

“ that we should have found the same faci-
 “ lity at London. The Executive Council
 “ readily acknowledges, that this negotia-
 “ tion has not been demanded according to
 “ diplomatic strictness, and that Citizen
 “ Chauvelin is *not formally enough autho-*
 “ *rized.* (81) To remove entirely this ob-
 “ stacle, and that they may not have to re-
 “ proach themselves with having stopp’d by a
 “ single defect in form, a negotiation, on the
 “ success of which depends the tranquillity
 “ of two great nations, they have sent to
 “ Citizen Chauvelin credential letters, which
 “ will give him the means of treating ac-

from a refusal to treat with him at all, a refusal which
 “ was never made, for, as Brissot himself said, “ the
 “ British Ministry both gave and courted explanations.
 See Note 5 to this chapter.

(81) Hitherto, therefore, the Executive Council had
 no reason to complain, that the British Ministry did not
 treat with him by the title of Minister Plenipotentiary
 of France.

“ cording

“ cording to all the severity of diplomatic
 “ forms.

“ To proceed now to the three points,
 “ which can alone form an object of diffi-
 “ culty with the Court of London, the Exe-
 “ cutive Council observes on the first, that
 “ is to say, the decree of November 19, that
 “ we have been misunderstood by the Mi-
 “ nisters of his Britannic Majesty, when they
 “ accuse us of having given an explanation,
 “ which announces to the seditious of all na-
 “ tions, what are the cases in which they
 “ may depend before-hand on the succour
 “ and support of France. Nothing can be
 “ more foreign to the sentiments of the Na-
 “ tional Convention, and to the explanation
 “ which we have given, than this reproach :
 “ and we did not think it was possible, that
 “ the open design of favouring seditious per-
 “ sons could be imputed to us, at a moment
 “ even when we declared, “ *that it would be*

“ *Doing an injury to the National Convention,*
 “ *to ascribe to them the plan of protecting in-*
 “ *surrections and seditious commotions, which*
 “ *might arise in any corner of a state, of associ-*
 “ *ating with the authors of them, and thus of*
 “ *making the cause of a few individuals that of*
 “ *the French nation.* (82)

“ We have said, and we choose to repeat
 “ it, that the decree of November 19 could

(82) On this explanation, see Note 41 to the present chapter. The words here inserted by the Executive Council “ *in any corner of a state,*” (*dans quelque coin d'un état*) and the words “ *cause of a few individuals,*” (*la cause de quelques particuliers*) are very artfully introduced: for thus they reserved to themselves the right of assisting the seditious in all countries, as soon as their number was at all considerable. At the very time, therefore, that they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree, they maintained their resolution of applying it: for they had nothing more to do, than to declare, that the number of the seditious in any country was considerable, and by their own avowal, they were authorized to put it in practice.

“ not

“ not be applicable but to the single case,
 “ where the *general* will of a nation, clearly
 “ and unequivocally expressed, should call for
 “ the assistance and fraternity of the French
 “ nation. (83) Sedition can certainly never

(83) “ Nous vous avons dit, et nous aimons à vous le
 “ répéter que le décret du 19 Novembre, ne pouvait
 “ avoir son application que dans le *seul* cas, où la vo-
 “ lonté *générale* d'une nation, *exprimée clairement et sans*
 “ *équivoque*, appellerait l'assistance et la fraternité de la
 “ nation Française. Certes, la *sedition* ne peut jamais
 “ être là où se trouve l'expression de la *volonté générale*.”

It deserves particularly to be noticed, that this solemn declaration, not to interfere in the internal concerns of any nation, with a view of overturning its government, till the *general* will of that nation, clearly and unequivocally expressed, should call for the assistance of France, was given by the Executive Council on the 7th of January, and that on the day following, namely, on the 8th of January, the instructions for the commissaries in Belgium (that is, the commentary on the decree of December 15, quoted in the preceding chapter) were signed by the same Executive Council, in which they declared that they regarded *whole* nations as enemies, which *resolved* to retain their Sovereigns. The Executive Council's own words were: La nation Française regarde
 comme

“ exist where there is an expression of the
 “ general will. These two ideas mutually

comme ennemi, même un peuple entier, si refusant la liberté et l'égalité il *voulait* traiter avec un prince et avec des castes privilégiées. Chaussard, p. 198. This, said the Executive Council, was the spirit of the eleventh article (l'esprit de l'article xi.) of the decree of December 15. Likewise, the words of that article are in direct contradiction to the explanation given in the note to the British Government of January 7. See the preceding chapter. Further, the Executive Council, in its commentary on the eleventh article of the decree of December 15, said: “ Les deux dispositions, qui
 “ renferment cet article ne sont ni une vaine menace, ni
 “ une promesse illusoire; elles sont au contraire des conséquences directes de tous les principes, desquels dérive
 “ la loi juste et salutaire décrétée par la Convention
 “ Nationale.” Chaussard, p. 225. Now there can be no doubt that the instructions given to the Commissaries on Jan. 8, conveyed the true meaning of the Executive Council, and consequently that the explanation given to the British Government on Jan. 7, was given with the consciousness of its falsehood: for it could have answered no purpose to have deceived their own Commissaries, whereas, the keeping the British Cabinet in the dark, in regard to their real designs, afforded the most effectual means of putting them in execution.

Besides,

“ exclude each other : for sedition is, and can
 “ only be a commotion of a small number
 “ against the majority of a nation ; and this
 “ commotion would cease to be seditious, if
 “ all the members of a society should arise at
 “ once, either to correct their Government,
 “ to change its form entirely, or to accom-
 “ plish any other object. (84)

Besides, the instructions given to the Commissaries cor-
 responded not only to the words of the decrees of
 Nov. 9 and Dec. 15, but likewise to all the interpre-
 tations, which had been given in the National Con-
 vention itself. (See Note 41.) Lastly, the declaration made
 to the Commissaries, that even a *whole* nation would be
 treated as an enemy, if it refused to rebel against its So-
 vereign, and consequently that France would inter-
 meddle in the internal concerns of neutral nations, even
 where *not one* seditious person was to be found in the
 whole country, forms also a strange contrast with the
 declaration made at the same time to the British Go-
 vernment, that their number must be very *considerable*,
 before the National Convention would think itself jus-
 tified in interfering.

(84) Brissot, likewise, in his report of the 12th of
 January, 1793, said : “ Un peuple libre sait distinguer

“ l'insur-

"The Dutch were certainly not seditious,
 "when they formed the generous resolution •

"*l'insurrection de la révolte, la volonté bien prononcée*
 "*d'une grande majorité, du vœu partiel de quelques in-*
 "*dividus. Protéger ces derniers contre la majorité,*
 "*c'est protéger la révolte; c'est être injuste, et une*
 "*peuple libre ne veut point l'injustice; les moyens té-*
 "*nébreux sont indignes de lui."* Moniteur, 15 Jan.

1793. Yet, in Brissot's work, à ses commetans, p. 87,

we find the following passage: "*Les révolutions, répon-*
 "*dait-on, ne se font qu'avec les minorités: c'est la mino-*
 "*rité qui a fait la révolution Française."* But even if the

revolutionary principles of the French rulers had in-
 volved no contradiction, and even if their theory had
 been in itself perfectly pure and just, still the *application*
 of their theory to particular cases was subject to various
 doubts, the determination of which they reserved to
 themselves: for instance, the decision of the two pre-
 vious questions, first, whether the disaffected party in
 any country, to which they had directed their attention,

ally constituted a majority of that country, and se-
 condly, whether the majority, at the same time, wished
 for the intervention of French fraternity. Conse-
 quently, the Executive Council, in order to acquire the
 right of applying the decree of November 19 to Eng-
 land, and of interfering in the internal concerns of this
 kingdom, wanted according to its own explanation,

nothing

“ of throwing off the Spanish yoke : and,
 “ when the general will of that nation called
 “ on the assistance of France, it was not ac-
 “ counted a crime to Henry IV. nor to
 “ Queen Elizabeth, that they listened to

nothing more than the simple declaration, which it was at all times in its power to make, that the English societies, which had sent addresses to France in November, 1792, and, at other times, constituted the majority of the English nation. It is obvious, therefore, that, when they pretended to give a satisfactory explanation of the decree of November 19, they sought evasions for the application of it, and endeavoured to obtain their object by deceiving the English Government. After all, it was ridiculous to enter into theoretical distinctions relative to what should, or should not be made, when the application of the decree to England actually *was* made. But this is a *fact*, which the conduct of the National Convention, on November 28 and December 24, had proved beyond a doubt. They ought to have instantly repealed the offensive decree, and to have acted up to that repeal : but we see, from this very note of the Executive Council, that they insisted on retaining it, and it has been shewn in the twelfth chapter of this work, that they continued to regulate all their actions by it.

“ them.

“ them. (85) A knowledge of the general
 “ will is the only basis of transactions between

(85) But neither Henry IV. nor Queen Elizabeth made a public declaration, that they were ready to assist *all* nations, which thought proper to take up arms against their Governments; and there is surely a wide difference between the lending of assistance to a *particular* people, *after* it is really oppressed, and the making a *general prospective* declaration like that contained in the decree of November 19. Besides, at the time when this decree was voted, France not only was itself in a state of revolution, but had already infused similar principles into the neighbouring nations; and therefore such a decree necessarily disturbed the general repose, by setting men's passions every where in commotion. Nor will any man venture to compare the state of the disaffected party in England, when this decree was issued, with the state of the Dutch, when they were assisted by Queen Elizabeth. For the latter were persecuted in the most cruel manner by the Spanish Governor, the Duke of Alva, who, in order to force them into Popery, introduced a Robespierrian system of terrorism, who instituted domiciliary visits, in order to discover *religious* heretics, as the French Directory did in 1798, in order to discover *political* heretics, and daily brought offerings to the sword or the faggot, as the modern rulers of France have done to the guillotine.

