

689(*) EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

Tanjore without an ally. It seems more probable to us that the Rajah is encouraged in his conduct by the Marattas, than that the Marattas will be encouraged by his example. It is the interest both of the Marattas and the Rajah to weaken the power of the Carnatick, and they will disturb it whenever they can; the former to get money, the latter from apprehension of danger to himself if the Nabob should grow powerful.

† We do not know what expression of the Field Deputies the Nabob alludes to; AGREED, to desire he will explain it, as well as a hint of the Tanjorean paying money, mentioned in the passage of the Nabob's letter referred to, marked K ‡.

¶ In this concluding paragraph, the Nabob, in the fullness of his hope and expectation, that, under the present favour of the Crown, he may obtain every superiority and full control of the Company, has in very plain terms expressed the cause of all the heart-burnings which have so clearly manifested themselves of late. Had the Company's troops, says he, after the taking of Pondicherry, *been put under my orders*, the late wars, and the present business, meaning that of Tanjore, would not have come to the pass they have: he even says he desired, and it was promised him; we hope however, for the honour of the Governor and Council, that no such promise was ever made, not even in the stile of eastern compliment. When our army sat down before Vellour in the year 1761, the Nabob being present, Mortiz Ally Khan, the Fouzdar of that place, upon Cowle of safety from the English Commanding Officer, for he would not trust the Nabob's, came out to pay the Nabob a visit, and to confer of and compromise with him the demand that had been made of money: it happened to be a rainy day, and the Nabob received him in his tent: after the first ceremony, he expressed his amazement that the Nabob should expose himself in a tent in an open plain in such weather, when his house was so near; adding, and pointing to the fort, that is your house. This compliment to the Nabob, then besieging the fort, was not more *outré* than an offer or promise of putting the Company's troops under his orders would have been. We know not whether in that case the late war, or the present business, would ever have happened, or whether the Company would have had any existence now on the Coast; but we think, had the Governor and Council given up themselves and the Company's troops to the Nabob's disposal, it is not difficult to ascertain the plan on which they would have been employed. The tenor of the Nabob's conduct points out clearly, that the conquest of the Tanjore country, of the Mysore possessions in the Payen Ghaut, and the possessions of the Deckan, are objects of which his ambition has never lost sight: but what is more astonishing than all is, that he should propose to effect these purposes by the assistance of the Marattas, who are themselves so manifestly aiming at the conquest of the whole.

† See the Nabob's letter, Page 677.

‡ Page 677.

¶ Page 678.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Tuesday, 2d July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that having waited upon the Nabob this morning in company with Mr. Hastings, the conversation was opened by the President, by observing, that at the last meeting between His Excellency and the Committee, it had been agreed to send away the small stores then proposed, but to detain the remaining capital stores, until we should be at a certainty respecting war or peace in Europe; by which time, His Excellency was pleased to observe, we should have a clearer insight into matters here, and be better able to judge of the propriety or impropriety of carrying the expedition against Tanjore into execution. That the receipt of advices from Europe, purporting the accommodation of the disputes between our Court and *that* of Spain, was the occasion of his present visit, to consult with His Excellency what was further to be done respecting the important business of Tanjore: that His Excellency was the properest judge thereof, knowing so thoroughly the whole of the Rajah's late conduct, and his present state and disposition; and being at the same time acquainted with the views and intentions of the Marattas and the Subah, and the condition of the Company's treasury. To all this the Nabob replied, that he would very frankly and freely mention his sentiments; however he should be glad previously to be informed of his, the President's, opinion of the Marattas: that as to the Subah, he might be considered as a woman, with the appearance only of a man—a beard. The President said, that without the least reserve he would give his opinion as desired; which was, that there was all reason to think, if we undertook the expedition against Tanjore, the Marattas would make some attempt in the Rajah's favour; either by entering the Carnatick, or by joining him with a body of troops, and thereby harassing our operations. That with respect to the Subah, whatever he might be in himself, there were not wanting people to instigate and push him on; and that he, the President, did not esteem him either the friend of the Company or the Nabob, but as a man waiting merely for an opportunity to shew his disposition towards them to advantage. The Nabob then took up the argument, and said, that this was a point the consideration of which required time; that the beginning of an expedition indeed was easy, but the end, the conclusion thereof, how *that* was likely to turn out, was the matter to be attended to. That the present proposed expedition, considered merely in itself, was certainly proper; and if we could be once at ease with regard to the Marattas, required not the least consideration: that the Marattas however were a people actuated by no impulse but that of money, and would certainly be of his side that paid the most; and that the Rajah *had* money, he *none*: that the Rajah's Vackeel had been negotiating with Trimbeck Row for an assist-

ance of 20,000 horse, and had been answered, that the same number would be sent, under Madarah, to settle his Coimbattoor country, and would be ready to act as occasion might require; but that as to the granting assistance separate and distinct therefrom, he must write to Maudhoorow. That Maudhoorow had dismissed Hyder's Vackeel from his court, and had, at his request, given him leave to proceed to Trimbeck Row's camp, to negotiate concerning a peace. That the Zemindars of the Balaghaut attending on Trimbeck Row having desired permission to return to their respective countries, as peace was going to be concluded with Hyder, Trimbeck Row had told them, that Hyder was such a fellow there was no dependence to be put upon him; and that besides he had an expedition to undertake against Arcot: upon hearing which the Zemindars had remained quiet. That the Maratta troops, it was true, were heartily tired of their present expedition; and if not reinforced, that Trimbeck Row might yet be obliged to give it up: that he had however taken all the forts between Seringapatam and Biddenore, and it was said was to receive a reinforcement of 10,000 horse. That the Rajah, under pretence of going to worship at a Pagoda, proposed having an interview with the Governor of Negapatam, to remain with him for some time, and even to put himself under the latter's protection. That the French benefited extremely by the Rajah's country under it's present Government; and that if the same was taken from him, Pondicherry itself would become like Carrical: that it was natural for them therefore to wish the Rajah's country to remain as it is, that the Rajah might act as a counterpoise to him, the Nabob; in the same manner as he was desirous that the Marattas should not extirpate Hyder, but that, if possible, their power should remain an equipoise, as neither to preponderate. The Nabob then referred to a message he had sent the President the preceding day by the means of Mr. Stracey, purporting, that as well the French, Dutch, as Danes, were assisting the Rajah underhand with Europeans, by dismissing them from the service, and giving them leave to go to him; and concluded the whole with repeating, that the point in question required time for deliberation. The President observing, that the Rajah had given even no opening for accommodating matters; the Nabob said, No—nor will he let you even remain in quiet, should you wish to do it; for if you do not go against him, he will not impute the same to regard but fear, and to it's not suiting your convenience; and will himself proceed against Tondiman, and then against Worriarpollam and Allianore, the turned-out Zemindars of which places he now affords protection to. The President informing the Nabob, that the convoy of small stores was arrived at Cuddalore, and desiring to know whether bullocks should be ordered from Trichinopoly to carry those stores to that place—the Nabob said, Yes. The President then acquainted the Nabob, that he certainly might take whatever time he thought proper to reflect on the point in question; and that he, the President, would only beg leave to recommend to his consideration, in the course of those reflexions, the following circumstances, viz. The state of the Company's treasury and resources; that the charges of the bullocks, &c. were still going on: that if the expedition was even to be determined on as that day, it would be the end of the month before every thing could possibly be ready to commence it; and that the Monsoon was at no great distance, when no operations could go on. To which the Nabob said, that he was very sensible of all this; that we should continue

to send on the stores necessary, until a determination was come to what to do further; but that the President might see, from the tenor of his discourse, *that* determination depended upon the Marattas.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 8th July, 1771.

THE Select Committee communicated to the Board the substance of the conference the President and Mr. Hastings had with the Nabob on the subject of the Tanjore expedition, as recited in their minutes of the 2d instant †.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Tuesday, 9th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that having received a message from the Nabob, purporting his desire of seeing him, he, the President, had waited upon him yesterday; when the Nabob informed him, that his reason for desiring the visit was, that before any arrangements were finally determined and agreed on, he might be able to ascertain in some measure the money, bullocks, and provisions, which would be requisite for carrying on the expedition against Tanjore; and at the same time gain some intimation of our intention respecting the following points, to wit: In case of the prosecution of the expedition, and obtainment of a sum of money, what was to be done with that money? Or in case of the reduction of the country, what was to be done therewith? That the Nabob having desired him, the President, to consider of these points, and to give him an answer thereto, he had thought it necessary to assemble them, the Committee, to have their advice and opinion thereon. The Committee thereupon taking the same into consideration, are of opinion, that the Nabob should be acquainted, with all frankness and candour, of what occurs to them on the said points; but that it be represented to him at the same time, in the strongest manner, that in case, by the Rajah's refusal of paying an adequate sum of money, the putting in execution the last-mentioned point (the conquest of the country) should be judged necessary, and meet with happy success, either of the arrangements now proposed respecting it, and which may then take place, must be regarded as merely temporary until the Company's pleasure be known, whose orders thereon on our part must be implicitly obeyed. With regard to the first point, the division of the money which may be taken from the Rajah, it is the opinion of the Committee, that in the first place the whole of the money which may be due to the

† Vide Page 689.

Company on account of the current charges at that period (including those of the expedition, the expenses of the Mysore war excepted) be fully discharged, and that the remainder of the money taken be appropriated to the payment of the Nabob's private creditors. With regard to the last point,—What is to be done with the country, in case of it's being taken?—it is the opinion of the Committee, that as the tenor and spirit of the Company's orders are every where uniform in pointing out, that it is by no means their wish or desire to subvert the established Government of any Power with whom they may have political connexion, but only that the same be modelled in such manner as not to hurt or prejudice their interest, or that of the Carnatick, they think it would be better to restore the Rajah, or some more fit person of his family, to the administration; he paying such Peshcush to the Circar as shall be judged proper, and assigning an adequate revenue for the payment of all charges of the expedition, and for the maintenance of a garrison to be kept within the fort of Tanjore on the part of the Company, and a sufficient body of their troops for the protection of the country. Or if that mode is not agreeable to the Nabob, that the revenues of the country be put under his management and direction, and the Fort remain in our hands, both in deposit, until the Company's pleasure be known; the revenues subject however in the first place to the purposes aforesaid, and the residue to be applied as shall be agreed between him and the Company.

With regard to the money, provisions, and bullocks, which will be necessary, it is agreed the Commissary-General and Agent be desired to form an estimate thereof, supposing the expedition to continue for three months.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Thursday, 11th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.
Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley.

THE President acquaints the Committee, that in the evening of the day the last Committee was held he had the favour of a visit from the young Nabob, who it was evident came, on the part of his father, to learn his, the President's, opinion on the two points referred to his consideration by the Nabob, as mentioned in the minutes of the last Committee †; that he, the President, therefore, with all frankness, acquainted him of what had been determined on at that Committee, taking care to enforce to him, that should the expedition, through necessity, be carried to the utmost extremity mentioned in the last point (the absolute reduction of the country), either of the proposed arrangements respecting it, which may *then* be adopted, must be regarded as merely temporary, subsisting only until the Com-

† Vide Page 691.

pany's pleasure be known, whose orders on our part must be implicitly obeyed. That the young Nabob, after attentively hearing all this, left him; and he, the President, the next evening, being that of yesterday, waited upon the Nabob to inform him thereof; when it appeared he had already been fully apprized of it by his Son; for before he, the President, could in any manner enter upon the sentiments of the Committee respecting the last point or question, the Nabob turned the discourse, by observing the great probability there was of the Marattas penetrating into the Carnatick, in case of the expedition proceeding; but said, if the President would do as he desired, he might take it upon himself; which was, to send for the Maratta Vackeel, and for him, the Nabob, and the President to sound the said Vackeel at a distance respecting this business; and in case the purport and substance of his answers should be such as to signify an inclination to act as a mediator therein, to proceed a little further, by stating to him the many and great favours which have been conferred on the present Rajah, and on his father, by the Nabob, the ill return he has met with, and the extraordinary instances of contumacy and insolence shewn by the present Rajah, in withholding the stipulated Peshcush for two years, and in undertaking expeditions against the Zemindars of Marawar and Nalcooty, dependants upon the Carnatick, in direct opposition both to the tenor and spirit of the treaty concluded in 1762, and to every idea of subordination and good government: that if the Vackeel seemed sensible of the justice and force of these arguments, and offered to take upon himself the bringing the Rajah to reason, he, the Nabob, thought it would be better to agree to it, as thereby we should get the Marattas on our side; or if we could, under pretence of the mediation of their Vackeel, have an opportunity of once commencing our operations against the fort, without receiving any molestation from them, it would be an amazing point gained. That on his, the President's, expressing his apprehensions lest the mediation proposed should in any manner tend or lead to an offensive alliance with the Marattas, an alliance which, being contrary to the spirit of all the Company's orders, could not be acceded to; the Nabob said he would take the utmost caution in founding the Vackeel, and if it was agreeable to the President, would see the Vackeel first by himself; when, if he found all things right, he would desire the President also to give him an interview; but if not, would drop it. That he, the President, assented to this, but took an opportunity also to put the Nabob likewise upon his guard, in the strongest manner, against giving any opening, or making any advances, to the Vackeel, which he could not immediately close, or with honour retract; so that no disgrace in any shape might be incurred by any communication made to the Vackeel. That the Nabob promised to use all circumspection therein, and if the President disapproved of the measure, to drop it even entirely; but that he, the President, had signified to him it was by no means his design to put a stop to it, but merely to point out the difficulties and dangers which occurred to him thereon.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
am^l. Ardley.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Thursday, 18th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

LETTER from the Rajah of Tanjore read, as entered in Country Correspondence*, setting forth the long friendship subsisting between his family, the Nabob, and the Company, the assistance he and his father have at different times afforded them, and promising to pay the Peshcush *sooner or later*, provided the Nabob and the Company are desirous of maintaining the old friendship with him.

Ordered, That a copy thereof be sent a number in the packet to the Court of Directors per Duke of Portland.

Draught of a letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors, to go per ship Duke of Portland, read and approved.

Ordered, That the same be wrote fair.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Samuel Ardley.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Wednesday, 24th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that on the 22d instant he had a conference with the Nabob, and informed him of the purport of the letter received from the Rajah of Tanjore, and the advices from the Islands respecting the force of the French there; also of the receipt of a letter from General Smith, signifying, that if the expedition against Tanjore was to be put into execution, it ought to be determined on immediately; for *even in that case* it would take to the end of August before every thing could be completely ready for the commencing thereof. The Governor then begged the Nabob to acquaint him of his sentiments respecting what was to be done further in the Tanjore business. The Na-

* Vide Page 613.

bob said, if things could not be accomplished according to our wish, it was better to remain quiet. The Governor desired to know his meaning in the words *remain quiet*; whether or no they implied a total silence and inactivity, as well respecting the expedition as negotiation. The Nabob replied, as to the latter, The Rajah in his letter to you has cut *that* short, by saying, that "If the Company's security to the treaty and friendship to him are to remain as before, the Peshcush may be paid, sometimes sooner, sometimes later;" and as to the former, if the result thereof is likely to be merely the above, the obtainment of the Peshcush, (the amount of which the expenses of the troops had already cost him) it was much better to remain quiet: however, that after seeing the account of the money, and the lists of provisions, bullocks, &c. which would be necessary for carrying on the expedition (and which he had before desired the Governor to prepare); after examining his own ability to supply them, and after considering the advantages and disadvantages of this business, he would acquaint the Governor very frankly of what occurred to him therein, and with what he would be satisfied. The Governor promised to send the account and lists desired, and the original letter from the Rajah, and expressed his readiness to act according to the Nabob's advice in this business: he observed however, that respecting the remaining entirely quiet therein, he, the Nabob, had before said that the Rajah would not suffer us to remain so, but would be the aggressor himself, and oblige us to fight; and that he should be glad the Nabob would give him his sentiments of what answers should be returned to the Rajah's letter. The Nabob replied, There was no doubt of the truth of what he had before said, that the Rajah would not remain quiet; and that he now began to talk to his people of demanding the Chillumbrum country: that as to the expedition against him, if it was not done now, it might another time; as, by God's blessing, there was no want, no deficiency of years, either in the existence of the Company, the lives of himself and children, or in their friendship to each other: that after seeing the Rajah's letter, he would acquaint the Governor of what occurred to him respecting the reply; and, as above, give him an answer to the whole business, upon seeing the account of money and lists of provisions, &c. which would be required for the expedition; and that if the same were sent as the next morning, he would wait upon the Governor in the evening, and inform him of his said answer. The Governor said he would not trouble him, but come to his house; and so the matter ended.

That the next day, being yesterday, he again waited upon the Nabob, and presented to him the account of extra-charges which would be monthly incurred in case of the expedition proceeding against Tanjore, also a list of the grain, bullocks, sheep, &c. which would in that case be monthly required, and a translation in Persian of the Rajah's letter. After which he told the Nabob, that as letters were daily coming in from General Smith, pressing that a determination be immediately had on the proceeding or non-proceeding of the expedition against Tanjore, he must request the favour of his sentiments and resolution thereon. It appeared soon that the Nabob's resolution was for the latter (the non-proceeding of the expedition); and that an accommodation of matters, for
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the present at least, by negotiation, was the mode he had adopted; to favour which, he desired the troops might still be kept at Trichinopoly. The Governor said, that as negotiation seemed to be his determination, there were three modes of doing it; either that the Governor and Council should, with his leave and permission, appear therein as the principal actors and mediators; or that it should be carried on jointly by him, the Nabob, and the Governor and Council; or that he, the Nabob, should alone negotiate the same, and the Governor and Council not appear therein, but only *underhand* give him all the support in their power. The Nabob approved of the latter, *objecting to the Governor and Council's interfering in this business in any manner publicly, or receiving any information therein but through his means*, as he said it was a business which belonged to him. He desired the Governor therefore, in answer to the Rajah's letter, to tell the Vackeel, that he was astonished his Master should write in the manner he had done; "That if the friendship was maintained and increased, the Peshcush might be paid sometimes sooner or latter;" and then to tell him, that he, the Governor, was ready to shew his friendship to his Master, but that he must satisfy the Nabob, to whom this matter belonged. In short, *as the Nabob termed it, the Governor was to make the Vackeel despair of an accommodation of matters*. The Nabob promised to acquaint Mr. Du Pré from time to time of the progress of the negotiation.

The President thinks it necessary here to add, that as he has frequently before, so he has now, by means and agents (which it is not proper to disclose, and which he never will disclose to the public) obtained some hints of what has passed in the deliberation of the Nabob with those he consults; and is well assured that the Nabob, jealous of the Company's appearing of more consequence than himself, if the negotiation were to be conducted publicly by the Governor and Council, Committee, or Governor, is determined to throw every difficulty he can in the way, in case the Board or Committee should resolve to negotiate an accommodation as mediators, by demanding an excessive sum of the Rajah as an indemnification, and by insisting on other terms, which it is not probable the Rajah will ever comply with.

The Committee taking under their most serious consideration the present state of affairs, and the reports made by the President of his conferences with the Nabob the 22d and 23d instant, take the following three points as certain and established beyond any doubt:

F I R S T P O I N T.

That the Nabob is averse at this time to a military expedition against Tanjore.

S E C O N D P O I N T.

That the Nabob is equally averse to any negotiation to be publicly conducted by the Company's Representatives.

T H I R D P O I N T.

That the Nabob is inclined to accommodation with the Rajah, if the negotiation be entirely left to himself, without the public intervention of the Company's Representatives; but supported nevertheless by the Company's power, merely as auxiliary. Upon which the following questions arise:

F I S T Q U E S T I O N.

Is it proper (all circumstances considered) that the expedition be immediately undertaken?

S E C O N D Q U E S T I O N.

If it be proper, shall it be undertaken whether the Nabob consent or not?

T H I R D Q U E S T I O N.

If it be resolved that the expedition shall not take place, contrary to the Nabob's inclination and consent, shall a negotiation take place in preference to total inactivity and silence?

F O U R T H Q U E S T I O N.

If the third question be determined in favour of a negotiation, shall that negotiation be conducted by the Company's Representatives, as mediators and guaranties of the Treaty of 1762?

F I F T H Q U E S T I O N.

If the fourth question be resolved in the negative, shall the negotiation be left entirely to the Nabob in the manner he proposes?

For the sake of perspicuity, we shall first record the resolutions of the Committee, and shall then offer at large the reasons in support of such resolutions.

To the first Question. It is the unanimous opinion of the Committee, that notwithstanding the many dangers which threaten in case the expedition be undertaken, yet that the dangers which threaten in case it be not undertaken are greater; that of two evils the least should be chosen; and therefore that the expedition *ought* to be undertaken.

To the second Question. It is the opinion of the Majority, that although they agree that the expedition *ought* to be undertaken, yet that it cannot with any degree of safety or prudence be undertaken contrary to the Nabob's inclination

and consent. It is therefore resolved, so far as depends on this Committee, that the expedition be not undertaken, because the Nabob is averse thereto.

To the third Question. In consequence of the resolution against the expedition, it is the unanimous opinion of the Committee, that negotiation be tried in preference to total inactivity and silence.

To the fourth Question. It is the opinion of the Majority, that the negotiation be *not* conducted by the Company's Representatives, as mediators and guarantees of the Treaty of 1762, and it is so resolved accordingly.

To the fifth Question. It is the opinion of the Majority, that the negotiation be left entirely to the Nabob in the manner he proposes, and it is so resolved accordingly.

We shall now offer our reasons in support of the several resolutions above recorded.

Reasons for the unanimous Opinion on the first Question.

We are unanimously of opinion that the expedition ought immediately to be undertaken.

1st. Because it seems the most ready and probable means of bringing the Rajah to a speedy and honourable submission.

2^d. Because to suspend the expedition at this time, when so short an interval is left, before the setting in of the Monsoon, in order to negotiate, is in effect to give up the expedition entirely for this season; since it is more than probable that the Rajah will designedly procrastinate, and prolong the negotiation in that very intention.

3^d. Because if the Rajah's submission to safe and honourable terms be not speedily effected, the consequences may be fatal to the Carnatick, and the Company's possessions under this Presidency; and it is beyond a doubt, that the French have a great force at the Islands ready to embark for India; and as our advices inform us that it is with difficulty so large a force can be subsisted there, it is probable they will employ them as auxiliaries to such of the Country Powers as shall solicit their assistance, and offer them terms of advantage; it is probable therefore, that they will unite with Tanjore, who can offer terms of advantage, and will most probably solicit their aid, if we stand as adversaries to him.

4th. Because such a junction might relieve the French from that distress, which is most likely to prove their ruin, the want of money, which the Rajah's Treasury can well afford, as is generally believed, and thereby give them a footing, which

may enable them soon to acquire such a superiority, as it would not be in our power to withstand.

Note. If the French should land a considerable force, which is expected, and join Tanjore against the Nabob, it must inevitably engage the two nations, English and French, in an auxiliary war. The French have nothing to lose on the Coast of any consideration but Pondicherry, and would be subsisted for a time from the Tanjore Treasury. The Company have a great deal to lose, and have nothing to depend upon but their own revenue (for the Nabob engages to assist them with money, &c. only in case of peace and tranquillity); and their own revenue must fail whenever their possessions are disturbed by war.

5th. Because the Marattas have declared their resolution of invading the Carnatick; and if Tanjore should not be reduced to proper terms immediately, and before peace between the Marattas and Hyder should take place, the power of Tanjore and the French co-operating with the Marattas, or in arms against us, at the same time would be irresistible; more especially as we must ever expect attempts from the Subah against the Northern Circars, whenever we shall be involved in danger in the South. And because we must add to this, what seems more dangerous than all the rest, the want of confidence between the Nabob and the Company, the countenance and support given to him by the Minister of the Crown, and the great diffidence which must necessarily hang on the minds of the Company's Servants, oppressed and perplexed by the powers of prerogative intrusted to the Minister of the Crown, whose conduct, as it is deducible both from his writings and his actions, is adverse.

6th. Because the latest advices from Europe afford the strongest cause to apprehend that a war is at no great distance; and if, in the interval which is yet left for action, the Rajah can be reduced to proper terms, it may deprive them of the best resource they could otherwise have.

Reasons for the Resolution of the Majority on the Second Question.

ALTHOUGH the Majority unite with the Minority fully and clearly upon the first Question, for the reasons before given, their opinion is to be understood as expressed, that the expedition OUGHT to be immediately undertaken; and that were they *principals acting for themselves, and not accountable*, they should resolve immediately to undertake it, but as *agents accountable*, they think it neither safe nor prudent to undertake it immediately.

1st. Because it is contrary to the Nabob's inclination; and if it be undertaken, it must be undertaken without his concurrence and approbation.

2d. Because the Company have too plainly shewn in their letters, that they consider this Government as culpable, as actuated by personal prejudices in their contests with the Nabob; charge this Government with a conduct tending to violate that firm alliance between the Nabob and the Company, &c. and in their
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letter to the Commissioners, dated 23d March 1770, in paragraphs 30, 31, 32, and 33, although they admit the representations made by this Government, in their letters by the Dutton and Thames, in respect to the Nabob, and the connexion with him, to be just; which representations shewed the necessity of a control over him; yet they refuse (in terms which even indicate anger that the idea was suggested) to give their Government any sort of control over him; express their apprehensions of the dangerous consequences it might have with respect to other Country Powers, and of the embarrassments it might lead into with the Crown; and enjoin the Commissioners to assure the Nabob of their resolution to give him all necessary consequence in the eyes of his neighbours.

3d. Because to undertake the expedition contrary to the Nabob's inclination would be to control him, and (in his opinion) to diminish, instead of support, his consequence in the eyes of his neighbours.

4th. Because whether we consider ourselves as guarantees to the treaty of 1762, as allies to the Nabob, or merely as auxiliaries, the matters in dispute regard immediately the interest of the Nabob, but those of the Company only consequentially. Because the Company, as well as the King's Minister, have set before our eyes the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, and tell us of the consequences if we break it. Because to enter into a war, and engage the Nabob therein, contrary to his inclination, might be construed a breach of the said article; and not only involve us personally in ruin, but subject the Company to a forfeiture of their Charter.

5th. Because the Nabob is of opinion, we are of opinion, all men are of opinion, that if we were now to march against Tanjore, the Marattas would send some horse into the Carnatick to create a diversion; which though not so ruinous as when the Sumbah crop is on the ground, would nevertheless greatly distress the country. Because the Nabob has over and over again told us, verbally and in writing, that he cannot engage to assist us, either with money or provision, if the Marattas invade the country; and in all his engagements has constantly annexed the condition of peace and tranquillity. Because we have not a fund of our own to support us in war; and our only resource, our territorial revenues, must fail whenever the Marattas invade us. Because we have all reason to believe, that neither the Nabob, nor the Minister of the Crown, would be displeased to see us driven to distress, by our own measures taken contrary to the Nabob's inclination; that therefore, far from hoping for assistance from him, we rather think he would counteract us, to bring on that distress, in hopes still of compelling us to an offensive alliance with the Marattas, as the only relief, though a temporary one. And finally, because as we impute in a great measure the injurious treatment we have met with from the Public, on account of the peace with Hyder Ally, to the false and malicious representations which have been made of our conduct, either by the Nabob or his Agents; because the peace, though an act of necessity, was contrary to his inclination, and not negotiated by him: so we have all reason to expect that our conduct in this respect will be assigned to motives which do not exist; that

we shall be traduced and blackened ; and that the Nabob's representations will be avouched and supported by the Minister of the Crown.

6th. Because the wisest and best supported measures cannot ensure success. Because we despair of being able to put the army in the field, with every article and every convenience required by the Commanding Officer. Because a deficiency in any of these will throw the blame of failure, should it so happen, upon us. Because we have all reason to believe, from the past, that the Court of Directors will give judgment in favour of their Military, against their civil Servants. And finally, because, however upright; however judicious our conduct may be, we have not a ray of hope that a vindication of our conduct will *any where* be listened to. The Nabob is against us : the King's Minister is against us ; the Ministry of course against us : May God grant that the Parliament be not as much against us ! *The orders of the Court of Directors against us ;* the Court of Directors of course against us : the whole military corps inevitably against us ; every man's hand and heart against us ; and nothing for us, but a consciousness of our own integrity.

Reasons for the Resolution on the Third Question.

These are so obvious, that it were wasting time to say why, if an expedition do not take place, it is better to try negotiation than to remain totally silent and inactive : the former affords some chance of accommodation, if an appearance be made at the same time of a resolution to recur to arms in case of need ; but the latter can be productive of nothing but certain disgrace, and probable ruin.

Reasons for the Resolution of the Majority on the Fourth Question.

We are of opinion, that the Company's Representatives do not take upon them the negotiation for an accommodation with Tanjore.

1st. Because the Nabob objects to it.

2d. Because if the Company's Representatives were to undertake it, in opposition to the Nabob's consent, we cannot doubt but that the Nabob would throw every obstacle in his power in the way : our intelligence informs us that he would ; and if we had no such intelligence, we should be as firmly convinced of it from the tenor of his conduct. We perceive therefore that it would be impossible to accomplish any accommodation on terms to which the Nabob would assent : the consequence would be, that we should be obliged to sustain the disgrace of relinquishing unaccomplished what we had undertaken, or accomplish it on terms against which the Nabob would protest.

3d. Because the manifest reason of the Nabob's objection to our negotiating is, that by raising our importance in the eyes of the Country Powers, it would proportionally diminish his. Because it is the Company's orders to the Com-
8 Q missioners

missioners to support his consequence in the eyes of his neighbours. Because to negotiate and settle terms for the Nabob and the Carnatick, contrary to the opinion of, and in opposition to the Nabob, would be to control the Nabob, which we are forbid to do. Because it might be construed a breach of the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, endanger us personally to we know not what penalties, and subject the Charter to forfeiture.

4th. Because if we were to accommodate on terms contrary to the Nabob's opinion, we strongly apprehend the like misrepresentations and the like consequences therefrom, as are expressed in articles 5th and 6th of Reasons for the Resolution on the Second Question.

5th. Because, for all the reasons aforesaid, we cannot reasonably hope for a successful end to our negotiation; that no good can proceed from it; but on the contrary that disappointment, disgrace, and inevitable difficulty, would be the probable consequence.

Reasons in support of the Resolution of the Majority on the Fifth Question.

WE are of opinion that the negotiation be left wholly to the Nabob, in the manner he proposes; that is to say, that the Company's Representatives do not publicly interfere, but do give the Nabob all possible support, by an apparent resolution to use military compulsion if negotiation fail.

1st. Because this is conformable to the Nabob's desire, and consonant to the spirit, tenor, and every letter of the Company's orders.

2d. Because we do believe that the Nabob, seeing the dangers that surround him,—the disgrace that must attend both him and us, if, after having compelled us to proceed thus far in our military preparations, all hostile intentions should silently be dropped,—*wishes heartily and truly that an accommodation could be brought about.* Because we think there is at least a probability that it may be effected by the Nabob, assisted by the appearance of resolution on our part to support him with military force in case of need: And because we think the effecting it on a firm footing, that is to say, under the solemn sanction of the Company, may as effectually prevent the dangers we apprehend from the French, (as herein-before expressed) should they unite with Tanjore whilst we stand in enmity with him, as if Tanjore were actually reduced or conquered; and our reason for this opinion is, that *Tanjore can have no grounds, no natural tendency to a preference of, or friendship with the French rather than with us, but the contrary.* And as we have, in other places of our proceedings, expressed our opinion that *the Rajah's conduct has in some measure proceeded from his apprehensions of the Nabob, and the disability of the Company to protect him against the Nabob, supported by the Minister of the Crown; so it is our opinion, that were he reinstated in the former confidence he had of the Company's impartial adherence to the treaty of 1762, he would never put himself into the hands or power of the French.*

3d. Because

3d. Because *we have no cause to infer from any orders we have received from the Company, that they wish the Fort and Country of Tanjore were conquered, and the present possessors dispossessed; but on the contrary, that they would not have either their possessions or those of the Nabob extended, or the hereditary possessors of territory dispossessed; but only that they should be reduced to such terms, as may give safety to the Carnatick and their own possessions.*

4th. Because if an accommodation can be effected by the Nabob to his own satisfaction, whether we are considered as guarantees to the Treaty of 1762, as allies, or as auxiliaries, we have no right to dispute it; and if the doctrine on the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris be just, it would be dangerous to dispute it: but that doctrine is inculcated, not only by the Minister of the Crown, but by the Court of Directors also; therefore, if we dispute the Nabob's right to settle his own concerns, it must be *at our own peril*. There are many, very many things, which we would venture to do *at our peril* for the public good, had we but grounds to hope for candour in the judgment to be passed on our conduct; but we here solemnly declare, judging from the past, that we have no such hope; the extreme rigour with which this Government has been treated, grounded, as we think, on the malicious misrepresentations of interested and revengeful persons, has banished hope; and when we consider the new enemies that have assailed us, their design, their means, and their power, nothing remains for us *but despair*.

In support of the foregoing arguments, it is necessary to quote some of the late orders of the Court of Directors.

General Letter, 10th November, 1769.

Par. 4. "But one part of your said advices we cannot help at present animadverting upon; and that is, your conduct towards the Nabob of Arcot, as represented in your additional general letter of the 8th March last. It is to our astonishment that by your said letter we discern an inclination in you tending to violate that firm alliance between the Nabob and the Company, which we have ever thought our interest to maintain; and the more so, as His Majesty, by the 11th article of the last General Treaty of Peace, has agreed, that "in order to preserve future peace on the Coast of Coromandel and Orixa, the English shall acknowledge Mahomed Ally Khan for lawful Nabob of the Carnatick."

5. "This seeming inclination in you towards breaking with the Nabob did induce us to desire the superintending Commissioners, by our letter of 26th September last, that they would not fail to repair to Fort St. George first, that the most vigorous measures might be pursued in carrying on the war against Hyder Ally, in order to produce a safe and honourable peace. The said Commissioners were also desired to exert themselves in the most effectual manner, firmly to support the Company's faithful Ally the Nabob of Arcot; and to that end we informed them, that they might expect the strongest reinforcements from hence, &c."

General Letter, 23d March, 1770.

Par. 11. "YOU have, contrary to our express injunctions, afforded but too much reason for all the Country Powers around you to suspect us of encroaching designs against their possessions and property, &c."

R E M A R K.

WOULD there not be the strongest cause for such an imputation in the case of Tanjore, if we were declaredly to undertake the conquest of it contrary to the Nabob's inclination, for whom alone we are authorised by our own Constituents to act against Tanjore? would not the Nabob himself alarm the Country Powers? it cannot be doubted.

Par. 12. Our ancient Ally, the Nabob, on whose economy and attention to the improvement of his revenues our welfare so much depends, and which it was your duty to promote, has been by you *dragged* or *allured* into new and most alarming difficulties; and from all your promises he has only acquired a most formidable and inveterate enemy, destruction to his country, and a ruinous accumulation of debt:—and if his *faith and honour*—(Good God! faith and honour) prevail not over his *distresses*, what have we not to expect may be the consequences in case of an European war? &c.

R E M A R K.

THE measures which occasioned the foregoing paragraph proved unsuccessful; and though the Nabob was not only consenting to them, but was even an instigator, yet as they terminated unfortunately, this Government is accused of *dragging* and *alluring* him into them. What will not be said should we really *drag* him into a war, contrary to his declared opinion, in a cause wherein we can only act as his supporters? Upon what ground shall we act against Tanjore, if the Nabob declare himself satisfied?—we must act for the Company in that case: Have we any authority to do so? and will it not be imputed to us, if we fail—nay, if we are successful, as a design to get the country into our own hands, and the plunder of it into our own pockets? He must be ignorant indeed of the temper of the times who can harbour a doubt of these, and every other imputation that the blackest malice can invent.

Par. 13. "Upon the whole, as we have before expressed our disapprobation of the commencement of the war, so we again declare it our opinion, that you have wantonly made us principals in the quarrel with Hyder, &c."

R E M A R K.

WE have already asked upon what justifiable grounds we can take upon us to make the Company principals in a war with Tanjore, who appeals to us to settle the difference

difference between him and the Nabob, as mediators and guarantees of the Treaty of 1762: we must not expect in such a case so mild an epithet as wanton:—*Delinquency—collusions—frauds—corrupt motives—are what we may be sure of from the Nabob, the Minister, and many other good friends we have in this country.*

Par. 22. “However salutary it might be to provide against future exigencies, after your investments shall have been carried to their full extent, yet it is with *astonishment* we see that our Servants could entertain an idea of *depriving* us of the only means we could have to discharge the same” (i. e. our engagements.)

24. “Although we hope that upon more mature deliberation you will have laid aside so *destructive* a plan, yet on the bare possibility of your adopting it, we here declare our *peremptory prohibition* of such a measure.”

N. B. The *destructive* plan above-mentioned, which in paragraph 24. is imputed to infatuation, was a proposition between this Presidency and that of Bengal, for making some provision to guard both against *destruction*, which must be the consequence of war without means.

R E M A R K.

We have obeyed the peremptory prohibition;—we have no fund;—our dependence is our territorial revenue;—how are we to carry on a war on our own bottom? If we engage in an expedition in opposition to the Nabob, we can expect very little assistance from him, if any, either of money or provision. In case our expedition should bring the Marattas into the country, or that it prove unsuccessful, from whatever cause, how are we to support ourselves? we must carry our investment to the full extent; and then, and not 'till then, provide for future *exigencies*.

We beg that our separate letters to the Honourable Court by the Dutton and Thanes, dated 8th March and 27th June 1769, may be first read with attention; particularly paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of the last; and then the following, viz.

General letter to the Commissioners, dated 23d March 1770, paragraphs 30, 31, 32, 33, and part of 35, beginning at the words, *And we further request.*

Note. These passages are so strong, that there needs no remark on them after what has already been said. To

Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 8th March, 1769. Received in London, 26th September, 1769.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, for Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies.

HONOURABLE,

Par. 1. HAVING, as well in our general address of this date as our former letters, given your Honours a minute detail of the several occurrences in the course of this war, how far our conduct may merit approbation

To the foregoing we beg leave to add the following extract, from whence alone we derive our *special* commission to invade Tanjore: we say our *special commission*,

probation or blame, is with great deference submitted to your judgment. If the warmest attachment and unwearied attention to your interest, and the best endeavours to procure success, could entitle us to your favourable sentiments, conscious of having exerted these, we should not doubt of obtaining them; but whatever may be your sense of the past, our duty to the Company as Servants, and to the Nation as Subjects, urges us with all deference to offer our opinion of the future. Three causes may be assigned as general obstacles in the pursuit of this war; a divided power, the want of cavalry, and the apprehension of wanting money. The forces in the field are under the sole command and direction of your Servants, but the means by which they must be supported are principally in the Nabob, whose idle vanity, desire of power, and jealousy of control, renders all dependence on him precarious. It cannot be necessary to use many arguments to prove, that the Power which is to direct the measures should know the means; but whilst those means lie so much in the Nabob as they must, we are in a thousand instances liable to disappointments and impediments. 'Tis with reluctance we say even thus much on a subject which demands much more, because we cannot propose a remedy; for there is no medium; the Nabob must be Nabob or nothing; that is to say, he must have the sole management of the countries, and the revenues and resources, or they must be wholly in the Company. In the first case we foresee dangers threatening on all sides, in which the Company must necessarily be involved; in the latter the Nabob would certainly be drove to the last despair; for it is not to be conceived how greatly his jealousy and apprehensions have increased, since the Company have assumed the power in Bengal; and yet such a system, until the affairs of the Carnatick could be put upon a more respectable footing, by the reduction of the debts and incumbrances, would, we are confident, produce far greater advantage and happiness in the end to the Nabob and his family, than the course he has hitherto taken, and no doubt will pursue. If what we have taken the liberty to offer on this subject is conceived in general terms, without descending to particular instances, it is because we are fearful of enforcing what would not only give us great pain to execute, but perhaps draw on us imputations we do not deserve, and wish to avoid: we shall therefore on this subject only add, that in our conduct towards the Nabob we shall carefully avoid giving him any cause of disgust, but shall nevertheless urge him in the warmest manner to such measures as shall appear to us necessary.

2. The want of cavalry is the second obstacle we have mentioned. Were peace restored, and the revenues of the Carnatick free and unincumbered, there is no doubt but they might well afford to maintain a respectable body of cavalry, besides the necessary and sufficient establishment of infantry; but, under the present embarrassments, it does not appear to us to be practicable. The Nabob is indebted to individuals near twenty Lacks of Pagodas, carrying an interest of ten per cent.—his former debt to you, added to the charges of the present war, amounts to at least twenty Lacks of Pagodas more; the sums which will undoubtedly be required of him annually towards the discharge of these debts, the civil charges of government, the repairs of fortifications, the charges of himself and family, suitably to the dignity of his station, the Jaghires to relations and dependants; all these being deducted from the revenues, will leave, as we apprehend, (for we do not know, and cannot obtain a satisfactory account of them) a sum very inadequate to the charges of such a military establishment; and without it, the course of this war has proved, that a body of ten thousand horse may ruin and lay waste the whole country.

3. The third cause of the protraction of this war has been our apprehension of wanting money; we say apprehension, because we have not to this time been in actual want; but such has been our situation during the greatest part of this war, that we have never been able to calculate a reasonable dependence on more than three or four months of our ordinary expenses. We have seen very plainly for some time past, that nothing could ensure us success but a body of cavalry that could be depended on; and it is certain, in raising and collecting such a body, that our known resources must have been exhausted before we could bring them into the field to any purpose. Now that we are drove to the last extremity, and that the Nabob sees his danger, he has engaged to procure both the cavalry and the means, as has already been taken notice of in our address of this date, and on his performance rest all our hopes; but we are sorry to say, that in this, as in all his other undertakings, we have our doubts. Had we not received from Bengal very large supplies of money, far beyond our expectation,

because the Company's sentiments expressed in former letters in respect to Tanjore are very different, viz. in their general letter to the Select Committee, 17th March 1769, paragraphs 7 and 8.*

we must long ago have sunk under the burthen of this war, to the charges of which the ordinary revenues are very inadequate. Since then it is evident, that even those revenues are in time of war very precarious, and by the ravage of a few horse may in a great measure fail; since it is equally certain (at least we believe so) that Bengal may be as liable to this misfortune as the Coast, we hope your Honours will not think us too presuming, if we humbly offer to your consideration the fatal consequences that may attend your possessions in India, if a sufficient fund be not raised, and always kept in reserve, at each of your Presidencies, to answer the extraordinary charges of war, in case the ordinary revenues should fail. We foresee the great distress that must attend your affairs at home, should your investments be stopped, or even curtailed, in order to form such reserves; but in our humble opinion the question is, whether it were better to do so, or to expose the whole to the most dangerous risk? upon which subject we earnestly request your full and clear sentiments and orders.

We are,

HONOURABLE,

Your faithful humble servants,

Chs. Bouchier
Jof. Du Pré
John Call
Ar. Wynch
John Andrews
Geo. Stratton
Geo. Dawson
Jas. Bouchier
Geo. Mackay.

Fort St. George,
8th March, 1769.

Letter from the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, to the Court of Directors, dated 27th June, 1769. Received in London, 16th December, 1769.

To the Honourable the Court of Directors, for Affairs of the Honourable the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies.

HONOURABLE,

Par. 1. IN a separate address by the Dutton, under date the 8th March, we took the liberty to offer briefly our sentiments on the connexion between the Company and the Nabob, and the inconveniences that resulted from the present system. It is a subject at once so delicate and so interesting, that we must acknowledge we treat of it with reluctance; lest, on the one hand, by relating facts as they are, we should be thought to recommend, and secretly desire, measures which we most earnestly wish could safely be avoided; and lest, on the other, your affairs should be exposed to dangers for want of such an explanation. In this dilemma the first is best; we shall therefore beg leave to expose to you, without colouring, the true state of your affairs with the Nabob, and to request your orders thereon.

2. In our General Address we have laid before you a succinct account of the progress of the war, from the dispatch of the Dutton to the conclusion of the peace with Hyder Ally. As the terms of that peace are by no means such as we should have accepted if we could have found a better alternative, we have thought it proper to enter on our Diary a summary of the motives and necessities which induced us to subscribe to them; for although we have not a doubt within ourselves but that, even such as they

* See page 525.

R E M A R K.

We are by no means left to act according to our own judgment and discretion. The expedition is wholly to be undertaken for the Nabob's benefit, to levy a sum of

they are, the disadvantages are less, both to the Company and to the Nabob, than the continuance of the war; yet as the Nabob hath been very averse to the peace, such an explanation is rendered the more necessary to vindicate our conduct. At the same time that it seemed requisite that we should set forth the causes which compelled us into that peace, it is equally necessary that we should justify ourselves to you for not having concluded it sooner: the only apparent opportunity was that which seemed to present itself in the negotiation which was opened at Colar in the month of October, but ended abruptly after the battle of Muliawakel, as has been fully related in our former advices. After that disappointment we took every occasion to renew the negotiation, which it was not in our power to bring to a speedier or better conclusion than has been set forth in our general advices and consultations.

3. The settling and adjusting with Hyder Ally the terms of peace were not the only difficulties we met with in the course of the negotiation. Had we been treating for the Company's separate and distinct concerns, unconnected with the Nabob's, few obstacles we believe would have occurred; for Hyder Ally has upon all occasions expressed and demonstrated a desire of peace and friendship with the Company; and the reason is clear; for were the Company to observe a neutrality, and leave the Nabob to protect his own country, it is beyond a doubt that the whole would fall to the first invader; and this we say without any design to injure the Nabob's reputation: his circumstances have been such, from his accession to the government 'till this time, as have put it out of his power to stand without support: this however is the fact; and the disadvantage to the Company in such a connexion consists in this; that whilst the burthen of defence and protection rests on the Company, they possess but a part of the means; and as the Nabob, though unable of himself to defend his own territories, possesses nevertheless in it's full extent the government of the country, the appointment of, and command over the persons intrusted with the departments, and the entire disposal of the productions and revenues, it is evident that in all transactions respecting the Carnatick he must be consulted, and nothing can properly be done without his concurrence. It is true, that knowing his sole dependence to be on the Company, whatever the necessities of your affairs require he must in the end comply with; nevertheless, as it is necessary in all things to preserve the dignity of his station, and consequently to procure his assent to all measures respecting the Carnatick, great management and address are requisite in such points as do not coincide with his inclination or interest, real or imaginary; whence delays, difficulties, and impediments are continually arising, very injurious to the public service. This disadvantage has in some measure always subsisted, but never in the degree to which it has of late arisen: to assign the causes might not be difficult; but whatever they be, the effects are such as we have related. Your Honours will please to observe, in the course of our proceedings, from the commencement of the negotiation to the conclusion of the peace, how desirous the Nabob has been to continue the war, although latterly his whole country has been at stake, even whilst the Carnatick was actually sustaining more cruel ravages than it had ever before been exposed to, and when every day brought fresh advices of the enemy's progress in the Tinnevely country, where his Sepoys were treacherously delivering up the forts one after another. The motives to a conduct so extraordinary appear to be principally these: first, a rooted and unconquerable hatred to his adversary; an insatiable desire of extending his possessions at least as far as the Ghauts, or Passes between the mountains that separate the Balaghaut from the Payen Ghaut country; and an opinion that the Company's credit and resources in Bengal are inexhaustible. Whence so great an enmity should have arisen we cannot tell; the Nabob imputes it to the assistance which Hyder Ally gave to the French at the time of the siege of Pondicherry; that indeed might have created a political enmity; but this seems to be personal, for the Nabob would never condescend to write to him, and has taken all occasions to treat him in the most contemptuous manner; not deigning to speak of him by any other name or style than Hyder Naigue, or simply the Naigue; although the Subah and others have, as it suited their purposes, given him the title of Nabob. In return for this treatment Hyder Ally refuses the title of Nabob to his adversary, and never speaks of him by any other than that of Mahomed Ally, and often with the addition of very opprobrious terms. However trivial this circumstance may appear, it certainly contributed greatly to our difficulties

in

money. We are enjoined to support the Nabob's pretensions on the Rajah of Tanjore; and if the Rajah shall refuse, we are then to pursue such measures as *the Nabob may think consistent with the justice and dignity of his Government.*

in the course of the negotiation, and may occasion fresh troubles, if some means of reconciliation be not successfully employed, which shall engage our best endeavours. In respect to the Passes, the possession of them would certainly be advantageous, though probably not of so much importance as has been imagined; but as the possession of them would separate from the Myfore dominions large and valuable countries, there could be no reasonable foundation for such ideas in the latter part of the war. As to the supplies for carrying on the war, it was in vain that we represented to him his mistaken opinion of our resources, and that even if we possessed them in as great an extent as he supposed, there could be no reason why the Company should exhaust their treasures for the support of countries, and the acquisition of others, from whence they were to derive no advantage. At length, seeing us determined to proceed in the negotiation (although he had, upon our urgent demands of money, constantly protested that he had not the means of supplying us with more than he did) he now offered to furnish the necessary funds for the whole charges of war, and to entertain besides an army of 10,000 Marattas. A proposition so disproportionate to what we conceive to be within the compass of his ability, could only serve as a striking proof, amongst many others, that there was not any extremity, however great, to which he would not rather have exposed himself, than have submitted to the terms which we found it necessary for your affairs to comply with.

