



T H E
R E S T O R A T I O N
O F T H E
King of Tanjore
C O N S I D E R E D.



PRINTED IN THE YEAR 1777.



T O T H E
R E A D E R.

THE occasion of the present publication is so universally known, that an introduction may appear almost unnecessary: yet the reader will expect to be informed, by whom, and from what materials, this little tract has been prepared.

When intelligence was received in Europe, that the Servants of the East-India Company had deposed the Rajah of Tanjore, and given the independent possession of his dominions to Mahomed Ally, Nabob of Arcot, so important a change upon the Coast of Coromandel engaged the serious attention of the Court of Directors. The dispatches which conveyed their orders for the restoration of the Rajah will prove, that this delicate subject was at that time minutely investigated, and completely understood.

At

At Madras the Nabob, unwilling to relinquish so valuable a prize as Tanjore, endeavoured to delay the restoration of the deposed Rajah, until a new representation could be made at home, and other advices be received from Europe. Happily for the British interest in India, the orders given by the Directors were too clear and positive to admit of delay, and the subject too fully explained in those dispatches to leave a pretence for the Servants of the Company to refer it a second time to the judgment of their Superiors. In England, however, the agents of Mahomed Ally, by various publications, accused the Company of injustice, and openly solicited a reversal of their act. Misrepresentation, industriously propagated, misled the uninformed, and the private interest of individuals concurred to spread the delusion. Under these circumstances, regard to their own honour, and to the trust with which they were invested, compelled the Directors to vindicate their conduct, and to support a measure, which justice, policy, and respect for the public faith of treaties, had before induced them to adopt.

The necessary papers having been collected, Mr. George Rous was requested to undertake the work: all the defects are therefore his: the Directors merely authenticate those documents, which, if attentively perused, will enable the reader to form his own judgment.

The author, after a laborious examination of his materials, was concerned to find, that the subject necessarily led him to condemn the conduct of Gentlemen, with whom his family had lived in habits of friendship, and whose established characters justly entitle them to respect. The situation was painful; the conduct to be observed did not admit of hesitation. He has not softened a single fact, which he thought the papers warranted; nor suppressed an observation, which his own understanding approved. No man will rejoice more than himself, if these Gentlemen can lessen the blame, which, upon his representation, they may appear to merit; but, ignorant of their apology, he could not betray his trust, and if he makes them his enemies, will endeavour to deserve their esteem.

Another occurrence likewise rendered the task unpleasant. Mr. Macleane, Agent for the Nabob, had, in a public advertisement, consigned his name to disgrace and infamy, if many facts were not true, which the author has been compelled by the proofs before him to deny. This phrase of Mr. Macleane must be considered as the vehement assertion of a zealous advocate, that he believed the facts advanced to be true. Mr. Macleane himself never resided in that part of India, had no personal knowledge of the transactions, and must, like every other man, judge from the materials he then possessed. His moral character, therefore, cannot be involved in the truth or falsehood of the facts in
b
dispute,

dispute, whatever censure may be due to his hasty condemnation of others, or to the language in which such condemnation has been conveyed. Mr. Maclean being absent, this explanation will not be deemed improper.

The original papers now given to the public are more voluminous than the occasion may seem to require. This has arisen from delicacy on the part of the Court of Directors, who, in vindicating themselves, were anxious not to withhold what might possibly tend to the exculpation of others. The first sixteen numbers of the Appendix, to page 240, contain such papers as were selected, under different heads of enquiry, for the information of the Directors. As these were selected for the mere purpose of information, without a view to particular opinions, it has not been thought right even to vary the arrangement. To these have been added the Consultations of the Council and Committee relative to the two expeditions against Tanjore, which are the history of their debates, and of the motives of their conduct, written by themselves at the time. These would have been incomplete without the information upon which they acted; which is therefore printed under the title of Country Correspondence.

As the Gentlemen in Council possess only a subordinate power, the reader must form a very imperfect judgment of their merits or demerits, had he not before him the orders received from

the Court of Directors. The orders are therefore printed, under the title of Correspondence, &c. and likewise the correspondence with the Directors, which contains a further exposition of the views and motives of the Council and Committee than appear on their Consultations ; or at least may be considered as a supplement to the other. This Correspondence does not relate merely to Tanjore, but comprehends a considerable period; and explains the political views, and interests of the Company during a course of years : for as the distance of place renders it impossible minutely to prescribe a particular conduct to the Servants of the Company, the reader ought to understand the general system.

Some further additions have been made, from a desire of rendering justice to the principal actors, and of affording the means of defence to all concerned.

The Gentlemen who had the management of the Company's affairs at Madras complain of two extrinsic causes, which rendered them unable to pursue the dictates of their own judgment ; viz. The existence of plenipotentiary powers from the Crown to treat with the Princes of India, independent of the Company ; and the influence of the private creditors of the Nabob, which embarrassed the measures of the Council. Justice therefore required, that the whole correspondence between Sir John Lindsay, Sir Robert Harland, and the Company's Servants, should be printed, as likewise the proceedings respecting the private creditors. The former
will

will afford a useful lesson, how impossible it is to prevent the operation of passion and prejudice in the best-intentioned minds, where rival powers subsist; the latter may give occasion to public regulations in future.

In 1772, the Nabob appearing dissatisfied with the Company's usual mode of address, an alteration took place: it was therefore thought right, that the reasoning and opinions of the Council, together with the sentiments of the Court of Directors thereon, should form a separate Number in the Appendix.

The bulk of these volumes may affright the indolent, and possibly be censured by some who will not acknowledge this motive. The first should be informed, that if they be more disposed to confide in the author than to investigate the matter themselves, they will find the subject of Tanjore sufficiently explained within a very moderate compass; the latter should learn, that the papers now printed contain a history of important transactions, hitherto little understood, and may therefore deserve attention. Every reader should know, that nothing has been designedly concealed; but that, in collecting the papers, comprised under the several titles, the single desire has been, not to omit what may throw light upon the subject.

T H E
R E S T O R A T I O N
O F T H E

Deposed RAJAH of TANJORE considered.

THE extensive possessions of the English East-India Company, the military force which they maintain, the manufactures which they export, and the great revenue derived to the State from their commerce, render every event affecting their prosperity well worthy the national attention. Yet, important as the subject must appear, various causes have hitherto prevented so general a knowledge of the British interests in India, as the inquisitive spirit of the present age, and the singular advancement of a commercial Company to the possession of Empire, must have taught us to expect. Colonies, originally settled for the sole purposes of trade, have involved a military establishment as necessary to their defence. Wars, first undertaken with this view, have opened new means of commerce, and, directed by political and military talents, which this great scene of action called into being, have led to the attainment of that force, which now forms no inconsiderable accession to the national strength. Commerce and dominion, united in the East-India Company, have grown to a magnitude, and become a source of wealth to Great Britain, which the most fortunate exertion of the State might have attempted in vain. To separate these objects, while the controlling power must reside at the distance of more than half the globe, would inevitably demolish the whole fabric.

The interests of Great Britain, and the interests of the Company, are in truth, and ever must be, the same. The free communication of papers, which has of late diffused the means of information, affords reason to believe, that the period, when this truth must prevail, is not very far distant. There are however occasions, which require something more than merely to afford the means of knowledge. When an act of signal justice has been severely arraigned; when great industry has been employed to disguise the truth; and when not only the characters of the actors, but important public interests are involved; the Trustees of a great Company would be wanting to their own honour, and to a proper sense of duty, if they confided wholly in the conviction, which a careless perusal of papers may produce. That the restoration of their religion, their government, and their laws, to a whole people, deprived of these blessings by the servants of the Company, in violation of a solemn treaty, upon pretences equally false and frivolous, was an act of justice and of sound policy, will scarcely be controverted. Yet, to arrange the facts, and to direct the reader's attention to proofs diffused through a large volume, may not be altogether unnecessary.

The orders given by the Court of Directors of the East-India Company, for the restoration of the deposed Rajah of Tanjore, have been treated as a violation of justice, and of national faith. Unworthy insinuations have moreover been made respecting the supposed *motive* of the actors; as if it were possible for the Rajah, deprived of his territories, robbed of his wealth, and imprisoned by his enemy, to interest men in his cause by any other motives, than by those feelings of the heart, which the great Creator has given to repress injustice. Such imputations can deserve only silent contempt. Yet, when bold assertions are advanced, with the pro-
fessed

ferred intention of conveying information ; and the King, the Parliament, and the Nation, are called upon to decide ; a sense of public duty may produce an investigation of the subject, which neither the character nor the conduct of an individual could deserve.

The conquests of the Mahomedans in India produced a revolution singular in the history of mankind. The whole government of the territories subdued passed into the hands of men, who bore no resemblance to the original inhabitants. Adventurers from Tartary, Persia, and Arabia, have been constantly entertained, and an uniform preference given by Mahomedan Princes to men of their own religion, and of hardy robust constitutions. These men, during the course of more than eight centuries, have gradually formed in India a mighty nation. They filled the armies of the Empire, and exercised all public employments ; but although the reigning nation, they are out-numbered by the Indians ten to one. The milder manners and delicate frame of the natives, rendered them unable to resist these fierce invaders ; yet the singular institutions of their religion have fixed insuperable barriers to an union with their conquerors ; and the Hindoos at this day continue a perfectly distinct race, even in the countries under a Mahomedan Government.

The Mogul Tartars, under Tamerlane and his successors, extended their conquests farthest to the south ; and the reign of Aurungzebe is perhaps the period, when the authority of the Empire was more implicitly obeyed in the Peninsula of India than during any former age. At this period, however, there yet remained countries of large extent, on the borders of the Empire, wholly under

the government of their native princes. Tanjore, Mysore †, and the countries possessed by the Marattas, are the most considerable of these Hindoo States. The latter, by their depredations, carried terror into the Empire during it's highest vigour, sometimes levied large contributions, and finally established their claim to a proportion of the revenues, under the denomination of a Chout. The two former were, for a time at least, subjected to a small tribute ; and in the confusion which ensued upon the dissolution of the Empire, these countries, like every other part of India, were occasionally plundered by Chiefs, whose authority extended as far as their sword could reach.

The countries subject to the Moguls were governed by Viceroy's, called Subahdars, and, under these officers, by Phouzdars, (Governors of smaller districts) and Killedars, who were the military commanders of forts. The largest Subah, or Province, was the Deckan, or South, of which the Carnatick is a part. The Carnatick however, in it's present extent, was never immediately submitted to one inferior Governor, until the successes of the English arms established Mahomed Ally, and finally exempted him, by treaty as well as by power, from all obedience to the Empire. These officers were, in regular subordination, the Governors of the country and Commanders of the army. Not only the Subahdars, but the inferior officers, were originally nominated at Delhi. The collection of the revenues and administration of justice were placed in other hands ; and so jealous were the Emperors of these military chiefs, that their Jaghires, or allowances, were assigned them in provinces not subject to their influence. Frequent changes likewise of the men were intended to limit their power ; but in the decline of the Empire, the

† Mysore has since become subject to Hyder Ally, who is a Mahomedan.

period of these commands was gradually prolonged, and those who possessed the power of the sword easily united every other authority in their own persons.

Aurengzebe died in the year 1707. The civil wars between his sons greatly weakened the authority of the Empire, which the Invasion of Thamas Kouli Khan almost annihilated. The anarchy which ensued did not however immediately reach the Deckan. In this province of the Empire the superior abilities of Nizam ul Muluck upheld a dominion, at the same time that he converted it to his own advantage. Upon his invitation was the expedition of Kouli Khan first undertaken. While therefore the revolutions in the north engaged his attention, the southern parts of his province were much neglected. Doast Ally, and afterwards his son Subder Ally, established themselves in part of the Carnatick; but perished, as the other adventurers of this period, the first in battle against the Marattas, the latter by the hand of an assassin, in the fort of Velloor, belonging to his kinsman Mortiz Ally.

The army, who had been gained by the liberality of Mortiz Ally, soon revolted, and proclaimed Scid Mahomed, the infant son of Subder Ally, in the room of his father. The apprehensions of Nizam ul Muluck on the side of Delhi being removed, by the retreat of the Persian, and by the appointment of his own son, Gazy o'Dean Khan, Vizier of the Empire, the Subahdar advanced towards the Carnatick with a vast army. His appearance repressed the disorders which had before prevailed, and Coja Abdullah, by his nomination, became Phouzdar of Arcot. His assassination in the next year, which was imputed † to his successor, made room for Anwar a Dean, the father of Mahomed Ally, the present Nabob of

† Orme's History, page 52.

the Carnatick. The attachment of the army to Scid Mahomed awakened the jealousy of Anwar a Dean, to whose care the youth had been intrusted, and he was murdered at a wedding, not without suspicion of design, which the other vainly laboured to remove †. While Nizam ul Muluck lived, Anwar a Dean was supported by the power of the Subahdar; but in 1749 he perished in battle against Murzafa Jing, who was the nephew of Nizam ul Muluck, and disputed the succession with the second son Nazir Jing. The assassination of Nazir Jing gave the brother a present possession, but he quickly experienced from one of the conspirators the same fate.

Soon after the defeat and death of Anwar a Dean, Mahomed Ally, his son, retired to Trichinopoly. This fort, with the adjoining country, had been ever under the government of its native Princes, until 1736, when Chunda Saib, the son-in-law of Doast Ally, treacherously seized and kept the possession. The Marattas afterwards took the fort, and made him their prisoner. The fort was by them surrendered to Nizam ul Muluck, who appointed Anwar a Dean Killedar in 1744, soon after he had received from the same hand the Phouzdary of Arcot. To the fort of Trichinopoly his son retired in 1749, and here, for the first time, solicited the assistance of the English.

The author of the "State of Facts" represents Anwar a Dean as the firm determined friend of the English. Nothing is less like the truth. During the war of 1745 his threats preserved ‡ Pondicherry. The fortifications were not completed, the garrison was small, and unable to resist. The English squadron, under Commodore Barnet, were preparing to attack the place, when the Nabob

† Orme's History, page 59.

‡ Ibid. page 61.

threatened destruction to Madras, if hostilities were commenced. At this time he promised to make the French observe the like neutrality, if their force became superior; but the promise was soon forgotten, and the French within the year were permitted to besiege Madras. The place being taken, the Nabob demanded the performance of the secret treaty, by which the Settlement was to be delivered to him; and when the French refused to comply, he attempted to obtain it by force †. Irritated by his defeat, he sent his two sons to assist ‡ the English, and to prevent the capture of Fort St. David, which the French were preparing to besiege. His resentment, however, being appeased by a considerable present from Mr. Dupleix, he permitted the enemy to renew their enterprize in the following year; but the place was fortunately preserved by the arrival of the English Squadron ||.

The Governor, in his letters to the Nabob, and to his son Mahomed Ally, had frequently complained of the favour shewn to the French, but without effect §. Upon the arrival therefore of the Squadron, the Governor addressed a letter to the Subahdar of the Deckan*, Nizam ul Muluck, complaining that Anwar a Dean, (then called Anaverdy Khan) “For the sake of a little money, has joined
“ with the French,” in direct opposition to his repeated orders; and that the English merchants, “By the connivance of Anaverdy Khan,
“ have been plundered of large sums, some robbed, others imprison-
“ ed, and all exposed to such cruelties as the most barbarous nations
“ were strangers to.” This letter was accompanied by one, in a

† Orme's History, page 73.

‡ Ibid. p. 79. The English were to defray part of the expense.

|| Ibid. p. 87.

§ Appendix, No. II. p. 8, 9.

* Ibid. p. 10.

Somewhat higher tone, from Commodore Griffin, * Commander of
 the Squadron. The Commodore affirms, that “ The robberies,
 “ cruelties, and depredations, committed on shore, upon the King
 “ his Master’s Subjects, by that insolent, perfidious nation the
 “ French, were connived at and abetted by the Nabob of Arcot,
 “ whose duty it was to have preserved the peace of the country.”
 He adds, “ I must intreat you, in the name of the King of Great
 “ Britain, my Royal Master, to call the Nabob to an account for
 “ his past transactions, and interpose your power, to restore, as
 “ near as possible in it’s original state, what has been so unjustly
 “ taken from us; or excuse me if I do not pay that strict respect
 “ to the tranquillity of your country, which has been hitherto
 “ done, but with my whole collected force endeavour to take
 “ satisfaction for the robberies which have been committed; which
 “ in all probability will make your country a scene of blood.”
 The Nabob being alarmed by this spirited application to his super-
 ior, and by the arrival of a considerable force, which had already
 defeated the French, his son Mahomed Ally wrote a letter, excus-
 ing his own desertion of the English as the effect † of necessity;
 and adds, “ I am very sorry, and much surpris’d, the Commodore
 “ has not wrote me a letter, that I might have congratulated his
 “ safe arrival, which I have daily longed for, that I might demon-
 “ strate the great love and regard I have towards the interest of
 “ the English Nation.” He promised likewise to dismiss the
 Frenchmen resident at his Court, and to assist the English. Yet
 we find the Nabob within three months demanding the release of
 two French prisoners, without requiring the same conduct from

* Appendix, No. II. p. 10.

† Ibid. p. 13. This was the “speedy answer” required to a letter advising
 of the arrival of a great force. Vide Appendix, p. 12.

the enemy ‡. Nor did the great “love and regard” of the Nabob prevent the enemy making in the next year another attempt against Fort St. David. This attempt, by the good conduct of Major Lawrence, was happily defeated †; and an armament, under Admiral Boscawen, which soon after arrived upon the Coast, established the superiority of the English, but the peace concluded the succeeding year prevented any considerable effect. 1748.

When Chunda Saib engaged in his enterprize against Trichinopoly, his family remained in Pondicherry as in a place of safety. He afterwards became the prisoner of the Marattas, who took from him the fort. By the intrigues of Mr. Dupleix, the Marattas were prevailed upon to release him from confinement in the year 1748. After some adventures, which have no relation to the present subject, he joined Murzafa Jing, in his competition for the Subahdary of the Deckan, and was appointed by him Phouzdar of Arcot. With a reinforcement of French from Pondicherry, their first enterprize was to obtain possession of the Carnatick. Self-defence obliged Anwar a Dean to take the field, and to oppose the invaders of his province. A battle ensued, in which he was defeated and slain, as we have before related.

The author of the “State of Facts ¶” says, “The zeal of Anwar a Dean for the English cause could only terminate with his life; for on the 23d of July 1749 he was slain in battle, bravely fighting for his allies and friends.” A reader, not suspicious of deceit, might by such expressions be led to believe, that the Nabob had expired in the arms of a Lawrence or a Clive, bravely fighting

‡ Appendix, No. II; p. 13, 16.

† Orme's History, page 91.

¶ Page 18.

in one common cause. If such an idea be conveyed, the author may be entitled to the praise of invention : but he is no faithful historian. The dull Englishmen on the spot did not suspect this Nabob to be their friend. When the intelligence was communicated by the English Governor to the Council, the tale is barely related as the news of the day, not a single observation is made, and the next article on the consultations is an order to the Company's bricklayer.

Mahomed Ally escaped to Trichinopoly, where he, for the first time, solicited the assistance of the English in August 1749. It is a remarkable fact, that a small supply † of cannon (the only assistance at this time given) was escorted from Devi-Cotah by the order and by the troops of Pertaupa Sing, the father of the present Rajah of Tanjore, with whom the English had at this time concluded a treaty. These transactions require now to be explained.

When intelligence of peace with France left the force lately arrived in India unemployed, a Tanjorean applied to Admiral Boscawen, representing himself as the lawful King of that Country, driven into exile by an Usurper. His liberal offer of territory and privileges to the English, with strong assurances of the general disposition of his subjects to join his standard, induced the Admiral and Governor to undertake an expedition against Devi-Cotah. The design was not communicated to the Council until the army had begun their march. It being now too late to recede, a majority of the Council were induced to acquiesce, and a sum of money was given the Tanjorean to levy troops among his own adherents.

† Vide letter to the King of Tanjore, dated 19th August, 1749. Appendix, No. V. page 24.

The expedition miscarried, and the projectors had the mortification to find, that their ally had not a single partizan, at least not one appeared, to join them. Piqued with the repulse, they immediately renewed the attempt by sea. The troops, being now commanded by Major Lawrence, succeeded in taking Devi-Cotah and another fort; when Major Lawrence, finding the Tanjoreans devoted to the reigning Prince, advised a peace, in which advice the Admiral likewise concurred. Devi-Cotah, together with a small district, was ceded to the English, paying an annual Peshcush; the other fort was restored. This treaty appears to be the first concluded by the English, upon a footing of equality, with any Indian Prince†.

The approach of Nazir Jing, who now regarded his nephew, 1750.
Murzafa Jing, as a formidable competitor, enabled Mahomed Ally to appear again in the Carnatick. The troops of the Subahdar, joined by a body of English under Major Lawrence, recovered Arcot, while a mutiny of the French soldiers obliged Chunda Saib to take refuge in Pondicherry. Murzafa Jing submitted, and was made a prisoner. The English however, by such complete success, lost the fruits of their service. Neither payment of their expenses, nor a cession of territory round Madras, though frequently promised, could now be obtained; and Major Lawrence, wearied with solicitation, returned to Fort St. David. The assassination of Nazir Jing, and the revolutions which followed, left Mahomed Ally unable to oppose his enemies in the field. He returned to Trichinopoly, and once more applied to the English for support. His affairs were become truly desperate. Madura was lost, his own troops revolted, and nothing remained but the fort of Trichinopoly, which his enemies now prepared to besiege. He himself

† See Proceedings, Appendix, No. V. from page 28 to page 34.

entertained thoughts of submission, and actually began to treat of a surrender, when a detachment of English troops revived his hopes.

It is not the intention of this work to enter upon a history of the war, farther than to observe, that the English victories in the Carnatick, of which neither Mahomed Ally, nor his dependents, had the smallest share, first opened a prospect of that success, which the good conduct of Major Lawrence at Trichinopoly almost completed. The King of Tanjore, during this war, sent his General Monackjee, at the head of 3000 horse and 2000 foot, to the assistance of Mahomed Ally. Chunda Saib, with the French troops, after a long struggle, was entirely defeated.

When Major Lawrence flattered himself that his toils had finally established the superiority of his nation over the French, and was preparing to march into the Carnatick, he had the mortification to discover, that the weakness of the Nabob had laid the foundation of a new war. His extreme timidity had induced him to purchase the support of the Mysoreans at any price, and by a secret treaty he had engaged to deliver Trichinopoly into their hands when the enemy should be repulsed. The execution of this treaty was now required; but as the Nabob at this time possessed no other considerable fortrefs, to comply was impossible.

1753. Major Lawrence having supplied the fort with provisions, and secured it by an English garrison from any attempts of the Mysoreans, determined to pursue his advantage against the common enemy in the Carnatick. His hopes were again defeated by the folly, or rather by the avarice of those in whose cause he had engaged. The brother of the Nabob had been induced to sell provisions from the magazines at a high price, and it was now discovered, that the

turn of Major Lawrence with the army could alone preserve the fort†. The French joined the Mysoreans, and a war ensued, more obstinate and more dangerous than the former. It were invidious, as well as unnecessary; to recount the numberless difficulties which arose from the misconduct of the Nabob and his people; one however is remarkable. In their utmost distress, a convoy had been brought from Tanjore, with great danger and difficulty; but when the provisions were to be lodged in the magazines, nine tenths of the bullocks appeared to have been loaded with the baggage, and other trumpery, belonging to the Nabob and his officers‡. His army, inconsiderable in numbers, was so far from rendering any real service, that the English, with fixed bayonets, rescued him from a mutiny of his own troops, who immediately deserted to the enemy§. In short, the victories of the English preserved Mahomed Ally from destruction, and gave him all he possessed.

During this war the alliance of Pertaupe Sing, Rajah of Tanjore, was necessary. His country fed our army, and from Devi-Cotah all military supplies were conveyed to Trichinopoly. The Nabob's sense of these services, while the friendship of the Rajah was yet requisite to his safety, will appear from a confidential letter written to the English Governor. In this letter || he says, “ I must
 “ to you observe, that the King of Tanjore and Tondiman are neigh-
 “ bours to the fort of Trichinopoly, who both assisted with provisions
 “ in the time of the war and troubles*, which supported the people
 “ in the fort. If we act the part of an enemy against them, it

† Orme's History. page 281.

‡ Ibid. page 303.

§ Ibid. page 295---6.

|| Dated 20th March, 1755. Appendix, No. V. page 39.

* From 1749 to 1754.

