

“ and it will not be extraordinary if, in a *short space of time*, addressees of congratulation “ be sent to a NATIONAL CONVEN- “ TION OF ENGLAND.” (21) At these words the French Convention applauded. The address itself was then read by one of the secretaries, which, after much abuse of the English, and much panegyric on the French Government, concluded with a sentence containing the following words: “ others will *soon* march in *your* footsteps, in this career of *useful changes*.” (22) And

(21) “ Citoyens de France, nous sommes députés “ par une société patriotique de Londres, pour vous “ féliciter en son nom des triomphes de la liberté.— “ D’après l’exemple que vient de donner la France, les “ révolutions vont devenir faciles; il ne ferait pas ex- “ traordinaire, que dans un court espace de tems il arri- “ vât aussi des félicitations à une Convention Nation- “ ale d’Angleterre.” (Applaudissemens). *Moniteur* 29 Nov. 1792.

(22) “ D’autres marcheront *bientôt* sur vos traces “ dans cette carrière d’*utiles changemens*.” *Ib.* The address is signed, Sempill, President; D. Adams, Se-

these *useful changes*, according to the interpretation of the deputies themselves, were to consist in the establishment of a National Convention, and consequently in the *total* abolition of the British Constitution: (23)

cretary. In the *Moniteur*, it is signed likewise by Joel Barlow and John Frost, the deputies who delivered it to the French Convention.

(23) It is extraordinary that, notwithstanding the public acts of this and other similar societies which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, and lie open to the whole world, both eminent orators and eminent writers should so long have persisted in the assertion, that nothing more was intended than a parliamentary reform. In like manner it has been asserted, even till the breaking out of the Irish rebellion, that the United Irishmen had no other object in view than a reform in the Commons House of Parliament. But at present we all know, from the report of the Secret Committees of the two Houses of the Irish Parliament, published in August 1798, and founded on the evidence of Arthur O'Connor, Emmet, Macnevin, and other chieftains of the rebellion, that a parliamentary reform was nothing more than a mask, under which the United Irishmen endeavoured to cover their real designs, that they were in fact closely allied with the enemies

As soon as the speech of the deputies was ended, and the address itself had been read,

enemies of Great Britain, and that, in the summer of 1796, Lord Edward Fitzgerald and Arthur O'Connor went to Francfort as deputies from the Irish Union, to settle with General Hoche the plan of the landing in Ireland, which was then in agitation, and which was attempted, though unsuccessfully, before the close of the year. And still more extraordinary is it, that members of the British Senate, hardly two months before Arthur O'Connor himself made these acknowledgments, could venture to declare in a Court of Justice, that they were acquainted with the political character of this man, and that they believed him to be sincerely attached to the principles which placed the present family on the throne. The impositions which have been practised since the French revolution, by the term "Parliamentary Reform," appear further from a memoir delivered in 1797 by Lewines, the ambassador of the United Irishmen, to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris, in which was the following passage: "The *delusions* of Reform and Emancipation are beginning to fail from the delay, &c." See the report of the Secret Committee of the Irish House of Commons, in August 1798, an extract from which is printed in the Times, of the 27th of August. Thus have the common people in Ireland

the President of the French Convention returned an answer, which contained the following passages: "The defenders of our liberty will one day become the defenders of your own.—The shades of Pym, of Hampden, and of Sydney, hover over your heads; and without doubt *the moment is approaching*, when the people of France will come to offer their congratulations to
 "THE NATIONAL CONVENTION OF
 "GREAT BRITAIN." (24)

who, as Oliver Bond acknowledged, cared very little about a parliamentary reform, been rendered the dupes of those who, as the same person added, "thought for them," or, in plain terms, wished to sacrifice their country to gratify their private ambition. The same *delusions of reform* were attempted to be practised in England, when the above-quoted addresses were presented to the French Convention in November, 1792: but, fortunately for Great Britain, they produced not the intended effect.

(24) "Les défenseurs de notre liberté le feront un jour de la votre.—Les ombres de Pym, de Hampden, de Sydney, planent sur vos têtes: et sans doute

Such answers to such societies, (25) united

*“ il approche le moment, où les Français iront féliciter
“ la Convention Nationale de la Grande Bretagne.”*
Moniteur, 29 Nov. 1792. The Convention then de-
creed, that the addressees, with the answers of the Pre-
sident, should be translated into all languages. *Ib.*

(25) On the 29th of November another address was
presented to the Convention from a society at Roches-
ter, in which, after much declamation against the Bri-
tish Government, mention was made, in very intelli-
gible, though general expressions, of people, “ who
wished to receive from the French Nation the benefit
of liberty” (*qui aspirent à recevoir de lui la bienfait de
la liberté*). Moniteur, 30 Nov. 1792. Another pas-
sage in this address, “ résolu que le président de la so-
“ ciété invitera tous les amis de l’égalité, *toutes les so-
“ ciétés correspondantes en France*, à employer leur zèle,
“ leurs efforts, leurs sollicitations auprès du Conseil
“ *Exécutif*,” etc. affords an additional proof, not only
that societies in England corresponded with societies
in France, but likewise that these societies stood in im-
mediate connexion with the French Executive Coun-
cil.—Beside this address and the three others above-
mentioned, several more were sent to France about this
time; for Lord Grenville, in his speech of the 13th of
December, 1792, said: “ he held in his hand no less
“ than *ten* addresses presented to the National Con-
“ vention

with the decree of the 19th November, (26) were equivalent to a formal declaration of hostilities against the British Government; and the general promise of assistance, which had been given to revolutionists of all nations, was, by the conduct of the National Convention, on the 28th of November, confirmed, and applied to Great Britain in particular. This was the reward of all the benefits which had been conferred on France: this was the return, which was made for the refusal to join the coalition, for the salvation of the French colony of St. Domingo, for the permission to import from England bread

“vention of France by subjects of this country.” See the *New Annual Register*, 1793; *British and Foreign History*, p. 22. See also *Rivington's Annual Register*, 1792; *State Papers*, p. 344—352.