4. Although the negotiation was carried on by us on behalf of the Company and the Carnatick, in strict propriety the Nabob ought certainly to have been made a contracting party in the treaty; but although we represented and explained to him the necessity of complying with that form to preserve his own dignity, yet he absolutely refused to be made a party, and for this reason, that he could not submit to give Hyder Ally the title of Nabob. Finding all arguments and persuasions ineffectual, the only proper alternative that remained was, that he should empower us to conclude and engage for the Carnatick as well as for the Company. This he consented to, and promised the President that he would address a letter to him to that effect, upon the faith of which promise the treaty was drawn conformably thereto; but the promised letter has never been given, and is now refused; so that there appears no authority on our records for the engagement we have entered into on behalf of the Carnatick: we consider this as a matter of no great consequence; the circumstance however deserves to be mentioned, as it marks the Nabob's present temper and disposition.

5. The treaty (concerning which we have spoken fully in our general address) being concluded, it became immediately necessary to settle with the Nabob the disposition of the troops, and the sums to be paid by him for the maintenance of those which are charged to his account, and towards the reimbursement of his debt to you. Hitherto the Nabob had frequently mentioned his apprehensions, that the peace we are about to conclude would be but of short duration; and that he would recommend above all things, that, as soon as it were concluded we should take the advantage of the interval to prepare again for war. After such sentiments, we were amazed to hear from him a proposal that we should disband the ten battalions of Sepoys, which had hitherto been trained, disciplined, officered, and paid by the Company, but charged to his account; or, if they were still kept up, that they should be entertained for the Company's account, alledging that he was unable to bear the charge. To this we objected, that the establishment of ten battalions had been formed with his full and free consent and approbation, that it had received your sanction, and that it appeared to us a point of too much importance to be relinquished without your permission; but that even had we the power to do so, it would certainly be an impolitical and dangerous measure; for it could not be doubted, but that these veterans, if disbanded, would seek their bread in the service of his enemies, where they would be eagerly entertained and cherished; or if, to prevent that, he should take them into his own pay, the expense would be nearly the same, and the difference would only be in the service to be had from them; that in less than six months they would lose their discipline, and become no better than his other Sibbendy troops, and consequently of no use in the defence of the country. At length he consented that seven thousand Sepoys should be entertained on the former plan, and charged to him; with this we thought it advisable to comply, keeping still the number of ten battalions, but reducing the number of men, which may be again augmented should oc-

We are not allowed to judge of that consistency; it is left wholly to the Nabob.

casion require. This, and every other reduction of expense that can be safely, ought undoubtedly to be made.

6. The next proposal made by the Nabob was, that these Sepoys, and all the Company's troops, should be withdrawn from his forts into the Jughire and the Company's bounds, and that his own country should be left entirely to his own management; protesting at the same time that he depended entirely on the Company for protection and support, that his attachment to them was inviolable, and that his only motive to this proposal was, to avoid the inconveniences and detriment which he sustained in his revenue, by the intermeddling of our officers, their Dubashes and servants. That the Nabob's attachment to the Company and to the English Nation is true and sincere we do verily believe, and that upon grounds and reasons the most cogent that can possibly exist—self-interest; he sees and knows perfectly well, and often repeats, that he has no other friends in the world on whom he can place the least dependence for protection and support, and that he is utterly unable to defend himself without their assistance. But at the same time that he thus feels his own weakness and dependence, his fears and jealousy of the Company's power and intentions rise in proportion; he has ever present before him the transactions in Bengal; and whenever we find it necessary to press him on any point that is disagreeable to him, he imagines immediately that we are only seeking some plausible pretence to seize his country. To satisfy the mind of a jealous suspicious man is impossible; and in the present case we can do no more, than to give him the strongest assurances of the Company's friendship and attachment to his person and family; that they have not the least intention of appropriating to their use any of his possessions, but as they have for a great number of years been in advance large sums of money on his account, it is just and reasonable that they should be reimbursed, and they expect it accordingly. These apprehensions of the Nabob we believe to be the true cause of his wishing to have the Company's troops removed from his garrisons; not but that we are sensible of many inconveniences to him and his managers from the conduct of some of our officers and their Dubashes, which it is not in our power wholly to prevent, because of the difficulty of ascertaining facts: we shall however use every means in our power to satisfy the Nabob on this subject, but we shall on no account consent to withdraw your troops from the principal garrisons where they have hitherto been stationed, until his debt to the Company be completely discharged, or until we have your sanction for so doing.

7. It appears in the course of our proceedings, that, upon our pressing instances to the Nabob to assist us with as much money as he could towards the charges of the war, he engaged to pay us one Lack of Pagodas in January, one Lack in March, and one Lack in May. Upon the conclusion of the peace, only half a Lack had been received on account of the January Kist; of course there remained due one Lack and an half on account of the January and March Kists; and the May Kist was not then due. It has been before observed, that the Nabob, in order to induce us to reject such forms of accommodation as our then distresses urged us to accept, had offered to bear the whole charges of the war; that it was certain his known resources could by no means extend to such an undertaking, and we had no reason to think he had secret means equal to it: however, by such a declaration, he now stood exposed to this dilemma; either he could, or he could not supply such sums as were requisite; if he could not, the attempt to deceive us into inextricable difficulties, by continuing the war, without the means of supporting it, was unpardonable; if he could, the time was now at hand, when a part of those sums might be most profitably applied in reimbursement of the debt he owed to the Company, of which we stood in the greatest need, as has already been explained in our general advices, for defraying our current expenses, and discharging a part of the heavy debt on bond which we had contracted in the course of the war. As we never believed him by any means able to procure the sums necessary for the support of the war had it continued, we were unwilling now to take the advantage of that rash offer, (although he had much aggravated that circumstance, by causing reports to be circulated in the colony, that we were under no necessity of concluding a peace from want of money, since he had undertaken to supply us); and considering the ruined state of the province, the loss of revenue that must thence ensue, and the sums that would be necessary to enable the inhabitants to resettle the country, we proposed to the Nabob, and requested,

If the Nabob then refuse his assent to the reduction of Tanjore, tells us he is satisfied to accommodate his difference with the Rajah on terms, it is

quested, that he would discharge the Lack and an half of Pagodas, which were due in March, before the conclusion of the war; and that from the 1st May 1769 to the 30th April 1770, he would pay five Lacks of Pagodas; out of which the charges of the seven thousand Sepoys agreed to be entertained on his account should be deducted, as well as all other charges of the garrisons where the Company's troops are stationed, and that the residue should go in abatement of so much of his debt. We are really of opinion that he might pay off these sums in the time we have named, and therefore we have been the more earnest and pressing in our request; but we are sorry to say we have not found so ready a compliance as we think the case requires on the one part, and admits on the other. Had we, or could we obtain an authentic account of the revenues of the country, and the real and necessary charges, we should be better able to form an accurate judgment of what might be done; as it is, we are much in the dark, and cannot pursue any measures for obtaining better lights without awakening all the Nabob's fears and jealousies. On the subject of these payments, as well as the Sepoys, the President addressed a letter to the Nabob the 17th of April, to which he has not yet returned any answer. It would be needless to relate minutely all that has passed on this subject, relative to the necessities urged and proved on our part for requesting these sums, and the distresses opposed on his part against the payment of them; but the President informs us, that in a late conversation with the Nabob, he hath promised to pay the whole six Lacks and an half of Pagodas from the 1st of July 1769 to the 30th of June 1770, which takes in two months more than we had proposed; so that (having already received from him half a Lack in January, and no more) supposing him to fulfil his promise, the whole sum that will be paid by the Nabob in the course of eighteen months, that is to say from the 1st January 1769 to the 30th June 1770, will amount to seven Lacks of Pagodas. This being so far settled, it remained to adjust the Kists or terms of payments; and here new difficulties have arisen; the Nabob, still urging his own inability and the distresses of the country, proposes to pay but little in the beginning, of course throwing back the large payments to the latter part of the term, which will greatly distress us; but we can see no remedy, having gone as far as we can without coming to an open rupture.

8. What we have said respects the sums we require out of the Nabob's own revenues; he is besides indebted to you in a very large sum on account of the Jaghire Lands, and Poonamallee, which he holds at rent under the name of Vincatachellum, who was a Bramin in his service, but is since dead.

9. Your Honours were advised by the Egmont from the other department, that the Nabob had delivered in an account of losses sustained in the Jaghire and Poonamallee by the incursion of the enemy in September 1767, amounting to Pagodas 1,58,281,30,75. We have not been able hitherto to obtain any satisfactory testimony of these losses; we have appointed a Committee to examine the accounts, and purpose, if necessary, to send a Member of the Board to enquire of the said losses on the spot: at present we can only say, that we do not conceive it possible they could really have amounted to a fourth part of the sum. Besides these losses, much greater have certainly been sustained since January last, when Hyder again entered the Carnatick; and particularly in the months of March and April, just before the conclusion of the peace, when great part of the Sumbah crop, the most valuable of the year, was still on the ground. Of these we have yet no account; but supposing both losses, that of 1767 and that of 1769, to amount to a Lack and an half of Pagodas, and deducting that sum from the arrears of rent, the Nabob will even in that case be indebted upwards of two Lacks of Pagodas on the first of July 1769; to which, if the growing rents be added until the 30th June 1770, in order to bring both accounts to the same term, the whole will amount to upwards of five Lacks and an half. To make the payments upon the whole as easy to the Nabob as the demands for our expenses will possibly allow, we have proposed, and he after much difficulty has consented to, the payment of Pagodas 65,000 per month from the 1st July to the 31st December, amounting to Pagodas 3,90,000. The balance of the two sums, that is to say, the Nabob's own account, and the rents of the Jaghire and Poonamallee, we propose to be paid in the following Kists, viz.

without any colour of authority that we go further, and at our great peril.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam^l. Ardley.

In January	—	—	—	—	1,70,000
March	—	—	—	—	2,00,000
April	—	—	—	—	2,50,000
And the residue before the end of June, about					2,00,000

*To which the Nabob has not yet consented, saying, that he cannot settle the Kist until he shall have been at Arcot, and inspected his accounts.

10. Having thus given your Honours a very minute and circumstantial detail of our late transactions with the Nabob, we hope you will not impute to us, in so doing, the intention of injuring him in your estimation; the critical situation in which we stand, makes it necessary that you should be furnished with every possible material, that might be essential to the forming your judgment. The true characters of men are better ascertained by the minutiae of their lives, than by a few great outlines, the effects perhaps of necessity. To have said in general, that we have had great difficulty in transacting your affairs with the Nabob, would have conveyed a very inadequate idea of the perplexities in which we have been involved. The Nabob no doubt thinks himself injured as well in the terms of peace, as in the subsequent arrangement of the military establishment, and in our pressing demand for money; and there are in all places men ever ready, some through interest, and some through envy, to give the very worst construction to every act of Government. The peace is an act of necessity warranted by your commands, and the distressed circumstances of your affairs on the Coast, which left us no choice but that or worse. The military establishment is of the first consequence, unless it were at once resolved to abandon the Carnatick, and with it all hopes of recovering the sums you have expended in it's defence. And in respect to money, were not our wants great as they are, we should have recommended some respite, that the country might the sooner recover itself. In a general calamity every one should cheerfully bear a part. The individuals of this Colony, who have lent their money to the Company, many who have borrowed that they might lend, suffer in their mercantile concerns, by having that money locked up, which they might employ to much greater advantage. The Company suffer in various ways; the expense of treasure, the loss in revenue, and the failure of investment, are immediate. The consequences may be still more important. If there be a possibility, our current and necessary expenses must first be provided for; next the discharge of our debt; and we have at present no resource but in the Nabob, that is to say the Carnatick, on which so much has been expended, except your own revenues, great part of which are also in the Nabob's hands.

11. If the details we have made are necessary to give you a just idea of the past, they are equally so to enable you to form your judgment of the future. The long friendship and alliance which has subsisted between the Company and the Nabob; your promises and engagements to support him and his family; the large debt that he owes you; the probable detriment to your affairs should the Carnatick fall into other hands; and the probability, we might almost say certainty, that it will do so, if not prevented by the interposition of your power; are cogent reasons for employing your forces whenever the safety of the Carnatick may be threatened. On the other hand, if once you take up arms, you cannot again lay them down at pleasure. Although acting only as an ally, the Company will be considered as the principal, and the Nabob but as a name. Thus engaged, the charges of the war must be furnished by some means or other; and if the Nabob cannot or will not, the Company must or abandon every thing; and of his ability we are and ever must remain ignorant, whilst he industriously conceals from us the amount of his receipts and disbursements. We should be unjust to the Nabob, were we not to acknowledge that he hath suffered great difficulties and distresses: from his first connexion with the Company

in 1746, to the reduction of Pondicherry in 1761, was one continued scene of war, in which he was
more

more than once reduced to great extremities: the revenues which came into his possession from the Carnatick were very inadequate to the charges of such a war; considerable treasures accumulated by his father were brought in aid and expended, and very heavy debts were contracted besides: before these could be much reduced, the defection of Ussif Khan in the Madura country brought on a very expensive expedition, and raised his debts again as high as ever: nevertheless, *that* to the Company would in all probability have been cleared before this time, had not the late unfortunate war prevented it. Large sums of money have certainly been paid in discharge of his debts from 1761 to this time, but his revenues during that period have also been very considerable; and we are not able to account for the application of them, when we consider the large debt he hath contracted to individuals, besides that to the Company: be that as it may, certain it is, that at present the Nabob does insist that his circumstances are greatly distressed, and we have no proof to the contrary. In case therefore of a fresh war, before the Nabob shall have discharged his debts, by what means can the charges be defrayed? It is evident that it will not be possible for him to lay by any thing, if he will do justice to the Company and his creditors; it is equally evident, that the ordinary revenues uninterrupted would not suffice for the exigencies of war; much less being, as they are, liable to failure by the ravages of a few horse: it follows therefore, that if the Company engage themselves in defence of the Carnatick, the burthen must lie on them; and all the expense, over and above what can be furnished by the Nabob out of the rising revenues (for which too his accounts must be taken and admitted without control) must be drawn from your Treasury or credit, as far as they will go; and when they are at an end, there the contest must end: so that, unless the Carnatick should from this time for several years to come enjoy profound peace, (which we are sorry to say is not probable) what may be extinguished of the Nabob's debt in the years of peace, will accumulate again by the charges of war. From past experience, and the prospect that now lies before us, these seem to be the natural consequences that may result from your engagement to protect the Carnatick; if, on the other hand, the necessity of your affairs, or any other causes, should determine you at any time to a neutrality, and the defence of your own possessions solely, these would probably be the effects of such a resolution: the Nabob having hitherto depended entirely on the Company for the defence of the country, has in himself no power to restrain even the Polligars, and of course he must fall a sacrifice to the first powerful invader; and we are sorry to say, that amongst all the neighbouring Powers (the Subah, the Marattas, Hyder Ally, the King of Tanjore) he has not a friend: the French too would no doubt come in for their share; and where such a scene of confusion might end is hard to say. We hope it will not be put to the trial; but we think it nevertheless our duty to expose to you our genuine thoughts and reflexions on this important subject, and earnestly to request your full and clear sentiments and directions for our future guidance.

12. Facts we shall always lay before you as they are; deductions from those facts being matter of opinion, we hope we shall be pardoned if at any time we err. The Nabob is most certainly apprehensive to the greatest degree (or affects being so), that sooner or later some pretence will be found to seize the Carnatick, and establish such a system as has been introduced in Bengal; on this account, if for no other, he seems earnestly desirous of discharging the debt he owes the Company, that he might then, with better grace, desire that all his forts might be put into his own hands; and should a fortunate interval of peace, or any secret resources, which we know not of, put it in his power to annihilate his debt, we have no doubt but he would insist that you should no longer keep up the 10 battalions of Sepoys on his account, that your troops should evacuate all his forts, and retire into the Jaghire and your own possessions, preserving nevertheless the alliance in all other respects. We fear the day is distant that may give him an opportunity to make such a proposition on such grounds: 'tis good nevertheless to be prepared; and we therefore beg leave to offer this subject to your consideration, and to request your orders thereon. The 8th paragraph of your commands of the 24th December 1765 leads us in part to your ideas on this subject, but does not reach to the case here suggested.

13. Mr. Barnard is still employed in surveying the Jaghire Lands, and hath made considerable progress; but much remains still to be done, and the work advances but slowly. He hath often represented the delays and impediments he meets with, from the backwardness of the Managers and Chiefs of the districts in giving him the necessary assistance; the Nabob has been frequently requested to issue his orders that Mr. Barnard may have all proper helps, and he hath promised to do so, but without much effect. When this survey shall be completed, we hope to acquire a more accurate knowledge of the value of these lands than hath hitherto been practicable. Upon such information as we have been able to obtain, we have no cause to differ from the representations that have been made to you at vari-

ous times, in the general advices from hence, touching the value of these districts; and we are of opinion, that if the Nabob continues to pay the full rents at which he hath farmed them, he must either oppress the inhabitants, or make good the deficiency out of his other revenues. Indeed we are sorry to say, that the apprehensions your Honours expressed in your commands of the 26th April 1765, paragraph 30, have but too much foundation; and we despair of seeing this valuable part of your possessions in a more flourishing condition than any other part of the Carnatick, whilst it remains under the Nabob's management: it is not in reason to suppose that he would encourage the inhabitants of your lands, to the prejudice of those which he considers as his own; but it is certain, that if no other encouragement were given, than merely not to exact more than the just proportion due to the Circar, *thus* alone would put the inhabitants in a far better condition than those of any other part of the Carnatick: common policy therefore would oppose such a preference, especially when immediate interest so plainly concurs. The experience we have lately had of the intractable disposition of the Nabob's Amuldar, gave us great cause to wish we had not parted with the power over these districts. When the enemy lately entered the Carnatick, we foresaw that the Jaghire, as well as other parts, might be exposed to their ravages, and that Madras might be distressed for provision; we therefore requested the Nabob, in the most pressing manner, to issue positive orders to the Amuldar to lay in as much as possible of the grain, provisions, and production of the country of every kind, into the forts of Chingleput and Poonamallee, and to use all possible means of conveying a good store to Madras. We must do the Nabob the justice to say he did repeatedly issue his orders, and we believe with a desire of having them obeyed; yet the effects were far short of our expectation, of which it would be endless to relate the particulars. The term granted to the Nabob, in the name of Vincatachelum, for the farm of the Jaghire and Poonamallee, will expire in July 1771; it rests with your Honours to determine whether they shall again be put under the Nabob's management if he should chuse it, or be let to other renters, or be managed by Amuldar. There is no doubt but that the Nabob will offer a much higher rent than any other person: the reasons and the consequences have been explained: and as your Honours are now furnished with all the lights we can at present give on this subject, it only remains that we request you will be pleased, before the expiration of the term, to signify to us your pleasure on this subject.

14. In our Consultation of the 17th April it is noted, that the Nabob's account current was laid before the Board, and the Accomptant ordered to make it up in future to the end of April, that it may correspond with the general books; agreeable thereto, his account comes a number in the packet: we are sorry to find the balance in your favour so large as Pagodas 1,240,373. 12 : 62.

15. The charges incurred in the late war stand separately in your books under the head of War with Hyder Ally. We intended to have sent by this dispatch a complete statement of this account, but the sudden death of Mr. Raitt the Paymaster, without completing his camp disbursements, and the uncertainty of arrears due to prisoners, will not permit us to ascertain the whole charge at one view, though we think it cannot be less than 14½ Lacks of Pagodas.

16. In our several conferences with the Nabob, since the conclusion of the war, this account hath often been the subject of much contest, and much concern, both to him and to us; and the result hath always been an earnest request on his part, that we would refer the consideration of this subject to your Honours, and wait your orders thereon; which we have consented to the more readily, because we may receive your directions long, very long, we fear, before the balance due on his particular account, referred to in the preceding article, can possibly be cleared off, and because these are circumstances which deserve consideration.

17. Your Honours have, from the beginning to this time, been very minutely informed of the remote and immediate causes, the incidents and progress of the war; and having thus every material before you, we should presume too much were we to offer our sentiments how far your possessions and how far the Nabob's were interested; the decision of that point must rest wholly on your judgment. Upon one circumstance however we beg leave to make some remarks. After the peace with the Subah in the beginning of 1768, and his separation from Hyder Ally, when it was judged expedient to carry the war into the Balaghaut, the Nabob, in consideration that all the country which might be subjected in that expedition, should be put under his management, and upon other motives, which appear in his agreement†, undertook to bear all the charges of the war. This agreement taken simply would certainly subject him to the whole; but when the unfortunate turn of the war,

† Consultation, 11th April 1768,

the distressed and ruined state of the Carnatick, the immense load of debt which the Nabob labours under, are all considered, we rest in doubt. Should your Honours upon the whole determine that the Carnatick shall make good all the expenses incurred, it shall be our part to conform ourselves to your pleasure; but should it appear equitable to you that any part should fall on the Company, it would then remain to ascertain that part; and if it should appear to you, that the risks were proportionate to the possessions, it seems a natural consequence, that the charges should be so likewise. The mean value of your late acquisitions, that is to say, the Circars and Jaghire, may be estimated from 35 to 40 Lacks of Rupees; the Nabob's revenues we can only guess at; we judge they may amount to between 70 and 80 Lacks of Rupees; but this is not founded on any proof, nor can we obtain any accurate account of them.

18. Whilst these matters were under deliberation with the Nabob, he addressed a letter to the President, desiring that he might have a copy of his accounts from the beginning of his connexion with the Company to this time. As he has had from time to time general statements, or accounts-current, to which he never before objected, an application now for the account particulars, for almost twenty years back, seems to imply new doubts and distrust: however, as he has a right to be satisfied, and there can be no objection to his having the particulars but the trouble of copying them, he was informed, that as such a work would be very voluminous, we could not spare hands immediately for such a purpose; but that if he was desirous of inspecting the accounts, or even of taking copies, the books should be laid before him: they have, according to his desire, been sent to him.

19. Since writing the foregoing, the Nabob has within these few days returned an answer to the President's letter of the 17th April, mentioned in the 7th paragraph of this address. Time will not admit of our making any remarks thereon; indeed it is the less necessary, as, from what we have herein before said, your Honours will have a very clear idea of our situation with respect to the Nabob.

We are,

HONOURABLE,

your faithful humble Servants,

Fort St. George,
27th June, 1769.

Chs. Bouchier
Jof. Du Pré
John Call
John Andrews
Saml. Ardley
J. L. Smith
Geo. Stratton
Geo. Dawson
Jas. Bouchier
John Whitehill.

Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the Commissioners, dated 23d March, 1770.

30. IT is with the utmost concern that we read the advices of our late Governor and Council of Fort St. George relative to the Nabob of Arcot. We allow their sentiments on the critical situation of his affairs with the Company to be but too just, and the conclusions they have made to be such as present appearances warrant them to draw therefrom; sorry we are to be obliged to add, it appears to us, that the imprudent and impolitic schemes engaged in and pursued by themselves, have eventually increased the Nabob's debts, and heightened his distresses to so great a degree, that it is become necessary, in their opinion, by some means or other, to become possessed of such a mode or measure of power over the Nabob's revenues, which, though it might perhaps operate immediately in favour of his creditors, considered simply as such, could scarce fail also of being productive of events, which might issue in the total annihilation of all our interest and influence in the Carnatick.

31. When we reflect on the long experience we have had of Mahomed Ally's faithful attachment to the English Company, we are surprized at the idea entertained by the Governor and Council, in their letters of the 8th March and 27th June 1769, to reduce him to a mere nominal Nabob.

• AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Saturday, 27th July, 1771.

• P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that, in consequence of the resolution taken at the last Committee, the 24th instant, viz. That the negotiation with Tanjore, or, negotiation proposed by the Nabob, be left to his management, under the support of the Company; he, the President, did on the 25th instant send for the Tanjore Vackeel, and after a proper introductory discourse, setting before him the steadiness with which the Company had on their part maintained their guaranty of the Treaty of 1762, their resolution to have preserved the same conduct, and the friendly advice that had often been given to his Master, informed him, that as much as the Company have wished to preserve peace and tranquillity, and to maintain the friendship which was established by the Treaty of 1762, they were equally determined to preserve their honour and dignity, and to suffer no infraction with impunity. That his Master's conduct had been so very exceptionable, that we could no longer look on it with indifference, and were determined to support the Nabob in all his *just* pretensions on the Rajah. That as these matters were the immediate concern of the Nabob, he, the President, advised him to wait on the Nabob immediately, if his Master wished to avoid the necessary conse-

32. The sanction of the Treaty of Paris, by which Treaty public faith became the guarantee of the Nabob's title, will be of little use to him, if notorious infringements of the rights and powers usually inherent in, and dependent on such title, should be by us countenanced and permitted to take place.

33. The vast sums which the Nabob owes the Company, and the distant and uncertain prospect of payment, while the Nabob's revenues are wholly in his own hands, and under his own management, are the reasons urged for adopting a new plan, or making some material alterations in our present system of policy with the Nabob; but as we conceive it will be extremely difficult to make an experiment of this kind, (and of the utility of the scheme we can only judge by experiment) without making such discovery of our intentions as would probably utterly destroy all the Nabob's confidence in us, which seems but too much weakened already, and also naturally tend to confirm the suspicions of all such Country Powers who may have received unfavourable impressions concerning us from the transactions at Bengal, we cannot think it prudent, or ourselves by any means warranted, again to alarm the inhabitants of India by attempts of this nature; more especially as perhaps we might thereby involve ourselves in the very disagreeable necessity of answering at some future period for the infraction of a public treaty, and the consequences thereof.

And we further request, that you embrace every opportunity, and use all means in your power, to remove any prejudices he may have imbibed to our disadvantage, and to convince him of the sincerity of our friendship for his person and family: in doing this, you will not fail to assure him in our name, that we cordially sympathize with him in his present unhappy circumstances, that we will contribute all in our power to protect the Carnatick, secure to him, as far as we may properly do it, all needful consequence in the eyes of Country Powers, maintain inviolably our faith with him, and that we repose the highest confidence in his honour for fulfilling all his engagements with the Company, so soon, and by such reasonable payments, as the exigencies of his affairs, and an economical management of his finances, may possibly enable him to perform.

quence of his late conduct. *The Vackeel seemed much alarmed, said his Master had, in his letter to the President, referred the differences between him and the Nabob to the Company, and wished we would take upon us to mediate between them.* The President however repeating his advice, that he should go to the Nabob, he said he would, and then withdrew; but some time after desired another audience, having something material to communicate. Being admitted, he begged that he might be permitted freely to disclose some matters relative to this subject, which affected it essentially, and which it might be material for him, the President, to know; and desired what he should say might be kept inviolably secret. He then said, that he was much alarmed at being desired to go to the Nabob, as such a reference seemed to imply an opinion or declaration that the Company's guaranty of the Treaty of 1762 was at an end; for which reason he thought it necessary to mention what had come to his knowledge; that some of the Nabob's principal courtiers, Vencatrow, the Cajancey or Treasurer, Auffem Khân, the Dewan, Mootevar Khân, &c. had declared that the English had formed the design of taking Tanjore fort and country for themselves; that they, the English, were a bad people; but that the Nabob would by no means consent thereto, and would use his endeavours to prevent it. That he, the Vackeel, had immediately sent this intelligence to his Master, who, in answer thereto, told him, that he did not give any credit to the declarations of the Nabob's courtiers; and as a proof that he did not, he was ready and willing to settle terms of accommodation, under the guaranty of the English, on whose faith and promise he would rely; but that he would never trust the Nabob without the security of the English; as he well knew the Nabob's intentions were to accommodate matters for the present; but that he had bad intentions, whenever an opportunity should offer in future. He added, that the following information he had from the Maratta Vackeel himself, Madarow Sadafive, viz.—That the Nabob had within ten days past, or thereabouts, sent for him, Madarow Sadafive, and told him a great deal of the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore, which he represented to be very bad and injurious to him, the Nabob. To which the Maratta Vackeel replied, that the Rajah's conduct did not appear to him altogether such as it was represented; but that, if it were agreeable to the Nabob, he would write to the Rajah, in order to bring about an accommodation. That the Nabob replied, it was necessary he should first propose it to the Governor, and have his consent; because, as the English were guarantees of the Treaty of 1762, they would take offence if any accommodation should take place without their concurrence. That the matter rested here for some days; when the Maratta Vackeel, pressing the Nabob to come to some resolution whether he, the Vackeel, should write to the Rajah or not; the Nabob told him, that he had mentioned it to the Governor, who did not approve of it; and the reason the Nabob assigned for the Governor's objection was, that if an accommodation should be brought about, by the means of the Maratta, he, the Governor, would get nothing by it himself. To all which the President replied, that he could not at this time enter into an explanation of these subjects, and could only repeat his recommendation to the Vackeel to wait upon the Nabob without delay.

The President adds, that he has had information of the declaration of the Nabob's courtiers, touching the designs of the English upon Tanjore, through another channel, and before the conference above-mentioned with the Tanjore Vackeel.

718 EXPEDITION AGAINST TÁNJORE IN 1771.

The President desires that it may be remarked, that the Nabob imputes the reluctance of the Committee to throw the negotiation, or rather mediation, into the hands of the Maratta Vackeel to the President's personal objection, viz. *That he should get nothing by it.* These injuries we must be content to bear; the same motives may be, and probably are imputed to every measure in which we differ from the Nabob: they are the more cruel, because they are not capable of refutation by proof; for what proof can ever be brought of such a negative?

The President further informs the Committee, that the next day, being yesterday, he waited on the Nabob, informed him of what he had said to the Tanjore Vackeel, of his advising him to wait on him, the Nabob, and of his, the Vackeel's, promise to do so; and added, that having now done all that he could for the present, consistently with the plan proposed, what remained rested wholly on him, the Nabob: that he begged leave however to repeat and enforce the observations he before made in the course of their deliberations, viz. that the season was now far advanced; that it seemed probable the Rajah would use delays, procrastinations, and evasions, in order to waste time, until the approach of the rains shall put it out of our power to use military compulsion; that to prevent the effect of such a design, it seemed necessary to press the Rajah to an immediate conclusion: the Nabob said that he was perfectly of the same opinion, and that he would press matters forward as much as possible.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Monday, 29th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that yesterday morning the Nabob's three sons called upon him at the Garden-House. The eldest informed him, that he was commanded by his father to communicate as follows, viz. That the Tanjore Vackeel had been with him: that, without reciting all that had passed, the Nabob made several demands, which he mentioned, and, to the best of the President's recollection, were as follows:

1st. That the arrears of Peshcush should be paid with interest, as the Nabob had assigned it to his creditors.

2d. That whatever had been taken from the Marawar should be given up to the Nabob.

3d. That

quence of his late conduct. *The Vackeel seemed much alarmed, said his Master had, in his letter to the President, referred the differences between him and the Nabob to the Company, and wished we would take upon us to mediate between them.* The President however repeating his advice, that he should go to the Nabob, he said he would, and then withdrew; but some time after desired another audience, having something material to communicate. Being admitted, he begged that he might be permitted freely to disclose some matters relative to this subject, which affected it essentially, and which it might be material for him, the President, to know; and desired what he should say might be kept inviolably secret. He then said, that he was much alarmed at being desired to go to the Nabob, as such a reference seemed to imply an opinion or declaration that the Company's guaranty of the Treaty of 1762 was at an end; for which reason he thought it necessary to mention what had come to his knowledge; that some of the Nabob's principal courtiers, Vencatrow, the Cajancey or Treasurer, Auffem Khân, the Dewan, Mootevar Khân, &c. had declared that the English had formed the design of taking Tahjore fort and country for themselves; that they, the English, were a bad people; but that the Nabob would by no means consent thereto, and would use his endeavours to prevent it. That he, the Vackeel, had immediately sent this intelligence to his Master, who, in answer thereto, told him, that he did not give any credit to the declarations of the Nabob's courtiers; and as a proof that he did not, he was ready and willing to settle terms of accommodation, under the guaranty of the English, on whose faith and promise he would rely; but that he would never trust the Nabob without the security of the English; as he well knew the Nabob's intentions were to accommodate matters for the present; but that he had bad intentions, whenever an opportunity should offer in future. He added, that the following information he had from the Maratta Vackeel himself, Madarow Sadafive, viz.—That the Nabob had within ten days past, or thereabouts, sent for him, Madarow Sadafive, and told him a great deal of the conduct of the Rajah of Tanjore, which he represented to be very bad and injurious to him, the Nabob. To which the Maratta Vackeel replied, that the Rajah's conduct did not appear to him altogether such as it was represented; but that, if it were agreeable to the Nabob, he would write to the Rajah, in order to bring about an accommodation. That the Nabob replied, it was necessary he should first propose it to the Governor, and have his consent; because, as the English were guarantees of the Treaty of 1762, they would take offence if any accommodation should take place without their concurrence. That the matter rested here for some days; when the Maratta Vackeel, pressing the Nabob to come to some resolution whether he, the Vackeel, should write to the Rajah or not; the Nabob told him, that he had mentioned it to the Governor, who did not approve of it; and the reason the Nabob assigned for the Governor's objection was, that if an accommodation should be brought about, by the means of the Maratta, *he, the Governor, would get nothing by it himself.* To all which the President replied, that he could not at this time enter into an explanation of these subjects, and could only repeat his recommendation to the Vackeel to wait upon the Nabob without delay.

The President adds, that he has had information of the declaration of the Nabob's courtiers, touching the designs of the English upon Tanjore, through another channel, and before the conference above-mentioned with the Tanjore Vackeel.

718 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

The President desires that it may be remarked, that the Nabob imputes the reluctance of the Committee to throw the negotiation, or rather mediation, into the hands of the Maratta Vackeel to the President's personal objection, viz. *That he should get nothing by it.* These injuries we must be content to bear; the same motives may be, and probably are imputed to every measure in which we differ from the Nabob: they are the more cruel, because they are not capable of refutation by proof; for what proof can ever be brought of such a negative?

The President further informs the Committee, that the next day, being yesterday, he waited on the Nabob, informed him of what he had said to the Tanjore Vackeel, of his advising him to wait on him, the Nabob, and of his, the Vackeel's, promise to do so; and added, that having now done all that he could for the present, consistently with the plan proposed, what remained rested wholly on him, the Nabob: that he begged leave however to repeat and enforce the observations he before made in the course of their deliberations, viz. that the season was now far advanced; that it seemed probable the Rajah would use delays, procrastinations, and evasions, in order to waste time, until the approach of the rains shall put it out of our power to use military compulsion; that to prevent the effect of such a design, it seemed necessary to press the Rajah to an immediate conclusion: the Nabob said that he was perfectly of the same opinion, and that he would press matters forward as much as possible.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Monday, 29th July, 1771. P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

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1st. That the arrears of Peshcush should be paid with interest, as the Nabob had assigned it to his creditors.

2d. That whatever had been taken from the Marawar should be given up to the Nabob.

3d. That

3d. That a sum should be paid to the Nabob, as an indemnification for the charges he had been put to in military preparation to do himself justice.

4th. That the Rajah shall give no aid or assistance of any kind to the enemies of the Circar.

5th. That whenever the Circar shall be involved in war or trouble, the Rajah shall, upon requisition, send a quota of troops to join and assist the Circar.

That to these demands the Vackeel replied, he had no power to settle these matters, but that he would write to his Master. Being asked how long it would be before he expected to receive an answer, he replied, in about 15 or 20 days.

That the Nabob thereupon recollected what the President had urged at the last conference concerning the Rajah's delays, and being convinced that nothing but a waste of time would be the event of a negotiation here with the Vackeel, thought more spirited measures might be necessary immediately to support a negotiation to be opened at Trichinopoly, to which place he proposed to send a proper person; to which he, the President, replied, that he would wait on the Nabob in the evening to deliberate further on measures.

That accordingly he did wait on the Nabob in the evening, who having related the substance of what is herein before inserted, added, that he purposed to send his eldest Son, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, to Trichinopoly, there to conduct the negotiation, and his second Son, Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, to have charge of supplying the army with provisions. That he thought it would be necessary now to put on the appearance of a determined resolution to use military compulsion, if an immediate compliance and submission to the terms demanded be not made.

That he, the President, assured the Nabob, that every measure should be immediately taken to give him the most effectual support; and as it might be necessary that the army should take the field, he desired the Nabob would give the necessary orders that the army might be effectually supplied with provisions: to which the Nabob replied, that we might rely on him, and that he wished the control, management, and direction of the Buzar might be entirely left to him; adding, that he did not propose it on account of the duties he should receive from it, for he would very willingly give the amount of them, whatever it might be, to the Commanding Officer: to which he, the President, replied, that the Nabob's generosity was well known to all the world; that whatever he thought proper on that occasion must be an act of his own free will and pleasure, and that the direction and control of the Buzar would be left entirely to him.

All which the Committee approve.

AGREED, that a report be made this day to the Board of the present state and circumstances of affairs between the Nabob, the Rajah, &c. with the opinion of
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this

this Committee, as to the measures taken and to be taken; that whatever be done in this important business, be done with the full concurrence of the Board.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam^l. Ardley.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 29th July, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley

John Smith

George Stratton

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

George Mackay.

THE Select Committee communicate to the Board the substance of the conferences the President had with the Nabob on the 22d, 23d, 26th, and 28th instant, as related in their minutes of 24th and 27th instant and this day; by which it appears that the Nabob seems inclined to settle the disputes with Tanjore by negotiation, but is desirous that the sole management should be left to him, without the intervention of the Board or Committee, otherwise than by affording him the necessary countenance and support in bringing the Rajah to terms. That in consequence thereof the Tanjore Vackeel had, at the desire of the President, waited on the Nabob, when it appeared that he was not furnished with instructions or powers for settling the differences; that it would be necessary for him to write to his Master, and that an answer could not be procured in less than twelve or fifteen days; from which it appeared evident that the Rajah only meant by delays and excuses to procrastinate until the Monsoon should set in, when it would be impossible to act against him; that the Nabob saw the conduct of the Rajah in the same light, and therefore thought it expedient that every thing should be immediately got in readiness to enforce the Nabob's demands. And that no time might be lost, the Nabob proposed that his eldest Son, Omdat-ul-Omrah, should immediately set out for Trichinopoly, and that he should have full instructions and powers for settling and concluding all matters; that his second Son, Mader-ul-Mulk, should also proceed to Trichinopoly, to whom it should be left to supply the army, and to superintend and manage the Buzar, which the Nabob particularly desired might be left entirely to him, and he would be careful that the troops should be amply furnished with all necessaries.

The Board having taken the foregoing into consideration, together with the reasons set forth by the Committee in their minutes of 24th instant* for leaving the negotiation wholly to the Nabob, are of opinion, that, all circumstances considered, the plan recommended is the most eligible: It is therefore resolved, that measures be immediately taken for carrying the same into execution; for which purpose the several returns of the troops being laid before the Board, the following disposition of them is now made; and ordered that the necessary instructions be dispatched for their being put in motion as soon as possible.

* Vide Page 702.

DISPOSITION OF THE TROOPS.

A R T I L L E R Y.

	Rank and File.
By General Smith's calculation required	300
Already at Trichinopoly, per return of June	101
To go from Vellour	20
To go from Madras	130
	<u>251</u>
Deficient	49

I N F A N T R Y.

By General Smith's calculation required	1200
Already at Trichinopoly, per return of June	844
To go from Vellour	150
To go from Madras	150
	<u>1144</u>
To go from Poonamallee, the Grenadier Company	70
	<u>1214</u>
Overplus	14

S E P O Y S.

By General Smith's calculation required	Eight Battalions	6000
Already at Trichinopoly, per return of June,	4 battalions,	4017
To go from Conjeveram, Cooke's,	1 ditto	1019
To go from Madura, Kelly's,	1 ditto	1000
To go from Vellour, Baillie's	1 ditto	1000
	<u>Battalions 7</u>	<u>7036</u>
	Deficient 1	
	Overplus	1036

To be ordered from Ongole to Vellour, Three Companies of Sepoys.
 from Poonamallee to Madras, Three ditto of Infantry.
 from Cuddalore to General Smith, Captain Kirker's Troop of Cavalry.

There will then remain	Artillery.	Infantry.	Sepoys.
At Veliour and Amboor,	32	162	1 bat. 3 companies.
At Madras,	50	250	2 bat.
At Ongole			7 companies.
At Poonamallee,		1 company,	and about 200 recruits.

RESOLVED, That the stores to be sent from hence to Vellour be put under the escort of the troops ordered to proceed to Trichinopoly; that the detachment from hence be joined by the grenadier company from Poonamallee, at Chingleput by Captain Cook's battalion at Carangoly, and by the Vellour detachment at Volconda.

722 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

The Board taking into consideration the expediency of ordering the corps of Engineers to camp, are of opinion that it is unnecessary, until we see what turn the negotiation is likely to take; in the mean time it is resolved, that only Captain Montrefor with two subalterns do join the army.

AGREED, That Mr. Casamajor be appointed Commissary, and Mr. Petrie Paymaster to the army; and it being proper that one of the Chaplains should attend the troops in the field, it is agreed that the offer be made to Mr. Thomas, as senior Chaplain.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 30th July, 1771.

WROTE the following letter to General Smith.

To Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

WE need not say that it has been our earnest wish to be enabled to take some decisive measures in respect to the Rajah of Tanjore; to explain the difficulties that have occurred, and the reasons for the resolutions now taken, would be of little use; thus it stands at present: The Nabob has determined to accept of terms from the Rajah; but as his Vackeels are not empowered to conclude, and so much time must necessarily be wasted if a negotiation were to be carried on with Tanjore at this distance; more especially as the Rajah will doubtless use all possible delays, in order to protract the time until the season shall be too far advanced for a military expedition; the Nabob hath therefore resolved to send his eldest Son, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, to Trichinopoly, to demand certain concessions and submissions of the Rajah. But as it is highly probable that the Rajah will never comply with such terms as shall be deemed safe, honourable, and sufficient, unless compelled thereto by actual force, or the real belief of our resolution to use such; we have therefore, upon the Nabob's declaration of his intention, come to the immediate and strong resolution to take every measure in our power to enable you to proceed against Tanjore, should the Rajah refuse or delay to submit to such reasonable conditions as shall be demanded. To this end we have ordered the artillery and stores, mentioned in the accompanying list, to be immediately dispatched to you from hence, and a further quantity, mentioned in another list enclosed, to be forwarded to you from Vellour; and these will be escorted by detachments of troops from hence and Vellour, mentioned in the enclosed disposition, which are ordered to join you, and will proceed without delay: in the mean time we desire you will make all the preparation in your power for taking the field as soon, or before the said detachments shall have joined, if you find it necessary; and we recommend to you, if you see no capital objection, after leaving in Trichinopoly such a garrison as you shall think fit, to draw together the rest and encamp on the plain, that you may be ready to move as occasion may require.

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The Nabob has undertaken to supply the army with provision, and to appoint proper persons to manage direct and superintend the Buzar, and has assigned this department to his second Son, Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder; and we rest on his assurances that such measures shall be taken as shall ensure plenty.

We shall immediately appoint a Commissary and Paymaster to accompany the army.

As it will be necessary that a Brigade Major be appointed, if the army take the field, we desire you will recommend a proper person for that employ.

We now order the Storekeeper at Trichinopoly to prepare as many Doolies as may be necessary, in case the army should take the field; these are to be under the charge of the Surgeons; and you will be pleased to inform us what other regulation you think may be necessary on this subject, and most conducive to the good of the service.

Orders have been issued for the several detachments, mentioned in the enclosed disposition of the troops, to march; except Captain Kelly's battalion of Sepoys at Madura, regarding which you will be pleased to give the necessary directions.

The Nabob has promised to order three battalions of his Sepoys, with the cavalry under Captains Matthews and Rumley, to join you.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
30th July, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOSIAS DU PRE, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 4th August, 1771.

THE following letter was this day wrote to General Smith, to go by the Nabob's eldest Son.

To Brigadier-General Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

IN our letter to you of the 30th July, we mentioned to you in general terms the reinforcements and stores we were sending to you, and their objects; it is necessary now that we should be more explicit.

That the Rajah of Tanjore may not avail himself of procrastinations, until the season shall be so far advanced as to render it impracticable to compel or reduce him by military operations, before the rains, to the terms and conditions that shall be thought safe and proper, the Nabob Waulau Jau has determined to depute

his eldest Son, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, to assert his claims on the Rajah, and has invested him solely with full power to negotiate and finally to conclude; and he will proceed immediately for that purpose to join the army under your command. This measure is the more necessary, because it is of the last importance that the matters in question relative to Tanjore be fully and firmly determined before the setting in of the rains. • It is impossible now to ascertain what particular circumstances may arise with such precision, as to give full and ample instructions concerning the same; and as so much time might be lost in writing to us for instructions, and waiting for our answer, as might frustrate our hopes of happily terminating the business now in hand before the rains, it is therefore necessary to inform you, that it is our determined resolution to support the intended negotiation in the most effectual manner, and to that end to use military compulsion with the Rajah, even to the reduction and capture of his capital, if necessary. And that no time may be lost, we do hereby empower you, whenever the Nabob's Plenipotentiary, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, shall signify to you the propriety and expediency thereof, to act in the most effectual manner to the attainment of these ends; either by merely marching towards Tanjore, without committing hostilities, or in a hostile manner to enter the territory of Tanjore, to take and establish posts, and even to invest and besiege and take the capital, without waiting for further orders from us: and you will be pleased to advise us from time to time of your proceedings.