“ will be attended with difficulty to defend the fort, as we shall
 “ not be able to get even a grain of provisions, which will render
 “ me unable to reside here with my family.” He adds indeed,
 “ The reason of my taking so great care to avoid the animosity of
 “ the King of Tanjore and Tondiman is, that formerly the coun-
 “ try of Trichinopoly remained in our possession; then we had no
 “ occasion to expect provisions from other districts; but now, as
 “ the Mysorean is in possession of the said country, *we must depend*
 “ *upon these*, viz. the King of Tanjore and Tondiman’s friendship
 “ for provisions.” He requested therefore an order for an English
 officer to desist from a negotiation, which gave the King and Ton-
 diman offence. So anxious was the Nabob to retain their friend-
 ship, that he urged the necessity of an immediate answer; and when
 an answer was returned, he acknowledged the compliance of the
 Governor as a favour conferred on himself †.

While these transactions passed in India, the Directors of the
 East-India Company had made representations to the Ministry of
 Great Britain of the hostilities in which they were involved. The
 Company, almost ruined by the war, were wholly unable, from
 their own resources, to continue a contest with the French Com-
 pany, powerfully supported by the administration of France.
 Strong remonstrances were therefore made to the French Court,
 and at the same time an order was given to equip a squadron of
 men of war, on board of which a regiment was to be embarked.
 This vigorous measure produced a disposition on the part of France
 to accommodate the disputes of the two Companies, and Commissa-
 ries were appointed to treat in India. When the Commissa-
 ries met, those on the part of the English prepared two articles, as
 the foundation of a treaty. One recognized Mahomed Ally in the

† Dated 5th May, 1755. Appendix, No. V. page 41.

Carnatick; the other guarantied to Pertaupa Sing the peaceable possession of the kingdom of Tanjore.

These terms could not be obtained. A truce was however concluded, by which the districts to be held by the respective Companies were limited, and the allies of both parties retained what each at the time possessed. During this truce the letter abovementioned was written by the Nabob.

While hostilities were thus suspended between the two Companies, the British troops were rarely employed even within the territories of their allies. Some expeditions were undertaken, chiefly with Seapoys, to settle the countries dependent on Trichinopoly, and to collect the revenues of Madura and Tinnevely to the southward. In the small part of the Carnatick, which Mahomed Ally possessed, innumerable Polligars and Chiefs of various denominations had established themselves in independence. Present possession, by the terms of the truce, had become the foundation of peace, and an attempt to subdue those Chieftans might have drawn both parties again into the field.

When intelligence was first received in India of a war between Great Britain and France, both parties were exhausted by their former struggles. The force of each being nearly equal upon the Coast of Coromandel rendered both cautious of engaging, as neither could hope to obtain advantages adequate to the expense of taking the field. Bengal and the northern part of the Deckan were the scenes, in which the two nations, under a Bussy and a Clive, were laying the foundations of future power and wealth. Successes in the Deckan, the resources obtained from the northern Circars, together with a reinforcement of troops from Europe, first enabled
 2 the

the French to renew hostilities with a prospect of success. Fort St. David was taken, Devi-Cotah abandoned to reinforce the garrison of Trichinopoly; and could the Rajah of Tanjore have been compelled to take part with the enemy, the reduction of Trichinopoly must inevitably have followed. To effect this purpose, Mr. Lally, with a considerable force, entered the country of Tanjore; and though harrassed in his march by Monackjee †, the brave and steady friend of the English, laid siege to the capital. The constancy of the Rajah began to be shaken. He offered a large sum to redeem his country, and engaged not to molest the enemy in their march; but no terrors could induce him to join his forces against Trichinopoly. Assisted by a small party of English, the Tanjoreans made an obstinate defence, and finally compelled Mr. Lally to retire with the loss of his cannon and standards.

Though greatly terrified with the attack on his capital, yet, during the siege of Madras, when the English affairs were almost desperate, the Rajah sent a body of horse to join Captain Preston, who with a small force harrassed the enemy, and intercepted their convoys. When the siege was raised, the Governor wrote to the King of Tanjore ‡: “The horse which you sent with the Commandant
“and Major Caillaud have joined our army, to the number of
“about 600. I have continually supplied them for their pay and
“batta, and shall shortly give them leave to return to your Court,
“lest the enemy should think of raising disturbances on that
“side.”

† The King of Tanjore's General.

‡ Dated 28th February, 1759. The siege was raised the 16th. Appendix No. V. page 45.

The war continued, with various success, until the year 1761, when Pondicherry being taken, the power of the English remained unrivalled in India.

This prosperous situation of affairs suggested to the mind of Mahomed Ally ambitious hopes, which, before this period, he could not possibly entertain. In the year 1752, when the Mysorean demanded the execution of a secret treaty, under his hand and seal, Mahomed Ally would not resign a fortress into the hands of an Indian Prince, because he himself was only a Viceroy appointed to govern during the pleasure † of the Emperor. Yet now, adopting the opinion, “That fortune is a throne ‡,” he plainly aspired to conquests, which, had he obtained, must have involved his former enemies and allies in one common fate. Pondicherry surrendered in January 1761. In August following; we find a paper § from the Nabob, stating his claims on Tanjore, on Mysore, and on the King of the Malabar Coast, the other side of the Peninsula of India. Not contented with the usual tribute paid to the Empire by the tributary princes, he represents, that it is customary “Some-
“ times to lay an extraordinary tax upon them, according to
“ their ability, and the *strength of the Nabob.*” With respect to his friend, the King of Tanjore, he proposes to himself the extortions of Doast || Ally, and his son Subder Ally, as his models.

† Orme’s History, page 244.

‡ The perpetual revolutions among the Mahomedan conquerors of India have rendered this proverbial. A restless and insatiable ambition is the common character of the people.

§ Appendix, No. VI. page 49.

|| These were the adventurers who conquered part of the Carnatick during the period when Nizam ul Muluck was engaged on the side of Delhi. In 1744 the government of Arcot and its dependencies was given to Anwar a Dean, father to Mahomed Ally, after Nizam ul Muluck had repressed the anarchy which before prevailed.

The latter appears to have been his favourite example ; who, he says, “ Obligated the King to pay him 80 Lacks of Rupees, and “ when he was last there possessed all that kingdom, placed a gar- rison in the fort of Tanjore, only paying the King some pension †.” So unfortunate was the Rajah in this representation, that whether he were plundered, or escaped being plundered, the argument was equally forcible against him. “ Nazir Jing, soon after his arrival, “ sent to the King to demand one Caroot, or ten millions of “ Rupees, from him ; but as he was killed very shortly, the “ King has saved the money †.” The Nabob confesses indeed, that during the troubles he had signed a treaty, to exempt the King from some of the arrears, and to lessen the tribute. He had before admitted, that his father “ Had agreed to receive a tribute “ of 7,00,000 Rupees, and 2,25,000 more as presents and Durbar “ charges, from Tanjore every year § ;” yet he states his own demand for “ Arrears at one Caroot, twenty-nine Lacks, and “ fifty thousand Rupees || ;” from which he proposes nevertheless to make great deductions, on account of “ the exemption and “ abatement abovementioned,” meaning by the treaty which he had signed. The King of Mysore, as an enemy, was not to escape so easily ; for after an enumeration of many Polligars, Zemindars, and Killedars, he concludes the catalogue thus : “ There are very “ large arrears of tribute due to me from the King of Mysore, “ which will amount to as much, or nearly as much as the total “ of all the above articles ††.”

† The same letter, Appendix, page 49.

† Appendix, page 50.

§ Ibid. Ibid.

|| Twelve millions, nine hundred and fifty thousand Rupees.

†† Appendix, page 52.

It would be ridiculous to enter into an investigation of the facts upon which these curious demands are founded, because no proof was ever offered, and because the Nabob, in a subsequent letter, avows †, “ That the affairs of the Peshcush ‡ are not under the same rule and regulation; *for it always depends on the strength of arms;* and according as we make use of force, so we meet with success. The former Governors received of the Tanjore King large sums of money *by force*, which is fully set forth in the paper I delivered you before. By the blessing of God, and through your favour, *I have more force and power than any body else;* for the former Governors never had the *English troops* with them.” He insists, that his account of the Peshcush due from the King of Tanjore is just and reasonable; that if the English army be left to his disposal, “ Affairs will immediately, and agreeably to the present times, be dispatched in a better manner. Should we endeavour to manage by negotiation, it will take up long time, by reason of the great distance. By the blessing of God we have a collection of a large army at present, and it is impossible to meet with the like opportunity again; and moreover the Marattas are in a distressed situation at present, and the Europe news uncertain. As the army is in readiness as above,” he thinks “ it is necessary we should at this time finish affairs, one after another, without loss of time or delay.”

At this period the servants of the English East-India Company did not prepare letters for the Nabob of Arcot; these therefore convey a faithful picture of his mind.

The letter from the Governor written to Mahomed Ally marks a plain rule of conduct, equally consistent with national justice and

† Received 13th January, 1762. Appendix, No. VI. page 53.

‡ Tribute.

found policy. He tells the Nabob †, “ Your future views extend
 “ far beyond the limits of your power, and consequently the object
 “ of them must be contrary to your true interest.” With respect
 to the King of Tanjore, “ I must take the liberty to say, you seem
 “ much more desirous of making a conquest of the country,
 “ than of settling amicably with him; for though you disapprove
 “ every article of his proposal, yet you would accept the sum he
 “ offered *without mediation*, you say; that is, you would willingly
 “ take the money, but still be left at liberty, and resolve in your
 “ own mind to attack him, whenever you shall find yourself able
 “ to do so. Is this just?” You say, “ His predecessors had not a
 “ legal right to Tanjore; and here you give me some particulars
 “ of the conquest of Indostan by the Mogul, in consequence of
 “ which all Indians acknowledged him Sovereign, and paid him
 “ a *Peshcush*. I think it not at all to our present purpose to en-
 “ quire into the legality of the present King’s rights; it is suffi-
 “ cient that he is acknowledged by the whole country, and was
 “ so long before you had a *funnud* for the government of the
 “ Arcot province.” You acknowledge “ That you did grant him
 “ a *funnud* for these places,” (Elangad and Coiladdy, which the
 King desired might be confirmed to him) “ but that it is proper
 “ to recall it, and take the places back; because, whilst they are in
 “ your possession, it will enable you, whenever you think proper,
 “ to cut the bank, and thereby deprive the Tanjore country of

† Dated August 12th, 1762. Appendix, No. VI. page 74. This letter, which is omitted in the “ State of Facts,” explains the whole negotiation and pretensions of the parties. All the papers relative to the treaty of 1762 are printed in Number VI. of Appendix, and will deserve the attention of the reader; particularly this letter, and another to the Nabob, dated 31st of May, page 59, which shews the distinction made between the King of Tanjore, as a sovereign prince, and the lesser Chiefs dependent on the Nabob,

“ water.”

“ water.” “ Subder Ally Khan, you say, by that means possessed
 “ himself of the whole Tanjore country, and placed a garrison in
 “ the fort, and therefore it is proper you should have the power of
 “ doing the same. I differ from you in opinion.” The Governor
 then observes, that if the King neglects to perform his engage-
 ments, and it should at “ any time be necessary to make war
 “ upon the King, it will be no difficult matter to cut the bank,
 “ even if Coiladdy and Elangad remain in his possession; and I
 “ think you cannot, consistently with the dignity of your charac-
 “ ter, revoke the Sunnud you have given.” The Governor like-
 wise, with the utmost candour and openness, explains the princi-
 ples upon which the English had acted, and in which it was their
 intention at that period to have persevered. “ They have waged a
 “ twelve years’ war in your behalf, but they never had an idea of
 “ foreign conquests.” “ The same principles which induced the
 “ Company to spend so much blood and treasure in support of
 “ your government, will lead them equally to support every other
 “ lawful government, and to maintain peace in the country, that
 “ the people may be happy, and their trade flourish.”

Such was the reasoning which induced the Governor and Coun-
 cil, after recommending moderation to the Nabob, and reminding
 him of his engagements taken with the King of Tanjore in the
 hour of his distress, to conclude the treaty of 1762.

The principal articles of this treaty † are, a confirmation of “ The
 “ full and free possession and enjoyment of the districts of Coiladdy
 “ and Elangad, which districts the said Nabob did give and grant
 “ unto the said Rajah during the late troubles, as may appear by

† Appendix, No. VI. page 77. Dated 20th September, 1762.

“ the said Nabob’s *Sunnuds* ;” an engagement on the part of the
 Rajah to pay twenty-two Lacks of Rupees at stated periods, “ In
 “ full payment and satisfaction for or on account of *Peshcush*, and
 “ in full of all accounts and demands whatsoever, unto the 10th day
 “ of July last past.” The Rajah likewise engages in future “to pay
 “ yearly, in the month of July, unto the said Nabob Anaverdy Khan,
 “ Behauder, or his successors, the sum of two Lacks of Rupees, as
 “ a *Peshcush* or tribute to the Mogul. And forasmuch as it hath
 “ been the usage and custom to make certain presents to the Nabob
 “ and his principal officers, at the time of paying the annual *Pesh-*
 “ *cush*, the said Rajah doth promise to pay yearly to the said Na-
 “ bob, or his successors, (at the day and time of paying the said
 “ *Peshcush*) the further sum of two Lacks of Rupees as a present,
 “ provided that no further sum, either for *Peshcush* or *Durbar*
 “ charges, be demanded.” The Nabob agrees to accept the four
 Lacks annually, “ And doth hereby promise that he will not de-
 “ mand any thing more.” The professed motives of the treaty
 were, “ That now it having pleased God to restore peace to these
 “ countries, by the expulsion of the common enemy, the said Na-
 “ bob, and the said Rajah, being equally desirous that the people,
 “ whom God hath placed under their rule, may enjoy the full fruits
 “ thereof, have mutually consented to establish a firm friendship
 “ between them.” The Governor and Council therefore, “ Hav-
 “ ing greatly at heart the peace and tranquillity of the countries
 “ where the Company hold possessions, and to which they trade,
 “ see with great satisfaction the conclusion of the treaty of friend-
 “ ship; and being willing and desirous, as much as in us lies, to
 “ establish the friendship between them” (the Nabob and the Ra-
 jah) “ upon a lasting foundation, do hereby promise to guaranty the per-
 “ formance of the said treaty, being thereunto invited by both parties ;

“ and accordingly we do hereby promise, as far as in us lies, that
 “ in case either party shall fail in the performance of the articles he hath
 “ hereby undertaken to perform, or any part thereof, we will to
 “ the utmost of our power *assist the other party to compel him, who*
 “ *shall fail, to fulfil his agreement, and to render due satisfaction for*
 “ *his failure therein.*”

This treaty has been arraigned, as “ Highly favourable to Per-
 “ taupa, and injurious to the just *rights* of Mahomed Ally †.”
 Such an idea could only proceed from an absurd opinion of RIGHT
 which Mahomed Ally indeed adopted, that the amount of Peshcush
 “ always *depends on the strength of arms;*” that as “ He had *more*
 “ *force and power*” than former Governors, “ who never had the
 “ *English troops,*” he was therefore entitled to levy larger contri-
 butions. An admirable motive for plundering Mysore, Tanjore,
 and the other nations of India ! Such perhaps might be the temper
 of Mahomedan conquerors ; but must British troops therefore be-
 come the instruments of oppression ? or be employed in so disgrace-
 ful a service ? Was no respect due to the Rajah, whose country fed
 our army in successive campaigns ? Who had supplied the necessities
 of the Nabob in the hour of his distress, and without whose assist-
 ance Mahomed Ally could not have subsisted with his family in his
 own fort of Trichinopoly ? Whose country was laid waste by the
 Marattas, in revenge for the assistance he had given ? Was deprived of
 it's fertility by the destruction of the great bank of Coiladdy ?
 Whose capital was exposed to a siege in our quarrel ? Who, during
 a long struggle with the French, had constantly appeared as our
 friend, and been included in a public treaty as our ally ? What
 claim had Mahomed Ally to a sacrifice of honour, justice, and na-
 tional faith, to gratify his boundless ambition ? After a twelve

† “ State of Facts,” page 24.

years' war he had been raised by the British arms to extensive dominions, amidst the wreck of the Empire. He appropriated to his own use a tribute formerly paid to the Mogul, which his predecessors in office had merely collected. Finally this right was established by treaty, and guaranteed by the English to him and his successors. The Rajah yielded much, and gained nothing. His dominions indeed, transmitted from his ancestors, continued in his possession; and the British faith was pledged to protect his kingdom from new exactions.

The urgent distress of the Nabob, and the immense sums expended by the English during a long war, were the real causes of so unequal a conduct.

We are told, that the family of Pertappa Sing were originally usurpers, and the year 1680 is the period which the author of a "State of Facts" has fixed as the commencement of this supposed usurpation †. It is difficult to conceive for what purpose the observation was introduced, unless to justify a foreign conquest. Must we in this age observe, that the right of succession is a question which the nation alone can decide? The right of governors is relative to the governed; their interests are alone affected; and a possession of near a century by the present Rajah's family may afford some proof, that the people of Tanjore did not wish for a change. Their abhorrence of a Mahomedan Government cannot be denied; and the perpetual civil wars, the poisonings and assassinations perpetrated among the Mahomedan Governors of the Empire, form a striking contrast to the mild and gentle sway of the native Hindoo Princes. The author of a "State of Facts" refers us to the histories

† Page 21.

of Orme and Dow for a knowledge of the subject. “ The relations
 “ of all travellers into Indostan,” says Mr. Orme †, “ abound
 “ with examples of the vices of these Princes.” He attributes to
 the Mahomedans established in India “ A cruelty of character, to
 “ which the Indians are at present happily strangers.” “ The faith
 “ of Mahomed,” says Mr. Dow ‡, “ is peculiarly calculated for
 “ despotism ; and it is one of the great causes, which must fix for
 “ ever the duration of that species of Government in the East.”
 After explaining the manner in which “ The unlimited power,
 “ which Mahomedanism gives to every man in his own family,
 “ habituates mankind to slavery ;” and how the religion of the
 Prophet leaves ample room for the cruelty of a Prince, he adds,
 “ Governors, magistrates, and inferior officers, invested with the
 “ power of the principal Despot, whose will is law to the whole
 “ Empire, exercise their authority with rigour.” Speaking after-
 wards of the Hindoos, the same author observes, “ The system of
 “ religion which they profess, is only perfectly known in the effect
 “ which it has upon the manners of the people. Mild, humane,
 “ obedient, and industrious, they are, of all nations on earth, the
 “ most easily conquered and governed. Their Government, like
 “ that of all the inhabitants of Asia, is despotic ; yet it is in such
 “ a manner tempered by the virtuous principles inculcated by
 “ their religion, that it seems milder than the most limited mo-
 “ narchy in Europe.”

“ Penal laws are scarce known among the Hindoos, for their
 “ motives to bad actions are few. Temperate in their living, and
 “ delicate in their constitutions, their passions are calm, and they

† “ Dissertation on the establishments made by Mahomedan Conquerors in
 “ India,” prefixed to his History.

‡ “ Dissertation on the origin and nature of Despotism in India.”

“ have no object but that of living with comfort and ease. Timid
 “ and submissive, from the coldness of a vegetable diet, they have
 “ a natural abhorrence of blood. Industrious and frugal, they
 “ possess wealth which they never use. Those countries governed
 “ by native Princes, which lay beyond the devastations of the Ma-
 “ homedans, are rich, and cultivated to the highest degree.
 “ Their Governors encourage industry and commerce, and it is to
 “ the ingenuity of the Hindoos we owe all the fine manufactures in
 “ the East.” This author, who travelled into the country, like-
 wise affirms, from his own experience, that “ The nation of
 “ Marattas, though chiefly composed of Rajaputs, or that tribe of
 “ Indians whose chief business is war, retain the mildness of their
 “ countrymen in their domestic government.”

The family of Mahomed Ally appear to have been actuated by
 the general spirit of Mahomedan conquerors. The Nabob, in his
 letter to the Directors, proposes to himself the example of his de-
 ceased father, who “ during his Subahdary was often under a ne-
 “ cessity of punishing him (the Rajah of Tanjore), and he ob-
 “ liged him *to pay sums of money.*” The motive is here apparent,
 and Anwar a Dean himself fully expressed the temper in which
 these expeditions were conducted. Highly commending the zeal
 and bravery of his Commanders against Tanjore, in a letter to the
 English Governor, he says, they “ Fought very well with their
 “ arrows, for they sent a great number of *the heathen soldiers into*
 “ *hell,* and about one hundred of their best officers, who were
 “ richly dressed, but fell by *the sword of Mahomed †.*” The aversion
 of the Tanjoreans to the government of Anwar a Dean will be
 easily conceived; nor do the people appear more disposed to sub-

† Appendix, I. p. 3.

mit to the son. Governor Du Pré and his Council, who engaged to conquer Tanjore in 1771 for Mahomed Ally, in a letter to the Court of Directors, the preceding year, declare, That they verily believe “ The Tanjoreans would submit to Hyder Ally, or to any other power, rather than to the Nabob, *because of his oppressions in the countries already in his possession.*”

We are told in the “ State of Facts†,” that the present Rajah’s family obtained Tanjore “ By perfidy, and governed for near eighty years by cruelty, oppression, and injustice.” This assertion is an effect of blind zeal, because the same author in more than one place informs us, that, at the time of writing his book, the “ Province is one of the most fertile and *opulent* countries of the Deckan‡.” The fact is indisputably true. Tanjore (before the expedition in 1771 at least) was in truth the garden of India. Strange effect of cruelty, of oppression, and of injustice ! Either, therefore, the assertion has no foundation in truth, or there is a mildness in the character of a Hindoo Government, which can disarm even the vices of the Prince.

It is said, “ The usurpation, character, and cruelty of Pertaupa Sing being universally execrated, the Nabob, Ally Doast Khan, sent his son, Subder Ally, from Trichinopoly, with a considerable force, to expel the Usurper from Tanjore. His success was equal to his expectations. Tanjore was taken, and Pertaupa thrown into prison, with an allowance of a small sum for his daily maintenance. In the troubles which soon after followed in the Carnatick, Ally Doast and his son were slain, and Pertaupa re-

† “ State of Facts” p. 21.

‡ Ibid. p. 37.—“ Original papers relative to Tanjore,” p. 6.

“ gained

“gained possession of Tanjore†.” •The narrative is somewhat brief; but if the fact be true, one question should be resolved :--- How did Pertaupa Sing regain possession of Tanjore? Was his restoration effected by an attachment of his subjects to the person of their Prince, or by their aversion to a Mahomedan Government? Both motives probably conspired. The present cause therefore is not the cause merely of one man, but of a whole people.

The author of a “State of Facts” speaks of *feudal* subjection, and of the Nabob as *feudal* Lord of Tanjore. The term has hitherto been applied to that system which the northern conquerors of Europe adopted, where lands were distributed upon condition of military service, and of other duties. Those lands being given upon express conditions, were forfeited if the vassal failed to perform his obligation; and rigorous as the terms may now appear, regard to their own safety, amidst a conquered people, ever ready to resist, and the necessity of an army obedient to it's leader in the country of an enemy, were sufficient to procure the consent of the nation. But what similitude is there between regulations established by a conquering tribe among themselves, and terms imposed upon others by the terror of the sword? Whatever rights the Mogul Emperors may seem to have obtained, by the dread of their power and acquiescence of the nations around, most indisputably fell with the Empire. The Subahdar of the Deckan, or the Phouzdar of Arcot, could claim no tribute in right of that Emperor whose authority they no longer acknowledged. If the inability of the Emperor to protect the provinces exempted the delegates of his own power from the duty of obedience, surely the nations around might resume their independence, and hereditary Sovereigns might justly

† “State of Facts” p. 23.

deny those claims, which originally had no better foundation than the strength of the Empire, and the comparative weakness of its neighbours.

The Rajahs of Tanjore are represented as mere Zemindars or Renters, not hereditary Sovereigns. "About the year 1680, is Fixed the origin of the *race* of Usurpers, whom some through design, and others from ignorance, call the *KINGS* of Tanjore†." Here we have the testimony of our author himself, that the *race*, or family, of the present Rajah *possessed* Tanjore during more than ninety years preceding the war of 1773. By the laws of all civilized nations, possession long continued is justly deemed a solid foundation of private right; and the best writers on the laws of nations have thought the same reasoning much more forcibly decides on the claims of Sovereigns. Between them there is no judge on earth; the appeal is to the sword, and their quarrels usually terminate in blood. Possessions of Sovereigns therefore must not be easily disturbed, but, being long continued, ought for ever to be reputed just. Were it permitted to have recourse to ancient times, few Sovereigns would enjoy their rights in security, and all hopes of peace must be banished from earth.

Possession, in the present instance, is a stronger foundation of right, because it subsisted at a period when the claims of the Empire were supported with the greatest vigour. Aurungzebe died in 1707. During twenty-seven years of his reign the family of the present Rajah governed Tanjore, Hindoo princes of the same religion with their subjects. The great abilities of Aurungzebe, his minute attention to all affairs of Government, are celebrated by historians; and the most implicit obedience to his will was rigidly exacted

* † "State of Facts" p. 21.

during a long reign. In the provinces of the Empire the duties of the several officers were accurately distinguished. The revenues were received by the Dewans, who regularly accounted with the Royal Treasury; while the Subahdars and Phouzdars were intrusted with the command of armies. Mahomedans, unconnected with the provinces they governed, were selected for these stations; and frequent changes kept them obedient to the hand that gave them their power. The possession of sovereign and hereditary authority by the Rajahs during this period, is the most convincing evidence, that Tanjore was never regarded, even by the Mahomedans themselves, as a part of the Empire.

