

“ been expressed at the atrocious act lately
 “ perpetrated in Paris : but as De Maulde
 “ assured both Ministers (the English and
 “ the Dutch) that General Dumouriez him-
 “ self was penetrated with the same senti-
 “ ments, and felt equal indignation, that

pour brusquer cette place, comme vous brusquerez Venlo, où vous ne devez pas trouver de résistance, n'y ayant point de garnison.” Correspondance du Général Miranda, p. 18.—These circumstances I mention, not so much with the view of accusing General Dumouriez, who well knew the resolution of his government, to attack England and Holland at all events, and therefore thought it necessary to act accordingly, as of shewing how very ill it becomes him, to transfer the charge of duplicity to those who acted with the utmost integrity. With equal injustice has he accused, likewise, the British Government of irritating that of France, by dismissing Mr. Chauvelin, even after the negotiation was begun : for the very first proposal of it was made by De Maulde at the Hague, *after* the order had been sent to Mr. Chauvelin in London. Consequently the inference, which Dumouriez thence deduces, “ *on peut donc leur reprocher autant qu'aux Français,*” falls of itself to the ground.

dreadful

“ dreadful catastrophe presented no obsta-
 “ cles to the negotiation. It was decid-
 “ ed, therefore, without difficulty, that, as
 “ soon as Lord Auckland received the an-
 “ swer from his Court, the conference should
 “ be holden at Moerdyk, on board a yacht
 “ of the Prince of Orange, which was or-
 “ dered to be fitted up for the reception of
 “ the General.”

During the time that De Maulde was on
 his journey to the Hague, Mr. Maret was
 dispatched to London, to propose the in-
 tended negotiation to the British Ministry.
 The object of Mr. Maret's mission, as Du-
 mouriez himself, who was the mover of the
 whole business, relates, was merely to inquire,
 whether Mr. Pitt was really desirous of treat-
 ing with General Dumouriez, (63) and, in

(63) “ Il fut décidé que Maret, qui avait déjà fait
 plusieurs voyages en Angleterre, y serait renvoyé pour

case he were, to procure for Dumouriez a passport to come over to England. (64) The

savoir de Mr. Pitt, si réellement il souhaitait traiter personnellement avec le Général Dumouriez." Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 131.

(64) In his letter to Miranda of the 23d of January, he said: "On envoie demain un agent secret fort connu de M. Pitt et de M. Fox, pour demander aux deux partis, c'est-à-dire à la nation toute entière, un sauf-conduit pour moi, et l'assurance d'être bien venu, quelque succès qu'ait la mission." Correspondance de Miranda, p. 15.—Of what use a *sauf-conduit*, from the Opposition party, could be to a French Ambassador, it is not easy to determine: but thus much is clear from the passage, that the French rulers never lose sight of their favourite maxim, and that they must always have something to do with those, who act in opposition to Government. In fact, the whole conduct of the negotiation is involved in mystery. If Dumouriez really intended to go over to England, and to negotiate with the Cabinet Ministers in person, what necessity was there for a conference with the British Ambassador at the Hague? And, on the other hand, if he intended to negotiate on the frontiers of Holland with the British Ambassador at the Hague, what necessity was there for sending

twenty-fourth of January was the day, which had been appointed for Mr. Maret's departure from Paris : (65) but Le Brun, under the pretence of giving previous information to Mr. Pitt by means of a person, who had already acted as mediator between him and Mr. Maret, (66) but in reality, as Dumouriez himself believes, with the view of counteracting the negotiation, (67) proposing a person to pave the way for his reception in London? To negotiate in both places was useless. How then is the enigma, that a person was sent to London, as well as to the Hague, to be solved? Perhaps, by the supposition, that it was deemed expedient to amuse *both* governments at the *same* time.

(65) This appears from the passage quoted in the preceding note.

(66) Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 133. The person here meant is probably Mr. Miles.

(67) Ib. But the *motive*, which Dumouriez assigns for Le Brun's conduct is certainly false: for he says, "Dans le fait, le Général a eu lieu de presumer, que Le Brun, piqué de ce que la cour de St. James ne voulait

tracted Mr. Maret's departure, and, in consequence, Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till

pas traiter avec lui comme Ministre des affaires étrangères de la république, ni avec la Convention, n'était pas fâché de faire manquer cette négociation sans y paraître." That Le Brun was resolved to counteract the negotiation, may be readily admitted; but this resolution must be ascribed to the motives alleged in the fourteenth chapter of the present work, and certainly not to any supposed refusal on the part of the British Government to treat with Le Brun. On the contrary, it was Le Brun, from whom Mr. Maret, at Mr. Pitt's own request, had desired instructions to negotiate, and which Le Brun had refused: it was Le Brun who communicated the instructions to Mr. Chauvelin: it was Le Brun who had signed with his own hand the note of the Executive Council on the 7th of January. Besides, Dumouriez himself, had the proposed negotiation been carried into effect, must likewise have been first empowered by Le Brun, as the Minister for Foreign Affairs: for, though the character of General might enable him to enter into a *military* convention with another General, yet he could not conclude a *political* treaty with an Ambassador, till he had received full powers from his own Government. The consent of the British Cabinet, therefore, to negotiate with Dumouriez, was again a consent to negotiate with those,

the *twenty-sixth* of January. (68) As soon as he had landed at Dover, (69) he formed the in whose name, and in whose name alone, he did or could act.—Hence, also, another objection is removed, which, as well as the former, has been made to the British Cabinet by a writer of our own country, namely, that it was absurd to think of treating with a General, as if a treaty with a General, when he assumes the character of *Ambassador*, were not as much a treaty with his Government, as when that character is assumed by a person in the civil line.

(68) That Mr. Maret did not leave Paris till the *twenty-sixth* of January, appears from a comparison of the following passages in the *Memoirs of Dumouriez*: “Le départ de Maret fut retardé assez mal à propos, et n'eut lieu que le jour même du départ du Général.” *Le Général Dumouriez partit le 26 Janvier.*” Tom. I. p. 133, 134. He says the same also, p. 142. Again he says of himself, p. 39, arrivé dans la capitale le premier Janvier: and p. 94, le Général Dumouriez traita les affaires pendant les *vingt-sept* jours qu'il a passés à Paris. This precise determination of the day, when Mr. Maret left Paris, is of great importance, as will appear in the sequel.

(69) All that is here said of Mr. Maret, after his arrival in England, is grounded on the authentic relation

resolution of writing to Le Brun, to demand fresh instructions, probably (as he was now in England, and recollected his former favourable reception with Mr. Pitt) with the view of acting for himself: for we have seen that, when he left Paris, he had no other commission, than to pave the way for Dumouriez. (70) But, whatever was his mo-

of Mr. Miles, who was an intimate friend of Mr. Maret, who saw him every day during his stay in London, and at whose house Mr. Maret appears to have lodged, as Mr. Miles in a letter, which he had lately written to him, had said, *venez donc sans crainte, descendez chez moi, et considérez ma maison comme la votre.* Authentic Correspondence, Appendix, p. 109. Mr. Miles's relation is given in the just-mentioned work, p. 101—104, and contains partly facts, to which he himself was eye-witness, and partly facts, for which, as he expressly attests, he had Mr. Maret's own authority. Consequently, all random reports, which agree not with Mr. Miles's relation, must be declared fabulous.

(70) See Notes 62, 63. Mr. Miles likewise represents Mr. Maret's mission as only *preparatory to the projected embassy of Dumouriez.* Authentic Correspondence, p. 102.

tive, whether he really intended to act for himself, or whether the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, whom he met on the road, suggested to him the necessity of an alteration in his instructions relative to Dumouriez, it is certain that he *did* write, and in very pressing terms, for fresh instructions, and, moreover, that he declared, in his letter to Le Brun, "*that he should not desire an interview with the English Minister, until fresh instructions arrived.*" (71) As soon as he had written to Le Brun, he went immediately from Dover to London: but having determined to demand no interview, or to discuss any matters of state, till his fresh instructions should arrive, he did not make any overture to the British Ministry, even in regard to the embassy of Dumouriez. It is true, that he sent a short note to Lord Grenville: but this note contained nothing more than the notification, "*that he had come over to take*

(71) *Ib.*

charge of the diplomatic papers in the house of the French Envoy." (72) In the mean time he waited for his fresh instructions from Le Brun, which he had so pressingly solicited: yet, though he staid in London *eight days*, (73) and, therefore, at least, till the *fourth* of February, (74) he not only received not the expected instructions, but not even a *single line or direction*. (75) But on the

(72) Ib.