The

“ nations : and we cannot treat with any
 “ Government, but because that Govern-
 “ ment is supposed to be the organ of the
 “ general will of the nation to which it be-
 “ longs. When by this natural interpreta-
 “ tion, therefore, the decree of November 19
 “ is reduced to its real signification, it will be
 “ found, that it announces nothing more than
 “ an act of the general will above all contest,
 “ and so founded in right, that it was not
 “ worth while to express it. For this rea-

The support of a nation, thus cruelly oppressed, when that nation demanded assistance, was very different from the encouragement of insurrection in a country, where the inhabitants, upon the whole, have great reason to be satisfied with their condition. A great deal, likewise, depends on the *object* of the support which one nation gives to another. Queen Elizabeth, after she had assisted the Dutch in shaking off the Spanish yoke, left them in quiet possession of their liberty, and even secured it by all possible means : whereas, the French rulers have removed from the Dutch, as they have done from the Swiss, a merely imaginary yoke, in order to impose on them a real and insupportable one.

son,

“ son, the Executive Council thinks, that the
 “ evidence of this right might have perhaps
 “ rendered it unnecessary for the National
 “ Convention to make it the object of a par-
 “ ticular decree: but with the preceding
 “ interpretation it cannot give offence to
 “ any nation. (86)

“ It appears that the Ministers of his Bri-
 “ tannic Majesty have made no objections
 “ under the declaration respecting Holland,
 “ since their only observation on this subject
 “ relates to the discussion concerning the

(86) We have seen that the preceding interpretation contained the grossest falsehoods: consequently it could not be satisfactory. Even Brissot, though in his report to the National Convention of the 12th of January, (*Moniteur*, 15. Janv. 1793) he supported the Executive Council, and endeavoured to justify the decree by similar sophistry, called it a few months afterwards, on more mature deliberation, “ *l'absurde et impolitique décret du 10 Novembre, qui a justement excité les inquiétudes des cabinets étrangers.*—*A ses Commettans*, p. 68.

“ Scheldt.

“ Scheldt. (87) It is on this last point,
 “ therefore, that we have to make ourselves
 “ understood.

(87) It is not true, that the Ministers of his Britannic Majesty made no objections under the declaration respecting Holland: for Lord Grenville, in his note of December 31, had combated that declaration with the following solid and unanswerable argument. In the month of June, 1792, the French Government had already engaged to respect the rights of the allies of England, as long as those allies continued neutral: but it had since *acted* contrary to that engagement, French ships of war having forced their way up the Scheldt, in opposition to the formal protest of the States General, and thus violated the rights of the Dutch, the allies of England. And not only was this violation founded on a resolution of the French Executive Council, but the said Council announced its determination to support that resolution. Since, therefore, the French Government broke its word in regard to *one* important point, what security had Great Britain that it would not break its word in *another*, and still further violate the rights of the Dutch, by an open invasion of their country?— This was the clear meaning of Lord Grenville’s argument; and experience soon proved that it was just, for it was only ten days after the date of his note, and only three days after the date of the present note of the Ex-

“ We here repeat that this question itself
 “ is of little importance. The British Mi-
 “ nisters thence conclude, that it is therefore
 “ more evident, that it has been brought
 “ forward only for the purpose of insulting
 “ the allies of England. We reply with
 “ much less warmth and prejudice, (88)

utive Council, that the order for the immediate invasion of Holland was actually given. See Ch. xii. Notes 50—52. It is no wonder, therefore, that on the 7th of January, the Executive Council wished to evade the question of the danger which threatened Holland. The manner in which they evaded it was likewise extremely artful, indeed much more so than any one, on a superficial reading of their note, would imagine. They exchanged, namely, the inference for the premises, wholly set aside the *analogical* part of Lord Grenville's argument, confined themselves to the opening of the Scheldt, without taking the least notice of the conclusion, which had been drawn from it, and argued, as if the British Cabinet could have no reason to suspect an invasion of Holland, provided it heard something consolatory about the Scheldt.

(88) So far was any warmth from being visible in Lord Grenville's note, that it was written with all possible coolness and deliberation, though the insolence of

“ that this question is absolutely indifferent
 “ to England, (89) that it is little interest-
 “ ing to Holland, (90) but that it is of the

Mr. Chauvelin's note, to which he replied, was sufficient to have irritated any statesman, who had less command of his passions. With respect to prejudice, I leave every impartial reader to determine, whether the notes of the British, or the notes of the French Government, are more consistent with truth, with justice, and with reason. And even if the French notes had been able to lay the most solid claim to one or all of these qualities, it was not well calculated to produce a reconciliation with the British Government, to say to its face, that it wrote with warmth and prejudice. But reconciliation was not the object of the Executive Council.

(89) The contrary of this assertion, and the dangerous consequences resulting to England from the opening of the Scheldt, when the French are masters of the Netherlands, have been so clearly shewn in the tenth and eleventh chapters, that it would be a waste of time to add any thing more on the subject.

(90) This position is so manifestly false, that a confutation is unnecessary. The Dutch themselves best knew whether the opening of the Scheldt would be injurious to them or not: and if they had not been fully

“ utmost importance to the Belgians. (91)

“ That it is indifferent to England does not

“ even require to be proved. It is little in-

“ teresting to Holland, since the productions

“ of the Belgic Netherlands can be conveyed

“ through the canals which end at Ostend :

“ (92) but it is of great importance to the

“ Belgians, on account of the numerous ad-

“ vantages which they may derive from the

convinced that it would not, they would have hardly been so anxious to secure the close of it by so many different treaties, from that of Westphalia in 1648, down to the treaty with France in 1785.

“ (91) They ought rather to have said, “ of the utmost importance to *France* : for the union of the Austrian Netherlands with France was already determin’d, when the French Executive Council drew up this note, as will presently be proved by authentic documents.

(92) But this is not the ground on which the importance of the close of the Scheldt for Holland rested. Nor is the position itself true : for the produce of Brussels, and all other parts of the Low Countries, which lie to the east of the Scheldt, can be much more conveniently shipped at Antwerp than at Ostend.

“ port

“ port of Antwerp. It is, therefore, on ac-
 “ count of this importance, to restore to the
 “ Belgians the enjoyment of a valuable right,
 “ and not to offend any one, that France has
 “ declared, that it is ready to support them
 “ in the exercise of so legal a right. (93)

“ But is France authorized to break stipu-
 “ lations which oppose the opening of the
 “ Scheldt? If we consult the right of na-
 “ ture, and of nations, not only France, but
 “ all the nations of Europe, are authorized
 “ to break them. No doubt can remain on
 “ this point. (94)

(93) It is evident from this declaration, that the French Executive Council was determined not to abandon the design of opening the Scheldt. Likewise in the instructions sent to Mr. Chauvelin, it was expressly said, “ *that the Scheldt would not be given up.*” See the Authentic Correspondence, p. 84.

(94) When individuals in civil society enter into a contract, each party circumscribes his right of nature, in order to obtain civil privileges, to which the right of

“If public right is consulted, we say that
“it ought never to be but the application of
nature alone would not entitle him. In like manner,
when two nations enter into a treaty, they submit
themselves to limitations, to which the right of nature
would not oblige them, in order to obtain political ad-
vantages, which, without such limitations, would be
unattainable. Neither a contract, therefore, between
individuals, nor a treaty between nations, can exist,
without a restriction of the exercise of natural right.
Consequently, if we adopted the maxim, that every
treaty, which was inconsistent with the free exercise of
the right of nature, was in itself void, no treaty what-
soever could subsist. The whole depends on this single
question: Is he, who enters into a contract with another,
entitled to submit himself to the limitations which
arise from that contract? If he is *entitled* to submit
himself to these limitations, he is undoubtedly *bound* to
fulfil the conditions of the contract, and no third person
has a right to dispense with the obligation. The case
is exactly the same in regard to whole nations. But
the Government of the Austrian Netherlands, like every
other independent government, was certainly entitled to
submit itself to a limitation in the navigation of the
Scheldt, especially since, as far as this limitation op-
erated, both sides of the Scheldt were Dutch territory, a
circumstance, which in itself gave the Dutch a claim

“ the principles of the general right of nations to the particular circumstances in

to the sovereignty over that part of the river. And the continuation of this long enjoyed sovereignty had been further granted to them by the Emperor Joseph, only seven years before the period in question, for the sum of ten millions of florins: France itself had been a party to the engagement, and by a particular treaty with Holland, in the year 1785, had guaranteed to them that very sovereignty of which it now attempted to deprive them. See Martens' *Recueil des Principaux Traités*, tom. ii. p. 612. Consequently, it was neither the right of nature, nor the right of nations, but wholly and solely the right of the stronger, on which the opening of the Scheldt, in the year 1792, was grounded. Even, if the Austrian Netherlands had been at that time already formally ceded to France, still the French Government would have had no right to have taken such a step: for, if an estate is mortgaged, or is otherwise subject to any kind of limitation, that estate does not change its quality by a change of its master. The new proprietor, if he chooses to free himself from the limitation, must, provided he act according to justice, make a compromise, and give an equivalent to the person or persons in whose favour the limitation had been made. But this mode of proceeding does not accord with the system adopted by the rulers of France, who

“ which nations may be in respect to each
 “ other: so that every private treaty, which
 “ might violate these principles, could never
 “ be considered but as the work of violence.
 “ (95) We will next add, that, in regard

expect, as we have lately seen in the negotiations at Rastadt, that, when they take possession of an estate which is encumbered with debts, those debts should be transferred to the estates of their neighbours.

(95) But is such a treaty therefore not binding? It was the work of violence, that in the negotiation at Rastadt the left bank of the Rhine was ceded to France; for, the German Empire, unless it had been forced to the concession, would not have yielded to its enemy so many beautiful and important provinces. Yet the French Directory certainly did not consider the articles of cession as therefore null and void. Public right is founded on existing treaties, whatever were the circumstances which gave birth to those treaties: and all that the Executive Council said on this subject, is mere sophistry and confusion. In fact, it was not their intention to convince by clear argumentation, but to perplex their opponents with finely-sounding words: and the French rulers, in general, have so completely laid aside the works of Puffendorf, Grotius, and Vattel, that

“ to the Scheldt, the treaty was concluded

“ without the participation of the Belgians.

“ (96) The Emperor, to secure the posses-

“ sion of the Netherlands, sacrificed, with-

that Mr. Genet, in a note to the American Secretary of State, said, “ I thank God, I have forgotten what these hired jurisprudents have written upon the rights of nations. See the *New Annual Register*, 1793; *Public Papers*, p. 111.

