April 18th 1899

CALENDAR

OF

LETTERS, DESPATCHES, AND STATE PAPERS,

RELATING TO

THE NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN ENGLAND AND SPAIN,

PRESERVED IN

THE ARCHIVES AT SIMANCAS, VIENNA, BRUSSELS, AND ELSEWHERE.

Vol. VII.

1594.

LIBRARY

PRINTED BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

EDITED BY

PASCUAL DE GAYANGOS.

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY

MARTIN A. S. HUME.

PUBLISHED BY THE AUTHORITY OF THE LORDS COMMISSIONERS OF HER MAJESTY'S TREASURY,
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE MASTER OF THE ROLLS.

LONDON:
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88435. Wt. 9584.

ABBREVIATIONS.

S. .... Archivo General de Simancas.

L. .....Legajo or bundle.

Bul. Suel. .....Bulas Sueltas.

Pat. Re. .....Patronato Real.

R. .....Rome.

Cap. c. l. cas. d'Austria...Capitulaciones con la casa de Austria.

A. .....Alemania (Germany).

B. .....Brussels.

E. .....Estado or Affairs of State.

F. .....Flandes (Flanders).

Fr. .....Francia.

I. .....Inglaterra (England).

W. .....Wien or Vienna.

L. de Ber. .....Libros de Berzosa, or copies from the Vatican, made by order of Philip II.

Sec. de Guer. ....Secretaria de Guerra.

Mar y T. .....Mar y Tierra.

P. ....Paris, Archives de l'Empire, now Archives Nationales.

INTRODUCTION.

The venerable editor, Don Pascual de Gayangos, unfortunately died before the last fifty pages of this Calendar had been corrected for the press; but with the exception of this portion of the work, the Index, and the present Introduction, the late editor is responsible for the whole of the volume. It has been thought advisable to close the volume at the point reached by Señor Gayangos at the time of his death, as in future the Calendar will be continued on a plan somewhat different from that adopted by him, and the new system will be more fittingly commenced in a fresh volume.

The period covered by the letters now published extends from the beginning of January to the end of December, 1544: and the documents deal almost exclusively with the short-lived armed alliance between England and the Emperor, which had been finally concluded after much distrustful negotiation in the beginning of 1543. During the autumn of that year some strain had been placed upon the new friendship in consequence of the condign punishment by the Emperor of the brother of Henry's repudiated wife, the Protestant Duke of Cleves, who had made common cause with Francis I., and threatened to prevent the passage of the imperial troops through Brabant to attack the French King. In September, however, the Duke of Cleves had begged for mercy on his knees, and had gratefully accepted his erstwhile independent dominion as a fief of the empire; and Henry made the best of a matter which

might well have turned out worse than it did for his former brother-in-law. In the meanwhile the French forces had overrun the Luxemburg and Piedmont, and had enlisted the aid of the Turkish galleys in the Mediterranean; whilst Francis himself, with the main body of his army, had invaded Flanders. Before the Emperor's advance, Francis and the Dauphin, leaving Landreci strongly garrisoned, fell back over the French frontier, and by the second week in November 1543 both armies had gone into winter quarters and stood upon the defensive, pending a renewal of hostilities in the spring.

The Emperor himself returned to Brussels by slow stages, in order to spend Christmas with his sister Mary, Dowager Queen of Hungary, the Stadtholderinn of the Netherlands. Readers of the last volume of the Calendar will recollect that at Valenciennes Charles was visited by the Duke of Lorraine, ostensibly without authority from Francis, for the purpose of interceding in the interests of peace. But Charles was now determined to humble, for once and for all, his life-long rival, and put an end to French claims in Italy, with the object, doubtless, of forwarding the project which was already in his mind, of substituting for the imperial suzerainty a Spanish dominion over the whole of the Italian peninsula. The Pope and the Italian princes were restive at the mere suspicion of such a plan, but the latter were divided, and for the most part amenable to the influences which Charles could bring to bear; whilst the sympathy of the Pontiff with the unholy alliance of Francis and the Turk placed the Emperor in the position of being able to form a combination for the purpose of crushing his enemy, which, under no other circumstances, would have been possible. French interference in Scotland had made it necessary for Henry VIII. to cripple France, unless his cherished idea of a protectorate over the disturbed sister kingdom was to come to nought: but now that humbling Francis meant humbling the papacy as well, the opportunity was an irresistible one to

the English king, and Charles, for the first time for many years, could count upon the help of Henry to crush a power obnoxious to them both. On the other hand, the union of France with the infidel Turk—the secular enemy of the empire—enabled Charles to appeal to the German princes, Catholics and Protestants alike, to lay aside their own religious differences, and to contribute men and money to fight the ally of the Moslem—that cruel and relentless foe of Christianity at large, from whose ravages the territories of the empire had never been entirely free. All overtures of peace, therefore, were coldly rejected by the Emperor, whose energies were directed entirely to the organisation of an irresistible force for the coming campaign. Before the departure of the Emperor to meet the princes at the Diet of Spires, and to organise his German forces, it was necessary that he should take steps to pin the King of England down to precise conditions and contributions to the common warfare against France. The note struck through all the protracted negotiations, for the alliance had been that of distrust, particularly on the part of Charles, who was well aware of the ephemeral nature of the circumstances which for the moment had made Henry's interests identical with his own. But the time had now come when diplomatic generalities had to be supplemented by precise mutual undertakings, and for the agreement to be arrived at for a joint plan of campaign. In December 1543 accordingly, Ferrante Gonzaga, a member of the princely house of Mantua, and himself Viceroy of Sicily, Duke of Guastalla and Prince of Molfetta, was sent to England to make arrangements with Henry. No better choice of an ambassador could have been made. Gonzaga was one of the foremost commanders of his age—a man after Henry's own heart—and took with him a double set of instructions which will be found printed entire in the last volume of this Calendar. He was to employ all the resources of his diplomacy, as well as his military reputation, to induce Henry to consent to a simultaneous invasion of France by

two armies of 36,000 foot and 7,000 horse each, entering at different points, crossing the province of Picardy, effecting a junction on the Somme, and thence together marching on Paris, where terms might be dictated to the common enemy. But the most important object of Ferrante Gonzaga's mission was to assure himself positively of Henry's ability and intention to take the field in France at all during the coming year, or whether the English forces would be mainly employed against the enemy in Scotland, in which case the Emperor secretly informed Gonzaga that he himself could not venture to invade France alone. Gonzaga found Henry and his council willing to accept most of his plans for the joint invasion, but only on their own conditions. April or May had been the period fixed by Charles as the most favourable season of the campaign, but the English insisted that, mainly in consequence of the lack of provisions and fodder, they could not cross the Channel before the 20th June. They agreed to contribute 20,000 crowns towards the expenses of the campaign in Piedmont, but stipulated that the Emperor should provide 1,000 Spanish harquebussiers for service on the Scottish border, a very difficult condition for Charles to fulfil, as his Spanish men-at-arms were the backbone of his army, and at the season not too numerous for his own purposes. With these terms Gonzaga was fain to be contented, and left for Flanders in the last days of the year (1543), but arrived there after the Emperor had taken his departure for the Diet of Spires, whither he followed him. At this period the letters in the present volume commence.

The demand for Spanish auxiliaries for the Scottish border, and that the Emperor should declare war against Scotland, was also urged personally upon the Emperor by Dr. Wotton, Dean of Canterbury, the English ambassador, but, as was the case with almost every demand made on either side during the course of this half-hearted alliance, hair-splitting evasions and excuses for non-fulfilment were all that could be obtained from Charles before he departed

from Flanders. It was extremely undesirable for the Emperor, in the interests of his Flemish subjects, who already greatly impoverished by the war, to suspend all commercial intercourse with Scotland, as well as with France, and he held out as long as he could, without actually breaking with his ally. From the first, the question of trade was a difficult one. In December, 1543, Chapuys advised that a proclamation had been issued in England forbidding the importation of French merchandise of any kind, even if directly proceeding from a neutral country; and, in addition to this, goods destined for French ports were liable to seizure in English waters. On the other hand, the Emperor, although at war with France, could not entirely deprive his subjects of the principal market for their merchandise, or of the French wines and other produce needed for the consumption of his armies, and was forced to grant safe-conducts for specific cargoes to and from France. The English, from the first, protested against this, and a few days after Gonzaga's departure (6 January) Chapuys advised the Emperor that three cargoes of salt herrings, bound to Bordeaux under safe-conduct, had been seized at Dover, whither they had been driven by stress of weather. So insignificant a fact as this, leading, as it did, to much friction and mutual recrimination, is sufficient to show the absence of any real identity of interest or unity of purpose between the allies; but it will be seen by Chapuys' letters to the Queen of Hungary—Stadtholderinn of the Netherlands—that not only this, but other questions of almost daily occurrence, continued throughout the whole course of the alliance to keep alive the irritation and distrust which had existed from the first. The acrimonious disputes as to safe-conduct, seizures, and commercial privileges on both sides, the question of the declaration of war against Scotland by Charles, and against the usurping King of Denmark (Christian III.) by Henry, and other points of difference, had already made the positions of the respective ambassadors — Chapuys in England,

Wotton with the Emperor, and Dr. Layton in Flanders—both difficult and unpleasant, when a fresh subject of distrust arose, which, but for the very decided action of the Emperor, might still further have widened the breach between the allies.

Paul III. was determined, if he could, to prevent a war in which the Emperor was to fight by the side of the arch-enemy of the Papacy; and in November, 1543, Cardinal Alessandro Farnese, the Pope's grandson, left Rome to offer the mediation of his Holiness between Francis and Charles. He had been received in Paris with the merest affectation of coolness at first, and early in January had started from the French court, armed with the acquiescence of Francis and letters of introduction from his Queen Eleanor to her brother the Emperor, and to her sister the Stadtholderinn. On his arrival on the Flemish frontier on the 9th January, Queen Mary wrote to Chapuys (page 13) ordering him to anticipate Henry's fears by emphatically assuring him that no negotiations should be undertaken without his participation. Farnese merely passed through Brussels on his way to see the Emperor at Spires, and found the Queen ostentatiously irresponsive to his suggestions for peace—at least so she assured Chapuys in her letter of 22 January — but the Emperor's answer was more emphatic still. If Francis would first surrender the territories in dispute in French Flanders, and accede to the pecuniary claims of the King of England, the Emperor would listen to the talk of peace, but not otherwise. "As we particularly insist upon these "two preliminary conditions, we refuse altogether, unless "they be previously fulfilled, to listen to any overtures of "peace. You (Chapuys) may inform the King of England, "our good brother, of these particulars, in order that he "may know and appreciate the respect and consideration "we entertain for his person and affairs" (p. 25). Granvelle was just as eager to impress upon the English ambassador, Wotton, the determination of the Emperor not to

be drawn into peace negotiations separately, and he writes to Chapuys (p. 26) an interesting letter, giving particulars of Farnese's dismissal. For the information of the English King he is informed that the Pope's grandson had neither been well received nor kindly treated, and that such an answer had been given to him as would effectually prevent a repetition of similar overtures. In answer to Cardinal Farnese's constant assertion that it was not the war against France to which the Pope objected, but the alliance of the Emperor with the schismatic King of England, Charles retorted that the Pope himself had sided with the infidel Turk against him, and that his protegé, King Francis, was notoriously supporting the Lutheran German princes in their contumacy. It was well that so strong a line was taken by the Emperor, for Henry and his councillors hardly dissembled their uneasiness at the Pope's intrigues. Chapuys writes on the 23rd January (p. 25) to the Queen of Hungary :—" His (Henry's) mind " will not be at rest until he hears that the Legate has " actually quitted the imperial Court, and that his work " there has come to nothing. Indeed this King . . . . " would have been much more pleased had . . . . the " Legate's visit been . . . . prevented altogether."

The firmness of the Emperor on this point smoothed the way to an ostensible but hollow agreement on the vexed question of the recognition of the safe-conducts given by the Emperor or his sister for cargoes going to or coming from France, so long as such cargoes were not landed in England; but the attempts on both sides to whittle down their obligations under the treaty of alliance continued without intermission, and readers of the correspondence will be struck with the almost puerile persistence with which each party tries to get the better of the other in their chaffering. It is clear to see that the objective of the whole negotiation, so far as Henry was concerned, was Scotland. The Regent Arran, after ratifying the treaty for the marriage of the Prince of Wales with the infant

Queen of Scots, had suddenly become reconciled with Cardinal Betoun, and had turned against the English party. Angus and the Douglasses also had deserted the cause of England; and above all Lennox, who had been driven by jealousy of Arran into the arms of Henry, was at this time (January 1544) again wavering, notwithstanding the tempting offers of the English King. When, therefore, Henry insisted to Gonzaga upon his inability to invade France until the end of June or July, he was probably influenced by his intention of first crushing the Cardinal and the French party in Scotland early in the spring. His urgent demands, also, for auxiliary Spanish troops for the Border, and that Charles should immediately declare war against Scotland, are facts which point to the same direction. Notwithstanding the importunities of the English council, and Chapuys' own recommendation, the Emperor insisted that Henry should declare war against Denmark at the same time as he did against Scotland, and the dispute was prolonged until the King of Denmark had come to terms with the Emperor, and the declaration of the latter against Scotland was of little practical use; whilst the return soon after of Lennox and his party to Henry's side made the constantly reiterated demand of the English for auxiliary Spaniards for the Border no longer necessary (p. 83).

In the meanwhile, England and Flanders rang with preparations for war. Count de Buren, by permission of the Emperor, was organising an auxiliary force in Flanders of 2,000 foot, to act with the English army, Colonel Landenberger had contracted to raise a large body of German mercenaries, and Captain Seckinghen, a thousand horse, for Henry's service, and in accordance with Gonzaga's promise when in England, afterwards confirmed by the Emperor, and the authorities in Flanders were straining every nerve to obtain the waggons, horses and stores which would be required by the English army in France. The nature and amount of the English demands in these respects struck the Queen Stadtholderinn with

dismay, as well as the unbusinesslike manner in which the English commissaries set about their work when, after much delay and remonstrance, they were sent. Mary writes to Chapuys (1st April), "The English Am-
" bassador here (*i.e.* Dean Layton) has presented a note
" of the . . . horses and carts which his master de-
" mands for his army, amounting altogether to 2,568 draft
" horses for the king's artillery, besides 2,260 waggons,
" each drawn by four horses, for ammunition and baggage,
" which would raise the amount of beasts required to
" 11,596, a number which not only seems to us excessive
" and unreasonable, but which we are doubtful of being
" able to procure in the country." The country people, indeed, in Flanders and Brabant, had been well nigh ruined already by the campaigns of the previous year, and Gonzaga had been specially instructed to beg Henry to refrain from asking for more horses, carts and stores, than he really needed. The King, however, was determined to do things on a grand scale, and Chapuys repeatedly referred to the extensive preparations he was making in England, first for the subjugation of Scotland, and next for his personal campaign in France. "The King still perse-
" veres (wrote Chapuys) in his purpose of attending the
" expedition to France in person, for which he continues to
" make incredible preparations in the way of provisions,
" never ceasing, as he told me yesterday, to apply himself
" to whatever relates to the undertaking" (18 February). This determination of Henry personally to command his army was anything but welcome to the Emperor, who plainly saw that it would hamper him in his plans, and render joint action more difficult. Henry had recently suffered from an aggravation of his old disease, an issue in the leg (p. 84); his bulk was enormous and age and excess were visibly telling upon him. These circumstances furnished the Emperor with an excuse gently to urge under cover of a tender solicitude for his health, that it would be better for "his good brother" to

remain at home. The way in which Henry received this disinterested piece of advice is characteristic and amusing. It is clear that Henry's own courtiers were apprehensive of his intention of taking the field, although, as Chapuys wrote on the 18th May, "no one here dares "to remonstrate with him," and early in June, Paget, who had been sent to the Emperor on a mission, and Dr. Wotton, the regular ambassador, confessed to Charles, that they agreed with him on the subject. The matter had to be very delicately handled, and Paget was entrusted with a tender message to his master, the Flemish Councillor de Courrières (Jean de Montmorency) being also sent to England, mainly for the purpose of laying before Henry the reasons why Charles should command his army, whilst the King of England remained at home. An account of the envoy's interview with Henry will be found on page 203. So long as the reasons referred only to Charles and his army, Henry had fair diplomatic answers to give to them; but when the subject of his own infirmities was touched upon he became angry. "The reasons, "moreover, which your Majesty alleged (continued the "King) for himself to remain at home and not attend "the expedition in person—such as his illness and so forth "—were not sufficiently strong, and might on the contrary "be brought to bear against your Majesty, inasmuch as "his present indisposition was accidental and transitory, "whereas gout, from which your Majesty had been suffer-"ing lately, was an awful disease, a return of which at "the approaching autumnal season would be extremely "dangerous." The King then showed the first sign of his intention to break away from the plan of campaign agreed upon—a determination which subsequently frustrated the whole expedition. He pointed out the danger of the Emperor's advancing into the heart of France without ensuring the territory at his back and keeping open his lines of communication. "It would be far better to "lay siege to two or three large towns on the road to Paris

" than to go to the capital and burn it down." In further colloquy with the envoy, the King "did not approve of " our warning, and, wishing to exaggerate the danger in " which your Majesty might find yourself," and then began to say rather ungraciously—all manner of things disagreeable to the ears of this ally. This was written on the 18th June, but for some time prior to that date it is evident from Chapuys' letters, that recent events had considerably changed Henry's view of the joint action against France. On the 14th April, Charles's army had suffered the crushing defeat of Ceresole, in Piedmont, at the hands of the Count d'Enghien. Del Guasto, the imperialist general, had been wounded, nearly 15,000 of his troops are said to have been slaughtered, and most of those that remained were taken prisoners, or fled in disorder, the French arms thus becoming paramount in Piedmont, and Francis's power of resistance in the north enormously increased. Charles put the best face possible upon the defeat in his letter to Chapuys (p. 125), but he does not conceal the seriousness of the defeat. But even of greater importance than this was the triumphant result of Seymour's (Earl of Hertford) rapid invasion of Scotland, of which an extremely interesting account, in Hertford's own words, will be found on p. 135, and also on pp. 141 and 146. The sacking of Leith and Edinburgh (6th May), the flight of Arran and Betoun, the adhesion of Lennox to Henry, and the formation of a strong English party amongst the Scottish nobles, all contributed to allay Henry's anxiety with regard to Scotland, and made it less necessary for him to drive Francis to utter extremity for the benefit of the Emperor's plans in Italy. He had doubtless decided, by the middle of May, that his personal campaign in France must serve his own honour and profit rather than those of his ally, and Charles also must have seen that his objects, and those of England, were less closely interwoven than they had been six months before. Francis himself was also fully alive to the changed

situation. His efforts to divide his enemies had hitherto been mainly confined to approaches, direct and indirect, to his imperial brother-in-law. On the 9th May, the King of France wrote to Henry, hinting at a desire for friendship (p. 165); but it was necessary for the success of the English object that the Emperor's suspicion should not be aroused, and Henry went to the length of sending secretary Paget to his ally, for the purpose of showing him the curt answer he had given to the approaches of Francis; and other indirect attempts of the French—of which details will be found in the correspondence—to approach Henry alone, were treated in a similar way. But earnest though the efforts were on the part of the allies to keep up a show of mutual confidence and unity, the task was almost a hopeless one from the first, and it is easy to see that each party, even before the campaign had begun, had fixed upon some act or omission of the other side, which should excuse their own inevitable subsequent departure from the terms of the alliance. Thus, the unwillingness of the Flemish government to furnish stores and transport to the extent demanded by the English, was promptly caught hold of by the latter to explain all their own shortcomings. On the 12th April (p. 97), Chapuys wrote to the Queen-Stadtholderinn, "respecting the number of " horses that your Majesty has offered for the artillery " and carriage of ammunition, and so forth, for the English " army, I must say that both the king and his ministers " are scandalised at the very small offers made, positively " declaring that it will be quite impossible for them to join " in the future undertaking against France, unless they are " previously furnished with the numbers required. . . . " This last sentence the privy councillors repeated more " than once, all the time asserting that they would be obliged " to give up entirely the idea of invading France, which " they regretted the more that all the money spent in " military preparations and armaments would be literally

" thrown away. If so, said the councillors to me, the fault " will not be ours but yours." When some sort of agreement had been arrived at on this point, and the English army had landed in France, the supply of provisions over the Flemish frontier took its place as a permanent grievance, to be employed as a retort to all complaints on the part of the imperialists. The English were never long without a cause for grumbling, nor was the Queen Stadtholderinn at a loss for subjects upon which to expostulate and protest. Henry, offended at some attempt at extortion by the leaders of the German mercenaries, angrily refused to have anything to do with them, or to pay them the dismissal money to which they were entitled, whereupon the Germans took to looting the Flemish villages in which they were quartered (p. 214). An endless correspondence ensued as to Henry's responsibility, in which the Queen-Stadtholderinn threw all the blame on the inexperience and ignorance of the English commissaries, and she made a similar retort to all complaints on the part of the English with regard to the shortness of stores and transport. Henry was careful of his money, and the Flemish peasants were not very willing to serve him. Complaints of his penuriousness are constant in the correspondence of the Queen-Stadtholderinn, who also much resented his action in raising a loan of a considerable sum of money in Antwerp, and his utilisation of the alliance to export from Flanders an inordinate number of the famous Flemish brood mares, for the purpose of improving the breed .of horses in England. Other causes of complaint on both sides arose out of the promise of the Flemings to provide transports and convoys for the English troops across the Channel and the delay of the ships.

At length, in the midst of these acrimonious bickerings, the main body of the English force crossed over to Calais, under Charles Brandon, Duke of Suffolk, late in June (p. 223); the vanguard, commanded by the Duke of

Norfolk, having preceded them by several weeks. When Paget visited the Emperor at Spires, Charles had impressed upon him the necessity for adhering to the plan of campaign agreed upon with Gonzaga (p. 218), but Henry had now made up his mind to besiege Montreuil and Boulogne (pp. 208, 223, etc.), and in spite of the Emperor's cautious remonstrances, this plan was persevered in. It was, indeed, no longer to Henry's interest to march upon Paris, and there dictate terms in favour of Charles's dominion over Italy. There was, for the present, no fear of French influence becoming supreme in Scotland, and the danger of it would be still further lessened if French activity in Italy were not utterly crushed; especially if the English footing in northern France could be extended and assured. Henry, therefore, naturally decided to go his own way, and serve the only interests he had at heart, namely, those of England.

Rarely has an English sovereign taken the field with more pomp and circumstance than did Henry on this occasion. His personal experience of war was not great, and most of his nobles were in similar case. The Emperor, on the other hand, had passed a great part of his life in active warfare, and had surrounded himself with the greatest captains of the age, chosen from all parts of his vast empire, whilst his Spanish rank-and-file had already gained for themselves the fame of supreme excellence, which clung to them for a hundred years later, until the defeat of Rocroi sounded the knell of their reputation. Although some Spanish auxiliaries were to be attached to Henry's army in France, in addition to the troops under de Buren, he was desirous of having at his side some noble of high rank who had distinguished himself in the Emperor's wars, and might advise him in moments of importance. In February, the Duke of Najera (Juan Estevan Manrique de Lara, third Duke) with a number of followers, landed in London from Calais, on his way home to Spain, and for a time Henry conceived the notion of begging him

to remain with him during the coming war. Great distinction was paid to the duke in London, whilst enquiries were being made, but as it was found that a much more experienced officer—Don Beltran de la Cueva, third Duke of Alburquerque, would shortly arrive in England, Najera was allowed to proceed on his voyage overland to Plymouth, where a riot took place at his embarkation, much to Henry's annoyance (p. 84). *

The Duke of Alburquerque arrived towards the end of March, and received a welcome even more splendid than the Duke of Najera. Henry told Chapuys (p. 208), that "he had never seen or heard of a per-" sonage whose condition pleased him more," and whilst the duke was delayed in London on various pretexts, Henry begged Chapuys to beseech the Emperor to order Alburquerque to stay with him during the war. The proposal was far from pleasant to the duke and his people. "He would not," said Chapuys, "give a " farthing for all the offers of this King," (p. 208) and he ostentatiously continued the embarkation of his men and material. But to Chapuys, and apparently also to the Emperor, the proposal seemed a providential one, as it would presumably place at Henry's elbow a prime adviser who might influence him to the ends desired; and Alburquerque was ordered to place himself and his men at Henry's disposal. This was in April, and in the two months which elapsed before Henry himself crossed the Channel, Alburquerque was able to send to Spain, with the result, that—"On the same day that the king " went over to Calais, a ship arrived bringing 22 jennets, " the best to be found in all Spain; and there came many

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* A full and most interesting account of the visits of Najera and Alburquerque to England, as well as the share of the latter Duke and the Spanish mercenaries in the siege of Boulogne, will be found in the *Spanish Chronicle* of Henry VIII. Translated and edited from a contemporary MS.—presumably by Antonio de Guaras—by the present writer (London: 1889).

" Spanish gentlemen to serve under him, so that the duke
" had, with gentlemen and servants, fully 150 men, very
" gallant folk; for truly it was a sight to see the brave
" show he made, and the smart liveries he had. To more
" than fifty gentlemen he gave scarlet coats with mantles
" trimmed with gold, and to all the other people very fine
" red cloth with stripes of yellow velvet." *

The king of England and his household left London on the 8th July and arrived at his town of Calais on the 14th. Charles had dissolved the Diet at Spires on the 10th June, and had started on his journey from New Schloss on the 13th, entering Metz on the 16th June, and remaining there until the 6th July. On that date he set out by way of Pont à Mousson, Dreux, Penne, Nassau, and Ligny, to join his army before the town of St. Disier, where he arrived on the same day that Henry reached Calais. Up to the very day that Heny left Dover the imperial ambassador continued to remonstrate and complain to him about the shortcomings of his commissaries in Flanders, and the excessive demands made upon the Flemings for stores and transport; to which Henry or his council retorted in like manner, and threw the blame for the proposed delay before Montreuil, etc., upon the paucity of supplies furnished to him by his ally's subjects. A week after the king's arrival at Calais another attempt was made by de Courrières, sent by the Queen Stadtholderinn, to persuade him to fulfil the arrangement he had made with Gonzaga, and to send a large portion of his force forward into France, and, above all, not to take any personal share in the campaign. Courrières was instructed to " tell the King that the Emperor, alarmed " at his late indisposition, and fearing that it may
" be increased by the trouble, fatigue and privations of a
" campaign in the enemy's country, would beg him to
" remain at Calais and issue his orders from that town,

* Spanish Chronicle of Henry VIII.

" with less fatigue to his royal person. His imperial " Majesty would have wished for many reasons . . . . " that the King should not have quitted England . . . . " for fear the change of air should debilitate or prostrate " him " (p. 251). Before de Courrières arrived in Calais with this message on the 21st July, Henry had opened his mind in reply to similar remonstrances from Chapuys, who, much against his will, and praying for release from his embassy, had followed him thither. Henry was determined, he said, himself to reduce Boulogne and Montreuil, both of which were wavering, but was more than cool about the subsequent advance of his army (pp. 261 and 277); and Chapuys shrewdly suspected that if he remained in arms at all beyond the four months agreed upon, it would be for the purpose of advancing, not upon Paris, but into Normandy (p. 258). Henry's attitude was unquestionably strengthened by the fact that the imperial army itself had tarried before St. Disier, and had not entered France proper at the date settled; but what was of more importance still, was a direct offer to him of peace sent from Francis I. For some time past, more or less official negotiations had been going on between M. de St. Martin, M. de Framozelles, M. de Biez, and a burgess of Calais, named Francis Hall;* but on the 20th July, Francis I. wrote direct to Henry, offering to concede to him all the pecuniary claims he made (p. 254). Henry made the most of this offer in conversation with Chapuys, whilst saying that, of course, he should not treat separately from the Emperor. It is quite clear, however, that the process which has already been noted, of gradual separation of the interests of the two allies was continuing, and that the division between them was growing wider day by day. The " Old Man," or " Tour d'Ordre," as it was called by the French, a tower on the shore of Boulogne harbour,

* Information about this man will be found in " *The Chronicle of Calais*," *Camden Society*. He was apparently a Lincolnshire man, and died about 1550, leaving a son, who was the ward of Sir William Cecil.

opposite the town, had been captured and dismantled by the English, and the low town of Boulogne, had been burnt and evacuated by the French themselves; so that Henry was in high hope and spirits with the prospect of, in due time, extorting a peace on his own terms from the French. On the other hand, the imperial army had on the 16th July experienced a serious check in its assault of St. Disier, the Prince of Orange * being killed (p. 256), and a slight affair in which Charles's troops had been successful over Marshal Brissac at Vitry, was but a small set-off against the delay before St. Disier. It is not surprising, therefore, that even thus early the Emperor and his sister were already anticipating the probability of the king of England's making a separate peace, and leaving his ally in the lurch, with his army far into French territory, and a weak line of communications behind him (p. 273); and consequently, when renewed offers came by the Bailly of Dijon, from Francis to Charles himself, before St. Disier, based on the marriage of the third son of the former, the Duke of Orleans, to the daughter (Maria) of the latter, with Milan as a dower, the answer, though haughty, left the door open for a continuance of the negotiations (pp. 278, 282). At the same time, once more approaches to the English were made through the Duke of Norfolk at Montreuil; and M. de Framozelle succeeded in obtaining an interview with Henry himself, to whom he delivered the letter from Francis (pp. 253, 283). Chapuys, sick and old, had retired to St. Omer, but de Courrières was with Henry's camp before Boulogne when Framozelle arrived, and sent an account to the Emperor of Henry's reception of the peace proposals, as

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* This was René of Nassau, the young and childless head of the Nassau family, who by will left to his cousin, William the Silent, then only eleven years old, the vast possessions of the family in the Netherlands, and the small principality of Orange in the south of France (Vaucluse), which he, René, had inherited from his maternal grandfather. The title of Prince of Orange has from that date always been borne by the head of the Nassaus.

related to him by the King himself (p. 284). Henry kept up an appearance of refusing all overtures for a separate arrangement, whilst Framozelle disingenuously asserted that his master would rather die than approach the Emperor; to which Henry replied, "If the King your "master dislikes applying directly to the Emperor, I will "myself undertake the task. I will write and ask him for "the good of Christendom to consider what are the lowest "terms he will accept, in order to secure a good and lasting "peace." Henceforward the whole negotiation became a game of diplomatic finesse, in which each of the allies sought to become the arbiter of the terms of peace for the other; so that he might obtain better conditions for himself. In this contest, as will be seen by the correspondence, Henry was outwitted, mainly by the unscrupulousness of the Emperor and Granvelle. It will be seen that on the 26th July (p. 272), some days before Framozelle's interview with Henry, Charles had foreseen that this would be the result of the separate French proposals, and Cornelius Sceppur (M. D'ieck) was sent by the Queen Stadtholderinn for the purpose of putting Chapuys on the alert and spying out the land in this respect. In accordance with the urgent orders of the Queen, Chapuys, in spite of his illness, hurried to Boulogne early in August to remonstrate with Henry for so readily receiving French envoys without some previous communication with his ally. Chapuys and de Courrières saw the King on the 6th August (p. 288), and were met with the usual *tu quoque*, as Henry had heard that the French were making overtures to the Emperor. The next day Chapuys went alone to the tent of Paget, who was an old and intimate friend, and played his card. "Supposing, I said, from "what I have heard the King and yourself say, that the "former is inclined to a good peace of some sort, and "would not object to the negotiations for it commencing, "I do not see why the King should not specify and "name his terms at once." Paget was slow to respond,

and when two days afterwards, Chapuys again saw the King, he tried his hand upon him personally. "It would be " so much better," he said, "that the allies should know " each other's conditions, so that when the moment for " negotiation arrived, the matter would be simplified" (p. 293). He (the King) could have no hesitation, surely, in acquainting the Emperor's sister with his terms: "as no personage in the world could have more re- " gard for his honour and welfare than your Majesty " (*i.e.* the Stadtholderinn), or would have, moreover, a " greater power to persuade the Emperor." To this Henry retorted that if the Emperor would let him know what *his* terms were he (Henry) could as well carry out the negotiations as the Queen Stadtholderinn, and would take as much care for the Emperor's interest as for his own; and with this Chapuys had to retire discomfited. The old ambassador, who for so many years, and under such trying circumstances, had represented Charles at Henry's Court was now nearly at the end of his career. "I " humbly beg and entreat your Majesty," he wrote, "to " have pity on me, and my indisposition . . . . I " fear the least change may bring it on again: if so, I " am a lost man, without any hope of recovering here, " or being able to be transported elsewhere . . . . I " most earnestly, and for God's honour, beg your " Majesty to let me know what the Emperor thinks:" but withal the faithful old servant was kept at his post for some time longer yet, for no one could manage Henry so well as he. St. Disier capitulated on the 8th of August, and before the Emperor moved onward into the heart of France, he sent an envoy post-haste to Henry once more to urge upon him that the moment had now arrived for the fulfilment of the arrangement made with Gonzaga. The French forces were, he said, being with-drawn from Picardy, as the English were lying idly before two strong places, and the whole power of Francis would soon be concentrated in Champagne, to bar the advance

of the imperial army. Henry was exhorted to push, at least a portion of his army forward, in order that the French might be divided. Whilst this obviously fruitless appeal was being made to the English king, the thoughts of both parties were directed to the management of the peace negotiations. The season was becoming advanced for a campaign in an enemy's country, and the allies were drifting further and further apart. Charles's action was decidedly the bolder and more statesmanlike, for whilst the approaches of the French continued, he never ceased for a moment in his preparations for a forward movement, and even two weeks before the body of his army left St. Disier (25th August), a large re-inforcement of German troops joined him and advanced bodies of his men raided far ahead into France. It must therefore have been obvious to Francis that the Emperor, being the most formidable and aggressive of his two enemies, should be first seriously dealt with for peace. The Emperor's nephew, the Duke of Lorraine, was the new intermediary, and persuaded Charles to receive Claude d'Hannebault, Admiral of France, who was awaiting permission to approach him at Chalons, hard by. He was to come with a full escort as the avowed ambassador of peace from Francis. In conveying this piece of intelligence to Henry, the imperial ambassadors were instructed to hand to him a copy of the Emperor's first demands (p. 304), which were practically his orignal pretensions before the war. Charles foresaw that Henry would again wish to know what his lowest conditions were, and endeavoured to turn the tables upon him in anticipation, by complaining that he, Henry, had not told him the ultimate terms to which he would consent, deploring that he would have to learn them from his enemy, the King of France: "Indeed we doubt," he says, "whether in "acting thus the king of England is not sounding "us on that particular point, and wishing to know our "final intention, with a view himself to assume the leader-

" ship of the whole negotiations" (p. 300). There need be no doubt that such indeed was the case, but it is obviously even more true of Charles than of his ally, and that the former, and not the latter, carried his intention to a successful issue. The Emperor was very emphatic in his instructions, to Chapuys especially, that any attempt on the part of Henry to get into his hands the settlement of the imperial claims against France, was to be nipped in the bud. " Indeed it would be quite an " unreasonable and dishonourable act, considering the " quality of each of us . . . . and we should be " blamed hereafter . . . . if we placed in the king " of England's hands that which concerns Christendom " at large and the Holy Empire in particular." " Besides," adds Charles, " our claims against France are more im- " portant than his, our experience of negotiations with the " French is greater, and the force we have now in the field " is stronger." The skilful way in which Chapuys dealt with Henry in the matter, and the ineffectual attempts of the latter to place himself in the more favourable position in the negotiations are well displayed in Chapuys letter to the Emperor of the 3rd September (p. 313). As a set off to the visit of Claude d'Hannebault to the Emperor, Henry boasted that a similar embassy was coming to him led by Cardinal du Bellay; and only after much controversy and bickering between Paget and Chapuys, would the English consent to set forth their claims in writing, to be signed by the imperial ambassadors, and sent to their master. As might have been foreseen, Henry adopted the same course as that initiated by Charles; his claims being practically those formulated before the war (p. 325): " the exorbitance of which," writes Chapuys, " needs no enhancing on our part, for the " Gentleman in question boasted of it, and whoever " peruses them will at once pronounce them to be ex- " ceedingly harsh." Notwithstanding the protest of the ambassadors, however, these were the only conditions

which Henry would send to his ally by the envoy M. de Tourcoing, who at the same time carried to his master the final decision of the English king that he could not push any of his force forward towards the Somme, as arranged with Gonzaga in London; but that Charles must face alone the French armies, both of the King and the Dauphin Henry. In the meanwhile the peace negotiations between Gonzaga and Granvelle, and Claude d'Hannebault's embassy had not delayed the Emperor's forward march. Leaving St. Disier on the 25th August, he had rapidly advanced along the line of the Marne, although the presence of the Dauphin's army near Chalons prevented his crossing the river. By the aid, however, of Francis's mistress, the Duchess d'Etampes, who had continued to maintain a treacherous correspondence with him in the interest of a peace which should favour the King's third son, the Duke of Orleans, as against the Dauphin, Charles was able to seize both Epernay and Chateau-Thierry, where most of the stores for the Dauphin's army had been kept, whilst the latter was condemned to inaction by the orders of his father, influenced by the Duchess. The Dauphin, however, had fallen back some leagues below Chateau-Thierry, and on the capture of the late place, determined in any event to defend the capital. When Chateau-Thierry was captured (7th September), the peace negotiations with d'Hannebault were far advanced; the French, panic-stricken at the celerity of the Emperor's advance, were in a yielding mood, whilst Charles himself was feeling the necessity for a settlement. The much needed stores at Epernay and Chateau-Thierry had, in great part, been destroyed by the French before the capture, the imperial lines of communication were extended and weak, and the Dauphin had ravaged the surrounding country in order to deprive the imperialists of supplies. Charles, therefore, found himself deep in an enemy's country, short of victuals, with two French armies intact to face him;

whilst his ally the king of England still lingered before Boulogne and Montreuil; and refused to fulfil his part of the compact upon which the campaign was planned.

In this "perilous position," as the Emperor himself called it, he decided to send to Henry a message in the nature of an ultimatum. The envoy entrusted with the delicate mission was the young Bishop of Arras, Antoine de Perrenot, the future Cardinal de Granvelle, son of the imperial Secretary of State. The instructions given to him (p. 327) contain an able statement of the position of affairs from Charles's point of view. In effect, the message was that, if the King of England could not advance and form a junction with him as arranged, he had determined to make peace with Francis, "provided the latter paid his debts to the king of England." But, at the same time, Henry was assured that the French had been informed—"that nothing was to be negotiated, "much less settled, save with the full consent and approval "of King Henry, and to his complete satisfaction." The terms offered by the French to the Emperor were that Francis would make common cause with him against the Turk, either in men or money, would restore all that had been taken from the Duke of Savoy, and would arrange a marriage of the Duke of Orleans with the Emperor's daughter Maria, with the Low Countries or Milan as her dower; or as an alternative, with Catharine, daughter of Ferdinand king of the Romans, the Emperor's brother, with the same coveted dower, which, however, was never to be incorporated with the French monarchy. The hand of the Duchess d'Etampes was plainly visible in the last two proposals; as she would thus be assured of a safe asylum on the coming accession to power of her enemies, the Dauphin and Diane de Poictiers, who from the first opposed the treaty. The call upon Henry to advance in accordance with the agreement was merely formal, and intended as a basis for future protest: Charles had determined to make peace, and if the king of England

showed any signs of acceding to the request as to advancing his troops, Arras was instructed to discourage him by pointing out the difficulties and dangers of such a course (pp. 332, 333).

Arras arrived in the English camp, before Boulogne, on the 11th September, three days before the capture of the city. He saw the King at once, and at the first interview Henry left him in no doubt as to his intentions. The season was now too far advanced for the English army to move forward, and the four months agreed upon as the duration of the campaign had only a fortnight longer to run: if the Emperor had committed himself to so dangerous a course as to advance thus rapidly without support into an enemy's country, he must take the consequences. The English council, moreover, had nothing but disapproval of the proposed conditions of peace, more especially that relating to the possible marriage of the Infanta to a French prince, with the Netherlands as a dower; and condemnation more emphatic still was expressed as to the clause relating to England—"As to the offer made by "the French to the Emperor of a speedy and satisfactory "settlement of all English claims, the aforesaid privy "councillor declared to us, that the King considered them "quite insufficient, as the French had on former occasions "offered, not only to pay him in cash all arrears of debts "and pension, but to deliver into his hands as security the "towns of Montreuil, Boulogne and Ardres, promising "besides to abstain in future from giving help to the "Scots." The imperial ambassadors finally remonstrated forcibly with the King upon his undefined attitude. "It "was absolutely necessary," they said, "for us to know "what his intentions were as to peace or war with France, "in order that the Emperor might take a resolution in the "matter, and not be obliged to send almost daily mes-"sengers to enquire what his views and intentions are." Probably Henry was angry at this, or he may have over estimated the strength of his position, in view of the im-

pending fall of Boulogne; in any case, his answer, as reported to the Emperor (p. 340), produced momentous results for England, and was subsequently used by the imperialists as a pretext for their proceedings. The answer given direct to Arras is not to be found in this calendar, as he hurried back to deliver it verbally to the Emperor, leaving Boulogne apparently on the 12th September; but in an interview with the ambassadors Chapuys and de Courrières, a day or two afterwards, Henry repeated his reply to them—"The "King's resolute answer was the same as at other times, "namely, that his imperial Majesty might conclude a "separate peace, so far as he himself was concerned, with "France, provided that no article should be introduced in "the treaty likely to prejudice the confidence, intelligence, "and sincere amity between them, or the treaty relating thereto." How necessary it was for the Emperor to seize upon this, or any excuse, which should enable him to conclude a separate peace without waiting for his ally, will be seen (in addition to the reasons already set forth) by the letter (p. 342) from Francisco de los Cobos, the young regent Philip's principal adviser in Spain. He writes—"There is not one ducat left in all these "kingdoms of Spain, nor whence to get it, for this year, "the next, or even the third." * Not an hour, indeed, seems to have been lost by Charles. On the 14th September the Emperor wrote hastily to his sister that peace had been agreed upon between him and Francis, and the Queen Stadtholderinn, in conveying the news to Chapuys and his

* In the Cortes of Castile held at Valladolid in this year (1544), the Government begged the members to provide funds to meet "our great need." The principal reason for the convocation, wrote Philip to the city of Toledo, "was to consider what measures could be devised to provide for the extreme necessity experienced by these kingdoms, for their own defence:" but the members resolutely refused to vote more than the accustomed subsidy of 450 million maravedis, payable during the years 1546–7 and 8; most of which amount was already spent in anticipation. The members of the Cortes urged the Emperor most vigorously to make peace with France and return home to Spain. (See "*El Poder Civil en España*," by Danvila y Collado.)

colleague, for the information of Henry, strikes the note which was to be the dominant one throughout all the long series of recriminations which was to follow—"The "Emperor having heard from the mouth of the Sieur "d'Arras * what the King's answer was, when consulted on "the subject, has actually concluded peace with France." After this piece of news, and the intelligence that the French armies were about to march on the English before Montreuil, the formal profession of Charles's desire to maintain the closest possible friendship with his ally, must have sounded somewhat hollow to English ears.

The peace was finally concluded on the 18th, by Charles, at the Abbey of St. Jean des Vignes, near Soissons, only fifty miles from Paris, and was proclaimed on the following day at Crespy, in the neighbourhood; the Duke of Orleans and Comte de Vendome, with the Duke de Guise and others remaining with the Emperor as hostages. By order of the Stadtholderinn and the Emperor the news was conveyed to Henry as tenderly and diplomatically as possible, at the time when he and his Council were in close negotiation with Cardinal du Bellay's embassy for a peace between England and France. The English king listened unmoved to a declaration which could not have been unexpected to him, and in which no details of the terms were given, but when he was informed that the French armies, now free from the Emperor, were said to be converging upon his camp before Montreuil, "he changed colour and countenance," and expressed his disbelief of the rumour. But immediately after the imperial ambassadors left the King

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* It is a little difficult to follow the chronology here. The Queen in writing from Brussels on the 20th, referring to a letter from Charles dated 14th, when the preliminaries of peace had been agreed upon, but not ratified. It seems impossible for Arras to have arrived at Soissons (where the Emperor was) in so short a time; indeed, Vandernesse in his diary expressly states that Arras met the Emperor at Crecy on the 18th. Doubtless the Queen Stadtholderinn assumed that Arras had reached the Emperor before the peace was concluded, as she was, of course, already aware of the answer which Henry had given to him.

the effect of the news was seen in the attitude of the French embassy. For some days the French ambassadors had been trying to persuade Henry and his Council to give them, for transmission to Francis, a statement, signed by the King, of the terms he would accept. As it was known by the English that the object of this was to refer the settlement of their claims to the Emperor, the request was resolutely refused. Secretary L'Aubespine, however, had been sent to Paris, with an English courier, for the purpose of verbally reporting progress to Francis, and asking for instructions; and, at the solicitations of the French envoys, Henry had also consented readily to send a letter to his ambassador at the imperial Court, repeating in writing the answer that had been given to Arras and Chapuys (p. 353); namely, that the Emperor was free to proceed with his own negotiations for peace, provided that no harm should be done to the friendly alliance between the Emperor and England. L'Aubespine had started from Boulogne on the 17th September, and pledged himself to return with King Francis's answer within eight days. Before he arrived in Paris, however, the King of France had heard from his ambassadors the particulars of Henry's verbal demands, which he characterised as excessive and over-harsh, and ordered his envoys to endeavour to moderate. This letter was written from Paris on the 17th September; and, apparently, before it was dispatched, Francis learnt that the peace with the Emperor was practically concluded—as it was on the 14th—for a postscript was written by Francis himself, saying, that on mature consideration he had come to the conclusion that nothing more could be done with regard to the peace with England until he had again consulted the envoys, whom he therefore ordered to return immediately. In fact, the separate peace with the Emperor, in which the French had left the arbitration of the English claims to Charles, had entirely changed the situation. Henry and his

Council had been outwitted; they had cut the ground from under their own feet by their answer to Arras, and were now face to face alone with France. Henry was evidently dismayed at the prospect, and obstinately refused to let the French embassy go until L'Aubespine had returned with Francis's reply. Cardinal du Bellay protested vigorously against this, and threatened that such violence offered to ambassadors would be fittingly resented by the King of France. The English retorted that they had been played with, and refused to allow the envoys to leave. Chapuys, de Courrières, and Alburquerque were consulted, and were inclined, cautiously, to approve of the English retention of Du Bellay until the return of L'Aubespine, or at least until news arrived from the Emperor himself that peace had been made in conformity with Henry's answer to Arras. The dispute between the English Council and the French envoys became daily more bitter, and in one interview related by Chapuys (p. 359), Cardinal du Bellay lost his temper and entered into a most unseemly wrangle with the Bishop of Winchester (Gardiner), whilst Henry himself is described as being deeply moved at the trick of which he was the victim, although at this stage he did not yet openly blame the imperialists for their share in it.

When, however, the Queen Stadtholderinn's letter of the 20th, already referred to, brought news to Chapuys that peace had actually been arranged between her brother and Francis, the circumstances were changed. No sooner had the imperial ambassadors retired from Henry's presence, than the French ambassadors informed Gardiner that, not only had peace with the Emperor been agreed upon, but that Francis would depend upon the Emperor's advice with regard to the English claims; their King, moreover, had again ordered them to return at once, and the Dauphin, with his army, was approaching to raise the siege of Montreuil. The position was a most galling one for Henry. He complained, through Gardiner, of the

Emperor's proceedings, but dared not make the breach between him and his late ally wider at the moment; for if Charles construed too literally the terms of his new friendship with Francis, the case of the English army in France would be perilous in the extreme. Gardiner pointed out to Chapuys that Henry had entered the field relying entirely on the Emperor, and if the English force was to be overcome by the French, the imperial interests would suffer. Unless, also, provisions and stores were allowed to come over the Flemish frontier by way of St. Omer, the English would be starved. It behoved, therefore, the English Council to dissemble somewhat their indignation against Charles and his advisers until, at least, their pressing peril had passed. According to the treaty Henry had to depend upon the Emperor's ships to convey his army back to England at the end of the four months' campaign, and it is evident that considerable anxiety existed in the English camp, as the period approached, that there was no sign of the arrival of the transports on the French coast; but reassuring professions having been made by the ambassadors on this point, and that of the supply of victuals from Flanders; and the abandonment of the siege of Montreuil having been decided upon, King Henry began to complain of the peace having been made over his head; and for the first time, in an interview with Chapuys and de Courrières on 26th September (p. 369), denied having given to Arras the reply so frequently referred to. In the meanwhile the King was hastily making preparations to return to England, in order not to compromise his own prestige by being present at the retreat of his army from Montreuil, or at any disaster which might happen to it from the approaching force of the Dauphin, who had already crossed the Marne, and had cut off the English line of retreat by St. Omer.

The King embarked for England on the 30th September, as soon as his vanguard from Montreuil had arrived at Boulogne; the Dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, the

Bishop of Winchester, and other principal members of his Council, remaining in France with the troops left at Boulogne, and the imperial ambassador staying with them.

The Emperor, on his part, during his slow journey through Hainault to Brussels, endeavoured to bring about a peace between England and France. Henry's demands, which were handed to the Emperor by Dr. Wotton, were acknowledged to be excessive; and in the formal discussion of them by De Granvelle and Cardinal Tournon, the latter emphatically said that his master, the King of France, would never consent to a peace which should deprive him of Boulogne. This was seen by the Emperor to be the principal point of the negotiation; and for the purpose of strengthening Chapuys and de Courrières in their treatment of it, in the event of a new French embassy being sent to Boulogne, Arras was again instructed to go thither, and lend his influence in the cause of a pacific settlement. Before he arrived, the English Council and most of the troops had retired with the imperial ambassador to Calais, leaving Boulogne garrisoned for the winter; and Chapuys had so far prevailed upon the Council, in his talk of fresh peace negotiations, as to induce them to send to England for specials powers to deal with a new French embassy, although he said there was but little chance of their giving up Boulogne—"as "the King values this conquest much more than if he "had taken ten towns like Paris."

Arras arrived in Calais on the 5th October, having previously conferred with King Francis, d'Hannebault, and others. His mission was to bring forward again, as preliminaries of peace, the terms which had been proposed by Cardinal du Bellay in the previous month. These terms were generous enough (p. 390), and practically conceded all of Henry's financial demands; but the English King had added two conditions, which formed now a greater stumbling-block even than before:—"To

" renounce all rights, titles and interests which the King " of France may have or pretend to have on Boulogne " and the Boulonois, and to renounce all the county of " Guisnes."

It was the task of Arras to minimise these difficulties, and pave the way for the reception at Calais of the new French embassy, which was following him a day behind. The first difficulty was that King Henry had sailed for England, and that special powers had not yet arrived for the Council; but this was a point of secondary importance, which was soon overcome. The real question at issue was that of Boulogne; and the English Council, in their first interview with Arras, foreshadowed the line they would subsequently take. The treaties with the Emperor were invoked to show that he was bound to come to the aid of the English, unless the French army at once retired; because, by the treaty of alliance, aggression against either sovereign was to be repelled by the other.* This was the real pivot upon which the negotiations were to turn, the complaints of the English as to the insolence and threatening attitude of the French, though constantly repeated, being merely formal; and Arras, young as he was, showed consummate ability in pointing out the impracticability of the English claim upon the Emperor's aid. Chapuys, the grey-headed diplomatist, paid a handsome tribute to his youthful colleague in a letter (p. 401) written to Granvelle, the father of Arras:—" In which " conferences," he says, " M. de Courrières and myself " have been spectators and witnesses, rather than actors; " for greater reason had the apples in the fable to say, " 'We also can swim,' and the fly on the ox's horn to " boast that it was ploughing, than we ourselves had

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* When Henry II. invaded the Luxemburg in 1552, Charles invoked this treaty, and claimed the armed aid of England against France. Sir William Cecil's holograph report upon the claim to Edward VI. with the young king's notes thereon will be found in the King Edward's journal, reproduced in facsimile in Nares' *Life of Burghley*.

" to pretend to have been of any use or help to " M. d'Arras."

But great as was Perennot's ability, he was unable to move the English Council from the fixed determination of their King to retain Boulogne at any cost; and Chapuys, seeing the improbability of any result being attained, was opposed to the coming of any French embassy at all. After some demur on the part of Henry, who would have preferred to receive the French envoys in England, Seymour and Paget were joined, with the Dukes of Suffolk and Norfolk and the Lord Privy Seal (Russell), in a commission to negotiate in Calais. This, however, did not suit Cardinal du Bellay, a passionate, violent man, who still resented the treatment he had met with from the English during his former embassy. He and his colleague, Rémond, at first refused to advance beyond Ardres, and it required all the diplomacy of Arras to induce the French to give way on the point. The delay, on the other hand, greatly added to the indignation of the English. Gardiner and Paget bluntly told Arras that Francis could have but little real wish for peace, or he would not act in so overbearing a fashion; whilst King Henry himself wrote to the Emperor (Oct. 20) saying that, if any hitch should occur in the coming of the French embassy to Calais, or should no arrangement with them be arrived at, Gardiner and Seymour were to leave Calais at once and visit the Emperor—" to declare and " show you the manner of dealing of these Frenchmen, " and to declare to you what our opinion of their beha- " viour is." It is evident that the efforts and intentions of the English Council at this juncture were not towards peace, but to endeavour to draw Charles again into hostility against France, by virtue of the treaty of alliance with England. The Council at Calais lost no opportunity of reminding Arras that the alliance bound both Henry and Charles to maintain a large naval force in the Channel, independently of the actual war against France; but

Henry himself boldly went to the root of the question, and instructed Dr. Wotton to protest vigorously to the Emperor against his having made a separate peace at all, without seeing that English claims were satisfied; and to demand, as of right, the Emperor's armed aid against the threatened "invasion" by the French of Henry's "possessions" at Boulogne. To do this effectually, it was necessary to repudiate, or explain away, the unfortunate hasty reply given to Arras when he first went to Boulogne, namely, that the Emperor might make a separate peace if he pleased, provided that the treaty of friendship with England was not infringed (p. 412). "And as regards "your Majesty's (*i.e.* Charles) excuse," said Wotton, "that you were greatly influenced in making peace by "reason of certain words which M. d'Arras reported to "have been said by my master the King; his Majesty "gave no message to M. d'Arras on the subject, except "that, as regards the marriages, of which he had spoken "to my master the King, it appeared to his Majesty that "the lesser evil would be to choose the match which "involved the cession of Milan by your Majesty. Even "if the King my master had said that he would be "willing for your Majesty to make the best arrangement "you could with the French, that in no wise should be "understood as meaning that the King wished to change "any point of the treaty, for treaties are made between "great princes after great and mature deliberation, and "are set forth in writing. It is therefore not likely, "nor is it customary, for a solemn written treaty to be "changed by simple word of mouth, but when it is desired "to alter anything it is done in writing" * (p. 413). The Emperor's reply to Wotton's representation points out that Henry's delay in fulfilling his part of the arrange-

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* It will be seen that this passage does not agree with the version in the text, as is also the case with some other quotations in this introduction. Reference to the original French at the foot of page 413 will show that Señor Gayangos misunderstood the point at issue.

ment for the joint campaign, and the position of the imperial army at the time that Arras had gone to Boulogne, had produced a state of things which made procrastination and indefinite delay impossible for the Emperor. The sophistry about the Arras message is brushed aside without hesitation. The message, says the Emperor, has been repeated several times since by the members of the Council; besides, he asks how it is possible to reconcile the message as you now interpret it, namely, that each of the allies might treat separately, but simultaneously, with the continuance on each side of the obligations imposed by the close confederacy? The two things, he says, are incompatible; and, so with professions of regard and assurance that he has done, and will do, his best to bring about friendship between France and England, Charles repudiates all responsibility for giving armed aid to his late ally.

In the meanwhile, the peace negotiations at Calais made no progress. During the last week in October, the English Council had apparently made up its mind that no peaceful result would be obtained; and Gardiner and Seymour, in accordance with the King's orders, set out to visit the Emperor at Brussels.

The departure of these two principal councillors was another grievance to the irritable du Bellay, and he and his colleagues broke off the negotiations and returned to France in the first days of November. The position was now simplified. The armies on both sides had gone into winter quarters; Boulogne was sufficiently garrisoned by the English, and Henry's whole efforts were directed to dragging the Emperor again into the war in the spring; or failing that, to obtain such material support from him as should enable the English King, after another successful campaign, to conclude a peace which should leave the Boulonois in his possession.

On the 29th October Gardiner and Seymour held a lengthy conference with Granvelle and Le Praët at Brus-

sels, at which the English began by saying that "they saw "no way to secure peace save that of the Emperor com- "pelling the King of France to it by declaring him his "enemy, and making war upon him. In this the ambas- "sadors persisted, adding that the declaration of war "against France, *to which your Imperial Majesty was* "*bound by treaty*, ... would greatly increase your "reputation, whilst it would stop the mouths of those who "might speak ill of your Majesty for having extricated "yourself from the war, whilst leaving them (the Eng- "lish) in the lurch." The reply to the English claims was, as before, a statement that Henry had failed to fulfil his part of the bargain made with Gonzaga in London, and that when this had made it necessary for the Emperor to enter into negotiation, the King had given his full consent (to Arras) to his making a separate peace (pp. 429, 456). The English representatives retorted that Charles's own delay before St. Disier, and the paucity of provisions, had caused Norfolk to besiege Montreuil, instead of crossing the Somme, such variations from the original plan of campaign having been necessary, and in reasonable subordination to the general joint objects in view. The knotty question of the King's speech to Arras was again explained. If he said anything of the sort, "Certain it is that his intention and meaning was, that he "assented to the peace being made between the empire "and France, provided his own rights (*i.e.* claims) were "safeguarded." These points were dealt with in a recriminatory spirit in the course of many conferences, the English ambassadors claiming that the invasion of Boulogne and Guisnes by the French was an act of aggression within the meaning of the treaty, and that Charles was bound to declare war in consequence, whilst the Emperor's ministers, with infinite length and learning, argued otherwise. Early in November a stronger argument was furnished to Henry by the predatory landing of a few Frenchmen in Kent, and the King himself now wrote to the

Emperor (p. 444) claiming that this, at all events, formed a *casus belli*. But nothing would move Charles to recommence the war with France for the sole purpose of increasing the English territory on the continent. His coffers were empty, his health was broken, and the great religious question in Germany was fast hurrying towards civil war. Peace, therefore, between the Catholic powers was the first need, and to weaken his Catholic neighbour Francis, for the sole benefit of the schismatic King of England, would have been bad policy indeed, now that there was a prospect of the vital question of Milan being settled amicably in his favour. He would do what he could to reconcile France and England, if the latter would only be reasonable; but he would not again draw the sword in the quarrel.

With this resolution Gardiner and Seymour left Brussels for England on the 25th November, to be followed in a few days by Charles's new resident ambassador, the Fleming François Van der Delft, who was to replace the aged Chapuys at Henry's court. In the instructions to the new ambassador, with whom nominally Chapuys was at first associated, the whole points of the controversy with the English were once more set forth, in order that they might be repeated to Henry personally (p. 447), which they were, but with as little effect as before. The papers relating to Van der Delft's negotiations, and the Anglo-French campaign in the following year, will be abstracted in the next volume of this Calendar.

In pursuance, meanwhile, of his new policy of drawing together the Catholic powers before the rising tempest of religious reform, Charles was industriously making friends with the Pope (Paul III.), who, on his part, was eagerly welcoming the Emperor's advances. The Farneses had not hitherto had much cause to be grateful to him. The Popes had looked jealously upon the growing influence of Spain—as apart from the Empire—over Italy, and had sided with France, the Venetians, and the Turks, in coun-

teracting it. Paul III., like his predecessors, had chafed and struggled at the successful and increasing efforts of Charles to weaken the power of the Pontiffs over the Roman Church in Spain; but the secret conditions of the peace of Crespy, which bound together the league of Catholics to crush Lutheranism for once and for all, brought the Pope to Charles's side. He proposed to hold a general council of the Church to devise means for the "reduction" of the heretics, and the resistance against the Turk, and offered to contribute liberally to either or both objects, on the hinted condition that the Emperor should let bygones be bygones, and aid in protecting the interests of the Pope's family (p. 464). He also offered to give way on another point, which he knew was near to the Emperor's heart, namely, the control of Rome over the Spanish clergy. The Emperor told his ambassador in Rome that there would be no harm "in appearing as if we "had forgotten past events, and were likely to accept his "Holiness's offers as conveyed to us by his Nuncio." But he made it clear at the same time that Paul would have to be much more explicit, and make greater concessions before he would be contented. The enterprise against the Turk is treated coolly, placed in the background, and the coercion of the Lutherans made, as indeed it was at this time, the principal subject of the settlement, although Charles does not hesitate to say that he deeply distrusts the Pope's sincerity on both points (p. 474). "But," continues the Emperor, "should his Holiness help us with "a good sum of money, such as 600,000 or at least "500,000 ducats, we think that so meritorious an enter-"prise as the reduction to the faith of the Lutherans, "might easily be carried out, particularly if the council "of the Church co-operate towards it. Should, therefore, "his Holiness consent to do this, and at the same time "will despatch the pending ecclesiastical business we have "at Rome, ... he may be sure we will forget the "past, and be his dutiful son and true friend, continuing

" to be, as hitherto, the protector of his family." All through this important letter (p. 463), it is evident that the great project of utterly crushing religious reform in Germany, and subsequently dealing with the Turk, was already fully formed in the Emperor's mind, and that the plans of almost universal dominion for his son Philip, which ripened after the battle of Muhlberg (1547), were perhaps even thus early foreshadowed as a result of his present policy.

The hard terms of the treaty of Crespy, to which the Emperor had been constrained to consent—harder, said the King of England, than if he had been vanquished instead of victor—included one of the two alternative marriages; that of the Infanta Maria, or of the daughter of Ferdinand, with the Duke of Orleans, the younger son of Francis; the bride bringing as a dower Flanders and the other territories formerly belonging to the house of Burgundy, or the duchy of Milan, and it was incumbent upon the Emperor to notify within a given time the match which he preferred. Charles de Valois was not a desirable bridegroom. He was a vicious youth, with no portion of his own, and doubtless the only consideration which led Charles to accept the condition was, that under no circumstances should the territory bestowed upon the bride be merged into the French dominion; which, in other words, meant that it was to be a state dependant upon the Emperor. But even thus, as the time approached for the fulfilment of the condition, it was less and less relished by the Emperor and his advisers; and several pretexts were suggested by which it might be avoided, such as the non-compliance on the part of Francis with certain articles of the treaty, and the bridegroom's lack of a corresponding dower to that of the proposed bride. It is evident, however, that the fatal decision permanently to attach the Low Countries to the crown of Spain, which was subsequently one of the principal causes of the ruin of the Spanish power, had

not yet been adopted by the Emperor himself, as he contemplated the possibility of alienating Flanders to his daughter. It was in Spain, and from amongst the advisers of young Philip, that the opposition to the cession of territory came. The Emperor in a note to Philip, sent by Secretary Idaquez, instructed him to summon the Council of State to deliberate upon the alternative marriages, together with their corresponding cessions of territory, and to advise the Sovereign on the subject.

The councillors, who had been placed by the Emperor by the side of his son, were the wisest and most experienced statesmen of the age. The Duke of Alba, Cardinal Tavara, Cardinal Loaysa, and especially Cobos, were versed in all the arts of government, and these were aided by others, who, though of less celebrity, were hardly less wise. For the consideration of the subject Philip added to these experienced ministers the three first jurists in Spain, the president of the Council of Castile, the Vice-Chancellor of Aragon, and the famous Dr. Guevara. The young regent, grave beyond his years, wisely determined first to consult privately the feelings on the subject of his sister the Infanta Maria herself, and fortified by the knowledge thus gained, he summoned the great Council at Valladolid, to deliberate upon the question submitted to them. The details of their various lengthy discussions will be found on pages 478, *et seq.*; and although the councillors were profoundly divided as to which would be the smaller of the two evils proposed, they were quite unanimous in their outspoken distrust of the French, and their dislike to any condition which should involve the cession of territory at all. Whatever may have been young Philip's personal view, if he had one on the subject, it is certain that Alba, probably for purposes of his own, was always desirous of securing for Philip the reversion to the empire, and the complete Spanish dominion over Italy, to the exclusion of Ferdinand and

Maximilian. Whilst, therefore, deprecating the alienation of Flanders, he led the majority of his colleagues in the arguments in favour of retaining Milan at any cost, even if Flanders had to be handed over as a bride's dowry. Alba and his party, at least, saw that, important as the possession of the Low Countries might be to the imperial power in Germany, its permanent retention as an appanage of the Spanish crown was difficult and dangerous. They acknowledged that Spanish commerce was benefitted by the possession of Flanders:—"but to judge from the past "no great assistance can be expected therefrom in other "matters to the Spanish crown. The government "and administration of Flanders in the absence of its "natural lord must always offer difficulties, and be very "costly." Besides which, as the Milanese territory was on the high road by which Spanish troops passed into central Europe and Flanders overland, the cession of Milan would, in any case, place the Low Countries at the mercy of France; and Alba, Cobos, and others, for this and many other wise and far-seeing reasons decided that if a territorial dower were given at all, it should be part of Flanders rather than Milan. Cardinal Tavara, the rival of Cobos, was, with Guevara and others, of different opinion. The penetration of French influence into Flanders, under any form or pretext, they thought, would enable Francis to absorb small neighbouring states, and undermine the Emperor's authority over the Princes of the empire:—"and in process of time, become superior to, "and greater than the King, who may, eventually, "wear the crown of these Spanish realms." The fear here expressed is evidently that the French King, or his successors, might champion the cause of protestantism; a danger that both at the time, and subsequently, was far from a visionary one.

As a result, probably, of this conference, the Emperor, late in December (p. 474) wrote to King Francis, informing him, with some circumlocution, that he had

decided in favour of the marriage of his niece Catharine, daughter of the King of the Romans (Ferdinand), with the Duke of Orleans, her dowry being taken from the Low Countries, as agreed. But the decision was but a lukewarm one, for no arrangements were suggested for carrying it out, and several questions were raised with regard to the non-fulfilment of the treaty on the part of France, and the want of a corresponding dowry for the proposed bridegroom. If the Emperor and his Councillors looked coldly upon the terms of the treaty of Crespy, the French themselves, especially the Dauphin Henry, had no greater love for them. The whole benefit to be gained was the personal aggrandisement of the Duke of Orleans, and the satisfaction of the Duchess d'Etampes. In return for this the French were to surrender all they had conquered from the Duke of Savoy, give up Stenay to Lorraine, and, above all, relinquish for ever their persistent claim to Milan. Before, therefore, the Emperor signified his decision, the Dauphin, at Fontainebleau, signed a formal denunciation of the whole treaty. In the meanwhile the Duke of Orleans and the Duchess d'Etampes were being splendidly entertained at Brussels; and early in the following year the French hostages with the Emperor returned to their own country. The papers in the present volume close at this point, and the final frustration of the treaty of Crespy by the untimely death of the Duke of Orleans must be dealt with later. The year 1544 ends with Henry still at war, sore and indignant at the way in which he had been juggled out of the peace; but determined to make a good fight of it in the coming spring, both by land and sea, engaging mercenaries, organising for the first time a formidable English navy, and grimly holding on to Boulogne, which was closely besieged by the French. On the other hand, the Emperor, though crippled and suffering, was planning his great blow against Lutheranism; the Council of Trent was slowly gathering to aid in the

work, upon which papal money, imperial prestige, and Spanish spears were to be lavished without stint; the work of reducing Christianity on the continent to one pattern, and rendering Charles and his descendants the supreme rulers of the civilised world.

MARTIN A. S. HUME.

CALENDAR OF STATE PAPERS.

SPANISH, HENRY VIII.

1544.

— Jan. **1. JUAN DE VEGA to PRINCE PHILIP.**

S.E., Roma.

"Señor,"—Cardinal Farnese * has heard of His Imperial Majesty's goodwill and inclination to peace, and says that His Holiness is about to send two legates, one to His Imperial Majesty, the other to king Francis, though he (the Pope) knows by experience that legacies and missions very seldom produce the effect for which they are meant, and have on the contrary done mischief and harm. It would be much better (he says) not to send legates at all.

The Cardinal, however, thinks that the Pope will in the end decide to send a legate to His Imperial Majesty; but he will like to know beforehand how his legate is to be received for fear he should fail in his object, as the bishop of Viseu (Sylva) once did. "To treat of peace between two such powerful princes as the Emperor and king Francis (continued the Cardinal), more is needed than the mere courtly demonstrations resulting from legacies of that sort."

The Cardinal then began to speak about the last Diet, and asked a number of questions. The answer returned to him was that His Imperial Majesty, being at war with king Francis, had more important business to attend to than to go into details and explain his motives and intentions. His Holiness (said the Cardinal) has already declared openly and signified to the prelates and ecclesiastics who attended it, as well as to the Papal Nuncio, what his reasons are for acting as he is doing; besides which the persons appointed by him to attend the next sitting of the Diet will have full cognizance of the affairs treated and resolutions taken therein.

My last Instructions from the Emperor are as follows:— "Should the Legates and the breve of revocation of the last Papal bull not have left Rome, the Imperial ambassador is to make every effort to stop the Legates and the 'breve' also;

* Alessandro, son of Pier Luigi, duke of Castro, about whom *see* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 199, 209–13, 260, 400.

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but should the Legates have started on their respective missions, His Holiness is to be urgently requested, in the Imperial name, to have them recalled. As to Our Royal rescript *pragmatica*, you must address His Holiness in the very same terms that Our son, Prince Philip, has done, warning him (the Pope) before he issues the revocation that his bull will not be obeyed here [in Spain]."

Spanish. Original. 1½ *pp.*

n. d. **2.** JUAN DE VEGA to ————.*

S.E. Roma, L. 847. You shall call on His Holiness and say that I (Vega) have communicated to the Emperor and to His Royal Highness Prince Philip, his son, the conversation I had with him, as well as my own individual opinion of the measures likely to be taken at home respecting matters in which the inhabitants of the various Spanish kingdoms consider themselves to be much aggrieved. That I myself have sent home a report of what His Holiness intends doing in the matter. You will add in my name that I have written to the Emperor, and to his son in Spain (prince Philip), describing the good disposition in which I have found him (the Pope), and that I confidently hope, nay trust, that my efforts with the Emperor and with his son will meet with complete success, and some effectual means be found to give complete satisfaction to the Holy Apostolic See.

Do tell him that after the affair had been closely examined in Spain by people of reputation and learning in such matters, and well known also from their devotion to the Apostolic See and to His Holiness in particular, it was resolved, after mature deliberation, that the provision lately made in Spain about the matter is good and just, and that His Holiness ought to consider it as such.

You will also say that I beg and entreat him to consider whether instead of a vigorous revocation of the measure it would not be better and more convenient, as he himself has frequently admitted, to recall or revoke his own Apostolic bull, and not let what the laws and customs of Spain have established for ages go to ruin, be disobeyed, and held as nought.

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*†

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* Most likely to Dr. Conciano or Conchano, at the time chargé d'Affaires at Rome owing to the Imperial ambassador's absence. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 572–5.

† These two letters (Nos. 1 and 2) are preserved at Simancas, and copies of them may be found in Bergenroth's Collection (Vol. XXII., pp. 291, 295). Neither of them is dated, nor is there any clue as to the place at which they were written. In the above-mentioned Collection (No. 28,593) both are calendared in January, and certainly one of them, if not both, refers to the celebrated "pragmatica," or Royal rescript promulgated by the Emperor in January 1544, forbidding the grant of ecclesiastical benefices to foreigners.

1544.

3 Jan. **3.** THE EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Venerable chier et feal,"—This will be for the purpose of informing you that the English ambassador,* who resided formerly at the Court of Our sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, and is now here with Us, spoke to Us on Sunday last on three different points. One was about Our sending to the King, his master, 500 Spanish hackbutiers out of those We have in Our army here, alleging that the King, his master, had already remitted the money for the men, and sent commissaries for conducting them to England. The second point was that we should hold the Scots as enemies, declaring them to be such, and interdicting their trade with Our dominions and subjects. The third was the 1 per cent. tax (*le centiesme denier*).

Respecting the first point, We remonstrated with the ambassador, telling him the want in which We Ourselves were of the said Spaniards, detached as they are now in the Luxenburg and in the Cambresis; wherefrom they could not at present be withdrawn without serious inconvenience, inasmuch as in the one as in the other of these provinces the common enemy are continually making inroads. That We had already dismissed and paid up the greater part of Our infantry, and that if from those remaining in Our service We were to withdraw the 500 hackbutiers now asked for, the infantry, which constitutes the nerve and soul of Our army, would become considerably weakened and unable to do efficient service hereafter.

To the second point the answer has been similar in every respect to that given to the Sieur de Briant,† namely, that whenever the King declared open war against the Scots, and had actually suspended the intercourse of trade with his own dominions, We should not fail to execute and accomplish whatever engagements were made or entered into by the last treaty.

With regard to the third point Our ministers have represented to the English ambassador that at Our departure from this place We shall particularly recommend to Our sister, the Queen, to take a good and final resolution in the matter, and that she, herself, will begin the moment we are gone to look into it most carefully.

Although the above-mentioned answers to the two first points, on which the English ambassador has particularly insisted, are reasonable and justifiable enough; although Monsgr. de Granvelle, to whom We referred him, has since spoken to him on the subject, yet the English ambassador does not seem at all satisfied, finding it very strange, as he says, that We should refuse to his master, the King, the 500 Spanish hackbutiers on whom he counted, and for whose enlistment

* Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury.

† In Oct. 1543 Sir Francis Briant was sent to the Emperor for a similar purpose. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 514, 523, 528.

1544.

the King had already remitted the necessary funds, besides having sent commissaries to conduct them to England. As to the Scots the English ambassador affirms that his master is already at war with them, insisting that the hackbutiers are really wanted, and that the King cannot do without their services. Notwithstanding these and other excuses, which the above-mentioned Briant found plausible and reasonable, when he spoke to Us on the subject, being apparently satisfied and adding, before he went away, that his master had not yet lost all hope of coming to terms with the Scots, this new resident ambassador will not accept Our said excuses, and insists upon Our sending to his master 500 Spanish hackbutiers to serve on the borders of Scotland.

We have considered it necessary to let you know in detail what passed with the English ambassador in order that with your usual dexterity and wisdom you may try to give satisfaction to the King on the three above-named points in conformity with the answer given to the English ambassador and Our own excuses, which, We repeat, are perfectly true, just, and reasonable, the more so, in regard to the first point, namely, that of the Spanish infantry, as We do not hesitate to say, that the number of those now with Us is really very small, many of them having perished during last year,* so much so that We have been obliged, as Don Fernando well knows, to send expressly to Spain for more. Besides which, as far as the Scots are concerned, it must be considered that apart from the text of the treaty of alliance between the king of England and Us there are other reasons to be taken into account, such as Our old confederacy with the Scots and the intercourse of trade with them, which it would be quite unreasonable and dishonest to break through at once without the above-expressed conditions of the King being actually at war with them.†

We left Brussels yesterday, and shall prosecute Our march to-day and to-morrow, counting upon being at Liège on the eve of the Epiphany; We shall pass that festival in Liège, and on the following day shall proceed by the route which, according to information, may seem to Us most commodious and secure, having ordered that a detachment of horse and foot go in front.‡

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* "Et mesmes qui, comme luy a este dict, le nombre en est petit, et en avons beaucoup perdu ceste annee."

† "Et quant aux dits Escossoys oultre le texte du traicté d'entre le dit sieur roy et nous [il] convient qu'ayons regard à ce qu'avons confederation et communication avecq iceulx Escossaiz, la quelles (*sic*) par raison et honnestete ne pouvons rompre sans les conditions ovant dites."

‡ "Faisant compte d'estre à Liège la veille des [Trois] Roys et y sesjournerons le jour, et des la passer oultre par le chemin que des lors nous adviserons selon les advertissements qu'aurons de la commodite et sheurete du chemin pour la quelle avons pourveu de quelque nombre de gens de cheval et de pied quest tout ce que pour le moment, &c." According to the Emperor's Itinerary by Vandenesse, on the 2nd of January 1544 Charles left Brussels for Louvain; he did not reach Liège till the 5th, after passing Tillemont and Tongres.

1544.

This is all We can tell you for the present. We presume that if Don Fernando * is still in England, you will communicate with him respecting the contents of this letter, and should he have left We refer you to what We write to him, of which a copy is enclosed.—Louvain, 3 of January 1543 [Old style].

French. Original minute. 3 *pp.*

6 Jan. **4.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Since the departure of the viceroy of Sicily nothing important has occurred here. This king is daily, nay from hour to hour (*et d'heure à aultre*), showing the greatest possible care and activity in preparing for the military undertaking in contemplation. Indeed, I am given to understand that his intentions are to make still greater efforts than he promised me some time ago.

Last week his ministers ordered the seizure at Dover of three ships (*navires*) laden with salt herrings, which Alexander Antenory, Symon Reory, and others were sending to France with your Majesty's permission and safe-conduct. Not having heard of the seizure of those ships until this very morning, and being ignorant also on what grounds it has taken place, and what this king's privy councillors intend doing with the ships, I cannot at present say more about the affair, but hope to be able to-morrow or later on to learn the truth, and report accordingly.

I humbly beg your Majesty that the payment of my personal salary, amounting to ———,† may not be delayed. I now send to Flanders the bearer of this letter, one of my secretaries, to claim the amount of my arrears, and lest he should have to remain [in Brussels] six or seven months, as he did last time, when sent on a similar errand, I have instructed him to wait first on your Majesty, and most humbly beg in my name that most pressing orders be sent at once to the treasurers in Brussels.—London, 6 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed; "To the Emperor."
French. Original. 1 *p.*

7 Jan. **5.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.
Rep. P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Madame,"—Since the departure of the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga) ‡ nothing important has occurred in this country. The king is showing great care and activity, etc.

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* That is Ferrante Gonzaga, duke of Molfetta, and viceroy of Sicily for the Emperor. He had been in London a few days, in December 1543, to arrange with king Henry the plan of campaign against France. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 526–8.

† There is a blank for the amount, which is said elsewhere to have been thousands of crowns.

‡ Gonzaga must have left London at the end of December. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 544.

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[The rest of the letter as in his dispatch to the Emperor of the 5th of January, with the following paragraph in his own hand]:

"I am really ashamed of my importunities with regard to my salary; but I cannot do otherwise, and, therefore, most humbly beg your Majesty to remind the treasurers that for several months past no payment has been made to my agents in Brussels.—London, 7 January 1544."

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

7 Jan. **6.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MONSEIGNEUR DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Monseigneur,"—This king is writing to the Emperor respecting the Milanese physician.* The purport of his letter is, that having resided so long in England, and even taken out letters of naturalisation, he (the physician) can only be judged by Englishmen.

Begs him to take charge of his private affairs and have his arrears of salary paid.—London, 7 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

7 Jan. **7.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—I beg Your Lordship to attend to my humble prayer to the Emperor, as in the enclosed, and to do your best for the speedy settlement of my arrears, for I am, indeed, in extreme want.

This King is now writing to his ambassador at the Imperial court respecting the Milanese physician, and the Emperor's letter to him. The King's answer is to this effect:—"That as the physician has resided very long in England, taken out letters of naturalisation, and has, besides, sworn to the statutes of the kingdom, he must needs be tried and judged as if he were an English subject, if he by the said letters of naturalisation—which, after all, are a privilege—had actually renounced the allegiance due to his natural lord, as well as the obligation under which he may be to the Apostolic See." Such a reasoning on the part of this King's ministers may have very serious consequences in future on many considerations, which I have no time at present to lay

* Baptozard Guerche (Baldasaro Il Guercino?) a singularly clever surgeon and physician, about whom *see* Vol. VI. Part II., pp. 538-9. He is said to have been a native of Il Boscho, near Milan. He was arrested in December 1543 and sent to the Tower, at the same time as two familiar friends of the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner) for having asserted in public the authority of the Pope in Church matters.

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before Your Lordship; but I readily submit to your good judgment.—London, 7 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "A Monseigneur, Monsr. de Grantvelle (*sic*), knight, first councillor of State, and lord Privy Seal (*garde des Sçeaulx*) to the Emperor."

French. Holograph. 1 *p.*

9 Jan. **8.** The Same to the Emperor.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Sire,"—By my preceding letter of the 6th inst. I informed Your Majesty that this King's ministers had ordered the seizure of three ships (*navires*) with cargoes of salt herrings, which by stress of weather (*fortune de mer*) and contrary winds had been obliged to put in at Dover, where two more ships with a similar cargo have since taken refuge. The herrings are the property of Alexander Antenory & Co., of Antwerp, who, with proper licence and safe-conduct from Your Majesty, were sending them to Bordeaux. Whatever remonstrances have been addressed by me to this King's privy councillors on the subject telling them that the article seized could not be kept long—being of a nature much subject to rot and decomposition—and that it was far preferable to give up the affair altogether, and get from the common enemy either money or some other merchandize instead, of a more durable kind, I have as yet been unable to obtain from the privy councillors proper reparation on that score, they alleging, among other reasons, that too much money had been spent by the King last year in naval armaments in order to deprive the French of the herring fisheries to allow them to be supplied now with the same sort of article. All his outlay of money (said the privy councillors) would count for nothing if, after all, the French were permitted to procure the article in another way.

Our* answer to that objection has been that the two cases were totally different; for, had they allowed the French to fish for their own herrings, it would not have cost them (the English) anything, and the enemy would not have had their money as on this occasion, when they will be obliged to repurchase the fish.† We, moreover, called the privy councillors' attention to the fact respecting the quality of the safe-conducts; they ought to consider, we said, that there was a great difference between Antwerp and London; for here in London the merchants are almost all natives of England, whereas Antwerp is full of merchants of all nations dealing in all sorts of merchandize, and, therefore, that it is

* Meaning himself and his colleague.

† "Leur a este respondu quil y avoit grande difference car les permettant pescher leur harengs que il ne leur eu[t] riens couste, et n'en eussent eu leurs ennemy largent comme à ceste heure quilz sont constraintz par necessite [de] les surachapter."

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just and convenient for the advantage and profit of merchants in general that the intercourse of trade be not interrupted.

Notwithstanding these and other like arguments of ours the King's privy councillors persist in their determination, and seem decided not to allow any merchandize to go into France, nor pass thence into Flanders, giving us to understand that the treaty of closer alliance between the two princes (the Emperor and their master) expressly forbids it With regard to the fish, they intend taking that portion of it that may be wanted for the provision of England, paying for it such a sum of money as may seem reasonable, the remainder of the ships' cargoes to go back to Flanders, that is, supposing that the herrings do not belong to French merchants; for, if they do, they will consider them a good prize, and will allow nothing for them. Respecting the ships themselves, until they ascertain whether they belong to Frenchmen or not they will not be released.

As the ambassador* of this King now resident at Your Majesty's court has charge of reporting on this particular, I will say no more about it for the present; but I beg to be apprized of Your Majesty's determination and receive instructions thereon.—London, 9 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Original. 2 *pp.*

10 Jan. **9.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—I have purposely delayed writing to you during the Emperor's stay in this country† (*par decha*), knowing that the Sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*) has communicated with you continually and reported news. Not having had anything of my own to say I have left off writing for some time; but since His Imperial Majesty has departed for Germany I shall, in obedience to his commands, resume my task and inform you of every occurrence in the Emperor's march. In the first place, you must have heard that the ambassador who for some time back has resided here for the king of England, that is, Master Nicolas Woutton,‡ has been ordered to follow His Imperial Majesty, instead of the bishop of London, the former ambassador at the Imperial court. Master Woutton at the very first audience he had from the Emperor asked him, in his master's name, for a certain number of Spanish hackbutiers to serve on the Scotch borders; but this the Emperor refused, on the plea

* Nicholas Wotton.

† Mary's last letter to Chapuys is dated December 1543. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 544. The Emperor, according to Vandenesse, arrived at Brussels on the 23rd December 1543, and left on the 2nd of January 1544.

‡ Nicholas Wotton, who in Nov. 1543 was accredited to the Emperor. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 525. He replaced the bishop of London, Edmund Bonner.

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that he could not possibly part with them without completely unfurnishing, as it were, the Spanish infantry he brought with him and who are now wintering in this country; he would rather send to England the whole of his Spaniards than the number of hackbutiers asked for, without whom the rest of his army would be of very little service to him.* The English ambassador was anything but pleased at this answer of the Emperor's ministers.

After that the ambassador complained about the 1 per cent. duty on all goods and merchandize imported from this country by the English, and asked the Emperor to be pleased to have it removed. The Emperor referred him to the Sieur de Grantvelle, to whom he has since made a similar complaint. It has been decided that the answer to the ambassador's application is to be thus conceived: It was agreed that English merchants should be exempted from payment of the 1 per cent. duty on all goods and merchandize they exported from these Low Countries They ought to be contented with that and not insist further on the entire and complete exemption from duty, as otherwise so many frauds would be committed that it would be impossible to detect them all.† It is, moreover, to be considered that the duty was merely imposed for the sake of, and during the continuance of, the present war with the French, as a sort of subvention to meet the excessive expenditure of these Low Countries in the conflict, as a tax, in short, equally profitable to the subjects of both nations, since by helping the inhabitants of these Low Countries to resist better the attacks of the common foe, the English, bound as they are by treaty to contribute with men or money towards the defence of these countries, would in a measure be relieved from part of their obligations. If to this be added that the thing in itself is so insignificant for the English merchants that it is hardly worthy of mention, you will easily understand why We refuse to comply with the demand. But, in spite of all the remonstrances Our ministers addressed to him on this subject, the English ambassador was dissatisfied, and maintained that English merchants in general ought to be completely exempted, and that the act and ordinances exempting them from payment of duty on their own goods when imported into the Low Countries ought to be changed inasmuch as they were only meant as provisional measures. To this argument of the English ambassador Our ministers replied that he (the ambassador) ought to be satisfied with the fact that no duty was levied on goods and merchandize of these countries when exported to England, and that the proclamation (*placart*) in virtue

* "Dont Sa ma^te^ s'excuse par ce qu'il ny sçaueroit (*sic*) envoyer sans entierement defurnir (defournir) les Espaignolz quil a faict yverner de par decha, et vauldroit autant envoyer en Engleterre tous les ditz Espaignolz que y envoyer les hacbutiers sans les quelz les aultres ne sçaueroient faire service."

† "Et sur ce que lui a este remonstré qu'on avoit accordé que les Englois seroient exemptz du centiesme pour les marchandizes quilz mesnent en Engleterre, dont il se debvoit contenter sans insister plus avant, aultrement se commetteroient tant de fraudes que impossible y seroit obvier."

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of which the duty of 1 per cent. was levied did not expressly refer to the English, but to foreign merchants in general. And on the ambassador observing that notwithstanding that the English themselves might one of these days be compelled to pay the duty, Our minister told him that whenever that came to pass, then it would be the time and opportunity to complain, not now.

We inform you of these particulars in order that should the ambassador, who, as it would appear, is influenced in this matter by personal interests (*par grande affection*), write home about it, you may make such representations as you deem most fit for the reasonable satisfaction of the privy councillors, dwelling on the small importance of the affair as far as the English are concerned, and of what harm it would be for the Emperor's subjects were the total exemption to be granted as the English demand. His Imperial Majesty finds the ambassador's demand not only unreasonable, but tending to do away altogether with the tax, thus defrauding His Imperial Majesty of its produce instead of promoting the interests of the English merchants, who import very little merchandise from these countries under Our government, besides which, what they do import is for their own use, not for other countries.

With regard to what you last wrote,* that the English do not seem inclined to respect the safe-conducts issued here, not even those granted for articles of food, and at the same time that they claim the restitution of two French ships (*navieres*) captured by Our warships at the island of Gernusy (Guernsey), pretending that the island is neutral ground and that the French have perfect right to sail thither, We cannot help stating that We find English pretensions on that score very strange and preposterous indeed, for whilst they of themselves maintain that Guernsey is neutral ground, and that Frenchmen can frequent it undisturbed, the island itself is included and expressly named among those which the Emperor is bound to defend as belonging to England. We, meanwhile, on Our side are prevented from granting safe-conducts for foreign vessels to take merchandize to France and bring therefrom goods and articles of trade most wanted in these countries. This pretension on the part of the English, to say the truth, We find very inconsiderate, because, though We admit that the allies are bound to do all possible harm to the common enemy, yet the safe-conduct by Us granted to vessels has nothing to do with that affair, since the naval forces of these countries under Our government have never ceased pursuing the French at sea since the beginning of this war. The very same reasoning applies with greater force to the pretended neutrality of Guernsey, by means of which the English are actually communicating, contracting

* *See* Chapuys' letter of the 13th of Dec. 1543., Vol. VI., Part II., p. 542.

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and bartering freely with the French as often as they like without hindrance or restriction of any sort.

In order, therefore, that poor merchants of this nation may not be deceived, owing to safe-conducts of Ours not being respected by the English, it will be your duty to represent the above arguments to that King's privy councillors, and if they do still persist in their refusal to consider them valid, signify to them with all possible discretion and mildness that they themselves ought to have no communication of any sort with the French nor grant them safe-conducts, as it is reported they are occasionally doing, for they cannot decently and honestly oppose Our granting some when they themselves on their side are bestowing them right and left. The inequality in this case would be too glaring and unbearable and a good deal more injurious to Us and to the inhabitants of these Low Countries than to the French, especially as to wine, nowadays very scarce in Germany, and which cannot be easily procured even from France. It is for the sake of wine, which is much wanted, for the soldiers especially, that We some time ago granted safe-conducts for vessels carrying herrings, an article that cannot be kept long, in exchange for French wine, for if the Emperor's army is not provided with it in time the soldiers will have none till after the autumn.

With regard to the two French ships (*navieres*)* taken at the island of Guernsey, those who captured them give a different version from the report which the governor of that island sent to the Privy Council. They say that being far out at sea, and away from the island, looking out for some vessel of the enemy, they saw in the distance, and away from land, the two French vessels, which they chased for some time. One of the ships carried twenty-one good pieces of ordnance, and had on board one trumpeter and sixty armed men for her defence. The chase lasted some time, a mutual cannonade going on all the time, until at the end the French took to flight and entered the port on the island, inside of which they were captured. Many of the French, however, escaped and took refuge on land; upon which the governor immediately opened fire against Our ships as if they belonged to the enemy. Finding, however, that the English gunners did not shoot as he liked the governor made use of the French, who, as above said, had landed and taken refuge in the island, to man the guns, firing several shots, which obliged Our ships to quit the place, carrying away, however, the prize they had taken, and which they would by no means abandon. The French ships had been freighted

* "Quant aux deux navires franchois prinses en lisle de Garnuyse ceulx qui ont fait la prinse deguysent la prinse aultrement que le capitaine du dit isle n'[en]a fait entendre à ceulx du Conseil du dit sieur roy, car ilz disent qu'estans en mer pour cherser leur avanture et endommaiger à les ennemis ilz appercheurent (apperçurent) en plaine mer les dits deux navires franchois, dont l'une avoit XXI bonnes pieces d'artillerie, une trompette et LX hommes de defense, lesquelles ilz poursuy[vi]rent de sorte que canonerent lung contre lautre. Finallement les navires franchoises prendrent la fuyte et se saulverent au port

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for the coast of Barbary, as was proved by the papers and books found on board of them,* and not for Guernsey as pretended. That the coast of Barbary was the ships' destination could easily be proved by the fact that their cargo consisted chiefly of linen cloth (*toilles*).

In all this there is no contravention of neutrality on Our part; it is, on the contrary, the governor of the island who by favouring and assisting the enemy against the allies of the King his master acted against it. Besides which, it must be said that the neutrality of Guernsey has never been notified to the government of the Low Countries. The commanders of the ships that made the prize suspect that the governor of the island acted as he did in order to save the French cargoes and himself get a gratuity (*pot de vin*) thereby. Even the French taken on board own that the capture of their ships was a legitimate one, and do not protest, which they might easily have done. Had the island been neutral ground, as alleged by the English, surely the French owners of the captured ships would have protested against the infraction of that neutrality, which, as above stated, was never intimated to Us nor to the military and naval authorities of these countries, who otherwise would have been requested to give up their prize. But, as the navigators of these seas tell Us, the neutrality of Guernsey would be very injurious to us, inasmuch as English and French traders are daily bartering and contracting in that island as if there was no war between the two nations, which by the way, if true, would be in direct opposition to the treaties.

The dean of York, that King's resident ambassador at this court has asked Us, in his master's name, to seize certain Scotch ships, which, he says, have robbed (*detroussé*) at sea certain English merchant vessels. This We have granted, and the seizure shall be made; but the same ambassador has applied to Us for a public declaration forbidding to the Scotch in general the residence in and frequentation of these Low Countries for the purpose of trade, as being at present enemies of that King. To this application of the English ambassador We have not returned an answer, waiting to know His Imperial Majesty's pleasure and what answer has been given to a similar request of the English ambassador residing at his Court. Meanwhile it would be advisable that you, Chapuys, should let Us know as soon as possible whether the war between the kingdoms of England and Scotland has actually broken out, which, by the way, the Scots here main-

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de l'isle Garnuyse, ou elles furent prinses par celles de par decha; mais plusieurs franchois se saulverent au dit isle. Et incontinent le capitaine du dit Garnuyse fist tirer contre les navires de par decha comme si elles eussent este aux enemis, et pour ce que les canoniers Englois ne tiroient à son plaisir il laissa tirer les franchois qui s'estoient saulfvés au dit isle, de sorte que celles de par decha furent constraintes eulx saulver menans avecq eulx leur proye, la quelle ilz ne voulurent abandonner."

* "Et estoyens les dits navires franchoises chargees et affrettees sur Barberie comme se troevé par les quarte parties troeves en icelles."

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tain is not the fact, that We may shape Our conduct accordingly, and in compliance with the text of the treaty.

But whilst a declaration against the Scots is being asked for, it seems just and reasonable that the king of England should make a similar declaration against the duke of Holstein, and the countries under his rule, forbidding all his subjects to trade with and frequent the King's dominions. On this point We shall also be glad to receive information and advice before returning an answer to the English ambassador.

On the other hand, We cannot omit to say that cardinal Ferneze (Farnese),* the legate and grandson (nephew) of Our Holy Father, the Pope, has gone to the Emperor. He left Rome at the end of November [last], and passing through France, arrived yesterday, the 9th, at this frontier. Some of his familiar servants, whom he has sent forward, state that he (the Cardinal) is going to the Emperor, to declare to him, as he has done to king Francis, the object of his mission, which is, as the Cardinal's familiars say, to treat of peace between king Francis and the allies. We cannot say whether the Cardinal will come as far as Brussels, or not; if he does, We will let you know what he says about it, that you yourself may report to that King, who, however, may be perfectly sure that nothing shall be treated or done without his intervention, in compliance with the treaty of closer alliance, the articles of which His Imperial Majesty intends to observe inviolably and with good faith, as the good friendship between the two allied Majesties requires.—Brussels, 10 January 1543 [Old style].

Addressed: "To ambassador Chapuys in England."

Indorsed: "To ambassador Chapuys in England, the tenth of January 1543, *Stil de court*" (sic).

French. Original draft. 3½ *pp.*

17 Jan. **10.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—As the courier, bearer of this letter, is in a great hurry to depart, almost immediately, I will only write two words to state that I am in receipt of the letter, which your Lordship was pleased to write to me by Don Luis de Avilla (Avila), who arrived in London yesterday evening (*sur le tard*). After conversing with me for a while on the affairs, which form the object of his mission, Don Luis thought, as I also did, that he ought to wait immediately upon the King, which he did on the very same day of his arrival, after dinner. D. Luis was welcomed and kindly received by the King, by the Queen, and by the

* Alessandro, son of Pier Luigi, duke of Castro, and grandson of Pope Paul. Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 199, 209–13, 400.

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Princess. The great haste in which the messenger is will not allow me to enter into details now, and inform your Lordship of the very kind words which the King addressed to Don Luis on the occasion; suffice it to say for the present —and this I can assure your lordship—that the Emperor's gentleman-in-waiting could not have come at a more opportune and fit occasion to consolidate and increase this King's affection for his Majesty, and insure the effect of the future undertaking.

I have also received His Majesty's letter of the 3rd inst. respecting the three points proposed by the ambassador of this King, and, as far as I can judge, it seems as if the King himself and his ministers were well satisfied with the answer and excuses made; at least up to this day neither the King nor his ministers have given any sign of resentment or displeasure. This may perhaps be owing to the hope they seem to entertain that on his arrival at the Emperor's court, Don Fernando Gonzaga will be able to obtain from His Imperial Majesty that their requests in that particular be granted. Until an answer to their application comes, I will abstain from broaching the subject to them, and yet I have prepared Don Loys and instructed him as to the way in which he was to answer had the King alluded to it any how.*

I very much regret not having been able to do service to Don Loys as I would have wished.—London, 17 of January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To Monseigneur de Granvelle," &c.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

17 Jan. **11.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Monseigneur,"—Yesterday, the 16th, Don Luis de Avila † [y Zuniga] arrived in the city, and went immediately to Court to pay his respects to the King, to the Queen, and to the Princess.—London, 17 January 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

* "Et peult estre que cest sur que le Sieur Don Fernando à son arrivee impetrera (*sic*) de Sa ma^te^ leurs requestes et jusques quilz ayent aultres nouvelles ne me semble dentagmer (d'entamer) la matiere; toutesfois bien en avois-je embouche le dit S^n^ Don Loys pour en respondre au dict S^r^ roy, en cas quil luy en eust faict quelque mention."

† Elsewhere Don Luis Davila, a great favourite of the Emperor, who employed him on various missions. In October 1539 he went to Italy for the purpose of informing Pope Paul and the Italian Powers of the Emperor's determination to go to Flanders through France. His Instructions may be seen in Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 191–3. He was the author of a history of the German war (*Guerra de Alemana del Emperador Carlos V.*, 1550, 8°) which is said to have been dictated to him by the Emperor himself. This opinion, however, is contradicted by Sandoval—*Historia del Emperador Carlos V.*, Pamplona, 1614, fol., vol. II., p. 595.

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18 Jan. **12.** The SAME to PRINCE PHILIP.

S. E. L., 806, f. 79.
B. M. *Add.* 28,594, f. 297.

I wrote to Your Majesty by Don Alonso Manrique the news of this country, and as I am almost certain that Your Highness has received my despatch, I will not repeat what I then wrote. Since then His Imperial Majesty sent here Don Fernando de Gonzaga, with full powers, in which I myself was named, to treat of and conclude with His Most Serene Majesty this King an agreement as to what may be required for next summer's undertaking. After various conferences, in which the point in question was discussed, it was resolved that both His Imperial Majesty and His Most Serene Majesty the king of England, unless prevented by illness or any other accident—which may God forbid—should be personally present within France not later than the 20th of July next; that the Emperor should enter that country by the province of Champagne and march directly on Paris; and, lastly, that His Most Serene Majesty of England should likewise enter it by way of Picardy and march also on Paris. That, although in the first draft of the treaty of alliance it was stipulated that the invading force of each ally should consist of* 20,000 *foot and* 5,000 *horse, yet, upon second thoughts, it has been considered that the forces ought to be increased to* 25,000 *infantry and* 7,000 *cavalry respectively, with* 60 *pieces of ordnance,* 4,000 *pioneers* (gastadores), *and* 100 *pontoons* (barquetes) *for the throwing of bridges across rivers and watercourses. This King is hastening as much as he can, and still persists in his determination to fulfil all the clauses of the treaty, notwithstanding that the affairs of Scotland do not go on so prosperously for him as was anticipated, for the earl of Lennox, who, as the King thought at first was to take his part and turn against the French, has, it appears, changed his mind owing to the latter having removed all cause of offence by actually contracting with him, not only for what they had promised many days before, but making him most brilliant offers besides.† This King, therefore, wishing to provide more efficiently for the affairs of Scotland whilst he himself is absent from England and personally engaged across the Channel, wishes that His Imperial Majesty would send him a number of Spanish hackbutiers. In return for which aid, if granted, he offers to contribute with* 20,000 *ducats for the undertaking that the duke of Savoy and the marquis del Gasto might, whilst*

* Don Alonso Manrique, most likely a relative of Don Juan, marquis de Aguilar, whose family name was *Manrique*, although there was at the same time another family of the same name known as *Manrique de Lara*, dukes of Nájera. The despatch alluded to by Chapuys must be that of the 28 Nov. 1543, No. 264. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 526.

† "Y el conde Linos (*sic*) que pensaba que debia volberse y alçar contra franceses y tomar el partido y affinidad del dicho Serenissimo Rey ha mudado del proposito à causa que los franceses han quitado la occasion contraendo no solo lo que muchos dias ha le havian prometido, pero endemas le han hecho grandes partidos."

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king Francis is occupied with the allied armies, lead into the Delphinal (Dauphinois) by way of Savoy, and thence into the Leonés (Lyonnais), an undertaking which, if achieved, would be of immense importance, owing to the harm it might inflict upon the common enemy.

As Your Royal Highness will hear verbally from Don Luis de Avila,* bearer of this despatch, the rest of the news from this country, I shall bring this letter to an end.—London, 18 January 1544.

Spanish. Original in cypher. 2 *pp.*

18 Jan. **13.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to HIGH COMMANDER COBOS.

S. E. Inglaterra.

The enclosed despatch of mine addressed to the Crown Prince (Philip) will apprise Your Lordship of the news of this country, and likewise of the details of the negociations carried on here in December last by Don Fernando [Gonzaga] and the agreement entered into with His Most Serene Highness the king of England.

As to the affairs of Scotland, they do not seem to me to go on of late as prosperously as this King and his privy councillors anticipated; *for count Lins (the earl of Lennox), who, as these people thought, would turn round and rise against the French, thereby following this King's party and looking out for an affinity or relationship with him,* ***has*** *lately changed his mind owing to the French having just won him over to their party by promising not only to give him [the Count] what they had offered many days ago, but grant him new favours and distinctions.*†—London, 18 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*

19 Jan. **14.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—We wrote to you last from Louvain an account of what the English ambassador, resident at this Our Court, represented to Us, and afterwards to the Sieur de Granvelle, and the answers made to his various applications, and more especially to the demand that We should declare against Scotland, and forbid the Scots to frequent and trade in the Low Countries. Since

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* Don Luis de Avila y Zuñiga. *See* above, p.14.

† "Las cosas de Scocia no van ya tan prosperas como esta gente lo pensaba, porque el conde Lins, quion creian y esperaban debia volberse y alzarse *contra* franceses y tomar el partido y affinidad del dicho Serenisimo Rey ha mudado de proposito à causa que los franceses han quitado la ocasion contraendo (contratando) que no solo le daran lo que muchos dias ha le habian proueido sino que le han hecho ademas grandes partidos."

This paragraph about the affairs of Scotland and the earl of Lennox, though substantially the same as that in Chapuys' despatch to Prince Philip (No. 12), is so differently worded that I have considered it advisable to reproduce the Spanish text of it. The rest of the ambassador's letter to Cobos is a mere copy, word by word, of his despatch to the Prince. *See* above, No. 12.

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then the queen dowager of Hungary, Madame, Our sister, has written that the English ambassador resident at her Court,* has made the very same application to her; stating, nay assuring her, that the King, his master, is already at war with Scotland. And, whereas, if such be the case, We shall be obliged to comply with the treaty, and observe the agreement entered into with Don Fernando [Gonzaga], it occurs to Us that if We are to declare the Scots Our enemies, it is but reasonable and just that the king of England should himself make a similar declaration against the duke of Holstein (Christian III.) now occupying the throne of Denmark, considering that the said duke is Our enemy, and king Francis' confederate, and has openly challenged and declared war to Us.

On the above and other like representations, such as your practical knowledge of that Court may suggest, you (Chapuys) shall insist to the very end, taking care to inform Us as soon as possible of the result of your negociation, and of the answer you get from those privy councillors.

As nothing worth mentioning has occurred since Our last, and We are daily expecting the arrival of Don Fernando de Gonzaga, We need not enter into details now, save to say that We have come as far as this town (Köln) without accident of any sort, and that We shall continue Our march to Speir (Spire) as quickly as We possibly can, fully intending to let you know from time to time the progress of Our journey to that place Conlogne (Cologne).—19 January 1544.†

P.S.—You might also tell the King that We have received reliable information of king Francis having sent to Scotland and Ireland secret agents to disturb and embroil that King's affairs in those countries, and mar, if he can, his projects, imagining that by doing this and employing such means, he (king Francis) can throw impediments in his way and prevent his interference against himself elsewhere.

Our news from Italy is that king Francis, wishing to play the part of a good Catholic prince, bas asked for the Pope's absolution for having once made treaties with the king of England, a schismatic and heretic. Since he has been so long about it, and has become so conscientious it is probable that in a few years hence he will confess and make penance for having allied himself to the Turk, and for his wretched practices and dealings with him.‡

French. Original minute. 2 *pp.*

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* D^r^ Layton, dean of York.

† According to Vandenesse's *Itinerary of Charles V.*, translated by William Bradford (p. 544), the Emperor was no longer at Cologne (Köln) on the 19th of January 1544; he left that town on the 14th, was at Bonn on the 15th, next day the 16th at Rombach, on the 17th at Andernach, on the 18th at Coblentz, and on the 19th at Sonne, a castle of the Palatinate.

‡ "Aussi avons entendu d'Italye que le dict roy de France, pour faire en bon catholique, fait demander absolution au Pape de ce qu'il a traicte avec cellui du dit Angleterre, seismatique et heretique. Et puisque il a tant attendu, et se rend si consciencieux, est vraysemblable que d'icy à aucunes années il se confessera et fera penitence de l'alliance du Turq et des malheureuses pratiques et emprinses qu'il a eu avecq luy."

1544.

21 Jan. **15.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 11th inst. came duly to hand, in answer to which I could not say more than I have said in my despatch to the Emperor, herein inclosed.

Your Majesty did some time ago write to me respecting the personage,* and I have not answered before, because in the first place, the departure of couriers from this place, and the importance of the affairs lately discussed, prevented me from attending to Your Majesty's commands, and secondly, because I thought that what I had often written concerning the dexterity, talent, good doctrine and aptitude for various charges of the said individual seem to me quite sufficient. As to his affection for the Imperial service, and the success of the negociation entrusted to him, having, as I have, constantly alluded to it in my despatches, I considered myself justified in not returning to the subject immediately, the more so that there are near Your Majesty several personages more apt to judge in one day of that individual's qualities and parts, than I myself could in ten years' time and acquaintance. Monsr. de Praët, with whom he has conversed longer, will be a better judge, and report to Your Majesty, and yet, as far as I myself am concerned, I cannot do less than confirm my first impression of the character and parts of the personage alluded to and beg Your Majesty to show him favour.

I likewise beg to be excused for not having written before on the subject of war ammunition and so forth, though I must say that in that particular I have followed Your Majesty's instructions and orders to the letter, though I could not prevent the King's privy councillors and others from applying directly to you on the subject, all the time declaring to them that my letters of commendation would be of no use to them.—London, 21 January 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed: "A la royne."
French. Holograph. 1 *p.*

22 Jan. **16.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—From the viceroy of Sicily, who left this city † for Spire, We heard all that passed between the king of England and himself, as well as the former's urgent solicitations that the Scots should be at once declared by the Emperor common enemies of both the allied princes, and lastly, that We Ourselves should forbid to them the frequentation of, and intercourse of trade with, these countries under Our government. We had previously written to the Emperor, Our brother, informing him of the singular and remarkable persistance with which the English ambassador brought forward his master's demands and requests, and he has written to you a letter, of which the enclosed is a copy, signifying his resolution in that affair. Although before

* Most likely Don Luis de Avila y Zuñiga. *See* above, pp. 14, 16.
† Brussels, which he must have left a few days before.

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the war broke out between the English and the Scots the Emperor made no difficulty about declaring and treating the latter as his enemies, the very moment that hostilities commenced on both sides; as he then promised to Master Bryant before his departure home, in compliance with the treaty of closer alliance, he has no objection now to repeat what he then promised to do —publicly declare the Scots his enemies and interdict to them the frequentation of, and trade with the Low Countries. That will be done as soon as We are duly and authentically informed by you (Chapuys) that the war between the two countries has really commenced, and provided the duke of Holstein, who has actually challenged Us, and declared war to the Low Countries, be also declared the common enemy of the allies and Our's in particular, as the king of England is bound reciprocally to do in virtue of the treaty of closer alliance, defensive and offensive.

As to the request made by that King's privy councillors to Don Fernando Gonzaga that after Our declaration against the Scots We should respect any safe-conducts that the king of England might grant to them, so that the said Scots may freely frequent and reside in these Low Countries, hoping by that means to gain some of them over to his party, and improve his own affairs in Scotland, We will grant the King's request, though it stands to reason that before obtaining from him such safe-conducts, they ought first to apply to Us. The safe-conducts granted by the king of England to the Scots We again declare shall be respected by Our people, provided those which We have granted, or may grant in future, be equally respected, and that the merchants and shipowners in possession of such safe-conducts may freely, and without being in any way molested or harmed, navigate the sea and enter even the ports of England for the purpose of taking in cargoes. On the above conditions the King's request shall be readily complied with, and We have already been assured that all masters of vessels having safe-conducts from the king of England may go to the ports of the Low Countries they having no cargo on board but expecting to receive one, provided they belong to a neutral country and not to the enemies. In this manner, and by observing such rules, the proclamation posted in the Low Countries enjoining that no goods and merchandise from France shall be imported into the kingdoms and countries under Our domination will remain in full vigour. As We are given to understand that a similar proclamation has been issued in England, there will be no difficulty in that case, We think, and therefore you (Chapuys) are requested to take care that an agreement be made with the King's privy councillors so that what We wrote to you on the 10th, and the above-stated *exposé* of Our intentions and resolutions in this matter of the safe-conducts, may be your guide in the negociation. Let this too be an answer to your despatch of the 9th, which has been duly received since then.

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The English resident ambassador has not yet said anything to Us on this matter of the safe-conducts; when he does he will get an answer from Our ministers in conformity with the above.

By way of a supplement to Our letter of the 10th inst.,* in which We announced to you the arrival of Cardinal Farnese at the frontier,† We deem it necessary to inform you that he came riding post through this city, and stayed only a few hours, during which he presented to Us a breve from His Holiness exhorting and admonishing Us to use all Our influence with the Emperor, Our brother, to find means of making peace with France, as the Cardinal, bearer of the breve, would declare unto Us. He, himself, told Us that he had been expressly entrusted by His Holiness with the charge of exhorting and persuading the two princes to put an end to the war and make peace, thus avoiding the great evils that Christendom is suffering in these calamitous times. To that end the Cardinal Legate had passed through France, where he had seen king Francis, and found him greatly inclined on his part, and willing to make peace. He was the bearer of such overtures on the part of king Francis as he hoped, nay was sure, the Emperor would not reject altogether. The Cardinal Legate ended by requesting Us to try and do Our best with the Emperor and induce him to accept king Francis' overtures, though he did not tell Us what they were. My answer to the Cardinal's speech was that, in my quality of Dame, I would do my best to procure the peace he spoke of, as I had always done; and that I was sorry to see that king Francis had not considered better the affairs of the past, and observed faithfully the treaties instead of recommencing war as he had done, thus placing the whole of Christendom in danger and trouble as it is now.

After this the Cardinal took leave of Us to proceed on his journey, which he did soon after. We immediately sent for the English ambassador, resident at this Court, to whom We related the substance of the Cardinal's conversation; he has no doubt written home, and yet you would do well in informing him of the whole in Our name.

We have no news yet of the Cardinal; We cannot tell whether he has seen the Emperor or not; as to the overtures he said he had from king Francis We know nothing. We have no doubt that if he really has any, the king of England will know as soon, or perhaps sooner, than Ourselves what their nature and importance are.

To pass to another topic, We recommend you to solicit that the vessels (*navires*) with a cargo of herrings, seized in England some time ago, be released at once, in virtue of the safe-conducts with which their masters were furnished, other-

* *See* above, p. 13, No. 9.

† On the 9th, after having passed some time in France, for according to

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wise the merchants who freighted them and the owners of the cargoes will sustain great loss and injury. Safe-conducts granted by the allies respectively ought to be respected, and therefore We find it both unreasonable and unjust that the English should detain and seize vessels furnished with such documents, and still more unreasonable and improper that they should keep the goods, paying for them any price they may think fit (as may be presumed they will do).—January the 22nd, 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

23 Jan. Vienna, Imp. Arch.

17. EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 10th inst. came to hand two days ago. I had already been informed by one of the Emperor's of the three points brought forward by the English ambassadors at Your Majesty's court; but I was not aware until now of the discontent and annoyance likely to be felt by these people should not the said three points, on which they particularly insist, be settled to their satisfaction. Possibly they may be expecting an answer to their demand sent through Don Fernando Gonzaga, whom this King and his ministers begged and entreated to intercede with His Imperial Majesty in their favour, more particularly about the two first points, namely, the Spanish hackbutiers, and the declaration against the Scots. When that answer comes I have no doubt that, if unfavourable, these people will show their disappointment and complain to me. I am prepared to reply to them according to the instructions and commands of Your Majesty, who, with your usual prudence and tact, has considered and weighed the affair as one of much importance.

With regard to the first point, that of the Spanish hackbutiers, I must say that when brought forward by the King, Don Fernando [Gonzaga] did start, among others, the objection that the Emperor had not, at present, the means of sending from Spain such an inconsiderable number of hackbutiers as the one asked for to serve in a foreign country so distant from that of their birth, alleging, as an example, that of the Italians, who, after joining the Emperor's camp in Germany, had all to a man returned home, chiefly on the plea (as they said) that their number was too small, though, in reality, they were three times more numerous than the Spaniards this King is now asking for.

As to the second point, which is the declaration against the Scots, there was no objection, he (Gonzaga) saying that Your Majesty wished, before deciding, to be certified of the real state of affairs in Scotland, whether a complete rupture with England had already taken place, or whether there was any appearance of their differences being peaceably adjusted, for though it be true that Count Douglast (the earl of Angus) and his brother (George), who were so kindly and honourably

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treated by this King during their exile, have lately allied themselves with the opposite party, yet they have, as asserted, written a letter to the King saying that they have taken this step under compulsion and promising that when time and opportunity offer, that is to say, whenever the King enters Scotland at the head of his army, they (the Douglases) and the whole of their adherents and friends will do him notable service.* The truth of the matter is, that nowadays both English and Scots are daily making raids on each other, and war is carried on between them with as much animosity and cruelty as ever.† I have not heard of any official proclamation of war between them, but still they go on, as usual, attacking each other, and from time immemorial have considered themselves each other's enemies, unless there happens to be an occasional truce between them. At any rate, *my opinion is that, if the declaration* against the Scots, on which this King and his ministers so strongly insist, is to be made in the Low Countries, as Your Majesty says, *it is but just and reasonable that these people (the English) should reciprocally do the same with regard to the duke of Holstein and his adherents.*

Touching the third point, or the 1 per cent. duty (*le centiesme denier*) it seems to me that Your Majesty's remonstrances are very urgent and fit, and cannot well be answered to, for considering *the frauds and cheatings* (la fraulde et tromperie) *that are practised at Anvers (Antwerp), the same might take place at Cadiz, where the duty to be paid by English merchants amounts to a much larger sum, which the Emperor would also lose by the exemption.*‡ *In order to reply to their importunities, should they persevere in their demands, I think that the best and quickest remedy to be applied would be that which I have pointed out in some of my earlier despatches.*

Respecting the late seizure of French ships (*navieres*) near the island of Gurnesay (Guernsey), these people refrain from mentioning or alluding to it in any way, knowing very well that it is without foundation or reason, *perhaps, that they may have further occasion of contravening the safe-conducts granted by Your Majesty or by the Emperor. For three consecutive days have I gone to the Privy Council and remonstrated with its members, who have answered me, by way of excuse, that the release of the cargo of herrings, about which Your Majesty had written to this King, could not be*

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* "Et mesmes veu que le conte Douglast et son frere, quont reçu durant leur exil d'Ecosse du dict sieur roy tant d'honneur, biens et faveur, se sont realliez avec les aultres. Bien est vray que ce a este pour constraincte, comme ilz alleguent, et ont faict entendre au dict sieur roy, lui promestans (*sic*) que en temps et lieu, à sçavoir venant à entrer le dict sieur roy avec une armee au dict pays, que eulx et leurs amys luy feroient notable service."

† "Il n'est riens si vray que journellement ceulx-cy et les Escossois font courreries lung sur laultre et en usent aussi hostillement et cruellement que oncques."

‡ "Au regard du tiers (*sic*) poinct concernant le centiesme denier il me semble les remonstrances de vre. mate estre tres urgentes, et mesmes que oultre la fraulde et tromperie *quilz pourroient* faire en Anvers aussi feroient ilz aux

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effected save in virtue of a statute and ordinance of the kingdom authorising the seizure of all vessels coming to England with victuals, and taking the cargoes thereof at a reasonable price. And upon my arguing that if such was the tenor of the ordinance, as they (the privy councillors) pretended, other goods and merchandize, not consisting of victuals, ought to be allowed to go freely to France, under Your Majesty's safe-conduct; they replied that they would not, for the present, deny or dispute Your Majesty's and the Emperor's right to grant safe-conducts without infraction of the treaties —which, nevertheless, they had on a previous occasion attempted to do, in virtue of Art. VI. of the last treaty, though it was shown to them that they could not avail themselves of it in support of their theory; but they maintained that the article was to be interpreted thus: That if by stress of weather or otherwise, ships having a safe-conduct should be driven on the coasts of England they (the English) were perfectly justified in seizing and detaining them, whatever the origin and nature of their safe-conducts might be. That for the same reason His Imperial Majesty might do the same if any English vessel was found carrying merchandize to the French. They did more, they denied entirely the neutrality of Guernsey with France.*

I then represented to them that there was no cause, reason, or equity in their opposition to the safe-conducts, and that the use they intended to make of them would be tantamount to opening the gate to, and creating dissension and enmity between, the Emperor's subjects and the English. Yet, notwithstanding this and other arguments of mine, they persisted in their resolution, and, although I begged and entreated them to let me know the King's final resolution on the whole, and they promised to do so, up to this day and hour no message from them has come, so that I am determined to write them an official note on the subject. Whatever the answer may be, I shall not fail to acquaint Your Majesty. Meanwhile I suggest, under correction, that Your Majesty would do well in having a Memorandum drawn for the use of the English ambassador at your Court, wherein the above and other reasons be specified in favour of the safe-conducts, for him to write home. I think that, among other arguments, the following one might be employed, namely, that had former safe-conducts been used in the form and manner which they pretend is the right one, the people of Cadiz and other Spanish ports, those of Messina in Sicily, and the rest of the Emperor's dominions, might stop and seize all vessels carrying English goods to the Levant, or

* "Ilz me respondirent quilz ne vouloient disputer ni contendre, pour lorsque sa mate ne peust sans infraction du traictez donner les saulfconduitz, ce que toutésfois au commencement ilz contradisoient en vertue du VI. article du dernier traicte, dont comme leur fust remoustre ilz ne se peuvent bonnement ayder en cest endroit, disant .et maintenant davantaige quil falloit entendre que si par fortune [de mer] les navyres, quelque saulfconduitz quelles current abordoient en ce royaulme, elles seroient prinses et detennes."

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coming therefrom, on the plea that those goods and merchandize are destined for Turkey, with which country His Imperial Majesty is now at war. The same might be said with respect to Flanders. Were the ships of war of that nation to meet at sea any English vessels with goods and merchandize for the Easterlings, they might stop and seize them on the ground that their cargoes were meant for the country over which the duke of Hôlstein now rules, or, at least, that he himself is to benefit by the transaction, and the money to be paid to the Custom House at Copenhagen.

As to the future undertaking against France, it must be owned that the King is showing great diligence and care. He was heard to say a few days ago that the French are very much mistaken if they think that their intrigues in Scotland will prevent him from crossing over; on the contrary, he himself will go to France with a more considerable force than that which he intended to take at first.

I must not omit to say that on the receipt of Your Majesty's letter of the 12th inst. concerning the safe-conduct which Jehan Paulo and Jehan Henry Helbert, brothers, merchants of Augsburg, are soliciting, I immediately after sent my man to the Privy Council with all the papers, memoranda, and requests (*requestes*) relating to the business which their factor in this city had addressed to me; and that when the King's privy councillors had seen and examined those papers, they began to look at each other and smile, and that, notwithstanding the solicitations of my man, who pressed them for an answer, they would give none, nor even offer an excuse, and that, in order to avoid his importunities, they went away and dispersed right and left.

This conduct on the part of the privy councillors emboldens me to say that it will be a shame if I do not pursue most briskly this affair of the safe-conducts. Since we have gone into it so deeply, I think that I ought to do so for the Emperor's honour and reputation, as well as for not giving these people occasion to assume such authority in matters concerning the Imperial service.

Respecting the Papal Legate, this King has news that at his arrival in France he had been treated at first with apparent coldness and dissimulation, as if king Francis would not in any way listen to his overtures of peace; but that in the end he (the King) had consented to do what His Imperial Majesty pleased in that respect. Upon which the Legate had called on the queen of France, and asked her for a letter for the Emperor, her brother, and for Your Majesty in favour of that peace.†* I do really believe that whatever

* Alessandro Farnese.

† "Quant au Legat ce roy est adverty comme á son arrivée en France l'on luy avoit faict quelque mine, et aussi dissimulation, comme si le roy du dit France ne ce[t] pas voulu ouyr parler de paix, et que à la parfin il s'estoit condescendu à vouloir faire tout ce quil plairoit à sa ma^te^ et que le dit legat avoit sollicité envers la royne de France lectres addressantes à sa ma^te^ et à la vre. en faveur de la paix."

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trust and reliance this King may place in the Emperor's words and doings, his mind will not be at rest until he hears that the Legate has actually quitted the Imperial Court, and that his work there has come to nothing. Indeed, this King, as I calculate, would have been much more pleased, had the thing been possible, that the Legate's visit had been somehow or other prevented altogether.

The privy councillors, and especially the one who was lately this King's ambassador to France, on whose word and assurance count Bernardino di San Bonifacio came to this country, do not cease to importune me respecting the release from prison of the said count. I, myself, would join my prayers to theirs, if it can easily be done, for, as the King's Councillors say, the count might at this season do some service to this King.*—**London, 23 January 1544.**

Signed: "**Eustace Chapuys.**"

French. Original, partially ciphered. 4 *pp.*

25 Jan. **18.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—After writing to you from Cologne (Köln), and close to this place,† Cardinal Farnese arrived, sent by Our Holy Father, the Pope. He came by way of France, where, as We suppose you must have heard, he stayed some days (*aucuns jours*). After explaining to Us in two or three audiences We granted him the nature and bearing of his political charge, he himself holding several conferences with Our ministers, the result has been that which you will see by the enclosed copy of the letter which We have written to Our ambassador at Rome on the subject, and the particular answer given to the Cardinal Legate in writing,‡ by the final paragraph of which answer you will be able to understand that if king Francis wishes to arrive at a good peace, he must beforehand make restitution of the places and towns of Ours that he holds in the Cambresis, and pay his debts, past and present [to the king of England]. As We particularly insist upon these two preliminary conditions, We refuse altogether, unless they be previously fulfilled, to listen to any overtures of peace.

You may inform the king of England, Our good brother, of these particulars, in order that he may know and appreciate the respect and consideration We entertain for his person and affairs, in conformity with which sentiments We have spoken to his ambassador § resident here with Us.

As Don Fernando de Gonzaga has not yet arrived here, and there is no news to communicate to him, We shall say

* Sir William Paget?

† The Emperor arrived at Worms on the 24th of January. He there gave audience to Cardinal Farnese, who received an answer to his communication and took leave. Vandenesse's *Itinerary of Charles V.* by Bradford, p. 544.

‡ Neither the Emperor's letter to Juan de Vega, his ambassador at Rome, nor his own answer in writing to Cardinal Farnese, have been found in the Imperial Archives of Vienna.

§ Dr. Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury.

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no more, and will at once put an end to this letter.—Worms, 25 January 1543 [before Easter].

French Original draft. 1 *p.*

26 Jan. **19.** MONS. DE GRANVELLE to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—You will see by the enclosed copy * of a letter written to cardinal Farnese that he is returning to Rome with an answer [to his mission]. The Emperor stopped at Cologne (Kohln) two days, waiting for the Papal Legate, to save him the trouble and fatigue of a longer journey.† The English ambassador has received from me full notice of all that the Cardinal Legate did represent in His Holiness' name, as also of the answer which he got to his proposals. This would take me too much time to relate, and therefore, to avoid prolixity, and that you may have an idea of what the answer has been, I will tell you in two words that he (the Cardinal) was not at all welcome, neither well received, nor kindly treated; nay, he was contradicted in his assertions, and his proposals and the means he suggested for insuring peace were rejected altogether, as you will see by the contents of the answer given to him. In short, the Emperor's answer and the rejection of the Legate's proposals will effectually bar the way to similar practices. The latter was evidently disappointed and annoyed when he heard it, saying that he had no commission or mandate from the Pope, but that, knowing how much the Emperor wished for peace in order to turn his arms against the infidel Turk, he had come without the knowledge or permission of His Holiness to suggest means for promoting and helping to the defence of threatened Christendom. If to this be added that the Legate's journey was through France, where he was known to have talked with the King's ministers, no wonder if the Emperor's answer to the Legate's proposals was curt and sharp. He told him in plain terms the bad turn (*mauvais offices*) which His Holiness had done him in the Turkish affair, as I myself, by his own commands, have occasionally written to Rome and to Paris with little or no success at all, for in the former city especially I am accused, as the Cardinal himself told me, of being the chief promoter of the treaty of alliance with England, and that I alone would prove to be an impediment and an obstacle to the peace with France; but I care not for what my enemies may say, and since I was once miraculously saved by the hand of God, I hope that this time the malignity of my enemies will not prevail.

But to resume the account of the Cardinal's mission. He repeated many a time—as if he were a "Bocler a toutes mains" (?) for excusing the Pope and himself, *that had the*

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* Not found in the Imperial Archives.

† According to Vandenesse the Emperor, on the 20th, was at Kreuzenach, in the Palatinate, where the Papal Legate (Farnese) had just arrived, having travelled post through France. The Legate was there visited by Mons. de Granvelle and by the bishop of Arras, p. 544.

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alliance of the Emperor with England not taken place, he (the Pope) would have had no objection to declare against France. To which the answer was that the Pope's dissimulation must have given rise to suspicion, for the political relations of king Francis with the Lutheran Princes of this Germany were notorious enough. It was through his means that the Imperial cities of Lausanne and Geneva and a good portion of the kingdom embraced the sect of Zwinglius; that the king of France has granted his Orders to the duke of Holstein, and the foolish declaration of the duke of Orleans that he wished to become a Lutheran. Such was the Duke's declaration at the time, too, when our religion was, and is, as scrupulously observed and kept in England as in any other kingdom of Christendom, save, however, as to Papal authority, which the King of that country refuses to acknowledge for his own particular and private reasons.†*

Apropos *of this, His Imperial Majesty said to the Cardinal that king Francis and his people wished His Holiness would help and assist France in the future war with a number of men from those he had for his own personal service. That, however, I cannot believe, for I do not think that the Pope is over liberal with his money; yet I must warn you that should His Holiness send one single man to France to the King's assistance and against king Henry, his ally, the Emperor will surely consider that a personal offence.*

In short, both the arrival here of the Cardinal Legate, his departure, and the conversations he held with me and other Imperial ministers, are really strange facts which I cannot sufficiently account for. He has been very favourably received in France, indeed treated as if he were God on Earth (ung Dieu en terre), *though not so sincerely. You, who know best the ways of the Court in France, will know how to appreciate this remark of mine.*

However this may be, as the Cardinal Legate in question assailed as he was by our justifiable remonstrances, has given out hopes that His Holiness will henceforward give his attention to Turkish affairs in direct opposition to the wishes of king Francis, all things considered, the prospect is better than it was; though, on the other hand, no great reliance is to be placed in it. As soon as he goes back to Rome you shall hear; and meanwhile, not to delay the courier, who is about to leave for Flanders, I shall say no more, &c.—Spire, 26 January 1543 [before Easter].

French. Original draft, all in cipher. 2 *pp.*

* The Duke's letter to the Landgraf of Hesse, the duke of Saxony, and other Lutheran Princes about to assemble at Francfort, has been abstracted at p. 479 of Vol. VI., Part II. In it the Duke promises that in the Grand Duchy of Luxenburgh, recently conquered by him, the Gospel might be preached without hindrance of any sort.

† "Et que nostre religion se gardoit aussi scrupuleusement, aultant bien en Angleterre que en toutes les aultres provinces de la Chretienté, si ce n'est seulement l'autorite du Pape que le roy d'Angleterre ne veult pas reconaitre par motifs particuliers."

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27 Jan. **20.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MGR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—As there is nothing important to communicate, and I am only waiting to hear what these people will reply after the answer made by the Emperor's ministers to the three points contained in the Imperial letter of the 4th inst., I deem it quite unnecessary to weary (*attieder*) His Imperial Majesty with useless writing on the subject. Therefore I will not allude to it at present, further than to refer Your Lordship to my despatch to the Queen, of which a copy is here enclosed.* Your Lordship will see by it that nothing new has occurred here worth mentioning.

For want of other intelligence,† I deem it opportune to tell Your Lordship that among the things which I myself suggested to Don Loys Davila for him to say to this King, on my part, as a manifest proof of the Emperor's affection for him, there was one with which this King was admirably pleased, namely, the assurance that nothing could be so agreeable to the Emperor, Our Master, as to see him (the King) in full possession of whatever he claims in France; for as His Majesty has no other purpose and object but to make war on the Turk, not only will he have thus his shoulders entirely protected, but he will also, as he hopes, have the help and assistance of the king of England, as required by the sanctity and importance of the undertaking. This suggestion of mine produced its effect, for on Don Loys telling him so, the King listened with complacency, and declared that, the case being so, he would do the office of a good prince, such as suited the perfect and sincere friendship by which he and His Majesty were united.—London, 27 January 1544.

Signed: "*Vostre plus que tres humble serviteur,* Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "A Monseigneur, Monsr. de Granvelle," &c., &c.
French. Holograph. 1 *p.*

30 Jan. **21.** MONSR. DE GRANVELLE to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—By the enclosed copy‡ of the answer that was returned to the Papal Legate (card. Alessandro Farnese), you will hear that he (the Cardinal) is now going back home, without having gained the object for which he came here [to Worms]. The Emperor had actually

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* Not found in the Imperial Archives.

† "Et en deffault d'aultre matiere m'a semblé d'advertir vre se (seigneurie) que entre plusieurs propoz que fust d'advis que le Sieur Don Loys Daville (de Avila) tinst (*sic*) à ce roy pour enrichir l'affection de Sa mate envers luy, il y eu (eust) ung que le dit Sr roy gousta merveilleusement, à sçavoir, que Sa mate *ne desire riens plus que de* [*le*] *veoir possesseur et joysant de ce quil pretendoit en France,* car, comme Sa mate n'avoit aultre scope (*sic*) fin ny pensement que de fere la guerre au Turc, non seullement icelle auroit les espaules asseurées, mais aussi comme icelle esperoit ne luy deffauldroit l'ayde et assistance du dit Sr roy."

‡ *See* above, No. 19, p. 26, where the answer in writing here alluded to has been mentioned.

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stopped at Cologne (Köln) eight-and-forty hours to save the Cardinal the trouble of a longer journey.* Full notice of all this has been given to the English ambassador (Nicholas Wotton), acquainting him not only with the Cardinal's proposals, but likewise with the answer returned to him. To tell you what the Emperor's answer to the Legate was would take me more time than I can spare just now; suffice it to say that he was anything but welcome, and was worse received,† and that his proposals in His Holiness' name were entirely rejected, as you will see by reading the said answer.

The viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga) has not yet arrived here; nor have I anything more to say for the present.—Worms, 30 January 1544.

Signed: "N. Perrenot."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

— Jan. **22.** OPINION of an IMPERIAL PRIVY COUNCILLOR on the AGREEMENT made by the VICEROY OF SICILY in London.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Respecting the agreement made by the viceroy of Sicily, and the business transacted by him in London during his late mission, my own private opinion is that there is nothing in its various articles and clauses contrary to His Imperial Majesty's interests, and that it ought to be accepted at once; and that the conditions stipulated between the Royal deputies and the Imperial ambassador at the Court of England (Eustace Chapuys) ought to be approved of and ratified; any contradictions or opposition to the said agreement might, on the part of the English, engender scruples and suspicion, which are to be avoided under present circumstances; besides which, there is nothing in it that is really objectionable, neither is there in it any mutual condition that the Emperor cannot accept at once. For it must be considered that after all the agreement itself conforms entirely with the preceding treaties of closer friendship and alliance, defensive and offensive, against the common enemy, and has besides one advantage, which is, that the time at which the Imperial fleet is to put to sea is not fixed or specified, which, after all, is reasonable enough, as otherwise the Queen Regent of the Low Countries would not have failed to remonstrate and protest against the article had any stipulation of that kind been introduced in it.

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* According to Vandenesse, the Emperor left Brussels on the 2nd of January, was at Cologne on the 15th, at Coblentz on the 18th, on the 20th he was at Kreuzenach, where the Papal Legate, Farnese, had just arrived, travelling through France. He was visited by Monsr. de Granvelle and by the bishop of Arras (his son); on the 21st he had audience from His Majesty. On the 24th the Emperor entered Worms.—Bradford's *Itinerary of Charles V.*, p. 544.

† "Il a este le tres mal venú, et de mesmes reçu et traicté, et on luy [a] reboulté à plat; comme contient la dite response, les moyens [de] paix quil a proposée."

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As to the demand of assistance made by the Emperor for the war in Italy, the king of England offered 20,000 ducats, on condition, however, of the Emperor contributing with about 1,000 Spanish hackbutiers for the Borders of Scotland, six hundred of them to be paid by the Emperor during three months. It seems as if the condition ought to be absolutely rejected; first of all, because the Imperial army is in want of them, as it has already been answered when the application was made; and, secondly, because the hackbutiers themselves dislike going to England, and chiefly to the Borders of Scotland, in so small a number, as they said to Don Fernando when he passed lately through the Luxenburg. At the same time, the Emperor's ambassador in London ought [in my opinion] to inform the king of England that great provision has already been made, and is now making, on the side of Italy against the reinforcements which king Francis has sent thither, with a view, no doubt, to prevent and forestall the invasion of his Own dominions by the allied armies; such being, according to reliable information, king Francis' plans. The Imperial ambassador in England should, moreover, be instructed to say that the Emperor is willing and ready to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty, as no doubt the king of England is doing on his side, and at the same time try to obtain from him the promised 20,000 crs. [for Italy] without the condition of the one thousand Spanish hackbutiers for Scotland. Though the promised sum is rather inadequate, and might by many reasons have been much larger, the Imperial ambassador ought to say that the Emperor will be satisfied and contented, but if he meets with resistance in the matter he must not insist too much upon it.

It would also be advisable that the Imperial ambassador in England should say to the King that although the Emperor intended to secure the personal services of Monsr. de Büren for the approaching campaign, yet, to do the King's pleasure, he (the Emperor) is willing to place him at the King's disposal with a force of 2,000 horse and 2,000 lanskennets, provided the King pays them and sends money besides for the enlistment of 2,000 more Germans, whom he wishes to be added to Monsr. de Büren's force.

Money to be likewise provided for the levying and enlisting of the 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse, and be remitted as quickly as possible to the persons having the charge of recruiting, etc., so that they may have able and experienced soldiers well equipped and mounted.

Item.—If the King has not already sent his own deputies to the Queen Regent in Flanders, let him do so as soon as possible, that the English commissaries, in union with those of the Queen, may look out for provisions and so forth.

Respecting money to gain the Swiss over to our party, the Imperial ambassador is to be instructed to try again whether he will not be able to persuade the King to furnish

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the cash, although there is very little chance of the English complying with our wishes in that respect.

The Imperial ambassador must try to ascertain as far as he can from the King or from his ministers, what is the real strength of the English army, and what military preparations, if any, are now being made to increase and reinforce the same; if there is any difficulty or hesitation about it; on what terms the King is with the Scotch, and whether, on the part of the latter some movement may be apprehended likely to prevent the English from crossing the Channel at the time fixed for the invasion of France; and, lastly, whether the French persevere in their intrigues, and are still trying to gain over the English, and if the King persists in his idea of crossing over in person, and who are to be the chief commanders of his forces. All this the Imperial ambassador should be ordered to investigate and ascertain as closely as possible, taking care to report to the Emperor, or to his Sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, the result of his enquiries.

With regard to the suggestion urgently made by the King's commissioners (*commis*), both to Don Fernando and to the Imperial ambassador, that the fleet of the Low Countries under Monsr. de Bèvres, or whoever may be its admiral at the time, be entirely regulated by the advice of the English admiral, and act, as it were, in obedience to the latter—a sort of suggestion and prayer which Don Fernando would not admit then, but has since been requested by the King's commissioners to lay before the Queen dowager—that is a sort of thing which can in no wise be accepted, not only for the sake of reputation, but because the adoption of the measure proposed might be followed by untoward and disagreeable events; for the Imperial fleet being, as it were, under the supreme command of an English admiral, would be exclusively used for the King's particular aims and designs in Scotland, and if destined afterwards for the coast of France, the precedent once established, it would again have to serve and operate under the English admiral. For the above reasons the ambassador ought to be instructed to say, should the said suggestion and application be renewed, that there will be no fault of good and amicable correspondence and co-operation on our part respecting the preconcerted common enterprise and endamagement of the enemy by land and sea.

As to the declaration which the king of England wishes the Emperor to make against the Scots, the measure seems to me reasonable enough, provided the King does the same against the duke of Holstein, who is professedly the Emperor's enemy, and has defied and challenged the Low Countries.

What the Queen, herself, has answered respecting the safe-conducts seems well, and for the present there is nothing more to say about it till we hear what the Imperial ambassador [in England] has written and given as his opinion on the subject.

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It seems also that it would be desirable that the Emperor's ministers should tell the English ambassador at the Imperial Court that the Emperor approves of and agrees to whatever his own ambassador in England has done or promised in the Büren * affair, and others of which the King or his privy councillors have spoken to him.

Indorsed: "Opinion of an Imperial Councillor† on the agreement made by the viceroy of Sicily."

French. Original. 4 *pp.*

1 Feb. **23.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

After the many hostilities and great falsehoods of the Scots, Henry has resolved to take up arms against them, and to declare them his enemies. Considers it right to inform the Emperor of that resolution, and requests him to make a similar declaration. His ambassador at the Emperor's Court ‡ will more fully explain this his determination, as well as the causes and motives he has had for it.—Westminster Palace, the 1st day of February 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

2 Feb. **24.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Eng.

"Sire,"—Four days ago, I received Your Majesty's letter of the 14th ult., and in compliance with the orders contained therein, I went to the Privy Council and urgently represented to its members on the necessity and convenience of their declaring at once the duke of Holstein to be this King's enemy, more particularly if they themselves insist, as they have done hitherto, upon Your Majesty making a similar declaration with regard to the Scots. In compliance with Your Majesty's commands I did this, and after a long conference with the councillors, and several consultations and long debates in the King's presence, I got the following answer from them:—That Your Majesty was no less interested in the declaration against the Scots than the King, their master was, as, said they, such declaration on the part of the Emperor will be the means of detaching the Scots from the alliance and friendship of France, for inasmuch as should they hereafter, at the solicitation and with the help of France, come to invade this kingdom of England, Your Majesty would be obliged to encounter considerable expense for its defence. The said declaration being a most efficacious remedy under present circumstances,

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* Here written *Büeren.*

† Most likely Louis de Flandre, sieur de Praët, once Imperial ambassador in England, 1523–5, who, owing to his great knowledge of English affairs, was often consulted by the Emperor and by queen Mary.

‡ Dr. Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury, formerly English ambassador in Flanders, who, in November 1543, was appointed by king Henry to reside with the Emperor in the room of the bishop of London (Edmund Bonner). *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 525.

and one, moreover, so advantageous for Your Majesty without any shade of danger to yourself or injury to your subjects, there ought to be no delay in making it. As to the declaration asked of them against the duke of Holstein, the privy councillors begged Your Majesty to consider that it would be of very little use to you, as the Duke after all is unable by himself to invade or overrun Your Majesty's dominions; whereas, should the King, their master, declare against him and consider him his enemy, it would be highly inconvenient and injurious for himself and his subjects, owing to the great resort of Englishmen to Denmark, to procure there the articles they want for the building and repairing of their ships, as well as other commodities." Besides which (added the privy councillors) we are almost certain that should our master make the declaration asked of him, that would be sufficient cause for the duke of Holstein, at the instigation and with the help of France, to land in Scotland, or at least send thither a large number of Germans, for the purpose of invading England on that side. In addition to which we must tell you that the merchants of this country have considerable property in Denmark, which property would be irretrievably lost the very moment that the declaration against the Duke was signed and proclaimed.* We therefore think that the Emperor should for the present desist from his purpose, and hope that he will. It would be very expedient, nevertheless, as well as necessary, that since the Emperor has asked to be sufficiently informed of the causes of the war between England and Scotland, we ourselves, the privy councillors, should be apprized of the causes for which the King, our master, is expected to declare against the Duke.† Notwithstanding my answers, replies and arguments, the privy councillors persisted in their refusal, all the time declaring that they had not the least doubt that Your Majesty would immediately sign and publish the declaration against the Scots. I have, therefore, been requested by them in the King's name to beg Your Majesty to listen to their prayer and make the said declaration, in expectation of which favour, as the privy councillors have given me to understand, this King has ordered the release from prison of the Milanese physician who had been incarcerated for having upheld the authority of His Holiness the Pope, and in whose favour Your Majesty had written.

Three days ago a Scotch king-at-arms arrived here to ask safe-conducts for three or four ambassadors who are coming on behalf of the General States of that country. Though the privy councillors have said nothing to me respecting the

* "Joinct que les subjectz de ce royaulme ont grande quantite de biens en ce cartier là lesquelz (en cas de la declaration) seroient tous perduz."

† "Et du moins à l'extreme seroit expedient et necessaire que comme vostre maieste a voulu estre suffisamment certiorée de louverture de la guerre entre eulx et les Escossois, que aussi fussent [ilz] suffisamment instruictz des causes legitimes par lesquelles le dict S^r roy se puisse bonnement declairer à lencontre du dict duc."

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mission entrusted to the Scotch ambassadors, yet the king-at-arms himself has said and declared to one of my servants, that the kingdom of Scotland wished for peace and amity with England, and did not intend in the least to contravene the treaties lately made between the two countries, and yet were of opinion that the concerted marriage of the prince of Gwalles (Wales) and the princess of Scotland (Mary Stuart) ought not to be effected before both parties were of a marriageable age. To these proposals of the Scots the privy councillors here seemed to attach little or no faith at all, and the proof is that they are using greater diligence than ever on the Borders, continually dispatching messengers and couriers thither, more to the disadvantage of that country than hitherto. I also hear that the aforesaid king-at-arms has also applied for a passport and safe-conduct for the patriarch of Aquileia, who intends returning [to Italy] through England.

After a good deal of altercation and dispute the King (though much against his will) has consented to the safe-conducts granted by Your Majesty, and by the queen dowager of Hungary, being respected by his subjects; but he will not allow that vessels with cargoes of French goods may under any circumstances bring them here for sale.

Neither the King nor his courtiers nearest to his person have ceased laughing ironically at this new turn of king Francis' conscience, and this King hopes that if any one is to give him absolution for his wicked practices and intelligences with the Turk, that Your Majesty and himself will impose the penance.

I must not omit to say that the King means to gratify and please Your Majesty in the matter of the safe-conducts by commanding his subjects to observe them strictly, provided the owners and captains of vessels on that side of the Channel do not lade them with artillery, arms, ammunition or provisions (*victuailles*) for France. I must likewise observe that up to this day the privy councillors have said nothing to me concerning the other two points mentioned by their ambassador at Your Majesty's court, viz., the Spanish hackbutiers and the "centiesme denier," and therefore that I have not thought it necessary or convenient to allude to them.—London, 2 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "To the Emperor. From the ambassador in England of the 2nd of February. Received at Spire (Speier) on the XIth of the same month, 1544."

French. Original. 4 *pp.*

2 Feb. **25.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 23.

"Madame,"—My last letter of the 28th ult. must have fully acquainted Your Majesty with the news of this country.

Since then, in fact the day after, the 29th, the King's deputies called and talked to me at length on the affairs of Scotland; the summary of their conversation being that although the King, their master, had not yet obtained all he wanted from the Scots, there was still every appearance and probability of his ultimately gaining his object. At any rate, they (the deputies) were sure, nay, certain, that during the King's life there would be no invasion of England from that quarter, and, therefore, it seemed to them both just and reasonable that in consideration for the relief thus procured to the Emperor, who would no longer be obliged, according to the letter of the treaty, to send auxiliary troops to the Borders, some prorogation of the period fixed for the defence [of the Low Countries] should be agreed upon. To which overtures on the part of the Royal deputies I replied, among other things, that their demand seemed rather exorbitant. It was exceedingly unpleasant for me to have to send home a demand of that sort and let it reach the ears of the Emperor, who, on hearing of it, might naturally presume that the King's application originated in a mercenary and selfish point of view rather than in a sentiment of affectionate friendship. They (the King's deputies) ought to recollect what I told them some time ago. Their King was now in greater need than ever of a good and binding alliance (*bonne colligation*) with His Imperial Majesty, and wanted particularly his help and assistance. At the time of king Robertus Brugius * of Scotland, and of king Edward the Second of England, the affairs of that kingdom were comparatively in a worse condition than they are at present, the whole of the country, with the exception of the Caledonian forest (*hors la sylve Caledonia*), being under the obedience and rule of the English, and yet, all of a sudden, the Scots had made desperate raids across the Borders and penetrated far into England; whereas the confederacy and alliance which they (the Royal deputies) sought against Scotland was not temporary but permanent. As to the reciprocity of which they talked I did not see it, for supposing the Scots, as they said, made no stir whenever the King, their master, decided to carry on war against France, I did not hesitate to say that there was still less probability of the French invading the Low Countries of the Emperor, knowing the mutual good intelligence between the two princes. The King, their master, would not be put to any expense whatever on that account, as there would be no need of his help and assistance for the defence, especially if the Emperor condescends to use clemency towards the duke of Clèves, who, as I hope, will sooner or later be brought to reason one way or other.

Hearing the above and other similar remarks of mine on the subject the Royal deputies talked together for a while

* Robert Bruce.

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and then returned to me, suggesting, as if it came from themselves, that it seemed to them that at least, and by way of compensation, the King their master ought to be exempted from the contribution to the defence of the Low Countries for a period of two years. And on my replying to them that the thing, for the above considerations, was of very small importance for their King, and, besides, that their demand had no foundation to stand upon, they again conversed together, and came back saying, that one of their colleagues in the Privy Council had suggested that most likely to-morrow or the day after His Majesty the Emperor, being in extreme want, and the better to resist the Turk, might possibly make some convention or other with the king of France, through which the King, their master, would remain, as it were, isolated and without the means of recovering the arrears of pension owing to him; and that in order to guard against that contingency and indemnify the king, it ought to be stipulated that in such an event the Emperor should make up the king of England's losses.

Hearing this I told the deputies my mind, and made such representations as I deemed opportune and fit under the circumstances. No reply, however, came from them, though shortly after they made another suggestion no less substantial, namely, that in order to render the friendship and alliance between the two princes (the Emperor and the King, their master) more perfect and indissoluble, it seemed to them that a stipulation of mutual assistance ought to be made both for the conquest of Gelders by the Emperor, and of Scotland for the King, to which I replied, "Why not add that of Denmark also?" * for certainly it will not be very difficult to dethrone the duke of Holstein.

After some discussion on the latter point the Royal deputies, perceiving that I had no express mandate to pass the article as originally worded, and fearing that other debatable points still unsettled, and the discussion of which would be both long and dangerous, might suffer from delay, resolved that it was far better to yield in the principal one, and agreed that in the article in question the Scots, the Danes, and the people of Geldres should be expressly and by name declared the mutual enemies of both the allies. But as the Emperor at the very beginning of the present negociations caused a letter to be written commanding me to take care not to contravene in the least the treaties then existing between him and the last king of Scotland, I refused to agree to the proposal of the Royal deputies, or consent to the expression "mutual enemies," being introduced as they desired. Upon which the deputies examined again (*revisiterent*) the original draft of the treaty, and, pointing out the article in question, asked me whether I thought

* "Et leur disant encoires quilz pouvoient bien adiouster Denmarch."

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or not that the clause, as it was there expressed, comprised all the common enemies. My answer was that I thought it did. Upon which they seemed satisfied and went away; and I cannot help thinking that it was principally to ascertain that that the deputies called on me.

I must not omit to say that the Royal deputies during their conversation with me failed not to allude incidentally, and more than once, to French intrigues, and to their having again renewed their offers of a marriage alliance with the Princess (Mary), thus giving me an opportunity, as well as the pleasure, of criticising French practices; which remarks of mine they listened to with attention, as people who are not much inclined that way.*

Some days ago nine French ships (*navieres*), sailing for Portugal or for the coast of Africa with a cargo of hempen and other cloths (*canevas et autres toiles*) valued at a large sum of money, were compelled by stress of weather to take refuge in the port of Anthona (Southampton), where, as the English assert, there happened to be at the time a Scotch vessel half captured by the English, and under the fire of one of the port's batteries. When night came on the French ships sailed away, taking with them the Scotch one, in consequence of which the nine French ones were detained, as they are still.—London, 2 February 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

2 Feb. **26.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

This morning I sent a message by my man to the Royal deputies, who answered that they will call at this embassy the day after to-morrow to bring the King's resolution on the whole business in hand. May God permit that it be such as befits the settlement of public affairs, and particularly those of the Emperor, and of Your Majesty. In any event I should like to know as soon as possible what Your Majesty's will is respecting the expression and nomination proposed,† and also with regard to the new offensive alliance. —London, 2 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed: "To the Queen."
French. Original. 4 *pp.*

2 Feb. **27.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 23.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 22nd ult., relating chiefly to your solicitation that this King may declare

* "Et me fust plaisir quilz me donnassent cest[e] occasion de blasonner ung peu les armes des françoys, et à eulx aussi de louyr comme gens non gueres inclinez de ce coustel la."

† Most likely that of the duke of Holstein in exchange for the declaration against the Scots so frequently alluded to by Chapuys.

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himself the enemy of the duke of Holstein, came duly to hand. I have been unable to obtain any further concession on that point than that which Your Majesty will see by the copy of my letter to the Emperor herein enclosed.*

Respecting the herrings (*harengs*) mentioned in Your Majesty's letter to me, they were already sold before the receipt of that letter; the privy councillors have sent me a message with the excuse, among others, that as their merchants last year had been for many reasons prevented from going to Island (Iceland) and purchasing herrings and other fish fit for eating, and could not procure the same elsewhere, they had been literally obliged to keep the herrings; but that the Emperor's and Your Majesty's safe-conducts would be observed and respected in future, though on the express condition that no French merchandize came to England in Flemish bottoms, as Your Majesty will see by my said letter to the Emperor.

The King has taken in very good part what Your Majesty declared to his ambassadors respecting the Legate's overtures, and also the concession (*l'octroy*) which Your Majesty has been pleased to make, that this King (although the Emperor's declaration against the Scots is not forthcoming) may grant safe-conducts to trade to whomsoever of them he pleases; in doing which it appears to me that it ought to be stipulated that the Scotch merchants who apply for such safe-conducts should solicit the confirmation of the same by Your Majesty.—London, 2 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

3 Feb. **28.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—I could not refuse these privy councillors to write, as I have done at other times, in favour and commendation of count Bernardin † de Saint Boniface, and beg Your Majesty to be gracious and please this King in the matter.—London, 3 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

3 Feb. **29.** The ARCHBISHOP OF SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA to the EMPEROR.

S. E., L. 64, f. 257. B. M. *Add.* 28,593, f. 299.

Gives an account of his voyage to Spain, and arrival at La Coruña [in Galicia] on Tuesday, the 29th of January, at the hour of noon, after 12 days' voyage.

* That of the 9th (No. 8, p. 7).

† About this co. Bernard de S[t] Boniface, or Bernardino di San Bonifazio, as he is elsewhere called (*see* Vol. VI., Part II.). He came to London in 1543 in company with another Italian captain, to offer his services to king Henry, who, however, did not accept of them, and dismissed him with a present. pp. 368 and 493. He was taken prisoner by the Imperialists at Ruremonde, or its immediate neighbourhood.