(73) Mr. Miles expressly says, p. 102. "His stay in London was *eight days*."

(74) It has been already shewn that Mr. Maret left Paris on the 26th of January. He could not possibly, therefore, have reached London before the 28th. Consequently, as he staid *eight days* there, we cannot fix his departure at an earlier day than the *fourth* of February, even if we include, likewise, the day of his arrival. But as Mr. Miles says, p. 103, that they took leave of each other at midnight, he departed, at the *soonest*, in the night between the fourth and the fifth of February.

(75) This, says Mr. Miles, p. 103, Mr. Maret expressly declared at the time of their taking leave.

fourth

fourth of February, the declaration of war, which had taken place on the first, was known in London: and after that time it was useless to think of negotiations. Mr. Maret, therefore, sent a letter to Lord Grenville, to take leave, and returned to Paris.—
(76) Thus ended the celebrated mission of Mr. Maret, which would afford an additional proof, if additional proof were necessary, that the French Government was determined, at all events, to avoid a reconciliation

(76) This letter, and the above-mentioned note, constituted the whole of Mr. Maret's negotiation, if it can be so called. Mr. Miles's own words, p. 103, where he speaks of the above-mentioned note, are: "This was all the intercourse that passed, and all the communication that was made to any of his Majesty's Ministers, except a letter which was sent by Mr. Maret at the instant of his final departure from London."—Mr. Pitt, likewise, on the 12th of February, 1793 (See the Parliamentary Debates), declared in the House of Commons, *that Mr. Maret, during his whole stay in London, had proposed to his Majesty's Ministers no questions of state whatsoever.*

with

with Great Britain : for, otherwise, it would not have refused to grant to an agent who was already on the spot, to an agent with whom Mr. Pitt had already expressed a readiness to negotiate, the instructions which that agent required. A compliance, however, with Mr. Maret's request was not to be expected, since, among the members of the Executive Council, Claviere, Pache, and Monge, were from the very beginning inimical to the whole negotiation, and Le Brun, though he did not declare himself against it, secretly counteracted its operation. (77)

(77) On Mr. Maret's mission to England at the end of January, 1793, were propagated as many false reports as on the conference which he had holden with Mr. Pitt in December: and these false reports, in defiance of Mr. Pitt's declaration in the House of Commons on the 12th of February, 1793, have been adopted and repeated by his adversaries, both writers and orators, as unquestionably true. Immediately after the passage, which has been quoted in Ch. xiii. Note 32, relative to the pretended instructions of Mr. Maret on the
the

While Mr. Maret was in London, in vain expecting instructions from the Executive

the former occasion, is added. "As the first mission of

"Mr. Maret was, however, not attended with any ef-

"fect, he was sent again from the Executive Council

"with *enlarged powers*. It was asserted, at that time,

"that his object was to propose to the British Ministry

"*the cession of some of the most valuable West India islands,*

"*and the annexing of the Netherlands to the Dutch re-*

"*public*, provided this arrangement should mutually

"prove agreeable to the States General and the Belgic

"Congress. Mr. Maret was, however, we believe,

"*never permitted to produce his credentials.*"—Now the

notion that the French Government was ready to give

up the Netherlands, and still more so, that it was ready

to abandon some of the most valuable of the West In-

dia islands, is in itself so absurd, and is so completely

contradicted by the avowed principles of the French

rulers, and by the notes which had been already de-

livered to Lord Grenville, that nothing but the height

of party prejudice could have induced any man, who

was the least acquainted with the history of the times,

to believe in it. And that Mr. Maret really had no

such instructions, is evident, not only from the relation

of Mr. Miles, but from the account given by Du-

mouriez himself, who represents Mr. Maret as a per-

son sent merely to pave the way for *his* reception. To

the

Council, the British Government received the intelligence from Lord Auckland, that

the passages already quoted may be added Mr. Miles's declaration, p. 103, that *Mr. Maret had very little to say*: and what *that little* was has been shewn in the notes 63, 64. As to the assertion, that he never was permitted to produce his credentials, we have already seen,

that even if he had any, he never once *offered* to produce them. To the passages above-quoted may be added the following declaration of Mr. Miles, p. 101.

"That all intercourse with him was refused by the King's servants, I positively deny, and for the best of all possible reasons, because *it had never been solicited*."

"On the same authority that I contradicted the former assertion, I deny this: *the authority of Mr. Maret*,

"who may, certainly, be allowed to know as much of the matter as those who, on such little foundation, have repeatedly urged it in Parliament, &c." Even,

therefore, if the report had been true, that Mr. Maret was authorized to make advantageous proposals, yet as none *were* made, nor even *offered* to be made, no blame could have attached to the British Ministry. Lastly, as

to the notion, which was likewise propagated with great assiduity, that Mr. Maret, as soon as he landed in England, received an order from Government to quit the country, a notion, which even Dumouriez, (who after the 26th of January, 1793, never returned to

Paris,

De Maulde was arrived at the Hague, and had proposed a negotiation between his Lordship and General Dumouriez. Now, though the conduct, both of the National Convention and of its Executive Council,

Paris, never again saw Mr. Maret, and, therefore, had no certain intelligence of what happened to him in England) has credulously adopted from the rumours of the day, it is confuted at once by the indisputable fact, that Mr. Maret remained eight days in London, and till after the intelligence arrived of the declaration of war.—It is true, that since the publication of the *Authentic Correspondence*, by Mr. Miles, in the year 1796, no one has ventured to say any thing more about Mr. Maret and his pretended instructions: but as, on the other hand, I know of no one who, having related those idle reports as indisputable facts, has afterwards had the generosity to inform his readers or hearers, that those reports are the mere inventions of party malevolence, and as the *Authentic Correspondence* does not appear to be so generally known, as a work of such high importance deserves, the above-quoted extracts from it are not superfluous, because not every one, who had heard of those reports, has likewise heard of their confutation.

had been uniformly such, as demonstrated the firm resolution of the French rulers to engage in a war with Great Britain, and, consequently, the improbability, if not impossibility, that they seriously intended to effect a reconciliation; yet the British Government, to avoid the reproach which would have resulted from a refusal, immediately consented to the negotiation, and authorized Lord Auckland to treat with General Dumouriez. (78) On the receipt of his instructions, Lord Auckland dispatched a courier to the General, who was then at Antwerp, and proposed the tenth of February for the day of holding the first conference. (79) But no conference, whatsoever took place: for the National Convention, which, instead of awaiting the issue of the negotiation, resolved from the very beginning to

(78) See the *Mémoires de Dumouriez*, tom. i. p. 143.

(79) *Ib.*

pay not the least attention to it, (80) had already, on the first of February, unani-

(80) What little attention the French Government paid to the negotiation even from the beginning of it, may be collected from the circumstance, *that it was on the very day on which the proposal was made to the British Minister at the Hague, that the order was issued to lay an embargo on all British vessels in the French ports.* (See Lord Grenville's speech in the House of Lords on the 12th of February, 1793.) What a contrast does this conduct form with the behaviour of the British Government, which consented to the proposal of Dumouriez, though the intelligence of the embargo arrived in London on the very same day with the first courier from Lord Auckland. (See Mr. Pitt's speech in the House of Commons on the 12th of February.) It requires, therefore, a more than usual want of either knowledge or of integrity to represent, on the one hand, the French Government as candid and solicitous for peace, and to accuse the British Government, on the other hand, of duplicity and a desire for war. The authentic documents, which have been produced in the present work, sufficiently demonstrate that the charge must be inverted. Indeed the question may be fairly asked: Is it possible that men of talents and reading,

mously decreed war against Great Britain and Holland.

professed speakers or writers on political subjects, should have remained wholly ignorant of all these documents? But if they were not, how could they venture to set them at open defiance, to substitute romance for history, and calumny for justice?

CHAP. XVI.

State of Parties in France at the Beginning of the Year 1793. Junction of Robespierre's Party with that of Brissot, on the Subject of the War with Great Britain. The Decree for War voted without one dissenting Voice. Eighteen Pretexts alleged in Justification of it. Confutation of those Pretexts. General Recapitulation, and Conclusion.

