

A P P E N D I X

N U M B E R XXVIII.

Extracts of the Proceedings of the Select Committee, and of the President and Council at Fort St. George, containing their reasons for differing in opinion from the Nabob of the Carnatick and Sir John Lindsay, respecting the conduct necessary to be observed by the Company's Servants towards the Marattas and Hyder Ally in the Years 1771 and 1772.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, Saturday, 12th October, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings


Samuel Ardley,

LETTER from Hyder Ally Khan read, setting forth the designs of the Marattas to invade the Carnatick after they shall have established themselves in the Balaghaut, and urging therefore the expediency and necessity of a firm union with him to oppose them, as well from the terms of the treaty as from mutual interest.

From Hyder Ally Khan to Governor Du Pré, dated 15th September, and received 7th October, 1771.

THE treaty and engagements, to last for ever, which were entered into between the Company and my Circar, through your's and the Council's means, are well known, and it was merely through hopes of our junction and union together, that for these two years past I have carried on a war with the Marattas. It is the custom of the Marattas, by cunning and deceit, to throw dissensions between two Powers, and thereby effect their own purposes; and it is by this artful and deceitful conduct

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conduct that they have acquired their possessions in the Indostan and Deckan countries, by first effecting the reduction of one Power, and then commencing that of another. This circumstance indeed is known to the whole world, as well as to yourself; 'till lately, however, they never came into these parts; and their now coming is owing to the various persuasions and inducements, as well by messages as letters, made use of by Morarow Gorparah, and other Sardars, through a groundless hatred and enmity; who have also caused them to winter here. By Morarow's persuasion likewise it is their fixed resolution to take the Subahship of Arcot, which indeed they have a long time been desirous of; and for this purpose have in view the reducing of some places in my country, and to fix an establishment therein; which done, to commence the conquest of the said Subahdary. It is well known that the custom of the Marattas is, when they commence hostilities against any Power, 'till his reduction is accomplished they send letters and embassies, and make use of the sweetest language, and the best of treatment; in appearance, to any other Power; but as soon as the former Power is reduced, they attack the latter; and there is no doubt, if they should effect their establishment in my country, they will proceed against the Arcot province; indeed I understand the same by some letters from some trusty people in the Maratta army, who are in friendship with me, and are my sincere well-wishers.

The conquest of the whole country of the Carnatick has been the design of the Marattas for this long time, and it is for this reason they will not agree to the offer I have made of paying the reasonable Choute, but demand impossibilities; and with a view, as above, of reducing the whole Carnatick, have commenced their disturbances against one part of it. By God's blessing you are a man whose consideration extends far, and who are acquainted with all matters; I flatter myself therefore you will resolve all these things thoroughly in your mind, and consult your principal Counsellors thereon, that our troops may be joined together, and the Marattas expelled this country without obtaining their object, and thereby both our countries remain for ever in peace and quiet from their disturbances. By the favour of the Almighty, in case of such a junction between us, the Marattas will not be able to oppose us in the field. Between Morarow and Trimbeck Row a treaty and engagement has been entered into, by which the former is bound to remain with the latter 'till the conquest of the whole Carnatick is effected; and after taking the Carnatick, Trimbeck Row is to give Morarow Trichinopoly.

As it is evident I bear you the sincerest friendship, and as I have not the least enmity or ill-will against the Nabob Serajah Dowlah, you will yourself be the mediator to clear up matters between us; for it is for the good of both our affairs, and tends to the perpetual tranquillity of the Company's and my countries, that harmony and union should subsist between me and all the Company's well-wishers. It is not self-interest only that prompts me to write this to you, but really with a view to both our benefit that I mention it out of my regard and friendship. For other matters I beg leave to refer you to Venajee Pundit, Vackeel, and Mahomed Usmaun. May your happiness and prosperity last for ever!

The President acquaints the Committee, that the Vackeels had informed him, that they were instructed by their Master to represent, that their Master had no ill-will to the Nabob, but that he was desirous to be on the most friendly terms with him, and to engage in the mutual support of each other against the Marattas; as a proof of which, and of their Master's desire of commencing a friendly correspondence with him, they were charged with a letter of condolance to the Nabob on the death of the Begum.

The President also acquaints the Committee, that he communicated to the Nabob the letter from Hyder Ally Khan, as also the purport of what the Vackeels had represented respecting their Master's desire of an union with the Nabob; that the Nabob thereupon informed the President, that it had been intimated to him, that Hyder Ally had proposed making an offer to the Company of the Baramahaul country, with the districts of Salem and Ohtour, and twenty Lacks of Rupees, for their assistance; and that if his proposals were not accepted, the Vackeels had instructions to apply to the French for aid. Upon which the Nabob observed, that the offer proposed, to be made by Hyder Ally to obtain the Company's assistance appeared improper, as their friendship and support were not to be purchased by money; but that if assistance were to be given, Hyder Ally should agree to be answerable for all the damages the Carnatick should sustain thereby. The Nabob added, that the contents of the letter from Hyder Ally, regarding the designs of the Marattas, were he believed true; that he had received the like intelligence from the Maratta camp, as well as from Bazalet Jung, by whom he was referred to Saffdir Jung, who had represented that he (the Nabob) was the only-Moorish Power capable of making any opposition to the Marattas, and therefore proposed and recommended a junction between him (the Nabob) and Bazalet Jung for that purpose. That the Nabob seemed at a loss how to act with respect to the letter sent him by Hyder Ally, and desired the advice of the President therein, who had recommended his receiving the letter privately.

The Committee think it unnecessary here to repeat their opinion frequently expressed of the expediency of supporting Hyder Ally against the Marattas, for the reasons set forth in many parts of their proceedings, provided the revenues and resources of the Carnatick were under our control. We sincerely hope that the Colebrooke and Lord Holland may bring us the clear and precise ideas and instructions of the Court of Directors on a subject of so much importance; in the mean time it appears expedient to assure Hyder Ally of our good inclination to support him from friendship and mutual interest, but that we must wait for instructions from our Superiors on this subject before we can take any decisive measure. A draught of a letter is therefore now prepared, which the President is desired to communicate to the Nabob.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

Extra

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, 19th October, 1771.

THE draught of the letter to Hyder Ally Khán, resolved on at the last Committee, having been communicated to the Nabob, and approved by him, was this day translated and sent away.

From Governor Du Pré to Hyder Ally Khán, dated 19th October, 1771.

YOUR friendly letter dated the 15th of the last month, I had not the pleasure of receiving 'till the 7th of the present month. I must and do acknowledge, that the dangers with which you tell me the whole Carnatick is threatened are very probable, and your intimations are kind; I confess also that your reasonings on this subject are perfectly just, except only in the reference you make to the treaty and engagements which were entered into between the Company and your Circar: you intimate, that it is from thence you derived a hope of our junction and union together, and in that expectation you have supported a war those two years. Give me leave to recall to your remembrance an express stipulation in the treaty, that if the party who asks for aid shall have been the aggressor, the other party is freed from the obligation of yielding any; allow me also to refer you to a letter I had the pleasure to write you the 27th of July of the year 1769; and after considering these, if you will take the trouble to compare them with your operations for some months after your return into the Balaghaut in the year 1769, I persuade myself you will be as much convinced as I am, that the engagements of the treaty are in the present case entirely out of the question. I do not mention these matters as a reproach upon former transactions, for what is past is past, but to place in a clear light the causes of the present troubles in which you are engaged; neither do I take notice of them to excuse myself from complying with your present proposal and desire, but to convince you, that if I shall be authorized by my Superiors to comply with them, it cannot be upon the footing of an obligation resulting from the treaty, though it may be from motives still stronger, from motives of firm friendship and mutual interest. Upon this subject I wrote very fully to the Company; my letters have been received, and I am promised answers by ships which are not yet arrived, but which are hourly expected. At present you well know the forces of the Carnatick are employed in punishing a disobedient dependant, and it is near the time of the rains, when the troops must go into winter quarters; in the mean time it is most probable that I shall receive answers from Europe to my letters, which will enable me to write to you more explicitly on the subject of your proposal. Look upon me as a well-wisher to your affairs, and let me frequently hear of your health, that I may rejoice.

P. S. Mahomed Usmaun has acquainted me fully of what you empowered him to tell me, and I have informed him also of my sentiments, and all other matters very fully, to whom therefore I beg leave to refer you.

Extract

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, 14th October, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to Governor Du Pré, dated, Camp near Tanjore, 6th October, 1771.

REPORTS prevail very strongly, that the Marattas are now in the Baramahaul, and that 10,000 are hourly expected to the Rajah's assistance, and on which he builds great hopes; the Nabob has also mentioned this circumstance to his Son, but on what foundation I know not.

Extract of Letter from Governor Du Pré to General Smith, dated 14th October, 1771:

BE under no apprehensions of Marattas; my life for it they will not trouble us before the rains.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, Friday, 1st November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

READ a letter from Hyder Ally Khân, setting forth the propositions repeatedly made to him by Trimbeck Row for accommodating matters and invading this province; which he had refused to comply with, in consideration of his engagements with the Company, and desiring to know in what manner he shall act.

From Hyder Ally Khân to Governor Du Pré, dated 13th, and received 29th October, 1771.

TRIMBECK ROW, the Sardar of the Maratta army, who is encamped at the distance of twelve Coss from Syringapatnam, has sent, and is still sending me repeated messages to the following effect: That "the undertaking an expedition against Arcot
" is of the greatest importance to him; on condition therefore of my sending my
" troops to accompany him, under the command of a trusty Sardar, he will conclude
" a perpetual friendship with me, and give up one half of the sum justly due to
" him." My answer to which has been, that "Between the King of England and
" me there subsists a treaty of peace and perpetual alliance, which treaty is under
" the seals of the said King and my own, and is signed by the Sardars and Gentle-
" men of Council of Madras, contrary to which therefore I could not act; and
" that, by God's blessing, from the beginning of my Government 'till now, it has
" been

“ been my study to perform my engagements to every one, and in future likewise
 “ the same was my design and intention.” Trimbeck Row, on being informed of
 this answer, sent me word again, “ If there is a treaty of perpetual friendship sub-
 “ sisting between you and the English Company, how comes it that you have re-
 “ ceived no assistance from them ?” To which I replied, “ That if I had been
 “ drove to such streights as to stand in need of such assistance, and had accordingly
 “ wrote so to the Company’s Sardars, they would certainly have sent it in conse-
 “ quence of their engagements ; and should it so happen that such necessity should
 “ occur, I should accordingly send for such assistance : and in case of his, Trim-
 “ beck Row’s, thinking again to spin out the war and his disturbances for a year
 “ or two more, in consequence of not obtaining the assistance of my troops for
 “ the Payenghaut expedition, I was ready, but would not break my faith to the
 “ Company by assisting him.” Trimbeck Row, notwithstanding this explicit
 answer on my part, is still urging and pressing me ; and in conformity to the firm-
 ness of my engagements, and the closeness of connexion between us, which ren-
 ders us as one, I have given, and am still giving him the same clear answer. As
 you are however my true friend, I shall act agreeable to whatever further advice
 you may give me respecting peace or war with the Marattas. I mention this to
 you out of the sincerity of my regard. My valiant troops have lately fallen upon
 the rear of the Maratta army, as they were marching, and killed and wounded
 a great many people ; and amongst the former four principal Sardars, whose Pa-
 lankeens and Ophtaubgheers† they brought away, together with four hundred
 horses. My troops penetrated even so far as their guns, but could not bring them
 away on account of their weight ; they killed the elephants and bullocks however
 that were drawing the guns. Every day indeed, besides this, 100 and 200 horses
 and camels are brought in by them : all which you have probably heard from other
 hands.

Always let me have the pleasure to receive your kind letters, advising of your
 health, that I may rejoice.

May your happiness increase !

THE President acquaints the Committee, that Hyder Ally’s Vackeels had in-
 formed him of their having received advice that a peace was on the point of
 being concluded ; that Trimbeck Row had expressed a desire of seeing Tippoo
 Saib, for which purpose Hyder Ally had sent for him to Syringapatnam, and that
 it was generally thought a peace would soon take place.

The above-mentioned letter from Hyder Ally Khân seems evidently calculated
 to involve us in a disagreeable dilemma, of which he may avail himself, what-
 ever part we may take. If we promise him assistance, there is no doubt but he
 will refuse complying with the demands of the Marattas, in the hope of being
 able to oblige them to desist therefrom. If we decline giving him a direct answer,
 and continue to amuse him with the hopes of assistance, he will make a merit
 with the Marattas, by urging the expectation he hath of our support and aid ;

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† A kind of umbrellas.

notwithstanding which he is ready to make up matters, and to enter into an alliance with them against the Carnatick Payenghaut. If we absolutely refuse our assistance, it will give him a pretext for breaking off his engagements with us, and joining the Marattas. Under these circumstances, we do not see what other answer we can return him than, to refer him to our letter of the 19th October*, and to repeat to him our expectations of receiving in a short time orders from Europe, without which we are not empowered to act.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

Letter from Governor Du Pré to Hyder Ally Khan, dated 8th November, 1771.

ON the 19th of last month I had the pleasure to write to you in answer to your friendly letter dated the 15th September. Now lately I have had the pleasure of receiving another letter of friendly contents from you, dated the 13th of October; in which, after relating some particulars of what has lately passed between you and Trimbeck Row on the subject of peace and his future intentions, out of the sincerity of your regard and friendship, and in confidence of mine, you desire my advice, whether to make peace or continue war with the Marattas. I should but ill deserve the true regard and friendship you manifest in asking my advice upon so important a concern, if in giving it I were to consult my own interest alone separately and distinctly from your's. You well know that my situation is very different from your's: you may determine in your affairs without asking the opinion of any one; I must follow the instructions I receive from the Company. I acquainted you in my last letter that I was waiting for their orders with great impatience; I expected to have received them before now; but by some unforeseen impediment it is probable the ships are gone to Bengal without calling here, so that this may occasion a delay of a month longer before I can receive them. I cannot at present say any thing more certain upon this subject than I have already done. You are wise, and can best judge what may be most conducive to the permanent safety and prosperity of your affairs; and whatever may tend to produce that effect your wisdom will certainly prefer to any temporary object. I have with truth and sincerity related to you my situation and expectation of orders in considering the state of your affairs; throw this circumstance into the scale, and let it weigh as much as it ought. What can I say more, but that the news of your prosperity will always give me pleasure?

From Trimbeck Row to the Nabob of the Carnatick. Received by the Nabob, 27th October, 1773.