(26) The explanation of this decree, which was afterwards given by the French Executive Council, will be examined in a subsequent chapter, where it will appear that the explanation was founded on the blackest hypocrisy.

and

and arms, and for the preservation of neutrality, even at a time when France might have been attacked with the utmost advantage. But what gratitude could be expected from men, who convert religion and morality into subjects of ridicule? They acted only, at that time, as they have acted ever since; for their whole conduct affords one continued proof, that from the moment they acquire the means of conquest, neither neutrality, nor justice, nor gratitude, prevent them from the execution of their designs.

It is true, that the National Convention pretended an especial friendship for the *people* of Great Britain. But what right did they possess to interfere in the internal affairs of a neutral country, and to separate the people from the government? According to their own maxims, this was the greatest offence of which one nation could be guilty toward another. The British Government had not

acted in this manner toward France; for so late as the end of August Le Brun himself acknowledged, that "it had conducted itself to that very period, with justice, with moderation, and impartiality." (27) But let us ask, what they meant by friendship for the people, and enmity to the Government of Britain; and how they could attack the latter, yet leave the former unmolested? It is not the members of a Government which usually take the field when a country is invaded, but the soldiers and the other inhabitants, who fight under the orders of government; the very persons, therefore, for whom the French pretended a particular friendship, were those who were immediately exposed to the effects of their enmity. Who, therefore, can be so blind, as not to see, that

(27) Le Brun's own words were, "la justice, la modération, et l'impartialité, qu'il a montrée jusqu'à présent." See his note to Lord Gower, quoted Ch. ix: Note 2.

such declarations were nothing more than attempts to delude the unwary, and to convert them into instruments of French ambition? If we further ask, in what the amity of the French rulers for the *people* of foreign countries really consists, the answer is obvious. Agreeably to their pretended doctrine, they declared war only on the Stadtholder of Holland, and yet reduced the once wealthy inhabitants of that country to beggary: they declared war, as they asserted, only on the oligarchs of Bern, and then subjected even the democratic cantons of Switzerland to slavery: they declared war on the Senate of Venice, and sold the *people* to a foreign master. Such is the friendship of these promoters of the rights of man, and such is their regard for what they call the sovereignty of the people. It was surely, therefore, the duty of the British Government to rescue the natives of our free and happy

happy island from the influence of *such* friendship. (28)

In fact, the means which have been adopted by the republican Governors of France,

(28) It is true, that the number of those, who have suffered themselves to be deceived by the specious professions of the French rulers has been very considerable even in Great Britain ; but at present, after an experience of seven years has enabled us to compare promises with the performance of them, I believe that every man, who *chooses* to see, *must* see the error. On this subject I can quote so high an authority as that of Mr. Sheridan himself, who, in the admirable speech which he delivered in the House of Commons on the 20th of April, 1798, said : “ If then they attempt to invade us, they will no doubt come furnished with flaming manifestoes. The Directory may instruct their Generals to make the fairest professions of how their army is to act; *but of these professions surely not one can be believed.*” And a few lines after, he added with great energy : “ *Can there be supposed an Englishman so stupid, so besotted, so besotted, as to give a moment’s credit to such ridiculous professions ?*” See the Morning Chronicle, 21st April, 1798.

to

to gratify their ambition and extend their conquests, are the most detestable, which human ingenuity can invent. The Monarchs of France, especially Louis XIV, had indeed likewise attempted, to subjugate the neighbouring states: but they went more openly to work, and deluded not the inhabitants of the countries which they invaded, by promises of felicity, which they were determined not to fulfil. They made no ostentation of propagating the rights of man: yet they oppressed them infinitely less than the modern despots of republican France. They intrigued, as well as the Convention and the Directory; but their intrigues were less injurious to mankind, for the intrigues of the former were confined chiefly to the great, or to the courts of Princes, whereas the intrigues of the latter operate on whole nations. The republican Governors of France set the vilest of the human passions in commotion, they work on the illiterate multitude, who

are

are not aware, that they are mere engines in the hands of their employers, and that they themselves, as well as those against whom they are employed, will at last become the miserable slaves of their pretended deliverers. The National Convention, toward the close of the year 1792, had its secret agents in almost every quarter, who endeavoured by all the arts of systematic deception, to seduce especially the lower orders of society. Chauffard, who was well acquainted with the principles of the new French Government, and was himself one of the agents in the Austrian Netherlands, speaking of the revolution professors, (29) as he calls them, says, "it is not at the tables of the great, but under the hatch of the cottager, that the toasts of liberty must be given." (30) He has described, likewise, the

(29) "Professeurs de révolution."

(30) "Ce n'était point aux banquets des administrateurs, qu'il fallait porter les toasts de la liberté; c'était

means which were adopted to bring the people of foreign countries into the views of the French Convention: and these means consisted in promises of unlimited freedom, and an absolute exemption from all taxes. (31) By such insidious and delusive professions, by assurances of wealth and liberty, have the

“c’était sous la chaîne du pauvre.” *Chaussard Mémoires Historiques*, etc. p. 53.

(31) *Ib.* To set the populace more effectually in commotion, a procession of butts of beer, ornamented with branches, and bearing the inscription, “free and exempt from duties,” was held at Brussels for this very purpose. *Chaussard’s* own words in the place just quoted are: “Ces tonneaux chargés de palmes promenés en pompe, portant pour inscription: *Libres et affranchis de droits*, escortés d’une cour plus pompeuse, que celle des monarques, c’était celle du peuple; ces acclamations de joie et de franchise, ces flots de la liqueur nationale écumeux et ruisselans, tout présentait une leçon en action, tout cela parlait plus haut et plus éloquemment encore que la philosophie.” See likewise the first article of the decree of 15th Dec. 1792, where the same delusive promises are given.

modern Governors of France reduced those, who have been weak enough to believe in them, to the lowest indigence and the meanest servitude. (32).

