

LETTERS,

Political, Military, and Commercial,

ON THE

PRESENT STATE AND GOVERNMENT

OF THE


Province of Oude

AND ITS

DEPENDENCIES.

ADDRESSED TO

SIR JOHN SHORE, BARONET,



BRITISH POSSESSIONS IN INDIA.

Ubi pro labore desidïa, pro continentia et æquitate libido atque superbia invasere, fortuna
simul cum moribus immutatur. Ita imperium semper ad optimum quemque à minus
bono transferretur. SALLUST.

A D V E R T I S E M E N T.

THE following letters, written by a Lieutenant in the Bengal Cavalry, have commanded the applause of every man in India, and the approbation of the Right Hon. the President of the Board of Controul, who hesitated not, with the manly liberality that so strongly marks his character, to bear a willing testimony to the merits even of an obscure and anonymous writer.

It cannot be doubted but that the approbation of Mr. Dundas will be a ready passport of the following sheets, to the candid consideration of every man who is interested in the prosperity of our Indian possessions, and feels for the oppression and misery of some millions of his fellow creatures.

LETTERS, &c.

To Sir JOHN SHORE, Bart.

Oude, June 1793.

SIR,

THE importance of the following reflections, which are the result of long experience, and a minute knowledge of the Nawab Vizier's country, will, it is hoped, be an apology for this intrusion, from a person who has no other means of conveying his sentiments to you. They were thrown hastily together on the departure of his Excellency's ministers for Calcutta, with the declared intention of effecting some change in the existing engagements with the Company, and are addressed, I trust, with peculiar propriety to you, to whom I shall take the further liberty of addressing such elucidations, as the subject may seem to require. Should this effort, in any manner, contribute to bring relief to the wretched inhabitants of this distracted country, it will be a heartfelt gratification to me, and all the reward I expect or hope.

Considering the immense advantages which the Honourable Company derive from their connection with the Nawab Vizier, and the minute attention they pay to whatever may promote their own prosperity, and support their interest in the East, it is a matter of surprise and astonishment, that they have never taken any measures for the improvement of his country; nor even used the common precautions which prudence dictates, or good sense directs, for its defence and permanent security. A too literal adherence to their engagements, and a studious, perhaps a culpable compliance with the prejudices of an interested party in England, may have hitherto prevented any interference in the interior management of his country. But to a cool and dispassionate mind, not biased by prejudice, nor warped by interest, their conduct to him, ever since he has been placed on the Musnud, would appear, rather that of an insidious enemy, systematically devising means for his destruction, than as friends and protectors united in the same views, and the same interests.

The enormous sums in specie which they have drawn from him; the duties which they levy on the few articles which his country produces for exportation;

tion; and above all, the continued annual drain of near one-third of a subsidy, paid expressly for the defence of his dominions, have a tendency obviously pernicious, and, added to the fundamental defects in the government, have, since the demise of Sujah Dowlah, reduced his revenue * upwards of a crore of rupees, (1,000,000*l.* sterling) per annum. It is obvious that such a system, if continued, must terminate in the entire ruin of the country; the evils, which it has already produced, are of an alarming magnitude:† emigrations are frequent: cultivation has been on the decline for many years; and, at the present time, the Company's troops stationed in his country, are subsisted by the supplies which they draw from the Mirzapore and Benares districts. Property is insecure. Murders and robberies are daily committed, and pass unpunished, and even unnoticed. Ultimately, there is neither police nor efficient government in his country. These facts are undeniable, and prove the necessity of the Company extending, without delay, their paternal care to the subjects of a friend and ally, whose prosperity is so intimately blended with our own.

When the disposition of the Vizier, the character of his ministers, and the nature of his government, are considered, it will not be difficult to discover the causes, which, joined with his hitherto pernicious connection with the Company, have reduced his country to the wretched state in which we now contemplate it.

Bred up in habits of indolence and pleasure, and with an unconquerable aversion to business, the Vizier allows the administration of his government to fall into such hands, as, he thinks, will contribute most largely to the gratifications of his favourite pursuits. The ‡ ostensible minister is weak, ignorant, and voluptuous. The § acting one has little to recommend him, beside a knowledge of the common forms of office; he has neither firmness of mind nor talents for a station above that of head mutsuddée, (a writer or clerk in an office) from which he has been lately raised. Both have a passion for money, and lose no means by which it may be procured: the one to display an ostentatious magnificence; the other to hoard, as is the practice of all his cast. In no court are the vices of venality and corruption carried to greater lengths than in that of Lucknow. The government of a large district is often sold to

* Rohilkund (exclusive of Fuzulla Khan's Jageer) produced under the government of the Rohillas in 1772-3 ninety-six lacks of rupees. After the conquest, in 1774, it was let for eighty-four lacks of rupees. In the year 1782 for fifty-five lacks. In the year 1790 for forty-five lacks; and this year, 1793, little above thirty lacks have been realized.

† In the above period there was a succession of above ten annis. Than this fact nothing can place in a stronger point of view the miserable state of the Vizier's government. The decrease in the revenues of Goruckpore, Banfy, and Baraitch, has been still greater than in Rohilkund.

‡ Goruckpore and the districts in the vicinity of the Bahar Province are almost entirely depopulated. And since the ten years settlement made by Jonathan Duncan, Esq. in the zemindary of Benares in 1787-8, the province of Allahabad has lost one-fourth of its inhabitants.

§ Hussian Resa Khan

§ Sujah Teckut Ray

the highest bidder, and not unfrequently the reward of actions disgraceful to our nature, and at which humanity revolts.* No attention is paid to character in the choice of Amils, (governors and collectors of districts) although invested with boundless power, having life and death in their hands. Such men, subject to no check or controul, and conscious of being daily liable to be displaced by a greater favourite, or one who can bribe higher, cannot be supposed to be interested in the improvement of the country. Their sole object is to amass and plunder, and the wretched husbandman, unable to procure redress, is compelled to submit to what he considers his destiny, or by a painful conquest over his prejudices, fly to the more happy districts under the government of the Company.

The immense body of troops maintained by the Amils under the denomination of *Murayenna*, and the enormous deductions which are made on that account from the revenues, may also be mentioned as principal causes of the rapid decline of the country. These troops, which are kept up for the avowed purpose of enforcing the collections, consist of about forty eight thousand infantry, and thirteen thousand cavalry, and with their guns and ammunition, cost the Vizier annually above seventy-five lacks of rupees. Besides being a heavy burthen to the state, this rabble, without discipline or subordination, keeps the country in perpetual warfare and disorder, from the continual acts of oppression which they are in the habit of committing on the industrious farmer and mechanic. (*See Abstract Statement, &c. at the end of the letter.*)

No prospect remains that the Nawab, or his ministers, will voluntarily set about rectifying abuses, or think of establishing a regular system for the collection of the revenue, or the administration of justice, founded on the principles of reason and equity. The excellent system in force in the Company's provinces would afford them an admirable example, had they the good of the subject or the prosperity of the country at heart; but these are ideas that have never entered the mind of either, nor ever will, unless impressed by a decided interference of the Company. The propriety, and even the necessity of such an interference is no longer a question; for surely the prosperity of one of the finest countries in Hindostan, and the happiness of some millions of subjects, are not to be sacrificed to a mistaken and reprehensible delicacy, or put in competition with the wishes of a few, who have been their plunderers and tyrants.

But until the subject shall engage the attention of Parliament, effectual relief cannot be expected. It may, however, be hoped that the same humanity which dictated the *Mukurreree* system, now established in the Company's provinces, will recommend a similar one for the Vizier's dominions. The government in India ought in the meantime to use every means in their power to

* A bearer (chairman), a dog-keeper, orderlies, and many others of the lowest casts, and most detestable characters, have been raised to places of the highest trust and responsibility, recommended solely by vices at which human nature shudders.

retard the progress of the alarming evils, until they shall receive authority for eradicating them entirely. By striking off the duties on the manufactures and productions of his country, they might give encouragement to the trade, which the enterprising spirit of a few individuals of the British nation has introduced. By putting a stop to the drain of specie, they would give new life and vigour to industry and cultivation. They might recommend to the Vizier to abolish the ruinous establishment of the Mutayenna troops, and in the event of agreeing to increase the subsidy to eighty-five lacks (which he might easily do from the saving this measure would induce) they might engage to furnish him with troops that would not only better promote the end for which the Mutayenna are kept up, but be a check on the oppressions and enormities of the Aumils. An augmentation of our Native battalions, and the establishment of a respectable body of cavalry, would thus be obtained; objects not more essential to the defence and security of the Vizier's dominions, than to the preservation of the peace of Hindostan.

I am, SIR,

With all due respect,

Your most obedient,

Humble servant,

CIVIS.

ABSTRACT STATEMENT OF THE EXPENSES OF THE VIZIER'S MUTAYENNA TROOPS.