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"The town of Anberez (Anvers, Antwerp), where I stayed five weeks, is at the present time so contaminated with Luther's false doctrines (*falsas libertades*), that it moves one to pity even to think of it. Indeed, no words can express what I myself feel. I cannot, however, refrain from saying —for such I consider it my duty—that since Your Imperial Majesty has so often and so earnestly worked for the preservation of your temporal dominions with so much labour, and even danger to your person, your bounden duty is to show the same zeal in spiritual matters.—Santiago [de Compostela], 3 February 1544.

Signed: "Gasp. Compostellanus."*

Addressed: "To the Sacred, Imperial, and Catholic Majesty."

Spanish. Holograph. 2 *pp.*

n. d. **30.** The EMPEROR to the CARDINAL OF SANTIAGO.

S. E., L. 64, f. 259.
B. M. *Add.* 28,593, *f.* 299.

His Imperial Majesty has heard with pleasure the account of the Cardinal's prosperous voyage to, and arrival at, La Coruña. Has to thank him (the Archbishop) for the prayers he has ordered to be made throughout the churches of his See for the prosperity of the Imperial arms.

Respecting Antwerp, the Emperor has already made such provision as is likely to cleanse that city from the heresies of the Lutheran sect. Should those provisions turn out insufficient, everything will be done to stop the evil.

Spanish. Original draft. ½ *p.*

4 Feb. **31.** PRINCE PHILIP to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

S. E., L. 64, f. 171, 302.

The Prince.—Two of your despatches, those of the 9th and 29th of November, have come to hand.† I am sorry to hear of your indisposition, and hope that on the arrival of this letter you will be in better health.

From the news of that country and Scotland written by you I gather that the king of England's affairs are going on prosperously enough. I am very glad to hear it, and beg you to continue writing to me as often as you possibly can, informing me of the occurrences of that country where you reside, as well as of the Emperor's progress; because, to tell you the truth, what with the Turkish fleet in the Levant and on the coast of France, it is very seldom that we have news of the Emperor's doings.

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* The Archbishop's name was Gaspar Avalos, who upon the death of Pedro Sarmiento de Mendoza in 1541, was promoted to the archiepiscopal see of Santiago of Compostela. He had formerly been archbishop of Granada (1529), and, founder of its University (1531), was made Cardinal in 1544, and died on the 2nd of November 1545.

† Of the two despatches which prince Philip says he received from Chapuys, only one—that of the 9th of November 1543—has been found. It is abstracted in Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 519–21.

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There is a report here that Don Fernando Gonzaga went to London by the Emperor's commands on a visit to the king of England. I should very much like to know what has been the result of his mission.

Here most certain intelligence has been received that the united fleets of France and Turkey are to pass the winter, the former at Marseilles, the latter in Toulon. This is a very grave piece of news, which will oblige us to provide for the defence of Our Mediterranean coast should the enemy think of infesting it next spring.

I went to Salamanca in the first days of November at the same time as the Princess [of Portugal], and on the 15th of the same month we were married. Thence we came to this town [of Valladolid], where we still are, both enjoying good health. Latterly, however, I myself have not felt quite well, though I am now much better. I enter into these details that you may inform that King of what has hitherto prevented my writing to him on the subject of my marriage.*

You will visit the Princess in my name, &c.—Valladolid, 4 February 1544.

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*

7 Feb. **32.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Venerable, chier et feal,"—We send you herein inclosed the summary of Our resolution in the business and charge entrusted to Don Fernando de Gonzaga on his return to Us from his mission in England.† It will serve you as Instruction and guidance in whatever you may have to carry out at the court of Our brother, the king of England.—Spire, 7 February 1543 [Old style].

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

9 Feb. **33.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to AMBASSADOR CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—By previous letters of Ours on the subject of the safe-conducts you must have been apprised of the fact that the English refuse altogether to acknowledge and observe those granted on Our side. We have since heard that vessels of these Low Countries with a

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* Prince Philip was married to Maria, daughter of Dom Joaõ III., king of Portugal in November 12th, 1543, at Salamanca. On the 19th of the same month he left for Valladolid, then the Court and capital of all Spain, where, on the 12th of July 1545, he lost his wife. Nine years after, on the 25th of July 1554, the Prince married, at Winchester, Mary Tudor, the daughter of king Henry VIII. and Catharine of Aragon.—Florez, *Memorias de las Reynas Catholicas de Españe*, Madrid, 1761 ; 4to., Vol. II., pp. 869–75.

† Most likely the paper at pp. 29–32, No. 22, headed, "Opinion of a Councillor of State on the agreement entered into by Ferrante Gonzaga with the king of England," unless it be the Emperor's own resolution in the matter, as the words, "La Resolution de l'Empereur touchant la besoigne du viceroy de Sicile en Angleterre" seem to imply. The opinion alluded to has no date, but as Gonzaga was at Brussels in January. Praët, or some other Imperial councillor of State, may by queen Mary's order have (l'ouir) consulted about it.

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cargo of herrings (*herents*) for France, to return therefrom with wine, have been seized in England, which seizure, as We apprehend, will be not only exceedingly inconvenient under present circumstances, but also, generally speaking, most prejudicial to the inhabitants (*manans*) of this country who are in want of wine. We were in hopes that in exchange for those herrings thus exported to France We might get in return a good quantity of wine from that country, and that is why the said safe-conducts were granted. The herring, as it is well known, is an article of food which cannot be kept throughout the summer months, and which must therefore be consumed within proper time and season, otherwise it would be good for nothing. In consequence of that seizure the herring fishers in these countries under Our government, who go to considerable expense in fitting out their smacks and so forth, will be seriously affected, and unless their vessels and cargoes are immediately released will in future desist from a trade and occupation which has been hitherto a source of gain for the sea people and inhabitants of these coasts in general; besides which, unless wine be procured by honest means from France, We shall have none for the consumption of the army when required at the approaching spring season.

To avoid the above and other serious inconveniences likely to arise from the English refusal to observe the safe-conducts granted in this country, We herein inclose credentials in your favour that you may see the King and make such representations on this subject as you may consider most fit and convenient, requesting him in Our name to have Our safe-conducts observed by his officers and people, just as We will in due reciprocity order his to be observed and respected by Our naval captains. You are, in short, particularly requested to employ all means in your power to obtain this, which is most important for His Imperial Majesty's subjects in these countries, namely, that Our said safe-conducts be faithfully observed by the English, not only for the profit to be derived from them, but for the money which is much wanted for the necessities of the present war. Should the King refuse Our application and persist in his determination not to allow the people of these countries and others to frequent France for the purposes of trade—which We hope he will not do—then, in that case, after the requisite excuses on your part, you will ask him in Our name to be pleased to release at least the vessels, and keep the cargoes until the herrings are sold, for certainly the King would in no wise maintain that vessels having safe-conducts from Us can be sequestered on account of their cargoes being destined for France. The King, We have no doubt, will attend to this request of Ours, though it be to the regret and loss of the poor merchants interested in the cargoes. We particularly recommend this affair to your care, and to let Us know as soon as possible how

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far the King is inclined to listen to it, and what resolution he takes on the whole, that We may accordingly decide what We have to do in future.

Indorsed: "To the ambassador in England, avec une lectre de credence au Roy."

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

14 Feb. **34.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—Your letter of the 2nd inst. inclosing copy of the one you wrote to the Emperor of the same date came duly to hand. We immediately apprised His Imperial Majesty of the excuses made by the king of England when invited to declare against the duke of Holstein. Since then We have received from the Emperor the packet of letters and documents which We forward along with this, and as We hear that the Emperor is willing to declare against the Scotch, provided the King himself declares against the Duke, We could not omit to send to you the copy, also here inclosed, of what We have written to him on the subject. All this has been done for the purpose of enabling you to remonstrate with that King and with his privy councillors, and give them to understand how important it is that England's declaration against the Duke should be made at once, and reminding, at the same time, the King's privy councillors of the obligation under which they are, and of the assurance they once gave you, whilst discussing the treaty of alliance between the King and the Emperor, that on that treaty being concluded and sworn to, the Duke would be declared the common enemy of the allied princes. Which declaration, if effected, would have come very *à propos* at the present juncture, when the Duke is sending his deputies to the Emperor for the purpose of obtaining terms, for that would no doubt render him more reasonable in his demands. Indeed, were the Duke to persevere in his hostility against the Emperor it would be materially impossible for the King of England to dissemble and refuse the required declaration.

However that may be the Emperor's Memorandum to you on the business transacted by the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), when he was last in that country, will inform you that among the agreements entered into with the privy councillors, one was that the King should send his deputies to Us to look after the provision to be made on this side of the Channel. The agreement seemed to Us then, as it does now, both convenient and useful, and yet We think that no great insistence should be made at present upon it, and that it would be far preferable that the King should send Us beforehand in writing a list of the victuals and waggons which he requires for his army, as We could then say to him whether

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We could or could not furnish the said provisions and effects.* Then the King might send his deputies whenever he considered it fit and convenient, as We wrote to you in Our last.

You will also inquire what number of foot soldiers the King intends Mr. De Buren to raise or engage for his royal service, and whether they are to be levied in Upper or Lower Germany. As the said force, in addition to the body of 2,000 horse and 2,000 foot from this country which the count is to command, is to operate in this country, We should be glad to hear in time all the particulars, that We may be prepared.

Nor can We omit to say that We have received news of certain gatherings of infantry in the duchy of Holstein and its neighbourhood, amounting, as We are told, to 10,000 men; their number is every day increasing, and their plan is to pay a visit to Friesland and Gronninge during this frosty season (*durant ces gellées*).† A mere accident has prevented them from carrying it out, but, We hear from authentic sources that next spring, as soon as the money they expect from France is received, the men are to go to sea in order to invade these Low Countries or Scotland, or else sail straight for France and serve and assist king Francis by land. We do not yet know for certain which of these three methods of hostility the duke of Holstein will choose; all depends upon their being able to procure ships for the passage, and artillery, which they expect to get from the Duke. That difficulty once got over there can be no doubt that the forces assembled in the duchy of Holstein are for an attack on these Low Countries, a landing in Scotland, or for otherwise increasing in France the army of Our common enemy. But We fancy that if the king of England fulfils his promise and declares against the Duke, the Holstein armed gatherings might easily be taken in, whilst the Duke himself comes to terms with His Imperial Majesty; and if the French sent them money, artillery and ships, the whole of the armament might be surprised and captured on their voyage west.

The count of Rœulx has also continual news of the great preparations which the French are making to revictual Terroaines (Terouennes) and Ardres as soon as the weather will permit them to take the field. If means could be found to prevent them from doing this, We think it would be possible for Us to gain possession of these two places, which according to reliable information are deficient in provisions of food and

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* "Toutesfois nous a semblé quil ne fault encoires sur ce faire grande instance, mais qu'il seroit melieur de premier nous envoyer par escript la note des provisions tant de vivres, victualles (*sic*), chariotz que aultrement le dit S^r^ roy entende que nous debvons faire pour son service."

† "Les quelz estoient deliberez durans ces gellées faire une visite aux pays de Frize et de Groninge, ce que par accident leur a este empesché, et avons entendu de bon lieu que au printemps, si tost quilz auront reçeu largent quils attendent de France, ilz se mettront en mer."

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war ammunition. We inform you of these particulars that you may report the news to the King's privy councillors whenever the opportunity offers.

In one of Our preceding letters We informed you of the communication by Us made to the resident English ambassador respecting Cardinal Farnese's mission, and what he said to Us at his passage through this city to go to the Emperor. Since then the ambassador has called to thank Us in his master's name. We have now declared to him, through Our ministers, the substance of the overtures made by the Cardinal to the Emperor, namely to leave to king Francis the duchy of Milan, and whatever he now occupies in Piedmont and Savoy. On these conditions the Emperor has not only refused to treat, but has maintained that nothing short of the complete abandonment by Francis of his pretensions in Italy, and the payment of his debt to the king of England will ever induce him to listen to overtures of peace, if that peace is to be sure and lasting.

At the same time that the above particulars were imparted to the English ambassador by Our ministers, he was told that the queen of France, Our good and dear sister, had sent one of her household officers, a native of this country, with a present of birds, and the prayer that We would let her know as soon as possible what answer the Emperor, Our brother, had returned to the Cardinal's overtures of peace, which We would not do without first consulting Our brother, whose answer came yesterday. Immediately after which we dispatched Our sister's officer back with the answer as above. As the officer has remained long at this Court We have considered it necessary also to acquaint the English ambassadors with these facts for fear of suspicion and in order that if mention is made in your presence, or any questions asked, or you yourself wish to talk about it, you may do so according to the above statement.

With regard to the 1 per cent. tax, and the pressing and hard solicitations of the dean of Canterbury on the subject before his departure from this Court, as We have already given you notice of Our final determination, there is no need of Our writing further about it. Neither are you to mention the subject at all unless the privy councillors speak first. The dean of York, Dr. Layton himself, who succeeded that of Canterbury (Dr. Wotton) as resident English ambassador here, has not even opened his mouth about it. Should another attempt be made there, you will let Us have your advice in the matter, and how We can meet the demands of Our allies and benefit them without actually doing harm to the inhabitants of these countries under Our government. In one of your letters to Us you say that you have sent your advice, but We cannot find out whether the advice and counsel you speak of was contained in your despatch of the 11th of June [1543] or in a later one.

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You have done well in ultimately agreeing with the privy councillors as to the safe-conducts, and having that matter settled for the future. In consequence of that final agreement orders shall be issued to Our naval commanders not to harm the masters and crews of, nor interfere in any way with vessels provided with regular safe-conducts from that King, under the restrictions previously pointed out, and which have been observed ever since the announcement of this present war, namely, that no safe-conducts shall be granted to vessels bound for France and laden with articles of food, war ammunition, and so forth, herrings only excepted, as in the case of the vessels lately sequestered by the English for the sole purpose of obtaining wine from France, a sort of commodity which We should have been glad to have before the next vintage. With the above restrictions We are quite ready to approve of the agreement entered into with that King's privy councillors.

The agreement entered into with the King's privy councillors as to future safe-conducts seems to Us good, and We approve of it. Orders shall be issued for all naval commanders in these Low Countries not to harm or injure, or in any manner interfere with the masters and crews of vessels provided with a safe-conduct from the king of England, though with the following restrictive measures, which have been in practice here ever since the commencement of the present war, namely, that no safe-conducts be granted to vessels bound for France and carrying articles of food, artillery, ammunition or war materials. There is only one exception to be attended to, namely, that of the herrings, as in the case of the vessels lately sequestered by the English. That being the only means available for obtaining wine from France—an article of which Our people and Our army were much in need, and which We should have been glad to get before the spring—We did not hesitate, as at other times, in granting the required safe-conducts to vessels of this nation to go to and from the ports of France. We only find one difficulty in all this, which is that the English, perhaps, will not allow vessels of the enemy, though provided with regular safe-conducts, to enter the ports and harbours of England. This might give rise to inconveniences, for supposing that vessels sailing for trade purposes, and with a proper safe-conduct to the countries under Our government, were, by contrary winds and stress of weather, thrown on the coast of England, but were not allowed to take refuge in the ports and harbours of that country, what would become of the said vessels? If you can, get the English to allow that vessels thus driven by storm or foul weather on the coasts of that kingdom be not considered a legitimate prize, and be permitted to enter a port for refuge provided the masters are furnished with a safe-conduct, and do not attempt to put any thing on shore well and good. That is the practice adopted in these countries

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—if a French vessel having a safe-conduct for her cargo comes to any port on the coast her skipper or master and her crew cannot land, or put anything on shore without first obtaining permission from the governor or chief officer in the place.

It will also be requisite that you (Chapuys) should suggest to the privy councillors how just and reasonable it would be that Scotch vessels under a safe-conduct from that King should also have one of Ours when destined for the ports and harbours of these countries, in order that their skippers or masters may know by the very words of Our safe-conducts how they are to behave the moment they touch land and anchor, and what steps to take before they land, and that We are perfectly in Our right in doing so, for fear that under cover of their safe-conduct the crews thereof after all should attempt some surprise or other; for if We gratify the King by admitting into the ports of these Low Countries the vessels of a nation, which he himself considers his enemies and wants Us to do the same, that is no reason why the usual precautions in time of war should be omitted. It will be for you (Chapuys) to submit to the King this suggestion of Ours, and procure that Scotch vessels sailing to these ports under the king of England's safe-conduct be also furnished with one of Ours.

With regard to the sequestered cargo, since the herrings, as you say, are already sold and consumed, no further reply is needed, save to say that We hope the English will pay a reasonable price for them so that the merchants may lose nothing; but on the contrary gain some small profit, to be fixed by English arbitration entirely. The merchants who put the herrings on board have urgently and repeatedly applied to Us for some provision or other to that effect, but We have constantly declined to take any other step, though We have contented the interested parties by telling them that We have written to you to assist them in their very just claims. That is why We request you to call again at the Privy Council, and represent that since the cargoes have not been declared to be a legitimate prize, it would be unfair to retain the herrings in England without paying for their cost here (in the Low Countries) and for the expenses of carrying and shipping. It is quite sufficient that the small profit to which the merchants are entitled should be left entirely to the arbitration of the English judges. The merchants, however, have already purchased wine in France, and are naturally afraid that unless they take thither a fresh cargo of herrings they will not be able to import the wine, which is what they most desire. This they have asked Us to sanction, but We have refused for fear of the English resenting it. You may inquire and try to ascertain how far the King's privy councillors are disposed to allow a safe-conduct for a fresh cargo of herrings, and at the same time what amount of indemnity for their losses will be allowed to the merchants for the sequestration

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of the herrings and other losses sustained.—Gandt, 14th February 1543 (Old style).

Addressed: "To the Emperor's ambassador in England: Maistre Chapuis, du XIIIIe de Fevrier, dois Gandt (Ghent), 1543 avant Jaques."

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*

14 Feb. **35.** HIGH COMMANDER COBOS to FRANCISCO DE ERASSO.

S. E., L. 67, f. 80, 304.

Since the departure of Martin Alonso de los Rios four letters from you have been received; one of the 17th of December [1543], another of the 27th, and two more of the 3rd of January [1544]. Of these latter, both of which came by hand, one was brought by Don Luis de Avila,* the other by the High Commander of Aragon.† I shall not answer each of them in particular, having already done so by Martin Alonso de los Rios, the messenger; though the latter had already left and was overtaken by an express sent after him. You will, therefore, receive at the same time the duplicate of my despatch of the 2nd of February, and this my letter in answer to all yours.

I thank you most gratefully for the care you take in writing to me privately and informing me by various ways of the Emperor's doings. Pray continue to do so as often as you can; you will do Us all a most signal service.

As to news from this country I have nothing fresh to communicate or to add to the contents of my other letter, save to recommend you to trust implicitly on secretary Idiaquez, and show him all the letters We write from this court (Valladolid) to His Imperial Majesty, as well as my own private ones to secretary Juan Vazquez de Molina, &c., for, as it is fit and proper that secretaries should communicate to each other their private letters and despatches, and His Highness, the Prince, does so with his own, I wish to comply with the established custom.‡—Valladolid, 14th of February 1544.

Spanish. Holograph. 1½ *pp.*

18 Feb. **36.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 7th inst. came to hand the day before yesterday, just at the time that I was preparing to go to Court to communicate to the King the message conveyed in the said letter, as well as the orders

* Don Luis de Avila y Zuñiga. *See* above, p. 14.

† The High Commander of Aragon, mentioned lower down, could be no other than Urries, the last Grand Master of Montesa, one of the Military Orders peculiar to Aragon; the other three, Santiago, Calatrava, and Alcantara being those of Castille and Leon.

‡ "Que pues lo principal está hecho y Su Alteza lo hace, no hay razon para no hazello."

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previously received from the Emperor, as Your Majesty will see by the copy of my letter to him herein inclosed. I have scarcely anything to add save on the revictualling of Theroeinne and Ardres, which this King would willingly have tried to prevent, had he had the means of doing so immediately; but he believes that by this time the French have either actually accomplished their object, or else that before he himself could collect a sufficient force to carry on the proposed military operation, the revictualling of those towns would have been effected. Many weeks ago before the rumours of the French movements had become more consistent he (the King) had caused a letter to be addressed to Monsr. du Rœulx on the subject, and that general had answered that he had then no means of co-operating in an invasion of French territory for the purpose of preventing the revictualling of those two fortified towns on the French frontier.

With regard to the safe-conducts, and to sending salted herrings to France, he made at first more difficulties than ever he did, and yet at the end of the audience he showed himself more disposed to yield, for having heard from me that wine could not be procured in France without allowing the herrings to be imported freely and without molestation of any sort, he (the King) seemed less disinclined than he was to respect the safe-conducts issued in Flanders, for he said to me "if only for a small quantity, that is a different thing." And yet I could not get from him a decided answer on the subject, for he wanted (he said) to consult his Privy Council about it.

As to licences to import corn and wine into Flanders and the Low Countries on a specified number of French vessels, the same difficulties have been raised. I will try my best to obtain a favourable resolution, and if I do I shall not fail to apprize Your Majesty thereof.

These privy councillors excuse their delay in issuing the letters patent on the observance of the safe-conducts granted by Your Majesty, not so much on account of their own occupations and engagements—which they say are many and multifarious—as of the notice they say they have received of Your Majesty having already issued your own respecting those which the king of England himself may have granted or will grant in future. That is why I beg and entreat Your Majesty to have letters patent drawn out in form as to the manner of observing the safe-conducts, stating at the same time that the English may freight French vessels for the purpose of trade and merchandize provided those vessels are completely unarmed, not omitting a short clause to say that besides the original safe-conduct the masters of the vessels shall have to exhibit, as many times as they may be required, authentic copies of the original patent attested by notaries and other public officers.

Respecting the 1 per cent. duty, the privy councillors have said nothing of late. Should they again speak to me about

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it I will answer them in conformity with the instructions received from Your Majesty.—London, 18 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

18 Feb. **37.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Since the departure of the viceroy of Sicily nothing new or important has occurred here; [the rest as in his letter to the Emperor of the same date,—the letter ending with a paragraph begging for a settlement of his account with the treasury of Flanders].—London, 18 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

18 Feb. **38.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 7th inst. came to hand the day before yesterday just at the time when I was going to wait on the King, with whom I conversed for a while, not only on the contents of the Emperor's letter to me, but also on the subjects particularly specified in those of Your Majesty. The King's answer on the whole being in substance that which Your Majesty will see by the copy of my despatch to the Emperor herein enclosed, I can only add, that respecting the victualling of Therouanne and Ardres by the enemy, the King's excuse was that he would willingly have done his utmost to prevent it had he had an opportunity, but that now it was too late; he believed that by this time the French had already accomplished their object, or would accomplish it before he himself could prevent it, and that long before the retreat of the forces he had in that quarter, he had entered into communication with Monsr. du Rœulx, who answered that he had not the means of giving the assistance required.

With regard to the safe-conducts for vessels to take herrings to France, the King made at first the same difficulties, though in the end, hearing that without sending that article as before, to France it would be very difficult to obtain wine, he became more tractable, and said that for such a small quantity of herrings as the one for which a safe-conduct was asked, even then he would raise no objection, only that he would grant no safe-conducts without consulting first his Privy Council thereupon, as well as on the permission applied for of carrying wine and wheat into Flanders on a specified number of French vessels. I shall warmly solicit a resolution on this point, and, if obtained, I will not fail to apprize Your Majesty of it.

These privy councillors have made their excuses for not having yet issued the letters patent for the observation of the safe-conducts already granted, or that Your Majesty may grant in future on the plea of their multifarious engagements,

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and also that they were waiting until Your Majesty has issued similar ones respecting those which this King may have granted. That is why I humbly beg Your Majesty to order that such letters patent be issued in the most ample form possible, expressing that the English may carry their property (*biens*) or merchandize on board French vessels, provided these are not armed, not forgetting a clause that equal faith be attached to a copy of the said letters attested by a notary, or other public officers, as to the originals.

Respecting the import duty of 1 per cent. (*le centiesme denier*) these people have said nothing of late (*n'ont fait aucun semblant*); should they speak to me on the subject, I will answer them in conformity with Your Majesty's instructions and orders, and state my opinion in writing.—London, 18 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Queen."

French. Original. 2 pp.

18 Feb. **39.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 25th ult. came to hand on the 11th inst., together with the papers and documents therein mentioned, after a careful examination of which I sent to ask the King for an audience in order to communicate to him their contents. The King's answer was the same as in the morning, when I sent to inquire when and at what hour he could receive the duke of Najera, just arrived, namely, that he must needs go as far as Greenwich on certain business of his own, but that on Sunday next, which was yesterday, he would be back and willingly grant me audience.

Yesterday at the hour fixed I waited upon the King, who, notwithstanding that he had heard from his ambassador the substance of what passed between Your Majesty and cardinal Farnese, yet showed much pleasure and contentment at being so minutely informed of all the circumstances of the case. Two points, above all, were particularly agreeable to him, namely, those which Mr. de Granvelle touched in his letter to me. One was Your Majesty's remarking to the Cardinal in conversation that His Holiness the Pope ought not to resent so much your alliance with him as the conduct of king Francis in allying himself with the Lutherans [of Germany], for, to say the truth, the service of God and Christian religion were as well observed in this kingdom of England as in any other country of Christendom barring Papal authority (which is a particular article).*

* "Que Sa S^te^ ne se debvoit aultant ressentir que v^re^. ma^te^ eust traicté avec le dict s^r^ roy que du roy de France que sestoit alligué avec les Lutheriens pour aultant que le service de Dieu et la religion chrestienne estoient si bien observez en ce royaulme que en province de chrestiente, hors mis (hormis) ce que concernoit lauctorite papale (questoit article particullier)."

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The other point was that the Cardinal had been given to understand that should His Holiness help king Francis with one single armed man against England Your Majesty would resent it as a personal injury, and take such measures as You thought fit. To give Your Imperial Majesty an idea of the King's content and satisfaction on the occasion, and how much obliged he felt, I can only say that he touched his cap by way of acknowledgment (*remerciment*), and took in good part the notice which the queen dowager of Hungary had given to his ambassador [at Brussels] of the arrival at her Court of a gentleman sent by the queen of France,* and the cause of his coming. To which piece of news I added, by way of supplement, that Your Imperial Majesty having received information that the duchess of Bar was preparing to go to your camp, you had sent her notice that if peace was the object of her journey she had better remain at home; unless her purpose was merely to kiss his hand and visit the princess of Denmark, her sister.

This statement of mine the King took in very good part, after which I communicated to him Your Imperial Majesty's resolution with regard to Don Fernando de Gonzaga's report, which resolution, together with the letter of the 7th inst., came to hand yesterday, just at the moment that I was about to start on my visit to him. Concerning the Spanish hackbutiers asked for, after repeating to him my previous arguments and the many reasons there were for Your Imperial Majesty not agreeing with him on that point, the King seemed contented enough and well satisfied, and I believe that this result is owing principally to the fact that the King thinks he will not be in need of Spaniards on the side of Scotland, where, if I am to believe what people outside the Privy Council tell me, affairs are going on prosperously enough for this King, though the privy councillors themselves have carefully avoided speaking to me about it, imagining that if they succeed quickly, that might prevent (*ostreturber*) or delay Your Imperial Majesty's declaration against the Scots, which this King and his Privy Council desire above all things, and are urging in the most strenuous manner.

Notwithstanding the refusal in sending the Spaniards, the King has made no difficulty in contributing towards the expenses of the expedition to Piedmont. Perhaps he thinks that there will be no need of it, inasmuch as the French there having been reinforced, Your Imperial Majesty's generals will have enough to do to keep and defend the State of Milan, and whatever else they hold in Piedmont, without attempting anything else, especially if there be any understanding between the Venetians and the French, as the King

* "Et prins aussi de tres bonne part ce que la royne douagiere d'Hongrie avoit aduerty son ambassadeur de la cause de la venue devers elle du gentilhomme que la royne de France luy avoit envoyé."

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supposes, and really believes, for he has spoken to me about it. With regard to his contribution in money to treat with the Swiss and gain them over, in spite of all the representations I have again addressed to him on the subject, adding fresh ones on this occasion, I have been unable to obtain a satisfactory answer, the King still persisting in his refusal.

He has, however, manifested great pleasure and seems much gratified at Your Imperial Majesty having granted his request respecting the count of Bueren and his services. He will not fail, as he tells me, to remit [to Flanders] the necessary funds for the pay of the 2,000 foot who are to be under the command of that general, as well as for that of the 4,000 foot and 2,000 horse that Christofle de Landembourg has promised to raise. Having, according to instructions received from the queen of Hungary, asked their King which country he preferred, whether Low or High Germany, for the infantry to be recruited in, he answered me that he had no choice in the matter, and would leave it entirely to Mr. de Bueren's (*sic*) discretion, who must well know which are more easily recruited and more serviceable. The same sign of approbation alluded to in the above paragraph did the King make when I mentioned to him Your Imperial Majesty's acquiescence in his wishes respecting Mr. de Bueren; he touched his cap with gracious thanks.

With regard to the King's declaration against the duke of Holstein I have spoken to him at length. At first he made difficulties, repeating the very same reasons and arguments with which I have acquainted Your Imperial Majesty in my former despatches, saying besides that inasmuch as the Duke had lately done him the honor of appointing him arbitrator in his case, at the same time assuring him that neither king Francis nor any other prince or cause in the world would ever have influence on him, and that he would remain for ever his friend, he could not now declare against him. But on my remonstrating with him that that was only a French stratagem to lull him asleep, and that since the declaration we were asking would not put him to any expense for the defence of his kingdom against the Duke—as might be required in conformity with the treaty of alliance—considering the defiance and challenge made by the Duke, and considering also the men he had assembled, the declaration could not do harm. He was not asked, I argued to arm against him, but merely to make a public declaration, which could be revoked any day. He, therefore, should make no difficulty about it, as it might be the cause and the means of inducing the Duke to come to terms with Your Imperial Majesty and accept reasonable conditions, especially since, according to the information I had received from the queen of Hungary, the Duke had actually sent again (*renvoyé*) his deputies to Your Imperial Majesty. Should the King (I added) make the declaration asked of him, there

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would be no difficulty or delay on Your Majesty's part to make that against the Scots.

To the above and other arguments of mine the King replied at some length, ending by telling me to go to his Privy Council and argue the case there, which I did immediately after leaving him. I found the privy councillors much colder (*beaucoup plus froictz*) than before with regard to the declaration against the Duke, and, on the contraty, warmer and more vehement in demanding ours against the Scots, showing marvellous displeasure and disappointment at the delay, especially having heard, as they asserted, from the Low Countries that the Scotch residing there had been of late much better treated than they had been at other times. They found the proceedings in that affair very strange (said the councillors), for, in the first place, Your Imperial Majesty had referred entirely to the Queen Regent; secondly, the Queen had answered that the very moment that the war between the English and the Scotch became an authentic fact Your Imperial Majesty would publish this declaration against them, and yet now that Your Majesty had been certified of the hostilities having commenced, the declaration was delayed and the condition asked for that the king of England should also declare himself against the duke of Holstein. They (the councillors) fully believed, nay, were certain, that the King, their master, would take in very bad part the delay incurred in the affair, the more so, that between friends and allies such indifference and procrastination could not be accounted for.

Though I finally represented to them that, at any rate, their master's declaration ought to precede that of Your Imperial Majesty—inasmuch as I myself had been in the field first, and had urgently applied for it when the Scots were not as yet the King's enemies, and the Duke had not only assisted and helped Your Imperial Majesty's enemies, but had declared war to the Low Countries, and had long conspired against their master and boasted that he would make war upon and conquer the kingdom of England, which he pretended belonged to him, adding on this subject many particulars which the Queen Regent had written to me in one of her despatches —I could not shake (*esbranler*) their opinion on the subject; they persisting all the time in their idea that Your Imperial Majesty's declaration ought to precede theirs, adding that should their master be informed in an authentic manner that the Duke had actually declared war, had helped and assisted the common enemy, and assembled troops for the purpose of war and invasion, he (the king of England) would, in conformity with the treaty, which he intended to observe in all its parts, not delay his own declaration. Neither Your Imperial Majesty nor your subjects (they said) could sustain injury or damage of any kind from the declaration against the Scotch; on the contrary, much more good than one could think of

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might result therefrom for the common intelligence of the allies and for the undertaking they had in view, whereas the declaration against the Duke could not be of any profit or advantage to Your Imperial Majesty, whilst it would be extremely prejudicial to them, begging me, as one who had worked so much for the closer friendship between Your Imperial Majesty and their master, to beg and entreat You to consider their representations.

Upon which, having promised them that Your Imperial Majesty would make the declaration against the Scots first—provided they gave me security that within a few days after the King would make his against the Duke—they only promised in general terms to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty. In fact, one of the things which they mostly tried to bring forward was that they were to be authentically apprized of the causes for which they were obliged to make the said declaration [against the Duke]. That is why, in my opinion, it will be necessary that Your Imperial Majesty be pleased to order that the said declaration be drawn out and sent; for if it were possible to gratify this King in some way or other, it would be very *à propos* for fostering the friendship and warm affection which he is manifesting for Your Imperial Majesty's service. There is danger of these and other scruples of the same kind throwing cold water on the affairs. It seems to me, considering the great gratification which this King would receive therefrom, there would be no harm if Your Imperial Majesty made the declaration first, for it will be always in your power, should these people not do the same reciprocally, to revoke it; besides which Your Imperial Majesty would have the advantage of being able to prove a contravention of theirs to the treaty of closer alliance;* which proof might be of service on future occasions, as Your Imperial Majesty by your divine prudence can consider much better than me.

With regard to safe-conducts for the Scots, in case of Your Majesty's declaration against them, the King will inform the Queen of those he grants here, in order to procure and obtain their confirmation and the Queen's "*placet*," as is just and reasonable, and in order to avoid inconveniences.

In compliance with orders received from the Queen Regent I have spoken to the King respecting his sending commissaries to Flanders for the purpose of collecting and storing provisions, requesting him to send a note of what is wanted, in order that on the arrival of the commissaries everything may be ready. He has promised to do so, and as to help in ships there has no longer been a question, and no mention has been made.

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* "Car tousjours sera en la main dicelle, en cas que ceulx-cy en apres ne font la reciproque, de la revocquer, et oultre ce vre. ma^te^ aura jeu sur eulx de leur prover leur contravention au dict traicte."

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The King still perseveres in his purpose of attending the expedition to France in person, for which he continues to make incredible preparations in the way of provisions, never ceasing, as he told me yesterday, to apply himself to whatever relates to, or is connected with, the undertaking, and considering that the season is close at hand and time must not be lost. The affairs of Scotland are not likely to impede his departure, for, as I said above, they are in good trim. Yesterday the earl of Harfort (Hertford) told me that he will depart for the Borders in a couple of days, and that he is to be there governor and commander-in-chief (*capitaine general*) instead of the duke of Suffolk, who is coming back, and that he thought that the Scotch business would be much sooner settled than the French one. I also hear that the duke of Norfolk has obtained permission from the King to lead the vanguard of the army against France; and as to French practices, I do not hear of any just as this moment. Should there be any I will keep my eyes open.

After I had been a long while with the King the duke of Najera came to present his respects to him, and was well enough received (*assez bien recueilli*) by the King. After that the Duke and I called on the Queen and on the Princess, who most particularly (*tres curieusement* ?) inquired after Your Imperial Majesty, both of them begging me to make their most humble commendations to Your Imperial Majesty's grace. Though the Queen herself was slightly indisposed at the time, yet she would come out of her room to dance for the honor of the company. She showed all possible favour to the Princess, who ever since the signature of the treaty has been treated by the King, her father, with the utmost esteem and consideration, so much so that at this last meeting of Parliament she has been officially declared able to succeed to the Crown of England should the Prince happen to die. Parliament has also granted and remitted to the King the whole of the money that was lent to him the other year, which amounts to an almost incalculable sum.—London, 18 February 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "To the Emperor, from the ambassador in England, the 18th of February. Received at Spiere (Spires) on the 26th of the same month, 1543."

French. Original. 9 *pp.*

20 Feb. **40.** KING HENRY to GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Is now sending Paget to the Emperor to treat with him of certain points concerning their mutual friendship. Begs Granvelle to help and assist Paget in the execution of his charge.—Westminster, 20 February 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

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22 Feb.

S. E., *Alemania*, L. 640, f. 53, 306.

41. The EMPEROR to PRINCE PHILIP, HIS SON.

By Juan Çapata, who left this town on the 8th inst., We wrote to you of political and other events up to that date. We also sent you a copy of Our answer to cardinal Farnese when he proposed to Us in His Holiness' name and in that of the Cardinals' College a peace with France. Though We always wished, and still wish now more than ever, for a lasting peace with king Francis, if calculated to ensure the welfare of Christendom at large, We cannot but say that the proposals were backed in such a manner that they did not admit of the least consideration. Indeed, the conditions were so dishonest and unreasonable, and so unlikely to secure a firm and lasting peace, which is Our constant aim, that We were actually obliged to reject them.

Matters being in this state, and the affairs of Italy and Germany being as they are, We have made up Our mind to invade France next June with an army composed of 16,000 High and 10,000 Low Germans, and 9,000 Spaniards in all, counting those We have with Us here, and the new recruits expected from Spain, besides 7,000 horse between men-at-arms and light cavalry. The king of England, at the same time, is to invade France at the head of 35,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry, including in that number 2,000 Germans We have already furnished him, and 2,000 horse more that We are bound to supply him with according to a clause in the treaty of defensive and offensive alliance. With this force We are confident, and trust to God that king Francis will be obliged to sue for peace, and that a firm and lasting one will be obtained with great profit and advantage to Us and Our kingdoms. Should We fail in any of Our engagements with the king of England, besides losing reputation, it is probable that king Francis would treat and ally himself with him against Us, which would be, as you may imagine, a most undesirable state of things, as We might then be compelled by necessity to sue for that same peace, and make concessions, and accept to Our great regret dishonourable conditions for Our person and subjects, which is to be avoided by all possible means. That would make the Pope and other Italian powers, who are anxiously watching the turn of affairs, declare openly for France and against Us, thus placing Us and matters of faith in a most dangerous position.

Since the ensuring of success and the remedying of the evil depend very much on the execution of the financial measures specified in the note that Çapata took to Spain, We have no doubt that by this time you have already provided funds to repay the 250,000 ducats remaining out of the 500,000 which We asked for, namely, 400,000 by the courier who left Avenes, and 100,000 more by Don Luis de Çuñiga,* partly spent in reimbursing the Fuggers at Brussels for the 276,000 borrowed from them, and 100,000 which Our ambassador in Genoa (Gomez Suarez de Figueroa) was compelled to borrow from merchants

* That is Don Luis de Avila y Zuñiga.

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and bankers of that city. All that, if not more, will be needed if the French, who are now all-powerful in Piedmont, and in combination with the Turkish fleet again, threatening Nizza and the coasts of Sicily and Naples, are at all to be resisted.

It is not only Spain that is called upon to help in this emergency; other kingdoms and dominions of Ours have already contributed to the utmost of their power. Flanders has already voted one million of gold; Naples and Sicily with a larger sum, the utmost they can give. Should the remittances We expect from that country (Spain) fail, the whole of the structure would fall to the ground. We could not keep this army of Ours longer; all the money hitherto spent would be as good as thrown away, and the harm done for want of proper help and assistance at this moment be incalculable.

We have, by Juan Çapate, written to you on this point more in detail, and given him besides a particular Instruction respecting what he has to say to you. We refer you to it. Be sure that every statement therein made, as well as in Our letter, of which We sent you a duplicate by way of Italy, is no exaggeration at all, but the plain and simple truth, and that upon the success of this enterprise of Ours depends in a great measure the good or the evil of all Our kingdoms, dominions, and estates. If the undertaking is at all successful, king Francis must either apply himself to the remedy of his own affairs here—as he has actually begun to do, and be thereby prevented from sending his armies to Spain, which would be of no small comfort to Us—or else he will send his fleet to the Mediterranean in combination with the Turkish to ravage the coasts of Naples and Sicily. As to the harm which he and Barbarossa may do on the coast of Catalonia, We are not afraid of that; provided the measures of defence We pointed out in Our last have been properly attended to, there is no cause for apprehension. That is why we pray and request you to avoid as much as possible all delay in the execution of Our orders; let, at any rate, the money and the men come as soon as possible.

We cannot omit to remind you again that you might ask the Cortes (el Reyno) to help you with a sum of money for your marriage, as they did once with Us when We married the Empress (Isabella), for it is no new thing in Spain; and, in fact, that money is to be procured [from Our subjects] in any other way you may think of. We have no doubt that Our councillors of State will exert themselves in this emergency a good deal more than they would have done at any other time, and that although they might allege as an excuse that they have no money, yet since they have land and estates they will be able to mortgage them, and they shall be repaid in the shortest possible term of time.*

* "Y que se busque por todas las otras vias que se pudiere haver, que no dudamos syno que los de nuestro Consejo de Estado haran por su parte en esta coyuntura mas de lo que podran; y que ya que se quisiessen escusar con dezir que les falta dineros, pues tienen caudal y possibilidad lo buscaran y tomaran sobre ty hasta que se les pague, que sera lo mas breve possible."

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The above is the substance of the letter which Juan Çapate took to Spain by a man whom the marquis de Aguilar sent Us by land. We here repeat part of its contents in order that, if the express should arrive first, you may be informed of Our wishes and gain time. Prince Doria must have written to you as he did to Us, urging for the galleys of Spain to come here and effect their junction with the rest of Our fleet in the Mediterranean, because (says he) if divided they will not be able to accomplish anything, whereas all together they will molest and harass the enemy at sea, and keep him in constant fear. Our answer to the Prince has been that We have referred the affair to you, and that he must communicate with Our Council of State that the plan may be discussed therein, and, if convenient, adopted at once. You will take care that 500 men be sent to La Goleta to reinforce the garrison, because Don Francisco de Tobar writes that he is in great need of them. Here We have no means of supplying that governor with such a force, because, though the viceroy of Naples (Don Pedro de Toledo) has petitioned Us to allow him to recruit 400 Spaniards for the defence of that kingdom in case of attack, We have refused to grant his appli-tion, lest this new levy of men should prevent you from sending those who are to join Us here. Yet not to leave Naples entirely without defence, We have given orders for the recruiting of an equal number of Germans in substitution for the Spaniards.

We are in good health (thank God). On the 20th inst. the Diet commenced its sittings; We will attend to it without loss of time, that We may be free and entirely disengaged for what is to be done next. Let Us hear as often as possible of your health, and of that of the Princess* your sister, and other general news by means of duplicate letters through both seas, for it is now nearly four months and a half that We have not seen your handwriting. We only know through private letters that you had returned from Salamanca, and were back at Valladolid, &c.—Spyres, the 22nd of February 1544.

Signed: "Carlos."

Addressed: "To the most Serene prince of Spain, Our dearest and most beloved son, &c."

Spanish. Original. 4 *pp.*

23 Feb. **42.** The Emperor to Eustace Chapuys.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—*About twelve days ago the English ambassador resident at this Our Court † waited on Us, and solicited our declaration against the Scots. We*

* Doña Maria, Infanta of Spain, born in 1528; she was married to her cousin Maximilian II., Emperor of Germany, and died at Madrid, a widow, in 1603.

† Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury.

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referred him to the Sieur de Granvelle, who could not for some days communicate with him owing to illness (maladie). *To-day, however, the English ambassador has called on him, and after explaining his master's wishes respecting Scotland, has received the very same answer that We gave him once before when he first waited upon Us accompanied by the representations, excuses and arguments contained in Our letter* [*of the 23rd February*]. *The ambassador was told in substance that We could not declare the Scots our enemies as long as the duke of Holstein was not declared such by the English. Monsieur de Granvelle went still further; he told him plainly that the article of Our last treaty with England specifically bore that the declaration was to be reciprocal. As the ambassador could not well deny the force of this argument, he tried as much as he could to diminish it by hinting, as it were, that the affairs of Scotland might become worse than they actually were if We refused the declaration applied for; the common enterprise against France might in some measure suffer from the want of it. This notwithstanding* (*the ambassador asserted*) *the King, his master, would not be in fault, but would on his part accomplish every thing he was bound to by treaty.*

After these and other arguments in favour of or against the declaration, Mons. de Granvelle has decided that, since the affair itself is of such importance with regard to the Low Countries (les pays d'en bas), *for the defence of which We are actually making great preparations, as and since the Queen Regent, Our sister, has fully instructed you* (*Chapuys*) *on the subject, it would be better to delay for some time the resolution of this point until We hear what has been done by you there* [*in London*],* *considering by this time you must have negociated with the King's privy councillors. We hasten to inform you of these particulars that you may write to Us, if you have not done so already, what you yourself have been able to ascertain respecting the King's final intention in this affair, and, finally, if you really think that Our declaration against the Scots is wanted, and that without it the undertaking against France may possibly experience a check, for if so We will give Our consent, as rather than run such a risk We would make one hundred such declarations.*

Besides the above the Sieur de Granvelle has told the English ambassador under reserve that We are in receipt of confidential reports from France, stating that the French, hearing of the answer given by Us to Cardinal Farnese, have been thunderstruck, and no longer have hopes of peace. In

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* "Le dit sieur de Granvelle s'est arresté comme l'affaire importoit tant aux pays d'en bas, devers les quels faisons practiquer grosse aide, et que la royne, Madame nostre sœur, vous a escript amplement sur cestuy affaire, que le mieulx seroit differer la resolution de ce point jusques à ce que l'on saiche (sage) ce que avez passe sur ce point."

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*their despair and disappointment, they have deliberated to make the greatest efforts to create differences and jealousy between the king of England and Us, and at the same time to try to deceive the English by making them believe that they have plenty of ways and means in their power for effecting a separate peace with them. For instance, they pretend that they can make the dowager queen of Scotland (Marie de Guise) and her daughter (Mary Stuart), and even the father of the former go to England against their own will.**

It is for you, Chapuys, to consider whether you are to make use of this piece of news or not, and if so communicate to the King and to his Privy Council the confidential information We have received. You will also tell the King that according to the very trusty and confidential report above alluded to, the French have lately been treating with cardinal Farnese of the marriage of the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois) with a sister of that Cardinal,† for which marriage, by the way, some proposals had some time ago been made at Rome. It is easy to conceive how these practices of the French may be connected with the Scotch affair if the indignation of the Pope against the king of England be taken into account. At any rate you will make use of this information as you may deem it convenient and opportune, and at the same time acquaint Us with every incident of the negociation.‡—Spire, 23 February 1544.

French. Original draft, mostly ciphered. 2 *pp.*

Copy of the letters written by the Emperor to his ambassador in England on the 23rd of February.

2 March. **43.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Having since my last despatch,§ in pursuance of the Queen Dowager's commands, solicited a conference with the King's privy councillors on the subject of the safe-conducts for vessels to carry salt herrings to France, and bring therefrom wine and wheat,‖ and likewise to get an answer to the letter written by Your Majesty to this King respecting

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* "Quilz trouveroient moyens pour faire passer en Angleterre la Royne veufve d'Escosse et sa fille nonobstant quilz n'en auroient volonté, mesmes le duc de Guyse, pere de la dite veufve."

† "Et aussi comme nous avons pareillement entendu que les ditz François traictoient avec le dit Cardinal du marriage du sieur d'Orleans avec la sœur du dit Cardinal, dont desia par ci devant a este practique." By "the Cardinal's sister," Vittoria Farnese is meant. Both the cardinal Alessandro and Vittoria were the children of Pier Luigi Farnese, duke of Castro, natural son of Paul III. Vittoria's marriage with the duke of Orleans, if proposed in earnest, was not effected, for in 1548 she married Guidobaldo della Rovere, duke of Urbino. *See* Calendar, Vol. VI., Part II., p. 594.

‡ To this draft, which is entirely ciphered, a deciphering is appended beginning with the usual words "L'Empereur et Roi."

§ No. 39, p. 50.

‖ "Pour mener harangz en France et ramener de là vins et bled."

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the seizure of Mr. de Beures' ship,* the councillors sent to request me to appear in Council on a fixed day, when they would be ready to answer any questions of mine.

Accordingly, on the 24th ult., I went to the Privy Council, but was much surprised to find that, instead of the two above-mentioned affairs—that of the safe-conducts and that that of Mr. de Beures' ship—another one was introduced, namely, that of Your Imperial Majesty's declaration against Scotland, the privy councillors reproducing the very same arguments used on former occasions, and adding that since the King, their master, had already begun to comply with Your Majesty's request in the matter of help and assistance against France, you were actually bound to grant without delay the very first request made by the King, especially as Your Majesty had formerly promised to do so the very moment that the enmity of the Scots became manifest and authentic. The perfect understanding and close friendship existing between you both, apart from the profit to be gained thereby, made it (the privy councillors added) indispensable that there should be no longer a delay in the matter. Nor was there need of promises or engagements on the part of the King, their master, with regard to his declaration against the duke of Holstein, save the general one of engaging himself, as he had already done, to observe faithfully in all its parts the treaty of closer friendship and alliance.

I answered them pertinently enough, reminding them of my request to them at the time that the duke of Clèves surprised Hammesfort † and invaded Brabant for the second time. I then asked them to declare at once against that duke; but not only did they refuse to do so, they would not dismiss the duke's agent in England. To this argument of mine the King's councillors knew not what to reply, except that the request had not been made officially and in a fit manner, and that since we pressed them to declare against the duke of Holstein, and Your Imperial Majesty had asked for authentic proofs of the hostility of the Scots; it was but just that they themselves should be equally certified as to the Duke's hostile movements. Meanwhile the declaration against the Scots ought not to be delayed.

I replied that the Duke's hostile intentions and military armaments were so notorious and public a fact that no further proof or confirmation was required; and yet they would not even grant that. At last, so earnestly did the privy councillors pray me in general, and afterwards privately, to try and obtain for them the aforesaid declaration against the Scots—from which declaration, as I wrote by my preceding despatch, and as they themselves assert, no loss or harm for Your Majesty, nor for the Low Countries, could possibly result, whereas their declaration against the Duke

* "Le reprinse de la navire de Mons. de Bèvres."
† Aamersfoort, in Holland. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 457.

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might cause the English great damage—that I fully promised to write to Your Majesty about it.*

True is it that all the time the King's councillors are showing all possible party spirit and partiality in the affair, and yet not one of them has gone so far as to hint that the whole affair might be spoilt through Your Majesty's refusal to accede to their wishes in that respect, though they have occasionally given me to understand that things might not go on so well in future. I must also own that neither the King nor his councillors seem to attribute the delay to Your Majesty, believing, as they say, that the whole proceeds from the Low Countries, and from the Queen's councillors. They fancy, also, that the delay is owing to some intrigue or other of Mr. de Beures, who is suspected to be much in favour of the Scots. Such a belief on the part of these councillors will rather counteract the efforts that are being made for the release of his ship. Indeed, though he sent three weeks or a month ago two gentlemen of his house to procure its release, they have not yet obtained audience from the privy council, nor from the admiral, though, to say the truth, there was scarcely need of it, for I myself have spoken and written enough about his case. Until now no resolution has been taken in the affair, nor in the other, of the declaration against the Duke, partly as I think, in order to wait for Your Majesty's answer respecting the declaration against the Scots, and partly because all these lords (*seigneurs*) are so busy in preparing for war that they have no leisure to assemble in council.

The King refuses to grant the Scotch ambassador, who went to Your Majesty, permission to return home through England conditionally, and under certain securities which most likely the latter will not agree to. Conjointly with the said refusal, the King's troops on the Borders made a raid into Scotland and did much harm (*et y firent de grandz maulx*). The King is daily sending thither infantry and hackbutiers, so that there is every appearance that on that side at least there will be no hindrance or impediment to the contemplated undertaking against France, for which preparations on a great scale are incessantly being made. Everywhere I hear that the King persists in his idea of attending the expedition to France in person, and I must add that up to the present I am not aware of French intrigues going on; even if there were, I am sure that the King would not listen to them, for he has already disbursed too much money, besides which, there is no appearance at all of the French having the will or the power of indemnifying him for his expenses besides paying him the remainder (*les reliques*) of the pension, without which the King is sure not to listen to any proposals of peace on their part.

Whilst writing the above, Your Majesty's letter of the 23rd of February has come to hand, in answer to which

* *See* Chapuy's letter of the 18th February, p. 54.

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I cannot say more than what is said above, and also in my preceding despatch, save that I shall lose no opportunity of bringing forward before the King, or the members of his privy council, the declaration made by Mr. de Granvelle (*sic*) to the English ambassador respecting the news from France, and at the same time try and learn if there be here any appearance just now of the French practices mentioned in the said letter. If any, I have no doubt that they would be easily counteracted by merely gratifying this King concerning the declaration on which he still insists.

I must not omit to say, the King has ordered the embargo of all vessels (*navieres*) actually at anchor in the ports of this kingdom, and, according to a message sent me by the Admiral, three days ago, there is question of assembling and fitting out a fleet of upwards of one hundred and fifty sail. I cannot yet say whether its destination is the coast of Scotland or for some undertaking against France according to the plan (*prouject*) of last year, a copy of which I sent to Your Majesty.

As I was on the point of closing and sealing this, the King sent me two of his privy councillors to say that he has news from an authentic and confidential quarter that the Venetians have agreed to put into the hands of the Turk the town of Bergamo,* which is a very important affair, and much open to danger. The King thought that, such being the case, it would be a *chef d'œuvre* if part of the men Your Majesty is now sending to Italy could occupy beforehand and surprise (*preoccuper et surprendre*) the said town. He has charged me to write to You on the subject as soon as possible. The councillors also told me that they had orders from the King, their master, to remind me of the declaration against the Scots enhancing, as they are in the habit of doing, the good that will result therefrom for the common enterprise against France, at the same time magnifying the inconveniences likely to arise should the King, their master, have to declare against the duke of Holstein, the losses his subjects would have to sustain, and the great damage to Your Majesty and to himself,† inasmuch as if the two Majesties have to fit out together and at the same time a considerable fleet, that cannot be accomplished without procuring in the parts of Dance (Dantzig) all the naval materials necessary for the equipment of ships of war, which cannot at the present moment be procured either here, in England, or in Your Majesty's dominions in the Low Countries or Spain. In order, therefore, that the merchants of the Low Countries, as well as England, may purchase at Dantzig all they want, and at the same time withdraw

* "Que les Venitiens avoient accordé de mectre entre les mains de ses gens la ville de Bergame (?)"

† "Et davantaige ont les dits conseilliers par commandement du s^r roy, leur maistre, remis en avant l'affere de la declaration contre Escosse m'enrichissant (m'encherissant) à l'accoustumee le bien que s'en ensuyvroit au benefice de la commune emprinse, me remonstrant de mesmes les inconvenicns que sen ensuyvroient se declairant le dit s^r roy contre le dit duc de Holstein, non seullement à ses subjects mais à vre ma^te et à luy."

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all the property they may have in those parts, it is necessary to delay for some time the publication of an edict declaring him the enemy of the allies. If Your Majesty pleases, the King may dally with the Duke so as to prevent his doing mischief. He will undertake that charge with pleasure. Since the Duke was at present treating of peace with Your Majesty, it seemed to him neither convenient nor honorable to declare himself until he saw the issue of his negociations is known; that if Your Majesty had absolutely resolved that he (the King) should publish the aforesaid declaration against the Duke, he would, out of sheer affection for Your Majesty and desire to please, comply with Your wish, for he knew Your Majesty to be so considerate and discreet in political matters that you would not consent that his subjects —of whom there were many living among the Easterlings, and possessing capital—should sustain considerable damage and loss. On that account he would beg and entreat Your Majesty to fix a reasonable term during which his subjects could withdraw their property, and, that being done, the declaration should be made and published without fail and without delay. This the King would willingly do, all the time praying Your Majesty very affectionately to be so kind as to gratify him with regard to the declaration against the Scots, which was a thing of great importance and which suffered no delay, for, as he has lately informed me by a confidential message, he is now on the point of reducing Scotland to such extremities that she will be unable in future to show favour or partiality for the French, or annoy him and his subjects. To that end, besides the large army he has on the Borders, and which he is daily increasing, he has now decided to send thither a very large fleet, having upwards of 20,000 men on board, and will use the utmost diligence in that affair, so as to prevent a number of Italians and other foreign soldiers who, according to information he has received, have already landed in Normandy to cross over to Scotland. The King, however, has great hope of success, not only because many Scotch lords follow his party and are ready to help his views, but because there is bad intelligence, dissension, and ill-feeling prevailing among the rest, even between the governor (Arran) and the counts of Argyll and Bothwell, all of whom (*les quels tres tous*) are now trying to divorce their wives in order to marry the queen dowager of Scotland (Mary of Guise). Indeed, the earl of Bothwell has used in that greater diligence than the others, for he some time ago deserted his wife, the daughter of Maxwell, one of the chief noblemen in Scotland.*

* "Et a le dit s^r roy tout bon espoir de prospere succes en la dicte emprinse, tant pour avoir ileq divers s^re de sa partialite, que aussi pour le maulvaise intelligence et dissension quest entre les aultres, et mesmes entre le gouverneur le conte de Lynnos et le conte Boduell, les quelz tres tous procurent soy divortier de leur propres femmes pour espouser la royne douaigiere du dit Escosse, et a le dit conte de Boduell usé[ence] plus grant diligence que les aultres en habandonnant sa femme, fille de mylord Machuel lung des principaulx du dict pays."

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As the French, according to all accounts, are now fitting out a large fleet (*armee de mer*), this King would like Your Imperial Majesty to send to sea as quickly as possible 3,000 men, according to the stipulation of the treaty of closer alliance, in case of the enemy increasing his forces. He would also wish above all things that Your Majesty made the declaration against Scotland. This last, should Your Imperial Majesty grant it, would, in my opinion, win the heart of this King, and oblige him to do the most he can for you, besides which, as I have said above, it would make him shut his ears completely to all overtures on the part of the French. I really do believe that, if Your Imperial Majesty could hear the modest and gracious words used by these privy councillors, you would scarcely have refused what they are asking from You, especially if the King engages, as he has announced, to make the declaration against the duke of Holstein after the lapse of the term that may be fixed beforehand, which hitherto he has not done except in general terms. I most humbly beg Your Imperial Majesty to maturely reconsider the affair, and not attribute to temerity what I have written above in token of my dutiful affection for Your Majesty's service.—London, 2 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England; of the 2nd of March. Received at Spire on the 11th of the said month, 1544."

French. Original. 4 pp.

n. d. **44.** HENRY VIII. to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres hault, etc.,"—Whereas it has been represented to Us by Our faithful and beloved ambassadors,* the bishop of London and Sir Francis Briant, as well as by the one who presently resides at your Court, that in consequence of the many invasions of this country, and other hostilities of the Scots, the above-mentioned ambassadors asked you in Our name to declare them "common enemies," and you answered that you were quite ready to do so, provided you were informed in an official and authentic manner that open war had actually broken out between this kingdom and the Scots, We now give you notice that the said Scots, having first invaded Our countries and lands (*nous pais et terres*), and afterwards broken their faith, and contravened to their fealty, and to their oaths and promises under signature and seal, having in all manner

* Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury, about whom *see* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 525. As to Sir Francis Briant and the bishop of London (Dr. Edmond Bonner), both had formerly gone on a mission to the Emperor as early as Oct. 1543, and had solicited him to interdict the trade between Scotland and the Low Countries. *See ibid.*, p. 507.

of ways irritated and offended Us that We have been actually obliged, for honour's sake and the defence of Our subjects, to take up arms against the Scotch, and repute and denounce them as Our enemies; and whereas Our ambassadors above-mentioned have solicited in Our name that the said Scotch should also be declared as enemies of us both in all your kingdoms and dominions, and having heard from the lips and reports of Our said ambassadors that whenever they spoke to you on this matter you deliberately answered that whenever it was officially and authentically proved to you that war had actually commenced between Us and the Scots you would declare them your enemies, and order that they should be treated as such in all your kingdoms, dominions and signories, in accordance with the treaties concluded between Us, We have considered it fit to write this present letter signifying and declaring to you that, for the causes and reasons above specified, and which Our ambassador will explain more fully if required, We from this moment repute, consider and hold the said Scotch as Our enemies, praying and requesting you, most high, etc., that they be equally accepted, reputed and treated as such, hoping that you will do so, not only for the love of Us, but for the fulfilment of the treaties existing between Us two; and, in short, attach as much faith to what Our ambassador will tell you on this subject as if We ourselves were personally addressing you.

French. Contemporary copy.

2 March. **45.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty will see by the enclosed all that has happened in this country since my last despatch. Not having any news to report, the object of this will be to beg Your Majesty most humbly to be pleased to order that the authentic declaration of the Emperor's hostility and enmity against Scotland, in the form lately pointed out by me, be at once forwarded, and likewise to dispose that a paper be made out detailing the damages and injuries which the inhabitants of those countries might have to suffer by the fact of the Emperor declaring the Scots his enemies, and forbidding their intercourse of trade with the Low Countries.

I will not omit to say that it would be fit and opportune, as I observed in one of my last despatches, that some remarks should be made by Your Majesty's ministers to this King's ambassador there [at Brussels] respecting the affair of the safe-conducts, for, as I gather from certain words uttered by this King himself, to the effect, he thinks that Your Majesty does not attach much importance to the subject, and that the pressure proceeds entirely from speculators, who wish to get a gratuity (*pot de vin*) from the owners of the goods.*

* "Et que seulement procede de quelques

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I have not forgotten to solicit the note of the provisions which these English wish to have ready for their passage across the Channel. As the privy councillors give me to understand, the note has already been forwarded to this King's ambassador.

After the above was written, two of the privy councillors have come to me by the King's command on the commission and charge that Your Majesty will see by the enclosed copy.* I refrain from making any further observations about it, and will limit myself to beg Your Majesty most humbly to intercede with the Emperor for the issue of the declaration against Scotland, which would, in my opinion, be a better and, under present circumstances, more profitable work than I could describe, for this King, to my certain knowledge, has determined after some time to reciprocally do the same against the duke of Holstein. There is also another reason for it, which is, that most likely the people of the Low Countries would suffer no harm from the Emperor's declaration against the Scots, inasmuch as it is very improbable that during the war the merchants of Scotland will care to traffic with the people of the Low Countries, or the Emperor's subjects with the Scots. Besides which, it is to be considered that although the king of England is very well disposed to observe the treaty in all its points, yet should not the affairs of Scotland turn out as he fancies to his credit, there is fear of his finding out some excuse or other for not helping to the enterprise against France, or listening to overtures of peace from that country; to which may be added that, as the Scots are continually making predatory raids on English territory, and threatening to do still worse, and this King might at any time claim the Emperor's help according to the letter of the treaty, the declaration itself, if absolutely denied or indefinitely delayed, might cause incalculable harm.—London, 2 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed; "To the Queen."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

5 March. **46.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable chier et feal,"—Your despatch of the 17th of February† was duly received, and We have heard with pleasure that the king of England has expressed satisfaction at hearing of the answer by Us given to the proposals

* Most likely the declaration against the Scots.

† *See* No. 39, p. 50, but the date is the 18th of February. In that despatch the Imperial ambassador writes that king Henry had heard with pleasure the answer made to the Cardinal's proposals, as well as Granvelle's sharp remarks about them.

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brought by cardinal Farnese the Papal Legate, and Our intentions, respecting the two points touched upon in Granvelle's letter to you. The diligence and care displayed by you on this occasion are certainly commendable and extremely agreeable to Us, as are also the representations and excuses addressed by you to the King, or to his ministers, in the matter of the Spanish hackbutiers.

We are also glad to hear that the King has not only admitted your excuses, but has made no objection whatever to Our proposal that in the event of Our having to fight the French in Piedmont,* he (the King) contributes to the expenses of that war. It will be fit and convenient that, whenever the opportunity comes to hand, you (Chapuys) remind the King of this particular point in the covenant made with the viceroy of Sicily. Meanwhile, should news be received from Italy likely to make Us alter Our plans of warfare, We shall lose no time in informing you thereof, that you may let the King know of it, for We are in hopes that having, as We have, sufficiently provided—though at considerable expense on Our part—for the defence of Our possessions in Italy, it is unlikely that king Francis will make any attempt in that country, and if he does he will be wonderfully deceived in his calculations.

We were likewise glad to hear that the King has shown satisfaction at the appointment of Mons. de Buren † to the command of the body of men that is to co-operate with the English army against France. The king of England, We hope, will have every reason to be pleased with the services of that Imperial commander. Nor are We less gratified to hear that on your proposal and recommendation the King has been persuaded to send his own commissaries to Flanders for the express purpose of procuring in that country the ammunition and carriage wanted for the English army. Pray continue to work in that line as assiduously as you have done hitherto, not only to ensure the good success of the contemplated enterprise against France, but also to penetrate into the King's future designs, and ascertain how far the English in general, and principally the King himself, are inclined to the invasion of France; and above all whether the latter will persevere in his determination of crossing the Channel in person. Of all these particulars and others, more or less connected with the enterprise against the French, you shall take care to inform Us as frequently as you can.

With regard to Our declaration against the Scots, We entirely approve of your reasonings with those privy coun-

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* "Pour excuser l'envoy des haquebusiers (*sic*) espaignols, et est bien à propoz quil sen soit contenté, et que ce nonobstant il n'ayt mis difficulte pour la contribution de l'emprise au coustel de Piemont."

† Here and elsewhere the name of this Belgian general is written Bueren; he belonged to the Egmont family and his Christian name was Maximilian. *See* Vol. VI. Part II. pp. 325, 414.

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cillors, as well as of your arguments in favour of Our refusing to make the same as long as the duke of Holstein is not reciprocally declared the common enemy of both parties, but the considerations entered into by you in your despatch of the 18th of February in favour of Our declaring at once against the Scots, notwithstanding that King's refusal to do the same with regard to the Duke, though pertinent and sensible enough by themselves, do not seem to Us entirely well grounded; for you must bear in mind that for a long time past the Scots have been the allies and confederates of the Low Countries* (les pays d'en bas), *and that the above said alliance and confederation already existing, and having been faithfully observed for one century, was again ratified about thirteen years ago at the time of the revolution in Scotland, and that during all that time both countries (Scotland and the Netherlands) have mutually gained considerable profit from their amicable relations and intercourse of trade. In short, that it would seem strange, inconvenient, and almost dishonest for Us to declare war to the Scots under present circumstances and merely at the chief request of that King, before addressing to the Scots themselves some sort of formal warning or representation on the subject; besides which the declaration, if issued by Us, might afford a good occasion for the Pope to ally himself with king Francis and with the Scots, and then losing all shame raise troubles in Italy with a view to defeat Our war-like plans against France.*

If the King has not entirely lost all hope of making peace with the Scots, this last will be in Our opinion a powerful consideration for his not insisting at present on Our declaration against them; which consideration seems to Us more weighty and powerful than any of those which the King has adduced in favour of the duke of Holstein. That is why for the sake of expediency, and in order to comply with the obligations of honest dealing with the said Scots, We have resolved that since it seems a suitable proceeding in the present state of affairs between England and Scotland, to send to the latter country some personage or herald of Ours, or some other officer of this Our Court, for the express purpose of requesting the Scots to make their peace or come to terms with the king of England, telling them that unless they do so, We will declare them Our enemies according to, and in fulfilment of, Our alliance and confederacy with the king of England. This We intend doing, on condition, however, that the King will send a herald of his to the duke of Holstein to make a similar intimation on his part. Should the King surmise that he would like to have a share in the appointment of Our herald you will tell him that We are in receipt of news that the Duke's deputies are already on the road to come to Us here

* See No. 39, p. 54.

[*at Spire*],* *and that if We send to him instead it is merely for the sake of preventing the inhabitants of Denmark, Sweden, and other northern countries from entering the service of France or otherwise doing harm to Our Low Countries.*

The above expedient to be proposed by you to the King's privy councillors as if the idea had originated with you, or as you may deem it more suitable and convenient; but if you perceive on the part of the King or his ministers signs of discontent or displeasure likely to prejudice in any way the projected invasion of France, let Us know immediately, and at the same time say what your advice in the matter is.

To conclude, you are doing the right thing in keeping on good terms with the Queen; do not fail, whenever the opportunity offers, to address her Our most cordial commendations as well as to the Princess.

The enclosed copy of the affidavit (*confession*) made by king Francis'† herald of the paper that was put into his hands when he lately came here with a message from his master, will keep you *au courant* of what French intrigues are. A similar copy has been placed in the hands of the English ambassador at this Court besides other papers on the same subject, the whole of which he has returned, and begged that they should be forwarded to England for you to exhibit in the King's Privy Council.—Spire, 5 March 1543 (Old style).

French. Original draft, partly ciphered. 5 pp.

9 March. **47.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—In answer to your letters of the 18th ult. and 2nd inst.,‡ We forward to you along with this the letters patent of the Emperor, Our brother, under his signature and seal, on the observance of the safe-conducts which the king of England may grant to merchants [of this country]§ to frequent and reside in France with merchandize; the contents of which letters you are to declare and explain to the King's privy councillors, at the same time that you receive from them similar letters patent for the observance of those We Ourselves may grant in the name of His Imperial Majesty, and under his signature and seal. Should the King's privy councillors wish to make any change, you may tell them that immediately after the receipt of the King's letters patent for the observance of the

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* The Emperor was at Spire (Speier), in Bavaria, from the 1st of February to the 10th of June.

† No inclosure has been found in the packet, though it may be presumed that it was in reference to Halle's communication with the French governor of Boulogne, Oudard de Biez, of whom more will be said hereafter.

‡ No. 39, pp. 52–53, and No. 45, p. 66.

§ "Sur l'observation des saufconduys que le roy d'engleterre pourra donner pour hanter marchandement en France."

1544.

safe-conducts We shall take care that letters similarly conceived and worded be sent to England.

With regard to the rules for the observance of the safe-conducts, the English ambassador (Dr. Layton) here residing with Us has not yet said anything, nor have We had occasion to speak to him on the subject; but on the very first opportunity that offers, We or Our ministers will communicate with him as to the duplicate of the said letters, that he may write home and the affair be advanced.

Now, in answer to the two points contained in your letter of the 16th ult., and on which you ask Us for instructions, We enclose an affidavit under Our signature and seal of the challenge and defiance which the duke of Holstein has addressed to Us and to the countries under Our government, which is a sufficient testimony and a much stronger proof than that adduced by the English for the war with Scotland, on which alone We have, however, accepted. Should the privy councillors ask you to exhibit the Duke's original challenge in writing, you will say that you cannot, and will offer as an excuse that We have not sent it to you. Indeed, had We chosen to forward the paper We could not do it, inasmuch as We have not got it in this town (Ghent), and also, to say the truth, because We do not wish the privy councillors to see it, lest they should find fresh causes for contention and dispute, pretending, as they did once, that the origin of the challenge and occasion of the war with Holstein is purely personal.

With regard to the second point, namely, the damage and loss which the Emperor's subjects in these countries under Our government would sustain through the declaration against Scotland, it is so notorious that there is scarcely any need of Our mentioning it; for, in the first place, Flanders and the Low Countries have never been at war with Scotland, nor have they shown the least hostility to the inhabitants of that country, but have, on the contrary, treated with them and their kings of friendship and alliance, which treaties it is no easy matter to break through unless there be powerful reasons for it and with the forms and manner which honesty requires. And, in the second, because, if at war with Scotland and with the duke of Holstein, the Emperor's subjects in these Low Countries will be entirely excluded from the navigation to the Oost, and the fishing for herrings in the Northern seas towards Scotland, which would be a greater harm for the inhabitants of those countries than all the damage which the English allege might come to them from their declaration against Holstein, which they still refuse to give.

We cannot omit to tell you confidentially and under reserve, at the same time requesting you to keep it secret, that even if We were obliged to make the declaration against Scotland We do not see how We could do so

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unless that King made a similar declaration against the Duke, and that the English themselves, as well as the Emperor's subjects, were prevented from navigating towards Oost, otherwise it would be absolutely impossible for Us to keep the people of these Low Countries quiet and contented. We particularly call your attention to this point for fear the declaration against Scotland once obtained, We encounter another evil likely to bring on some angry dispute between the allies, which is a thing to be avoided under present circumstances.

We see by your despatches to the Emperor that the king of England is continually preparing for the undertaking against France, and persists in his determination to cross the Channel at the head of his army. The same news We have from the English ambassador resident at Our court, and yet there are no signs here of any such military preparations, for, in the first place, up to the present date We have not heard of his having tried to recruit foreign soldiers, nor has he remitted to Landenbergen money for the 2,000 horse and 4,000 foot which that captain has charge to levy, nor has Monsr. de Buren heard any more respecting the commission that King was pleased to give him, at which, by the way, We are exceedingly surprised. We also observe that he delays sending the list of provisions, which he wishes to be made and stored here for the use of his men, about all which things not a word has been said to Us by the English amambassador here resident, who, as it would appear, has received no charge in the matter.

As to the King's wish that the Emperor should, according to the letter of the treaty, furnish 3,000 men for sea service, We do not see the immediate necessity for it. The French have not, that We know of, a powerful fleet at sea. Perhaps the requisition has been made for the purpose of pressing the declaration against Scotland rather than for any other. If the privy councillors repeat the demand you will try to make excuses on account of the great expense We have been put to, besides being obliged to furnish 2,000 horse and 200 foot for the King's army, as well as the 2,000 men now asked for sea service. Unable as We are to supply the wants of Our own garrisons and what is required for the Emperor's army, it will be impossible for Us to fulfil at once and in full measure all the stipulations of the treaty. We have purposely informed you of these details that you may, if pressed by the privy councillors, not grant all their demands until an answer comes from His Imperial Majesty.—Gand (Ghent), 9 March 1543 (Old style).

P.S.—The letters patent for the observance of the safe-conducts, and the ratification of the war against Holstein, will be sent to-morrow. The copies were not ready when the bearer of this letter left, and We could not keep him waiting.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

1544.

10 March. **48.** THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—You will find herein inclosed the letters patent * for the observance of the safe-conducts, as well as the notification of war (*certification*) by the duke of Holstein, and an abstract of what We have written to the Emperor, Our brother, respecting a communication of the English resident ambassador on the state of affairs in Scotland.

Since Our letter of yesterday's date † the owners of the cargoes of salt herrings lately seized by the English have come to Us to complain and remonstrate that they had only received a sum of about two thousand pounds sterling for their salt herrings, which, counting the purchase money, custom duties, and insurance of the vessels, stood to them at more than five thousand four hundred and sixty gross of Flanders, or the equivalent of £3,600, not including in that sum what they have had to pay for the war duties and other extraordinary expenses, and what they have lost, by a vessel which was sunk, as they say, at the time that the seizure (*arrest*) was made, which loss amounts, as they say, to six thousand five hundred and eighty pounds sterling, so that they are in danger of being ruined unless they are helped and assisted in their just demands.‡ As We have already written, and do again, the English cannot do less in this case than pay the cost of the herrings here first hand (*en premier achapt*), the port and other ordinary duties (*les droitz de tollieu*), the franchise of the vessels, and besides that some honest profit for the merchants themselves. We must add that the persons to whom the herrings belonged have exhibited the safe-conducts granted by that King and allowing the plaintiffs to bring merchandize from France to these Low Countries in French bottoms, as you will see by the enclosed copy of the original safe-conduct. Should the King's privy councillors or the Admiralty officers make any difficulty about this you may show them the safe-conduct and papers, and at the same time do your best to assist and help the merchants in their just claims.—Gand, 10 March 1544.

Indorsed: "À l'ambassadeur Chapuys en Engleterre du X^me^ de Mars 1543 [Old style] dois Gant."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

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* Has not been found.

† That of the 9th, No. 47, p. 70.

‡ "On ne leur [a] pour les ditz harengg (*sic*) donné que environ de deux mille £ sterlinx que leur ont couste en somme achapt, droit ordinaire des tollieux et affranchishment des navieres plus de V^m^IV^c^LX gs. de Flandres, que revegnent à plus que III^m^VI^c^ £ sterlinx, sans encoires compter ce quilz ont payé pour le droit de la guerre et aultres despens extraordinaires, et ce quilz ont perdu par une naviere perie à l'occasion du dit arrest comme ilz disent, que monte plus de VI^m^V^c^IV^xx^ £ sterlinx, et par ainsy toute leur perte porteroit bien VI^m^V^c^IV^xx^ £ sterlinx, de sorte quilz soient (sont) en dangier destre destruitz silz ne sont assistez."

1544.

10 March. Wien, Imp. Arch.

49. THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—As We wrote yesterday,* We now enclose you the letters patent for the observance of the safe-conducts, and at the same time those for the war against Holstein, as well as an abstract of Our letter to the Emperor on the proposals, which the English ambassador here resident has made in his master's name concerning the state of affairs in Scotland.†

Since then, the owners of the cargoes of salt herrings sequestered in England have represented to Us that they have only received as indemnity a sum of money amounting to about 2,000 pounds sterling, whereas the total cost of the fish, including the purchase price, ordinary custom duties, insurance (*affranchissement*), and other expenses amount to 5,460 grosen of Flanders, or 3,600 pounds sterling, the owners of the salt fish having, therefore, suffered a loss of more than 6,524 pounds sterling, without counting what they have paid as war tax, and other extraordinary expenses, ‡ besides the value of a ship that went on shore and was lost, as they maintain, when the seisure took place, the value of which, as they say, amounted to upwards of 6,580 pounds sterling, and consequently the total loss the merchants have incurred amounts to upwards of 4,180 pounds sterling, and that the owners of the said vessels and cargoes are in danger of being completely ruined and failing in their engagements unless they are in some way or other assisted and helped. That is why you are requested to look out for means and ways of helping them in their difficulties. It seems to Us, as We have pointed out to you in a former letter, that the English are bound to pay the value of the merchandize—that is, the price which the merchants paid for the fish here, including, of course, what they paid for taxes and custom duties, ordinances and insurances (*affranchissements*); that is the least they can do, and then allow the merchants and shipowners a small profit on the speculation.

We must add that the merchants in question have duly exhibited copies of the various safe-conducts obtained from the king of England, allowing all and each of the petitioners

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* Such is the date of this draft, which at first appearance seems to be only a duplicate of the preceding. On the dorse, in a hand of the time, though different from that of the draft itself "envoié le 12^{me} du mois." By looking closely into it I find, however, that although the subject treated is substantially the same, there is a slight difference in its details. Queen Mary was then at Ghent, and it might be that before returning to Brussels on the 15th, and signing on the 10th the letter to Chapuys (No. 48), more reliable accounts were perhaps obtained in the former town of the loss sustained by the Flemish and Dutch merchants, and that another and second letter was addressed to Chapuys.

† The ambassador was still the dean of York, Dr. Richard Layton.

‡ "En non leur payant pour les dits harengz que environ de deux mille £ sterlinx que leur ont coustés en somme, achapt, droit ordinaire des 'tollieux,' et affranchissement des navires plus de V^{m}IV^{c}LX gs. de Flandres que revegnent (reviennent) à plus que III^{m}VI^{c} £ sterlinx, sans encoires compter ce quils ont payé pour le droit de la guerre et aultres despens."

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to bring back, on their return from France, any goods they chose from that country, and if necessary in French bottoms, as you will be able to verify by the single inspection of the said safe-conducts. We enter into these details in order that should the King's ministers make difficulties, you may be better prepared to insist on the merchants' just demands.—Ghent, 10 March 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

Indorsed: "Copie des lettres à sa mat^e Imperiale de part (*sic*) de son ambassadeur en Angleterre, du XII^e de Mars 1544."

16 March. **50.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—The day before yesterday Your Majesty's letter of the 5th inst. came to hand, and yesterday I went to this Privy Council and talked with some of its members concerning the kings-at-arms, heralds, or other officials to be sent simultaneously to Scotland and to the duke of Holstein in compliance with Your Majesty's orders and Instructions to me. But notwithstanding all my representations on this subject, based principally on the contents of Your Majesty's letter, and whatever arguments I could use of my own, the privy councillors would not admit the convenience or the expediency of the measure proposed, and said that they should not dare speak to the King their master about it, nor could they advise me to do so, lest he should take it in bad part, and consider it only a stratagem to gain time, and delay Your Majesty's declaration against Scotland, which, as they say, is most pressingly wanted. They have, therefore, decided to wait for Your Majesty's answer to my letter of the 2nd. I have, however, begged them to think of the affair, and talk it over with the rest of their colleagues, so as to lay the case before the King their master. I expect from hour to hour their answer to my application and request. As soon as I get it I will not fail to advise Your Majesty; but, in the meantime, I must not forget to say that, in my opinion, should Your Majesty not find it expedient to make the declaration demanded, Your Majesty's very wise suggestion ought to be attended to, namely, that an Imperial king-at-arms be sent to Scotland for the purpose announced in Your Majesty's letter, provided this King makes no difficulty in sending one of his to Denmark on a similar errand, since he himself offered to do so some time ago, as Your Majesty may have seen by my last. In short, all possible means and ways of amusing the duke of Holstein, and preventing him from undertaking anything against him in the meantime, ought to be found.

Respecting this King's contribution towards the war in Piedmont, I have not deemed it necessary to speak one way

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or other, for it would be tantamount to increasing the difficulties of the negociation on that point, and perhaps, too, affording the King an opportunity to withdraw his declaration.*

The King persists in his determination of joining in person this spring the expedition against France, and never ceases preparing for it. He has caused certain engines to be fabricated to surprise towns, and throw armed men within them in spite of the enemy. He has ordered boats (barques) to be built more portable, lighter, and better than those hitherto used, and I am told that he intends taking with him the duke of Suffolk to command the army under him. He is collecting as much money as he possibly can from the subsidy which his subjects have granted him, amounting to a very large sum, and I believe that in order not to touch his own hoard, he is only waiting for the payment of the remainder to remit [to Flanders] the funds required for the pay of the mercenaries to be enlisted. Indeed, I hear that if he has not already despatched his commissaries to that effect, it has been owing to his wishing to send, at the same time, the money for the Queen Regent. Indeed, it has not been the fault of the privy councillors if the whole provision has not been made already. As to me, I shall never cease importuning them until the thing is done completely.

The King has sent me word that the inhabitants of Doue (Douay) had done so valuable a service in receiving and keeping the artillery and ammunition which his own men left in that town on their return from the siege of Landresis, as well as the good treatment of the English who had occasionally gone thither on his service,† that he cannot do less than consider himself much obliged to them, and bound to do their pleasure in whatever they may want of him; all the time begging me to write to Your Majesty on the subject, and recommend them to Your Majesty.

Conversing yesterday with the privy councillors, I had no leisure to speak to them of the herald's deposition, and therefore I said nothing about it; but I shall not fail to send a copy of it, that they may show it to the King.

At this very moment, when I was about to close and seal this letter, my man came back from Court. He tells me that the King has positively written to Mr. de Buren, and remitted to him the sum of money required for the enlistment and pay of the additional mercenaries who are to be under his command, and that in a similar manner he has made remittances of money for the enlistment and pay of Christophe de Landenberg's band; also that the "billets" of the provisions to be bought in Flanders have been sent to the Queen

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* "Il ne me semble estre de besoing en toucher chose quelconque car ce seroit mectre le cas en difficulté et donner occasion de s'en retirer mesmes à cause de ses entresfaictes (*sic*) de la dite declaration."

† "Tant au recueil et conservation de l'artillerie et munition que ses gens laisserent la au retourd de Landrechiz que aussi au bon traictement de tous ceulx qui sont à la ville de sa part."

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Regent. The privy councillors particularly requested my man to inform me of all these particulars, and likewise that since the date of the last letters received from Your Majesty the billets above mentioned had been presented to the Queen. The Admiral also has sent me a message by my man that he will sail for Scotland in a week's time, and that the number of troops on board the Royal fleet is so considerable that he will with perfect ease be able to land 12,000 or 15,000 men, leaving the ships amply provided with crews. Before his departure, however, he will call at this embassy, for he intends to converse at length with me on that and other affairs. —London, 16 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

French. Original. 2½ *pp.*

16 March. **51.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—The day before yesterday Your Majesty's letter of the 9th inst. came to hand together with that of the Emperor to me.* It would be desirable that for the satisfaction of these people, and the better to meet their demands in the matter of the declaration [against the Scots], Your Majesty gave orders that a legal affidavit of the challenge (*deffiance*) of the duke of Holstein should be sent to me by the first courier. There is no need, for the reasons alleged in Your Majesty's letter, of the challenge itself as it was made.

With regard to the safe-conducts, since the date of my last despatch, this King has through his Privy Council again confirmed to me his determination to have them observed as far as the resort of French merchants and the carrying of French merchandize are concerned, as well as all goods, which being exempted do not require a safe-conduct. No articles of food to be allowed, though licences have lately been obtained for three hundred "lasts" or loads of salt herrings † to be transported [to France], as I have informed Jaspard Duchy, that he may apprize Your Majesty. As soon as the letters patent of the Low Countries come to hand I will take care that reciprocal ones be obtained according to Your Majesty's wish.

Respecting the injury and damage likely to result to the inhabitants of the Low Countries from the Emperor's declaration against the Scots, these people will not hear a word. They say, on the contrary, that even supposing the effect to be produced by the declaration yet the great effort now being

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* No. 47, p. 70 and No. 46, p. 67.

† "Et quant aux saulfconduitz depuis mes precedentes ce roy m'a faict reconfirmer l'observation d'iceulx pour l'hantise marchande en France saulf pour les exemptes, et mesmes de transporter en France vituailles, octroyant pourtant license que l'on y peult porter trois cens lastz d'harengs."

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made to keep Scotland under obedience, the fishing will become more practically free for the people of the Low Countries, and that at any rate (*au pis aller*) their ships and those of the Low Countries would be stronger and more numerous than those of Scotland, and therefore the enemy could do no harm or hinder ours from fishing.

As to the three thousand sailors of whom I wrote last I can assure Your Majesty that I will not exceed my instructions on that point, but will make all possible excuses. Most likely the solicitation has its origin, as Your Majesty most wisely conjectures, in a desire of these people to promote and facilitate the Emperor's declaration against Scotland. That is why the best excuse to be offered would be, in my opinion, to say, as I believe is true, that the French have no great force at sea at this present moment.

As to other affairs, I beg leave to refer Your Majesty to my despatch to the Emperor herein inclosed.*—London, 16 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

16 March. **52.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Your Imperial Majesty's letter of the 5th inst.† came to hand the day before yesterday in the evening, and yesterday I had a communication with some of the privy councillors concerning the king-at-arms or other personages to be sent respectively to Scotland and to the duke of Holstein, at the same time calling their attention to the contents of Your Majesty's letters to me. This notwithstanding, and although I myself urged them on, they did not think it expedient that they or I should propose the measure to the King lest this latter should think it strange, and consider it a stratagem on our part to gain time and delay the declaration they are soliciting, which declaration, as they say, is more than necessary, nay indispensable at this present juncture. In short, they (the councillors) are of opinion that we had better wait for Your Majesty's answer to my despatch of the 2nd inst. I have, nevertheless, earnestly recommended them to reconsider the affair, and consult their colleagues in the Privy Council as to the best means of bringing the proposed measure before the King for approval. I am expecting from hour to hour their answer as to that; the very moment it comes to hand I shall not fail in letting Your Majesty know. Yet, I must not omit to say that in my opinion, should Your Imperial Majesty find it inexpedient to make the declaration against Scotland, it would be advisable and opportune to adopt and follow Your Majesty's

* *See* the following, No. 52.

† No. 46, p. 67.

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very wise counsel, namely, to send here a king-at-arms to go to Scotland and make there the declaration contained in Your Majesty's letter. That is provided this King has no objection to reciprocally do the same thing with regard to the duke of Holstein, which is not probable, since he himself has offered, as Your Majesty may have seen by my preceding despatch, to employ all means in his power to dally with the said duke of Holstein so that he may know nothing about it.*

With regard to the King's contribution towards the expenses of the war in Piedmont, I have not considered it necessary to touch on that point just now, for new difficulties might thereby be raised and afford the King an opportunity to withdraw [from his engagements] on the very grounds of the declaration that we want him to make against the duke of Holstein.†

I hear that the King still persists in his idea of attending personally the expedition against France, and continues to make preparations for the future campaign. He is having engines built for the purpose of surprising fortified towns, and throwing inside armed men in spite of the enemy, besides a number of vessels (*barques*) more fitting, portable, and advantageous than those we have hitherto seen, and I am told that he intends taking with him the duke of Suffolk to command the army.‡ No time is being lost or effort spared in collecting the money of the subsidy granted [by Parliament], which will amount to a very considerable sum, and I believe that in order not to touch his treasure (which he very much dislikes) the King is only waiting for the subsidy and taxes to come in to remit to Flanders the sum required for the levy of the men mentioned in former despatches. In short, I believe that as soon as the money is ready he will appoint the commissaries, who are to go to the Queen in Flanders and lay out the money in the recruiting of men, buying provisions, and so forth. There has been no need for me to press the privy councillors on that score, for they are doing everything in their power to hasten all sorts of preparations for war. This notwithstanding, I purpose not leaving them in peace until all is ready for the projected undertaking.

The King has sent me word that the people of Doué (Douay) had done him such honor and service in receiving and keeping the artillery and ammunition, which his men

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* "Actendu quil sest offert, comme vostre maieste aura peu veoir par mes precedentes, de tenir tous moyens pour entretenir le dit duc de Holstein, affin quil nen pregne (*n'en apprenne*?) riens."

† "Et il ne m'a semblé estre de besoing en toucher chose quelconque, car ce seroit mectre le cas en difficulté, et donner [au Roy] occasion de sen retirer mesmes à cause de ses entrefaictes en la dicte declaration."

‡ "Mesmes à faire fabricquer engins pour surprendre villes, et jecter gens dedans en despit des enemys, aussi fere fere (*sic*) barques plus propices portatives et advantageuses que l'on a veu jusques içy, et me dit l'on qu'il menera le duc de Suffocq pour conducteur de la bataille desoubz luy."

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left there on their return from the siege of Landreschyz, as well as in the good treatment of all the English, who had gone thither at his commands, that he was exceedingly obliged and grateful to them, and very desirous of doing their pleasure in anything they might want of him. The message further said that he (the King) could not do less than let Your Imperial Majesty know of it, and return proper thanks after warmly recommending the people of Doue and their services to him.

When I spoke yesterday to the privy councillors I had no opportunity to allude to the statement to be made by the herald; I could not if I chose [for I had not perused it], but I will send it to them in writing that they may report to the King.*

Just at this moment, when I was about to close and seal this letter, my man returns from Court bringing me a message from the privy councillors to the effect that the King, their master, had really and truly written to Mr. de Buren, and remitted to him the sum of money required for the levy of the additional body of men (*surcroist*) that he has charge to recruit [for the English service] and likewise that he had already remitted funds for the levies of Christoffle Landenbourg (*sic*). The bills (billets) for the provisions to be bought in the Low Countries had been sent to the Queen, and they had no doubt that since the date of the last letter of Her Royal Majesty (*sa ma^te^ reginale*) to me the said bills of exchange were already in her possession.

My man brought me also a message from the Admiral, purporting that he was about to sail in a week for Scotland with the whole of the Royal fleet (*l'armee de mer*), and that he would take so considerable a force on board that twelve or fifteen thousand men might easily be landed without leaving the ships unprovided; but that before his departure he would come and dine with me (*banquetter avec moi*) and have a long talk on the affairs of the day.—London, 16 March 1544.

Indorsed: "Copie des lettres à sa ma^te^ Imperiale de part son ambassadeur en Angleterre, du 16^e^ de Mars 1544."

French. Contemporary copy. 3 *pp.*

17 March. **53.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your letter of the 4th inst. respecting the King's new demand for Our declaration against the Scots,† and his offer to issue a similar declaration

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* "Parlant hier aux dits du Conseil neu loysir leur tenir propoz de la depposition du herault, et aussi se l'avoye je encoires parleu (parcouru ?), mais je ne fauldray de la leur envoyer pour la communicquer au dit S^r^ roy."

† "Vos lettres du IIII^e^ du present contenans linstance que ceulx du roy d'Angleterre vous ont de rechief faict pour nostre declaration à lencontre des Escossois," are the words; but no letter of Chapuys' has been found in the

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on his part against the duke of Holstein, in case of his deputies now in this town (Spire) refusing to treat with Us, has duly come to hand. The affair may therefore be considered as definitely settled, provided the King be informed beforehand of Our determination that he, himself, may advise his subjects to withdraw from Elsino (Elseneur) and other towns of Denmark. We now write to Madame, Our sister, the queen regent of Flanders and the Low Countries, of Our determination in that matter, that she may let you know of it, and in the meantime you will conduct yourself with the King and with his privy councillors as courteously and friendly as ever. Of Our future movements you shall be apprized in time.—Spire, the 17th of March 1543 (Old style).

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

24 March. **54.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—I am in receipt of Your Majesty's letter of the 10th inst.* as well as of the letters patent therein inclosed, and of the abstract of the notes and communications of the English ambassador residing at that Court, about which I recollect having, on more than one occasion, written to Your Majesty. *Indeed, it seems to me as if the communications of the English ambassador would have been more opportune and acceptable had they been made before, and emanated (notwithstanding their tardiness) from his own free will, and without waiting for the remonstrances and reproaches I have addressed to him on the subject for not having given cognizance of the said affairs either to Your Majesty or to me.*

With regard to the indemnity (*recompense*) to be given to the herring merchants for their losses, nothing has been done yet, nor is there any probability for the present of the affair being concluded, inasmuch as the privy councillors persist, on the advice of that King's ambassador, in delaying as long as possible the settlement of that business, and have four times consecutively refused, under some pretence or other, to give audience to my man and to that of Jaspar Douchy, who has come here to solicit the said indemnity. It has, therefore, been quite impossible for me to speak to the privy councillors respecting the reciprocal letters patent, to the delivery of which—whatever they may say and affirm in public of their readiness—there is, in my opinion, very little inclination, the privy councillors excusing themselves on the ground of their manifold and important occupations. And yet, as I, myself,

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Imperial Archives bearing the date of March the 4th. In his despatch to queen Mary of the 2nd, Chapuys writes "that two of king Henry's privy councillors had called on him in the King's name, and spoken on the subject of the declaration," and he refers her to the "enclosed copy of his despatch to the Emperor," which has not been found either.

* *See* above, No. 48, p. 73.

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have written to Jaspar Douchy on the subject,* the merchants and navigators of the Low Countries must not cease employing French vessels, for these privy councillors assured me that they could do so without fear.

Respecting the declaration [*against Scotland*], *I have thought it better not to exhibit it until I have received from the Emperor an answer to my despatch of the 2nd inst.,*† *according to which we may aid ourselves in future negociations.*

Since my last, nothing important has happened here, save that the reinforcements destined for Scotland have sailed for that country. They are to make all possible haste on their way in order to carry out their enterprise. Please God, the intentions of these people may be fulfilled, and the invasion of France not further delayed.‡—London, 24 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 2 *pp.*

30 March. Wien, Imp. Arch.

55. EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty must already have heard from this King's ambassador, as well as from those whom the case concerns, of the disorder which took place at La Verre, of an English merchant vessel anchored there, which certain Scots boarded and took away with them.§ The King and all the members of his Privy Council have been greatly ill-contented and scandalized, especially when they knew that the Scotch vessel had returned to Scotland, and that the goods and merchandize of the English vessel were publicly sold and dissipated. I myself have been strongly requested by the Privy Council to write to Your Majesty and ask that reparation and indemnity to the master of the vessel and crew be immediately made. I have already received three different messages from the privy councillors to that effect brought by my own man, and yesterday the King sent me word by one of them to remonstrate, and at the same time request me to write to Your Majesty for the amendment and reparation of the said outrage, saying, among other things, that he (the King) had heard that five more vessels were soon to sail from the ports of Scotland, which he thought were bound for certain ports of the coast of Zeeland. If not so, they at least to go to the coast of France, so close to that of Zeeland that it would not be difficult to seize them, which would be a sort

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* "Mais cependant, comme ay escript cy devant au dict Jaspar Douchy ceulx de par de là ne doibvent laisser de naviguer ne de se servir de navyres françoises comme mont declairé il y a desja quelques jours les dits du Conseil."

† "Touchant la dicte declaration il ne m'a semblé la monstrer jusques aye response de Sa m^te^ sur mes lectres du II^e^ de ce mois conforme á laquelle il se fauldra ayder de la dicte declaration."

‡ "Affin de non delayer l'expedicion contre France."

§ "Laquelle les Escossois ont conblée et emmenée" (?)

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of compensation and remedy for the loss of the English. To this end the King begged Your Majesty to stir in the matter, and take such measures against the Scots resorting to the Low Countries, that in future they may not have the means or the opportunity, much less the boldness, of committing such insolent and disorderly acts. I must humbly beg Your Majesty to attend to my prayer as the case requires, and the very singular and perfect friendship and intelligence between the Emperor and this King demands.—London, 30 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

30 March. **56.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—The opportunity of this messenger offering, I would not let it pass without writing these few lines to Your Majesty. Four days ago the King received letters from Count Lynns (Lennox), the nobleman who, as I wrote to Your Majesty, received the money and ammunition from king Francis, declaring his readiness to embrace his cause under certain reasonable conditions, and proposing to send an agent (*commis*) to the Borders to treat of the affair. And the King, hearing of that, has appointed a personage with sufficient powers, whose dexterity and wisdom are such that people here are confident of the whole negociation turning out to the King's advantage. And, certainly, should the King win over to his party the aforesaid count, as he may well do, he will be able with his help and that of his own partisans, if these only persevere in their good intentions, to do what he pleases in Scotland. Of what may happen there I shall not fail to apprize Your Majesty.

The Patriarch of Aquileia, notwithstanding the safe-conduct obtained from the King to pass through England, has preferred trusting to the fortunes of the sea, after alleging certain reasons and excuses of his own, and has addressed a long discourse exhorting him not to go to war with France, but take upon himself the task of arbitration between the Emperor and king Francis: not doubting, as he has been heard to say,* that as this King is rich and opulent whilst the other [princes] are poor, he (the Patriarch) can easily persuade the latter to do whatever he pleases, especially if the Pope—to whom the more to please this King, the Patriarch

* "Point doubtant, comme il disoit, que pour estre ce dict sieur roy riche et opulent et les aultres en tous endrois necessiteux, il leur persuaderoit facillement à faire tout ce quil vouldroit (mesme tenant main de laultre coustel au quel pour plus complaire au dict S^r^ roy ne donnoit tiltre de Pape, ains seullement de sieur et maistre), et que soubdain quil seroit arrivé en France il mectroit le cas en train et terme, et apres incontinent, moyennant le bon plaisir et saufconduyt du dit sieur roy, se retourneroit à Calais pour communiquer des dites affaires."

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in his discourse gives no other titles than those of "Seigneur" and "Maistre"—lends his hand to it. He would, on his arrival in France, try to carry out his plans, and, if at all successful, would, with the King's permission, return to Calais, and communicate the result of his mission of peace.

For the last eight days the King has been ill of a sore in one of his legs, which during forty-eight hours has brought on a slight fever. He is now, thank God, free from it, and yet he is still indisposed and keeps his room. That is the reason why the duke of Alburquerque has not yet thought of paying his respects to him. The Duke arrived here eight days ago, and I fancy that he will not take his departure as soon as he thinks of doing, for in spite of all his efforts to freight fit vessels for his passage [to Flanders] he has yet been unable to find any. He will most likely remain in this city until he can procure a passage,* to avoid the annoyance and discomfort to which the duke of Najera was subjected when he came over from Spain; for the latter is still in Plymua (Plimouth) waiting for an opportunity to cross over [to Calais]. He was, I am told, rather annoyed, not only because he did not find there [at Plymua] the necessary provisions [for his suite], but because the people of that town are somewhat rough and ill-conditioned. As to the duke of Alburquerque, he has been visited courteously enough (*assez soigneusement*) in the King's name.—London, 30 March 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

1 April. **57.** NEWS from ROMÉ of the 1st of April 1544.

S. E. L., 806, f. 89.

By letters from Tolon (Toulon) of the 7th of March, sent by a reliable person, the news is:—

That Barbarossa had made there a large provision of biscuit for his galleys, feeding his men with what the French had given him, and storing his own stock for another opportunity, as he said the allowance given was short and bad. Indeed, it is rumoured that the French are doing that on purpose, in order to drive him to extremity, and oblige him, as it were, to take part against the Emperor.

On the 25th of that same month of March he (Barbarossa) complained of the bad treatment of the French. He had written twice to the Grand Turk about it, pointing out to him how important it was that the Turkish fleet should go back to the Levant, and that he (Barbarossa) suspected that his two

* "Et sejournera en ceste ville jusques à la provision des dits navieres propices pour son passaige, quelque diligence quil nait faict mesmes pour evister lencommodite et fascherie que eu le duc de Najera dactendre ses navires á Plymeu, ou il est encoires; et y a esté ung peu ennoyé tant pour non y trouver la provision necessaire que pour estre le peuple d'illec ung peu brusque et mal condicionne, et a esté le duc dalburcquerque icy sonnieusement (soigneusement?) visité de la part du dit S^r roy."

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last despatches had been intercepted by the French. He had been heard to say that were the Grand Turk not to grant him leave [to quit Toulon] he would certainly take it and sail away. That the French have not paid him one farthing of his salary.*

That he is not in so great a want of galley-slaves (*esclavos*) as reported, for he has plenty of Frenchmen and natives of Provence to serve the oars.

Spanish. Contemporary copy. 1½ *pp.*

1 April. **58.** The Queen of Hungary to Eustace Chapuys.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C., ff. 19–20.

"Monsigneur† l'Ambassadeur,"—Enclosed is the letter received from the Emperor, Our lord, at the same time as another of the 18th ult.,‡ giving Us commission to make the declaration against the Scots or else temporise with that King's ministers, provided We find the delay thus caused will not spoil the preconcerted undertaking against France, or in some manner affect these Low Countries and injure its inhabitants: such are the Emperor's orders, as you will see by the enclosed abstract of his letter to Us. We have answered him, as you will see by the abstract of Our letter, also enclosed; but as We do not exactly know what sort of harm the delay in acquiescing to that King's wishes may cause to the projected undertaking against France, as you, who are on the spot, are the best judge, We are referred for information to you. We have, however, ordered the enclosed draft of a declaration to be drawn up in conformity with the treaty of closer friendship and alliance, which draft you may, if you find it suitable, show the same to those privy councillors or let Us know what you think best, either to temporise a little longer or else issue the said declaration at once; but let it be understood that, should you find that for the advancement of affairs, and not to damp the undertaking against France, it is necessary that the declaration be made at once, after you have taken securities from that King and his ministers, that within two months after the date of Our said declaration against the Scotch a similar one against the duke of Holstein be prepared and obtained in England, unless within two months counted from this day, and before the departure of the Emperor from Spires,§ the Duke's deputies come to some sort of agreement with him, the king of England's declaration against Denmark be published without further delay, since during the said two

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* "Que no la dan blanca de su sueldo y à el [le] tienen muy mal presentado[?]."

† *Sic* in the original draft; but it is, no doubt, a slip of the pen for *Monsieur*.

‡ "Les lettres ci-jointes que avons recu [pour vous] de l'Empereur, monseigneur avec ses lettres [à nous] du XVIII[e] de ce mois."

§ "The Emperor left Spires on the 10th of June, after closing the Diet on that day."—*See* Bradford's *Itinerary*, p. 545.

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months his English subjects will have plenty of leisure to remove their property out of that country.

As to the interest which the inhabitants of these Low Countries may have in the King's declaration against Denmark, it is so great and so notorious, as explained in Our last letter to you,* that We need not call your attention to it; besides which, if We go to war with the duke of Holstein We should lose the navigation of the Northern Seas, nor could the Emperor's subjects in these parts be able to support the injury unless the king of England also declared him his enemy: that is, in Our opinion, the only means of recalling him to reason, as We wrote to you on them. However that may be, We fancy that the English will not insist on Our publishing the requisite declaration as long as We arrest and imprison the Scots in these countries—on the occasion of which We wrote to the Emperor, as you will see by the abstract of Our letter to him here enclosed †—for We have ordered the arrest of upwards of one hundred and fifty men of that nationality, mostly sailors, who are without money or means of subsistence; so much so, that in order that they may not die of hunger, We have applied to the English ambassador at this Our court to take under his charge the feeding of all these poor wretches, who after all are not responsible for what their respective masters may have done against the English. To this application of Ours the ambassador has agreed on condition that the merchants themselves be retained, two of whom shall be sent to England to solicit the release of the English vessel that was captured, on condition, however, that if they do not obtain it, the rest of the prisoners here will be answerable for them. In short, the English ambassadors here have been asked whether they think that We can do more for the indemnity of the English, because We are fully prepared to please them in this as well as in other matters. You may, if you consider it fit and opportune, declare this to the King's privy councillors.

The King's deputies here have communicated to the Sieur de Buren the orders they have received from England of raising 2,000 infantry, with a stipend of four "carolis" monthly for each man. This commission, however, Buren has not accepted, for no foot soldier ever enlisted here for less than four "phillips" or five "carolis"—that is to say, four gold florins of XV patars per each man monthly. The deputies have promised to acquaint the King with this fact, and in the meantime the affair is suspended.

The English ambassador here resident has presented a note (*billet*) of the number and quality of the horses and carts which his master demands Us to furnish for his army, amounting altogether to two thousand five hundred and sixty-six draft horses to drag the King's artillery, besides two thou-

* No. 47, p. 71.

† The same mentioned above (p. 85), of which, if in the Imperial Archives, no copy has come to hand.

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sand two hundred and sixty waggons, each drawn by four horses, for ammunition and baggage, which would raise the amount of beasts required to eleven thousand five hundred and ninety-six in all, a number which not only seems to Us excessive and unreasonable,* but which We are doubtful of being able to procure in the country. We have, however, ordered a general requisition to be made throughout the provinces under Our government, and hope to be able, after satisfying the Emperor's demands, to supply the king of England, and those of the 2,000 mounted men (besides 2,000 foot) We are bound to contribute towards the invasion of France.—1 April 1544.

Indorsed: "To ambassador Chapuys, of the 1st of April 1543, before Easter (*Note à joindre*)."

French. Original draft.

4 April. **59.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—We have seen what you wrote on the 2nd ult.,† and also what the Sieur de Courrières advised from the Imperial camp by means of the note (*billet*) herein inclosed.‡ You seem to think, as We do, that this is the opportune moment for executing the orders We sent you by the Sieur d'Eeken,§ and those which the Emperor himself gave you by his letter of the 26th ult. in confirmation of Ours; and yet it seems to Us that this is not a matter to be communicated to your own subordinates, nor to the privy councillors, without having first spoken to the king of England about it.‖ That is why, if possible, We should wish that for the sake of such good work (as this is), and also to prevent the king of England from commencing to treat by himself without His Imperial Majesty's co-operation, I request you to call first on him, for otherwise We are afraid that very little or nothing at all would come out of the affair.—Brussels, 4 April 1544.

French. Original draft.

4 April. **60.** MASTER HALLE'S ANSWER to MONSR. DE BIEZ' LETTERS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur le Mareshal,"—I commend myself heartily unto you. These shall be to advertise you that having lately sent

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* The Latin numbers must be wrong, or the reckoning was, for the various items make up a sum of 12,796 horses. The text reads: "Il demande IIᵐVᶜLVI chevaulx lymoniers pour servir à l'artillerie du roy, et IIᵐIIᶜLX chariotz de quatre chevaulx pour mener munitions et bagage qui sont XIᵐVᶜ IIIXXXVI chevaulx, que me semble nombre excessif, et non recouvrable."

† *See* above, pp. 66–7, his letter to the Emperor, No. 43, and that to the Queen, No. 45.

‡ No inclosure in the packet.

§ Sieur d'Ecke in the Netherlands, that is Cornelius Duplicius Scepperus, about whom, and his various missions to England *see* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. xxiii–iv.

‖ "Mais il ne me semble matiere pour la faire mangier par vos gens, ne aussy la descouvrir à ceulx du Conseil, ne fust que premiers en eussiez parlé au roy d'engleterre."

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unto England such letters and other writings as I have received from you in order that the King's Majesty, my master, should be informed of the contents of the same, I am commanded by letters from England, in His Majesty's behalf, to signify to you by way of an answer that whereas it appears by your letters and writings that the King, your master, is desirous of peace with the King, my master,* and that if he has letters of assurance or safe-conducts, he will be content to send ambassadors to treat of the same to His Majesty's satisfaction, His Highness [the king of England] recollecting how often heretofore there have been fair words and large promises by the French king, none of which have been fulfilled or had effect, and perceiving also that even at the present [time] the King, your master, is making semblant by words and offers of being desirous of peace, nevertheless does by his deeds declare the contrary, since he goes about by all the means in his power encouraging and soliciting the Scots to be the King, my master's, enemies, and to break the faith and honour wherein they stand bound to him, sending to them aid and money, and giving them for that express purpose all the relief and comfort he can. His Highness has good cause to think that the overtures made by the said Sieur de St. Martin to me—through your appointment of him and intervention of yours in this affair—is no more [than a] device and practice, and that the proposed coming here of ambassadors from the King, your master, is only meant for the sake of gaining time, for it is apprehended that after many devices, and much talk, the French ambassadors, if they do come, will depart and go away without any conclusion whatever. Should the King, your master, as you have written in his behalf, really intend earnestly and truly to declare by his deeds what his own words imply, then you may signify to him that the very first thing he must do will be to abandon the Scots and leave them to themselves, nor give them further aid and comfort against the King's Majesty. And whereas His Majesty has no doubt that if the King, your master, desires, as you say, to make peace, and asks for safe-conducts for his ambassadors to come here, His Majesty must first of all have some knowledge of the grounds upon which the negociations for that peace are based, and what offers the King, your master, intends making in order to attain his aim, so that His Majesty of England may have

* In a subsequent despatch of Chapuys' it is stated that a copy of this and other papers relating to king Francis' first overtures for peace through Oudard du Biez and St. Martin was forwarded by the Privy Council to Wotton to put into the hands of the Emperor at Spire. Of Oudard or Odart du Biez frequent mention has been made in the preceding volume, pp. 371, 385, 414. He was Marshal of France and the King's lieutenant in the Boulonnois, whilst his son-in-law, Jacques de Coucy, sieur de Vervins, commanded at Boulogne itself. Accused of having cowardly delivered that town to the English, Jacques de Coucy was tried and beheaded, whilst Oudard himself fell into disgrace, was degraded, and sent to prison. He died in 1549. De Thou, *Histoire Universelle*, Vol. VII., pp. 380–1.

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some occasion of judging whether the King, your master, really works *bona fide* in the matter, and will gladly prove by deed what his words mean and he professes to desire.

Should, therefore, the King, your master, make such like offers as will prove that he is in earnest and desires peace, and thereby show that he is willing to come to a satisfactory settlement of the differences existing between the king of England and him, and also between the Emperor and him, a further communication may take place and matters come in the end to an honourable settlement between the parties; for as the war began by your master's fault, owing to his not observing the treaties, His Majesty of England thought good to make a treaty of closer friendship and alliance with the Emperor, to the intent and purpose that both might conjointly and together, under one consent and agreement, recover by force of arms that which by right and reason belongs exclusively to each of them, and perceiving they could not obtain the same by fair and friendly means in time of peace.

His Majesty, however, cannot and will not, for honour's sake, come to terms with the King, your master, unless the Emperor be on his side contented and perfectly satisfied; the King, your master, may send to the king of England any overtures or articles he may be disposed to draw out, and the king of England will in a like manner send such articles as he himself may be contented with. Otherwise the king of England declines to take any further notice of the affair.

Should the King, your master, dislike this answer of mine to your letter, you may tell him that if, on the landing of the king of England at Calais, where, God willing, His Majesty intends to be very shortly, the King, your master, sends thither an ambassador of his, His Majesty will give him another such answer as His Majesty may consider most convenient.

Indorsed: "Master Halle's * letter to Marshal de Biez."

English. Contemporary copy. 4 *pp.*

4 April. **61.** MONSR. DE BIEZ' AFFIDAVIT.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C., f. 235.

We, Oudart, sieur de Biez, knight of the King's Order, marshal of France, lieutenant-general for the King in those countries of Picardye and Arthois, in the absence of Monsr. the duke of Vendosmois do certify that the Sieur de St. Martin† has by the King's command spoken to Master Halles

* The writer of this letter, whose name is variously spelt Hall, Halle, Halles, and even Hars, is said elsewhere to have been an Englishman inhabiting Calais. In the *State Papers*, vol. X., p. 655, he is said to be the nephew of Sir Robert Wingfield. De Biez's letter to him is not in the Vienna Archives.

† Le Sieur de Saint Martin, that is according to *State Papers*, Vol. IX., p. 392, Nicolas de Marques; though there was about this time another Sieur de St. Martin, whose name was Martin du Bellay, a brother of the cardinal and archbishop of Paris (Jean du Bellay), and of Guillaume du Bellay, Sieur de Langeais or Langey, French general in Piedmont. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 286.

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in the following terms. Having heard and learnt through Marshall du Biez the conversation (*pourparler*) which the aforesaid Sieur de St. Martin and Master Halles have had together on the differences now existing between king Francis and the king of England, after reporting on the whole affair to the King, his master, Mons. de St. Martin will say to Master Halles that king Francis cannot persuade himself that the friendship which has hitherto existed between him and the king of England can be impaired, or the treaties by which they are bound to each other broken. That the friendship which unites them ought, on the contrary, to be kept for ever, and that the king of France has the wish and will of preserving it. Monsr. de St. Martin will say to Master Halles that if the king of England, his master, will only grant safe-conducts, king Francis is ready to send to him ambassadors and notable personages furnished with sufficient ample powers to treat of and settle any differences that may now exist between them both in such a way that the king of England will have every reason to be satisfied with the arrangement. In testimony of which We, Oudart de Biez, do sign these present letters with Our hand and seal them with Our arms.—Boulogne sur la Mer, 4th of April 1543, before Easter (1544).

*French. Contemporary copy.** 1 *p.*

5 April. **62.** NEWS of the TURK sent from Venice.

S. E. L., 806, f. 84.

The news from Constantinople of the 30th of March, brought by a person coming from that city, are :—

That no less than fifty galleys were on the stocks, though they would not be ready very soon, as the work proceeded slowly.

Seven other galleys of the Turk had gone to the defence of the Archipelago.

The Grand Turk did not seem inclined to undertake anything this year by land or sea.

That a despatch had been received therefrom advising that king Francis had asked Solyman for the loan of sixty more of his galleys, offering to pay the crews of them, &c. Also for a body of 30,000 Turks to land in Pulla (Puglia), or in any other part of Italy where he (the Grand Turk) liked best, offering likewise to pay the salary of the crews and so forth.

That Liutfi Baxa (*sic*), who had returned to Solyman's favor and good graces, and was Barbarossa's enemy, had opposed King Francis' application, and that for some time at least nothing would be done in the matter.

* There are two copies of this paper in the Imperial Archives of Vienna forwarded, no doubt, by Chapuys, one to the Emperor, the other to Queen Mary, the Regent in the Netherlands. That addressed to the latter, which is not so full and somewhat varies from the one to the Emperor here given in full, is dated thus :—*A Boullongne sur la mer le IIIe jour d'avril l'an mil cinq cens quarente trois avant pasques.*

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Here, at Venice, cardinal Grèmani has come as Papal Nuncio; an ambassador from France is also expected, as well as another from Turkey—all come to negociate with this Signory a league against His Imperial Majesty, and there can be no doubt that they will work strenuously towards it. If that cannot be obtained, they will at least ask for the free passage through Venetian territory of 50,000 Turks. I do not think that the Signory will grant that or make any stir for the present, because they are afraid of the Emperor's power, and, therefore, will not trouble themselves with such practices. I myself am doing all I can to defeat the French plans. Should I hear anything more about their intrigues I will not fail to apprize your Lordship.*—Venice, 5 April 1544.

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*

5 April. **63.** NEWS from CONSTANTINOPLE and the TURKS sent from Venice.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

The news from Constantinople of the 30th of March, etc.

Spanish. Contemporary copy. 1 *p.*

12 April. **64.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—This will be in answer to your despatch of the 16th ult.,† and likewise to what you yourself wrote to the Sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*) on the same day, and again on the 20th of March and 4th inst., all of which We have perused. We thank you for your good services and the continual care you take in fulfilling the duties of your charge by minutely informing Us of whatever occurs in that country. I earnestly request you to continue as hitherto; indeed, it is more important than ever if the success of the undertakings in which We are now engaged is to be secured beforehand.

This courier, moreover, is sent for the express purpose of giving you notice that some days ago the ambassador of England residing at this Our Court applied, in his master's name (as he said), to the Sieur de Granvelle for some good and experienced German captain to raise for his service and bring to him one thousand horse, besides and above those that Landenberg has charge to enlist. The English ambassador at the same time wished to know from the Sieur de Granvelle what Our usual articles and terms were when contracting for German cavalry for Our service,‡ in order that the King, his master, might be guided and know how

* Most likely Cobos, the Emperor's Secretary for Foreign Affairs; the newsletter being probably addressed to him by Don Diego de Mendoza, still ambassador to the Signory. Cobos, however, was no longer with the Emperor but with Prince Philip in Spain. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 427, 442, 453.

† *See* No. 52, p. 78.

‡ "Et que communiquissions au dit ambassadeur les articles de retenue que baillons à nos gens de cheval afin de traicter selon ce."

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to act in the matter. Upon which, and after much thought, no one could be found more apt for the service required than captain Siquingen,* who merely for Our sake (as he said), and not without many excuses and some difficulties, accepted at last the charge of raising for the king of England the above-mentioned body of horse. We must add that, as captain Siquingen is an officer of experience and credit in all military affairs, We ourselves had been thinking of retaining him for Our own service; but since the King wants German cavalry, and applies to Us for it, We have no objection to pass over to him the said captain and his thousand horse. But We cannot omit to say that when Our ministers began treating with him he asked persistently for a security from bankers and merchants of this country (Germany), such as the Fouchrers (Fuggers), the Welsers, and others, that he and his men shall be regularly paid from the day of their arrival until they quit the English service. The ambassador said that he was not empowered to make any engagement, but would willingly report home, though he doubted whether his master, the King, would consent to tender the securities demanded, and although the Sieur de Granvelle told him that such were the terms of German captains in general, and that in contracting with them We had always subscribed and signed obligations and deeds to that effect, yet the English ambassador persisted in his negative.† On the other hand, captain Siquingen (*sic*) and his Germans, though they have frequently been in Our service, have greater facilities and prefer to deal with Us to dealing with other princes, besides which, in case of non-payment, they might possibly recover their wages from Our own subjects,‡ yet they have, as above said, absolutely refused to enter that of that king of England's, except on the above specified terms and full security of their being paid, whilst the English ambassador obstinately refuses to take any engagement without consulting his master first.

Matters being in this state, and fearing lest the delay in an affair of this sort should prevent the king of England from joining the preconcerted enterprise against France for want of cavalry—as some time must necessarily pass before another thousand German horse could be procured—as, even if the King accepts the terms proposed, it will be difficult for the said Sechingen (*sic*) to have his thousand horse ready and pass muster to them before the end of May. We have promised him that the king of England will give the security asked for before the end of the present month of April, or within

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* Sickingheim (Francis von).

† "Le dit ambassadeur enfin a expressement respondu quil n'en avoit charge, ny ne le vouloit faire, combien que l'on luy ait remonstré que à nous mesmes les autres capitaines nous ont demandé la dite assheurance et nous a failli baillier nos lectres signees de nostre nom et scelleés."

‡ "Nonobstant quilz soient estez souvent à nos gaiges et que leur soyons de plus facile convention et mesmes par l'arrest de noz subjectz s'il y avoit faculté."

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the first two or three days of May at the latest, and that should the King decline to do so, the 2,000 florins* which the English ambassador has already paid him on account of his engagement (*retinue*) shall remain in his hands and to his profit without his being obliged to do any service at all.

As you may conceive, it is highly important, nay, necessary, that the King give the security within the time above specified, and that is why We have despatched this express messenger that you may make haste and explain to the King and to his ministers the real state of this affair, giving them to understand that We have issued orders that his ambassador should be helped and assisted in his negociations with captain Landenberg, and pointed out the districts and places wherein the muster of the infantry as well as of the cavalry might be passed to the King's greater advantage, without stopping to consider the damage which Our subjects might receive through it. As, however, We intend to send soon [to England] some personage of Our Court to visit him and more amply inform him of all occurrences We shall make an end to this Our letter and refer you to Our next.—Spire, 12 April 1544.

French. Original draft.

12 April. **65.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—On the 5th inst. Your Majesty's letter of the 1st came to hand at the same time as His Imperial Majesty's of the 18th ult., endorsing the draft (*minute*) abstract of proceedings and other documents referred to in the same. As the King (the message said) was still convalescent, and had not sufficiently recovered from his last illness to attend to business, he would not give me the trouble of going to Greenwich, conferring with his ministers, and declaring to them the news I had to communicate, as well as the particular charge I had from Your Majesty; he was pleased, on the contrary, to send two of his councillors to me that I might tell them what my charge was.† The two councillors came, and I, in the first place, demonstrated to them the great damage and loss that His Imperial Majesty's subjects in Flanders and in the Low Countries would have to sustain from so sudden a declaration against the Scots; and yet (I said) the Emperor, wishing, as he does, to keep and observe the treaty of closer friendship and alliance lately made, is willing to issue the said declaration against Scotland, provided the whole affair was conducted in a fair and honest way. Since the King hesitates and asks for delay in the matter of the duke of Holstein, alleging as an excuse that he

* "Deux mille florins" says the deciphering, but in another copy of the same letter, "dix mille."

† "Et pour non estre le roy bien restauré de sa maladie, ni en disposition pour entendre au negoce, il ne voulu[t] me travailler d'aller en Court vers ses ministres pour leur declairer les nouvelles et charge que avoye, ains luy plust envoyer par devers moy deux de son Conseil, etc."

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was once on good terms with him, and wishes to save his subjects from the losses they might sustain in their trade in case of war, it is natural and reasonable that the Emperor have the very same facilities, not only because the late king of Scotland (James V.) was a Knight Companion of the Golden Fleece, the Emperor's Order, but because the people of the Low Countries have always lived at peace with the Scots, have been their friends and confederates, and, since the confirmation three or four years ago of the commercial treaties, carried on trade with them.

"With regard to the indemnity to the English merchants for their losses (said I to the privy councillors), the Emperor has certainly as much, if not greater, solicitude for his subjects of the Low Countries than the king of England can show for his men, inasmuch as the former had during the last few years wonderfully helped him with their substance, notwithstanding that they had suffered immense losses through the last wars; also because English subjects,* whatever the King might say of them, would never dare raise their voices or utter complaints in an affair of that sort, whilst those of the Low Countries, being more free-spoken, the least trifle likely to cause them loss or annoyance, might set them up against their lord and master, and perhaps, too, make them show their discontent by refusing to grant supplies. Besides which (said I), if the arrest of Scotch vessels and their crews has already commenced in the ports of Flanders and the Low Countries, there is no fear at all of the Scots going thither in future for the purposes of trade as long as the interdiction lasts. On the other hand, if the declaration is meant to intimidate the Scots, that will be more easily obtained by the Emperor sending to them a herald or king-at-arms, as I have already proposed, than by making that declaration in the Low Countries, which declaration after all very few people in Scotland will get cognizance of."

To the above reasoning of mine the privy councillors had nothing to reply, and therefore, after a little more conversation on other subjects, the King's deputies, perceiving that they could not convince me, took leave and went away, promising to make their report to the King and let me know his resolution as to that as well as to the eleven thousand (*unze mille*) horse they want from the Low Countries, and the quality and size of the vessels to be armed and fitted out in compliance with the treaty.

Yesterday [the 11th] the King sent for me that we might talk over the three points, and chiefly to give me notice of what Your Majesty will see by the duplicate of my despatch to the Emperor. After a long conversation with him the King referred me to his Privy Council, where (he said) I

* "Et aussi pour cause que les subjects de par deça (quoique feist le dit s^r roy en cest endroit) né seroient si osez ni si hardiz den faire querelle, ni en dire la moindre parollè du monde, ce que n'estoit de par de là ou ilz parlent plus librement."

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would get an answer. Once there I found the privy councillors as obstinate as ever respecting the first point in the declaration against the Scots, repeating to me the very same arguments used on a former occasion, and being a long time before they agreed as to the hour and time at which the King their master would consent to make his declaration against the Duke. After much talking and wrangling they consented to have it ready one month after His Imperial Majesty had issued his against the Scots—an affidavit of the acts of hostility committed by the Duke, and another to prove that the declaration against the Scots had taken place and been publicly proclaimed in the principal towns of Flanders and the Low Countries. Even this they granted with reluctance, wishing to consult first the King their master, who was then in his chamber, as they actually did. The King's answer was that he would make no other promise in the matter, save that one month after the Emperor's declaration he would do what he was obliged by the treaty to do,* and that I (Chapuys) was to write home and procure that the Emperor sent him the said declaration properly attested and in due form; also an authentic affidavit of the hostilities committed by the Duke, as he himself had promised to do with regard to the Scots.

My answer to the privy councillors was short and sharp enough.† I told them that their demand was unfounded and unreasonable; the circumstances of each case differed much. As I had already told them, the King's declaration against the Duke ought to precede that which they want the Emperor to issue against the Scots, inasmuch as the hostilities of the latter were comparatively recent, whereas the Emperor's enmity to the Duke was of long standing; besides which, long before the King thought of the Scots, the wrongs of the first duke of Holstein‡ against the Emperor had become manifest and notorious. The Danes had often boasted that he would some day make war to England, and conquer this kingdom which he pretends belongs to him by right, and that some years ago, as the King himself had told me, he had actually made warlike preparations to carry out his designs – all reasons why the king of England ought to have no regard or consideration for the said Duke. As to the indemnity of his own subjects trading with Denmark, I did not hesitate to say that the Easterlings residing in England would willingly purchase and pay for all the goods and merchandize the English might have in Denmark, and even recover the money, if any, owing to them there. I went

* "Le quel envoya dire resoloument qu'il ne vouloit faire aultre promesse sinon qu'apres la dite declaration de sa ma^te^ il feroit ce à quoy il estoit obligé par le dit traicté."

† "A quoy leur respondis assez courtement et brusquement."

‡ That is Frederick I., who in 1523 dethroned Christian II., King of Denmark and Sweden, married to Isabella, the Emperor's sister. Frederick died in 1533, and was succeeded by his son, Christian III.

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still further on with my argument. I told these privy councillors that I saw no way or means of doing good in that affair, since on the 3rd of March last the King their master had sent me a message to say, by two members of his Privy Council, that there would be no difficulty in his declaring against the duke of Holstein after His Imperial Majesty had declared against the Scots. "Am I now (said I) to write to the Emperor that all these assurances on the part of your master meant nothing at all, and that I am now refused what I was offered a few weeks ago without asking for it?" Hearing these words of mine, the Privy Council sent to the King one of its members, my lord Wyrothesley (lord Wriothesley) and the secretary (Paget), the former of whom returned soon after with the following answer:—"The King, Our master, owns having said something of the kind to the Imperial ambassador; but as the Emperor's declaration against the Scots, worded exactly as he wanted it to be,* was not forthcoming, and, moreover, the Emperor's ministers are now suggesting dilatory expedients of all kinds to avoid it, he thinks that he can honestly and fairly withdraw his promise. To show, however, that he is a man of his word, and wishes to proceed in the matter frankly and sincerely, he now promises to issue the declaration against the Duke six weeks after the Emperor has issued his against the Scots. As soon as he (the King) is informed by authentic letters and documents emanating from the Emperor himself, not from Flanders or the Low Countries, that the declaration against the Scots has been publicly made, and that at the same time authentic proofs are given of the hostilities committed by the Duke in that country, the king of England's declaration against Denmark shall not be wanting."

In this manner was the affair settled, though not without my intimating to the privy councillors that I was not specially empowered to accept the King's proposal, but had no doubt that His Imperial Majesty would condescend to do so. I, therefore, promised them that next day I would take to them the minute of the declaration, which Your Majesty did send me the other day, giving them to understand that if they found any fault or deficiency in it, I was ready to amend or supply it, and draw out a fresh one. It will be enough, therefore, that the affidavit (certification) come here in the same form as that which this King has sent to His Imperial Majesty.

I cannot omit to say that during the discussion with the privy councillors some of the latter tried to introduce His Holiness' personality, asserting to have positive news from various parts [of Italy] that he (Pope Paul) had actually raised and paid for a body of 4,000 Italian infantry to aid king Francis against England, and that if he did so, the Emperor, in

* Alluding no doubt to the draft sent by queen Mary to Chapuys. *See* above, p. 85.

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a like manner, according to the letter of the treaty, would be obliged to declare the Pope his enemy. My answer to the councillors was that the news of His Holiness being about to arm in favour of king Francis and against England was a mere hoax (*mocquerie*); to suppose that pope Paul, fond as he is of his money, would disburse one single farthing of it in favour of king Francis was entirely out of the question.* The news (I said) must proceed from Venice, a city celebrated for its lying reports (*bourdes*). The King's councillors retorted: "Will you not attach faith to letters written by one of the Pope's secretaries to worthy personages (*bons personaiges*) at the Court of France, and near the King's person?" "Not I," was my reply, "for I believe and maintain that about His Holiness' person there are secretaries and other officials quite capable of spreading such news, either for their own particular interest or from mere conjecture. As to king Francis and his courtiers, I would attach no faith at all to them, for as you (the councillors) know by experience, the French never kept their word, and that there is not a drop or spark of truth (*une goutte ou scintelle de verité*) in them. You (the councillors) know the manners and customs of the French too well to be deceived by their words, since, as is notorious, they never did scruple, in times of difficulty and pressure, to spread false reports and lies to make the World believe that they have intelligences in many countries, indeed almost everywhere. It is just the contrary now, as can be proved by the letters of the Imperial ambassador at Rome, and of many others [in Italy], and, if necessary, by His Holiness' own assertion and that of his ministers. Even if it were true that pope Paul had promised king Francis some sort of aid, it would only be in consideration of, and with regard to, Scotland, not on any other account: a point on which His Imperial Majesty has afforded more than sufficient satisfaction by his open declaration against the people of that country."

Respecting the number of horses that Your Majesty has offered for the artillery and carriage of ammunition and so forth of the English army, I must say that both the King and his ministers are scandalized at the very small offers made, positively declaring that it will be quite impossible for them to join in the future undertaking against France unless they are previously furnished with the number required, or nearly so; and that if their army is to cross the Channel and operate against the French, it must needs have a sufficient number of waggons and draft-horses to carry their heavy baggage, ammunition, victuals and so forth. That when the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga) came to

* "Et leur disant que ce estoit tout mocquerie que sa Sté. voulsist employer un seul denier pour telles affaires selon quil est avaricieux, et aussi pour plusieurs aultres respectz."

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London they (the English) were persuaded at his request to almost double the number of men stipulated by the first treaty, and that, hoping to be furnished with everything he wanted, the King had considerably increased his forces, whereas he now found himself disappointed, and would be obliged to reduce his army to the number of men stipulated in the treaty of closer alliance, since the number of waggons and draft-horses offered was quite insufficient for their wants. This last sentence the privy councillors repeated more than once, all the time asserting that they would be obliged to give up entirely the idea of invading France, which they regretted the more that all the money spent in military preparations and armaments—on a by far greater scale than had ever been made in England—would be literally thrown away. "If so" (said the councillors to me), "the fault will not be ours but yours." They went still further with their argument, telling me that they had in their possession a descriptive account of all the parishes in Flanders, Brabant, Hainaut and Artois, and that they were so numerous that if each of them would only furnish one waggon and a couple of draft-horses, four times the number required would be found, and that if Your Majesty wanted horses for the Emperor's army they could easily be procured in Germany; and after my replying to their argument with the one Your Majesty was pleased to use, I added that in that part of Germany, where the Emperor now is, it was difficult to procure horses, owing, in the first place, to the French having of late years exported a good many through Lorraine, and, secondly, because the river Ryn (Rhine) being navigable in all seasons, the peasants of the districts adjoining it did not pay much attention to horse-breeding, and consequently had few horses fit for draft (*chevaulx de charroi*). Even if horses were plentiful there it would be difficult to procure them, for no order, authority, or command would avail there as in the Low Countries, to induce the peasants to part with their horses except at a very high price. I ended by telling them that owing to my inexperience in that line I could not possibly advise them as to the best manner of procuring draft-horses, nor point out the localities where they most abounded; I only pointed out to them some of the means that Your Majesty was pleased to suggest, namely, that this King should send commissaries to Flanders and to the Low Countries, who, in union with those of Your Majesty, might travel through the countries under Your government and take note of the waggons and draft-horses (*chevaulx de charroy*) that can be obtained. It will likewise be the duty of the English commissaries to point out the number, class, size, and tonnage of the ships or hulks (*navires ou hulcs*) required for the passage of the English army. I hear that about two hundred will be wanted, and that the English commissaries, when appointed, will have charge of choosing

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and selecting the ships and hulks (*navires et hulcs*) that are to be sent to Suffolk, Norfolk, Quin (Kent) and other counties, which suggestion the privy councillors found good and most convenient.* They also desire and request that Your Majesty give orders that the waggons and draft-horses offered be at Calais or at the place of their destination on the very day fixed by the commissaries, so that when landed the men may not be idle, and consume their provisions and ammunition to no purpose.

As to the quality of the ships (*navires*) to be fitted out for sea service according to one of the articles of the treaty, these privy councillors and the King himself think that at least one-third ought to be of 300 tons burden, and the remainder no less than eighty tons each. Please Your Majesty to have them equipped and fitted out so that the whole of the fleet may be ready for the 18th of May at the latest to be in the Calais Strait.

With regard to the safe-conducts and the patents granted them, the privy councillors have assured me that I shall receive them this very day in due form. They have also promised me that Monsr. de Buren would be furnished with a supply of money to pay the men under his command; he (the King) had written to his commissaries to that effect, so that the said Monsr. de Buren will have reason to be satisfied.

I forgot to say that these people do not seem to care much for the arrest (*arrestement*) of Scotchmen over the way (*de par de là*), alleging that they have as many facilities as they had before for bartering and negociating, and are free and at liberty to do so. The King's ministers will not take into account the arrest of Scotch merchant vessels as long as their owners are allowed to sell their merchandise, and, perhaps, to transfer their property and goods to French merchants.†

Already, before the receipt of Your Majesty's letter, perceiving that after the departure of those who have left for Scotland this King's privy councillors did not show any particular desire for the preconcerted invasion of French territory, I ventured to ask one of them what might be the cause of the coldness and indifference which I observed, and how it was that those, who left this country for Flanders, had there spread the rumour that no military preparations of any sort were going on here, in England, at which the people of those Low Countries wondered much.

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* "Aux cartier[s] de Suffocq, Norfocq, Quin (*sic*) et aultres ce que leur sembla tres bon et convenable."

† "Que ceulx Escossois ont aultant de commodité de contracter et negocier illec que par avant veu quilz [s]ont en toute liberté. Et ne veuillent prendre en payement que ores quilz ne negocient à leur plaisir, que ce n'est riens, seullement quilz n'ayent faculté de transporter leurs biens quilz ont de par de là."

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I told him further that it seemed to me that if the Scots were, as they said, divided, and without a King, and there was, therefore, no fear of their invading England, the King, their master, might well have avoided the expense of so large a force as that which he had lately sent thither. Even supposing, as it is natural to suppose, that after the Scotch expedition the King intends the army returning to England to be employed against France, it might well happen that bad weather and contrary winds delayed the Royal fleet at sea, or else that the defence made by the Scots should prove stouter and longer than is anticipated, all causes which might retard beyond measure, if not impede altogether, the undertaking against France.

The privy councillor's answer was that I had no idea of the military preparations his master had been making for the invasion of France, nor of the activity and haste with which every one of the King's ministers and officers of his Royal army proceeded in the discharge and fulfilment of what they considered to be their respective duties. Every man was at his post ready to join the moment he received orders, and the transports from the Low Countries hove in sight. As to the army in Scotland the King did not intend to employ it in France, although if they had done their work by the time the rest of his army crossed over they might, and would most certainly, join in the invasion of French territory as a supplementary force. The very same assurances were given by two personages the King sent lately to me, and also by all the privy councillors whom I consulted on the subject. But, nevertheless, I see no appearance of their being able to achieve what they have in hand as quickly as they calculate, for the fleet, owing to contrary winds and rough weather, has not yet made much progress, and, besides that, I doubt whether the English have in Scotland the intelligences and large party of adherents of which they speak.

This is what the King told me on the subject as well as the two privy councillors who came to this embassy with his message. Indeed, all well-informed courtiers express the same sentiments and opinions about Scotland and the Scots; and yet I very much doubt their having in that country the intelligences and party they boast of, so much so, that the other day in the Privy Council, whilst I was there transacting business for the Emperor, after their reading a despatch of the earl of Hertford, commander-in-chief of the Royal army in Scotland, the councillors in my presence gave visible signs of displeasure and sorrow, and remained sometime thoughtful.* As to the English army on the Borders,

* "Et doubte que ceulx-cy n'ayent poinct toutes les intelligences quilz vouldroient bien avoir au dit cartier, ce que m'a meu (mû) à dire pour aultant que les dits du Conseil, apres avoir leu une lettre que le comte Darford (qui est chief au cartier du Nord) escripvoit au dit s^r roy, ilz se monstrerent tres tous malcontents et pensifz."

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whatever the English ambassador residing with Your Majesty may say about it, there is no infantry at all, or very little with it, but only cavalry, and that by no means numerous. The earl of Lennox,* who, as I wrote lately, had actually started for the Borders there to treat with the king of England's deputies, has been obliged to return home in haste to defend a castle of his called Dumbarton, which the governor of Scotland (Arran) and other noblemen of his party were about to besiege, and in his stead send commissioners or deputies of their own to negociate the treaty with England, to which I have alluded.† Of whatever else may happen under the new aspect of the Scotch question I shall not fail to apprize Your Majesty.

With regard to the money proceeding from the sale of the salt herrings, about which Your Majesty has been pleased to write to me, I have from the privy councillors the promise that the owners of the cargoes will be fully indemnified without asking them for a security.—London, 12 April 1544.

P.S.—This despatch was written on Friday last. Thinking that the King, according to promise, would let me know in a day or two what his resolution in these matters is, I purposely left it open for two consecutive days. Finding, however, that no message has come from the Privy Council, I have not considered it necessary to wait any longer, especially as the King may by this time have written to Your Majesty on the subject.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 7 *pp.*

12 April. **66.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—In answer to your dispatch of the 16th ult., and also to your letters to the Sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*) of the same day, the 29th of March and 4th inst., the whole of which have been duly received, We have nothing particular to say except that We are very thankful for the good service you are doing Us in the fulfilment of your charge, and the care you take in advising news. We request you to continue as hitherto to inform Us most minutely of every event that occurs there, for you understand very well of what importance it is for Us under present circumstances, and in view of the undertaking that We are meditating, to be acquainted with political and other events in that country.

This present courier is despatched for the express purpose of informing you that the ambassador resident of the king of

* "Le comte de Lennox, le quel, comme jescripvis dernierement à vre. mate, se debvoit retrouver aux frontieres pour traicter avec les commis du dit sieur roy, a esté constraint d'aller deffendre une sienne bonne place appelée Dunbarton, que le gouverneur et aultres de sa partialité vouloient assieger, et en son lieu envoyer commis et deputez pour entendre au dit traicté."

† That of August 1543, which after being approved of by the Scotch Parliament was not ratified. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 456.

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England did some days ago urgently request the Sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*), in his master's name (as he said) to point out and recommend to him some good captain or other, capable of levying and enlisting for his Royal service 1,000 German horse, over and above those that Landenberg has contracted to levy for him; at the same time asking what price We were in the habit of paying for each horseman thus retained, in order to decide and make the necessary arrangements, &c. To this request and question of the English ambassador, after long thought, no one seemed to Us so convenient and suitable as captain Sequingan,* who out of consideration for Our person and service has, after many excuses, accepted the commission of raising for the king of England the above-mentioned number of horse, and although We Ourselves had some idea of utilising his services—the said captain being a man of great experience in warfare, and who enjoys much credit in that line—We have no objection to pass him over to Our brother and ally the king of England. But when the captain was asked what were his terms, he stated that his contracting price was so much per each mounted man, but that he must have the security of German bankers like the Fockers (Fuggers), the Welzers, and others, for the payment of the said horse as long as they are in the King's service † according to contract. This conditional bargain the English ambassador expressly refused to accept, alleging that he had no charge from his master to that effect; and although he was told that We Ourselves in treating with other German captains were in the habit of signing certain documents and obligations to that effect, and appending Our Imperial seals to them—a sort of security which contractors and captains very often have considered insufficient, notwithstanding their having been frequently in Our pay, their having greater facilities to treat with Us, and above all, in case of non-payment, being entitled to seize the persons and requisition the property of Our subjects—the English ambassador persisted in his refusal, saying that he could do nothing of the sort without first consulting his master.‡

Upon which, and perceiving that if the retention (*retinue*) of the men were further delayed it would be almost im-

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* Sickinghen (?), though his name will be found to be variously written Seiquinguen, Sequiguen, and Sectquinghen.

† "Sur quoy apres y avoir beaucoup pensé, n'avons trouvé personne plus convenable que le capitaine Sequingen, le quel en nostre consideration, et non sans plusieurs excuses, en a accepté la charge, voire et nonobstant que l'eussions deliberé de nous en servir, pour estre personnaige bien entendu au fait de la guerre, et de bon credit. Mais quand on est venu à traicter, et quil a persisté d'estre assheuré de marchans en ceste Germanie, comme des Fouckers. Welzers et aultres compagnies d'allemans et marchans de credit, du payement et solde des ditz gens de cheval pour le temps qu'ilz serviront selon la retinue."

‡ "Combien que l'on luy ait remonstré que à nous mesmes les aultres capitaines nous ont demandé les dictes assheurances, et nous [a] fallu bailler nos lectres signees et sçelees, des quelles à difficulté se veuillent ilz contenter, nonobstant qu'ilz soient esté souvent à nos gaiges, et que leur soyons de plus facile convention, et mesme pour l'arrest de nos subjectz s'il y avoit faulte."

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possible afterwards to procure them that the enterprise against France might be seriously inconvenienced thereby, and that, however urgent Our request, captain Seckingen would refuse to raise the 1,000 horse without the required security for the payment, and have them armed and ready to pass muster by the end of May next, We have finally settled with captain Seckingen that the King will give him the security he asks for within the month of May, or the two or three first days of June at the latest, and that should the King fail in sending the said security within that fixed space of time the captain will be entitled to leave at once the King's service, and retain and keep the 2,000 florins * that the English ambassador has paid him in advance, without being obliged to serve any longer.†

As it is for many reasons requisite that the King give the security asked for within the specified space of time, We despatch this express messenger, that you may at once set about persuading the King to approve what has been done and contracted in his name and in the presence of his own ambassador. You will explain the whole matter to the King, in order that his ambassador may afterwards discuss the matter with captain Landenberg, and agree with him as to the most commodious places for the foot and horse to pass muster for the King's service, without considering the loss and damage which Our subjects may have to sustain through the temporary stay of the men at the said places.

As We intend shortly to send expressly a personage of this Our court to visit the King in Our name and inform him of Our movements, We shall not say more for the present.—Spire, the 12th of April 1544.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

13 April. **67.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl.

Sends Monsg^nr de Chantonnay, gentleman of his Chamber,‡ to visit him and enquire about his health, also to communicate

* "Deux mille florins," says the deciphering, but a marginal note in a different hand has "*dix mille.*"

† "Quoy voyant et que s'il y avoit plus de delay quelconque à faire la dicte retinue pour le dit sieur roy d'angleterre, il seroit impossible de recouvrer plus les dits mille chevaux pour s'en servir en l'emprinse, et que encores apres toutes instances faictes en traictant dois mainctenant lon na peu induyre le dit capitaine Sechingen à pouvoir assheurer les ditz gens de cheval, et les rendre prestz à faire monstre jusques au dernier de May, nous [uous] sommes enfin faict fort et promis au dict Sechingen que le dict sieur roy baillera la dicte assheurance en dedans la fin de ce mois, ou dedans deux ou trois jours du prochain au plus tard, et en cas qu'il ne le face les deux mille florins que le dit ambassadeur luy a faict delivrer sur la dite retinue luy demeureront sans qu'il soit tenu plus avant servir."

‡ "Gentil-hombre de la Boca" are the words used, Gentleman of the *Valletus pro Ore Regis.* His name was Thomas Perrenot sieur de Chantonnay, second son of Nicholas sieur de Granvelle, the Emperor's Lord Privy Seal (*Guarda Sellos*) and his principal minister till his death in 15—. Thomas had in the year before been employed by the Emperor in various missions to the Pope at Rome and to king Henry in England. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. xix.–xx.

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with him respecting certain affairs of his and ask his opinion. The King may attach faith to whatever Chantonnay tells him, as if the Emperor himself were speaking to him.—13 April 1544.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

13 April. **68.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 17th ult., concerning the affair of the declaration against Scotland, came duly to hand on the 5th inst. As my orders were to follow in every respect the instructions and commands of the Queen Regent, whom I had already consulted, receiving from her most ample information on the subject, I have prosecuted the negociation, though I must confess that all my efforts have been vain, as Your Majesty will see by the duplicate of my letters to the said Queen.* In short, all I have been able to obtain from these privy councillors is contained in the duplicate of that letter, and yet in many respects and for considerations which will be explained hereafter, and Your Majesty, I am sure, will know best how to appreciate, I have accepted the Privy Council's views in that affair.

Yesterday the King sent for me, and when in his presence, after many preliminary assurances of his wish to proceed uprightly and sincerely with Your Majesty in all matters, as the close alliance and brotherly friendship between him and you require, he said to me that it was not his intention to conceal anything from Your Majesty, nor take steps without first communicating with you or your ministers; and, therefore, that he informed me that I might apprize Your Majesty of the fact that a Frenchman named Saint Martin, inhabiting a place close to the Calais frontier, had some time before entered into communication with and made overtures of peace between him and the king of France to an inhabitant of that town called Master Halles,† and that the latter, suspecting that the Frenchman's overtures were mere sham and only an invention of his for his own private ends, had refused to listen to Saint Martin unless he produced proofs of his authority to treat of such matters, whereupon Monsr. de Saint Martin had brought and exhibited to him [Halles] an affidavit (*certification*) in due form under the signature and seal of the Sieur du Biez, governor of Boulogne, the purport of which was, in substance, that whatever Saint Martin had said proceeded from the wish, with the knowledge, and by the commands of the King, his master, who, as the document in question stated, could not persuade himself that so close and intimate a friendship as had existed between the king of England and himself could possibly be

* That of the 14th of March (No. 54, pp. 81, 82, and that of the 30th of the same month No. 55, pp. 82, 83).

† "Maistre Hars," says the original, but his name seems to have been *Halle* or *Halles*.

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broken asunder at a moment's notice. And that, if the king of England consented and agreed to it, he (Francis) would send ambassadors furnished with full powers to treat with him of the means and ways of fostering and strengthening that friendship. That is (I am told) the substance of the paper signed by Biez which Saint Martin placed in the hands of Master Halles, as Your Majesty will be able to judge by the copy which this King has sent to his ambassador to exhibit there [at Spires].

After hearing the above from the King's lips, and having first made use of the prefatory compliments on such occasions,* I begged the King to tell me what he intended doing in the case. He said that he had not yet consulted his Privy Council about it; he would do so that very day, and after that declare his intention. Upon which, and after many protestations on my part, I (Chapuys) told him that in my own private opinion the answer to be given to French overtures, if any were sent to him, ought to be similar in context to that which Your Imperial Majesty had on a previous occasion returned to cardinal Farnese, namely, that before entering into negociations for peace it was quite indispensable that the French paid down the money they owe him, and restored, besides, the property usurped from Mons. de Savoie and any other since the beginning of the war. That (I said) had been Your Majesty's answer to the Legate, and such, I thought, ought to be his. I added, moreover, that I was very much astonished at his placing reliance in Monsr. de Saint Martin's letters and proposals, which, after all, were positively cold and unmeaning, and contained no overtures of any kind, and that he knew too well the stratagems of the French, whose only wish and aim was to sow jealousy and mistrust between Your Majesty and him, as I had already on a previous occasion warned him in Your Majesty's name. Then the King said to me that, as far as his own information went, he believed that the French would willingly make over to him the duchy of Guienne, and that, in his opinion, the mere act of giving audience to French ambassadors was not in any way a contravention to the articles of the treaty of alliance, especially if he did, as he fully intended, with the intervention and in the presence, as it were, of Your Majesty's ministers hear what they had to say. Nor would there be anything said or done without Your Majesty being fully apprized of it and consenting to it. Your Majesty (continued the King) had given audience to cardinal Fernez (Farnese), to the duke of Lorraine, and to a gentleman whom the queen of France (Elinor) had sent to Flanders after the cardinal's departure therefrom. To this last argument of the King's I replied, "Had there been any fear of king Francis, in despair of obtaining peace,

* "Ayant le tout ouy, et usé des compliments que me semblerent necessaires, etc."

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applying elsewhere* for friendly intelligence and help—more prejudicial and dangerous, perhaps, than those he has hitherto procured—I do not pretend to say that to grant audience to his ambassadors would be contrary to reason; no, what I mean is that as such embassies are merely for the purpose of destroying and catching you asleep—they ought not to be received. As king Francis is now almost at his wits' end, does not know which way to turn, and has already exhausted all his malice in vain,† I candidly confess that I cannot see how and in what way the arrival here and reception of French ambassadors can be profitable to the allies; it will, on the contrary, encourage the French, and make them suspect that the good understanding between the Emperor and this King is not so firm and solid as it really is,‡ and give them occasion and opportunity to invent and dream of many things so as to introduce jealousy and discord into the heart of his enemies. Against the voice of such syrens we ought to shut our ears; for, as the French proverb says, "Woman who listens and fortress that parleys, half surrenders."§ That it was needful to avoid not only the evil but also the suspicion of it, and respecting the audience to the Cardinal that Your Majesty could not well refuse it on the above-mentioned considerations, the more so that he did not come from, nor was sent by, the king of France, but merely of his own accord, just as the duke of Lorraine, who many a time affirmed, protested and swore that he was not sent by King Francis, but went to Your Majesty of his own free will and moved by his desire of peace, and that Your Majesty, in order to be quit of the Duke, had hastened your departure from Valenciennes without allowing the Duke to return home through France. That all this had been said, related and declared to his (the King's) ambassador at the time, and that he ought to recollect that when I myself talked to him of the affair, I distinctly told him that Your Majesty, before starting for the Diet of Speir (Spires), had signified to the duchess of Bart (Bar)‖ that if her intention was to go to that town for the purpose of bringing forward overtures of peace, she had better remain at home (*demeurer à lhostel*).

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* Evidently meaning to the Pope.

† "Mais pour quil estoit au bout de son sens, et avoit experimenté son extreme malice."

‡ "Sinon donner cueur aux dits françois qui surprenneroient l'intelligence entre vre. mate et luy, et leur sera (fera?) ministrer occasion de inventer et sconer (semer?) beaucoup de choses pour mestre quelque zizanie (*sic*) et scrupule entre vre. mate et luy."

§ "Femme qui out (ouyt) et forteresse qui parle est á demy rendue."

‖ "Que vre. mate avoit signifié à la duchesse de Bart (Bar?) avant de partir pour Flandre." That is Christina of Denmark, the Emperor's niece, and widow of Francesco Sforza, the last duke of Milan. After the death of her husband she married François de Lorraine, marquis de Pont à Mousson and duke of Bar (Bar le Duc en Lorraine). Christina had during her widowhood, which lasted six years, from 1535 to 1541, used the title of duchess of Bari in Naples, which explains why in this despatch and others *Bar*, *Bari* and *Bart* are erroneously made synonymous."