THE two great parties, into which the National Convention was divided at the beginning of the year 1793, were headed, the one by Robespierre, the other by Brissot. The former were denominated sometimes by the name of Jacobins, at other

times by the appellation of Anarchists; (1) the latter, though originally only a younger branch of the Jacobin family, had assumed the title of Girondists, because many of the members of it were from the department of the Gironde; and they were distinguished likewise by the title of Brissotines, from the name of their leader. (2) The principal members of the Girondist party were men of talents and education; whereas the Jacobins, though many of them were not devoid of natural abilities, were, for the most part, unlettered enthusiasts. The one had been educated in the school of French philosophy, and in the tenets of the encyclopedists; the

(1) This last title was usually given them by their opponents.

(2) Beside these two *great* parties, there were indeed some inferior factions and subdivisions; but they were either of no importance, or they arranged themselves under the standards of the two principal parties.

other had learnt no other maxims than those which were suggested by anarchy and brutal violence. In regard to morality, there was this only difference between them, that the Jacobins set all honour and religion at *open* defiance, while the Girondists, who in their hearts possessed as little of either, had acquired from their education the habit of concealing their sentiments, and of veiling their iniquity under the mask of probity. The former were the Iconoclasts; the latter, the Jesuits of the revolution.

These two parties had divided the power of France since the deposition of the King, and had been engaged in one continual struggle for the supreme ascendancy. But on the subject of the war with Great Britain and Holland they formed a perfect junction, (3) and were animated with simi-

(3) "Les deux factions se réunirent, pour prendre sans réflexion, sans délibération, sans discussion, le

lar principles and similar desires. The motives to this war, which have been assigned in the fourteenth chapter, operated equally on every member of the Convention, and the hope of ruining the ancient rival of France smothered for a while their habitual animosity; nay, so completely unanimous were the members of the Convention on this occasion, that though seven members, out of the seven hundred and fifty, had voted against the war with Austria, yet the war with Great Britain and Holland was decreed *without one dissenting voice*. (4) Equally remarkable is it, that this union of the two parties was soon converted into the most violent enmity; for, no sooner did they

partie le plus violent et le plus téméraire."—Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 143.

(4) On demande de toutes parts à aller aux voix. Le décret est porté à l'unanimité.—Moniteur 3d. Feb. 1793.

and themselves disappointed in their expectations of the conquest of Holland, as a preparatory step to the conquest of England; no sooner had Dumouriez, instead of carrying all before him, as in the preceding campaign, been obliged, by the defeat at Neerwinden, to abandon the Austrian Netherlands, than they began to make each other the most bitter reproaches. “Who
 “ was it that provoked the war? the *Anarchists* alone;—yet *they* lay the charge
 “ to *our* door,” said Brissot in his address to his constituents. (5) And not only was

(5) “ Qui donc a *provoqué* cette guerre? Les *Anarchistes* seuls! Et cependant ils nous en font un crime,” Brissot à ses Commettans, p. 71.—Dumouriez likewise, though he had left the party of the Jacobins, says of Brissot and Le Brun, “ Ils ont, l’un et l’autre, *provoqué* la déclaration de guerre contre l’Angleterre et la Hollande.” Vie de Dumouriez, tom. iii. p. 385. He does not, however, confine the blame to the Girondists alone, for he ascribes an equal share of it to the Jacobins. “ Quant à Brissot, il profitait de l’occa-

the accusation reciprocal, but the means which each party adopted to render the other odious to the nation, in consequence of the declaration of war, were equal. For Brissot asserted that the Anarchists or Jacobins were instruments in the hands of foreign powers, (6) while the same ridiculous charge was laid by the Anarchists to Brissot. (7) But as the Girondists, through

fion, pour insulter, comme à son ordinaire, les rois et les peuples ; *en quoi il était bien secondé par Barrere, et par le parti des Jacobins.*"—Mémoires de Dumouriez, tom. i. p. 143.

(6) He calls them (A les Commettans, p. 58) ces meneurs, qui sciemment ou insciemment étaient *les instrumens des puissances étrangères.*

(7) They gave him the title of Allié de Pitt. See what was said on this subject in Ch. i. Note 6.—In fact the two parties were so liberal in the application of these titles, that even the monster Robespierre was called a *Royalist* ; for a philippic published by Louvet, who was of the Gironde party, was entitled, A Maximilien Robespierre et à ses *Royalistes.*

causes

causes which it would be foreign to the present history to investigate, (8) were soon

(8) The author of a popular pamphlet, published in the year 1797, ascribes, with his usual accuracy, the fall of Brissot, and the ascendancy of Robespierre, to the part which Brissot took in the declaration of hostilities, a part which this author himself cannot deny, though he endeavours to palliate it by saying, "the part that *even* Brissot, &c." He had probably never heard that Robespierre voted for the war with England, as well as Brissot; that in this respect, therefore, they were *perfectly equal*; and, consequently, that the fall of the one, and the ascendancy of the other, must be owing to some other cause. He had heard, probably, the exclamations of the victorious party alone, which overwhelmed the exclamations of the conquered party; not because they had a greater share of justice on their side, but merely because they were victorious. A minute investigation of the causes, which gave the Jacobins the advantage over the Girondists, lies, as already observed, without the limits of the present history; but, perhaps, it will not be superfluous, cursorily to remark, that the two following were the principal. First, the wavering and inconsistent

overpowered by the opposite party, it was the natural consequence that they alone

sistent conduct of the Girondists on the trial of the King; for, though the principal members of this party voted, with only one or two exceptions, for his death, they insisted that, before he was executed, the sentence should be confirmed by the primary assemblies. But in this attempt they failed, and thus they gave the advantage out of their own hands, of which the Jacobins, who were *consistent* in their infamy, and exposed, therefore, no weak side to their adversaries, knew how to make a proper use; for, in a struggle between two unprincipled parties, that party which goes the greatest length will generally succeed. The other grand cause of the ascendancy of the Jacobins was, their almost unlimited influence at the beginning of the year 1793 over the sections of the city of Paris, which at that time were vested with so much power, that the party supported by them was certain of governing the whole nation. This influence the Jacobins acquired partly by their intrigues, which enabled them to fill the principal offices in the sections with their own creatures, and partly by the system of terrorism, in which the Federates, as they were called, rendered

suffered for the common crime (9); and Brissot, with his associates, ended his life on rendered them essential service. Prepared in this manner, the Jacobins found no difficulty, in the spring of 1793, of overthrowing their adversaries, even on the most futile pretext. But cause and pretext are very frequently confounded by superficial observers, especially if he who uses the pretext is successful. It is not extraordinary, therefore, that, during the long reign of Robespierre and his associates, the notion that they were innocent in regard to the war with England was gradually propagated, and adopted by superficial writers, who knew not that the war was *unanimously* decreed. On the other hand it must be admitted, that Opposition writers act with perfect consistency, in endeavouring to remove the blame of the war from any party in France; because if they could succeed in the attempt, they would find it so much the more easy to transfer the blame to the British Government.

(9) When the Jacobins brought Brissot with his associates to the bar, one of the principal charges laid to him was, *that he had involved France in a war with England*; to which Brissot very properly replied, *it was the Assembly of the Nation, not I, who decreed the war.*

the scaffold, while Robespierre and his accomplices ascended the throne. (10) Which of the two parties was most deserving of the guillotine it is unnecessary at present to examine : but thus much at least is obvious, that the reciprocal accusation of having involved France in a war with Britain, is a tacit acknowledgment from *both* parties, that not to the British, but to the French Government alone its origin must be assigned.

The proposal of it in the Convention fell to the lot of Brissot ; not because Brissot was more inclined to a war with England than Robespierre, but solely because Brissot happened to be at that time the orator of the Diplomatic Committee, and of the

See the *Moniteur*, October 27th, 1793. Supplement, 2de. feuille. But this argument could not prevail against the *jus fortioris*.

(10) *Committunt eadem diverso crimina fato ;
Ille crucem sceleris pretium tulit, hic diadema.*

Com-

Committee of General Defence, which two united Committees the National Convention on the 30th of January had ordered to present within two days a report relative to Great Britain, (11) or, as the Committees well understood, to propose a declaration of war. And it cannot be denied, that the orator of the Committees executed his commission with fidelity; for his whole speech contained one continued invective against the British Government, which undoubtedly gratified the ears of the whole Assembly. (12) As soon as he had ended his speech,

(11) *Moniteur*, 31st January 1793.