STATIONS.	Cavalry.		Infantry.		Artillery.	Expense of Mutayenna with each Annull.	Total of Expense.
	Number of Men	Amount of Expense	Number of Men	Amount of Expense			
Corah, Etawa, &c. &c.	3,556	9,89,954 14 0	9,053	5,96,056 0 0	90,639 0 0	16,76,642 14 0	
Rohi cund	1,740	4,90,616 14 0	6,492	4,55,856 10 1	47,000 0 0	9,99,513 8 1	
Khyrabad and Mhamdy,	502	2,21,450 8 0	700	25,375 0 0	51,503 12 0	2,98,129 4 0	
Ghoonda and Amora	320	1,01,123 0 0	2,328	1,26,295 0 0	14,079 0 0	2,41,688 0 0	
Bareilly, Dalmow, Reddowly, &c.	339	77,825 6 0	1,761	1,44,492 8 0	4,535 0 0	2,26,852 14 0	
Atmity and Rampore	181	73,412 4 0	870	68,619 0 0	18,356 4 0	1,60,387 8 0	
Sylah	115	32,402 0 0	1,82	49,593 0 0	8,996 10 1	90,991 10 1	
Sullanpore	749	2,55,055 10 0	2,645	1,12,317 0 0	15,000 0 0	3,82,972 10 0	
Sundelu Milleabad	231	98,473 8 0	750	27,187 0 0	5,085 0 0	1,30,745 8 0	
Azemgur and Mahole	875	3,07,544 11 2	2,760	1,30,485 0 0	21,400 0 0	4,69,429 11 2	
Acburpore	400	1,19,407 0 0	1,141	49,125 0 0	16,434 0 0	1,84,966 0 0	
Sandy and Shahabad	218	54,022 0 0	1,000	36,250 0 0	10,472 0 0	1,01,364 0 0	
Achmeh Sundelu Milleabad	40	9,180 0 0	679	27,466 0 0	5,741 0 0	42,387 0 0	
The Sayer	18	5,127 8 0	215	14,362 8 0	—	19,490 0 0	
Furruckabad	100	24,000 0 0	1,000	4,000 0 0	—	64,000 0 0	
By fix arrah	257	54,976 0 0	2,000	8,000 0 0	24,412 0 0	1,59,388 0 0	
Allahabad	209	62,700 0 0	2,000	96,000 0 0	10,000 0 0	1,68,700 0 0	
Purtabgur	250	90,000 0 0	1,000	36,250 0 0	12,757 8 0	1,39,007 8 0	
Lucknow	5	1,821 12 0	150	5,427 8 0	—	7,259 4 0	
Mohon	3	1,235 0 0	75	4,368 0 0	—	5,603 0 0	
Goruckpore	688	2,06,648 0 0	3,810	2,81,651 2 0	32,000 0 0	5,20,299 2 0	
Mannooabawry	74	7,123 0 0	300	10,875 0 0	7,000 0 0	25,198 0 0	
Sablone	272	87,940 0 0	2,200	50,000 0 0	3,000 0 0	1,40,940 0 0	
Sooratpore	123	31,647 8 0	575	41,410 0 0	6,799 0 0	79,553 4 0	
Bridgenore, &c.	287	99,040 0 0	—	—	—	99,040 0 0	
Lucknow	1,540	6,75,130 0 0	4,007	3,18,198 12 0	1,04,577 0 0	10,97,905 12 0	
	13,152	41,85,476 7 2	48,715	28,27,406 12 1	5,09,778 2 1	7,522,661 6 0	

N. B. These troops are employed solely in enforcing the collections of the revenue, there being, exclusive of them, the huzzoree, or household troops; that guard and attend on the person of the Nabob; they consist of several battalions of sepoy, a large train of artillery, and a considerable body of cavalry, totally without order or discipline.

To Sir JOHN SHORE, *Bart.*

SIR,

Oude, July 18, 1793.

ON the departure of the Nabob Vizier's ministers for the presidency, I took the liberty of addressing some reflections to you on the state of the country, in the hope that I should draw your humane attention to the consideration of the miserable situation of its inhabitants. The obvious causes of the ruin which is impending over it were therein depicted with moderation and truth, and, I trust, amply prove the necessity of the Bengal government extending, without delay, their paternal care to avert the evil. I shall occasionally continue to add such reflections and facts as appear necessary to the further elucidation of this important subject.

It is a truth universally admitted, that the subjects under all arbitrary governments are happy or miserable in proportion to the wisdom or depravity of their rulers, and perhaps it has never been more forcibly evinced than in the example afforded by a comparison of the Company's government with that of the Nabob Vizier's. The Company, with the grant or conquest of their provinces, naturally acquired the power of ruling their subjects by the same arbitrary maxims by which they had hitherto been governed, but have wisely relinquished that right in a very great measure, and established a system more liberal and just; their subjects consequently enjoy a degree of happiness and of increasing prosperity, unknown in any other part of Hindostan. The striking traits in the Nabob Vizier's government strongly resemble those of his * character and disposition, which have been already given, and are sufficiently well known to make any repetition of them here unnecessary. No fixed system, no police, no courts of justice, the unhappy subjects in his dominions are left exposed to rapacity and oppression, and in the anarchy and confusion which is the inevitable consequence, cultivation is neglected, and trade and manufactures suffered to decay. Having mentioned in a former communication the advantages which the Company derive from this country, and also that the heavy drain of specie which they have made from it, was one of the causes of its decline, the following statement is given in proof of these assertions; it will shew the total amount which they have received from hence in the last twenty years, and in the proportion

* "*Extract of a letter from the Governor-general in Council, to the Court of Directors, dated 4th February, 1775*

Paragraph 4th. "Just before the Vizier's death (6th February) he wrote a letter to the governor general, which was afterwards transmitted to its address by Mahomed Edich Khan, his minister and favourite servant, accompanied by one from himself; by these letters it appears that Mirza Amanny, otherwise called Asout ul Dowlah, had his father's positive nomination to the succession, and though by all accounts he possesses neither the qualities of the heart nor head equal to the station to which he is thus called, we have not as yet any reason to think that his right will be disputed."

of his government, and knows this country, will readily give credit to their assertions; they also declare, that under the management of the Company, it is still capable of being raised to this sum, and do not hesitate to express their hope, that the day is not distant when that desirable event will take place, an event that would secure to them their lives, their property, and the fruits of their industry.

The unsettled state of the Nabob Vizier's country and government in 1784, and the reasons which induced the Governor General to visit Lucknow, are too well known to need relation here; it will suffice to state, that he found only 1,79,75,504 rupees had been realized that year, and that the following settlement was made by his advice and at his recommendation for five years, with men recommended by the minister as the most respectable and trust-worthy. (*See Account, &c. at the end of the letter.*) Viz. For

				Rupees.
1784-5, or Fuffullee year,	1192	-	-	2,20,65,630
1785-6, or ditto,	1193	-	-	2,44,50,404
1786-7, or ditto,	1194	-	-	2,66,05,326
1787-8, or ditto,	1195	-	-	2,87,11,326
1788-9, or ditto,	1196	-	-	3,06,93,036

He* was, however, extremely deceived in the opinion he formed of the the Vizier and his minister, if he was so sanguine as to hope that they would carry through the plan of settlement which he had formed with so much care: few of the engagements lasted more than two years, and many of them only one; all reverted to the old system of rapacity and oppression, and the collections of the present year will fall short even of those of 1784, when they were at the lowest ebb of depression.

Much yet remains to be said regarding the trade, the soil, and cultivation; but it shall be reserved for a future occasion, having already trespassed too long on your time and patience.

I am, SIR,

With due respect,

Your devoted Servant,

CIVIS.

* This settlement proves that the Governor General was of opinion that the country would with ease produce upwards of three crores of rupees ~~per~~ annum; and from his own extensive local knowledge, and the services and information he could command, it is fair to conclude that his opinion was just and well-founded.

ACCOUNT PARTICULARS OF THE FIVE YEARS SETTLEMENTS.

Provinces.	Annals Names.	Summa of late Years, 1197, A. D. 1784-5	Summa of 1197, A. D. 1784-5	Summa of 1197, A. D. 1785-6	Summa of 1197, A. D. 1786-7	Summa of 1197, A. D. 1787-8	Summa of 1197, A. D. 1788-9	Total Summa of the five Years.
Corah, Etaya, and Co	Almasi Ali- Cawn	4385415 5 0	6156207 6 0	6549,32 0 0	7309522 0 0	899572 0 0	8200532 0 0	36854395 0 0
Chuckla, Bardy, including Meyooda	Raja Jaggannath	34 7645 12 3	44 00000 0 0	4800000 0 0	5200000 0 0	5700000 0 0	6200000 0 0	26320000 0 0
Mitahabad	Naboo Amer Khan	506303 14 9	510000 0 0	601000 0 0	611000 0 0	961000 0 0	1010000 0 0	4555000 0 0
Perrabgur, Pellone, and Bulkan	Mahomed Beg Cawn	472037 0 0	531000 0 0	591000 0 0	600000 0 0	716000 0 0	750000 0 0	321000 0 0
Khairabad, Mahomdy, and Conne	Sunulphrad	84506 11 9	140000 0 0	121500 0 0	141000 0 0	153000 0 0	173000 0 0	7112500 0 0
Barwarah, Dalmow, Bazolly, Garutty, Rampore,	Ran-dien	185311 0 3	182000 0 0	207000 0 0	225000 0 0	235000 0 0	240000 0 0	1974000 0 0
Sanree	Sut-he-thend	25 000 0 0	290000 0 0	3330 0 0	34000 0 0	70000 0 0	42000 0 0	1812000 0 0
Sundelah, Maltehad, and Bire	Mirza Mahomed Beg	466161 8 0	506161 8 0	546161 8 0	556161 8 0	626161 8 0	666161 8 0	2910007 8 0
Derriahad, Badowlu, and Co	Mirza Mchaddy	621000 6 0	751000 0 0	876000 0 0	960000 0 0	124000 0 0	1101000 0 0	4735005 0 0
Gorackpore	Mahomed Shuffe Cawn	1615342 3 3	1910000 0 0	230000 0 0	270000 0 0	3100000 0 0	3000000 0 0	13510000 1 0
Asangur, Sultanpore, or Akbarpore	Mirza Alla Prg Cawn	1185523 9 6	1314000 0 0	1514000 0 0	1664000 0 0	1764000 0 0	184000 0 0	8100005 0 0
Kharengur	Laloo D de Sing	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	1000005 0 0
Sar	Rajah Bow-mo Sing	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	200000 0 0	1000000 0 0
Mohan	Meer Ally Ahmed	62083 0 0	73000 0 0	73000 0 0	73000 0 0	73000 0 0	73000 0 0	365000 0 0
Lucknow	Aga Algeria	58675 12 9	58675 12 9	58675 12 9	58675 12 9	58675 12 9	58675 12 9	293178 15 9
Furruckabad	—	450000 0 0	450000 0 0	450000 0 0	450000 0 0	450000 0 0	450000 0 0	2250000 0 0
Sivuk	Ray Namul Dols	185475 14 9	217000 2 0	245000 2 0	27000 2 0	301000 2 0	329005 2 0	1366475 10 0
A. ems, Sundu, Mauhabad	Bjaya Amhar Abby Khan	278539 8 0	325000 0 0	355000 0 0	400000 0 0	435000 0 0	465000 0 0	1990000 0 0
Jas	Meer Ismaun Udaun Khan	285421 15 6	320000 0 0	350000 0 0	380000 0 0	410000 0 0	440000 4 6	1899444 4 6
Sundry Tallocks	—	441494 15 6	441494 15 6	444494 15 6	445916 15 6	447916 15 6	449916 15 6	2226740 13 6
		17975504 14 9	22065630 1 3	32445044 6 3	32605326 6 3	328711326 6 3	320693035 10 9	12555732 10 6

The Settlement of the following Mohals has also been made for the year 1197, A.D. 1789-1790.