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As to the gentleman whom the queen of France (Elinor) had, as he said, sent to the Queen, Your sister, his mission was no other than to take to Flanders certain birds, and hear what sort of answer the Cardinal had received at his departure, and that upon the queen of Hungary being asked that question she had refused to answer until she, herself, knew Your Majesty's pleasure in that affair, owing to which the aforesaid gentleman had to wait some time at Court, and after all go away with an answer conceived in general terms like that made to the Cardinal. "This," I said, "the Queen Regent herself had positively declared to his (the King's) ambassador at Brussels, who, perhaps, forgot to mention it in his despatches, *or else the King, himself, feigned ignorance, though his privy councillors do not deny the fact of my having informed them of it." With regard to the offer of Guyennes, which the King said had been made to him, I really believed that even taking for granted that the French wished to give that province over to him (which I do not think possible), I considered him too wise a prince to accept of such a gift as long as the king of France remained as powerful as he is at present without his wings being clipt, for that would entail upon himself considerable expense, and at the end of it all he would not be able to retain possession of that province. In short, that if he wished for a lasting and honourable peace, that could only be obtained sword in hand* (lespee au poing), *and in the midst of the enemy's country; he then would find the French speaking with greater courtesy and in more reasonable terms.*

Such was the pith of my conversation with the King, who ended by saying that he had not yet consulted his privy council, nor made up his mind, and that this very day, or to-morrow at the latest, I should have his resolution in the matter.

After this the King said to me that, respecting other affairs which I had lately declared to the two privy councillors, whom he had sent owing to his not feeling quite well at the time, he intended to approve and ratify whatever decision his council might ultimately advise, and yet that he could not help declaring to me that in many things very little regard was paid on that side of the Channel to the treaty existing between Your Majesty and him, and especially in what concerns the declaration against the Scotch, the provision of horses which he wanted for his army, and that he considered that an ungrateful behaviour on the part of his allies, considering the very great expense he had to undergo last year.

The King manifested very great joy at hearing that His Most Serene Highness, the prince of Spain (Philip), had written announcing his marriage, and at the same time sending to him his most affectionate commendations, and graciously

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offering to please and be agreeable to him in every way possible, as the friendship between him and his own father demanded, on hearing which the King, putting his hand to his cap, expressed his most gracious thanks for the complimentary message, and begged me to write to this effect by the very first opportunity.

After some conversation on this and other subjects, the King began to speak about the duke of Alburquerque, whom he praised as highly as possible, declaring, among other things, that he had never known, seen or heard of a personage whose condition and manners pleased him more. All the English officers who had met him at Landresis were of the same opinion, and made him wish to see the Duke. Now that he had seen and known him he could judge for himself, and was extremely desirous to retain him with him near his person for his next expedition across the Channel. He himself had lately written to Your Majesty on the subject, but he would again repeat this request, and beg me write again expressing that wish of his, adding that I should do him the greatest possible pleasure were I to recommend his suit and press Your Majesty do order and command the said Duke to go with him to the French expedition, and at the same time I was requested to certify that the King considered the Duke's services on the occasion as valuable to him as if he had been an Englishman and a commander in his own army. I was likewise requested to advise and persuade the Duke—who, by-the-way, is thinking of going back to Spain by sea—not to quit England until he hears of Your Majesty's pleasure in a matter so important, as the King says, for Your Majesty's and his own service. I myself have spoken to the Duke on the subject, and made him the representations that I considered needful, and his answer has been *that for many reasons he would not give a farthing for all the offers this King might make him, but that if Your Majesty thought that he could be of service here he would remain. In short, that if such was Your Majesty's express wish he will obey orders, and devote his person and property to the cause.**

Now, if I am asked to state my opinion in this matter I will say, under due and humble correction, that the Duke's acceptance of service under the King (should such be your Majesty's pleasure), might be wonderfully beneficial in the undertaking against France, for having, as he has, the King's favour, and enjoying much credit among the English, he might, if appointed, be of great use to the common cause by obviating delays, thwarting the enemy's practices, if renewed, and generally speaking any inconveniences that might arise, besides which he might be of great help and assistance to

* "Que pour tous les offres que luy sçauroit fere le dit sieur roy il n'en donroit (donneroit)| ung maravedis pour beaucoup de raisons, mais que si vre. ma^{te} se pouvoit estre servye de sa demeure et que icelle le luy fist entendre bien expressement, il ne deffauldroit d'y obeyr et y employer personne et biens."

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these people in military matters, for, as the English themselves own, they have few men experienced in warfare who know how to treat scientifically of such matters. Lastly, should this King by a sudden indisposition or some other accident, be prevented from attending the expedition in person, as there is reason to fear, he, the Duke, might help to dissuade the King, as I hear several of his courtiers have already tried to do, from personally crossing over, which in my opinion would be a great boon for his own army, and especially for those commanders who wish the Duke to accompany the King.†*

The reason why many of those who are about the King's person do not wish him to cross the Channel on this occasion is, among others, that they are afraid of his suddenly failing in health, and also that, if they have to take care of his person, all military operations will necessarily be delayed and the march of their army slackened through it; besides which the King's chronic disease and great obesity (gravité) *require particular care lest his life should be endangered. For my own part I think that for many reasons, which Your Majesty will be able to appreciate much better than myself, the King ought not to enter France in person. It would be enough for him to continue saying that he intends doing so, and even to cross the Channel, provided after his landing at Calais‡ he remain there, and does not go beyond that town.*

Please Your Majesty to let me know your pleasure and commands respecting the Duke's business§.—London, 13 April 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed: "To the Emperor."
Indorsed: From the ambassador in England of the 13th of April. Received the 21st of the said month, 1554. *French. Original.* 6 *pp.*

13–22 April. S. E. L. 806, ff. 85, 311.

69. EUSTACE CHAPUYS to PRINCE PHILIP.

"Muy alto y muy poderosisimo Señor,"—Your Highness' letter of the 4th of January was duly received. I must begin by humbly thanking Your Highness for the interest

* "Il pourra entre aultres choses obvier à toutes dilations et aux practiques que pourroient survenir, et pareillement à diverses inconveniens, oultre l'assistance quil pourroit fere á ceulx-ci en matiere de guerre qui ont peu de gens, comme ilz confessent, quen sçaichent gueres profondement en parler."

† "Et speciallement aux aultres principaulx quen ont charge que le dit duc soy trouve en sa compagnie."

‡ "Et aussi quilz presupposent que s'il soy (s'y) retrouve en personne tous les affaires seront plus tardifz, car il fauldra marcher beaucoup plus lentement pour la gravité et indisposition du dit sieur roy, et aussi avec plus graut soing et respect pour non le hazarder. Et croy quil ne seroit le pire pour beaucoup de respectz que vre. mate peult trop mieulx comprendre que (qui!) face (*sic*) continuer le bruit d'y aller, et quil passe jusqu'à Callayx."

§ See pp. 84, 108, Don Beltran II. de la Cueva.

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shown at my last indisposition, and at the same time expressing my deep regret at hearing that Your Highness' health has not been so good lately. I hope Your Highness will have recovered completely, and that God, to whom I have lately addressed my earnest prayers, will grant you a long life, as befits the prosperity and happiness of all your vassals and servants (*vassallos, criados y servidores*).

The most Serene Majesty of this King has been exceedingly pleased at hearing of Your Highness' felicitous marriage, and of the good will and affection which you bear him. He has earnestly requested me to return your commendations at the rate of one hundred for one, and to signify his reciprocal good will and affection, as well as his desire to be useful to Your Highness. The same offers and protestations of friendship have come from the Queen and from the Princess.

Though I presume that Your Highness will be acquainted with what has passed at the Emperor's Court since I last wrote, yet in obedience to Your Highness' commands I shall state in two words that the States of the Empire in general at the Diet of Spira (Speier) have unanimously granted and promised to His Imperial Majesty help and assistance against Francis and the Turk, which resolution, as I fancy, will be anything but agreeable and pleasing to that King.

On the other hand, the Bohemians and other patrimonial subjects of the most Serene King of the Romans, and those also among the Hungarians, who follow his party and are devoted to him, have made much greater grants of money to him than they ever did on former occasions for the sake of carrying on war against the Turks, so that there is every hope that, with the Emperor's help and assistance, king Ferdinand will now be able not only to resist the Turk most efficiently, but likewise recover part of the land which that Infidel conquered last year.

The people of Flanders and other countries bordering on the Emperor's dominions have agreed to tax themselves to the amount of 200,000 ducats for six months, to be paid by monthly instalments, and spent exclusively in wars against the French, who, as We here can plainly perceive, are now very much frightened and by no means so high-spirited as they were some time ago, having, as reported, asked the Pope's absolution for having treated with this most Serene King, whom they now call schismatic. Indeed, the King himself declared to me three days ago, on the 10th, that they have been, and are still, looking forward for every available means of procuring peace, though it must be owned that up to this present moment they have made no overtures nor proposals of any substance. For my part I have made all possible efforts to persuade the King not to admit to his presence nor give audience to the ambassadors whom king Francis proposes to send here. If he does I shall not fail to apprize Your Highness of whatever their errand may be.

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The chief motion which these Cortes or English Parliament have discussed and passed is that of making over to the King the money which his private subjects (*particulares*) lent him last year. Besides that, they have agreed to give him one-tenth of their property, which will amount to a very large sum of money. For the present I hear of no other motion of importance in these English Cortes; should one be made worth mentioning I shall not fail to inform Your Highness.

Of other news I can only say that the most Serene Majesty of this King, besides having sent a body of troops—both infantry and cavalry—to the borders of Scotland by land, has now fitted out a fleet of one hundred and fifty sails, which fleet is to take on board no less than 15 000 men, the most experienced and best soldiers that could possibly be enlisted. The fleet left the Thames on the 20th of March, but owing to contrary winds and to bad weather has not made much progress yet. It is, however, confidently expected that with a fair wind it will shortly reach the coast of Scotland, and that by means of that force on board the dissension between the Scotch and themselves will be put down, and that through the intelligences which the English have in that country, the King will be able to gain ground there, and make some sort of covenant, by means of which these two kingdoms of England and Scotland will in future live at peace with each other. May God guide matters as may best fit His service and the welfare of Christendom!

The news from Scotland is that the Patriarch of Aquileia (Grimani) had gone on board his fleet to return to France; but I suspect that when he hears of this King's fleet sailing thither he will not leave so soon, or trust now to safe-conduct and passport, any more than he did when this King offered him one to pass through here.* He (the Patriarch) has quite recently written a letter to this King, enclosing a very long discourse to persuade him to make peace with France, and likewise promising to make His Imperial Majesty and the king of France agree to it; but the Patriarch would have done much better had he forborne taking so much trouble in matters which he does not understand, and exposing himself to be laughed at by these courtiers, who are actually making fun of him for his foolish simplicity, and so forth.

Though the King is rather embarrassed just now, owing to the turn affairs are taking in Scotland, as above said, he is nevertheless as intent as ever he was in his purpose to carry on the war against France, in which war, should he himself be in health, he wishes above all things to be personally present.

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* "Se entiende que de aquella banda de Escocia el patriarca de Aquileya era enbarcado para pasar en francia; pero sospecho que si es avissado de la dicha armada deste Serenissimo Rey, que tardará un poco, y no se confiará mas de la dicha armada que se confió del salvo conducto y passapuerto que le havia otorgado el dicho Serenissimo Rey de passar por aqui."

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He loses no time or labour in providing the necessaries for his fleet (*armada*), which will be the strongest and most powerful that ever left the shores of England. May God keep him in that holy purpose (*santo proposito*), and give him bodily health so as to accomplish his purpose!

I believe Your Highness may some days ago have heard that the duke of Alburquerque (D. Beltran II. de la Cuera) left Court to go to Spain, and that he undertook his voyage thither touching first here in England, and landing in this city of London on the 24th of March. He has since been obliged by stress of weather and contrary winds to remain here until now, and I apprehend that he will have to make a still longer stay, for this King's most Serene Majesty has been more pleased with him than with any other Spanish grandee that he ever conversed with. The day before yesterday the King spoke to me so highly of him, and so praised his qualities and manner, that nothing could surpass it. I must add that all and every one of the lords and knights of this court who have had anything to do with him are likewise enchanted; so much so, that the King wishes very much to take him into his service, that he may accompany him in his projected expedition against France, and has hitherto used all manner of persuasions and prayers to induce him to remain in England and take service under him. The Duke has raised difficulties, excusing himself for his duties which call him back to Spain, besides many other considerations; but the King still insists, and has written to His Imperial Majesty by this post asking that he (the Duke) be allowed to remain and serve under his orders. Indeed, two days ago the King himself signified to me that he was on the point of despatching another messenger to the Emperor with the same request, praying me to use all my influence* with His Imperial Majesty and with Your Royal Highness to that effect. Whatever may be the result of this King's request in this particular, I shall not fail to inform Your Royal Highness thereof.

I cannot, however, omit one circumstance with regard to the Duke's reception at this Court, which in my opinion is both very flattering and significative. Whatever his personal merits may be—and certainly they are very great—it must be said that the Duke's reception and treatment at this English Court has been really extraordinary, and that no other foreign nobleman ever met with half the honour and hospitality that has been lavished upon him; for I can assure Your Royal Highness that for a long time back no prince or lord did land in England and meet with such a cordial and magnificent reception as the Duke has. In order to please the King, and yield, as it were, to his importunities, the Duke has visited no less than six or seven Royal manors or

* "Rogandome muy encargadamente (encarecidamente) de tener la mano en ello de toda mi poder."

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pleasure houses of the best in this country, where feasts and carousals have been ordered for his entertainment, exhibiting before his eyes the best part of the gorgeous furniture and silver plate belonging to the King, without mentioning the pastimes of chase and sport, and others arranged for him.

Within the last few days a covenant has been agreed upon stipulating that His Imperial Majesty, according to the last treaty of alliance, will declare the Scots to be his enemies, and that this King will afterwards do the same with regard to the duke of Holstaçia (Holstein), who has usurped the kingdom of Denmark, unless he (the Duke) enters first into an agreement with His Imperial Majesty, having, as it is reported, sent to Spire for that purpose an embassy, at the head of which is the count of Odenburgue (Oldenburg). There is every hope that the agreement will be made, and that the Palatine duke Frederik, not to be thwarted in the succession to his brother the Elector, who died a short time ago, especially in what concerns the electorship, will not be so difficult to deal with as he has been hitherto. Respecting the restoration of the duke of Brunswick to his estate, nothing is known yet. It is hoped that His Imperial Majesty will get everything he asks from the Germans.

No other news for the present.—London, 13 of April [1544.]

P.S.—This letter remained several days on my table,* waiting for a courier to send it on. Meanwhile, advices from Spires came announcing that His Imperial Majesty had obtained from the States of the Empire that the help of 24,000 foot and 4,000 horse, with which they had decided to contribute, should be commuted for money, which has been a highly advantageous and more profitable arrangement for His Imperial Majesty than if the Germans had furnished double the number of men; for in this manner the Emperor will get sufficient money to raise 16,000 men wherever he pleases, whilst the king of the Romans, his brother, will have 8,000 foot and 1,000 horse to fight the Turk.

The Palatine duke Frederik has been declared Elector. A few days ago he was publicly invested with that dignity at Spire with great solemnity, and in the presence of the Emperor, attended by a large number of German princes and lords.

His Imperial Majesty is to leave Spire on the 22nd, taking the road to Metz, in Lorraine. The ordnance and ammunition left for Flanders several days ago in that direction, whilst the prince of Orange, with seven battalions (*banderas*) of Germans, will follow in a couple of days.

The king of France, as far as we can hear, has no foreign soldiers with him, except 2,000 Italians who are scattered about the frontiers of his kingdom. Nor is there any rumour of levies being made in France; if there is, the news has not reached us. The King himself is now near Rouen, engaged

* That accounts for the letter being dated the 13th of April, whereas the P.S. is of the 22nd.

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in hunting and sporting. May God be pleased that he himself may be hunted down, as he was once at Pavia, as his bad practices and worse intentions so richly deserve.

His Imperial Majesty sent me a message on the 12th inst. that very shortly I should hear from him news of His Imperial person and of his plans. He was to send to that effect a gentleman of his Court. I am anxiously expecting his arrival, that I may write to Your Royal Highness.

Meanwhile, I will not close this despatch without adding that this King continues to prepare for the undertaking [against France]; he has ordered several handy ovens to bake bread that are to be put on wheel carts, and also several mills to grind the corn whilst the carts are in motion. The King's fleet (*armada de mer*) has not yet reached the coast of Scotland owing to adverse winds.

No other news; should there be any worth reporting, I shall not fail to acquaint Your Royal Highness with them.—Closed on the 22nd of April 1544.*

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Spanish. Original. 8 *pp.*

14 April. **70.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—This morning the King, after dispatching a courier to Your Majesty, sent two of his privy councillors to inform me of the answer which his man at Calais, named Master Hars,† to whom the French had addressed themselves with the overtures of which I yesterday wrote to Your Majesty,‡ is prepared to make in his name to the Sieur de Biez. The substance of which answer is to be as follows:—"That, as the king of France is in the habit of making overtures, nay promising, and taking engagements which he does not observe or fulfil, it is fit and convenient that in order to show his sincere desire for peace, he should beforehand desist from giving help and aid to the Scots, and should bring forward honourable and reasonable conditions for the acceptance of the Emperor and the King. And that, should the French delay to do so, they shall soon find him at Calais ready to meet them anyhow."§

The King has also sent me the duplicate of the very draft [of the paper] which I myself placed in the privy councillors' hands, with the addition of a short clause towards the end,

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* Chapuys' last despatches to Prince Philip are dated the 9th of November 1543 (Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 519–21), and 18th of January 1544 (No. 12, p. 15.) That accounts for Chapuys, in his general report of news, mentioning events both in England and Scotland between October 1543 and the end of April 1544. Grimani's landing at Leith took place in November, and Gonzaga's mission in December 1543.

† Master Halles, as above. *See* pp. 88, 104.

‡ See above, No. 68, p. 104. "M'a envoyé advertir par deux de son Conseil de la reponse que son homme de Calais, nommé m^e Hars, à qui les françois se sont addressés pour les practiques dont hier escripvis à vre. ma^te, doibt faire au s^r de Biez."

§ "Et que tardant à se resouldre les dits françois sur cela, ilz le trouveroient bientost en Calais pour fere tous expediens" (*sic*).

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and the omission of that which was agreed upon between Us, namely, that before the ratification of the convention a list of the safe-conducts granted by this King to the Scots should be submitted to Your Majesty's inspection.* I have told the privy councillors my mind about the clause, but they have not replied to my observations, save saying that they will report to the King. It is for the Emperor and for Your Majesty to decide on what is best and most convenient for your interest under the circumstances.

Having at present no leisure to write to the Emperor on this subject, and the privy councillors themselves seeming to be in great haste, I most humbly beg Your Majesty to tell me as soon as possible whether I am to approve of the proposed additional clause and the omission of the stipulated condition, that I may report to the Emperor the whole.†

I hear that the fleet (*armee*) that sailed for Scotland, and had separated at sea for the express purpose of encountering and capturing any Scotch vessels they might find, has met with rather bad weather (*a couru quelque peu de fortune*), and I am also told that count Douglas (the earl of Angus) and his brother (Sir George) have again revolted against this King, and joined the Cardinal's party. It has not been within my power to prevent this King's undertaking against Scotland, so that he might employ all his energy to remedy the evil by punishing the king of France, who is the chief cause of it, as well as of many other troubles in Christendom. —London, 14 April 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

17 April. **71.** INSTRUCTIONS for the SIEUR DE CHANTONNAY respecting his mission to England.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

You shall go as hastily as possible to the dowager queen of Hungary, Our sister, and communicate to her your present charge on the points specified hereafter, and after taking her advice on the whole, and adding to these Instructions any observation or remark of her's concerning Our service, shall cross over to England and act there as Our resident ambassador (Chapuys) will direct you, taking good care to inform Us as soon as possible of the state of political affairs in that country, and especially of the King's intention and disposition to act in common with Us in the projected invasion of France.

You will say that the principal object of your mission (*voiage*) is to visit the King and inquire after his health.

* "Obmestant ce que avoit este arresté entre nous à sçavoir que prealablement les saulfconduictz ottroyez pour (par) le dict s^r aux Escossois fussent presentez à vre. ma^te, et par icelle ratiffiez."

† "Vos ma^tes par leur tres grande prudence en userent comme semblera convenir à icelles. Suppliant tres humblement vre. ma^te (pour ce que nay loysir descripre presentement à sa ma^te, à cause de la haste du Conseil) quil plaire à icelle (si le cas le requiert)."

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This to be done with discretion, and according to the disposition in which the King may be.

Also to inform him most particularly of the provisions and preparations made by Us in infantry as well as in cavalry, pioneers, artillery, victuals, etc., in conformity with the papers and documents in your hands, and what has been since verbally communicated to you.

You will inform the King of Our final resolution of invading France, when We intend departing hence, what road We purpose taking, and where Our forces, that is to say the German infantry under count Guillaume de Furstenberg, and the fresh levies made at Hamburg, will concentrate. All this according to and in view of the note that was put into your hands, and the information which from time to time has been communicated to you, at the same time asking, and if necessary, persisting in the inquiry as to when the king of England will order his army to advance, the place where the English forces will concentrate, and the road they will take, so as to combine the movements of both armies.

You will say, if the opportunity offers and you see that it is the fit moment for it, how very important it is to accelerate the departure of the English force and make it march into the enemy's country, especially after the news lately received from France, stating that the French are placing their principal hope in the delay that the meeting of the combined armies may experience, as well as in preventing the invasion by means of removing or destroying the provisions along their line of march, garrisoning and fortifying places on their frontiers, although up to this time We do not hear of their having had the means of enlisting foreigners, though they have tried hard, and are still trying to make levies.

Also, if Our ambassador should consider it advisable, show to the King or to his ministers the advertisements received from France respecting the entrance of the English into that country.

To explain to the King, in view of Our letters to Messire Chapuys, of which a copy has been put into your hands, Our reasons for helping and assisting his resident ambassador here, in this town, to levy in these parts a certain number of foot and horse for the King's service, and the promise by Us made to captain Seckinghen, as well as security (*assheurance*) for payment of the 1,000 horse he has the charge to recruit.

To speak to the King of the large army We have in Italy, and the great number of Germans We have thought advisable to send thither to reinforce the garrisons thereof, all at considerable cost and expense, as you can prove by the papers and documents in your possession.

Also to tell the King the state of affairs in Italy, and the good terms on which We stand with its princes and powers, as well as the general indignation of the latter against France, as you have been informed in detail. Indeed, you

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will tell the King that the news from Rome as well as from Venice is very good, and in fact that the measures taken by Us there, and those We intend taking, will baffle the designs of the French, and that their attempts this time will be as vain and futile as they have ever been.

To conclude, you will do carefully and conscientiously, in union with the above-mentioned ambassador, everything in your power to learn and ascertain all particulars concerning the English army, what its number will be, and how composed; and whether the King really means to cross over personally; who is to command it under him, present or absent, as well as other captains; when that army will be collected and ready to embark, and when and where, having crossed the Channel, it will march on, and what road they will take,* and every other particular you can learn respecting the circumstances, numbers and designs of that army. The same may be said about the artillery, ammunition, victuals, horses (*montures*), equipages and materials of all kinds, the orders and provision the King may make for the government of his kingdom during his absence, the state of affairs in England as well as in Scotland; for how long the King intends keeping up his army against France; what provision the King has made for the charge given to the Sieur de Buren, and for the troops that he wishes to place under his command; how far he (the King) is likely to be satisfied with that general's services now that the difficulties raised by the latter, with good reason as it appears, respecting the men's pay have been removed.

On what terms the English are now with the French, and whether there are, or are not, signs of the former having taken any trouble about making or listening to overtures of peace.

French. Original draft, with several corrections. 2 pp.

21 April. **72.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Yesterday [the 20th], Your Majesty's letter of the 12th inst. came to hand, and to-day, the 21st, after dinner, I waited on the King to communicate its contents according to Imperial commands. *After explaining to him my charge, the King said to me, with some show of discontent, that as captain Sickinghen was so long about making up his mind, and seemed disinclined to take service under him, considering also that the said Sickinghen had on a former occasion served the French, and had, moreover, done other unreasonable acts, his ambassador at Your Majesty's court ought not to be so hard pressed, as he was, to treat with the said captain, the more so that there was no lack of other German*

* "Et en conclusion vous ferez soigneusement et consciencieusement tout ce que en vous sera avec le dit ambassadeur pour estre certain de tout ce que concerne l'armée du dit sieur roy d'Angleterre—quel nombre de gens de guerre yl y aura, et de quelle qualité; si le roy viendra en personne;—qui aura charge d'icelle apres luy, soit en son absence ou presence, et des autres capitaines et personnes ayant charge; quant le dite armée seri assemblée, et marchera; le chemin qu'elle prendra," &c.

captains more reasonable in their demands and readier to serve under him, provided Your Majesty gave them permission. As he had already informed You through his own ambassador, the King thought that it would be undignified for him to press further captain Sickinghen to take service, adding between his teeth, and with evident signs of resentment, that he would rather lose the 10,000 *florins than prosecute the negociation.**

At last, after many remonstrances on my part, the King seemed a little more satisfied on the whole, and ended by requesting me to write to Your Majesty to allow those whom he will charge with the raising of the said cavalry to recruit freely in Your Majesty's dominions, and bring the men to him [at Calais]; and be pleased, for the good success of the affair in hand, to help and assist them in their charge without loss of time;† adding that he himself intended giving the command of 500 *of them to a German captain now here [at Calais], whose name he did not mention. The command of the other* 500 *he (the King) intended to give to Mr. de Buren. He further said that he wished me to intercede with Your Majesty that the cavalry contingent to be furnished by Flanders on Your Majesty's account should be picked out and selected by the abovesaid Mr. de Buren from the Imperial cavalry; for unless they be men known to that captain he could not do good service with them; the King surmising that should Your Majesty commit the charge to officers of the Low Countries, the thing will not be accomplished in a fit and convenient manner.‡*

After this the King informed me that king Francis had ordered great naval armaments to be got together in the ports of Normandy, indeed, much greater than ever, and that it was now high time to make up for past faults and deficiencies; that Your Majesty's fleet should be got ready and join his, now at Calais, in order, among other services, to protect and insure the passage of victuals and ammunition which he intends to send to Calais. Upwards of one hundred vessels were ready to set sail for that service, and he had heard that the French bragged of invading England as soon as he had left it for the continent; but, said the King, though few people believed them to be in earnest, he the King had made such preparations to receive them, that if they ventured to

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* "Et n'a esté le dit s^r roy sans quelque resentement des dix mille florins, dont il a tenu quelques propos à demy entre dens."

† "A la parfin le dit s^r roy l'est monstré assez satisfait du tout, me priant de tenir main quil pleut (*sic*) à vre. ma^te permectre à ceulx auxquelz il donnera la charge des chevaulx, dont est question, et les lever et mener à luy en faire service, ordonnant vre. ma^te leur estre faicte l'assistence require pour le bien et haste de l'affaire."

‡ "Me requerant davantaige d'interceder vers vre. dite ma^te que le dict sieur de Buren puist choisir ceulx quil amenera de la part de vre. ma^te car si ce ne sont gens quil cognoit il ne sçauroit faire bon exploict, se mesdoubtant le dit s^r roy que laissant vre. ma^te la charge à ceulx des pays dembas (d'en bas), quilz ne le pourvoyeront sortablement comme il convient."

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come they would be punished as they deserved. The King also said to me that king Francis had sent to Marseilles a large number of sailors (*maronniers*), Normans and Bretons, to man and navigate the ships and galleys he had in the ports of Normandy. This news, the King observed, was to be communicated to Your Majesty as soon as possible, in order that on this side of Spain steps should be taken to prevent the French from passing the Straits.

The King also told me that according to information received, a considerable number of Italians—ten or twelve thousand, and perhaps more—had lately arrived in France, but he had heard that they were men of no great importance in military matters, and on my replying to him that the news brought to me by a man lately come from that country made their number not to exceed two thousand, the King gave me to understand that the Venetian secretary, residing for his Republic in this city, was the author of the news, all the time boasting of being attached to the French party.

Besides the above, the King repeated to me part of the conversation he had with me the other day respecting the duke of Albuquerque, as I informed Your Majesty by my last letter. He is very desirous to know whether Your Majesty has granted his request, that he may accompany him in this enterprise against France. Please Your Majesty to let me know me as soon as possible if I am to tell him that his wishes are complied with.—London, 21 April 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 3 *pp.*

21 April. Wien, Imp. Arch.

73. EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

"Madame,"—Yesterday afternoon I went to the King with the Emperor's despatch of the 12th inst., which I read to him. No sooner had I finished my reading than the King, giving evident signs of displeasure, began to say that it seemed to him as if captain Sikinghen did not intend entering his royal service freely and with good will, since he was making so many difficulties about it. He had also found that the said captain had once been in the service of king Francis, and done other unreasonable acts. He was not a man of known experience in military affairs, and therefore could not imagine why he (the King) should be recommended with such insistence to his ambassador in Brussels, when there were plenty of other captains in Upper Germany who would be glad to take service under him, provided the Emperor allowed them to do so. [The remainder of the letter as in the following one to the Emperor, of the same date, though with a paragraph thus worded.]

The King ended by saying that he would not employ captain Sikinghen; he nevertheless would take into his service the 1,000 horse; he would give the command of

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500 of them to a German captain, whose name he did not tell me, but who, according to information I have received, has been some time here soliciting it, and the remaining 500 to Monsr. de Buren.—London, 21 April 1544.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

21 April. **74.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Yesterday I received Your Majesty's letter of the 12th inst.,* and in the afternoon of to-day, after dinner, in obedience to your commands, went to the King's court to communicate with him. *After a due explanation by me of the contents of that letter, the King said to me with* certain signs of displeasure, that it seemed to him that since captain Sickinghen made so many difficulties about entering his service freely and with good will; considering also that the said captain had once served under king Francis, and done certain unreasonable acts,† we (the Imperialists) ought not to press on his ambassador as hardly as we had done, and were still doing, half obliging him to enter into a contract with that captain, especially as there were many others in Germany quite competent and willing to enter his service on more reasonable terms, provided Your Imperial Majesty gave them licence, and that as he, himself, had written to his ambassador, it would be dishonorable for him to accept the services of the said Sickingham (*sic*). Nor did the King omit to show regret on the occasion, and mutter half between his teeth, words of resentment respecting the 2,000 florins, which he had advanced.

At last, after several remonstrances on my part, which seemed to him satisfactory enough, the King ended by asking me to write to Your Imperial Majesty, that the enlisting of the 1,000 horse be entirely left in the hands of his own commissaries, adding that he intended giving the command of 500 of them to a German captain, who is actually here, but whose name he did not mention, and that of the other 500 to Mr. de Buren. He also requested me to intercede in favour of the latter, for him to be allowed to pick out the men coming on Your Majesty's behalf, "For (said the King) unless the men are well-known to him, Mr. de Buren will be unable to do the good service that is required of him, and I am afraid that if the commission be entrusted to officers of the Low Countries, they will not acquit themselves of it in a fit and convenient manner (*sortablement*)."

After this, the King told me that he had news that king Francis had caused to be made in the ports of Normandy the greatest naval armaments ever heard of, and that it was high

* No. 64, pp. 91–3.

† "Et considerant qu'il avoit autresfois servi en France oultre aultres choses desraisonables." The German captain's name is here written *Sickingham*, which after all may very well be that of Francis von Sickengheim, a German "condottiere" of the time.

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time (in order to make up for past deficiencies) that the Imperial fleet should be fitted out and join his own at Calais, in order to insure, among other things, the passage of provisions for the English army. He (the King) has already upwards of 100 vessels of all sizes ready to sail on that service; but he has also heard that king Francis is boasting and bragging that he will invade England the very moment he leaves for the Continent. "But (added the King) though very few people know anything about it, I have taken such measures and am so well prepared, that if the French come to England they will get as good a drubbing (*ilz seront frotter*) as they deserve."

The King also told me that king Francis has sent to Marseilles a large number of sailors from Normandy and Brittany to man certain ships of war and galleys of his own in the former port, and then sail for the coast of Normandy.

"All this (the King said) you are to write to His Imperial Majesty, in order that proper provision be made in Spain, so as to prevent the French fleet from crossing the Straits [of Gibraltar]."

I was likewise informed by the King that a body of Italians, amounting, as it was reported, to 10,000 or 12,000, and perhaps 10,000 more, men had gone to France; though they were not, as he had heard, people of great esteem in military matters. And on my replying to him that I also had fresh news from France, by a man lately arrived from that country, who said that all the Italians together in king Francis' army, old and new, did not exceed 2,000,* the King gave me to understand that the Venetian secretary, resident at his Court, was the author of the news, and that being notoriously a partisan and a spy of the French, he suspected him of having exaggerated his report.

Lastly, the King did not fail to repeat to me the prayers he lately made to Your Imperial Majesty for the duke of Alburquerque to remain here in his service. As I had the honour to write to Your Majesty, this King is very desirous that the Duke should accompany him in his expedition to France, and is daily waiting for an answer to his application, hoping that it will receive due consideration. I most humbly beg to hear Your Majesty's commands on this point.—London, 21 April 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 3 *pp.*

22 April. Wien, Imp. Arch. **75.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to AMBASSADOR CHAPUYS.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—In answer to your letters of the 12th and 14th inst., what We have to say is this: First, touching the declaration against the Scots, after perus-

* "Et luy respondant qu'avoye (*sic*) entendu par homme venant freschement de France quil ny avoit en ce cartier là ny des vieulx ni des nouveaulx venus passez de deux mille des dits Italiens."

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ing the draft or copy of the one which the King's privy councillors put into your hands, We find that it differs considerably from that which We caused to be drawn out here, and was forwarded to you on the [. . . .], not only as concerns the narrative (*narré*), but also as regards the measures to be taken thereupon (*le depositif*); inasmuch as in the one you sent Us it is stated that the Scots have made raids into England, and are thereby declared common enemies of the allies, which expressions are not contained in the form of declaration sent to you from here, in which form neither the said raids are mentioned, nor are the Scots on that account declared common enemies of the allies. The words of Our declaration were that having been made aware that war had broken out between England and Scotland, the frequentation of, and residence in, these Low Countries was consequently forbidden to the Scots, in a like manner as that of Scotland was forbidden to the subjects of these Low Countries under Our government, and that these latter, moreover, could not under a certain pass give favour and assistance to the Scots, etc., according to the letter of treaty of closer alliance—thus establishing an express distinction between those to whom the frequentation of, and residence in, these Countries must be interdicted, and those who may be reputed as common enemies.* Neither did We consider Ourselves obliged to express in Our declaration that the Scots having safe-conducts from the king of England may frequent freely and reside without molestation in these Countries under Our government. This, however, for the sake of the king of England, We have no objection to grant, provided, before applying for a safe-conduct, they give notice of it to the ambassadors or ministers of His Imperial Majesty, as We have pointed out in previous letters. As you (Chapuys) wrote to Us that as the future invasion of France by the allies was so intimately connected with that of Scotland by the king of England, your advice, therefore, was that We ought at once to issue the declaration demanded from the Emperor—which declaration, by the way, We should never have granted otherwise—and that it would be enough for the present to prohibit to the Scots the frequentation of, and residence in, these Low Countries, We have naturally hesitated as to what We had better do in the matter, wishing on the one hand to please and satisfy that King, and, on the other, to resolve in a convenient manner the point relating to the Scots, which in Our opinion is not of small importance. That is why We again request you to let Us know as soon as possible what the

* "Mais pour que nous sçavons quilz sont en guerre contre le royaulme d'Engleterre, leur estoit interdit la hantise des pays de par decha, et aussy aux subjectz de par decha de hanter en Escoisse, ne aussy leur porter aulcun faveur ou assistence conforme au traicte de plus estroicte alliance, que fait expresse distinction entre ceulx auxquelz on doibt faire interdiction de hantise et ceulx que l'on doibt reputer communs enemis."

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Emperor and his ministers have written to you respecting the advice you tendered Us, and whether that advice of yours has, or has not, met with superior approbation. Meanwhile, We have sent to the Emperor, Our lord and brother, a copy of what you yourself wrote to Us on this subject, and We are only waiting for his decision in order to do his pleasure in this as well as in all other cases. We are anxiously expecting his answer and yours.

With regard to the number of draft-horses which the English ask for, the King's privy councillors are not correctly informed, if they think that by reckoning the number of parishes in the provinces of these Low Countries—of which they pretend to know the exact amount—and calculating that each parish can furnish one waggon drawn by four draft-horses (that is four times the number of those wanted), they may easily be obtained. All We can say is that We have ordered a census to be made of all the draft-horses to be found in these provinces under Our government, and We find that, taking one horse out of six, of each peasant and cart owner (*voiturier*) in the country, the number of those thus obtained will not exceed 8,000, for although there may be parishes capable of furnishing ten, or perhaps twenty, waggons each, the small villages can only give one, two, or at the most three, so that it will be almost impossible for Us to furnish the number required. We have in this manner eight thousand draft-horses, which are already engaged or inscribed for the English as well as for the Emperor, to obtain which it has been absolutely necessary to discard and send away a large number of small, lean and wretched animals quite unfit for the service required, and notwithstanding all this, lest the English should take advantage of that to delay the enterprise against France, you will tell them that they ought not to wonder at Our making difficulties in an affair of this kind, and that Our excuses are not for the sole purpose of relieving the Emperor's subjects in these parts, they are founded on truth, and on Our complete inability to supply the whole of their demands, and in order also that Our allies be not deceived in their calculations. Indeed, were We to impose upon the peasants and farmers of these Countries a higher tax than one-sixth part of their horses, We are afraid all would be obliged to forsake their agricultural labours and desert the land, whence scarcity and dearth of provisions, if not actual famine, would ensue. You will also tell the King or his ministers that in placing at their disposal one-half, that is 4,000 out of the 8,000 draft-horses already inscribed, We consider that the English are well served. If of the remaining 4,000, after supplying the Emperor's army both in Germany and here in Flanders—where carts and waggons are also required for the baggage of the men—there should be a remnant without employment, We shall be glad to pass them over to the English. This We

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promise and can do; but notwithstanding that, if the King's troops happened to be in want of food and provisions for want of a sufficient number of waggons and draft-horses, the fault will not be Ours, for We have warned them beforehand.

Should you find that the King and his privy councillors will be contented with 6,000 draft-horses—by far the highest number We can possibly procure even with great difficulty—you may suggest and propose, as if the idea originated with yourself, that if the King at the proper time will send his own commissaries* We will hand over to them the inventory or list that has been made of the said waggons and draft-horses in the parishes and villages of these Countries under Our government, and if by chance they do ascertain that there are in the country a greater number than that specified in the said list and description, We will give them all the help and assistance they may require for pressing the English into their service.

As to furnishing the Royal Commissaries with the number of draft-horses the King wants for his army, that is a sheer impossibility. The English ought to consider that if We give them 2,000 saddle-horses for their cavalry, and 6,000 for their artillery and baggage, We shall have to deliver altogether a much greater number of horses than that which the King has for the rest of his army, which is quite unreasonable.

As to the 200 transport vessels, which they want for the passage of their army, We have sent to all the ports and coasts of these Low Countries to retain and keep ready for that service all those that may be found to make up that number, and, if necessary, still more—in short, anything We can do to favour and assist the enterprise in which the allies are now engaged. We will, indeed, use all diligence in that respect in order that they be ready to sail off the very same day that they are wanted, provided, however, that We receive notice from England a few days before, for as seafaring people and masters of vessels like those of Flanders and the Low Countries are most particular, when engaged for foreign service, to know, more or less certainly, the date of the month at which they are expected to sail.

As to warships there will be some difficulty as to their equipment and armament. Every diligence shall be used to have them ready, but all those who are experienced in such matters believe that it would not be expedient to have for the guard of the coasts vessels of less tonnage than 480 tons, and, although We have asked for the advice of the English, and consulted them on this point, We have received no answer. True it is that We do not consider Ourselves obliged to follow in this particular case the English ordinances (*d'armer*

* The names of the English commissaries on this occasion were George Browne and John Broke. State Papers, Vol. IX., p. 66.

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à leur ordinance), and, therefore, if We prepare warships for 1,000 men on board, according to the letter of the treaty, that will be quite sufficient.

You will do well to ask for reciprocity in the matter of the safe-conducts and their security. Having forwarded to you the letters patent to that effect, the least you can do is to ask for theirs in return. Had you received them you would, no doubt, have enclosed them to Us, but as you have not, I remind you of this that you may apply for them urgently.

The English ambassador here* has exhibited to Us a paper abstracted, as he says, from the declaration made by those who were on board the English ship taken by the Scots in sight of La Verre. The pith of the declaration comes to this: the people of La Verre are accused of having made bad use of the said prize. We have given orders that a judicial inquiry be instituted at that port [of Zeeland], and if the accusation turns out true, We will take care that the delinquents, whoever they may be, receive exemplary chastisement, and besides that, We will send to that port some person of authority to compel the Scots to restore what they took from the English crew, according to the declaration, which the latter have placed, as we say, in the hands of their ambassador.—Brussels, 22 April 1544.

Indorsed: "A l'ambassadeur en Angleterre Chappuys (*sic*)."

French. Original draft. 4 pp.

25 April. **76.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Three days ago news came to this town [Spire] from private people, purporting that a battle had been fought, and that Our men had lost it. We have delayed writing about it until the news was officially confirmed, as it was this very morning. The details of the affair are, as you will see, in the enclosed copy of the official report addressed to Us. As soon as the first news of the defeat of Our army was received here, We immediately dispatched an express messenger with letters for the marquis del Gasto and for prince Doria, ambassador Figueroa, and the duke of Florence, making such provision as was necessary at the moment, with full powers to Our ambassador for procuring immediately 50,000 ducats on bills on Our Imperial treasury. After that, We yesterday despatched to Italy, Giovan Ballista Castaldo, the Marquis' new confidential friend and a creditable officer in Milan, with letters to the said Marquis and to the commanders of Our army in that State. Castaldo is to go afterwards to the cardinal of Mantua, and thence to Cremona and Milan, in order to procure, solicit, and obtain whatever

* Dr. Layton still, or Edward Carne.

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may be necessary for the defence of Our Italian dominions And as the Marquis writes, that notwithstanding the wounds received in the battle, and the gout that molested him, he was much occupied in ascertaining what his real losses were and getting together those among the fugitives who might be recovered, and giving besides orders for the defence of the fortresses and castles in the State, and had promised to send more details two days after by express messenger, there is no ground for alarm. After the courier was dispatched by the Marquis, some Spaniards coming from Carignan, brought news of a large number of their comrades and fellow soldiers having reached that fortress in safety, as you will be able to see by the enclosed copy of the official report. Besides that the captain of the castle of Milan, Don Alvaro [de Luna], writes that the very moment that the Milanese heard of the defeat of Our army they asked the sixty members of the Town Council to assemble, who, in union with the rest of the inhabitants, resolved to aid in the defence of the city and State of Milan, and decided to raise a sum of 100,000 crs. to that effect, so that with this and other provisions the defence of the State of Milan is pretty well insured, at least, until We have entered France, when We hope with God's help to give them so much to do that they will not have either the leisure or the power of molesting Us elsewhere.

Your despatch of the 13th inst. has been duly received, as well as the account of your conversation with that King respecting the waggons (*chariotz*) and the cavalry for count de Buren, and likewise on the declaration against the Scotch and the duke of Alburquerque. On these same points We have returned a ready answer to the King's ambassador who resides here with Us, and since then made the Sieur de Granvelle tell him in Our name that with regard to the waggons the King might be certain that the dowager queen of Hungary, Madame, Our sister, will help and assist him in every way as much as she conveniently can. In fact, the better to serve the King in that respect, We have issued orders that both horses and carriages for the artillery be procured here in this country, as well as horses and waggons for the heavy luggage, and that the rest be placed at that King's disposal, except the few that We have ordered from the Low Countries for the immediate use of Our army here to carry the tents, heavy baggage and so forth, and that the King must know that if there be any failure in what We deliberately promise, it will certainly not be Our or Our sister's fault, since both she and We intend doing the most We can for his sake.

As to the declaration against the Scots, the King must be told that it shall be made, and that already Our sister and We consider them as enemies. That We at once beg him to make any public demonstration he may wish in Our joint name, and that the Queen is having it drawn out to be published.

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With regard to the duke of Alburquerque, We are very glad to hear that the King wants him to accompany him. We have written to him the enclosed to that effect. To conclude with this letter the English ambassador came this morning to speak to Mr. de Granvelle, to hear from his lips the news of Italy above-mentioned, and, passing to another topic of conversation, he announced to him that his master the King had expressly signified to him that he would not take into his service colonel (*sic*) Seckinghen, for he had heard that he was not a fit commander of armed men. We were surprised to hear that, for the said Seckinghen happens to be one of the best captains that We could have chosen; and in order that he might take service with the king of England, We had made him give up the command of five companies (*enseignes*) of infantry, and in short he and his brother had been for four years pensioners of Our sister, the Queen, and served in the Low Countries. After the English ambassador has spoken to Us on the subject We will let you know what resolution is taken in this affair.—Spires, 25 April 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

29 April. **77.** The Emperor to Eustace Chapuys.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your letter of the 21st inst. has come to hand. *We have also heard from the Sieur de Granvelle the particulars about captain Seckinghen, of whose services, as you say, the king of England refuses to avail himself altogether. We have likewise been informed of what passed between the King's ministers and yourself on that subject, and the reason why he (the King) disliked that captain so much, for before your letter arrived the English ambassador residing here had said to Us that on no account would his master take captain Seckinghen into his service, having heard that the said captain could bear no good will to his person, since he mistrusted him as to payment. He (the King) had besides been told that Seckinghen was not a man of the sort required for such a charge, and, in short, that if We had engaged Our word, and promised him the 2.000 florins, which his own ambassador had advanced, he would rather forfeit the money than accept Seckinghen's services.*

*Our answer to the English ambassador, as delivered by the Sieur de Granvelle in person, has been that We fully believed that the King, Our brother, would have been well served by captain Seckinghen, whose experience in warfare and whose courage in the field had been put to the test two years ago by the queen of Hungary, Madame, Our sister, who had preferred him and his brother to other German captains. Indeed, he had acquitted himself so well of his task, that the Queen herself had granted him a pension, and We ourselves would have given him the command of five "*epseignes*" had it not been*

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that in order to please the king of England We proposed to him to take him into his service.

As to the security for the payment of the men's wages, the English ambassador was told that that was a sort of condition generally demanded by German captains; this security We ourselves have been obliged to give whenever We have been in need of their services, that being the reason why We have stipulated that should the King fail in giving proper security, or should captain Seckinghen not accept the one offered, he can retain and keep in his power the 2,000 florins he has received in advance, and quit the King's service, all the time giving the English ambassador to understand that on no account was the money to be returned, as that would be quite unreasonable. To this plan of Ours the King's ambassador assented, but since then he has again questioned on the point the Sieur de Granvelle, who has repeated the same statement in gracious words. We apprize you of the fact that you may justify this conduct of Ours in the affair, whenever it comes to be discussed, and let Us know what will be the end of it, always assuring the King that if We can do anything towards facilitating to his own English captains the levying of that or any other body of foreign cavalry, he will find Us perfectly disposed to do him this favour.

With regard to the Italians, who you have been told came from France, your answer was according to truth. As to the ships of Marseilles there was really some rumour, but since then there has been no confirmation of the news.

The gentleman of the Marquis del Gasto, who was to be the bearer of a detailed account of the engagement at Cerisoles, and the state of affairs in Lombardy, has not yet arrived. The news is that the French are so weakened by the last engagement (*rencontre*) that they have not moved from where they were; the garrison and people of Carignan on the other hand were determined to hold out to the last, and as they have provisions for six weeks at least there is nothing to fear on that side. This is all We can tell you besides the news contained in our previous letter to which We refer to you.

As to the declaration against the Scots, which that King insists upon so strongly, Our sister the queen of Hungary to whom We are now writing will communicate with you.

To conclude, Dame d'Egmond has represented to Us that last year when they entered France they wasted and burned down, causing great havoc in the lands and property she owns on the French frontier, and she is naturally afraid that this year if the invasion again takes place the English soldiers may do the same. She has now begged Us to write to you that you may lay her complaints before the king of England, and We do it with pleasure, considering her demand to be just and reasonable enough. You will, therefore, pray the King in Our name to issue orders for the property and lands

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of Our born subjects to be respected by the English soldiers in their march. That would be a most fitting and convenient measure to take under the circumstances, considering the mutual friendship between Us two, and that which now exists between the King's subjects and Our own, whose losses are Our own, and who, besides suffering much from the common enemy, are ready to sacrifice their bodies and property for the common service.—Spire, 29 April 1544.

French. Original draft, almost entirely ciphered. 3 *pp.*

30 April. **78.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Is in receipt of the Emperor's letter by Monsr. de Chantonnay, and has listened to the message he brought and to the address he himself delivered in his presence, showing the Emperor's brotherly affection for him, and his desire to promote their common affairs. Chantonnay will be the bearer of Henry's thanks for the affection and love which the Emperor professes for him, and at the same time report on his army, which is quite ready to take the field against the common enemy, according to the stipulation of the treaty of alliance.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

30 April. **79.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Monsieur de Chantonnay, bearer of this my despatch, will give Your Majesty particular and full account of everything that has happened during his mission to this country.—London, 30 April 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

1 May. **80.** KING HENRY to QUEEN MARY OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.
Fasc. Varia, No. 3.

Thanks her for her friendly offers of service, as made in the letter brought by the Sieur de Chantonnay (Thomas Perrenot), to whom he (Henry) has given commission to express verbally his gratitude.—Greenwich, 1 May 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

4 May. **81.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Considering the bad state in which the affairs of the common enemy are, that the frontiers of France are not well provided for, and that no army has yet been assembled for their defence, We are thinking of forestalling the French, and preventing them from massing their forces on any given point, or affording them time to fortify their frontiers as they have begun to do. Orders have

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been issued to count Guillaume de Furstenberg with his Germans to advance as far as possible into the enemy's country. We have likewise written to Our sister, the queen of Hungary, to send to Luxemberg, with all possible haste, the Spanish and German infantry that were lately at Cambray, besides the utmost cavalry force she can dispose of—the whole to be under the chief command of the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), who has direct orders from Us to go to Luxemberg first, and then penetrate into the enemy's country, disconcert and defeat their plans, lay waste and burn their fields, and do all possible damage, whilst the main body of Our army is getting ready, and until We Ourselves are able to go forward at the head of it, which We hope will be soon.*

However that may be, the English ambassador† residing at the Court of the Queen, Our sister, has informed her that on or about the 15th inst. the vanguard of the King's army will be ready to cross over, that the main body is to follow soon, and the King himself with the rest of his army almost immediately afterwards. We have considered it fit to inform you of the above particulars in order that the king of England may know from your lips Our plans of campaign against the common enemy, and make his own accordingly. If the King could conveniently, and according to the rules of warfare, make the vanguard of his army penetrate into the enemy's territory, lay waste the country, and do some execution or other before he himself crosses over with the rest of his forces, it would have an admirable effect; for two invasions on different sides of their frontier would naturally astonish and bewilder the French, who, having their forces scattered about, would not have the means of concentrating them so as to resist the attacks of our allied armies; besides which, as the French would not know which point to defend by preference, the operations, if not immediately successful, would at least have no danger for the allies.

You will make the King understand the above, and at the same time try to persuade him that it is our common interest to invade France at once on two different sides of its frontiers, and that if the van of his own army is ready about the 15th, Ours will be in Luxemberg before that date.—Spire (Speier), 4 May 1544.

Addresse: "Charles V. *à son ambassadeur en Engleterre.*"

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

4 May. **82.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—The day before yesterday Your Majesty's letter of the 25th ult. came to hand, enclosing papers and docu-

* "En attendant que la main de (?) nostre armee soit preste, et que puissions marcher et suyvre avecq icelle, [ce] que esperons sera aussi en brief."

† The dean of York, Dr. Richard Layton.

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ments relating to Piedmont, and yesterday, after dinner, I went to the Privy Council and communicated its contents. After praising the magnanimity, wisdom, and activity displayed by Your Majesty in the management and settlement of Italian affairs, the privy councillors answered me in a similar way to that used by the King in his conversation with Mr. de Chantonnay and with me, as Your Majesty will see by the duplicate of my letter to the dowager queen of Hungary herein enclosed. Respecting the rest of its contents, namely the declaration against Scotland, and the provision of carriage-horses in the district of Spire with a view the better to accommodate this King with those of the Low Countries, I again beg leave to refer Your Majesty to my despatch to the Queen.

With regard to captain Sequinghen, the privy councillors showed much satisfaction and content at Your Majesty's decision, as well as at Your Majesty's consent that the duke of Alburquerque should take service under him. The Duke has for the last week been away from London hunting in a park five miles from this city. I have sent to him Your Majesty's letter, but have had no answer yet.

Respecting other news from this country, I could not say more than I have done in my aforesaid dispatch to the Queen, to which I beg leave to refer.—London, 4 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

4 May. **83.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 22nd of April * came to hand on Wednesday the 30th. I have not answered it sooner by Mr. de Chantonnay, as I intended at first, because I was expecting to have audience from the King and to appear before the Privy Council. The audience, however, could not be obtained until yesterday, after dinner, owing to the King being about to quit Grignvyth (Greenwich). I went accordingly to the Privy Council, but notwithstanding all the representations I addressed them on that subject, even giving them to understand that both the Emperor and Your Majesty would be contented and satisfied that England's declaration against the duke of Holstein should be drawn out in the express form and words contained in the minute presented by me, I could in nowise persuade them to that, whilst they absolutely insisted that Your Majesty's declaration against the Scots should be definite and express, and such as they, themselves, had offered to make reciprocally against the duke [of Holstein]. They did more; they seemed disappointed and angry at the idea of any difficulties being raised there [at Brussels] respecting that point, considering that the King,

* No. 75 pp. 121–5.

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their master, has proved to the Emperor by an authentic letter, of which a copy is herein inclosed, that the Scots have actually invaded England.

Wishing to be more fully informed on this particular, I interrogated the privy councillors thereupon, and likewise the duke of Suffolk, who as this King's lieutenant had for some time before commanded the army on the Borders, and their answer was that really and truly some months ago a certain number of Scots had assembled under the warder of the ports of that kingdom * for the express purpose of making a raid. The Duke added that one division of the Scots had penetrated far enough into England for the purpose of slaying an Englishman. On my objecting to accept this last case, and begging the Duke to state the matter in writing, and prove to me by the testimony of some other member of the Privy Council there present that the invasion of which he spoke had really taken place, he changed the conversation. After which the privy councillors consulted together for a while, then came to me and said that they would not put to shame the King, their master, by adding any details to what he, himself, had written to the Emperor, for that (they said) would be tantamount to throwing doubt upon his veracity. In short, they complained bitterly of the scruples and delays interposed in an affair of that sort, using words and expressions rather acrimonious (*aiggrettes*) against those councillors who surround Your Majesty, and asserting that the Emperor has assured the English ambassador resident at his Court that both He and Your Majesty have already declared the Scots their enemies, as appears by the former's letter to me of the 25th ult.

With regard to Scotch invasions in this country, all the information I have been able to obtain does not go beyond the statement above made; most likely the invasion, if any, has not been of the sort and manner that these people represent, and as the declaration of enmity, which the King wishes for, requires it to be; and yet I do not hesitate to say that any further difficulty or delay thrown in the way of this affair might possibly prejudice other more important matters at the present juncture. That is why I humbly beg Your Majesty to look to this, and take speedily a final resolution as the case requires. There will be no necessity to express in the declaration that the Scots, in virtue of the safe-conducts granted by this King, will be allowed to trade with the Low Countries, for these privy councillors have made *no allusion* whatever to that point.

Respecting the horses to be furnished, the privy councillors, taking into consideration what I said to them on a previous occasion, were certainly more moderate and accommodating

* That is, Lord Maxwell, warder of the Western Marches of Scotland. "Que aucungs du dict Escosse s'estoient assemblez plusieurs mois passez avec le gardiant (*sic*) des portz d'Escosse pour faire une invasion contre ce royaulme, et davantaige dict qu'ng escois (Escossois) estoit entré assez avant au [royaulme] pour tirer (tuer) ung Anglois [Somerset, the herald ?]."

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this time, for according to my suggestions they have sent commissaries to procure and buy throughout England proper draft-horses, and also oxen for the same purpose,* so that I think they will be content with the 6,000 which Your Majesty is willing to place at the disposal of the English commissaries. Yet I have made no offer at all, considering that when the article in question was discussed they (the privy councillors), knowing Your Majesty's good disposition towards them, and your readiness to help and assist their commissaries to the utmost of your power, no special remark was made as to the number of beasts and so forth, though they particularly requested me to write to Your Majesty that both the carts and the horses should be ready for the day that will be appointed by their commissaries, which will be, as far as I can understand, from the 20th to the 25th of this present month, the day on which the duke of Norfolk has fixed for his crossing with the vanguard, and as this latter is to leave Calais immediately and advance on French territory leaving room for the rearguard that is to cross, land, and follow him, it is necessary, as Your Majesty may consider, that the carts and horses be ready.

Touching the transports for the English troops, these privy councillors have given me to understand that they have already sent to the Low Countries commissaries to select and direct to the ports of this kingdom those that may be considered most fit for the embarkation of troops. As to warships, they request that Your Majesty order them to sail immediately for Calais, if they have not done so already, and effect their junction with this King's fleet, so as to insure the passage of the English troops. This is most important and necessary, inasmuch as from this day (*desormais*) there will be a continuous passage of men, ammunition, and provisions. I have said nothing to them respecting the quality and size of the ships, principally because I never had the opportunity, and also because they showed their temper enough when I spoke to them about the declaration against the Scots.

Some days ago the reciprocal letters-patent for the observance of the safe-conducts were put into my hands. I have delayed transmitting them until the translation, which I have ordered to be made, should be completed and authenticated by the Admiralty; when that is done I will forward them to Your Majesty, although, in my opinion, it would be far better that the original document should remain in this embassy as evidence in case of contravention.

The day before yesterday, in the evening, Your Majesty's letter of the 29th of April came to hand, as well as the copy of the "News from Piedmont," which news I at once communicated to the privy councillors, who were exceedingly

* "Et si (s'y) ont (suyvant ce que leur en ay diz (dict) par ça) envoyé pour (par) tout le royaulme 'pour chercher chevaulx propices aulx charriages (*sic*) et pour avoir des bœufs soltables (?) à ce faire."

1544.

sorry to hear of the late mishap of the Emperor's arms in Italy, repeating to me the very same words that the King had said to Mr. de Chantonnay and to me, namely, "That it was impossible in warfare to avoid misfortunes, and that the one which had lately occurred to the Imperial arms could not fail to be shortly repaired, owing to the wise measures since adopted; that it was convenient, nay, necessary to gather new forces, and summon courage for the enterprize against France,* so as to recover at the rate of one hundred per cent. both the lost capital of reputation and the interest thereof."

Since Mr. de Chantonnay's departure no recent news has been received from Scotland nor from the army which this King has sent thither, nor is there any event worth recording save that Milort Wriothesley, to whom eight days ago the keeping of the great seal was entrusted, has been created [high] chancellor of England.†

I reminded the privy councillors of the answer which Your Majesty made to the man who last year brought you widgeons as a present‡ from king Francis, and I did so in order to have occasion to ask them what was the King's answer to the Frenchman, who presented him the other day with one hundred butts of wine in the name of his master; but the privy councillors answered that they knew nothing about it, and that they supposed that the jeweller (*joulier?*), who had come to present the wine, had solicited to be the bearer of it, for the purpose of recovering at the same time certain jewels which had been detained and sequestered here—owing to some irregularity or other connected with the customs or with fiscal rules,—which jewels the King had ordered to be restored to him.—London, 4 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
Addressed; "To the Queen."
French. Original. 3 *pp.*

4 May. **84.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Yesterday these privy councillors sent me word that, according to what Your Majesty had written to

* "Et qu'il convenoit [d'] avoir tant meilleur cœur en ceste imprinse (*sic*) contre France."

† Sir Thomas, formerly secretary to the Privy Council, and who about this time was appointed Lord Chancellor.

‡ "Je rememoray aux dits du Conseil la responce (*sic*) que fest vre. ma^te^ [à celuy] que luy avoyt appourte des oyseaulx l'année passee de la part du roy de France, mais ilz desirent pour avoir occasion de leur demander la reponce que le dit s^r^ roy avoit faict à celuy que luy avoit presente les cent tonneaulx de vin de la part du roy françois; mais ilz desirent (disrent) quilz n'en sçavoient riens, et quilz pensoient que le jeulier (jouillier) que leur estoit venu presenter les dits tonneaulx de vin avoit sollicité le dit envoy pour recouvrer certains joyaulx que luy avoient esté içy detenus pour fourfaitz." Under the date of February 23 of 1542 queen Mary informed Chapuys that a gentleman, named curiously enough Reigne, sieur de La Reine, usher of king Francis' chamber, had brought her a present from that monarch, consisting of 12 widgeons (*sarcelles*) and the answer she made. See Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 255–6.

1544.

the Deputy at Calais* respecting an Italian named Octavien; the King, their master, had immediately ordered his arrest. He was yesterday closely examined and questioned in the Council Room,† but nothing could be got out of him respecting his secret intelligences in France, save that he lived on familiar terms with a Frenchman named La Chapelle, who was his friend, and had once lent him money. Such was the amount of his confession, upon which the King's councillors, not finding any ground for the accusation brought against him, resolved not to confine him to an ordinary prison, but send him to the house of the bishop of London (Bonner), to be kept there under his custody until they hear again from Your Maiesty. Please to acquaint the Council in detail of the grounds of the accusation, and let it be as soon as possible.

I am told that there is news in town of the Royal fleet having already arrived on the coast of Scotland, and that after landing the troops on board, who are afterwards to be joined by a strong body of cavalry, the whole fleet is to return home. Such is my information on this point; but it is to be feared that the unavoidable delay caused by contrary winds and bad weather at sea is likely to lead to the detection of this King's plans, and eventually mar the success of this undertaking, which seems somewhat perilous, unless, however, the indisposition and serious illness of the governor (earl of Arran), and the help that may be afforded by the sons of count Douglas—who, notwithstanding that their father, the Count, is still a prisoner, have lately robbed (*destrousse*) the captain of Dombart (Dunbar) of all his men and luggage—may assist the English. Should further intelligence come from Scotland I shall not fail to apprize Your Majesty of it. —London, 4 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "To the Queen."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 1½ *pp.*

6 May. **85.** The Earl of Hertford to King Henry.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Please it Your Highness to understand that upon the despatch of our last letter‡ to Your Majesty, making mention of our landing besides Legh (Leith), having forthwith put

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* Le Debitis—that is, the Deputy or King's lieutenant in Calais, Lord Maltravers (?). *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 414, 493.

† "Avoit faict prendre, et saisy ung Italien nommé Octave, le quel fust hier examiné des dits du Conseil." Octave, or Octavien is the Christian name, in French, of Ottavio, or Ottaviano Boscho, a Milanese armourer, of whom more will be said hereafter.

‡ That is, the Earl's and the Admiral's, for this unsigned letter was evidently written by both. No earlier letter, however, has been found in the Imperial Archives of Vienna, unless it be that of Sir John Russel to the Secretary of the Council.

1544.

Your Majesty's army in order of battle, we marched towards Legh (Leith) in three wards, whereof the Lord Admiral (Sir John Russel), had the forward, and the earl of Shrewsbury (Talbot) the rearward, and so marching towards Legh (Leith) intending to recover the town, because, being masters thereof, we might bring into the haven such hoys and crayers (crafters?) as were laden with our great pieces of artillery,* and the draft-horses with their draft and carriages for the better landing of the same, with such victuals as should be needful for our army, having, indeed, no other place to land them on upon this shore. Albeit we wrote unto Your Majesty, in our said last letter, that at our landing we saw no great appearance of any resistance (indeed, we saw none, neither had [we] any manner of impediment at our landing, so that we were set all on land out of our ships boats and cables, with a few light pieces of ordnance for the field, in less than three hours), yet after we had marched a mile, carrying our said light pieces of ordnance, drawn with us by force and strength of men, the forward discovered a good number of Scots, both on horse and foot, to the number, as we think, of six thousand, laying in order of battle, betwixt Leght and Edinburgh,† along upon a brook, whereupon they had laid their ordnance in two straits and passages, which we must needs pass to come to this town, or else have been driven to have gone six or seven miles about; which passage they (the Scots) had furnished with men and ordnance, and being there the governor (earl of Arran), and cardinal (David Beton), the earl of Murray, the lord Seton, and sundry other lords of Lothian, they seemed utterly determined to keep that passage, showing a great face and countenance of the same. Nevertheless, we marched towards them with good speed, and shot of the ordnance out of the forward;‡ the Scots proudly again shot at us, both out of the field and also out of the town of Lythe (Leith), with a great brag, as though they would have winned with us; but, in fine, we approached them so fast, and pressed them with our shot, as well of the hackbutiers§ as [of the] archers, that we beat them from the said brook after this sort—that is to say, the forward marched first to the first passage towards Edinburgh, where the greatest number of the Scots lay, and having put them to flight and scaled (scared?) them from their ordnance (ordinance?), turned towards the other passage besides Legh (Leith), because the Scots shot their ordnance from thence very hotly upon your men. And yet, when the said Scots perceived the forward turn towards

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* "Suche hoyes and crayers as weare laden with our greate peaces of artillery."

† "Leght and Edinborough."

‡ "And shot of the ordinance (*sic*) out of the forward." It is doubtful whether "forward" is here meant for vanguard, as in other passages of this report, or whether the flagship "Forward," of which mention is made at p. 149 *n.* of Vol. VI., Part II., is meant. I am inclined to adopt this last conjecture.

§ "Hacquebutters."

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them [no sooner did they see that], than they all left that passage with their ordnance; and the hackbutiers, being in hot chase of the Scots, which fled from the further passage towards Edinburgh, had no regard to the forward when the same turned to the other passage* towards Leith, as aforesaid, but followed the first chase; whereupon, the battle being at hand, [we] made towards the said hackbutiers, and sent out a good number of archers to back them, and retired the said hackbutiers without losing of any man, and brought away the Scots' ordnance, and returned all without hurt; and so [in] we won both the passages, assuring Your Majesty that for the space of half-an-hour, or thereabout, it was right sharply handled on both parties, and on our side very honestly handled and boldly maintained by sundry here,† as I, the earl of Hertford, shall at more leisure declare unto Your Highness. And among the rest Peter Mecotas,‡ with his company of hackbutiers, did Your Highness right honest service; and also the forward, in the meantime, recovered by force into the town of Leith,§ which was stoutly defended by the Scots, and the streets of the entry into the town fortified with their ordnance, such as it is, besides that they had cast ditches‖ almost round about to defend our entry; but our men gave the onset so boldly, that a little before night we had both the town and their ordnance, such as it is, and our enemies fled apace out of the town, whereof sundry were slain; and God be thanked that but two or three of our men were slain, and two hurt with shot of ordnance.

Thus have we now the possession of this town, where we be encamped; and yesterday and this day, having brought the ships laden with ordnance and draft-horses into the haven as the tide would serve, we have done, and do, as much as is possible to land the said ordnance and horses, which has been a great business, and is now at a good point, so that, with the leave of God, we intend to-morrow by daylight to march to Edinburgh for [the] execution of such charge as it has pleased Your Majesty to commend unto me, the said earl; and albeit we have been suffered to lie quietly enough in this town these two nights without any alarms or business, save that some light horsemen of the Scots have pricked aloft about the town to view our doings, whereof hackbutiers have taken taken up some of them, and also of their horses, with their hackbuts, and likewise brought some

* "Wenne the same (they came?) tourned to the other passaige towards Legh."

† "Be [by?] sundry here."

‡ Here the scribe who copied for me this and other letters in English, added by way of a note:—"The name of this captain of hackbutiers is quite illegible; it begins with an M and ends in *tas*, Mirotas, Micotas, Meotas (?).

§ "And also the forwarde, *cant à cant*, recovered *par force* into the town of Legh, which was stoutly defended by the Scots, and also the straits of the entry into the town."

‖ "Besydes that they had cast dyches almost rounde about to defend our entre."

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of them hither prisoners, yet we understand that at Edinburgh they be determined to defend the town and the castle with all their power; but, with God's grace, their defence shall little avail them. The Governor and Cardinal were in the field with the earl of Morrey (Murray) and sundry lords of Lothian, as is before said, whereof the lord of Brunestoune was one.* But after they had shewn us the said brag, and were put to flight in [the] manner above-mentioned, they tarried not in the town of Edinburgh, but fled forthwith to Lithes, as we be informed;† and if we had had any horsemen, it had been possible, and like enough, that perchance the Cardinal himself and the Governor, or some of them, might have come short to Edinburgh. We trust to very soon hear of our horsemen, and when they come we shall the better [be] able to do Your Highness' service, and in the meantime we shall not be idle.

The said town of Lithe (Leith) was found to be of good substance, at the least of ten thousand pounds, as we suppose, whereof there was great store of grain of all kinds, finding also within the haven two fair ships of the late Scotch King's called the "Salamander" and the "Unicorn," for the which I, the Lord Admiral, have taken such order that by the sufferance of Your Majesty the one shall arrive to Your Majesty with the rest of your Navy.

Furthermore on Sunday night, immediately upon our entry into the town of Leith, the provost of Edinburgh and other burgesses of the same sent a herald to me—the said earl—with desire of assurance to come and speak with me, which I granted unto them; and yesterday in the morning they came unto me, requiring to know my intent towards their town, offering that, if I would grant them assurances, and so long as Your Highness would support them against the power and authority of the realm of Scotland—whereof they were subjects, and were not able of themselves to stand and resist the same—they would be content to stand and adhere finally to Your Majesty, as much as in them is, for to have the late treaties accomplished. Whereunto I answered and remembering them of the great untruth used towards Your Majesty by the realm [of Scotland] with their most worsiest (*sic*) proceedings with Your Highness from the beginning, which I extended and dilated as my poor wit would serve me, not forgetting thereunto to express unto them Your Majesty's great clemency and goodness ministered to them, and Your Highness's godly intent to have brought these two realms to a perpetual, wealthy, amity and quietness. I told them that Your Majesty being a prince of honour, power, and such magnanimity and courage as could not bear these untruths and disloyal behaviour used towards

* "Whereof the lorde of Brunestoune (Alexander Crichton, laird of Brunston) was one."

† "And fled forthwith to Lithes (*sic*), as we be informed."

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Your Majesty, had therefore sent me hither to extend your sword and violence in the revenge of their falsehoods to such as would make resistance against your force and power now arrived (arrayed ?) here, and therefore I told them plainly that [it was] my intent to have their town and castle on Your Majesty's behalf, and dispose [of] as I thought good. The Provost replied that was an extremity they could in nowise agree to, and therefore that, such being the case, they would return to their town and defend themselves as well as they could; but if I would declare unto them what kindness they should receive at my hands if they would set open the gates of their town, and receive them gently into the same, they would then deliberate together, and show me what they could do in that behalf. I answered that I came not hither to put conditions or treat with them; but if they would deliver me their town to be disposed [of] as I thought good, I would receive it and use it accordingly; but in case they made any resistance or defence, they might be sure that I would in that case so persecute them as the law of armies here requires, and make them an example to the World. Other answers they could have none of me. So that in fine they desired respite to make an answer, whether upon their devise and consultation with the rest of the town [people] it should seem best unto them to deliver the same in [the] form abovesaid, which, considering our ordnance was not yet landed, and that we could not be in readiness to march to Edinburgh before to-morrow, I was content to grant them till yesterday evening at 7 of the clock, at which hour they came not again themselves, but sent their herald unto me with their resolution that unless I would capitulate with them what kindness should be shown unto them in case they would receive me into their town, they could not deliver the same to be disposed [of] at my will; but [were] and would rather be enforced to defend themselves, and would do so to the utmost of their power. This I accepted as their final answer and resolution in that matter, intending to summon the town to-morrow and assure them that in case of their abiding the shot of the cannon or making any resistance whereby any damage or grief may ensue to any one of this army, I would not fail to persecute them with fire and sword without mercy, as partly I have declared to the said herald to be signified to them. In a like manner on Sunday night, after our entry into this town [of Leith], whence we had set the watch upon the same, came the lord of Bruneston* to the town's end, intending, as he says, either to have been taken prisoner or by some means to have got assurance to come into the town to speak to me, the said earl, but some[one] of the watch having spied him, shot an arrow at him and hurt him in the thigh, so that he was fain to return for fear of

* *See* above p. 138.

1544.

his life. Nevertheless, yesterday he came again by daylight, and sent to me for assurance to come to my presence, and in discourse with him of the state of the realm [of Scotland]. He told me that there were a great number of gentlemen here, in Lowdyan (Lothian) which, if they saw that Your Majesty was determined to have a footing and entry, and would make any abode of Your force here for their relief and succour, would come in to serve Your Highness and stand against all such as would impeach Your Majesty's good purpose; whereas if extremity be ministered he (lord Brunestón said) it shall be a means to lose the hearts of all the people of this realm, and to put them in utter desperation of Your Majesty's favour and clemency, which by gentleness and kind handling, without rigour to be used in blood shedding or spoiling of their goods, might very easily be won and recovered, especially if it might appear unto them that Your Majesty would plant here [so] as to fortify, this town being now in Your Highness' hands, and so proceed forthwith to the conquest of the town and castle of Edinburgh, and then establish a garrison there, which [being] done, Your Majesty (he said) may be sure of all on this side of the Frith, and also very shortly come to the rest of the whole realm.

This tale Lord Bruneston told unto us all severally, which we have thought good to signify unto Your Majesty, the more so, because now, upon our arrival here, we see some likelihood that if Your Majesty has a good foot[ing] here, a great part of the realm would soon fall into Your Highness' devotion, and also now upon the view of the situation of this town it is evident that the same in time might be fortified and kept against the power of all enemies, and by the same both Edinburgh and the rest of Scotland on this side of Force (the Forth) be subject to Your Highness' will and pleasure; so that had Your Majesty's former determination to fortify this town continued, we think it would not but have served to great purpose, which we can no less do than advertise for the discharge of our duties, although with God's leave I, the said earl, do intend to proceed to the accomplishment of Your Majesty's last resolution with as much diligence and no less good will than to my duty appertains, supposing that before we shall be able to recover the town and castle of Edinburgh and put the same to sack, fire and sword, burn this town, which is well sacked already with all such villages as be here, it will be yet eight days or we cannot well depart from hence, and on our return home by land we shall not fail, God willing, to annoy the enemies as much as we can.

Finally, within our arrival here Richard Broke, the master of the galley "Subtellis,"* has taken a block-house situated on an island within the river called Hirschegaruie (Inchegarvie),

* That is the "Subtle."

1544.

which after a little assault made thereunto and some shots out of his galley was rendered unto him, and because Your Majesty had determined that we shall not abide here upon fortification of this town, order is taken that the said block-house shall forthwith be rased, which, had Your Highness' first determination to fortify here continued, would have been worth the keeping. Thus Almighty God preserve Your Majesty in your royal state most felicitously to endure. At Legh (Leith), on Tuesday the vi of May, at night.

Indorsed: "A copie of therle of Hertford's letter to the King's Majestie."

English. Contemporary copy. 5 *pp.*

8 May. **86.** The ADMIRAL (SIR JOHN RUSSEL) to SECRETARY PAGET.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Mr. Secretarye,"—I have no news to write [to] you but of the stout cardinal, who, like a valiant captain, showed himself on the field with such power as he could make against the King's Majesty army, setting a great face, as though he would have bidden the battle, and had chosen himself a strong ground, having between us and him a river, which had a narrow passage. He had bestowed his two slings and three serpentines of iron, and did back the same himself with all his band, which was estimated among themselves to the number of five or six thousand fighting men,* besides the multitude of rascals and "paysants" wherewith the country was furnished; and when he saw the vanguard march down towards him, and that he might perceive they had [no] great devotion to wait the showers to come, His Holiness,† like a valiant champion, gave his horse the spurs and turned his back, and was fain to leave his ordnance behind. Yet he tarried till we came within shooting distance of our hacks.‡ He was appareled, as it has been reported since to my lord Lieutenant and [to] me in a frock of yellow velvet, cut and pulled out with white tinselled sarcenet.§

And in the meantime that we were in no other mind but that we should have had some business with him, there was at another passage at the town of Lieth (*sic*) certain pieces of ordnance, which did us some displeasure; but after we were dispatched of that place, the vanguard marched through to the other passage, the which of force the army must pass

* "He had bestowed 11 slynghs and 111 serpentines of iron, and did back the same himselfe with all his bande, whiche was estimated among themselves to the number of V. or VI^m. fighting men."

† "And that he might perceive they had greate devotion to waite the showes (*sic*, showers of arrows?) to come to his Holiness." Such is the reading in the copy before me, but it is evident from what follows that the negative was omitted by the English copyist.

‡ "Tyll we came within short distance of our hakes (hackbuts?)."

§ "Le Cardinal y estoit," as in * note, p. 142.

1544.

before they would come to the town of Lieth, and before we could come to that passage they slew two or three of our men, and in conclusion the Scots were fain to leave their ordnance. At such place I stayed the whole vanguard till the battle* was come in.

If I should write to you the good order of array that our men kept that day, and being the first day of our marching and newly come from the sea, perchance you would hardly believe it, but I assure you it was passingly (*sic*) good.

Thus I take my leave of you for the time, requiring you to show the King's Majesty that I have rigged and equipped for His Highness the "Salamander" and the "Unicorn," which be two princely ships for their burden as ever I saw. This last I esteem to be as much as the "Mynyon" (Minion), and the "Salamander" I judge to be as much as the "Great Galley" or within very little, and fully as long. I have loaded their bellies full of great cannon shots of iron.

The soldiers and sailors (mariners) have made their hands [full] here. I esteem the pillage of the town [at] no less than ten thousand pounds among them. The town standing to be very strong, and no hill nigh unto it to hurt it, I do not perceive but if it were His Majesty's pleasure all the country would be glad to be His Majesty's subjects, and stands in no less fear at the present moment than I think will happen unto them.

You may perceive by this despatch to the King's Majesty the rest of our proceedings, and what we are determined to do. This, after my hearty commendations to yourself, I pray you commend me to my lord Wriothesley, and to all my lords and friends at your discretion.—Scribbled at Lieth the 8th of May [1544].

Indorsed: "Copye of my Lorde Admyrall's letter to Master Secretary Paget."

English. Contemporary. 2 *pp.*

8 May. **87.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—After your letter of the 22nd ult.,† of which a copy was forwarded to the Emperor, Our brother, We received one from His Imperial Majesty, dated the 29th of April, telling Us that in his opinion and in order to please the king of England in the matter, the declaration against the Scots ought to be made without delay, at the same time bidding Us to have it drawn out. Accordingly, and in compliance with the Emperor's wishes and commands, We have caused the aforesaid declaration, of which a copy is inclosed, to be made and published. We think that

* That is the "main body."
† *See* above, p. 121.

1544.

the king of England will be perfectly satisfied with it, since the Scots are therein fully declared to be the Emperor's enemies.* Although the words of Our declaration are not exactly the same as those of the minute that was put into your hands there [in London], yet no harm can come out of this, since the few words added are expressly meant for the justification of the said declaration as far as the Emperor is concerned, and also by way of excuse for Our not having sent a challenge before-hand, as it was proper and honest to have done, notwithstanding that the declaration, as you will see, is founded on the doings and hostilities committed by the Scots in the dominions and countries belonging to His Imperial Majesty, and especially in those countries under Our government, in contravention of, and direct opposition to, the old treaties. In order to save time and no longer delay the declaration, We have considered that it was better not to send the challenge to the Scots; it will be for you to inquire and ascertain what the English think of the document as it is worded.

As to the King's declaration against the duke of Holstein, the Emperor has not yet lost all hope of coming to terms with him, and, therefore, as long as the Danish deputies, whom the Duke has sent to Spire, remain there and do not go back to Denmark, there is no necessity for urging the King to make his declaration against him.

We have sent word to the English ambassador residing at this Our court, that some days ago a French herald presented himself at the gates of Cambray, and asked for permission to pass on and deliver a letter he had for Us, which permission the captain (governor) of that city very properly refused, saying that if he (the herald) had any letters he would undertake to have them delivered to Us, and that in the meantime he might remain at Chastelles de Gouy until an answer, if any, was returned. The letter was from the Admiral of France to Us; a copy of it is inclosed, but as the affair concerns as much the king of England and his subjects as it does those of the Emperor, We would not answer or take any steps about it before consulting the King, and to ask for and obtain his advice and counsel about it. The object of the letter, as you will see, is exclusively the liberty of fishing. You must, therefore, ask the privy councillors whether it would be convenient to give mutual securities for the subjects of France and those of the Emperor, including of course those of the king of England, to carry on fishing

* "De la quelle le dit s^r roy se doibt contenter en tant que par icelle les dits escossois sont declares ennemis, et combien que le narré n'est du tout conforme à la minute qui vous avoit esté baillée par de la, si ny ayt il en ce nul prejudice, et est le narré faict pour justification de la dite declaration et excusation que on [n'a pas] envoy'en Escosse faire la defiance comme l'honnesteté requeroit, ne fust que la dite declaration est fondée sur les exploitz et hostilitez commis par les Escossois es pays de sa ma^te."

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freely and with out molestation. The securities should also comprise the Scots, for otherwise it would be of no use whatever, especially if that given by France cannot be relied upon entirely.

We have also informed the Emperor of the contents of the Admiral's letter to Us in order to know what his wishes in this matter are, and how to reply to the French overtures in the manner most suitable to the interests of both the Majesties, Imperial and Royal. True it is that in the year 1542 the admiral of France* made also overtures to that effect, proposing that the fishermen of the nations then at war should pay a quota of money (*deniers*), but as his overtures were made at a time when the Emperor's subjects in these Low Countries had ended theirs, after having been obliged to arm themselves for the defence of their fishing crafts and crews, the securities demanded by the French were not granted; now the state of affairs is different and the fishermen on both sides of the Channel, whether Frenchmen, English or Flemish, being equally in a position to profit by an arrangement of that sort, you shall try to obtain the King's resolution on that point, and let Us know of it, at the same time assuring the King and his ministers that in this, as well as in other matters, We shall never take a determination without consulting him first and obtaining his consent.

We have ordered the arrest and imprisonment of a French spy (*traitre*) named La Chapelle, who went about the country inquiring for news to transmit to France. He has accused another spy, an Italian named, Octavian Bos, residing at Antwerp, who, he (La Chappelle) says, has great intelligences in France, and has now gone over to England for the purpose of reporting news of that country, and secretly sending them to La Chapelle for him to forward to France. We have written to the Deputy of Calais, who has replied through the English ambassador here that previously to the receipt of Our letter the said Octavian had taken his departure for England. The Deputy, however, had considered it his duty to inform the English ministers of the fact, in order that the said Octavian might be arrested and examined.

As soon as you (Chapuys) hear of Octavian's arrest you shall take care that he be questioned respecting his accomplices, if he had any others besides La Chapelle when he was last in France, and whether since October of last year he has or has not been at St. Jean de Nemours, near Fontaine le Bleau (Fontainebleau), and given certain letters to Monsr. de Vendôme; for La Chapelle—with whom Octavian lived in great familiarity, occupying the

* At that time Philippe Chabot de Brion or Brion-Chabot, as his name is sometimes written, had the charge of Admiral; he fell into disgrace in January 1543. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 9*n*., 39, 47, 579.

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same lodgings at the Golden Goat (*La Chievre d'Or*) of Mechlin, in Flanders—declares to have been present when Octavian delivered certain letters to the said Monsr. de Vendôme, who, he says, had since gone to England to gather information and report to France. I request you to have him well interrogated, in order to ascertain whether he has accomplices here in this country.

Count du Rœulx writes to Us that the Sieur de St. Martin, of whom you wrote to the Emperor on the 8th of April, was in the English camp during the last incursion into the Boullonois made by him (the Count), in concert and union with our allies—which incursion, by the way, turned out very successful in wasting the enemy's land and spoiling it. Having inquired of the English commander who St. Martin was, the Count was told that he was king Francis' servant, and was doing the King service. This the Count could not believe, inasmuch as the said St. Martin* is well received by the Sieur de Biez, who (the Count adds in his letter, ignoring, perhaps, the Frenchman's practices [in Calais]), knew very well that St. Martin had frequently visited the English camp. That made the Count suspect that some foul trick was being played, and he accordingly wrote to Us. If the opportunity offers, you had better speak to the privy councillors confidentially about it.

French. Original draft. 5 pp.

n. d. **87A.** The EMPEROR'S DECLARATION AGAINST SCOTLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"By the Emperor, etc."†—Whereas from the most remote ages down to the present time the subjects of the kingdom of Scotland have been in the habit of resorting to, and frequently residing in these Our Low Countries for the purposes of trade, and have been well and honestly received, treated and favoured in conformity with the treaties of alliances made between Us and Our noble predecessors on the one side, and the late kings of Scotland on the other; and whereas in consequence of those mutual treaties and engagements, the people of Scotland have been friendly treated, and have reciprocally communicated and traded with Our subjects; in a like manner have those among Our subjects, who wished to frequent Scotland for the purposes of trade, been well received and treated in that country, so that in point of fact the relations between the Scots and the people of the Low Countries, Our subjects, have always been most amicable. Yet, subjects of the kingdom of Scotland have, since the death of their late king, gone so far as to make confederacy and alliance with the French (?) allies of the Turk, and, therefore, enemies

* *See* above, No. 61, p. 89.

† A marginal note has the following:—"L'on prendt ce present [language] pour garder honnestete vers les Escossois et demonstrer que on n'a rompu les traictez avecq eulx sans souffisante cause."

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of God and Ours, whilst the French themselves have made war upon the most high, most powerful prince Henry, king of England, France, and Ireland, Our good brother, cousin, perpetual ally and friend; and have also, under the excuse of resorting to, and frequenting these Low Countries of Ours for the purpose of trade, invaded by sea, robbed, and taken prisoners the subjects of the aforesaid King, bringing them in irons into Our ports and bars, thus contravening not only the treaties existing between Us and Scotland, but acting directly against Our perpetual alliance and close friendship with the aforesaid king of England, his kingdoms, countries, and subjects, which We cannot tolerate, permit, or in any way allow, but are bound, on the contrary, to remedy the evil of it.

For the above cause, and other good and urgent reasons prompting Us, We ordain and command you, —— N——, under pain of Our indignation to have the above published through all Our country and county of N., that all subjects of the kingdom of Scotland shall not in future visit, haunt, frequent, or reside in our Low Countries, under pain of being held and reputed as enemies, and, as such, being made prisoners and their vessels and merchandise and property seized and considered a legitimate prize. Also, that none of Our subjects dare haunt or frequent the said kingdom of Scotland, or send help, assistance, or favour to the Scots, under pain of being punished and chastised as peace breakers, ordering all Our officers, and those among Our vassals, etc.

Headed: "A nra. trés n̄ra. chere et feal, etc." *

French. Original draft. 1¼ *pp.*

— May. Wien, Imp. Arch. **88.** ABSTRACT of LETTERS from ENGLAND with NEWS of SCOTLAND.

The earl of Hertford, King's lieutenant and commander-in-chief of the English army, accompanied by the Admiral (Sir John Russel), by the earl of Shrewsbury, of the name of Talbot, lord Cobham, lord Clington (Clinton), lord Sturton, lord William Howard, lord Dacres, lord Scroupe, lord Conyers,† and a large number of lords and gentlemen, entered Scotland by sea with a fleet consisting of 210 sail and provisions for sixty days. By land, with orders to join the above-

* The Declaration has no date, but as the preceding letter of queen Mary to the Imperial ambassador in England is of the 8th of May and the "Declaration" was enclosed, I have not hesitated to calender it here.

† "Monsr. l'admiral et le conte de Shrevsbery nommé Talbot, mylorde Cobham, mylorde Clyngton, mylorde Sturton, mylorde Guillaume Hawarde, mylorde Dacres, mylorde Scroupe (?), mylorde Conyers." The names and titles of the lords named in this passage are probably those of: Francis Talbot son of George, king Henry's Lord Steward; Sir John Brooke, lord Cobham, captain of king Henry's bodyguard; Edward, lord Clinton; — Stourton or Storton (lord Edward); — Dacre of Dacre, or of Gillesland (lord William); Scrope of Bolton (?); and Conyers of Hornsby (lord Christopher)?

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mentioned Lord Evre (Evers) with 4,000 horse,* besides 3,000 more under Lord Sturton, who entered also by another side of the Borders to call off the attention of the enemy in that quarter. Of the cavalry I have no news yet; but the King's lieutenant, lord Hertford, with the royal fleet, anchored in sight of Lith (Leith), a town and seaport among the best of Scotland, situated a short league from Edinburgh, which is the capital of the kingdom, just as London is the capital town of England, and Paris of France. The landing, which took three hours, was effected without opposition, and the whole of the force, with a few pieces of light field artillery, were sent to attack and take possession of the said town and port of Lith (Leith), for otherwise it would have been impossible to land the heavy ordnance and the horses to drag it along. In advancing upon the town the men themselves had to drag the light pieces.

At about one league from the sea a body of armed Scots amounting to 6,000 men, without including in that number the "paysants," among whom were the Governor (Arran), the Cardinal (Beton), the earl of Murray, lord Seton and other great lords, was seen encamped and fortified on two narrow passes (*destroitz*), which our army had necessarily to go through, the one leading to Leith, the other to Edinburgh; at one and the other of these two passes the Scots had some pieces of ordnance. Lord Hertford, after dividing his army into three parts and giving the command of the vanguard to the Admiral and rearguard to lord Shrewsbury, himself with the main body advanced against the Scots, ordering the Admiral to attack the pass leading to Edinburgh, which happened to be guarded by the above-mentioned Scotch lords with the greater force. The artillery played on both sides, and our hackbutiers (*arquebutiers*) and archers took such aim that at last the Scots had to abandon their position and take to flight, leaving their artillery behind. Whilst our hackbutiers were in pursuit of the enemy, the vanguard, finding that the pass to Edinburgh was free, and that the Scots had fled, turned round and went to the other pass, where the Scots made a stouter defence, with their artillery and that of Leith closely playing on us for some time, though in the end they did like the others—they abandoned their position and fled. Meanwhile the main body of the English army, under the King's lieutenant, perceiving that the hackbutiers were not aware of the vanguard having attacked the other pass, continued still in pursuit of the enemy, followed them closely and brought them back without loss. The two passes being thus gained, the army proceeded towards the town, and notwithstanding the artillery shots from the walls and the defence that was made, the courage [of the Scots] at last failed, and Leith was taken late in the evening

* "Quatre mille chevaulx soubz la conduicte de mylorde Evre (*sic*)."

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of the third of May. Our loss was only three men killed and a few wounded, whilst the enemy's was considerable; the rest escaped, for we had no cavalry and night was coming on. The town, moreover, was sacked and given up to the soldiery (*aux compagnons*), who made a very handsome booty to the estimated value of 10,000*l.* sterling, or 30,000 "carolins." In the harbour two fine warships, named "La Salamendre" and "La Licorne," which belonged once to king James, were found. This happened on Sunday, the 4th of May. Had our people had any cavalry, most probably the Governor and the Cardinal would have fallen into our hands. The latter was dressed in yellow velvet.*

On Monday and Tuesday the artillery and the horses were landed from the ships. Meanwhile, the Governor (*sic*) of Edinburgh, after applying for a safe-conduct, which was granted to him, came to the king's lieutenant and offered to surrender under certain conditions, which were not accepted, lord Hertford telling them that the town was to surrender at discretion. About the same time a Scotch nobleman, named lord Breston, approached Leith for a similar purpose; that is to say to ask for a safe-conduct to parley, or to have himself taken prisoner. However that may be, no sooner had he dismounted than one of the sentries wounded him in the thigh with an arrow. He went away, but returned next day under safe-conduct, making to lord Hertford very large offers in the name of the grand masters (*grand maistres*) of Scotland, which offers were also refused. During this time the captain of the [Royal] galley went to attack a small fort or block-house (*blockehuis*) on an island in the river named Inchegarnoy. It was taken by storm, demolished and rased to the ground.

The above is the abstract of two letters, one from lord Hertford, the King's lieutenant, dated the 6th of May, the other from the Admiral, of the 8th. Other letters came from Scotland on the 14th, though not from the abovesaid generals, announcing that Our people have taken possession of the good city of Edinburgh, and set fire to it, burned and rased it to the ground, as they had formerly done at Leith. The confirmation of this news is expected from hour to hour, and it is hoped that, with God's help, when the afore-mentioned cavalry arrives, some good "exploit" shall be made.

Indorsed: "Extraicts de lettres d'Angleterre† (du 6, 8, et 14 Mai) sur les nouvelles d'Ecosse pour asjouter à la lettre de la Reine de Hongrie à Chapuys du 8 Mai."

French. Copy. 3 *pp.*

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* "Le cardinal y estoit en ung beau chamar de velour iausne tout couppé et deschiquetté bien soigneusement comme à ung tel prelat appartient." *See* above the Admiral's account, p. 141.

† Evidently a French translation of part of the two letters in English, Nos. 85 and 86, to which another of the 14th was afterwards added.

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n. d. **89.** NEWS from SCOTLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Relying on the proposals of the inhabitants of Esdenbourch (Edinburgh) who had many a time gone to the English camp offering to surrender and deliver up the keys of their city, the earl of Hertford, though he had less artillery than he ought to have had, advanced and presented himself before the gates. These, however, notwithstanding the offers of the inhabitants, were found closed, and some of his men, who had little experience of warfare, having approached one of them, the artillery of the castle fired upon them, and caused some damage. Meanwhile, the Earl's artillery having battered down one of the gates,* the English penetrated into the city, after slaying two hundred Scots to whom the defence had been entrusted. After which the English, inexperienced as they are in attacks of that sort, fell into disorder, and the confusion was such that they wounded and slew each other without knowing it. Thus milord Guillaulme, the brother of the duke of Norfolk, had his cheek pierced by an arrow.† Indeed, such was the disorder and confusion on the occasion, and the strong resistance from the castle, that the assailants were obliged to retreat. During the fight the Cardinal (Betoun) and the Governor abandoned the city, and as the cavalry which the Earl expected from England did not arrive in camp until the afternoon of that day, they could not be pursued, and so escaped.

Next day the English renewed the assault, and took possession of the town; but some foreign soldiers (*soudards*), not satisfied with that, and bravadoing (*faisant les braves*), thought that they could, with the help of the English troops, attack and carry the castle; but they were repulsed, and the artillery played upon them.

After sacking the city, and slaying two hundred Scots who composed its garrison, it was proposed to lay siege to the castle; but surrounded as it is by rocks and sands, it was considered almost impossible to open trenches there. When the English artillery approached, that of the castle succeeded in dismounting one of the principal English guns. Not having the means at hand to render the gun serviceable or carry it away, the Earl ordered the piece to be loaded up to the muzzle that it might burst, as it did. Such is the account which the earl of Hertford himself has sent home, adding that he had sent his cavalry to sack and burn the towns and villages near Edinburgh for five or six leagues around. The English have thus made a very rich spoil,

* "Et que apres avoir abattu la dicte porte à cops d'artillerye ses gens estoient entré dedans la dicte ville et, du premier impute (unpetu) avoient occis deux cents, Escossois qu'estovient à la defense de la dicte porte. Quoy estre faict les dits anglois (comme peu practiques en tel cas) misrent en desordre et y en telle confusion qu'ilz [se] blesroient lung l'aultre."

† "Et entre les aultres mylord Guillaulme, frere au duc de Norfolc, fust blessé au visaige d'ung cops de fleche, au moyen du quel desordre et de la *forte resistance* quilz trouverent dedans ilz furent constraints se retirer."

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without having lost in all the encounters and assaults more than seventy or eighty men.

The King has since received news from Scotland that the Cardinal and the Governor (earl of Arran), finding themselves in such perplexity, and not knowing how to improve their cause, had determined to set at liberty count Dhouglas (Douglas), earl of Angus (Archibald), and other state prisoners, and gain them over to assist against the common danger and peril of their situation. They had also summoned the earl of Lynnox to return, but he answered that he was ready to come back and do his duty towards his native country, provided the government were in other hands than those of Arran, under whom he would never serve.

The earl of Hertford, after having captured the two best and largest ships of the Scotch navy, one called "La Salamandre," the other "La Lycorne," had taken and demolished a castle, situated on an island formed by the river beside a town called Lyft (*sic*), the richest and most commercial place in all Scotland. He had also sacked and burnt two (*lieux*) belonging to the said Cardinal, and skirting the coast so as to obtain, in case of need, the assistance of the English fleet, he is now returning home. After marching with the whole of his force the distance of 16 miles along the coast, the Earl intends to dismiss the fleet, and take the road towards a castle called Whome (Hume), 12 miles from the Northern frontier of Scotland, and take, fortify, and hold it, so as to molest and annoy the Scots from thence, and, if necessary, make it the central position for a large army.

I have omitted to say that on the landing of the English on the coast the Cardinal said the Governor had gone out of Edinburgh with a good number of men, in order to guard some difficult pass, but on the approach of the English the Scots retreated and fled, leaving behind them all their artillery and heavy baggage; and the same was done by other lords (*seigneurs*) who had charge to defend the said pass. And it is, moreover, asserted that the Cardinal was dressed in a cassock (*casaque*) of yellow velvet, checkered and lined with white silk taffeta.

Indorsed: "Billet des nouvelles et occurrences en Escosse envoye à l'Empereur par son ambassadeur en Angleterre."

French. Copy of the time. 2 *pp.*

10 May. **90.** KING HENRY to QUEEN MARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Fasc.* Varia, No. 4.

Takes the opportunity of Paget being now sent to the Emperor's Court. Has given him order to visit the queen [regent] of Flanders and the Low Countries. Paget is to tell her the news [of England], and at the same time to

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thank her for the kind help and assistance she has bestowed in the matter of provisions, and so forth, for the English army.—Westminster Palace, 10 May 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

12 May. **91.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—This morning the privy councillors sent me word by my man that they were in receipt of letters stating that the Royal army had, some days before, effected a landing two leagues from Edinburgh,* the capital of the kingdom of Scotland, at a seaport town called Leith, the nearest to that city. No sooner, however, was the cardinal of St. Andrew's advised of the arrival of the English, than he hastily assembled an army of 12,000 or 14,000 men and took the field, though, hearing that the English were in much greater numbers than he anticipated, he immediately retreated, leaving only on the coast a few pieces of ordnance.† That after the Cardinal's retreat the inhabitants of Edinburgh had sent to present the keys of that city under certain conditions, which offer the earl of Hertford, the Admiral, and other chief commanders of the English fleet and land forces, had refused to accept,‡ unless the castle of the place surrendered at the same time. To this condition, however, the people of Edinburgh could not subscribe, inasmuch as the castle was not in their power, nor had they the means of reducing it to obedience. The English, on the other hand, finding that the 6,000 horse they were expecting from the Northern frontier had not yet joined, and, in consequence of that, being unable to drag along their heavy field guns, suspended their attack on Edinburgh; yet they lost no time thereat, for they sacked two or three small towns in its immediate neighbourhood. Indeed, the privy councillors are of opinion that the above-mentioned cavalry must already have joined the bulk of the Royal army on Thursday last, for on the preceding Wednesday they had crossed the Borders in pretty good haste, and as the distance to the English camp was only 45 or 50 miles, most probably they have already effected their junction.

The privy councillors, moreover, have informed me that besides the King's old intelligences in the place, certain Scotch lords have lately embracéd the cause of England, so that they confidently expect that what with the powerful army the King has in the field, and the indisposition—or,

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* Written "Esdembourt."

† "Et que estant le cardinal du dict Escosse adverty de leur arrivée, avoit faict amas de douze ou quatorze mil hommes, et estoit sorty en campagne, mais entendant le nombre des Anglois et lesquipaige [estre] plus grant quil ne pensoit, il s'estoit incontinent retiré, delaissant aux champs quelques pieces dartillerie."

‡ "Mais le conte Darfort et ladmiral avec les aultres chiefz principaulx navoient voulu accepter."

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rather, the grave illness—under which the Governor Arran is now suffering, events will turn out successfully for them.*

The landing of the English on the coast of Scotland has been very opportune and favourable for my lord Machwell (Maxwel), the count Dhouglas (Douglas, earl of Angus) and his brother, and certain other Scotch lords, whom the Cardinal and his party had cast into prison, and intended to have beheaded in a few days, though many here presume that the said Dhouglas and Machwell had purposely allowed themselves to be taken, and that their imprisonment was only a feint. Nor has the arrival of the English force been less fortunate for count Lynnes (Lennox), who has been persecuted to extremity by the said Cardinal and Governor.† Machwell and Douglas are prisoners in Edinburgh Castle, whilst the dowager Queen and the Princess her daughter are in another castle far away.

As far as I can gather from the privy councillors, their master's intention was that after the landing of the English force on the coast of Scotland, the Royal fleet should return home. I do really believe that, considering the good success of the expedition, he can hardly have changed his mind, but will, on the contrary, persevere in his purpose, and have his fleet back as soon as possible, the more so that he suspects and fears that the vast naval armaments now being made in France are destined for the invasion of his own kingdom the very moment that he is absent from it, and has crossed over [to Calais]. Should king Francis really intend to invade England, it must be requisite to have the whole of the Royal fleet along the south-western coast of England‡ facing that of Normandy and Brittany, in the ports of which these French naval armaments are being made. And so is this King preparing for the event, for he has already taken his measures for a body of troops to be ready to concentrate at any point of this western coast that may be invaded; he is daily sending thither commissaries and experienced agents to provide every necessary for the defence, has established a postal service like that of the North,§ and, as far as I can hear, besides the usual garrisons for the defence of that coast, he has raised a sufficient force to protect any point attacked by the enemy. It is doubtful whether the French will not prefer to send their fleet to Scotland rather than to

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* "De sorte quilz esperoient moyennant cela, leurs forces, lindisposition, et la griefve maladie du gouverneur que la tout ira bien en ce coustel là."

† "Est venu bien à propos à mylord Machevell [et] au conte Dhouglast et son frère et certains aultres seigneurs prisoniers, les quelz le dict Cardinal et ses adherants voulloient faire decouller dans peu de jours, quoy que ceulx-cy presumanent que les dicts Dhouglast et Machel se fussent faict ou laisse prendre pour une feinte. Aussi nen dira [ira] mal au conte de Lynnes, le quel es toit poursuyvist (poursuivi) du dict Cardinal et gouverneur extrememement."

‡ "Au quel cas seroit tres requis avoir la dicte armée [de mer] en la coste du ponant (Poniente, the West) correspondant à la Normandie et Bretaigne."

§ "Et y a faict asseoir les postes comme du coustel du Nort."

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invade any part of England, *unless, perhaps, the French have on their side cardinal Pole, by means of whom the internal affairs of this kingdom might be troubled.*

In consequence of a letter written by the queen dowager of Hungary to the deputy * of Calais, asking him to arrest the person of one Octavian Bosque (*sic*), an armourer of Milan, accused of some treasonable dealings against Your Imperial Majesty, the said Octavian has been arrested and confined to prison here pending the pleasure of the Queen, who is to decide what is to be done with the prisoner.

The King, after hearing what Your Majesty has written to the duke of Alburquerque, has sent him a message to the effect that he must needs put aside the pleasures of the chase, and that he will give him a house close to his Court in order to be better able to speak to him when necessary.—London, 12 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England of the 12th of May. Received at Spire the 22nd of the said month."

French. Original. 4 *pp.*

12 May. **92.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Madame,"—By the enclosed copy of my letter to the Emperor,† Your Majesty will learn the news of this country. I will only add that these privy councillors have again sent to request me to write to Your Majesty to be pleased to tell them what is to be done with the person of Octavian, the Italian.—London, 12 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the dowager queen of Hungary."

French. Original. ½ *p.*

14 May. **93.** PRINCE PHILIP to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADOR in England.

S. E., L. 64, ff. 108, 321.

Your letter of the 18th of January came duly to hand. I was glad to hear that Ferrante Gonzaga's mission had met with complete success, and that the king of England continued in his good purpose of brotherly affection for the Emperor, my lord, and as firm as ever in his determination to attack Our common enemy. His Imperial Majesty has since written to me to the same effect, at which you may imagine what my joy and contentment has been. I hope to God that the end of all this will be such as We all wish.

The 5,000 Spanish infantry who have been recruited in these kingdoms [of Spain] for Flanders are already on board, and We are sure will arrive there as soon as this letter.

* "Le Debity de Callais."

† *See* above, No. 91, p. 151.

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Provision has been made for the defence of Our coasts for fear the Turkish fleet—which, in combination with the French, was, as We hear, preparing to sail for Toulon and Marseilles—should ravage them.

As far as We can learn, the designs of king Francis for the present consist in sending most of his forces to Italy, whilst his fleet and that of the Turks come to Our Mediterranean coast, and perhaps to the islands of Mallorca and Iviza. It is not yet known which coast they will attack first, but every preparation for defence is now being made, &c.

Of their land army nothing is known for certain, though the rumour is that it is slowly approaching the Rousillon.—Valladolid, 14 May 1544.

Spanish. Original. 3 *pp.*

14 May. **94.** HIGH COMMANDER [COBOS ?] to the EMPEROR.

S. E., L. 64, ff. 222, 316.

"Sacra, Cesarea Catolica Majestad,"—On the 4th of February, Martin Alonso de Los Rios, the messenger, was despatched from this place to Your Imperial Majesty. The weather was so foul when he was about to embark that my letter of the 14th, enclosing bills of exchange amounting to 466,500 ducats, was delayed until the 18th, when, as there was nothing new to advise, a duplicate was sent by another way. That is the principal reason why my answer has been so long on the road. Another is, that the deputies (*procuradores**) to these Cortes, having arrived and held some sittings, it seemed to me and my colleagues in office that he (Rios) ought at the same time to have given Your Imperial Majesty some account of what had already been done. In the meantime, the courier of the 24th of February, from Italy, with duplicate letters of that date, arrived. Soon after, Juan Çapata de Cardenas came with that of the 14th, and a few days after, that which Your Majesty ordered to be written to me on the 22nd. This last letter came by hand of the messenger whom the marquis de Aguilar despatched by land. As it contained, in fact, the substance of what Your Imperial Majesty wrote by Juan Çapata [de Cardenas], and as previous to that it was known here that Martin Alonso de Los Rios had landed safely in England, and, therefore, that Your Imperial Majesty was already acquainted with our answer, this was again a cause for our not sending the duplicate of our letter, which was already written when the above-mentioned Martin Alonso de Los Rios came back from England. By him I wrote again to Your Imperial Majesty, answering some of the questions contained in the memoranda brought by Don Luis de Avila y Zuñiga. The rest shall be duly answered when there is an opportunity.

Your Imperial Majesty cannot imagine how glad we all

* Those of Valladolid, who happened then to be assembled.

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were to hear of Your arriving at Spire in good health, notwithstanding the uncommonly sharp winter and the bad roads, for certainly the journey from Brussels to Spire must have been a very fatiguing one.

I see by what Your Imperial Majesty writes to me that the prince electors of the Empire have arrived at Spire, and that on the 20th of February the deliberations of that body were to commence immediately by the discussion of religious matters. I and my colleagues are very anxious to know what the result has been in other matters in which Christendom is principally concerned—such as peace, and defence against the Turk. We shall be glad to hear what resolution has been taken in other matters at issue, and principally those relating to France.

Respecting the peace, I gather from the copy of the letter which Your Majesty caused to be written to Juan de Vega, the ambassador at Rome, as well as by the answer to cardinal Farnese, that there is very little chance, if any, of its being secured. Both Your Imperial Majesty's declaration on the subject and Mons. de Granvelle's resolute answer appear to me and my colleagues inimitable, for certainly if no other overtures were made, and the Cardinal had no other mandate from His Holiness, it is quite evident that they deserved no other answer. From various quarters, and especially from a servant of the Portuguese ambassador at Rome, intelligence has come here of the depression and disappointment caused by Your Imperial Majesty's resolute answer to the Cardinal. Indeed, it appears that both in France and at Rome, where the cardinals of the French party fancied that the Pope's overtures for peace might be accepted, the blow has been severely felt. It never occurred to them that unless king Francis himself came forward and gave certain securities for the future, all proposals of peace on the part of His Holiness would be rejected.

Notwithstanding Your Imperial Majesty's love of peace, and the many sacrifices you have hitherto made for the sake of attaining it, yet if the state in which Your Spanish kingdoms at present are is to be taken into consideration, with a Turkish fleet in combination threatening our coasts, and a treasury completely exhausted, Your Majesty would not have been justified in accepting His Holiness' overtures. For I can assure Your Imperial Majesty that after the money which has been just procured is spent, there will be no means of getting one "real" more out of the people; for in order to procure the bills of exchange sent by Martin Alonso de los Rios, and attend to other pressing wants we have been obliged to utilise the funds destined to other services of the State, and take in advance the extraordinary grant of money made by the Cortes.

The Instructions to Ferrante Gonzaga, on his mission to England to settle the details of the campaign against France

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this next summer, could not be better than they are. I am glad to hear that he has brought such an answer from the king of England as will ensure success, because when king Francis sees himself hemmed in on both sides of his kingdoms by the two most powerful allied armies, he cannot do less than come to terms, relax in what he pretends to do against this country and in Italy, although it must be said that the intelligence we have from France is that he is in no humour just now to take the offensive, but will limit himself to strengthening his towns on the frontiers of Picardy and Champagne, and keeping on the defensive, besides doing what harm he can in Italy, as he has already begun to do in Catalonia, with the help of the Turk. As to Your Imperial Majesty's resolution to invade the kingdom of France by one side, whilst the king of England enters it by another, nothing could, in my opinion and that of my colleagues, be better and more opportune. We can only add, that as Your Imperial Majesty is on the spot, and well acquainted with the military resources of France, there can be no doubt that, all things considered and with God's help, the issue will be what we all here expect and wish for.

Prince Doria and ambassador Figueroa wrote to me in similar terms as Your Imperial Majesty did respecting the offers made by Barbarossa; but certainly I must say that had his demands been more moderate it would have been very convenient to accept them; but as they were so exorbitant, there is no need of further talking about him and his offers.

In making the 5,000 foot soldiers march to the place of their embarkation, great diligence has been used. Vares de Acuña passed this way, and instructions were given to him of what he had to do. Already the men, as I hear, are close to the port where they are to embark; they would have reached their destination much sooner had not the late heavy rains retarded their march, and their having been waiting for Don Alvaro de Bazan, who is to command the fleet. They will sail at the end of this month at the latest. Before leaving home the men received one month's pay; another will be issued at their embarkation; one-half more in specie will go on board the ships to be distributed among the men at their landing. The merchants of Burgos could not be persuaded to allow some of their men to take passage in their fleet, and therefore we have been obliged to freight elsewhere as many transport ships as could be found. As it is, we are not sure that, when everything is prepared, the naval squadron that is to escort them will be ready*.—Valladolid, 14 May 1544.

Spanish. Original. 9 pp.

* "Con los mercaderes de Burgos no se pudo acabar que llevasen en su flota ninguna gente, aunque se procuró con ellos, y por esto se han tomado los mas que han sido menester para llevarlos. No sabemos si la dicha flota estará presta para ir en conserva de la armada."

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14 May. **95.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to SECRETARY COBOS.

S.E. Anglia, L. 8.

"Muy magnifico señor,"—Though I have frequently written to his Imperial Majesty, as well as to his sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, of late events in this country, and most particularly of the invasion of Scotland, which took place at the beginning of this month of May, and I have no doubt that my information, such as it is, has been duly communicated to His Highness, the Crown Prince in Spain, yet lest the Privy Council (*Consejo de Estado*) at Valladolid should want more details about it, I now send your Lordship a summary of the news obtained from these privy councillors, as well as from other officials and private persons of this Court.*

On the third day of this month, the King's lieutenant, milor Darfort (the earl of Hertford), and the Admiral (Sir John Russel), accompanied by milor Seusburio† (Shrewsbury), and other lords (*lores*) and knights (*caballeros*) of this kingdom, landed with a force amounting to several thousands of men on the 2nd of May on the western coast of Scotland, close to a fortified town named Leiza or Lizay (Leith) only distant a few miles from the capital of Scotland—Edinburgo (Edinburgh). The Royal fleet consisted of upwards of two hundred sail, between warships of all sizes and tonnage, and transports (*hurcas*), the force on board ‡ amounting to many thousands of men, exclusively of a large body of cavalry, that went by land, crossed the Scotch borders near a place called Barbique (Berwick Castle), commanded by an English general named Lord Ralph Everss.§

The first thing the English did after landing and defeating the Scots who attempted to bar them the passage to Leiza (Leith), was to storm that town, which was taken without much resistance, its garrison and the principal inhabitants flying in all directions. Had the cavalry joined the bulk of the English army, not one of the Scots would have escaped. As it is, they were persued some distance beyond the walls, and the town was sacked.

This happened on the 4th of May; next day, a Scotch lord of the name of Brumsen ‖ arrived at the gate of Liza (Leith); he came, as he said, either for the English of that garrison to take him prisoner, or else to hold a parley

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* Ever since the Emperor's departure from Barcelona in May 1543, his son Philip, having been declared Regent of Spain, held his Court at Valladolid, in the centre of Castille.

† "El Conde Darfort, teniente de Rey, vicerey, el° Almirante Rousel, Sebusberrio (Shrewsbury), y otros lores y caballeros de este reino."

‡ "La armada [naval] consistia segun me dicen, de mas de doscientos vaxeles de todo porte, entre navios de guerra con artilleria y hurcas ó transportes para la gente de desembarqua, la qual pasaba de muchos millares."

§ Sir Ralph Evers. "Sin contar mucha caballeria que fue alli por tierra y pasó la frontera no lejos de un castillo denominado Barbique al mando de un capitan ynglés llamado milor Raulfo Evero (*sic*)."

‖ Elsewhere Brumeston and Bruneston, *i.e.* Alexander Crichton, laird of Brunston.

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with the English general-in-chief. One of the guard outside of the fortifications shot an arrow at him, and wounded him in the leg. The Scotch laird rode away, but came again next day provided with a safe-conduct. He stated that he came on behalf of several Scotch noblemen (*grand maistres d'Escosse*) to make large offers to Monsr. de Hertford (Edward Seymour), which offers the latter refused to take into consideration. Almost at the same time the captain of the galley sailed to a small fort or blockhouse (*blockhuis*) that was on an island in the middle of the river [Forth], called Inchegarvie, which he took by storm, and razed to the ground.

Meanwhile the provost and baillies of Edinburgh (*el Alcade y Regidores de Edinburge*) sent a deputation to the English camp, offering to deliver the keys of that town, which, as I said above,* is the capital of all Scotland, under certain conditions, which the King's lieutenant (earl of Hertford) granted willingly; but when the English presented themselves at one of the gates of Edinburgh they found them closed, and the artillery of the castle played upon them. Whilst this was passing at one of the gates the English were busy at another. Having battered it down with their guns they penetrated into the town and took it without much resistance. The castle also was attacked, though ineffectually, for it was found to be too strong. The cardinal (David Beton) and the Governor-General (earl of Arran) left it at night and fled; but, as the cavalry had not yet joined (it did not reach the English camp until the afternoon of the ensuing day), both reached some place of safety.

The day after the attack on the castle was renewed, but as it was well provided with ordnance and ammunition it could not be taken, and the royal army, after sacking Edinburgh and setting it on fire, besides taking possession of two boroughs or ecclesiastical benefices belonging to the cardinal, withdrew towards the coast.†

The royal fleet, on the other hand, was equally successful, for the admiral captured two fine war ships ("La Salamandre" and "La Licorne ‡"), belonging to the late King [James V.], and took and destroyed a fort on an island [of the Forth].

The privy councillors tell me that, for the present, nothing

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* "Que como antes dije" are the words, which, literally translated, mean "as I said before, or in a former letter." *See* above, p. 151, where a similar remark occurs. This would prove that either the "Abstract of Letters from England with News of Scotland" (No. 88), pp. 146–8) was made by Chapuys himself, or else that in a former letter to the High Commander, or to Prince Philip, both of which have not been preserved, Chapuys announced the King's resolution to withdraw his army from Scotland.

† "Y con saquear y pegar fuego à la dicha ciudad, y sorprender los burgos de las cercanias que eran del beneficio eclesiastico del Cardenal de Escocia, se retiraron hacia la Costa."

‡ The "Salamander" and the "Unicorn," as in the Admiral's letter, p. 142.

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more will be done by way of punishment to the Scots; the King being justly satisfied that his royal army will soon return to England to be employed in the future campaign against France.

Of the Emperor's camp I have no fresh news. The last letters I have received are dated from Metz. He was then about to march with the whole of his army to Pont à Mousson in Lorraine. May God guard you from all dangers, and long preserve your life for the better service of his Imperial Majesty and of his son, the Crown Prince of Spain!—London, this day, the 14th of May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To Don Francisco de los Cobos, señor de Sabiote, High Commander of Leon, in the Order of Santiago, of the Emperor's Council of State," &c.

*Spanish.** *Holograph.* 3 *pp.*

17 May. **96.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On the 2nd inst. Your Majesty's letters of the 30th of April and 5th inst. came to hand, and the day after, as I could not see and speak to the King, owing to his having taken some medicine in the shape of pills (*pillules*), I communicated to the Privy Council the contents of Your Majesty's letters to me, immediately after which, and previous to the report by the councillors, I received the following answer in his name.

In the first place, that already in captain Siquinghen's business, he (the King) had, in view of my observations and representations, shown his satisfaction and contentment; he was now more pleased than ever to hear that Your Majesty has approved of the terms, and complimented him on the bargain he has made, and offers to assist and favour that captain and any others in the enlistment of men, and so forth.

With regard to the progress of the two invading armies, after my representing to the privy councillors the many advantages that might result for Your Majesty, as well as for the King, their master, by defeating the plans that king Francis may have formed in favour of the Scots, or for the invasion of this kingdom, after a long debate with the privy councillors on the expediency and facility of the proposed advance, and after my having removed all their scruples, I was told, in the King's name, that he desires no less than Your Majesty to hasten the invasion of France, and thinks of nothing else day and night; so much so, that he is taking care that his own army crosses the Channel and takes the field as soon as

* This letter itself, though signed as usual by Chapuys, is not, as I am informed, in his own hand, nor in that of his secretary, but in that of one of his Spanish servants; for the Imperial ambassador himself knew little of that language.

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*time and the means of conveyance may permit.** *This desire of the King the privy councillors backed and confirmed, the secretary of the Council, through whom I had repeated my application, having this very morning sent me word that the King, since I called on him, has sent messengers to the most remote parts of the kingdom to hasten the march of his forces, and written to the count Darfort (Hertford) to come back from Scotland as soon as possible, and when in England, and in a place where he may not want all this force under his command, to detach 3,000 of them and send them to Calais to reinforce his vanguard there.† He (the King) has likewise hastened the storing of victuals and provisions of all kinds for the men and horses that it will be convenient to keep between this city and Dover, and should the hulks and transports of Flanders soon make their appearance (of which, however, not one has yet been seen in the ports of England), I have no doubt that the whole force will cross over to Calais sooner than the date promised to Monsr. de Chantonnay.‡ Meanwhile, I shall not desist from my application. As to this King's ambassador in Flanders assuring the queen of Hungary that by the 15th instant the English vanguard would be at Dover ready to embark, there is no truth in the assertion. If he said so, it was merely for the purpose of hastening the fitting out and sailing of the hulks,§ for certainly before their arrival in port the men they are to transport across the Channel will not move from the place whereat they are now quartered, for fear of increasing the price of victuals wherever they may go.*

As to Mdme. Daiguemont, and others who happen to possess property and lands in France,‖ this King has sent an answer to this effect, that he has issued express commands for his men not to do harm to and waste the lands of Your Majesty's subjects, or do anything else likely to injure Your reputation or his. Your Majesty knows too well the natural condition of soldiers, and their propensity to commit disorderly acts in time of war, and yet he (the King) will certainly do every-

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* "Me feist respondu de la part de dict s^r^ roy quil ne desiroit moins haster la dicte emprinse que vre ma^te^ et que ny jour ny nuict il n'a pensoit a aultre chose, et quil auroit tout le soing possible de faire passer [ses gens] si avant que le moyen et la facillite se pourra adonner, et le mesme massurarent (*sic*) les dicts du Conseil de leur part."

† "Et a escript au conte Darfort de se haster à son retour d'Escosse, et desquil sera en lieu dont nait (n'aie) besoing de tous les gens quil meyne quil en face (fasse) embarquer trois mille, et les envoye à Calais pour le renforcement de lavantgarde."

‡ "Et ne tiendra que à larrivee des hurz de flandres (dont il ny a encoires piece de venue) quilz ne partent plustot que ne fust respondu à Monsr. de Chantonnay."

§ "Et la deu dire seullement pour faire haster les dictes hurz." *Hurz* seems a corruption of "hulk"; in Spanish, *hurca*.

‖ "Quant à laffaire de M^me^ daiguemont (Aigremont?) et aultres ayans leurs biens aux frontières sur les pays de France, le dict s^r^ roy me feist respondre quil avoit pour expressement commande à ses gens de guerre de non les endommaiger si avant que cela ne redonde au deservice de vre. ma^te^ et sienne."

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thing in his power to prevent such acts, and has written to the commanders accordingly.

With respect to the late news from Scotland, I beg leave to refer Your Majesty to the enclosed note.—London, 17 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England, the 17th of May. Received at Speier the 20th of May 1544."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 2½ *pp.*

17 May. **97.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Last Monday Your Majesty's letter of the 8th inst. came to hand, and on the ensuing day I informed these privy councillors of its contents. As to the declaration against the Scots, Your Majesty cannot imagine how glad the King was to read it, and how warmly he requested me to thank Your Majesty and all those who have had a hand in it. Indeed, I do not hesitate to say that Your Majesty has done a singularly good work towards winning the heart and affection of this King, by despatching a business of that kind without further delay. Had it been otherwise, great injury might have been done to the Emperor's affairs in general.

The King has taken in very good part the news I communicated to him of the manner in which Your Majesty treated the bearer of the Admiral of France's letter. He has been still more pleased at hearing that Your Majesty desires to know his opinion on the contents of that letter before it is answered. He says that Your Majesty may act towards the French as you please, but that at first sight, and without long consideration, his opinion is that it would be very convenient for us and very annoying to the French if the truce they are soliciting for the express purpose of fishing was refused to them.* The Emperor's army and his own are now so powerful in the field, that the subjects of both Majesties will be able to fish without danger wherever they like, whereas the French themselves will not dare go far from their coast. Such, the King tells me, is his opinion of the affair, subject, however, as I said above, to Your Majesty's pleasure.

Respecting Octavian Bos, the privy councillors have sent him to this Embassy to be cross-examined by me. I have questioned him at length on all matters concerning the treason of which he is accused; but as it would be too long and

* "Mais encore plus de ce que vre. mate entendroit (â l'endroit ?) du contenu des dictes lectres a bien voulu avoir son advis et consentement preablement que d'en faire la reponse, et dict le sr roy que vre. mate en pourra user comme mieulx luy semblera et que pour ceste heure, sans avoir pensé fort avant en l'affaire, il lui sembleroit que ce seroit grand commodité et dommaige aux françois [de] leur refuser ia tresve pecheresse quilz demandent."

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too prolix for me to enter into details, I will only say that since he left Lyons to return to Milan, about three years ago, he never revisited France; and that for the last sixteen months, which he passed in that country, he did not make the acquaintance of one single man of importance and rank in France (*parmie les grans de France*). That he had never in his life spoken to Monsr. de Vendôme, and though he had occasionally seen him when he, himself, was a page of Gallia Visconte,* he would not, if he saw him now, recognize him. That during the whole of October last he had been either at the camp before Landressy or at Valenciennes, and that after the retreat of the Imperial army he had gone straight to Anvers (Antwerp), whence he had twice returned to the Cambresis, taking with him La Chapelle, who was at Anvers without any employment or professional occupation. That his acquaintance with the said La Chapelle began at Milan, where he first saw him serving in the band of one of the lords Des Meynes.†

Octavian further affirms that he had no knowledge whatever of the arrest and imprisonment of La Chapelle until he himself arrived at Calais, where he first heard of it. Having questioned him how it was that after La Chapelle's arrest he, himself, had not returned to Lyons, where he formerly had a mercantile occupation, instead of going to Flanders, he answered that as it was then forbidden to export armour from France he preferred going to Flanders rather than to his native place, Milan.

The above is the result of Octavian's examination. I have also cross-questioned his secretary, a native of Dynant (Dinan), who confirms his master's statement respecting his staying at the camps of Landresy and at Valenciennes during the month of October. It would be advisable to examine, as soon as possible, others of Octavian's servants who remained behind at Antwerp, in order to see if their testimony agrees with the former declaration, for these privy councillors are urging me beyond measure to procure full evidence on the subject of Octavian's treasonable doings (*mesfaits*), anxious, as they say they are, to decide at once whether he is to be set free or remain in prison. May it please Your Majesty to have the affair looked into, and more witnesses examined, for as the said Octavian is much in favour with many English gentlemen who served lately in the aforesaid camp [of Landresy], it is to be apprehended that, unless more proofs of his supposed guilt be immediately produced, these people will at once set him at liberty.

With regard to Monsr. de Saint Martin and his overtures, the privy councillors have approved of Your Majesty's views

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* Galeas or Galeazzo Visconti, descended from one of the dukes of Milan of that family.

† "Du temps que le dit de La Chapelle estoit de la bande [d'ung] des seignours Des Meynes."

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of the affair. They find the advice extremely good, and intend following it, principally as they know well that Frenchmen are more artful and cunning than they themselves in affairs of this sort, and are constantly in the habit of sending forth their agents with * bait in order to make their profit thereby. The privy councillors, however, say that they will take more care in future.

The remainder of the news from this country Your Majesty will learn from my letter to the Emperor.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Queen."

French. Original. 3 *pp.*

17 May. **98.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Just at this moment two privy councillors, sent by the King, have come to this embassy to announce, in this King's name, that his principal secretary, Master Paget, is going on a mission to the Emperor for the purpose of reciprocally visiting and informing him of the good turn the affairs of Scotland are taking, and at the same time giving an account of the preparations that are being made for the undertaking against France. These two, I am told, are the only objects of that secretary's diplomatic mission; and yet I have considered it my duty not to let this courier depart without advising his appointment to the said mission. Indeed, nothing could be more favourable under present circumstances than the nomination of Master Paget, for being, as he is, a person of parts, and enjoying good credit with the King, his master, he has always shown great inclination for the Emperor's service, and cannot behave otherwise than well.—London, 17 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

18 May. **99.** The SAME to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—The King has sent me a message through two of his privy councillors to the effect that he has resolved to despatch towards Your Majesty his first secretary, present bearer, for the purpose of reciprocally visiting and informing Your Majesty of the late events in Scotland, as well as of the preparations now being made for the future undertaking against France, storing of provisions for his army, and so forth.

* "Congnisant (cognoissant) tres bien que les franchoys sont plus fins et plus subtilz qu'eulx en telz affaires, et qu'ilz envoyent semblables l'avec quelque petite ammone pour faire leur grant prouffit."

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To-day the King has sent me his secretary (Paget) to show me *the letter he has received from the king of France, and a copy besides of the answer he himself has made to it.** *The originals of both that secretary is to take to Your Majesty for personal inspection, and therefore I need not make any observations of my own, but merely refer to them.*

However, it seems to me, as Your Majesty will be more able to judge and understand from the Secretary's words, that no greater activity can be displayed in hastening the preparations for the undertaking against France than that which is actually taking place here; though, to say the truth, the more I look about me, the more I doubt things being ready as soon as Your Majesty desires and expects and the occasion requires. However, if there be delay, the cause, in my opinion, will be the King's affectionate desire and inclination—nay, obstinate resolution—to personally attend the expedition; for in order to insure safety, it is fit and necessary to provide so many things, that it will be impossible, I fear, to get ready in a short time. Indeed, I venture to say that the King will be acting imprudently if he persists in his determination of crossing the Channel and taking the command of his army; for however stout-hearted he may be, his age, his obesity and weight, and the state of his legs are such that those who have seen him of late wonder how it is that he does not keep his bed, and think that he will not be able to stand any fatigue without actual danger to his life. And yet no one here dares remonstrate with him about that or dissuade him from the resolution he has taken. There can be no doubt that his presence in the field will be of great use, if he can only recover the use of his limbs; but, on the other hand, in his present condition his voyage is fraught with danger, and may turn out a serious inconvenience for Your Majesty's plans of campaign. This Your Majesty will perceive much better than I myself can. For this reason, and others which for the last few days I have been turning over in my mind, it seems as if it would be a good and notable work to look out for the means of persuading the King to hasten his voyage to Calais, and remain there during the war, which plan would be more commodious and advantageous for Your Majesty's affairs.—London, 18 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England, on the 18th of May 1544. Received at Spiere, the 16th."

18 May. **100.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—I yesterday informed Your Majesty of this King's determination to despatch his first secretary, Master

* No. 98, p. 163.

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Paget, to the Emperor, and this very afternoon he has sent him to me to communicate the purpose of his mission, which, besides having the two objects specified in my last, is to communicate to His Imperial Majesty the contents of a letter written to him by king Francis from Saint Germain on the 9th inst., as well as the answer which he himself has returned to the said letter. Its purport in substance is as follows:—"That he (king Francis) never could imagine or think that there would be a breaking off of their mutual friendship, causing hostilities to ensue in the Boulonnois and the surrounding districts, the capture of vessels in the Channel, and other warlike operations. He was the more surprised at it because, in the letter he had written to him some time before, he (king Francis) had in vain proposed means of conciliation, peace, and confederacy. It seemed to him (the King observed) as if the king of France were only looking for the means of engendering jealousy between him and the Emperor; but that he is out of his reckoning, for the friendship of the allies is inviolable, and king Francis would do well in future to depart from such a line of conduct, and such indirect and out-of-the-way dealings. If he really wished to enter into ways of peace, he had better, before all things, renounce the Turk's as well as the Scots' alliance, pay his debt, and compensate the Emperor for his expenses."

In the end of the letter, as a *contre coup* for the news of Piedmont, which king Francis gave him, the King included a paragraph referring to the state of his affairs in Scotland.

As secretary Paget was in great haste to depart, I could not obtain a copy of king Francis' letter, nor of this King's answer to it; but there is no necessity for that, for I suppose that the Emperor will not fail to see it. The Secretary, as I pointed out in yesterday's letter, goes also for the purpose of informing the Emperor of the preparations here made for the future undertaking against France—such as the storage of provisions, arms, ammunition, and so forth. The King persists in his determination to cross the Channel in person. There can be no doubt that this will greatly benefit the enterprise should he be able to bear the fatigue of the journey; but it is quite certain that if he perseveres in his purpose, affairs will be delayed much longer than we can foresee; besides which, there is evident danger for his Royal person, for in addition to his age, which is considerable, he is so weak on his legs that he can hardly stand, and if after the long stay at home he ventures upon so fatiguing and trying a work as war is, there is danger for his life. All those who surround him have tried, though in vain, to dissuade him from his purpose, and I see no other chance than that of the Emperor making some excuse or other, and not placing himself at the head of his own army, for otherwise this King is sure to consider it a point of honour to do what the Emperor does. But to say the

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truth, and speaking under correction, it seems to me that whoever could find plausible excuses for both princes, the Emperor and the King, remaining behind, and not exposing themselves to the perils of war, would achieve a highly meritorious work. I beg and entreat Your Majesty not to attribute this prayer of mine to presumption or temerity, but to my zeal for the Emperor's service, for the two Majesties might, all the time the war lasted, be somewhere on the frontiers of the common enemy, whence they could annoy and surprise him as much as if they were at the head of their respective armies. Should this advice and prayer of mine meet with Your Majesty's approval, this last paragraph of my letter might be copied for the Emperor's inspection, but I beg Your Majesty not to mention to secretary Paget any part of it, but, on the contrary, thank him for the good offices which he has continually been rendering in all matters concerning the Emperor and his subjects.—London, 18 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. *Original.* 3 *pp.*

18 May. **101.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Sends him his councillor, Messire Guillaume Paget (sir William) to communicate certain views of his own respecting the advancement of their common affairs. Begs the Emperor to give him (Paget) audience, and attach faith to whatever he may say, as if he himself were talking to him. Paget, moreover, is to inquire what the Emperor's opinion is as to Henry's proposals, and bring him back an answer.—Westminster Palace, the 18th of May 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. *Original.* 1 *p.*

18 May. **102.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Profiting by Paget's departure on a mission to the Emperor, king Henry has ordered him to call first at Brussels on his way to the Imperial Court.* Paget is to visit queen Mary in his name, and at the same time that he informs her of late news in England, thank her warmly for her kind help and assistance in forwarding [to Calais] provisions for his army.—Westminster Palace, 18 May [1544].

Signed: "Henry."

French. *Original.* 1 *p.*

* On the 18th of May the Emperor was at Spire; he left on the 10th of June.

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18 May. **103.** The SAME to MGR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Has sent Paget to the Emperor on matters of importance. Begs Granvelle to help and assist him in the execution of his mission, and do his best for him to get a quick and favourable answer.—Westminster Palace, 18 May 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

21 May. **104.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—By your letters of the 12th and 17th inst.* We have been duly apprised of the news of that country, as well as of the King's successes in the parts of Scotland, of which news his ambassador, resident at this Our court, had already given Us notice, at the same time exhibiting a letter † from the King's general (earl of Hertford) relating to his landing in Scotland, his taking two forts guarded by the Scots, as well as the town of Lith (Leith), and the flight of the Governor and Cardinal, and so forth, the whole of which is contained in the said letter as shown to Us. We have caused it to be translated [from the English] into French, and to be published and proclaimed everywhere, as a very good and most agreeable piece of news. And We request you, when the opportunity offers, to thank that King in Our name for his attention in communicating to Us that signal success of his arms, which has been as pleasant and agreeable to Us as if the affair had been one of Our own. We hope that with so good a beginning the King will establish such order in the country that the Scots will no longer have the means or the power of rebelling against him, and that Our common undertaking against France will be benefitted and made easier through it, confident as We are that his men will behave as gallantly on this side of the Channel as they have in Scotland.

We have likewise been pleased to hear that the King has taken in good part and approved of the declaration against the Scots, without making any difficulty as to the clause about the safe-conducts, which his privy councillors added in the form proposed by them, and which, as you must have observed, has been purposely left out; for it has nothing to do with the declaration.

With regard to the letter of the Admiral of France (Hannebault) We cannot say anything yet, not having had an answer to the one We wrote to the Emperor, our lord and brother, about it. When that answer and the Emperor's decision come to hand, We shall know whether the Admiral's

* No. 92, p. 153; and No. 97, p. 161.
† See above, No. 85, p. 185.

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letter is to have a reply or not,* and, if so, what that reply has been, that you may immediately inform the King of it, all the time thanking him for the good advice he has been pleased to bestow on Us, and assuring him that in this matter of the Admiral, as in many others, We do not intend to act without letting him know first and ascertaining what will be found most convenient for both parties, and most suitable for the observance of the treaty of closer alliance between the two majesties, Imperial and Royal.

You will do well in trying to ascertain from that King's ministers what they intend to do with the port of Lit (Leith), and whether they are thinking of fortifying it or abandoning it altogether, for should they abandon it, the fishing of the people of these countries would become a very hazardous occupation, and, if so, We must look to, and reject, the propositions which the French High Admiral (Hannebault) is now making Us on the subject.†

With regard to Octavian Bos, prisoner in England, We have issued orders that a copy of Guillaume de la Chapelle's confession should be placed in the English ambassador's hands. La Chapelle, who, as you know, is a Frenchman, incriminates him at every stage of the trial, and it is not to be wondered at, if Octavian refuses to acknowledge his complicity in so offensive and treasonable an act as the one he is accused of. Nevertheless, the evidence against Octavian is becoming so strong that it seems impossible that La Chapelle could have invented the facts adduced against him. True it is that at the very commencement of the trial the former would not confess, and denied the charges brought against him, though his "gougart"‡ (accomplice and denouncer) told him to his very face that he had been the bearer, by his order, to France of certain letters in cipher, which he himself had deciphered for La Chapelle's use, but no sooner was the latter put to the rack than he confessed the whole of it. Since then, on different occasions, and without any further torture, La Chapelle has confirmed his first declaration, and when closely examined and questioned by the Sieur de Brabançor (to whom he owes many favours) he has voluntarily confessed what he had formerly indirectly declared in an affidavit; and besides that, as you will see by the copy of his confession herein inclosed, has charged the said Octavian with having been the principal agent in the treasonable correspondence of which both are accused.

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* See above, No. 97, p. 161.

† "Vous ferez bien d'assentir de ceulx de par de là comment ilz entendent faire du port de Lit, et silz le veuillent fortifier ou abandonner, car en cas quilz doibvent le delaisser la pescherie de ceulx de par decha seroit bien hazardeuse, et selon ce nous conviendroit avoir regart à rebouter la practique que l'admiral de France presente et offre."

‡ "Combien que son gougart (*sic*) luy dit en sa face qu'il luy avoit fait porter lettres en France en luy deciffrant le contence d'icelle."

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Ever since the Emperor's camp was at Landreschis Octavian has done nothing else than go up and down from Antwerp to the frontier, and from the frontier to Antwerp, without having in that town any trade, pursuit, or business likely to require his presence thereat so often after frequenting the Imperial camp in front of Landreschis, for We have caused his property at Antwerp to be seized, and nothing has been found there, whereas, here, in Brussels, his sequestered property amounts to only thirty florins in all, which certainly is not a sufficient capital to carry on trade. In addition to this, he had no occupation or profession that is known of, all of which are strong proofs that the said Octavian's frequent journeys to Antwerp had another object than that of merchandise.

It is not likely that Octavian will confess having had a hand in the treasonable practices he is accused of, and which deserve punishment of death, unless he be first put to the rack. If the King's privy councillors, after a close inspection of the papers and documents herein enclosed, think as We do, they might send him here, where the guilty practices he is accused of have taken place, to be confronted with La Chapelle; that it may be ascertained whether he is guilty or not. This is a thing no less important to the king of England than necessary for the security of the countries and provinces under Our government, and therefore, We request you to put the case before the privy councillors, and beg them to issue orders for the transportation and delivery of the said Octavian, if they consider it just and well-founded, for We remit Ourselves to their judgment. The English resident ambassador proposed to Us to send the said La Chapelle to England, but this We have not accepted for many reasons; first of all, because La Chapelle has been a military man, has served and received pay in this country, and committed here the crime of which he is accused; whereas Octavian had his domicile at Antwerp, whither he escaped from Brussels, and the crimes with which he is charged had their origin in these countries under Our government, besides which, We are in Our full right, according to the fifth article of the treaty of closer alliance, to have him ejected out of England. We have delayed until now to ask for Octavian's extradition, for fear the King's privy councillors should hesitate, and bring on an altercation on the subject; but now We can no longer demur, as justice must be done in this case, as in others. We hope, therefore, that Our request will be complied with in order that the truth may come to light.

All possible diligence has been used on Our part to send Our warships to sea; Monsr. de Bèvres has left to hasten their departure. We expect that about the 25th inst., or soon after, the fleet will be ready to put to sea, and if weather and wind be favourable touch on the coast of England and communicate with the King's commissioners

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as to the service that is expected from them. We, however, request you to take care that the said Monsr. de Bèvres * be properly treated and not molested by the English military authorities (*gens de guerre*), who, whenever they are the stronger at sea, insist upon everything being done after their fancy, which is by no means convenient to the common welfare of the two allied princes; the ships' crews should be able to live amicably and in perfect harmony with each other without any show of arrogance or assumption of superiority of one party over the other.

We have furnished Mons. de Bèvres with a private letter for you; please attend to it, for the soldiers on board Our fleet complain that the English very frequently keep them inactive at sea, with great danger of their ships running on shore, whilst Our men, separately, are not allowed to inflict a blow on the enemy. Indeed, We hear that the men on board the fleet, all the time that they are hoping to do good service to the king of England, and perhaps also benefit themselves without any risk to the ships,† are frequently kept on a lee shore doing nothing. This is the cause of the great difficulty there is now in procuring able seamen, and engaging them for any length of time, they preferring much to serve on privateer vessels with little or no salary at all, and have the chance of a good prize from the enemy, than be on board warships for the Emperor's money.‡ So it is, that in order to procure able seamen for the Imperial fleet, it has become necessary and convenient to forbid the armament of privateer vessels as long as the present war lasts, and Our fleet must be manned. You, Chapuys, should take note of this, in order to remonstrate with the King's privy councillors when convenient and opportune.

Every facility has been given by Us to the commissaries, whom the king of England has lately sent here for the purpose of chartering vessels for the transport of the English army to Calais; all they have asked for has been placed at their disposal—warrants, orders to the governors, letters to merchants and shipowners, and so forth. The commissioners have already left for the harbours and ports on the coast, but since their departure We have had no news of their doings, nor

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* "Vous priant de tenir la main que le dit s^r de Bevres puist estre bien traicte sans estre molestez des gens de guerre du dit s^r roy, lesquelz quant ils sont les plus fortz en mer, ne veuillent le tout faire synon à leur fantaisie, qui ne convient à commun bien des dites princes; mais est besoing quilz s'entendent par ensemble sans user de haulteur ou preeminence lung sur l'autre."

† "Aussy nos gens de guerre se plaindent que ceuls de par de là le veuillent tenir (ocieulx, oisifs?), souvent avecque grant peril de donner en terre sans vouloir permettre quilz puissent exploicter contre les enemys [là] ou ilz esperoient à la fois faire bon service et profiter pour eulx mesmes sans hazarder les navieres."

‡ "Qu'est cause que bien mal on peult içy recouvrer des matelotz qui se veuillent meltre en mer à soldre, aymant mieulx servir aultres pour riens, quant ilz peuvent choisir leur fortune que sa ma^te pour son argent, de sorte que pour avoir bons matelotz nous a convenu de deffendre d'armer navieres tant que les navieres de sa ma^te seront en mer."

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do We know how far they have been successful. Should the English commissaries, however, for the reasons above-stated, find a deficiency, or else that they cannot charter the number of transports required, the fault is in nowise to be attributed to Us, but to themselves, because previously to their departure from this city, We had it declared that if they wanted assistance or help for the execution of their charge We would willingly give them any that was in our power, and not only have they not answered Our offer of assistance, they have sent back, without a verbal message, the very man We despatched to assist them in their business.

You have not yet sent Us the King's letters patent on the matter of the safe-conducts. We request you to make haste and send them on, that we may have the *vidimus* and the authentic copies of them made at once. If you deem it necessary, and they are wanted, We can send you back the originals.—21 May, 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

22 May. **105.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Eng.

"Madame,"—Yesterday, the King sent me word by the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner) to the effect that the army he has in Scotland, after wasting the country, and doing incredible damage besides that of which I wrote last, had reached in safety the English frontier,* whilst his fleet was returning home, save a few vessels, which had sailed in pursuit of five French ones at anchor in the port of St. Andrews. The King hopes they will not escape; he is daily expecting the news of their capture, and waiting only for the arrival of such intelligence in order to inform Your Majesty most minutely of what he has accomplished in Scotland.

The King also sent to say that in the morning of that day he had received letters from a servant (*serviteur*) of his, whom he had sent to Dançag (Dantzig) for the purpose of buying cables and other things required for the navigation of vessels, and who had written to say, as most certain and true, that the duke of Holstein had sent to various parts, and also to the said Dançag (Dantzig), to recruit as many as thirty battalions (*enseignes*) of infantry (*pietons*), and three or four thousand horse.† That besides that he had at the Sond no less than 50 hulks (*hucques*) ready for sea, and sixteen more in two ports, which he named.

The King's message was for the purpose of my writing to the Emperor and to Your Majesty on the subject, warning you both to be on the alert and prepared to defeat the Duke's

* "Estoit arrivee (*sic*) en saulveté aux froutieres de ce royaulme."

† A marginal note in a different hand has the following:—"Ces nouvelles ne sont vraies semblables, car Dansic neest lieu pour avoir bons pietons, et les a trop meilleurs plus pres de soy."

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plans. He therefore begged Your Majesty to take care and watch the movements of the said Duke, and let him know that he himself may also be prepared, &c.

Yesterday morning Octavian, the Milanese, was on the point of escaping* from the servants of the Secretary of the Council, who guarded him. In the afternoon of the same day, after dinner, the privy councillors sent him to this embassy to be examined by me, and after that committed to the Tower, if I considered it necessary. I questioned him at length, according to the memorandum and articles that came from Flanders, and most particularly concerning the case of Salazar and his accomplices; but he would not confess anything, save that he was Salazar's friend, and had once resided in Cambresant (the Cambresis); that since then Salazar had been twice or three times at Anvers (Antwerp), and visited him (Ottaviano) in his shop (*en sa boultique*). Besides that, he would make no confession; he persisted, as he has done hitherto, in denying the guilt of which he was accused. Seeing which I sent him to the Tower, where he happened to meet the Secretary of the Council, to whom he confessed that he had been in France in October last, with La Chapelle, and had promised to the Dauphin to do service by information and other means in his power, but that he had not yet had time or opportunity to fulfil his word. As the above confession is conclusive enough to convince Ottaviano of high treason, one could, if Your Majesty approve of it, ask the King's permission for the culprit's extradition and transportation to Flanders, that we may hear from his own lips what were Salazar's plans, and who were his accomplices. I have no doubt that Ottaviano's extradition will be granted without difficulty,† and, therefore, let Your Majesty's orders come as soon as possible.

The King has again requested me to remind Your Majesty of his prayer for the transport ships (*hurces*) which he wants for the crossing of his army, to come as soon as possible, as he is only waiting for them, and everything else is ready for the passage.‡—London, 22 May, 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Queen."

French. Original. 3 *pp.*

* "Hier matin Octavian, le milanois, pensa reschapper (s'eschapper) des serviteurs du Secretaire du Conseil quil lavoit (qui l'avoient) en garde."

† On the margin of the draft I find the following: "Il me semble qu'il seroit bien faict de transporter le dict Octavien."

‡ Against this passage there is also in the same hand as the preceding:—"Il fauldra parler à l'ambassadeur du dict s[r] roy affin qu'il face (fasse) haster les hurces, car comme il s'est jaffaict (dejà faict) ce que est en moy, ne reste [sinon] que ses gens [en] faisent (fassent) la diligence des chenors (chevaulx, chariots ?), de quoy en pourrez aussy advertir nostre ambassadeur en Angleterre.

"President, par les apostilles vous verrez mon avis; toutesfois vous pourres communiquer ceste à Mess[rs] D'Aarschot et Praët, et selon et mon dict avis faire les despeches au dict ambassadeur et parler à l'ambassadeur d'Angleterre touchant les hirces (*sic*), dont pourres avertir le nostre de la response qu'il vous affaicte (a fait)."

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22 May. **106.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—The enclosed copy of my despatch to the Queen * will sufficiently inform your lordship of what has happened here since the date of my last, of which news, if your lordship pleases and considers it necessary, His Majesty, the Emperor, may equally be apprised. I have, moreover, avoided troubling the Emperor with a longer despatch about Scotland, because I am waiting for the full account of the state of affairs in that country which the King has promised to send me by one of his privy councillors.

If there should have been any temerity on my part respecting the reasons I alleged for His Imperial Majesty not attending personally the projected expedition against France, I beg to be excused, and pray your Lordship to consider that the motives I had for doing so did not exclusively proceed from me, and that I was obliged to gratify and please the company.†

I am expecting my redemption from this slavery more anxiously than the holy fathers their own from Limbo, for I beg your Lordship to believe me when I say that I could not possibly follow this King's camp for one single day; nor could I, if I wished, remain longer in England without imminent risk of my life. Such is, indeed, the state of my health through weakness brought on by chronic illness, that physicians here assert my life is in danger; that is why I beg and entreat that your Lordship to do me the greatest favour in the world, which is to remove me from this embassy.—London, 22 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To Monsgr. de Granvelle."

French. Holograph, partly ciphered.

22 May. **107.** ANONYMOUS LETTER of an ENGLISHMAN to [an ENGLISHMAN.]

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—Nothing of what the Burgundians took from me has been restored, and therefore I am unable to do service as I should wish and ought to do. I hope, however, that His Majesty the King [of England] will know what I have done, and in the end acknowledge my services.‡ In compliance with orders received, I went on Monday last to Boulogne and stayed there the whole of Tuesday, and saw Monsr. de

* No. 105, p. 171.

† "Sil y heust de la temerarite (*sic*) en mes pieces touchant lexcuse de non aller sa ma^te^ en personne en larmee, je supplie v^re^ S^te^ men tenir pour excusé, et considerer que ces motifz ne sont procedes de moy mesme, et quil a fallu gratiffier à la compagnie."

‡ "Pour quoy il ne m'est possible de fere si bien mon debvoir comme je vouldroys [et] comme j'espere que la ma^te^ du roy en la fin en aura bonne cognoisance."

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Fourquerole,* with whom I had a pretty long conversation on various matters, and chiefly on the differences now existing between the two princes, the king of England and that of France. Monsr. de Fourquesol (*sic*) told me positively that king Francis could not possibly forget the great friendship and regard which he once entertained, and in a great measure still entertains for the king of England, so much so that he had actually sent from his Court [to Boulogne] a rich and most wonderful ring, to be presented to the queen of England or to the King's daughter.† Of this I am certain (said Fourquesolle (*sic*) to me); may God, by his infinite bounty, permit that the king of England may take in good part these sentiments of my Royal master, that Christendom at large may, after so many troubles, rest in peace!

You know, continued Monsr. de Fourquesole, that there is no fiercer war than that which is raged against each other by two princes who were once friends. King Francis, I warn you, has just visited all the ports of Normandy, and I am informed by good friends and correspondents I have in that country, that he (king Francis) has ordered every large ship, besides his own, to be freighted and fitted out for war. That among the war ships of his own there is one *carracon* ‡ of 500 tons, which the last admiral of France § caused to be placed on the stocks, and is now completely finished and armed. This ship and others are destined for descent on the coast of England, unless king Francis obtains first England's friendship. The command in chief of this force, by sea as well as by land, he has entrusted to the count of Dieppe, ‖ and the landing is to take place near a port of the coast called, if I have understood well, Hamptonne (Southampton), by which port the Emperor's father, Philip, escaped and saved himself, as reported. Once on land, the French intend penetrating into a district of England called La Rye. The towns and boroughs of France are to furnish for the King 70,000 men, paid for five months; the Pope 6,000 infantry, and the duke of Urbino¶ an equal number; the Venetians have declared against the Emperor, and likewise promised to furnish 6,000 infantry paid for four months."

Such was the imformation imparted to me by Fourquesolles (*sic*). It is also reported that the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois) is about to join Monsr. d'Enghien in Italy, whilst others assert that he is about to operate in

* Lower down *Fourquesol* and *Fourquesolle*. Which is the true reading I am unable to say, but *Fourquesolle*, with an "s" at the end (*Fourquesolles*) seems more acceptable.

† Mary. "Et a le dit s^r roy de France fait apporter une bague fort, excellente et merveilleusement riche, de sa court jusques à Boulloigne, pour en faire un present à la royne d'Engleterre ou à la fille du roy."

‡ *Carracon* is the augmentative of *carraca* in Spanish—a large ship of burden.

§ The last admiral of France, that is Philippe de Brion Chabot, or otherwise and more correctly, Philippe Chabot, sieur de Brion, who succeeded Anne de Montmorency, and was replaced by Marshal d'Hannebault.

‖ "Le Comte de Dieppe."

¶ Guidobaldo della Rovere.

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France, in conjunction with his brother, the Dauphin (Henri). Those who make him go to Italy, pretend that he is going thither for the purpose of taking possession of the duchy of Milan. No one knows for certain what this Duke's object or destination may be, but the great military preparations made, and the rumour that he is to start soon, followed by a large retinue of officers and gentlemen of the household, is gaining ground, and indicates that something is intended against the Emperor.

I commend myself to your good graces, and remain, as you know me to be, your very faithful servant.—Ascension Day, the 22nd of May 1544.

Indorsed: "Lettre d'un inconnu à un Anglois." *

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

23 May. **108.** A SUMMARY of what the KING'S PRINCIPAL SECRETARY said to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

First of all the Secretary (Sir William Paget) offered the King's commendations and thanks for the solicitous care with which she (the Queen) has attended to his request for carriage (*charroy*) and other material required for the campaign against the French.

Secondly, he said he had charge to state that, although the news from Scotland had already been sent to her, yet if she wished for more particulars, he (the Secretary) had orders to give her complete information on that subject.

The Queen answered that she had already heard of the news, and had been very much pleased, but that she should be glad to hear of it again in detail, if such was the ambassador's wish. Then the Secretary told her most minutely the said news, adding that the English had taken possession of the towns of Edinburgh and Leith, made rich spoil to the amount of three hundred thousand florins, and were thinking of taking some other fortresses and castles to keep, if easily defensible, and should the war continue destroy or rase them altogether. So great was the waste the English had made in Scotland, that next year if the king of England sent another army thither, he would soon become, if he chose, lord of the whole country, for the waste and destruction had been so general, that neither king Francis nor the king of Denmark could find provisions for their armies if they did land there.