SINCE the time of my victorious army taking up their quarters in this country, letters of friendship in various modes have been wrote and dispatched to you, purporting as well my desire to see you, as that you should join and exert yourself in

* Vide page 1388.

in the affairs of the Circar of Sercemant Pundit Purdhaun; the answers received to which have expressed your expectation of the arrival of ships from Europe, and that immediately upon the receipt of letters from thence, you would come, and having made friends of those Sardars who are backward in supporting the affairs of the Circar, would bring them with you. I now understand that ships, troops, and letters have lately been received from Europe; and that you and the Governor, sitting together in private, made Madarow Sadafive a partaker of your council; telling him, that in a short time you should set out to add strength to the mode in which the affairs of Sercemant Saheb have been settled; that you had heard the sending of the troops of the Circar of Sercemant into the Baramahaul country was proposed, and that he, Madarow Sadafive, should write to forbid the same, or else the country near to the district of Trichinopoly, which Sercemant Saheb had agreed to confer on you, would be ruined by their devastations: all which I understood by a letter from the said Madarow Sadafive; and am to acquaint you, that out of consideration to you, I have at present stopt the marching of the troops to that part, and am in expectation of your coming. The sincere friendship therefore subsisting between us, requires that you should with the utmost expedition prepare the stores for the troops, and set off, that thereby as well the expressions you have made use of in your letters to Sercemant Purdhaun, most of them being to the above purport, as what I likewise, trusting to the sincerity of your friendship, wrote to him in a proper manner, may be found to be true, and the remaining of so trusty a person of the Circar as Madarow Sadafive by you 'till this time, the sending of whom by Sercemant Saheb was owing to his conviction of your sincere regard, be found to have been with reason; that thereby likewise your firm friendship to Sercemant Pundit Purdhaun may be known to high and low throughout the world, and the extirpation of the enemy, which, by God's blessing, has with ease been in these days in some measure accomplished, be effected by us jointly, which may in every respect be of service to you. According to the Arabick phrase, "Every thing in this world has it's time and season;" and it is certain that the time for this business is now come; not only therefore the delaying and postponing the same any further appears to me very inconsistent with the prudence of a wise man, but also the suffering of time to pass away unprofitably, or the paying attention to a trifling advantage † without any meaning: what is proper therefore is, that you should entirely quit *that unbecoming business*, which in the eye of sincere friendship carries nothing but a bad appearance with it, and come the soonest possible, advising me with the utmost expedition of the hour you propose setting off: more than which how much must I write?

May your wishes be ever happily accomplished!

† Supposed to mean the expedition against Tanjore.

*Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, Thursday,
21st November, 1771.*

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

* **HAD** the expedition against Tanjore been undertaken at that season of the year when it was first proposed, we are of opinion still, as we were then, that the Marattas would have made an effort to assist the Tanjoreans. Our advices from the Maratta army for some time past, mention the pressing instances of the Rajah of Tanjore to Trimbeck Row for immediate assistance, and his promises of giving it. By our last intelligence we are informed, that bills for a very considerable sum sent by the Rajah were received by Trimbeck Row; who having thereupon called a Council, it was resolved to leave a part of the army to oppose Hyder, and to march with the rest to the relief of Tanjore: but it must be observed, that the letters which accompanied those remittances represented the siege of Tanjore as advancing, and the place to be in great danger of falling if not speedily relieved; and at the receipt of the letters, it was not known in the Maratta army that a peace was concluded: we remain therefore in doubt whether, upon the receipt of the news of the peace, the Marattas will desist from their above-mentioned intentions of entering the Payenghaut or not; if they should pursue that design, we must in a very few days hear further of their motions; and if they should pass the Ghauts, it is certain we must for the present desist from all thoughts of reducing the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars, and collect a force nearer the center. If, upon the news of a peace with Tanjore, they should desist for the present, but still keep in reserve their design of invading the Payenghaut, which we still think is most probable, in that case it is not likely they will carry that intention into execution 'till the latter end of January or February, unless they should sooner conclude a peace with Hyder. Our reason for this opinion is, that from January to May an army of Marattas might best be subsisted in the province, and their ravages would be most severely felt; the crops being then on the ground, part unreaped and part in stacks, and but little secured in the forts.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, 22d November, 1771.

THE following intelligence was this day received from the Nabob:

Purport of Advice from the Maratta Camp, dated 10th November, and received by the Nabob, 22d November, 1771.

TRIMBECK ROW intends to leave 10,000 horse under the command of Jakaramhurry in the Balaghaut, and himself to march to the plains of Olore

* For the occasion on which this was written, see Appendix, No. XXVI. page 946, &c.

and Anikel, and from thence to send Balaventraw's Son to the assistance of Tanjore. Subaraw, the Tanjore Vackeel, presented Trimbeck Row a bill for five Lacks of Rupees, with a pair of pistols; he brought the Rajah's letters to him and to the other Sardars. Trimbeck Row told him he would defer his campaign against Hyder and go to the assistance of his Master; so that he ordered the Vackeel to go along with Balaventraw's Son, and gave answers to the Rajah's letters. Trimbeck Row directed Narfingarow Gavick Vandy, Vankajee Mooty, Cadapa and Cundanore troops, as also the Polligars of Chitteldurg and Hurperhully, &c. to accompany him: he joined 4000 horse belonging to the Circar to the said Jakaramhurry's command. The Tanjore Hircar represented to Trimbeck Row, through the means of Balaventraw's Son, that he should send away the Nabob's news-writer and that of the English out of the camp; but he did not consent to it, saying that his army is very superior, so that there was no matter who comes in or goes out of it: at length he told him that he would give orders accordingly. The Marattas took possession of Garycode and demolished it, after plundering the same. The army moved from the said place, and arrived near Buffohully, one Cofs from Meddore, and is fighting there. Jakaram, in his return from Negapoor, took possession of Beerhully, and plundered the same. The Tanjore Vackeel being asked concerning the army in the Carnatick, he informed Trimbeck Row as follows; 2000 Europeans, 10,000 Sepoys, 4000 horse, and twenty guns, now before Tanjore; to which half of the troops from the garrisons of Amboor and Sautgada, as well as Bangar Yachem Naick's forces, &c. joined them. The Vackeel told him further, that if he (Trimbeck Row) enters the Ghaut at this time, Amboor and Sautgada will be easily taken; that the Nabob has 100 horse and 500 Sepoys with him; that the English at Madras have only 200 Europeans and 1000 Sepoys; and that there was sufficient water and grass to be got for the Maratta army. Trimbeck Row told the Vackeel, that he wrote several letters to the Nabob concerning Tanjore, but received no answer; that Madavarow sent letters, and insisted upon his sending assistance to Tanjore; that if the Nabob finishes the Tanjore affair before he enters the Payenghaut, and sends his troops to join him, as he promised, he will then write in the Nabob's behalf to Madavarow. Morarow told me, that if the Nabob makes peace with the Tanjoreans, and acquaints him with it, he can prevent the Maratta army from entering the Ghaut. Hyder's Vackeel told Trimbeck Row to restore Colar, and write to Madavarow about Belapoor; but he answered him, that he is going to Tanjore, and that Narrain Row will soon come, when he will tell him of it. It is talked here, that Narrain Row, with 20,000 horse, arrived at Kistna River; that 4000 of them arrived at Tungabadra; and that 500 horse, with a proper Sardar, joined the army. If the Marattas should arrive towards Baramahaul, some Hircars should be placed at Amboor and Mallappaudy.

Purport of Advice from Arcot, dated 19th November, 1771.

NEWS was brought that Vankatraw, relation to Trimbul Row, from Vellour, sent twenty Sepoys to Army country, and seized 1000 cattle, &c. but two Peons belonging to the Tachorians fired against them, upon which they left the cattle and went away.

News was brought also from Vaniambaddy and Tripatore, that the Polligar of Coimbetoor, by permission of Trimbeck Row, comes along with Balaventraw's Son, who intends to enter the Ghaut with 10,000 horse, through Cangondy Canama, to take possession of Jagadave, &c. The said Balaventraw's Son is now at Chinna-patam, and not yet removed from thence.

The foregoing intelligence agrees with the advices received by the President, except that we had no account of the march of Narrain Row.

AT A SELECT COMMITTEE, Monday, 25th November, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Jofias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President acquaints the Committee, that by intelligence papers received from the Balaghaut, he learns that Trimbeck Row had determined to enter this province; and for which purpose he had dispatched Balaventraw's Son, with a body of 10 or 12,000 horse, as an advanced party, who had arrived within a few Cofs of Ouscotah. That the President had conversed with the Nabob on the subject, who informed him that he had received the same intelligence. That he imputed this resolution of Trimbeck Row to two motives. The first, that having received bills for a considerable amount from the Rajah of Tanjore, and which were not payable unless assistance were sent to the Rajah, and hearing that matters were likely to be accommodated, he had made this motion to convince the Rajah of his readiness to assist him on receipt of the bills; that in case the Rajah should compromise his disputes with the Nabob, he, Trimbeck Row, might insist on the amount of the bills, alleging that it was the Rajah's own fault in making peace, and not waiting the arrival of the troops which were marching to his assistance. The other motive assigned by the Nabob was, that he has advice that Narrain Row, brother to Madavarow, is appointed to the command of the troops in the Balaghaut; that upon his arrival Trimbeck Row's powers will cease, who is therefore desirous of collecting what he can previous to Narrain Row's arrival. That the Nabob then proposed sending a message to Trimbeck Row, through the means of Madarow Sadasive, the Maratta Vackeel, to the following effect:—That he learns that Trimbeck Row is advancing this way, with an intention of entering the Payenghaut; that he, Trimbeck Row, has been frequently advised, that the English could not take part in the war in the Balaghaut without orders from Europe; that those orders might now be daily expected to arrive; that he, the Nabob, would advise him not to make any attempts before they arrived; since, if they were for the English to assist him, he might expect their aid; and if they were not authorized so to do, he should be frankly informed of it: but that in case he entered the province, or committed the least hostility in it, he must not expect the assistance of
the

the English, should the orders they may afterwards receive empower them to join him.

The Committee are of opinion, that the motives assigned by the Nabob for this motion of the Marattas are natural and probable; and they much approve of the message proposed by the Nabob to be sent to Trimbeck Row.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Sam^l. Ardley.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, 27th November, 1771.

RECEIVED the following letter from the Select Committee at Bombay, by way of Anjengo :

To the Honourable Josias Du Pré Esquire, President and Governor, &c. &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort St. George.

Honourable Sir and Gentlemen,

WE addressed you last under the 31st August, a duplicate of which has already been forwarded to you.

Having received a letter from the Resident at Onore, containing an account of the present posture of affairs between the Nabob Hyder Ally and the Marattas; we enclose copy thereof for your Honour, &c.'s information, as also copy of two letters from the Nabob, one of which is directed to the President, the other to the Resident at Onore.

The Nabob hath therein earnestly applied for assistance both from you and us, without which we have reason to think he will fall a sacrifice to the superior power of the Marattas; we therefore much wish to do every thing in our power to prevent such an event, entirely concurring in opinion with our Honourable Masters of the necessity of supporting Hyder Ally as a barrier to the Maratta power.

But as it is necessary we should be more precisely informed of the situation of the Nabob's affairs, of his wants and offers in case of our affording him assistance, and particularly whether he can or will deposit a sum of money before hand adequate to the expense which we may incur in assisting him, and without which it will be totally out of our power to do it; we have therefore directed Mr. James Sibbald to write him fully on the subject from Onore, and get his answer with the utmost expedition for the above purpose, and we shall not fail to advise your Honour, &c. of the result of it.

And

And in the mean time we request your Honour, &c. will particularly inform us, whether in case we should afford Hyder Ally assistance against the Marattas, you will or can co-operate with us in support of him, and to what extent.

We are with esteem,

Honourable Sir and Gentlemen,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Bombay Castle,
21st October, 1771.

W^m. Hornby
W. A. Price
David Wedderburne
Nath^l. Stackhouse
John Watson
W^m. Tayler.

P. S. We are concerned to advise you, that the packet you forwarded us to be dispatched over-land for the Honourable Company has miscarried, by the capture of the vessel in which it was from hence by the Sangarians.

To the Honourable William Hornby Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Bombay.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

IN consequence of your orders for keeping you advised from time to time of the operations of the Marattas against the Nabob, I have paid particular attention to the means for procuring certain intelligence of their motions, as well as of the Nabob's situation; and as the mode the Marattas have adopted this season for distressing Hyder's affairs, not only shew their determination of totally reducing him if in their power, but at the same time the great probability that matters between them will be brought to a crisis before the expiration of another season, it will I presume be thought a consideration worthy your Honour, &c.'s notice and attention.

The Marattas, after the defeat given the Nabob on the 7th March, when he was obliged to retire within the walls of Syringapatnam, invested in a manner that place, and contented themselves with firing upon the town from a great distance for upwards of twenty days; but this the Nabob no further regarded, than as it prevented his drawing supplies for his army from the country round him. He flattered himself the approach of the rains would, as heretofore, oblige the Marattas to evacuate his country during that season, as being the conditions promised the greatest part of the soldiery which compose their armies. The Nabob was sensible a cessation of hostilities for the space of six months would give him time to repair his loss in troops, that in the absence of the Marattas he should be

able to retake his forts and places in their possession, and be in a condition to stand upon the defensive, when they might enter his country in the month of November. But very contrary to these expectations of Hyder, the Maratta grand camp, under the command of Trimbeck Row, retired from Syringapatnam about the middle of April, and after laying waste the Nabob's countries in the Biddenure districts, fixed their encampment for the rainy season at Terree Ghery, being in the center of the Nabob's country, and in the high road both to Syringapatnam and Biddenure. Since taking up their quarters at Terree Ghery, they have detached large bodies of horse and foot for bringing the country on all sides under their subjection, and have absolutely reduced some considerable forts within two days' way of Biddenure itself. So effectually have they cut off Hyder's communication with this latter place, so far as extends to the drawing of succours from thence, that even his Hircarrahs are obliged to take their route through the Coorga country and down to Mangalore. The opening a communication with Biddenure being of the last importance to his affairs, he has made several attempts to effect it, but all have proved unsuccessful; and a body of five hundred horse, escorting twenty pieces of cannon with other military stores from Biddenure, in the beginning of June, were intercepted by the Marattas, and fell into their hands.

As the Nabob, from the situation of his enemy, added to the small body of troops now in Biddenure, must be under some apprehensions for the safety of that place, he absolutely determined about two months ago on leaving Syringapatnam, in the command of his brother-in-law, and coming himself to Biddenure; for which purpose he demanded a passage through the Coorga Rajah's country, and absolutely made over to the Rajah a considerable district contiguous to Managalore for this permission, which was granted; but just at that juncture, a body of the Maratta army moving suddenly towards the borders of the Coorga country, left Hyder no room to doubt of the Rajah's treachery; it is therefore supposed he will not put himself in his power.

The Marattas being now in the heart of the Nabob's country, and nothing to stop their progress but the severity of the season, it is to be expected that their most vigorous efforts will very shortly be exerted for accomplishing their designs, and that therefore the Nabob's situation may be looked upon as critical and distressed. The Marattas, by being in possession of the greatest part of his Mysore country, at the same time both prevent his raising troops, and drawing the necessary supplies for his army; the scarcity of grain is very great, so much, that he has turned all the inhabitants out of the town, and for want of forage he has lost more than half of his few remains of horse.

I yesterday received a letter from him for the Honourableth the President, which I now transmit, and have thought it not improper to enclose for your Honour, &c. notice, a correct translation of his letter to me at the same time.

I am, &c. &c.

Onore,
9th September, 1771.

(A true Copy, Geo. Skipp, Secretary.)

JAMES SIBBALD.
The

The letters from Hyder Ally Khân to the Governor of Bombay and Mr. Sibbald, representing the necessity of our taking part with him against the Marattas, who threaten to invade the Carnatick.

From Hyder Ally Khân to Governor Hodges at Bombay, dated 18th August, and received 17th October, 1771.

AFTER compliments.