(96) If no treaty, made by any two governments, were valid till it had been ratified by the general voice of the subjects of those two governments, it would be difficult to find a valid one in any part of Europe. It is in fact absurd to talk about consulting the great mass of the people, in regard to the connexions between its government and that of other nations. For how is it possible, that they, who are seldom rightly informed in regard even to political facts, who are wholly unable to penetrate into the secrets of foreign cabinets, and to discover the springs of action, should be able to form a proper estimate of the relative situation of their own country to that of foreign ones? Least of all have the present Lords of France a right to appeal to a want of expression of the general will; for they set at defiance not only the people, but even their representatives, who are both qualified and bound to discuss political subjects.

“out scruple, the most inviolable of rights.
 “Being master of these beautiful provinces,
 “he governed them, as Europe has seen,
 “with a rod of absolute despotism, respect-
 “ed none of their privileges, but those
 “which were of importance for him to pre-
 “serve, and continually attacked and de-
 “stroyed the rest. (97) France entering
 “into a war with the House of Austria, (98)
 “expels it from the Low Countries, and re-
 “stores liberty (99) to those people, whom
 “the Court of Vienna had devoted to fla-

(97) Do the new masters of the Netherlands act otherwise? Or, rather, do they not act infinitely worse?

(98) Namely, by a declaration of hostilities on the part of France, at a time when the Austrian Cabinet was neither prepared for war, nor, in all probability, had any intention of acting offensively. See Ch. vii. p. 132—143.

(99) In like manner the Romans, after they had reduced Greece to a Roman province, said, *Libertas Græciæ*, data. Livii Hist. lib. xxxiii.

“very.

“ very. Their chains are broken: (100) they
 “ are restored to all those rights which the
 “ House of Austria had taken from them.
 “ (101) How can that right, which they
 “ had over the Scheldt, be excepted, espe-
 “ cially when it is of real importance only
 “ to those who were deprived of it? (102)
 “ In short, France has too good a profession
 “ of political faith (103) to make, to be

(100) And other chains, ten times as heavy, imposed on them.

(101) In order that those rights, together with whatever privileges the Emperor Joseph had left unimpaired, might be surrendered to the new House of France.

(102) That is, in plain English, “ as this right was of real importance to France.” And hence arose the determination of the Executive Council, not to abandon its design.

(103) Their *profession* of political faith was certainly very captivating, and has produced wonderful effects, especially in a popular pamphlet which appeared in the year 1797, where many examples of their fair *professions* are quoted at length. But a comparison of their *professions*

“ afraid of avowing its principles. The Executive Council declares, then, not that it may appear to yield to some expressions of threatening language, but only to render homage to truth, (104) that the French

professions with their *actions*, which latter are left wholly unnoticed in the said pamphlet, will probably induce the reader of the present work to draw a conclusion diametrically opposite to that which results from a contemplation of their professions alone.

(104) We have already seen in *what manner* the French rulers rendered homage to truth. As to threatening language, no instance is to be found of it in Lord Grenville's note, though many in that of Mr. Chauvelin. At the same time must be admitted the truth of their assertion, that they were not influenced in any of their actions by a fear of the British Government: for a French agent said to Mr. Miles, on November 13, 1792, that *France as little dreaded England as she did the republic of Ragusa*. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 58. And this contempt of the power of England, which arose from the expectation of a civil war, necessarily increased their inclination to hostilities. They little thought, at that time, that the ruin of their
then

“ Republic does not mean to establish itself
 “ an universal arbiter of the treaties which
 “ bind nations together. It equally knows
 “ to respect other governments, and to take
 “ care that it may make its own respected.
 “ It does not wish to give law to any one :
 “ (105) and it will never suffer any one to
 “ give laws to it. *It has renounced, and still*
 “ *renounces, all conquest :* (106) and its occu-

then considerable navy would be the consequence : on the contrary, they expected that the navy and the commerce of England would be transported to France.

(105) The^d decree, then, of December 15, and the commentary on it by the Executive Council, which commanded whole nations, whether they wished it or not, to overturn their existing governments, under pain of being treated as enemies by the French Convention, *prescribed laws to no one !*

(106) If we had^d not been already too much accustomed to hear glaring falsehoods from the Executive Council, to expect an adherence to the truth, our indignation would perhaps be roused at the daring assertion, *that they still renounced all conquest,* when the Dutchy
 of

"pying the Netherlands will continue no longer than the war, and during that time

of Savoy had only a few weeks before been incorporated into France by a solemn and unanimous decree of the National Convention. See Ch. x. note 3. (Yet a celebrated Opposition writer has ventured to declare, "*that the ancient limits of France were proposed as her dominion.*") The incorporation of Nice and its territory was likewise unanimously voted within three weeks after this pretended renunciation of aggrandizement. See the *Moniteur*, 1st Feb. 1793. And on the very same day that the incorporation of Nice was voted, the incorporation of the Austrian Netherlands, and the Bishopric of Liege, was proposed by Danton, who said to the National Convention: "*Je ne demande rien à votre enthousiasme, mais tout à votre raison, mais tout aux intérêts de la République Française. N'avez-vous pas préjugé cette réunion, quand vous avez décrété une organisation provisoire pour la Belgique? Vous avez tout consommé par cela seul, que vous avez dit aux amis de la liberté: organisez-vous comme nous.*" *Ib.* Nor was Danton's proposal rejected, but only *deferred*, till the procès verbal of the people of Liege, for which they waited, should arrive in Paris. *Ib.* In this manner did the rulers of France *render homage to truth*: in this manner did their actions correspond to their promises, to renounce conquest and aggrandizement.

“ which may be necessary for the Belgians
 “ to lecture and consolidate their liberty :
 “ (107) after which, provided they be inde-
 “ pendent or happy, France will be suffi-
 “ ciently rewarded. (108)

(107) By this clause the Executive Council reserved to itself the right of occupying the Austrian Netherlands with a French army, as long as it thought proper: for it is to be understood, that the French alone would determine the question, *when* the liberty of the Belgians could be considered as sufficiently consolidated. Besides, it was easy to foresee, that if a French army remained there till the Belgians became a free people, it would remain there till it was expelled by force.

(108) Here we have a specimen of the sentimental, which has not failed of its effect: for a celebrated Opposition writer, though he has quoted not a syllable either from Mr. Chauvelin's note of Dec. 27, or from Lord Grenville's answer to it, or from his reply to the present note, has quoted this sentimental passage not less than twice in the compass of one page. But if, instead of suffering ourselves to be influenced by passion, we attend to the dictates of cool reason, we shall discover that, *at the very time* that the Executive Council wrote thus sentimentally on the pretended indepen-
 dence

“When that nation shall find itself in
“the full possession of its liberty, and when

dence of the Belgians, it was fully determined to incorporate *Belgia into France*. For, in the first place, within four and twenty hours after this note was signed, the Executive Council signed the instructions for the Commissaries in *Belgia*, and the whole drift of these instructions, which are printed in *Chaussard Mémoires Historiques et Politiques*, p. 180—228, was manifestly to reduce the Belgians to a state of absolute dependence on France, as every one must perceive even on a superficial reading. Secondly, on Dec. 31, 1792, a whole week, therefore, before the note of the Executive Council to the British Government was signed, one of the Commissaries, *Publicola Chaussard*, received his private instructions, in which was said: “*Prions et requérons tous ceux à qui le dit Commissaire s’adressera, ou pourra s’adresser, de lui donner toute assistance et toutes les facilités qu’il jugera convenables et nécessaires pour remplir, conformément au vœu de la République, l’objet de sa mission.*” *Chaussard*, p. 157. Thirdly, when the Commissaries, who were nine in number, met at *Brussels* on the 3^d of February, 1793, to determine the important question: “*La Belgique doit-elle être réunie à la France?*” agreeably to their instructions, or, as was said, agreeably to the will of the republic, the question was determined in the affirmative.

“ its general will may be declared legally
 “ and unfettered, then, if England and Hol-
 tive. See the documents on this subject in Chaussard
Mémoires, p. 80—85. See likewise p. 11—21, where
 the reasons are assigned for the necessity of incorporat-
 ing Belgia into France. Three days after the decision,
 Chaussard wrote to Le Brun, the French Minister for
 Foreign Affairs, and said: “ *La minorité favorable aux*
 “ *principes révolutionnaires se devise elle-même: nous*
 “ *tâchons de la rallier autour du système de la réunion;*
 “ *mais une partie se flatte de l'espoir d'une Convention*
 “ *Nationale.*” *Ib.* p. 86. But the National Conven-
 tion confirmed the decision of the Commissaries, as
 Chaussard himself says, p. 425, note 15. “ *La Con-*
 “ *vention par un décret a approuvé les arrêtés de ses Com-*
 “ *missaires dans la Belgique.*” Likewise in Brissot's work,
 à ses Commettans, p. 87, we find the following passage:
 “ Cambon disait hautement devant les Belges mêmes:
 la guerre de la Belgique nous coûte des centaines de
 millions; leurs revenus ordinaires, et même des impôts
 extraordinaires ne les mettront jamais à même de nous
 rembourser, et cependant nous avons besoin. L'hypo-
 thèque de nos assignats touche à la fin. Que faut-il
 faire? Vendre les biens ecclésiastiques du Brabant;
 voilà une hypothèque de deux milliards. Mais com-
 ment nous en emparer? En nous réunissant à la Bel-
 gique. Et aussitôt on ordonne cette réunion.” Lastly, Ge-

“land still affix any importance to the opening of the Scheldt, the Executive Council
 general Dumouriez, who was well acquainted with the secrets of the French Government, has publicly made the following confession: “*L'intention secrète à Paris n'était point que le peuple Liegeois, et encore moins celui de la Belgique, se réunît en corps de nation, pour se donner une constitution et des loix; on craignoit qu'une fois assemblés ces deux peuples ne pussent leurs forces, et ne fondassent une république indépendante.*” Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 348. There remains, therefore, not the shadow of a doubt, that it was the intention of the French Government, from the very beginning, to incorporate Belgia into France, and consequently it is certain that the assurances of the contrary, which were given to the British Government on the 7th of January, were given with the consciousness of their falsehood.