(12) His speech is printed at full length in the *Moniteur*, 2d February, 1793. The following passage may serve as a specimen. “La nation Anglaise une fois éclairée par notre exemple, fera justice aussi de ses conspirateurs en place. La comédie de l'éternel procès de Hastings ne se renouvellera plus, et les échaffauds serviront encore une fois aux Straffords et aux Lauds du régime actuel, comme aux simples brigands.” But unfortunately for this Allié de Pitt, who spoke

he completed the execution of his trust by proposing, in the name of the Committees, a declaration of war against Great Britain and Holland. Ducos seconded the motion: (13) and, as no one in the whole Assembly spoke against it, the cry of *vote, vote*, resounded from every quarter, and the war was immediately decreed without one dissenting voice. (14) Further, as the favourite maxim of the French rulers, "the governed must be excited to rebel against their governors," never forsakes them, was voted, on the proposal of Fabre d'Eglantine, and on the recommendation of Barrere, an address to the English nation, spoke so respectfully of his friends, the prophecy, like most other prophecies of the French rulers, was fulfilled only in the prophet himself.

(13) The speech of Ducos, which was delivered in the same strain with that of Brissot, is printed in the *Moniteur* of the 3d of February.

(14) See Note 4.

which

which was ordered to be drawn up by Barrere, Fabre d'Eglantine, Condorcet, and Thomas Paine. (15)

But as the real causes of the war, which have been assigned in the fourteenth chapter, were not such as had justice on their side, it was deemed expedient to seek a number of pretexts, which might palliate the aggression with the unthinking populace, and furnish their advocates with sophistical arguments in their defence. Nor were their endeavours in this respect unsuccessful; for they were so fortunate as to discover not less than *eighteen* pretexts, (16) all of which, however, were of such a nature, that no rational Council of State, unless other motives had operated, would have been induced by them to a declaration of war. The first article is of general import,

(15) *Moniteur*, 3d February 1793.

(16) *Ib.*

and contains the charge, that the British^e Government, after the 10th August 1792, had given many indications of being ill-affected toward France: and in the seventeen following articles the particular actions are specified, chiefly in chronological order, in which this evil disposition was supposed to have displayed itself. (17) These seventeen articles, therefore, must be particularly examined.

The first of them relates to the recall^d of the British Ambassador from Paris on the 17th of August: but this charge has been already repelled in the ninth chapter. In the second article is asserted, that the Bri-

(17) It is to be observed, that even the sophistry of the National Convention was unable to discover any pretext for accusing the British Government, before the 10th of August, 1792, whence it appears that the advocates of the French have gone still greater lengths than their clients themselves.

. tish Government had, ever since the 10th
 of August, suspended all communication
 with Mr. Chauvelin. Now this charge is
 absolutely false, as is evinced by the nego-
 ciation described in the thirteenth chapter.
 It was only *official* communication with
 Mr. Chauvelin which had been suspended,
 of which the fault had not lain with the
 British Government; for it was the depo-
 sition of the King of France which rendered
 Mr. Chauvelin's former credentials of no
 value, and it was not before the 17th of Ja-
 nuary, when the question of war or peace
 was already decided, that he had even of-
 fered to produce new credentials. The
 third and fourth articles relate to the re-
 fusal of the British Government, to ac-
 knowledge the French Republic in the
 person of Mr. Chauvelin, a refusal which
 has been already justified in the preceding
 chapter. In the fifth, sixth, seventh, and
 eighth articles, complaints are made about

the acts of parliament, mentioned at the end of the eleventh chapter, where it has likewise been shewn that those complaints are ungrounded. In the ninth article the British Government is accused of having given a reception to French emigrants, as if hospitality to persons in distress were a crime. And this charge, in another respect, ill became those who had not only from the very commencement of the French Revolution uniformly encouraged and corresponded with the disaffected party in England, (18) but on the 28th of November had received, with every mark of friendship and every token of applause, the addressees of those societies, who on that day signified their intention of overturning the British Constitution. Besides, whatever might be the private views of the French

(18) See the documents on this subject in Rivington's Annual Register for 1793, Part. II. p. 128—155. The first has so early a date as Nov. 4, 1789.

emigrants, who were permitted to reside in England, it is a known fact that they were not permitted to act an open part, or to assemble in a military corps, till after the declaration of war: whereas the French Executive Council had not only already formed the Dutch patriots, to the amount of ten thousand, into a separate legion, but had placed them on the frontiers of Holland, as a preparatory step to its invasion. It required, therefore, more than usual audacity, to accuse the British Government of having granted an asylum to the French emigrants. Another charge in the ninth article relates to the emigrants from the island of St. Domingo. Now it is undoubtedly true, that even before the close of 1791, a great part of the French colonists in the island of St. Domingo, highly dissatisfied with the conduct of the National Assembly, to which they justly ascribed the insurrection of the negroes, sincerely wished to submit the co-

only to the crown of Britain, and that several of the colonists came to London, with the view of inducing Ministers to send out an armament and take possession of the country. But equally certain is it, that the British Government, true to the principles of neutrality, which it had determined to maintain, rejected the offer, and that no attention was paid to the colonists till after war had been declared. (19) Its upright conduct, therefore, deserved not the censure, but the thanks of the National Conven-

(19) The words of Mr. Bryan Edwards, whose authority on this subject is not to be questioned, and who certainly cannot be accused of an unjust partiality in favour of Administration, are as follow: "To these representations *no attention at that time was given*; but at length, *after* the National Assembly had thought proper to declare war against Great Britain, the English Ministry *began* to listen with some degree of complacency to the overtures, which *were again made.*" *Historical Survey of St. Domingo*, p. 140.

tion. (20) The three following articles relate to the naval preparations in England, the necessity of which has been so fully demonstrated in the eleventh chapter, that it would be a waste of time to say any thing further on the subject. They contain also a complaint, that certain friends in England were ill treated by the Government. Now, though it cannot be denied, that the measures taken by the British Government to counteract the machinations of those who acted in concert with the National Convention, necessarily gave offence to that venerable body, yet in converting those measures into a subject of complaint, it really outdid its *usual* outdoings. In the thirteenth article a complaint was made about the English ships which had been sent to Flushing at the beginning of January: and it was

(20) This is not the only instance in which the integrity of the British Cabinet has been strangely abused, and that not by the French alone.

made under the pretence that those ships had been sent "to disturb the operations of France in Belgia." (21) But it has been shewn in the preceding chapter, (22) that the object of the squadron was merely to act on the defensive, and, in case of an attack on the part of France, to protect the coast of Zealand. The presence of this squadron was likewise absolutely necessary; for on the 10th of January the attack on Zealand had been already ordered by the Executive Council, but was abandoned in consequence of the obstacles which this very squadron presented to the undertaking. (23) The charge, therefore, brought in the thirteenth article is totally without

(21) Pour troubler les opérations de la France dans la Belgique.

(22) Note 21.

(23) See Miranda's letter on this subject quoted in Ch. xv. Note 46.

foundation.

foundation. (24) The fourteenth article relates to the dismissal of Mr. Chauvelin, a

(24) A celebrated Opposition writer has objected to the assistance sent to the Dutch, on *another* ground, namely, that it was sent without being previously requested by the Dutch Government. Now whether Baron Nagel, the Dutch Ambassador in London, formally demanded of Lord Grenville the succour stipulated by the treaty of 1788, is a question which I cannot determine by official documents, as the communications which passed between Lord Grenville and Baron Nagel have never been laid before the public: though I have been informed from very good authority, that the Dutch Ambassador really did make the demand, but requested that it might be kept a secret, lest the bare act of concerting measures of defence should be distorted by the National Convention into a combination *against* France, and thus expose the Dutch to a still greater danger than that with which they were already threatened, when the demand was made: and that the Dutch Government, whose preservation depended on the co-operation of England, really did make the demand is so highly probable in itself, that it seems to be unnecessary to attempt a proof of it. Be this, however, as it may, it is cer-

subject which has been fully discussed in the preceding chapter, where it has been proved,

tain that the States General had formally declared to the British Ambassador at the Hague on the 16th of November, 1792, *that nothing could more effectually conduce to the happiness and mutual interests of the two nations, than the continuance of that intimate union which had been established between them:* and equally certain is it, that fourteen days afterward they formally protested against the opening of the Scheldt. See Ch. ix. After these declarations the States General might certainly expect, that, as soon as the United Provinces were in real danger of an invasion, the British Government would fulfil its duty to its ally, without being further reminded of it: and no one can deny, that when the squadron in question, which was the first succour sent to the Dutch,⁶ arrived off the coast of Zealand, that province was threatened with very imminent danger. Further, that the arrival of the British ships was agreeable to the desire (whether formally expressed or not) of the States General, is evident from the circumstance, that Dutch ships of war were ordered to join them. See Ch. xv. Note 41. And this very junction was made a subject of complaint against the Stadtholder in the National Convention, when

that though it may find a place in a view of the *pretex*ts for the war, it can have no place

when war was declared against Great Britain and Holland. See the *Moniteur*, 3d February, 1793. Lastly, after the war was openly declared, and the States General had ceased to be under the influence of the motive alleged above, they declared to the whole world, in an official note presented to Lord Auckland on the 20th of March, their sincere desire that the British Government would make *their* cause its own. The notion, therefore, that we assisted the Dutch without being desired to do so, is ungrounded.