The agreements that are settled by your Honour, as well as the Governor of Madras, his means, and with the English King's seal, are very well known. The Marattas, notwithstanding my promising to pay them their just Choute, are making a demand of Mahal or country; and to take possession of all the Carnatick country, they have raised disturbance in my dominions: they had long ago this intention of taking the Subah of Arcot, and all the country of the Carnatick, but they are now resolved to put their above-mentioned design into execution: this you may believe to be true, as I heard it by letters from some of the principal officers of the Marattas, who privately keep on good terms of friendship with me, and are my well-wishers. The ways of the Marattas are to play tricks with one Governor out of two who may be at war with each other; and when one of them is broke, they begin their endeavours to break the other: by these means they have taken possession of the countries of Hind and Deckan. Now they wish to take possession of my dominions to abide there, in order to use their means about taking the Subah of Arcot; and when they shall be settled in this country, and have taken some possession of my dominions, they will certainly put their hand over the Subah of Arcot, and all the country of the Carnatick: it is therefore right and good that your Honour, the Governor of Madras, and I, should join together (meaning against them); when the Marattas will not, please God, dare to remain in this country, and to keep their bad intentions against my dominions and the Company's. Your Honour is prudent, and very wise; I therefore hope that you will take all the above-mentioned circumstances into your consideration, and write the Governor and Council of Madras to send their forces for my assistance, agreeable to our agreements; when I assure you the Maratta army will be unable to stand before our forces, and will very likely return to their dominions, and will never think to come in this country again; my dominions as well as the Company's will then ever remain unmolested. The whole world, as well as your Honour, is very well acquainted with the Marattas' tricks; your Honour therefore should look upon their friendly letters, should they write any either to you or the Governor of Madras, to be deceitful; for their custom is, as I have before mentioned, to keep friendship with one Governor first against the other; and when he is broke, they begin to break the other.

I don't mean to join with you for my own advantage only, but also for the benefit of both the Company and myself. Your Honour will always please me with your friendly letters, therein giving me an account of your wellfare.

(A true Copy, Geo. Skipp, Secretary.)

From

*From Hyder Ally Khán to Mr. James Sibbald, dated at Syringapatnam, the 7th of
Zumadillaeva.*

AFTER compliments.

The treaties entered into between my Circar and the Governor and Council of Madras and Bombay, with the Company's own Seal affixed to them, you have seen, and are well acquainted with the purport of them. Now I have engaged to pay the Marattas their just Choute, but this will not content them; they want nothing less than all the country of the Carnatick and the Subah of Arcot, in which they hope to succeed: this they have long had in view, and now they are determined to exert their utmost efforts to accomplish their ambitious designs; and to which end they have begun the war in my country, and possessed themselves of many strong places, that they may have a firm footing therein; their next object will then be the Subah of Arcot, with the whole country of Carnatick. These designs of their's I am very particularly acquainted with from some of their principal Sardars, who have long kept friendship with me. If therefore the Governor and Council of Chinnapatam and Bombay would agree to join me with a military force, the Marattas could not do any thing, nor would they be able to stay longer in my country. You are the friend of my Circar, and must therefore address the Governor and Council of Bombay, and procure their letters to Madras, for assisting me with a proper force; and then, please God, the Marattas will never more return to give this country trouble. I have not wrote this on account of my necessities; it is as much the interest of the Company as it is mine to put a stop to the designs of the Marattas. It is a custom with them to endeavour to make a breach between two Powers, that they may have an advantage over one; and when that one is reduced, they turn their arms against the other: in this manner they have conquered Indostan and the Deccan: should they therefore write letters of friendship to the Governor and Council of Bombay and Madras, they ought to be disregarded. You will write all this both to the Governor and Council of Bombay and Madras, and endeavour as soon as possible to get a proper body of the Company's troops to join me. I have now wrote a letter to the Governor of Bombay, which I desire you will forward, and get me an answer immediately; and acquaint him that I have great occasion for 3 or 4000 muskets, which I request may be sent. I have no more to add, only to desire your immediate answer to this, and you will procure one from the Governor as fast as possible.

(A true Copy, Geo. Skipp, Secretary.)

In consequence of which the following letter was immediately wrote to Bombay:

To the Honourable William Hornby Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Bombay.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

WE have this instant received your letter of the 21st October, and reply to it immediately.

From the beginning of the present contest between Hyder Ally Khân and the Marattas, we have been of opinion, that it would be best, and most conducive to the future security of the Company's possessions in India, to support Hyder Ally Khân, in case he should at any time be in danger of sinking under the superior power of the Marattas; but at the same time we were of opinion, that we should forbear to take any part in this contest until such a crisis should happen, and thereby render it necessary. This was merely an opinion, which, however desirous we might be of carrying it into execution, from a full conviction of it's propriety, we saw clearly we should never be able to bring into practice; because the plan and system of the Nabob of Arcot stood in direct opposition to it, and the warmest representations have been made to us by him and by the King's Minister to assist the Marattas to reduce Hyder Ally, which we refused to comply with. It is true, that the tenor of all the late letters from the Court of Directors indicate their opinion to be, that the power of Mysore should be supported as a barrier against the Marattas; yet in one of their late letters they enjoin us not to interfere in the quarrels of the neighbouring Powers, unless there should be an absolute necessity, which proviso must always remain to be construed after the event.

We have not failed to represent to the Honourable the Court of Directors the situation of their affairs and connexions under this Presidency, and particularly by the *Lapwing*; we have not to this hour received any other orders than such as we have mentioned above; but we may reasonably hope and expect to receive their decisive directions on this very important subject by the *Lord Holland*, which sailed, as we are informed, the 1st of June, or by the *Britannia*, which was to sail about the middle of the same month.

In expectation of instructions, we have to this time temporized both with the Marattas and with Hyder Ally, and must continue to do so until we receive further instructions from our Constituents, unless we should be compelled to act by being attacked; which at this time seems not improbable, as our advices from the *Balaghaut* are repeated and strong, that *Trimbeck Row* now hath taken the resolution of moving towards the borders of the *Carnatick Payenghaut*.

We have lately received letters from Hyder Ally Khân of the same tenor as that he wrote to you and Mr. Sibbald; we send you herewith a copy of our answers to him.

Your Honour, &c. desired to be informed how far we will or can co-operate with you in support of Hyder Ally, in case you should afford him assistance

against the Marattas. We would answer to this proposition with the greatest precision, if it were in our power to determine and execute. Your Honour, &c. will clearly perceive, by what we have already said, that it does not rest with us. We have reason to believe, that both the Nabob and the King's Minister have made representations on this subject to Europe; and as their plan is diametrically opposite to our's, we cannot even conjecture what orders we shall receive; but should the expected orders authorize us to assist Hyder Ally, still it will rest in a great measure with the Nabob to unite, to assist, to oppose, or to remain inactive; so that until we shall have concerted measures with him upon the orders which we may receive, it will not be in our power to give your Honour, &c. any assurance of the support we shall be able to give you; our sentiments are nevertheless the same as they have always been from the beginning of the contest.

We are,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
27th November, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Committee.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, 29th November, 1771.

RECEIVED this evening advice that a party of Maratta horse had advanced as far as Calachavaucum, which they had plundered.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, Thursday, 5th December, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

THE President lays before the Committee the following letters, &c. delivered to him by the Nabob:

Translation of a Letter from Trimbeck Row to Madarow Sadasree, the Maratta Vackeel, dated 20th November.†

Translation of Morarow's Letter to the Nabob, dated 24th, and received 30th November, 1771.

I AND Trimbeck Row have wrote to you two or three letters, which I hope have reached you; but no answer has yet arrived, which gives me surprize, as there

† This letter is printed in Appendix, No. XIV. page 212.

is no distinction between us. I, with an intent to increase the friendship and brotherly union, wrote to Madavarow about the personal conference we have had, and sent for his answer concerning your request, that it might make you easy, which you are well acquainted with; notwithstanding which you have not yet paid any regard to the brotherly friendship of the said Madavarow, which is not proper. I, with a view that your design may meet with success, and you gain a good name, and obtain your desire by the compliance with your request, spoke to Trimbeck Row in the best manner, and got him to write a letter, but I do not know in what light the people in your place explained the matter to you. The affair of Tanjore is not of any importance; the Tanjore Rajah will not neglect to behave amicably, or manifest instances of his friendship. Although there was a friendship between you and the said Rajah, yet you have ruined the Tanjore country, and erected batteries against the fort of Tanjore. The Tanjore Rajah sends his letters to us. Hyder Naigue is weakened; Trimbeck Row left Vamenray with an army about Syringapatnam, and by continual marches is arrived near the Ghauts: he detached a body of about 10,000 horse, under the command of Kishnaraw and Seickaramhurry, as also with my army, against Hyder's country in the Payenghaut; Vankatraw and Candaraw, Sardars of my army, are with the said Kishnaraw and Seickaramhurry; these will ravage Hyder's country: Trimbeck Row's army is also arrived near the Ghaut. The friendship between us is very great, wherefore I spoke to Trimbeck Row what was necessary, and out of regard to your friendship settled in such a manner, that the army may not proceed against your country, nor raise any disturbance; you will therefore be mindful of the important measures to be taken, and get your business dispatched, for this is the time to do it. Please to regard Madavarow's friendship: come and pay a visit; otherwise send my nephew, † Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, with an army and warlike stores. Trimbeck Row told me what was requisite; I also told him on my part. Don't delay at this time, but send a proper person along with Madarow Sadaive. If you write about my coming, I shall come to your place, make you easy, and get you to visit Trimbeck Row, or otherwise I shall take with me my said nephew; by all means I shall be a mediator; there is no cause to doubt in any respect; Trimbeck Row is a very wise man. I shall do what may be conducive to dispatch your business, and to gain you a good name. Send an answer to this letter very soon. I have wrote some certain matters to Madarow Sadaive, who will communicate the same to you. I have wrote a letter to my Vackeel Seereput Row in my own hand, who will inform you about it. I must request that you will send a proper person along with Madarow Sadaive. I and Trimbeck Row sent separate letters to you by a Camel; we also wrote to Madarow Sadaive, which will reach your place: I send this besides. Please to send an answer to this by the Tappal with all possible speed.

What can I say more?

† Meaning the Nalob's eldest Son.

Translation

Translation of a Letter from Morarow to his Vackeel, Seereput Row, the Original of which is said to be in Morarow's own Hand, dated 23d November, 1771.

I HAVE wrote a letter to the Nabob, a translation of which you will get made, and shew the whole thereof to him ; his answer and your answer you will send by the Tappals with all expedition. You will inform the Nabob that such another opportunity will not offer ; that he has quitted the object on this side, and has undertaken an expedition against Tanjore, employing thereon the whole army, both Europeans and Indians, with their artillery, under the command of his Son, and esteeming that expedition as of more importance than this object. If the Rajah of Tanjore would not pay the money justly due, Trimbeck Row and I, after our interview with the Nabob, would have brought the Rajah into the proper road, and procured the money for the Nabob. The Nabob has listened to the representations of people, and undertaken that expedition ; but what matter of importance is it ? In consequence of the receipt of repeated letters from the Rajah, that both his reputation and country would be lost, Trimbeck Row is thinking of sending 15,000 horse to his assistance, and to cross the Ghauts himself with 20,000 more ; conformable to which plan, by repeated marches, he is arrived between Bodicotah and Ancusgurry. I have explained matters to Trimbeck Row in every mode, and agreeable to my desire he has determined to encamp at the Passes ; and as the consequences of the whole army being together would be such as to render it difficult to procure water and forage, he has dispatched 12,000 horse under the command of Kishur Row, the Son of Oppaw Buluwunt Row, Seickaramhurry, and the Sons of Vankatraw Gorparah and Cundhurow Gorparah, to Hyder's country on the other side of the Passes, and they are accordingly arrived in the countries of Sitte-maurunhully, Coverypainam, &c. and are sporting and hunting there. I have by various modes held Trimbeck Row not to enter the Nabob's country, and have procured orders conformable to the several Commanders of the army. My attention is towards the Nabob's friendship, between him and Madavarow likewise a friendship will be established, and the disposal of matters on the other side of the Ghauts will come into the Nabob's hands. Sometime ago the Nabob entertained designs against the Chief of Mysore, but it did not succeed ; now however, if the Nabob, with an army of Europeans and Sepoys and their great guns, will join Trimbeck Row and me, and exert himself in the expedition in hand, it will gain him the approbation of Pundit Purdhaun, and be the means of retrieving his lost reputation. Madarow Sadasive has been there ten months, and as many times has wrote letters advising of his having been negotiating, but the same has not been credited ; now let the Nabob dispatch a trusty person with Madarow Sadasive to see Trimbeck Row and me, and after engagements entered into respecting this business, dispatch his Son with an army of Europeans and Sepoys and heavy artillery, and acquire a great name : such another opportunity will never offer ; and in this plan is the Nabob's good also, and friendship will be established. If the Nabob will send a trusty person with Madarow Sadasive here, and will send for me to him, I will proceed there, and after inutual engagements being entered into,

will carry the Saheb Tadah* with me to the Ghauts, and settle the expedition against Hyder Naigue, which will be finished to our wishes, and Madavarow's friendship remain. Without this negotiation is put on some footing, Trimbeck Row will not march from near the Passes. If the Nabob, listening to the representations of the Europeans, shall assist Hyder Naigue, Madavarow's army is large, and may be able to cope with both parties, and the whole country of Arcot and Trichinopoly on the other side of the Ghauts will be destroyed. Should the Nabob's Vackeel and Madarow Sadafive come here, you likewise will enter into the negotiation, and come to me. A translation of this letter also you will shew to the Nabob, and procuring a proper answer relative thereto, dispatch the same by the Tappals; advise me likewise in what mode the business of Tanjore has been settled.

What can I say more?

The following extracts of intelligence received by the Nabob, and delivered by him to the President at the same time, are also now read :

Extracts of Intelligence received by the Nabob from the Maratta Army, under date the 28th November, 1771.

ADVISE, that the 25th in the evening Trimbeck Row sent for Appajee Ram, Hyder Naigue's Vackeel, and asked him what his Master had wrote; that the Vackeel told him his Master had mentioned he would pay the sum of fifty Lacks of Rupees in ready money, and give Soucar bills for twenty more, payable at a fixed period, and would also send his Son Tippoo with a force to meet him: to which Trimbeck Row replied, telling him to inform his Master, "In four days he should acquaint him." The Intelligencer then says, that Trimbeck Row's intention is this;—that as, by the advancing of his troops, the affair of Tanjore has been adjusted, a terror must now be struck in the Arcot country; the Choute that is to be given by the Nabob paid (a Lack of Rupees, more or less); assistance obtained; and if the Nabob will not come to see him, that one of his Sons would come; and peace being established, that he then should proceed against Hyder with the troops of assistance so obtained: and if the Nabob would neither give money nor assistance, but be in friendship with Hyder, in that case some favour must be shewn to Hyder, the Ghauts passed, and an expedition undertaken against the Arcot country. That the 26th November Appajee Ram received further letters from Hyder, telling him at all events to make peace, and that he would agree to send assistance; in consequence of which the said Appajee Ram went to Morarow, and acquainted him thereof. After which they both went to Trimbeck Row; and the former told him, "You have hitherto, Sir, been of opinion your desires were not complied with; I have now a letter from my Master, saying, that he will comply therewith; shew your kindness therefore, and make peace: the sum of fifty Lacks of Rupees shall be paid you in ready money, and a Soucar's bill given, and Tippoo Saib will come to your assistance with 2000 horse, 4000 Sepoys, and ~~ten~~ pieces of cannon." That after this Morarow also told Trimbeck Row,

* The Nabob's Son.