The engines, which they set to work with so much success in the Netherlands, they endeavoured likewise to employ in England: for at the end of November and the beginning of December, 1792, London abounded with révolution professors, as Chaussard called them, or missionaries, as they were termed by Gregoire, (33) who

(32) Dumouriez himself says: “C’est le 15 Décembre que fut donné le fameux décret qui prouvait aux Belges et à tous les peuples, qui avaient appelé les Français ou qui les avaient reçu, que la Convention n’envoyait les armées chez eux que pour les spolier et les tyranniser.—On disait aux Belges dans le préambule, qu’ils étaient libres; on les traitait en esclaves.” Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 373, 374.

(33) In a report which Gregoire delivered to the National Convention on the 27th of November, 1792,

he

were amply supplied with money, for the purpose of bribing and seducing the lower orders of the people. Various circumstances attending this infamous plot are well known: but as no one seems to have been more intimately acquainted with it, than the author of a tract published in the Collection of the Works which have been written in defence of Louis the Sixteenth, (34) it will not be

he said: "Vient-on nous dire, que les peuples ayant
 " des constitutions différentes les fonderont toutes sur
 " les principes de l'égalité, de la liberté, et se ché-
 " ront en frères? C'est le cas d'appliquer le conseil
 " d'un ministre à l'Abbé St. Pierre. *Envoyez préa-*
 " *ladement des missionnaires pour convertir le globe.*
 " Plusieurs contrées de l'Europe et de l'Amérique ag-
 " grandiront bientôt le domaine de la liberté." Mo-
 " niteur, 28 Novembre, 1792. But Camille Jourdan
 has given these missionaries their true name, and called them *apostles of rebellion*. "Continuant à professer
 " toutes les maximes révolutionnaires et inondant tous
 " les pays de leurs apôtres de rebellion, etc." Camille
 Jourdan à ses Commettans sur la révolution du 18
 Fructidor, p. 90.

(34) Collection des Meilleurs Ouvrages qui ont été

superfluous to quote the following passage. (35) "The King of England," says the author of this tract, "knew the leaders, the agents, the societies, the correspondences, the emissaries, the periods of their meeting, their journies, and their resolutions. He knew that the plan was laid to seize the Tower, to plunder the arsenal, to break open the prisons, to pillage the public buildings and the houses of the rich, and to cut off at one stroke the several branches of the constitution. His Majesty knew that the execution of the plan was fixed for Saturday the first, or Monday the third of December: he saw likewise a model of the daggers with which the insurgents were to be armed, and this model was found in the hands of

publiés pour la défense de Louis XVI. Paris, 1793. tom. ii. p. 8. This tract is printed in tom ii. p. 251—286.

(35) P. 272, 273.

"a French-

ence (36) may be proved from the actions, speeches, and confessions of the French rulers themselves. For that the avowed principles, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," "missionaries and revolution-professors must be sent out to convert the globe," "every nation which chooses to rebel against its government shall receive assistance from France," were particularly applied to England, appears from the above-described conduct of the National Convention on the 28th of November. (37) The application of these prin-

(36) As the bare *existence* of the plot is sufficient for the present history, it is immaterial whether credit be given to the above mentioned *circumstances* or not: nor do I quote them as absolutely certain, because they are not taken from an official document.

(37) From the documents on this subject, which are recorded in the *Moniteur*, there lies no appeal: and these documents alone are a sufficient proof that the National Convention co-operated in the plan to overturn the British Constitution.

ciples to England and Ireland, appears further from the confession of Brissot himself: for in his Address to his Constituents he said, "it was necessary to encourage the movements of liberty in Ireland," (38) "we could set England in alarm by exciting a fermentation in its own bosom." (39) And that the French emissaries in London were supplied with considerable sums by the National Convention, to enable them to operate with the utmost vigour, appears likewise from the same work. For Brissot says: "These republicans have never ceased to

(38) "L'Irlande dont il fallait encourager les mouvemens de la liberté." Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 73.

(39) "Nous pouvions inquiéter l'Angleterre en excitant la fermentation dans son sein." Ib. 78. That attempts were made to excite an insurrection in England, long before the declaration of hostilities (which is very different from assisting a disaffected party when two nations are already at open war), appears likewise from the circular letter of the Marine Minister Monge, dated 31st December, 1792, which will be cited in a following chapter.

"assert.

“ assert, that, if we expect to succeed we
 “ must have *money for secret expenses*, partly
 “ for the purpose of dividing the Cabinets,
 “ and partly for the purpose of *exciting the*
 “ *people* against their tyrants. We want
 “ it for the North, we want it for the
 “ South, we want it for *the Indies*.” (40)

This passage undoubtedly applies to England. And a few lines after, Brissot adds:

“ It was Cambon and Barrere who caused the decree to be made, by which
 “ the Executive Council was authorized to
 “ take, under the head of army extraordinary,
 “ *unlimited sums for these secret operations*.” (41) Lastly, Brissot acknowledges,

(40) “ Ces républicains ne cessaient de dire: Si
 “ l'on veut réussir, il faut de secret, il faut de l'argent
 “ pour les *dépenses secrètes*, soit pour diviser les cabinets,
 “ soit pour *exciter les peuples* contre leurs tyrans.
 “ Il en faut pour le Nord, il en faut pour le Midi, il
 “ en faut pour les Indes.” A ses Commettans, p. 74.