But suppose, for the sake of argument, it were true, that the States General had neither directly nor indirectly, neither on the 16th of November nor at any other time, signified a desire of assistance, yet the protection of Holland was a duty which Great Britain owed to itself, if not to its ally. When two houses are so connected, that the one cannot be destroyed without endangering the fall of the other, and the master of the latter, while his neighbour is asleep, sees an enemy approaching to destroy the house of the former, he would certainly be considered as a downright idiot if he determined to wait till his neighbour awakened

in a view of the *causes* of it. In the fifteenth article the British Government is accused of an attachment to the traitor, as he is there called, Louis XVI, and of having given orders, immediately after his execution, to augment the preparations both by sea and by land. Now of the attachment to Louis XVI, it has been shewn in the preceding chapter that the British Government remained perfectly neutral, that it did not even intercede for him, and that it took no other part than that which every honest awakened and demanded assistance. Nothing, therefore, could be more absurd than the reproach made to the British Government of having sent succour to the Dutch, even if the premises on which the reproach is founded were true. Besides, what shews the inconsistency of the Opposition party on the 15th of March, 1793, in a debate relative to the succour by land, which was not sent till *after* the declaration of war, it was objected to Ministers, that the measures for the defence of Holland were not taken *sooner*. See the New Annual Register for 1793, British and Foreign History, p. 75.

man

- man must take in the cause of an innocent sufferer. And in regard to the augmentation of the military preparations which was ordered in the latter part of January, it was the necessary result of the refusal which had been made by the Executive Council, to accept the conditions of peace proposed by the British Government. In the sixteenth article the British Government is accused of having entered into a treaty of alliance with the Emperor, during the month of January which was just elapsed. But this charge is absolutely false; for since the 10th of August, 1790, two years and a half therefore before the declaration of war, Great Britain had made no treaty whatsoever with Austria; and even that treaty was nothing more than a Convention relative not to France but to the Austrian Netherlands. (25) In the interval, which

(25) Marten's *Receuil des Principaux Traités*, t. iii. p. 342.

elapsed between the 10th of August, 1790, and the 1st of February, 1793, not even a forged treaty between England and Austria has ever been produced, though the history of the last ten years furnishes many examples of the kind: nor is it possible that the genuine treaty, had any such existed, should have remained to this very hour a profound secret. But what puts the matter out of all doubt is the positive declaration of Lord Grenville in the House of Lords, and of Mr. Pitt and Mr. Dundas in the House of Commons, on the 12th of February, 1793, who, in consequence of the charge brought by the National Convention, were called upon to explain themselves, and all three solemnly declared that no such treaty existed. (26) The seventeenth and last article contains a falsehood which is equally gross with the preceding:

(26) See the Parliamentary Debates of that day.

for it is there said that the British Government had drawn the Stadtholder into a coalition against France. (27) Now it is true that the British Government acted in concert with the Government of Holland: but it has been so fully demonstrated, that all its measures were purely defensive, that it would be an affront to the reader to add another syllable on the subject.

The History of the Politicks of Great Britain and France, from the time of the conference at Pillnitz to the declaration of war against Great Britain, is now brought to a conclusion. The principles and the conduct of the two Governments, during this im-

(27) This charge has been echoed even in England by a well-known Opposition writer, who has ventured to assert, that "*we* involved Holland in all the horrors of war."—If by *we* he means the British Government, the assertion is confuted by every page of the present history.

portant

portant and decisive period, have been delineated with historical accuracy, the representation has been every where founded on authentic documents, and every assertion has been supported by unquestionable testimony. In the narration of the manifold events, strict attention has been paid to the order of time, the relation between cause and effect has been thus uniformly preserved, and hence every action has been traced up to its real source. Nothing of the least importance, whether favourable or unfavourable to either party, has been omitted: no fact, however disadvantageous to the British Cabinet it might appear, when considered by itself, has been suppressed, and on the other hand, every thing which, under the same circumstances, appears advantageous to the French rulers, has been scrupulously observed. Consequently, the measures adopted by the two parties
being

being completely represented, and placed as it were in parallel, they appear in their true light. Lastly, the account which has been given both of the actions and the declarations of the French rulers, has not been derived from a second-hand source, but has been *immediately* taken from their own writings, and their own official journals, from which there lies no appeal. Nothing, therefore, now remains than to bring the heads of the preceding history, of which the vouchers have been already given into one view, in order to enable the public to decide with greater facility on the grand question: Who were the aggressors?

1. In the celebrated conference at Pillnitz in August, 1791, the British Government took not the most distant part: and if any treaty was concluded there, which is itself a matter of great doubt, the British
Govern-

Government not only never acceded to it, but was never apprised even of its contents. Further, when the British Government was requested in 1791 to join a coalition against France, it gave a positive and unequivocal refusal. (28)

2. Toward the close of the same year the valuable colony of St. Domingo was preserved to France by the timely assistance sent by Lord Effingham, then Governor of Jamaica; and the British Cabinet signified through its Ambassador at Paris to the French Government, that it fully approved of Lord Effingham's conduct. At the same time, true to the strictest principles of honour and neutrality, it refused the advantageous offer made by the French colonists, who were highly dissatisfied with the National Assembly, to surrender the French

part of St. Domingo to the Crown of Britain. And these acts of generosity were repaid by France with the utmost ingratitude. (29)

3. When Louis XVI. formally accepted the new constitution, in September, 1791, and sent circular letters to the different Courts of Europe signifying his assent, the Court of Great Britain was one of the first which returned an answer; and the answer was couched in very respectful terms, whereas some other courts either did not answer at all, or in a manner displeasing to the National Assembly. Yet, on the other hand, an event took place about this very time, which shewed how very little the National Assembly cared about the neutrality of Great Britain. (30)

(29) Ch. ii.

(30) Ch. iii.

4. When Parliament assembled in January, 1792, the British Cabinet was so far from displaying any hostile views, that it was proposed, in his Majesty's speech, to make an immediate reduction of the forces both by sea and by land. The number of seamen and marines, to be employed that year, was accordingly diminished to sixteen thousand: it was determined that the Hessian subsidy, which then expired, should not be renewed: the British land forces were likewise reduced: and taxes to the amount of two hundred thousand pounds were abolished. Yet at this very time the National Assembly took measures for a very considerable augmentation of the French marine; measures which, had they been taken in England, would have been represented in France as acts of hostility. But our Ministers did not suffer themselves to be disturbed in their system of neutrality. (31)

5. After

5. After France had declared war against Austria, on the 20th of April, 1792, the British Government proved, both by its actions and declarations, that it was determined to remain neutral in the contest between the two powers. The French Minister in London, Chauvelin, sent official information, on the 28th of April, to his Court, that the British Cabinet was resolved to preserve neutrality: and, on the 1st of May, the King of France wrote a letter of thanks to his Britannic Majesty, and acknowledged his obligations for the refusal to join the coalition. On the 15th of May, Mr. Chauvelin delivered a note, in which, after an attempt at a justification of the National Assembly in declaring war against Austria, the British Government was requested to forbid all British subjects to accept of commissions from any power which was hostile to France. This request was punctually complied with,

and a Royal proclamation to that purpose was issued on the 25th of May. At this friendly conduct the French Government again expressed its satisfaction. (32)

6. The proclamation of the 21st of May was a mere matter of national police, which the machinations then at work to overturn the British Constitution rendered absolutely necessary: it contained nothing which could give the least offence to the French Government, which was not even named in it: it contained no indications whatsoever of a hostile disposition to that country: nor did any such thought occur to the French Government, but, on the contrary, not only Mr. Chauvelin, in a note which he delivered three weeks afterward, but Le Brun himself, in the name even of the new government, in the month of Au-

gust, testified his conviction of the friendly disposition and conduct of the British Cabinet toward France. (33)