Corah and Etaya — Almasi Ally Cawn
Perrabgur and Bulkan — Mahomed Beg Cawn
Sybuc Sekidu — Ray Nchud Dols

8299532 0 0	310000 0 0	8610532 0 0
780000 0 0	86-24 0 0	866-24 0 0
329295 2 0	32083 14 0	361379 0 0
9408237 2 0	409807 14 0	9818635 0 0

To Sir JOHN SHORE, Bart.

Oude, 28th July, 1793.

SIR,

IN pursuance of my promise I proceed to make some observations on the trade and cultivation of the Nabob Vizier's dominions, and shall do it with the freedom and candour which truth demands, trusting that I shall obtain credit when I declare that I am actuated solely by humane motives, and neither dread reprehension nor hope for reward, other than the satisfaction of one who endeavours well.

In Great Britain and other countries, where trade has attained a degree of perfection, and the principles on which it is conducted are better defined and understood than they are in this quarter of the globe, the taxes and duties on each article, the exports and imports of each state, are easily ascertained; but in a country like this, (Oude) where trade may be termed in its infancy, the only possible mode of ascertaining the duties levied on each article, or of judging of the extent of its imports from, or exports to, the Company's dominions, is either from an inspection of the Custom-house books, or from the communications of merchants concerned in the different branches of the trade carried on in the country, who must necessarily have obtained a considerable degree of knowledge in the respective articles to which their attention has been directed. The first mode not being practicable, and many difficulties lying in the way of obtaining a general knowledge by the latter, I shall not be able to enter so minutely into the subject as I could wish, though I hope sufficiently so to answer the purpose in view.

The conduct observed with respect to the trade between the two countries first presents itself to consideration. This is regulated by what is called a Commercial Treaty; the term is, I suppose, given for form's sake: but as it may tend to mislead people, and make them imagine that as treaties are generally well discussed, and pretty evenly arranged with respect to the interests of the respective countries between which they are contracted before they are ratified, so of course the treaty with his Excellency the Vizier was fully approved of before agreed to. It is necessary to observe, that the treaty was presented to the Nabob with merely a *congé d'elire*, or rather not so much, as he durst not refuse to agree to a proposal coming from the Governor General; and instead of the pompous opening with which it at present commences, it would have been much more agreeable to truth to begin, like other official informations—"By order of the Governor General."

This treaty, after mentioning a number of articles and the amount of duties to be paid upon them, contains a clause most singular, viz. "That either of the contracting parties may impose what duties they think proper on articles coming through or being the produce of their respective countries, except on cotton coming from the Decan."—From this it seems to be in the power of either party to put a stop to any particular branch of trade, but it really throws the whole power into the hands of the Governor General, as he has only occasion to request the Nabob to lay a heavy tax upon any article he wishes to prevent being imported into the Company's dominions. Such has been the case with indigo, which, although an article that not only employs a great number of people in the cultivation and manufacture of it, but also tends considerably to increase cultivation, and of course the revenues of the country have received so great a check by the heavy duties levied upon it, amounting to seven rupees twelve annas per maund, that it must gradually fall off. Sugar, an article now in great demand, and that might become equally beneficial to cultivation and the revenues of the country, is shackled with a duty of ten per cent. Opium, salt-petre, cloths, and in short every article which the country produces for exportation (and they consist of a great variety) is burthened with a heavy and vexatious tax: but an article still more singular, excludes Rohilcund entirely from the treaty, or any benefit that could be derived from it: what is to be inferred from this exclusion? Either that the Nabob's title to this country is doubtful, or that the parties agree to set it apart for wanton rapacity, and from the conduct observed towards it, one would be inclined to believe the latter; a duty of near thirty per cent is laid on indigo, sugar, and other articles produced in it for exportation, which being equivalent to a prohibition, will totally stop the cultivation of these articles. Broad cloths, and the productions of Bengal, for which there is an extensive demand in Rohilcund and the adjoining countries, are excluded by enormous and arbitrary duties.

Yet even the complimentary form of the order being issued in the Nabob's name, has not always been attended to, but an article coming through his country, and affording a large revenue, which still promised to increase, viz. salt, has been peremptorily ordered to be confiscated, if imported into the Company's dominions, as the order states that it is found to be destructive of the profits the Company have long enjoyed from the monopoly of that article.

In the treaty it is agreed upon that all articles not mentioned (under which head comes salt) shall pay an import duty of five per cent. Surely this implies a toleration of such articles: could this act be defended in a court of justice after such an agreement? Would not damages be given on such a confiscation?

But let us pass over a subject so little worthy attention as the dignity of the Nabob is: let us consider the effect this prohibition has on the poor industrious inhabitants of the Company's provinces, who bear without repining an enormous profit extorted from them on an article, one of the principal necessities of life; who sacrifice life itself in the producing that article, and for what purpose?

pose? Is it to enrich the country? To open canals? To make roads? To endow hospitals for the relief of the sick? To afford sustenance for the poor? No! it is to enrich a body of people who unhappily prefer the narrow chicanery of a counting-house, to the noble and benignant principles of legislation. Such was the immense superiority of the salt alluded to, that in a year remarkable for the quantity manufactured in the Company's dominions, after the expenses of land carriage for 200 cosses,† after its charges, amounting to upwards of 300 per cent. on the prime cost, being defrayed, yet was it preferred both in price and quality to that provided by the Company. O wretched people! where your rulers are monopolizers, and let you perish or give up your property rather than abate their inhuman profits.

And yet does this inhuman measure deprive them of a greater profit than they gain. A learned writer (Dr. Adam Smith) observes, that a tax upon the necessaries of life acts in the same manner as a tax on the wages of labour, and must ultimately in the same manner fall upon the consumer. In the Company's dominions, therefore, as they are the principal and almost only consumers of the labour of the inhabitants, this tax must revert upon them. This salt has principally been consumed in Bahar: will not being obliged to pay higher for it than usual affect the price of opium, and thus injure the profits from another monopoly and every other commercial production?

With respect to indigo, nothing can be more extraordinary than the manner in which it is managed. The Company recommend every encouragement being given to its cultivation, yet will not suffer an European to hold a farm in their dominions. If he goes to the Nabob's, there is a duty of thirteen per cent. imposed, although it is well known it must come through the Company's dominions. In each of these cases the Nabob's revenue suffers; on the salt he gets a duty of four annas per maund, and, as has been observed, the indigo trade has been a most beneficial one to his country, and would be still more so were it not for the heavy duties. How much more noble would it be, instead of enriching one country at the expense of another, to endeavour to enrich both, abolish taxes at once on all merchandize, throw the trade completely open between the two countries, and allow industry a free exertion of her powers. The benefits which the Vizier's dominions would derive from it are too evident to need being insisted on. The increase of the revenue caused by the increase of the trade would make up tenfold for the loss sustained by the abolition of the duties.* The advantages to the Company are many, and solid, and with the increase of trade and cultivation in the Vizier's country, the consumption of European articles, and articles produced in Bengal, would increase.

* The gross amount of the duties is commonly about two lacks of rupees per annum; the neat sum paid into the treasury rarely amounts to one-half lack of rupees. A trifling sum compared to the advantages of a free trade, and not more than* the Nabob has been known to give for a monkey or a toy!!!

† About 350 British miles.

The broad cloth, the copper, brass, lead, tin, fire-arms, cutlery, alums, &c. of Great Britain, the muslins, the wrought and unwrought silks, the beetle-nut, &c. of the Company's provinces, besides spices and various other articles, would find ample marts in the Vizier's dominions; and, passing with facility, would soon open new channels of trade with the nations to the west of them, and make their way to the banks of the Indus, and even to Cabul and Candahar. With respect to the soil of this country, and how far it is capable by its fertility to increase the various articles of commerce which it produces, the strongest proof that can be given of its excellence in this point, is, that under the burthenome taxes and various impediments thrown in the way of trade, still has there been exported from it considerable quantities of indigo, sugar, salt petre, and other articles of late years.

The fertility of Rohilcund and the countries on both banks of the Gogra are proverbial, the Doab and other parts of the Vizier's dominions are little inferior to them in soil or produce. In the Doab the indigo is found wild in many places, which gives reason to suppose that the soil must be more congenial to the production of that plant, than any other country we know.* The sugar cane thrives remarkably in every part of the country, but in Rohilcund is peculiarly luxuriant and productive. Grain of every denomination is produced in great abundance in every part with little labour. In short, no country appears to have been more liberally gifted by nature than this is, or better adapted for commerce and cultivation. The Ganges, the Gomuty, and the Gogra, keeping nearly parallel courses, fertilize the soil, and afford an easy and ready communication by water; beside various other smaller rivers, which issue from the hills and fall into the Gogra and Ganges, and facilitate the internal intercourse.

To conclude, there is only a free trade and a just government required to make this as prosperous and happy a country as any on earth, and that it may soon enjoy these blessings, is the ardent wish of,

SIR,

Your devoted Servant,

CIVIS.

* The wild indigo plant of the Doab produces more indigo, and of a superior quality, than that which is cultivated.

To Sir JOHN SHORE, Bart.

Oude, August 1, 1793.