(41) “ C'est Cambon avec Barrere, qui a fait rendre
 “ un décret pour autoriser le Conseil Exécutif à prendre

that before the declaration of war not less than *twenty-five millions of livres* had been sent to England from the national treasury, and that Cambon, the President of the Committee of Finance, had kept their destination a secret." (42)

That a plot, therefore, to overturn the English Government and Constitution, toward the close of the year 1792, not only existed, but that the National Convention took a very active part in it, admits of no

"des sommes illimitées sur l'extraordinaire des guerres,
"pour ces opérations secrètes." Ib.

(42) "A cette époque (lors de la déclaration de guerre) la trésorerie dirigée par Cambon, avait pour 25 millions de numéraire achetés en Angleterre, et qui furent exposé à être pris. Que sont-ils devenus? On l'ignore." Ib. 97. Immediately before this passage, he had said that five other millions had been deposited in the house of Bourdieu and Chollet in London, and that after the war broke out they fell into the hands of the English Government.

doubt.

doubt (43). The members of the National Convention in general, and of the Executive

(43) Another unanswerable proof of the part which the French Government took in this plot, is contained in the two following passages of a letter written by Mr. Miles to Le Brun, on the 2d of January, 1793: “Rappelez donc tous vos émissaires; que le projet *pagand* finisse, et ne cherchez plus à troubler la tranquillité publique dans ce pays.—Au nom de Dieu, si vous voulez éviter un embrasement universel, ne vous mêlez pas de notre gouvernement; si nous sommes moins libres que vous, même si nous étions dans l’esclavage le plus affreux, laissez nous nos fers, et puisqu’ils ne nous gênent pas, pourquoi vous inquiètent-ils? Je m’étends d’autant plus sur cet article, que je n’ignore pas les espérances mal fondées que vous avez conçues d’une révolte générale, et pendant que vous encouragez de tels projets, il me fera impossible de vous aider, et même d’entretenir aucune correspondance, ni avec vous, ni avec le Conseil Exécutif.” See p. 96, of the appendix to the work intitled, *Authentic Correspondence with M. Le Brun, the French Minister, and others, to February, 1793, inclusive*; published as an appendix to other matter, not less important, with a preface and explanatory notes. By W. Miles. London, 1796-8. Mr. Miles further observes (Appendix, p. 59), that persons were employed to propose, in

Council in particular, believed likewise that nothing was more easy at that time than the excitement of a rebellion, as well in England as in Ireland: for they considered the numerous addresses, delivered to them in^d November, 1792, as expressive of the sentiments of the people at large, in which opinion they were undoubtedly mistaken, the great majority of the nation being even at that period well affected to the ancient constitution. Mr. Miles, who, during the time that he was intrusted with a mission to the Prince Bishop of Liege, had contracted an intimacy with Le Brun, afterwards French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who continued his correspondence with Le Brun and other men of consequence in France, till the National Convention thought proper to break with England; who had frequent intercourse in

the debating societies in London, such questions as were suitable to the views of the National Convention.

the latter part of the year 1792, with French agents in London, and even acted as mediator between them and the British Ministry; who may be supposed, therefore, to have been well acquainted with the views of the French Government, and who is certainly not, as appears from his present writings, unjustly partial to the present Administration, says expressly in a passage, where he speaks of the month of November: "It is
 "worthy of observation; that the Executive
 "Council had made up their minds at this
 "time on the part they had resolved to
 "take." (44) And then observing, that
 "the Executive Council looked upon a re-
 "volt as inevitable," he proceeds to give
 account of a note which he committed to
 writing in November, 1792, in the presence
 of a French agent, and says: "I have print-
 "the note exactly as it was taken in the
 "presence of the person with whom I con-

(44) Authentic Correspondence, p. 88.

“ versed, omitting nothing but some wild
 “ assertions (45) respecting these societies,
 “ (46) which he, as well as the rest of his
 “ countrymen, considered as means in the
 “ last resort, to force the British Cabinet to
 “ chuse between dishonourable concession
 “ and a war, which they considered would
 “ place the Minister so completely between
 “ two fires, that Government, assailed at the
 “ same time by civil insurrection and foreign
 “ hostility, would inevitably fall, and this
 “ country, incapable of mischief, would fall
 “ into impotency and ruin by its own dis-
 “ tractions. *Such I aver on the faith of an*
 “ *honest man, were the delusive hopes enter-*

(45) Mr. Miles probably omitted them out of respect to this person, whom he calls (p. 87) his friend. But though they are omitted in the note (which is printed in the Appendix, p. 57-60) it is very easy to collect their meaning from what Mr. Miles himself relates, p. 88-89, in the passage which I here quote.

(46) Certain English societies, which Mr. Miles, however, has not mentioned by name.

“ *tamed*

“tained by Le Brun, and many others, who,
 “unfortunately for both nations, had more
 “power and influence at that moment than
 “sense and discretion.” (47) In vain did

(47) The assertions and speeches of the French rulers themselves clearly prove, that Mr. Miles was not mistaken. Kerfaint, one of the principal orators of the National Convention, delivered a speech on the 1st of January, 1793, in which the following passages occurred: “Les inquiétudes du premier Ministre,
 “Pitt, maître absolu de l’Angleterre, depuis huit ans,
 “et que les orages d’une révolution, ou ceux d’une
 “guerre menacent également de sa chute, &c.—L’Irlandais semble tourner ses regards vers nous, et nous
 “dire: Venez, montrez vous, et nous sommes libres.—
 “Le sentiment des vérités, que je viens de développer
 “est répandu dans une foule de bons esprits en Angle-
 “terre: le gouvernement doit en redouter l’explosion, et
 “les événemens de la guerre doivent la hâter.—C’est sur
 “la ruine de la Tour de Londres, que vous devez
 “figurer, avec le peuple Anglais dé trompé, le traité qui
 “réglera les destins des nations, et fondera la liberté
 “du monde.” *Moniteur*, 3 Jan. 1793. Even in November 1792, a French agent said to Mr. Miles, that
 “Such was the actual state of Great Britain, that we
 “did not dare to call out the militia.” (*Authentic Correspondence*, p. 96): and in Condorcet’s *Journal*,
 though