“Hyder’s Vackeel says he will act agreeable to your desire ; give up therefore such of the districts you have taken as may appear to you proper, and some how or other make peace.” To which Trimbeck Row replied, “After my arrival in the Arcot country I will give an answer respecting this business : the case is this, that if the Nabob will make peace, and send his assistance, Bangalore must be taken ; but if they †, *being in friendship with Hyder*, neither make peace nor send assistance, but on the contrary come to make war against us, in that case some favour must be shewn to the Naigue,—the whole of the countries *I have* taken from him, Chock-bellapore excepted, restored to him,—what money he gives accepted,—his assistance taken,—and then we must proceed against the Arcot country. The Nabob, it is true, is in friendship with Sercemant ; but he may possibly think I am insolent, and must be punished, and on that account has entered into no negotiation, nor even sent away my Vackeel.” That after this conversation Trimbeck Row and Morarow had a private conference together, and it was determined to dispatch letters to the Nabob, which accordingly each of them has done. That Tippoo, Hyder’s Son, had attacked the detachment under Waumanrow, which had attempted the siege of one of Hyder’s forts, defeated the same, and took fifty horses and an elephant ; in consequence of which Waumanrow had wrote to Trimbeck Row for a reinforcement of 4000 horse, but no answer had been sent to his letter at the time of this intelligence being dispatched. That upon the march of the Maratta army lately, Hyder’s horse likewise had attacked the rear thereof, and carried off three camel-loads of artillery and stores, and four camels, and between fifty and sixty bullock-loads of baggage belonging to the army. That secret advice had been received *at the Maratta camp*, that Hyder had collected together 4000 horse, 10,000 Sepoys, and 10,000 Carnatick Peons, and had got fifty pieces of cannon ready mounted upon their carriages. That upon the representation of a person in the Maratta camp to Morarow, that if the army was to proceed to the Arcot country where there are a great many Pagodas, the country would be plundered ; and that he, Morarow, as a friend to the Nabob and Madavarow, should prevent the army from passing the Ghauts ; Morarow said, that he had wrote a letter to the Nabob, to which if a *proper* answer was received, it was well ; if not, he would go himself to the Nabob, taking with him only a Palankeen and two horses, and persuade the Nabob, and bring him back with him. The Intelligencer here says he is of opinion that an answer should soon be dispatched to Morarow’s letter ; for if not, he thinks the advanced part of the army will pass the Ghauts. That Trimbeck Row had received a letter from Upparow, advising of his having crossed the Pass of Bodicotah, and arrival in the country towards Paulcote and Singarapettah ; and that Trimbeck Row, in consequence of the great distance Upparow’s and Waumanrow’s corps were from him, would march from Hussoor, by the road of Bodicotah, cross the Coopum Pass, and proceed towards Coverypatnam and Killnagherry.

The Committee think it necessary to observe, that the advices we receive from the Nabob upon any critical occasion generally lead to the question, and support the measures the Nabob wishes us to take. Hyder Ally, in the above intelligence—

† Supposed to mean the Nabob and the English.

paper, is represented as not only soliciting for peace, but offering to join the Marattas to enter this province; this is contrary to our advices; and the President acquaints the Committee, that Hyder Ally's Vackeels assured him, that although their Master had a Vackeel with Trimbeck Row, yet there was one article insisted on which their Master would not consent to, viz.—to join the Marattas to invade the Arcot country. How far the Nabob's intelligence may be depended upon, or what credit may be given to our advices and the assurances of the Vackeels, we cannot say.

The President acquaints the Committee, that the Nabob had informed him, that from the above letters and intelligence, he thought there was now no room to doubt but the Marattas would enter the province, and therefore desired that the Committee would immediately deliberate on the measures to be taken.

It is with infinite concern the Committee observe, that notwithstanding the repeated and earnest representations of the Board and this Committee, in their several addresses of 31st January, 6th April, 4th June, 10th August, and 29th September, 1770, to the Court of Directors, of the very critical situation of affairs with respect to the Marattas and Hyder Ally, which were so fully and clearly explained, in order to enable them to give us their sentiments and orders with respect to the conduct they would wish us to observe in so important and interesting a matter, we still find ourselves not only without orders, but without the least intimation of their opinion thereon. It is true, that the expectation and non-arrival of those orders have furnished us with a plea for procrastination for some time past; but we fear that will not long avail us, at least with regard to the Marattas, whom, as we are told, nothing will divert them from their intention of entering this province, but our sending a force to assist them in reducing Mysore. The Committee think therefore they can no longer delay taking under their most serious consideration the measures necessary to be pursued in this most critical juncture; and although our sentiments thereon should not be conformable to the orders we may hereafter receive, yet we can never be accused of rashly adopting measures, without having first fully explained all circumstances to the Court of Directors, and waited their orders as long as possible, consistently with the safety of the Carnatick and the security of the Company's possessions.

The better to enable the Committee to determine on this important subject, it is necessary to state in brief the present situation of the Marattas, Hyder Ally, the Nabob, and ourselves.

The Marattas have now been engaged in a continued war of two years with Hyder Ally, and have shewn a determined resolution to destroy him, and annex the Mysore dominions to their present possessions. The Mysore country is already impoverished and depopulated, and all but the principal forts have fallen into the hands of the Marattas. The Nabob assures us, that they have cut off all communication with the Biddnure country, from whence Hyder used to draw his supplies; and as he is unable to oppose them in the field, he can have nothing to depend on but the provisions laid up in his principal forts, which must of course be greatly exhausted.

exhausted. The Marattas have published their intentions of invading the Carnatick, and have actually advanced to the borders, and some straggling parties have plundered Calaspauk. The Nabob is of opinion they will certainly enter the province as soon as the season shall favour them, which will be about the beginning of January, when the crops are on the ground, from which time they will have 'till the latter end of April to ravage and lay waste, even should they propose returning into their own country this season. By late advices we learn, that Narrain Row, with a body of 20,000 horse, was on his march to join them; and whether they be intended to reinforce the troops now in the Balaghaut, or to relieve some of those who have been long on service, such a body of fresh troops will be a great addition to their strength.

With respect to the Nabob, he seems, as well he may, to be under great apprehensions of the consequences of their entering the province; and declares, that as the country will be entirely ruined, the army will have nothing to subsist on but the grain in the forts; that it will be utterly out of his power to furnish any money for the expenses of the troops beyond that now due from him for the current charges, amounting to about four Lacks of Pagodas.

With regard to ourselves, we have not the means of providing supplies for the army, or of procuring money for our current expenses, but by the assistance of the Nabob; the whole revenues and resources of the Carnatick are in his hands, and when the country is ravaged and destroyed they must of course fail.

This being the present state of affairs, it remains to be considered, what measures appear the most eligible for the security of the Carnatick, and the Company's possessions in it; and for this end there appear but three modes to be pursued.

1st. Either to join the Marattas, which for the present may prevent their entering the province; or,

2dly. To join Hyder Ally, provided he can furnish money for the expenses of the army, and can procure sufficient supplies of provisions for their subsistence, or

3dly. To collect together a body of troops in some central position, where they may best oppose the enemy, either by detachments or otherwise, and be enabled to cut off the supplies from the Maratta army.

With respect to the first proposition of joining the Marattas, it might here appear needless, after having so fully and clearly expressed our sentiments on the subject in many parts of our proceedings, and in our letter to the Court of Directors, to enter into a fresh discussion thereof; it might suffice to declare, that our sentiments continue invariably the same. Nevertheless the Committee think it necessary now to recite the reasons and motives which have weighed with them against such a measure,

sure, that the whole may appear at one view, and which will come properly under the following heads :

- 1st. The orders of the Company ;
- 2dly. Our treaty and engagements with Hyder Ally ;
- 3dly. The opinion of the other Presidencies ; and
- 4thly. The dangers and fatal consequences to be apprehended from such a measure.

Although we have not yet had any answer from our Constituents to our repeated representations of the embarrassments we labour under, for want of their clear and precise instructions with respect to our conduct in the present critical situation of affairs, yet it is evident, from the whole spirit of their orders to this and the other Presidencies for some years past, that they look upon the growing power of the Marattas with jealousy and apprehension, and that they esteem it a very dangerous system to lend them any assistance to reduce or weaken the few remaining Powers of India capable of opposing their ambitious views, which evidently tend to the conquest of all Indostan : in these sentiments we have frequently expressed our clear and hearty concurrence : we cannot therefore suppose that the orders we may receive will be contradictory to, or inconsistent with them ; especially when it will appear to the Court of Directors from our late advices, that there is every day fresh cause to be apprehensive of the growing power of the Marattas, by reason of the advantages they have acquired in the northern provinces, and the superiority they have gained over Hyder Ally.

We come now to the second consideration which hath weighed with us in refusing to assist the Marattas, viz.—Our treaty and engagements with Hyder Ally.

In the article of the treaty with Hyder Ally, respecting the assistance to be afforded to either party, it is provided nevertheless, that if the party requiring such assistance shall have been the aggressor, the other party shall not be obliged to furnish any aid. This clause was inserted, as we expected that he might by acts of hostility bring a war upon himself, and we should then stand excused from assisting him, without a breach of our engagements, in case we found it inconsistent with the interest of the Company, or inconvenient to our affairs, to afford him any support. We will not pretend to say that the attack made on him by the Marattas was occasioned by the steps he took after the conclusion of the peace in 1769, which however were sufficient to give umbrage ; we believe that their attempts to subdue him would have been equally the same, had he refrained from every thing which might be construed an aggression against them. He had not discharged a sum he had agreed to pay them upon a compromise with them in 1767 ; his military and enterprising genius made him a dangerous neighbour to them, and such a one as might, if suffered to gain more strength, most effectually oppose their plan

of conquest in the south: these were motives sufficient to draw on him the Maratta war, which has oppressed him now more than two years. Nevertheless, as his conduct towards his neighbours, in levying contributions on them, and even not sparing some districts belonging to the Marattas, or under their protection, may, without forcing the sense, be construed an aggression in respect to them, the clause in the treaty furnishes us with a just plea to decline assisting him: but although we thus stand excused from complying with his requisitions for aid, we are clearly of opinion, that we could not, without manifest breach of the treaty, assist his enemies; and we have declared to him, that although many circumstances have prevented our uniting with him, yet that he may be assured that we will not take part with the Marattas against him.

We next proceed to the third consideration against assisting the Marattas, viz. The opinion of the other Presidencies.

The very valuable and extensive possessions which the Company enjoy in Bengal, together with the advantage derived from their trade on the Malabar Coast, are certainly objects which demand our most earnest attention, to the security and permanency of which we ought to pay the greatest regard in all our engagements. The Nabob is desirous of assisting the Marattas, and is supported by the King's Minister; he is not under any compulsion or restraint from us, and is at liberty to pursue such steps as he shall judge most conducive to his own interest; but if his plans and measures are opposite to the system recommended by the Company, shall we suffer ourselves to be dragged into them contrary to our judgment, and contrary to every warrant of our Constituents? It was from an earnest desire that the three Presidencies should act upon one uniform plan, and that no measures should be adopted at one Presidency which might any ways clash with the interest or views of the others, that we have constantly communicated to the Gentlemen at Bengal and Bombay our ideas and opinion of the state of affairs; and there is no point which has been more attentively discussed by the several Presidencies than that now before us, and no one in which we have more clearly and expressly concurred in opinion; we could therefore never be justified in an alliance with the Marattas, in direct opposition to the sentiments of the other Presidencies, and after a clear and manifest conviction of the dangers of such a measure. It has been the constant and uniform tenor of the Company's recommendation to this, and we believe also to the other Presidencies, to be mutually assisting to each other, and to concert measures for that purpose; and they expressly tell us, that Bengal is the object of their greatest attention, and that this Presidency is only valuable as a barrier to it. See Separate General Letter, dated 17th March 1769, Par. 25*, and Letter to the Select Committee, 17th March 1769, Par. 2 and 3†. We have in former minutes referred to the many passages in the late letters from the Court of Directors, which express their sense of the power of the Marattas, the danger of raising that power, and the expediency of supporting the power of Mysore as a barrier against them in the south; we refer to them again, viz.

Extracts

* Vide page 523.

† Vide pages 524, 525.

*Extracts of Letters from the Honourable the Court of Directors.**Separate General Letter, 25th March, 1768.*

Par. 45. THE Marattas, instead of being reduced, are like to be aggrandized by their conquests of the Myfore dominions, which brings them so much nearer to the Carnatick; the Subah's weakness and indigence seem beyond all relief; and Hyder Ally, if less formidable to the Subah and the Marattas, is more likely to be an enemy to us, and to embrace every opportunity of disturbing the Carnatick.

General Letter, 13th May, 1768.

Par. 7. IT is with the utmost concern we find that the victory you have gained tends to involve us still farther in this chaos of treaties and engagements, and that you should still think your enemy so formidable as to call in foreign assistance; though you have a moral certainty that the attack of the Subah's dominions from Bengal must oblige him to a precipitate march to his capital, and though the Myfore dominions and Hyder Ally's possessions on the Malabar side all lay exposed to your attacks: that you should have recourse to the Marattas for that assistance, is still more alarming; and from the spirit of your negotiations with Madavarow, and your wild proposal to Bengal of putting up one of Shah Allum's Sons, we fear all the barriers to the Maratta power will be broken down, and that they will add the Deckan and Myfore dominions to their extensive empire, and hasten that event you designed to avert, we mean the conquest of the whole.

8. We should have hoped that the experience of what has passed in Bengal would have suggested the proper conduct to you; we mean, when our Servants, after the battle of Buxar, projected the extirpation of Sujah Dowlah from his dominions, and the giving them up to the King. Lord Clive soon discerned that the King would not have been able to maintain them, and that it would have broken down the strongest barrier against the Marattas and the northern Powers, and therefore wisely restored Sujah Dowlah to his dominions. Such too should be your conduct with respect to the Nizam and Hyder Ally, neither of whom it is our interest should be totally crushed.

Separate General Letter, 17th March, 1769.

Par. 3. IN our letter of the 25th March last, we gave you our sentiments at large with respect to the negotiations with the Subah of the Deckan, and the consequences apprehended from the treaty you had entered into with him; and by our before-mentioned letter, under date the 13th May, we expressed the dangers we apprehended from your calling in the Marattas to your assistance.

17. Your proceedings of the 28th April still leave us reason to apprehend you may enter into engagements with the Marattas for a body of horse, which we think

will have very fatal consequences, by harrassing and laying waste your own country as well as the enemy's; and we apprehend, notwithstanding the vast sum of money they will cost, they will be of very little use, it not being probable they will expose themselves much for our service; and when you have occasion to disengage yourselves from them, disagreements may arise of dangerous consequences.

Letter to Select Committee, 17th March, 1769.

Par. 4. JUDGE then our anxiety at seeing a system adopted so repugnant to our views, as that of supporting Mahomed Ally in the Myfore country. We repeat, we shall not think ourselves secure while we have a soldier, or Sepoy in that country, nor 'till we see it given to some Power, who may preserve it as a barrier against the Marattas, and who may be an useful ally, should we ever have occasion to call in the assistance of a Country Power.

General Letter, 30th June, 1769.

Par. 5. We must say, that upon principles of policy we wish for a peace with Hyder Naigue, whenever it can be obtained upon the most moderate terms; for our policy is to avoid every thing that tends to the increase of the Maratta Power, which is evidently the misfortune of this war; for you are reduced to the necessity of being yourselves the proposers of new provinces to be added to the dominion of the Marattas, already possessed of half the Mogul Empire.

6. Whether the Marattas have accepted or not of your offer, certain it is they will make the most use they can of the embroils of others; it is by this conduct they have arrived at their present degree of power; and our best policy is to check their growth by every opportunity, or at least to avoid lending our own force to their aggrandizement, which we certainly do as often as we engage in wars with the few remaining Chiefs of India who are yet capable of coping with them.

7. Nizam Ally and Hyder Naigue are two of those Chiefs, and it is our true interest to preserve a good understanding with them.

Separate General Letter, 23d March, 1770.