7. When the British Cabinet, on July 8, in answer to the proposal to act as mediator between France and the other Belligerent Powers; replied, that it could not do so, unless the mediation were requested by *all* the parties concerned, the refusal was so far from indicating a disposition to hostilities, that it proved the very reverse: and this is confirmed by Mr. Chauvelin's acknowledgment in his letter of July 17, and by the acknowledgment of Le Brun, in his note to Lord Gower. Besides, the mediation was requested in the name of the King of France, at a time when his authority was expiring: and though he was not *formally* deposed before the 10th of August, yet the events of the 20th of June

(33) Ch. vi.

had transferred the whole power of France, executive as well as legislative, to the National Assembly: and this assembly was so far from being solicitous for peace, as certain persons have very falsely, and very artfully, asserted, in order to throw the blame of the war on the British Government, that it was determined, at all events, to prosecute the war. (34)

8. When an alarm was spread in France, in July, 1792, in consequence of the sailing of five ships of the line, and a few frigates, from Portsmouth, merely to perform naval evolutions in the chanel, Mr. Chauvelin sent a note to his own Government, in which he testified the pacific dispositions of the British Cabinet, and even complained of the false notions which were entertained on this subject. On the 4th of August, Mr. Chau-

Chauvelin's note was read in the National Assembly: and it was declared that Mr. Chauvelin's testimony to the pacific dispositions of the British Cabinet was satisfactory. (35)

9. The recall of the British Ambassador from Paris, after the King had been dethroned, was no breach of neutrality toward France, either in itself, or in the manner in which it was conducted. As he had been accredited to the King, his letters of credence were become useless: and before a new diplomatic connexion could be formed, it was necessary first to know who was to govern France in future. But, at that time, all authorities were organized only provisionally: and, during the struggle of contending parties, it was most consistent with the principles of neutrality to await the issue of it. Besides, the letter of recall was couched in

such pacific and friendly terms, that Le Brun openly testified his approbation of it, and declared, in the National Assembly, that the British Ambassador had left a satisfactory testimony of the dispositions of his court. The pacific disposition of the British Court was further evinced by the decisive rejection of the invitation which was made at that very time, as it had been already in the preceding year, to join the coalition. (36) But that the Provisional Executive Council might not be wanting in etiquette; it immediately dispatched Mr. Noel with an order to Mr. Chauvelin to return to Paris. • Mr. Chauvelin, however, obtained a revocation of the order, in consequence of his making the following remonstrance; “that he was perfectly well with Mr. Fox, and some other members of Opposition, and that it would not be prudent in France to lose the fruits of

- his labour with these gentlemen, and their subsequent services, for a vain form of diplomatic etiquette." (37)

10. In the month of November, 1792, after the Dutchy of Savoy, the Austrian Netherlands, and a part of Germany, had been conquered, the French rulers threw off the mask, and declared to the whole world the revolutionizing system which they had hitherto only followed in the dark. Not only was it decreed, on the 19th of November, that all nations which chose to rebel against their governments should receive assistance from France, but, on the 28th of November, when deputies from certain British societies appeared at the bar of the National Convention, and signified their intention of overturning the British Constitution, they were received with applause from the whole As-

sembly, and were assured by the President himself, that the period was not far distant, when Frenchmen would come to congratulate the National Convention of Great Britain. After this declaration, it ought no longer to be a question : Who were the aggressors ? Further, toward the close of the year 1792, England was overrun with French emissaries, who were engaged in the plot for the overthrow of the British Constitution, and were supplied, for that purpose, with immense sums from the French Government. A considerable fleet also was fitted out in France three months before Great Britain even began to arm. (38)

11. When the British Parliament assembled in the month of December, in consequence of the danger with which the country was threatened from France, all the mea-

measures which were taken were purely defensive : and a war might have easily been avoided, had it been the will of the National Convention, and of the Executive Council. (39)

12. While measures were taking in Great Britain, in order to ward off the danger with which it was already threatened, the rulers of France continued to augment that danger : and, by a new series of injuries and insults proved their determination to engage in a war with Great Britain and Holland. By the decree of December 15, war was declared, not only on all kings, but on all nations, which refused to take up arms against them : and this decree, with that of November 10, was, in various ways, applied to Great Britain in particular. The Minister for Foreign Affairs threatened, in the Na-

tional Convention, an appeal to the British Nation, and the Marine Minister publicly proclaimed the design of a landing in Britain with fifty thousand caps of liberty. A new and very considerable addition was ordered to be made to the French ships already in commission, with the avowed view of acting against Great Britain: and, before the middle of January, the order was signed for the actual invasion of Holland. (40)

13. In the diplomatic communications between Great Britain and France, the British Ministers displayed no unwillingness to negotiate: and, though no negotiation could be considered at that time as strictly official, Mr. Chauvelin's credentials having been received from the deposed King of France, yet he was assured by Lord Grenville, that outward forms would be no hinderance to his

Britannic Majesty, whenever the question related to explanations which might be satisfactory and beneficial to both parties. Mr. Pitt, likewise, in a conference which he had with Mr. Maret, expressed his readiness to negotiate with Mr. Maret as a confidential person of the French Executive Council; but this Council not only refused to grant instructions to Mr. Maret, but forbade him even to converse with Mr. Pitt on political subjects. When the negotiation was conducted between Lord Grenville and Mr. Chauvelin, the notes which were delivered, on the part of the French Government, were so far from containing satisfactory explanations, that a firm resolution was avowed in them of continuing those very aggressions of which the British Government complained. And when, notwithstanding this avowal, the Executive Council endeavoured, by all the arts of sophistry, to impose a belief of its pacific intentions, its actions uniformly contradicted

its assertions. Nor was it ashamed to utter the most solemn declarations, even with the consciousness of their falsehood. Its whole mode of conducting the negotiation, betrayed as much insolence as hypocrisy: and an appeal to the people of Great Britain was threatened in the very first note. On the other hand, the conditions of peace, proposed by the British Government, had no reference whatsoever to any particular form of government in France; they related only to the external power of that country; they were absolutely necessary for the salvation of Britain, and were so far from being degrading to France, that they required only an adherence to that principle which the republican rulers had repeatedly declared to be the basis of their system of politicks. These conditions were rejected: and at the same time it was announced, that, if the preparations then making in the British ports (which had been ordered merely in self-defence,

fence, and which could not be possibly stopt, after the Executive Council had rejected the conditions, which alone could insure safety to Great Britain) were still continued, a declaration of war would be the consequence. It was no longer in the power, therefore, of the British Government to avoid a rupture with France. (41)

14. A war with Great Britain had been resolved on in the French Cabinet, not only before the negotiation was ended, but even before it commenced: and the object of the Executive Council was not to produce a reconciliation, but to amuse the British Government, and to deceive the nation, till the plan, which had been laid for the destruction of the British empire, was fully ripe for execution. The mad ambition of the French rulers, their determination to extirpate all

kingly governments, and the confident expectation of insurrections in every part of Europe, aided by the necessity of finding employment for their turbulent armies, were their motives to war in general : and their firm belief, that the inhabitants of Great Britain were so disaffected to their Government, that French assistance would induce them to an immediate revolt, the inconsiderable number of troops at that time in Great Britain, in comparison with those which could easily be spared from France, the forward state of the French navy, the persuasion that a landing on the British coast would be attended with no difficulty, and the immense advantages expected from the acquisition of the British wealth, commerce and marine, in the prosecution of their conquests on the continent, all these motives, added to the innate desire of crushing an ancient and formidable, but at that time despised rival, induced

duced them to a war with Great Britain in particular. (42)

15. The events of the last fourteen days, before the declaration of war, cannot possibly be numbered among the causes of it, because the war was already determined. As to the negotiation, attempted by General Dumouriez, it had no other object than to amuse the British and Dutch governments a little longer : and, though both governments gave their consent to it, the National Convention refused to await the issue of it, and declared war unanimously on Great Britain and Holland. (43)

16. The pretexts alleged by the National Convention, to justify the declaration of hos-

(42) Ch. xiv.