With respect to the pretended love for the Belgians, which, according to the Executive Council, was so great, that their independence and happiness was the whole reward which was sought by France for its kind exertions, the above-quoted passage in Chaussard's Letter to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, affords an admirable proof of it. For it appears from that passage, that the majority of the Belgians wished for no revolution whatsoever, and that even a part of the minority

“ will leave that affair to a direct negotiation with the Belgians. If the Belgians, rity wished, not for an union with France, but for a National Convention of their own. Chauffard himself, therefore, admitted, that the incorporation of Belgia into France was a measure, which was disapproved by far the greatest part of the inhabitants. And this representation was in fact much too feeble; for, so early as the 29th of December, 1792, at a meeting of the Belgians at Brussels, the proposal, that they should renounce their old constitution, and take the new oath, produced the following effect. *Le serment fut hautement refusé dans le plus grand nombre des sections.* “ Point d’égalité, point de nouvelles loix; nos états, notre ancienne constitution, et point d’autre chose,” *s’écria de toutes parts.* Moniteur, 6 Janv. 1793. The French Executive Council, therefore, were well acquainted with the sentiments of the Belgians, even before they signed the instructions for the commissaries. But Chauffard, faithful to this trust, easily discovered the means of removing all objections, and said in his vote for the incorporation: “ On m’oppose le vœu du “ peuple: *le vœu d’un peuple enfant ou imbécile serait nul, “ parcequ’il stipulerait contre lui-même.*” Such is the French method of promoting the high-prized happiness and sovereignty of the people. Well, therefore, did Dumouriez say: “ On disait aux Belges dans

“ through any motive whatever, shall con-
 “ sent to deprive themselves of the naviga-
 “ tion of the Scheldt, France will not op-
 “ pose it. It will respect their independence
 “ even in their errors. (109)

le préambule, qu'ils étaient libres ; on les *traitait* en esclaves." Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 374.—That the French rulers have spoken so speciously, and have acted so infamously, is no wonder, because systematic deception is a constituent part of their general plan : but that so many men of talents and penetration could suffer themselves to be duped by their artifices, is really a wonder. Fortunately, however, for Great Britain, our *Ministers* saw more clearly : or we should ere now have shared the wretched fate which has befallen the Dutch and the Swiss.

(109) It was to be expected that so captivating and sentimental a passage as this would not escape the notice of a celebrated writer, who has made a copious collection of the fair *professions* of the French rulers. Indeed, he has not only quoted it, but has ventured to declare, that “ implicit respect was manifested to the *independence and constitutions* of other nations.”—But in *what* manner the independence of Belgia was respected, in *what* manner its constitution, which the majority of the inhabitants

“ After so free a declaration, which manifests the present designs of peace, the Ministers of his Britannic Majesty ought to inhabitants wished to preserve, was held in honour, and in *what* manner the French Executive Council regulated its conduct by the will of the sovereign people, has been shewn in the preceding note. Further, says Dumouriez, immediately after the words last quoted : “ On ne leur laissait aucune administration : on les mettait en tutelle. On se chargeait du séquestre de tous les biens ecclésiastiques, qu’on nommait biens nationaux, sans s’embarrasser, s’il conviendrait aux Belges de dépouiller son clergé, et de déclarer ses biens nationaux. Tout cela se faisait, *pour les forcer à se donner à la France* ; et bientôt on employa *la violence et les moyens les plus criminels*, pour arracher l’émission de ce vœu.” Whoever wishes to read a circumstantial account of these violent and infamous measures, of which not only Dumouriez, but even Brissot (à ses commetans, p. 82—87.) loudly complains, may consult the second volume of Desodoards’ *Histoire Philosophique de la Révolution de France*. The description given by Desodoards, which no one will call in question, as the author is himself a staunch republican, and a decided enemy of Great Britain, should be further compared with the all-promising manifesto, with which the entry of the French army into the Netherlands was accompanied, and it will

“entertain no doubt respecting the inten-
 “tions of France. (110) But if these expla-
 “nations appear to them insufficient, and if we
 “are still obliged to hear the language of haugh-
 “tiness, and if hostile preparations are conti-
 “nued in the ports of England, after having
 “done every thing in our power to maintain
 “peace, we will prepare for war, (111) con-
 “scious, at least, of the justice of our cause,

then be confessed, that a more abominable plan of systematic deception was at that time introduced, than had ever disgraced the annals of mankind.

• (110) Nor did they entertain any doubt.

(111) Hence it is evident, that this note of the Executive Council contained their *ultimatum*: for they expressly say, “we will prepare for war (*nous nous disposerons à la guerre*) if the explanations appear insufficient, and the preparations in the ports of England be still continued.”—The British Government, therefore, was reduced to this dilemma: either to admit, that the explanations given by the Executive Council were satisfactory, and to put a stop to the preparations making in the sea-ports, or to reject the explanations as unsatisfactory,

“ and of the efforts we have made to avoid
“ that extremity (112) We shall combat
“ with regret the English, whom we ef-
“ teem : (113) but we shall combat them
“ without fear.

(Signed) “ LE BRUN.”

To this final note of the French Execu-
tive Council Lord Grenville returned, within

factory, and to continue the preparations in the sea-
ports. But it has been fully proved, that the former
was *impossible* : consequently, the latter was *unavoid-
able*.

(112) One becomes gradually so accustomed to the
hypocrisy of the French rulers, that indignation at
length gives way to contempt.

(113) With great artifice was this clause inserted.
It was designed to separate the people from the Go-
vernment, and to promote the expected insurrection.
They never lose sight of their favourite maxim : *Il faut
s'opposer les administrés contre les administrans.*

five days after the receipt of it, the following answer. (114)

Whitehall, Jan. 18, 1793.

“ I have examined, Sir, with the utmost
 “ attention, the paper you remitted me on
 “ the 13th of this month. I cannot help
 “ remarking, *that I have found nothing satis-*
 “ *factory in the result of it.* The explanations
 “ which it contains, are nearly reduced to
 “ the same points which I have already re-
 “ plied to at length. The declaration of
 “ *wishing to intermeddle with the affairs of*
 “ *other countries* is there renewed. No de-
 “ tial is made, nor reparation offered for the
 “ outrageous proceeding I stated to you in
 “ my letter of December 31 : and the right
 “ *of infringing treaties, and violating the rights*

(114) The French original of Lord Grenville's answer to the note of the Executive Council was not printed in the *Moniteur*, as the preceding notes were : but as the English translation was officially laid before Parliament, it supplies the place of the original.

“ of ”

“ *of our allies* is still maintained, by solely
 “ offering an illusory negotiation upon this
 “ subject, which is put off, as well as the
 “ evacuation of the Low Countries by the
 “ French armies, to the *indefinite term*, not
 “ only of the conclusion of the war, but like-
 “ wise of the consolidation of what is called
 “ the liberty of the Belgians.

“ It is added, that, if these explanations
 “ appear insufficient to us, if you should be
 “ again obliged to hear a haughty tone of
 “ language, if hostile preparations should
 “ continue in the ports of England, after
 “ having made every effort to preserve peace,
 “ *you will then make dispositions for war.*

“ If this notification, or that relative to
 “ the treaty of commerce, had been made to
 “ me under a regular and official form, (115)

(115) It was admitted by the French Executive Council, in the very note to which Lord Grenville here replied,

“ I should have found myself under the ne-
“ cessity of replying to it, that to threaten
“ Great Britain with a declaration of war,
“ because she judged it expedient to aug-
“ ment her forces, and also to declare that a
“ solemn treaty should be broken, because

replied, that Mr. Chauvelin was no otherwise accredited to his Britannic Majesty than from the late King of France, and that he was not formally enough authorized to treat as an agent of the new Government of France; consequently Mr. Chauvelin's communication of the note, to which Lord Grenville here replied, was, in diplomatic strictness, no *official* communication: and as this was avowed by the Executive Council itself, no one could censure a British Minister for using the same language. Indeed it is obvious, that, if the British Government had been ever so inclined to acknowledge, at that early period, the French Republic, it could not consider any individual as the accredited Ambassador of that republic, till credentials from the part of those, who had the administration of it, had been both delivered and received. But (as Lord Grenville had already explained to Mr. Chauvelin) the issue of the negotiation depended, not on the *form*, but on the *substance* of it. (See Note 4 to the present chapter.)

“ England

“ England adopted, for her own safety, such
 “ precautions as already exist in France, (116)
 “ would only be considered, both the one
 “ and the other, as new grounds of of-
 “ fence (117), which, as long as they

(116) It has been proved, that the French naval preparations preceded those, which were made in Great Britain, by three whole months, and that the number of ships of war, which were ordered by the British Government to be put in commission in the latter half of December and the former part of January, was inferior to the number of those which France had already in commission, to which was now to be added the considerable reinforcement of ships of the line and frigates, ordered by the National Convention on the 13th of January. See Ch. x. Note 5. Ch. xi. Note 44.³ and Ch. xii. Notes 59—61.

(117) To complain about preparations, which were not only mere measures of defence, but were still less extensive than those already adopted by the menacing power, and, while the motives which had given rise to the preparations of the menaced nation still continued, to insist on the cessation of those preparations, and lastly, when the causes of alarm were openly avowed, to accompany the demand with a new ~~message~~, that, unless it

“ should subsist, would prove a bar to every
“ kind of negotiation.

“ Under this form of extra communica-
“ tion, I think I may yet be permitted to
“ tell you, not in a tone of haughtiness, but
“ firmness, *that these explanations are not con-*
“ *sidered as sufficient, and that all the motives,*
“ *which gave rise to the preparations, still con-*
“ *tinue.* These motives are already known
“ to you by my letter of December 31, in
“ *which I remarked in precise terms what those*
“ *dispositions were, which could alone maintain*
“ *peace and a good understanding.* (118) I

were instantly complied with, a declaration of hostilities would be the consequence, was, in fact, to treat the menaced nation with the utmost insolence and contempt.

(118) On the precise terms, in which Lord Grenville had marked to Mr. Chauvelin the dispositions, which alone could maintain peace and harmony between the two nations. (See Note 66 to this chapter.)