Mr Miles attempt to undeceive Le^c Brun, and to convince him that his expectations of

though I do not recollect the particular number, it was asserted in positive terms, that the English Nation was on the eve of abolishing royalty, and of establishing a National Convention. In the reports both of Brissot and of Le Brun, in Dec. 1792, and Jan. 1793, to the French Convention, and even in Chauvelin's note to Lord Grenville, of the 27th of December, may be found expressions which indicate the same expectation. And this expectation had necessarily very great influence on the system of fraternisation, which was particularly calculated for England. See what Mr Miles says on this subject, Appendix, p. 115. Lastly, as soon as war was declared, and the leaders of the French Convention had no longer need to conceal the motives of their actions, they openly avowed, not only that the expected rebellion was the grand inducement to their declaration of war, but that they believed the deluded English would be kind enough to become the instruments and the dupes of French ambition. For no sooner was the hostile decree pronounced, on the 1st of February, 1793, than Barbaroux said, in positive terms, “ J’ai voté la guerre contre le Cabinet de Saint James, *parceque* j’ai l’espérance de voir le *peuple Anglais* sortir enfin de la stupeur, où l’a plongé la longue habitude de son esclavage

con-

a general insurrection in England were ungrounded: in vain did he attempt to convince the French Minister of the absurdity of declaring war against a powerful nation, which, with exception to a few democratic societies, was sincerely attached to the existing constitution, and ready to sacrifice the last drop of blood in its defence. (48). Le

constitutionnel, et nous venger *lui-même* d'une Cour, etc." Monit. 3 Fev. 1793.

(48) On the 19th of December, Mr. Miles wrote a letter to Le Brun, which ended with the following passage: " Mr. Maret vous donnera sans doute des
 " éclaircissémens sur bien des choses que vous ne pou-
 " vez savoir que par lui. Il ne vous dissimulera pas
 " l'attachement du peuple pour la constitution, et sa
 " loyauté pour le Roi et son Gouvernement. Il vous
 " dira que, loin d'adopter les rêveries bizarres, qui
 " sont à la mode actuellement en France, il est déter-
 " miné, coûte qu'il coûte, de laisser choses comme elles
 " sont, et de ne permettre, qu'on porte à la constitu-
 " tion aucune atteinte sous prétexte de réforme; par
 " conséquent, on vous a cruellement trompé en vous
 " assurant " *que le peuple Anglais mécontent et opprimé*."

Brun, in defiance of all representations, persisted in the error into which both himself and his colleagues had fallen: the resolution, which had been taken in consequence, remained unaltered, and a war with England was irrevocably decided in the French Cabinet. (49)

*“ n’attend que le signal pour se révolter * ; au contraire, il est content, heureux, et attaché au Roi, aux loix, et à sa patrie, et prêt à les défendre jusqu’à la dernière goutte de son sang. Voilà le vrai état des choses. ~~Jugez~~ après cela, s’il vous convient de déclarer la guerre à une nation unanime et si puissante ? J’attends votre réponse avec empressement.”* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 65. Whether Le Brun sent an answer to this letter, Mr. Miles has not mentioned: but, if he did, it must have been a very unsatisfactory one, as Mr. Miles judged it necessary to write to him again on 2d. Jan. 1793, and to say to him what has been already quoted in Note 48.

(49) Dumouriez himself says: *“ Le Brun pria même le général, Dumouriez, d’écarter tout ce qui concernait les négociations avec l’Angleterre et la Hollande: il n’en fut pas du tout question.”* Mém. de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 108. 2d. edit.

* *“ Report of Le Brun to the Convention.” Note of Mr. Miles.*

CHAP. XI.

Official Communications between the Govern^{ts}ments of Great Britain and Holland, on the Progress of the French Arms in the Austrian Netherlands. Uneasiness produced by the Resolution to open the Scheldt. Further Alarm in Great Britain, occasioned by the Decree of the 19th of November, and the concomitant Measures taken by the National Convention, in Conjunction with certain British Societies. Proclamation of the First of December, for calling out the Militia: and another of the same Date, for the Meeting of Parliament. Spirited Declaration of the Bankers, Merchants, and other Inhabitants

of the City of London, in Favour of the Constitution. Meeting of Parliament, and Speech from the Throne. Means adopted for the external as well as internal Defence of Great Britain. Reflexions on this Subject.

TOWARD the close of the year 1792, Great Britain and Holland were nearly in the same political situation, and the interests of the two countries were so interwoven with each other, that an attack on the one might be justly considered as an attack on the other. In both countries there was a considerable French party, though in Holland it was not only more numerous, but possessed the power of impeding the operations of the Dutch Government, by means which were inapplicable in Great Britain. The protection of the two countries against the machinations of the French Convention

made

made one common cause: for it was easy to foresee that the ruin of Britain would inevitably draw after it the ruin of Holland, and that the conquest of Holland would place its ally at least in a very dangerous situation. Further, they were closely cemented by the treaty of 1788, by which they had engaged, in case of an attack from any European power, to protect each other by sea as well as by land, and reciprocally to guarantee all the countries, places, and privileges, which the contracting parties hitherto possessed. (1) In consequence of this intimate union, and reciprocal obligation, the British Ambassador at the Hague, seven days after the battle of Gemappe, when the army of Dumouriez was advancing toward the Dutch frontiers, delivered, by order of his government, the following note to the States General. (2)

(1) See the second article of this treaty in Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. iii. p. 128.