The Queen's answer, after praising and extolling the feat of arms achieved by the King's generals, was that she confidently hoped that, after such a signal success against the Scots, the

* The letter is neither signed nor addressed; but as a copy of it has been found at Vienna, it may be conjectured that it was originally written by some secret agent of king Henry, and addressed to the dean of Canterbury (Dr. Nicholas Wotton), at that time English ambassador at the Imperial Court. It was probably written in English, and then translated into French, to be placed into the hands of Granvelle, or some other of Charles' ministers, which explains why it is still in the Imperial Archives of that city, among the papers and letters relating to England.

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King, with the help of God would obtain a similar, and perhaps a greater one against the French, and that as the season was advancing, she was naturally very desirous to know when the King, his master, would be ready to cross the Channel.

The Secretary replied, that although he had no express commission to say so, his own personal information was that the vanguard of the Royal army would cross during the present month of May and beginning of June, and the remainder before the 20th, as he believed.

The Queen replied that the infantry and cavalry who were to join the English were quite ready, and had already begun their march; that was why she wished to know the precise date and place of their meeting with the English. Upon which the Secretary said that he would forthwith write to the King inquiring about those particulars, and would let Us know the result.

The Secretary further said that most likely the Queen had heard that the king of France had sent a present of wine to the king of England, and the Queen replied that so she had heard, and also that the French boasted of that, and said there was a certain understanding between the two princes.

Upon which the Secretary observed that the French were certainly at their usual tricks, trying to make people believe that the overtures which they themselves are making proceed from another quarter, and that it is we, the English, who are actually seeking for peace; for after the present of wine king Francis wrote a letter to the King, my master, thanking him for the honest words (*honnestes propos*) he had addressed to the man, who now took the wine, as a present, as a token of friendship, &c., whereas the truth is that the King's answer on the receipt of the present had been quite different, for he had said to the messenger: "I am very much astonished at your master, the King, pretending to be my friend, when he has been, and is still, making war upon me in the Boulongnois (*sic*), and is hoping soon to make a greater one. If I returned a civil answer to the man who brought me the wine, it was merely because it came from the king of France. If he thought by that means to engender jealousy between the Emperor and him, he (the King) was very much mistaken, for our friendship is indissoluble. As to Francis' friendship he cared not for it, unless he previously renounced the alliance with the Turk, and satisfied offended Christendom, the Emperor, and himself of all their demands.

The Secretary then produced king Francis' original letter to the king of England, and the copy of the latter's answer, and after that he intimated that he had some private affairs of the King, his master, to speak of, such as that of count of San Bonifacio, kept prisoner at Ripelmonda, whom he (the Secretary) had gained over in France, and brought to England for the Royal service. He had been

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taken prisoner in the Luxemburg, and kept long in a dungeon, and although the King had written in his favour and interceded for him through the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), Monsr. de Chantonnay, and others, the Count had not yet been released.

The Queen's answer was that she would consult those who knew of the Count's affair, and let him know her decision.

After this, the Secretary said that English merchants had long been soliciting to be exempted from the "*centième denier*," which exemption they had not yet obtained, and that they compelled them at the custom houses to take an oath, which they disliked immensely and which was the grievance they had often complained of.

To which the Queen made answer that the English could not refuse to take the oath required, unless they wanted to introduce forbidden goods into the Low Countries, since according to the commercial treaties between England and the Low Countries, she understood that it was customary to visit and search the goods coming from England, as was done with the Flemish shipped for that country.

The Secretary replied that in England the custom was to visit the goods imported, but that was not the custom of Flanders and the Low Countries, and that the last [English] ambassador had presented an article on that point, to which no answer had been given.

The Queen answered that she would make inquiries and let him know the result thereof.

Thirdly, the Secretary complained that no sentence had yet been pronounced in the Brabant chancery one way or the other in the cause (*proces*) of Tiedlevelle (*sic*).

Fourthly, that there was in the territory of Ypre, in the service of the king of England, a young man, son [of his], who happened to have had words with a certain presbyter of that town. In the course of the dispute the latter had spoken disparagingly of the king of England, and moreover, denounced the young man to the justice of the place, as professing Lutheranism. The youth in question had been summoned to appear at Court, but being unable to do so, owing to his being in the King's service, he (the Secretary) asked that his contumacy should be overlooked, and that if anyone was found guilty, the Devil himself should suffer the penalty.* Upon which the Queen promised that if the defaulter (*adjourné*) presented his memorial she would look into the whole affair, and decide; she would also have the case thoroughly investigated, and if the words uttered by the

* "Quartement dit que au quartier de Ipre avoit ung jeune filz dont le roy d'Angleterre se servoit, le quel avoit eu parolles contre ung presbytre, qui avoit dit beaucop de mal du roy d'Engleterre (*sic*), à cause de quoy le presbytre l'avoit deferé à la justice comme Lutherien, et estoit appellé mais ne pouvoit comparoir pour le service du roy, requerant que sa contumace ne luy fust preiudiciable et quel'on fist chastier le diable."

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presbyter were found to be in any way injurious to the King, she would have him punished.

Fifthly and lastly, the Secretary wishes to know how the affair of the indemnity, to be paid to the English on board the vessel taken by the Scots close to La Vere, is going on. The Queen answered that she had already declared to the Scots that the English were to be fully indemnified for their losses; otherwise she would put them and their property into the hands of the English. This, however, was not much to the Secretary's taste, who remarked that his countrymen would have preferred that the indemnity should be paid to them, by the Queen, and then taken out from the Scots in the Low Countries.

French. Entirely ciphered. 4 *pp.*

25 May. **109.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassador,"—After the receipt of your despatch of the 18th inst., and before that of the 17th came to hand, Master Paget, one of the principal secretaries of the king of England, arrived here with credentials for Us; in virtue of which credentials, and after due commendations and thanks from the King, his master, to Us for the solicitude and care which, he said, We had employed in forwarding the King's affairs in these countries under Our government, he (Paget) addressed Us in the words contained in the indorsed summary of the conference We had with him. He first of all began to speak to Us about the imprisonment of count de Boniface,* who was arrested in this country wearing secretly a French uniform, which, as military men here say, is a capital offence. To please the king of England We should already have ordered his release from prison, had it not been that whilst in confinement he has threatened to revenge himself somehow, and when interrogated, declared, among other things, that he was travelling on behalf of the English merchants, who complained that they were now compelled to declare on oath what merchandise they imported or exported from the Low Countries, whereas in former times, according to the rules of the intercourse of trade, a simple inspection of the goods would have been sufficient.† So much did the Count say, ignoring, perhaps, that if We have ordered that the English be made to declare on oath what merchandise they bring to or take away from this

* About this Italian count, whose real title was *San Bonifacio*, see above, p. 176.

† The passage is rather obscure; it stands thus:—"Et que neanmoins pour complaire au dit sieur roy volountiers l'eussions eslargy, ne fust que estant en prison il menasse de soy venger par quelque boult que [ce] soit, et aussy donner responce [estant interrogué] de ce quil se duelloit (douloit) que les marchans d'Engleterre estoyent constraires (constrains?) de declairer par sermens les merchandises quilz passoient,

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country, it is both for the sake of sparing them the trouble and annoyance of having their vessels and cargoes visited, and that if the merchants are thus made the judges in their own affairs they have no reason whatever to complain.

With regard to the affair of which you wrote to Us on the 18th,* the Emperor will decide what had better be done.

Two days ago, one who styles himself the king of England's commissioner arrived for the purpose, as he says, of raising at Antwerp (Anvers) money for that King, namely, one hundred thousand ducats monthly. We are very much surprised to hear of it, believing, as We do, that the king of England has plenty of means, and, therefore, is not in need of financial operations. Even if he were so, and he (the King) wishes to send his money to this country by means of exchange, that will be inconvenient, as it will considerably delay and impede the military operations of the Emperor, who has not the means of bringing money from Spain, and run the risk of losing it—unlike the king of England, who can easily send his own wherever he pleases, and especially to this country.† The same happens with Us, for the greater part of the money with which We have to aid the Emperor as well as the English, according to treaty, is to be raised at Antwerp by bills of exchange, and should there be the least delay in the payment of these bills you may imagine what discredit would fall on the Emperor and Us. That is why We earnestly request you to try and ascertain whether the King has really given the commission or not. Some one under his name is trying to raise money [at Antwerp]. Should you upon inquiry find out that it is by the King's orders that the above-mentioned agent is going to Antwerp to negociate, you shall try as graciously as possible to dissuade the King from it, and tell him that there is nothing We wish for so much as to serve him with anything he may want from these countries under Our government, as long as that can be done without thwarting or delaying His Imperial Majesty's military operations against the common enemy; but that by trying to raise money here [in Flanders], he will seriously affect the Emperor's plan of campaign, which can be easily and commodiously avoided by raising the money in his own kingdom and remitting it here in specie. It is for you to request him to attend to this prayer of Ours for the above-mentioned considerations and reasons.—25 May 1544.

Addressed: "To the ambassador in England."

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

* Most likely that of the truce, about which overtures had been made to queen Mary. *See* above, No. 97, pp. 161–3, though the letter is dated the 17th.

† "Et sy ainsy estoit que le dit sieur roy vouldroit lever son dit argent par decha par finance, donneroit gran retardement aux affaires de sa ma^te^ Imperiale, qu'en a (qui n'a pas) la commodité de tirer son argent d'Espagne pour non le hazarder comme le dit s^r^ roy qui peult faire conduire son argent d'Engleterre par decha."

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27 May. **110.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—The day before yesterday Your Majesty's letter of the 21st inst. came to hand, and yesterday I, myself, went and communicated its contents to the privy councillors, all of whom seemed delighted at the pleasure and gratification expressed by Your Majesty on hearing of the prosperous success of this King's arms in Scotland, and at the publication Your Majesty has ordered to be made declaring the Scots to be the Emperor's enemies. They have also read with pleasure, and greatly approved of *the answer in writing, which Your Majesty caused to be made to the admiral of France (Claude Hannebault)* without your having first consulted this King thereupon, the privy councillors telling me that the case being, they would take care that the King, their master, should with mutual courtesy make a similar answer.*

With regard to Octavian, the Milanese, the privy councillors promised to have him closely examined and put to the rack this very day, to make him confess and declare the whole truth, unless he choses himself to do so willingly. As to sending him to Flanders to be confronted with La Chapelle, his accomplice, they did not take a resolution, but would consult the King. On this point and others, they would as soon as possible let me know what was the King's will.

Respecting the transports for the passage of the English army they are certainly highly displeased at the delay, and I really believe that had the commissaries, sent to the Low Countries for the purpose, been here at present, they would be reprimanded for their negligence;† but I must say, that although this King's privy councillors accuse their own commissaries, they also inculpate Your Majesty's ministers, who, knowing how important affairs of this sort are for his Imperial Majesty and for this King, under present circumstances, were bound to correct the negligence of the English. That is why the King's privy councillors request and pray Your Majesty to order that all possible haste be made in sending the transports to sea, so that the English army may as soon as possible cross the Strait, and the King save expense, for soldiers here are already receiving full pay as if they were in France in sight of the enemy.

With regard to the warships the privy councillors beg

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* "Aussi ont ilz faict de ce quil a pleu à vre. mate escripre en response aux lettres de l'admiral de France sans prealablement en assentir le dit sr roy envers le quel ilz tiendroient main qu'il use en semblable cas de mutuelle courtoisie."

† "Et n'est rien si certain sinon que si leur Commissaires se retrouvoient presentement içy quilz leur feroient tres maulvois tort (tour?) combien quilz n'exemptent de culpe ni negligence les ministres de vie mate, les quelz pour estre l'affaire aultant importante pour sa mate que pour le dit sr roy, leur me (maistre) voyant la negligence de leur gens, y debvroient remedier. Ilz prient tres affectuensement vre. mate vouloir faire donner toute extreme haste à l'envoy des dits navires et tout le surplus que concerne leur charge se plaindent merveilleusement les dits du Conseil de ça dite tardance mesmes pour aultant que dois quelques jours en ce les souldres (la solde?) que ce roy donne à ses gens de guerre se paye comme si desja ilz estoient aux champs."

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Your Majesty most humbly that those of Flanders and the Low Countries should be sent at once to protect the transports (*charrues*) and their men and their passage, because they have news that the king of France has nc less than 40 warships, very well equipped and armed, on the coast of Normandy, ready to set sail on the shortest notice, and it is necessary and convenient that the two allied fleets, that of the Emperor and that of this King, be together in the Channel to defeat any hostile plans the French may have formed. There has been no talk, except in general, about the terms (*respectz*) which the two fleets, their commanders and crews must observe towards each other, but after receiving the letter which Your Majesty intends to write to the Privy Council, and admiral de Bèvres remarks on the subject, I will spare no trouble to have the whole matter satisfactorily settled, so that mutual harmony and good behaviour prevail.

Some days ago I myself took to the Admiralty here Your Majesty's letters patent for the observancy of the safe-conducts, that they might be translated into English and put in authentic form in order that seamen of this country, who do not, or pretend not to know, any other language but their own, may take full cognisance of the rules therein contained; otherwise they might from ignorance, or otherwise disregard the copy in French, which I have sent to the Admiralty Court. And now that I am treating of this subject I must explain why the letters patent have not been sent sooner to Flanders. The Judge of the Admiralty has been out of town nearly three weeks; when he came back there was still some unavoidable delay, until at last (yesterday), they were delivered at this embassy. I now send them on together with a copy of the English translation. The remaining copies, of which I have ordered several to be made out, shall go in a couple of days, and I humbly beg Your Majesty to issue one of them unless the English letters patent have not reached Brussels.

I also send Your Majesty the copy of a letter which has accidentally fallen into my hands, though unsigned. It is one from Monsr. de St. Martin, the person to whom I have frequently alluded in my despatches to the governor (*bailli*) of Guînes. The contents of the letter are a further proof of the practices and intrigues of the French, and of their being at their old tricks again.—London, 27 May 1544.

P.S.—Whilst closing this letter the privy councillors send me a message, again begging me most earnestly to solicit Your Majesty to hasten the fitting out of the transports (*charrues*), as well as of the waggons, carts and draft-horses, and so forth, for the carriage of guns, ammunition, victuals, and baggage for the army: the whole of it to be at Calais on the 15th of June next at the latest.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. *Original draft.* **3** *pp.*

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27 May. **111.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MONSR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—Your Lordship will see by the enclosed copy (of my letter to the Queen) what little news there is to report. I shall only add that it seems these people—for want of the Flemish transports which have not yet arrived—could not cross the Channel as early as they promised and would be desirable, which is very provoking, as Your Lordship can appreciate much better than I can.

However that may be, I cannot omit to say that the favor this King did from the beginning show to the duke of Alberquerque is always increasing. The other day the King on his return from the country gave him lodgings close to the place where he is now holding his Court, after sending count Sorey (the earl of Surrey) and Master Trevenet with a gallant and numerous suite to meet him on the road thither. Since his return, the Duke has at various times visited Court, where he has been received and treated by the King and Queen in the kindest possible manner.* Four days running the King has sent him consecutive messages requesting him to attend meetings of his Privy Council of his when at leisure, and to be present at its deliberations, that he (the Duke) may take cognizance of the affairs discussed therein. The Duke, however, though he knows this to be an honourable distinction, and one that might perhaps afford him an opportunity of doing service to the Emperor, has declined the invitation until he had communicated with me on the subject, and knew how to act. Yesterday, after taking my advice, he attended the sitting of the Privy Council, whose members again complained to him in the terms expressed in my despatch to the Queen respecting the delay of the transport ships,† begging him most particularly to represent to me how annoyed they were at it, and recommending that I should again and again solicit their speedy departure. The Duke, moreover, has several times been invited to dine with the privy councillors and appear as if he were one of the King's household (*et soy monster domestique*), and he has accepted on my advice.

I have entered into these details because I suppose that the Duke being Your Lordship's friend, and the Emperor's service being in question, you will be glad to hear of his reception in this country.—London, 27 May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "A. Monseigneur; Mons^r. de Granvelle."

French. Holograph. 1½ *pp.*

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* "Et le fist loger tout aupres de la Court l'ayant faict rencontre[r] par le comte de Surrey et m^e (maistre ?) Trevenet avecq fort grande et belle compaignie, et depuis son retourd il a esté diverses fois à la dite Court, ou le roy luy a faict toute le meilleure chiere du monde et la royne encoires plus grande."

† "Et hier sur mon advis il se trouva au dit Conseil, les quelz lui firent les mesmes planitifz (*sic*) contenu en la dite copie touchant la tardance des dits navirez."

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29 May. **112.** QUEEN MARY'S INSTRUCTIONS to MESSIRE HUGUES DE SOUASTRE,* knight and gentleman of the Royal Household, and lieutenant of the Archers of the guard, and ANDRIES† DE PALANT, *escoutette* of Maëstricht.

B. Neg. d'Ang., Vol. 2, f. 323.

First of all you will take the road to Maëstricht, and there, having called on the Mayor (*escoutette*) of that town, will request him in virtue of your credentials, which you will exhibit to him, to start in company with you on the mission for which We have appointed both of you. Immediately after your arrival at Aix, or elsewhere on the road [to Maëstricht], where you have met the king of England's commissioners sent expressly for the purpose of passing muster to the Germans under Landenberg, both of you conjointly will call on that captain or his lieutenant (Messire Cristoffle de Landenberg,† or his lieutenant) and, in virtue of the credentials you have for each and both of them, give them notice that, having heard of the assembly of troops in the neighbourhood of that town, and the king of England having sent thither the said commissioner to pass them muster, and after that make them march towards the English camp, which could not be done without traversing countries belonging to the Emperor, We have sent you thither to accompany and guide them, conduct them by the shortest possible road, and procure them provisions, victuals and quarters at reasonable prices, assist, help, and treat them as stipendiary servants of the king of England, just as if they were serving the Emperor. That they will do well to give you notice of the day in which they will be able to undertake their march, in order that on the day and hour the provisions required for their march should be ready.

You will immediately let Us know by one of the messengers We have sent in your suite, the day of the departure of the men, and in the meantime will make use of the *placart* you have with you, signed with Our name for the provisions destined for that force, so that they may be ready in the places at which they will act. Their march is to be strait to the river Meuse, taking the high road (*chaussée*) to Haynault and thence to the town of Ayre, in the neighbourhood of which the king of England has resolved to concentrate his forces.‡ We must, moreover, inform you that We have written to the Dean and Chapter of Liege, that on the application of you both, or of either of you, they are to keep in readiness provisions as well as lodgings for the men.

Meanwhile both, or one of you, shall remain with the English commissaries and captains of the men, and will take notice of the manner and ways in which the men behave,

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* "Chevalier gentilhomme de nostre maison et-lieutenant de nos archiers."

† Christopher van Landenberger, colonel of German horse.

‡ "Que sera en tirant droit vers la riviere de Meuze pour trouver le chaussee et passer par Haynault vers la ville de Aire entour de la quelle le dit s^r roy dangleterre est resolu faire lamas de son armee."

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especially towards the Emperor's subjects in that neighbourhood of the said Aix, and should you find that these latter are too exacting, or in any way oppress and ill-treat the country people, you will remonstrate in the mildest possible way and as you think most proper with the commissaries and commander-in-chief of the band, giving all and each of them, and especially the latter, to understand—without, however, entering into a debate or having high words with them—that being well paid their men ought to forbear committing outrage;* and you will request and pray to see to it, so that We may report favourably both to the Emperor and to the king of England about the men, and praise their good behaviour and discipline.

Whenever the Germans are ready to march you will suggest to the English commissaries and to Landberger himself, that they should march together in one body, and follow the same route, without separating or breaking into small groups, that they may be more easily provided on the road with food and anything else they may want. Besides this, the commissaries will take care, wherever the men halt, to publish *franc marché*, and closely forbid any outrage to the *vivandiers*.† Both, or one of you, to be constantly near the commissaries and commander-in-chief of the force, and have a guard of archers under you, to watch and report on the conduct and behaviour of the men, that you may from time to time remonstrate with the commissaries and commander-in-chief, should there be occasion for it; the remonstrances, if any, to be made with all possible mildness, begging them to correct the abuses and indiscipline of the men.‡

But before your departure from Aix, you will take care of what has passed between the said commissaries, captains, and commander-in-chief, and yourselves, and how you have found them disposed to behave during the march, and you will report to Us in writing what places the men halt, and We will then let you know more at full of Our intentions, as well as of the road which you are to take.—Bruxelles, under Our name, on the 29th of May 1544.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*§

* "Sans toutefois entrer en aygreur ne debat, principalement que puis quilz sont bien salaries et payez, que se deussent deporter de faire telz oultraiges. Les requerant et priant y pourvoir affin que ayant (ayons) occasion de nous en louer envers l'empereur et le dit s^r roy dangleterre."

† "Sans eulx escarter ne deborder affin que tant plus commodement (commodieusement) ilz soient pourveuz de vivres. Et que oultre ce ilz facent (*sic*) publier franc marche en gardant estroictement que les vivandiers ne soient oultraigez."

‡ "Aiant toutesfois quelques archiers parmy les gens de guerre pour prendre regard à leur conduyte et nous advertir de ce quilz trouveront pour en tenir propos aux dits commissaires et chef, et les exhorter et induyre en toute doulceur à y donner meilleur ordre." This paragraph, as will be observed, is almost a repetition of the preceding, but as it is not effaced in the minute, and is also in the Simancas copy, I have not suppressed it.

§ A copy of these Instructions with the same date, is also at Simancas. *See* the transcript of it in Vol. XXII. of Bergenroth's Collection, *Add.* 28,593, 80.

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31 May. **113.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—The day before yesterday the privy councillors sent me word that an order had come down from the King commanding that Octavian Bos should be again examined and questioned as to whether he had any accomplices in the treasonable dealings of which he is accused. This being done (said the message to me), Octavian shall be placed in your hands to be transmitted to the Queen Regent of the Low Countries. I therefore most humbly beg Your Majesty to send me Your commands and instructions on, so that I may know how to act.

Another message also came from the privy councillors purporting that they had heard from secretary Paget the pain and solicitous care Your Majesty had taken in the furnishing of the transport ships, horses, and waggons, and that the King, their master, was wonderfully pleased, and thanked You very much for it. The King (said the message) had also been glad to hear that his answer to king Francis' letter had met with the Emperor's approval. Of that letter, and of this King's answer, I gave a sufficiently detailed account in my dispatch of the 18th ult.,* owing to the said secretary having assured me that he had no positive orders from his master to show Your Majesty. Nor can I say whether the said Paget has since procured orders to do so after the perusing of the draft of my letter to Your Majesty, which at his particular desire I showed him, *and principally* the excuse made by the King for not attending personally the understanding against France, respecting which article I took upon myself at secretary Paget's intercesion, *and in order to please the members of the Privy Council* to write to Your Majesty, to write too *boldly perhaps.*

That is why, Madame, I beg your Majesty not to impute to temerity my action on that occasion.

To day Your Majesty's letter of the 21st inst., concerning the code of rules for Monsr. de Bèures' direction at sea in conjunction with the English fleet, has come to hand. The privy councillors have made no difficulty whatever to grant their approbation of them, provided similar ones are issued in favor of the English. When ready I will forward them to Your Majesty and to Monsr. de Bèures.

At this very moment, and when about to close and seal this dispatch, Your Majesty's letter of the 25th inst. and the summary of the conference held by secretary Paget with Your Majesty, as well as of the answer made to his proposal, have come to hand.† No observation or remark need, in my opinion be made, neither is there anything to add or retrench to the answer on the subject of public or private acts. Should these people speak again about them and repeat the arguments made by the secretary, I will conform myself

* See above, No. 100, p. 164.
† See above, No. 109, p. 178.

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entirely with the substance of the answer, and with regard to the financial operations which Your Majesty has heard the English wish to make in the Low Countries, I will do my best to dissuade them from it; for certainly, as Your Majesty rightly observes, it would be highly inconvenient for Your Majesty to have to pay four patons of Flanders for each angelot; that would in future cause the price of the royal and demi-angelot to rise, by which means an infinite quantity of angelots, and also of "royals," will be taken out of Flanders—and, indeed, a large quantity of them has already come to this country. I shall not fail to advise Your Majesty of the Council's final resolution on this point.

I must not omit to say that this King's army is now returning from Scotland without stopping before any castle or fortified place whatsoever—not even before Melsome (Melrose?), which they thought of taking, strengthening, and keeping—all because the drink for the men began to fail. I have no doubt that the said secretary has informed Your Majesty how Leith and the castle in the neighbourhood have been abandoned, owing to their having no time to fortify them, and yet it would have been requisite to further strengthen both the town and the castle, andkeep there a considerable force; but it appears that the expedition against France, now near at hand, has prevented it. The keeping of those two places might have been very *à propos* for the protection of the fisheries on the coast, which, however, the Scots are not likely to disturb or prevent during this present year, for the greatest part of their ships have been taken or burnt by the English; besides which, there is every appearance that affairs in Scotland will go on better and better for this King. Indeed, he has fresh news from that country, as some of his privy councillors have come to tell me that the counts of Lynns (Lenox) and Glancairn, who hold for him, have had a sharp encounter with the troops of the governor (Arran) and his party, many of whom had been slain; and among them one brother of the governor, a squire and his secretary, and other favourites of his. The Cardinal has been singularly displeased and disheartened at this defeat of the governor's men, and also at the taking of the five ships, which, as I wrote to Your Majesty, he intended to arm for the protection and defence of a certain town of his where he kept his plate and his best furniture—for ships and all were sacked and burnt by the English. Indeed, the Cardinal was in such fear and perplexity, that he was thinking of crossing over to France, stealthily and in disguise, on board a small craft, armed and equipped in the English fashion (*armoyé et accoustré d l'anglaise*). For that reason the King's privy councillors should wish that Your Majesty gave orders for the warships of the Low Countries to keep good watch at sea, so as to prevent the passage of the above-mentioned craft. The above news seems to me, in many respects, as

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important as the victory of the army to which I alluded in former dispatches. Of whatever may happen in Scotland, I shall not fail to apprise Your Majesty.

These privy councillors beg Your Majesty, in the most affectionate manner possible, to be pleased to send to the ports and harbours of the Low Countries where the hulks or transport ships for the passage of the English are stationed, some persons of authority to hasten the fitting out and departure of the same, notwithstanding the bad weather and contrary winds at sea, for otherwise they would have to wait too long. Once under sail and at sea, the hulks might, though the weather was rough, get along with the tide, and, serving themselves of it when far in the sea, navigate with all winds. Please Your Majesty to look to it.—London, the last day of May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

31 May. **114.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—After closing and sealing my other letter of the same date the privy councillors have sent me word that the King, their master, after hearing their report on the financial operation which he thought of making in the Low Countries, had remarked that he found it rather strange that Your Majesty should object to it. That operation he never intended to make until Your Majesty was sufficiently provided to meet it. He was satisfied to pay what he owed to the men he had in Flanders, in coin of that country. It was a very small sum in comparison with that which he would have to leave in the hands of peasants and Flemish soldiers in his service. He did not act in the affair himself as the king of Portugal, who did every day negociate much larger sums at Antwerp. This message the privy councillors sent me without considering that the money which the factor of the king of Portugal raises at Antwerp did generally remain in that city.

Neither did the privy councillors agree to their own merchants being obliged to take an oath on the quantity and quality of the goods they introduce at Antwerp, entirely disregarding my remonstrances on that score. And, *in short*, it seems as if these people would like to have all the mercantile questions settled to their advantage *and profit*. —London, 31st of May 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

31 May. **115.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—After the receipt of your despatch of the 17th inst., it has been published here in Brussels, that king Henry's affairs in Scotland are going on

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most prosperously for him. It is reported that most of the Scotch nobility are prisoners of the English, and letters have also been received, stating that the Queen (widow herself) her daughter, and even the Cardinal (Beton) are under their power. As in your dispatch of the 27th, no mention whatever is made of such events, and as We are particularly desirous to hear of that King's good successes, We request you to let us know as soon as possible whether the reported news is true, and the King's successes in Scotland are as great and decisive as reported.

We had yesterday news from the camp in front of Lutzenbourg (Luxenburg). It would appear that the French garrison inside that town had offered to surrender and evacuate the town by the 6th of June next, if by that time they were not, with arms and baggage, succoured by king Francis. The viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), who is in command of the Imperial army, has agreed in the Emperor's name to the capitulation, one of the articles of which bears that the French garrison will issue out at once with arms and baggage, and that out of the four infantry battalions (*enseignes*) which compose it, two shall evacuate the place at once, and the other two remain until the day actually fixed for the surrender.

News has also been received from Spires respecting the treaty lately concluded between his Imperial Majesty and the duke of Holstein. As soon as We get a copy of it We will send it to you, that you may show it to the King. We hope that in this way there will be an end put to the notices and warnings which that King is daily giving you of the assembling of troops in the parts of Oost (*du coste d'Oost*), for which, however, please thank the King in Our name.

With regard to Octavian Bos, the Milanese, he has been fully convicted of high treason, and of his having promised to get information there and transmit it to the common enemy. He had gone to England as prisoner (La Chapelle says) to hear news and report on events, which news he was to put down in writing and send to La Chapelle in France. We request you to have him well interrogated and examined about his other accomplices, if he had any in his treacherous correspondence, and also respecting the white sign (*blanc signe*), which he delivered to Monsr. de Vendôme. If the English consent to send him here to Us, they may depend upon Our being as careful in extracting from him every detail of his treasonable attempt against their King as if the Emperor, Our brother, was personally concerned.

As to the transport ships (*navires passagiers*), of the non-arrival of which the privy councillors complain, imputing the delay to Our ministers, We wrote to you on the 21st inst., that We had already done and would do in future all that was due for the service of the allies, so that

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if fault there was, surely it could not be imputed to Us or to Our ministers. But since you write again on the 27th that the English seem inclined to throw the blame on Our ministers, We are going to inform you in detail of the measures that have been taken here to ensure the fitting out and sailing of the said transports, as well as of the preparation of carts and waggons made for the use of the English army apart. Some time ago We wrote to you, as you must be aware, that We wished to know beforehand the precise time at which the King's army was likely to cross the Channel, in order to have the provisions as well as the transports and waggons ready, and yet We never got a resolute answer to that question of Ours, until now that you send Us word that both the transports and the waggons (*chariots*) must be ready for the 15th of June. As soon as the King's commissaries landed at Antwerp everything they might want to execute their commission was facilitated to them; they were furnished with authority to stop all vessels and press them for the service of their King at reasonable prices. This they got in writing the very same day of their arrival in this country. We did more, We appointed one of Ours to assist and help them* in their requisition, whom they dismissed and sent back the day after without their having written or said one word about their commission until the 24th inst.† when they sent a message to say that the masters of vessels retained by them in Holland refused to go to sea for fear of some French warships that were known to be in the neighbourhood. When We heard of that We sent an express messenger to the Admiral and governor of Zeeland commanding them to detach towards the coast of Holland some of the warships that were then ready for sea, for the purpose of driving away the French. Since then no news has come from the English commissary, nor do We know at present whether they have retained ships for the transport service, and if so, how many, and of what tonnage. We only know that the people of Antwerp complained of the English commissary having retained in that locality more vessels than they can really want. We have, however, taken no measures to interfere between the masters of the vessels and the English commissary because the latter has not called to Us for assistance, and has on the contrary sent back those officers appointed by Us to facilitate their work, so that if fault there is it is not Ours, but of the English who do not seem to have much knowledge or experience of these sort of affairs; or else that if their commissary has had proper instructions he does not know how to keep to them.

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* "Et leur balasmes (*baillames*) ung pour les assister."

† "Jusques au XXIIII. de ce mois quilz manderent que les navieres quilz avoient retenu en Hollande noyossoient (n'y osoient) sortir de leurs havres à cause de d'aulcuns navieres de guerre franchoises que les aggesoient (guellaient)."

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The same may be said respecting the waggons (*chariotz*). As soon as the commissaries, appointed by the king of England to look out and retain the number and class of waggons required for his Royal service, landed at Antwerp, We sent them a list and full description of the districts and localities where horses and waggons could be procured, that they might examine it and see whether it would do for their purpose, and enable them to ascertain whether the number and class of horses and waggons they wanted for heavy luggage, ammunition, and provisions of the English army, would be ready. Our own officers behaved in that respect, as it was their duty to do; they placed into the hands of the English commissaries the above-mentioned description, by means of which the latter were enabled to make a list and calculate where and in what number horses and waggons could be retained for the service of the King, their master. But We must say that continually, nay daily, complaints are coming in from peasants, whose horses and waggons have been retained for the Royal English service, that it is so long ago since the retention and engagement did take place, without their having received any money on account of their service contracted for, that many, the poorest amongst them, will be shortly obliged to sell their own horses for want of fodder to give them. Our own officers there deputed by Us to help and assist the English commissaries in the above said requisition called the other day on the King's ambassador here and respectfully stated to him their opinion as to the order and manner of the requisition, and told him that it was necessary to appoint someone to pay the men some money on account, as otherwise they will not move, for it cannot be expected that poor, as most of them are, they will feed their horses on the road to Calais or to the English camp, without getting some advance on their wages. The ambassador has written home to the Privy Council about this; whether he has, or has not, received an answer We cannot say, for up to this day neither We, nor Our commissaries, have received any notice.

In a like manner the Belgian commissaries, in charge of the provisions of food for the English army, have communicated with the English ambassador as to the best way of proceeding orderly and regularly to the execution of their charge; the ambassador, as it appears, has also written home about this, but has not yet received an answer, or if he has, Our own commissaries have not been informed of it.

After this plain *exposé* of the facts, it will be for you (Chapuys) to consider if the accusation of negligence and want of care on the part of some of Our ministers can in any way be supported. You are, therefore, earnestly requested to take the very first opportunity of remonstrating with the members of that Privy Council, and giving them to understand that the same, if not greater, diligence and care has been used in providing for the wants of the the English army

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as for the Imperial, and that We find it very strange indeed that if their Own commissaries have been guilty of negligence, or are unacquainted with the duties of their charge, the fault should be imputed to Us or to Our ministers, when We Ourselves have no authority or command over English functionaries.* It is quite sufficient for Us to help the English with whatever they may want, as We have done hitherto, paying perhaps more attention to their wishes and demands than if they were the Emperor's Own.

While writing this letter the brother of the English ambassador, residing at this Our Court, called to say, that during the illness of the latter he has taken up, with Our consent, these and other affairs of the English embassy; that he has sent a message to inquire how Our naval commissaries were proceeding on the charge entrusted to them, at the same time declaring that he imagines that the vessels are already in the ports of England, but that respecting the waggons and provisions he has no news at all from the privy councillors, though he expects a letter from hour to hour, and certainly before inculpating others, the English ought to consider that they have here a man to represent them who has been for some time confined to his bed from a dangerous illness, that may end fatally one of these days. Even if he were in good health, he is totally unqualified for the transaction of military affairs for which he has no taste or liking. Generally speaking the officials sent here by the English king, are so ignorant in matters appertaining to war, that if We did not take care to assist and help them in the discharge of commissions from England, the King of that country could not be well served.†

Just at this moment We are in receipt of letters from His Imperial Majesty, purporting that he will take no resolution respecting the letter which the admiral of France sent to Us, before he knows what the king of England thinks of it. We are now sending to him an abstract of your despatch of the 17th inst.,‡ in which you allude to the French Admiral's message, and its purport which you have shown to the King, and what the latter has answered. As to Us, We do not intend to answer the French Admiral's missive, you will tell the King.

* "Mais que trouvons estrange que si leur commis estoyent negliges (negligeants) que par aventure ne sçavoient bien respondre de leur charge, que ce nous pourroit estre imputé à nous ou à nos ministres veu que nous n'avons aulcun commandement sur leur Commis."

† "Et certes ceulx de par de là s'ilz veuillent encoulper aultruy debvroient considerer quilz laissent içy un homme maladde (*sic*) jusqu'à la mort que ne peult negocier, et quand il seroit en santé [il] n'est qualiffié pour traicter les affaires de la guerre, aussy ceulx qu'ilz envoyent sont si petitement instruitz que si on ne faisoit aultre diligence par decha en ce quilz apportent d'Engleterre ilz en seroient tres mal servis." The ambassador alluded to in the above passage was Dr. Layton, dean of York, who succeeded Dr. Nicholas Wotton in November 1543. He died eight months after at Brussels.

‡ *See* No. 97, p. 161, where Hannebault's letter to queen Mary is first mentioned.

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A duplicate of the Sieur de St. Martin's letter, which fell into your hands, has been forwarded to the Emperor. The letters patent of that King for the safe-conducts, have been received.—London, 31 May 1544.

Addressed: "To the ambassador in England."

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

— May. **116.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—After the receipt of your letter of the 18th inst., and before the arrival of that of the 19th, which came the day after, one of the King's principal secretaries (Master Paget) arrived here, who, after exhibiting his credentials, and offering the King's commendations and thanks to Us for the great care and solicitude (as he said) with which We had attended to his affairs, began to make the demands and claims contained in the appended note, of which another copy has been forwarded to the Emperor. After giving him as courteous and polite an answer as possible, We have sent one of Our privy councillors to him for the purpose of answering all his demands. One of these was relating to the imprisonment of count Boniface. He (Master Paget) was told that the Count had been taken prisoner in this country (*par decha*),* and he was wearing secretly the band (*escharpe*) of the king of France, which is a capital offence, as military men assert. We would gladly have given orders for his release, merely to please the king of England, had it not been that, according to the report of Our officers, the Count, whilst in prison, did use most insolent language, threatening that he would have his revenge in some way or other.†

Master Paget complained also of the English merchants being obliged to declare under oath the sort of merchandise they brought to these countries, whereas the standing rules of the intercourse of trade were that English manufactured goods were not to be visited, and that now an affidavit under oath was required. On this point the King's secretary has been answered that the affidavit is only a substitute for the visitation, in order to avoid trouble and loss of time, and that there is no real cause for the English merchants to complain of the measure, since after all they themselves are made, as it were, judges in their own cause. Otherwise they would be compelled to exhibit their goods and merchandise, and undergo a troublesome and annoying search, which would be worse for them.

We have deemed it necessary to inform you of the above particulars in order that, if you (Chapuys) are interpellated

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* "Tant sur l'emprisonement du conte de Boniface qui a esté apprehendeé par decha."

† This is in part a duplicate of queen Mary's letter of the 25th (No. 109), though referring especially and more in detail to Paget's mission.

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on the subject by the King's privy councillors, you may at once reply to them according to Our views in this matter.

With regard to the affair* mentioned in your despatch of the 18th, the Emperor will decide and let you know.

For the last two days an Englishman, who says he has a commission from the king of England, has been trying at Antwerp to raise money for his master. We are told that he is contracting for a loan of 100,000 ducats per month. We are rather surprised at this, inasmuch as We know the king of England to be rich, well furnished with cash, and in no need whatever of financial operations at present. If, however, the King is in want of money, and wants to raise it by means of a loan in this country (*par decha*), that will retard considerably the affairs of the Emperor, who, on account of the long distance and risk, cannot well bring his money from Spain, and has necessarily to apply to the bankers of Antwerp or Augsburg; whereas the king of England can easily bring his own here with perfect security. We Ourselves are obliged to raise at Antwerp the greater part of the money granted to Us by the States, for the taxes do not come in as promptly as they ought; and the consequences will be, that if there is such a draft on Antwerp, money will become scarce, and the operations of the future war may be cramped through it. That is why We request you to inquire and ascertain whether the King has really given the commission above alluded to, for fear others should borrow the money in his name; and if so, give him to understand, as graciously as you can, that We desire nothing so much as to be useful to him here, and do his pleasure in every way, but that for the above-mentioned considerations and reasons We beg and entreat him not to employ on this occasion the bankers of Antwerp, but remit his money from England, as otherwise the Emperor's operations against the common enemy may be retarded.—[May 1544.]

Indorsed; "To the ambassador in England."

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

3 June. **117.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY VIII.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres hault, &c.,"—By your first secretary, Messire Guillaume Paget, We are in receipt of Your letter, and the object and aim of his mission. In the first place we thank you most cordially for sending so well qualified and intelligent a personage to visit Us, and likewise for the good news of the prosperity of your arms as well by sea as by land, in Scotland and in other parts. We also thank you warmly for the care you take in letting Us know continually the military preparations you are making, and in

* That of the French overtures, and admiral Hannebault's letter to Queen Mary.

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sending me an account of your views and intentions, as well as your advice on the whole.

As you will hear from Your secretary's lips what Our answer to Your message has been; as his talent (*suffisance*) and the trust you place in him are great, and as We are now writing to Our sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, to send a personage of her court to you for the better resolution of the charge given to Your secretary. We will not trouble you with a longer letter.—Spire, 3 June 1544.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

3 June. **118.** THE EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your letters of the 17th and 18th* ult. have been received, and We have also those you wrote to the Sieur de Granvelle on the 22nd.† On the 26th the King's principal secretary arrived, and next day he declared to Us the charge he had from his master, which charge consists of the four points mentioned in your letter; the last and most important of which is the King's desire and intention of crossing the Channel, and commanding his own army in person. The inclosed note (*escript*) will inform you of what We Ourselves first, and the Sieur de Granvelle afterwards, have answered on that particular point, and therefore, We do not see the necessity of saying more about it; only that, when the note was put into the secretary's hands, both he and the King's ambassador at this Our Court approved, or at least seemed to approve, of Our reasonings, and found Our arguments in favor of Our personal command strong enough. They also praised above all things Our resolution—of which the Sieur de Granvelle informed them on the following day—of sending to England from Flanders some high personage or other for the purpose of better persuading the King to adopt the mutual line of conduct traced in the said note, without however letting him know that both his secretary and his resident ambassador here approved of Our advice in that respect for fear of wounding the King's susceptibilities in so delicate a matter. In this sense We are now writing to Our sister, the Queen, that she may send to England conjointly with the King's secretary now going back, either the Sieur de Courrières or the Sieur de Courbaron, whichever she pleases.

As to the English army for Our common undertaking against France, as far as We can gather from the Secretary's words, there is an attempt to persuade Us that We ought to be contented with 30,000 men, and that the remainder of the force which his master is bound by treaty to furnish be left to his discretion, to be employed in some enterprise

* No. 96, p. 159, and No. 99, p. 163.
† No. 106, p. 173.

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personally led by him, or by a lieutenant of his elsewhere, adding* that the passage of the 30,000 men could not take place so soon [as was thought], but that every possible diligence would be made to quicken their embarkation, for them to land on the Continent between the 8th and 10th of this present month of June.

Our answer to the Secretary has been, as you will see in the enclosed paper to which We again refer you. It will be fit and convenient that the personage whom Our sister, the Queen, is to despatch to England along with the King's secretary, who is going back, and you yourself take note of what is said in the paper, and make the King understand what Our will in the matter is, though the reminding must be done cautiously, and in such a manner that the King and his privy councillors may not fancy that We consider that as a satisfaction to, and complement of, the treaty with Don Fernando Gonzaga.—Spiere, 3 June 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

7 June. **119.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 31st of May † has come to hand, and seems to me so satisfactory and good respecting the matters therein treated, that I can imagine nothing better. Both the excuses made by Your Majesty's ministers and the instructions given to this King's commissaries for the execution of their charge could not be in my opinion more clearly defined or satisfactorily explained than they have been. That will help me considerably to convince this King and his privy councillors of the necessity there is of their providing victuals and the carriage of the same through the Low Countries. For that purpose I have not only shown to them the passages of Your Majesty's letter respecting that matter—with which, moreover, the King seems perfectly satisfied—but I also read to him those relating to the Luxenburg capitulation, and that of the duke of Holstein. He (the King) was still more glad to hear of Your Majesty's will respecting those capitulations, of which I gave him a full and detailed account. He was likewise pleased to hear Your Majesty's answer to the letter of the High Admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault).

Respecting the hulks‡ and transports the King also seemed satisfied at the activity and diligence displayed by Your Majesty in the matter, since they are already in these waters.

* "Le dit Secretaire, à tout ce que l'on a peu comprendre, a tousiours tenu principale fin que nous voulsissions [nous] contenter que le dit Sieur roy envoya[t] seulement pour la dite emprinse XXX^m hommes, delaissant à son arbitraige denvoyer la reste à faire quelque autre emprinse de l'autre coustel fust (soit ?) avecque sa personne ou par autre commis."

† No. 115, p. 187.

‡ "Et quant aux hucs (hulks ?), il se tient tres satisfait."

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The affair of the victuals and the transport thereof has also been settled by the privy councillors, who have promised to attend to it.

No intelligence has been received from Scotland since the date of my last; should any fresh news come I shall not fail to apprise Your Majesty.

Inclosed are some copies of the letters patent which Your Majesty was pleased to send me on the 25th ult.; the remainder has been sent to Monsr. de Beures.* I most humbly beg Your Majesty to order that similar ones be sent here as soon as they can be, after having them read and promulgated in the ports and harbours of the Low Countries, just as these people will have theirs.

The King has no objection but rather approves of Monsr. du Rœulx listening to the overtures which it is reported some Frenchmen intend to make to him, sure as he is that he will not allow himself to be deceived by foolish and ill-founded promises, and will not fail to communicate with Monsr. de Norfolk who, after his landing in France, has charge from this King to treat with him of that and other affairs. I have no doubt that the enterprize of Montreuil will also be discussed at the conference.—Londres, 7 June 1544.

P.S.—Respecting Octavian Bos, the King sends me word that he will be delivered into my hands, provided I undertake to send him on to Your Majesty. I am only waiting for orders.

I must not forget to say that the King and his Privy Council wonder much why the Imperial fleet of warships that is to escort the transports have not yet arrived in the Channel. Should it not have left those ports, let it set sail as soon as possible.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Holograph. 2 *pp.*

8 June. **120.** THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—After the receipt of your letter of the 31st of May a gentleman of the king of England arrived here, stating that he brought commission from his master, the King, to procure XI^{c}. (eleven hundred) draft-horses (*lymoniers*) and V^{c}. (five hundred) waggons (*chariotz*), to be at Calais by Thursday next, the 12th inst. We have given orders that the commissaries charged by Us with the delivery of the said waggons and horses to the English should hold an interview with the English commissary. They tell Us that they have seen the Englishman, but he says that he is alone, has no co-adjutor or clerk to assist him in his duties, and, therefore, that he cannot attend to the carts and horses by himself. Having then asked him whether he would have

* "Survenant aultres ne deffauldray den advertir vre. [ma^{te}] à la quelle envoye vues (unes?) des patentes dont il [a] plust à icelle m'escripre par tes lectres du XXV^{e}. du dit mois, et les aultres ay envoya à Mons^{r}. de Beurez."

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carmen from this country to drive the horses, he answered that he had no instructions from home as to that; which answer, to say the truth, We have found strange enough inasmuch as it is absolutely impossible for one single man to get together quickly, and collect in one spot, such a large number of waggons (*chariotz*) and horses as must necessarily come from different provinces and districts of these Low Countries. Nor is it less difficult either for one man alone to collect and get together three thousand draft-horses and fifteen or sixteen hundred carmen or drivers (*chartons*), who by-the-way are not the best conditioned people to deal with. As the general custom of this country is that for every hundred pioneers (*peonniers*) raised for the service one commissary is required; and the Englishman as he says and owns is quite alone, it seems to Us as if his employers were rather improvident and careless, in thus sending only one man to execute so important and heavy a work as to levy such a number of waggons and horses.* Since the man himself, as he owned to Our ministers, has no instructions at all from home, save one closed letter, the consequence of all this will be that notwithstanding the great care taken here the fault will be imputed to Our own ministers without whose care and assistance, and particular regard for that King's service, We do not hesitate to say things might have been in this respect much worse than they are, and the king of England himself will be sadly disappointed, as We wrote to you the other day.

We have considered it necessary to inform you of this in detail that you may tell the King's privy councillors to bestow in future more care on affairs of this sort, and not throw the blame on Us if they are not served more quickly and efficiently. However this may be, that the King's service might not be further delayed, We did immediately after the receipt of your letter of the 31st ult. despatch to the districts and more closer to Calais to furnish the number of horses and waggons demanded by the King's commissary, and make them go with the greatest possible diligence to the place of their destination, so that We are confident that the King will soon be served according to his wishes. The same pressing orders shall be issued for Flanders, although it will be impossible to have the waggons and horses delivered on the day the English want them, the time is short. You must tell the King's privy councillors to be pleased, in future, whenever they may want horses and waggons for their master's army, to let Us know some time before, for they will have to come from a much greater distance. It will

* "Et nous semble que ceulx de par de là font bien petit debuoir de envoyer ainsy leurs gens si cruement pour lever si grant nombre de chevaulx et chariotz, car, comme il a confessé, na aulcune instruction, mais seulement une lettre close, et si sont (ainsi sont ilz) faciles de gester (jetter) la coulpa sur ceulx de par decha, et si on ne faisoit yçy melieur debvoir de les assister ilz seroient tres mal servis."

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also be requisite that they themselves provide conductors, who can speak with the drivers (*chartons*), to take care that the latter do not hide or desert, or allow their horses to be stolen or killed, otherwise they will find that when all the waggons and horses have been procured, very few will remain in this country, their numbers will be soon diminished, for most of the drivers will rather lose their horses and return home than be kept in service against their will, as was found by experience last year.*

We have avoided speaking further to the King's gentleman on the subject, or recommending him to employ as conductors natives of this country and who can speak the language of the drivers—for fear he (the King's gentleman and commissary) should suspect that We want his master to incur greater expenses in this affair, or put money into the hands of our country people; and yet We firmly believe that unless the King's privy councillors decide to employ people of this country to superintend the carmen or drivers, these latter will desert and their master's service will not be done.

In answer to your letter of the 31st May, if the king of England will remit to Us the person of Octavian Bos, and have him delivered into the hands of the governor of Gravalinghes (Gravelines), We will take care that he is brought here [to Brussels] that he may be tried, and, if guilty, that exemplary justice be made.

As to the hulks (*hues*) or transports, We are ready to do the King's pleasure, and send some person of authority to hasten the fitting out of those that are to transport the King's army across the Channel, but the fact is that, as stated in Our last, We cannot at this present moment ascertain where nor on what part of this coast the King's commissaries have retained the said hulks.† However this may be We hear from the English ambassador's secretary that he has news of their having already sailed off.

With regard to the financial operation the King is thinking of carrying on in this country, since he is disinclined to listen to Our observations and follow Our advice, it will be convenient to let him do as he pleases, for although his plans will in a great measure affect His Imperial Majesty's service in these Countries under Our government, yet We are unwilling to throw obstacles in his way in matters principally concerning his service.

The above-mentioned Secretary to the English ambassador here resident has applied for a passport for 30 Flemish mares, which he says the King has caused to be purchased in this

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* "Et que prendent regart quilz ne se desrobent ou laissent tuer ou desrober leurs chevaulx, aultrement quant ores on les avera trouve tous les chevaulx et chariotz quilz demandent, ilz seront bientost diminues, surtout que la plus part deulx vouldront avoir perdu ses chevaulx et povoir retourner au logis, comme avons trouvé par experience l'an passé."

† "Ne sçavons ou ne du quel quartier les commis du dit S^r roy ont retenu les dites hucs (hourques)."

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country, and which had been stopped at Gravelinge (Gravelines). As the governor of that town had already written informing Us of the arrest, and saying that the merchants who had charge of the said mares confessed that they were not in reality sold to the King, but were exported to England to be disposed of there, We have remonstrated with the English secretary who solicited the passport, telling him that he did wrong in stating that the mares were for the King's own service when they were not; that every day complaints come before Us of English merchants trying to export without a licence out of Flanders and these Low Countries anything they please, and if the customs house officers offer any opposition, or stop the goods, they say that they are destined for the king of England's service, which is generally an untruth. This much was said in Our name to the Englishman, who excuses himself with the contents of a letter he has received from the Debitis (Deputy) of Calais..

We have considered it fit to enter into these particulars in order that if you hear people talk about this, you may answer in conformity with the above, and represent to those privy councillors that every day We are told of merchants trying to deceive people of these Countries into exporting goods, from times of old prohibited, on the plea and excuse that they are for the king of England's service, or for his ministers and courtiers, which we need scarcely say is highly unreasonable. That is why We have signified to the English ambassador residing with Us that whenever the King or his people (*les siens*) wish to export from this country, and take over any prohibited articles or goods, they are to let Us know beforehand, and every possible favor shall immediately be granted to them; but that if merchants present themselves at Gravelinge, or at any other port, with prohibited articles or goods on pretence that they are for the king of England's service the customs house officers must needs do their duty, as the English do in similar cases—seize the said articles and sell them off for the benefit of the Imperial Treasury and their own, since a portion of the sale money has by law been assigned to them to encourage them the better to do their duty, carefully watch and examine what passes through the customs house, and prevent the introduction or export of prohibited articles.

Count de Rœulx has written to Us that a gentleman of king Francis' chamber wishes to speak to him on certain political matters, as you will see by the inclosed letter of the Count to Us. We forward it to you * that you may show it to the King, who cannot fail in his consummate wisdom to understand what the French are about, trying, as they always do, to sow discord and engender jealousy between

* Here a marginal note of the president of the Flemish Council with the following order: "Soit fait copie de cette lettre et de l'originale et envoyée," but neither the Frenchman's letter, nor De Rœulx's answer to it has been found.

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His Imperial Majesty and him. They are, however, greatly mistaken; they will not gain their purpose. It seems to Us that the practices of this French gentleman in question have something in common with those of the Sieur de Saint Martin a few months ago; but as he has had no answer from the Count de Rœulx, he may perhaps desist from further communicating with him.

We have just this moment received intelligence that the French have evacuated the grand duchy of Luxemburg according to capitulation, and that the Imperialists have entered its capital, and found inside 40 pieces of ordnance, of which 30 are cannon and half-cannon, and 80 large casks (tonn) of gunpowder.—June 8, of 1544.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

11 June. Wien, Imp. Arch. **121.** THE QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—Your despatch of the 7th inst. in answer to Our letter of the 31st of May, came duly to hand, as well as the letters patent issued by command of that King. You will find herein inclosed similar ones for the use of the English, which We have caused to be promulgated according to your advice in all ports of these dominions.

As We informed you by Our last letter of the 6th inst., between the hours of seven and eight on the clock, the French garrison of Lutzenbourg (Luxemburg), numbering in all 14,000 men, evacuated that city, having previously made an inventory of the artillery and munition left behind, which consists of 41 cast-iron guns and 140 casks of gunpowder, all in good condition, and without being spoiled or damaged in the least, and letters have come from the spot stating that the walls are in good repair and the town itself so well fortified that had the French defended it for any length of time, it would have proved to be almost impregnable.

We have been singularly pleased at hearing that the transports (*navires passagières*) sent for the crossing of the English army have reached their destination, and, therefore, that the landing of Our allies will suffer no delay. With regard to carriage you must know by Our last the preparations here made, and the irregularity and want of order of the English ministers and officials, who, for taking charge of three thousand horses, and fifteen or sixteen hundred carriers, sent one single man, and him without any letter of introduction for Us, or for some of Our ministers to assist and help him in the execution of his work, which step We Ourselves took care to advise and recommend to Paget, that King's First Secretary, when he passed through this city [of Brussels] on the 9th inst. on his return from his mission to the Emperor's Court. It happened that after waiting two whole days for that ambassador We had gone out into the fields for the sake of recreation and sport (*à la chasse*), having first given orders that should the King's Secretary arrive in the meantime, We

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were to be immediately informed. So it was done, for in the evening of the day of Our departure the King's Secretary, although he was duly informed of Our temporary absence, and requested to wait two or three hours for Our return to Brussels, would not stay, alleging that he was in a great hurry to go, and had besides nothing of importance to tell Us, save both the purport of his embassy to Spire, of which We had previously been informed, and the answer he himself had received from the Emperor, which must be known to Us. He knew, moreover, that Monsr. de Courrières (Jean de Montmorency) had already departed for England on a mission, and, therefore, begged to be excused if he left immediately for England, where he was anxiously expected and wanted. All this the Secretary said to the officers of Our household, begging them to express his regret at his not being able to spend a few hours in Brussels, all the time requesting Us not to leave for his sake the chase and sport in which We were then engaged. Notwithstanding the Secretary's courteous message, We should have much preferred having a few minutes conversation, and begging him to present Our most affectionate and grateful regards to the King, his master, for the very kind terms in which he spoke to Paget about Us, when the latter first came to this Court [of Brussels], and the praises of Our solicitude and care in all matters concerning the alliance.

With respect to provisions and so forth, though a long time back, We gave orders that every branch of that service should be carefully attended to; though We caused placards to be fixed everywhere, granting complete freedom to merchants and retailers (*vivandeurs*), of articles of food to frequent the English camp and given full notice of Our orders in that line to the last English ambassador,* the one who died, yet up to this hour We have not been told how the English wish to be served in that line, and yet it is important that We should be apprised in time, in order that the army of Our English ally should be provided with food at the same time and as abundantly as that of the Emperor, Our brother.

We hope that the warships under Monsr. de Bèvres are by this time under sail, since We are in receipt of letters from him that the whole fleet is ready to put to sea, and that he was only waiting for a favourable wind to raise anchors and sail away. Since then We heard that for the last forty-eight hours the wind has been fair, and therefore We have no doubt that by this time the Imperial fleet of these Low Countries has reached its place of destination.

As to Octavian Bos, We wrote last requesting you to ask the King to have him transported as far as Gravelinghes,

* Dr. Layton, dean of York. The text is: "Et du tout adverty l'ambassadeur trespassé, et luy [avons] faict bailler par escript que le tout estoit prest; mais n'avons encoires este advertie du costé de là."

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which might easily be done under the custody and keeping of some of the many soldiers who are continually crossing the Calais Strait, as We, Ourselves, could not do so without the help and assistance of the king of England. We are *now of opinion* that if you find the least difficulty as to that you must have the prisoner delivered into your hands and try to procure a vessel of this country, on board of which the prisoner's person, well tied and bound, may be delivered and brought either to Zeeland or to Antwerp, as may be, the master of the vessel being paid on arrival the sum stipulated according to contract.—11 June 1544.

French. Original draft. 2½ *pp.*

17 June. **122.** KING HENRY to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

The Sieur de Courrières (Jean de Montmorency) bearer of this, my letter to you, has faithfully delivered your message, and spoken about the Emperor's answer to the proposals made by Paget in my name. As to my own reply on the subject, you shall hear it from the lips of De Courrières himself.—Westminster Palace, 17 June 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

17 June. **123.** The SAME to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch., *Rep.* P. *Fasc.*, C. 235.

Paget has returned [to England] accompanied by Monsr. de Courrières, and We have perfectly well understood from the report of Our principal Secretary (Paget), as well as from that of Your Majesty's envoy, what your opinion is respecting the overtures and proposals which Our said Secretary has made to you.—Westminster, 17 June 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

18 June. **124.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On the 12th inst. Monsr. de Courrières and secretary Paget arrived here together, by whom Your Majesty's letter of the 3rd came to hand. On the ensuing day we applied to the King for audience, but he excused himself on account of the arrival at Court of count Lennis (the earl of Lennox), a Scotchman.

On the 14th, Monsr. de Courrières and I waited on the King, who showed great satisfaction at hearing of the good disposition of affairs [abroad], and also at our congratulating him, in Your Majesty's name and in that of the Queen Regent, on the success of the Scottish expedition. Then, coming to the principal point of our charge, the King began to say that Your Majesty's excuses rested principally on two grounds

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One was the actual promise made to the States of the Empire to attend personally to the future undertaking against France; the other, the different nationalities of the general officers in command of the Imperial army.

As to the former point, he (the King) thought that the States of the Empire, after hearing the explanation of the cause and reasons given to Your Majesty by his secretary (Paget), would not insist upon that promise being fulfilled. Then, as to the second, he imagined that the undertaking would be far more dangerous than it was thought at first, inasmuch as for some time back king Francis had made most wonderful efforts to increase his forces; and, what is still worse, had issued orders for the havoc and waste of every sort of food on the passage of the invading army, which wanton havoc and waste, as he understood, had already commenced by the King's orders. The reasons, moreover, which Your Majesty alleged (continued the King) for himself to remain at home, and not attend the expedition in person—such as his illness, and so forth—were not sufficiently strong, and might, on the contrary, be brought to bear against Your Majesty, inasmuch as his (the King's) present indisposition was accidental and transitory, whereas gout, from which Your Majesty had been suffering lately, was an awful disease, a return of which at the approaching autumnal season would be extremely dangerous. Besides which, to hazard Your person so far into France without having first gained and taken possession of some territory or other at the back, so as to have the shoulders guarded, and insure the free passage of victuals, would be a most rash and imprudent movement to make. It would be far better to lay siege to two or three large towns on the road to Paris, than to go on to the capital of France and burn it down. As to counting upon the rebellion and consequent assistance of the French people against their King, that was pure vanity, for never before had the French risen in rebellion against their King.

As to the latter point—that is to say, the Emperor's excuse that the quality and different nationality of the commanding officers in his army rendered his own presence indispensable—it seems to me that, such being the case, the Emperor ought not to trust his person among them, and for that very reason not assume the supreme command over it.

Upon which Monsr. de Courrières and I replied graciously, and according to Your Majesty's orders and wishes as it seemed to us; and yet the King, not approving of our warnings, and wishing to exaggerate the danger in which Your Majesty might find yourself, began to say, rather ungraciously, that he had heard that many of the men that Your Majesty had levied had deserted, that the French had occupied Nancy, and that in Italy the whole marquisate of Montferrat, except Sainct Salvadore and another town, had fallen into the hands of the French; that the people of La Mirandola had made

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common cause with and joined the Piedmontese, and that whatever we might say to him he would never be persuaded that the news he had received from various parts were not true. Lastly, he told us that, after reading Your Majesty's letter and the answer to his Secretary, which he desired us to give him, he would pass the papers to his Privy Council, there to be examined, and let us have his answer.

On the 15th the privy councillors met and deliberated; but on the 16th, owing to the sudden arrival [in London] of count Obersteyn, and of certain other officers of Christophe de Landenberg's band, we were not, as we expected, summoned to Court. Yesterday, the 17th, however, early in the morning, De Courrières and I went again to the Privy Council to hear what had been the result of the deliberations and the King's answer. Instead of that, the privy councillors began to speak to us about the contract entered into with Christophe de Landenberg, saying that according to that contract the above-mentioned captain was to be paid at the rate of sixty "paies mortes" by battalion of men (*enseigne*); the King had since increased the number to one hundred, and now Landenberg absolutely declared that he would not serve for less than four hundred,* which exorbitant demand the King, their master, was unwilling to grant, for fear of introducing such bad custom in future. The King, therefore, did not intend to avail himself of Landenberg's band on such terms. The privy councillors added that there was still another reason for the King refusing to grant that captain's demands. He had, in conversation with the Royal commissaries, openly defied them, making, among other insolent remarks, that on a previous occasion he had well dared to disappoint both the Emperor and his brother, the king of the Romans, and that he would not hesitate now to do the same with the king of England.† The King, my master (proceeded one of the privy councillors), has been pleased to communicate the above facts to us that we may inform you (Chapuys) and Mr. de Courrières, in order not only to justify himself towards the Emperor, but to beg him to be on his guard concerning the aforesaid Landenberg, and prevent him from going over to the enemy. And upon our telling the privy councillors in general, and the one who spoke last in particular, that if such was the case they could easily dismiss Landenberg and his band from English service, and enlist other foreign troops, they replied to us that it was too late to look out for

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* "Et comme oultre le convenu avec le dit Landenberg le dit sieur roy n'estoit obligé qu'à donner soysante payes mortes pour chascun enseigne, ilz avoient augmenté jusques au nombre de cent, et que maintenant le dit Landenberg disoit absoulutement quil ne serviroit sans en avoir quatre cents par enseigne."

† "Pour aultant que le dit Landenberg a deu braver contre les commissaires du dit sieur roy, et leur dire entre aultres choses avec oultre cuydement qu'il avoit bien osé aultres fois osé desplaire à vre. ma^te^ et au roy des Romains, [et] que trop plus facillement pourvoit il desplaire au dit sieur Roy."

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recruiting elsewhere; and, moreover, that they were not wanted, as there were in England plenty of men willing to serve abroad, and more than sufficient to cover Landenberg's deficiency and make up the number of troops, which, in virtue of the treaty, the King their master was obliged to furnish for the invasion of France, inasmuch as their number would surely exceed 40,000 Englishmen paid by the King, without counting those under the command of Mr. de Buren, and six thousand English cavalry and three thousand foreigners, including those that Your Majesty is to send them.

After dinner, Mr. de Courrières and I (Chapuys) went to see the King in his own chamber, and he recited to us the substance of the above conversation concerning Landenberg, adding that after all it was very fortunate that the said captain had declared his intention so soon, and before war operations had actually begun; for otherwise, had he kept quiet, and then brought on his most unjustifiable demands, a good deal of disorder and scandal would have ensued.

After this the King went on to say that we, the Imperial ambassadors, must already have heard from his people (*ses gens*) what his answer would be to the charge brought by his own Secretary (Paget), and the request made by Your Majesty that he should take particular care of his person and health by following your very wise, cordial, and amiable advice and representations on that subject; but that, thank God, he was at present doing very well, and thinking of crossing over to Calais as soon as possible, ordering his army of 30,000 men to pass on, and in the meantime preparing the remainder of his forces, and doing exactly as contained in the message delivered to Your Majesty by his own Secretary (Paget). Once at Calais he would decide to march on as he would deem it necessary or convenient to assist Your Majesty in your warlike plans and for inflicting greater damage upon the common enemy, all this being done according to the prescriptions of warfare. He ended by most warmly thanking Your Majesty for the care and solicitude you had shown for his health, reciprocally and instantly begging Your Majesty to take particular care of yours, which he said he valued no less than his own. All this the King said to us with very good grace, begging us write to Your Majesty proposing that some high personage of the Imperial Court should come here and inspect (*recoignostre*) his army whenever it is assembled, under the supposition that you will be pleased to hear the report.

However soon the King may be prepared to cross the Channel, we (Monsr. de Courrières and Chapuys) do not believe, according to our information, that his passage will take place before the 8th of next month, or thereabouts. As to the King going beyond Calais, as he says, I (Chapuys) do

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not believe it, unless it be by mere chance (*par aventure*), or by a determination to besiege Montreiul, to which he has shown a certain inclination.* Indeed, before the departure of secretary Paget with his last message to Your Majesty, that Secretary himself had given me to understand clearly enough that the King his master, at the request and prayers of his privy councillors, and other high personages of his kingdom, that he should excuse himself from going personally over [had decided to acceed to their wishes]. So that, in my opinion and in that of my colleague, it is to be apprehended—to judge from the difficulties and inconveniences he is continually putting forward—that, when called upon to push on into France, he will excuse himself somehow, unless he hears of Your Majesty's successful invasion of that country, and a victory gained over the common enemy.

According to information procured by Mons. de Courrières and me (Chapuys), there is every probability of the count of Lynns, about whom I wrote, marrying this King's niece, daughter of count Douglas. I cannot say what salary he will receive as compensation for the company of 100 men-at-arms which he held in France, and to the command of which he succeeded after the death of his uncle, Mons. d'Aubigny. The count is young and good-looking, and brings with him a brother of his, who is a bishop.†

The King's affairs in Scotland go on prosperously, and are getting every day more favourable. The King himself said the other day to Mons. de Courrières and to me (Chapuys) that he had heard that only a very small number of his own people (the English)—so small, indeed, that it seemed incredible, and he did not like to mention it, though he had the report of men who had been present—had defeated and slain a good number (*multitude*) of Scots, and made several prisoners among the officers, besides setting fire to and burning down the best towns of Scotland, after Idembourg (Edenburg).—London, 18 June 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, almost entirely ciphered.

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* "Et quoy quil dic de passer plus avant de Calaix, je tiens pour tres certain quil ne passera dillec si ce n'estoit par adventura s'il se resolvoit faire assieger Montreuil, en quoy semble qu'il inclinoit voulentiers, et desja devant que partit le dit secretaire pour vīe. maᵗᵉ il m'avoit assez clerement donné à entendre que le dit sʳ roy à la tres instante requeste de ceulx de son Conseil et aultres bons personnaiges du royaulme d'excuser son allee personelle en la dite emprinse, et est à craindre que mal voulentiers envoyerant il s'en armee bien avant au dit France."

† "Il y a apparence que le susdit comte de Lynns espousera la niepce du dit sʳ Roy, fille du conte Douglas. Ne sçay quel traictement luy sera faict dailleurs en recompense de la bande de cent hommes d'armes qu'il a laissé en France, à la quelle avoit succedé apres la mort de Mons. d'Aubigny, son honcle. C'est un seigneur jeusne, de bon visage, que semble estre de tres bonne grace, et [il] a amene avec luy ung sien frere evesque."

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18 June. **125.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Your Majesty's letter of the 8th inst.,* inclosing another from the Emperor to me, came duly to hand a few days ago. With regard to the preparation of waggons (*chariotz*), the duke of Norfolk, as I hear from these privy councillors, has already made the necessary provision. As to the transports (*charruees*) from that country, they are already here, as I mentioned in my last. Since then the Emperor's warships, under the command of Monsr. de Bèvres, have also arrived in the Straits,† at which the King and those around him have evinced great satisfaction and content. Yet whatever the latter may say about the greater part of their army being already on board, there is still much to be said, though it must be owned that they are making all possible haste in preparing all things for their departure, and have written to Monsr. de Bèvres telling him to have patience for 4 or 5 days, and not to take in bad part that unavoidable delay; and the King himself has written to him a gracious letter of welcome to his kingdom.

With regard to the mares detained at Gravelines, no further application has been made to me for their release, and it seems to me that it was good council and a wise measure not to allow any forbidden merchandise to be exported from the Low Countries without sufficient proof that it is really intended for Royal service, or by the King's express commands. Your Majesty's letters patent in favour of this Lord High Admiral have been received here, and delivered to him.‡ They have given general satisfaction, as well as the news which I gave them of the recovery by the Imperialists of the whole duchy of Luxenburg and its capital town—so important and advantageous feat of arms, owing to its great strength and to the artillery there found.

With regard to Octavian Bos, I hope to be able to send him to Your Majesty by the very first transport ship (*charroie*) that leaves here for Flanders.

The rest of the news Your Majesty will hear by the verbal report of Monsr. de Courrières, as well as by the inclosed copy of my despatch to the Emperor.—London, 18 June 1544.

P.S.—I forgot to say that this King was very much pleased when I showed him, the other day, the copy of Your Majesty's letter to Mons. de Rœulx. He (the King) is of the same opinion as Your Majesty with regard to French practices, saying that since his last answer, rejecting entirely their overtures, he has given him to understand clearly that if they fancied they could at any time create jealousy or dissension between His Imperial Majesty and himself, they

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* *See* above, No. 120, p. 196.

† "Et depuis sont venus aux Dunes les navires de guerre de Sa Ma^te."

‡ "J'ay delivré les patentes de vre. ma^te faictes en faveur de l'admiral du dit s^r roy, qu'a esté chose aggreable à ceulx-cy."

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were very much mistaken, and that in future he (the King) would no longer listen to their overtures.*—London, 18 June 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

18 June. **126.** KING HENRY to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Thanks her for her good will and assistance in the matter of provisions, horses, and carriages for his army. Has heard of it through his commissaries [in Flanders], and is grateful for all she has done in that way. And whereas the Queen's commissioners, who have come here [to Calais] for the purpose of providing for the wants of the English camps, have duly exhibited the written orders and instructions received from her to that effect, nothing more is wanted than to request the Queen to allow her commissioners to remain some time at Calais. Supposing, therefore, that the Queen will not find it inconvenient or otherwise disagreeable, the King has retained her said commissioners, and requested them to reside at St. Omer for some time, that they may, under her orders, and conjointly with the English commissariat, procure and collect provisions and other necessaries for the English camp before Montreuil. The King, moreover, is sure that the Queen will do everything that is fit and convenient for the common interest of the allies.—Westminster Palace, the 18th of June 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 p.

19 June. **127.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch, *Rep.* P. *Fasc.*, C. 235.

"Madame,"—The members of this Privy Council, and chiefly the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner) and others, who have the charge of superintending the victuals [for the English army] have given me notice that one Robert Reynold, merchant of this city, has purchased at Camphers, through his factors there, named Thomas Bertor and Thomas Ros, some quantity of dried fish to be brought here to England for the King's service, and that now that the above-mentioned merchants wish to have the fish sent here, he hears from friends and correspondents of his that difficulties are raised at the port. The privy councillors beg me to write to Your Majesty about this, and be pleased to order that the cargo be released and the export allowed.—London, 19 June 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1½ *pp.*

* "Disant que puisquil a rebrouté (rebouté) pour (par?) sa derniere response les dits françoys leur donnant clerement à entendre quilz se fourcomptoient de pouvoir mectre jalousie ou dissencion (*sic*) entre sa ma^te^ et luy, quilz se deporteront (deportassent) de rechercher et reprendre la pratique."

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24 June. **128.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—The account which you (Chapuys) and your colleague (De Courrières) have written to the Emperor respecting the displeasure and annoyance which Colonel Landenberger (*sic*) has caused the King, who now absolutely refuses to keep him in his service, has, to say the truth, caused Us great regret, and We know not what to do, or how to proceed in that affair, for it happens that before the receipt of your joint letter of the 18th inst., the said captain and his men had already crossed the river Meuze (La Meuse), billeting themselves on the poor inhabitants of the country of Liège, and declaring that unless they were paid all that was due and the money they were entitled to they would not move on, but would remain where they were. Such, indeed, have been and are the extortions practised by Landenberg's men on the people of Liège and its immediate neighbourhood that any damage or harm sustained from an enemy might have been more tolerable to them, only that the Germans under Landenberg have hitherto contented themselves with taking, or snatching away, food and drink wherever they found it, without attempting the waste and destruction of the crops and fruits of the land, otherwise the ruin and havoc caused by an enemy is more general and complete.

Matters being in this state, and hearing that one of the English commissaries had arrived here [in Brussels], We sent for him to know from his own lips the origin and causes of the differences between Landenberg's infantry and the King, his master. The English commissary stated that Landenberg had done nothing towards fulfilling the conditions of his contract and that, although he had since been offered the same amount of pay, which the Emperor is in the habit of giving to his German infantry, that colonel * had obstinately refused to take service unless all his demands were fully complied with. This the English commissary could not grant without express orders from the King, his master, besides which Landenberg himself had already received 18,000 crs. in advance for services which he had not rendered.

Such was the verbal declaration made by the Royal Commissary in Our presence. On the same day two of Landenberg's deputies arrived in this town; one from the infantry, the other from the cavalry, under that captain. Both came here [to Brussels] complaining highly of the king of England's commissaries, who, they said, had failed to make their appearance on the day fixed for passing muster, to the great prejudice and loss of the men themselves. The foot soldiers, as they maintained, were willing to serve the king of England on the same conditions and wages as those given by the Emperor to his infantry recruited in Germany; but the

* "Du Coronel de Landenberger," *i.e.* Christophle von Landenberg, here called "colonel" instead of captain as above. This title was then given to the commander of a column (*colonna* or *colonnella*, regiment) of infantry or cavalry having several captains under him.

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English commissaries would not pay them the one month's wages which were then due. Of this the Royal commissaries had only paid them five or six thousand crs. on account, with which payment the infantry could not possibly return home. As to the cavalry their deputies complained that they had no real engagement (*retinue*), as you (Chapuys) may easily gather from their note (*billict*) in German, of which a French translation is here inclosed. Such being the state of things, We have ordered that an answer be prepared for the aforesaid deputies in the following terms: To the infantry, that We have been informed that the king of England will no longer retain them in his service, and has, therefore, licensed or dismissed them, and that since their deputy said that the men would gladly go home on payment of their arrears, and of one month more for their return—a distance of upwards of one hundred leagues—We would willingly have their case properly represented to the king of England. With regard to the cavalry, that We will make Our ministers communicate with the English commissaries in order to know what provision had been made in England respecting them. This being done, as We promised to the deputies, it was found that when the English Royal commissary was called upon to answer Our inquiries, he was absent from this place, having gone to Antwerp. We immediately sent to Diost, the lieutenant of Our body guard, with thirty mounted men, to bring here in safety the other English commissary, and the remainder of the money he might have with him. This precaution We took owing to a rumour afloat of the Germans under Landenberg having threatened the commissary's life in order to ascertain what money he and his colleague had brought from England, and what payments they had made out of it, for while the commissaries asserted that they had disbursed 18,000 crs., the Germans maintain that they have only received 10,000 or 11,000 in all, a considerable difference, which must be accounted for one way or other. The worst is that all this time Landenberg's infantry remain where they are, living at the expense of the poor inhabitants of Liège and its vicinity, and committing all manner of extortions, which are driving the people to despair, they meanwhile throwing all the blame on Us for having led them at Our personal requisition and prayer to receive the said Germans within their territory, believing, as they did, that they were already in the King's service.

You may well imagine what displeasure the poor inhabitants of Liège and its vicinity, and the subjects of His Imperial Majesty in general, will feel at seeing themselves robbed, and utterly ruined by those whom they received and sheltered as friends, but who are not only behaving as enemies, but setting fire to the houses, and wantonly destroying property. We have sent a gentleman of this town expressly to the foot soldiers to signify to them that the king of England will not take them into his service, but We doubt

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their consenting to go home without their salary being paid in full from the day of their enlistment.

As to the cavalry, it cannot be supposed that having come such a distance at their own cost and expense they will now consent to go back home without pay or indemnity of some sort; but from what We hear, they would consent to remain in the king of England's service if the English commissaries would only promise to pay them the usual stipend; otherwise, We very much fear that they will seize the property and goods of every English merchant they meet on their journey back to Germany.

This intelligence We send that you may represent the state of things to the King, and at the same time request him to be pleased to give orders to his commissaries to come to terms with the German infantry, though to say the truth We do not see how their claims can be settled unless they are paid one month or six weeks' stipend, considering that they will have to return home. This, as far as the infantry is concerned; the cavalry, who, as We are told, are all men of substance, declare that they have nothing to do with Landenberg, and would never have mounted their horses for his sake or at his bidding, only that in obedience to the Emperor's warrants they had enlisted for the king of England's service, which is a different question, and having come so far at their own expense, they can hardly be dismissed without some compensation.

With respect to the Sieur de Courrières' mission in that country, since the King has come to a decision there is nothing more to say save that We are glad of his having approved of the Emperor's proposals.

Ever since the departure of Secretary Paget a servant-secretary of the late English ambassador, deceased,* has been applying for a licence to export three horses, which he (the King's Secretary), as he says, had purchased for his own use. In addition to that the said servant-secretary has applied for a passport for two mares, which passport We have refused to grant, because the Secretary in question (that is Paget) had not, that We know of, mentioned the fact to anyone at this Court. Since then, the very same individual (that is the deceased ambassador's servant) has applied for two mares for the King's secretary, and what is more, has exhibited a paper of the King's asking passport for 200 mares, which We must own We find very strange. We have, therefore, refused altogether the licenses applied for, and have sent to the man a message thus conceived:—"We do not choose to have these countries under Our government so entirely despoiled, and the peasants thereof deprived of their mares (*jumens*)."†

* Dr. Richard Layton, dean of York.

† "Depuis le partement du secretaire Paget ung secretaire de l'ambassadeur dernierement trespassé sollicitant passeport pour III. chevaulx que le dit secretaire desiroit avoir avait requis quant à quant avoir passeport pour le dit secretaire, que luy avons refusé, parceque le dit secretaire n'en avoit tenu aulcun propos Et depuis le mesme serviteur a baillé ung billet pour avoir passeport pour II[e] jumens pour le roy, comme il disoit, [ce] qu'avons trouvé estrange, et luy avons refusé expressement, luy faisant dire que ne voulons du tout laisser despouler (depouiller) cet pays des dites jumens."

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We have considered it fit to inform you of these particulars in order that should you be interrogated about it you may know what to answer.—24 June 1544.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

24 June. **129.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch. "Venerable, chier et feal,"—We heard yesterday that Captain Christophlo de Landenberg, after having long been encamped with 1,000 horse and 4,000 German foot, most of whom were quartered upon, and living at the expense of Our patrimonial subjects in the neighbourhood of that town,* had suddenly removed to Liège, where his men are now oppressing and practising all manner of extortions on the inhabitants.† As We were preparing to send to the above-mentioned Captain and men a gentleman in waiting of Our chamber, named the Sieur de Holstentein,‡ came to inquire into the reason of their going thither, bid them go elsewhere, and put a stop to the damage they are inflicting on the country people, the English ambassador residing here with Us, called and said that owing to certain differences which had arisen between the said captain and the King, his master, concerning the pay of his men, the latter was rather inclined not to employ him and his band, which determination, if carried into effect, might, as you are aware, be of great inconvenience [to Us], since the infantry, being so close to the French frontier, might one of these days be tempted to take service under king Francis, who, on the other hand, would grant them any thing they asked for, as may be inferred from his own secret practices and intrigues with the body of German infantry lately levied by Us.§

In consequence of the above facts We have been obliged to keep a strict watch over Captain Landenberg's band, and if necessary have punishment inflicted on the delinquents, to which effect We immediately sent the above-mentioned Astertain to Liège, that he may persuade Captain Landenberg and his band to be contented with the terms offered by the king of England, and should he not succeed, to treat with them to come to Us to some place which We shall name, and thus prevent their going over to France, which must be avoided. Meanwhile, the said Sieur de Astertain will go to the queen

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* Aix, Aich, Hivail in Belgium.

† "Et la plusparts sur nos sujets patrimoniaulx prouchains de là il s'estoit venu mectre a[u] pays de Liège, ou il faisoit grand foule et estonnement (ou extorsement ?) à ceulx du dit pays."

‡ The name of this officer is lower down written Arstenstein and Arsenstain; could it be Hartzenstein?

§ "L'ambassadeur d'Angleterre icy resident a adverty que par (pour) les difficultez que le dict Landenberg avoit faict sur le traictment des ditz gens de guerre, son maistre estoit assez inclin de non se servir de luy, ny des ditz gens de guerre, dont, comme vous pouvez entendre, pourroit venir très grands inconvenient[s], et mesmes que le ditz gens de pied estant si prouchains du roy de France et son royaulme ne fauldroient de l' aller servir, le quel les acheteroit ce qu'ilz vouldroient, comme il a demonstré par les praticques (*sic*) qu'il a mene quant à ceulx qu'avons fait lever."

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dowager of Hungary, Our sister, and inform her of the mission he has from Us, that she herself may take cognisance of it, and request the king of England to try and settle Landenberg's business as economically for himself as he can.

It will, moreover, be your duty as Our ambassador to lay before the king of England a proper view of this case, and at the same time a warning of the inconveniences that might arise from his not taking into his service and paying Captain Landenberg's band, which might be avoided by his commissaries having the affair settled as soon as possible.—Metz, 24 June 1544.

French. Original draft. 1½ *pp.*

26 June. **130.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Before the arrival in London of Jehan Symmich, the bearer of Your Majesty's letter of the 12th inst.,* I had already prepared a vessel (*charrue*) and everything else needed for the transport of Octavian Bos, and the vessel was only waiting for fair wind to sail off. Having since heard by Your Majesty's letter what your orders are respecting the said Octavian, I have delivered him into Symmich's hands, bound and fettered, as is fit, for the greater security of the prisoner during the voyage.—London, 26 June 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

26 June. **131.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—Whereas the foot and horse under Landenberg † complain bitterly of the king of England's commissaries, who, they say, have fulfilled none of the conditions of their engagement, nor the promises made to them, since they still refuse to pay them one month's wages (*gaiges*), whilst the Germans themselves maintain their readiness to serve the king of England without asking for higher terms and salary than the Emperor is accustomed to give to those in his service; and whereas they have come from such a long distance to serve the king of England, whose terms they accepted solely at the Emperor's request, and not influenced in the least by their colonel (*coronel*), for whom they cared but little, the English ambassador being present at the Imperial Court—all this being done with the knowledge and in the presence of the English ambassador then residing at the Imperial Court, We find it very strange that the king of England should now wish to dismiss them without paying them at least the time they have served and that needed for their return home. That is why We request you most particularly to remonstrate with and represent to the King that if he dismisses these men

* *See above*, No. 128, p. 209.

† That is Capt. Christophle von Landenberg, at times called "colonel," as at p. 209.

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without their pay, or without a composition of some sort so as to satisfy them, he is sure to lose all credit with the Germans, and will not be able in future to raise one single man among them. You will also tell him that if he refuses to take Colonel Landenberg into his service, the cavalry under that commander, to say nothing of the infantry, will not serve under captains appointed by the king of England.

There is still more to be said on this affair. We cannot exactly understand, though We have carefully read your last despatches to the Emperor, whether the king of England refuses the services of Landenberg because he dislikes him, or whether he means also not to employ the horse as well as the foot recruited by him in Germany, and whether his commissaries here are or not aware of his real intentions in that matter.

Meanwhile the men are here encamped, ill-treating the poor country people, and living upon them, and therefore We request you to go to the King and actually represent to him how very important it is for his own reputation not to dismiss the horse and foot in the manner that his commissaries have done, without paying them for the time they have been in his service. Although the King's commissaries assert that they have paid the men no less than 18,000 crs., of which they have a receipt, the men deny having received as much—which, however, would not cover one month's pay—alleging that the utmost the cavalry have received is 5,000 crs., and the foot soldiers 6,000 crs., making in all 11,000 crs., which sum is by no means sufficient for one month's pay; for the cavalry, if dismissed, will want at least three months' pay, counting from the day of their enlistment and arrival here until their return home, maintaining that such are the words of the engagement under which they agreed to serve the king of England, besides which it is not customary to raise cavalry for only one month, as there would be scarcely time enough for the men and horses to reach their destination and go back home.

As to the foot soldiers, they demand at least one month's pay, and one fortnight's more for their return home.

We fancy that the King's commissaries, if they have really and truly disbursed the 18,000 crowns, as they say, must include in that sum the enlisting fee (*loirgalt*), and reckon as part of pay what is only a gratuity for Upper Germany. The custom is for the captains to give that first instalment of money to the foot men, in order to keep them contented and satisfied till the day of the general muster. If, therefore, the Royal commissaries, in their account of the money paid to the Germans, have included that first bounty as pay, they have made a mistake. However that may be, unless the said Germans are reasonably satisfied, We cannot prevent them from going over to France, for, having come from so far off, and being so close to its frontier, they could easily do it before We had time and a sufficient force col-

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lected to frustrate their designs, which would be of great help to the enemy who would not fail to seize such an opportunity and make his profit out of it, by publishing that the king of England does not wish to harm or injure them since he is dismissing part of his army, which rumour, if dexterously spread and circulated, would certainly work against Our present common undertaking against France. The King ought also to consider that these Germans, having penetrated so far into this country, are an intolerable nuisance to Us, and that We hope they will not be dismissed from the King's service without paying them their due, and having them conducted to the spot where they passed their first muster, and thence separate them so that each man may go home, without throwing them all together, as it were, upon the hands of his friends and allies.

For the above reasons We again recommend you to employ all means in your power to persuade the King to retain the said German cavalry and infantry, and give orders to his commissaries to pay them their due, and make them march towards Calais, there to join the English army. After duly representing to the King the above-mentioned considerations, you will take care to advise Us as soon as possible of the King's determination in this affair, in order that Astertain the gentleman whom the Emperor sent to treat with the said Germans, may know what he is to do next.

P.S.—"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—In case you should perceive that the King one way or other refuses to retain in his service, the German cavalry and infantry under Landenberg, you will try to persuade him by all convenient means to pay them what is reasonably due to them, not only for the time they have served him, but also for that of their march back home without stopping, as the misunderstanding that may exist between the said colonel Landenberg and his own commissaries. Both the German infantry and the cavalry under Landenberg are composed of old and worthy soldiers experienced in warfare. As to the latter (*les chevaulcheurs*), who had to procure in haste horses and harness for the purpose of serving the English, they might with more justice still resent the King's resolution; but you should take care not to put forward the above said means as long as you have any chance of persuading the King to employ the said Germans, especially recommending you again and again the management of this affair, as one from which depends in a great measure the success of the enterprise against Our common enemy, the French.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

— June. **132.** NEWS from SCOTLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

About twelve days ago mylorde*Evre (Evers), and his son Messire Rauf,* wardens of the Eastern and Middle

*Sir Ralph Evers, *see above*, p. 157.

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Marches, advanced at the head of 3,000 Englishmen, upon a town called Jedworthe,* one of the chief places in Scotland after Edinburg, naturally strong and well fortified, having at all times a numerous garrison for its defence, especially since the beginning of the last war, when the neighbouring country was wasted and sacked by our army. After a sharp encounter with the Scots, of whom 120, including several gentlemen, were slain, the town itself was taken by storm, sacked, burnt, and razed to the ground, as well as the abbey close by, and the English returned to England bringing with them 500 horses laden with the spoils of the enemy.

On their return home our men saw far away in the distance a great fire on our frontier. Suspecting what might be the cause and occasion of the fire, and that perhaps the enemy in the meantime had made a raid [in England] and set fire to some village or farmhouse on our frontier, they sent forward 110 cavalry to the spot where the fire was; but the men rode thither so fast, and spurred on their horses in such a manner, that before they reached the place most of the poor beasts were completely done up and refused to go on, so that 80 of them, with their riders, had to remain behind at a convenient spot in ambush. The remaining thirty men, being better mounted than the others, pushed on, and happened to fall in with the Scotch party, consisting of 800 horse and 100 foot, who, thinking they might do something of importance, had secretly and at night crossed the Borders, though they had achieved nothing save setting fire to a poor little house not worth 30 ducats. The thirty Englishmen made a sudden and furious onset on the Scots, who, fancying that such a small number of men could not possibly attack them unless they were backed by a much larger force, took to flight in disorder, and came to the very spot where the rest of the English cavalry was hidden in ambush, the result being that more than 120 of the Scots were slain, and 217, mostly gentlemen of birth, were taken prisoners and brought over to England. One hundred more, in their flight, were drowned in a river which they attempted to pass. In the pursuit of the enemy our men had no loss whatever in dead or wounded, but at the storming of the town there were six men killed or wounded.

Now the Scots, in all the extensive territory round that town, have no castle or fortress left wherein they can assemble and meet in any number to come to England and do us injury.

In short, the victory won over the enemy looks more like a miracle from Heaven than anything else. May God be praised for it!

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

* Jedburgh?

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27 June. **133.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—I hear from the privy councillors that about 200 mares, that the King, their master, had caused to be bought there [in Flanders] for his service, have been stopped at Dunkerk. I humbly beg Your Majesty to issue orders for their immediate release.—London, 27th June 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

27 June. **134.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your letter, and that of Mons. de Courrières, explaining what you (Chapuys) and he had conjointly done in execution of your charge, have duly come to hand, besides which the English ambassador at this Court has put into Our hands a paper, signed by his master, bearing on the subject, the substance of which may be reduced to five points, as follows:—

The first relates to his army and Ours invading France, on which point there is nothing to remark save to say that you are to thank the King, whenever there is an opportunity, for the care he takes of Our person, and for his good counsel and admonitions, using reciprocal terms of courtesy and acknowledgment as you may think most fit and convenient.

The second, relates to his own passage, and that of his army, in the way and at the time specified in the King's paper, and the distribution of his forces as he (the King) may judge most suitable and convenient for the enterprise. We need not say that you are to bear in mind Our formal answer to Secretary Paget when he interrogated us on the subject, as you must have seen by the mission, which Mons. de Courrières took to England, so as to ensure, as stipulated and settled, that the king of England send at least 30,000 men into France, according to the agreement entered into when Don Fernando Gonzaga was last in England, and that in all other matters the King may do his pleasure, all the time giving him to understand, in the most gracious terms possible—and this is most particularly requested—that, considering the forces which he thinks the king of France has, or may have, in the field, he will act so as to oblige the latter to divide his own, and thus we both may more easily overpower the French, and carry out Our designs. On this particular point you shall insist, making use of your customary discretion and dexterity so as not in any way arouse the King's suspicions or make him angry.

As to the third point, namely the King's advice to Us not to penetrate too far into France except on solid grounds, and to make sure of provisions for Our army, We have already, and will in future, attend to it with all the care and attention that

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the matter deserves; but the news that the King has heard of King Francis having given orders for the wasting of land and burning of provisions along the frontiers of France, cannot be authentic, and requires confirmation, for We have not yet heard of it. You must, however, thank the King for his good advice, and tell him that We shall take the utmost care that provisions be not wanting in Our march into France.

Touching the undertaking against Paris, the King must recollect the agreement entered into when Don Fernando Gomage was in England, and it seems to Us that since then nothing has occurred to necessitate a change or modification of the plans then concerted, and that, on the contrary, the above-mentioned Secretary Paget, when he was in Spire, represented that military expedition to be so easy that neither the person of the King, his master, nor Our own was necessary for the undertaking, so much so that it could be carried into execution by Our respective lieutenants and commissioners. As to king Francis' forces, We hear every day from reliable sources that they are by no means so considerable as the French themselves pretend, their chief hope consisting in 12,000 Swiss, if the king of England, who had consented to contribute with a sum of money on his own side, would certainly not have taken part with the French. Even now Francis' ambassador, who is now bargaining with them, is not sure of retaining their services; perhaps, too, the defeat which the French have lately experienced in Lombardy will make them look twice before they enlist; besides which, if the information that has come to Us be correct, even if the Swiss accept the terms proposed, they will not be ready before the end of this month. To conclude, if the king of England causes his 30,000 men to enter France before the 10th inst., at the same time that we invade it by another frontier, as the said Secretary expressly assured Us he would do, and then makes his army march on, the French will be weakened this side as well as on the side of the English army, as they will be obliged to divide their forces as above said; and, since the King cannot fail to see the advantage of a movement of this sort, We need not insist further on this point.

With regard to the news which the King says he has from France, We can assure him that it is entirely false, and lately forged for the purpose of concealing their last defeat; but let the King hold for certain that what We have written to him is the pure and simple truth, and that We hope still, with God's help, to receive soon more pleasing tidings from the same quarter.

Respecting Landenberg and his band, We cannot tell you more than We wrote on the 24th inst., the gentleman whom We sent to him not having yet returned from his

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convenient and desirable that the King should take him into his service in order to obviate the inconveniences of which We expressly spoke to his ambassador here, and that, even in the case of his bringing over 40,000 Englishmen, the King will not entirely fulfill the conditions stipulated with Don Fernando respecting the foreign foot and horse that he is to enlist. Nor ought the King to demur, at the terms demanded by Landenberg, because those terms once accepted, and that Captain having commenced service, and continued in it for some time, should he reproduce his demands or make fresh ones, We would, on the King's mere request, have him punished in a manner to give him complete satisfaction.—Metz, 27 June 1544.

P.S.—We told the English ambassador who was last here with Us that lately the new duke of Lorraine (François) wrote in his own hand to the Sieur Granvelle that his uncle, the Cardinal (Charles), had wished him to inquire from the former whether, on the application of a safe-conduct for himself, he would be allowed to come to Our camp; Mons. de Granvelle's answer has been that unless he knew beforehand what was the Cardinal's object in coming, he could not possibly ask Us for one. Since then the Duke himself has come here to Metz, and has told Granvelle that the Cardinal had not declared to him the cause for which he wished to see Us, nor could he guess at it, save that he fancied that it was for the sake of making overtures of peace. We have taken no notice whatever of the Duke's words, nor has the Sieur de Granvelle given the least sign of wishing for the Cardinal's coming to Us. If you find an opportunity for it, you may say so to the King, that he may be informed of what passes here, as it is reasonable and just that he should be, and as the perfect and everlasting friendship existing between Us two demands.

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

28 June. **135.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—This present will be merely to apprise you of Our arrival here at Metz,* which We entered accompanied by the duke Mauritius of Saxony and the marquis Albert de Brandenburg, with their respective men-at-arms and some companies (*enseignes*) of infantry. Yesterday, on the road to this town, We received news from Commerse that the garrison of that town had surrendered at discretion to Don Fernando [de Gonzaga] after a slight

* According to Vandenesse's "Itinerary of Charles V.," translated by Bradford, "On the 16th of June the Emperor made his entry into Metz, accompanied by the Archdukes, the duke Maurice of Saxony, the Margrave Albert of Brandenburg, and several other princes, five thousand infantry and three thousand horse. He remained at Metz till the 6th of July." Pp. 545-6.

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cannonade. We suppose that you have heard the news from our said general, who, after leaving a sufficient garrison in the place, with the required provision, has marched to Ligny, whence We expect to receive soon similar news.

On same day news came from Italy, brought by Count Landriano,* whom the Marquis del Gusto sent to announce the rout of Pietro Strozzi and Count Pitigliano, and all their party, numbering about sixty (*enseignes*), of which most of the captains were slain, and the remainder are either prisoners or completely broken and scattered, as you will see by the inclosed copy of the official account.† We hope that this signal defeat of the partisans of France in Italy will have the effect of entirely ruining the French and marring their designs, which were to make those Italians march into Piedmont, and thence into France, to assist in the defence. Do inform the King as soon as you can of this news, etc.—Metz, 28 June 1554.

French. Original.

28 June. **136.** NICHOLAS WOTTON to MONS. DE GRANVILLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

A young man, son of a Scotchman, but he himself born in the county of Charolois, came the other day to me direct from Paris, stating that he was an attendant (*serviteur*) of count d'Aubigny,‡ who after the death of his uncle, the captain of king Francis' [Scotch] bodyguard, took the name and title of Sieur d'Aubigny. The Count, as the man himself asserts, is the brother of the earl of Lennox, a Scotchman, now on king Henry's side, and favourably disposed towards him, that being the cause of both count Auby (*sic*) and his attendant being arrested and sent to prison by order of king Francis. The former has, though with great danger to his life, made good his escape, and wishes to go to England to inform the earl of Lennox of his brother's fate. He has applied to me for a passport, but as I do not know him, nor whether what he tells me is true or not, I send him to you that he may be examined, and if what he himself says is true, and Lennox is really in London, a passport may be granted to him.

If you have any news to communicate, or letters for the King, my master, you may send them to me, for I shall in a day or two have to despatch a messenger to England.—At home, 28 June 1544.

Signed: "Nicholas Wotton."

English. Holograph, with seal. 1 *p.*

* Count Francesco Landriano, about whom *see* Vol. VI., Part I., pp. 415–6.
† Not found in the Imperial Archives.
‡ Comte d'Auby (d'Aubigny ?).

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29 June. **137.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—By the inclosed copy of my despatch to the Emperor, Your Majesty will learn the recent news of this country. Nothing important has occurred since, and I only beg and entreat that my own personal affairs be attended to.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

29 June. **138.** The SAME to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Having this very morning received and read Your Majesty's letter of the 23rd inst., I immediately had myself conveyed [in a Sedan chair] to the Palace,* without previously applying, as usual, for an audience, lest there should be delay in the granting of it owing to this King's many occupations, and principally to the solemnity of the marriage about to be celebrated of count Lynes (earl of Lennox) and Dame Marguerite Douglas, the King's niece. Arrived at Greenwich Court, I found that the King was not yet ready to receive me in his chamber (*n'estoit encores prest*), and therefore I communicated to the privy councillors the contents of Your Majesty's letter, at the same time adding remarks and observations of my own in conformity with Your Majesty's instructions and those of the queen dowager of Hungary in her letter to me of the 25th inst., and stating the complaints and recriminations brought against Christofle (*sic*) [von] Landenberg, and the officers under him, by this King's commissaries sent to the Queen dowager. In short, notwithstanding all my efforts to remonstrate with the privy councillors, they have decided that the King, their master, ought by no means to employ or take into his service people at such unreasonable terms; that no trust or confidence could be placed in the infantry, in proof of which they urged the very same arguments mentioned in my last dispatch.† With regard to the cavalry, there was not the same difficulty; the King would be inclined to take it into his service, and give them the same pay that Your Majesty gives to the Germans. This (added the privy councillors) was the King's answer to Landenberg's deputies when they came here, and they themselves had offered to induce Landenberg to accept those conditions, or should he still refuse the terms of payment proposed, they hoped to be able to prevail on most of

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* "Me fis tout incontinent transporter devers ce roy."

† "Que le dit s^r roy ne se debvoit servir aulcunement de telles (*sic*) gens si desraisonables, et aussi aux queulx (?) ny avoit foy ny ascheurance, mesmes en l'endroit des pietons, allegeant sur ce les raisons que tou choye par mes precedentes."

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the cavalry to enter the King's service.* The privy councillors added that Your Majesty had means and men enough in Your power to prevent the said Landenberg from going over and taking service in France, and yet (continued the privy councillors) that is a sort of thing that we should very much like to hear of, considering that if Landenberg's men go over to the French side, the Most Christian King may be so emboldened as to offer or accept battle, which is what we desire most.

Such words from the mouth of the privy councillors rather surprised us, and I (Chapuys) am sure that they would willingly not have uttered them if they had heard the arguments which I and my colleague brought in favour of their retaining Landenberg's men in the King's service, and coming to an agreement of some sort with him; for we should have represented to them the great difficulties and danger there would be in trying to prevent the passage of that force, and the disrepute that would fall on Your Majesty should Landenberg's band go over to the French, and thus open the way for other captains of German auxiliaries to do the same, and disobey the injunctions of the Imperial Diet, to the great discredit and contempt of Your Majesty's authority.

After this I (Chapuys) went to the King, who, having listened to what I had to say, repeated for his own justification the very same arguments of which he made use at a former audience of Mons. de Courrières and myself, as recorded in our joint dispatch of the 18th ult., adding that since then he had received information of his commissaries having actually disbursed some money and advanced it to Landenberg and his band, under the solemn promise that they would immediately march wherever they were told, and that after receiving the money that captain had refused to march, and would not move, persisting in his demand, and declaring that he must have more money; that in saying so he (Landenberg) had made use of strong language and threats, and had even caused one of his Royal commissaries to be followed to the gates of Brussels, within which some of his own mounted men had for some days spied and tracked him with a view to take him prisoner. The King then went on to express the same wish as his privy councillors had done to me one hour before—namely, that he had no objection to take into his service the cavalry, but as to Landenberg's infantry he would not have it. He ended by declaring that he did not think, after all, that Landenberg would ever go over to France, to judge from his own language when he was last in this country, for he seemed to be extremely indignant against king Francis for causing his

* "Lesquels commis se sont à moitée offerd à fere à ce condescendre le dit Landenberg, et en cas de reffus ilz esperoient de tant fere envers ceulx de cheval quelz les ameneroyent pour la pluspart au service du dit sieur roy."

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brother to be beheaded. If still afraid of his defection, Your Majesty might easily take him and his band into Your service, and they would certainly have more respect for You than for him.

I (Chapuys) failed not to say that Your Majesty had already too many men in Your service, and more than You wanted, and had besides a very great burden to sustain in Italy; that he need not be in fear of the disorderly conduct or inconveniences of which he spoke when once matters between him and Landenberg had been sufficiently explained and settled; and I ended by begging him to reconsider the affair with his usual wisdom, and let me know his intention, which he promised to do.

I must not omit to say that in the course of conversation the King gave me to understand that he was in receipt of news that Landenberg had retreated; but, however that may be, I neither expect nor hope to get from the King more than what has been said above.

The duke of Suffolk has not yet left, but the main body under his command (*ses gens de la bataille*) has already crossed the Channel. To-morrow morning early he will set sail for Calais, and will be accompanied by the bishop of Winchester, superintendent-general of the provisions (*victuailles*), and the Grand Squire, and several other lords. If I am to believe what the King told me the other day, his advice is that whilst he himself is preparing to cross the Channel—which will not be so soon, for he cannot go before eight or nine days—an attempt will be made to carry Montreuil. It seems as if, after the news of the victory gained by Your Majesty's arms in Italy, and of which I took care to inform him in pursuance of orders received on the 18th inst., this King has had an increasing desire of crossing the Channel, and personally attending to the above-said enterprise, for when I detailed to him the particulars of the battle, and what the marquis du Gast had written to me on the subject, he showed marks of great pleasure and joy, as he had done a few days before when hearing of the progress of Ferdinand Gonzaga (Ferrante Gonzaga).

As Your Majesty once wished to know how long the King would like to continue the war against France, I will take upon myself to say that he will not go beyond the period of time fixed, and that he will very soon feel tired of the expense, owing to his treasury not being so full as was thought at one time. My reasons for suspecting as much are that he has already made financial operations for good round sums with various commercial houses of Anvers (Antwerp), and has spoken secretly with various merchants—English and foreign—to stand security for him at Antwerp for the sum of 400,000 or 500,000 crs., or perhaps more, which he wants to borrow there, to be repaid at Christmas, together with the

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interest amounting to a very large sum. Another proof of the King's treasury being nearly exhausted is the fact—a very strange one, indeed—that he is now contracting a loan with merchants of this city for such an insignificant sum as 20,000 sterling, to be repaid out of the standing revenue, with an interest of 12 per cent., which conditions he would certainly not accept if he had plenty of money. True it is that, fond as he is of having plenty of funds in his treasury, it may be said that the loans he has made, and is about to make, are precautionary measures taken beforehand, in order to meet money difficulties if they should supervene.

The marriage of count Lynns (earl of Lennox) and dame Marguerite Douglas took place this morning at mass (*à la messe*), the King and Queen being present. It is said that an annual income of three or four thousand crs. has been promised by the King to the married couple.*—London, 29 June 1544.

Signed : "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 4 pp.

3 July. Wien, Imp. Arch.

139. EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

"Madame,"—After expressly informing the King and his Privy Council of the many reasons and remonstrances contained in Your Majesty's letter of the 26th ult., and giving them to understand the danger to which the Royal agents and ministers, and even all classes of English subjects trading with the Low Countries, would be exposed from Landenberg's band unless that captain and his men, now dismissed from the king of England's service, were promptly paid up, I could get no final answer from the latter to my representations save to say that the King, their master, wishing, as I wrote last to Your Majesty, to have a body of German cavalry in his service, had to that effect sent [to Flanders] a sum of 4,000 ducats, which his commissaries (*commis*) had paid down to them in advance.† As to the infantry (*gens de pied*), their demands were so unreasonable that he would not engage them. Nor could he have done so if he chose, for having received notice from His Imperial Majesty not to give them a larger stipend than that which their countrymen received from the Emperor, he found that their demands were unusual and most exorbitant. As to his paying money to Landenberg's men on their dismissal from service and consequent return home, that

* "Et dict l'on que le d^{t} s^{r} roy a promis au syre des noupces et à la dame trois ou quatre mille ducatz dentretenement pour (par) an."

† "N'ay finallement sçeu avoir aultre resolution sinon que le dit s^{r} roy desirant se servir des gens de cheval, estoit en bonne esperance de les avoir, et pour cest effect ses commis avoient puis nagueres faict delivrer aux dits gens de cheval quatre mille ducats."

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he obstinately refused to do, and I have in vain tried to persuade him that in all contracts of the kind there is a clause stipulating that men serving in German infantry and cavalry are to be paid their wages from the day they leave home and pass muster until they return home, the privy councillors alleging that the King had remitted to Landenberg a sum of 18,000 ducats, independently of what he (the King) had paid for the marching bounty. If the men had not received any portion of that money, they could, and ought to, apply to the captain for their due, and call on him to render an account.*

There is nothing more for me to advise, save that the King intends sailing for the Continent on Monday next. May God be pleased that nothing occur to prevent him!—London, 3 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

3 July. **140.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* I., *Fasc.* C., 234.

"Madame,"—A Piedmontese named Jehan Mary Toullant, residing here, in London, stole some time ago, from a certain Baptiste Barron, some gold rings of the approximate value of 1,500 ducats. As Toullant was about to cross over to France with his theft (*larcin*), he was stopped at the frontier of Luxemburgh by Monsr. de Villemont on suspicion of his being a Frenchman—a spy—not on any other particular charge. The said Jehan Mary had previously entrusted the stolen rings to a priest, who, hearing of the former's arrest, consigned them for greater security to Maitre Jehan Chevallier, nephew of Jehan Tirry (Tierry), both of whom, uncle and nephew, after closely inspecting the rings, and finding by the description and particulars given by Barron that they originally belonged to him, now offer to restore to him the stolen property on condition that Mr. de Villemont will no further molest the priest or them, and desist from the prosecution. It appears, however, that though Your Majesty has written to Monsr. de Villemont in favour of the detention, the judicial proceedings are still going on, and Barron does not get back his rings. As the duke and duchess of Suffolk, whose jeweller (*argentier*) the said Barron seems to be, have strongly recommended this affair to me, I cannot do less than repeat their joint prayer, and beg that Monsr. de Villemont

* "Disant et affirmant avoir faict delivrer au dit Landenberg XVIII[m] ducats sans compter ce[ulx] du 'lauwfighelt,' (lawfgeld ?) et que les dits pietons s'en pouvoient prendre au dit Landenberg et luy en fair[e] donner compte."

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be made to desist from the prosecution, and Tyrry (*sic*) ordered to restore to Barron his property.—London, 3 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1½ *pp.*

3 July. **141.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—I have nothing to add to my inclosed for the Emperor, save that I have not forgotten to thank these privy councillors for the sending off of Octavian Bos, at the same time telling the King what Your Majesty's intentions are as to the manner of treating that prisoner, all of which the King has taken in very good part.

Nor will I omit to say that I have not failed to remonstrate again with these councillors on all the points contained in Your Majesty's letter to me, supplementing them, as is my duty, with such arguments and remarks of my own as I thought advisable; and in the end, after some debate (*estrifz*) he has shown not only contentment at Your Majesty's doings, but also commiseration at the state of perplexity and trouble in which Your Majesty must now be owing to the annoyance caused by the soldiery (*gens de guerre*), as well as by the provision of victuals and other necessaries for his camp.—London, 3 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

3 July. **142.** The SAME to MONSEIGNEUR DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—Your Lordship will see by the inclosed copy of my letter to the Queen the last news of this country, as well as the King's final resolution in the Landenberg affair; but I will not omit to say that *my lord the duke of Alburquerque is every day rising in reputation and credit among these courtiers, and that the King and the Queen are showing him much favour. Yet the Duke, as I gather, cares little for it, his stay here being for no other purpose than that of being useful to the Emperor. Had it not been for that, I can assure your Lordship that whatever these people might have said or done to induce him to stay here, he (the Duke) would not have remained one hour more with them upon any consideration. True it is that, as it seems to me, the Duke is pleased and flattered at the idea that the Emperor appreciates his services, and that the fact is becoming public among courtiers here and elsewhere, yet he fears that His Imperial Majesty does not really and truly wish him to remain in this country, though he has received orders to that effect, but has only yielded to the intercession and prayers of this King. That is the reason why I humbly beseech your Lordship to write a few words to the Duke, and*

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also to Don Bartolomé, his brother, and others on the subject.*—London, 3 July 1544.

Signed : "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed : "A monseigneur Monsieur de Granvelle, Chevalier, et premier Conseiller de l'Empereur."

French. Original. Partly ciphered.

3 July. **143.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to AMBASSADOR CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'Ambassadeur,"—Our letters of the 24th and 26th ult. must have apprised you sufficiently of the very great damage which Landenberger's † men have inflicted on the inhabitants of Liège, subjects of the Emperor. Since then the men have overrun the plains round that town, living entirely upon the poor peasants, and practising all manner of extortions; so much so, that there has been some talk among the country people of rising against them, and getting at once rid of the nuisance anyhow. Meanwhile, the inhabitants of Liège and its immediate vicinity, as you may imagine, are throwing all the blame on Us, saying that it was at Our request and recommendation, and on the assurance We gave them that Landenberger's men would behave in a friendly manner and pay for their quarters and food, that they consented to their crossing the river Meuse and coming down to them, which they might easily have prevented had they only suspected what was going to happen. All this proceeds from some misunderstanding or other on the part of that King's commissaries, owing, no doubt, to their being insufficiently acquainted with the manner of dealing with recruits (*pietons*) from Upper Germany, who are in the habit of asking at first unreasonable prices for their services, and if they find that the contractors are inexperienced in affairs of that sort, making most excessive and preposterous demands.

Ever since the beginning of the present war with the French, no affair has given Us so much trouble as this one of Landenberger's men, whom We by no means can suffer to remain thus at large and unpaid for fear of discouraging others‡ from taking service, since after all they have been levied, engaged, and contracted for the king of England's service. We have tried in vain to persuade the King's commissaries to go to them and endeavour to arrange matters; but they will not, because they say they are afraid of being ill-treated by the soldiery. Meanwhile, His Imperial Majesty's subjects have been, and are still, despoiled, robbed, and oppressed

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* Bartolomé Fernandez de la Cueva, third son of Don Francisco de la Cueva, second duke of Alburquerque, and brother of Don Beltran II., the third duke.

† Christophle von Landenberg, or Landenberger, as his name is here written. *See above*, No. 112, p. 183.

‡ "Lesquels ne pouvons laisser baillie (?) pour non descourager tous aultres."

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without Our being able to prevent it, which is exceedingly annoying to Us, as we have to listen to the incessant clamouring of the Emperor's subjects in these parts without the means of satisfying their very just claims and demands, or compensating them for their losses.

We have, therefore, just cause and reason for resentment against those through whose inexperience such a set of people, as these German soldiers are, have been let loose upon these provinces under Our government, after dismissing them without their due, for We cannot be persuaded that it is the King's real intention and purpose that Landenberger's men should remain unpaid for their services up to this day. Had the Royal Commissaries consented, as We wrote to you on the 26th of June, to pay Landenberger's infantry one month's salary for the time they have served the king of England, besides fifteen days more for their return home, which is what they ask for, the men would have been satisfied, and the evils the people of Liège are suffering would have been avoided. But the King's commissaries, We repeat, would never come to terms or settle accounts with the men, and have only paid them some money on account, which after all has passed into the pockets of their captains without the men themselves receiving any portion of it, at which, as you may imagine, the latter are very indignant.

We cannot imagine the reason there may be for your not having yet replied to the urgent request contained in the Emperor's letter of the 24th ult. respecting Altesteyn, the gentleman of his chamber sent by him to Landenberger's quarters. Until your answer comes, and We know what the King says on the subject, Altesteyn cannot possibly execute his commission, which is most important for His Imperial Majesty's service and the welfare of his subjects in these countries.

Yesterday afternoon your letter of the 27th ult. came to hand, in which you try to persuade Us to allow and give license for the export of 200 Flemish mares stopped at Dunkerke, and which, you say, had been purchased for that King's service, as the privy councillors have officially informed you. We wrote to you on the 24th of the said month of June that a secretary of the late English ambassador * at this Our Court had also applied for a license to export to England two mares, which license We had refused to grant on certain considerations of Our own. The same ambassador's servant (*serviteur*), the day after Our refusal, applied for passports for 200, which he, in a note of hand, stated were wanted for the King's stables. We found it strangely ridiculous—nay, almost an ironical joke—that the very same man who had applied for a license to export *two* mares, and had been refused, should now apply for *two hundred* for the

* Dr. Layton, dean of York.

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Royal stud. We, therefore, ordered Our councillors to tell the man that even if the mares were really and truly destined for the King's stables, he (the late ambassador's servant) was not, in Our opinion, the fit person to make the application. The demand was important, and required more ample and official formalities than those used. After this the Royal Commissary, who came here to procure carts and waggons for the English army, has renewed the application for the said 200, though without exhibiting credentials or other papers showing that they are really intended for the King's own service; and the commissary, hearing that We refused his application, has, We are told, made use of words highly inconsiderate, saying that perhaps this refusal on Our part might give occasion to, and be the cause of, mightier things being prevented. In short, the same commissary has presented in Our Council a copy of your letter to Us of the 27th of June, by which We are apprised that the mares are already at Dunkerke, which We find very strange, considering the circumstances of the case. But, as We say, there is in all this just cause for Our refusing a license for the export of such a number of mares, lest these provinces under Our government, whose principal industry consists in the breeding of horses, should get depopulated, which would soon be the case if the Flemish mares—an article the export of which has always been expressly forbidden—should be allowed to go out of the country so frequently as has been the case of late. To those prohibiting ordinances We must particularly adhere, the more so now that We are informed that in the hulks or transport ships which left lately the ports of Flanders and the Low Countries for the passage of the English army to France, no less than 700 Flemish mares—many of which are not yet fit for breeding—were embarked without Our license. We do not presume that it is the King's intention thus to deprive these countries of their resources, since he himself wishes the merchants of these countries to behave honestly, and not to export from his kingdom prohibited articles. We have not failed to supply as many horses as the King wanted for his camp, although it has been to the great regret of the inhabitants of these provinces, who would have much preferred to grant a large sum of money towards the expenses of the war than have their horses and waggons pressed for the King's service. Indeed, We are told that the people of Flanders in particular have offered to contribute with 100,000 crs. towards the expenses of the war, provided they are exempted from the requisition of waggons for the English army, and the great number of draft-horses required, which, according to calculation, amounts to upwards of 8,000. Whenever the king of England has applied to Us for horses for himself or his courtiers, We have granted licenses for the passage thereof without the least difficulty, and now, only for his sake, We have given orders that the 200 mares detained at Dunkerke be shipped for

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England, on condition, however, and with the hope, that in future the King's ministers and officials will not apply by themselves for similar concessions—a thing to which We could in no wise consent to. Since you say that the King's Privy Council has informed you that the Dunkerke mares are really intended for the Royal stables, We should like to know whether it really is so, and whether the King is aware of it, and has given orders for their purchase for this present enterprise, since there are some among them which are not serviceable for the purpose.

You will thank the King for his having sent Us Octavian Bos, on whom exemplary justice shall be such as the Emperor's service and his own demand.

After the above was written yours of the 29th ult. comes to hand, together with another for the Emperor, which We forwarded to him immediately. In answer to yours, We can only say, for the present, that We are much concerned at the grievances (*cryerie*) of the Emperor's subjects here, who certainly regret more the damage caused to them by those whom they considered their friends, than all the harm they might have received from the hands of the enemy.

From another side We have news that some German cavalry for the king of England's service is coming from Utrecht without Our having been informed of it beforehand, and that both men and horses on their passage through that district are living entirely at the expense of the country people—so much so, that a deputation has come here to complain. Generally speaking, We cannot do less than blame the conduct of the Royal commissaries in this and other cases, for We cannot believe that it is the King's intention to treat them and the Emperor's subjects in this way.

As We were writing the above, news has been received that the strong place of Ligny has surrendered at discretion to the viceroy of Sicily, and that both the counts of Ligny and Rochy* (*sic*) are prisoners of war.—[3 July 1544.]

French. Original draft. 4 *pp.*

5 July. **144.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable chier et feal,"—Your letter of the 29th ult.† came to hand yesterday, the 4th inst. Since then, perceiving that notwithstanding all your remonstrances the king of England persists in his refusal to employ Landenberg and his band, We have been obliged to take them into Our own service in order to avoid in future the great damage they have been inflicting on the inhabitants of the Low Countries, and

* Father Daniel calls them "Brienne et Roussy." His words are: "De là [Commercy] l'Empereur vint assieger Ligny en Barrois, ou le Comte de Brienne s'ètoit enfermé avec le Comte de Roussi, son frère, les sieurs d'Eschenais, et de Gonsoles, plusieurs capitaines, quinze cent homme de pied et cinquante gendarmes."—*Histoire de France*, Amsterdam, 1720, Vol. V., p. 406.

† No. 138, p. 221.

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chiefly on those of Liège and its district. This measure of Ours was the more necessary on account of Landenberg's foot making common cause with the cavalry, and threatening, if they were not paid, to go over to France. You will represent to the King that this will become a heavy charge for Us to support, owing to the very great number of men We have already under Our banners, and that if We have taken the said foot and horse into Our service it has been merely for the sake of avoiding their unruly conduct, and preventing them from passing over to the enemy. If the expense is to fall upon Us alone it is unjust, since Our army already exceeds by much the stipulated number. As to the privy councillors telling you that they care not whether Landenberg's men go over to France or not, alleging for it the reasons specified in your letters, We really do not know what to make of it. At times, when it suits their purpose, the English will say, by way of argument, that king Francis' forces are insignificant and good for nothing; whereas, at other times, they seem to dread them, as if they represented the power of all the World put together.*

With regard to the King's final determination to cross the Channel and come personally to the undertaking against Montreuil, well and good; but you must take care that the English advance into France without stopping on the frontiers of Picardy, as they have done hitherto, and as We have informed you by Our letters.

As to the surmise expressed in your last despatch that the King has not at present too much money to dispose of, We recommend you to make fresh inquiries, and ascertain, if possible, what means he has at his disposal, and how long he intends keeping up his army, and in general let Us know from time to time what you can learn on the subject.

We will to-morrow take Our departure for Thou[l], where Our army, still in front of St. Desir, will join Us.† Of whatever occurs you will be duly apprised.—Metz, 5 July 1544.‡

French. Original draft. 1½ *pp.*

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* "Et quant à ce que çeulx du Conseil du dit s^r roy vous ont dit quilz ne se soucirent quant oyres (*sic*) les dits gens de guerre allassent en France pour les causes contenues en vos dites lectres, nous ne scavons bien entendre les propoz des dits anglois que aulcunes fois font les forces des françois si petites quilz ne les estiment en riens, et par fois si grandes quil sembla que l'on doibve les craindré comme ce estoit toute la puissance du monde."

† According to Vandenesse, the Emperor left Metz the day after. On the 6th [of July] the Emperor marched with flying colours from Metz to Pont-à-Mousson, rested on the 7th, and came to Menonville on the 8th. See *Itinerary of Charles V.*, Bradford translation, p. 316.

‡ Joined to the above letter from the Emperor to Chapuys, dated Metz, 5 July, are a few lines in Queen Mary's own hand, addressed to Lewis Schore, president of the Council of Flanders, thus worded :—"President, let this letter be forwarded at once to the Imperial ambassador in England (Eustace Chapuys), and if you deem it convenient and opportune, let Scepperus' attention be called to the paragraph relating to Landenberg's men." The letter alluded to must be either that of the Emperor to Chapuys of the 24th of June (No. 129, p. 212), or else that of the 27th of June (No. 134, p. 217.)

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— July. **145.** The ANSWER of the LIEUTENANTS and CAPTAINS of the GERMAN BAND under LANDENBERG to QUEEN MARY OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P. *Fasc.* C. 23.

To the message brought by Cornelis Scepperus on behalf of the Emperor and of the Queen Regent, the undersigned answer that they have no objection to serve the king of England, provided they get two months' pay in advance, besides having their expenses paid up to the day.*

Indorsed: "Received at Liège on the 8th of July."
French. Original. 1 *p.*

6 July. **146.** FRAGMENT of a LETTER from the EMPEROR to SECRETARY JUAN VASQUEZ DE MOLINA.

S. E. L., 640, f. 80.

Our vanguard has worked so well, that after recovering Lucenburque (Luxenburg)—as you know, a very important place of arms—it has gone and taken a castle further on, which was very convenient and necessary for the supply of provisions. Lini (Ligny)—a strongly fortified town, where the French had made greater preparations for defence than anywhere else, for the garrison consisted of nearly 1,500 men, including 500 Italians, and twenty-six pieces of heavy brass artillery, and forty more of lighter calibre, brass and cast-iron, besides a great quantity of powder, ammunition, provisions, and so forth—was next taken; and whilst We are writing this, Landisihies (Landrecis), which is a town of great importance, is being besieged, and We confidently hope that, with God's help, it will shortly fall into Our hands.

The king of England has ordered the vanguard and rear-guard of his army to advance, and both are already inside France. He himself will cross over to Calais with the main body (*batalle*) so as to join the rest of his forces, and march, as agreed, on Paris, so that, to judge from this beginning and the state of affairs in France, as reported, there is reason to believe that the undertaking will be successful. Indeed, until now no resistance has been offered; no one knows of the King having an army under his command, or the means to raise one as soon as it is required,† and We hope that, with God's help, his service will be done, because the district where We now are is very apropos for an invasion, being fertile and rich, and having very few or no castles at all.

* No date. A clerk of the Imperial Archives has written, in a modern hand, 1543; but this is evidently a mistake, for Landenberg's contract for service did not begin until May of 1544. In December of the preceding year he was in London, negociating with Henry's ministers respecting a body of German infantry to be raised for the Royal service (Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 539, 542). It was in June 1544 that his men, as it appears, would not move from Liège without being paid two months' salary in advance, and that Scepperus was sent by Queen Mary. The above is their answer.

† "De manera que à lo que se cree puede juzgar [se] segun los principios se llevan, y de la manera que se entiende que esta lo de Francia, donde no se halla hasta agora resistencia, ni se sabe que tenga[n] junto exercito, ni lo podra[n] hacer tan presto, esperamos, &c."

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Should this advantageous state of things cease through Our being unable to support Our army till the middle of September at least, you may well imagine the confusion in which I might be placed,* for not only would Our reputation suffer immensely through it, but all monies hitherto spent would be as good as thrown away. The loss of military reputation We would feel above all things; and if this army of Ours, hitherto so prosperous, had to retreat and be disbanded for want of money, there is no saying what Our subjects would feel, when after so much expenditure to insure their comfort and welfare, and oblige or induce king Francis to sue for peace—which is after all the sole and exclusive aim of Our armaments—they found that they were not secure from French attacks. That is the reason why We ask you as urgently as We can to procure Us the greatest sum of money possible.—Metz, 6 July 1544.

Signed: "Yo El Rey."

Countersigned: "Idiaquez."

Addressed: "To Juan Vasquez de Molina, Our Secretary." †

Spanish. Original. 1½ *pp.*

7 July. **147.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Your Imperial Majesty's letter of the 28th ult., as well as the copy of the note presented by this King's ambassador, in answer to Mons. de Courrière's mission, came to hand yesterday, the 6th. To-day, after dinner, I, myself, waited on the King, to whom, after the usual courteous compliments and thanks for the interest he shows for your Majesty's health and personal concerns, I spoke in the following terms:—With regard to the proposed division or parcelling of the Royal army, that (I said) ought not to take place in the manner stated in the English ambassador's memorandum, but in conformity with the agreement previously entered into with secretary Paget.‡ I gave him to understand that Your Majesty's advice was, that in case of the whole of the English army not being ready to take the field at the appointed time, at any rate the 30,000 men proposed by that secretary should at once penetrate into the enemy's territory. The rest of the Royal army, the secretary had declared would, doubtless, be employed wherever it could do most harm to the common enemy according to the stipulations of the treaty. That formal declaration secretary Paget had made in Your

* "Ya podreis ver y considerar en la confusion en que nos veriamos, porque no solamente se aventuraria lo mucho que está gastado y consumido hasta agora, pero [sufriria] la reputacion, que seria lo que mas sentiriamos, y aun nuestros señorios y estados no sabemos la seguridad que tendrian si este exercito se deshiziesse en tal coyuntura haviendole hecho para remedio de ellos ó para reducir y atraer al rey de Francia á alguna buena y firme paz."

† Secretary of the Council. *See* Vol. VI., Part II., p. 153.

‡ "Quant au departement de son armee, non point selon la teneur du dit escript, mais conforme en ce qu'on (il) fust dit au secretaire Paget."

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Imperial Majesty's presence, promising that the above-said 30,000 men would take the field on the 10th of June.

To this statement of facts the King replied that his men had actually been within French territory at the specified period of time, and that a large division of his army had made an advance into the enemy's territory, whilst Your Majesty's own had not yet marched into it. So much did the King reply to my statement, without, however, alluding to secretary Paget's restrictions or choosing to admit, notwithstanding, my efforts were to persuade him, that Commercy and Ligny (taken by your Imperial Majesty's men) were really and truly within French territory.

If his men (the King continued) had not pushed on further into France (or rather did not hasten to do so) he, himself, was not to be blamed for it, the fault laid with the people of the Low Countries, who had not furnished the transport ships and other necessaries, such as waggons, and covered carts (*et aultres car*); without victuals (he said) it was quite impossible for an army to march. There was no hope of getting assistance from the Low Countries in that way, for since, at the very frontier, men had actually died of hunger and thirst, and the greater part had been three or four days without drinking anything but water; a sort of privation which military men seldom endure without falling into despair.

The King ended by telling me confidentially, and as a secret, that in order to obviate the above inconvenience and keep the road open for the victualling of his army, he had made up his mind to try and see whether Montreuil could not be taken. He was expecting from hour to hour the report of his generals thereupon, and also to hear from the duke of Suffolk that everything was ready for that undertaking; the very moment the required information reached him he would embark, and cross over to Calais, and place himself at the head of his forces.

My reply was that if the undertaking could be carried out immediately with prompt success, it would, without doubt, prove advantageous to the invading armies; otherwise it might turn out injurious to the military reputation of both princes, and contrary to the letter of the treaty, wherein it is expressly said, that on no account are the invading armies to stop on the way unless it be by sheer force, or the exigences of warfare, and that as to the want of provisions of which he complained, the fault lay with his own ministers, who had been warned in due time to send to Flanders, and the Low Countries, commissaries and agents to purchase and make stores of them during the season. The King's ministers were also recommended, in union with those whom the Queen Regent would appoint for the purpose, to see that the country-people (*paysans*) supplied daily the English camp with provisions. The want of which the Royal commissioners complain (said I) is in a great measure to be attributed to the

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poverty of the country-people, caused by the damage done to them in these times of war by enemies as well as by friends, and the consequent scarcity of victuals, as his (the King's ministers) had been informed beforehand. Besides which, as I had reason to think, the evil partly originated in the fact that the English and the foreign soldiers in the King's service refused to pay for the provisions taken to their camp by the country-people a higher price than the one which their King sold his at Calais, and, still more, the peasants and sutlers were obliged to take in payment the new coin at a higher value than that of the old one, which is worth nearly two "liards" more than the new one of this country.

As to the waggons (*chariotz*), of which the King spoke, I maintained that the number he had asked for, had been supplied and rightly handed over to his own commissaries, who being quite inexperienced in such matters, fancied that only two men (for there were no more) could conduct (*conduire*) such a large number of them, with their respective teams of horses, and that if the drivers had gone away the fault laid with his ministers and commissaries, and not in any way to the Queen Regent or the people of the Low Countries.

On this last point the King replied that there was no appearance whatever of the carriers refusing to serve, and lead their horses, especially when they were paid the price stipulated for their services; if they had left and would not earn money, he (the King) suspected that there must have been some contradictory orders from the Queen Regent.

Thus spoke the King, and yet he seemed very much surprised when I read to him the paragraph of a letter from the Queen to me, of the 3rd instant,* in which it is expressly stated that the inhabitants of the Low Countries would willingly pay a very large sum of money as contribution to the expenses of this present war rather than be obliged to furnish waggons and horses (*charrettes et chevaulx*), and that those of Flanders, especially, have made an offer of 100,000 crowns, to be exempted from it. To that statement the King had nothing to reply.

Respecting the expedition to Paris I have formally declared to the King, as graciously and adroitly as it was in my power, and in conformity with the instructions and letters received, what Your Imperial Majesty's intentions are. The King made no remark whatever on this subject. Nor can I omit to say that when I mentioned to him "en passant" the fact that the want of application to the Swiss, which Your Imperial Majesty did once suggest might prove a great fault, and that if he (the King) would help in that quarter there might be still a chance of destroying the hope which the French have on that nation, he (the King), persisted, as on former occasions, in his idea, saying that even in case of the Swiss granting king Francis the

* *See* No. 143, p. 230.

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12,000 men who are being enlisted, as the rumour is, he cared not for it (*il ne s'en souceyoit*), for on the contrary he thought that would bring on the ruin of king Francis, who trusting in them might be induced to fight a pitched battle and be vanquished, which was all that Your Majesty and he ought to desire most. I observed to him that if the Swiss came the inconvenience alluded to in his ambassador's note might rise, for the French would then be able to dispatch a large force to some point of their own territory, whence they could easily stop the passes and the carriage of victuals, whereas on the contrary if the Swiss or other foreign troops did not come, king Francis would probably be in such perplexity that he would be compelled to come to reason and make a lasting peace, to the advantage of Your Imperial Majesty and of him, which was, in my humble opinion, the aim to be attained.

Hearing this the King remained some time thoughtful, and then replied, that whoever would pay attention to that would be in the right, and all such practices directed towards a desirable termination of the present war; and that there could be no doubt that king Francis was placed in extreme perplexity and at his wit's end, especially at this present moment, when the news of the signal victory gained by Your Imperial arms in Lombardy must have astounded and discomfited him—such a victory (added the King), that at the present juncture and season nothing better could be desired.

With regard to Landenberg's* band, the King said the same to me as on previous occasions, adding that he would show to me how his commissaries had paid for the damage done to that captain's men in two or three places; and on my remonstrating with him that Landenberg and his men pretended that he had offered to pay them the very same stipend that Your Imperial Majesty had last year given to other German soldiers. To which remark of mine the King replied that if he had made such an offer it was entirely out of regard for Your Imperial Majesty, as he said now he would not pay the Germans the high wages they asked for, or in any way attend to their claims, for fear of those whom Your Majesty has now in your service following the example of the others, and demanding an increase of pay. He could grant them an honest and gracious license to quit by giving them one month's pay, and one half more for their return home, thus avoiding the inconveniences above alleged. I told him, as the Queen Regent wrote once to me, that all the fault laid entirely with his own commissaries, who ignored completely the manners and customs of Upper Germany in military matters, and had never visited that country for the purpose of engaging or recruiting soldiers. If they had, they had made no formal payment in specie, and had contented themselves with handing over to the captains certain sums of

* Here written Landemberg.

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money on account. The King replied that he had, as above stated, paid part of the damage caused by the soldiery. He was not bound by contract to pay the men themselves, but to deliver the money into the hands of the captains for them to distribute it. As to what His Majesty was pleased to write to you, intimating that had Landenberg in any way failed in his duty towards him (the King) you would have had him punished, the King replied that there was no necessity for Your Majesty to take so much trouble about it, for upon one occasion Landenberg, happening to be at his Royal camp, he should have punished him well had he been at all insolent, which words from the King's mouth differ much from those he uttered to me the other day, when he positively said to me that God had granted him the immense favour of perceiving and becoming aware in time of all the malice and ill-will of the said Landenberg before he came to the camp, for otherwise that captain might have committed irreparable follies.*

The King also resents bitterly enough the Queen Regent's refusal to allow certain mares (*jumens*) that he has caused to be bought in Flanders to be exported out of that country, owing to his ministers or agents not having first applied for a license. For want of such permission, and on several other grounds, the Queen's refusal was both just and reasonable. Since then the Queen, at my request, has ordered that passports should be issued for the passage and export of the said mares. As the King was not aware of this fact, he began to complain to me of the ministers of Your Majesty, who (he said) had often assured him that nothing he would wish for or want from Flanders and the Low Countries would be refused to him, and yet (said he), "Here I am with my money, and having paid for the article I am prevented taking it from the country. It seems to me as if the Imperialists of Flanders were annoyed at my preparations to push forward [and invade France], and that they would much prefer my guarding only the frontiers of the Low Countries." †

Hearing this, I could not help telling him that he knew very well that Your Imperial Majesty had entered into a treaty of alliance with him, the principal object of which was the invasion of France and the march on Paris. He was aware of Your Majesty's constant solicitations for the prompt execution of that plan of campaign, and that Your intention was to march straight upon the capital of France, without

* "Et quant à ce quil a pleu à vre. mate m'escripre celle eust bien chastie le dit Landemberg en cas quil ne se fust porte dheument au service du dit sr roy, il m'a respondu quil neust este besoing que vre. mate eust prinse ceste peyne, car se trouvant une foir au camp le dit Landemberg (*sic*) il l'eust bien chastie s'il avoit voulu faire de la beste; que tout aultres propos que ceulx quil disoit nagueres, à sçavoir que Dieu luy avoit fait grande grace de cognoistre de bonne heure la maulvaise volonte du dit Landemberg (*sic*) avant que vinse au camp, car il eust peu faire des folies irreparables."

† "Et quil sembloit que l'on avoit grant ennuye quil tira avant ains seullement quil gardast les frontieres des pays bas."

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stopping to lay siege to fortified towns on the way. As to his saying that the frontiers of Flanders and the Low Countries might, without his help and favour, have been lost or seriously compromised, I would not dispute it. I would only observe that about two years ago, as he (the King) could remember, when those countries were completely unprovided for and not thinking of war, owing to king Francis' dissimulation and cunning arts, and were invaded on every side by those powerful French armies—namely, that commanded by the duke of Orleans, that of Vendôme, and that of Van Rossen—so stout was the defence made by the inhabitants, without the least assistance from foreign powers, that the enemy, after a long campaign, was repulsed and obliged to return home; besides which, it is not likely that, now that king Francis will have plenty to think of at home, he can meditate an attack upon Flanders.

To the above remarks of mine the King knew not what to reply, and after a few minutes' silence he touched on another point. He said that he had heard from the Queen Regent that at Utrecht certain horsemen (*gens de cheval*) coming (as they said) from Seelande (Zeeland) for his services, had made, and were still making, great extortions on the country-people, and that the Queen Regent was very much astonished and surprised at not having heard from his commissaries of the arrival of such cavalry. Having thus asked him what he knew about it, he answered that he had really given orders for 400 or 500 horse to be levied in the district of Utrecht, and promised to take them into his service provided they were at Calais on a fixed day; but as they have not fulfilled their engagement he is now having an equal number raised by Mr. de Buren, so that if they come he does not intend to take them into his service, and it will be necessary to punish them if they do damage to the Emperor's subjects. The King could not tell me the name of the German, the commission of raising the men having been given by his ministers; but I have since ascertained that his name was Lylkmach, a merchant, once the agent of the Stillars in this city, but who, after the failure (*banqueroutte*) of those bankers mixed himself up with war affairs.

The King has shown more pleasure at the news of the counts of Ligny and Rossy* having been taken prisoners than at the taking of Ligny itself, which he does not consider of much importance.

He has also taken in very good part the announcement of the offer made by the Cardinal of Lorraine to Your Majesty, as well as his having already received through the English ambassador and through me, a summary of the answer prepared for the Cardinal by Your Majesty.

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* Father Daniel (*Histoire de France*, Vol. V., p. 406), calls him Roussy; he was the brother of the count de Brienne, lord of the place, who had with him the viscount of Estange, with the sieurs of Eschenais and Gonsoles.

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While writing this dispatch the King has sent me word that immediately after my departure from his presence he had received a letter from the commander-in-chief of his army (in France) announcing the arrival of Lytemach at the English camp, making many excuses for his delay. In consequence of which, as the cavalry raised by him was so far advanced, he (the King) had determined not to dismiss the men, but keep them in his service, notwithstanding what he had said to me the day before. He has begged me to write on the subject to the Queen Regent, and express his regret that he was not apprised sooner of their arrival; furthermore he would have sent commissaries to take charge of them, and conduct them to the place of their destination, and take care that they should not inflict injury or do damage to the inhabitants of the places where they halted. He hoped in short that now that the men had received money they would no longer be disorderly and exacting, but would pay in cash for what they had in the shape of food for themselves and fodder for their horses.—London, 7 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassadors in England, 7th of July. Received at the camp before St. Desir on the 21st of the said month of July 1544."

French. Original. 4 *pp.*

8 July. **148.** THE QUEEN REGENT'S PRIVY COUNCIL to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADOR IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

The Queen having heard the representations verbally made to her and afterwards reproduced in writing by the accredited agent of the duke of Suffolk, cannot do less than answer as follows:—Since April last the Queen has frequently ordered her ministers to communicate with the English ambassador who then resided at her Court,* and tell him how much she wished to know beforehand, what amount of provisions, and what number of carts and waggons, as well as of draft-horses the king of England wanted for his army. The ambassador replied that eleven thousand five hundred draft-horses and 2,200 waggons of four horses each would be required,† which number seemed at once excessive, and not to be procured in these countries, considering that at least an equal, if not, a larger number of carts and horses would have to be provided for the Imperial army now marching into France. The Queen then, on the 1st of April, wrote to the Emperor's ambassador in London, requesting him to remonstrate with

* The dean of York, who, as stated, died at Brussels about the end of May; *see* p. 191.

† "Sur quoy le dit ambassadeur avoit requis que [l'on] voulsist fournir de ce costé IIᵐVᶜ chevaulx limonyers et IIᵐIIᶜ chariotz à IIII chevaulx." Such is the reading of the passage, but instead of IIᵐ it is evident that XIᵐ or XIIᵐ must be meant.

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the King's privy councillors as to the excessive number of horses and carts asked for, but to say that all efforts would be made to collect as many as could be found.

An inventory was then made throughout Flanders and the Low Countries of all horses fit for the service required, and it was found that without putting a stop altogether to agricultural labour in the fields or to carriage of merchandise it would be materially impossible for the peasants to furnish upwards of 10,000 horses, part of which, as above stated, will be required for the Emperor's army, and another part for the baggage and provisions of the infantry and cavalry which count de Buren has already raised. A requisition was then made, and the men ordered to be ready with their carts and horses.

In compliance with Madame (the Queen's) orders as large a number of carts and horses as the English commissaries asked for, has ever since the 20th of May been kept in readiness, and yet until the beginning of June no one came [from Calais] to take the men and horses to the place of their destination, at which the disappointed drivers complained bitterly, saying that they had been detained several days for the service of the English, without being allowed to return to their agricultural and other pursuits, through which they had suffered great damage and loss.

At the beginning of June, as above stated, one single English commissary made his appearance here, saying that he had orders to raise 11,000 draft-horses and 500 waggons (*chariotz*), which he said were to be at Calais within six days' time. The English commissary was told in the Queen's name that it was impossible for one single man to levy in so short a space of time 11,000 horses, and make 1,000 or 1,200 carriers (*chartons*) reach their destination. He (the Royal commissary) was moreover asked whether he had or had not with him any assistants to help him in the discharge of his duties, and if he had none, whether he wished for any assistance from this country. The commissary's answer was that he had no one to assist him, nor had he instructions to apply for aid, his orders were only to make the requisition of so many draft-horses, and so many carts or waggons, and pay for them in cash.* This, however, he could never have done had not the Queen set diligently about it. Indeed such was the activity displayed by her own officers deputed for the purpose that soon after the day fixed by the English commissary, the waggons and draft-horses required were at Calais, the Queen having taken the precaution of ordering those nearest to that town to go thither first, sending besides a message to the King's commissaries at Calais, that if they wanted more draft-horses and

* "Qu'il avoit charge de faire lever XI^{c} (*sic*) chevaulx limoniers et V^{c} chariotz, les quelz il vouloit avoir à Calais en dedens (*sic*) six jours et sur ce que de la part de la royne luy fust remonstré qu'il n'estoit faisable qung seul peult (*sic*) lever III^{m}c chevaulx (*sic*) et conduire mille ou XII^{c} chartons et mesmes en grande diligence. Et luy demandant sil avoit aulcuns assistans, ou desiroit estre assisté de gens de par decha le dit commissaire respondit, etc."

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carts they must let the Queen know much sooner, in order that the King's service should not be retarded, inasmuch as the horses and so forth would have to come from places and districts far more distant from Calais.

Again at the solicitation and request of François Van Halle, man-at-arms of the King, the Queen did furnish at one time 300 waggons, and at a second time . . .* besides 1,360 draft-horses, of which a part is still on the road [to Calais]. François Van Halle was perfectly satisfied and said he wanted no more, so that according to the above account the Queen has furnished 2,460 draft-horses, and 1,800 waggons, making all together 9,660, so that out of the inventory and requisition once made, nothing has been deducted for the Emperor's army which will have to be provided for elsewhere.

If, however, all the waggons and horses have not yet joined, it is no fault of the Queen's, who was not informed in time of the King's wishes in that respect, considering that the greater part has to come from behind the Meuse, and from Namur. No want of diligence can be imputed to the Queen, for immediately after the arrival of the English commissaries, she gave orders that they should be attended to and helped in the execution of their charge, sending couriers and special messengers to the provinces and territories under her government to urge the requisition.

If delay has been experienced in the delivery, that was certainly not the Queen's fault, but to that of the English commissaries who came insufficiently instructed as to the duty they had to perform, and also without assistants nor clerks to help them, for if for every 100 or 200 foot, or pioneers to be raised, one adjutant-commissary is required to take charge of the men, and if each battalion (*enseigne*) of 300 or 400 men has a captain, and several officers under him it stands to reason that one single commissary could not possibly collect, and conduct to the place of their destination the 500 or 1,000 waggons required, with at least 700 or 1,400 carmen (*chartons*) to drive them.†

The Queen, therefore, expects that her diligence in this matter will be fully acknowledged, and no blame cast upon her if there has been any fault or delay in complying with the King's wishes. She has acted towards the English army as she would have done towards the Emperor's.

However that may be, if 1,000 more waggons and the proportionate number of draft-horses are still wanted, it is quite evident from the reasons above alleged that the Queen

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* A blank in the original: "Deppuis à la sollicitation de Franchois van Halle homme d'armes du roy, elle a encores fait fournir IIIᶜ chariotz et une autre partie et XIIIᶜLX chevaulx lymoners, dont une partie est encore en chemin."

† "Et si pour lever cent ou IIᶜ. pictons ou pionniers il est besoign d'avoir ung commissaire, ou aultre qui en ayt la charge, et que chacune enseigne de IIIᶜ ou IIIIᶜ testes ayt son capitaine et plusieurs officiers soubz luy, on peult considerer si pour lever et conduire Vᶜ. ou M chariotz que du moins doibvent avoir VIIᶜ ou XIIIIᶜ chartons se peulvent lever et conduire par ung homme seul."

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cannot furnish them now, for the number is really excessive, besides which the demand previously made has already been complied with, or nearly so, with the exception of 400 waggons and 40 draft-horses, which, as above-stated, the Queen can in no wise furnish without unduly oppressing the Emperor's subjects in these parts, who have been, and are still, loudly complaining, and would more willingly grant a large sum of money to his Imperial Majesty towards the expenses of the present war, than be obliged to contribute with so large a number of waggons and horses as has been asked of them—a sort of compulsory service, from which, as they say, they suffer much more than from all their losses during the last wars.

As to provisions for the English camp [before Boulogne] the Queen has taken, ever since April last, every measure to have the English army well supplied with them. No lack of diligence can be imputed to her in this respect, for not only did she immediately order that a report should be drawn up of the quantity and quality of the provisions likely to be required for the English army, but she recommended the appointment of an English commissary-general, with sufficient funds to purchase articles of food and other necessaries of life wherever they could be obtained. Had the said commissary been appointed, and had he come to these Low Countries, the Queen would willingly have afforded him all the aid required for the fulfilment of his charge, and the English camp would have been amply supplied. But either the appointment of a commissary-general never took place, or else the Englishman appointed, if there was one, never made his appearance. For although the king of England sent word through his ambassador here [at Brussels] that an officer would be duly appointed to attend to that service, the fact is that up to this day no one has made his appearance, and yet the Queen has done her duty towards the King, by issuing proclamations, and having bills posted authorising sutlers and all sorts of provision merchants to carry victuals to the English camp—neither more nor less than has been done for the Emperor, who, in order to provide food for his men, has a commissary of his own and clerks, who buy food and provide for the camp in the event of the ordinary supplies failing altogether.*

As to the duke of Norfolk and his letter to the Queen stating that he much feared that the division of the English army which he commands [before Montreuil] would soon be in want of food, no sooner did the Queen hear of it than she dispatched towards him one of her commissaries—the same one, who last year provided in part for the English camp [before Landresis]—to declare

* "Et combien que on ayt mandé que le roy l'envoyast au temps, si n'est il encoires venu, et neanmoins la royne pour faire son debvoir a fait publier ses placarts donnant francisse (*sic*) à tous vivandiers qui vouldront mener vivres aux camps du dit s[r] roy, ne plus ne moins qu'elle a fait pour l'empereur, le quel pour pourvoyr son camp de vivres a commissaire qui achepte toutes necessaires de vivres pour pourvoir son camp quant les marchandiers n'en aureient assez."

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and explain to him the causes of the delay, and say that up to the present hour no English commissary had come [from England], nor even announced his approaching arrival [at Calais], much less written to say what sort of provisions he wanted, and so forth, where they are to be sent at the King's expense, or, finally, whether the provisions are to be stored at the risk of not being used, and spoiling, which is a thing the Queen cannot possibly overlook.

Thus, if the English camp [before Montreuil] happens to be in want of provisions, it will certainly not be the fault of the Queen, who has not failed to give all possible attention to the matter, making the usual requisitions, and issuing proclamations for people to go to the English camp with provisions for sale. In fact, the Queen has hitherto acted in this affair in such a manner that the English ought to be perfectly satisfied.

Nor has it been the Queen's or her minister's fault if the van-guard and rear-guard of the English army have stayed so long on the road; the fault, if any, must be ascribed to the above causes. Indeed, the Queen would be very sorry if any one should attempt to inculpate her, or her ministers, on that score, of deficiencies and faults, which are not theirs, and she cannot do less than declare on this present occasion that unless better provision be made for the future, it is to be feared the English may feel still greater wants than those they now complain of, which would be very distressing for her to hear.—Brussels, 8th of July 1544.*

Indorsed: "Pour ajouter à la lettre de la Reine de Hongrie à Chapuys du 11 Juillet 1544."

French. Original draft. pp.

10 July. **149.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to PRINCE PHILIP OF SPAIN.

S. *Estado*, L. 806, f. 87.
R. M. Add. 28,593, f. 326.

"Days ago I received Your Highness' letter of the 4th of February, that was brought to me by Juan Çapata de Cadenas.† I kiss Your Highness' hands and feet one hundred thousand times for the singular and abundant favours contained in it. Since then, there has been no opportunity of a faithful messenger leaving, and indeed no event has occurred worth writing upon, save, perhaps, that mentioned in my letter to the High Commander of Leon (Cobos). I may, perhaps, be excused for having delayed an answer to it, and beg Your Highness to pardon me for the delay.

Their Most Serene Majesties of the King and Queen, as well as the Princess, have been glad to hear of the affection and love Your Highness professes for them, and have ordered

* "Et si l'avant garde et l'arriere garde ont seiournée, n'a esté la faulte de la royne ou de ses ministres, mais à l'occasion avant dite; et seroit bien maryé [marrie] que on voulsist jecter la culpe d'aultruy sur elle ou ses ministres. Et veult bien advertir que s'ilz ne metteut meilleure provisions de leur coste, [illegible]t (est) à craindre qu'ilz en pourront avoir plus grande faulte [ce], que seroit au regret de la dite royne,—Fait à Bruxelles le VIII jour de Juillet XV^{c}XLIIII."

† Juan Zapata de Cardenas, son of Pedro Zapata de Mirabel. *See* Lopez de Haro, *Nobiliario Genealogico*, Part II, fol. [illegible]

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me most urgently to return their commendations and compliments. Each of them individually has questioned me respecting Your Highness' marriage, and how it went off. I gave them such information as I possessed from private letters, and all seemed pleased at it.

Your Highness must already have heard of the prosperous and signal victory which the Emperor's arms have lately gained in Lombardy, which victory has excited and set up (*excalientado*) the English to such a degree that they have not ceased from that day to send troops across the Channel; so much so, that at this present moment there are on the other side no less than 40,000 men, and the King is more confirmed than ever in his resolution of crossing over in person. *Indeed I am told that he is only waiting for the news that all things required for the encampment of his army are ready, to cross the sea and land at Calais. His intention is first to lay siege to Montreuil, a most important place, which, if taken, will facilitate the passage of provisions for his army, and become also the point of departure for Teruana, Andresy, Bolonia,* and the neighbouring districts. He is very sorry at the delay of that undertaking, especially since he has heard of the great success of the Imperial army,* which, after gaining possession of a place called Commisy (Commersy), on the frontiers of Champagne, on the 29th ult., took Ligni and its territory further on within the said province, which surrendered at discretion to the Imperial General, though the Count and Lord of the place, as well as of Brienne, and Count de Ross and his brother, with about 1,000 French infantry and 500 Italians and some cavalry were inside. This has been a most important capture, and there is every reason to believe that since then the bulk of the Imperial army has prosecuted its triumphant march into the enemy's territory. As far as I can gather from letters received here, king Francis is amusing himself (*holgando*) near Paris, to the little satisfaction and content of the inhabitants† of those places already subdued in that province, and still less of those threatened with the same or worse treatment, *for he is thinking of ordering all the villages of Champagne to be set on fire and destroyed.* All his hopes are centred in 12,000 Swiss that he is trying to recruit in the Cantons, though on the 15th ult. his ambassador in Switzerland, for the purpose, had not yet been able to answer whether he had succeeded or not in his commission.