“ do

“ do not see that it can be useful to the ob-
“ ject of conciliation, to enter into a discus-
“ sion with you, on separate points, under
“ the present circumstances, as I have al-
“ ready acquainted you with my opinion
“ concerning them. If you have any expla-
“ nation to give me under the same extra-
“ official form, which will embrace all the
“ objects contained in my letter of the 31st
“ of December, as well as all the points,
“ which relate to the present crisis with
“ England, her allies, and the general system
“ of Europe, *I shall willingly attend to them.*

“ I think it, however, my duty to in-
“ form you in the most positive terms, in
“ answer to what you tell me on the subject
“ of our preparations, *that, under the present*
“ *circumstances, all those measures will be con-*
“ *tinued, which may be judged necessary to*
“ *place us in a state of protecting the safety,*
“ *tranquillity, and the rights of this country,*

“ as

“ as well as to guarantee those of our allies,
“ and to set up a barrier to those views of am-
“ bition and aggrandizement, dangerous at all
“ times to the rest of Europe, but which become
“ still more so, being supported by the propaga-
“ tion of principles destructive of all social
“ order.

(Signed) “ GRENVILLE.”

When we examine the several parts of the preceding negotiation, we must confess, that the motives which had induced the British Government to have recourse to a naval armament, were far from being removed by it, and that those causes of alarm, which have been described at large in the tenth chapter, continued to operate in full force. And in the middle of January, 1793, were now to be added those additional causes which have been related in the twelfth chapter, causes which necessarily produced so much the more striking effects, as they arose
at

at the very time that the French Executive Council was pretending to remove the former causes of complaint, and, during negotiations, of which the apparent object was the preservation of peace. For the decree of December 15, the new address to all nations in favour of insurrection, the menace in the National Convention of an appeal to the British people, and the decisive refusal on December 24, to except Great Britain from the decree of November 19, succeeded Mr. Pitt's conference with Mr. Maret, and took place about the period, when the French Executive Council must have been engaged in preparing instructions for Mr. Chauvelin. It was only four days after Mr. Chauvelin had delivered his note of December 31, and, on the very day on which Lord Grenville replied to it, that the Marine Minister, Monge, wrote the circular letter to the French sea-ports, threatening England with an invasion, and fifty thousand

land caps of liberty. It was only one day after the Executive Council had, in the note of January 7, solemnly pledged its word to respect the independence both of England and its allies, that this same Council instructed its commissaries, that the French Republic considered every nation as an enemy, which, however unanimous in the resolution, was determined to preserve its ancient form of government. Lastly, it was only three days after the solemn pledge to respect the allies of England had been given, and even before any reply either was or could be made by the British Government, that positive orders were sent to General Miranda for an invasion of Holland. It lies not, therefore, within the power of sophistry itself to deny, that the French Executive Council entered into the negotiation with the sole view of amusing the British Government, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was

was full ripe for execution. But the British Government had more penetration than the French Government imagined, and was too wise to be decoyed into a snare, which, within the compass of a few years, has proved the ruin of millions. (119)

(119) The readiness to give credit to the protestations of the French rulers, till the iniquitous invasion of Switzerland at last opened the eyes of all who chose to see, and rendered the truth, that the actions of these pretended benefactors of mankind were uniformly at variance with their specious professions, as palpable even to the illiterate in politicks, as it had been from the very beginning to the intelligent, appears from the following passage of a letter written from Paris in the autumn of 1798, and published in the Annals of the Prussian Monarchy (*Annalen der Preussischen Monarchie*) November, 1798, p. 272—276. “The (French) Government sent to Germany, some time ago, a man of great talents and information, who expresses himself with spirit and fluency, in order to probe the public opinion, and, if possible, to work upon it. He is lately returned, and has informed me that he has made the following report to the Government: *That before the events in Switzerland foreigners were still inclined to*

Besides, the negotiation itself, even without any reference to those facts, which place the systematic deception of the French rulers in the clearest point of view, proved, beyond a doubt, that they preferred the gratification of their ambition, and a war with England, to moderation and a continuance of peace. For, if they had preferred the latter, they would have readily accepted the conditions which were offered by the British Government, since these conditions were nothing more than, first, that France should renounce its views of aggression and aggrandizement, and secondly, that it should cease to interfere in the internal concerns of neu-

*"suffer themselves to be deceived in regard to the real views
"of the French Government, but, that after those extortions
"and excesses, all attempts to justify its conduct were without
"effect."*—This passage proves, likewise, what indeed wants at present no proof in England, that the French Government still sends revolution-professors abroad, to work on the public opinion.

tral nations. (120) Without a compliance with these conditions on the part of France, it would have been madness to have desisted from the preparations which were making

(120) Not only were these conditions distinctly specified in Lord Grenville's note of December 31, but the conduct of the National Convention, as being contrary to what was required in those conditions, had, on the 13th of December, been alledged in his Majesty's speech as the cause of the British armament. "I have carefully observed (said his Majesty) a strict neutrality in the present war on the continent, and have uniformly abstained from any interference with respect to the internal affairs of France: *but it is impossible for me to see, without the most serious uneasiness, the strong and increasing indications, which have appeared there of an intention to excite disturbances in other countries, to disregard the rights of neutral nations, and to pursue views of conquest and aggrandizement, &c.*"—Great Britain, therefore, had recourse to an armament, as to a measure of defence, because France had displayed views of conquest and aggrandizement, and had interfered in the internal concerns of neutral nations, particularly of Great Britain itself. And, when that armament became a subject of negotiation, the question, whether it should cease or be continued, depended entirely on the ques-

in the ports of Britain. For, in regard to the former, it was certainly not to be expected, that, after the conquest of Holland, and the great accession of sea-coast and nation, whether the French rulers would abandon or retain their plan of interference and aggrandizement, whether they would accept or reject the proposed conditions. The whole negotiation turned on this single point, and therefore it is sheer sophistry, when the adversaries of the British Ministry intermix other questions, such as the new form of government in France, to which the negotiation had not the most distant reference. The French rulers themselves were conscious, that it was their views of conquest and aggrandizement which occasioned the British armament, and that they were determined, under no conditions, to abandon those views: for, on the day which preceded the declaration of war, Danton said in the National Convention: "*Les limites de la France sont marquées par la nature: nous les atteindrons dans leurs quatre points, à l'Océan, au Rhin, aux Alpes, aux Pyrénées.—On vous menace de l'Angleterre! Les tyrans de l'Angleterre sont morts: vous avez la plénitude de la puissance nationale.*" *Moniteur*, 1 Fev. 1793. From this passage we see, likewise, the reason why the conditions, proposed by the British Government, were rejected by the rulers of France. They supposed, namely, in consequence of the

val power, which would accrue from it to France, the government of that country would not take the earliest opportunity of attacking Great Britain with double force. It was surely not to be expected, that a nation, which has ever been the great rival of France, a nation, which, on account of its power and wealth, is envied by all Europe, would alone remain unmolested. Nor could it be supposed, that the desire of humbling Britain, which is necessarily inherent in the French, would diminish with the increase of their power, and that this desire would at length vanish, when they had acquired the means of controlling us according to their pleasure. The renunciation, therefore, of conquest and aggrandizement on the part of

the expected rebellion, that the British Constitution was at its last gasp : in the heat of their imagination, they represented royalty in Britain as even expired : and disdained, therefore, to be re-conducted within the limits of moderation by a government, which, on account of its imagined debility, they despised.

France was a condition essential to the salvation of Britain. Equally necessary was the acceptance, and even the most punctual fulfilment of the other condition: for it was wholly impossible, that Great Britain should preserve its internal tranquillity, while the decrees of November 10, and December 15, continued in force, while the French Government continued to encourage those societies, who, by their own avowal on the 28th of November, had formed the resolution of overturning the British Constitution, and while it still persevered in infesting our country with its apostles of rebellion. (121) It is clear, therefore, that France had no right to expect a cessation of the warlike preparations on the part of Britain, unless the former would condescend to accept of conditions which were indispensibly necessary for the preservation of the latter. This

(121) See Ch. X. p. 203—231.

matter was represented very perspicuously by Mr. Miles on the 11th of January, 1793, in a letter addressed to his friend Mr. Maret, who was then become *Chef du Département pour les Affaires Etrangères*, and consequently, the principal person in that department, after the Minister himself. Mr. Miles pointed out the impossibility, that the British Government should remain tranquil, unless the Executive Council would consent to fulfil what was required in the proposed conditions: and, at the same time, he positively assured Mr. Maret, *that if the Executive Council would comply with them, a war would not take place.* (122) To the French Mini-

(122) As this letter was written to a man in an official capacity, and is a document of some importance, it is necessary to quote the following extract from the original.

A Londres, le 11 Janvier, 1793.

La dépêche envoyée par Monsieur Chauvelin, Lundi, 31 Décembre, vous est certainement parvenue, cependant vous ne m'en accusez pas la réception. Vous me

ster for Foreign Affairs himself Mr. Miles had already written on the 2d of January, on

parlez de l'ardeur du peuple Français et de ses ressources immenses ; hélas ! mon cher Maret, il n'est question ni de l'une ni de l'autre. Après les griefs détaillés dans la réponse de Milord Grenville à la note de Monsieur Chauvelin, quel autre parti y a-t-il à prendre pour la France, que *de reculer ou se battre ?* Je n'en connais aucun. Vous me direz, peut-être, que ce qu'on a exigé est trop humiliant ; mais mon cher ami, *il n'est pas question d'orgueil, mais de justice.*—Si l'Assemblée Nationale dans un moment d'ivresse fait des bévues ou des injustices, il convient qu'elle corrige les uns et répare les autres. Permettez que je vous répète ce que vous avez déjà lu dans la réponse de Milord Grenville, que les ordres donnés à vos officiers généraux de poursuivre l'ennemi sur les terres neutres est une atteinte contre l'indépendance des puissances qui ne sont point en guerre avec vous. L'arrêté du Conseil sur l'ouverture de l'Escaut est une infraction des traités. L'appropriation de la Savoie est contre vos propres principes ; vous avez renoncé à toutes conquêtes, et vous en faites ! Comment se fier à une nation qui ne respecte ni les traités ni les sermens ? Le décret du 19 Novembre, ainsi que celui du 15 Décembre, étant conçus en termes généraux, et invitant, pour ainsi dire, les peuples de tous les pays à se révolter contre leurs gouvernemens respectifs,

the same subject, and had assured him, *that the fate of Britain and France depended on the decision of the Executive Council.* (123) If

respectés, en leur promettant du secours, sont des griefs trop évidens et trop sérieux pour ne pas indigner le Gouvernement Britannique, et justifier ses craintes, surtout après que l'Assemblée Nationale a accueilli, avec un empressement aussi peu décent que peu politique, les adresses de quelques clubs factieux en Angleterre, qui ne dissimulaient pas leurs intentions de tout bouleverser. *Voilà donc, mon cher Maret, où nous sommes; si vous pouvez engager le Conseil Exécutif à revenir sur ses pas, relativement aux articles ci-dessus, la guerre n'aura point lieu.* Il faut convenir que l'Angleterre ne peut que se sentir comprise dans les décrets qui offrent ce que vous appelez fraternité à tous les peuples du monde. Il est évident aussi que notre existence politique ne permettra nullement que la France s'aggrandisse: et vous ne pouvez nier que le traité de 1788, nous oblige à garantir la fermeture de l'Escaut, et que vous y êtes tenu par le traité de 1786. Il est aussi vrai, que pendant qu'un traité existe on doit le respecter. Répondez le plutôt possible à ma lettre, etc. Authentic Correspondence, etc. Appendix, p. 106—108.