(2) The French original is printed in the *Mémoires*

“The undersigned Ambassador extraor-
 “dinary, and Minister Plenipotentiary of
 “his Britannic Majesty, has received the
 “King’s order to inform their High Mighti-
 “nesses the States General of the United
 “Provinces, that his Majesty, seeing the
 “theatre of war brought so near to the fron-
 “tiers of the republic by the recent events
 “which have happened, and being sensible
 “of the uneasiness which may naturally re-
 “sult from such a situation, thinks it due
 “to the connexion, which subsists between
 “him and the republic, that he should re-
 “new to their High Mightinesses, on this
 “occasion, the assurances of his inviolable

teur, 27th November, 1792. It is dated there, No-
 vember 16: but 16 appears to be an error for 13, not
 only because the answer of the States General is dated
 November 16, and it is not probable that the answer
 was given on the same day, but because Lord Auck-
 land himself, in his note of the 25th January, 1793,
 mentions it as dated 13th November. Mr. Dundas,
 likewise, in his speech of 14th December, quoted it
 the same date.

“friendship,

“ friendship, and of his determination to ex-
“ ecute, at all times, with the utmost good
“ faith, all the different stipulations of the
“ treaty of alliance so happily concluded, in
“ 1788, between his Majesty and their High
“ Mightinesses. In making to their High
“ Mightinesses this declaration, the King is
“ very far from supposing the probability of
“ any intention, on the part of any of the
“ belligerent parties, to violate the territory,
“ of the republic, or to interfere in the in-
“ ternal concerns of its government. The
“ King is persuaded, that the conduct which,
“ in concert with his Majesty, their High
“ Mightinesses have hitherto observed, and
“ the respect to which the situation of his
“ Majesty and the republic justly entitles
“ them, are sufficient to remove any ground
“ of such apprehension. His Majesty, there-
“ fore, confidently expects, that no events of
“ the war will lead to any circumstance from
“ without, which may be injurious to the

“rights of their High Mightinesses; and he
“strongly recommends to them to employ,
“in concert with his Majesty, an unremitted
“attention and firmness to repress any at-
“tempts which may be made to disturb the
“internal tranquillity of the provinces. His
“Majesty has directed this communication
“to be made to their High Mightinesses, in
“the full persuasion, that nothing can more
“effectually conduce to the interests and
“happiness of both countries, than the con-
“tinuance of that intimate union, which
“has been established between them for the
“maintenance of their own rights and se-
“curity, and with a view to contribute to
“the general welfare and tranquillity of
“Europe.”

(Signed) AUCKLAND.

This note was nothing more than a mea-
sure of precaution, which the existing cir-
cumstances required; it contains nothing
which

which could give offence to the French Government, not even a supposition of hostile designs,(3) and displays a moderation which forms a striking contrast with the language adopted at this time in the National Convention relative to the British Government. On the 10th of November the States General returned the following answer. (4)

“ Their High Mightinesses are most strongly impressed by the renewal of the assurances, which his Britannic Majesty has

(3) The two orders of the French Executive Council, the one to open the Scheldt, the other to attack the Austrians on the Dutch territory, if they retreated thither, were not given, as appears from the preceding Chapter, before the 16th. Consequently, on the 13th there existed no public document, which *officially* proved a disposition on the part of the Convention to violate the neutrality in respect to Holland: and therefore prudence required, that the British Government should rather imply the contrary, as was really done.

(4) The original is printed in the *Moniteur*, 30th November, 1792.

“ now been pleased to make, of his inviolable
“ friendship for this republic, and his deter-
“ mination to execute at all times, with the
“ most scrupulous good faith, all the diffe-
“ rent stipulations of the treaty of alliance,
“ so happily concluded in 1788, between
“ his Majesty and their High Mightinesses.
“ The States General, have never doubted
“ these generous sentiments on the part of
“ his Britannic Majesty; but the declaration
“ which his Majesty is pleased to make of
“ them at the present moment, cannot but
“ be extremely agreeable to their High Migh-
“ tinesses, and inspire them with the live-
“ liest gratitude and the most devoted at-
“ tachment to his Britannic Majesty. The
“ States General, moreover, perfectly agree
“ with his Majesty in the persuasion, that
“ there is not the least reason to attribute
“ to any of the belligerent powers, hostile
“ intentions against the republic; and in-
“ deed their High Mightinesses are equally
“ persuaded

“persuaded with the King, that the con-
 “duct and the strict neutrality, which, in
 “concert with his Majesty, they have hi-
 “therto so carefully observed, and the re-
 “spect to which the situation of his Ma-
 “jesty and the republic justly entitle them,
 “are sufficient to remove any ground of such
 “apprehension. With respect to the inter-
 “nal tranquillity of the republic, their High
 “Mightinesses are perfectly sensible of the
 “necessity of continuing to secure to its in-
 “habitants so invaluable an enjoyment, and
 “they are not negligent of any means, for
 “the attainment of that salutary end. The
 “States General, in concert with the pro-
 “vinces of the union, have already taken,
 “and continue to take, the necessary mea-
 “sures for preventing any interruption of
 “this tranquillity in the present circum-
 “stances. They have the satisfaction of
 “being able to assure his Majesty, that their
 “efforts have so far been crowned with the

“ desired success; and they have reason to
 “ flatter themselves, that, with the blessing
 “ of Providence, those efforts will be equally
 “ fortunate in future. Finally, their High
 “ Mightinesses do not hesitate to declare,
 “ that they agree with his Britannic Ma-
 “ jesty in the persuasion, *that nothing can*
 “ *more effectually conduce to the happiness and*
 “ *mutual interests of the two nations, than the*
 “ *continuance of that intimate union which has*
 “ *been established between them, and which*
 “ *their High Mightinesses, on their part, will*
 “ *neglect no opportunity of cementing and*
 “ *strengthening, for the maintenance of the*
 “ *mutual rights and interests of the two coun-*
 “ *tries, and for the security of the general wel-*
 “ *fare and tranquillity of Europe.*” (5)

(Signed) W. H. WASSENAER.