Par. 12. THE Marattas and Hyder you say were at war, and it undoubtedly was our interest, on many accounts, to see the power of the Marattas, if not of both the contending parties, weakened, but by no means to interfere in the dispute. Every Maratta that fell in the contest, might almost be considered as one of our enemies slain. But you have diverted Hyder—

The Honourable Court are, if possible, still more explicit in their orders to Bombay; see Extracts (sent us by the Select Committee there, in their letter of the 5th

5th May 1771) from the Honourable Company's commands, under date the 30th June 1769, entered in the minutes of this Committee 5th June last, in which they expressly say, that the whole tenor of their letters to the other Presidencies are to the same effect. Accordingly, in our correspondence with those Presidencies on the subject of the Marattas, it appears that they adhere to the system recommended by the Court of Directors; and Bombay enters so heartily into their ideas, that they are on the eve of actually declaring in favour of Hyder Ally Khan, in opposition to the Marattas. Supposing then we were ever so well inclined to gratify the Nabob, to indulge his revenge against Hyder Ally Khan, and gain him the present favour of the Marattas, by sending the Company's forces to conquer for them the Myfore country, and establish their power at our door, how could we justify the opposing the Company's forces of this Presidency, by acting with the Marattas, to the Company's forces of the Bombay Presidency that may be acting with Hyder Ally? for we have reason to believe, from their last letter of 21st October,† that they will send him aid, if he supplies them with money. We are aware of the answer, for it is already used by persons of high character; it is this:—Orders from home can only be temporary; and as times and circumstances change, so measures and systems ought to be changed. It is a sensible observation, and as a general maxim we adopt it; let us consider how it may be applied to the particular case before us. When this Presidency, in the year 1769, was on the very brink of ruin for want of money, and by that want was compelled to conclude a dishonourable peace, strongly impressed with the necessity of establishing some resource in time of danger, and in failure of ordinary supplies, we ventured to recommend to Bengal the making a prudent reserve; and Bengal, as strongly convinced as we, concurred in opinion with us. Private or personal motives could not possibly have any part in this proposal; safety to the Company's valuable possessions was the sole object. 'Tis true we had no express authority to make such a proposal, but there were no orders against it; and we surely had the general authority implied in our trust, of doing the best in our judgment for its preservation in cases unprovided for. Had we erred in judgment, as the intention was laudable, and on public motives, we should have thought it might have sufficed to say, the plan was not suitable to the circumstances of the affairs of the Company at home, and therefore at all risks must be laid aside. But we are not to expect such gentleness. We are stigmatized for making a peace, to which we are compelled for want of money to wage war; we are harshly censured for *proposing* means to avoid such another disgrace, or worse. This is the language in which we were reprimanded. We are told, that nothing but *infatuation* could have produced a system of guarding against *distant evils* abroad, by suffering the Company to sink under *immediate distress* at home; the *distant evils* were those of war with the French, the Marattas, or other powerful neighbours, of which we are in *constant* danger; the *immediate distress* at home, is the necessity of paying a large specific sum to our own Government, which ought to protect us, and a large dividend to the proprietors of stock, who have their capital at stake. We are commanded to lay aside so *destructive a plan*; to wit, that of guarding against dangers abroad, by entailing present advantages at home; and a *positive injunction* is added in these words; "That you do not at any time engage in plans of *so important* a nature without our knowledge and concurrence, as it behoves you to concert

† Vide page 1396.

“with us only such systems as materially affect the very existence of the Company:” and after this, shall we either deviate ourselves, or concert with the other Presidencies a deviation from a general system established for them all; a system which does indeed most materially affect the very existence of the Company? Forbid it prudence!

We come now to the fourth and last consideration against an alliance with them, viz. The danger and fatal consequences to be apprehended from such a measure.

We believe no one can doubt but the views of the Marattas evidently tend to the subjection of all India; this has been manifested by their conduct for some years past, but more especially of late; and the advantages they have gained over the Jauts and Rohillas, the obtaining possession of the Mogul and his family, together with the superiority they have acquired over Hyder Ally, are circumstances but too favourable to their ambitious designs. Their purposes would be answered in several ways, if we could be prevailed on to send the Company's forces to their assistance. First, it would ensure to them the conquest of the Mysore country, the principal forts of which, without our aid, may yet hold out a long time, and put them to the expense of a great force to starve them out. If we join them, they must see that neither Bengal or Bombay can oppose them; for they cannot think the Company's system so absurd, as that one Presidency shall oppose another; but if we do not join them, they know that Bengal, and Bombay too, look upon them with jealous eyes. If we once join them, we must not expect that our labour will end with the reduction of Mysore; we must follow them to the conquest of Bidder-nure, or wherever they please to carry us, or fight our way back through them, and through a vast and desolate country, without provisions; and thus our strength being wasted in making conquest and acquiring wealth and strength for them, what shall afterwards give protection to the Carnatick and the Company's possessions under this Presidency? The Nabob will answer it in two words, and the late Plenipotentiary would echo back his reply, MARATTA FAITH—MARATTA FAITH! Of all the faithless Powers on earth, the Maratta is most faithless; and shall we then submit our necks to such a yoke? Some excuse may be made for the Nabob, but what shall be said for the late Plenipotentiary, who, charged with the honour of the Crown, could nevertheless *humble* himself before the Musnud, and submit to become the instrument of insulting us, wantonly insulting us, with the *time when*, the place *where*, and the *manner how*, the peace was made with Hyder; a peace to which the want of aid from *his Idol* compelled us; and yet, without a blush, could urge us to comply with the threats of a Maratta Chief, and at all perils send the Company's forces, the British forces to his aid. Such are the honours the late Plenipotentiary endeavoured to acquire for the Crown of Great Britain—the honour of humbling the East-India Company before the *throne* of Mahomed Ally Khan! Hyder Ally was the Power in the south best able to withstand their efforts, and oppose their designs; the reduction of him therefore they looked upon as a necessary step to their views of universal conquest: and it is certain, that were they once possessed of the Mysore country, the Carnatick would be next exposed to their ravages, by which means the country must be ruined; and if we have not money to pay ~~our~~ troops, and provisions to subsist them, the forts must soon fall into their hands.

the Deckan has now but little power of resistance, and would become an easy prey to them; and they would then be enabled to bend their whole force against the northern Powers. These are the consequences naturally to be expected from the reduction of Myfore; and although the Nabob may flatter himself that a junction with the Marattas, to enable them to accomplish it, might for the present free himself from their ravages, we are fully persuaded that such a measure would in the end be productive of ruin to the Carnatick and the Company.

From all which reasons and considerations, the Committee are clearly of opinion, that they ought not to enter into an offensive alliance with the Marattas; and that the Nabob should be acquainted, that we never will engage in such a measure, unless commanded by the Court of Directors.

We come now to the second proposition, viz — To join Hyder Ally, provided he can furnish money for the expenses of the army, and can procure supplies of provisions for their subsistence.

We have, in our deliberations on this subject, frequently declared it as our opinion, that the supporting of Hyder Ally, that is the Myfore Government, as a barrier to the Maratta Power, would tend the most effectually to secure the peace and tranquillity of this province; and that in case the whole power and resources of the Carnatick were at our command, such a system would be the most prudent and eligible. But while the Nabob not only objects to such a measure, but urges the propriety of joining the Marattas to subdue Myfore, and in which he has been supported by His Majesty's Minister, it would be imprudent in the Company alone to undertake it; as not having the means of carrying it into execution, and as it might cause a separation of interests, which we ought as far as possible to avoid. We have annexed to the proposition the condition of Hyder's being able to furnish money and provisions, since without them it would be impossible to undertake any thing in his support. With regard to money, we know not how far his abilities may extend; but as to provisions, we think it impossible he should be able to furnish such supplies as would suffice for our army, unaccustomed to the hardships the country troops often suffer; we had proof enough of this in the late war. In this state of uncertainty, and considering the Nabob's utter aversion to any measures in support of Hyder Ally, we think we ought not to join him, or make any declaration in his favour; particularly as such a declaration would in fact be an open declaration of offensive war against the Marattas, which might endanger the Company's Charter; at least such has been the doctrine of His Majesty's late Minister. If we are attacked, it will be necessary we should take measures for our defence; and whatever steps shall appear expedient for that purpose will be justifiable: which brings us to the third and last proposition, namely,

To collect a body of troops in some central position, where they may best protect the country, either by detachments or otherwise, and distress the enemy by cutting off their supplies.

We

We have frequently declared it as our opinion, that it is impossible for infantry effectually to prevent the ravages of horse; in these sentiments we still continue: we are nevertheless of opinion, that we ought to oppose them as far as we are able; and it is not impossible but that, by vigorous and active measures, some advantage might be gained; or at least that the enemy may be so distressed by having their convoys intercepted, as to be obliged to abandon the province: whereas, were we to put the troops into garrison, and suffer the enemy to ravage and lay waste at pleasure, our resources and provisions would be exhausted to no purpose, and no one advantage could accrue. We are therefore of opinion, that General Smith should be instructed, after placing sufficient garrisons in the forts in the south, to hold the remainder of the army in readiness to march; that the Nabob be consulted with regard to the most proper station, and the supplies of money and provisions he can furnish. And as it will be necessary to prevent if possible Hyder Ally from making up matters with the Marattas, which he will no doubt do, if he hath no hopes of assistance from us; the Committee are of opinion, that a letter should be wrote expressing our good inclination towards him, but that we are at present unable, for want of orders from Europe, to take any measures; that these orders are shortly expected; and that in the mean time he be desired to inform us what assistance of money and provisions we may expect from him, in case the orders we may receive should authorise us to join him.

AGREED, That the foregoing Minutes be communicated to the Council.

The following letters from Trimbeck Row and Morarow to the Nabob, which were received yesterday, enclosed in a note from the Nabob, are now read.

Translation of a Note from the Nabob of the Carnatick to Governor Du Pré, dated and received 4th December, 1771.

ENCLOSED I send for your perusal a letter from Trimbeck Row, and a Persian translation of one from Morarow, both received by Camel Hircarrahs. Be so good as to tell me what I shall say in reply, that conformable thereto I may dispatch my answers, for which the Camel Hircarrahs are pressing. Accompanying I likewise send you a letter from Wellee Mahomed Khán, my deputy at the Fort of Sautgudda, and another from the Paishear of the Fort of Maleepady, also a translation of a Cadjan received from Chengam, and an Advice Paper from Cuddepanaut.

What can I say more?

Letter from Trimbeck Row to the Nabob. Received 4th December, 1771.

FOR these two years past, out of the greatness of my regard, I have been writing to you letters of friendship; and the answers I have received from thence have been full of expressions of the warmest regard, accompanied with fine evasions. The wintering of my victorious army in this country has been merely to punish
Hyder

Hyder Naigue, and accordingly he has been punished; but it is the gracious pleasure of Serceinant that the enemy should be punished effectually; and in the same manner I understood from Morarow was your fixed intention; to wit, to join in the Circar's affairs, and to have your revenge on your enemies; and after taking Syringapatnam, &c. places from the enemy, to give them to the Circar. You are thoroughly acquainted with the sincerity of the friendship of the English, and by the performance of this business, you will shew it so clearly and plainly. By a letter from Madarow Sadasive, above two months since, I understand that the Governor and you, sitting together in private, sent for him, *and swore to him*, saying, you both would send a proper force, and in the space of six weeks' time join *me*; and as you had heard the troops were coming on that side of the Ghauts into Hyder's country, that he, Madarow Sadasive, should prevent the same by writing to me, or else, by the coming of those troops, that the country near to you both would be ruined; accordingly, in consideration of their being no distinction between us, I at that time put a stop to the march of those troops, resting assured that in the time aforementioned your forces would come; but all at once I was informed of batteries being erected, and siege laid against Tanjore. In consideration of the friendship subsisting between us, on this business likewise I wrote to you repeatedly, but have not yet received an answer from thence on that subject; and every day brought me news of the streights to which the Fort of Tanjore was reduced: being under a necessity therefore, I dispatched a light army to assist the Rajah, and to pass likewise through Hyder Naigue's country. Between Serceinant Sahib and you a friendship most undoubtedly subsists, and the performance of such unbecoming measures from Madras appears highly improper, and may not be attended with good to either party. Most likely by this time a peace has been established between the Maha Rajah and you; but if not, I will come myself, and be the means of concluding a friendship between you; and that done, conformable to our intention, join you invariably in the Circar's affairs, and perform the great matters, which are agreeable to the pleasure of Serceinant Sahib. "The great hopes I place on the friendship of you, who are the fountain of friendship, are very great." For further particulars I refer to † Sunayputty's letter, and the verbal representation of Madarow Sadasive.

What can I say more?

May the time pass agreeable to the wishes of your friends!

From Morarow to the Nabob. Received 4th December, 1771.

AGREEABLE to your desire, I am to this time speaking in your behalf to Trimbeck Row by various ways and means; he, out of his friendship towards you, is ever founding your praise on account of your future foresight. I entertained hopes from the beginning that assistance would arrive from you, and the desire of your heart meet with success; but as you have not complied with the same, I am greatly amazed. You have no reasons, nor even is it proper for you to

† Morarow.

neglect or delay the execution of the necessary affairs, which I write to you. You have experienced the fashions of the English; if this be the case, what is the new fashion then? You have told me certain matters in my presence concerning this subject, notwithstanding which, I do not see it proper, nor even advantageous, that you should write of their (the English) negligence. You have agreed for certain matters lately, and wrote in plain terms; it is for this reason a delay in the affair would prejudice great people's promises. A bare friendship of Madavarow is esteemed more superlatively high than that of others with advantages; he being so great a Sardar, you can reap not the least profit by being his enemy; but on the contrary, it would be much more advantageous your being numbered among his friends; so that it is not proper that you should be evasive in your questions. The expedition against Tanjore was far from right; it is good for you to settle the business of that place, preserve the inclination of this side, and act according to the agreement. Had I been arrived to the assistance of Tanjore, I would have paid a visit to you, and would have carried on important operations, as also gained a good name. But while I stand as a mediator no enmity can take place. Don't be doubtful of our entering the Payenghaut with the army. If you have made a peace with the Rajah, it is well; if not, it will be incumbent on me to endeavour to preserve the friendship of Trimbeck Row for you, as well as the pleasure of Madavarow; it behoves you likewise to be mindful of this subject: what can I write you more than this? You will soon send an answer to this letter. I have spoke to Trimbeck Row, and got orders to the army that entered the Payenghaut; they will not molest your country. You will send a proper man along with Madarow Sadasive and Seereput Row. By all means I wish for your good. Don't delay to send an answer to this very soon.

The Committee think it only necessary to observe on the above letters, that without forcing an inference, it should seem from them, as well as from other letters and advices from the Balaghaut, that the Nabob has not contented himself with barely making excuses for not complying with the demands of the Marattas for assistance; but that he has gone further, that he has actually promised it; and which he might be induced to do from three motives. The first, that by promising to assist the Marattas in the reduction of Myfore, in which they would acquire great advantages, he hoped to prevail on them to defer their demand on him for Choute: Secondly, as he hoped to annex to his possessions the Barahamaul country, &c. which it appeared, by the letters he lately received from Trimbeck Row, had been promised him as a Jaghire: And thirdly, to gratify his revenge, as is expressed in Trimbeck Row's letter. The Nabob, it is true, well knew how averse we have constantly been to such a measure; but he has all along entertained hopes, that either by the influence of His Majesty's Minister, or the distresses to which he might be able to expose us, he should compel us to adopt his plan.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
Saml. Ardley.

