

ought not to want any more troops. At Cannas, then, Hannibal had struck his greatest blow: he could do no more. The Romans had learned to wait, and be careful: so they fought no more great battles, but every year they grew stronger and Hannibal grew weaker. The chief town that had gone over to Hannibal's side was Capua, but in 211 the Romans took it again, and Hannibal was not strong enough to prevent them. The chief men of Capua were so afraid of falling into the hands of the Romans that they all poisoned themselves. After this all the Italian cities that had joined Hannibal began to leave him again."—M. Creighton, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 3.

Also in: T. A. Dodge, *Hannibal*, ch. 11-39—T. Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 43-47—See, also, PUNIC WAR, THE SECOND.

B. C. 214-146.—The Macedonian Wars.—Conquest of Greece. See GREECE B. C. 214-146; also 280-146.

B. C. 211.—The Second Punic War: Hannibal at the gates.—In the eighth year of the Second Punic War (B. C. 211), when fortune had begun to desert the arms of Hannibal—when Capua, his ally and mainstay in Italy was under siege by the Romans and he was powerless to relieve the doomed senators and citizens—the Carthaginian commander made a sudden march upon Rome. He moved his army to the gates of his great enemy, "not with any hope of taking the city, but with the hope that the Romans, panic stricken at the realization of a fear they had felt for five years past, would summon the consuls from the walls of Capua. But the cool head of Fabius, who was in Rome, guessed the meaning of that manœuvre, and would only permit one of the consuls, Flaccus, to be recalled. Thus the league of the rebel city was not broken. Hannibal failed in his purpose, but he left an indelible impression of his terrible presence upon the Roman mind. Looming through a mist of romantic fable, unconquerable, pitiless, he was actually seen touching the walls of Rome, hurling with his own hand a spear into the sacred Pomerium. He had marched along the Via Latina, driving crowds of fugitives before him, who sought refuge in the city. He had fixed his camp on the Anio, within three miles of the Esquiline. To realize the state of feeling in Rome during those days of panic would be to get at the very heart of the Hannibalic war. The Senate left the Curia and sat in the Forum, to reassure, by their calm composure, the excited crowds. Fabius noticed from the battlements that the ravagers spared his property. It was a cunning attempt on the part of Hannibal to bring suspicion on him; but he forthwith offered the property for sale; and such was the effect of his quiet confidence that the market price even of the land on which the camp of the enemy was drawn never fell an 'as.' . . . Hannibal marched away into the Sabine country, and made his way back to Tarentum, Rome unsacked, Capua unrelieved."—R. F. Horton, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 12.

Also in: T. Arnold, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 44.—T. A. Dodge, *Hannibal*, ch. 34.

B. C. 211-202.—The Second Punic War: Defeat of Hasdrubal at the Metaurus.—The war in Africa.—The end at Zama.—Acquisition of Spain.—"The conquest of Capua was the turning point in the war. Hannibal lost his stronghold in Campania and was obliged to re-

tire to the southern part of Italy. Rome was gaining everywhere. The Italians who had joined Hannibal began to lose confidence. Salapia and many towns in Samnium were betrayed to the Romans. But when Fulvius, the proconsul who commanded in Apulia, appeared before Herdonia, which he hoped to gain possession of by treachery, Hannibal marched from Bruttium, attacked the Roman army, and gained a brilliant victory. In the following year the Romans recovered several places in Lucania and Bruttium, and Fabius Maximus crowned his long military career with the recapture of Tarentum (B. C. 209). The inhabitants were sold as slaves; the town was plundered, and the works of art were sent to Rome. The next year Marcellus, for the fifth time elected to the consulship, was surprised near Venusia and killed.

The war had lasted ten years, yet its favorable conclusion seemed far off. There were increasing symptoms of discontent among the allies, while the news from Spain left little doubt that the long prepared expedition of Hasdrubal over the Alps to join his brother in Italy was at last to be realized. Rome strained every nerve to meet the impending danger. The number of legions was increased from twenty-one to twenty-three. The preparations were incomplete, when the news came that Hasdrubal was crossing the Alps by the same route which his brother had taken eleven years before. The consuls for the new year were M. Livius Salinator and G. Claudius Nero. Hannibal, at the beginning of spring, after reorganizing his force in Bruttium, advanced northward, encountered the consul Nero at Grumentum, whence, after a bloody but indecisive battle, he continued his march to Canusium. Here he waited for news from his brother. The expected despatch was intercepted by Nero, who formed the bold resolution of joining his colleague in the north, and with their united armies crushing Hasdrubal while Hannibal was waiting for the expected despatch. Hasdrubal had appointed a rendezvous with his brother in Umbria, whence with their united armies they were both to advance on Narnia and Rome. Nero, selecting from his army 7,000 of the best soldiers and 1,000 cavalry, left his camp so quietly that Hannibal knew nothing of his departure. Near Sena he found his colleague Livius, and in the night entered his camp that his arrival might not be known to the Carthaginians. Hasdrubal, when he heard the trumpet sound twice from the Roman camp and saw the increased numbers, was no longer ignorant that both consuls were in front of him. Thinking that his brother had been defeated, he resolved to retire across the Metaurus and wait for accurate information. Missing his way, wandering up and down the river to find a ford, pursued and attacked by the Romans, he was compelled to accept battle. Although in an unfavorable position, a deep river in his rear, his troops exhausted by marching all night, still the victory long hung in suspense. Hasdrubal displayed all the qualities of a great general, and when he saw that all was lost, he plunged into the thickest of the battle and was slain. The consul returned to Apulia with the same rapidity with which he had come. He announced to Hannibal the defeat and death of his brother by casting Hasdrubal's head within the outposts and by sending two Carthaginian captives to give

him an account of the disastrous battle. 'I foresee the doom of Carthage,' said Hannibal sadly, when he recognized the bloody head of his brother. This battle decided the war in Italy. Hannibal withdrew his garrisons from the towns in southern Italy, retired to the peninsula of Bruttium, where for four long years, in that wild and mountainous country, with unabated courage and astounding tenacity, the dying lion clung to the land that had been so long the theatre of his glory. . . . The time had come to carry into execution that expedition to Africa which Sempronius had attempted in the beginning of the war. Publius Scipio, on his return from Spain, offered himself for the consulship and was unanimously elected. His design was to carry the war into Africa and in this way compel Carthage to recall Hannibal. . . . The senate finally consented that he should cross from his province of Sicily to Africa, but they voted no adequate means for such an expedition. Scipio called for volunteers. The whole of the year B. C. 205 passed away before he completed his preparations. Meanwhile the Carthaginians made one last effort to help Hannibal. Mago, Hannibal's youngest brother, was sent to Liguria with 14,000 men to rouse the Ligurians and Gauls to renew the war on Rome; but having met a Roman army under Quintilius Varus, and being wounded in the engagement which followed, his movements were so crippled that nothing of importance was accomplished. In the spring of B. C. 204 Scipio had completed his preparations. He embarked his army from Lilybæum, and after three days landed at the Fair Promontory near Utica. After laying siege to Utica all summer, he was compelled to fall back and entrench himself on the promontory. Masinissa had joined him immediately on his arrival. By his advice Scipio planned a night attack on Hasdrubal, the son of Gisco, and Syphax, who were encamped near Utica. This enterprise was completely successful. A short time afterwards Hasdrubal and Syphax were again defeated. Syphax fled to Numidia, where he was followed by Lælius and Masinissa and compelled to surrender. These successes convinced the Carthaginians that with the existing forces the Roman invasion could not long be resisted. Therefore they opened negotiations for peace with Scipio, in order probably to gain time to recall their generals from Italy. The desire of Scipio to bring the war to a conclusion induced him to agree upon preliminaries of peace, subject to the approval of the Roman senate and people. . . . Meanwhile the arrival of Hannibal at Hadrumetum had so encouraged the Carthaginians that the armistice had been broken before the return of the ambassadors from Rome. All hopes of peace by negotiation vanished, and Scipio prepared to renew the war, which, since the arrival of Hannibal, had assumed a more serious character. The details of the operations which ended in the battle of Zama are but imperfectly known. The decisive battle was fought on the river Bagradas, near Zama, on the 19th of October, B. C. 202. Hannibal managed the battle with his usual skill. His veterans fought like the men who had so often conquered in Italy, but his army was annihilated. The elephants were rendered unavailing by Scipio's skillful management. Instead of the three lines of battle, with the usual intervals, Scipio ar-

ranged his companies behind each other like the rounds of a ladder. Through these openings the elephants could pass without breaking the line. This battle terminated the long struggle. . . . Hannibal himself advised peace."—R. F. Leighton, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 23-24.—"Scipio prepared as though he would besiege the city, but his heart also inclined to peace. . . . The terms which he offered were severe enough, and had the Carthaginians only realised what they involved, they would surely have asked to be allowed to meet their fate at once. They were to retain indeed their own laws and their home domain in Africa; but they were to give up all the deserters and prisoners of war, all their elephants, and all their ships of the line but ten. They were not to wage war, either in Africa or outside of it, without the sanction of the Roman Senate. They were to recognise Massinissa as the king of Numidia, and, with it, the prescriptive right which he would enjoy of plundering and annoying them at his pleasure, while they looked on with their hands tied, not daring to make reprisals. Finally, they were to give up all claim to the rich islands of the Mediterranean and to the Spanish kingdom, the creation of the Barcides, of which the fortune of war had already robbed them, and thus shorn of the sources of their wealth, they were to pay within a given term of seven years a crushing war contribution! Henceforward, in fact, they would exist on sufferance only, and that the sufferance of the Romans. . . . The conclusion of the peace was celebrated at Carthage by a cruel sight, the most cruel which the citizens could have beheld, except the destruction of the city itself—the destruction of their fleet. Five hundred vessels, the pride and glory of the Phœnician race, the symbol and the seal of the commerce, the colonisation, and the conquests of this most imperial of Phœnician cities, were towed out of the harbour and were deliberately burned in the sight of the citizens."—R. B. Smith, *Rome and Carthage: the Punic Wars*, ch. 17.

Also in H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 31-34.—See, also, PUNIC WAR. THE SECOND B. C. 2d Century.—Greek influences. See HELLENIC GENIUS AND INFLUENCE.

B. C. 191.—War with Antiochus the Great of Syria.—First conquests in Asia Minor bestowed on the king of Pergamum and the Republic of Rhodes. See SELEUCIDÆ. B. C. 224-187.

B. C. 189-139.—Wars with the Lusitanians. See PORTUGAL: EARLY HISTORY; and LUSITANIA.

B. C. 184-149.—The Spoils of Conquest and the Corruption they wrought.—"The victories of the last half-century seemed to promise ease and wealth to Rome. She was to live on the spoils and revenue from the conquered countries. Not only did they pay a fixed tax to her exchequer, but the rich lands of Capua, the royal domain lands of the kings of Syracuse and of Macedonia, became public property, and produced a large annual rent. It was found possible in 167 to relieve citizens from the property tax or tributum, which was not collected again until the year after the death of Julius Caesar. But the sudden influx of wealth had the usual effect of raising the standard of expense; and new tastes and desires required increased means for their gratification. All manner of luxuries were finding their way into the city from the East. Splen-

did furniture, costly ornaments, wanton dances and music for their banquets, became the fashion among the Roman nobles; and the younger men went to lengths of debauchery and extravagance hitherto unknown. The result to many was financial embarrassment, from which relief was sought in malversation and extortion. The old standard of honour in regard to public money was distinctly lowered, and cases of misconduct and oppression were becoming more common and less reprobated. . . . The fashionable taste for Greek works of art, in the adornment of private houses, was another incentive to plunder, and in 149 it was for the first time found necessary to establish a permanent court or 'quaestio' for cases of malversation in the provinces. Attempts were indeed made to restrain the extravagance which was at the root of the evil. In 184 Cato, as censor, had imposed a tax on the sale of slaves under twenty above a certain price, and on personal ornaments above a certain value; and though the 'lex Oppia,' limiting the amount of women's jewelry, had been repealed in spite of him in 195, other sumptuary laws were passed. A 'lex Orchia' in 182 limited the number of guests, a 'lex Fannia' in 161 the amount to be spent on banquets, while a 'lex Didia' in 143 extended the operation of the law to all Italy. And though such laws, even if enforced, could not really remedy the evil, they perhaps had a certain effect in producing a sentiment, for long afterwards we find overcrowded dinners regarded as indecorous and vulgar. Another cause, believed by some to be unfavourably affecting Roman character, was the growing influence of Greek culture and Greek teachers. For many years the education of the young, once regarded as the special business of the parents, had been passing into the hands of Greek slaves or freedmen. . . . On the superiority of Greek culture there was a division of opinion. The Scipios and their party patronised Greek philosophy and literature. . . . This tendency, which went far beyond a mere question of literary taste, was opposed by a party of which M. Porcius Cato was the most striking member. . . . In Cato's view the reform needed was a return to the old ways, before Rome was infected by Greece."—E. B. Shuckburgh, *Hist. of Rome to the Battle of Actium*, ch. 32.

B. C. 159-133.—Decline of the Republic.—Social and economic causes.—The growing system of Slavery and its effects.—Monopoly of land by capitalists.—Extinction of small cultivators.—Rapid decrease of citizens.—"In the Rome of this epoch the two evils of a degenerate oligarchy and a democracy not yet developed but already cankered in the bud were interwoven in a manner pregnant with fatal results. According to their party names, which were first heard during this period, the 'Optimates' wished to give effect to the will of the best, the 'Populares' to that of the community, but in fact there was in the Rome of that day neither a true aristocracy nor a truly self-determining community. Both parties contended alike for shadows. . . . Both were equally affected by political corruption, and both were in fact equally worthless. . . . The commonwealth was politically and morally more and more unhinged, and was verging towards its total dissolution. The crisis with which the Roman revolution was opened arose not out of this party political con-

flict, but out of the economic and social relations which the Roman government allowed, like everything else, simply to take their course"; and which had brought about "the depreciation of the Italian farms; the supplanting of the petty husbandry, first in a part of the provinces and then in Italy, by the farming of large estates; the prevailing tendency to devote the latter in Italy to the rearing of cattle and the culture of the olive and vine; finally, the replacing of the free labourers in the provinces as in Italy by slaves. . . . Before we attempt to describe the course of this second great conflict between labour and capital, it is necessary to give here some indication of the nature and extent of the system of slavery. We have not now to do with the old, in some measure innocent, rural slavery, under which the farmer either tilled the field along with his slave, or, if he possessed more land than he could manage, placed the slave . . . over a detached farm.

. . . What we now refer to is the system of slavery on a great scale, which in the Roman state, as formerly in the Carthaginian, grew out of the ascendancy of capital. While the captives taken in war and the hereditary transmission of slavery sufficed to keep up the stock of slaves during the earlier period, this system of slavery was, just like that of America, based on the methodically prosecuted hunting of man.

No country where this species of game could be hunted remained exempt from visitation; even in Italy it was a thing by no means unheard of, that the poor free man was placed by his employer among the slaves. But the Negroland of that period was western Asia, where the Cretan and Cilician corsairs, the real professional slave hunters and slave-dealers, robbed the coasts of Syria and the Greek islands; and where, emulating their feats, the Roman revenue-farmers instituted human hunts in the client states and incorporated those whom they captured among their slaves. . . . At the great slave market in Delos, where the slave-dealers of Asia Minor disposed of their wares to Italian speculators, on one day as many as 10,000 slaves are said to have been disembarked in the morning and to have been all sold before evening. . . . In whatever direction speculation applied itself, its instrument was invariably man reduced in the eye of the law to a brute. Trades were in great part carried on by slaves, so that the proceeds belonged to the master. The levying of the public revenues in the lower departments was regularly conducted by the slaves of the associations that leased them. Servile hands performed the operations of mining, making pitch, and others of a similar kind, it became early the custom to send herds of slaves to the Spanish mines. . . . The tending of cattle was universally performed by slaves. . . . But far worse in every respect was the plantation system proper—the cultivation of the fields by a band of slaves not unfrequently branded with iron, who with shackles on their legs performed the labours of the field under overseers during the day, and were locked up together by night in the common, frequently subterranean, labourers' prison. This plantation system had migrated from the East to Carthage, . . . and seems to have been brought by the Carthaginians to Sicily. . . . The abyss of misery and woe which opens before our eyes in this most miserable of all proletariates, we

leave to be fathomed by those who venture to gaze into such depths; it is very possible that, compared with the sufferings of the Roman slaves, the sum of all Negro suffering is but a drop. Here we are not so much concerned with the distress of the slaves themselves as with the perils which it brought upon the Roman state [see SLAVE WARS IN SICILY AND ITALY]. . . . The capitalists continued to buy out the small landholders, or indeed, if they remained obstinate, to seize their fields without title of purchase. . . . The landlords continued mainly to employ slaves instead of free labourers, because the former could not like the latter be called away to military service; and thus reduced the free proletariat to the same level of misery with the slaves. They continued to supersede Italian grain in the market of the capital, and to lessen its value over the whole peninsula, by selling Sicilian slave-corn at a mere nominal price. . . . After 595 [B. C. 159], . . . when the census yielded 328,000 citizens capable of bearing arms, there appears a regular falling off, for the list in 600 [B. C. 154] stood at 324,000, that in 607 [B. C. 147] at 322,000, that in 623 [B. C. 131] at 319,000, bourgeois fit for service—an alarming result for a period of profound peace at home and abroad. If matters were to go on at this rate, the bourgeois-body would resolve itself into planters and slaves; and the Roman state might at length, as was the case with the Parthians, purchase its soldiers in the slave-market. Such was the external and internal condition of Rome, when the state entered on the 7th century of its existence. Wherever the eye turned, it encountered abuses and decay; the question could not but force itself on every sagacious and well disposed man, whether this state of things were not capable of remedy or amendment."—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 2 (v. 3).

ALSO IN: T. Arnold, *Hist. of the Roman Commonwealth*, ch. 2.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 1, ch. 10-12.—W. R. Brownlow, *Slavery and Serfdom in Europe*, lect. 1-2.

B. C. 151-146.—The Third Punic War: Destruction of Carthage.—"Carthage, bound hand and foot by the treaty of 201 B. C., was placed under the jealous watch of the loyal prince of Numidia, who himself willingly acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome. But it was impossible for this arrangement to be permanent. Every symptom of reviving prosperity at Carthage was regarded at Rome with feverish anxiety, and neither the expulsion of Hannibal in 195 B. C. nor his death in 183 B. C. did much to check the growing conviction that Rome would never be secure while her rival existed. It was therefore with grim satisfaction that many in the Roman senate watched the increasing irritation of the Carthaginians under the harassing raids and encroachments of their favoured neighbour, Masinissa, and waited for the moment when Carthage should, by some breach of the conditions imposed upon her, supply Rome with a pretext for interference. At last in 151 B. C. came the news that Carthage, in defiance of treaty obligations, was actually at war with Masinissa. The anti-Carthaginian party in the senate, headed by M. Porcius Cato, eagerly seized the opportunity; in spite of the protests of Scipio Nasica and others, war was declared, and nothing short of the destruction of their city itself was demanded from the despat-

ing Carthaginians. This demand, as the senate, no doubt, foresaw, was refused, and in 149 B. C. the siege of Carthage began. During the next two years little progress was made, but in 147 P. Cornelius Scipio Æmillianus, son of L. Æmilius Paulus, conqueror of Macedonia, and grandson by adoption of the conqueror of Hannibal, was, at the age of 37, and though only a candidate for the ædileship, elected consul and given the command in Africa. In the next year (146 B. C.) Carthage was taken and razed to the ground. Its territory became the Roman province of Africa, while Numidia, now ruled by the three sons of Masinissa, remained as an allied state under Roman suzerainty, and served to protect the new province against the raids of the desert tribes. Within little more than a century from the commencement of the first Punic war, the whole of the former dominions of Carthage had been brought under the direct rule of Roman magistrates, and were regularly organised as Roman provinces."—H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman Hist.*, bk. 3, ch. 1.—See, also, **CARTHAGE: B. C. 146.**

B. C. 146.—Supremacy of the Senate.—"At the close of a century first of deadly struggle and then of rapid and dazzling success, Rome found herself the supreme power in the civilised world. . . . We have now to consider how this period of conflict and conquest had affected the victorious state. Outwardly the constitution underwent but little change. It continued to be in form a moderate democracy. The sovereignty of the people finally established by the Hortensian law remained untouched in theory. It was by the people in assembly that the magistrates of the year were elected, and that laws were passed; only by 'order of the people' could capital punishment be inflicted upon a Roman citizen. For election to a magistracy, or for a seat in the senate, patrician and plebeian were equally eligible. But between the theory and the practice of the constitution there was a wide difference. Throughout this period the actually sovereign authority in Rome was that of the senate, and behind the senate stood an order of nobles (nobiles), who claimed and enjoyed privileges as wide as those which immemorial custom had formerly conceded to the patriciate. The ascendancy of the senate, which thus arrested the march of democracy in Rome, was not, to any appreciable extent, the result of legislation. It was the direct outcome of the practical necessities of the time, and when these no longer existed, it was at once and successfully challenged in the name and on the behalf of the constitutional rights of the people. Nevertheless, from the commencement of the Punic wars down to the moment when with the destruction of Carthage in 146 B. C. Rome's only rival disappeared, this ascendancy was complete and almost unquestioned. It was within the walls of the senate-house, and by decrees of the senate, that the foreign and the domestic policy of the state were alike determined. . . . Though the ascendancy of the senate was mainly due to the fact that without it the government of the state could scarcely have been carried on, it was strengthened and confirmed by the close and intimate connection which existed between the senate and the nobility. This 'nobility' was in its nature and origin widely different from the old patriciate. Though every patrician was of

course 'noble,' the majority of the families which in this period, styled themselves noble were not patrician but plebeian, and the typical nobles of the time of the elder Cato, of the Gracchi, or of Cicero, the Metelli, Livii, or Licinii were plebeians. The title nobilis was apparently conceded by custom to those plebeian families one or more of whose members had, after the opening of the magistracies, been elected to a curule office, and which in consequence were entitled to place in their halls, and to display at their funeral processions the 'imagines' of these distinguished ancestors. The man who, by his election to a curule office thus ennobled his descendants, was said to be the 'founder of his family,' though himself only a new man. . . . Office brought wealth and prestige, and both wealth and prestige were freely employed to exclude 'new men' and to secure for the 'noble families' a monopoly of office. The ennobled plebeians not only united with the patricians to form a distinct order, but outdid them in pride and arrogance. . . . The establishment of senatorial ascendancy was not the only result of this period of growth and expansion. During the same time the foundations were laid of the provincial system, and with this of the new and dangerous powers of the proconsuls."—H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman Hist.*, bk. 3, ch. 3.—"The great struggle against Hannibal left the Senate the all but undisputed government of Rome. Originally a mere consulting board, assessors of the king or consul, the Senate had become the supreme executive body. That the government solely by the comitia and the magistrates should by experience be found wanting was as inevitable at Rome as at Athens. Rome was more fortunate than Athens in that she could develop a new organism to meet the need. The growth of the power of the Senate was all the more natural and legitimate the less it possessed strict legal standing-ground. But the fatal dualism thus introduced into the constitution—the Assembly governing de jure, and the Senate governing de facto—made all government after a time impossible. The position of the Senate being, strictly speaking, an unconstitutional one, it was open to any demagogue to bring matters of foreign policy or administration before an Assembly which was without continuity, without special knowledge, and in which there was no debate. Now, if the Senate governed badly, the Assembly 'could not govern at all'; and there could be, in the long run, but one end to the constant struggle between the two sources of authority."—W. T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, ch. 2.—See, also, SENATE, ROMAN.

B. C. 133-121.—The attempted reforms of the Gracchi.—"The first systematic attack upon the senatorial government is connected with the names of Tiberius and Gaius Gracchus, and its immediate occasion was an attempt to deal with no less a danger than the threatened disappearance of the class to which of all others Rome had owed most in the past. For, while Rome had been extending her sway westward and eastward, and while her nobles and merchants were amassing colossal fortunes abroad, the small landholders throughout the greater part of Italy were sinking deeper into ruin under the pressure of accumulated difficulties. The Hannibalic war had laid waste their fields and thinned their numbers, nor when peace returned to Italy did it bring

with it any revival of prosperity. The heavy burden of military service still pressed ruinously upon them, and in addition they were called upon to compete with the foreign corn imported from beyond the sea, and with the foreign slave-labour purchased by the capital of the wealthier men. . . . The small holders went off to follow the eagles or swell the proletariat of the cities, and their holdings were left to run waste or merged in the vineyards, oliveyards, and above all in the great cattle-farms of the rich, while their own place was taken by slaves. The evil was not equally serious in all parts of Italy. It was least felt in the central highlands, in Campania, and in the newly settled fertile valley of the Po. It was worst in Etruria and in southern Italy; but everywhere it was serious enough to demand the earnest attention of Roman statesmen. Of its existence the government had received plenty of warning in the declining numbers of able-bodied males returned at the census, in the increasing difficulties of recruiting for the legions, in servile out-breaks in Etruria and Apulia."—H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman Hist.*, bk. 4, ch. 1.—The earlier agrarian laws which the Roman plebeians had wrung from the patricians (the Licinian Law and similar ones—see above: B. C. 376-367; also AGRARIAN LAWS) had not availed to prevent the absorption, by one means and another, of the public domain—the "ager publicus," the conquered land which the state had neither sold nor given away—into the possession of great families and capitalists, who held it in vast blocks, to be cultivated by slaves. Time had almost sanctioned this condition of things, when Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus, elder of the two famous brothers called "The Gracchi," undertook in 133 B. C. a reformation of it. As one of the tribunes of the people that year, he brought forward a law which was intended to enforce the provisions of the Licinian Law of 367 B. C., by taking away from the holders of public land what they held in excess of 500 jugera (about 320 acres) each. Three commissioners, called *Triumviri*, were to be appointed to superintend the execution of the law and to redistribute the land recovered, among needy citizens. Naturally the proposal of this act aroused a fierce opposition in the wealthy class whose ill-gotten estates were threatened by it. One of the fellow-tribunes of Tiberius was gained over by the opposition and used the power of his veto to prevent the taking of a vote upon the bill. Then Gracchus, to overcome the obstacle, had recourse to an unconstitutional measure. The obstinate tribune was deposed from his office by a vote of the people, and the law was then enacted. For the carrying out of his measure, and for his own protection, no less, Tiberius sought a re-election to the tribunate, which was contrary to usage, if not against positive law. His enemies raised a tumult against him on the day of election and he was slain, with three hundred of his party, and their corpses were flung into the Tiber. Nine years later, his younger brother, Gaius Gracchus, obtained election to the tribune's office and took up the work of democratic political reform which Tiberius had sacrificed his life in attempting. His measures were radical, attacking the powers and privileges of the ruling orders. But mixed with them were schemes of demagoguery which did infinite mischief to the Roman people and state. He carried

the first frumentarian law (*lex frumentaria*) as it was called, by which corn was bought with public money, and stored, for sale to Roman citizens at a nominal price. After three years of power, through the favor of the people, he, too, in 121 B. C. was deserted by them and the party of the patricians was permitted to put him to death, with a great number of his supporters — G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 1, ch. 10-13, 18-19. — "Caius, it is said, was the first Roman statesman who appointed a regular distribution of corn among the poorer citizens, requiring the state to buy up large consignments of grain from the provinces, and to sell it again at a fixed rate below the natural price. The nobles themselves seem to have acquiesced without alarm in this measure, by which they hoped to secure the city from seditious movements in time of scarcity; but they failed to foresee the discouragement it would give to industry, the crowds of idle and dissipated citizens it would entice into the forum, the appetite it would create for shows, entertainments and largesses, and the power it would thus throw into the hands of unprincipled demagogues. Caius next established customs duties upon various articles of luxury imported into the city for the use of the rich; he decreed the gratuitous supply of clothing to the soldiers, who had hitherto been required to provide themselves out of their pay; he founded colonies for the immediate gratification of the poorer citizens, who were waiting in vain for the promised distribution of lands; he caused the construction of public granaries, bridges and roads, to furnish objects of useful labour to those who were not unwilling to work. Caius himself, it is said, directed the course and superintended the making of the roads, some of which we may still trace traversing Italy in straight lines from point to point, filling up depressions and hollowing excrescences in the face of the country, and built upon huge substructions of solid masonry. Those who most feared and hated him confessed their amazement at the magnificence of his projects and the energy of his proceedings; the people, in whose interests he toiled, were filled with admiration and delight, when they saw him attended from morning to night by crowds of contractors, artificers, ambassadors, magistrates, soldiers, and men of learning, to all of whom he was easy of access, adapting his behaviour to the condition of each in turn; thus proving, as they declared, the falsehood of those who presumed to call him violent and tyrannical. . . . By these innovations Caius laid a wide basis of popularity. Thereupon he commenced his meditated attack upon the privileged classes. We possess at least one obscure intimation of a change he effected or proposed in the manner of voting by centuries, which struck at the influence of the wealthier classes. He confirmed and extended the Porcian law, for the protection of citizens against the aggression of the magistrates without a formal appeal to the people. Even the powers of the dictatorship, to which the senate had been wont to resort for the coercion of its refractory opponents, were crippled by these provisions; and we shall see that no recourse was again had to this extraordinary and odious appointment till the oligarchy had gained for a time a complete victory over their adversaries. Another change, even more important, was that by which the knights were admitted to the

greater share, if not, as some suppose, to the whole, of the judicial appointments. . . . As long as the senators were the judges, the provincial governors, who were themselves senators, were secure from the consequence of impeachment. If the knights were to fill the same office, it might be expected that the publicani, the farmers of the revenues abroad, would be not less assured of impunity, whatever were the enormity of their exactions. . . . It was vain, indeed, to expect greater purity from the second order of citizens than from the first. If the senators openly denied justice to complainants, the knights almost as openly sold it. This was in itself a grievous degradation of the tone of public morality; but this was not all the evil of the tribune's reform. It arrayed the two privileged classes of citizens in direct hostility to one another. 'Caius made the republic double-headed,' was the profound remark of antiquity. He sowed the seeds of a war of an hundred years. Tiberius had attempted to raise up a class of small proprietors, who, by the simplicity of their manners and moderation of their tastes, might form, as he hoped, a strong conservative barrier between the tyranny of the nobles and the envy of the people; but Caius, on the failure of this attempt, was content to elevate a class to power, who should touch upon both extremes of the social scale, — the rich by their wealth, and the poor by their origin. Unfortunately this was to create not a new class, but a new party. . . . One direct advantage, at all events, Caius expected to derive, besides the humiliation of his brother's murderers, from this elevation of the knights: he hoped to secure their grateful co-operation towards the important object he next had in view: this was no less than the full admission of the Latins and Italians to the right of suffrage." — C. Merivale, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, ch. 1.

ALSO IN: Plutarch, *Tiberius Gracchus*; *Caius Gracchus*. — T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 2-3 (v. 3). — S. Eliot, *Liberty of Rome*, bk. 3, ch. 1. — See, also, *AGER PUBLICUS*.

B. C. 125-121. — Conquest of the Salyes and Allobroges in Gaul. — Treaty of friendship with the *Ædui*. See *SALYES*; *ALLOBROGES*; and *ÆDUI*.

B. C. 118-99. — Increasing corruption of government. — The Jugurthine War. — Invasion and defeat of the Cimbri and Teutones. — The power of Marius. — "After the death of Caius Gracchus, the nobles did what they pleased in Rome. They paid no more attention to the Agrarian Law, and the state of Italy grew worse and worse. . . . The nobles cared nothing for Rome's honour, but only for their own pockets. They governed badly, and took bribes from foreign kings, who were allowed to do what they liked if they could pay enough. This was especially seen in a war that took place in Africa. After Carthage had been destroyed, the greatest state in Africa was Numidia. The king of Numidia was a friend of the Roman people, and had fought with them against Carthage. So Rome had a good deal to do with Numidia, and the Numidians often helped Rome in her wars. In 118 a king of Numidia died, and left the kingdom to his two sons and an adopted son named Jugurtha. Jugurtha determined to have the kingdom all to himself, so he murdered one of the sons and made war upon the other, who

applied to Rome for help [see NUMIDIA: B. C. 118-104]. The Senate was bribed by Jugurtha, and did all it could to please him; at last, however, Jugurtha besieged his brother in Cirta, and when he took the city put him and all his army to death (112). After this the Romans thought they must interfere, but the Senate for more money were willing to let Jugurtha off very easily. He came to Rome to excuse himself before the people, and whilst he was there he had a Numidian prince, of whom he was afraid, murdered in Rome itself. But his bribes were stronger than the laws. . . . The Romans declared war against Jugurtha, but he bribed the generals, and for three years very little was done against him. At last, in 108, a good general, who would not take bribes, Quintus Metellus, went against him and defeated him. Metellus would have finished the war, but in 106 the command was taken from him by Caius Marius the consul. This Caius Marius was a man of low birth, but a good soldier. He had risen in war by his bravery, and had held magistracies in Rome. He was an officer in the army of Metellus, and was very much liked by the common soldiers, for he was a rough man like themselves, and talked with them, and lived as they did. . . . Marius left Africa and went to Rome to try and be made consul in 106. He found fault with Metellus before the people, and said that he could carry on the war better himself. So the people made him consul, and more than that, they said that he should be general in Africa instead of Metellus. . . . Marius finished the war in Africa, and brought Jugurtha in triumph to Italy in 104. . . . When it was over, Marius was the most powerful man in Rome. He was the leader of the popular party, and also the general of the army. The army had greatly changed since the time of Hannibal. The Roman soldiers were no longer citizens who fought when their country wanted them, and then went back to their work. But as wars were now constantly going on, and going on too in distant countries, this could no longer be the case, and the army was full of men who took to a soldier's life as a trade. Marius was the favourite of these soldiers: he was a soldier by trade himself, and had risen in consequence to power in the state. Notice, then, that when Marius was made consul, it was a sign that the government for the future was to be carried on by the army, as well as by the people and the nobles. Marius was soon wanted to carry on another war. Two great tribes of barbarians from the north had entered Gaul west of the Alps, and threatened to drive out the Romans, and even attack Italy. They came with their wives and children, like a wandering people looking for a home. . . . At first these Cimbri defeated the Roman generals in southern Gaul, where the Romans had conquered the country along the Rhone, and made it a province, which is still called the province, or Provence. The Romans, after this defeat, were afraid of another burning of their city by barbarians, so Marius was made consul again, and for the next five years he was elected again and again. . . . In the year 102 the Teutones and the Cimbri marched to attack Italy, but Marius defeated them in two great battles [see CIMBRI AND TEUTONES: B. C. 118-102]. Afterwards when he went back to Rome in triumph he was so powerful that he could have done what he

chose in the state. The people were very grateful to him, the soldiers were very fond of him, and the nobles were very much afraid of him. But Marius did not think much of the good of the state: he thought much more of his own greatness, and how he might become a still greater man. So, first, he joined the party of the people, and one of the tribunes, Lucius Appuleius Saturninus, brought forward some laws like those of Caius Gracchus, and Marius helped him. But there were riots in consequence, and the Senate begged Marius to help them in putting down the riots. For a time Marius doubted what to do, but at last he armed the people, and Saturninus was killed (99). But now neither side liked Marius, for he was true to neither, and did only what he thought would make himself most powerful. So for the future Marius was not likely to be of much use in the troubles of the Roman state."—M. Creighton, *Hist. of Rome (Primer)*, ch. 7.

ALSO IN: H. G. Liddell, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 54-56 (v. 2).—V. Duruy, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 39-41 (v. 2).—Plutarch, *Marius*.

B. C. 90-88.—Demands of the Italian Socii for Roman citizenship.—The Marsian or Social War.—Rise of Sulla.—"It is a most erroneous though widely prevalent opinion that the whole of Italy was conquered by the force of Roman arms, and joined to the empire [of the Republic] against its will. Roman valour and the admirable organization of the legions, it is true, contributed to extend the dominion of Rome, but they were not nearly so effective as the political wisdom of the Roman senate. . . . The subjects of Rome were called by the honourable name of allies (Socii). But the manner in which they had become allies was not always the same. It differed widely according to circumstances. Some had joined Rome on an equal footing by a free alliance ('*fœdus æquum*'), which implied nothing like subjection. . . . Others sought the alliance of Rome as a protection from pressing enemies or troublesome neighbours. . . . On the whole, the condition of the allies, Latin colonies as well as confederated Italians, seems to have been satisfactory, at least in the earlier period. . . . But even the right of self-government which Rome had left to the Italian communities proved an illusion in all cases where the interests of the ruling town seemed to require it. A law passed in Rome, nay, a simple senatorial decree, or a magisterial order, could at pleasure be applied to the whole of Italy. Roman law gradually took the place of local laws, though the Italians had no part in the legislation of the Roman people, or any influence on the decrees of the Roman senate and magistrates. . . . All public works in Italy, such as roads, aqueducts, and temples, were carried out solely for the benefit of Rome. . . . Not in peace only, but also in the time of war, the allies were gradually made to feel how heavily the hand of Rome weighed upon them. . . . In proportion as with the increase of their power the Romans felt more and more secure and independent of the allies, they showed them less consideration and tenderness, and made them feel that they had gradually sunk from their former position of friends to be no more than subjects." There was increasing discontent among the Italian allies, or Socii, with this state of things, especially after the time of the Gracchi, when a

proposal to extend the Roman citizenship and franchise to them was strongly pressed. In the next generation after the murder of Caius Gracchus, there arose another political reformer, Marcus Livius Drusus, who likewise sought to have justice done to the Italians, by giving them a voice in the state which owed its conquests to their arms. He, too, was killed by the political enemies he provoked; and then the allies determined to enforce their claims by war. The tribes of the Sabellian race—Marsians, Samnites, Hirpenians, Lucanians, and their fellows—organized a league, with the town of Corfinium (its name changed to Italica) for its capital, and broke into open revolt. The prominence of the Marsians in the struggle caused the war which ensued to be sometimes called the Marsian War; it was also called the Italian War, but, more commonly, the Social War. It was opened, B. C. 90, by a horrible massacre of Roman citizens residing at Asculum, Picenum,—a tragedy for the guilt of which that town paid piteously the next year, when it was taken at the end of a long siege and after a great battle fought under its walls. But the Romans had suffered many defeats before that achievement was reached. At the end of the first year of the war they had made no headway against the revolt, and it is the opinion of Ihne and other historians that "Rome never was so near her destruction," and that "her downfall was averted, not by the heroism of her citizens, as in the war of Hannibal, but by a reversal" of her "policy of selfish exclusion and haughty disdain." A law called the Julian Law, because proposed by the consul L. Julius Caesar, was adopted B. C. 90, which gave the Roman franchise to the Latins, and to all the other Italian communities which had so far remained faithful. Soon afterward two of the new tribunes carried a further measure, the Plautio-Papirian Law, which offered the same privilege to any Italian who, within two months, should present himself before a Roman magistrate to claim it. These concessions broke the spirit of the revolt and the Roman armies began to be victorious. Sulla, who was in the field, added greatly to his reputation by successes at Nola (where his army honored him by acclaim with the title of Imperator) and at Bovianum, which he took. The last important battle of the war was fought on the old blood-drenched plain of Cannæ, and this time the victory was for Rome. After that, for another year, some desperate towns and remnants of the revolted Socii held out, but their resistance was no more than the death throes of a lost cause.—W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 6, ch. 9, with foot-note, and bk. 7, ch. 18-14.

Also in: G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 2, ch. 15-16.—B. G. Niebuhr, *Lect's on the Hist. of Rome*, lect. 88-84 (v. 2).

B. C. 88-78.—Rivalry of Marius and Sulla.—War with Mithridates.—Civil war.—Successive proscriptions and reigns of terror.—Sulla's dictatorship.—The political diseases of which the Roman Republic was dying made quick progress in the generation that passed between the murder of Caius Gracchus and the Social War. The Roman rabble which was nominally sovereign and the oligarchy which ruled actually, by combined bribery and brow-beating of the populace, had both been worse corrupted and debased by the increasing flow of

tribute and plunder from provinces and subject states. Rome had familiarized itself with mob violence, and the old respect for authority and for law was dead. The soldier with an army at his back need not stand any longer in awe of the fasces of a tribune or a consul. It was a natural consequence of that state of things that the two foremost soldiers of the time, Caius Marius and L. Cornelius Sulla (or Sylla, as often written,) should become the recognized chiefs of the two opposing factions of the day. Marius was old, his military glory was waning, he had enjoyed six consulships and coveted a seventh; Sulla was in the prime of life, just fairly beginning to show his surpassing capabilities and entering on his real career. Marius was a plebeian of plebeians and rude in all his tastes; Sulla came from the great Cornelian gens, and refined a little the dissoluteness of his life by studies of Greek letters and philosophy. Marius was sulkily jealous; Sulla was resolutely ambitious. A new war, which promised great prizes to ambition and cupidity, alike, was breaking out in the east,—the war with Mithridates. Both Marius and Sulla aspired to the command in it; but Sulla had been elected one of the consuls for the year 88 B. C. and, by custom and law, would have the conduct of the war assigned to him. Marius, however, intrigued with the demagogues and leaders of the mob, and brought about a turbulent demonstration and popular vote, by which he could claim to be appointed to lead the forces of the state against Mithridates. Sulla fled to his army, in camp at Nola, and laid his case before the officers and men. The former, for the most part, shrank from opposing themselves to Rome; the latter had no scruples and demanded to be led against the Roman mob. Sulla took them at their word, and marched them straight to the city. For the first time in its history (by no means the last) the great capital was forcibly entered by one of its own armies. There was some resistance, but not much. Sulla paralyzed his opponents by his energy, and by a threat to burn the city if it did not submit. Marius and his chief partisans fled. Sulla contented himself with outlawing twelve, some of whom were taken and put to death. Marius, himself, escaped to Africa, after many strange adventures, in the story of which there is romance unquestionably mixed. Sulla (with his colleague in harmony with him) fulfilled the year of his consulate at Rome and then departed for Greece to conduct the war against Mithridates. In doing so, he certainly knew that he was giving up the government to his enemies, but he trusted his future in a remarkable way, and the necessity, for Rome, of confronting Mithridates was imperative. The departure of Sulla was the signal for fresh disorders at Rome. Cinna, one of the new consuls, was driven from the city, and became the head of a movement which appealed to the "new citizens," as they were called, or the "Italian party"—the allies who had been enfranchised as the result of the Social War. Marius came back from exile to join it. Sertorius and Carbo were other leaders who played important parts. Presently there were four armies beleaguering Rome, and after some unsuccessful resistance the gates were opened to them, by order of the Roman senate. Cinna, the consul, was nominally restored to authority, but Marius was really supreme, and Marius was

implacable in his sullen rage. Rome was treated like a conquered city. The public and private enemies of Marius and of all who chose to call themselves Marians, were hunted down and slain. To stop the massacre, at last, Sertorius—the best of the new masters of Rome—was forced to turn his soldiers against the bands of the assassins and to slaughter several thousands of them. Then some degree of order was restored and there was the quiet in Rome of a city of the dead. The next year Marius realized his ambition for a seventh consulship, but died before the end of the first month of it. Meantime, Sulla devoted himself steadily to the war against Mithridates [see MITHRIDATIC WARS], watching from afar the sinister course of events at Rome, and making no sign. It was not until the spring of 88 B. C., four years after his departure from Italy and three years after the death of Marius, that he was ready to return and settle accounts with his enemies. On landing with his army in Italy he was joined speedily by Pompey, Crassus, and other important chiefs. Cinna had been killed by mutinous soldiers; Carbo and young Marius were the leaders of the "Italian party." There was a fierce battle at Sacriportus, near Præneste, with young Marius, and a second with Carbo at Clusium. Later, there was another furious fight with the Samnites, under the walls of Rome, at the Colline Gate, where 50,000 of the combatants fell. Then Sulla was master of Rome. Every one of his suspected friends in the senate had been butchered by the last orders of young Marius. His retaliation was not slow; but he pursued it with a horrible deliberation. He made lists, to be posted in public, of men who were marked for death and whom anybody might slay. There are differing accounts of the number doomed by this proscription; according to one annalist the death-roll was swelled to 4,700 before the reign of terror ceased. Sulla ruled as a conqueror until it pleased him to take an official title, when he commanded the people to elect him Dictator, for such term as he might judge to be fit. They obeyed. As Dictator, he proceeded to remodel the Roman constitution by a series of laws which were adopted at his command. One of these laws enfranchised 10,000 slaves and made them citizens. Another took away from the tribunes a great part of their powers; allowed none but members of the senate to be candidates for the office, and no person once a tribune to hold a curule office. Others reconstructed the senate, adding 800 new members to its depleted ranks, and restored to it the judicial function which C. Gracchus had transferred to the knights; they also restored to it the initiative in legislation. Having remodeled the Roman government to his liking, Sulla astounded his friends and enemies by suddenly laying down his dictatorial powers and retiring to private life at his villa, near Puteoli, on the Bay of Naples. There he wrote his memoirs, which have been lost, and gave himself up to the life of pleasure which was even dearer to him than the life of power. But he enjoyed it scarcely a year, when he died, B. C. 78. His body, taken to Rome, was burned with pomp.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 2, ch. 17-29.

Also in: W. Ihne, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 7, ch. 16-29.—Plutarch, *Marius and Sulla*.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 4, ch. 9-10.—C. Merivale, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, ch. 4-5.

B. C. 80.—The throne of Egypt bequeathed to the Republic by Ptolemy Alexander. See Egypt: B. C. 80-48.

B. C. 78-68.—Danger from the legionaries.—Rising power of Pompeius.—Attempt of Lepidus.—Pompeius against Sertorius in Spain.—Insurrection of Spartacus and the Gladiators.—The second Mithridatic War, and war in Armenia.—"The Roman legionary, . . . drawn from the dregs of the populace, and quartered through the best years of his life in Greece and Asia, in Spain and Gaul, lived solely upon his pay, enhanced by extortion or plunder. His thirst of rapine grew upon him. He required his chiefs to indulge him with the spoil of cities and provinces; and when a foreign enemy was not at hand, he was tempted to turn against the subjects of the state, or, if need be, against the state itself. . . . Marius and Sulla, Cinna and Carbo had led the forces of Rome against Rome herself. . . . The problem which thus presented itself to the minds of patriots—how, namely, to avert the impending dissolution of their polity under the blows of their own defenders—was indeed an anxious and might well appear a hopeless one. It was to the legions only that they could trust, and the legions were notoriously devoted to their chiefs. . . . The triumph of Sulla had been secured by the accession to his side of Pompeius Strabo, the commander of a large force quartered in Italy. These troops had transferred their obedience to a younger Pompeius, the son of their late leader. Under his auspices they had gained many victories; they had put down the Marian faction, headed by Carbo, in Sicily, and had finally secured the ascendancy of the senate on the shores of Africa. Sulla had evinced some jealousy of their captain, who was young in years, and as yet had not risen above the rank of Eques; but when Pompeius led his victorious legions back to Italy, the people rose in the greatest enthusiasm to welcome him, and the dictator, yielding to their impetuosity, had granted him a triumph and hailed him with the title of 'Magnus.' Young as he was, he became at once, on the abdication of Sulla, the greatest power in the commonwealth. This he soon caused to be known and felt. The lead of the senatorial party had now fallen to Q. Lutatius Catulus and M. Æmilius Lepidus, the heads of two of the oldest and noblest families of Rome. The election of these chiefs to the consulship for the year 676 of the city (B. C. 78) seemed to secure for the time the ascendancy of the nobles, and the maintenance of Sulla's oligarchical constitution bequeathed to their care. . . . But there were divisions within the party itself which seemed to seize the opportunity for breaking forth. Lepidus was inflamed with ambition to create a faction of his own, and imitate the career of the usurpers before him. . . . But he had miscalculated his strength. Pompeius disavowed him, and lent the weight of his popularity and power to the support of Catulus; and the senate hoped to avert an outbreak by engaging both the consuls by an oath to abstain from assailing each other. During the remainder of his term of office Lepidus refrained from action; but as soon as he reached his province, the Narbonensis in Gaul, he developed his plans, summoned to his standard the Marians, who had taken refuge in great numbers in that region; and invoked the aid of

the Italians, with the promise of restoring to them the lands of which they had been dispossessed by Sulla's veterans. With the aid of M. Junius Brutus, who commanded in the Cisalpine, he made an inroad into Etruria, and called upon the remnant of its people, who had been decimated by Sulla, to rise against the faction of their oppressors. The senate, now thoroughly alarmed, charged Catulus with its defence; the veterans, restless and dissatisfied with their fields and farms, crowded to the standard of Pompeius. Two Roman armies met near the Milvian bridge, a few miles to the north of the city, and Lepidus received a check, which was again and again repeated, till he was driven to flee into Sardinia, and there perished shortly afterwards of fever. Pompeius pursued Brutus into the Cisalpine.

The remnant of [Lepidus'] troops was carried over to Spain by Perperna, and there swelled the forces of an able leader of the same party, Q. Sertorius. Sertorius had established himself strongly in Spain, and aspired to the founding of an independent state; but after a prolonged struggle he was overcome by Pompeius and assassinated by traitors in his own ranks (see SPAIN, B. C. 83-72). Pompeius had thus recovered a great province for the republic at the moment when it seemed on the point of being lost through the inefficiency of one of the senatorial chiefs. Another leader of the dominant party was about to yield him another victory. A war was raging in the heart of Italy. A body of gladiators had broken away from their confinement at Capua under the lead of Spartacus, a Thracian captive, had seized a large quantity of arms, and had made themselves a retreat or place of defence in the crater of Mount Vesuvius [see SPARTACUS, THE RISING OF].

The consuls were directed to lead the legions against them, but were ignominiously defeated [B. C. 72]. In the absence of Pompeius in Spain and of Lucullus in the East, M. Crassus was the most prominent among the chiefs of the party in power. This illustrious noble was a man of great influence, acquired more by his wealth, for which he obtained the surname of Dives, than for any marked ability in the field or in the forum, but he had a large following of clients and dependents, who now swelled the cry for placing a powerful force under his orders, and entrusting to his hands the deliverance of Italy. The brigands themselves were becoming demoralized by lack of discipline. Crassus drove them before him to the extremity of the peninsula. . . . Spartacus could only save a remnant of them by furiously breaking through the lines of his assailants. This brave gladiator was still formidable, and it was feared that Rome itself might be exposed to his desperate attack. The senate sent importunate messages to recall both Pompeius and Lucullus to its defence. . . . Spartacus had now become an easy prey, and the laurels were quickly won with which Pompeius was honoured by his partial countrymen. Crassus was deeply mortified, and the senate itself might feel some alarm at the redoubled triumphs of a champion of whose loyalty it was not secure. But the senatorial party had yet another leader, and a man of more ability than Crassus, at the head of another army. The authority of Pompeius in the western provinces was balanced in the East by that of L. Licinius Lucullus, who commanded the forces of

the republic in the struggle which she was still maintaining against Mithridates. . . . The military successes of Lucullus fully justified the choice of the government. He expelled Mithridates from all the dominions which he claimed, and drove him to take refuge with the king of Armenia. "The kingdom of Armenia under Tigranes III. was at the height of its power when Clodius, the brother-in-law of Lucullus, then serving under him, was despatched to the royal residence at Tigranocerta to demand the surrender of Mithridates. . . . The capital of Armenia was well defended by its position among the mountains and the length and severity of its winter season. It was necessary to strike once for all [B. C. 69]. Lucullus had a small but well-trained and well-appointed army of veterans. Tigranes surrounded and encumbered himself with a vast cloud of undisciplined barbarians, the flower of whom, consisting of 17,000 mailed cavalry, however formidable in appearance, made but a feeble resistance to the dint of the Roman spear and broadsword. When their ranks were broken they fell back upon the inert masses behind them, and threw them into hopeless confusion. Tigranes made his escape with dastardly precipitation. A bloody massacre ensued. . . . In the following year Lucullus advanced his posts still further eastward. . . . But a spirit of discontent or lassitude had crept over his own soldiers. . . . He was constrained to withdraw from the siege of Artavata, the furthest stronghold of Tigranes, on the banks of the Araxes, and after crowning his victories with a successful assault upon Nisibis, he gave the signal for retreat, leaving the destruction of Mithridates still unaccomplished. Meanwhile the brave proconsul's enemies were making head against him at Rome."—C. Merivale, *The Roman Triumvirates*, ch. 1.—Lucullus "wished to consummate the ruin of Tigranes, and afterwards to carry his arms to Parthia. He had not this perilous glory. Hitherto, his principal means of success had been to conciliate the people, by restraining the avidity both of his soldiers and of the Italian publicans. The first refused to pursue a war which only enriched the general; the second wrote to Rome, where the party of knights was every day regaining its ancient ascendancy. They accused of rapacity him who had repressed theirs. All were inclined to believe, in short, that Lucullus had drawn enormous sums from the towns which he preserved from the soldiers and publicans. They obtained the appointment of a successor, and by this change the fruit of this conquest was in a great measure lost. Even before Lucullus had quitted Asia, Mithridates re-entered Pontus, invaded Cappadocia, and leagued himself more closely with the pirates."—J. Michelet, *Hist. of the Roman Republic*, p. 308.—"It was imagined at Rome that Mithridates was as good as conquered, and that a new province of Bithynia and Pontus was awaiting organisation. . . . Ten commissioners as usual had been despatched to assist. . . . Lucullus had hoped before their arrival to strike some blow to recover his losses; but Marcus Rex had refused his appeal for help from Cilicia, and his own troops had . . . declined to march. . . . when they learnt that the command was about to pass from Lucullus to Glabrio,"—E. S. Shuckburgh, *Hist. of Rome to the Battle of Actium*, p. 677.

