellion.

(15) *Ib. ib.*

thought proper to declare war against Great Britain. (16) And this generous conduct has been repaid, on the part of France, with the blackest ingratitude.

(16) *Ib.* p. 140.

CHAP. III.

Other less important Events, relative to Great Britain and France, in the Year 1791.

ON the 28th of September, 1791, the King of France issued a proclamation, in which he formally notified his acceptance of the new constitution: and he wrote likewise circular letters to the different courts of Europe, to the same purpose. The Court of Great Britain was one of the first which sent an answer, and this answer was delivered in terms of great respect. (1) It may be said indeed, that answers of this kind are mere matters of form: yet, when we con-

(1) It is contained in the *Moniteur*, dated 5th Nov. 1791, and is dated Oct. 6th, 1791.