Europeans, from their first intercourse, have uniformly acknowledged the Rajahs of Tanjore as Sovereigns. The Dutch obtained grants of territory and privileges as early as 1658; the French not before 1738; but the grants to the French Nation, which were produced upon the restoration made of Carrical, in pursuance of the Treaty of Paris, are in terms a sale of territory upon certain conditions †. The Juncan, or duties without the town, were to be collected by the Rajah's officers, for the use of his Circar. If a mint be established, the customs are to be paid "In the same manner as is usual at Negapatam‡;" and provision is made for support of the Pagodas, for due respect to their worship, for the celebration of their feasts, that the houses of Bramins shall not be polluted, and that no Europeans shall enter into the Tanks or Pagodas. In short, these grants appear to be grants of a Hindoo Prince; while some, of a much later date, in the Carnatick, con-

† Appendix, No. VIII. p. 104.

‡ The Settlement before granted to the Dutch in the kingdom of Tanjore.

vey lands in Jaghire, and are registered in the office of the Dewan †, preserving in this respect the ancient forms of the Empire.

The English obtained Devi-Cotah in 1749; and throughout the proceedings of the Council ‡, no doubt appears to have occurred respecting the sovereign authority of the Rajah, who is uniformly stiled the King of Tanjore. His ambassador was received; peace concluded; Acheveram restored; and Devi-Cotah finally ceded to the Company. Admiral Boscawen approved the treaty, as before he had encouraged, nay conducted the enterprize. It is moreover remarkable, that there are letters extant, written in the three preceding years by Governor Floyer to THE KING OF TANJORE §, treating Pertaupa Sing as a Sovereign, at the very period when complaints were made to Nizam ul Muluck, Subahdar of the Deckan, as the Superior of Anwar a Dean, father to the present Nabob of Arcot. Anwar a Dean, a stranger in the Carnatick, was appointed by Nizam ul Muluck Phouzdar of Arcot in the year 1744, at which period the family of the present Rajah had reigned just seventy four years in Tanjore.

The author of a “State of Facts” is offended, that the title of **KINGS** has been given to the Rajahs of Tanjore, and roundly affirms, that this title “Was for the first time conferred upon them in the “treaty of 1762 ||” The appellation he supposes to have been given by some through design, by others through ignorance. Surely the author has not read the histories of Mr. Orme and other

† Mr. Dow explains Dewan, or Duan, to be the Receiver-General of the province. He was not merely a Receiver; he had sole management of the revenues.

‡ Appendix, No. V. beginning at p. 28.

§ Appendix, No. IV. p. 25, &c.

•|| Page 21.

publications; the correspondence of the Company's servants with the Rajah, with the Nabob, with each other, and with the Directors. If he had, he must have known, that the appellation of KING had been constantly used from the year 1746, before which period we had little intercourse with the country. Men saw a Prince in the actual government of his dominions. Expressing in the native tongue the idea which presented itself, they naturally employed a term descriptive of his station. The title of KING, thus bestowed by a succession of men unconnected with each other, and without a possible design, is the strongest and least suspicious testimony that the Rajahs really exercised the rights of sovereignty.

The first † treaty of peace and alliance entered into by the English with any Indian prince, was that with Pertaupa Sing in 1749. In the same year the Rajah's troops escorted from Devi-Cotah to Trichinopoly a small supply of cannon sent to Mahomed Ally: but the year 1751 is the period when the English more directly engaged in his cause. Chunda Saib, appointed Nabob of the Carnatick by Murzafa Jing, really possessed the country, and Mahomed Ally was negotiating the surrender of his last fortress, when the assistance of an English force revived his hopes. The expense of this war in defence of Trichinopoly, maintained during two years against Chunda Saib and the French, fell wholly on the East-India Company; and although in the succeeding war, which continued to the truce of 1754, the expense was somewhat alleviated

† There is a letter of the Governor of Fort St. George extant, which purports to have enclosed the treaty of alliance. The Books of Correspondence have been regularly kept at the India-House, but this treaty has either not been sent home, or has been mislaid. The correspondence likewise proves, that a new engagement of mutual assistance between the King of Tanjore and the English was concluded in 1760. Appendix, No. V. p. 48.

from the revenues of countries won by the sword, no real assistance was given, either by the Nabob or by the British Nation.

The opinions entertained during this period by Pertaupa Sing, by Mahomed Ally, and by the English, upon the respective rights claimed by the two former, appear not only from the correspondence, but from Phirmaunds which the Rajah and the Nabob received, or pretended to receive, from the Subahdar of the Decan and from Delhi. The Governor, writing to the King of Tanjore says, “I congratulate your Majesty on the honours lately received from Court; look upon this as an omen of your future happiness, and continue firm to Mahomed Ally.” He exhorts the King not to regard the threatening letters of Mr. Dupleix. “If you keep strict to *your alliance*, it will not be in his power to hurt you †.” The Rajah is here treated as an useful ally, but no idea suggested of his dependence on Mahomed Ally. Pertaupa Sing explains these honours to be a Phirmaund from the Emperor, containing assurances of protection, and of the punishment of his enemies, with a direction not to pay “The tribute money to any one ‡.” This Phirmaund is said to have been granted upon the favourable representation made of Pertaupa Sing by the Subahdar of the Deckan. Admitting for a moment that it never came from Delhi, yet it equally tends to prove the real situation of the Rajah. A future exemption from tribute is manifestly the object in view; but it did not occur to him, or to the author of the Phirmaund, that the consent of the Emperor was requisite to the Rajah’s possession of that country, which his ancestors had governed in succession in the time of Aurungzebe. The argument acquires

† Appendix, No. I. p. 4.

‡ Ibid. p. 5.

double force, when this paper is contrasted with a Sunnud transmitted by Mahomed Ally to the English Governor. The defeat of the French before Trichinopoly, with the capture and death of Chunda Saib, happened in May 1752; and in the November following the Nabob encloses a Sunnud from the *Subahdar of the Decan*, which *confirms* him in the Government of Arcot, the Carnatick, Trichinopoly, &c. “He may therefore with a contented and firm mind manage the affairs thereof, collect the revenues, and *send them to Court*. He shall not spend any larger sums than what are stipulated, *without a proper order* sent him to that end. Observe this as a strict order †.” The former observation may be again applied. Whether the Sunnud was really received by Mahomed Ally, or designed as an ostensible title, it equally demonstrates what were his pretensions. He here admits himself to be the Governor of several districts under the Subahdar of the Decan, deriving authority from his Sunnud, and accountable for the whole revenues, deducting the usual allowance for the expenses of the army and government. The negotiations for peace between the French and English Companies commenced in February 1754, and the terms of truce were concluded in December. In this latter month, when the hopes of Mahomed Ally increased with the success of the English, he enclosed a Phirmaund, supposed to be received from Delhi. This instrument does not indeed command him, in the terms of the former Sunnud, “To send the revenues to Court;” the *Peshcush* which hath been stipulated is alone required; yet the Phirmaund confirms him “In the employment of the Dewanny and Phouzday of Arcot, as well as the Killedary and Phouzday of Trichinopoly, in the *same manner as it hath been usual* ‡.” Mahomed Ally here pretends to no inde-

† Appendix, No. I. p. 6.

‡ Ibid. p. 7.

pendent authority. The Phirmaund unites several offices in his person, but these are described as the known inferior offices in the Empire, subordinate to the Subahdar of the Deckan.

In January* preceding, the English Commissaries proposed, That the King of Tanjore shall also be comprehended in this “ treaty, and the peaceable possession of his kingdom guaranteed to him by the contracting parties.” The French Commissaries in their answer say, “ With regard to Tanjore, the Marquis Dupleix has already declared to the Honourable Mr. Saunders, that it was in the breast of the Tanjoreans to be at peace with the French, and that he would give them assurances free from equivocation, if they on their part would lay down their arms †.” Neither the French nor the English Commissaries considered Tanjore as comprehended within the limits of the Empire. The difference which prevented the conclusion of a peace arose from the pretensions of the two parties, under the names of those whom they supported as officers of the Mogul Empire. The English Commissaries required, that Mahomed Ally should be acknowledged Subahdar of the Carnatick, meaning probably, from the use of that term, to claim a future exemption from all subordination to the Deckan. The French on the other hand demanded, that no opposition should be made to the disposition and regulations made by Salabat Jing in the Carnatick; promising, on this condition, that some establishment should be secured to Mahomed Ally. Salabat Jing was at this time Subahdar of the Deckan, supported by French troops, and had already granted the Government of the whole Carnatick to Mr. Dupleix. Had either party

† Vide “ Proceedings of the Commissaries at Sadras,” subjoined to “ An Account of the War in India,” by Richard Owen Cambridge, Esquire.

therefore

therefore prevailed in their demand, the consequence was obvious ; under the name of their ally they would really have given laws to the adverse nation. All hopes of a permanent peace under these circumstances were vain ; but a truce was concluded, in which the allies of both parties were included, retaining their present possessions.

In a long correspondence between the King of Tanjore and successive Governors it appears, not only that the Rajah was uniformly acknowledged as a Sovereign, but also as an Ally. During the wars from 1751 to 1754, letters requesting provisions for Trichinopoly, and acknowledging assistance in troops, money, and provisions, are many, and couched in very strong terms. After this period he is informed regularly of the hopes entertained of peace, that a treaty had taken effect, that he was included, and that the English troops should punish his enemies†. Even his disputes with his neighbours were accommodated under the Governor's mediation.

As soon as the war between France and Britain was known in India, the intelligence was communicated to Pertaupa Sing, who declares his troops are ready to act with those of the Company. In the course of this war the French besieged the capital of Tanjore ; yet in the subsequent year we find a letter from the English Governor, acknowledging the assistance of 600 Tanjorean horse at the siege of Madras. Such was the continued intercourse with the Rajah, for whose protection the British faith was pledged by the

† Many of these letters will be found in the different numbers of the Appendix according to the subject ; particularly in Appendix, No. V. from page 34 to page 48, and in Appendix, No. XII. from page 182 to page 185.

treaty of 1762 ; yet it is now made a subject of reproach †, that Governor Pigot and his Council did not concur with the Nabob to oppress an old Ally of the English, whom they had recently engaged to protect ‡. Mahomed Ally in 1755 eagerly solicited the conduct which he afterwards condemned. At this period indeed he could not reside in his own fort of Trichinopoly without supplies from Tanjore ; and with equal prudence and gratitude he avows this motive. But the assistance of the Rajah was no longer *necessary*, when the French had been driven from India §.

When servants of the Company labour to overthrow the rights of the Company, we must not be surprised if the same men forget likewise their duty as subjects. The Treaty of Paris has been introduced, for the purpose probably of making a further appeal from the English to the French Nation. It were strange indeed if these nations, who explicitly acknowledged the rights of the King of Tanjore in 1754, had transferred his possessions to the Nabob by the Treaty of Paris. The two Companies had been engaged in hostilities, long before the national war in 1756, to support the pretensions of their respective allies in India. By the Treaty of Paris it is therefore stipulated, that “ In order to preserve future peace on
“ the Coast of Coromandel and Orixa, the English and French
“ shall acknowledge Mahomed Ally Khân for lawful Nabob of
“ the Carnatick, and Salabat Jîng for lawful Subah of the Dec-
“ kan.” No idea was at this time entertained by either nation that Tanjore was a part of the Carnatick, or in the smallest degree dependent on the Nabob. By the 11th article of this treaty, all the factories which the French possessed at the beginning of

† “ State of Facts,” p. 24.

• ‡ In 1760 a treaty of mutual assistance was concluded. Vide Appendix, No. V. page 48.

§ Pondicherry was taken in 1761.

the year 1749 were to be restored. Mr. Law, who from his long residence in India had acquired a perfect knowledge of the country, was appointed Commissary on the part of the French King to execute the treaty, and to accept the restitution therein promised. He arrived in India the latter end of the year 1764. In the preceding year Tuljaujee had succeeded his father Pertappa Sing as hereditary Sovereign of his dominions. Mr. Law expressed no doubt of his right; on the contrary, in his first letter, he congratulates the King on his succession, and informs him of the object of his mission. He applies for a restitution of Carrical in the Kingdom of Tanjore, which, as he expresses himself, writing to the King, "Had been granted to us by your predecessors †." In a letter of the same date to Mahomed Ally, Mr. Law addresses him by the appellation ‡ "Lord Nabob, whose puissance is derived from the throne imperial;" informs him, that he was sent by the King of France "To renew the ancient friendship which was between your nation and our's, between your predecessors and the French Chiefs settled in the Carnatic. *This country is in your own dependence.*" Mr. Law therefore applies to the Nabob for the restoration of Pondicherry and its dependencies; but no mention is made of the French Settlement in Tanjore, because Mr. Law well knew this was no part of the Carnatick. The restoration of Carrical first took place. A dispute arose, whether, from the terms of the treaty, a Peshcush, which had been remitted since the year 1749, remained due to the King of Tanjore. While the contest was depending between the Commissaries, Mr. Law again writes, requesting the negotiation with the Nabob, respecting the restoration of Pondicherry, may be forward-

† Appendix, No. VIII. page 100.

‡ Ibid. page 99.

ed † ; and afterwards, when engaged, with the English Commissary and the Nabob's officer, in ascertaining the districts belonging to Pondicherry, he again requests the good offices of the English with the Rajah of Tanjore ‡ ; but no idea occurs of the Nabob's superiority, or that he had any right to interfere. In the solemn act of restitution, the districts of Carrical, &c. are restored §, " Subject, with respect to the Government of Tanjore, to
 " the same yearly tribute with which they were charged before
 " the commencement of the year 1749, in case the KING OF
 " TANJORE shall demand it ||."

To these proofs of the rights of the Rajah we may add the testimony of Mr. Du Pré and his Council, after they had undertaken to conquer Tanjore in 1771. The Nabob in 1772 was desirous of an address by Arruzdasht from the Governor and Council, which mode of address is there explained to be an acknowledgment of superiority in him to whom it is made. The Council were divided in their opinions how far it might be proper to gratify the Nabob by degrading the Company. The majority yielded to his wish ; but even they agree, that " The Rajah of Tanjore, 'till his late humi-
 " liation," (by the expedition of 1771) " never considered him-
 " self as a dependent on the Nabob ; he held himself equal to
 " him at least. He paid 'tis true an acknowledgment yearly to
 " the Empire, but considered the Nabob as no more than the de-

† Appendix, No. VIII. p. 109.

‡ Ibid. p. 142.

§ Ibid. p. 124.

|| The papers relative to the restitution made in consequence of the treaty of Paris are printed in Appendix, No. VIII. The Rajah is by both parties styled KING of Tanjore, is considered as a sovereign prince, and the claims of the French Nation were wholly derived from the grants of his ancestors.

“ puty or the officer of that Empire, authorised to receive that
 “ acknowledgment; while he, the Rajah, held his kingdom by
 “ inheritance, and exercised every act of independent sovereignty
 “ in it. It is no wonder then that he should not have used the
 “ Arruzdasht; it might rather have been expected; that he would
 “ have assumed a character of superior dignity to that of the Na-
 “ bob, whose office is constitutionally revocable at pleasure *.”
 The address used from the Rajah to the Nabob was ascertained by
 the testimony of interpreters skilled in the language and customs
 of the East, and assented to by both parties; the fact therefore is
 indisputable †. We shall add only one observation; that forms of
 address, continued by the succession of office, are often the best evi-
 dence of ancient rights.

The reader may possibly be of opinion, that, previous to the treaty
 of 1762, the claims of the Nabob to tribute from the Rajah were
 extremely doubtful. The Nabob himself declares, that the affair
 of Peshcush was uncertain; it was therefore a proper subject of
 treaty. His pretensions are avowedly formed on his own strength
 compared with that of former Governors, and on the support of
 English troops; the English therefore might justly refuse the
 assistance of those troops to enforce exorbitant demands, or even
 employ them to compel a reasonable accommodation. “ A So-
 “ vereign,” says President Montesquieu, “ who is always in that
 “ state in which he forces or is forced, cannot complain of a
 “ treaty he has been compelled to sign: this would be to complain
 “ of his natural state.” Such a plea, once admitted, would for ever
 destroy the faith of treaties, and annihilate those obligations which
 alone can preserve peace on earth.

* Appendix, No. XIX. pages 479 and 480.

† Ibid. p. 474.

It is now said, that the treaty of 1762 was personal, and expired at the death of Pertaupa Sing. All writers on the law of nations agree, that the omission of successors will not render a treaty personal. It is a question of construction from the subject matter, and the presumption is in favour of its continuance, especially if intended to ascertain litigated or uncertain claims. No writer on the law of nations has yet appeared so great an enemy to mankind as to maintain, that a treaty which tends to preserve peace can be considered as personal, unless the express terms of the treaty require it. In the present instance we need not regard it as a question of construction, for the Nabob has given the most clear, strong, and decisive acknowledgments that the treaty yet subsists.

When Pertaupa Sing died, two of the Kists stipulated were not become due. These were paid by his successor Tuljaujee, who likewise continued to pay the annual Peshcush. The payment and acceptance of these amounted to an express declaration, that both parties considered the treaty as a subsisting obligation. Pertaupa Sing died the 16th December 1763. On the 31st of the same month the Nabob sent a special Ambassador to congratulate the son on his accession †. The Vackeel carried a present and a letter, in which the Nabob declares, that Pertaupa Sing was to him a brother, and he would regard Tuljaujee as a son; and concludes the letter with an assurance of friendship in his own hand-writing, "As rain is to a garden so will I be to you ‡." The Rajah in answer informed the Nabob, that he had held the customary Durbar, and would according to the request of his Vackeel fulfil

† Nabob's letter to the Governor, Appendix, No. VII. p. 92.

‡ Ibid. pages 91 and 92.

the treaty. The Nabob wrote a congratulatory letter on that event, and gave new assurances of friendship, if the Rajah observed the treaty †.

The Nabob indeed, constant to his object, the possession of Tanjore, did not write these letters before he had tempted the new Governor. Mr. Palk succeeded Governor Pigot in November 1763. In a letter to Governor Palk, dated the 17th of December, the Nabob says, “ Yesterday morning Pertaupa Sing, Rajah of Tanjore, “ died suddenly, not without suspicion that his son and Monackjee were the perpetrators of it.” “ I thought it requisite to “ advise you immediately of this strange and cruel murder, which “ is properly incumbent on me to enquire into. I request you “ to favour me with your advice and opinion on this occasion as “ soon as you can.” He suggests danger from the Rajah and his General Monackjee, and concludes, “ Prudence dictates that we be “ beforehand with them, if possible, in the measures to be pursued, before they are *fully settled and their power established* ‡.”

The Governor discouraged the ambitious views of Mahomed Ally, and informed him, that he had already written a letter to Tuljaujee ||, “ And expressed his hopes, that by pursuing the same “ measures, and fulfilling the engagements of his deceased father, “ he will preserve the friendship which has long subsisted between the Government of Tanjore, the English, and your “ Excellency.” The decision of Mr. Palk produced that § profusion of compliments which we have before remarked. The

Appendix, No. VII. p. 93.

† Ibid. p. 81.

|| Ibid. p. 89.

§ That this was the motive of the Nabob appears from his letter to the Governor, p. 91.

story of the murder was no more heard of; nay, amidst all the calumnies heaped upon the unfortunate Rajah, the tale is not at this day revived.

We are now told, that † “ No sooner had his father expired, than he removed from his presence every person suspected of being attached to the Nabob of Arcot. Monackjee, a name well known in the annals of India, had often saved Pertaupa Sing from the consequences of his own rash and profligate conduct. This old warrior, grown grey in the service of the family, was disgraced and imprisoned.” After the death of Pertaupa Sing, Mahomed Ally himself, in his letters, represents Monackjee as the favourite of the young Rajah ‡. A report indeed prevailed in Madras in the year 1770, that this old warrior, grown grey in the service of the Rajah’s family and in the *wars of Mahomed Ally*, would be disgraced; but in the succeeding year he appears to have commanded the Rajah’s army against the Marawar Polligar ||; and General Joseph Smith, in 1773, says Tanjore was surprised with little loss on our side, “ The Rajah and his family, Monackjee and his sons, *two of whom are wounded*, being prisoners. The situation of the Rajah is truly pitiable, and likewise Monackjee’s.” These therefore the General requests may be treated in a manner suitable “ To the rank they once held in this country§.”

The author of a “ State of Facts,” if he cannot explain away the engagement of the English in the treaty of 1762, is desirous of proving, that the subsequent conduct of Pertaupa Sing and his son destroyed all obligation of the guarantee. “ On the first occasion

† “ State of Facts,” p. 34.

‡ The Nabob’s letter, Appendix, No. VII. p. 88.

|| Appendix No. XXI, p. 576.

§ Appendix No. XXVII, p. 1218.

“ that offered itself, Pertaupa exhibited marks of his rooted aversion to the English as well as to the Nabob. He instigated Usoff Khân to rebel ; he and his son aided their rebellion with their native troops †.” In proof of this charge one extract of a letter from Pertaupa Sing is produced, which, if genuine, shews his confidence in the English and distrust of the Nabob. He advises Usoff Khân, who appears to have received two letters, one in English the other in Persian, not to go from Madura in consequence of the *Persian letter* : “ You should take security from some man of consequence in Madras, and then you will be safe.”

The other letters from Usoff Khân to Pertaupa Sing tend to shew, that Usoff Khân was well informed of the injuries which the Rajah had sustained from the Nabob : “ That the mound and watercourses are broken ; that the revenues of the Tanjore country depend upon their being in good order :” That the Rajah had applied to the English Governor for justice, and waited the event. Usoff Khân thinking the Rajah irritated by these injuries, plainly hoped to engage him in the common cause, and requested him to send his Vackeel to obtain the assistance of the Marattas and of the French. That the injuries were real, but that these never produced upon the mind of Pertaupa Sing, or of his son Tuljaujee, the effect which Usoff Khân expected, and which probably the Nabob intended, will be clearly evinced.

Madura is a fort situated at a considerable distance from the Nabob's possessions in the Carnatick, formerly dependent on the Hindoo Princes who governed in Trichinopoly. This country was in 1757 the scene of a former revolt, when Maupheus Khân, the

†. Page 25. The letters here mentioned appear in an Appendix to the “ State of Facts.”

elder brother of Mahomed Ally, who now “Lives with him in “great harmony at Chepauk†,” attempted to establish himself in independence. *Usof Khân was, without exception, the most gallant and enterprising soldier, who appeared among the Mahomedans while the French and English were contending for superiority in India. During the wars of Trichinopoly he was frequently employed by Major Lawrence on the most important and dangerous service: His activity under Major Preston, in distressing the enemy when before Madras, greatly conduced to the safety of the place, and established his reputation. The mutual jealousy which afterwards arose between him and the Nabob, was a natural effect of merit under a Moorish Government. “The field of fortune,” says Mr. Orme, “is open to every man who has courage enough to make “use of his sword, or to whom nature has given superior talents “of mind.” Among these soldiers of fortune, a man highly distinguished becomes the rival of his master; and regard to his own safety is a frequent cause of rebellion.

Whatever motives instigated Usof Khân to revolt, the English, in support of the Nabob’s Government, were obliged to reduce him. The siege of Madura commenced in June 1763, but the place was not taken before October in the succeeding year. On the 6th of December 1763 the Governor writes to the King of Tanjore, that, “On account of the heavy rains, the English army drew off their “cannon and stores from before Madura,” but that the siege will be renewed. “My desire therefore is, that you *continue* your assistance “if possible more *than you have hitherto done* ‡.” In January 1764, the Rajah Tuljaujee, in answer to a letter written to his father, observes, that a body of his horse had attended the army from the be-

* †. Original Papers, p. 125.

‡ Dated 6th December, 1763. Appendix, No. XIII. p. 190.

ginning of the expedition. On the 19th of March 1764 the Nabob informs the Governor, that he had laid a scheme for dispersing the Rebel's people in the forts of the Tinnevelly countries and of Davood Khân his friend; that he had assembled troops for this purpose. "Some are already arrived, and some are coming. Three hundred horse from the King of Tanjore arrived here this day †." From a letter of the Governor to the Nabob, dated 26th April it appears, that 300 Tanjorean horse had likewise attended the army before Madura from the beginning of the expedition, and "Lately double ~~this~~ number ‡." On the capture of Madura the Governor, writing to the King of Tanjore, expresses his wish that the same "friendship may continue ||. "For my part you may depend on my constant attention to promote these views, and I depend on the Nabob's and your hearty concurrence, assured that no other Power will then be able to disturb so united a Government."