SIR,

IN my last letter I ventured to suggest some measures which would alleviate the miseries and evils with which this country is afflicted, and which I conceive could be effected by the government of Bengal, of its own authority, without risk or much difficulty. Having since given the subject a more general degree of consideration, it may be expected before I quit it, that I should give some idea of a more radical cure for the disorders which have been exposed to view; however unqualified I may be for the task, the expectation shall not be disappointed, and I shall deliver my sentiments on a total reform of the system of government in this country, with the same freedom and candour I have hitherto done. The disorders that require to be remedied, originating in fundamental defects in the principles of government, to remove them we must begin at the foundation of the edifice, and re-build it a-new, making use only of such materials as are sound, rejecting the rotten and defective parts, at the same time preserving, as far as circumstances will admit, the outward appearance of the ancient structure. I shall make some preliminary observations and reflections on the nature of the Nabob's, and his predecessor's, connections with the Company, and conclude with a sketch of the plan and the advantages arising out of it.

The motives for restoring Oude and its dependencies to Sujah Dowlah, upon their becoming by conquest the property of the Company, were, it is to be supposed, an apprehension of the territorial acquisitions being too extensive for the means either of external defence or internal arrangement. The newly-assumed government of Bengal would also, it might be thought, require the united exertions of both the civil and military servants, and the proper arrangement and defence of that country alone afford them sufficient employment. By so generous an act, it might also be supposed that Sujah Dowlah's friendship would be secured to the Company, and a trade opened with the country, then in a flourishing state, and promising by his abilities to become of still greater importance, while by the clause limiting his means of defence, it must at all times remain at their mercy.

On the demise of Sujah Dowlah, a majority of the Supreme Board were of opinion, "that the specific conditions of our former alliance expired with him; and that although we owe friendship to the present Nabob, as heir to his father, we are not bound to any special services to him." Conformable to the principles of the Mussulman government, this opinion is strictly just and well-founded, and the Company were as decidedly intitled to the Subadary of

Oude, as they were on a former occasion to the Dewanee of Bengal, &c. and might have established this right with the concurrence of the Mogul, at as cheap a rate as the Nabob obtained the title and appointment of Vizier, (viz. ten lacks of rupees, and six battalions of sepoys, stationed with the Huzoor,* under the command of Letafat Ally Khan.) In so doing, they would have acted with more justice, and certainly with more humanity, than they have done in the line of conduct since pursued. They would have saved the remains of the illustrious house of Timor from the ruin and miseries which have since fallen on it, and extended peace and prosperity to some millions of the human race. The above opinion, however, was opposed by a party of the Supreme Board, who soon succeeding to power by the demise of some of their opponents, and the opinion which they had adopted being approved of by the Company, the line of conduct observed towards Sujah Dowlah, was obstinately persevered in with the son, without ever examining his claims, or reflecting how dissimilar his character and his father's were. He inheriting neither the understanding nor abilities of his predecessor, and being addicted from his youth to some of the most detestable vices, which have left him without progeny, was held in so great disesteem, that he could not have maintained possession of the country a day without the aid and protection of the Company, as the assassination of his prime minister, Mukhtiar Uddowlah, and of Khujah Buxent, with the convulsions that took place on his accession, clearly evince. His imbecility, and these acts of violence, furnished the Company with a pretence for obtaining those advantages which they might have taken in their own right. By the subsidy they receive for the payment of troops to defend his dominions, they are enabled to keep up a very respectable force, and have a saving to defray the expenses of their foreign wars. By this force they command the country, while surrounding nations admire their forbearance; and to continue the force, they form various alliances with him, as it suits their convenience, or as their interest may require. By the last of these, which is termed a commercial treaty, he is made nearly to destroy the cultivation of some of the most productive articles of the country, by the heaviness of the taxes imposed.

Why do we not openly and boldly take that country to which so just a claim can be made? (the having conquered it and being obliged to provide for its defence.) Why delay to apply these sums to the use of the country, and their own defence, which are now squandered on useless pageantry? Is it in compassion to a man equally noted for the vileness of his private character, and the inability of his public, they remain deaf to the cries of unfortunate millions, condemned to suffer from the rapacity of avaricious villains, whose only anxiety is to enrich themselves? The plea of character established among the neighbouring nations of generosity, is merely ideal. In the politics of nations, solid wisdom attracts admiration, and the keeping up a name, while the power remains in their hands, is too flimsy a veil not to be seen through.

* The presence, i. e. with the Vizier.

Giving the country to Sujah Dowlah, under whose wise administration the natives prospered and were happy, was a noble act, but continuing to let his successor hold it, without ever considering his abilities for such an office, is a disgrace to wisdom, a disgrace to humanity; it is forging the fetters with which he oppresses that portion of mankind committed to his care. Let us view again the state of this country. The Nabob immersed in luxury, given up to the most despicable vices, and detested by his subjects—the revenue gradually falling off—the country farmed out to eunuchs and to slaves—population rapidly diminishing—the just reward of industry torn away by rapacious Aumils, who are alike strangers to justice and that noble passion a love to their country—property and life itself depending on the nod of a capricious tyrant and his minions.* Yet this vile character and this vile system is supported by the Company. From their armies he derives his strength, he enjoys this country; from their assistance he collects his revenues, which he could not do by his disorderly troops, were it not for the fear of his orders being enforced by our's. By taking the country from such a disgrace to mankind, they would restore happiness to millions. Trade, cultivation, arts, every thing that is desirable to a nation, would increase, industry would exert itself, being sure to enjoy the fruits of its labours. The revenue, instead of being squandered on pernicious extravagance, would serve to protect the country from outward enemies, and the subjects from private plunderers. Trade would furnish a new resource of treasure to our country, and justice would exult in healing the wounds inflicted by despotism.

And who would be the sufferer? The Nabob. I deny it; enough would be left to supply him in all his reasonable desires; enough even to live in great luxury, and give ample pensions to all his relations and dependents; indeed, it can easily be demonstrated that his receipts would be infinitely greater, and more regular than they are at present. It is true, that his power of doing wrong would be circumscribed, but his power of doing good would be enlarged. In the plan I am going to propose, he is treated with more delicacy, perhaps, than his character deserves; but having been raised to the situation in which he is placed by the Company, some consideration is due to the station. He in fact only changes a set of ignorant, incapable servants, for men who are well informed and able, and who are actuated by the true principles of justice: and to make the reform still more palatable and unobjectionable to him, the seat of the new government might be fixed at some central spot on the banks of the

* "Extract of a Letter from John Briflow, Esq. Resident at the Court of the Finier, to the Governor-general in Council, dated Etawa, 24th April, 1776.

"There are no Adawlets in this country, but the execution of justice rests with the Aumil and Curvel. There is generally a Curvel in each town, or any village of consequence; he is totally subservient to the Aumil, and I am sorry to say, in the execution of justice there is hardly any decision made but what is biased by money."

See the whole of this letter, and many interesting papers relative to Oude in ad part of Appendix to the 1st Report of the Committee of Secretaries on India affairs.

Ganges, such as Mindie Gaut, or Kanoge, leaving Lucknow for the undisturbed residence of his family and dependants.

In this and the foregoing papers, I trust I have made evident to every dispassionate mind the necessity and propriety of the Company's adopting some plan similar to what follows :

Outlines of a Plan for establishing Courts of Justice in the Dominions of Oude.---For regulating the Collections of the Revenue, and introducing the Mukurreree System.---For opening the Trade with Bengal, and abolishing Imposts and Duties.---And for disbanding all irregular Troops, and raising regular Corps of Horse and Foot for the Defence of the Country, and, if necessary, to enforce the Collection of the Revenue.

1st.—That a member of the Supreme Board, or any senior civil servant, be nominated resident at Lucknow, to act as first minister to the Vizier, but amenable to the Supreme Board, &c.

2d.—That four senior civil servants be appointed to Lucknow, to form a board of revenue and trade, at which the resident shall preside.

3d.—That the country be divided into districts, as in Bahar and Bengal, and Company's civil servants appointed to each, to collect or receive the revenue under the same rules and regulations as in the Company's provinces, &c. &c.

4th.—That Adawlets, or courts of justice, be established in each city and district, with a judge and register, who shall be Company's servants, under the same rules and regulations as they are in the Company's provinces, &c.

5th.—That the necessary offices under Company's servants be established, such as treasurer, paymaster, &c.

6th.—That all imposts and duties be entirely abolished ; and that all goods, the produce of Great Britain, or the Company's provinces, be imported into the dominions of Oude, &c. and carried into any part of them, (or the countries west of them) and sold duty free without let or molestation : and that, on the other hand, all articles, the produce of the Vizier's dominions, be imported into the Company's provinces duty free, &c.

7th.—That the whole of the Nabob's troops be disbanded, and that two brigades of cavalry, (each six regiments of 500 strong) and two brigades of infantry, (of the present strength) be raised, to defend and protect the country : these to be on the same footing, in all respects, as the Company's other troops now in his dominions.

8th.

8th.---That the surplus of the revenue, after paying the above civil and military establishments, and the other expenses of the government, all of which shall be regulated on strict principles of oeconomy, be paid to the Nabob for his expenses, and to defray such pensions as he may chuse to confer on his relations and dependents.

Various other explanatory articles might be added, but this is sufficient to give the idea of a plan which would completely remove the disorders of this government.

The revenue of the country may be estimated at about two crore of rupees per annum, though this year they will, probably, fall considerably short of that sum; but under a government such as has been described, no doubt can be entertained but that they may, in the course of ten years, or less, be gradually increased to three crore and upward. At the expiration of ten years the Mukurreree system might be established, as by that time an equitable assessment could be ascertained. The increase of regular infantry, and the corps of cavalry, (the want of which has been so severely felt) would make the Company's forces so truly respectable, as to insure them the arbitration of Hindostan, and be the best security of a continuance of peace. The saving which would be made by the dismissal of the Mutayenna and other irregular troops, when added to the subsidy, would be amply sufficient to pay this force and defray the expenses of the civil government, the Nabob would consequently be in receipt of as large a sum as at present, with every probability of a considerable annual increase to it until the Mukurreree system was established, by which time it would be nearly doubled.