(123) The words of the original are: "*C'est au Pouvoir Exécutif à décider*:" and a few lines after, "*Vous êtes*

this Council then had been really desirous of peace, it would have decided in favour of the acceptance of the proposed conditions, especially as they contained nothing more than the proposal, that France should remain true to the principles which, from the commencement of the revolution, it has uniformly professed. No alteration was required in the new form of government: the subjects of negotiation related solely to the *external* power of France: and if this power had continued in the hands even of Louis XVI., and he had acted towards Great Britain in the same manner as the National Convention did, the British Government would have been equally obliged to insist on the same conditions, and, in case of their rejection, to persevere in the preparations of war. But we have seen that the Executive Council, instead of accepting these conditions, which

êtes-maitre de leur destin. Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 97, 98.

his Majesty had mentioned in his speech to the British Parliament on the 31st of December, and which Lord Grenville, in his first Note to Mr. Chauvelin, had very distinctly proposed as the only possible basis of peace, (124) still insisted on the right of ap-

(124) The proposition was in fact so clear (See the Notes 66 and 120 to this chapter), that it creates just matter of surprise, that an eminent leader of Opposition could venture, on the 18th of February, 1793, in the House of Commons, to lay the following charge to Ministry: "That in the late negotiation—they never
 " stated distinctly to the French Government any terms
 " and conditions, the accession to which, on the part of
 " France, would induce his Majesty to persevere in a
 " system of neutrality." See *New Annual Register*, 1793, *British and Foreign History*, p. 57. But another leader of Opposition does not rest satisfied with this charge: for he seems, at least, to deny the existence of the negotiation itself, saying in his late popular pamphlet, "We neither made war upon these aggressions, which might have led to a termination of it upon their removal, nor would we consent to put their removal into a train of amicable negotiation."—It is true, that whoever derives his knowledge of British and French politics from this eminently superficial, though highly eloquent, pamphlet,

plying the decree of November 19 in certain cases, that is, in fact, of interfering at its own pleasure in the internal concerns of Great Britain. (125) On the right of violating existing treaties, of depriving the allies of England of privileges guaranteed to

pamphlet, might be induced to suppose it were true that no negotiation was conducted between the two governments, since the author has thought proper, if we except a few specious promises in the note of the Executive Council, which he calls *conciliatory declarations*, to pass over the negotiation in total silence. On the other hand, as he acknowledges that a *correspondence* was carried on between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, he appears in reality to object only to the *form* negotiation. But as this very term was used not only by Mr. Fox, in the above mentioned charge, but likewise by the French themselves, who speak of "*négociations avec l'Angleterre*" (Ch. X. Note 49); and as it is not the name, but the thing, which demands our attention, I leave it to the reader to give whatever appellation he thinks proper to the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France. *In verbis simus faciles.*

(125) See Notes 82—84 to this chapter.

them, by almost all the powers of Europe, and of occupying the Netherlands with a French army till the liberty, as it was called, of the Belgians was consolidated, that is, for ever, (126) was likewise formally insisted. Consequently the two conditions of peace, proposed by the British Government, were unequivocally rejected. Thus was the negotiation brought to a crisis: for, without the acceptance of these conditions, Great Britain *could not* desist from the preparations then making in the ports, and these conditions France *would not* accept. The former, therefore, *was obliged* to continue its preparations, as Lord Grenville explained to Mr. Chauvelin, in his note of January 18, on this very ground. And as the French Executive Council formally and positively declared, that they would commence hostilities, if the explanations given in the note of January 7 were not deemed satisfactory, and

(126) See the Notes 106—109 to this chapter.

the preparations in the British ports were not consequently discontinued, we have an irrefragable proof, *that it was not in the power of the British Cabinet to prevent a rupture with France.* (127)

(127) On the 18th of January, therefore, Mr. Miles closed his correspondence with the French Minister, Le Brun, with the following letter: "Un événement m'est arrivé qui m'ôte à jamais la douce espérance d'être utile à la chose publique. J'aurais voulu écarter la guerre, ce terrible fléau du genre humain: *mais enflé d'un orgueil très déplacé, vous n'écoutez ni la prudence ni la justice.* Je me trouve tracassé et estropié de tout côté et de toute manière. Je n'en puis plus. Il y a bien des années que vous connaissez mes principes: mes démarches ont été dictées jusqu'à présent par l'amour de la vérité et de la liberté, non pas d'une liberté effrénée et sans bornes comme la vôtre, *mais d'une liberté bien entendue, bien raisonnée, et qui rend le monde un paradis terrestre.* Mais que faire? *L'enthousiasme vous aveugle et vous ne voyez plus ni la justice ni la prudence.* Quant il était question du traité de commerce, j'exprimai mes vœux dans une lettre adressée à Mr. Pitt, que ce traité pût devenir la base d'une alliance entre les deux nations, qui assurerait à l'Europe et au monde entier la douce jouissance d'une paix éternelle. Mais au lieu de
la

la paix; c'est la guerre que je vois prêt à s'éclater et engloutir les deux nations. *Le Brun! vous allez vous charger d'une terrible responsabilité. Songez y bien; il est encore tems; vous pouvez tout réparer: j'ai le cœur gros et obsédé par des idées tristes et lugubres; la vie commence à me peser furieusement.*" *Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 113.* But this last warning was of no more avail than the preceding: the resolution, once formed, was not altered: and Le Brun's obstinacy, of which Mr. Miles had already complained in a letter to Mr. Maret of the 4th of January,* rendered him insensible to the calamities in which he and his colleagues were warily involving Great Britain and France.

* "J'ai le cœur navré de voir que tous mes efforts pour écarter la guerre n'aboutissent à rien, et ça à cause de l'opiniâtreté de *Le Brun*, qui est assurément très mal instruit de la situation intérieure de ce pays." *Id.* p. 89.

CHAP. XIV.

Proof that the French Rulers had fully resolved on a War with Great Britain some Time before the Middle of January, 1793. Investigation of the Motives which induced them to undertake it.

WE have seen, in the preceding chapter, that the question, whether a rupture should take place between Great Britain and France, was fully decided before the middle of January, 1793, (1) and that this decision was founded on the refusal of the French Executive Council to accept the con-

(1) It was on the 13th of January that the ultimatum of the French Executive Council was delivered to Lord Grenville.

ditions of peace which had been proposed by the British Government. Now, as the note, in which the refusal was signified, was signed by Le Brun on the 7th of January, the Executive Council must, at least, on that day, if not sooner, have come to a resolution of engaging in a war with England, because they knew from Lord Grenville's express declaration, in his note of the 31st of December, that, without the acceptance of the proposed conditions, a rupture would be unavoidable. But they had undoubtedly formed this resolution at a still earlier period, and even before the answer of the British Court to Mr. Chauvelin's note of December 27 was known to them: for it was on the very day on which Lord Grenville replied to it, namely, December 31, that the Marine Minister, Monge, sent his celebrated circular letter to the sea-port towns of France, and it is evident that no Minister would take so open and decisive a step before war had been re-

solved on in the cabinet. (2) The date of the circular letter deserves, likewise, in an-

(2) This is so obvious, that the circular letter of the Marine Minister was considered by the inhabitants of the sea-ports as the signal of an immediate attack on England. The following answer, returned by the municipality of St. Malo, dated 17th January, and printed in the *Journal de Paris*, 28th January, 1793, may serve as an example.

Lettre du Conseil Général de la Commune de St. Malo, au Ministre de la Marine, le 17 Janvier.