It is proper also to inform you, that in order to supply the army in the best manner possible with provision of every kind, the Nabob has appointed his second Son, Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, invested him with power, and committed this department to his charge and care; you will be pleased therefore to address yourself to him on whatever may occur relative thereto.

The Nabob has ordered several detachments of his own troops to join the army, and act under your command. As we have supplied you from hence with artillery and stores of every kind, it is needless to desire that you will cause the Nabob's troops to be supplied out of the general stores with whatever may be necessary for the service; it is a matter of course, as the whole united will for one army and for one service.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
4th August, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 5th August, 1771.

A DRAUGHT of a letter to the Rajah of Tanjore, in answer to the one received from him, being laid before the Board, is approved of, and ordered to be communicated to the Nabob.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Saturday, 10th August, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President informs the Committee, that he had communicated to the Nabob a translation of the letter proposed to be wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore, approved in Consultation the 5th instant.

That the Nabob approved the whole, except only the concluding passage; viz. "As the Company *is* guarantee of the Treaty of 1762, I am obliged to support him therein:" upon which he remarked, that the expression, "The Company *is* guarantee," appeared to him improper; that it should be *was*, and not *is*, as the Treaty exists no more. The alteration proposed by the Nabob is no otherwise material, than as it is declaratory of his sense and intention to annihilate entirely the Treaty of 1762, in order to free himself from the Company's guaranty; for if the Company *were* guarantee of the Treaty of 1762, they *are* obliged to see so much of it performed as has not been done. When a rupture happens between States, all treaties between them prior to that rupture are thereby disannulled, or at least suspended; each party will endeavour to gain what advantage he can; and upon a restoration of peace, the former treaties may be restored to the state they were in before the rupture, or others may be substituted.

The President further informs the Committee, that in a conversation with the Nabob yesterday, the Nabob in confidence opened his mind more freely and clearly, upon the subject of the present transactions relative to Tanjore, than he had ever done before. In times past such confidential communications were not reduced to writing, but in these dangerous times it is necessary that the grounds of our resolutions appear; and if the judgment formed thereon be wrong, it is fit we receive the censure it deserves; if right, the commendation.

The President therefore communicates the substance and spirit of his conversation with the Nabob to the Committee; which he thinks himself obliged to do, as their resolution on the points in question is necessary, and it is impossible for them to form a proper resolution unless they have the necessary materials.

Upon reference to the Minutes of this Committee of the 9th July*, it will appear that the Nabob had desired to be informed of the intentions of the Committee on certain points, viz. If a sum of money were obtained from the Rajah, what was to be done with it:—Or in case of the reduction of the fort and country, how they were to be disposed of. That the Committee thereupon declared what they judged to be most proper in those cases, and resolved to communicate such their

* Vide Page 691.

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The Nabob has ordered several detachments of his own troops to join the army, and act under your command. As we have supplied you from hence with artillery and stores of every kind, it is needless to desire that you will cause the Nabob's troops to be supplied out of the general stores with whatever may be necessary for the service; it is a matter of course, as the whole united will for one army and for one service.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
4th August, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 5th August, 1771.

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* Vide Page 691.

opinion frankly to the Nabob. It further appears by the Minutes of the 11th July*, that the young Nabob had been sent by his Father to the President, to learn the sense of the Committee on those points; that the President had fully and clearly communicated the same. That in a subsequent conference which the President had with the Nabob, it appeared the Nabob had been informed of the whole by his Son; that he apparently declined the discussion of them, and proposed an expedient to bring about an accommodation with the Rajah, by the means of the Maratta Vackeel†. It will further appear by the Minutes of the 24th July‡, that in a conference with the Nabob on the 22d, he rather seemed averse to hostile measures, stated difficulties, and hinted the remaining quiet at present, and deferring an expedition to another time. That in another conference on the 23d§, the Nabob had expressed his disinclination to an immediate expedition, chusing rather an accommodation with the Rajah, to be negotiated by himself, without the interposition of the Company; but desiring nevertheless their support of his measures. It will appear further by the Minutes of the 24th, that the Committee taking the whole seriously under their consideration, had come to the resolution, for the reason there given, to leave the negotiation to the Nabob, and to give him all necessary support¶. By the Minutes of the 29th, it appears that the Nabob had opened his demands to the Tanjore Vackeel; that finding the negotiation at this place would be attended with ruinous delays, had proposed to send his eldest Son to Trichinopoly, and desired that we would support him, with the appearance of resolution, to compel the Rajah by military force if necessary**.

It appears from the whole of these transactions, that the Nabob has latterly been averse to a military expedition against the Rajah of Tanjore. The Committee in many places of their Minutes have expressed their astonishment that the Nabob, who in the beginning, that is to say, when the Rajah took the field against Marwar, was so urgent with us for immediate hostility, and was so warmly supported therein by the Minister of the Crown, at a time when we were not prepared to act effectually, and when the Marattas might with every advantage have entered the Carnatick, should so suddenly change his opinion, and oppose a military expedition, when we were prepared to act with vigour, and when there appeared far less danger of the Marattas. The cause to which the Committee in their opinion assigned that change was, that when the Nabob urged hostility, he hoped to entangle us with the Marattas, and thereby compel us into an alliance with them from necessity; but that since our absolute declaration against such an alliance, he had lost that hope, and therefore saw no good, but much injury to his country, should the Marattas enter it in support of Tanjore. However well grounded this opinion may be, there are other causes for the Nabob's late objection to hostility, which, without invalidating the reasons on which that opinion was founded, are separate and distinct from them. The Committee indeed have long suspected, that the Nabob's objection to a military expedition against Tanjore, arose from a jealousy of our keeping the conquest (if any were made) for the Company, but wanted sufficient grounds to deliver that opinion formally.

* Vide Page 692. † 693. ‡ 694, 695. § 695, 696. ¶ 698, 702. ** 718, 719.

Purport of a Conference between the Nabob and the President, on the subject of suffering the Fort and Country of Tanjore, if taken, to fall into his hands.

THE President informs the Committee, that the Nabob has explained himself on this subject, and the matter is now made clear. That in conference with him yesterday the Nabob made this proposal, viz. That in case of proceeding to extremities with Tanjore, and that the fort and country should be taken, if we would deliver up the whole into his hands, as we had done other dependancies on the Carnatick, he would pay ten Lacks of Pagodas to the Company : that if this were refused, he had his fears and apprehensions; and according as this proposition succeeded or not, so his measures must be modelled. To which he, the President, replied, that as we had no orders or instructions from the Company respecting the conquest of the Tanjore country, and consequently could have none respecting the disposal of it; all that we desired, in case we should be led to the conquest of it by the Rajah's refractory conduct, was, to leave all definitive arrangements respecting the same entirely to the Company and the Nabob; for that having no powers to make any definitive arrangement, were we to make *any* agreements, they could not be binding until they had the sanction and approbation of our Superiors; and therefore we wished not to make any, but to leave the whole to the Nabob and the Court of Directors, who would probably wish to pay the compliment themselves to the Nabob of yielding to him the entire possession, and not to follow our lead in a matter of that importance: and in the mean time, it was our desire to leave the management of the country and the revenue to the Nabob, and only to keep possession of the fort, until we should receive orders from home. The Nabob replied, that the condition of our keeping possession of the fort was the matter he objected to; that he considered the fort and territory of Tanjore as a Zemindary dependent on the Carnatick, in the same manner as any other Zemindary or Polligary; that we had assisted him to reduce many of these which had rebelled, and never before made any difficulty to put the whole into his hands, as properly belonging to his Government, and that the Company never claimed any right to them; and that now, in the present case, the claim of keeping possession of the fort alarmed him. That far from making any objection to the receiving a garrison of the Company's troops into the fort, whenever there should be occasion, he should desire and solicit us to place a garrison in it, and charge ourselves with it's defence and protection, in the same manner as he desired us to garrison Trichinopoly and Vellour; but that it must rest in his discretion, and not be considered as a matter of right in the Company. That in answer to what the President had urged of the inutility of making any immediate arrangement, since any such arrangement must be subject to the approbation or disapprobation of the Court of Directors, he said the argument on the other side was equally strong; for *if the whole were suffered to fall into his hands*, in like manner as other appendages to the Carnatick, under like circumstances, had been given up to him, *and if the Company should not approve of it, they would have as much right to require other conditions at any time hereafter as they have now*; and who could doubt their ability and power to resume it, or any other part of the Carnatick, if they had thought fit. That he desired the President would seriously

reflect on the whole, and let him know what he might depend on, which should determine him accordingly.

Upon all which the President desires the opinion of the Committee.

Considerations and Opinion of the Committee thereon.

THE Committee having maturely and seriously considered the whole, deliver their opinion in the manner following :

1. Considering the short space of time which remains for military operations before the rains ;—that it is highly probable the Rajah will never submit to safe and honourable terms without military compulsion ;—and that a suspense of measures, and consequently a waste of time, may prove more fatal to us than almost any decisive resolution ;—we think it highly necessary that a clear and determinate answer be given to the Nabob, and that a resolution of the Board is necessary for that purpose.

2. From the declaration made by the Nabob, as herein before stated, and from all antecedent circumstances, we are of opinion, that it may be taken for granted that the Nabob will not consent to our proceeding to extremities with the Rajah, whatever political necessity there may be, unless we consent to give the whole conquest (should any be made) into his possession, as a matter of course.

3. That if we refuse our consent to the Nabob's proposition, his fears and jealousies of the Company will be so quickened and strengthened, as that he will be induced to accept of any terms from the Rajah, rather than risk even the commencement of hostilities, lest any conquest should fall into, and be retained in our hands.

4. That if the Nabob, under such impressions, should accept of terms dishonourable or disadvantageous to himself, to whatever cause it may be imputed, it will evidently appear as the effect of some present necessity : The Rajah, knowing himself obnoxious on that account both to the Nabob and to the Company will conclude, that hostilities will of course be renewed against him whenever a more favourable time shall offer, or whenever the present obstacles are removed ; and, to prevent them, will naturally throw himself into the arms of the French, who from equal necessity will urge him, by every argument and incentive, to the same alliance.

5. That although, as aforesaid, the Rajah will never consent or submit to terms safe and honourable to the Company and the Carnatick without military compulsion, nor even until he shall be driven to extreme danger ; yet that, seeing the approach of danger, he may for present convenience comply with terms, such as may leave him at liberty and with power ; both which he will probably use, upon the very first opportunity, to unite with the enemies of the Carnatick, in order to free himself from his apprehensions of the Nabob's designs against him.

6. That if military operations should be commenced and pressed, even to the endangering of the capital, and the Rajah, to save himself from impending ruin, should submit to terms, such as the Nabob shall dictate, without the guaranty of the Company, they will be dangerous; because the Rajah will never place any dependence in the Nabob's faith, (see Committee's Minutes, 27th July*) and consequently will, as the most natural means of relieving himself, unite with the French; the consequences of which are stated in our Minutes of the 24th July †.

7. That unless we comply with the Nabob's proposition, he will never consent to our again becoming guarantees to any treaty with the Rajah; nor consent to our reducing the fort of Tanjore, the only effectual security if we are not guarantees; consequently, that time will be wasted, a ruinous expense incurred, and we shall be left after all without money, and in a much worse condition than we are at present.

8. We have already delivered our opinion in Committee 24th July‡, that we cannot justify proceeding in hostility without the Nabob's consent; and consequently, if the Nabob at any period shall inform us, that he has accommodated his differences with the Rajah, and is satisfied;—if we proceed further, it must be on the Company's account solely;—the war then will be a war of the Company's as principals, and at our own peril; and we know, from the declaration of the Minister of the Crown, that the Ministry will be against us in such a war. It follows from these premises, that we are entangled in dangers every way;—the Nabob will never consent to our guaranty; the Rajah will never be satisfied without our guaranty; he will not abide by a treaty concluded on terms that shall bear too hard upon him, nor trust to one on his own terms. It seems therefore that no safe terms can be made, and that safety can be ensured only by the reduction of the fort; but the Nabob will not consent to the reduction of the fort unless we consent to his proposition, and we dare not proceed without him;—what must be the consequences? 'tis hard to say. We see nothing at present but certain danger, and probable ruin; because if the matter were to remain as now, *undecided* between the Nabob and us, *the Nabob, more fearful of us even than of the enemy he is contending with, will be as ready to betray the interests of us, his real friends, as to subdue the power and pride of the Rajah, his real enemy*; and while we remain thus uncertain of what the Nabob will do, we could not stand justified in our own opinion for exposing the Company to the hazards of war, without even a hope of an adequate advantage, in procuring future security to their possessions and to the Carnatick.

It has been agreed by the Majority, (see Minutes 24th July ||) that we are not warrantable in proceeding without the Nabob's consent. The whole matter then, circumstanced as we now are, seems to be reducible to this question—Which is most dangerous to the Company; to let the whole conquest, fort and country of Tanjore) if there should be a necessity of pushing our operations to that extent, go immediately into the possession of the Nabob as a matter of course; or that the Rajah be left in power under a compromise, from which he will endeavour to free himself by an union with the French?

* Vide Page 717.

† Pages 698, 699.

‡ Pages 697, 698, 699.

|| Ibid.

We have given our reasons, in the minutes of the 24th July†, why we think it dangerous to leave the Rajah with power *in a state of fear and apprehension of the Nabob*; and we think there needs not much argument to prove, that, under such circumstances, he will naturally seek the aid of the French; who, under their circumstances, would as naturally unite with him. If it were necessary to explain a subject already so plain, much more might be said. We conclude with our opinion, that it would be impolitic and dangerous to the last degree, now that things have been brought to the state they are with the Rajah, to leave him the power of uniting with the dangerous enemies of the Company and the Carnatick; and therefore that *he ought* to be totally subdued, or at least reduced to such terms as shall put it out of his power to become dangerous. But as we see no probability of effecting either so long as the Nabob shall remain jealous of our design to withhold any part of what shall be (if any thing be) acquired, and equally jealous of our even appearing as parties in any negotiation or compromise:

We are therefore further of opinion, that of two evils we ought to chuse the least; and that it is less dangerous to let the conquest (if any be made) pass, as of course, into the Nabob's hands and possession, than that the Rajah should be left dissatisfied, as he most certainly will be, and with power to become dangerous; which, as aforesaid, we think must be the consequence of any compromise made by the Nabob, under the influence of his fears and jealousy of us.

In delivering this opinion, we do not forget the opinion we gave in our address to the Honourable Court of Directors, under date the 31st January 1770, paragraph 4; we remain fully and clearly of the same opinion: neither do we see cause to change in one tittle the opinions we have expressed in our former minutes, particularly those of the 9th July, of the propriety of keeping the fort of Tanjore in our own hands should it be taken. We are clearly of opinion, that we ought to retain it if we could; and that we ought not to yield the point to the Nabob, if greater apparent dangers were not incurred by refusing it: but as we think a present acquiescence with the Nabob's proposition the least of the dangers which surrounds us, though it leads to danger, so we are of opinion it ought now to be complied with, as an act of political necessity.

We deliver it further as our opinion, that although it leads to danger, it is not immediately dangerous; for there is no doubt, but that while we have garrisons in the principal forts in the Carnatick, and have on foot such a military establishment as the present, we may with great ease control the Nabob, should it be necessary, *and should we be authorised to do so*:—at present we have no authority to control him. It is not necessary here again to state the sense of the Court of Directors on this subject, or the spirit of the Ministry; or to say any thing more on the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, hung over our heads *in terrorem*: we have been sufficiently explicit in former minutes; particularly those of the 24th July, with extracts annexed, as *pièces justificatives*, if we may be permitted to use the French phrase. The state of affairs here will be clearly before our Superiors at home; they will also have our opinion of what may be expected as natural consequences of increasing the Nabob's

power. If they and the Ministry should continue of opinion, that the Nabob's fidelity and attachment is such, that the increase of his power is the same as an increase of the British power on the Coast; the resolution of leaving the whole conquests, if any be made, in his hands, must be approved, and we shall only be liable to censure for having doubted of the propriety of doing so. If, on the other hand, it should be thought, that such an increase of power in the Nabob may become dangerous, the remedy is at home, and there only; and legal orders to the British Delegates of the national power on this Coast, may model and restrain it within such bounds as shall be thought fit.

It remains to consider the Nabob's offer of ten Lacks of Pagodas to the Company, if we resign the fort and country entirely into his hands, should they be conquered. Upon which we are of opinion,

That we ought not to receive that, or any other sum, or any consideration of what kind soever, by way of compensation, compact, or agreement, for resigning to him the said conquests, should they be made; because we mean to leave the Company at full liberty to make what arrangements they shall think best in these respects. But if we were to receive any consideration for resigning the conquests, the public faith must be pledged for the performance of the agreement; and the Company could not deviate therefrom, without an apparent and dangerous breach of that faith. We are therefore of opinion, that if it be necessary to take the fort and country of Tanjore, that the Nabob be tacitly left in possession of the whole, in the same manner as has before been done, when Worriarpollam, Arrialore, and other Polligaries, were reduced; as a matter of course, and without any declaration respecting the same; and that if the Nabob shall think proper to give the Company ten Lacks of Pagodas, or any other sum, as a voluntary gift for their friendly aid, it be received, subject to the future pleasure of the Court of Directors.

Many other arrangements may become necessary in case of reducing Tanjore, such as the military force necessary for it's defence; but it is evident that such propositions now will excite the Nabob's fears and jealousies, as much as a resolution to retain the conquest: if any thing of this kind be to be effected, it must be by removing his jealousy in the first instance. But to say the truth, we have little expectation of his ever consenting to the Company's keeping up, under their own control, any other forces for the protection of his possessions; since he has so strenuously objected even to the seven battalions of Sepoys now entertained by the Company on his account in the Carnatick, and since he is so warmly supported therein by the Minister of the Crown.

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Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 12th August, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

John Smith

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley

George Stratton

George Mackay.

THE many inconveniences which arose during the late war from the manner of supplying the army with provisions, and the difficulties which ensued in the adjusting of the accounts with the Nabob, render it necessary to adopt a plan, which shall secure to the army plenty of provisions, and at the same time prevent disputes between the Commanding Officers and the Amuldars, or difficulties with the Nabob in the settling with him for the provisions that may be supplied.

The Nabob having sent one of his Sons with the army, the Deputy Agent shall apply to him, or the person deputed by him, for grain, cattle, or any other articles which may be requisite for the victualling of the army, and for draught and carriage bullocks if wanted.

A price shall be established with the Nabob for all the cattle, grain, or other articles, his Agent may deliver to the Deputy Agent for the victualling of the army, at which rate he shall be credited for them.

The Deputy Agent, on receipt of the articles applied for, is to give a receipt to the Nabob's people, specifying the number of cattle, quantity of grain, &c. received; and on the same day to enter in his journal the several articles received, at the prices fixed for them, giving the Nabob credit for the same.

The Deputy is to take care that the provisions received are good of the kind; and if any become damaged, they are to be returned to the Nabob's Agents: all wastage at camp is to be carried to profit and loss.

The Commissary is daily to give a return of the number of men to be victualled, and then by that return the allowance settled by the military regulations will be issued.

The Deputy is to have the charge of the bullocks, and is to take particular care that none but good ones be employed: at any time that he shall meet with such as ought to be dismissed, if the service will admit of it, they are to be instantly turned away; but if that be judged inconvenient, then the Deputy will hire as many as may be necessary to replace those which are not fit, and he will then dismiss the unserviceable bullocks; taking care however that none of the Company's Servants, civil or military, nor any European, be interested directly or indirectly in the hire of such bullocks.

The Deputy is monthly to transmit his accounts, with the proper vouchers, to the Agent.

These

These accounts, as received, the Agent is to enter into his books as usual, crediting the Nabob for all that shall have been received from him, and debiting the Commissary-General for all the men that have been victualled, and the carriage and draught bullocks which shall have been supplied at the usual rates; and whatever profits shall have arisen thereon, at the end of the campaign, shall be carried to the credit of the Nabob.

Plan of the Books to be kept by the Deputy Agent at Camp for victualling the Troops, and providing of Draught and Carriage Bullocks for the Army.

Cash Dr. to Commissary-General.

Pagodas received of the Paymaster of the army.

Sundry Accounts Dr. to the Nabob for the following Articles received	Pagodas of			
Bullocks for slaughter 200 Sheep, for Rice, for Paddy, for Salt, for	at each at per Pag. at per Garce at at per Mercal			
Sundry Accounts Dr. to Agent at Madras for the following received at Madras.	Pagodas			
Rice Sheep Salt Arrack				
Victualling the Troops Dr. to sundry Accounts Pagodas for the following served out in this month.				
Bullocks for slaughter Sheep Rice Salt Arrack				

Sundry

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Sundry Accounts Dr. to Cash—Pagodas—Bullock-hire for the following Draught Bullocks for one Month.

For 25		
20		
15		
10 Days, at $1\frac{1}{2}$ Pag. per Month per Bullock		
Carriage Bullock		
For 1 Month		
20 Days		
10 ditto, at $1\frac{1}{2}$ per Month per ditto		
Bullock Drivers		
For Days, at 2 Fanams per day		
Charges of Merchandize		
For the following		
1 Deputy per Month		
1 Assistant—Dashper		
2 Conicopies—Swamy and Moolcah		
2 Peons		
Coolies employed in delivering Provisions		

Victualling the Troops Dr. to Bullock-hire—Pagodas

For Carriage Bullocks, employed in carrying Provisions, at 3 Pag. 40 Cash per Day

AGREED, That Mr. Cassamajor be appointed Deputy to the Agent for transacting the business in camp, and that instructions be prepared for him agreeable to the foregoing regulations.

ORDERED also, That the 75th paragraph of the commands of the Court of Directors of 23d March 1770*, respecting the levying of duties in camp, and the sale of spirituous liquors, be transmittted to General Smith, and that regulations be prepared for carrying the same into execution.

* *Extract of Separate Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, dated 23d March, 1770. Received at Fort St. George, 15th September, 1770.*

Par. 75. As we are informed that it has been customary for the Commander in Chief of our troops to receive duties from the Buzar, imposed either on the sutlers who follow the army, for the liberty of keeping shops or stalls, or on the merchandizes or provision they expose to sale; and when we consider the distresses and inconveniences which have attended our troops in the late war, either for want of provisions, their being bad, or sold at an advanced price; and as we conceive it is not possible to ascertain any precise rule, whereby to determine when it may not be prudent for the Commander in Chief to levy or forbear to impose such duties, we cannot but be of opinion, that all duties whatever, imposed, directly or indirectly, on provisions brought to camp, were better remitted as impolitick, tending to discourage country people from yielding us all that assistance they otherwise might do, if permitted to sell provisions duty free, and consequently contributing towards advancing their price in camp to a greater height than otherwise might be needful; more especially as such duties are, as far as appears to us, indeterminate, and laid and levied solely at the will and pleasure of the Commander in Chief, or some of his servants; which must in some degree render the price of provisions dependent on his

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, at their Military Department, 13th August, 1771.

WROTE the following letter to General Smith.

To Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

IN our letter to you of the 30th July we informed you, that the Nabob had undertaken to supply the army with provisions, and to appoint proper persons to manage, direct, and superintend the Buzar. Mr. Cassamajor, whom we have appointed Commissary of the Army, as mentioned in our letter to you of the 7th instant, besides the duties belonging to that department, expressed in the Book of Military Regulations, is also charged with the execution of the duties which were dependent on the Contractor, when the Europeans were victualled by contract: he is to apply to and receive from the Nabob's Agents such provisions of every kind as shall be necessary and sufficient for victualling the Europeans, and he is to issue the same in the same quantities, and at the same rate, as is expressed in the book of regulations, in page 69.

In our letter of the 30th July, and in another which we have addressed to you, and which you will receive by the hands of Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, you will observe, that in case hostilities should be commenced against the Rajah of Tanjore, our wish is that the operations may be pressed with the utmost vigour, even to the besieging and reduction of the capital if necessary; in which case it may be proper in many respects, but particularly for facilitating the means of supplying the army with provisions, that convenient and tenable posts be established, for keeping open the communication between the camp and Trichinopoly; it will depend on you to establish such posts, and to give the necessary information to the Commissary, that he may apply to, and procure from the Nabob's Agents the provision which you shall think proper to be deposited in such posts, as temporary

his disposition; and the proprietor cannot know whether it may answer his purpose to bring provisions to our camp, or not, before he arrives therein. We therefore hereby direct, that no duty, tax, or imposition whatever shall at any time be levied or taken by our Commander in Chief, or by any person for him, or by any other person or persons, on any pretence whatever, or for any provisions and necessaries brought by any person or persons, with intent to sell the same to our soldiers, Sepoys, or other our Servants, when encamped, or otherwise in the field, or marching to or from any place or places in time of war, or for the liberty and privilege of erecting and keeping any shop or stall in the Buzar, or attending our camp for the sale of provisions and necessaries only; and that no merchant or other person whatever, be on any account compelled to sell rice, or other necessaries, or provisions, to any contractor or other person, but that they be fully at liberty to sell the same in the public Buzar, without any let, hindrance, or molestation whatever; and that this our order be made as public as possible, that all persons, as well our Servants as the natives of the country, may be fully informed thereof and act accordingly: provided always, and we hereby direct, that this order shall not extend to give privilege to any person or persons to sell, or otherwise vend, any sort of spirituous liquors whatever to any of our Servants in camp, or to repeal or alter any orders heretofore made by any of our Presidents and Council, or otherwise, for preventing the sale or consumption of spirituous liquors to or by any persons in our service; but any such order or orders, as have heretofore been made for regulating the sale of spirituous liquors, shall remain, notwithstanding this order, in full force. And we further direct, that the Commander in Chief do at all times afford due protection to all persons who may bring provisions, with intent to sell them to our troops as aforesaid.

magazines, not only for the Europeans, but for facilitating the supply for the whole army.

The Sepoys will receive their usual Field Batta, and must supply themselves with provision as heretofore from the Buzar attending the army, as must also all followers of the camp. The Nabob has given us the strongest assurances that the most effectual measures have been and shall be taken to ensure plenty; and amongst others, that he hath declared and will publish a general exemption from duty.

Upon this subject we received very particular orders from the Court of Directors last year; but as there have not been any troops in the field since the receipt of them, we deferred the publication until occasion should require it: we send you herewith a copy of the whole paragraph relative thereto, being the 75th of their commands, dated 23d March 1770, and desire that, agreeable to the injunction therein contained, you will cause the same to be made as public as possible, that all persons may be fully informed thereof.

The general purport of the order made and established by the said 75th paragraph, is to forbid the levying taxes of any kind on provisions or necessaries brought to the camp; but a proviso is added, that the said order shall not extend, or be construed to give privilege to any person to sell or vend any sort of spirituous liquors whatever, or to repeal or alter any orders heretofore made by the President and Council for preventing the sale or consumption of spirituous liquors, &c. As the orders that have heretofore been made by our predecessors on this subject may not be known, nor easily collected together even by ourselves; it is necessary to substitute one clear, precise, and positive order respecting the same; and we do hereby accordingly and positively prohibit the distilling, selling, or offering to sale, of spirituous liquors of any kind whatsoever in the camp, or to the soldiers, Sepoys, or other persons composing, belonging to, or following the army, excepting only such person or persons as shall be appointed by the President and Council to have the charge of arrack and spirituous liquors in camp, for the purposes expressed in the Military Regulations under the head, 'Orders relative to the Contractor for victualling the Army, &c.' page 69, and such other occasional purposes as the service may require, and shall be thought fit by the Commanding Officer of the Army for the time being; and we desire that you will cause the said prohibition to be made as public as possible. The Nabob has given us the most positive assurances that he will lay the strongest injunctions on his Officers and Agents, who shall be appointed to superintend and control the Buzar, to prevent the introduction and sale of spirituous liquors in the Buzars, and we desire you will give them the most effectual support therein.

The foregoing order, restraining the use of spirituous liquors, is founded on the incontrovertible fact established by experience, that the immoderate use thereof is pernicious to and destructive of the health of the soldiers: if on this account it be proper to limit and restrain the use thereof in camp, it is no less necessary to regulate the same in the forts or garrisons where the Company's Officers have command, or in cantonment where the Company's forces may at any time be.

The Articles of war, section 7th, article 4th, have so effectually provided that no Officers commanding in any of the garrisons, forts, or barracks, shall levy any
duty

duty on, or be interested in the sale of liquors, that it may seem unnecessary to establish any other order concerning the same; as it may be supposed that the Commanding Officer, not being interested therein, will always restrain the immoderate use of spirituous liquors: we have however reason to believe that in many instances the fact has been otherwise, and that very little regard has been paid to the above-quoted article of war; it is therefore our intention not only to require a due observance of the said article, but to prohibit the sale of spirituous liquors of every kind, in every such garrison or cantonment, as far as depends on us; and the Nabob has promised to lay the same injunctions on all his servants and dependants: but as it is proper that the Europeans should be supplied with some liquor in a moderate quantity, we propose to provide, on the Company's account, and to put under the charge of the Storekeeper of each garrison, &c. such quantities as shall be necessary to be issued daily in drams to the soldiers, under the control of the Commanding Officer, *as shall be thought necessary*, and at such a rate as shall yield a reasonable profit; that an account shall be stated yearly of the profit arising therefrom, after deduction of prime cost and charges; *and that the profit, whatever it be, shall be given to the Commanding Officer as a gratuity.* As we are very confident this gratuity will not be an equivalent to the Commanding Officers for the profit which we believe to be now generally made, the Nabob has intimated to the President, that he will most willingly add thereto as shall amount to an equivalent, provided the Officers shall heartily and effectually give their aid and assistance in suppressing the unlicensed or clandestine sale of spirituous liquors, which is become a great and general grievance. *The Nabob hath also intimated his intention of giving an equivalent to the Commanding Officer for the time being of the army, for the duties on the Buzar, and the license for selling spirituous liquors:* we are well pleased with these intimations, but whatever the Nabob shall do herein must flow voluntarily and spontaneously from himself; and in that case we shall readily consent, *as far as we have power to consent thereto.*

As soon as we shall be prepared to carry into execution these regulations respecting the garrisons, we shall give the proper notice thereof.

We are, SIR,

Your most obedient humble Servants,

Fort St. George,

13th August, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, and Council.

AT A CONSULTATION, Thursday, 15th August, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley

John Smith

George Stratton

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

George Mackay

THE Select Committee communicate to the Board the substance of the conference between the Nabob and the President, as recited in their minutes of the 10th

* Vide Page 727.

instant.

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instant, on the subject of suffering the fort and country of Tanjore to fall into the Nabob's hands in case they should be reduced, together with the reasons which induced the Committee to think it expedient to comply with the Nabob's requisition in this instance, and with which the Board acquiesce.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 17th August, 1771.

The following Instructions were this day sent to Mr. Cafamajor, Deputy-Agent.

To Mr. James Henry Cafamajor.

S IR

HAVING resolved that the charge of victualling the troops and furnishing bullocks for the service of the army be put under the management of the Commissary-General, as Agent on behalf of the Company, and it being necessary that some person should be appointed as his deputy for transacting the business in camp, we have appointed you for this service, and the following instructions are to serve you for your guidance therein.

You are carefully to follow all such orders and directions as you may from time to time receive from the Agent.

The Nabob having sent his second Son, Mader-ul-Mulk, to the army, for the purpose of procuring provisions, &c. you are to apply to him, or the person deputed by him, for grain, cattle, or any other articles which may be requisite for the victualling the army, as well as for what draught or carriage bullocks may be wanted.

A price will either be established here by the Nabob, or with his Son at Trichinopoly, for all the grain, cattle, sheep, &c. as shall be delivered to you; and all articles received by you from the Nabob's Agents must be issued at the same price at which they are received.

You are to give regular receipts for all articles which may be delivered to you, specifying therein the number of cattle, quantity of grain, &c. so delivered; and which you are in the same day to enter particularly in your journal, setting forth

forth the prices fixed on each particular article, and giving the Nabob credit for the same.

You are to take care that the provisions received are good of the kind; and if any are damaged, they are to be returned to the Nabob's Agents, and for which you are to be careful to obtain full and particular receipts; or in case the Nabob's Agents should refuse to take them back, they must be sold at public outcry, and the difference between the price they were received at, and that for which they may sell, must be wrote off to profit and loss: all waftage at camp is to be carried to profit and loss.

As Commissary, you are daily to make out a return of the number of men victualled, by which return the allowance settled by the military regulations will be issued.

You are to have the immediate charge of the bullocks, and you are to take particular care that none but good ones are employed: whenever you shall meet with such as ought to be dismissed, you are immediately, if the service will admit of it, to turn them out; and you will, if the service requires it, entertain as many as may be necessary to replace those that may be so dismissed; taking however particular care that none of the Company's Servants, civil or military, nor any European whatever, or their Dubashes, Conicopies, servants, or dependants, be directly or indirectly interested or concerned in the hire of such bullocks.

You are to transmit your accounts monthly, agreeable to the accompanying form, to the Agent at Madras, with the proper vouchers.

In consideration of the trouble you will have in this department, we have agreed that an allowance shall be made you of fifty Pagodas per month. The Agent will appoint proper persons to assist you therein, and to whom you are to give certificates in writing of their being your assistants in this business.

We are, SIR,

Your affectionate friends,

Fort St. George,
19th August, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

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Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 29th August, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith, dated, Trichinopoly, 25th August, 1771.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I HAVE been honoured with your commands of the 4th, 7th, 13th, and 14th instant; to which I deferred replying 'till after the Nabob's Son had arrived.

In my address to the Honourable President of the 22d, I acquainted him of the arrival of Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, and Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, on the North side of the Cavery on the morning of the 21st; and that after encountering many difficulties, they crossed the river, and made their entrance into Trichinopoly that evening.

Omdat-ul-Omrah, whom the Nabob has appointed his Plenipotentiary to negotiate with the King of Tanjore, has delivered me your original instructions of the 4th; agreeable to which, as soon as the detachment joins me, *I shall be ready to receive his orders, and march to Tanjore in support of the intended negotiation, either with or without commencing hostilities, as he may think proper.*

Your Honour, &c. have been very clear in the orders you have been pleased to give me; which are, that I should not only (when required) commence hostilities against the King of Tanjore, but continue them even to the reduction of his capital; subject from time to time to the opinion of the Nabob's Plenipotentiary, how far such force may be necessary to forward his negotiation: but should he direct what operations are to be carried on, and what shall not? and if such measures should appear to me unwarrantable, and not conducive to the end proposed, I apprehend I am not to pursue them: therefore I request to know whether this is the intention of the Honourable Board or not, that, if at any time such a circumstance should fall out, I may regulate my conduct accordingly. If the direction is lodged with me, I shall always nevertheless consult with the young Nabob; and should he have any particular point in view, I shall readily come into his measures, provided I think I can do it without retarding too much such operations as may be necessary to the accomplishment of the principal object.

Our intelligence from Tanjore says, that on the 22d HIS MAJESTY hoisted his Jundas on the plain near the fort, pitched his tents, and encamped with 2000 horse, 2000 Sepoys, a company of Topasses, and three field pieces. The command of the garrison is intrusted to the care of his brother.

In consequence of which the following letter was immediately wrote to General Smith :

To Brigadier-General Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

WE have this instant received your letter of the 25th; and as that part thereof respecting your instructions requires an immediate answer, we now apply thereto.

You have in some measure mistaken the spirit and intention of our letter of the 4th instant; on reference thereto you will find, that the manner in which we express ourselves does not import that you should commence hostilities *when required*, but that we empower you to act, &c. *whenever Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrab shall signify to you the propriety or expediency thereof*. The effect may be the same, but the difference lies in this; that we never meant to put you under the Nabob's orders, but we empowered you to act in conformity to his recommendation. Of course you will perceive by this explanation, that it is our intention to leave entirely to your judgment and discretion to execute what shall be recommended, or to vary the mode, as you shall think best, and most conducive to the end proposed: in other words, *the time of commencing hostilities, and the continuation of hostilities, are to be determined by the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrab; but the mode of conducting them, and the plan and execution of the operations, are left solely to you*.

We shall defer replying to the other parts of your letter 'till another opportunity.

We are, S I R,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
29th August 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 16th September, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton

George Mackay.

The following letter from General Smith, received yesterday, is now read:

To

To the Honourable Josias Du Prè Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

AT the time I received your instructions with respect to the Nabob's two Sons, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder and Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder; that the former was vested with full powers to negotiate with the King of Tanjore, in which the army was to support him, either by compelling the Rajah to accept of terms, or by reducing him; and that the latter had been ordered by the Nabob his Father to take on him the sole charge and care of providing the army with a sufficient Buzar and provisions: in consequence, the day after their arrival, I laid before Mader-ul-Mulk, in presence of his brother, an estimate of the quantity of grain that was necessary to subsist not only the Europeans, but the black troops and followers of the army for two months; which he most faithfully promised to provide, and have in readiness by the time we should be able to move.

Yesterday Lieutenant Manoury, the Commissary of Stores, having reported that the heavy guns, &c. were in proper condition to move, I informed Omdat-ul-Omrah that the troops were in readiness to march, and only waited for the provisions being sent to camp, *and his orders to proceed.*

I had often put Mader-ul-Mulk in mind of the supplies I depended on, and the evening before Lieutenant Manoury's report, I waited on him to enquire whether he had prepared the grain, &c. that was to accompany the army: he gave me the most positive assurances that there should be plenty, and that I might depend on him for the most ample supplies. On this I sent for the Cutwal of the Buzar, and asked him what grain had been brought to the camp; when, to my great surprize and astonishment, he informed me there were but fifty bags of rice in the Buzar, and that it was with difficulty the people could be that day subsisted. Both the Nabob's Sons were this moment in a tent of mine; I went to them, and could not avoid telling Mader ul-Mulk, with some warmth, that he had not kept his promise to his brother and me, as there was not a measure of rice in camp, but what Mr. Cassamajor had got for the Europeans, and not above a thousand sheep; that we were now on the point of moving, and he had put a stop to it, by his not furnishing the supplies of grain he had from day to day promised. He, in the true Eastern manner, began to form a thousand excuses, and went immediately into town to forward this very essential business; but although his brother has sent him numberless messages, and I as many more, particularly by Captain Horne, to whom he promised in the most solemn manner it should be in camp this evening at three o'clock, but I cannot see the least appearance of it; and from his behaviour, he seems determined to give us no more assistance than what he cannot possibly avoid. I have spoke my mind very freely to his brother and him, and absolutely declared, that whatever bad consequences may arise from such conduct, I shall not be answerable. I also hinted to the young Nabob, it was necessary he should exert himself in this very interesting business, for that there was

much at stake, and every hour we lost would be irrecoverable; but, from what motives I know not, he seems cautiously to avoid entering into any disputes with his brother, who is absolute here among the natives, and will do as he pleases. I think, on a service of this kind, where every heart and hand should go together, it was ill judged in the Nabob to send these two brothers to act in concert, between whom there has been, and still is, a very visible dislike to each other; *and the character of the Trichinopoly Nabob is so well known, that it needs not my pen to paint it.* Notwithstanding so much time has elapsed, but one battalion of the Nabob's has joined, with some Topasses, a few of Tondiman's Colleries, and some black horse from the Southward, all complaining loudly for money. Davidson's battalion laid down their arms, and would not march to the camp, 'till they were assured by Captain Horne, who happened to be passing by at the time they were mutinying, that their claim should be discharged.

Enclosed I sent you a Chit from Captain Matthews, which will but shew you his situation; and from what I have seen, *it appears to turn out quite a Nabob's expedition*; which is a very distressing reflexion, when we have so many fine fellows in the field, willing and ready to execute every thing that is required of them.

I shall do all in my power to comply with your instructions; but should it fail in any part, there is no one to blame but the young gentlemen I have mentioned.

The river has fallen so much lately, that I have no hopes of getting any thing from Devecotah by water. When the army arrives before Tanjore, I must find a method of conveying the stores to it in the best manner I can.

I mentioned the foregoing circumstances to your Honour, &c. that you may know the situation of the troops, and not expect more than is in our power to effect.

I wrote thus far last night, but receiving fresh promises that seven hundred bullock loads of rice would certainly arrive in a few hours, I postponed concluding my letter; and would have this morning commenced my march, but at day-break finding myself disappointed again, I went into the fort to Mader-ul-Mulk, to know what preparations he had made; and I find that, of about four thousand bullocks, which will scarcely be sufficient to convey supplies to the Buzar, he has not got five hundred, and very few gunny bags: he seems busy in sending out rice in small quantities on elephants, and pressing hackaries. Finding this to be the case, and that none of the Bullock Maistries will employ their cattle in his service, I am under necessity of using my personal credit, and have desired Mr. Hay's assistance to hire two thousand carriage bullocks: this is the only alternative, or cantoning the army. They will be employed as the Nabob's, and on his account entirely, but must be paid by us, as not a man will stir on his account; and the moment I can get the number I have mentioned loaded, I will march. As I am thus circumstanced, I hope your Honour, &c. will approve of the step

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I have taken; it is the only means in my power to carry your intentions into execution.

In the hurry of my spirits in this business I forgot to inform your Honour, &c. that the young Nabob Omdar-ul-Omrah has signified to me the necessity of using military compulsion with the Rajah, (who had refused to comply with the terms demanded of him) and that he joined the army the 7th instant.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

With the greatest respect,

Trichinopoly,
13th Sept. 1771.

Your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH SMITH.

Dear Horne,

TO-MORROW morning I will send a man for the tubes. We have not as yet received the money from Mader-ul-Mulk; to-night he promises to send my share, to-morrow Rumley's. All our horse-keepers have deserted, having two months pay due to them; we cannot move without these rascals, and they take advantage of the times. Pray let me know if orders are out for marching, because I am afraid of being prevented joining so soon as I could wish. If the cash comes from the young man, I can pacify my necessary runagates; but what Rumley will do, I know not.

I am,

Your very affectionate servant,

Camp, 11th Sept.
7 P. M.

RICHARD MATTHEWS.

Half a feed of grain to the horses yesterday, and not any to-day—we shall not be able to make a vigorous charge.

The President acquaints the Board, that on the receipt of the above letter, he wrote the following to General Smith.

Extract of Letter from Governor Du Pré to General Smith, dated 15th September, 1771.

Dear Sir,

I RECEIVED in due course your letter of the 8th, and from the contents was in great hopes that your next would have informed me of some progress; but how great
3 my

my disappointment this day, on the receipt of your general letter of the 13th. I was but just returned from the Nabob; I hastened back to him immediately, represented to him the dangerous consequences of so capital a neglect as his second Son had been guilty of; I informed him of the mutiny of Davidson's battalion, and the distress of Matthews and Rumley; and in short painted every thing to him in proper colours: he seemed much concerned; assured me, that there was provision enough in Trichinopoly for all your demands, that money had been sent for his troops, and that by whatever mistake or inadvertence the present difficulty had happened, the next letter would inform me that all was well; I hope it will be so, and nothing shall be wanting on my part. The Nabob immediately dispatched away a letter upon the subject to Mader-ul-Mulk, which I hope will make him more attentive.

You shall have an answer to your general letter from the Board to-morrow, which can only be to the foregoing effect: I am sure they must approve of the measures you have taken about procuring bullocks, and the promises you gave to Davidson's battalion; the Nabob however assures me they shall be paid by his people. I do not think that what has happened could have been prevented by the elder of the two brothers, as their departments are (as I believe) strongly and distinctly separated, on account of the want of cordiality between them, that so they may not clash: if the younger has done this on purpose to thwart the elder, it is most unpardonable.

The following letter is now wrote to General Smith:

To Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

YOUR letter of the 13th instant was received yesterday, and the President has laid before us the letter he wrote to you in reply; we entirely concur with him in approving the measures you have taken for procuring bullocks, and in the promise made to Davidson's battalion; and we must add, that when we consider the dangerous consequences of retarding the enterprize, and that the shortness of time left for action will not admit of your waiting our orders for any measures which may appear to you expedient and necessary, it must be left to you to take such means for forwarding the service as you shall think proper, and you may depend on our concurrence and support.

Since writing the foregoing your letter of the 13th has reached us, and we are glad to find that you purposed marching immediately; and we hope you will meet with no further impediments to your operations.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
16th September, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Before

Before the above letter was closed, the following letter came in from General Smith, in consequence of which the last paragraph was added :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, and Gentlemen of Council at Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

13th September, 1771. Camp.

I HAD the honour to address you yesterday, and therein informed you of the disappointment we had met with in respect to provisions for our Buzar. Mader-ul-Mulk sent some grain to camp last night ; he is now endeavouring to collect with great diligence all the bullocks and bags he can ; I sent him from the army this morning every spare beast we had, amounting to 400, and 200 Mr. Hay had provided for me since yesterday. And as the young Nabob, as well as myself, have severely felt this check to our wishes, he has express great desire for the army to move towards Tanjore : in consequence of this request, and an order for all the Sepoys, &c. to furnish themselves with four days rice, and collecting what more at present could be got, with assurances from Mader-ul Mulk, that he would prepare and send us every supply in his power, I determined to issue the orders of march, and this day propose setting forward towards Tanjore. The Nabob's three sons, with Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, being assembled at Omdat-ul-Omrah's tent, I again put the question to them with regard to the future supplies for this army ; and then informed them, unless they would give me positive assurances that we should be under no difficulties on that account, I could not pretend to march hence without two or three days rice, and subject the troops to that distress they had experienced formerly ; and if hereafter any impediments arose to our operations, or the service in any degree suffered by their neglect, that I positively declared the blame should not rest with me, nor would I risk my reputation at such a hazard. The imprudence of the young man to whose charge the grain business was committed has lost us three days ; and being but too sensible that the time is very far advanced, makes it the more necessary for us to push at all events ; more especially as the young Nabob informs me a body of Marattas are expected in the Burrah Maul, and it is not improbable but they may come to the assistance of His MAJESTY, as he confidently reports he expects aid from that quarter. However, now we are on foot, we will do all we can to prosecute this business with vigour and activity, and wish the Nabob's agents may equally do so. Nazeeb Khan with the Nabob's irregulars are still at Mussenpotah, and have a fine Buzar it's said with them ; but why they could not have crossed the river in all this time is a mystery to me. We ought to have begun three months ago at least, and then probably His Excellency's servants would have had things in order. Mader-ul-Mulk has paid Matthew's and Rumley's people, and their mouths stopt for the present. Davidson's battalion in camp, and two companies of Topasses ; Alexander's, London's, and Goddard's, still at Trichinopoly in receiving pay and stores. I have the honour to be with much respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient servant,

J. SMITH.

P. S. I am happy to find it's only the 13th :—I made a mistake in the date of yesterday's letter.

J. S.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 21st September, 1771.

CAME in the following letter from Captain Poverly, commanding at Trichinopoly :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, and Council, &c.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

ABOUT $\frac{1}{2}$ past five o'clock this evening I received a letter from General Smith, with one enclosed, Gentlemen, for you, which I immediately forwarded ; and for fear of a miscarriage, I take the liberty of transmitting the heads of his to me, viz.

We arrived near Vellum at 10 this morning, and were soon after visited by some of the Tanjore cavalry. About 2 in the afternoon HIS MAJESTY came to review us, at the head of all his body of cavalry and some infantry, when a heavy rain fell for near two hours, and they still continued on the ground they occupied : as soon as the weather proved favourable, we advanced on them with Matthews's cavalry and our corps of grenadiers ; they waited patiently 'till we could speak to each other, but the instant we began to speak from the mouth of our fixes and Matthews's light guns, they set out like lusty fellows for Tanjore, and HIS MAJESTY at their head : the moment they disappeared we moved down to the Pettah of Vellum, and gained possession ; but the fort is garrisoned by 1000 Sepoys, 200 Topasses, &c. and we must reduce it with battering cannon.