Also in: Plutarch, *Pompeius Magnus*.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 2, ch. 80-83, and v. 3, ch. 1-5.—G. Rawlinson, *Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 10.

B. C. 69-63.—The drift towards revolution.

—Pompeius in the East.—His extraordinary

commission.—His enlargement of the Roman

dominions.—His power.—Ambitions and projects

of Cæsar.—Consulship of Cicero.—“To

a superficial observer, at the close of the year 70

B. C., it might possibly have seemed that the

Republic had been given a new lease of life

. . . And, indeed, for two or three years this

promising condition of things continued. The

years 69 and 68 B. C. must have been tolerably

quiet ones, for our authorities have very little to

tell us of them. . . . Had a single real statesman

appeared on the scene at this moment, or even

if the average senator or citizen had been pos-

sessed of some honesty and insight, it was not

impossible that the government might have been

carried on fairly well even under republican

forms. But there was no leading statesman of

a character suited to raise the whole tone of

politics; and there was no general disposition on

the part of either Senate or people to make the

best of the lull in the storm, to repair damages,

or to set the ship on her only true course. So

the next few years show her fast drifting in the

direction of revolution, and the current that

bore her was not a local one, or visible to the

eye of the ordinary Roman, but one of world-

wide force, whose origin and direction could

only be perceived by the highest political intelli-

gence. It was during these years that Cæsar

was quietly learning the business of government,

both at home and in the provinces. . . . Cæsar

was elected *questor* in 69 B. C., and served the

office in the following year. It fell to him

to begin his acquaintance with government

in the province of Further Spain, and thus began

his lifelong connection with the peoples of the

West. On his return to Rome, which must

have taken place about the beginning of 67 B. C.,

Cæsar was drawn at once into closer connection

with the man who, during the next twenty

years, was to be his friend, his rival, and his

enemy. Pompeius was by this time tired of a

quiet life. . . . Both to him and his friends, it

seemed impossible to be idle any longer. There

was real and abundant reason for the employ-

ment of the ablest soldier of the day. The

audacity of the pirates was greater than ever

[see *CILICIA, PIRATES OF*]. Lucullus, too, in

Asia, had begun to meet with disasters, and

was unable, with his troops in a mutinous tem-

per, to cope with the combined forces of the

kings of Armenia and Pontus. . . . In this year,

67 B. C., a bill was proposed by a tribune,

Gabinus, in the assembly of the plebs, in spite

of opposition in the Senate, giving Pompeius

exactly that extensive power against the pirates

which he himself desired, and which was really

necessary if the work was to be done swiftly

and completely. He was to have exclusive com-

mand for three years over the whole Mediter-

raean, and over the resources of the provinces

and dependent states. For fifty miles inland in

every province bordering on these seas—i.e.,

in the whole Empire—he was to exercise an

authority equal to that of the existing provin-

cial governor. He was to have almost unlimited

means of raising both fleets and armies, and

was to nominate his own staff of twenty-five

‘legati’ (lieutenant-generals), who were all to

have the rank of prætor. Nor was this all, for

it was quite understood that this was only part

of a plan which was to place him at the head of

the armies in Asia Minor, superseding the able

but now discredited Lucullus. In fact, by

another law of Gabinus, Lucullus was recalled,

and his command given to one of the consuls of

the year, neither of whom, as was well known,

was likely to wield it with the requisite ability.

Whichever consul it might be, he would only be

recognised as keeping the place warm for Pom-

peius. . . . Pompeius left Rome in the spring

of 67 B. C., rapidly cleared the seas of piracy,

and in the following year superseded Lucullus

in the command of the war against Mithridates

[with the powers given him by the Gabinian Law

prolonged and extended by another, known as the

Mamian Law]. He did not return till the begin-

ning of 61 B. C. At first sight it might seem as

though his absence should have cleared the air,

and left the political leaders at Rome a freer

hand. But the power and the resources voted

him and the unprecedented success with which he

used them, made him in reality as formidable to

the parties at home as he was to the peoples of

the East. He put an end at last to the power

of Mithridates, received the submission of Ti-

granes of Armenia, and added to the Roman

dominion the greater part of the possessions of

both these kings. The sphere of Roman influ-

ence now for the first time reached the river

Euphrates, and the Empire was brought into

contact with the great Parthian kingdom beyond

it. Asia Minor became wholly Roman, with the

exception of some part of the interior, which

obedient kinglets were allowed to retain. Syria

was made a Roman province. Pompeius took

Jerusalem and added Judæa to Syria [see *Jews*:

B. C. 166-40]. The man to whom all this

was due became at once the leading figure in the

world. It became clear that when his career of

conquest was over yet another task would

devolve on him, if he chose to accept it—the

reorganisation of the central government at

Rome. . . . His gathered power overhanging

the state like an avalanche ready to fall, and in the

possible path of an avalanche it is waste of time

and labour to build any solid work. So these

years, for Cæsar as for the rest, are years of

plotting and intrigue on one side, and of half-

hearted government on the other. . . . He was

elected to the curule ædileship—the next above

the *questorship* in the series of magistracies—

and entered on his office on January 1, 65 B. C.

. . . . Cæsar’s political connection with Crassus at

this time is by no means clear. The two were

sailing the same course, and watching Pompeius

with the same anxiety, but there could not have

been much in common between them, and they

were in fact rapidly getting in each other’s way.

The great money-lender, however, must have

been in the main responsible for the enormous

expenditure which Cæsar risked in this ædileship

and the next three years. . . . At the close of

the year 64 B. C., on the accession to office of a

new board of tribunes, . . . an agrarian bill on

a vast scale was promulgated by the tribune

Servilius Rullus. The two most startling fea-

tures of this were, first, the creation of a board

of ten to carry out its provisions, each member

of which was to be invested with military and

judicial powers like those of the consuls and prætors; and secondly, the clauses which entrusted this board with enormous financial resources, to be raised by the public sale of all the territories and property acquired since the year 88 B. C., together with the booty and revenues now in the hands of Pompeius. The bill included, as its immediate object, a huge scheme of colonisation for Italy, on the lines of the Gracchan agrarian bills. . . . But it was really an attack on the weak fortress of senatorial government, in order to turn out its garrison, and occupy and fortify it in the name of the democratic or Marian party, against the return of the new Sulla, which was now thought to be imminent. The bill may also have had another and secondary object—namely, to force the hand of the able and ambitious consul [Cicero] who would come into office on January 1, 68; at any rate it succeeded in doing this, though it succeeded in nothing else. Cicero's great talents, and the courage and skill with which he had so far for the most part used them, had made him already a considerable power in Rome; but no one knew for certain to which party he would finally attach himself. . . . On the very first day of his office he attacked the bill in the Senate and exposed its real intention, and showed plainly that his policy was to convert Pompeius into a pillar of the constitution, and to counteract all democratic plots directed against him. . . . Whether it was his eloquence, or the people's indifference, that caused the bill to be dropped, can only be matter of conjecture; but it was withdrawn at once by its proposer, and the whole scheme fell through. This was Cicero's first and only real victory over Cæsar. . . . It was about this time, in the spring of 68 B. C., that the office of Pontifex Maximus became vacant by the death of old Metellus Pius, and Cæsar at once took steps to secure it for himself. The chances in his favour were small, but the prize was a tempting one. Success would place him at the head of the whole Roman religious system. . . . He was eligible, for he had already been for several years one of the college of pontifices, but as the law of election stood, a man so young and so democratic would have no chance against candidates like the venerable conservative leader Catulus, and Cæsar's own old commander in the East, Servilius Isauricus, both of whom were standing. Sulla's law, which placed the election in the hands of the college itself—a law framed expressly to exclude persons of Cæsar's stamp—must be repealed, and the choice vested once more in the people. The useful tribune Labienus was again set to work, the law was passed, and on March 8th Cæsar was elected by a large majority. . . . The latter part of this memorable year was occupied with a last and desperate attempt of the democratic party to possess themselves of the state power while there was yet time to forestall Pompeius. This is the famous conspiracy of Catilina; it was an attack of the left wing on the senatorial position, and the real leaders of the democracy took no open or active part in it.—W. W. Fowler, *Julius Cæsar*, ch. 4-5.

Also in J. A. Froude, *Cæsar*, ch. 10.—Suetonius, *Lives of the Twelve Cæsars: Julius*, sect. 7-18.—C. Middleton, *Life of Cicero*, sect. 2.

B. C. 63.—The conspiracy of Catiline.—The conspiracy organized against the senatorial

government of Rome by L. Sergius Catilina, B. C. 63, owes much of its prominence in Roman history to the preservation of the great speeches in which Cicero exposed it, and by which he rallied the Roman people to support him in putting it down. Cicero was consul that year, and the official responsibility of the government was on his shoulders. The central conspirators were a desperate, disreputable clique of men, who had everything to gain and nothing to lose by revolution. Behind them were all the discontents and malignant tempers of demoralized and disorganized Rome; and still behind these were suspected to be, darkly hidden, the secret intrigues of men like Cæsar and Crassus, who watched and waited for the expiring breath of the dying republic. Cicero, having made a timely discovery of the plot, managed the disclosure of it with great adroitness and won the support of the people to his proceedings against the conspirators. Catiline made his escape from Rome and placed himself at the head of a small army which his supporters had raised in Etruria; but he and it were both destroyed in the single battle fought. Five of his fellow-conspirators were hastily put to death without trial, by being strangled in the Tullianum.—W. Forsyth, *Life of Cicero*, ch. 8.

Also in A. Trollope, *Life of Cicero*, ch. 9.—A. J. Church, *Roman Life in the Days of Cicero*, ch. 7.—Cicero, *Orations* (tr. by C. D. Yonge), v. 2.

B. C. 63-58.—Increasing disorders in the capital.—The wasted opportunities of Pompeius.—His alliance with Cæsar and Crassus.—The First Triumvirate.—Cæsar's consulship.—His appointment to the command in Cisalpine Gaul.—Exile of Cicero.—Recent events had fully demonstrated the impotence of both the Senate and the democratic party; neither was strong enough to defeat the other or to govern the State. There was no third party—no class remaining out of which a government might be erected; the only alternative was monarchy—the rule of a single person. Who the monarch would be was still uncertain; though, at the present moment, Pompeius was clearly the only man in whose power it lay to take up the crown that offered itself. . . . For the moment the question which agitated all minds was whether Pompeius would accept the gift offered him by fortune, or would retire and leave the throne vacant. . . . In the autumn of 68 B. C. Quintus Metellus Nepos arrived in the capital from the camp of Pompeius, and got himself elected tribune with the avowed purpose of procuring for Pompeius the command against Catilina by special decree, and afterwards the consulship for 61 B. C. . . . The aristocracy at once showed their hostility to the proposals of Metellus, and Cato had himself elected tribune expressly for the purpose of thwarting him. But the democrats were more pliant, and it was soon evident that they had come to a cordial understanding with the general's emissary. Metellus and his master both adopted the democratic view of the illegal executions [of the Catilinarians]; and the first act of Cæsar's prætorship was to call Catulus to account for the moneys alleged to have been embezzled by him in rebuilding the Capitoline temple and to transfer the superintendence of the works to Pompeius. . . . On the day of voting, Cato and another of the tribunes put their veto upon the proposals of Metellus.

who disregarded it. There were conflicts of the armed bands of both sides, which terminated in favour of the government. The Senate followed up the victory by suspending Metellus and Caesar from their offices. Metellus immediately departed for the camp of Pompeius; and when Caesar disregarded the decree of suspension against himself, the Senate had ultimately to revoke it. Nothing could have been more favourable to the interests of Pompeius than these late events. After the illegal executions of the Catilinarians, and the acts of violence against Metellus, he 'could appear at once as the defender of the two palladia of Roman liberty'—the right of appeal, and the inviolability of the tribunate,—and as the champion of the party of order against the Catilinarian band. But his courage was unequal to the emergency; he lingered in Asia during the winter of 63-62 B. C., and thus gave the Senate time to crush the insurrection in Italy, and deprived himself of a valid pretext for keeping his legions together. In the autumn of 62 B. C. he landed at Brundisium, and, disbanding his army, proceeded to Rome with a small escort. On his arrival in the city in 61 B. C. he found himself in a position of complete isolation, he was feared by the democrats, hated by the aristocracy, and distrusted by the wealthy class. He at once demanded for himself a second consulship, the confirmation of all his acts in the East, and the fulfilment of the promise he had made to his soldiers to furnish them with lands. But each of these demands was met with the most determined opposition. . . . His promise of lands to his soldiers was indeed ratified, but not executed, and no steps were taken to provide the necessary funds and lands. . . . From this disagreeable position, Pompeius was rescued by the sagacity and address of Caesar, who saw in the necessities of Pompeius the opportunity of the democratic party. Ever since the return of Pompeius, Caesar had grown rapidly in influence and weight. He had been prætor in 62 B. C., and, in 61, governor in Farther Spain, where he utilized his position to free himself from his debts, and to lay the foundation of the military position he desired for himself. Returning in 60 B. C. he readily relinquished his claim to a triumph, in order to enter the city in time to stand for the consulship. . . . It was quite possible that the aristocracy might be strong enough to defeat the candidature of Caesar, as it had defeated that of Catilina; and again, the consulship was not enough; an extraordinary command, secured to him for several years, was necessary for the fulfilment of his purpose. Without allies such a command could not be hoped for; and allies were found where they had been found ten years before, in Pompeius and Crassus, and in the rich equestrian class. Such a treaty was suicide on the part of Pompeius; . . . but he had drifted into a situation so awkward that he was glad to be released from it on any terms. . . . The bargain was struck in the summer of 60 B. C. [forming what became known in Roman history as the First Triumvirate]. Caesar was promised the consulship and a governorship afterwards; Pompeius, the ratification of his arrangements in the East, and land for his soldiers; Crassus received no definite equivalent, but the capitalists were promised a remission of part of the money they had undertaken to pay for the lease of the

Asiatic taxes. . . . Caesar was easily elected consul for 59 B. C. All that the exertions of the Senate could do was to give him an aristocratic colleague in Marcus Bibulus. Caesar at once proceeded to fulfil his obligations to Pompeius by proposing an agrarian law. All remaining Italian domain land, which meant practically the territory of Capua, was to be given up to allotments, and other estates in Italy were to be purchased out of the revenues of the new Eastern provinces. The soldiers were simply recommended to the commission, and thus the principle of giving rewards of land for military service was not asserted. The execution of the bill was to be entrusted to a commission of twenty. . . . At length all these proposals were passed by the assembly [after rejection by the Senate], and the commission of twenty, with Pompeius and Crassus at their head, began the execution of the agrarian law. Now that the first victory was won, the coalition was able to carry out the rest of its programme without much difficulty. . . . It was determined by the confederates that Caesar should be invested by decree of the people with a special command resembling that lately held by Pompeius. Accordingly the tribune Vatinius submitted to the tribes a proposal which was at once adopted. By it Caesar obtained the governorship of Cisalpine Gaul, and the supreme command of the three legions stationed there, for five years, with the rank of prætor for his adjutants. His jurisdiction extended southwards as far as the Rubicon, and included Luca and Ravenna. Subsequently the province of Narbo was added by the Senate, on the motion of Pompeius. . . . Caesar had hardly laid down his consulship when it was proposed, in the Senate, to annul the Julian laws [See JULIAN LAWS]. . . . The regents determined to make examples of some of the most determined of their opponents. Cicero was accordingly sent into exile, by a resolution of the tribes, and Cato was appointed to an odious public mission, which carried him out of the way, to Cyprus.—T. Mommsen, *Hist. of the Roman Republic* (abridged by Bryans and Henty), ch. 33.

ALSO IN G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 3, ch. 17-20.—C. Middleton, *Life of Cicero*, sect. 4.—Napoleon III., *Hist. of Julius Caesar*, ch. 3-4.

B. C. 58-51.—Caesar's conquest of Gaul.—See GAUL: B. C. 58-51.

B. C. 57-52.—Effect of Caesar's Gallic victories.—Return of Cicero from exile.—New arrangements of the Triumvirs.—Caesar's Proconsulship extended.—The Trebonian Law.—Disaster and death of Crassus at Carrhæ.—Increasing anarchy in the city.—"In Rome the enemies of Caesar . . . were awed into silence [by his victorious career in Gaul], and the Senate granted the unprecedented honour of fifteen days' 'supplicatio' to the gods for the brilliant successes in Gaul. Among the supporters of this motion, was, as Caesar learnt in the winter from the magistrates and senators who came to pay court to him at Ravenna, M. Tullius Cicero. From the day of his exile the efforts to secure his return had begun, but it was not until the 4th of August that the Senate, led by the consul, P. Lentulus Spinther, carried the motion for his return, in spite of the violence of the armed gang of Clodius, and sum-

moned all the country tribes to crowd the comitia on Campus Martius, and ratify the *senatus consultum*. The return of the great orator to the country which he had saved in the terrible days of 68 B. C. was more like a triumph than the entrance of a pardoned criminal . . . But he had come back on sufferance, the great Three must be conciliated . . . Cicero, like many other optimates in Rome, was looking for the beginnings of a breach between Pompeius, Crassus and Cæsar, and was anxious to nourish any germs of opposition to the triple headed monarchy. He pleaded against Cæsar's friend Vatinius, and he gave notice of a motion for checking the action of the agrarian law in Campania. But these signs of an independent opposition were suddenly terminated by a humiliating recantation, for before entering upon his third campaign Cæsar crossed the Apennines, and appeared at the Roman colony of Luca. Two hundred senators crowded to the rendezvous, but arrangements were made by the Three very independently of Senate in Rome or Senate in Luca. It was agreed that Pompeius and Crassus should hold a joint consulship again next year, and before the expiration of Cæsar's five years they were to secure his re-appointment for another five. Unfortunate Cicero was awed, and in his other speeches of this year tried to win the favor of the great men by supporting their proposed provincial arrangements, and pleading in defence of Cæsar's friend and protégé, L. Balbus. In the year 55 B. C. the Trebonian Law was passed, "which gave to Crassus and Pompeius, as proconsular provinces, Syria and Spain, for the extraordinary term of five years. In this repeated creation of extraordinary powers in favor of the coalition of dynasts, Cato rightly saw an end of republican institutions. . . . Crassus . . . started in 54 B. C., at the head of seven legions, in face of the combined opposition of tribunes and augurs, to secure the eastern frontier of Roman dominion by vanquishing the Parthian power, which, reared on the ruins of the kingdom of the Seleucids, was now supreme in Ctesiphon and Seleucia. Led into the desert by the Arab Sheikh Abgarus, acting as a traitor, the Roman army was surrounded by the fleet Parthian horsemen, who could attack and retreat, shooting their showers of missiles all the time. In the blinding sand and sun of the desert near Carrhæ [on the river Belik, one of the branches of the Euphrates, the supposed site of the Haran of Biblical history], Crassus experienced a defeat which took its rank with Cannæ and the Arausio. A few days afterwards (June 9th, 53 B. C.) he was murdered in a conference to which the commander of the Parthian forces invited him. . . . The shock of this event went through the Roman world, and though Cassius, the lieutenant of Crassus, retrieved the honour of the Roman arms against the Parthians in the following year, that agile people remained to the last unconquered, and the Roman boundary was never to advance further to the east. Crassus, then, was dead, and Pompeius, though he lent Cæsar a legion at the beginning of the year, was more ready to assume the natural antagonism to Cæsar, since the death of his wife Julia in September, 54 B. C., had broken a strong tie with his father-in-law. Further, the condition of the capital seemed reaching a point of

anarchy at which Pompeius, as the only strong man on the spot, would have to be appointed absolute dictator. In 53 B. C. no consuls could, in the violence and turmoil of the comitia, be elected until July, and the year closed without any elections having taken place for 52 B. C. T. Annius Milo, who was a candidate for the consulship, and P. Clodius, who was seeking the prætorship, turned every street of Rome into a gladiatorial arena. In January Clodius was killed. "Pompeius was waiting in his new gardens near the Porta Carmentalis, until a despairing government should invest him with dictatorial power, he was altogether too timid and too constitutional to seize it. But with Cato in Rome no one dared mention the word dictator. Pompeius, disappointed, was named sole consul on the 4th of February [B. C. 52], and by July he had got as his colleague his new father-in-law, Metellus"—R. F. Horton, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 29.

ALSO IN W. Forsyth, *Life of Cicero*, ch. 13-16 (p. 1-2).—C. Merivale, *The Roman Triumvirates*, ch. 5.—G. Rawlinson, *The Sixth Great Oriental Monarchy*, ch. 11.

B. C. 55-54.—Cæsar's invasions of Britain.—See BRITAIN. B. C. 55-54.

B. C. 52-50.—Rivalry of Pompeius and Cæsar.—Approach of the crisis.—Cæsar's legions in motion towards the capital.—"Cæsar had long ago resolved upon the overthrow of Pompey, as had Pompey, for that matter, upon his. For Crassus, the fear of whom had hitherto kept them in peace, having now been killed in Parthia, if the one of them wished to make himself the greatest man in Rome, he had only to overthrow the other, and if he again wished to prevent his own fall he had nothing for it but to be beforehand with him whom he feared. Pompey had not been long under any such apprehensions, having till lately despised Cæsar, as thinking it no difficult matter to put down him whom he himself had advanced. But Cæsar had entertained this design from the beginning against his rivals, and had retired, like an expert wrestler, to prepare himself apart for the combat. Making the Gallic wars his exercise ground, he had at once improved the strength of his soldiery, and had heightened his own glory by his great actions, so that he was looked on as one who might challenge comparison with Pompey. Nor did he let go any of those advantages which were now given him, both by Pompey himself and the times, and the ill government of Rome, where all who were candidates for office publicly gave money, and without any shame bribed the people, who, having received their pay, did not contend for their benefactors with their bare suffrages, but with bows, swords and slings. So that after having many times stained the place of election with the blood of men killed upon the spot, they left the city at last without a government at all, to be carried about like a ship without a pilot to steer her; while all who had any wisdom could only be thankful if a course of such wild and stormy disorder and madness might end no worse than in a monarchy. Some were so bold as to declare openly that the government was incurable but by a monarchy, and that they ought to take that remedy from the hands of the gentlest physician, meaning Pompey, who, though in words he pretended to

decline it, yet in reality made his utmost efforts to be declared dictator. Cato, perceiving his design, prevailed with the Senate to make him sole consul [B. C. 52], that with the offer of a more legal sort of monarchy he might be withheld from demanding the dictatorship. They over and above voted him the continuance of his provinces, for he had two, Spain and all Africa, which he governed by his lieutenants, and maintained armies under him, at the yearly charge of a thousand talents out of the public treasury. Upon this Cæsar also sent and petitioned for the consulship, and the continuance of his provinces. Pompey at first did not stir in it, but Marcellus and Lentulus opposed it, who had always hated Cæsar, and now did everything, whether fit or unfit, which might disgrace and affront him. For they took away the privilege of Roman citizens from the people of New Comum, who were a colony that Cæsar had lately planted in Gaul; and Marcellus, who was then consul, ordered one of the senators of that town, then at Rome, to be whipped [B. C. 51], and told him he laid that mark upon him to signify he was no citizen of Rome, bidding him, when he went back again, to show it to Cæsar. After Marcellus's consulship, Cæsar began to lavish gifts upon all the public men out of the riches he had taken from the Gauls, discharged Curio, the tribune, from his great debts, gave Paulus, then consul, 1,500 talents, with which he built the noble court of justice adjoining the forum, to supply the place of that called the Fulvian. Pompey, alarmed at these preparations, now openly took steps, both by himself and his friends, to have a successor appointed in Cæsar's room, and sent to demand back the soldiers whom he had lent him to carry on the wars in Gaul. Cæsar returned them, and made each soldier a present of 250 drachmas. The officer who brought them home to Pompey, spread amongst the people no very fair or favorable report of Cæsar, and flattered Pompey himself with false suggestions that he was wished for by Cæsar's army; and though his affairs here were in some embarrassment through the envy of some, and the ill state of the government, yet there the army was at his command, and if they once crossed into Italy, would presently declare for him; so weary were they of Cæsar's endless expeditions, and so suspicious of his designs for a monarchy. Upon this Pompey grew presumptuous, and neglected all warlike preparations, as fearing no danger. . . . Yet the demands which Cæsar made had the fairest colors of equity imaginable. For he proposed to lay down his arms, and that Pompey should do the same, and both together should become private men, and each expect a reward of his services from the public. For that those who proposed to disarm him, and at the same time to confirm Pompey in all the power he held, were simply establishing the one in the tyranny which they accused the other of aiming at. When Curio made these proposals to the people in Cæsar's name, he was loudly applauded, and some threw garlands towards him, and dismissed him as they do successful wrestlers, crowned with flowers. Antony, being tribune, produced a letter sent from Cæsar on this occasion, and read it, though the consuls did what they could to oppose it. But Scipio, Pompey's father-in-law, proposed in the Senate, that if Cæsar did not lay down his arms within such a time, he should be voted an enemy; and the

consuls putting it to the question, whether Pompey should dismiss his soldiers, and again, whether Cæsar should dishband his, very few assented to the first, but almost all to the latter. But Antony proposing again, that both should lay down their commissions, all but a very few agreed to it. Scipio was upon this very violent, and Lentulus the consul cried aloud, that they had need of arms, and not of suffrages, against a robber; so that the senators for the present adjourned, and appeared in mourning as a mark of their grief for the dissension. Afterwards there came other letters from Cæsar, which seemed yet more moderate, for he proposed to quit everything else, and only to retain Gaul within the Alps, Illyricum, and two legions, till he should stand a second time for consul. Cicero, the orator, who was lately returned from Cilicia, endeavored to reconcile differences, and softened Pompey, who was willing to comply in other things, but not to allow him the soldiers. At last Cicero used his persuasions with Cæsar's friends to accept of the provinces and 6,000 soldiers only, and so to make up the quarrel. And Pompey was inclined to give way to this, but Lentulus, the consul, would not hearken to it, but drove Antony and Curio out of the senate-house with insults, by which he afforded Cæsar [then at Ravenna] the most plausible pretence that could be, and one which he could readily use to inflame the soldiers, by showing them two persons of such repute and authority, who were forced to escape in a hired carriage in the dress of slaves. For so they were glad to disguise themselves, when they fled out of Rome. There were not about him at that time [November, B. C. 50] above 300 horse, and 5,000 foot; for the rest of his army, which was left behind the Alps, was to be brought after him by officers who had received orders for that purpose. But he thought the first motion towards the design which he had on foot did not require large forces at present, and that what was wanted was to make this first step suddenly, and so as to astound his enemies with the boldness of it. . . . Therefore, he commanded his captains and other officers to go only with their swords in their hands, without any other arms, and make themselves masters of Ariminum, a large city of Gaul, with as little disturbance and bloodshed as possible. He committed the care of these forces to Hortensius, and himself spent the day in public as a stander by and spectator of the gladiators, who exercised before him. A little before night he attended to his person, and then went into the hall, and conversed for some time with those he had invited to supper, till it began to grow dusk, when he rose from table, and made his excuses to the company, begging them to stay till he came back, having already given private directions to a few immediate friends, that they should follow him, not all the same way, but some one way, some another. He himself got into one of the hired carriages, and drove at first another way, but presently turned towards Ariminum." —Plutarch, *Cæsar* (Clough's Dryden's trans.)

Also in Cæsar, *Commentaries on the Civil War*, bk. 1, ch. 1-8.—T. Arnold, *Hist. of the Later Roman Commonwealth*, ch. 8 (v. 1).

B. C. 50-49.—Cæsar's passage of the Rubicon.—Flight of Pompeius and the Consuls from Italy.—Cæsar at the capital.—"About ten miles from Ariminum, and twice that distance

from Ravenna, the frontier of Italy and Gaul was traced by the stream of the Rubicon. This little river, red with the drainage of the peat mosses from which it descends [and evidently deriving its name from its color], is formed by the union of three mountain torrents, and is nearly dry in the summer, like most of the water courses on the eastern side of the Apennines. In the month of November the winter flood might present a barrier more worthy of the important position which it once occupied; but the northern frontier of Italy had long been secure from invasion, and the channel was spanned by a bridge of no great dimensions. . . . The ancients amused themselves with picturing the guilty hesitation with which the founder of a line of despots stood, as they imagined, on the brink of the fatal river [in the night of the 27th of November, B. C. 50, corrected calendar, or January 15, B. C. 49, without the correction], and paused for an instant before he committed the irrevocable act, pregnant with the destinies of a long futurity. Caesar, indeed, in his *Commentaries*, makes no allusion to the passage of the Rubicon, and at the moment of stepping on the bridge, his mind was probably absorbed in the arrangements he had made for the march of his legions or for their reception by his friends in Ariminum."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 14.—After the crossing of the Rubicon there were still more messages between Caesar and Pompey, and the consuls supporting the latter. "Each demands that the other shall first abandon his position. Of course, all these messages mean nothing. Caesar, complaining bitterly of injustice, sends a portion of his small army still farther into the Roman territory. Marc Antony goes to Arezzo with five cohorts, and Caesar occupies three other cities with a cohort each. The marvel is that he was not attacked and driven back by Pompey. We may probably conclude that the soldiers, though under the command of Pompey, were not trustworthy as against Caesar. As Caesar regrets his two legions, so no doubt do the two legions regret their commander. At any rate, the consular forces, with Pompey and the consuls and a host of senators, retreat southwards to Brundisium—Brindisi—intending to leave Italy. . . . During this retreat, the first blood in the civil war is spilt at Corfinium, a town which, if it now stood at all, would stand in the Abruzzi. Caesar there is victor in a small engagement, and obtained possession of the town. The Pompeian officers whom he finds there he sends away, and allows them even to carry with them money which he believes to have been taken from the public treasury. Throughout his route southward the soldiers of Pompey—who had heretofore been his soldiers—return to him. Pompey and the consuls still retreat, and still Caesar follows them, though Pompey had boasted, when first warned to beware of Caesar, that he had only to stamp upon Italian soil and legions would arise from the earth ready to obey him. He knows, however, that away from Rome, in her provinces, in Macedonia and Achæa, in Asia and Cilicia, in Sicily, Sardinia, and Africa, in Mauritania and the two Spains, there are Roman legions which as yet know no Caesar. It may be better for Pompey that he should stamp his foot somewhere out of Italy. At any rate he sends the obedient consuls and his attendant senators

over to Dyrrhachium in Illyria with a part of his army, and follows with the remainder as soon as Caesar is at his heels. Caesar makes an effort to intercept him and his fleet, but in that he fails. Thus Pompey deserts Rome and Italy,—and never again sees the imperial city or the fair land. Caesar explains to us why he does not follow his enemy and endeavour at once to put an end to the struggle. Pompey is provided with shipping and he is not; and he is aware that the force of Rome lies in her provinces. Moreover, Rome may be starved by Pompey, unless he, Caesar, can take care that the corn-growing countries, which are the granaries of Rome, are left free for the use of the city."—A. Trollope, *The Commentaries of Caesar*, ch. 9.—Turning back from Brundisium, Caesar proceeded to Rome to take possession of the seat of government which his enemies had abandoned to him. He was scrupulous of legal forms, and, being a proconsul, holding military command, did not enter the city in person. But he called together, outside of the walls, such of the senators as were in Rome and such as could be persuaded to return to the city, and obtained their formal sanction to various acts. Among the measures so authorized was the appropriation of the sacred treasure stored up in the vaults of the temple of Saturn. It was a consecrated reserve, to be used for no purpose except the repelling of a Gallic invasion—which had been, for many generations, the greatest dread of Rome. Caesar claimed it, because he had put an end to that fear, by conquering the Gauls. His stay at Rome on this occasion (April, B. C. 49) was brief, for he needed to make haste to encounter the Pompeian legions in Spain, and to secure the submission of all the west before he followed Pompeius into the Eastern world.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 1-4.

ALSO IN J. A. Froude, *Caesar*, ch. 21.

B. C. 49.—Caesar's first campaign against the Pompeians in Spain.—His conquest of Massilia.—In Spain, all the strong forces of the country were commanded by partisans of Pompeius and the Optimæ party. Caesar had already sent forward C. Fabius from Southern Gaul with three legions, to take possession of the passes of the Pyrenees and the principal Spanish roads. Following quickly in person, he found that his orders had been vigorously obeyed. Fabius was confronting the Pompeian generals, Afranius and Petreius at Ilerda (modern Lerida in Catalonia), on the river Sicoris (modern Segre), where they made their stand. They had five legions of well-trained veterans, besides native auxiliaries to a considerable number. Caesar's army, with the reinforcements that he had added to it, was about the same. The Pompeians had every advantage of position, commanding the passage of the river by a permanent bridge of stone and drawing supplies from both banks. Caesar, on the other hand, had great difficulty in maintaining his communications, and was placed in mortal peril by a sudden flood which destroyed his bridges. Yet, without any general battle, by pure strategic skill and by resistless energy, he forced the hostile army out of its advantageous position, intercepted its retreat and compelled an unconditional surrender. This Spanish campaign, which occupied but forty days, and which was decisive of the contest for all Spain, was one of the finest of Caesar's military

achievements. The Greek city of Massilia (modern Marseilles), still nominally independent and the ally of Rome, although surrounded by the Roman conquests in Gaul, had seen fit to range itself on the side of Pompeius and the Optimates, and to close its gates in the face of Cæsar, when he set out for his campaign in Spain. He had not hesitated to leave three legions of his moderate army before the city, while he ordered a fleet to be built at Arêlates (Arles), for coöperation in the siege. Decimus Brutus commanded the fleet and Trebonius was the general of the land force. The siege was made notable by remarkable engineering operations on both sides, but the courage of the Massiliots was of no long endurance. When Cæsar returned from his Spanish campaign he found them ready to surrender. Notwithstanding they had been guilty of a great act of treachery during the siege, by breaking an armistice, he spared their city, on account, he said, of its name and antiquity. His soldiers, who had expected rich booty, were offended, and a dangerous mutiny, which occurred soon afterwards at Placentia, had this for its main provocation.—Cæsar, *The Civil War*, bk. 1, ch. 38-81, and bk. 2, ch. 1-22.

ALSO IN G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 5 and 8.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 15-16.

B. C. 48.—The war in Epirus and Thessaly.—Cæsar's decisive victory at Pharsalia.—Having established his authority in Italy, Gaul and Spain, and having legalized it by procuring from the assembly of the Roman citizens his formal election to the consulship, for the year A. U. 706 (B. C. 48), Cæsar prepared to follow Pompeius and the Senatorial party across the Adriatic. As the calendar then stood, it was in January that he arrived at Brundisium to take ship, but the season corresponded with November in the calendar as Cæsar, himself, corrected it soon afterwards. The vessels at his command were so few that he could transport only 15,500 of his troops on the first expedition, and it was with that number that he landed at Palæste on the coast of Epirus. The sea was swarming with the fleets of his enemies, and, although he escaped them in going, his small squadron was caught on the return voyage and many of its ships destroyed. Moreover, the Pompeian cruisers became so vigilant that the second detachment of his army, left behind at Brundisium, under Marcus Antonius, found no opportunity to follow him until the winter had nearly passed. Meantime, with his small force, Cæsar proceeded boldly into Macedonia to confront Pompeius, reducing fortresses and occupying towns as he marched. Although his great antagonist had been gathering troops in Macedonia for months, and now numbered an army of some 90,000 or 100,000 men, it was Cæsar, not Pompeius, who pressed for a battle, even before Mark Antony had joined him. As soon as the junction had occurred he pushed the enemy with all possible vigor. But Pompeius had no confidence in his untrained host. He drew his whole army into a strongly fortified, immense camp, on the sea coast near Dyrrhachium, at a point called Petra, and there he defied Cæsar to dislodge him. The latter undertook to wall him in on the land-side of his camp, by a line of ramparts and towers seventeen miles in length. It was an undertaking too great for his force.

Pompeius made a sudden flank movement which disconcerted all his plans, and so defeated and demoralized his men that he was placed in extreme peril for a time. Had the Senatorial chief shown half of Cæsar's energy at that critical moment, the cause of Cæsar would probably have been lost. But Pompeius and his party took time to rejoice over their victory, while Cæsar framed plans to repair his defeat. He promptly abandoned his lines before the enemy's camp and fell back into the interior of the country, to form a junction with certain troops which he had previously sent eastward to meet reinforcements then coming to Pompeius. He calculated that Pompeius would follow him, and Pompeius did so. The result was to give Cæsar, at last, the opportunity he had been seeking for months, to confront with his tried legions the motley levies of his antagonist on an open field. The decisive and ever memorable battle was fought in Thessaly, on the plain of Pharsalia, through which flows the river Enipeus, and overlooking which, from a contiguous height, stood anciently the city of Pharsalus. It was fought on the 9th of August, in the year 48 before Christ. It was a battle quickly ended. The foot soldiers of Pompeius outnumbered those of Cæsar at least as two to one; but they could not stand the charge which the latter made upon them. His cavalry was largely composed of the young nobility of Rome, and Cæsar had few horsemen with which to meet them; but he set against them a strong reserve of his sturdy veterans on foot, and they broke the horsemen's ranks. The defeat was speedily a rout; there was no rallying. Pompeius fled with a few attendants and made his way to Alexandria, where his tragical fate overtook him. Some of the other leaders escaped in different directions. Some, like Brutus, submitted to Cæsar, who was practically the master, from that hour, of the Roman realm, although Thapsus had still to be fought.—Cæsar, *The Civil War*, bk. 3.

ALSO IN W. W. Fowler, *Julius Cæsar*, ch. 16.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 10-17.—T. A. Dodge, *Cæsar*, ch. 31-35.

B. C. 48-47.—Pursuit of Pompeius to Egypt.—His assassination.—Cæsar at Alexandria, with Cleopatra.—The rising against him.—His peril.—His deliverance.

See ALEXANDRIA: B. C. 48-47.

B. C. 47-46.—Cæsar's overthrow of Pharnaces at Zela.—His return to Rome.—The last stand of his opponents in Africa.—Their defeat at Thapsus.—At the time when Cæsar was in a difficult position at Alexandria, and the subjects of Rome were generally uncertain as to whether their yoke would be broken or not by the pending civil war, Pharnaces, son of the vanquished Pontic king, Mithridates, made an effort to recover the lost kingdom of his father. He himself had been a traitor to his father, and had been rewarded for his treason by Pompeius, who gave him the small kingdom of Bosphorus, in the Crimea. He now thought the moment favorable for regaining Pontus, Cappadocia and Lesser Armenia. Cæsar's lieutenant in Asia Minor, Domitius Calvinus, marched against him with a small force, and was badly defeated at Nicopolis (B. C. 48), in Armenia Minor. As a consequence, Cæsar, on being extricated from Alexandria, could not return to Rome, although

his affairs there sorely needed him, until he had restored the Roman authority in Asia Minor. As soon as he could reach Pharnaces, although his army was small in numbers, he struck and shattered the flimsy throne at a single blow. The battle was fought (B. C. 47) at Zela, in Pontus, where Mithridates had once gained a victory over the Romans. It was of this battle that Caesar is said to have written his famous *'Veni, vidi, vici'*. "Plutarch says that this expression was used in a letter to one Amintus; the name is probably a mistake. Suetonius asserts that the three words were inscribed on a banner and carried in Caesar's triumph. Appian and Dion refer to them as notorious."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 18.—After defeating Pharnaces at Zela, destroying his army, "Caesar passed on through Galatia and Bithynia to the province of Asia proper, settling affairs in every centre, and leaving the faithful Mithridates [of Pergamum.—See ALEXANDRIA B. C. 48-47] with the title of King of the Bosphorus, as a guarantee for the security of these provinces, he sailed for Italy, and arrived at Tarentum before any one was aware of his approach. If he had really wasted time or lost energy in Egypt, he was making up for it now. On the way from Tarentum to Brundisium he met Cicero, who had been waiting for him here for nearly a year. He alighted, embraced his old friend, and walked with him some distance. The result of their talk was shown by Cicero's conduct for the rest of Caesar's lifetime, he retired to his villas, and sought relief in literary work, encouraged doubtless by Caesar's ardent praise. The magical effect of Caesar's presence was felt throughout Italy, all sedition ceased, and Rome, which had been the scene of riot and bloodshed under the uncertain rule of Antonius, was quiet in an instant. The master spent three months in the city, working hard. He had been a second time appointed dictator while he was in Egypt, and probably without any limit of time, space or power, and he acted now without scruple as an absolute monarch. Everything that had to be done he saw to himself. Money was raised, bills were passed, the Senate recruited, magistrates and provincial governors appointed. But there was no time for any attempt at permanent organisation; he must wrest Africa from his enemies. . . . He quelled a most serious mutiny, in which even his faithful tenth legion was concerned, with all his wonderful skill and knowledge of human nature, sent on all available forces to Sicily, and arrived himself at Lilybæum in the middle of December."—W. W. Fowler, *Julius Caesar*, ch. 17.—The last stand of Caesar's opponents as a party—the senatorial party, or the republicans, as they are sometimes called—was made in Africa, on the old Carthaginian territory, with the city of Utica for their headquarters, and with Juba, the Numidian king, for their active ally. Varus, who had held his ground there, defeating and slaying Caesar's friend Curio, was joined first by Scipio, afterwards by Cato, Labienus and other leaders, Cato having led a wonderful march through the desert from the Lesser Syrtis. In the course of the year of respite from pursuit which Caesar's occupations elsewhere allowed them, they gathered and organized a formidable army. It was near the end of the year 47 B. C. that Caesar assembled his forces at Lilybæum, in Sicily, and

sailed with the first detachment for Africa. As happened so often to him in his bold military adventures, the troops which should follow were delayed by storms, and he was exposed to imminent peril before they arrived. But he succeeded in fortifying and maintaining a position on the coast, near Ruspina, until they came. As soon as they reached him he offered battle to his adversaries, and found presently an opportunity to force the fighting upon them at Thapsus, a coast town in their possession, which he attacked. The battle was decided by the first charge of Caesar's legionaries, which swept everything—foot soldiers, cavalry and elephants—before it. The victors in their ferocity gave no quarter and slaughtered 10,000 of the enemy, while losing from their own ranks but fifty men. The decisive battle of Thapsus was fought on the 6th of April, B. C. 46, uncorrected calendar, or Feb 6th, as corrected later. Scipio, the commander, fled to Spain, was intercepted on the voyage, and ended his own life. The high-minded, stoical (who committed suicide at Utica, rather than surrender his freedom to Caesar) Juba, the Numidian king, likewise destroyed himself in despair, his kingdom was extinguished and Numidia became a Roman province. A few scattered leaders of revolt still disputed Caesar's supremacy, but his power was firmly fixed.—A. Hirtius, *The African War*.

ALSO IN G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 24-27.

B. C. 45—Caesar's last campaign against the Pompeians in Spain.—His victory at Munda.—After Thapsus Caesar had one more deadly and desperate battle to fight for his sovereignty over the dominions of Rome. Cnæus Pompeius, son of Pompeius Magnus, with Labienus and Varus, of the survivors of the African field, had found disaffection in Spain, out of which they drew an army, with Pompeius in command. Caesar marched in person against this new revolt, crossing the Alps and the Pyrenees with his customary celerity. After a number of minor engagements had been fought, the decisive battle occurred at Munda, in the valley of the Guadalquivir (modern Monda, between Ronda and Malaga), on the 17th of March, B. C. 45. "Never, it is said, was the great conqueror brought so near to defeat and destruction," but he won the day in the end, and only Sextus Pompeius survived among the leaders of his enemies. The dead on the field were 30,000.—*Commentary on the Spanish War*.

ALSO IN C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 19.—G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 30.

B. C. 45-44.—The Sovereignty of Caesar and his titles.—His permanent Imperatorship.—His unfulfilled projects.—"At Rome, official enthusiasm burst forth anew at the tidings of these successes [in Spain]. The Senate decreed fifty days of supplications, and recognized Caesar's right to extend the pomerium, since he had extended the limits of the Empire. . . . After Thapsus he was more than a dead-god; after Munda he was a god altogether. A statue was raised to him in the temple of Quirinus with the inscription: 'To the invincible God,' and a college of priests, the Julian, was consecrated to him. . . . On the 18th September the dictator appeared at the gates of Rome, but he did

not triumph till the beginning of October. This time there was no barbarian king or chieftain to veil the victories won over citizens. But Cæsar thought he had no longer need to keep up such consideration; since he was now the State, his enemies, whatever name they bore, must be enemies of the State. . . . It was expected that Cæsar, having suffered so many outrages, would now punish severely, and Cicero, who had always doubted his clemency, believed that tyranny would break out as soon as the tyrant was above fear. But jealousies, recollections of party strifes, did not reach to the height of Cæsar. . . . He restored the statues of Sylla; he replaced that of Pompey on the rostra. . . . He pardoned Cassius, who had tried to assassinate him, the consularis Marcellus who had stirred up war against him, and Quintus Ligarius who had betrayed him in Africa. As a temporary precaution, however, he forbade to the Pompeians, by a 'lex Hirtia,' admission to the magistracy. For his authority, Cæsar sought no new forms. . . . Senate, comitia, magistracies existed as before; but he centred public action in himself alone by combining in his own hands all the republican offices. The instrument which Cæsar used in order to give to his power legal sanction was the Senate. In former times, the general, after the triumph, laid aside his title of imperator and imperium, which included absolute authority over the army, the judicial department and the administrative power; Cæsar, by a decree of the Senate, retained both during life, with the right of drawing freely from the treasury. His dictatorship and his office of præfectus morum were declared perpetual, the consulship was offered him for ten years, but he would not accept it; the Senate wished to join executive to electoral authority by offering him the right of appointment in all curule and plebeian offices, he reserved for himself merely the privilege of nominating half the magistracy. The Senate had enjoined the members chosen to swear, before entering on office, that they would undertake nothing contrary to the dictator's acts, these having the force of law. Further, they gave to his person the legal inviolability of the tribunes, and in order to ensure it, knights and senators offered to serve as guards, while the whole Senate took an oath to watch over his safety. To the reality of power were added the outward signs. In the Senate, at the theatre, in the circus, on his tribunal, he sat, dressed in the royal robe, on a throne of gold, and his effigy was stamped on the coins, where the Roman magistrates had not yet ventured to engrave more than their names. They even went as far as talking of succession, as in a regular monarchy. His title of imperator and the sovereign pontificate were transmissible to his legitimate or adopted children. . . . Cæsar was not deceived by the secret perfidy which prompted such servilities, and he valued them as they deserved. But his enemies found in them fresh reasons for hating the great man who had saved them.

. . . The Senate had . . . sunk from its character of supreme council of the Republic into that of a committee of consultation, which the master often forgot to consult. The Civil war had decimated it; Cæsar appointed to it brave soldiers, even sons of freedmen who had served him well, and a considerable number of provincials, Spaniards, Gauls of Gallia Narbonensis,

who had long been Romans. He had so many services to reward that his Senate reached the number of 900 members. . . . One day the Senate went in a body to the temple of Venus Genetrix to present to Cæsar certain decrees drawn up in his honor. The demi god was ill and dared not leave his couch. This was imprudent, for the report spread that he had not deigned to rise.

. . . The higher nobles remained apart, not from honours, but from power; but they forgot neither Pharsalia nor Thapsus. They would have consented to obey on condition of having the appearance of commanding. This disguised obedience is for an able government more convenient than outward servility. A few concessions made to vanity obtain tranquil possession of power. This was the policy of Augustus, but it is not that of great ambitions or of a true statesman. These pretences leave everything doubtful; nothing is settled, and Cæsar wished to lay the foundations of a government which should bring a new order of things out of a chaos of ruins. Unless we are paying too much attention to mere anecdotes, he desired the royal diadem. . . . It is difficult not to believe that Cæsar considered the constituting of a monarchical power as the rational achievement of the revolution which he was carrying out. In this way we could explain the persistence of his friends in offering him a title odious to the Romans, who were quite ready to accept a monarch, but not monarchy. . . . In order to attain to this royal title . . . he must mount still higher, and this new greatness he would seek in the East. . . . It was meet that he should wipe out the second military humiliation of Rome after effacing the first; that he should avenge Crassus.—V. Duruy, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 58, Sect 2-3 (p. 3).—“Cæsar was born to do great things, and had a passion after honor. . . . It was in fact a sort of emulous struggle with himself, as it had been with another, how he might outdo his past actions by his future. In pursuit of these thoughts he resolved to make war upon the Parthians, and when he had subdued them, to pass through Hyrcania; thence to march along by the Caspian Sea to Mount Caucasus, and so on about Pontus, till he came into Scythia; then to overrun all the countries bordering upon Germany, and Germany itself; and so to return through Gaul into Italy, after completing the whole circle of his intended empire, and bounding it on every side by the ocean. While preparations were making for this expedition, he proposed to dig through the isthmus on which Corinth stands; and appointed Anienus to superintend the work. He had also a design of diverting the Tiber, and carrying it by a deep channel directly from Rome to Circeii, and so into the sea near Tarracina, that there might be a safe and easy passage for all merchants who traded to Rome. Besides this, he intended to drain all the marshes by Pomentium and Setia, and gain ground enough from the water to employ many thousands of men in tillage. He proposed further to make great mounds on the shore nearest Rome, to hinder the sea from breaking in upon the land, to clear the coast at Ostia of all the hidden rocks and shoals that made it unsafe for shipping, and to form ports and harbors fit to receive the large number of vessels that would frequent them. These things were designed without being carried into effect; but his refor-

mation of the calendar [See CALENDAR, JULIAN], in order to rectify the irregularity of time, was not only projected with great scientific ingenuity, but was brought to its completion, and proved of very great use."—Plutarch, *Caesar* (Clough's *Dryden's trans.*).

ALSO IN T. Mommsen, *Hist. of Rome*, bk. 5, ch. 11, with notes.