(43) Ch. xv.

tilities, were either futile or false, or were events, which had not taken place, till after a war with Great Britain and Holland had been resolved on. Lastly, though the two great parties in France, the Girondists and the Jacobins, formed a junction on the question of a war with Great Britain: yet, as soon as they found that it did not answer their expectations, they accused each other of having been the authors of it. And this mutual accusation is a tacit acknowledgment from both parties, that the blame did not attach to the British Government. (44)

After a statement of these premises, all of which have been proved in the preceding history by unanswerable documents, every shadow of doubt must be removed in regard to the origin of that war, which was declared by the National Convention on the 1st of

February, 1793. It was a war of aggression, of injury, and of insult, on the part of France, as well in the motives which gave it birth, as in the open declaration of it: and, on the part of Britain, it was just and necessary, as being strictly a war of self-defence.

APPENDIX.

• CONTAINING

A NARRATIVE OF THE ATTEMPTS MADE BY THE
• BRITISH GOVERNMENT TO RESTORE PEACE.

As the preceding History contains a full and unanswerable Proof that the War, which was declared against Great Britain in February, 1793, derived its Origin from the French Government alone, a plain and impartial Statement of the Attempts, which have been made to restore Peace, will equally prove, that the Continuance of the War can no more be ascribed to the British Government, than the Commencement of it.

AFTER hostilities had continued three years, and the arms of Britain had been crowned by sea with as much success

as the arms of France had been by land, the British Government formed the resolution in February, 1796, of making, at least, an attempt to restore that peace, which the mad ambition of the French Convention had wantonly broken. (1) The period in question

(1) It cannot be said that the French, on their part, had made any attempt to restore peace: for the note, signed by Le Brun on April 2, 1793, and delivered by a notary public to Lord Grenville (*New Annual Register*, 1793, *British and Foreign History*, p. 98), was nothing more than a new attempt to amuse and to deceive the British Government. In this note Le Brun, who, in the negotiation conducted by Mr. Chauvelin, had displayed the most shameful duplicity, who had acknowledged to Dumouriez his resolution to pay not the least regard to that negotiation, who had refused to await the issue of the conference with Lord Auckland, and had, moreover, twice refused to furnish Mr. Maret with instructions, presumed to notify to Lord Grenville an intention of sending the same Mr. Maret to London as a negotiator. Now, after the British Ministers had been so frequently and so shamefully deceived by Le Brun, they really must have been deficient in common sense, had they listened to his proposal of the 2d of April:

was well adapted to the purpose, if any thing short of irresistible force can induce the Directory of the *Great Nation* to make a general peace : for the armies both of General Pichegru and of General Jourdan had been lately obliged to yield to the Imperial troops, at that time victorious ; Mannheim had been retaken, the supposed impregnable lines before Mayntz had been forced, the right bank of the Rhine was again free, and Marshal Clairfayt had advanced a considerable distance on the other side. The intelligence, that the Cape of Good Hope had surrendered

April : and, after the irrefragable proofs of the hostile disposition of the National Convention toward Great Britain, they must have been struck with blindness, had they supposed that the Convention sincerely wished to live in peace and amity with Great Britain. But they clearly saw, that the only object of Le Brun's note was to gain time, as the invasion of Holland had already met with a considerable check, and to suspend the operations of Great Britain, in order that its intended destruction might be completed at a more convenient opportunity.

to the British arms was already known in Europe; Corsica was still in our possession; a British fleet commanded the Mediterranean; and Buonaparte did not yet stand at the head of a victorious army in Italy. An armistice of two months had been concluded between Austria and France, and thus a road had been opened, which, if the French Government had thought proper, might have led to a general peace.

Of these apparently favourable circumstances, the British Government resolved to avail itself; but as it was first necessary to know whether France, on her part, was equally disposed to peace, and as no direct communication subsisted between London and Paris, Mr. Wickham, Minister Plenipotentiary to the Swiss Cantons, was previously commissioned to demand of Mr. Barthelemi, the French Minister in Switzerland, an answer to the following questions, which

which he did in a note dated the 8th of March. (2)

1. "Is there the disposition in France to
"open a negotiation with his Majesty and
"his allies, for the re-establishment of a ge-
"neral peace upon just and suitable terms,
"by sending, for that purpose, Ministers to
"a congress, at such place as may hereafter
"be agreed upon?"

2. "Would there be the disposition to
"communicate to the undersigned the gene-
"ral grounds of a pacification, such as France
"would be willing to propose; in order that

(2) Mr. Wickham's note to Mr. Barthelemi is printed, in the French original, in the *Moniteur*, 21st April, 1796, where Mr. Barthelemi's answer is likewise printed. The English translation, of which a copy is here given, is that which was published by authority, together with the declaration of the British Court, on April 10, 1796.

"his

“ his Majesty and his allies might thereupon
“ examine in concert, whether they are such
“ as might serve as the foundation of a ne-
“ gotiation for peace ?

3. “ Or would there be a desire to pro-
“ pose any other way whatever, for arriving
“ at the same end, that of a general pacifi-
“ cation ? (3)

(3) It has been objected to this note, that the word *France* was used instead of *French Government*, and that this language was adopted, in order to avoid a formal acknowledgment of the French republic. Now, as the republican rulers of France had not only been the aggressors, but had uniformly acted with the utmost insolence toward the British Government, we were certainly not in so distressed a situation at the beginning of the year 1796, as to render it necessary to acknowledge, formally, that hostile republic, even before we knew whether its rulers would condescend to make peace with us. When it is further said, that the use of the word *France* was an insult, we may observe, that nothing is more common, than to use the name of a country, where, in strictness, the government alone can be understood.

At the same time Mr. Wickham informed Mr. Barthelemi, that he was hitherto commissioned only to propose these previous questions, and that he was not authorized to discuss the subjects of negotiation, which indeed he could not be, till it was known whether France would condescend to enter into a negotiation at all.

After having waited *eighteen days*, Mr. Wickham at length received an answer to the questions in a note from Mr. Barthelemi, dated Basel, 26th March.

understood. Mr. Chauvelin himself, whose authority will not be rejected by those who object to the note of Mr. Wickham, used the word *France* in the very same sense in which it is here used. The following passages, taken from the French original of his note to Lord Grenville, of Dec. 27, 1792, may serve as examples. *Si la France* doit regarder l'Angleterre, etc. Le moindre doute sur les dispositions de *la France* à l'égard de l'Angleterre, etc.—Non seulement *la France* doit et veut respecter l'indépendance de l'Angleterre, etc.—La pureté des intentions de *la France*, etc.

“The

“ The Directory ardently wishes to pro-
“ cure for the French republic a just, ho-
“ nourable and solid peace. The step taken
“ by Mr. Wickham would have afforded to
“ the Directory a real satisfaction, if the de-
“ claration itself, which that Minister makes,
“ of his not having any order, any power
“ to negotiate, did not give room to doubt
“ of the sincerity of the pacific intentions of
“ his court. (4) In fact, if it was true, that

(4) This passage very clearly proves, that the Directory was resolved to evade a negotiation; for had they been desirous of promoting it, they would not have used so wretched a pretext for throwing obstacles in the way at the very outset. That the pretext was a most wretched one is obvious. For how was it possible that the British Government, which had proposed not merely to negotiate for itself, but to include its allies, should draw up instructions for its Ambassador, which required a previous communication with those allies, when the place of congress had not been determined, and when it was neither known in what manner the Directory thought proper to negotiate, nor whether it chose to negotiate at all?

“ Eng-

“ England began to know her real interests,
 “ that she wished to open again for herself
 “ the sources of abundance and prosperity ;
 “ if she sought for peace, with good faith ; (5)
 “ would she propose a congress of which the
 “ necessary result must be to render all ne-
 “ gotiation endless ? (6) Or would she con-

(5) This insulting language again proved that the Directory was firmly resolved to admit no reconciliation with the British Government. For when two parties are at variance, and that party which had been first attacked, comes to the other and says, “ Let us in future be good friends ; ” the other party certainly would not answer, “ Sir, you are a hypocrite, ” unless he were still animated with the same hostile sentiments, which he had displayed from the beginning. There was likewise great artifice in the mode of reply ; it was calculated to excite discontents in England, by suggesting the notion, that the interests of the country had been wantonly sacrificed by its ministers : nor was the artifice, when aided by the co-operation of certain persons at home, wholly destitute of success.

(6) A congress will never render a negotiation endless, when *all* parties are sincerely desirous of peace ; and where this is not the case, a negotiation even be-

(between

“ fine herself to the asking in a vague man-
 “ ner, that the French Government should
 “ point out any other way whatever for at-
 “ taining the same object? (7)

“ Is it that this step has had no other object,
 “ than to obtain for the British Government

between two *single* powers will not advance very rapidly toward a happy conclusion. Besides, when *several* powers are engaged in war, and it is proposed to make a *general* peace, a congress, that is, a meeting of ambassadors from *all* the powers engaged, is the the usual, if not the only means of effecting the purpose. But it was not the policy of the French Directory to make peace with all the allied powers at the same time: and on the other hand, it was not consistent with the integrity of the present Ministers of Great Britain, to make a separate peace, and thus expose their allies to the mercy of the French.