A l'instant où nous avons reçu votre Lettre, avec la délibération du Conseil Exécutif en date du 7 Janv. nous nous sommes empressés, de concert avec l'Ordonnateur civil, de lui donner la plus grande publicité par la voie de l'impression, bien certain que nos concitoyens seraient jaloux de prouver leur patriotisme, en entrant dans les vues du Pouvoir Exécutif, et faisant leurs efforts pour coopérer de tous leurs moyens, à anéantir les tyrans, et les hordes d'esclaves ligués contre notre liberté. Nous n'avons point été trompés dans notre attente, Citoyen Ministre, et déjà nous vous annonçons que nos armateurs travaillent avec grande activité, à disposer les objets nécessaires à l'armement de six corsaires, dont trois montent 28 canons en batteries et trois autres plus petits. Vous pouvez compter, qu'ils seront prêts à l'instant où la Convention Nationale ouvrira sur les mers

other respect, to be particularly noted, because it shews that the resolution of engaging in a war with England was formed by the Executive Council, even before they knew the conditions under which the British Government was willing to preserve peace with France, and consequently, that they were determined on a rupture at all events, whatever might be the terms required as the

mers un nouveau champ d'honneur aux Français régénérés."—The contents of the *deliberation of the Executive Council bearing date 7th of January*, which is mentioned in this letter, have, I believe, never been made known to the public: but it is evident, from the manner in which the municipality of St. Malo spoke of it, that its tendency was the same as that of the letter written by the Marine Minister, namely, to rouse the people to a war with England. The circumstance, therefore, that it was signed by the Executive Council on the *very same day* on which the note of the Executive Council to the British Government was signed, affords a new and very striking proof of that glaring duplicity, which characterizes the rulers of modern France.

price of peace. Though the question, therefore, whether a rupture must take place between Great Britain and France could not be brought to its final issue before the tribunal of the public, till the ultimatum of the Executive Council had been delivered on the 13th of January, yet their private determination had been irrevocably made, without the least regard to the result of a negotiation. Indeed the whole conduct of the French rulers, from the middle of November to the middle of January, afforded one continued proof of this assertion: and Mr. Miles, who, in consequence of his connexions with Le Brun, and other leading men in France, was intimately acquainted with their secret views, has testified, that the Executive Council had formed a decided resolution on the part to be taken in regard to England, not four weeks only when the circular letter of the Marine Minister was issued, but even

ten weeks before the open declaration of hostilities. (3)

That the resolution, to engage in a war with England, was taken by the Executive Council, at least before the negotiation was finished, if not before it commenced, appears likewise from the confessions of General Dumouriez. In the first volume of his Memoirs, where he speaks of his own residence in Paris during the former part of January, and the measures which were then concerting for the next campaign, he says, in positive and unequivocal terms, that Le Brun, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, desired him to pay no regard to the negotiation with Great Britain, and *that this negotiation was not made even a subject of the least inquiry.* (4) We have here, also, an ad-

(3) Compare p. 37 with p. 88 of the Authentic Correspondence with Le Brun and others.

(4) "Le Brun pria même le général d'écartier tout ce qui concernait les négociations avec l'Angleterre, et

ditional proof, that the Executive Council, of which Le Brun, in all matters relative to foreign countries was the chief, was resolved *at all events* on a war with England, and that the negotiation, which was then carrying on, had no other object than to amuse its government till the plan of attack was ripe for execution. Further, General Dumouriez informed General Miranda, in a letter dated Paris, 10th January, that the war between England and France appeared to be decided. He said, indeed, to Miranda, "decided on the part of England," (5) being too prudent to betray the secrets of the Executive Council: but that he himself was convinced the British Government had at that time *not* determined on a war with France, is manifest from the circumstance,

la Hollande: il n'en fut pas du tout question. Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom i. p. 108.

(5) La guerre de la part d'Angleterre paraît à-peu-près décidée. Correspondance du Général Miranda, etc. p. 3.

that

that in a passage of his Memoirs, where he had just before expressly spoken of the *fifteenth* of January, (6) he says *it would have been extremely easy for France to have avoided a war with England.* (7) Dumouriez, therefore, certainly did not believe on the *tenth* of January, that the English Cabinet had determined on a war with France: for in that case he could not have supposed, that the French Government, on the *fifteenth* of that month, might so easily have avoided a rupture: nor could he have at all ima-

(6) Tom. i. p. 103. "Nous étions déjà au 15 du mois de Janvier.

(7) "La Clos, qui venait d'être nommé commandant dans l'Inde proposait, qu'on le fit partir avec quinze mille hommes et quinze vaisseaux de guerre, ce qui supposait nécessairement la guerre avec les Anglais et les Hollandais, guerre qui n'était point déclarée, et qu'il eût été *très-facile* et *très-nécessaire* d'éviter. Ib. p. 105. He says also p. 128: "De Maulde en arrivant à Paris pour se justifier vint trouver le général, et lui dit, que si on voulait garder la neutralité avec la Hollande et l'Angleterre, *rien n'était plus facile.*"

gined, that the decision of war and peace depended on the will of the Executive Council, unless he had been thoroughly persuaded, that the designs of the British Government were pacific. The expression, therefore, *guerre de la part d'Angleterre*, must be considered as synonymous to *guerre avec l'Angleterre*: the use of it must be ascribed to the caution which he thought was necessary in writing to Miranda, but which no longer operated when he published his Memoirs: and the decision in favour of war must be understood of the French Government, a construction, of which the justness is demonstrated, not only by Le Brun's acknowledged resolution, to pay no regard to the negotiation with England, but likewise by the order sent to General Miranda, on the same 10th of January, to make an immediate attack on the United Provinces. And it receives still further confirmation, from the declaration made by Lord Auckland in the House

House of Lords, on the 9th of January, 1798, whence it appears, that at the time when preparations were making (8) to open a negotiation between Lord Auckland, then Ambassador at the Hague, and General Dumouriez, the General himself acknowledged, that the French Executive Council had determined on a war with England. His Lordship further added, that he had not mentioned the matter before, but that he then felt himself at liberty to state it. (9)

(8) Of these preparations, which commenced only a few days before the declaration of war, more will be said in the following chapter.

(9) See the Parliamentary Debates on Jan. 9, 1798.—As no personal interview, if I mistake not, took place between Lord Auckland and General Dumouriez, the negotiation having been stopped at the very outset by the declaration of war on the part of the National Convention, the secret, which his Lordship has revealed, must have been contained in some written or verbal message, either to himself or to some other person. Now Dumouriez relates in his *Mémoires*, tom i. p. 342, that he sent a confidential letter to his friend De Maulde, who was then at the Hague, and that De

But whatever may be the period at which the French Cabinet came to a settled resolution in regard to the war with England and Holland, the *fact* that it did come to this resolution, and that too before the middle of January, 1793, has been so fully demonstrated in the tenth and twelfth chapters of the present work, that it would be a waste of time to say any thing further on the subject. Indeed, the positive order sent to General Miranda on the 10th of January, for an immediate invasion of Holland, and the considerable augmentation of the French marine, which was ordered only three days afterwards, expressly to act against England, though the French had a greater number of ships already in commission than were at

Maulde shewed this letter to Lord Auckland. But whether the acknowledgment of General Dumouriez was contained in this confidential letter, or in some other dispatch, his Lordship can best determine. As the information, however, was really communicated, the vehicle is of no great consequence.

that time sitting in the English ports, (10) would alone demonstrate the truth of the assertion. Lastly, Mr. Miles says in the work, (11) which has been frequently quoted, "I have other documents in my possession, which all tend to prove that France was too much intoxicated with her success, and too confident that she was invincible, to keep any measures with a nation whom it was her misfortune to behold in no other light than as a very powerful neighbour and rival, and whom she thought it was necessary to humble, if not to crush." Perhaps the documents, of which Mr. Miles here speaks, will hereafter be laid before the public: however, they are unnecessary for our present purpose, as we have already evidence enough.

To this war with Great Britain the republican rulers of France were induced by

(10) See Ch. xii. Note 51.

(11) Pag. 93.

various motives, which, unfortunately for human kind, derived their origin from the French revolution.

The conclusion of it, as it was called, had already induced the National Assembly, in April 1792, to declare war against Austria: (12) they had deemed it expedient to employ their forces abroad, that they might be more at liberty to execute their projects at home, and to divert the general attention from the cabals in the centre of the kingdom to the military operations on the borders, that their own secret machinations might less attract the notice of the public. When hostilities were once commenced, the same motives urged both the continuance and extension of them: for the Minister of the interior declared, in the summer of 1792, that, as there were three hundred thousand men in arms, it was necessary to make them

(12) See Ch. vii. Note 3.

march as far as their legs would carry, or they would return and cut their throats, a reformation, a reformation, a reformation, degrees, and stages of their employers. (13) War, considered as a national business, as Brissot himself acknowledged, was regarded as the only evil which the republican rulers of France had to combat, which had as Louvet observed, it was, it was scarcely a republic. (15) The successful consequence of 1792, and the advantages which the French obtained over Austria and Prussia, into the new fields of action to the French arms, which were daily increasing both in numbers and in military prowess: and to men accustomed to subsist by rapine, nothing more inviting could be offered, than the plunder of a commercial country, whose wealth is proverbial. And, as it was deemed expedient

(13) Ch. vii. Note 36.

(14) Ib. Note 7.

(15) Ib. Note 12.

various employment for the French sailors as
human kind, the soldiers, a war with Great
French revolution only an alluring object, but
National Convention; to af-
The con- securing its authority at
Already induced the
April 1792, to dec
(12) they had dec however, with Austria and
ploy their forces answered the ends of the
more at libers to a certain degree, it is pro-
home, and at the declaration of hostilities against
from the Britain would have been deferred to a
d somewhat later period, unless other causes,
of which the effects were more rapid, had
operated at the same time. These causes
were partly general, or such as applied to
other countries beside Great Britain, and
partly especial, or such as applied to Great
Britain alone. To the former class is to be
referred the resolution of the French repub-
licans to extirpate monarchy not only in
France,

France, but throughout all Europe, a resolution which was formed by degrees, and which may be traced in the stages of the French revolution.

The rational sense of liberty, which had long prevailed in Britain, was scarcely awakened in France, when, in consequence of the impetuosity of the French character, it began to degenerate into enthusiasm. From the original design of establishing a monarchy, limited by a ^{both} per intermixture of democracy and aristocracy, (16) which is the happiest constitution

(16) I purposely say the *design* of establishing such a monarchy, for the framers of the constitution of 1789, or, as it is more usually called, of 1791, because it was then formally accepted, entirely failed in the execution; they by no means introduced a just mixture of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, and on that very account it was impossible that the constitution should be of long duration. The grand fault consisted in this, that the States of France, which had been formerly divided

for a great empire, a sudden transition was made to all the horrors of anarchy: and the divided into three houses, or chambers, were melted into *one*. Thus the equilibrium of the state-machine, which it is the first object of a good legislator to preserve, was totally destroyed; and it was easy to foresee, that with such an institution, aided by the spirit of the times, the King would be degraded to a mere Commissary of the National Assembly, and that for want of a separate aristocratic power, to form a counterpoise, the monarchical part of the constitution would soon be annihilated by the daily increasing power of the democratic. The States should have been divided into *two* Houses: the heads of the principal noble families, with the higher orders of the clergy, should have been placed in the one, and the representatives of the people in the other. The reciprocal action of aristocracy and democracy would then have preserved an equilibrium: the prerogatives of the King, and the liberties of the people, would have been guaranteed at the same time: tranquillity would have been secured to France, and the miseries, which have been inflicted on the neighbouring countries, would have been avoided. The faultiness of a *single* legislative body has been since discovered by the French themselves, and, therefore, in the latest of their constitutions they have introduced *two* Councils, in imitation of the two Houses of the British Parliament.