Extract

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Monday, 9th December, 1771.

Extract of Letter from General Smith to the President and Council, dated Trichinopoly, 2d December, 1771.

P. S. Since I wrote the annexed letter, a body of Maratta cavalry, said to be about six thousand, have appeared a few miles to the westward of Syringapatnam; I shall take what steps I think necessary in consequence, and be glad to receive your instructions concerning the troops and their operations. The general orders respecting the artillery promotions have come to hand.

J. S.

The President lays before the Board the following extract of a letter wrote yesterday by him to General Smith:

Extract of a Letter from the President to General Smith, dated 8th December, 1771.

I HAVE no doubt but that the plundering the villages in the Nabob's country was by order of the Maratta Chief, tho' they pretend 'twas by mistake. Perhaps it was done to merit the money remitted to Trimbeck Row by the Rajah of Tanjore just before the conclusion of the peace; perhaps 'twas to get some money from the Nabob; perhaps 'twas to frighten us into a junction with them: in the last they will not succeed, unless we should receive orders from the Company to assist them; orders which I think the Company will not give.

We are told Narrain Row, with a fresh army of 20,000 horse, is under orders for the Balaghaut, and a part of them advanced as far as Junjabudra; I think it therefore very probable that we shall have a very powerful invasion in January. The Nabob is of opinion, and so am I, that the army had better not take the field until we learn further of their intentions; in the mean time I shall be obliged to you for your opinion what force to leave in the south in all the garrisons, and that done, what force you can put into the field out of the troops in the south. How are the Nabob's battalions now disposed of? How many are there? What horse has he besides Matthews' and Rumley's? Are they good for any thing?

Whenever the army moves, it appears to me necessary that you take with you from Trichinopoly as much provision as will serve you, at least 'till you can reach Wandewash, or other principal forts, where you may get fresh supplies; for it appears to me impossible to subsist an army in the field in any other way, when the enemy is superior in cavalry. I wish you would speak to the young Nabob upon this subject, that preparations may be made. I will urge the Nabob here to order proper quantities of Paddy to be beat and kept ready in rice in the several forts,

and I will endeavour to get a gross account of what is in store in them. It will be still more difficult to supply an army with bullocks for slaughter and sheep: the inhabitants will no doubt drive their cattle into the woods upon the first alarm, and it will be well if they do, and can be there preserved from the enemy; supplies may be obtained from thence from time to time, tho' not a daily and certain stock.

I beg you will also give me your opinion of a plan of operations, in case the Marattas should enter the province, and our army in consequence take the field.

Since writing the above, I have received advice that Trimbeck Row, with the main body of his army, was in motion, and was arrived within five Coss of Kist-nagherry; that an advanced party of 5000 were actually arrived near to Kist-nagherry, and that a detachment had been made towards Coverypatnam. As the party under Upparow and Kishen Row, which first entered the Baramahaul, plundered Calaspauk, and proceeded towards your parts, was sufficiently strong to ravage all Hyder's country on this side the Ghauts, it is natural to conclude, that Trimbeck Row's coming with his main body must have some further object; I begin therefore to think we shall have them upon us sooner than I expected: we must however remain as we are, until the Nabob consents to the army's taking the field: I have not seen him since the receipt of the last news. I shall write to you again shortly; mean while, I earnestly recommend to you to concert with the young Nabob about provisions to accompany you when you march, and hold every thing in readiness; and let me know what stores you shall want when you move towards those parts, that we may be preparing, or deposit them in time in proper places.

The Board much approve of what the President hath wrote General Smith, and which contains all we can at present say on the subject, until we shall have determined on the measures to be taken.

The Select Committee communicate to the Board their Minutes of the 5th instant, containing the substance of letters from Trimbeck Row and Morarow, and the advices received from the Balaghaut, together with the reflexions and opinion of the Committee on the measures to be taken.

AGREED to meet to-morrow morning at nine o'clock to take the same into consideration.

AT A CONSULTATION, Tuesday, 10th December, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings
John Smith
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill

Samuel Ardley
George Stratton

George Mackay.

THE Board having met, pursuant to the resolution of yesterday, proceed to take into consideration the reflexions and opinion of the Committee on the present state of affairs, and the threatened invasion by the Marattas, as recited in their minutes of the 5th instant; † when having maturely deliberated thereon, the Board came to the following resolutions, viz.

The Governor is desired to inform the Nabob,

1st. That it is our resolution not to enter into an offensive alliance with the Marattas, or to give them the least assistance of the Company's forces, unless we should receive orders to do so from the Court of Directors.

2d. That we are nevertheless desirous of remaining in peace and friendship with them.

3d. That whatever claim or demand the Marattas may have upon the Nabob, under whatever promises or pretences, we neither know nor acknowledge in them any just claim or demand of any kind upon the Company.

4th. That as they have no colour of right to require the assistance of the Company's forces, a demand of such assistance, (in whatever terms, whether in the form of proposals, or otherwise,—whether directly, or by intermediation) accompanied with the threats of laying waste the Carnatick Payenghaut, and by actual hostility, as in the plundering of Calaspauk, and other villages, is a very great insult.

5th. That a compliance therefore with such a demand must be dishonourable, and what is still worse, must subject the Company to the like insults again and again, not only by the Marattas, but by every Power around; who seeing our fears or necessities, and inferring from such a dishonourable submission, that the Company have no will, government, or power of their own, will be encouraged upon every occasion to threaten the Carnatick, in order to obtain the Company's aid: that a compliance therefore is not only dishonourable, but dangerous.

† Vide page 1402, &c.

6th. That we are determined not to make offensive war upon any Power; and that we will not assist even Hyder Ally Khán against the Marattas, unless we are authorized by the Company to do so, or unless an actual invasion of the Carnatick Payenghaut by the Marattas should compel us to a defensive war; in which case, if an union of our forces with Hyder Ally Khán should then appear a better plan of defence than a separate opposition to them, we think such a junction should then be formed.

7th. That considering the friendship and connexion between the Company and the Nabob, we are ready to enter into measures with him for defending ourselves and his possessions against all invaders, and particularly against the Marattas, who now threaten the Carnatick Payenghaut.

8th. That notwithstanding what we have herein before declared, of our resolution not to join with or assist the Marattas with Company's troops, and that we will not make offensive war with any Power, but only defend ourselves and the Nabob's country, if attacked, in the best manner we can; yet, as the Nabob is not bound, and we do not mean to bind him, by our resolutions, if he shall think it conducive to the safety of his country, and the permanent prosperity of his affairs, to join the Marattas with his own proper forces, we think him at full liberty to do so; though such a measure would be contrary to the system recommended by the Company to the three Presidencies; because the other two Presidencies, as well as this, adopt that system; and because we think a contrary system will in the end bring on certain ruin. That should the Nabob nevertheless resolve to join the Marattas with his own proper troops, in that case we shall beg leave to recall the Company's Officers we have lent him; we shall then put all the Company's troops into garrison, and observe a strict neutrality, unless we should receive clear and explicit orders from the Company to act in any manner; which orders we are determined to obey, whatever he may be, should we have it in our power to do so.

9th. That our money and resources, besides four Lacks of Pagodas due from the Nabob for charges expended on his account to ultimo October last, and one Lack of Pagodas, which will be due the end of January next, for the Jaghire Kist; we say, our money and resources beyond these sums are so inconsiderable, that they will barely suffice for the ordinary civil charges of the Presidency.

10th. That it is therefore necessary in the first place to be ascertained by the Nabob, what support of money we may depend upon from him for the military charges of the field and his garrisons, in case the Marattas should enter the country.

11th. That in case the army should take the field, it must rest entirely on the Nabob to supply the army in the field, as well as the garrisons in his country where we have troops, with provisions, as it is not in our power to do so, having no control in the Nabob's country.

12th. That

12th. That we earnestly recommend to the Nabob to give directions for preparing supplies of provisions in the several forts, agreeable to a separate paper annexed, marked A.

13th. That in the present posture of affairs, we are of opinion, that General Smith be ordered to leave such garrisons of Europeans and Sepoys at Trichinopoly, Madura, and Palamcotah, as he shall think absolutely necessary for their present defence, and hold all the rest of the troops in the south in readiness to move upon short warning.

14th. That the Nabob be consulted as to the time of the army's moving, the place to which they shall move, and the object.

The following is an account of the provisions to be collected, and other articles provided by the Nabob, referred to in the 12th article of the foregoing resolutions :

1st. What quantity of grain is in the several forts of the Carnatick, particularizing the quantity which is in each fort.

2d. The full allowance for an European soldier is $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of clean rice, $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of beef, or the eighth part of a sheep.

3d. About the same quantity rice, or part of rice and part doll, for the Sepoys.

4th. Ghee and Curry stuff, such as Sepoys generally eat, a quantity in proportion.

5th. To keep in each of the principal forts, in the different parts of the country, as much rice as will victual at least 10,000 men for 10 days ; for Paddy will be of no use, as there will not be time to beat it into rice when the army may be on the march, or arrive in distress for supplies.

6th. About 15,000 lb. or 600 Maunds of Rice will be necessary for 10,000 men for ten days. A bullock carries about 75 lb. so that 15,000 lb. will load 2,000 bullocks.

7th. In the field, and in the Nabob's forts, the number of Europeans will be full 1500. The Nabob has promised to lay in stores for three years at Velum ; in Trichinopoly and Vellour he assures us there is plenty. It will be necessary to provide for Madura and Palamcotah.

8. It is supposed the army and necessary attendants will not consist of less than 10,000 people ; of these we must reckon 1000 Europeans ; allowing these $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of beef per man per day, or 8 men to one sheep, the daily consumption will be 125 sheep ; or 1500 lb. of beef, at 80 lb. per bullock, will be about 18 bullocks per day ; or in the same proportion, part sheep and part bullocks.

9th. Whether it is not necessary to keep a good stock, both of sheep and bullocks, under cover of the principal forts, or in such Polligars' woods where they may be safe, and from whence the army may get supplies.

Mr. Mackay delivers in his dissent to the 8th Article of the foregoing resolutions, as follows :

Article 8. I DISAPPROVE of telling the Nabob, that we think him at liberty, if he pleases, to join the Marattas against Hyder Ally with his own forces, as expressed in this article: not that I believe he will be mad enough to take such a step, whatever may be his inclinations; but because I think such a declaration from the Board highly improper, as also contrary to the spirit of all the orders received from the Court of Directors, which positively tells us, that we are not to have any alliances or connexions with the Marattas that will tend to aggrandize their power, but only to live in peace with them: and as the union between the Nabob and the Company is of that nature, that their acting in opposition to each other may, and probably will, be attended with consequences fatal to one, if not to both, I do not think our Honourable Masters can approve of our declaring any sentiments to the Nabob, that tend to make him believe he is at liberty to separate his interest from their's.

GEO. MACKAY.

Mr. Hastings also begs leave to deliver in his dissent to the 6th and 8th Articles of the foregoing resolutions, as follows :

6th. ALTHOUGH my opinion will not be found to differ very materially from that of the Board, as contained in this article, yet I think it necessary to explain the sense in which I can with propriety assent to it; because, as it stands, it implies a doubt of the powers of this Government where I have none; and the resolution expressed in it, though suitable to the present occasion, appears too peremptory and determinate.

The constant tenor of all the Company's orders forbids any kind of alliance with the Marattas, expressing the strongest apprehensions of their power, and recommending it as the "Best policy to *check* their growth by every opportunity." In their orders to the Presidency of Bombay, now before us†, they reproach them for bearing with the menaces and insults of the Marattas; and plainly intimate, that they ought to have attacked, and even destroyed, the Maratta Fleet, when it cruized off their harbour; although no hostilities had been actually committed, nor does it appear that any were intended. We may safely conclude, from this instance, what would be the sentiments of our Superiors on the late behaviour of the Marattas towards this Presidency. They have demanded aid; they have threatened; they have done more, they have committed hostilities, not against the Company indeed, but against the Nabob, the firm friend and ally of the Company; and this the Court of Directors declare, in the passage above quoted, they shall consider as

† Vide Note, page 1438.

equal to an offence committed against themselves; and that *they will never suffer a people, under their protection, to be distressed and plundered under any pretence whatsoever.*

We are therefore already *authorized by the Company* to make *offensive war* against the Marattas, if to prevent an insult, or to prevent a determined injury, be to act offensively.

I must give it as my opinion, that if the Nabob were disposed to unite and cooperate heartily and steadily with us, and we could be assured of the necessary supplies of provisions, the resolution of this Government ought to be taken immediately, not to defend the Carnatick when it shall be invaded, but to prevent an invasion, by carrying the war at once into the Balaghaut; and in support of this opinion, I beg leave to offer the following reasons:

Because we are assured, and the Marattas themselves have declared, that they will invade the Carnatick.

Because their present force in the Balaghaut has been much harrassed and weakened, and of course rendered less fit for that kind of war in which their superiority consists, by the fatigues and distresses of a long campaign.

Because they expect to be reinforced by a fresh army of 20,000 horse, under the command of Narrain Row; which may yet be detained some time, as they must bring their provisions with them.

Because the Marattas could not easily find a subsistence in the Payenghaut before the new crops are ripe.

Because at such a time, therefore, it would be more easy to cut off their supplies, by attacking their Bunjarees, their only actual means of subsistence.

In a word, because an *offensive war* begun and carried on at a time most convenient to ourselves, in a foreign country, and against an enemy not fully prepared, but determined to begin with us if we do not begin with them, is on every account to be preferred to a *defensive war* in the heart of our own country, begun by the enemy, with the choice of their own time, with every advantage of the season in their favour, with all their force collected and every preparation made, and Hyder Ally, whose power might yet avail us something, totally reduced, as he probably would be, and his country and it's resources at their command.

But as the Nabob will not consent to such a measure, and even perseveres in urging us to assist the Marattas, and we cannot act without him, I therefore agree with the Majority of the Board, that it would be most expedient to wait for the arrival of the expected orders from England, before any decisive step be resolved on; in the mean time, I think that every previous disposition should be made, which would have been necessary had the resolution passed for an immediate and offensive war:

I mean, that the preparations to be made should have an offensive war for their object; that is to say, to move the army, and form detachments. It might take up a fortnight or three weeks to make such dispositions; in that time the expected orders from the Company may arrive; these may be so clear and decisive, as to cut off every hope which the Nabob may yet entertain of their assenting to his plan of a Maratta alliance, and to induce him to submit to the only option left him of opposing the Marattas. But should it so happen, that any accident, not improbable from the lateness of the season in which the Lord Holland and Britannia left England, should retard their arrival, and the Nabob, in the mean time, should be induced, either by fresh provocations of his enemies, or by a change of sentiment, to form the resolution of returning their hostilities, or commencing hostilities against them; in such a case I think this Government will not only be justified in assisting him without waiting for further authority, but will be liable to the reproach of a disobedience of orders and infidelity to their Ally, besides much worse consequences, if they do not.

8. I do not approve of this article, because I fear it may encourage the Nabob to send his own forces to assist the Marattas. All they want is a disciplined force and artillery to reduce Hyder's principal forts; this purpose may be effected by the forces in the Nabob's service: and notwithstanding the intimation given him, that the Company may order us to act against the Marattas, I apprehend such an order may come too late, when the Nabob shall have entered into so close an alliance with them, as to make it impossible to act against them without becoming his enemy at the same time; which we are pretty certain no orders of the Company can justify, while the constant and invariable spirit of all the orders is, that the confirmation of their alliance with the Nabob, and the support of his Government, are to be the ruling principles of all our political transactions. If therefore, on such a latitude given to the Nabob, he should precipitate himself into a Maratta alliance, this Government is tied to him, and must necessarily follow him in it, in spite of all orders the Company may give; unless they *expressly* authorize a total separation from him, which is impossible.