(Counter-signed) H. FAGEL.

(5) This last sentence proves, what some persons
 have called in question, that the Dutch Government,
 from the very commencement of the communications
 between

But on the very day on which the States General expressed their expectation, that the neutrality, which they themselves had preserved, would not be violated by other nations, it was grossly violated on the part of France: for it was on this day, as appears from the preceding chapter, that the Executive Council made the two resolutions, to attack the Austrians even on the Dutch territory, and to deprive the United Provinces of their sovereignty over the Scheldt. The first resolution, indeed, created very little uneasiness, because, when the intelligence of it arrived at the Hague, the Austrians were already retreating towards Aix la Chapelle,

between Great Britain and Holland, relative to the power and influence of France, was decidedly of opinion, that it was necessary for the two countries to make one common cause. Indeed the necessity of it was so obvious, that no one, who did not wish that the arms and intrigues of France might overturn the Dutch constitution, could have supported a contrary opinion.

and

and gave no indications of a design to retire toward Holland; but the other resolution excited a general alarm throughout the United Provinces, because it was obvious, that the execution of it would be highly detrimental, if not destructive, to the Dutch commerce, and consequently to the general welfare of the nation. "It would be difficult," says a Dutch correspondent in a letter, dated Hague, 30th November, and printed in the *Moniteur*, 9th December, 1792, "to form an idea in France of the terrible commotion which this decree has excited. At Amsterdam and Rotterdam the principal merchants have experienced a sudden coolness for the French cause, which is not at all surprising. Perhaps they propose to make a common cause with the Stadtholder, and to prevent the execution of the decree by force of arms. With respect to the Government, they have instantly dispatched several couriers to
" England

“ *England to demand succour*: and all means
 “ are employed to make Great Britain sen-
 “ sible, that its own interests are equally
 “ affected with those of Holland.” (6) The
 States General protested, likewise, publicly,
 against the decree, and commissioned the

(6) La Haie, Nov. 30. “ On aura peine à se faire
 “ une idée en France de la terrible commotion, que
 “ ce décret a excité en quelques esprits. A Amster-
 “ dam et à Rotterdam les principaux négocians en-
 “ ont éprouvé un refroidissement subit pour la cause
 “ Française, cela n’a rien d’étonnant. Peut-être
 “ songent-ils à faire cause commune avec le Stadthou-
 “ der, pour arrêter par la forces des armes l’exécution
 “ de ce décret. Quant au gouvernement, il a dé-
 “ pêché d’abord divers couriers en Angleterre pour en
 “ réclamer des secours: et tous les moyens sont mis
 “ en œuvre pour faire sentir à la Grande Bretagne,
 “ que son intérêt y est tout aussi compromis que celui
 “ de la Hollande.” *Moniteur*, 9 Dec. 1792. As this
 letter is printed in the *Moniteur*, and was therefore un-
 doubtedly written by a person attached to the French
 cause, no one can well object that the description, in
 this instance, exceeded the reality. However, as it
 is not an official document, I shall make no further
 use of it.

Stadtholder

Stadtholder to send positive orders to the Captain of the guardship, which lay at the mouth of the Scheldt, to prevent all French ships of war from entering it, and to inform the commanders, that, by virtue of treaties, the Scheldt was shut to all armed vessels. (7) Yet, notwithstanding this pro-

(7) The following is the official note, which the States General delivered to the Imperial Ambassador at the Hague, at the beginning of December, 1792.

“ Que depuis le commencement des troubles sur-
 “ nus entre le maison d’Autriche et la France, L. H. P.
 “ ont observé la-plus stricte neutralité, et ont taché
 “ d’en concilier les devoirs avec l’amitié et les égards,
 “ qu’elles ont de tout tems manifesté pour S. M. I.
 “ Que les Etats Généraux sentent, que ce serait s’écarter de cette neutralité, que de permettre à des navires Français de remonter l’Escaut pour attaquer la citadelle d’Anvers. Que L. H. P. n’ignorent pas non plus combien cette démarche serait contraire aux traités subsistans; et que c’est d’après ces principes, qu’elles n’ont pu accorder la demande du commandant des chaloupes canonnières Françaises de remonter l’Escaut jusqu’à Anvers, mais qu’elles ont prié S. A. le Prince d’Orange et de Nassau, comme amiral-général de cette république, d’ordonner à l’officier qui commande

test, several French ships of war forced a passage, on the 1st of December, in order to bombard the citadel of Antwerp.

“ *commande le vaisseau de garde, stationné à l’embou-*
 “ *chure de l’Escaut; de ne pas accorder le passage, mais*
 “ *d’informer le commandant Français, qu’en vertu de*
 “ *traités la rivière d’Escaut est close pour les vaisseaux*
 “ *de guerre.*” *Moniteur*, 16th December, 1792. Here

we have a formal protest, on the part of the Dutch Government, against the opening of the Scheldt: and this *official document* is alone sufficient to confute the assertion that the States General were wholly indifferent on the subject (which even without this document would be almost incredible), and that the British Government determined to support their rights, when they themselves did not wish for any such support. It is true that a great part of the Dutch, namely, the French party in Holland, were so far from desiring assistance from England, that they would, if possible, have repelled it. But at that time, the French party in Holland by no means constituted the Dutch Government, and when two nations negotiate, whether they are monarchicai or republican, the negotiations must be conducted by their respective governments. Nor could this party in the year 1792, though numerous and formidable, be considered as the Dutch nation: for the Stadtholderian party, especially if regard be had to landed property, was at that time