During the whole of this war the Nabob laboured to provoke hostilities from the Rajah, in expectation of adding Tanjore to his other dominions.

The River Cavery, which rises in the mountains on the Coast of Malabar, after a course of near 400 miles, divides itself into two branches. The one called the Coleroon, bounding Tanjore to the north, runs immediately into the sea. The other branch, taking a longer course, again subdivides itself into many smaller streams, intersecting the whole country. From these streams the natives, with an industry unknown under a Mahomedan Government, have

† Appendix, No. XIII. p. 191.

‡ Dated 20th April, 1764. Appendix, No. XIII. p. 194.

|| Ibid. p. 211.

by innumerable channels supplied water to their grain. Within 20 miles of the first separation, the Coleroon and Cavery approach so near to each other, that the division has been supported by a great bank, for the defence of which a fort was erected at Coiladdy. This fort being taken by the French in 1754, “ They immediately cut “ through the great bank, which preventing the waters of the Ca- “ very from running into the channel of the Coleroon, may be “ called,” says Mr. Orme †, “ The bulwark of the fertility of the “ Tanjore country.” The injury at that time was thought ~~of~~ No much importance to our Ally, that we no sooner regained the fort, than a large detachment of the army was stationed there to protect the workmen employed in the repairs. We may likewise remember, that in the negotiation preceding the treaty of 1762, the Nabob was desirous of regaining the district of Coiladdy, declaring, that the possession of it had enabled Subder Ally to place a garrison in Tanjore, and to conquer the country ‡.

This bank, the destruction of which was the greatest mischief the Tanjore nation could sustain, requires frequent repairs, especially on the approach of the rainy season. Previous to the commencement || of the expedition against Madura, complaints had been made by the Rajah of the injuries his country sustained from the defects of the bank, which the Nabob would not permit him to repair. In a letter on this subject, he requests the English Governor to enquire into former customs, applies to him as a *mediator*, and intreats the

† Page 360..

‡ Appendix, No. VI. p. 71.

|| Appendix, No. XIII. p. 186. The expedition against Madura commenced in June 1763, and it appears that complaints had then been made some time before.

Governor to do justice between them†. The arrears of tribute, stipulated by the treaty of 1762, had been assigned by the Nabob to the Company towards the discharge of his debt. Three Kists at that time remained due; and the Rajah suspected that the intention of Mahomed Ally was, by distressing his country, to render him unable to pay the money, for the purpose of embroiling him with the English. It appears that the Nabob, desirous of preventing all explanation, had promised to repair the bank, *provided no Vackeel of the Rajah resided at Madras*‡; but the insidious design of this condition became evident from his affected delays. In April 1764 the young Rajah had discovered his purpose; for he writes, “ This “ is the time to expect water in the Caverry river, but it is the Na- “ bob’s resolution to hinder it, and thereby to ruin this country, “ and then possess it himself||.” The Governor had in vain represented to the Nabob that the French would soon return, that the Rajah might be driven to despair, and form other connexions. On the 24th May he observes, that the Nabob appeared unwilling he should interfere; urges the strongest arguments from regard to the Nabob’s own security, reminds him of his former adversity, of their joint solicitations at Tanjore, and that the Rajah’s friendship may again be necessary. Lastly, the Governor adds, that all persons whom he had consulted agreed, that the bank ought to be re-

† Appendix, No. XIII. p. 201, 202.

‡ It appears from a letter of Major Lawrence, that the Nabob was offended at the application of the Rajah to the English. That the Nabob required the Rajah not to send a Vackeel to Madras is asserted by the Rajah, Appendix, No. XIII. p. 192; and it appears, by the subsequent letters of the Governor to the Nabob, that no credit was given to his representations of the hostile intentions of the Rajah, made while the Tanjorean horse were serving in the Nabob’s cause before Madura.

|| Ibid. p. 192.

paired; but that he should send a Gentleman to examine the spot, who would make an exact report. He concludes his letter to Mahomed Ally by saying, “ The tract of country to be protected on
 “ the Coast is very considerable, and our attention ought to be em-
 “ ployed in preserving peace and tranquillity here, instead of en-
 “ gaging in the quarrels of others, to the detriment, perhaps to the
 “ entire loss of our own. Let us endeavour to reconcile, if possible,
 “ our system of politicks to our interest; and take care of the ~~good~~
 “ things you are already possessed of, without entering on a *preca-*
 “ *rious pursuit*, and thereby putting every thing to the risk †.”

When the report was made, it appeared, that the repair of the bank could produce no possible injury or inconvenience to the countries in the possession of the Nabob; on the contrary, the breaches being continued would endanger a Pagoda in the ~~land~~ of Seringham, dependent on Trichinopoly.‡ After many frivolous delays, the remonstrances of the Governor at length prevailed. Mahomed Ally, with great reluctance, gave a sullen assent, and the banks were repaired under the inspection of an English Gentleman deputed by the Council for that purpose.

Had the Rajah assisted Ussoff Khân under these provocations, who could have condemned his conduct? yet, confiding in justice from the English, he sent a body of horse to the army before Madura, who continued there during the whole siege. He sent another body of 300 horse to reduce the country of Tinnevely in conjunction with other troops; and he affirms in one of his letters, what, if not true, must have been instantly disproved, that 600 of his horse had for some months encamped on the Plain near Trichinopoly, at

† Dated 24th May 1764. Appendix, No. XIII. p. 204.

‡ Ibid. 206.

the express request of the Nabob †. These forces were maintained by the Rajah at his sole expense; while it appears from the Nabob's own letters, that he allowed batta to the troops of Tondimán, of the Marawars, and other Polligars ‡. We shall now close this period with some extracts from the correspondence, in which Governor Palk expresses his sense of the Rajah's friendly conduct, and our obligations to protect him||. The Governor writes, "I am well satisfied of your inclination to assist Madras on every emergency, and your encouraging the exportation of grain in this time of scarcity is a fresh instance of your regard." On the 26th of June § the Governor, acknowledging the Rajah's assistance against some discontented Polligars, says, "By the blessing of God, while we continue thus mutually to assist each other, the whole Carnatick will enjoy the blessings of peace." He informs the Rajah that a battalion of 1000 Sepoys had marched to those parts, and adds, "Any troops which Gauderow therefore may have left there may now be withdrawn, and I thank you and him for your ready assistance." When departing for Europe, after assuring the Rajah * of "The strict regard of this Government at all times to see the treaty guaranteed by us sincerely kept and punctually observed, and which by the blessing of God will never be infringed," he writes, "Yet I will again repeat, that as you have on your part performed

† This assertion is made in a letter received 10th April, 1764, Appendix, p. 193. It is repeated in a letter received 14th of May following, which adds, that the troops had remained there two months, and gives an account of the Nabob's ill-treatment of the Rajah's officer. Appendix, p. 199. The truth or falshood of this assertion must have been known to the Governor, because the English army was engaged farther to the southward before Madura, and a constant intercourse subsisted between Madras and the camp.

‡ Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.

|| 18th April, 1766. Appendix, No. XII. p. 183.

§ 26th June, 1766. Ibid. ibid.

* 19th December, 1766. Ibid. p. 184.

“ every engagement entered into, it is our full intention to per-
 “ vere in enforcing the spirit and true meaning of it *on the Nabob*
 “ *also* in every instance.” “ I shall represent to the Company in a
 “ proper manner the sincerity of your attachment, and your de-
 “ pendence on their support ; and I take upon me to promise, *in*
 “ *their name*, that while you continue the friendship and good con-
 “ duct which you have hitherto observed, your government will
 “ be entirely protected, and no infringements of the treaty will
 “ be suffered to take place †.”

The second instance of pretended hostility from the Rajah is yet more
 unfortunate than the first. We are told, ‡ “ He entered into close
 “ connexion with Hyder Ally. He gave him valuable pre-
 “ sents, and he furnished him with provisions, which enabled him
 “ to carry the war to the gates of Madras. All these are incontro-
 “ vertible facts ; for Tuljaujee’s correspondence with Hyder fell
 “ into the hands of the English.” Three extracts of letters are
 given in the Appendix. The first, part of a letter from Tuljaujee,
 proves, that he had advanced to Hyder four Lacks of Rupces. Nei-
 ther the time nor the occasion appear, but from circumstances men-
 tioned in this broken correspondence. Hyder’s answer says, “ The
 “ English troops are retired from my country ;” again, “ To annoy
 “ the enemy, ’till I can march the main body of my army against
 “ them, I have sent Lallamia into the Payen Ghaut” (Carnatick)
 “ with five or six thousand horse ; besides there are in readiness to
 “ follow him two commanders, each having under his command
 “ four thousand horse and five thousand Sepoys.” This cor-
 respondence therefore passed at the period when the English army
 had returned into the Carnatick, and when this country was invaded.

† Vide Appendix, No. XII. from page 182 to page 185.

‡ “ State of Facts,” p. 25.

by Hyder Ally. He adds in the same letter, “ You need not fear
 “ the enemy ; depend upon your strength, and *give no money to*
 “ *them, nor send them any troops*, but put them off with delays.”
 Hyder therefore knew he was writing to a man, who might be in-
 duced from some motive to *give money* and *send troops* to his enemies
 the Nabob and the English. In the third piece produced, the Ra-
 jah says, “ You write me, that *now there is friendship* between us,
 “ I should consider your troops and your wealth as mine, and re-
 “ pose myself in pleasure and *ease of mind* ; your Vackeel verbally
 “ confirmed this, which has *made me happy beyond expression*. As it
 “ is *your intention* to add to the prosperity of my country, *I have*
 “ *no apprehensions*.” The friendship therefore was *recently* establish-
 ed, and the *apprehensions* of the Rajah removed by a promise of
 protection. In truth he had, by the payment of a sum of money,
 appeared an enemy, who *had resented* the ravages committed
 in Mysore by the Tanjorean horse, in conjunction with the
 English troops. The assistance given to the English first drew
 the resentment of Hyder upon the Rajah ; yet is a composition thus
 paid to a conquering enemy, provoked by our injustice, now im-
 puted to this unfortunate man as a crime.

The pretence for this war was assistance promised by an unne-
 cessary treaty to the Subahdar of the Deckan, but the real object
 was the conquest of the Mysore country. The recent usurpation
 of Hyder, together with the report of a general disaffection to his
 government, made by a man who was supposed to know the coun-
 try, encouraged the attempt.

The Vackeel of Hyder Ally at Madras was directed to inform his
 master, in answer to complaints † of hostilities begun, that “ The

† 29th June, 1767. Appendix, No. XI. p. 167.

“ English had no quarrel with the Mysore Government ; on the
 “ contrary, it is well known, that we were desirous of living on
 “ terms of friendship, and for that purpose Mr. Bouchier was sent
 “ to treat with Hyder Ally. As allies to Nizam Ally †, and Jag-
 “ hiredars, we were obliged to follow the Subahdar’s standard,
 “ without being enemies to Hyder Ally.” Professions are made
 of a disposition to preserve peace ; but several places are mentioned
 as “ Requisite for the security of the Carnatick,” which, possessed
 by the Nabob, would expose Mysore to invasion. Hyder therefore
 applied himself, with great address, to detach the Subahdar from
 an alliance with the English ; and the known object of the Nabob’s
 ambition enabled him to effect his purpose. In April 1765 Maho-
 med Ally had written to the Directors, of an invitation received
 from several Chiefs to take upon himself the Government of the
 Deckan ; and although they had very wisely discouraged the at-
 tempt, yet this favorite design does not appear to have been en-
 tirely abandoned. The Subahdar of the Deckan therefore was ea-
 sily persuaded to regard his allies as more dangerous than his former
 enemy ; and unwilling to aggrandize the Nabob, by adding My-
 sore to his dominions, agreed to join his own forces with those of
 Hyder Ally.

This secret treaty was concluded at a time when the supply of
 the English army depended in a great measure on the Subahdar.
 A discovery of the treachery intended, reduced General Smith to
 the necessity of retiring towards the Carnatick. To intercept him
 in his march became the great object of Hyder and Nizam Ally,
 who now openly united their armies. A battle ensued on the 2d
 September 1767, and the combined forces were defeated with the

• † Subahdar of the Deckan.

loss of 4000 men. A second victory on our part obliged the Subahdar to sue for peace; and had no schemes of conquest intervened, the war at this time might have been honourably concluded. A treaty was however signed, by which the Subahdar declared the Nabob of Mysore deposed as a rebel, and authorised the conquest of that country.

We must here mention a transaction at the commencement of this war, which strongly marks the restless spirit of Mahomed Ally. The Rajah of Tanjore represented to the Governor an attempt to destroy the banks of the Caverry, repaired in 1764 under the inspection of an English deputy from the Council; that the Nabob did not think proper to break the banks openly, but had ordered an old watercourse to be enlarged, and the mouth of it opened in such a direction, as must effectually ruin them when the water increased in the river. Upon the remonstrances of the Governor, the Nabob consented to shut up this new channel in the latter end of the year 1767 †; yet no sooner had he finished the treaty with the Subahdar, than, thinking the conquest of Mysore certain, he disclosed new projects against the King of Tanjore ‡, at the very moment when 3000 of the King's troops were acting with Colonel Wood in the neighbourhood of Trichinopoly. He revives the old tales of Doast Ally, Subder Ally, and the other plunderers of Tanjore; and then remarking, that the King had escaped being pillaged by the Subahdar, proposes to make him pay 25 Lacks of Rupees. “ The
“ scarcity of money in the Company's treasury, and the impor-

† The correspondence respecting this subject is contained in Appendix, No. XIII. from page 212 to page 216.

‡ The treaty with the Subahdar was concluded the 3d February 1768, and the Nabob's letter is dated the 9th of March. Vide Appendix, No. XI. p. 169.

“ tance of the expedition now on foot to remove a powerful + ene-
 “ my, in great friendship with the French, and who, in case of a
 “ war between the English and French, will doubtless supply the
 “ latter with all necessary succours, (which *makes his extirpation*
 “ *highly necessary*);” these considerations, the Nabob says, “ Added
 “ to the great difficulty of collecting money from the country, on
 “ account of former troubles and apprehensions of new ones, in-
 “ duced me to *put you in mind of this plan*, which is consistent with
 “ the customs of the country respecting the same. However, what-
 “ ever you in your great wisdom may determine upon, I shall
 “ esteem best.”

Mr. Palk had resigned the Government in January 1767. No
 sooner had this change taken place, than the Nabob renews his at-
 tempt to destroy the banks of the Cavery, and consequently the
 fertility of Tanjore. The approaching war, together with the re-
 monstrances of the Governor, who thought the junction of the
 Tanjorean horse necessary, suspended the execution of this design;
 yet no sooner had the treaty with the Subahdar relieved him from
 one enemy, than he returns to his favourite object. The low state
 of the Company's treasury, and the exhausted condition of his own
 country, are made pretences for plundering his neighbours. The
 intended effect of the money to be obtained was worthy of the
 other part of “ *This plan*,”---the extirpation of Hyder Ally.

The Governor in answer declares, that the Rajah had shewn too
 little regard to their interest; “ Yet as no mention is made, in any
 “ part of the treaty, that he is obliged to join us on any occasion,”
 the Governor opposes making the demand of money; “ Especially
 “ as his conduct since has in some measure made amends for it,

† Hyder Ally.

“ a body

“ a body of his troops † being now employed with Colonel Wood.” However, as the Rajah will be secured in the peaceable enjoyment of his possessions, the Governor agrees to request that he will bear a further part of the burthen of the war; “ But whether he will voluntarily consent thereto may be doubted; for as, by the treaty with him, we have deprived ourselves of every pretence to insist upon it, were we to make such a demand, it might be construed a breach of treaty, and bring a reproach upon your Excellency, as well as upon ourselves, of a breach of our faith; which, bound as we are by such solemn engagements, we ought scrupulously to avoid giving the least foundation for ‡.”

The event of the war afforded the Rajah no opportunity of making a liberal return for “ The peaceable enjoyment of his possessions” under our protection. The Nabob, encouraged by our first success, thought the Phouzdary of Mysore within his grasp; but the officers to whose care he had committed the forts we had taken, either from treachery or cowardice, betrayed their charge. The army, unable to subsist in an enemy’s country, retired into the Carnatick; and the Rajah, without defence, was compelled to humble himself before an enemy, whose country had been ravaged by his troops.

Hyder Ally was originally desirous to avoid a war. He observes, that he had written a letter to the Governor of Bombay by a Vackeel, who was sent back without an answer §; “ Therefore my heart,” he says, “ cannot consent to write him again.” Yet he

† 3,000.

‡ This plain and honest Answer appears in Appendix, No. XI. pages 169 and 170.

§ Vide his letter to Mr. Hornby, Appendix, No. XI. p. 167.

applied to Mr. Hornby, Chief at Tellicherry, representing the attention he had paid to the Company's commerce; that "These disputes only ruin the country"; "So by disputes both parties will be losers; therefore you must come between, and advise the Governor of Bombay to write to those of Madras, and make peace." He concludes, "The Company and me disputing, neither will be the better, of which I know you are sensible." Governed by the same views, no sooner had he retaken the forts in his own country, than eluding General Smith, he marched into the Carnatick, and demanded peace under the walls of Madras. The Governor and Council were alarmed at his approach, and a mutual restitution of places taken terminated an unsuccessful and disgraceful war.

Hyder Ally acted with equal wisdom towards the King of Tanjore. Hostilities committed by the Rajah authorised a demand of compensation, and the necessity of Hyder's affairs required a supply; yet the demand was not oppressive. Protection was afterwards promised; and unwilling that the events of this war should afford a pretence for destroying a Hindoo Government, or for increasing the power of the Nabob, he peremptorily insisted that the Rajah should be included in the treaty.

Writers on the law of nations afford abundant authorities to prove, that a treaty establishing a tribute, does not necessarily include a promise of further assistance; that even an express stipulation to this effect cannot extend to a war unjust in itself, or which has conquest for its object; and that peace concluded, or even supplies given to a prevailing Power, cannot be deemed a violation of the most direct and solemn alliance. These enquiries in the present instance become unnecessary, because the treaty of 1765,

while public faith remains, must for ever silence the best grounded complaints, and extinguish (if such^e had existed) the remembrance of all former injuries.

In January 1770 Mr. Du Pré succeeded to the Government of Madras, and the first expedition against Tanjore was undertaken in the succeeding year. From this period therefore our information will necessarily be less perfect, because the intercourse between the Rajah and our Government became less frequent; and because almost the whole of the subsequent materials were transmitted by the Nabob, who had a strong interest to mislead. Yet an attentive examination even of these papers will satisfy every mind, that the pretences for the first expedition were frivolous, and not only frivolous but false; and that the ostensible pretexts used were not the true motives to the war. Even allowing these for a moment to have been in the utmost extent, yet the manner in which the expedition was undertaken, by rendering the army of the guarantee an implicit instrument in the hands of one party, for the avowed purpose of conquering the dominions of the other, must destroy all confidence in public treaties.

The non-payment of the annual Peshcush of four Lacks has been alleged as one cause of the war; yet this is slightly touched by the Gentlemen who undertook that war. Probably they suspected that a peremptory demand would have been immediately complied with; and even the most contumacious neglect could not authorize hostilities, which had conquest for the avowed object.

Tuljaujee

Tuljaujee, in a letter received 20th January 1770, states the expense of his assistance against Hyder Ally at fourteen Lacks of Rupees; that it had been customary to make an allowance for these expenses, and to deduct a part at least from the tribute: that in the war of Trichinopoly a like demand had been complied with, and that in the expedition against Madura four Lacks had likewise been remitted. This claim on the part of the Rajah does not appear to have been ever discussed, though the treaty expressly stipulates, that the Nabob shall "Not demand any thing more" than the tribute. If the facts alleged by the Rajah be true, it might be difficult to refute his claim; especially since the Nabob's own letters prove, that he actually paid the Marawar Polligars for the assistance of their troops in 1763 †. A mistaken claim (supposing it even to be unworthy of examination) and a consequent delay in the payment of the tribute, surely did not incur forfeiture of dominions, which the Rajah and his ancestors had possessed for near a hundred years, or authorise a conquest by the troops of those who had solemnly engaged to guaranty the respective rights of both parties.

Had the Governor and Council decided on this claim, and peremptorily required a punctual payment of the tribute, the conduct of the Rajah rendered it highly probable that he would have complied. The Governor on the 18th of April complained, that a part of the Peshcush of the preceding year was unpaid, and on the 12th of May 200,000 Rupees were actually received. When, on the 4th of June following, the Governor represented that a balance of 50,000 Rupees yet remained, the Rajah indeed urged

† Letter of the Nabob dated 7th August 1763, Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.
 Another letter dated 26th August 1763, p. 190.

the distress of his country, but within one month he borrowed the money, and discharged the debts[§]. The correspondence between the Governor and the Rajah furnishes no *proof* that the Peshcush after this period had been actually paid; yet supposing the strongest possible case, one year's tribute could alone have become due in July 1770, seven months before the Select Committee publicly deliberated on hostilities against Tanjore. If hostilities were not immediately commenced, their own consultations abundantly prove, that no respect for the rights of the Rajah occasioned this delay; but that the backwardness of the Nabob to afford the means of warfare, together with some apprehension from the Marattas, were in truth the real restraint.

Where the charge is so extremely frivolous, perhaps the observation might be spared; yet the fact is nevertheless remarkable. The English held Devi-Cotah by a treaty made in 1749, and engaged to pay an annual Peshcush. By a receipt from the Treasury of Tanjore in 1756, five years' Peshcush appear at that period to have remained unpaid[†]. Subsequent materials are wanting to trace the exact periods at which payments were afterwards continued, and in 1764 the future tribute was remitted by a grant from Tuljaujee, the present Rajah of Tanjore[‡]. Measuring therefore the justice of the English with the conduct observed by themselves, a mere non-payment for seven months will scarcely justify a conquest of the country. The right of the Nabob the Rajah never disputed; for not only the language of his Vackeel and his own letters, but the Consultations of the Committee demonstrate, that the Rajah was willing to pay the tribute, under the guaranty of the English; while the Nabob urged immediate hostilities, and

§ These Letters are printed Appendix, XXI. pages 566, 567.

† Appendix, No. V. p. 42.

‡ Ibid. p. 43.

requested such an answer to be given, as would make the Vackee despair of an accommodation.*

Those who undertook the expedition against Tanjore in 1771, and who eagerly urged the conquest of the country, seem to have been themselves ashamed of this plea. In their consultations the subject indeed is slightly mentioned, but the deliberations of the Committee, of the Council, and the daily letters of intelligence and of complaint from the Nabob, wholly turn on the hostilities committed by the Rajah against the Marawar Polligar. The Committee, in their proceedings of the 13th March, declare, "The Rajah of Tanjore already has, and will no doubt further remonstrate, that the Marawar is no more a dependent on Trinopoly than he is on Tanjore; that he pays tribute to neither, but has presented Nazirs to both, as suited the circumstances of the times."† They acknowledge that the dependence of the Polligar on the Carnatick was a doubtful point; yet, without an examination of the claim, commit the army of the guarantee, who had solemnly engaged to protect the rights of both, to the command of one party, for the avowed purpose, not of obtaining *satisfaction even for supposed injuries*, but of *conquering* the hereditary dominions of the other. They write to the Commander in Chief, that "The Nabob Waulau Jan has determined to depute his eldest son, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, to assert his claims on the Rajah, and has *invested him solely* with full power to negotiate, and finally to conclude." They add, that "It is our determined resolution to support the *intended negotiation* in the most effectual manner, and to that end to use military compulsion with the Rajah, *even to the reduction of his capital*, if necessary; and that no time may be lost, we do empower you, whenever the Nabob's

* Appendix, p. 626.

† Appendix, No. XXII. p. 662. The history of these disputes was laid before the Committee by the President on the 3d of April 1771, Appendix, p. 680.

“ *Plenipotentiary, Omdat-ul-Omrah Behauder, shall signify to you the*
 “ PROPRIETY and EXPEDIENCY *thereof*, to act in the most effectual
 “ manner to the attainment of these ends; either by merely
 “ marching towards Tanjore, without committing hostilities, or
 “ in a hostile manner to enter the territories of Tanjore, to take and
 “ establish posts, or *even to invest and besiege and take the capital, with-*
 “ *out waiting for further orders from us†.*”

These Gentlemen cannot be suspected of voluntarily disclosing a justification of the Rajah's hostilities against the Marawar, because whatever tended to exculpate him, must at the same time condemn themselves. Nevertheless, from their public deliberations, and from the mutilated correspondence and intelligence transmitted by the Nabob, we must now proceed to examine the subject, since little intercourse was at this time permitted between our Presidency and the Rajah. This unfortunate man was referred solely to the Nabob, at the time when the Nabob requested the President to make the Vackeel despair of an accommodation‡. From materials furnished by these parties, from the correspondence of these enemies of the Rajah, we are under a necessity of forming our judgment of the respective rights; and yet such is the force of truth, that even these materials demonstrate that there could be no just reasons for hostilities, and that the ostensible cause was not the real motive to the war. The reader perhaps may be inclined to add, that the conquest of a country by guarantees of a treaty, who never condescended to examine the rights of the parties, was a violation of every tie which ought to be held sacred among nations.