WARREN HASTINGS.

The Board think it necessary to make the following remarks on Mr. Hastings' dissent to the 6th article:

It has never been denied that the orders of the Company against any measures which may tend to an increase of the Maratta Power are very plain and express; in these sentiments the three Presidencies have as clearly and heartily concurred: it is our steady perseverance therein that has been the principal cause of dispute with the Nabob; and we have fully expressed our resolution to him not to depart therefrom, without the express directions of our Superiors.

The arguments urged by Mr. Hastings in favour of the plan proposed by him, that our operations should not be confined simply to the defence of the Carnatick

when it shall be invaded, but to prevent an invasion, by carrying the war at once into the Balaghaut, have great weight: but there is one insurmountable objection to such a measure;—the Nabob is against it. This objection Mr. Hastings admits; and therefore, setting aside our inability, it remains only to be considered, whether we should be justified in adopting such a plan without his concurrence.

The orders of the Company are not more express against aggrandizing the Maratta Power, than they are against our entering into offensive wars; indeed *we have been told, that the Company are not authorized by their Charter to make offensive wars.* The conduct and threats of the Marattas are against the Nabob's country: whatever may be his motives for suffering their insults and depredations, we cannot take up arms in his support without his concurrence, as such a step would in fact be engaging in an offensive war, in which we must make ourselves the principals: we should expose ourselves to the imputation of dragging the Nabob into measures contrary to his inclination; and if the country be plundered and laid waste, if an accommodation be thereby prevented, or whatever consequences may happen, they would be laid at our door.

The orders of the Court of Directors to the Presidency of Bombay do by no means imply that we are to assist the Nabob against the Marattas whether he will or not; they declare, that they look upon the Nabob as their firm friend and ally, and *that they never will suffer a people under their protection to be plundered or distressed.* But the Nabob does not, or would not, seem to look upon the conduct of the Marattas in that light, or to regard them as enemies; he not only does not desire our assistance to oppose them, but is utterly averse to any measures against, and even presses a junction with them. And although we are not obliged to suffer ourselves to be dragged into measures, which appear to us inconsistent with the Company's orders and the security of their possessions, we could not certainly be justified in commencing a war in support of the Nabob's Government in express opposition to his will.

The resolution of the Board on the article now under consideration must be supposed to be founded on the present state of affairs; a change in that state must necessarily occasion a change in resolution; and it will always be prudent to change to-day the resolution of yesterday on good cause. For instance,—If the orders of the Company should authorize an alliance with Hyder Ally against the Marattas, and if the Nabob should change his opinion, and see the necessity of taking vigorous measures to repel their insults and depredations, and desire our assistance, in such a measure we should not only be justified, but it would then be incumbent on us to afford him the most effectual support for the security of his country.

As to what Mr. Hastings recommends, that every previous disposition should be made which would have been necessary had the resolution passed for an offensive war, and that it might take up a fortnight or three weeks to make such a dis-

Supposition. the Board do not see what other preparations can with propriety be now made than those already resolved on. The troops have been ordered to hold themselves in readiness for moving; and it has been determined in the 14th article, that the Nabob shall be consulted as to the time of the army's moving, the place to which they shall move, and the object.

The Board think it necessary, in answer to the foregoing dissents on the 8th article, to make some observations, which may serve to explain their motives and reasons for the declaration proposed to be made to the Nabob in that article; and which is the more necessary, as the Board see the force of the arguments urged by Messieurs Hastings and Mackay against such a declaration, and which must yet appear in a stronger light to persons not well informed of our present situation and circumstances.

We have said, that we see plainly the force of the arguments urged by Messieurs Hastings and Mackay, and, under other circumstances than the present, we should concur with them in opinion of the impropriety of making any declaration to the Nabob, that could tend in the most distant manner to an idea of a separation of interests; but after the repeated declarations made to us by His Majesty's late Minister Plenipotentiary, that the Nabob is considered as an Ally of the Crown of Great Britain, by virtue of the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, sentiments which are adopted by the Court of Directors, as evidently appears from their commands to the Commissioners of 23d March 1770, Par. 31, 32*; after this Government hath been so severely accused of dragging the Nabob into measures contrary to his inclination: after these circumstances, we say, we think we ought not only to leave the Nabob at liberty to take such measures as shall appear to him expedient for the safety of his country; but that it is no less necessary that we should make such our plain declaration to him, to avoid the imputation of having actually or virtually compelled him into measures contrary to his will. These considerations induced us to make the like declaration to the Nabob in our letter to him of 25th April last†, when he desired our opinion with regard to the expediency of his sending his own troops to the assistance of the Marattas; and we shall think it necessary to observe the same cautious conduct, while such a construction is given to the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris, and while we are surrounded by persons who are ever on the watch to accuse us of a breach thereof.

Mr. Mackay says such a declaration is contrary to the spirit of the orders received from the Court of Directors, which positively tell us, that we are not to have any alliances or connexions with the Marattas, but only to live in peace with them. In answer to this, in the first place, we say, it does not appear to us that the orders are positive; they are strong systematic recommendations: but suppose them to be the most positive orders that words can convey, we act agreeable to the letter and spirit of them, in *refusing* for ourselves to accede to their demands, and in *advising* the Nabob to do so too, and enforcing such advice by reasons; and were we to do otherwise, we should act contrary to the letter and spirit of the Company's Orders, which refuse us a control over the Nabob. It does not follow
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* See Appendix, No. XXX. page 29.

† Appendix, No. XXI. 609.

by any means, that if the Nabob should join the Marattas that we are to act in opposition to him; on the contrary, our declaration in the same article is, that we will remain inactive in garrison.

The spirit of Mr. Hastings's dissent consists in these points :

1st. That the Nabob may be encouraged to assist the Marattas.

2d. That his forces and artillery may reduce Hyder.

3d. That if we receive orders from the Company to assist Hyder, we cannot after the Nabob shall have joined the Marattas.

4th. That if he should join them, we are tied to him, and must follow him.

We answer,—1st.—That to advise against a measure is to discourage it; and we have no other means of prevention but force, which we think unlawful, and therefore cannot consent to.

2d. That the Nabob's artillery, we believe, is not a jot better than the Maratta artillery; indeed we know not of any artillery he has except a few field-pieces, unless he should take the guns from the ramparts of Vellour and Trichinopoly, and few of the carriages would travel ten miles.

3d. Then we must not assist Hyder; for we cannot do impossibilities; we cannot make contradictions consistent.

4th. Though we cannot compel the Nabob, nor act against him, it does not therefore follow that we must submit to be dragged into all his measures; he would have carried us some years ago into the Deckan to place him on the Musnud; we refused, and the refusal was approved; and if his measures carry him from us, while our shackles confine us, we cannot help it; we have no choice; it cannot be imputed to us, but to the cause of which we have frequently complained to the Court of Directors, viz. *the want of system in the connexion between the Nabob and the Company*, and which the Company alone can establish.

Mr. Hastings's Reply to the Board's Remarks.

I AM sorry that I have been the cause of leading the Board to so long a discussion on subjects, which I should not have considered of so much importance in themselves as to have thought it necessary to explain my particular sentiments upon them, but that it tended to elucidate and confirm what has been so often repeated, of the embarrassments and dangers to which this Government is exposed by its loose and indefinite connexion with the Nabob. I must however beg leave to add a few words

words in support of the points quoted from my dissent, merely that I may not be misunderstood.

1st. I do not mean that the Board should advise against the measure in question, or discourage it, but that we say nothing either for or against it; because the advice is dangerous, and we are not called upon to give any. I will frankly confess, that I think the apprehensions expressed by the Board but too well founded, and their precaution just; nevertheless, I desire my opinion may stand of the consequences which I think may ensue from such a declaration.

2d. I do not know what artillery the Nabob has, I know only that he has English officers to command it; and though that corps may not yet be sufficiently strong, or sufficiently provided, to perform the service for which they may be required, yet my apprehensions go further than I before ventured to express on record, but which I will now declare to be, that if the Nabob should resolve to assist the Marattas against Hyder Ally, he will apply to the Admiral for a detachment of his seamen or marines, and with such an addition his artillery may be equal to the proposed service.

To the 3d and 4th articles I will only say in two words, that there is no medium; we never can act a *neutral* part while the Nabob takes an active one, but we must be with him or against him. It is not very essential to the present question to prove this assertion, and it would lead to endless argument.

WARREN HASTINGS.

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
John Smith
Geo. Stratton
Henry Brooke
John Whitehill
Geo. Mackay.

Extract of Proceedings of the Select Committee at Fort St. George, 10th December, 1771.

DISPATCHED the following letters to Bengal and Bombay, * the first per Tapals, the other via Anjengo.

To the Honourable John Cartier Esquire, President and Governor, &c. Gentlemen of the Select Committee at Fort William.

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

OUR advices for some time past have given us cause to apprehend that the designs of the Marattas were to invade this province with a view of compelling us

* The letter to Bombay is to the same purport as that to Bengal.

into a junction with them against Mysore; and we now think it necessary to inform you, that the main body of their army is already on this side the Passes, and considerable detachments have been made into the Baramahaul country, which lies also on this side, and belongs to Hyder Ally. Straggling parties have actually entered this province, and plundered some villages; but their actions have been disavowed by the Maratta Vackeel at this place, and they have retired out of the country, carrying with them their plunder. We also learn, that a reinforcement of 20,000 horse, under the command of Narrain Row, is on the march from Poonah, and we have all reason to believe that a very formidable invasion will be made on this province.

The Marattas still persist, as we have before advised you, in demanding the assistance of the Company's forces against Hyder Ally, and we persist in refusing them. The Nabob, who, supported by Sir John Lindsay, urged us in the warmest manner to unite with the Marattas, finding us determined against such a measure, ceases to press us so violently, but still retains the same sentiments. Having wrote in the strongest and clearest manner on this subject to the Court of Directors in every letter from January 1770 to the dispatch of the Lapwing in October 1770, without receiving a word of reply to this time, we cannot doubt but that the advices expected by the Lord Holland will bring us decisive instructions; our present resolution therefore is to hold ourselves in readiness, but to take no hostile step, unless the Carnatick shall be attacked, until we receive instructions. We have already said, that we expect the Carnatick will be shortly invaded; in that case our army must take the field; our expenses will be great, our means inadequate; but we have no choice. The Nabob tells us, that if the province is invaded, he shall not be able to supply us with money, we cannot therefore place any dependence on him; our own resources, such as we can depend on, will not extend beyond the expenses of four or five months; we beg therefore to be informed, whether you can give us any or what assistance in specie, for we do not think we shall be able to negotiate bills on your Presidency for any considerable amount. We are apprehensive that this may be distressing you, but as our exigencies will probably be very great, we doubt not but you will assist us all in your power. We are,

Honourable Sir and Sirs,

Your most obedient humble servants,

Fort St. George,
10th December, 1771.

JOS. DU PRÉ, &c. Committee.

AT SELECT COMMITTEE, Wednesday, 11th December, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley.

LETTER from Hyder Ally Khan received the 6th instant read, advising of his having, out of regard to his friendship and engagements to the Company, peremp-
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torily refused the pressing solicitations of the Marattas to join in an invasion of the Carnatick Payenghaut, towards which they had advanced; that he had dispatched 5000 horse to watch their motions; recommending that detachments be posted at the passes of Chamanga and Amboor, to prevent their entering the country, and that the inhabitants be directed to secure their cattle and effects in the woods and forts.

From Hyder Ally Khân to Governor Du Pré, dated 23d November, and received 6th December, 1771.

I T was with pleasure and satisfaction I received your letter of the 19th of October last.† You tell me, “You do not doubt but I shall do whatever may be best for procuring permanent stability to my affairs, and that you write to me in all truth and sincerity.”‡ It has been merely out of consideration of the sincerity of your friendship and adherence to your engagements, which makes me esteem our interests entirely as one, that I have given the Marattas this plain answer;—that between the English Company and me a treaty of perpetual peace, confirmed by every tie, subsists, and that I would on no account send my troops to accompany them, in case of their making irruptions and raising disturbances towards Arcot. This plain answer has been given them; notwithstanding Trimbeck Row their Sardar and I had been quarrelling and disputing this very matter for four or five months. They have now left these parts, with an intention of passing into the Arcot Payenghaut; I have stationed troops, both Sepoys and Peons, to stop the Passes, and have dispatched a body of brave and well mounted horsemen, to the amount of 5000, to attack their van and rear, and to keep moving round them; accordingly every day, by God’s blessing, an hundred and two hundred horses are taken by them, as I make no doubt you have also heard from other hands. You likewise will keep on your part two trusty Sardars, with troops, the one at Changama, and the other at Amboor, with directions to chastize the Marattas wherever they may make their appearance; to your Talookdars also you will give orders to send away the inhabitants and cattle belonging to the open towns and villages to the woods and other places of protection. Besides running about the country, and carrying off it’s cattle, what can the Marattas do? your first care therefore as above should be to send the afore-mentioned orders to the Talookdars. Respecting the inhabitants and cattle, I mention this out of the greatness of regard subsisting between us. Always let me have the pleasure of receiving letters from you advising of your health, that I may rejoice?

May your happiness and prosperity increase!

P. S. Strengthen your forts and garrisons, and send orders to your Killedars and Talookdars, that in case of the Maratta troops entering into the Arcot country, and the Circar’s troops following them with a view of chastising them, that they (the Killedars and Talookdars) procure whatever secret intelligence they can respecting the Marattas, and advise the Sardar of the Circar’s troops thereof.

May your happiness and prosperity increase!

† Vide page 1388.

‡ This passage is a quotation from Governor Du Pré’s letter of the 8th of November, instead that dated the 19th of October.—See page 1391.

The President also lays before the Committee the following intelligence received yesterday from the Nabob :

Purport of the Advice from the Balaghaut to the Nabob, dated 7th December, 1771.

HYDER's Vackeel applied to Trimbeck Row, and after delivering his Master's letter to him, told him, by his Master's order, that if he would make peace with his Master before he enters the Payenghaut, he was willing to send an assistance of a force along with Muckdoom Naigue to enable him, the said Trimbeck Row, to take possession of all the Arcot forts, and to commit hostilities as far as Madras; he told the same thing to Morarow: but Trimbeck Row answered, that as his Master did not hearken to him before, he had no occasion to talk about it at present; and he added, that if he was unable to do what he talks of, he will then ask for his assistance. On this the said Vackeel got one Yadavaput to speak to Trimbeck Row, that the Nabob always made an excuse to send his assistance, saying, that the Europeans were not under his direction; if so, how came they to fight the Tanjoreans according to his direction? which Trimbeck Row communicated to Morarow, who spoke in favour of the Nabob; that it was not right to comply with Hyder's request; but that it was better to be in peace and friendship with the Nabob, as it will be impossible for Hyder to cope against the European force. Trimbeck Row answered him, to endeavour to send for the Nabob soon to join him. Morarow replied, that by the time the army arrives at Kistnagherry, the Vackeel and the assistance from the Nabob will join him. Morarow seeing me and the Company's Hircar, told us the same; and said that I should write to the Nabob to act in such manner, that what he spoke to Trimbeck Row may stand good, that the Nabob's country may be saved from plunder, and that the Vackeel may soon come to the army while it may remain at Trinamel, that the assistance may be sent for from the Nabob. It seems the intention of the Marattas is to form a design against Amboor and Sautgudda, as they gained intelligence that there are no more than 500 men in each fort, and a few men in Malapaddy. A Maratta Sardar from Poorah is arrived with 10,000 horse at Chetragul, and has been wrote to by Trimbeck Row to take that Polligar's forces with him, and proceed towards Biddenure; Trimbeck Row has also wrote to the different Polligars to join him with their forces, and acquainted them that he is making preparations for war.