Your Highness must also have heard that the army of this most Serene Majesty has come back from Scotland, after wasting and destroying a good portion of that kingdom, and that after its return, the counts (earls) of Linus‡ and

* That is, Therouane, Landresis, and Boulogne sur Mer.

† Con poco (*sic*) alegria y consolacion de los dichos lugares.

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Glancarna* took up arms and fought against the Governor, and slew a great number of his men. Meanwhile, the English on the borders are making raids into Scotland and wasting the land. Count Linus, the nearest kinsman of the late king, and a nephew of Mr. Daulbigni, and his successor in France (to the post of captain of 100 men-at-arms), having left the service of France, has arrived here [in London], and married this King's niece, daughter of the late queen of Scotland and of count Douglas; he [the earl of Linus] has made over to this King his rights to the crown of Scotland.

No other news for the present; should there be any worth reporting I shall not fail to advise.—London, 10 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: To the Prince [of Spain].

French. Original, partly ciphered. 3 *pp.*

10 July. **150.** The SAME to the HIGH COMMANDER OF LEON.

S. E. L. 806, L. 88, f. 328.

"Most illustrious Sir,"—By the nephew of the "factor" of Portugal, I wrote to Your Lordship some days ago, advising the news of this country. As since then I have written to His Highness the Prince and entered into more details, I will not make this letter of mine longer.—London, 10 July 1544.

Signed: "Eustacio Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

11 July. **151.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to AMBASSADOR CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—By the Emperor's letter to Us—a copy of which is herein inclosed†—you will hear of His Imperial Majesty's displeasure and resentment at the damage and loss which Landenberger's men have inflicted, and are still inflicting, on his subjects, more especially on the inhabitants of Liège and its immediate neighbourhood, who have repeatedly sent their deputies to Us asking to be fully indemnified and compensated for their losses, alleging, among other reasons, that since it was at Our express recommendation, and on the assurance that those Germans would behave properly and honourably, that they consented to receive and harbour them within their territory, We were naturally bound to repair the injuries they had sustained, and indemnify them for their losses. Our former letters must have informed you of the solicitude and care with which We have always attended to that King's wants in all matters relating to the present war with France—what efforts We have made, and are still making, to persuade Landenberger's

* Glencairn.
† Not found in the Imperial Archives.

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men to remain in the king of England's service; the difficulties We have met with; how the infantry demand one month's pay, to count from the day they passed muster, besides a fortnight's more for their return home; how the English commissaries refuse to give them more than one month's pay at the rate of wages allotted by the Emperor to his German infantry, without allowing them anything for their return home. On the other hand, Landenberger's men have constantly refused to depart, until this very moment, when a letter comes from councillor Scepperus—a copy of which is inclosed—stating that he has some hope of the men being satisfied and leaving the country of Liège.

As to the cavalry, they demand one month's pay for the time they have served in June, and one more for the current month of July. That is, they say, the promise once made to them by the King's commissaries, as you will see by the inclosed; and they declare that, unless they are paid in full, they will not move from the spot where they are. Such being their determination, it is quite evident to Us that Landenberger's horsemen will remain in the neighbourhood of Liège, oppressing the inhabitants and living at their expense. Such a resolution and declaration on the part of Landenberger's band is for Us a cause of grievous resentment, the more so that the cavalry maintain that they were promised by the King's commissaries that they might remain in the Emperor's dominions until paid in full, of which promise, if made, We never had the least notice, nor have the men themselves been officially informed of it since the 13th of June ult., when the English commissaries made the promise and took the engagement*—which, by the way, seems an intolerably hard one. Since then the King's commissaries have treated with one of the German captains, named Frederic Spadt; but it appears that in the receipt, signed by that captain, of 3,000 crs. from the Royal commissaries, it is expressly stated that the latter would fulfil the conditions and promises of the engagement, which they (the commissaries) have not yet done.†

These above facts having come to the Emperor's knowledge, he, feeling that unless the above difficulties, and others of the same kind that may arise, are not promptly removed, his own dominions and subjects, as well as those of his allies and friends, might be damaged and oppressed, has now

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* "Disans de se avoir promesse des commissaires d'Engleterre comme verrez par le double d'icelle cy joincte. Et soubz ceste occasion (condition ?) demeurent [ils] mengeans [mangeant] et foullans les pays, par quoy à bonne cause nous en povons resentir, et mesmes de ce que les gens de cheval demeu-demeu[re]rent les pays de sa M^te^ tant quilz [ne] les auroient satisfait du tout sans jammais nous en avoir parlé ne adverty ne ausi mandé aux dits gens de cheval depuis le VIII du mois passé quilz fisrent la dicte promesse."

† "Si dit le dit fredericq en baillant la quictance des IIII escuz quil a receu et a expressé que les dits commissaires furnirovent à leur dite promesse ce quilz

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resolved, in order to relieve the same of such vexatious and to them unbearable treatment, to send to them, and try all possible means to induce the German cavalry to remain in the service of the king of England, or else to go back home quietly, without wasting the countries through which they pass. Should, however, the men refuse to serve the King, and insist upon being paid, or else remaining where they now are, then in that case the Emperor, to avoid greater evils, has decided—notwithstanding that he has already more men than he wants, and that additional expenditure will be incurred thereby—to take them into his service.

We do not choose to inculpate any of the parties, and throw the blame on the King's commissaries or on Landenbergher; but the fact is, that the latter is in the wrong for not having adhered to his original engagement, and that the King's commissaries, on the other hand, ought to have passed muster to that captain's men immediately after making the agreement with him, and not refuse to pay them as they did. Nor was it right on the part of the Royal commissaries not to have fulfilled their engagements towards the cavalry.*

All this you (Chapuys) are requested to represent as graciously and mildly as you can to that King, telling him, in Our name, that if he cannot possibly retain in his service the captain and his men, so as to prevent them from going over to the French, His Imperial Majesty has decided to take them into his. Of this request of Ours, and other matters relating to the employment of foreigners by the king of England, you shall apprise the Privy Council as soon as possible, and let Us immediately know what they say about it.

The duke of Suffolk has sent here credentials in favour of certain English commissioners, whose business is to represent to Us the want in which the King's camp is of provisions, draft-horses, and carriage, requesting that one thousand more waggons should be prepared, and at the same time wishing to know what amount of provisions has been stored for their use. As the Duke's agents and the verbal report made by the latter seems to imply that the fault is Ours for not having sooner attended to the King's demands, the Duke's agents have been requested to state in writing the object of their mission, at the same time as the reasons they have for saying that We have not fulfilled Our engagements in that respect. The Duke's agents have accordingly drawn up their report, of which a copy—as well as of other documents and papers relating to the same affair—is inclosed. As you will see, the report is couched in terms rather dry and

* "Cy trouvons que si le dit de Landembergher (*sic*) a mal faict de n'avoir satisfaict à sa premiere [promesse] que aussi les commissaires n'ont bien faict d'avoir [de n'avoir] passé la monstre oultre la promesse de celluy Landembergher, et apres ne les voulloir payer selon la dite monstre. Aussi n'a esté bien faict quilz n'ont tenu ce quilz ont promis aux gens de cheval."

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courteous though not so intemperate and harsh as those of the verbal messages they brought Us from the Duke. In answer to which, and in justification of Our acts, We have ordered Our ministers to draw out the reply, of which a copy is also inclosed. Indeed, it is exceedingly disagreeable to Us to find, after having so diligently provided for all the wants of the English army before Boulogne, that any deficiency in the supplies should be attributed to these countries under Our government; whereas the fault, if there is any, is not Ours, but that of the English for not having thought sooner of the stress to which they might be reduced. Indeed, it seems to Us as if We had much more reason to complain of that King's ministers, who, after so many urgent requisitions, have completely neglected to give the necessary instructions to their own people; so much so, that up to the present day—the 11th of July—no English commissary has made his appearance here, nor has the money been remitted for the purchase of victuals, and so forth. And they (the English) come now to ask Us what amount of provisions We have in store for their army, as if We were obliged by treaty to furnish them gratis and at Our own expense—a sort of thing which We have not done even for His Imperial Majesty!

In short, We cannot help telling you, confidentially and under reserve,* that if the king of England's ministers show so little inclination to prosecute vigorously the war against France—as the King of that country confidently asserts there is no need of inculpating Us, as they are now doing, for the result of the campaign will evidently show where the fault lies and who is to blame, without the English being able to excuse themselves if their intention was to act unfairly towards their ally (the Emperor), which We hope it was not. That is why you, Chapuys, are requested, whenever the opportunity offers itself, to make Our excuses to the king of England, and remonstrate with him respecting the demands made by the duke of Suffolk in his name, at the same time showing him with what care and solicitude We have always attended to the wants of his army, and anything else relating to his Royal service.

Whilst writing this despatch (*depesche*), yours of the 6th inst. comes to hand, as well as the duplicate of the one for His Imperial Majesty of the same date. No answer is required to them, since their contents relate chiefly to these countries under Our government, and the king of England makes difficulties, and seems to doubt whether the Emperor's army will or not be on the enemy's territory by the appointed day, alleging that Commercy and Ligny are not in France, though both those towns held for king Francis until they were again reduced to the obedience of the Emperor, who retains them in his power as if they were the fiefs of France.†

* "Et ne nous povons garder vous dire ce mot en confidence."

† Both these towns were formerly fiefs of Lorraine.

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The King himself could not, for the same reason, say that he has actually invaded France, for after all neither the Boullonois nor Ardre nor Montreuil can be said to belong properly to the kingdom of France, being, as they are by right, part and portion of the county of Artois.

With regard to the exchange of money, the duke of Norfolk had written to Us to have the new English "gros" valued at six grossen of Flanders and three "patarts" of Brabant, but after assaying it here it has been found that the new English coin is only worth four "grossen" of Flanders or two "patarts" of Brabant, after deducting the Royalty, or seigniorial rights, and the making. We have, therefore, written to the Duke that We cannot possibly admit the valuation of the English coin, for the drivers of the carts and waggons, to whom a promise has been made of seven "grossen" of Flanders a day for each horse, will naturally complain if they are not paid at the rate of their engagement. That was the price paid last year by the Emperor, each crown being counted for 38 "grossen"; and yet, when the men arrived at their destination, the drivers have been paid in silver crowns calculated at 45 sols each, whereas the original exchange, as abovesaid, was at the time 38. That is not all. In making the payment the King's treasurer discounted the difference between 38 and 45, or 7 sols per crown, which, to say the least of it, is not likely to encourage the men to the King's service.* Indeed, a message has come from the people of Waes stating that every day they find their horses and mares beaten or stolen without knowing who has done it, or to whom to apply for redress, and that unless proper order be introduced in the English camp, the drivers will desert and go home, even at the risk of being pursued, caught, and hanged. In fact, it seems to Us quite unreasonable that subjects of the Emperor, Our brother, pressed for the particular service of the king of England, his ally, should be treated in such a barbarous and cruel manner. The commanders-in-chief and captains of the English army ought to take care that the drivers are not molested and ill-treated by the soldiery, otherwise one of these days they may find themselves without the means of conveyance or carriage; whilst on Our part We have issued orders that all those who leave the English camp without a passport be at once punished as deserters from the Emperor's

* "Sur quoy après avoyé faict faire l'essoy du dit nouveau gros avons trouvé quil ne vault au plus hault que quatre gros [de] flandres ou deux patarts de Brabant en descomptant le droict, signioriage et labeur comme l'on donne sur la monnaye de sa ma^te^. Par quoy avons escript au dit Duc que ne povons faire la dite evaluation. Aussi les chartons se plaindrent grandement [de ce] que l'on leur avoit promis VII grossen pour cheval pour chacun jour, ce quils entendoyent en bonne monnaye comme l'empereur avoit payé l'an passé, et en les levant l'on leur a donné l'escu à XXXVIII "grossen," quant ilz [sont] venus à Calais il leur a este donne pour XLV, et par dessus ce que l'on leur avoit payé à XXXVIII on leur a rabattu en reduisant l'escu donné par decha jusqu'à XLV sols qui est pour perdre le couraige de bien servir."

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service, though if their complaints be true, and they are so ill-treated as they represent, We do not see why they should be so punished.

As to the cavalry coming from Oostland—which, as you tell Us, the King now refuses to take into his service—the English commissaries have continually applied to Us for letters to count de Reuthen to allow them to cross his estate, and this We have promised to do on condition that the King's commissaries themselves should write a letter to the Count in their master's name; but as they have refused to do so, matters remain in the same state as before—a manner of proceeding which We think very strange, for had We written to the Count, as We were frequently solicited, the cavalry newly recruited for that King's service would have remained in Reuthen and its immediate vicinity on the same oppressive and harsh terms as Landenberger's horse are still at Liège.

Lytonalier's horse have already arrived. They are only 420 in all; the remainder are still encamped in the Reuthen territory, and will not join the English camp [before Boulogne] till three weeks are over.

Octavian Bosch* has been interrogated here. He denies having ever confessed to the Secretary, who went to the Tower to examine him, having promised to the Dauphin of France (Henri de Valois) to do service in England by reporting news or otherwise. In two or three days hence his trial and that of his accomplice will take place, and if they confess anything of importance We shall not fail to let you know, that you may inform the King.

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*

Addressed: "To ambassador Chapuys in England, of the 11th of July 1544. Le joindre les lettres de l'Empereur."

16 July. **152.** QUEEN MARY'S INSTRUCTIONS to MONSR. DE COURRIÈRES.

B. Neg. d'Ang., Tome L. B.M. *Add.* 28,593, f. 329.

Instructions and memorial for you Messire Jehan de Memorancy (Montmorency), Sieur de Courrières, of what in the Emperor's name and Our own you are to say, and to remonstrate to the king of England, to whom his Imperial Majesty is now sending you.

First of all you shall go to Calais, where the King is now said to be, and will tell him that the Emperor, hearing his (the King's) determination to cross the Channel, and come to Calais, had expressly sent you hither to wait for his arrival and landing, at the said port. That you go purposely to congratulate him on his safe arrival, and to inquire about his health, which, the Emperor hopes, has not suffered through

* Here the name of Octavian, or Ottaviano, the Milanese, is distinctly written

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the passage. The same congratulations and wishes to be also made in Our own name, and you shall not fail to inquire also about the King's health, which We do prize as much as Our own. Last, but not least, you will take care to inform Us, as soon as possible, how the King feels.

You shall by all possible means, and before you get an audience from the King, try to ascertain through the Imperial ambassador, if he should happen to be at Calais with the King, or through the duke of Albourquerque, what his will and intentions are; whether he purposes to remain at Calais, or go beyond with his army, and prosecute his right and fortune against France.

Should you find that he has made up his mind not to remain at Calais, but will go out and expose his person to the dangers of war, by marching through the enemy's territory, and so forth,* you will address him in the terms of the Emperor's letter to him (in answer to the commission brought by one of his chief secretaries, Messire Guillaume Paget).

At the same time you will tell the King that the Emperor, alarmed at his late indisposition, and fearing that it may be increased by the trouble, fatigue and privations of a campaign into the enemy's country, would beg of him to remain at Calais, and issue his orders from that town with less trouble and fatigue to his Royal person. That his Imperial Majesty should have wished, for many reasons already stated in his letters, that he should not have quitted England and the place of his residence, for fear the change of air should debilitate and prostrate him, or otherwise increase the nervous affection from which he is suffering; but since he (the King) has obstinately persisted in his former resolution, that can only be caused by his singular magnanimity, and his fervent desire to come to hands with the common enemy. The Emperor, you will tell him, has no doubt that the issue of the war will be such as the king of England wishes and expects, and yet the Emperor cannot fail to recommend him again to take much care of his precious life, and not to expose himself wantonly to danger.

Should you Monsr. de Courrières, find out that the King has determined not to move from Calais, you will encourage him and say that that is the wisest thing to do, as he can conveniently from that town send orders to his ministers, and direct the operations of his army. In short, you will make use of such arguments as are contained in the instructions which you took to England, the last time that the Emperor sent you thither.

You will try to ascertain, conjointly with the Imperial ambassador, if he should happen to be at Calais, or otherwise by yourself, how the King intends to operate [against the common enemy], and in what direction his army will march;

* "Et si trouvez quil est deiiberé nullement d'estourner ains passer oultre employer et exposser sa personne en ceste guerre."

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whether his forces are to be employed exclusively on the siege of Montreuil, or whether they are to proceed beyond that town, and penetrate further into France according to the agreement (*capitulation*) made with the Viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), in the Emperor's name, a copy of which agreement will be put into your hands, in which you will find that both princes (the Emperor, my brother, and the king of England) mutually bind themselves to march on Paris at the head of their respective armies as far as the reason of military warfare, the victualling of the men, and the movements of the enemy will permit.

You shall try, by all possible means, to induce and persuade the King to make his army advance into France as far as he can and march straight upon Paris, making use of Gonzaga's additional treaty, and your own instructions, and should the conversation turn on the provisions, waggons and draft-horses for the King's army, you will tell the King that if fault there is, it is not Ours, which appears from the paper we have caused to be drawn out, and placed into the hands of the duke of Suffolk's agents here, of which a copy will be given to you. These provinces have been so exhausted by war, and in some localities the havoc done by the enemy has been so considerable that provisions are by no means so plentiful as they were in the year 1530, when after a good and long peace these countries were flourishing.

The English ambassador, presently residing at this Our Court,* has applied to Us for 500 more waggons. We have promised him 300 of them, which is the utmost We can accommodate the King with, but We have told him that we shall be glad to help him to procure from private people as many as he may want for his money, and without using violence of any kind.

In short you will do your best to persuade the King to remain at Calais, and will keep us daily informed of whatever happens there, as We will take care that due notice be given to you of the events of this country, and the Emperor's movements.—Bruxelles, 16 July 1544.

French. Original. 5 pp.

17 July. **153.** The EMPEROR'S INSTRUCTIONS to the same DE COURRIÈRES.

Almost a duplicate of the preceding, with the only difference that the Queen Regent is not named in them.—Brussels, 17 July 1544.†

French. Original. 1 *p.*

* "Et pour ce que l'ambassadeur, presentement saident devers nous, nous a dem[andé] aultres V^{c} chariotz, auquel avons respondu que lui furnirions jusques à III^{c} des ditz chariotz, et que sommes contente que davantaige il se serve de ceulx quil pourra recouvrer par argent."

† Though bearing the date of the 17th, these Instructions must have preceded those of Mary on the 16th.

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18 July. **154.** KING HENRY to QUEEN MARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Fasc. Varia.* No. 5.

Thanks her for her good will and kind assistance in the matter of provisions, horses, carts, waggons, and so forth for the English army. His ambassadors at her Court and also his commissaries have written about it. As the latter however have written home concerning the measures adopted by the Queen for the regular and orderly execution of their task, he (the King) has nothing to say save that he finds those measures and rules excellent, and approves entirely of them. He has, therefore, ordered his commissaries, to stay some time in Flanders, and fix their residence at St. Omer, so that they may be under the Queen's orders, and with her permission attend to the provisioning of the English camp before Montreuil.

The King hopes that the Queen of Hungary will continue to do her best for the advancement of their common interests.—Calais, 18 July 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

20 July. **155.** KING FRANCIS to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur, mon frére,"—Having heard by the Sieur de St. Martin's letter of the good and honest words in which you have addressed him, I now send towards you the present gentleman,* in order to inquire and ascertain from you whether those words are really the expression of your sentiments, and proceed directly from you in order that I may send a corresponding answer to them, and make you acquainted with my intentions. This, I calculate, you will find so fair and reasonable that you will have no difficulty in believing and acknowledging that my desire has always been, and is to maintain the good and perfect amity, in which I have constantly held you. I cannot persuade myself that, on your part, the friendship and brotherhood, in which we have always lived, has suffered any diminution, for, I can assure you that, so far as I, myself, am concerned, it has not been impaired in the least. That is why I now send the bearer of this, my letter, to declare to you verbally, and more explicitly, the above sentiments. Please believe what he will tell you in my name, and return an answer.—St. Mor des Fossetz,† the 20th of July 1544.

Signed: "Your good brother, cousin, and ally, Françoys."

Addressed: "To Monsr., my good brother, the king of England."

French. Contemporary copy.‡ 1 *p.*

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* No doubt Monsr. de Framozelles, who, as will be related hereafter, made his appearance at the camp before Boulogne on the 30th of July.

† Otherwise St. Maur les Fosses in the Isle de France.

‡ Sent by Chapuys to Brussels. The original is in the Record Office. *See* State Papers, Vol. X., p. 1.

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n. d. **156.** PROPOSALS OF FRANCE.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P. *Fasc.* 231. f. 68.

The king of France will pay the arrears of pension due to the king of England, or will give him such securities that he will be satisfied with.

The war between them once over, the king of France will make the South lay down their arms, so that the king of England will become their friend, as much as the friend of the king of France.

Respecting the damages and interest, the peace once made between them, king Francis will be as reasonable in the matter that the king of England will have no cause for complaint.

As to the offers which the king of England makes to the Emperor, should the latter restore the duchy of Milan, which belongs to France, together with all the fortresses and castles, which he retains in that duchy, king Francis will restore to him all that he has taken since the beginning of the last wars, provided the Emperor does the same.

Respecting the Emperor's claims, and any other in which king Francis may be concerned, he would like to get the advice of his brother, the king of England.*

Indorsed: "Articles et conditions de paix entre le roy d'Angleterre et le roy de France."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

20 July. **157.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Madame,"—On my embarking at Dover, on the 18th inst., Your Majesty's letter of the 11th came to hand, and yesterday the 19th, I waited on the King, *who made no other answer respecting Landenberg's business than what Your Majesty will find in the inclosed letter for the Emperor.*

As to the business on which the duke of Suffolk wrote to Your Majesty,† the King showed satisfaction at the arrangement made—as he, himself, declared to Monsr. Doysot, telling him that he had written thanking you—and certainly the King says that he is very much obliged to Your Majesty for the great care and trouble you have taken, and are taking of his affairs, and is far from inculpating you if there be fault in the supplies for his army.

Neither the King, nor any of his Privy Councillors have said a word to me respecting the English army not having entered France on the day fixed for the invasion. I am very

* There is no date to this paper, which is placed in the Imperial Archives immediately after Francis' letter to king Henry (No. 155, p. 253). That it was put into the King's hands by Framozelles, the agent of king Francis and bearer also of his holograph letter, seems probable, but whether it was delivered at Calais, soon after Henry's landing there, or at Boulogne, in September, it is difficult to say.

† The Duke's letter is not in the Imperial Archives, but Queen Mary's answer, dated the 8th, may be seen under No. 147, p. 239.

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glad of it, for in the present state of affairs, it is far better to dissemble than to enter into discussion with these people on the subject.

With regard to the ill-treatment of the carriers, and payment of their salaries, the King cannot, or will not, be persuaded that his men ill-use them; yet he has promised to have the affair looked into.

As to the Zeeland cavalry the King has given me to understand, as your Majesty will see by the inclosed, that the duke of Holstein had sent for them (les avoit rappellé).

As to Octavian Bos, I heard two hours ago that an Italian had come expressly to speak to the secretary of the Privy Council in his favour,* offering to prove his innocence. I really believe that the Secretary will not stir in this affair more than he has done hitherto, and after all the rack will settle the whole matter.

I most humbly beg and entreat Your Majesty to be pleased *to replace me and appoint another ambassador to reside at this Court*, for the King will in a couple of days, leave for his camp in front of Boulogne. This favour I confidently expect from Your Majesty, the more so, that my secretary was told so at Brussels, and I, myself, have since received the confirmation thereof.—Calaix, 20 July 1544.

P.S.—As Your Majesty will understand by the inclosed copy of Monsr. de Courrières' letter how this business of Framozelle's is going on, I must not refer to it further.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 1½ *pp.*

21 July. **158.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—On the 18th inst., as I was about to embark at Dover, Your Majesty's letter of the 11th came to hand, and yesterday, the 20th, I waited upon the King, and spoke to him on the affair of Captain Landenberg and his Germans. *The only answer he gave me is that which Your Majesty will see by the inclosed copy of my despatch to the Emperor.*

With regard to the affair about which the duke of Suffolk † wrote to Your Majesty, this king seems satisfied, as he himself has declared to Master Dysot (Doyset),‡ adding that he had sent letters of thanks. And certainly, it must be owned that in this last, as in other affairs, the King is duly showing the obligation under which he stands to Your Majesty, fully acknowledging the great care and trouble that is there taken to supply this, his Royal army, and entirely exculpating Your Majesty whenever any delay or deficiency in the supplies is experienced.

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* "Pour la discoulpe et descharge du dict Octavian."

† That of the draft-horses, waggons, and provisions for the English army, p. 239.

‡ "Comme il a declaré à maistre Doysot (?) disant avoir envoyé à vre mate lectres de remerciment.

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*Neither the King nor his Privy Council have said a word to me concerning the Imperial army not having entered France on the appointed day, and I am glad of it, for under present circumstances it is much preferable not to enter into discussion with these people, but to dissemble if there be means of doing so.**

With regard to the bad treatment and bad pay (*for compte*) of the waggoners (*charretiers*) in that country, the King cannot, or will not, be persuaded that the fault lies with the English, who, he says, do behave quite well towards them; he will, however, look into it.

As to the horse from Seeland (*Zeeland*), the King has given me to understand, as Your Majesty will see by the copy of my despatch to the Emperor, that the Duke of Holstein had already sent for them.

With regard to Octavian Bos, I heard two hours ago that an Italian has come here [to Calais] expressly for the purpose of treating with the Secretary of the Privy Council, and exculpating the said Octavian, and trying to obtain his release; but I believe that the Secretary will not act differently in that affair from what he has done hitherto; if he does, torture will bring the criminal to reason.†

As the King intends leaving this place in a couple of days to take the command of his camp, I most humbly beg Your Majesty to be pleased to appoint another ambassador to reside at this Court instead of myself, as Your Majesty promised to my secretary, when he was last in Brussels, and the Emperor announced in one of his letters to me.—Calais, 20 of July 1544.

P.S.—As Your Majesty will see by the letter of Mons. de Courrières, and the inclosed copy [of my despatch to the Emperor] what we both have done in compliance with orders, I need not be more explicit on the subject.—Calaix, 21 of July 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 2 *pp.*

21 July. **159.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On the 18th inst., just as I was going on board to pass over to this place [Calais], Your Majesty's letter of the 3rd inst.‡ came to hand. *The day after I waited on the King, to whom, in pursuance of Your Majesty's commands, I failed not to represent, as strongly as I could, the great injury and incalculable loss which Your Majesty's subjects*

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* "Le meilleur est de non entrer en discussion avec ceulx-cy y ayant moyens de le disimuler."

† As will be observed this paragraph relating to Octavian Boscho is almost a repetition of that in Chapuys' dispatch of the 20th addressed to the Queen, No. 157, p. 254.

‡ No. 118, p. 194.

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and their neighbours (circonvoisins) *in the countries of Liège, and others had had to suffer at the hands of the men, whom Landenberg had recruited for his Royal service, and, moreover, that the inhabitants of those districts so harmed and damaged had actually petitioned the queen dowager of Hungary, regent in the Low Countries, to be indemnified for their losses inasmuch as through her assuring them by letters patent that Landenberg and his men would behave honestly and pay reasonably for what they wanted, they had allowed the said armed men to penetrate into their territory, and had shown them hospitality. "The damage caused by Landenberg's men must be paid for, and the inhabitants indemnified for their losses (said I to the King), but it is very inconvenient for the Emperor, my master, to add that one to the many expenses he has had to defray, for in the first place the Emperor cannot take those Germans into his service, he has already too many of them—more than he wants; and secondly, the Emperor has, since the treaty of closer alliance was ratified, and war against France begun, spent a good deal more money than was necessary. Last year, for instance, in order to molest and harass the common enemy in Flanders as well as in Italy, he had to pay the men of Mr. de Buren and the crews of the fleet, which had been so long in the Straits of Calais* (en ce estroict), *quite needlessly, and which, if disengaged and sent elsewhere might have done much towards harassing the common enemy, and guarding and defending many merchant vessels, Flemish as well as Spanish, which during the last month have been captured by French privateers in the Channel."**

The King's answer to these and other remonstrances of mine was exactly similar to that which he made in the first instance in justification of his conduct in that affair, adding only new complaints of Landenberg, and alluding to the trick which (he said) Captain Frederick Spect had played him, owing to which he no longer would take Landenberg's horse into his service, as he had thought of doing. Such was the King's explanation of his conduct in Landenberg's affair, to which explanation he added that he suspected that the duke of Holstein had recalled, by means of threats, the greater part of the cavalry that was meant for his service.†

After the above conversation, I begged the King to give me his final instructions as to what I was to write to Your Majesty, and what were his intentions respecting the advance of his army, that being a most important point, and one of which Your Imperial Majesty must needs be informed beforehand, in order to shape your military movements accordingly, since he himself had decided to embark for France, and march on

* "Et de l'armee de mer, qu'avoit desja esté si long temps en ce estroit sans necessité, la quelle estant en liberté eust peu endommager l'ennemy, et garder d'inconvenients plusieurs navires, tant flamingues qu'espaignoles, qu'ont esté ces mois passez prinses en ce canal."

† No doubt Captain Spect's horse, recruited in Holstein.

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*Paris in conjunction with Your Imperial Majesty in compliance with the agreement made with the viceroy of Sicily when he was last in England. To this question of mine, the King, after some thought, replied coldly enough that he would say no more than what I, myself, must have heard concerning his plans and intentions, namely, that the greater part of his army had already laid siege to Montreuil, and that some of it was to besiege Boulogne. And upon my remarking that in my opinion the two operations would have been excellent if undertaken two months ago, especially if there was a hope, or appearance or likelihood of their being successfully and quickly achieved, and that it would have been far better for us all, as agreed, to march straight into the enemy's country without stopping at fortified places, which Your Majesty was already doing, according to the plan settled between you and him, the King replied that it was quite impossible for an army to march into France without first taking possession of Montreuil, as otherwise no food could be procured for the men, who close upon the frontiers of Your Imperial Majesty's dominions had suffered immensely (he said) from scarcity of food. He hoped, however, with God's pleasure, to be able to achieve, sooner or later, the two undertakings—that of Montreuil, and that of Boulogne—which would surprise and astonish the French, and inflict great loss upon them.**

Perceiving the King's resolution on that point, I did not consider it advisable to remind him of the agreement entered into with the viceroy of Sicily, for fear of over irritating him, and also because I hoped that he would declare more openly his intentions, which I thought were to refuse most obstinately to march into the interior of France, unless the two undertakings above alluded to had been previously disposed of. That being done, I gathered from information (actually dragged out by me from him, on several occasions in the most mysterious manner) that his intention was to make his own army march, not in the direction of Paris, but towards Normandy, a province of France, where provisions are more abundant, and which, in point of fact, is of easier access and closer to his own dominions in France.†

Again, making use of the very same arguments adduced by me on former occasions, I tried, as graciously as I could,

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* "Quil ny avoit ordre demarcher avant sans la prinse du dit Montreuil, car aultrement il estoit impossible de recouvrer vivres pour son armée, la quelle estant mesmement aux lysieres des pays de vre. ma^te avoit souffert extreme necessité de victuailles, et qu'il esperoit au plaisir de Dieu venir à chief des dites emprinses quoiqu'il ; deust tarder [ce] que seroit ung grand estonnement aveq inestimable perte des francois."

† "Et voyant la mine et resolution du dit s^r roy ne me sembla luy mectre en avant la capitulation faicte avec le dit visroy (*sic*) de Sicile pour non l'irriter, mesmes jusques à ce queusse plus avait jusques à la fin des dites emprinses, apres les quelles selon que arrachay misterieusement de luy on plusieurs fois, fait son compte d'en dresser son armee non point du coustel devers Paris, mais devers la Normandie, pour estre pais plus habondant et commodieux pour luy en tous endroitz mesmes ayant gaigné les portz de mer plus prochains."

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to induce the King to make his army march in the direction stipulated by the viceroy of Sicily; but evidently the subject was disagreeable to him, for changing abruptly the conversation, he gave me to understand that the French had lately renewed, with greater warmth than ever, their overtures for peace, and made most advantageous offers, such as paying all their debts to him, besides his own particular expenses since the beginning of the war by instalments and at reasonable terms of time. That, as security for the fulfilment of those conditions, if accepted, they offered to deliver proper hostages, and so forth. "Such offers (said the King) are not small." My reply was that I considered them, on the contrary, both small and insignificant, for after all the French did not offer to give him any portion of their territory, which he (the King) claimed as his own by right. He knew (I said) as well, and better than me, that all French practices were insidious, and designed merely for the sake of sowing discord and engendering jealousy in the minds of Your Majesty and of himself. "King Francis (I added) cannot seriously think of peace, since up to the present he has made no offers whatever to the Emperor, my master, nor has he mentioned him in his overtures to you the king of England."*

To this last remark of mine the King replied; "I have no doubt that the French, knowing that I will never treat with them for peace, save with the Emperor's full consent and approval, will ultimately make some good offer or other, and that there would be no harm in listening to their overtures, and examining the conditions proposed, and, if reasonable and convenient, accepting them."† My reply on this occasion was almost similar to that which I made to him when he told me that the French had offered him the duchy of Guienne. I only added by way of confirmation of my warning to that effect, that in former times king Francis' hostages had proved to be no security at all for the execution of treaties, as was the case in 1526, *when he (the most Christian king of France) had delivered his two sons into Your Imperial Majesty's hands, in order to obtain his own freedom. "If so (said I) the pledge offered will be completely worthless." "All that is very well," retorted the King, "but king Francis' sons were given as hostages in a case of extreme necessity, and in order to release their father from captivity." "Granted (said I), but king Francis might have obtained his liberty at once by giving up the duchy of Burgundy, which he then retained, and still retains in his possession, notwithstanding that it is notoriously a part of the Emperor's own hereditary dominions." "I was not aware of that (retorted the King) nor did I receive notice of*

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* "Pour divertir ces propos que ne luy debvoient estre agreables me donna d'entendre que les françois rechauffoient fort les practiques de paix, luy faisant tres gros offres, comme de lui payer tout son dheu et les frais qu'il a presentement faict à termes convenables, pour l'observance desquels donneront hostaiges suffisans.'

† "Ilz condescendroient de faire quelque offre raisonable à vre. mate, et quil ne seroit le pire d'y entendre et soy condescendre à bonnes conditions."

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it at the time. However that may be, I still persist in my idea. Should king Francis pay his debt to me there will be no fear for a long time of his being in a condition to make war on the Emperor or upon me, for he will be so reduced and impoverished, that all his efforts to recommence hostilities will be completely unavailing."

*To this argument of the King I replied that the French would still have the means of troubling Christendom, and I then proceeded to demonstrate to him as well as I could, with what facility king Francis might again, whenever he pleased, renew his alliance with the Turk. Even supposing (as he said) that the conditions of the peace were faithfully kept during king Francis' life and that no harm was done to England it must be remembered that the French are looking on to the future, and calculating that the league between Your Majesty and England was hereditary, and, therefore, would do anything to break and dissolve it, in order that, should one of you two come to die (which may God forbid!) they may the more easily molest and worry his successor or successors. Indeed, that were he to die, deprived at the time, of Your Majesty's friendship and alliance, the French might easily, with the assistance and co-operation of the Scotch do immense and irreparable mischief and harm to his subjects here, and on the other side of the Channel.**

To the above remark of mine the King replied, that as far as he, himself, was concerned, he considered the alliance between Your Majesty and him to be perfect, perpetual and indissoluble; that it would always remain such, since he would never lend an ear to French overtures without Your Majesty's consent, as he, himself, had expressly declared whenever offers of peace had been made to him. The King never mentioned any proper names to me, nor did he say who the people were who had thus come to him with proposals, and, therefore, if I dared state my own private opinion, I should say that the whole of what the King said to me on the subject was pure invention, for had any serious proposals been made, I have no doubt he, the King, would have revealed them immediately, as well as the names of the persons concerned. Your Majesty, with your incomparable political wisdom, will easily guess what the King's words on this occasion really mean.

After the above reasoning, I went on to say that the treaty of alliance, in one of its clauses, refers to the continuation of the war against the common enemy, during at least four months. I held (I said) for certain that he had not made such warlike preparations, stored such a quantity of provisions and am-

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* "Que les françois regardoient de loing, considerant la ligue entre vre ma^te et luy estre hereditaire, et pour cela vouldroient l'esbranler et rompre afin que survenant le deces d'une des deux parties (dont Dieu ne veuille) ilz puissent travailler comodieusement les successeurs, et que s'il venoit à deffaillir estant denué de l'amytié de vre ma^te et des siens seroit plus facille aux françois avec l'intelligence des Ecossois ung dommaige irreparable à ses pays tant de ça que de là la mer."

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*munition, nor spent such an incredible sum of money for so short a time as, he said, the reduction of Montreuil and Boulogne would take; and that I was sure that he had neither the will, nor the men, nor the money to continue the war as long as required, yet that I begged and entreated him to be pleased and tell me what his intention was upon the whole, that Your Majesty might be informed beforehand to arrange your plan of campaign, so as to meet him. To this question and prayer of mine the King coldly answered that taking for granted that God gave good health to his army and plenty of provisions to his camp, he would not fail to march on to whichever place it was deemed necessary for him to advance, but that should an urgency of some sort or other occur, it would be expedient and convenient to retreat, alleging, as I think, the above argument, more as an excuse for his retreat after the expiration of the said four months than for any other reason, at the same time showing me by his language and manner that he has no great desire of continuing the war beyond that time. And yet I am inclined to think that the good success over the common enemy might encourage him to continue war beyond the four months if necessary. Should, however, things not turn out so well as we expect and wish, I very much doubt of his remaining in the field, besides which, as I have informed Your Imperial Majesty in one of my former dispatches, money is not very abundant with him just now, as people well versed in financial matters tell me.**

Two days ago two Lords from Scotland arrived here [at Calais]; the name of one of them is Millort Fift (Fife.) They have come to offer their services to the King, saying that in Scotland affairs are in great confusion, that there is neither order nor government in the country, and that the Cardinal (David Beton) has retired to one of his livings without troubling himself at all with the government of the country.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. Almost entirely ciphered. 4 *pp.*

21 July. **160.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—As I was about to close the above dispatch,† Mr. de Courrières arrived here [at Calais] with a letter

* "A quoy me respondit assez froidement quil ne sçavoit ce que selon quil plaise à Dieu de donner santé au camp et commodité de victuailles il ne fauldroit conduire et que survenant occasion urgente, quelque temps que ce fut conviendroit bien se retirer, allegant plustost à mon advis les dites raisons pour [s']excuser en cas que dedans les dits quattre mois sil vinne (s'il vient) à se retirer pour aultre chose, demonstrant peu de chaleur de continuer davantaige le dit temps. Toutesfois le success des affaires le pourra assez inciter à la continuation necessaire, de la quelle je doubteroye fort non allant les affaires prosperement, et à souhait et mesme pour la cause quay cy devant escript à vre ma^te, et trouve à loppinion de diverses gens quentendent beaucoup des affaires quil nen y a grant habondance dargent."

† No. 159 of the same date.

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from the queen of Hungary. This very day, after dinner, he had audience from the King, who not only received him very graciously, but took in very good part the congratulations offered by him in Your Majesty's and the Queen's name for his safe landing at this port. As Mr. de Courrières, however, had been informed by me (Chapuys) and by other people of the King's determination of at once visiting his camp before Boulogne, and thence proceeding further on, if the state of his health and the favourable disposition of affairs would allow it, neither De Courrières nor I (Chapuys) considered it necessary to renew the subject of our joint mission.

With regard to other points of De Courrières' instructions —such as the advance of the English army into the enemy's territory—the King, after hearing my colleague's exposé, stated in a few words, and, as it were, "en passant," that as soon as the two undertakings against Montreuil and against Boulogne had been achieved, not only would he order his army to go forward and penetrate into the enemy's country, but he himself would go thither in person and take the command. This the King said, and repeated several times to Mr. de Courrières and to me (Chapuys), adding that he hoped to hear soon of the successful issue of both undertakings, inasmuch as he had letters from his camp before Boulogne stating that a good beginning had already been made, both in the siege of that town and at Montreuil, and that here, at Calais, a rumour was afloat of Montreuil having already been taken. "Even if Montreuil is still held by the enemy (said the King to me), one might take the popular rumour that is prevalent—though I have not been officially informed of it—as a sort of prognostic of the taking of that town, which might be still further strengthened by the fact of its governor, Monsr. de Biez, having suddenly left it without anyone knowing where he is gone." On the side of Boulogne the English artillery had already done considerable damage to its castle, though the French declared it *inoffensable d'artillerie*. He was much put out by the French having set fire to the lower town in order to prevent the English from lodging thereat; but instead of houses for his men, he would have tents raised in such places that the enemy's fire could not harm his soldiers. In this manner the King considers it certain to carry the town by assault. The only thing the King and his men regretted was not to have a naval force at hand to prevent the garrison and the inhabitants from escaping by sea with their valuables.

I never found the King so joyous and so light-hearted as when my colleague and I saw him to-day; even if he had had positive news of the taking of those two towns by his men, I doubt whether he would have been in such buoyant spirits. I even believe that this joy and good humour which he manifests has in a certain measure been increased by the fact of

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his having lately received intelligence that Landenberg's horse were coming to serve him with perfect good will.

The King has proposed to us (De Courrières and me) that, in order to save superfluous expense, the naval force which Your Majesty and he hold at sea should be reduced by one half—that is to say, instead of one thousand men each, or the contingent stipulated by treaty, each party should only keep five hundred men. As there is no appearance or show of the French preparing a fleet, the remainder of the allied naval force would be sufficient for the purpose of rendering the navigation of the Channel quite secure. This my colleague and I readily granted, adding that Your Majesty would have no objection to please him (the King) in this matter as in any other of greater importance.—Calais, the 21st of July 1544.

Indorsed; "From the ambassador in England. Received at the camp before St. Dèsier, the 29th of the same month [of July] 1544."

French. Original. 5 *pp.*

21 July. **161.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Just as I was finishing the above dispatch and about to sign it, Mr. de Courrières arrived here. In the afternoon of the same day he (De Courrières) applied for and obtained audience from the King. He was very well received, the King taking in very good part the congratulations, of which my colleague was bearer in Your Royal name, as well as in that of the Emperor, for this King's safe landing* here [at Calais]. As Monsr. de Courrières had been previously informed by me and others of the King's determination to visit his camp before Boulogne, and thence push on further, should the state of his health and the good success of his military operations allow it, he naturally refrained from renewing the representations and persuasions so frequently addressed to him in writing, as well as the prayer not to quit this port of Calais during the war.†

To the other point on which Mr. de Courrières was to touch in pursuance of His Imperial Majesty's commands—namely, that of the quick movements of the English army—the King replied summarily in a few words, saying only that the enterprises both against Montreuil and Boulogne being successful, he (the King) would not only order his army to march at once into France, but would personally take the command of his forces. Such was the King's reply to Mr. de Courrières assuring us both that he confidently expected a

* "Et la (l'a) humainement laisse recuiller (faict recueillir) pregnant en tres bonne part le congratulement que le dict sieur de Courrières luy a faict de sa descente içy."

† As may be observed this dispatch of Chapuys', though dated also from Calais, is almost a duplicate of the preceding to the Emperor.

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good issue of both sieges, for, as he had heard from the commanders of his forces at Montreuil and at Boulogne, a good beginning had already been done at both places. Already (he added) news had reached here [Calais]—though unofficial and uncertain—that the former of those towns—*i.e.*, Montreuil—had surrendered. Should that news turn out untrue, it would still be in the popular mind a sort of presage of its speedy fall, the hope of which is greatly increased by the sudden departure of Mr. de Biez, without anyone knowing whither he has gone.

At Boulogne the artillery of the English had battered and almost demolished a big tower (*une grosse tour*) on the seaside. The besiegers had also done considerable damage to the castle, though those inside boasted that the English siege-guns could not reach it.* The King was not pleased to hear that the French had set fire to Basse-Boulogne, in order to prevent the English from taking possession and lodging in it, but said to us that "after all he did not care for what the French had done; if his men had no houses to live in, he would all the same occupy that part of the town, and let his soldiers sleep in tents, and in places where they could not possibly receive harm from the enemy." Indeed, the King feels certain that Boulogne will fall very shortly, and so do his men, only that the latter are displeased at the sea not being guarded, so as to prevent the garrison of Boulogne from escaping and carrying away their valuables.†

I never in my life saw the King so joyful and in such good spirits as he is at present; so much so, that both Mr. de Courrières and myself think that should he suddenly receive official intelligence of the taking of both those towns —Boulogne and Montreuil—he could not be more glad and elated than he seems to be. I also believe that his good humour has been much increased by the intelligence he has just received that Landenberg's cavalry are willing to serve affectionately (*avec bonne affection*).

The King has hinted to Mr. de Courrières and to me that, in order to avoid superfluous expense, it would be desirable to diminish by one-half the naval forces of each country. One thousand men might be licensed by Your Imperial Majesty, and one thousand by him, for there is no appearance or rumour at present of the French having now an armed fleet at sea, whilst the remainder of Your Imperial Majesty's and of the English will be quite sufficient for all purposes. This Mr. de Courrières and I granted, adding that we were sure that Your Imperial Majesty would at once do

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* "Quoique les françois bravoient icelluy [chasteau] estre inoffensible dartillerie."

† "Et ne desplait (comme il dit) à ses souldars qui sont devant Boulogne sinon de ce que larmee (la mer?) nest garder affin que le gens de guerre que sont dedans le dict Boulogne ne se puissent saulver pas mer et emporter leur besoignes."

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his pleasure in this matter as in others of greater importance. —Calais, *ut supra.*

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England. Received at the camp before St. Desir (St. Desier), on the 29th of the said month."

French. Original. 5 *pp.*

23 July. **162.** KING HENRY to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

As the weather is fine and the season good, and supposing that you will not find it inconvenient or disagreeable, I have sent orders to my commissaries in that country to remain some time at St. Omer for the purpose of procuring provisions, and forwarding them to Our camp before Montreuil. —Callais (*sic*), 23 July 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

25 July. **163.** ADVICES OF THE TAKING OF ST. DISIER.

S. Sria de Guerra. Mar. y Tierra, No. 28.

"Most magnificent Sir,"—After writing to you from Pont à Mouson,* His Imperial Majesty continued his march with his Court and part of his army only, and took the road to a place between Vari (Bar le Duc) and Ligny, where the duchess of Lorraine † was then residing. He arrived here on the 12th, at the time that Don Fernando Gonzaga was laying siege to this town. On the 16th the assault was given, but although the plan of attack was good, it failed, owing to the men advancing without orders from their superior commander, Field-Master Don Alvaro de Sande,‡ who was at the time in the Emperor's tent consulting on certain matters deemed necessary for the success of the undertaking. Our men were repulsed with loss, and the town itself could not then be taken, until the whole of the Imperial army took part in the storming. Meanwhile our loss was heavy and consisted of:

Killed.

The Prince of Orange,
Capt. Cortœvilo (Courteville ?), German,
Capt. Vandoc, Burgundian,
Count Oven, German,
And 20 more gentlemen soldiers, all men of quality, who were killed in the moats, and among them fifty more of lower rank and condition.

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* The copy has Pont *de* Monjon, which is evidently a mistake of the copyist. It is a small town of Lorraine on the river Moselle. The Emperor's camp was there on the 7th July.

† This duchess was Dorothea of Denmark, who after the death of her first husband, Francesco Sforza, duke of Milan, was married to François de Lorraine.

‡ *Santade* in the copy, which is evidently wrong, for *Santde* or *Sande* as this name of that general is generally written by Spaniards.

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Wounded.

Field-Master, Don Alvaro de Sande, and Capt. Monsalve with their faces, hands and legs burnt to the bones.
Field-Master Luis Perez de Vargas, of an hackbut shot in the thigh.
Capt. Alonso de Caravajal.
Sergeant-Major Espin, of an hackbut shot, which pierced his two legs.
Another Capt., Don Alonso de Caravajal, of a gun-shot in the forehead, which comes down to the eye. This Capt. is one of the newly arrived.
Capt. Don Guillen, of a gun-shot in the throat (*gaznate*).
Capt. Pagan, of a hackbut shot in the back.
Capt. Gamboa, of another shot near the thigh bone, almost touching on the genitals.*
Ensign (*alferez*) Diego Ortiz of two hackbut shots in the upper part of the leg.
Capt. Bernal Soler, of one, in the hip.
Capt. Socarrate, of a musket shot in one of his buttocks close to the right genital; he is on the point of death
Capt. Nicolas Spes (Espés), of another in the left jaw stretching out to the ear; he is dying.
Pheilipe de Aguilar, ensign-bearer (*alferez*) to Capt. Alonso de Caravajal, of an hackbut shot in one of his arms.
Spanish soldiers wounded and burnt, about 600.
A good many besides are wounded by stones; I do not include them in this list because all of them stand on their legs, and go about, though ill-disposed and incapable of service for the present.

Our men, having been repulsed with loss, retreated; the fire on our side and that of the enemy ceased, for scarcely if from time to time there was a musket shot on either side. The Emperor held a council of war for two or three days running in which it was resolved to make the trenches wider and longer, which has been done, so as to advance 12 or 15 steps closer to the moat, and erect besides, bastions, and other defences and mines in two different places.†

The work goes on steadily, and is being executed with such solidity, and in such style that we all think that with God's help, the town will be taken before the end of the month, at the latest. May the Almighty guide it all as best suits His service, and that of the Emperor!

This fortress once taken, we shall go to Xalon (Chalons) where the French have a force of 7,000 or 8,000 men. Troyes, I hear, has also been fortified.

The loss of the enemy at St. Disier I hear amounts to 400 between killed and wounded. Though the French have made a movement to succour the garrison, they have hitherto

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* "De un arcaburzazo en las nalgas que viene à daren un testiculo."
† "Y bestiones (*sic*), reparos y minas por dos partes en las quales se ha labrado hasta y cinco o seis estados."

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been unable to enter the town. A portion of their infantry and cavalry are certainly hovering about Our camp, but hitherto they have not attacked Us; on the contrary Our people are after them, and if they can only draw the enemy into a skirmish they are sure to get the best of it.

In all the places of some importance, belonging to the duchess of Lorraine, as well as in those which we have already taken, there were strong garrisons of infantry and cavalry.

The Prince of Orange (René de Nassau) died on the 15th. He met with his death in the following manner: He was going to the trenches in company with the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), when they met the marquis of Marignano seated on a chair on which the Emperor used to seat. When the Marquis saw the Prince and the Viceroy approach, he got up and offered them the vacant chair. Some courteous offers and excuses followed as to who was to occupy the chair, until at last the Prince sat down in it. Very shortly after an iron ball from a culverin came from the walls of the town, and passing between the Viceroy and the Marquis, after touching lightly on the edge of the bastion, hit the Prince under the right shoulder, so that it penetrated the gristle (*ternille*), and broke one of the Prince's ribs, carrying away part of the shoulder.* On the second day after the accident he passed away from this life; the regret of the whole army and the Court being so great that no words of mine can describe it. His Majesty, the Emperor saw him die, and after that retired to his chamber, where he remained some time aloue, without seeing any one. I am told that he gave evident signs of how much he loved him. His command, they say, will be given to Mons. Logran (*sic*). His widow is in the family way. May it be so, and may she bear and be delivered of a son to inherit the rich estates that his father, the Prince, once owned!

Next day the Emperor, in person, visited Don Alvaro de Santde, Capt. Monsalve and Luis Perez de Vargas. I am told that he addressed a number of kind words to them, promising to make grants (*hacer mercedes*) to each, and remunerate their services. He ordered that the greatest possible care should be taken for their cure. The same is now being done with other officers wounded at the storming of the town, which, as stated, proved a failure.

At St. Dizier, Mr. de la Lande,† who was reputed to be a great soldier (*gran hombre de guerra*) had gone to command the garrison the day before the Emperor arrived before the walls, much against his will, but at the express orders of king Francis, which he could not well disobey.

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* Both Sandoval (*Hist. del Emp. Carlos V.*, Vol. II., p. 500.) and the French historians give us a different account of the Prince's death, though they both agree as to his having been killed by a falconet shot from the besieged town.

† Sande or Sandi was his real name. He was killed by a cannon shot. (*See*

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I hear from an authentic source that for the last fortnight king Francis has been laid up with fever, and that he is so ill that no one goes into his room except the cardinal of Lorraine, Mme. d'Estampes, the queen of Navarre (Margaret) and Mr. de Boisi (Boissy). He is now staying at a monastery or abbey, four leagues distant from Paris, and it is added that he is so disturbed in mind that he does nothing but pace up and down in his chamber, uttering dismal cries. The Queen, his wife (Elinor) is at Paris, and Mr. d'Orleans at a place between Troyes and Xalon (Chalons sur Marne). May God send us such a peace as Christendom stands in need of, for the benefit and advantage of all its princes and people!

The vanguard and rearguard of the English army are in front of Monterreu (Montreuil), a town of some importance, having a garrison of 4,000 foot and 200 men-at-arms for its defence. The King, himself, with the main body of his army, was about to leave London on the 8th inst. We are every day expecting news of his having crossed the Channel.

The day before yesterday the Emperor received intelligence that at a French village called Vitri (Vitry), five leagues distant from this place, there were 600 horse, and 3,000 foot. The night before last a force consisting of 3,000 horse and 6,000 foot, was under the command of Mr. Logran, Don Franceisco d'Este, and Juan Baptista Castaldo, who upon their arrival at a bridge on this side of Vitry, found 200 hackbutiers, and 200 more foot sent thither ready to defend the passage. They, however, were defeated, and our men passed the bridge, and went to another where the enemy's principal force was situated; but our men charged this, and in the space of half-an-hour the whole of the enemy's infantry were either drowned or prisoners. Of the cavalry some were slain, between 50 or 60 were taken prisoners, the remainder took to flight, not, however, without leaving in our hands the whole of their baggage and tents, valued at 30,000 crowns.

From the camp in front of St. Dizier.—25 July 1544.

P.S.—To-day, the 30th, and the work of the redoubt (*caballero*), and of the mines in front of St. Dizier is progressing very steadily. News has come that the king of England has actually crossed the Strait, and landed at Calais.* His army is making all possible haste in constructing mines, against Monterreue (Montreuil). It is thought that the place will be soon taken. Our army has plenty of provisions, and if this state continues things will go well enough.

On the last day of July, 25 French horsemen, attempted to enter St. Dizier, five of whom succeeded and got in, nine more fled, and the eleven remaining were taken prisoners by Our men. On the very same day a peasant (*villano*), who was in the town, threw himself down from the top of the wall and came to our camp driven by hunger.† He said that

* He did so on the 20th.

† "Se hecho (echó?) de la muralla abajo, y dixo que era por hambre."

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he was hungry, and the garrison was in great stress for want of food, for although they have still plenty of wheat, they cannot make flour for want of mills; in consequence of which there is dissension and fighting between the garrison and the people of the town.

The Germans, who went to Vitry, set fire to the place, the whole of which, with considerable stores of provisions, ammunition, and so forth was consumed. * The Emperor was exceedingly angry when he heard of it.

Letters from Vienna announce that the city is being fortified in haste, though for this present year, we have no news of the Turk coming that way. Eleven thousand of their cavalry have taken Neugrado (Novgorod), in Hungary, and and had not Rocandholpho (Rucandolf) gone out against them with 10,000 foot, they might have made themselves masters of the island of Comara (Komorn).

Don Alvaro de Sande, the Field-Master, though still suffering from his wounds, has caused himself to be carried to the trenches, and has there pitched his tent close to the walls, declaring that he will not move away until the place surrenders. Count Guillermo de Fustanberg* was wounded at Vitry, and is now at Bar de Lorena, under a surgeon's treatment.

[19th of August.] The people of St. Dizier are in greater stress than ever, wanting many things in the way of necessaries of life. Our artillery fires every day upon the town, and kills many of the garrison.

There is a report in the camp that a French personage came the other day to treat of peace, and conferred with the Emperor's ministers, but as he had no credentials, and was not sufficiently empowered to treat of such matters, he has been dismissed and has gone away just as he came.

From France the news is that the marquis de Aguilar† with a handful of men from the garrison of Perpinoan (Perpignan) has taken Carcasome, a strong place a few leagues from Narbonne, on the road to Toulouse. Such is the news that has come to this camp, but it requires confirmation, and is not considered by some as sufficiently authentic.

We hear that the king of England has already crossed the Channel and landed at Calais.‡ His army, in the meanwhile is laying siege to Montreuil, and digging trenches round it. It is generally believed that the town will not make a long defence, and will be soon taken.

Hearing that there was a considerable French force close to Vitry, the Emperor went thither in person, at the head of a

* That is Count Wilhelm von Furstenberg. French historians, and among them Father Daniel (Vol. V., p. 407) state that he was taken prisoner whilst attempting to reconnoitre the French camp.

† Don Juan Manrique, Imperial ambassador at Rome, from 1526 to 1543, and who in June of the same year (1543), was appointed Captain-General of Catalonia and its frontier. (*See* Vol. VI. Part II., pp. 44–45, of the Introduction; and 382, 384, 579 of the text.)

‡ The King's landing took place on the 14th of the month according to State Papers, Vol. X., p. 1.

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strong body of cavalry and some infantry. There was, however, no engagement at all, for on his arrival there, no Frenchman was to be seen.*

The enemy had a better chance at St. Dizier itself, for on the very same day that the Emperor left for Vitry, the garrison made a sally, and carried away 12 or 15 of our men.

Fresh news has been received of the English before Montreuil. It would appear that the town is invested and that the siege is being pushed on most vigorously, the heavy artillery battering its walls and so forth. The King, himself, had pitched his tent before Bolonia (Boulogne sur Mer) and was battering its walls with thirty-two pieces of heavy ordnance. He (the King) had besides a good many lighter guns and several engines of war, by means of which, and explosive mines, he was steadily sapping its walls and opening breaches in them. He expected to take the place soon, after which he intends, *as we hear*, to march on Ruen (Rouen) in Normandy.

In order to facilitate the storming of St. Dizier, an excellent engineer of the Emperor is now constructing two bridges, attached to strong wooden towers, by means of which our men will mount the walls better protected. I believe that in a day or two the attack of the place will begin, and that in three or four more the town will be ours, to judge from the many mines that have been laid and batteries (*caballeros*) raised.

Captain Don Alonso de Caravajal died yesterday of his wounds. His body was, this very morning buried most honourably; it was carried and followed to the grave by a company of men, all Spaniards, preceded by two drummers (*tambores*), and one fifer (*pifaro*), accoutred in the deepest mourning and playing the tune called "LA DERROTA DE MARIÑAN."† The command of Caravajal's foot was given to Montero, the key-bearer (*clavero*) of the military order [of Calatrava] formerly the sergeant of Juan Gaytan. On the same day died Capt. Socarrate,‡ whose company was given to Don Alonso Puertocarrera, formerly an ensign (*alferez*) of Capt. Castañoso de Bracamonte.§ This latter and Capt. Pedrarias, both of whom were wounded at Commersi are still at Bari (Bar le Duc), convalescent and almost well, so much

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* Marshal Brissac (Charles de Cossé) was at Vitry with a body of troops, having abandoned it. Of this expedition to Vitry, Sandoval, who calls the place Vitriaco, treats at length, and in detail. (*See Historia del Emperador Carlos V. Pamplona* 1614, Vol. II., p. 502.) The Emperor did not go thither personally, but sent a division of his army under Furstenberg, Este, and the duke Maurice of Saxony.

"Pero no sé si ergusó (se siguió) efecto alguno porque maldito el frances que toparon, los quales como supieron por sus escuchas que el Emperador venia contra ellos decamparon y se fueron tierra adentro."

† Marignan in the duchy of Milan, where the Swiss were defeated by the French in 1515.

‡ See above, p. 266.

§ Brachamonte is a wrong spelling for Bracamonte, a town in Extremadura.

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so that they are expected to-morrow or the day after to take part at the head of their respective companies, in the second storming of this place.

Field-Master Don Alvaro de Sande* and Capt. Monsalve can already stand on their feet, and walk along, having perfectly recovered from their wounds, and the burnings (*quemaduras*)† they had suffered. The former, I hear, is already at work and doing service.—Camp before San Desir (Dizier), 25 July 1544.

Spanish. Original.‡ 4 pp.

26 July. **164.** The EMPEROR to CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your letter of the 7th inst. was duly received, as well as the report of your conversation with the King respecting the note (*escript*) here presented by his ambassador, from which report and note it is apparent to Us that the King does not intend making any great effort; and yet it would seem as if, in order to palliate his own fault in not complying entirely with the agreement entered into with Don Fernando Gonzaga, he was trying to prove that the fault is Ours. Your answer was prudent and wisely conceived—most fit and convenient in the present state of affairs. We entirely approve of it, and request you to continue and persevere in the same as long as you deem it necessary, and according to the news you may from time to time receive of the progress of Our arms.

Of Our successes up to this time you must have been periodically informed by the queen dowager of Hungary, Our sister. Although, as you well know, it is necessary to temporise with the king of England, he must not have entirely his own way respecting the observance of the agreement made with Gonzaga, and what We Ourselves have done, and are still doing, to fulfil its conditions and terms.

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* Here and elsewhere written *Santde*, which is evidently a mistake for Sande (Don Alvaro de) a distinguished *maestre de Campo*, or *Coronel de Tercio* of these days, about whom *see* Sandoval *Historia del Emperador Carlos*, Vol. II., pp. 50–4.

† So-called by the Spaniards.

‡ This news-letter is in the form of a diary, from the 12th to the 25th of July; a copy of it is preserved at Simancas, *Mar y Tierra. Sucesos militares de* 1544. may be found in Vol. XXII. of Bergenroth's Collection, B.M. *Add.* 28,593 of the *Add. MSS., ff.* 131–71. By whom written, or to whom addressed, are difficult points to settle. From the title of *Muy magnifico Señor* it might be conjectured that the letter was addressed to some high personage or official at the Spanish Court in Valladolid—letters of the kind between Alonso Idiaquez, one of the Emperor's secretaries, and Francisco de Los Cobos, Minister for Foreign Affairs to Prince Philip, being frequent in this Collection - and yet both the style and certain expressions of the letter itself, which I have purposely underlined, make me think that, instead of an official report, we have to deal here with one of those news-letters *Relacion, Nouvelles, Avisi, Ragnaglio* Gazette and so forth, so common at the time, often printed and constituting, as it were, the original periodical press throughout Europe.

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At present there is no news worth recording, save what happened lately at Vitry, as you will see by the inclosed account, which is the exact truth. We cannot tell whether the account sent by the English ambassador to the King his master, when he first heard of the event through the Sieur de Granvelle, agrees or not with Our own as in the inclosed, but the real fact is that the Sieur de Longueval has sent a second message to the Sieur de Granvelle asking for an interview with him to treat of peace, saying that king Francis is ready to do what he considers to be his duty in that affair. Similar words had been addressed to Don Fernando [Gonzaga] by a lieutenant of the company of Count de Bryenne,* who says he has heard king Francis himself declare that he wishes singularly for peace, especially with Us. The answer given to the lieutenant, as well as to Longueval, was that those were general proposals without meaning or foundation, which could not be submitted to Us; and as We fancy, as you yourself suspect, that king Francis may have made similar overtures there in England, and as you write in one of your dispatches that that King told you the other day there could be no harm in listening to French overtures, and hearing what the French had to say, there is every reason to suppose that what the king of England is aiming at is to have a better and earlier opportunity of knowing what the French are about, and what their wishes are as to peace; and if he sees that his army, on which he has already spent so much money, achieves nothing very important or useful to himself, he will listen to or perhaps accept the terms offered by the enemy. That is why We request and order you to make inquiries and let Us and Our sister the Queen know as soon as possible what you think of the King's intentions, and above all whether there is a probability of his being now in favour of truce or peace. On this point you will follow entirely the directions of Our sister, for should you perceive any inclination on the part of that King to listen to overtures of truce or peace, it strikes Us that the most honest and most convenient plan, for that King's reputation and Our own—since We are in arms against France, and actually within French territory—would be that the affair, in one way or other, should be placed in the hands of Our said sister. We need scarcely add that the whole affair must be conducted with your usual dexterity and discretion, and with the advice and counsel of Our sister.—St. Desir (Dizier) 26 July 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

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* "Et que le Roy, son maistre, s'en mectoit en tout devoir, et que le semblable avoit rapporte au dit sieur don Fernande le lieutenant de la compaignye du conte de Bryenne avoir entendu du dit roy de France qu'il la desiroit singulierement avec nous." This count de Brienne had defended Ligny, which the Emperor took in July, the governor and his brother, the viscount of Roussy, being made prisoners.

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— July. **165.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADOR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—Having read your despatch to the Emperor, Our lord and brother, dated the 21st inst., and the account therein given of your conversation with that King respecting the offers of peace made to him by the French, considering also the coldness (*froideur*) with which the English look on this undertaking against France, and that most likely, owing to that coldness, they will not keep the field long, it is to be feared that affairs will be less vigorously prosecuted, or else that on the approach of winter some disease or other may pervade their army.* Even if they succeed in carrying Boulogne and Montreuil—which would be a thing to astonish and discourage the French beyond measure—it is doubtful whether they would not be satisfied with that for this season, and retire altogether from the field, after trying all possible means to secure and keep their conquest. On the other hand, if the English perceive that they cannot gain possession of those two towns, and lose all hope of gaining other advantages by advancing and penetrating into France, they will return home without actual loss of reputation.

The above considerations make Us think that the king of England may, one of these days, feel inclined one way or other to listen to French overtures either of peace or of truce; perhaps, also, to agree with the French that such proposals and offers as the king of England considers just and reasonable should be made to His Imperial Majesty, which proposals, if rejected, might afford the king of England occasion and excuse to separate himself from the Emperor, who in that case would be greatly disappointed of the hopes and trust he had in his ally, and there would be an end to all plans and designs in common.† In one particular thing We consider that King to be right in looking with attention to the end of this present campaign. Should the two allied armies suffer a check in their march, or else not obtain at once the success which We hope they both together, or each of them separately, will gain, and be consequently obliged to retreat without having gained much territory from the common enemy, it would then become more difficult to treat with the French; whereas, if the allied armies were intact, one could perhaps obtain from the enemy concessions which the latter would certainly not grant after the retreat of the allies. Since the King, as may be gathered

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* "Considerant la froideur dont les anglois usent en l'entreprise contre France, et qu'il est vraysemblable quilz ne vouldront longuement demeurer aux champs convient (*sic*) que les affaires tombent, mesmes approchant lyber, ou que ses gens tombent en quelque maladie."

† "Lesquelles considerations nous font doubter que le dit s^r roy, comme que soit, pourroit bien facilement entendre à quelque practique de traiter, soit de paix soit de tresve, et par aventure accorder avecq les franchois de faire aulcunes faire quelques representations et offres à sa ma^te imperiale telz que le dit s^r roy jugeroit raisonables, et si on ne les acceptoit soubz ceste couleur prendre occasion soy disjoindre de sa dite ma^te, au quel cas sa dite ma^te se trouveroit grandement circonvenu de l'espoir il a au dit s^r roy et seroient rompus leur desseigns."

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from the conversation he has held with you on the subject, has taken it into his head (*en fantasie*) to listen to overtures and treat of peace, We very much fear that he may go on still further, and beyond the prescriptions of the treaty of closer alliance. That is why We request you to try and ascertain by perfectly honest means what the King's intentions are in that matter. This might be done either by returning to the subject whenever there is an opportunity, or by mildly opposing the King's arguments in favour of his own ideas on the subject. This, however, is to be done with your usual dexterity and skill, trying to ascertain the King's intentions without speaking in favour of or against French practices—which practices, to tell you the truth, if We consider the state of public affairs, might after all be most suitable and advantageous to Christendom in general, and especially for the kingdoms, countries, and subjects of His Imperial Majesty, who could not in the end support and bear the excessive expense and cost of war.

This last consideration is the principal reason We have for mixing Ourselves up with the affair, more perhaps than Our charge and instructions authorise Us to do. Should the King again speak to you about treating with the enemy, you will ask him how and in what way—whether of peace or of truce. You will represent to him that, in order to treat of peace separately and on his own side only, it behoves him to insure, first of all, the payment of Francis' debt to him, which demand the French could not supply by means of hostages, as the King himself says has been proposed to him for the future; it would be requisite that the security should consist in towns and districts of France, as prescribed by the treaty of closer alliance. It would also be requisite, for the greater security of the King and his successors on the throne, that France should renounce for the future all alliance with Scotland, which they (the French) will not willingly do.* This is on that King's side, for on that of His Imperial Majesty it would be requisite that king Francis restore all that which

* The whole paragraph, which is highly important, stands thus in the original:—"Pourquoy vous requerons que veuilliez regarder si ne sçauriez par bon moyen entendre plus particulierement l'intention du dit s^r Roy, en luy mectant de rechief en avant les ditz propoz sans trop rebouter la practique d'entendre à traicter avecq les ennemis, la quelle pour vous dire franchement, ayant regard à l'estat des affaires publicques, ne scauroit que bien convenir à toute la Chrestienté et singulierement aux royaulmes, pays et subjects de sa ma^te, les quelz à la longe (*sic*) ne pourront supporter si grans et excessifz fraiz et depens[ses] de la guerre, [ce] qui nous mene de [á] nous mesler en cecy plus que n'avons charge de sa ma^te. Et sy le dit roy vous tient encoires propoz de traicter, luy pouvez demander comment et de quelle sorte il entend traicter, à sçavoir de paix ou tresve, et lui mettant en avant que en traictant de paix [il] conviendroit de son costé bien s'assurer de son deu, au quel les franchoys ne sçauroient satisfaire par hostages comme il confesse lui estre mis en termes du moins pour l'advenir, mais seroit requis pour sa seurté quil fust saisy dauculnes terres du royaulme de France selon; qu'il est convenu par le traicté de plus estroicte alliance, aussy que pour la seurté de sa succession, les franchoys remarchassent (renonçassent) à l'alliance d'Escosse ce quilz ne feront voulontiers."

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he has usurped and still retains, belonging to him, such as the duchy of Burgundy and the bailiwick of Hesdin, besides what he has occupied during the present war; also to restore to the duke of Savoy all that has been taken from him, to renounce again and for ever the duchy of Milan and the towns he occupies in Piedmont, as well as all rights he may pretend to have to titles and possessions of the Emperor, and especially to those of the Empire, as reason demands. All these things could not be definitely settled save with great difficulty and after considerable delay; besides which, there are other minor points to be settled between His Imperial Majesty and king Francis—such as private estates belonging to vassals of the Empire, natives of the duchy of Burgundy, the Low Countries, and so forth, whose claims must needs be attended to. All these points ought to be well settled and determined before consolidating a good and lasting peace, unless the king of England prefers a good and honest truce.

Should you find that the King is really and truly inclined to treat with Our common enemy, you must try to ascertain, if the opportunity offers, by whose mediation and through whom he intends the peace to be negociated, and whether he will approve or not of Our becoming the intermediary of it, without, however, insisting too strongly on your inquiries unless you are positively sure that he himself is inclined to peace; but you must not make it appear as if the idea had originated with Us, and you had been directed to make the inquiry. On the contrary, the suggestion must come as a private one, and from yourself, declaring to the King that you have no orders from His Imperial Majesty as to that, which after all is the plain truth.* Should the King answer in the affirmative you will immediately let Us know, in the hope that he is inclined, as We Ourselves are, to peace. We will employ all Our means and influence with Our brother the Emperor to induce him to consent, for the sake of the king of England, to a truce, during which all matters might be wonderfully well settled. We, therefore, again recommend you to manage with your usual dexterity and skill the above matter as if all originated with you, in such manner that if you think that any beneficial result can come out of it, you may make the suggestion provided it appears to me made for that King's sake exclusively, and by his wish.

In short, though We have no charge from the Emperor on this particular point, yet, considering the conversation you have held with the King on the subject, and the present state of public affairs, as well as of the Emperor's private ones,

* "Et si avant que trouverez le dit s^r roy à ce enclin adviserez d'entendre par moyen de qui'il la vouldroit traicter, et si l'opportunité s'adonnoit, pouvez regarder si le dict s^r roy troeveroit bon que nous entremettions de ceste practique sans toutesfois en ce cas vous eslargir plus avant que sentirez l'inclination du dit sieur roy, ne aussy faire semblant qu'en ayes aulcunne charge de nous, mais seulement parlant comme de vous mesmes, en luy declairant ce qu'est veritable que n'avez aulcune charge de sa ma^te."

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We have deemed it necessary—nay, indispensable, unless We choose to run the risk of it—to try all possible means of putting an end to this wretched war (*mal dicte guerre*) one way or other, and applying a remedy to the evil, which cannot be done except through the intermediate agency of some person or other whilst the allies keep the field at the head of their respective armies, and that the person or prince thus interfering may, as it is most fit, take for the honour, reputation, and profit of His Imperial Majesty, as well as of that King.* It is merely on that account that We have made the above suggestions. We have no doubt of any good effect coming out of it, but We trust that His Imperial Majesty will excuse the liberty We have taken, and that whatever you (Chapuys) may do in fulfilment of the charge entrusted to you will be agreeable to the Emperor.

French. Original draft, without date. 5 *pp.*

27 July. **166.** DE MONTMORENCY and SIEUR DE COURRIÈRES to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Yesterday, at the dinner hour, I arrived here, but the King would not give me audience until to-day in the afternoon. He received me very well and took in very good part the commendations and visit which I was charged to make in the Emperor's and your Majesty's name, for which he returned thanks.

Hearing from Monsieur Chapuys, the ambassador, that the King has determined to depart for his camp before Boulogne, I have not, for many reasons, tried to persuade him to remain here. Indeed it is rumoured that he will take his departure next Thursday, or soon after, for Boulogne, to which the Duke of Suffolk is now laying siege, with a good hope, as it is said, of carrying it by force of arms.† *I fear, however, that this will not happen so soon as he (the King) and the Duke himself think, for the place is considered very strong, and I have no doubt that the garrison inside will defend it to the utmost. Already, as men well practised in warfare, the French commanders have set fire to and burned down the lower town (La Basse Boulogne).*

I have represented to the King that it would be well to make his army go at once into France, as otherwise that of

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* "Combien que, comme dit est, nous n'avons nulle charge de l'Empereur, Monsieur nre. frere, de ce que dessus, toutesfois ayant regard aux propos que le dit sr roy vous a tenu, et aussy à l'estat des affaires, tant publicques que particulieres de sa mte Imperiale, il nous semble plus que necessaire, que [s'il] ne veult le tout hazarder, qu'il aye regart de mectre fin à ceste mauldite guerre par lung boult ou l'aultre, [ce] que ne se peult faire si [ce] n'est qu'aucun s'en meyde (mesle), et aussi qu'il est plus convenable pour la reputation de sa dite mte et dudit sr roy traicter durant qilz tiennent les champs."

† "Je ne luy ay tenu aucun propos pour le faire demeurer içy pour plusieurs respectz. Il est le bruyt quil partira le jeudi prouchain, ou bientost apres, pour aller devant la dite ville de Boulogne, la quelle est assiegée du duc de Suffolk de sorte que le roy a bon espoir de l'emporter."

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the Emperor will have to sustain all the brunt and the expense of the invasion, since, according to authentic news lately received, no less than thirty-six battalions (*enseignes*) of Switzers have already entered France, at which piece of information the King seemed surprised and put out when I told him.

With regard to Montreul (Montreuil), there is no news yet of the siege being vigorously pressed on, although I hear that the besiegers are laying a mine.* May God be pleased that the mine take effect soon, *for until then I see no appearance of the town surrendering, or the King's besieging army being able to penetrate further into France. The King said the other day to Chapuys and to me (De Courrières) that it is important to dispatch the Montrueil affair before going further into France. That being done, he will give orders for all his army to advance, and will not spare either his own person or his forces in the undertaking.*† *Such were the King's words to us two; but notwithstanding his good wishes I find him too heavy* (pesant) *to be able to move hastily, besides which, if he succeeds in taking Boulogne, he may, by gaining partly his object, be contented with that.*

However that may be, I will do my best, should Montreuil fall in the meantime, to make the King's army march further into France, according to the agreement entered into with the Viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga). I am only afraid, as I said above, that the place will not fall so soon as they expect. Your Majesty, no doubt, knows better than myself, and can judge by the letters of Monsieur du Rœulx what is the real state of the siege, and whether our fears are grounded or not. This king tells me that Monsieur de Biez has left Montreuil and gone nobody knows where, or on what errand.

Respecting the 300 waggons, which Your Majesty has placed at the disposal (*accordé*) of this King, the offer has been accepted with thanks, as well as the permission (*congée*) granted to his agents to go into the provinces and procure them without violence.

The King has formally declared to ambassador Chapuys and to me that his opinion is that neither the Emperor nor he himself need have more than 1,000 men each at sea for the defence of the coast. That would be, the King thinks, quite a sufficient number for the protection of the coast, and would also diminish the expense. The ambassador‡ and I myself have found the King's advice in this particular both good and opportune. Please Your Majesty to tell us what to answer on this point should the King again mention the subject and repeat the opinion.

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* "Et tout y a que j'entens que lon y a fait une mine."

† "Le dit s^r^ roy nous a dit quil falloit depescher cela avant tyrer plus avant en france, et que cela achevé il fera tyrer la dite armee et n'y espargnera sa personne ni toute sa puissance."

‡ That is Eustace Chapuys, who was already at Calais.

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I understand that the ambassador wishes to be recalled owing to the King's departure from hence.—London, 27 July 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency."

Addressed: "To the Queen.'

French. Original draft. 2 pp.

28 July. **167.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 235.

"Madame,"—To-day Your Majesty's letter by Mr. de Dièckе* has duly come to hand, and I have perfectly well understood by his own verbal explanation of his mission, as well as by the draft or copy of the letter which Your Majesty has caused to be written to me, and which I have not yet received, what Your Majesty's intention and wish is in the matter therein contained. After due communication with Monsr. Dièckе We both deemed it advisable to act in that business as Your Majesty will hear by the verbal report of the said Dièckе, and, therefore, I will not trouble Your Majesty further with the account of what has been done.

I humbly beg permission to quit this place (Calais), where I can no longer be of service owing to the King having left for his camp [before Boulogne],† and also because the town itself is most unhealthy for me in my present condition, suffering as I do still suffer from my late indisposition, besides which people are dying of the plague.‡—Calaix (*sic*) le XXVIII[e] de Julliett 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

31 July. **168.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Your despatch of the 21st inst. came duly to hand. We have heard with pleasure the answer you gave to the king of England when he spoke to you.

On Our part there is nothing new to advise save that We hope, with the help of God, to come soon to a good end with this town of St. Desir. As stated in one of Ours, the Sieur de Villers Les Ponts, bailli de Dijon, came the other day to this camp and made overtures of peace on the basis of the marriage of Marie, Our daughter, with the duke of Orleans, and besides that the duchy of Milan, as a dower, which conditions were at once rejected; the said bailli still persisting in his proposals and saying that the King, his master, was willing to make concessions to the allies, he was told that should king Francis really wish for peace and offer

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* That is Cornelis Scepper, sieur (lord) of Ecke, about whom more will be said hereafter. *See* Vol. VI. Part II., *Int.* pp. xxii-iv.

† King Henry had already left; he was at his camp before Boulogne on the 23rd. *State Papers*, Vol. X., p. 12.

‡ "Oultre quil se (que l'on) commence à mourir de la peste."

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convenient and reasonable terms, be contented with his own property and not covet other people's, pay his debt to England, and restore what he has robbed from others, he may send whom he pleases; otherwise there is no peace for him, and he will have to rue the consequences. With this answer the bailli was dismissed and sent back home, and the Sieur de Granvelle did immediately inform the English ambassador here resident with Us of all this.—From Our camp in front of St. Desir, 31 July 1544.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

31 July. **169.** MONTMORENCY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—This will be for the sole purpose of announcing my arrival here, yesterday, and telling you that never in my life did I meet with so bad a reception, and that I very much regret having left Gravelines to come here to this camp, for the weather is detestably bad, and there is nothing that annoys and torments a traveller more than to arrive at the place of his destination in the midst of such a storm of wind and rain as we had here yesterday. God, however, who remedies things when he pleases, has given us fine weather to-day, and I thank him most heartily for it.

The duke of Alburquerque has invited Monsieur de Wincester and de Saint Jean (St. John), the Controller* [of the Royal Household] some other gentlemen and myself to dinner. Secretary Paget was also invited; but as we were about to sit down to table, the latter received orders to go immediately to the King, which he did. We had plenty of good cheer, and there was much mention made of your Signiory, the Duke having particularly requested me to transmit to you his commendations whenever I wrote. He [the Duke] was sorry at the fault he committed at the King's departure for Calais when he (the Duke) saw, or fancied that he did see him turn his head towards us.†

Of other news I have little to say, save that this King's men have taken three places between Boulogne and Montreuil, and that Monsr. de [Buren]‡ has taken a fourth, the name of which I do not know, between Hesdin and Montreuil. One of the three taken by the English is a town named Hardelot, the garrison of which surrendered without firing a shot, evidently from want of victuals.

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* There were at this time two Lord's "St. John," one Sir Walter Sandilands, mentioned in *State Papers*, Vol. V., p. 322, and Sir William Poulet, controller of the Royal Household, who is no doubt the one alluded to in the above paragraph.

† De Courrières' French is so bad that I am not sure of having caught the sense of this paragraph. It stands thus in the original:—"Estant marry de la faute quil fist, au partement du roy à Callis (*sic*), tant y a que penssoit (pensoit) avoer veu tourner la teste à sa majeste vers nous." As the Duke's letter [to Granvelle or to Chapuys] has not been preserved, it is not very easy to guess in what that nobleman's fault consisted.

‡ That is Maximilien d'Egmont, co. de Bueren or Buren.

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With regard to this one (Boulogne) the English expect it to surrender soon, though no batteries have yet played on its walls. The same may be said of Montreuil, though, as far as I can judge, most of the men in this camp have little experience of such military affairs.

I was told this very morning that yesterday a French gentleman, accompanied by a trumpeter of his nation, came to this camp. Being altogether ignorant of what the cause or reason of their coming may be, I cannot at present tell you for certain what the gentleman's mission is, neither does the Duke [of Alburquerque] himself know. I will, however, make enquiries about it, and if I learn anything, shall not fail to advise.

All these gentlemen have requested me to send you their commendations, &c.—From the English camp, before Boulogne, on the last day of July 1544.

P.S.—"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—Should you have by you a fit messenger to dispatch to the Queen Regent in Flanders, you might communicate to him the news contained in the above letter to you, and also that as far as I can hear, two, if not three, batteries have just opened fire against the town, which fire those inside have certainly returned this afternoon more briskly than they did before, sparing like men experienced in war their powder and shot, and not firing at random, but only against the English batteries themselves.

I am at this very moment returning from a visit of inspection, and I find that the outside wall is strong, and lined with parapets. May God permit that the siege end favourably for the English!

I am in receipt of a letter from my Own lieutenant of the archers, dated St. Dizier the 17th, writing that as the late prince of Orange [René de Nassau] was sitting between the Viceroy [of Sicily] and Monsr. de Lachaux he was fatally wounded by a bullet from an *arquebuze á croix*. . . . . My lieutenant adds that the Imperial camp was beginning to feel the want of provisions, but as the news sent by the Sieur d'Eske is later and more reassuring there is no need to be alarmed.—Your good and sincere friend, De Montmorency.—Camp sur Boulogne, 31st of July 1544.

Indorsed: "A Monsr. l'ambassadeur, Mess[ire] Eustace Chapuis, conseiller et mestre (*sic*) des Requestes de l'Empereur à Gravelingues."

French. Holograph. 2 *pp.*

1 Aug. **170.** MONTMORENCY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

After closing my letter of the 31st of July* I ascertained that the name of the gentleman, who came here

* *See* above, No. 169, p. 279.

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the other day, is Sieur de Framozelle,* and that being interrogated by the duke of Suffolk and Secretary Paget as to his errand, he answered that he wished personally to see the King, and deliver into his hands a letter he had from his master, the Most Christian King of France. He could not see the King on that day; but he has had an audience this very morning. I am told that his business here [at the Camp] is to ask the King's permission to take out of Boulogne his wife, who is in the family way. The privy councillors assure me that nothing else has brought the man to this camp; but it strikes me that if such was his only purpose he needed no regular safe-conduct. Should I learn anything more about him, I shall not fail to let you know.—From the Camp before Boulogne, 1 August 1544.

French. Holograph. 1 *p.*

2 Aug. **171.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—As fear of the plague drove me out of Calais, so have the bad air and uncomfortable lodgings of Gravelinghes, with a touch of my usual old complaint, the gout, compelled me to leave the latter place and take up my quarters here, at St. Omer, where, after the dinner hour, I received the inclosed letter from Mons. de Courrières, with news of the two English camps.† I am, however, astonished to hear from the said Monsr. de Courrières that, up to the hour at which he wrote, the King's privy councillors had not informed him of a safe-conduct having been previously granted to the French gentleman‡ named in the letter, for, as I hear, the duke of Norfolk, himself, had shewn the safe-conduct to Monsr. de Beuren. It is to be supposed that the French gentleman in question is going to the English camp before Boulogne for some other purpose than that specified in the said inclosure, and I have no doubt that by this time either the King, himself, or his privy councillors have already told Monsr. de Courrières what the Frenchman's object is However that may be, had I not been waiting for Your Majesty's orders respecting the business transacted by Monsr. Dièckе and myself, and prevented by illness from going to the King's camp, I would certainly have sent thither one of my own clerks to try and learn from confidential friends of mine among the King's privy councillors what can be the Frenchman's business, and if I saw the opportunity begin negotiating on the matter, of which

* *See* above, p. 280. His name, however, is variously written Fermoselle, Framozelle, Fremozelle, &c.

† Those of Boulogne and Montreuil.

‡ Monsr. de Framozelles.

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Monsr. Dièckе* spoke to me; which matter, however, as it seems to me, might have been easily, and without suspicion, treated by one of my own clerks, whilst I, myself, was able to go thither personally, which at this present moment I could not possibly do. In this manner the affair might be attended to, though as Monsr. de Courrières, himself, is on the spot, I have no doubt that he will do what is suitable and convenient.

May Your Majesty be pleased to send me orders respecting my recall, or else let me know what I am to do next, and where to go, that I may do my best for the Emperor's and Your Majesty's service.—St. Omer, 2 August 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 1½ *pp.*

2 Aug. **172.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—After what passed between the Sieur d'Ecke and you on the charge entrusted by Us to him, a letter came to hand from the Emperor, Our brother, conjointly with another for you,† which is inclosed, containing the news of the good success of the Imperial arms at Vitry, which town was taken and is still in Our power, though this fact itself is not expressly mentioned in the note (*billiet*) appended to the letter addressed to you. You will also hear that the French have since been soliciting through a third person to come to terms with His Imperial Majesty. We cannot, however, assert that their intentions are right and honest, and that they really wish for peace; they might perhaps be trying to deceive His Imperial Majesty and create jealousy between him and the king of England, his good brother and ally.

As the Emperor has no doubt that the French may already have made, or will make soon, similar overtures on that side, you (Chapuys) are requested to find out with your usual discretion whether king Francis has directly or indirectly applied to that King for the purpose. That is the chief object of the Emperor's letter to Us, as well as to announce his victory over the French at Vitry. In doing so to the King you must use your well-known tact and discretion in order to ascertain what are that King's real intentions respecting the charge which Monsr. d'Ecke took [to Calais] and the instructions of which he was bearer.‡ Although We are aware how troublesome it will be for you, in your present condition of health, to leave that town

* Thus in the original, but there can be no doubt that *Diecke* is meant for Cornelius Scepper, sieur d'Ecke or Ecken, in Belgium. *See above* 278 *n.*

† "Et avecq icelles aultres à vous qui vont joinctment avec cestes."

‡ "Et pour ce qu'elle ne doubte que les franchois ne feront moins envers le dit s^r roy d'Engleterre [sa ma^te] desire que usant de vostre discretion accoustumée veuilles donner à cognoistre au dit s^r roy les practiques qui se font de son costé."

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and travel, yet the affair itself is so important and so great also, the good to be gained by your exertions, that We again request you to go to the King's camp [before Boulogne] and declare to him in the most convenient manner the charge and commission you have received from the Emperor, Our brother. We need not add that in the declaration of your said charge, as explained in the inclosed letter to you, the utmost care and discretion is to be used, so that the king of England may not suspect that Our inquiries respecting his own military movements are made for the purpose of advising or recommending him to abandon his present undertaking. The utmost diligence, moreover, must be employed so that both the Emperor, Our brother, and We Ourselves may be apprised as soon as possible of the King's resolution in this matter.

You will observe that in the Emperor's letter to you,* no mention at all is made of Monsr. de Courrières; that is due to the fact that the insecurity and dangers of the roads have naturally retarded the courier who brought the news, the Emperor was not yet aware of the King's landing at Calais.—2 August 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

3 Aug. **173.** MONSR. DE COURRIÈRES to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On my arrival at this camp [before Boulogne] there came with a safe-conduct from the king of England a French gentleman, named Monsr. de Frameselle, who, after staying here two days or thereabouts, and being interrogated by some of the privy councillors as to his charge or commission, found the means of speaking to the King, and delivering to him a letter from his master, the king of France, signed by him, and countersigned by his Secretary, though written entirely in the latter's hand. After the King's audience, and when the Frenchman had returned to his lodgings, I myself was summoned to the King's presence, and introduced to him by Secretary Paiget (Sir William Paget). On my arrival I was very kindly received by the King, who, after telling me that I was most welcome to the camp, began to inform me of the cause and nature of Monsr. de Framoselle's mission, and how he had answered him. He might go back and tell the King, his master, that he, the king of England, declined to treat, even if he should offer him one-half of his kingdom, unless previously

* Vos lettres ne font mention de s[r] de Courrières, parceque pour le danger des chemins sa ma[te] nestoit [alors] advertie de la descente [à Calais] du dit sieur roy." Such is the reading in the original draft, and, therefore, by *vos lettres* those of the Emperor to Chapuys are meant. Henry's landing at Calais had taken place on the 18th of July (*see State Papers*, Vol. X. p. 5); the Emperor's letter to Chapuys was dated the 26th.

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and before-hand he did his best to satisfy and please Your Imperial Majesty. He had been all his life a prince of honour and virtue; he had never broken his word, and he was too old, as the beard on his chin—already getting grey plainly shewed, and he could see—to begin again upon another track.

Upon which the French gentleman stated that king Francis would rather die than send anyone to Your Majesty with overtures of peace. "If so," replied the King, "I see no means of treating with Your master." "What is to be done then?" asked Framoselle (sic); *and the King answered: "I will tell you. If the King, your master, dislikes applying directly to the Emperor, I will myself undertake the task. I will write to ask him that, for the good of Christendom, he be pleased to consider what are the lowest terms he will accept in order to secure a good and lasting peace, and that on his getting an answer from Your Majesty concerning this point, he himself would let king Francis know."*

This is what passed at the audience, or at least the account which the King himself gave me, at the same time showing a great and affectionate desire of fulfilling all the engagements taken with Your Imperial Majesty and of being well satisfied with your conduct [*in the affair*]. *But my impression is that he* (*the King*) *wished first of all to get possession of this town, and after that he will easily enter upon negotiations of peace in order to save the very great expense at which he is just now, for there is a rumour afloat that he is no longer the good archer he once was, and never shot so badly as now.**

As the King assures me that a copy of king Francis's letter to him, as well as of the note presented by Monsr. Framoselle, are about to be forwarded to his ambassador residing at Your Majesty's camp, I have refrained from making further inquiries. I have, however, read attentively that which Master Paiget brought to my tent, which letter I find is full of most honest and commendable expressions, as well as regrets at this present war, stating that king Francis is very much astonished at the sudden enmity which has arisen between the two countries [*France and England*], *and that there is nothing he desires so much as to recover his friendship. Monsr. de Framoselle's note containcd besides, the offer of payment by his master of all the pensions owing to England, arrears and interest thereof, as well as of a reasonable sum of money for the expenses of the war at this King's will. King Francis, moreover, promises to renounce his alliance with Scotland, and to place the town of Ardres in the King's hands as security,*

* "Car le bruit court quil est pire archier quil ne fust onques, et quil ne tire jamais si en vis" (sinon en visant?). If the last words of the paragraph are to be understood so, the word *archier* must be translated by "archer" (the writer had been and was still lieutenant or captain of the Emperor's body guard of archers).

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&c. But as he himself has declared to me, the King does not intend to enter into any treaty with France unless Your Imperial Majesty be previously satisfied as to your own demands.*

As to the news from this camp, I can only say that according to information, which the King, himself, communicated to me the other day, Montreuil is far too strong, and its garrison too numerous, to be carried by a coup de main. *However closely besieged, the people inside will still have two gates at their disposal. Your Imperial Majesty, however, may be sure, as far as I can judge, that this King will do his utmost to get possession of this town of Boulogne. He is determined to raise three batteries and mount them with plenty of guns and mortars, which he has, and try also some mines. The trenches have already been pushed almost as far as the walls of the town, and will soon be completed. But I find that the town is very strongly fortified inside* (ramparée), *having bulwark, with good covered ways* (bonnes traverses) *and double walls. I do not believe that the besieged have much powder and shot at their disposal, only enough to defend themselves, for they scarcely make use of their artillery, and yet they have the finest possible battlements to shoot from. Indeed, I think that if the besieged had more ammunition at their command they might have killed with their shot a great number of men in this camp. Such is at present the state of things here; of what may happen hereafter Your Imperial Majesty will be duly apprised in time. The town itself is very small* (fort petite), *and I fancy that the garrison is not numerous, for hitherto they have made no sallies. The report is that two battalions* (enseignes) *of Italians, and others of Frenchmen, compose it.*

The personage to whom I alluded at the beginning of this dispatch has begged from the King permission to see his wife, who, he says, is inside Boulogne. He only asks to go as far as the walls of the town, accompanied by such English officers and men as the King be pleased to appoint, and there, in their presence, hold some conversation with her on family matters. The King has told him that if he gets possession of the town, she and the rest of the women will be well treated, but, notwithstanding that, if he wishes to see and speak to her the permission he asks for will be granted, or else, if he chooses, she may come to the camp as often as she wishes. God knows whether the permission has been granted, and in what mode the French gentleman in question has availed himself of it, for I have not, nor

* "Que le roy son maistre offre de payer les pensions du dit roy dangleterre, interestz et arrerages dicelle, aussi de payer honnestement les fraiz de ceste guerre au contentement du dit sieur roy, quil renuncera à l'alliance d'Escosse, et mectra la ville d'Ardres es mains du dit sieur roy."

do I expect, to see him, for our diplomatic charge has nothing in common, and besides that the privy councillors have not said anything to me about him.

I have met here the duke of Alburquerque, who, besides the obligation under which he is to Your Imperial Majesty, is doing his utmost for the service of this King. I do not hesitate to say, under correction, that he well deserves a letter from Your Majesty. There is nothing he regrets so much as to see that this King's affairs in these parts (par deçæ) *do not advance in the manner, and so far as Your Majesty might wish. I can assure Your Majesty that the Duke makes no secret of his regret on that score, and I am afraid will in the end be much disgusted with it all.*

As to the King's person, he is in excellent health, and working a good deal harder than I should have expected.—From the Camp before Boulogne, 3rd of August 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency."

French. Original, entirely ciphered. 3 *pp.*

3 Aug. **174.** MONTMORENCY to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl.

"Madame,"—By the English courier, who left the other day, I informed the Emperor of late occurrences at this camp, and I have, according to Your Majesty's commands, communicated to the King and to his privy council the copy of the letter addressed to Monsr. de Praët from Metz, on the defeat of the French at Vitry. This piece of intelligence, however, the King and his privy councillors will not believe in, unless it be confirmed by letters from the Emperor himself or from their own ambassador at the Imperial Court and Camp.

As to the King, himself, he is doing well.—From the Camp before Boulogne, 3rd of August 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency."

P.S.—"Madame,"—A worthy personage (*quelque bon personnaige*) tells me that *the Frenchman* says that his master, the King, offers to restore to the Emperor everything he took from him during the last war, provided he* (*king Francis*) *be reinstated in the duchy of Milan, which, he pretends, belongs to him by right. My answer to the person who brought me that intelligence, was, that in order to obtain that from the Emperor, "the deed must be signed at Lyons, as the exchange cannot possibly take place anywhere else." I have purposely refrained from*

* Monsr. de Framozelles. *See* above, p. 281, n.

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mentioning this circumstance in my dispatch to the Emperor, for fear of adding fresh fuel to the fire, which is already raging fiercely enough. If, however, Your Majesty thinks that His Imperial Majesty ought to be acquainted with the Frenchman's words, let this paragraph of my letter be copied and sent to him.

French. Original, partly in cipher. 1½ *pp.*

4 Aug. **175.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur l'ambassadeur,"—We have seen your note of the 2nd inst., and also De Courrières' letter to you from the camp [before Boulogne], together with the note (*billet*) appended to it.* We think, as you do, that this is the fit time for executing the mandate We gave you by the Sieur d'Eecke, (*sic*) and likewise the orders that the Emperor, himself, sent you on the 26th ult., in confirmation of the message which the latter must have re-delivered to you. But in Our opinion this is not the sort of affair to be placed in the hands of your secretaries or clerks, nor even to be disclosed to the King's privy councillors, before you, yourself, have spoken to the King about it. That is why, if possible, We should wish that for such a good end, as the promotion of peace, and to forestall the King, and prevent him from treating separately and without the knowledge of His Imperial Majesty, you should try to get a private audience from him, and verbally explain to him the whole business.† We earnestly request you to do so, because otherwise We very much fear that nothing at all, or very little indeed, will be gained towards carrying out the Emperor's views and intentions in the matter.

Indorsed: "To ambassador Chapuys, 4th of August 1544, from Brussels."

French. Original draft.

7 Aug. **176.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—At Saint Omer, on the 4th inst., about noon, Your Majesty's letter of the 2nd, and the Emperor's of the 26th ult., were duly received, when, in obedience to

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* That of the 31st July with its postscript, and of the 1st of August, Nos. 169, p. 279, and 170, p. 280; Chapuys' despatch of the 2nd, is under No. 171, p. 281.

† "Mais il ne me semble matiere pour la faire manger par vos gens, ne aussy la descouvrer (*sic*) à ceulx du Conseil ne fuet que premier n'en eussiez parlé au roy d'Engleterre, parquoy s'il estoit aulcunement possible je desireroye que pour ung si grant bien, et mesmes pour prevenir que le dit s^r roy ne commenche à traicter sans nostre ma^te, vous trouviez vers icelluy, dont je vous prye, aultrement je crains que peu ou riens succedera selon l'intention de sa dite ma^te."

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Your Majesty's commands, and notwithstanding a slight indisposition, I set out for this camp [before Boulogne] where I arrived in less than 15 hours, not without much bodily fatigue. My haste in obeying Your Majesty's commands as soon as possible prevented me at the time from acknowledging the receipt of the above-mentioned letters, or informing you of my departure. I therefore ask Your Majesty's pardon, and beg to be excused for it.

I arrived (as I said) on the following day at an early hour, but as the King was then out in the fields (*aux champs*), and did not return to the camp until the evening, there was no possibility of speaking to him on the day of my arrival. However, yesterday, the 6th, after dinner, Monsr. de Courrières and I went to present our respects to him. I began by saying the chief reason for my coming to the camp before Boulogne was to comply with the wish he himself had expressed that I should see his army, and at the same time to congratulate him on the state of his health, which, according to information received from the duke of Alburquerque and from my colleague, Monsr. de Courrières, was then very good. A letter from the Emperor to me (I added) had considerably increased my desire to visit his camp.

This the King took in very good part, saying—after Monsr. de Courrières and I had declared to him the contents of the Emperor's letter—*that in reality the French had made certain overtures of peace, not only to him but to his ministers. It was also perfectly true that they (the French) had renewed the offers which Framzelle had brought forward some time before, as he himself had declared to me at Calais; but as the Frenchman's offers had no foundation at all, he (the King) had taken no notice whatever of them. That is why he had not named to me the persons who had intervened in the affair, nor had he written to the Emperor about it. Now Monsr. de Framizelles* (sic) *had returned with full powers from king Francis; he could not do less than acquaint the Emperor, as well as Monsr. de Courrières, his ambassador, with the nature and amount of offers made by him, which offers, for the sake of information, he proceeded to specify and detail to me, in the very same terms he had used with my colleague; ending by assuring us both that nothing would persuade him to listen to French overtures, and treat with them and others without the express* knowledge and wish of the Emperor.

The haste in which I write prevents me from stating the representations and persuasions which Mons. de Courrières and I addressed to the King on this occasion; suffice it to say that after expressing the good hope he had of the taking of this town (Boulogne), and also of Montreuil, he (the King) was induced by us to make the following textual

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declaration, namely, that whatever might be said, in the end a good peace was desirable and convenient.*

The King then said to us in plain words (platement) *that he had not heard from his own ambassador at Your Majesty's Court, of Monsr. de Longueval having applied for a safe-conduct to repair to the Imperial Court with the intention of negociating for peace. He, however, was glad to hear the answer made to him in Your Majesty's name† The King afterwards caused me to be most closely interrogated by Secretary Paget as to that, and asked whether the answer had been such as We described. The Secretary then owned to me that the King, his master, had written to his ambassador to beg the Emperor, should he come to treat of peace with the French, to take care of his honour and profit in all matters, just as he, himself, would have done of those of the Emperor, had the application for peace been made to him first. The Secretary said more; he told me—whether inadvertently or to give me a proof of confidence —that his master had written to his ambassador to use all dexterity to prevent the Emperor from forming a bad opinion of his wishes in the matter, and attributing them either to his own desire of peace or his being actually tired of war.‡*

I did not deem it fit and opportune, on many considerations, to enter more fully into the matter, reserving myself for another opportunity; and so it was, for this very morning, without any previous notice, I entered alone, without my colleague's company, the tent of Secretary Paget, and gave him to understand that as the matters, of which I was about to speak to him, proceeded originally and directly from myself, and from my attachment and zeal for his master's service, I had purposely come alone, and without Monsr. de Courrières, since I wished that there should be no witnesses to our conversation. He was (said I to him) my bosom friend, and the person who would more easily pardon any indiscretion or fault on my part should I, led away by my attachment to his master's service, commit any; he was, moreover, better qualified than anyone else to take the affair in hand, and bring it to a successful termination. "Supposing (said I), from what I have heard the King and yourself say that the former is inclined to a good peace of some sort, and would not object to the negociations for it commencing, I do not see why the King should not specify and name his terms at once." Then I told him repeatedly, and with sundry presentations and interpolations of my own, what Your Majesty wrote

* "Que quant tout seroit dit à la parfin conviendroit de venir à une bonne paix."

† "Et a esté joyeulx d'entendre du remede que luy a esté faict de la part de vre. mate."

‡ "Et l'eschappa au dit secretaire me dire ou par inadvertence, ou pour confidence quil a en moy, que le dit sr roy avoit escript à son ambassadeur quil use[r] de telle dexterite que sa mate ne peult prendre sinistre opinion au de desir de paix ou dennuy de la guerre."

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to me by the Sieur de Deke (d'Ecke), all of which I omit for brevity's sake, as it would take too much time for me to recite them. The Secretary approved of it all, and promised to inform the King immediately; and I believe that an answer from him will not tarry.

I will not omit to say that Secretary Paget asked me whether Your Majesty had, or had not, full instructions from the Emperor as to his intentions in the matter. My answer was that he might well suppose that my knowledge as to that was not, and could not be, positively certain, since my proposals originated with myself, and yet that I believed, nay, was quite sure, that the Emperor would not disavow or reject anything done by Your Majesty in the matter, in confirmation of which assurance on my part I alleged several reasons.

Though I have not yet received the King's answer to my proposals, I have not failed to acquaint Your Majesty of what has been said and done in this affair, as also of the receipt of your letters of the 4th inst.* The Seigneur de Buren arrived here yesterday to present his respects to the King, and give account of the state of affairs at Montreuil. After Framizelle's (*sic*) departure his wife quitted Boulogne; but I believe that she will remain under the custody of the Deputy of Calais, who is here in the camp, until Boulogne is taken, that she may not communicate with anyone and impart the news of the place and the particulars, as Your Majesty will hear from Monsr. de Courrières' lips.—Camp before Boulogne, 7th of August 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."
French. Original. 4 *pp.*

8 Aug. **177.** NEWS from the IMPERIAL CAMP before ST. DIZIER.

E. Italia.

On the 2nd inst. a stratagem (*ardid*) was devised against the defenders of St. Dizier, which proved successful, and was the cause of much harm to the enemy. About 35 or 40 of Our Spaniards proceeding noiselessly along the trench approached nearly to the moat, and suddenly began to cry at the top of their voices, "Santiago! In, in, the town is ours!" The guard on the watch, gave the alarm, mounted the parapets and crowded the walls, upon which the hackbutiers and artillerymen of the camp, who had made their preparations for the event, fired several volleys upon the French, with such effect that few of them escaped, and we could distinctly see from our tents by moonlight—for the sham attack took place at night—the bodies of several men flying up in the air.†

* No. 75, p. 287.

† "Los de la muestra tocaron alarma y coronaron la muralla. Entonces los arcabuceros y la artilleria del campo, que estaba prevenida y opunto bizo fuego y el enemigo recebió una buena reziado que se vió à muchos de ellos con la luna pues era de noche, saltar por los aires. A todo esto los nuestros gritaban: 'Santiago y adentros nuestra es San Desir.'"

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Captain D. Juan de Guzman who, for having killed [in a duel] another foreign captain of the name of Thionille, had been obliged to go and take refuge in England, returned the other day to the camp, but finding that the general-in-chief would not grant him pardon he has gone to Var de Lorena (Bar le Duc in Lorraine) where he intends to reside until he actually gets it.

As Our people intend very shortly to renew the assault, and the information We get from spies is that the garrison is deficient in many articles absolutely necessary for the defence of a town, and that since the 8th there has been among them a talk of surrender, I should not be surprised if my next letter to you was not for the purpose of announcing a capitulation. Indeed, I hear from an authentic source that at the time I am writing a parley from the town has come to say that the garrison is willing and ready to capitulate, under certain conditions. These, however, have been found by the commander-in-chief to be so preposterously high, considering the state of the fortifications, and scarcity of provisions, that they have been rejected, and the officer of the garrison, who brought them to this Camp, did get a rather short and sharp rejoinder to boot. They, however, returned next day offering to surrender, if the town is not succoured before the 17th inst. A capitulation has accordingly been drawn out, and signed, the articles of which I have not seen, but as I am informed they are reduced to this: that the Governor shall go out of the place at the head of his men, with arms and unfurled banners, besides two pieces of light artillery, selected by Don Fernando Gonzaga.—Camp before St. Dizier, 8th of August 1544.

*Spanish. Original.** 2 *pp.*

8 Aug. **178.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—As the Secretary, who has in his possession the deciphering key, as well as "*le cahier de chiffre,*" is indisposed, I have requested the dowager queen of Hungary to be so kind as to order a transcript to be made of my last despatch to her† and to Your Majesty, and forward it.—London, 8 August 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

8 Aug. **179.** The SAME to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—The day before yesterday, very late in the evening, Your Majesty's letter of the last day of July‡ came

* Though forming part of the paper under No. 168, p. 265, and evidently by the same writer and hand, it has been advisable to divide them and place them according to their dates—one in July, the other in August.

† Here the ambassador alludes no doubt to his own despatch of the 7th, which, as has been noticed, is entirely in cipher. *See* above, No. 147, p. 233.

‡ No letter with this date has been found.

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duly to hand, and to-day, after dinner, Mons. de Courrières and I, called on the King to communicate its contents. *To the point therein touched, and the hope Your Majesty had of the taking of St. Disier* [*by the Emperor*], *the King answered nothing. With regard to the arrival of the Sieur de Villemont, bailli of Dijon, with his offers, I gave the King to understand, in order to give more importance to his mission* (pour encherir l'affaire), *that among the many and various offers made by the Bailli, in his master's name, one was the marriage of the most Serene princess of the Spains* to the duke of Orleans, his son; which offer spoiled all the rest, as far as the Emperor himself is concerned, inasmuch, and chiefly because the said Bailli had made no offer whatever for him* (*the King*). *That his Imperial Majesty, therefor, had suddenly put a stop to the Bailli's overtures declaring to him his firm resolution not to have the said marriage spoken of, and adding that it was necessary before all things to give some sort of satisfaction to the king of England. That the French ought to be contented with what they had, and not think of increasing it, but of returning other people's property.† After this explanation of the Bailli's mission and offers, and how they were met by the Emperor, I* (*Chapuys*) *added that the reason for the proposal of such a marriage being so resolutely rejected by the Emperor was principally, as I imagined, that, as I have often written to Your Majesty, the former recollected that a marriage of the sort, and with such a dower, would be exceedingly unpleasant to his brother of England. I also thought it expedient to tell the latter by way of complimentary address that the Emperor, I was sure, would never have lent his ear to such a marriage as the one proposed by king Francis, or given audience to the bailli of Dijon, had I not written many a time that he* (*the King*) *was of opinion that an audience might be granted king Francis' emissary, inasmuch as nothing could be risked or lost through it.*

Hearing these words from my lips, the King showed great content, assuring me that there would be no want of correspondence or reciprocity on his part, in what concerned the welfare, honour and reputation of his Imperial Majesty. It was true (*he said*) *Framozelle had spoken to him of the said marriage, adducing all manner of reasons and arguments to persuade him that the estate of Milan belonged by right to his master, the king of France, which arguments he* (*the King*) *had answered by saying that he was neither judge, doctor, nor advocate, to decide on questions of that sort, and that he left the case to be determined by the parties concerned in it.*

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* "Le marriage de la Serenissima princessa des Espaignes." The name of the Princess was Maria, daughter of Charles V, and Isabella of Portugal, born at Madrid, 21 June 1528.

† "Et que les françois se contentassent du leur restituyssent lautruy."

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As Secretary Paget would not own that he had reported to his master on my last and Monsr. de Courrières' final communication with him, I would not lose the opportunity of talking to the King on the subject. I requested him, first to allow me, with that gracious benignity with which he had always excused my faults and my temerity, to express in a few words my own ideas on a particular subject. This the King granted with a good heart, and after my retiring some distance Monsr. de Courrières advanced and related to him in substance what the Sieur d'Eecke and himself had verbally told us, and had shown to me in writing, adding what I, myself, thought of it, namely, that it was highly expedient to well consider and weigh what the intentions of the French were, and prevent them from saying hereafter that we, the Imperialists, know not the proper time and season for making or preventing war. For both these two things, peace or war, apart from many others, opportunity and diligence was terribly required, for should the king of England show the least inclination to peace, it would be highly inconvenient and long lasting to wait until after the discussion of each article for the Emperor's answer, and in like manner for the king of England to inform the Emperor of his intentions and will, should the French go on treating of peace; and that since he (the King) had so wisely discoursed with me, of the innumerable untoward accidents, which might suddenly supervene in time of war, it was highly expedient, now the Emperor was in arms, and both his Imperial Majesty and the king of England had each a flourishing army* (armees florissantes) *in the field, to seize that opportunity, and think as soon as possible of the means of so obliging the enemy to come to terms, and know beforehand what those terms were to be. That, I said, ought to be done with all speed, and I was further of opinion that in order to dissemble whatever wish of peace the allies might have, and prevent the goers and comers to the camps of their two Majesties, who after all might only be spies, such affairs should be negociated by truly and sufficiently empowered persons, well inclined to peace, in some middle country* (en lieu moyen de leur pays). *In short, after a long and mature consideration, I thought that no one was fitter for that than Your Majesty, who, as I thought, was as earnestly desirous of peace as any living prince, not only out of your benevolence, virtue and wisdom, as for the relief of the innumerable sufferings which war is causing to the inhabitants of Flanders and the Low Countries. Besides which*

* "Y adjoustant ce dont me suis peu adviser mesmes quil convenoit bien considerer lintencion des dits françois, et avoir regard que iceulx ne puissent à raison dire et improperer que lon ne sçauroit prendre la saison et opportunite de paix ni de guerre, auxquelles deux choses, sur toutes aultres, loppertunite et la diligence y estoient terriblement requises, et que estant iceulluy roy aucunement enclin à paix, ce seroit long proces dactendre coup sur coup response de sa ma^te."

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(I added) no personage in the World could have more regard for his honour and welfare than Your Majesty, who had moreover, a greater power to persuade the Emperor than any living person.

At last, after many answers and replies, the King began to make his excuses on his not having by him a suitable person to send to Your Majesty for the practical purpose of listening to the overtures made by king Francis' agents. This, in no way would I grant to him; he then pleaded ignorance, saying that he could not tell whether king Francis would consent to it or not; and on replying and showing him in the most palpable manner that there could be no doubt of his acceding to it, he came to the conclusion that it was more reasonable that those whom the case concerned, should debate it, and that he flattered himself that should matters come to a good issue he would have as much power as Your Majesty to persuade and convince the Emperor, and that if His Imperial Majesty would let him know in absolute terms, the conditions under which he consented to grant peace to the enemy, he would make such an offer for the Emperor as he should make for himself. And on my representing to him that it would be extremely difficult for the Emperor to do that under the circumstances, unless he knew beforehand part of the conditions to be asked from the common enemy, and that since he, himself, had made up his mind as to what conditions he was to ask for, he would do well, in order to save time, to send a message to the Emperor to this effect, that should the French send again to him, renewing their offers, or making fresh ones, the Emperor may conjointly with his wishes promote and bring about his own. The King's answer was that he had already written to His Imperial Majesty on the subject, and that until Framozelles returned with an answer, or some other French emissary came, he could not, and would not, ask, nor say more about that. I replied to him that the heart of the affair for the French was to spy and find out what his wishes might be, in order to regulate their own conduct—not to treat—and at once come to terms with the two allies, and that Your Majesty, together with the personage whom he (the King) should be pleased to appoint might easily do that. "Nothing," I said, "can prevent His Majesty from doing that, listening to French proposals, and officiously doing whatever may be best for the purpose." Thus the conference ended, the King persisting in his determination, and pleading the same excuses as above.

Before leaving his presence, the King addressed himself to Monsr. de Courrières and to me (Chapuys), and assured us both, that last night some of his men had mounted the breach and slain a Frenchman who was there, and that near that spot, close to the walls of the town, ten or twelve more Frenchmen had been slain. He, therefore, had no doubt whatever that

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the place would soon be carried by storm; but that in order to proceed with caution, and insure success he had ordered two mining batteries *to continue to perfect the mines that were being dug.**

I most humbly beg and entreat Your Majesty to have pity on me, and my indisposition, which, owing to the fine weather has somewhat abated, though, I fear the least change will bring it on again; if so, I am a lost man, without any hope of recovering here, or being able to be transported elsewhere. That is why I most earnestly, and for God's honour, beg Your Majesty to let me know what the Emperor thinks of the contents of my preceding dispatch, and this present one, in which I refer to my letters to him.—At the camp before Boulogne, the 8th of August 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 3 *pp.*

11 Aug. **180.** HENRY VIII. OF ENGLAND to KING FRANCIS I.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur mon frere,"—Your letter by the Sieur de Framozelle,† bearer of this one of mine was duly received, which letter, if I am to refer to the credentials brought by the said Framozelles, has singularly surprised me, for the commencement of this last letter of your's differs much from that of the previous one received from you. These overtures for peace, as you know, were first made by the Sieur de Sainct Martin, Your subject, and on my finding certain difficulties about them were afterwards renewed by Monsieur le Marshal de Bies and the Sieur de Verbins, your governor of Boulogne, and yet in this second letter of yours you seem to state that the matter was first broached by me, which statement wounds greatly my honour. This I have until now inviolably preserved, as you know, and I shall never allow anyone in my old age to ataint it.

As to Framozelle's overtures, and the King's prayer that I should let him know what my good brother the Emperor's intentions were about them, I am willing for the sake of Christendom at large, and of the friendship which existed once between us two, to mediate between my brother the Emperor and yourself, provided you make him through me such reasonable offers as he may think it advisable to accept.

I beg you to be contented for the present with this answer to your letter, for until I have written to the Emperor and received an answer on this subject, I cannot really say more, for after all having been obliged by your own fault or that of your ministers to take up arms against you, I cannot (upon my honour) resume that friendship with

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* "Et continuer à la perfection des mevnes (*sic* menées?) encommencées."

† That of the 20th July, No. 155, p. 253.

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you without previous notice to my good friend the Emperor that he himself may proceed in the matter as he considers it due and just. It is therefore at your request that I am prepared to send in haste some person to the Emperor to inquire what his will and intentions are in this matter, and I hope within a fortnight or 20 days, at the latest, to have a reply from him, and if you will only send to me at the end of that period, I will let you know the Emperor's answer on the whole affair, which answer after all might be favourable, and turn out well if you, the king of France, showed as much affection for the welfare of Christendom as you say you have, and would act reasonably as every king should do.

Signed: "Your good brother and cousin, Henry."

French. Contemporary copy to be sent to the Emperor. 1¼ *pp.*

15 Aug. **181.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY VIII.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Credentials in favour of the Sieur de Chantonnay, now returning to the Emperor.*—15 August 1544.

French. Original draft. ½ *p.*

— Aug. **182.** The SAME to his AMBASSADORS [in England].

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Très chiers et feaulx,"—Our nephew the duke of Lorayne (Lorraine),† to whom We have sent the Sieur de Montbardon in order to prevent the coming here of the Cardinal de Lorraine,‡ has sent Us word by the same messenger that he is on the eve of his departure for France to see King Francis on certain private and very important affairs of his own. Hearing which We have sent back to him the same Sieur de Montbardon, and written expressly to the Duke and to the Cardinal, and especially to the former, to postpone the Cardinal's departure, or at least delay it for some days, for fear people should think that his journey is at Our wish,§ or in consequence of the Duke having lately come to this Our camp to procure the reception of the said Cardinal, his uncle, with his overtures of peace.

We have deemed it fit to inform you of these particulars in order that should the Duke go to France, you may give

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* At this time the Emperor must have been in the neighbourhood of St. Dizier, which had not yet surrendered, though its governor, Count of Sancerre had promised to do so on the 17th of August, unless he was relieved in time.

† No longer the duke Antoine "Le Bon," who died in 1543, but his eldest son François, Marquis de Pont à Mousson, and Duke of Bar, who succeeded him in 1544.

‡ Jean, bishop of Metz and cardinal, son of Antoine "Le Bon."

§ "Quoy entendu nous avons incontinent renvoyé le dit sieur de Montbardon, et escript tres expressement au dit duc, et enchargé icelluy Montbardon tenir main quil delaisse ou au moins sursoye son partement pour quelques jours, affin que l'on ne puisse presumer que ceste allee soit u par charge de nous."

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Our word of honour that it is not by Our wish, but, on the contrary, very much at Our regret. This message We have ordered the said Montbardon to convey to the Duke and to his wife, the Duchess, Our neice.*

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

17 Aug. **183.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Messieurs,"—The Sieur de Torcquayne (*sic*) has arrived here riding post by the Emperor's commands, and is now sent to England in haste to visit the King in his name, and at the same time inform him of the conditions under which the town and garrison of St. Dizier surrendered, as you will see by the letter of which the Sieur de Torequayne will be the bearer, and which he has orders to show you, besides giving any verbal information that may be requisite. You are particularly requested to give him every help and assistance for seeing the King, and delivering the Emperor's letter, and saying or doing anything else that you may think proper or convenient.

As it seems that our common enemy is hardly enough pressed by the King's army, and in consequence, all their forces are being withdrawn from Picardy, and as is well known marching towards Champagne, there would be no harm, We think, in letting that King know of it in passing, and hinting as if it came from you exclusively that the enemy's withdrawal from Picardy and the countries nearest to the English is chiefly due to the fact that His Imperial Majesty is advancing towards the centre of the kingdom of France, whilst he himself (the King) remains at the limit or extremity of it, and that he can scarcely harm them, and that in Our opinion it would be reasonable and at the same time highly convenient that, according to his agreement with the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante Gonzaga), when he was last in England, he would push on his forces into the enemy's country, now that the French, by the withdrawal of their own, are giving him greater facilities for an advance. He might thus inflict a good blow on the enemy, and make a breach into France. That is Our own individual opinion in the matter, but We leave it to you to make use of the suggestion, at a time and when the

* "Sa femme la Duchesse de Bari, niece de l'Empereur," that is, Dorethea of Denmark, widow of Francesco Maria Sforza, last duke of Milan, who in 1541 married François de Lorraine, Marquis de Pont à Mousson and duke of Bar (now Bar le Duc). There is no date to this letter, nor is the place named where the minute or draft of it was written; but as the Emperor left Metz on the 6th of July, was on the 7th at Pont à Mousson, and at Menonville on the 8th, and on the 11th at Nassau, where, according to "Vandenesse's Itinerary" (Bradford, p. 546) the duke and duchess of Lorraine (this latter the Emperor's niece) visited him, it may be conjectured that the date was the 11th of August, 1544.

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urgency of the Emperor's affairs and his service may demand it.—Anvers (Antwerp) 17 August, 1544.

Addressed: "Au sieur de Courrières et Messire Chapuys."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

18 Aug. **184.** The EMPEROR to his AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres chiers et feaulx,"—Three days ago, on the 15th, your joint despatch of the 3rd inst.* was received, by which We learned what the king of England, Our very dear and good brother, and his ministers told you respecting the charge entrusted to the Sieur de Fremozelles, and what you yourselves had been able to find out in the matter. The King's ambassador residing at this Our Court† has also been interrogated on the subject, and shown Us the very letter which king Francis had sent him through Fremozelle, as well as the articles he (Francis) proposed,‡ and the copy of the answer which that King made upon the whole. The English ambassador further requested Us to acquaint his master with Our intentions of peace, and the terms and conditions which We should like to stipulate for it. Our answer to the ambassador has been that We thank the King, his master, for the frankness with which he has proceeded in this as in other matters in conformity with the perfect and very close friendship between Us and him, and that his answer to king Francis' letter is an excellent token of his very great magnanimity, constancy, and virtue, and so wisely conceived and worded that it could not be better. Thus the English ambassador was told, and the truth is that the King's answer to Francis' letter is very well written and expressive. We send you a copy of it, as well as of the two other letters and articles proposed.

As to the King's requisition through his ambassador that We should let him know what Our wish is, Our answer has been that We will gladly listen, in union with him, to overtures of peace in the manner and on the conditions detailed in his own letter to king Francis, and will take care that the points, conditions, and means touching Our person be transmitted to him.

At the same time, We deemed it fit and convenient to inform the English ambassador that king Francis, after the return to him of the Sieur de Bertheville, which happened about a week ago, and especially since he heard of the St. Desir capitulation and surrender, had again sent to request Us to intervene in the peace. For that purpose Our nephew, the duke of Lorraine, had come here [to Spire] to

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* No. 173, p. 283.
† Nicholas Wotton, dean of Canterbury, and, by this time, of York.
‡ No. 134, p. 219.

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request and persuade Us to allow the cardinal of Lorraine (Jean), his uncle, to come with a safe-conduct to that effect. After the Duke came the friar, of whom We wrote in one of Our letters to you (Chapuys). We likewise informed the English ambassador of his arrival and mission, which was that, although We had already refused to treat of the marriage of Our daughter Maria with the duke of Orleans, Francis' son, or put forward instead other conditions and means of peace, yet a safe-conduct should be placed at the disposal of Hannebault, the Admiral [of France], then staying at Chalons, near Us, at the express command of king Francis.* The safe-conduct, as We were told, was to be personal for the said Hannebault, accompanied only by one other personage not named. It was granted as requested, and Francis' commissioners then brought forward four different sets of overtures for Us, to choose that one which seemed to Us best, or else to compose out of the four one to Our taste. You must know, for you were informed of it at the time, that We declined to receive the cardinal of Lorraine on the plea that We were not aware of his coming here by king Francis' commands, and also that he was too high a personage to come thus to Us on a private business of his own, and without Our knowing who sent him, and what was his object in coming. As to the Admiral, since his avowed purpose was to treat of peace, and he had instructions to that effect from the King, his master, to conform Ourselves with that King's wishes, We had no difficulty in conforming Ourselves to that King's wishes, and answered that the Admiral might come to Us by himself, or accompanied by another person of quality, such as king Francis would designate or appoint, and a suite or escort of not more than 20 mounted servants. Safe-conducts were then issued for Hannebault and his suite to last only for ten days. Should the Admiral come We will let the King know of it, and at the same time inform him of every step in the negociation, corresponding in this manner to the honourable and upright behaviour on this occasion.

It is for you to address the King on the precise terms of this Our letter, and in conformity with the above facts and in the best possible manner, so that the King may not be surprised at the arrival of the French admiral under the circumstances above related. After Our repeated refusals and Our many excuses to receive the cardinal of Lorraine and Mr. de Longueval, We could not persist in that determination. You will tell the King that if We have consented at last to receive king Francis' commissioners, it is solely to conform with his wishes and conduct in that affair,

* "Comme aussi avyons fait le dit ambassadeur requerir tres instamment que, non obstant que eussions reffusé de non traicter le mariaige de la princesse nostre fille avec le duc d'Orleans, et de mectre en avant autres moyens de paix, que voulsissions accorder assheurance pour le sieur de Hannebault, admiral de France, estant au costel de Chalon prochain de nous."

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and not to appear as if We wished to render the peace impossible by rejecting every sort of overtures to Ourselves.

In order to satisfy that King and comply with his wishes, We inclose, for his inspection and yours, a copy of the Articles that have been drawn out by Our ministers as necessary conditions of peace—if there is to be one—as far as We are concerned. Perhaps they will be found too exacting, but We consider them reasonable and well founded, and We are now writing to the dowager queen of Hungary, Madame Our sister, to send you her opinion on the whole. Should she add or retrench anything from the said Articles, of which a copy is also inclosed, it will be your duty to exhibit them to the King thus amended, and after representing to him whatever you may deem most convenient for their justification, should the King still persist in wishing to know how far We consent to reduce Our demands, and what will be Our last word as to the conditions We ask for, you can tell him, if there be a fit opportunity for it, that he must bear in mind Our own obligations towards the Holy Empire by reason of Our Imperial dignity, and the great damage which the whole of the Christian Republic, We Ourselves, Our kingdoms, and countries have received through the patent, notorious, and inexcusable wrongs inflicted by king Francis, and that he be pleased to let Us know, under the above-explained considerations, what he thinks of the Articles proposed by Us, and if there is anything in them of which he disapproves; for being, as they are, founded on justice—as the King himself can see and judge—and not knowing of any particular thing more than another to which king Francis would rather submit—We could naturally not omit those acts of his by which he has caused Us manifest wrongs, for which he is bound to offer reparation. Again, We could not, if We had wished it, reform and moderate the said Articles before We knew for certain, through king Francis' formal overtures, what his principal aim is. It would have been, in Our opinion, far more reasonable that the king of England himself should have informed Us beforehand of the proposals made to him by king Francis, and what his own intentions are concerning them. Indeed, We doubt whether in acting thus the king of England is not sounding Us on that particular point, and wishing to know our final intention with a view to embody in himself or assume the leadership of the whole negociation.* Should the King speak to you of the moderation of the Articles, you can tell him that you believe that We shall be tractable enough as far as We can perceive what his own intentions are, and provided good security be obtained from the king of France that the treaty shall be carried into effect. This is a sort of thing to which

* "Et doubtons que le dit roy d'angleterre nous reserche sur ce point de sçavoir nostre finale intencion pour embrasser tout le traicte."

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great attention should be paid, not only for the sake of the king of England, of Our own particular and individual affairs, and of those of Our kingdoms and subjects, but of all Christendom at large, so that the French King may not have the power of breaking whatever conditions he himself has agreed to and resuming war, as he has done before in spite of all his promises and oaths. From which conduct on the French King's part, were We again deceived by him, the greatest harm, damage, and loss of reputation might ensue for the king of England and for Ourselves, since both of us have so frequently experienced the little trust and confidence, if any, that is to be placed in his acts or in his promises. The shame and loss of reputation to Ourselves in particular would be immense, since We have experienced Francis's want of faith more than once to Our great cost and damage.

In addition to the above remarks and warnings, which you are instructed to lay before the King, it would be advisable that both of you—and especially you (Chapuys)—should look out for every possible occasion and opportunity of representing to him, as if it came from yourself, that in order to prepare the way for the said peace—supposing that king Francis really and seriously thinks of it, and intends to proceed on righteously, and willingly consents and submits to the ways and means, as well as with the necessities proposed by the allies—it would be advisable that the king of England should first try to ascertain as far as possible what are the will and intentions of king Francis respecting him, and that We Ourselves should endeavour to do the same on Our side, on the condition, however, that nothing shall be concluded by one or the other of Us two without the common and mutual agreement and consent of both parties, not only as regards the individual interests of both, but also with reference to the conditions to be stipulated and the securities to be demanded, each party continually and consecutively advising the other of the progress and incidents of the negociation, always declaring and protesting to king Francis' ministers or commissioners that the allies will conclude nothing separately but only with the mutual agreement and consent of both. In that manner, as We take it, one might arrive sooner at the conclusion of the peace, for the king of England knows best what suits his own interest, just as We understand and know what is most convenient for Us. By acting thus each of the parties will promote his own individual interests, and We in particular shall attend to Our obligations and duties in what concerns Our Imperial dignity and authority, according to former treaties and late events, and the state of Our affairs at the present moment in Our various kingdoms and dominions.

It would likewise be just and convenient that in their negociations for peace with the common enemy both the

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allied parties should pay particular attention to one important feature, which is, that king Francis—knowing, as he does know, that Our union is the only means of bringing him to reason, and making him keep to his promises and engagements—will do his utmost to divide and sow dissension and jealousy between us.

The affair being of such importance as you two—and more particularly you, Chapuys, who know by long experience what dexterity and tact are requisite to treat with the king of England, and are well acquainted with all the treaties between that country and the Empire, the last of which passed through your hands—cannot fail to acknowledge, it is very desirable that you attend with the utmost care to the above points. We beg you most affectionately that if you possibly can be near the King's person when he happens to cross over to Calais, you do your best to be by his side, even if you had to be carried in a sedan chair, or in any other conveyance, as it may be,* that you may negociate and treat of the above points, holding this as an axiom (*maxime*), that the King must be first persuaded and made to understand that We have done Our best to please him touching the above-mentioned Articles, and to show him that they are reasonable. That respecting the coming of the Admiral, or any other whom king Francis may send to this Our camp, We have granted it merely to give him pleasure, and imitate his own conduct in giving audience to the Sieur de Fremozelles (*sic*), and ascertain whether there be any foundation in the overtures which Francis is trying to put forward, all the time assuring him that whatever offers the king of France may cause to be made to Us, We most certainly will not accept any of them without consulting him first, and that in the same way We trust that he will with Us.

Of this you both shall take particular and assiduous care. Should French practices for the peace with England continue and progress, you are to watch closely, and try to ascertain how far the king of England's interests and Our own are safe-guarded and looked after, without allowing Our own personal and individual one to be submitted one way or other to the king of England's arbitration should he attempt it. That would never do. Indeed, it would be quite an unreasonable and dishonourable act considering the quality of each of us two, and We should be blamed hereafter and fall into disrepute for having placed in the king of England's hands that which concerns Christendom at large and the Holy Empire in particular, which We have promised under oath to protect and defend. Besides which, Our claims and pretensions against Francis are much greater and better qualified than those of the king of England, for that

* "Quant oyres vous y devries faire pourter en litiere ou autrement comme quil soit."

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We have more frequently treated with the former, are more accustomed than he himself is to deal politically with the French ; and last, but not least, that We have at present in the field a much larger force than that of the King, without counting in its number the foot and horse We have sent to his assistance at Our own expense.

For the above causes, and others which We need not specify here, the king of England ought to consider and bear in mind. Should you see an opportunity of laying them before him or his ministers, or else get the duke of Alburquerque to do so in his own name as if coming from him, We shall be glad, leaving entirely at your discretion to use either of the means proposed.

In conformity with what you (the Sieur de Courrières) have written, the inclosed letter for the duke of Alburquerque has been prepared. We trust that the latter will do his best offices in this affair. The same may be said of the Sieur de Buren, whom you will take care to instruct as to what he is to say to the King if consulted in the matter. We send you two words by way of credence to him.

We expect an answer to this letter as soon as possible, that We may know what you have done and what your advice is, and request you most particularly not to cease writing to Our sister in Flanders, and apprising her of all events.

No express mention is made in the inclosed Articles of the restitution of Hesdin, or of that of St. Pol and other towns, chiefly because nothing is said therein of St. Desir, Ligny, and Comersy, which We have since occupied, because the king of France is obliged to restore every town mentioned in the said Articles as having been unjustly taken or kept from Us since the rupture of the truce and commencement of the war, whereas the three above-named towns were taken only a few weeks ago, and there is no similarity at all between towns taken from Us—and which ought to have been restored long ago according to the letter of the treaty of Cambray— and the three last-named fortresses ; for whenever the point comes to be discussed, Our first demand will be that all fortresses and castles of Ours taken from Us by the French before the breaking of the truce of Nizza, which king Francis still retains, are to be immediately restored, as well as other towns in Flanders or the Low Countries, which according to the note We expect to receive from Our sister, the Queen, may be exchanged for those We Ourselves have taken since We invaded France.

We have considered it necessary to inform you of these particulars, because if there should be a question there of St. Desir, Ligny, and Comersy, you may say that the taking and retention by Us of those three towns has nothing in common with the restitution by Us demanded of Hesdin, St. Pol, and others ; and, above all, giving the King and his

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ministers to understand that the former are very important, especially so St. Desir, which is situated in the heart of France.

You may tell the King that on this very day, the 17th of August, the Count of Sancerre went out of St. Desir, and delivered the keys of it into our hands. The town was really and truly much stronger than was thought at first. Its garrison, when they came out, numbered upwards of 2,000 foot and 200 horse. We were glad that the town surrendered by capitulation, not only for the sake of the men We might have lost in storming it, but because had We had its walls battered with artillery, We should not have been able to repair the damage.

We are about to take a resolution and advance into France. Of the road which We may take, and what will be done next, the king of England will be apprised by Our first letter. We are very glad to hear of the good hope that the King has of the taking of Boulogne, and also of that of Montreuil. If the King could make his army, or a portion of it, march further into France, that would be the true means of bringing to reason the king of France.—Camp in front of St. Desir, 18 August 1544.

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*

18 Aug. **185.** The ARTICLES of the PEACE proposed by the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Whereas His Most Serene Majesty of the king of England has condescended for the weal of Christendom at large, and the remedy of its public affairs, to listen to the overtures of peace made by the most Christian king of France through the Sieur de Fremozelle and others of his ministers, provided the Emperor, himself, consents to do the same, and so treat of it, on means equally acceptable for both princes, as the close and perfect friendship between them requires; and whereas the king of England wishes to know what the Emperor's intentions and pretensions are on the whole, that he (the king of England) may inform king Francis thereof. His Imperial Majesty has been pleased to answer as follows:—

His Imperial Majesty conforms willingly and entirely with the king of England as to treating of peace for the very same reasons and considerations above-mentioned, that is, that God may be served, and Christendom at large benefitted through it, by means of the measures.

In the first place, regard should be had to the notorious harm and damage inflicted by king Francis upon the whole of Christendom, chiefly during the last war, the most Christian having successively, or at the same time, attacked the Holy German Empire, the king of the Romans, the kingdoms of Hungary and Bohemia, Italy, the kingdom of Naples, the duke of Savoy, the Republic of Gennes (Genoa), and even several of the kingdoms depending from the Spanish crown.

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As the damage and loss caused in so many countries and places were without excuse, and His Imperial Majesty is bound by duty as a Christian prince, he could not do less than defend and protect the sacred German Empire and the rest of the European powers, and repair the injuries and damages caused by king Francis' armies and fleets, frequently combined with those of the infidel Turk, not only on the side of Spain, but also at Nyce and its citadel at Gennes (Genoa), and in the kingdom of Naples.

The king of France in particular shall be obliged to restore to the Emperor all and every one of the provinces, districts, or towns which he has occupied and still retains, with compensation for the damage caused by the said occupation since the beginning of the last war, which he suddenly recommenced [on July 1542] without any legitimate cause or reason, and without the previous usual challenge ; for when His Imperial Majesty was most confident, and trusted in the truce of Nizza, and thinking of nothing else but of attacking the Turk with all his forces, when he had at great cost made, and was still making, immense preparations to attack the Infidel in his own dominions, he (king Francis) suddenly, and without notice, invaded Flanders and the Low Countries, and so commenced hostilities, which the Emperor was naturally obliged to resist.

The aforesaid restitution and satisfaction is also to comprise Estenay (Stenai), which is notoriously a fief of the Empire, which king Francis has lately *obtained in a most strange manner from the last* duke of Lorraine (Antoine "le Bon"), without making the slightest duty or acknowledgment for that Duchy, and having, on the contrary, occupied and retained it, very much against the will of the Duke, to whose ancestors the German Emperors committed it to be held in fief. The more so, that king Francis has made of the said Estenay a convenient place wherefrom to invade, as he has done, the neighbouring duchy of Luxenburgh, of which Estenay is a moveable fief.*

For the same uncontrovertible reason, the king of France is bound before all things to restore to the duke of Savoy (Carlo) whatever he has taken from him since the beginning of the war in Piedmont, as well as in other parts [of Italy]; for not only is this duke expressly named in the treaty of Nizza, but king Francis can hardly allege justifiable reasons for having made war against him and usurped part of his patrimonial estates.

* The whole paragraph is rather obscure; I reproduce it as in the copy before me : "Estenay estant notoirement du fief de sa dite ma^{te} et le quel il a, ce nonobstant estrangement obtenu du feu duc de Lorrayne, et sans en avoir faict aucun debvoir ni recognaissance, aynsi celluy occupé et detenu violentement (*sic*), tellement quil a esté commis et devolu, et appartient entierement à sa dite ma^{te} imp^{le} tant plus que le dit sieur roy de france a faict du dit Estenay la guerre au pays de Luxembourg, dont il est mouvant (?) de fief."

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As to king Francis' renewed pretensions about Milan, which he now brings forward as the means of ensuring a lasting peace between us, this must be said with regard to them: that by renewing his application, king Francis gives the World to understand that he will rather have war than give up his claims to that duchy, since it has been fully proved and demonstrated, as is notorious, that neither he nor any member of his family has, or ever had, the least right to its possession. On the contrary, that the peace may be made just, reasonable, and lasting, it is necessary, nay indispensable, that the king of France restore the duchy of Bourgoigne (Burgundy) and vicounty of Auxerre, which belong by right (*irreflagablement*) to His Imperial Majesty, and to his heirs whoever they may be, as their own and exclusive property and patrimonial estate, the occupation and retention of which is so unjust, that king Francis is bound to restore the whole of it, besides the fruits and taxes collected or levied therein during his violent occupation of the same.

In order, therefore, to arrive at a peace, if it is to be secure and lasting, it is also requisite that the king of France restore entirely to the duke of Savoy the whole of the provinces, districts, towns, and lands taken from him, on this as well as on the other side of the Alps, since it is notoricus and manifest to all peoples that the said violent occupation and retention of the Duke's various patrimonial estates is unjustifiable in the eyes of God and of the World. His Imperial Majesty cannot do less than persist in the aforesaid restitution, not only out of duty towards the Holy German Empire, but also because the Duke himself and the princes his sons, his confederates, and near relatives are Our allies and friends and consequently intitled to all the benefits and advantages of a treaty made between Us and the king of France.

Besides the points above touched upon, it will be necessary that king Francis and his ministers promise to observe and keep really and truly all and every one of the stipulations contained in the Madrid Convention and subsequent treaty of Cambray.

With regard to the rights and claims of the king of England, no particular mention is herein made, because although His Imperial Majesty has as much at heart the king of England's affairs as his own, yet up to this hour he does not know what those claims and demands are or may be.* His Imperial Majesty, however, trusts that as the King's affairs and his own are and will be in future one and

* "L'on ne s'avança en ceçy de riens toucher quant aux droits, actions et pretensions du dit s^r roy d'angleterre, combien que sa dite ma^te imp^le ne les aye moins à cœur que les syennes propres, comme s'est, et sera tousiours une mesme chose et perpetuelle unyon de leurs deux ma^tes et leurs (*sic*) successours, royaulmes et pays pour aultant que sa dite ma^te imp^le confye entierement que sa maiesté royale les declairera et esclercira comme il est requis et convient à luy et aux syens."

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the same as the union between the two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, promises to be everlasting and indissoluble, the king of England will one of these days declare and explain what his own views respecting the peace are as is befitting and convenient for him and his people to do.

Should, however, peace be made, with God's pleasure, their two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, ought to take particular care that before signing the treaty, securities should be obtained of all and every one of its conditions being faithfully kept and observed hereafter for the public welfare of Christendom at large, as well as the common and particular advantage of the contracting parties, their persons, kingdoms, and estates.

Indorsed: "Articles de paix proposes par l'Empereur ajoutés à la lettre de l'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre."

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*

— Aug. **186.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

His Imperial Majesty begs the Majesty of England to take the above statements into consideration and weigh the very great justice, reason and equity of the points above specified and the duty and obligation under which His Majesty is of adhering to, and demanding them from the king of France. Should the Emperor's demands seem excessive, it must be borne in mind that the causes given by the king of France are still more so, and the reasons which His Imperial Majesty has for putting them forward.

No mention is made in the above paper of the allies and confederates of the two Majesties, Imperial and Royal, under the supposition that they will be expressly named at the proper time and place, but His Imperial Majesty particularly presumes that the Holy German Empire will be comprised in the present peace, as well as in any convention or treaty likely to ensure the future welfare, tranquillity and safety of all and every one of the states comprising that Empire, and that the same be understood with regard to Italy, considering His Imperial Majesty's close union with that country, and its various Powers and Republics.*

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

18 Aug. **187.** JEHAN DE MONTMORENCY and EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"*Sire,*"—*Having heard by a letter from Mr. de Roulx* (sic) *that the forces the French have in these parts were about to join the Dauphin's army in the district of Amiens* (lez

* There is no date to this paper, but as it seems to form part of the preceding I have not hesitated to calender it here.

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Amiens), *and thence march all together against Your Majesty, and moreover, that the French themselves are spreading the rumour, that they and their King are now on pretty good terms with the English, and have almost made some sort of treaty with them, we (De Courrières and I) considered it convenient and opportune to call on this King's privy councillors, and represent to them the personal danger in which Your Majesty would be,* if by adhering strictly to the treaties and capitulations made in London last year—and trusting, as Your Imperial Majesty no doubt does, and will do, that the king of England, your ally, would reciprocally do the same, and—taking the route traced in the agreement to march on Paris, conjointly with or separately from Your Imperial Majesty—you had penetrated, as you fully intended to do, into the heart of France.* We told them that considering the force the French have, should they join together, as rumoured, and go away from where they now are, there would be no fear of their attacking or otherwise molesting the English camp, even supposing their number to be much less than it really is. It seemed to us (we said) that since military operations on our side required much time and consideration, it would be advisable, and at the same time very convenient, as far as the victualling and provisioning of the English army is concerned, that a number of horse and foot be detached from it and invade some part of French territory, which would prevent, or at least delay the Dauphin's reported advance, or diminish his forces † by obliging him to detach part of it, towards the threatened frontier. There was besides every probability that if the English, in a sudden attack of the French frontier, should find the towns and villages of the invaded district unprovided for the defence, some molestation (*faschérie*) and harm would be caused to the enemy, especially if the attack was directed against Saincte, Ricquerque, and other neighbouring places, it would be desirable, that to Mons. de Beuren and Landenberger's, cavalry a number of English infantry considered sufficient for the enterprise should be joined.

With regard to the rumour spread by the French of their being in intelligence with the English, we said to them that the report seemed to be a pure invention of theirs. We told the privy councillors that we believed, as the Gospel, that a prince so virtuous as the King, their master, was, and having such regard for his own honour and reputation, would never do that without first informing Your Imperial Majesty of it. Yet that on many considerations of their own it was to make use of the occasion of such rumour and reports,

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* At this time, on the 18th of August, St. Dizier had been taken after a siege of several weeks, and the Emperor was about to penetrate further into France.

† "Du moins de lui faire disminuer *sa vende*" says the original, but *sa bande* is no doubt meant.

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which will, no doubt, be increased by the sudden arrival of Monsr. de Ryon at the English camp before Montreuil, on the 12th, when he came accompanied by eleven more gentlemen with the permission (*congé*) and safe-conduct of Monsr. de Norfolk.

The privy councillors' answer to the above observations of ours, was as follows: As to the first point, that they would report to the King fully, and in detail, and let me know his answer, and secondly that we might be sure that their master's constant affection and regard for Your Imperial Majesty continues as strong as we believed it to be. As to the arrival of Monsr. de Ryon at the camp of Montreuil, they knew nothing of it, and thought that if it had really taken place the King, their master, would be anything but pleased with it.

On the ensuing morning we sent for the answer and our man was told that the King himself would summon us to his presence after dinner, the privy councillors adding that the King, their master, was a virtuous prince (*de vertu*), and never forgot anything.

21 Aug. **188.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—By the enclosed copy of my letter to the Emperor Your Majesty will see the news of this country. I, myself, could add nothing save to say that this King has requested me to beg Your Majesty to prepare and get ready the transport ships, which he wants for the passage of his troops across the Channel and, principally, to hasten the fitting out of the warships, which are to be of the size, tonnage and armament most convenient for the service. They are to be royal vessels, with crews paid by Your Majesty, and not like last year's private vessels (*navires aventurieres*), for otherwise it will be impossible to retain and make use of them in the service as long as they will be wanted.

Certainly the King wants a good deal of help in the way of draft-horses for this his expedition to France, for besides those, of which he intends employing for the carriage of provisions for his army, at least for 20 days, he has caused several wooden towers (*forts*) to be constructed, to go on the top of carts, and also several mills to grind as they move along. As Your Majesty wrote to me lately about the great difficulty there was in Flanders to procure horses, I have suggested to these privy councillors that since they are sending across the Channel some thousands of live oxen for the supply of meat to their troops, they might employ part of them in the dragging of the said carts; but they have not approved of the suggestion, either for want of men to drive the oxen, or because they do not like them to be so much worked, but to be kept as fat as possible.—London, 21 August 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original draft.

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23 Aug. **189.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Messieurs,"—After seeing the two letters of the Emperor, my lord, to you of the 18th inst., in one of which he refers entirely to me, to add or retrench anything from them that might appear ambiguous or indiscreet,* I really did not know what to add to the contents of the said letters, you being so wise and discreet, especially knowing as I do know your ability, and diligence, and being sure that you both will make the best possible use of the instructions therein contained, as the importance of the affair requires.

This, however, I must state, that although in both the Emperor's letters to you, it is positively asserted that the King's answer in writing to the overtures and offers made by the Sieur de Framoselle, in the name of the king of France was inclosed, I have in vain looked for it among the documents annexed; I have only found two copies of the King's offers, one of which I suppose was included in the packet instead of that King's answer to Framozelle, which, as I say, is missing.

I take this opportunity of requesting you to let me know as soon as possible how that King has taken, or will take, the fact of His Imperial Majesty having granted a safe-conduct to the Admiral of France (Hannebault), and everything else you may hear about this King's intentions and designs.—Brussels, 23 August 1544.

Addressed: "A Courrières et Chapuys, du XXIII^{e}, d'Aougst (*sic*) 1544.

French. Original. 1 *p.*

31 Aug. **190.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres hault, etc."—We are now writing a few words to Our good and beloved sister, the dowager queen of Hungary, that she may put herself in communication with you through Our ambassadors at your Royal Court. Please to attach faith to whatever she may impart to you in Our name, as if Our letter to her had been addressed to you.—From Our camp, three short leagues from Chalons,† on the last day of August 1544.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

2 Sept. **191.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Varia, *Fasc.* 23.

Has duly received the Emperor's letter brought by the Sieur de Tourcoigne,‡ and heard from the lips of the latter the news

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* "*Qui sont si bien et discretement escriptes auxquelles* je ne sçauroys, etc." A marginal note in the hand-writing of one of queen Mary's secretaries, has the following:—"Les mots soulignés doibvent estre cancellés."

† That is at La Chaussée, near Chalons, in the dep. of La Marne.

‡ The same individual elsewhere named *Turcoin* (Tourcoigne) or *Torquain*; but there must be some mistake in the date of the King's letter (the 12th instead of the 2nd?) for, as will be seen hereafter, on the 8th of the same month queen Mary announced to the Imperial ambassadors in England the departure of Tourcoigne for Boulogne.

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of his successes against the common enemy. Hopes soon to be able to report similar news of his own. Tourcoigne, who is now returning home, will inform him in detail of what he, himself, has seen and witnessed here at Our camp before Boulogne.—September the 2nd, 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

2 Sept. **192.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Messieurs,"—The English ambassador residing at this Our Court, called the day before yesterday (31st of August), on Us, and said that the King, his master, wished that 100 lasts of gunpowder should be purchased for his service,* and commissaries appointed to procure it in this country; adding that the price of the said gunpowder ought, by no means, to be higher than that which the Emperor pays for his. That at the same time the King wants a good number of carts and waggons (*chariots*), to carry the gunpowder to his Royal camp, and lastly wishes that We be pleased to order the release from prison of an Italian named Jehan de Salerne, whom he (the King) intends employing in matters of his Royal service.

And first of all, We find the quantity of gunpowder called for by the King, namely, 1,200 casks (*tonnels*), each cask being of 300 pounds weight, very excessive. We have this very day sent a message to the ambassador representing to him that in the King's last letter the supply of gunpowder applied for in this instance was only 40 casks—already a large quantity—whereas, now, the demand is more than double, *i.e.*, one hundred, which can by no means be procured here, or bought at this present moment.† As the ambassador insists upon having the last named quantity, We have given him permission to export the quantity asked for, if he can find it in this country, and granted to the English commissaries the requisite license to purchase the same, &c.

As to Ourselves executing their commission that is a thing never done before, even in the case of the provisions of that article for the Emperor's army; that is not in Our power to do. Even if the Emperor, Our brother, wanted gunpowder for his army, he would send his own agents to contract with the merchants for the quantity and price of it, without obliging the manufacturers themselves to agree to his own terms. All We can do to please the King in this

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* "Que le roi, son maistre, desiroit provision estre faicte par deça de cent *lastz* de pouldre."

† "Sur quoy, en premier lieu, quant à la dicte quantité de pouldre trouvant icelle bien grande et excessive, comme de XII tonnelz, chascun tonnel d'environ III^{c} [livres] pesant, lui ai aujourd'hui faict remonstrer que le dit sieur roy par ses dernieres n'en avoit demandé que XL 'lastz,' qu'estoit encoires beaucoup, et que doubtons les pouvoir recouvrer de par decha."

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respect is to order Our master of the ordnance to accompany the King's commissary or commissaries to the powder mills, and bestow on them such advice and help, as he would to His Imperial Majesty's agents.

Respecting the carts, which constitutes the second demand of the English ambassador, Our answer has been that We very much regret that owing to the great quantity of them required for His Imperial Majesty's and the King's army at the commencement of the late war, it is materially impossible for Us to furnish the number now asked for, especially at the present moment, when daily requisitions are on foot to send provisions, ammunition, money, and all manner of things for the Emperor's army, besides which it would be much cheaper and quicker to send the gunpowder by sea. Yet We assured the ambassador that should there be means of furnishing the said carts, which We very much doubt, no effort shall be spared to accommodate the King, and We would do Our best to give him pleasure in that respect.

At this reasoning of Our ministers' the English ambassador seemed at first rather dissatisfied, and said hurriedly* that if the King, his master, cannot have from this country all he requires for his army, he will have to raise his camp and go elsewhere since he cannot be supplied from his own Kingdom, which words from the lips of an English ambassador We find rather impertinent and ill-natured, since they seem to imply that should the king of England experience any want in his camp, he would raise it and excuse himself from keeping faith with Us. The ambassador's words, however, are matter for serious thought, and We urgently request you to speak to the King about this, and, whenever the opportunity offers, represent to him, with due modesty, and make him understand, that at all times and on all occasions, We have done for him all We could do, and that We are still ready to do his pleasure. As a proof of this We have just signed an order for the master of the ordnance to help and assist the ministers of the king of England to procure and purchase the said gunpowder, and likewise the carts for its transport, whether by land or sea, on the best terms. You both are particularly requested to speak confidentially to the King on these subjects, and let Us know the result of your conference.