From what has been said, the advantages to the Company, to the Nabob, and to some millions of industrious inhabitants, must appear so evident, as to make it unnecessary to expatiate upon the subject farther; I shall therefore conclude, having discharged what I thought due to humanity, in bringing to public view the hardships and oppressions under which a harmless and industrious people groan, and in the hope that my feeble efforts may not prove entirely abortive.

I remain with due respect,

SIR,

Your devoted servant,

CIVIS.

To Sir JOHN SHORP, Bart.

Oude, Sept. 9, 1798.

SIR,

HAVING treated of the civil government of Oude, I shall now consider the Vizier's dominions in a military point of view, and as the barrier to the Company's provinces, which they have very justly been denominated.

It is a fact not more extraordinary than true, that the dominions of the Company and the Vizier are so situated, that the force requisite for their defence when united, would, were they separated, be barely adequate to the defence of either; for were a nation hostile to the Company in possession of the Vizier's dominions, the Company would find their present force insufficient (without a body of cavalry) to defend their western frontier; while, on the other hand, such nation having an extensive frontier to the south and west, as well as to the east, would find it necessary also to keep up a very formidable army of foot and horse, but particularly the latter, to oppose the sudden incursions of the southern and western neighbours, whose forces principally consist of cavalry.

That these matters have not passed without the knowledge of the Company, a reference to their correspondence regarding the country (Oude) will shew, and particularly the utility and necessity of cavalry. The Court of Directors, in their letter to the Governor General and Council, of the 15th of December, 1775,

Say—Par. 20th. “ And as a good body of horse would not only be of
“ great use in time of action, but also of singular
“ service in preventing the incursions of Indian ene-
“ mies, who frequently ravage the country with ca-
“ valry, and retire before infantry can come up
“ with them, we should deem it an essential service
“ rendered the Company, if you would prevail on
“ the Nabob of Oude to keep up a body of horse to
“ be disciplined and officered by Europeans under
“ our command.”

With ideas so very just on the subject as the Company possessed at such an early period, it must appear extraordinary that so great a space of time should have been suffered to elapse without some effectual effort to establish a corps of cavalry on a permanent basis, and it can only be accounted for by the general attention of the Company and the nation at large, being entirely engrossed

by

by the troubles and dangers in the Dekan, which at one time seem to threaten the loss of the possessions in that quarter ; but these dangers being now happily dissipated, may we not hope that those to which their possessions are exposed on this side of India will obtain a due degree of consideration.

To form a just idea of them, it will be necessary to consider, 1st. the extent of frontier, the natural barriers which it presents to eventual enemies, and the number and nature of the troops provided for its defence ; and next the policy and dispositions of the neighbouring nations, their troops, and the progress they have made in the military art.

The Vizier's dominions having the Company's provinces to the east, and the Tibet mountains to the north, (which form an impenetrable barrier) are only exposed to invasion from the south and west : this boundary extends from Illahabad to Hurdowar, a space of about 500 miles ; from Illahabad to Etyah, 240 miles, the Jumna forms a feeble barrier, for being in many places fordable during the dry season, and in all parts narrow, cavalry would find little difficulty in crossing it, plundering the country, destroying the harvest, and recrossing, without infantry having it in their power to molest them : but the Jumna, from Etyah upward, being in all parts fordable for the greatest part of the year, if cavalry that had crossed lower down found themselves pressed by infantry, they could always make their way upward, cross the Jumna, and be in perfect security. From the Jumna, near Etyah, to the Ganges at Ramgaut, 140 miles, the boundary takes an oblique direction across the Dooab ; this space is entirely open and defenceless. From Ramgaut to Hurdowar, 140 miles, the Ganges forms the boundary ; (except the district of Anoopshcher, which lies to the west of the river) but being in all parts fordable for cavalry, from November to July, it must be considered more an ideal than a real barrier. For the defence of this weak and extended line, two brigades of infantry are stationed on the banks of the Ganges, eighty miles distant from each other, and sixty miles from the nearest part of the frontier ; from one of these brigades a detachment of two or three battalions is annually made to Anoopshcher during the dry season, to protect Rohilcund from the incursions of the Seicks. A few wretched cavalry, which the Vizier maintains in Rohilcund, are not deserving of notice as defensive troops, and the number of the Company's is so very trifling, that in the event of an invasion they could never act out of sight of their infantry. From this view of the frontier, it must appear evident even to the most cursory observer, that the present means of defence are totally inadequate ; but it will appear in a still stronger point of view when the policy of our southern and western neighbours is considered, the state of their troops, and the progress which they have made in the art of war.

All the countries on the Vizier's southern and western frontiers are now in the possession of the Mahrattas, a warlike and restless people, who have for centuries disturbed the peace of Hindostan. History informs us that conquest

has been invariably their object; that they sedulously watch every opportunity of extending their dominion, is notorious to this day; and were it not for the troops of Europe, they would in all probability, ere this, have subdued every country on this side the Indus. That they have dormant claims on the Vizier's country, and on the Company's provinces, which they revive as occasions offer, the demands made through Major Brown (when ambassador at the court of the unfortunate Shah Allum) proves to conviction.

Since the peace of 1782, the extension of their empire on this side of India is truly alarming. Mahajee Scindia has conquered the country of Golan Kader Khan, (son to Zabeta Khan) possessed himself of all the countries dependent on Delhi and Agra, and subjected the Rajepoot Rajahs of Gein Ghur Joudpore, &c. Ally Bahauder, another Mahrattah chief, has subjugated the countries of Bundel Cund and Bughil Cund: these acquisitions have given the Mahrattah empire complete possession of every country from Mirzapore to the Commoow hills at Hurdowar. The former of these chiefs is a deep, designing politician, whose views are not easily penetrated: the latter is less reserved, having been frequently heard to declare, that with ten thousand horse he could with ease plunder the Dooab. The efforts our infantry could make to prevent it he ridicules. Fortunately for this country these chiefs have been at variance; so that circumstance it is, perhaps, more indebted for the peace which it enjoys, than to any dread the Mahrattahs have of our power. The former and the late war have disclosed to them the secret wherein their advantage lies over us. They have seen our unwieldy armies of infantry and artillery (unconquerable but by famine) unable to move without the assistance of cavalry; and they well know, that though they cannot face us in the field, they can, by cutting off our convoys and intercepting our supplies, compel us at all times to retire: but though the Mahrattah forces have hitherto consisted of cavalry, and that they are perfectly sensible of the advantages they derive therefrom over our infantry, yet have they not been inattentive to the additional advantages of disciplined artillery and infantry, as many of the chiefs* have shewn, by taking into their service Europeans for the purpose of forming and disciplining regular corps; among these Mahajee Scindia stands first as having made the greatest progress. The army which he has formed under the direction of M. de Boigne, to whom he has given the rank of general, consists of regular infantry divided into brigades and battalions under the command of † French officers of experience and abilities. A corps of regular artillery, at the head of which is a German officer of abilities, formerly in the Company's service on the coast. A corps of regular cavalry (which as yet only amounts to about 1000 men) commanded by a French officer; and the whole is in all respects appointed, clothed, and disciplined like European troops:—neither attention nor expense

* The Bow: Hurry Punt. Mahajee Scindia. Tekoo Jee Halkar, and Ally Bahauder. Among others.

† Brigadier Fremont, formerly commandant of the French troops at Chandernagore; Brigadier Perrot, &c. &c. &c.

has been spared by Scindia in the formation of these corps; every European who has a pretension to the rank of gentleman, is admitted into his service as an officer, and promoted according to his merit and abilities. This encouragement has drawn to his service numerous adventurers from Great Britain, the continent of Europe, and America, whereby he has been able to give a tolerable proportion of European officers to each corps—he encourages mechanics from the Vizier's dominions, and even assists personally in casting cannon and making fire arms: since he has been in the Dekan, he has purchased at Goa and different places on the Malabar coast, brass ordnance and musketry, and keeps agents there solely for that purpose; these arms he sends as occasion offers to his regular troops: he has likewise entertained Europeans, sufficient with what he had before, to form a corps of about three hundred strong. Five years are now elapsed since he commenced the formation of his regular troops, and in that time they have been paid with the utmost punctuality. He well knows, that to a similar conduct the Company are indebted in a great measure for the attachment and fidelity of their sepoy, and so well convinced is he of the necessity of the measure, that he has, since being detained in the Dekan, given M. de Boigne assignments on the revenues of all the countries east of the Jumna, and some districts between Mutra and Delhi, for their payment; these countries being in the most settled state, and the revenue most productive.

The regular corps form but an inconsiderable part of his army, as will appear by the annexed statement, as it stood the 1st of January, 1793; since that period the regulars have been increasing gradually; and, with the increase and improvement of the European officers, bid fair to arrive soon at a considerable degree of perfection in their discipline. Supported by so considerable a body of irregular cavalry, they are already truly formidable, and how much more so they may become it is not difficult to foresee, nor can those who have the prosperity of the Company's possessions at heart reflect on it with indifference; it must create in every reflecting mind a degree of solicitude and concern, particularly when the defenceless state of the Vizier's frontier is considered, and the apathy and supineness, with which not only the Vizier, but the Bengal Government, view the progress their neighbours are making in discipline, and warlike preparations.

The Seicks, though not immediately bordering on the Vizier's country, must be considered in the general view as eventual enemies, having almost annually attempted depredations on Rohilcund. The diligence with which they seized the opportunity offered by the withdrawing the Futtyghur detachment, in 1785, of entering Rohilcund, and plundering Chundowsey and several trading towns of note, as well as the attempts they made in December 1790, when they understood a considerable number of our troops had been withdrawn from the Vizier's country, on account of the war in the Dekan, clearly demonstrate their disposition, and the eagerness with which they watch opportunities to enrich themselves by plunder. These tribes, inhabiting a more northern

climate, are more robust and better able to bear hardships than the southern inhabitants of Hindostan, their country also produces a better race of horses, so that, as irregular cavalry, they are more formidable: they have as yet made no improvements in discipline, but the natural advantages they possess, in some degree, compensate for the want of it, and with the avidity they have for depredation, make them very dangerous neighbours, in the event of a war with the Mahrattas. The desire of plunder brings down innumerable hordes on Rohilkund and the upper parts of Dooab, which our present forces are not calculated to repel.