† Consultations of the President and Council 4th of August 1771, Appendix, p. 723.

‡ These were the terms used by the Nabob in a conference with the President on the 23d July, Appendix, p. 696, and the resolution to commit the whole negotiation to the Nabob was taken the next day, viz. on the 24th of July. Vide the reasons given at large by the Committee, Appendix, No. XXII. from p. 698 to p. 712.

The Rajah asserted, that the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars had been established in their respective Governments by his ancestors; that the Tanjoreans had possessed the disputed districts during more than fifteen years before the Marawar Polligar encroached upon their possession; that the Nalcooty Man had seized his elephants coming from the Dutch Settlement to Tanjore, and that he had no other means of security to his own dominions than by punishing their insolence.

That this representation of the Rajah is just will appear highly probable. That these Polligars were not dependent on the Carnatick will appear unquestionable, from the letters and intelligence transmitted by the Nabob himself.

In the year 1755, † Mahomed Ally represented to the Governor, that the Rajah of Tanjore's Vackeel had complained of protection given to the Marawar, by which the Rajah and Tondiman had been hindered from "Retaking the districts which he had possessed;" that he (the Nabob) had written "To Colonel Heron on this head
" to the following purport: The Marawar acted as an enemy for
" these five or six years past; *we never reaped any advantage from*
" *him.* We should not lose the King of Tanjore and Tondiman
" by giving our protection to the Marawar: the support of the
" fort of Trichinopoly depends on their friendship." Yet doubtful of the effect of his own letter, he requests an order to Colonel Heron, "As soon as possible, to quit his protection to the Marawar."
" war." The Governor immediately writes to the King of Tanjore, that he understood ‡ "His army was in readiness to march
" into the Marawar's country, to take possession of certain districts
" which belonged to him before the war." He advises indeed an

† Appendix, No. V. p. 39.

‡ 27th March, 1755. Appendix, No. V. p. 41.

accommodation, for fear of creating new troubles; yet he adds,
 “ The Marawar is very desirous of entering into an agreement
 “ with the Nabob and the English, but I have wrote my officer,
 “ the Marawar is your enemy, and sent positive orders not to con-
 “ clude any matters, or make any friendship with him, unless he
 “ does at the same time give you satisfaction concerning the afore-
 “ mentioned districts, nor to enter into any treaty without your
 “ concurrence.” The Nabob acknowledging the Governor’s an-
 “ swer to his former letter †, writes, “ You also say, that in consider-
 “ ation of the friendship of the said King and Tondiman, and of
 “ *your regard to me*, you have wrote to the Colonel not to give his
 “ protection to the Marawar, but on the contrary to send away
 “ his Vackeel. I have forwarded your letter to the said King, who
 “ was vastly pleased with it. *I have wrote to the Marawar very*
 “ *pressingly to restore the King’s districts* which he possesses, and de-
 “ liver them as soon as possible to his people.” When the negoti-
 ation which preceded the treaty of 1762 was depending, the Na-
 bob admits that he had authorised the expedition of the King of
 Tanjore against the Marawar; but as the French were then driven
 from India, he thought himself strong enough, with the assist-
 ance of the English troops, to convert the former success of the
 Rajah to his own advantage. He says, “ The meaning of the
 “ word expedition here is, to gain country, or money; if so,
 “ whether what is obtained by such expedition is to be kept for his
 “ use, or to be delivered to him who commanded him to under-
 “ take it, the *Commander being myself*, as above, I leave it to your
 “ consideration‡.” This project of the Nabob received no en-
 couragement from the English Council, and when the treaty was

† Appendix, No. V. p. 4. Dated the 5th May, 1755.

‡ The Nabob acknowledges that this authority to attack the Marawar was given in writing. Appendix, No. VI. p. 69.

concluded,

concluded, strong assurances were made to the King of Tanjore, that no protection should be given to the Polligars who may attempt any thing against him.

Soon after the commencement of the siege of Madura, and when an attack was meditated against the friends of Ussoff Khân in the Tinnevelly country, the Nabob writes†, that as Major Preston thought “ The junction of Tondiman, Marawar, and Nalcooty was highly
“ necessary, on account of the expedition against Tinnevelly, and
“ that I should send for them, I accordingly sent for Tondiman by
“ agreeing to pay the batta. As to Marawar and Nalcooty, *they*
“ *did not chuse to come hither* ‡ for these 40 or 50 years, or from
“ the time of the Gentoo Rajahs||; but I prevailed on them, by
“ agreeing to grant certain of their requests, and they accordingly
“ came to Trichinopoly.” At this period therefore, in August 1763, the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars had not acknowledged the authority of Mahomed Ally, nor of any former Mahomedan Governor of the Empire; neither had they acknowledged the authority of the Gentoo Rajahs who reigned in Trichinopoly for some years before that fort was taken by Chunda Saib. He obtained Trichinopoly by treachery in 1736, but was soon compelled to surrender himself a prisoner to the Marattas, who relinquished the fort to Nizam-ul-Muluck in 1744, nineteen years only before this letter of the Nabob was written. Admitting therefore the Nabob’s own state of the fact, these Polligars were independent of Trichinopoly 20 or 30 years before that country was subjected to a Mahomedan Government, when his father Anwar-a-Dean, a stranger in the Deckan, was appointed Killedar of the fort.

† Appendix, No. XIII. p. 189.

‡ Trichinopoly, whence the Nabob wrote, and on which he now says their countries are dependent.

|| Dispossessed of Trichinopoly by Chunda Saib in 1736.

That these Polligars were not dependents of the Nabob, at the time when the Rajah of Tanjore besieged the Capital of the Marawar, is evinced by the acts of the Nabob, and by the correspondence of his officers. On the 24th February 1771, when the Rajah of Tanjore had taken some forts from the Marawar, and was approaching the capital, Mahomed Ibrar Khân, Phouzdar of Madura, writes to the Nabob : “ In consequence of their family disputes, I think that the
 “ affairs of the Marawar are in a very bad way at this juncture ;
 “ therefore the *country belonging to the Circar*, which is in *possession*
 “ *of the Marawars*, may with ease and without trouble be acquir-
 “ ed : I wait for your orders on this head.” He advises an “ Im-
 “ mediate seizure of whatever country is in their possession.” † His design was not executed ; for Syed Muckdoom Ally Khân, another officer of the Nabob, in a letter dated the 5th March, ‡ transmits an agreement from the Vackeel of the Marawar, dated the 3d March, which his distress, and the siege of his capital, had induced the Marawar to make. He agrees to deliver up Tripanom and Pallymadi §, two districts which belonged to the Circar. To this period therefore, in the judgment of the Nabob and his officers, the Marawar was so far from being dependent on the Carnatick, that he had actually seized in a hostile manner two districts belonging to the Circar.

The expedition against Tanjore, undertaken on the pretence of protecting these dependents, terminated in the submission of the Rajah to the terms dictated by the Nabob. This submission was

† Appendix, No. XXI. p. 593.

‡ Ibid. p. 598.

§ These appear to have been the districts demanded by the Nabob in 1755, which districts the Marawar, notwithstanding such demand, retained 'till the year 1771—sixteen years. Such was his state of dependence ! Vide Nabob's letter, dated 19th May, 1755. Appendix, No. V. p. 41, 42.

signed

signed by the Rajah on the 27th of October 1771. The next day the Nabob's son writes to his Father, representing the insolence of the Marawar and Nalcooty Man : “ If your Highness *proposes* taking
 “ Ramnaut and Nalcooty Man's country, *when can there be a finer*
 “ *army* collected together than the present ? If an order therefore
 “ from the Governor and Council to the General, *agreeable to the*
 “ *order they gave in writing respecting Tanjore*, is received here, and
 “ your Highness, out of your favour and goodness, will intrust me
 “ with this expedition on the part of the Circar, by the *bleſſing of*
 “ *God I will conquer them both* in a very little time.” † On the 3d
 of November the Nabob, in a letter to the Governor, solicits
 the assistance of the English forces to reduce these Polligars. He
 says, ‡ “ In my former letter I acquainted you of the state of depen-
 “ dence and subjection which the Marawar and Nalcooty Zemini-
 “ dars, and also Tondiman, were in to the Governors of Trichi-
 “ nopoly *during the time of the Rajahs of that place*. Their state of
 “ subjection and obedience was such, that if the Rajah either or-
 “ dered them upon any service, or sent for them to him, the same
 “ was complied with immediately.” He then observes, the King
 of Tanjore retired from their country merely because his son
 marched against Tanjore ; § and adds, that “ Neither the Marawar
 “ nor Nalcooty Zemindars sent to the army a single man, nor sup-
 “ plied it from their countries with a single grain of provision ;
 “ and contrary to the spirit of obedience do not pay their stated
 “ Peshcush ||. Besides they keep in their woods the insolent Col-

† Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 948.

‡ Ibid. p. 941.

§ This is not true. The King of Tanjore had concluded peace with the Marawar before the 17th March ;—vide Nabob's letter ; and the expedition against Tanjore was not undertaken before the 4th August ; vide Instructions to General Smith of that date.

|| These Polligars never had paid any stated Peshcush since the time of the Gentoo Rajahs.

“ leries, and notorious thieves of the Madura and Tinnevely coun-
 “ tries, who, through the support and protection of these Zemins-
 “ dars, molest the inhabitants of the villages of those countries in
 “ the cultivation of the lands, and hold in their possession some dis-
 “ tricts belonging to Madura, which were before mine.” The
 army was ordered to reduce these Polligars, and their countries
 were immediately sacrificed to the ambition of Mahomed Ally.

The 11th of February, the Committee deliberating on the war,
 condemn the conduct of the King of Tanjore. “ For if the Ma-
 “ rawar country is dependent on Trichinopoly, as the Nabob
 “ alleges it is, to make war, or commit hostilities against the depen-
 “ dents of the Government of the Carnatick, is the same as to take
 “ up arms against the Carnatick. But whether it be dependent
 “ or not, in the manner the Nabob claims it, certain it is, that
 “ the right or pretensions of Tanjore are litigated; and therefore
 “ the Rajah, as a party, ought not to assume the character of a
 “ judge also.” They therefore think themselves “ Under a neces-
 “ sity of taking part in the affair.” Whoever compares this pas-
 sage with other proceedings of the Committee, especially with the
 order commanding General Smith to act as the Nabob’s Plenipo-
 tentiary shall judge *proper* or *expedient*, even to *the reduction of the*
capital of Tanjore, will scarcely believe these Gentlemen could be
 serious in the opinion which they so gravely deliver. Was it less
 just in the Rajah to repel an injury by force, to take arms against a
 Polligar, whose dependence at least was doubtful, than in the Na-
 bob to attack the capital of an Ally, without ascertaining any right
 to interpose? If the Polligars were really independent, it was the
 common case of all nations, who acknowledging no superior on
 earth, make their last appeal to heaven. If they were dependent,
 it became the Nabob to examine well the grounds of quarrel, be-

fore he undertook to revenge a supposed injury. As strangers, or as allies to the Nabob, the English could have no right to interfere, without examining the justice of the cause ; but as guarantees, constituted judges to decide between the parties, bound by a solemn treaty to preserve the rights of both, to violate that obligation, precipitately to engage without discussing the claims, † to become the instrument of conquest in the hands of an ambitious party, was to subvert the foundations of public faith, and to banish all trust and confidence from men. In private life an act of perfidy is indelible reproach ; but among nations, the tranquillity, happiness, and security of the human race, depend on the observance of justice ; and all the horrors of war here serve to blacken the account.

The Committee, when they determined to engage, had all the materials before them which we now possess. Whatever *claims* the Nabob might have on the Marawar country, these materials demonstrate, that the Polligars were not *in fact* so dependent on the Nabob, as could authorize him to afford protection. Protection and obedience are the relative duties of Sovereign and Subject. These qualities are necessary to constitute the relation. Actual obedience to a superior could alone render the Polligar not an immediate object of hostility to another State. This State, while the Polligar

† The President and Council at Madras have lately investigated the subject. They found that the districts in dispute were possessed by the Father of the present Rajah in 1762, and consequently were included in the guaranty ; and that the Governor at that time explained the sense of the treaty to be, that the Polligars should receive no assistance from the Nabob or the English. Vide Consultations printed in “ Papers relative to the Restoration of the King of Tanjore, &c.” Vol. I. p. 295. also the Nabob’s claim, Vol. II. p. 428. The Rajah stated his claim and long possession in a letter to the Governor, received the 25th of March, 1771, near five months before the commencement of hostilities, and therein asserted, that he had applied to the English for redress before he took arms against the Polligar. Appendix, No. XXI. p. 608.

really submits himself to another, must carry it's complaint to that Sovereign, whose duty it is to protect his subject on the one hand, on the other, to compel that subject to redress the injury. Were not the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars, as the fact is stated by the Nabob, actually independent of Trichinopoly long before it became subject to a Mahomedan Government? Had not those Polligars openly disclaimed obedience? Had they not seized districts belonging to the Nabob? Were not their woods an asylum to thieves, who plundered the villages dependent on Madura? Did not the Nabob, immediately after the Tanjore expedition, implore the assistance of the English to subdue these enemies? If therefore the Nabob's *right* of dominion had been perfectly clear, a complaint to him, under such circumstances, would only have insulted his inability to grant redress. But the use of the Nabob's name is an idle ceremony; the war was the act of the English, † who are responsible to God and man for the consequence.

The dispute between the Marawars and the Rajah of Tanjore was moreover at an end. Hostilities had ceased, and a peace had been concluded long before the expedition against Tanjore commenced. Intelligence of this peace was communicated to the Governor, in a letter from the Nabob dated 17th March, and the letter to General Smith, authorising him to act against Tanjore, 1771. was not written before the 4th of August. To *protect* the Marawar *from injury* therefore was not the object of the war; neither was it intended to *procure him redress*. When the Rajah submitted at discretion, all the stipulations made were for the benefit of the Nabob. The miserable Polligar was totally forgotten, except that Mahomed Ally claimed the spoil taken by the Rajah; and his pretensions, as far as we have any knowledge of them, are truly

† The Rajah, in a letter to the Governor, asserts, that he had applied to the English for redress before he took arms. Appendix, No. XXI. p. 608.

ridiculous.

ridiculous. His pretensions to the jewels appear in a paper dated 15th of March, transmitted by the Nabob the 22d, from his intelligencer at Tanjore; who, after mentioning the terms of peace, enumerates the valuable things obtained by the Rajah:

“ Two large elephants, two good horses, two large pieces of
 “ cannon, a pair of pearls of great value, and four strings of
 “ pearls *belonging to the Government of Trichinopoly*, which, the in-
 “ telligencer says, the Nabob, during the siege † of Madura, by
 “ the means of Perāsa Davy, Soucar, *desired* Damooderas Pilla to
 “ *let him have*, and which the said Pilla *agreed to*, but by his death
 “ the same never came to the Circar.” ‡ The whole spoil was
 however taken by the Nabob's Plenipotentiary, who, in the stipu-
 lations made with the Rajah on the 27th of October, totally for-
 got the rights of these supposed subjects. On the 28th he proposes
 to his father to subdue the Polligars, and on the 3d of the next
 month Mahomed Ally himself applies to the Council. To the
 disgrace of the English name the army were directed to obey !

Whatever representation the Polligar might, on the first com-
 mencement of hostilities, be induced to make, it appears that he
 entertained greater apprehensions of the Nabob than of the Rajah
 of Tanjore. So early as the 11th of February the Marawar Vac- 1771.
 keel represents, that the Rajah's army approached the country
 “ With a design to commence hostilities. When the Nabob was
 “ acquainted with these proceedings, and desired to write to the said
 “ Rajah to desist from his hostile intentions, he, instead of doing
 “ the same, talked of sending his orders to Tondiman and other

† It began in June 1763, and the place was taken in October 1764, seven years before this period. It should be remembered, that the Nabob in his letters of that time speaks of his paying the Marawar for the assistance of his troops.

‡ Appendix, No. XXI. p. 606.

“ Polligars, as well as to his Sardars in Trichinopöly, Madurá, and
 “ Tinnevelly countries, to assist my máster, to oppose and carry
 “ on a war with the said Rajah, *which was contrary to my máster's*
 “ *inclination.* The Nabob does this in order to foment the dispute
 “ between my máster and the said Rajah, and *to gain his point in the*
 “ *mean time,* which is to catch at any opportunity to reduce the
 “ said Rajah, *according to his long meditated scheme.*” The Commit-
 tee subjoin, “ The said Vackeel told Mooda Kistnah †, that if
 “ what he spoke to him, as above, reaches the Nabob's ears, it will
 “ be attended with *great danger* to him and his *máster's country* ;
 “ for which reason he desired care to be taken not to bring his
 “ name in question.” ‡ The public representations of the Mara-
 war were therefore made in compliance with the Nabob's views,
 and proceeded from a dread of his resentment.

That the Nabob really intended to foment the dispute for his
 own advantage, his own negotiations with the Committee demon-
 strate. That the Polligar had more cause to apprehend danger
 from the Nabob than from the Rajah, the event has now decided.
 The Rajah recovered his districts, obtained a small sum § as an in-
 demnification for his losses, and settled their family disputes by a
 double marriage. The Nabob having plundered the Rajah to re-
 venge the Polligar's injuries, and appropriated the spoil recovered
 to his own use, immediately marched an army to subdue the Chief,
 whose protection had been the ostensible cause of the war.

Had the English, as guarantees of the treaty of 1762, examined
 the pretensions of both parties, they would probably have discover-
 ed, that the quarrel between the Rajah of Tanjore and the Marawar
 originated in the intrigues of the Nabob. There are passages, even

† Indian interpreter to the Board.

‡ Appendix, No. XXII. p. 642.

§ Appendix, No. XXI. p. 605, 606.

in the mutilated correspondence transmitted by the † Nabob, which prove that the Marawar relied on the promised assistance of the Nabob ; some which create a suspicion, that the first hostilities against the Rajah were undertaken by his advice. So early as the 12th of February, the day after the Rajah's intention against the Marawar had been communicated to the Committee, and before his army had actually commenced hostilities, the Nabob held a conference with Mr. Du Pré and Mr. Hastings. In that conference he proposed, “ That we should disband some of our Sepoys, with
 “ the intent that they might be secretly enlisted by the Marawar,
 “ and that HE should *instigate* the great Marawar, Tondiman, Travencore, and other Polligars, to unite against Tanjore, and that
 “ HE should order his people from the Madura and Tinnevelly
 “ countries to assist.” In the same conference the Nabob likewise proposed, “ That the President should give out publicly, *so that it*
 “ *might circulate*, that he was displeased with, and resented extremely the conduct of the Rajah ; that he should write a threatening letter to him ; and that the Commandant of Trichinopoly
 “ should be ordered to mark out a camp, to draw out guns and
 “ stores, pitch tents, &c. and put on the *appearance of hostility*.” This *appearance of hostility* from the English was a necessary part of the Nabob's design to embroil the neighbouring Polligars, who declined acting without being secure of support. On the 22d of March the Nabob transmits a letter from his officer, Syed Muckdoom Ally Khân, but gives only the *purport* of the letters enclosed from the Polligars ; yet from this abstract it appears, that after the greater Marawar had satisfied the Rajah, the Nalcooty Man was instructed “ Not to follow the example of the Chief of Ramanaut, but to exert himself and stand firm and steady, conform-

† He often gives the *purport* of letters, sometimes a copy of part, rarely the whole letter even of his own officer. The papers are printed, Appendix, No. XXI.

“ ing himself to the orders of the Circar, to which he should shew
 “ his fidelity.” † Nevertheless all the arts of the Nabob to prolong
 these hostilities failed, for peace was concluded some months before
 the English undertook the conquest of Tanjore.

From the above authorities it appears evident that the termination
 of these disputes, and the protection of a supposed subject, were
 never intended by the Nabob ; neither did the delay on the part of
 the Committee arise from any respect for the Rights of the Rajah,
 or for the solemn engagement of the Company as guarantors of the
 treaty. The President and Mr. Hastings, in reporting their confere-
 nce with the Nabob, say, “ We begged he would excuse us for
 “ so often mentioning the subject of money ; that it proceeded
 “ from necessity.” The Nabob desired we would make a calcu-
 “ late of the expense, and he should *understand* it. As this
 “ whole deliberation had passed without the least appearance of
 “ altercation, but in perfect good humour, the President added,
 “ with the same appearance of cordiality, and when your Excel-
 “ lency shall have understood it, what will follow ? He replied,
 “ smiling, I shall then know whether it be much or little.
 “ We thought it best not to urge more, and here the confere-
 “ nce ended.” ‡ This passed on the 12th of February. On
 the 13th of March the Committee observe, that “ The assistance
 “ of the Nabob is precarious, for as we cannot control him,
 “ he will give his aid so long as we pursue his plans and
 “ ideas, and may with-hold it whenever we differ from him ;”
 and it appears to have been their opinion, that great success alone
 could excuse them to the Company at home for engaging in a
 war. They conclude, that after April an attack from the Marattas
 will be less probable, as “ It will be difficult from May to Octo-
 “ ber for an army of ravaging horse to find provender and water.

† Appendix, No. XXI. p. 606.

‡ Ibid. No. XXII. p. 652.

“ It would be rash therefore, to commence hostilities against Tan-
 jore *at present*, as the Nabob wishes, *since we are not pre-*
 “ *pared to execute effectually*, and we think ourselves yet in dan-
 “ ger from the Marattas.” † The letter to General Smith,
 authorising hostilities, was not written until the 4th of August;
 but that the Committee never relinquished the intention is mani-
 fest from the following passage, which they immediately subjoin :
 “ It is our intention however to collect together at Trichinopoly,
 “ *as expeditiously as we can*, troops, artillery, and stores.” They
 profess indeed to mean an accommodation upon honourable terms ;
 “ But if that cannot be effected, we do not see how we can, with
 “ any degree of propriety, should we have the means, avoid com-
 “ pulsive measures. But we will form no decisive resolution on
 “ this subject, nor even *declare our intention* further than is herein
 “ before declared, *until we shall be ready to execute* what we may
 “ resolve to undertake.” ‡ Accordingly nothing material appears on
 their proceedings before the 12th of June, when the measures taken
 by these *guarantees* towards an *honourable accommodation* are curious.

The Nabob in this conference, on the 12th of June, affected an
 unwillingness to engage in an expedition against Tanjore. After ma-
 ny arguments had been employed to persuade him, he asked three
 questions respecting the object of the war :---Whether it was inten-
 ded to chastise the Rajah ? Or to chastise and make him pay a sum
 of money ? Or to conquer the country ? “ The Committee in reply
 “ thereto said, that in their opinion, if the Rajah could be brought
 “ to the payment of a *large* sum of money, and to submit to such re-
 “ gulations as may be judged proper to remove all apprehensions of
 “ him in future, it would be better to agree thereto, and not to
 “ proceed to the *extremity mentioned in the last question* ; however, as
 “ they doubted very much whether the Rajah would be brought

† Appendix, No. XXII. p. 663.

‡ Ibid. p. 663---4.

“ thereto

“ thereto *without proceeding to that extremity*, it was necessary to
 “ *adapt* our preparations to that end. The Nabob said, he *agreed*
 “ *entirely* with the Committee in *their opinion in this*; however he
 “ begged leave to ask one more question, to wit,—To *whom*. was
 “ the money that might be taken from the Rajah to belong? The
 “ Committee replied *to him*, but that they thought the expenses of
 “ the expedition should be first paid out of it, and then *his pri-*
 “ *vate creditors*. To both which the Nabob seemingly with great
 “ joy consented.”†

But the Nabob was not yet satisfied. On the 22d of July he again affected a backwardness, and said, “ If things could not be accom-
 “ plished according to our wishes, it were better to remain quiet.” He desired however that the troops might still be kept at Trichinopoly. *Negotiation* being the mode now chosen by the Nabob, it was debated at another conference in what manner the Governor and Council should act, whether as mediators, or treat jointly with the Nabob; or, leaving the negotiation wholly to the Nabob,
 “ Not appear therein, but only *underhand* give him all the support
 “ in their power. The Nabob approved of the latter, objecting
 “ to the Governor and Council interfering in this business in any
 “ manner *publicly*, or *receiving any information* therein, but
 “ through *his means*, as he said this was a business which belonged
 “ to him.” He then instructs them what answer the Governor should return to the Rajah’s letter, requesting the Governor to say,
 “ That he must *satisfy the Nabob*, to whom this matter belonged.
 “ In short, as the Nabob termed it, “ *The Governor was to make the*
 “ *Vackeel despair of an accommodation of matters.*” ‡ The Committee then proceed to deliberate, and unanimously resolve to undertake the expedition. They indeed *unanimously prefer* “ negotiation to

† Appendix, No. XXII. p. 685.