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* "Dont le dit ambassadeur du commenchement ne se monstra assez satisfait, ains luy eschappa [de dire] si le dit roy nauroit diçy ce que luy seroit besoing, que luy (qu'il lui) conviendroit lever son camp puisque de son roiaulme ne le povoit recouvrer [ce] que je trouve propos bien fachieux et tendans ad (*sic*) ce que survenant quelque faulte au camp du roy, il le leveroit et prendroit excuse sur moy. Sur quoy gist bien à penser, vous requerant bien instanment en faire discours par bonne modestie et convenable opportunité au dit roy, et luy faire bien entendre que par le passé n'ay cessé donner toute la meilleure addresse que m'a esté possible au bien de ses affaires, comme encoires suis preste faire en ec qu'est en ma possibilité."

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As to Jehan de Salerne, We are glad to have been able to order his release from prison at the King's request, so that he may go wherever he pleases.—Brussels, 2 September 1544.

Addressed: "To the ambassadors of the Emperor in England." *

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

3 Sept. **193.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On the 18th of August Monsr. de Tourcoing arrived here.† Next day both of us accompanied him to the King who received him most kindly, and showed much pleasure and joy at the letters which he brought from Your Majesty, with news of your good health, respecting which he made most particular inquiries. *The King was also most pleased to hear the news of the surrender and capitulation of St. Disier, the terms and conditions of which Mons. de Courrières and I (Chapuys) detailed and explained to him according to, and in conformity with, a paragraph of Your Majesty's letter to the Queen Regent, which we happened to have with us. The King was also glad to hear through us two that Your Majesty had been delighted to hear by our letters that there was a good hope of this town (Boulogne) and Montreuil being soon taken. This hope the King failed not to confirm, telling us that before long there would be a fine exploit against the town, for his men had already gained much ground in advance, and were close to the walls.‡ And upon our remarking that it was very important for Your Majesty and for him that all military operations against Montreuil should be accelerated for fear of the many inconveniences that might arise, such as plague in his own camp, or revictualling of the town by the French, he replied that there was no fear of that, inasmuch as the enemy had no great forces in that quarter, having sent the most of their army to encounter Your Majesty. This last sentence from the King's lips opened the way for us to represent to him, that if so, all the weight of the war would fall on Your Majesty, since, trusting that the English would invade France by another frontier, Your Majesty had placed yourself*

* A note on the dorse, in a contemporary hand, states that a duplicate of this letter was forwarded to the Emperor on the 4th of September.

† "Au dixhuitieme du mois passé (August)" are the words in the text, but there is a remarkable contradiction, for, as it has been said (p. 310, *n.*), Tourcoigne (here called Tourquan) is said to have left Brussels on the 1st of September. Only by supposing that instead of the 1st of September the 21st of August is meant, and that his arrival at the camp took place on the twenty-eighth of the said month of September, can the dates be made to agree.

‡ The passage stands thus in the copy :—"Disant que bien tost l'on en verroit quelque bon exploit, puisque ses gens avoient desja gaigné pays jusques pres de la muraille, et que d'ailleurs ilz approuchoient de beaucolp (beaucoup) plus pres deux (de ceulx) de dedens (du dedans), veuillans estre avancees (*sic*) oultre de la muraille."

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in the hazardous position in which you now were, and that in our opinion, it would be advisable that he (the King) should detach part of his own forces towards Abbeville and its vicinity. To this the King replied in the same terms he had done on a former occasion, adding that even if he chose he could not do it for he had not sufficient force with him to invest Montreuil on every side, besides which (the King said) there is little, or no appearance at all, of king Francis wishing to fight a pitched battle, knowing, as he must know, how strong and well provided for the Emperor is. Landenberg's four thousand foot must since have joined him, and increased his army; the garrisons of Lingny (Ligny), Commersy and other fortified towns taken from the French, had been recalled to the Imperial camp. Even supposing that the French really wish to fight a battle with the Emperor, it will certainly not be on account of the towns and fortresses taken from them—which after all are not so important as they are represented to be—but because they expect the succour of* 12,000 *infantry from Switzerland.*

This last remark on the part of the King aroused my attention and that of my colleague (De Courrières), for only a few days before, whilst treating of the Swiss, and of the means to be employed to prevent them from enlisting for French service, the King said openly that he did not care a straw for the Swiss; he was sure they would not enlist for the service of king Francis, or if they did, that it would not be so soon as people imagined and circulated, for they (the Swiss) wanted first to be paid in cash certain arrears of pay due to them, and asked for other conditions far more advantageous than those under which they had served France at other times.

In this way did the king meet every one of our arguments until, perceiving that we could not convince him, my colleague and I passed on to another no less important point. As the King, himself, had not said a word to us concerning Framozelle's arrival at the camp of Montreuil, we asked him what news he had of the French envoy, since the period of twenty days fixed for his return to the camp before Boulogne had nearly expired. The King answered without hesitation that Framozelle had arrived at the camp [before Montreuil]; had been entertained and well taken care of thereat, until he himself (the King), had received news from Your Majesty that Framozelle had whilst there [at Montreuil] forged the copy of a letter,† which he affirmed had been written to him by Monsr. de Saint Martin, in which letter it was expressly stated that king Francis had spoken at some length

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* "La quelle en confiance que ses gens marcheroient en France par aultre coustel s'estoit mise en l'hazart (le hazard) ou elle se retrouvoit."

† "Que le dit Framezelle (*sic*) avoit forgé la copie d'une lectre qu'il affirmoit luy avoir esté escripte par le sieur de Saint Martin."

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with the said Saint Martin on the renewal of the old friendship [between him and king Henry]. That in consequence of that he had sent for Monsr. de Saint Martin (who denied altogether having written the said letter), in order to have him confronted with Framozelle.

Such was the King's answer to our joint interpolation on Framozelle's business. He (the King) has since told us (De Courrières and me) that the Frenchman no longer maintains that the letter in question was actually written by Saint Martin; he now says that it was a blunder on the part of the scribe, who, when transcribing the letter for him, made the mistake; and the King, I must say, showed discontent and annoyance at all this, and especially at Framozelle having positively asserted that the King, his master, had never solicited Your Majesty for peace and friendship and that "nothing in this world would induce him to do so" †—an assertion (remarked the King), which I know to be completely false and contrary to truth, not only by the reports of my own ambassadors, resident at the Emperor's Court, but by what you, yourselves, have told me. Another cause for the King's displeasure, which, however, has since turned out to be well founded, is that Framozelle's wife had left Boulogne during the siege of that town, and that her husband's negociations at the English camp were connected with some intrigue or other for the relief of Boulogne in combination with the garrison and the people of that town.*

Since then, on the 27th ult., Your Majesty's letter of the 18th, together with the articles,‡ which it is your intention to propose on the matter of the peace, has come duly to hand. On the following day, my colleague and I waited on the King, to whom, for the justification of the contents of that letter as well as of the articles therein inclosed, we failed not to make use of the same remarks and representations as contained in Your Majesty's letter, adding, moreover, to them whatever else came to our minds as most fit and opportune to accelerate one way or other the conclusion of the affair, at the same time requesting him (the King) to be pleased to let us know his intentions as soon as possible. In short, we told him that haste on this occasion was more needed than ever owing to the Admiral's § announced visit to Your Majesty's camp. Should he (Hannebault) go thither much good might be done for the conclusion of a peace so desirable on all hands.

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* Monsr. de Saint Martin, *see* above p. 295. The passage reads thus :—"Et quil avoit la envoye [chercher] le sieur de Sainct Martin, que nyoit avoir escript telles choses pour le confronter avec le dit Framozelles. Et à ce que nous a dit depuys le dit roy, le dit Framozelles n'a voulu soustenir cela avoir este escript par le dit de Sainct Martin le tout à la culpe de celuy qui avoit escript la dite copie."

† "Tant pour cela que pour luy avoir donne [à] entendre et affirmé bien expressement que le dit roy n'avoit onques fait solliciter de paix et amitié vre. mate, et ne le vouldroit faire pour chose du monde."

‡ *See* above No. 154. p. 298. "Depuis, à sçavoir le vingt septieme du dit mois passé."

§ Claude Hannebault.

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Should he (the king of England) send, in writing, as Your Majesty has already done, a resumé *of what his intentions and demands are (said we) all overtures relating to union, intelligence, truce or peace, friendship and mutual confidence will be better understood if they relate especially to Your Imperial Majesty, than if they are treated in general terms,* and, therefore, we begged him to declare to us as soon as possible his final intention on the whole.*

The King seemed pleased at this suggestion of ours, declaring to us that since he found it reasonable, and approved of it entirely, he would set about it without loss of time, and let us know.

From the above and similar expressions my colleague and I gather that the King has taken in good part your Majesty's interference in the affair, as well as our trying to ascertain with the respect and discretion used in such cases what the French will say about it; in fact he again owned to us, as he did on a former occasion, that it was always desirable for both the allies to know beforehand what the then common enemy is aiming at.

Yet with all this we cannot help suspecting that whatever mien he (the King) may put on he is displeased at, and resents the appointment of, so high a personage as the Admiral of France (Claude Hannebault) to go to the Emperor on a mission of peace, when those sent to him on a similar errand like Framozelle and others, were of much inferior class. True it is that my colleague and I have heard him often say that he cares not for that, and that he is perfectly indifferent as to whom the French send; but we think otherwise, and suspect that the personages chosen by king Francis as plenipotentiaries at Your Majesty's court are for some reason or other distasteful to him, for he keeps saying to his courtiers and ministers that the Admiral is not a man of ability (homme d'espoit) *capable of treating such matters, and as to the Cardinal of Lorraine that he has no credit at all either with king Francis in or France. He, however, said nothing to us concerning the arrival of Mons. Byon at the camp before Montreuil, nor of a servant of a gentleman named Mons. Lavigne,† who two days before had brought to Boulogne a letter of king Francis for him.‡*

In the course of our representations to the King respecting the care to be taken and attention to be paid to the security and observance of the stipulations and articles in the future treaty of peace, not only as to its chief points but as to its details, we told him that the French, being as they are, cautious, subtle and malicious, might easily grant in the

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* "Joint que l'union, intelligence, tresve faicte, amitié, et confidence se conguoistroient trop mieulx parlant de vostre ma^te^ particulierement [au sujet] des affaires et dicte intention du dit s^r^ roy, que seulement de tenir propos en general."

† "Ne aussy dung serviteur dung gentilhomme, nommé mons^r^ de Lavigne."

‡ That of the 20th of July, No. 155, p. 253.

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first instance all that was asked of them, with a view to extricate themselves out of present difficulties placed, as as it were, between the binding clauses of the treaty of closer alliance and the appearance of everlasting confraternity and friendship of your two Majesties. As long (said we) as the observancy of the treaties remained in their hands, and, as it were, at the will and discretion of the French, the latter are sure to do what they have done hitherto on many occasions —that is, turn the negociation to their profit in cases of less importance—and Your Majesty and he (the King) had so often experienced their bad faith that the utmost care was needed in treating with them.

The King's answer was that he knew that well; had it not been for the sake of Christendom and its weal, which he cherished as much as any one, he would have refused to treat with the French owing to their total want of faith in political matters. He held it as certain that, as we had just pointed out to him, the French were evidently looking out for means and ways of creating jealousy and separation between the allies, thinking that in a game between two players a third may be found to pay the scot. "You may well believe (continued the King) that I am not so deficient in common sense as to forget taking my precautions with the French."*

Coming afterwards to the point of hostages for the security of the stipulated conditions, we (my colleague and I) failed not to call his attention to the many inconveniences that might arise therefrom, especially in case of the death of one or more of the hostages. To this the King replied that the right way to proceed in such matters was to ask for fortified towns or castles to be retained as security for the conditions of the treaty; but as that would not be granted by France he believed that all insistence on that point would end in a rupture of the negociations. On our again representing to him how important it was that he should take a resolution in this affair of the peace, he told us that the proposition ought to come from the French rather than from Your Majesty or himself, for the longer they (the allies) waited the less profit would the French gain by their endeavours to make a separate peace with the two allies, as, in the meantime, Your Majesty's good success might continue, and he, himself might take possession of this town of Boulogne and Montreuil also, which would place the allies in a much better position.†

We will not omit to say, while on this subject, that after the King had expatiated at length, and with a certain

* "Et quil tenoit pour certain que, comme luy disions, les dits françois ne taschoient à riens plus que de mectre quelque desunion, suspection ou jalousye entre vre. mate et luy pour parvenir au dit effect, pensant que le tiers payeroit premier le dot (l'eschot ?) et que l'aultre apres en payeroit sa part."

† "Il nous reprint (respondit) que le geste devoit estre plus tost du coustel de France que de vre. mate, car quant plus ilz attendroient ilz en feroient tant moins leur profit pour austant, que cependant vre. mate pourroit continuer en son bon success, et luy de l'aultre coustel prendre ceste dicte ville et Monstreul (*sic*), que leur encheriroit bien leur marchie."

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complacency on the number and quality of the personages likely to compose the embassy coming to him in representation of king Francis—of which embassy, by the way, he (the king of England) seemed both proud and vain-glorious—my colleague and I remarked that he was individually entitled to so much honour and regard, that were king Francis to come to him in person, that honour and regard could not possibly be thereby increased. Indeed, that one might very well say of the proposed French embassy what a certain [politician] *said in a similar case: "If the ambassadors come with bad intentions and as enemies, they are too few for that, if, on the contrary, to treat exclusively of peace, they are too many; for to go straight to the point without noise no such number was required." Truth persuades itself; in short, even for treating* [*of peace*] *and setting people to sleep* [*about their future plans*], *no such numbers were wanted.**

The King was evidently pleased and flattered at this observation of ours respecting the honour and glory attached to his individual person, for he took in good part all we said to him on the subject, and ended by stating that he laughed at the stratagems employed by the French,† and did not care for them. If so, my colleague and I can very well say "Amen," though, to judge from various trifles in which he (the King) has already tried to indulge the French, it may be doubted whether his opinion of them, as expressed to us, is really sincere. We must add that the King at this audience did not tell us whether safe-conducts for the French ambassador had or had not been prepared, and if they had, whether the embassy would be received or not; but one of the gentlemen of his Royal household has given my colleague and me to understand that a castle named Ardelot, half-way between this town and Montreuil was at first designated as the place of meeting of the deputies of both nations, but that since then the King had changed his mind, and given orders for some other place nearer to this town, to be looked for and selected. As to the safe-conducts for the French deputies, they had not yet been drawn out owing to the King's privy councillors wishing to know beforehand the day when the respective deputies or commissioners were to assemble and hold their conferences, as well as the number of horse which Your Imperial Majesty had agreed should constitute the Admiral of France's escort.‡

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* "Et que l'on pourroit dire d'iceulx ce que disoit l'aultre, que s'ilz viennent pour enemys ilz sont trop peu, si pour ambassadeurs ilz estoient trop, et que pour aller secretement (directement ?) et à la realité ny falloit tant de gens, car la verité se persuade de soy mesme, mais que pour practiquer et endormir le monde tost estoit dobsoing (tant n'estoit de besoing ?)"

† "Qui'l se gaudissoit des ruses et finesses des françois."

‡ "Et que quant au dit saufconduit il n'avoit encoires esté expedié pour aultant que ceulx du Conseil du dit s^r roy vouloient premierement adviser de respectivement se conformer au temps et nombre de chevaulx que vre. ma^te accordoit au dit admiral de France."

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*We have not considered it opportune to touch upon the point about which Your Majesty wrote to us on the 18th, namely that this affair of the peace should be treated in Your Imperial Majesty's presence, for that would require that each of the contracting parties should try to understand well, nay ascertain, the intentions of the enemy, and at the same time learn thoroughly what the pretensions of the allies are in common and separately.**

Next day, however, we begged Secretary Paget to come to us, which he did, and then, as if the idea originated entirely with Ourselves, and adding of course such protestations as the affair itself required, we represented to him what seemed to us most convenient respecting the above points. Paget made no other answer to our request than a promise to lay the matter before the Privy Council, and take care that after deliberating upon it a report should be addressed to the King.

On the evening of the preceding day the above-mentioned Secretary (Sir William Paget) sent us a copy of the articles, against which my colleague and I had protested, requesting us in the King's name to append our signatures to them according to the promise made to their ambassador at the Imperial Court by the viceroy Ferrante Gonzaga and Monseigneur de Granvelle. We at first refused to sign that paper on the plea that we had no instructions whatever from home concerning it, either directly from Your Majesty, or from the above two ministers (Granvelle and Gonzaga). Then Paget renewed his application and prayer, exhibiting and giving us to read the original letter of the English ambassador, stating under his signature and seal, that both those Imperial ministers (that is Granvelle and Gonzaga) had really and truly told him that instructions would be sent to us to sign the paper above alluded to.

Seeing the insistence of these people we promised to do so, provided their ambassador should do the same, respecting the articles presented to Your Majesty by this King, of which we had also a copy. The said Secretary also said that Your Majesty's articles had been approved by the King, their master, who had found them good, only that it seemed to him as if they had not been drawn up exactly as the King wished them to be, that is gradually (de degré en degré) *so that after ascending to the top of the ladder, one might descend step by step according to the exigency of the case, or the pressure of time and circumstances, to which remark of the Secretary's we replied that we thought Your Imperial Majesty had gone down the least number of steps possible on*

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* "Ce que besoigneroit que cheseun (*sic*) en son endroit, se parforce (parforçat) d'entendre jusques au bout l'intencion des enemys et ce que compestoit (compettoit) à sa prestance."

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*the ladder.** *In short, the Secretary's visit this time was exclusively for the purpose of making my colleague and myself append our signatures to the articles, which we did on the spot.*

Since then we have never ceased soliciting daily the King's final resolution on this and other pending matters, but, as the privy councillors tell us, the affair is so important, and they, themselves, are so much engaged with the daily occurrences here that they can very seldom meet and deliberate and come to a resolution thereupon, they cannot send their report to the King as soon as they might wish. This is the answer we got every day of this week from them, until yesterday, the 2nd, when we received that of which we will write hereafter, which answer, as we take it, has been delayed at least 48 hours, inasmuch as Sunday, the 30th of August, the King received a holograph letter from king Francis, begging for a safe-conduct for the cardinal of Paris (Jean du Bellay), the first president of [the Parliament of] Rouen, the marshal of France (Claude Hannebault), his first Secretary, and a gentleman of his chamber, and a captain of the Dauphin's body-guard, all of whom went hastily to Abbeville in order to meet afterwards at Calais, Guisnes (Guînes), or elsewhere, as this King should decide. The King, himself, told us on the very day that he received king Francis' letter, for as my colleague De Courrières was out in the street he met the King, who stopped and told him the news. I (Chapuys) came up soon after, and witnessed the conversation, and it strikes me, to judge from his mien and manner, that the King was not only glad, but glorious and self-satisfied at having received from king Francis a letter of the sort and the offer of an embassy which, compared with that which king Francis is said to be preparing to send to Your Imperial Majesty, is likely to increase his own reputation, to which he attaches great importance.†

Yesterday morning, having sent a message to Secretary Paget to know whether the King had mistaken his resolution in the matter of the peace and would receive Monsr. de Torquaing ‡ who was to apply for his congé *to return home, he sent us word that since that envoy (Tourcoign) had received a full answer to the mission he brought from Your Majesty, and that besides the English ambassador resident at the Imperial Court had been written to, there was no need of his going to the King. Since then, however, having again applied to the Secretary and stated that the King had positively assured us that before Monsr. de Tourcoign's*

* "A quoy respondimes qu'il nous sembloit que vre. mate avoit condescendu sur iceulx le moins quelle pouvoit."

† "Et sembl[er]oit aux gestes et façons de faire du dit sr roy qu'il estoit non seulement joyeux mais assez glorieux des dites nouvelles pour sa reputation, ou il est fort fondé."

‡ Here, as in other letters and papers, written "Torquen and Torquoing." His name was Baudoin de Lanoy, sieur (lord) of Tourcoing or Tourcoigne in Belgium.

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departure for the Continent we should hear the King's final resolution on the whole, and that we were anxious to forward the same to the Emperor, he (Paget) sent us word that we might either go to the King at the same time as Monsr. de Tourcoin, or to the Privy Council, as we chose, and there ask for the Royal resolution, which would be communicated to us without fail. Of the two means proposed, my colleague and I preferred going personally to the King, not only for the more prompt execution of the special charge entrusted to us, but because we wished particularly to hear that resolution from his Royal lips, as well as any observations he might make on the subject. Accordingly that very day, after dinner, all of us went and presented to him the queen of Hungary's letter of excuse for not being able to remit to him the 40 lasts of gunpowder he had asked for, but promising that if that amount could be found in private hands, she would do her best to accommodate the Royal commissaries with it.

Having heard the contents of the Queen's letter, and her excuses, which he seemed to accept graciously, the King thinking that he had done with us, and that our only object in soliciting an audience had been for the purpose of putting the said letter into his hands—not recollecting, perhaps, that he had promised to give us a definite answer on the occasion, and before Monsr. de Tourcoign's departure, or rather feigning that he had suddenly forgotten the fact—he abruptly turned towards the Imperial messenger and began to speak to him. We then mixed in the conversation, and took the very first opportunity that offered of reminding him of his promise, saying to him that he knew well where Your Majesty was and how you were situated, and how important it was for you to hear, as soon as possible, what his intention and resolution was respecting peace or war, for the expense of keeping up an army as considerable as Your Majesty's was very great. "That army (we said to him) has so far advanced into the enemy's country that it is necessary, nay indispensable, that the Emperor should be apprised beforehand of what he (the king of England) intends doing." The situation of the parties, we added, is very different; he (the King) is, as it were, at home, in a place from which he might withdraw and go away at pleasure; and, as we have more than once represented to him, in war as well as in peace, that diligence and cpportunity are the chief factors, he could very well understand that, if this affair of the peace with France is to go on as slouly as hitherto, there will be no end to the negociations. In short, we again begged him to tell us what means and ways he thought there were of hastening a solution of the present difficulty.*

* "Et quil ne luy en prenoit ainsi comme à vre. ma^te^ pour estre icy comme en sa maison et en lieu dont il pourroit repartir et y sejourner à son plaisir."

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The King's answer was that he knew of none; upon which we proposed to him, as coming exclusively from us, that since Your Majesty was so near to him, and he himself seemed so desirous of peace, there would be in our opinion no difficulty at all in your undertaking the management of the affair, having as you had as much and more regard for his interests than for those of the enemy however for the cause above specified. Thus much did my colleague and I impart to him though we did not particularly insist upon it.*

The duke of Alburquerque has gratefully received the letter which Your Majesty caused to be written to him. There is, as he says, nothing he desires so much as to be of service to Your Majesty anywhere and in everything. We are sure that he will do his best to please Your Majesty. He is so annoyed at the procrastination and coldness of these people that every day that passes seems to him one year. Among other wishes of his he has the very natural one of going back to Spain† and attending to his own private affairs. This he intends to do as soon as the present war comes to an end one way or other.

With regard to Mons. de Buren and his letter we have spoken to the King. Though owing to his absence he (Buren) has been unable to take any part in these last occurrences; his letter will be of use in future, especially if the practices that have begun should continue.

Respecting the siege of this town we will not trouble Your Majesty with further details, especially as Mons. de Tourquaing, who has carefully inquired into everything, will soon take his departure. As to Montreuil the generals in command of the English before that town, even the duke of Norfolk and the Lord Privy Seal (Sir John Russel), who have come here, and stayed several days, despair of taking it by force of arms unless the King sends a larger force than that which they have under their orders, so as to allow them to surround and invest other towns in the neighbourhood as well as to prevent the garrison of Montreuil from receiving victuals by one of the gates.‡ Already scarcity of provisions begins to be felt therein, so much so that no meat can be obtained, and the men eat horse's flesh when they can get it. Even bread was getting scarce according to the report of deserters, two of whom had arrived at the English camp.

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* "Ayant austant et plus de respect à donner à son interest que à celuy des ennemis."

† "Que les offres de par deça ne se avancent mieulx, et est si triste et ennuyé de la longueur et froideur de la procedure de ceulx-çy que chascun jour lui semble un an, pour entre aultres choses le desir quil a de soy retirer en Espagne."

‡ "Et quant à ceulx de Montreuil les chiefs qui sont devant, mesmes le duc de Norfolk et le Privisel quont esté içy divers jours desperans (desesperant) d'en pouvoir avoir bonne yscue [si] ce n'estoit [que] le dit s^r roy leur envoye plus largement de gens afin de pouvoir environner toutes les villes et serrer l'une des portes. Mais que içy (que jusqu' içy) leur a esté libre. Tant y a qu'il y a plusieurs jours quilz sont en trez grande dizette de chair, et ont mangé de celle de cheval quant ilz en ont, comme ont rapporté deux qu'en sont sortis."

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Indeed, certain ciphered letters of Monsr. de Bietz (sic) *to king Francis had fallen into the hands of the besiegers, which being deciphered were found to contain the following words:—"It seems to me as if the English are more confident to take me by the beak than by the hands,* and therefore I beg and entreat Your Majesty to provide for the wants of this garrison and send us wheat and other provisions, in the manner and way that the bearer of this, my letter, will point out."*

The above-mentioned Monsr. de Tourcoign and we two, have made every possible effort to get a definite and final answer to Your Majesty's proposals; but the King has intentionally delayed the same from day to day, telling Tourcoign and us (De Courrières and myself) whenever we have pressed him too hard, that we must have patience and wait a little longer, for he wishes and hopes that at the same time that he sends his answer he will be able to send also some good piece of news—meaning, no doubt, the taking of this town. Then recollecting suddenly that the term he, himself, had fixed for his answer was the day of Monsr. de Tourcoign's departure, he again begged us to retain that Imperial messenger a few days longer at the camp, at least until the arrival of another, who might be the bearer of this dispatch.†

Shortly after our return from the King, one of the gentlemen of his Chamber brought us a copy of the articles, which he said his master was about to remit to his own ambassador at the Imperial Court, the exorbitance of which, by the way, needs no enhancing on our part, for the gentleman in question boasted of it, and whoever peruses them will at once pronounce them to be exceedingly harsh. The articles were drawn in English, and, when interpreted to us, and compared with those of Your Majesty, it seemed to us as if they differed materially. We applied for copies of them in French, but hitherto not one has been sent to us.‡

As Your Imperial Majesty, by your incredible and inestimable wisdom, is more able than we ourselves are to judge what this King's intentions and inclinations may be at the present moment, all remarks and observations of our own would be perfectly superfluous, and our poor and valueless advice upon the whole quite unnecessary. Yet in obedience to Your Majesty's express commands we will state our opinion in two words: this King has for the present no other intention, wish or desire, than to gain possession of

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* "Les anglois ont plus de confidence de me prendre par le beq que par les mains."

† "Et inspiré du premier terme quil avoit donné, nous pria quil, Monsr. de Tourcoign, attendist un peu plus, pour [ung] aultre [courier], au moins pour emporter ce present depesche."

‡ "Les quels n'estoit besoing quil nous blasonna[st] estre exhorbitants comme dit est, car il le temoignoit assez de soy mesme. Il les nous envoya en Anglois, et à ce quil nous fust interpreté, la narration estoit fort different[e] et comme contraire de celle des dits articles de vre. mat^e. Nous le priames de les avoir en françois, mais encore ne les nous ont rapporté."

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this town. He has frequently told us so, and has since repeated it to us many a time with a certain emphasis is more important to him than Paris itself. Indeed he already considers Boulogne as his own, so much so, that he is thinking of erecting inside and out several buildings in the way of fortifications and pleasure houses.*

In short we have no doubt that once master of Boulogne, which he keeps telling us is of more importance to him than a march on Paris, he will not move further unto France unless he saw a fair chance of gaining also Montreuil. To this latter enterprise he would perhaps attend with all care and energy, not indeed as we think to add it to his other acquisitions, but to keep it with a view to making a better bargain in the event of peace, for unwilling as he is to spend his money, and not having abundance of it at present, he is not likely to undergo willingly the expense of raising new fortifications there and elsewhere to guard and defend his conquests. Indeed we really think that once Boulogne and Montreuil are taken the King will gladly listen to proposals of peace with France, more expeditiously and lightly perhaps than it would be suitable for the effect and security of it, especially if the French commissioners, who came here for the purpose, endeavour, as most certainly they will, to gain by fair words, or otherwise corrupt and bribe with money and presents, those who surround this King, which attempt, however, we shall take the utmost possible care to prevent.

It seems, moreover, to my colleague (De Courrières) and to me (Chapuys) that should Your Imperial Majesty entertain the least idea of distributing pensions [among this King's privy councillors] this would be the fit season and time for doing so. May Your Majesty be pleased to think of this and likewise of the expediency of gratifying the King by sending us, as he himself has requested, due powers to represent Your Majesty at the meeting of the Commissioners. If so, Your Majesty may be sure that your commands and Instructions will be punctually executed.

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* "Toutesfois pour obeyr à vre. ma^te disons que le dit s^r roy n'a autre intention principalement que de gaigner et empourter ceste ville, la quelle comme desja aultresfois nous a dit, et de rechief nous a refresche (rafraiché ?) luy importe trop plus que Paris, la quelle [ville] il tient quainsi comme pour sienne, devisant desja de faire en icelle et dehors plusieurs edifices tant de fortz que de plaisance, et [est] à doubter que l'ayant obtenue ne se souciera de marcher plus avant, n'estoit qu'il eust grand espoir de soubdainement empourter Monstreul (*sic*) à la quelle emprinse en tel cas entendroit volontiers non point, comme croyons, pour la tenir que pour en faire ses conditions meilleures, car comme il despent (depense) mal volontiers, et ne se trouve trop furny d'argent, il ne se vouldra mectre en plus grandz fraiz pour la fortification et garde d'icelle, et pensons qu'ayant conquis ceste ville il entendra volontiers à la paix, et plus legierement quil ne conviendroit à la seureté d'icelle, mesmes venant devers luy telz causseurs quilz [qui] ne fauldront par parolles et presantz (*sic*) à gaigner et suborner ceulx qui sont autour de luy. Et nous sembleroit, si vre. ma^te avoit oncques envye (envie) de donner pensions à quelqungs de ceulx [çy], il en pourroit bientost estre la propre saison. Il plaira à vrē. ma^te y avoir de l'advis, et aussi quant à gratiffier au dit s^r roy à l'endroit des pouvoirs, quil demande pour nous, du quel [envoy] ne s'en usera que puntuellement comme commandera vre. ma^te."

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At this very moment, whilst writing the above lines, the privy councillors send to my colleague and to me two copies of the "Articles and Conditions," which the king of England demands for his peace with France. Both are in English, the councillors having made excuses on the ground of the excessive and troublesome work they have in hand, and the press of time which, as they say, has prevented them from having a French translation made. Another copy has been forwarded to their ambassador at Your Majesty's Court with orders to have it put into French; but as it often happens that translations from English into French and* vice versâ, *made abroad or here by two different persons, though similar in context, do not exactly agree in words, as happened last year with English papers and documents translated here and at Brussels, my colleague and I are of opinion that besides the translation, which the King should have ordered his own ambassador to make, another one be made [at Brussels] so as to have them compared together and kept in reserve.*†—Camp before Boulogne, 3rd September 1544.

French. Original, partly in cipher.

n. d. Wien, Imp. Arch.

194. The KING OF ENGLAND'S ARTICLES for the PEACE.

Whereas the Emperor is contented in respect of the common weal of Christendom, and for the redress of the affairs of the same, and at the instance and request made unto him on the behalf of the French king by the Sieur Dannebault,‡ admiral of France and the bailif of Dijon, to give ear to a treaty for peace, having given them safe-conducts for that purpose with protestation that his kingly Majesty do the *semblable*, and that such means be set forth by the said French king as may be agreeable to both their Majesties, for as much as the kingly Majesty has been desired by the Emperor's ambassadors in the name of their Majesty to [make] known his intention in that behalf to the intent [that] they might advertise to the French king thereof His Royal Majesty thought good to declare the same as follows:

That is to say: His Majesty Royal is well contented, as the said Emperor is, to treat of peace for the same respects and considerations of Christendom that the Emperor does, and so that such covenants and agreements be made, and with

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* Two copies in English exactly alike are in the Imperial Archives besides a French translation made at Brussels.

† "Pourroit estre que ores que la substance fust tout une, toutesfois les motz des deux translateurs pourroient estre divers, [ce] que sonneroit aucunement mal, et que quant au proheme ne leur avons semblé y riens changer pour non estre chose d'importance, aussi ne l'eussent ilz osré faire sans consulter le dit sieur roy leur maistre, dont ce (*sic*) depesche se fust par trop prolonguée."

‡ Clar de d'Annebault or d'Hannebaut, who succeeded Brion-Chabot in the charge of Admiral of France.

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such assurances as be reasonable, and required for both their Majesties.

Firstly, whereas, notwithstanding [that] the duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine do belong, and of right belong, and as is well and probably known do appertain to His Majesty Royal is his own proper inheritance, His Majesty for the avoiding of the shedding of Christian blood, and in the hope to have preserved with the forbearing of his particular right the universal state of Christendom more quiet and [in] tranquillity has been pleased to accept of the aforesaid French king a yearly pension of one hundred thousand crowns or thereabout, which the said French king has, contrary to his promises and treaties, withheld from His Majesty's hands nearly eleven years. His Majesty requires that all the arrears of the said pension may be presently paid to him off hand, and likewise all such sums of money as His Majesty has by means of the aforesaid French king been obliged to disburse both by sea and by land, as well as for the recovery of his right—which the said French king detains [for his armaments] from him as of such other charges as His Majesty has been put to by the wars of Scotland, procured and much maintained by his aid, counsel and support.*

Secondly, His Majesty requires to have restored to him and delivered into his possession the realm of France, the duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine†—over which His Majesty has so just and evident title and right that the said French king might so restore, allowing His Majesty all such profits as the same—usurping now of a long time the possession of the said realms and duchies of Normandy, Guyenne, and Aquitaine—has perceived and taken; and albeit His Majesty Royal has the cause of his good brother, the Emperor, no less to heart than his own, even as to the amity does appertain, desirous that such assurances may be made for both their parts as may be to the benefices of them and their posterity, yet His Majesty Royal makes no mention of the right, titles, and interests that the Emperor pretends against the said French king, and by cause he has already caused the same to be presented to His Majesty Royal by Messieurs Eustace Chapuys and the Sieur de Courrières, his ambassadors, not doubting but that the said demands before expressed for the part of His Majesty Royal seem reasonable to the said Emperor, and meant to be performed, and satisfied as well as in respect of the just causes His Majesty Royal had to make the same, as for that also His Majesty requires restitution or accomplishment of some other things than is expressed in the treaty passed between their Majesties, and therefore trusts his said good brother will the rather see them

* "Supportacion" in one of the copies.

† These demands of French territory are substantially the same as those contained in the challenge and intimation of war read by the duke of Norfolk to the French ambassador in June 1543 at Westminster. *See* Vol. VI., Part. II., pp. 407–11.

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performed as the amity between their Majesties does require.

Indorsed: "Double des articles du roi d'Angleterre.*

English. Contemporary copy forwarded from England to the Emperor's Court. 3 *pp.*

7 Sept. **195.** The EMPEROR'S INSTRUCTIONS to the BISHOP OF ARRAS.

B. Neg. d'Angleterre Tome 2. p. 62.

You shall go as quickly as possible to the king of England and represent to him in Our name that since Our leaving Spire† for Our expedition against France We have never failed, when an opportunity offered, to apprise Our Sister, the queen, regent of the Low Countries, of every step and incident of Our march, that she, herself, and Our ambassadors at the Court of England (the Sieur de Courrières, captain of Our Body-guard, and Messire Eustace Chapuys), might in turn acquaint the King of that country with Our hitherto successful invasion of French territory; and that We have taken good care that his (the King's) ambassadors at this Our Court should be fully informed of Our progress through the enemy's country, as well as of the various and different overtures of peace made to Us from time to time, namely, on the first instance by Monsr. de Longueval, who was sent by the bailli de Dijon;‡ secondly, by the Sieur de Brenteville,§ lieutenant of the Sieur Dennison;‖ and thirdly, through a friar¶ bearing a message from the Admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault), who offered to come to Our camp under a safe-conduct.

You will tell the King that for a long time We openly and distinctly refused to listen to those and other overtures of the French, purposely delaying an answer to them, until We knew for certain whether similar ones had or had not been made to him; how those overtures, if made, had been received by him; in short, that We should like to know, before taking a resolution in the matter, what the king of

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* Evidently one of the two copies mentioned by Chapuys in his preceding letter of the 3rd to the Emperor; *see* above No. 193, p. 323.

† After closing the Diet of Spire (Speier) on the 10th of June, the Emperor published his determination to invade France. On the 16th of that month, he entered Metz, accompanied by the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), the duke Maurice of Saxony, and the Margraf of Brandenburg (Albert). He remained at Metz till the 18th of July, when the invasion of France may be said to have commenced.

‡ Villiers Les or Des Ponts, *see* p. 278. As to Mons. de Longueval, his name was Nicholas de Bossut, sieur de Longueval.

§ As to Monsr. de Bertenville (elsewhere written Berthenvile and Bertheville), *see* above No. 184, p. 298.

‖ "Lieutenant du Sieur Dennison" are the words in the copy at Brussels, but there is reason to suspect that *Dannison* must be a corruption of d'Annison or D'Anisson, as I find it elsewhere written. He was captain of the duke of Orleans' body-guard.

¶ Fr. Gabriel de Guzman (?).

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England, our ally, thinks of it all, whether any overtures have been made to him, and if so, whether they have been listened to, and how does he thinks we ought to answer those made to Us. In one word, until We hear from the king of England, himself, or from his ambassador, at this, Our camp, whether he considers it advisable that Monsr. du Rœulx do listen in his (the King's) name to the proposals, which the French themselves are about to make, as king Henry has given Us to understand through his ambassador at this camp of Ours, as well as through his own here, and until We know what passed between him and Framozelles (*sic*) We shall take no final resolution in the matter.

In Our conferences (*communications*) with the Admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault) We were naturally guided by Our desire to ascertain what king Francis' real intentions were, and what Don Ferrante de Gonzaga and Monsr. de Granvelle thought about the French overtures; both ministers, We must say, seemed rather inclined to listen to the overtures, and We own that after discussing the matter with them, We resolved to listen to king Francis' proposals of a separate peace with Us, provided he (the King) helped and assisted against the Turk, and paid his debts to the king of England. On these conditions and the protest on Our part that nothing whatever was to be negotiated, much less settled, save with the full consent and approval of king Henry, and to his complete satisfaction, We allowed a conference to take place between king Francis' commissioners and Our ministers. Yet while the negotiations (*pour parlers*) were going on, We continued to march against the common enemy and vigorously prosecuted the war all the same notwithstanding the surrender of towns and fortresses on Our way, and the representations and offers of peace of the French. In this manner We approached the town of Chalons,* pretending that We intended to lay siege to it, but in reality to draw out of its fortified camp the French army commanded by the Dauphin, and give them battle if they wished to accept it.

You may tell the King while discussing the subject of this Our letter of Instructions to you how busily employed We were on the whole of Tuesday,† and the ensuing Monday till Wednesday, in trying to bring the French out of their intrenchments, which they left suddenly and in disorder at Our appearance, taking refuge within a strongly fortified place in the neigh-

* This account of the Emperor's progress in Champagne until his arrival at Chalons on Marne, or rather at La Chaussee in its immediate neighbourhood, does not exactly agree with Mary's letter of the 8th of September.

† The Emperor was then at Phin in Champagne, four leagues from La Chaussee, and two from Chalons sur Marne. It was there that, according to French historians, a series of skirmishes and cavalry engagements took place between the Imperialists and the French, in one of which Count William von Fustenburg the German was taken prisoner, whilst in another the French Prince de la Roche sur Yon (Charles de Bourbon) fell into the hands of the Germans.

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bourhood (*en leur principal fort*), thereby showing that, although their entrenched camp was advantageously situated on the top of hills commanding the surrounding country, though they had on one side the river We had just crossed, and on the other a lake, though for several consecutive days they had been working day and night to further strengthen their camp, surrounding it with trenches and moats, the French dared not come to blows with Our men, but suddenly left in disorder, hastily taking refuge within the walls of their principal fortress in that district, and then, without stopping there, fled in the direction of a town called Espernay,* where they kept in store both the provisions and the ammunition of war for their army, to which they themselves set fire for fear of their falling into Our power. In a like manner did the French destroy and burn to the ground several villages in the immediate neighbourhood of that town and on the bank of the river [Marne]. All this the common enemy had done with a view to prevent Us from collecting provisions for Our army, though they have since remained in their fortified camp without going anywhere beyond it, or accepting battle, save now and then a slight skirmishing with Our troops in which, however, they have always been beaten and obliged to take to flight.

Seeing which, and highly astonished at Our marching onwards, and leaving Châlons behind, the French have since strongly solicited Us for peace, offering to furnish 10,000 infantry and 600 men-at-arms to serve against the Turk, or if not a sufficient sum of money to pay an equal number of Germans or Swiss; to restitute all they have taken from Us and from the duke of Savoy on this or the other side of the Alps since the commencement of the last war, and besides that to make of Stenay—which they took from the late duke of Lorraine, and fortified on the frontier of Luxemburg—any settlement that may be agreeable to Us. That if We feel inclined to bestow the hand of Our daughter [Maria] on king Francis' son, she bringing as a dower the Low Countries (*les pays dembas*), or else that of Our niece, the second daughter of the king of Romans, he will make restitution to the duke of Savoy of the rest of the territories and lands they have taken from him on this, as well as on the other side of the Alps. He promises besides to confirm all the treaties of Madrid and Cambray, and will give such securities as may be required for the establishment of an everlasting peace.

As far as the English king is concerned—and We must again observe that in Our communications with the French

* Epernay in Champagne is not far from Cateau or Chateau Tierry. In those two towns according to Père G. Daniel, the historian (*Histoire de France*, Amsterdam, 1720, p. 412), abundant stores of provisions were kept, which the French in their retreat set fire to, though the Imperialists in pursuit arrived soon enough to save the greater part. The above-named French historian speaks at length of a treasonable act of a French captain, who having received orders from the Dauphin for cutting the bridge on the Marne leading to Epernay forgot or neglected to do so.

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envoys, We have always insisted on the above-mentioned condition—the French offer to pay him all the arrears of pension due to him at reasonable dates, and in future for the rest of their debt, at such times as may seem to Us reasonable. This last offer We have always refused to admit, and said expressly that it was for the king of England to decide, and that it was his consent not Ours which was to be solicited.

And that for a long time back We have had no news of the King or from his army, and the French are asserting that he has achieved nothing either at Boulogne or at Montreuil, and are boasting that the season being so far advanced, he will not be able to do anything important or to penetrate further into France, but be obliged to retire to winter quarters, and that already, as they have learned through their spies, the King has ordered the greater part of his infantry and cavalry to go back to England, and that the Dauphin's return from that province is owing to that and to the probable retreat of the English.

That the said want of news from the King, and the rumours circulating among the French, are the cause of Our sending you to him for the purpose of inquiring what his final determination is respecting the peace, but chiefly to inform him of what has passed both in prosecution of the war with France, as well as concerning their offers of peace, that We Ourselves may know for certain what his (the King's) wants are, and what he intends to do one way or another, so that We on Our side may correspond and conform with his plan and wishes according to the treaty of closer alliance between us two, and for Our common and mutual advantage and profit.

As to the prosecution of the present war, the King of England ought to bear in mind that We are now within this kingdom [of France]. He ought to consider what We have already achieved, and the astonishment produced among the French by Our sudden and hither to successful invasion of their territory, the hazardous and *precarious* position (*perileuse situacion*) of king Francis and his army; and lastly that should the king of England cause his own to march onwards, and approach [Paris] on his side, the object and aim of Our common undertaking will in all likelihood be gained.

You will also tell him that anything We can do for him with Our army in the prosecution of this war, as well as in bringing about a favourable and profitable settlement of his claims, shall be done, since king Francis has offered to accept the above specified conditions.

The king of England ought also to consider that the chief force of king Francis is in front of Us and of Our army; and that, most certainly, he has with him a considerable number of horse and foot, Italians and French, brought from Piedmont; that seeing Us advance so far into his kingdom, he has already sent for the troops he has on the frontiers of

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Burgundy, Luxemburg, and elsewhere, and will do the same with those of Picardy and the Calais frontier, and that, if so, We shall have to bear too great a burden on Our shoulders. To this should be added that this army of Ours is so considerable and large that it has already cost, and is costing Us, an immense amount of money; that there is great difficulty and excessive labour in procuring victuals, and that should the French arrest Our march and oblige Us to stop somewhere [on the road to Paris], the evil might be irreparable. On the other hand, being so far into the heart of France, as above said, it would be impossible for Us to send for Our Flanders army without paying the men their due, as the King no doubt has heard; the money is already in the ports of that country, but, if We send for it, We shall have to detach from here a large force to escort the same, which would naturally diminish the numbers of this one now in front of the enemy.* To undertake at this juncture the siege of some important and well-garrisoned town, without payment in full of what is owing to the men, should the provisions fall short, which might very well be the case, would cause a mutiny, and of the men—deserting Our camp on the plea that winter is approaching, or else for want of payment—should the besieged town surrender, sacking and destroying it.

On the other hand, if the war is to be prosecuted with this army of Ours, for the sole purpose of wasting the country and ruining the inhabitants, it would be a cruel and fruitless act even for Us and the king of England, inasmuch as king Francis might then be deterred from making the offers he has already made.

In short, to finish with Our arguments on this point, it is highly important and very necessary for Us to know what the king of England's intentions are, and whether he wishes or not to continue the war, and for how long; whether he is willing or not to send a powerful army into France; what road that army of his will take without stopping to lay siege to a town until it approaches Us—all this to be done through true and mutual correspondence. Also that with the help and favour of his army We may make that of Flanders march in this direction, which is a very important and substantial point under the circumstances for the reasons above explained.

As to the offers of peace made by the French, the King will be pleased to let Us know his final resolution, and what his demands are; also what Cardinal Du Bellay's charge was when he went to him on a mission from king Francis, as the French themselves are triumphantly announcing and boasting

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* "Daultre part que comme nous sommes si avant, comme dit est, en [ce] pays il nous est impossible de faire venir [l'argent pour] le paiement dicelle qui est au coustel de Flandres, comme le dit s^r roy la desja bien peu entendre, et si nous devyons envoyer conduyte de ceste armee pour la faire venir, il fauldroit qu'elle fust grande, et dautant se diminueroit ceste dicte armee."

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of. You shall take care to inform the King of the overtures and offers made to Us by the French for the public weal of Christendom and Our own, trusting entirely that the King's answer with regard to the first point will be as befits his Royal dignity and his well known magnanimity, and to the second as a true friend of Ours.

The above Instructions you shall communicate to the said Sieur de Corron and ambassador Chapuys, and, after getting their advice, propose to the King that which you and they may think best, that for the King's greater contentment and satisfaction you may at your very first audience announce to him how much We should wish to have an answer on the above points.

We hold as a maxim, foundation and conclusion of your charge, as above, that should the king of England tell you that he is decidedly for the prosecution of the war, and intends making his powerful army march [into France] so as to approach Ours, you must represent to him difficulties attending that resolution of his, namely: the approach of the winter season, that it is already getting too late for field operations, that there might be on his side more impediments than he is aware of; and, if so, that the expense for Us to keep up such a large army in the enemy's country would be enormous: in fact, that We could not bear it. That it is important to know beforehand what our mutual pretensions are, and what can probably be obtained from king Francis, which, after all, will be the surest way of making the common enemy listen to reason.* It would also be requisite and more than necessary that if the King decides for the prosecution of the war, that Our money may come [in time]. Let the King know that all We shall do in future will be for him and for his sake not for Our own, and, in short, any other arguments that may come to your mind, so as to place Us on firm ground, and avoid further expense, unless there be good cause or ground for it.

Should, however, the King refuse to make his own army march on Paris immediately, as above said, you will make him understand that We, on Our side, have done all that was and is in Our power to press the enemy, and that he (king Francis) has yet done nothing to arrest Our march or prevent Us from reaching the capital of his kingdom,† and that, therefore, it is for him (the king of England) to consider the many causes and reasons there are for Our not stopping where We are, as otherwise We should have to undergo a most tremendous expense, which We cannot possibly defray, besides which if the concerted plan of a march on Paris is to be abandoned

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* "Il fauldra que lui remonstrez (*sic*) les difficultez que y sont de du commencement du [mauvais] temps et saison, et comme desja il est tard, et y pourra encoires avoir longueur de son coustel, et quele charge nous a esté et est grosse. Et si fauldra bien regarder ce à quoy l'on pretendra et ce que vrayseablablement l'on pourra exploicter, et si ce sera plus grand moyen d'avenger (?) lennemy."

† "Et quil n'a resisté ny fait encoires riens par (pour) nous [empescher] de passer oultre."

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there is no necessity for Us to keep so large a force as We have in the field. It is, therefore, for him to decide at once on what conditions he, himself, can make peace with the French, sure as We are that in the present state of affairs the common enemy will listen to reason.

But let this negotiation of yours be conducted in such a way that the king of England may not think that We are absolutely determined and have made up Our mind as to the war being prosecuted or ceasing altogether, or listening to overtures; for, as We said above, everything is suspended until We receive your report, and know what that King's intentions are.*

Thus, unless you perceive clearly that the King wishes the war to continue, you will do your utmost to persuade him to decide as soon as possible in favour of peace, and to be sure that We on Our side will do the same without any message backwards and forwards, for, as you can tell our ambassadors, confidentially and under reserve, unless the king of England take the first step in this matter immediately, We shall be obliged to withdraw this Our army from France, and accept peace under the general conditions that the French agree to make, independently of those they may separately stipulate with him.†

Of course with all this We wish above all that the King of England be completely satisfied, and without fear of any sort, of Our friendship for him having diminished in the least. We wish the last treaty of alliance between Us two to remain in all its force and vigour, and that at all events, and under any circumstances whatever, We may be credited with having observed and kept to the end Our engagements towards him, and that if fault there has been, it was rather on his own side and such as We might well complain of it.‡

Immediately after your arrival in Flanders (*les pays denbas*) you will inform the Queen of the nature and bearing of this your mission, and tell her in Our name to remit and keep ready in the neighbourhood of Calais all the money, and likewise all the provision in store for the pay and keeping of this army in case We should want them for the prosecution of the war; and if on the side of England, by applying to the king of England, if necessary, you find means of remitting to Us the said money, you will inform the Queen of it, as well

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* "Mais que toute ceste negociacion vostre soit de maniere que le roi d'angleterre neutende que soyons absolument determiné en ce que concerne la dicte guerre, soit de la continuer ou cesser, ny aussi quant à la dicte paix, ains que nous l'avons suspendu, et que nous determinerons selon le rapport de vostre dicte charge, et apres avoir entendu son intention."

† "Car comme vous pouvez dire à nos dits ambassadeurs confidamment, si le dit roy dangleterre ne fait ce premier poinct (pas?) des incontinent, il nous est force de retirer ceste dicte armee et accepter les conditions esquelles les François condescendent en reservant toute l'alliance et traicte avec le dit sieur roy."

‡ "Et que en tous advenements soyons justiffies avoir comply et gardé l'honnestete jusques au boult, et que plustot nous pourrions nous greuver (*sic*) des faultes qui y ont esté de son coustel."

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as whatever else you may have negotiated in England or at Calais, wherever the King may be now.—Written at Our camp one league from Vermans (*sic*), 7 September 1544.*

Addressed: "A nostre très chier et feal conseillier Messire Antoine Perrenot, evesque d'Arrás."

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*

8 Sept. Wien, Imp. Arch. **196.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS.†

"Messieurs les Ambassadeurs,"—We have just received a letter from the Emporer, Our lord and brother, dated the 31st of August, from La Chaulsée, three short leagues from Châlons, telling Us that on the following day, the 1st inst., he would march in the direction of that town, as if he were to lay siege to it. The town of Châlons is said to be well fortified, and to have a strong garrison, but the Emperor does not intend to attack it, on the contrary will leave it behind him, as he (the Emperor) is quite determined to prosecute his advance on Paris, and fulfilling that part of the agreement made in London by Don Fernando in his Imperial name.‡ Should the king of England, in compliance with that convention, advance with an army of at least 30,000 men, and join the Emperor, that would be, as he, himself, acknowledges, the surest means of obliging king Francis to ask for terms, and put up at once with the claims and demands of the allies. If after exposing himself to personal danger, His Imperial Majesty found that through the king of England, his ally, incurring too much expense and not carrying into effect that part of the convention made with Gonzaga in December, 1543, his plan of campaign mutually agreed upon, were likely to fail, he would certainly be disappointed and much displeased.§

The Emperor sent me the other day the inclosed letter for that King, as well as credentials in your favour, for you to explain to him what passed here [at Brussels] between

* According to Vandenesse's "Itinerary of Charles V.," translated by Bradford (p. 348), on the 6th day of September the Emperor was at Chatillon [sur Marne in Champagne] whence the bishop of Arras departed for England under a safe-conduct from the French king; on the 7th he was at St. Creppau when Tierry-Simony (Chateau Thierry) was taken by the Imperialists' light horse; on the 8th at a village called Sabaythe. On the 9th and 10th he advanced half-a-mile further, and on the 11th came to Soissons. Chatillon and Chateau Tierry, the two towns mentioned in the above passage were both in Champagne, but what is meant by Sabaythe I have been unable to discover, the name must be corrupted.

† Still De Courrières and Chapuys.

‡ "M'advertissant que lendemain il entendoit faire semblant d'approcher la ville, la quelle il [a] enttendu (*sic*) estre bien fortifiée, et avoir une grosse garnison, et quant à quant estoit determiné passer oultre contre Paris pour satisfaire à la capitulation faicte à Londres avec le roy d'Angleterre."

§ "Et ne sera petit regret à sa ma^te imperiale [si] oultre le hazard et danger de sa personne le dit s^r roy n' avanche en riens son armée en tant que toute la forche (*sic*) de l'enemy tombera sur son armée."

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Monseigneur de Granvelle, the Emperor's Privy Seal, and Ferrante Gonzaga, the Viceroy of Sicily, on the one side, and the Admiral of France (Hannebault) and one of the presidents of the Parliament of Paris,* on the other, as you will see by the abstract of the Emperor's letter to us. The contents of that letter, moreover, will show you that the above-mentioned Imperial deputies, as far as they (Granvelle and Gonzaga) are concerned in adjusting the Emperor's peace with France, have thoroughly complied with all the requirements and prescriptions of the treaty of closer alliance and friendship with England. You will do your best to convince the King of that which is the real truth, adding such considerations and arguments of your own as you may deem opportune. We sincerely hope that the king of England will no longer raise difficulties about the Emperor's peace with France, and that he will be convinced that the French are now at their old tricks again, trying to sow discord between the allies, which object, however, We hope, please God, they will never attain.

Yesterday the Sieur de Tourcoigne † left this city (Brussels) on his mission to the king of England, but We are much afraid that he will not be able to proceed on his journey [to Boulogne] as hastily as it might be desired, owing to the Emperor, Our brother, having ordered that all passes and bridges leading to his Imperial camp should be barred or cut for he dislikes above all things, and wishes to put an end to the continual flow of couriers and messages from all parts.—8 September 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 pp.

14 Sept. Wien, Imp. Arch. Corresp. Engl.

197. **Eustace Chapuys and Monsr. de Courrières to the Emperor.**

"Sire,"—On the 11th inst., close upon noon, Monsr. d'Arras arrived at this camp [before Boulogne] and communicated with us both respecting the Instructions he himself had received from Your Majesty.‡ As the Bishop's arrival took place just at the moment that the King was thinking of having one of the mines under the castle's walls set fire to in order to try the temper and disposition of his men, and make sure of their good behaviour in case of an assault, he could not give audience to Monsr. d'Arras on that day, but promised to see him the day after,§ as he did most graciously.

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* Elsewhere "le Chancellier de France." If so, it was Monsr. de Chemans, who, according to Daniel (Vol. V., p. 410), was at the time Chancellier et Garde des Sceaux of king Francis.

† "Le Sieur de Torquain" (*sic*), about whom, *see* above, p. 310.

‡ *See* No. 195, p. 327.

§ "Et pour estre à l'heure ce roy deliberé de faire mectre le feu à une myne du chasteau, et prendre quelque asseurance de ses gens comme ilz s' acquiteroient en ung [cas de] besoing, et ne peult (pust) donner [ce jour là] l'audience demandée par Monsr. D'Arras, ce qu'il fist le lendemain."

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Monsr. d' Arras, whom, in compliance with Your Majesty's commands, we had accompanied to the King's presence, exhibited his credentials and proceeded to explain the object and cause of his mission, of which task he acquitted himself so discreetly and so eloquently to the general contentment and satisfaction of those who heard him (*de toute la compaignie*) that it would have been really impossible for any other to have done it better.

As Your Majesty will soon hear from the Bishop's lips the upshot of his conference with the King, the latter's reply, as well as consent to the peace, and his final resolution on the chief points of the mission with which he (the Bishop) was entrusted, we need not enter into more details, besides which, as above said, the Bishop himself cannot fail to report on the whole, as well as on certain occurrences in this camp. —Camp before Boulogne, 14 September 1544.

Signed : "Eustace Chapuys" and "J. de Montmorency."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

16 Sept. Wien, Imp. Arch. **198.** FRAGMENT of a CIPHERED LETTER from the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS in ENGLAND to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

My colleague and I (Eustace Chapuys) asked the privy councillors whether we could next day wait upon the King, together with Monsr. d'Arras, whose arrival at this camp [*before Boulogne*] *we expected at* 2 *o'clock in the afternoon. Their answer was that the King would be glad to see the Bishop and us also at any time. Shortly after the Bishop's arrival, which took place at the appointed hour, we all* * *went to the King. Monsr. d'Arras, after presenting his credentials, proceeded to explain the object and purpose of the mission entrusted to him by the Emperor, of which mission, and Instructions for it (as he told us in private) he himself had given to Your Majesty full account from the camp before Montreuil.*† *The King's answer to Mons. d'Arras was in substance as follows : That the season being so far advanced he (the King) had decided that his army should not march further* [*into France*]*, and that he had issued orders to that effect. He could not, if he chose, do otherwise, besides which his Privy Council had reported to him that the period during which the allied armies were bound to keep the field would expire in a*

* "Tous les trois," that is to say Eustace Chapuys, De Courrières, and the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot), as above. *See* Chapuys' preceding despatch to the Emperor, p. 335.

† "Et apres avoir tres pertinentement et avec la dexterité requise expliqué la commission et charge dont il advertit vre. mate doiz Montreuil."

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fortnight. This the King said, as it were, by way of reproach, and as if he wished to blame the Emperor for having so boldly penetrated into the enemy's country, and placed himself in danger, though, as we think, his real object was to excuse his own nonobservance of the treaty and justify, in a certain degree, his remaining behind, and pitching his tents before this town. This resolution of the King was the day after confirmed by several of his privy councillors, who most deliberately declared to me that on no account would their master consent, at present, to his army penetrating further into France; he (the King) considered the Emperor's undertaking as at once rash and dangerous, and he thought that his penetrating so far into the enemy's country was an imprudent act.*

"With regard to the Emperor's conditions for his own peace with France (one of the councillors added) the King, our master, cannot possibly approve of them and say that they are by no means as advantageous as they ought to be for his Imperial Majesty, when one of them is the marriage of the Princess of Spain (Maria) to the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois)." "That marriage (observed one of the councillors) the King, our master, can never approve of, not only because the said Princess (Maria) might eventually become Queen of that country, but because, as the King himself told you at the second audience you had from him, it would be a dishonourable and almost shameful condition for the Emperor to offer or accept from the King of France. Even if the Emperor had fallen a prisoner into the hands of king Francis, the conditions of peace proposed by himself or offered for his acceptance could not be harder than these. The same might be said of the Low Countries, and the second daughter of the king of the Romans (Ferdinand of Austria), which is the alternative marriage proposed for the duke of Orleans. Should either of these marriages so take place,—though it is most improbable that the inhabitants of Spain, the Milanese, or the people of the Low Countries will put up with the affront of being ruled over or governed by the son or the descendants of the greatest enemy their master, the Emperor, ever had,—the evils and complications arising from such conditions, if accepted and carried out, would be incalculable. That is why (continued the privy councillor) my master, the King, thinks that the Emperor ought to retreat [at once into Flanders]. If so, as his ally, the King, Our master,

* "Finallement l'effect substantiel qu'il rapporta de la responce (*sic*) du dit s[r] roy est que icelluy s[r] roy est resolu pour estre la saison si avancée de non faire marcher son armée, car aussi ne avoit il ordre du monde ores qu'il le voulust, et d'ailleurs le temps qu'estoit capitulé, comme disoyent ceulx de son Conseil, de tenir les armées aulx champs debuoit expirer dans dix ou xv jours. Mordant aucunement l'empriuse de sa ma[te] s'estre si hazardeusement et dangereusement tant avant au pays. A quoy dire vraysemblablement il a esté esmeu pour s'excuser de ce qu'il n'a observé la capitulation en ce[t] endroit et pour coulourer sa demeure ici."

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*who is not far from the frontier of France, he can, in case of need, protect his retreat with any force that may be requisite."**

As to the duke of Orleans' marriage with the second daughter of the King of the Romans (Ferdinand of Austria), and the Duchy of Milan as a dower for that Princess, it would, though less objectionable than the other, still offer great difficulties, for as neither the French Duke nor the Austrian Princess is the Emperor's lineal descendant, it is very doubtful if the Milanese will put up with them.

"Respecting the restoration of Mons. de Savoy on all his patrimonial estates, on which the Emperor insists so energetically, the King, my master, has nothing to observe; he finds it both just and necessary; yet as the French set such a high price on it, and its weight on the political balance is so overrated by them, the King, my master, may be excused if he fails to consider the Duke's restoration to his own patrimonial dominions as a sine qua non condition of peace imposed upon the common enemy." Such was the argument of the privy councillor respecting the duke of Savoy and his estates, but it seems to us that if the king of England may be excused for failing to appreciate the importance of the restitution, he cannot be so on the ground of integrity and justice.†

As to the offers made by the French to the Emperor of a speedy and satisfactory settlement of all English claims, the aforesaid privy councillor declared to us that the King, his master, considered them quite insufficient, inasmuch as they (the French) had on former occasions offered not only to pay him in cash all arrears of debt and pension, but to deliver into his hands, as security for that payment, the towns of Montreuil, Boulogne and Ardres, promising besides to abstain in future from giving help and assistance to the Scots. True it is, as they say, that in consideration for the surrender of the above-mentioned fortified towns as a pledge, the French asked to be released in future from the payment of the annual pension they were formerly bound to pay to

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* "Mesmes celuy (celle) qui concerne le marriage de la Princesse d'Espagne avec le duc d'Orleans, et que la couronne du dit Espagne pourroit venir à la dite princesse, joint qu'il pensoit que les gens des pais bas ne seroyent contents d'avoyr un tel seigneur que le duc d'Orleans. Voire qu'il vint à dire la derniere fois que parlasmes à luy que ce seroit grant honte pour sa ma^te^ d'accepter les offres que fayseient à icelle les françoys, et que ores que sa ma^te^ fust prisonnier entre les mains des dits françoys, ilz ne luy sçauroyent offrir conditions plus prejudiciales ni ignominieuses, et qu'il seroit d'advis que sa ma^te^ se retirat sans rien conclure, joint qu'il n'estoit loing des frontieres, et [que] si besoing estoit pour favoriser la dite retraicte feroit marcher quelque nombre de ses gens selon qu'il seroit advisé."

† "Le dit sr roy louait fort que sa ma^te^ s'arrestat si soigneusement en la restitution des pays de Mons^r^ de Savoye, puisque les françoys le luy vouloyent vendre si cher. Sur quoy le dit s^r^ roy est en partie excusé pour non sçavoir l'importance de la dite restitution, mais lon ne [le] sçauroit excuser en l'endroit de l'honnesteté."

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England, and that he King should waive all his rights and pretensions to Scotland; but that condition the King refused to accept. His motives for doing so (added the privy councillor confidentially and under reserve), were secret; he would not declare them save to the Emperor himself or to Mons. de Granvelle, his minister, yet for the Emperor's sake, and considering the position of his affairs, he would do his best towards gratifying the French in that matter, and helping them in their endeavour to obtain good terms of peace, so that the Emperor may also improve his own case and profit by his (King Henry's) good offices in that respect, as he had done on previous occasions.†*

Such was the King's declaration to us at our second audience. After some slight observations on our part, which we deemed indispensable, we pointed out to him that the good offices to which he alluded had been made at the time of his declaration of war to the French ambassador in England, in conformity with the treaty of closer alliance and friendship;‡ they were entirely for the sake of the French, and for their benefit and advantage. As to more recent ambassadors of king Francis, we were not officially aware of their having made any overtures or offers whatever. They had merely stated to the King's commissioners sent for the express purpose of inquiring what their errand was, and why they came to the English camp, that their instructions were to speak to the King in private and ascertain whether he would be pleased to listen to overtures of peace from the King, their master, in consequence of which the King has this very day summoned them to his presence, with a view, no doubt, to ascertain, if he can, from them what king Francis' real intentions are with regard to peace.§

We also told him, by way of remonstrance, that the French were giving out that they would make short work of England, and grant any conditions he pleased, and we ended by representing to him as forcibly as it was in our power to do, that it was absolutely necessary for us to know what his intentions were as to peace or war with the French, in order that the Emperor might take a resolution in the matter, and not be obliged to send almost daily messengers to enquire what

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* "Mais que pour le dire en grant secret et confidentement avec protestation il ne se declaireroit qu'à sa ma^te^ ou à Mons^r^ de Grantvelle (*sic*)."

† "Il seroit content en contemplation de vre. ma^te^, voyant les termes ou icelle se trouvoit, de grattifier aux dits françoys àfin que sa ma^te^ en peult mieulx en faire son cas, comme il avoit desja faict en aultres occasions au profit de vre. ma^te^."

‡ "Luy remonstrant que cest office avoit il desja faict aux françoys par la sommation faite à l'embassadeur de France conforme au contenu du traicté de plus etroicte amitie."

§ "Et quant aux ambassadeurs françoys nouvellement venuz encoires n'ont fait offres ni ouvertures sinon en termes generaulx aux commis qu'il avoit envoyé devers eulx, disant que leur charge estoit de prealablement parler à luy, à la quelle occasion les a fait aujourd'hui venir içy esperant de tirer d'eulx plainement l'intention du roi de France en son endroit."

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*his views and intentions were.** *The King's resolute answer was the same as at other times, namely, that His Imperial Majesty might conclude a separate peace, as far as he was himself concerned, with France, provided no article should be introduced in the treaty likely to prejudice or in any manner impair the confidence, good intelligence, and sincere friendship existing between the two allies, or the treaties made for that express purpose,† he (the King), promising to do the same on his side.*

We cannot, however, omit to say that this very day [the 16th of September], a little before our conference with the King was at an end, the latter sent for the duke of Suffolk, and in our very presence rebuked him rather angrily for having said to us, whilst in reply to some argument of ours, that it was quite unreasonable to expect that after taking possession by force of arms of such a town as Boulogne—the siege of which had cost him so much money—the King, his master, should give it up to an enemy with whom he was still at war. As these words of the Duke had been uttered immediately after the King himself had told us that the French ambassadors had offered, as security for the payment of their debt, not only Boulogne, but Montreuil and Ardres also, the latter was rather displeased at it, and, as abovesaid, upbraided the Duke rather sharply.‡

We should have preferred that, instead of continually applying to His Imperial Majesty for advice in the matter, the King had decided to treat of peace with the French ambassadors separately and by himself. This, as the King himself did tell us the other day, would have removed all causes for future resentment, especially when he himself is under the impression that His Majesty, the Emperor, can and will obtain for him more advantageous conditions than he himself could demand from his enemy.§ We have not failed to represent to him how desirable it is that he take at once a resolution in this affair, and he has promised to consult his Privy Council about it; but the haste in which Mons. d'Arras is to return to the Emperor's camp, and the many

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* "Que les dits françoys donnoient à entendre qu'ilz en feroient bien avec le dit s^r roy, et qu'ilz le contenteroient entierement, luy representant au mesme temps par plusieurs fois la necessité que sa ma^te avoit de se resouldre en matiere de paix pour qu'il ne soit question sans luy delayer l'affaire ny pouvoir envoyer de par deça."

† "C'est à dire que sa ma^te pouvoit conclure en ce que touchoit à icelle, reservant tousjours qu'il ne se traictat chose prejudiciable à la confidence, intelligence, et sincere amitié entre eulx deux ni au traicté sur ce fait."

‡ "Appella le duc de Suffolk, au quel il echappa de dire sur quelques propos qu'il avoit malentendu, qu'il ne seroit point raison que le dit s^r roy quittast des mains ceste place que luy avoit tant cousté. Les quelles parolles le dit s^r roy, qui avoit parlé paravant des dits Montreuil et Ardres, ne se monstra content, ains le rebroussa ung peu asprement."

§ "Sans donner charge à son ambassadeur d'en faire poursuyte devers sa ma^te, affin d'oster toute occassion de ressentement, sachant mesmesment qu'il entend que sa ma^te doibge demander conditions avantageuses pour luy qu'il ne seroit (sçauroit) demander à ceulx-çy."

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occupations and engagements by which the King and his councillors are now surrounded, have hitherto prevented them from coming to a final resolution on this point.

On the very same day of Mons. d'Arras' arrival at this camp another mine close to the wall of the castle was set fire to and exploded, though with so little an effect that the English could not mount the breach, and were repulsed. The King, who had witnessed the attack, came back to his tent highly incensed and displeased, and not without some apprehension that the repulse of his men might be the cause of the town holding out much longer than he (the King) anticipated.† On the following day,‡ however, the governor§ of the place sent a parley and offered to capitulate for its surrender. The offer was accepted and the capitulation signed on the afternoon of the* **14th.** ***A copy of it will be inclosed if we receive it before the departure of this courier, if not it shall be forwarded separately, in order that Your Majesty may apprise the Emperor in detail, together with a full account of the form and manner in which the French garrison inside of it went out, and the number of those who remained behind in charge of the artillery and provisions.***

It appears that the King is thinking of personally going to his camp before Montreuil in order to press the siege of the place, and, if possible, carry it by storm, which would be a most splendid and glorious feat of arms to achieve, and very desirable under present circumstances, on many reasons which Your Majesty may appreciate much better than we ourselves can.—Camp sur Boulogne, 16 September **1544.**‖

Signed : "Eustace Chapuys" and "Jean de Montmorency."

French. Original. Mostly ciphered. 8 *pp.*

Indorsed : "Lettre chiffrée des ambassadeurs en Angleterre pour M^me^ la Royne de Hongrie."

199–

— Sept. **200.** The IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

There was inside Boulogne at its surrender a garrison composed of about 14,000 men, mostly foreigners (*soudards*

* That is on the 11th of September. *See* above, p. 333.

† "Que l'effort des anglois ne fust tel que le dit s^r^ roy pensoit, dont il en revint (s'en resent ?), et aussi avec quelque craincte pour le reboutement de ses gens de non empourter ceste ville si tost qu'il pensoit."

‡ On the 11th.

§ Jacques de Coucy, sieur de Verbins or Vervins, in Picardy.

‖ It is to be regretted that the first paragraphs of this most interesting despatch to the queen of Hungary be missing, for had it been found in the Imperial Archives at Vienna we might have been able to judge with greater certainty of what passed at the English camp before Boulogne, between king Henry and the bishop of Arras. That the latter arrived at the camp on the 11th and saw the King on the 12th we are informed by his two colleagues (p. 335, No. 187), but what he himself said to the King, or what answer he received we are not told, for the bishop left on the 14th. No doubt on his return to the Emperor, as his colleagues wrote on that very day (p. 336), he drew up an official account of his mission, but if he did so it has not been preserved.

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estrangiers), and about 600 of the people of that town or its immediate neighbourhood capable of bearing arms. The cause of the governor's surrender seems to have been that he and garrison could no longer resist the fire of the English batteries, from which, we are told, no less than one hundred thousand shots were fired, besides which the English had already gained possession of part of the ramparts by effecting breaches in the walls. The garrison, as it appears, had orders from the king of France to hold out for six weeks until the promised reinforcements had arrived, but these never came, and when they surrendered the siege had already lasted two months. They left behind them many gun-carriages (*charettes*), but hardly any artillery.—Boulogne, September 1544.

Signed: "J. de Montmorency" and "Eustace Chapuys."

French. *Original.* 1 *p.**

17 Sept. **201.** HIGH COMMANDER COBOS to MONS. DE GRANVELLE.

S. E. L. 64, f. 95.

Has received his lordship's ciphered letter of the 23rd of June,† asking for particulars of the Emperor's conversation with the duke of Alba at Madrid respecting Milan and its government, to which letter, however, he (Cobos) will have little to answer, having already stated his opinion in writing whenever he has been asked. The duke ‡ persists in his former assertion, namely, that the last time the Emperor spoke to him about the government of Milan, it was *not* stipulated that should he be appointed to that post he was to resign his charge of Lord High Steward to His Imperial household. That, he says, was never mentioned in conversation, nor would he have accepted the government of Milan on such conditions. The only thing the Emperor said on the subject was, that should he decide to appoint a governor for the duchy of Milan, he would certainly think of him for that post, and this was said with every demonstration of good will and affection on the part of the Emperor, adding that

* Immediately after the above despatch of the 16th, this one follows as a supplement or postscriptum to it. Could it be the account of the capitulation and surrender of Boulogne, which, as stated therein, the Imperial ambassadors expected to receive from the Privy Council before the departure of the courier bearer of their despatch of the 16th? That may be, and yet the gross exaggeration about the number of shots fired by the English artillery (*cent mille cops de cannon*), and other statements not in accordance with English or French accounts, afford sufficient reasons for suspecting that, unable to procure before the departure of the courier the promised official account of the capitulation and surrender of Boulogne, they took a hasty note of the events according to the news circulating in the English camp.

† Not in Simancas nor in Paris.

‡ "El duque siempre está en que la postrera vez que con su mag^{d} habló en esto no quedó que habiendose de dar à el se entendia que fuese dexando el cargo de mayor domo mayor, que esto nunca lo pensó, sino que quando su mag^{d} lo oviesse de proveer ternia memoria de el con demostracion de muy buena voluntad, y que le avisaria de lo que se oviesse de hazer."

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the case being, he (the duke) would receive instructions as to what had to be done there. Such is the duke's declaration as to what passed between the Emperor and him at Madrid. He is, however, confident that in that or in any other charge His Imperial Majesty is sure to utilize his services.

As to Don Ferrante [Gonzaga], he (Cobos) has no doubt of his being one of the candidates for that high post, and that he was summoned to Court expressly for that; but events have happened since to prevent altogether his nomination. If the Emperor, as he (Mons. de Granvelle) says, is free and disengaged in this matter, he will, when the time comes, appoint either the one or the other; no better choice could be made. The duke might perhaps be missed here in Spain and his (Cobos') impression is that, although the post of governor of the duchy of Milan is a highly honorable and responsible one, and the duke would be glad to get it, yet he will not be offended by the Emperor conferring it upon some other personage, and will continue to do service here in Spain or elsewhere. If ever the Emperor decides to appoint a governor the duke ought to be written to.

His last letters must have informed him (Granvelle) of the state of things here, in Spain. He (Cobos) is not a man to start new difficulties, much less in the Emperor's path, and yet what he is going to say is of such importance that I cannot conscientiously forbear from mentioning it. There is not one ducat left in all these kingdoms of Spain, nor whence to get it for this year and the next, and even for the third, considering that the budget of 1546 will have to be spent on the galleys of Prince Doria and Spain, and foreigners (*forasteros*), besides other expenses, like public works and so forth, and the interest to be paid to bankers and merchants for their loans. Something may in the meantime happen to disarrange all our plans, because though all here are the Emperor's true and faithful servants, will they offer us help in procuring money, for that becomes a matter of conscience, and there are not wanting friars—ugly customers enough *—to preach to the people not to pay. Indeed, some are so inconsiderate as to imagine that the surest means for obliging the Emperor to reside in these realms of Spain consists in not granting him so much money as they have voted for his foreigners' services. Notwithstanding that, all that can be done in the matter has been done; he (Cobos) is set down as a wicked man without conscience, who is doing all the harm he can to his fellow Christians. God only knows how much I wish that your lordship may persuade His Imperial Majesty to take some good resolution in foreign affairs, and come to reside among us, for if anything happens (which

* "Porque aunque acá todos son verdaderos servidores de su mag^{d}, ayudaran poco à lo que es menester quanto à provision de dineros, y hay gran conciencia (*sic*) y no faltan frayles, que es una mala materia."

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may God forbid!) the Emperor's son (Philip) is too young yet to remedy it, although I am positively certain that the Emperor's true and faithful servants, who are not in small numbers, will do in every respect their duty.

I could not, for the repose of my conscience, whatever efforts I made, forbear writing to your lordship on the subject, and reporting on the true state of this country. My letter being ciphered, I have omitted for brevity's sake some details which your lordship may read in that which I write to the Emperor; if necessary, this may be shown to our master, provided no other person sees it.—Valladolid, 17 September 1544.

Signed: "Francisco de los Cobos."

Spanish. Original in cipher. 3 *pp.*

17 Sept. **202.** PRINCE PHILIP to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

S. E. L. 68, f. 78.

Your despatch of the 10th of July, as well as your letter* to the High Commander (Cobos) of the same date, informing me (*sic*) and him of the Emperor's progress, and of events in England and Scotland, were duly received; We thank you for them. We have, however, no direct news from the Imperial camp, and though We are expecting them daily, We still are anxious to hear how the overtures for peace made by the French have ended, and what has been the result of them.

Here [in Spain] things are going on as smoothly as could be desired. It is true that some time ago a rumour was afloat that Monsr. de Labrit† had actually come to Bayonne for the purpose of making levies of men there and in the adjoining districts, with a view to invade Navarre and try to surprise some towns or other in that kingdom; but it has since been ascertained that the aforesaid Monsr. de Labret is now somewhere in Gascony. He has no foreign troops with him, and if so, any attack on his part, in case he pressed the frontier, would be of no importance at all, besides which, should he attempt to go out of Narbonne he is sure to come to grief, for the viceroy of Catalonia writes to say that he is quite prepared and ready to meet him, and will, on the contrary do all possible harm to the French on the Rousillon frontier. He (the Viceroy) writes that he will not limit himself as hitherto, to the defence of Catalonia; he will, if he finds a favourable opportunity, cross the frontier and attack the enemy in his own territory.

My kind regards to the princess of England (Mary).

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* No. 149, p. 243, and No. 150, p. 245.
† Henri II. d'Albret, titular king of Navarre.

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I sincerely congratulate you for the abbey of St. Angel,* which the Emperor has granted to you.—Valladolid, 17 September 1544.

Indorsed: "Minuta de carta al embajador en Inglaterra, Eustaqio (*sic*) Capucho (*sic*)."

Spanish. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

20 Sept. **203.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Messieurs,"—This will be to inform you of the fact that this very morning the Sieur de La Voessane arrived here [at Brussels] with a letter of the 14th inst.† from the Emperor, announcing that peace with France has been concluded. The Emperor has delayed taking any decisive steps in that matter until the return of the Sieur d'Arras, as he wished to know beforehand what resolution the king of England had come to. You will tell the King that he, himself, is comprised in it; but that as the articles of the treaty, not yet drawn out, are signed by the parties when Voeseur (*sic*) left, His Imperial Majesty could not give Us the particulars. This, notwithstanding, We could not fail to inform you of the fact that you may with proper discretion announce it to the King, at the same time giving him to understand that the Emperor, having heard from the mouth of the Sieur d'Arras what the King's answer was when consulted on the subject, has actually concluded peace with France. You will also tell him that the Emperor, Our brother, has done and will do his utmost for the observance of the closest possible friendship between himself and his ally, which friendship His Imperial Majesty intends and wishes to observe most faithfully on his own side. We, however, ask you most particularly to watch the King's countenance when you make him the above communication, and impart the said news to him.

The above-mentioned Sieur de Voesane (*sic*) tells Us that on his passage through St. Quentin he heard that king Francis was sending part of his army towards Montreuil, and that there was a rumour of the Dauphin (Henri de Valois) being about to start in the same direction. Although We have no certainty of this, yet the sincere friendship We entertain towards the King prompts Us to inform you of the said news that you, yourself, may apprise the King, if you deem it advisable and convenient.

The English ambassador here has just this moment

* In May or June of 1543, after the conclusion and ratification of the treaty of closer alliance and friendship with England, Chapuys was rewarded with the abbey of Saint Angelo in Naples.

† "Que ce matin est içy arrivé le Sieur de La Voessane avecq lettres de l'Empereur." If this Sieur de La Voessane—whose name is also written in the same letter *Voesseur* and *Voesen* (Whessen?)—arrived in Brussels, with the Emperor's letter to his sister dated the 14th, the Bishop's return from Boulogne must have taken place on that very day.

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announced to Us the surrender of Boulogne; please do congratulate the King on that event, and tell him that no news could have been more agreeable to Us. As to his (the King's) thanks for Our having ordered at his request, the release of the Italian prisoners, it is a thing for which no thanks are due; We shall always be ready to do that and a good deal more for the King's sake.

With regard to the warships, equipped and fitted out in these parts, We hear that they are already out; though, as the sea is large and wide, We cannot exactly determine their whereabouts. We wish, however, to inform you that, when the ships returned from their last expedition, the soldiers (*gens de guerre*) on board of them complained that they had remained many days on the Dover coast without doing any service at all, which We then considered reasonable enough, owing to that King's intended passage and in accordance with the treaty of closer alliance. The ships shall not remain between Calais and Dover, but sail along the coast of the enemy's country. Those are the orders We have now given to the admiral in command of them, and it is to be hoped that they will be complied with. The ships, therefore, may probably have done what the king of England wants them to do without letting him know, but, as abovesaid, until their return We cannot say where they have been or are at present. With this explanation on Our part you can make the most gracious excuses possible for Our inability to comply at present with the King's request.—20 September 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

20 Sept. **204.** NEWS from the EMPEROR'S CAMP and the PEACE with FRANCE.

P. Arch. Nat. Simancas.

On Friday the 28th of August, the Emperor being six leagues from Xalons in France, Anibalt (Claude d'Annebault), admiral of France, the Grand Chancellor,* and a secretary of king Francis, Claude de l'Auberpine,† came to the Imperial Camp with a safe-conduct, previously obtained from the Emperor. With them came upwards of seventy French knights

* Monsr. Erraut de Chemans, Chancellor of France, who was at the same time "Garde des Sceaux" (Lord Privy Seal), and President of the Parliament of Paris. Sandoval (*lib.* XXVI., Vol. II., p. 507) calls the French commissioners: *Anibaldo, el Almirante, Carlos Nullio, y Bayardo* (Gilbert Bayard). The one whom the good bishop of Pamplona calls *Carlos Nullio*, can be no other than "Charle de Neuilly," who was only Master of Requests at the time, and perhaps also Garde Sceaux *ad interim*, for Father Daniel, in his *Histoire de France*, Vol. V., p. 412, says that in consequence of Neuilly having slapped the face of Fr. Gabriel de Guzman, the Dominican, during the conference that preceded the peace of Crepy, Neuilly, whom he calls *Etienne* instead of Charle, lost the chance of becoming Chancellor of France, to which charge he would certainly have been promoted had not Cardinal de Tournon, then at the head of affairs in France, conferred it on another. Both Du Thou (Vol. VII., p. 346) and Simonde de Sismondi (Vol. XVII.) confirm the fact.

† According to Father Daniel (*loco laudato*, XVII.) it was not L'Aubespine, but Gilles, or Gilbert, Bayard, another of Francis' secretaries, who accompanied the Admiral and the Chancellor on this occasion.

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(*caballeros*). Gonzaga and Monseigneur de Granvelle, accompanied by Alonso de Idiaquez and another of the Emperor's secretaries, went out of the Imperial Camp to receive them. They all met in a church one quarter of a league from the camp, where a conversation took place between them as to the means of putting an end to the war. During the meeting the French knights with their white and the Spaniards with their red crosses, kept up an amicable conversation together either on the glorious practice of warfare or on the advantages of peace, most of them being in favour of the latter. Nothing, however, was done at the meeting, the admiral, chancellor, and secretary returning as they had come, being accompanied part of the way by Don Alvaro de Sande and one thousand Spanish hackbutiers. On the following day, which was Saturday, a rumour having been spread that peace was about to be made, the vanguard of the Imperial army continued its march towards Xalons (Chalons), and the Sunday after pitched their tents half a league from that town. Here a skirmish took place, at which thirty Frenchmen were taken prisoners, the Imperialists arriving soon in front of the town, whose walls and fortifications they began to reconnoitre. Then it was that Fray Gabriel de Guzman, a Dominican friar, came to the Emperor, and either on behalf of His Holiness the Pope, or of king Francis himself, as asserted, made overtures of peace, which were accepted under certain preliminary conditions. Immediately after, the Admiral (Hannebault), the Chancellor, keeper of the Seals, and the king's Secretary made their appearance at the Imperial Camp, whilst Ferrante Gonzaga, Monseigneur de Granvelle, and Secretary Idiaquez met them at a castle of the bishop of Chalons (Robert de Lenoncourt), a quarter of a league from that town. Though the conference lasted from noon to night, nothing was concluded On the following day (Tuesday) the Imperial Camp moved on towards Paris, passing on one side of Xalons (Chalons), and distant enough from it not to be offended by the artillery of the place. The Imperial army did not cross the Marne, but, leaving Xalons (Chalons) behind and following that river bank, advanced upon Perne (Epernay) and Casteo-Tier (Cateau-Thierry), where the enemy kept their stores of provisions. Though the two above-mentioned towns had garrisons sufficiently strong to wait at least for an attack, the French on the appearance of our scouts abandoned them precipitously, after setting fire to the stores, and fled in the direction of a town near which the Dauphin's army was encamped. Enough bread and wine was, however, saved to last our men for some days. From Chateau-Thierry our army proceeded to Chastelon (Chatillon sur Marne), a large walled town, which made little or no defence at all, and thence to Soissons. Castellon (*sic*) is only 17 leagues distant from Paris, so that had our horses been in better condition,

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and able to run faster, surely we should have reached the gates of that capital, made acquaintance with the enemy, and most likely taken possession of their houses.* The Emperor arrived at Soissons on Sunday the 17th. He did not go into the town, but took up his lodgings at an abbey in the neighbourhood, called San Juan de las Viñas (St. Jean des Vignes),† where he stayed three whole days waiting for news. Here a report circulated in the camp, the substance of which was that the inhabitants of Paris were flying in all directions, carrying away with them their valuables. There it was also that the admiral of France, Anibalt (Claude d'Hannebault), this time coming expressly with a message from king Francis, renewed his proposals of peace, and the peace between our master, the Emperor, and the king of France was concluded, the publication being made next day at a place of the neighbourhood called Crespio (Crepy).—[Soissons], 20th of September 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

20 Sept. **205.** ADVICES from FRANCE.

S. E. Francia. L. 68.

After the taking of San Desir (St. Dizier)‡ the Emperor, our King and master, leaving a sufficient garrison in it under a field-marshal of his army with orders to have that town further strengthened and revictualled, decided to continue his march on Paris. On the 18th of August he left St. Dizier and after a few slight skirmishes with the enemy, and sacking and burning on his march towns and villages, reached La Chaussée, four leagues distant from a large town of that country called Xalon (Chalons). This, however, he would not attack, though he approached it, not so much because the season being far advanced and the town strong he feared the defence might be stout, and his own advance to Paris consequently retarded, but also, because having heard that king Francis and the Dauphin, his son, were encamped not far off, he wished above all things to give them battle. Having, therefore, issued orders that the very moment that the marquis of Brandenburgh's drums sounded in the distance the whole camp would be raised and both infantry and cavalry ready to march, he, suddenly, and without the enemy being aware of it, continued the road to Paris. In this manner the Germans and Spaniards under his commanders marched the whole

* "Y si nuestros caballos hubieran estado en mejor condicion y podido correr mas à priso à buen seguro que nuestra gente hubiera llegado à las mismas puertas de Paris, hecho conocimiento con su enemigo, y quizá tambien echadole de su casa."

† "Alli mesmo, en una abadia que llaman San Juan de las Viñas y está puesta en una barriada de Solson (*sic*) fue ajustada la paz entre el Emperador y el Rey de Francia, en Crespio (Crepy) un lugarejo de las cercanias, les qualos al dia a siguiente que fue, que fué el 19 del mes, se publicaron en el campo."

‡ After a comparatively long siege, during which Capt. La Lande, who commanded the garrison, was killed, the town surrendered on the 8th of August. *See* above, p. 269.

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of the night until they arrived in sight of the enemy who happened to be encamped on the opposite side of the river [Marne].

On the very same day the road by which the French army received provisions was occupied by our men, as well as the towns of Catiotero (Chateau Thierry) and Perne (Epernay) on the Marne, where the greater part of their stores were kept. In the latter place no less than 500 barges, laden to the top with flour, wine and other provisions, were found, which were mostly wasted or destroyed by the Emperor's orders. Enough, however, was saved to feed this army for several days, though upwards of 200 casks of wine were spilt for fear of the Germans getting drunk, and thereby becoming unruly and insolent, as they did partially on the occasion.* In fact, though we were never in want of food during this French campaign, owing to this year's harvest in wheat and barley having been plentiful, and to the good management and administration of the purveyor general, yet I must own that we were at one time rather apprehensive of the worst coming to pass, especially as there was then a rumour afloat in this camp that king Francis had ordered the crops to be destroyed or burned in all the districts surrounding the capital of his kingdom, with a view, no doubt, to oblige us to retreat or die of hunger. But either these orders were not issued, as it was said, or else the soil of France is wonderfully fertile, for we found everywhere plenty of food and provisions for all of us.

At this place it was published throughout the camp that a pitched battle would soon be fought, owing to there being only one narrow bridge across the river, and the absolute necessity there was of hastily throwing up other bridges for the passage of the artillery; besides which, as our army had proceeded along the right side of the Marne two leagues beyond the French position on the left bank, in order to meet the enemy strongly entrenched, as he was, between two rivers surrounded by marshes (*pantanos*), we could not do less than cross two other rivers which, though not so considerable and deep as the Marne, might still offer some difficulty in a strategetic point of view. If to this be added that on hearing of our army having crossed the Marne, and marching against the French, the latter might suddenly raise their tents and go away in the direction of the Valois,† there was no probability of the Emperor

* "Tomóseles el mesmo dia el paso de las vituallas que venian rio arriba y la villa de Perne donde hacian la massa dellas, y hallaronse en el rio mas de quinientas barcas de harinas y otras provisiones y en el lugar tantas que bastaron para proveer nuestro exercito muchos dias y sobraron, porque el Emperador mandó que se derramasen mas de 2,000 botas de vino porque los alemanes no se apoderasen dellas; que comencaban ya á se revolver como suelen hacerlo." Sandoval in his History of the Emperor (*lib.* XXVI., pp. 505-7) speaks at length of the indiscipline of the German mercenaries on this occasion.

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deciding to attack the French, which military operation would take at least two or three days. He, therefore, thought that it was far preferable to follow the right bank of the Marne, because should provisions for his army become scarce or fail altogether—for according to news brought by confidents the King's camp on the other side of the Marne are beginning already to feel the want of them—it would have been necessary to change the route to Paris. These are the considerations which obliged the Emperor to insist on his former determination.

In this manner did our army march in the direction of Paris, it being published throughout the camp that the Emperor's intention was still to enter that capital, or oblige its defenders to engage in a pitched battle; which resolution* was so much to the taste of our countrymen, that all were glad and full of spirits at the mere idea of obliging king Francis to desert his capital, which might have been accomplished had our cavalry in the vanguard run faster.†

At Soissons, or in its immediate neighbourhood, the Emperor stayed from the 14th to the 17th, during which time overtures of peace were made by the admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault) and other French ministers, the Emperor having deputed the duke of Molfelta (Ferrante de Gonzaga) and Monseigneur de Granvelle, his Lord Privy Seal, to hear what the French commissioners had to say. The conferences took place at an abbey of the neighbourhood called Nuestra Señora de las Vinasd, and ended in a peace with king Francis, which was published two days after, on the 19th, at Crepy.—[Soissons] 20 September 1544.

Spanish. Contemporary copy. 3 *pp.*

21 Sept. **206–7.** The QUEEN OF HUNGARY to the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS AT BOULOGNE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Messieurs,"—We have this moment received the enclosed letter from the Emperor,‡ with orders to forward it to you after adding or suppressing in it whatever We may deem necessary or convenient. The affair treated in it is so important that We willingly refrain from making any alterations save to warn you that in executing the charge which His Imperial Majesty entrusts to you the utmost care

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* "La qual resolucion puso de tan buen talante à nuestra gente, y con tan buena voluntad que todos se alegraron de ir á Paris, y sacar al Rey Francisco de su casa, dando ya la cosa como hecha y efectuada, y asi lo hubieran logrado si los caballos de la vanguardia hubieran corrido un poco mas."

† Compare the preceding letter (No. 204) by another camp correspondent, who says distinctly "had our horses been in better condition, &c." This and other passages of the two "Relaciones" or "Avisos," as these early specimens of periodical newspapers were then called, are not the production of the same pen, as it might at first sight be presumed.

‡ No. 204, pp. 347, 348.

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and dexterity must needs be used by you two, so as to be able to declare the contents of the Emperor's letter to the King alone in private, and without the presence of any of his privy councillors. In exposing the object of your charge you shall take care not to lay so much stress on the necessity in which the Emperor was of condescending to treat with the French, nor on the King's fault in not observing what Secretary Paget had fully promised in his name. You shall avoid calling the French "newly reconciled friends," but you shall do your best, by aid of the most gracious and sweetest words you can think of, to persuade the King that His Imperial Majesty has completely fulfilled his duty on this occasion, followed to the letter the treaty of closer alliance with the king of England, and acted in conformity with the answer which he himself gave to the bishop of Arras when consulted on the subject; that having regard to the state and disposition of public affairs, and considering also that the King had already taken possession of Boulogne, and that the season was so far advanced that it was impossible to keep the field much longer, His Imperial Majesty had been obliged to accede to the proposed peace.

This much you will say to the King in private, if you possibly can, all the time making use of the reasons, arguments, and persuasions otherwise contained in the Emperor's letter to you two, and affording the King as complete a satisfaction and contentment as you can, and which We have no doubt you know how to do. But you must take care above all not to give the King, or to any of his privy councillors, in writing, any of the contents of the Emperor's letter to you touching the above-mentioned points, save perhaps what concerns the article of the treaty, which is sent separately. And should the King ask you to declare your charge before his Privy Council, you will do it in the most summary way possible.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

22 Sept. **208.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS and DE COURRIÈRES to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—Yesterday, very early in the morning (*au prime*), these privy councillors gave us in writing the result of their conference with the French ambassadors, as Your Majesty will see by the enclosed memorandum.* They seemed, however, very much disappointed and sorry, as Your Majesty will judge from what will be said lower down,† at their not

* Not found in the Imperial Archives.

† "Et se sont bien pris par le becq les dits du Conseil de ce que plus ne les avoient monstré, comme pourra vre. mte entendre par ce que dessoubz sera dit."

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having given a fuller and more detailed account of what passed between them and the French ambassadors.

The time and place of the conference having been fixed, the Cardinal and his colleagues went to the council and stated the opinion—which, they said, was also shared by some of the privy councillors—that one of the ambassadors, namely, secretary L'Aubespine, should be dispatched to king Francis in order to give him notice of the meeting, and at the same time ascertain his will and intentions. To this proposition of the French ambassadors, backed, it was rumoured, if not entirely made at their solicitation, the privy councillors readily assented; but when the ambassadors applied for a copy of the English articles, signed by the King himself, it was flatly refused. What may have been the cause of the refusal we cannot guess. Certain it is that when the French ambassadors applied as aforesaid for a certified copy of the conditions under which the king of England would consent to make peace—the copy itself being signed by him—and requested that in a similar manner a copy of the French articles, also signed by king Francis, should be forwarded to the Emperor, together with a letter stating that the king of England found the overtures and offers of the French, as he said to Monsr. d'Arras, very fair and reasonable (*très honestes et raisonables*), and approved of them, they (the French) were unable, notwithstanding all their efforts, to gain their point, the privy councillors persisting in their former refusal, and declaring that, supposing, as they themselves believed, that the Emperor would take the greatest care in an affair which touched so much his honour and reputation, the King their master had left entirely to him the management and settlement of it. It was not (the councillors said) for the King their master to dictate terms for the Emperor's use in making his peace with the French,* sure as he was that, being so virtuous a prince, and so desirous of promoting the welfare and peace of Christendom at large, he would not fail to accept the French conditions of peace even if they were not wholly rèasonable.

Then the French, perceiving that they could not carry their point, asked the privy councillors what they themselves thought or knew of the Emperor's inclination to a ready settlement of their differences with England, and whether he approved or not of the overtures they had made. The councillors' answer to that question was in conformity with the declaration once made to Monsr. d'Arras, and with what

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* "Et leur fust respondu que se dit s^r roy presupposoit que sa ma^te de l'empereur auroit son mieulx regard en tout ce que luy competeroit et toucheroit son honneur et reputation *et que à luy n'estoit de coupper les morceaulx à sa dite ma^te ne* luy persuader de condescendre à nulle condicion, mesmes saichant que sa ma^te pour estre prince si vertueux et qu'avoit tant pour recommandé le bien et repost (*sic*) de la Chretienté ne refuseroit condicions ores qu'elles ne fussent que à demy raisonables."

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we ourselves had told them a few days before, that is to say, that His Imperial Majesty, at the departure of Monsr. d'Arras [for Boulogne], had not yet gone so far into the affair as to be able to say at once whether the conditions offered by the French were or were not acceptable, for he (the Emperor) was then altogether unacquainted with the will and intentions of the English King, and, therefore, could express no opinion in the matter.*

Instead of the letter, for which they had applied in vain, the French ambassadors asked next for one to the English ambassador at the Imperial Court, telling him that the Emperor might proceed with his own negociations for peace on the terms specified to Monsr. d'Arras, namely, that no harm should be done to the friendship and the treaties of the two allies.

This last request of the French ambassadors was easily granted, and on the 17th inst. a courier of the King started in company with the aforesaid secretary Aulbespine (*sic*), this latter having promised to return in eight days' time with king Francis' answer.

On the 19th, about 9 or 10 o'clock of the night,† the French ambassadors called upon the duke of Suffolk to say that they had received from the King their master a letter dated Paris, the 17th, purporting that the summary account of their conference with the privy councillors had been duly received, but that the conditions of peace asked by England seemed to him excessive and over harsh. He (king Francis) could not believe that the king of England, with whom he had always lived on terms of intimate friendship, would now stop at such trifles. They (his ambassadors) should make every effort to have the English conditions moderated or reduced as much as possible, and at the same time try to ascertain to the utmost what king Henry's intentions were respecting the peace. The French King's letter to his ambassadors, as the latter stated, had besides a holograph postscript of this tenour: "After mature consideration, I think that nothing can be done in this affair of the peace [with England] without previously seeing my ambassadors and talking with them on the subject, the more so that I have not now at this my court any minister sufficiently acquainted with the political relations between England and France in later times."

In corroboration of this last sentence of king Francis' postscript, the Cardinal and his colleagues alleged the death

* "Vindrent à demander aux dits du Conseil qu'est ce qu'ilz presupposoient de la voulenté et inclination de sa ma^te^ [imperiale] touchant les ouvertures à icelle faictes; à quoy leur fust respondu conforme à ce que Monsr. d'Arras et nous leur avions dit [à sçavoir] que sa ma^te^ n'estoit venu tant avant au partement de Monsr. d'Arras que de se vouloir resouldre sur les dits offres pour non sçavoir la voulenté et bon plaisir du dit s^r^ roy."

† "Environ les IX ou X heures de la nuit."

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of admiral Çhabaut,* who had been, as they said, the register-book keeper of all the political affairs and transactions with England for the last few years and likewise that of the lawyer who held lately the office of High Chancellor in France,† the absence and illness of Marillac,‡ formerly French ambassador in England, and last, not least, the disgrace and banishment from court of the High Constable and Grand Master of France (Anne de Montmorency), whose papers had been sequestered.

In addition to this, the French ambassadors stated that king Francis' letter to them contained positive orders for their immediate return to France, warning them three times over that he, the king of France, their master, would listen to no overtures of peace until all and every one of them had returned home.

For this purpose did the Cardinal and his colleagues, as aforesaid, visit the duke of Suffolk on the 19th inst., begging him to solicit the King's permission to leave for France and take his orders if he had any to give. As it was a late hour when the Cardinal and his colleagues called, the Duke promised that next day he would report in Council what his wish was in obedience to his master's commands, so that the King might at once be apprized of his intention to quit and return home.

Next day, the 20th, the privy councillors, whether of their own accord or after consulting the King we cannot exactly tell, sent to the French ambassadors a message to this effect: that since they had promised, or, at least, tacitly consented, not to quit before the return of L'Aubespine and the English courier, who went in his company, they found it very strange and a downright mockery (*chose estrange et ouverte mocquerie*) to insist now on their immediate departure without waiting two or three days more for the return of L'Aubespine and courier,§ when the term of time assigned for their mission to the French court would expire. Had the king of France (they said) been informed in time of the above particulars, surely he would not have recalled you before the expiration of that term.

Notwithstanding the above and other similar arguments, the French ambassadors persisted obstinately in their determination, at the same time declaring that, should they be refused

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* Philippe de Brion-Chabot, who died in March 1543, and was succeeded by Claude d'Hannebault.

† François de Montholon, President of the Parliament of Paris and High Chancellor of France, who died in June 1543, and was succeeded by Errault de Chemans.

‡ Charles de Marillac, from April 1539 to April 1543.

§ "Au dit lendemain iceulx du dit Conseil ne sçavons si par leur mouvement, ou apres avoir parlé au dit s[r] roy, envoyarent (*sic*) devers les dits ambassadeurs pour leur remonstrer entre aultres choses que puis qu'ilz avoient promis, du moins tacitement, qu'ilz ne partiroient avant le retour des dits Aulbepine et courier, c'estoit chose estrange et ouverte mocquerie de maintenant vouloir partir sans actendre (*sic*) deux ou trois jours."

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leave to depart, they would protest against the violence done to them, and the non-observance of the safe-conducts. Which declaration, uttered as it was by the Cardinal in rather an intemperate and sharp tone of voice, was little to the taste of the privy councillors, who happen to be now in a state of great perplexity, as Your Majesty will judge by what follows.*

In the afternoon of the 21st, at the request and prayer of the privy councillors themselves, my colleague (Monsr. de Courrières) and I went to the Council rooms, together with the duke of Alburquerque,† who was also invited. After relating to us what had passed between them and the French ambassadors, they (the privy councillors) asked us what our opinion was respecting their behaviour towards the French ambassadors, and whether they were or were not justified in acting as they had done in the name of their Royal master, who (they said) in matters so important as the present, which bore on his honour and reputation, wished always to show himself such as he was, a virtuous and just prince. They, therefore, requested us three to advise and tell them in plain terms whether we thought that their Royal master would be justified, if, in order to avoid being laughed at in future and without infraction of the safe-conduct, he (the King) retained the French ambassadors next his person. To this question of the privy councillors my colleague and I, after many excuses and protests of our insufficiency to decide on such matters, answered that in our opinion the King, their master, could delay the departure of the said French ambassadors until the return of secretary L'Auberpine and of the courier, who was dispatched at the same time with him, and, above all, until it was known here, at the Camp, that Monsr. d'Arras had actually reached the Imperial Court. This last reason, among others, we alleged in support of our opinion, owing to the King, while discussing the matter with us, having positively stated that he had requested the Bishop to wait at the Camp before Boulogne until the letter he himself was about to write to the Emperor should be ready.‡ On the other hand we thought that the retention (*la dite retinue*) would be of small importance since it would only last three or four days at the utmost. Even if the King chose to retain the ambassadors

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* "Mais quoique sçussent alleger les dits du Conseil iceulx ambassadeurs persistarent (*sic*) obstinantment de vouloir partir, et qu'en cas de reffus ilz estoient deliberez de protester de la violation et inobservance de leur saufconduit. Les quels propos furent trouvez bien aigres pour (par) les dits du Conseil, et en demourant (demeurerent?) en perplexité, comme vfe. ma^te^ pourra entendre par ce que s'en suyt."

† Don Beltran II de la Cueva, third duke of Alburquerque or Albuquerque, about whom see Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 201–2, whose arrival in London took place on the 24th of March (No. 36, p. 84).

‡ "Par les quelles le dit s^r^ roy pourroit delayer le retour des dits ambassadeurs jusques au retour des dits Aubespine et courrier, et que l'on sçeu[t] l'arrivée de Monsr. d'Arras devers sa ma^te^ suyvant ce que le dit s^r^ roy nous avoit dit quant il pria le dit s^r^ d'Arras d'actendre ses lettres."

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of admiral Çhabaut,* who had been, as they said, the register-book keeper of all the political affairs and transactions with England for the last few years and likewise that of the lawyer who held lately the office of High Chancellor in France,† the absence and illness of Marillac,‡ formerly French ambassador in England, and last, not least, the disgrace and banishment from court of the High Constable and Grand Master of France (Anne de Montmorency), whose papers had been sequestered.

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§ "Au dit lendemain iceulx du dit Conseil ne sçavons si par leur mouvement, ou apres avoir parlé au dit s^r^ roy, envoyarent (*sic*) devers les dits ambassadeurs pour leur remonstrer entre aultres choses que puis qu'ilz avoient promis, du moins tacitement, qu'ilz ne partiroient avant le retour des dits Aulbepine et courier, c'estoit chose estrange et ouverte mocquerie de maintenant vouloir partir sans actendre (*sic*) deux ou trois jours."

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leave to depart, they would protest against the violence done to them, and the non-observance of the safe-conducts. Which declaration, uttered as it was by the Cardinal in rather an intemperate and sharp tone of voice, was little to the taste of the privy councillors, who happen to be now in a state of great perplexity, as Your Majesty will judge by what follows.*

In the afternoon of the 21st, at the request and prayer of the privy councillors themselves, my colleague (Monsr. de Courrières) and I went to the Council rooms, together with the duke of Alburquerque,† who was also invited. After relating to us what had passed between them and the French ambassadors, they (the privy councillors) asked us what our opinion was respecting their behaviour towards the French ambassadors, and whether they were or were not justified in acting as they had done in the name of their Royal master, who (they said) in matters so important as the present, which bore on his honour and reputation, wished always to show himself such as he was, a virtuous and just prince. They, therefore, requested us three to advise and tell them in plain terms whether we thought that their Royal master would be justified, if, in order to avoid being laughed at in future and without infraction of the safe-conduct, he (the King) retained the French ambassadors next his person. To this question of the privy councillors my colleague and I, after many excuses and protests of our insufficiency to decide on such matters, answered that in our opinion the King, their master, could delay the departure of the said French ambassadors until the return of secretary L'Auberpine and of the courier, who was dispatched at the same time with him, and, above all, until it was known here, at the Camp, that Monsr. d'Arras had actually reached the Imperial Court. This last reason, among others, we alleged in support of our opinion, owing to the King, while discussing the matter with us, having positively stated that he had requested the Bishop to wait at the Camp before Boulogne until the letter he himself was about to write to the Emperor should be ready.‡ On the other hand we thought that the retention (*la dite retinue*) would be of small importance since it would only last three or four days at the utmost. Even if the King chose to retain the ambassadors

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* "Mais quoique sçussent alleger les dits du Conseil iceulx ambassadeurs persistarent (*sic*) obstinantment de vouloir partir, et qu'en cas de reffus ilz estoient deliberez de protester de la violation et inobservance de leur saufconduit. Les quels propos furent trouvez bien aigres pour (par) les dits du Conseil, et en demourant (demeurerent?) en perplexité, comme vre. ma^te pourra entendre par ce que s'en suyt."

† Don Beltran II de la Cueva, third duke of Alburquerque or Albuquerque, about whom see Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 201–2, whose arrival in London took place on the 24th of March (No. 36, p. 84).

‡ "Par les quelles le dit s^r roy pourroit delayer le retour des dits ambassadeurs jusques au retour des dits Aubespine et courrier, et que l'on sçeu[t] l'arrivée de Monsr. d'Arras devers sa ma^te suyvant ce que le dit s^r roy nous avoit dit quant il pria le dit s^r d'Arras d'actendre ses lettres."

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longer than he originally intended, the latter were not of such a rank and position in France that the King of that country need be offended at their having been retained at the English camp a few days beyond the date of their safe-conduct, besides which the persons who composed the embassy were not calculated by their position in the Government to obtain more favourable conditions from the king of England than others would. There was still another consideration for us to lay, as we did, before the privy councillors, namely, that whatever excuses and good reasons might be alleged for the retention of the said ambassadors, French people would be sure to spread all over the World, according to their usual practice, the news of the infraction of the safe-conduct, misrepresenting it at their pleasure, and advantageously for themselves. "To this may be added (said we to the privy councillors) that king Francis may perhaps conjecture from the retention of his embassy beyond the date fixed in the safe-conduct that the King of England is extremely desirous of peace, and perhaps considers himself unable to prosecute, and carry on the negociation of it to his advantage, or for fear of being unable to prosecute the war."

We further told the councillors that in our opinion the best and more magnanimous course to be pursued in that affair was for the King, their master, to represent to the French ambassadors the reasons he had for retaining them at his Court, and at the same time to let them know how much he himself resented their manner of proceeding in the affair. This last complaint of his, however, to be made in such words that his Royal quality, honour, and virtues, should appear more prominent than the fault committed by the ambassadors, to whose departure he has no objection whatever.*

Our speech at an end the privy councillors desired to know the opinion of the duke of Alburquerque, who, as aforesaid, had accompanied us to the Council Rooms. His advice was that the king of England should retain the French ambassadors at the Camp until the return of L'Aubespine and the courier sent with him, that is to say until His Imperial Majesty had been apprised of what had taken place here [at the Camp].

After this the councillors again asked us (De Courrières and Chapuys) whether we were of the same opinion as the Duke. Our answer was that the King, their master, was so prudent and wise and had such a remarkable set of privy councillors to aid him with their deliberations, that it seemed

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* "Et que d'ailleurs le dit roy de France pourroit conjecturer pour (par) telle retention que le dit s^r roy eust fort desir de la paix, et que cela debvoit proceder par quelque diffidence de pouvoir plus continuer la guerre ou aultres choses, et que la chose pourroit estre jurée (jugée?) plus magnanime que le dit s^r roy feist remonstrer au dits ambassadeurs la juste occasion qu'il avoit de les retenir et [de] s'en ressentir de leur façon de faire et ce neatmoins veuillant plus avoir regard à sa qualité, honneur et vertu que à la faulte d'iceulx et qu'il estoit content qu'ilz en partissent."

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to us quite unnecessary to give an opinion on matters so important as that, and, therefore, that we begged to be excused if we did not positively say which was the best course to follow in the affair. They might act as they pleased in view of the reasons that had been alleged in favour of, or against the said retention of the French ambassadors. What we ourselves could do and which appertained to our charge was to inform His Imperial Majesty, his brother, the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), and Your Majesty, the Queen Regent, of their master's justification in his dealings with the French embassy. That we promised to do immediately, and yet the privy councillors again solicited us for our advice in the matter, which we declined to give for the reasons and considerations which Your Majesty may well appreciate.

As the privy councillors still insisted on their demand, we could not help telling them that if they gave us notice in writing of the King's and their own final resolution in the affair, we would *conform with it; at which answer, on our part, they (the privy councillors) seemed as delighted and joyful as they had been formerly sad and almost angry.**

We cannot omit to say that during the conference we seized the opportunity of telling the privy councillors that in our opinion it would have been far better, and likewise more convenient, to have communicated with us before the departure of L'Aubespine and the courier, as we might then have advised with greater freedom on the whole. Had it been for no other purpose than to put the affair in order, and prevent its coming to the state in which things are at present, we (the Imperial ambassadors) should have been apprised of it. At this, our observation, the privy councillors looked at each other, and remained silent; then secretary Paget came to me and said in my ear that he himself had thought of that, and predicted what had come to pass, adding that we (the Imperial ambassadors), would most certainly resent not having received notice at the time of the Council's communications with the French ambassadors.†

The conference ended by the privy councillors again begging us to send an express messenger to Your Majesty, requesting you to use your influence over the Emperor, your brother, and persuade him to grant the King's request, and use all means in your power to let the Emperor know as soon as possible the ins and outs of this affair. This we

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* "Ce non obstant ne cesserent ilz les dits du Conseil de fere (faire) extra instance que disions nre. advis, dont nous sembla nous debvoir par les considerations que vre. mate peult penser, et n'y eust ordre de les contenter jusques à tant que leurs dismes quilz nous feissent entendre celle du roy et la leur, et que nous y condescendrons et conformerions, de la quelle response se montrarent fort joyeulx comme si estoient paravant monstrez et à demy courroucez."

† "Sur les quelz propos les conseillers commencherent à [se] regarder l'ung l'aultre, et peu apres nous dire le secretaire à l'oreille qu'il n'avoit jammais pensé moins, et l'avoit predict, que ne defauldrions donner quelque indice de resentement de non nous avoir plus tost donné avis de leur communications avec les ambassadeurs."

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promised to do, though we failed not to represent to them the many difficulties that stood in Your Majesty's way, owing to the insecurity of the road to the Imperial Camp and Court.

Shortly after our leaving the Council room we received a message from the privy councillors purporting that they had sent for the French ambassadors for the purpose of informing them officially of the result of our interview with them, and the reasons then and there alleged in justification of their master's conduct in the affair, and they requested us to take the trouble of going to the Council Rooms and being present at this interview. This my colleague (De Courrières) and I willingly granted, and accordingly went thither. Almost immediately after the archbishop of Paris (cardinal Jean du Bellay) and two of his colleagues in the embassy, namely, the President of Rouen and the sieur de Trumel, made their appearance in the room, and when every one had taken his seat the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner) addressed the French ambassadors,* in the name of the Council, the substance of his address being, as above stated, a summary of the reasons the King, his master, had for wishing them to remain at his Court a few days longer than the time fixed in their safe-conduct. The Bishop's address at an end, Cardinal Du Bellay got up and, after a long preamble touching on various topics more or less connected with the present question, said that he owned it to have been entirely the fault of his colleagues; had they listened to his advice there would have been no occasion for the present dispute, for they would all have left when L'Aubespine and the courier departed. As to what passed in the Council between him and his colleagues in the embassy on one side and the privy councillors on the other, he (the Cardinal) did not exactly recollect, his memory being rather bad. He therefore subscribed entirely to what each of the parties might allege.† As to himself, he protested that if he could, in his position of ambassador, have remained longer at the King's court he would have done it with pleasure, owing to the kindness with which the King had treated him on all occasions. But it was not in his power, nor in that of his colleagues, to put any gloss or comment upon their master's orders—their duty was to obey them implicitly; and he ended by requesting the councillors to procure from the King permission for him and his colleagues to leave and return home.

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* "Et incontinent apres survint le cardinal et deux de ses collegues, à sçavoir le president de Rouen et le Sieur de Trumel (*sic*), et estans assis chascun [en son] recoin (?) l'evesque de Wyncestre print la parolle."

† "Et ayant achevé le dit Cardinal, apres divers preambules et prohemes, dit qu'il confessoit avoir tort de ses dits collegues, les quels si leur creust (silz lavoient creu) n'eust esté question de ceste dispute, car ilz fussent tres tous deslogez quant et quant les dits Aubespine et courrier, et que touchant ce que estoit passé entre luy et ses dits collegues d'une part et d'autre avec les dits du Conseil, il avoit la memoire la belle, et pour ce sen remectoit il absolutement à ce qu'en estoit."

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To the above speech of the Cardinal the Bishop of Winchester replied that there was no need on the occasion of alluding to the articles proposed by him in his master's name; what he wanted was a formal declaration on his part and that of his colleagues in the embassy as to whether the statements he (the Bishop) had made were true or not.*

At this stage of the conference the Cardinal began visibly to get into a passion (*à colleriquer*), and tried to embroil the affair; yet in the end, and not knowing how to get out of the difficulty and defeat the Bishop's arguments, he actually came to own that the words of the latter were perfectly true.† At last, seeing himself caught, and not knowing what to reply, he suddenly changed conversation and began to speak in a passion about the English conditions for the peace, which, he said, were exceedingly harsh in general. For instance (said he) the article concerning Scotland—to demand that the king of France should renounce the alliance and stop all relations with that country—is a most strange and preposterous condition, especially when couched and laconically expressed in a few words, and it is one the like of which the Most Christian King will never subscribe to. Even when he himself or two of his children were the Emperor's prisoners such like condition was never dreamt of. "In short," continued the Cardinal, "in all the treaties and confederacies which the Most Christian King, my master, had once with the king of England, the Scots were comprised as allies and federates of both princes; and I should like to know what faith can henceforth be attached to the promises and treaties made by the king of England if he breaks his own alliances so easily and on so slight an occasion as the one I speak of."

Hearing which the Bishop replied again, and so pushed his arguments that he compelled the Cardinal and his colleagues to own that the overtures respecting the Scotch article did not originate with them, and that even those referring to Scotland proceeded originally from the French, since the Cardinal himself had offered to do his utmost for the article relating to Scotland to be accepted by the King his master, at the same time recommending its adoption to the royal deputies, both English and French, most particularly and in the warmest terms.‡ This last assertion of the bishop of

* "Qu'il n'estoit nul besoign de se remectre à l'escriptures des articles projectez, aultre les quelz avoient passez par luy recitez pour quoy convenoit que le dit Cardinal et ses collegues respondissent formellement au propoz qu'il leur avoit proposé s'ilz estoient veritables ou non."

† "Le Cardinal se commençe à colleriquer, et voulut desguiser les affaires, toutesfois à la parfin ne s'en scavit detracquer qu'il ne vint à confesser effectuellement les proposites (*sic*) du dit evesque de Winchestre [estre vraies]."

‡ "Et finallement reduist le dit Cardinal et ses collegues en termes qu'ilz luy peultroient poussent nyer bonnement que les ouvertures des dits articles ne vinssent de leur part, et mesmes celluy concernant Escosse, et que le mesme Cardinal s'estoit offert de tenir main au parachevement du dit article, et se (aussi) avoit au mesme temps prié particulierement et bien estroictement les deputez avec ceulx de la parte du dit s' roy pour tenir la main à l'effectuation des choses pourparlees."

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Winchester the Cardinal did not attempt to contradict, he only said that it was true that respecting the said Scotch article he had always, on every occasion, promised to do what he could for the adoption of the article [about Scotland]. It was also true that in conversation with the Bishop he (the Cardinal) had spoken in favour of the adoption of the article privately, and in a manner generally used among politicians, who very often for the sake of gaining the confidence and affection of those with whom they have to treat uttered words and made offers in direct opposition to their intentions and wishes; which words and promises ought by no means to be taken as the real expression of their sentiments, and be afterwards considered as obligations.

The Bishop's reply was so sharp and pointed that the Cardinal, who was already giving signs of being in a passion, could not restrain his feelings, and exclaimed: "You are like Martin, the priest, who said Mass and acted besides as his own acolyte: you wish both to speak and to cry out." The Cardinal thought, no doubt, that by addressing the Bishop in this manner he had won a sort of victory over him, since no one of the privy councillors present rose to contradict him.* As no one of the privy councillors present rose to respond to him, the Cardinal thought at first that he had gained a sort of victory over his opponent, but he was very much mistaken, and had to repent, for the Duke of Suffolk interfered, and said to him: "The words addressed by you to such a personage as the Bishop of Winchester, speaking in the King (our master's) name, are not honest and fit words; you should have a little more regard for the assembly (*compaignie*) in which you are." The Cardinal then attempted to excuse himself in a way, saying, half jokingly (*comme à demy gaudissant*), that if he had in any manner offended the members of the King's Privy Council he begged their pardon, but that he himself had heard that very morning from the lips of one of them that he pitied much those who attempted to do service to the king of France, which words secretary Paget then and there owned to have said to the Cardinal, though with some explanation of the meaning, which the Cardinal accepted and was satisfied with.

Perceiving this altercation and mutual reproaches (*altercations et picquements*) my colleague and I considered it expedient to interfere, and take a middle course between the Bishop's proposals and the obstinate refusal of the French ambassadors. This we did with fit moderation and tact, so as not to wound the feelings of the Frenchmen, and at the same time conciliating the privy councillors, which we

* "Et luy venant à replicquer le dict evesque de Whincestre (*sic*), icelluy cardinal, qui desja avoit donné indices de sa collere (*sic*) picquant le dit Wincestre (*sic*), entra alors en plus grande collere, luy disant qu'il estoit le pretre Martin, qui disoit la messe et respondoit, et qu'il vouloit tousiours parler et crier, faissant son compte d'avoir gagné la cause et victoire puisqu'il n'y avoit contradicteur."

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succeeded in doing, both parties appearing glad and satisfied with the result. Thus did the conference end, though without a final agreement being taken, save that the councillors promised to report to the King and let the ambassadors know his resolution on the whole.

As your Majesty may already have heard and also known by our despatches, what this King feels most at this bantering (*mocquerie*) of the French, as he calls it, is—as is the rumour afloat—that the news taken by the courier [who departed at the same time as L'Aubespine] could not have induced His Imperial Majesty to make his peace with the French and withdraw his army from the field, which two facts had rendered the common enemy more difficult to treat with. But on the other hand the King, as His privy councillors maintain, is so confident and trusts so implicitly in the Emperor's kindness, virtue, and friendship, that he thinks the same hostages (*hostagiers*) whom the latter will demand as security for the stipulations of his own treaty of peace with the French, will do for him."

On leaving the Council very late in the evening, together with the French ambassadors, news was received here of the arrival of 6,000 Englishmen newly raised in England, at which news the privy councillors were much rejoiced (*faisoient feste*). *We cannot guess what may be the cause of their rejoicing, for after all the season is so far advanced that it seems as if it were time to be sending part of the army back to England rather than calling for reinforcements. The measure, however, seems to be in direct opposition to what the privy councillors themselves told me a few days ago, namely, that the period of time during which the allies were bound to keep the field was about to expire in* 10 *or* 12 *days. There is no appearance yet of the King marching again* (remarche) *towards Montreuil; nor do we know whether the arrival of the* 6,000 *men above alluded to will invite him to do so.** *Of this, as well as of other events, we shall not fail to apprise Your Majesty.*

Just at this moment we received a verbal message from the King, thanking us (my colleague and me) for our good offices in the affair of the French ambassadors, whom he intends, as it seems to us, retaining here till after L'Aubespine's return, and that of the courier at the same time.† Of whatever may occur in this and other affairs, we shall not fail to inform Your Majesty.

The King has this very morning received intelligence of the

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* "Et ne scavons a quelle occasion veu que la saisson requeroit plustost d'en envoyer gens que d'en faire venir, et est bien diversea chose de ce que les dits du Conseil nous dirent dernierement, a sçavoir que le terme de tenir les champs expiroit dans dix ou douze jours. Il n'y a mesmes apparence que le dit s^r roy remerche (*sic*) devers Monstrueil, ne sçavons si la supervenance des dits six mille hommes l'incitera à ce faire."

† "Les quels à ce que nous semble [il] entend de retenir plus longuement que le retour du dit Aubespine et courier, dont [on] luy [veult] en rabatre l'envy."

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*Emperor's return to Chartel Cambresis, but has shown no displeasure at the news, under the impression, nay, the firm belief, that his Imperial Majesty, now that he is in a place of surety, will think of him, and when peace is concluded will attend to the reservation of his rights. That is why we his ambassadors will be able in future to speak to him more freely, and without causing any harm, on the affair of the French ambassadors.**—La Basse, Boulogne, 22nd of September 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency" and "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 9 pp.

23 Sept. **209.** CHAPUYS and MONTMORENCY to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Madame,"—This very morning, about 9 o'clock, Your Majesty's letter of the 20th came to hand, after the deciphering of which my colleague (Montmorency) and I (Chapuys) waited on the King, who not only had graciously granted us the audience applied for, but had sent us two or three messages wondering why we did not go to him, and bidding us to make haste, the cause of such impatience being in our opinion that the King wished to hear what we had to say before he gave audience to the French ambassadors, who had just arrived at the King's residence.† We were received kindly enough (*assez benignement*) by the King, who after hearing from our lips the news of the peace just made between the Emperor and king Francis, inquired from us whether we had any other particular news to communicate. We answered that we had none saving that His Imperial Majesty had done the utmost of his duty (*tout extreme debvoir*) towards the observance of the treaty of closer friendship between his Imperial Majesty and him. Hearing which, and that the state of the roads in Flanders (*par deça*) had prevented the messenger ‡ from coming sooner, but that I expected to hear soon either from the Emperor or from you, he replied, "I daresay another messenger will shortly arrive with further particulars, and that I shall then be officially informed of what has taken place."

As the King knew already all about the peace, he showed no signs whatever of surprise, joy, or discontent; on the

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* "Et par quant qu'il a reçu ce matin eu entendu les nouvelles du retour de sa ma^te au coustel du Chastel au Cambresis, des quelles nouvelles ne montre aucun deplaisir, pensant et tenant fermement que sa ma^te. aura eu souvenance de luy et la resercion (reservation) qu'il convenoit en leur endroit pour respect d'entendre sa ma^te estre en lieu de seureté, pour quoy pensans plus librement et sans prejudice d'icelle [ma^te] poierrons user à leur advis en l'endroit des dits ambassadeurs."

† "Que desja estoient arrivez au logis du dit s^r roy."

‡ "Sur quoy entendant de nous que les chemins de ce costel là [estoient en maulvais estat], nous dit qu'il ne povoit tarder que sa ma^te renvoyast icy plain advertissement de toutes choses."

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contrary, he received the news of it with greater moderation and calm than we have seen in him up to this time. But when my colleague and I (Chapuys) announced to him, privately, not officially, in Your Majesty's name the rumour afloat of the French marching towards Montreuil to have the siege of that town raised, he showed surprise at it, changed colour and countenance, observing that the rumour could not be true [not], inasmuch as the Emperor had probably broken up his army by that time;* and on our replying to him that if such was the intention of the French, he (the King) had sufficient means in his power to remedy that, he admitted that he had been in a much better position than he was in now to resist the attacks of his enemy, for he had sent back [to England] the English infantry that had lately come over. At any rate he would do his best.†

The King has been pleased to receive Your Majesty's congratulations on the taking of this town (Boulogne), and taken in good part what my colleague and I (Chapuys) said to him in Your Majesty's name, that there was no need of thanking you for the release from prison of the Italian ‡ mentioned in his letter; that was the least thing Your Majesty was prepared to do in his favour.

We have not considered it fit or convenient just now to say anything to him about the warships [of the Netherlands], but should the opportunity come, we will most certainly mention the subject to the privy councillors, in conformity with Your Majesty's instructions.

Since our return here the Bishop of Wyncestre (Winchester), and the Treasurer of War § called to give us notice in the King's name that the French ambassadors immediately after our departure [from Boulogne] had signified to him [the Bishop] in the very same words as we did to the King the event of the peace [made at Crépy], only adding that the King, their master, had written to say that as far as the king of England was concerned, he (King Francis) would act entirely on his Imperial Majesty's advice. King Francis also wrote [to his ambassadors] to return to him as soon as possible. The ambassadors, moreover, after delivering their master's message to the Bishop and Treasurer, have not omitted to say that the Dauphin (Henri) was coming down

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* "Comme il estoit desja preadverty des dites nouvelles, il ne monstra signe du monde de joye ni de mescontement, ainsi de plus grande moderation que n'avions jusques içy à ceste heure veu, mais quant luy vinmes advertir comme en particulier, et non comme de la part de vre. mate, du bruyt que courroit que les françoys marchoyent pour lever le siege de Montreuil, il s'en est monstré un peu estonné, changeant de myne et de grimache, disant que çela n'estoit poinct, par ce que sa mate paradventure auroit rompu son armée."

† "Et luy disant qu'il estoit bien pourveu pour y remedier, il nous respondit quil l'avoit esté mieulx par çy devant, car il avoit renvoyé les Anglois, que nouvellement estoyent venu; toutesfois quil feroit [de] son mieulx."

‡ Count St. Boniface?

§ "Le tresorier des Guerres" can be no other than Sir Thomas Cheyne, treasurer of the Household from 1540 to 1547.

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to have the siege of Montreuil raised. They have since obtained the King's leave to quit and return home.

We were also told by the above-mentioned Bishop and Treasurer that the King, their master, was very much surprised and astonished at the Emperor not having informed him, at the time that he was treating of peace with the French, that it was already concluded, and what the conditions were. Our answer was that we had nothing to do with the conditions of the peace, that was not our province; and as to breaking up his army, the Emperor would look more than twice before he did it, considering that my colleague and I (Chapuys) had written to say that Montreuil might be taken. Of the taking of that town they might well suppose that the Emperor would have been glad, were it for no other purpose than to save the expense of the men serving under Monsr. de Bueren at the siege. Perhaps, also, the Emperor relied on the words which the King had addressed to Monsr. d'Arras on the subject of the period of time during which the allied armies were to keep the field.*

The Bishop and Treasurer ended by asking us to beg and entreat you to use all your influence over His Imperial Majesty for him not to break up his army without previously informing the king of England thereof, that he may employ his own, and do with it what he thinks proper and convenient. The King, our master (said the Bishop and Treasurer), had no doubt that as the English took the field relying entirely on his Imperial Majesty, the latter will not allow them to be oppressed by the common enemy; for after all the Emperor would feel the damage of the war as well as the English. The said Bishop and Treasurer have also given us to understand that the King, their master, will attend carefully to the defence of his own dominions on that side of the Channel should the French attempt anything against him, and that in order to resist the enemy more effectually, it would be requisite, nay, necessary, that his men should be provided with victuals from the side of St. Omer. They have requested us to write to Your Majesty about it, promising, as we have advised them to do, to give notice to their commissaries (*les commissaires de vivres*) to procure what is wanted.

We have not considered it opportune, my colleague and I (Chapuys), to speak to the King in Your Majesty's name about the rumour current there [in Flanders] of the Dauphin coming down to these parts, on many reasons; for certainly, should the news turn out true, it seems to us that a march of the French upon Montreuil would be at the present moment most inconvenient and an untoward event for the men under Bueren, who, we hear, begin already to feel the want of

* "Que pourroit estre aussi que sa ma^te^ se fonda sur les propos qu'avoyent esté tenuz à Mons^r^ d'Arras de l'expiration du temps capitullé (*sic*) de continuer aux champs."

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victuals and fodder for their horses.* We fear it the more on account of the injury and damage which that general and the great number of nobles and gentlemen who are with him might possibly receive, should the French go that way. We have no doubt that both Your Royal Majesty and the Emperor will look to that as an affair of great importance. —Boulogne, 23rd September † 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency" and "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original partly ciphered. 2 pp.

24 Sept. **210.** The EMPEROR to HIS AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres chiers et feaulx,"—We suppose that you have received Our last.‡ Since then the English ambassador residing at this Our Court has come here to Cateau Cambresis, and spoken to Us at length about the overtures of peace made to the King, his master, by Cardinal [Jean] du Bellay, and other deputies of King Francis. The ambassador, at the same time, placed into Our hands a paper of the conditions under which the casé being, his master's ministers would accept the said peace. He has, moreover, given Us to understand, whilst talking over the matter contained in the said paper, that the King, his master, had written to say, that although he does not yet know what the conditions of Our separate peace with France are, he consents to it, on the understanding only that the articles and conditions of that separate peace of Ours will only facilitate and promote that which the allies conjointly may afterwards make with France.§

Hearing this from the lips of the English ambassador We referred him to what We had signified once to him through Mons. de Granvelle and Mons. D'Arrás, at the time that the King's consent was obtained, namely, "that We would treat of the peace, reserving the King's rights in compliance with the treaty of closer alliance," as you, yourselves, saw

* At this time, though the Emperor's peace with France was on the point of being concluded, the Sieur (lord and count) of Buren (Maximilien d'Egmont) was still commanding the auxiliary Belgian force in front of Montreuil. The passage runs thus: "Et certes il nous semble quil viendroit mal à propos que les françoys vinssent devers Montreuil, ou nos gens souffrent des vituailles et mesmes de (les?) chevaulx; et d'aultant plus doubteryons cela pour le dommaige que pourroit survenir à Mons. de Bueren et à la grande et notable noblesse qu'il a avecq luy."

† Such is distinctly the date of this draft, which, unlike most of the letters and documents emanating from Queen Mary's Privy Council, expresses the day in which it was drawn. The singularity of the fact called my attention, and I made enquiries, the result of which has been that really and truly the draft is dated *September*, though the clerk who wrote it endorsed it 24 "October."

‡ No. 195, pp. 327–34.

§ "Encoires qu'il ne s'coit (sçait sache) poinct le traicte de paix par nous faict, qu'il est seulement entendu que puissions arrester nos articles avec France pour conjoinctement [apres] faire la dite paix."

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and heard at the time, and wrote to the queen of Hungary,* Our sister. We also declared to the English ambassador the great pressure We had put on the Duke of Orleans and the Admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault), for them to induce the King of France to satisfy as much as possible English demands, and come to terms with him. To that end We had expressly sent to the camp before Boulogne the Bishop of Arrás, who, if necessary, would return to the King and remind him of the words uttered by him (the King) on the occasion We desired above all things that the said meeting took place.

With regard to the friendly and confidential advice bestowed on Us by the king of England respecting the dangerous position in which, as he said, We had placed Ourselves—though, in truth, We had nothing to apprehend from the forces of king Francis, as long as We were marching through his country—We spoke to the English ambassador in plain words, and told him that as King Francis was at the head of a powerful army, and seemed at one time inclined, as reported, to march [against him], We had certainly written advising him to raise the siege of Montreuil, and had also spoken to his ambassador about it, which advice was tendered sincerely, and with the best possible intentions.†

We have entered into these details in order that, should the English ambassador report differently, or in a cruder way, our conversation with him on the above topic,‡ you and your colleague (Montmorency) may be in a situation to explain the whole in the most courteous and mildest manner possible what Our intention is in the matter.

In short, We were thinking of ordering the Sieur de Grantvelle to give the ambassador a fuller answer to his proposals; if so, he, himself, will inform you of what passes at their conference. As, however, We are on the point of departure from this place to re-enter Cateau Cambresis, and there divide Our army, and make part of it retreat without causing the least injury to the king of England's cause, directly or indirectly, the proposed conference cannot immediately take place. However that may be, let it be known that the scattering and retreat of Our army was effected according to the advice of the king of England, Our ally, expressed in a note which his own ambassador placed a few days ago into Our hands, when We had already decided to do so.

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* "Que puissions traicter la dite paix en reservant le traicte d'amytie que avyons avec son dit maistre, comforme[ment] à ce que avons veu(?) et avez escript à la royne madame nostre soeur."

† "Dismes en la mesme sorte au dit ambassadeur que icelluy roy de France avoit puissante armée, et que comme avyons entendu, marchoit quil par adventure le mieulx scroit que le dit s[r] roy retira son armee de Montreuil, le quel advertissement fismes au dit ambassadeur sincerement et de bonne intencion."

‡ "Et pour ce que par adventure il le pourroit escripre plus crûment."

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As to the remainder, We refer you to Our preceding letter,* the answer to which We are expecting.—Cambray, 24th September, 1544.

French. Original minute. 2 *pp.*

26 Sept. **211.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS and MONSR. DE COURRIÈRES to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On the 24th inst., about 9 o'clock in the morning, Your Majesty's letter of the 20th† came to hand, at the same time as those of this King's ambassador with Your Majesty and his own report on the result of his mission. These last we immediately forwarded to the King, at the same time applying for an audience. After reading and examining what the ambassador wrote—*which, by the way, could not be very agreeable to him*‡—*the King sent his excuses for not being able to receive us at once, on account, as he said, of his being engaged the whole of that day on business connected with the departure of the duke of Suffolk, whom he was about to send next day to Montreuil.*

Three hours after the above answer to our application, the earl of Hertford, the Admiral, and Secretary Paget *came to us with a similar message from their master, alleging the very same excuses of most urgent engagements, though We must say that our belief was rather shaken by the most unfortunate coincidence that just at the time that the above said privy councillors were excusing their master, the King, on the plea of the most important and urgent business, he happened to be seen going out of the town to sport in the fields. The King's message, as delivered by the privy councillors, was thus worded: "As the King, our master, cannot for the alleged reasons give you audience to-day, he sends us on to inquire from you if there be any pressing business requiring your immediate and personal attendance upon him. Should there be any such necessity, We are commanded to go back to him and report. Otherwise you must have patience; to-morrow the King will be glad to receive you."*

Our answer in general terms, and without specifying the nature of our communication, was simply this: That the matter was very important and required our personal attendance on the King. Upon which, the privy councillors, perceiving that they could not get more out of us, began to say that the King, their master, found it strange that Your Majesty's fleet (*navires de guerre*) was not yet in the Strait,

* That of the 24th (No. 210, p. 365), written at Cambray, where the Emperor, after his treaty of peace with France, found his sister, the Stadtholderin (Mary, queen dowager of Hungary), waiting for him, as well as the French cardinals of Meudon and of Lorraine. This latter (Jean) had come for the purpose of replacing his brother, the Duke of Guise, who, with two others, a son of the Admiral of France (Claude Hannebaut), and Monsr. de La Val, were to be delivered as hostages for the Peace.

† That of the 24th, No. 210, pp. 365–7.

‡ "Et que ne luy devoit gueres contenter."

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according to the treaty, and, moreover, that the vessels and transports destined for the passage of their army back to England were not ready; and on our replying that, according to information received from the Queen [of Hungary], Your Majesty's warships had already put to sea, and, moreover, that it was impossible for us to guess whether they really intended to have their army back in England or to remain in France, and that in case of their deciding for the return English commissaries ought to have been appointed beforehand, as on previous occasions, which had not been done. To this argument of ours the councillors made no reply, nor did they offer explanation, but they went on to say that the King, their master, found it also very strange that after Your Majesty had concluded peace with France no intimation had come to him for the raising of the English camp before Montreuil, and their consequent retreat. Our answer was that Your Majesty supposed that either Montreuil had already surrendered, or else that the King, their master, who had great experience of military affairs, and knew perfectly well the quality and numbers of the enemy's force inside, might have provided in the matter, as was fit and convenient. An imputation of temerity might have attached had Your Majesty tendered advice in a matter of that sort; people might perhaps have thought that the wish of saving the pay of Mons. Bueren's men had influenced you to counsel the raising of the siege of Montreuil. We further told them on the subject of the peace between Your Imperial Majesty and the king of France, at which they seemed both surprised and astonished, that We were quite sure of its being quite as advantageous for England, and had no doubt that the King, their master, being a virtuous and wise prince, would not fail, after mature consideration and thought, to be perfectly satisfied with it. After this we readily granted their request, and promised to write to the Queen [of Hungary], and also to Mons. de Rœulx, to have provisions stored on the side of St. Omer, provided the King sent his own commissaries to get charge of them.

At this last suggestion of ours the privy councillors seemed very much pleased, and declared that they wished to go immediately to the King, who, they thought, might still give us audience that very day, if possible. That, however, did not take place, for the King was then, as aforesaid, out of town in the fields, and did not come back [to Boulogne] until a very late hour.

Next day, after dinner, we waited on the King, and explained to him in the most gracious and courtly terms possible the substance of our charge, as contained in Your Majesty's letter to us. We began, according to instructions, by thanking him in Your Majesty's name [for the advice he had tendered], which thanks he (the King) took in very good part. Not understanding, however, sufficiently well what he

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(the King) had meant by his last warning against the proposed marriage of Your Majesty's daughter to the duke of Orleans, we asked him for an explanation. Upon which, not recollecting the two points of the alternative, the King began to say* that peace being now made and concluded, there was no further need of determination [of the case]. Upon which, we reminded him of the alternative terms, and he seemed satisfied. Passing then to the chief matter—that is, his objection to the marriage—*the King was evidently displeased at our asking for an explanation, for he tried to divert the conversation, and denied having said to Mons. d'Arrus the words which we wished him to explain.*" † He found it strange that Your Majesty should have concluded peace with France, without having his settled at the same time, and that Your Majesty should thus have shown more regard for a duke of Savoy and a duke of Mantua than for himself, the king of England, who had always been an affectionate friend to You, and undergone so much expense for Your sake. He wondered the more why Your Majesty had not obtained for him at least a truce, or suspension of hostilities, during which he (the King) might honourably retreat into his own kingdom—which, however, he had now decided to do—after offering battle to the French if they wished to have it.‡

As to the aid which king Francis offered to give against the Turk, that (the King said) ought not to have been an incentive for Your Majesty making peace with him, for, according to information and news lately received, there was no fear at present of military movements on the side of Turkey.

The same complaints and grievances (*douleances*) did the King express to us respecting the warships and hulks for the transport [to England] of his army, now in France, he repeating the very same words and arguments of which the above-mentioned earl of Hertford, his admiral, and Secretary Paget had made use; to which objections and complaints we replied by showing him the memorandum (*billet*) appended to Your Majesty's letter.§

Touching the furnishing (*subministration*) of provisions, we made such pertinent answer as it was in our power to do, employing all sorts of arguments to prove to him that neither Your Majesty nor the queen dowager of Hungary had been in fault. Those arguments it would take us too long to repeat

* "Non entendant bien toutesfois a dernier concernant de son advis en lendroit du marraige de Mons. d'Orleans, car non se souvenoit de l'alternative, commença à dire, &c."

† "Et venant au principal de la matiere, ne la pouvoit bien gouster veuillant aucunement denyer navoir donne telle responce à Mons. d'Arras, que nous luy disions."

‡ "Apres avoir presentée le bataille aux ennemys silz en eussent volu manger."

§ "Sur toutes les quelles objections ayant presenté au dit s^r roy le billet encloz aux dites lettres de vre. ma^te concernant la submission (subministration?) en icelles mencionnees."

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here; suffice it to say that the King seemed half satisfied with them, and he ended by saying that he would communicate with his Privy Council and let us know his answer, that we might write to Your Majesty.

We found the King rather depressed and thoughtful, instead of buoyant and high spirited as he generally is, indeed very different in manner from what he was at the time that the French ambassadors asked for their "congé," and he himself had unofficial notice of the peace having been concluded.* To judge from what we have heard him and his Privy Councillors say, we really believe that his low spirits and depression are chiefly caused by the fear that the retreat of his army may eventually bring upon him some loss of reputation.

This very morning the King sent us word by Secretary Paiget (Sir William Paget), to the effect that having reflected on what we (my colleague and I) had told him in Your Majesty's name, and considering the inconveniences that might arise in case of delay, he at once approved of, and sanctioned all that Your Majesty had done respecting the peace as well as the care You had taken of the reservation prescribed by the treaties, and in obtaining king Francis' submission, and that he himself felt completely sure that as Your Majesty considered Yourself secure and free from danger, You would not fail in acting the part of a true and faithful friend and perpetual confederate and ally. Of this last wish and hope expressed by them, We gave as complete an assurance as it was in our power, describing in the highest possible terms the perfect, complete, and almost incredible friendship and affection that Your Majesty professed towards him.

After this, having declared to the Secretary (Paget) the contents of Your Majesty's letter to us of the 24th inst. received last evening, he gave us to understand that his master, the King, had similar news from his ambassador at Your Majesty's Court, and that following Your Majesty's kind advice, he had resolved to raise the siege of Montreuil and withdraw his army, and retreat by way of St. Omer, at the same time requesting us to take care that provisions should be ready there, and write to the Queen and also to Mons. du Rœulx to that effect, which we promised to do.

Respecting Mons. d'Arras (said the Secretary), the King's ambassador writes—that as soon as he has negociated with the French King he will come here to treat with my master, but I am afraid that the King will not know for the present what to answer, nor what resolution to take on Monsr. d'Arras' mission, especially now that he is preparing to cross

* "Nous trouvasmes le dit s^{r} roy tout quoy (coi) et pensif, et bien abaissé de sa maniere et traversè accoustumee et de la dispcsitiou, en la quelle il a continue lorsque les ambassadeurs françoys commencerent à demander congé et qu'il eust quelque vent de la dicte paix."

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over to England, for he would have sailed this very morning had the large warships destined for his escort arrived. The Secretary assured us that, in a couple of days at the most, the King will take his departure, which, we believe, will be the cause of great fear and anxiety to the English army at Montreuil as well as to the English of this town, considering the disorder and confusion that prevail in all this affair at present.

The King, in our opinion, has received with pleasure the advice tendered by Your Majesty with regard to the retreat of his army before Montreuil, because that advice will, in a certain measure, colour and justify the retreat of his army; but he would be doubly glad, nay, would be much obliged, if Your Majesty could insinuate to the king of France that the whole had been done at Your Majesty's request and for Your sake, and request king Francis to do the same on his side, and in this manner avoid the inconveniences and damages that might ensue, and that a suspension of hostilities should follow till the means of securing peace were found, either through direct negociation between the parties concerned, or by arbitration and sentence of Your Majesty, to which sentence the King will readily submit with pleasure, and consider himself much obliged if Your Majesty would undertake to pronounce it. In this manner all the scruples which the King might entertain—which we dare say must be considerable—whatever mien the necessity and pressure of present affairs may oblige him to put on, might be removed.*

Had the King's large warships been in sight this morning, he himself would have gone on board and sailed away, as we said above, without giving us notice, as we presume; but as the ships have not yet made their appearance, he has had the courtesy, as reason and honesty demanded, to inform us of his departure, which will take place within two days, during which time neither my colleague nor I can procure a passage to cross over to England at the same time with him. Not that there is much probability of our being able to do so, for, in the first place, my colleague—affairs being at present more embroiled and perplexing than they have been for a long time past—candidly confesses that he is unable to

* "Le Roy a monstré grand contentement de l'advis de vre. mate touchant le retirement de son armée [devant Montreuil] pour honorablement colourer la dite retraite; mais ce luy seroit double plaisir, voire le tiendroit à grande obligation qu'il plust à vre. dite mate faire advertir le roy de France que luy (le dit sr roy) à la contemplation et requeste de vre. mate se soit (*sic*) volountiers condescendu à la dite retraite, et qu'il pleust (*sic*) au roy de Francaise la semblable pour eviter les dommaiges et inconvenients que s'en suyvroient, et que les armees deussent cesser entre eulx jusques à ce quand [qu'on] donnast les moyens d'appoinctement entre eulx, ou pour la judication et sentence de vre. mate à la quelle il plaira avoir regard et croique le dit sr roy s'en tiendroit fort satisfaict et bien obligé à vre. mate, et s'oublieroient tous les scrupules qu'il pourroit avoir conçeu que ne deuvent (doibvent) estre petiz quelque bonne myne que la necessité et l'estonnement des afferes peuvent luy avoir faict tenir, les quelles ne vouldroit soy alliener de vre. mate si j'a nestoit que lautre couste il fut aveugle et subernè."

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act by himself single-handed; besides that, he has no commission to accompany the King in time of war. And as to me (Eustace Chapuys), owing to my present indisposition and want of health, and the air and temperature of England being so unfavourable at the present season of the year for gouty people, I could not be of service to Your Majesty, besides risking my life. Besides which, Your Majesty has been pleased to gratify me with the promise that after the undertaking against France is finished I may retire and go home.

For the above reasons my colleague and I have decided not to cross the Channel and leave this place the very moment the King sails for England, thus avoiding the dangers that might arise. We intend to go to Calais, where, should people not be actually dying from the plague, we will stay until orders come from Your Majesty.

We again beg and entreat Your Majesty to allow us to go home.—Boulogne, 26 September 1544.

Signed: "J. de Montmorency" and "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original, partly ciphered. 5 *pp.*

26 Sept. **212.** The IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS to the QUEEN OF HUNGARY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"**Madame,**"—Your Majesty's letter of the 12th inst. came duly to hand, and following Your instructions we have entirely shaped our conduct in the manner prescribed in the Emperor's letter to us of the 20th, as Your Majesty will see by the enclosed duplicate of our answer to him. This will be an excuse for our not troubling Your Majesty with a repetition of the facts.

The King has, through his Privy Council, twice requested us very pressingly to write and request Your Majesty, that at St. Omer provisions be collected for the use of his army, giving us to understand, in the first instance, that the provisions were wanted for the division of the Royal army now besieging Montreuil, though on the second application this King's privy councillors told us distinctly, or rather disclosed to us, that the provisions were wanted for the purpose of feeding the camp about to raise the siege of that town. The reason the King, their master (the councillors said), had for choosing St. Omer instead of another town, was owing to his men being about to embark for England at Dunkerke, Nyeuport, and Ostende. We cannot say whether the measure is intended for the purpose of saving the stores of provisions they have at Calais, or for fear of the plague and pestilence,† from which his

† "Ne sçavons si cest pour soulaiger les vivres de Calais, ou pour crainete quilz ny portent ou pregnent la pestilenze."

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army is suffering, being communicated to that town. However this may be, the King begs Your Majesty to provide boats (*bateaux*) for the transport of provisions to the above seaports of Dunkerke, Nyeuport, and Ostend, and we have readily consented to write to Your Majesty on the subject, provided the King or the privy councillors send thither English commissaries to see about it, and take charge of the provisions delivered to them, as otherwise it would amount to nothing.—Boulogne, 26 September 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys" and "De Montmorency."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

27 Sept. **213.** The SAME to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—After we had closed and sealed the letter* that goes along with this, the courier who was to have been the bearer of it having been detained at the request of the King's privy councillors, Secretary Paget came from the King to tell us that he has news of the vanguard of the French army having already crossed the river, and that in consequence of that he had changed his plans of campaign; for instead of making his army lay siege to Montreuil by way of St. Omer, as was his first thought, he has now resolved to bring it here and make it encamp near this place, in order to wait and see what the next movement of the French will be, and whether they wish or not to come to a pitched battle with him. On this account the King had determined, against the advice and will of his privy councillors, to delay his embarkation and departure for England. This intelligence Secretary Paget brought to us two (De Courrières and I), at the same time begging us, if we happened to see the King, to try and persuade him that no injury whatever could be inflicted on his honour and reputation, inasmuch as he had achieved such a feat of arms as the taking of a town like Boulogne; besides which, the king of France is not coming down at the head of his army.

The Secretary also gave us to understand that in the number of the French expeditionary force (*cavalgada*) there were, according to rumour, a number of German lanskenets of those whom Your Majesty lately caused to be dismissed (*castés*) from his army, which report, if true, the King, his master, found exceedingly strange, and therefore that he prayed Your Majesty to see to it, as the true and perfect amity between You two demanded, and as Your Majesty had been pleased to signify to his ambassador. In short, he begged Your Majesty to act in the matter in such a way that the

* *See* above, No. 209, p. 367.

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world at large may perceive the sincere and affectionate good will that Your Majesty bears him.

Having, for the causes and reasons specified in our preceding dispatches, made our excuses for not crossing over to England at the same time as the King, Secretary Paget came and declared to us, in his master's name, that it would sound badly in people's ears—not only among the French, but likewise and more especially among the English—that after Your Majesty had made Your own private and separate peace with the king of France, who still remained in hostility against him, he (the king of England, and Your Majesty's ally) should return to his kingdom without with being at least accompanied by Your ambassadors; and, therefore, that he begged us write to Your Majesty and inform You of the public sentiments, that You may put a stop to slandering tongues.

Three hours ago three of Your Majesty's warships anchored outside this port. They could not have come at a better juncture and opportunity for the satisfaction of this King, who failed not at the sight of them to show great joy and delight in the very presence of all his privy councillors. There was a fourth warship with them—the Admiral's—which had either lost her way or separated intentionally from the other three, whether to take home part of the spoil, or from contrary winds, or some other accident at sea we cannot say.*—Boulogne, 27 September 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency" and "Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "To the Emperor."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

28 Sept. **214.** PRINCE PHILIP to the EMPEROR his Father.

S. E., L. 64, ff. 211–12.

"Sacra Cesarea Catolica Magestad,"—The day after my sending Don Bernardino de Mendoza† by way of Italy, on the 17th inst., with my letter, of which a duplicate is enclosed, Your Majesty's from Sandesir, of the 18th, came to hand. The letters brought by the same courier of the 14th and 18th of August brought to my knowledge how that town and its garrison had surrendered according to capitulation, &c.