You may tell in plain words to Mader-ul-Mulk my great astonishment at not yet seeing his troops, and a further supply of rice here, with Nazeeb Khân's cavalry ; I have and shall again make known at Madras this behaviour of his ; and should any accident happen he alone must be answerable. Make my love to Hay ; I would write to him, but my eyes are blind with fatigue, having not been off my horse since 5 this morning, and it is now past 12 at night, cold, wet, and chagrined at these reflexions. My hopes are on Jemmy, and should he not assist, you may guess the rest : say all to him your own feeling dictates, and his good heart must partake.

Tell Mader-ul-Mulk that a detachment of horse is gone towards Trichinopoly, and that no grain can now come without a battalion or two of Sepoys ; many people were out in that road this day ; but do stir him, my friend, or I know he will do nothing.

In consequence of the above, Gentlemen, I immediately waited on the young Nabob, and represented things in the above light, but I am afraid to little effect. Mr. Hay sent him this morning three hundred bullocks with bags, which are not as yet loaded. I prevailed on him to detain Captains Alexander's and Loudon's battalions of Sepoys, belonging to the Nabob, 'till to-morrow morning, (which were marched to the Plain) and at the same time to get all the bullocks loaded to night, to go with them early in the morning; he has promised it, but I will not, Gentlemen, take on me to say it will be done. I shall do my utmost for the good of the service, and you may depend on it, Gentlemen, there shall be no neglect on my side. Colonels Bonjour and Ross, with Major Vaughan, are with the two above battalions. I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

P. JAS. POVERY.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 23d September, 1771.

THE President informs the Board, that the Nabob had proposed writing a letter on the subject of the ten Lacks of Pagodas, which he had offered as a present to the Company, provided the Fort and Country of Tanjore were put into his hands, as mentioned in the Minutes of the Select Committee of the 10th August **. A letter from him on that subject is now read, as entered in Country Correspondence †, to which a draft of an answer is now read and approved.

AT nine o'clock this evening the following letter was received:

Camp before Vellum, 21st September, 1 A. M.

Honourable Sir,

GENERAL SMITH having been a great part of the day on horseback, and very much fatigued, has desired me to acquaint you, that this morning a battery of six eighteen pounders was opened against Vellum. By night a breach was made, but not deemed practicable by the Engineers: however, as it was very far advanced, a storming party was ordered to be in readiness, and there is no doubt it would have been carried after a few hours battering in the morning. About twelve at

** Vide page 731.

† page 623.

night,

night I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Bonjour, with a battalion of Sepoys and some Europeans, to march towards the breach. The Colonel fired a platoon, and on no return being made, he marched into it at the head of a company of Sepoys, found the fort deserted, ordered one of the gates to be opened, and the remainder of the battalion marched in. From the General's intelligence it is to be feared there is very little provision in the place: he proposes to march to-morrow to Tanjore, if possible, from whence he will address you himself. Nazeeb Khan marched into camp this morning with about 1,500 black horse, Captain Goddard's battalion of Sepoys, some Polligars, and 250 bullock loads of rice. I have been for some time past, and am still very unwell, which, with the hurry and fatigue the General has undergone, was the reason you were not daily advised of the occurrences of the army. I have kept notes of every thing material that has happened from my own observation, which I shall do myself the honour, if I am able, to transmit to you to-morrow.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir,

With the utmost respect,

Your obedient humble servant,

THOMAS PARKINSON.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 25th September, 1771.

Came in the following letter from General Smith :

Honourable Sir,

YOU were advised by Mr. Parkinson's letter of yesterday of the fall of Vellum, which now proves to be a very great acquisition. The fort is regular, and though large, compact, and very strong, the works extremely clean and in good condition, and the districts belonging to it very valuable. It will be convenient to receive our heavy guns, ammunition, stores, and lumber of every kind, 'till we have encamped before the city, for it is necessary the army should proceed on our next march as lightly equipped as possible. I did propose moving in the morning, but the Commissary of stores says 'tis impossible to get the ammunition from the Pagoda where it was lodged 'till to-morrow night; and next morning, please God, the army will be on it's ground before Tanjore. This place will furnish us with magazines for provisions, and an hospital for our sick, and is not more than six miles from the capital. I have the pleasure to acquaint you, that when the Paddy (which is the only provision that has yet been discovered) is all collected, I hope it will amount to near 3000 Cullums; I shall direct Mr. Cafamajor to take an account of the whole. I expect a return from Colonel Butler of the guns and military stores found in the place; the latter I believe are very trifling: the returns of all I shall have the

3

honour

honour to send you as soon as they are received. The Rajah this afternoon sent two Vackeels to camp, and Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder has promised them an audience to-morrow. I moved the army yesterday evening towards the fort, which I imagined hastened the fall of the place. This morning I marched again into the Tanjore road, and as we halt to-morrow, I shall endeavour to send you a plan of the fort. I hope you will make an apology for my silence to the Board, as since the hour I left Trichinopoly, my mind and body have been so greatly fatigued, I have not had a moment's time to write, and my Secretary has been very unwell.

I have the honour to be

Honourable Sir,

With the greatest respect,

Your most obedient servant,

JOSEPH SMITH.

Lieutenant-Colonels Bonjour and Ross, and Major Vaughan, joined the army yesterday morning.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 27th September, 1771.

RECEIVED this day the following letter from General Smith :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I SHOULD have done myself the honour of addressing you sooner, but since my general letter of the 13th to this hour I have not had a leisure moment, which I hope will in some degree apologize for my silence, and my Secretary has been unwell. The Honourable President, I have no doubt, has informed you from time to time of such occurrences as have come to his knowledge.

The army arrived at this place on the 16th, and immediately on coming to our ground, the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder summoned the garrison of Vellum to surrender; but in place of making any reply to his letter, the Killedar detained the flag of truce a prisoner, and treated him very harshly: the same day, at the time our troops took possession of the Pettah, he made his escape, and returned to his Master.

On the 17th, early in the morning, Lieutenant-Colonel Butler, with Captain Montresor, examined the Pettah, in order to find out the most convenient spot to erect a battery on, which was completed by the 18th in the morning, and the guns got into it by two in the afternoon. This place was reported to the Engineer as the best to breach from, but as I was not thoroughly satisfied with the accounts I had received of the depth of the ditch, I sent a man on whom I could depend, under cover of the night, to examine it, and it was found to be very wide, and the water impassible for the troops. The ditch was examined in several other places, and the Engineers have agreed on the spot where there was no water. A second battery was erected to the westward, and the guns which had played from four o'clock in the evening of the 18th to six, in the former battery, were removed to the latter, which could not be opened before the 20th in the morning; and notwithstanding a very hot fire was kept, from sun-rise 'till the evening, from six pieces of cannon, and near eight hundred shot fired, yet the breach could not have been made practicable 'till about three the next afternoon; however the garrison saved us that trouble. Observing from the battery the enemy's fire of musquetry to be very trifling, I ordered Lieutenant-Colonel Bonjour, who commanded the covering party, to advance some men to the breach, and by that means find out whether they were going off or not. The Colonel pushed his men over the ditch, and with great difficulty raised some of them to the top of the breach, where finding no opposition, he moved on with two platoons of Europeans and some Sepoys. The remainder of Captain Cosby's battalion marched in at one of the gates, which the advanced party opened. A few of the runaways were killed, and others taken prisoners. I attended the young Nabob into the fort early the next morning the 21st, and at the same time the army moved ground to the eastward of the fort; from whence I proposed marching this morning to Tanjore, but the Commissary of Stores assured me it would be impossible for him to bring the ammunition, &c. from the Pagoda (where it was lodged for safety, previous to the fall of Vellum) 'till noon this day, and he is now busy securing it in the fort 'till we shall send for it to Tanjore.

The Chief Engineer is desired to take a plan of Vellum, which, with returns of the guns, military stores, provisions, &c. I shall have the honour to send you the moment I receive them. I have ordered Mr. Casamaior, the Commissary on the part of the Company, to take a particular account of the grain, &c. which is found in the place, which, from what appears at present, is far short of the quantity I hoped to have found in such a fort as Vellum, which for strength surpasses any I have seen in the Carnatick except Vellour.

I have garrisoned the fort with four companies of Captain Cosby's battalion, and two companies of Topasses belonging to the Nabob, amongst whom are several gunners. As Captain Cosby mounted the breach with part of his battalion, I thought he had the best title to remain after the army moved from hence. I hope from his diligence many discoveries will be made with respect to hidden grain, as I suppose a place of such consequence to Tanjore could not be left without a considerable store in it.

Nazeeb Khan, with the Nabob's Cavalry, Loudon's, Alexander's, and a part of Goddard's battalion of Sepoys, have joined; but the latter corps are very incomplete in numbers. Captain Matthews's cavalry on every occasion have behaved with great steadiness and intrepidity, such as I could not believe had I not been an eye witness. It is a great pity his horses are not better fed; they have not strength to undergo half the service he would put them to, if they were taken proper care of; but gram is very scarce, and little comes to his share.

I did expect to have found with Nazib Khan a plentiful Buzar, as I was informed by the young Nabob at Trichinopoly, that all the carriage bullocks were with him on the other side of the Colleroon; but on his arrival in camp he brought about fifty bullock loads of rice, and two hundred from Mader-ul-Mulk on cattle engaged by Mr. Hay. We have scarce had a bag of rice sold in the Buzar; for were the supplies that are brought from Trichinopoly to camp exposed to public sale, the great number of followers with this army would consume the whole in a day. I am preparing an escort to march this evening for Trichinopoly with empty bags and bullocks, and the Commissary's carriage cattle for the stores.

I cannot without great injustice to Mr. Hay omit recommending him to the Board's particular notice, for the great care and attention he has shewn in collecting bullocks and bags for the use of the army, and giving his assistance on every other occasion where the service required it. I am persuaded, but for his being indefatigable to enable us to march, which he cheerfully engaged in, we might yet have remained on the plains of Trichinopoly, or been obliged to return ere this time.

The young Nabob with me is very assiduous, and willing to do all that lies in his power; but never having been with an army before, it cannot be supposed that he has any idea of providing for it. Some sheep have been sent from Trichinopoly for the Europeans, and I shall use my utmost endeavours to forward the service we are employed on.

The enemy's cavalry, to the number of four thousand, have been very troublesome since our army arrived so near the capital: they have more than once endeavoured to break through our lines; and about thirty desperate fellows (mad with bang), pushed their way into camp near the park of heavy artillery; but they paid severely for their temerity, as not above five men that I could learn escaped being killed; nor could one of them, had not our people mistook them for the Nabob's black horsemen, that are hourly going in and out of camp: they rode to the Nabob's tent, and called aloud for him; but on the first alarm he hastened to me, and went to the lines, where we found some of the enemy within the push of the bayonets: many of them and their horses were killed and wounded; those that survived the Nabob sent to the Rajah next morning.

Last night about six o'clock two Vackeels arrived in camp from the King, to talk matters over with Omdat ul Omrah, and to try to bring about an accommodation; they desired that Syed Muckdoom Ally Khân might be permitted to return with them, but this Omdat-ul-Omrah absolutely refused, and informed them the army would be near Tanjore to-morrow, and more conveniently situated for negotiating than at a distance. Monajee and Dobbear are still confined close, and Gillegellepah yet holds his sway over the young King. The Dutch and French have both sent Europeans to his assistance; the former some guns, and ammunition in abundance.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

with respect,

your most obedient servant,

Camp near Vellum,
22d September, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 30th September, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings.

John Smith

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley

George Stratton

Richard Brickenden

George Mackay.

The President lays before the Board the following letter from Mr. Casamaijor :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

ACCOMPANYING this you will receive a copy of a letter sent me this day by General Smith; I have in consequence obeyed the directions he has been pleased to give. As a similar case may occur, I must take the liberty to request you will inform me how I am to act.

I am with respect,

Honourable Sir,

your most obedient

humble servant,

Camp near Vellum;
22d September, 1771.

JAS. HY. CASAMAIJOR.

To Mr. James Henry Cafamaijor.

S I R,

AS it is indispensably necessary that an account should be taken, on the part of the Company, of all provisions and other property found in the fort of Vellum, (guns and military stores excepted, which the Commandant of artillery will attend to); you will therefore be pleased to employ proper persons for that purpose, and make a return thereof to me, which I shall transmit to the Board. You will give orders that a distinction be made in the returns between the Circar and private property.

The Nabob has given orders to his servants to attend at the time such account is taking.

I am,

S I R,

your most obedient servant,

Camp before Vellum,
21st September, 1771.

(Signed) JOSEPH SMITH.

In consequence of which the following letter is now wrote to Mr. Cafamaijor.

To Mr. James Henry Cafamaijor.

S I R,

THE President has communicated to us your letter of the 22d instant, enclosing copy of one from General Smith, and we approve of your having, in compliance with General Smith's desire, taken an account of the provisions and other property found in the fort of Vellum. Although we think it extremely proper and necessary that an account should be taken by you of whatever provision or plunder may be taken by the army during the present service; nevertheless, as the whole is to be at the Nabob's disposal, you are not to take any part thereof under your charge, except such provisions as may be delivered over to you by the Nabob's Son for the use of the army, and for which you are to give receipts, agreeable to your general instructions.

We are,

S I R,

your affectionate friends,

Fort St. George,
30th September, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Received

Received the following letter from General Smith, 25th September:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

I HAD the honour to address the Board on the 22d, and on the 23d, at daylight in the morning, the army marched and encamped before Tanjore Fort, about three miles distance, E. by S.

On the fall of Vellum the Rajah ordered the Pettah to be evacuated, broke up his camp, marched his Sepoys, Polligars, and Peons into the fort, and left his cavalry only in the field.

Colonel Flint, with the European and Grenadier Sepoys of the army, were posted at a mosque in the Pettah, about 800 yards from the fort, and a company of Sepoys at a village in their front. That evening, and all the 24th, the Engineers were employed reconnoitring, and their people cutting wood for fascines and gabions. The enemy began to fire briskly from twenty-four pounders, that flanked our post in the Pettah, but, though their shot were very well directed, without success.

There are at Killicotah 600 of the Nabob's Sepoys; 500 I have ordered to proceed to camp with the plank, timber, and stores belonging to the Engineers: they are to halt at Vellum in their way 'till Captain Loudon arrives there from Trichinopoly, and both convoys are to come into camp together. Nazeeb Khan, with his cavalry, and Capt. Alexander's battalion, are to march to-night and reinforce Captain Loudon.

The Engineers having determined to attack the S. E. angle of the fort, and the army being at too great a distance to support their operations, I moved ground this evening, and encamped the troops nearer; but not so conveniently as I could wish, on account of the water, which is to be had at one particular place only.

The Vackeels are gone into the fort for instructions, and as the Engineers will require two or three days to prepare before they break ground, a truce from firing on either side was agreed upon, in order to bring about an accommodation; but the fort nevertheless continued to fire the whole day from heavy artillery, and the Vackeels are not returned.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir,

with respect and esteem,

your most obedient servant,

J. S M I T H.

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Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 1st October, 1771.

Came in the following letter from General Smith:

Honourable Sir,

I HAD the honour to address you the 25th, advising I had encamped the troops as conveniently as I possibly could to support the attack of the Engineers on this place. Thus far advanced, much depends on them; and notwithstanding they have been making preparations for several days past, they will not break ground before the 28th at night. Yesterday evening very late I received intelligence that the enemy had assembled 2000 of their best cavalry, and as many foot, to intercept Capt. Loudon's convoy between Vellum and camp. Major Braithwaite was immediately detached with the European and Sepoy Grenadiers, and part of Capt. Matthews's Cavalry, to give them an alert; they accordingly fell in with their advanced-guard of about 200 Horse, not more than fifty yards distance, when they were discovered by the light of the moon. The enemy immediately took the alarm, and were riding off, when the Major threw grape amongst them from the six pounders 'till they got out of reach. Our spies who were with the enemy say several of their people were killed, five horses left on the plain, and others wounded that got off. The detachment marched on to Vellum, and brought Captain Loudon with his convoy safe to camp. About 6050 bullock loads of rice and grain, with a large quantity of Buzar stuff, arrived. The public rice, about 900 bullock loads, was started at Vellum, and all the carriage-bullocks that were able to return to Trichinopoly were sent back for more rice, escorted by Captain Alexander's detachment. Our communication is entirely cut off with Trichinopoly by the Polligars; scarce a letter escapes being taken, though dispatched by our best Hircars.

I have the honour to be with respect,

Honourable Sir,

your most obedient servant,

Camp before Tanjore,
27th September, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 3d October, 1771.

Received the following letter from Captain Poverly :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

YESTERDAY afternoon Captain Alexander, of the Nabob's troops, marched with his battalion, and 1000 of the Nabob's Black Horse, to convoy the heavy guns and the first division of stores which General Smith indented for. Captain Alexander sent on, Sir, yesterday morning, some horsemen, with a letter to acquaint the General that he was to march in the evening, as the General had given orders to him to send before he marched, that he might send a proper escort to meet him. Captain Alexander could not go any farther than the Sugar-loaf Rock on the Plain yesterday, where he halted with an intention of marching again this morning; but about two in the morning the horsemen returned, and informed Captain Alexander that they had seen in the road between him and the army 2000 horse and a large body of Colliers. Capt. Alexander has taken a strong post on the Rock, and fortified himself very well, so that it is impossible any thing in the world can hurt him, and waits 'till he gets further orders from the General, to whom I have dispatched, Sir, six different Hircars to inform him of what has passed.

I have the honour to be,

with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

your most obedient

Trichinopoly,
29th Sept. 1771.

and very humble servant,

P. JAS. POVERY.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 4th October, 1771.

The following letter was this day received from Captain Poverly :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. at Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

LAST night I received a letter from the General, acquainting me that Colonel Flint, with the Grenadiers of the army, had marched to meet the escort, and
6 desired

desired that I would send four companies of my battalion to join Captain Alexander, and for him to proceed, as there were not above 6 or 700 horse, instead of 2000 as reported: I accordingly sent them, and he is marched this morning. I am sorry to acquaint you, Sir, of the death of Ensign Ralph Ford, who died the 28th at night. I don't know, Sir, whether the General acquainted you of the death of Ensign Charles Stephens of my battalion; it happened, Sir, before the General left this.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

your most obedient

and very humble servant,

Trichinopoly,
30th September, 1771.

P. JAS. POVERY.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 6th October, 1771.

Came in the following letter from Capt. Poverly, commanding at Trichinopoly:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. at Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

I HAD the honour to receive your favour last night of the 28th ultimo, with one enclosed for Mr. Casamajor, which I shall take care, Sir, to forward to him by the first escort, which I expect very soon, as it is dangerous sending any letters but those that are made up in a very small compass by the Hircars, there being a number of Colleries and small bodies of horse between camp and this of the enemy's. I hope, Sir, Captain Alexander with the stores is safe at Vellum by this. Captain Loudon, and not Colonel Flint, as first ordered, came to meet him. I constantly, Sir, correspond with the General from a cypher he gave me before he left this. I am often obliged to write the General triplicates in one day for fear of a miscarriage, particularly when any escort is to leave this, that he may provide accordingly. I had the honour, Sir, to write you the 25th, 26th, 29th, and 30th ultimo, which was my last. Had I, Sir, received any news from the General in the interval of the 22d and 25th, I would have done myself the honour to have made you acquainted with it. I this morning, Sir, received a letter from the General, dated the 30th ultimo, the particulars of which I take the liberty of sending, viz.

“ We broke ground late last night, and all this day the fort have kept up a
“ constant fire of heavy cannon and small arms, but to little purpose. Last night
“ four Companies of Sepoys attacked one of their posts, in which were 1000
“ Colleries, and drove them without the loss of a man, though they fired more
“ than 100 rounds at them from the fort, and our people past on the glacis.”

Enclosed

Enclosed, Sir, I send the the monthly returns of the garrison, and have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

your most obedient

and very humble servant,

P. JAS. POVERY.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 7th October, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letter from Captain Poverly :

To the Honourable Josias Du Prez Esquire, President and Governor, &c. of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

I HAD the honour to write you last night, and have this day received a chit from Captain Cosby at Vellum of the 1st instant, in which he says poor Nicoll received a bad wound in the thigh last night. They are now firing hard from the fort; our batteries I hope will return the salute this afternoon. We are so situated here, that we can see the fort and every gun that is fired. I have not, Sir, heard from the General since the 30th ultimo. This moment, Sir, I have the honour to receive both your favours of the 30th ultimo, with one for the General, and another for Mr. Cafamajor, which I shall take care to forward by the first safe conveyance. You may depend, Sir, on my obeying your orders in a most-particular manner.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

Trichinopoly,
3d October, 1771.

P. JAS. POVERY.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 9th October, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letter from Captain Poverly :

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To

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

Trichinopoly, 5th October, 1771.

I HAD the honour to write you the 3d; since then, Sir, I have not heard from the General. I send you, Sir, a paragraph of a letter from Colonel Flint to Mrs. Flint.

Camp, 3d October, 1771.

THE Tanjore horse and foot two days ago thought proper to attack our posts, and continued for near six hours smart firing on both sides; they were beat off with great loss, so much that I fancy they will not attempt any thing of the kind in a hurry. One of our batteries opened yesterday, which has silenced those in the fort a good deal. Captain M'Kenzie, Lieutenant Nicoll, Lieutenant Campbell badly wounded, and one or two others slightly. Captain Alexander is arrived at Vellum, and will be with us this afternoon.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient and very humble servant,

P. JAS. POVERY.

I am afraid, Sir, the Monsoons are beginning to set in, as we have had a good deal of rain yesterday and this evening.

The following is an extract of a private letter from Camp :

Extract of a private Letter from Camp, dated the 3d, and received the 9th October, 1771.

IN my last I gave you information of our being employed in making fascines, gabions, &c. After a good deal of deliberation, the south face of the small fort was determined to be attacked; and on the 29th at night a battery was begun at about 550 yards distance. On the 30th the fort kept a very hot fire on our covering party, and endeavoured to burn our new work: this night we had a large working party, but the battery was not above two thirds finished. On the 1st of October, the General being drove to the utmost distress, having sheep for that day only, detached Captain Matthews on a foraging party, with all the cavalry and some Sepoys. About ten o'clock in the forenoon the fort began an unusual hot cannonade on our covering party, which this day was commanded by Major Vaughan; the strength of which I will inform you of some other time. About half an hour after very great bodies of Sepoys and Colliers, with matchlocks,

matchlocks, rockets, &c. took possession of a watercourse and a garden in the front of our intended battery, from whence they commenced a very hot fire, and advanced, as they increased in numbers, from the watercourse to small banks, and covered every well adapted to such purpose. The fire from our Sepoys on the right and the enemy's became very hot; and the Major fearing, as the enemy grew still more numerous on their left, and advanced on our people, that they would soon turn on his right flank, detached Captain Cheshire, with a body of Europeans, to their assistance; but before he got half way, he observed the enemy's cavalry coming round his left flank from the west side of the fort, and moving round to his rear; this obliged him to recall his party with Cheshire, and form with his rear to the fort, leaving Captain McKenzie, with some of his Sepoys, to battle it on the right as well as he could. As the cavalry advanced, the Major cannonaded them from two Sepoy guns he had with him; which, although it knocked several down, the body took no notice of them, but advanced. It happened that the Major had posted a Subaltern and 20 Europeans about 300 yards from him at a Choultry, which, when he faced the fort, was in the rear of his left; as the enemy advanced, this party was struck with a panick and abandoned their post; which the Major observing, detached Captain Campbell with a party to support them; but before they could join the Major, some of them were cut down, and about 500 of the enemy's horse made a full charge on him; but by his personal steadiness, which kept his small party of Europeans firm, and the grape from one of his three pounders only, they were repulsed; but not before one was so close, when he received his death, as to cut at one of our men at the gun; this hero was son-in-law to Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, who is with us in camp. On the fire's first commencing very hot, the General ordered a battalion of grenadier Sepoys to the Major's assistance, with whom he gave me orders to see how he went on, and inform him how matters stood. On our march the Brigade Major joined me, and galloping on a little in front, arrived just in sight as the enemy had made the above charge; and waving his hat, and giving three cheers, was perceived and answered by the Major and his men. By this time I was arrived out of the Pettah, and directed Captain Chandler to form his men, and moved at their head, as fast as they could keep up with me, towards the Sepoys and Collieries on McKenzie's flank, who soon gave way; we pushed them pretty close to the fort, and then took post under a little cover. By this time a company of European grenadiers, with two 6 pounders, arrived, which the Major sending for joined him; and as soon as we had drove the enemy quite clear from the bushes, &c. where I was, I went to the Major. At this time the enemy's whole cavalry were assembling again, and advanced in a much more numerous body than he had seen before: by his desire I returned to where I had left the grenadier Sepoys, brought them up, and formed in a line with the Europeans on the plain; and the Major desiring me to manage the guns, we began as they advanced a hot fire on them, which put a stop to their progress. Close by the Choultry our Europeans had retreated from is a dry Tank, which a number of them got into; but the major part of them wheeling off, the grenadier Sepoys pushed out and drove them clear off, and took possession of it. During the whole time the fort was playing on us very briskly, and you may suppose we suffered some loss. The enemy acknowledge to have lost 7 Jemidars, 100 horsemen killed, and 200 horses

horses wounded and 200 horses killed, besides a great number of Sepoys and Colerics, and the Commandant, and a number of Arabs the Rajah had in his service. This stroke had been concerting some time, and was chiefly directed it is said by the Rajah, by signals from the fort; this seems probable, as different colours were seen at times to wave from the walls, which were as full as they possibly could be of people. If he had the direction, he had the mortification to see his scheme (although exceedingly well laid, and very resolutely pushed from $\frac{1}{4}$ past 10 to 3 o'clock) foiled, and his people not able to stand the fire of our troops.

At night we went to work again on our battery, and although but very slightly finished, got six 18 pounders, and two 12 pounders, one 10 inch mortar, and two 8 inch ditto, with 4 royals, which began to fire the 2d in the morning. Captain De Morgan commanded the battery, but not giving satisfaction to the General, who went to see the effects our fire had, he ordered another officer to relieve him. Our fire yesterday and to day has in a great measure silenced the enemy's; and by the Nabob's account out of the fort, the shells have killed many, and thrown them into the greatest consternation.

Matthews returned yesterday with a supply of sheep for a few days; this has saved the draught cattle of our heavy guns, which otherwise we must have killed.

The General is much hurt at the scarcity of provisions in camp, a cruel circumstance to a man of his feelings.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee, at Fort St. George, Saturday, 12th October, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley.

READ a letter from the Rajah of Tanjore, as entered in Country Correspondence†, requesting the interposition of the President in settling the disputes between him, the Rajah, and the Nabob. A letter from the Rajah to Moodoo Kistnah is also read‡, to the same purport, enclosing a list of the demands made by the Nabob, and referring to the Vackeel.

The President acquaints the Committee, that the Vackeel mentioned in the letter to Moodoo Kistnah is not arrived; that the letters were sent by an inferior person, who, on the President's representing to him the impropriety of his Master's late conduct, and the little regard he had paid to the repeated advice given him by

† Vide page 626.

‡ Page 627.

the President, had endeavoured to exculpate his Master, by laying the blame on Gullabellapah, the person now intrusted with the management of affairs. The President further informs the Committee, that he communicated the above letters to the Nabob, who recommended that the Rajah should be referred to Omdat-ul-Omrah, the Nabob's eldest Son, to whom the management of the negotiation was now intrusted; which the Committee approve.

Jof. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam^l. Ardley.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 14th October, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letter from General Smith :

Honourable Sir,

I AM almost ashamed of myself in having so long been silent, when I know that your expectations will be on the stretch hourly for accounts of our proceedings; and indeed I do not wonder at it, when the importance of the business we are employed on, the uncertainty of the weather, and the very scandalous manner that our army is provided with grain, are causes sufficient to excite your anxiety. Indeed, Sir, the little time that is given to me, from the business of the day, rather prepares me to rest than to take up the pen; and Mr. Parkinson has been so much indisposed since we left Trichinopoly, that he could not afford me scarce any assistance, and has been obliged to leave camp. Captain Horne, at my desire, communicated such events as were interesting to my friend Sullivan, and hope he has informed you therewith. While the fair weather continued, we have made a shift to get rice sufficient from Trichinopoly to satisfy our fighting men; but what the other parts of the army do for an existence, I'm sure I am at a loss to find out. We have also been fortunate in our convoys, for an accident happening to any one of them would have distressed us beyond redemption. Yesterday arrived Captain Alexander with stores, &c. I at the same time received one from Mader-ul Mulk, assuring me that 1100 bullock loads of rice was with the escort; but guess my surprize, on asking Captain Alexander what he had brought, to receive for information only 382 bullock loads, not one day's provision for the troops, and they had wanted two days before. Some merchants left Trichinopoly at the same time, and what with their stock and his Nabobship's, only 500 and odd bags could be mustered. I mention this matter to you, Sir, that you may for a surety know we have been trifled with in the most essential point.

The weather has for two days been very wet, and hard rains rather alarming; but I hope the Monsoon is not yet at hand: we should be in very bad plight were the heavy rains to break in upon us, and no supplies in camp or Vellum. Petrie returned from thence yesterday, after examining the magazines of paddy, and

assures me there are not 300 bullock loads of paddy in the place; I am therefore come to a resolution of sending Matthews on a foraging party, and try what can be found in the Tanjore districts. The bullocks that Hay procured for us, by being constantly employed, grow weak and feeble; however I hope they will be able to hold out as long as we may have occasion for them. The Colleries are so exceedingly troublesome on the road from hence to Trichinopoly, that no Hircars can go safe; and they intercept our convoys also: some of them have paid dear for their insolence, but the hopes of booty takes from them every sense of danger. The young Nabob does all he can, poor fellow, and is very willing and ready; but the old one has not, by what I can find, supplied with the life and spring of every thing else—*money*; and you know, Sr, that the people of this country, unless they receive pecuniary gratifications, will not exert themselves, or be useful to you in matters that regard not them, unless they are rewarded. Here are Colleries, Black Horsemen, &c. under the denomination of the Nabob's troops, and said to be commanded by his eldest Son; but on his application to them to go and bring cattle, &c. for the use of the troops, they flatly refused, and positively would not budge an inch: this he himself told me with tears in his eyes; and I was under a necessity of sending my own, after having been put off from day to day, and 'till there was not a sheep left in camp. I mention these matters, that the other Gentleman may not amuse you with false stories.

The constant escorts we are obliged to furnish from hence to Trichinopoly, and those very strong, our working parties, duty of the trenches and the lines, have, since our being here, sickened a good many of our people; and with 80 men at Vellum in the hospital, also the killed and wounded, a return of which accompanies this, the Pioneer company, and draughts that the Commanding Officer of Artillery will want to assist in his branch, reduce our European corps prodigiously; and the rainy weather affects the Blacks very much. We have on the spot only $5\frac{1}{2}$ battalions; Cosby, with four companies of his battalion, was necessary to remain at Vellum, as I could not trust the Nabob's people there. The place fixed on by the Engineer for the properest spot for the attack is so situated, that we keep there 11 companies of Sepoys and 150 Europeans; and never less than 500 Sepoys and 40 or 50 Europeans, besides the Pioneers, working: this brings the duty about pretty smartly; though, while our men's bellies are filled, they'll never complain. Six companies of grenadiers more, if they could come in time, might be useful. The second day after breaking ground, the Rajah's troops made an attack on our covering party with a great deal of resolution; and had not Major Vaughan been a staunch old veteran, we might have suffered more; but his steadiness, at the head of 120 Europeans and eight companies of Sepoys, with two small guns, repulsed the flower of the Rajah's Behauders: they lost several horses and men on the spot, 50 of the former died of their wounds, and 200 disabled, with about 300 men and 7 officers killed and wounded. Since that day they have continued very quiet, except a few straggling Colleries, who throw rockets at a distance. In justice to Major Vaughan, and the Officers that day under him, I recommend them to your notice, and hope you'll speak of them to the Board as they deserve. Old Mackenzie, and his Commandant Moden Saib, are both

badly wounded;—the first through the arm, the latter through the body; and the Major gives them both merit and praise. Our grenadier corps was ordered to support the Major, and I believe he was not ill pleased to see them on the plain.

The Rajah it seems would consent to the Nabob's terms, excepting two articles; those are,—receiving an English garrison in Tanjore, and giving up Vellum for ever; *but he will not trust the Nabob's word or his Son's for a half-penny.* No messengers have lately come from him, except a flag of truce, after the action, to seek for some dead bodies. *He's determined to try his fate, and rather die, family and all, than submit to the Nabob's terms, unless you'll interfere.* The fort has in it plenty of fighting men, and they do not appear to want ammunition, for their cannon are going from morn 'till night, except on the face where our works are carrying on; and even there, from the Fausse-Braye, they contrive to give us a few shot now and then. Our Engineers are getting forward, though not so fast as our wishes; and though Colonel Ross is a very brave good man, yet being an utter stranger to the natives and mode of conducting his branch in this country, it has not gone on with that briskness we could desire; and Montrefor, having now no authority, cannot act but by order: however I hope in a few days we shall see the inside, and be within too, by the blessing of God. Many of the inhabitants are fled from Tanjore to the sea coast, and more are hourly going with their effects and jewels.

As disputes arise between our officers and the Nabob's when on duty, I could wish the Board would settle this point, as our lads do not by any means approve being commanded by his stragglers.

Reports prevail very strongly, that the Marattas are now in the Burrah Maul, and that 10,000 are hourly expected to the Rajah's assistance, and on which he builds great hopes; the Nabob has also mentioned this circumstance to his Son, but on what foundation I know not.

Lieutenants Maul, Thornton, Dee, and Gun, are arrived in camp. I shall take an opportunity by the next escort to address you again, and am with respect and esteem,

Honourable Sir,

Camp near Tanjore,
6th Oct. 1771.

Your most obedient servant,

J. SMITH.

The following is an extract of a private letter from camp.

Extract of a private Letter from Camp, dated the 8th October, 1771, and received the 14th.

✓ OUR last escort brought us sufficient for the Sepoys and Lascars only for about three days; the General therefore sent Captain Matthews, with his horse and a battalion

battalion of Sepoys, to Amalpetty, a large town about fifteen miles from us, to try what could be done there; and an escort of a battalion and an half, with the bullocks and empty bags, to Trichinopoly the 7th in the morning early: Matthews found the town abandoned, but no rice. In the afternoon of yesterday, the enemy's cavalry were in motion to the westward of our sieging party, but kept at the distance of cannon-shot from our post; it immediately occurred, that their views were only to amuse us, while their principal object was Matthews or the Trichinopoly escort. The former proved the case;—five hundred horse were sent to intercept Matthews: I had wrote to him to put him on his guard. This morning his outguards discovered the enemy, and gave him time to get in readiness and draw out of the town. On his observing their numbers, he advanced towards them, and directed his grenadier troop and marksmen to charge. The enemy had not courage to stand—gave way—and he pursued; they took to the Paddy ground, over which he followed for five or six miles. He is returned this moment to camp, and has brought the Jemidar that commanded and about 30 horsemen prisoners, and between 80 and 90 horses; he says he believes there were about 150 men more killed and wounded.

They still continue a hot fire from the fort, and we daily lose men. The batteries we opened are at too great a distance to answer the end proposed, particularly as the powder is exceedingly bad. However we have carried on our approaches, and last night began a battery for ten guns at about 280 yards from the fort; by the 11th I hope it will be playing on the fort, which will alter affairs very soon. Colonel Ross was last night wounded by a musket ball on the cheek-bone; there is no danger in the wound, but it has laid him up for the present.

In consequence of which orders were immediately given for the march of the grenadier companies of the 1st and 2d battalions of Sepoys from hence; and the following instructions were given to the Officer commanding them:

To Lieutenant Lane.

S I R,

YOU are appointed to the command of the grenadier companies of the 1st and 2d battalions of Sepoys, now under orders to march to Trichinopoly. You have herewith the route by which you are to proceed; and as the detachment will be as lightly equipped as possible, you will march with all expedition, advising me and Captain Poverly at Trichinopoly of your progress; and you will desire him to acquaint General Smith therewith.

I am, S I R,

Your most obedient servant,

JOS. DU PRÉ.

Fort St. George,
14th October, 1771.

The

The following letter was also wrote at the same time to Lieutenant-Colonel Tod, commanding at Vellore :

To Lieutenant-Colonel Tod, commanding at Vellore.

S I R,

YOU will be pleased immediately on the receipt hereof to order the grenadiers of Captain Evans's battalion of Sepoys to march immediately to Trichinopoly. You will see that they are as lightly equipped as possible, it being necessary that they should proceed with all expedition, and you will appoint a careful officer to command them. You will be pleased to advise Captain Poverly of the time of their marching, and of their route, and desire that he will take the first opportunity of acquainting General Smith therewith.

I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient servant,

Fort St. George,
14th October, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ.

A letter was also wrote as follows to General Smith, and sent in triplicate to Mr. Dawson at Cuddalore, to be forwarded by different routes.

Dear General,

I HAVE received your's of the 6th. Mr. Sullivan has communicated all the advices received from Captain Horne;—they are clear and ample. We are all exceedingly vexed at the scarcity in camp, and the cause: we have no remedy; promises we have in abundance. I wish you had wrote sooner for the grenadiers, they should have been sent. Four companies march from hence to-morrow by Colonel Butler's route, and two companies from Vellore. If you have any orders for them, send them to meet the Commanding Officer on the route. Some money has been sent; a full supply goes with the grenadiers. *Be under no apprehensions of Marattas; my life for it they'll not trouble us before the rains.* 'Twas bravely done of Major Vaughan; and Captain Matthews, as advised in Captain Horne's, merits praise. What can I say more? Pray let somebody write a line in cypher every day in duplicate and triplicate by various routes; if they miscarry 'tis no matter.

I am,

Your most obedient servant,

Fort St. George,
14th October, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 15th October, 1771.

Came in the following letter from Captain Poverty:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

LIEUTENANT BLAKE, that went with my four Companies to escort the provision, is this day returned; and I shall send, Sir, to-morrow another supply, which I hope will last them a month. I have not, Sir, had any particular news from the General, but have heard that our grand battery was opened the 8th instant. The General, Sir, has a severe cold, and is a good deal out of order. Mr. Parkinson is very ill at Vellum, Sir, which I imagine is the reason of my not hearing particularly from the General.

I am,

With the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient

And very humble servant;

P. JAS. POVERY.

Trichinopoly,
10th October, 1771.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council of Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 16th October, 1771.

Received the following letter from Captain Poverty:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

I HAVE this morning sent off Lieutenant Galbraith, with four companies of my battalion, one battalion of the Nabob's Sepoys, and some black horse which the General sent from camp with Lieutenant Blake, and my former four companies, with an escort of provisions and stores. These two days past we have heard them, Sir, firing excessive hard; and I dare say, Sir, our grand battery is opened, as the report seems to be from heavy guns.

I have the honour to be,

With the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient

And very humble servant;

P. JAS. POVERY.

Trichinopoly,
12th October, 1771.

Extract

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George in their Military Department, 17th October, 1771.

Dispatched the following letters :

To George Dawson Esquire, Chief at Cuddalore.

S I R,

HEREWITH you will receive copy of a letter we now address to Sir John Lindsay. The President wrote to you yesterday, desiring that you would by the Stag give advice of the event of the siege of Tanjore to the Company's Secretary, for the information of the Honourable Court of Directors; enclose in it a copy of the letter we now address to Sir John Lindsay, put them under a flying seal, and deliver them to the care of Sir John Lindsay. We are

S I R,

Your affectionate friends

Fort St George;
17th October, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

To Sir John Lindsay, Knight of the Bath.

S I R,

WE are informed by the Chief of Cuddalore of your arrival there. As the event of the siege of Tanjore may happen before your departure, and be known at Cuddalore before it can reach us, we have directed the Chief of Cuddalore, immediately on receiving the news, to address a letter to the Court of Directors informing them thereof, and to request the favour of you to take the same under your care. As we cannot doubt but the event of this siege, whatever it be, will greatly influence the Company's stock, we think it our duty to take every possible means in our power to prevent any prejudice to uninformed individuals; and therefore we request the favour that you will be pleased to convey the letter of the Chief of Cuddalore by the very first opportunity to the Court of Directors, that it may be made public; or if that should not be consistent with the rules of the service, that in such case you will be pleased to transmit the same to the Secretary of State, informing him of our request and motives, and that it may appear we have no other view but that which we hereby declare. We have directed the Chief to leave his letters to the Court of Directors under a flying seal.

We have the honour to be,

S I R,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
17th October, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

To General Smith.

S I R,

IN my letter of the 14th, which went in triplicate, I desired you would give me a line every day of your progress. Sir John Lindsay, with the Stag, is I understand at Cuddalore, waiting I imagine to carry with him the news of the event of the siege. As it is of the utmost consequence that the Company should have the most early advice thereof, I desire you will lose no time in communicating the same to Mr. Dawson at Cuddalore, that he may, if the Stag be there at that time, advise the Court of Directors thereof; for this purpose Mr. Dawson is now instructed to open all letters addressed to me or the Council.

I am,

S I R,

Your most obedient humble servant,

Fort St. George,
17th October, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Friday, 18th October, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Camp before Tanjore, 12th October, 1771.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I AM honoured with your commands of the 23d and 25th September, with the several extracts from the Court of Directors' letters relative to plunder, booty, &c. all which, pursuant to your orders, have been made public to the troops under my command. It may be thought by the Honourable Board that I have been rather remiss in my duty in not more frequently communicating to them the operations of the army, and the progress we have hitherto made against Tanjore; but let me assure them it has not proceeded from any wilful neglect, or desire to withhold that information which I am certain they cannot but be anxious to have, and which I would often give, did not a variety of objects hourly present themselves to engage my attention;

tion; and those too so very essential to the army under me, that I confess my thoughts and mind have not had a moment's relaxation since the hour we moved from the plains of Trichinopoly. When the Nabob had undertaken to furnish the army with provisions, and engaged his promise that plenty should be provided for it, I was under no apprehensions, considering the means in his hands, that we should experience the smallest difficulty on this head; but I have been most egregiously mistaken; and with all the care and assiduity of Mr. Hay, together with such supplies as Mader-ul-Mulk has furnished, we have scarce been able to keep this army from starving. By the last escort I received letters from the Trichinopoly Nabob, informing me that 1100 bullock-loads of rice accompanied Captain Alexander. Such a supply would have enabled us to hold out until another could be brought; but, to my utter surprise and astonishment, I found Captain Alexander had only received 330 bullock loads, not a day's consumption, and at the time of his arrival we had not a grain in camp. The bullocks bags were immediately dispatched back again, together with all that could possibly be collected in camp; but I have not to this hour heard if they have left Trichinopoly; and we have been driven to extreme distress, which has occasioned a general murmur through the whole army. Many of the Officers' servants have left them, and many of the Company's Coolies, &c. whom it was totally out of my power to relieve; and to add to our misfortunes, the rains have already set in for several days, and the weather continues to wear all the appearance of the approaching Monsoon. Under these circumstances I detached Captain Matthews, with his cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, to the eastward, hoping that he may intercept some convoys going to Tanjore, or at least discover where supplies are to be had: at present I have received no intelligence from him, but expect it to-morrow. You must forgive me for mentioning these disagreeable truths, but they bear so hard upon my spirits, that it is with difficulty my patience can support it; and I'll leave you to judge, when at a time the troops had hard duty and extreme bad weather to encounter, and when the vigour and alacrity of every individual is required to carry on our operations, and every encouragement should be given them, what I must feel in not having it in my power to find them a daily subsistence. It cannot be expected that men will go through the fatigue incident to our profession, unless they are nourished and taken care of. My own feelings on these occasions are most sensibly affected, and renders a service, which would otherwise be a pleasure, an irksome task indeed.

The Engineers had raised a battery for six pieces of heavy cannon and two twelve pounders, which was intended to ruin the defences of the front attack, and to dismount the enemy's guns on that face. This battery was opened the 2d instant, but on trial was not found to have the desired effect; and Colonel Ross then advanced a trench to a watercourse about 250 yards in front of it, where a body of our troops were immediately posted; and from thence, on the side nearest the fort, erected another battery of ten guns, which was opened the 11th, and is within 370 yards of the walls. The enemy have and do still keep up a brisk fire, which has killed and wounded many of our men. The rains have retarded our working very much, and from the slow progress on this account, I much fear we shall not be able to reduce this fort ere the heavy rains set in, and which threaten hourly. Much of our am-

munition has also been damaged, and the fire we were under the necessity to keep up has lessened our stock more than was at first imagined. A further supply of shot, and powder in particular, will be requisite, with some more shells of different sizes. Our Sepoy corps has suffered a good deal from wounds, &c. and many fall from being exposed to the rains. The six companies of grenadiers from the Jaghire battalion, and a number of draughts from each of them, will be necessary to keep them tolerably complete. Since Colonel Roß received his wound, Captain Montresor has taken charge of the corps of Engineers; and he proposes, should the weather prove favourable, to carry on a sap from our advanced battery to the crest of the glacis, which he commences the 13th at night, and there erect one for breaching both walls. We will do all we can, but should the weather prove so unfavourable as to prevent his carrying his designs into execution, we must remain 'till it is more favourable, and seize every hour that presents itself to our advantage. I have only one concern, and that is for provisions, which we must endeavour to procure and get to camp by the best means in our power; and I hope soon to see a large convoy arrive from Trichinopoly, being informed that 2000 Gunny bags were sent thither from Arcot. As soon as I can lay in a few days stock of provisions before hand, I shall send an escort to Devecotah; and will try to open a distinct communication, either by Chillumbrum or Worriarpollam, for our letters; but at present it is impossible to get an Hircarrah through the country.

The Rajah's Vackoels are in camp with the young Nabob, and very readily agree to all his demands, except the entire cession of Vellum, and admitting a garrison into the capital. The young man at present appears firm, but is greatly hurt at the scarcity of provisions.

P. S. Mr. Petrie informs me of his want of money, and that he has received no account of any supply being on the road.

The following is an Abstract of the Killed and Wounded in the Affair of the 1st October, as per Return accompanying the above Letter.

A R T I L L E R Y.

	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Corporals.	Matrosses.
Killed —	2.	0	0	0
Wounded	1	1	1	5

E U R O P E A N I N F A N T R Y.

	Serjeants.	Corporals.	Private.
Killed —	0	0	7
Wounded	1	2	21

S E P O Y S.

S E P O Y • S.

	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Commandants.	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Total Black Officers and Sepoys.
Killed	0	1	0	1	0	1	3	0	1	2	25	—
Wounded	1	2	1	2	1	0	5	7	10	2	71	—
												82
												96

Names of the Officers Killed and Wounded.

Lieutenant Henry Nicoll	—	Killed.
Captain Alexander M'Kenzie,	}	Wounded.
Lieutenant George Campbell,		
Nath. Stuckey,		
Ensign Henry Dixon,		

The following is a copy of a private letter from camp, received at the same time :

Copy of a private Letter from Camp, dated the 12th, and received the 18th October, 1771.