‡ These two conferences on the 22d and 23d of July appear in the proceedings of the Committee. Appendix, No. XXII. p. 695--6.

“ *total inactivity and silence,*” and a majority † resolve, that “ The negotiation be not conducted by the Company’s representatives, as mediators and guarantees of the treaty of 1762, but left entirely to the Nabob in the manner he proposes.”

To have the sole direction of the enterprise, and to remove the restraints imposed by the guaranty of 1762, had throughout the negotiation been the great objects of the Nabob’s policy. These being obtained, he immediately appointed his eldest son Plenipotentiary; and the proceedings of the Committee being approved by the Council, on the 29th of July General Smith is ordered to proceed. On the 4th of August the letter is written, which renders the English army subservient to the Nabob’s pleasure. The avowed purpose is that “ Of supporting the *intended negotiation,*” the eldest son being “ Invested solely with full power to *negotiate* and conclude;” and the General is directed to obey this Plenipotentiary, and “ Even to *invest, and besiege, and take the capital, without waiting for further orders.*” These instructions were given after the Nabob had requested the Governor to make the Vackeel *despair of an accommodation,* by referring the Rajah solely to him. 1771.

The forts belonging to the Rajah fell successively into the hands of the English, and on the 29th of September the army broke ground before the capital. On the 25th, the letter printed in a “ State of Facts” was written, promising to leave Tanjore wholly to the disposal of Mahomed Ally. This written engagement did not however entirely dispel his doubts; for when the troops were ready to enter the breach on the 27th of October, the submission of the Rajah was accepted. He engaged to pay the Peshcush as before, thirty two Lacks and fifty thousand Rupees for the expenses of the expedition, and to cede some districts which had been con-

† The Committee consisted of Messieurs Du Pré, Hastings, and Ardley.

firmed to him by the treaty of 1762. The spoil taken from the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars, together with the districts recovered from them by the Rajah, the Nabob appropriated to himself. Twelve Lacks were paid in ready money, and districts assigned for the remainder, yielding more than sixteen Lacks per annum, which, according to the Nabob's own estimate, would discharge the debt in two years.

These terms Mahomed Ally preferred to a total reduction of Tanjore, because he yet suspected that the country would not be continued in his possession. That this was the real motive appears from the whole of his former conduct, and is confirmed by an article in the treaty, stipulating that the fort of Vellum, taken and garrisoned by English troops, should afterwards be destroyed. We have likewise the testimony of Mr. Du Pré, Mr. Hastings, and Mr. Audley, who in their letter to the Directors on the subject say†, “What oppressed his mind much more, as we verily believe, “ was, *his apprehension of a latent purpose* in the Company, at a convenient time, to take the country from him. It is in vain that “ your Honours think to remove his apprehensions, by recalling “ to his memory the generous support you have given him; he feels “ *no such principles in himself*, and cannot conceive it to be possible “ they should exist in others.” Governor Wynch and his Committee observe‡, “That the Nabob *has constantly had in view the design of* “ *conquering Tanjore will not admit of a doubt*; and as the Honourable Court were advised by the Lord North, we are firmly persuaded, “ *that his chief motive* for concluding peace with the Rajah, at a time “ when our troops were upon the point of getting possession of the “ place, arose from *his jealousy* lest the Company purposed at a con-

† Appendix, No. XXV. p. 934.

‡ Select Committee's proceedings, 22d June, 1773. App. No. XXVII. p. 1116.

“ convenient opportunity to take the country from him.” The same Committee, in their address to the Court of Directors after the capture of Tanjore, say†, “ It appeared evident, that the Nabob desisted
 “ from the entire conquest of Tanjore” (meaning in 1771) “ not
 “ from any want of inclination to obtain so important an acquisition, but from an apprehension that the Company might at a
 “ convenient opportunity get possession thereof.” When this letter was written, the Nabob’s eagerness to withdraw the English army, to demolish the approaches, to repair the breach, and to place a garrison of his own troops in Tanjore, had rendered his jealousy of the English no longer a subject of opinion, but a fact supported by the strongest evidence.

Mr. Du Pré and his Committee in 1771 seem to have acted against the conviction of their own minds, unable or unwilling to resist the united efforts of the Nabob and the Plenipotentiary of the Crown. From their proceedings of the 7th September 1770‡ it appears, that the Rajah had even at that time expressed his apprehensions, that the guaranty of the Company would not avail him against the Nabob. The Committee in various parts of their proceedings, even so late as the 24th July 1771, when they resolved to give the command of the army to the Nabob’s son, declare, § “ That the Rajah’s conduct has in some measure
 “ proceeded from his apprehensions of the Nabob, and the disability
 “ of the Company to protect him against the Nabob supported by
 “ the Minister of the Crown;” and add, “ *So it is our opinion,*
 “ that were he reinstated in the former confidence he had of
 “ the Company’s *impartial adherence* to the treaty of 1762, he
 “ would never put himself into the hands or power of the French.”

† 29th October, 1773. Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1367.

‡ Appendix, No. XVII. p. 391. § Appendix, No. XXII. p. 702.

Impressed with such an opinion, why did not Mr. Du Pré and his Committee avow themselves guarantees of the treaty of 1762? examine the respective rights of the parties, and enforce their decision? Why commit the whole negotiation to the Nabob, which *in his own judgment* must make the *Rajah despair of an accommodation*? When the Rajah of Tanjore professed at least an adherence to the treaty, *under the guaranty of the English*, why renounce the alliance? Why relinquish all right of judgment in themselves, to execute the dictates of Mahomed Ally?

Before the siege commenced, the Rajah wrote to the Governor, entreating † his interposition with the Nabob, professing an entire submission to his will, accepting any terms which he should dictate, and soliciting him only to save his Government, who relied on the faith of treaties. The Rajah humbled himself so far as to write to the Indian interpreter, Mooda Kistnah, to employ his influence with the Governor, ‡ enclosed the terms demanded by the Nabob, and requested the Governor to dictate how far he should comply. Sensible indeed of his degradation, he desired that this application might be secret. The army had not broken ground before Tanjore when these letters were sent by the Rajah. During the siege, he again solicited the interposition of the Governor, and the influence of Mooda Kistnah. § In his letter to the latter, he entreats him to get the business settled *in any manner*. He urges, that to neglect it at this juncture were to *betray their Gods and Bramins*; and that this one act would atone for a whole life, meriting rewards both in this world and in the next. Under these circumstances, why was not the hand of justice extended to preserve a people? The English troops were submitted

† Received 8th of October, 1771. Appendix, No. XXI. p. 626.

‡ Dated 20th of September, received 9th of October. App. No. XXI. p. 627.

§ Appendix, No. XXI. p. 629.

to the will of an ambitious Mahomedan ;—the Nabob's son possessed the command.

An appeal has been made to national prejudice ; an alarm of the French has been introduced : but the Committee found themselves embarrassed with former opinions ; they adopt therefore the opinion, “ That Tanjore can have no grounds, no natural tendency “ to a preference of, or friendship with the French rather than with “ us, but, the contrary,” † and labour to reconcile it with their present conduct. The proceedings of the Committee are drawn into great length, but, when attentively considered, sufficiently prove, that the greatest talents, employed to cover injustice, will betray a secret conviction that the measure is wrong. This conviction became so apparent, that in their letter to the Court of Directors, dated 28th February 1772, they avow it; and after some apology for themselves declare, ‡ “ Had your Government here stood in such a “ degree of confidence with their Constituents, as that they might “ have entertained a reasonable hope of support and justification in “ an impartial and spirited conduct, *the part they should have taken* “ *ought no doubt to have been this:—*Upon the Rajah's complaint, “ that he was entitled to an indemnification for the expenses he “ sustained in the assistance given to the Nabob in the late war, “ and that the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars withheld from “ him his just rights ; on the other hand, the Nabob complaining “ that the Rajah withheld the Peshcush unjustly, had no right to, “ the indemnification he demanded, nor any just claim on Marawar “ and Nalcooty ; this Government, as GUARANTEES, ought to “ have marched a force to maintain peace between the complaining “ parties, to have required deputies from both, to state the demands of each respectively, and upon a fair discussion to have “ decided between them, and to have enforced the decision, whether

† Appendix, No. XXII. p. 702. ‡ Appendix, No. XXV. p. 935.

“ in favour of the Nabob or in favour the Rajah : but your Government here did not dare to act such a part.”

The march of an army would have been totally unnecessary, had there been any disposition to administer equal justice. Both parties must have submitted to the decision ; the Nabob, because he had no means of executing his purpose but by the arms of the English ; the Rajah, because he was unable to resist their power.

With respect to the *professed design* of protecting the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars, the Nabob has given judgment against himself by immediately conquering their country. Other circumstances also give a very unfavourable impression of the intention of the Nabob and of the Committee. On the 4th of January 1771, before the Rajah had entered on hostilities against the Marawar, the Nabob writes to acquaint the Governor †, that a Vackeel to Tanjore had requested a safe passage through his country. The Governor in his answer doubtfully intimates, ‡ that “ If it be permitted to him to hold such intercourse with one State in amity with the Carnatick, such an intercourse ought not to be prohibited with another State also in amity with the Carnatick.” Was it doubtful whether the Rajah had been accustomed to send and receive Vackeels ? Did not a Vackeel from the Rajah at that instant reside at Madras ? Were not Messieurs Caillaud and Palk ambassadors at Tanjore in the wars of Trichinopoly ? Were not the English happy to maintain this friendly intercourse during the siege of Madras in 1759 ? Did not Mr. Du Pré himself, in that character, negotiate the treaty of 1762 at Tanjore ? Why therefore intimate a doubt ? Was it intended to encourage injustice, and that the consequent estrangement of the Rajah should afford a pretence for conquering his country ?

† Appendix, No. XXI. p. 509.

‡ Ibid. Ibid.

The Nabob represents the district of Coiladdy as one which the Rajah had seized; he claims likewise the Jaghire of Arnee. These two districts are specifically named in the treaty of 1762; yet no disapprobation of these claims is expressed, no investigation of the subject even proposed; no traces of a disposition to render justice can be found in the proceedings of the Committee.

We shall now dismiss the expedition of 1771, and proceed to examine the pretences alleged for the conquest of Tanjore in 1773.

The author of a "State of Facts,"† speaking of the first expedition, says, "The event of the war, one might suppose, should have secured, at least for some time, the obedience of the Rajah. But misfortune itself had no effect on the resists and treacherous spirit of Tuljanjee. The rear of our army had scarce ceased to be seen from the walls of Tanjore, when the Rajah began to encourage the Marattas to invade the Canatick. In compliance with his solicitations, twenty thousand of their horse appeared on the frontiers of the province under the command of Trimbeck Row, and threatened the whole country with fire and sword." The truth is, that the Nabob had been long desirous of engaging with the Marattas against Hyder Ally to conquer Myfore. He had amused their Vackeel with promises, which the refusal of the Governor and Council to undertake this war had rendered him unable to perform. When the Marattas discovered, that instead of fulfilling his engagements with them, the conquest of Tanjore was intended, strong remonstrances were made by the Vackeel, accompanied with intimations, that the measure would necessarily involve hostilities with his master. To procure a respite sufficient for the enterprize against Tanjore, the Nabob

bribed the Vackeel, and Trimbeck Row, the Maratta General, who commanded the army on the frontiers. One Lack of Rupees was promised to Trimbeck Row, three Lacks more to the Vackeel and other Saldars. When the troops returned from Tanjore, the Nabob became unwilling to pay the money. Trimbeck Row could not avow this fraud upon himself as his motive for invading the Carnatick, but having sufficient authority to protect the Hindoo Government of Tanjore, he pretended to be ignorant of the peace, and made this the ostensible cause of hostility. When intelligence of his approach was communicated through the Nabob, the real motive was concealed; but when a letter from Trimbeck Row to the Maratta Vackeel had been laid before the Committee, it behoved them to prepare for the defence of the Carnatick, or to know that defence became unnecessary. The President therefore disclosed the secret, and assured them, that the money being now paid, the angry Chief would be appeased. The event verified his prediction.

The Committee, so early as the 13th of March 1771, † observe, “ It is not improbable but the Marattas, to whom the Rajah of Tanjore is allied, may make a diversion in his favour, by sending a body of horse into the Carnatick, or even into the Jaghire.” In a letter from Poonah, dated 2d November 1771 ‡, from Mhaudarow, the Chief of the Marattas, to his Vackeel, complaining of perpetual evasions on the part of the Nabob, and of his army being gone against the Rajah, but not with “ A design (which God forbid!) to take the fort of Tanjore,” says, “ Tell the Nabob therefore plainly, you have now, Sir, obliged me to pass

† Appendix, No. XXII. p. 662.

‡ Appendix, No. XIV. p. 223.

“ three years in negotiation. If you propose assisting me, give me
 “ that assistance; if not, tell me so plainly.” He expresses an
 apprehension, that the war which the Nabob is making against
 Tanjore is not just, but founded only upon a knowledge of supe-
 rior strength; that the Tanjoreans would be unable to withstand
 him; and directs his Vackeel to interpose. The silence of Mhau-
 darow respecting any requisition of support, together with his igno-
 rance of the real state of affairs with Tanjore, affords a strong pre-
 sumption, that no direct intercourse subsisted between him and the
 Rajah. His Vackeel and his General were better informed, but
 they were bribed to deceive him.

The 5th December 1771, Governor Du Pré, in his remarks on
 the letter of Trimbeck Row † observes, “ The Nabob, it is certain,
 “ did inform the President, in the very beginning of the expedition
 “ against Tanjore, that it was necessary to amuse the Maratta Vac-
 “ keel, who expressed his apprehension that the *great preparations*
 “ which had been made, and the formidable army which was assem-
 “ bled, were not intended merely to recover the Peshcush and charges
 “ of the Rajah, but in fact to conquer the whole country; a mea-
 “ sure of which the Marattas would certainly not remain peaceable
 “ spectators.” The Nabob informed the President he had given
 the strongest assurances to the Vackeel that he entertained no such
 intention, but at the same time said, “ These were only pretences
 “ to quiet the Marattas, and prevent their disturbing our opera-
 “ tions; but that it was necessary to take the fort, and totally re-
 “ duce the Rajah, who was now become dangerous.” The Vackeel,
 aware of the great preparations, could not be so easily deceived; he
 was therefore corrupted to deceive his master at Poonah.

† This letter, with the comment of the President, is printed in *Appendix*
No. XIV. from page 219 to page 222.

“ About the † same time the Nabob informed the President, but
 “ defined it might be then kept a *profound secret*, that he had so set-
 “ tled matters with the Maratta Vackeel, that he hoped we should
 “ have no disturbance from the Marattas during the Tanjore expe-
 “ dition. *The charm by which it was to be effected* was a *present* of a
 “ Lack of Rupees to Trimbeck Row, and near three Lacks more in
 “ *presents* to other Sardars and to the Vackeel, *upon which the Vackeel*
 “ *had promised* to write to Trimbeck Row. At the time of writing
 “ the letter on which we are now remarking, this money had *not*
 “ *been paid*, and therefore, says Trimbeck Row, *no effect of your*
 “ *negotiation have I yet seen*. The money however is now paid,
 “ which probably may appease the angry Chief for a-while.”

Mr. Du Pré, in his further remarks on this letter, adds, “ It
 “ was necessary at all events to find some expedient for a delay
 “ that would carry us near the time of the rains, as we might hope
 “ the Tanjore expedition would be at an end.” He therefore
 with the Nabob had met the Vackeel, and amused him with the
 expectation of orders from Europe. “ This, but much *more effectua-*
 “ *lly* the palliative mentioned in note B. ‡ *produced a promise from*
 “ *the Vackeel* that we should not be disturbed for six weeks.” In
 execution of this promise the Vackeel amused his master Mhaudarow
 at Poonah, by misrepresenting the Nabob’s designs respecting the
 Rajah of Tanjore, and by giving him expectations of assistance from
 the English against Hyder Ally. The Chief at Poonah however
 discovered that the same expectations were given to Hyder, and in
 his letter of the 2d of November commands his Vackeel to re-
 quire a positive answer. An answer appears to have been given to

† Appendix, No. XIV. p. 220. Comment of the President.

‡ Ibid. p. 221.

both parties, nearly in the same terms, when the Tanjore expedition was concluded †.

That the money being unpaid was the true cause of the army under Trimbeck Row entering the Carnatick is manifest. On the 27th of October the siege of Tanjore was discontinued, the Rajah having subscribed to the terms required by the Nabob. Trimbeck Row must have received the intelligence nearly as soon as it was known at Madras, viz. on the first day of November; yet in his letter dated the 20th of November he writes, “ And I am continually *re-*
“ *ceiving letters* from Tanjore, advising of the batteries being advan-
“ ced close to the ditch of the fort; that every morning or even-
“ ing it was expected to be stormed; that they the Tanjoreans had
“ no further ability of resistance, and that the Gentoo Government
“ there would be lost.” The President on this part of the letter remarks, ‡ “ Notwithstanding what he says in this paragraph,
“ Trimbeck Row had actually received the news of the peace with
“ Tanjore, but it suited his purpose to conceal it; the plain mean-
“ ing is this; you, says he to the Vackeel, are receiving douceurs
“ from the Nabob, and join with him in deceiving me. As I can-
“ not march the army professedly to enforce the payment of my
“ promised douceur, I will come under pretence of succouring Tan-
“ jore, which I find the Nabob means to take.” On the § 29th of November the Nabob in a letter to Trimbeck Row writes,
“ With a view in doing what would give you pleasure, I have paid
“ to Madarow Sadalives in ready money *the Lack of Rupees I pro-*
“ *mised you as a present through his means*, and you will accordingly

† Appendix, No. XIV. p. 228---9.

‡ Appendix, No. XIV. page 220.

§ Ibid. page 223.

“ receive it from him.” This charm again produced the desired effect, for the Committee writing to the Governor and Council of Bengal on the 10th † of December, inform them of the Maratta invasion ; “ Straggling parties,” they say, “ have actually entered
 “ this province, and plundered some villages ; but their actions have
 “ been disavowed by the Maratta Vackeel at this place,” who had received the money, “ And they have retired out of the country,
 “ carrying with them their plunder.” Trimbeck Row hearing that the money had been paid, recalled the light troops, or Pundaraus, “ Whose profession” he describes to be “ plundering ;” and in answer to the Nabob’s friendly letter and *present*, he writes on the 20th of December‡, “ I swear however by the Almighty, that immediately upon hearing the news thereof” (meaning the peace with Tanjore, the protection of which was still the ostensible motive)
 “ I dispatched two Sardars from my presence to punish and bring to
 “ me under a guard those thieves : and the same Almighty knows
 “ that the Badars, &c. had plundered the places in your country
 “ before the arrival of those Sardars.”

Before the true cause of this invasion had been disclosed by the President, the Nabob suggested two motives § which might operate with Trimbeck Row. First he supposed that bills might have been given by the Rajah upon a promise of assistance, and that this invasion was intended to afford a pretence for demanding payment. This suggestion, made at Madras so early as the 25th November, has for it’s foundation *a knowledge* by Trimbeck Row that peace was made with Tanjore, or, in the Nabob’s language, “ That
 “ matters were likely to be accommodated.” Allowing equal

† Appendix, No. XIV. page 224.

‡ Ibid. page 225.

§ Ibid. page 217.

time for the conveyance, the intelligence, from which this opinion was drawn, must have preceded the letter of Trimbeck Row, received on the 5th of December, eleven days. This fact therefore greatly corroborates the opinion of the President, that when that letter was written, Trimbeck Row actually knew of the peace, although he professed to make the protection of the Rajah the ostensible cause of his invasion of the Carnatick. These bills, supposed to have been given to Trimbeck Row, the Maratta General, on the frontiers of the Carnatick, do not correspond with the instructions from Poonah to the Vackeel at Madras, of a † previous date to the letter of Trimbeck Row, directing the Vackeel to interpose in favour of the Rajah. Similar instructions probably received at the same time by the General from Poonah, will more naturally explain his making the preservation of a Gentoo Government his ostensible motive. But if bills had been given to the General, it is singular that in all his correspondence no mention should have been made of any application from the Rajah whose cause he undertook; that no trace should remain of a subsequent demand on Tanjore. The suggestion originated in the impressions on the Nabob's own mind, who *knew* that Trimbeck Row invaded the Carnatick to *obtain payment of money promised*, but he substituted the name of the Rajah, as the person making the promise, instead of his own.

The other motive suggested by the Nabob was, “ That Narrain Row, brother to Madavarow, is appointed to the command of the troops in the Balaghaut; that upon his arrival Trimbeck Row's powers will cease, who is therefore desirous of *collecting what he can* previous to Narrain Row's arrival.” If the object

† The letter to the Vackeel is dated the 2d November, that of Trimbeck Row the 20th.

of this invasion was “ *Collecting what he can,*” by what magic was this desire of plunder so entirely extinguished in the mind of Trimbeck Row? What motive could induce him so suddenly to recall his troops? The money promised by the Nabob had been paid, and the angry Chief was appeased.

The Committee resolved, that “ The motives assigned by the “ Nabob for the motion of the Marattas are natural and probable,” and direct a strong declaration to be made of their resolution to protect the Carnatick. But when the nearer approach of danger obliged the President to disclose the Nabob’s secret, so entirely did they rely on the effects of this payment, that no steps were taken to resist the formidable invasion. Nevertheless, in their letter to Bengal, dated the 10th of December, they assign a new motive †, and say, “ The designs of the Marattas were to “ invade this province, *with a view of compelling us into a junction* “ with them against Mysore.” They informed the Council of Fort William, that the hostilities then committed were disavowed by the Maratta Vackeel, and that the army had retired. They add, “ We also learn, that a reinforcement of 20,000 horse, under the “ command of Narrain Row, is on the march from Poonah, and “ we have also reason to believe that a very formidable invasion will “ be made on this province.” To disprove the motive here assigned, of compelling a junction against Mysore, the fact is decisive. With this formidable reinforcement of 20,000 horse no hostilities were committed. The Vackeel at this period knew that the assistance required would not be given against Mysore; and within a month this refusal was formally confirmed in a letter written to Trimbeck

† Appendix, No. XLV, p. 224.

Row *; yet no invasion of the Carnatick has been attempted by the Marattas from that period.

The author of a "State of Facts" refers generally to the Country Correspondence in the India-House, to prove that the invasion of the Carnatick by Trimbeck Row in 1771 originated from the intrigues of the Rajah of Tanjore. This correspondence has now been produced, and the public will judge of the evidence. "He *continued*," says † the same author, "his intrigues at Poonah." In proof of *these continued intrigues*, we are told that he sent a person to solicit assistance at that capital *in the beginning of 1773*. Mr. Mostyn, the English Resident at the Court of Poonah, it is said, "Advised
" the Governor and Council of Fort St. George, that the Carnatick
" was to be invaded by the combined forces of the Marattas and
" the Rajah." ‡ Reference is made to the minutes of the Select Committee. In these minutes the letter of Mr. Mostyn appears §, which contains advice to the Governor and Council, not only that the Carnatick will not be invaded, but that no assistance will be obtained. The Rajah, when the intention of the Nabob to conquer his country was universally known, and when his Vackeel was refused all intercourse with the English, who, bound by a solemn treaty to protect his rights, were become parties against him, did indeed apply at Poonah for permission to raise a body of horse. Mr. Mostyn, on the 14th May, 1773, writes, that a promise had been given, but that new objections were started by the Dewan, and that the permission, if granted, would probably be ineffectual. He promises to advise the Council, "If the Rajah should hereafter
" procure leave, and there should be any probability of his getting

* Appendix, No. XIV. p. 228.

† "State of Facts," p. 32.

‡ Ibid. Ibid.

§ Appendix, No. XV. p. 230.

“ troops.” The Committee, in deliberating upon this letter, add their own opinion, with respect to the Marattas †, “ That an expedition against Tanjore will not hasten or retard their designs.”