I have read Your Majesty's account (*discurso*) of what passed about the proposed peace, first with the Sieur de Longueval and afterwards with the Admiral of France (Hannebault), and with the lieutenant of men-at-arms of the

* "Il y en avoit une autre [navire] de compaignie, questoit l'Admirale, la quelle sest esguartee (escartée, esgarée?), ne sçavons si pour rapporter Butin au logis ou par fortune [de mer]."

† Naval commander of the "Mendoza," duke of Infantade, about whom *see* Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 243, 245, 291–3.

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company of count Brien (Brienne), and how the affairs stand, though by what I myself have written on the subject, and the opinion of these councillors, it would seem as if, in the state of affliction in which Christendom is, any reasonable and honourable proposals of peace coming from the enemy ought to be accepted, thus relieving Your Majesty of the immense labour and fatigue of a campaign, and at the same time ensuring the tranquillity and welfare of these Spanish kingdoms, impoverished and exhausted as they are. Yet such is Your Majesty's wisdom and perfect knowledge of political matters, that I trust entirely in You and in Your decision, sure as we all are that whatever that decision be, it will be the best. Yet we cannot help begging and entreating Your Majesty, as earnestly as we possibly can, to bear in mind that if peace can be secured it is far preferable for all purposes.

I am glad to hear that the king of England is so powerful (*poderoso*), though I very much fear that, as Your Majesty writes, he is so slow in his movements that he cannot be expected to accomplish much.*

Since the arrival of Don Bernardino de Mendoza with the galleys, I have had no news from Italy. I am hourly expecting the arrival of the courier, who left the camp at St. Desier on the 14th of August. Considering the time he has been on the road, I have no doubt that he will also bring letters from Italy, and I shall then know how things are going on there.

Bills of exchange on the Fucares (Fugger) and Belcar (Belsero).—Juan Vasquez de Molina.

Your Majesty knows already that I wrote to the king of Portugal (Joaõ III.) requesting him to send his fleet to the Azores, in order to escort the vessels returning from the Indies. He has answered, and so also has the ambassador, Lope Hurtado, that he is trying to send to the Islands one large galleon and four caravels, but thinks they had better not for the present go beyond the Cape of St. Vincent, that being the place where the French corsairs are most likely to wait for them, because after the 15th of September the navigation in that sea becomes very difficult. He has, moreover, sent a message to the commander of his fleet at Malagueta, that if on his return home he should meet with vessels coming from the Indies, he is to accompany and escort them as long as they need protection.

As to the invasion of France by the Perpignan frontier, I daresay the marquis of Aguilar has already informed Your Majesty whether he has or has not effected it. All We know here, by his own despatches and other private letters, is that the Marquis intended to cross the frontier at two different

* "De quan poderoso se hallar, vel Ser^mo rey de Inglaterra, aunque me temo, como vra. majestad escribe, procediendo tan despacio en sus cosas no podra hacer efectos de mucha consideracion."

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parts with the colonel of the Germans and Don Jusepe, and do all the harm he could. Should I hear anything more, I will let Your Majesty know.—Valladolid, 28 September 1544.

Signed: "Your very humble son, *El Principe.*"

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*

30 Sept. **215.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MONSEIGNEUR DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monseigneur,"—This is chiefly for the purpose of enclosing another from the duke of Alburquerque; yet, as I have my pen in hand, I think I ought to give your lordship notice of the King's embarkation for England this very afternoon, after dinner.* All along his way to the ship he kept reminding us (De Courrières and me) of the message he had sent us through Secretary Paget, the substance of which is contained in our despatch,† and I wrote to the Emperor pointing out, among other things, the discredit it would bring on us all should we quit his Court before the arrival of our successors in this embassy. He graciously accepted our joint offer of service in that matter as far as it might be in our power to comply with his wishes, and he begged us to remain here [at Boulogne], together with the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, the Admiral (Sir John Russel), the Treasurer, the bishop of Winchester (Gardiner), and some others of his privy councillors, until the arrival of those who may come to fill our places.‡ He takes but few people with him, and told us that he leaves behind a sufficient force to keep his own possessions. He showed no displeasure whatever at the peace with France, though he alluded to it three or four times, and has taken his departure well disposed and joyful, with a decided intention and resolution of keeping possession of this town.

Though I know well that your lordship is sure to pity me, and will do the utmost to take me out of this purgatory, I nevertheless cannot do less than remind your lordship of my prayer.

The English, who were at the siege of Montreuil, have returned here safe and sound. Mons. de Büren has also left with his band, but instead of coming this way he went off by way of Chasteau Neuf. He would have wished, as he tells us, to have come as far as this place to kiss the King's hands, but he could not possibly do so. The King, on the other hand, speaks very highly of the service he has rendered

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* That of the 26th. *See* p. 367, No. 211.

† *See* above, p. 211, No. 367.

‡ "Et mesmes touchant la disreputation que seroit en nous restirant sans survenance de successeurs, et à ceste cause a accepté nostre offre, et prié que suyvant icelluy voulsissimes demeurer en ce lieu avec les ducs de Norforc et Suffoc, Admiral, Tresourier, Evesque de Wyncestre, et aulcungs aultres de son Consil, jusques à ce que vinssent nos dits successeurs."

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in this last campaign, and requested us to thank him in his name for his brave and distinguished conduct in the field.* He has, moreover, begged us to write to the Emperor in his behalf, which Monsr. de Courrières and I intend doing by the next post.—Boulogne, the last day of September 1544.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

1 Oct. **216.** The EMPEROR to his AMBASSADORS in ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.

"Tres chiers et fealx,"—The day before yesterday, on Our arrival at Mons, your joint despatch of the 26th and 27th ult.† came duly to hand. Yet as We were then, and are still, on Our way [to Brussels], We could not answer you as fully as We might have desired. Even now We have only leisure to state, in as few words as possible, that your two despatches of the 20th and 22nd of September,‡ containing a summary of the conversation you held with the King and his ministers on the subject of Our peace with France, have been duly received, and their contents carefully examined in Our Privy Council.

As to your answers to the objections made by that King's privy councillors and ministers, We can only say that We have found them pertinent enough, and that We approve of them in every way; § for the truth is, that We have done nothing of which the king of England can possibly complain, nor have We, since Our peace with France, omitted to do whatever We deemed proper and fit for the preservation— and, if possible, for the increase—of that sincere affection and friendship which unites Us both.

As to what Secretary Paget told you of Germans quitting Our service and going over to that of king Francis, it will be found upon inquiry that, on the contrary, measures have been taken expressly to prevent that contingency. ‖ Orders have been issued for all Germans now leaving Our service to collect at certain spots close to the frontiers of their respective countries.

Towards that end We Ourselves have sedulously worked, a considerable sum of money having been spent in the execu-

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* "Le camp de Montreuil est retourné icy sain et sauve, du quel Monsr. de Buren est parti avec sa bande dois Chasteauneuf sans veoir jusques içy, et nous a donné d'entendre que le dit s[r] roy il su[t] bien voulu veoir, et apres nous avoir dict mil louanges de luy, nous a prié de remercier vre. ma[te] du vertueux et notable office qu'il a faict de la faire entendre à sa ma[te] avec tout encherissement et commendaticns."

† No. 211, p. 369, and No. 213, p. 373.

‡ No. 205, p. 348, and No. 207, p. 351.

§ "Et [à] ce que vous a esté objecté avez bien usé (*sic*) et respondu pertinentment, et justiffiablement en tout, comme aussi à la verité nous n'avons faict chose dont dit s[r] roy puisse aveoir mal contentement."

‖ "Mais pour le contrayre que nous avons tenu grand soyn pour l'empescher de faire enchemyner tous les dits allemands pour soy retirer de (du) tout et y avons besoigné personellement et avecq nostre grande coustange."

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tion of Our commands. In fact, it may be confidently asserted that, declining to listen to the various proposals and suggestions which from time to time have been addressed to Us or to Our ministers by the two cardinals, and other great personages of the French Court, We have always taken care not to infringe in any way Our treaty with England. Nor have We, on the other hand, in the least infringed the treaty by ordering Buren's auxiliary division to retire and go home, nor in other matters in which We have constantly been solicited to intervene.*

As to the objection raised by the King's privy councillors, that in Our treaty with France there should have been a clause stipulating that immediately after the signature of the same, the two armies—the French and the English—were to retire from the field, God knows how much We should have desired that some such stipulation had been inserted, and that the differences standing between the two countries had been quickly and satisfactorily settled; but as you (Chapuys) know, and very properly answered when the objection was raised, the king of England has constantly given Us to understand that he wishes to arrange his own affairs, and that particular one, by himself, without the intervention of anyone;† whilst he kept all the time assuring Us that he would soon become the master of Boulogne, and of Montreuil also. These very sentiments he expressed to the bishop of Arras when the latter spoke to him on the subject while at the camp before Boulogne, this being the chief cause for the French sending the whole of their army in that direction, resolutely determined as they are to recover Boulogne at any cost, even if they lose six different battles before its walls.

With regard to the last Articles presented by the king of England, detailing the conditions under which he would consent to a peace with France—which Articles he wishes Us to bring forward and recommend to king Francis's ministers, or rather oblige the latter to accept the same, however reluctantly, as well as appoint commissioners or deputies of their own to discuss them with the English—that is a sort of thing which We cannot promise to do as warmly and

* "Et nous sommes tousjours arresté, comme faisons, à l'endroit des dits François et mesmes des eardinaulx et autres bons personaiges, qui sont venuz devers nous de par (*sic*) le roy de France de nous aller dehors en façon du monde du dit traieté d'Engleterre, ny touchant la revocation du sieur de Buren et ses gens ny d'aultres choses dont ilz nous ont faict constantment resercher."

† "Et au regard de ce que l'on a objecté que devions en traictment avec les dits françois convenir que leur armée et celle du roy d'Engleterre se retirassent Dieu sest (sait) que nous l'eussions singulierement desiré et que tous differends d'entre eulx fussent esté pacifiquement arranges; mais comme vous sçavez le dit s^r roy a tousjours donné ouvertement à entendre qu'il vouloit luy mesmes manger et traicter son affaire particuliere et ausi assheuroit et tenoit pour certain d'empourter Boulogne et Montreuil, comme encore il le fit quant Monsr. d'Arras fust devers luy, qui a esté le cause pour le quelle les françoys ont enchemyné leur armee de ce cousté de là."

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urgently as the king of England wishes Us to do; and yet We have not failed to speak to the Admiral of France (Claude de Hannebault), to cardinal Lorraine, and to cardinal Tournon, who now happen to have the government of France in their hands, about it. All and every one of them have formally declared to Us that the conditions asked by the king of England are exceedingly hard and exorbitant.

But to come to the point. Yesterday, after a careful and minute examination of your joint despatch of the 26th, and having previously considered what could be done in this matter in order to please the king of England, We ordered the Sieur de Granvelle to remain at Mons, and wait there for cardinal Tournon, who arrived in that town at 11 o'clock in the morning.* Of what passed between the said Cardinal and Our own Privy Seal (Granvelle), in the presence of the French ambassador,† you (Chapuys) will be apprised by the enclosed copy of the Article, which will be made for the bishop of Arras, and likewise by the Instructions We gave him for his mission. This We did with a view to induce king Francis to send to king Henry an embassy to treat of a peace of some sort, which peace, if concluded, would be immediately followed by the withdrawal of the two armies from the field. This course of action We particularly suggested to the Bishop, and We again recommend it to him and to you, in order that should king Francis send immediately his ambassadors to treat with England, that most desirable object may be attained, and the armies of the belligerents may retire at once from the field. The Bishop and you (Chapuys) shall work sedulously at this, and make every effort for the said French embassy to be sent and received thereat, for the above-mentioned cardinal Tournon has positively declared that there will be no difficulty at all on the part of the King his master. In fact, should both Princes be prepared to mutually accept reasonable conditions, Our intervention in that affair would no longer be required.‡ Respecting this most important point, and the reasons and arguments to be used by you in your endeavour to carry it out, We refer you particularly to the contents of the said Article, and also to what We may in future have to write on this subject according to the state and disposition of affairs; and We need scarcely say that, in carrying out these Instructions of Ours, We

* "Fismes hier demurer le sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*) à Mons pour actendre le Cardinal de Tournon, que (qui) seullement y vint environ les XI. heures du matin."

† Charles Solier, sieur de Morette, French ambassador at the Imperial Court after the peace of Crêpy. "Ce que verrez par le coppie (*sic*) de l'article que s'en escript au dit evesque d'Arras, et ausi ce que luy en chargeons à fin que le dit roy de France envoye incontinent ses ambassadeur pour entendre à la dite pacification, et qu'elle se face (fasse) et retirent les armees d'un costé et de l'aultre."

‡ "En quoy vous et luy tiendrez la main jusques au boult [que] le dit envoy [de l'ambassade] se face (fasce), car s'il ce faict, comme le cardinal de Tournon, a asseubre qu'il ny auroit faulte et que tous deux [princes] veuillent se ranger à la rayson, le tout iras bien."

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expect you to use the utmost diligence, as well as your never-failing tact and discretion.

The chief point of the negociation will naturally be that of the town of Boulogne—about which, by the way, you say nothing at all in your joint despatch; for if the king of England has resolutely made up his mind to keep it in his power, there can be no doubt that, on the other hand, king Francis will never consent to treat for peace, as you may judge from the Cardinal's original note on the margin of the Article in question. In fact, it would be extremely difficult, in Our opinion—if not altogether impossible after the Cardinal's formal declaration to that effect—to induce king Francis to let the town of Boulogne remain in the hands of the English. Whatever the other conditions of the future treaty of peace between England and France may be, certain it is that king Francis will never consent to that town remaining for any length of time in the hands of his enemy, not even as a pledge and security for his debt to England, for fear the King should cause its castle to be further strengthened whilst in his possession, and thereby be tempted to retain it somehow.* That being the reason why the Sieur de Granvelle and cardinal Tournon have been of opinion—as you will see by the enclosed copy of the Article in question—that it cannot pass as it is, you (Chapuys) shall devote all your attention to that particular part of the future negociation, and whilst trying to gain the point according to Our wishes, ascertain how far the king of England is inclined to listen to the proposals of France, and what means and ways had better be employed to persuade him to receive the French embassy.

Among the many remonstrances made by the Cardinal and by Monsr. de Morelte against the last Articles of England, the chief one is that the conditions proposed by the king of England for the peace with France are not only exceedingly harsh and contrary to what has hitherto been done in their former treaties with that country, but also repugnant to all sense of equity and justice, inasmuch as while an annual pension is insisted upon, the English want to retain and keep a portion of French Crown territory.† For nothing in

* "Et se fait à doubter que difficilement se trouvera moien (*sic*) que comme qu'il soit il la laisse ce mains du dit roy d'Angleterre, mesmes pour l'assheurance du deheu (*sic*) ny en tous advenements que icelluy roy d'Angleterre la pousse fortiffier, sur quoy esté advisé par le dit sieur de Grantvelle (*sic*) avec le dit sieur Cardinal (Tournon) que vous verrez par le dit article, et pourrez assentir, et cependant ce que l'on en pourra faire avec le dit roy d'Angleterre."

† As the Paper drawn up by the French ambassador and by cardinal Tournon on the Articles of England has not been found in the Imperial Archives, it may not be amiss to transcribe here the whole passage:—"Les remonstrances que ce (se) font dans l'escript baillé par le dit cardinal et le sieur de Morelte sont que c'est chose, comme ilz disent du tout contraire aux traictez entre le dit France et Angleterre, cloire et repugnante à ce qu'ilz pretendent [de] le pension et que le dit roy de France ne vouldroit pour rien au monde avoir ceste honte de perdre terre de la coste mesmes piece de telle qualité, et que le dit roy d'Angleterre devroit prendre example sur nous qui avons restitué les places qu'avons dernierement occupé."

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the World, they say, would king Francis consent to the shame of being deprived of a piece of his Crown, as Boulogne is. The king of England (they said) ought to imitate the example We gave him by restituting all places taken during the last war. On the other hand, it ought to be considered that, if the king of England persists in his resolution to retain Boulogne, it will be very difficult for king Francis to attend, as he is in duty bound, to the defence of Christendom threatened by the Turk; and, if so, the fault will not be his own, but that of the king of England and those who advise him.

It is, moreover, considered certain that should king Henry of England re-cross the Channel and return to his kingdom, the French ambassadors will not cross the Strait and go to England. Indeed, as Cardinal de Bellay (*sic*) has told Monsr. d'Arras, he and his colleagues in the former embassy were, and are still, much offended at their having been forcibly kept and detained nearly six days at Calais the last time they went thither.*

To say the truth, it strikes Us that if the King's object is merely to gain time, he may accomplish his purpose more efficiently by waiting for the French ambassadors, and, when they come, treating with them—which, after all, would be by far the best way—or else, after hearing the nature and substance of the ambassadors' mission, finding some excuse or other for returning home suddenly, pretending that his Royal person is wanted in England. This, in Our opinion, would be the best way for the King to gain his purpose; for, as the discussion of the articles is likely to last several days, the King may easily allege in the meantime that his presence is wanted in his own kingdom, whereas his not waiting for the French ambassadors, and going over to England without hearing what they have to say, will probably arouse the suspicion that he (the King) is disinclined to listen to peace overtures.

There is still another powerful reason why the King should wait for the arrival of the French mission,† which is, that during the discussion of the articles or conditions proposed by each party a suspension of hostilities could easily be obtained, and effectual means found of adjusting the differences between the belligerents, and of the two armies—that is, the English and the French—withdrawing at once from the field. The King then will remain as long as he pleases in his dominions on the Continent, and if, after all, notwithstanding the above-stated and other considerations, he (the King) decides to cross over to England, it would be requisite,

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* "Que desia [se] resentent fort, comme le cardinal de Bellay l'a dit au dit evesque d'Arras de ce quilz ont esté empeschéz de retourner environ six jours non obstant leur saif conduit."

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nay indispensable, that he should leave behind some of his own privy councillors or ministers to carry on the negotiations in his name; the English deputies to be chosen among the principal and most confidential of the King's privy councillors, for otherwise We hold it as certain that king Francis's ambassadors will not condescend to treat with people of inferior rank and quality; nor would it be suitable and convenient for Us, considering Our intervention in that affair of the peace, and the part We wish and intend to take in it, both through you (Eustace Chapuys) and through the bishop of Arras, who is to be your colleague in the forthcoming negotiation, and whose arrival you must shortly expect.*

You must, therefore, bear in mind Our instructions on this particular point, and carefully investigate and watch the proceedings, as well as the arguments of the English and French commissioners if they happen to meet.

The above-mentioned French cardinals, Lorraine and Meudon,† said the other day to one of Our ministers that they were in receipt of reliable intelligence, that Our cousin, the Sieur de Buren, at his withdrawal from the English camp before Montreuil, had pitched his tents somewhere else in the vicinity of that town, and that they wished to know whether the report was true. The answer returned to them was, that if the news they had was correct, Monsr. de Buren must have chosen that position either from want of forage for his cavalry, of which he was known to stand in need, or else for fear of some contagious disease breaking out among his men, or some other reasonable cause, with the king of England's consent or previous agreement.‡ It will be desirable that you, Our ambassadors at the Court of England, put yourselves in communication with Our said cousin (count Buren) and procure that his behaviour towards the English in all military matters be so upright and friendly under present circumstances that the latter may feel now the same satisfaction and content at his services as they did on former occasions, and as the English themselves have frequently acknowledged up to this Our last peace with France.

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* "Car aultrement nous tenons pour certain que les ambassadeurs du dit roy de France ne vouldroient besoigner avec des gens de petite qualité. Ny ausi conviendroit à l'affaire ny (*sic*) à l'office que desirons y faire par les mains du dit evesque d'Arras et de vous, sur quoy vous regarderez curieusement en actendant sa venue."

† "Les deux cardinaulx, Lorraine et Meudon." By Lorraine (Jean de), archbishop of Rheims, son of Antoine le Bon, duc de Lorraine, is meant. As to cardinal Meudon, his name was Antoine Sanguin, archbishop of Orleans, who in 1539 had been created cardinal by Paul III. At this time he was Grand Almoner of France, enjoyed great favour with king Francis, and had been chosen, together with the duke of Guise and count La Val, as hostage or security for the peace of Crêpy; but still there is reason to suppose that instead of *Tournon*, the clerk who drew out the minute wrote mistakingly *Meudon*.

‡ "Que en ce cas nous supposions soit esté (*sic*) pour la faulte de fourage ou pour danger de peste, ou pour aultre cause raisonable pour la quelle le dit roy

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In addition to the above-stated remarks on the articles of England, and the opinions expressed with regard to them by Cardinal de Lorraine and others, We cannot omit to say that having, in conversation with the former, suggested the opportunity and mutual convenience of a suspension of arms between the belligerents, he (the Cardinal) approved thoroughly of Our idea. It seems, therefore, to Us that it would be a good and meritorious piece of work to undertake, more particularly for the English King under present circumstances, to try and bring on a truce between the belligerents, for the suspension of hostilities would naturally be followed by the immediate retreat of the contending armies and a longer truce, during which all differences might be peaceably adjusted or settled according to the state of political affairs in Christendom. We need scarcely add that if during the negotiations for that truce or peace We could intervene, with the perfect consent and agreement of the two parties, We would do the best in Our power to accomplish that aim. We have ordered the Sieur de Granville to speak to that effect to Cardinal de Tournon, who, as aforesaid, is expected here [at Mons].* Of what may result from their conference, you [Chapuys] and your colleague (De Courrières), as well as the bishop of Arras,† will be duly apprised.

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*‡

— Oct. **217.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.

Is now sending to his ambassador at the Imperial Court (Dr. Nicholas Wotton, dean of York) certain important proposals in writing, which he (Wotton) is to submit to the Emperor or to his ministers personally, and at the same time ask urgently for a quick and definitive answer to them,

* He was to meet there cardinal Tournon. *See* above, p. 379.

† The bishop of Arras' Instructions (No 334, p. 327), bearing the date of the 7th September, are at page 195. He arrived at the English camp before Boulogne on the 11th of that month; he quitted it on or about the 16th, and went back to the Emperor. He was again sent to Calais as one of the Emperor's commission to attend, conjointly with Chapuys and Montmorency, sieur de Courrières, the conferences about the peace between England and France. On the 1st of October he was not yet at his post, and that explains why this letter of the Emperor does not refer to him in person.

‡ As usual, this minute has no date, except perhaps that on the dorse—"Le premier d'Octobre de 1544." In this case, however, there is no difficulty to accept that date as the right one, for, according to Vandenesse's *Itinerary of Charles V.*, p. 549, the Emperor was at Mons on the 29th of September; next day he slept at Notre Dame de Chaulx, within three miles of Brussels. On the 1st of October he dined at Trois Fontaines, and reached Brussels at night. The letter, therefore, might have been signed at Mons a few hours before the Emperor's departure from that town.

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such as their mutual friendship and close alliance demand. —Greenwich, —* October 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

2 Oct. **218.** CHAPUYS and DE COURRIÈRES to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—The day before yesterday, after dinner,† we both accompanied this King to the place of embarkation, from his lodgings (*logis*) to the port. On the road thither we conversed with him of various matters, the purport and substance of which conversation being that which we lately communicated to Your Majesty. The King did particularly tell us that, whatever peace was made, he had no doubt that Your Majesty, as a virtuous prince, would faithfully observe the treaties. He was, however, astonished to hear (he said) that the French persevered in their hostility to him, and, therefore, could not conceive how, knowing their malice, Your Majesty had not beforehand informed him of it, and exhorted the French to put down their arms, since he himself had, on the advice and representation of Your Majesty, withdrawn his army and raised the siege of Montreuil. As long (he added) as the French kept theirs on foot Your Majesty was, by the strict terms of the treaty, bound to assist and help him.

Our answer was that he (the King) might rely as much as ever on Your Majesty's perfect, complete, and sincere friendship, adding in general terms that nothing should be wanting on the part of your Majesty, and that whatever promises You had made would be fulfilled, to which the King replied: "I have always heard fine words; I wish to see them put into effect."

Although the chief topic of our conversation with the King was, as above stated, the peace with France, we must own that the King showed no resentment about it; on the contrary, he was more open and frank with us than when he first heard of it. This, in our opinion, is in a certain measure owing to the agreeable intelligence he has lately received of his own army before Montreuil having effected its retreat, and being already close to this place with-

* A blank is left for the day of the month, but as the important proposals here alluded to—namely, the Emperor's declaration against king Francis—were personally submitted to the Emperor on the 7th of October by Wotton, (State Papers, Vol. X., p. 109), and besides that there is in the above-mentioned collection (*ibid.* p. 94) a letter from the Privy Council to the said English ambassador, dated from Leeds, in Kent, 3 Oct. 1544, telling him that the King is much dissatisfied with the separate peace made with France by the Emperor, there is reason to suppose that the letter was written between the 4th and the 10th of October, when, as will be said hereafter, Wotton verbally explained the cause and motives of Henry's dissatisfaction. It must be added that by this time, *i.e.* in October, Wotton, the dean of Canterbury, had been appointed to the vacant deanship of York in succession to Dr. Richard Layton, deceased.

† The 30th of September.

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out having been at all molested in their march, save by occasional alarms without consequence.*

A propos of this retreat of the English army before Montreuil, the King said to us that Mons. de Buren was one of the good lords and princes (this last title the King gave him) that he had ever known. He had so deci-ively fulfilled his duty all the time he had been at the English camp that he could not possibly have done better.† The King begged us to thank him personally in his name, and likewise to write to Your Imperial Majesty recommending, in the highest possible terms, the services of the said Mons. de Buren.

The King also repeated to us the very words of secretary Paiget (Sir William Paget) concerning our departure or withdrawal from this place, begging us to remain here until new orders. This request of the King we both granted, promising to remain here, at Boulogne as long as his own privy councillors, most of whom, as the two dukes, the Lord Privy Seal, the bishop of Winchester, the two treasurers, of the Royal Household and of the army, the Controller, and certain others, remained. The King having signified to us that it would be more useful and convenient that we stayed here, at Boulogne, with his Privy Council, instead of accompanying him to England, we willingly consented to it, subject, of course, to Your Imperial Majesty's commands, or till the arrival of our successors in this embassy.

This very morning the duke of Norfolk and the bishop of Winchester called on us, saying that the French had massed the greater part of their forces at Ardres, and detached five standards of infantry (*cinq enseignes*) towards Oudenarde,‡ where they had been as well received and entertained as if they had been in the heart of France; but that, owing to the country where they are now, and that to which they intend going next, having been completely wasted and exhausted during the late war, it was doubtful whether they could remain forty-eight hours there without Your Majesty's subjects furnishing them the victuals they require; and, if so, it seemed to them (the Duke and the Bishop) that it was a very strange thing, and one much against reason and honesty, as well as amity and alliance treaties. On that account (they said) they had come to complain, and at the same time to request us to write immediately to Your Imperial Majesty, as well as to the queen of Hungary and

* "A quoy croyons si aidoit le plaisir quil avoit que sa dite armee de Monstreul estoit desja cy auprez sans avoir eu dommaige en chemin non obstant quelques petites allarmes quilz eussent eu sans consequence."

† "Nous commençant à dire que Monsr. de Buren estoit lun des bons et virtueulx seigneur[s] et prince[s] commil le nommoit que l'on sçauroit dire et quil sestoit tres bien acquitté du temps quil avoit demeure au d.t camp."

‡ "Et avoient passe cinq enseignes une part du pays de Bredenarde (*sic*), ou ilz ont esté si bien reçuz et racuelliz (recuéllis) quilz seroient (auroient) esté au millieu de France."

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others, on the subject, and declare that should the French wish for battle they shall have it, for they are determined to wait for their attack, where they now are, so much so that they (the English) are daily improving the defences of this town, and fortifying besides their own camp outside; they have a good number of foot, and a smaller of cavalry force, though it is to be feared that forage for the horses will soon be wanted.

The carts and waggons they had from Flanders and the Low Countries have been sent away, the drivers paid and dismissed.* The dismissal, however, came rather late, as the French had already occupied the country. For this reason we have deemed it necessary to dispatch a trumpeter to the French camp to inform them of the circumstance, and request them to allow the above carts and waggons to return home without molestation, and were Your Imperial Majesty pleased to back our injunction to the French commanders, we have no doubt that the safety of the men and beasts would be ensured.

The war ships of which we wrote last, after landing the King at Dover, have returned here for the purpose of their commanders asking our advice as to what they are to do next. We have told the latter that, since the said war ships were back in Boulogne, our advice was that they should, at the present juncture, remain in port until orders come from Your Imperial Majesty. Nothing, we thought, could be so gratifying to the king of England under the circumstances, and, therefore, we shall be glad to hear Your Imperial Majesty's pleasure and commands in that respect.—Boullongne, 2 Oct. 1544.

Signed: "De Montmorency," "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 3 pp.

5 Oct. **219.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—On Friday last the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk came to us very early in the morning, and said that, although on the previous day they had decided to further strengthen the English camp before Boulogne, and wait for the French, as we wrote to Your Imperial Majesty, yet, imagining that the enemy would be too long in coming and offering battle, and that during that time the provisions stored for the garrison might be entirely consumed, or else that the French, as they suspected, knowing that all their army was now concentrated at Boulogne, might perhaps waste, sack, and burn the flat country, they (the Dukes) had changed their plan of campaign, and decided to come here

* "Ceulz-cy ont despeché et licensié la plus part des cartons du pays de vre. mte et a esté la depesché en peu trop tardif."

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(to Calais) with all their army, except about 4,000 men, whom they intended leaving at Boulogne well provided, as they said, with victuals for at least four months. After the above communication, the two Dukes begged us to be prepared to follow them to Calais, which we actually did on the following day.

Immediately after the departure of the two Dukes and of some other members of the Privy Council, as well as of the whole of the English force, Your Majesty's letter of the 1st inst. came to hand, together with the abstract of the article therein mentioned; and yesterday, after our arrival here, we fully declared and explained to the bishop of Winchester, whom the Privy Council had deputed, the contents of the letter and enclosed article as far as we considered it fit and convenient to do. This morning we were summoned to appear before the Privy Council within the Castle, where we did repeat the same statements we had previously made to the Bishop in private.

With the first point of the above-mentioned article respecting the good, perfect, and affectionate friendship which Your Imperial Majesty bears towards the King their master, the privy councillors seemed quite satisfied, as well as with the arrangements made for the retreat of the German auxiliaries. Nor did the said privy councillors find fault at all with the reasons alleged by Your Imperial Majesty for not interfering with the retreat of the armies on both sides. The point, however, to which they listened with most attention, and concerning which we have reason to think they will require further explanation, was that of the proposed truce, for they fancy it will turn out to their profit; firstly, because it will reduce the expense of keeping up an army in the field, and secondly, because it may give them time to fortify Boulogne. It is, however, to be feared that the French will not agree to any sort of truce, save on the conditions specified in Your Imperial Majesty's letters.

With regard to Monsr. de Bueren's* leave to quit (*congé*) we wrote on the 3rd inst. how satisfied this King had been with his services on the occasion, and what fine and praiseworthy words the former had uttered about him. We will, therefore, make no further remark on the subject, save to say that, this King having requested us to remain at Boulogne with his privy councillors, we did so until we came here [to Calais], and are still waiting for Your Imperial Majesty's commands and the appointment of our successors, which, we hope, will come down soon.

In pursuance of Your Imperial Majesty's orders, we have tried to ascertain if there was any appearance or likelihood of these people being inclined to the restitution of Boulogne. We have no positive information as to that; but, in our

* Floris d'Egmont, count of Bueren or Buren.

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*opinion, there is very little chance, if any, of their giving up their conquest, not only on account of the profit and advantages which the King expects to derive therefrom, but from fear of the loss of reputation which the abandonment of such a place might entail upon him. Indeed, we are told that he, the King, values this conquest much more than if he had taken ten towns like Paris.**

After our daily communication with the privy councillors, and also during the various conferences we have held with them, we have been requested and frequently pressed to put down in writing whatever we have told them on the subject of the proposed truce, that they may report to the King their master. That, however, we have graciously declined to do, believing that their very urgent and frequent requests in that line cover some mysterious plan of their own, the more so that this very afternoon, after dinner, they themselves have dispatched a courier to the King, their master, to inform him of our conversation and arguments in the matter, and at the same time to beg him to send full powers to treat of peace or truce, as it may be.† Nor can we omit to say that these privy councillors have pressed us much to write to Your Imperial Majesty to be pleased to issue orders that the French camp should not be allowed to pass through the Northern districts of Picardy, and likewise that a watchful eye should be kept over certain bulwarks (ballivarts) *erected close to the swamps* (marecages) *and river of St. Omer, for (said the privy councillors to us), should the French become masters of that bulwark, they might without the least difficulty penetrate into, overrun, and waste the whole country between Gravelinghes and this place [Calais].‡ In addition to this they requested us to write a letter to the Governor of Gravelinghes for him to detach a few men from the garrison of that fortress and send them to St. Omer for the defence and guard of the above-mentioned bulwark, which we have done, whilst Your Imperial Majesty's orders to that effect are reaching their destination.*—Calais, 5th of October 1544.

P.S.—After the above was written, Monsr. d'Arras arrived here very late at night. As he has not yet communicated with us, we cannot, at this late hour, say anything about his

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* "Et à ce quil nous semble il y a peu d'apparence que ceulz-cy le veuillent laisser tant pour la reputation, prouffit, et commodité que le dit s^r roy en actend, lextimant plus que davoir pris dix Paris."

† "Dont nous sumes (*nous sommes*) desmelle gracieusement nous semblant tant plus quilz nous en requeroient quil y avoit tant plus de mystère. Et ont cest apres dinne depesche devers le dit s^r roy pour lenvoyer advertir de tout, et mesmes afin quil veuille envoyer ample pouvoirs pour traicter tant de paix que de tresves."

‡ "Et aussi quil ne leur fust octroyé passage par le pays de [la] bande Nord, et davantaige quil pleust a iceile mectre garde à ung bellevart quest aupres des marcaiges (?) et de la riviere de St. Omer, car si les dits françois s'en saisissent ilz pourront librement courir et gaster tout le pays entre Gravelinghes et ce lieu."

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charge. To-morrow morning we shall call on him, and after taking knowledge of his instructions will, conjointly with him, proceed to their execution, and report by our very first despatch.

Signed: "J. de Montmorency," "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 3 *pp.*

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

5 Oct. **220.** KING FRANCIS' OFFERS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

The Most Christian king of France did once before, previously to his own peace with the Emperor, send his deputies to the king of England proposing terms for the settlement of their mutual differences.* This he did principally for the sake of Christendom's tranquillity and welfare; but though the terms of conciliation offered were reasonable (*honnestes*), and such as the king of England might have accepted at once, they were rejected, and the Most Christian King, in consequence of that refusal, was obliged to look out for other ways and means of conciliation, such as the help of arbitrators and fair judges (*amigables compositeurs*).† That is why, in his treaty with the Emperor, the Most Christian king of France agreed to submit himself to and promised to stand and abide by his judgment in all matters concerning his differences with the king of England, which differences were caused by, and originated in, certain treaties made between them. To this end the Emperor did offer to send commissioners or deputies fully empowered and instructed to do their work.

As the Emperor, however, was of opinion that before having recourse to the above-mentioned submission, and to the arbitration therein proposed, as well as the appointment of the said commissioners or deputies, it was desirable to ascertain whether some means could not be found for both parties to come willingly to terms of peace, the Most Christian king of France, following the Emperor's kind advice and request, did send to His Imperial Court cardinal du Bellay and president Raymon (*sic*) ‡ to hold a preliminary

* Alluding, no doubt, to St. Martin, Fremozelles, Ryan, and others, who as early as in May and June, before king Henry crossed the Channel and afterwards, had been the bearers of letters and messages from king Francis to that effect.

† "Dont seroit venu le dit s^r roy à l'aultre moyen qui est d'elegir (d'eslire) arbitres et amigables compositeurs, par quoy par le dit traicté qu'il a faict avecq l'empereur il s'est submis d'estre à son jugement quant aulx differents d'entre luy et le dit s^r roy d'Angleterre procedant à cause de certains traictés passez entre eulz, et à ces fins offert envoyer ses deputes comptemment instruitz de toutes choses."

‡ Elsewhere Raymond, Raymont, and Ramond, first President of the Parliament of Rouen.

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conference with the Emperor's deputies as to the best means of arriving at a final settlement of his differences with the king of England.

Nevertheless, although the above said Cardinal and President were fully prepared to show by arguments and papers of the greatest importance that the obligations under which the Most Christian King stands towards England consist chiefly, as the King maintains, in sums of money borrowed from him from time to time, and that that debt has already been liquidated and acquitted, as his own ministers are prepared to show and demonstrate, the king of England having already, as they say, received more money than his due, and having manifestly violated the very treaty upon which the king of England founds his allegation,* yet the Most Christian king of France, in consideration for the public welfare and out of regard for the Emperor, consents to his deputies making to the English, in his name, the following final offers :—

Firstly,—The rest of the two millions of crowns, which the king of England claims as owing to him by the treaty of 1525, will be paid by early instalments of 25,000 crowns each.†

Secondly,—The life pension (*pension viagère*) of 100,000 crowns will likewise be paid in compliance with the letter of the treaty.

Thirdly,—As to the other pension of 50,000 crowns in perpetuity, the Most Christian King's deputies shall refer to and call the attention of the Emperor's ministers to the articles of the said treaty with England, wherein it is clearly and expressly stipulated that the aforesaid pension shall be paid by France as long as she is at peace with England ; and whereas the king of England has now invaded the Most Christian King's territory, wasted, sacked, and burnt the whole of the Bouloignois (Boullonois) seized and kept the capital of that county itself, it is quite clear that he himself has violated the treaty, and therefore has no right whatever to demand a perpetual pension from France since he has wilfully invaded it, and thereby disturbed the Most Christian King in the peaceful possession of his kingdom. This stipulation not having been complied with, it is evident that the obligation of a perpetual pension falls to the ground, and

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* "Les quels, combien que ilz eussent plusieurs grans moyens pour monstrer et faire apparoir evidentement que les obligations pretendues par le roy d'Angleterre sont de debtes solutes (?) et acquitées, en sorte que le dit s[r] roy d'Angleterre est plus que payé comme les ministres du dit roy tres Chrestien peuvent sur le champ faire apparaitre ; et d'avantaige qu'il a de son coustel manifestement enfraint (*sic*) le traicté en vertu du quel il pretend et fonde ses (ces) dites obligations."

† "Et pour la derniere resolution offriront aulx depputez du roy d'Angleterre que la somme restant à payer des deux millions d'or pretendus par le roy d'Angleterre par le traicté faict l'an mille cinq cents vingt et cinque seront payes à la raison de vingt cinque mille escus par an."

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that the Most Christian king of France is not bound to pay it.

Although, all things considered, the Most Christian King has every reason to presume that the above-mentioned offers to be made in his name by his commissioners are more than sufficient for the purpose and will be accepted, yet out of deference and regard for the Emperor he (the Most Christian king of France) now consents, though he had resolved to make no further concessions, to pay over and above the one million of gold, or whatever sum France may be owing to England, out of the two millions claimed, two hundred thousand crowns during the present year, that is to say, 100,000 next Easter and 100,000 on All Saints Day of 1545. Also to pay in the course of next year the annual pension of 100,000 crowns, namely, 50,000 crowns on the 1st of May and 50,000 on All Saints Day, which are the terms specified in the treaty. For the future, the Most Christian king of France promises to continue paying annually the said pension (*viagère*); to pay every year 50,000 crowns until the remainder of the one million of gold said to be owing to England be completely paid, always deducting from it the sums that may have been paid during the current year 1544, or the next, 1545; and to give such securities for the payment of all and each of the above-mentioned sums of money at the dates herein specified and fixed as the Emperor may approve of.*

With regard to the perpetual pension, though, as above stated, it must be, for the reasons alleged, annulled, yet the Most Christian King will conform himself entirely with the amicable decision of the Emperor in the matter, provided Boulogne is restored to him, without which condition this last, as well as all previous offers, will be nul and void as if they had never been made. Indeed, the Most Christian King begs the Emperor his brother to believe firmly that if it were in his power to make better offers he would willingly do so, more for the welfare of Christendom at large and out of regard for him than for any other motive or cause. It must also be considered that the offers are considerable if

* "Et combien qu'il semble au roy tres chrestien le tout bien consideré les dits offres faictes par les dits ambassadeurs estre plus que raisonables, toutes fois pour le respect qu'il porte à l'empereur, combien qu'il soit deliberé de non passer oultre, il est content de payer [en] sus du million d'or ou autre somme que se trouvera estre deue des dits deux millions, les payments rabattuz, deux cent mille escuz durant le cours de la presente annee, cest à sçavoir cinquante mil escuz à pasques prouchaines, et cinquante mil et les autres cent mil escuz à la Tous Sain ensuyvant durant la dite annee pour la pension viagere, cest à sçavoir cinquant mil escuz au premier jour de May prouchain, et autres cinquante mil escuz à la Tous Sainctz ensuyvant, que sont les termes convenez par le dit traité, et pour l'advenir payer et contynuer la dite pension viagière, et en oultre aux termes d'icelle pension par chascun an cinquante mil escuz en deduction de la dite somme d'un million d'or jusques au parfaict payement d'icelle, et pour la sureté du parfait payements de la dite somme bailler telles securitez quelles seront advisees et par l'empereur et entre eulx accordées."

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the great expenditure to which he has been put during the last three years is taken into account, and that should the Turk bestir himself and come down upon Christend m next year, as is most likely, he will be obliged, even if he settles with the king of England, to incur great expenditure in conformity with the treaty between him and the Emperor.*

Should it happen that, against all reason, the said king of England refuses the above-specified terms, the Most Christian king of France will consider himself free and quit of such obligations; and, moreover, will request the Emperor to relieve himself of the intervention, and consider him as entirely free from all engagements or obligations he may have made or contracted with the king of England.

The Most Christian king of France also begs the Emperor to consider him as quite released and free from his submission (*i.e.* to arbitration,) since he must have heard and understood that he (the Most Christian king of France) has fulfilled in all its parts the article of the treaty which relates to the aforesaid submission, whereas the king of England absolutely refuses to abide by the Emperor's judgment and sentence of arbitration, to which he (the Most Christian king of France) cannot bow and submit separately and alone.†

French. Original draft. 3 *pp.*‡

Oct. **221.** **The Emperor to King Henry.**

Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.

"Monsieur, mon bon frère,"—Immediately after receiving my ambassadors' answer to what I had written to them on the subject of a peace between you and the king of France, I gave orders that cardinals Loreyne (Lorraine) and Tournon should be communicated with, and I did expressly send on the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to the king of France, to whom I wrote a most affectionate letter recommending him to send an embassy to you. This the Bishop had orders from me to procure with all possible diligence, and, whatever answer he got to his mission, to go over and acquaint you with it.

I am now writing more specifically on this subject to my

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* "Il faudra que le dit sieur Roy ayant appoincté au roy d'Angleterre entre en grande despense suyvant le traicte fait nagueres entre l'empereur et luy."

† "S'il advenoit que contre toute raison le dit roy d'Angleterre reffuse des offres susdits le roy tres chrestien entend en estre et demourer (*sic*) quicte, et davantaige prie le dit sieur Empereur le vouloir tenir deschargé de sa submission à luy faicte ayant entendu que a luy est satisfait à l'article de la dite submission, attendu mesmes que le roy d'Angleterre reffuse à estre et à se soubmettre (*sic*) à pareil jugement que luy et quil ne peult seul estre obligé."

‡ This paper has no date, but, as it is placed immediately after Chapuys' and De Courrières' letter to the Emperor of the 5th (No. 129 p. 386), wherein mention is made of King Francis' offers and before the offers themselves, dated

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own ambassadors, in order that, in the meantime, you may be apprised of the fact. Should the affair come to a good issue, I beg you to agree to that which you will find most fit and convenient for the furtherance of such a good and holy work as peace between two Christian princes is. Attach faith to what the said Bishop and ambassadors will say in my behalf, as if I myself were addressing you, and believe that I shall do the best possible offices in that affair.*

Addressed: "A Monsieur, mon bon frere et cousin le roy d'Angleterre."

French. Original draft.† 1 *p.*

6 Oct. **222.** The OFFERS OF FRANCE and the KING OF ENGLAND'S ANSWER.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

The offers which cardinal du Bellay, the first President [of the Parliament of] Rouen, Secretary de L'Aubespine, and the Treasurer of the Finances [of France] have made in the name of king Francis to the King my master are as follow :—

To pay immediately the arrears of the pension.

To continue yearly the payment of the same.

To pay for the damage and cost which the king of England, my master, has had to sustain since the commencement of these present wars.

To place the town and territory of Ardres at the disposal of the King my master.

To make the Scots submit to the will of the king of England my master, in all reasonable things, and if they do not, abandon them altogether.

To deliver good and sufficient hostages as security.

The King my master's answer to the conditions above specified, besides which the following are added :—

To renounce all rights, titles, and interests which the king of France may have or pretend to have on Boulogne and the Boullonois.‡

To renounce and give up entirely to the King my master all the county of Guisnes (Guînes).

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* "Vous pryant si la chose vient à bons termes condescendre à ce que verrez convenyr à parfayre si bonne et saynte œuvre et ora les dits Evesque et ambassadeurs et que en ce ne lesseré (laisserai) de fayre tout bon office possible."

† The original is preserved in Record Office (*State Papers*, Vol. X., p. 101). Neither the draft minute nor the letter itself has a date, but as the latter is placed immediately after one of the 5th October, from the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk to king Henry, and another of the Privy Council in England to the said Dukes at Calais, it stands to reason that it must have been written about the 6th, though it was not forwarded by Granvelle, who was to have been the bearer, until the 3rd of November, as will be seen hereafter.

‡ "De renoncer tout droit, titres et interets que le roy de France pourroit pretendre d'avoir à Bouloigne et au Bouloignois."

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Should, however, king Francis find the continuation of an annual pension to last for ever a grievous and intolerable burden, he may be relieved from that obligation by giving up to the King my master the town of Montreuil, of which he expects to get possession soon, with its territory, besides the county of Ponthieu. The King my master will be satisfied with that instead of the annual pension.*

To deliver good and fit hostages as security for the additional conditions.

French. Contemporary copy. Made in London, and sent by Chapuys to Brussels.

6 Oct. **223.** The EMPEROR to HIS AMBASSADORS IN ENGLAND.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Reverend pere en Dieu, tres chiers et feaulx,"—Supposing that by this time, and on the receipt of this Our letter, you three are together,† the present will be in answer to the despatch [of the 2nd inst.] signed conjointly by two of you, Monsr. de Courrières and Eustace Chapuys, and received yesterday, the 5th.‡ The answer will also comprise the particulars relating to the mission of you, the bishop of Arras, to the Court of France for the purpose of and with a view to settling the differences existing between the kings of England and of France, and the proposed appointment by the latter of ambassadors to resume the negociations for the peace.

As to that King's departure and passage to England, and what you, the said De Courrières and Chapuys (*sic*), wrote about it, We have nothing to observe. We approve entirely of your resolution to remain where you are, were it for no other purpose than to attend and watch, according to Our particular instructions, the proceedings of the commissioners, and individually and all together look out and procure the means of adjusting differences between the parties, and, in short, to do your best for the peace between England and France.

As to the representations which you say have been addressed to you both by that King's privy councillors and ministers, respecting the favour with which five standards (enseignes) *of French infantry have been treated by Our subjects at their passage through Bredenarde, you may answer, whenever an opportunity offers, that We know nothing about it, except what you yourselves wrote, nor have We received the least notice of the passage of that infantry*

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* "Qui aultrement a bon espoir de l'avoir en brief et se contentera de cela en lieu de la dite pension." This sentence from the pen of king Henry's chief Secretary (Sir William Paget) shows that at this time, in October, the siege of Montreuil still continued.

† The Bishop had arrived at Calais on the 5th.

‡ *See* No. 217, p. 384.

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through Our dominions. If they had really passed, and been favourably treated by the peasants of that district, it must have been rather out of fear than otherwise. However that may be, We have not failed to complain to the French ambassadors residing at this Court, telling them seriously that We do not intend to allow king Francis' soldiers to pass through Our dominions.

*And since this point of the passage of armed men through Our territory has been touched, We consider it fit to inform you that the French have frequently and most urgently requested us to allow them to purchase, in Flanders, provisions for their army, alleging that, as it is, most of what they now eat and drink comes from foreign countries, and especially from Flanders and the Low Countries. This request of theirs We have refused to grant without attending to the formal prescriptions of our treaty with England, according to which We might very well have granted the French request, inasmuch as Boulogne is not among the towns or districts specified in the said treaty. This is said merely for your own private information, and that you may make use of it, or not, as you please or deem it convenient.**

Touching the Sieur de Buren, We are glad to hear that the king of England was, as he himself told you both, pleased and contented with this General's services on this late occasion. As far as We can learn here [at Brussels], Monsr. de Buren has fulfilled his charge honourably and to that King's complete satisfaction.

But to return to the negociations for a treaty of peace between England and France. As far as we can understand, the chief difficulty is Boulogne, which town, as you, De Courrières and Chappuys (sic), *informed Us in various of your dispatches, the English intend to retain, whilst king Francis, on the other hand, as you, the bishop of Arras, tell me, will in no way give up, as the ministers and ambassadors of king Francis have frequently declared to Us, at the same time alleging causes and reasons why the King their master cannot possibly yield on that point. Matters in this state, it will be your duty to use all your ability and discretion in speaking or acting impartially, so as not to raise the suspicions of one or the other of the parties; indeed, the point itself being so delicate and so* (affectionné) *to both princes, the utmost care should be taken not to offend either of them by appearing to lean towards one side more than to the other, especially as most likely the first thing the French commissioners will do upon their arrival* [*at Calais will be to ask for the restitution of Boulogne, and if the*

* "Ce que leur avons reffusé expressement sans nous attaicher à la formalité du traicté que nous avons avec le dit Angleterre, par ce qu'il la pouvyons du moins permectre, actendu que Boulogne n'est des proces (places?) comprises au dict traicté ce que vous voulons faire ou dire ceste particularite comme mieulx vous semblera."

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English absolutely refuse to treat on that ground there is danger of the negociation being broken, the more so that, according to what you, the bishop of Arras, wrote to Us, king Francis has positively declared that he will never consent to a suspension of hostilities unless he knows beforehand that the king of England consents to the said restitution, as a preliminary step to the negociations for peace.

We cannot at present give you further instructions on this point, but We recommend you to do the utmost according to the disposition and will of both the parties themselves, and the number and strength of their respective forces in the field, thus obviating the many hazardous contingencies that might supervene by land or sea. We hardly need remind you here of what We wrote in Our last. It is of the utmost importance that you, the Bishop, make the most strenuous efforts and employ all your ability and tact in trying to effect a peace between the belligerents, or, at least, procure a suspension of hostilities or a truce of some duration, long or short as it may be, during which, and according as the state of political affairs will permit, a peace may be negociated and concluded.

We must not omit to say, for your guidance in this negociation, that the French have seriously spoken to Us about the engagement they had taken of sending their ambassadors to the king of England, as well as about their readiness to comply, as much as it is in their power, with any reasonable demands on the part of England, in conformity with the offers they themselves have made, and the "submission" to Our arbitration stipulated in their treaty of peace with Us shall remain entirely in Our hands. This the French have always insisted upon ever since We made peace with them, continually reminding our ministers and privy councillors of the mutual engagement stipulated in Our treaty with them, protesting that they have done, and will do in future, all that is in their power to put an end to this war, but, at the same time, hinting that should their offer be refused, and any evil come out of that refusal, it will not be their fault.

As far as We can gather, though they do not openly and expressly say so, the French seem to fancy that, if they have to apply for Our arbitration, ultimately they will be favoured by it. That is why We order and request you, should the opportunity offer, and you deem it fit and convenient, to make use of the above information so as to induce the King and his ministers to facilitate more and more the ways of peace. But let these words and sentiments of the French, when reported by you to the King or to his privy councillors, be said and stated without commentary, and by way of conversational interchange of news, lest the English should imagine that We desire and are trying to get into Our

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hands the arbitration of differences existing between the two parties,* or that wish to press them (the English) to come to an agreement with their enemy, excepting on terms which they may find convenient and suitable to them.

Should any remarks be again made to you respecting the naval armaments of France, and should the privy councillors again talk to you on the subject, you will tell them that, if possible, Our warships now in sight of Calais must not run the risk of being wrecked or lost, except for reasonable cause, and yet that the help and assistance which the English require will be afforded to them; but this, again, must be said in a manner and in words not likely to cause resentment.†—Brussels, the 6th of October 1544.

Indorsed: "L'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre."‡

French. Original minute, partly ciphered. 3 *pp.*

6 Oct. **224.** The Bishop of Arras to the Admiral of France.

Wien. Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—I arrived here yesterday [the 5th] as the trumpeter, bearer of this my letter, will tell you, and heard that the King had embarked and left for England on Tuesday last.§ He, however, left behind him the two dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, besides others of his principal privy councillors, to attend to military affairs.‖ Meanwhile, as the Imperial ambassadors have already done all they possibly could to induce the King to the peace with France, and his Majesty has nevertheless sailed for England, they (the

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* "Et que ce soit par forme de parolles des dits françoys et non pour que iceulx anglois puissent penser qu'ayons fin d'embrasser la charge de vuidange des dites differends qui sont et pourroient rester en difficulté entre les dites parties, ny que les veuillons plus pousser au dit accord de ce qu'ilz verront qu'il leur conviendra et sera à leur propos."

† "Vous aurez aussi regard comme el sera [parlé] de l'armee de mer de France, et que s'il est possible, nos bateaulx qui sont au coustel de Calaix ne se hazardent de perdre sans raisonable fondement [donneront l'assistance requise] tenant toutesfois regard que aussi ce soit [dit] sans bailler raisonable [cause] de resentement aux dits anglois."

‡ The ambassadors were still Chapuys and De Courrières, to whom Antoine Perrenot, bishop of Arras, had been adjoined as extraordinary envoy a second time, that being the reason of the draft being headed "*Tres Reverend père en Dieu,*" &c. On this occasion, however, the Bishop was rather sent as Imperial commissioner at the meeting of Calais.

§ On the 30th of September. *See* above, p. 384.

‖ "Mais qu'il a içy delaissé les ducs de Norfort et Saffort (*sic*) et les principaulx de son Conseil pour entendre en ce qu'il convient au fait de son armee, et que comme les ambassadeurs de sa ma^te^ Imperiale ont continuellement fait instance pour rendre le dit roy d'Angleterre enclin à la paix, et procuré ce que leur a semblé à ce necessaire, neans (voyant?) que le dit roy passait, ont tenue le main à ce que les dite sieurs du Conseil du dit roy depechassent vers leur maistre pour avoir commission et pouvoir necessaire à traicter la paix, affin que, venans les ministres du roy très chrestien l'on peult (peuve) incontinent commencer la besoigne.'

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imperial ambassadors) have moved the Councillors to dispatch a messenger to the King their master, asking for full powers to treat with the French deputies, so that immediately upon the arrival of those whom the Most Christian King may appoint the negociations may commence. In this manner, the very moment that the English deputies arrive with full powers and commission to treat of the peace, both parties shall proceed to work.

I have considered it my duty to inform you, as I do, of the state of the affair, that you may command my services, and let me know what else I can do to forward your views, begging you to let me know your resolution. I do not write direct to those lords in order not to molest them, and will put an end to this letter by affectionately commending myself to your good graces, and begging our Creator to give you a long life.—From Calais, the 6 October 1544.

Addressed; "To Mons. d'Hannebault, marshal and admiral of France, &c."

French. Holograph. 1 *p.*

6 Oct. **225.** ANTOINE PERRENOT, BISHOP OF ARRAS, DE COURRIÈRES and CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—The dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, and other members of this King's Privy Council, having been informed that I (the bishop of Arras) had arrived in this town [of Calais] yesterday, sent me this morning, without my applying first for an audience, as is customary on such occasions, a message purporting that, being assembled at the Town Hall (Maison de Ville) far away from the quarter of the town where we the Imperial ambassadors reside, and they themselves now much engaged at the time, they would be glad to see me and my colleagues at the said Town Hall before or after dinner, as we pleased. Which invitation we accepted for the afternoon of the same day, considering that hour most fit and convenient to have a long conversation with them.*

After dinner, therefore, I (the bishop) and my two colleagues went to the Town Hall, where the King's privy councillors were assembled, and after referring partly to what Monsr. de Courrières and Chapuys had told them the day before, I (the bishop of Arras) began to explain to them the nature of the charge I bore from Your Imperial Majesty. I told them, in short, that my mission was to solicit and find out the ways of peace between England and France. That my business was to try and persuade the King their master

* "Nous ont envoyé dire qu'il estoient d'assez bon loisir pour deviser avec nous si voulions deviser avec eulz devant ou apres disner à nostre choy, leur seroit plus commodieux, et que aurions plus de space pour deviser avec eulx."

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to accept the proposals once made by cardinal du Bellay and his colleagues in the name of the Most Christian King, or, failing that, induce the latter to send here to Calais new ambassadors to treat of peace. And, lastly, that the Most Christian King, finding the terms and conditions proposed by the English rather unreasonable and intolerable, had consented, at the express request and for the sake of Your Imperial Majesty, to send to England a fresh set of ambassadors, who were to leave the day after my departure, that is last Saturday, as I (the bishop) had occasion to write to Your Imperial Majesty from the camp of the Most Christian king of France. That passing by the place where king Francis was encamped, I had heard from the lips of the admiral of France that he had news of the king of England having crossed over to Dover,* and if that were so, he thought there would be some difficulty in sending French ambassadors to England. Doubting, however, whether the news was correct and authentic, I had come to this town, hoping that the King had not yet returned to England, but was still in France. I ascertained, however, that he was already in England, but had left behind some of his privy councillors, and had written to me by a trumpeter the letter of which a copy is enclosed.

After hearing this explanation of my motives in coming here [to Calais], the privy councillors † retired to an adjoining room to deliberate, and on their return to the Council hall began by thanking me for the trouble I had taken in the affair of the peace. After that they went on to say that, *truly speaking, they could not conceive how the King, their master, could possibly, without injury to his reputation, consent to treat of peace in the present state of affairs, for it seemed to them as if the French had no real desire for the peace they were seeking, since instead of applying for it in moderate and dignified terms, such as were requisite in such cases, they were making use of outrageous and threatening language* (oltrageries et menasses), *thinking thereby to intimidate the King, their master, and compel them to accept the said peace. "That is not (the privy councillors added) the way to induce the King, our master, to listen to proposals of peace, being, as he is, both powerful and magnanimous. The French are very much mistaken if they think that because they are so close to us as they are, and because the two dukes and the Lord Privy Seal, who enjoy most of the King's favour, are at present engaged with the administration of military affairs, they have a greater chance of pushing on their negotiations than if they had to deal with us, who, as members of the Privy Council, would necessarily enough have to attend the diplomatic conferences about the peace, whilst the*

* On the 30th of September.

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French deputies themselves might live on English territory without having to attend to other important affairs of State."

Besides the above argument, the privy councillor, who spoke for his colleagues, brought forward another remark more pointed than the rest, alleging that the very mild terms used by Your Imperial Majesty whilst intervening in the peace were calculated to render the French still more insolent than they were, and that in his opinion, if such a good object as the peace was to be attained, Your Imperial Majesty should employ authority rather than persuasion or exhortation.* In short, that since Your Majesty had expressly declared and reserved that the treaty of closer friendship and alliance between Your Majesty and the King their master, would remain in force and have effect, Your Imperial Majesty was bound, in case of invasion of English territory by the French, to declare against king Francis, and hold him as your enemy (*et luy signifier belligerence*), as Your Majesty was strictly obliged by the letter of the said treaty. The privy councillor ended by saying that what he had just proposed and advised was the result of his own and his colleagues' deliberation in the Privy Council without consulting the King, his master, whose will and orders on the subject they expected to receive very shortly.

My answer to the above speech of the privy councillor, and his very polite thanks for the trouble I (the Bishop) had taken in coming [to Calais], was as follows:—I told them in courteous terms that I had done so with pleasure, and would willingly have taken much greater trouble and inconvenience for the sake of their King's service. *As to the point at variance between Your Imperial Majesty and this King, and on which I plainly saw that the privy councillors wished to promote a debate,* my two colleagues and I myself made such observations and remarks as we considered pertinent and convenient on the occasion.† That we did in the most moderate (*honestes*) and gracious terms possible, explaining how to our certain knowledge Your Imperial Majesty had hitherto done, and was ready to do in future, in this matter of peace, all that you were obliged by treaty; but that, I said, is not the object of my present mission; it is limited to inquiring whether the King your master will receive the new ambassadors whom the Most Christian king of France was prepared to send. At the same time I did not let the opportunity pass away without telling them that through Your Majesty's late peace with them, king Francis

* "Que la doulceur de vre. mate [en] pratiquant et entravenant (intervenant) à la dite paix rendroit les dits françoys plus insolens et quil conveoit pour le bon effect de la dite paix que vre. mate usast plus tost d'autorité devers le dit sieur roy tres chrestien que d'exhor. cion."

† "Et quant à la dispute avec les dits du Conseil nous demesnames gracieusement et modestement, leur disant en termes generaulx que vre. mate avoit faict et cy apres [faira] tout ce à quoy icelle estoit obligee et que pour ceste heure nous seulement sommes venus pour communiquer sur la charge de moy l'evesque."

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had become, as it were, Your own confederate and ally, with the perfect will and consent of the King, their master, which fact was sufficient of itself to refute most of the allegations they had made, or might make hereafter, in favour of their demand. "All of us thought," said I (the Bishop) to the privy councillors, "that the King your master would see with pleasure the arrival of the new French embassy, as he himself, at his departure, told me and my colleagues (De Courrières and Chapuys). At that time the King knew very well that the French were marching [on Boulogne] against him."

With regard to the loss of reputation, on which they founded most of their arguments, I told them that I saw no cause at all to fear it; for besides their King being in arms, as the Most Christian King was, his being actually in possession of Boulogne placed him in a more advantageous position, as far as reputation goes, than the latter, who was now actually suing for peace.

As to the authority, of which, as they said, Your Imperial Majesty ought to make use in the present case, it would not do for You, whilst treating of peace, to stipulate for the retreat of the French army, unless You promised that the king of England would also evacuate French territory. Nor was it proper and convenient to do so, for the reasons alleged yesterday, which reasons they themselves had found good and sufficient.* Besides which, the very moment You heard that the King, their master, had actually raised the siege of Montreuil, You had broken up (*rompu*) Your army, and therefore my colleagues and I considered that authority not backed by force to remedy the evil in case of refusal would have been of no use at all in the present case, and would certainly have hampered Your Imperial Majesty in the execution of the peace, and You would have lost all credit as well as the means of inducing the Most Christian King to peace.—From Calais, 6 October 1544.

Signed: "A. Perrenot, bishop of Arras; J. De Montmorency; Eustace Chapuys."

Indorsed: "From the ambassador in England of the 6th of October. Received at Brussels on the 9th of the said month of October."

French. Original. 4 pp.

6 Oct. **226.** EUSTACE CHAPUYS to MGR. DE GRANVELLE.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Onz. Conser.

"Monseigneur, &c."—Your Lordship will see by the letter addressed to His Imperial Majesty the substance of our

* "Et que quant à l'auctorité dont ilz parloient il ne convenoit a vre. mate en traictant de la paix pieusement (preussement) capituler sur là retraicte de l'armée des dits françois non ayant povoir de promectre le mesme d'icelle du dict roy leur maistre et aussi ne convenoit pour les raisons que leur furent hier alleguées et qu'ilz trouverent bonnes."

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conferences with these privy councillors, in which conferences Mons. de Courrières and I myself have been spectators and witnesses rather than actors; for greater reason had the apples of the fable to say "We also can swim," and the fly that stood on the horn of the ox to boast that it was ploughing, than we ourselves had to pretend to have been of any use or help to Monsr. d'Arras, who certainly has no need of such Delius and Theseus, as we both are [to him].* One single injury (*aggravie*) † he has done us, and particularly me, which is his having refused to put down in writing the result of the conferences; but I have taken my revenge by purposely omitting to mention many things that were said thereat, that he himself should take the trouble of keeping them in memory. Indeed, to say the truth, and without affectation of any kind, I do not hesitate to say that His Imperial Majesty could never, for a thousand reasons (*pour mille respects*), have chosen a fitter person than him to fill the duties of the charge entrusted to him.

In the present case, however, the two chief foundation stones on which all negociations ought to rest—namely, the opportunity, which is the source of all profitable actions, and the matter itself—should be well chosen. Without those conditions no natural agent can possibly effect anything. As to me, I do really believe that had I been entrusted with Monsr. d'Arras' mission, all my arguments at the conferences would have been perfectly useless and unavailing under the circumstances; for this King, on many considerations, of which Monsr. de Courrières and I myself wrote to His Imperial Majesty on the ———, will not easily give up his conquest. Perhaps after turning over in his mind several considerations which your Lordship may appreciate better than myself, he may after all renounce his new acquisition.‡ As to me, I would not find fault with the French if they made excuses, and did not send their ambassadors and ministers, for out of that nothing should be done; for I doubt whether anything can be concluded, and I am almost sure that neither of the parties will advance or retreat one single step of their own respective pretensions; and who knows whether, after all, one or the other of the princes, and perhaps both, will not cast suspicions on His Imperial Majesty? § After the parties have become tired

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* "Et à meilleure raison disoient les pommes '*Et nos quoque poma natamus*,' et la mouche qu'estoit sur la corne du bœuf qui se vantoit d'arer, que ne ferions nous de dire avoir donné aucune assistance à Monsr. d'Arras, qui n'a mestier *talibus Delyes aut Theseys* que sommes nous aultres."

† The word translated by injury is the Spanish (*agravio*), which, as far as I know, was not used by French writers of the time.

‡ "Bien peult estre que si apres considerant plusieurs choses que vre. sre peult trop bien et mieulx que moy considerer, il se pourroit condescendre."

§ "Quant à moy je ne tiendrays pour mal que les françoys s'excussassent d'envoier içy leurs ambassadeurs, doubtant qu'il ne se conclura riens, et que l'une ou l'aultre des dites parties pourroit prendre quelque suspicion de sa mate, mais apres que l'un ou l'autre seront fasches du fraiz, que conviendra supporter, sera la saison, &c."

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of spending money in the keeping up of their respective armies, that will be the time for the Emperor to mediate; as the advocate advised his son, at the beginning of the dispute, never to interfere between two parties until they were actually tired of pleading; or, as the proverb says: "Beatus in declinatione morbi medicus."

By way of confirmation of the above-mentioned subject, I cannot help telling your Lordship that to-day, after the conference was over, the bishop of Winchester (Gardiner) told me confidentially, and under reserve, after many protests and excuses for speaking his mind freely, that it seemed to him as if His Imperial Majesty, being now on good terms with the Most Christian king of France, had conceived some sort of jealousy and envy at his master the king of England keeping possession of some small portion of French territory which he had conquered during the war; and that as the Emperor himself, by his separate peace with the French, had obtained nothing of the sort, rather than let his late ally enjoy that advantage and commodity, seeing him so great and in fair way of becoming still greater and more powerful, he was trying to mediate between the two kings, and promote some sort of peace that would ultimately leave Boulogne in the hands of the French.

I must add that the very same bishop in conversation had told me two days before that it would not be asserted, as people generally said, that Your Imperial Majesty had been forced to make peace with France, since, after all, you had obtained everything that was desirable, namely, giving the investiture of Milan to the duke of Orleans on the very same conditions once rejected by the French, and that as to Boulogne and the river Somme, that would have been increasing the expense of the war, as that territory could on no account be kept without an army, and would cause for ever the hatred of the French, besides which it was quite evident that Your Imperial Majesty had already more domains and kingdoms than You wished for, and that what you wanted was peace and tranquillity.

Whatever efforts I made to stop the Bishop's mouth, I could not do so until I told him that he was actually casting dishonour on the King, his master, who whilst debating with the bishop of Arras and with me on the subject, deliberately said that the conditions [of Crépy] had been made, could not have been worse had His Imperial Majesty been a prisoner in France.

Your Lordship, with your great wisdom and tact, will easily understand what may be the purpose of the above and other similar arguments, which I myself could not if I chose put down in writing. As this my letter is already too long and too prolix, I beg your Lordship to excuse me.—Calais, 6 October 1544. Your most humble, &c.

Signed: "Eustace Chapuys."

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9 Oct. **227.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Orders have been issued for some of his own privy councillors in Calais to negociate and treat of peace with the ambassadors and commissioners of king Francis. Should the French commissioners not agree to the reasonable terms proposed by the English, two of the latter—namely, count Darfort (the earl of Hertford) and the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner)—will go to the Emperor and explain to him king Henry's views and intentions in the matter, telling him in plain words what his wishes are. The Emperor may attach the same faith to the representations of his deputies as if he himself were personally declaring his sentiments and views. Expects soon from the Emperor a resolute and final answer on the whole affair, such as their mutual friendship and close alliance demand.*—Westminster Palace, 9 October 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

10 Oct. **228.** The BISHOP OF ARRAS, the SIEUR DE COURRIÈRES and EUSTACE CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P., *Fasc.* C. 23.

"Sire,"—The day before yesterday two of Your Imperial Majesty's letters, both dated the 6th † inst., came duly to hand, immediately after the receipt of which the bishop of Winchester came to us saying that the King's privy councillors were very much surprised to see that the vessels (*bateaux*) destined for their passage [to England] had not yet arrived, and begging us to write to Your Majesty to give proper orders about them. Our answer was, according to the contents of Your Majesty's letter, that due provision had already been made for the whole, not failing, at the same time, to remonstrate with him respecting the many abuses committed by the English during the transport of the Flemish mares (*juments*), and the ill-treatment of the carriers and sutlers. The Bishop promised that in future order should be given to put that right, and this morning, having gone to the Privy Council, we were again assured that proper orders should be issued to that effect, yet giving us to understand at the same time that, as there had been of late no transport of Flemish mares, there was no ground for complaint on that score, nor would there be any in future, for they were too busy in transporting their own horses to think of other cattle. As to the ill-

* When the State Papers for the reign of Henry VIII. were published (1830–52), the above letter of king Henry to the Emperor could not be found; but from a note to p. 103 of Vol. X. of the Collection, it appears that on the 9th of October 1544, the earl of Hertford, the bishop of Winchester, Sir John Gage, secretary Paget and Sir Richard Ryche were appointed King's commissioners to treat of the peace with France.

† One only is in the Imperial Archives of Vienna (No. 221, p. 394), unless that of the 1st (No. 216, p. 377) be meant.

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treatment of carriers and sutlers* (said they), it was natural enough that in a camp so numerous as theirs was there should be some appearance of disorderly and unjustifiable acts, the reparation of which, if sufficiently proved, would immediately be made. Had they (the councillors) chosen to complain of the carmen (*chartons*) they would have plenty of cause for it, for some of the artillery drivers, either through malice or because they were drunk, were on the point of letting some of the guns fall into the hands of the French, and whenever they went out of the camp to get beer (*cervoise*) they remained long out of it, loitering on the roads, or went away farther than was necessary, for the purpose of drinking a larger quantity of it more at their ease. If in this manner some of the carriers have suffered, it was no fault of the English, but their own, owing to their choosing to go out of the camp foraging without waiting for proper escort. With respect to their pay, the privy councillors assured us that they would be paid up to the last penny, but they ought to wait patiently for a few days, for the treasurer who had the money to pay them had crossed over to England; and upon our remonstrating that if the men had to wait for the return of the treasurer, they and their horses would die of hunger, the privy councillors begged us to advise the carriers to go away with their horses, deputing or leaving behind here, at Boulogne, one or more agents of their own sufficiently empowered to receive the sum of money owing to them.

The privy councillors have gratefully acknowledged the service which Your Imperial Majesty has done to the King their master by the appointment of an Imperial commissary, with whom it has been settled that victuals shall be furnished to the English army at a place near Gravelinghes, and close to the frontier of the territory now under their King's jurisdiction.† With such an arrangement as particularly specified in Your Imperial Majesty's letters, the privy councillors are perfectly satisfied, as well as with the orders issued that the French be not provided with victuals from the same quarter, though supposing, as they themselves have declared to us, that it will be almost impossible to have those orders executed strictly, and prevent the peasants, men and women, from taking food and commodities to whichever place they find a better market for them. The English themselves, said the privy councillors, at the siege of Montreuil would have died of hunger, had not the people of Hesdin and the neighbouring country supplied them daily with food.‡

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* "Mauvois traictement des chartons et vivandiers."

† "Que les dits vivres leur seroient delivres tous aupres de Gravelinghes à la limite de la jurisdiction du dit sieur roy mentionnée aux susdites lettres."

‡ "Bien supposans, comme ilz nous ont declairé, qu'il estoit impossible que sa ma^te^ scent les paysans et femmes qu'ilz ne portassent leur denrées ou ilz les pourroient bien vendre, et que ceulx estans au siege de Montreuil fussent morts de faim sans les paysans de Hesdin et la en autour journellement leur portoient vivres."

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Your Imperial Majesty's answer to the request of these privy councillors, that the five companies (*enseignes*) of English infantry should be allowed to pass through the territory of Bredenarde, has likewise been gratefully received, for *when the application was made, they really thought that the news they had received was authentic.* As to the five war vessels of Your Imperial Majesty that are still in these waters, we have already signified to the Vice-Admiral that it is not Your intention that they should remain any longer here. The Vice-Admiral would willingly have remained here one fortnight more for Your Imperial Majesty's service, and for other considerations, if he knew that he could get a sufficient supply of beer (*bière*) for his ships, the crews of which are suffering greatly for the last five or six days in consequence of that which they had on board having become sour and undrinkable. We are, moreover, afraid that if the ships leave this place they will have to go to Zeeland, for whatever efforts we and the said commander have made to get a supply of beer, it has been impossible to obtain here, with the Council's authority, more than seven casks, which is nothing for 700 men on board the ships, so much so that should they remain here the men will have nothing to drink.

In short, to return to the principal affair, the privy councillors, on the receipt late in the evening of yesterday of letters from their master, sent us word that this very morning, at 8 o'clock, they would call and communicate with us on the subject. So they did, telling us in substance that the King, their master, considering that matters could easily be determined and concluded in England, did not see a reason for the French ambassadors declining to go thither. He, the King, saw no difficulty whatever in it, and could not imagine what the objection of the French could be; besides which, if any really existed, the Emperor would contribute to its removal. The King, moreover, was surprised to hear (one of the privy councillors observed) that the conditions offered to the cardinal of Paris (Jean du Bellay) and his colleagues were considered by the French to be very hard and intolerable, whereas they were evidently more moderate than those he himself had proposed when the war was declared, as may be seen in the treaty of closer alliance made with Your Imperial Majesty, and milder than those which king Francis himself had offered to accept.

To the above asseverations, I, the bishop of Arras, leaving aside the task of refuting the privy councillors' arguments, proceeded to relate the great efforts which Your Imperial Majesty and I myself, in Your Majesty's name, had once used to procure permission, in case of the King having returned to his English kingdom, for the ambassadors of the Most Christian king of France to go over to that country, at the same time declaring what had passed between me and the admiral of France (Hannebault). As to what they began to say and hint

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that I might again write to Your Imperial Majesty, and that they were in receipt of fresh letters from the King, their master, which having been read and discussed in Council, they came back to us saying that the letters just received were very slightly connected with the subject of the peace, since their purport was to announce that the King their master had despatched the earl of Hertford and secretary Paget with sufficient powers to listen to the proposals of the French [ambassadors] under the supposition that the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, and the Lord Privy Seal,* were engaged in military affairs.

The privy councillors having asked what news we had of the French ambassadors, I, the bishop of Arras, answered in accordance with the admiral of France's letter to me, telling them in substance what was my reply to him. Enclosed are copies both of the letter and answer, as well as a duplicate of another from the Admiral to me received this very afternoon, after dinner. In short, in order to save time and put off the affair, the privy councillors have been of opinion that I, the Bishop, should send a message to the Admiral inquiring how soon the said embassy is likely to be here, who and how many the ambassadors are, the names and titles of each of them, and how many servants and other attendants will accompany them, in order to prepare the necessary safe-conducts and so forth in conformity with the powers which the two Dukes formerly had to treat with them and hear their proposals. To this effect, immediately after their departure [for Calais] the Dukes sent me a trumpeter, to whom I delivered the letter of which the enclosed is a copy.

Respecting Monsr. de Buren, these privy councillors did certainly give a few days ago a remarkable proof of the satisfaction and contentment they have felt at his services on this occasion, for during the three or four days he, the Count, has spent in this town, he has been feasted and entertained beyond measure, the more so that I (the Bishop) strongly suspect that their treatment of his person has been somewhat exaggerated for the purpose of rendering us jealous of him, and making me feel that my arrival and that of my colleagues in this town has not been over acceptable. Indeed, Briant the other day could not help saying to him that we must be rather disappointed and in bad humour at not being invited to the many parties and entertainments in his (count Buren's) honour. And although no great reliance should be placed on the words of such a speaker, yet as these people are in the habit of employing such stratagems when discontented, there is every likelihood of the said Briant having spoken on the authority of some personage higher in office than himself. I am the more convinced of it that the day before yesterday the privy councillors sent for the Admiral's trumpeter and gave him different lodgings, at which he slept

* Sir John Russel, who had replaced FitzWilliam in that office in March 1543. See Vol. VI., Part II., p. 263.

under care of a guard appointed for the purpose,* and on the ensuing morning would not allow him to depart and take the letters I had given him for the Admiral, nor those of my colleagues to either, but despatched for that purpose another trumpeter of their own. True it is that this very morning they have acted with more courtesy, for after the duke of Norfolk had said a few words to him, the Englishman came to us and asked whether we had any orders for him.

With regard to the chief point, namely, the giving up of Boulogne, not a word has been said to us, nor have we alluded to it in the least, for the reasons and considerations explained in Your Imperial Majesty's letters to us, both the last and the preceding ones. Neither has an allusion been made on our part to the pressing and urgent requests made to Your Imperial Majesty by the ministers of the Most Christian king of France in order to comply with and submit to the conditions of the peace, for we consider this not to be the fit moment and opportunity to do so, fearing that when the French ambassadors themselves see no hope of peace on this side, they will of themselves touch on this point.

The governor of Gravelinghes † had written to me (Courrières) about the secret requisition of the French captain at Ardres, asking him to allow him the passage through that territory of 10,000 Frenchmen for the purpose of making an inroad on this side. The Governor had answered that he could not consent to it unless Your Imperial Majesty sent him an order to that effect. Having communicated with my colleagues, I (Courrières) have said in answer to the Governor's letter that should the application be renewed, he is to persist in his refusal, and prevent the passage of French troops through the territory under his immediate command. This I gathered to be Your Imperial Majesty's will in this affair from the answer to the despatch in which my colleagues and I mentioned the rumour that was afloat of five companies of French infantry having passed through Bredenarde. Of this we have confidentially and under reserve given the privy councillors notice, that they may be on their guard, and know that we proceed with perfect good faith in everything concerning them. Since then the privy councillors have again particularly requested us to keep the said passage well guarded, as well as that of the bulwark erected close to the river of

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* "Et d'autant plus en parforcent ilz, comme je crois, pour nous donner scrupele et sentimeut de non estre le trop bien reçeus, car Briant mesmes ne se sçeut tenir de dire au dit s^{r} de Buren que nous aultres devions estre marris de ce que n'estions appelés aulx festes, et combien sur les propos de tel auteur ne fault faire grand fondement, toutesfois selon [ce] que ces gens ont coustume d'usee de telles grimaces en cas de mescontentement il est vray semblable que le dit Briant en parlant apres quelque aultre personne de plus d'auctorité tant plus sommes nous esmeuz à ce dire pour aultant qu'avant hier ilz envoyerent içy querin la trompette du dit admiral, et le logerent autrement, où il couche soubz la garde de ces deputez."

† Jean Destourmel, sieur de Vendeville, as in *State Papers*, Vol. VIII. pp. 56, 263–5, 762, although it is not easily explained how the same individual could be treasurer of France in 1543. Vol. X. pp. 55, 63–6 of the same Collection.

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St. Omer, about which we wrote to Your Imperial Majesty, adding that if the governor [of St. Omer] had not under him a sufficient force to prevent the pas-age, they (the English) would guard it, provided Your Imperial Majesty allowed it. Our answer to the privy councillors has been that both Gravelinghes and St. Omer were well provided for, and had sufficient garrisons, and that the above said passages would be well guarded, and we are now writing to the governor of Gravelinghes again recommending the affair to him.—Calais, 10th of October 1544.

Signed: "A. Perrenot, bishop of Arras;=J. de Montmorency;=Eustace Chapuys."

Addressed: "To the Emperor."

Indorsed: "From the ambassadors in England on the 10th of October 1544. Received at Brussels on the 12th of the said month." *

French. Original, partly ciphered.

10 Oct **229.** The Bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to the Admiral of France.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—This morning the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, the king of England's Lord Privy Seal (Sir John Russell), the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner), and other members of the King's Privy Council came to us, the Imperial ambassadors, to communicate the intelligence and orders they had received from England respecting their commission to treat of the peace. After again insisting on the convenience of the French deputies crossing over to England in order to treat more easily and comfortably of the proposed peace without their having to send backwards and forwards to consult their masters; after my representing to the Dukes the inconvenience of such a plan for the reasons adduced in your letter to me, and above all, that you and the rest of the French deputies would have to pass through the English camp, the Dukes told me that they are expecting to-day the arrival of the earl of Hertford and secretary Paget, who are to be the bearers of the said commission and powers to treat, and no doubt will bring with them the King's final resolution in that matter. Of course, should the King still insist on his idea that the meeting of the commissioners take place in England, I shall let you know immediately, in order that whatever may be wanted for the passage across the Channel of the French deputies†

* "Reçues à Bruxelles le XII[e] du dit *Avril*" are the words; but this must be a mistake, for in that month the invasion of France had not yet taken place.

† "Et apres avoir persisté à ce que les ambassadeurs du roy tres chrestien passassent en Angleterre pour traicter plus commodement et sans tant de renvoys, et que je leur ai sur ce reprins ce que vous me dites sur ce point [en] passant par le camp nous ont dit quilz attendoient aujourdhui le comte Darfort et le secretaire Paget, les quelz apportent les commissions et pouvoir pour traicter. Je suppose que venant ceux-là ils seront instruitz de la voulenté du dit sieur roy leur maistre, dont je vous ay dit. S'il persiste encores à ce que l'affaire se depesche en Angleterre je vous en advertiray à fin que vous regardiez, Monsieur, à ce que convient pour le passaige," &c.

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of whose number and names I should be glad to have a list as soon as possible, in order to have the safe-conducts, passports, and all that is requisite on the occasion, prepared without delay. If, therefore, you will kindly send me by the trumpeter, bearer of this my letter, a list of the names, quality, and offices held by those who are to cross the Channel as commissioners or deputies to treat of peace, as well as of their attendants and servants, you will oblige me.—Calais, 10 October 1544.

Signed: "Anthoine, bishop of Arras."

Addressed: "A Monsieur le Marechal d'Hannebault [Amiral de France]."

French. Contemporary copy.

10 Oct. **230.** The ADMIRAL OF FRANCE to MONSR. D'ARRAS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,'—I am in receipt this very moment of your letter [of the 6th],* in answer to which I can only say, as I wrote to you this very morning, that I am expecting from hour to hour to receive news from cardinal Du Bellay. I cannot exactly tell you the number of people, secretaries, personal servants, and so forth, that the Cardinal and president Raymond †—who, in my opinion, will be the two persons appointed [with me] by the King my master for the negociation of the peace—will bring in their suite, but according to their quality and rank I should think that it will be at least between 80 and 100 mounted followers. I agree with you that no time should be lost, for things long delayed never come to a good issue, and besides that, I am afraid that you yourself will be greatly annoyed by the delay, and by having to stay so long at Calais without the means of returning to your master the Emperor.

That is why if you please to apply for a safe-conduct for cardinal Du Bellay, president Raymond, and their suite, not exceeding 100 followers in all, I shall be much obliged to you. As soon as the said safe-conduct reaches me, I shall forward it to the Cardinal, that he and his colleague may at once depart on their mission.—Camp at Fijennes,‡ 10 October 1544.

French. Contemporary copy.

10 Oct. **231.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—The bearer of this letter brought me yours of this day, and I am anxiously expecting news of the Cardinal

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* No. 224, p. 397.

† Elsewhere Remond and Remonts.

‡ "Escript au Camp de Fijeunes (*sic*) la X^e^ d'Octobre." Fiennes was a small town of the French Artois (now in the dep. Pas de Calais).

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and of the President, as I wrote to you this very morning by my trumpeter. I cannot conceive what may be the cause of their delay, for had the cardinal of Paris fallen ill on the road, he surely would have let me know of it. I have sent an express messenger (*homme express*) to go to Court and try to find his whereabouts. Should he meet him on the road, as I believe he will, my messenger is to apprise him of the contents of your letter, and tell him to make haste. Should he not meet him, then immediately upon my man's return I will write and inform you of the cause and reasons of his delay, if I can hear of or guess at them.

I must, however, observe that no later than yesterday I received a letter from cardinal de Tournon, saying that the Emperor is now feasting and taking pleasure, and that in his opinion neither you nor any of His Imperial Majesty's ambassadors, not even one of king Francis' commissioners, will cross over to England, since the conferences for the peace can as well, if not better, take place on this side of the Channel, those among the king of England's privy councillors who are on the Continent attending them. As to me, I am of the same opinion; I think that it is more fit and convenient that the conferences for a treaty on the base of the offers and conditions made by our master, and of which the Emperor has already had full cognizance, should be held in some neutral town like Dunkerke, St. Omer, or any other on the frontier of Flanders.

However that may be, I have the pleasure of sending you one of the Spanish prisoners, who was (I do not know how long ago) taken prisoner by my men (*nes gens*). He happens to be a servant of the Imperial ambassador at the court of France, and was taken together with some bundles of clothes and other articles which he has hitherto been unable to recover. I do my best to discover in whose hands they are, that the whole may be restored to him.* I promise you to take this affair in hand as diligently and with as much care as if it were my own, and see that the man be fully compensated for his loss.

I must not omit to say that I believe our queen (Eleoenor) will soon undertake a journey to see her brother, the Emperor, and I hope that you yourself by that time will be returning to the Imperial Court.†

Begging to commend myself to your good graces, and hoping to receive soon agreeable news of your good health

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* Je vous envoye ung des serviteurs de Mons. l'ambassadeur de l'Empereur qui fust pris par mes gens, il y a je ne sçay combien [de temps] avecques quelz ques (avec quelques) hardes qu'il n' a encoires sçeu recouvrer. Je mectray peine de les faire rendre et de sçavoir [ce] quelles seront devenues pour incontinent vous les envoyer." At that time Mons. de St. Maurice, who had represented the Emperor in France until June 1542, when Francis, without a previous declaration of war, invaded the Low Countries, had not yet returned to his post. He was a connection of Granvelle on the female side.

† "Que je croye que nostre royne pourra faire ung voyage [à Bruxelles] pour aller veoir l'Empereur et pour ce que en ce temps là vous y pourrez estre de retour, je ferai fin à ceste lectre," &c.

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and so forth, I remain, Monsieur good friend, entirely yours. —Written at the camp of Fyennes, on the 10th day of October 1544.

Signed: "D'Annebault."

French. Original. 2 *pp.*

Addressed: "To Monsieur the bishop of Arras."

10 Oct. Wien, Imp. Arch. **232.** The ENGLISH AMBASSADOR'S REPRESENTATIONS to the EMPEROR on his separate peace with France.

The king of England, my master, has been apprised by my despatches, and also verbally informed by the Emperor's ambassadors,* then residing near his Royal person, that after, and in consequence of, Your Imperial Majesty's peace with France, Your Majesty's army has left that country and retreated to Flanders. By doing which the King, my master, who has not been included in that peace, or otherwise satisfied as to his own claims, has remained, and is still, at war with the French. Even after he (the King), on the Emperor's advice, had raised the siege of Montreuil, the French have wantonly assailed the English everywhere, besides spreading the rumour that they are about to invest Boulogne, one of my master's possessions. Should they do so, as they are threatening, the King, my master, will be obliged to keep his army in the field, and that cannot be done save at great cost and expense, which the King, my master, wishes to avoid. He has, therefore, commanded me to lay before Your Imperial Majesty the following considerations :—

The state of Your Majesty's affairs at the time Your army had penetrated far into France was so fraught with danger, that Your Imperial Majesty thought it convenient to make a separate peace with the common enemy on conditions much less advantageous to Yourself than they would have been had Your Imperial Majesty (as the King my master once suggested) waited to make the same conjointly with Your ally, the king of England, when most surely You would have obtained from the French all You wished for.

Since Your Majesty's return to Flanders, the cause of the king of England, Your brother, has evidently been forgotten or neglected by You, on the plea, no doubt, that You wanted before all things to recover the town of Landrecy—one of the conditions of Your treaty of peace with France. But even granting that, it stands to reason that now that the said fortress has been restored to You, and that Your army is out of French territory altogether, You should proceed and act with the common enemy in conformity with the treaty You have with the King, my master, which treaty the latter has always observed, and intends in future to observe, most faithfully.

* At this time Chapuys and De Courrières besides Antoine Perrenot, bishop of Arras, who had joined them in September. *See* p. 335, No. 197.

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How the king of England has behaved in these transactions Your Imperial Majesty has no doubt heard, not only from the French lords (*seigneurs*) who were then at my master's court—some of whom are now here [at Brussels]—but from others among king Francis' ministers, as well as from the correspondence between the latter and the King, my master, and also by the last demands made by the King, my master, to the French ambassadors, which demands and conditions I myself declared and explained to Your Imperial Majesty at Crespy (Crêpy) in the Laonois.*

As to Your Majesty's assertion that certain ambiguous words and promises were said by the bishop of Arras to have been uttered and made by the King, my master, respecting the peace with France, I am fully authorised to state that the only remark His Majesty the king of England, my master, made on the occasion in regard to the alternative of the marriage, about which the Bishop spoke to him, was that it seemed to him as if the marriage of Your Imperial Majesty's daughter with the duke of Orleans, and Milan as a dower, would be less objectionable than that of the king of the Romans' second daughter with the Low Countries.†

Even had the King, my master, said to the Bishop that he would be satisfied and glad at getting the most advantageous terms and conditions possible from the common enemy, that could not, and ought not, to be by Your Majesty interpreted as meaning that the King, my master, was ready to relinquish or diminish in the least his very just claims, or in other words impair his own treaty with Your Majesty. Treaties between Princes are made after long and mature deliberation, and after that set down in writing, and therefore it is very improbable—nay, unusual, that treaties put down in writing, solemnly signed and ratified, should be afterwards altered or changed by mere words uttered at random by one of the contracting parties. Should any alteration or change be introduced by mutual consent, then the said alterations are to be put down in writing.‡ Not only that, I most resolutely declare that never, at any time, was the King, my master, of opinion that peace could be concluded by one only of Your two

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* Here the copy reads distinctly *Lovenois*, but it is evidently a mistake for Laonnois, or district of Champagne, of which Laon is now the *chef-lieu*.

† "Et quant à ce que vre. mate pretendt d'avoir beaucoup esté reduict à faire la dicte paix a l'occasion d'aulcunes parolles que Monsr. d'Arras auroit raporté estre dictes par le roy mon maistre, sa mate ne donna aultre creance touchant ceste affaire là à Mousr. d'Arras synon que quant à l'alternative des marriages, dont il avoit parlé au roy mon maistre il sembloit à sa mate qu'il y auroit moins de mal de choisir le party par lequel vre. mate cederoit Mylan."

‡ "Et quant le roy mon maistre auroit dit qu'il estoit content que vre. mate s'accordast le mieulx que vous pourries avec les françois, toutesfois cela ne se pouroit ny se debvoit entendre que le roy voulsist alterer ni changer quelque chose du traicté car les traictes se font entre princes par grande et pure deliberation, et se couchent par escript, et pour tant il n'est pas vraysemblable, ni est il de coustume encoires qu'ung traicté mis solempnellement par escript soit alteré et changé par simples parolles, mais quant on y veult alterer et changer quelque chose on le fait mectre par escript."

Majesties, alone, without the concurrence and co-operation of the other, and not unless both of you were satisfied and contented.*

His Majesty, the king of England, holds the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to be a lord (*seigneur*) of unimpeachable veracity and honesty, as well as consummate skill and wisdom, a man incapable of asserting that the King, my master, ever said the words attributed to him respecting the alteration, change, or breaking up altogether of the treaty.

His Majesty, the king of England, has invariably been in the habit of entrusting to me in full confidence all political and other affairs he may have with Your Imperial Majesty. He has never failed to do so, and I declare that hitherto no letter nor message from him has come to me on the subject.† Had he ordered me to mention it to Your Majesty, I should infallibly have done so out of obedience to his commands and regard for Your Majesty. At any rate, I am sure that the king of England, my master, never intended that the peace with France should be made and ratified by Your Imperial Majesty alone until both of you were satisfied and contented.

True it is that in consequence of certain overtures made by Your Majesty's ambassadors at the camp and court of Boulogne, my master, the king of England, did approve of the proposal then made that a communication or conference should be held with king Francis' commissioners in order to ascertain whether means could be found of coming to an understanding and reconciliation, but in consenting to that the King, my master, meant that both of you, the allies, should work conjointly and fairly (*à bon scient*) for so desirable an object, so that neither of the allies could actually conclude a solemn and binding peace unless the other was completely satisfied and contented.

That such was my master's intention and wish appears evident from the fact of Your Imperial Majesty asking him urgently for a statement of the demands he wished to make from the French, that You might bestir Yourself on his behalf, and obtain them from the common enemy; and that in a like manner—on the above and other like considerations that might, if necessary, be adduced, and knowing that the common enemy of both the allied princes (Your Majesty and the King my master) is bound to submit himself to Your

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* "Et quen approchant les affaires chascun pour sa part, et neantmoins (?) aussy que chascun de vos deux maiestes travaillast, et s'emploiast à bon sçient lung pour l'aultre et toutesfois ne puist rien conclure jusques à ce que les deux fussent contens et satisfaits."

† "Et le roy tient Monsr. D'Arras pour seigneur et prelat de telle honesteté et prudence qu'il ne vouldroit dire que sa ma^te eust dict quelques choses tendant à l'alteration, changement ou roupture (*sic*) du dict traicté. Et en oultre sa ma^te a tousjours accoustumé de commettre à moy la creance de ses affaires pour les remonstrer à vre. maiesté, comme je l'ay tousjours faict, toutes fois de cela jamais il ne m'en riens escript."

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arbitration and sentence—my Royal master trusts and expects to get, through Your Imperial Majesty's influence and power, a quick and complete settlement of all his just and legitimate claims, of the import and nature of which Your Majesty has already full cognisance, knowing them all to be reasonable and of small importance when compared with those which the King my master would be perfectly entitled and justified in making in virtue of the treaty of friendship and closer alliance with Your Imperial Majesty.*

Sire, to put an end to this long speech of mine, I beg Your Majesty in my Royal master's name to be pleased to request—nay, urgently press the king of France to come to an agreement with the King my master, to admit at once the whole of his demands, and comply with them efficiently. Should the king of France refuse to do so, or seek means and excuses to delay his answer, then in that case I will beg and entreat Your Imperial Majesty to be pleased to declare openly in favour of the King my master, and be the enemy of king Francis, as required by the treaty of alliance. The King my master is quite certain that, his demands on this occasion being so moderate, and at the same time so just, Your Imperial Majesty will attend to his request, and that having regard to the very close and brotherly friendship and alliance which unite you both, Your Majesty will grant his request.†

Indorsed: "Piece à ajouter à la lettre de l'Empereur à son ambassadeur ‡ en Angleterre, du 10 Octobre 1544."

French. Contemporary copy. 5 *pp.*

10 Oct. **233.** THE EMPEROR'S REPLY to the ENGLISH AMBASSADOR'S § NOTE OF HAND.

Wien, Imp Arch.

The Emperor having seen what the ambassador of the king of England, his good brother, stated in writing, has

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* "Et consideré aussi que l'ennemy s'est obligé de s'accorder à l'arbitrage et sentence de vre. mate sur les demandes du roy mon maistre, des quels (*sic*) demandes vre. mate est desja bien et suffisament informée. Par quoy aussy vous savez qu'elles sont raisonables et de tres petite importance au regart de celles que le roi mon maistre pourroit demander par le traicté."

† "Qu'il vous plaise de requerir le roy de France, voire de le, presser bien à certes que incontinent il s'accorde aux dictes demandes, et que de faict il les accomplisse, et en cas qu'il refuse de ce faire, ou qu'il aille cherchant delay pour non le faire incontinent, qu'il vous plaise en faveur du roy mon maistre, de vous declarer ennemy de dict roy de France comme le traicté le requiert. Et se tient le roy mon maistre pour asseuré que attendu l'equité de sa dicte requeste vre. mate aura regard à icelle, et que vous vous contenterez de la mectre en execution sans delay en consideracion de la dicte tres estroicte allyance et amytié fraternelle d'entre vos deux maiestés."

‡ This copy of the speech made by Dr. Wotton to the Emperor on the subject of the latter's peace with France, appears to be mentioned in the preceding number. At the Emperor's request it was put in writing for its various points to be discussed with Granvelle, and a copy of it forwarded to Chapuys. It is undated, but attached to the next letter of the Emperor to his ambassadors at Boulogne. Wotton, however, had three days before recited its contents to the Emperor.

§ Still Nicholas Wotton, dean of York. *See* No. 232.

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ordered the following answer to be prepared for him to send to the King, his master.

His Imperial Majesty trusts too much in the wisdom and discretion of his good brother, the king of England, to think for one moment that He (the Emperor) has failed in fulfilling all and every one of the conditions of the treaty of alliance, or of the convention afterwards entered into with the viceroy of Sicily, Don Fernando de Gonzaga.

As to the Emperor's treaty of peace with France, that treaty was concluded on perfectly justifiable grounds, and with the full consent of the king of England, as well as his excuses for being unable (the ambassador said) to join the Emperor in the undertaking against France.

The Emperor has no doubt—nay, holds for certain, that the king of England will recollect the very words he addressed to the bishop of Arras and to other Imperial ambassadors, when asked to give his consent to the Emperor's request, which words he (the King) and the members of his Privy Council have frequently quoted and repeated since, and the Emperor hopes that the promises which the King made on that occasion will be kept, since words among princes proceeding in good faith are as binding as the most authentic documents.

There is no need to contradict the assertion made in writing by the English ambassador, *i.e.*, that the agreement entered into on the occasion of the Emperor's informing the King, his ally, of the overtures of peace made by the French, was that each of the contracting parties should be at liberty individually and separately to treat of peace with the common enemy, provided there was complete satisfaction on the part of the allies. But neither the propositions then made to the king of England in His Majesty's name respecting the meeting of their armies for a joint invasion of French territory and subsequent march upon Paris, nor the condition of the Imperial army at the place in the heart of France, where it happened then to be encamped, nor the answer, which the King himself made to the Emperor's pressing message, could in any way justify the long protracted delay in the King's consent.* Certainly, it was not fear of the common enemy as it was represented to the English ambassador, that caused the Emperor to ask so urgently for an answer to his application. Several other considerations of paramount importance were then laid before him, and afterwards

* "La response sur [ce] faicte ne pouvoit bailler lieu à la longueur de la practique du dit commung consentement (*sic*). Non pas que sa ma^te^ imperiale heust (eust) craincte de l'ennemy, comme desja a esté respondu au dit ambassadeur, mais bien pour les autres raisons et considerations qui aussi luy ont esté dictes, et qu'il a mesmes peu (pû) veoir, et furent remonstrees au dit roy d'Angleterre, les quelles il cognoit bien, comme le peuvent juger toutes gens de bien."

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submitted to the king of England himself, which reasons and considerations could not fail, as the King well knows, to impress all worthy people with the idea that His Imperial Majesty has already done in that respect all that could be expected from Him, and has been perfectly justified, even in view of the king of England's answer and excuses, in acting as He did, and treating with the French.

Nor could the interpretation, or rather supposition, embodied in the King's verbal message to Monsr. d'Arras—namely, that both the allied powers should manage their own affairs separately and individually,* and yet preserve all the time the true and perfect amity, friendship, and alliance existing between them—be admitted, that being of itself a state of things not to be reconciled with the affair now under discussion.

There is, besides, no shadow whatever of plausibility in the objections raised by the English ambassador that the mere fact of the Emperor having sent to the King a copy of the demands He intended to make from France, and of the king of England having reciprocally forwarded his own, might be taken as an argument in his favour, for in no way did that correspondence bind the two princes one towards the other:† it was the express consent afterwards given by the king of England for each prince to treat individually with the common enemy, and negotiate a separate peace with him, that did in a certain way bind the parties together.

That consent once obtained, His Imperial Majesty proceeded to execute His engagements as expressly and as honourably as could be desired, taking particular care that the article of the reservation of the king of England's rights should be inserted in His own treaty with France. The king of England, therefore, ought to be glad of the agreement then taken, as he has since appeared to be completely satisfied with it.‡

Indeed, ever since his treaty with France, the Emperor has done the best he could for the interest of the king of England. Neither the Landrecy incident, nor any other consideration, has prevented him from doing all he could on his behalf, and procuring the settlement of the differences between England and France. As to Landrecy, there was no fear of its becoming an obstacle to his wishes, as the Emperor had in

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* "Et aussi ne fut peu (n'eust pû ?) convenir à ceste interpretation ou exposition (supposition ?) de la dite responce que le dit s^r roy consentit [à sçavoir] que chascun peust (pût) traicter à part [soy] en reservant d'ung coustel et d'autre la parfaite amytié et confederacion d'entre eulx que fust esté chose à soy repugnante."

† "Et si (aussi) n'y a apparence en l'objection de ce que sa dite ma^te eust envoyé par avant ses dits demandes au dit s^r roy et aussi luy reciproquement les siennes car cela ne lyoit en riens ni l'ung ni l'aultre, mais bien le apres consentement depuis baillé de pouvoir traicter particulierement en droit soy, avec la susdite reservation."

‡ "Et l'ayant sa dite ma^te Imp^le ainsi faict et si expressement et honnestement comme contient l'article d'icelle reservation le dit s^r roy doit avoir tout bon contentement comme aussi il l'a demonstré depuis tousiours avoir."

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his hands sufficient security in the way of French hostages, and so forth. He has done all he possibly could to persuade king Francis to send again his ambassadors to the king of England. Even in his endeavour to bring about a reconciliation between the kings of England and France, the Emperor thought that he was working in favour and for the interest and satisfaction of his ally; so much so, that his own ministers and ambassadors have, according to his express orders and instructions, worked incessantly to that end.* Precisely in the same strain, and for the particular advantage of the king of England, his ally, did the Emperor speak to the English ambassador residing at his court, when he advised that the siege of Montreuil should be raised.† That advice the King accepted, though it must be observed that, when first tendered, the English ambassador here [at Brussels] did not approve of it.

As to the strict observance of his treaty with England at present and in future, his Imperial Majesty will not be in fault. He has hitherto complied, and will in future comply, most strictly with all and every one of its prescriptions; he will take care that the reservation of the king of England's rights stipulated in his own treaty with France be carried into full effect. That this will be his line of conduct for the future, abundant proofs have already been given, firstly by his allowing the infantry and cavalry under count Buren to remain with the English as long as the King wanted and wished;‡ and secondly, by continuing to furnish provisions and carriage, together with a large number of draft horses (*limoniers*), notwithstanding the ill-treatment of his Imperial Majesty's subjects by the English soldiers, and the immense damage and loss inflicted upon the Belgian peasants and drivers during the war.

As to urging and pressing the king of France to agree to and comply with the king of England's last demands, and should he refuse to do so, declaring war against him, that is a sort of thing which the Emperor at present declines to do; but he fully promises to act in such a manner that it shall not be imputed to him that he has forgotten any part of the stipulations of his treaty with the king of England, or disregarded any of the means suggested by the king of England to bring about his reconciliation with king Francis.

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* "Et en cecy mesmement a sa dite ma^te^ Imp^le^ pensé faire chose convenable au dit sieur roy d'angleterre et sa satisfaction et si n'ont deffailly et feront les ministres et ambassadeurs de sa ma^te^ d'y faire tout bon office."

† The Emperor was then in Brussels, where he arrived on the 2nd of October; his advice to Dr. Wotton concerning Montreuil was tendered in September. *State Papers*, Vol. X., p. 88.

‡ "Et l'a bien demonstré mesmes en delaissant ses gens de cheval et de pied soubz la charge du comte de Bueren (*sic*) si longuement qu'il a pleu au dit s^r^ roy, et en la continuation du fournissement des vituailles et service de si grand nombre de chevaulx de charroy, limoniers, voire et non obstant le mal traictement des subjects de sa ma^te^ imperiale et le trop grand dommaige qu'ilz ont resçu de l'armee du dit sieur roy et à l'occasion d'icelle."

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In bringing to an end the above answer, His Imperial Majesty trusts that the king of England will take in good part this answer of His, and acknowledge that every clause of the treaty of closer friendship and alliance with England has been and will be punctually executed on His side, trusting also that the king of England will acknowledge that in all these matters the Emperor has acted with perfect sincerity as well as regard for the confederacy and friendship which unites them both.*—[Oct. 10, 1544.]

Indorsed: "Piece ajoutee à la lettre de l'Empereur à ses ambassadeurs en Angleterre."

French. Original. 5 *pp.*

11 Oct. **234.** MONSR. D'ARRAS to the ADMIRAL OF FRANCE.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—Your letter of yesterday morning † was duly received on the evening of the same day, specifying the number and quality of the persons who are to accompany cardinal Du Bellay and president Raymont in their mission for the negociation of peace, in order to obtain for all and each of them the required safe-conducts. Immediately after the receipt of which letter, I myself called, for that purpose, on the dukes of Suffolk and Norfolk, who being now invested with competent royal authority in this town, have without loss of time sent me the enclosed safe-conduct, which I beg you to forward to the said Cardinal, the President, and their suite. There can be no hindrance now to their coming here as soon as possible, and since they must be now close to you, as I calculate from the diligence you have been pleased to use in looking out for them, I hope that they will soon be here, for this King's ministers, if the weather and wind be at all favourable, are expected from England this very evening. I earnestly beg you and them to use all diligence in this affair, because, besides my own very natural desire that the negociation for the peace between the King, your master, and the king of England should commence at once, I myself am due to return home and wait upon the Emperor, my master.—Calais, 11 October 1544.

Indorsed: "Copy of letters from the bishop of Arras to the admiral of France."

French. Contemporary copy. 1 *p.*

* No date to it, but as the Emperor on the same day, *i.e.*, the 10th of October, enclosed it to his ambassadors, there can be no doubt that Granvelle, Praët, or Schore, whoever had orders to answer in writing Dr. Wotton's representations (No. 233), did so on the same day, or the day before.

† No. 230.

1544.

14 Oct. **235.** CARDINAL DU BELLAY and PRESIDENT REMOND to the BISHOP OF ARRAS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—In consequence of the information sent by you, the king of France, our master, has ordered us to come here [to Ardres], that we may hear from your own lips the very same words you said to the king of England, and at the same time hold a meeting and conference with his deputies.* The king of France, our master, thinks that the deputies of both nations should meet on neutral ground, the more so that on a former occasion my colleagues and I went to him, whereas now there is no question of going to him, but only of meeting his servants. As you, Monsieur, are, in the Emperor's name, the chief promoter of the proposed meeting, you will be pleased to designate with the deputies' agreement the place most commodious for them and us to meet at, with full assurance on our part that whatever town be chosen by you will be equally acceptable to us; Gravelines is close to the English possessions, and cannot be open to suspicion. St. Omer is also a neutral town; other places there may be in the neighbourhood of which we do not know; but the English are better acquainted than ourselves with the countries surrounding their territory in France, and therefore we leave it entirely to you and to them to decide.

As the intention of the King, our master, has always been, as it is now, that the said meeting should take place as soon as possible, this very morning, after consulting with the dauphin of France and with the Admiral, we have decided to put ourselves entirely in your hands, and ask whether we are to go to Calais, if you consider it necessary and convenient for the favourable issue of the peace about to be negociated.

Such being the case, it seems to us as if it were reasonable and just that this should be done through your means and at your own request, in order that they, against whom we, the French, are now in open hostility, may not profit in the least at the beginning of the future negociations.†

We are sure that, considering the friendship now existing between our respective masters, so much and so long desired by all the King's good servants, and especially by the under-

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* Early in September at Hardelot Castle, five miles from Montreuil, where cardinal Du Bellay, the President of the Parliament of Rouen in Normandy, the Treasurer of the Finances of France, and Secretary Claude de L'Aubespine, met the earl of Hertford, the bishop of Winchester, Sir Richard Ryche, and Secretary Paget.—*State Papers*, Vol. X., p. 55.

† "A finq ne celuy avec le quel nous sommes en ouverte inimitie y prinst dautant moins dadvantage. A quoy nous sumes (sommes) seur[s] que prendriez peu (*sic*) de playsir pour l'amyté estant entre noz maistres, tant et si longtemps desirée par tous les bons serviteurs, et entre aultres de ceulx qui se commendent, &c., à vostre bonne grace que prions nre. Saulveur qu'il vous maintienne en la sienne.—Arrivant à Ardres le XIIII. d'octobre."

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signed, you will take care that our reception be honourable, and a suitable place chosen for the conferences between the English deputies and yourselves, the Emperor's commissioners. Praying our Saviour to maintain both you and us in His good grace, we remain, &c.—Written at Ardres immediately after our arrival there on the 14th October 1544.

Signed: "Jean du Bellay, Card." and "Remond, Pres."*

Indorsed: "Coppie des lettres de l'Evesque d'Arras."

French. Copy. 2 pp.

15 Oct. **236.** THE BISHOP OF ARRAS to CARDINAL DU BELLAY and PRESIDENT REMOND.

Wien, Imp. Arch. *Rep.* P, *Fasc.* C. 33.

"Messieurs,"—Yesterday, late in the evening, your letter of the same day came to hand, and this very morning I have communicated its contents to De Courrières and to Chappuis,† to both of whom and to myself the Emperor has been pleased to entrust this present negociation, ordering us to make the greatest possible efforts for the establishment of peace between the two princes.

After carefully examining and weighing the contents of your joint letter, my colleagues and I are of opinion that you and the President ought not to make difficulties as to coming here, for neither is the king of England's reputation likely to be increased, nor that of the Most Christian King to be in the least diminished through it, since the negociation is not set on foot at the solicitation or from sheer necessity of one of the parties, but merely at the express request of His Imperial Majesty, and out of His desire that Christendom be united, and peace firmly established between princes, both of whom are His friends. This request of the Emperor, my master, is evident enough through the overtures which I myself made to the king of France, as well as by what was said on the subject to cardinal Tournon in Flanders. True it is that neither my colleagues nor I myself have considered it necessary or convenient to inform this King's commissioners of the above facts, for fear of raising suspicion or scruples in their mind respecting a matter which had hitherto offered no difficulty at all, and also because we presumed that their answer would naturally be delayed until they, themselves, had consulted the King, their master, thereupon, besides which we thought that the uncertainty of the navigation and

* Elsewhere "Raymond" and "Remont," his Christian name being "Pierre." He was appointed President of Rouen in succession to Jean Jacques des Mesmes, who died at the beginning of 1544. Had not his name appeared at the end and in the indorsement of the original letter, it might have been erroneously supposed, as the editors of *State Papers* (Vol. X., p. 55) once did, that the President of the Parliament of Rouen in Normandy, in Sept. 1544, was still Des Mesmes.

† *See* the preceding, No. 235.

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contrary winds might possibly retard it. In addition to this I must tell you that your and the President's arrival here [at Calais] has been expected for a long time, and that in matters of this sort the utmost diligence is required in order to strike the iron while it is hot.

For the above reasons and considerations my colleagues and I have refrained from speaking to this King's commissioners on the subject. I therefore beg you, in order that all doubts and scruples concerning the Emperor's request and intervention in the affair may at once be removed, to take the trouble of coming here [to Calais], that all of us together may work at so great a boon as peace among Christians really is, unless, however, you have reasons for not acceding to this our request, in which case my colleagues and myself shall be glad to hear Your final resolution.—Calaix (*sic*), 15 October 1544.

French. Contemporary copy. 2 *pp.*

16 Oct. **237.** MONSIEUR D'ARRAS to CARDINAL DU BELLAY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur,"—Here, at Calais, the King's privy councillors have asked me whether I had news of your coming here to-day, the 16th. I answered them that I had not. I can very well see that they (the privy councillors) are sorry at the delay, and, therefore, I beg you to let me know your final resolution in this affair, and whether you intend coming or not. Please let me have an answer as soon as possible by the same express messenger, bearer of this my letter, whom the privy councillors have engaged for the purpose, hoping that he will return with an answer this very evening.

I hope that the letter I wrote to you yesterday morning * by the "Tabourin" has reached you, and therefore I need not reproduce its contents.—Chateau de Calais, 16 October 1544.

Indorsed: "A Monsieur, Monsieur le cardinal du Bellay."

French. Contemporary copy. 1 *p.*

16 Oct. **238.** The BISHOP OF ARRAS, DE COURRIÈRES, and CHAPUYS to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—After our joint despatch of the 10th inst., Your Majesty's letter of the same day † enclosing copies ‡ of the

* *See* above, No. 236.

† No. 228, p. 404.

‡ "Avec les copies y joinctes tant de l'escript presenté à icelle de l'ambassadeur du roy d'Engleterre que de la response que l'on avoit conceu sur icelluy, et aussi celle de l'escript presenté par le cardinal de Tournon. Et avons le tout

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memorandum and note presented by the English ambassador at Your Imperial court, as well as of the answer which Your Majesty intended should be made to the ambassador's paper, and to the remarks and objections thereupon made by cardinal Tournon,* came duly to hand. The whole of which papers and documents being put together, and closely examined, it is our intention to use if an opportunity offers, according to Your Majesty's wishes and commands.

The captains in command of Your Majesty's warships in these parts have heard through us what Your Majesty's intentions are, and also that a powerful French fleet is about to come here [to the Strait]. They know also that the warships of the English, being unable to resist such a powerful fleet as the French one is, and suddenly decided to go away from this port of Calais to return home, decided to go away without waiting for orders, and went away three days ago for the coast of Zeeland.† This cannot be a cause of complaint for the English, for Your Majesty's warships waited here until the last of the English had sailed off, notwithstanding that, as we lately informed Your Majesty, their crews were in want of beer.

On the very same day that the courier, bearer of our last despatch, left this port [of Calais], I, the bishop of Arras, received a letter from the admiral of France (Claude Hannebault) in answer to that which I wrote to him at the solicitation and request of these privy councillors for the purpose of inquiring the number, names, and quality of the people coming in the suite of cardinal Du Bellay and president Remont (sic), *to have them included in the safe-conduct. The day before yesterday* [*the 14th*] *I heard from the Cardinal, and yesterday, the 15th, in the morning, I and my two colleagues* [*De Courrières and Chapuys*] *answered, as Your Majesty will see by the copy of my letter to him,‡ enclosing transcripts of the Cardinal's as well as of the Admiral's letters to me (the Bishop). I must, however, observe that our joint answer to cardinal Du Bellay was chiefly prompted by our desire not to create scruples or arouse suspicions in the mind of these privy councillors, and at the same time avoid delay, which in the present state of the negociation might prove to be exceedingly inconvenient.*

After dinner the bishop of Winchester (Stephen Gardiner)

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bien incorporé et examiné soigneusement pour en user (si l'occasion s'en adorne) comme vre. dite ma^te^ nous en declaire par ses dites lettres [estre] son intention."

* No copy has been found of cardinal Tournon's remarks, though an abstract of them may be seen in the Emperor's letter to Chapuys of the 1st of October, No. 217, p. 235.

† "Et que celles d'angleterre pour n'avoir moyen de luy resister pour estre icelle trop puisante s'estoit retire en Angleterre prendrent (prisrent) il y a quatre jours leur retraicte contre Zellande."

‡ No. 234, p. 419.

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and Secretary Paget called at this embassy to say, among other things, *that they wondered why the French Cardinal and his colleagues tarried so long, and adding that they thought it very strange that king Francis should use such overbearing language. He can (said Paget) feel very little real desire for peace, or else considers himself so powerful by sea and land that he makes no efforts whatever to secure the boon he professes to want and is asking for. Indeed, knowing, as he must know, the union and friendship that exist between the Emperor and the King, our master, is he not aware that one of the articles of the last treaty of alliance says expressly that, as long as the war lasts, the two allied princes shall keep a fleet of warships at sea,* and gradually increase that number in proportion as the naval forces of the enemy increase? Does not king Francis know that the King, our master, is already preparing for the emergency, and will soon have a powerful fleet in the Channel?*

Such was Paget's address to me, adding that he confidently hoped that, since matters had come to such a pitch, Your Imperial Majesty would arm and do the same as he himself was doing—that is, increasing his naval force.

Our answer was that we were in daily expectation of letters from cardinal Du Bellay. As to the fitting out of the Imperial fleet, we would immediately apprise Your Majesty of the King's wish, but we all three thought, nay, were almost sure, that as Your Imperial Majesty had hitherto kept, and was resolved to keep in future, all the conditions of the treaty of alliance with him, and likewise those affectionate bonds of friendship and close alliance which unite you with him, you could not possibly accede to his wishes in that particular, but that, having already done so much in their master's favour, it was to be hoped that both English and French (*l'ung et l'aultre*) would soon be in a condition to conclude through us a good and honourable peace, thus saving such an expense as the armament and keeping of a fleet would necessarily entail upon each of the allied princes.† Besides which (said the Bishop to the privy councillors) you must not fancy that because king Francis happens now to be stronger than you by sea, it follows that he is disinclined to treat of peace, for you know very well that when he (king Francis) made up his mind to send an embassy to your master, his land and sea forces were much stronger than they are now.

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* "Adjoustant que aussi trouvoient ilz estrange bravant tant, et qu'ilz pensoient qu'il avoit peu d'affection à la paix puisqu'il venoit si puissant par mer, saichant l'amytié d'entre vre. ma^te^ et le roy leur maistre, et entendu qu'il avoit este traicté que tous deux deviez avoir armée en mer."

† "Et que nous tenions pour certain que comme vre. dite ma^te^ garder ceste estroite amytié et y a satisfaict si reallement en toutes choses comme enlx mesmes le sçavent quelle y continueroit jusque au boust, il est à esperer que l'ung et l'aultre sera tout hors de ces frais."

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This reasoning of ours seemed for a while to have calmed down the fears of our visitors, who left us shortly afterwards apparently well satisfied with our explanation, and went away.

This very morning the duke of Norfolk invited us three to dine at the Castle with him and the rest of the privy councillors, but as De Courrières was slightly indisposed, and Chappuys (*sic*) himself with a fit of the gout, both declined the invitation, and I (the bishop of Arras) had to accept and go, lest the Duke and his colleagues should think that all of us shunned their company.* On my arrival at the Castle, I was first of all asked whether I had or had not any news of cardinal Du Bellay, and whether he was coming or not today. My answer was that I did not know for certain. I concluded from his last letter that he had arrived at Ardres, and had written to him to make haste and come, but that the trumpeter bearer of my letter to him had not yet returned with the answer. Hearing this, the Duke begged me to write again to the Cardinal, which I have since done, inquiring from him urgently whether he is coming or not, and a trumpeter of theirs has departed with the letter, of which I enclose copy.

They also told me, at the same time, that they had news of the Cardinal having written to me that he wished the negociations for the peace should be carried on at some neutral town, such as Gravelinghes or St. Omer,† and that they (the councillors) wondered why they (the French) had not asked that the king of England's ministers should go to a town of France to treat.

I myself wonder how this piece of intelligence has reached these people's ears, for although the report is perfectly true, I do not recollect having ever spoken, much less written, to anyone about it. I owned to the Duke and to his colleagues that the Cardinal, or his people, had sent me word that they would have much preferred that the commissioners met at Gravelinghes or at St. Omer; but that will show you, said I to the Duke and his colleagues, how truly affectionate we are to you in all our dealings, for knowing very well what your interest was in an affair of this kind, we (the Emperor's ambassadors) have made no use of the information we had

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* "Et pour ce que moy (Courrières) me sentys indisposé et je (Chapuys) fort attaché (attaqué) de goutte nous en susmes (sommes) excuséz, et je l'evesque d'arras pour non sembler que nous tous fouyesions leur compagnia, y suis allé."

† "Ilz m'ont dit au mesme temps qu'ilz avoient entendu que le dit Cardinal m'avoit escript qu'il desireroit que l'on traicta[st] ceste affaire en quelque lieu neutre et qu'ilz s'esbaissoient comme il ne demandoit que l'on alla traicter vers eulx. Je me suys, Sire, d'ou ilz le peuvent avoir entendu et me suis pensé que les françoys mesmes en ayant tenu propos, et leur ay confessé qu'il estoit vray qu'ilz m'avoient faict sçavoir qu'ilz eussent desiré que ce fust à Gravelinghes ou à St. Omer."

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on the subject, and did not back or recommend the Cardinal's very just application.*

Just at this moment I (the Bishop) am asked whether we have or not, according to our promise, written to Your Majesty respecting the Imperial fleet, and the assistance they themselves want. My answer has been that I have not written, because, as the Cardinal was and is expected here from day to day, we were waiting for his arrival to announce it to Your Majesty, and at the same time inform Your Majesty of this King's wishes. The Duke again begged me to write without delay, proposing that, should the Imperial fleet of Flanders and the Low Countries be unable, for some reason or other, to put to sea, Your Majesty would lend him any such Spanish or Italian merchant ships as might now be at anchor in the ports and harbours of Flanders close to this Strait, with their respective crews of sailors, the King fully promising to man and arm them at his own expense, to pay the wages of the sailors, and should the ships be wrecked or otherwise lost, to indemnify their owners most completely.

I (the bishop) of Arras, promised to inform my colleagues (De Courrières and Chappuys) of the privy councillors' wishes, at the same time assuring them (the Duke and the privy councillors) that I had not the least doubt that Your Majesty's answer would be favourable, so that they would see how well disposed Your Majesty was to fulfil to the end all the conditions of the treaty of alliance. In saying this, I (the Bishop) have conformed myself entirely with what we three said yesterday after dinner to the privy councillors, our guests. I have considered it necessary to let them conceive the hope of Your Imperial Majesty complying with their wishes, not only in order to remove any scruples they might entertain, but to gain time; for, if the requisition is to be made in conformity with the articles of the treaty, and commissaries are sent to the coast of the Low Countries to inquire how many vessels are there and of what nation, when the report of the English commissioners comes in I am almost sure that contrary winds and the approach of winter will render the application of the English, though granted by Your Imperial Majesty, entirely useless.

Since the above was written, news has come that cardinal Du Bellay is coming here. I, myself, perceiving that there will be some difficulty in preparing apartments, left those I had, and have gone to stay [with my colleagues] at the Imperial embassy. The present despatch is for the purpose of informing Your Majesty of my change of domicile, as well as of what passed [at Boulogne] the days I was there. Awaiting

* "Mais qu'ilz voient par ce la realité dont nous usions en leur endroit car cognoissans ce que leur convenoit sans les en travailler n'y leur vendre ce bon office nous l'avions excusé, et sur ce ilz ont tous loué la bonne intention de vre. dite mate et de ses ministres."

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Your Majesty's orders, we all remain your most humble and most obedient subjects and servants.—Calais, 16 October 1544.*

Signed: "A. Perrenot, bishop of Arras"; "De Montmorency"; "Eustace Chapuys."

French. Original. 5 *pp.*

n. d. **239.** FRAGMENT of a CIPHERED DESPATCH from the IMPERIAL AMBASSADORS to the EMPEROR.
Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—We cannot say how cardinal Du Bellay will take the departure of those above alluded to,† and whether, hasty and impetuous as he is, he will decide to return home without stopping any longer here, under the supposition that the resolution of sending commissioners to this place [Calais] *has been taken after, and in consequence of, the King having learnt the nature and import of his (the Cardinal's) mission. However this may be, the latter has received an official communication on the subject. Indeed, on our inquiring from the earl of Hertford and bishop of Winchester what might be done to make the Cardinal remain until a final answer comes from the King, they have told us jokingly* (en gaudissant),‡ *that the Cardinal had gone to amuse himself farther on, but that he would very shortly come back, take part in the game, and work conjointly with the other commissioners, adding that when the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk, and other King's councillors, came here, they would not fail to apprise him (the Cardinal) of their arrival.*

* This last paragraph stands thus in the original:—"Depuis ilz ont eu nouvelles que le dit cardinal de Belay (*sic*) venoit [et] *me suis departy* les veans (voyant) empesches pour son logi [et] m'en suis venu au mien, et avons dressé ceste pour en advertir vre. dite mate et de tout ce que dessus, de la quelle nous pourra sur le tout commander son bon plaisir." I am not sure that the underlined words in the above passage really mean that the Bishop was obliged (as he says) to quit the lodgings, which as usual had been assigned to him in consequence of the dukes of Norfolk and Suffolk not being able to procure within the Castle of Calais suitable appartments for cardinal Du Bellay. At any rate it is not to be inferred from the words "Je me suis departy" that he left Calais on that occasion, for not only did he sign there the joint despatch of the 16th, but also another, without date, announcing the breaking up of the conferences for the peace, and the sudden departure of the Cardinal at the end of the month.

† Most likely Seymour and Gardiner, though the first portion of the despatch being missing, it is difficult to determine. At any rate, this incomplete despatch is the last dated from Calais, and signed by the three Imperial ambassadors (the Bishop, Montmorency, and Chapuys), and shortly after the negociations for the peace were suspended, or entirely broken up. The text reads: "Nous ne sçavons en quelle part le cardinal De (*sic*) Bellay pourra prendre le partiment des susditz et selon qu'il est subit si oseroit entreprendre son retour sen (sans ?) plus long sejour."

‡ "Nous ont respondu en gaudissant que le dit Cardinal s'estoit allé esbatre ung peu plus avant, et que bientost le tout se retrouveroit ensemble et dehors du jeu, dirent (disant ?) que venant icelle les ducqz de Norfolk et Suffolk et autres du conseil l'en advertiroient."

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From Your Majesty's most humble and most obedient subjects and servants—"Perrenot, bishop of Arras"; "De Montmorency"; "Eustace Chapuys."*

French. Original ciphered. 1 *p.*

[20] Oct. **240.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Tres hault, tres excellent, et tres puissant prince, &c.,"—Having given to some members of my Privy Council now at Callaice (Calais) commission to treat with the ambassadors of king Francis concerning matters of peace and the means of obtaining it, We have expressly charged Our faithful and most beloved councillors, the earl of Hertford, Our Lord High Chamberlain, and the bishop of Winchester† (Stephen Gardiner), that should the French ambassador not come at all, or refuse making some sort of appointment, to leave Calais at once, and depart for Your Majesty's court, not only to declare and show to you the manner of dealing of these Frenchmen, but to reveal and openly declare to you what Our opinion of their behaviour is, and what We wish respecting them and their master.‡ We most affectionately request you earnestly to listen, and attach faith to these words, as if We Ourselves were talking to you.—Written at Our Palace of Westminster, — § October 1544.

Signed: "Henry."

Addressed: "A tres hault, tres excellent, et tres puissant prince, nostre tres chier et tres aime bon frere et cousin l'Empereur."

French. Original. 1 *p.*

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* The letter is ciphered and undated. A clerk in the Imperial Archives has written on the dorse of it "September 1544," but this is evidently wrong, for the bishop of Arras, whose signature appears at the bottom conjointly with those of his two colleagues, did not reach Calais until the — of October (*see* above), whilst cardinal Du Bellay himself did not make his appearance in that town until the 16th. Next day the meeting of the English and French commissioners took place, but no agreement could possibly be made, the French refusing to accept the conditions offered, whilst the English resolutely insisted upon retaining Boulogne. The despatch itself being signed by the three Imperial ambassadors (the bishop of Arras, De Courrières, and Chapuys), there can be no doubt that it was between the 16th and 20th of October, when the negociations for the peace with France were suddenly broken off.

† "A nos fealz et bien aymes conseillers, le counte de Hertford, nostre Grand Chambrelain (*sic*), et l'evesque de Winchestre."

‡ "Que en cas que les dits ambassadeurs du dict Roy Françoys ne deussent parvenir ne descendre à quelque appointment conforme à la raison, de se mettre en chemin par devers vous, tant pour vous declarer et remonstrer leur maniere de proceder que pour vous ouvrir et clairement exprimer bien au longue nostre opinion et desire."

§ The day of the month was left blank, but as the original minute, corrected by king Henry himself, is still preserved in the Public Record Office, and endorsed in a Secretary's hand "XX October 1544," there can be no doubt as to that being the true date of the letter.

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30 Oct. **241.** AN ACCOUNT of what passed on the 29th of October between MESSIEURS LE PRAËT ET DE GRANVELLE on one side, and the ENGLISH AMBASSADORS on the other, at the Conference held by them on the Tuesday preceding.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

At the end of October, the Emperor, being at Brussels, ordered the Sieurs de Praët and Granvelle to continue to look out for ways and means of bringing on peace between the kings of England and France, a thing so much needed for the tranquillity and welfare of Christendom at large, the common benefit of the kings of those two countries, as well as for the convenience and repose of His Imperial Majesty, whose mind is agitated and troubled by their differences. They were to meet with the English ambassadors for the purpose, which they did on the very same day. After being duly informed of the Emperor's great desire that an end should be put to the war between England and France, and that the meeting was for that express purpose, the English ambassadors stated that they should be glad of some agreement or other being made to secure peace, but that they, themselves, saw no way to it save that of the Emperor actually compelling the king of France to it by declaring him his enemy, and making war upon him. In this the ambassadors persisted, adding that the declaration against France, to which Your Imperial Majesty was bound by treaty, could not fail to be advantageous to You, as it would greatly increase Your good reputation, whilst it would stop the slandering tongues of those who might find fault with Your having made peace with the French,* and left the English in the lurch, to fight their own battles single-handed.

To the above argument Praët and Granvelle replied: That inasmuch as the English ambassadors were the King's most confidential servants, and knew his wishes and intentions in the matter, they, Praët and Granvelle, had orders from the Emperor to communicate with them openly, and without disguise, in order to justify His conduct. The king of England (they said) could not deny how much His Imperial Majesty had done for the observance and fulfilment of the treaty in all its parts, a fact which, though somewhat brought into question, as reported, by some of the king of England's ministers,† is nevertheless both true and notorious to all. It has been surmised by some English officials that the Emperor did unduly and unjustly conclude peace with king Francis, and thereby left the king of England at war with his adversary. To answer such an accusation, and prove the

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* "Que cela seroit chose à l'avanteage de vre. mate et surcroit de reputation de vous declarer contre les françois, à la quelle (à quoy ?) vre. mte estoit tenu par traité et serviroit aussi pour cloire (clôre) la bouche aux gens qui pourroient mal parler de que sa dite mate s'estoit mise hors de guerre en les y delaissant."

† "Quelques ungs des ministres du roy en ont parlé impertinemment et que s'en tenoit divers propos entre les anglois pour mal imprimer sa Majesté comme si elle heust (eut) injustement et induement (*sic*) traicté de paix et delaissé le dit

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contrary, it is needful to enter into some details, and sum up the causes and origin of the alliance. The treaty was made, as is well known, for the express purpose of compelling king Francis by means of an offensive warfare, to satisfy the claims of the allies and comply with their demands. Without that there would have been no necessity for a treaty of closer alliance between England and the Empire, inasmuch as there was at that time perfect amity between them [the king of England and the Emperor]. The treaty having been made and concluded for the above cause and reasons, the Emperor last winter sent the viceroy of Sicily, Don Fernando Gonzaga, to England to hear the king's pleasure and advice as to the manner and time of the invasion, with what force, and by which frontier, and lastly, when and where the allied armies were to meet in order to proceed and march on Paris. After that Paget, himself, went to the Emperor with excuses from the King, his master, saying that he could not possibly collect more than 20,000 men, and that even those men could not cross the Channel before the 10th of June, or thereabouts. The surplus of the contingent, which he was bound by treaty to supply, was to remain with him, and serve under his own command in the frontier of France on the Calais side. An agreement was accordingly entered into to that effect, as one, the English ambassador, then residing at the Imperial Court, and now present, can testify.

Trusting entirely in the above-mentioned treaties and covenants, the Emperor marched with the whole of his army into France; he would have advanced as far as Paris had the English done the same on their side. King Francis then would undoubtedly have been worsted, and the principal aim of the war attained. But whilst the Emperor was penetrating into France, he had no news whatever of the king of England nor of his army, and, therefore, sent Monsr. d'Arras to inform him of the position of affairs. The King's answer, as the Imperial ambassadors well know, was that he could not then join the Emperor's army so that both together might advance upon Paris as preconcerted. Upon this answer from the king of England, the Emperor, perceiving that his plan of campaign against the common enemy would completely fail, listened to the overtures of the French and made peace with them. This He did with the full consent and approval of the king of England, His ally, reserving his rights, thus extricating himself from the dangerous position in which, according to king Henry's own ideas and supposition, the Emperor was.* In short, His Imperial Majesty concluded a separate peace with France, and kept all the time

* "Sur quoy la response fust telle que les dits ambassadeurs sçavent, et mesmes que le dit sieur roy ne pouvoit entendre à la dite emprinse ny (ne y) assister, et que ce actendu (entendu) sa dite ma^te traictà avec les dits françoys reservant le dit s^r roy et ses droits et fist le mieulx quelle pouvoit pour se retirer du danger ou il presuposoit et tenoit que sa dite ma^te imperiale y estoit."

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his friendly duties towards the king of England, as appears and is notorious.

True it is, as the English ambassadors argue, that the treaty is honourable enough for the Emperor, but it would have been far more honourable and advantageous had the king of England corresponded and fulfilled his part of the agreement.

The Emperor would certainly have obtained more advantageous terms from France before his invasion of that country than he has now by his peace.* He would then have saved expense and spared his money, but he refused to listen to French overtures in order to execute and do, completely and in good faith, whatever he had promised.

What happened afterwards, when the Emperor actually invaded France? The Most Christian King, finding that the king of England had employed the whole of his army in the siege of Boulogne and Montreuil, removed all the forces he had in those quarters and sent them against the Emperor, his son the Dauphin [Henri de Valois] doing the same. The Emperor, besides, had 2,000 horse and as many foot of his own serving all the time with the English, of which force He might have made use, as also of that in Lombardy, where he had to fight the French single-handed and without any help whatever from his allies. He had, moreover, to keep a large fleet in the Mediterranean to defend Nizza, Genoa, Siena, Piombino, as well as the coast of Naples and Sicily from the attacks of Barbarossa.

If the Emperor, under the circumstances, did make his peace with France with the full consent of the king of England, neither this latter nor his subjects have cause or reason to complain, much less appeal to the sincere and perfect amity which He professes for the king of England. Indeed, no living creature will be found who, knowing how things have passed, will fail to acknowledge that the Emperor's conduct in this case was perfectly justifiable.†

The Emperor, since his peace with France, has done everything in his power to prevent the Germans dismissed from his own service entering that of France. He has refused to assist the French with provisions, and has not allowed his own subjects or vassals to go into the service of the Most Christian King, all the while that, disregarding the urgent solicitations of the latter king, stronger and sharper than the English themselves are perhaps aware,‡ He has, until a short time ago, allowed general De Büren and his

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* "Alors sa ma^te^ imperiale auroit plus facilement obtenu ses droits contre le roy de France, et imposé des conditions beaucoup plus dures."

† "Ni le dit sieur roy ni ses subjects ont cause pour prendre scrupule en l'amytié entiere et parfaite que sa dite ma^te^ imperiale a avec le dit s^r^ roy d'Angleterre, ny y a personne vivante que saichant comme les choses sont passées qu'il ne doige (doibve) tenir sa dite ma^te^ pour tres grandement justifiée de ce qu'elle en a faict."

‡ "Malgré les solicitations du roy de France beaucop (*sic*) souvent plus pressantes et aigrea que les anglois ne pensent."

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force to continue in the king of England's service, and has ordered his own subjects to assist the English with provisions of all kinds, notwithstanding the frequent ill-treatment of the Belgian sutlers by the English soldiery. What more could the Emperor do?

Meanwhile, and in order to satisfy the king of England, his ally, the Emperor has hitherto done, and will do in future, everything in his power to make his real or pretended claims acceptable to king Francis and his people; yet the latter say and maintain that by submitting entirely, as they have, to the Emperor's arbitration and decision as to the conditions of their peace, they have done their utmost towards removing the difficulties there might be for a settlement of their differences. The Emperor's position, therefore, placed as he is between the king of England, his old friend, and king Francis, for many years his enemy, is really both difficult and disagreeable.

Considering, therefore, the above stated reasons, and several more equally strong, which, if necessary, might be adduced in justification of the Emperor's conduct since his own peace with France; considering his old and hardly interrupted friendship with England, and his ancient enmity to France; considering the enormous expense he has had to sustain, and his own duties towards the Empire, His Imperial Majesty could not act otherwise than he has done in this affair, and, therefore, begs the ambassadors of the king of England to do their best towards bringing to an end the differences existing between their master and king Francis, by means of some agreement or other equally acceptable for both parties. To that most desirable end the Emperor is sure to help with all his might.

French. Original draft. 5 *pp.*

The English ambassadors' reply was that the king of England, their master, had likewise complied with all and every one of the prescriptions of the treaty. His army had been ready and in the field at the appointed time. They had laid siege to Montreuil just as the Imperialists had invested St. Dizier. True enough, though the duke of Norfolk, who was in command of the English forces, had instructions to cross the river Somme, perceiving that the Emperor remained in sight of that fortified town, he (the Duke) prosecuted the siege of Montreuil and remained where he was chiefly for the purpose of securing provisions, which were already beginning to fail. This was also, without doubt, the cause of the Emperor's delay before St. Dizier. The article of the treaty referring to the date and mode of the invasion could not be taken literally and absolutely, but it ought to be understood that each of the allies was to do what seemed to him most convenient and proper for carrying out the under-

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taking against the common enemy. The English army, moreover, had been of great advantage to the Emperor. Had not the King, their master, considered himself bound by the treaty to assist the Emperor in his invasion of France, surely he might have employed his arms against the Scots rather than at the siege and taking of Boulogne, which, after all, when compared with Scotland, is for us (English) a thing of lesser importance. If the Emperor had spent money in Italy, the king of England had also consumed part of his treasure in war with the Scots, the allies of France. Though the king of England, in 1543, did not openly help and assist the Emperor to the conquest of the duchy of Ghelders, yet it must be owned that the presence of his army, the most numerous and powerful that ever left the shores of England, both at Montreuil and at Boulogne* had considerably disconcerted the French by compelling them to detach part of their army to Picardy, and thereby weaken and diminish their forces on the frontier of Champagne.

"We do not pretend to insinuate (the ambassadors went on to say) that His Imperial Majesty has failed in the least to accomplish the prescriptions of the treaty, but we maintain that on our part we have also complied with them, and yet the fact is that we are still at war with France." This is a sort of thing at which the people of Flanders and the Low Countries wonder, naturally asking each other how can that be, and discussing the matter in their conversations. The English, on the other hand, could not help wondering why the Emperor does not declare against the French. If the causes of our master's dissension and quarrels with king Francis have been recognised and held as just by His Imperial Majesty, how is it that he has been able to make his own peace with the French and leave the English at war with them? Whatever the King, our master, may have said to the bishop of Arras on the subject of the peace, certain it is that his intention and meaning was that he assented to the peace being made between the Empire and France, provided his own rights as king of England were reserved and safeguarded. The King, our master, trusted that if the Emperor had asked for and obtained hostages for the security of his treaty with France, which treaty was most honourable for himself, he was duly bound to see that our master was somehow included in it, or, at least, that his very just demands should be complied with. However that may be, as the king of France has since made war upon the English, it stands to reason that His Imperial Majesty is bound in justice to declare against him; otherwise people will say, with reason, that we, the English, have been deserted and

* "Et si n'avoit leur faveur peu prouffitter l'annee passée à la conqueste de Gheldres ny estoit venue ceste annee venue bien àpropos l'armee si puissante quilz avoient lieu au coustel des dit Boulogne et Montreuil."

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left to ourselves by His Imperial Majesty. Indeed, the French are already profiting by this state of things, and therefore we beg His Imperial Majesty to be pleased, in conformity with the treaty of alliance, with his own honest answer to our representations on the subject, and his own promises, to compel the king of France to listen to reason and attend to our very just demands.

At another conference the English ambassadors inquired of us: "Do you (the Emperor's ministers) really mean that the King, our master, has not fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty of closer friendship and alliance? If you think so, we are quite ready to dispute the matter and prove to you the contrary. The Emperor, himself, never complained of that before; neither did the bishop of Arras, when he came on his mission to the King, our master, hint at it in the least. Had he done so, we, as his privy councillors, should have heard of it immediately."

Another argument brought forward by the English ambassadors at the same meeting was that the submission stipulated in the treaty of peace with France was unnecessary, inasmuch as the English demands were perfectly clear and definite, and had been previously approved by the Emperor in the act of signing the treaty of alliance, defensive and offensive, against France; and if the Emperor intends to make use of the said submission he cannot do less than compel the French to satisfy completely the demands of the English, for it cannot be supposed that, by the fact of his having become the friend of the former through the peace concluded with them, he should now turn against us, his good and faithful allies. Nor would the French have consented to the Emperor becoming the judge and arbiter of their differences unless they believed or imagined that he would ultimately decide in their favour.

Our answer was that the King, their master, might, as they said, have fulfilled all the conditions of the treaty; so had the Emperor for his own part, as could be proved by reference to its articles. Paget had offered in his master's name that, by the 10th of June at the latest, 30,000 Englishmen should cross the Channel and land for the undertaking of Boulogne, the remainder of the force being destined for the frontier of Picardy. As to the ambassadors' assertion that some people in Flanders and the Low Countries had found it expedient to undertake the siege of Montreuil, neither Praët nor Granvelle knew anything about it, nor had the people, who gave such a counsel, any mandate whatever from His Imperial Majesty. Even if Mons. du Rœux had entertained any idea about it, he certainly did not communicate it in an official manner, inasmuch as when consulted upon the march of the allied armies upon Paris he proposed four different ways of advancing on that capital, in none of which did Montreuil figure as an obstacle to be got rid of

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before proceeding further. Nor could the siege of St. Dizier by the Emperor be alleged as an excuse by the ambassadors, inasmuch as that town is by no means so close to the frontier of Flanders as Montreuil is to that of Calais. When the Emperor arrived at St. Dizier he had already reduced by force of arms Ligny and Commeray; if he did stop on his way and remain before St. Dizier, it was in consequence of the English not advancing, as Secretary Paget had proposed, nay, promised, that they would, without letting His Imperial Majesty know before or afterwards anything to the contrary. That, and no other, was the reason for His Imperial Majesty stopping at St. Dizier for the purpose of securing provisions for his men, which he did with great difficulty and much inconvenience and expense; since, being, as he was already, within the enemy's country, he could not secure the arrival of the same without detaching right and left divisions of his army to escort the convoys. Had the English army pushed forward, as had been stipulated and agreed, there would have been no need for the Emperor to stop at St. Dizier, and the difficulties that arose in consequence of that delay would not have arisen, and both the allies would have gained their object by marching on Paris, as it had been stipulated and concerted. Besides which, neither the Sieur de Praët nor Granvelle was on the spot and able to remonstrate against the king of England's non-observance of the articles of the treaty. The bishop of Arras, himself, had no mandate from the Emperor to speak to the King on the subject, as may easily be proved by Secretary Paget's despatches, of which a copy is at hand. This was an important fact to establish, inasmuch as the English ambassadors in their peroration had uttered words implying that the Emperor had not acted rightly in making his peace with France.

To this argument of the Imperial ministers, the English ambassadors replied that they did not want to see the copy of Secretary Paget's notes or despatches, nor of the offers which that secretary and ambassador might have made in their master's name, but went on insisting in general terms that there had been no infraction of the treaty by the English.

As to their asserting that, by undertaking the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil, they, the English, had been of great use to the Emperor, and had diverted part of the army which might otherwise have been employed against Him, the assertion was plainly contradicted by the well-known fact of their having, on the contrary, withdrawn almost the whole of those they had in Picardy and Normandy, the two provinces of France most threatened, in order to meet the Imperial army on the side of Champagne and Burgundy. In short, that no one could pretend to say that the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil by the English could really have influenced the king of France to listen to reason and come to terms with

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the Emperor and with the king of England conjointly, which was the sole and principal aim of the treaty.

With regard to the wish expressed by the ambassadors that the Emperor would make no difficulty in sanctioning and supporting the claims of the English according to the letter of the treaty of closer friendship and alliance, both defensive and offensive, it is quite clear and evident that the meaning of the article was that each of the contracting parties was to support and favour the claims and demands of the other; but those claims and demands were not clearly specified, besides which the king of England, himself, had voluntarily abandoned some of them, for he had evidently disapproved of those contained in the note which His Imperial Majesty sent from St. Dizier specifying His own demands, however reasonable and moderate; and, therefore, though His Imperial Majesty by His treaty with France had settled His own conditions, it did not follow from that that those of the king of England, his ally, should also be considered as settled in the same manner, without modification of any sort, and merely by virtue of the Emperor's peace with France. The hostages, moreover, had been given, and there was no plausible reason to justify the retaining of them for the sake of compelling king Francis to comply with the king of England's demands.

For the above specified reasons, the ambassadors' request that the Emperor should declare war against king Francis and consider him his enemy, owing to the French having attacked not only Boulogne but Guînes also, is quite inadmissible. Now that the French have laid siege to Boulogne, to the defence of which the Emperor is not bound by treaty, it follows that He cannot accede on that account to the English ambassadors' request, besides which there will be plenty of time for that. Since the war between France and England is now reduced to Boulogne, peace, if made, ought to be exclusively based upon that town.*

French. Original draft. 6 pp.

3 Nov. **242.** The BISHOP OF ARRAS to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Sire,"—Your Majesty must already have been informed that the Emperor, my master, dispatched me towards the king of France for the express purpose of persuading him to enter into a treaty with Your Majesty, and that since then I

* This detailed account of the conferences between the earl of Hertford and the bishop of Winchester on the one side, Granvelle and Praët on the other, Dr. Wotton and Joyce Bave occasionally attending (*State Papers*, Vol. X., pp. 152 *et seq.*), is mentioned in the Emperor's letter to his ambassadors. It finishes abruptly, as has been seen, to recommence again on the 9th of November, and is indorsed: "Les demandes du Roy d'Angleterre, et les raisons qu'a sa ma^te^ imperiale pour ne pas les luy accorder."

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received fresh orders from home commanding me to use all possible diligence, and should I not succeed in satisfying him as to Your Majesty's intentions, to solicit the said king of France most urgently to send again [to you] cardinal Du Bellay and the other ambassadors for the express purpose of renewing the negociations. To this the King readily consented. Since then certain difficulties have arisen respecting the passage to England of the ambassadors, which, however, were partly surmounted with the aid of the Imperial ones at king Francis' court, by the French coming to this town of Calais,* where they at present are, and where preliminary communications have already been held, though not sufficiently formal and serious to bring about the negociation and subsequent conclusion of a peace between England and France, so much desired by His Imperial Majesty.

At last my colleagues and I—perceiving that the king of France has recalled his ambassadors, who are about to return home, and that for the present at least all our efforts to retain them here have been of no use—have made up our minds to go home and report this state of things to the Emperor, our master, who, we are sure, will not desist from his endeavours to bring about peace between Your Majesty and the king of France, just as we ourselves have occasionally and more fully explained to the members of Your Majesty's Privy Council [at Calais] in our conferences with them.

Though I, myself, should have wished to go to Your Royal Majesty, and at the same time be the bearer of letters which my Imperial master wrote to me during my stay at the court of France, and which are herein enclosed, the opportunity and means of so doing have failed, and, therefore, thinking that I might do better for Your Royal Majesty and my Imperial master's service, too, by returning home, I am about to do so. I must add that the Emperor's letter † to Your Majesty in credence of myself contained, among other things, the assurance that my Imperial master is ready to do the best offices possible on behalf of Your Majesty, were it for no other reasons and considerations than those which I myself have expounded in Your Majesty's Privy Council in these parts, where I have declared my Imperial master's singular desire for a speedy settlement of the differences between England and France.—Calaix, 3 November 1544.

Signed: "Perrenot, evesque d'Arras."

Addressed: "Au Roy."

French. Original draft.‡ 2 *pp.*

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* "En quoy despuis a heu (il y a eu) difficulté pour le passaige d'icelle [embassade] en Angleterre, et neantmoings j'ay avec Messieurs les ambassadeurs de sa dite ma^te^ imperiale despuis tenu main avec ceulx du dict France quilz unissent (vinssent)."

† That of the 6th of October, No. 225, p. 398.

‡ The letter itself is preserved in the Record Office, and was published in *State Papers*, Vol. X., p. 101.

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6 Nov. **243.** HIGH COMMANDER COBOS * to LOPE HURTADO.

Port. S. E. L. 373, f. 232.

There has been neither occasion nor opportunity yet either to answer your letters or to execute His Imperial Majesty's commands with regard to yourself and in connection with the Portuguese political affairs which secretary Idiaquez brought in his charge. Now, however, it is my duty to announce to you that yesterday, the 5th inst., Juan Montepulchiano,† archbishop of Siponti, arrived here [at Valladolid], sent by His Holiness the Pope as papal nuncio to that kingdom of Portugal. He did not intend at first remaining here long, but to continue his journey [to Portugal] as soon as he had visited the Princess ‡ here. This morning (the 6th) he again called and dined with me. He said that Her Royal Highness the Princess had shown him a letter from the King, her father, stating that he (the King) was glad to hear of his (the nuncio's) arrival here [at Valladolid], but begged him to stay some time, and not to proceed on his journey [to Portugal] until he himself had written about it.§ At which desire of His Majesty the king of Portugal, the said papal nuncio is very much surprised, having done his best at Rome, as he said he had, conjointly with the Portuguese ambassador, for the settlement of all pending questions. He (Montepulchiano) heard from the Portuguese ambassador himself that the King would be glad to see him, and had accepted the charge which His Holiness had given him for the sole and exclusive purpose of continuing his services near his Royal person, and, therefore, could not imagine what suspicion could have entered that King's mind.

To see himself affronted in this manner is a sort of thing which the papal nuncio could not bear with patience. He is, as you may imagine, exceedingly displeased at it, perhaps not without reason, and has therefore decided to stop here [at Valladolid] until the Prince's return from Madrid, on the plea that he has a private message for him from His Holiness, which he wishes to deliver in person. That is why, without letting anyone know the cause of his resolution, he is determined not to depart for Portugal until he he has seen the Prince. Meanwhile he has dispatched a courier to Portugal with a letter for the King, begging him to permit his going

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* "Francisco de los Cobos, or Covos, as his name is frequently spelt, High Commander of Leon in the Military Order of Santiago, at this time Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to Prince Philip of Spain.

† Giovan Riccio da Montepulciano, about whom see Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 202, 204, 205.

‡ Doña Maria, Infanta of Portugal, daughter of Joaõ III., king of Portugal. She was married to Prince Philip of Spain, only son of the emperor Charles V. and of Joanna, the Crazy, in November 1543. Vol. VI., Part II., pp. 75, 342, 474.

§ "Y despues me dixo como el deam (?) de la Princesa, nuestra señora, le havia dado oy [à leer] una carta del Ser^mo^ Rey de Portugal en que le decia que havia visto con sumo gusto la llegada á Valladolid del arzobispo, nuncio de Su Sant^d^; porque (paro que) le rogaba que suspendiese por algunos dias sa viage."

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to His Royal presence, and assuring him that he (the nuncio) has no other mission or mandate from His Holiness save that of complimenting him, and showing his readiness to please him in all matters. He, himself, was sincerely attached to the King's Royal person and service, as all the Portuguese courtiers were aware, and they would consider it an injury to his person and an offence to his honour if he were obliged to stop longer at Valladolid, where he was, without being able to deliver personally His Holiness' message of which he was bearer.

During the many years of my personal acquaintance with Montepulchiano,* I (Cobos) have held him to be a most accomplished and well-intentioned ecclesiastic, sincerely attached to the Emperor's service, and also to that of the king of Portugal; and I recollect that in all matters immediately depending on him, or connected with his office, he has always shown inclination and desire to be useful to the two Majesties, Imperial and Royal. Even before he thought of being appointed papal legate to Portugal, he (Montepulchiano) had worked in favour of that King, for in the Aleaçoba and Santa Cruz ecclesiastical affairs, which others before him had failed to adjust, he did so well that all was, after many years, settled to the advantage and profit of Portugal.