(7) Here the Directory felt itself reduced to the necessity of taking refuge in nonsense. The questions, which had been proposed were simple, clear, and determinate, as it is possible for questions to be. But how could the British Government determine the answers, which is left to the decision of the Directory?

“ the

“ the favourable impression, which always
“ accompanies the first overtures for peace ?
“ May it not have been accompanied with
“ the hope, that they would produce no
“ effect ? (8)

“ However that may be, the Executive
“ Directory, whose policy has no other
“ guides than openness and good faith, (9)

(8) These highly insulting questions were very artfully introduced by the French Directors, in order to transfer all blame from themselves to the British Government. They were conscious of their own hypocrisy, and therefore endeavoured to obviate the charge, which might be made to them, by previously laying it at the door of their opponents. This is the usual finesse of the French rulers ; and it has been hitherto attended with great success.

(9) The openness and good faith of the present Directory are perfectly on a parallel with the openness and good faith, which had been displayed by the Executive Council, the nature of which has been fully represented in the thirteenth chapter of the preceding history.

“ will

“ will follow in its explanations a conduct,
“ which shall be wholly conformable to
“ them. Yielding to the ardent desire, by
“ which it is animated to procure peace for the
“ French republic, and for all nations, it will
“ not fear to declare itself openly. *Charged*
“ *by the constitution with the execution of the*
“ *laws, it cannot make or listen to any propo-*
“ *sals, that would be contrary to them: the*
“ *constitutional act does not permit it to consent*
“ *to any alienation of that which, according to*
“ *the existing laws, constitutes the territory of*
“ *the republic.* With respect to the countries
“ occupied by the French armies, and which
“ have not been united to France, they, as
“ well as other interests, political and com-
“ mercial, may become the subject of a ne-
“ gotiation, &c.”

By this declaration all negotiation was at once precluded: for it was demanded, as a preliminary article, from which it was resolved

solved in no case to deviate, that the French should retain almost all their conquests, and that the English should retain *none*.⁽¹⁰⁾ The expression, "that which according to the existing laws constitutes the territory of the republic," comprehended: 1. France, according to its ancient limits. 2. The countries which had been incorporated into France, namely; *a*) Avignon and the country of Venaissin; *b*) Mombeliard and Porrentru; *c*) The whole Dutchy of Savoy; *d*) Nice and Monaco; *e*) All the Austrian Netherlands; *f*) The principality of Liege; *g*) Dutch Flanders, Maestricht, Venlo, in short all that the Dutch had been obliged to cede to France. 3. The Spanish, as well as French part, of St. Domingo. 4. Guadeloupe. 5. The islands of Bourbon and Mauritius. 6. All the conquests which had been made by Great Britain, and were then

(10) Yet it has been said that the Note of the French Directory contained nothing which could prevent a continuance of the negotiation!

in our possession, namely ; *a)* Corfica ; *b)* Martinico, Tobago, with other islands in the West Indies ; *c)* Pondicherry and Chander-nagore in the East-Indies ; *d)* St. Pierre and Miquelon, at the mouth of the river St. Lawrence ; *e)* The islands of St. Marcou, on the coast of France. All this was to be granted to France, before the Directory would condescend even to enter upon the negotiation. But at the beginning of the year 1796, France was not in a situation which warranted so enormous a demand : nor was Great Britain in so distressed a situation, as to render the acceptance of it necessary. The British Government therefore very properly rejected it, and of course the attempt, which it had made to restore peace, failed of success. (11)

(11) It is a very false conclusion, which has been drawn, that the British Ministers did not wish for peace. It follows only, that they did not wish for peace *on such terms* ; and in that wish, surely the hearts of all true Britons must join them.

• But

But within six months after the first attempt had failed, the British Government determined to make a second, to which it was induced by the decisive victory of the Austrians at Amberg in the Upper Palatinate, on the 24th of August, 1796. This grand victory, which obliged the whole army of General Jourdan to retreat to the Rhine with great precipitation and disorder, was announced in the London Gazette of the sixth of September: (12) and *on this very day* Lord Grenville took the first step toward a new negotiation, in the hope that, as the Directory saw its project of subjugating the Emperor unsuccessful, it would at last consent to grant the blessings of peace to a suffering world. On the 6th of Sep-

(12) They who have not access to the London Gazette itself, need only consult any other paper of the following day. That which I have now before me is the Sun of Sept. 7, 1796, where a copy is given of the Gazette of Sept. 6.

tember, namely, Lord Grenville sent a note to Count Jarlsberg, the Danish Ambassador in London, (13) in which, as there was no direct communication between the British and French Governments, his Lordship requested him to forward an inclosed note, addressed to the French Government, dated likewise Sept. 6, and signed by Lord Grenville himself, (14) to the Danish Minister in

(13) Lord Grenville's note to Count Jarlsberg, with all the other notes belonging to the negotiation, were printed under the following title: "A correct copy of the papers relating to the negotiation between Great Britain and France, London, Dec. 29, 1796. As the notes are all numbered, I shall quote each by the number prefixed to it. Lord Grenville's Note to Count Jarlsberg is No. 1.

(14) It is printed No. 2. and is as follows: "His
 "Britannic Majesty, animated with the same desire,
 "which he has already manifested, to terminate by
 "just, honourable, and permanent conditions of peace,
 "a war which has extended itself throughout all parts
 "of the world, is willing to omit nothing on his part
 "which may contribute to this object. It is with this
 "view that he has thought it proper to avail himself of
 "the

Paris, to be by him communicated to the French Minister for Foreign Affairs. This inclosed note, in which the Directory was requested by the British Government to

“ the confidential intervention of the Ministers of a
 “ neutral power, to demand of the Executive Direc-
 “ tory passports for a person of confidence, whom his
 “ Majesty would send to Paris with a commission to
 “ discuss with the Government there all the means the
 “ most proper to produce so desirable an end. And
 “ his Majesty is persuaded, that he shall receive, with-
 “ out delay, through the same channel, a satisfactory
 “ answer to this demand, which cannot fail to place, in
 “ a still clearer light, the just and pacific dispositions
 “ which he entertains in common with his allies.

Westminster, Sept. 6, 1796. GRENVILLE.

In the edition which I have now before me, this note is without any address: but that Lord Grenville's original was addressed to the French Directory, is evident from the answer returned by the Danish Ambassador, (No. 3.) which begins thus: “ I have the honour to
 “ inform your Excellency, that the note *addressed to the*
 “ *Executive Directory*, in date of the 6th of the present
 “ month, was transmitted by Mr. Koenemann, Chargé
 “ d’Affaires of his Danish Majesty, to Mr. Delacroix,
 “ Minister for Foreign Affairs at Paris.”

grant a passport for an Ambassador who, should come to Paris to negotiate a peace, was delivered by Mr. Koenemann, the Danish Chargé d'Affaires in that city, into the hands of Mr. Delacroix, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, who promised to lay it before the Directory, and to return an immediate answer. But as three days elapsed without any notice being taken of it, Mr. Koenemann again waited on the French Minister, when, instead of receiving the requested passport, or any kind of written answer to Lord Grenville's note, he was informed by the French Minister, in a very dry tone, (15) that the Executive Directory had not permitted him to return an answer in writing, but that he was directed to express himself verbally to this effect: "That the Executive Directory of the French republic would not for the future receive

(15) See Mr. Koenemann's letter to Count Jarlsberg, No. 4. It is dated, Paris, Sept. 19, 1796.

“ or answer any confidential overtures transmitted through any intermediate channel from the enemies of the republic; but that, if they would send persons furnished with full powers and official papers, these might, upon the frontiers, demand the passports necessary for proceeding to Paris.”

From this answer, to say nothing of its affronting tone, which it is usual to avoid when a reconciliation is really desired, it was obvious that the French Directory endeavoured to evade the proposed negotiation. The refusal of a passport, under the pretence that the request had been made through an intermediate channel, was mere chicane, since the note, which contained that request, was signed not by the Danish Ambassador, but by the British Secretary of State himself. The British Government, therefore, applied immediately to the Directory :