The decree for the opening of the Scheldt, and the force which was employed to put it in execution, could not be regarded with indifference by the British Government. The dangerous consequences of it to England, when France is in possession of the Low Countries, have been already represented in the preceding chapter. At this time the political situation of England was very different from that of the year 1785, when the Emperor Joseph likewise proposed to open the Scheldt. For as long as the Netherlands were possessed by the Emperor, the opening of the Scheldt could do no injury to England. Austria was not a maritime power, could not therefore convert the Scheldt into a station for ships of war; and England could at all times, with only a few frigates, have closed the Scheldt, and put an end to the imperial commerce. Further, there was reason to believe that it was not so much Joseph's intention really to open the

the Scheldt, as to frighten the Dutch, and to induce them to ward off the danger by the payment of some millions of florins, which they effectually did. Nor was it the duty of England, in the year 1785, to assist the Dutch against the Emperor: England and Holland had been lately at war; the definitive treaty of peace was not signed before the 20th of May, 1784; (8) and in the short interval which elapsed, no treaty of alliance had been made between the two powers. But in the year 1792 England, by virtue of the treaty of 1788, was really bound to assist, in protecting not only the territory of the United Provinces, but likewise their franchises and liberties, of which that which they exercised over the Scheldt was one of the principal. (9) With great injustice,

(8) Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 520.

(9) The second article of the treaty is: " Dans le cas, où une des deux parties contractantes serait

therefore, has the British Government been accused of inconsistency, in remaining perfectly tranquil, when the Emperor attempted to open the Scheldt in the year 1785, and yet not shewing a similar indifference when the same resolution was formed by the French Government in the year 1792. The mere circumstance, that the French were become masters of the Austrian Netherlands, by whatever name the dependence of these countries on France might be decorated, could not but excite uneasiness in

“ hostilement attaqués par quelque puissance Euro-
 “ péenne, dans quelque partie du monde que ce puisse
 “ être, l’autre partie contractante s’engage de secou-
 “ rir son allié, tant par mer que par terre, pour se
 “ maintenir, et se garantir mutuellement dans la pos-
 “ session de tous les états, dontaines, villes et places,
 “ franchises et libertés, qui leur appartaient ré-
 “ spectivement avant le commencement des hostili-
 “ tés.” And in the fifth article is said: “ Elle l’as-
 “ sistrera même de toutes ses forces, si les circonstances
 “ l’exigent.” See Martens’ Recueil des Principaux
 Traités, tom. iii. p. 128, 129.

the British Ministry: and when we consider that the Scheldt was to become a station for French ships of war, they would have acted faithlessly, as well to their own country as to the allies of England, if they had not at least attempted to prevent the execution of the design. The superiority, likewise, which this station gave the French on an invasion of Holland, an invasion which was in agitation so early as December (10)

(10) In a letter written to Dumouriez by Pache, the War Minister, dated Paris, 6th December, 1792, occur the following expressions: "*Ainsi si l'armée de la Belgique se porte sur la Hollande, et ne passe point la Meuse, etc.*"—"Les divers motifs ci-dessus, Général, ont déterminé le Conseil à persister dans son ancien arrêté: il a délibéré comme mesure d'urgence, et qui devait devancer l'expédition de la Hollande, etc." Correspondance du Dumouriez avec Pache (Paris, 1793-8), p. 137. These expressions clearly prove, that even at that time an attack on Holland was in agitation. Chauffard likewise (*Mémoires*, p. 278) uses the expression, "*Opérations exécutées dans la Flandre, et projetées sur la Hollande.*" And Brissot, though before the declaration of war he

1792, was much too great to be disregarded by the British Government. And it was of the highest importance to England, to prevent, if possible, the French from becoming masters of Holland, as it was obvious that, with the additional advantage of the Dutch coast and the Dutch navy, they would take the earliest opportunity of attacking England with double force. (11)

denied, with his wonted hypocrisy, that the French Government had any design of invading Holland, made no scruple to complain afterwards (*A ses Commettans*, p. 79), *that Holland was not sooner attacked*,

(11) Brissot himself, in his speech of the 12th Jan. 1793, made the following acknowledgment, in speaking of the English nation: "Sans doute elle avait raison, lorsque la France était sous le despotisme: elle avait raison à s'opposer à l'extension en Hollande de l'influence de la France: cette influence ne tendait qu'à augmenter ses forces." *Moniteur*, 15 Janvier, 1793. He immediately added, indeed: "Mais si jamais la République Française était appelée à rendre la liberté à la Hollande, ce ne serait pas pour augmenter son influence; elle n'en veut aucune sur
" les

When we further take into the account the decree of the 19th of November, with all its concomitant circumstances, described in the preceding chapter, we must acknowledge, that the British Government had not a moment to lose, and that vigorous preparations were necessary to rescue Great Britain from the destruction with which it was threatened. On the 1st of December, therefore, as soon as intelligence arrived in London of the public encouragement which had been given by the National Convention on the 28th of November, to those societies who had announced their design of overturning the British Constitution, the follow-

“ les états étrangers.” But the sophistry of this distinction could deceive only those who either were, or chose to be, blind: and at present every one knows by experience, whether republican France displays less ambition, and less desire to extend its influence over foreign countries, than monarchical France formerly displayed.

ing proclamation was drawn up and immediately published.

“Whereas; by an act passed in the 26th.
“year of our reign, intituled, an act for
“amending and reducing into one act of
“Parliament the laws relating to the mi-
“litia in that part of Great Britain called
“England, it is enacted, that if it shall be
“lawful for us, in the cases and in the man-
“ner therein mentioned, the occasion being
“first declared in Council and notified by
“proclamation, if no parliament shall be
“then sitting, to order and direct the draw-
“ing out and embodying of our militia
“forces, or any part thereof: *and whereas*
“*we have received information, that in breach*
“*of our laws, and notwithstanding our Royal*
“*proclamation of the 21st day of May last, the*
“*utmost industry is still employed by evil dis-*
“*posed persons within this kingdom, acting in*
“concert