B. C. 44.—The Assassination of Caesar.—

"The question of the kingship was over; but a vague alarm had been created, which answered the purpose of the Optimates. Caesar was at their mercy any day. They had sworn to maintain all his acts. They had sworn, after Cicero's speech, individually and collectively to defend his life. Caesar, whether he believed them sincere or not, had taken them at their word, and came daily to the Senate unarmed and without a guard. . . . There were no troops in the city. Lepidus, Caesar's master of the horse, who had been appointed governor of Gaul, was outside the gates with a few cohorts; but Lepidus was a person of feeble character, and they trusted to be able to deal with him. Sixty senators, in all, were parties to the immediate conspiracy. Of these, nine tenths were members of the old faction whom Caesar had pardoned, and who, of all his acts, resented most that he had been able to pardon them. They were the men who had stayed at home, like Cicero, from the fields of Thapsus and Munda, and had pretended penitence and submission that they might take an easier road to rid themselves of their enemy. Their motives were the ambition of their order and personal hatred of Caesar; but they persuaded themselves that they were animated by patriotism, and as, in their hands, the Republic had been a mockery of liberty, so they aimed at restoring it by a mock tyrannicide. . . . One man only they were able to attract into coöperation who had a reputation for honesty, and could be conceived, without absurdity, to be animated by a disinterested purpose. Marcus Brutus was the son of Cato's sister Servilia, the friend, and a scandal said the mistress, of Caesar. That he was Caesar's son was not too absurd for the credulity of Roman drawing-rooms. Brutus himself could not have believed in the existence of such a relation, for he was deeply attached to his mother; and although, under the influence of his uncle Cato, he had taken the Senate's side in the war, he had accepted afterwards not pardon only from Caesar, but favors of many kinds, for which he had professed, and probably felt, some real gratitude. . . . Brutus was perhaps the only member of the senatorial party in whom Caesar felt genuine confidence. His known integrity, and Caesar's acknowledged regard for him, made his accession to the conspiracy an object of particular importance. . . . Brutus, once wrought upon, became with Cassius the most ardent in the cause which assumed the aspect to him of a sacred duty. Behind them were the crowd of senators of the familiar faction, and others worse than they, who had not even the excuse of having been partisans of the beaten cause; men who had fought at Caesar's side till the war was over, and believed, like Labienus, that to them Caesar owed his fortune, and that he alone ought not to reap the harvest. . . . The Ides of March drew near. Caesar was to set out in a few days for Parthia. Deci-

mus Brutus was going, as governor, to the north of Italy, Lepidus to Gaul, Marcus Brutus to Macedonia, and Trebonius to Asia Minor. Antony, Caesar's colleague in the consulship, was to remain in Italy. Dolabella, Cicero's son-in-law, was to be consul with him as soon as Caesar should have left for the East. The foreign appointments were all made for five years, and in another week the party would be scattered. The time for action had come, if action there was to be. . . . An important meeting of the Senate had been called for the Ides (the 15th) of the month. The Pontifices, it was whispered, intended to bring on again the question of the Kingship before Caesar's departure. The occasion would be appropriate. The Senate-house itself was a convenient scene of operations. The conspirators met at supper the evening before at Cassius's house. Cicero, to his regret, was not invited. The plan was simple, and was rapidly arranged. Caesar would attend unarmed. The senators not in the secret would be unarmed also. The party who intended to act were to provide themselves with poniards, which could be easily concealed in their paper boxes. So far all was simple; but a question rose whether Caesar only was to be killed, or whether Antony and Lepidus were to be dispatched along with him. They decided that Caesar's death would be sufficient. . . . Antony and Lepidus were not to be touched. For the rest the assassins had merely to be in their places in the Senate in good time. When Caesar entered, Trebonius was to detain Antony in conversation at the door. The others were to gather about Caesar's chair on pretence of presenting a petition, and so could make an end. A gang of gladiators were to be secreted in the adjoining theatre to be ready should any unforeseen difficulty present itself. . . . Strange stories were told in after years of the uneasy labors of the elements that night. . . . Calpurnia dreamt her husband was murdered, and that she saw him ascending into heaven, and received by the hand of God. In the morning (March 15th) the sacrifices were again unfavorable. Caesar was restless. Some natural disorder affected his spirits, and his spirits were reacting on his body. Contrary to his usual habit, he gave way to depression. He decided, at his wife's entreaty, that he would not attend the Senate that day. The house was full. The conspirators were in their places with their daggers ready. Attendants came in to remove Caesar's chair. It was announced that he was not coming. Delay might be fatal. They conjectured that he already suspected something. A day's respite, and all might be discovered. His familiar friend whom he trusted—the coincidence is striking—was employed to betray him. Decimus Brutus, whom it was impossible for him to distrust, went to entreat his attendance. . . . Caesar shook off his uneasiness, and rose to go. As he crossed the hall his statue fell and shivered on the stones. Some servant, perhaps, had heard whispers, and wished to warn him. As he still passed on, a stranger thrust a scroll into his hand, and begged him to read it on the spot. It contained a list of the conspirators, with a clear account of the plot. He supposed it to be a petition and placed it carelessly among his other papers. The fate of the Empire hung upon a thread, but the thread was not broken. . . . Caesar entered

and took his seat. His presence awed men, in spite of themselves, and the conspirators had determined to act at once, lest they should lose courage to act at all. He was familiar and easy of access. They gathered round him. . . . One had a story to tell him; another some favor to ask. Tullius Cimber, whom he had just made governor of Bithynia, then came close to him, with some request which he was unwilling to grant. Cimber caught his gown, as if in entreaty, and dragged it from his shoulders. Cassius, who was standing behind, stabbed him in the throat. He started up with a cry and caught Cassius's arm. Another poniard entered his breast, giving a mortal wound. He looked round, and seeing not one friendly face, but only a ring of daggers pointing at him, he drew his gown over his head, gathered the folds about him that he might fall decently, and sank down without uttering another word. . . . The Senate rose with shrieks and confusion, and rushed into the Forum. The crowd outside caught the words that Cæsar was dead, and scattered to their houses. Antony, guessing that those who had killed Cæsar would not spare himself, hurried off into concealment. The murderers, bleeding some of them from wounds which they had given one another in their eagerness, followed, crying that the tyrant was dead, and that Rome was free; and the body of the great Cæsar was left alone in the house where a few weeks before Cicero told him that he was so necessary to his country that every senator would die before harm should reach him"—J. A. Froude, *Cæsar*, ch. 26.

B. C. 44.—The genius and character of Cæsar.—His rank among great men.—“Was Cæsar, upon the whole, the greatest of men? Dr Beattie once observed, that if that question were left to be collected from the suffrages already expressed in books, and scattered throughout the literature of all nations, the scale would be found to have turned prodigiously in Cæsar's favor, as against any single competitor; and there is no doubt whatsoever, that even amongst his own countrymen, and his own contemporaries, the same verdict would have been returned, had it been collected upon the famous principle of Themistocles, that he should be reputed the first, whom the greatest number of rival voices had pronounced the second.”—T. De Quincey, *The Cæsars*, ch. 1.—“The founder of the Roman Empire was a very great man. With such genius and such fortune it is not surprising that he should be made an idol. In intellectual stature he was at least an inch higher than his fellows, which is in itself enough to confound all our notions of right and wrong. He had the advantage of being a statesman before he was a soldier, whereas Napoleon was a soldier before he was a statesman. His ambition coincided with the necessity of the world, which required to be held together by force; and, therefore, his Empire endured for four hundred, or, if we include its Eastern offset, for fourteen hundred years, while that of Napoleon crumbled to pieces in four. But unscrupulous ambition was the root of his character. It was necessary, in fact, to enable him to trample down the respect for legality which still hampered other men. To connect him with any principle seems to me impossible. He came forward, it is true, as the leader of what is styled the democratic party, and in that sense

the empire which he founded may be called democratic. But to the gamblers who brought their fortunes to that vast hazard table, the democratic and aristocratic parties were merely rouge and noir. The social and political equity, the reign of which we desire to see, was, in truth, unknown to the men of Cæsar's time. It is impossible to believe that there was an essential difference of principle between one member of the triumvirate and another. The great adventurer had begun by getting deeply into debt, and had thus in fact bound himself to overthrow the republic. He fomented anarchy to prepare the way for his dictatorship. He shrank from no accomplice however tainted, not even from Catiline; from no act however profligate or even cruel. . . . The noblest feature in Cæsar's character was his clemency. But we are reminded that it was ancient, not modern clemency, when we find numbered among the signal instances of it his having cut the throats of the pirates before he hanged them, and his having put to death without torture (*simplici morte puniti*) a slave suspected of conspiring against his life. Some have gone so far as to speak of him as the incarnation of humanity. But in the whole history of Roman conquest will you find a more ruthless conqueror? A million of Gauls we are told perished by the sword. Multitudes were sold into slavery. The extermination of the Eburones went to the verge even of ancient licence. The gallant Vercingetorix, who had fallen into Cæsar's hands under circumstances which would have touched any but a depraved heart, was kept by him a captive for six years, and butchered in cold blood on the day of the triumph. The sentiment of humanity was then undeveloped. Be it so, but then we must not call Cæsar the incarnation of humanity. Vast plans are ascribed to Cæsar at the time of his death, and it seems to be thought that a world of hopes for humanity perished when he fell. But if he had lived and acted for another century, what could he have done with those moral and political materials but found, what he did found, a military and sensualist empire. A multitude of projects are attributed to him by writers, who, we must remember, are late, and who make him ride a fairy charger with feet like the hands of a man. Some of these projects are really great, such as the codification of the law, and measures for the encouragement of intellect and science; others are questionable, such as the restoration of commercial cities from which commerce had departed; others, great works to be accomplished by an unlimited command of men and money, are the common dreams of every Nebuchadnezzar. . . . Still Cæsar was a very great man, and he played a dazzling part, as all men do who come just at the fall of an old system, when society is as clay in the hands of the potter, and found a new system in its place; while the less dazzling task of making the new system work, by probity and industry, and of restoring the shattered allegiance of a people to its institutions, descends upon unlaurelled heads. But that the men of his time were bound to recognise in him a Messiah, to use the phrase of the Emperor of the French, and that those who opposed him were Jews crucifying their Messiah is an impression which I venture to think will in time subside.”—Goldwin Smith, *The Last Republicans of Rome* (*Macmillan's Mag.*, April, 1868).

ALSO IN: T. Arnold, *Hist. of the Later Roman Commonwealth*, ch. 9 (v. 2).—A. Trollope, *Life of Cicero*, v. 2, ch. 8.

B. C. 44.—After Caesar's death.—Flight of "the Liberators."—Mark Antony in power.—Arrival and wise conduct of Caesar's heir, the young Octavius.—The assassins of Caesar were not long in discovering that Rome gave no applause to their bloody deed. Its first effect was a simply stupefying consternation. The Senators fled—the forum and the streets were nearly emptied. When Brutus attempted an harangue his hearers were few and silent. In gloomy alarm, he made haste, with his associates, to take refuge on the heights of the capitol. During the night which followed, a few senators, who approved the assassination—Cicero among the number—climbed the hill and held council with them in their place of retreat. The result was a second attempt made, on the following day, to rouse public feeling in their favor by speeches in the forum. The demonstration was again a failure, and the "liberators" as they wished to be deemed, returned with disappointment to the capitol. Meantime, the surviving consul who had been Caesar's colleague for the year, M. Antonius—known more commonly as Mark Antony—had acted with vigor to secure power in his own hands. He had taken possession of the great treasure which Caesar left, and had acquired his papers. He had come to a secure understanding, moreover, with Lepidus, Caesar's Master of Horse, who controlled a legion quartered near by, and who really commanded the situation, if his energy and his abilities had been equal to it. Lepidus marched his legion into the city, and its presence preserved order. Yet, with all the advantage in their favor, neither Antony nor Lepidus took any bold attitude against Caesar's murderers. On the contrary, Antony listened to propositions from them and consented, as consul, to call a meeting of the Senate for deliberation on their act. At that meeting he even advocated what might be called a decree of oblivion, so far as concerned the striking down of Caesar, and a confirmation of all the acts executed and unexecuted, of the late Emperor. These had included the recent appointment of Brutus, Cassius and other leaders among the assassins to high proconsular commands in the provinces. Of course the proposed measure was acceptable to them and their friends, while Antony, having Caesar's papers in his possession, expected to gain everything from it. Under cover of the blank confirmation of Caesar's acts, he found in Caesar's papers a ground of authority for whatever he wished to do, and was accused of forging without limit where the genuine documents failed him. At the same time, taking advantage of the opportunity that was given to him by a public funeral decreed to Caesar, he delivered an artful oration, which infuriated the people and drove the blood-stained "liberators" in terror from the city. But in many ways Antonius weakened the strong position which his skillful combinations had won for him. In his undisguised selfishness he secured no friends of his own; he alienated the friends of Caesar by his calm indifference to the crime of the assassins of Caesar, while he harvested for himself the fruits of it; above all, he offended and insulted the people by his impudent appropriation of Caesar's vast hoard of

wealth. The will of the slain Imperator had been read, and it was known that he had bequeathed three hundred sesterces—nearly £3 sterling, or \$15—to every citizen of Rome. The heir named to the greater part of the estate was Caesar's favorite grand nephew (grandson of his younger sister, Julia) Caius Octavius, who became, by the terms of the will, his adopted son, and who was henceforth to bear the name Caius Julius Caesar Octavianus. The young heir, then but eighteen years of age, was at Apollonia, in Illyria, at the quarters of a considerable force which Caesar had assembled there. With wonderful coolness and prudence for his age, he declined proposals to lead the army to Rome, for the assertion of his rights, but went quietly thither with a few friends, feeling the public pulse as he journeyed. At Rome he demanded from Antony the moneys which Caesar had left, but the profligate and reckless consul had spent them and would give no account. By great exertions Octavius raised sufficient means on his own account to pay Caesar's legacy to the Roman citizens and thereby he consolidated a popular feeling in his own favor, against Antony which placed him, at once, in important rivalry with the latter. It enabled him presently to share the possession of power with Antony and Lepidus, in the Second Triumvirate, and, finally, to seize the whole sovereignty which Caesar intended to bequeath to him.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 23-24.

ALSO IN G. Long, *Decline of the Roman Republic*, v. 5, ch. 34.

B. C. 44-42.—Destruction of the Liberators.—Combination of Antony, Octavius and Lepidus.—The Second Triumvirate.—Mark Antony's arrangement of peace with the murderers of Caesar, on the basis of a confirmation in the Senate of all Caesar's acts, gave to Marcus Brutus the government of Macedonia, to Decimus Brutus that of Cisalpine Gaul and to Cassius that of Syria, since Caesar had already named them to those several commands before they slew him. But Antony succeeded ere long in procuring decrees from the Senate, transferring Macedonia to his brother, and Syria to Dolabella. A little later he obtained a vote of the people giving Cisalpine Gaul to himself, and cancelling the commission of Decimus Brutus. His consular term was now near its expiration and he had no intention to surrender the power he had enjoyed. An army in northern Italy would afford the support which his plans required. But, before those plans were ripe, his position had grown exceedingly precarious. The Senate and the people were alike unfriendly to him, and alike disposed to advance Octavius in opposition. The latter, without office or commission, had already, in the lawless manner of the time, by virtue of the encouragement given to him, collected an army of several legions under his personal banner. Decimus Brutus refused to surrender the government of Gaul, and was supported by the best wishes of the Senate in defying Antony to wrest it from him. The latter now faced the situation boldly, and, although two legions brought from Epirus went over to Octavius, he collected a strong force at Ariminum, marched into Cisalpine Gaul and blockaded Decimus Brutus in Mutina (modern Modena). Meantime, new consuls, Hirtius and Pansa, had taken office at Rome, and the Senate, led by

Cicero, had declared its hostility to Antony. Octavius was called upon to join the new consuls with his army, in proceeding against the late consul—now treated as a public enemy, though not so pronounced. He did so, and two battles were fought, on the 15th of April, B. C. 43, at Forum Gallorum, and on the 27th of the same month under the walls of Mutina, which forced Antony to retreat, but which cost Rome the lives of both her consuls. Antony retired across the Alps and joined his old friend Lepidus in Transalpine Gaul. Octavius declined to follow. Instead of doing so, he sent a military deputation to Rome to demand the consulship, and quickly followed it with his army when the demand had been refused. The demonstration proved persuasive, and he was elected consul, with his half-brother for colleague. His next business was to come to terms with Antony and Lepidus, as against the Liberators and their friends. A conference was arranged, and the three new masters of Rome met in October, B. C. 43, on an island near Bononia (modern Bologna), constituting themselves a commission of three—a triumvirate—to settle the affairs of the commonwealth. They framed a formal contract of five years' duration; divided the powers of government between themselves; named officials for the subordinate places; and—most serious proceeding of all—prepared a proscription list, as Sulla had done, of enemies to be put out of the way. It was an appalling list of 300 senators (the immortal Cicero at their head) and 2,000 knights. When the work of massacre in Rome and Italy had been done, and when the terrified Senate had legalized the self-assumed title and authority of the triumvirs, these turned their attention to the East, where M. Brutus and Cassius had established and maintained themselves in power. Decimus Brutus was already slain, after desertion by his army and capture in attempted flight. In the summer of the year 42 B. C., Antony led a division of the joint army of the triumvirate across the sea and through Macedonia, followed soon after by Octavius with additional forces. They were met at Philippi, and there, in two great battles, fought with an interval of twenty days between, the republic of Rome was finally done to death. "The battle of Philippi, in the estimation of the Roman writers, was the most memorable conflict in their military annals. The numbers engaged on either side far exceed all former experience. Eighty thousand legionaries alone were counted on the one side, and perhaps 120,000 on the other—at least three times as many as fought at Pharsalia." Both Cassius and Brutus died by their own hands. There was no more opposition to the triumvirs, except from Sextus Pompeius, last survivor of the family of the great Pompeius, who had created for himself at sea a little half-piratical realm, and who forced the three to recognize him for a time as a fourth power in the Roman world. But he, too, perished, B. C. 35. For seven years, from B. C. 43 to B. C. 36, Antony ruled the East, Octavius the West, and Lepidus reigned in Africa. —C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 24-28.

Also in: The same, *The Fall of the Roman Republic*, ch. 15.

B. C. 31.—The victory of Octavius at Actium.—The rise of the Empire.—The battles of Philippi, which delivered the whole Roman world to Antony, Octavius and Lepidus

(the Triumvirs), were fought in the summer of 42 B. C. The battle of Actium, which made Octavius—soon to be named Augustus—the single master of a now fully founded Empire, was fought on the 2d of Sept., B. C. 31. In the interval of eleven years Octavius, governing Rome, Italy, and the provinces of the West, had steadily consolidated and increased his power, gaining the confidence, the favor and the fear of his subject people. Antony, oppressing the East, had consumed his energies and his time in dalliance with Cleopatra, and had made himself the object of hatred and contempt. Lepidus, who had Africa for his dominion to begin with, had measured swords with Octavius and had been summarily deposed, in the year 36 B. C. It was simply a question of time as to when Antony, in his turn, should make room for the coming monarch. Already, in the year after Philippi, the two sovereign-partners had been at the verge of war. Antony's brother and his wife, Fulvia, had raised a revolt in Italy against Octavius, and it had been crushed at Perusia, before Antony could rouse himself to make a movement in support of it. He did make a formidable demonstration at last, but the soldiers of the two rivals compelled them on that occasion to patch up a new peace, which was accomplished by a treaty negotiated at Brundisium and sealed by the marriage of Antony to Octavia, sister of Octavius. This peace was maintained for ten years, while the jealousies and animosities of the two potentates grew steadily more bitter. It came to an end when Octavius felt strong enough to defy the superior resources, in money, men and ships, which Antony held at his command. The preparations then made on both sides for the great struggle were stupendous and consumed a year. It was by the determination of Antony that the war assumed chiefly a naval character, but Octavius, not Antony, forced the sea fight when it came. His smaller squadrons sought and attacked the swarming fleets of Egypt and Asia, in the Ambracian gulf, where they had been assembled. The great battle was fought at the inlet of the gulf, off the point, or "acte," of a tongue of land, projecting from the shores of Acarnania, on which stood a temple to Apollo, called the Actium. Hence the name of the battle. The cowardly flight of Cleopatra, followed by Antony, ended the conflict quickly, and the Antonian fleet was entirely destroyed. The deserted army, on shore, which had idly watched the sea-fight, threw down its arms, when the flight of Antonius was known. Before Octavius pursued his enemy into Egypt and to a despairing death, he had other work to do, which occupied him for nearly a year. But he was already sure of the sole sovereignty that he claimed. The date of the battle of Actium "has been formally recorded by historians as signaling the termination of the republic and the commencement of the Roman monarchy." —C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 28.

B. C. 31-A. D. 14.—The settlement of the Empire by the second Cæsar, Octavius, called Augustus.—His organization of government.—"Power and repute had passed away from the old forms of the Republic. The whole world lay at the feet of the master of many legions; it remained only to define the constitutional forms in which the new forces were to

work. But to do this was no easy task. The perplexities of his position, the fears and hopes that crossed his mind, are thrown into dramatic form by the historian Dion Cassius, who brings a scene before our fancy in which Octavianus listens to the conflicting counsels of his two great advisers, Agrippa and Mæcenas. . . . There is little doubt that schemes of resignation were at some time discussed by the Emperor and by his circle of advisers. It is even possible, as the same writer tells us, that he laid before the Senators at this time some proposal to leave the helm of state and let them guide it as of old. . . . The scene, if ever really acted, was but an idle comedy. . . . It is more probable that he was content with some faint show of resistance when the Senate heaped their honours on his head, as afterwards when, more than once, after a ten years' interval, they solemnly renewed the tenure of his power. But we cannot doubt his sincerity in one respect—in his wish to avoid the kingly title and all the odious associations of the same. . . . He shrank also from another title, truly Roman in its character, but odious since the days of Sulla, and though the populace of Rome, when panic-struck by pestilence and famine, clamoured to have him made dictator, . . . yet nothing would induce him to bear the hateful name. But the name of Cæsar he had taken long ago, after his illustrious uncle's death, and this became the title first of the dynasty and then of the imperial office [see CÆSAR, THE TITLE]. Besides this he allowed himself to be styled Augustus, a name which roused no jealousy and outraged no Roman sentiment, yet vaguely implied some dignity and reverence from its long association with the objects of religion [see AUGUSTUS, THE TITLE]. . . . With this exception he assumed no new symbol of monarchic power, but was satisfied with the old official titles, which, though charged with memories of the Republic, yet singly corresponded to some side or fragment of absolute authority. The first of these was Imperator, which served to connect him with the army. . . . The title of the tribunician power connected the monarch with the interests of the lower orders. . . . The Emperor did not, indeed, assume the tribunate, but was vested with the tribunician power which overshadowed the annual holders of the office. It made his person sacred. . . . The 'princeps senatus' in old days had been the foremost senator of his time. . . . No one but the Emperor could fill this position safely, and he assumed the name henceforth to connect him with the Senate, as other titles seemed to bind him to the army and the people. For the post of Supreme Pontiff, Augustus was content to wait awhile, until it passed by death from the feeble hands of Lepidus. He then claimed the exclusive tenure of the office, and after this time Pontifex Maximus was always added to the long list of imperial titles. . . . Besides these titles to which he assumed an exclusive right he also filled occasionally and for short periods most of the republican offices of higher rank, both in the capital and in the country towns. He took from time to time the consular power, with its august traditions and imposing ceremonial. The authority of censor lay ready to his hands when a moral reform was to be set on foot, . . . or when the Senate was to be purged of unworthy

members and the order of equites or knights to be reviewed and its dignity consulted. Beyond the capital the pro-consular power was vested in him without local limitations. . . . The offices of state at Rome, meantime, lasted on from the Republic to the Empire, unchanged in name, and with little seeming change of functions. Consuls, Prætors, Quæstors, Tribunes, and Ædiles rose from the same classes as before, and moved for the most part in the same round of work, though they had lost for ever their power of initiative and real control. . . . They were now mainly the nominees of Cæsar, though the forms of popular election were still for a time observed. . . . The consulship was entirely reserved for his nominees, but passed rapidly from hand to hand, since in order to gratify a larger number it was granted at varying intervals for a few months only. . . . It was part of the policy of Augustus to disturb as little as possible the old names and forms of the Republic. . . . But besides these he set up a number of new offices, often of more real power, though of lower rank. . . . The name præfectus, the 'préfet' of modern France, stood in earlier days for the deputy of any officer of state charged specially to execute some definite work. The præfects of Cæsar were his servants, named by him and responsible to him, set to discharge duties which the old constitution had commonly ignored. The præfect of the city had appeared in shadowy form under the Republic to represent the consul in his absence. Augustus felt the need, when called away from Rome, to have some one there whom he could trust to watch the jealous nobles and control the fickle mob. His trustiest confidants, Mæcenas and Agrippa, filled the post, and it became a standing office, with a growing sphere of competence, overtopping the magistracies of earlier date. The præfects of the prætorian cohorts first appeared when the Senate formally assigned a body-guard to Augustus later in his reign [see PRÆTORIAN PRÆFECTS]. . . . Next to these in power and importance came the præfects of the watch—the new police force organised by Augustus as a protection against the dangers of the night, and of the corn supplies of Rome, which were always an object of especial care on the part of the imperial government. . . . The title 'procurator,' which has come down to us in the form of 'proctor,' was at first mainly a term of civil law, and was used for a financial agent or attorney. The officers so called were regarded at the first as stewards of the Emperor's property or managers of his private business. . . . The agents of the Emperor's privy purse throughout the provinces were called by the same title, but were commonly of higher rank and more repute. Such in its bare outline was the executive of the imperial government. We have next to see what was the position of the Senate. . . . It was one of the first cares of Augustus to restore its credit. At the risk of odium and personal danger he more than once revised the list, and purged it of unworthy members, summoning eminent provincials in their place. . . . The functions also of the Senate were in theory enlarged. . . . But the substance of power and independence had passed away from it for ever. Matters of great moment were debated first, not in the Senate House, but in a sort of Privy Council formed by the trusted advisers of the

Emperor. . . . If we now turn our thoughts from the centre to the provinces we shall find that the imperial system brought with it more sweeping changes and more real improvement. . . . Augustus left to the Senate the nominal control of the more peaceful provinces, which needed little military force. . . . The remaining countries, called imperial provinces, were ruled by generals, called 'legati,' or in some few cases by proctors only. They held office during the good pleasure of their master. . . . There are signs that the imperial provinces were better ruled, and that the transference of a country to this class from the other was looked upon as a real boon, and not as an empty honour. Such in its chief features was the system of Augustus. . . . This was his constructive policy, and on the value of this creative work his claims to greatness must be based.—W. W. Capes, *Roman Hist: The Early Empire*, ch. 1.—“The arrangement undoubtedly satisfied the requirements of the moment. It saved, at least in appearance, the integrity of the republic, while at the same time it recognised and legalised the authority of the man, who was already by common consent ‘master of all things’; and this it effected without any formal alteration of the constitution, without the creation of any new office, and by means of the old constitutional machinery of senate and assembly. But it was an arrangement avowedly of an exceptional and temporary character. The powers voted to Augustus were, like those voted to Pompey in 67 B. C., voted only to him, and, with the exception of the tribunician power, voted only for a limited time. No provision was made for the continuance of the arrangement, after his death, in favour of any other person. And though in fact the powers first granted to Augustus were granted in turn to each of the long line of Roman Cæsars, the temporary and provisional character impressed upon the ‘princely’ at its birth clung to it throughout. When the princeps for the time being died or was deposed, it was always in theory an open question whether any other citizen should be invested with the powers he had held. Who the man should be, or how he should be chosen, were questions which it was left to circumstances to answer, and even the powers to be assigned to him were, strictly speaking, determined solely by the discretion of the senate and people in each case. It is true that necessity required that some one must always be selected to fill the position first given to Augustus, that accidents, such as kinship by blood or adoption to the last emperor, military ability, popularity with the soldiers or the senate, determined the selection, and that usage decided that the powers conferred upon the selected person should be in the main those conferred upon Augustus. But to the last the Roman emperor was legally merely a citizen whom the senate and people had freely invested with an exceptional authority for special reasons. Unlike the ordinary sovereign, he did not inherit a great office by an established law of succession, and in direct contrast to the modern maxim that ‘the king never dies,’ it has been well said that the Roman ‘princely,’ died with the princeps. Of the many attempts made to get rid of this irregular, intermittent character, none were completely successful, and the inconveniences and dangers resulting from it are apparent through-

out the history of the empire.”—H. F. Pelham, *Outlines of Roman Hist*, bk 5, ch 3

ALSO IN: W. T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, ch 3.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 80-84 (v. 3-4).

B. C. 16-15.—Conquest of Rætia. See RHÆTIA.

B. C. 12-9.—Campaigns of Drusus in Germany. See GERMANY, B. C. 12-9

B. C. 8-A. D. 11.—Campaigns of Tiberius in Germany. See GERMANY, B. C. 8-A. D. 11.

A. D. 14-16.—Campaigns of Germanicus in Germany. See GERMANY A. D. 14-16

A. D. 14-37.—Reign of Tiberius.—Increasing vices and cruelties of his rule.—Campaigns of Germanicus in Germany.—His death.—The Delatores and their victims.—Malignant ascendancy of Sejanus.—The Prætorians quartered at Rome.—Augustus had one child only, a daughter, Julia, who was brought to him by his second wife Scribonia, but on his last marriage, with Livia, divorced wife of Tiberius Claudius Nero (divorced by his command), he had adopted her two sons, Tiberius and Drusus. He gave his daughter Julia in marriage, first, to his nephew, Marcellus, the son of his sister Octavia, by her first husband, C. Marcellus. But Marcellus soon died, without offspring, and Julia became the spouse of the emperor's friend and counsellor, Agrippa, to whom she bore three sons, Caius, Lucius, and Agrippa Posthumus (all of whom died before the end of the life of Augustus), and two daughters. Thus the emperor was left with no male heir in his own family, and the imperial succession fell to his adopted son Tiberius—the eldest son of his wife Livia and of her first husband, Tiberius Claudius Nero. There were suspicions that Livia had some agency in bringing about the several deaths which cleared her son's way to the throne. When Augustus died, Tiberius was “in his 56th year, or at least at the close of the 55th. . . . He had by this time acquired a perfect mastery in dissembling his lusts, and his mistrust. . . . He was anxious to appear as a moral man, while in secret he abandoned himself to lusts and debaucheries of every kind. . . . In accordance with this character, Tiberius now played the farce which is so admirably but painfully described by Tacitus; he declined accepting the imperium, and made the senate beg and intreat him to accept it for the sake of the public good. In the end Tiberius yielded, inasmuch as he compelled the senate to oblige him to undertake the government. This painful scene forms the beginning of Tacitus' Annals. The early part of his reign is marked by insurrections among the troops in Pannonia and on the Rhine. . . . Drusus [the son of Tiberius] quelled the insurrection in Illyricum, and Germanicus [the emperor's nephew, son of his brother Drusus, who had died in Germany, B. C. 9], that on the Rhine; but, notwithstanding this, it was in reality the government that was obliged to yield. . . . The reign of Tiberius, which lasted for 23 years, that is till A. D. 37, is by no means rich in events, the early period of it only is celebrated for the wars of Germanicus in Germany. . . . The war of Germanicus was carried into Germany as far as the river Weser [see GERMANY, A. D. 14-16], and it is surprising to see that the Romans thought it necessary to employ such numerous armies against tribes

which had no fortified towns. . . . The history of his reign after the German wars becomes more and more confined to the inferior and to his family. He had an only son, Drusus, by his first wife Agrippina, and Germanicus, the son of his brother Drusus, was adopted by him. Drusus must have been a young man deserving of praise, but Germanicus was the adored darling of the Roman people, and with justice: he was the worthy son of a worthy father, the hero of the German wars. . . . Germanicus had declined the sovereignty, which his legions had offered to him after the death of Augustus, and he remained faithful to his adopted father, although he certainly could not love him. Tiberius, however, had no faith in virtue, because he himself was destitute of it, he therefore mistrusted Germanicus, and removed him from his victorious legions." He sent him "to superintend the eastern frontiers and provinces. On his arrival there he was received with the same enthusiasm as at Rome; but he died very soon afterwards, whether by a natural death or by poison is a question upon which the ancients themselves are not agreed. . . . In the reign of Augustus, any offence against the person of the emperor had, by some law with which we are not further acquainted, been made a 'crimen majestatis,' as though it had been committed against the republic itself. This 'crimen' in its undelimited character was a fearful thing, for hundreds of offences might be made to come within the reach of the law concerning it. All these deplorable cases were tried by the senate, which formed a sort of condemning machine set in motion by the tyrant, just like the national convention under Robespierre. . . . In the early part of Tiberius' reign, these prosecutions occurred very rarely, but there gradually arose a numerous class of denouncers ('delatores'), who made it their business to bring to trial any one whom the emperor disliked" (see DELATION—DELATORS). This was after the death of the emperor's mother, Livia, whom he feared, and who restrained his worst propensities. After her influence was removed, "his dark and tyrannical nature got the upper hand: the hateful side of his character became daily more developed, and his only enjoyment was the indulgence of his detestable lust. . . . His only friend was Aelius Sejanus, a man of equestrian rank. . . . His character bore the greatest resemblance to that of his sovereign, who raised him to the office of praefectus praetorio. . . . Sejanus increased the number of the praetorian cohorts, and persuaded Tiberius to concentrate them in the neighbourhood of Rome, in the 'castrum praetorianum,' which formed as it were the citadel outside the wall of Servius Tullius, but in the midst of the present city. The consequences of this measure render it one of the most important events in Roman history; for the praetorians now became the real sovereigns, and occupied a position similar to that which the Janissaries obtained in Algeria: they determined the fate of the empire until the reign of Diocletian [see PRÆTORIAN GUARDS]. . . . The influence of Sejanus over Tiberius increased every day, and he contrived to inspire his imperial friend with sufficient confidence to go to the island of Capreae. While Tiberius was there indulging in his lusts, Sejanus remained at Rome and governed as his vicegerent. . . . Prosecutions were now instituted against

all persons of any consequence at Rome; the time when Tiberius left the capital is the beginning of the fearful annals of his reign." The tyrannical proceedings of Sejanus "continued for a number of years, until at length he himself incurred the suspicion of Tiberius," and was put out of the way. "But a man worse even than he succeeded, this was Macro, who had none of the great qualities of Sejanus, but only analagous vices. . . . The butchery at Rome even increased. . . . Caius Caesar, the son of Germanicus, commonly known by the name of Caligula, formed with Macro a connexion of the basest kind, and promised him the high post of 'praefectus praetorio' if he would assist him in getting rid of the aged monarch. Tiberius was at the time severely ill at a villa near cape Misenum. He fell into a state of lethargy, and everybody believed him to be dead. He came to life again however; on which he was suffocated, or at least his death was accelerated in some way, for our accounts differ on this point. Thus Tiberius died in the 23d year of his reign, A. D. 37, at the age of 78"—B G Niebuhr, *Lect's on the Hist of Rome*, lect 111-112 (v 3).

ALSO IN Tacitus, *Annals*, bk 1-6—C Merivale, *Hist of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 42-46 (v 5).

A. D. 37-41.—Reign of Caligula, the first of the imperial madmen.—Caius Caesar, son of Germanicus, owed his nickname, Caligula, to the soldiers of his father's command among whom he was a great favorite in his childhood. The name was derived from "Caliga," a kind of foot covering worn by the common soldiers, and is sometimes translated "Little Boots." "Having

secured the imperial power, he fulfilled by his elevation the wish of the Roman people, I may venture to say, of all mankind, for he had long been the object of expectation and desire to the greater part of the provincials and soldiers, who had known him when a child, and to the whole people of Rome, from their affection for the memory of Germanicus, his father, and compassion for the family almost entirely destroyed.

Immediately on his entering the city, by the joint acclamations of the senate, and people, who broke into the senate house, Tiberius' will was set aside, it having left his other grandson, then a minor, coheir with him; the whole government and administration of affairs was placed in his hands, so much to the joy and satisfaction of the public that, in less than three months after, above 160,000 victims are said to have been offered in sacrifice. . . . To this extraordinary love entertained for him by his countrymen was added an uncommon regard by foreign nations. . . . Caligula himself inflamed this devotion by practising all the arts of popularity. . . . He published accounts of the proceedings of the government—a practice which had been introduced by Augustus, but discontinued by Tiberius. He granted the magistrates a full and free jurisdiction, without any appeal to himself. He made a very strict and exact review of the Roman knights, but conducted it with moderation; publicly depriving of his horse every knight who lay under the stigma of any thing base and dishonourable. . . . He attempted likewise to restore to the people their ancient right of voting in the choice of magistrates. . . . He twice distributed to the people a bounty of 300 sesterces a man, and as

often gave a splendid feast to the senate and the equestrian order, with their wives and children. . . . He frequently entertained the people with stage-plays of various kinds, and in several parts of the city, and sometimes by night, when he caused the whole city to be lighted. . . . He likewise exhibited a great number of circensian games from morning until night; intermixed with the hunting of wild beasts from Africa. . . . Thus far we have spoken of him as a prince. What remains to be said of him bespeaks him rather a monster than a man. . . . He was strongly inclined to assume the diadem, and change the form of government from imperial to regal; but being told that he far exceeded the grandeur of kings and princes, he began to arrogate to himself a divine majesty. He ordered all the images of the gods which were famous either for their beauty or the veneration paid them, among which was that of Jupiter Olympus, to be brought from Greece, that he might take the heads off, and put on his own. Having continued part of the Palatium as far as the Forum, and the temple of Castor and Pollux being converted into a kind of vestibule to his house, he often stationed himself between the twin brothers, and so presented himself to be worshipped by all votaries; some of whom saluted him by the name of Jupiter Latiaris. He also instituted a temple and priests, with choicest victims, in honour of his own divinity. . . . The most opulent persons in the city offered themselves as candidates for the honour of being his priests, and purchased it successively at an immense price. . . . In the day-time he talked in private to Jupiter Capitolinus; one while whispering to him, and another turning his ear to him. . . . He was unwilling to be thought or called the grandson of Agrippa, because of the obscurity of his birth. . . . He said that his mother was the fruit of an incestuous commerce maintained by Augustus with his daughter Julia. . . . He lived in the habit of incest with all his sisters. . . . Whether in the marriage of his wives, in repudiating them, or retaining them, he acted with greater infamy, it is difficult to say. Some senators, "who had borne the highest offices in the government, he suffered to run by his litter in their togas for several miles together, and to attend him at supper, sometimes at the head of his couch, sometimes at his feet, with napkins. Others of them, after he had privately put them to death, he nevertheless continued to send for, as if they were still alive, and after a few days pretended that they had laid violent hands upon themselves. . . . When flesh was only to be had at a high price for feeding his wild beasts reserved for the spectacles, he ordered that criminals should be given them to be devoured; and upon inspecting them in a row, while he stood in the middle of the portico, without troubling himself to examine their cases he ordered them to be dragged away, from 'bald-pate to bald-pate' [a proverbial expression, meaning, without distinction.—*Translator's foot-note*]. . . . After disfiguring many persons of honourable rank, by branding them in the face with hot irons, he condemned them to the mines, to work in repairing the high-ways or to fight with wild beasts; or tying them by the neck and heels, in the manner of beasts carried to slaughter, would shut them up in cages, or saw them asunder. . . . He compelled parents to be present at the

execution of their sons. . . . He generally prolonged the sufferings of his victims by causing them to be inflicted by slight and frequently repeated strokes; this being his well-known and constant order: 'Strike so that he may feel himself die.' . . . Being incensed at the people's applauding a party at the Circensian games in opposition to him, he exclaimed, 'I wish the Roman people had but one neck'. . . . He used also to complain aloud of the state of the times, because it was not rendered remarkable by any public calamities. . . . He wished for some terrible slaughter of his troops, a famine, a pestilence, conflagrations, or an earthquake. Even in the midst of his diversions, while gaming or feasting, this savage ferocity, both in his language and actions, never forsook him. Persons were often put to the torture in his presence, whilst he was dining or carousing. A soldier, who was an adept in the art of beheading, used at such times to take off the heads of prisoners, who were brought in for that purpose. . . . He never had the least regard either to the chastity of his own person, or that of others. . . . Besides his incest with his sisters. . . . there was hardly any lady of distinction with whom he did not make free. . . . Only once in his life did he take an active part in military affairs. . . . He resolved upon an expedition into Germany. . . . There being no hostilities, he ordered a few Germans of his guard to be carried over and placed in concealment on the other side of the Rhine, and word to be brought him after dinner that an enemy was advancing with great impetuosity. This being accordingly done, he immediately threw himself, with his friends, and a party of the pretorian knights, into the adjoining wood, where, lopping branches from the trees, and forming trophies of them, he returned by torch-light, upbraiding those who did not follow him with timorousness and cowardice. . . . At last, as if resolved to make war in earnest, he drew up his army upon the shore of the ocean, with his balistæ and other engines of war, and while no one could imagine what he intended to do, on a sudden commanded them to gather up the sea shells, and fill their helmets and the folds of their dress with them, calling them 'the spoils of the ocean due to the Capitol and the Palatium.' As a monument of his success he raised a lofty tower. . . . He was crazy both in body and mind, being subject, when a boy, to the falling sickness. . . . What most of all disordered him was want of sleep, for he seldom had more than three or four hours' rest in a night; and even then his sleep was not sound."—Suetonius, *Lives of the Twelve Cæsars: Caligula* (tr. by A. Thomson).

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 47-48 (v. 5).—S. Baring-Gould, *The Tragedy of the Cæsars*, v. 2.

A. D. 41.—The murder of Caligula.—Elevation of Claudius to the throne by the Prætorians.—Beginning of the domination of the soldiery.—"If we may believe our accounts, the tyrant's overthrow was due not to abhorrence of his crimes or indignation at his assaults on the Roman liberties, so much as to resentment at a private affront. Among the indiscretions which seem to indicate the partial madness of the wretched Calus, was the caprice with which he turned from his known foes against his personal friends and familiars. . . . No one felt himself secure, neither the freedmen who attended on

his person, nor the guards who watched over his safety. Among these last was Cassius Chærea, tribune of a prætorian cohort, whose shrill woman's voice provoked the merriment of his master, and subjected him to injurious insinuations. Even when he demanded the watchword for the night the emperor would insult him with words and gestures. Chærea resolved to wipe out the affront in blood. He sought Callistus and others . . . and organized with them and some of the most daring of the nobles a plot against the emperor's life . . . The festival of the Palatine games was fixed on for carrying the project into effect. Four days did Caius preside in the theatre, surrounded by the friends and guards who were sworn to slay him, but still lacked the courage. On the fifth and last, the 24th of January 794 [A. D. 41], feeling indisposed from the evening's debauch, he hesitated at first to rise. His attendants, however, prevailed on him to return once more to the shows, and as he was passing through the vaulted passage which led from the palace to the Circus, he inspected a choir of noble youths from Asia, who were engaged to perform upon the stage . . . Caius was still engaged in conversation with them when Chærea and another tribune, Sabinus, made their way to him: the one struck him on the throat from behind with his sword, while the other was in the act of demanding the watchword. A second blow cleft the tyrant's jaw. He fell, and drawing his limbs together to save his body, still screamed, 'I live! I live!' while the conspirators thronging over him, and crying, 'again! again!' hacked him with thirty wounds. The bearers of his litter rushed to his assistance with their poles, while his body guard of Germans struck wildly at the assassins, and amongst the crowd which surrounded them, killed, it was said, more than one senator who had taken no part in the affair. . . . When each of the conspirators had thrust his weapon into the mangled body, and the last shrieks of its agony had been silenced, they escaped with all speed from the corridor in which it lay; but they had made no dispositions for what was to follow, and were content to leave it to the consuls and senate, amazed and unprepared, to decide on the future destiny of the republic . . . Some cohorts of the city guards accepted the orders of the consuls, and occupied the public places under their direction. At the same time the consuls, Sestius Saturninus and Pomponius Secundus, the latter of whom had been substituted for Caius himself only a few days before, convened the senate. . . . The first act of the sitting was to issue an edict in which the tyranny of Caius was denounced, and a remission of the most obnoxious of his taxes proclaimed, together with the promise of a donative to the soldiers. The fathers next proceeded to deliberate on the form under which the government should be henceforth administered. On this point no settled principles prevailed. Some were ready to vote that the memory of the Cæsars should be abolished, their temples overthrown, and the free state of the Scipios and Catos restored; others contended for the continuance of monarchy in another family, and among the chiefs of nobility more than one candidate sprang up presently to claim it. The debate lasted late into the night; and in default of any other specific arrangement, the consuls continued to act as the leaders of the common-

wealth. . . . But while the senate deliberated, the prætorian guards had resolved. . . . In the confusion which ensued on the first news of the event, several of their body had flung themselves furiously into the palace, and begun to plunder its glittering chambers. None dared to offer them any opposition, the slaves and freedmen fled or concealed themselves. One of the inmates, half hidden behind a curtain in an obscure corner, was dragged forth with brutal violence; and great was the intruders' surprise when they recognised him as Claudius, the long despised and neglected uncle of the murdered emperor. He sank at their feet almost senseless with terror but the soldiers in their wildest mood still respected the blood of the Cæsars, and instead of slaying or maltreating the suppliant, the brother of Germanicus, they hailed him, more in jest perhaps than earnest, with the title of Emperor, and carried him off to their camp . . . In the morning, when it was found that the senate had come to no conclusion, and that the people crowding about its place of meeting were urging it with loud cries to appoint a single chief, and were actually naming him as the object of their choice, Claudius found courage to suffer the prætorians to swear allegiance to him, and at the same time promised them a donative of 15,000 sesterces apiece . . . The senators assembled once again in the temple of Jupiter, but now their numbers were reduced to not more than a hundred, and even these met rather to support the pretensions of certain of their members, who aspired to the empire . . . than to maintain the cause of the ancient republic. But the formidable array of the prætorians, who had issued from their camp into the city, and the demonstrations of the popular will, daunted all parties in the assembly. . . . Presently the Urban cohorts passed over, with their officers and colours, to the opposite side. All was lost the prætorians, thus reinforced, led their hero to the palace, and there he commanded the senate to attend upon him. Nothing remained but to obey and pass the decree, which had now become a formal act of investiture, by which the name and honours of Emperor were bestowed upon the new chief of the commonwealth. Such was the first creation of an emperor by the military power of the prætorians. . . . Surrounded by drawn swords Claudius had found courage to face his nephew's murderers, and to vindicate his authority to the citizens, by a strong measure of retribution, in sending Chærea and Lupus, with a few others of the blood embued, to immediate execution. . . . Claudius was satisfied with this act of vigour, and proceeded, with a moderation but little expected, to publish an amnesty for all the words and acts of the late interregnum. Nevertheless for thirty days he did not venture to come himself into the Curia . . . The personal fears, indeed, of the new emperor contributed, with a kindly and placable disposition, to make him anxious to gain his subjects' good-will by the gentleness and urbanity of his deportment. . . . His proclamation of amnesty was followed by the pardon of numerous exiles and criminals, especially such as were suffering under sentence for the crime of majestas. . . . The popularity of the new prince, though manifested, thanks to his own discretion, by no such grotesque and impious flatteries as attended on the opening

promise of Caius, was certainly not less deeply felt. . . . The confidence indeed of the upper classes, after the bitter disappointment they had so lately suffered, was not to be so lightly won. The senate and knights might view their new ruler with indulgence, and hope for the best; but they had been too long accustomed to regard him as proscribed from power by constitutional unfitness, as imbecile in mind, and which was perhaps in their estimation even a worse defect, as misshapen and half-developed in physical form, to anticipate from him a wise or vigorous administration. . . . In another rank he would have been exposed perhaps in infancy; as the son of Drusus and Antonia he was permitted to live: but he became from the first an object of disgust to his parents, who put him generally out of their sight, and left him to grow up in the hands of hirelings without judgment or feeling. . . . That the judgment of one from whom the practical knowledge of men and things had been withheld was not equal to his learning, and that the infirmities of his body affected his powers of decision, his presence of mind, and steadfastness of purpose, may easily be imagined: nevertheless, it may be allowed that in a private station, and anywhere but at Rome, Claudius would have passed muster as a respectable, and not, perhaps, an useless member of society. The opinion which is here given of this prince's character may possibly be influenced in some degree by the study of his countenance in the numerous busts still existing, which represent it as one of the most interesting of the whole imperial series. If his figure, as we are told, was tall and when sitting appeared not ungraceful, his face, at least in repose, was eminently handsome. But it is impossible not to remark in it an expression of pain and anxiety which forcibly arrests our sympathy. It is the face of an honest and well-meaning man, who feels himself unequal to the task imposed upon him. . . . There is the expression of fatigue both of mind and body, which speaks of midnight watches over books, varied with midnight carousals at the imperial table, and the fierce caresses of rival mistresses. There is the glance of fear, not of open enemies, but of pretended friends; the reminiscence of wanton blows, and the anticipation of the deadly potion. Above all, there is the anxious glance of dependence, which seems to cast about for a model to imitate, for ministers to shape a policy, and for satellites to execute it. The model Claudius found was the policy of the venerated Augustus; but his ministers were the most profligate of women, and the most selfish of emancipated slaves. . . . The commencement of the new reign was marked by the renewed activity of the armies on the frontiers."—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 48-49 (v. 5).

Also in: W. W. Capes, *The Early Empire*, ch. 8-4.

A. D. 42-67.—St. Peter and the Roman Church: The question. See PAPACY: ST. PETER AND THE CHURCH AT ROME.

A. D. 43-53.—Conquests of Claudius in Britain. See BRITAIN: A. D. 48-58.

A. D. 47-54.—The wives of Claudius, Messalina and Agrippina.—Their infamous and terrible ascendancy.—Murder of the emperor.—Advent of Nero.—The wife of Claudius was "Valeria Messalina, the daughter of his cousin

Barbatus Messala, a woman whose name has become proverbial for infamy. His most distinguished freedmen were the eunuch Posidus; Felix, whom he made governor of Judæa, and who had the fortune to be the husband of three queens; and Callistus, who retained the power which he had acquired under Caius. But far superior in point of influence to these were the three secretaries (as we may term them), Polybius, Narcissus, and Pallas. . . . The two last were in strict league with Messalina; she only sought to gratify her lusts; they longed for honours, power, and wealth. . . . Their plan, when they would have any one put to death, was to terrify Claudius . . . by tales of plots against his life. . . . Slaves and freedmen were admitted as witnesses against their masters; and, though Claudius had sworn, at his accession, that no freeman should be put to the torture, knights and senators, citizens and strangers, were tortured alike. . . . Messalina now set no bounds to her vicious courses. Not content with being infamous herself, she would have others so; and she actually used to compel ladies to prostitute themselves even in the palace, and before the eyes of their husbands, whom she rewarded with honours and commands, while she contrived to destroy those who would not acquiesce in their wives' dishonour." At length (A. D. 48) she carried her audacity so far as to go publicly through a ceremony of marriage with one of her lovers. This nerved even the weak Claudius to resolution, and she was put to death. The emperor then married his niece, Julia Agrippina, the daughter of Germanicus. "The woman who had now obtained the government of Claudius and the Roman empire was of a very different character from the abandoned Messalina. The latter had nothing noble about her; she was the mere bond-slave of lust, and cruel and avaricious only for its gratification; but Agrippina was a woman of superior mind, though utterly devoid of principle. In her, lust was subservient to ambition; it was the desire of power, or the fear of death, and not wantonness, that made her submit to the incestuous embraces of her brutal brother Caius, and to be prostituted to the companions of his vices. It was ambition and parental love that made her now form an incestuous union with her uncle. . . . The great object of Agrippina was to exclude Britannicus [the son of Claudius by Messalina], and obtain the succession for her own son, Nero Domitius, now a boy of twelve years of age. She therefore caused Octavia [daughter of Claudius] to be betrothed to him, and she had the philosopher Seneca recalled from Corsica, whither he had been exiled by the arts of Messalina, and committed to him the education of her son, that he might be fitted for empire. In the following year (51) Claudius, yielding to her influence, adopted him." But, although Britannicus was thrust into the background and treated with neglect, his feeble father began after a time to show signs of affection for him, and Agrippina, weary of waiting and fearful of discomfiture, caused poison to be administered to the old emperor in his food (A. D. 54). "The death of Claudius was concealed till all the preparations for the succession of Nero should be made, and the fortunate hour marked by the astrologers be arrived. He then (Oct. 13) issued from the palace, . . . and, being cheered by the cohort which was on guard, he

mounted a litter and proceeded to the camp. He addressed the soldiers, promising them a donative, and was saluted emperor. The senate and provinces acquiesced without a murmur in the will of the guards. Claudius was in his 64th year when he was poisoned."—T. Keightley, *Hist. of the Roman Empire*, pt. 1, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 50 (v. 5).—Tacitus, *Annals*, bk 11-12

A. D. 54-64.—The atrocities of Nero.—The murder of his mother.—The burning of the city.—"Nero . . . was but a variety of the same species [as Caligula]. He also was an amateur, and an enthusiastic amateur, of murder. But as this taste, in the most ingenious hands, is limited and monotonous in its modes of manifestation, it would be tedious to run through the long Suetonian roll-call of his peccadilloes in this way. One only we shall cite, to illustrate the amorous delight with which he pursued any murder which happened to be seasoned highly to his taste by enormous atrocity, and by almost unconquerable difficulty. . . . For certain reasons of state, as Nero attempted to persuade himself, but in reality because no other crime had the same attractions of unnatural horror about it, he resolved to murder his mother Agrippina. This being settled, the next thing was to arrange the mode and the tools. Naturally enough, according to the custom then prevalent in Rome, he first attempted the thing by poison. The poison failed. for Agrippina, anticipating tricks of this kind, had armed her constitution against them, like Mithridates; and daily took potent antidotes and prophylactics. Or else (which is more probable) the emperor's agent in such purposes, fearing his sudden repentance and remorse, . . . had composed a poison of inferior strength. This had certainly occurred in the case of Britannicus, who had thrown off with ease the first dose administered to him by Nero," but who was killed by a second more powerful potion. "On Agrippina, however, no changes in the poison, whether of kind or strength, had any effect; so that, after various trials, this mode of murder was abandoned, and the emperor addressed himself to other plans. The first of these was some curious mechanical device, by which a false ceiling was to have been suspended by bolts above her bed; and in the middle of the night, the bolt being suddenly drawn, a vast weight would have descended with a ruinous destruction to all below. This scheme, however, taking air from the indiscretion of some amongst the accomplices, reached the ears of Agrippina. . . . Next, he conceived the idea of an artificial ship, which, at the touch of a few springs, might fall to pieces in deep water. Such a ship was prepared, and stationed at a suitable point. But the main difficulty remained, which was to persuade the old lady to go on board." By complicated stratagems this was brought about. "The emperor accompanied her to the place of embarkation, took a most tender leave of her, and saw her set sail. It was necessary that the vessel should get into deep water before the experiment could be made; and with the utmost agitation this pious son awaited news of the result. Suddenly a messenger rushed breathless into his presence, and horrified him by the joyful information that his august mother had met with an alarming accident; but, by the blessing of Heaven, had escaped safe

and sound, and was now on her road to mingle congratulations with her affectionate son. The ship, it seems, had done its office; the mechanism had played admirably; but who can provide for everything? The old lady, it turned out, could swim like a duck; and the whole result had been to refresh her with a little sea-bathing. Here was worshipful intelligence. Could any man's temper be expected to stand such continued sieges? . . . Of a man like Nero it could not be expected that he should any longer dissemble his disgust, or put up with such repeated affronts. He rushed upon his simple congratulating friend, swore that he had come to murder him, and as nobody could have suborned him but Agrippina, he ordered her off to instant execution. And, unquestionably, if people will not be murdered quietly and in a civil way, they must expect that such forbearance is not to continue for ever; and obviously have themselves only to blame for any harshness or violence which they may have rendered necessary. It is singular, and shocking at the same time, to mention, that, for this atrocity, Nero did absolutely receive solemn congratulations from all orders of men. With such evidences of base servility in the public mind, and of the utter corruption which they had sustained in their elementary feelings, it is the less astonishing that he should have made other experiments upon the public patience, which seem expressly designed to try how much it would support. Whether he were really the author of the desolating fire which consumed Rome for six days and seven nights [A. D. 64], and drove the mass of the people into the tombs and sepulchres for shelter, is yet a matter of some doubt. But one great presumption against it, founded on its desperate imprudence, as attacking the people in their primary comforts, is considerably weakened by the enormous servility of the Romans in the case just stated: they who could volunteer congratulations to a son for butchering his mother (no matter on what pretended suspicions), might reasonably be supposed incapable of any resistance which required courage, even in a case of self-defence or of just revenge. . . . The great loss on this memorable occasion was in the heraldic and ancestral honours of the city. Historic Rome then went to wreck for ever. Then perished the 'domus priscorum ducum hostilibus ad-huc spoliis adornatæ': the 'rostral' palace; the mansion of the Pompeys; the Blenheims and the Strathfelds of the Scipios, the Marcelli, the Pauli, and the Cæsars; then perished the aged trophies from Carthage; and from Gaul; and, in short, as the historian sums up the lamentable desolation, 'quidquid visendum atque memorabile ex antiquitate duraverat.' And this of itself might lead one to suspect the emperor's hand as the original agent; for by no one act was it possible so entirely and so suddenly to wean the people from their old republican recollections. . . . In any other sense, whether for health or for the conveniences of polished life, or for architectural magnificence, there never was a doubt that the Roman people gained infinitely by this conflagration. For, like London, it arose from its ashes with a splendour proportioned to its vast expansion of wealth and population; and marble took the place of wood. For the moment, however, this event must have been felt by the people as an overwhelming calamity. And it serves to illustrate the passive

endurance and timidity of the popular temper, and to what extent it might be provoked with impunity, that in this state of general irritation and effervescence Nero absolutely forbade them to meddle with the ruins of their own dwellings—taking that charge upon himself, with a view to the vast wealth which he anticipated from sifting the rubbish.”—T. De Quincey, *The Caesars*, ch. 8.