Constituent Assembly, in which were many very respectable members, was scarcely dis-

But the imitation falls greatly short of the original: for the Council of Elders, and the Council of Five Hundred, can never answer the purpose which is attained by the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. The House of Lords, which forms the aristocratical part of our constitution, is admirably devised to keep the monarchical and democratical parts within their due limits. It has an equal interest with the Commons in preventing a too great increase in the power of the one, and an equal interest with the King in preventing a too great increase in the power of the other. And as it is placed immediately between both, it can keep the constitution in a proper poise, by siding with the one, if encroachments are made by the other, and by supporting both, when they preserve the limits marked out by the constitution. But no such advantage attends the French Council of Elders. They are representatives of the people, and, consequently, belong to the democratical part of the French Constitution, as well as the Council of Five Hundred: the two Councils are, in fact, nothing more than parts of the *same* house, and whether seven hundred and fifty representatives assemble in *one* hall, as they did before, or whether one room be allotted to five hundred of them, and another to the remaining two hundred and fifty, as at

solved, when the Legislative Assembly, which met in the autumn of 1792, and consisted

present, the difference in the result is not so great, as the authors of the last French Constitution imagined. Both Councils consist of men of the very same description; the members of each have an equal interest in all cases, whether they be inclined to oppose or to support the Directory, to which the executive power is entrusted; and their ability or inability must be likewise in all cases the same. The present French Constitution, therefore, has established oligarchy (the Directory), on the one hand, and democracy (the two Councils), on the other, without any intermediate power, to prevent mutual incroachments. Consequently, as from the natural desire, which all men have to increase their authority, the one part of the constitution must have always a tendency to oppress the other, the whole can never be kept in equilibrium. Either the Directory will render the two Councils, and with them the whole nation, subservient to its absolute will; or the two Councils will infringe on the executive power, and impede the necessary operations of Government. The former case has already taken place: for ever since the 4th of September, (18th of Fructidor, as they call it) 1797, the Directory has governed France with a rod of iron, and their unhappy slaves might say with Tacitus, *memoriam quoque ipsam cum voce perdidissemus, si*
nam

chiefly of violent democrats, formed the secret resolution of dethroning the King of France, and of raising *themselves*, under the

tam in nostra potestate esset oblivisci, quam tacere. But if a change of circumstances from without should occasion discontents in the interior, and the two Councils be enabled to resume the power which is allotted them by the constitution, they will, probably, go as much beyond the constitutional exercise of it, for want of an intermediate check, as the Directory has hitherto done, and thus reduce the Executive Power to a state of debility, unless, in imitation of the National Convention, they take the whole into their own hands, and destroy the constitution at one stroke. Though the British Constitution, therefore, is adapted to all cases, the present Constitution of France is adapted to none: under the latter there is always danger either of despotism or anarchy, under the former there is danger neither of the one nor of the other: the former has stood the test of a whole century, the latter was shaken to its foundation before it had existed even two years. A comparison, then, which so illustrates the excellencies of the British original, and the defects of the French imitation, must excite in Britons, of every description, the sincere desire of transmitting, unaltered, to posterity the constitution which they have inherited from their ancestors.

specious and alluring title of friends of the people, to the dignity of all-potent sovereigns. In the Jacobin Club, especially, where all subjects of importance were discussed and arranged before they were introduced into the National Assembly, the plan was already settled at the beginning of the year 1792, not only for the establishment of a republic in France, but for the introduction of the same form of government in every quarter of Europe. The spirit, which animated the Club of the Jacobins, operated on almost every member of the National Assembly: and to the National Convention, which met in September, 1792, it was transmitted in all its vigour. A hatred of Kings, which, without distinction either of their political power, or of their private character, were denominated tyrants, betrayed itself in every harangue: and Sovereigns of all descriptions were openly branded, in what was called the senate of a great nation, with the opprobrious appellation

appellation of public robbers. (17) And this hatred displayed itself not merely in detached

(17) *Lès rois ne savent combattre les peuples qu'en brigands*, said Barbaroux, in the National Convention, on the 8th of December, 1792. See the *Moniteur*, 10th December, 1792. And whoever consults the *Moniteur*, not to mention the *Journal des Jacobins*, with the view of discovering other expressions of the same kind, will find them in abundance. I will not trouble the reader, therefore, with many extracts: but I cannot avoid quoting a passage from a letter, written by a very celebrated member of the Convention, Thomas Paine, whose principles, as is well known (for he was afterwards imprisoned) were deemed by the Jacobins *too moderate*. This letter, which was read in the National Convention on the 14th of January, 1793, begins thus: "Citoyen Président, *mon mépris et ma haine pour le gouvernement monarchique* sont assez connus; *ma compassion pour les infortunés, amis ou ennemis, est également profonde*. J'ai voté pour mettre Louis Capet en jugement, parcequ'il était nécessaire de prouver à l'univers *la perfidie, la corruption, et l'horreur du système monarchique*. La masse des preuves, que vous avez sous les yeux, le constate suffisamment. Il en résulte que la monarchie, *quelque forme qu'en lui donne, despotique ou limitée*, devient nécessairement le centre autour duquel se forment et se rassemblent tous les

speeches, or in the opinions of only a few orators, but was so generally adopted, that it

genres de corruption, et que le métier de *roi* détruit aussi certainement toute moralité dans un homme, que le métier de *bureau* toute sensibilité. Je me rappelle que pendant mon séjour en Angleterre je fus extrêmement frappé d'un mot de M. Anthoine aux Jacobins, lequel est *parfaitement conforme* à l'idée que j'énonce : *Faites moi Roi aujourd'hui, disait-il, et je serai demain un brigand.*"—*Moniteur*, 18 Janv. 1793.—Of expressions, abusive of the English Government in particular, the following may serve as specimens : "Voyez par quels moyens *perfides* le Gouvernement Anglais à tout à-coup aliéné la nation Anglaise.—Faire ici le tableau de la comédie joué par les *machievellistes* que dirigent l'Angleterre, c'est peindre les *forfaits* de presque toutes les puissances de l'Europe." These words were uttered in the National Convention, on the 1st of January, 1793, by Brissot, who was afterwards called *Allié de Pitt*. See the *Moniteur*, 3d Jan. 1793. A similar expression, "un acte de *persidie*," was used, likewise, in a letter to Lord Grenville by the *temperate* Mr. Chauvelin, as he has been termed. See Note 38 to Ch. xi. On the 3d of January, 1793, Danton represented royalty as already extinguished in England, saying : les *tyrants* de l'Angleterre sont morts ; vous avez la plénitude de la puissance *nationale*. *Moniteur*,

became an essential ingredient in French politicks. *Principles* (said the President of the National Convention, Gregoire, on the 28th of November, 1792) are waging war against royalty, which will fall under the blows of philosophy : (18) and, five days afterwards, another President, Barrere, with his gorgeous eloquence, declared, that *their principles, and their hatred of Kings*, were

1 Feb. 1793. On the day, on which the National Convention declared war, Ducos said: "Le peuple Anglais, trompé par les proclamations *mensongeres* et les terreurs *hypocrites* de son gouvernement, etc. : and in the public manifesto, with which the entry of the French army into Holland was accompanied, about ten days afterwards, was said, "le peuple Anglais se laisse égarer—*par les mensonges de son roi*." See the *Moniteur*, 3d and 20th of February, 1793. These, with numberless other passages of the same import, merit the particular attention of those gentlemen, who have taken so much offence at the warmth with which Mr. Burke censured the conduct of the French rulers.

(18) See Ch. x. Note 19.

their ministers plenipotentiary. (19) But, should any one still entertain a doubt, whether this hatred extended itself to the French rulers in general, it will certainly be removed by the following exclamation of the whole National Assembly, on the 4th of September, 1792: *We all swear hatred to Kings and to Royalty.* (20)

(19) *Nos principes et notre haine contre les tyrâns, voilà nos ministres plénipotentiaires.* Moniteur, 6th Dec. 1792. It is never to be forgotten, that in the language of the French Convention the words *roi* and *tyrant* are always synonymous.

(20) Dites au peuple Français (saið Chabot) que vous avez trop appris à connaître les vices des rois, et de la royauté, et que vous les détestez. Oûi, oui, s'écrient tous ensemble les députés: *Nous le jurons.* Journal de Paris, 1792, p. 941. And this hatred was carried to such a length, that Jean de Brie, who was afterwards appointed by the Directory to negotiate with Kings and Princes, proposed to the National Convention to establish, for the more easy propagation of French principles, a corps of twelve hundred knights-regicide.

This

This hatred, however, which had never been accompanied with fear, was gradually converted, before the declaration of war against England, into profound contempt; and the name of King was become, in the National Convention, a subject of jest and ridicule. "Another Bourbon (exclaimed Treilhard, then President of the Convention, on Jan. 8, 1793, when the King of the Two Sicilies had been forced, by the French fleet in the Mediterranean, to submit to an indignity) another Bourbon in the number of the vanquished: *Kings are here the order of the day.* (21) And the contempt of the French rulers for the kingdom of Great Britain in particular was so great, that, according to their own declarations, they cared for it as little, as for the republic of Ragusa. (22) This contempt

(21) *Encore un Bourbon au nombre des vaincus; les rois sont ici à l'ordre du jour.* Moniteur, 9 Janv. 1793.

(22) *Authentic Correspondence*, Appendix, p. 58.

arose in some measure from the pride,^o with which the successful campaign of 1792 necessarily inspired them, but more particularly from their conviction, that French principles had every where taken such deep root, that the neighbouring nations were become ripe for rebellion, were prepared to depose their sovereigns, and to open their gates to the pretended deliverers of humankind. Of the English nation in particular they entertained these sentiments: (23) whence they supposed, that the English Government was not only in a state of debility, but approaching to its final dissolution. And so confident were they in their expectations of universal insurrection, that the impending execution of Louis XVI. was openly represented in the National Convention as a prelude to similar executions in the other kingdoms of Europe. “Teach the nations (said Remi, on the 2d of December, 1792)’ to punish

(23) See the latter part of Ch. x.