From what has been said it is evident, that infantry, unsupported by a respectable body of cavalry, is totally inadequate to the defence of so extended a frontier as the Nabob Vizier's dominions present to the Mahrattas and Seicks. It must likewise be obvious, that the means of defence, in sound policy, ought to keep pace with the improvements in discipline, and the war-like preparations of our neighbours, and that the present improved state of their troops points out, in the most forcible manner, the urgent necessity for not only a large and formidable body of cavalry, but for a very considerable increase of infantry.

The experience of every war we have had in India, but particularly the two last, has shewn, that our existence as a power in this country, in a great measure, depends on them; every one knows how ineffectual the gallant efforts of Sir Eyre Coote and his army were rendered, by the want of cavalry, during the former war, and that the detachment under Colonel Carnac was harassed and compelled to retreat, though victorious, by the Mahratta Pindarees.* In every situation, when our troops have acted without cavalry, the same consequences have invariably ensued; had there not been a body of cavalry in the late war, the movements of the army must have been as much cramped as it was under Sir Eyre Coote, and the war might have terminated as ingloriously. The eminent services which they rendered, (though a small body) are on record from the first authority; the same high authority records the inefficient services of those of the Mahrattas and Nizam in our pay, and shews the dependence which is to be placed on such as we can hire from Native powers; in their own cause they are forward and active, in our's, they will ever be found backward and sluggish; could the money which was paid for their assistance have been employed in establishing a body of cavalry, either in the Vizier's or the Company's dominions, at a proper season, a sufficient reinforcement might have joined the army, on the coast, at an early period of the war, and by bringing it to a speedy termination, perhaps, have saved some millions to the state, and the lives of many valuable subjects.

* A banditti that attend all Indian armies merely for the sake of plunder at their own expense and risk, picking up all stragglers, and often cutting off small convoys of provision. On the coast of Coromandel they are commonly called Looties, that is, plunderers.

The season for establishing a corps of cavalry is again arrived, and if again neglected, may not only involve the safety of the Vizier's dominions, but endanger the Company's possessions in India. That such establishment may be permanent, it must be formed on the strictest principles of œconomy; to form it on such principles, the first and most material step necessary to be taken, is to introduce a breed of horses into your own provinces sufficient to maintain the number of cavalry required; and the period of profound peace is surely the most proper season for the adoption of such a measure.

In the event of a war with the Mahrattas, and the union of their power on this side of India under one chief, (which is certainly not impossible) the most serious consequences might be apprehended, possessed (as I have shewn they are) of all the frontier countries from Muzapore to the Comrow Hills, and their territories extending from Suhind (north lat. 31°) to the Gulph of Cambay, they have it in their power to prevent a single horse from coming into the Vizier's dominions, and, as hitherto these countries and the northern horse-merchants have supplied what were wanted, either for cavalry or private purposes, it would be found impracticable, if this source was stopped, either to hire or raise a corps: this circumstance alone shews the obvious necessity of not only forming a corps of cavalry, but of an immediate attempt to introduce the breeding of horses generally throughout the Vizier's country, and the Company's provinces. That it is practicable, every man of information on the subject, and that is acquainted with the climate and soil, will vouch; and that it will be of great advantage to the country, by retaining considerable sums of money which are annually sent abroad for the purchase of horses, is perfectly manifest.

The policy and expediency of these measures have, I trust, been made so evident, as to require the aid of no farther argument; and I now proceed to demonstrate, that the carrying into immediate effect the seventh article of the plan, (in my last letter) for the regulation of the government of Oude, would, instead of being any additional expense, be a saving to the Vizier of near forty lacks of rupees per annum; be of infinite benefit to the country, by retaining in circulation near eighteen lacks of rupees, the balance of the subsidy which is annually drawn from it, and place the Company's army on a footing of respectability that must insure permanence to the peace of Hindostan.

The annual expense (as has been shewn) of the Nabob Vizier's		Lucknow Rupees.
Mutayenna troops is	-	75,00,000
The subsidy paid to the Company for their troops is	-	50,00,000
Total, one crore and twenty-five lacks		1,25,00,000

The total expense of all the Company's troops now in the Vizier's dominions, including cavalry, artillery, European and Native infantry, staff, stores, cattle, buildings, &c. &c. amount annually to about		Carried over	32,00,000
			Ths

	Brought over	Lucknow Rupees.
		32,00,000
The expense of a sepoy brigade in the field is, per month, about 70,000 rupees, including the staff, &c. so that the two additional sepoy brigades recommended to be raised may be estimated at seventeen lacks per annum	- -	17,00,000
The expense of a regiment of cavalry of 500 men, on the present system, will be, per month, under 20,000 rupees, (including feeding and all contingencies); six regiments, or one brigade, including staff, may be estimated at one lack and 30,000 rupees per month; and two brigades of cavalry, recommended to be raised, may be estimated at per annum	- - - -	31,00,000
	Sicca rupees	80,00,000
To this increase of cavalry and infantry it will be necessary to add some artillery, suppose what is at present in the field increased to a complete battalion, (in room of which a fourth might be formed in Bengal) an allowance of five lacks per annum may be made for the increase of expense and all contingencies in this department	- -	5,00,000
	Sicca rupees	85,00,000
Total expense of twelve regiments of cavalry, one battalion of artillery, one regiment of European infantry, twenty-four battalions of sepoy, staff, &c. in the field, eighty-five lacks of Lucknow rupees per annum.		
There will remain a saving of forty lacks	- -	40,000,000
	Sicca rupees	1,25,00,000

On the above statement it is only necessary to observe, that the estimate will be found to exceed the actual expense, (as can be ascertained with exactness by applying to the proper offices) and that the heavy expense of raising a body of 6000 cavalry may be obviated by proceeding in it gradually, adding three or four regiments annually as horses can be procured: the demand will increase the influx from the north-west, and facilitate the acquisition of blood mares proper for establishing studs in the provinces of the Company and the Vizier. The expense of these studs might be defrayed from the balance, which I am confident will accrue from the estimated sum of eighty-five lacks per annum, for the complete establishment of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, in the interim the balance will be considerable, viz.

The established annual expense of two complete brigades of cavalry is		Rupers.
1st year.—Deduct for the purchase of 1,600 horses to complete the present cavalry to four regiments, at 400 rupees per horse	6,40,000	31,00,000
Pay, &c. for four regiments, as estimated, supposing them complete	10,30,000	
	<hr/>	16,70,000
	Remains rupees	14,30,000
2d year.—The estimated annual expenses of two complete brigades of cavalry is		31,00,000
For the expenses of the second year, forty-five lacks, and thirty thousand rupees		45,30,000
Deduct for the purchase of 2,000 horses, at 400 rupees	8,00,000	
Pay, &c. for eight regiments, as per estimate	20,60,000	
	<hr/>	28,60,000
	Remains rupees	16,70,000
3d year.—The estimated annual expense of two brigades of cavalry		31,00,000
For the expenses of the third year, forty-seven lacks and seventy thousand rupees		47,70,000
Deduct for the purchase of 2,000 horses	8,00,000	
Pay, &c. for twelve regiments	31,00,000	
	<hr/>	39,00,000
	Sicca rupees	8,70,000

There remains eight lacks and seventy thousand rupees for purchasing studs of mares, exclusive of such other further savings as may arise from the eighty-five lacks of rupees.

How far the measures which have been recommended may be for the good of the state, or whether they are supported by sound policy and wisdom, is left to your decision.

In exposing the evils of the internal government, and the dangers with which the state is threatened from without, I conceive I have discharged the duty of a good citizen.

And am, with due respect,

Your devoted Servant,

CIVIS.

*An Abstract of the Mahratta Army stationed in Hindostan.**

Cavalry of different denominations	-	-	-	88,250
Forty-five battalions, regular and irregular, from 5 to 750 strong,				
average 600	-	-	-	27,000
European infantry	-	-	-	190
Several small irregular bodies of horse, in all	-	-	-	10,500
			Total	<u>125,940</u>
Guns of different calibers in the field	-	-	-	<u>362</u>

Of the above army General de Boigne has under his command,

12 Battalions Sepoys, clothed and armed like the Company's,

4 Battalions Native artillery (regular) with clashees attached, &c.

4 Battalions of Nigibs, with matchlocks,

2 Battalions of Dummuckdars, large matchlocks,

1000 Regular cavalry,

90 Europeans,

120 Pieces of brass cannon.

* All the countries north of the province of Malwa they term Hindostan, and all to the south Dekan.

To CIVIS.

Futtyghur, July 15, 1793.

SIR,

I HAVE perused with attention your letter to Sir John Shore, Bart. on the declining state of the dominions of the Nabob Vizier of Oude, and as I have had in the course of service in that country, many opportunities of acquiring a pretty general knowledge of it, I must declare that I think the account you give is faithful and just, as far as you go; but at the same time I deem myself bound by truth and justice to assert, that you have touched some evils too lightly, and passed others truly interesting, without notice; how far it comes within the design of your letters to enter into a minute description of the hardships which the poorer class of people of Oude groan under, I cannot take upon me to say, but it is a melancholy subject, deserving of your early and most serious consideration.

The farmers or ryots are, in every country except this, considered as the most useful class of inhabitants, and have the first claims to protection and encouragement; but in the Vizier's dominions they seem as if destined, and peculiarly marked out for oppression. The farmer at the commencement of the season engages in this, as in other countries of India, to cultivate a certain portion of land at a fixed rate, as may be agreed on with the Aumil; if from drought, or any other cause, the crop fails, the sum he has agreed for is extorted from him with the utmost inhumanity: his cattle, the implements of husbandry, and even his children, are seized and sold to make it up. Should the season turn out well, and the crop abundant, the ryot is not suffered to enjoy the kind blessings of Heaven, the myrmidons of the Aumil seize it, on some pretence, and leave the unprotected farmer but a scanty pittance for his support, without paying the least regard to the agreement that has been made; so as the flinty-hearted Aumil procures money to stop the mouth of some greedy Cerberus at court, in order to secure an interest to avert his being plundered on his removal, as is the custom, he cares little by what means it is acquired, or what injury it may do the country, being never sure of remaining more than one season, and actuated solely by the spirit of rapacity and oppression, in which he has been bred up from his infancy.