ALSO IN. Suetonius, *Lives of the Twelve Caesars: Nero*—Tacitus, *Annals*, bk. 13-16—S. Baring-Gould, *The Tragedy of the Caesars*, r. 2.

A. D. 61.—Campaigns of Suetonius Paulinus in Britain. See BRITAIN A D 61

A. D. 64-68.—The first persecution of Christians.—The fitting end of Nero.—“Nero was so secure in his absolutism, he had hitherto found it so impossible to shock the feelings of the people or to exhaust the terrified adulation of the Senate, that he was usually indifferent to the pasquinades which were constantly holding up his name to execration and contempt. But now [after the burning of Rome] he felt that he had gone too far, and that his power would be seriously imperilled if he did not succeed in diverting the suspicions of the populace. He was perfectly aware that when the people in the streets cursed those who set fire to the city, they meant to curse him. If he did not take some immediate step he felt that he might perish, as Gaius [Caligula], had perished before him, by the dagger of the assassin. It is at this point of his career that Nero becomes a prominent figure in the history of the Church. It was this phase of cruelty which seemed to throw a blood-red light over his whole character, and led men to look on him as the very incarnation of the world-power in its most demoniac aspect—as worse than the Antiochus Epiphanes of Daniel’s Apocalypse—as the Man of Sin whom (in language figurative, indeed, yet awfully true) the Lord should slay with the breath of His mouth and destroy with the brightness of His coming. For Nero endeavoured to fix the odious crime of having destroyed the capital of the world upon the most innocent and faithful of his subjects—upon the only subjects who offered heartfelt prayers on his behalf—the Roman Christians. . . . Why he should have thought of singling out the Christians, has always been a curious problem, for at this point St. Luke ends the Acts of the Apostles, perhaps purposely dropping the curtain, because it would have been perilous and useless to narrate the horrors in which the hitherto neutral or friendly Roman Government began to play so disgraceful a part. Neither Tacitus, nor Suetonius, nor the Apocalypse, help us to solve this particular problem. The Christians had filled no large space in the eye of the world. Until the days of Domitian we do not hear of a single noble or distinguished person who had joined their ranks. . . . The slaves and artisans, Jewish and Gentile, who formed the Christian community at Rome, had never in any way come into collision with the Roman Government. . . . That the Christians were entirely innocent of the crime charged against them was well known both at the time and afterwards. But how was it that Nero sought popularity and partly averted the deep rage which was rankling in many hearts against himself, by torturing men and women, on whose agonies he thought that the populace would gaze

not only with a stolid indifference, but even with fierce satisfaction? Gibbon has conjectured that the Christians were confounded with the Jews, and that the detestation universally felt for the latter fell with double force upon the former. Christians suffered even more than the Jews because of the calumnies so assiduously circulated against them, and from what appeared to the ancients to be the revolting absurdity of their peculiar tenets. ‘Nero,’ says Tacitus, ‘exposed to accusation, and tortured with the most exquisite penalties, a set of men detested for their enormities, whom the common people called Christians. Christus, the founder of this sect, was executed during the reign of Tiberius by the Procurator Pontius Pilate, and the deadly superstition, suppressed for a time, began to burst out once more, not only throughout Judaea, where the evil had its root, but even in the City, whither from every quarter all things horrible or shameful are drifted, and find their votaries.’ The lordly disdain which prevented Tacitus from making any inquiry into the real views and character of the Christians, is shown by the fact that he catches up the most baseless allegations against them.

The masses, he says, called them ‘Christians,’ and while he almost apologises for staining his page with so vulgar an appellation, he merely mentions in passing, that, though innocent of the charge of being turbulent incendiaries, on which they were tortured to death, they were yet a set of guilty and infamous sectaries, to be classed with the lowest dregs of Roman criminals. But the haughty historian throws no light on one difficulty, namely, the circumstances which led to the Christians being thus singled out. The Jews were in no way involved in Nero’s persecution. The Jews were by far the deadliest enemies of the Christians, and two persons of Jewish proclivities were at this time in close proximity to the person of the Emperor. One was the pantomimist Aliturus, the other was Poppaea, the harlot Empress. . . . If, as seems certain, the Jews had it in their power during the reign of Nero more or less to shape the whisper of the throne, does not historical induction drive us to conclude with some confidence that the suggestion of the Christians as scapegoats and victims came from them? . . . Tacitus tells us that ‘those who confessed were first seized, and then on their evidence a huge multitude were convicted, not so much on the charge of incendiarism as for their hatred to mankind.’ Compressed and obscure as the sentence is, Tacitus clearly means to imply by the ‘confession’ to which he alludes the confession of Christianity; and though he is not sufficiently generous to acquit the Christians absolutely of all complicity in the great crime, he distinctly says that they were made the scapegoats of a general indignation. The phrase—‘a huge multitude’—is one of the few existing indications of the number of martyrs in the first persecution, and of the number of Christians in the Roman Church. When the historian says that they were convicted on the charge of ‘hatred against mankind’ he shows how completely he confounds them with the Jews, against whom he elsewhere brings the accusation of ‘hostile feelings towards all except themselves.’ Then the historian adds one casual but frightful sentence—a sentence which flings a dreadful light on the cruelty of Nero and the Roman mob. He adds,

'And various forms of mockery were added to enhance their dying agonies. Covered with the skins of wild beasts, they were doomed to die by the mangling of dogs, or by being nailed to crosses; or to be set on fire and burnt after twilight by way of nightly illumination. Nero offered his own gardens for this show, and gave a chariot race, mingling with the mob in the dress of a charioteer, or actually driving about among them. Hence, guilty as the victims were, and deserving of the worst punishments, a feeling of compassion towards them began to rise, as men felt that they were being immolated not for any advantage to the commonwealth, but to glut the savagery of a single man.' Imagine that awful scene, once witnessed by the silent obelisk in the square before St. Peter's at Rome! . . . Retribution did not linger, and the vengeance fell at once on the guilty Emperor and the guilty city. The air was full of prodigies. There were terrible storms, the plague wrought fearful ravages. Rumours spread from lip to lip. Men spoke of monstrous births; of deaths by lightning under strange circumstances, of a brazen statue of Nero melted by the flash, of places struck by the brand of heaven in fourteen regions of the city; of sudden darkenings of the sun. A hurricane devastated Campania, comets blazed in the heavens, earthquakes shook the ground. On all sides were the traces of deep uneasiness and superstitious terror. To all these portents, which were accepted as true by Christians as well as by Pagans, the Christians would give a specially terrible significance. . . . In spite of the shocking servility with which alike the Senate and the people had welcomed him back to the city with shouts of triumph, Nero felt that the air of Rome was heavy with curses against his name. He withdrew to Naples, and was at supper there on March 19, A. D. 68, the anniversary of his mother's murder, when he heard that the first note of revolt had been sounded by the brave C. Julius Vindex, Prefect of Farther Gaul. He was so far from being disturbed by the news, that he showed a secret joy at the thought that he could now order Gaul to be plundered. For eight days he took no notice of the matter. . . . At last, when he heard that Virginius Rufus had also rebelled in Germany, and Galba in Spain, he became aware of the desperate nature of his position. On receiving this intelligence he fainted away, and remained for some time unconscious. He continued, indeed, his grossness and frivolity, but the wildest and fiercest schemes chased each other through his melodramatic brain. . . . Meanwhile he found that the palace had been deserted by his guards, and that his attendants had robbed his chamber even of the golden box in which he had stored his poison. Rushing out, as though to drown himself in the Tiber, he changed his mind, and begged for some quiet hiding-place in which to collect his thoughts. The freedman Phaon offered him a lowly villa about four miles from the city. Barefooted, and with a faded coat thrown over his tunic, he hid his head and face in a kerchief, and rode away with only four attendants. . . . There is no need to dwell on the miserable spectacle of his end, perhaps the meanest and most pusillanimous which has ever been recorded. The poor wretch who, without a pang, had caused so many brave Romans and so many innocent Christians to be murdered, could

not summon up resolution to die. . . . Meanwhile a courier arrived for Phaon. Nero snatched his despatches out of his hand, and read that the Senate had decided that he should be punished in the ancestral fashion as a public enemy. Asking what the ancestral fashion was, he was informed that he would be stripped naked and scourged to death with rods, with his head thrust into a fork. Horrified at this, he seized two daggers, and after theatrically trying their edges, sheathed them again, with the excuse that the fatal moment had not yet arrived! Then he bade Sporus begin to sing his funeral song, and begged some one to show him how to die. . . . The sound of horses' hoofs then broke on his ears, and, venting one more Greek quotation, he held the dagger to his throat. It was driven home by Epaphroditus, one of his literary slaves.

So died the last of the Cæsars! And as Robespierre was lamented by his landlady, so even Nero was tenderly buried by two nurses who had known him in the exquisite beauty of his engaging childhood, and by Acte, who had inspired his youth with a genuine love.—F. W. Farrar, *The Early Days of Christianity*, bk. 1, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: T. W. Allies, *The Formation of Christendom*, ch. 10 (i. 2).

A. D. 68-96.—End of the Julian line.—The "Twelve Cæsars" and their successors.—A logical classification.—"In the sixth Caesar [Nero] terminated the Julian line. The three next princes in the succession were personally uninteresting, and, with a slight reserve in favor of Otho, . . . were even brutal in the tenor of their lives and monstrous; besides that the extreme brevity of their several reigns (all three, taken conjunctly, having held the supreme power for no more than twelve months and twenty days) dismisses them from all effectual station or right to a separate notice in the line of Cæsars. Coming to the tenth in the succession, Vespasian, and his two sons, Titus and Domitian, who make up the list of the twelve Cæsars, as they are usually called, we find matter for deeper political meditation and subjects of curious research. But these emperors would be more properly classed with the five who succeed them—Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, and the two Antonines, after whom comes the young ruffian, Commodus, another Caligula or Nero, from whose short and infamous reign Gibbon takes up his tale of the decline of the empire. And this classification would probably have prevailed, had not the very curious work of Suetonius, whose own life and period of observation determined the series and cycle of his subjects, led to a different distribution. But as it is evident that, in the succession of the first twelve Cæsars, the six latter have no connection whatever by descent, collaterally, or otherwise, with the six first, it would be a more logical distribution to combine them according to the fortunes of the state itself, and the succession of its prosperity through the several stages of splendour, declension, revival, and final decay. Under this arrangement, the first seventeen would be long to the first stage; Commodus would open the second; Aurelian down to Constantine or Julian would fill the third; and Jovian to Augustulus would bring up the melancholy rear."

—T. De Quincey, *The Cæsars*, ch. 8.
A. D. 69.—Revolt of the Batavians under Civilis. See BATAVIANS: A. D. 69.

A. D. 69.—Galba, Otho, Vitellius.—Vespasian.—The Vitellian conflict.—On the overthrow and death of Nero, June, A. D. 68, the veteran soldier Galba, proclaimed emperor by his legions in Spain, and accepted by the Roman senate, mounted the imperial throne. His brief reign was terminated in January of the following year by a sudden revolt of the prætorian guard, instigated by Salvius Otho, one of the profligate favorites of Nero, who had betrayed his former patron and was disappointed in the results. Galba was slain and Otho made emperor, to reign, in his turn, for a brief term of three months. Revolt against Otho was quick to show itself in the provinces, east and west. The legions on the Rhine set up a rival emperor, in the person of their commander, Aulus Vitellius, whose single talent was in gluttony, and who had earned by his vices the favor of four beastly rulers, from Tiberius to Nero, in succession. Gaul having declared in his favor, Vitellius sent forward two armies by different routes into Italy. Otho met them, with such forces as he could gather, at Bedriacum, between Verona and Cremona, and suffered there a defeat which he accepted as decisive. He slew himself, and Vitellius made his way to Rome without further opposition, permitting his soldiers to plunder the country as they advanced. But the armies of the east were not disposed to accept an emperor by the election of the armies of the west, and they, too, put forward a candidate for the purple. Their choice was better guided, for it fell on the sturdy soldier, Titus Flavius Vespasianus, then commanding in Judea. The advance corps of the forces supporting Vespasian (called 'Flavians,' or 'Flavianites') entered Cisalpine Gaul from Illyricum in the autumn of 69, and encountered the Vitellians at Bedriacum, on the same field where the latter had defeated the Othonians a few weeks before. The Vitellians were defeated. Cremona, a flourishing Roman colony, which capitulated to the conquerors, was perfidiously given up to a merciless soldiery and totally destroyed,—one temple, alone, escaping. Vitellius, in despair, showed an eagerness to resign the throne, and negotiated his resignation with a brother of Vespasian, residing in Rome. But the mob of fugitive Vitellian soldiers which had collected in the capital interposed violently to prevent this abdication. Flavius Sabinus—the brother of Vespasian—took refuge, with his supporters, in the Capitolium, or temple of Jupiter, on the Capitoline Hill. But the sacred precincts were stormed by the Vitellian mob, the Capitol—the august sanctuary of Rome—was burned and Sabinus was slain. The army which had won the victory for Vespasian at Bedriacum, commanded by Antonius Primus, soon appeared at the gates of the city, to avenge this outrage. The unorganized force which attempted opposition was driven before it in worse disorder. Victors and vanquished poured into Rome together, slaughtering and being slaughtered in the streets. The rabble of the city joined in the bloody hunt, and in the plundering that went with it. "Rome had seen the conflicts of armed men in the streets under Sulla and Cinna, but never before such a hideous mixture of levity and ferocity." Vitellius was among the slain, his brief reign ending on the 21st of December, A. D. 69. Vespasian was still in the east, and did not enter

Rome until the summer of the following year—Tacitus, *History*, bk 1-3.

ALSO IN: C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans*, ch. 56-57.

A. D. 70.—Siege and destruction of Jerusalem by Titus. See JEWS: A. D. 66-70

A. D. 70-96.—The Flavian family.—Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian.—"Unfortunately Tacitus fails us . . . at this point, and this time completely. Nothing has been saved of his 'Histories' from the middle of the year 70, and we find ourselves reduced to the mere biographies of Suetonius, to the fragments of Dion, to the abridgments of Aurelius Victor and Eutropius. The majestic stream from which we have drawn and which flowed with brimming banks is now only a meagre thread of water. Of all the emperors Vespasian is the one who loses the most by this, for he was, says St Augustine, a very good prince and very worthy of being beloved. He came into power at an age when one is no longer given to change, at 60 years. He had never been fond of gaming or debauchery, and he maintained his health by a frugal diet, even passing one day every month without eating. His life was simple and laborious. . . . He had no higher aim than to establish order in the state and in the finances, but he accomplished this, and if his principate, like all the others, made no preparations for the future, it did much for the present. It was a restorative reign, the effects of which were felt for several generations; this service is as valuable as the most brilliant victories. Following the example of the second Julius, the first of the Flavians resolved to seek in the senate the support of his government. This assembly, debased by so many years of tyranny, needed as much as it did a century before to be submitted to a severe revision. . . . Vespasian acted with resolution. Invested with the title of censor in 73, with his son Titus for colleague, he struck from the rolls of the two orders the members deemed unworthy, replaced them by the most distinguished persons of the Empire, and, by virtue of his powers as sovereign pontiff, raised several of them to the patriciate. A thousand Italian or provincial families came to be added to the 200 aristocratic families which had survived, and constituted with these the higher Roman society, from which the candidates for all civil, military, and religious functions were taken. . . . This aristocracy, borrowed by Vespasian from the provincial cities, where it had been trained to public affairs, where it had acquired a taste for economy, simplicity, and order, brought into Rome pure morals. . . . It will furnish the great emperors of the second century, the skilled lieutenants who will second them, and senators who will hereafter conspire only at long intervals. . . . To the senate, thus renewed and become the true representation of the Empire, Vespasian submitted all important matters. . . . Suetonius renders him this testimony, that it would be difficult to cite a single individual unjustly punished in his reign, at least unless it were in his absence or without his knowledge. He loved to dispense justice himself in the Forum. . . . The legions, who had made and unmade five emperors in two years, were no longer attentive to the ancient discipline. He brought them back to it. . . . The morals of the times were bad; he did more than the laws to reform them—he set

good examples. . . . Augustus had raised two altars to Peace; Vespasian built a temple to her, in which he deposited the most precious spoils of Jerusalem; and . . . the old general closed, for the sixth time, the doors of the temple of Janus. He built a forum surrounded by colonnades, in addition to those already existing, and commenced, in the midst of the city, the vast amphitheatre, a mountain of stone, of which three-fourths remain standing to day. . . . A colossal statue raised near by for Nero, but which Vespasian consecrated to the Sun, gave it its name, the Coliseum. . . . We have no knowledge of the wars of Vespasian, except that three times in the year 71 he assumed the title of 'imperator,' and three times again the following year. But when we see him making Cappadocia an imperial proconsular province with numerous garrisons to check the incursions which desolated it; and, towards the Danube, extending his influence over the barbarians even beyond the Borysthenes; when we read in Tacitus that Velleda, the prophetess of the Bructeri, was at that time brought a captive to Rome; that Cerialis vanquished the Brigantes and Frontinus the Silures, we must believe that Vespasian made a vigorous effort along the whole line of his outposts to impress upon foreign nations respect for the Roman name. . . . Here is the secret of that severe economy which appeared to the prodigal and light-minded a shameful stinginess. . . . Vespasian . . . was 69 years old, and was at his little house in the territory of Reate when he felt the approach of death. 'I feel that I am becoming a god,' he said to those around him, laughing in advance at his apotheosis. . . . 'An emperor,' he said, 'ought to die standing.' He attempted to rise and expired in this effort, on the 23rd of June, 79. The first plebeian emperor has had no historian, but a few words of his biographer suffice for his renown. 'rem publicam stabilivit et ornavit,' 'by him the State was strengthened and glorified.' . . . Vespasian being dead, Titus assumed the title of Augustus. . . . His father had prepared him for this by taking him as associate in the Empire; he had given to him the title of Caesar, the censorship, the tribunitian power, the prefecture of the prætorium, and seven consulates. Coming into power at the age of maturity, rich in experience and satiated with pleasures by his very excesses, he had henceforth but one passion, that of the public welfare. At the outset he dismissed his boon companions; in his father's lifetime he had already sacrificed to Roman prejudices his tender sentiments for the Jewish queen Berenice, whom he had sent back to the East. In taking possession of the supreme pontificate he declared that he would keep his hands pure from blood, and he kept his word; no one under his reign perished by his orders." It was during the short reign of Titus that Herulaneum and Pompeii were overwhelmed by an eruption of Vesuvius (August 23, A. D. 79), while other calamities afflicted Italy. "Pestilence carried off thousands of people even in Rome [see PLAGUE: A. D. 78-206]; and at last a conflagration, which raged three days, consumed once more the Capitol, the library of Augustus, and Pompey's theatre. To Campania Titus sent men of consular rank with large sums of money, and he devoted to the relief of the survivors the property that had fallen to the treasury through the death of those who had perished in the disas-

ter without leaving heirs. At Rome he took upon himself the work of repairing everything, and to provide the requisite funds he sold the furniture of the imperial palace. . . . This reign lasted only 26 months, from the 23rd of June, A. D. 79, to the 18th of September, A. D. 81. As Titus was about to visit his paternal estate in the Sabine territory he was seized by a violent fever, which soon left no hope of his recovery. There is a report that he partly opened the curtains of his litter and gazed at the sky with eyes full of tears and reproaches. 'Why,' he exclaimed, 'must I die so soon? In all my life I have, however, but one thing to repent.' What was this? No one knows." Titus was succeeded by his brother Domitian, then thirty years old. "The youth of Domitian had been worthy of the times of Nero, and he had wearied his father and brother by his intrigues. Nevertheless he was sober, to the extent of taking but one meal a day, and he had a taste for military exercises, for study and poetry, especially since the elevation of his family. Vespasian had granted him honours, but no power, and, at the death of Titus, he had only the titles of Caesar and Prince of the Youth. In his hurry to seize at last that Empire so long coveted, he abandoned his dying brother to rush to Rome, to the camp of the prætorians. . . . On the day of their coronation there are few bad princes. Almost all begin well, but, in despotic monarchies, the majority end badly, particularly when the reigns are of long duration. . . . Domitian reigned 15 years, one year longer than Nero, and his reign reproduced the same story: at first a wise government, then every excess. Happily the excesses did not come till late. . . . Fully as vain as the son of Agrippina, Domitian heaped every title upon his own head and decreed deification to himself. His edicts stated: 'Our lord and our god ordains. . . . The new god did not scorn vulgar honours. . . . He was consul 17 times, and 22 times did he have himself proclaimed 'imperator' for victories that had not always been gained. He recalled Nero too by his fondness for shows and for building. . . . There were several wars under Domitian, all defensive excepting the expedition against the Catti [see CHATTI], which was only a great civil measure to drive away the hostile marauders from the frontier. If Pliny the Younger and Tacitus are to be believed, these wars were like those which Caligula waged: Domitian's victories were defeats; his captives, purchased slaves; his triumphs, audacious falsehoods. Suetonius is not so severe. . . . Domitian's cruelty appeared especially, and perhaps we should say only, after the revolt of a person of high rank, Antonius Saturninus, who pretended to be a descendant of the triumvir. . . . He was in command of two legions in Germany whom he incited to revolt, and he called the Germans to his aid. An unexpected thaw stopped this tribe on the right bank of the Rhine, while Appius Norbanus Maximus, governor of Aquitania, crushed Antonius on the opposite shore. . . . This revolt must belong to the year 93, which, as Pliny says, is that in which Domitian's great cruelties began. . . . Domitian lived in a state of constant alarm; every sound terrified him, every man seemed to him an assassin, every occurrence was an omen of evil." He endured this life of gloomy terror for three years, when his dread forebodings were realized, and he was

murdered by his own attendants, September 18, A. D. 96.—V. Duruy, *Hist. of Rome*, ch. 77-78 (v. 4).

ALSO IN: Suetonius, *Lives of the Twelve Cæsars: Vespasian, Titus, Domitian*.—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 57-60 (v. 6-7).

A. D. 78-84.—Campaigns of Agricola in Britain. See BRITAIN: A. D. 78-84.

A. D. 96-138.—Brief reign of Nerva.—Adoption and succession of Trajan.—His persecution of Christians.—His conquests beyond the Danube and in the east.—Hadrian's relinquishment of them.—“On the same day on which Domitian was assassinated, M. Cocceius Nerva was proclaimed Emperor by the Prætorians, and confirmed by the people. He owed his elevation principally to Petronius, Prefect of the Prætorians, and Parthenius, chamberlain to the late Emperor. He was of Cretan origin, and a native of Narni in Umbria, and consequently the first Emperor who was not of Italian descent. . . . He was prudent, upright, generous, and of a gentle temper, but a feeble frame and weak constitution, added to the burden of 64 years, rendered him too reserved, timid, and irresolute for the arduous duties of a sovereign prince. . . . The tolerant and reforming administration of the new Emperor soon became popular. Rome breathed again after the bloody tyranny under which she had been trampled to the dust. The perjured ‘delator’ was threatened with the severest penalties. The treacherous slave who had denounced his master was put to death. Exiles returned to their native cities, and again enjoyed their confiscated possessions. . . . Determined to administer the government for the benefit of the Roman people, he (Nerva) turned his attention to the question of finance, and to the burdensome taxation which was the fruit of the extravagance of his predecessors. . . . He diminished the enormous sums which were lavished upon shows and spectacles, and reduced, as far as was possible, his personal and household expenses. . . . It was not probable that an Emperor of so weak and yielding a character, notwithstanding his good qualities as a prince and a statesman, would be acceptable to a licentious and dominant soldiery. But a few months had elapsed when a conspiracy was organized against him by Calpurnius Crassus. It was, however, discovered; and the ringleader, having confessed his crime, experienced the Emperor’s usual generosity, being only punished by banishment to Tarentum. . . . Meanwhile the Prætorians, led on by Ælianus Carperius, who had been their Prefect under Domitian, besieged Nerva in his palace, with cries of vengeance upon the assassins of his predecessor, murdered Petronius and Parthenius, and compelled the timid Emperor publicly to express his approbation of the deed, and to testify his obligation to them for wreaking vengeance on the guilty. . . . Nerva was in declining years, and, taught by circumstances that he was unequal to curb or cope with the insolence of the soldiery, adopted Trajan as his son and successor [A. D. 97]. Soon after, he conferred upon him in the Senate the rank of Cæsar, and the name of Germanicus, and added the tribuneship and the title of Emperor. This act calmed the tumult, and was welcomed with the unanimous consent of the Senate and the people. . . . Soon after the adoption of

Trajan he died of a fit of ague which brought on fever, at the gardens of Sallust, after a reign of sixteen months, in the sixty-sixth year of his age [A. D. 98]. . . . The choice which Nerva had made proved a fortunate one. M. Ulpius Nerva Trajanus was a Spaniard, a native of Italica, near Seville. . . . He was of an ancient and distinguished family, and his father had filled the office of consul. Although a foreigner, he was a Roman in habits, sympathies, and language; for the south of Spain had become so completely Roman that the inhabitants generally spoke Latin. When a young man he had distinguished himself in a war against the Parthians. . . . At the time of his adoption by Nerva he was in command of a powerful army in Lower Germany, his head-quarters being at Cologne. He was in the prime of life, possessed of a robust constitution, a commanding figure, and a majestic countenance. He was a perfect soldier, by taste and education, and was endowed with all the qualities of a general. . . . He was a strict disciplinarian, but he knew all his veterans, spoke to them by their names, and never let a gallant action pass unrewarded. . . . The news of Nerva’s death was conveyed to him at Cologne by his cousin Hadrian, where he immediately received the imperial power. During the first year of his reign he remained with the army in Germany, engaged in establishing the discipline of the troops and in inspiring them with a love of their duty. . . . The ensuing year he made his entry into Rome on foot, together with his empress, Pompeia Plotina, whose amiability and estimable character contributed much to the popularity of her husband. Her conduct, together with that of his sister, Marciana, exercised a most beneficial influence upon Roman society. They were the first ladies of the imperial court who by their example checked the shameless licentiousness which had long prevailed amongst women of the higher classes. . . . The tastes and habits of his former life led to a change in the peaceful policy which had so long prevailed. The first war in which he was engaged was with the Dacians, who inhabited the country beyond the Danube [see DACIA: A. D. 102-106]. . . . A few years of peace ensued, which Trajan endured with patient reluctance; and many great public works undertaken during the interval show his genius for civil as well as for military administration. . . . But his presence was soon required in the East, and he joyfully hailed the opportunity thus offered him for gaining fresh laurels. The real object of this expedition was ambition—the pretext, that Exedarius, or Exodares, king of Armenia, had received the crown from the king of Parthia, instead of from the Emperor of Rome, as Tiridates had from the hands of Nero. For this insult he demanded satisfaction. Chosroes, the king of Parthia, at first treated his message with contempt; but afterwards, seeing that war was imminent, he sent ambassadors with presents to meet Trajan at Athens, and to announce to him the deposition of Exedarius, and to entreat him to confer the crown of Armenia upon Parthamasiris, or Parthamaspes. Trajan received the ambassadors coldly, told them that he was on his march to Syria, and would there act as he thought fit. Accordingly he crossed into Asia, and marched by way of Cilicia, Syria, and Seleucia to Antioch. The condemnation of the

martyr bishop St. Ignatius marked his stay in that city [A. D. 115]. It seems strange that the persecution of the Christians should have met with countenance and support from an emperor like Trajan; but the fact is, the Roman mind could not separate the Christian from the Jew. The religious distinction was beneath their notice; they contemplated the former merely as a sect of the latter. The Roman party in Asia were persuaded that the Jews were meditating and preparing for insurrection; and the rebellions of this and the ensuing reign proved that their apprehensions were not unreasonable. Hence, at Antioch, the imperial influence was on the side of persecution; and hence when Pliny, the gentle governor of Pontus and Bithynia, wrote to Trajan for instructions respecting the Christians in his province, his 'rescript' spoke of Christianity as a dangerous superstition, and enjoined the punishment of its professors if discovered, although he would not have them sought for. Having received the voluntary submission of Abgarus, prince of Osroene in Mesopotamia, he marched against Armenia. Parthamasiris, who had assumed the royal state, laid his diadem at his feet, in the hopes that he would return it to him as Nero had to Tiridates. Trajan claimed his kingdom as a province of the Roman people, and the unfortunate monarch lost his life in a useless struggle for his crown. This was the commencement of his triumphs: he received the voluntary submission of the kings of Iberia, Sarmatia, the Bosphorus, Colchis, Albania; and he assigned kings to most of the barbarous tribes that inhabited the coast of the Euxine. Still he proceeded on his career of conquest. He chastised the king of Adiabene, who had behaved to him with treachery, and took possession of his dominions, subjugated the rest of Mesopotamia, constructed a bridge of boats over the Tigris, and commenced a canal to unite the two great rivers of Assyria. His course of conquest was resistless; he captured Seleucia, earned the title of Parthicus by taking Ctesiphon, the capital of Parthia [A. D. 116], imposed a tribute on Mesopotamia, and reduced Assyria to the condition of a Roman province. He returned to winter at Antioch, which was in the same winter almost destroyed by an earthquake. Trajan escaped through a window, not without personal injury. . . . The river Tigris bore the victorious Emperor from the scene of his conquest down to the Persian Gulf; he subjugated Arabia Felix, and, like a second Alexander, was meditating and even making preparations for an invasion of India by sea; but his ambitious designs were frustrated by troubles nearer at hand. Some of the conquered nations revolted, and his garrisons were either expelled or put to the sword. He sent his generals to crush the rebels; one of them, Maximus, was conquered and slain; the other, Lusius Quietus, gained considerable advantages and was made governor of Palestine, which had begun to be in a state of insurrection [see Jews: A. D. 116]. He himself marched to punish the revolted Hagareni (Saracens), whose city was called Atrâ, in Mesopotamia. . . . Trajan laid siege to it, but was obliged to raise the siege with great loss. Soon after this he was seized with illness. . . . Leaving his army therefore to the care of Hadrian, whom he had made governor of Syria, he embarked for Rome at the earnest solicitation of the Senate. On arriving

at Selinus in Cilicia (afterwards named Trajanopolis), he was seized with diarrhoea, and expired in the twentieth year of his reign [August, A. D. 117]. . . . He died childless, and it is said had not intended to nominate a successor, following in this the example of Alexander. Hadrian owed his adoption to Plotina. . . . Dio positively asserts that she concealed her husband's death for some days, and that the letter informing the Senate of his last intentions was signed by her, and not by Trajan. Hadrian received the despatches declaring his adoption on the 9th of August, and those announcing Trajan's death two days afterwards. . . . As soon as he was proclaimed Emperor at Antioch, he sent an apologetic despatch to the Senate requesting their assent to his election; the army, he said, had chosen him without waiting for their sanction, lest the Republic should remain without a prince. The confirmation which he asked for was immediately granted. . . . The state of Roman affairs was at this moment a very critical one, and did not permit the new Emperor to leave the East. Emboldened by the news of Trajan's illness, the conquered Parthians had revolted and achieved some great successes; Sarmatia on the north, Mauritania, Egypt, and Syria on the south, were already in a state of insurrection. The far-sighted prudence of Hadrian led him to fear that the empire was not unlikely to fall to pieces by its own weight, and that the Euphrates was its best boundary. It was doubtless a great sacrifice to surrender all the rich and populous provinces beyond that river which had been gained by the arms of his predecessor. It was no coward fear or mean envy of Trajan which prompted Hadrian, but he wisely felt that it was worth any price to purchase peace and security. Accordingly he withdrew the Roman armies from Armenia, Assyria and Mesopotamia, constituted the former of these an independent kingdom, surrendered the two latter to the Parthians, and restored their deposed king Chosroes to his throne. . . . After taking these measures for establishing peace in the East, he left Catilius Severus governor of Syria, and returned by way of Illyria to Rome, where he arrived the following year. . . . A restless curiosity, which was one of the principal features in his character, would not permit him to remain inactive at Rome; he determined to make a personal survey of every province throughout his vast dominions, and for this reason he is so frequently represented on medals as the Roman Hercules. He commenced his travels with Gaul, thence he proceeded to Germany, where he established order and discipline amongst the Roman forces, and then crossed over to Britain. . . . It would be uninteresting to give a mere catalogue of the countries which he visited during the ensuing ten years of his reign. In the fifteenth winter of it he arrived in Egypt, and rebuilt the tomb of Pompey the Great at Pelusium. Thence he proceeded to Alexandria which was at that period the university of the world. . . . He had scarcely passed through Syria when the Jews revolted, and continued in arms for three years [see Jews: A. D. 130-134]. . . . Hadrian spent the winter at Athens, where he gratified his architectural taste by completing the temple of Jupiter Olympius. . . . Conscious . . . of the infirmities of disease and of advancing years, he adopted L. Aurelius Verus, a man



of pleasure and of weak and delicate health, totally unfit for his new position. . . . Age and disease had now so altered his [Hadrian's] character that he became luxurious, self-indulgent, suspicious, and even cruel. Verus did not live two years, and the Emperor then adopted Titus Antoninus, on condition that he should in his turn adopt M. Annius Verus, afterwards called M. Aurelius, and the son of Aurelius Verus." Hadrian's malady "now became insupportably painful, his temper savage even to madness, and many lives of senators and others were sacrificed to his fury. His sufferings were so excruciating that he was always begging his attendants to put him to death. At last he went to Baïæ, where, setting at defiance the prescriptions of his physicians, he ate and drank what he pleased. Death, therefore, soon put a period to his sufferings, in the sixty-third year of his age and the twenty-first of his restless reign [A. D. 138]. Antoninus was present at his death, his corpse was burnt at Puteoli (Pozzuoli), and his ashes deposited in the mausoleum (moles Hadriani) which he had himself built, and which is now the Castle of St Angelo."—R. W. Browne, *Hist. of Rome from A. D. 96, ch. 1-2*.

Also in C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire, ch. 63-66* (r. 7)—T. Arnold and others, *Hist. of the Roman Empire* (*Encyclop. Metropolitana*), ch. 4-6.

A. D. 138-180.—The Antonines.—Antoninus Pius.—Marcus Aurelius.—"On the death of Hadrian in A. D. 138, Antoninus Pius succeeded to the throne, and, in accordance with the late Emperor's conditions, adopted Marcus Aurelius and Lucius Commodus. Marcus had been betrothed at the age of 15 to the sister of Lucius Commodus, but the new Emperor broke off the engagement, and betrothed him instead to his daughter Faustina. The marriage, however, was not celebrated till seven years afterwards, A. D. 146. The long reign of Antoninus Pius is one of those happy periods that have no history. An almost unbroken peace reigned at home and abroad. Taxes were lightened, calamities relieved, informers discouraged, confiscations were rare, plots and executions were almost unknown. Throughout the whole extent of his vast domain the people loved and valued their Emperor, and the Emperor's one aim was to further the happiness of his people. He, too, like Aurelius, had learnt that what was good for the bee was good for the hive. . . . He disliked war, did not value the military title of Imperator, and never deigned to accept a triumph. With this wise and eminent prince, who was as amiable in his private relations as he was admirable in the discharge of his public duties, Marcus Aurelius spent the next 23 years of his life. . . . There was not a shade of jealousy between them; each was the friend and adviser of the other, and, so far from regarding his destined heir with suspicion, the Emperor gave him the designation 'Cæsar,' and heaped upon him all the honours of the Roman commonwealth. It was in vain that the whisper of malignant tongues attempted to shake this mutual confidence. . . . In the year 161, when Marcus was now 40 years old, Antoninus Pius, who had reached the age of 75, caught a fever at Lerium. Feeling that his end was near, he summoned his friends and the chief men of Rome to his bedside, and there (without saying a word about his other adopted son, who is generally

known by the name of Lucius Verus) solemnly recommended Marcus to them as his successor; and then, giving to the captain of the guard the watchword of 'Equanimity,' as though his earthly task was over, he ordered to be transferred to the bedroom of Marcus the little golden statue of Fortune, which was kept in the private chamber of the Emperors as an omen of public prosperity. The very first act of the new Emperor was one of splendid generosity, namely, the admission of his adoptive brother Lucius Verus into the fullest participation of imperial honours.

The admission of Lucius Verus to a share of the Empire was due to the innate modesty of Marcus. As he was a devoted student, and cared less for manly exercises, in which Verus excelled, he thought that his adoptive brother would be a better and more useful general than himself, and that he could best serve the State by retaining the civil administration, and entrusting to his brother the management of war. Verus, however, as soon as he got away from the immediate influence and ennobling society of Marcus, broke loose from all decency, and showed himself to be a weak and worthless personage. . . . Two things only can be said in his favour; the one, that, though depraved, he was wholly free from cruelty; and the other, that he had the good sense to submit himself entirely to his brother. . . . Marcus had a large family by Faustina, and in the first year of his reign his wife bore twins, of whom the one who survived became the wicked and detested Emperor Commodus. As though the birth of such a child were in itself an omen of ruin, a storm of calamity began at once to burst over the long tranquil State. An inundation of the Tiber . . . caused a distress which ended in wide spread famine. Men's minds were terrified by earthquakes, by the burning of cities, and by plagues of noxious insects. To these miseries, which the Emperors did their best to alleviate, was added the horror of wars and rumours of wars. The Parthians, under their king Vologeses, defeated and all but destroyed a Roman army, and devastated with impunity the Roman province of Syria. The wild tribes of the Catti burst over Germany with fire and sword; and the news from Britain was full of insurrection and tumult. Such were the elements of trouble and discord which overshadowed the reign of Marcus Aurelius from its very beginning down to its weary close. As the Parthian war was the most important of the three, Verus was sent to quell it, and but for the ability of his generals—the greatest of whom was Avidius Cassius—would have ruined irretrievably the fortunes of the Empire. These generals, however, vindicated the majesty of the Roman name [A. D. 165-166—see PARTHIA], and Verus returned in triumph, bringing back with him from the East the seeds of a terrible pestilence which devastated the whole Empire [see PLAGUE: A. D. 78-266] and by which, on the outbreak of fresh wars, Verus himself was carried off at Aquileia. . . . Marcus was now the undisputed lord of the Roman world. . . . But this imperial elevation kindled no glow of pride or self-satisfaction in his meek and chastened nature. He regarded himself as being in fact the servant of all. . . . He was one of those who held that nothing should be done hastily, and that few crimes were worse than the waste of time. It is to such views and

such habits that we owe the composition of his works. His 'Meditations' were written amid the painful self-denial and distracting anxieties of his wars with the Quadi and the Marcomanni [A. D. 168-180,—see *SARMATIAN AND MARCOMANNIAN WARS OF MARCUS AURELIUS*], and he was the author of other works which unhappily have perished. Perhaps of all the lost treasures of antiquity there are few which we should feel a greater wish to recover than the lost autobiography of this wisest of Emperors and holiest of Pagan men. . . . The Court was to Marcus a burden, he tells us himself that Philosophy was his mother, Empire only his stepmother, it was only his repose in the one that rendered even tolerable to him the burdens of the other. . . . The most celebrated event of the war [with the Quadi] took place in a great victory . . . which he won in A. D. 174, and which was attributed by the Christians to what is known as the 'Miracle of the Thundering Legion' [see *THUNDERING LEGION*]. . . . To the gentle heart of Marcus all war, even when accompanied with victories, was eminently distasteful, and in such painful and ungenial occupations no small part of his life was passed. . . . It was his unhappy destiny not to have trodden out the embers of this [the Sarmatian] war before he was burdened with another far more painful and formidable. This was the revolt of Avidius Cassius, a general of the old blunt Roman type, whom, in spite of some ominous warnings, Marcus both loved and trusted. The ingratitude displayed by such a man caused Marcus the deepest anguish; but he was saved from all dangerous consequences by the wide-spread affection which he had inspired by his virtuous reign. The very soldiers of the rebellious general fell away from him, and, after he had been a nominal Emperor for only three months and six days, he was assassinated by some of his own officers. . . . Marcus travelled through the provinces which had favoured the cause of Avidius Cassius, and treated them all with the most complete and indulgent forbearance. . . . During this journey of pacification, he lost his wife Faustina, who died suddenly in one of the valleys of Mount Taurus. History . . . has assigned to Faustina a character of the darkest infamy, and it has even been made a charge against Aurelius that he overlooked or condoned her offences. . . . No doubt Faustina was unworthy of her husband; but surely it is the glory and not the shame of a noble nature to be averse from jealousy and suspicion. . . . 'Marcus Aurelius cruelly persecuted the Christians.' Let us briefly consider this charge. . . . Marcus in his 'Meditations' alludes to the Christians once only, and then it is to make a passing complaint of the indifference to death, which appeared to him, as it appeared to Epictetus, to arise, not from any noble principles, but from mere obstinacy and perversity. That he shared the profound dislike with which Christians were regarded is very probable. That he was a cold-blooded and virulent persecutor is utterly unlike his whole character. . . . The true state of the case seems to have been this: The deep calamities in which during the whole reign of Marcus the Empire was involved, caused wide-spread distress, and roused into peculiar fury the feelings of the provincials against men whose atheism (for such they considered it to be) had kindled the anger of the gods. . . . Marcus, when ap-

pealed to, simply let the existing law take its course. . . . The martyrdoms took place in Gaul and Asia Minor, not in Rome. . . . The persecution of the churches in Lyons and Vienne happened in A. D. 177. Shortly after this period fresh wars recalled the Emperor to the North. . . . He was worn out with the toils, trials and travels of his long and weary life. He sunk under mental anxieties and bodily fatigues, and after a brief illness died in Pannonia, either at Vienna or at Sirmium, on March 17, A. D. 180, in the 59th year of his age and the 20th of his reign"—F. W. Farrar, *Seekers after God: Marcus Aurelius*.—"One moment, thanks to him, the world was governed by the best and greatest man of his age. Frightful decadences followed; but the little casket which contained the 'Thoughts' on the banks of the Granicus was saved. From it came forth that incomparable book in which Epictetus was surpassed, that Evangel of those who believe not in the supernatural, which has not been comprehended until our day. Veritable, eternal Evangel, the book of 'Thoughts,' which will never grow old, because it asserts no dogma"—E. Renan, *English Conferences: Marcus Aurelius*.

Also in: W. W. Capes, *The Age of the Antonines*—C. Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch. 67-68 (v. 7)—P. B. Watson, *Marcus Aurelius Antoninus*—G. Long, *Thoughts of the Emperor M. Aurelius Antoninus*, introd.

A. D. 180-192.—The reign of Commodus.—

"If a man were called to fix the period in the history of the world during which the condition of the human race was most happy and prosperous, he would, without hesitation, name that which elapsed from the death of Domitian to the accession of Commodus. The vast extent of the Roman empire was governed by absolute power, under the guidance of virtue and wisdom. The armies were restrained by the firm but gentle hand of four successive emperors whose characters and authority commanded involuntary respect. . . . It has been objected to Marcus, that he sacrificed the happiness of millions to a fond partiality for a worthless boy, and that he chose a successor in his own family rather than in the republic. Nothing, however, was neglected by the anxious father, and by the men of virtue and learning whom he summoned to his assistance, to expand the narrow mind of young Commodus, to correct his growing vices, and to render him worthy of the throne for which he was designed. . . . The beloved son of Marcus succeeded to his father, amidst the acclamations of the senate and armies; and when he ascended the throne, the happy youth saw round him neither competitor to remove, nor enemies to punish. In this calm elevated station it was surely natural that he should prefer the love of mankind to their detestation, the mild glories of his five predecessors to the ignominious fate of Nero and Domitian. Yet Commodus was not, as he has been represented, a tiger born with an insatiate thirst of human blood, and capable, from his infancy, of the most inhuman actions. Nature had formed him of a weak, rather than a wicked disposition. His simplicity and timidity rendered him the slave of his attendants, who gradually corrupted his mind. His cruelty, which at first obeyed the dictates of others, degenerated into habit, and at length became the ruling passion of his soul. . . . During the three first years of his reign, the

forms, and even the spirit, of the old administration were maintained by those faithful counselors to whom Marcus had recommended his son, and for whose wisdom and integrity Commodus still entertained a reluctant esteem. The young prince and his profligate favorites revelled in all the license of sovereign power; but his hands were yet unstained with blood; and he had even displayed a generosity of sentiment, which might perhaps have ripened into solid virtue. A fatal incident decided his fluctuating character. One evening, as the emperor was returning to the palace through a dark and narrow portico in the amphitheatre, an assassin, who waited his passage, rushed upon him with a drawn sword, loudly exclaiming, 'The senate sends you this.' The menace prevented the deed, the assassin was seized by the guards, and immediately revealed the authors of the conspiracy. It had been formed, not in the State, but within the walls of the palace. . . . But the words of the assassin sunk deep into the mind of Commodus, and left an indelible impression of fear and hatred against the whole body of the senate. Those whom he had dreaded as importunate ministers he now suspected as secret enemies. The Delators, a race of men discouraged, and almost extinguished, under the former reigns, again became formidable as soon as they discovered that the emperor was desirous of finding disaffection and treason in the senate. . . . Suspicion was equivalent to proof, trial to condemnation. The execution of a considerable senator was attended with the death of all who might lament or revenge his fate; and when Commodus had once tasted human blood, he became incapable of pity or remorse. . . . Pestilence and famine contributed to fill up the measure of the calamities of Rome. . . . His cruelty proved at last fatal to himself. He had shed with impunity the noblest blood of Rome: he perished as soon as he was dreaded by his own domestics. Marcia, his favorite concubine, Eclectus, his chamberlain, and Lætus, his Prætorian præfect, alarmed by the fate of their companions and predecessors, resolved to prevent the destruction which every hour hung over their heads, either from the mad caprice of the tyrant, or the sudden indignation of the people. Marcia seized the occasion of presenting a draught of wine to her lover, after he had fatigued himself with hunting some wild beasts. Commodus retired to sleep, but whilst he was laboring with the effects of poison and drunkenness, a robust youth, by profession a wrestler, entered his chamber, and strangled him without resistance" (December 31, A. D. 192).—E Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch 8-4.

ALSO IN: J. B. L. Crevier, *Hist. of the Roman Emperors*, bk. 21 (v. 7).