The reflexions of our author are as curious as his facts ‡. “ It is evident,” he tells us, “ from the whole tenor of Tuljaujee’s conduct, from the day the siege of Tanjore was raised, that he meditated another war. He only waited for a fit opportunity of *carrying fire and sword* through the dominions of the Nabob, his lawful and acknowledged superior.” Such language may captivate the passions, and mislead an uninformed reader. The Committee however at Madras, where the truth was notorious, were ashamed to employ such reasoning. On the 22d June 1773, after the public application of the Nabob for the conquest of Tanjore, and only three days before they resolved to undertake the expedition, they consider this request of assistance from Poonah as intended by the Rajah merely for the defence of his country. They say, “ Neither is the conduct of the Rajah in this instance to be wondered at. The apprehensions he before had, have been increased by *the publication of the Nabob’s intention of reducing him*, which has gained credit all over the country. He knows that, in our present situation, we cannot interfere in the dispute between him and the Nabob : that the NABOB *did not even allow his Vackeel to visit the President*. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Rajah should endeavour to strengthen himself by every means in his power, to enable him to *withstand any attempts of the Nabob against him*§.” They judge it indeed dangerous that such a Power should subsist, “ Unless the Company can engage the Rajah to their

† Appendix, No. XV. p. 231.

‡ “ State of Facts,” p. 30.

§ Appendix, No. XV. p. 231.

“ interest by a firm promise of support in *all his just rights* ;” that is, by a strict observance of the guaranty of 1762, which they had deliberately undertaken, repeatedly approved, and to which they were equally bound by the rules of justice and of sound policy most firmly to adhere.

Connexions the most inconsistent are imputed to the Rajah, to alarm the mind of an English reader for the safety of our Settlements. The author of a “ State of Facts” informs us, † that the Rajah “ Sent several embassies to Hyder Ally,” evidently meaning, at this period, “ with a view to a war with the Nabob and the English. The idea of an allied army, consisting of troops from Powers at enmity with each other, from the Marattas and Hyder Ally, inveterate foes, would scarcely have occurred to any man who had the smallest knowledge of the system of policy in the peninsula of India. To bold assertions late advices enable us to oppose proofs. “ I received,” ‡ says Hyder Ally to the Rajah of Tanjore, “ with great pleasure the accounts of your restoration “ *from my Vackeel at Madras. Six months before you lost Tanjore I “ frequently wrote you of your approaching danger, but I have not “ been able to learn whether you thought my advice worthy of atten- “ tion. It was your fate that these things should happen. How- “ ever, by the favour of the Almighty, your kingdom has been “ restored to you. The Europeans have shewn you great marks “ of friendship and regard ; you must therefore abide by their ad- “ vice, and they will continue to assist you.”* The reader may

† Page 30.

‡ Second volume of papers relative to Tanjore and the arrest of Lord Pigot, lately printed, p. 457.

compare this letter with the letters of Hyder Ally in the Appendix to a "State of Facts," and with the conduct of this great man, for such he really is, in the war concluded by the treaty of 1769. The examination will doubtless convince him, that Hyder Ally perfectly understands the true interest of the English, and dreads their power only when subservient to the ambition of the Nabob. Nothing but a compliance with this ambition can drive the Mysorean into an alliance with the French, or induce an able Prince to solicit the assistance of Europeans, who must in the event of a successful war become the real masters of his kingdom.

The Rajah, it is † said, "Entered into the strictest connexions with the French, the Dutch, and the Danes, as appeared from the original Sunnuds, delivered up to the Nabob after the capture of Tanjore by the respective Governors of those three nations." General assertions can be answered only by general observations. For what purpose could the Rajah invite these three European Powers to send troops into his kingdom? Could he hope that they would unite in his defence? Or did he propose that these Powers should contend for the possession of his dominions? The internal evidence of the transaction proves, that if such applications had been made, they must have been the effect of despair. In proof of his assertion, the author refers to Sunnuds, delivered up after the capture of Tanjore by the respective Governors of those three nations." No traces are to be found of any Sunnuds, or cession of territory, except to the Dutch; and to explain this transaction, we shall have recourse to the testimony of the Nabob's son, whom the Nabob had appointed to take charge of Tanjore. His state of the transaction, transmitted to General Smith within a fortnight after the capture of the place

† "State of Facts," p. 30.

is this :---That in the latter end of July last, (one month therefore after the resolution had been taken to conquer Tanjore †) the Rajah applied to the Dutch for money on the mortgage of part of the country; that the Dutch accepted the proposal; but hearing that General Smith and the Nabob's son had left Madras, they insisted upon the necessity of an absolute sale; that the Rajah on hearing of General Smith's arrival at Trichinopoly consented; when the Dutch, instead of paying the money, returned some jewels which the Rajah had formerly mortgaged; " The Rajah wanting *immediate assistance from money*, refused the jewels, and wrote himself " to the Dutch; " as also instructed his Ambassadors to acquaint " them, *that if they did not pay the money, or return the lands, he should consider the lands as taken by force.* The Dutch detained " the two Ambassadors, from whom the Rajah had not heard 'till " a week before the storm ‡. The Rajah acquaints the Nabob, " that supposing the Dutch to have paid the money for the lands, " they certainly cannot be averse to shewing the receipts for it."

Such were the connexions of the Rajah with the Dutch, as explained by the Nabob's son. He indeed disclosed the transaction with reluctance, being unwilling to give any explanation without first consulting his father. Mahomed Ally himself appears at this time to have entertained thoughts of expelling the Dutch from the Coast of Coromandel; nevertheless, when he understood that the English were in strict alliance with this nation in Europe, he consented that they should retain their ancient possessions. The unwillingness afterwards expressed by the Governor and Council of Madras; to employ force in recovering even the newly-acquired terri-

† Appendix, No. XVI. p. 236.

‡ The capture of Tanjore, 17th September, 1773.

stories, induced him at length to pay a sum † of money, which the Dutch, equally apprehensive of hostilities, accepted, and agreed to relinquish the grant.

It is a painful task to follow the Nabob through all his pretensions. He reclaims the territories alienated by the Rajah, because the Rajah was his tributary, and therefore had no right to dispose of these countries without his consent. If Tanjore first became tributary by the treaty of 1762, we have only to observe, that no further subjection is imposed than the payment of an annual Peshcush. If an antecedent right existed, the reasoning equally extends to the more ancient possessions of all the European nations. The Dutch had possessed Negapatnam, under a grant from the Rajahs of Tanjore, near a century before the Nabob, or his father Anwar a Dean Khân, were known in the Deckan. The French likewise possessed Carrical by the same title, some years before Anwar a Dean was appointed, by Nizam ul Muluck, Phouzdar of Arcot; and this possession, lost in the late war, was restored by the 11th article of the Treaty of Paris. The exact period when the Danes acquired Tranquebar cannot be ascertained; but their rights must depend on the same principle. When such pretensions are advanced, the consequence may deserve attention. Are the English to expel the Dutch? To violate the national engagement with the French? To declare themselves the common enemy of all nations? For what purpose? Will they gratify the ambition of the Nabob, merely to become the first of his slaves?

† The sum actually paid on this account was no more than 2,45,000 Pagodas; for 45,545 Pagodas were the sum which the Dutch had paid to obtain a discharge from the annual Peshcush, and 1,80,000 were advanced to the Rajah upon a pledge of jewels of greater value, which the Nabob therefore chose to redeem.

The

The author of a "State of Facts" asserts, that † both French and Dutch had engaged to supply the Rajah with troops "In his meditated war against the Nabob." Such inconsistent assertions destroy each other; for that both should be true is morally impossible. As no proof has been adduced of any intercourse whatsoever with the French, our observations have necessarily been confined to the transaction with the Dutch. This transaction has been proved, from the testimony of the Nabob's son, to have been an attempt on the part of the Rajah to borrow money for the approaching siege of his capital, who also affirms, that the money was in truth never received. A former loan of 1,80,000 Pagodas is afterwards mentioned in adjusting these accounts, which the Dutch Governor explains to have been a sum advanced in 1771, when the Rajah was compelled to make large payments to the Nabob, and had pledged his jewels to perform the engagement ‡. Had the Dutch, possessed of a valuable Settlement for more than a century, and deriving privileges of trade from the grants of the Rajahs, taken arms in defence of the Government under which they lived, who could possibly have condemned their conduct? Their behaviour however demonstrates, that, careless of the fate of Tanjore, they were intent only on sharing the spoil; and the application to them for money, like that to the Marattas for troops, appears an act of self-defence in the Rajah, in the hour of extreme distress. These tales of the Dutch and the French are an exact counterpart to the Nabob's present complaints respecting Hyder Ally. According to the last letter received from the Nabob, Hyder Ally "Has wrote to France, requesting a considerable number of troops to be sent to him, and offering to pay for them; and he

† Pages 30, 31.

‡ This appears likewise from the first article of the treaty between the Nabob and the Dutch Company, on the surrender of districts possessed by the latter. The treaty is dated the 23d November, 1773. App. No. XVI. p. 237.

“ *has also prevailed on the Governor of Negapatnam to write to Batavia for the same purpose. His sole intention is to raise disturbances in the Carnatick, and to destroy the English.*” In the very moment when the Nabob solicits the repossession of Tanjore, he imputes the same *connexions* to Hyder Ally which he before imputed to the Rajah, and for the *same purpose*. His supposed intentions must become the pretence of a new war.

Continued injustice may possibly realize these fables, by uniting all nations against a common enemy ; but nothing less than continued injustice can produce so violent an effect, where opposition of interest must for ever remain. If the English will render justice to the Indian nations, the natural desire of Sovereigns to preserve their own authority must prevent the introduction of strangers ; and should Europeans attempt to intrude themselves by force, the English will be invited to resist them. This happened in 1758, when the French experienced the beginning of their misfortunes in the siege of Tanjore ; and even the present Rajah, now supposed to be hostile, in his former quarrel with the Danes at Tranquebar, applied to the English for their assistance.

The 18th of June 1773, after several conferences had been held on the subject, the Nabob again proposed to the Committee the reduction of Tanjore. The conquest of the country is here avowed as the sole object ; but the reasons assigned are such, that even those who instantly assented to the measure, were ashamed to adopt the Nabob's professed motives. These justificatory reasons consist chiefly of apprehensions of the future conduct of the Rajah. He intrigued, it is said with the Danes, with the Dutch, with the French, with the Marattas, and with Hyder Ally ; and his sole *intention*, in all

† Vide the Nabob's letter, dated the 18th of June, 1773. Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1109.

these supposed intrigues, is absurdly conjectured to be, like the *intention* now imputed to Hyder Ally, to raise disturbances in the Carnatick, and to destroy the English. To these conjectures of hostile *intention*, two complaints are added of injuries sustained. One is, that the Rajah did not assist the Nabob against the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars in 1771; the other, that the sums stipulated in 1771 had not been paid. The reader may remember, that hostilities by the Rajah against these Polligars, though concluded by a treaty more than four months before the expedition commenced, were yet the professed motive to the first war against Tanjore; that the Rajah was compelled to relinquish the spoil he had taken, which the Nabob appropriated to himself; that the next day after the expedition against Tanjore was concluded, the Nabob's Son proposed to subdue these Polligars, for no better reason, than because there never was "*A finer army collected together*;" and that Mahomed Ally himself within six days applied to the Council, avowing that the Polligars were really hostile, and never had been actually dependent on Trichinopoly from the time when Gentoo Rajahs governed in that country. The army however marched against these supposed subjects, whom the Nabob had taken arms to protect, and their destruction was the necessary effect. When the army marched, the Rajah remained at Tanjore to settle his own Government, convulsed by the siege of his capital, and to make the ~~expensive~~ payments to the Nabob, by borrowing from his own subjects, and by pledging his jewels to the Dutch. That the Rajah did not accompany the army, for the first time imputed as a neglect at the expiration of two years, is alleged in this letter of the Nabob as a principal motive to a new war; a war which it was not intended to terminate but by a conquest of the whole country. What aggravates the absurd injustice of this pretext is, that the *fine army* mentioned by the Nabob's Son appeared too numerous to be employed against the Polligars, and a considerable part were dismissed to their canton-

ments.

ments §. The other injury alleged is, if possible, more ridiculous than the former. The Nabob says, that there remained due from the Rajah, of the sum stipulated, ten Lacks of Rupees. Here we must recollect, that in 1771, while the English army lay before Tanjore, considerable sums had been paid to the two sons of the Nabob without account, which in the eastern style are denominated *presents*; that a considerable sum had likewise been paid towards discharging the expenses of the expedition, and that districts yielding a revenue of 16 Lacks per annum had been assigned, which, upon the Nabob's own estimate, would discharge the whole within two years. These two years were nearly expired; the fact therefore of this debt remaining appears highly improbable. But supposing for a moment 10 Lacks were unpaid †, the districts yielding a revenue of 16 Lacks per annum would within one year discharge this sum, and also the annual Peshcush of 4 Lacks growing due, and leave a surplus of 2 Lacks as an advance for the succeeding year. When the Nabob therefore had the means of payment in his own hands without drawing the sword, to make this debt the pretext for a war must be the most wanton injustice.

No intercourse subsisted between the Rajah and the English; for the Committee declare, “That the Nabob did not even allow “his Vackee to see the President ‡.” To examine therefore the rights of the respective parties might be deemed impracticable. The Committee plainly thought the task unnecessary. Deliberat-

§ In the April following, when the expedition against the Marawar and Nalcooty Polligars was resumed, 550 Europeans, with three battalions of the Company's Sepoys, were employed, and even this force was thought by several members of the Council more than sufficient. Vide Dissent of Messieurs Stratton and Mackay. Appendix, No. XXVI. p. 957.

† The Rajah affirms, that before the last expedition commenced, he had transmitted bills on Mr. Benfield for the sum demanded by the Nabob. Vide Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1179.

‡ Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1117.

ing on the advices from Poonah, when they judged that + “ The
 “ apprehensions he (the Rajah) before had, have been increased by
 “ the *publication of the Nabob's intention of reducing him*, which has
 “ gained credit all over the country,” and that these apprehensions
 had naturally produced his application at Poonah, they add, “ How-
 “ ever, setting all these considerations aside, it is evident, that, in
 “ the present system, it is dangerous to have such a Power in the
 “ heart of the province.” The *present system* is not explained ;
 but in the *former system*, this Power had by it's assistance enabled
 the Nabob and the English to preserve Trichinopoly, and to defeat
 the French. The reason for this opinion of the Committee they
 immediately subjoin : “ That unless the Company can engage the
 “ Rajah to their interest, by a *firm promise of support in all his just*
 “ *RIGHTS*, we look upon it as certain, that should *any troubles arise*
 “ *in the Carnatick*, whether from the French or a country enemy,
 “ and present a favourable opportunity of *freeing himself from his*
 “ *apprehensions of the NABOB*, he would take part *against him*, and
 “ at such a time might be a dangerous enemy in the South.”
 The conclusion from all this reasoning is admirable ; for assuming
 that “ A firm promise of support *in all his just rights*” to the Rajah
 was a thing impossible, the Committee immediately add—“ The
 “ *propriety and expediency* therefore of embracing the present oppor-
 “ tunity of reducing him *entirely* before such an event takes place,
 “ or *before he has strengthened himself by alliances with any other*
 “ *Powers*, are EVIDENT.” The Committee then proceeded to de-
 liberate upon dangers to be apprehended in the execution ; and
 judging that the Marattas “ Will be unable to pass the Kistnah,”
 and that Hyder Ally is “ Too much employed in settling his own
 “ affairs to attempt any thing,” they resolve upon the conquest of
 Tanjore.

This reasoning appears in the consultations of the Committee on the 22d June ; and, after another conference had with the Nabob, the Committee request the concurrence of the Council on the 28th of the same month. The next day the Council assign their reasons for assenting to the expedition. The first difficulty which occurred was the guaranty in the treaty of 1762, which they declare to be null and void. The reasons given for this opinion †, though formally divided into three, are comprised in this one position — That because the treaty of 1762 was not in terms ratified and confirmed in 1771, it must have been the intention of the contracting parties to discharge the English from that guaranty. The reader will recollect, that before the Rajah submitted to the terms dictated by the Nabob, he implored the interposition of the Governor ; nay humbled himself so far as to entreat the influence of the Indian interpreter, to obtain peace upon any conditions which the English might prescribe. The reader will likewise remember, that the war of 1771 was in truth the act of the English, and that their troops compelled the Rajah to sign the stipulations prescribed by the Nabob, in which no mention was made of the former treaty. The supposition, therefore, that the Rajah *voluntarily* renounced the protection of the English, to submit himself *entirely* to the Nabob, from whom the guaranty was intended to protect him, and of whom, in the judgment of these Gentlemen themselves, he entertained constant apprehensions lest the Nabob should take possession of his country ; and that he should have *voluntarily* renounced this guaranty, for the sole purpose of obtaining worse terms, without any security that these terms should be observed, is not only incredible, but in point of fact utterly false. Moreover this supposition admits the war in 1771, on the part of the English, to have been the most barefaced injustice ; for it presumes, that their

† Appendix, No. XXVII. page 1129.

conduct was not, in execution of the treaty of 1762, to support the just rights of the Nabob. If it were, then they (the same party, as representing the English Nation) must presume, that they had not exceeded the just bounds of their duty as guarantees; that they had only compelled the party failing to fulfil his engagement; and consequently, that the guaranty *remained a subsisting obligation*. In whatever light therefore the subject may be considered, we shall of necessity recur to this question—Whether the guarantee can or cannot renounce the obligation? That the guarantee cannot compel one party to discharge him is evident, for this would be only to add violence to injustice. That the guarantee cannot discharge himself, by renouncing the obligation, seems to be a position equally manifest; for if he can do this at pleasure, treaties are worse than useless; they become instruments of fraud and deceit upon those who rely on the faith of the contracting parties. The affirmative of this question appeared too strong a position for the Council to advance in terms; but they adopt generally the reasons of the Committee, who were less delicate †. The second reason given by the Committee, why the guaranty did not remain in force, is, “ Because this Government promised, at the commencement of the “ expedition‡, not to interfere in any negotiation between the Nabob and the Rajah, but to leave the whole to be settled by him §.” This promise given to the Nabob plainly resolves itself into the question above stated; for if a guarantee cannot at pleasure renounce his engagement, this was a promise given in direct opposition to a prior, subsisting obligation by a treaty, to which both the Nabob and the English were contracting parties.

† Their expression is, “ As well as for the reasons given by the Committee.” Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1129.

‡ In the year 1771.

§ Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1116. Their view of the consequences of determining this question in the same page of the Appendix, and indeed their whole reasoning on the subject is curious, and may deserve attention.

There

There yet remains to be examined* another reason: “ Because
 “ the conduct of the Rajah, which obliged this Government to
 “ take up arms against him, cancelled every obligation contained
 “ in that treaty.” † To examine the truth of this position has been
 the principal purpose of the present work. The nature of the ob-
 ligation however deserves some observations. By the treaty of
 1762 the Rajah and Nabob “ Mutually consented to establish a
 “ firm friendship between them.” That the Rajah had violated
 this friendship, by invading the Marawar Polligar, was one cause
 alleged for the first war. By the same treaty the Rajah engaged
 to pay an annual Peshcush of four Lacks; the Nabob, “ That he
 “ will not demand any thing more.” The neglect to pay this
 annual Peshcush was another cause alleged for the war in 1771.
 The Nabob solicited the assistance of the English; the Rajah ap-
 pealed to their justice; they were therefore bound to decide be-
 tween the parties, and to enforce their decision. In fact, the Eng-
 lish did interpose, and marched their army against Tanjore. No-
 thing antecedent could excuse them, so intervening without a pre-
 tence of injury to themselves, from rendering equal justice to both
 parties. Their duty is implied in the nature of the obligation
 under which they acted; but in this instance, the duty and its
 extent are in terms prescribed by the treaty: “ In case either
 “ party shall fail in the performance of the articles, or any part
 “ thereof, we will,” say the English as guarantees, “ to the utmost
 “ of our power, assist the other party to *compel him* who shall fail to
 “ fulfil his agreement, and to render *due satisfaction* for his failure
 “ therein.” If the English exceeded the bounds of their duty thus
 prescribed, they violated their engagement; and it would be a singu-
 lar mode of reasoning, from one violation of duty to infer an ex-
 emption from all obligation in future.

† Appendix, No. XXVII. page 1116.

The reader will probably think, that the English could not consider themselves discharged from the obligation, had the renunciation been made in terms by the Rajah, while their army lay before his capital. The truth however is, that the exact Peshcush, first ascertained by the treaty of 1762, is expressly continued in 1771. The other articles, exorbitant or otherwise, the plunder of the Marawar, and the sums paid for the expenses of the expedition, were demanded as a compensation for supposed injuries. This part of the treaty was moreover *executed*; for to defray these expenses districts were immediately assigned. Unless therefore the engagement of the Rajah to assist the Nabob with his troops, which the Nabob and his friends pretend was implied in the payment of tribute, be considered as a *new* obligation, nothing remained *to be performed in future* but what the treaty of 1762 had prescribed. Now the single reason why a new treaty may in some cases discharge a guaranty is, that if the parties voluntarily, without the intervention or consent of the guarantee, vary their respective rights, he is not *obliged to enforce a future performance* of their *new engagements*. But no writer on the law of nations has yet maintained, that the guarantee might justly *act* in opposition to his *own express engagement*; much less, that having actually interposed in one instance, the *excess* of compensation *exact*ed by his *own forces* could exempt him from all future obligation.

The Council having resolved that the Company were no longer guarantees of the treaty of 1762, proceed to state their reasons why they deemed it just and right to conquer the country of Tanjore, as the Nabob had requested. To comment on their arguments would be a waste of time. The first reason assigned is, + “ Because
 “ it appears to them (the Council) that in *consequence of the humiliating conditions* to which the Rajah of Tanjore was obliged to

+ Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1129.

“ submit at the conclusion of the late peace, and the *constant ap-*
 “ *prehensions* he is under of the Nabob's taking possession of his country,
 “ it is *natural*, and there is all reason to believe he *will* take the first
 “ good opportunity of joining any Power, be it Européan or Country,
 “ by whose aid he may think himself enabled to shake off his *present*
 “ *yoke*, recover his *former dignity and power*, and if possible retaliate
 “ *upon those* who were the means of reducing him to his *present state*.”
 Such are the relative situations of the parties, and the avowed mo-
 tives of the war, as stated by the Council. Former injustice creat-
 ed a suspicion in the authors of that injustice, that the Rajah *will*
hercafter be hostile; and the inference is as curious as the prin-
 ciple: “ The undertaking of the present expedition *therefore*, and
 “ the Rajah's *total reduction*, are become *matters of self-defence* †.”
 The succeeding arguments are designed to prove, that if the Rajah
be not reduced, great danger is to be apprehended from *other*
Powers; and that to prevent the *present expedition*, these other
 Powers will not *at this time* interfere. Convinced by such argu-
 ments, the Board instantly resolve, “ That it is *expedient* and *ne-*
 “ *cessary* to undertake the proposed expedition against Tanjore.”
 The preceding day the Board had adjourned, because “ The Mem-
 “ bers of the Council, sensible of the *importance of the subject*
 “ which is now submitted to their determination, *desire further*
 “ *time to consider of it* before they give their opinion ‡;” yet on the
 next day, the *probable* conviction from the debate was so far antici-
 pated, that a CALCULATE of the force necessary in the reduc-
 “ tion of Tanjore” was delivered to the Board the moment the
 former resolution had passed, immediately approved, and it was in-
 stantly ordered, “ That the necessary instructions be dispatched for
 “ the troops being put in motion as soon as possible §.”

† Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1130.

‡ Ibid. p. 1128.

§ Ibid. p. 1131.

The siege of Tanjore commenced the 20th of August 1773, and the place was taken by storm the 17th of September following.

The conquest of Tanjore had been undertaken by the Governor and Council, *as a measure of self-defence*; yet when taken, it was immediately delivered to the Nabob, who placed a garrison of his own troops in the fort. On the 27th of September the President acquainted the Board, that “He had represented to the Nabob the expediency of having an European garrison in Tanjore, as he did not think the place altogether secure, if only garrisoned by his own Sepoys: That the Nabob had always evaded giving a positive answer on this subject, and only said, that he would soon come and consult with his friends upon it +” The remonstrances of General Smith induced the Council to renew their representation, to urge the opinion of the General, and again to request the Nabob’s “Acquiescence in a measure which is evidently so much for his own advantage.” The President twice conferred with the Nabob upon the subject, and then reported his final determination: “That he was not in the least convinced of the expediency of having an European garrison in Tanjore, as he considered the place perfectly secure in the possession of his own troops;” that for the present he has no occasion for the assistance of the Europeans in Tanjore; when he has, he will then apply for them.” The President further added, “That the Nabob expressed much uneasiness, and appeared to be much alarmed at our pressing this measure so strenuously ‡.” General Smith, in a letter received the 1st October §, further urged the necessity of an European garrison, *as essential to the safety of the place*; represented the number of men sick and wounded; that since the siege many

+ Consultation 27th September, 1773. Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1232.

‡ Ibid. 28th of September, p. 1236.

§ Ibid. 1st of October, p. 1242.

more were reported unfit for duty ; that the European corps were much diminished ; and that as the rainy season approached, it would be essential to the health of the troops, they should be “ Quartered in proper time, which might be in Tanjore and it’s dependencies.” The Council assented to the reasoning of the General, but their fear of disgusting Mahomed Ally prevented it’s effect. The approaches before Tanjore were demolished, the breach was repaired, and the fort garrisoned by the Nabob’s troops, under the command of Monsieur Martinz, an European officer in his service.