In the march to and from Aunsoopacher, the desolate state of Rohilcund excited the astonishment of every officer of the detachment, but particularly those who had seen it before, and compared it with what it had been; the places which I saw populous and flourishing when in this country with the army formerly, are now deserted and in ruin. This extraordinary change naturally excited my curiosity, and I was particular in inquiring of the few inhabitants

bitants that remained in the different towns and villages we passed, whence it arose; they were by no means backward in giving the information I desired, and the above causes they invariably assigned, "who will think of cultivating the ground under such oppression," said a venerable old man, "we merely plough a spot that will produce sufficient to keep us alive; if we do more, it is seized and taken from us by force, by violence, by cruelty; why do not the English come and take possession of the country for themselves? If we were cherished as the Bengallies are, this would soon be a fine country; it would produce upwards of a crore of rupees yearly, whereas scarce thirty lacks are now collected. The country, Sir, is yours; the English ought to be its masters—you have conquered it; were it not for you, we would soon have a good government, as we had before—we would not suffer that"—Here he poured out a torrent of invectives in the severest terms of language on the Nabob Vizier, much too violent to repeat.—"Though you do not oppress us yourselves, it is done under your authority, and you are answerable to God by the laws of the prophets for delivering us over to cruelty and pillage, as much as if you did it yourselves. The * *Sabib loag of Calcutta* are just, and if they knew our condition, we are sure they would aker the country and relieve us. We hope you will represent it to them; you see what a fine country it is, if it was cultivated as formerly; you know the soil produces wheat, barley, and all kinds of grain in greater abundance than any other country in Hindostan; the rice near the hills is so fine that you send it down as presents to Bengal; but above all, represent that the great number of rivers which intersect our country, supplies such a plenty of water as to enable us to cultivate indigo, opium, and sugar, so send to your Willaiet, (meaning Europe) cheaper than they can get it at any place else: we would engage, in four or five years after the Company had the regulation of the country, to make ten thousand maunds of indigo every year, and give it to them at fifty rupees the maund; a lack of maunds of sugar, or as much more as they like, at four rupees the maund; and a large quantity of opium, at a very low price. Guzzenas, and other cloths, we can make in plenty, and very cheap." Thus have I heard not one alone say, but many in substance, and if you will listen to them, they will go on enumerating the produce of the country, and the advantage it would be to our government to take it into their own hands. The truth of these facts, and the justness of their observations and conclusions, are clear. All that I have commonly said was, that I would mention the subject among all my friends, when our brigade went to Calcutta; that they must be patient, that something would doubtless be done to relieve them. There is no man in India better acquainted with the state of the country than our commanding † officer, and as it was the constant theme of conversation, I have sometimes ventured to hint the propriety of his representing it to Government, but he considered it not in the precision of his

* Meaning the members of government, and the English gentlemen in general residing there.

† We apprehend our intelligent correspondent means Lieutenant-colonel Erskine.

duty to do it voluntarily, and that nothing but a requisition from the Council would justify him in doing it; there is much propriety in the objection, though I have often lamented that it should obtain, in a case of such importance, as a representation coming from a man of his information and knowledge would command due consideration. But to return to my subject; by the causes above assigned, three-fourths of the inhabitants have been drove out of the country; the army under M. de Boigne, in the service of Mahah Jee Scindia, is almost entirely composed of Rohillas, and his corps are continually recruiting from Rohilcund. Of the inhabitants who still remain in the country, many have entirely given up all idea of cultivation, and subsist by robbery alone, and the roads are therefore so much infested by them, that there is no travelling without a strong guard. On our march we were obliged to be as circumspect as if in an enemy's country. The day we left Ragepore Ghaut, a party of unfortunate people, whom oppression has thus driven to desperation, attacked some camp-followers on our flank, and killed and wounded nine men; an unfortunate grass-cutter, who had not to the value of eight annas about him, cloaths and all, was cut almost in two by the blow of a Tulwar*. This shows how savage and desperate, hunger, and want of protection, will make men; but in this respect Rohilcund is not singular, murders and robberies are frequent in every corner of the Vizier's dominions; even in the vicinity of our camps they are daily committed.

Having shewn you part of what I have seen and know of the state of the country, which I but just passed through, as far as it has come within my knowledge and view; I think you are convinced that many parts of it are in a much worse and more wretched condition than you have represented. For the truth of what I say, I appeal to the officers of the detachment, and I trust the hint will induce you to do justice to the subject in the future letters you have proposed to write. I will conclude by submitting to your consideration two propositions: First, whether it would not be of great advantage to the Company, and the Nabob Vizier, that the latter should cede to the former the country of Rohilcund, as he did Benares, in lieu of the subsidy for maintaining the troops? as the Nabob hardly realizes thirty lacks of rupees per annum from it, he would be a considerable gainer thereby, and the Company would not be less so; for under their management the revenue would double or treble in a few years, besides producing large quantities of indigo, opium, sugar, saltpetre, and cloths for their investments, and happiness to a brave tribe of men, in attaching them to their country by protecting agriculture.

Second, whether it would not be of mutual advantage to the Company and the Nabob Vizier, that the latter should give up the entire management of his country (if it can properly be called his, when it ought to revert to the Mogul at his demise) to the former, and receive from them in lieu, or as rent, one crore of rupees per annum for himself, his household, and family? this would be a million of pounds sterling, as much as the King of Great Britain receives, and

* Scymetar.

is nearly double what the Nabob receives at present from his ministers. It ought not to dissatisfy him to have his allowance doubled, and be put on a footing with the richest, and one of the greatest monarchs on earth. The Company would be great gainers also; they might by good management increase the revenues to upwards of three crore of rupees per annum; set one apart for the Nabob, one for the civil government and army, and one would remain to invest in the produce of the country, viz: cloths of various kinds, indigo, opium, sugar, &c. &c. &c. In my apprehension this last would be a noble plan, and worthy the wisdom of our government to adopt; I leave it entirely to you to urge it in whatever mode you think most eligible.

That success may attend your generous endeavours is the sincere wish, as I trust I have shewn in this, and will in future efforts, of

(Signed) MILES.

P. S. Since writing the above, a very intelligent man who resides at Barrelly, and with whom I had much conversation on the subject of the trade of the country, sent for my information, and to convince me of the arbitrary, detestable, and pernicious conduct of the Aumils, an authentic copy of an order under the seal of Hussun Ally Khan, Naib or Deputy to the Aumil of Rohilkund, Mindee Ally Khan, addressed to Mahtab Chowderree, and Sew Loll, collectors of the duties, to this effect, "That hearing that several Europeans had sent their agents into the country to establish * cotees, and purchase sugar, he, in the name of the Aumil, most positively prohibited it, without their first having obtained his permission; that Rohilkund being excluded from the commercial treaty with the Governor-general of Calcutta, they had no right to trade there, and the duties to be levied were optional with him; that such as he permitted to purchase sugar in the country were to pay the same duties as the † beparées and retailers in the different bazars, &c." This duty, he observes, is from two to three rupees per bag, or about twenty per cent. which amounts nearly to a prohibition, and will put a stop entirely to the cultivation of sugar there. He further adduced as an argument to prove how much the Vizier hated Rohilkund, and studied its ruin, its being excluded from the benefits of the commercial treaty, and left at the mercy of a hard-hearted Aumil! Is it possible that Rohilkund was meant to be excluded from the benefits of the commercial treaty? and if it is, I am at a loss to discover upon what principle. ‡ Mr. Ives perhaps can tell; indeed, I have always heard that the treaty itself was the reverse of advantageous to the trade either of the Vizier's dominions or the Company's provinces; but certainly the treaty has this advantage, that a fixed rate of duties, however high and inexpedient, is better than an arbitrary one.

* Houses of trade.

† Itinerant merchants, who supply towns and camps with provisions, &c.

‡ The English resident at Lucknow.

To the PRINTER.

Oude, July 20, 1793.

SIR,

IN your paper of Saturday, June 2, I perused with much satisfaction a letter addressed to Sir John Shore, Bart. As the author displays considerable knowledge of his subject, I am willing to suppose him competent to complete the task he has assigned to himself, yet I fear he has too long deferred stepping forth to seek a remedy for the innumerable evils under which the people of these provinces already suffer, or to prevent others with which the wretched policy of the Court of Oude is pregnant. To detail as much of these as fall within my own knowledge, would carry me far beyond the limits of a newspaper; and if CIVIS proceeds, it would be presumption in me to anticipate him on a subject which he has brought forward with so much candor and ability. I trust, however, he will excuse me, when I venture to assure him, that deplorable as is the state of Goruckpore, and the districts in the vicinity of Bahar, they are yet, compared with Rohilcund, rich in culture and population.

In the year 1774 I acted with the army in Rohilcund, and was, in common with my brother-officers, equally pleased and surprised at the rich and flourishing state of the country, and the contented situation of its numerous inhabitants: every march afforded us ample testimony of the government's attention to the welfare of the subject: on all the public roads, which were in high repair, were spacious stone walls, at the distance of about three miles from each other, with seats of accommodation to afford rest and refreshment to the weary traveller; and over many of the innumerable rivers and water courses, that pour down from the hills, we found stone bridges, generally consisting of from seven to eleven arches; in short, so different was the aspect of this country from every other we had seen in India, that while we were exerting our utmost endeavours to suppress the dangerous and aspiring power of the Rohillas, we were compelled to admire the policy, the wisdom, and the liberality of their government.

Shortly after the treaty of Loldong I returned into the Company's provinces, and until very lately had not an opportunity of re-visiting Rohilcund. Much has been said by a Member of the House of Commons of its ruinous and depopulated state; but being in my own mind fully persuaded that no measures, however impolitic at the time, or destructive they might be in their tendency, could in the lapse of so few years, effectually ruin a country so rich and flourishing as was Rohilcund. I ever considered the assertions of that Gentleman, partly

partly the offspring of his prolific fancy, and partly as originating in interested views and misrepresentations.