A. D. 192-284.—From Commodus to Diocletian.—Twenty-three Emperors in the Century.—Thirteen murdered by their own soldiers or servants.—Successful wars of Severus, Aurelian, and Probus.—On the murder of Commodus, "Helvius Pertinax, the præfect of the city, a man of virtue, was placed on the throne by the conspirators, who would fain justify their deed in the eyes of the world, and their choice was confirmed by the senate. But the Prætorians had not forgotten their own power on a similar occasion; and they liked not the virtue and regularity of the new monarch. Pertinax

was, therefore, speedily deprived of throne and life. Prætorian insolence now attained its height. Regardless of the dignity and honour of the empire, they set it up to auction. The highest bidder was a senator, named Didius Julianus [March, 193]. . . . The legions disdained to receive an emperor from the life-guards. Those of Britain proclaimed their general Clodius Albinus, those of Asia, Pescennius Niger; the Pannonian legions, Septimius Severus. This last was a man of bravery and conduct: by valour and stratagem he successively vanquished his rivals [defeating Albinus in an obstinate battle at Lyons, A. D. 197, and finishing the subjugation of his rivals in the east by reducing Byzantium after a siege of three years]. He maintained the superiority of the Roman arms against the Parthians and Caledonians [see Britain: A. D. 208-211]. His reign was vigorous and advantageous to the state; but he wanted either the courage or the power to fully repress the license and insubordination of the soldiery. Severus left the empire [A. D. 211] to his two sons. Caracalla, the elder, a prince of violent and untamable passions, disdained to share empire with any. He murdered his brother and colleague, the more gentle Geta, and put to death all who ventured to disapprove of the deed. A restless ferocity distinguished the character of Caracalla. he was ever at war, now on the banks of the Rhine, now on those of the Euphrates. His martial impetuosity daunted his enemies, his reckless cruelty terrified his subjects. . . . During a Parthian war Caracalla gave offence to Macrinus, the commander of his body-guard, who murdered him [A. D. 217]. Macrinus seized the empire, but had not power to hold it. He and his son Diadumenianus [after defeat in battle at Immæ, near Antioch] . . . were put to death by the army, who proclaimed a supposed son [and actually a second cousin] of their beloved Caracalla. This youth was named Elagabalus, and was priest of the Sun in the temple of Emesa, in Syria. Every vice stained the character of this licentious effeminate youth, whose name is become proverbial for sensual indulgence: he possessed no redeeming quality, had no friend, and was put to death by his own guards, who, vicious as they were themselves, detested vice in him. Alexander Severus, cousin to Elagabalus, but of a totally opposite character, succeeded that vicious prince [A. D. 222]. All estimable qualities were united in the noble and accomplished Alexander. . . . The love of learning and virtue did not in him smother military skill and valour; he checked the martial hordes of Germany, and led the Roman eagles to victory against the Sassanides, who had displaced the Arsacides in the dominion over Persia, and revived the claims of the house of Cyrus over Anterior Asia. Alexander, victorious in war, beloved by his subjects, deemed he might venture on introducing more regular discipline into the army. The attempt was fatal, and the amiable monarch lost his life in the mutiny that resulted [A. D. 235]. Maximin, a soldier, originally a Thracian shepherd, distinguished by his prodigious size, strength and appetite, a stranger to all civic virtues and all civic rules, rude, brutal, cruel, and ferocious, seated himself on the throne of the noble and virtuous prince, in whose murder he had been the chief agent. At Rome, the senate conferred the vacant dignity on Gordian, a noble, wealthy

and virtuous senator, and on his son of the same name, a valiant and spirited youth. But scarcely were they recognized when the son fell in an engagement, and the father slew himself [A. D. 237]. Maximin was now rapidly marching towards Rome, full of rage and fury. Despair gave courage to the senate; they nominated Balbinus and Pupienus [Maximus Pupienus], one to direct the internal, the other the external affairs. Maximin had advanced as far as Aquileia [which he besieged without success], when his horrible cruelties caused an insurrection against him, and he and his son, an amiable youth, were murdered [A. D. 238]. The army was not, however, willing to acquiesce in the claim of the senate to appoint an emperor. Civil war was on the point of breaking out [and Balbinus and Pupienus were massacred by the Prætorians], when the conflicting parties agreed in the person of the third Gordian, a boy of but thirteen years of age [A. D. 238]. Gordian III. was . . . chiefly guided by his father-in-law, Misitheus, who induced him to engage in war against the Persians. In the war, Gordian displayed a courage worthy of any of his predecessors; but he shared what was now become the usual fate of a Roman emperor. He was murdered by Philip, the captain of his guard [A. D. 244]. Philip, an Arabian by birth, originally a captain of freebooters, seized on the purple of his murdered sovereign. Two rivals arose and contended with him for the prize, but accomplished nothing. A third competitor, Decius, the commander of the army of the Danube, defeated and slew him near Verona [A. D. 249]. During the reign of Philip, Rome attained her thousandth year.—T. Keightley, *Outlines of Hist. (Lardner's Cabinet Cyclop.)*, pt. 1, ch. 9.—“Decius is memorable as the first emperor who attempted to extirpate the Christian religion by a general persecution of its professors. His edicts are lost; but the records of the time exhibit a departure from the system which had been usually observed by enemies of the church since the days of Trajan. The authorities now sought out Christians, the legal order as to accusations was neglected; accusers ran no risk, and popular clamour was admitted instead of formal information. The long enjoyment of peace had told unfavourably on the church. . . . When, as Origen had foretold, a new season of trial came, the effects of the general relaxation were sadly displayed. On being summoned, in obedience to the emperor's edict, to appear and offer sacrifice, multitudes of Christians in every city rushed to the forum. . . . It seemed, says St. Cyprian, as if they had long been eager to find an opportunity for disowning their faith. The persecution was especially directed against the bishops and clergy. Among its victims were Fabian of Rome, Babylas of Antioch, and Alexander of Jerusalem; while in the lines of other eminent men (as Cyprian, Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgus, and Dionysius of Alexandria) the period is marked by exile or other sufferings. The chief object, however, was not to inflict death on the Christians, but to force them to recantation. With this view they were subjected to tortures, imprisonment and want of food; and under such trials the constancy of many gave way. Many withdrew into voluntary banishment; among these was Paul, a young man of Alexandria, who took up his abode in the desert of the The-

baid, and is celebrated as the first Christian hermit.”—J. C. Robertson, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, bk. 1, ch. 6 (v. 1).—“This persecution [of Decius] was interrupted by an invasion of the Goths, who, for the first time, crossed the Danube in considerable numbers, and devastated Mœsia [see GOTHs: A. D. 244-251]. Decius marched against them, and gained some important advantages; but in his last battle, charging into the midst of the enemy to avenge the death of his son, he was overpowered and slain (A. D. 251). A great number of the Romans, thus deprived of their leader, fell victims to the barbarians; the survivors, grateful for the protection afforded them by the legions of Gallus, who commanded in the neighbourhood, proclaimed that general emperor. Gallus concluded a dishonourable peace with the Goths, and renewed the persecutions of the Christians. His dastardly conduct provoked general resentment; the provincial armies revolted, but the most dangerous insurrection was that headed by Æmilianus, who was proclaimed emperor in Mœsia. He led his forces into Italy, and the hostile armies met at Interamna (Terni); but just as an engagement was about to commence, Gallus was murdered by his own soldiers (A. D. 253), and Æmilianus proclaimed emperor. In three months Æmilianus himself met a similar fate, the army having chosen Valerian, the governor of Gaul, to the sovereignty. Valerian, though now sixty years of age, possessed powers that might have revived the sinking fortunes of the empire, which was now invaded on all sides. The Goths, who had formed a powerful monarchy on the lower Danube and the northern coasts of the Black Sea, extended their territories to the Borysthenes (Dniester) and Tanais (Don) they ravaged Mœsia, Thrace and Macedonia; while their fleets . . . devastated the coasts both of the European and Asiatic provinces [see GOTHs: A. D. 258-267]. The great confederation of the Franks became formidable on the lower Rhine [see FRANKs: A. D. 258], and not less dangerous was that of the Allemanni on the upper part of that river. The Carpians and Sarmatians laid Mœsia waste; while the Persians plundered Syria, Cappadocia, and Cilicia. Gallienus, the emperor's son, whom Valerian had chosen for his colleague, and Aurelian, destined to succeed him in the empire, gained several victories over the Germanic tribes; while Valerian marched in person against the Scythians and Persians, who had invaded Asia. He gained a victory over the former in Anatolia, but, imprudently passing the Euphrates, he was surrounded by Sapor's army near Edessa . . . and was forced to surrender at discretion (A. D. 259) [see PERSIA: A. D. 226-627]. During nine years Valerian languished in hopeless captivity, the object of scorn and insult to his brutal conqueror, while no effort was made for his liberation by his unnatural son. Gallienus succeeded to the throne. . . . At the moment of his accession, the barbarians, encouraged by the captivity of Valerian, invaded the empire on all sides. Italy itself was invaded by the Germans [see ALLEMANNI: A. D. 259], who advanced to Ravenna, but they were forced to retire by the emperor. Gallienus, after this exertion, sunk into complete inactivity; his indolence roused a host of competitors for the empire in the different provinces, commonly called ‘the thirty tyrants,’ though the number of pretenders did not

exceed 19. . . . Far the most remarkable of them was Odenatus, who assumed the purple at Palmyra, gained several great victories over the Persians, and besieged Sapor in Ctesiphon. . . . But this great man was murdered by some of his own family; he was succeeded by his wife, the celebrated Zenobia, who took the title of Queen of the East. Gallienus did not long survive him; he was murdered while besieging Aureolus, one of his rivals, in Mediolanum (Milan); but before his death he transmitted his rights to Claudius, a general of great reputation (A. D. 268). Most of the other tyrants had previously fallen in battle or by assassination. Marcus Aurelius Claudius, having conquered his only rival, Aureolus, marched against the Germans and Goths, whom he routed with great slaughter [see GOTHs, A. D. 268-270]. He then prepared to march against Zenobia, who had conquered Egypt, but a pestilence broke out in his army, and the emperor himself was one of its victims (A. D. 270). . . . His brother was elected emperor by acclamation; but in 17 days he so displeased the army, by attempting to revive the ancient discipline, that he was deposed and murdered. Aurelian, a native of Sirmium in Pannonia, was chosen emperor by the army, and the senate, well acquainted with his merits, joyfully confirmed the election. He made peace with the Goths, and led his army against the Germans, who had once more invaded Italy [see ALEMANNI: A. D. 270]. Aurelian was at first defeated; but he soon retrieved his loss, and cut the whole of the barbarian army to pieces. His next victory was obtained over the Vandals, a new horde that had passed the Danube; and having thus secured the tranquility of Europe, he marched to rescue the eastern provinces from Zenobia, whom he vanquished and brought captive to Rome (see PALMYRA). This accomplished, the vigorous emperor proceeded to the suppression of a formidable revolt in Egypt, and then to the recovery of Gaul, Spain, and Britain, "which had now for thirteen years been the prey of different tyrants. A single campaign restored these provinces to the empire; and Aurelian, returning to Rome, was honoured with the most magnificent triumph that the city had ever beheld. . . . But he abandoned the province of Dacia to the barbarians, withdrawing all the Roman garrisons that had been stationed beyond the Danube. Aurelian's virtues were sullied by the sternness and severity that naturally belongs to a peasant and a soldier. His officers dreaded his inflexibility," and he was murdered, A. D. 275, by some of them who had been detected in peculations and who dreaded his wrath. The senate elected as his successor Marcus Claudius Tacitus, who died after a reign of seven months. Florian, a brother of Tacitus, was then chosen by the senate; but the Syrian army put forward a competitor in the person of its commander, Marcus Aurelius Probus, and Florian was presently slain by his own troops. "Probus, now undisputed master of the Empire, led his troops from Asia to Gaul, which was again devastated by the German tribes; he not only defeated the barbarians, but pursued them into their own country, where he gained greater advantages than any of his predecessors [see GAUL: A. D. 277 and GERMANY: A. D. 277]. Thence he passed into Thrace, where he humbled the Goths; and, returning to Asia, he completely subdued

the insurgent Issaurians, whose lands he divided among his veterans," and commanded peace on his own terms from the king of Persia. But even the power with which Probus wielded his army could not protect him from its licentiousness, and in a sudden mutiny (A. D. 282) he was slain. Carus, captain of the praetorian guards, was then raised to the throne by the army, the senate assenting. He repelled the Sarmatians and defeated the Persians, who had renewed hostilities; but he died, A. D. 283, while besieging Ctesiphon. His son Numerianus was chosen his successor; "but after a few months' reign, he was assassinated by Aper, his father-in-law and captain of his guards. The crime, however, was discovered, and the murderer put to death by the army. Diocletian, said to have been originally a slave, was unanimously saluted Emperor by the army. He was proclaimed at Chalcedon, on the 17th of December, A. D. 284; an epoch that deserves to be remembered, as it marks the beginning of a new era, called 'the Era of Diocletian,' or 'the Era of Martyrs,' which long prevailed in the church, and is still used by the Copts, the Abyssinians, and other African nations."—W. C. Taylor, *Student's Manual of Ancient Hist.*, ch. 17, sect. 6-7.

ALSO IN E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 5-12 (p. 1).

A. D. 213.—First collision with the Alemanni. See ALEMANNI. A. D. 213.

A. D. 238.—Siege of Aquileia by Maximin. See above: A. D. 192-284.

A. D. 258-267.—Naval incursions and ravages of the Goths in Greece and Asia Minor. See GOTHs: A. D. 258-267.

A. D. 284-305.—Reconstitution of the Empire by Diocletian.—Its division and subdivision between two Augusti and two Cæsars.—Abdication of Diocletian.—"The accession of Diocletian to power marks a new epoch in the history of the Roman empire. From this time the old names of the republic, the consuls, the tribunes, and the Senate itself, cease, even if still existing, to have any political significance. The government becomes avowedly a monarchical autocracy, and the officers by whom it is administered are simply the nominees of the despot on the throne. The empire of Rome is henceforth an Oriental sovereignty. Aurelian had already introduced the use of the Oriental diadem. The nobility of the empire derive their positions from the favor of the sovereign, the commons of the empire, who have long lost their political power, cease to enjoy even the name of citizens. The provinces are still administered under the imperial prefects by the magistrates and the assemblies of an earlier date, but the functions of both the one and the other are confined more strictly than ever to matters of police and finance. Hitherto, indeed, the Senate, however intrinsically weak, had found opportunities for putting forth its claims to authority. . . . The chosen of the legions had been for some time past the commander of an army, rather than the sovereign of the state. He had seldom quitted the camp, rarely or never presented himself in the capital. . . . The whole realm might split asunder at any moment into as many kingdoms as there were armies, unless the chiefs of the legions felt themselves controlled by the strength or genius of one more eminent than the rest. . . . The danger of disruption, thus far averted

mainly by the awe which the name of Rome inspired, was becoming yearly more imminent, when Diocletian arose to re-establish the organic connection of the parts, and breathe a new life into the heart of the body politic. The jealous edict of Gallienus . . . had forbidden the senators to take service in the army, or to quit the limits of Italy. The degradation of that once illustrious order, which was thus rendered incapable of furnishing a candidate for the diadem, was completed by its indolent acquiescence in this disqualifying ordinance. The nobles of Rome relinquished all interest in affairs which they could no longer aspire to conduct. The emperors, on their part, ceased to regard them as a substantive power in the state; and in constructing his new imperial constitution Diocletian wholly overlooked their existence. . . . While he disregarded the possibility of opposition at Rome, he contrived a new check upon the rivalry of his distant lieutenants, by associating with himself three other chiefs, welded together by strict alliance into one imperial family, each of whom should take up his residence in a separate quarter of the empire, and combine with all the others in maintaining their common interest. His first step was to choose a single colleague in the person of a brave soldier of obscure origin, an Illyrian peasant, by name Maximianus, whom he invested with the title of Augustus in the year 286. The associated rulers assumed at the same time the fanciful epithets of Jovius and Hercules, auspicious names, which made them perhaps popular in the camps, where the commanding genius of the one and the laborious fortitude of the other were fully recognized. Maximianus was deputed to control the legions in Gaul, to make head against domestic sedition, as well as against the revolt of Carausius [see BRITAIN. A. D. 288-297], a pretender to the purple in Britain, while Diocletian encountered the enemies or rivals who were now rising up in various quarters in the East. His dangers still multiplied, and again the powers of the state were subdivided to meet them. In the year 292 Diocletian created two Cæsars, the one, Galerius, to act subalternately to himself in the East; the other, Constantius Chlorus, to divide the government of the western provinces with Maximian. The Cæsars were bound more closely to the Augusti by receiving their daughters in marriage; but though they acknowledged each a superior in his own half of the empire, and admitted a certain supremacy of Diocletian over all, yet each enjoyed kingly rule in his own territories, and each established a court and capital, as well as an army and a camp. Diocletian retained the wealthiest and most tranquil portion of the realm, and reigned in Nicomedia [see NICOMEDIA] over Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt; while he intrusted to the Cæsar Galerius, established at Sirmium, the more exposed provinces on the Danube. Maximian occupied Italy, the adjacent islands, and Africa, stationing himself, however, not in Rome, but at Milan. Constantius was required to defend the Rhenish frontier; and the martial provinces of Gaul, Spain, and Britain were given him to furnish the forces necessary for maintaining that important trust. The capital of the Western Cæsar was fixed at Treves. Inspired with a common interest, and controlled by the ascendancy of Diocletian himself, all the emperors acted with vigor in their

several provinces. Diocletian recovered Alexandria and quieted the revolt of Egypt [see ALEXANDRIA: A. D. 296]. Maximian routed the unruly hordes of Mauretania, and overthrew a pretender to sovereignty in that distant quarter. Constantius discomfited an invading host of Alemanni, kept in check Carausius, who for a moment had seized upon Britain, and again wrested that province from Allectus, who had murdered and succeeded to him. Galerius brought the legions of Illyria to the defence of Syria against the Persians, and though once defeated on the plains of Carrhae, at last reduced the enemy to submission [see PERSIA: A. D. 226-327]. Thus victorious in every quarter, Diocletian celebrated the commencement of his twentieth year of power with a triumph at the ancient capital, and again taking leave of the imperial city, returned to his customary residence at Nicomedia. The illness with which he was attacked on his journey suggested or fixed his resolution to relieve himself from his cares, and on May 1, in the year 305, being then fifty-nine years of age, he performed the solemn act of abdication at Morgus, in Mæsia, the spot where he had first assumed the purple at the bidding of his soldiers. Strange to say, he did not renounce the object of his ambition alone. On the same day a similar scene was enacted by his colleague Maximian at Milan; but the abdication of Maximian was not, it is said, a spontaneous sacrifice, but imposed upon him by the influence or authority of his elder and greater colleague. Diocletian had established the principle of succession by which the supreme power was to descend. Having seen the completion of all his arrangements, and congratulated himself on the success, thus far, of his great political experiments, he crowned his career of moderation and self-restraint by strictly confining himself during the remainder of his life to the tranquil enjoyment of a private station. Retiring to the residence he had prepared for himself at Salona, he found occupation and amusement in the cultivation of his garden."—C. Merivale, *General Hist. of Rome*, ch. 70.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 13.—W. T. Arnold, *The Roman System of Provincial Administration*, ch. 4.—See, also, **DIOCLETIAN**

A. D. 287.—**Insurrection of the Bagauds in Gaul.** See **BAGAUDS**; also, **DEDITITUS**.

A. D. 303-305.—**The persecution of Christians under Diocletian.**—"Dreams concerning the overthrow of the Empire had long been cast into the forms of prophecies amongst the Christians. . . . There were some to repeat the predictions and to count the proofs of overthrow impending upon the Empire. 'But there were more, far more, to desire its preservation. Many even laboured for it. The number of those holding offices of distinction at the courts and in the armies implies the activity of a still larger number in inferior stations. . . . Never, on the other hand, had the generality of Christians been the objects of deeper or more bitter suspicions. . . . By the lower orders, they would be hated as conspiring against the customs of their province or the glories of their race. By men of position and of education, they would be despised as opposing every interest of learning, of property, and of rank. Darker still were the sentiments of the sovereigns. By them the

Christians were scorned as unruly subjects, building temples without authority, appointing priests without license, while they lived and died for principles the most adverse to the laws and to the rulers of the Empire. . . . Everywhere they were advancing. Everywhere they met with reviving foes. At the head of these stood the Cæsar, afterwards the Emperor Galerius. He who had been a herdsman of Dacia was of the stamp to become a wanton ruler. He showed his temper in his treatment of the Heathen. He showed it still more clearly in his hostility towards the Christians. . . . He turned to Diocletian. The elder Emperor was in the mood to hear his vindictive son-in-law. Already had Diocletian fulminated his edicts against the Christians. Once it was because his priests declared them to be denounced in an oracle from Apollo, as opposing the worship of that deity. At another time, it was because his soothsayers complained of the presence of his Christian attendants as interfering with the omens on which the Heathen depended. Diocletian was superstitious. But he yielded less to his superstition as a man than to his imperiousness as a sovereign, when he ordered that all employed in the imperial service should take part in the public sacrifices under pain of scourging and dismissal. . . . At this crisis he was accosted by Galerius. Imperious as he was, Diocletian was still circumspect. . . . Galerius urged instant suppression. 'The world,' replied his father-in-law, 'will be thrown into confusion, if we attack the Christians.' But Galerius insisted. Not all the caution of the elder Emperor was proof against the passions thus excited by his son-in-law. The wives of Diocletian and Galerius, both said to have been Christians, interceded in vain. Without consulting the other sovereigns, it was determined between Diocletian and Galerius to sound the alarm of persecution throughout their realms. Never had persecution begun more fearfully. Without a note of warning, the Christians of Nicomedia were startled, one morning, by the sack and demolition of their church. . . . Not until the next day, however, was there any formal declaration of hostilities. An edict then appeared commanding instant and terrible proceedings against the Christians. Their churches were to be razed. Their Scriptures were to be destroyed. They themselves were to be deprived of their estates and offices. . . . Some days or weeks, crowded with resistance as well as suffering, went by. Suddenly a fire broke out in the palace at Nicomedia. It was of course laid at the charge of the Christians. . . . Some movements occurring in the eastern provinces were also ascribed to Christian machinations. . . . The Emperesses, suspected of sharing the faith of the sufferers, were compelled to offer public sacrifice. Fiercer assaults ensued. A second edict from the palace ordered the arrest of the Christian priests. A third commanded that the prisoners should be forced to sacrifice according to the Heathen ritual under pain of torture. When the dungeons were filled, and the racks within them were busy with their horrid work, a fourth edict, more searching and more pitiless than any, was published. By this the proper officers were directed to arrest every Christian whom they could discover, and bring him to one of the Heathen temples. . . . Letters were despatched to demand the co-operation of

the Emperor Maximian and the Cæsar Constantius. The latter, it is said, refused; yet there were no limits that could be set to the persecution by any one of the sovereigns. . . . None suffered more than the Christians in Britain. . . . The intensity of the persecution was in no degree diminished by the extent over which it spread. . . . Some were thrown into dungeons to renounce their faith or to die amidst the agonies of which they had no fear. Long trains of those who survived imprisonment were sent across the country or beyond the sea to labour like brutes in the public mines. In many cities the streets must have been literally blocked up with the stakes and scaffolds where death was dealt alike to men and women and little children. It mattered nothing of what rank the victims were. The poorest slave and the first officer of the imperial treasury were massacred with equal savageness. . . . The memory of man embraces no such strife, if that can be called a strife in which there was but one side armed, but one side slain"—S. Eliot, *History of the Early Christians*, bk. 3, ch. 10 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: A. Carr, *The Church and the Roman Empire*, ch. 2—G. Uhlhorn, *The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, bk. 3, ch. 1.

A. D. 305-323.—The wars of Constantine and his rivals.—His triumph.—His reunion of the Empire.—On the abdication of Diocletian and Maximian, Constantius and Galerius, who had previously held the subordinate rank of Cæsars, succeeded to the superior throne, as Augusti. A nephew of Galerius, named Maximin, and one Severus, who was his favorite, were then appointed Cæsars, to the exclusion of Constantine, son of Constantius, and Maxentius, son of Maximian, who might have naturally expected the elevation. Little more than a year afterwards, Constantius died, in Britain, and Constantine was proclaimed Augustus and Emperor, in his place, by the armies of the West. Galerius had not courage to oppose this military election, except so far as to withhold from Constantine the supreme rank of Augustus, which he conferred on his creature, Severus. Constantine acquiesced, for the moment, and contented himself with the name of Cæsar, while events and his own prudence were preparing for him a far greater elevation. In October, 306, there was a successful rising at Rome against Severus, Maxentius was raised to the throne by the voice of the feeble senate and the people, and his father, Maximian, the abdicated monarch, came out of his retirement to resume the purple, in association at first, but afterwards in rivalry with his son. Severus was besieged at Ravenna and, having surrendered, was condemned to death. Galerius undertook to avenge his death by invading Italy, but retreated ignominiously. Thereupon he invested his friend Licinius with the emblems and the rank of the deceased Severus. The Roman world had then six emperors—each claiming the great title of "Augustus": Galerius, Licinius, and Maximin in the East (including Africa), making common cause against Maximian, Maxentius and Constantine in the West. The first, in these combinations, to fall out, were the father and son, Maximian and Maxentius, both claiming authority in Italy. The old emperor appealed to his former army and it declared against him. He fled, taking shelter, first, with his enemy Galerius, but soon

repairing to the court of Constantine, who had married his daughter Fausta. A little later, the dissatisfied and restless old man conspired to dethrone his son in law and was put to death. The next year (May, A. D. 811) Galerius died at Nicomedia, and his dominions were divided between Licinius and Maximin. The combinations were now changed, and Constantine and Licinius entered into an alliance against Maxentius and Maximin. Rome and Italy had wearied by this time of Maxentius, who was both vicious and tyrannical, and invited Constantine to deliver them. He responded by a bold invasion of Italy, with a small army of but 40 000 men, defeated the greater army of Maxentius at Turin, occupied the imperial city of Milan, took Verona, after a siege and a desperate battle fought outside its walls, and finished his antagonist in a third encounter (Oct. 28, A. D. 312), at Saxa Rubra, within nine miles of Rome. Maxentius perished in the flight from this decisive field and Constantine possessed his dominions. In the next year, Maximin, rashly venturing to attack Licinius, was defeated near Heraclea, on the Propontis, and died soon afterwards. The six emperors of the year 308 were now (A. D. 313) reduced to two, and the friendship between them was ostentatious. But it endured little longer than a single year. Licinius was accused of conspiring against Constantine, and the latter declared war. The first battle was fought near Cibalis, in Pannonia, the second on the plain of Mardia, in Thrace, and Constantine was the victor in both. Licinius sued for peace and obtained it (December, A. D. 313) by the cession of all his dominion in Europe, except Thrace. For eight years, Constantine was contented with the great empire he then possessed. In 323 he determined to grasp the entire Roman world. Licinius opposed him with a vigor unexpected and the war was prepared for on a mighty scale. It was practically decided by the first great battle, at Hadrianople, on the 3d of July, 323. Licinius, defeated, took refuge in Byzantium, which Constantine besieged. Escaping from Byzantium into Asia, Licinius fought once more at Chrysopolis and then yielded to his fate. He died soon after. The Roman empire was again united and Constantine was its single lord.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 14.

ALSO IN: E. L. Cutts, *Constantine the Great*, ch. 7-22.

A. D. 306.—Constantine's defeat of the Franks. See FRANKS A. D. 306.

A. D. 313.—Constantine's Edict of Milan.—Declared toleration of Christianity.—After the extension of the sovereignty of Constantine over the Italian provinces as well as Gaul and the West, he went, in January, A. D. 313, to Milan, and there held a conference with Licinius, his eastern colleague in the empire. One of the results of that conference was the famous Edict of Milan, which recognized Christianity and admitted it to a footing of equal toleration with the paganisms of the empire—in terms as follows: "Wherefore, as I, Constantine Augustus, and I, Licinius Augustus, came under favourable auspices to Milan, and took under consideration all affairs that pertained to the public benefit and welfare, these things among the rest appeared to us to be most advantageous and profitable to all. We have resolved among the first things to or-

dain, those matters by which reverence and worship to the Deity might be exhibited. That is, how we may grant likewise to the Christians, and to all, the free choice to follow that mode of worship which they may wish. That whatsoever divinity and celestial power may exist may be propitious to us, and to all that live under our government. Therefore, we have decreed the following ordinance, as our will, with a salutary and most correct intention, that no freedom at all shall be refused to Christians, to follow or to keep their observances or worship. But that to each one power be granted to devote his mind to that worship which he may think adapted to himself. That the Deity may in all things exhibit to us His accustomed favour and kindness. . . . And this we further decree, with respect to the Christians, that the places in which they were formerly accustomed to assemble, concerning which also we formerly wrote to your fidelity, in a different form, that if any persons have purchased these, either from our treasurer, or from any other one, these shall restore them to the Christians, without money and without demanding any price. . . . They who as we have said restore them without valuation and price may expect their indemnity from our munificence and liberality."—Eusebius, *Ecclesiastical Hist.*, bk. 10, ch. 5.

ALSO IN: P. Schaff, *Progress of Religious Freedom*, ch. 2.

A. D. 318-325.—The Arian Controversy and the Council of Nicæa. See ARIANISM, and NICÆA A. D. 325.

A. D. 323.—The conversion of Constantine.—His Christianity.—His character.—"The alleged supernatural conversion of Constantine has afforded a subject of doubt and debate from that age to the present. Up to the date of his war against Maxentius, the Emperor believed, like his father, in one god, whom he represented to himself, not with the attributes of Jupiter, best and greatest, father of gods and men, but under the form of Apollo, with the attributes of the glorified youth of manhood, the god of light and life. His conversion to Christianity took place at the period of the war with Maxentius. The chief contemporary authorities on the subject are Lactantius and Eusebius. Lactantius, an African by birth, was a rhetorician (or, as we should call him, professor) at Nicomedia, of such eminence that Constantine entrusted to him the education of his eldest son, Crispus. Writing before the death of Licinius, i. e. before the year 314 A. D., or within two, or at most three, years of the event, Lactantius says, 'Constantine was admonished in his sleep to mark the celestial sign of God on the shields, and so to engage in the battle. He did as he was commanded and marked the name of Christ on the shields by the letter X drawn across them, with the top circumflexed. Armed with this sign his troops proceed,' etc. Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, the historian of the early Church, the most learned Christian of his time, was, after Constantine's conquest of the East, much about the court, in the confidence of the Emperor, and one of his chief advisers in ecclesiastical matters. In his *Life of Constantine*, published twenty-six years after the Emperor's death, he gives us an interesting account of the moral process of the Emperor's conversion. Reflecting on the approaching contest with Maxentius, and hearing of the

extraordinary rites by which he was endeavouring to win the favour of the gods, 'being convinced that he needed some more powerful aid than his military forces could afford him, on account of the wicked and magical enchantments which were so diligently practised by the tyrant, he began to seek for divine assistance . . . And while he was thus praying with fervent entreaty, a most marvellous sign appeared to him from heaven, the account of which it might have been difficult to receive with credit, had it been related by any other person. But since the victorious emperor himself long afterwards declared it to the writer of this history, when he was honoured with his acquaintance and society, and confirmed his statement by an oath, who could hesitate to credit the relation, especially since the testimony of after time has established its truth? He said that at mid day, when the sun was beginning to decline, he saw, with his own eyes, the trophy of a cross of light in the heavens, above the sun, and bearing the inscription, "Conquer by this." At this sight he himself was struck with amazement, and his whole army also, which happened to be following him on some expedition, and witnessed the miracle. He said, moreover, that he doubted within himself what the import of this apparition could be. And while he continued to ponder and reason on its meaning, night imperceptibly drew on, and in his sleep the Christ of God appeared to him with the same sign which he had seen in the heavens, and commanded him to procure a standard made in the likeness of that sign, and to use it as a safeguard in all engagements with his enemies." The standard which is said to have had this origin was the famous Labarum.—E. L. Cutts, *Constantine the Great*, ch 11.—"He [Constantine] was not lacking in susceptibility to certain religious impressions, he acknowledged the peculiar providence of God in the manner in which he had been delivered from dangers, made victorious over all his pagan adversaries, and finally rendered master of the Roman world. It flattered his vanity to be considered the favourite of God, and his destined instrument to destroy the empire of the evil spirits (the heathen deities). The Christians belonging to court were certainly not wanting on their part to confirm him in this persuasion. . . . Constantine must indeed have been conscious that he was striving not so much for the cause of God as for the gratification of his own ambition and love of power; and that such acts of perfidy, mean revenge, or despotic jealousy, as occurred in his political course, did not well befit an instrument and servant of God, such as he claimed to be considered. . . . Even Eusebius, one of the best among the bishops at his court, is so dazzled by what the emperor had achieved for the outward extension and splendour of the church, as to be capable of tracing to the purest motives of a servant of God all the acts which a love of power that would not brook a rival had, at the expense of truth and humanity, put into the heart of the emperor in the war against Licinius. . . . Bishops in immediate attendance on the emperor so far forgot indeed to what master they belonged, that, at the celebration of the third decennium of his reign (the tricennalia), one of them congratulated him as constituted by God the ruler over all in the present world, and destined to reign with the Son of God in the world to come. The feelings

of Constantine himself were shocked at such a parallel."—A. Neander, *General Hist of the Christian Religion and Church*, period 2, sect. 1, A.—"As he approached the East, he [Constantine] adopted oriental manners; he affected the gorgeous purple of the monarchs of Persia; he decorated his head with false hair of different colours, and with a diadem covered with pearls and gems. He substituted flowing silken robes, embroidered with flowers, for the austere garb of Rome, or the unadorned purple of the first Roman emperors. He filled his palace with eunuchs, and lent an ear to their perfidious calumnies, he became the instrument of their base intrigues, their cupidity, and their jealousy. He multiplied spies, and subjected the palace and the empire, alike, to a suspicious police. He lavished the wealth of Rome on the sterile pomp of stately buildings. . . . He poured out the best and noblest blood in torrents, more especially of those nearly connected with himself. The most illustrious victim of his tyranny was Crispus, his son by his first wife, whom he had made the partner of his empire, and the commander of his armies. . . . In a palace which he had made a desert, the murderer of his father-in-law, his brothers in law, his sister, his wife, his son, and his nephew, must have felt the stings of remorse, if hypocritical priests and courtier bishops had not lulled his conscience to rest. We still possess the panegyric in which they represent him as a favourite of Heaven, a saint worthy of our highest veneration, we have also several laws by which Constantine atoned for all his crimes, in the eyes of the priests, by heaping boundless favours on the church. The gifts he bestowed on it, the immunities he granted to persons and to property connected with it, soon directed ambition entirely to ecclesiastical dignities. The men who had so lately been candidates for the honours of martyrdom, now found themselves depositaries of the greatest wealth and the highest power. How was it possible that their characters should not undergo a total change?"—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Hist. of the Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch 4 (v 1)—See, also, CHRISTIANITY A D 312-337

A. D. 330.—Transference of the capital of the Empire to Byzantium (Constantinople). See CONSTANTINOPE A D 330

A. D. 337-361.—Redivision of the Empire.—Civil wars between the sons of Constantine and their successors.—Elevation of Julian to the throne.—Before the death of Constantine, "his three sons, Constantine, Constantius, and Constans, had already been successively raised to the rank of Cæsar about the tenth, twentieth, and thirtieth years of his reign. The royal family contained also two other young princes, sons of Dalmatius, one of the half-brothers of Constantine; the elder of these nephews of the Emperor was called Dalmatius, after his father, the other Hanniballianus. . . . Constantine shared—not the Empire, but—the imperial power among his three sons. The eldest, Constantine, was to hold the first rank among the three Augusti, and to take the western Gallic provinces under his especial administration; Constantius was to take the east, viz., Asia, Syria, and Egypt; Constans was to take the central portion of the Empire, Italy, Africa, and Western Illyricum."—E. L. Cutts, *Constantine the Great*, ch. 33.—The father of these three

princes was no sooner dead (A. D. 337) than they made haste to rid themselves of all the possible rivals in a family which seemed too numerous for peace. Two uncles and seven cousins—including Dalmatius and Hannibalianus—with other connections by marriage and otherwise, were quickly put out of the way under one and another pretence and with more or less mockery of legal forms. The three brothers then divided the provinces between them on much the same plan as before; but Constantine, the eldest, now reigned in the new capital of his father, which bore his name. There was peace between them for three years. It was broken by Constantine, who demanded the surrender to him of a part of the dominions of Constans. War ensued and Constantine was killed in one of the earliest engagements of it. Constans took possession of his dominions, refusing any share of them to Constantius, and reigned ten years longer, when he was destroyed, A. D. 350, by a conspiracy in Gaul, which raised to his throne one Magnentius, a soldier of barbarian extraction. Magnentius was acknowledged in Gaul and Italy, but the troops in Illyricum invested their own general, Vetranio, with the purple. Constantius, in the East, now roused himself to oppose these rebellions, and did so with success. Vetranio, an aged man, was intimidated by artful measures and driven to surrender his unfamiliar crown. Magnentius advanced boldly to meet an enemy whom he despised, and was defeated in a great battle fought September 21, A. D. 351, at Mursa (Essek, in modern Hungary, on the Drave). Retreating to Italy, and from Italy to Gaul, he maintained the war for another year, but slew himself finally in despair and the empire had a single ruler, once more. The sole emperor, Constantius, now found his burden of power too great, and sought to share it. Two young nephews had been permitted to live, when the massacre of the house of Constantine occurred, and he turned to these. He raised the elder, Gallus, to the rank of Cæsar, and gave him the government of the præfecture of the East. But Gallus conducted himself like a Nero and was disgraced and executed in little more than three years. The younger nephew, Julian, escaped his brother's fate by great prudence of behavior and by the friendship of the Empress Eusebia. In 355, he, in turn, was made Cæsar and sent into Gaul. Distinguishing himself there in several campaigns against the Germans (see GAUL: A. D. 355-361), he provoked the jealousy of Constantius and of the eunuchs who ruled the imperial court. To strip him of troops, four Gallic legions were ordered to the East, for the Persian war. They rose in revolt, at Paris, proclaimed Julian emperor and forced him to assume the dangerous title. He promptly sent an embassy to Constantius asking the recognition and confirmation of this procedure; but his overtures were rejected with disdain. He then declared war, and conducted an extraordinary expedition into Illyricum, through the Black Forest and down the Danube, occupying Sirmium and seizing the Balkan passes before he was known to have left Gaul. But the civil war so vigorously opened was suddenly arrested at this stage by the death of Constantius (A. D. 361), and Julian became sole emperor without more dispute. He renounced Christianity and is known in history as Julian the Apostate.—

E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 18-22.

A. D. 338-359.—Wars of Constantius with the Persians. See PERSIA: A. D. 226-327.

A. D. 350-361.—Extensive abandonment of Gaul to the Germans.—Its recovery by Julian. See GAUL: A. D. 355-361.

A. D. 361-363.—Julian and the Pagan revival.—“Heathenism still possessed a latent power greater than those supposed who persuaded the Emperors that now it could be easily extirpated. The state of affairs in the West differed from that in the East. In the West it was principally the Roman aristocracy, who with few exceptions still adhered to their ancient religion, and with them the great mass of the people. In the East, on the contrary, Christianity had made much more progress among the masses, and a real aristocracy could scarcely be said to exist. In its stead there was an aristocracy of learning, whose hostility was far more dangerous to Christianity than the aversion of the Roman nobility. The youth still thronged to the ancient and illustrious schools of Miletus, Ephesus, Nicomedia, Antioch, and above all Athens, and the teachers in these schools were almost without exception heathen. . . . There the ancient heathen spirit was imbibed, and with it a contempt for barbarian Christianity. The doctrinal strife in the Christian Church was held up to ridicule, and, alas! with too much reason. For, according to the Emperor's favor and caprice, one doctrine stood for orthodoxy to day and another to-morrow. To-day it was decreed that Christ was of the same essence with the Father, and all who refused to acknowledge this were deposed and exiled. To-morrow the court theology had swung round, it was decreed that Christ was a created being, and now it was the turn of the other party to go into banishment. The educated heathen thought themselves elevated far above all this in their classic culture. With what secret anger they beheld the way in which the temples were laid waste, the works of art broken to pieces, the memorials of an age of greatness destroyed, and all in favor of a barbarian religion destitute of culture. The old rude forms of Heathenism, indeed, they themselves did not desire, but the refined Heathenism of the Neoplatonic school seemed to them not merely the equal but the superior of Christianity. . . . These were the sources of the re-action against Christianity. Their spirit was embodied in Julian. In him it ascended for the last time the imperial throne, and made the final attempt to stop the triumphal progress of Christianity. But it succeeded only in giving to the world irresistible evidence that the sceptre of the spirit of Antiquity was forever broken. . . . What influenced Julian was chiefly enthusiasm for Greek culture. Even in a religious aspect Polytheism seemed to him superior to Monotheism, because more philosophic. Neoplatonism filled the whole soul of the young enthusiast, and seemed to him to comprehend all the culture of the ancient world in a unified system. But of course his vanity had a great share in the matter, for he naturally received the most devoted homage among the Hellenists, and his rhetorical friends did not stint their flattery. . . . He made his entry . . . [into Constantinople] as a declared heathen. Although at the beginning of his campaign he had secretly sacrificed to Bellona, yet

he had attended the church in Vienne. But on the march he put an end to all ambiguity, and publicly offered sacrifices to the ancient gods. The Roman Empire once more had a heathen Emperor. At first all was joy; for as universally as Constantius was hated, Julian was welcomed as a deliverer. Even the Christians joined in this rejoicing. They too had found the arbitrary government of the last few years hard enough to bear. And if some who looked deeper began to feel anxiety, they consoled themselves by the reflection that even a heathen Emperor could not injure the Church so much as a Christian Emperor who used his power in promoting whatever seemed to him at the time to be orthodox in the dogmatic controversies of the age. And Julian proclaimed, not the suppression of Christianity, but only complete religious liberty. He himself intended to be a heathen, but no Christian should be disturbed in his faith. Julian was certainly thoroughly in earnest in this. To be a persecutor of the Church, was the last thing he would have thought of. Besides, he was much too fully persuaded of the untruth of Christianity and the truth of Heathenism to persecute. Julian was an enthusiast, like all the rhetoricians and philosophers who surrounded him. He regarded himself as called by a divine voice to the great work of restoring Heathenism, and this was from the beginning avowedly his object. And he was no less firmly convinced that this restoration would work itself out without any use of force; as soon as free scope was given to Heathenism it would, by its own powers, overcome Christianity. . . . The Emperor himself was evidently in all respects a heathen from sincere conviction. In this regard at least he was honest and no hypocrite. The flagrant voluptuousness, which had corrupted the court, was banished, and a large number of useless officials dismissed. The life of the court was to be simple, austere, and pure. Men had never before seen an Emperor who conducted himself with such simplicity, whose table was so economically supplied, and who knew no other employments than hard work, and devoted worship of the gods. A temple was built in the palace, and there Julian offered a daily sacrifice. Often he might be seen serving at the sacrifice himself, carrying the wood and plunging the knife into the victim with his own hand. He remembered every festival which should be celebrated, and knew how to observe the whole half-forgotten ritual most punctiliously. He was equally zealous in performing the duties of his office as Pontifex Maximus. Everywhere he revived the ancient worship which had fallen into neglect. Here a closed temple was re-opened, there a ruined shrine restored, images of the gods were set up again, and festivals which had ceased to be celebrated, were restored. . . . Soon conversions became plentiful; governors, officials, soldiers, made themselves proficient in the ancient cultus; and even a bishop, Pegasus of New Ilum, whom Julian had previously learned to know as a secret friend of the gods, when he had been the Emperor's guide to the classic sites of Troy, changed his religion, and from a Christian bishop became a heathen high-priest. . . . The dream of a restoration of Heathenism nevertheless soon began to prove itself a dream. Though now surrounded by heathen only, Julian could not help feeling that he was really isolated in

their midst. He himself was naturally a mystic, and lived in his ideals. His Heathenism was one purified by poetic feeling. But there was little or nothing of this to be found actually existing. His heathen friends were courtiers, who agreed with him without inward conviction. . . . He was far too serious and severely moral for their tastes. They preferred the theatre to the temple, they liked amusement best, and found the daily attendance at worship and the monotonous ceremonies and sacrifices very dull. A measurably tolerant Christian Emperor would doubtless have suited them better than this enthusiastically pious heathen. Blinded as Julian was by his ideal views, he soon could not escape the knowledge that things were not going well. If Heathenism was to revive, it must receive new life within. The restoration must be also a reformation. Strangely enough Julian felt compelled to borrow from Christianity the ways and means for such a reformation. The heathen priests, like the Christian, were to instruct the people, and exhort them to holy living. The heathen, like the Christians, were to care for the poor. . . . While new strength was thus to be infused into Heathenism, other measures were adopted to weaken Christianity. An imperial edict, June 17, A. D. 362, forbade the Christians to act as teachers of the national literature, the ancient classics. It was, the Emperor explained, a contradiction for Christians to expound Homer, Thucydides, or Demosthenes, when they regarded them as godless men and aliens. He would not compel them to change their convictions, but also he could not permit the ancient writers to be expounded by those who took them to task for impiety. . . . This, of course, was not a persecution, if the use of force alone makes a persecution, yet it was a persecution, and in a sense a worse one than any which went before. Julian tried to deprive the Christians of that which should be common to all men,—education. . . . Nevertheless he had to confess to himself that the restoration of Heathenism was making no progress worth speaking of. . . . He spent his whole strength, he sacrificed himself, he lived only for the Empire over which Providence had made him lord, and yet found himself alone in his endeavor. Even his heathen friends, the philosophers and rhetoricians, kept at a distance. . . . With such thoughts as these, Julian journeyed to Antioch, in Syria, in order to make preparations there for the great campaign he purposed to make against the Persians. There new disappointments awaited him. He found the shrines of his gods forsaken and desolate. . . . The temple of Apollo was restored with the greatest splendor. Julian went there to offer a sacrifice to the god. He expected to find a multitude of worshippers, but no one even brought oil for a lamp or incense to burn in honor of the deity. Only an old man approached to sacrifice a goose. . . . Shortly afterwards, the newly restored temple burned down in the night. Now the Emperor's wrath knew no bounds. He ascribed the guilt to the Christians; and although the temple, as is probable, caught fire through the fault of a heathen philosopher, who carried a dedicatory lamp about in it without due precautions, many Christians were arrested and tortured. The Church had its martyrs once more; and Julian, discontented with himself and the whole world besides, advanced to new

measures. The cathedral of Antioch was closed and its property confiscated. Julian decreed that the Christians, whose God had forbidden them to kill, should not be intrusted with any office with which judicial functions were connected. . . . Julian himself became more and more restless. He hurried from temple to temple, brought sacrifice after sacrifice, he knelt for hours before his gods and covered their statues with kisses. Then at night he sat in the silence at his writing-table and gave vent to his bitterness and disgust with every thing. Then he wrote his works full of brilliant wit, thought out and expressed with Greek refinement, but full of bitterest hatred especially against the Galileans and their Carpenter's Son. . . . Finally, his immense preparations for the campaign against the Persians were finished. Julian started, after finally settling over the Antiochians a wretch as governor, with the remark that the man did not deserve to be a governor, but they deserved to be governed by such a one.—G. Uhlhorn, *The Conflict of Christianity with Heathenism*, bk 3, ch 3

ALSO IN: G. H. Rendall, *Julian the Emperor*—B. L. Gildersleeve, *The Emperor Julian (Essays and Studies, pp. 355-400)*—Gregory Nazianzen, *Invectives against Julian*, and Libanius, *Funeral Oration upon Julian*; trans by C. W. King.

A. D. 363.—The Persian expedition of Julian.—His death.—Jovian made Emperor by the retreating army. See PERSIA: A. D. 226-627.

A. D. 363-379.—Christianity reascendant.—Secret hostility of Paganism.—Reign of Valentinian and Valens.—Approach of the Huns.—The struggle with the Goths.—Elevation of Theodosius to the throne.—When Julian's successor, Jovian, "who did not reign long enough to lead back to Constantinople the army which he had marched from the banks of the Tigris, made public profession of Christianity, he, at the same time, displaced a great number of brave officers and able functionaries, whom Julian had promoted in proportion to their zeal for paganism. From that period, up to the fall of the empire, a hostile sect, which regarded itself as unjustly stripped of its ancient honours, invoked the vengeance of the gods on the heads of the government, exulted in the public calamities, and probably hastened them by its intrigues, though inextricably involved in the common ruin. The pagan faith, which was not attached to a body of doctrine, nor supported by a corporation of priests, nor lightened by the fervour of novelty, scarcely ever displayed itself in open revolt, or dared the perils of martyrdom; but pagans still occupied the foremost rank in letters:—the orators, the philosophers (or, as they were otherwise called, sophists), the historians, belonged, almost without an exception, to the ancient religion. It still kept possession of the most illustrious schools, especially those of Athens and Alexandria; the majority of the Roman senate were still attached to it; and in the breasts of the common people, particularly the rural population, it maintained its power for several centuries, branded, however, with the name of magic. . . . Less than eight months after his elevation to the throne, on the 17th of February, 364, Jovian died in a small town of Galatia. After the expiration of ten days, the army which he was leading home from Persia,

at a solemn assembly held at Nice, in Bithynia, chose as his successor the son of a captain from a little village of Pannonia, the count Valentinian, whom his valour and bodily prowess had raised to one of the highest posts of the army. . . . Spite of his savage rudeness, and the furious violence of his temper, the Roman empire found in him an able chief at the moment of its greatest need. Unhappily, the extent of the empire required, at least, two rulers. The army felt this, and demanded a second. . . . Valentinian. . . . chose his brother Valens, with whom he shared his power, had the weak, timid, and cruel character which ordinarily distinguishes cowards. Valentinian, born in the West, . . . reserved the government of it to himself. He ceded to his brother a part of Illyricum on the Danube, and the whole of the East. He established universal toleration by law, and took no part in the sectarian controversies which divided Christendom. Valens adopted the Arian faith, and persecuted the orthodox party. The finances of the empire demanded a reform, which neither of the emperors was in a condition to undertake. They wanted money, and they were ignorant where to seek the long exhausted sources of public wealth. . . . Vast provinces in the interior were deserted; enlistments daily became more scanty and difficult, the magistrates of the 'curiae' or municipalities, who were responsible both for the contributions and the levies of their respective towns, sought by a thousand subterfuges to escape the perilous honour of the magistrature [see CURIA, MUNICIPAL, OF THE LATER ROMAN EMPIRE]. . . . During the twelve years that Valentinian reigned over the West (A. D. 364-376), he redeemed his cruelties by several brilliant victories [see ALEMANNI, A. D. 365-367]. . . . Valentinian had undertaken the defence of Gaul in person, and generally resided at Treves, then the capital of that vast prefecture, but at the time he was thus occupied, invasions not less formidable had devastated the other provinces of the West [see BRITAIN, A. D. 367-370]. . . . At this period Valens reigned over the Greeks, whose language he did not understand (A. D. 364-378). His eastern frontier was menaced by the Persians, his northern by the Goths. . . . Armenia and Iberia became subject to Persia; but as the people of both these countries were Christian, they remained faithful to the interests of Rome, though conquered by her enemy. . . . The dominion of the Goths extended along the shores of the Danube and the Black Sea, and thirty years had elapsed since they had made any incursion into the Roman territory. But during that period they had gone on increasing in greatness and in power. . . . Spite of the formidable neighbourhood of the Goths and the Persians—spite of the cowardice and the incapacity of Valens—the East had remained at peace, protected by the mere name of Valentinian, whose military talents, promptitude, and severity were known to all the barbarian tribes. But the career of this remarkable man, so dreaded by his enemies and by his subjects, had now reached its term." He died in a fit of rage, from the bursting of a blood-vessel in his chest, November 17, A. D. 375. "His two sons,—Gratian, who was scarcely come to manhood, and Valentinian, still a child,—shared the West between them. . . . Never, however, was the empire in greater

need of an able and vigorous head. The entire nation of the Huns, abandoning to the Sienpi its ancient pastures bordering on China, had traversed the whole north of Asia by a march of 1,800 leagues." The Goths, overwhelmed and flying before them, begged permission to cross the Danube and take refuge in Mœsia and Thrace. They were permitted to do so; but such extortions and outrages were practiced on them, at the same time, that they were exasperated to a passionate hatred. This bore fruit in a general rising in 377. Two years of war ensued, marked by two great battles, that of Ad Salices, or The Willows, which neither side could fully claim, and that of Adrianople, August 9, 378, in which Valens perished, and more than 60,000 of his soldiers fell (see GOTHIC: A. D. 376, and 378). "The forces of the East were nearly annihilated at the terrible battle of Adrianople. The Goths . . . advanced, ravaging all around them, to the foot of the walls of Constantinople, and, after some unimportant skirmishes, returned westward through Macedonia, Epirus, and Dalmatia. From the Danube to the Adriatic, their passage was marked by conflagration and blood. No general in the East attempted to take advantage of the anarchy in favour of his own ambition, no army offered the purple to its chief; all dreaded the responsibility of command at so tremendous a crisis. All eyes were turned on the court of Treves, the only point whence help was hoped for. But Gratian, eldest son of Valentinian, and emperor of the West, was only 19. He . . . marched upon Illyricum with his army, when he learned the event of the battle of Adrianople, and the death of Valens, who had been so eager to secure the undivided honours of victory, that he would not wait for his arrival. Incapable of confronting such a tempest, he retreated to Sirmium. The news of an invasion of the Allemanni into Gaul recalled him to the defence of his own territory. Danger started up on every hand at once. The empire stood in need of a new chief, and one of approved valour. Gratian had the singular generosity to choose from among his enemies, and from a sense of merit alone. Theodosius, the Spaniard, his father's general, who had successively vanquished the Scots and afterwards the Moors, and who had been unjustly condemned to the scaffold at the beginning of Gratian's reign, had left a son 83 years of age, who bore his name. The younger Theodosius had distinguished himself in the command he held in Mœsia, but was living in retirement and disgrace on his estates in Spain, when, with the confidence of a noble mind, Gratian chose him out, presented him to the army on the 19th of January, 379, and declared him his colleague, and emperor of the East"—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *The Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 5 (v. 1).

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, introd., and bk. 1, ch. 1.
A. D. 378.—Gratian's overthrow of the Allemanni in Gaul. See ALEMANNI: A. D. 378.
A. D. 379-395.—Theodosius and the Goths.—His Trinitarian Edict.—Revolt of Maximus.—Death of Gratian.—Overthrow of Maximus by Theodosius.—Usurpation of Eugenius, and his fall.—Death of Theodosius.—"The first duty that Theodosius had to undertake was to restore the self-confidence and trust in victory of the Roman army, terribly shaken as these quali-

ties had been by the disastrous rout of Hadrianople. This he accomplished by waging a successful guerilla war with the Gothic marauders. Valens had played into the hands of the barbarians by risking everything on one great pitched battle. Theodosius adopted the very opposite policy. He outmanoeuvred the isolated and straggling bands of the Goths, defeated them in one skirmish after another that did not deserve the name of a battle, and thus restored the courage and confidence of the Imperial troops. By the end of 379 he seems to have succeeded in clearing the territory south of the Balkan range of the harassing swarms of the barbarians. In February, 380, he fell sick at Thessalonica (which was his chief basis of operations throughout this period), and this sickness, from which he did not fully recover for some months, was productive of two important results, (1) his baptism as a Trinitarian Christian, (2) a renewal of the war against fresh swarms of barbarians. (1) Theodosius appears up to this point of his career not to have definitively ranged himself on either side of the great Arian controversy, though he had a hereditary inclination towards the Creed of Nicæa. Like his father, however, he had postponed baptism in accordance with the prevalent usage of his day, but now upon a bed of sickness which seemed likely to be one of death, he delayed no longer, but received the rite at the hands of Ascholus, the Catholic Bishop of Thessalonica. Before he was able to resume his post at the head of the legions, he published his celebrated Edict: "To the people of Constantinople—We desire that all the nations who are governed by the rule of our Clemency shall practise that religion which the Apostle Peter himself delivered to the Romans, and which it is manifest that the pontiff Damasus, and Peter, Bishop of Alexandria, a man of Apostolic sanctity, do now follow: that according to the discipline of the Apostles and the teaching of the Evangelists they believe in the one Godhead of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in equal Majesty, and in the holy Trinity. We order all who follow this law to assume the name of Catholic Christians, decreeing that all others, being mad and foolish persons, shall bear the infamy of their heretical dogmas, and that their Conventicles shall not receive the name of Churches: to be punished first by Divine vengeance, and afterwards by that exertion of our power to chastise which we have received from the decree of heaven." Thus then at length the Caesar of the East was ranged on the side of Trinitarian orthodoxy. Constantine in the latter part of his reign, Constantius, Valens, had all been Arians or semi-Arians, some of them bitter in their heterodoxy. Julian had been a worshipper of the gods of Olympus. Thus for nearly two generations the influence of the Court of Constantinople had been thrown into the scale against the teaching of Athanasius, which was generally accepted throughout the Western realm. Now by the accession of Theodosius to the Trinitarian side, religious unity was restored to the Empire: but at the same time a chasm, an impassable chasm, was opened between the Empire itself and its new Teutonic guests, nearly all of whom held fast to the Arian teaching of their great Apostle Ulfilas. (2) The other consequence of the sickness of Theodosius was, as I have said, a fresh incursion of barbarian hordes,

swarming across the Danube and climbing all the high passes of the Balkans. The work of clearing the country of these marauders had to be all done over again. . . . At length, in the closing months of 380, the provinces south of the Balkans (Macedonia and Thrace) were once more cleared of their barbarian intruders. Peace, in which Gratian concurred, was concluded with the Goths who still doubtless abounded in Moesia [see GOTHs: A. D. 379-382]. . . . The insurrection at Antioch [A. D. 387] displayed the character of Theodosius in a favourable light, as a strong but merciful and magnanimous ruler of men. Very different was the effect on his fame of the insurrection which broke out three years later (390) in the Macedonian city of Thessalonica [see THESSALONICA: A. D. 390]. . . . In the year 383 a military revolt broke out in Britain against the young Emperor Gratian. . . . The army revolted and proclaimed Magnus Clemens Maximus, Emperor. He was, like Theodosius, a native of Spain, and though harsh and perhaps rapacious, a man of ability and experience, not unworthy of the purple if he had come to it by lawful means. Gratian on his side had evidently given some real cause for dissatisfaction to his subjects. . . . Hence it was that when Maximus with the army of Britain landed in Gaul, he shook down the fabric of his power without difficulty. Gratian, finding himself deserted by his troops, escaped from the battle-field, but was overtaken and killed at Lyons. For more than four years, Maximus, satisfied with ruling over the three great Western provinces which had fallen to the share of Gratian, maintained at any rate the appearance of harmony with his two colleagues. . . . At length, in the autumn of 387, Maximus deemed that the time had come for grasping the whole Empire of the West. Lulling to sleep the suspicions of Valentinian and his mother by embassies and protestations of friendship, he crossed the Alps with an army and marched towards Aquileia, where the young Emperor was then dwelling in order to be as near as possible to the dominions of his friendly colleague and protector. Valentinian did not await the approach of his rival, but going down to the port of Grado, took ship and sailed for Thessalonica, his mother and sisters accompanying him. The Emperor and the Senate of Constantinople met the Imperial fugitives at Thessalonica, and discussed the present position of affairs. . . . What the entreaties of the mother might have failed to effect, the tears of the daughter [Galla] accomplished. Theodosius, whose wife Flaccilla had died two years before (385), took Galla for his second wife, and vowed to avenge her wrongs and replace her brother on the throne. He was some time in preparing for the campaign, but, when it was opened, he conducted it with vigour and decision. His troops pressed up the Save valley, defeated those of Maximus in two engagements, entered Aemona (Laybach) in triumph, and soon stood before the walls of Aquileia [July, 388], behind which Maximus was sheltering himself. . . . A mutiny among the troops of Maximus did away with the necessity for a siege, and the usurper, betrayed and delivered to Theodosius, was speedily put to death. Theodosius "handed over to Valentinian II. the whole of the Western Empire, both his own especial share and that which had formerly been held by his brother Gratian.