IN my last I informed you I was in expectation we should open our new battery of ten guns on the 11th ; I then gave what I imagined would be a day too much ; but unfortunately very heavy rains set in here the 8th, and although not constant, have been heavy every afternoon, and great part of the nights since, which has retarded us much : however we made shift to open the battery yesterday morning ; and although we made the bastions from whence they fired so hot that they were often obliged to abandon their guns, yet they no sooner found one place too hot, than they opened some other ; and as soon as our attention was taken that way, they would be at the old ones again, or some other ; and have hitherto kept up as hot a fire as we have ; and last night were as busy repairing their works as we were repairing our battery. Whoever has the direction of their works and defending them, is neither deficient in knowledge nor activity, and will oblige us to carry on our approaches with regularity and circumspection : but what is the most unfortunate circumstance is the heavy rains, and some losses that we have had in the tenderest article that could affect us by it, our gunpowder. If the weather don't immediately grow more favourable, we must begin to build Pandalls for our men. We shall make the best use of our time until the Monsoon sets in for good ; should that overtake us before we are in possession of the place, the General I believe proposes, if he can get provisions, maintaining his ground, if possible, and pushing on whenever the rains abate ; but as we daily sustain losses, and the troops grow sickly, draughts to complete every corps should be sent, or the enemy, who are very numerous, may harass us too much, more particularly as we must have large foraging parties and escorts for provisions.

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The General dispatched Matthews and a battalion of Sepoys a rice-hunting to the eastward yesterday morning, and we have out a battalion and a half, with Nazeeb Khan's horse, for supplies from Trichinopoly; and in the mean time we are very glad of a little Paddy from Vellum: however I don't despair of writing you in a little time of being in possession of Tanjore.

A letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors is now wrote, enclosing copies of the above letters, to be sent under cover of the following to Mr. Dawson at Cuddalore, to be forwarded by His Majesty's ship Stag.

To George Dawson Esquire, Chief at Cuddalore.

S I R,

ACCOMPANYING this you will receive a letter for the Honourable the Court of Directors, which you will deliver to Sir John Lindsay, if he should be at Cuddalore, requesting his care thereof, and that he will be pleased to forward it with all expedition on his arrival in England.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
18th October, 1771.

Your affectionate friends,

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 20th October, 1771.

THE following is a copy of a private letter from camp, received this day; copy of which was sent to Mr. Dawson at Cuddalore, to be forwarded to the Court of Directors by the Stag.

Copy of a private Letter from Camp, dated the 15th, and received the 20th of October, 1771.

I HAVE the pleasure to inform you, that the 13th at night a large escort of rice arrived at Vellum; the General immediately sent orders for it to remain there 'till further orders. On the 14th, in the morning early, about 2000 of the Rajah's cavalry were in motion on the Vellum road; but finding the escort did not move, returned; and in the afternoon the greatest part marched to the eastward, as we suppose, in quest of Matthews. In the evening Captain Russell, with six companies of Sepoys and two guns, marched to Vellum, and this morning returned with the escort and rice, &c. safe to camp, to the great joy of many thousands who had hungry bellies. Whether Matthews has received any of our Hircars since he marched, is uncertain; we have had none return, nor no news immediately from

from him, but heard a considerable deal of firing from the eastward this morning; and one of my spies this moment arrived out of the fort reports, that they have had accounts that there has been a skirmish, in which they have lost near 100 men, and Matthews about 40: this account I do not yet put much credit in.

In my letter of the 12th I mentioned the heavy rains retarding us much; though not constant, they still continue: however we have not only kept up our fire, but have forwarded our approaches, and have greatly lessened the enemy's fire. We are now within twenty paces of the covered-way, and to-night our Engineers will be able to determine whether it will be necessary to build a battery on the top of the glacis, for breaching the Fausse-Braye, or not. Miners are collecting for blowing up the counterscarp of the ditch, which is very deep, and the counterscarp a solid rock, but I believe not much water in. Captain Campbell of the Engineers was wounded last night through both thighs, but the bone not hurt. Colonel Ross will be out again in a few days. The General is much better since the rice arrived, and I am tired, being just come from the trenches.

P. S. Monajee, who has been a close prisoner for some time, is restored to power, and invested with the command of the army. How far, now all is at stake, and the Gentoo Government being liable to receive such a shock, may influence him, and prevent his resenting the ill usage he has received from the Rajah, time must shew. By all accounts, every person in Tanjore, except the late favourites, are greatly rejoiced at this event. He has wrote to the young Nabob of his being restored to power, and hopes that, by the friendship which formerly subsisted between him and the Nabob, he may be the means of bringing about a peace, or something to that effect.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 20th October, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letters:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I HAVE this day received the honour of your letter, dated yesterday, with a copy of the one you have addressed to Sir John Lindsay, which letter I forwarded to him on board His Majesty's ship the Stag, now at anchor in this road.

I have taken every possible means to obtain the most early intelligence of the event of the siege of Tanjore, which should I be so fortunate as to receive before the departure of the Stag, I will not fail to address the Honourable Court of

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Directors under a flying seal, agreeable to your orders, and enclose the copy of your letter to Sir John Lindsay.

I have the honour to be,

With great respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Cuddalore,
18th October, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servant,

G E O. D A W S O N.

Stag, off Cuddalore, 18th October, 1771.

G E N T L E M E N,

I HAVE just now had the honour of receiving your letter of yesterday's date, and will with great pleasure comply with your request, in forwarding any letters the Chief of Cuddalore may send me, by express, immediately on my arrival in England. But I am much afraid I shall not have the happiness of carrying any news of importance from Tanjore, as I think it will not be safe to remain on the Coast longer than to-morrow night or Sunday morning.

I have the honour to be,

G E N T L E M E N,

Your most obedient humble servant,

Josias Du Pré Esquire,
President and Governor,
&c. Council of Madras.

J O H N L I N D S A Y.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 21st October, 1771.

THE President informs the Board, that he had applied to the Nabob to know whether we could, in any shape, be assisting in supplying the army with provisions; that the Nabob had informed him that there was a large quantity of rice at Chillumbrum, part of which he had ordered to be conveyed to a mud fort in the Arrialore District, from whence it might be transported to camp; and that if we could assist him with bullocks and Gunnies, they would be of great service: that he, the President, had thereupon wrote to Mr. Dawson at Cuddalore, directing him to send to Chillumbrum all the bullocks and bags he could procure.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 21st October, 1771.

Received the following letter from Mr. Dawson :

To Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor of Fort St. George.

S I R,

THE Stag sailed from this road at about eleven o'clock this morning, since which I have received a letter from Sir John Lindsay as follows :

“ As I have found the greatest part of my papers that were missing, I shall not wait for the rest ; for I am apprehensive, from the calms we have had for some days past, that we may expect bad weather at the full of the moon, which is now very near. I heartily wish I could stay 'till the fate of Tanjore is decided ; but it is running too great a risk, particularly as it is so very uncertain when that event may happen. If you should receive any intelligence of importance before the Stag is out of sight, fire guns and I will return.”

I do not think it improbable Sir John Lindsay may call at one of the southern ports, I have therefore dispatched people for information.

This morning I received the enclosed letter under your address, which, agreeably to your directions, I opened and read, not without hopes of meeting with the much-wished-for intelligence.

Lest there should be a possibility of seeing the Stag again, I will detain the copy of the Board's letter to Sir John Lindsay until to-morrow.

I am, very respectfully,

S I R,

Your most obedient

humble servant,

Cuddalore,
19th October, 1771.

GEO. DAWSON.

Extract

778 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 22d October, 1771.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

HIS Majesty's ship Stag having failed yesterday for England, I have now to return you the packet you were pleased to order me to deliver to Sir John Lindsay for the Honourable the Court of Directors.

I am, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient servant,

Cuddalore,
20th October, 1771.

GEO. DAWSON.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, 23d Oct. 1771.

Received the following letter from General Smith :

Honourable Sir,

I HAVE the pleasure, by the return of Lieutenant Galbraith to Trichinopoly, to inform you that the convoy of provisions arrived safe in camp two days ago, to the great joy of every black man in it, as not a grain was left when it marched in. 2000 bags of rice, and some for the Europeans, with a quantity of salt, and a number of sheep, eight thirds of arrack, and some merchants, composed the convoy. We expend at the nicest calculation 200 bags per diem, and less cannot do without distressing our servants and followers. Since I had the honour to write you, our approaches are carried on to the crest of the glacis, and we are busied in forming a battery to breach the outward wall, which is of stone, very high, and the ditch upwards of twenty-four feet in depth. However, if the weather keeps fair, I hope three or four days more will bring to a crisis this business. We have lately lost a good many Europeans and Sepoys. Several Officers have been wounded, and amongst the rest, Captain Campbell through both his thighs.

I informed you, Sir, that I had detached Captain Matthews, with his cavalry and a battalion of Sepoys, into the Tanjore country to search for provisions; but since he left the army I have not had the least intelligence from him, which has given me much concern. I have several people out, and hope by to-morrow to obtain some tidings of him, which I shall communicate to you.

The Tanjore Vackeels have been with the Nabob several days, and Affavendrow to-day arrived with fresh overtures for peace; but I fancy the young man's terms will bear so hard upon them, that I believe they will run all risks rather than agree to them: you shall be informed, the moment I learn, how the negotiation goes

goes on. Talk as they please, nothing stops our great guns ; though the walls of Tanjore are tough enough.

As Captains of Artillery were much wanting on the batteries, Captain Oates being at times the only one to do duty, I took the liberty of appointing Lieutenant Jones to act as Captain-Lieutenant until the Board's pleasure should be known : I can say for him, that I never saw a better officer on service in this country.

I have the honour to enclose you the returns for the months of August and September, with a list of officers now with the army, &c. Monajee and the Dobbée are released and taken into favour ; I know not what change this may make in politics. Monajee has wrote a very civil letter to Omdat-ul-Omrah : and I am, with respect and esteem,

Honourable Sir,

Camp,
17th Oct. 1771.

Your most devoted,

J. SMITH.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 27th October, 1771.

Came in the following letter :

Honourable Sir,

AT present we have not much firing from our batteries, the breach in the inner wall being sufficient ; but must wait 'till the mine is completed to blow in the wall of the counterscarp, and that a battery is cut out of the glacis for four guns to breach the fausse-braye, which cannot be seen from our batteries. The Engineers have sunk the shaft, and are branching out the galleries ; they have also begun the sap battery on the counterscarp, which, when ready for us, I make no doubt but will be breached fit for the troops to mount in less than two days. The weather is very fine at present ; God send it may last so.

I have now five officers wounded, but all doing well, as are those of the army. The Scapoys have suffered much, but there is rice for them now.

We can perceive the enemy working behind the breach, and it is said they are fortifying and mounting cannon on the wall that divides the old from the new town, but that will be of little use when we get into the fort attacked. The ditch is deep, the fausse-braye about $23\frac{1}{2}$ feet, the counterscarp about 16 : I have viewed them both yesterday and this afternoon.

I am, with the greatest respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your much obliged

And most humble servant,

J., BUTLER.

780 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President, &c.

Honourable Sir,

SINCE I had the honour of addressing you last, I am so far recovered as to be able to visit the trenches without much inconvenience.

We have now sunk a shaft within a few feet of the crest of the glacis, and are carrying on our galleries, in order to place our mines so as to blow in enough of the counterescarp to make the descent into the ditch easy; and we are at the same time sinking a four gun battery in the glacis, whose embrasures are to be cut out of it, in order to batter the fausse-braye wall as low as possible, the wall of the body of the place being already destroyed.

I am, most respectfully,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient

And most humble servant

Camp before Tanjore,
20th October, 1771.

PATRICK ROSS.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 28th October, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Camp near Tanjore, 20th October, 1771.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

IN my last I had the honour to inform you, that I expected a large supply of grain from Trichinopoly. Lieutenant Galbraith arrived at Vellum on the 15th, and a detachment under the command of Captain Russell was ordered from camp to reinforce the convoy, which arrived here the next morning. This supply consisted of 2000 bags of rice for the Nabob, 7000 sheep with salt and rice for the Europeans, and eight thirds of arrack, together with rice, &c. the property of merchants. It came indeed most seasonably, for it was with the utmost difficulty that I could find a sufficient allowance for the Sepoys to keep them in good humour 'till this relief arrived. Lieutenant Galbraith returned to Trichinopoly with 1700 bullocks for farther supply of rice, which I hope soon to hear is on the road, and shall this night send a battalion of Sepoys for it's security.

I have at length obtained intelligence of Captain Matthews, but with the utmost difficulty, as the Colleries throughout the Tanjore country are very numerous,
much

much attached to the present Government, and extremely vigilant, so that not one messenger in twenty can escape them. Captain Matthews writes to me from Sholavaram, where he has been endeavouring to open a communication with the Nabob's troops at Carpoor, and if possible obtain some supplies of grain from thence, and to bring it with him. He informs me, that the roads through the Tanjore country are extremely bad, especially for cavalry, but that he had met with no interruption but from the Polligars, who are numerous. I have wrote, and directed his return to camp, as I find the scheme I first proposed by no means practicable.

I had the honour to inform you, that the Engineers were about to carry a sap to the crest of the glacis; this is now effected, and a battery for breaching the outward wall begun, as also a mine to open the counterscarp of the ditch. This business will take up more time than was at first imagined, as the soil is very hard to work, and our Engineers rather too sanguine in their expectations; as, from what they had expressed, I was led to hope we should have been able to have opened a battery of four twenty-four pounders to-morrow morning, but I am now apprehensive it will be two days longer ere this be completed. Colonel Ross is again abroad, and Montrefor, from a musket ball that went through his hat, but did not break the skin, is this evening much indisposed. Captain Campbell is wounded through both thighs; Lieutenant Giels, a very active young gentleman, doing duty with the Engineers, is shot into the head; Lieutenant Bonnevaux in the arm: in short scarce one in that corps has escaped. Lieutenant Wittwer is sick, and only Mr. Maule remains.

The Nabob has had several Vackeels from the Rajah, with offers of agreeing to most of the articles insisted on, except that regarding the cession of Vellum; they were this day dispatched to know the Rajah's final determination: an answer is expected to-morrow, which I shall send express.

We have now near three hundred Europeans sick and wounded, besides what have been killed, and a great number of Sepoys. The rains have impaired the health of the soldiers much, and their duty has been pretty severe since we broke ground. A few days more must put an end to the dispute in favour of one or the other, and I pray they may be fair ones. It is now the 20th of October, and my fears are hourly alarmed lest the Monsoon should break ere the business is finished.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 28th October, 1771.

Came in the following letters:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire.

I HAD the honour to address you the 20th, and then gave you an account of our operations. The mine for making a descent into the ditch, the Engineers have reported

reported will be completed some time to-morrow : as soon as that is done, a four gun battery, which is in readiness on the covered-way, will be opened to breach the wall of the fausse-braye. I have reason to think the enemy have made retrenchments behind the present breach, which on that account is to be enlarged from the ten-gun battery, and by that means I hope the storming party will be able to force their way into the fort to the right and left of it. The weather has been very unfavourable ; however that must not stand in our way. Captain Matthews returned to camp this afternoon, without being able to collect provisions of any kind.

This morning at day break the ten-gun battery began to play on the wall to the right of the breach. It rained a great part of the day ; notwithstanding a brisk fire was kept up, and with tolerable success. It is expected we will be able to open the four-gun battery in the covered way on the fausse-braye wall by twelve o'clock this night, as the Engineers report, that the mine by that time will be loaded, and secured so as to receive no damage from the shock of the firing. The ten gun battery will continue to enlarge the breach to-morrow, when I shall have the honour to address you again ; and am,

Honourable Sir, with respect,

Your obedient servant,

Camp before Tanjore,
24th October, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH.

The following is an extract of a letter from Mr. Parkinson :

*Extract of a Letter from Mr. Thomas Parkinson, Secretary to General Smith, dated
23d October, 1771.*

I HAVE been a great part of yesterday and to-day in the trenches ; and though the General does not like to give you his sentiments as to the time this place may hold out, on account of the disappointments he has met with in our operations, in my opinion two days more will put us in possession of it, if matters are not agreed before that time, and the rains do not fall exceedingly heavy and constant in the interim.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré.

Honourable Sir,

I ARRIVED last night on the island of Seringham, and crossed the Cavary this morning to Trichinopoly. Some exceeding bad weather, and the badness of the roads towards the latter end of my march, a good deal retarded it ; which however is
attended

attended with no particular bad consequence, as Captain Poverly has not yet received from General Smith, who had timely notice of my approach, any particular orders relative to the further disposal of my people.

I have the honour to remain with respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

Trichinopoly,
24th October, 1771.

THO. LANE.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 24th October, 1771.

Received this night the following letter from General Smith :

Honourable Sir,

WE have been very much disappointed in our expectations of opening the four gun battery in the covered-way on the fausse-braye wall at 12 o'clock at night ; it could not be done 'till eleven this forenoon, as the mine was not secured from the shock of the firing 'till that time, on account of a spring which interrupted the miners, and by that means another day has been lost ; however a brisk fire has been kept up from the ten and four-gun batteries, with as much success for the time as could be expected, and will be continued 'till the breach is practicable. Captain Horne had the misfortune to be wounded this afternoon, with a cannon shot of small size which grazed his head, but I hope he will soon be well again.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir,

With the greatest respect and esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

Camp before Tanjore,
25th October, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH.

MR. PETRIE presents his most respectful compliments to you, and desires I may acquaint you, that the money is far advanced on the way to camp, and that all is well on that account. He had no cypher, or he would have had the honour to address you himself.

I am with respect,

Honourable Sir,

Your obedient servant,

THO^s. PARKINSON.

784 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

The following is an extract of a letter from Mr. Parkinson, received at the same time :

Honourable Sir,

THE morning after to-morrow I think the fate of Tanjore will be determined : the soldiers are panting to revenge the lots of their messmates ; the officers are no less warm to be on this service ; and I have not the least apprehension of a repulse, notwithstanding all the opposition of their works within the breach.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir,

Your obedient humble servant,

THOMAS PARKINSON.

*Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, Friday,
1st November, 1771.*

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President lays before the Committee a letter received this morning from General Smith, dated the 27th October, advising that the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah had that morning wrote him a letter, informing him that he had signed the Articles of Peace, in consequence of the Rajah's accepting the terms offered him ; and therefore desiring that hostilities might cease, which the General had complied with, agreeable to the instructions sent him at the commencement of the campaign. General Smith further advises, that Nazeeb Khān and Syed Muckdoom Ally Khān were returned to the fort, and that the treaty was to be ratified the next day ; the particulars of which he, the General, purposed communicating in his next, as far as should come to his knowledge.

We cannot avoid expressing our surprise to learn, from the abovementioned letter, that a treaty of peace has been so suddenly concluded. It is certain that General Smith frequently advised us that negotiations were frequently carrying on ; but as we engaged in the expedition with a professed intention of bringing the Rajah to the Nabob's terms, and the Nabob's Son was sent to negotiate them, it was necessary that a negotiation should be carried on at the same time that our operations were prosecuted with all possible vigour. And as the General informed us that the Rajah would never consent to the demands, which the Nabob's Son seemed

determined

determined not to recede from, we could never suppose that an accommodation would take place thus suddenly and conclusively; especially after the Rajah's conduct had compelled us not only to appear before the place, but to carry on our approaches even to the effecting almost a practicable breach. And when we were given to understand by the last advices, that the troops were in great spirits and eager for the assault, we could not imagine that at such a crisis any other terms would have been accepted than the surrender of the fort at discretion. However, as we are yet uninformed of the conditions on which a peace has been concluded, and have no intimation of the grounds and reasons for such a measure, we must keep our judgment suspended, until we can obtain a full and particular account of all circumstances; for which purpose a draught of a letter is now prepared to be wrote to General Smith from the Board, and for that purpose it is agreed to summon the Council immediately.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

AT A CONSULTATION, Friday, 1st November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President,

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley

George Stratton

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

George Mackay.

THE Board having assembled, pursuant to the desire of the Select Committee, the following letter from General Smith is read :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir,

I HAD the honour to address you the 26th, a duplicate of which is as follows :

I have nothing material to add to my last; the guns from the ten and four-gun batteries are kept playing night and day, but the latter has not made the impression on the fausse-braye wall that was expected; however we must persist 'till a practicable breach is made.

The garrison keeps up a very hot fire; and, notwithstanding every precaution, we lose both Europeans and Sepoys every day, particularly artillery men.

The

The Rajah seems very desirous to accommodate matters with the Nabob, but nothing is yet concluded.

I have now the honour to acquaint you, that this forenoon I received a letter from the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, informing me he had signed articles of peace, in consequence of the Rajah's accepting the terms offered him; and therefore desired I might cease hostilities, which was complied with, agreeable to the instructions I had the honour to receive from the Board at the commencement of this campaign.

Nazeeb Khan and Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan are returned from the fort, and to-morrow the treaty is to be ratified, I understand, in due form; the particulars whereof I shall have the honour to communicate in my next, as far as comes to my knowledge.

I have the honour to be, with respect and esteem,

Honourable Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

Camp near Tanjore,
27th October, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH.

The Select Committee lay before the Board their Minutes of this day on the foregoing letter, together with the draught of an answer prepared in consequence, which is approved, and ordered to be wrote fair and sent away immediately.

Jof. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

The following letter to General Smith, agreed on by the Committee, and approved by the Board this day, is now sent away:

To Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

THE President has communicated to us your letter to him of the 27th October, wherein you inform him, that Nabob Omdat ul-Omrah having signified to you that he had signed articles of peace with the Rajah of Tanjore, and desired that in consequence thereof hostilities might cease, you had complied therewith, agreeable

to the instructions you received from the Board at the commencement of the campaign.

That such was the tenor of our instructions is most certain ; we were not authorized to give any other, as the Nabob was principal in the war, and the Company only auxiliary : yet as the eyes of the Powers around are fixed on the Company, as the effective strength and support of the Carnatick, the honour of the British arms is deeply interested in this event. All the late letters from the army have given us cause to think that the siege advanced successfully ; and the last letters of the 26th speak of the breach as being almost practicable, and of the army, both officers and men, as wishing for the hour that should lead them to the assault, not doubting of victory. At this crisis you inform us, that a peace has been definitively concluded ; we must suppose the reasons were strong and clear : but however cogent they may be, we cannot but lament that the British arms are thereby deprived of that eclat, which they were on the point of acquiring.

We beg you to receive this as it is meant, not even to hint at disapprobation of any thing that has happened : we hold, and shall hold, our judgment suspended and free from bias, until we shall be minutely informed of all circumstances ; and it is to desire of you such information that we write this.

We are, SIR,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
1st November, 1771.

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 4th November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
Richard Brickenden
George Mackay.

THE following letter from General Smith, received this day, is now read :

788 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I HAD the honour to communicate to your Honour, &c. the operations of the army previous to our success in the reduction of the Fort of Vellum, and in part our transactions since that time.

On the 23d. the army marched and encamped before Tanjore, distance about two miles and a half. A party was advanced the same day to a Choultry, about eight hundred yards from the fort, and a company of Sepoys to a village in their front. The Engineers were employed reconnoitring the ground, and in search of the most favourable spot for their attack.

On the 24th at night I received intelligence that the enemy's cavalry had moved to our rear, in order to intercept our convoys coming from Trichinopoly. Major Braithwaite, with the European and Sepoy grenadiers, was detached in order to give them an alert; but as they are always prepared to move on the first alarm, they got off with the loss of a few men and horses: however, it had the good consequence of making them cautious not to encamp at night within our reach on the plain. The Major halted 'till the escort with the heavy guns and stores ordered from Vellum joined him, and marched into camp next morning.

On the 25th, the Engineers having agreed that the south-west angle of the fort was the most likely place to be attacked with success, I moved the army as near that quarter as circumstances would admit of, in order to support their operations. On the 29th, the redoubt battery intended for ten guns, but afterwards called the six gun battery, at first supposed to be five hundred yards distance, but proved to be upwards of seven hundred, was begun, in order from thence to destroy the defences.

The army by this time began to be so much distressed for provisions, having but little rice, and not a day's beef, mutton, or salt, that I was under a necessity of ordering Captain Poverly at Trichinopoly to drive any cattle he could meet with and send them to camp: Captain Matthews was also detached to scour the country with his cavalry for the enemy's bullocks and sheep, if any could be found, to supply the men.

On the 1st of October, about 9 o'clock in the morning, the cannon from the fort began to play on our besieging party with uncommon briskness; and about 10 the enemy's Colleries sallied, and assembled in great numbers, under cover of a watercourse, and some high ground in our front. They were soon reinforced by a very large body of Arabs and Sepoys; and being increased to upwards of five thousand foot besides horse, they advanced towards our party; which consisted of
three

three companies of the seventh battalion of Sepoys in the redoubt battery, not then finished, and eight companies of the sixth battalion, with an hundred Europeans, posted near and in a watercourse, under the command of Major Vaughan; and twenty more, with an officer, were detached to a Tank and Choultry, about three hundred yards to the front of his right. The enemy advanced on his right, and appeared as if they intended moving round the flank of the eight companies of Sepoys; to prevent which the Major detached a party of his Europeans and a three pounder; but on perceiving their cavalry galloping from the west face of the fort towards his rear, he recalled the party, and drew out his small body of Europeans on the plain facing the cavalry. The Sepoys would not quit the watercourse, though their Captain and Commandant used every means in their power to get them to join the Europeans.

It unfortunately happened that the twenty Europeans detached to the Tank and Choultry, were alarmed on seeing so large a body of horse, and endeavoured to join the Major; but before that could be done the horse were at their heels, and cut some of them to pieces; though their retreat was favoured as much as possible. Flushed with success, this body charged the Major also, who by his personal steadiness so encouraged his party, that the enemy could make no impression on him; and after keeping up a smart fire of grape from his three pounders, they retired. A Jemidar of the enemy's fell at the muzzle of one of our guns, and several of their best men within a few yards.

The Arabs and Sepoys were just so far advanced as to be able to flank the eight companies in the watercourse, when Captain Candler, with the first battalion of grenadier Sepoys, whom I had ordered from camp to re-inforce Major Vaughan, made his appearance, and soon repulsed them. A company of European grenadiers, with two six pounders, arriving also from camp, the Major ordered them to join him; and observing the enemy's cavalry had formed again, and, not satisfied with their first repulse, were advancing, as if determined to try the event of a second charge, he ordered the grenadier Sepoys, then on his right watching the motions of the infantry, to be drawn up, on the plain on his left, and as the enemy came on cannonaded them, which they withstood but a short time, when they thought proper to retire. Here this grand effort of the Rajah's, which lasted upwards of two hours, ended, without being able to destroy our works, or make any impression on the party who defended them; though he had, by signals from the fort walls, directed the movements of his troops himself. He lost that day seven principal Jemidars, about a hundred men killed, and two hundred wounded, of his cavalry, beside a Commandant of infantry, many Arabs, Sepoys and Colliers.

On the 2d, to my great satisfaction, Captain Matthews arrived in camp with a supply of bullocks and sheep for the troops. Our redoubt battery was opened this day, and the next a three gun battery begun, which was opened the 4th, both to destroy the fences. On the 5th and 6th, our approaches were carried on from the three gun battery to a great watercourse in our front. The next day
Captain.

Captain Matthews marched again in search of provisions, and some of the village people, who had only seen his advanced party, consisting of a single troop, carried intelligence to the Rajah; on which he immediately detached three hundred horse, with orders to bring them in: they advanced too near to get off without a skirmish, in which many of them were killed, thirty men and eighty three horses taken; the remainder returned to the fort, and Captain Matthews to camp. The horses were sold by outcry, and the prisoners sent to Vellum at the Nabob's desire.

On the 11th, a ten gun breaching battery was opened about three hundred yards from the wall; and Captain Matthews marched a third time with the cavalry, a battalion of Sepoys, and six light guns, in search of provisions: he was directed to proceed to the eastward, in hopes to intercept the enemy's convoys, or make discoveries of Paddy to supply the troops; but he failed in this attempt; and as there was no prospect of any supply from Trichinopoly in time, I was exceedingly alarmed; and had it not been that Tondiman's people brought two little convoys, of about five hundred bullock loads of rice, to camp at this critical time, which they did not do before or since, I cannot say what the consequence might have been; we could not have held out to the 15th, when a convoy of about two thousand bullock loads of rice reached us from Trichinopoly, which with management would supply the troops for ten days.

By the 16th, the enemy's guns on the face attacked were most of them silenced, their defences destroyed, and a sap begun. On the 18th, we made a lodgment on the crest of the glacis, finished the cavalier of the trenches, the parallel to the right and left of the covered-way, secured the rear of the cavalier to the left for a thirteen inch mortar for stones, and the same day began the mine to throw the counterscarp into the ditch. The next day the sap was finished, and the sap battery for four guns began. The ten gun battery had been kept playing for some time past on the wall, and a breach was in great forwardness.

On the 23d, Captain Matthews returned to camp without any provisions.

It had long been my wish to beat up the quarters of a body of horse encamped on the glacis, under cover of the guns on the north face of the fort; but our troops, with detachments, escorts, working parties, and other duties, were so much harassed and fatigued, I could not spare a force sufficient for the undertaking 'till Captain Matthews's detachment returned. And as Captain Kelly had desired to be employed on that service, and his battalion being the first for duty, I directed him to march on the 25th in the night, and make a sweep round the west face, and endeavour to get into their camp by surprize; at the same time I marched Captain Alexander's battalion to the east face of the fort, there to be in readiness to attack the flank, as soon as I perceived Captain Kelly had entered their camp. I waited 'till near day light in the morning, and not hearing any fire from that quarter, I returned to camp with the battalion. Captain Matthews, who had moved into the plain with his cavalry to cover Captain Kelly's retreat, or to take any advantage

of the enemy that might offer, was ordered to return to camp. About 10 Captain Kelly came in, and reported that the enemy's out guards were so vigilant, and such a number of Colleries on the west face, it was impossible for him to surprize the main body.

25th. This day the sap battery of four guns was opened on the fausse-braye wall, and both it and the ten gun battery kept playing night and day.

On the 27th, the Engineers reported that the breach would be practicable by the next morning, both in the fort and fausse-braye wall, and it was resolved to spring the mine to open a passage into the ditch; but before noon I received a letter from Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, (a copy of which I have the honour to enclose) informing me he had signed articles of peace, in consequence of the Rajah's having accepted the terms offered him; and desiring me at the same time to cease hostilities, which I complied with, agreeable to the instructions you were pleased to honour me with of the 29th of August.

I have mentioned but one sally of the enemy's, as being the principal; notwithstanding they were very frequent, and always repulsed, but not without some loss. The besieged kept up an incessant fire from the fort ever since we came before it, 'till the peace was made, both from musketry and artillery, particularly the eighteen and twenty-four pounders taken from General Lally; and it is my astonishment how their magazines held out.

I have a very particular satisfaction in assuring the Honourable Board, that the officers and men under my command have shewn, during the expedition, all the steadiness, alacrity, and cheerfulness in the execution of every part of their duty I could wish, and shall on all occasions be happy to express the sense I entertain of their good behaviour during this siege.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you a copy of the treaty made with the Rajah, and delivered to me by the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder; also a return of the military stores taken at Vellum, and a return of the killed and wounded; and when Mr. Casamaijor has got an account of the plunder taken at Vellum made out, and sends it in, I shall have the honour to transmit it also.

Translation of a Paper, containing the Articles agreed to by the Rajah of Tanjore, dated 20th October, 1771.

THE two years Peshcush, amounting to eight Lacks of Rupees, I am to pay in ready money.

For the expences of the army I am to pay thirty-two Lacks and fifty thousand Rupees.

Whatever lands, money, and effects, I have taken from the Marawar and Nalcooty Zemindars, I will restore.

Whenever Horse, Sepoys, Peons, &c. fighting people, are required, I am to send them; and they are not to return 'till they have leave from Court; and the charge of Batta, &c. is not to be required of the Circar.

Should the Paddy, which the merchants and people belonging to the Company had in the Tanjore country, have been plundered, I am to answer it.

I am to have nothing to do with the Marawar, Nalcooty, Tondiman, &c. and if they are guilty of any improper act, their punishment is to be from the Circar.

With the friends of the Circar I am to be in friendship, and with its enemies in enmity; and I am not to give place or protection in my country to the enemies, and those laying under the displeasure of the Circars.

If I have taken any thing from the runaway Polligars of Worriarpollam and Allianore, I am to restore it; and if they are in my country, I will deliver them to the Circar's people.

I have given a separate treaty of friendship.

If any Europeans in the service of the Circar or Company have deserted, and fled to me, I will deliver them up.

If the Company's trade in the whole Tanjore country shall be continued, I am to use their weavers well.

The fort of Vellum to be given to me hereafter; it must be destroyed. †

The districts of Elangad and Coiladdy to be conferred on me.

I am to give up to the Circar the villages of Tewanoor, &c.

I am to give up to the Circar the Jaghire district of Arny.

Translation of an Engagement under the Seal of Rajah Tuljaujee, dated 25th October, 1771.

THE firm engagement of Rajah Tuljaujee, Rajah of Tanjore, to the Circar is; That whereas, in part of the stipulation in favour of the Circar of the Nabob

† Something seems to be wanting in this article to complete the sense; it is conformable to two copies, but in a third it runs thus:—"I give up to the Circar the fort of Vellum." See another Copy of the Articles in Appendix No. XXIV.

Waulau Jau, the sum of thirty-two Lacks and fifty thousand Rupees is stipulated to be paid; in lieu of payment thereof in specie, I have appointed the Subahship of Manewarum, and some districts of the Subahship of Cumcurrum, the annual revenues of which may amount to sixteen Lacks and twenty-five thousand Rupees, for the discharge of the same; and accordingly the same will be entirely discharged by two years revenues of the said lands: and after the receipt of the said money by the Circar, I shall take back again the said two Subahships which belong to me.

Translation of the Engagement under the Seal of Rajah Tuljaujee, dated 20th October, 1771.

THE firm engagement and true acknowledgement of Rajah Tuljaujee, Rajah of Tanjore, to the Circar of the Nabob Waulau Jau, are;—That with the friends of the Circar he will be in friendship, and with it's enemies in enmity; that he will on no account whatever, either secretly or openly, afford assistance or support in any shape to the disturbers of the peace of the Carnatick; that he will always join and be in friendship with the Circar; that whenever his troops, Horse, Sepoys, or Peons, shall be required, he will send them with his Sardar, and not demand their expenses from the Servants of the Circar; that he shall pay the stated Peshcush yearly, without deceit or delay; and that in future he shall not undertake any operations whatever. In testimony of which, I, the said Rajah, have given this engagement under my hand and seal; swearing thereto by the faith of the religion I profess, that the same hereafter may appear as a Saned.

Translation of a Copy of a Letter from the young Nabob to General Smith, dated 27th October, 1771.

I HAVE acquainted you from the beginning of the negotiation between the Rajah of Tanjore and me; you are therefore probably fully apprized thereof. I now likewise inform you, that the Rajah has agreed to my demands; the first of which was, that he is on no account whatever to afford assistance in any shape to the disturbers of the peace of the Carnatick; which he has agreed to, swearing to the same by his religion: I have therefore made peace with him, and shall send my trusty people to him, agreeable to his desire. The Rajah will first stop the firing of his guns; which done, you will be so good as to send orders to the Officer at the battery, that as soon as he sees a white flag hoisted upon the fort, he will stop the firing likewise from his guns. All this has proceeded from the bravery and valour of yourself and the army.

I

What can I say more?

794 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

Return of the Killed and Wounded in the Army commanded by Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, from their leaving Trichinopoly to this date. Camp before Tanjore, 28th October, 1771.

		Lt. Colonel.	Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Bombardiers.	Gunners.	Corporals.	Drummers.	Private.	Total.
European Cavalry	Killed										2	2
	Wounded											
Artillery	Killed						3			1	4	8
	Wounded		1	2	3		5	5			18	31
1st Battalion of 1st Regiment	Killed										13	13
	Wounded					3		2			36	41
1st Battalion of 2d Regiment	Killed			1		1		2			11	14
	Wounded			2	1			2	1		38	42
Grenadiers of 2d Batt. of 2d Reg.	Killed										1	1
	Wounded							1			5	6
Engineers	Killed											
	Wounded	1	1									2
Total		1	2	5	3	5	6	5	12	2	128	160

S E P O Y C O R P S.

		Captains.	Lieutenants.	Ensigns.	Serjeants.	Commandants.	Subadars.	Jemidars.	Havildars.	Naigues.	Beffees.	Colour Men.	Drummers.	Sepoys.	Total Black Officers & Sepoys.
4 Battalion	Killed													14	14
	Wounded		3		1			3	1	2				16	22
5 Battalion	Killed		1		1									8	8
	Wounded		1		1		1			2			1	12	16
6 Battalion	Killed				1			1	2				3	11	17
	Wounded	1			1	1		2	6	6				34	49
7 Battalion	Killed				1			1	2	1		2	1	22	29
	Wounded			1	1		1	1	4				1	53	60
9 Batta	Killed						1			1	1			3	6
	Wounded				1				2	1	1			21	25
10 Battalion	Killed						1		2					9	12
	Wounded							1	1					21	23
Total		1	5	1	8	1	4	7	17	18	2	2	6	224	281

List of Officers killed and wounded.

Artillery	Captain Matthew Horne, Aid-du-camp	-	-	-	-	} Wounded.
	Lieutenant M ^c Hugo	-	-	-	-	
	Lieutenant Giels, acting as Engineer	-	-	-	-	
	Lieutenant F. W. Clawson	-	-	-	-	
	Lieutenant F. W. Hudson	-	-	-	-	
	Lieutenant F. W. Douglas	-	-	-	-	

2d Regiment { Lieutenant Weld killed.
Lieutenant Darrell,
Lieutenant Bonnevaux, acting as Engineer, } wounded.

Sepoy Corps	4th Battalion	Lieutenant Barton	- - -	} wounded.
		Lieutenant Campbell	- - -	
		Lieutenant Davis	- - -	
	5th Battalion	Lieutenant Henry Nicoll	killed.	
		Lieutenant Stuckey	wounded.	
	6th ditto	Captain M ^c Kenzie	wounded.	
	7th ditto	Ensign Dixon	wounded.	

Engineers—Colonel Ross and Captain Campbell wounded.

N. B. Exclusive of this return, there have been 36 of His Excellency the Nabob's troops killed and wounded; 1 Tindal, 7 Lascars of the Honourable Company killed; and 1 Syrang, 2 Tindals, and 34 wounded.

JOSEPH SMITH, Brigadier-General.

796 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

*An Account of Ordnance, and all other Warlike Stores, taken in the Garrison of Vellum,
22d September, 1771.*

Quality.	Num- ber of each Nature.	Diameter of Bore.		Length of the Guns.		Nature of Metal.	Remarks.
		Inches.	Parts.	Feet	Inches.		
Ordnance.							
24 Pounders	1	5	83	8	6	Iron	Mounted
12 ditto	1	4	56	7	4	ditto	Not mounted
9 ditto	1	4	24	7	4	ditto	Mounted
8 ditto	2	4	—	7	3	ditto	ditto
7 ditto	1	3	$\frac{1}{4}$	7	2	ditto	ditto
6 ditto	4	3	66	5	2	ditto	2 mounted, and 2 not ditto
5 ditto	1	3	40	6	1	ditto	Not mounted
3 ditto	2	2	92	3	8	1 Brafs, 1 Iron	1 mounted, and 1 not
2 ditto	4	2	54	3	4	Brafs	2 ditto, and 2 ditto
1½ ditto	2	2	31	4	1½	ditto	Mounted
1 ditto	2	2	—	3	—	1 Brafs, 1 Iron	1 mounted, and 1 not
½ ditto.	2	1	$\frac{7}{10}$	3	1	1 Brafs, 1 Iron	1 ditto, and 1 ditto
	1	8	$2\frac{1}{2}$	15	2	Iron	
	2	5	$\frac{1}{12}$	13	11	ditto	
	1	4	$\frac{1}{12}$	12	2	ditto	Without a chamber
	2	6	$\frac{4}{10}$	10	3½	1 Brafs, 1 Iron	
Malabar Guns	1	7	$\frac{3}{12}$	9	—	Iron	
	1	6	$\frac{3}{12}$	9	—	ditto	
	1	5	$\frac{1}{12}$	6	4	Brafs	
	1	4	23	7	—	Iron	
	1	2	$\frac{2}{12}$	5	10	ditto	
	1	2	$\frac{2}{10}$	4	4	ditto	
	1	2	$\frac{3}{4}$	4	6	ditto	

N. B. The implements for the above guns are unserviceable, and very few in number : the carriages also are very bad.

Filled

Filled Cartridges.

12 Pounders	_____	_____	_____	_____	3
9 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	2
8 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	5
6 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	17
5 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	22
4 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	7
3 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	17
2 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	4
1½ ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	8
1 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	24
½ ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	15

Powder of different Sorts.

				lb.
Coarse large grained	_____	_____	_____	6400
Coarse smaller ditto	_____	_____	_____	850

Round Iron Shot hammered.

24 Pounders	_____	_____	_____	_____	3
14 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	5
12 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	20
9 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	21
8 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	87
7 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	95
6 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	177
5 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	166
4 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	141
3 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	110
2½ ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	63
2 ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	53
1½ ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	70
½ ditto	_____	_____	_____	_____	7

Ball Cartridges, between the size of a musket and a carbine,	11870
Loose Balls for Buckaneer muskets	35000
Rockets, of 1lb. 14oz. wt. each, without the stick	184
Blue Lights	32

	lb.
Iron cut into square pieces for grape	280
Saltpetre unpulverized { singly refined	153
{ dirty	2
Rough Sulphur, not refined	160

J. MANOURY, Commissary of Stores.

The

The Board's Observations and Orders.

WE have already, in our letter of the 1st instant, desired General Smith to give us all the information in his power of the causes and motives for concluding a peace at such a crisis; and it is agreed that the Nabob be applied to by letter for information touching the same: in the mean time we shall defer any animadversions thereon, until we are furnished with the necessary materials. We can only say, that as it appears to us insecure, it is necessary we should make every possible preparation for any event that may happen. General Smith is therefore to be desired to transmit to us a general return of the artillery, ammunition, and stores remaining, with an account of their state and condition, accompanied with an indent of whatever may be farther requisite, in case it should become necessary to recommence hostilities. And as gunpowder is an article which will be most wanted, and in which we are very deficient, he is to be desired to be as exact as possible in his calculate of the quantity required; and to endeavour to obtain from the Nabob's Son, Mader-ul-Mulk, an exact account of what remains in his store at Trichinopoly and if possible to inspect his magazines and get it proved; and if it be bad, to see if it can be made at Trichinopoly, or if an additional stock can be made at that garrison; in which case supplies of brimstone and saltpetre shall be sent.

By the treaty it appears that the fort of Vellum is either to be delivered up to the Rajah or demolished; and as it will require a considerable time to demolish it, should the Nabob determine to do so; and as the President informs the Board, that the Nabob had sent positive orders to his Son on no account to deliver it up to the Rajah, and proposed addressing a letter to us on the subject; General Smith is to be instructed to place a sufficient garrison in it for the present under the command of one of our officers, with the necessary stores; and that it be not given up without our express directions for that purpose.

As General Smith has not informed us whether he proposed to withdraw the army immediately from before Tanjore, or wait our instructions for that purpose, we are of opinion that General Smith should be instructed not to relinquish the advantage he has gained, lest the Rajah should be guilty of any breach of his engagements: upon this however General Smith must take the opinion of Omdat-ul-Omrah. But if the Rajah should have complied with his engagements, and in consequence thereof the guns should have been withdrawn from the batteries, the works demolished, and the army retired from before the place; in that case General Smith must be instructed, after leaving a sufficient garrison in the fort of Vellum, to order the remainder of the troops into Trichinopoly and cantonments.

As we imagine that the stores of ammunition in Tanjore must be very much reduced, if not quite exhausted, General Smith is to be desired to obtain the best information he can of their state and condition, and whether the Rajah is taking any and what means to obtain supplies from the French, the Dutch, and the Danes.

We observe with great satisfaction the favourable mention made by General Smith of the behaviour of the officers and men of every corps during this expedition; beside a due attention and regard to their respective merits, we can only offer them our thanks; particularly to Major Vaughan, whose steady conduct and firmness on the 1st October deserves the most honourable notice.

Letter to the Honourable the Court of Directors of this date is now read and signed to go to Bengal, to be dispatched by the first ship from that Presidency; and ordered that a duplicate be sent by Pattamar to Bombay, to be forwarded over-land, or by the first ship that may sail from thence for England.

Jof. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St George, in their Military Department, 7th November, 1771.

Extract of Letter from the President and Council to General Smith.

S I R,

ON the 4th instant we received by Captain Montresor your letter of the 29th October, with the papers it refers to.

In our letter to you of the 1st instant we acknowledged the receipt of your's of the 27th October, advising us of the conclusion of the peace: as we have therein desired you will give us the clearest information in your power of the causes and motives to the conclusion of terms of peace at such a crisis as you describe, we shall only observe here, that whatever they were, we are very apprehensive that it will prove insecure. We do not mean now to animadvert on the terms, or investigate their future consequences; yet, under the apprehensions we have expressed, it seems necessary that, in the very commencement of the peace, we should be providing as if we were on the eve of a war. We therefore desire you will, as soon as possible, send us a general return of the artillery, ammunition, and stores remaining, with their state and condition, accompanied with an indent of what may be further requisite, in case it should become necessary to recommence hostilities: we would on no account have the idea entertained that we mean to do so, and we wish even to conceal from the public that we are apprehensive it may become necessary; but it is

proper that you should know our thoughts on this subject, that you may the better assist us with your advice and opinion.

The article of which you will stand most in need will no doubt be gunpowder, and in that our store is most deficient; you will be pleased therefore to be as exact as possible in your calculate of the quantity required. We desire you will endeavour to obtain from the Nabob's Son, Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, an exact account of what remains in his stores at Trichinopoly; we wish you could inspect it in his magazines and have it proved; and if any of it be bad, and it can be re-made at Trichinopoly, it would be very proper to have it set about immediately: and if for this purpose, or for making an additional stock of powder, supplies of saltpetre and brimstone be wanting, we will send what may be required. We beg you to enquire into this matter, and give us all the information you can.

Although you have sent us a copy of the articles of peace, many explanations are necessary; these we expect to receive from the Nabob, and until we receive them we can form no determinate arrangements. We understand that the Nabob is at liberty to demolish the fort of Vellum, or restore it to the Rajah; it appears to us to be a fort of great importance. If it should be resolved to demolish it, as the place is of great extent, it must be a work of time; meanwhile it will be very proper that a strong garrison be kept in it, furnished with all necessary means of defence as far as may be. If this letter should reach you before the artillery and stores you had in the field shall be brought back to Trichinopoly, we desire you will consider what part it may be necessary to leave for some time at Vellum, and that you will give orders accordingly; advising however with Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder on this subject. With respect to the garrison to be left in Vellum, and the command of the same, we expect shortly to have the Nabob's desire signified to us in writing, and we shall then write to you more particularly: in the mean time, the Nabob having informed the President, that his positive instructions to his Son are, that Vellum be not given up to the Rajah without his particular and express orders, we desire you will appoint one of the Company's officers to remain in the charge and command of that garrison, with like instructions, until you hear further from us on that subject.

Our meaning is, that until you shall have received orders from us to deliver up the fort of Vellum to the Nabob, the Company will remain in the charge and possession thereof; and therefore it is our express desire that you will on no account either restore it to the Rajah, or destroy it, until you shall receive our particular and express directions to do so. With respect to the time and manner of delivering over the charge of the fort to the Nabob or his order, we expect shortly to receive a letter from him on that subject; we shall write to you in consequence.