The conquest of Tanjore, and the immediate surrender of that country to Mahomed Ally, have been vindicated as the necessary consequence, if not the direct object, of orders received from the Court of Directors. These orders, which have been partially selected, bear date the 17th of March 1769. It is not essential to our present purpose to enquire, how far the sentiments at that time expressed by the Directors may be consistent with the rights of the Rajah, or with the engagements of the Company ; we shall prove, what in our view of the subject is more material, that the aggrandizement of the Nabob was not the intention of those who wrote, nor so understood by those to whom the letter was addressed ; and that these orders, whether just or unjust, had been in terms revoked before the first expedition against Tanjore was agitated by the Council.

It has been already remarked, that success attended the English arms in the beginning of the war against Hyder Ally, which commenced in 1767, but terminated ingloriously, by a treaty concluded the 3d of April 1769, under the walls of Madras. During the intermediate period, while we were yet successful, the Directors
received

received complaints from the Nabob, not only that the Rajah withheld all assistance, but that he was really become the enemy of the English. Without other information, and adopting the idea suggested by the Nabob, that Tanjore had been protected by the operations of the English army, the Directors declare it is just, that the Rajah “ Should be made to bear some part of the expense of
 “ those measures, to which he owes his security and the peace of his
 “ country.” They therefore enjoin the Select Committee to give
 “ the Nabob such support as may be effectual; and if the Rajah
 “ refuses to contribute a just proportion to the expense of the war,
 “ you are then to pursue such measures the Nabob may think
 “ consistent with the justice and dignity of his Government.” §
 From this part of the letter alone it is evident, that the Directors intended nothing more than to compel the Rajah to contribute a proportion of the expense, upon a supposition, that to those measures he *owed his security and the peace of his country*. Subsequent events removed even the appearance of a claim. The retreat of the English army left the dominions of the Rajah without protection, exposed to an enemy whom the hostilities of the English had provoked, and whose country had been ravaged by the Tanjorean horse, acting in conjunction with the English troops. The treaty of peace with Hyder Ally was concluded nearly at the period when the letter abovementioned was written, and the Rajah of Tanjore being expressly included in that treaty, all retrospect became impossible, except by a direct violation of this recent and solemn engagement. These events appear to have been very imperfectly known to the Court of Directors at that period; yet in a subsequent letter, after condemning the conduct of the Governor and Council throughout this war, they † observe, “ The Rajah is, as we conceive,

§ Appendix, No. XX. p. 525.

† This letter is dated 23d March, 1770, and arrived at Madras, in the

“ effectually sheltered, by the faith of a treaty, from being com-
 “ pella^ble to contribute a single Rupee towards defraying the
 “ charges of the war ; our former orders therefore in this respect,
 “ relative to the King of Tanjore, must be suspended, because
 “ they are rendered utterly impossible to be carried into execution,
 “ without committing a breach of the treaty you have lately con-
 “ cluded.” †

During these troubles the Nabob's former debt to the Com-
 pany remained unpaid. More than sixteen Lacks of Pagodas
 had been advanced to prosecute the war. The Directors were
 not apprised, that three thousand Tanjorean horse had served
 with the English troops under Colonel Wood ; much less could
 they at that time suspect, that the retreat of our army would en-
 able Hyder Ally to exact a compensation from the Rajah for
 assistance given to the English, and for the consequent ravages in
 the dominions of Myso^re. Impressed therefore with the opinion,
 that the country of Tanjore would be protected by the English
 arms, they required the Rajah to contribute a proportion to the
 expense of the war ; but the conquest of that country for the
 Nabob was directly repugnant to their views, plainly expressed
 in the same letter. In the beginning of the letter of the 17th of
 March 1769, the Directors say, “ The tenor of our letters to the
 “ Separate Department, since the negotiations were commenced
 “ with Nizam Ally for the Circars, will explain to you the sense we
 “ have entertained of the deviations that have been made from our
 “ former more contracted, but, as we trust, more permanent system,

Lord Mansfield, the 15th of September, 1770 ; a duplicate was sent by the
 Morse, which arrived the 10th of April, 1771. The letter of the Council
 to General Smith to march against Tanjore is dated the 4th of August, 1771.

† Appendix, No. XX. p. 535.

“ of

“ of confining our influence and possessions within the boundaries
 “ of the Carnatick. *It is to retreat back within those limits,* and for
 “ other purposes; which we shall hereafter express, *that we*
 “ *† hereby appoint you a Select Committee, and intrust to your direction*
 “ *and abilities the conduct of our political affairs†.*” In the same
 letter, taking notice of reports respecting the private creditors of
 the Nabob, they add, “ We are alarmed lest this debt to indi-
 “ viduals *should have been the real motive to the aggrandizement of*
 “ *Mahomed Ally,* and that we are plunged into a war to put him
 “ in possession of revenues for the discharge of that debt.” They
 urge therefore, as a measure preferable to an increase of revenue
 by conquest, a reduction of the Nabob’s expenses, particularly in
 his military force, which “ Have been increasing to a degree, as
 “ would almost incline us to think he meant to rely on them for
 “ the defence of the Carnatick.” They require the Committee
 to represent to the Nabob the folly of such intentions, to incul-
 cate the necessity of re-establishing his finances, to remind him
 of the long war sustained by the English in his defence, and of
 the probability of another struggle with the same powerful enemy.
 The inference which they make is, that the Nabob “ Must con-
 “ fine all his ambition to the putting the Carnatick in a proper
 “ state of defence, by keeping up the fortifications, and having
 “ his magazines well stored.” In a letter to Mahomed Ally of
 the same date, the Directors explain their views in terms not to
 be misunderstood. They say, † “ Commerce is the great object of
 “ our attention; it is for the protection of that we have been
 “ forced to engage in the wars of Indostan, and that protection
 “ is all we aim at. We seek no new possessions or revenues, but
 “ wish to see the whole Empire in peace, that we may carry on
 “ our commerce uninterrupted to the remotest parts. We wish

† Appendix, No. XX. p. 524.

‡ Appendix, No. XX. p. 527.

“ your

“ your Excellency to adopt the same principles of moderation,
 “ and to confine all your views to the peaceable possession and
 “ good government of the Carnatick.”

It is not easy to conceive how the ideas expressed in these letters are to be reconciled to the conquest of Tanjore by English troops, and to the independent possession of that country by the Nabob; yet from a single paragraph of the first letter, unexplained, is the whole argument derived; which paragraph, as before observed, was revoked in the most pointed terms by subsequent orders, received at Madras in September 1770. On the 13th of March 1771†, the Committee deliberating on the first expedition against Tanjore, take notice of the orders *lately received* by the Dolphin Frigate, against becoming parties in disputes between the Powers of India; and on the 24th of July following they say‡, “ We have no cause to *infer*
 “ from any orders we have received from the Company, that *they*
 “ wish the fort and country of Tanjore were conquered, and the
 “ present possessors dispossessed; but on the contrary, that they
 “ will not have *either their possessions or those of the Nabob extended,*
 “ or the hereditary possessors of territory dispossessed; but only
 “ that they should be reduced to such terms, as may give safety to
 “ the Carnatick and to their own possessions.” The Committee however resolve to prepare for an expedition against the Rajah, on pretence of supporting a negotiation, *committed wholly to the Nabob*, with the professed view of obtaining a pecuniary satisfaction for supposed injuries; yet they most disingenuously suppress the letter of 1770, in which the Directors declare, that to demand a single Rupee would be a manifest breach of the treaty of 1769†.

‡ Appendix, No. XXII. p. 659. § Ibid. p. 703.

† The object of the Committee was the conquest of Tanjore; vide page 101. The manner in which they misled the Directors may be seen in the letter of the Court of Directors, Appendix No. IX. from p. 145 to p. 152.

The Letter of 1770, revoking the orders of 1769, may in fair construction be considered as prohibiting an attack upon Tanjore. On the most limited interpretation, this letter revives the antecedent orders of the Company, which are plain, direct, and uniform. The Directors in 1763 approved the treaty concluded between the Nabob and the Rajah, and the guaranty of that treaty by the Company *. Disputes arose in 1764 respecting the waters of the Caverry ; upon which occasion, after expressing their concern at the unreasonable opposition of the Nabob to the repair of the banks, they write †, “ In such a case as this you should
 “ shew a firmness becoming the Power you represent. You have
 “ guarantied the treaty made in 1762 between him and the
 “ King, and have therefore a right to interfere in subjects of con-
 “ tention that may arise between them, though not immediately
 “ expressed in the treaty.” They recommend an effectual inter-
 position, and add, “ This justice requires, and *considering the*
 “ *two Powers in a political light, we think it is for our interest that*
 “ *each should be maintained in his proper rights.*” In December
 following, alarmed by a new scheme of conquest by Mahomed
 Ally, they observe, ‡ “ It is but too evident, from the Nabob’s
 “ letter to us, that his ambition would lead him into an attempt
 “ to gain the Subahship of the Deccan, if we were wild enough
 “ to support him in it.” They declare, in the strongest terms,
 that they never can approve the undertaking, and assign this reason ;
 “ For *the spirit of conquest is by no means that which § rules with*
 “ *us, and which we hope you will never suffer to gain the ascendant with*
 “ *you.*” They add, || “ We are well pleased that you have at last
 “ made the Nabob sensible how much it is his interest to main-

* Appendix, No. VI. p. 84. † Ibid. p. 86. ‡ App. No. XX. p. 505.

§ The same sentiments are conveyed in a letter of the same date addressed to the Nabob.

|| This paragraph being printed in Appendix, No. VI. p. 87. is omitted in Appendix, No. XX.

tain a friendship and harmony with the King of Tanjore. Whether he be sincere or not in these professions, it is well that he seems so; and *it must be your care* to keep him in that temper, and to *prevent his attempting any thing unjustly to the Rajah's prejudice.* The great reluctance he has shewn to suffer the banks of the Cavery and Annacut to be repaired, *is no favourable proof of the disposition he bears towards the Rajah's Government.* The improvement and extension of our commerce on the Coast (an object we have greatly at heart) depends so much on the peace of the Carnatick, that it is become a necessary part of our system to watch over and preserve it's tranquillity. This being established as a *fundamental principle*, you must endeavour to form your conduct thereon, and prevent, as much as you prudently can, *one Power from encroaching on another.*" In 1767, speaking of the lesser Zemindars and Polligars dependent on the Carnatick, the Directors write, † "As the object in view is not, or *ought not to be, the acquisition of territory to the Nabob,* but to put it out of the power of *his neighbours, or his subjects,* to disturb the peace of his government, it appears to us too severe to *dispossess these people entirely of their hereditary rights.*"— Again, ‡ "It requires your constant attention to *prevent the Nabob bringing on himself new quarrels with his neighbours.*"— Speaking afterwards of the King of Tanjore, they say, § "You *must lose no opportunity of raising in him the idea of a firm dependence on our friendship.* You will not want opportunities, we apprehend, of giving proofs of your impartiality, for we discover in many instances a want of cordiality between him and *the Nabob.*" Further---"We fear the Nabob will ever be seeking pretences to provoke him, in order to draw you into

† Appendix, No. XX. p. 511.

‡ Par. 16. Ibid. p. 512.

§ This paragraph being printed in Appendix, No. VI. p. 87. is omitted in Appendix, No. XX.

“ the quarrel, in hopes of adding some part of the Tanjore country to
 “ his own.” As the river Cavery will afford numberless subjects
 of dispute, it is recommended to procure a precise account of the
 ancient usages, that the Governor and Council “ May be enabled, on
 “ good grounds, to mediate in such disputes, without injuring the
 “ Nabob, or (to gratify his passions) sacrificing the rights of the King.”

The subsequent orders † of the Directors relate more immediately
 to the war against Hyder Ally ; but these orders are likewise uniform
 against extending the possessions of the Company, or of the Nabob.

Is it possible for imagination to conceive a conduct more opposite
 to the instructions received from the Court of Directors, than
 giving to Mahomed Ally the *independent possession* of Tanjore ? Or
 could there be a mode of executing that measure more repugnant
 to the letter and spirit of the Court's instructions, than committing
 the whole negotiation to the Nabob, and their army to the orders
 of his Son ? Neither was this open contempt of the orders of the
 Company excused or extenuated by the pretence of public interest ;
 for the Committee, in their letter of the 31st of January 1770,
 avow it as their opinion, that it would neither be good policy in
 the Company to *suffer* the Nabob of the Carnatick to reduce Tan-
 jore, if he were powerful enough of himself to effect it, nor pru-
 dent for the Company to conquer Tanjore by their own force, and
 to place it under his management and control ‡.

An apology has been made for the Committee who undertook
 the second expedition in 1773. It has been said, they requested
 the decision of the Directors, and that a strong line might be traced
 for their guidance. It is true this request was made, in a letter
 dated the 28th February 1772 ; and the alternative stated by the

† Appendix, No. XX.

‡ Appendix, No. XXV. p. 938.

Committee for the opinion of the Directors is, “ Either to take
 “ the King of Tanjore openly and avowedly under your protection,
 “ and give him *proofs of your impartial justice, which we think,*
 “ *even now, notwithstanding what has passed, will bind him firmly to*
 “ *your interest,* or to conquer and subdue him totally ;---but in the
 “ latter case the *consequent arrangements will be matter of the most*
 “ *serious consideration* †.” No answer could be received to this letter
 before September 1773. ‡ The 22d June preceding the Committee
 declare their expectation of these orders and instructions ; yet with-
 out suggesting a motive, which did not exist in 1772, they decide
 the question upon which they had so recently requested instruc-
 tions ; they resolve to conquer Tanjore ; and without once delibe-
 rating on the *consequent arrangements, which were to be matter of the*
most serious consideration, they deliver the fort and country to the
 Nabob.

The Committee had particularly requested the decision of the
 Directors, how far the Company’s guaranty of the treaty of 1762
 was affected by the expedition against Tanjore in 1771, and the
 consequent treaty between the Nabob and the Rajah ; they like-
 wise desired instructions *for their future guidance.* By the next
 ship the Directors write, “ However desirous we may be to explain
 “ ourselves on such points as may require our decision, we must
 “ defer the consideration of those now before us, until we shall have
 “ leisure to deliberate fully and maturely on them ; more especial-
 “ ly as the objects are of too much importance to admit of a hasty
 “ determination §.” It is evident that the question respecting the
 guaranty could only be decided by comparing the two treaties, by
 considering how far the English had concurred in the change, if

† Appendix, No. XXV. p. 930.

‡ This is avowed by the Committee, when they resolved to undertake the
 expedition on the 22d of June, 1773. Appendix, No. XXVII. p. 1119.

§ Received at Madras, September 6th, 1773. Appendix, No. XX, p. 548.

any had been made, and by minutely examining the conduct of the Rajah, whether he had forfeited the protection of the Company stipulated in the treaty of 1762. If the Company were discharged from the guaranty, their instructions for the *future guidance* of their servants must depend on a deliberate review of their political situation, and of the interests and designs of the neighbouring States, and European Powers who possessed Settlements in India. These subjects, they thought "Did not admit of a hasty determination;" neither did the occasion appear to require it. The Nabob had in 1771 obtained a full compensation for all injuries and expenses, according to his own estimate; and districts, valued at four Lacks of Rupees per annum, had been ceded to him in perpetuity; large sums had been paid to defray in part the expenses of the expedition, and other districts, yielding a revenue of sixteen Lacks per annum, had been assigned to discharge the remainder, which were more than a sufficient security for the annual tribute. The Rajah, despoiled of his treasure and revenues, was unable, if he had been so disposed, to disturb the peace of the Carnatick. Under these circumstances, how could the Directors suspect that the conquest of Tanjore would be so soon attempted? Or that the Committee, without awaiting their instructions, would decide on those important measures, which they had expressly referred to the judgment of their Superiors?

The situation of affairs in England lessened the attention of the Directors to political concerns in India. The ability of the Company to fulfil their [†] engagements with the State, had been warmly contested; yet these engagements, first taken in 1767, had been renewed in 1769. Involved in debt by their former struggles with

[†] 400,000l. dividend, 400,000l. annually to the State, and an indemnification to the public from all loss by a reduction of the duties upon tea, which in some years became little less than 200,000l.

the French, the Company had with difficulty continued the stipulated payments during three years and a half, when bills drawn from Bengal, to the amount of more than a million sterling, rendered the event no longer doubtful. In the latter end of the year 1771, the necessity of reducing the dividend to the Proprietors, and of discontinuing the payment of £.400,000 per annum to the State, was universally acknowledged. The loss of their property, the price of which fell with the dividend, irritated the Proprietors; and the suspicions of persons unacquainted with the subject extending much farther than the truth, shook the credit of the Company, and spread a general alarm. The minds of men were engaged in ascertaining the cause of this distress, and investigating the conduct of those to whom it was imputed. New regulations were the perpetual subject of discussion by General Courts and Committees of Proprietors. The succeeding winter produced other enquiries. Two Committees of the House of Commons sat on India affairs at the same time. Their proceedings engrossed the attention of the Company, who found their interest deeply involved. During this commotion, several of the principal Directors retired, some were rejected at the annual election †, and the management of affairs passed into other hands. In June 1773 the Constitution and Government of the Company, both in England and Bengal, were greatly altered by an Act of the Legislature. The instructions to the new Council in that country, and the regulations which this change required, necessarily engaged the attention of Proprietors and Directors; so that the Gentlemen appointed by Parliament did not receive their instructions before March 1774.

During this interesting period political affairs on the Coast of Coromandel had been little regarded. The 26th of March 1774

† April, 1773.

the

the first intelligence arrived of the second expedition, and of the capture of Tanjore. The measure excited general indignation. The dangerous consequences were immediately seen, but the remedy to be applied required the most temperate deliberation. The consultations of the Council, which were received on the 26th of August, brought the subject fully before the Directors, who lost no time in preparing papers necessary to an attentive investigation. Unwilling, in a measure of so great national importance, to act wholly on their own judgment, they laid these papers before His Majesty's Ministers in January 1775. On the 17th of March the intended paragraphs of a letter to the President and Council of Madras were transmitted to the Secretary of State, who on the 7th of April expressed his concurrence, so far as he thought it became him to decide†. The dispatches were signed on the 12th of the same month.

These orders restored to the deposed Rajah of Tanjore his dominions, to his subjects their religion, their government, and their laws. That to redress injustice is justice cannot be the subject of reasoning. The axiom is derived from the first impressions of nature, and written by the Deity in the heart of man. If therefore the Rajah was unjustly deposed by the servants of the Company, to restore him to his dominions became a measure, not of choice but of duty. Injuries committed, without the consent of the Company, may have rendered limitations necessary to the safety of their Settlements; but no rights of the Nabob of Arcot could oppose the resti-

† The Secretary of State informed the Directors, that upon a perusal of their intended instructions to their President and Council, he saw nothing therein contrary to the subsisting treaties; and that as to the private and public regulations of the Company, there would be great impropriety in giving his opinion.

tution. There are however those; who, not accustomed to moral reasoning, but observing possessions obtained by Sovereigns, in wars evidently unprovoked, to be acknowledged by neighbouring nations, have conceived, that a *right of conquest* may exist independent of *the justice* of a war. These gentlemen have doubted whether the English can rightfully wrest Tanjore from Mahomed Ally, however unjustly he may have obtained the country.

Every man has a *right* to have *wrongs* redressed. In civil society, to render this right effectual is the duty of the Magistrate, and individuals are not the avengers of their own wrongs. Nations have no superior;—force therefore is the arbiter between them; and every Sovereign may take part in a war, according to his opinion of what justice requires. It is the duty of States, as well as of individuals, to oppose injustice; but as a Sovereign owes a superior duty to the people, whose preservation is more immediately intrusted to his charge, a regard to their safety or prosperity may sometimes require that he should avoid hostilities. As a neutral Power, he can have no authority to decide between the contending parties, because he is not their superior or judge; and a prudent attention to interest, or even duty, in some cases, may prevent him becoming an associate in the war. Under these circumstances he acts indifferently towards both, as if each had a just cause of hostility. That each should really have a just cause of hostility is in fact impossible; yet the supposition will be found a necessary consequence of renouncing all right to decide between them. This conduct of neutral Powers produces what some authors denominate external rights; rights derived wholly from an acquiescence of nations, who acknowledge a present possession, without examining the means by which such possession was acquired. It is
evident

evident that Mahomed Ally can establish no claim to Tanjore upon this reasoning,* because the Company might justly become associates against him in a war, to redress an injury done to the Rajah. Neither does their conduct remain a subject of choice, or even of imperfect duty. The Company have guaranteed the treaty of 1762 ; they have pledged their faith to decide between the Nabob and the Rajah, and to enforce that decision. The Nabob and the Rajah, by executing the treaty, have constituted the Company their judge, and authorised every measure necessary to give effect to their opinion of what justice demands.

The fort and country of Tanjore were taken by the English arms ; the conquest was their act ; and no doubt was ever yet entertained, whether moral duty required that men should restore what they had unjustly taken. A gift, or even sale of possessions, so obtained, cannot defeat an antecedent right. If it could, all moral obligation were indeed easily evaded, and laws prescribed by Infinite Wisdom, might be annulled by the low cunning of his creature.

The utmost claim of an innocent party, involved in such a transaction, can extend only to compensation. Supposing therefore Mahomed Ally had never entertained unjust designs against Tanjore, nor employed unworthy arts to engage the English in hostilities ; that his conduct had been guided by the strictest sense of moral duty, and his assent to the conquest been the mere effect of error, he could claim nothing against the Rajah, equally innocent, and possessed of an antecedent right. From those indeed who had caused his mistake he would be entitled to demand a compensation of his injury, but could not retain a country unjustly conquered ; and a full compensation for his loss he had before received. By the expedition of 1771 he obtained a reimburse-

ment of expenses, and satisfaction for supposed injuries, according to his own estimation. In 1773 he plundered the capital of Tanjore, and taking possession of the country, appropriated to his own use the revenues of more than two † years. That the sum thus obtained exceeded the expenses incurred in the second expedition he has sufficiently declared, by refusing to state the account. Whatever injustice therefore the Rajah may have sustained, the Nabob can have no cause of complaint.

Arguments rather foreign to the subject have been urged. Gratitude to Mahomed Ally has been suggested as a motive for sacrificing Tanjore to his ambition; a malignant imagination has been ransacked to traduce the character of the Rajah, and the finer feelings of the heart have been addressed to mislead the judgment. Were we disposed to imitate such an example, the obligations of Mahomed Ally to the father of the present Rajah; the resources thence derived in the hour of distress; the imputation of parricide to the Son to wrest from him his dominions; the profusion of compliment when he failed in this attempt; the conduct of the Nabob respecting the waters of the Cavery, when the troops of the present Rajah were serving in his camp; his intrigues to foment the quarrel with the Marawar Polligars; and the instant destruction of their Chiefs, whose protection was the professed motive to the war, might afford colourings to a picture not the mere creature of invention. Neither can ingratitude be imputed to the English. Mahomed Ally was negotiating the surrender of his last fortress, when their assistance rescued him from despair. In return he yielded with reluctance a small portion of the coun-

† The amount of the revenues was about 40 Lacks of Pagodas, or 1,600,000l. The expenses of the second expedition defrayed by the Nabob could not amount to tenth part of that sum.

tries won by their sword. But public measures should flow from the great principles of justice; and personal character ought not to govern the conduct of nations.

We are reproached with inattention to policy, as if human actions must ever be measured by interest, and gain be the established criterion of right. In the conduct of nations, justice is policy. Independent of internal strength, what greater security can the English possess in India, than a firm persuasion in the neighbouring States, that they have every thing to hope from their justice, and nothing to fear from their power? Can the aggrandizement of Mahomed Ally render their possessions more secure? Must the supply of their garrisons depend solely on his pleasure? Or will he be less disposed to abuse their confidence when he can do it with impunity? If the former services of the Rajah, if a regard to the solemn engagements of the Company, cannot preserve Tanjore, what hopes of safety remain to the other Sovereigns of India? Mahomed Ally has aspired to the command of the Deckan, and to the conquest of Mysore;---Will not the Subahdar, will not Hyder Ally be compelled to take refuge from the Nabob's ambition, in an alliance with the enemies of the British Nation? But the people of this country are actuated by nobler motives than a sordid regard to interest. They behold with indignation a shameful violation of public faith. They feel for an inoffensive people, sacrificed to men who have desolated the other parts of India. They will not surrender the Tanjoreans to Mahomedans, who are abhorred by them, who regard them as heathens, and who exult in their destruction by the sword of Mahomed. The generous temper of a free people will uphold at least one act of public justice, to atone for the crimes of individuals, and to vindicate the national character from reproach.

T H E E N D.