The young Emperor was now 17 years of age; his mother, Justina, had died apparently on the eve of Theodosius's victory, and he governed, or tried to govern alone." But one of his Frankish generals, named Arbogast, gathered all the power of the government into his hands, reduced Valentinian to helpless insignificance, and finally, in May, 392, caused him to be strangled. "The Frankish general, who durst not shock the prejudices of the Roman world by himself assuming the purple, hung that dishonoured robe upon the shoulders of a rhetorician, a confidant, and almost a dependent of his own, named Eugenius. This man, like most of the scholars and rhetoricians of the day, had not abjured the old faith of Hellas. As Arbogast also was a heathen, though worshipping Teutonic rather than Olympian gods, this last revolution looked like a recurrence to the days of Julian, and threatened the hardly-won supremacy of Christianity." Again Theodosius was summoned to the rescue of the West, and, after two years of careful preparation, marched against Eugenius by the same route that he had taken before. The two armies met at a place "half-way between Aemona and Aquileia, where the Julian Alps are crossed, and where a little stream called the Frigidus (now the Wipbach) burst suddenly from a limestone hill." The battle was won by Theodosius after a terrible struggle, lasting two days (September 5-6, A. D. 394). Eugenius was taken prisoner and put to death; Arbogast fell by his own hand. "Theodosius, who was still in the prime of life, had now indeed 'the rule of the world,' without a rival or a colleague except his own boyish sons. . . . Had his life been prolonged, as it well might have been for twenty or thirty years longer, many things might have gone differently in the history of the world. But, little more than four months after the victory of the Frigidus, Theodosius died [January 17, A. D. 395] of dropsy, at Milan."—T. Hodgkin, *The Dynasty of Theodosius*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: F. W. Farrar, *Lives of the Fathers*, ch. 15: *Ambrose and Theodosius* (v. 2).—R. Thornton, *St. Ambrose*, ch. 6-14.

A. D. 388.—Formal establishment of Christianity.—Until the year 384, "paganism was still the constitutional religion of the [Roman] senate. The hall or temple in which they assembled was adorned by the statue and altar of Victory. . . . The senators were sworn on the altar of the goddess to observe the laws of the emperor and of the empire; and a solemn offering of wine and incense was the ordinary prelude of their public deliberations. The removal of this ancient monument was the only injury which Constantius had offered to the superstition of the Romans. The altar of Victory was again restored by Julian, tolerated by Valentinian, and once more banished from the senate by the zeal of Gratian. But the emperor yet spared the statues of the gods which were exposed to the public veneration: four hundred and twenty-four temples or chapels still remained to satisfy the devotion of the people, and in every quarter of Rome the delicacy of the Christians was offended by the fumes of idolatrous sacrifice. But the Christians formed the least numerous party in the senate of Rome." The senate addressed several petitions to Gratian, to the young Valentinian, and to Theodosius for the restoration of the altar of Victory. They were supported by the elo-

quence of the orator Symmachus, and opposed by the energy of Ambrose, the powerful Archbishop of Milan. The question is said to have been, in the end, submitted to the senate, itself, by the Emperor Theodosius (A. D. 388)—he being present in person—"Whether the worship of Jupiter or that of Christ should be the religion of the Romans? The liberty of suffrages, which he affected to allow, was destroyed by the hopes and fears that his presence inspired. . . . On a regular division of the senate, Jupiter was condemned and degraded by the sense of a very large majority"—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 28.

A. D. 391-395.—Suppression of Paganism.—"The religious liberty of the Pagans, though considerably abridged by Gratian, was yet greater than had been allowed by the laws of Constantine and his immediate successors. The priests and vestals were deprived of their immunities; the revenues of the temples were confiscated for the service of the State; but the heathen rites of their forefathers were still allowed to those who were conscientiously attached to them, provided they abstained from nocturnal sacrifices and magical incantations. But when Theodosius, in the early part of his reign, prohibited the immolation of victims, their superstition was attacked in its most vital part, and, in the course of a few years, the success of his measures against heresy, and his triumph over Maximus, emboldened him to proceed to steps of a still more decisive kind, and to attempt the entire subversion of the already tottering fabric of paganism. A commission was issued to the prefect of the East, directing him to close all heathen temples within his jurisdiction; and while the imperial officers were engaged in this task, assisted by the clergy, and especially by the monks, with a vigour not always strictly legal, Theodosius gradually increased the rigour of his legislative prohibitions. A law was passed in the year 391, declaring that to enter a heathen temple, with a religious purpose, was an offence liable to a fine of fifteen pounds of gold, and in the following year, not only all public, but even all private and domestic, exercise of heathen rites was interdicted under the severest penalties. In some few instances, the intemperate and tumultuous proceedings of the monks in destroying the temples, excited the opposition of the fanatical heathen peasantry, and at Alexandria a serious commotion, fatal to many Christians, was occasioned by the injudicious measures of the patriarch Theophilus. But, generally speaking, the pagans showed little disposition to incur the rigorous penalties of the laws, still less to become martyrs for a religion so little calculated to inspire real faith or fortitude. Some show of zeal in the cause of paganism was made at Rome, where the votaries of the ancient superstition still had a strong party, both among the senate and populace. But the eloquent exertions of Symmachus, the champion of heathenism, were easily baffled by Ambrose, who encountered him with equal ability, better argument, and a confident reliance on the support of his sovereign; and not long after, a more important victory was gained, in an enactment by the senate, carried, through the influence of Theodosius, by an overwhelming majority, that Christianity should for the future be the sole religion of the Roman State. This decisive meas-

ure sealed the ruin of paganism in Rome and its dependencies. The senators and nobles hastened to conform, nominally at least, to the dominant religion, the inferior citizens followed their example, and St. Jerome was in a little while able to boast that every heathen altar in Rome was forsaken, and every temple had become a place of desolation"—J. B. S. Carwithen and A. Lyall, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, pp. 63-65.

ALSO IN: P. Schaff, *Hist. of the Christian Church*, period 3, ch. 1, sect 7 (v. 2).—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 28.

A. D. 394-395.—Final division of the Empire between the sons of Theodosius.—Arcadius in the East, Honorius in the West.—Ministries of Rufinus and Stilicho.—Advent of Alaric the Visigoth.—"The division of the Empire between East and West on the accession of the sons of Theodosius [A. D. 395], though it was possibly meant to be less complete than some preceding partitions, proved to be the final one. It is worth while to indicate the line of division, which is sufficiently accurately traced for us in the *Notitia*. In Africa it was the well-known frontier marked by 'the Altars of the Philaeni,' which separated Libya (or Cyrenaica) on the East from Africa Tripolitana on the West. Modern geographers draw exactly the same line (about 19° E of Greenwich) as the boundary of Barca and Tripoli. On the Northern shore of the Mediterranean the matter is a little more complicated. Noricum, Pannonia, Savia, and Dalmatia belonged to the West, and Dacia—not the original but the later province of Dacia—to the East. This gives us for the frontier of the Western Empire the Danube as far as Belgrade, and on the Adriatic the modern town of Lissa. The inland frontier is traced by geographers some 60 miles up the Save from Belgrade, then southwards by the Drina to its source, and so across the mountains to Lissa. Thus Slavonia, Croatia, and Dalmatia in the Austrian Empire, and Croatia, most of Bosnia, Herzegovina, and Montenegro in the state which was lately called Turkey in Europe, belonged to the Western Empire. The later province of Dacia, which fell to the Eastern share, included Servia (Old and New), the south-east corner of Bosnia, the north of Albania, and the west of Bulgaria. By this partition the Prefecture of Illyricum, as constituted by Diocletian, was divided into two nearly equal parts. . . . What makes the subject somewhat perplexing to the student is the tendency to confuse Illyricum the 'province' and Illyricum the 'prefecture,' the latter of which embraced in modern geographical terms, Servia, Western Bulgaria, Macedon, Epirus and Greece.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 1, ch. 4, note C, and ch. 3 (v. 1).—"This decree for a partition, published by Theodosius shortly before his death, appears to have been generally expected and approved. The incapacity of Arcadius and Honorius, of whom the former had only attained his 18th and the latter his 11th year, had not then been discovered. These princes showed more and more clearly, as time went on, that they inherited no share of their father's abilities, their weakness being such as to render their sovereignty little more than nominal. . . . It was never intended that the two jurisdictions should be independent of each other, but rather that the Emperors should be colleagues and coadjutors, the defenders of one

commonwealth. . . . At the time of the decree, belief in the unity and immortality of the 'Sancta Respublica Romana' was universal. . . . Enactments were invariably made in the names of both Emperors; and, so often as a vacancy of either throne occurred, the title of the Caesar elect remained incomplete until his elevation had been approved and confirmed by the occupant of the other. . . . Theodosius left the Roman world in peace, and provided with a disciplined army sufficient, if rightly directed, for its defence; but his choice of the men to whom he confided the guidance of his sons was unfortunate. Rufinus, to whom the guardianship of Arcadius was entrusted, by birth a Gascon, owed his advancement to his eloquence as an advocate, and his plausible duplicity had so far imposed on the confiding nature of Theodosius as to obtain for him the prefecture of the East. Stilicho, the guardian of Honorius, was by descent a Vandal, and is styled by St. Jerome a semi-barbarian. . . . His military abilities, combined with a prepossessing exterior, induced Theodosius to confer upon him the chief command of the imperial forces, and the hand of his niece, Serena."—R. H. Wrightson, *The Sancta Respublica Romana*, ch. 1.—"Stilicho . . . was popular with the army, and for the present the great bulk of the forces of the Empire was at his disposal; for the regiments united to suppress Eugenius had not yet been sent back to their various stations. Thus a struggle was imminent between the ambitious minister who had the ear of Arcadius, and the strong general who held the command and enjoyed the favour of the army. . . . It was the cherished project of Rufinus to unite Arcadius with his only daughter. . . . But he imprudently made a journey to Antioch, in order to execute vengeance personally on the count of the East, who had offended him; and during his absence from Byzantium an adversary stole a march on him. This adversary was the eunuch Eutropius, the lord chamberlain. . . . Determining that the future Empress should be bound to himself and not to Rufinus, he chose Eudoxia, a girl of singular beauty, the daughter of a distinguished Frank, but herself of Roman education. . . . Eutropius showed a picture of the Frank maiden to the Emperor, and engaged his affections for her; the nuptials were arranged by the time Rufinus returned to Constantinople, and were speedily celebrated (27th April 395). This was a blow to Rufinus, but he was still the most powerful man in the East. The event which at length brought him into contact with Stilicho was the rising of the Visigoths, who had been settled by Theodosius in Moesia and Thrace. . . . Under the leadership of Alaric they raised the ensign of revolt, and spread desolation in the fields and homesteads of Macedonia, Moesia, and Thrace, even advancing close to the walls of Constantinople [see GORRIS: A. D. 395]. . . . It was impossible to take the field against the Goths, because there were no forces available, as the eastern armies were still with Stilicho in the West. Arcadius therefore was obliged to summon Stilicho to send or bring them back immediately, to protect his throne. This summons gave that general the desired opportunity to interfere in the politics of Constantinople; and having, with energetic celerity, arranged matters on the Gallic frontier, he marched overland through Illyricum, and confronted Alaric in

Thessaly, whither the Goth had traced his devastating path from the Propontis. . . . It seems that before Stilicho arrived, Alaric had experienced a defeat at the hands of garrison soldiers in Thessaly; at all events he shut himself up in a fortified camp and declined to engage with the Roman general. In the meantime Rufinus induced Arcadius to send a peremptory order to Stilicho to despatch the eastern troops to Constantinople and depart himself whence he had come; the Emperor resented, or pretended to resent, the presence of his cousin as an officious interference. Stilicho yielded so readily that his willingness seems almost suspicious. . . . He consigned the eastern soldiers to the command of a Gothic captain, Gainas, and himself departed to Salona, allowing Alaric to proceed on his wasting way into the lands of Hellas." When Gainas and his army arrived at the gates of Constantinople, the Emperor came out to meet them, with Rufinus by his side. The troops suddenly closed round the latter and murdered him. "We can hardly suppose that the lynching of Rufinus was the fatal inspiration of a moment, but whether it was proposed or approved of by Stilicho, or was a plan hatched among the soldiers on their way to Constantinople, is uncertain."—J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, bk. 2, ch. 1 (p. 1).

A. D. 396-398.—Commission of Alaric under the Eastern Empire.—Suppression of the revolt of Gildo in Africa.—Commanding position of Stilicho.—"For the next five or six years the chief power over the feeble soul of Arcadius was divided between three persons, his fair Frankish Empress Eudoxia, Eutropius, the haggard old eunuch who had placed her on the throne, and Gainas the Goth, commander of the Eastern army. Again, in the year 396, did Stilicho, now commanding only the Western forces, volunteer to deliver Greece from the Visigoths. The outset of the campaign was successful. The greater part of Peloponnesus was cleared of the invader, who was shut up in the rugged mountain country on the confines of Elis and Arcadia. The Roman army was expecting soon to behold him forced by famine to an ignominious surrender, when they discovered that he had pierced the lines of circumvallation at an unguarded point, and marched with all his plunder northwards to Epirus. What was the cause of this unlooked-for issue of the struggle? . . . The most probable explanation . . . is that Fabian caution co-operated with the instinct of the Condottiere against pushing his foe too hard. There was always danger for Rome in driving Alaric to desperation: there was danger privately for Stilicho if the dead Alaric should render him no longer indispensable. Whatever might be the cause, by the end of 396 Alaric was back again in his Illyrian eyrie, and thenceforward whatever threats might be directed towards the East the actual weight of his arms was felt only by the West. Partly, at least, this is to be accounted for by the almost sublime cowardice of the ministers of Arcadius, who rewarded his Grecian raids by clothing him with the sacred character of an officer of the Empire in their portion of Illyricum [see GORRIS: A. D. 395]. The precise title under which he exercised jurisdiction is not stated. . . . During an interval of quiescence, which lasted apparently about four years, the Visigothic King was using the forms of Roman

law, the machinery of Roman taxation, the almost unbounded authority of a Roman provincial governor, to prepare the weapon which was one day to pierce the heart of Rome herself. The Imperial City, during the first portion of this interval, was suffering the pangs of famine. Since the foundation of Constantinople Egypt had ceased to nourish the elder Rome. Rome was thus reduced to an almost exclusive dependence on the harvests of Africa proper (that province of which Carthage was the capital), of Numidia, and of Mauretania. But this supply . . . in the year 397 was entirely stopped by the orders of Gildo, who had made himself virtual master of these three provinces. The elder Theodosius had suppressed in 374 a revolt in Mauretania headed by one Firmus. "The son of a great sheep farmer, Nabal he [Firmus] had left behind him several brothers, one of whom Gildo had in the year 386 gathered up again some portion of his brother's broken power. We find him, seven years later (in 393), holding the rank of Count of Africa in the Roman official hierarchy. He turned to his own account the perennial jealousy existing between the ministers of the Eastern and Western Courts, renounced his allegiance to Rome, and preferred to transfer it to Constantinople. What brought matters to a crisis was his refusal to allow the grain crops of 397 to be conveyed to Rome. The Roman Senate declared war in the early winter months of 398 against Gildo. Stilicho, who of course, undertook the fitting out of the expedition found a suitable instrument for Rome's chastisement in one who had had cruel wrongs of his own to avenge upon Gildo. This was yet another son of Nabal Mascezel. Mascezel, at the head of nearly 40 000 men, accomplished the overthrow of his brother, who slew himself, or was slain, when he fell into Roman hands. "Thus the provinces of Africa were for the time won back again for the Empire of the West, and Rome had her corn again. The glory and power of Stilicho were now nearly at their highest point. Shortly before the expedition against Gildo he had given his daughter Maria in marriage to Honorius and the father-in-law of the Emperor might rightly be deemed to hold power with a securer grasp than his more chief minister."—T Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk 1, ch 4 (p 1)

A. D. 400-403.—First Gothic invasion of Italy under Alaric.—Stilicho's repulse of the invaders. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS) A D 400-403

A. D. 400-518.—The Eastern Empire.—Expulsion of Gothic soldiery from Constantinople.—Conflict of John Chrysostom and the Empress Eudoxia.—Reigns of Theodosius II., Pulcheria, Marcianus, Leo I., Zeno, and Anastasius.—Persistent vitality of the Byzantine government.—"While Alaric's eyes were turned on Italy, but before he had actually come into conflict with Stilicho, the Court of Constantinople had been the seat of grave troubles. Gainas, the Gothic 'Magister militum' of the East, and his creature, the eunuch Eutropius, had fallen out, and the man of war had no difficulty in disposing of the wretched harem-bred Grand Chamberlain. . . . The Magister militum now brought his army over to Constantinople, and quartered it there to overawe the emperor. It appeared quite likely that ere long the Ger-

mans would sack the city, but the fate that befell Rome ten years later was not destined for Constantinople. A mere chance brawl put the domination of Gainas to a sudden end [July, A D 400].

The whole population turned out with extemporized arms and attacked the German soldiery. Isolated bodies of the Germans were cut off one by one, and at last their barracks were surrounded and set on fire. The rioters had the upper hand, 7,000 soldiers fell, and the remnant thought themselves lucky to escape. Gainas at once declared open war on the empire but he was beaten in the field and forced to fly across the Danube where he was caught and beheaded by Uldes king of the Huns. The departure of Alaric and the death of Gainas freed the Eastern Romans from the double danger that [had] impended over them. The weak Arcadius was enabled to spend the remaining seven years of his life in comparative peace and quiet. His court was only troubled by an open war between his spouse, the Empress Aelia Eudoxia and John Chrysostom, the Patriarch of Constantinople. John was a man of saintly life and apostolic fervour, but rash and inconsiderate alike in speech and action.

The patriarch's enemies were secretly supported by the empress, who had taken offence at the outspoken way in which John habitually denounced the luxury and insolence of her court. She favoured the intrigues of Theophilus, Patriarch of Alexandria against his brother prelate, backed the Asiatic clergy in their complaints about John's oppression of them and at last induced the Emperor to allow the saintly patriarch to be deposed by a hastily summoned council, the 'Synod of the Oak', held outside the city. The populace rose at once to defend their pastor, riots broke out, Theodosius was chased back to Egypt, and the Emperor, terrified by an earthquake which seemed to manifest the wrath of heaven restored John to his place. Next year, however, the war between the empress and the patriarch broke out again. The Emperor, at his wife's demand, summoned another council which condemned Chrysostom and on Easter Day A D 404, seized the patriarch in his cathedral by armed force, and banished him to Asia. That night a fire probably kindled by the angry adherents of Chrysostom, broke out in St Sophia, which was burnt to the ground. From thence it spread to the neighbouring buildings, and finally to the Senate house, which was consumed with all the treasures of ancient Greek art of which Constantine had made it the repository. Meanwhile the exiled John was banished to a dreary mountain fastness in Cappadocia, and afterwards condemned to a still more remote prison at Pityus on the Euxine. He died on his way thither. The feeble and inert Arcadius died in A D 408, at the early age of thirty one, his imperious consort had preceded him to the grave and the empire of the East was left to Theodosius II. a child of seven years, their only son. The little emperor was duly crowned, and the administration of the East undertaken in his name by the able Anthemius, who held the office of Praetorian Praefect. History relates nothing but good of this minister, he made a wise commercial treaty with the king of Persia, he repelled with ease a Hunnish invasion of Moesia, he built a flotilla on the Danube, where Roman war ships had not been seen since the

death of Valens, forty years before; he reorganized the corn supply of Constantinople, and did much to get back into order and cultivation the desolated north-western lands of the Balkan Peninsula. . . . The empire was still more indebted to him for bringing up the young Theodosius as an honest and god-fearing man. The palace under Anthemius' rule was the school of the virtues, the lives of the emperor and his three sisters, Pulcheria, Arcadia, and Marina, were the model and the marvel of their subjects. Theodosius inherited the piety and honesty of his grandfather and namesake, but was a youth of slender capacity, though he took some interest in literature, and was renowned for his beautiful penmanship. His eldest sister, Pulcheria, was the ruling spirit of the family, and possessed unlimited influence over him, though she was but two years his senior. When Anthemius died in A. D. 414, she took the title of Augusta, and assumed the regency of the East. Pulcheria was an extraordinary woman: on gathering up the reins of power she took a vow of chastity, and lived as a crowned nun for thirty-six years; her fear had been that, if she married, her husband might cherish ambitious schemes against her brother's crown; she therefore kept single herself and persuaded her sisters to make a similar vow. Austere, indefatigable, and unselfish, she proved equal to ruling the realms of the East with success, though no woman had ever made the attempt before. When Theodosius came of age he refused to remove his sister from power, and treated her as his colleague and equal. By her advice he married in A. D. 421, the year that he came of age, the beautiful and accomplished Athenais, daughter of the philosopher Leontius. . . . Theodosius' long reign passed by in comparative quiet. Its only serious troubles were a short war with the Persians, and a longer one with Attila, the great king of the Huns, whose empire now stretched over all the lands north of the Black Sea and Danube, where the Goths had once dwelt. In this struggle the Roman armies were almost invariably unfortunate. The Huns ravaged the country as far as Adrianople and Philippopolis, and had to be bought off by the annual payment of 700 lbs. of gold (£31,000). . . . The reconstruction of the Roman military forces was reserved for the successors of Theodosius II. He himself was killed by a fall from his horse in 450 A. D., leaving an only daughter, who was married to her cousin Valentinian III., Emperor of the West. Theodosius, with great wisdom, had designated as his successor, not his young son-in-law, a cruel and profligate prince, but his sister Pulcheria, who at the same time ended her vow of celibacy and married Marcianus, a veteran soldier and a prominent member of the Senate. The marriage was but formal, for both were now well advanced in years: as a political expedient it was all that could be desired. The empire had peace and prosperity under their rule, and freed itself from the ignominious tribute to the Huns. Before Attila died in 453, he had met and been checked by the succours which Marcianus sent to the distressed Romans of the West. When Marcianus and Pulcheria passed away, the empire came into the hands of a series of three men of ability. They were all bred as high civil officials, not as generals; all ascended the throne at a ripe age; not one of

them won his crown by arms, all were peaceably designated either by their predecessors, or by the Senate and army. These princes were Leo I (457-474), Zeno (474-491), Anastasius (491-518). Their chief merit was that they guided the Roman Empire in the East safely through the stormy times which saw its extinction in the West. While, beyond the Adriatic, province after province was being lopped off and formed into a new Germanic kingdom, the emperors who reigned at Constantinople kept a tight grip on the Balkan Peninsula and on Asia, and succeeded in maintaining their realm absolutely intact. Both East and West were equally exposed to the barbarian in the fifth century, and the difference of their fate came from the character of their rulers, not from the diversity of their political conditions."—C. W. C. Oman, *Story of the Byzantine Empire*, ch. 4-5.—"In spite of the dissimilarity of their personal conduct, the general policy of their government [i. e. of the six emperors between Arcadius and Justinian] is characterised by strong features of resemblance. . . . The Western Empire crumbled into ruins, while the Eastern was saved, in consequence of these emperors having organised the system of administration which has been most unjustly calumniated, under the name of Byzantine. The highest officers, and the proudest military commanders, were rendered completely dependent on ministerial departments and were no longer able to conspire or rebel with impunity. The sovereign was no longer exposed to personal danger, nor the treasury to open peculation. But, unfortunately, the central executive power could not protect the people from fraud with the same ease as it guarded the treasury, and the emperors never perceived the necessity of intrusting the people with the power of defending themselves from the financial oppression of the subaltern administration."—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 2, sect. 11.

A. D. 404-408.—The Western Empire: The last gladiatorial show.—Retreat of Honorius and the imperial court to Ravenna.—Invasion of Radagaisus.—Alliance with Alaric the Goth.—Fall and death of Stilicho.—"After the retreat of the barbarians, Honorius was directed to accept the dutiful invitation of the senate, and to celebrate in the imperial city the auspicious era of the Gothic victory and of his sixth consulship. The suburbs and the streets, from the Milvian bridge to the Palatine mount, were filled by the Roman people, who, in the space of a hundred years, had only thrice been honoured with the presence of their sovereigns [whose residence had been at Constantinople, at Treves, or at Milan]. . . . The emperor resided several months in the capital. . . . The people were repeatedly gratified by the attention and courtesy of Honorius in the public games. . . . In these games of Honorius, the inhuman combats of gladiators polluted for the last time the amphitheatre of Rome. . . . The recent danger to which the person of the emperor had been exposed in the defenceless palace of Milan urged him to seek a retreat in some inaccessible fortress of Italy, where he might securely remain, while the open country was covered by a deluge of barbarians; . . . and in the 20th year of his age the Emperor of the West, anxious only for his personal safety, retired to the perpetual confinement of the walls and morasses of Ravenna.

The example of Honorius was imitated by his feeble successors, the Gothic kings, and afterwards the exarchs, who occupied the throne and palace of the emperors; and till the middle of the 8th century Ravenna was considered as the seat of government and the capital of Italy. The fears of Honorius were not without foundation, nor were his precautions without effect. While Italy rejoiced in her deliverance from the Goths, a furious tempest was excited among the nations of Germany, who yielded to the irresistible impulse that appears to have been gradually communicated from the eastern extremity of the continent of Asia [by the invasion of the Huns, which Gibbon considers to have been the impelling cause of the great avalanche of barbarians from the north that swept down upon Italy under Radagaisus in 406—see RADAGAISUS].

Many cities of Italy were pillaged or destroyed, and the siege of Florence by Radagaisus is one of the earliest events in the history of that celebrated republic, whose firmness checked and delayed the unskilful fury of the barbarians. Stilicho came to the relief of the distressed city, "and the famished host of Radagaisus was in its turn besieged." The barbarians, surrounded by well guarded entrenchments, were forced to surrender, after many had perished from want of food. The chief was beheaded, his surviving followers were sold as slaves. Meantime, Alaric, the Gothic king, had been taken into the pay of the Empire. "Renouncing the service of the Emperor of the East, Alaric concluded with the Court of Ravenna a treaty of peace and alliance, by which he was declared master-general of the Roman armies throughout the præfecture of Illyricum; as it was claimed, according to the true and ancient limits, by the minister of Honorius." This arrangement with Alaric caused great dissatisfaction in the army and among the people, and was a potent cause of the fall and death of Stilicho, which occurred A. D. 408. He was arrested and summarily executed, at Ravenna, on the mandate of his ungrateful and worthless young master, whose trembling throne he had upheld for thirteen years.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 30 (v. 3).

A. D. 406-500.—The breaking of the Rhine barrier.—The great Teutonic invasion and occupation of the Western Empire.—"Up to the year 406 the Rhine was maintained as the frontier of the Roman Empire against the numerous barbarian races and tribes that swarmed uneasily in central Europe. From the Flavian Emperors until the time of Probus (282), the great military line from Coblenz to Kehlheim on the Danube had been really defended, though often overstepped and always a strain on the Romans, and thus a tract of territory (including Baden and Würtemberg) on the east shore of the Upper Rhine, the tithe-land as it was called, belonged to the Empire. But in the fourth century it was as much as could be done to keep off the Alemanni and Franks who were threatening the provinces of Gaul. The victories of Julian and Valentinian produced only temporary effects. On the last day of December 406 a vast company of Vandals, Suevians, and Alans crossed the Rhine. The frontier was not really defended; a handful of Franks who professed to guard it for the Romans were easily swept aside, and the invaders desolated Gaul at pleasure for the three

following years. Such is the bare fact which the chroniclers tell us, but this migration seems to have been preceded by considerable movements on a large scale along the whole Rhine frontier, and these movements may have agitated the inhabitants of Britain and excited apprehensions there of approaching danger. Three tyrants had been recently elected by the legions in rapid succession; the first two, Marcus and Gratian, were slain, but the third Augustus, who bore the auspicious name of Constantine, was destined to play a considerable part for a year or two on the stage of the western world [see BARRI A. D. 407]. It seems almost certain that these two movements, the passage of the Germans across the Rhine and the rise of the tyrants in Britain, were not without causal connection; and it also seems certain that both events were connected with the general Stilicho. The tyrants were elevated in the course of the year 406, and it was at the end of the same year that the Vandals crossed the Rhine. Now the revolt of the legions in Britain was evidently aimed against Stilicho. . . . There is direct contemporary evidence . . . that it was by Stilicho's invitation that the barbarians invaded Gaul, he thought that when they had done the work for which he desiguated them he would find no difficulty in crushing them or otherwise disposing of them. We can hardly avoid supposing that the work which he wished them to perform was to oppose the tyrant of Britain—Constantine, or Gratian, or Marcus, whoever was tyrant then; for it is quite certain that, like Maximus, he would pass into Gaul, where numerous Gallo-Roman adherents would flock to his standards. Stilicho died before Constantine was crushed, and the barbarians whom he had so lightly summoned were still in the land, harrying Gaul, destined soon to harry and occupy Spain and seize Africa. From a Roman point of view Stilicho had much to answer for in the dismemberment of the Empire, from a Teutonic point of view, he contributed largely to preparing the way for the foundation of the German kingdoms"—J. B. Bury, *A History of the Later Roman Empire*, bk. 2, ch. 6 (v. 1).—"If modern history must have a definite beginning, the most convenient beginning for it is the great Teutonic invasion of Gaul in the year 407. Yet the nations of modern Europe do not spring from the nations which then crossed the Rhine, or from any intermixture between them and the Romans into whose land they made their way. The nations which then crossed the Rhine were the Vandals, Suevians, and Alans. . . . None of these nations made any real settlements in Gaul; Gaul was to them simply the high road to Spain. There they did settle, though the Vandals soon forsook their settlement, and the Alans were soon rooted out of theirs. The Suevian kept his ground for a far longer time; we may, if we please, look on him as the Teutonic forefather of Leon, while we look on the Goth as the Teutonic forefather of Castile. Here we have touched one of the great national names of history; the Goth, like the Frank, plays quite another part in Western Europe from the Alan, the Suevian, and the Vandal. . . . Now both Franks and Goths had passed into the Empire long before the invasion of 407. One branch of the Franks . . . was actually settled on Roman lands, and, as Roman subjects, did their best to withstand the great

invasion What then makes that invasion so marked an epoch? . . . The answer is that the invasion of 407 not only brought in new elements, but put the existing elements into new relations to one another. Franks and Goths put on a new character and begin a new life. The Burgundians pass into Gaul, not as a road to Spain, but as a land in which to find many homes. They press down to the south-eastern corner of the land, while the Frank no longer keeps himself in his north-eastern corner, while in the south-west the Goth is settled as for a while the liegeman of Cæsar, and in the north-west a continental Britain springs into being. Here in truth are some of the chiefest elements of the modern world, and though none of them are among the nations that crossed the Rhine in 407, yet the new position taken by all of them is the direct consequence of that crossing. In this way, in Gaul and Spain at least, the joint Vandal, Alan, and Suevian invasion is the beginning of the formation of the modern nations, though the invading nations themselves form no element in the later life of Gaul and only a secondary element in the later life of Spain. The later life of these lands and that of Italy also, has sprung of the settlement of Teutonic nations in a Roman land, and of the mutual influences which Roman and Teuton have had on one another. Roman and Teuton lived side by side, and out of their living side by side has gradually sprung up a third thing different from either, a thing which we cannot call either Roman or Teutonic, or more truly a thing which we may call Roman and Teutonic and some other things as well, according to the side of it which we look at. This third thing is the Romance element in modern Europe, the Romance nations and their Romance tongues."—E. A. Freeman, *The Chief Periods of European History*, pp. 87-90—"The true Germanic people who occupied Gaul were the Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Franks. Many other people, many other single bands of Vandals, Alani, Suevi, Saxons, &c., wandered over its territory; but of these, some only passed over it, and the others were rapidly absorbed by it; these are partial incursions which are without any historical importance. The Burgundians, the Visigoths, and the Franks, alone deserve to be counted among our ancestors. The Burgundians definitively established themselves in Gaul between the years 406 and 413; they occupied the country between the Jura, the Saône, and the Durance; Lyons was the centre of their dominion. The Visigoths, between the years 412 and 450, spread themselves over the provinces bounded by the Rhone, and even over the left bank of the Rhone to the south of the Durance, the Loire, and the Pyrenees: their king resided at Toulouse. The Franks, between the years 481 and 500, advanced in the north of Gaul, and established themselves between the Rhine, the Scheldt, and the Loire, without including Brittany and the western portions of Normandy; Clovis had Soissons and Paris for his capitals. Thus, at the end of the fifth century, was accomplished the definitive occupation of the territory of Gaul by the three great German tribes. The condition of Gaul was not exactly the same in its various parts, and under the dominion of these three nations. There were remarkable differences between them. The Franks were far more foreign, German, and barbarous, than the Bur-

gundians and the Goths. Before their entrance into Gaul, these last had had ancient relations with the Romans, they had lived in the eastern empire, in Italy; they were familiar with the Roman manners and population. We may say almost as much for the Burgundians. Moreover, the two nations had long been Christians. The Franks, on the contrary, arrived from Germany in the condition of pagans and enemies. Those portions of Gaul which they occupied became deeply sensible of this difference, which is described with truth and vivacity in the seventh of the 'Lectures upon the History of France,' of M. Augustin Thierry. I am inclined, however, to believe that it was less important than has been commonly supposed. If I do not err, the Roman provinces differed more among themselves than did the nations which had conquered them. You have already seen how much more civilized was southern than northern Gaul, how much more thickly covered with population, towns, monuments, and roads. Had the Visigoths arrived in as barbarous a condition as that of the Franks, their barbarism would yet have been far less visible and less powerful in Gallia Narbonensis and in Aquitania. Roman civilization would much sooner have absorbed and altered them. This, I believe, is what happened, and the different effects which accompanied the three conquests resulted rather from the differences of the conquered than from that of the conquerors."—F. Guizot, *History of Civilization*, v. 2, lect. 8—"The invasion of the barbarians was not like the torrent which overwhelms, but rather like a slow, persistent force which undermines, disintegrates, and crumbles. The Germans were not strangers to the Roman Empire when they began their conquests. It is well known that many of the Roman Emperors were barbarians who had been successful soldiers in the Imperial army, that military colonies were established on the frontiers composed of men of various races under the control of Roman discipline, that the Goths, before they revolted against the authority of the Emperor, were his chosen troops, that the great Alaric was a Roman general, that the shores of the Danube and the Rhine, which marked the limits of the Empire, were lined with cities which were at the same time Roman colonies and peopled with men of the Teutonic races. When the barbarians did actually occupy the territory their movement seems at first to have been characterized by a strange mixture of force with a sentiment of awe and reverence for the Roman name. In Italy and in Gaul they appropriated to themselves two-thirds of the lands, but they sought to govern their conquests by means of the Roman law and administration, a machine which proved in their hands, by the way, a rather clumsy means of government. They robbed the provincials of all the movable property they possessed, but the suffering they inflicted is said not to have been as great as that caused by the exactions of the Roman taxgatherer. The number of armed invaders has doubtless been exaggerated. The whole force of the Burgundian tribe, whose territory, in the southeast of modern France, extended to the Rhone at Avignon, did not, it is said, exceed sixty thousand in all, while the armed bands of Clovis, who changed the destinies not only of Gaul but of Europe, were not greater than one-tenth of that number.

The great change in their life was, as I have said, that they ceased to be wanderers, they became, in a measure at least, fixed to the soil, and in contrast with the Romans, they preferred to live in the country and not in the towns. In this they followed their Teutonic habits, little knowing what a mighty change this new distribution of population was to cause in the social condition of Europe. They retained, too, their old military organization, and, after attempts more or less successful to use the Roman administration for the ordinary purposes of government, they abandoned it, and ruled the countries they conquered by simple military force, under their Dukes and Counts, the Romans generally being allowed in their private relations to govern themselves by the forms of the Roman law." —C. J. Stillé, *Studies in Medieval History*, ch. 2 — "The coming in of the Germans brought face to face the four chief elements of our civilization, the Greek with its art and science, much of it for the time forgotten, the Roman with its political institutions and legal ideas, and furnishing the empire as the common ground upon which all stood, the Christian with its religious and moral ideas, and the German with other political and legal ideas, and with a reinforcement of fresh blood and life. By the end of the sixth century these all existed side by side in the nominal Roman empire. It was the work of the remaining centuries of the middle ages to unite them into a single organic whole — the groundwork of modern civilization. But the introduction of the last element, the Germans, was a conquest — a conquest rendered possible by the inability of the old civilization any longer to defend itself against their attack. It is one of the miracles of history that such a conquest should have occurred, the violent occupation of the empire by the invasion of an inferior race, with so little destruction of civilization, with so complete an absorption, in the end, of the conqueror by the conquered. It must be possible to point out some reasons why the conquest of the ancient world by the Germans was so little what was to be expected. In a single word, the reason is to be found in the impression which the world they had conquered made upon the Germans. They conquered it, and they treated it as a conquered world. They destroyed and plundered what they pleased, and it was not a little. They took possession of the land and they set up their own tribal governments in place of the Roman. And yet they recognized, in a way, even the worst of them, their inferiority to the people they had overcome. They found upon every side of them evidences of a command over nature such as they had never acquired. cities, buildings, roads, bridges, and ships; wealth and art, skill in mechanics and skill in government, the like of which they had never known; ideas firmly held that the Roman system of things was divinely ordained and eternal; a church strongly organized and with an imposing ceremonial, officered by venerable and saintly men, and speaking with an overpowering positiveness and an awful authority that did not yield before the strongest barbarian klug. The impression which these things made upon the mind of the German must have been profound. In no other way can the result be accounted for. Their conquest was a physical conquest, and as a physical conquest it was complete, but it scarcely went farther. In

government and law there was little change for the Roman, in religion and language, none at all. Other things, schools and commercial arrangements for instance, the Germans would have been glad to maintain at the Roman level if they had known how. Half unconsciously they adopted the belief in the divinely founded and eternal empire, and in a vague way recognized its continuance after they had overthrown it." —G. B. Adams, *Civilization During the Middle Ages*, ch. 5 — See, also, GAUL, A. D. 406-409, 5-8TH CENTURIES, and 5-10TH CENTURIES.

A. D. 408-410. — The three sieges and the sacking of the Imperial city by Alaric. — Death of the Gothic chieftain. — Having rid himself of the great minister and general whose brain and arm were the only hope of his dissolving empire, Honorius proceeded to purge his army and the state of barbarians and heretics. He removed all who professed religious opinions different from his own, from every public office. . . . and, to complete the purification of his army, ordered a general massacre of all the women and children of the barbarians, whom the soldiers in his service had delivered up as hostages. In one day and hour these innocent victims were given up to slaughter and their property to pillage. These hostages had been left in all the Italian cities by the barbarian confederates, as a guarantee for their fidelity to Rome, when they learned that the whole had perished, in the midst of peace, in contempt of all oaths, one furious and terrific cry of vengeance arose, and 30,000 soldiers, who had been the faithful servants of the empire, at once passed over to the camp of Alaric [then in Illyria], and urged him to lead them on to Rome. Alaric, in language the moderation of which Honorius and his ministers ascribed to fear, demanded reparation for the insults offered him, and strict observance of the treaties concluded with him. The only answer he obtained was couched in terms of fresh insult, and contained an order to evacuate all the provinces of the empire. On this provocation, Alaric crossed the Alps, in October, A. D. 408, meeting no resistance till he reached Ravenna. He threatened that city, at first, but the contemptible Emperor of the West was safe in his fastness, and the Goth marched on to Rome. He arrived before Rome [in the autumn of A. D. 408] 619 years after that city had been threatened by Hannibal. During that long interval her citizens had never looked down from her walls upon the banner of an enemy [a foreign invader] waving in their plains. . . . Alaric did not attempt to take Rome by assault; he blockaded the gates, stopped the navigation of the Tiber, and soon famine took possession of a city which was eighteen miles in circumference and contained above a million of inhabitants. . . . At length, the Romans had recourse to the clemency of Alaric, and, by means of a ransom of five thousand pounds of gold and a great quantity of precious effects, the army was induced to retire into Tuscany. The standard of Alaric was now joined by 40,000 barbarian slaves, who escaped from their Italian masters, and by a large reinforcement of Goths from the Danube, led by the brother-in-law of Alaric, Athaulphus, or Athaulphus (Adolphus, in its modern form) by name. The Visigothic king offered peace to the empire if it would relinquish to him a kingdom in Noricum, Dalmatia and Venetia, with a yearly payment of gold; in the

end his demands fell until they extended to Noricum, only. But the fatuous court at Ravenna refused all terms and Alaric marched back to Rome. Once more, however, he spared the venerable capital, and sought to attain his ends by requiring the senate to renounce allegiance to Honorius and to choose a new emperor. He was obeyed and Priscus Attalus, the præfect of the city, was formally invested with the purple. This new Augustus made Alaric and Ataulphus his chief military officers, and there was peace for a little time. But Attalus, unhappily, took his elevation with seriousness and did not recognize the commands that were hidden in the advice which he got from his Gothic patron. Alaric found him to be a fool and stripped his purple robe from his shoulders within less than a year. Then, failing once more to negotiate terms of peace with the worthless emperor shut up in Ravenna, he laid siege to Rome for the third time—and the last. "On the 24th of April, 410, the year 1163 from the foundation of the august city, the Salarian gate was opened to him in the night, and the capital of the world, the queen of nations, was abandoned to the fury of the Goths. Yet this fury was not without some tinge of pity, Alaric granted a peculiar protection to the churches, which were preserved from all insult, together with their sacred treasures, and all those who had sought refuge within their walls. While he abandoned the property of the Romans to pillage, he took their lives under his protection, and it is affirmed that only a single senator perished by the sword of the barbarians. The number of plebeians who were sacrificed appears not to have been thought a matter of sufficient importance even to be mentioned. At the entrance of the Goths, a small part of the city was given up to the flames, but Alaric soon took precautions for the preservation of the rest of the edifices. Above all, he had the generosity to withdraw his army from Rome on the sixth day, and to march it into Campania, loaded, however, with an immense booty. Eleven centuries later, the army of the Constable de Bourbon showed less veneration." Alaric survived the sack of Rome but a few months, dying suddenly in the midst of preparations that he made for invading Sicily. He was buried in the bed of the little river Bisentium, which flows past the town of Cozenza, the stream being diverted for the purpose and then turned back to its course.—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 6.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 31.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 1, ch. 7.

A. D. 409-414.—Invasion of Spain by the Vandals, Sueves and Alans. See SPAIN: A. D. 409-414.

A. D. 410.—Abandonment of Britain. See BRITAIN: A. D. 410.

A. D. 410-419.—Treaty with the Visigoths.—Their settlement in Aquitaine.—Founding of their kingdom of Toulouse. See GOTHS (VISIGOTHS): A. D. 410-419.

A. D. 410-420.—The barbarian attack on Gaul joined by the Franks. See FRANKS: A. D. 410-420.

A. D. 412-453.—Mixed Roman and barbarian administration in Gaul. See GAUL: A. D. 412-458.

A. D. 423-450.—Death of Honorius.—Reign of Valentinian III. and his mother Placidia.—

Legal separation of the Eastern and Western Empires.—The disastrous reign of Honorius, emperor of the West, was ended by his death in 423. The nearest heir to the throne was his infant nephew, Valentinian, son of his sister Placidia. The latter, after being a captive in the hands of the Goths and after sharing the Visigothic throne for some months, as wife of king Ataulphus, had been restored to her brother on her Gothic husband's death. Honorius forced her, then, to marry his favorite, the successful general, Constantius, whom he raised to the rank of Augustus and associated with himself on the throne of the West. But Constantius soon died, leaving his widow with two children—a daughter and a son. Presently, on some quarrel with Honorius, Placidia withdrew from Ravenna and took refuge at Constantinople, where her nephew Theodosius occupied the Eastern throne. She and her children were there when Honorius died, and in their absence the Western throne was usurped by a rebel named John, or Joannes, the Notary, who reigned nearly two years. With the aid of forces from the Eastern Empire he was unseated and beheaded and the child Valentinian was invested with the imperial purple, A. D. 425. For the succeeding twenty-five years his mother, Placidia, reigned in his name. As compensation to the court at Constantinople for the material and received from it, the rich province of Dalmatia and the troubled provinces of Pannonia and Noricum, were now severed from the West and ceded to the Empire of the East. At the same time, the unity of the Roman government was formally and finally dissolved. "By a positive declaration, the validity of all future laws was limited to the dominions of their peculiar author, unless he should think proper to communicate them, subscribed with his own hand, for the approbation of his independent colleague"—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 33.

ALSO IN: J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, ch. 6-8.

A. D. 428-439.—Conquests of the Vandals in Spain and Africa. See VANDALS: A. D. 428, and 429-439.

A. D. 441-446.—Destructive invasion of the Eastern Empire by the Huns.—Cession of territory and payment of tribute to Attila. See HUNS: A. D. 441-446.

A. D. 446.—The last appeal from Britain. See BRITAIN: A. D. 446.

A. D. 451.—Great invasion of Gaul by the Huns.—Their defeat at Chalons. See HUNS: A. D. 451.

A. D. 452.—Attila's invasion of Italy.—The frightful devastation of his hordes.—Origin of Venice. See HUNS: A. D. 452; and VENICE: A. D. 452.

A. D. 455.—Pillage of the city by the Vandals.—"The sufferings and the ignominy of the Roman empire were increased by a new calamity which happened in the year of Valentinian's death [murdered by an usurper, Petronius Maximus A. D. 455]. Eudoxia, the widow of that emperor, who had afterwards become [through compulsion] the wife of Maximus, avenged the murder of her first husband by plotting against her second; reckless how far she involved her country in the ruin. She invited to Rome Genseric, king of the Vandals, who, not content with having conquered and devastated Africa,

made every effort to give a new direction to the rapacity of his subjects, by accustoming them to maritime warfare, or, more properly speaking, piracy. His armed bands, who, issuing from the shores of the Baltic, had marched over the half of Europe, conquering wherever they went, embarked in vessels which they procured at Carthage, and spread desolation over the coasts of Sicily and Italy. On the 12th of June, 455, they landed at Ostia. Maximus was killed in a seditious tumult excited by his wife. Defence was impossible; and, from the 15th to the 29th of June, the ancient capital of the world was pillaged by the Vandals with a degree of rapacity and cruelty to which Alaric and the Goths had made no approach. The ships of the pirates were moored along the quays of the Tiber, and were loaded with a booty which it would have been impossible for the soldiers to carry off by land."—J. C. L. de Sismondi, *Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 8 (v. 1).—"On the whole, it is clear from the accounts of all the chroniclers that Gaiseric's [or Genseric's] pillage of Rome, though insulting and impoverishing to the last degree, was in no sense destructive to the Queen of cities. Whatever he may have done in Africa, in Rome he waged no war on architecture, being far too well employed in storing away gold and silver and precious stones, and all manner of costly merchandise in those insatiable hulks which were riding at anchor by Ostia. Therefore, when you stand in the Forum of Rome or look upon the grass-grown hill which was once the glorious Palatine, blame if you like the Ostrogoth, the Byzantine, the Lombard, above all, the Norman, and the Roman baron of the Middle Ages, for the heart-breaking ruin that you see there, but leave the Vandal uncensured, for, notwithstanding the stigma conveyed in the word 'vandalism,' he is not guilty here."—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 3, ch. 2 (p. 2).

A. D. 455-476.—Barbarian masters and imperial puppets.—From Count Ricimer to Odoacer.—The ending of the line of Roman Emperors in the West, called commonly the Fall of the Western Empire.—"After the death of Valentinian III., the unworthy grandson of the great Theodosius [March 16, A. D. 455], the first thought of the barbarian chiefs was, not to destroy or usurp the Imperial name, but to secure to themselves the nomination of the emperor. Avitus, chosen in Gaul under the influence of the West Gothic King of Toulouse, Theoderic II., was accepted for a time as the western emperor, by the Roman Senate and by the Court of Constantinople. But another barbarian, Ricimer the Sueve, ambitious, successful, and popular, had succeeded to the command of the 'federated' foreign bands which formed the strength of the imperial army in Italy. Ricimer would not be a king, but he adopted as a settled policy the expedient, or the insulting jest, of Alaric. . . . He deposed Avitus, and probably murdered him. Under his direction, the Senate chose Majorian. Majorian was too able, too public-spirited, perhaps too independent, for the barbarian Patrician; Majorian, at a moment of ill-fortune was deposed and got rid of." After Majorian, one Severus (A. D. 461-467), and after Severus a Greek, Anthemius (A. D. 467-472), nominated at Constantinople, wore the purple at the command of Count Ricimer. When, after

five years of sovereignty, Anthemius quarreled with his barbarian master, the latter chose a new emperor—the senator Olybrius—and conducted him with an army to the gates of Rome, in which the imperial court had once more settled itself. Anthemius, supported by the majority of the senate and people, resisted, and Rome sustained a siege of three months. It was taken by storm, on the 11th of July, A. D. 472, and suffered every outrage at the hands of the merciless victors. Anthemius was slain and his enemy, Ricimer, died a few weeks later. Olybrius followed the latter to the grave in October. Ricimer's place was filled by his nephew, a refugee Burgundian king, Gundobad, who chose for emperor an unfortunate officer of the imperial guard, named Glycerius. Glycerius allowed himself to be deposed the next year by Julius Nepos and accepted a bishopric in place of the throne; but later circumstances gave the emperor-bishop an opportunity to assassinate his supplanter and he did not hesitate to do so. By this time, the real power had passed to another barbarian "patrician" and general, Orestes, former secretary of Attila, and Orestes proclaimed his own son emperor. To this son "by a strange chance, as if in mockery of his fortune, had been given the names of the first king and the first emperor of Rome, Romulus Augustus, soon turned in derision into the diminutive 'Augustulus.' But Orestes failed to play the part of Ricimer. A younger and more daring barbarian adventurer, Odoacer the Herule, or Rugian, bid higher for the allegiance of the army. Orestes was slain, and the young emperor was left to the mercy of Odoacer. In singular and significant contrast to the common usage when a pretender fell, Romulus Augustulus was spared. He was made to abdicate in legal form, and the Roman Senate, at the dictation of Odoacer, officially signified to the Eastern emperor, Zeno, their resolution that the separate Western Empire should cease, and their recognition of the one emperor at Constantinople, who should be supreme over West and East. Amid the ruin of the empire and the state, the dethroned emperor passed his days, in such luxurious ease as the times allowed, at the Villa of Lucullus at Misenum, and Odoacer, taking the Teutonic title of king, sent to the emperor at Constantinople the imperial crown and robe which were to be worn no more at Rome or Ravenna for more than three hundred years. Thus in the year 476 ended the Roman empire, or rather, the line of Roman emperors, in the West."—R. W. Church, *Beginning of the Middle Ages*, ch. 1.—"When, at Odoacer's bidding, Romulus Augustulus, the boy whom a whim of fate had chosen to be the last native Cæsar of Rome, had formally announced his resignation to the senate, a deputation from that body proceeded to the Eastern court to lay the insignia of royalty at the feet of the Eastern Emperor Zeno. The West, they declared, no longer required an Emperor of its own; one monarch sufficed for the world, Odoacer was qualified by his wisdom and courage to be the protector of their state, and upon him Zeno was entreated to confer the title of patrician and the administration of the Italian provinces. The Emperor granted what he could not refuse, and Odoacer, taking the title of King [not king of Italy, as is often said—foot-note], continued the consular office, respected the civil and ecclesiasti-

cal institutions of his subjects, and ruled for fourteen years as the nominal vicar of the Eastern Emperor. There was thus legally no extinction of the Western Empire at all, but only a reunion of East and West. In form, and to some extent also in the belief of men, things now reverted to their state during the first two centuries of the Empire, save that Byzantium instead of Rome was the centre of the civil government. The joint tenancy which had been conceived by Diocletian, carried further by Constantine, renewed under Valentinian I. and again at the death of Theodosius, had come to an end; once more did a single Emperor sway the sceptre of the world, and head an undivided Catholic Church."—J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 3.