We wish you had, in your letter of the 27th, informed us whether your intentions were to withdraw the army immediately from before the place, or wait for instructions from hence; concluding, by your silence, that you would have retired before any advices could reach you, we thought it needless to say any thing on the subject. However, as it is reported, so late as the 2d instant, that you had not withdrawn the

guns from the batteries, in consequence of some hesitation on the part of the Rajah in complying with the payment stipulated; we think you should not relinquish the advantage you have, if the Rajah should be guilty of any breach of his engagement; but upon this it is necessary you should take the opinion of Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder. If the Rajah shall have complied with his engagement, and in consequence you should have withdrawn your guns, demolished your works, and retired from the place; in that case, after leaving a garrison in Vellum, the rest of the army must, for the present, return into garrison at Trichinopoly and into cantonments: the particular arrangements upon this occasion we leave to you.

As the stores of ammunition in Tanjore must be very much reduced, if not quite exhausted, we recommend to you to obtain the best information you can of their state and condition; whether the Rajah is taking any, and what measures to obtain supplies; and whether he receives any, and what assistance herein from the French, Dutch, or Danes.

We read with great satisfaction the commendation you bestow on all the officers and men of every corps who have been under your command in this expedition: besides a due attention and regard to their respective merits, we can only offer them our hearty thanks; particularly to Major Vaughan, whose conduct and firmness on the 1st October deserves the most honourable notice.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 9th November, 1771.

A LETTER was this day wrote to the Nabob, desiring information regarding the particulars of the peace, and the motives for it.

From Governor Du Pré to the Nabob of the Carnatick, dated 9th November, 1771. †

SOME days are now elapsed since your Excellency communicated to me the advice you had received from your Son Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, that he had granted peace to the Rajah of Tanjore; I have also received the same information from General Smith, but I am not informed of the circumstances and motives. It is true that the Company's forces took the field to support and enforce your negotiations with the Rajah, for obtaining satisfaction of your demands; and therefore our instructions to General Smith empowered him to commence hostilities when Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder should signify to him the propriety of doing so, to extend even to the reduction of Tanjore; and cease hostilities, if it should be signified to him by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder that he had obtained satisfaction. Had the Rajah in the beginning submitted himself, and had your Excellency then granted such terms as should have been thought safe and honourable to the Circar and the Company, it might have been advisable to do so; but the Rajah has acted a very different part; he set both the Circars and the Company at defiance, and compelled the army to lay a regular siege to his capital; and many lives have been lost, and great quantities

† Vide the Nabob's reply to this letter in Appendix. No. XXIV.

961 EXPEDITION AGAINST TANJORE IN 1771.

of military stores have been expended. The advices I received from the camp even so late as the 26th October, the day before signing of the peace, informed me, that the siege advanced successfully, that the breach was almost practicable, and that the officers and soldiers were in good spirits: under these circumstances, there was every reason to hope that the fort might soon have been taken; and your Excellency then might have given the law, and settled the affairs of the Tanjore country in a proper manner. It will also probably be suggested, that the concluding a peace at such a crisis implies, and may be construed by the world, as a declaration of doubt whether the fort could be taken or not. Your Excellency well knows that I have a great regard and friendship for Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, and that his honour and reputation are dear to me; not only on his own account, but because they are dear to your Excellency: I have also a great opinion of his wisdom and prudence; and therefore must conclude that he had good and sufficient motives for concluding a peace decisively at such a crisis. I have wrote to General Smith to give me all such informations as are proper on his part; I request also that your Excellency will be pleased to give me such eclaircissements as may come to your knowledge on the part of Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder.

I beg the favour also that your Excellency will be pleased to communicate to me the terms of the peace, with such explanations of them as may enable me to form a judgment of the measures which are proper to be now taken in consequence thereof.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 11th November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton

George Mackay.

THE President informs the Board, that the Nabob has acquainted him that the Rajah of Tanjore has consented to the entire cession of Vellum, as also of Coiladdy and Elangad.

The Board are much surprized at not having received any advices from General Smith of what has been in agitation since the conclusion of the peace, or what was intended in consequence thereof; nor any answer to the letter wrote him on the 1st instant: the following letter is therefore now wrote him, to accompany duplicates of our letters of the 1st and 7th instant.

To Brigadier-General Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R, .

WE wrote to you the 1st instant in answer to your's of the 27th October, where-
in you advised us of the conclusion of the peace; having received no answer thereto,
nor the least intimation from you of any kind since then of what has been in agita-
tion, or what was intended in consequence of the peace, either on the part of Omdat-
ul-Onirah Behauder, or in respect to your own command, we must conclude that
letters have been intercepted: we therefore send you herewith a duplicate of our
letter of the 1st instant, and also a duplicate of our letter of the 7th instant, in
answer to your's of the 29th October, received by Captain Montrefor.

We are, S I R,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
11th November, 1771.

J O S. D U P R É, &c. Council.

*Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military
Department, Monday, 18th November, 1771.*

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
Richard Brickenden
George Mackay.

READ the following letters from General Smith:

*To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort
St. George.*

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I HAVE been honoured with your letter of the 1st instant, expressing your con-
cern that, when the operations of the army were so far advanced towards the reduction
of Tanjore, as in all human probability to ensure success, the British arms should be
deprived of that eclat which they were on the point of acquiring; you were pleased
also to desire to be minutely informed of all the circumstances respecting the reasons
for making peace at that crisis.

On the 28th I had the honour to transmit to you a copy of the Nabob's letter desiring me to cease hostilities, and three papers which he told me contained a copy of the treaty; they were enclosed in my address to your Honour, &c. giving you a detail of our transactions from the time the army arrived before Tanjore to the conclusion of the peace: these papers, I flatter myself, you have received by the hands of Captain Montresor, and from them I have no doubt the Honourable Board will be able to judge how far the Nabob ought to be influenced to make peace from any diffidence in our success.

Few days passed, after our arrival before Tanjore, that Vackeels were not passing and repassing from the Rajah to the young Nabob; and he more than once sent to me desiring a truce whilst they were negotiating; which I would by no means grant, and, as far as it was possible, hastened on our operations.

When matters drew near a crisis, I daily informed the young Nabob of our progress, assuring him we had every human probability of success; and knowing these people to be tedious and dilatory in their negotiations, I did not cease firing night and day, in hopes to make the breach practicable ere a peace was concluded; and in that case the troops would most assuredly been ordered to the assault: but the day before it was expected to happen the young Nabob's letter was delivered, and we were obliged to cease hostilities.

It is true, in many of my letters to the Honourable President, I have very freely given my sentiments with respect to the Rajah of Tanjore, and urged that I thought no medium could be preserved with him; but at the time I did so, I hoped, whenever an expedition did take place, that it would be with a firm resolution on the part of the Nabob as well as the Board to reduce him entirely. Soon after our moving with the army, from the many intercourses the young Nabob had with the Tanjore Vackeels, and their continual negotiating, I began to suspect that this business would end in an accommodation. Circumstanced as you were with respect to the Nabob, and the limited authority you of necessity invested me with, I could only, by urging such arguments as I thought most likely to keep the young Nabob steady, and by daily informing him of the progress we were making, hope to induce him to go on with the attack, and make the conquest.

That the Rajah has been greatly humbled, and reduced to such terms as the young Nabob demanded, and thought safe and honourable, is evident; but it is impossible for me to inform the Board of his real motives for not reducing him totally;—these time must discover.

With respect to the honour and eclat that would have attended our arms, in case of our succeeding in the attack and fall of a place of so much consequence as the City of Tanjore, which we had every reason to hope, I with you most sincerely regret; and this you will readily believe, when you consider that share of honour and reputation which must accrue to me as Commanding Officer of this army; but though we are deprived of this eclat, yet I will assert that the honour of the English arms

arms has been fully preserved. This assertion must not only be evident to all the Powers around; but also, that Tanjore's not being reduced, is owing to the young Nabob's accepting the Rajah's submissions, and such terms as he had prescribed to him.

The ground on which the army had remained so long becoming exceedingly offensive, it was highly necessary to move for fear of infection, as the cattle were dying daily; and the young Nabob desired the troops might encamp at Monajee's garden, two miles and a half south-west of Tanjore, and about four miles from Vellum, 'till he could receive certain sums stipulated to be paid by the Rajah; and 'till that was done, that the heavy guns should not be withdrawn from the batteries. Seven Lacks and a half have been paid, and the remainder is expected in a day or two.

I hope in a few days to be honoured with your instructions respecting the future destination of the troops.

I have the honour to be,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

With respect,

Your most obedient servant,

Camp near Tanjore,
6th November, 1771.

JOSEPH SMITH.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

YOUR commands of the 1st and 7th instant are come to hand. To the former I have had the honour to reply on the 6th; and am now to acquaint you, that although the peace was concluded between the Nabob Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder and the Rajah of Tanjore on the 27th ultimo, yet the former requested our heavy guns might not be withdrawn from the batteries, or our works destroyed, 'till the 3th instant, when the Rajah had fully satisfied him, by paying him in the interim twelve Lacks of Rupees; ceding Coiladdy and Elangad; that Vellum should not be given up; and by sending the jewels and two guns taken from the Marawar.

On the 9th our batteries and works were destroyed. On the 10th Monajee had an interview with the young Nabob and myself, at which the Field-Officers of the army, my Staff, the Commissary and Paymaster, were present. Monajee seemed much alarmed, though all the force of Tanjore was at his back, and the visit soon ended.

On

On the 11th the army marched about seven miles towards Trichinopoly and encamped,—Vellum bearing about three miles. Previous to the receipt of your letter of the 7th, I had ordered the remainder of Captain Cosby's battalion to that place as part of the garrison, which I proposed to augment with two companies of Europeans, thirty artillery-men—3—24 pounders, 2—18, and 7—12, with a proper proportion of stores, 'till your pleasure on that head was known. The garrison is now formed, and to-morrow I shall proceed with the rest of the Company's troops to Trichinopoly, where part of them may be cantoned, and the remainder can be disposed of in that neighbourhood for a time.

The Nabob acquaints me he intends to order his Topasses to march out of Vellum, and that Captain Alexander with his battalion should be sent in as part of the garrison. Captain Lowdon with his battalion is to proceed to-morrow (I believe to the southward) on service. Captain Matthews has mentioned Palamcotah as the best place to recruit his half starved cattle, where I believe he must be permitted to move, as there is neither grain nor forage for his horses in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly.

I have with difficulty laid up in the magazine at Vellum eighteen hundred bullock-loads of rice, as the Paddy remaining in that place would not supply the present garrison above two days; and I shall not fail to press the Nabob Mader-ul-Mulk, on my return to Trichinopoly, to lay in a store of grain and other provisions for a year's supply; which will be the more necessary, as it is a place of so much consequence.

The Rajah must have been greatly humbled, when he was obliged to give up the cannon he had taken from the Marawar by force of arms, and of course submitted to the greatest disgrace that can befall any Power. From what I have observed, I believe he will never again give cause for running himself into the same danger he has escaped, as the possession of Vellum will be a security for his good behaviour. The officer commanding it will take care to be informed of every transaction of the Rajah's, and of course be a constant check over him. He says himself, it is like placing a sentinel at his door, and that he cannot go out of his fort, or even sleep in it with safety. So thoroughly convinced is he of the importance of this place, that he constantly perseveres in his applications to get it back, or that it should be razed to the ground. The Company's troops should garrison this fort, as the Nabob's are often ill paid, and at times troublesome, which makes it dangerous to trust a place of importance to them alone.

Lieutenant Manoury is ordered to make out a return of the guns, stores, ammunition, &c. now remaining, which I shall very soon have the pleasure to transmit to you; and should hostilities recommence, I must beg leave to refer your Honour, &c. to my former indent, which will best shew the articles wanting.

Mader-ul-Mulk spared us part of our supplies of gunpowder from the quantity he had at Trichinopoly, and now calls loudly to have it replaced; I shall endeavour

your to find out what remains in his magazines, and such other stores as may be useful. I believe there is no apparatus at Trichinopoly for making powder, and that it can be provided sooner, and with less inconvenience, at Madras or Vellour.

The Dutch have lately supplied the Rajah largely with gunpowder, shot, shells, and small arms; should he procure further supplies from the Coast, I shall be able, I hope, to let you know what they consist of, and from whence he has them. From the constant fire he kept up while the army was before the town, it would appear his stores were inexhaustible; and my spies assure me he has sufficient for years.

Read also a letter from the Nabob, representing the importance of the fort of Vellum, desiring that the Company will place a garrison therein under the command of a careful officer, and containing some regulations for the conduct of the officer to be appointed to the command.

From the Nabob of the Carnatick to Governor Du Pré, dated and received 13th November, 1771.

BY the blessing of the Almighty, and your kindness and great exertion, the fort of Vellum, which originally belonged to Trichinopoly, is fallen into my possession; and the Tanjoreans have given me an agreement, purporting that a garrison of the Circar is for ever to be kept therein. By the keeping firm possession of this fort, the Tanjoreans, by God's blessing, will now be in the same state of obedience and subjection they were formerly. For this long time past the best forts in my country have been under the care of the Company; and how shall I express the goodness, the honour, the harmony with which they have acted, and do still act in this trust, in complying at all times with my desire in the kindest manner; either in lessening the number of people, withdrawing them, or keeping them in any other place? From your favour I am now also in hopes of even more than this; and am therefore desirous that the fort of Vellum may be kept under the charge of the Company, for as long as I may think proper, on the same footing as the forts in my country; and as the furnishing thereof with a store of provisions, sufficient for the expence of a thousand men for a term of three years, rests on me, I have given orders conformably to my Deputy at Trichinopoly. You will be so good as to put a careful man therein, with some good Sepoys out of those in my service who are under the charge of the Company; also powder and shot sufficient for two years. And as the said fort is very near the fort of Tanjore, and the Tanjoreans are noted for their tricks and perfidy, I am to request you will on no account empower the Commandant to enlist Sepoys; or else (which God forbid!) the Tanjoreans; on hearing the enlisting of Sepoys there, will dismiss to outward appearance their own servants, and send them there for service; and then there is reason to apprehend they will only wait for an opportunity, by treachery, to make themselves masters of the fort. You will be so obliging farther as to tell the Commandant not to have any money-transactions with the Tanjoreans, the Circar's Deputy, or the inhabitants there; to make no repairs there but of places which may have fallen or been broken down; and merely to confine himself to the care and safety of the fort: likewise that he directs his Dubash not to interfere in the affairs. The Tanjoreans will make use of

various modes to induce and prevail on him; let him pay no attention thereto, nor meddle with the house which was the residence of the Rajah, or the gardens; nor the husbandmen or inhabitants residing either within the fort or Pettah. For his own residence, let him take either the former Killedar's house, or some other. And as I shall appoint a Killedar there on the part of the Circar, in the same manner as in the forts of Vellour, &c. to take care of the storehouses of provisions, to keep the keys of the fort, and to protect the Pettah and the inhabitants; let him live in peace, and be civil to the said Killedar. And as the seat of residence of the Gentoos is near there, and they would much dislike if bullocks were to be killed at that place; let him not do it, but make shift with mutton, fowls, &c. This is an excellent opportunity for me to shew my honour and justice to the Tanjoreans. And as I have in view the settling of many affairs in those parts, and the conciliating of the minds of the Tanjoreans, you will order the said person not to interfere in any shape whatever in the affairs there; and in case you should think proper for me to write to him, you will give him permission to comply with whatever I may so write to him respecting the affairs there.

The Board's Minute.

The Board are fully sensible of the great importance of the fort of Vellum, and that therefore every possible precaution should be taken to secure the possession thereof; and as Major Vaughan is an officer, who, from his great prudence and vigilance, seems well qualified for such an important trust, it is agreed that he be appointed to the command thereof; and that particular instructions be prepared for him, and that the regulations recommended by the Nabob, which appear exceedingly proper, be inserted therein.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 25th November, 1771.

DRAUGHT of the instructions to Major Vaughan, appointed to the command of Vellum, read and approved; and ordered that Lieutenant-Colonel Ross be directed to proceed thither; and, after taking a survey of the place, to prepare a plan and estimate of such works, buildings, or repairs, as may be necessary for the security of the place, magazines, or barracks, that we may lay the same before the Nabob.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, 26th November, 1771.

Extract of Letter from the President and Council to General Smith.

AS matters have been so lately settled with Tanjore, and it is uncertain what may happen in the south, we recommend that you remain at Trichinopoly, where you will of course command, in consequence of our orders of the 21st March last.

We have appointed Major Vaughan to the command of Vellum; and we now write to Lieutenant-Colonel Ross to examine and report to us what new works, buildings, or repairs are necessary, either for the security of the place, magazines, or barracks; and to send us a plan of them, with an estimate of the expense, that we may lay the same before the Nabob.

To Lieutenant-Colonel Rossi, Chief Engineer.

S I R,

IT being necessary that the fort of Vellum should be put in a proper state of defence, you will be pleased, on the receipt hereof, to proceed thither, and, after surveying the works and buildings, transmit to us a report of such new works, buildings, or repairs as may appear to you necessary, as well for the defence of the place, as for magazines or barracks, with a plan of them, and an estimate of the expense, that we may lay the same before the Nabob; but nothing is to be undertaken, except what is immediately necessary for the security of the fort, until you receive our orders: and whatever money is expended on this service, must be issued by the Company's Paymaster who will be appointed to that garrison.

During your residence at Vellum you are not to interfere in the command of the garrison, but to confine your attention solely to the service on which you are now employed, conformable to the resolution of Council of 7th March last, with which you have been made acquainted.

We are, S I R,

Your most obedient servants,

Fort St. George,
26th November, 1771.

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 2d December, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Trichinopoly, 23d November, 1771.

AS my continuance at Trichinopoly for any length of time is uncertain, I have appointed Lieutenant-Colonel Lang to the command of the garrison 'till your pleasure is known.

The Tanjore people have hitherto prevented the Buzar of Vellum being supplied from the country; the inhabitants of the villages who attempt it are made prisoners, carried to Tanjore, and their grain, &c. taken from them. Madur-ul-Mulk has promised to lay up in the magazines at Vellum three years' provision for a thousand men; which he says his father has ordered him to do, and which I have urged all in my power; yet at present the garrison has no other supply but the rice I lodged there while the army was before Tanjore, and that will last but a short time. I hope this business will not be to do when strong escorts may be required, and the troops are wanted on other service. The weather is now very fine, and the bullocks that attended the army unemployed; therefore Mader-ul-Mulk should take the present opportunity to lay up a sufficient quantity of provisions in Vellum, to secure the garrison from want if troubles should happen; for we can neither, in peace or war, have any dependence on the country for supplies.

Enclosed I have the honour to send you Mr. Cafamaijor's return of the provisions, &c. found in Vellum; also a general return of artillery, ammunition, and stores of the army now remaining; and should it become necessary to recommence hostilities against the Rajah of Tanjore, I cannot point out the articles better than by referring your Honour, &c. to my former indent that it may be completed.

Account

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Account of sundry Articles found in the Fort of Vellum.

					Maunds.	Seers.	Pucka Seers	Cullums	Marcals.
Belonging to the Circar.									
Paddy	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	1354	8
Pepper	-	-	-	-	—	—	12		
Turmeric (rotten)	-	-	-	-	—	—	6		
Lack, old	-	-	-	-	—	—	12		
Boiled Nuts, old	-	-	-	-	—	—	28		
Ghee (damaged)	-	-	-	-	—	—	185		
Lamp Oil	-	-	-	-	—	—	4		
Rockets	-	-	-	-	100				
Beetlenut Oil	-	-	-	-	2000				
Match Locks	-	-	-	-	3				
Ivory Palankeen	-	-	-	-	1				
Belonging to the Inhabitants, found in private Houses.									
Paddy	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	948	2 $\frac{1}{2}$
Conduloo	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	833	
Natcheeny	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	98	2
Cumboo	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	157	$\frac{1}{2}$
Verago	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	724	8 $\frac{1}{2}$
Salt	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	12	4 $\frac{1}{2}$
Chamaloo	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	—	6
Coraloo	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	—	5
Gingely Oil Seeds	-	-	-	-	—	—	—	1	6
Tamarind	-	-	-	-	—	60	3		
Long Pepper	-	-	-	-	—	35	31		
Tobacco	-	-	-	-	—	52	33		
Mentuloo	-	-	-	-	—	—	32		
Ginger	-	-	-	-	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$		
Dumparaftum	-	-	-	-	—	—	28 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Sandal Wood	-	-	-	-	—	—	62		
Mustard Seeds	-	-	-	-	—	—	10		
Caracoy	-	-	-	-	—	—	10		
Chillaginzaloo	-	-	-	-	—	—	6		
Teppely Mody	-	-	-	-	—	—	2		
Vashumbo	-	-	-	-	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$		
Nava Charma	-	-	-	-	—	—	$\frac{1}{2}$		
Cotton, first sort	-	-	-	-	—	66	35 $\frac{1}{2}$		
Ditto, second ditto	-	-	-	-	—	329	15		
Beetlenut, old	-	-	-	-	3500				
Long Iron Pins	-	-	-	-	12				
Picotee Pots of Iron	-	-	-	-	23				
Match Lock	-	-	-	-	1				
Large and small Scales	-	-	-	-	5				
Small Iron Pots	-	-	-	-	2				
Large old Brass Pots	-	-	-	-	3				
Small ditto, ditto and Pans	-	-	-	-	14				
Leaden Cups, small	-	-	-	-	2				
Stone Cups	-	-	-	-	2				
Buffaloes and Calves	-	-	-	-	17				
Bullocks, Cows, and Calves	-	-	-	-	15				

Trichinopoly, 22d November, 1771.

Errors excepted.

JA^S. H^V. CASAMAJOR.

AGREED that General Smith be informed, that the Nabob assures us that he has given us the most positive orders for laying in provisions at Vellum sufficient for 1000 men for three years.

AGREED, that Mr. William Light be appointed Paymaster and Storekeeper at Vellum, and that instructions be prepared for him.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 6th December, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letter from Lieutenant-Colonel Ross.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your orders of the 26th instant respecting Vellum, and shall, in obedience to them, proceed thither to prepare the plan, report, and estimates, agreeable to your directions.

The General is of opinion there should be at Vellum barracks sufficient to contain half a company of Artillery, three hundred Europeans, and one thousand Sepoys, with their Officers complete; also magazines for twelve months' provisions, and one thousand barrels of gun-powder; together with an hospital for one hundred men, and quarters for the Surgeon and Paymaster; likewise sheds for small stores, gun carriages, &c.

I am, with due respect,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient

Trichinopoly,
December 1, 1771.

And most humble servant,

PATRICK ROSS.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, }
President, &c. Council of Fort St. George. }

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Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 9th December, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President,	
Warren Hastings	Samuel Ardley
John Smith	George Stratton
Henry Brooke	<hr/>
John Whitehill	George Mackay.

THE following instructions for Major Vaughan, appointed Commandant, and Mr. William Light, Paymaster and Store-keeper at Vellum, are now signed.

To Major Richard Vaughan.

S I R,

THE fort of Vellum having been ceded by the Rajah of Tanjore to the Nabob, he has desired that we will place a proper garrison therein, under the command of a careful officer; it being a place of great importance, as a check on the Rajah's conduct, by reason of it's strength and vicinity to Tanjore: and as we have the highest opinion of your prudence and attention, we have appointed you to the command thereof. And it being of the utmost importance that every possible precaution be taken, as well for the security of the place, as to reconcile and engage the affections of the inhabitants, we have thought it necessary to lay down the following rules for your conduct in this important trust.

General Smith acquaints us, that he has placed the following garrison in it for the present, viz. Captain Cosby's battalion of Sepoys, two companies of European infantry, and thirty artillery-men; and that he has left therein three twenty-four pounders, two eighteen pounders, and seven twelve pounders, with a proper proportion of stores: General Smith also informs us, that the Nabob purposed ordering Captain Alexander's battalion of Sepoys to do duty in the garrison. But as it is our intention to place such a garrison in it as to secure it against any attack, we desire you will acquaint us what addition you think necessary to be made to the force now appointed for that service, as well as with what further artillery and stores may be required.

An Engineer we understand has been ordered by General Smith to repair the breach, and to make such other works as are immediately necessary for the defence of the place. The Engineer will be directed to survey the works and buildings; to make a report of such as are necessary either for the security of the place, magazines, or quarters; to form a plan thereof, with an estimate of the expence, to be transmitted to us, to be laid before the Nabob: but no new buildings are to be erected, nor repairs made, without our particular and express directions; unless such as are immediately necessary for the safety of the place, and regarding which it might be dangerous to wait our orders, in which case you will not fail giving us the most early intelligence thereof; and the money for all such buildings or repairs must be issued by the Company's Paymaster.

The

The fort of Vellum being in a manner a key to Tanjore, and an entire check on the motions of the Rajah, it may be expected that attempts will be made to recover it, either by surprize or treachery; we therefore direct, that the garrison have no manner of intercourse with the Tanjoreans, not even for procuring provisions: Indents must be made for what may be required to the Nabob's Son at Trichinopoly, who will be ordered to send sufficient supplies. And you will be careful that no Sepoy be on any account entertained there; but if any are wanting to complete the battalion, you will be pleased to advise us thereof, when recruits or draughts shall be sent you. And the better to prevent the garrison being tampered with, we shall frequently order it to be relieved; but we shall not signify our intention of doing so, nor give any intimation of the corps to be ordered thither, (which will not be according to Roster) until we send the actual orders for their march.

Many complaints having been made by the Nabob, on account of the Company's officers, or their Dubashes, interfering in the affairs of the country; we particularly recommend that you do not yourself in any shape interfere therein, nor suffer any one under your command to do so. All matters respecting the affairs of the country are left entirely to the Nabob's managers; and your attention must be confined solely to the preserving good order and discipline among the troops, and to the security of the fort. We also recommend to you to prevent the lending of money to any of the Tanjoreans, or others, since such transactions will naturally bring on an intercourse and correspondence, which may be very prejudicial to the service.

The Nabob acquaints us that he has ordered provisions to be laid in sufficient for 1000 men for 3 years; we will endeavour to procure the Nabob's orders to his people, that you may, as often as you think proper, inspect their state and condition, and of which you will be pleased to advise us, informing us at the same time of any deficiencies.

As the Nabob seems very desirous to gain the affections of the inhabitants by all conciliating means, you will be particularly careful that none of them are ill treated or insulted by any of the troops under your command. And as there is nothing of which the Gentoos are so tenacious as the particular tenets of their religion, nothing can more effectually reconcile them to our government, than an apparent desire in us to avoid every thing that may give offence in matters which they deem sacred; and as the killing of bullocks is expressly forbid by their religion, we would particularly recommend to you that none be suffered to be killed for the use of the garrison: The Nabob has promised that you shall be fully supplied with sheep and other provisions.

It being intended that the firing any more guns than the morning and evening gun at Vellum shall be a signal that an attack is made on the place, that a reinforcement may be immediately detached to it's assistance, you will on no account suffer any guns, except the morning and evening gun, to be fired, unless upon the arrival of the Nabob, or any of his Sons, or the Commanding Officer of the troops; or

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unless you should find it necessary to have the guns of the fort scaled, or the artillery out at practice ; in which cases you will previously advise the Commandant of Trichinopoly thereof, that he may not be alarmed.

The Nabob having desired that the house and gardens in which the Rajah resided may not be occupied by any of the troops, you will be pleased not to suffer any one to reside therein. The Killedar's, or any other house, may be appropriated for your quarters, and such necessary repairs may be made as to render them convenient.

Four Hircarrahs will be allowed you for the correspondence between Trichinopoly and Vellum.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
9th December, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

To Mr. William Light.

S I R,

WE have appointed you to be Paymaster and Storekeeper to the garrison of Vellum, and you have herewith a book of regulations for your general guidance in those employs ; but as there are several points on which it is necessary you should be fully and clearly informed of our intentions, that you may not through inadvertency fall into error, we have thought it necessary to lay down the following instructions, which you are carefully and strictly to observe.

As it is intended to supply the fort of Vellum with a very ample provision of artillery and stores, it must be your care to see that they are preserved in as good a condition as possible ; and for this purpose a careful serjeant may be appointed to assist you, with an additional allowance of four Pagodas per month : the returns of them you will be careful to transmit monthly, agreeable to the regulations.

An Engineer has been appointed to repair the breach, and such other works as are necessary for the security of the place. Lieutenant-Colonel Ross has also been directed to examine and report to us such works, buildings, and repairs, as may be requisite for the safety of the fort, magazines, or barracks ; but none are to be undertaken without our particular and express directions, except such as the Commandant shall represent as immediately and absolutely necessary for the preservation of the place ; and all money for such buildings and repairs must be issued by you, and charged to the Commissary-General ; for which purpose you are daily to muster the workmen and Coolies that may be so employed.

You

You are on no account to have any intercourse or correspondence with any of the Tanjoreans, and you must do all in your power to prevent your Dubashes, or others belonging to you, from having any ; and neither you nor any of your servants must interfere in any shape in the affairs of the country, which are committed to the Nabob's Managers alone ; your attention must be wholly confined to the duties of your employs.

We do strictly prohibit your lending money to any of the country people, or having any dealings with them, directly or indirectly, in grain, or other merchandize ; and you must endeavour to prevent your Dubashes, servants, or others belonging to you, from having any transactions of that sort.

Having directed that the Commissary-General, as agent on behalf of the Company, shall have the charge of supplying the military, &c. in the several out-garrisons with arrack, and having also ordered that the execution of this duty be committed to the several Storekeepers at the out-garrisons under the control of the Agent, you have herewith such rules and regulations as have been thought necessary to be established for your conduct in this business, together with the forms in which your accounts respecting the same are to be kept.

Four Hircarrahs are allowed for the correspondence between Trichinopoly and Vellum.

Your allowance as Paymaster and Storekeeper is to be ten shillings per day as pay, and Pagodas 1 : 25 : 16 per day as Batta.

We are, S I R,

Fort St. George,
9th December, 1771.

Your most affectionate friends,

JOSIAS DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Draught of a letter to the Nabob, in answer to his of the 13th November, respecting the garrison of Vellum, is now read and approved.

From Governor Du Pré to the Nabob of the Carnatick, dated 9th December, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's letter of the 13th of November ; in which you inform me, that the fort of Vellum having fallen into your possession, the Tanjoreans have given you an agreement, purporting that a garrison of the Circar is for ever to be kept therein. That considering the importance of keeping firm possession of this fort, in order to awe the Tanjoreans into a proper state of obedience and subjection, and having experienced the honour and friendship of the Company in the charge and care of the principal forts in your country with which

they have been intrusted, you now desire that the fort of Vellum may also be kept under the charge of the Company, on the same footing as the forts in your country; that a careful officer may be chosen for that command; that a good garrison be appointed; a proper quantity of gunpowder and stores of war lodged there; and that instructions might be given to the Commanding Officer, the particulars of which are inserted at length in your said letter; all which I have duly observed.

As nothing gives me greater pleasure than to have the means of shewing a ready compliance with your Excellency's desire, and agreeing entirely in opinion with you, that the preservation of the fort of Vellum is of great importance, I have chosen and appointed Major Vaughan, a steady and experienced officer, to take upon him the charge of and command in the fort of Vellum; and I have appointed a garrison, upon the same footing as the Company have garrisons in the principal forts in your country, consisting of two companies of European infantry, half a company of European artillery-men, and one complete battalion of Sepoys; and I shall send from time to time, and as expeditiously as possible, good and sufficient stores of war, such as guns, gunpowder, arms, and other necessaries. I have given to Major Vaughan instructions for his conduct, such as you desire; and as I know him to be a punctual, discreet, and attentive officer, I think you may depend on him in every respect. I have also appointed Mr. William Light, one of the Company's Servants, to be Paymaster and Storekeeper in the said fort; and I have bound him by rigid instructions, upon pain of forfeiting the Company's service, to forbear all intercourse with the Tanjoreans, and to confine himself solely and entirely to the duty of his office. In case your Excellency should at times think it necessary that any thing should be added to the instructions of the Commanding Officer, if you will be so good as to inform me of your desire, I will write to him accordingly.

I have ordered the Company's Chief Engineer to examine the fort of Vellum, and to report to me its present state and condition, and the repairs necessary to put it in a good state of defence; also what buildings or repairs are wanting for barracks for the men, quarters for the officers, and magazines for the stores; which I shall lay before your Excellency when I receive it. The storing the Fort with provisions, and supplying it with what may be wanted for the present, and daily expense, rests on your Excellency.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Trichinopoly, 21st December, 1771.

MAJOR VAUGHAN I have not the least doubt will answer every purpose of his appointment to command Vellum. I should be glad to know if the three companies of Europeans there are to form part of that garrison, or any particular companies the Major may wish to have in preference (grenadiers excepted): though this mode is not agreeable to the rules of the army, yet I believe the Major would on this occasion be glad of such an indulgence.

Colonel Ross has received your commands with respect to his department, and no doubt will, as soon as possible, send you a plan of the buildings, &c. wanted at Vellum, agreeable to your directions.

——— Agreeable to your directions, I shall remain to the southward as long as may be necessary.

The Board's Minute.

WITH respect to Vellum, we understood from General Smith's letter of the 12th November, that he proposed two companies of European infantry, thirty artillery men, and 1 battalion of Sepoys, should be appointed to garrison it; however, as it is a frontier fort, and of the utmost consequence, care must be taken that the European companies be always kept complete from the troops in the south.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 13th December, 1771.

THE President acquaints the Board, that the Nabob had observed on the letter wrote to him respecting the fort and garrison of Vellum, that no mention was made therein, that the Company would keep a garrison there so long as it should be agreeable to the Nabob, and that the keys of the fort should be kept by his Killedar, conformable to his desire in his letter. To which the President replied, that as no such stipulation had ever been made by any of his predecessors, with regard to the other forts which are garrisoned by the Company's troops, he, the President, did not think himself authorized to establish such a precedent: that as it has been by his, the Nabob's, particular desire that the Company have placed garrisons in the several forts, it must be of course understood that they are kept for the Nabob's use alone: and with respect to the keys of the fort of Vellum, the same practice would be observed as in the other forts: With which the Nabob seemed satisfied.

A P P E N D I X.

N U M B E R XXIII.

Extracts of the Proceedings of the President and Council of Fort St. George, relative to the Nabob's Donation to the Troops employed against the King of Tanjore in the Year 1771.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Public Department, Monday, 23d September, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.
 Warren Hastings Samuel Ardley
 John Smith George Stratton
 Henry Brooke John Whitehill
 George Mackay.

THE Honourable Court having directed, in their letter of the 22d March last*, that the Letters-Patent granted to the Company in the 31st year of His late Majesty's Reign be made public, by being given out in general orders: A letter to

* *Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, dated 22d March, 1771. Received at Fort St. George, 22d August, 1771.*

WE cannot express our astonishment at the total ignorance of the army in respect to His Majesty's Letters-Patent, by which all plunder is granted to the Company. We see a war begun, carried on, and concluded; and, for aught we find to the contrary, every man in the army, during such war, deemed himself, by custom of the service, entitled to every thing that came to hand in the enemy's country. In case therefore the Letters-Patent, referred to in the trial of Colonel Wood, should not, before your receipt hereof, have been published in the army in due form, we direct that the said Letters-Patent be immediately given out in general orders, together with the explanation thereof, transmitted to your Presidency in our letter of 8th March 1758, and that due obedience be paid thereto on all occasions in future.

Letters-Patent, granted to the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, bearing date the nineteenth of September, in the Thirty-first Year of the Reign of George the Second, Anno Domini, One thousand seven hundred and fifty-seven.

GEORGE the Second, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting. Whereas applica-
 9 Z tion

General Smith, as entered hereafter, is now signed, to accompany copy of the said Letters-Patent, and the extracts from the Honourable Company's letters; which are also ordered to be given out here.

tion has been made to Us, on behalf of the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, representing that they have been obliged to commence hostilities in the East-Indies against the Nabob of Bengal, for the recovery of the town and settlement of Calcutta, taken from the said Company by the forces of the said Nabob, without any just or lawful pretence, contrary to good faith and amity, and of the goods and valuable commodities belonging to the said Company, and to many persons trading or residing within the limits of the said settlement; and that the officers and agents of the said Company at Fort St. George, have concerted a plan of operations with Vice-Admiral Watson, and others, the Commanders of Our Fleet employed in those parts, for regaining the said town and settlement, and the said goods and valuable commodities, and obtaining adequate satisfaction for their losses; and that it has been agreed between the officers of the said Company on the one part, and Our said Vice-Admiral and Commanders on board Our said Fleet on the other part, assembled in a Council of War, that one moiety of all plunder and booty, which shall be taken from the Moors, be set apart for the use of the captors, and that the other moiety thereof shall be deposited 'till Our Royal Pleasure be known.

And whereas the said Company have humbly besought Us, in compensation for the great damage which they have sustained, and of their great expenses in fitting out and preparing an expedition for the purposes before recited, that We would be graciously pleased to grant to the said Company, and their successors, all that one moiety or part of the plunder and booty agreed to be deposited as aforesaid; We being willing and desirous, in consideration of the premises, to condescend to their request: Know ye therefore, that We, of Our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, have given and granted, and, by these presents, do give and grant unto the said United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, and their successors, all that one moiety of all the booty or plunder, ships, vessels, goods, merchandizes, treasure, and other things whatsoever, which, in pursuance of the said plan of operations, concerted as aforesaid, have been, or shall be taken or seized from the said Nabob of Bengal, or any of the forces employed by him, or on his behalf, or from any of his subjects, allies, or adherents; excepting nevertheless, and always reserving, out of this Our Grant, all such ships, vessels, goods, merchandizes, treasure, and other things whatsoever, which have been forcibly taken or detained by the enemy from any Our Subjects, or others trading or residing within the limits of the said town and settlement of Calcutta, or in any manner under Our protection; and which have been, or shall be retaken, in consequence of the plan of operations, and of the said expedition; it being agreeable to justice and equity, and to Our Royal Purpose, that the same should be restored to the original owners thereof respectively, (as far as may be) on payment of reasonable salvage; to have and to hold the said one moiety of all the premises herein before granted (except as is herein before excepted) unto the said United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, and their successors, to their own proper use and behoof.

In witness whereof, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent. Witness Ourselves, at Westminster, the nineteenth day of September, in the thirty-first year of Our Reign.

By Writ of Privy Seal,

C O C K S.

Letters-Patent, granted to the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, bearing date the fourteenth of January, in the thirty-first Year of the Reign of George the Second, Anno Domini, One thousand seven hundred and fifty-eight.

GEORGE the Second, by the Grace of God, of Great Britain, France and Ireland, King, Defender of the Faith, &c. To all to whom these presents shall come, greeting. Whereas, by virtue of several Charters or Letters-Patent, heretofore granted, by divers of Our Royal Predecessors, to different Companies of Merchants of London, and of England, trading to the East-Indies, which have formerly been incorporated, such former Companies have had power to send ships of war to their settlements in the East-Indies, to raise and keep a military force, and to make peace or war with any

To Joseph Smith Esquire, Brigadier-General, and Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

THE Honourable Court of Directors, in their letter bearing date the 22d March last, having been pleased to direct that the Letters-Patent granted to the Company

any Princes or People, not Christians, in any places of their trade; and also to right and recompense themselves upon the goods, estate, or people of those parts, by whom they should sustain any injury, loss, or damage, or upon any other people that should any way interrupt, wrong, or injure them in their trade, within the limits of their Charters.

And whereas by virtue of a Charter, or Letters-Patent, granted by Our Royal Predecessor, King William the Third, of glorious memory, bearing date, at Westminster, the fifth day of September, in the tenth year of his reign; and by virtue of Our Royal Charter, or Letters-Patent, under the Great Seal of Great Britain, bearing date, at Westminster, the eighth day of January, in the twenty-sixth year of Our Reign, the United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies have power to raise and maintain such a body of standing forces, at their several settlements in the East-Indies, and such a number of seamen, and ships of defence, as shall be necessary for the safeguard and defence of the same; and to take and surprize all and every person and persons, with their ships, armour, and ammunition, and other goods, as shall, in an hostile manner, invade, or attempt the defeating or destruction of the said United Company's settlements, or Our Subjects inhabiting therein; and, upon just cause, to invade and destroy the enemies of the same.

And whereas many troubles have of late years arisen in the East-Indies, and the said United Company have been obliged, at very great expense, to carry on war in those parts against the French, and likewise against the Nabob of Bengal, and other Princes or Governments in India; and some of the territories and possessions, goods, merchandizes, treasure, and other things belonging to the said United Company in India, having been taken from them by the said Nabob of Bengal, have been since retaken by the ships of war, and forces maintained raised and paid by the said United Company, in conjunction with some of Our Royal Ships of War and forces, which We have been graciously pleased to send to the East-Indies, for the defence and assistance of the said United Company against their enemies, and other territories, or districts, goods, merchandizes and effects, have been conquered and taken from some of the said Princes or Governments in India, at variance with the said United Company, by the Ships and forces of the said United Company alone.

And whereas it is expedient for the said United Company, in order to enable them to support the great burden and expense of the war they are now engaged in, and of such wars as they may hereafter have with any of their, or of Our Enemies in India; and the better to enable them, from time to time, to make peace or terms advantageous to their trade, that We should make them such grant, and give them such powers, as herein after are contained: Now know ye, that We well weighing how highly it imports the honour and welfare of this Our Realm, and Our good Subjects thereof, that all fitting assistance and encouragement should be given to the said United Company, and in performance of divers covenants between Our Royal Predecessors and the said Company, for granting them all such further reasonable powers and privileges as may be advisable, for the better support and improvement of their trade, have, of Our especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, given and granted, and, by these presents, for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, do give and grant unto the said United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East Indies, their successors and assigns, all such booty or plunder, ships, vessels, goods, merchandizes, treasure, and other things whatsoever, which, since Our Royal Letters-Patent of the nineteenth day of September last past, have been, or shall be taken or seized from any of the enemies of the said Company, or any of Our Enemies in the East-Indies, by any ships or forces of the said Company, employed by them, or on their behalf, within any places or limits of their trade, prescribed to them by any of the Charters granted by Us, or any of Our Royal Predecessors: Provided always, that the said plunder or booty, as aforesaid, be taken or seized during wars or hostilities begun and carried on, in order to right and recompense the said Company upon the goods, estate, or people of those parts, from whom they shall sustain, or shall have just and well grounded cause to fear any injury, loss or damage; or upon any their people who shall

in the 31st year of His late Majesty's reign be made public, by being given out in general orders; you will receive herewith copy of the said Letters-Patent, extract

shall interrupt, wrong, or injure them in their said trade within the limits of their Charters; or who shall, in an hostile manner, invade, or attempt to weaken or destroy the settlements of the said Company, or to injure Our Subjects, or others trading or residing within the said settlements, or in any manner under Our protection, within the said places or limits: And further; Provided always, that the booty or plunder, as aforesaid, be taken in wars, hostilities, or expeditions, begun, carried on, and completed by the forces raised and paid by the said Company alone, or by the ships employed at their sole expense; saving Our Prerogative Royal, to distribute the said plunder or booty, in such manner and proportions as we shall think fit, in all cases where any of the forces, by land or sea, of Us, Our Heirs and Successors, shall be appointed and commanded to act in conjunction with the ships or forces of the said Company: And excepting always, out of this Our Grant, all such ships, vessels, goods, merchandizes, treasure, and other things whatsoever, which have been, or shall be forcibly taken, or detained by the enemy, from any of Our Subjects, or others, trading or residing within the places or limits aforesaid, under Our protection; and which have been, or shall be retaken, in consequence of any wars, hostilities, or expeditions as aforesaid; it being agreeable to justice and equity, and to Our Royal Purpose, that the same shall be restored to the original owners respectively, as far as may be, on payment of reasonable salvage.

And further, We have, of Our like especial grace, certain knowledge, and mere motion, given and granted, and, by these presents, for Us, Our Heirs and Successors, do give and grant unto the said United Company of Merchants of England trading to the East-Indies, their successors and assigns, that they, the said United Company, their successors and assigns, shall and may, by any treaty or treaties of peace made, or to be made, between them, or any of their officers, servants or agents, employed on their behalf, and any of the Indian Princes or Governments, cede, restore, or dispose of any fortresses, districts, or territories, acquired by conquest from any of the said Indian Princes or Governments, during the late troubles between the said Company and the Nabob of Bengal, or which shall be acquired, by conquest, in time coming: Provided always, that the said Company shall not have any power or authority whatsoever to cede, restore, or dispose of any settlements, fortresses, districts or territories, conquered from the subjects of any European Power, without the especial licence and approbation of Us, Our Heirs and Successors.

And We do, for Us, our Heirs and Successors, grant and declare, that these Our Letters-Patent, or the enrolment thereof, shall be, in and by all things, valid and effectual in the law, according to the true intent and meaning of the same; and shall be taken, construed, and adjudged in the most favourable sense, for the best advantage of the said Company, as well in our Courts of Record as elsewhere, notwithstanding any non-recital, misrecital, defect, incertainty, or imperfection, in these Our Letters Patent.

In witness whereof, We have caused these Our Letters to be made Patent. Witness Ourselves, at Westminster, the fourteenth day of January, in the thirty-first year of Our Reign.

By Writ of Privy Seal,

C O C K S.

Extract of General Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Fort St. George, dated 8th March, 1758. Received at Fort St. George, 12th October, 1758.

31. IN our General Letters of the 11th November and 23d of December last, we acquainted you that the matter of captures was under the consideration of the most eminent lawyers: and finding, in the course of our consultations with them, that they were not satisfied whether the several charters formerly granted to the Company were sufficiently explicit to answer all our purposes; and they recommending it to us rather to endeavour to obtain such a grant as might remove all doubts; we accordingly made our application to His Majesty, who, by His Letters-Patent under the Great Seal of Great Britain, bearing date the 14th day of January last, has been graciously pleased to grant to the Company for their own use (under the exceptions therein-mentioned) all such plunder and booty, &c.

from the Company's letter of the 8th March 1758, and extract from their before-mentioned letter of the 22d March last: we shall cause them to be given out in

as our land or sea forces may take from our enemies by sea or land; and likewise such territories, &c. as we may acquire by treaty, grant, or conquest. We sent you by the Pitt one of the grants under the Great Seal, and copies thereof come by these ships; to which, for your fuller information, you are referred.

32. You will observe, that the Company, in virtue of the said grant, are entitled to the whole of the plunder and booty which shall be taken in wars, hostilities, or expeditions by the Company's own land or sea forces: but as we are willing to give all reasonable encouragement to our said forces, we do agree, and accordingly direct, that the plunder or booty so taken be divided into two parts; one part or moiety whereof is to be given among the captors, and the other part or moiety is to be carried to the credit of the Company; excepting in land operations, you are to observe, that cannon, ammunition, and military stores of all kinds, are not to come into the division, but are to belong entirely to the Company; but if any ships shall be taken, the value of the ship, cargo, ammunition, stores, and every thing belonging thereto, are to be equally divided between the Company and the captors as before directed. As to the manner of dividing the moiety allotted for the captors, and the proportions of each and every person concerned, according to their several ranks and stations in the service, we must leave it to your discretion to act therein in such a manner as shall appear to you upon the whole to be most reasonable and equitable; sending us an account, in every instance, how and in what manner you distribute the same, distinguishing therein how much to each commission and warrant officer, and how much a-piece to each private man. And as you will probably have divided the plunder which was taken upon the late expedition to Bengal under the agreement which you previously entered into with the King's forces, whereby one moiety was to belong to the captors, we desire you will send us a particular account how the proportion which belonged to our forces was distributed; and that you will also procure and send to us the account in what manner the King's forces distributed among themselves the proportion which belonged to them.