THE Pandaura horsemen that plundered Calaspauk arrived in the army on the 4th, and sold some cloth in the Buzar; upon which Trimbeck Row took away the bales of cloth they brought, punished and imprisoned them. Some Pandauras sold cloth in Morarow's camp, who used them in the same manner, and told me that a strict order had been given not to plunder the Arcot country; but now, if the Nabob does not send his answer soon to the letter he wrote to him, his country will be disturbed more than what was already done by the Pindaries; and he added, that it was better for the Nabob soon to send his Vackeel and the answer.

T.
Nabob.

Purport of the Advice from Cuddapatnam to the Nabob, dated 7th December, 1771.

TRIMBECK ROW lay encamped at Kistnagherry, and is erecting Mourchas. Vamenraw is near Syringapatnam. It is talked that Morarow comes to Vencatgherry with 2000 horse; that the Company's Hircars, as per orders from Madras, sent some Hircars, &c. news-writers, both to Vamenraw and Upparow's camp; and that Tippoo Saib is arrived at Bengalore, to collect a force and to attack Vamenraw by night.

The Committee think it only necessary to remark, that the foregoing intelligence differs very widely from the professions made by Hyder Ally in his above-mentioned letter. How far the one or the other may be depended upon it is impossible to say; the Committee however think that at all events means should be tried to prevent an accommodation between them, as a junction against the Carnatick would probably be the consequence; and the draught of the letter to Hyder Ally being prepared, a postscript is now added thereto, acknowledging the receipt of his above-mentioned letter, expressing our satisfaction at his refusal of the Maratta proposal, and assuring him that we still retain the same favourable sentiments towards him which we have frequently expressed; and resolved that the same be communicated to the Board for their approval.

The President lays before the Committee a note from the Nabob, accompanying a translation of a letter from Trimbeck Row to Madarow Sadaive, dated 3d instant, advising of his having passed the Ghaut of Bodicotah with a design of settling the Circar's affairs in the Baramahaul, recommending that the Vackeel proceed to him with a trusty person from the Nabob, and that a person be sent to the Nabob from Trimbeck Row, when affairs will be settled to their mutual advantage.

Translation of a Note from the Nabob to Governor Du Pré, dated 11th December, 1771.

ENCLOSED I send for your perusal a letter from Mahomed Neẖaz Khân, Amuldar of the Vellour Jaghire, together with a translation of a letter from Trimbeck Row to Madarow Sadaive.

What can I say more

Letter from Trimbeck Row to Madarow Sadaive, dated 3d December, 1771.

IN consequence of what you write to me, I did not send my army before into the country below the Passes; yesterday however I passed the Ghaut of Bodicotah, and with my troops am arrived in the said country. The Tongedar of Cuddapah formerly, when he settled his matters with the Circar, gave up thereto the Baramahaul district; but some confusion happening in the management of affairs there,

Hyder Naigue got it into his possession: the Circar's government however must now be established therein. A friendship subsists between the Nabob and me, and Sercemant Pundit esteems him as his own. I have wrote in various modes to Court; Morarow Gorparah Surmyaputtee also has done the same; and it is now near a twelvemonth since you were dispatched from thence. The fruit of friendship between people of distinction is mutual benefit; had the friendship between the Nabob and me been attended with that effect, that friendship would have gained strength, and in the eye of the world appeared well. The extirpation of Hyder Naigue is my fixed intention, and with this view I am arrived near; there must now be an interview between us: you should bring a trusty person with you on the part of the Nabob, and people of trust also should be sent to him from hence, and the affairs of both parties be accomplished; this will doubtless be agreeable to Pundit Purdhaun, and be the means of effecting important objects: the making use of excuses herein is neither consistent with wisdom nor prudence. The plan on which the large armies of the Marattas* are conducted is this†: they have with them great quantities of stores, and thousands of horse constantly going round them at a considerable distance; and the Nabob knows that this is not a mode merely of to-day: he should not think any thing of this; for supposing the army of a father to pass by the village of a son, or the army of a son to pass by that of a father, the largeness of the army will cause some damage to be done, but they are never in consequence of orders from the Sardar: the Pandauras and plunderers accompanying the army plunder even great cities. Should the horse, on account of my near approach, plunder the Circar's villages through ignorance, do not construe it in any other light; I have given them positive orders on this head, and therefore acquaint you of it. My views are these; your coming, an interview with the Nabob, and the accomplishment of the objects before us; should the Nabob think any otherwise, you will imprint in his mind the above matters. I have acquainted you clearly of the thoughts of my heart: let not the Nabob think of things detrimental to our friendship; I have not, but have wrote to you plainly. Your coming to me with a trusty person of the Nabob's, the obtaining advantages for both sides, and listening to my word, are all matters which will give pleasure to Pundit Purdhaun. I will also listen to what messages you may report to me in a proper manner on the part of the Nabob, which will give him pleasure. It is on this account that I have so frequently wrote to you in so † undisguised a manner, and now write this; send me your answer soon, as, in expectation of the same; I am waiting here to conquer the Baramahaul country and reduce it's garrisons. The taking of the forts upon the hills will require four days; the garrisons in the other places may with the greatest ease be disposed. This is the time for accomplishing the proposed plan, agreeable to what I wrote to you. Complete

* It is to be observed that he files them *The Plunderers*.

† The meaning of which is supposed to be, that as Trimbeck Row's army is one of those large ones, and of course has those numerous bodies of horse going the circuit round it at a considerable distance therefrom, the Nabob ought not to take it amiss that some of his villages have been plundered.

†† I am writing of the skin to the Persian.

Nabob.

your negotiation, and come to me soon, for *that* is the fruit of your remaining there so long.

What can I say more?

Purport of a Letter from Mahomed Newaz Khán to the Nabob, dated 7th December, 1771.

I OBSERVED what your Excellency was pleased to acquaint me concerning your treatment to the Marattas, and of course I should make myself easy with regard to their committing hostilities, give encouragement to the inhabitants, collect the present year's money, and send a quantity of Paddy, amounting to one Lack of Rupees, to the Fort of Vellour. Agreeable to your orders I rode as far as the district of Nermetty, and gave all possible encouragement to the inhabitants; but they would not believe me, or place any confidence in my sayings. As the Maratta horse invaded the neighbourhood of Tripatore and Vaniambaddy, the inhabitants of Codynollam, &c. were dispersed; which news reaching to the inhabitants of my district, they went away with their families, cattle, &c. to the woods for shelter, and are still going away, leaving only one man in their respective houses. Caur crop is spoiling away for want of people to cut and to gather them, which occasions great loss to the produce. It is impossible for me to write the great impediment that attends in collecting the revenues, and in carrying on the cultivation, on account of the inhabitants being dispersed as above. They say, that if the town wall of Peromnor, as well as the Gadies of Pulleconda, Samfabad, Vaniambaddy, &c. are repaired, and proper garrisons stationed in different places, they will then mind the business of their carrying on their cultivation, taking protection in the said Gadies, &c.—if otherwise, they say it will be impossible for them to stay and mind their business. If you send 200 Sepoys and Peons to me, it is well; if not, you will send an order to me, that I might enlist Sepoys, repair all the Gadies as aforesaid, place proper garrisons in different places, and settle the affairs of the districts, after making the inhabitants easy as is required. If the Marattas should stay any longer in Payenghaut, (which God forbid!) the inhabitants will never settle themselves in the country, but on the contrary they will go and settle in that of the Marattas. It is highly necessary to repair the Gadies, and to place the Tannas in different places, that the inhabitants might thereby be enabled to mind the business of cultivation; I am ready to obey your orders concerning this subject.

Agreeable to your repeated orders, I have lately sent 5100 Cullums of Paddy, and have now sent about 4000, through the means of Fatta Mahomed Kân. I will in the time of the harvest of Caur, Sumbah, &c. crop, send the Paddy of the Circar's share, after deducting that of the inhabitants.

As the whole of this business is now before the Board, resolved that the above letter be communicated to the ..

Jos. Du Pré
Warren Hastings
To

From Governor Du Pré to Hyder Ally Khán, dated 11th December, 1771.

LATELY I had the pleasure to write you two letters, the first dated the 19th October, the last dated the † 8th November; in both of them I informed you, that I was waiting with great expectation for letters from Europe; and that until I should receive them, I could not determine any thing on the subject concerning which you wrote to me within these few days. Your Vackeel has communicated to me the contents of a letter he has received from you, offering to come down with your forces, and unite with those of the Company in the Payenghaut to oppose the invaders. This I consider as a proof of your steadiness and firm friendship; but as to this time I remain in the same uncertainty in respect to the instructions which are coming to me, and which are not yet arrived, I think it best, on all accounts, that your forces be yet a little while employed entirely in the protection of your own country. It is impossible to say exactly at what time I shall receive the instructions I expect, for no man can control the winds and the seas; but as I have news of the sailing of two ships from England, I think their arrival may be expected in the course of a month or six weeks. In the mean time, there are two things of which I wish to be ascertained, that in case I should be authorised to comply with your proposal, there may be no obstacle; the one is money for the payment of the army, the other is provision for their subsistence, both are essentially necessary. As to money, I have no doubt of your ability to provide amply, and that you will do so in this place; but in respect to provisions, the cruel ravages which your country has suffered, will perhaps make it difficult, if not impracticable, to furnish such as may be requisite. In consideration of the friendship between us, I think it proper to mention to you these thoughts which have occurred to me. It will always give me pleasure to hear of your health and prosperity. What can I say more?

P. S. Since writing the foregoing, I have received your letter dated 23d November. Your peremptory refusal of the proposal made you, to employ your troops to the injury of the Payenghaut country, is at once a strong proof of your wisdom and of your friendship. For these two years past I also have been solicited, with entreaties and with threats, to send the Company's forces against your country; I have always refused. My sentiments towards you and your affairs I have in former letters explained, they remain firmly the same. I thank you for the good advice you give me; proper orders will be issued accordingly.

Extract of Proceedings of the President and Council at Fort St. George, in their Military Department, Friday, 13th December, 1771.

P R E S E N T,

Josias Du Pré Esquire, Governor, President.

Warren Hastings

Samuel Ardley

John Smith

George Stratton

Henry Brookes

Richard Brickenden

John Whitehill

George Mackay.

THE President lays before the Board his report of what passed between the Nabob and him, upon communicating to him the 14th Article ‡ of the Minute of Consultation of the 10th instant, which is as follows:

* Vide page 1388.

† Vide page 1391.

‡ Vide page 1423.

I introduced the subject by informing the Nabob, that although the Select Committee had maturely considered his proposition relative to the present state of affairs and the demand of the Marattas; yet as the safety and welfare of the Carnatick, and the Company's possessions, were nearly concerned in the measures to be now taken, the Select Committee had thought it necessary to deliberate thereon with the Council, and to take the opinion and resolution of the whole.

That as I understood there were people who imputed our objection to an offensive alliance with the Marattas merely to a regard to Hyder Ally, or to a partiality to the treaty of peace with him, because we had made it; I thought it proper in the first place to convince him, that in our resolutions on this subject, such personal motives had no part, and that they were founded on the Company's orders; and the better to convince him of this truth, I begged to communicate to him a passage of a letter from the Court of Directors to the Presidency of Bombay; I then read him the extract from the Company's letter to Bombay, dated 30th June 1769.*

The Nabob said the sentiments of the Court of Directors were clear enough; that as to what regarded him in those passages, he begged we would return his thanks to the Court of Directors, and assure them that he thought the more of their friendly sentiments, because they were not wrote with any intention that he should see them.

* *Extract of Letter from the Court of Directors to the President and Council at Bombay, dated 30th June, 1769.*

Par. 8. Considering however the Marattas as the most dangerous growing Power in India, we shall be very sorry to add to their strength by a total defeat of Hyder Naigue, who has hitherto been a strong check upon their ambitious views; we wish him therefore to remain an independent Power in amity with us, and we hope he will consider in time that his own interest points this out; for if once he lets the Marattas get a footing in the Mysore country, under a pretence of assisting him against the English, they will not rest 'till they are masters of the whole.

9. You will see by the whole tenor of our letters to you and the other Presidencies, that we are rather jealous of the Maratta Power; yet we have sought to continue in peace with them, and to keep up a friendly intercourse; but if they think fit to take a hostile part against us, to send you insulting messages, and to brave your port with their Grabs, it is time to take vigorous measures for preserving that respect which we have hitherto held on your side of India. When you wrote your letter of the 13th December, giving an account of the Maratta fleet cruizing off the harbour, and of the insolent answer of Vizajee Punt, you had ships in your harbour more than sufficient to have destroyed his fleet, or brought him to a more becoming and explicit declaration; and when Madavarow informed you that his design was to demand the Choute from the Nabob of Arcot, preserving at the same time the utmost good will towards the English, you should have told him that those two things were incompatible; that the Nabob of Arcot was, as he knew, in firm friendship and alliance with the English, and that any demands upon him at the head of an army laying waste to his country, would be answered by the English forces in all parts of India, who never would suffer a people under their protection to be distressed and plundered under any pretence whatsoever; that accounts should be settled between their respective agents in the usual manner, and if any thing was due from the Nabob of Arcot, your good offices should be employed in bringing the matter to an amicable conclusion.

I then proceeded to inform him, that the Board had desired me to communicate to him their opinions and resolutions †; and then I gave him the substance of them by the interpretation of Mr. Stracey.

On the 1st and 2d he made no observation.

To the 3d he said the Marattas had no claim of any kind on him, except the Choute, and to that they had no other right than force.

To the 4th and 5th I added a further remark, that the insult to the Company was increased by this circumstance; that they did not seem to think us of consideration enough to be applied to directly; their language has generally been, that they expect the Nabob to join them, and to bring the English (or the Faringees) with him. The Nabob said, that only proceeded from their looking upon him and the Company as one; that if I chose, the Vackeel should immediately apply to us.

To the 6th, no observation.

To the 7th, he would do as we please.

To the 8th, he would act with us in all things, and would not separate.

To the 9th and 10th, he seemed deeply affected, and said it seemed to him from those articles, that we expected more money from him; that he had no money, and could not even undertake to pay the Lack of Pagodas due to the end of January for the Jaghire Kist if the Marattas came into the country. "Then, Sir, our case is desperate indeed, for we have no more than the four Lacks of Pagodas you have promised to reimburse us,—and when that is gone, ruin must follow." I put him in mind of his engagements, in February last, to reimburse the Company the money they might expend in current charges on his account every three or four months, *and to pay his creditors ten Lacks of Pagodas in the course of this year.*—"True," said he, "Umriut, i. e. in case of tranquillity;" I answered, "There has been tranquillity to this time."—(Nabob) "Do you call this tranquillity? I have no money:" "And, Sir, we have none, but the four Lacks of Pagodas." (Nabob) "And how then can you think of my making war upon the Marattas?" "I do not mean to make war; I desire peace; but if they attack us, we must defend ourselves, and therefore I must again beg to know what assistance of money we might depend on from him;" he said, "The four Lacks of Pagodas, and no more, if the Marattas came into the country."

To 11th and 12th, he said he would give orders accordingly.

To 13th and 14th, that he could say nothing; he left it to us to do as we thought best; he was under our protection.

† Vide page 1421.