ALSO IN: T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 3, ch. 4-8.—J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, pref. and bk. 3, ch. 5 (v. 1).

A. D. 476.—Causes of the decay of the Empire and the significance of its fall in the West.

"Thus in the year 476 ended the Roman empire, or rather, the line of Roman emperors, in the West. Thus it had become clear that the foundations of human life and society, which had seemed under the first emperors eternal, had given way. The Roman empire was not the 'last word' in the history of the world; but either the world was in danger of falling into chaos, or else new forms of life were yet to appear, new ideas of government and national existence were to struggle with the old for the mastery. The world was not falling into chaos. Europe, which seemed to have lost its guidance and its hope of civilization in losing the empire, was on the threshold of a history far grander than that of Rome, and was about to start in a career of civilization to which that of Rome was rude and unprogressive. In the great break-up of the empire in the West, some parts of its system lasted, others disappeared. What lasted was the idea of municipal government, the Christian Church, the obstinate evil of slavery. What disappeared was the central power, the imperial and universal Roman citizenship, the exclusive rule of the Roman law, the old Roman paganism, the Roman administration, the Roman schools of literature. Part of these revived; the idea of central power under Charles the Great, and Otto his great successor; the appreciation of law, though not exclusively Roman law; the schools of learning. And under these conditions the new nations—some of mixed races, as in France, Spain, and Italy; others simple and homogeneous, as in Germany, England, and the Scandinavian peninsula—begin their apprenticeship of civilization."—R. W. Church, *The Beginning of the Middle Ages*, ch. 1.—"The simple facts of the fall of the Empire are these. The Imperial system had been established . . . to protect the frontier. This it did for two centuries with eminent success. But in the reign of Marcus Aurelius . . . there occurred an invasion of the Marcomanni, which was not repulsed without great difficulty, and which excited a deep alarm and foreboding throughout the Empire. In the third century the hostile powers on every frontier began to appear more formidable. The German tribes, in whose discord Tacitus saw the safety of the Empire, present themselves now no longer in separate feebleness, but in powerful confederations. We hear no more the insignificant names of

Chatti and Chauci; the history of the third century is full of Alemanni, Franks, and Goths. On the eastern frontier, the long decayed power of the Parthians now gives place to a revived and vigorous Persian Empire. The forces of the Empire are more and more taxed to defend it from these powerful enemies. . . . It is evident that the Roman world would not have steadily receded through centuries before the barbaric, had it not been decidedly inferior in force. To explain, then, the fall of the Empire, it is necessary to explain the inferiority in force of the Romans to the barbarians. This inferiority of the Romans, it is to be remembered, was a new thing. At an earlier time they had been manifestly superior. When the region of barbarism was much larger; when it included warlike and aggressive nations now lost to it, such as the Gauls; and when, on the other hand, the Romans drew their armies from a much smaller area, and organized them much less elaborately, the balance had inclined decidedly the other way. In those times the Roman world, in spite of occasional reverses, had on the whole steadily encroached on the barbaric. . . . Either, therefore, a vast increase of power must have taken place in the barbaric world, or a vast internal decay in the Roman. Now the barbaric world had actually received two considerable accessions of force. It had gained considerably, through what influences we can only conjecture, in the power and habit of co-operation. As I have said before, in the third century we meet with large confederations of Germans, whereas before we read only of isolated tribes. Together with this capacity of confederation we can easily believe that the Germans had acquired new intelligence, civilization, and military skill. Moreover, it is practically to be considered as a great increase of aggressive force, that in the middle of the fourth century they were threatened in their original settlements by the Huns. The impulse of desperation which drove them against the Roman frontier was felt by the Romans as a new force acquired by the enemy. But we shall soon see that other and more considerable momenta must have been required to turn the scale. . . . We are forced, . . . to the conclusion that the Roman Empire, in the midst of its greatness and civilization, must have been in a stationary and unprogressive, if not a decaying condition. Now what can have been the cause of this unproductiveness or decay? It has been common to suppose a moral degeneration in the Romans, caused by luxury and excessive good fortune. To support this it is easy to quote the satirists and cynics of the Imperial time, and to refer to such accounts as Ammianus gives of the mingled effeminacy and brutality of the aristocracy of the capital in the fourth century. But the history of the wars between Rome and the barbaric world does not show us the proofs we might expect of this decay of spirit. We do not find the Romans ceasing to be victorious in the field, and beginning to show themselves inferior in valor to their enemies. The luxury of the capital could not affect the army. . . . Nor can it be said that luxury corrupted the generals, and through them the army. On the contrary, the Empire produced a remarkable series of capable generals. . . . Whatever the remote and ultimate cause may have been, the immediate cause to which the fall of the Empire can be traced is a physical, not a

moral, decay. In valor, discipline, and science, the Roman armies remained what they had always been, and the peasant emperors of Illyricum were worthy successors of Cincinnatus and Caius Marius. But the problem was how to replenish those armies. Men were wanting; the Empire perished for want of men. The proof of this is in the fact that the contest with barbarism was carried on by the help of barbarian soldiers. . . . It must have been because the Empire could not furnish soldiers for its own defence, that it was driven to the strange expedient of turning its enemies and plunderers into its defenders. Nor was it only in the army that the Empire was compelled to borrow men from barbarism. To cultivate the fields whole tribes were borrowed. From the time of Marcus Aurelius, it was a practice to grant lands within the Empire, sometimes to prisoners of war, sometimes to tribes applying for admission. . . . The want of any principle of increase in the Roman population is attested at a much earlier time. In the second century before Christ, Polybius bears witness to it, and the returns of the census from the Second Punic War to the time of Augustus show no steady increase in the number of citizens that cannot be accounted for by the extension of citizenship to new classes. Precisely as we think of marriage, the Roman of Imperial times thought of celibacy,—that is, as the most comfortable but the most expensive condition of life. Marriage with us is a pleasure for which a man must be content to pay, with the Romans it was an excellent pecuniary investment, but an intolerably disagreeable one. Here lay, at least in the judgment of Augustus, the root of the evil. To inquire into the causes of this aversion to marriage in this place would lead me too far. We must be content to assume that, owing partly to this cause and partly to the prudential check of infanticide, the Roman population seems to have been in ordinary times almost stationary. The same phenomenon had shown itself in Greece before its conquest by the Romans. There the population had even greatly declined, and the shrewd Polybius explains that it was not owing to war or plague, but mainly to a general repugnance to marriage, and reluctance to rear large families, caused by an extravagantly high standard of comfort. . . . Perhaps enough has now been said to explain that great enigma, which so much bewilders the reader of Gibbon; namely, the sharp contrast between the age of the Antonines and the age which followed it. A century of unparalleled tranquillity and virtuous government is followed immediately by a period of hopeless ruin and dissolution. A century of rest is followed, not by renewed vigor, but by incurable exhaustion. Some principle of decay must clearly have been at work, but what principle? We answer: it was a period of sterility or barrenness in human beings; the human harvest was bad. And among the causes of this barrenness we find, in the more barbarous nations, the enfeeblement produced by the too abrupt introduction of civilization, and universally the absence of industrial habits, and the disposition to listlessness which belongs to the military character.”—J. R. Seeley, *Roman Imperialism*, pp. 47-61.—“At no period within the sphere of historic records was the commonwealth of Rome anything but an oligarchy of warriors and slave-owners, who indemnified themselves

for the restraint imposed on them by their equals in the forum by aggression abroad and tyranny in their households. The causes of its decline seem to have little connexion with the form of government established in the first and second centuries. They were in full operation before the fall of the Republic, though their baneful effects were disguised and perhaps retarded by outward successes, by extended conquests, and increasing supplies of tribute or plunder. The general decline of population throughout the ancient world may be dated even from the second century before our era. The last age of the Republic was perhaps the period of the most rapid exhaustion of the human race, but its dissolution was arrested under Augustus, when the population recovered for a time in some quarters of the empire, and remained at least stationary in others. The curse of slavery could not but make itself felt again, and demanded the destined catastrophe. Whatever evil we ascribe to the despotism of the Cæsars, we must remark that it was Slavery that rendered political freedom and constitutional government impossible. Slavery fostered in Rome, as previously at Athens, the spirit of selfishness and sensuality, of lawlessness and insolence, which cannot consist with political equality, with political justice, with political moderation. The tyranny of the emperors was only the tyranny of every noble extended and intensified. The empire became no more than an ergastulum or barracoon on a vast scale, commensurate with the dominions of the greatest of Roman slaveholders. . . . We have noticed already the pestilence which befel Italy and many of the provinces in the reign of Aurelius. There is reason to believe that this scourge was no common disorder, that it was of a type new at least in the West, and that, as a new morbid agent, its ravages were more lasting, as well as more severe, than those of an ordinary sickness. . . . At another time, when the stamina of ancient life were healthier and stronger, such a visitation might possibly have come and gone, and, however fatal at the moment, have left no lasting traces; but periods seem to occur in national existence when there is no constitutional power of rallying under casual disorders. The sickness which in the youth of the commonwealth would have dispelled its morbid humours and fortified its system, may have proved fatal to its advancing years, and precipitated a hale old age into palsied decrepitude. The vital powers of the empire possessed no elasticity, every blow now told upon it with increasing force; the blows it slowly or impatiently returned were given by the hands of hired barbarians, not by the strength of its own right arm. Not sickness alone, but famines, earthquakes, and conflagrations, fell in rapid succession upon the capital and the provinces. Such casualties may have occurred at other periods not less frequently or disastrously; but these were observed, while the others passed unnoticed, because the courage of the nation was now broken no less than its physical vigour, and, distressed and terrified, it beheld in every natural disorder the stroke of fate, the token of its destined dissolution. Nor indeed was the alarm unfounded. These transient faintings and sicknesses were too truly the symptoms of approaching collapse. The long line of northern frontier, from Odessus to the island of the Batavi, was skirted by a

fringe of fire, and through the lurid glare loomed the wrathful faces of myriads, Germans, Scythians, and Sarmatians, all armed for the onslaught in sympathy or concert"—C Merivale, *Hist. of the Romans under the Empire*, ch 18 (v 7)—“Under the humane pretext of gratifying the world with a flattering title, an Antoninus, in one of his edicts, called by the name of Roman citizens the tributaries of the Roman empire, those men whom a proconsul might legally torture, flog with rods, or crush with labour and taxes. Thus the power of that formerly inviolable title, before which the most shameless tyranny stopped short, was contradicted; thus perished that ancient safety-cry which made the executioners fall back, I am a Roman citizen. From that period Rome no longer existed, there was a court and provinces: we do not understand by that word what it now signifies in the vulgar languages, but what it signified primitively in the Roman language, a country conquered by arms, we mean to say, that the primitive distinction between conquering Rome and those it had conquered then became established between the men in the palace and those out of the palace; that Rome itself lived only for one family, and a handful of courtiers, as formerly the nations it had conquered had only lived by it. It was then that the name of subjugated, subjects, which our language has corrupted into that of subjects, was transported from the conquered inhabitants of the East or Gaul, to the victorious inhabitants of Italy, attached in future to the yoke of a small number of men, as these had been attached to their yoke; the property of those men, as well as the others, had been their property, worthy, in a word, of the degrading title of subjects, subjects, which must be taken literally. Such was the order of things which had been gradually forming since the time of Augustus; each emperor gloried in hastening the moment of its perfection, Constantine gave it the finishing stroke. He effaced the name of Rome from the Roman standards, and put in its place the symbol of the religion which the empire had just embraced. He degraded the revered name of the civil magistrature below the domestic offices of his house. An inspector of the wardrobe took precedence of the consuls. The aspect of Rome importuned him, he thought he saw the image of liberty still engraved on its old walls, fear drove him thence, he fled to the coasts of Byzantia, and there built Constantinople, placing the sea as a barrier between the new city of the Cæsars and the ancient city of the Brutus. If Rome had been the home of independence, Constantinople was the home of slavery, from thence issued the dogmas of passive obedience to the Church and throne; there was but one right—that of the empire, but one duty—that of obedience. The general name of citizen, which was equivalent, in language, to men living under the same law, was replaced by epithets graduated according to the credit of the powerful or the cowardice of the weak. The qualifications of Eminence, Royal Highness, and Reverence, were bestowed on what was lowest and most despicable in the world. The empire, like a private domain, was transmitted to children, wives, and sons-in-law; it was given, bequeathed, substituted; the universe was exhausting itself for the establishment of the family; taxes increased immoderately; Constantinople alone was exempted;

that privilege of Roman liberty was the price of its infamy. The rest of the cities and nations were treated like beasts of burden, which are used without scruple, flogged when they are restive, and killed when there is cause to fear them. Witness the population of Antioch, condemned to death by the pious Theodosius; and that of Thessalonica, entirely massacred by him for a tax refused, and an unfortunate creature secured from the justice of his provosts. Meanwhile savage and free nations armed against the enslaved world, as if to chastise it for its baseness. Italy, oppressed by the empire, soon found pitiless revengers in its heart. Rome was menaced by the Goths. The people, weary of the imperial yoke, did not defend themselves. The men of the country, still imbued with the old Roman manners and religion, those men, the only ones whose arms were still robust and souls capable of pride, rejoiced to see among them free men and gods resembling the ancient gods of Italy. Stilico, the general to whom the empire entrusted its defence, appeared at the foot of the Alps, he called to arms, and no one arose, he promised liberty to the slaves, he lavished the treasures of the fisc, and out of the immense extent of the empire he only assembled 40,000 men, the fifth part of the warriors that Hannibal had encountered at the gates of free Rome”—A. Thierry, *Narratives of the Merovingian Era and Historical Essays*, essay 13.—“It was not the division into two empires, nor merely the power of external enemies, that destroyed the domination of Rome. Republican Rome had ended in monarchy by the decadence of her institutions and customs, by the very effect of her victories and conquests, by the necessity of giving to this immense dominion a dominus. But after she had begun to submit to the reality of a monarchy, she retained the worship of republican forms. The Empire was for a long time a piece of hypocrisy, for it did not dare to give to its rulers the first condition of stability, a law of succession. The death of every emperor was followed by troubles, and the choice of a master of the world was often left to chance. At length the monarchy had to be organized, but thenceforth it was absolute, without restraint or opposition. Its proposed aim was to exploit the world, an aim which in practice was carried to an extreme. Hence it exhausted the orbis romanus”—E. Lavisse, *General View of the Political History of Europe*, ch 1.

A. D. 486.—The last Roman sovereignty in Gaul. See GAUL. A. D. 457-486.

A. D. 488.—Theodoric the king of the Ostrogoths authorized and commissioned by the Emperor Zeno to conquer a kingdom in Italy. See GOTHs (OSTROGOTHS). A. D. 473-488.

A. D. 488-526.—The Ostrogothic kingdom of Theodoric.—It was in the autumn of the year 488 that Theodoric, commissioned by the Eastern Emperor, Zeno, to wrest Italy from Odoacer (or Odovacar), broke up his camp or settlement on the Danube, in the neighborhood of Sistova, and moved towards the west. The movement was a national migration—of wives and children as well as of warriors—and the total number is estimated at not less than 200,000. Following the course of the Danube, the Gothic host met with no opposition until it came to Singidunum, near the junction of the Save. There, on the banks of a stream called the Ulca, they fought a great

battle with the Gepidæ, who held possession of Pannonia, and who disputed their advance. Victorious in this encounter, Theodoric pushed on, along the course of the Save; but the movement of his cumbrous train was so slow and the hardships of the march so great, that nearly a year passed before he had surmounted the passes of the Julian Alps and entered Italy. He found Odoacer waiting to give him battle on the Isonzo; but the forces of the latter were not courageous enough or not faithful enough for their duty, and the invading Goths forced the passage of the stream on the 28th of August, 489. Odoacer retreated to Verona, followed by Theodoric, and there, on the 30th of September, a great and terrible battle was fought, from which not many of the Rugian and Herulian troops of Odoacer escaped. Odoacer, himself, with some followers, got clear of the rout and made their way to the safe stronghold of Ravenna. For a time, Odoacer's cause seemed abandoned by all who had supported him; but it was a treacherous show of submission to the victor. Theodoric, ere long, found reactions at work which recruited the forces of his opponent and diminished his own. He was driven to retreat to Ticinum (Pavia) for the winter. But having solicited and received aid from the Visigoths of southern Gaul, he regained, in the summer of 490 (August 11) in a battle on the Adda, not far from Milan, all the ground that he had lost, and more. Odoacer was now driven again into Ravenna, and shut up within its walls by a blockade which was endured until February in the third year afterwards (493), when famine compelled a surrender. Theodoric promised life to his rival and respect to his royal dignity; but he no sooner had the old self-crowned king Odoacer in his power than he slew him with his own hand. Notwithstanding this savagery in the inauguration of it, the reign of the Ostrogothic king in Italy appears to have been, on the whole, wise and just, with more approximation to the chivalric half-civilization of later mediæval times than appears in the government of any of his Gothic or German neighbors. "Although Theodoric did not care to run the risk of offending both his Goths and the Court of Constantinople by calling himself Cæsar or Emperor, yet those titles would have exactly expressed the character of his rule—so far at least as his Roman subjects were concerned. When the Emperor Anastasius in 497 acknowledged him as ruler of Italy, he sent him the purple cloak and the diadem of the Western emperors; and the act showed that Anastasius quite understood the difference between Theodoric's government and that of Odoacer. In fact, though not in name, the Western empire had been restored with much the same institutions it had had under the best of the Cæsars." The reign of Theodoric, dating it, as he did, from his first victory on Italian soil, was thirty-seven years in duration. When he died, August 30, A. D. 526, he left to his grandson, Athalaric, a kingdom which extended, beyond Italy, over Rætia, Noricum, Pannonia and Illyricum (the modern Austrian empire south and west of the Danube), together with Provence in southern Gaul and a district north of it embracing much of modern Dauphiné. His government extended, likewise, over the Visigothic kingdom, as guardian of its young king, his grandson. But this great kingdom of the heroic Ostrogoth was not

destined to endure. One who lived the common measure of life might have seen the beginning of it and the end. It vanished in one quarter of a century after he who founded it was laid away in his great tomb at Ravenna, leaving nothing to later history which can be counted as a survival of it,—not even a known remnant of the Ostrogothic race.—H. Bradley, *Story of the Goths*, ch. 16-20.—"Theodoric professed a great reverence for the Roman civilization. He had asked for and obtained from the Emperor Anastasius the imperial insignia that Odoakar had disdainfully sent back to Constantinople, and he gave up the dress of the barbarians for the Roman purple. Although he lived at Ravenna he was accustomed to consult the Roman senate, to whom he wrote, 'We desire, conscript fathers, that the genius of liberty may look with favor upon your assembly.' He established a consul of the West, three prætorian prefects, and three dioceses,—that of northern Italy, that of Rome, and that of Gaul. He retained the municipal government, but appointed the decurions himself. He reduced the severity of the taxes, and his palace was always open to those who wished to complain of the iniquities of the judges. . . . Thus a barbarian gave back to Italy the prosperity which she had lost under the emperors. The public buildings, aqueducts, theatres, and baths were repaired, and palaces and churches were built. The uncultivated lands were cleared and companies were formed to drain the Pontine marshes and the marshes of Spoleto. The iron mines of Dalmatia and a gold mine in Brutii were worked. The coasts were protected from pirates by numerous flotillas. The population increased greatly. Theodoric, though he did not know how to write, gathered around him the best literary merit of the time,—Boethius, the bishop Eunodius, and Cassiodorus. The latter, whom he made his minister, has left us twelve books of letters. Theodoric seems in many ways like a first sketch of Charlemagne. Though himself an Arian, he respected the rights of the Catholics from the first. . . . When, however, the Emperor Justin I. persecuted the Arians in the East, he threatened to retaliate, and as a great commotion was observed among his Italian subjects, he believed that a conspiracy was being formed against himself. . . . The prefect Symmachus and his son-in-law, Boethius, were implicated. Theodoric confined them in the tower of Pavia, and it was there that Boethius wrote his great work, *The Consolations of Philosophy*. They were both executed in 525. Theodoric, however, finally recognized their innocence, and felt such great regret that his reason is said to have been unbalanced and that remorse hastened his end"—V. Duruy, *Hist. of the Middle Ages*, bk. 1, ch. 3.—"The personal greatness of Theodoric overshadowed Emperor and Empire; from his palace at Ravenna, by one title or another, by direct dominion, as guardian, as elder kinsman, as representative of the Roman power, as head by natural selection of the whole Teutonic world, he ruled over all the western lands save one; and even to the conquering Frank he could say, *Thus far shalt thou come and no further*. In true majesty such a position was more than Imperial; moreover there was nothing in the rule of Theodoric which touched the Roman life of Italy. . . . As far as we can see, it was the very greatness of Theodoric which kept his power

from being lasting. Like so many others of the very greatest of men, he set on foot a system which he himself could work, but which none but himself could work. He sought to set up a kingdom of Goths and Romans, under which the two nations should live side by side, distinct but friendly, each keeping its own law and doing its own work. And for one life time the thing was done. Theodoric could keep the whole fabric of Roman life untouched, with the Goth standing by as an armed protector. He could, as he said, leave to the Roman consul the honours of government and take for the Gothic king only the toils. Smaller men neither could nor would do this. It was the necessary result of his position that he gave Italy one generation of peace and prosperity such as has no fellow for ages on either side of it, but that, when he was gone, a fabric which had no foundation but his personal qualities broke down with a crash."—E. A. Freeman, *Chief Periods of European Hist.*, lect. 3.

ALSO IN The same *The Goths at Ravenna* (*Hist. Essays*, v. 3, ch. 4).—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 4, ch. 6-13 (p. 3).—Cassiodorus, *Letters*; trans. and ed. by T. Hodgkin.—H. F. Stewart, *Boethius*, ch. 2.

A. D. 527-565.—The reign of Justinian.—“In the year after the great Theodoric died (526), the most famous in the time of Eastern emperors, since Constantine, began his long and eventful reign (527-567). Justinian was born a Slavonian peasant, near what was then Sardica, and is now Sofia, his original slave name, *Upawda*, was latinized into Justinian, when he became an officer in the imperial guard. Since the death of the second Theodosius (450) the Eastern emperors had been, as they were continually to be, men not of Roman or Greek, but of barbarian or half barbarian origin, whom the imperial city and service attracted, naturalized, and clothed with civilized names and Roman character. Justinian's reign, so great and so unhappy, was marked by magnificent works, the administrative organization of the empire, the great buildings at Constantinople, the last and grandest codification of Roman law [see *CORPUS JURIS CIVILIS*]. But it was also marked by domestic shame, by sanguinary factions [see *CIRCUS, FACTIONS OF THE ROMAN*], by all the vices and crimes of a rapacious and ungrateful despotism. Yet it seemed for a while like the revival of the power and fortune of Rome. Justinian rose to the highest ideas of imperial ambition, and he was served by two great masters of war, foreigners in origin like himself, Belisarius the Thracian, and Narses the Armenian, who were able to turn to full account the resources, still enormous, of the empire, its immense riches, its technical and mechanical skill, its supplies of troops, its military traditions, its command of the sea. Africa was wrested from the Vandals [see *VANDALS* A. D. 533-534], Italy from the successors of Theodoric [see below]; much of Spain from the West Goths.”—R. W. Church, *The Beginning of the Middle Ages*, ch. 6.—“In spite of the brilliant events which have given the reign of Justinian a prominent place in the annals of mankind, it is presented to us in a series of isolated and incongruous facts. Its chief interest is derived from the biographical memorials of Belisarius, Theodora, and Justinian; and its most instructive lesson has been drawn from the influence which

its legislation has exercised on foreign nations. The unerring instinct of mankind has, however, fixed on this period as one of the greatest eras in man's annals. The actors may have been men of ordinary merit, but the events of which they were the agents effected the mightiest revolutions in society. The frame of the ancient world was broken to pieces, and men long looked back with wonder and admiration at the fragments which remained, to prove the existence of a nobler race than their own. The Eastern Empire, though too powerful to fear any external enemy, was withering away from the rapidity with which the State devoured the resources of the people. The life of Belisarius, either in its reality or its romantic form, has typified his age. In his early youth, the world was populous and wealthy, the empire rich and powerful. He conquered extensive realms and mighty nations and led kings captive to the footstool of Justinian, the lawgiver of civilisation. Old age arrived, Belisarius sank into the grave suspected and impoverished by his feeble and ungrateful master, and the world, from the banks of the Euphrates to those of the Tagus, presented the awful spectacle of famine and plague [see *PLAGUE* A. D. 542-594], of ruined cities, and of nations on the brink of extermination. The impression on the hearts of men was profound.”—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 3, sect. 1.

ALSO IN Lord Mahon, *Life of Belisarius*.

A. D. 528-556.—The Persian Wars and the Lazic War of Justinian. See *PERSIA* A. D. 226-627, also, *LAZIC*.

A. D. 535-553.—Fall of the Gothic kingdom of Theodoric.—Recovery of Italy by the Emperor Justinian.—The long Gothic siege of Rome.—The siege, capture and pillage by Totila.—The forty days of lifeless desolation in the great city.—On the death of the great Theodoric, the Ostrogothic crown passed, not to his daughter Amalasuntha, but to her son, Athalaric, a child of eight or ten years. The boy king died at the age of sixteen, and Amalasuntha assumed the regal power and title, calling one of her cousins, named Theodatus, or Theodahad, to the throne, to share it with her. She had powerful enemies in the Gothic court and the ungrateful Theodatus was soon in conspiracy with them. Amalasuntha and her partisans were overcome, and the unhappy queen, after a short imprisonment on a little island in the lake of Bolsena, was put to death. These dissensions in the Gothic kingdom gave encouragement to the Eastern emperor, the ambitious Justinian, to undertake the reconquest of Italy. His great general, Belisarius, had just vanquished the Vandals (see *VANDALS* A. D. 533-534) and restored Carthaginian Africa to the imperial domain. With far smaller forces than that achievement demanded, Belisarius was now sent against the Goths. He landed, first, in Sicily (A. D. 535), and the whole island was surrendered to him, almost without a blow. The following spring (having crossed to Carthage meantime and quelled a formidable revolt), he passed the straits from Messina and landed his small army in Italy. Marching northwards, he encountered his first opposition at Neapolis—modern Naples—where he was detained for twenty days by the stout resistance of the city. It was surprised, at length, by a storming party

which crept through one of the aqueducts of the town, and it suffered fearfully from the barbarians of the Roman army before Belisarius could recover control of his savage troops. Pausing for a few months to organize his easy conquest of southern Italy, he received, before he marched to Rome, the practical surrender of the capital. On the 9th of December, 536, he entered the city and the Gothic garrison marched out. The Goths, meantime, had deposed the cowardly Theodatus and raised to the throne their most trusty warrior, Witigis. They employed the winter of 537 in gathering all their available forces at Ravenna, and in the spring they returned to Rome, 150,000 strong, to expel the Byzantine invader. Belisarius had busily improved the intervening months, and the long-neglected fortifications of the city were wonderfully restored and improved. At the beginning of March, the Goths were thundering at the gates of Rome; and then began the long siege, which endured for a year and nine days, and which ended in the discomfiture of the huge army of the besiegers. Their retreat was a flight and great numbers were slain by the pursuing Romans. "The numbers and prowess of the Goths were rendered useless by the utter incapacity of their commander. Ignorant how to assault, ignorant how to blockade, he allowed even the sword of Hunger to be wrested from him and used against his army by Belisarius. He suffered the flower of the Gothic nation to perish, not so much by the weapons of the Romans as by the deadly dews of the Campagna." After the retreat of the Goths from Rome, the conquest of Italy would have been quickly completed, no doubt, if the jealousy of Justinian had not hampered Belisarius, by sending the eunuch Narses—who proved to be a remarkable soldier, in the end—to divide the command with him. As it was, the surrender to Belisarius of the Gothic capital, Ravenna, by the Gothic king, Witigis, in the spring of 540, seemed to make the conquest an accomplished fact. The unconquered Gothic warriors then held but two important cities—Verona and Pavia. Milan they had retaken after losing it, and had practically destroyed, massacring the inhabitants (see MILAN, A. D. 539). But now they chose a new king, Ildibad, who reigned promisingly for a year and was slain; then another, who wore the crown but five months; and, lastly, they found a true royal chief in the knightly young warrior Baduila, or Totila, by whose energy and valor the Gothic cause was revived. Belisarius had been recalled by his jealous master, and the quarrels of eleven generals who divided his authority gave every opportunity to the youthful king. Defeating the Roman armies in two battles, at Fuenza and in the valley of Mugello, near Florence, he crossed the Apennines, passed by Rome, besieged and took Naples and Cumæ and overran all the southern provinces of Italy, in 542 and 543, finding everywhere much friendliness among the people, whom the tax-gatherers of Justinian had alienated by their merciless rapacity. In 544, Belisarius, restored to favor and command only because of the desperate need of his services, came back to Italy to recover what his successors had lost; but he came almost alone. Without adequate troops, he could only watch, from Ravenna, and circumscribe a little, the successes of his enterprising antagonist. The latter, hav-

ing strengthened his position well, in central as well as in southern Italy, applied himself to the capture of Rome. In May, 546, the Gothic lines were drawn around the city and a blockade established which soon produced famine and despair. An attempt by Belisarius to break the leaguer came to naught, and Rome was betrayed to Totila on the 17th of December following. He stayed the swords of his followers when they began to slay, but gave them full license to plunder. When the great city had been stripped and most of its inhabitants had fled, he resolved to destroy it utterly, but he was dissuaded from that most barbarous design by a letter of remonstrance from Belisarius. Contenting himself, then, with throwing down a great part of the walls, he withdrew his whole army—having no troops to spare for an adequate garrison—and took with him every single surviving inhabitant (so the historians of the time declare), so that Rome, for the space of six weeks or more (January and February, 547), was a totally deserted and silent city. At the end of that time, Belisarius threw his army inside of the broken walls, and repaired them with such celerity that Totila was baffled when he hastened back to expel the intruders. Three times the Goths attacked and were repulsed, the best of their warriors were slain, the prestige of their leader was lost. But, once more, jealousies and enmities at Constantinople recalled Belisarius and the Goths recovered ground. In 549 they again invested Rome and it was betrayed to them, as before, by a part of the garrison. Totila now made the great city—great even in its ruins—his capital, and exerted himself to restore its former glories. His arms for a time were everywhere successful. Sicily was invaded and stripped of its portable wealth. Sardinia and Corsica were occupied, the shores of Greece were threatened. But in 552 the tide of fortune was turned once more in favor of Justinian,—this time by his second great general, the eunuch Narses. In one decisive battle fought that year, in July, at a point on the Flaminian Way where it crosses the Apennines, the army of the Goths was broken and their king was slain. The remnant which survived crowned another king, Teias, but, he, too, perished, the following March, in a battle fought at the foot of Mount Vesuvius, and the Ostrogothic kingdom was at an end. Rome was already recovered—the fifth change of masters it had undergone during the war—and one by one, all the strong places in the hands of the Goths were given up. The restoration of Italy to the Empire was complete.—T. Hodgkin, *Italy and Her Invaders*, bk. 4, ch. 16; bk. 5, ch. 1-24.—"Of all ages in history the sixth is the one in which the doctrine that the Roman Empire came to an end at some time in the fifth sounds most grotesque. Again the Roman armies march to victory, to more than victory, to conquest, to conquests more precious than the conquests of Cæsar or of Trajan, to conquests which gave back Rome herself to her own Augustus. We may again be met with the argument that we have ourselves used so often; that the Empire had to win back its lost provinces does indeed prove that it had lost them; but no one seeks to prove that the provinces had not been lost; what the world is loth to understand is that there was still life enough in the Roman power to win them back again. I say the Roman

power; what if I said the Roman commonwealth? It may startle some to hear that in the sixth century, nay in the seventh, the most common name for the Empire of Rome is still 'respublica.' No epithet is needed; there is no need to say that the 'respublica' spoken of is 'respublica Romana.' It is the Republic which wins back Italy, Africa, and Southern Spain from their Teutonic masters. . . . The point of the employment of the word lies in this, that it marks the unbroken being of the Roman state, in the eyes of the men of the sixth century the power which won back the African province in their own day was the same power which had first won it well-nigh seven hundred years before. The consul Belisarius was the true successor of the consul Scipio."—E. A. Freeman, *The Chief Periods of European History*, lect. 4.

ALSO IN: E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 41 and 43.—J. B. Bury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, bk. 4, ch. 5-7 (v. 1).—R. H. Wrightson, *The Sancta Respublica Romana*, ch. 5-7.—Lord Mahon, *Life of Belisarius*.

A. D. 541.—Extinction of the office of Consul. See CONSUL, ROMAN.

A. D. 554-800.—The Exarchate of Ravenna.—On the final overthrow and annihilation of the Gothic monarchy in Italy by the decisive victories of the eunuch Narses, its throne at Ravenna was occupied by a line of vice-royal rulers, named exarchs, who represented the Eastern Roman emperor, being appointed by him and exercising authority in his name. "Their jurisdiction was soon reduced to the limits of a narrow province; but Narses himself, the first and most powerful of the exarchs, administered above fifteen years the entire kingdom of Italy. . . . A duke was stationed for the defence and military command of each of the principal cities; and the eye of Narses pervaded the ample prospect from Calabria to the Alps. The remains of the Gothic nation evacuated the country or mingled with the people. . . . The civil state of Italy, after the agitation of a long tempest, was fixed by a pragmatic sanction, which the emperor promulgated at the request of the pope. Justinian introduced his own jurisprudence into the schools and tribunals of the West. . . . Under the exarchs of Ravenna, Rome was degraded to the second rank. Yet the senators were gratified by the permission of visiting their estates in Italy, and of approaching without obstacle the throne of Constantinople: the regulation of weights and measures was delegated to the pope and senate; and the salaries of lawyers and physicians, of orators and grammarians, were destined to preserve or rekindle the light of science in the ancient capital. . . . During a period of 200 years Italy was unequally divided between the kingdom of the Lombards and the exarchate of Ravenna. . . . Eighteen successive exarchs were invested, in the decline of the empire, with the full remains of civil, of military and even of ecclesiastical power. Their immediate jurisdiction, which was afterwards consecrated as the patrimony of St. Peter, extended over the modern Romagna, the marshes or valleys of Ferrara and Comacchio, five maritime cities from Rimini to Ancona, and a second inland Pentapolis, between the Adriatic coast and the hills of the Apennine. Three subordinate provinces—of Rome, of Venice, and of Naples—which were divided by

hostile lands from the palace of Ravenna, acknowledged, both in peace and war, the supremacy of the exarch. The duchy of Rome appears to have included the Tuscan, Sabine, and Latin conquests of the first 400 years of the city, and the limits may be distinctly traced along the coast, from Clivita Vecchia to Terracina, and with the course of the Tiber from Ameria and Narni to the port of Ostia. The numerous islands from Grado to Chiozza composed the infant dominion of Venice; but the more accessible towns on the continent were overthrown by the Lombards, who beheld with impotent fury a new capital rising from the waves. The power of the dukes of Naples was circumscribed by the bay and the adjacent isles, by the hostile territory of Capua, and by the Roman colony of Amalphi. . . . The three islands of Sardinia, Corsica, and Sicily still adhered to the empire. . . . Rome was oppressed by the iron sceptre of the exarch, and a Greek, perhaps a eunuch, insulted with impunity the ruins of the Capitol. But Naples soon acquired the privilege of electing her own dukes, the independence of Amalphi was the fruit of commerce, and the voluntary attachment of Venice was finally ennobled by an equal alliance with the Eastern empire."—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 43 and 45.

A. D. 565-628.—Decline of the Eastern Empire.—Thickening calamities.—Reigns of Justin II., Tiberius Constantinus, Maurice, and Phocas.—Brief brightening of events by Heraclius.—His campaigns against the Persians.—"The thirty years which followed the death of Justinian are covered by three reigns, those of Justinus II (565-578), Tiberius Constantinus (578-582), and Maurice (582-602). These three emperors were men of much the same character as the predecessors of Justinian, each of them was an experienced official of mature age, who was selected by the reigning emperor as his most worthy successor. . . . Yet under them the empire was steadily going down hill: the exhausting effects of the reign of Justinian were making themselves felt more and more, and at the end of the reign of Maurice a time of chaos and disaster was impending, which came to a head under his successor. . . . The misfortunes of the Avaric and Slavonic war [see AVARS] were the cause of the fall of the Emperor Maurice. . . . Maurice sealed his fate when, in 602, he issued orders for the discontented army of the Danube to winter north of the river, in the waste marshes of the Slavs. The troops refused to obey the order, and chased away their generals. Then electing as their captain an obscure centurion, named Phocas, they marched on Constantinople. Maurice armed the city factions, the 'Blues' and 'Greens,' and strove to defend himself. But when he saw that no one would fight for him, he fled across the Bosphorus with his wife and children, to seek refuge in the Asiatic provinces, where he was less unpopular than in Europe. Soon he was pursued by orders of Phocas, whom the army had now saluted as emperor, and caught at Chalcedon. The cruel usurper had him executed, along with all his five sons, the youngest a child of only three years of age. . . . For the first time since Constantinople had become the seat of empire the throne had been won by armed rebellion and the murder of the legitimate ruler.

EUROPE at the DEATH of the EMPEROR JUSTINIAN 583 A.D.

EAST ROMAN EMPIRE


RACE DIVISIONS

CELTIC PEOPLES
SLAVIC PEOPLES
LITHUANIAN PEOPLES
URAL ALTAIC PEOPLES

SCANDINAVIANS

ANGLES, SAXONS, JUTES, ETC.

THE GERMANIC STATES AND PEOPLES ALL APPEAR
IN DIFFERENT SHADES OF PINK.



Phocas was a mere brutal soldier—cruel, ignorant, suspicious, and reckless, and in his incapable hands the empire began to fall to pieces with alarming rapidity. He opened his reign with a series of cruel executions of his predecessor's friends, and from that moment his deeds of bloodshed never ceased. . . . The moment that Phocas had mounted the throne, Chosroës of Persia declared war on him, using the hypocritical pretext that he wished to revenge Maurice, for whom he professed a warm personal friendship. This war was far different from the indecisive contests in the reigns of Justinian and Justin II. In two successive years the Persians burst into North Syria and ravaged it as far as the sea; but in the third they turned north and swept over the hitherto untouched provinces of Asia Minor. In 608 their main army penetrated across Cappadocia and Galatia right up to the gates of Chalcedon. The inhabitants of Constantinople could see the blazing villages across the water on the Asiatic shore. . . . Plot after plot was formed in the capital against Phocas, but he succeeded in putting them all down, and slew the conspirators with fearful tortures. For eight years his reign continued. . . . Africa was the only portion of the Roman Empire which in the reign of Phocas was suffering neither from civil strife nor foreign invasion. It was well governed by the aged exarch Heraclius, who was so well liked in the province that the emperor had not dared to depose him. Urged by desperate entreaties from all parties in Constantinople to strike a blow against the tyrant, and deliver the empire from the yoke of a monster, Heraclius at last consented." He sent his son—who bore the same name, Heraclius—with a fleet, to Constantinople. Phocas was at once abandoned by his troops and was given up to Heraclius, whose sailors slew him. "Next day the patriarch and the senate hailed Heraclius [the younger] as emperor, and he was duly crowned in St. Sophia on October 5, A. D. 610. . . . Save Africa and Egypt and the district immediately around the capital, all the provinces were overrun by the Persian, the Avar and the Slav. The treasury was empty, and the army had almost disappeared, owing to repeated and bloody defeats in Asia Minor. Heraclius seems at first to have almost despaired. . . . For the first twelve years of his reign he remained at Constantinople, endeavouring to reorganize the empire, and to defend at any rate the frontiers of Thrace and Asia Minor. The more distant provinces he hardly seems to have hoped to save, and the chronicle of his early years is filled with the catalogue of the losses of the empire. . . . In 614 the Persian army appeared before the holy city of Jerusalem, took it after a short resistance and occupied it with a garrison. But the populace rose and slaughtered the Persian troops, when Shahrbarz had departed with his main army. This brought him back in wrath: he stormed the city and put 90,000 Christians to the sword, only sparing the Jewish inhabitants. Zacharias, Patriarch of Jerusalem, was carried into captivity, and with him went what all Christians then regarded as the most precious thing in the world—the wood of the 'True Cross' [see JERUSALEM: A. D. 615]. . . . The horror and rage roused by the loss of the 'True Cross' and the blasphemies of King Chosroës brought about the first real outburst of national feeling that we meet in the history

of the Eastern Empire. . . . Heraclius made no less than six campaigns (A. D. 622-627) in his gallant and successful attempt to save the half-ruined empire. He won great and well-deserved fame, and his name would be reckoned among the foremost of the world's warrior-kings if it had not been for the misfortunes which afterwards fell on him in his old age. His first campaign cleared Asia Minor of the Persian hosts, not by a direct attack, but by skillful strategy. . . . In his next campaign Heraclius endeavoured to liberate the rest of the Roman Empire by a similar plan: he resolved to assail Chosroës at home, and force him to recall the armies he kept in Syria and Egypt to defend his own Persian provinces. In 623-4 the Emperor advanced across the Armenian mountains and threw himself into Media. . . . Chosroës . . . fought two desperate battles to cover Ctesiphon. His generals were defeated in both, but the Roman army suffered severely. Winter was at hand, and Heraclius fell back on Armenia. In his next campaign he recovered Roman Mesopotamia. . . . But 626 was the decisive year of the war. The obstinate Chosroës determined on one final effort to crush Heraclius, by concerting a joint plan of operations with the Chagan of the Avars. While the main Persian army watched the emperor in Armenia, a great body under Shahrbarz slipped south of him into Asia Minor and marched on the Bosphorus. At the same moment the Chagan of the Avars, with the whole force of his tribe and of his Slavonic dependents, burst over the Balkans and beset Constantinople on the European side. The two barbarian hosts could see each other across the water, and even contrived to exchange messages, but the Roman fleet, sailing incessantly up and down the strait, kept them from joining forces. . . . In the end of July 80,000 Avars and Slavs, with all sorts of siege implements, delivered simultaneous assaults along the land front of the city, but they were beaten back with great slaughter." They suffered even more on trying to encounter the Roman galleys with rafts. "Then the Chagan gave up the siege in disgust and retired across the Danube." Meantime Heraclius was wasting Media and Mesopotamia, and next year he ended the war by a decisive victory near Nineveh, as the result of which he took the palace of Dastagerd, "and divided among his troops such a plunder as had never been seen since Alexander the Great captured Susa. . . . In March, 628, a glorious peace ended the 26 years of the Persian war. Heraclius returned to Constantinople in the summer of the same year with his spoils, his victorious army, and his great trophy, the 'Holy Wood.' . . . The quiet for which he yearned was to be almost as disastrous as the commencement. The great Saracen invasion was at hand, and it was at the very moment of Heraclius' triumph that Mahomet sent out his famous circular letter to the kings of the earth, inviting them to embrace Islam."—C. W. C. Oman, *The Story of the Byzantine Empire*, ch. 9-10.

ALSO IN: J. B. Rury, *Hist. of the Later Roman Empire*, bk. 4, pt. 2, and bk. 5, ch. 1-3 (v. 2).—See, also, PERSIA: A. D. 330-627.

A. D. 568-573.—Invasion of the Lombards.—Their conquest of northern Italy.—Their kingdom. See LOMBARDS: A. D. 568-573; and 578-754.

A. D. 590-640.—Increasing influence and importance of the Bishop of Rome.—Circumstances under which his temporal authority grew.—"The fall of the shadowy Empire of the West, and the union of the Imperial power in the person of the ruler of Constantinople, brought a fresh accession of dignity and importance to the Bishop of Rome. The distant Emperor could exercise no real power over the West. The Ostrogothic kingdom in Italy scarcely lasted beyond the lifetime of its great founder Theodoric. The wars of Justinian only served to show how scanty were the benefits of the Imperial rule. The invasion of the Lombards united all dwellers in Italy in an endeavour to escape the lot of servitude and save their land from barbarism. In this crisis it was found that the Imperial system had crumbled away, and that the Church alone possessed a strong organisation. In the decay of the old municipal aristocracy the people of the towns gathered round their bishops, whose sacred character inspired some respect in the barbarians, and whose active charity lightened the calamities of their flocks. In such a state of things Pope Gregory the Great raised the Papacy [A. D. 590] to a position of decisive influence, and marked out the course of its future policy. The piety of emperors and nobles had conferred lands on the Roman Church, not only in Italy, but in Sicily, Corsica, Gaul, and even in Asia and Africa, until the Bishop of Rome had become the largest landholder in Italy. To defend his Italian lands against the incursions of the Lombards was a course suggested to Gregory by self-interest; to use the resources which came to him from abroad as a means of relieving the distress of the suffering people in Rome and Southern Italy was a natural prompting of his charity. In contrast to this, the distant Emperor was too feeble to send any effective help against the Lombards, while the fiscal oppression of his representatives added to the miseries of the starving people. The practical wisdom, administrative capacity, and Christian zeal of Gregory I. led the people of Rome and the neighbouring regions to look upon the Pope as their head in temporal as well as in spiritual matters. The Papacy became a national centre to the Italians, and the attitude of the Popes towards the Emperor showed a spirit of independence which rapidly passed into antagonism and revolt. Gregory I. was not daunted by the difficulties nor absorbed by the cares of his position at home. When he saw Christianity threatened in Italy by the heathen Lombards, he boldly pursued a system of religious colonisation. While dangers were rife at Rome, a band of Roman missionaries carried Christianity to the distant English, and in England first was founded a Church which owed its existence to the zeal of the Roman bishop. Success beyond all that he could have hoped for attended Gregory's pious enterprise. The English Church spread and flourished, a dutiful daughter of her mother-church of Rome. England sent forth missionaries in her turn, and before the preaching of Willibrod and Winifred heathenism died away in Friesland, Franconia, and Thuringia. Under the new name of Boniface, given him by Pope Gregory II., Winifred, as Archbishop of Mainz, organised a German Church, subject to the successor of St. Peter. The course of events in the East also tended to increase the importance of the See of Rome.

The Mohammedan conquests destroyed the Patriarchates of Antioch and Jerusalem, which alone could boast of an apostolical foundation. Constantinople alone remained as a rival to Rome, but under the shadow of the Imperial despotism it was impossible for the Patriarch of Constantinople to lay claim to spiritual independence. The settlement of Islam in its eastern provinces involved the Empire in a desperate struggle for its existence. Henceforth its object no longer was to reassert its supremacy over the West, but to hold its ground against watchful foes in the East. Italy could hope for no help from the Emperor, and the Pope saw that a breach with the Empire would give greater independence to his own position, and enable him to seek new allies elsewhere."—M. Creighton, *Hist. of the Papacy during the Period of the Reformation*, introd. ch. 1 (v. 1).

Also in: T. W. Allies, *The Holy See and the Wandering of the Nations*, ch. 5.—See, also, CHRISTIANITY: A. D. 553-800, and PAPACY: A. D. 461-604, and after.

A. D. 632-709.—The Eastern Empire.—Its first conflicts with Islam—Loss of Syria, Egypt, and Africa. See MAHOMETAN CONQUEST. A. D. 632-639, to 647-709.

A. D. 641-717.—The Eastern Empire.—The period between the death of Heraclius and the advent of Leo III (the Isaurian) is covered, in the Eastern Empire, by the following reigns: Constantine III and Heraclonas (641), Constans II (641-668), Constantine IV (668-685), Justinian II. (685-711), Leontius and Absimar (usurpers, who interrupted the reign of Justinian II. from 695 to 698 and from 698 to 704); Philippos (711-713), Anastasius II. (713-716); Theodosius III. (716-717).

A. D. 717-800.—The Eastern Roman Empire: should it take the name of the Byzantine Empire?—and when?—"The precise date at which the eastern Roman empire ceased to exist has been variously fixed. Gibbon remarks, 'that Tiberius [A. D. 578-582] by the Arabs, and Maurice [A. D. 582-602] by the Italians, are distinguished as the first of the Greek Cæsars, as the founders of a new dynasty and empire.' But if manners, language, and religion are to decide concerning the commencement of the Byzantine empire, the preceding pages have shown that its origin must be carried back to an earlier period; while, if the administrative peculiarities in the form of government be taken as the ground of decision, the Roman empire may be considered as indefinitely prolonged with the existence of the title of Roman emperor, which the sovereigns of Constantinople continued to retain as long as Constantinople was ruled by Christian princes. . . . The period . . . at which the Roman empire of the East terminated is decided by the events which confined the authority of the imperial government to those provinces where the Greeks formed the majority of the population; and it is marked by the adoption of Greek as the language of the government, by the prevalence of Greek civilisation, and by the identification of the nationality of the people, and the policy of the emperors with the Greek church. For, when the Saracen conquests had severed from the empire all those provinces which possessed a native population distinct from the Greeks, by language, literature, and religion, the central government of Constantinople was gradually

ually compelled to fall back on the interests and passions of the remaining inhabitants, who were chiefly Greeks . . . Yet, as it was by no means identified with the interests and feelings of the native inhabitants of Hellas, it ought correctly to be termed Byzantine, and the empire is, consequently, justly called the Byzantine empire.

. . . Even the final loss of Egypt, Syria, and Africa only reveals the transformation of the Roman empire, when the consequences of the change begin to produce visible effects on the internal government. The Roman empire seems, therefore, really to have terminated with the anarchy which followed the murder of Justinian II [A. D. 711], the last sovereign of the family of Heraclius, and Leo III., or the Isaurian [A. D. 717-741], who identified the imperial administration with ecclesiastical forms and questions, must be ranked as the first of the Byzantine monarchs, though neither the emperor, the clergy, nor the people perceived at the time the moral change in their position, which makes the establishment of this new era historically correct. Under the sway of the Heraclian family [A. D. 610-711], the extent of the empire was circumscribed nearly within the bounds which it continued to occupy during many subsequent centuries.

The geographical extent of the empire at the time of its transition from the Roman to the Byzantine empire affords evidence of the influence which the territorial changes produced by the Saracen conquests exercised in conferring political importance on the Greek race. The frontier towards the Saracens of Syria commenced at Mopsuestia in Cilicia, the last fortress of the Arab power. It ran along the chains of Mounts Amanus and Taurus to the mountainous district to the north of Edessa and Nisibis, called after the time of Justinian, the Fourth Armenia, of which Martyropolis was the capital. It then followed nearly the ancient limits of the empire until it reached the Black Sea, a short distance to the east of Trebizond.

In Europe, Mount Hæmus [the Balkans] formed the barrier against the Bulgarians, while the mountainous ranges which bound Macedonia to the north-west, and encircle the territory of Dyrrachium, were regarded as the limits of the free Slavonian states.

Istria, Venice, and the cities on the Dalmatian coast, still acknowledged the supremacy of the empire.

In the centre of Italy, the exarchate of Ravenna still held Rome in subjection, but the people of Italy were entirely alienated.

The cities of Gaëta, Naples, Amalfi, and Sorrento, the district of Otranto, and the peninsula to the south of the ancient Sybaris, now called Calabria, were the only parts [of southern Italy] which remained under the Byzantine government. Sicily, though it had begun to suffer from the incursions of the Saracens, was still populous and wealthy."

—G. Finlay, *Greece under the Romans*, ch. 5, sect. 1 and 7.—Dissenting from the view presented above, Professor Freeman says: "There is no kind of visible break, such as is suggested by the change of name, between the Empire before Leo and the Empire after him. The Emperor of the Romans reigned over the land of Romania after him as well as before him. . . . Down to the fall of Constantinople in the East, down to the abdication of Francis II. in the West, there was no change of title; the Emperor of the Romans remained Emperor of the Romans, how-

ever shifting might be the extent of his dominions. But from 800 to 1453 there were commonly two, sometimes more, claimants of the title. The two Empires must be distinguished in some way; and, from 800 to 1204, 'Eastern' and 'Western' seem the simplest forms of distinction. But for 'Eastern' it is just as easy, and sometimes more expressive, to say 'Byzantine', only it is well not to begin the use of either name as long as the Empire keeps even its nominal unity. With the coronation of Charles the Great [800] that nominal unity comes to an end. The Old Rome passes away from even the nominal dominion of the prince who reigns in the New."—E. A. Freeman, *Historical Essays*, series 3, p. 244.—See BYZANTINE EMPIRE.