33. By the said Grant, all plunder or booty taken in wars, hostilities, or expeditions, where any of His Majesty's forces by land or sea shall be appointed and commanded to act in conjunction with the ships and forces of the Company, is reserved for distribution in such manner and proportions as the King shall think fit; in consequence, all such plunder or booty, or the produce thereof, must be kept entire: previous therefore to any expeditions, you are to make an agreement with His Majesty's Officers that the same be delivered into your possession, or the produce thereof; giving us an exact account of the same, that we may make the necessary applications to His Majesty for the division thereof; presuming that His Majesty will be graciously pleased to grant one half of such plunder or booty to the Company, as he has done, by Letters-*Patent* of the 19th of September last, in consequence of the agreement made between you and the King's forces in the expedition against the then Nabob of Bengal; and that the other half will be set apart for the use of the captors. In order to facilitate our application therefore for obtaining such a grant or grants, it will be necessary for you, previous to all and any expeditions, to make a particular agreement, as you did in the before-mentioned case, with His Majesty's Officers, that one moiety of all plunder and booty taken, where the King's and Company's forces act jointly as aforesaid, be set apart or reserved for the Company, and the other moiety for the use of the captors: and it will be necessary also that you make particular agreements in what manner, and in what proportions, the captors' moiety is to be divided among the King's and Company's forces; in which the plan we presume you proceeded upon in the before-mentioned agreement with His Majesty's Officers may be your guide, unless a better and more equitable one can be substituted in its room. As we shall give the like instructions to our other Presidencies, you must send as soon as possible copies of your said agreement for dividing the captors' moiety among the King's and Company's Officers, for their information and guidance.

orders here, and we desire that you will make them known to the army under your command.

We are, SIR,

Fort St. George,
23d September, 1771.

Your most obedient humble servants,

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 16th September, 1771.

Extract of Letter from Governor Du Pré to General Smith, dated 16th September, 1771.

I SHALL give out the Patent in public orders. I have more than once informed the Nabob, that, according to the usage of war, the plunder of towns taken by storm belongs to the captors.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Friday, 18th October, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
Richard Brickenden
George Mackay.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Camp before Tanjore, 12th October, 1771.

I AM honoured with your commands of the 23d and 25th September, with the several extracts from the Court of Directors' letters relative to plunder and booty, &c.—all which, pursuant to your orders, have been made public to the troops under my command.

The Rajah's Vackeels are in camp with the young Nabob, and very readily agree to all his demands, except the entire cession of Vellum, and admitting a garrison into the capital. The young man at present appears firm, but is greatly hurt at the scarcity of provisions. He has made a proposal to give the army 7 Lacks of Rupees in

in case Tanjore is taken, and what is found in it, together with what was in Vellum be delivered up to him; including, moreover, what may hereafter be taken during the expedition. Having assembled the Field Officers, together with one Captain and one Subaltern from each corps, I communicated to them the above proposal, which they unanimously rejected; and I may venture to say, they spoke the sense of the whole army. The terms they seemed disposed to accept were, that each individual should receive double the sum they received at Madura; on which they are ready to relinquish their claim to that portion of the spoil which the Court of Directors had allotted to them. This their resolution I have made the Nabob acquainted with, but I have not yet had his answer.

Minute of the Board on the above Letter from General Smith.

WE consider the Company, in the present expedition against Tanjore, as Auxiliaries to the Nabob; in which character we are commanded by our Superiors to support and assist him, and not to make them the principals in his wars: for which reason we have not thought ourselves authorized to stipulate for any compensation to the Company, either for their risks, or for their services; nor do we think the Company, merely as Auxiliaries, entitled to plunder and booty. Whatever shall be taken or acquired, is taken or acquired for the principal—the Nabob. How far this may in the long run answer to the Company, is not for us to enquire; but if the case be so, then the army can have no claim to any plunder or booty, by virtue of the promise made by the Company to give to the army the half of the plunder and booty granted to the Company by the Letters-Patent of the 14th January 1758; because those Letters-Patent speak only of such plunder or booty as shall be “taken” or seized from any of the *enemies of the said Company, or the enemies of the Crown.* Nevertheless, we believe the usage of war entitles the troops, whether Principals or Auxiliaries, to the plunder of places taken by storm. It was, we believe, upon this consideration, that at the siege of Vellour, and again at the siege of Madura, the Nabob agreed with the army to give them a specific sum in case the place should be taken, either by assault or by capitulation, as an agreed equivalent to the plunder they would be entitled to should it be taken by storm. We consider the offer which General Smith informs us the Nabob’s Son has made to the army, as an offer made upon this ground. The reflexion that occurs to us upon it is, that if the army be entitled, by the usage of war, to the plunder and booty found in places taken by storm, we have no power to control that right, and cannot therefore with propriety interfere in this transaction. If it be their right, they may agree to an equivalent to forego that right, or they may refuse it. The case would be different if the Nabob were to offer a voluntary donation to the army, as a reward for past, or as an encouragement for future services. The President, however, is desired to inform the Nabob of what the General has wrote on this subject, in his letter now before us, but to leave the Nabob entirely to do therein as he shall think fit.

BOOTY AND PLUNDER.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 21st October, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
———
George Mackay.

THE President informs the Board, that he communicated to the Nabob the proposal made to the army by his Son, of 7 Lacks of Rupees, as an equivalent in lieu of the plunder and booty that may be taken during the present service, as advised in General Smith's letter of the 12th instant, entered in the preceding Consultation. That the Nabob replied, that he would readily agree to pay double what was given at Madura, which he said amounted to about 150,000 Pagodas. But when the President informed him, that each individual expected to receive double what those of the same rank received at Madura, the Nabob seemed much surprised, and said he would consider of it.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 28th October, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
———
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
Richard Brickenden
George Mackay.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Camp near Tanjore, 20th October, 1771.

I TOOK the liberty of mentioning to the Board the Nabob's first offer to the army, regarding the moiety of the plunder and booty that might be taken during

during the campaign, and the sense of the whole corps of officers entertained of such a proposal. I communicated their opinion of it to Omdat-ul Omrah Be-hauder, with their expectations from the capture of Tanjore; he returned me the enclosed address; and having summoned all the Field Officers of the army, with a Captain and Subaltern from each corps, I laid before them his second proposal, which they agreed to, (the Field Officers excepted) who thought their proportions, as well as those of the Captains and Subalterns, ought to be doubled. I mentioned this to the young Nabob, who returned for answer, that at the reduction of Madura there were only two Majors, whereas at present there are no less than nine Field Officers; and that to double their proportions, the sum required would be more than he could consent to give. You will observe he has put down the Commanding Officer an eighth of the whole; give me leave to assure you, upon my honour, that this was merely an act of his own, I never having opened my lips to him on the matter, knowing that these points would rest entirely in the breasts of the Board to do as they may think proper.

The Field Officers address you now on the subject, and I transmit their letter to me by this conveyance for the Board's perusal; and at the same time I beg leave to remark, that their desire of tying the Nabob down to certain terms, whether the place was put into his possession or not, *and that at a time when service is going on*, I could not have expected from the principal officers of this army; but I leave you to judge of the propriety or impropriety of such a demand. However, I mentioned to the young Nabob, "That supposing a peace should take place, I hoped he would consider the fatigues and hardships the troops had undergone since they sat down before this place, and that his endeavours to obtain, either from the Rajah or his Father, some recompense for them would not be wanting.

Letter from Omdat-ul-Omrab, the Nabob's eldest Son, to Brigadier-General Smith, commanding the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

HAVING duly considered and deliberated upon your answer, respecting the proportion expected by the army in consideration of the fatigue and trouble they either have or may undergo during this present campaign, or on my being put in possession of the garrison of Tanjore, either by agreement or force of arms; I do hereby consent and promise to give them, in lieu of all claim or claims to plunder or booty, of what kind soever, that has or may be taken during the expedition, as follows; payable within three months after the fall of Tanjore.

To the Commander in Chief I will give a sum equal to one eighth of what the share of the Company's troops only amount to.

10 B

To

BOOTY AND PLUNDER.

	Pagodas.
To every Lieutenant-Colonel	4000
To every Major	3000
To the Quarter-Master General, as such, only	4000
To the Aid-du-Camp, Brigade-Major, Secretary, Commissary and Paymaster, Chaplain and Surgeons, and Commissary of Stores }	2000
To the Provost Marshal	1000
To the Baggage Master	500
To the Surgeons' Mates, each	1000
To the Adjutant of Sepoys	1000
To Captains of the Army	2000
To Subaltern Officers, each	1000
To Serjeants	40
To Corporals and European Drummers, each	30
To Private Europeans, each	20
To Black Drummers	8
To Commandants of Battalions of Sepoys, each	100
To Subadars	50
To Jemidars	15
To Havildars	8
To Naigues	6
To Sepoys	4
To Syrangs	30
To Tindals	15
To Lascars	4

I am, SIR,

Your most obedient and humble servant.

Camp before Tanjore,
17th October, 1771.

Letter from the Field Officers to General Smith.

S I R,

WE whose names are underwritten, the Field Officers of the army employed in the reduction of Tanjore, beg of you to take the earliest opportunity of returning thanks to His Excellency the Nabob for the generous disposition he has shewn towards the troops, by proposing to grant to them a sum of money in lieu of their moiety of the captures incident to this campaign; which we apprehend, though not clearly expressed in His Excellency's letter, we shall at all events receive. For although the Nabob should not be actually put in possession of Tanjore, yet as we are battering in breach, and have advanced the sap to the very counterescarp, we cannot doubt but any terms which His Excellency may now make will be attended with every advantage he can desire, and will be owing entirely to the operations of the military, and the terror infused in the Rajah by our very near approach.

We

We cannot however help observing, that by the covenants we have separately entered into with the Honourable the Court of Directors, for governing and directing the affairs of the Honourable and United Company of British Merchants trading to the East-Indies, it is not in our power to stipulate, or even agree, to the particular sums which each individual is to receive. We have therefore to request of you to desire His Excellency seriously to consider the merits of the troops, and to grant a certain sum, leaving the distribution of it to the Honourable the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, agreeable to the intentions of the Honourable Court of Directors; and they, we make no doubt, will proportion it agreeable to the rank and appointment which each individual holds from the Company.

We remain, with great respect and esteem,

S I R,

Camp before Tanjore,
October 18th, 1771.

Your most obedient servants,

Rofs Lang
J. Butler
W. Flint
A. Bonjour
Patrick Rofs
Edward James
John Braithwaite
John Braithwaite
Humphry Harper
John Des Plans.

For Major Vaughan on duty,

The President also lays before the Board the following letter from the Field Officers, on the subject of the Nabob's proposals.

Letter from the Field Officers to the Governor on the same subject.

Honourable Sir,

WE find ourselves under a necessity of troubling you on a subject, which we sincerely wish had never been brought into altercation; that is, as it relates to particulars, we could have wished that you had been first addressed upon the matter in general, and that the distribution and determination, as to individuals, had first come from you with the concurrence of the Board.

On the 10th instant, we, with a Captain and Subaltern from each corps, were desired to meet at the General's tent that afternoon at four o'clock. Upon our being assembled, we were acquainted with the orders of the Honourable Court of Directors, entitling us to one moiety of the captures incident to war, ordnance, stores, &c. excepted; and were at the same time told that His Excellency the Nabob, both as an encouragement for the future and reward for past services, was pleased to offer to the army seven Lacks of Rupees; which was also to be deemed by the army as a sufficient

cient sum, in consideration for their moiety of the captures of this campaign, which were in consequence to be carried to his credit. The general opinion was, that the sum was so far from being a reward or encouragement, that it could scarcely be deemed a reasonable offer for the moiety to which the army was entitled; and the general voice, upon it's being asked what was expected, was, that the doubling the prize money of Madura to each individual might be expected. On the 18th instant, we received orders, signed by the Brigade-Major, to meet at the General's tent at eleven that day, in conjunction with a Captain and Subaltern from each corps, to settle the affair of prize-money. Upon our meeting a paper was laid before us, particularizing the sum to be paid to each individual of the army; this paper was delivered by the General, who at the same time told us, that it was the Nabob's final resolve, to which every one must sign, or do as they could.

Upon considering with ourselves we concluded, that we were not authorized to sign any such agreement with the Nabob, and declined signing it; for which the General desired us to give our reasons in writing, which we accordingly did that evening in a letter, a copy of which we enclose to you under No. 1. We also enclose to you, under No. 2, a copy of the paper proposed to us to sign; which, over and above the impropriety of the act, we apprehend has particular defects, viz. That there are allowances for the Staff independent of their ranks in the army, and there are also omissions of extra rewards to Serjeant Major, Quarter-master Serjeants, and Drum Majors, who are upon these occasions, by the custom of the army, always distinguished.

Our opinion however, Sir, upon the whole was, that we had no right to altercate the matter, but were bound to leave it to the President and Council; and in that stile we accordingly delivered our sentiments to the General. Nevertheless, wishing to avoid all public appearances of division, we unanimously submit this matter to you, to determine in such manner as you may think most eligible, and consonant to the intention of our Honourable Masters.

We have the honour to remain, with true respect,

Camp before Tanjore,

Honourable Sir,

October 20, 1771.

Your obedient servants,

Rofs Lang
J. Butler
A. Bonjour
Patrick Rofs
John Des Plans
Edward James
Richard Vaughan
Humphrey Harper
John Braithwaite.

N. B. Lieutenant-Colonel Flint on duty.

Papers

Papers encl. d.

- No. 1. Letter to the General of the 12th instant.
 2. Distribution of prize-money.
 3. The General's answer to the letter of the 12th, sent upon the receipt of.
 4. Second letter to the General of the 20th instant.
 5. Third letter to the General of the 20th instant.

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire.

The Nabob's proposals, referred to in the foregoing letter, No. 1, are the same as entered above, with the following remarks and objections made thereto by the Field Officers:

1st. That the allowance to the Quarter-Master-General, as it is worded, entitles him to receive also as Captain-Lieutenant of Artillery, which will make his share amount to Pagodas 6000, and that he supersedes all Majors.

2d. That the Aid-du-Camp and Brigade Major have extra pay, and extra share of prize-money—unprecedented.

3d. The allowance to Provost Master unprecedented.

4th. The allowance to Baggage Master unprecedented.

5th. The Adjutant of Sepoys not more entitled than every other Adjutant, who never receive double shares.

The copy of the letter from the Field Officers to General Smith, transmitted with their letter to the President, and referred to No. 2, is the same as that entered above, received from General Smith.

S I R,

Camp before Tanjore, 20th October 1771.

IN consequence of your own desire, by which you wished to have our reasons delivered to you in writing, for objecting to sign a paper particularizing the sums to be paid to each individual, in lieu of their moiety of the captures incident to this campaign, we did ourselves the honour to write to you a letter on the 18th instant, requesting you therein to communicate our opinion to His Excellency the Nabob, at the same time with our thanks for the generous disposition he has shewn, with which we were perfectly satisfied. As we therein chose, as in duty bound, His Honour the Governor, and Council of Fort St. George, to make the distribution, we think it a duty incumbent on us to write to the Presidency on the subject; but before we close our letter, should be much obliged to you to

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BOOTY AND PLUNDER.

know the Nabob's sentiments on this matter ; and we hope we shall be excused, if we add a desire of receiving your answer, previous to the dispatch of any escort.

We remain, with true respect,

S I R, &c.

Letter from General Smith to Lieutenant-Colonel Lang, &c. Field Officers.

GENTLEMEN,

I AM this moment favoured with your address relative to the Nabob's proposals concerning the captures incident to this campaign ; he has been informed with your sentiments therein, and at the time I mentioned to him your dissatisfaction with respect to the *proportions* ; he desired me to inform you it could not be altered. It was my intention to transmit your letter of the 18th October to the Board, and I shall this evening ; and whatever you may have to add on this subject I will readily forward to the Presidency.

I am, GENTLEMEN, with esteem,

Your most obedient servant,

Camp, 20th October, 1771.

(Signed) J. SMITH.

P. S. However unanimous we might have been in regard to the Nabob's proposals, yet the final determination and distribution must come from the Governor and Council.

Letter from the Field Officers to General Smith.

S I R,

WE are just now favoured with your's of this instant, for which we return you our thanks, as also for the opportunity you give us of communicating our sentiments to the Honourable Board, which shall be sent to you forthwith, requesting that you will forward them with your own. We cannot help saying, that you seem totally to have mistaken our intention, when you say, that " At the same time you acquainted the Nabob with our dissatisfaction at the *proportions*." We do not recollect to have expressed any dissatisfaction in our letter ; we only therein observed, that we thought it belonged to the Honourable the Governor and Council to make the distribution, and to those only, and of that opinion we still remain ; being,

S I R, with true respect,

Your most obedient servants.

The Board's Remark on the foregoing Papers.

WE have already, in our Minutes of the 18th instant, delivered it as our opinion, that as the army have, by the custom of war, a right to the plunder and booty found in places taken by storm, they may stipulate for a sum to be paid them in lieu of such right, whether the place be taken by assault or capitulation; but we are clearly of opinion, that they have no right to make any stipulation for a sum to be paid them if the place be not taken, which would be a breach of their covenants. If the Nabob should be desirous of making them a present, in consideration of the dangers and fatigues they have undergone, we think we ought not to object to their receiving it; but then it must come voluntarily from the Nabob, of his own free will and motion, and must not be looked upon as what they have the least right to demand. With respect to the manner of dividing the sum that may be agreed on in case the place be taken, or such present as the Nabob may be pleased to make to the army if the place be not taken, the Board think it unnecessary at present to enter into a discussion thereof.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 4th November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton
Richard Brickenden
George Mackay

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated, Camp near Tanjore, 29th October, 1771.

I HAVE a very particular satisfaction in assuring the Honourable Board, that the officers and men under my command have shewn during the expedition all the steadiness, alacrity, and cheerfulness, in the execution of every part of their duty, I could wish, and shall on all occasions be happy to express the sense I entertain of their good behaviour during this siege; at the same time I beg leave to recommend to the Honourable Board's protection and countenance, in obtaining a reward for them, in some degree their due, for the hardships and fatigues they have undergone; as I can with truth affirm, that no army in this country has, in the same space of time, suffered more fatigue than they have done. We hope and believe your Honour, &c. will use your influence with the Nabob to make some addition to the sum stipulated by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, in one of the articles of peace with the Rajah, in favour of the army, so as to make it worth their acceptance. Two breaches were nearly practicable at the time the Nabob settled matters with the

Rajah; the officers, &c. think that circumstance alone will be sufficient to plead for them, as it was in consequence of the dread of our arms, and being on the crest of the glacis, that obliged the Rajah to comply with the young Nabob's demands. Whatever may be allotted to them, your directions will be absolutely necessary for the mode of distribution.

The Board's Observation.

We observe with great satisfaction the favourable mention made by General Smith of the behaviour of the officers and men of every corps during this expedition: besides a due attention and regard to their respective merits, we can only offer them our thanks; particularly to Major Vaughan, whose steady conduct and firmness on the 11th October deserves the most honourable notice.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 18th November, 1771.

A DRAUGHT of a letter to General Smith being prepared, on the subject of the request contained in his letter of the 29th October, that the Board would use their influence with the Nabob to make some addition to the sum stipulated by *Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder*, in one of the articles of the treaty of peace with the Rajah of Tanjore, in favour of the army, so as to make it worth their acceptance; it is ordered that the same be sent round for the consideration of the several Members.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 25th November, 1771.

THE draught of a letter to General Smith, on the subject of his request that the Board would interest themselves with the Nabob, to obtain some addition to the sum stipulated for the army in the treaty with the Rajah of Tanjore, having been sent round, and approved by the several Members, the President is desired to communicate the same to the Nabob; and if approved by him, that it be wrote fair and dispatched.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 26th November, 1771.

The following letter was this day sent to General Smith, the draught thereof having been previously shewn to the Nabob, and approved by him:

To Brigadier-General Joseph Smith, Commanding Officer of the Troops on the Coast.

S I R,

IN your letter of the 12th October you informed us, that Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder had made a proposal of giving the army 7 Lacks of Rupees in case Tanjore should be taken, provided what should be found in it, as well as what had been and should be taken from the enemy during the expedition, were delivered up to him. That having deliberated thereon with the Field Officers, &c. they had unanimously rejected the offer, seemed disposed to accept of double what each officer received at Madura, and for such a consideration would relinquish their claim to that portion of the spoil which the Court of Directors had allotted them.

In your letter of the 20th October you inform us, that having communicated to Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder the sense of the whole corps of officers in respect to his abovementioned proposal, (which you enclosed to us) purporting a promise, or engagement, to give to the army under your command certain sums therein expressed, in lieu of all claims they might have to plunder or booty, of what kind soever, that had been, or should be taken during the expedition, in case of his being put in possession of the fort of Tanjore, payable within three months after the fall of the fort. That the proposal was agreed to by all except the Field Officers, who thought their proportions, as well as those of the Captains and Subalterns, ought to be doubled. That Omdat-ul-Omrah being acquainted therewith replied, that at the reduction of Madura there were only two Majors; that on this service there are no less than nine Field Officers; and that to double their proportions, would raise the sum to more than he could consent to give. That upon this occasion the Field Officers had addressed a letter to you, dated the 18th October, (which you also enclose us) desiring, amongst other things, that the distribution of the whole sum promised to the army might be left to the President and Council; and intimating their sense of the promise made by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to be, although not clearly so expressed, that they should *at all events* receive the same; for that altho' he should not be actually put in possession of Tanjore, yet whatever terms he should obtain must be attributed to the operations of the army. That however you had only mentioned to him your hope, that, in case a peace should take place, he would consider the fatigues and hardships the troops had undergone; and that his endeavours would not be wanting to obtain some recompence for them, either from his Father or the Rajah of Tanjore.

At the same time the President received a letter from the Field Officers under your command, dated the 20th October, and wrote, as it appears, with your knowledge and concurrence, referring the distribution of the whole sum so promised to be given or paid to the determination of the President and Council, in such manner as they should think most eligible, and consonant to the intention of the Court of Directors.

In your letter of the 29th October, after advising us of the conclusion of peace, expressing the sense you entertain of the good behaviour of the officers and men under your command, and commending the steadiness, alacrity, and cheerfulness they had shewn in the execution of every part of their duty during the expedition against Tanjore, you recommend them to our protection and countenance, in obtaining a reward for them, in some degree you think their due for the hardships and fatigues they had undergone; adding, you hope and believe we will use our influence with the Nabob, to make some addition to *the sum stipulated by Omdut ul-Omrab Bebauder, in one of the articles of the peace with the Rajah, in favour of the army*, so as to make it worth their acceptance.

We have thought it proper thus to recite the material parts and spirit of what hath come before us on this subject, that a clear state of the matter may at once, without reference, be apparent to whomsoever it may concern.

The subjects above recited are so very interesting to the individual, and so important in their consequences to the public;—as individuals we feel so strong a propensity to favour the individuals of the army, as responsible agents we find ourselves so limited and restrained, and as depositaries of the general interest of our Constituents and their connexions, we see such danger in precedents, that we enter with great reluctance on the discussion of such opposite interests, and can scarcely flatter ourselves with the hope of giving general satisfaction. We must nevertheless hazard an opinion; and that the Company, the Nabob, the Army, the Public, may know the grounds of our procedure, and the principles which govern us, we shall explain them at large; to serve not only as a decision, so far as it rests with us to decide in the present case, but as a rule for the future, at least until the Court of Directors shall declare their sense on this subject.

In the late Parliamentary discussions of the Company's rights it hath been asserted, that they derive no power or authority from their charter to wage offensive war as principals. We are far from assuming a competency to judge of a proposition of such importance to the Company; it is sufficient that such a proposition hath been suggested to put us on our guard, that the Company incur not a premunire by our conduct. *The Company's trade was not obstructed by the Rajah of Tanjore; his offences were against his liege Lord, the Ruler of the Carnatick Payen Ghaut, whom the Company's forces have been employed to assist and support, as Auxiliaries.*

The King, our Gracious Sovereign, by His Royal Letters-Patent, bearing date the 14th day of January 1758, hath been pleased to grant to the Company all such plunder or booty as shall be taken or seized from any of the enemies of the said Company, or the enemies of the Crown.

The Court of Directors, by their letter to the President and Council of Fort St. George, dated 8th March 1758, par. 32 †, have been pleased to promise to their forces one half of the plunder and booty which should be taken by such forces, and which is so granted to the Company by the above-recited Patent.

We are of opinion, that the grant made by the said Letters-Patent does not extend to plunder or booty taken by the Company's forces in any war or expedition wherein they are only auxiliary, and act in conjunction with the forces of the State to which they are auxiliary; and consequently, that the Company have no right, under the Patent, to any plunder or booty taken in an auxiliary war or expedition, cannot grant any to their forces, nor can their forces, as servants, have a greater right than their principals, except in the case herein-aftermentioned.

The Rajah of Tanjore hath not, in the late expedition, been declared or considered as an enemy either to the Crown or to the Company; but on the contrary, we have declared the Company to be only auxiliary in the late expedition; and consequently we are of opinion that the army can derive no right or benefit, in the late expedition, either from the Letters-Patent, or the Company's promise made in consequence thereof.

But we are of opinion, that, according to the usage and custom of war, all plunder and booty (warlike stores excepted) found in places taken by storm, becomes the property of the captors; that is to say, the individual forces by which such places are so taken.

Upon an attentive perusal of the covenants between the Company and their military officers, we do not find any thing that, in our opinion, can be construed, or is intended to supersede that right.

If this opinion be just it will follow, that the forces investing or besieging a place, may lawfully compromise, bargain, and exchange that right for any specific sum to be paid them in lieu thereof, upon a surrender of that right, when they shall be in actual possession.

But we are of opinion, that the Company's forces cannot, consistently with their covenants, make any compromise, bargain, or agreement for a compensation in any other case whatsoever, because the covenants expressly prohibit any bargain or contract for service or services performed or to be performed. In brief, our opinion is, that plunder or booty taken by storm differs from every other case in this respect; that the one is a matter of right by the usage of war, and every man may dispose of his right; but services in war, in all other cases, give no right of this kind, unless by special grants; and the reward of military services is ever at the will of the Sovereign.

We are further of opinion, in respect to the Company's forces, that services being performed, they may, consistently with the spirit, and according to the true intent and meaning of their covenants with the Company, receive and retain any gift, gratuity, or donation, in money or effects, from any Indian Prince, Sovereign, Subah, or Nabob, for whom such services shall have been performed; provided no compulsion be used,—no compromise, bargain, or stipulation shall have been previously made.

made: in a word, that such gift or donation be made freely and spontaneously, and with the privity and consent of the Governor and Council.

Having thus given our opinion upon the matter of right, claim, or pretension of the army to plunder or booty, or an equivalent, we shall make some observations on the late transactions respecting the same, as they are communicated to us in the letters herein-before recited.

As to the proposal first made by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder of 7 Lacks of Rupees, the sense expressed by the officers thereon, and the second proposal or engagement of Omdat-ul-Omrah, we have only to observe, that we think the army had a right to reject or to accept of any proposal which was made them of a sum of money, as an equivalent for the plunder and booty which should be found in the fort of Tanjore if it were taken by storm, to be paid them after the fort should be taken, upon their relinquishing such their right and possession; and therefore, so far as the second proposal or engagement of Omdat-ul-Omrah may be construed an engagement limited to this particular case, we think it was justifiable. And as the sum thereby agreed to be paid would have been an equivalent for an independent right, the distribution would not have fallen under our control; and therefore, had the agreement taken place, it would not have been necessary, and cannot now be so, for us to deliver any opinion respecting the proportions or shares proposed for the several ranks of European officers. But we cannot help remarking the great and humiliating distinction which is made between the European and Sepoy corps, because such a distinction tends, in our opinion, to the prejudice of the service. A Commandant of a battalion of Sepoys is allotted for his share 100 Pagodas, an European Captain 2000 Pagodas; a Subadar 50 Pagodas, and a Jemidar 15 Pagodas, both commissioned officers; a Subaltern of Europeans 1000 Pagodas, a Serjeant 40 Pagodas, and a private European 20 Pagodas, &c. Although the superior courage, discipline, and attachment of our countrymen will ever give them the greatest title to our confidence, yet it is principally upon the native troops that the Company must depend ultimately for the protection of their acquisitions in India; it seems therefore necessary by every means to inspire them with military ardour, and attach them to the service in which they are engaged: but can either spirit or attachment be expected, when such proofs of contempt are manifested? The whole corps of native troops is degraded by the proposed distribution, in which the native commissioned officer is reduced beneath the level of a private European soldier.

From what has been said, our opinion upon the whole is clearly deducible; yet as we wish not to leave the least colour of doubt upon any part of this interesting subject, we think it proper to say in express terms, that, in our opinion, the sense declared by the Field Officers, in their letter to you of the 18th October, is by no means warrantable. It is very evident however that it arose from a mistake in the ground of their reasoning; a mistake, as it appears to us, for they set out with acknowledgments to the Nabob for his generous offer of a sum of money, *in lieu of*
their

their moiety of the captures incident to the campaign; from whence it is plain they thought the plunder and booty which might be taken in the late expedition, came within the intent and meaning of the Letters-Patent of 1758, and the Company's promise in consequence of it: we are of a contrary opinion, and have already assigned our reasons. One observation more occurs on the Field Officers' letter: They say they apprehend, though it is not clearly so expressed in Omdat-ul-Omrah's letter or proposal, that they should *at all events* receive the promised sum; and the reason they assign for that expectation is, that although the Nabob should not be actually put in possession of Tanjore, yet as you were battering in breach, &c. whatever terms the Nabob might make, would be owing entirely to the operations of the army, &c. Since the Rajah contemptuously rejected all reasonable demands of submission before the army took the field, there cannot be a doubt that whatever terms the Rajah afterwards submitted to ought to be ascribed to the operations of the army; yet in our opinion it does not follow, that *therefore* the army became entitled to any compensation, for the words and spirit of the covenants between the Company and their Officers speak expressly the contrary. You appear to us to be also of this opinion; and therefore you only expressed your hope to Omdat-ul-Omrah, that in case a peace should take place, the fatigues and hardships of the army would be considered, &c. This mode appears to us less exceptionable; yet *we doubt whether it will meet with approbation at home, because it may establish a dangerous precedent*. From the general tenor of *your* conduct, and what we know of *your* disposition, we are very confident that *you* were incapable of doing or intending more than is expressed in your letter to us; you mentioned the subject in a respectful manner, and left it there: but who sees not, that if ever the army should have a violent, an arbitrary, an overbearing rapacious man at its head, circumstances may so happen, as that a most humble request may differ only in words from a demand, and produce the same effects as compulsion. In a word, where there is no right there ought to be no claim; and if any thing be given, it should be given freely and unasked.

We come now to your letter of the 29th October, in which you recommend the army to our protection and countenance, in obtaining a reward for them, which in some degree you think their due, and request our influence in obtaining from the Nabob some addition to the sum stipulated, in one of the articles of peace with the Rajah, in favour of the army, &c.

In the articles of the peace you sent us we do not find any stipulation in favour of the army, and we will be so frank as to say, we are glad there is none; because, if there had been such a stipulation, it would not have availed the army, and because the precedent would have been most dangerous. We will also without reserve inform you, that the Nabob has explained himself fully to the President on this subject. He admits the right of the army to plunder and booty found in places taken by storm, and allows it to be the usage in this country as well as in others; beyond that he admits of no right, claim, or pretension of any kind, to compensation, equivalent, or reward, upon any consideration whatsoever. He is alarmed at the conse-

quences, and, as far as we can judge, means not to give one Rupee to the army whilst they seem to entertain such ideas. Our advice therefore to the army is, that, through you, they do formally relinquish all manner of pretension to compensation, reward, or by whatsoever name it may be called, for services, fatigues, or hardships, past or to come, reserving only the single instance of right herein-before-mentioned; and for the rest leave the Nabob now, and at all future times, to do freely what his own feelings may suggest, or to refrain if he shall think fit.

You have recommended the army under your command to our protection and countenance with the Nabob. Considering the station assigned us here, such a form of words may not be improper; although you well know how we are circumscribed. We have already assured you, that, as individuals, our inclination to favour the individuals of the army is strong; we will add, that, in our public character, the army may rest assured of this,—whenever we shall find a generous, a munificent sentiment spontaneously rising in the Nabob's mind, we shall, with great satisfaction to ourselves, give all due encouragement.

And that the army may not seek for our sentiments on this subject any where but in our own declarations, we desire that you will call together the Field Officers under your command, with so many of every other rank as you shall think proper, and let these our sentiments be publicly read to them.

We are, SIR,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
26th November, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Council.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 6th January, 1772.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings	Samuel Ardley
John Smith	George Stratton
Henry Brooke	_____
John Whitchill	George Mackay.

Letter from General Smith read as follows:

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Council of Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

THE Field Officers, and as many of every other rank who had been on the Tanjore expedition as were necessary, were assembled on the 2d instant, and, agree-

able to the instructions I received from your Honour, &c. of the 26th ultimo, your letter of that date on the subject of prize-money was read to them. Nothing further could be done at that time; they were obliged to return to their several posts, intelligence being just then received that a party of Marattas had entered the Carnatick, and advanced within a few miles of this place. The officers have since had a meeting, and addressed me with a letter of this date, which I have the honour to send you enclosed.

I am, Honourable Sir and Sirs,

With respect,

Your most obedient servant,

Trichinopoly,
28th December, 1771.

J O S E P H S M I T H.

To Brigadier-General Smith.

S I R,

IT was with much concern that we heard you read the letter from the Honourable Board, relative to the conduct and expectations of the army under your command in the late expedition against Tanjore; nor has the perusal of it with which you have favoured us, nor the mature deliberations with which we have considered it, lessened that concern.

It appears to us that our conduct has either been misrepresented to His Excellency the Nabob, or that he has totally misunderstood it.

We are told, "That he has fully explained himself to the President on the subject; that he admits the right of the army to plunder or booty found in places taken by storm, and allows it to be the usage in this country, as well as in others; beyond that he admits of no right, claim, or pretension of any kind, to compensation, equivalent, or reward, upon any consideration whatsoever: he is alarmed at the consequences, and means not to give one Rupee to the army while they seem to entertain such ideas."

"And that the Honourable Board do therefore advise us, through you, formally to relinquish all manner of pretensions to compensation, reward, or by what name soever it may be called, for services, fatigues, or hardships, past or to come, reserving only the single instance of right before-mentioned (of places taken by storm); and for the rest leave the Nabob now, and at all future times, to do freely what his own feelings may suggest, or refrain if he should think fit." When we think of the President and the Honourable Board in their characters as individuals, we think of them as our friends; when we reflect on them in their public characters, we acknowledge them to be our Superiors, Directors, and Governors; that in their hands are the reins of government, and that of course from them.

them all instances of rewards and punishments must proceed. We therefore beg of you, Sir, to transmit to them our sincere thanks for their advice, and to assure them of our acquiescence therein, as far as relates to the past or present pretensions which have been held out to us, and as far as relates to ourselves altogether, if, after what we have to say, such a concession shall by them be deemed necessary; but for our successors, or what may happen in futurity, we do not think ourselves authorized to determine.

Having done this, we beg leave now to add somewhat in our justification; which we think necessary, from the misinformation, misconstruction, or want of generous sentiments towards the army, too glaringly evident, and indeed expressed by His Excellency the Nabob.

We at all times, having the firmest confidence in our Superiors here, have obeyed their orders with cheerfulness, and zeal for the service; nor do we believe that it ever occurred to a single officer of the army to enquire whether we acted as principals or auxiliaries in the late expedition.

Had we considered ourselves as auxiliaries to the Nabob, we think that with propriety we might have made the first overtures to Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, touching the disposal of the booty or plunder we might acquire, giving His Excellency the preference to any other purchaser; on the contrary, the army were to a man silent. Taken up with our duty, not a thought of plunder, prize-money, or booty intruded upon us 'till the publication of the orders of 14th October last, containing His Majesty's Letters-Patent to the Honourable Company, enabling them to take, seize, and detain the goods and properties of persons and nations, not Christians, in opposition or enmity with them; also the generous resolution of the Honourable Company to divide all plunder, booty, &c. so acquired into two parts, whereof one moiety was allotted to the army, as a reasonable encouragement for their services. From this time we began to think of prize-money; but not as a gratuity or donation from the Nabob, but as a thing to which we had an acknowledged claim under the sanction of our Superiors.

Some time after this, if you remember, Sir, you convened us together, and read to us a letter written by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, and addressed to the Officers of the Army; wherein, in the name of his Father, he acknowledged the many services he had received from the Honourable Company's troops, expressing great concern for the inability he had hitherto laboured under to reward those services, and his satisfaction that the time now drew near which would enable him to do it; and at the same time offering a certain sum, to be paid to the army within three months after the fall of Tanjore, provided that what should be taken therein, as well as every thing else during the expedition, should be delivered up to him. Thus, in the first part of his letter, the Nabob expressed an intention to reward our services; while, in the latter part, he made a proposal to purchase our right; for which we returned him our thanks, but thought fit to reject the proposal, upon the supposition

supposition that the sum offered, so far from comprehending any reward for past services, was not an equivalent for our moiety of the plunder expected to be taken in Tanjore.

This our conduct induced a second proposal from Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, which we apprehend, without further discussion with him, thanks excepted, was transmitted to the Honourable Board.

The letter here mentioned *was* the spontaneous work of Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, or rather dictated or prescribed to him by his Father, and evidently, if we may judge from the preamble or first part, suggested by the feelings of gratitude; and from the reflexion (nay he so expresses himself) of having made former voluntary promises to the army, which it had not been in his power to fulfil, of which failure on his part it does not appear that the Army have ever complained.

The Army have never made any claim or demand for reward or compensation for their services at any time whatsoever: At what then is the Nabob so alarmed, that he should express himself in so ungenerous a manner towards us?—"That he will not give one Rupee to the army while they entertain any such ideas." Let him candidly investigate what those ideas are, and trace their origin and source; and we are confident he will think he has been too hasty in his opinion of us: we are confident that he will find those ideas of our's amount to no more than a grateful acceptance of a promised reward for our services, not induced or brought on by any application, but spontaneously proceeding from the generous sentiments then prevailing in his own breast; and a dependence that the Honourable Board would so speak of us to him, as to convince him that we were not undeserving of such generosity, even though peace was concluded; and thereby induce him to comply with the request of his Son, who publicly declared, that from a sense of the services so often rendered to him, and a desire to reward them, he had stipulated with the Rajah for a certain number of Lacks of Rupees, which he intended for them, and would add to it with his Father to add to it.

Should it appear that the procedure of his Son's was the consequence of a mistake, or that he was misled with that paragraph of the Field Office, or that he was misled by the Army, it is implied their not having any doubt but that the sum mentioned; for although the Nabob was in possession of Tanjore, yet whatever terms he might have offered, he would have been obliged to add with every advantage to himself, and be entirely independent of the Army: surely he cannot with justice on that account be supposed to have been misled by the Army, or suppose that their conduct, in this particular case, can tend to establish a general dangerous precedent.

The expectations of the Army at this juncture arose from his spontaneous offer to reward their services in general: they were conscious of having at all times done their utmost for his security and advancement, in consequence of the firm attach-

ment shewn by their Honourable Employers to his interest; and they were not ignorant that at that time they were rendering him very essential service; so that if Tanjore fell or not, if the war concluded to his satisfaction and advantage, as he had of his own free will, through his Son, expressed his intention to reward their services, they surely had pretensions to expect those services would be rewarded.

We are clear that no claim has ever been made on our part, and that neither direct or indirect means have been used; we have no doubt therefore, Sir, but that when you state our case literally as it is to the Honourable Board, they will, though not in a situation to influence the Nabob, think that our conduct has not exceeded the most limited observance of our covenants, and that we have through the whole endeavoured to manifest our respect and attention to them; and that if any error has been committed, it has been on the part of the Nabob, who first taught us to pretend, and now complains of our pretensions.

We cannot quit this important subject without mentioning, that from this ungenerous procedure of the Nabob in the present instance, there is little room left us to hope that, by faithful services, we may in time acquire the means of enjoying that ease and repose, which constitutions broken in India, when drawing to an advanced age, more particularly require.

It has been so long the custom in these countries for European Military, when acting in conjunction with, or in the cause of the Country Princes, to receive pecuniary rewards for their services, that the custom has, by long and unvaried continuance, almost established a right; we are nevertheless convinced that there is in fact no such right, and that it is the intention of our Honourable Employers that there never should. The Honourable Board however agree, that, in particular cases, the army have a right to profit by their services; but it is such a right, as we have reason to think, as things are circumstanced, will never be of any avail to us.

The Honourable the President and Board seem to agree with His Excellency the Nabob, that we have no right but in the case of places taken by storm; they also think, that, when acting as auxiliaries, we have a clear title to *all* booty or plunder found in the places so taken, and are of opinion that we shall never wage war offensively, but as auxiliaries. From hence it appears evident to us that we shall never derive any indisputable advantages from our services, as it will be always for the interest of our Principal to forego taking places by storm; for having reduced them to the last extremity, he may, by granting them terms, and accepting the place by surrender or capitulation, sufficiently answer his own purposes, and relieve himself from paying any consideration whatsoever to the Army. We therefore request of you, Sir, to refer it to the candid re-consideration of the Honourable Board, whether here, as is the custom elsewhere, the right of the army ought not to be extended a little farther; so that we may derive advantages from places taken by stratagem, and from surrenders by capitulation, as was the case with the troops acting against Pondicherry, the Havannah, Martinico, &c.

as also from the defeat of armies in the field, whereby we may become masters of treasure, camp equipage, horses, &c. in all which cases we are assured, were the Honourable Company the principals, they would yield us the moiety which they have generously allotted us of plunder, &c. taken in their wars; and we have no doubt but that the Honourable Board, in all their transactions wherein we are concerned, will manifest the same generous disposition expressed by the Honourable Company, viz. to give us all reasonable encouragement,—and it shall be our particular care to merit it.

To sum up the whole, Sir, that you may be at ease, and never entertain other sentiments of us than those you have expressed, let the conduct of His Excellency the Nabob towards us at this juncture be what it may, we shall continue to discharge our duties with our usual chearfulness and alacrity; so that in the end he may be convinced that he has Gentlemen of Honour, and not mercenary legions, to deal with; while our Superiors and the Public shall own that we have deserved from him those rewards, which perhaps we may never receive.

We have the honour to be, with true respect,

S I R,

Your most obedient

Trichinopoly, and very humble servants,
28th December, 1771.

Rofs Lang, Lieutenant-Colonel

Wm. Flint, Lieutenant-Colonel

Edward James

John Des Plaines

John P. ...

Captains

the 2d Regiment

of Engineers

Charles Lucas } for the 1st Regiment

Charles Lucas

D. Baillie, Lieutenant, for the Subalterns of the 1st
battalion of 2d Regiment

Thomas Oats, for the Captains of Artillery

J. M. Hugo, Lieut. for the Subalterns of Artillery.

AGREED, That General Smith be acquainted, that we will communicate to the Nabob the sentiments of the corps of Officers, and that we shall be glad to find in

in him a disposition to make the army some recompence for the fatigues and dangers they underwent before Tanjore.

Extract of Letter from the President and Council to General Smith, dated 17th January, 1771.

WE will communicate to the Nabob the sentiments of the corps of Officers, as expressed in their letter to you of the 28th December; and we wish we may find in him a disposition to make the army some recompence for the fatigues and dangers they underwent.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council in their Military Department, Friday, 17th April, 1772.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

John Smith

Henry Brooke

John Whitehill

George Stratton

Charles Smith

George Mackay.

THE President acquaints the Board, that the Nabob had renewed the subject with regard to the present to be made to the troops employed before Tanjore, and had at the same time expressed his sentiments very fully on the impropriety and danger of his paying any thing in consequence of any right which the army may pretend to: that however willing he might be to make a voluntary donation to the troops, yet he never would consent to pay one Rupee, if it were looked on as a matter of right. In answer to which, the President acquainted him, that he, the Nabob, had already been fully informed of the sentiments of the Board on this subject, as expressed in their letter to General Smith of 26th November, which had been explained to him before it was sent away; that the same had been communicated to the officers, in consequence of the orders sent to General Smith for that purpose. That the officers had relinquished all pretensions to a donation as a matter of right, and submitted it entirely to the Nabob's will and pleasure. To which the Nabob replied, "If that were the case, he proposed making a present to the troops who were on the expedition against Tanjore"; and desired the President to inform him what sum would be proper: to which the President replied, "That it must rest solely with the Nabob to give whatever he pleased; that what he might of his own free will and pleasure give, we should permit the officers to receive, and should return him thanks, in the name of the Company, for such a mark of his favour and attention to their servants. The Nabob then said, "That he proposed making the army a present

a present of five Lacks of Rupees; two of which he would give them immediately, and the other three the next year; and promised to write to the President a letter on the subject.

Jos. Du Pré
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Charles Smith
Geo. Mackay

Extra of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 1st June, 1772.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.	
John Smith	George Stratton
Henry Brooke	_____
John Whitehill	Charles Smith.
George Mackay.	

From the Nabob of the Carnatick to Governor Du Pré, dated and received 29th May, 1772.

IT is at all times my wish to shew my regard to the English Nation, who are my sincere friends. On the Tanjore expedition the Company's troops required a present, which I delayed complying with; as the giving an ~~award~~ for prize money, is on condition of the capture of the place at which it was not taken. I now however understand from you that the Nabob never requiring an equivalent on account of the loss of the place, I shall right, make no demand whatever on account of the same, but I shall shew my friendship to my friends, the officers, soldiers, &c. of the army, by giving them five Lacks and ten thousand Rupees, which I shall pay in ready money, and I shall endeavour to procure tranquillity, at the end of July I shall send the General of this, and tell him, that I have given Marawar, &c. none of the European officers or soldiers requiring a reward, as no mention was made there- of in the King of Vengole, Pulnaur, Worriarpollam, Allianore, or Tanjore. I never will agree to the entering into any promise, or engagement, for the giving of any present to the army, on account of any service whatever; regarding the Company in the light of my friends, their concerns as mine, my concern as their's. People of merit have often experienced my favours, and, by God's blessing, I shall still not be backward in shewing my regard in a proper manner; but of this I myself must be the judge.

What can I say more?

AGREED, That a letter be wrote to the Nabob, returning him thanks for his intended donation to the Army, and that a copy of his letter be transmitted to General Smith, to be communicated to the troops.

From Governor Du Pré to the Nabob of the Carnatick, dated 4th June, 1772.

I AM honoured by your Excellency's letter of the 29th May, informing me of your intention to give to the officers, soldiers, &c. of the army, of your own free will, as a reward for their services against Tanjore, the sum of five Lacks and ten thousand Rupees, or one Lack, forty-five thousand, seven hundred and fourteen Pagodas; of which sum, two Lacks of Rupees in ready money, and the remainder, in case of tranquillity, at the end of July 1773. Nothing is more just, nothing is more reasonable, than that your Excellency alone should determine of what rewards to bestow out of your own treasure. I shall, agreeable to your desire, communicate this your generous intention to General Smith by the first opportunity, that it may be made known to the army; in the mean time, permit me to return you my thanks on their behalf. I shall also, by the first opportunity, communicate to the Company this instance of your favour to their troops; and although, upon another occasion, they informed your Excellency, that it is proper they alone should be the rewarders of their own Servants, I cannot doubt of their acquiescence to this act of your own free will.