Fraught with these ideas, I lately accompanied a party to re-visit the field in which I made my first essay in arms, and thence to retrace our former footsteps to that disastrous spot where so many brave soldiers fell inglorious, the victims of an inhospitable clime. What were my feelings after I had penetrated some distance in Rohilcund? I have not language to express, nor can imagination conceive, a more deplorable contrast than the whole face of the country exhibited: most of the wells are fallen in, and of those that remain, many are obscured by the thick jungles* which now overspread the ample high roads of the Rohillas, leaving little more than a foot-path, scarcely marked by the trace of a passenger: some of the bridges are yet passable, while by far the greater number exhibit only a few mouldering piers, the melancholy monuments of departed splendour; long rank grass, and reeds, now wave over the extensive plains, which then displayed the golden ear in luxurious profusion. Many of the populous villages that we passed on our march in 1774, are now wholly deserted, and become the retreats of wild beasts, destructive to mankind. The splendid palaces of the Rohillas are fallen to decay. Their cities, so lately the scenes of opulence and happiness, are humbled to the dust, and their scattered inhabitants immersed in penury and woe.† Such, Sir, is the unexaggerated picture of that once rich and flourishing, but now miserable, country.

Being naturally of an inquisitive disposition, whenever I am on a march I seek society among the natives, interest myself in their concerns, inquire about the produce of their crops, and into the character of their Aumal or Collector; in this excursion, following up my old habits, I conversed with many who had seen better days; who had been nourished under the fostering government of the Rohillas; in tones of voice strongly expressive of sorrow and dismay, and actually with tears in their eyes, they spoke of past comfort, and deprecated the ills they yet foreboded: many with anxious solicitude inquired, when would the Company take the management of the country into their own hands? an event which they are firmly persuaded will some time come to pass, and they appear to anticipate it with uncommon satisfaction. They are not ignorant of the

* Thickets.

† The following circumstance will convey some idea of the wretched state of the police in their cities.—Previous to our setting out for this tour, I thought it prudent to procure a hundsy (bill of exchange) for a few hundred rupees, on a banker in one of the principal cities in Rohilcund; this, when presented, was accepted; but the banker requested of me to wait until dark for the cash, that it might be conveyed to my tent without the circumstance being known to the inhabitants of the city: to this request I readily assented; but as it appeared to me extremely singular, I inquired of the man what were his motives for it? he without hesitation replied, that the few bankers who reside in that city, are obliged to keep their treasure in a secret deposit, and to take advantage of the night to draw forth such sums as circumstances require: he added, that a party of English gentlemen, who passed the same road a few months before, whose demands upon the bankers for shrodded mico, had for the same reason been detained two days:—between the hours of nine and ten at night the cash was delivered with all possible secrecy.

many comforts enjoyed by the Ryots* in the Company's provinces, and the hope that under the influence of the same lenient laws and regulations, they shall soon be in a state as enviable, is their only consolation under their present oppressive burthen of accumulated ills.

In justice to Mirza Mindy Alli,† the Aumil of Rohilcund, I deem it necessary to say, that the inhabitants of that country spoke of him as no worse than his predecessor, and while the same system of venality and corruption shall be pursued at the Court of Oude, they can have little hope of amendment by a change; yet it is but too true, that whenever I mentioned his name, it appeared to strike my hearers with as much horror, as would the sound of a whirlwind in its approach to sweep before it their few and scanty crops; or as the apprehension of a pestilential disease that would exterminate their whole race.

Signed, PHILO CIVIS.

* Husbandmen.

† One day in the midst of a conversation I had with an old gentleman in Bereilly, on the affairs of Rohilcund, "I knew," said he, "Mirza Mindy Alli, when he had not means sufficient to procure even a tattoo pony, and I gave him a horse; though few years have rolled down the tide of time since that period, I have been plundered of my all, and am reduced to poverty; while he, surrounded by five thousand attendants, rides in a silver howdah carriage fastened on the back of the elephant, too elevated to look into the valley of past favours, and I suffer in common with the rest of my unfortunate countrymen. such is the difference of our destiny! but God is Great."

To CIVIS.

SIR,

YOUR valuable letters to Sir John Shore, Bart. on the state of the Vizier's country, which have lately appeared in the World, have excited, in an uncommon degree, the attention of the officers, and indeed all the European gentlemen now in his dominions. The continuation of the subject is looked for with an eagerness and anxiety, so highly flattering to you, that I trust you will not abandon it, but soon again resume the pen which you have wielded with so much judgment and discretion. The minds of all have been turned to inquire into the facts you have stated, and they are not less astonished at the moderation and accuracy with which you have treated them, than that they should so long have passed unrectified by the government of Bengal.

To the avidity for information on the subject which you have caused, the public are indebted for the republication of the following letter; in it the leading features in the Lucknow government are justly delineated, and an act portrayed, which, for injustice and cool-blooded cruelty, stands unequalled in the annals of Hindostan; every Briton who reads it must feel his blood chilled with horror; he must feel mortified in the extreme to think, that this act of barbarous butchery was perpetrated under the eye of the representative of our government, and apparently with his concurrence; for his refusing to interfere in behalf of the unfortunate victims must be so construed. I will not make farther comments. I leave to the justice and humanity of my countrymen to decide, how far the author of this savage act of cruelty and injustice is worthy of the support and friendship of our nation, and how far it is implicated in the guilt, by conferring and maintaining the power by which such deeds are committed. None can be surprised, after hearing of this act, to find that anarchy and devastation should mark the progress of his government; but let us hope that it is near amendment, and that the generous and humane exertions of CIVIS will remove the veil from the eyes of the Bengal government, and impress on their minds the necessity of a reform, such as will avert the impending ruin which threatens this devoted country and its afflicted inhabitants; every man who is actuated by the tender feelings of humanity, and whose heart yearns for the miseries of his fellow creatures, must pray for such an event, and none more fervently than

Cowaspore, Aug. 20, 1793.

(Signed) A BRITON.

To the Hon. WARREN HASTINGS, Esq. Governor-General, &c. &c. &c.

Camp near Etawa, February 25, 1776.

HON. SIR AND SIRs,

I AM sorry to mention a disagreeable event which happened yesterday.

The Nabob has dismissed Meer Aszul's corps, which had been stationed on the other side the Jumna, for some time past, with the Gossaines. There were five months arrears of pay due to them, which his Excellency engaged they should have in fifteen days; the men considered this delay an artifice to deprive them of their right, refused to admit of it, and 4000 of them marched from their station to within six cofs of our camp. The day after their arrival the Nabob went in person among them, and thought he had settled the whole affair, for only a part of the pay, on the receipt of which they were to give up their cannon and arms, and to disperse. The person employed by his Excellency in conducting the negotiation had carried false messages, and when the Nabob found the next day, that the matchlock-men would not give up their arms, he resolved on cutting them all to pieces: I heard this by chance at ten o'clock at night, and immediately waited on him to dissuade him from it, as it was an act that could not do him any credit. He urged their disobedience of orders in leaving their stations contrary to his injunction, and that if after he had settled the matter once, and they refused to abide by what they had agreed to, and he suffered their conduct to pass unnoticed, his army would be constantly in actual mutiny; I answered, he must expect it unless he paid them; and represented, in the strongest terms I could, that his cutting them to pieces would disaffect his troops in general, and that I thought it probable they would not fight in such a cause, as they might naturally say, the same would be their situation another time: I observed, on these occasions there were a few who spirited the rest; and recommended to his Excellency to pick out those men and punish them, but to pay and dismiss all those who had no other hand in the mutiny, than being led into it by persuasion and ignorance of the consequences. I sat with his Excellency till one o'clock in the morning without being able to dissuade him from his resolution; he therefore ordered his minister to march against them early the next morning with about 15,000 men, with directions, that if they gave up their arms, and accepted of about 20,000 rupees, he would suffer them to go away unmolested; otherwise, there should not be a man of them left alive. The matchlock-men would gladly have compounded for part of their pay, when about two lacks were due to them, but they even doubted their obtaining the small sum that was offered after they

they had once grounded their arms; they were therefore rendered desperate, all treating was at an end, and they resolved on meeting their fate; out of 4000, 1500 refused to fight, and left the camp, so that the engagement was supported by 2500, who did every thing that men in their deplorable state could; they had been for some days past reduced to the greatest distress for the necessaries of life, were weak and terrified by the numbers they had to oppose.

Notwithstanding all the disadvantages they laboured under, the Nabob got the victory by a chance; he was repeatedly repulsed, some guns were even taken from him, his army put to the route, when a tumbril blew up, and threw the matchlock-men into confusion, upon which his Excellency's troops broke in upon them, and carried the day.

The Nabob had about 300 men killed; of the matchlock-men there were 600, many wounded, 800 taken prisoners, and released to-day; the rest escaped, as his Excellency's troops fought with ill-will, and suffered them to get away, otherwise a man could not have been saved.

The eleven old battalions, that is, those under Jao, Loll, and Bussant, who are formed into two brigades, were not in the engagement, but drew out when the news of the Nabob's troops having given way reached them. The men in general declared, it was not to attack the matchlock-men, they only meant to defend the camp. Upon the whole, this act, as might be expected, has given great discontent among the troops, and it is the general cry, that they are never to expect their pay, but when they can exact it. It is well known I advised the Nabob against the measure; and I flatter myself, the credit of the British nation was never at a higher pitch in this country than now. The Nabob's behaviour at Mindighaut is a striking contrast to that on the present occasion.

On my return from the Nabob, the night before the affair, a deputation of five of the matchlock-men presented me a petition, just as I entered my tent, which I refused to receive: I understood from them, that it contained a request for me to get them their pay. After what had passed I could not interfere further. I told them they were the Nabob's servants, and that the Company had nothing to do with them.

I have the honour to be, &c.

(Signed) J. B.

President at the Court of
the Nabob of Ouda.

F I N I S.