A. D. 728-733.—Beginnings of Papal Sovereignty.—The Iconoclastic controversy.—Rupture with the Byzantine Emperor.—Practical independence assumed by the Pope. See PAPACY A. D. 728-774, and ICONOCLASTIC CONTROVERSY.

A. D. 751.—Fall of the Exarchate of Ravenna. See PAPACY A. D. 728-774.

A. D. 754-774.—Struggle of the Popes against the Lombards.—Their deliverance by Pippin and Charlemagne.—Fall of the Lombard kingdom. See LOMBARDS, A. D. 754-774; also, PAPACY A. D. 728-774, and 755-774.

A. D. 800.—Coronation of Charlemagne.—The Empire revived. See FRANKS: A. D. 768-814, and GERMANY A. D. 800.

A. D. 843-951.—The breaking up of Charlemagne's Empire and founding of the Holy Roman Empire. See ITALY A. D. 843-951; FRANKS A. D. 814-962, and GERMANY A. D. 814-843, to 936-973.

A. D. 846-849.—Attack by the Saracens.—

"A fleet of Saracens from the African coast presumed to enter the mouth of the Tiber, and to approach a city which even yet, in her fallen state, was revered as the metropolis of the Christian world. The gates and ramparts were guarded by a trembling people, but the tombs and temples of St. Peter and St. Paul were left exposed in the suburbs of the Vatican and of the Ostian Way. Their invisible sanctity had protected them against the Goths, the Vandals, and the Lombards, but the Arabs disdained both the Gospel and the legend, and their rapacious spirit was approved and animated by the precepts of the Koran. The Christian idols were stripped of their costly offerings. . . . In their course along the Appian Way, they pillaged Fundi and besieged Gaëta." The diversion produced by the siege of Gaëta gave Rome a fortunate respite. In the interval, a vacancy occurred on the papal throne, and Pope Leo IV. by unanimous election, was raised to the place. His energy as a temporal prince saved the great city. He repaired its walls, constructed new towers and barred the Tiber by an iron chain. He formed an alliance with the cities of Gaëta, Naples, and Amalfi, still vassals of the Greek empire, and brought their galleys to his aid. When, therefore, in 849, the Saracens from Africa returned to the attack, they met with a terrible repulse. An opportune storm assisted the Christians in the destruction of their fleet, and most of the small number who escaped death remained captives in the hands of the Romans and their allies.—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 53.

A. D. 903-964.—The reign of the courtesans and their brood.—Interference of Otho the Great.—His revival of the Empire.—During these changes [in the breaking up of the empire of Charlemagne], Rome became a sort of theocratic democracy, governed by women and priests, a state of things which, in the barbarism of the middle ages, was only possible at Rome. Theodora, a woman of patrician descent, equally celebrated for her beauty and her daring, obtained great power in Rome, which she prolonged by the charms of her two daughters. The city of Saint Peter was ruled by this trio of courtesans. The mother, Theodora, by her familiar commerce with several of the Roman barons, had obtained possession of the castle of Saint Angelo, at the entrance of Rome, on one of the principal bridges over the Tiber, and she had made it an abode of pleasure and a fortress, whence she corrupted and oppressed the Church. Her daughters, Marozia and Theodora, disposed of the pontificate by their own arts, or through their lovers, and occasionally bestowed it on the lovers themselves. Sergius III., after a contested election and seven years' exile, was recalled to the see of Rome by the interest of Marozia, by whom he had had a son, who afterwards became Pope. The younger Theodora was no less ambitious and influential than her sister. She loved a young clerk of the Roman Church, for whom she had first obtained the bishopric of Bologna, and then the archbishopric of Ravenna. Finding it irksome to be separated from him by a distance of 200 miles, she procured his nomination to the papacy, in order to have him near her, and he was elected Pope in 912 under the title of John X. . . . After a pontificate of fourteen years, John was displaced by the same means to which he owed his elevation. Marozia, who had married Guy, Duke of Tuscany, conspired with her husband against the Pope and he was put out of the way. That accomplished, Marozia allowed the election of two Popes successively, whose pontificate was obscure and short, and then she raised to the papal see a natural son of hers, it is said, by Pope Sergius III., her former lover. This young man took the name of John XI., and Marozia, his mother, having soon after lost her husband, Guy, was sought in marriage by Hugh, King of Italy, and his brother by the mother's side. But it would appear that the people of Rome were growing weary of the tyranny of this shameless and cruel woman. King Hugh was driven from Rome by a revolt, in which another son of Marozia, named Alberic, took the lead. "Alberic, the leader of this popular rising, was proclaimed consul by the Romans, who still clung to the traditions of the republic; he threw his mother, Marozia, into prison, and set a guard over his brother, Pope John; and thus, invested with the popular power, he prepared to defend the independence of Rome against the pretensions of Hugh and the forces of Lombardy. Alberic, master of Rome under the title of patrician and senator, exercised, during twenty-three years, all the rights of sovereignty. The money was coined with his image, with two sceptres across; he made war and peace, appointed magistrates and disposed of the election and of the power of the Popes, who, in that interval, filled the See of Rome, John XI., Leo VII., Stephen IX., Martin III., and Agapetus II. The name of this subject and imprisoned papacy

was none the less revered beyond the limits of Rome. . . . Alberic died lord of Rome, and had bequeathed his power to his son Octavian, who, two years afterwards, on the death of Agapetus II., caused himself, young as he was, to be named Pope by those who already acknowledged him as patrician.—A. F. Villemain, *Life of Gregory VII.*, introd., period 4.—"He [Octavian] was elected Pope on the 23d of March, A. D. 956. His promotion was a disgraceful calamity. He brought to the chair of St. Peter only the vices and dissolute morals of a young debauchee, and though Luitprand must have exaggerated the disorders of this Pope, yet there remains enough of truth in the account to have brought down the scandal of the pontificate through succeeding ages, like a loud blasphemy, which makes angels weep and hell exult. Octavian assumed the name of John XII. This first example of a change of name on ascending the pontifical chair has since passed into a custom with all the Sovereign Pontiffs."—Abbé J. E. Darias, *General Hist. of the Catholic Church*, period 4, ch. 7.—Finding it hard to defend his independence against the king of Italy, Pope John XII. made the mistake, fatal to himself, of soliciting help from the German king Otho the Great. Otho came, made himself master of Italy, revived the empire of Charlemagne, was crowned with the imperial crown of Rome, by the Pope [see ROMAN EMPIRE, THE HOLY, and GERMANY, A. D. 936-973], and then purged the Roman See by causing the bestial young pope who crowned him to be deposed. John was subsequently reinstated by the Romans, but died soon after.—A. D. 964.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 5, ch. 12.—The state of things at Rome described in the above has been fitly styled by some writers "a pornography."

A. D. 962-1057.—Futile attempts of the German Emperors to reform the Papacy.—Chronic disorganization of the city.—"It had not been within the power of the Emperor Otto I. to establish a permanent reformation in Rome. . . . The previous scandalous scenes were renewed, and a slight amelioration of things under the Popes Gregory V. and Sylvester II., whom Otto III. placed on the papal throne [A. D. 997-1003], was but transitory. . . . For the third time it became necessary for an emperor, in this instance Henry III., to constitute himself the preserver and purifier of the papacy, first at Sutri and afterwards at Rome. At that period the papal chair was occupied within twelve years by five German popes [Clement II. to Victor II.—A. D. 1046-1057], since amongst the Roman clergy no fitting candidate could be found. These popes, with one exception, died almost immediately, poisoned by the unhealthy atmosphere of Rome; one only, Leo IX., under Hildebrand's guidance, left any lasting trace of his pontificate, and laid the foundation of that Gregorian system which resulted in papal supremacy. . . . Rome was assuming more and more the character of a sacerdotal city; the old wealthy patrician families had either disappeared or migrated to Constantinople; and as the seat of government was either at Constantinople or Ravenna, there was no class of state officials in Rome. But the clergy had become rich upon the revenues of the vast possessions of St. Peter. . . . Without manufactures, trade, or industry of their own, the people of Rome were induced

to rely upon exactions levied upon the foreigner, and upon profits derived from ecclesiastical institutions. . . . Hence the unvarying sameness in the political history of Rome from the 5th to the 15th century."—J. I. von Döllinger, *Studies in European History*, ch. 8.—See PAPACY: A. D. 987-1048.

A. D. 1077-1102.—Donation of the Countess Matilda to the Holy See. See PAPACY: A. D. 1077-1102.

A. D. 1081-1084.—Surrender to Henry IV.—Terrible Norman visitation.—Four years after his humiliation of himself before the pope at Canossa (see CANOSSA), Henry IV. ("King of the Romans" and claiming the imperial coronation, which the pope refused him), entered Italy with an army to enforce his demands. He had recovered his authority in Germany; the rival set up against him was slain; northern Italy was strong in his support. For three successive years Henry marched his army to the walls of Rome and made attempts to enter, by force, or intrigue, or by stress of blockade, and every year, when the heats of summer came, he found himself compelled to withdraw. At last, the Romans, who had stood firm by Gregory VII., tired of the siege, or the gold which purchased their fidelity (some say) gave out, and they opened their gates. Pope Gregory took refuge in his impregnable Castle of St. Angelo, and Henry, bringing with him the anti pope whom his partisans had set up, was crowned by the latter in the Church of St. Peter. But the coveted imperial crown was little more than settled upon his head when news came of the rapid approach of Robert Guiscard, the Norman conqueror of southern Italy, with a large army, to defend the legitimate pope. Henry withdrew from Rome in haste and three days afterwards Robert Guiscard's army was under its walls. The Romans feared to admit these terrible champions of their pope, but the vigilance and valor of the Normans surprised a gate, and the great city was in their power. They made haste to conduct Gregory to his Lateran Palace and to receive his blessing; then they "spread through the city, treating it with all the cruelty of a captured town, pillaging, violating, murdering, wherever they met with opposition. The Romans had been surprised, not subdued. For two days and nights they brooded over their vengeance; on the third day they broke out in general insurrection. . . . The Romans fought at advantage, from their possession of the houses and their knowledge of the ground. They were gaining the superiority; the Normans saw their peril. The remorseless Guiscard gave the word to fire the houses. . . . The distracted inhabitants dashed wildly into the streets, no longer endeavouring to defend themselves, but to save their families. They were hewn down by hundreds. . . . Nuns were defiled, matrons forced, the rings cut from their living fingers. Gregory exerted himself, not without success, in saving the principal churches. It is probable, however, that neither Goth nor Vandal, neither Greek nor German, brought such desolation on the city as this capture by the Normans. From this period dates the desertion of the older part of the city, and its gradual extension over the site of the modern city, the Campus Martius. . . . Many thousand Romans were sold publicly as slaves; many carried into the remotest parts of Calabria."

When Guiscard withdrew his destroying army from the ruins of Rome, Gregory went with him and never returned. He died not long after at Salerno.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 7, ch. 8.

ALSO IN: A. F. Villemain, *Life of Gregory VII.*, bk. 9.—See, also, GERMANY: A. D. 978-1122, and PAPACY: A. D. 1056-1122.

A. D. 1122-1250.—Conflict of the Popes with the Hohenstaufen Emperors. See PAPACY: A. D. 1122-1250; and GERMANY: A. D. 1138-1268.

A. D. 1145-1155.—The Republic of Arnold of Brescia.—Arnold of Brescia—so-called from his native city in Lombardy—was a disciple of Abelard, and not so much a religious as a political reformer. "On all the high mysterious doctrines of the Church, the orthodoxy of Arnold was unimpeachable; his personal life was that of the sternest monk; he had the most earnest sympathy with the popular religion. . . . He would reduce the clergy to their primitive and apostolic poverty; confiscate all their wealth, escheat all their temporal power. . . . His Utopia was a great Christian republic, exactly the reverse of that of Gregory VII." In 1145, Arnold was at Rome, where his doctrines had gone before him, and where the citizens had already risen in rebellion against the rule of the pope. "His eloquence brought over the larger part of the nobles to the popular side; even some of the clergy were infected by his doctrines. The republic, under his influence, affected to resume the constitution of elder Rome. . . . The Capitol was rebuilt and fortified; even the church of St. Peter was sacrilegiously turned into a castle. The Patrician took possession of the Vatican, imposed taxes, and exacted tribute by violence from the pilgrims. Rome began again to speak of her sovereignty of the world." The republic maintained itself until 1155, when a bolder pope—the Englishman, Adrian IV.—had mounted the chair of St. Peter, and confronted Arnold with unflinching hostility. The death of one of his Cardinals, killed in a street tumult, gave the pope an opportunity to place the whole city under an interdict. "Religion triumphed over liberty. The clergy and the people compelled the senate to yield. Hadrian would admit of no lower terms than the abrogation of the republican institutions; the banishment of Arnold and his adherents. The republic was at an end, Arnold an exile; the Pope again master in Rome." A few months later, Arnold of Brescia, a prisoner in the hands of Frederick Barbarossa, then coming to Rome for the imperial crown, was given up to the Pope and was executed in some summary way, the particulars of which are in considerable dispute.—H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 8, ch. 6-7.

ALSO IN: J. Miley, *Hist. of the Papal States*, bk. 6.

A. D. 1155.—Tumult at the coronation of Frederick Barbarossa. See ITALY: A. D. 1154-1162.

A. D. 1167.—The taking of the city by Frederick Barbarossa. See ITALY: A. D. 1166-1167.

A. D. 1198-1216.—The establishing of Papal Sovereignty in the States of the Church. See PAPACY: A. D. 1198-1216.

A. D. 1215.—The beginning in Italy of the strife of the Guelphs and Ghibellines. See ITALY: A. D. 1215.

13-14th Centuries.—The turbulence of the Roman nobles.—The strife of the Colonna and the Ursini.—“In the beginning of the 11th century Italy was exposed to the feudal tyranny, alike oppressive to the sovereign and the people. The rights of human nature were vindicated by her numerous republics, who soon extended their liberty and dominion from the city to the adjacent country. The sword of the nobles was broken; their slaves were enfranchised; their castles were demolished; they assumed the habits of society and obedience. . . . But the feeble and disorderly government of Rome was unequal to the task of curbing her rebellious sons, who scorned the authority of the magistrate within and without the walls. It was no longer a civil contention between the nobles and plebeians for the government of the state. The barons asserted in arms their personal independence; their palaces and castles were fortified against a siege; and their private quarrels were maintained by the numbers of their vassals and retainers. In origin and affection they were aliens to their country; and a genuine Roman, could such have been produced, might have renounced these haughty strangers, who disdained the appellation of citizens, and proudly styled themselves the princes of Rome. After a dark series of revolutions, all records of pedigree were lost; the distinction of surnames was abolished; the blood of the nations was mingled in a thousand channels; and the Goths and Lombards, the Greeks and Franks, the Germans and Normans, had obtained the fairest possessions by royal bounty or the prerogative of valour. . . . It is not my design to enumerate the Roman families which have failed at different periods, or those which are continued in different degrees of splendour to the present time. The old consular line of the Frangipani discover their name in the generous act of breaking or dividing bread in a time of famine; and such benevolence is more truly glorious than to have enclosed, with their allies the Corsi, a spacious quarter of the city in the chains of their fortifications. The Savelli, as it should seem a Sabine race, have maintained their original dignity; the obsolete surname of the Capizucchi is inscribed on the coins of the first senators; the Conti preserve the honour, without the estate, of the counts of Signia; and the Annibaldi must have been very ignorant, or very modest, if they had not descended from the Carthaginian hero. But among, perhaps above, the peers and princes of the city, I distinguish the rival houses of Colonna and Ursini [or Orsini]. . . . About the end of the thirteenth century the most powerful branch [of the Colonna] was composed of an uncle and six brothers, all conspicuous in arms or in the honours of the Church. Of these Peter was elected senator of Rome, introduced to the Capitol in a triumphant car, and hailed in some vain acclamations with the title of Cæsar; while John and Stephen were declared Marquis of Ancona and Count of Romagna by Nicholas IV., a patron so partial to their family that he has been delineated in satirical portraits, imprisoned, as it were, in a hollow pillar. After his decease their haughty behaviour provoked the displeasure of the most implacable of mankind. The two cardinals, the uncle and the nephew, denied the election of Boniface VIII.; and the Colonna were oppressed, for a moment by his temporal and spiritual arms.

He proclaimed a crusade against his personal enemies; their estates were confiscated; their fortresses on either side of the Tiber were besieged by the troops of St. Peter and those of the rival nobles; and after the ruin of Palestrina, or Præneste, their principal seat, the ground was marked with a ploughshare, the emblem of perpetual desolation [see PAPACY: A. D. 1294-1348]. . . . Some estimate may be formed of their wealth by their losses, of their losses by the damages of 100,000 gold florins which were granted them against the accomplices and heirs of the deceased pope. All the spiritual censures and disqualifications were abolished by his prudent successors; and the fortune of the house was more firmly established by this transient hurricane. . . . But the first of the family in fame and merit was the elder Stephen, whom Petrarch loved and esteemed as a hero superior to his own times and not unworthy of ancient Rome. . . . Till the ruin of his declining age, the ancestors, the character, and the children of Stephen Colonna exalted his dignity in the Roman republic and at the Court of Avignon. The Ursini migrated from Spoleto; the sons of Ursus, as they are styled in the twelfth century, from some eminent person who is only known as the father of their race. But they were soon distinguished among the nobles of Rome by the number and bravery of their kinsmen, the strength of their towers, the honours of the senate and sacred college, and the elevation of two popes, Celestin III. and Nicholas III., of their name and lineage. . . . The Colonna embraced the name of Ghibellines and the party of the empire; the Ursini espoused the title of Guelphs and the cause of the Church. The eagle and the keys were displayed in their adverse banners; and the two factions of Italy most furiously raged when the origin and nature of the dispute were long since forgotten. After the retreat of the popes to Avignon they disputed in arms the vacant republic; and the mischiefs of discord were perpetuated by the wretched compromise of electing each year two rival senators. By their private hostilities the city and country were desolated.” —E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 69.—“Had things been left to take their natural course, one of these families, the Colonna, for instance, or the Orsini, would probably have ended by overcoming its rivals, and have established, as was the case in the republics of Romagna and Tuscany, a ‘signoria,’ or local tyranny, like those which had once prevailed in the cities of Greece. But the presence of the sacerdotal power, as it had hindered the growth of feudalism, so also it stood in the way of such a development as this, and in so far aggravated the confusion of the city.” —J. Bryce, *The Holy Roman Empire*, ch. 16.

A. D. 1300.—The Jubilee. See PAPACY: A. D. 1294-1348.

A. D. 1305-1377.—Withdrawal of the Papal court from Rome and settlement at Avignon.—The “Babylonish Captivity.” See PAPACY: A. D. 1294-1348, to 1352-1376.

A. D. 1312.—Resistance to the entry and coronation of Henry VII. See ITALY: A. D. 1310-1318.

A. D. 1328.—Imperial coronation of Louis IV. of Bavaria. See ITALY: A. D. 1318-1330.

A. D. 1347-1354.—The revolution of Rienzi, the last Tribune.—“The Holy City had no gov-

ernment. She was no longer the Imperial Rome, nor the Pontifical Rome. The Teutonic Cæsars had abandoned her. The Popes had also fled from the sacred hill of the Vatican to the slimy Gallic city, Avignon. . . . The real masters of the city were the princes or barons, who dwelt in their fortified castles in the environs, or their strong palaces within. The principal among them were masters of different parts of the city. The celebrated old family of the Colonnas reigned, it may be said, over the north of the city, towards the Quirinal. . . . The new family of the Orsini extended their sway along the Tiber from the Campo-di-Fiore, to the Church of St. Peter, comprising the castle of St. Angelo. The Savelli, less powerful, possessed a part of the Aventine, with the theatre of Marcellus, and the Conti, the huge tower which bears their name, on Cæsar's Forum. Other members of the nobility, in the country, were possessors of small fortified cities, or castles. . . . Rome, subjected to such a domination, had become almost deserted. The population of the seven-hilled city had come down to about 30,000 souls. When the barons were at peace with each other, which, however, was a rare occurrence, they combined to exercise their tyranny over the citizens and the serfs, to rob and plunder the farmers, travellers, and pilgrims. Petrarch wrote to the Pope at this period, that Rome had become the abode of demons, the receptacle of all crimes, a hell for the living. . . . Rienzi was then 28 years old. . . . His function of notary (assessore) to the Roman tribunals, would seem to infer that he was considered a peaceful, rational citizen. It appears, however, that he brought in the exercise of his official duties, the excited imagination and generosity of heart which characterized his nature. He gloried in being surnamed the Consul of orphans, of widows, and of the poor. His love for the humble soon became blended with an intense hatred for the great: one of his brothers was killed accidentally by a Roman baron, without his being able to obtain any satisfaction. . . . Rienzi had always been noted for his literary and poetical taste; he was considered as deeply versed in the knowledge of antiquity, and as the most skilful in deciphering and explaining the numerous inscriptions with which Rome abounded. . . . The least remains of antiquity became for him a theme of declamatory addresses to the people, on the present state of Rome, on the iniquities that surrounded him. Followed by groups that augmented daily, and which listened to him with breathless interest, he led them from ruin to ruin, to the Forum, to the tombs of the Christian martyrs, thus associating every glory, and made the hearts of the people throb by his mystical eloquence. . . . No remedy being brought to the popular grievances, an insurrection broke out. The senator was expelled; thirteen good men (*buoni uomini*) were installed in the Capitol and invested with dictatorial powers. It was a Guelfic movement; Rienzi was mixed with it; but without any preëminent participation. This new government resolved to send an embassy to the Pope, at Avignon, and Rienzi formed part of it. Such was the first real public act in the life of Cola di Rienzi. The embassy was joined by Petrarch. . . . The Pope would not hear of leaving his new splendid palace, and the gentle population of Avignon, for the heap of

ruins and the human turbulence of Rome." But "Cardinal Aymeric was named to represent the Pope at Rome, as Legate, and a Colonna and an Orsini invested with the senatorial dignity, in order to restore order in the Eternal City, in the name of the Pontiff. Rienzi indulged in the most extravagant exultation. He wrote a highly enthusiastic address to the Roman people. But his illusion was not of long duration. The new Legate only attended to the filling of the Papal Treasury. The nobility, protected by the new senators, continued their course of tyranny. Rienzi protested warmly against such a course of iniquities, in the council. One day he spoke with a still greater vehemence of indignation, when one of the members of the council struck him in the face, others hissed out at him sneeringly, calling him the Consul of orphans and widows. From that day he never appeared at any of its meetings, his hatred had swollen, and must explode. . . . He went straight to the people (*popolo minuto*), and prepared a revolution. To render his exhortations to the people more impressive, he made use of large allegorical pictures, hastily drawn, and which form a curious testimony of his mystical imagination, as well as of his forensic eloquence. . . . Finally, he convoked the people at the Capitol for the 20th of May, 1347, the day of Pentecost, namely, under the invocation of the Holy Ghost. Rienzi had heard, with fervour, thirty masses during the preceding night. On that day he came out at 12 o'clock armed, with his head uncovered, followed by 25 partisans, three unfurled standards were carried before him, bearing allegorical pictures. This time his address was very brief—merely stating, that from his love for the Pope and the salvation of the people, he was ready to encounter any danger. He then read the laws which were to insure the happiness of Rome. They were, properly speaking, a summary of reforms, destined to relieve the people from their sufferings, and intended to realize, what he proclaimed, must become the good state [*or Good Estate*, *il buono stato*]. By this outline of a new constitution, the people were invested with the property and government of the city as well as of its environs; the Pontifical See, bereft of the power it had exercised during several centuries, and the nobility deprived of what they considered as their property, to assist the public poverty. The revolution could not be more complete; and it is needless to add, that Rienzi was clamorously applauded, and immediately invested with full powers to realize and organize the *buono stato*, of which he had given the programme. He declined the title of Rector, and preferred the more popular name of Tribune. Nothing was fixed as to the duration of this extraordinary popular magistracy. The new government was installed at the Capitol, the Senators expelled, and the whole revolution executed with such rapidity, that the new Tribune might well be strengthened in his belief that he was acting under the protection of the Holy Ghost. He was careful, nevertheless, not to estrange the Pontifical authority, and requested that the apostolical vicar should be offered to be adjoined to him, which the prelate accepted, however uncertain and perilous the honour appeared to be. During the popular enthusiasm, old Stephen Colonna, with the more formidable of the barons, who had been away, returned to Rome in haste;

he expressed publicly his scorn, and when the order came from Rienzi for him to quit the city, he replied that he would soon come and throw that madman out of one of the windows of the Capitol. Rienzi ordered the bells to be rung, the people instantly assembled in arms, and that proudest of the barons was obliged to fly to Palestrina. The next day it was proclaimed that all the nobles were to come, to swear fealty to the Roman people, and afterwards withdraw to their castles, and protect the public roads. John, the son of old Colonna, was the first who presented himself at the Capitol, but it was with the intention of braving and insulting the Tribune. When he beheld the popular masses in close array, he felt awed, and took the oath to protect the people — protect the roads — succour the widows and orphans and obey the summons of the Tribune. The Orsini, Savelli, Gaetani, and many others, came after him and followed his example. Rienzi, now sole master, without opponents gave a free course to the allurements of authority. The tolls, taxes, and imposts which pressed upon the people were abolished by Rienzi, in the first instance, and afterwards, the taxes on the bridges, wine, and bread, but he endeavoured to compensate such an enormous deficit by augmenting the tax on salt, which was not yet unpopular, besides an impost on funded property. He was thus making hasty, serious, even dangerous engagements with the people, which it might not be in his power to keep.

For the present, calmness and security were reigning in the city. The Tribune received the congratulations of all the ambassadors, the changes he had effected appeared miraculous. He believed implicitly that he was the founder of a new era. The homage profusely lavished upon him by all the Italian Republics, and even by despotic sovereigns confirmed him in his conviction. One nobleman alone, the Prefect of Vico, secretly supported by the agent of the Pontifical patrimony, refused to submit and to surrender the three or four little cities in his jurisdiction. Rienzi led rapidly against him an army of 8,000 men, and attacked the rebellious Prefect so suddenly and skilfully, that the latter surrendered unconditionally. This success inflated the head and imagination of Rienzi, and with it commenced the mystical extravagances and follies which could not fail to cause his ruin.

—Prof. De Vericour, *Rienzi, the last of the Tribunes* (Dublin Univ. Mag., 1860 — *Eclectic Mag.*, Sept., 1860) — "Rienzi's head was turned by his success. He assumed the pomp of a sovereign. He distributed titles, surrounded himself with ceremonies, and multiplied feasts and processions. . . . He desired to be ennobled, and to have the title of Knight, as well as Tribune. To celebrate his installation as Knight, a splendid series of ceremonies was arranged," at the end of which he "made an address, in which he cited the Pope, and Lewis of Bavaria, and Charles of Bohemia, to give reasons for any claims they had on Rome; and pointing his sword to three points of the compass, he exclaimed, 'This is mine, and this is mine, and this is mine.' . . . Folly had quite got the better of him now, and his vanity was leading him swiftly to ruin. . . . Shortly afterwards he issued a proclamation that he had discovered a conspiracy against the people and himself, and declared that he would cut off the heads of all those concerned

in it. The conspirators were seized and brought forward, and among them were seen the chief of the princely families of Rome. Solemn preparations were made for their execution, when Rienzi, suddenly and without reason, not only pardoned them all, but conferred upon them some of the most important charges and offices of the state. No sooner were these nobles and princes free out of Rome than they began seriously to conspire to overthrow Rienzi and his government. They assembled their soldiers, and, after devastating the country, threatened to march upon Rome itself. The Tribune, who was no soldier, attempted to intimidate his enemies by threats, but finding that the people grew clamorous for action, he at last took up arms, and made a show of advancing against them. But after a few days, during which he did nothing except to destroy still more of the Campagna, he returned to Rome, clothed himself in the Imperial robes, and received a legate from the Pope. His power soon began to crumble away under him, and when, shortly afterwards, he endeavoured to prevail upon the people to rise and drive out the Count of Minorbino, who had set his authority at defiance, he found that his day was past. He then ordered the trumpets of silver to sound, and, clothed in all his pomp, he marched through Rome, accompanied by his small band of soldiers, and on the 15th October, 1347, intrenched himself in the Castle St. Angelo. Still the influence of his name and his power was so great, that it was not till three days after that the nobles ventured to return to Rome, and then they found that Cola's power had vanished. It faded away like a carnival pageant, as that gay procession entered the Castle St. Angelo. There he remained until the beginning of March, and then fled, and found his way to Civita Vecchia, where he stayed with a nephew of his for a short time. But his nephew having been arrested, he again returned to Rome secretly, and was concealed in Castle St. Angelo by one of the Orsini who was friendly to him and his party. . . . Cola soon after fled to Naples, fearing lest he should be betrayed into the hands of the Cardinals. Rome now fell into a state of anarchy and confusion even worse than when he assumed the reins of power. Revolutions occurred. Brigandage was renewed. . . . In 1353 Rienzi returned with Cardinal Albornos, the legate of the Pope. He was received with enthusiasm, and again installed in power. But he was embarrassed in all his actions by the Cardinal, who sought only to make use of him, while he himself exercised all the power. The title of Senator of Rome was conferred on him, and the people forgave him. . . . But Rienzi had lost the secret of his power in losing his enthusiasm. . . . At last, in October 1358, a sedition broke out, and the mob rushed to the Capitol with cries of 'Death to the traitor Rienzi!' . . . He appeared on the balcony clothed in his armour as Knight, and, with the standard of the people in his hand, demanded to be heard. But the populace refused to listen to him. . . . At last he decided to fly. Tearing off his robes, he put on the miserable dress of the porter, rushed down the flaming stairs and through the burning chambers, . . . and at last reached the third floor. . . . At this very moment his arm was seized, and a voice said, 'Where are you going?' He saw that all was lost. But, at bay,

he did nothing mean. Again there was a flash of heroic courage, not unworthy of him. He threw off his disguise, and disdaining all subterfuges, said, 'I am the Tribune!' He was then led out through the door . . . to the base of the basalt lions, where he had made his first great call upon the people. Standing there, undaunted by its tumultuous cries, he stood for an hour with folded arms, and looked around upon the raging crowd. At last, profiting by a lull of silence, he lifted his voice to address them, when suddenly an artisan at his side, fearing perhaps the result of his eloquence, and perhaps prompted by revenge, plunged his pike in his breast, and he fell. The wild mob rushed upon his corpse."—W. W. Story, *Castle St. Angelo*, ch. 4.

ALSO IN: H. H. Milman, *Hist. of Latin Christianity*, bk. 12, ch. 10-11 (v. 5).—E. Gibbon, *Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, ch. 70.

A. D. 1367-1369.—Temporary return of Urban V. from Avignon. See PAPACY: A. D. 1352-1378.

A. D. 1377-1379.—Return of the Papal court.—Election of Urban VI. and the Great Schism.—Battles in the city.—Siege and partial destruction of Castle St. Angelo. See PAPACY: A. D. 1377-1417.

A. D. 1405-1414.—Rising in the city and flight of Pope Innocent VII.—Sacking of the Vatican.—Surrender of the city to Ladislas, king of Naples.—Expulsion of the Neapolitans and their return. See ITALY (SOUTHERN): A. D. 1386-1414.

A. D. 1447-1455.—The pontificate of Nicolas V.—Building of the Vatican Palace and founding of the Vatican Library.—The Porcario revolt. See ITALY: A. D. 1447-1480.

A. D. 1492-1503.—Under the Borgias. See PAPACY: A. D. 1471-1513.

A. D. 1494.—Charles VIII. and the French army in the city. See ITALY: A. D. 1494-1496.

A. D. 1526.—The city taken and the Vatican plundered by the Colonnas and the Spaniards. See ITALY: A. D. 1523-1527.

A. D. 1527.—The capture and the sacking of the city by the army of Constable Bourbon.—Captivity of the Pope. See ITALY: A. D. 1523-1527; 1527; and 1527-1529.

A. D. 1537-1563.—Inclinations towards the Reformation.—Catholic reaction. See PAPACY: A. D. 1537-1563.

A. D. 1600-1656.—The great families and the Roman population.—"A numerous, powerful, and wealthy aristocracy surrounded the papal throne; the families already established imposed restraints on those that were but newly rising; from the self-reliance and authoritative boldness of monarchy, the ecclesiastical sovereignty was passing to the deliberation, sobriety, and measured calmness of aristocratic government. . . . There still flourished those old and long-renowned Roman races, the Savelli, Conti, Orsini, Colonna, and Gaetani. . . . The Colonna and Orsini made it their boast, that for centuries no peace had been concluded between the princes of Christendom, in which they had not been included by name. But however powerful these houses may have been in earlier times, they certainly owed their importance in those now before us to their connection with the Curia and the popes. . . . Under Innocent X., there existed for a considerable time, as it were, two great factions, or associations of families. The

Orsini, Cesarini, Borghesi, Aldobrandini, Ludovisi, and Giustiniani were with the Pamphili; while opposed to them, was the house of Colonna and the Barberini. . . . In the middle of the seventeenth century there were computed to be fifty noble families in Rome of three hundred years standing, thirty-five of two hundred, and sixteen of one hundred years. None were permitted to claim a more ancient descent, or were generally traced to an obscure, or even a low origin. . . . But by the side of the old families there rose up various new ones. All the cardinals and prelates of the Curia proceeded according to the pope's example, and each in proportion to his means employed the surplus of his ecclesiastical revenue for the aggrandizement of his kindred, the foundation of a new family. There were others which had attained to eminence by judicial appointments, and many were indebted for their elevation to being employed as bankers in the affairs of the Dataria. Fifteen families of Florence, eleven from Genoa, nine Portuguese, and four French, are enumerated as having risen to more or less consideration by these means, according to their good fortune or talents; some of them, whose reputation no longer depended on the affairs of the day, became monarchs of gold; as for example, the Guicciardini and Doni, who connected themselves, under Urban VIII., with the Giustiniani, Primi, and Pallavicini. But even, without affairs of this kind, families of consideration were constantly repairing to Rome, not only from Urbino, Rieti, and Bologna, but also from Parma and Florence. . . . Returns of the Roman population are still extant, and by a comparison of the different years, we find a most remarkable result exhibited, as regards the manner in which that population was formed. Not that its increase was upon the whole particularly rapid, this we are not authorized to assert. In the year 1600 the inhabitants were about 110,000; fifty-six years afterwards they were somewhat above 120,000, an advance by no means extraordinary; but another circumstance here presents itself which deserves attention. At an earlier period, the population of Rome had been constantly fluctuating. Under Paul IV. it had decreased from 80,000 to 50,000; in a score or two of years it had again advanced to more than 100,000. And this resulted from the fact that the court was then formed principally of unmarried men, who had no permanent abode there. But, at the time we are considering, the population became fixed into settled families. This began to be the case towards the end of the sixteenth century, but took place more particularly during the first half of the seventeenth. . . . After the return of the popes from Avignon, and on the close of the schism, the city, which had seemed on the point of sinking into a mere village, extended itself around the Curia. But it was not until the papal families had risen to power and riches—until neither internal discords nor external enemies were any longer to be feared, and the incomes drawn from the revenues of the church or state secured a life of enjoyment without the necessity for labour, that a numerous permanent population arose in the city."—L. Ranke, *Hist. of the Popes*, bk. 8, sect. 7 (v. 2).

A. D. 1797-1798.—French intrigues and occupation of the city.—Formation of the Roman Republic.—Expulsion of the Pope. See FRANCE: A. D. 1797-1798 (DECEMBER—MAY).

A. D. 1798 (November).—Brief expulsion of the French by the Neapolitans. See FRANCE: A. D. 1798-1799 (AUGUST-APRIL).

A. D. 1799.—Overthrow of the Roman Republic.—Expulsion of the French. See FRANCE: A. D. 1799 (AUGUST-DECEMBER).

A. D. 1800.—The Papal government re-established by Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1800-1801 (JUNE-FEBRUARY).

A. D. 1808-1809.—Napoleon's quarrel with the Pope.—Captivity of Pius VII.—French occupation.—Declared to be a free and imperial city. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

A. D. 1810.—The title of King of Rome given to Napoleon's son. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

A. D. 1813.—Papal Concordat with Napoleon. See PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

A. D. 1814.—Occupation by Murat for the Allies.—Return of the Pope. See ITALY: A. D. 1814; and PAPACY: A. D. 1808-1814.

A. D. 1815.—Restoration of the works of art taken by Napoleon. See FRANCE: A. D. 1815 (JULY-NOVEMBER).

ROMERS-WAALE, Naval battle of (1574). See NETHERLANDS: A. D. 1573-1574.

ROMMANY. See GYPSIES.

ROMULUS, Legendary founder of Rome. See ROME: B. C. 753-510. . . . Romulus Augustulus, the last Roman Emperor of the old line, in the West, A. D. 475-476.

RONCAGLIA, The Diets of. See ITALY: A. D. 961-1039.

RONCESVALLES, The ambushade of. See SPAIN: A. D. 778.

ROOD, Holy (or Black Rood) of Scotland. See HOLY ROOD OF SCOTLAND.

ROOF OF THE WORLD.—The Pamir high plateau, which is a continuation of the Bolor range, is called by the natives "Bamiduniya," or the Roof of the World.—T. E. Gordon. *The Roof of the World*, ch. 9. See PAMIR.

ROOSEBECK OR ROSEBECQUE, Battle of (1382). See FLANDERS: A. D. 1382.

ROOT AND BRANCH BILL, The. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1641 (MARCH-MAY).

RORKE'S DRIFT, Defense of (1879). See SOUTH AFRICA: A. D. 1877-1879.

ROSAS, OR ROSES: A. D. 1645-1652.—Siege and capture by the French.—Recovery by the Spaniards. See SPAIN: A. D. 1644-1646; and 1648-1652.

A. D. 1808.—Siege and capture by the French. See SPAIN: A. D. 1808-1809 (DECEMBER-MARCH).

ROSBACH, OR ROSSBACH, Battle of. See GERMANY: A. D. 1757 (JULY-DECEMBER).

ROSECRANS, General W. S.: Command in West Virginia. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1861 (JULY-NOVEMBER); and 1861 (AUGUST-DECEMBER: WEST VIRGINIA). . . . Command of the Army of the Mississippi. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862 (JUNE-OCTOBER: TENNESSEE-KENTUCKY). . . . Battle of Stone River. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1862-1863 (DECEMBER-JANUARY: TENNESSEE). . . . The Tullahoma campaign. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1863 (JUNE-JULY: TENNESSEE). . . . Chickamauga.— Chattanooga campaign.—Displacement. See UNI-

A. D. 1831-1832.—Revolt of the "Papa States, suppressed by Austrian troops. See ITALY: A. D. 1830-1832.

A. D. 1846-1849.—Liberal reforms of Pope Pius IX.—His breach with the extremists.—Revolution, and flight of the Pope.—Intervention of France.—Garibaldi's defense of the city.—Its capture and occupation by the French.—Overthrow of the Roman Republic. See ITALY: A. D. 1848-1849.

A. D. 1850-1861.—First consequences of the Austro-Italian war.—Absorption of the Papal States in the new kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1850-1861.

A. D. 1867-1870.—Garibaldi's attempt.—His defeat at Mentana.—Italian troops in the city.—The king of Italy takes possession of his capital. See ITALY: A. D. 1867-1870.

A. D. 1869-1870.—The Ecumenical Council of the Vatican. See PAPACY: A. D. 1869-1870.

A. D. 1870-1871.—End of Papal Sovereignty.—Occupation of the city as the capital of the kingdom of Italy. See ITALY: A. D. 1867-1870; and PAPACY: A. D. 1870.

ROSECRANS, General W. S.: Command in Missouri. See UNITED STATES OF AM.: A. D. 1864 (MARCH-OCTOBER: ARKANSAS-MISSOURI).

ROSES, Wars of the. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1455-1471.

ROSETTA STONE.—"The Rosetta Stone is a fragment of a stela discovered in the year 1799 by M. Boussard, a French artillery officer, while digging entrenchments round the town of that name. It contains a copy of a decree made by the priests of Egypt, assembled at Memphis, in honour of Ptolemy Epiphanes. This decree is engraved on the stone in three languages, or rather in three different writings. The first is the hieroglyphic, the grand old writing of the monuments; the second is the demotic character as used by the people; and the third is the Greek. But the text in Greek character is the translation of the two former. Up to this time, hieroglyphs had remained an impenetrable mystery even for science. But a corner of the veil was about to be lifted: in proceeding from the known to the unknown, the sense at all events was at length to be arrived at of that mysterious writing which had so long defied all the efforts of science. Many erudite scholars tried to solve the mystery, and Young, among others, very nearly brought his researches to a satisfactory issue. But it was Champollion's happy lot to succeed in entirely tearing away the veil. Such is the Rosetta Stone, which thus became the instrument of one of the greatest discoveries which do honour to the nineteenth century."—A. Mariette-Bey, *Monuments of Upper Egypt (Itinéraire)* p. 29.—See, also, HIEROGLYPHICS.

ROSICRUCIANS.—ILLUMINATI.—"About the year 1610, there appeared anonymously a little book, which excited great sensation throughout Germany. It was entitled, *The Discovery of the Brotherhood of the Honourable Order of the Rosy Cross*, and dedicated to all the scholars and magnates of Europe. It commenced with an imaginary dialogue between the Seven Sages of Greece, and other worthies of antiquity, on the best method of accomplishing a

general reform in those evil times. The suggestion of Seneca is adopted, as most feasible, namely a secret confederacy of wise philanthropists, who shall labour everywhere in unison for this desirable end. The book then announces the actual existence of such an association. One Christian Rosen Kreutz, whose travels in the East had enriched him with the highest treasures of occult lore, is said to have communicated his wisdom, under a vow of secrecy, to eight disciples, for whom he erected a mysterious dwelling-place called The Temple of the Holy Ghost. It is stated further, that this long hidden edifice had been at last discovered, and within it the body of Rosen Kreutz, untouched by corruption, though, since his death, 120 years had passed away. The surviving disciples of the institute call on the learned and devout, who desire to co-operate in their projects of reform, to advertise their names. They themselves indicate neither name nor place of rendezvous. They describe themselves as true Protestants. They expressly assert that they contemplate no political movement in hostility to the reigning powers. Their sole aim is the diminution of the fearful sum of human suffering, the spread of education, the advancement of learning, science, universal enlightenment, and love. Traditions and manuscripts in their possession have given them the power of gold-making, with other potent secrets, but by their wealth they set little store. They have arcana, in comparison with which the secret of the alchemist is a trifle. But all is subordinate, with them, to their one high purpose of benefiting their fellows both in body and soul. I could give you conclusive reasons, if it would not tire you to hear them, for the belief that this far-famed book was written by a young Lutheran divine named Valentine Andreä. He was one of the very few who understood the age, and had the heart to try and mend it. This Andreä writes the Discovery of the Rosierucian Brotherhood, a jeu-d'esprit with a serious purpose, just as an experiment to see whether something cannot be done by combined effort to remedy the defect and abuses—social, educational, and religious, so lamented by all good men. He thought there were many Andreäs scattered throughout Europe—how powerful would be their united systematic action! Many a laugh, you may be sure, he enjoyed in his parsonage with his few friends who were in the secret, when they found their fable everywhere swallowed greedily as unquestionable fact. On all sides they heard of search instituted to discover the Temple of the Holy Ghost. Printed letters appeared continually, addressed to the imaginary brotherhood, giving generally the initials of the candidate, where the invisibles might hear of him, stating his motives and qualifications for entrance into their number, and sometimes furnishing samples of his cabballistic acquirements. Still, no answer. Not a trace of the Temple. Profound darkness and silence, after the brilliant flash which had awakened so many hopes. Soon the mirth grew serious. Andreä saw with concern that shrewd heads of the wrong sort began to scent his artifice, while quacks reaped a rogue's harvest from it. . . . A swarm of impostors pretended to belong to the Fraternity, and found a readier sale than ever for their nostrums. Andreä dared not reveal himself. All he could do was to write book

after book to expose the folly of those whom his handiwork had so befooled, and still to labour on, by pen and speech, in earnest aid of that reform which his unhappy stratagem had less helped than hindered. . . . Confederacies of pretenders appear to have been organized in various places, but Descartes says he sought in vain for a Rosierucian lodge in Germany. The name Rosierucian became by degrees a generic term, embracing every species of occult pretension,—arcana, elixirs, the philosopher's stone, theurgic ritual, symbols, initiations. In general usage the term is associated more especially with that branch of the secret art which has to do with the creatures of the elements. . . . And from this deposit of current mystical tradition sprang, in great measure, the Freemasonry and Rosierucianism of the 18th century,—that golden age of secret societies. Then flourished associations of every imaginable kind, suited to every taste. . . . Some lodges belonged to Protestant societies, others were the implements of the Jesuits. Some were aristocratic, like the Strict Observance; others democratic, seeking in vain to escape an Argus-eyed police. Some—like the Illuminati under Weishaupt Knigge, and Von Zwackh, numbering (among many knaves) not a few names of rank, probity, and learning—were the professed enemies of mysticism and superstition. Others existed only for the profitable juggle of incantations and fortune telling. . . . The best perished at the hands of the Jesuits, the worst at the hands of the police"—R. A. Vaughan, *Hours with the Mystics*, bk 8, ch 9 (c 2).

ALSO IN F. C. Schlosser, *Hist. of the 18th Century*, v 4, pp 483-504.—T. Frost, *The Secret Societies of the European Revolution*, v. 1, ch 1.—A. P. Marras, *Secret Fraternities of the Middle Ages* ch 8.

ROSSBACH, OR ROSBACH, Battle of. See GERMANY. A D 1737 (JULY—DECEMBER).

ROSSBRUNN, Battle of. See GERMANY. A D 1866.

ROSTOCK.—A Baltic seaport of considerable importance in the Middle Ages, one of the Hansa Towns.

ROSY CROSS, The Honorable Order of the. See ROSIERUCIANS.

ROTATION IN OFFICE. See CIVIL SERVICE REFORM IN THE U. S.

ROTEINU, RUTENU, OR RETENU, The.—"The Syrian populations, who, to the north of the Canaanites [17th century B. C.], occupied the provinces called in the Bible by the general name of Aram, as far as the river Euphrates, belonged to the confederation of the Rotennu, or Retennu, extending beyond the river and embracing all Mesopotamia (Nahraina). . . . The Rotennu had no well-defined territory, nor even a decided unity of race. They already possessed powerful cities, such as Nineveh and Babylon, but there were still many nomadic tribes within the ill-defined limits of the confederacy. Their name was taken from the city of Resen, apparently the most ancient, and originally the most important, city of Assyria. The germ of the Rotennu confederation was formed by the Semitic Assyro-Chaldean people, who were not yet welded into a compact monarchy."—F. Lenormant, *Manual of the Ancient Hist. of the East*, bk 3, ch 8.

ROTHIÈRE, Battle of La. See FRANCE. A. D. 1814 (JANUARY—MARCH).

ROTOMAGUS.—Modern Rouen. See BELGÆ.

ROTTELN: Capture by Duke Bernhard (1638). See GERMANY A D 1634-1639.

ROTTEN BOROUGHS. See ENGLAND: A. D. 1830, and 1830-1832.

ROTTWEIL: Siege and capture by the French (1643). See GERMANY A D 1643-1644.

ROUEN: Origin of the city and name. See BELGÆ.

A. D. 841.—First destructive visit of the Northmen. See NORMANS A D 841.

A. D. 845.—Second capture by the Northmen. See PARIS A D 845.

A. D. 876-911.—Rollo's settlement. See NORMANS A D 876-911.

A. D. 1418-1419.—Siege and capture by Henry V. of England. See FRANCE A D 1417-1422.

A. D. 1431.—The burning of the Maid of Orleans. See FRANCE A D 1429-1431.

A. D. 1449.—Recovery from the English. See FRANCE A D 1431-1453.

A. D. 1562.—Occupied by the Huguenots and retaken by the Catholics. See FRANCE A D 1560-1563.

A. D. 1591-1592.—Siege by Henry IV., raised by the Duke of Parma. See FRANCE A D 1591-1593.

A. D. 1870.—Taken by the Germans. See FRANCE A D 1870-1871.

ROUK. See CAROLINE ISLANDS.

ROUM, The Sultans of. See TURKS (THE SELJUKS) A D 1073-1092.

ROUMANI, OR ROMUNI, The. See DACIA A D 102-106.

ROUMANIA. See BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES 14-18TH CENTURIES.

ROUMELIA, Eastern. See TURKS A D 1876, THEATRES OF SAN STEFANO AND MADRID, and BALKAN AND DANUBIAN STATES A D 1878, to 1878-1880.

ROUND TABLE, Knights of the. See ARTHUR, KING.

ROUND TOWERS OF IRELAND.—"At various periods between the sixth and twelfth centuries (some of them still later, but the greater number, perhaps, in the ninth and tenth centuries), were erected those singular buildings, the round towers, which have been so enveloped in mystery by the arguments and conjectures of modern antiquaries. . . . The real uses of the Irish round towers, both as belfries and as ecclesiastical keeps or castles, have been satisfactorily established by Dr. Petrie, in his important and erudite work on the ecclesiastical architecture of Ireland. . . . These buildings were well contrived to supply the clergy with a place of safety for themselves, the sacred vessels, and other objects of value, during the incursions of the Danes, and other foes, and the upper stories, in which there were four windows, were perfectly well adapted for the ringing of the largest bells then used in Ireland."—M. Haverty, *Hist. of Ireland*, p. 115.

ALSO IN: S. Bryant, *Celtic Ireland*, ch. 7.

ROUNDHEADS.—The Parliamentary or popular party in the great English civil war were called Roundheads because they generally wore their hair cut short, while the Cavaliers of the king's party held to the fashion of flowing locks.

According to the Parliamentary clerk Rushworth, the first person who applied the name was one David Hyde, who threatened a mob of citizens which surrounded the Houses of Parliament on the 27th of December, 1641, crying "No Bishops," that he would "cut the throats of these round headed dogs"—D. Masson, *Life of John Milton*, v. 2, bk 2, ch 6.

ALSO IN: Mrs Hutchinson, *Memoirs of Col. Hutchinson* (1642)—See, also, ENGLAND A D. 1641 (OCTOBER).

ROUSSEAU, and educational reform. See EDUCATION, MODERN REFORMS, &c: A D 1762.

ROUSSILLON: A. D. 1639.—Situation of the county.—Invasion by the French. See SPAIN A D 1637-1640.

A. D. 1642.—French conquest. See SPAIN A D 1640-1642.

A. D. 1659.—Ceded to France. See FRANCE A D 1659-1661.

ROUTIERS, The. See WHITE HOODS OF FRANCE.

ROXOLANI, The.—A people, counted among the Sarmatians, who occupied anciently the region between the Don and the Dnieper, —afterwards encroaching on Dacian territory. They were among the barbarians who troubled the Roman frontier earliest, and were prominent in the wars which disturbed the reign of Marcus Aurelius. Later, they disappeared in the flood of Gothic and Hunnish invasion partly by absorption, and partly by extermination.

ROYAL ARCANUM. See INSURANCE.

ROYAL ROAD OF ANCIENT PERSIA, The.—"Herodotus describes the great road of the Persian period from Ephesus by the Cilician Gates to Susa. It was called the 'Royal Road,' because the service of the Great King passed along it, and it was, therefore, the direct path of communication for all government business."

It is an accepted fact that in several other cases roads of the Persian Empire were used by the Assyrian kings long before the Persian time, and, in particular, that the eastern part of the 'Royal Road,' from Cilicia to Susa, is much older than the beginning of the Persian power. . . . Herodotus represents it as known to Aristagoras, and therefore, existing during the 6th century. B. C., and the Persians had had no time to organize a great road like this before 500, they only used the previously existing road. Moreover, the Lydian kings seem to have paid some attention to their roads, and perhaps even to have measured them, as we may gather from Herodotus's account of the roads in the Lycus valley, and of the boundary pillar erected by Croesus at Kydrara"—W. M. Ramsay, *Hist. Geog. of Asia Minor*, pt. 1, ch 2.

ROYAL TOUCH, The. See MEDICAL SCIENCE. 12-17TH CENTURIES.

RUBICON, Caesar's passage of the. See ROME: B C 50-49.

RUCANAS, The. See PERU: THE ABORIGINAL INHABITANTS.

RUDOLPH, King of France, A. D. 928-936.
 . . . Rudolph I., King of Germany—called Emperor (the first of the House of Hapsburg), 1278-1291. . . . Rudolph II., Archduke of Austria and King of Hungary, 1576-1606; King of Bohemia and Germanic Emperor, 1576-1612.