For the above and other reasons which I and others here might allege, I beg you [Lope Hurtado] to intercede with the King on Montepulchiano's behalf, that the latter may be received at court as favourably as other legates and nuncios of His Holiness.

The Prince left yesterday for Madrid. He will, as I am told, sleep at Coca, next day at Segovia, and will reach Madrid on Saturday.† He is in excellent health, as is also the Princess,‡ though now in the family way.—Valladolid, 1 November 1544.

Spanish. Original. 2 *pp.*

6 Nov. **244.** The Papal Nuncio to Portugal to High Commander Cobos.

S. E. Port., ff. 335–6.

Your Lordship's letter to the Imperial ambassador is excellent; it cannot be better. If Your Lordship considers it fit and opportune,§ His Highness the Prince [of Portugal]

* Monte Pulciano, in Tuscany, of which Giov. Ricci was Bishop since 1537.

† "El Principe salio ayèr para Madrid. Dicen me que irá à dormir à Coca y al dia siguiente al Bosque de Segovia. Llegar el Sabado à Madrid."

‡ According to Florez, *Reynas Católicas de España* (Vol. II., p. 874), the Princess Mary [of Portugal] was not long at Madrid, but returned on the 19th to Valladolid, where she died on the 12th of July 1545.

§ "Si vra. señoria lo considerase conveniente y oportuno debiera Su Alteza el Principe ser al propio tiempo informado de los antecedentes de mi persona manifestandole las razones que me asisten para no ir inmediatamente à su Real presencia como era mi deber obedeciendo las ordenes que de Su Santidad tengo."

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should be at the same time informed of my reasons for not leaving immediately for His Royal presence, as I would otherwise have done. He should be told what a faithful servant of His Royal Highness I profess to be, and am, and how much I have done for the speedy settlement of his affairs at Rome, since I was the very Bishop who was able to adjust, in a very few days, and to the complete satisfaction of the king of Portugal, the Alcobaza and Santa Cruz affairs, which had been unsettled for many years past.

There is still another point which ought to be touched upon in the letter which your lordship offers to write to the Imperial ambassador in commendation of my business, namely, that I enjoy some credit with His Holiness and with those who surround him, but of this Your Lordship will be able to testify much better than I myself can.—Valladolid, 6 November 1544.

*Spanish. Original.** 1 *p.*

— Nov. **245.** The ENGLISH ARTICLES, respecting which the AMBASSADORS of the MOST CHRISTIAN KING OF FRANCE desire an explanation.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

First of all (the French ambassadors) † wish to know whether the king of England will be pleased or not that former treaties between the two nations remain unchanged, and that in virtue of those treaties the pension be paid by France at the time and periods therein stipulated.

What dates will the king of England be pleased to fix for the payment of arrears due to him, and what hostages will he demand as security for the payment of such arrears as well as of the aforesaid pension?

What is meant by the interests on the Most Christian King's debt to him; what sum of money those interests are estimated at; and that being settled, whether the King will be pleased to grant reasonable terms and dates within which the Most Christian King may pay his debt to the king of England?

What his demands are respecting Ardres? ‡ How is the Most Christian King expected to behave towards the Scots without attaint either to his own honour or to the reputation of his brother the king of England?

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* This letter of the Papal Nuncio to High Commander Cobos, at this time Secretary of State to Prince Philip in the Department of Foreign Affairs, was no doubt enclosed in that of the same date (No. 243, p. 438) from Cobos to Lope Hurtado.

† No doubt cardinals Lorraine and Tournon, perhaps also that of Meudon (Antoine Sanguin), besides Charles Solier de la Morette, then resident ambassador at the Emperor's court.

‡ Ardres in Picardy had been offered as compensation for king Henry's war expenses.

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Also whether the King intends, by means of and through the treaty of peace which will be concluded between him and the Most Christian King, to restore the town of Boulogne, or retain it in his possession?

The ambassadors of the Most Christian King wish also to know whether, in stating his opinion that fresh offers should again be made by king Francis through the Emperor's medium, the king of England, after hearing Monsr. d'Arras' verbal explanation, means to say that the Most Christian king of France has failed to satisfy him on all points.* The French ambassadors are much surprised at it, for they know from a reliable source that the Emperor had not only approved of the offers made in the Most Christian King's name, but had found them just and reasonable.†

French. Original. 1½ *p.*

8 Nov. **246.** Continuation of the CONFERENCES held at BRUSSELS.‡

Wien, Imp. Arch.

After the above answer of ours,§ the English ambassadors went on insisting as before in their demand that the Emperor should declare war against France, since (as they said) he is bound by the treaty of closer alliance to consider as his own enemies all those who are the enemies of the king of England, and they asked for a plain and categorical answer, yes or no, adding the following request: that the Emperor's declaration should be couched in such words as to make of it an auxiliary against the French in virtue of the reservation of the English rights as stipulated in the treaty of Crêpy.‖

To the foregoing request of the English commissioners, one of the Emperor's ministers answered, that after a most minute examination of the clauses of the treaty, His Imperial Majesty had failed to discover any that obliged him to make such a declaration. His peace with France had been concluded with the full consent and approval of the king of England, and therefore it would be quite unreasonable for the Emperor to recommence war against France. The article of the treaty on which the king of England founds his demand for the Emperor's declaration against that country

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* "Et pour ce qu'il a esté d'advis que le Roy feist quelques [aultres bons offres] à l'Empereur, s'il [ne] luy semble par ce qu'il a entendu de Monsr. d'Arras le Roy aye à cette (cela?) suffisamment satisfait."

† No date to this paper, which is in the same bundle as Nos. 193, 215 and 246. Most probably it was addressed to the Emperor, or to his prime minister Granvelle, at the time that the articles of England for the peace with France were discussed at Brussels.

‡ See No. 241, p. 429, where an account of previous ones from the 28th to the 30th of October is given. It must have been the last, for on the 14th the Earl and the Bishop received orders to take leave and return home, and on the 17th they departed from Brussels. *State Papers*, Vol. X., pp. 190 and 202.

§ No. 241, p. 429.

‖ "Et que du coustel de sa dite ma^te^ l'on s'en peut (pus) valloir contre les françoys en vertu de la reservation faict[e] par le traicté de paix avec France."

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has nothing to do with the present case; it refers only to countries and towns invaded by the common enemy, and certainly the town and castle of Boulogne could not be named in the treaty, since it was besieged long afterwards by the English and taken after the Emperor's peace with France. The Emperor therefore refuses to issue the declaration demanded, that he may be better able to mediate for peace between England and France.

The English ambassadors renewed their demand, and were again answered in the same terms as before, namely, that the invasion of English territory in the county of Guînes was not of the sort and class specified in the treaty of closer alliance. Even if it were, and the article quoted referred to it, which it does not, a mere raid or incursion by fifty mounted men, or a small number of adventurers, no doubt to procure victuals for the men and fodder for the horses, can hardly be called a regular invasion of English territory.* For these reasons, and several more that could be alleged, the Emperor cannot comply with the king of England's wish in that particular. Indeed, the taking of Boulogne by the King, their master, took place long after the treaty of closer alliance was made and signed; no one of its clauses could possibly allude to it, for in December 1543, when the agreement between the king of England and Ferrante di Gonzaga was signed, no mention whatever was made of that town or of Montreuil, which the King promised to leave behind, so as to meet the Emperor on the banks of the river Somme, and then march on Paris. As Boulogne, therefore, was not then an English possession, how could the Emperor consider it as such and declare against king Francis? He, therefore, refuses altogether to comply with the king of England's demand, that he may better be able to mediate, and bring on a lasting peace between England and France.

The English ambassadors went on repeating the same arguments, adding that the invasion by the French of English territory had not been limited to Boulogne; the county of Guînes had likewise been overrun by an army of 20,000 Frenchmen, who had set fire to many churches, and stored their artillery within them, besides having many war vessels on the sea to help them in their hostile attempt; and that if the examination of the clauses of the treaty of alliance could be made in their presence, they would be able to prove their assertion, namely, that the Emperor is obliged by that treaty to declare against France. If so, and if time were allowed to them for discussion, they flattered themselves that our

* "Et que il ne failloit (fallait) entendre si cruement le traicté que pour cinquante chevaulx ou aultre petit nombre de gens de pied qui fissent une course l'on debvoit declarer, encoires pour ung plus gros nombre de gentillants seullement pour recognoitre ou pour cercher (*sic*) fourrage ou se procurer vituailles."

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answer this time would not be so hasty and so short as in the preceding conferences.

In conclusion, we told them that next day the result of the conferences would be faithfully reported to the Emperor, and a copy of our own report sent to the Imperial ambassador in England.—Brussels [10th of November 1544.] *

Indorsed: "Coppie de la derniere conference heue (hue) entre Messieurs les ambassadeurs anglois et les ministres de sa Mate Imperiale."

French. Original draft. 5½ *pp.*

11 Nov. **247.** MARY STUART to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Asks for the continuation of the peace concluded with her father (James), and requests the Emperor, whilst her kingdom is at war with England, to refrain from acts of hostility against her, so that her subjects, the Scots, be no longer treated so harshly as hitherto merely to please the English, her enemies, but on kind and friendly terms, as the old treaties and confederacies existing between Spain and Scotland justly demand. Her councillors have warmly recommended her to propose that when the Emperor comes next to Lower Germany, an ambassador be sent to him with this petition.†

Signed: "Jacobus Arranis Comes."

Latin. Original. 1 *p.*

14 Nov. **248.** KING HENRY to the EMPEROR.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Hearing from Our ambassadors at the Imperial Court the objections and doubts raised by Your ministers against the report made by the former in Our name, of frequent aggressions committed by the French, and of their having more than once invaded Our territories and possessions on both sides of the Channel,‡ We have deemed it fit and convenient, in order that truth may become manifest, to inform You of the facts as they have occurred.

Ever since the French concluded peace with You, they have never ceased making war against Us. After attempting to retake Lower Boulogne (*la basse Boulogne*), they invaded

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* No date or signature, very much corrected, and in some parts almost illegible.

† The letter has no date, but secretary Bave? or some clerk of queen Mary's Privy Council, wrote on the dorse "11 Nov. 1544," which was most likely the date of its receipt at Brussels.

‡ "Depuis la paix dernierement faicte d'entre nous eussent hostilement, et à mayn armée invadés (*sic*) nos pays, terres et possessions tant deça la mer que dela."

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Our Guînes territory,* and after destroying or setting fire to certain churches and strong places in the neighbourhood, they did all they could to get possession of Our castle of Hampnes,† and of Guînes itself, though, thanks to God, they were at both places shamefully beaten. Not satisfied with that, and perceiving that they could do Us no harm whatever inland, they came to this coast with a number of warships,‡ and landing not far from Our town of Calais, surprised and took prisoners certain sick soldiers of Ours, who on account of sickness had been sent out into the country, some short distance from Calais, for change of air. This is not all: the French did actually land in Our very kingdom of England, not far from Our town of Dover, trying by all means in their power to harm Us. In this attempt, however, the French were most singularly baffled, for they were soon obliged to return to their ships with loss. Since then they continue in sight of Our ports and harbours on this coast, looking out for an opportunity to land in force, and do Us damage. There they will no doubt remain, until the fleet, which We have ordered to be prepared and fitted for the defence and protection of Our subjects, goes out to sea, and obliges the French to return home.

All this Our ambassadors at the Imperial Court have charge to relate to You more in detail. We beg You to believe them as if the account came from Our own lips, and send Us quickly as satisfactory and good an answer on the whole as the long and continuous friendship between us two demands.—Westminster Palace, 14 November 1544.

Signed: "Vostre bon frère et cousin Henry."

French. Original.§ 1 *p.*

21 Nov. **249.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp. *Fasc.* No. 3.

"Tres hault, tres excellent, et tres puissant prince nostre tres chier et tres amé (*sic*) bon frere et cousin,"—Yesterday We received through the earl of Hertford (le comte Darfort) and the bishop of Wyncestre (Winchester) your letter of the

* "Ayantz premierement enterprise la prinse de la Basse Boulogne ont esté depuis dedans nos Marches de Guisnes et y ayant rues (*sic*) sus quelques esglises et fortes places ont faict tout leur debvoir de surprendre nostre chasteau de Bampnes (*sic*) et nostre ville de Guisnes, de ou toutesfois, la mercy à Dieu, ilz ont estés honteusement reboutez."

† Bampness is the reading in the copy before me, and likewise, as I am assured, in the original preserved at Vienna; but as the minute in French, in the hand of Sir John Mason, one of the secretaries or clerks of the Council for the French tongue, has *Hampnes*, which was then a small village in the Marches of Calais, I have not hesitated to adopt the latter reading. *See State Papers*, Vol. X. pp. 189–94.

‡ "Non contents d'avoir à tout leur pouvoir attemptes (*sic*) à nous nuyre et endommaiger par terre, se sont davantaige faictz (*sic*) fortz sur la mer."

§ The minute in French, as above said, is in the Public Record Office, and was printed in *State Papers*, Vol. IX. p. 189.

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14th inst.* As both these ambassadors are now returning home, they will be able to report to You verbally on their conference with Our ministers,† and Our own ideas (*devises*) concerning their mission.

We will, however, shortly dispatch to You the personage We have just appointed to reside with You conjointly with Our councillor and Master of Requests in Ordinary, Messire Eustace Chapuys, who, if the state of his health permits,‡ will again represent Us at Your court, and inform You of Our intentions and determination respecting the observance of Our treaty of closer friendship and alliance with You.

As these and other matters more or less connected with the object of Your late mission to Us will be fully explained to You by Our said ambassadors, We need not at present dwell more at length on the subject.—Brussels, 21 November 1544.

Signed: "Vostre bon frere et cousin, Charles.

Countersigned: "Bave."

Addressed: "A tres hault, tres excellent et tres puissant prince, nostre tres chier et tres amé bon frere et Cousin le Roy d'Angleterre, &c."

French. Minute. 1 *p.*

21 Nov. **250.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch. Hof. Corresp.

"Monsieur mon bon frere,"—Immediately after the receipt of my ambassadors' answer § to the letter I wrote to them respecting Your own peace with the king of France, I ordered my ministers to confer on the subject with cardinals Lorraine and Tournon,‖ and sent expressly [to France] the bishop of Arras with instructions to request king Francis most affectionately to send again, and at once, his ambassador to You. The Bishop had also orders and instructions from me to

* No. 248.

† Both were still in Brussels on the 22nd, for on that very day the Earl and the Bishop, as well as the dean of York (Dr. Nicholas Wotton), announced to the Privy Council in England their departure from Brussels in the following terms: "And we, the undersigned, E. Hertford and Ste. Wintoniensis (Gardyner, bishop of Winchester), and this post now depart from this town, and shall, with as convenient diligence as we can, repair to Your Majesty's presence."—*State Papers*, Vol. X. p. 220.

‡ "Et nous depechons (depescherons) prestement le personage qu'avons deputé pour aller resider devers [vous] pour joinctement avecque nostre conseiller et maitre des Requestes en ordinaire Messire Eustace Chappuys (*sic*) si sa disposition le peult pourter, &c."

§ "Que j'ay en response." The letter being private and confidential, as it were, it will be observed that the Emperor addresses king Henry in the first person singular.

‖ "Les cardinaux (*sic*) Loreyne et Tournon," that is Jean de Lorraine, son of the duke Antoine "le Bon," and François de Tournon, at this time archbishop of Auch in Gascony; of Lyons, 1551–62; cardinal since 1530. *See* above, pp. 371, 411.

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make as much haste as possible, and go afterwards to You with the result of his mission. I now write these few lines to You, merely to inform You of the step I have taken, and will also write more fully to my ambassadors at Your court. I beg You, should the negotiation be set on good terms, to act in this present business as You may deem convenient and suitable for the achievement of such a good and holy work as the present is, and to credit and believe the said bishop of Arras, as well as my own ambassadors at Your court, as if I, myself, were speaking to You, and believe that in this particular affair I shall not fail to do my best good offices for Your sake.*

Signed: "Vostre bon frere et cousin, Charles."

Addressed: "A mon bon frere et cousin le Roy d'Engleterre."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

21 Nov. **251.** The EMPEROR to EUSTACE CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, tres chier et feal,"—The earl of Hertford and the bishop of Winchester are going back home. As We have not yet been able to come to a resolution respecting their mission, We have decided to send immediately to England the personage who is to succeed you as ambassador there, with full information respecting what passed here [at Brussels] between the said English ambassadors and Our ministers, as also a copy of Our instructions to the new ambassador † as to how he is to act, and what he is to say. But as the affair itself is very important, We request you as earnestly as We can, if the state of your health will permit, to take the trouble of again crossing the sea and going to England, to remonstrate with the King of that country, and make him understand the causes and reasons as well as the justification of Our answer to his ambassadors. This, We think, you can do much better than any one else, owing, first of all, to the great esteem in which the king of England holds you, then to your own experience in treating of that kind with the King and his privy councillors, and last, but not least, the well-known dexterity and tact with which to Our great satisfaction and contentment you have hitherto managed affairs political of this sort. Were it not that the matter itself demands a sacrifice on your part, We would not request you to take the trouble of going again to England,

* No date nor place, but as the original letter is preserved in the Public Record Office, and was published in Vol. X. of *State Papers*, p. 101, I have not hesitated to calendar it here. The place where it was written must be Brussels, where the Emperor was since the 3rd of October.

† A blank is left for the name, that is François van der Delft, as will be seen hereafter.

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knowing very well how troubled you must be by your present indisposition; but if that does not actually prevent you from travelling and crossing the Channel, I again request you to go to England and assist the new ambassador in the discharge of the mission entrusted to him. This We will consider a service, and after having instructed the new ambassador, and helped him in the execution of his mission, you may return home whenever you like without applying freshly for leave.

This letter of Ours goes by express courier, in order that during the arrival here and departure for England of François van der Delft you may make the necessary preparations for your voyage.—Brussels, 21 November 1544.

French. Original draft. 2 *pp.*

21 Nov. **252.** The SAME to the SAME.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

Sends Messire François van der Delft (*sic*), councillor, to represent Him at the Court of England, in place of Messire Eustace Chappuis (*sic*), who owing to failure of health has applied for leave to retire from the service, which he will do as soon as he has introduced his successor.

Van der Delft will explain to king Henry the object of the mission entrusted to him, which is to reply in the Emperor's name to that brought the day before yesterday by the earl of Hertford and bishop of Winchester.—Brussels, 21 November 1544.

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

24 Nov. **253.** The EMPEROR'S INSTRUCTIONS to EUSTACE CHAPUYS and FRANÇOIS VAN DER DELFT.

B. *Negot. d'Angl.* Vol. 11.

The following are instructions for you, Messire Eustace Chappuys (*sic*), Our councillor and Master of Requests (*Maistre aux Requestes*) in ordinary, and for you, Messire François van der Delft, knight, whom We now send to reside as ambassador to the king of England in place of you, the above-mentioned Eustace Chapuys, respecting what you will have to say and represent for the fulfilment of your charge, and in answer to that brought to Us by the earl of Harforg (Hertford) and the bishop of Wyncester (Winchester).

You, Van der Delft, will be the bearer of a report in writing,* being the account of what passed between the said English commissioners and the Sieurs Praët and Granvelle at their first, second, and third conferences, as well as the answer returned in the first instance to the English commissioners.†

* No. 241.

† No. 246.

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As the Earl and the Bishop were dissatisfied with Our answer to their mission and subsequent communications with Our ministers (Praët and Granvelle); as they insisted upon all the treaties being again examined, notwithstanding that, as the report of the conference will show, both the treaty of confederacy and alliance between Us and the king of England, and the agreement subsequently made with Don Fernando de Gonzaga, Our viceroy of Sicily, and last, not least, that which Secretary Paget accepted in his master's name at Spires and took back with him to England, had been exhaustively debated and referred to in various private conferences, yet, the more to satisfy the English on this point, We afterwards caused the said Sieurs de Praët and De Granvelle, and together with them the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) and the president and chief of Our Privy Council in Flanders (Schore), to hold another conference with the above-mentioned English commissioners, in which conference Our ministers insisted upon and read aloud in the presence of the English if not the whole of the treaty at least those articles particularly referring to the defensive and offensive alliance.

This being done, the question at issue was formally debated in the following terms:—The English commissioners began by stating that the Emperor had no right to make peace with France without the full consent of the English king, and their being completely satisfied in all their demands and pretensions according to the limited consent, which at the time of the bishop of Arras' visit to Boulogne the King forwarded to his resident ambassador with Us; the principal argument of the commissioners being that Articles 6, 19, and 20 of the said treaty were quite clear and indisputable.

They likewise argued that in the treaty made with France the article relating to the reservation was express enough, since it was said therein that We had refused to treat or contract unless the king of England were previously satisfied of all his demands, and that their intention was the more founded because it was necessary to stop precisely at the words of the treaty between the said King and Us in which the stipulation was expressly defined, and that We had approved and confirmed that their master's previous consent was absolutely necessary by sending to him the bishop of Arras for that particular purpose. Now these two ambassadors allege that the King, their master, had really given his consent, though on two conditions: one, that the treaty between him and Us should be reserved, and the other that he himself should be satisfied and paid. Such (they said) were the King's words to the bishop of Arras immediately after he put the answer into his hands. It could not be expected (they said) that a king so wise and prudent as their master was could grant his consent without two such conditions, and that he ought to be believed in preference to the Bishop. No sensible man could interpret

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otherwise their master's answer to the Bishop. It was also convenient to ascertain, the King's commissioners alleged, the reason why the Bishop immediately after his arrival in England * tried to learn on what terms the King, their master, was with the French ambassadors, and what chance he had of his demands being complied with, as they had been sent to their resident ambassador at this Our court. To the same end did the English commissioners enquire what you (Chapuys) could mean by telling them that they would be ultimately the gainers of Boulogne, Ardres, and Montreuil, as you assured them they would be in making a treaty with France. You said that we had done as much for their master, as We did for Ourselves, telling them besides that it was advisable for them to send instructions to the English ambassadors residing at this Our court to forward conjointly and at the same time the demands and pretensions of the King, their master, and that the Queen, Our sister, had written to you that the King should be fully satisfied as to his claims.

The commissioners were thereupon informed that the articles on which their arguments rested, even the 19th, could in no wise serve to support their contention that we could not treat of the said peace without first obtaining conjointly (*copulativement*) the King's consent to it, and the satisfaction of all his demands; for the article in question has reference to the war, which had not commenced yet. And since the letter and words of the treaty are perfectly clear without such a commentary and interpretation of the article as they (the English) choose to give it, it is evident that, the King's consent once obtained, no more was needed, and the following articles would count for nothing save for the fact of establishing the consent.

With regard to the article of the reservation in the Emperor's treaty with France, and the mention therein made that the king of England shall be thoroughly satisfied respecting his claims and demands, there can be no doubt that the King's satisfaction shall be attended to; but the article (it must be observed) refers to the past, before the consent was applied for and obtained, and if the commissioners intend to use it as a proof in their favour, it should be understood that in the very same article ample provision is made for the said satisfaction of the King's claims,† since the French, themselves, refer to it, and say that the king of England may declare what his wishes are, and that they will be attended to.

As to the Bishop's mission to Boulogne, the principal object was not, as alleged by the commissioners, to ask for their master's consent; it was to let him know how We had

* "En Angleterre" is here meant for Calais, where the Bishop arrived on the 5th October.

† "Et à ceste cause baillé le dit consentement dont on ne peult (pu) faire relation prejudiciable quil fut necessaire ni moings fait àpropos de comprouver lautre condition de la satisfaction du dit sieur roy."

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entered far into France, and what chance there was then of Our getting the uppermost over the common enemy. The Bishop was to ask the King to co-operate and join in the enterprise. This the King declined to do, being then occupied with the sieges of Boulogne and Montreuil, but he, nevertheless, gave his consent (*i.e.* to the negotiations), from which fact one might draw the inference that his real object in the war with France was to obtain his arrears of pension, and at the same time get possession of those two towns and their adjoining territory.

As to the assertion made by the English commissioners that the King, their master, did grant his consent under the two specified conditions, and that he himself had said so to the members of his Privy Council, and, therefore, that considering the King's usual veracity, it was impossible not to attach faith to his words, inasmuch as the Bishop's assertion was in opposition to what you, yourself (Messire Eustace Chapuys), and Madame, Our good sister, had written to Us, We can only say that the Bishop is a man of integrity and veracity, and that We believe in his report of the King's answer.

With regard to the conversation held by you two with the King's councillors, it was no doubt very fit and convenient for the purpose of proving the reserve of the said conditions; but what you said to them of the King not having sent to his [ambassadors] the powers is still a stronger and conclusive proof of our assertion, as without that power We could not treat on behalf of the king of England; to which may be added what the King himself had told you some time before, namely, that each prince would treat of his own affairs separately,* adding the regret he felt at his being unable to aid Us in Our difficulty, which clearly shows that We could not possibly remain on such terms without treating, nor could we wait for the King's resolution respecting the peace proposed, for the danger consisted chiefly in stopping in Our march, as it has been said and written many a time.

Another proof of that is the King's answer to the Bishop that he would treat with Cardinal du Bellay whenever he should come to his court.

In a like manner it was objected to the English ambassadors† that the contents of Our sister's letters were not what they were represented to be. They were limited to informing you of the conclusion of the peace, and expressing clearly enough that She (the Queen) knew nothing then of the particulars thereof, which was the fact.

Another objection was likewise addressed to the said ambassadors, which is that the King's reservation respecting his own satisfaction with the conditions of Our peace

* "Et quant aux propoz que vous avies (*sic*) tenu ne servien (servent) en riens à comprouver la reservation des dites deux conditions, mais bien au contraire ce que vous avies (*sic*) dit de non avoir envoyé le pouvoir concluoit que sans icelle nous ne pouvions traicter pour le dit roy d'angleterre, avec ce que auparavant il vous avoit dit que chascun traicteroit de son particulier pour soy."

† That is the "commissioners" Hertford and Gardiner, who were ambassadors extraordinary.

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with France was neither reasonable nor just, inasmuch as the king of England had excused himself from assisting Us in Our contest with France; notwithstanding the engagements made with Don Fernando [de] Gonzaga, We received no substantial help from him. Indeed, it would have been highly improper for the king of England, whilst positively refusing the promised aid, to pretend that We alone should bear the brunt and expense of a war against Our common enemy.

To the foregoing objection another one has been added by Our councillors. The English ambassadors have been told that in the treaty made with Don Fernando [de] Gonzaga for the joint invasion of France, it was expressly stipulated how, at what time, and with what number of men, the invasion was to be effected; and it being notorious that the king of England had not fulfilled the whole of its articles, it might be said that, finding Ourselves so far in the heart of France without the king of England's corresponding and promised aid, We should have been justified, apart from other motives, in treating with the French without asking for and obtaining the King's consent.

With regard to the aforesaid non-observance of the covenant concluded with Don Fernando [de] Gonzaga, the English ambassadors have always affirmed and maintained that the King, their master, had fulfilled all and every one of the stipulated conditions as strictly as We, Ourselves, had; and, therefore, that the King could in no wise be charged with any infraction of the said covenant, since the English would have taken the field immediately had they not been prevented from marching into France by want of the waggons (*chariotz*) that were to have been furnished to them [from Flanders]. That in order to procure victuals, the English had been obliged to lay siege to Montreuil. If they had stayed too long before that place, it was owing to the intelligence received of Our having done the same at St. Dizier, and likewise for the want of victuals, which did not come in regularly enough, and became scarce. Had We (the ambassadors alleged) been more fortunate in Our attempt on St. Dizier, reduced it sooner, and gone beyond, they would have raised the siege of Montreuil, and joined Our force. That is why, said the ambassadors, no fault is to be imputed to them; if they had committed any, it had arisen from the same causes which had perplexed us; they having all the time co-operated in the invasion of France as efficiently as could be expected, and spent a large sum of money therein.

In vain were they told that the failure of carriage was entirely caused by them, for not having sent agents in time to take charge of, and pay for, the waggons, as they had been told under protest. That they could not deny, since it was a notorious fact; no reply was made to this.

As to their having been compelled (as they said) by want of provisions, and in order to insure a supply of them, to lay

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siege to Montreuil and Boulogne, they were told that neither of those towns lay on the river Somme, and that it had been proved by the result of previous invasions (*passages*) of the same kind that it was not the best way to Paris. Besides which, count du Rœulx had pointed out to their generals three better and more convenient roads to march on the French capital.* The English ambassadors could not contradict this statement of Our councillors, and yet they insisted on their former allegation, declaring that the route by Montreuil and Boulogne was the most convenient for their army to follow in order to reach the Somme and then march on Paris. And when they were told that the course to be followed was settled by an article of the first treaty, and further explained and confirmed by the second agreement with Don Fernando [de] Gonzaga, they replied that the article in the latter must be understood *selon la raison de la guerre*, not otherwise. Our councillors' reply was that by the article of the second treaty or agreement it was expressly stipulated that the English force was to march to the river Somme, and thence to Paris, as best it could, and that there was no need of comment upon or interpretation of the article to excuse their departing from it. Even if the words of the article should be taken not *pedem litteræ* as they pretend, reason would still not be on their side.

Not one of Our councillors' arguments on the subject seemed to convince the English ambassadors. Neither did they pay any regard to the agreement in writing between Secretary Paget and Our ministers respecting the 30,000 men with whom the king of England was to help in the invasion of France. Neither the King nor his ministers had ever said anything to the contrary; nor that the number of men to be employed by him in the invasion of France differed considerably from the army We had before St. Dizier, a town far in the interior of France, for after taking Commercy and Ligny there was no necessity for Us to lay siege to St. Dizier, as We did, unless it were to wait for the arrival of the English force, and then march straight on Paris. This was the real cause of Our staying so long before the walls of that place to Our great personal inconvenience, which, however, We should have endured and awaited the English had not the want of provision in Our camp induced Us to listen to the French overtures about the peace, as otherwise Our army might have sustained heavy damage.†

Nor is this all; the English ambassadors have been told, and they cannot deny that the siege of Boulogne could in no wise serve the purpose of the common invasion of French territory. Ever since the commencement of the war, it had

* "Et que levidence l'a monstré par les passages que cy-devant ont esté faictz, et que le comte du Rœulx leur avoit mis en avant trois autres chemins."

† "Ny pour ceste cause nous estions voulsu (eussions nous crûs obligés) à y rester et attendre l'arriveé des angloix (*sic*) si ce n'eust esté la necessité des vituailles."

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been observed that the tendency of the King and of his ministers was to attempt Boulogne and Montreuil rather than join in the enterprise against France and march on Paris.

All these and other arguments in Our favour were useless, the English ambassadors persisting in their first declaration, and asserting that they (the English) had fulfilled all and every one of the conditions of the treaty as well as Ourselves, which assertion, to say the truth, seems to Us rather extravagant and injurious, as Our councillors have told them, though in the mildest and most courteous terms possible, giving them to understand that We fully intend to arm and defend Ourselves against such nonobservance of the treaties, though this may be contrary to Our interest, and thus cancel all the pretensions the king of England may have formed against us, taking as Our shield his own non-observance.*—24th November 1544.

French. Original draft. 8 *pp.*

25 Nov. **253A.** The EMPEROR to KING HENRY.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Monsieur mon bon frere,"—I now send to You Monsr. François van der Delft, my councillor, to replace Eustace Chapuys, who, owing to the bad state of his health, has applied for leave to return home after remaining some time in that country for the express purpose of introducing my new ambassador to You. Van der Delft has instructions from me to speak to you concerning the mission brought here by the earl of Hertford and bishop of Winchester.—n. d.†

French. Original. 1 *p.*

25 Nov. **254.** The SAME to CHAPUYS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Venerable, chier et feal,"—Though We are sure that in compliance with Our last orders you have by this time made preparations for your voyage to England conjointly with Messire François van der Delft, who is presently leaving this city to succeed you in that embassy, yet as the charge the latter and yourself have is of such moment and importance for Our Imperial service, We again request you, as affectionately as possible, if the state of your health will permit, to cross over to England and help the said François van der Delft in the mission of which We wrote to you on the 21st inst. That being done, you may take leave and retire.—Brussels, the 25th of November 1544.

Indorsed: "Charles V. to ambassador Chapuys."

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

* "Que à la verité nous a semblé chose fort exhorbitante et griefve, dont toutesfois la remonstrance a esté faïcte avec toute doulceur et modestie, leur baillant à entendre que nous viendrions volontiers à nous armer et ayder de la dicte innobservance combien quelle pourroit (eussions voulu?) et effacer tout ce que le dit roy d'Angleterre pourroit pretendre à lencontre de nous."

† As usual this minute is undated, though endorsed in a different hand, "Brussels, 25th of November," which happens to be that of the holograph preserved in the Record Office, and published in *State Papers*, Vol. X. p. 210.

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25 Nov. **255.** The SAME to the DUKE OF NORFOLK.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

"Cousin,"—We now send to England Messire François Van der Delft, knight, Our councillor, to represent Us and reside there as Our ambassador, near the person of Our good brother, the king of England, having at the same time given orders to Messire Eustace Chappuys (*sic*), Our councillor and master of Requests, to cross over and accompany him thither to visit the King in Our name, and help Van der Delft in his mission as far as his own health will permit, and then return.

As from both, or one of them at least, you will hear what the substance and purport of Our mission is, We need not be over prolix here, save to pray you, Our cousin, to attach faith to what they will tell you concerning the continuation of the perfect friendship which unites the King, Our good brother, and Us, as We confidently expect from the good will and affection which you have always shown for that friendship.—Brussels, the 25th of November 1544.

Addressed: "To the duke of Norfolk." *

French. Original draft. 1 *p.*

27 Nov. **256.** LOPE HURTADO [DE MENDOZA] to the HIGH COMMANDER.

S. E. L. 373, f. 229.
B.M. *Add.* 28594, f. 30.

Is in receipt of his letter of the 6th inst.† about Montepulchano and his cor g to Portugal. Called immediately on the King, and sp to him in conformity with his (the High Commander's) d how much in favour Montepulchano was ne, and with cardinal Farnese, anc io was of coming here and deliv answer was that he had reall cio to stop where he was, an ntil he should receive further orders. hat in sending Montepulchano the Nuncio to reside at his court, His Holiness wrote that he issued a brief, saying that if he (the king of Portugal) was dissatisfied with him, he might send him away, and that in future no more nuncios should be appointed to Portugal. Matters in which he (the King) had sustained notorious injury—such as cardinal Viseu's ‡ treatment, which His Holiness had promised to consider favourably—were still unsettled, and nothing had been done to satisfy and please him, or redress the wrongs of which he complained.

"This sending now of a Papal nuncio (said the King to me) without saying a word to me is contrary to His Holiness'

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* As Chapuys had not yet left for England, and was still at Calais, this letter to the Duke must be considered as a sort of credential for his recall.

† No. 243, pp. 439–40.

‡ Cardinal Miguel de Silva.

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own words in the brief." He (the King) fancied that the whole might be owing to some foolish trick on the part of the new Christians of Portugal. On this and other accounts he (the King) had written to Montepulchano to stop where he was until he, himself, had informed His Holiness of what had happened, and requested him to make no change. However, to please the High Commander, should Montepulchano be a man of the quality and parts described, he (the King) would look into the affair, and let him have an answer. After this the King, as I hear, consulted the Queen, the Infantes, and his own privy councillors, and it was decided that Juan de Montepulchano might come if he liked. It must be owned that the Papal nuncio now residing at this court did his best towards it, for he is dying to leave his post and go away.*

This despatch of mine will be taken by Don Francisco de Luna, whom this king is now sending to our lord the prince of Spain (Philip), as your lordship will hear by another private letter.

Whilst matters were in this state, the Nuncio residing here received letters from Rome, as well as orders from His Holiness, to notify to the Infante Dom Henrique, now Grand Inquisitor of Portugal, the contents of the new Papal brief, namely, that all sentences pronounced against newly converted Moors (*los confessos*) should be delayed, and all legal proceedings against them and the Jews be suspended until the arrival here of Juan de Montepulchano, who is to be the judge of the cause and reasons for those sentences or proceedings against the rest. This, of course, to be done as secretly as possible, without telling the King or the Royal family, and without the Nuncio himself exhibiting his credentials or showing a hand in the affair, but merely speaking privately about it to the said Grand Inquisitor. This being done, the Papal nuncio is to report on the whole, so that His Holiness may decide on the matter.

The brief I allude to was issued by the Pope at the solicitation and request of the newly converted Moors and Jews, who have complained to His Holiness of the grievous injuries and ill-treatment they have received from the Portuguese. At this the King and his ministers are indignant, fancying that Montepulchano's mission is only directed to matters relating to the newly converted and to the Portuguese Grand Inquisitor, and that he is coming exclusively for the purpose of helping the former against the Holy Office.

The King tells me to write to your Lordship that this is an affair of such paramount importance for the service of God and presses so grievously on his conscience, that the whole must be reconsidered, and weighed by His Holiness before

* "Por que muere por irse de aqui."

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Juan de Montepulchano can set his foot in Portugal, and that, as I hear from His Highness' own lips, will not take place for many a day, unless His Holiness consent to revoke the brief about the New Christians and the Portuguese Inquisition.

As the Papal nuncio is sure to write to Montepulchano on the subject, I need not dwell longer on this particular. I, myself, have written to that prelate informing him of the existing difficulties, and telling him that in the present mood of this King and his ministers the remedy must come from Rome, and that there is at present no chance of his being accepted and received here. I regret exceedingly my being obliged to convey such bad news, and should have been glad to see Montepulchano here.—Evora, 27 November 1544.

P.S.—All these things, it is thought, are caused by the cardinal of Viseu, a bad remedy for his sentences.*

Signed: "Lope Hurtado."

Spanish. Original. 5 *pp.*

— Nov. **257.** An IMPERIAL COUNCILLOR'S OPINION on the demand made by the ENGLISH AMBASSADORS.

Wien, Imp. Arch.

With regard to the demand made by the ambassadors of the king of England (the earl of Hertford and the bishop of Winchester) † that the Emperor should declare himself the enemy of king Francis, inasmuch as since their peace with the Emperor the latter has wilfully made war upon England at Guînes and elsewhere, the following points are to be considered:—

"It was expressly stipulated (the English ambassadors said), by Articles 13 and 14 of the treaty with England, that neither of the contracting parties can make truce or peace with the common enemy without the previous consent and approval of the other party, and that if the one party does so, the act will be considered null and void, and the (original) treaty itself remain in all its force and vigour."

The answer to this is: Had not that formality been fully complied with, the king of England would have ample reason to say that the Emperor was not justified in treating with the French, but the Emperor did ask for and obtained the consent of his ally, the king of England.

"That consent (contended the ambassadors) was granted on the express condition that the friendship and confederacy between His Imperial Majesty and the king of England should be reserved.

"The demand, therefore, that His Imperial Majesty should declare himself the enemy of France is consistent and well

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* "Todas estas cosas piensan que causa el cardenal de Viseu; son mal remedio para sus sentencias."

† "Le comte D'Hartford (*sic*) et l'evesque de Wincestre."

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founded, since the King of that country has wilfully made war against England by land [in the territory of Guînes], which the latter has invaded, as well as by sea, on the Channel and elsewhere.

"On this point the 6th Article of the treaty is clear and explicit enough. It stands thus: '*Whoever shall invade the territory of one of the two contracting parties, the other party shall consider the invader as his enemy.*' And here it must be observed that the general sense of the words '*whoever shall invade, or whoever shall make an invasion,*' leaves no doubt whatever as to how each of the contracting parties is to act in case of invasion of the territory of the other, of *whatever sort* that invasion may be, and *whoever the aggressor* may be.*

"No specific mention is made in the treaty as to the invasion being 'just' or 'unjust,' whilst in Article 17 it is expressly said that the treaty is to be observed strictly, and to the letter, without interpretation or commentary of any sort.

"The Emperor is surely obliged to observe and keep the treaty in all its parts, for the king of England having commenced war at his desire, and in compliance with the treaty of alliance, would certainly not have given his consent to the peace with France had he known that by doing so he would be left alone to prosecute the war against the common enemy. In addition to which, the Emperor ought also to bear in mind that the king of England did assist and help him [in his plan of campaign] when that help and assistance was most useful."

Such were the arguments adduced by the King's ambassadors,† the earl [of Hertford] and the bishop of Winchester, in support of their assertion that the Emperor is bound, by his treaty of alliance with England, to declare king Francis his enemy. Against such an assertion on the part of the English, the following reasons and considerations are to be brought forward:—

The king of England has not completely fulfilled the conditions of the treaty of alliance and subsequent agreements respecting the stipulated joint invasion of France. By the very text of that treaty invoked by the English ambassadors, by the agreement entered into with the viceroy of Sicily (Ferrante di Gonzaga), as well as by various other reasons that will be stated hereafter, it is quite evident and notorious that the king of England failed in that part of his engagement relating to the joint invasion of France

* "Le texte du susdit article contient: Quiconque invadera l'ung des contrahans l'aultre le tiendra pour ennemy. Et icy, il fault remarquer la generalité des mots *quiconque invadera* et aussi *quiconque* fera *invasion*, que comprent (qui comprennent) toutes invasions quelles (qu'elles) soient et par qui que ce soit."

† That is Hertford and Gardiner, whose special mission or charge was to demand the Emperor's declaration against France.

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and march on Paris. That can easily be proved by the nature and contents of the very mission he entrusted to his first Secretary (Paget), who being asked whether his master, the King, was really disposed to join his forces to those of the Emperor, and march on the capital of France, answered hesitatingly and in such a manner as to show that his master, the King, had no great inclination towards that course, for on the Emperor insisting and saying that the English army ought to consist of at least 30,000 men, Paget assented, but said that he would consult his master the King,* a still greater proof of the King's disinclination to co-operate with the Emperor in France as agreed, since no steps were taken to comply with the Emperor's just and legitimate demands. Nor did the king of England afterwards write or allude to it in the least.

As to asserting that the king of England was in the field and commenced war as soon as the Emperor set out with his army, and that he could not do less than lay siege to Montreuil if he was to secure provisions for his army, much might be said against such assertions, which are far from being correct; but even admitting them to be substantially true, the King's excuses for not marching immediately on Paris, or joining his forces to those of the Emperor, according to the agreement entered into with the viceroy of Sicily in London, are inadmissible, considering that in his covenant with the Viceroy it was expressly stipulated that the English army was to march in the direction of the Somme, and follow up the right bank of that river.

The words of the covenant above alluded to are clear enough, nor can anything be said against it. By not observing the treaty to the letter, the King has formally broken it. No palliation or disguise, no handling of the facts according to the King's taste,† can in this instance be admitted. Every man of judgment and common sense will arrive at the conclusion that the sieges of Montreuil and Boulogne at the same time were not likely to promote the object of the allied powers, which was no other than to march straight on Paris, and compel king Francis to listen to reason and sue for terms. That was the only and exclusive aim of the war against king Francis; but the king of England would not fulfil his engagement, and from the beginning to the end has only attended to his own exclusive interest and profit.

By the king of England failing to comply efficiently with the prescriptions of the treaty of closer alliance, and subse-

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* "Et par le mesme texte du dit traicté faict avec le dit visroy (viceroy) et aussi par le dit suyvant escript, il est tout evident, notoire et inexcusable que le dit s^r roy d'Angleterre n'y a satisfait et si se (ainsi) se comprent par la charge du dit Paget à Spires qu'il navait volonté à la faire. Mais comme l'Empereur insista d'avoir au moins trente mille hommes et Paget accepte, a offrit de consulter le roy son maistre."

† "Et ne se peult en cecy riens pallier pour le vouloir faire entendre à l'appetit du s^r roy d'Angleterre."

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quently with the agreement made with the viceroy of Sicily in London, and lastly with Secretary Paget's formal engagement [at Spire], His Imperial Majesty was perfectly in his right to make, as he did, his own separate peace with France.* In order to do this, the Emperor applied for and obtained the consent of his ally, though he might have done so without it. Nor can the Emperor entertain the objection raised by one of the King's councillors—*i.e.*, that the Emperor, our master, did not inform him in time of his wish and intention to make peace with king Francis, then their common enemy; for the complained-of informality, if there was one, did in no manner affect the king of England, or cause damage and loss to his army or to his subjects, since up to the present day nothing has taken place which may strictly be called a contravention of the treaties between England and the Empire.

Neither is there any truth in the statement that, by the reservation of the king of England's rights and claims introduced by the Emperor in his treaty of peace with France, the king of England's non-observance of the treaty is in any way condoned, for the Emperor's treaty with France is quite another thing, and He can make it as He himself pleases and may think proper and convenient.

Through the inobservance of the treaty, the King and kingdom of England are bound to bear all the losses and contingencies of warfare, as well as suffer its consequences. Article 16 of the treaty is conclusive on that point, as is quite notorious. Should any of the contracting parties fail to observe the treaty, or willingly break it off, the other party may regard the defaulter and his subjects as if they were his enemies.

In any case the Emperor would have been justified in making His peace with France without the consent of His ally, the king of England, since it is quite incontrovertible and notorious that the English army did not take the route that had previously been agreed upon, that is the bank of the Somme, there to form a junction with the Emperor, and then march on Paris.

According to other articles of the treaty, the common invasion of France was to be made within two years after the signature and ratification of the treaty, in order to compel king Francis to forsake the alliance of the Turk, and give king Henry and the Emperor satisfaction, whilst Article 11 of the treaty fixed the period of the war at four months. But as the Emperor had penetrated so far into the heart of France without any help or assistance whatever from England—which aid and assistance King Henry never intended

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* This paragraph is differently worded in another draft of the same document. It stands thus: "Through the king of England not effectively complying with the prescription of the treaty, he gave the Emperor sufficient cause to make His peace with king Francis."

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giving, since, among the excuses profferred to the bishop of Arras one was that the period stipulated for the duration of the war with France was about to expire; and seeing that there was no probability of obtaining an extension of it, the Emperor decided to listen to the overtures of the French ministers. Thus, after getting the consent and approval of king Henry, though, as above stated, He did not consider it necessary, He entered into negociation with king Francis' ministers, and concluded his own separate peace in all honour and justice.

As to the English ambassador's allegation that since our Emperor's peace the French have invaded the county of Guînes, and that in consequence of that invasion and other hostile acts the Emperor is bound to declare them his enemies, and that if king Henry's rights are to be reserved and safe-guarded according to the English treaty His Imperial Majesty must recommence war against France, that is a sort of argument which can easily be refuted by the single fact that the cause and origin of that French invasion is no other than the taking and retention of the fortified town of Boulogne, to the defence of which the Emperor is by no means pledged, since no mention whatever is made of it in the treaty of alliance with England, but only of such territories, lands, and towns then possessed by the allies; so that in point of fact the Emperor cannot in any way consider himself obliged to the defence of a town not mentioned in the treaty of alliance, and taken by the English long after the signature and ratification of that treaty.

As to the French invasion of Guînes, it was only an accessory fact connected with, and as it were depending entirely from, the state of the political relations between France and England at this time. No doubt Guînes, Calais, and other territories in France belong to king Henry, and therefore the Emperor would have been obliged to defend them against the common enemy; but since His Imperial Majesty has made a separate peace with France, with the consent of king Henry, He no longer stands under such an obligation, and leaves the contending parties to settle their differences as best they can. Had the Emperor taken another course of action, his last treaty with France would have been perfectly illusory and without effect—nay, contrary to the much desired peace in Christendom, and the repulse of the infidel Turk.

It might also be argued on the Emperor's behalf, and against king Henry and his demand, that according to the very letter of the treaty invoked, neither of the contracting parties is bound to remain in arms beyond the four months stipulated therein, and that the continuation of hostilities between England and France has nothing in common with the late enterprise of the allies against the latter country, but merely and exclusively with the particular interest and individual profit of king Henry who wishes to retain and keep Boulogne.

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The Emperor's treaty of peace with France is not in any way disadvantageous to England, for the former country will receive no help or provisions from the Low Countries or other Imperial dominions, whilst England will be assisted openly against all other enemies. Besides which, it must be observed that, whilst king Henry is asking the Emperor to declare against France, the king of that country has willingly submitted the judgment of his differences with England to the former's arbitration. King Henry's unwarranted demand comes just at a time when His Imperial Majesty is much concerned and busily employed for God's service in promoting the welfare of Christendom at large, the good of religion everywhere, and the repulse of the Turk.

The King of England cannot allege in his favour or otherwise take advantage of the fact that the Emperor did actually ask him for his consent; for that was one of the stipulations of the treaty of alliance, and His Imperial Majesty could not do less than comply with it.

On the contrary, king Henry might be accused of having broken the treaty and the stipulated condition about the joint invasion of France, for when the bishop of Arras was sent to remind him of it, he (the King) coolly answered, as above stated, that he could not then direct his army march on Paris, though the above-mentioned Bishop had been sent for the express purpose of announcing to him the prosperous advance of the Emperor into the heart of France, and that the opportunity was near at hand for gaining the object of their common campaign against king Francis.*

There is still another charge to be brought against the king of England, namely, that when pressed by the bishop of Arras (Antoine Perrenot) to unite his forces to those of the Emperor he not only refused, but said distinctly that he could not do so then, because the whole of his army was engaged in the sieges of Montreuil and Boulogne, which sieges were notoriously planned and undertaken for his own particular and individual profit; besides which, as will be stated hereafter, he declared to the bishop [of Arras] that as the period of four months, during which the allies with their respective armies were bound to keep the field together, was to expire soon, and the winter season was close at hand, "*he could not advance* further into France unless those two towns, Montreuil and Boulogne, had first fallen into his hands."

The Emperor, nevertheless, out of personal regard for the King, and not being desirous of breaking off the alliance, purposely avoided communicating expressly

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* "Mais plustost luy debvroit estre imputé et seroit contre luy, que non obstant qu'il n'eust satisfaict jusque lors comme dit est, que encoires il s'en excusa quant l'evesque d'Arras fust envers luy, et tant plus que l'on l'advertissoit de la prosperité de sa ma^te et occasion occurante pour tost parvenir à la fin pour la quelle la dite emprinse avoit esté faicte."

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with the English ambassador at his court respecting that inobservance, or rather wilful infraction of the treaty, which after all constitutes the chief base, the true and peremptory cause * and reason for the Emperor refusing to make the declaration of war requested of him. It appears that this point of the declaration now demanded by England is of such importance for the Emperor's political relations, present and future, with that country, that it ought to be carefully examined and attended to, inasmuch as the English people are so difficult to treat with, so interested, and so fond of making their own profit out of every negociation, the more so that already they seem inclined to take advantage of the mere fact that their ambassador at the Imperial court was not officially informed of the Emperor's resolution in the matter.

In addition to the above reasoning, what trust and confidence can His Imperial Majesty place in king Henry should the former, as desired and requested, accede to his very urgent solicitations and declare war against the king of France, when it can be proved that the former mistrusts the Emperor, and refuses him the right of arbitration in his differences,† to which king Francis has voluntarily submitted himself?

Had not the Emperor considered the above reasons quite sufficiently strong to excuse his non-compliance with the wishes of king Henry, many others might have been adduced to justify his refusal, or at least to suspend and delay his answer, as, for instance, that the king of France has not at present a regular army in the field, and that the invasion of Guînes, and even what is called that of England, have only been mere raids or incursions without consequence or duration of time.

The king of England may be sure that the Emperor has taken measures to prevent his own subjects from entering the service of France; he has not furnished the French with provisions, but has allowed the Belgians to continue in the service of England, and has accommodated king Henry and the English with anything they wanted from the Low Countries in the way of provisions, ammunition, and so forth.

The Emperor has already declared himself the enemy of Scotland, whilst on his side the king of England has long delayed his own declaration against the newly-elected king of

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* "Qu'est toutesfois la vraye et peremptoire cause et raison de reffuser la declaration qu'ilz demandent. Du moins semble il que ce poinct si substancial (*sic*) et ou il va tant pour tout ce que l'on aura à faire avec les dits anglois pour maintenant et[à] l'advenir selon qu'ilz sont difficiles et interesseux, amys de non delaisser ni couler legierement, et mesmes actendu qu'ilz veullent desjà prendre à leur advantaige de ce que l'on n'en a faict mention [à leur ambassadeurs] combien que cela ne peult prejudicier jusques à maintenant puisque l'on n'a faict acte quelconque dont l'on puisse arguer contravention."

† "Et que plus est, quelle confidence peult sa dite ma^te^ Imperiale avoir du dit roy d'Angleterre en soy declairant à sa requisition contre le dit roy de France puisque l'on voit que icelluy roy d'Angleterre se deffie de l'Empereur."

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Denmark.* Though it was generally known, and it had been proved, that the latter had declared war against Flanders and the Low Countries, the king of England delayed as long as he could his declaration against him, on the plea that king Christian had not actually made war upon His Imperial Majesty's subjects.

In conclusion, even if the French had at present in the field an army of 10,000 men, which they have not, the king of England could not demand aid and help from the Emperor during the present year, for one of the articles of the treaty says explicitly: "That one of the two confederated powers shall not ask help or aid from the other more than once in one year," and certainly it would be preposterous to ask the Emperor for aid in money when he has had during the present year so large a force of his own to support.

Such were the Emperor's reasons and motives. That peace He made with the king of England's full consent and approval, and after having fulfilled all and every one of the conditions and obligations of his treaty of alliance with England. He (the Emperor) does not consider himself in any way bound to grant king Henry's demand for help and assistance against France, much less to declare and resume hostilities with that country, since that war would be a sequel or repetition of that same war which He began conjointly and on king Henry's behalf, and to which He himself put a stop for the causes and reasons above specified, and with the full consent of the king of England.

The above is my own private opinion on the whole. Such as it is I † submit it entirely to the pleasure and better judgment of His Imperial Majesty, and of the personages who may be consulted thereupon.‡

French. Original. 7 pp.

2 Dec. **258.** The EMPEROR to JUAN DE VEGA, his AMBASSADOR at ROME.

S. E. Flandres, 500.

Besides the contents of the other letter § that goes along with this one, We have considered it fit and opportune to inform

* Christian, or Kristiern III., duke of Holstein, who by this time had been elected king of Denmark by his subjects, and recognised by the Emperor.

† Most probably Louis de Flandre, sieur de Praët, about whom see pp. 436*n*, 439, or else Louis Van Schore, the president of the Council of State in Flanders.

‡ Again this paragraph, though substantially the same, is so differently worded as to make one suppose that what appears to be Praët's or Van Schore's opinion may be the work of Bave, the secretary, the more so that one of the copies of that document now before me has not the finishing paragraph, in which the writer modestly submits his report to the superior knowledge and tact of the members of the Imperial Council in Flanders. No date is assigned to the paper, or rather report; but as the earl of Hertford and bishop Gardiner arrived in Brussels on the 20th of November, and Henry's letter to Charles is of the 21st of the same month, I have not hesitated in placing it after No. 256 and before that of the 27th.

§ Not found at Simancas.

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you separately of many particulars closely connected with the business in question. His Holiness' Nuncio did lately give Us to understand the great pleasure and joy which His Holiness the Pope has felt at the conclusion of Our peace with France, and his determination and will to come† and be present at the celebration of the General Council [of the Church]; to strive equally for the reduction of the Lutherans, and resistance against the Turk. Towards attaining those two objects (said the Nuncio) His Holiness is fully disposed to contribute largely and efficiently.*

Such was the substance of His Holiness' message to Us, though conceived in rather general terms, as delivered by his Nuncio, who, among other things, stated that Pope Paul and his family (the Farnesi), knowing, as they do, that they could not find elsewhere the help and protection they wanted, were fully prepared to do efficient work, not only in regard to the public affairs of Christendom at large, but likewise in Our own private concerns. This and other like asseverations the Nuncio afterwards repeated to Monsr. de Granvelle in conversation with him, adding that no better opportunity than the present could offer itself for the attainment of the two above-mentioned objects. If We only could forget past events, continue on friendly and affectionate terms with His Holiness, grant him and his family‡ the same favour and protection We have hitherto granted to them, he (Poggio) had not the least doubt, nay firmly believed, that His Holiness would be easily persuaded to contribute with a considerable sum of money both towards the expenses of the war against the Turk, and the reduction of the Separatists from the Faith.

To the above statements the Nuncio added that His Holiness was disposed to grant that which We for some time have been asking for on behalf of Our various kingdoms, namely, the annexation of certain religious orders and monasteries. "I am sure (continued the Nuncio) that there will be no difficulty now as to that, and that I myself can co-operate efficiently towards the settlement of that and other ecclesiastical affairs in favour of the Spanish kingdoms, for I know that he (the Pope) is well disposed, and has no serious objection to it."

All things considered,§ and in view of the profit to be

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* Giovan Poggio, bishop of Tropea in Sicily. He had been in Spain as Papal Nuncio to the Emperor from 1538 to 1540. *Calendar*, Vol. VI., Part I., pp. 281, 286, 322, 323. He was appointed cardinal in 1551, and died in 1556.

† "Y la voluntad determinada que tiene de venir [à Trento?] para la celebracion del Concilio, reduccion de los Lutheranos y assistencia contra el Turco."

‡ That is, the descendants of Pier Luigi Farnese, duke of Castro, Pope Paul's natural son.

§ "Considerado lo qual y el provecho que de ello podria resultar que no seria sino bien probar esta vez si por ventura se podria ganar algun fruto con disimular las cosas pasadas y que hableys á Su S^{d} y al dicho cardenal Fernes (*sic*) como mejor os pareciere segun lo que entendieredes de su inclinacion á la dicha subvencion y ayuda y tambien para el despacho de las otras cosas particulares."

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made by His Holiness' offers, We are of opinion that there would be no harm in dissembling and appearing as if We had forgotten past events, and were likely to accept His Holiness' offers as conveyed to Us by his Nuncio. You will therefore speak to His Holiness, as well as to cardinal Farnese, in the terms you consider most convenient, on the subject of the promised help and subvention, as well as on the annexation of monasteries and other ecclesiastical affairs of these realms.

But in doing so, you (Vega) are to give His Holiness and the Cardinal to understand how meritorious their work would be in the eyes of God, and what amount of worldly praise both of them (the Pope and the Cardinal) would deserve by accomplishing the good We are speaking of. It is generally known that the Holy See is in possession of considerable treasure, procured and obtained for the avowed and express purpose of employing the same against the Turk. Its employment against the Protestants would be equally acceptable to all people, especially if the undertaking against the Turk had ceased to be a pressing necessity. But His Holiness should be told clearly and distinctly, and be made to understand, that those two undertakings, when discussed or treated in common by His Holiness and Ourselves, no longer admit of vague words, but must be treated particularly, separately, and in detail, so that We Ourselves should know in a resolute, determined, and specific manner what sum of money His Holiness intends devoting to the purpose; and you will ask Him to declare the sum to you confidently, so that We may at the next Diet [in Germany] see what can be done for the present respecting either point, that of the Turk or that of the Protestants, and perhaps also in both, with the help of God; because should war be declared against the Turk, it is quite evident that We must dissemble with the Lutherans, unless His Holiness assist Us with a large sum of money. Even if the war against the Turk should come to an end one way or other, We could not, without substantial help from Pope Paul, compel the Lutherans to return to the Catholic Faith, Our means being completely exhausted in consequence of the late wars. But should His Holiness help us with a good sum of money,† such as 600,000, or at least 500,000*

* "Todos saben que Su Santidad tiena muchos dineros, y aun sacados con ocasion y so color de empleartos contra el Turco, y no seria esto menos accepto á todos si se empleasen contra los protestantes cessando la necesidad, y empressa contra el Turco; pero es bien que se entienda que lo uno ó lo otro de esta necesidad no sufre mas palabras generales sino que es mas que menester y necesario venir á la particularidad y saber resoluta, determinada y especificadamente la summa que Su Santidad querra emplear en esto y que os lo declare confidentemente por que viniendo á la proxima dieta podamos conforme á ello mirar y resolver lo que se podrá hacer agora sea en el uno ó en el otro de estos dos puntos."

† "Pero si Su Santidad quisiese ayudar, y con buena summa de dineros, como seria de seiscientos mil ducados, ó quando menos quinientos mil, pensamos que se podria dar cabo á una tan buena cosa para servicio de Dios, y que lo de

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ducats, We think that so meritorious an enterprise as the reduction to the Faith of the Lutherans, might be easily and without much labour carried out, especially if the Council of the Church should on its side co-operate towards it. Should, therefore, His Holiness consent to do this, and at the same time will despatch the pending ecclesiastical business We have at Rome, as is due, in consideration of Our own war labours and the expenses We have undergone in resisting Turks, Moors, and infidels of every description, so as to prevent the utter ruin of Christian religion, Pope Paul may be sure that We will forget the past, and be His dutiful son and true friend, continuing, as We have hitherto done, to be the protector of His family.

But it is highly important and desirable that the above two points be treated and discussed by you with the utmost care and dexterity, so as not to give Frenchmen any cause or motive to suspect that We intend to work separately from them especially in matters relating to the Council and the reduction of the Lutherans.

The Papal Nuncio (Poggio) also gave Us to understand that if We chose to apply to Rome for cardinals' hats for prelates of Our dominions, he (Poggio) had every reason to think that we might obtain three additional hats besides the two which His Holiness reserved* "in pectore," *and which We always fully expected to have for the prelates We chose to recommend, whilst he would only give two hats to the French. He would also grant others to Spaniards or Germans devoted to Our person, especially to the bishop of Augusta (Augsburg)†.*

Such was the Nuncio's verbal declaration to Us of His Holiness' intentions in this matter of the cardinalate, but as such a long time has elapsed since His Holiness promised Us three hats, one for the archbishop of Santiago [de Compostela] in Spain,‡ another for the bishop who was once of Pamplona,§ and a third for the bishop of Jaen, now deceased,‖ We own that We had almost forgotten the circumstances and occasion of the aforesaid promise, and con-

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la Fé se remediaria con poco color y trabajo que el Concilio pusiese de sa parte, y que queriendo Su Santidad hacer esto y despachar nuestras cosas como se debe à tantos trabajos y gastos que habemos hecho para resistir à Turcos, Moros, é Infieles, y obviar á que no se acabe de perder del todo lo de la Religion, Su Santidad podria ser seguro que se olvidaria todo lo passado, y nos hallaria en todo buen hijo y verdadero amigo y terniamos (atenderiamos?) á la continua protecion de toda su casa."

* "Tenia entendido, y creia que se podrian alcanzar tres de nuevo demas de la reservacion de los dos en que siempre habemos estado que Su Santidad nos habia otorgado para las personas que nos quisieremos y que solamente crearia dos cardenales para franceses."

† Otto Truchses, who in 1545 was created cardinal.

‡ Pedro Sármiento de Mendoza, brother of Luis, the Imperial ambassadorin Portugal. He was succeeded in that archiepiscopal see by Gaspar Avalos, who at the end of December 1543 was raised to the cardinalate.

§ Pedro Pacheco from 1539 to 1545.

‖ Francisco de Mendoza, who died at the end of 1543.

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sequently took little or no heed of the Nuncio's formal declaration in that respect. Yet, lest it should be said after the death of the present Pope that the Sacred College of Cardinals had not at the time a sufficient number of good members to ensure a fitting Papal election, or else that We, Ourselves, out of enmity and ill-will to the French, had brought about the conflict, We think that if you perceive that His Holiness is in earnest, and well inclined in this and other matters personally relating to Us and to Our various kingdoms, and that besides the four hats, which, as you know, We asked Him for, and which We still affirm and maintain were granted to Us without difficulty, His Holiness be pleased to give Us the other two reserved* "in pectore," *and not grant to the French more than two—one of which, as We are given to understand, is destined to the brother of the admiral of France (Claude d'Hannebault)—then, in that case, you (Vega) will pass on to the topic of the future creation, and will treat with the Pope, or His minister, in the manner and on the terms above specified, at the same time taking care that the choice of the other new cardinals falls on deserving prelates entirely devoted to Us and to Our person. If possible, one of them should be archbishop Colonna, † brother of Camillo [Colonna], whom We cannot fail to recommend most highly, since there has always been a number of cardinals of his family.*

As to the four hats, they should be given to the archbishop of Santiago (Avalos), to the bishop of Pamplona, now of Jaen, who succeeded to that see on the death of the latter. Since His Holiness objects to promote Dr. Mohedano,‡ another hat might be bestowed either on the bishop of Coria § or on Don Bartholomé de la Cueva.‖

With regard to the other two hats, by His Holiness reserved "in pectore," *it would be desirable that time should be given Us to look out for well-deserving prelates of Our kingdoms and dominions, and recommend them to His Holiness as ecclesiastics well fitted for the purple.*

*After the above was written, archbishop Sfondrato ¶ arrived here ** with the commission and charge, about which*

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* "Y porque faltando Su Santidad no se pueda decir que por falta de haber buenos cardenales se siguió alguna creacion de Sumo Pontifice que no conviniese.

† That is Francesco Colonna, archbishop of Rossano in Naples.

‡ Dr. Mohedano, auditor of the Rota at Rome. *See Calendar*, Vol. VI., Part I., pp. 122, 164, 244.

§ At this time T. Bobadilla was bishop of Coria in Estremadura. He was appointed cardinal in 1545.

‖ A brother of Don Beltran II. de la Cueva, third duke of Alburquerque. *See* above, p. 227*n*.

¶ Francisco de' Sfondrati, or card. Sfrondato, as his name is otherwise spelt in this and other papers. He was born in 1493; had first been married to a lady of the Visconti family, after whose death he took orders, and became bishop of Cremona.

** At Brussels, where the Emperor had arrived the day before.

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*Marquina * wrote to Us some days ago, namely, of congratulating Us on Our recent peace, and assuring Us of His Holiness' absolute will and determination to hold the Council, persuaded, as He (Pope Paul) is, that it will be the only sure remedy on matters of religion, however amply they might be discussed at the next Diet. Archbishop Sfondrato also promised that His Holiness would help and assist against the Turk, though this was said in general terms; and on these points, of religion, the holding of the Council and the resistance against the Turk, he pledged His Holiness to contribute his good offices to the extent of his power.*

The above will inform you of the substance of the declarations of Sfondrato and the Nuncio to us, and of their various conferences with M. de Granvelle.

Our answer has been that no doubt the Council would be very useful for the purpose, but that other measures would also be requisite, such as the observance of the rules and acts of former Councils, and the reformation [of the Clergy], so as to prevent the growth and spreading of the evil, which is so deeply rooted that there is danger of its becoming ultimately the ruin of Christendom. It is for His Holiness, as Head of the Church —to whom, as He himself says, belongs the right as well as the duty of attending to religious matters—to discover the best way of attaining those two objects, the meeting of the General Council and the settling of all differences in matters of Faith. To that end He (the Pope) should devote all His energies and power. His Holiness knows very well how much We, Ourselves, have done, and the enormous sums of money We have already spent. We are therefore unable to do as much as we should like now in the reduction of the Lutherans or the resistance to the Turk.† Indeed one of Our chief objects in concluding peace with France was to set Ourselves free, so as to be able to plan and carry out successfully the two above-mentioned undertakings, following in this respect the line of conduct We have traced for Ourselves since the beginning of Our reign; that is to say, to procure by all means the welfare of Christendom at large. But in

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* Elsewhere Marchina and Markina, one of the secretaries or clerks in the Imperial embassy at Rome. He was a Spaniard by birth, his true name being Marquina, as above.

† "Y que para poder entender, y emplear nuestra persona en ambas á dos cosas habiamos hecho la paz con Francia siguiendo lo que siempre habiamos procurado por el bien publico de la Christiandad y que no querriamos constreñir ni apremiar á Su Santidad á mas de lo que el quisiera, solamente le queremos significar lo que ya sabrá y podrá bien entender de esta necesidad por que si aun quando ayude largamente á ello y que nos estemos certificados de lo que Su Santidad specificadamente quiere hacer, en ninguna manera podriamos emplear ni poner nuestra persona en lo del Turco, ni en el remedio de la Religion como la qualidad del caso lo requiere, y señaladamente no podriamos ver como hallandose lo de la religion en los terminos que está en la Germania, se pudiesse remitir assi facilmente al Concilio, pues se ha visto la obstinacion de los Luteranos y de los otros desviados de la Fé, y que como cada vez que se habla de su resistencia contra el Turco luego ponen achaque de ser asegurados en lo de la Religion."

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doing so, We do not wish to put pressure on His Holiness in the least, or oblige Him to do in this affair more than what He himself feels disposed and is willing to undertake. We only wish to signify to Him that, even if He should help and contribute largely towards the expenses of both undertakings, and sends Us a detailed and specific account of the means He intends to employ for the success of both enterprises, We shall not be able to work personally in this as efficiently as the quality and importance of these matters and the state of European politics require, and We Ourselves should wish. Still less could We, in the present state of opinion in Germany as far as religion is concerned, refer the religious question to the Council, for such is the obstinate resistance of the Lutherans and others, that whenever there has been occasion for applying to them for help and assistance against the Turk, they have never failed to answer that if they do help against the Infidel, they must needs be first ensured in matters of their own Faith, and allowed to live in peace and freedom. The stronger Our arguments to persuade them of the necessity for offering resistance to the Turk, and preventing him from again invading Christendom, the greater has been the obstinacy of the Lutheran princes of Germany in refusing their help and assistance against him, and if in moments of urgency, and having other weighty affairs to attend to, We have at times relaxed in the prosecution of Our hostile plans against the Infidel, the more strongly have they insisted in their religious dissents, all with a view to making proselytes in Germany, and gaining all Germans to their cause, and perhaps, too, going still further and forming fresh pernicious confederations. Indeed, should the necessity for making war against the Turk become more urgent than it is at present, there are superabundant reasons to believe that the Germans will become more firm in their resistance, and still more tenacious if pressed to attend the Council of the Church [at Trent], and will do everything in their power to stop armaments against the Turk, endeavouring to pervert and corrupt other countries of Christendom, as they have now and then attempted to do, boasting that they would carry their Lutheranism into Italy.

For the remedy of all this, it would be convenient that His Holiness should have a good sum of money placed in Germany, and spread the rumour that it is to be spent in war against the Turk, as in reality it will be in the end. If the money could come to these parts in such a way, and at a time when*

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* "Para remedio de todo esto convendria que Su Santidad tuviese una buena y notable cuantidad de dineros en Alemania con voz y fama de que fuese contra el Turco, como en la verdad seria, y es necesario para este efecto, y que pudiendo venir conjuntamente para que los protestantes tuviesen mas voluntad de assistir á la ayuda contra el Turco y someterse al Concilio lo qual tambien aprovecharia para que entre tanto no se moviesen á tentar cosa de mayor inconveniente, y por ventura se podria reducir ó de agrado ó por otra manera sin sperar la provision del dicho Concilio."

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the Protestants are less disinclined to assist against the Turk and submit their differences to the Council, much might be gained by it, as in the meantime, and whilst the war against the Turk lasted, they might relent in their opposition, and not attempt movements of greater importance. And who can tell, after all, whether under such circumstances, by persuasion or otherwise, they might not, without waiting for the provision of the Council, return to the Catholic Faith?

There is still another argument to be brought forward in favour of the proposed measure, which is that the war against the Turk, and the bringing back of the Separatists to Faith, are two undertakings which could not be successfully carried out at the same time except by sheer force.

Both the Papal nuncios took in good part all that was said to them respecting the Council and the Germans; but they have never failed to suggest, when that assembly and the reformation to be made therein have been alluded to in their presence, that it would be desirable, nay necessary, that the latter comprised equally the ecclesiastics and the laymen* (seglares).

This last suggestion of the two Nuncios We would not contradict; on the contrary, We told them that it seemed to Us excellent, and We praised it beyond measure. They, on their own part, seemed to understand well and appreciate Our remark that His Holiness the Pope should help and assist, as well as declare the particular means He intended making use of against the Lutherans, though they declared to Us that such had been His Holiness' expenses in preparing and carrying out the meeting of the General Council of the Church [at Trent], that He (Pope Paul) could not contribute towards the two objects in question with anything like the sum of money which He was, perhaps, supposed to have at His command. It would be (they said) proper and convenient to make use now of such means as had usually been employed on similar previous occasions, with the consent and authority of the Holy See, and also to know beforehand what other princes and lords in Christendom were prepared to do in the matter, and how much they intended to contribute.

Our ministers' reply to such suggestions was that His Holiness had notoriously large sums of money at his disposal, and that if He had, as they said, spent much of it, it could only be very little in proportion to the sum He had received under colour of helping with it against the Turk.†

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* "Aunque no han dexado de decir y repetir algunas vezes hablando en la reformacion, que seria menester que esta se hiciese de los eclesiasticos y seglares, lo qual no les habemos querido contradecir."

† "A lo qual se les ha replicado que no dejaba de ser muy notorio que Su Santidad tenia dineros, y que si habia gastado, como ellos decian era mucho mas lo que habia cobrado, y señaladamente con color de ayudar contra el Turco; y que fundarse en los otros medios, que se apuntaban, seria cosa larga y incierta y sin resolucion, lo cual no convenia para el breve remedio; y que si se pensaba

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As to Our employing the means proposed by the Nuncio and by the Legate, as likely to be instituted by His Holiness, that would be a measure not only vague and uncertain, but of very difficult and almost impossible execution, for even if His Holiness thinks that Our kingdoms and dominions will contribute with large sums of money for this purpose, the idea could not be carried out, certainly at the present moment, inasmuch as Our kingdoms and dominions are so exhausted, owing to the last wars, that scarcely a trifling benevolence or gift could now be obtained from them. Other Christian princes, if applied to for help, will bring forward similar excuses, having naturally suffered by the said wars in which they were engaged. With regard to the suggestion that enquiry should be made as to what the other Christian powers of Europe would do in this emergency, and how far they would respond to His appeal, you may tell Him that it is quite notorious that as regards Ourselves, if We saw that preparations were being made in earnest, We should not be found wanting, but would employ Our person in the undertaking. No less would the Prince-Electors of the Empire do as it was settled in the last Diet. As to the king of France, it was stipulated in the treaty of peace that in the event of a war against the Turk, he will help with 600 lances (cavalry), and the pay of 10,000 infantry, so that in point of fact there was no need for His Holiness to make the enquiry, since He and every one else knows what the Christian powers of Europe are prepared to do.†*

After this the two nuncios, Poggio and Sfondrato hinted of their own accord, and as if the idea had sprung exclusively from them, that cardinal Farnese wished very much to be of service to Us in all matters touching the armed resistance against the Turk and the reduction of the Lutherans to the Faith, and that he (Farnese) would do his best towards the accomplishment of those two objects. This (they said) the Cardinal desired most ardently, both on account of the affectionate regard he entertains for Our person, and his most ardent wish to recommend and promote Our ideas on the subject, thus giving Us to understand that perhaps His Holiness might appoint him to come personally to Our court and discuss the subject.

No reply was made by Our ministers to the above declaration of cardinal Farnese's sentiments, ideas, and offers of service; they neither approved nor rejected them, but when

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sacar ayuda de nuestros reinos ellos estaban tan gastados que no se podria haber de ellos cosa de momento y que la misma excusa darian los otros habiendo tenido que sostener la guerra y que querer saber lo que los potentados harian era muy notorio que viendo nos el aparejo no faltariamos de emplear nuestra persona, ni menos los del Imperio pues ya se sabia lo que se determinó en la ultima Dieta, y quanto al Rey de Francia que ya tambien se expresaba en el tratado que ayudaria para esto, etc."

* That is, by Poggio and Sfondrato, for the latter had been sent by the Pope as nuncio-extraordinary or legate.

† "De manera que no habia para que Su Santidad parasse en esto."

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the opportunity here came to hand, and conversation fell on the next Diet, Our Privy Seal (Granvelle) told them in plain words that it would be requisite and necessary that one or two persons, well qualified for the purpose, should go thither, and transmit any communications that might confidentially and under reserve be made to them respecting the two important points to be discussed thereat. By the appointment of such a person, or persons, the disagreeable results experienced in former Diets, in which private intrigue had ruined the business, might be avoided. Our ministers' idea was well received by the two Papal nuncios, who promised to speak to His Holiness about it.*

Another question did Sfodrato put to Us. How, he inquired, is His Holiness to understand the matter of the king of England? because (said he) being actually at war with king Francis, and also being one of the chief Separatists from Faith, the French are sure to solicit and request help against him,† and that should His Holiness give it him, He (the Pope) could not contribute so efficiently as He would otherwise have done towards resisting the Turk, and putting down Lutheran dissent? Our answer was that the differences between the two kings did not proceed from divergency of opinion in matters of Faith. At present the chief points to be decided are the resistance against the Turk, and the remedy to be applied to the state of things in Germany. To both of these We will carefully attend, as it is Our duty to do, and at the same time We are bound by treaty to assist the king of France. There is, therefore, no need for asking the question.‡

The nuncios then replied that they would write to His Holiness the result of their conference with Us, as well as of their joint communications with Mons. de Granvelle before and after. In short, they have promised to report faithfully to His Holiness the whole of the above, which We have ordered to be put into cipher.

Our final answer to the Nuncio and Legate has been that, although it be true that the Council would undoubtedly be very convenient and fit for the purpose of dealing with the

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* "Lo qual no se ha aprobado ni rechazado pero habiendo venido á proposito, tornando à hablar sobre lo de la proxima Dieta, se ha dicho que seria muy necesario que viniese alli una ó dos personas qualificadas y de buen celo, con los quales se pudiese con toda confianza comunicar lo que conviniesse, con tal que no acaeciesse lo que en las passadas Dietas en las quales las particulares platicas y diversas que habian gastado los negocios, como era claro, lo qual no les ha desplacido."

† "El dicho Sfondrato demas de esto ha preguntado como se entendia lo del rey de Inglaterra pues estando el rey de Francia en guerra contra él, y siendo de los principales desviados de la Fé no faltaria el rey de Francia de instar y pedir ayuda contra él y que habiendoselo de dar, no podria ayudar tanto. . ."

‡ "A lo qual se [les] ha respondido que la diferencia de entre ellos no era por razon de las cosas de la Fé y que hasta agora el principal inconveniente, el qual se ha siempre apuntado, es sobre lo que toca al remedio de lo del Turco y de la Germania y que siendo nos obligados á ello y de asistir al Rey de Francia asi mismo, no habia [para] que hacer esta pregunta."

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*Protestants, yet many other points should be discussed and settled thereat, such as the full observance and execution of the measures proposed and adopted in former Councils of the Church, thereby preventing the evil, which is already very deeply rooted, from spreading elsewhere, and causing altogether the ruin of Religion. It would indeed be requisite that His Holiness, being the head of the Church, and the judge to whom all religious matters must needs be submitted, should carefully attend at once to both points, that of the Turk and that of Religion, principally to the latter, and devote all His energy and power for the remedy of the said evils, the more so that His Holiness was fully prepared to do what was wanted.**

Putting together and comparing what archbishop Sfondrato said to Us, and what Poggio, the Nuncio, had formerly stated, with what they, themselves, had said to the Sieur de Granvelle, We find that, in substance, His Holiness' offers come to this: That He will assist and help Us against the Turk, though without specifying how, or with what sum of money, and that He will immediately summon the Council, which, in His opinion, will be the only sure remedy in matters of Religion.

You shall try, above all things, to ascertain what His Holiness' particular intentions are respecting the help in money He has promised to give Us. That must be done mildly, without constraining or obliging Him to do more than what He himself is willing to do.† According to what His Holiness will promise to do in that way, and how He proposes to deal with the Protestants, We shall act as best We can towards the accomplishment of both objects. The proposals about the Protestants, however, must be treated by you with the utmost care and dexterity, not giving them cause or occasion to be more displeased, or get afraid of Us, than they actually are, watching closely how His Holiness will proceed with respect to them, lest by His not choosing to follow the right and convenient path in affairs of this kind, We Ourselves should be harmed or placed on bad

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* "Haseles por fin respondido y dicho que si es verdad que el Concilio seria muy á proposito, pero que tambien seria menester otras cosas como la observacion de los concilios passados y reformar y obviar que el mal que ya está tan grande y arraigado no se continue y pare en entera ruina y que Su Santidad debia mirar en lo uno y en lo otro, en lo del Turco y en lo de la Religion como principal cabeza y á quien toca, como él mismo dice, señaladamente en lo de la Religion emplear todo su poder y fuerzas para el remedio dello."

† "Tendreis la mano de saber su voluntad particularmente sin apremiar le ni hacer otra instancia, ni mostrar le que tengamos mas deseo en esta cosa del que veremos su voluntad de la obra que querra hacer en ello sino figurar y representalle la necesidad que tenemos de que se declare quanto á esto y que conforme á lo que hiciere tambien haremos de nuestra parte lo que buenamente pudieremos, y quanto a lo que toca a los protestantes se ha de tratar con tal advertencia y dexteridad que no se les de occasion de haber mas sentimiento ni temor de nos, mirando bien la manera con que Su Santidad procederá en ello por que quanto no se quiere andar por el camino que se debe no nos quiera dañar ni poner mal con ellos,"

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terms with them. Indeed, as Don Diego de Mendoza, Our ambassador in Venice, writes [from Trent], and you perhaps may have heard from him, the bad offices which His Holiness has already done, and is still doing, to prevent the Council from deliberating, and consequently delaying any remedy of Faith, His wish to see the Turk in Europe rather than try to resist him, is evident. You are, however, not to show to His Holiness that We are aware of, or suspect that, but only tell Him that, according as He may proceed and act in these two important matters, so will He find Us ready to act and execute His wishes.*

Should you see that His Holiness shares these Our sentiments, and agrees with Us, you will add that the whole agreement must be kept secret, because, as has been seen, there is not in the whole of Germany one single prelate, or private individual, even among those who show most desire for the remedy of Religion, who knows how to keep a secret.

You will also bear in mind that should His Holiness feel inclined to send to Us cardinal Farnese, and you should think that We might then obtain more money from the Pope, and oblige Him to make greater efforts to carry out both undertakings, then in that case you will offer no objection as to his coming here,† because, after all, his youth will be an objection to His Holiness rather than to Us. If the Cardinal comes, it would be very desirable that he should be accompanied by some other person of good sense, prudence, and experience, with whom one can plainly and confidentially negotiate, such as the archbishop Sfondrato, who is still here. Of this you shall take care to make the suggestion, and, at any rate, take care that some such person should be sent to the Diet.—Brussels, 2 December 1544.‡

Spanish. Original minute ciphered.

—- Dec. **259.** The EMPEROR'S DECLARATION on the ALTERNATIVE of the DUKE OF ORLEANS' MARRIAGE.

S. E. L 67, f. 12.

The following is the declaration made by the Emperor at the time of his treaty of peace with France respecting the alternative of the duke of Orleans' marriage:—

At Crêpy, on the 18th of September 1544, a marriage was agreed upon between the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois)

* Don Diego de Mendoza, younger son of the count de Tendillo, Don Iñigo Lopez Hurtado de Mendoza. Don Diego was then ambassador in Venice, but he had gone to Trent to represent the Emperor at the General Council. *See* Vol. VI., Part 1, pp. 194–6.

† At that date the Emperor was to have been betweeu Alost and Ghent, at which city he stayed until the 13th of January, "all the time much tormented by the gout." On the 16th he went to Brussels.—*See* Vandenesse's *Itinerary*, translated by Bradford, p. 551. If the date of "Brussels, 2 December 1544," be correct, the only way of reconciling the variance of date is to suppose that a duplicate of the Emperor's letter to ambassador Vega from Ghent the 2nd of December was sent to Prince Philip in Spain from Brussels.

‡ The deciphering of this paper is headed: "Copia descifrada de la carta quese escribió por su Mag^{d}. á Juan de Vega de Bruxelas á dos de Diciembre de 1544."

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king Francis' third son, and the princess of Spain, eldest daughter of His Imperial Majesty, or else with His niece, the second daughter of His brother Ferdinand, the king of the Romans. It was, moreover, agreed that should the Duke marry the Emperor's daughter;* the latter would have as a dower the State or duchy of Milan, or else Flanders and Burgundy with king Ferdinand's second daughter.† Owing, however, to His very long illness, and to His still longer convalescence, His Imperial Majesty could not then take His departure for Germany‡ and consult His brother Ferdinand on the matter of that alternative marriage as He had deliberated to do. Yet, in order to proceed with the treaty, and fulfil all and every one of its conditions, He did then, and does now again, declare that however much He might wish that the duke of Orleans should marry at once His daughter, the Infanta Doña Maria, princess of Spain, in order to show the great affection he professes for the Most Christian king of France and his family, and render the last peace more complete, and if possible everlasting, He found that the said marriage could not take effect without the Duke's position and estate being considerably improved with relation to, and in proportion to the dominions of the other contracting party and the circumstances and possessions of the Emperor.§ By the treaty, therefore, the marriage of the Duke with the second daughter of the King of the Romans is reverted to. Should the King of France approve of the proposed marriage, means might be found to make it equally acceptable to the Duke. His

* Maria, daughter of the Emperor Charles and Isabel of Portugal, born the 21st of June 1528. She married in 1548 her first cousin, Maximilian II. emperor of Germany, and died at the Escurial on the 7th of September 1572. After the death of her husband in 1576 she retired to Madrid, where she died on the 26th of February 1603. *See* Florez, *Reinas Catolicas de España*, Vol. II., pp. 856–7.

† She was afterwards married to Francesco Gonzaga III., duke of Mantua and marquis de Monferrato, who died in 1550. Catherine herself died in 1572.

‡ On the 3rd of December the Emperor arrived at Ghent, where he continued to be tormented by the gout during the whole month. On the 1st of January he went from Ghent to Iremonde (Dendermonde), and on the 16th to Brussels. On the 1st of February he was still laid up with the gout, and on the 20th began to follow a regimen, and to make use of Indians' wood.—Vandenesse's *Itinerary of the Emperor*, by Bradford, p. 551.

§ "Que en fin halla que segun los respectos que se deber tener no se podria tratar del dicho casamiento sin mejorar la parte del dicho señor de Orleans al proposito de las tierras de acá, y por el bien de ellas, y á su satisfacion y de los otros reynos y estados de Su Magestad Imperial y por esto quedando en los terminos del dicho tractado se para en el partido del dicho señor de Orleans en la segunde hija del rey de Romanos, y de satisfacer segun y como se contiene en el dicho tractado, y si pareciera bien al dicho S^r^ Rey se mirará aun si se podran enderezar [los] medios convenientes al otro partido aunque Su Mag^d^ Imperial no entiende, ni querria poner al dicho señor Rey en caso que se parecerse grave y á los suyos; pero le quiera bien advertir con sincera amistad que parece que la porcion del dicho S^r^ duque de Orleans podra ser mejor como por el uno como por el otro de los dichos casamientos. Y por que por el dicho tratado de paz se ha capitulado que se mirará sobre la restitucion de Hesdin y sus apertenencias mediante recompensa, Su Mag^d^ requiere y ruega al dho. s^r^ Rey hazer entender en ello [su voluntad] segun que Su Mag^d^ confia del buen deseo del dicho Rey, pues que Su Mag^d^ Imperial especialmente haze muymayor cosa en consideracion de los senores sus hijos."

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Imperial Majesty does by no means intend putting any stress on king Francis and his family in matters so grave and serious, and yet cannot help telling him, in token of the most sincere friendship, that in either case, whether the duke of Orleans marries his daughter, the princess of Spain, or his niece (Catharine), second daughter of the king of the Romans, his marriage portion might be better than it is.

As by one of the clauses of the said treaty of peace it is stipulated that the fortified town of Hesdin and its appurtenances, shall be restored to its legitimate lord, or else the latter to be compensated for it, His Imperial Majesty requests and prays king Francis will see to it, and confidently trusts that this restitution of Hesdin (Hêdin)* *will be speedily accomplished in conformity with the article of the treaty referring to it, especially as His Imperial Majesty is now doing, on behalf of king Francis' sons, a good deal more.*

His Imperial Majesty trusts, also, that there will be no difficulty either in the restitution of [*the county of*] *Charolois, and that the delivery of the same will take place in perfect good faith, and according to the text of the said treaty, and the letters patent which the king of France, himself, has issued and caused to be proclaimed on the subject.*

As His Imperial Majesty wishes and intends to proceed in this as well as in other matters specified in the said treaty plainly, and with perfect good faith towards all parties, and more especially towards the king of France and his people, and also observe and loyally fulfil all and every one of the stipulations contained in the treaty, he most affectionately requests and begs the king of France to consider and bear in mind the very great delay experienced in the delivery of the strong places and castles on the other side of the Alps, which delay has been exceedingly injurious to His Imperial Majesty, since Cahours has not yet been restored, when it is just that it should be.

The same may be said respecting the strange means employed by the ministers of king Francis to delay, and, if possible, to avoid altogether the restitution of Astenay (Stenay), against the express article of the treaty of peace, which they, themselves, have completely disregarded, excusing themselves, and throwing all the blame on the duke of Lorraine (François), who, they pretend, dislikes the said restitution, when on the contrary, it is notorious that he (the Duke) wishes for it.

Besides the above facts, the Royal Commissioners who attended the meetings at Cambray † were so unreasonable and

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* The town and bailiwick of Hêdin, in the Artois, had already been mentioned in the treaties of Madrid and Cambray as belonging to Flanders and the Low Countries, and consequently to be restored to the Emperor. A similar stipulation was made in the treaty of Crêpy.

† The Emperor soon after the peace of Crêpy went to Cambray, where the French commissioners, cardinals Meudon and Lorraine (the latter in the place of the duke of Guise, his brother), had already arrived.—Vandenesse's *Itinerary*, p. 549.

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absolute, that even in matters of no difficulty whatever, and in which all right, reason, and justice was evidently on His Imperial Majesty's side, they offered uncommon and wilful opposition, a very strange mode of proceeding, if the good friendship now existing between His Imperial Majesty and the King, their master, is taken into consideration.

Indeed, the Most Christian king of France should take care that these and all differences still existing between His Imperial Majesty and him should be quickly settled, and made to disappear altogether. For instance, all the Emperor's vassals or subjects in his various kingdoms and dominions are continually complaining of the many robberies and violences committed upon them by the French by land and sea, and that when they do complain against the said violences, they are referred to a tribunal or court of law, under plea that their respective cases are to be investigated and tried by ordinary judges, which judicial proceeding, as is notorious, entails considerable expense upon the claimants, and is subject to much delay and inconvenience. Besides which, though right and justice be evidently on the side of the claimants, the judges generally disregard, alleging particular ordinances, of which the Emperor's subjects are ignorant, and which cannot in any way be applied to them, the Spaniards especially. The judges, moreover, deny the claims, so much so, that in one way or another there has been no one single case since the peace in which the robbers by land or at sea have been punished, and the property restored to its owners; and although they allege that similar robberies and violences have been practised against them by the Emperor's subjects, certain it is that no case has been reported, and no culprit named. And yet, as all the world knows, this sort of evil, too often recurring, must be quickly remedied, or else peace cannot last so long as it is desired.

To this must be added that His Imperial Majesty's subjects have not yet obtained restitution of the property taken from them during the preceding wars with France, and that the goods and chattels sequestered from them without any form of justice still remain in the hands of the royal officers, though in every one of the treaties of peace between His Imperial Majesty and king Francis it is stipulated that prisoners and sequestered property shall be mutually restored.

The king of France knows very well the sort of obligation under which His Imperial Majesty stands towards the king of Portugal (Dom João), who, having been comprised in the treaty of Crêpy, should naturally partake of this present peace. The King was also included in former treaties by which all letters of mark are annulled and forbidden, and yet the said letters of mark still continue, and the King's

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subjects are still assailed under them,* His Imperial Majesty begs the Most Christian king of France to favour the king of Portugal in that very just demand of his, as His Imperial Majesty has lately done in mightier affairs of the French nation, by no means so clear and justifiable as this present one of the king of Portugal.

In conclusion, His Imperial Majesty again begs the Most Christian king of France, his good brother, to be pleased to consider the above stated reasons, and take such care at present and for the future as the observance of the said peace and of the perfect amity now existing between the two monarchs demands. His Imperial Majesty trusts that the Most Christian king of France will readily do this, and that his intentions are that the last treaty of peace between the two monarchies (France and Spain) take effect, and continue not only as regards the above-stated points and other private concerns of their two Majesties (Imperial and Royal), but likewise in the public affairs [of Christendom], respecting which His Imperial Majesty will behave and act in such a manner that he never will be found to have failed in his own obligations.

Indorsed: "Copy of the Emperor's Declaration on the alternative of the Duke of Orleans' marriage."†

Spanish. 4 *pp.*

14 Dec. **260.** PRINCE PHILIP OF SPAIN to the EMPEROR, his Father.

S. Estado, B.M., Add. 28,594, f. 41.

On the 1st of last month Idiaquez arrived here‡ and brought me news of Your Majesty's good health, as well as of Your entry into France and the progress of Your Imperial arms throughout that country last summer, the subsequent French overtures, and, last not least, the peace concluded at Crêpy, and the state in which political affairs remained at Idiaquez' departure. I humbly kiss Your Majesty's hand for the singular favour You have done me of informing me in

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* "Por los quales todas marcas son anuladas y prohibidas, pero todavia se procede contra sus sugetos (*sic*) y por medio de ellas; en lo qual Su Magestad Imperial ruega al Rey Christianissimo quiera tener respecto y remediar y proverlo, especialmente considerado lo que Su Mag^{d} haze en otras cosas or respecto del dho. Rey que no son tan favorables ni justificadas."

† No signature nor date to this official declaration; but as it is placed at Simancas between the Emperor's ciphered letter to his ambassador at Rome (Juan de Vega) of the 2nd and that of the 14th, in which the prince of Spain (Philip) acknowledges the receipt by secretary Idiaquez of the Emperor's views on the subject, there is every reason to suppose that, however soon the official declaration was drawn out, it did not reach Valladolid, then the Court of Spain, earlier than the 10th of December. There is still another reason to suppose that date to be the right one, for on the 19th of January 1545, at the latest, the Emperor was bound by the treaty of Crêpy to decide within the period of four months stipulated on the alternative of the duke of Orleans' marriage.

‡ That is at Valladolid in Castille, where the Crown prince Philip held his Court at the time.

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detail of Your victorious march through France, and subsequent conclusion of the treaty of peace.

Secretary Idiaquez also read to me the original instructions he himself had received from Your Majesty for his mission, as well as a full explanation of the alternative marriages proposed for the duke of Orleans in the treaty of peace made with his Father, the king of France. No sooner had I carefully read and examined the Instructions, and learnt that Your Majesty wished to know my opinion and that of the Council of State on the whole, than I caused its members to be summoned to meet, which they did on three or four consecutive days, Secretary Idiaquez being also present to explain to them in words what Your Majesty's intentions were on so important a matter. And as Your Majesty had signified to the said Secretary (Idiaquez) how desirable it would be that the Count of Cifuentes should also be present at the deliberations of the Council in order to ascertain through him the more or less inclination my sister (the Infanta Doña Maria) may feel to her marriage with the Duke, and then let Your Majesty know what the result of the deliberations had been, and likewise what the Infanta's wish was; as by Idiaquez' arrival here, at Valladolid, and owing to the reasons Your Majesty knows, there was no longer need of moving the Court to Madrid, where the Count of Cifuentes* was then staying somewhat indisposed in health. It was thought that from that or some other cause he might excuse himself from coming to Valladolid, and as I was, moreover, almost sure that my sister, the Infanta, would not so openly declare her sentiments to Secretary Idiaquez or to the Count himself, as she would to me—I decided to go thither for the purpose of visiting her and my other sister † and bringing the Count back to Valladolid with me, as I did, returning to Valladolid on the 29th of November after a stay of 12 or 13 days at Madrid.

During my absence, as I had ordered in obedience to Your Majesty's instructions, the members of Your Majesty's Council of State held four or five consecutive meetings, and as the matter submitted to their deliberation was, and is, so important, I directed that other fit persons not members of the Council, should also take part in its deliberations.

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* Don Fernando de Sylva, or Silva, Imperial ambassador at Rome from April 1533 to 1537. Soon after his return to Spain in 1537, the Count was appointed Lord High Chamberlain to the princes (*Camarero mayor de los Principes*). He had formerly held the charge of Lord High Steward (*Mayordomo Mayor*) to the Empress Isabel, but after her death in 1539 he continued to be Lord High Steward and Governor of the Household (*Mayordomo Mayor y Governador*) to her daughter the Infanta Maria and her sister Juana. He died at Madrid on the 15th of September 1545. These particulars are taken from a scarce Spanish work entitled: *Theatro Universal de España*, by Francisco Xavier de Garma y Duran, Madrid, 1751, Vol. IV.

† Philip had two sisters, Maria, born on the 21st of June 1528, and Juana, born 24 June 1535, who was married in 1552 to João, prince of Portugal, and was the mother of king Sebastian. She died in 1573.

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The President of the Council of Castille, the Vice-Chancellor of Aragon, and Dr. Guevara, all of them men of high reputation and sound learning, well versed in State affairs, were selected and invited to take temporary seats in Council, and state their own individual opinion.

After the matter had been discussed at large, it was found that the councillors were not unanimous. Seeing which, I requested the councillors again to discuss the matter and to put down in writing their individual opinion, sign it with their own names, and enclose the same to me that I might report to Your Majesty. This was done as I directed, so that on the receipt of this my letter Your Majesty will be able to judge what has been the result of the Council's deliberations. As far as I, myself, can see, all the members of Your Majesty's Council of State, and those persons aggregated to it on this occasion, regret that You should have considered Yourself bound, in order to secure a lasting peace with France, to promise to give the hand of my sister or that of my cousin to the duke of Orleans (Charles de Valois); but they differ in opinion, some of them voting for the marriage of my cousin (Catharine), the daughter of the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), with Flanders as a dower, whilst others maintain that the Duke's marriage with my sister Doña Maria, and Milan as a dower, would be on many political considerations altogether preferable.

Among those who voted for the cession of Milan and the marriage of the Infanta Doña Maria, my sister, with the duke of Orleans, were the cardinal of Toledo,* president of the Council of Castille; the count of Cifuentes, and the High Commander of Castille † [in the Military Order of Santiago), Dr. Guevara, and others, who said that, as the States of Flanders have been so long in Your ancestors' hands, and have since become Your own patrimonial inheritance, they should not on any consideration whatever be alienated from Your Imperial crown, especially as their inhabitants, subjects of Your Majesty, like the Flemish, have been found always faithful and strongly attached to Your Majesty. Indeed, it would be unreasonable and highly impolitic (the above-mentioned councillors alleged), nay, exceedingly injurious to Your Majesty's conscience, honour, and reputation, as well as derogatory to Your Imperial authority, and opposed to the

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* Don Juan Tavera, archbishop of Toledo, and president of the Council of Castille from 1524 to the 1st of August 1545, when he died.

† "Consultador mayor de Castilla," are the words in the copy before me; but as there never was an officer of that title in Castille, I have taken upon myself to substitute *Comendador Mayor de Castilla;* if so, that high office was held at the time by Don Juan de Zuñiga, lord of Martorell, and Molins de Rey in Catalonia, who died on the 27th of June 1545. True it is that *Consultador* (as the copy reads) might be an error for *Contador*, or Accountant General, but Don Juan Manuel II., who seems to have been the last of them, died on the 15th July 1543.

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tranquillity and rest of Your mind in future, to alienate those States in any way, or deprive Your successors of them; for even if given as a dower to my sister, the Infanta, on her marriage to the duke of Orleans, Your Majesty reserving for Yourself, during the Infanta's life, the sovereignty of them, and the government and administration of those countries being conducted with justice and proper respect for Your Majesty's authority, should my sister (Doña Maria) die without children (which may God forbid), or else despair of having them, her husband, the Duke, might easily, with the assistance of his father and brother, rise and take possession of the country; for he could at any time, and without waiting for such a contingency, give them cause and opportunity for entering the land, making secret compacts with Your Majesty's enemies, and setting up all manner of intrigues for the express purpose of depriving You of the sovereignty of the land, and keeping it for himself. This the Duke, or his successors, might perhaps accomplish without much difficulty; he might pick a quarrel with Your Majesty as to his manner of conducting the government of the country, or he might take offence at Your attempting to arrest the violences and vices of administration, from which attempt on the part of Your Majesty ill-feeling and anger would arise, and be the cause of the war with the French being renewed; for even taking for granted that the Duke of Orleans behaved in all matters as a good, faithful, and obedient son of Your Majesty, his father and brother, or at any rate this latter (Henri) after the death of king Francis, his father, might very well, being so close a neighbour, and more powerful than he, and having besides a greater force under his command, enter those States against his will and take possession of them before Your Majesty had time to prevent it. In short, should the French in one way or other get possession of Flanders now, the recovery of it would be, if not altogether impossible, exceedingly difficult. Through the loss of those States by us, in whatever way effected, the kings of France would naturally become much stronger than they are now both by land and by sea, and Your Majesty would consequently lose much of Your authority and reputation with other European powers, and chiefly with the prince-electors of the German Empire; whilst king Francis, by means of such an increase of power, would become much greater, would possess himself of all the small States bordering on France, and finally by aid of that greatness and power so acquired, and by his well-known practices and intrigues, win the hearts of the German Princes,* and place in jeopardy Your Majesty's dignity and authority with the Empire, and

* "Y aquistaria (*sic*) la voluntad de los principes de Alemania con esta reputacion y grandeza y con ella y con las platicas y formas que tendrian, podrian traer en gran inconveniente la autoridad y dignidad imperial de V. M."

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in process of time become superior to and greater than the King who may eventually wear the Crown of these Spanish realms.

In order, therefore, to avoid this and other dangers, and to preserve intact the imperial authority, these councillors are of opinion that Your Majesty should not part in any way with the States of Flanders, so beneficial and profitable as they are to these Spanish kingdoms and to Your Imperial Majesty on account of the intercourse of trade, and of the help and assistance they can afford in war-times by land as well as by sea, especially against king Francis or his successors, if they should again attempt to invade these Spanish kingdoms, or other dominions of Your Majesty; whilst the alienation, in whatever way and under whatsoever conditions effected, would decidedly be the source of much displeasure and discontent among Your Majesty's subjects all over the world; besides which, as Your Majesty wisely remarks in Your letter, as well as in the Instructions, there is the danger of the failure of succession,* and many other difficulties that might arise therefrom, as has been practically observed in many Royal and ducal families which, though blessed at one time with a plentiful succession, yet on the death of the chief possessed no male heir to fill the vacant throne, as happened in the time of the Queen, my Lady † [grandmother].

As to Milan, the cardinal of Toledo said, it has always been considered as a comparatively modern acquisition, and by no means one of firm and permanent possession, but on the contrary as unsteady and fickle, having frequently passed from the hands of one family into those of another, or been occupied and retained by whomsoever happened to be the strongest amongst the competitors, as the experience of the past has shown—a field always open for contention and strife, and a chief cause of all the past wars and shedding of blood by which Christendom at large, and especially these Spanish kingdoms, has been afflicted of late years.

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* "Y la enagenacion seria de muy mal nombre y mucho desgrado (*sic*) y de sentimiento (y descontentamiento?) á todos los subditos y quanto mas lo seria á los de los mismos estados, lo qual vra. mag^{d} lo debe de entender. Y es tambien de muy grande consideracion como vra. mag lo apunta lo de la sucesion."

† This last passage is rather obscure; it stands thus in the copy before me, "Y es tambien de muy grande consideracion, como vra. mag^{d} lo apunta en su carta, y tambien eu las Instrucciones, los inconvenientes que de ello podrian seguir con los exemplos que se han visto, aun haviendo mucha succession con el tiempo venir á faltar muchos succesores, como acaeció para venir á heredar la Reyna mi Señora." Whom does the Crown Prince of Spain designate here by the Queen, my Lady (*la Reyna mi Señora*)? Surely he can mean no other than his grandmother, Crazy Jane (*Juana la Loca*), daughter of the Catholic Sovereigns, Ferdinand of Aragon and Isabella of Castille, who, by her marriage to Philip of Burgundy in 1496, became the mother of the Emperor Charles and of his brother Ferdinand, king of the Romans. In 1498, after the death of Prince Juan, then the presumptive heir to the Spanish crown, Juana, who was the eldest of the deceased prince's four sisters, was proclaimed heiress to the throne of Castille.

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Such has Milan been in the past, and is likely to be in future, for king Francis will never relinquish his pretended claims on that Duchy, nor will he relent in his ambitious desire of obtaining possession of it somehow. Even if his own son, the duke of Orleans, were to acquire Flanders by his marriage with my sister (Doña Maria), and the king of France were to dissemble for some time, the Dauphin (Henri) and his successors on the throne, whoever they may be, would not lose the right which according to them France has to the possession of Milan, alleging, among other reasons of their own, that king Francis could not waive rights belonging to them, nor could they either contradict or oppose his will. That Milan is a feudatory State that Your Imperial Majesty cannot hold for Yourself, or that, considering its quality and origin, it is even doubtful whether it can be transferred to a Royal son or daughter, whilst retaining its feudatory character, and that retaining it for Yourself, or passing it over to me as Your son and heir, would arouse the suspicions and fears of the Italian Powers,* and give them, jealous and afraid as they are of Your Majesty's greatness, cause and occasion to rise against You and make alliance with Your enemies, as they have already done more than once. This, in the opinion of the above-named councillors, would become a certainty the very moment that, as hinted in the letter to me as well as in the Instructions, the incorporation of Parma and Piacenza and other territories in Italy once belonging to the dukes of Milan, takes place. Besides which it must be borne in mind that both the Catholic king of Spain (Fernando of Aragon) and Your Majesty yourself have in past times resisted the attacks of the king of France, defeated his armies, and vanquished him in Italy, which might with greater ease be done again by Your Majesty under the name and title of Protector and Defender of the Italian potentates and their liberties, than as principal and absolute owner of Milan itself.† And finally, that since Your Majesty, in order to restore peace to Christendom at large, had determined and resolved to alienate from Your own crown one of the two states, they (the councillors) were of opinion that it would be the lesser evil to get rid of the duchy of Milan, the cause of so many wars, and that by doing this the pretensions of the French would be put an end to, and the occasion of renewing them disappear, thus

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* "Diciendo que el Rey que agora es no les pudo perjudicar, ni ellos le pudieron contradecir y es estado feudal que dizen que vra. magd no le puede tener en su mano y aun se dubda que lo pudiese seguramente dar á hijo guardando la natura del feudo, y que si lo quisiese retener en su persona ó ponerlo en la mia seria sospechoso y odioso á los potentados de Italia."

† "Y que el Rey Catholico y vra. magd en los tiempos passados sin este estado han resistido al Rey de Francia en Italiá, y roto y vencido sus exercitos y esto se haria mas facilmente y á menos costo y peligro con nombree titulo de valedores y defensores de la libertad de Italia y de aquellos potentados que no como principales señores de la cosa."

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keeping for ever Your ancient patrimonial estate, so important for Your honour, authority, and service, whereas if Your Majesty disposes of Flanders, the French might, with the additional strength which that cession would afford them, easily conquer Milan afterwards, and perhaps, too, invade other kingdoms and dominions of Your Majesty.

In addition to the above reason for the cession of Milan in preference to that of Flanders, it was urged that if after this last peace with France fresh differences should arise, and war break out again between the two countries, this Council of State might naturally be blamed for having advised Your Majesty to give up Your own patrimonial inheritance and thereby increase the power of our adversary, making him Your superior,-as it were, and affording him the means of contending with You successfully, whereas the same accusation could not be brought forward against them if Milan were bestowed on the son of France as a fief; for after all this Duchy is not a State inherited from Your ancestors, and You can grant it to any prince or nobleman You choose to appoint; and if You now bestow it on the Duke of Orleans as one of the favours (*beneficios*) conferred on France on account of the late peace, if the political relations between Your Majesty and king Francis become embroiled, and war breaks out again, nobody can blame Your voluntary action in that respect, such as it is, but will attribute it entirely to Your Imperial magnanimity and Your ardent zeal for Religion and the weal of Christendom at large.*

These councillors further observed that, should Flanders be alienated, whatever conditions, restrictions, and ties were imposed upon the holders of the fief, the sovereignty of that State will never go back to Your Majesty, for once lost, no neighbour (*vezino*) would help you to its recovery; whereas, if Milan were given up, and king Francis or his son prove unfaithful, and proceed to assail other adjoining territories, he would have to encounter, besides Your Majesty's forces, those of Venice, which hates the French and their domination, those of the Pope, Florence, Genoa, and other minor powers in Italy, all of whom, considering the cause their own, would ally themselves with Your Majesty or with Your successors, and help to the recovery of the Duchy, or assist against any French invasion, and would, moreover, beg and implore Your Majesty, as people to whom French yoke is most intolerable, to help and assist them on the occasion.

They also urged that it may after all happen that, guided by Divine inspiration, king Francis will keep the peace, and fulfil all and every one of its conditions; but even if he did so, it would be far better to give up Milan than

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* "No se podria imputar á ninguna siniestra occasion sino á la grandeza Imperial de vra. mag^{d} y su gran zelo al servicio de Dios y bien de la Chris-

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part with Flanders, because the duke of Orleans, if invested with that Duchy, will find it necessary for his own security and comfort to be obedient and devoted to Your Majesty, in which case a good deal of annual expenditure and cost in Italy will be saved. Should, however, the king of France disregard the conditions of the last treaty—which is much to be apprehended, judging by past experience, and the difficulties which occur to a right understanding and compliance on his part with the conditions he has undertaken; then, in that case, it is quite evident that it is far preferable to get rid of the duchy of Milan than to give up such fine possessions as the States of Flanders, especially now that His Majesty, the Emperor, has added to them by conquest, and at no small personal risk, the duchy of Gueldres, and that the French are making difficulties about restoring Hesdin, which is a sure sign that king Francis does not intend to observe all the conditions of the treaty, nor to deliver the castles he still holds in Piedmont, as agreed, but wants to keep open for himself the road to Italy.

These councillors also remind Your Majesty that when king Francis, and afterwards his two sons, were prisoners in Madrid, no attempt whatever was made to take from him one single turret of what he then possessed, not even the duchy of Burgundy, which belonged to Your Majesty's ancestors; and, therefore, that to give now to France the States of Flanders would be paramount to darkening the splendour and glory of Your Majesty's past victories throughout the whole of Christendom.*

As to the argument put forward by those who dissent, that should Milan be given to the French, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would be in danger, these councillors reply that those kingdoms could more easily be defended and kept by Milan becoming French than by Your Majesty keeping possession of it, because, should Your Majesty retain it and not give it to the French, there will be need of two armies, provisions, ammunition, and so forth, one for Milan itself, and another for Naples and Sicily, which could not be provided without difficulty and at considerable expense; whereas, if Your Majesty do not keep it but give it to the French, there will only be wanted one army, and the defence would be easier and much sooner effected by having all Your Majesty's forces concentrated on one point, than divided; besides which, the Italian Powers, always jealous and afraid of French ambition, instead of encouraging them to

* "Tambien dizen que se deve acordar vra. mag^{d} que con haber tenido preso al rey de Francia en Madrid y despues á sus hijos, y estando él en la afliccion que se vió nunca se le sacó una almena de lo que él poseya en el ducado de Borgona, aunque este era del patrimonio de vra. mag^{d} y que darle ahora [á su hijo] los Estados de Flandes. Seria en alguna manera escurecer el nombre y gloria que vra. mag^{d} tiene ganada en esta y en las jornadas pasadas en toda la Christiandad."

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prosecute their warlike plans against Your Majesty, would rather unite themselves with Your Majesty against them, especially the Republic of Genoa,* which, if the report be true, will be attacked the very moment that the French become masters of Milan, though the Genoese have lately fortified it, and will offer considerable resistance, determined, as they are, to remain free, under their republican institutions and government, though strongly attached to Your Majesty, whose protection they need, and the profit they gain through their maritime enterprises.

As to the marriage of the Infanta, my sister, some councillors were of opinion that, considering the report We have here of the Duke's inclinations, tastes and character, even if the States of Flanders and Milan already belonged to him, it would be very questionable whether the Infanta should be married to him; and much more so if the States are to be given with her.

With regard to the suggested marriage of the son of the King of the Romans (*i.e.*, Maximilian of Austria with the Infanta Maria): seeing that Your Majesty is willing to grant Milan as a dowry to the daughter of the King of the Romans (Catharine) if she marries the Duke of Orleans, it would be a great diminution of your dominions if you conferred also the States of Flanders on the Infanta. At the same time the councillors agreed with Your Majesty's remark that, considering the present condition of the affairs of the King of the Romans, if the Infanta received the States as a dowry Your Majesty would be obliged to uphold her and husband in their government. Looking, therefore, at the youth of the Infanta, and that a delay of three or four years would not be prejudicial, they are of opinion that it would be better to wait for a time to see how the affairs of Hungary and the Turk proceed. Your Majesty moreover may, it is to be hoped, have grandsons in Spain who may inherit these States of Flanders. Your Majesty yourself, too, may hope to live many years to enjoy them; and in the opinion of the councillors should at present busy yourself rather in adding to your own power and prestige, than in arranging for the future inheritance of your descendants.

The Cardinal Archbishop of Seville † was of a contrary opinion. He said that, although the Flanders States, Your Majesty's old patrimonial inheritance, were undoubtedly an

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* "Y la Republica de Genova que se dize que teniendo los Franceses á Milan la señorearian luego con la fortificacion que han hecho, y como agora esté se deve juzgar que no la podrau ni se dexara Genova occupar por franceses, y se conservaran en Republica y en la devocion de vra. mag^d y su corona y sucesores en ella."

† Fr. Garcia de Loaysa y Mendoza, archbishop of Seville, 1541 to 1546. He enjoyed the Emperor's favour, became councillor of Castille in 1524; president of the Council of the Indies in 1524; and Grand Inquisitor of Spain in February 1545. He died at Madrid on the 22nd of April 1546.—*Ortiz y Zuñiga, Anales Eclesiasticos y Seculares de Sevilla,*

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important appendage to the Crown of Castile, yet they were by no means profitable, or easily defended in case of invasion by an enemy. On the contrary, they have been, and will continue to be in future, the cause and occasion of a good deal of expenditure, as the experience of the past has shown; for ever since Your Majesty inherited these Spanish kingdoms no money or help of any sort whatever has come from them, whereas Your Majesty has been frequently obliged to go thither, as in your dangerous passage through France * in 1529, in *order to quell the rebellion of Ghent;* and your recent expedition to Gueldres. You had to go thither at the head of a powerful army.

Milan, on the contrary, is a very convenient and useful possession for the Spanish Crown, for it not only preserves Naples and Sicily, as well as Genoa, in their devotion to the Emperor, but upholds and increases his authority among the Italian powers. Should the Duchy be disposed of in such a way that the king of France may have a hand in it, all the authority and influence which His Majesty has in Genoa would be lost, and consequently the respect which other Italian powers have for him. The doorway open for the defence of the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily would, in case of king Francis invading them, be for ever shut, and no succour from Spain or Germany could be sent to them.

The Cardinal went on to say, in explanation of his vote, that if Your Majesty, as we all wish, is to keep and if possible increase Your authority and reputation and influence with the Empire and with Germany, it would be necessary to keep Flanders, and that were You to dispose of them, You might lose part of Your influence and authority over the Germans; for if, possessing Flanders as Your own patrimonial inheritance, You have not always been able to manage the Diets, or gained over the Prince Electors to your cause, what hope is there that Your Majesty will be able to do so without them? He was of opinion, therefore, that the possession of these States was vital for Your Majesty's power in Germany, and in the interests of the King of the Romans; and that Your Majesty would be much weakened by giving them up.

The Cardinal continued that if king Francis' experience of the past, his constant unsuccessful attempts to harm the Emperor,† and the failure of his deceitful and vain attacks

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* Here Bergenroth's copy of the original at Simancas reads distinctly: "Y el peligro que tuvo la pasada por Francia allá el año de xxxix y la ultima de la jornada de Gueldres y de los socorros de gentes que ha sido menester embiar diversos tiempos sin haber sacado de dichos estados grandes sumas de dineros." The italicised words of this paragraph were omitted in Bergenroth's transcript, but I hear that, though slightly effaced in the original draft at Simancas, they are still legible.

† "Que considerada la experiencia que el Rey de Francia tiene de las cosas pasadas, y de lo que ha intentado tantas veces, y que los engaños con que vino

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against Perpiñan be taken into his consideration; if he bears in mind that, notwithstanding his having sought and obtained the aid of the Turk, and brought that Infidel's fleet to the shores of the Mediterranean, he, himself, though powerfully assisted, could hardly do (at Nice) the trifling mischief he did, and that after Your Majesty had last year (1543) conquered the duchy of Gueldres, gained much reputation through its conquest, entered France at the head of a powerful army, and obliged the King of that country to take to flight, Your Majesty following him to a place fifteen leagues distant from Paris, where peace was made and signed, it may be concluded that, so tutored by experience, king Francis will observe the conditions of this latter treaty of peace more faithfully than he has former ones, and that seeing the bad result of his former enterprises, he will not think in future of again engaging in wars with his neighbours, and that, having regard to the generosity with which His Majesty has acted towards him, offering to his son, the duke of Orleans, the hand of His daughter, the Infanta, or that of his niece, it is to be hoped that the present peace may be maintained, as well for His Majesty's honour as for the rest of Christendom at large."

Above all, if the news that has come and circulates of the Duke's character, mode of life, and habits be correct, and there is no certainty of a change, the Cardinal did not hesitate to say that he would never be a fit husband for the Infanta Doña Maria.* Even if he himself brought to the marriage the States of Flanders, His Imperial Majesty ought to refuse to him the hand of his daughter. But if better news came of his life, there was no other prince [in Europe] more fit for the Infanta, my sister, to choose for a husband. Besides which, were the marriage with the Infanta, with Flanders as a dower, to take place as proposed, that would not amount to alienating it; but giving it to Your own son, keeping the sovereignty as at present, during Your lifetime, which it is to be hoped God will prolong, and after Your death it would be inherited by Your grandchildren, so as to remain always in Your family.

á invadir á Perpiñau no le sucedieron como pensaba ni sacó dello fruto ninguno, y assi mesmo que con haber llamado á los Turcos y traido su armada en daño de las cosas (*sic*; costas?) de vra. mag^{d} no hizo mas efecto de lo que todo el mundo sabe."

* "Si la opinion que se ha derramado hasta agora del caracter, manera de vivir y costumbres del duque de Orleans persevera, y no hay certinidad de enmienda, que aunque el truxesse en dote el estado de Flandes en ninguna manera se debe pensar casar con él la infanta doña Maria mi hermana, mas qui si hay otra mejor relacion de su vida y costumbres y inclinacion que de presente no sera otro partido de casamiento para ella que sea de la qualidad ni tan á proposito como esta en la esperanza que se ofrescerar segun la disposicion que hay en los principes cristianos y que haciendose este casamiento no seria enagenar vra. ma^{d} lo que heredó de sus mayores sino darle á su hijo, y esperar á que sus nietos lo hereden pues todos los dias de su vida, que Dios haga muy luengos, ha de quedar señor de dicho estado, como al presente lo es, y paresca que esto no es contra conveniencia pues no se pueden governar ni mantener en obediencia sino con tener á su señor presente."

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For the above reasons, and many others, which I omit for brevity's sake, the cardinal of Seville was of opinion that should Your Majesty think, hear, and ascertain that the king of France intends to fulfil all the conditions of the treaty [of Crêpy], and will be your friend in future, it will be less inconvenient and less dangerous to give up the States of Flanders than the duchy of Milan. If, however, there is the least doubt about it, or the slightest suspicion that he will infringe this last and other preceding treaties with Your Majesty, then in that case he (the Cardinal) thinks that it would be less dangerous for Your Majesty to dispose of the duchy of Milan, because should war break out again, it would be better to keep and retain, as aforesaid, for Your Majesty's reputation and influence in the Empire and in Germany, the absolute and sovereign lordship of those old patrimonial States of Yours in Flanders rather than Milan, which is a dominion recently acquired, as it were, and respecting which it may be doubtful whether the nature of the fief be such that Your Majesty can legally retain it. If war in Italy cannot be avoided, it must be made at the expense and cost of Milan, which after all seems destined to be the battlefield for the whole of Italy.

The duke of Alba,* the count of Osorno,† the High Commander of Leon,‡ and the Vice-Chancellor of Aragon, spoke next; their opinion was in substance as follows:—

There can be no doubt that the States of Flanders are of great value and importance; they are Your Majesty's patrimonial inheritance, and have been profitable and of much use to this monarchy as far as the authority and the trade of Spain with other nations are concerned, though up to the present day, to judge from the past, no great help or assistance can in other matters be expected from them to the dominions of the Spanish Crown. The government and administration of Flanders, in the absence of its natural lord, must always offer difficulties, and be very costly, as the Emperor points out in his instructions. Should the duchy of Milan be disposed and in the hands of the French, the States of Flanders would be in great danger of being lost if the king of France invaded them, for there would be no other way of providing for their defence (the road through the Milanese being closed) than that of the ocean sea—always difficult and almost impracticable, especially if the king of England had made an alliance with the Emperor's enemy; for although it be true that, Flanders once given to France, the power of that country would be greatly increased by it, it must be considered that if the country were given as a

* Don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo, third duke of Alba.

† Don Garcia Fernandez Manrique, third count of Osorno, who died on the 25th of January 1541.

‡ Don Franciso de los Cobos, High Commander of Leon, in the Military Order of Santiago.

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dower to the Infanta on her marriage with the Duke of Orleans, it would not pass to the king of France but to Your own children.* Should the duke of Orleans even forget the favour received from Your Majesty by the marriage, he must, nevertheless, hold Your Majesty as his father, and the king of the Romans his protector, against his own brother, the Dauphin [Henri] and his father, and guard himself against them, because in cases of supreme command (*en casos de reynar*) and of private interest, everyone looks out for his own, and entirely disregards those of his father and brother. It is, therefore, to be supposed that such will happen in this case. Should the contrary happen, and should the Duke follow the inclination and advice of his own father and brother, which would be unreasonable and unlikely, that would not be during the lifetime of the Emperor (whom may God preserve as long as we all wish), and who would be lord and master of Flanders, whilst the Duke would only be the governor and administrator of the States in his name. Should he, however, think of an attempt to rise against His Majesty in order to usurp that part of the Emperor's dominions, give entrance to his own father and brother into the State against the authority and sovereign rights of His Majesty and the faithful subjects, then, in that case, measures can and will be taken to remedy the mischief done, especially if we retain Milan—which is conveniently situated for that purpose, being, as it were, the gate to go to and come from Germany and Flanders—and to provide for the defence of the latter if invaded, and at the same time uphold and maintain the authority of the Empire. Without Milan it seems as if Flanders could not be well governed and administered, besides which all the other kingdoms and dominions belonging to His Majesty would be isolated, and unable to help and assist each other in case of attack by an enemy. His Majesty will then have to consider how, in such case, States thus invaded could be successfully defended against an enemy, and the peril and danger in which his subjects would be placed, if despairing altogether of assistance, and not knowing whence it could come to them.

The State of Milan is very important and necessary not only for the defence of Naples and Sicily, but also for the security and tranquillity of these Spanish kingdoms, and for keeping the way open for His Majesty the Emperor to go to and come from Germany and Flanders, and enabling him to send either from Spain or from Germany the succours of men, provisions, and other things that may be wanted, in any

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* "Por que dandolos su mag^{d} en dote á la infanta doña Maria en su casamiento con el duque de Orleans no se ha de presuponer que se dan al rey de Francia sino á los hijos de vra. mag^{d} y el Duque por su particular interese quando desconociese y olvidase la merced que vra. mag^{d} le haria con este casamiento y le ha de tener por padre, y favorecerse de V. M. y del rey de Romanos."

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event, and at any time whatsoever, for the defence of the said kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and resistance against France. All the bloodshed and the money spent in keeping Milan must be considered as well employed, since by means of it and through the wars it has had to sustain, the defence and security of both Naples and Sicily have been achieved, whilst these latter have been the cause of these Spanish kingdoms not having been invaded by the enemy.* Had not His Majesty the Emperor had such means of communication with Germany as Milan can afford, he certainly could not have gone to Gueldres as quickly as he did in 1543, and victoriously carried out his undertaking. What His Majesty did then he can do whenever he pleases, provided the State of Milan remains on his side, whereas should the Emperor dispose of it in favour of the duke of Orleans, though the latter chose to be a dutiful and obedient son of His Majesty, or of the king of the Romans (Ferdinand), neither he (the Duke) nor any other prince in whose hands the Duchy may be could possibly retain the same, except the Emperor and his successors. Nor could anyone prevent the king of France from descent into Italy. Without Milan it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to stop him in his career, and provide for the defence of Naples and Sicily, which would then be lost without remedy, the more so if king Francis, or his successor on the throne of France, happens then, as at other times, to keep up intelligences with the Turk. Should the State of Milan remain in the Emperor's hands, as it is at present, and should Parma and Piacenza, as the Emperor himself remarks in his Instructions, be joined to it, and some towns which might easily be obtained from the Piedmontese, giving to the duke of Savoy other towns by way of exchange and compensation, there can be no doubt that king Francis would gradually lose that for him irresistible desire, besides his own pretensions to Milan, of mixing himself up with the affairs of Italy. Indeed, it is quite evident that all the king of France's obligatory renunciations of the duchy of Milan, as well as of the kingdom of Naples, contained in previous treaties, are dead letters for king Francis, and that he will never relinquish the idea of getting somehow full possession of it, as has been remarked even by those councillors who are of the contrary opinion, and vote for the retention of Flanders and alienation of Milan. Should, therefore, the Duchy remain as it is at present, well attended to and provided for, the kingdoms of Naples and Sicily will be secured, and Genoa and the rest of *the Italian* powers *will* unite in favour of the Emperor if attacked by the French in those parts. That would be the only sure remedy against king Francis' ambitious designs thus shutting against him the passage into Italy, and the

* "Y aquellos han sido causa de no la tener en estos reynos."

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means of going thither, promoting wars and attacking his neighbours instead of keeping within his own frontiers.

For the above and other like reasons, the councillors who voted with the Duke of Alba were of opinion that, although the cession of Flanders had its drawbacks and disadvantages, yet it seemed to them on many accounts far preferable to that of the duchy of Milan, not only for the preservation of the present peace with France, but also for the security in future of Your Majesty's dominions in general, as well as for the authority of Your Imperial dignity, and Your own reputation in Italy, the more so that the fears once entertained of the duke of Orleans inheriting the crown of these Spanish kingdoms have become fainter since the Princess [my wife]* has been declared to be pregnant, and his chance of succeeding to the crown of France has also diminished by the fact of the Dauphin of France having sons.†

Although the States of Flanders are very important, it would be better (said the above councillors) to give them to my sister, the Infanta, who is already marriageable, and at present, as Your Majesty remarks, there is not a more suitable husband for her than the said duke of Orleans, and the councillors have been of opinion that, in the event of the peace being broken, there would be less danger if Flanders instead of Milan were given to her as a dower, for if ever king Francis, or his son the Dauphin, does put his foot in Italy, or by any means obtain a free passage to that country, with the signs he has given of his lust for power, and his vehement desire (*desordenado apetito*) of mixing himself up with Italian affairs, it is doubtful whether war would not break out again under some pretence or other, if not in king Francis' lifetime, after the succession of his son, the Dauphin, whose ardent desire to penetrate into Italy is well known, since he has publicly declared his pretensions to Florence; and that if peace is so desirable a boon for the whole of Christendom, no sacrifice, however costly, on the part of Your Majesty, would be considered too great to obtain that object, and ensure for the future the tranquillity and quietness of Italy, and the safety of Your Majesty's dominions in those parts. Indeed, should Your Majesty, as suggested, be able to effect the investiture of Milan, and endow my sister [Maria] with a good marriage portion in the States of Flanders, having her married to the duke of Orleans, as stipulated at Crêpy, that would be, in the opinion of the above councillors, the best method for ensuring

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* Mary of Portugal, daughter of king João III., was married to Prince Philip in November 1543, and died on the 12th of July 1545, four days after being delivered of a son, named Carlos, whose mysterious career and death gave rise to much romantic lore.

† Henri, "the Dauphin," who after the death of his father, Francis I., became

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peace, whereas the opposite plan might lead to wars more fierce and destructive than the past.*

With regard to the marriage of the Infanta Doña Maria to the prince of Hungary, son of the king of the Romans, the Duke [of Alba] and those of his opinion agreed entirely with the cardinal of Toledo and his party.

As to the king of the Romans, all the councillors were unanimously of opinion that whatever may be Your Majesty's resolution respecting the duke of Orleans' marriage, he (Ferdinand) cannot fail to be satisfied and pleased, especially if his son, the Prince,† were to be married to the daughter of the king of France, by means of which marriage king Ferdinand, himself, might be efficiently assisted and favoured in his negociations [with the Turk]. If that marriage can take place, Your Majesty will doubtless procure it.

Whilst adhering to the above opinion in all its details, and agreeing with the duke of Alba as to the cession of Flanders in preference to the State of Milan, the High Commander of Leon (Francisco de los Cobos) added that when he (the High Commander) voted for the alienation of the States of Flanders, it was under the conditional understanding and supposition that Your Majesty, during Your lifetime, will retain the sovereignty of them, by which amendment the said High Commander meant that in his own private opinion the cession of Flanders should be to a certain extent limited, and not be made unless there is perfect security and certainty that Your Majesty will remain and be absolute lord and master of the said States, and that if there should be no positive certainty and security of this, he, the High Commander, would consider the cession of Milan preferable to that of Flanders, the latter being a State of such importance and quality, so large and populous.

Such has been, after a most careful and prolonged discussion, the councillors' opinion and advice on the points submitted by Your Majesty. The councillors have examined and weighed the matter with the zeal and affection they entertain for Your Majesty's service, and the utmost desire of hitting upon the best, not to say the less injurious, solution of this affair for Your Majesty's honour, authority, and service, as well as the good of Your kingdoms and subjects. May Your Majesty accept the result of their deliberations as a proof of their goodwill, and with Your wisdom and discretion choose that of the two opinions, which may seem to You the best.

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* "Pudiendo vſa. mag^{d} como se presupone hacer la investidura de Milan, y doctar (*sic*) con buena consciencia á la Infanta, mi hermana en los Estados de Flandes, se deve hacer efectuandose su casamiento con el duque de Orliens, como esta tractado, por que este paresce ser el mejor medio para durar la paz, y lo contrario seria ó podria ser, causa de entrar en nuevas guerras mas duras y peligrosas que las pasadas"

† Maximilian II., born in 1526, succeeded his father in 1563 and died in

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As to the inclination my sister, the Infanta Doña Maria, may have to her marriage with the Duke, Your Majesty will learn by the letter in my own hand.*

Respecting ecclesiastical affairs, such as Your pressing a request, backed with a requisition from king Francis, that the Pope should at once assemble the General Council of the Church, the Council of State is of opinion that it is a request well worthy of Your Majesty's honour and reputation, for the speedy meeting of the Council is, in the opinion of all of us, very much wanted for the settlement of affairs in matters of Faith and Religion. May God be pleased to permit that other princes, on whom the very same duty is incumbent, correspond and help to the same direction, in order that so desired an object may be obtained.

As to the orders received from Your Majesty for me to look out for and select the prelates of these realms of Castille, as well as those of Aragon and Valencia, who are to go to Trent, the matter has been discussed in the Council of State, and it has been finally resolved, as Your Majesty thought, that three or four prelates will be sufficient from these realms [Leon, Castile, and Andalusia], and from Aragon, Catalonia, and Valencia two more, making in all five or six; and that as there seems to be plenty of time for it, a list should be forwarded to Your Majesty of those willing to go. This has been done, and herewith enclosed is a memorandum of the said prelates, who unite most of the qualities required for the task—good health and goodwill. Your Majesty will be pleased to designate those who are to go [to Trent], that they may prepare for the departure when necessary.

Your Majesty should exert Your influence with the Pope not to insist, as he did last time, upon the attendance, in addition to the bishops You send, of the two Cardinals and other dignitaries entitled to be present, but who do not wish to go. With regard to this paragraph, however, as to the compulsory attendance of other dignitaries, beyond those nominated by Your Majesty, count de Cifuentes is of opinion that it will be prejudicial that any such request should be made to his Holiness, inasmuch as the greater number of votes at the disposal of Your Majesty the better will be the resolutions adopted in the service of God and the welfare of Your realms. Moreover, the Ccunt was of opinion that it would not look well for Your Majesty to appear to be raising obstacles to their attendance. The other councillors did not agree with the Count, but I have thought well to let Your Majesty know his opinion.

Respecting the expenses of the said prelates, which, it is suggested in Your Majesty's letter, might be provided by those who are not to go, the opinion here is that this is quite impracticable, and that no mention should be made of it.

* Not to be found at Simancas.

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This Council of State submits that those Spanish prelates whose ecclesiastical dignity imposes upon them the obligation of going [to Trent] for the general meeting of the Church are already sufficiently provided for by Your Majesty's goodness with money enough to defray their own expenses, and therefore need not have a supplementary allowance made to them. Your Majesty, however, will bear them in mind, and take care that if they need Your Majesty's merciful favour in other matters, it shall be bestowed. Each of the prelates should take in his company one or more lawyers (*letrados*), the affair being of such importance, to whom there will be no necessity to grant any subvention whatever.

But besides the lawyers (*letrados*) who may accompany the prelates [to Trent], it would be advisable that Your Majesty send thither three or four scholars highly graduated in Theology and in Canonical as well as Civil Law, who may well understand, study the points at issue, and advise Your Majesty's representatives at the Council. These doctors may be selected from the enclosed list, and Your Majesty will have to provide for their expenses.

Secretary Idiaquez read to me a copy of the article* concerted between Your Majesty's deputies and those of the king of France, respecting the affairs of the Indies (*sobre lo de las Indias*). It was then officially read in this Council of State, and there was some discussion about it, the opinion of these councillors being that the article in question should be sent to the Council of the Indies, and that the councillors should discuss it, and state their opinion in writing. This was done, and the President's† report shall be enclosed, and sent so that Your Majesty may have it examined there. After this, at a subsequent meeting of this Council of State, the article was again discussed, and it was resolved that the matter—being, generally speaking, so important for these Spanish kingdoms—ought to be also discussed in the Royal Council [of Castille]. This was done accordingly, and I ordered the members of this Council of State to meet and deliberate upon the subject, and summoned the President of the Council, and Dr. Guevara. They all came, and the President stated that the article had been fully discussed, and that the opinion of the Royal Council was that on no account should the clause referred to be adopted, in consequence of the serious evils which might result from trade being allowed, as set forth in the clause. The Council think that it would be extremely prejudicial to the welfare of the Indies, and Your Majesty's interests, and might lead to war, since they (the

* That of the treaty of Crêpy relating to navigation and trade.

† "El Real Consejo de las Indias," was an institution of Charles V. in 1524; cardinal Loaysa was its first President, and as his death did not take place till the 22nd of April 1545, it is natural to suppose that he is the one here alluded to. He was succeeded by Garcia Manrique, count of Osorno.

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French) would not conduct the trade properly, no matter what regulations were made on the subject. The Council of State were also of this opinion, and thought that it would be better that matters should remain as they are. The cardinal of Seville* alone dissented from this, his opinion being that the clause should be accepted with some modifications, and that trade should be permitted. The reply from Portugal on the subject has not yet arrived. I learn that it is being brought by a gentleman sent by the King specially. Valladolid. 14 December 1544.

Spanish. Original draft. 17 *pp.*

* Fr. Garcia de Loaysa was at this time President of the Council of the Indies till his death on the 22nd of April 1545; he was succeeded by count de Osorno (D. Garcia Manrique), and this latter by D. Luis Hurtado de Mendoza. third count of Mondejar. The President of the Council of Castille (*Real Consejo de Camara de Castilla*), was the archbishop of Toledo, D. Juan Tavera, from 1524 to 1545.

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ERRATA.

p. 9, l. 17, insert "to England" after the word "exported."

p. 15, l. 1, substitute "Highness" for "Majesty" and cancel the last two lines of note *.

p. 26, l. 2 from bottom, substitute "it" for "he."

p. 57, last line of note, substitute "sy" for "ty."

p. 65, l. 2, substitute "would" for "should."

p. 125, l. 6, substitute "Battista" for "Ballista."

p. 132, l. 9 and first line of note *, substitute "Warden" for "Warder."

p. 148, l. 17 from bottom, substitute "Inchgarvie" for "Inchgarnoy."

p. 160, l. 8 from bottom, substitute "Egmont" for "D'Aiguemont."

p. 182, l. 14, substitute "Knyvett" for "Trevenet."

p. 206, l. 2, substitute "Montreuil" for "Montreiul."

p. 218, l. 11, substitute "Gonzaga" for "Gomage."

p. 219, l. 2 from bottom, substitute "Commercy" for "Commerse."

p. 238, l. 18, substitute "I" for "he."

p. 238, l. 19, substitute "I said that I had heard" for "He said that he had heard."

p. 241, ls. 5 and 9, the real name of "Francois Van Halle" was "Francis Hall."

p. 244, l. 21 from bottom, substitute "Roussi" for "Ross."

p. 250, l. 18, substitute "Lytemach" for "Lytonalier."

p. 268, note *, substitute "14th" for "20th."

p. 269, l. 18, substitute "Belgrade" for "Novgovod."

„ l. 11 from bottom, substitute "Carcasonne" for "Carcasome."

p. 276, l. 17, delete "and."

p. 297, l. 4, substitute "niece" for "neice."

p. 309, letter 188 is misplaced. It was evidently written in June, not in August as printed.

p. 311, l. 24, substitute "12" for "1200."

„ l. 28, substitute "lasts" for "casks."

p. 312, ls. 14 and 15 from bottom, substitute "and blame me for it" for "and excuse himself from keeping faith with us."

p. 319, l. 20, substitute "which I and my colleague had presented" for "against which I and my colleague had protested."

p. 320, l. 19, delete "Claude Hannebault."

„ l. 10 from bottom, substitute "taken" for "mistaken."

p. 332, l. 8, substitute "Courrières" for "Corron."

p. 350, l. 13 from bottom, delete "d" in "vinasd."

p. 362, l. 1, substitute "Cateau" for "Chastel."

p. 369, ls. 8 and 9, delete "that is his objection to the marriage."

„ l. 12, substitute "to which we referred" for "which we wished him to explain."

p. 373, l. 20, substitute "raise the siege of Montreuil and withdraw by way of St. Omer" for "lay siege to Montreuil by way of St. Omer."

ERRATA—*continued.*

p. 374, delete note †. Don Bernardino de Mendoza was the son of the 1st Marquis of Mondejar.
p. 380, l. 8, substitute "Morette" for "Morelte."
p. 401, l. 8, delete "me and."
p. 406, l. 1, substitute "complaint" for "request."
„ l. 2, substitute "French" for "English."
„ l. 4, substitute "but" for "for."
„ l. 5, substitute "complaint" for "application."
„ last line, substitute "When I hinted" for "As to what they began to say and hint."
p. 407, l. 1, substitute "as" for "and that."
„ l. 23 from bottom, delete "for Calais."
p. 408, l. 16, substitute "that you will arbitrate on" for "in order to comply with and submit to."
„ l. 20, insert "not" after "themselves."
„ delete note †.
p. 411, l. 6 from bottom, delete "eo" in "Eleoenor."
p. 413, l. 16, insert "was" after "occasion."
„ l. 22, delete the words following master, down to enemy, and substitute the following version: "Said to the bishop that he would be willing for your Majesty to make the best arrangement you could with the French."
p. 417, l. 14, delete the words after "admitted," to the end of the sentence, and substitute "as being incompatible."
p. 426, l. 2, delete "very just."
p. 434, l. 19, substitute "arbitration" for "submission."
„ l. 12, delete "of Boulogne."
p. 435, l. 6, substitute "Commercy" for "Commeray."
p. 438, note ‡, substitute "the Empress Isabel" for "Joanna the Crazy."
„ penultimate line of note §, substitute "pero" for "paro."
p. 439, l. 20, substitute "Alcaçoba" for "Aleaçoba."
p. 449, l. 21, insert "we" after "that."
„ l. 3, delete "did."

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The Chronicle of Evesham illustrates the history of that important monastery from about 690 to 1418. Its chief feature is an autobiography, which makes us acquainted with the inner daily life of a great abbey. Interspersed are many notices of general, personal, and local history.

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Richard of Cirencester's history, in four books, extends from 447 to 1066. It gives many charters in favour of Westminster Abbey, and a very full account of the lives and miracles of the saints, especially of Edward the Confessor, whose reign occupies the fourth book. A treatise on the Coronation, by William of Sudbury, a monk of Westminster, fills book ii. c. 3.

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33. HISTORIA ET CARTULARIUM MONASTERII S. PETRI GLOUCESTRIÆ. Vols. I., II., and III. *Edited by* W. H. HART, F.S.A., Membre Correspondant de la Société des Antiquaires de Normandie. 1863–1867.

34. ALEXANDRI NECKAM DE NATURIS RERUM LIBRI DUO; with NECKAM'S POEM, DE LAUDIBUS DIVINÆ SAPIENTIÆ. *Edited by* THOMAS WRIGHT, M.A. 1863.

In the *De Naturis Rerum* are to be found what may be called the rudiments of many sciences mixed up with much error and ignorance. Neckam had his own views in morals, and in giving us a glimpse of them, as well as of his other opinions, he throws much light upon the manners, customs, and general tone of thought prevalent in the twelfth century.

35. LEECHDOMS, WORTCUNNING, AND STARCRAFT OF EARLY ENGLAND; being a Collection of Documents illustrating the History of Science in this Country before the Norman Conquest. Vols. I.–III. *Collected and edited by* the Rev. T. OSWALD COCKAYNE, M.A. 1864–1866.

36 ANNALES MONASTICI. Vol. I.:—Annales de Margan, 1066–1232; Annales de Theokesberia, 1066–1263; Annales de Burton, 1004–1263. Vol. II.:—Annales Monasterii de Wintonia, 519–1277; Annales Monasterii de Waverleia, 1–1291. Vol. III.:—Annales Prioratus de Dunstaplia, 1–1297. Annales Monasterii de Bermundeseia, 1042–1432. Vol. IV.:—Annales Monasterii de Oseneia, 1016–1347; Chronicon vulgo dictum Chronicon Thomæ Wykes, 1066–1289; Annales Prioratus de Wigornia, 1–1377. Vol. V.;—Index and Glossary. *Edited by* HENRY RICHARDS LUARD, M.A., Fellow and Assistant Tutor of Trinity College, and Registrary of the University, Cambridge. 1864–1869.

The present collection embraces chronicles compiled in religious houses in England during the thirteenth century. These distinct works are ten in number. The extreme period which they embrace ranges from the year 1 to 1432.

87. MAGNA VITA S. HUGONIS EPISCOPI LINCOLNIENSIS. *Edited by* the Rev. JAMES F. DIMOCK, M.A., Rector of Barnburgh, Yorkshire. 1864.

This work is valuable, not only as a biography of a celebrated ecclesiastic but as the work of a man, who, from personal knowledge, gives notices of passing events, as well as of individuals who were then taking active part in public affairs.

88. CHRONICLES AND MEMORIALS OF THE REIGN OF RICHARD THE FIRST. Vol. I.:—ITINERARIUM PEREGRINORUM ET GESTA REGIS RICARDI. Vol. II.:—EPISTOLÆ CANTUARIENSES; the Letters of the Prior and Convent of Christ Church, Canterbury; 1187 to 1199. *Edited by* the Rev. WILLIAM STUBBS, M.A., Vicar of Navestock, Essex, and Lambeth Librarian. 1864–1865.

The authorship of the Chronicle in Vol. I., hitherto ascribed to Geoffrey Vinesauf, is now more correctly ascribed to Richard, Canon of the Holy Trinity of London.
The letters in Vol. II., written between 1187 and 1199, had their origin in a dispute which arose from the attempts of Baldwin and Hubert, archbishops of Canterbury, to found a college of secular canons, a project which gave great umbrage to the monks of Canterbury.

39. RECUEIL DES CRONIQUES ET ANCHIENNES ISTORIES DE LA GRANT BRETAIGNE A PRESENT NOMME ENGLETERRE, par JEHAN DE WAURIN. Vol. I. Albina to 688. Vol. II., 1399–1422. Vol. III., 1422–1431. *Edited by* WILLIAM HARDY, F.S.A. 1864–1879. Vol. IV., 1431–1447. Vol. V., 1447–1471. *Edited by* Sir WILLIAM HARDY, F.S.A., and EDWARD L. C. P. HARDY, F.S.A. 1884–1891.

40. A COLLECTION OF THE CHRONICLES AND ANCIENT HISTORIES OF GREAT BRITAIN, NOW CALLED ENGLAND, by JOHN DE WAURIN. Vol. I., Albina to 668. Vol. II., 1399–1422. Vol. III., 1422–1431. (Translations of the preceding Vols. I., II., and III.) *Edited and translated by* Sir WILLIAM HARDY, F.S.A., and EDWARD L. C. P. HARDY, F.S.A. 1864–1891.

41. POLYCHRONICON RANULPHI HIGDEN, with Trevisa's Translation. Vols. I. and II. *Edited by* CHURCHILL BABINGTON, B.D., Senior Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge. Vols. III.–IX. *Edited by* the Rev. JOSEPH RAWSON LUMBY, D.D., Norrisian Professor of Divinity, Vicar of St. Edward's, Fellow of St. Catharine's College, and late Fellow of Magdalene College, Cambridge. 1865–1886.

This chronicle begins with the creation, and is brought down to the reign of Edward III. It enables us to form a very fair estimate of the knowledge of history and geography which well-informed readers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries possessed, for it was then the standard work on general history.
The two English translations, which are printed with the original Latin, afford interesting illustrations of the gradual change of our language, for one was made in the fourteenth century, the other in the fifteenth.

42. LE LIVERE DE REIS DE BRITTANIE E LE LIVERE DE REIS DE ENGLETERE. *Edited by* the Rev. JOHN GLOVER, M.A., Vicar of Brading, Isle of Wight, formerly Librarian of Trinity College, Cambridge. 1865.

These two treaties are valuable as careful abstracts of previous historians. Some various readings are given which are interesting to the philologist as instances of semi-Saxonised French.

43. CHRONICA MONASTERII DE MELSA AB ANNO 1150 USQUE AD ANNUM 1406, Vols. I.–III. *Edited by* EDWARD AUGUSTUS BOND, Assistant Keeper of Manuscripts, and Egerton Librarian, British Museum. 1866–1868.

The Abbey of Meaux was a Cistercian house, and the work of its abbot is a faithful and often minute record of the establishment of a religious community, of its progress in forming an ample revenue, of its struggles to maintain its acquisitions, and of its relations to the governing institutions of the country.

44. MATTHÆI PARISIENSIS HISTORIA ANGLORUM, SIVE UT VULGO DICITUR, HISTORIA MINOR. Vols. I., II., and III. 1067–1253. *Edited by* Sir FREDERICK MADDEN, K.H., Keeper of the Manuscript Department of the British Museum. 1866–1869.

45. LIBER MONASTERII DE HYDA: A CHRONICLE AND CHARTULARY OF HYDE ABBEY, WINCHESTER, 455–1023. *Edited by* EDWARD EDWARDS. 1866.

The "Book of Hyde" is a compilation from much earlier sources which are usually indicated with considerable care and precision. In many cases, however, the Hyde

Chronicler appears to correct, to qualify, or to amplify the statements which, in substance, he adopts.

There is to be found, in the "Book of Hyde," much information relating to the reign of King Alfred which is not known to exist elsewhere. The volume contains some curious specimens of Anglo-Saxon and mediæval English.

46. CHRONICON SCOTORUM; A CHRONICLE OF IRISH AFFAIRS, from the earliest times to 1135; and SUPPLEMENT, containing the events from 1141 to 1150. *Edited, with Translation, by* WILLIAM MAUNSELL HENNESSY, M.R.I.A. 1866.

47. THE CHRONICLE OF PIERRE DE LANGTOFT, IN FRENCH VERSE, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE DEATH OF EDWARD I. Vols. I and II. *Edited by* THOMAS WRIGHT, M.A. 1866-1868.

It is probable that Pierre de Langtoft was a canon of Bridlington, in Yorkshire, and lived in the reign of Edward I., and during a portion of the reign of Edward II. This chronicle is divided into three parts; in the first, is an abridgment of Geoffrey of Monmouth's "Historia Britonum;" in the second, a history of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman kings, to the death of Henry III.; in the third, a history of the reign of Edward I. The language is a curious specimen of the French of Yorkshire.

48. THE WAR OF THE GAEDHIL WITH THE GAILL, or THE INVASIONS OF IRELAND BY THE DANES AND OTHER NORSEMEN. *Edited, with a Translation, by* the Rev. JAMES HENTHORN TODD, D.D., Senior Fellow of Trinity College, and Regius Professor of Hebrew in the University of Dublin. 1867.

The work in its present form, in the editor's opinion, is a comparatively modern version of an ancient original. The story is told after the manner of the Scandinavian Sagas.

49. GESTA REGIS HENRICI SECUNDI BENEDICTI ABBATIS. CHRONICLE OF THE REIGNS OF HENRY II. AND RICHARD I., 1169–1192, known under the name of BENEDICT OF PETERBOROUGH. Vols. I. and II. *Edited by* the Rev. WILLIAM STUBBS, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History, Oxford, and Lambeth Librarian. 1867.

50. MUNIMENTA ACADEMICA, OR, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF ACADEMICAL LIFE AND STUDIES AT OXFORD (in Two Parts). *Edited by* the Rev. HENRY ANSTEY, M.A., Vicar of St. Wendron, Cornwall, and late Vice-Principal of St. Mary Hall, Oxford. 1868.

51. CHRONICA MAGISTRI ROGERI DE HOUEDENE. Vols. I.–IV. *Edited by* the Rev. WILLIAM STUBBS, M.A., Regius Professor of Modern History, and Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. 1868–1871.

The earlier portion, extending from 732 to 1148, appears to be a copy of a compilation made in Northumbria about 1161, to which Hoveden added little. From 1148 to 1169—a very valuable portion of this work—the matter is derived from another source, to which Hoveden appears to have supplied little. From 1170 to 1192 is the portion which corresponds to some extent with the Chronicle known under the name of Benedict of Peterborough (*see* No. 49). From 1192 to 1201 may be said to be wholly Hoveden's work.

52. WILLELMI MALMESBIRIENSIS MONACHI DE GESTIS PONTIFICUM ANGLORUM LIBRI QUINQUE. *Edited by* N. E. S. A. HAMILTON, of the Department of Manuscripts, British Museum. 1870.

53. HISTORIC AND MUNICIPAL DOCUMENTS OF IRELAND, FROM THE ARCHIVES OF THE CITY OF DUBLIN, &c. 1172–1320. *Edited by* JOHN T. GILBERT, F.S.A., Secretary of the Public Record Office of Ireland. 1870.

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The first volume of these Chronicles contains the *Annales Londonienses* and the *Annales Paulini:* the second, I.—*Commendatio Lamentabilis in Transitu magni Regis Edwardi.* II.—*Gesta Edwardi de Carnarvan Auctore Canonico Bridlingtoniensi.* III.—*Monachi cujusdam Malmesberiensis Vita Edwardi II.* IV.—*Vita et Mors Edward II., conscripta a Thoma de la Moore.*

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Vol. III. contains the *Gesta Stephani Regis*, the Chronicle of Richard of Hexham, the *Relatio de Standardo* of St. Aelred of Rievaulx, the poem of Jordan Fantosme, and the Chronicle of Richard of Devizes.
Vol. IV. contains the Chronicle of Robert of Torigni.

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84. CHRONICA ROGERI DE WENDOVER, SIVE FLORES HISTORIARUM. Vols. I.–III. *Edited by* HENRY GAY HEWLETT, Keeper of the Records of the Land Revenue. 1886–1889.

This edition gives that portion only of Roger of Wendover's Chronicle which can be accounted an original authority.

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The Letters printed in these volumes were chiefly written between 1296 and 1333.

86. THE METRICAL CHRONICLE OF ROBERT OF GLOUCESTER. *Edited by* WILLIAM ALDIS WRIGHT, M.A., Senior Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Parts I. and II., 1887.

The date of the composition of this Chronicle is placed about the year 1300. The writer appears to have been an eye witness of many events of which he describes. The language in which it is written was the dialect of Gloucestershire at that time.

87. CHRONICLE OF ROBERT OF BRUNNE. *Edited by* FREDERICK JAMES FURNIVALL, M.A., Barrister-at-Law. Parts I. and II. 1887.

Robert of Brunne, or Bourne, co. Lincoln, was a member of the Gilbertine Order established at Sempringham. His Chronicle is described by its editor as a work of fiction, a contribution not to English history, but to the history of English.

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
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