A P P E N D I X.

N U M B E R XXIV.

Translation of a Letter from the Nabob of the Carnatick, with Copies of Letters, &c. from his Sons Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, and Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, and his Buxey, Nazeeb Khán, on the Subject of the Peace concluded with Tanjore in the Year 1771.

Letter from the Nabob to Governor Du Pré, dated and received 22^d December, 1771.

I HAVE received your letter of the 9thth ult^o and have perused its contents. You tell me that your instructions to General Bussy, to commence hostilities against the Rajah of Tanjore, and that Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder should signify to him the necessity of his being obliged to the reduction of Tanjore; and to Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, and his Buxey, Nazeeb Khán, to be signified to him by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, that the same had been complied with. That had the Rajah of Tanjore himself, and had I then granted such a request, it would have been more agreeable and honourable to the Circar and the Company, than to have been obliged to do so; that the Rajah however, from some secret motive, had set both the Circar and Company to a regular siege to his capital; and many great quantities of military stores expended. That by the day before the signing of the peace, you had been informed that the siege advanced successfully, that the breach was almost practised, and that the officers and soldiers were in good spirits; that, under these circumstances, there was every reason to hope that the fort might soon have been taken; and then I might have given the law, and settled the affairs of the Tanjore country in a proper manner: that the concluding of a peace therefore at such a crisis, may probably be construed by the world as a declaration of doubts whether

† Vide Appendix. No. XXII. page 801.

the fort would be taken or not. That I well know you have a great regard for Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder ; that you have also a great opinion of his wisdom and prudence, and therefore must conclude that he had good and sufficient motives for concluding a peace decisively at such a crisis. That you had wrote to General Smith to give you all such informations as are proper on his part, and desire I will give you such eclairsissements as may have come to my knowledge on the part of Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder ; and that I will communicate to you likewise the terms of the peace, with such explanations of them as may enable you to form a judgment of the measures proper to be now taken in consequence thereof.

I cannot inform you clearly of the cause of making peace ; for in assigning to you the just reasons thereof, ill must be said of friends. Omdat ul-Omrah Behauder is as myself, and the General one of my best friends. Your enquiries, however, on this head have been repeated ; but obliged even thereto, I can write to you nothing more thereon, and only send you copies of the letters received from Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, and their Council. Thus much indeed I can give you in writing, that this peace has not been conformable either to the wishes of myself or friends ; and I can tell you likewise, that Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder did nothing without the knowledge and approbation of the General, as the copies of the said Behauder's letters will shew you.

You desire me to communicate to you the terms of the peace, with explanations thereof ; in answer to which I beg leave to refer you to the several papers now sent to you, under the seal of the Rajah.

With regard to the fort of Vellum, having understood by Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder's letters, that the giving up of the same to the Rajah had been stipulated, knowing the necessity of detaining it in the Circar's hands, in order to induce the Rajah to perform the conditions he had entered into, I wrote to my Son in the following manner; telling him, that what was done was done ; but as I did not understand from his letters, that the fort of Vellum was to remain in the Circar's possession, I was in very great doubt whether the Rajah would comply with his engagements or not: that if the Rajah therefore failed therein, or acted contrary to such his engagements respecting the payment of the money then stipulated, he, Omdat-ul-Omrah, on the strength of such failure on the Rajah's part, should insist that the fort of Vellum be given up for ever to the Circar. Accordingly, the Rajah having failed greatly in his engagements, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, on the strength thereof, required the perpetual cession of the said fort to the Circar ; and at last the Rajah, with his own consent, gave a writing under his hand and seal purporting such perpetual cession thereof to the Circar, together with the districts of Elangad and Coiladdy, and some villages of Tewanoor, &c. belonging to Trichinopoly. The Circar has also got possession of the Annacut, upon the same footing as it was formerly ; it is situated in the Trichinopoly country, and belongs to the Coiladdy district.

What can I say more?

List of Papers enclosed in the above Letter, viz.

Twenty four copies of letters from Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder.

Twenty three ditto from Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder.

Ten copies of ditto from Mahomed Nazeeb Khân.

Nine copies of papers, in the Persian and Maratta languages, relative to the Treaty, &c. viz.

A Persian copy of the Rajah's agreement under his hand and seal.

Ditto ditto—of his agreeing to pay the sum of thirty-two Lacks and 50,000 Rupees, under his hand and seal.

Ditto ditto—of a paper under his hand and seal, specifying the several articles he has agreed to.

A Maratta copy of paper for the sum of one Lack and 50,000 Rupees, the original of which is under his hand and seal.

Ditto ditto ditto—for the sum of two Lacks of Rupees, the original of which is under his hand and seal.

Ditto ditto ditto—for the sum of one Lack of Rupees, the original of which is under his hand and seal.

Ditto ditto—of a letter from the Rajah to Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, as

Ditto ditto—of a paper from the Rajah to give up the districts.

Ditto ditto—of a paper from the Rajah for the interest, and which is given under his hand and seal.

The Rajah's engagement to the Circar, and assignment of the sum of thirty-two Lacks and 50,000 Rupees, are in the original of the same with those before transmitted by the General. ‡

Copy of a Paper, containing the Articles agreed to by the Rajah, dated 20th October, 1771.

I am to pay the two years' Peshcush, amounting to eight Lacks of Rupees.

‡ See pages 791, 792.

For the expenses of the expedition, and putting the army into the field, I am to pay the sum of thirty-two Lacks and 50,000 Rupees.

Whatever lands, money, and effects I have taken from the Marawar and Nalcooty Zemindars, I am to restore.

I am to send my horse, Sepoys, &c. fighting people, whenever required, and they are not to return from His Highness without permission.

Should the Paddy, which the merchants and people belonging to the Company had in the Tanjore country, have been plundered, I am to answer it.

I am to have nothing to do with the Marawar, Nalcooty, Tondiman, &c. Zemindars; and if they are guilty of any improper act, the Circar is to punish them soon.

With the friends of the Circar I am to be in friendship, and with it's enemies in enmity; and I am not to give protection in my country to the enemies of the Circar, or *those* laying under it's displeasure.

If I have taken any thing from the run-away Polligars of Worriarpollam and Allianore, I am to restore it; and if they shall come into my country, or under my suretyship, I will deliver them to the Circar's people.

I have given a separate engagement of friendship.

The Company's trade shall go on throughout the whole Tanjore country, and the weavers and others dependent upon them shall be used kindly.

If any Europeans, either in the service of the Circar or the Company, have deserted and fled to me, I will deliver them up.

I will give up to the Circar the villages of Tawanoor, &c.

I am to give up to the Circar the Jaghire district of Arny.

I give up to the Circar the fort of Vellum.

I am to give up to the Circar the districts of Elangad and Coilandy.

Copy of a Letter from Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to the Nabob, dated 8th November 1771.

ENCLOSED your Highness will receive the true state of the case, without any omission. Let me say ever so much in praise of General Smith's goodness, and his regard for your Highness, (hitherto at least) I shall still think I am wanting therein; and

and flatter myself that, by the enclosed narrative, no blame of want of exertion will fall upon him: let me beg also that the same be only explained to Governor Du Pré Behauder and Mr. Hastings, by the means of Mr. Stracey, and that they be desired not to inform any one else thereof. Conformable to your Highness's directions I have committed this narrative to paper, but I must own it has been with great apprehension; the more private therefore it is kept the better: in short, your Highness, by God's blessing, may be assured that I am not, in the least instance whatever, to blame in this business. It appears to me proper your Highness should shew this letter to Mr. Stracey, and with energy beg of the Governor Behauder and Mr. Hastings to keep the narrative private.

The day after to-morrow, by God's blessing, I shall, with the advice of the General, dispatch 1000 horse, Mr. Loudon's battalion, and Tondiman's people, under the command of Urshud Beg Khan, to take possession of Hanamanta-goody and the fort of Armogam. To-day also I have told Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder to take possession of Coiladdy and Elangad; and at the same time told him, that as, by God's blessing, the fort of Vellum was now fallen into the Circar's hands, he should write to your Highness, and by my means advance to the Engineer as far as the sum of 12,000 Rupees, in order to level the ground about it. The General proposes leaving the Company's people in that fort, and I shall desire him to leave 1000 of the Circar's Sepoys also therein: it is a second Tanjore: whatever number of people your Highness may order shall be kept therein. By the keeping of this fort your Highness's authority is extended throughout the Tanjore country. To-morrow Monajee comes—Rajah does not propose coming.

To say more would be exceeding the bounds of

Translation of sundry Papers, containing the History of the late Rajah of Tanjore, as transmitted by the Nabob, in his Letter of 8th November,

CONFORMABLE to your Highness's commands, I should acquaint you of the cause of making war upon the dependants of the Carnatick, I shall inform you of every circumstance. So far am I from wishing to speak any ill of the Carnatick, that it is my sincere desire to recommend them to your Highness's protection. I have a young man, Mr. Smith, who I can for certain acquaint your Highness with the Company, a brave Officer, beloved by the whole of Tanjore: I shall however, in compliance with your Highness's commands, inform you of the circumstances you desire. There is no occasion for me to inform your Highness and the Governor and Council of Tanjore—his making war upon the dependants of the Carnatick, of what sums of money from them he pleased; of your Highness's both writing and speaking to the Governor and Council on this subject; of a great deal of negotiation passing thereon afterwards between your Highness and the Governor,

and at last the sending of General Smith towards Trichinopoly took place; of your Highness's determining after that, out of your great favour, to send me to settle the business of Tanjore, with full powers; of your delivering to me a paper, containing certain requisitions to be made on the Rajah, to which your Highness's signature is affixed; of your then sending me, with Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, to the Governor, and after his approving thereof, of your dispatching me to these parts with full powers, and of my arrival at Trichinopoly: of all these matters, I say, neither your Highness nor the Governor and the Council stand in need of any information, either from the General or me; it is from hence that you are both to understand from us the remaining part of this business, what the General has wrote to the Governor thereon I know not; but this I well know, that I have informed the General of all that I have wrote to your Highness from the time of my first interview with him, as well respecting the sending of Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, the writing of letters to the Rajah, the commencing of the negotiation for settling of this affair, &c. as also what I have of myself negotiated in this business. And as to the military operations, in them I put so much under the General's command, that on his telling me at Trichinopoly, the day before the army marched from thence, "That things could not go on well without the command of the troops was vested in one person, and that it was necessary your Highness's troops should be under his orders;" I agreed thereto; telling him, "That both myself and your Highness's troops would be under his orders;" and accordingly I put the troops under his directions the same instant. *Although it was your Highness's orders to all your Servants to obey me, and you had given no directions for their obeying the General, but so far from it, that it was clearly evident from your Highness's letters, you thought the Circar's troops were entirely at my disposal;* still however, as above, I agreed to the General's desire. After this the victorious army marched forth, and the Almighty gave into your Highness's hands the strong fort of Vellum, without our being at the pains to storm it; and the 20th of September we encamped on the plain of Tanjore. Batteries were erected against the fort, and the 25th the firing on both sides commenced; *I on one side negotiating a peace, and the General on the other endeavouring to reduce the place.*

In all this time, from the setting out of the army from Trichinopoly, the troops in general were under such apprehension of the rains, that every day which passed without rain afforded them the same satisfaction as if they had obtained a victory over their enemy. The rains however began to fall in the encampment, and I informed the General every day of the progress I made in the negotiation for peace; the mode was this: I used to send for Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, Mahomed Nazeeb Khan, and Mahomed Ubraur Khan, and, in their presence, negotiated with the people sent by the Rajah of Tanjore; and then immediately went to the General, informed him of the whole that had passed, and dispatched the Rajah's people to the fort. The same mode also was observed with regard to the answers received from the Rajah; that is to say, the above Khans were first advised thereof, and then, with their approbation, I used to go to the General and acquaint him of them; this continued for some time. At last the rains increased,

creased, most of the horses, elephants, and bullocks fell sick and died, a great many people were wounded, and it was concluded for certain that the heavy rains were set in; on this I went to the General, and told him, "That I had put the negotiation for peace, in some measure, on a proper footing, and that he likewise had, in some measure, made a breach in the wall of the fort; if therefore he would take the place, I would on no account make peace; but if not, I should make peace." The General answered, "He could not say he would take the place, but that he would endeavour to do it; and that if it succeeded, and if not—not, I replied,—God forbid it should so happen! but supposing your endeavours to miscarry, the Rajah will not then make such a peace as he now offers."—The General said, "my opinion is, even, that he will then give you nothing; but if he does, he is a great fool."—To this I replied, "there is then another way, do you make the attempt; but in case of your miscarriage in taking the place, you must give me your promise, that you will procure such a peace from the Rajah as he now offers through me."—The General said, "He would by no means, nor on any account, agree thereto."—Upon which I immediately went and acquainted Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, Mahomed Nazeeb Khan, and Mahomed Ubraur Khan of all that had passed between the General and me; and in consequence of your Highness's orders, that whatever was done, be it peace, or be it the capture of the place, should be done before the setting in of the heavy rain, by the advice of the above Khans, I went a second time to the General, and told him, "That the first object was the capture of the place, and then peace: that if he would take the place, I would not make peace; if not, I should make peace:" The General replied the same as before. I then said, "I should make peace;" the General asserted, "It was well; it was at my option." After this I went home, and informed the three afore-mentioned people of this; and, by their advice, first shewed to the General every article the Rajah had agreed to; and then, in their presence, delivered the paper containing the same to Buswunt Row, the Rajah's Envoy, telling him to bring a treaty from thence, under the Rajah's seal: which done, I sent the General word I would come and see him; but received an answer from him, that he would come to me, which accordingly he did. At that time there were in the audience tent, of the people sent by the Rajah, Syed Peer Mahomed, Syed Ismael Ally Khan, Buswunt Row, and Baboo Row; and of the Circar's people, Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, Mahomed Nazeeb Khan, and Mahomed Ubraur Khan. They all presented compliments to the General, and carried him to the tent, where he explained to him every syllable of the Rajah's proposals, and said, that in compliance of the Rajah's desire, that Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan should be sent to him to conclude the negotiation, and accordingly of sending them. The General's reply was, "It was well." After this, conformable to the above, the two envoys returned to Tanjore, and the firing on both sides was stopt; but before peace took place, the General told me I must write him a letter, telling him to stop the firing, which I did, agreeable to his desire. After Mader-ul-Mulk's coming to me, I learnt from him, that the General had wrote letters to the Europeans at Trichinopoly, purporting, that he would have taken the fort "had the peace been delayed;"

delayed;" at which I was exceedingly astonished and concerned: and having before been informed by your Highness, that the General had wrote to the Governor, telling him he would take the fort, and that the rain was no preventative thereto; surprized thereat, I asked the General of this matter, telling him, "Your discourse with me has been in *this* manner, and your letters there in *that* manner:" The General said, "I did not write so; thus much indeed I wrote, that in case of 'little rain, I would use my endeavours to take the place, but not in case of a 'great deal of rain.'" When the General came to my tent, on a visit to Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, I desired the latter also to speak to the General on this business; accordingly he informed the General particularly of his having seen his, the General's, letters, the contents of which he had understood: The General's reply also, at this time, was, that the expressions he had made use of in his letters were those of *using his endeavours*. After this I interrogated the General, in the presence of Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, in an explicit and particular manner, respecting the conversations which had passed between him and me concerning this business of Tanjore, and of which your Highness has been before advised. Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder acquainted Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, Mahomed Nazeeb Khan, and Mahomed Ubraur Khan likewise of this matter. By God's blessing, in this business I have no reason to be ashamed, having, to the best of my judgment, done for the good of the Circar's affairs.

An Agreement given by the Rajah of Tanjore to Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder, dated 25th October, 1771.

I HAVE agreed to pay to the Nabob one Lack of Rupees, which I shall pay him within the space of four months.

An Agreement given by the Rajah of Tanjore to Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder, dated 25th October, 1771.

AS the Nabob was pleased to assist greatly towards the affairs of this country, I agreed to pay him a sum of six Lacks of Rupees, and have already paid in part three Lacks in ready specie, so that there remained three Lacks; out of which one Lack, the amount of a separate note given him, being deducted, there still remained two Lacks, which I promise to pay him within the space of four months.

An Agreement given by the Rajah of Tanjore to Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder, dated 26th October, 1771.

AS the Nabob was pleased to finish the affairs of this Samastan with great sincerity at present, and agreed to promote it's welfare in future in every respect, without making any distinction, I engage myself to pay every year one Lack and fifty thousand Rupees, on account of his expenses; which I shall pay him every year, beginning Phasely 1182; but I am not to give him any security for it, nor is he to demand any security concerning the same.

An Agreement given by the Rajah to Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder, dated 7th November, 1771.

I SHALL pay you, within the space of one month, the sum of 77,000 Rupees, which I agreed to give you on account of your Zeafut or entertainment.

Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore to Seneevasaraw, dated 7th November, 1771.

I HAVE given the Army country, which is now in your possession, to the Nabob; whose Amuldars will come, when you will deliver up the said country into their custody.

Letter from the Rajah to Satputty, alias Marawar, dated 7th November, 1771.

I WRITE this to acquaint you, that I have given the countries and forts which were taken during my late expedition to the Nabob; whose Amuldars will come, when you will deliver up the said countries and forts into their custody.

Letters from Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder to the Nabob of the Carnatick, from No. 1 to 25.

N. B. No. 7, 10, 13, 17, 18, are most material.

No. 1.

*From Omdat-ul-Omrab * Behauder to the Nabob, presented to him at the time of his Departure; no date.*

THIS day I addressed a letter to your Excellency, thereby requesting your orders to all the Sardars in the service; wherefore I suppose my brother was displeased: the intent of my requesting the said orders, was to make myself easy in every respect with regard to the affairs of the present expedition, which you are pleased to intrust me with; and so to begin it, trusting to the help of God. I hope in God, and your favour, that this affair will be dispatched with such success, that it may procure your approbation, as well as that of all the well-wishers. Your Excellency is very sensible, that when any one is employed upon any business†, to furnish him with such orders; your Excellency accordingly furnished Arneanudder Hahamud Khan with like orders; the Company on their part are observing the same practice: I had no other view; but my view is to do nothing without the knowledge of Mader-ul-Mulk ‡ Behauder. My demand of the above orders is to let the Sardars know of the business, it being not my intention to interfere in the business of my brother: I have got good opportunity to shew my friendship to my said brother; by the blessing of God you will hear of the great friendship which shall be shewn him. I hope in God to merit your Excellency's

* Nabob's eldest Son.

† Something seems to be omitted in this place, but it agrees with the copy.

‡ Nabob's second Son.

favour, on account of my good friendship to him, after the present expedition is dispatched with good success. I remember your good advice; and am very sensible of the admonitions wrote very much by Ameer Sayeb Keraun upon this head

No. 2.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Bebauder to the Nabob, dated 6th August, 1771, and received on the same day.

Your Excellency was pleased to write to me of what the Tanjore Vackeels have represented to you, and likewise of your answer to them, for which I return you my inexpressible thanks; as God has power over all things, I hope, in his Grace, not to act contrary to your directions; even as much as the breadth of an hair.

No. 3.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Bebauder to the Nabob, dated 18th, at Munfoor Pettah, and received 22d August, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's two letters, dated the 14th instant in the forenoon, with four copies of letters from the Governor and your Excellency, directed to Madavarow* and Trimbeck Row†. You were pleased to say, that the Vackeels of the Tanjore Rajah have kindled the fire of aspersions in the Balaghaut, by false words and insinuations; pretending that an engagement happened between the Circar's people and the Rajah, and that the Circar's servants broke open the Annacut, or bank of the river; and requesting, at the same time, to send the Maratta army soon to ruin this country. You were pleased to say also, that as the said Rajah will, in the end, be revenged of the damages that might happen to the Circar's country, I should act with good sense and future consideration of affairs. As God is omnipotent, I hope in his Grace, to enable me to dispatch the present undertaking with such good success, that it may be a means to obtain your commendations.

Yesterday I had the happiness to receive your two letters, dated Tuesday the 13th, at Wootaloor, with some newspapers from Balaghaut, and observe the advices therein contained.

This day, at the hour of three Vahaur at night, I set out from Wootaloor, and arrived in Munfoor Pettah after eight o'clock in the morning; and found, that by reason of the creeks in the side of the Coleroon, there is nothing but water to be seen from this side of Coleroon as far as the sides of the river, at which ends the situation of the said Pettah, besides the Cavery and Coleroon rivers: the above creeks have formed another river in the middle, so that the breadth and force of it's waters exceeds far from the two rivers. Seven or eight villages are drowned in the water, but the people saved their lives; although we see them plainly, yet they cannot cross the river. I am not negligent in getting the boats and baskets in this place,

* Maratta Chief.

† Maratta General.

According as I have wrote you from Wootaloor, with great pains and trouble I procured five baskets and one boat. It was a very lucky circumstance that Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder sent one Mahomed Soory before him, to observe the boats and the swelling of the rivers. In short, I halted this day at Munsoor Pettah, and appointed some trusty people, in order to get the people that came along with me to cross the river; as for my part I am taking care of other people. I encouraged the boat people, with a promise of a present, to employ their boats and baskets the whole night in passing and repassing the people; and gave orders to light a great fire on the other side of the river, that it may serve as a signal to the boat people. By the blessing of God this method proved very advantageous, because about 500 people of the army went over the other side to this hour, being 8 o'clock at night, and hope to see a great many more get over by the next morning. On the 19th, early in the morning, I and Mader-ul-Mulk hope to cross the rivers and arrive in Trichinopoly, and I hope also that the stores, &c. people also will be carried over to the other side in the same morning. I employed Mahomed Ubraur Khan to get the stores and remainder of the people to cross the river, and ordered Captain Alexander to come along with the said Khan after every thing is passed.

No. 4.

From Omdat-ul-Omrak Behauder to the Nabob, dated 21st, and received 25th August, 1771.

AFTER I addressed a letter to your Excellency from Munsoor Pettah, giving you an account of the occurrences, I could not write you 'till now, by reason of my being busy in crossing the rivers. Praised be God, that on the 20th instant, being Tuesday, at 3 o'clock in the afternoon, I crossed the river, and paid a visit to General Smith, &c. Sardar of the Faringees; and then prayed at the shrine of the holy Saint, and sent Careamoolla Khan to all the sepulchres of the holy men to implore their aid and assistance; and at length I arrived in the fort of Trichinopoly, in company with Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder. This day I went to General Smith's house along with the said Behauder; and after presenting your compliments to him, I delivered your letter, together with one from the Governor and Council. The discourse which we have had, you will find it inserted very fully at the foot of this address.

I seeing the difficulty of passing the river Cavery and Coleroon, together with another fresh water river which formed itself on the other side of Coleroon, by reason of the creeks in the side of the said Coleroon, and which runs with more violence than the whole rivers, I addressed myself to Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan and Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder in the manner following:

By the blessing of God the Nabob was pleased to intrust the management of this
 " important expedition with us three people, wherefore it behoves us to exert ourselves
 " in dispatching the said affairs. Besides the troops that came along with myself
 " and Mader-ul-Mulk, a large force, with great guns, are coming along with Colonel
 " Butler; Mahomed Nazeeb Khan brings another force along with him; so that
 " these

“ that these two different bodies of forces will arrive in five or six days at the banks
 “ of the Cavery, with an intermission of one or two days between them ; at which
 “ time, if the boats, &c. are wanting to cross the rivers, as they are at present, it
 “ will take up a long time for the troops to get over this side ; wherefore it is
 “ necessary that one of us should take the management of the boats, and to get the
 “ army to cross, that no delay may take place on the affairs.” If you would leave
 “ the management of this affair to me, in which case you should deliver the materials
 “ I may want for it, and then I engage myself to get the said two armies to cross the
 “ river in a week or ten days. There may be at present four boats and forty baskets
 “ in three rivers, and we expect ten or more boats from Devecotah and Portonovo,
 “ and three from Allianore and Worriarpollam ; and in the mean time I shall take
 “ some baskets from grain-sellers, &c. both by consent and compulsion ; and as all
 “ these make about twenty boats and eighty baskets, I shall put them under the care
 “ of some trusty people, to be sent to the districts of Moosary, where both the rivers
 “ are united, to cross over from thence at once. I shall write to Colonel Butler and
 “ Nazeeb Khan to proceed thither, in which case the army will be able soon to
 “ cross.” On hearing these particulars Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder took the manage-
 ment of this affair upon himself, to whom I delivered my sentiments in writing,
 copy of which comes enclosed to your perusal. I beg leave to acquaint you of the
 particulars of the several requests of the General, and of my answers to him, viz.

The General told me, that as it was the greatest difficulty to cross the rivers, the
 best method ought to be consulted for it ; in answer to which I have represented the
 above particulars, which he approved, and was very glad, and said that I removed
 the concern which he had about this affair.

Second request was, soon to send for the bullocks belonging to the ammunition
 of the Company which are on the other side ; I answered him, that I will do so in
 two days, excepting this day.

Third request was, that as he wanted a great many planks for the use of the
 Mourchas, I should get them supplied by Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder ; who then
 asked him for a list of the same, which he promised to give in a few hours.

Fourth request was, that as the sheep supplied him were bad, I should get good
 ones to be delivered for the use of the Faringees : I spoke to Mader-ul-Mulk about
 it, who will use the utmost of his endeavours to provide them.

On my part, I asked the General to engage his favour in the affairs of the Circar,
 and to dispatch them as may be requisite ; to which he agreed : and I asked him
 further to tell me then every thing he wanted, that there may be no occasion for
 asking for any more on the road ; to which he answered, that he had already pro-
 cured a great part of the things he wanted, and that what little things he stands
 in need of he will let me know.

By

By the blessing of God I shall get this day all the demands of the General and myself, to put them in writing, and then to think of providing them; as well as to regulate the affairs relating to the boats and baskets in the best manner I can, and shall advise you jointly with Mader-ul-Mulk. As the ford of Moosary is very convenient for the army to cross, a great many people told me the same thing; however I shall speak to Mader-ul-Mulk, and send Govinda Punt and an Engineer to review it; they will get there to-day, and bring their report to me to-morrow. Mader-ul-Mulk has sent Mahomed Syed and Caudercooly, with a proper number of people, to settle the affairs of the boats and baskets.

P. S. I have represented to Syed Muckdoo Ally Khan all the particulars relating to the Tanjore Rajah's failing in his argument, and asked his advice; and will ask again upon that matter: whatever may happen hereafter I shall advise you.

No. 5.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder to the Nabob, dated 22d, and received 28th August, 1771.

IN my letter to your Excellency of the 21st, I took the liberty to acquaint you of my arrival in Trichinopoly, and of a method of crossing the river Cavery and Coleroon, as well as of the discourse between myself and General Smith, very fully; since which, the General having spoke to Major Bonjour, sent a list of his demand in the English language to Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder; I also drew out a list of my demand and delivered him. I observe, by what Syed Muckdoo Ally Khan tells me, that out of the things which I drew out and delivered according to your Excellency's letter, bullocks, Coolies, boutiques, &c. were got ready; but there wanted some little things to be prepared, and that Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder is taking a great deal of pains: by the blessing of God they will be soon ready. I herewith send you a copy of the said list, which will be presented to your Excellency.

Mader-ul-Mulk gave me place to lodge in the Bungalow which was newly built, *where I live, and spend my time in devotion to God*, and in observing night and day of the circumstances and dispositions of the Rajah, and in consulting with Syed Muckdoo Ally Khan upon this affair; and likewise in getting information from Syed Bader Allom, and others, who are acquainted with the affairs of that country.

I spoke to Mader-ul-Mulk to send you copy of the list delivered by the General, and he will do it accordingly.

I went and reviewed all the places within the palace of Darullamurah, where I called to my mind of your residence, as well as my dear Mother; and likewise of my reading in the school at the entry, and of the anger shewn by Syed Hussein in the walks to the north of the place of rest and repose; which put me into such a situation, that I began to weep, with tears in my eyes praying for your return, as well as my dear Mother. I here understood the sense and meaning of the verse, *Sharafulmacan Bilmakeen;*

Bilmakeen; which being rendered in English is this, "That the honour or ornament of the place depends upon the people that live in the same."

List of the Things wanted, and delivered to Mader-ul-Mulk.

- 100 boutiques, with all manner of goods.
- 1000 carriage and draught bullocks, out of which the number of the draught bullocks must not be less than 300.
- 1000 Coolies.
- 500 Spades.
- 200 Axes, 200 Codaley, and 100 iron rakes.
- 5000 strong and firm baskets to take up the earth.

You should spare as many Hircars as you can out of the 40 the Nabob ordered you to enlist, as well as what you can spare out of the old Hircars who receive ten months' pay in a whole year, according to the Tanjore custom.

You should spare some Amuldars, &c. who are acquainted with the nature of the affairs of the Tanjore country.

You should send for daily intelligence of the Tanjore, and acquaint me with it.

You should send for the news of the Marattas, as well as the news of those that remain in the borders of Hyder Ally Khan, and acquaint me with it also.

A certain number of people are employed to see the army cross 'till the rivers remain full, out of which some people should be appointed to take care of the letters that may arrive from His Excellency, and others, with stores, and send them over to me to this side.

No doubt you are very attentive about sending continual supplies of provisions, according to His Excellency's orders; what number of bullock-loads of provisions you may send at every time, a receipt shall be given you at that very instant.

Besides a troop of horse that are with you, there are a body of horses of the Sawyer, which you will send along with the army.

No. 6.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Bebauder to the Nabob, dated 23d August, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive two letters from your Excellency, dated the 17th instant, this day at 12 o'clock in the forenoon. You were pleased to advise me of the day in which the Rajah of Tanjore visited you, as well as the place of such visit, and likewise of the copy of your letter directed to Governor Pigot. I think

if your Excellency be pleased to send receipts for two year's Peshcush, in two different papers, leaving the blank to fill up the sums, and under your sign and seal, it will be proper.

No. 7.

From Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to the Nabob, dated 11th, and received 14th September, 1771.

SYED MUCKDOOM ALLY KHAN went from hence for Tanjore, with letters from the General and me. Before he had reached the Tanjore camp, he was stopped by a guard of the Rajah's people, and about 25 minutes after had a party of about 200 Sepoys and some horse stationed over him; at all which he was not a little surprized. The next day he received a message from the Rajah, telling him first to visit his Dewan; and accordingly he had an interview with an insignificant fellow, one Gullabellapah. The following is an account of what passed there:—Immediately after they had embraced each other, Gullabellapah having made the usual enquiries about his health, asked Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan what he was come for? Syed Muckdoom said he would inform him. Gullabellapah replied, Oh! I know what it is you are come for; you are come to take our turbands. Syed Muckdoom said he would acquaint him in private. Why this is the private audience chamber, replied Gullabellapah; and having sent away the people standing round, he asked Syed Muckdoom again of his errand? Syed Muckdoom then informed him of what he was empowered to deliver verbally, together with some other matters; on hearing of which Gullabellapah flew into a violent passion, telling Syed Muckdoom he should see in what manner he would thresh the English, so that they would remember it. Syed Muckdoom asked him how he would do it? Gullabellapah replied, he would order his Sepoys to fire, from the great smoke of which the English would not be able to see any thing, and then he would fall upon them with his horse, the dust kicked up by which would get into their eyes as soon as the smoke should be dispersed. Syed Muckdoom in reply said, the scheme was an excellent one, and certainly the true way of threshing the English. On this Gullabellapah told him the way to catch birds, was to put a piece of wax upon their heads when the sun was perpendicular, which melting the wax, the same would run into their eyes, and then they might be taken. In short, a great deal of conversation of this nature passed between them. At last the Rajah sent for Syed Muckdoom, and asked him what it was he came for? Syed Muckdoom said he had brought letters from the Governor Behauder, the General, and me. The Rajah replied, what have I to do with the Governor? I do not desire him to guarantee the treaty now; and on seeing my letter, he flew into a passion, saying, that had he not assisted the Nabob, the Nabob would have found the difference of it: in short, his conversation was such as was by no means proper. His answer in writing to our demands has been this, that we should also defray the expenses of his troops; and in opposition to each demand of our's, sets up a like demand of his own. Considering therefore his obstinacy, I joined the army, yesterday, being Tuesday the 10th instant, about 10 o'clock in the forenoon; to-day we halted, but to-morrow, please God, being Thursday, we are to proceed to Tooagoody. Enclosed I send

10 L

your

your Highness copies of the Rajah's letters, and of my letter to him, to which he has also replied. The Rajah has sent no answer to the Governor's letters, and told Syed Muckdoom Ally Khân, that he had no need of this Governor's guaranty. Accordingly Syed Muckdoom, despairing of being able to effect any thing, from these unbecoming expressions of the Rajah, returned again to me.

Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder is taking a great deal of pains in the affairs of the Circar more than others ; Siaf-ul-Mulk Behauder remains also in Trichinopoly.

Copy of a Letter from the Rajah of Tanjore to Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder.

I HAD the pleasure to receive your letter, which you sent me on your arrival at Trichinopoly ; and take the liberty to inform you, that when the great Rajah (meaning his Father) was living, the Nabob came to my country on account of the troubles occasioned by Chunda Khân, Nande Rauz, Morarow, Hidauyet Mehayeddeen Khân, and the French ; and having solicited fairly and sincerely for the space of two months, and signed an instrument for to give Madura, Trichinopoly, Verdachelum, &c. five Mahals, or districts, requested his assistance, which was afforded at great expence, for the reduction of Chunda Khân, &c. which caused some certain people to be our enemies ; and in consequence my fort was attacked several times, which put us into great expence ; all which is well known to the Nabob. Notwithstanding which, as the payment of the Peshcush of the two years was delayed for some time, *by reason of not allowing me credit for certain articles*, the Nabob was displeased, and sent his army against my country, making certain demands on me that were very improper, which surprized me greatly. You are wise, and I hope therefore that you will do whatever may be conducive to my safety, and your own reputation ; I, on my part, sent my demands in writing, which I hope you will take into your consideration ; I am ready to undertake the same business which you came upon at present.

No. 8.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder to the Nabob, dated the 13th, at the Golden Rock, and received 15th September, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's favour, dated the 8th instant, on the 12th at the said place. This day the army halted, and the General went to Mader-ul-Mulk to bring supplies of rice ; by the blessing of God the army will move to-morrow. Mader-ul-Mulk is taking a great deal of pains to collect the provisions.

Since writing the above I had the honour to receive your letter of the 9th, and I understand the intention of the Marattas, and the agreement of their Vackeel with you ; by the blessing of God I shall keep them secret. I have no time at present to write you fully. I spoke to the General very fully ; to-morrow I shall address a letter to you.

From

No. 9.

From Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to the Nabob, dated 22d, and received 28th September, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive your several letters, and beg leave to answer every article therein contained, You were pleased to advise me of Trimbeck Row's intention to send a body of ten thousand horse, in an outward appearance to ruin the country of Jaggadavoo Vanambady, &c. but that his inward design was to assist the Tanjoreans. You advised me also of Aunandarow, brother to Madarow Sadasive's departure to Trimbeck Row, to obtain his promise not to assist the Tanjore Rajah, and that of Madarow Sadasive's agreeing not to assist him for the space of six weeks; directing me at the same time to finish every thing that is to be done within the said space, and not to acquaint these particulars to any other people but to Mader-ul-Mulk, Mahomed Nazeeb Khan, and the General. I have accordingly acquainted the General what was necessary, and likewise to Mader-ul-Mulk, to whom I shewed your letter. At that time Mahomed Nazeeb Khan was not arrived at the army, but he was busy in crossing the army over the rivers. By the blessing of God I shall not neglect to exert myself in the affairs of the Circar, as far as lay in my power. I have perused the translation of Aunandarow's letter to Madavarow. You were pleased to write an order to Captain Matthews to act in obedience to me, and the instructions which you sent him were delivered and explained to him.

I spoke to the Company's Sardars about Captain Rumley to be taken in the room of Mr. Folken, Cornet, which was agreed to.

You were pleased to express your approbation of the letter I wrote to the Rajah of Tanjore; all this is nothing of my own, but was the effect of your kind instructions and communications to me; similar to the earth kept at the Hammam*, or Bathing Place, which procured sweet scent by it's being mixed, handled, and touched by odoriferous flowers, so to become fit and proper for the use of the people that go to wash there; otherwise it was meer earth and useless; so that my capacity has the same model.

You were pleased to say that I wrote to you very much about the great pains which Mader-ul-Mulk took, but that the General and all other Faringees complained to the Governor, &c. about his neglect, which created an inexpressible displeasure in you; wherefore you asked me by what foundation I mentioned to you of the great pains he took as above. It is true I mentioned to you of the pains he took about collecting the provisions and money for to pay to the Sepoys, &c. which the Faringees themselves saw with their own eyes. The neglect which was occasioned by Mader-ul-Mulk was this, that he began to collect the bullocks of provisions, &c. just at the time of the marching of the army, as he was in mourning and in deep affliction all the while before: however, I daily put him in mind of the said business. When the army marched from Trichinopoly, the provisions, &c. were ready. The General demanded sixteen days provisions, but there remained in the army only for three or four days; by which we may easily suppose,

* It is customary in Persia, &c. to keep perfumed earth at the Bathing Tanks, to rub the washer's body with.

that if Mader-ul-Mulk did not furnish the army with the provisions, how comes it that the said army is arrived as far as this place?

N. B. The above story of the earth is written in the Persian verses.

No. 10.

From Omdat-ul-Omrab Behauder to the Nabob, dated 22d, and received 28th September, 1771.

I HAD the honour to receive your Excellency's letter, advising me of the agreement between you and the Governor, *about paying ten Lacks of Pagodas for Tanjore*; and of what the Governor has said, that the determining about the stores in the fort depended upon the General: you advised me also very fully about what was to be done on that head. Give me leave to inform you, that before your letter came, there passed great discourse between me and the General on that head; and I find that his views extend to 30 or 40 Lacks of Rupees: *he observed, that the country was a new acquisition, and not such as of old belonged to the Circar, and that the Circar's benefit therein would be very great.* I herewith send you copy of a letter which I wrote to the General, and shall use my utmost endeavours, and advise you with what may be again determined.

What you were pleased to write to me *about paying the Batta to Tondiman was very just*; for he has been disgusted before, and now is very well pleased with it, and agreed to send in a large supply of provisions. I enclosed a note and your Excellency's letter.

Since writing the above I had the happiness to receive your second letter, empowering me to agree to something more for taking Tanjore, than what has been agreed on account of an Enaum at the time of the taking Madura; by the blessing of God I shall discourse about this matter to-morrow.

After the Tanjore army that rushed into our camp was defeated, we began to cannonade against the fort of Vellum: praised be God that the same was taken on the 20th at night, and the people of the fort betook themselves to flight. All the Faringees were of opinion, that the said fort was ten times stronger than that of Trichinopoly. After Velloor and Madras, the said fort may be reckoned a strong one. I take the liberty to pay you a compliment of congratulation, with a present of five Rupees upon the occasion.

If Tanjore is taken, I hope to be favoured with the farm thereof; but if peace is concluded according to our liking, there is no occasion for it: God's pleasure is the best of all.

Yesterday the Rajah of Tanjore sent Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan's Son, and his Son-in-law, with the two old Vackeels, to me, and desired that Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan might be sent to him. I introduced the Rajah's people to the

* Meaning plunder and booty which might be found in the fort of Tanjore, if taken.

General, and intend to send them back to-day with a message, purporting, that he (the Rajah) must either come himself, or else send Narasing Row or Gillibilly; that Syed Muckdoom cannot be sent to him; that he (the Rajah) is not a greater man than Nizam Ally Khân, who sent the Dewan of the Deckan to us; and that I shall esteem it a particular instance of his favour, "not to have any more offers of accommodation made to me." This message will be a means of peace; what I want is to negotiate, at the same time that we are using our endeavours to take the place. If the latter is soon effected, there is an end of the peace; but should any thing happen to prevent our taking of the place (which God forbid!) in that case we may still have a peace to our satisfaction.

You will be pleased soon to let me know your opinion of this matter: I am very impatient to receive an answer to this letter; you will therefore be pleased to order the Moonshy to write an answer without any delay: you will write a letter to Mader-ul-Mulk Behauder, not to forward your letter to me without a proper escort.

I have received certain intelligence from Tanjore, that the Rajah there wants to go to Poonah, and to hoist the Maratta flag on the Tanjore fort. By the blessing of God I shall any how keep the fort of Vellum in the possession of the Circar, because there is no such fort in the Carnatick besides that of Vellour and Madras. I have appointed Mahomed Ackber, one of the Circar Servants, that staid in Sacoyer, by the advice and counsel of Mahomed Nazeeb Khân and Syed Muckdoom Ally Khân, to reside in the fort of Vellum. By the blessing of God I shall write to you very fully by and by.

No. 11.

From Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to General Smith, dated 14th September, 1771.

IT is out of my power to express to you fully of the league of friendship and assistance maintained and given by the Nabob with and to the English Company in the time of Governor Hind; the Company and the English on their part did the same with the Nabob: I being then too young, and consequently of sound memory, when I became capable of his understanding, I saw the same harmony between them with my own eyes. The Nabob thinks firmly and sincerely, that whatever services he may afford to the Company, according to his ability, cannot be a sufficient recompense. I on my part believe his above thoughts to be just, and that he has not been able hitherto to afford suitable services to them, being very much disabled by his distressed circumstances; an instance of which I take the liberty to remark, that his Excellency is involved in a considerable debt to the English and the Soucars. The reason of his distressed condition is this, that he had been at very great expense to take several forts which were in possession of the enemy, through the blessing of God, and the assistance of the English. Since the taking them to this day, whatever incomes are collected from the countries thereof have not answered the expense of taking them; besides which I seldom heard that the revenues of the countries taken in any place ever answered the expense thereof.

thereof. I hope therefore that you will take the foregoing into your consideration, and advise me what you think is a proper recompense to be made by the Circar to the army. I am of opinion, that excepting the charges we shall be at in taking the forts and the Tanjore country, we shall suffer great loss in the whole Carnatick in a very short time, because the Marattas will commit hostilities every year in the said country; wherefore I beg you will take the above into your consideration, and soon advise me of your sentiments, considering the circumstances or ability of the Circar, regarding the said affair.

No. 12.

From Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to the Nabob, dated 1st, and received 9th October, 1771.

THE Poligars in these parts did not assist the army with any thing. Tondiman Sardar said, that if Batta is paid he will supply us with provisions, &c. but he has not yet sent even a single grain; on the contrary, he is making an evasive excuse: in consideration of the present times, I am encouraging them with good words to afford their services, notwithstanding they will not hearken to it. Marawar and Nalcooty have not yet ceased in their excuses. *My sentiment and opinion is, to clear the country from this cursed people*, when an opportunity may offer. The General, &c. Faringee Sardars, were astonished by their above proceedings and silence; as for my part I am very much vexed. What is past is not to be called to mind; the provisions that are already got are what were sent from Mader-ul Mulk, and procured from the Tanjore country; in several villages of the said country, rice, &c. hath been found buried.

No. 13.

From Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder to the Nabob, dated 4th, and received 14th October, 1771.

I LATELY addressed repeated letters, thereby advising you of what had passed, and of what method was to be taken in future; as well as of the negotiation with the Rajah of Tanjore; through the means of the Son of Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, and Yafawventraw, the messengers from the Rajah: I wait for your answers, and beg leave to inform you with what hath happened since, by the will of Providence; which is as follows:

Yafawventraw, whom the Rajah has sent, went in company with Ismael Ally Khan, the Son-in-law of Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, and the two Vackeels to Tanjore, with letters from myself and the General to the Rajah, and with a promise to return in one day; but when we found that they failed in their promise, we began to fire against the fort. As to the Tanjoreans, they have been firing from the very day of our encampment in the plains of Tanjore; but on the 1st instant I heard greater reports of the small arms from the Mourcha than I used to do every day, and immediately sent to acquaint the same to General Smith, desiring him that it would be best to send an assistance to the people of the Mourchas. The General thereupon thought fit to order the battalion of the Grenadiers, consisting of the Sepoys and Faringees, to assist them; in the mean time news was brought, that the whole army
of

of Tanjore, consisting of Horse, Sepoys, Colleries, Peons, and the Arabs, which last were twelve hundred bold men, under the command of two Sardars, namely, Siddy Caroor and Chanda Sarvar, were fighting hard against the Mourchas, and attempted to storm it; upon which *I and the General*, having stood at the front of our army, began to send assistance one after another, and to take care of the different quarters of our army. This engagement lasted from eleven o'clock in the forenoon until two in the afternoon; the Tanjoreans exerted bravely; the Rajah stood all the while upon a bastion of the fort, and was encouraging the people of his army to take possession of the Mourcha: our people in the Mourcha were so firm, that they would not stir their feet out of their post. The Tanjoreans made a very desperate push no less than four times to take it, but to no purpose: in short, both parties shewed their bravery as Rustem an old hero. The Tanjoreans formed their line regularly, and maintained their action in a very close compass, or within half-yard distance from our people; they deserve praise for it: our people likewise deserve praise on their part, because they did not regard the enemy. At length a victory being your lot, was gained at two o'clock in the afternoon. About 400 people of the Tanjoreans were killed and wounded; one of which, Mahomed Hussein, relation to Syed Muckdoom Ally Khan, a very brave man, being wounded, was found lying by a gun, but afterwards died. The said Khan lamented his death, but I comforted him, as it required in the case of the mourning. About seventy Sepoys and fourteen Europeans, with two Sardars, were killed and wounded on our side. Mr. Eagle, an Officer, died of the wound he received of the wall-piece shot this day; Mr Mackay was also wounded; Shaik Moheydeen, Commandant of Trichinopoly, was wounded with a musket-shot in his breast. After the above engagement there has been no encounter to this night. Several guns of the fort were broke or stopt by our cannon-shot from the Mourcha. The people from the fort are throwing shells. Our people have not yet begun to batter the walls, which they say will commence in six or seven days. The Rajah seems to be quite silent, and would not negotiate. I and the General received a true intelligence from the fort, that the Rajah has sent 60 Golla Peons with money to the Marattas, in company with two of his companions; and that they proceeded by the way of Lalguddy, belonging to Trichinopoly, to Torayoor. I have wrote very much to Mader-ul-Mulk upon that subject, asking his reasons for not taking them. Perhaps the Rajah will remain quiet 'till he receives an assistance from the Marattas, concerning which the report is very current; however I have two methods in view concerning this affair, and hope that God will grant an easy success. The first method is this; that the Monsoon is drawing nigh; Mader-ul-Mulk will never neglect to exert in the business of the provisions, as far as lay in his power; notwithstanding we could not receive them as much as we may want; wherefore it is necessary to collect such quantity of provisions, &c. as we may want for the army in the fort of Vellum, that it may be thereby reckoned equal to Trichinopoly: this cannot be effected alone by Mader-ul-Mulk, unless we are assisted by the Polligars of different parts, of whose circumstances I lately wrote you very fully. I was under a necessity of writing in pressing terms to Ally Navaz Khan and Mader-ul-Mulk to send a large supply of provisions to Vellum; and acquainted the said Khan to collect them at Worriarpollam, because the Faringees say, that if provisions are collected in the

said: