

A CRITICAL ACCOUNT
PHILOSOPHY OF (KANT.)

WITH AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION.

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Dedicated

To the Memory of

George Rankine Luke,

Late Senior Student and Tutor of Christ Church,
Oxford.

Io veggio ben che giammai non si sazia
Nostro intelletto, se'l Ver non lo illustra,
Di fuor dal qual nessun vero si spazia.
Posasi in esso, come fera in lustra,
Tosto che giunto l'ha; e giugner puollo;
Se non, ciascun disio sarebbe frustra.
Nasce per quello, a guisa di rampollo,
Appiè del vero il dubbio; ed è natura
Ch'al sommo pinga noi di collo in collo.

Dante, *Paradiso*, iv. 123-32.

P R E F A C E.

THE object of this work is to explain the Critical Philosophy in its relation to the general development of Philosophy, and especially to the stages of that development which immediately preceded it. I have therefore found it necessary to give a short account of the tendencies and methods of the three great modern schools of speculation, which were founded by Des Cartes, by Locke, and by Leibnitz. The influence of Des Cartes and Spinoza upon Kant was remote and indirect;¹ that of Locke and Hume on the one hand, and of Leibnitz and Wolff on the other, was direct and immediate. As regards the philosophy of Locke and Hume, the exhaustive work of Mr. Green made it unnecessary for me to enter into much detail. As regards the philosophy of Leibnitz, there is, so far as I know, no satisfactory account or criticism of it in the English language:

¹ For a fuller account of the Cartesian school, the author may refer to his article on "Cartesianism" in the *Encyclopædia Britannica*.

and for that reason, as well as because the connexion of his speculations with those of Kant has not received so much attention, I have given more space to the examination of that author.

It was originally my intention to give a general account of the development of the philosophy of Kant, without specially examining his different works, or following minutely his own division of the subject. But I soon found that, especially in the case of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it was almost impossible to separate the substance of the Critical Philosophy from Kant's mode of exhibiting it. The *Critique*, besides, has become the subject of so much controversy, that any account of its doctrines requires a running commentary on the text to justify it. For these reasons, as well as for the convenience of students, I have thought it advisable, in the first place, to state what I believed to be the meaning of each considerable section of the *Critique*, and then to add such comments and criticisms as seemed to be necessary. In some few cases, where it would have involved unnecessary repetition, I have not rigidly adhered to this method of separating explanation from criticism; but, in these cases, I think the distinction has been sufficiently indicated to save the reader from any confusion.

The number of works on the *Critique*, by German

writers, has of late been very great, and I cannot pretend to have read all of them; but I wish to express special obligations to Professor Bona Meyer (*Kant's Psychologie*), to Dr. H. Cohen (*Kant's Theorie der Erfahrung*), to Dr. E. Arnoldt (*Kant's transcendente Idealität des Raumes und der Zeit*), and to Dr. Hölder (*Kantische Erkenntnisslehre*). In revising my account of the pre-critical works of Kant, I have derived considerable assistance from Dr. Paulsen (*Versuch einer Entwicklungs-Geschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisslehre*). I have also consulted with advantage the writings of Drs. Liebmann, Grapengiesser, Von Hartmann, Thiele, and others. On the whole, I owe most to the writings of Kant's immediate successors, especially to Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, Jacobi, Maimon, and Schopenhauer. I am obliged to content myself with this general acknowledgment of my debts, for, in most cases, I find it all but impossible to trace the special obligations which I owe to numerous books read during my study of Kant.

I am responsible for my own translations, but, for the convenience of English readers, I have added references to Professor Meiklejohn's translation of the *Critique*, and Professor Mahaffy's translation of the *Prolegomena* (in the third volume of his *Kant's Critical Philosophy for English Readers*). I have also referred to Professor Mahaffy's translations of

those passages from the first edition of the *Critique* which do not appear in the second edition (included in the same volume of his book).¹

I hope at some future time to complete the general plan of this work in another volume on the Ethical and Æsthetical works of Kant, especially the *Critique of Practical Reason*, and the *Critique of Judgment*.

¹ There is no small difficulty in the exact rendering of Kantian terms. *Anschauung* I always translate by 'Perception,' and *Begriff* by 'Conception.' For *Vorstellung* I have reluctantly chosen 'Idea' as the nearest equivalent, following the use or abuse of that word which Locke has rendered general among English writers. The disadvantage of this is, that 'Idea' is used by Kant himself in a narrower sense; but I think the context will, in every case, make it sufficiently clear which sense is intended. I cannot reconcile myself to the usual translation, 'Representation,' which is both awkward and misleading.

Mr. Monck has written a short *Introduction to the Critical Philosophy*, which will be found useful by those who are commencing the study of the *Critique*.

UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW,

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IV.A.17

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

INTRODUCTION.

CHAPTER I.

THE CRITICAL PROBLEM.



“THIS age may be best characterised as the age of criticism—a criticism to which everything must submit. Religion, on the ground of its sanctity, and law, on the ground of its majesty, often resist this sifting of their claims. But in so doing, they inevitably awake a not unjust suspicion that their claims are ill-founded, and they can no longer expect the unfeigned homage paid by reason to that which has shown itself able to stand the test of free enquiry.”

Necessity
of Criti-
cism.

In these words Kant expresses the thought that underlies and animates all his work. Philosophy has to retrace the path of the ordinary consciousness even in its highest manifestations in religion and morality, to analyse the process by which all our positive beliefs and institutions were created, and to criticise that process. The result of that criticism may be either the justification, the condemnation, or the modification of the ordinary consciousness. It

may be the discovery that reason was at the making of our world, that the conceptions of the natural and spiritual universe which we find in common sense, and in that extension and correction of common sense which we call science, are capable of rational explanation and justification. It may show that the historical movement which has built up our social organization, and through it by custom and teaching has formed our moral and intellectual life, is no mere series of contingencies, but a course of development whose law and necessity are derived from the nature of reason itself. Or, on the other hand, it may show, as Hume thought he had shown, that the most fixed beliefs of the common understanding disappear before the analysis that detects their origin: that there is no necessity, nothing but accident, in the combinations of thought that constitute them, and that science is but an extension or systematic development of the groundless assumptions and unjustifiable inferences of the common understanding. It may teach us to regard our moral life with all that it depends on, as the result of a succession of historical accidents, or, what is the same thing, of a merely external necessity, down to the last accident or necessity by which we were born in a particular time to breathe a particular spiritual atmosphere. But whatever be the result, whether it be or be not possible to vindicate to awakened and conscious reason the result of its own unconscious education,—of one thing Kant warns us, viz., that we cannot safely shrink from the testing process. The question here is of such a nature that, when once asked, it must be answered in one way or another. If the individual has separated

himself from his 'spiritual substance' in the common beliefs of his time and place, if he has begun to question the necessity of that view of the world of which he finds himself possessed, he has undergone an experience from the effects of which he can never escape. • That harmony with himself, that spiritual security and innocence, which meant simply that his self-consciousness was inseparable from his consciousness of the general life in which he had a part, is incapable of being restored to him who has become conscious of the distinction. Nor can we bring back that fulness and energy of spiritual life, which were enjoyed so long as the 'age of faith' lasted, by a mere resolve to ignore the question that has disturbed us. To say with Reid that common sense gives us certain beliefs which are not to be questioned, and to point to an agreement of all unsophisticated minds in holding these beliefs, is only to point back to the state we have lost, and to tell us that it is the most desirable state. It does not alter the fact that the individual reason has questioned these beliefs, and that the question has not been answered: in other words, the division which the reason of the individual has discovered between itself and that with which it formerly identified itself, has not been reconciled. So, when Jacobi declares that the recognition of any difference between the mind and its object is fatal to faith, and that we cannot apprehend God by the finite or reflective consciousness, but must apprehend him by a consciousness which is in identity with its object, he is merely telling us to forget the difference we have discovered in order to enjoy the unity. Or, again, when the Protestant who has separated

himself from the Catholic church, and learnt to regard it as a merely external authority, finds one belief after another showing itself to be equally external, until at last, it may be, all objective dogmas and institutions lose their hold on him, it is vain to ask him simply to reverse the process, to abstract from the differences he has discerned, forget the gulf that has opened up between himself and his beliefs, and without any intellectual mediation, by a mere transcendent act of will, annihilate the division that disturbs his spiritual life. Such a *tour de force*, whether it be performed in the interests of common sense, of science, or of religion, in the interest of our belief in the external world or in the interest of our belief in God, or in some special form of Christian doctrine, or in an infallible church, must be ineffectual to attain the result aimed at. The wounds of reason can only be healed by reason. The faith which is the result of a mere act of will betrays its origin by its restless, dissatisfied, and arbitrary character. It is haunted and driven into fanaticism by the sense of an unsolved contradiction. When forced to defend itself, it often has recourse itself to the weapons of scepticism, which are fatal to the defender as well as to the enemy. It attempts to rest philosophical or religious truth on the proved incapacity of the human mind for the knowledge of either. It is like anything rather than the original simplicity and peace of the unreflecting consciousness, whose unity with itself has not yet been disturbed. The first faith does not exclude reason, for reason is not yet opposed to it, not yet distinguished from it. In submitting to it, therefore, the

The second faith is the despairing effort of self-preservation, that abandons one element, the free movement of reason, in order to preserve the other element, the matter of belief. But with its separation from the form of reason, the matter loses its meaning and value, its educating and its inspiring power. Let the content or substance of our beliefs be ever so reasonable, yet, if they be presented, not as reason, but rather as unreason, they cease to be the truth that makes man free. Whenever the truths, upon which the moral order of life is based, come to be regarded as something given entirely from without, and which human consciousness can neither test nor verify for itself, faith and obedience lose their sincerity and become degraded into political expedients. The State becomes a government obeyed for fear of anarchy; the Creed, a doctrine believed for fear of scepticism. Spiritual life dies out, because the link is destroyed that connected the elements of truth with each other and with the spirit of man.

Our first certitude of things is immediate and uncritical. We find ourselves assured of the existence and nature of ourselves, of the world, and of God, without any consciousness of the logical relation of the elements thus bound together in our thought. The world spiritual and natural in which we live seems to be given along with the consciousness of self as a separate individual existence in that world. We do not ask how it is that the universal and individual consciousness are bound together; how it is that we as individuals do yet in thought transcend the limits of our sensible individuality, and look at ourselves as we look at other objects,

as parts of one universe. The universal point of view from which, as thinking beings, we regard the world, and the individual limitations under which thought is developed and realised in us as sensitive organisms, are somehow united together without any distinct consciousness of the difficulty involved in this unity of the individual and the universal life. The terms are implicitly reconciled, and their difference and opposition dissolved without their being separately recognised or even named. But the progress of intellectual life inevitably brings with it a disturbance of this simple consciousness, a separation and opposition of the individual and the universal, of thought and things; a division of the consciousness of self from the consciousness of the world, and of both from the consciousness of God. Doubt and reflection rend the 'seamless garment' of thought, and things that seemed before to be essentially interwoven within each other, now appear as irreconcilable opposites. When this point is reached, it is vain to oppose a faith, which is a mere assertion of unity, to the sceptical proof of difference. The sceptic himself professes such a faith, and points to our assertion as an acknowledgment of his victory. What is necessary is, that the immediate and unreasoned synthesis of our first consciousness should give place to mediate or reasoned synthesis, that the link that binds the opposed elements of truth should be found, that the apparent contradiction between the form of thought and the matter of it, between the individual consciousness and the objective reality, should be dissolved and transcended, and that without denying its relative validity and importance. The reconciliation of the mind with

itself, the faith which is also reason, cannot be attained till we get beyond the point of view, in which such contradictions seem absolute, and get beyond it, not by suppressing one of the alternatives, but by discovering the unity of principle that explains their difference.

Now this is the problem which Kant proposed to himself as the problem of criticism. It is immediately connected with the question which he presents to us at the beginning of the Critique of Pure Reason—"How are synthetic *a priori* judgments possible?" For the meaning of this question, as we shall see, is simply this—How can the individual mind get beyond itself? how can we *know*? I can well understand (Kant seems to argue) how analytic propositions are possible; how the mind, when it has once possessed itself of certain conceptions, can analyse them, or break them up into their parts. But in so doing it is merely dealing with itself: how can it go on to add to its own conceptions of objects? How can the mind throw a bridge between itself and objective reality? how can it form a new synthesis and bind elements together which are not already given to it in combination, with the assurance that they are so combined in the objective world? We find as a matter of fact that it has actually done so, for we are continually making judgments in relation to objects, and in these judgments binding together ideas that by no means imply each other, or can be got by mere analysis from each other. But what is the value of this process? How is what we call experience possible? What validity can be ascribed to our knowledge of objects when, on the very assumption

Kant's
statement
of the pro-
blem.

that they *are* objects, the impossibility of knowledge seems to be involved? It is the office of criticism to discover the value of knowledge—by scrutinising its genesis. If we can trace the process whereby knowledge is attained, we shall be able to see on what it rests, and thereby to determine its validity, and the limit of its validity—to determine whether it is trustworthy in regard to all the objects it seems to disclose to us, or only in relation to some of these, and not to others. For it is possible that the result may not be the same in all branches of human thought, that, for instance, mathematics and physics may be capable of justification before the bar of reason, but not metaphysics or theology. In any case, it is evident that, until we have thus tested our knowledge, and seen by what title we possess it, our possession must be precarious and liable to the inroads of scepticism. On the other hand, whenever we are able to vindicate our knowledge by connecting its objects with the very nature of reason itself, we shall have secure and certain ground on which to build the edifice of science.

The age of
Criticism.

Kant called his own age the age of criticism. It would be nearer the truth to call it the age of criticism *par excellence*. It was only in Kant's time that the problem of knowledge took the definite form just described; it was only in his time that the subjective and objective were distinctly separated from, and opposed to, each other, and that therefore the extent of the difficulty and the conditions of its solution were clearly discerned. Yet, in a sense, Kant's problem is simply the oldest of all problems, and the age of criticism begins with

philosophy itself. Philosophy, in its very dawn, presupposes a disturbance of the unity of man's life, a division and discord between the individual and his world, a spiritual revolt against custom, tradition, and opinion, and an attempt to test them by a new standard. Philosophy is 'nothing if not critical;' it is an analysis of all things with a view to a higher synthesis which shall no longer be instinctive or habitual, but rational. It begins in doubt and wonder, which disturb the peace of ignorance, and its goal is the peace of knowledge. But at first, and in the earlier philosophies, there is an imperfect analysis, and therefore in them there can be only an imperfect synthesis. The difficulty cannot be solved, because it has not been fathomed. The apparent failure of philosophy in spite of real progress is explained, when we observe that the progress is not simply towards better answers to the question asked, but quite as much towards the deepening and enlarging of the question. For until the seeming contradiction has been stretched to the utmost, it cannot be reconciled; until the problem has been stated in its most dangerous form, all solutions of it must be partial and inadequate. They must leave after all an inexplicable surd, like the matter of Aristotle, which simply indicates a place left vacant by the logic of the system. If Kant prepared the way for a better philosophy than that of his predecessors, it was because he took up the problem at a more advanced stage after the failure of the individualism of Locke and Leibnitz, as well as of the universalism of Spinoza. He asked at first sight a harder question, but it turned out to be a question that could be answered.

To show more clearly the nature of this question, a short sketch of the history of philosophy seems to be necessary ; a sketch which may be very vague and general in relation to the earlier period, but which must become more definite and detailed as we approach the time of Kant himself.

CHAPTER II.

THE CRITICAL SPIRIT IN ANCIENT AND MEDIÆVAL
PHILOSOPHY.

THE philosophy of Greece does not correspond to Kant's idea of criticism; mainly because it does not give to the individual, as such, that independent position, that right of private judgment which has been claimed for him in modern times. The conception that the individual is a law to himself, and that no doctrine can claim to be admitted, no rule to be obeyed by him, except on the evidence of his own consciousness, would have seemed to the Greek philosophers to involve intellectual and moral anarchy. If their speculation was itself an assertion of man's spiritual freedom, yet with them it was an unconscious assertion of it. If they appealed from the senses and the imagination to the reason, yet they did not regard man as essentially rational; and hence their claim for the rights of reason was not a claim for the rights of man. A philosophy that conceives of reason as the special faculty of the Greek as distinguished from the barbarian, of the philosopher as distinguished from the crowd, and not as that consciousness of self which makes

Greek
philosophy
not indivi-
dualistic.

us men, can only emancipate the man of culture. Its ideal life is not possible for all; it is attainable in its perfection only by the philosopher, it is not altogether beyond the reach of the statesman, but it gradually disappears as we descend to the populace, who are the mere instruments of a happiness they cannot partake. In such a philosophy the claim of the individual to find in his own consciousness the touchstone of truth is not recognised, and therefore the difficulty that arises when that claim is recognised, cannot be felt. It is not till reason has been distinctly defined as self-conscious and individual, that it becomes hard to see how it can also be universal, how it can transcend the individuality of the subject so as to apprehend the objective reality of things.

Individual-
ism of
Stoics and
Epicureans
is dog-
matic.

This critical difficulty appears for the first time in the post-Aristotelian philosophers, and it is this which gives them their peculiarly modern aspect. The problem of the criterion of truth, which was the subject of so much controversy to the Stoics, Epicureans, and Sceptics, is simply the problem of knowledge in the form which it necessarily takes in all individualistic speculation. Such speculation necessarily starts with the assumption of a dualism between knowing and being, between the "me" and the "not me," without any attempt to explain the nature and origin of this dualism. It presupposes a world of reality independent of the thinking subject, and asks how the thinking subject, confined as he is to his own thoughts and feelings, can ever come to know it. As thus stated the problem is an insoluble one, and the post-Aristotelian schools can hardly be said even to have made a serious

effort to solve it. The Stoics, whose criterion of truth, when we examine the meaning of their various utterances, turns out to be but the formal self-identity of thought, or the logical laws of identity and contradiction, ignored or suppressed the difficulty altogether. Their assertion that "the rational is the real" was empty and valueless, for to them the rational meant only the self-consistent. Their principle was not, in Kant's language, a principle of synthesis, and therefore it could not enable them to show that anything in particular exists or does not exist. On the other hand, the Epicureans, whose criterion of truth was sensation, were from the first involved in the contradiction of seeking the objective in that which is essentially subjective, the universal in that which is essentially individual. The very problem as to the possibility of knowing the objective world, must lose its meaning, if immediate sensation be not interpreted as having relation to something different from, and more permanent than itself. And if it be so interpreted, the criterion of truth cannot be the mere isolated sensation as such. The atomic theory of Epicurus betrays undisguisedly the fatal defect that clings to all similar attempts to base knowledge on simple feeling. Sensationalism at once necessitates and renders impossible a materialistic explanation of the universe. It necessitates materialism, for it must explain sensations as impressions made by a material object; and it renders it impossible, for the impressions in themselves can tell us nothing of the object that produces them. Thus, the individualistic schools of later antiquity failed to apprehend, much more to solve, the difficulties of the problem they had set

before them; the Epicureans, because by their criterion it was impossible to explain how the individual should go beyond his own individuality at all; and the Stoics, because the universality of reason—i.e., its independence of the feelings of the individual subject—was conceived by them in a merely formal and negative way, and their criterion of truth was at best a criterion of logical self-consistency.

And therefore easily refuted by Sceptics.

The Sceptics made short work with the opposite dogmatisms of the Stoics and Epicureans. They had in fact, merely to show that they *were* dogmatisms; or, in other words, that they were based on principles that were only assumptions. Taking their stand on the same opposition between the world and the individual consciousness which Stoics and Epicureans had presupposed, they needed simply to point out that, on this presupposition, the problem is absolutely insoluble except by a 'leap in the dark.' The objection which Berkeley afterwards pressed against the materialists, *they* pressed against both schools equally, that our consciousness cannot go beyond itself to apprehend that of which, according to the very idea of it, we are not conscious. On the one side is the object, on the other the individual mind. How can consciousness bridge the gulf between itself and that which is not itself? how can it be one of the terms, and at the same time the unity that includes them both? *Tecum habita et noris quam sit tibi curta supellex.* We cannot leap off our own shadow. All questions as to objective truth and reality, as such, must be rejected by the mind that would confine itself within the limits of certitude, and avoid arbitrary hypo-

thesis. Peace is to be found, not where the Stoics and Epicureans sought it, in conforming ourselves to a law of nature without us, of which we know nothing; but in conforming ourselves to the nature within us, in the self-centred life that makes itself independent of everything but the individuality in which it is imprisoned.

The victory of the Sceptic seems complete so long as we regard his reasoning simply as an *argumentum ad homines*, as a weapon of polemic against the Stoics and Epicureans. He needs in fact only to point out that those who begin, as they begin, by assuming an absolute dualism between the self-consciousness of the individual and the world, can never find any logical way of transition from the one to the other. When, however, we ask him to prove either this presupposed dualism, or the logical possibility of his own position, we soon discover that scepticism, in destroying every dogmatism, destroys itself. If we cannot know a world which is not ourselves, we cannot know that it exists; and if we do not know that it exists, then the very division between knowing and being disappears. The whole force of the sceptic assertion that we know appearance and not reality, depends on the assumption that there is a reality distinct from appearance. Carry out the argument of scepticism to its legitimate conclusion in the denial of any object distinct from the states of the subject, and the ignorance disappears along with the knowledge. In short, the distinction of subject and object must be assumed ere the limitation of the subject to the phenomena of his own consciousness can have any meaning. Appearance and reality do not need to

Scepticism
also a dog-
matism.

be reconciled unless they have first been separated ; and the sceptic has first to justify the division of the terms ere he can make it the ground of his scepticism. On the other hand, if it be dogmatism to assert anything positive, the self-concentration of the sceptic in opposition to dogmatism becomes at a certain point, as Bacon remarked, itself a dogmatism. The negation of the reality of the object involves the assertion of a standard of reality in the mind of the subject. For how does the sceptic maintain his thesis that we know only appearance ? It is by showing that, in regard to every question, two opposite views may be supported with equal force of reason. If thought and perception apprehend reality, they must, it is assumed, apprehend something permanent, self-consistent, and identical ; what they do apprehend is changeable, self-contradictory, and without definite quality, therefore they apprehend only appearance. Thus the sceptic has an idea of truth and knowledge, with which he compares our actual conceptions of things and finds them wanting. The necessity of reason to assert itself is revealed even in his denial of reason. It is vain for him to declare that he does not dogmatise even about the incomprehensibility of things, and that his philosophy is "like a medicine that purges out itself along with the disease." He cannot doubt his own doubt *ad infinitum* ; his negation of the particular rests on the assertion of the universal. The very logic by which he overthrows the dogmas of philosophy, implies that the mind possesses in itself the form and idea of truth. His deepest doubt reveals a certitude that transcends and embraces it.

When we try to trace the effect of this experience on the philosophies or theosophies that close the record of Greek speculation, we are somewhat embarrassed by the increasing imperfection of logical method and form, that characterises the transition period between the isolated national civilisation of the ancient world, and the universal culture of Christendom. It was a time when men were troubled with thoughts beyond the reaches of their souls, when Eastern and Western ideas met together, and the synthesis between them was performed rather by the heart than the head. In the absence of any clear principle of unity, of any logic adequate to the task of defining the different elements, and bringing them into intelligible relation to each other, imagination had to supply the defects of reason. A literature grew up in which the language of symbol and metaphor was strangely blended and confused with the language of abstract thought. Such a literature, full of suggestive matter, yet utterly crude and almost barbarous in respect of scientific form, it is not easy to interpret, without finding either too much or too little meaning in it. Still, we cannot mistake its general bearing and fundamental thought, illustrated as it is by the contemporaneous development of Christian doctrine, and this is all that is necessary for our purpose.

The Neo-platonic period.

That thought is the thought of a reconciliation of the dualism which in various forms, and finally in the form of the dualism of subject and object, had been the presupposition of all Greek philosophy, and had reached its inevitable result in Scepticism. Scepticism had however more than a merely negative value. In a sense in which the Sceptics did

Its leading idea.

not apply the metaphor, it purged out itself along with the disease. In other words, it suggested that the dualism of matter and form, being and knowing, subject and object, is not absolute; that the thinking subject, as such, transcends the distinction of himself from the object, and that, on the other hand, the object is essentially spiritual. Hence philosophy becomes religious; its problem is no longer to find a bridge between the individual mind and the world, but rather between man and God. The terms set in opposition are the infinite and the finite, and all the speculation of the time is engaged with these two questions: how shall the infinite become finite, or reveal itself in the finite, and how shall the finite consistently with its finite nature rise to the infinite? There is a certain family resemblance in all the various forms which the doctrine of reconciliation takes. On the one side, God, the universal Being, is regarded as not abiding in himself, but, in some way, going out of himself, and by the necessity of his own nature giving rise to the finite. On the other side, the finite is no longer supposed to be limited to itself; even in the sense of its own weakness, its own nothingness, it has an implicit consciousness of its relation to the infinite, and in some way, whether by moral or intellectual development, or by a mystic ecstasy, it is supposed to be capable of passing beyond its own limits to partake in the life of God. Thus the process of the infinite out of itself into the finite, is met by the process of the finite into the infinite. Each side of the antagonism loses its absolute fixity, and comes into relation with the other, or even passes into unity with the other; yet each side still maintains its self-identity in the

process of self-surrender, or rather, the highest manifestation of the life of each is just this process of self-surrender to the other. The idea of the Logos, the unity that expresses itself in difference, and the idea of atonement, of the return of the differences into unity, rule the spirit of the age, and in all its religious or philosophical systems, both ideas are represented in one form or another.

It is unnecessary to enter into any detailed account of the particular forms in which these ideas were expressed by different Neoplatonic or Gnostic writers. These were often arbitrary and fantastic enough, but they should not hide from us the importance of the ideas themselves—ideas without which the modern spirit of liberty, and the modern spirit of criticism could not have existed. For it is the conviction, latent or expressed, that in the consciousness of self he has the ultimate test of truth, or, in other words, that there is no absolute dualism between himself and the world, that has given to the individual in modern times the courage to challenge all forms of authority, whether practical or speculative, whether in religion, in politics, or in science. It is this that has inspired him with the sense of absolute rights and claims, and thereby emancipated him from those great social powers by which, in earlier times, his life was absorbed, and from which, at all times, he derives the culture of his higher nature. Nay, it is this also that has set him in a free attitude towards his immediate consciousness of outward nature, and so provoked that spirit of investigation out of which modern science has sprung. A religion which should penetrate mankind with this conviction, a religion in other

Relation of
it to
Criticism.

words founded on the idea of the unity of the human and the divine, was necessary to produce, as in its ultimate development it must produce, an age of criticism.

Christian
form of the
idea.

Christianity was not in the beginning a philosophical theory, it was the life of Christ. But this life stood in essential connection with the thoughts and wants of the time. Christ laid hold of the spirits of men with irresistible force, just because the whole religious life of the time was connected with the effort to bring the infinite and finite, the divine and the human together, to conceive God as revealing himself, man as transcending himself. And, on the other hand, this thought could not but react on the idea of Christ as it was received in the Church, and assist in its development. Already, in the earlier writings of St. Paul, that idea has lost its peculiarly Jewish form. Jesus is not merely the Messiah of the Jews, but has become the Christ of mankind. And in the later epistles which, whether Pauline or not, contain the immediate and necessary development of Pauline doctrine, Christ's universal position towards man is directly combined with the idea that he is the Logos of God, the express image of his person. It was impossible for Christianity, born so late in the world's history, to rest for more than a moment in the simple form of intuitive feeling and implicit faith; it was already becoming a doctrine even in the minds of its very first believers. And the rapid formulating of the creed of the Church in regard to the nature of God, showed how pressing was the intellectual necessity, by which the Christian consciousness was driven to make clear and explicit its answer to the great question of the time.

Yet the intellect thus awakened was but ill equipped for the task of apprehending and analysing the fact of Christianity, or of discovering the unity of principle that bound together all its different elements. The proper age of Greek philosophy had passed, and the metaphysical and logical conceptions it had elaborated and stored up, mainly in the works of Plato and Aristotle, were inadequate, even if their full meaning had been apprehended, to explain the meaning of the new phenomena of the religious life. The dualism, that underlay Greek speculation, had so impregnated its philosophical language, as to make it unfit for the consistent expression of the idea of reconciliation. When, for example, we examine the metaphysics of Plotinus, we find that his logical and strictly scientific language is always dualistic, and that whenever he attempts to express the unity of the elements distinguished, his style at once becomes metaphorical and pictorial. And when we follow the development of Christian doctrine in the earlier centuries, the same conflict of form and matter presents itself. The history of dogma is a continual war of logic against the spirit of Christianity, a continual re-assertion of the completeness of Christianity against a one-sided logic. Heresy lays hold alternately of that element in Christianity which is kindred to Monotheism, and of that element which is kindred to Pantheism, and the unity of truth is in danger of being lost, because no mode of expression can be devised, in which it may appear consistent with itself. The church, swaying now to one side and now to another, arrests the controversy at a certain stage only by the arbitrary *anathema sit*, of her

Struggle
of Faith
and Reason
in the early
Church.

successive councils. In the dogmas thus fixed and declared, we may find a certain balance maintained between the opposite tendencies that divide the Christian world. Yet we cannot attribute this balance to any clear philosophic consciousness of a unity of principle in Christianity, which permeates and reconciles the difference of its elements. We must attribute it simply to the healthy instinct of Christendom, that repelled any attempt to mutilate its life. When Gibbon sarcastically says, that the most irrational solution of a difficulty was sure to be adopted by the church, he is not far from the truth. By any logic then used, Arianism or Sabellianism, Docetism or Eutychianism, were more reasonable than the dogmas which were erected as barriers against them. But in the struggle of different tendencies, the balance was held by the general sympathy or feeling of Christian men, who refused to give up any element of the faith because they were unable to reconcile it with the rest, and who accepted contradictions rather than an incomplete Christianity. While, therefore, minds in which the logical was stronger than the spiritual interest followed out opposite lines of thought to their result, and were thus forced to sacrifice one or other aspect of their religion to a theoretical unity and self-consistency, the general judgment of the church insisted on combining the strongest statements on one side with the strongest statements on the other, without any attempt at logical reconciliation. With all the appearance of intellectual activity in the earlier centuries of the Christian era, during which the framework of dogma was being put together, the result was the suppression and not the satisfaction

of the questions of the intellect. The different articles laid down by the councils were but successive boundary marks, showing the extent of the territory won by faith from reason. That very doctrine of the union of human and divine, which might have been expected to free the mind of man, seemed to be turned into a means of fettering and enslaving him. Christianity had to be received and felt, it had to penetrate the life of man, and remould the social order, ere it could be understood and criticised: and the momentary silencing of a philosophy whose method was inadequate, was necessary to the development of philosophy itself. Thus the growth of dogma gradually limited, and finally overpowered, the energy of thought. When the predominant influence passed from the Greek to the Latin church, heresy all but died out, and in the silence of criticism the church devoted itself exclusively to its practical task of converting and civilising that chaotic mass of barbarians out of which the modern nations of Europe were to spring.

The first clear, though feeble, assertion of the claims of reason, as distinct from faith, was made by the scholastic philosophy. The scholastics were far from rebelling against the dogmatic system of the church. On the contrary, they started with the acknowledgment of it as absolutely complete and certain, independently of any movement of thought. In their well known motto *Credo ut intelligam*, they intended to lay down the rule of implicit faith in respect to those principles, which constituted the premises of all reasoning on moral and religious subjects, and they vindicated the rights of reason

The
Scholastic
Philoso-
phy.

only as the *ancilla fidei*, whose function it was to analyse and interpret the doctrine first received on authority. The purely external and unquestioning reception of the matter of belief was the first point; but this receptive attitude toward the teaching of the Church was not conceived to be inconsistent with a subsequent process of logical development, by which its bearing on all disputed questions was to be determined, and its utmost consequences to be brought to light. Yet even for this process an external guide was sought and found in Aristotle, who was regarded as the author of a kind of logical revelation, and whose categories and metaphysical principles were assumed to be absolute criteria of truth, applicable equally to all things human and divine. Scholasticism was no free reflection, it was rather the application of a method received on authority to a matter received on authority; it was criticism of a kind, but a criticism that derived its principle and method, as well as the object to which it was applied, from an external source.

Effect of
the
Scholastic
Rational-
ism.

The result of the Scholastic method was necessarily the reverse of its intention. It was supposed, by those who first applied it, to be a purely formal process of analysis and ratiocination, which would elicit the full meaning of the dogma, without in the slightest degree modifying or changing it. But a method always involves a principle, and a change of form is impossible without a change of matter. The categories used to develop and systematise Christian doctrine, inevitably altered its essential character. What seemed most to protect the dogma of the Church from depravation, really left it with-

out defence against the scholastic rationalism. Just because it was received as an external tradition, it was exposed to the utmost distortion from the logical principle applied to it. Just because he accepted his creed from the church with implicit faith, the Scholastic was unprepared to reject, and ready to admit, any strange or even absurd consequence that could with apparent conclusiveness be deduced from it. He sometimes showed in close connection the extreme of slavish submission to authority, and the extreme of rationalistic license. His criticism was lawless and capricious, because there was no subjective check of the spirit upon it, but only the check of a dead external letter. In an earlier period the Christian consciousness had overruled and overmastered logic, and expressed itself in its completeness in the doctrine in spite of all formal contradictions. But now the reverse took place. Logic seized upon a doctrine which had become an external tradition, and finding it no longer protected by a living Christian consciousness, it gradually disintegrated and dissolved it. The Aristotelian philosophy was essentially dualistic, and when its categories and principles were applied in undoubting confidence to a religion which is the implicit negation of all dualism, their effect was not to explain it, but to explain it away. An infinity of subtle distinctions and artificial divisions was the necessary result of an essential contradiction between form and matter, which they disguised but could not remove. The Scholastics did for Christian doctrine what, at a later time, the Casuists did for Christian morality; they gradually buried it under an artificial system, in which all trace of unity of principle was

lost. As by the multitude of casuistical rules, the law of duty was made capricious and uncertain; so in the multitude of scholastic reasons, nothing could be seen to be Christian or rational. The scholastic interpretation of theology ended in separating theology from all real interests, even from the interest of the religious life. It was a gigantic illustration of the truth, which is almost a truism, that reason can be limited only by itself, and that, when it accepts a belief as something purely external and resting on an external authority, it becomes at once lifeless and capricious, without law and without liberty. Scholasticism had completed its work when, by a process of exhaustion, it proved the emptiness and unreality of that transcendent region in which life and light had been sought by mediæval thought, and thus prepared the way for the reconciliation of faith with reason, of religion with human life. Out of this reconciliation, and the more perfect emancipation of the individual reason which it brought with it, arose the modern philosophy.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY—
DESCARTES AND SPINOZA.

CHRISTIANITY, as we have seen, implicitly ^{Mediæval Dualism.} contained in it the idea of a reconciliation of the ancient dualism. By it the opposition of matter and form, which was insoluble to Plato and Aristotle, and the opposition of subject and object, which was insoluble to the Stoics and Epicureans, were alike transcended. When God was conceived as self-revealing, he required no foreign matter upon which he might act, and in which he might realise his will. When the external object was conceived as spiritual, or as the revelation of spirit, it could no longer be regarded as something entirely foreign to, and hidden from, the thought of man. The unity in both cases embraced the difference, and made its terms transparent to each other. But this idea of unity and reconciliation was in the first instance presented in an abstract and undeveloped form. It was at first confined to the church, and did not penetrate the world; it became the source and spring of religious life, but cast no new light upon nature or politics. And just because it did

not yet cast any light upon them, or connect itself with them, it deprived them of all import and value for the spirit of man. Hence the very doctrine of reconciliation itself gave rise to a new opposition between the world and the church, the secular and the sacred, nature and spirit. The general idea of the reconciliation of the divine and the human was set against all particular illustrations or manifestations of it. The spirit of modern science, which finds the simplest phenomenon interesting, because it sees law and order everywhere, and the spirit of modern poetry, to which nature is the transparent vesture of divinity, were equally alien to the mediæval mind. Nature was condemned as unholy, the present world and its interests were treated as essentially evil, the realisation of the spiritual kingdom was deferred to the future life. No scientific curiosity as to nature and human nature could live, except in a few rare minds, when earth was regarded as the "ante-room of heaven," when the spiritual order was not conceived as revealing itself in the natural order, but as continually interfering with it and miraculously overturning it. Science and philosophy were all but swallowed up by theology: and theology, thus divorced from the other interests of man's life, ended by divorcing itself even from the interests of religion.

The Renaissance
and the Reformation.

The Renaissance and the Reformation mark the return to experience. They showed that the doctrine of reconciliation was at last passing from the abstract to the concrete. They were closely related to each other, though sometimes accidentally opposed. The Renaissance was the revindication of nature and human nature, the reassertion of

finite interests. Its revival of ancient literature was but one indication of the awakened thirst for a wider experience, to fill up the void left by an endless and purposeless dialectic, that had in it no principle of development. But, in the first instance, it seemed that this new spirit was essentially secular, that it was opposed not only to theology but also to religion, and that in exalting the human, it depressed the divine. It was Luther's task to show that this was not so—to vindicate religion, on the new ground, as a fact of experience, for the evidence of which man did not need to look to the authority of a divinely commissioned church, but only to his own consciousness. Luther could adopt the scholastic motto *Credo ut intelligam*, but he gave it a new meaning. With him it meant, not 'I accept my creed from authority, that I may afterwards develop its logical meaning and results,' but 'I feel that I may know.' It meant, not that the church must speak before the individual, but that the heart of the individual must speak before his intellect; that religious experience is necessary to him, who would understand the nature of religion. But this experience is possible to every one. The key of knowledge is not in the exclusive possession of any church, any more than it is the reward of any special training of the schools. In this sense the Reformers maintained, that every one has the right, or rather, the duty of private judgment. The Protestant, if he did not accept the maxim *Pectus theologum facit*, was at least obliged to hold, that the cultivated intelligence of the theologian could only evolve, and make articulate, the secret logic of the religious sentiment; that his only function was to justify the process, by which

Christianity influenced the souls of men, by bringing that process to clear self-consciousness.

Empiri-
cism com-
mon to
Luther and
Bacon.

This return to experience is the point of union between the revivers of learning and the Reformers. The explanation of what is *within* the range of human consciousness by that which is supposed to be utterly *beyond* it, is the one thing they are agreed in rejecting. Luther condemns an authoritative church, as standing between the soul and God, in the same spirit in which Bacon afterwards condemned the abstractions of scholastic philosophy as standing between the human mind and nature. Both demand the direct contact of subject and object; both are equally convinced that, by means of this contact, the harmony and unity of the two may be attained without any need of a mediator. In both cases, indeed, a process is held to be necessary: a process, whereby in the one case the natural man, to whom the life of Christ is an external fact, is to be converted and changed into the spiritual man, to whom the belief in Christ is one with the consciousness of himself; and a process in the other case, whereby the student of nature is to free his mind from all presuppositions and prejudices, and make himself, in Bacon's language, into a pure mirror of the external universe. But in the one case, as in the other, the process is one which is to be carried on from beginning to end in the mind and experience of the individual himself, and which involves no dependence on an external authority. The circle is complete within the range of human thought and perception. The living experience is its own sufficient evidence.

The assertion, therefore, of experience in opposition to mediæval dualism, involved the principle, that the

truth can be mediated to the spirit of man only by the movement of that spirit. This movement may in one point of view be described as the self-surrender of the individual mind to a truth, which is independent of it. "Into the kingdom of man which is based on science, as into the kingdom of heaven, we can enter only *sub persona infantis*," * giving up all subjective idols and preconceived opinions, and simply receiving the truth as it is presented to us from without. Yet, on the other hand, this simplicity of reception does not in either case imply a mere passivity of thought. On the contrary, our first apprehension of things is farthest from the truth, and an acquiescence in immediate appearance is denounced, by both Luther and Bacon, as the great hindrance of true religion and true science. In both cases there is a method, a definite course of activity, through which the individual mind must pass, ere it can reach the truth and become identified therewith, so as to find the evidence for it in itself. By this course of activity the object ceases to be, what it is in the first apprehension of it, a merely external object : it comes to be seen in its principle, or cause, or law, and therefore, as, in some sense, one with the thought that apprehends it. Hence, what, in one point of view, is a change of the subject, is, in another point of view a change of the object. The sacrifice of mere subjective presuppositions or idols of the mind, with a view to the simple reception of the truth of nature, may also be regarded as the finding of mind in nature. The surrender of reason to the teaching of Christ is, in another point of view, the discovery of reason in Christianity.

* * "Novum Organum," I, § 68.

Need of
Philosophy
to justify
Experi-
ence.

At the same time, it is to be noticed, that this conception of the unity of thought with its object, which is involved in the Lutheran idea of religion, and in the empiricism of Bacon, was not brought by either of them to clear and explicit consciousness. Bacon, while he describes the method of physical inquiry, and lays down the principles by which it is to be guided, has no thought of connecting his principles or his method with the nature of mind itself. He always speaks as if facts were given through sense without any aid from reason, and as if every contribution of reason to the data of sense must necessarily involve a distortion of these data. His image of the mind as a mirror seemed to him a sufficient account of its relation to the world, and freed him in his own eyes from the necessity of attributing any constitutive power to thought. And Luther, while he allows that the truth must be spiritually discerned, thinks of the conversion whereby it comes to be so discerned, as a state produced in the individual soul by an influence under which it is purely passive. It is therefore fair to say of both, that, though they virtually asserted the unity of truth with the mind that apprehends it, they were content to *feel* this unity without attempting to understand it. The implicit reason of the mind's assent to truth was not by them made explicit. How the individual, as such, can transcend his individuality, how his assurance of that which is not himself can be vindicated, how he can be an exclusive and finite being, and yet in thought can overpass his limits, and regard both himself and all other things from a universal point of view, as if he were 'a spectator of all time and existence,' are

questions which they did not ask. Ultimately, both Bacon and Luther rested on an immediate certitude of feeling. / As the one felt that he was dealing with reality when he was dealing with the external world, so the other felt that he was dealing with reality when he was dealing with God. And the steps taken in both cases to develop this knowledge, and to raise it from the form in which the object is something merely external, into that form in which its law or principle is apprehended, were justified simply by their result. As a matter of fact, nature ceases to be a mere external existence for us, when we have discovered its laws. As a matter of fact, God ceases to be a mere blank name for the absolute power and unity that embraces all things, when we receive into our minds the Christian idea of his nature. But still, even after this process, self, the world, and God have the aspect of three elements, which we find together in our minds, but which are connected by no necessary relations, or at least by relations, which are felt only, and not understood. Hence this immediate and unreflected consciousness in all its forms is still exposed to the shocks of doubt, a doubt that may assail even the reality of its objects. The consciousness of self may be turned against the consciousness of an external world; or the consciousness of an external world against the consciousness of self, so long as they are not seen to be necessary to each other. Or, again, the finite consciousness may be opposed to the consciousness of the infinite, and either may be used to suppress the other. The Spinozistic Pantheism, that reduces the world and the finite spirit to an illusion, is but the opposite counterpart of

the Positivist denial of the possibility of knowing God.

The Problem of
Philosophy.

So soon as such doubts arise, the empirical method ceases to be sufficient, and philosophy becomes a necessity. For the empirical method must presuppose its objects as given, and given independently of each other. It must take God for granted, if it is not to treat the religious sentiment as an illusion. It must take the external world for granted, else it has no fact before it for science to examine. Philosophy, on the other hand, seeks to draw the lines that connect all these objects in one system of belief, and to show the impossibility of admitting one of them without, in some sense, admitting all. Its aim is to undermine and cut away every standing ground for scepticism, by showing the reciprocal implication of all the principles, on which the world as an intelligible world must rest. It must therefore distinguish itself from the ordinary opinion or common sense of men by two marks: it must raise into clear consciousness what is latent in common sense, the laws and the principles that underlie our common experience and knowledge; and, secondly, it must bring its thoughts together, and discover their mutual relation, instead of passing from the one to the other and forgetting each in turn. For the consciousness that dwells in parts and not in the whole, can never estimate the parts properly; or rather, each part is to it for the moment as if it were the whole. Thus the different elements of truth stand each by its own isolated weight; they do not support, and it is well if they are not even turned against, each other. But the ultimate test of each truth, a test which at the same time fixes

the limit of its validity, lies in the exhibition of its relation to other truths in a system. Thus philosophy is a kind of reasoning in a circle; but this is no argument against it, for it is the circle beyond which nothing lies. The ultimate unity of knowledge must be that, in which all the elements of knowledge are reflected into each other, in which the parts cannot be apprehended except as merging themselves in the whole; and the whole cannot be apprehended except as necessarily differentiating itself to the parts. That there is no vanity or presumption in the attempt to reach such a unity, but that, on the contrary, the idea of it is involved in the very nature of reason, and that our whole intellectual life is an effort to realise and develop it, we shall afterwards attempt to show.

DESCARTES was the first modern who realised the extent of the problem of philosophy—the first who took his stand with confidence on the ground of criticism prepared by Christianity. His aim was, in the first place, to bring into *clear* and *distinct* consciousness each of the elements that go to make up the world of experience, in order that, in the second place, he might discover the inner link of connection that binds all these elements together. These two processes constitute his method. He begins with analysis, abstraction, distinction, setting each element by itself, and fixing it with the utmost definiteness in its separate nature. He ends with synthesis, relation, unity—showing, or at least attempting to show, that the elements thus rent from each other are necessarily connected together. He divides in order to unite; but what he divides is in appearance a congeries or aggregate of opinions and

The
method of
Descartes.

facts without any necessary relation or affinity ; and the unity he seeks, is a unity of system, in which each part necessarily determines, and is determined by, the rest. In other words, he breaks up the synthesis of ordinary thought, in order to become conscious of its combining principle, and in order to distinguish the elements that are connected by necessity of reason, from those that are connected by mere arbitrary association. This at least is his general aim and intention, however imperfectly he is able to realise it. His merit is to have shown the nature of the problem of modern philosophy. That the first attempt to solve that problem was insufficient and crude, is no more than might have been expected.

Generally speaking, the error of Descartes lay in this, that the spirit of abstraction and distinction was too strong in him. The first movement of thought, by which the elements were set free from each other, carried him so far, that he was unable to reconnect them by any but external and accidental bonds. The division and independence of the parts was conceived so absolutely, that it became impossible to bind them again in unity of the whole, or possible only by suppressing their separate existence altogether. Just because he starts with an absolute dualism, his thought in the end can find no resting-place short of Spinozism.

His first
Principle.

He begins, where the Sceptics ended, with a doubt that tries to make itself absolute: *De omnibus dubitandum est.* Examining the beliefs of the ordinary consciousness—the beliefs of which he is possessed without the aid of philosophy—he finds that they form an incongruous mass of opinions,

collected without method, arranged without system. They have been acquired by no conscious intellectual process, whereby thought and reality have been mediated with each other, and therefore we can have no certainty as to their truth, or as to their relation to each other. In order to attain such certainty, we must first, by doubt and abstraction, free our consciousness from the successive strata of opinion and prejudice by which it has been overlaid. When we have thus taken up the attitude of criticism, the first thing that becomes doubtful and uncertain, is the secondary or 'properly sensible' qualities of matter. For these, as we find, are not fixed properties of any object, but are constantly changing with its relations to other objects, and to the sensitive subject. What remains as the reality of the object, when we abstract from all these changeable qualities, is a something whose only qualities are extension and capacity of motion; and therefore for the truth of things external we must go to mathematical science. But the possibility of doubt remains. Even the truths of mathematics may be supposed to be illusions, without objective reality. As we can imagine that there is some malevolent spirit playing upon our minds and feeding us with lies, we must surrender as doubtful all objective judgments as to the external world, and concentrate ourselves upon our own minds. Even here we have not reached the limit of doubt, for, apart from any reference to an object, we find in our minds various states, which we call by the different names of feeling, willing, perceiving, imagining, &c. These, however, are modes of consciousness, and not consciousness itself, and it is therefore possible to

abstract even from them. Whatever I can think away, Descartes argues, is not me: and I seek to be with myself, that I may know how much I have in myself without borrowing from any foreign source. His method of doubt is a method of abstraction, by which he first reduces the external object to extension and the subject to pure self-consciousness, and then, by a second step, concentrates the thinking being upon itself by negation of the external object. Thus he reaches his first principle. The thinking substance asserts its existence even in the very act by which it denies everything else. Its self-affirmation is involved in the very possibility of doubt, and cannot itself therefore be the object of doubt. What we can doubt is what we can separate from the self-affirming Ego, which is as it asserts itself, and asserts itself as it is. But the end of doubt is the beginning of knowledge, and in the *cogito ergo sum* we have a first unity of thought and being, out of which a complete reconciliation of them may spring.

Conflict of
Dualism
and Pan-
theism.

But here comes the difficulty. If consciousness is to find in itself the principle of all knowledge, it must transcend its own individuality. A purely individual consciousness, as the history of subjective idealism was subsequently to prove, would be for ever shut up within itself. Now the absolute opposition, which Descartes has established between the subject and the external object, seems to make the transition from the one to the other impossible. Reducing all the qualities of the object to bare extension and all the qualities of the subject to bare thought, Descartes treated as illusory all phenomena that lie in the interval between the mechanical and the mental. To him mind is a thinking substance,

a pure activity, which abides in itself and is moved only by itself; matter is an extended substance, a pure passivity, absolutely self-external, and moved only from without. A gulf is thus opened up between the inward and the outward, which cannot be bridged, unless thought should become extended, or matter should think; and to Descartes the one alternative seemed as absurd as the other. But knowledge is impossible, unless thought can cross this gulf, unless it can 'apprehend' at once the self and the not-self. There must be some point of view from which the dualism ceases to be absolute, if the individual mind is not for ever to be imprisoned in itself.

Descartes' solution of the difficulty is, in effect that there is a unity beyond the difference, and that this unity is to be found in thought. But he expresses this idea in a naive, imperfect, and even self-contradictory manner. He finds in his mind the consciousness of the infinite; nay, this consciousness is not only in the mind, but it is necessary to the mind. It is the very idea that makes the human mind what it is. "Let us never imagine," he argues in the Third Meditation, "that the conception of the infinite is got merely by negation of the finite, just as we conceive rest to be the negation of movement, and darkness to be the negation of light. On the contrary, we obviously think of the infinite substance as having more reality in it than the finite substance; nay, it may even be said that our consciousness of the infinite is in some sense prior to our consciousness of the finite; or, in other words, that our consciousness of God is prior to our consciousness of self. For how could we doubt or desire, how

could we be conscious that anything is wanting to us, and that we are not altogether perfect, if we had not in ourselves the idea of a perfect being, in comparison with whom we recognise the defects of our nature."

His arguments for the Being of God.

'The consciousness of a limit implies the consciousness of something beyond it.' If Descartes had followed out this line of thought, he might have seen that the dualism of mind and matter is not absolute, and that thought transcends the distinction while it recognises it. But this is not his way of reasoning. In his view, the idea of the infinite, like every other idea, is distinct and separate from its reality; his argument is only that there can be no adequate cause of such an idea in our minds, except the infinite itself: an argument which can have no weight, unless we already presuppose that very connection of the subjective with the objective, which has to be proved. Or, again, he argues that the conception of God as the perfect Being implies his existence, as the conception of a triangle implies its having its angles equal to two right angles; from which it would follow, not that God exists, but only that *if* he exists, he exists by the necessity of his nature, and not by an external necessity, like finite things. In both forms of the argument there is a *salto mortale* from thought to existence, from the finite to the infinite, which is immediately followed by another *salto mortale* from the existence of God to the existence of the external world. The reality of matter is proved by the truthfulness of God: for if God is truthful, our clear and distinct ideas cannot deceive us, but must have realities correspondent with them. Hence our purely mathematical idea

of matter, as it is clear and distinct, represents the reality of the external world. But why, we may ask, should God's truth be pledged for the existence of a matter independent of, and corresponding to, the thought of matter, if, as spiritual beings, we never can have to do with anything but thought? Obviously the truthfulness of God is brought in as a *Deus ex machina*, to represent that unity of the object with the subject, which is wanting to the philosophy, and which, indeed, is rendered impossible by its absolute dualism.

This general view of the Cartesian philosophy may be sufficient to show by what merely external bonds of ratiocination its different elements are united together. But this is not all. Descartes, though he starts with the strongest assertion of the claims of the individual consciousness, adopts a method and a principle that are fatal to all such claims. When, indeed, he asserts that nothing should be accepted as true except that which is clearly and distinctly apprehended, in other words, that which is *thought*, and not merely *felt* or *imagined*, he seems at first to be only maintaining the essential presupposition of all philosophy and science—that the world is an intelligible system, and therefore capable of being understood and explained. But, when we look nearer, we see, that in opposing thought to sense and imagination, he really means to oppose the abstract to the concrete, the universal to the particular. The clearness he seeks is the clearness that belongs to that which is simple, to that which is without difference or complexity. To get rid of the indistinctness of sense and imagination, is with him to reduce matter and mind to their abstract essence—

Pantheism
the neces-
sary result
of the
method of
Abstrac-
tion.

matter to a purely passive substance with the one attribute of extension, and mind to a purely active substance with the one attribute of thought. All other elements in our ordinary conceptions of both are to be explained away. But thought, if it is to seek for the reality of things in the simple and the abstract, cannot stop at this point. If the differences *within* the outer world, and the differences *within* the inner world are to be explained away, should we not on the same principle explain away the very difference *between* the outer and inner. Descartes is driven by the necessary logic of his thought to conceive all limits and differences as purely privative—*i.e.*, as mere absence or defect of existence. The Infinite alone is affirmative or positive Being, the unity of all affirmations; the finite, so far as it *is*, is one with the infinite; it is only distinguished from it so far as it *is not*. It is but a single step from this to the Pantheistic denial of the reality of the finite; for if the limit of the finite is nothing real, but only an absence of reality, then the finite, as such, has no independent or individual existence; its apparent independence and individuality is but an illusion of sense or imagination. And then what becomes of the absolute certainty of self-consciousness, the *cogito ergo sum*, upon which all truth was supposed to be based. Descartes shows his embarrassment when he declares that the consciousness of God or of the infinite is, 'in a manner,' or 'in a sense,' prior to the consciousness of self—*i.e.*, prior to his own first principle: and again, when he tells us that the finite substances, matter and finite mind, are not called substances in the same sense in which the term is applied to the infinite Being. But

then what is the *sense* or *manner* in question? There is no answer in Descartes. If the infinite contains all positive reality in itself, and if in the finite, as such, there is no reality, then the substantial existence of the ego, and non-ego must be equally illusory. The absolute unity swallows up all differences in itself, and cannot reproduce them; and for the finite consciousness there is no way to truth, except to abstract from itself as well as every other limited existence. The logical and necessary outcome of the philosophy of Descartes is therefore the philosophy of Spinoza.

SPINOZA has been called an atheist, not without Spirit and Letter of Spinoza. reason, if we look at his system from the outside and in its ultimate logical results. But if we look at it in its inner motive and in ~~the~~ dialectic of its development, he is more truly described by Hegel as an Akosmist, or by Növalis as a God-intoxicated man. In him the tendency to unity, to the infinite, to religion, overbalanced itself, till, by mere excess it seemed to be changed into its own opposite. For the assertion of the infinite as the only reality in opposition to the finite, when carried to its utmost logical consequence, reduces the infinite itself to an empty form. The God who does not reveal himself in the world, or in the consciousness of man, necessarily ceases to be a living God. But this is not the spirit of Spinoza; it is only the dead ultimate result of an imperfect logic, that confuses an abstract with a concrete unity—a unity of all things in which their differences are suppressed or neglected, with a unity of system in which all difference and multiplicity are subordinated to one principle. We do not need to read much of Spinoza to see that he

knows the distinction between these two kinds of unity, and that he aims at the latter. But in spite of himself the movement of his thought, the dialectic he inherited from Descartes, inevitably carries him toward the former.

Spinoza's
opposition
of Reason
to Imagin-
ation.

To Spinoza the great defect of human thought is its abstractness, by which he means, not that it deals with ideas got by abstraction or generalization, but that the views it takes are partial and imperfect; that it separates things from that necessary relation to other things, which is the condition of their existence. Because of this defect, it gives individual and independent reality to things, that can exist only as links in a series, or elements of a greater whole. It substantiates accidents, and treats the finite as if it were infinite. Thus, sense perceives, and imagination enables us to represent, dependent and limited existences apart from their conditions, as if they were independent and complete in themselves. On the other hand, the pure intelligence corrects this tendency to fragmentary views of things. It forces us to connect things together, to see each object as related to all other objects in the world, and so, finally, to regard the universe, not as an aggregate of isolated contingencies, but as a necessary unity. "The less the mind understands and the more it perceives, the greater is its power of fiction and fantasy; while the more it understands, the narrower are the limits set to that power." * With widening knowledge the range of the possible, of the accidental, is gradually diminished, till finally all things, being seen *sub specie æternitatis*, or in their relation to God, are seen to

* *De Intellectus Emendatione*, ch. 8.

be necessary. Thus the progress of the mind toward truth is a progress from the abstract and general to the concrete and definite: from perception and imagination, which apprehend things in their isolation and particularity, to reason, which sees them through the idea of the whole to which they belong.

But this suggests a new question. How are we to attain the apprehension of things in their unity? Ought we simply to proceed from part to part, continually correcting the imperfection of our knowledge, by taking into account the relations of what we have known before, to new objects as they come within our ken? Or is it possible for us to rise at once to the idea of an all-embracing unity, by which all the parts of the system of things are predetermined? Can we, in other words, transcend the finite and apprehend the infinite, or must we proceed from finite to finite without end? Can we see the world *sub specie æternitatis*, or can we see it only in the form of time, in which we always find condition beyond condition, cause beyond cause, and never reach the unconditioned, the *causa sui*? This is a dilemma which Spinoza was the first to state clearly and distinctly, and which, as we shall see, was revived by Kant after it had been forgotten through an age of Individualism. In the treatise *De Emendatione Intellectus*, he enumerates the defects of a knowledge that is limited to the finite. Such knowledge never reaches a final explanation of anything. It sends the mind backward through a series of events in time, upon none of which it can rest as the first event. Or it sends it outwards through space on every side for a complete view of conditioning circumstances, which the very nature of

Nature of
Absolute
Know-
ledge.

space makes it impossible to attain. "It is impossible for human weakness to complete the series of individual and changeable things, both on account of their multitude, which transcends all number, and on account of the infinity of circumstances in connection with any one thing, each of which may be the cause of its existence or non-existence." * In reasoning from effect to cause we always end in the unknown, because we can never reach an ultimate fact. Or again, seeking to avoid this result, we fall into a kind of explanation that is just a repetition in abstract language of the fact to be explained. Thus 'because we feel a particular body and nothing else, we conclude that the soul is united to a body, and that this union is the cause of the sensation, but of the nature of that union we can, in this way, understand nothing absolutely. The union, in fact, is just the sensation, and nothing else.' † The object, after such explanation, still remains an external fact, the real reason of which is unknown, or, in the language of Spinoza, the 'essence,' or definition we have given of it, 'does not involve its existence.' 'The essences of individual things are, however, not to be discovered by looking at the series or order of their existence; for in this way we can only get external marks or relations, or in short, attendant circumstances, but not the explanation of the things in themselves. For such explanation we must look to that which is eternal and unchanging, in which, as in tables of stone, we find inscribed the laws according to which all individual things are produced and ordered; nay, these changeable individuals are so intimately, and in their essence depen-

* *De Intellectus Emendatione*, ch. 14.

† *Id.*, ch. 4.

dent on those things which are eternal, that apart from them the former can neither exist nor be conceived. Wherefore these eternal and unchanging things, though they be individual, yet on account of their omnipresence and far-stretching power, have the value of universals or generic definitions of the things that are changeable. In them, therefore, we shall find the proximate causes of all things.*

Spinoza, then, holds that there are certain first truths or principles, at once of thought and existence, through which everything is, and is known. Rejecting the Cartesian distinction of the *principium essendi* from the *principium cognoscendi*, he maintains that our science can be adequate only when it follows the order of the genesis of things. 'In order that our mind may be a true reflection of the order of nature, it ought to develop all its ideas from that idea which corresponds to the spring and origin of all nature, and make it the spring and origin of all other ideas.† His philosophy, therefore, begins with the idea of God as the substance of all things, as the infinite unity, which is necessarily presupposed in all consciousness of finitude and difference. From this he proceeds to the first great difference of thought and extension, under which this unity reveals itself to the human mind. From thought and extension again he descends to finite individuals, which, seen in their true nature, from the universal or divine point of view, are but modes of the infinite substance, and may at pleasure be regarded either under the form of thought or under the form of extension.

* *De Intellectus Emendatione*, ch. 14.

† *Id.*, ch. 7.

Defect of
Spinoza's
Logic.

Without following any further the development of this system, it will be sufficient for our present purpose, to mark the point at which its logic is defective. Like Descartes, Spinoza seeks to begin at the beginning, with the idea which is the presupposition of all other ideas, and which itself presupposes nothing *quod per se concipitur*; and this idea is by him immediately identified with the existence which is the condition of all other existence, *quod in se est*. This primal unity we think, whenever we abstract from all that is finite, even from our individual selves; for every limited existence implies a negation, and the positive is presupposed in the negative. Any definite figure we draw, implies infinite space from which it is cut off; any finite consciousness of self, is possible only by the limitation of a consciousness that goes beyond the finite. Further, if we admit with Descartes that the extended substance and the thinking substance may each be conceived *per se*, we must at the same time assert that the difference of the two is merely relative to our thought: that they are but two forms in which the one infinite substance is expressed to us. It is therefore only in the presupposed existence of the modes, that there lies any necessity for the substance to be expressed in attributes at all. In itself it has no necessity of self-revelation in attributes or modes. It is logically the end of everything, the beginning of nothing: if we advance beyond it, it can only be by empirically assuming something outside of it, to which it stands in relation. By his principle, that "determination is negation," Spinoza is driven, in spite of himself, to dissolve everything in the dead abstraction of substance, in a pure iden-

tity that has no difference in itself, and from which no difference can by any possibility be evolved. He defines substance, indeed, not only negatively as the Being which is absolutely indeterminate, but also positively, as the Being that "consists of an infinity of attributes." The former is the definition which presents itself to him when he thinks of it as the end, the latter when he thinks of it as the beginning, of all thought and existence ; but these two aspects of substance are simply put side by side without mediation, for the substance is not to him a unity that explains or expresses itself in the difference of mind and matter, but simply the common element in both. Still less is there any logical transition from the attributes to the modes. Philosophy having reached the absolute, must fold its hands and rest ; if it attempt to do more, it can only take up again empirically the distinctions which it let drop in its upward course of abstraction. Spinoza's manner of seeing things *sub specie æternitatis* does not transform the character of his view of them as things of time. It is like a Sunday confession that the interests of the world are nought, while we treat them as absolute realities all the other days of the week.

Spinoza may be condemned out of his own lips. His most prominent idea was the idea of unity, and yet he is an absolute dualist. He asserted that the highest good is 'the knowledge of the union which the mind has with all nature ;' yet such union and such knowledge are on his principles impossible. The identity of thought and being, as he conceives it, is an identity of two elements, which are not seen to have any necessary relation to each other. Even in the definition of substance, as *id quod in se est, et*

His self-contradiction.

per se concipitur, there is no connection between the two members. Hence the proof of the being of God, as stated by Spinoza, has the same defect that lay in the statement of Descartes. He assumes the unity of thought and being, while he knows them only in their difference. If the separate attributes are like parallel lines that never meet, how, through mere thought, which is but a mode of one of them, can we apprehend their unity? The individual mind, according to Spinoza, is capable of apprehending not only itself, but also the absolute substance. Nay, it cannot know itself without knowing God; and as knowing and being are the same thing differently expressed, it thus becomes one with God, without ceasing to be self-conscious and individual. Yet, on the other hand, it is but a mode of the attributes, and its independent existence rests on a mere negation: in other words, it has no independent existence, and its knowledge of itself as individual is an illusion, a defect of the knowledge of God. The individuality of the finite spirit is thus justified while it is condemned, and condemned while it is justified. Spinoza calls on the individual to live not in himself, but in the life of God; but the individual upon whom such a demand may be made, cannot be merely a passing mode of the infinite. If God is necessary to him, yet, on the other side, he is necessary to God.

His relation to subsequent Individualism.

The development of Spinoza's thought thus pointed to a new philosophy, a philosophy which should transcend the absolute dualism of Descartes, and, at the same time, should revive his individualism in a higher form. The rapid absorption of the finite in the infinite, which was the necessary result of Cartesianism, showed that in Cartesianism the finite

consciousness had not received its due. And till it had received its due, its reconciliation with the consciousness of the infinite must be inadequate and unsatisfactory. There was a necessity for a fuller assertion of the rights of the individual, and the completeness and independence of his life. But to make this possible the individual must no longer be regarded as a mere thinking subject, standing face to face with a world entirely alien to thought. It is a general characteristic of all the writers of the second period of modern philosophy, that they deny or explain away that opposition of subject and object, which Descartes and Spinoza had regarded as absolute, and that, in one way or another, they attempt to bring the two terms into harmony, or even identity, with each other. As a consequence of this, the individual, feeling himself, even in his finitude, the complete possessor of his own world of sense or thought, is led to minimise or even deny his relation to the infinite. The finite consciousness is rounded into a complete whole, with no division in it, which it needs a Cartesian *Deus ex machina* to reconcile: it becomes *securus adversus Deos*, and the divine begins to appear visionary or transcendent. Not till individualism had thus developed its utmost results, did the reaction come. It was at the end of its reign, and in opposition to the last representative of its tendencies, that Kant developed his philosophy. His partial return to the universalism of Descartes and Spinoza was mediated by an exhaustive study of the opposed individualisms of Germany and England.

CHAPTER IV.

SECOND PERIOD OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY — THE
INDIVIDUALISM OF LOCKE, BERKELEY, HUME.

Causes of
the revival
of Indivi-
dualism.

CARTESIANISM was, as we have seen, the philosophical counterpart of the Protestant Reformation, which, for the first time, gave its due importance to the subjective and individualistic aspect of Christianity. But both in its religious and in its philosophical form Individualism was but a moment of transition. In Protestantism the individual no sooner found himself freed from the authority of the Church, than he sought to escape every appearance of subjective caprice, by denying the independence of the human spirit, and reducing it into the passive vessel of divine grace. And in the Cartesian philosophy the doubt by which the consciousness of self was set in opposition to the consciousness of the object, was immediately corrected by the thought, that the consciousness of self is secondary to the consciousness of God.

But the subjective element, once admitted, could not be satisfied without a fuller recognition. The Reformers might try to silence the anarchy of private judgment by insisting on the necessity of

conversion and faith, and by exaggerating the passivity of the soul in the apprehension of truth. But they had appealed to the individual reason, and to the individual reason they were bound to go. When the first terror of emancipated reason at its own boldness had passed away, it was inevitable that the feeling of independence should grow and assert itself. Even extreme doctrines of grace contained the means of their own correction, for, if they annihilated human reason and will before God, they at the same time brought God nearer to man. Calvinism, nay, even Spinozism, had in it the germ of a new individualism. The idea that our highest self-consciousness is but God's consciousness of himself in us, with which Spinoza concluded his *Ethics*, leads to a conception of the finite as standing not merely in a negative, but also in a positive relation to the infinite. The spirit *in* which, as well as *to* which God speaks, cannot be like a mere vehicle or instrument, which is so much better suited to its purpose the nearer it is to absolute passivity. Only freedom can express or apprehend freedom. It is not in the silence of the reason and the slavery of the will, but where thought and action are most spontaneous and self-determined, that we are to seek the point of union between the finite spirit and the infinite.

This reassertion of the rights of the finite and individual consciousness coincides with the great development of the secular spirit, which marks the end of the seventeenth, and beginning of the eighteenth, century. Even the earliest Reformers, though they had approximated to Spinozism in their view of religion, had utterly broken away from

The growth of a secular spirit.

that asceticism which contemns human and finite interests as such. Luther defended the life of the family and the state, not as something to be tolerated in concession to human weakness, but as the highest moral life, and as the proper expression of the religious principle. In so doing, he was in harmony with those leaders of the Renaissance, who were reviving the study of literature, and directing the curiosity of man to himself and the world in which he lives. The Puritan jealousy of art and science, the withdrawal of some Protestant sects from political life, and their maintenance of the mediæval division between the Church and the world, were narrownesses which might be excused by the prevalence of the opposite narrowness of the positive and worldly spirit, but they could not be justified on the principles of Protestantism. It might be rational to condemn, or to justify, the secular life,—to treat it altogether as the negation, or altogether as the expression, of the religious principle,—but it could not be rational to draw a completely arbitrary line between one set of secular interests and another. Like the arbitrary line, drawn by Bacon and others, between the things of reason and the things of faith, such a distinction might serve a momentary purpose, but it involved, nevertheless, a logical inconsistency. No one can divide the world between Cæsar and God, if the two jurisdictions are conceived as independent and inconsistent. The attempt to do so must end in claiming all for Cæsar or all for God.

Limitation
of Know-
ledge to
the finite.

In the beginning of the eighteenth century the tendency was to extend Cæsar's claim to everything, or at least to everything that has reality or interest

for man. If the finite was not all, it seemed at least to become more and more certain, that it could not be transcended by human thought.

“ Know well thyself, presume not God to scan,
The proper study of mankind is man.”

The divine, the infinite, was being gradually emptied of all positive meaning, and reduced into the spectral shape of an *Être Suprême*. All the real contents of science, all the real interests of life were separated from it, and connected with the finite consciousness. God was relegated beyond the world of experience as the unknown, and, it soon began to be said, the unknowable. Even religious men seemed to admit this conclusion when they took refuge in mysticism, and directed their main attention, not to the objective doctrines of Christianity, but to the detail of subjective experience. The individual was becoming to himself the beginning and end of all truth and knowledge; he could not, it was argued, transcend his own limits as an individual; if there was a truth that could not be brought within those limits, it must be for him as good as nothing.

Of this tendency, the principal philosophical Locke. representative is LOCKE. In his writings we find an Individualism that has lost its first sanguine hopes, and become conscious of its limitations. The tone of Descartes is self-confident: “What is truth must show itself true to me.” The tone of Locke is cautious and distrustful: “I must take care to assert nothing as truth which cannot show itself true to me. I, as an individual, am fixed and determined as the subject of knowledge, and it is impossible that I should know the finite

object in itself, much less the infinite. I can only know either of these indirectly, in so far as they come within the range of my consciousness, in so far as they are represented in my sensations and my thoughts. The one thing necessary to make my steps towards knowledge secure, is that I should keep steadily within this limit." It is in this spirit that Locke speaks in the first book of his essay: "I thought that the first step towards satisfying several enquiries the mind of man was very apt to run into, was to take a view of our own understanding, examine our own powers, and see to what things they were adapted. Till that was done, I suspected we began at the wrong end, and in vain sought for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths that most concerned us, whilst we let loose our thoughts into the vast ocean of being, as if all that boundless extent were the natural and undoubted possession of our understanding, wherein was nothing exempt from its decisions or that escaped its comprehension. Thus men, extending their enquiries beyond their capacities, and letting their thoughts wander into those depths where they can find no sure footing, it is no wonder that they raise questions and multiply disputes, which, never coming to any clear resolution, are proper only to continue and increase their doubts, and to confirm them at last in perfect scepticism. Whereas, were the capacities of our understandings well considered, the extent of our knowledge once discovered, and the horizon found which sets the bounds between the enlightened and dark parts of things, between what is and what is not comprehensible by us, men would perhaps with less scruple acquiesce in the avowed ignorance

of the one, and employ their thoughts and discourse with more advantage and satisfaction in the other." *

In these words Locke clearly indicates his individualistic point of view. The mind is to him a dark room, into which light is streaming through a narrow window, and only so much of the outside can be seen as the window permits. We are in communication through the senses with an external world, a world wider than our own souls, yet we are only in broken and imperfect communication with it. In regard to the extent of the information which we thus acquire, Locke is not consistent with himself. Sometimes he speaks of sense, as affording us a real knowledge of objects, which are independent of sensation: sometimes he speaks of it as a mere mental affection which reports nothing and is related to nothing but itself. In so far as the former view prevails, the external world is brought within the compass of the individual mind: the immediate data of sense are supposed to furnish all the matter of thought: and the process of knowledge is simply a process of abstraction and analysis by which we break up the concrete unity of individual objects into its constituent parts. In so far as the latter view prevails, the external world is excluded from the direct vision of the mind; what is immediately given as real, is only a series of momentary sensations without relation to each other or to any permanent object: and the process of thought by which knowledge is acquired, consists in putting together these simple elements, and so forming various complex ideas or judgments. But, as all these combinations are artificial, as they are the 'work of the mind,' and

His compromise between Materialism and Sensationalism.

* Locke's *Essay*, I., i., § 7.

not what is immediately given in sensation, they cannot claim to represent anything objective and real. The theory which spreads its influence over most of the *Essay on the Human Understanding* is a curious compromise between these two views. Solidity and extension, the primary qualities of matter, are supposed to be given through the sensation of touch, and given as objective, i.e., as in things, and not merely in the mind; while the secondary qualities are considered to be merely subjective appearances, dependent on the peculiar nature of the sensitive organism. This view ultimately rests on the metaphor contained in the phrase 'mental impression.' The sensations, especially the sensation of touch, are conceived as carrying with them a theory of their own cause, or a reference to a reality which is distinct from the mind, and which operates on it just as one piece of matter operates on another. The language of Locke is, therefore, perpetually embarrassed by the dilemma, which yet he never brings to clear consciousness, that, as distinct from the mind and not an idea, the object is beyond knowledge: and yet that, as acting on the senses by physical impact, it is known to possess at least the qualities of extension and solidity. And the two views are but awkwardly combined together in the theory, that the real nature of the object consists in the constitution of its insensible parts, but that that constitution can never be known, or at least fully known.

Its failure.

Those who wish to follow the thought of Locke through all its various windings, may be referred to the exhaustive analysis of Mr. Green in his *Introduction to Hume*. For our present purpose we need

only observe that there are two fixed points between which the thought of Locke moves, or rather oscillates. On the one hand, he thinks of a world in space, of which the mind of the individual, enclosed in a particular body, forms a part. On the other hand, he thinks of the individual mind as having no necessary or direct relation to this world, but as dealing with it indirectly through its own sensations, which are its immediate objects. And the great defect of his philosophy, the defect which ultimately led to the development of a more consistent sensationalism by Berkeley and Hume, is, that these two different points of view cannot be reconciled, or even combined. If we begin with the individual mind, we are forced to conceive its knowledge as limited to the simple ideas of its own sensations and actions, and the various complex ideas which may be got by combining these simple ideas. In this view, objective reality, or things in themselves, lie altogether beyond the possibility of knowledge. If we begin, on the other hand, with the idea of a world, which immediately acts on the mind of the individual through the senses, we assume a knowledge of things in themselves, independent of the sensations of the individual, and explain by this means these very sensations themselves. In this case, in addition to the difficulties which, on individualistic principles, beset any ontological theory whatever, we have to encounter the double difficulty of a materialistic ontology. For even if we admit that things in themselves can be known, and known to be material, the relation of the physical impression which the material object makes to the thought which is its consequent,

remains utterly unintelligible. When, indeed, in his fourth book, Locke speaks of our mathematical ideas as archetypes of reality, he suggests a third alternative, which might have freed him at once from both difficulties, and even have enabled him to forestall the leading ideas of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. But we cannot attach much weight to a thought which is stated with some ambiguity, and of whose import Locke himself shows no consciousness. If, therefore, we pass over this undeveloped hint, the philosophy of Locke reduces itself to an attempted synthesis of two contradictory theories. For one of two things is inevitable. Either consciousness must be conceived as transcending the individuality of the human animal, as embracing in one thought the duality of subject and object, which then can have no existence in themselves apart from the unity in which they are known. In this way we may save, if not the ontology of Locke, at least some kind of ontology at the expense of his psychology. Or if, on the other hand, the individual consciousness is not to be conceived as transcending itself, then we must be in earnest about its limits. We must give up all pretence of knowing things in themselves, or construing out of our own affections a reality not included in them. We must surrender all that part of Locke's philosophy which deals with things as opposed to ideas, with real material substance defined by the primary qualities, as opposed to the secondary qualities which exist only in the mind. It is impossible to preserve both the sensationalist view of the development of knowledge, and the materialistic account of the origin of sensation.

The unstable equilibrium between two irreconcilable tendencies which Locke maintained, was inevitably disturbed in the works of his followers, and that by the natural development of his own theories.

His greatest disciple, BERKELEY, had no hesitation in preferring a sensationalist theory of knowing to a materialistic theory of being: indeed, the former recommended itself to him mainly as a weapon against the latter. That the *esse* of things was only their *percipi*, seemed to him a welcome doctrine, just because it crased the distinction between primary and secondary qualities. For this at once made it impossible to explain sensation by the mechanical action of extended and solid substances on the organs of sense, and took away all ground for a suspicion, which such an explanation could not but suggest to Locke, that the mind itself was material. Berkeley, no doubt, thought that if he could rid the world of material substance, he would thus establish the absolute reality of spirit. He did not observe that the weapon he had so hastily taken up was double-edged, and that in rejecting Locke's materialistic ontology, he was rejecting all ontology whatever and reducing reality to a series of feelings, which by this reduction were emptied of all intelligible meaning. If the *esse* of things is their *percipi*, it certainly follows that there is no existence of matter apart from the sensations of touch and sight. But what will these sensations be to us, if, on the same principle, we withdraw from them all the mental additions, all the constructive interpretation, by which they are changed into perceptions of an

Berkeley's
method
with the
Material-
ists.

objective world? Where, among the mere isolated feelings that come and vanish with every moment, shall we find that permanent objective order, which, according to Berkeley himself, is the revelation of God? Or how, without bringing in conceptions of relations, not given in the sensations themselves, can we bind these sensations together, and refer them to a permanent self? If the Baconian rule of taking facts as they are, be interpreted on the hypothesis, that pure sensations are the only facts, then reality is something, which we may feel, but of which we can neither think nor speak. "A consistent sensationalism must be speechless."* The truth is, that Berkeley's polemic against matter confuses two things which are distinct from, and even opposed to, each other, the denial of the existence of an object in itself without relation to any subject, and the denial of the existence of an object distinct from sensation. So long as he is arguing that the mind can apprehend nothing but ideas, and that an object which is not an idea is an absurdity, he is irresistible; because we suppose him to be maintaining only the self-evident proposition, that consciousness cannot get out of itself; in other words, that thought cannot apprehend that, of which the one determination is, that it is *not a thought*. But when ideas are interpreted as mere feelings that exist only in being felt, we discern at once that the system before us is not an Idealism, which finds the ultimate reality of things in spirit, but a Sensationalism, which begins by denying, not merely the existence of matter in itself, but of matter

* Green's *Introduction to Hume*, § 45.

also as the necessary object of spirit, and which must end in denying the existence of spirit itself.

Berkeley, as is shown by the commonplace book which Professor Fraser has published, was at one time far on the road to such a conclusion. He had already denied the existence of thinking, as well as of material substance, and declared that "the very existence of ideas constitutes the soul." He partly recovered himself, however, and brought back under the name of "notions" what he had rejected as "ideas." At the period when his first book was written he had become conscious that some permanent reality is needed, to take the place of matter in the object, and to bind the succession of sensations into the unity of one life in the subject. Although, therefore, he begins by denying that we have the power of forming abstract ideas, on the ground that nothing but the particular can be given in immediate perception, he thinks himself at liberty to admit that we have not an idea, but a "notion" of spirit whose *esse* is "not *percipi*, but *percipere*." Asserting that the only object of an idea is the idea itself, he yet holds that our ideas carry with them a necessary reference, on the one hand to the mind as their perceiving subject, and on the other hand to God as their producing cause. Ere the second edition of his *Principles* was published, he had further discovered that, to be intelligible objects, sensations or "ideas" must be related to each other, and accordingly he asserts that we have not only "notions of spirits," but also "notions of the relations and habitudes between things," and in the same passage he tells us

His compromise
between
Sensation-
alism and
Idealism.

that relations "include an act of the mind."* Yet from this he did not think of drawing any inference to correct his former view of reality as consisting merely in the series of passive sensations or involuntary feelings. And while he spoke of such feelings or ideas as the language through which God manifests himself to us, he did not see that in attributing to the mind the power of reading this language—*i. e.*, of knowing, through sensation, not merely finite objects, but the infinite spirit, he was admitting that our thought is in the highest sense constructive. He was, in fact, claiming for man the knowledge of the infinite, at the same time that he pretended to restrict him to the apprehension of the states of his own individual consciousness. The omissions and additions in the later editions of his works, and the vaguely adumbrated idealism of the *Siris*, may show that he was gradually becoming conscious of the imperfection of his first theory, and feeling after the higher theory that the real is, as Mr. Green says, "not *percipi*, but *intelligi*."† But there is nothing to show that he ever discovered the wide distinction that separates the one theory from the other.

Method of
Hume.

HUME was the first writer who distinctly realized the limits within which a sensationalist individualism is confined, and also the first who carried out, with something like fidelity, that substitution of psychology for ontology, which his predecessors had been more ready to prescribe than to practice. The philosophy of Locke and Berkeley had been developed partly from the point of view of an individual mind, whose immediate knowledge was confined to its own feelings, but partly also from the universal

* *Principles*, § 142.

† Green's *Introduction*, § 183.

point of view of a spectator, who could observe both the mind and its object, first in their separateness, and then in their action upon each other. Seeing clearly the inconsistency of this double procedure, Hume made at least a vigorous effort to avoid it, and to confine himself to the observation of his own consciousness. While his predecessors virtually ascribe to the mind a certain constitutive activity, he treats thought as dependent upon sensation, not only for its materials, but also for the legitimate combination of those materials. His first principle of method is that every idea, simple or complex, must be tested by comparison with the impression from which it is supposed to be derived. If, in this comparison, it is found there is something in the idea that is not in the sensation, such surplusage or 'extra-belief' must be regarded as the result of arbitrary association. The sound kernel of knowledge is that which is immediately given in the pure impressions of the sensitive subject. Whatever goes beyond these elementary facts of experience may be practically useful, but cannot have, strictly speaking, the value of knowledge.

It is obvious that with this abandonment of the ontological side of the theory of Locke and Berkeley, the problem to be solved takes a new shape. The mind *ex hypothesi* can know nothing but its own states. The question, therefore, is not how we are to know a world, that exists independently of the sensations through which we know it, but simply how a series of isolated and transitory sensations should ever come to have for us the appearance of a connected world of objects. Granting Berkeley's principle that the *percipi* is the

He seeks to explain the illusion of knowledge.

esse, Hume sees that it is not the *esse*, as it is understood by common sense and by science. An object that exists when it is not perceived, a mind that is more than a series of perceptions, are things with reference to which we cannot ask how they exist, but only how they come to be supposed to exist. By the terms of the problem he has set before himself, Hume has therefore two difficulties to encounter. In the first place, he has to explain, how isolated and transitory feelings can be in any way related or combined with each other. And, in the second place, he has to explain, how combinations of impressions and ideas in certain cases come to be regarded as real and objective existences independent of the mind.

His assumption
of natural
relations.

Locke had solved the former of these problems by the theory, that while the mind receives its first materials from sensation and reflection, it is possessed of a power of combining them in various ways into complex ideas. This power, indeed, he regards as merely formal, as adding nothing, or at least not legitimately adding anything, to the matter of the ideas combined. But he who grants to the mind any activity at all, must ultimately be driven to concede to it a more than formal activity. A power that combines given matter must act on some principle or rule. It must bring with it forms of unity, types of combination, and thus it must alter and add to the matter it combines. The mind is not a mere casket into which ideas can be thrown like stones, and in which they can be held together by an external limit. If it combines the isolated impressions made upon it, it must find in itself the norm or principle of unity upon which it

works. And it becomes by no means easy to reconcile this activity of the mind in combining and compounding the ideas it has received, with its supposed passivity in their reception. Perceiving this difficulty, Hume is interested to show that the mind is passive, not merely in regard to isolated impressions, but also in regard to the modes in which they are related and connected with each other. Therefore, he represents it, not as actively dealing with given materials in order to put them together, but as finding already in the very data of sensation, certain "natural relations," by reason of which the one calls up or "introduces" the other. Without certain associative principles, he confesses that even the appearance of knowledge would be impossible. "Were ideas entirely loose and unconnected, chance alone would join them, and 'tis impossible the same simple ideas should fall regularly into complex ones (as they commonly do) without some bond of union among them, some associating quality, by which one naturally introduces another." * These "natural relations" are, as we find, resemblance and contiguity (including under the latter co-existence both in time and space), and sequence.† In other words, Hume holds that a merely sensitive consciousness is able to set its feelings before it as definite objects, and to pronounce that they resemble or do not resemble each other: and he maintains that it is able to represent these feelings, not merely as events in time, but also as quantities or extended things in space. It is only

* *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I., 1, § 4.

† Hume says causation, which, however, is afterwards interpreted as sequence.

on the presupposition of these natural relations, as *subjective* principles of association, that Hume afterwards explains, or rather explains away, the *objective* principles of identity and causation. What, then, is his conception of a purely sensitive consciousness? It is "a bundle of perceptions that succeed each other with inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux or movement."* Yet this "bundle" is supposed to be conscious of itself as an order of succession in time, and also as an order of co-existence in space; and in both orders it can separate the parts from the whole, and compare them with each other. When we put the case thus plainly, it becomes obvious that Hume puts into the sensitive consciousness a content only possible to thought, in order afterwards to treat thought as illusory, whenever it goes beyond the range of sensation. He maintains that the ideas of quantity and quality, time and space, are all derivable from pure feeling, are all the legitimate possessions of a mind that knows of no reality but its own sensitive states; but he maintains this only with a view ultimately to discredit every assertion of such reality, whether the object asserted be spiritual or material, an extended or a thinking substance.

His explanation of Identity and Causation.

The conceptions of identity and causation are, as Hume recognises, the foundations of the *objective* consciousness, of the consciousness of things as distinguished from impressions and ideas. For it is only in so far as the series of transitory feelings is interpreted by these categories, that there can exist for us a permanent self and a permanent world of objects, determined by universal laws in

* *Treatise on Human Nature*, Book I., 4, § 6.

the coexistence and succession of their states. But, according to Hume's fundamental principle, such a consciousness must be illusory. He seeks, therefore, not to explain or justify these categories, but to explain them away: in other words, to show that what is legitimate in them can be reduced to the "natural relations," and that whatever goes beyond these is the effect of an irrational "propensity" of our minds "to feign" something that has no basis in reality. This task he has, however, made easy for himself by giving an account of the natural relations that presupposes the very categories in question. Thus, in discussing the conception of identity, Hume omits to explain how a series of sensations can be conceived either as constituting, or as referring themselves to, a single object that "remains the same with itself" through all its different appearances. Generally, indeed, he speaks as if such sameness were immediately perceived by sense, and as if the only difficulty lay in our belief of the *continued* existence of the object when it is *not* perceived. Even if we correct this oversight by the aid of other passages in which the serial or discontinuous nature of our consciousness is more distinctly recognised, the account of the matter we extract from Hume is not much more satisfactory. The mind "naturally" relates impressions that are successive in time, especially if they resemble each other, and this relation, as it renders easy the transition of thought from the one to the other, makes us feel as if there was no transition at all. Hence we come to believe, in the identity of the successive impressions, or, what is treated as the same thing, the identity of their object. Again,

when the series of like impressions is interrupted and after a time renewed, the same ease of transition leads to the identification of the later with the earlier impression or object, and the prolongation of its existence during the interval when it is not perceived, is only a last fiction of the imagination necessary to make the others self-consistent. The law of causality is explained in a similar way. Mind or imagination has a certain inexplicable "tendency to go on in the line in which it has been put." Hence every time that two impressions occur in sequence, there is a certain attraction established between them. And this attraction grows with repetition, till the impulse to connect them becomes irresistible, and we cannot have the one impression without the idea of its usual companion being suggested. Moreover, impressions are distinguished from ideas only by their superior liveliness, and by close association with an impression, an idea acquires so much of this liveliness that it also appears to be real. Hence, in this case, we not only think of the sequent impression or object, but we believe that it will come: in other words, we relate the two impressions to each other as cause and effect.

The *Essays*
and the
Treatise.

The reasoning of the *Essays* is substantially similar to that of the *Treatise*. The main differences are that (1) the discussion relates almost entirely to the origin of the idea of causation to the exclusion of the idea of identity, which plays so great a part in the earlier work: and (2) that the distinction between impressions and objects is altogether neglected, or at least thrown into the shade. Thus sense is supposed to present to us

a world of objects whose phases succeed each other in a certain order, and the only question discussed is whether the succession has in it objectively the necessity expressed in the idea of cause, or whether that idea merely represents an inseparable association produced by frequent experience of sequence.

It is not necessary for us to follow Mr. Green in his exhaustive examination of Hume's reasoning, especially as we shall have to return to the subject in considering Kant's reply. Here it is sufficient to repeat that the plausibility of Hume's sceptical treatment of the objective or thinking consciousness, really depends on his extravagant concessions to the subjective or sensitive consciousness. His disproof of the validity of the categories of identity and causation presupposes an experience which would not be possible without these very categories. If he had strictly confined himself, as he professes, to the sensitive consciousness, he would have been unable, by his own confession, to explain even the semblance or illusion of knowledge. But a principle that is fatal even to the illusion of knowledge, refutes itself. ^{Hume refutes himself.} The suspicion, which Hume would cast upon knowledge, is turned against his sensationalist explanation of it. If the foundation which he lays, be not the foundation on which experience and science are based, his scepticism does not affect them, but only his own false theory of their origin. And then the self-annihilation of Individualism in its sensationalist form prepares the way for a more adequate philosophy.

Is such a more adequate philosophy to be found in the idealistic individualism of Leibnitz?

CHAPTER V.

THE IDEALISTIC INDIVIDUALISM OF LEIBNITZ.

Locke and
Leibnitz.

THE philosophy of Locke, as we have seen, was vexed with a dualism which ultimately was fatal to it. Locke professed to explain the world purely from the point of view of individual consciousness. Yet, constrained by the nature of thought, which refuses to be limited by the distinction it has itself made between subject and object, he added to his sensationalist explanation of knowledge, as a mental state of the individual, a materialistic explanation of it as a relation of the individual mind to the external world. The subsequent history of Locke's school showed that these elements were incongruous: and while his English followers carried out his sensationalism to its logical result in the sceptical severance of thought and being, and the negation of all ontology, his French disciples took hold of the other side of his doctrine—his theory of the mechanical action of matter on mind—and, by the necessary development of it, were soon landed in a bare and simple Materialism. Meantime, the hints, contained in the fourth book of the *Essay*, of that higher truth which can alone reconcile the psychological with the onto-

logical theory of knowledge, remained unnoticed, or, under the influence of a one-sided logic, were expelled from the systems alike of materialists and sensationalists. These hints were, however, recognised and welcomed by one who was not Locke's disciple, but his critic and opponent, the "author of the *Pre-established Harmony*."

LEIBNITZ, like Locke, was deeply influenced by the individualistic spirit of his time, and, as we shall see, he never completely escaped from it. But the study of authors like Spinoza, in whose works the opposite side of the truth finds an exaggerated expression, soon drew him out of the Atomism to which he was first inclined. He saw the necessity of combining two things which had fallen asunder with Locke—ontology and psychology. He saw that, if the possibility of knowledge is to be maintained, the *ordo ad individuum* must be brought into relation with the *ordo ad universum*. Hence, while constructing an individualistic system, he at the same time endeavoured to conceive the individual mind as capable of transcending itself, and entering into communion with the universe of which it is a part. It is only when we keep in mind the influence of these opposite motives on the philosophy of Leibnitz, that we are able to understand the peculiar complexion of his doctrine of Monads—a doctrine which might otherwise appear to us, under our changed conditions of thought, as a kind of philosophical romance, or fairy tale of speculation. Possessed with the ideas at once of the individuality and the universality of existence, he steers a difficult course between two opposite currents of speculation, and solves the difficulty by declaring that while the

Monadism
not pure
Indivi-
dualism.

monads or individual substances are *really* separated from each other, yet *ideally* they are all related to, and imply, each other. Each monad *really excludes, ideally includes*, the whole universe; it is independent of the world, just because in a manner it contains the world in itself.

The Monad
really
excludes,

In regard to the first of these two points, Leibnitz maintains, like the Atomists, that the reality of the complex and composite things that we see around us, must consist in the simple and divisible substances they contain. "There can be nothing real or substantial in the collection, unless the units be substantial." * But material atoms do not supply us with the substantial unity required. "As extended, they must have parts, and the invincible attachment of one part to another, even if that were conceivable, would not annihilate their diversity. The true atoms must be atoms of substance, that is, real units without parts, in order that we may find in them the primary sources of activity, and the first principles of the composition of things; or, if we look at them from the other side, the last elements that can be reached by analysis. They may be termed metaphysical points, or points of force, and they have a kind of life and perception in them. They differ from physical points in being indivisible, not merely in appearance, but in reality; and from mathematical points, in being not modal, but real." † Their unity and simplicity excludes all influence from without. "They have no windows through which anything might come into them or go out of them." ‡ Hence they cannot begin but by creation, or perish but by annihilation; and their life is absolutely self-

* Erdmann's Leibnitz, p. 714.

† *Id.*, p. 126.

‡ *Id.*, p. 705.

determined except in relation to God. Each is a little world developing under its own laws, "as if there were nothing in existence but God and itself."

In regard to the other side of the nature of the monad—its ideal inclusion of the world—And ideally includes, the universe. Leibnitz tells us that each monad "expresses" or "represents" the whole universe. Often he expresses this relation of the monad by the word *perception*, adding, however, that he does not use it in the sense in which it is exclusively applied to a thinking or sentient subject. "*Perceptio nihil aliud est quam multorum in uno expressio.*" His meaning may best be indicated by saying that each individual is so related, though only ideally related, to all the other individuals, that if we could understand it fully, we should understand the whole universe. "As the world is a plenum where every body acts upon every other body with more or less intensity according to the distance, so each monad is a living mirror, gifted with an internal activity, whereby it represents the whole universe according to its particular point of view, and in such a way that its ideal universe has all the regularity of the real one."† The last part of the sentence must be taken as explaining the first part of it; for as the monads are absolutely exclusive of each other, all apparent relation must be explained as ideal correspondence or harmony. "God has created the soul and every other real unity, in such a way that everything is evolved for it out of its own substance, with perfect spontaneity on its part, yet with perfect conformity to things external."‡

* Erdmann's Leibnitz, p. 127.

† *Id.*, 714.

‡ *Id.*, 127.

“Every spirit” (and the same is true is Leibnitz’s view of every monad) “being like a separate world, sufficient for itself, independent of every other creature, enveloping the infinite, expressing the universe, is as durable, as self-subsistent, and as absolute as the universe itself.” *

The Pre-
established
Harmony.

The idea of the monad, then, combines at once absolute exclusion and absolute inclusion of the universe; and the contradiction between these two aspects of it is avoided by the exclusion being declared to be real, and the inclusion ideal. The monad expresses a universe which it is not; it is, to use Leibnitz’s constant image, a mirror, and not that which is reflected or represented in the mirror. And, if we ask how the reflection either is, or is known to be conformable to the reality, he answers by his well-known theory of “Pre-established Harmony.” The monads have been so constituted from the beginning that the life of each runs parallel with the life of all the other monads, and each in its successive states represents the universe in its order and development. Thus, in place of the continual miracle of the system of occasional causes, Leibnitz substitutes his one all-embracing miracle whereby the future history of itself, and, through itself, of all other things and beings, is concentrated or gathered up, in potentiality, in the first constitution of each individual substance. The one system equally with the other involves the denial of any *real* relations between substances, and is therefore forced to explain their *ideal* relativity by an external and artificial arrangement of God. Yet this great gulf fixed between the real and the ideal, seems to

* Erdmann’s Leibnitz, p. 128.

disappear when we look at the inner nature of the monad itself as it is defined by Leibnitz. For if the monad is essentially a representative activity, and exists only in representing other monads, there can be no absolute division between its real and ideal sides. Each monad, as it exists in representing and being represented by the others, acts and is acted upon by them. Each is in itself but a repetition of the same world from a different point of view, and there is no world but in these different representations. Each finds its reality in its ideality—its individuality in its relation to the whole universe. What, then, is the object of absolutely separating two elements that necessitate and imply each other, only in order to combine them again by an artificial expedient like the Pre-established Harmony?

The bearing of this question becomes clearer if we look at the monads in their relation to God, who establishes and maintains, and, we might almost say, *who is* the harmony. “*Dieu seul fait la liaison et communication des substances.*” As each monad is confined to itself, we can know the harmony of existence with our perceptions only through our knowledge of God. Yet it would seem that the knowledge of God cannot be attained by a being who is an individual substance, unless he transcends the limits of his individuality—*i. e.*, unless he goes beyond representations or perceptions, which are merely modifications of his own being, and rises to a representation or perception which includes existence in itself. And this, indeed, is implicitly acknowledged by Leibnitz when he defines God as the Being, the possibility or thought of whom involves his existence. In saying that the thinking monad

In God
ideality
and reality
are one.

can rise to the knowledge of God, Leibnitz is admitting that *it* at least is not limited by the division which he elsewhere treats as absolute, between, thought and reality. In the idea of God, in fact, there is a necessary unity of the same two elements which in the idea of the world of finite monads are set in absolute opposition to each other. But, then, these two ideas—the idea of the unity of being and thought in God, and the idea of their distinction in the world—should be brought together and united with each other. They are, indeed, not two ideas, but two aspects of one idea. To apprehend myself as one in a world of individuals, from which I am necessarily distinguished, is possible only in so far as I relate both myself and them to a unity which transcends the distinction. I cannot have the consciousness of self except through the consciousness of the not-self; nor can I have the consciousness of the two as distinct and opposed except in relation to their unity. In this sense the thinking monad cannot exclude the world without including it; if it “represents” the world, and knows that it represents it, it at the same time represents God, the absolute unity of thought and existence. Hence, the individuality and universality of the monad, or its relation to itself and its relation to the world, which Leibnitz separates so absolutely from each other, are opposed yet complementary truths. It is, therefore, superfluous to construct an artificial harmony between two factors of reality which cannot be given in their distinction without also being given in their unity.

Leibnitz himself is not altogether without this thought, though in its expression he is not able to

rise above the language of figure and metaphor. He repeatedly points out that the *spirit-monad*—the monad that has consciousness of itself, (or, in his language, that has not only perception but apperception) holds a very different position in the universe from other individual substances. Thus we find him saying that while all substances express the universe, yet the other substances express rather the world than God, spirits express rather God than the world. “The difference between those monads which express the world with consciousness, and those which express it unintelligently, is as great as the difference between a mirror and one who sees.” In one passage he goes so far as to declare that the other monads have only a metaphysical, not a moral or spiritual individuality; for it is memory or the consciousness of self that constitutes personality, and makes a being responsible and capable of reward and punishment. Without such continued self-consciousness, indeed, the mere permanence of substance is nothing more to the individual than if a new substance had been created. “If an individual were made king of China on condition of forgetting all that he had been, would it not be to all practical intent and purpose the same thing as if he had been annihilated and a king of China created at the same time in his place?” *

If Leibnitz had clearly followed out the view expressed in such passages, it would have carried him beyond his monadism or ideal atomism on the one side, and beyond his idea of pre-established harmony on the other. For if it be true that mere continuity of existence is not enough to constitute

They transcend the idea of the Monad.

* *Discours de la Metaphysique*, §§ 34-5.

individuality, without personality or self-consciousness, then it is impossible to rest on the bare idea of the monad, as that which underlies and explains everything. Or, if we do, we must define the monad, not merely as a substance, but as a subject: we must say that the only true monad, the only independent and individual being, is a conscious self, and that all other substances are essentially related to, and dependent on the system of which they form a part. But, then, if self-consciousness, in which alone the idea of individuality or of the monad is perfectly realized, represents rather God than the world, or, in other words, involves in it the idea of a unity that transcends the distinction of the individual and the world, there can be no absolute opposition between individuality and universality. Individuality in its highest form is not merely negative and exclusive, but also positive and inclusive; it is not merely the consciousness of a self in opposition to other things and beings, but also the consciousness of a self in relation to, and unity with them. Hence the idea of the monad must be modified and transformed. Exclusive individuality cannot be the highest category for those who see that the only being who is really individual is also universal; or that the being in whom alone a distinct personal life is realised, is also the being that is least confined within the limits of its separate existence. Leibnitz himself, whenever he speaks of the relation of spirits to God and to each other, forgets the idea of harmony, and exchanges it for the idea of a communion or continuity of life, in which the differences of individuals are absorbed. Thus in the *Monadology*, after

speaking, in words similar to those already quoted, of spirits as representing not only the world but God, he proceeds to say—"It is this that makes spirits capable of entering into a kind of society with God, so that he holds towards them, not merely, as towards the other creatures, the relation of an inventor to the works he has produced, but also the relation of a king to his subjects, or of a father to his children. And from this we may easily gather that the assembly of all spirits must constitute the city of God—*i.e.*, the most perfect state that can exist under the most perfect of monarchs. And this city of God, this truly universal monarchy, is a moral world within the material world, the highest and divinest of God's works, and that in which his glory consists. For he would have no glory if his greatness and goodness were not admired by spirits: nay, it is in reference to this community alone that he can properly be said to have goodness at all, though his wisdom and power are manifested everywhere." With passages like these, in which the community of all spiritual beings is insisted on, and contrasted with the merely external relations of material objects, it is not easy to combine the idea of the repellent individuality of the monads and their artificial harmony. A spirit is not, strictly speaking, a monad at all, or if he is to be so regarded, we must free Monadism from the slough of ordinary Atomism, which, with Leibnitz, it never completely cast off.

The same difficulty recurs in another form, when we try to combine the independence of the monads with their absolute dependence upon God. It seems necessary that one or the other of them should be

Conflict of
Monadism
and Pan-
theism in
Leibnitz.

sacrificed; and, in fact, Leibnitz sacrifices each of them alternately. Where the independence and self-determination of the finite monads is to be emphasised, God sinks into a mere name for the harmony: where the substantiality of God, as the "highest monad," is insisted on, the finite monads become mere modes of his existence. Leibnitz generally starts with the former aspect of things. "*Omne individuum tota sua entitate individuatur*," is the thesis of his first essay, and the key-note of his speculation: and, like Aristotle, he combines the conceptions of individuality and activity. It is in the spontaneity and self-determination of the monads that he finds his defence against Pantheism. "When we take away all active force from things," he declares, "it becomes impossible to distinguish them from the divine substance, or to escape from falling into Spinozism."* In other words, the activity of a substance consists in differentiating itself from other substances; and conversely, where there is no difference, there is no activity, and hence no substance or individuality. This is the meaning of the celebrated "identity of indiscernibles," which Leibnitz frequently supports by inadequate empirical illustrations (such as, *e. g.*, the impossibility of finding two leaves alike), but which, in its proper sense, is the necessary corollary of Monadism. Yet, on the other hand, in spite of this strong assertion that the finite individual as such is a real substance, an independent activity, Leibnitz no sooner begins to speak of the nature of the "highest monad" than he comes under the yoke of that abstract logic which found its legitimate outcome in Spinozism. Admit-

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 161.

ting the principle that determination is negative and *merely* negative, he was driven, like Spinoza, to seek for positive reality in the indeterminate. For if God be the absolute affirmation without negation, and if other beings are distinguished from him only by negations, it is a necessary consequence that their limited existence is only a part of his infinity. Their independence is an illusion from which we have to abstract when we seek to determine the absolute reality. And along with the idea of limit, the idea of individuality must also disappear. If there be no determination at all, there can be no self-determination. God and man equally cease to be monads or subjects, and become mere substances. The Spinozistic difficulty as to the possibility of the absolute substance differentiating itself into attributes and modes, or giving rise even to the phenomenal illusion of a finite world, returns upon Leibnitz, and while, in the Theodicy, he contends that evil is the necessary result of the finitude of the creatures, by the same reasoning he makes it impossible to account for the existence of finite creatures at all. It may be true that, if the finite is to exist, certain evils must result, even in the best of all possible worlds. But why should a finite world exist, when by it nothing can be added to the absolute reality of God, when it is not necessary to God, and when there is no difference between it and God except through the presence of negations. "It is yet unknown to men," Leibnitz says on one occasion, "what is the reason of the *impossibility* of different things" (*i.e.*, the impossibility of different things existing together), "or how it is that the natures of different things can be opposed to each other, seeing

that all purely positive terms seem to be compatible."* The logic of this passage involves a dilemma that is fatal to Leibnitz's favourite conception of the Divine Being as selecting out of all possible worlds the one that contains the greatest amount of good, with the smallest amount of evil. If there be any positive existences which are *impossible*—i. e., which cannot be combined without opposition and conflict, and if, for that reason, the best of all possible worlds, the world that has the greatest sum or reality of good in it, must contain also a certain amount of evil, then it is obvious that all positive existence cannot be combined in God, who is affirmation without negation, good without evil. If, on the other hand, all positive existence is *compossible*, and is actually combined in God without negation or evil, why should they not also be combined without negation or evil in the best of all possible worlds? If there be no negation or evil involved in the union of all positive reality in God, then evil is not a *sine quâ non* of good, and God will not admit it in his world: if negation and evil is involved in the union of all possible reality, then how can we exclude it from the divine nature itself?

He fails to
combine
Individu-
ality and
Relativity.

The explanation of these contradictions is simply that Leibnitz did not see how universality or relativity to other beings could be reconciled with the notion of the individual substance. But the self-determination of the monad, as has been already shown, implicitly contains in it a positive as well as a negative relation to that which is different from itself. Following out this idea, we are able to do justice to the independence of the individual, with-

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 99.

out thereby cutting him off from all connexion with the world. We are able to think of God, not as the absolute substance that leaves room for no other existence than itself, but as the absolute subject, the self-determined individual, who, just because he is self-determined or self-revealing, manifests himself in and to a world of beings that partake of his own nature. And, on the other hand, we are able to think of the finite individual, and especially of the self-conscious subject, as self-determined and "a little universe" in himself, without shutting him up in a world of mere representations, where he comes in contact with nothing really different from himself. But, as Leibnitz failed to apprehend this idea, and as he imagined that he could defend the substantiality of the monad only by denying all real relations between it and everything else, he was forced to recur to the Cartesian method of abstraction, in order to connect the monads with each other and with God. He did not observe that this way of abstraction necessarily leads to Spinozism, and connects the individuals together only by denying to them any real individuality. The imperfection of the monadism of Leibnitz is thus shown by the fact that he has to supplement it out of a system based on principles contradictory to his own. The result is a continual crossing of inconsistent lines of thought, veiled only by the use of figurative and popular expressions which suggest, alternately, the pantheistic and the individualistic idea, without bringing them to any rude collision. When we read that "God alone is the primitive unity or simple origivative substance, of which all the creative or derivative monads are the

productions, born, as it were, of the continual fulgurations of divinity from moment to moment," we are easily carried along the stream of metaphor, and do not stop to think that such language derives its power from combining two different conceptions of the relation of God to the world, which are never by Leibnitz reconciled.

The contradiction which we have here discovered in the fundamental conceptions of Leibnitz necessarily runs through all his speculations: for at every point the unity or continuity of existence is broken by the isolation of the monad, and has to be restored by some logical *tour de force*. One of the most important illustrations of this is to be found in his treatment of the ideas of *space* and *extended matter*. Not unfrequently he introduces his theory of monadism by the argument that there must be simple substances since there are composite things, for the composite is only an aggregate of simple units. The statement is, as Leibnitz puts it, self-evident, or even tautological: for what is called composite is by that very name defined as a mere aggregate. But Leibnitz supposes that he has thus shown the impossibility of all real continuity, *i.e.*, of all complexity that does not end with indivisible units. Hence he denies the reality of space and extended substance. For the extended, as such, is infinitely divisible; you never can find in space a unit which may not again be treated as an aggregate. The Atomists attempting to reach an individual, fell into the contradiction of supposing the existence of something extended which yet was without parts. But their failure shows us at once the necessity of seeking a real unit; and the im-

Hence he is obliged to explain Space and Matter as only phenomenally real.

possibility of finding it in space. The real units or monads must therefore be unextended; hence they can have only *internal* determinations or, in other words, perceptions, and their relations to one another must be limited to correspondence in these perceptions. There is therefore no existence except the existence of monads, and the conceptions of space and extended substance are confused ideas. The reality of extended substance can be found only in the aggregation of monads, the reality of space can be found only in the relation of these monads to each other, a relation which is, of course, purely ideal. And the same reasoning may be also applied to time. To get at the truth in the former case, we must modify our conception of extended substance, *i. e.*, substance continued through the difference of space, by the denial of any real continuity or relation between monads. To get at the truth in the latter case, we must take into account that the monad never changes into anything else, and that its present state virtually contains all its past and all its future. But, though time and space are thus ideal and not real, though they are mere relations, and relations not clearly conceived, yet this must not be taken to imply that things apprehended under the conditions of time and space are merely subjective or illusory appearances. They are, indeed, phenomena, not things in themselves, but they are real phenomena; they have a coherence and connection which raises them above the level of illusions or dreams: or, at least, there is a method and order in these dreams which enables us from the past to foretell the future. "We can never," he says, "demonstrate the existence of material bodies, and there

is nothing against the notion that the things outwardly presented to us are well-ordered dreams (*somnia bene ordinata*), which are by us judged to be true, and which are indeed for us as good as true, because they agree with each other. Nor can we attach much weight to the argument that this would make God a deceiver; for, when we assume anything without proof, we are not deceived by God, but by our own judgment. And what if it should be the case that our nature is not capable of the truth? Surely in that case we should not have to blame, but to thank God, if he made appearances, since it was impossible that they should agree with reality, to agree at least with each other; and so bestowed on us a knowledge which, for all the purposes of life, was equivalent to the knowledge of reality.”* The ideality of time and space, in fact, involves the ideality of motion, of all external phenomena, and even of the law of causation itself, by which they appear to determine each other in succession or co-existence; for monads are only determined internally. But yet, not only are these phenomena coherent with each other, but their coherence corresponds perfectly to the real connection of the states of things, though that is ruled by an altogether different law—the law, not of efficient, but of final causation. In other words, the monads are all determined from within, but their self-determination corresponds exactly with the apparent determination from without which takes place in phenomena, under conditions of time and space. “*Les âmes agissent selon les loix des causes finales par appétitions, fins et moyens. Les*

Yet this
phenomen-
al is in har-
mony with
absolute
reality.

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 144.

corps agissent selon les loix des causes efficientes, ou des mouvements; et les deux règnes, celui des causes efficientes, et celui des causes finales, sont harmoniques entre eux."* They are harmonious, because the latter is the reality of which the former is the phenomenon, though Leibnitz often speaks as if they were two separate kingdoms of reality. The phenomenal world is only the real world presented in a certain confusion or distortion, which, however, follows a regular law of change, as it transmutes the purely internal connexion of states in the self-evolving monad into a regular external connexion of things in space and time. And, as indicated in the passage above quoted, it is owing to the limits of our finite natures that we cannot fully represent the order and connexion of the world of monads, except in this confused and imperfect form.

But this raises another question. How can monads, or individual substances, be thus limited in the form of their knowledge? To understand this, we must remember that though Leibnitz represents the monads as spontaneous and self-determined in all their perceptions, he yet holds that God alone is *actus purus*. In every other monad there is a passive element, a *prima materia*, a limit; and its absolute spontaneity means only that the limit is not external, not imposed by the influence of anything else, but simply by its own original constitution. Now, as the activity of the monad is representative or perceptive, this limit takes the form of a certain confusion in its perceptions. In regard to the nature of this confusion, Leibnitz tells us, *first*, that it is that which

Subjective
source of
the ideas of
Space and
Time.

* *Monadologie*, § 79.

makes us feel and imagine, as distinguished from that which makes us think; and, *secondly*, that it is that which makes us represent the world as an order of things in time and space, and not as a multitude of isolated monads. As to the first of these points, he frequently remarks, that our sensible perceptions are not simple, as Locke had supposed, but really involve an infinite complexity. Their apparent simplicity arises only from the want of analysis. The infinity of the world lies implicitly in sense, and the work of thought is just to evolve and disentangle it. As to the second point, he tells us that matter is not extension, but *extensionis exigentia*, or, in other words, it is that which necessitates our conceiving a multitude of co-existent monads as extended substance. These two points are closely connected together; we conceive things as *partes extra partes* in space, just because they are present to us in sense, in a confusion or complexity which we can never analyse. Thus the *prima materia*, the limit or confusion of our ideas, is the reason of the *secunda materia* that seems to belong to things as *phenomena realia*. The *secunda materia*, or matter in the ordinary sense of the word, has no real existence in itself, but only in the monads that constitute it. At the same time, as we have seen, this matter, though only phenomenally real, is a definite object of knowledge in its order of space and time; and, indeed, it is only as material, and in this order, that the greater part of the world can be explained by us. Leibnitz is, therefore, as zealous as Bacon in excluding the idea of final cause from physics, and in demanding that all the particular phenomena of nature should be accounted for mechanically, though he thinks that

the general laws of mechanics may be deduced from the *principium melioris*.

These two doctrines of Leibnitz—that sense is confused thought, and that existence is space and time is a *phenomenon reale*—have a special importance when viewed in relation to the ideas of Kant. Before criticising them, however, we may complete the general outline of the Leibnitzian philosophy, by giving a brief account of his view of the kingdom of monads as a graduated scale of being. The doctrine that sense is confused thought becomes in the hands of Leibnitz a means of reducing the qualitative differences of things into mere differences of quantity. All monads are with him perceptive beings, distinguished from each other only by the clearness or confusion of their perceptions, and thus the scale of being extends downwards, without a break, from spirits who apprehend the world in the light of thought, to animals who apprehend it only in the obscurity of sensation ; and from these again down to monads, whose perceptions are too confused to be classed even with those of sense. The following passage from the *Monadologie* will be sufficient to show the method in which Leibnitz seeks to obliterate any absolute line of distinction between the various stages of existence.

The differences of Monads merely quantitative.

“The passing state of the monad which envelopes and represents a multitude of things in the unity of the simple substance, is what is called *perception*, which must be carefully distinguished from *apperception*, or consciousness. . . . The action of the internal principle that causes the change or passage of the monad from one state to another, may be named *appetite*. . . . Now, if we call everything

a soul which has perceptions and appetites in the sense just explained, all the simple substances or monads may be called souls. But as sensation is something more than simple perception, it is better to give the general name of monads or entelechies, to those simple substances that have only perception; and to reserve the name of soul for those whose perception is more distinct, and is accompanied by memory. To illustrate this, I may appeal to our own experience, for we ourselves sometimes fall into a state in which we remember nothing and have no distinct perception, as when we faint away, or are immersed in profound slumber without a dream. In this state the soul does not visibly differ from a simple monad, though, as it revives, it shows itself to be much more. Are we, then, to say that, in such a state, the simple substance is without any perceptions? That is impossible for reasons already given. But when there are a great multitude of little perceptions, none of them vivid or distinct, we become stunned, as when we turn round and round in the same direction for many times, we get giddy and faint so as to lose the power of distinguishing anything. And death may produce this state in animals for a time. . . . Hence we see that if in our perceptions there were nothing distinct, nothing, so to speak, standing in higher relief, or more strongly tasted than other things, we should always be in a stunned condition, and this is the state of monads wholly naked. But nature has taken care to give distinct and outstanding perceptions to the animals by furnishing them with organs which gather into themselves several rays of light, or several undu-

lations of air, to make them more efficacious by their union.”*

We cannot set much value upon these illustrations (for they are no more), except as they show how Leibnitz endeavoured to find unity through all the differences of things, and to minimise the division between the conscious and the sentient, between the sentient and that which is without sensation. The idea of development is nowhere in Leibnitz applied to nature as a whole, yet we may gather from various passages that he was only restrained by theological difficulties from asserting, that differences in the scale of being are merely differences in the stage of evolution which various monads have attained. And, indeed, no other doctrine is consistent with his assertion that each monad “represents,” or contains implicitly in its perception, the whole universe.

But this doctrine of the qualitative similarity of all individual substances gives rise to another difficulty when we try to apply the idea of the monad to all the different objects that are brought under it. A monad is a completely self-determined existence that excludes all relations to other things, just because it is itself a “little world” in which they are all ideally represented. But how can we ascribe such completeness of existence to beings that have only sensitive consciousness? In a certain sense we may regard a self-conscious being as complete in himself, for such a being is not limited to his own sentient individuality. Of him, therefore, it may be said that in all his knowledge he only knows himself, and in all his action he only acts upon himself. To

Difficulty
of applying
the idea of
the Monad
to animals.

* *Monadologie*, §§ 14, 15, 19-21, 24, 25.

him there is nothing absolutely external ; he takes the life of the world into his own life ; and just for that very reason he may be regarded as self-sufficient, as a "little world" in himself. But how are we to apply this conception to a purely sentient being? A being without self-consciousness is, as Leibnitz himself says, without knowledge of those necessary truths which form "the soul and connective principles" of our perceptions, and alone enable us to discern the universal in the particular—the laws of a world in the phenomena of sensitive experience. For it, therefore, no universe exists, and all that even Leibnitz ventures to say of it is, that it is a "mirror" of the universe, that "in the least of substances eyes as piercing as those of God could read the whole sequence of things in the universe." But this means not that it is a whole in itself, but simply that it cannot be interpreted except in relation to the whole, of which it is a part. The centre, in reference to which it becomes completely intelligible, is not, as with the thinking being, found within itself—the *ordo ad individuum* and the *ordo ad universum* do not with it coincide. And when we go lower than the organic world, we find it still more difficult to find individuals that correspond to the description of the monad. The organised living being has still an ideal centre to which the various phenomena of its life may be referred, and in reference to which it may be treated as a complete whole in itself, a "little world" which is a copy of the great one. But, with life and organism, the individuality of nature, in the proper sense of the word, ceases. Leibnitz, indeed, evades the difficulty by declaring that nature is organic

Impossibility of applying it to inorganic matter.

throughout, and that it contains an "actual infinity" of organisms within organisms. The difference of natural from artificial machines is, he says, that "the machines of nature are machines in their smallest parts."* But this simply shows that his principles force him to deny the reality of the inorganic. Such a notion as that of matter, which is infinitely divisible and continuous, which is not made up of indivisible units, and whose units are necessarily related to each other, will not fit into his theory. He is, therefore, obliged to supplement his doctrine that existence is essentially individual, by the doctrine that extended substance is, as such, phenomenal, and that time, space, and motion, are confused ideas—*i. e.*, ideas imperfectly representing their objects. In other words, he attempts to see in every existence a microcosm or self-determined whole, after the analogy of the ego, and, when this expedient utterly fails him, when any existence by the very notion of it involves relativity and continuity, he takes refuge in the denial of its objective reality.

In thus dealing with the continuity and divisibility of matter, Leibnitz betrays the fundamental inconsistency of his system. Drawn one way by his individualistic psychology, and another way by his idealistic ontology, he ends in a compromise that is in harmony with neither. His individualism would lead him to assert that the mind can apprehend nothing but its own perceptions. The pure individuality of the monad, if taken literally, imprisons it within itself, and the universe can exist to it only in the painting on the walls of its prison. But the logical development of this view would have

The doctrine, that matter is phenomenal, a compromise between Individualism and Idealism.

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 126.

excluded all reference of its perceptions to any object, and therefore all possibility of knowledge. To avoid this consequence, therefore, the thinking monad must be made more than a monad. Its perceptions, we are told, pass at one point into reality; it has one immediate external object, viz., God,* the thought of whom at once involves his existence. And it is a conclusion from the goodness of God, that the other perceptions also represent reality. The reality which is thus represented cannot, however, be the existence of extended substances or things in space. For things in space have no indivisible unity: they have no internal relations that can be distinguished from their external relations. To admit their real existence, therefore, would be to surrender monadism. They can be nothing more than coherent phenomena — phenomena which, as they have a definite order and connexion, point to a reality, but to which no reality exactly corresponds. It is obvious that we have here a repetition of the inconsequence of Berkeley when he first denies the reality of material substance, because we cannot through ideas know any object but the ideas themselves; and then asserts that through the same ideas we know God and other spiritual beings. Leibnitz does not hesitate to admit that we have the knowledge of God, though he is an external object, and though he is a being whose thought is creative—*i. e.*, a being who is not shut up in himself like a monad, but has external relations. Further, Leibnitz does not hesitate to admit, that we have knowledge of other spiritual beings, and of beings which have sensation, or even

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 222.

life : of all beings, in short, who can in any way be brought under the definition of monads. It is only when he comes to matter in space, to mere extended substance in which external and internal relations are no longer distinguishable or separable, that he finds an insuperable difficulty. It is only then that he affirms the object, because of its continuity, to be necessarily phenomenal, and to have no reality except in the units or monads which it contains. But, if the continuity of the monads, or their relativity to each other, be once admitted, as it is by Leibnitz, when he combines the individuality of the thinking monad with its necessary relation to God, and again when he combines the individuality of God with his necessary relation to the world of created monads, then it seems absurd to hesitate about space and extended substance, on the ground that the idea of continuity is involved in them, or, in other words, that we can find in them no absolute units that exclude all relation. It is true that the conception of the world as a world in space, is only an imperfect and abstract conception of it. Its imperfection, however, lies, as will be shown in the sequel, not in its implying the continuity of things, as well as their individuality, but in this, that these two elements of the conception are not yet reconciled with each other. But, with Leibnitz, the doctrine of the phenomenal character of space, is not based on the idea that it is an imperfect form of expression for the individuality and relativity of things, but on the false theory that they have no relativity at all—a theory which, nevertheless, is practically abandoned by Leibnitz himself, as it must be abandoned by every one who takes the step from

thought to existence. For individualism, by the necessity of the case, is suicidal, and the mind of a pure monad could never ascertain the truth even of monadism. When Leibnitz asserted against Locke that all knowledge rests on principles which, as universal, are independent of the experience of this or that individual, when he taught that it is the constitutive activity of thought through which alone there exists to us any unity or connexion of things, he, in effect, pronounced his own condemnation.

Inconsistency in his distinction between contingent and necessary truth.

This last remark leads us, finally, to notice a point which is of great importance in tracing the connexion of the Leibnitzian with the Kantian system. Leibnitz, as we have seen, sought to explain away the differences in the perceptions of monads, or at least to treat them as merely quantitative, as differences of degree and not of kind. In this view sensation is but confused thought, and thought is but distinct sensation. Yet, whenever he passes to the more exact consideration of the nature of the two, he finds not, as we might expect, a fluctuating boundary but a marked division between them. He draws a wide distinction between contingent and necessary truth between truths of fact, and truths of reason. The latter, he thinks, can always be carried back by analysis to self-evident principles, and, indeed, to identical propositions; the former are incapable of such final resolution. "I use two principles," he says, "in demonstration; one of them is the principle that whatever contains a contradiction is false; the other is that for every truth which is not an identical proposition, a reason can be given. In other words, the notion of the predicate

is always explicitly or implicitly contained in the notion of the subject, and this is the case, not less in contingent than in necessary truth. The distinction between necessary and contingent truth very closely resembles the distinction between commensurable and incommensurable numbers. Just as we can always find a common measure for commensurable numbers, so we can always demonstrate necessary truths—*i. e.*, we can always carry them back to identical propositions. On the other hand, just as the analysis of a ratio of incommensurables produces an infinite series, so contingent truths require an infinite analysis which only God can complete. Wherefore it is by him alone that they are known with certainty and *a priori*;* for though a reason can always be found for the state that succeeds in the state that precedes, yet this reason requires another reason, and so on *ad infinitum*. And this progress *ad infinitum* takes, in our knowledge, the place of a sufficient reason, which can only be found outside of the series in God, on whom all its parts, prior and posterior, depend, far more than they depend upon each other. For when a truth is incapable of final analysis, and cannot be demonstrated from its own reasons, but derives its final reason and certitude from the divine mind alone, it is not necessary. Such are all those I call truths of fact, and this is the root of their contingency, which I doubt whether any one hitherto has explained.”*

In his answer to Locke, Leibnitz gives a psychological explanation of this distinction, in which he sometime approaches very closely to the Kantian theory. The world of sense is a world of confused

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 83.

ideas, between which the mind can see no relations. Why two merely sensible qualities should be found together, we cannot tell. Hence purely sentient beings can never rise to the apprehension of general truth or science. They are confined to the particular, and when they combine ideas it is merely by arbitrary association. "The animals are pure empirics, and only guide themselves by examples. Their consecution of ideas is but a shadow of reasoning; that is to say, it is only a connexion of imagination and a transition from one image to another. An object similar to one that has presented itself before makes them expect that which formerly was perceived in connection with it, as if things were connected in reality, because their images are connected in the memory."* Out of this mere particularity, the mind of man is lifted by the eternal truths which form its own essence, which are necessarily combined with its consciousness of self, and which form the connective elements of all thought. "General principles enter into our thoughts, and are their soul and uniting principle. They are necessary to thinking, as the muscles and tendons are necessary for walking. The mind rests on these principles at every moment, though it is not easy for it to disentangle them, or to represent them distinctly and separately, for that requires a close attention to its own operations, and few people are capable of such attention."† Hence the mere sensations which in themselves would give us no conception of objective reality, acquire objective meaning when connected together by means of these principles. "The true criterion of reality in relation to the objects of sense is the inter-

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 195.

† *Id.*, p. 211, p.

dependence of phenomena—*i.e.*, the connection of events that happen in different times and places, and in the experience of different men, who themselves are very important phenomena to each other in this regard. And the interdependence of phenomena, which guarantees the truths of fact in relation to the sensible objects external to us, is verified by means of the truths of reason, as the appearances of Optics are explained by Geometry.”* Yet we must remember that this kind of knowledge is very imperfect, for it is not based on clear and intelligible relations of thought: its matter, if not its form, is derived from the confused ideas of sense; and we can never be certain that it has a higher value than a self-consistent dream. “It must be allowed,” he says, in the immediate context, “that this knowledge is not of the highest degree of certainty. The truth of our own existence, and of the cause of phenomena, is of quite another nature, as it has relation to substances” (or things in themselves).

Leibnitz, therefore, in spite of his assertion that sensation is confused thought, seems to hold that, for us at least, there is an absolute limit that prevents the confusion from ever being disentangled. Truth of fact and truth of reason are for him two species that cannot be reduced to one, though he seems indistinctly to see what Kant afterwards demonstrated, that there is no truth of fact without truth of reason. It is not merely that truth first comes to us in the complication and confusion of sense, before it is evolved and made distinct by the analysis of reason, but that, between the knowledge of phenomena and the knowledge of things in

* Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 344, p.

themselves, there is supposed to be an impassable gulf. The phenomena of sense are incapable of analysis, and therefore incapable of being fully explained or accounted for. They must have some sufficient reason, but that reason is unknown to us, and unknowable : or what is the same thing, a sufficient reason for them can be found only in the will of God.

If sufficient reason is reducible to identity, there is no explanation of differences.

But this suggests a difficulty in the interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason. In the passage above quoted, the difference between it and the principle of identity and contradiction is reduced to a minimum. Whenever we cannot immediately and intuitively discern that a predicate is identical with or contained in the notion of its subject, we are obliged to seek a reason for connecting them. But this is ascribed merely to the confusion of our ideas. If we *could* analyse fully the idea we have of any individual thing, we should find in it an adequate explanation of all its qualities. Hence, in his letters to Arnauld, Leibnitz declares that a complete analysis of the idea of any man would enable us not only to discover his general character, but also to predict all the events of his life ; nay, more, as each monad is a mirror of the whole system of which he forms a part, the analysis of the idea of one man would be sufficient to make manifest to us the nature and history of the whole universe. Now, Leibnitz recognises no difference between what is contained explicitly in the idea of a thing, and what is involved or implied in it as part of a system, except the difference of greater or less distinctness (as, indeed, on the theory of Monadism, it was impossible for him to recognise any other

difference). To attain the goal of science, therefore, would be to reduce all truth to identical propositions; and it is only the imperfection of our faculties that makes it impossible for us ever to attain this goal in reference to so-called contingent truth or truth of fact—*i.e.*, truth that is known to us through the instrumentality, and therefore in the confusion, of sense. But again, from a logical theory, which thus makes the principle of identity the highest principle of truth, there is but a single step to the metaphysical result of Pantheism, the absorption of all difference in an original unity of substance. To say that truth in its highest form is an identical proposition, and that all propositions not identical involve a certain degree of confusion of thought, is to repeat in other words the doctrine of Spinoza, that all appearance of difference and determination is but the necessary illusion of a finite consciousness.

Leibnitz, however, never comes in sight of this result without an instant recoil. Accordingly we find, in other parts of his works, a second interpretation of the principle of sufficient reason, which raises it from a secondary form of the principle of analysis into a co-ordinate and independent principle of synthesis. In other words, he explains it as a principle that enables us, not to detect identity under all *appearance* of difference, but rather to discover an identity that is the source and explanation of *real* difference. Unfortunately this new meaning is gained for the principle of sufficient reason at the expense of the general unity of the system. In answer to the frequent accusations of fatalism brought against him, Leibnitz makes a distinction between what he

If it is not,
there are
two first
principles.

calls metaphysical and moral necessity—*i. e.*, between the necessity of that which we cannot think otherwise, because its denial would involve a contradiction, and the necessity of that which we can think otherwise, but which must be as it is, because it is for the best. The former necessity fixes the bounds of *possibility*, and is a limit even to the power of God, who cannot make that exist, the existence of which involves a contradiction. The latter necessity fixes the content of *reality*, and depends on the goodness of God, who, because of his goodness, must create, and when he creates, must produce the ‘best of all possible worlds.’ The former necessity is ultimately reducible to the principle of identity, the latter to the *principium melioris*, which is now identified with the principle of sufficient reason. These two necessities are quite distinct, and even, in a certain degree, opposed to each other; for the existence of evil is explained by the theory that it is not possible for a finite world to be perfectly and simply good, without admixture of evil. According to the *principium melioris*, the highest sum of good, or, what is the same thing, of positive reality, must be realised in the world, but according to the principle of identity, it cannot be realised without the admission of the negative element, or, what is the same thing, of evil. I have already shown that Leibnitz is inconsistent with his own logical principles, when he asserts that evil is necessary to the greatest sum of good, the positive to the negative; and, indeed, it is abundantly evident that the principle, of identity, to which all metaphysical necessity is reduced, does not involve, but rather precludes, such a union of

opposites. Yet it is on this supposition, and on the consequent collision of the co-equal principles of metaphysical and moral truth, that Leibnitz relies to 'justify the ways of God to man,' and to save his own philosophy from the gulf of Pantheism. But to set up *two first principles* is really to put the problem to be solved for its own solution. The question is just this, how the two aspects of truth are to be united. It is a remnant of the false scholastic method, to suppose that all that is necessary to solve a vital difficulty, is a mere '*distinguo*,' by which separate spheres are assigned to each of the conflicting elements.

We have now gone over the main applications of the Monadism of Leibnitz, and may sum up the contradictions which it involves. Leibnitz seems to advance beyond the Individualism of Locke, when he conceives the monad as perceptive of the whole world; yet he admits an absolute division between the perceptions of the monads and the reality they represent, which is equally inconsistent with the possibility of knowledge. He declares that each individual monad is an active and self-determined unity; yet he admits the Spinozistic principle that determination is negation, which, logically carried out, reduces the individuality both of the finite and of the infinite to an illusion. He denies the reality of space and extended substance, because continuity and real relativity is contrary to the definition of the monad; yet he admits real relations between the finite and the infinite monad. Unable to rest on the pure abstract idea of individuality, he introduces the opposite idea of universality or community, but

The con-
tradictions
of Monad-
ism.

he introduces it in a hesitating and inconsistent way, or substitutes for it the conception of an external harmony. Lastly, he seems to rise above that scholastic logic that admits only an analytic movement of thought, when he adds to the principle of identity the co-ordinate principle of sufficient reason. But on looking more closely, we find that he denies to pure thought any synthetic movement, and that he regards the principle of sufficient reason only as an imperfect form of the principle of identity—a form which it takes in its application to the ‘confused’ ideas of sense. And if, in other parts of his writings, he treats the two principles as independent, he brings them together only by means of an awkward compromise.

Now, all these collisions of thought, between the real isolation and ideal communion of the monads, between the self-determination of the individual and his finitude, between the assertion of the communion of monads and the denial of the reality of space on the ground of its continuity, between the principle of analysis and the principle of synthesis, show that the unity of the philosophy of Leibnitz is superficial and external. And this is, in fact, unconsciously confessed by Leibnitz himself in his constant recurrence to the idea of harmony; for it is only things that are independent and external to each other that require to be harmonized. The value of his philosophy, therefore, consists rather in the multiplicity of elements which he tries to combine, than in the untempered mortar with which he binds them together. He is continually speaking of method, yet the great defect of his philosophy is his loose and unmethodical way of treating each

point by itself, without reference to the whole of which it forms a part. We have to gather his system out of many occasional writings, none of which gives us a complete view of it, and his largest work, the *Theodicy*, is confessedly popular rather than scientific. His logic is inadequate to the matter to which it is applied, and though he speaks of a new *calculus* of thought, he seems to have sought for it in the wrong direction—not in a transformation of the old logic, but in a mere addition to it. The analytic method of the schools remains for him a fixed and certain presupposition, and though the speculative force of his thought often breaks through its rules, yet he shrinks from bringing together into one view the different aspects of truth, and he is fertile in ingenious distinctions, to prevent them from conflicting with each other. Hence, as he never presses differences to the point of contradiction, so he is never able to reconcile them, except in an external way. He shuns that collision of opposites out of which the light of truth springs; and his harmonies ‘heal the hurt’ of philosophy ‘slightly,’ because he has never fathomed its depth. The union of reality and ideality, of the finite and the infinite, of efficient and final causes, of the principle of identity and the principle of sufficient reason, is never completely achieved. Each of them is supposed to have its special province; none of them is taken for an ultimate principle; yet no other principle of unity is discovered by which the bounds of the respective provinces may be fixed. ✓

Perhaps we may best characterise the philosophy of Leibnitz as *Reason speaking in the language of*

Wolff exaggerates the defects of Leibnitz.

the Understanding. For according to a common use of terms, it is the understanding that fixes abstractions in their separation from each other, while it is reason that brings the abstract elements together, and discovers their uniting principle. A "harmony," therefore, is what seems to come nearest to the satisfaction of the claims of reason without undue offence to the understanding. In such a compromise, however, the substantial victory is left in the hands of the understanding: its abstractions are treated as complete and independent realities, while their unity is reduced to a shadow. And it is only what was to be expected, that in the development of the philosophy even the shadow should disappear. The Wolffian school, with its superficial clearness of dogmatism, and its revived scholastic method, was related to Leibnitz as Berkeley and Hume were related to Locke. It purged the Leibnitzian philosophy of its inconsistencies and extravagancies; but, by the same process, it expelled all the higher speculative elements of that philosophy, and reduced it to a collection of nominal definitions.

CHAPTER VI.

THE WOLFFIAN PHILOSOPHY.

THE system of Wolff has now ceased to have much importance, except as the immediate antecedent of the Critical Philosophy, and as the school in which the author of the Critical Philosophy was trained, It may be fairly described as an unconscious revival of Scholasticism, in which the authority of the common consciousness comes in the place of the authority of the church. It professed, indeed, to be something quite different from this. It professed to emancipate thought from all presuppositions and hypotheses, and to carry it back to first principles. Philosophy was to aim at knowing all things which are known by common sense or the special sciences, but knowing them by a better method, and in the unity of a system. In fact, however, it borrowed almost all its matter from the ordinary consciousness, whose presuppositions it never questioned; and whatever it had of speculation was inherited from the idealistic individualism of Leibnitz; though Wolff took care to omit most of those hints of higher truth by which his master had modified the narrow self-consistency of his sys-

The
Rational-
ism of
Wolff.

tem. The more excellent way of philosophy was, to Wolff, simply the way of analysis; the higher light, the *Aufklärung*, which he introduced into the thought of his time, was got simply by dissecting it. No man ever had a fuller conviction that the secret of things was to be found by taking them to pieces; and when he "had the fragments in his hand," no man ever thought less of any "spiritual bond" which might have disappeared in the process of disintegration. Possessed by a noble faith in the virtue and necessity of bringing all things to the test of clear consciousness, and an inveterate distrust of everything that refused to be brought to that test, he never questioned the sufficiency of the formal methods he employed. ~~The one~~ hindrance to spiritual progress was confusion, and the one remedy was "victorious analysis." To him the real thing, the thing in itself, was that which remains after dissection has been pushed to the last point, to which the knife of the anatomist, or the critical intellect of the philosopher, can go.

Such being his general view of things, it is not surprising that Wolff's life should have been a continual war with those who represented the religious feelings of the time, or that the progress of his school should have awakened a pietistic protest against philosophy, as essentially the "wisdom of this world." Unable to meet the destructive logic of Wolff by any better logic of their own, those who clung to that unity of life, which he "murdered to dissect," were driven to reject logic altogether, and to appeal, like Jacobi at a later time, from the head to the heart. Again, as in the middle ages, rationalism found its natural complement in mysticism,

and the conflict, by exposing the defects of both, did much to prepare the way for a higher philosophy, which should be rational, without being merely analytic and formal. It would be difficult to exaggerate the emptiness of this philosophy of the *Aufklärung*, its want of speculative insight, its persistent tendency to explain away all real difficulties, its external and mechanical way of dealing with ideas. All these defects flowed directly and necessarily from the nature of its method. Yet, on the other hand, it is absurd to fall into the error of its immediate opponents, and to forget the debt we owe to men, who, after all, were genuine children of light, struggling for the rights of reason with the best weapons they possessed. Their vigorous assertion of the claims of philosophy, their persistent resolve to leave nothing in confused complexity, but to separate and distinctly determine every fibre of thought by itself, their careful mapping out of the intellectual kingdom in all its parts, was the necessary preparation for an era of fruitful speculation. And he who asks whether these dry bones can live, may be fairly directed to the later German philosophy.

To the details of the Wolffian philosophy we shall have to refer so often in considering the criticism of Kant, that it may suffice here to indicate its general character. Wolff begins with the simplest and most general conceptions, and proceeds from these to the more complex and determinate. But in this process, from the abstract to the concrete, there is no real evolution of thought. It is not that the more abstract and general idea when analysed shows its imperfection, and so forces thought to go beyond

His
method
only in
appearance
synthetic.

it to something more complex and concrete. It is simply that Wolff compares the general idea with another more complex and concrete idea which he "finds in his mind," and discovers that the former is, or is not, contained in the latter. Thus, there is no necessary sequence either in the movement of thought from one category to another within the sphere of ontology or *philosophia prima*; or again, in the application of these categories to the three great departments of concrete philosophy—psychology, cosmology, and theology. There is simply a continuous, though not quite regular, descent from the general to the particular, in which every step involves a new appeal to common consciousness and experience. The appearance of a development of the complex out of the simple is quite illusory. Really the complex is supposed to be given in all its complexity from the first, and all that is done is to show by analysis that it contains the simple.

Emptiness
of his
distinction
of *a priori*
and *a posteriori*.

When the movement of reason is thus conceived as purely formal and analytic, the question at once arises as to the source from which the matter of thought is derived. Wolff adopted the Leibnitzian view that all truth is evolved from within, and that there is only a quantitative difference of greater or less clearness between the apprehensions of sense and those of reason. But this did not hinder him, any more than it hindered Leibnitz, from drawing a marked line of division between *a priori* and *a posteriori* evidence, between truth of reason and truth of fact; nay, he went so far beyond Leibnitz as to divide every science into an empirical and a rational part. At the same time he lost hold of the sole ground on which, on Leibnitzian principles, this distinction

could be defended, when he attempted to prove that the principle of sufficient reason is a form of the principle of identity. For this was to deprive thought of every originaive or synthetic principle, and to reduce it to mere analysis. It is true we do not find this inference drawn by Wolff; on the contrary, he always speaks as if there were a distinct class of *a priori* truths. But in practice there is no real difference in his treatment of the rational and the empirical. In both cases a conception is supposed to be given in inner or outer experience: we find it in our minds or we apprehend it by our senses, and analysis makes it yield up its contents. It was reserved for Kant to show that the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* is perfectly futile, so long as it is not proved that thought by its own activity produces new matter, or at least adds something to the matter given to it from without.

It is worth while to look for a moment at the way in which Wolff reduces the law of sufficient reason into a form of the law of identity, both because we perceive here the *πρῶτον ψεῦδος* of all his logic, and because we shall afterwards have to contrast with it the reverse process by which Kant restores life to the synthetic principles. Wolff starts with two definitions—"nihilum est cui nulla respondet notio," and "*aliquid est cui notio aliqua respondet*;" hence something and nothing are contradictories between which there is no middle term. No repetition of nothings can make them equivalent to something, or, in other words, *ex nihilo nihil fit*; which is simply the converse of the proposition that there is a positive reason for everything. It is evident at once that this argument rests on that absolute separation of affirma-

His absolute separation of Affirmation and Negation, and its results.

tion and negation, of which we have seen the necessary result in Spinozism. Strictly taken, it involves the consequence, not only that nothing can come of nothing, but that there is no "becoming" or change at all. Nay, even the very conceptions of something and nothing are on these terms impossible. Wolff's own definition of "nothing," *id cui nulla respondet notio*, would be enough to refute him, for it is a definition of the indefinable; and as the definition of "something" has significance only by contrast with this; it also must be unmeaning. The principle that the purely affirmative alone can be known, is in direct contradiction with the first movement of thought by which positive and negative are distinguished from, and related to each other; and as Wolff does not yet think of the subterfuge that these opposites are bound together merely in our thought but not in existence, the inconsistency is obvious and glaring. Understood in this way, the logical principle of identity becomes the very extreme of absurdity, for that union of positive and negative which we find even in the very simplest conceptions, the conceptions of something and nothing, or being and not being, of course meets us in a more formidable shape at every step of our onward progress. If Wolff had logically carried out his principle he could not have advanced at all; and while he does advance in the way already described, by taking up at every step new conceptions which he finds in the mind or gets from experience, he continually gets rid of difficulties by the same easy method which he had applied to the idea of becoming. In other words, he accepts each idea as it is given in the common consciousness, but deforms it by eliminating, or at least ignoring, all its negative

elements, and thus reduces it to a collection, more or less numerous, of affirmative predicates, each of which is fixed and isolated from the rest, though they may be externally combined as predicates of one common subject. His individualistic speculation not only sets every subject by itself without relation to the others, but it even isolates every predicate. Thus all the relations of ideas and things are reduced to the external relation of logical quantity. One subject may have a greater, another a less number of qualities: one quality may be possessed by a greater, another by a less, number of subjects: but qualities and subjects alike are fixed and definite units without movement or transition between them. Such a logic gives an artificial simplicity to thought, simply because it isolates everything; because it gives to every individual and to every abstraction a factitious independence and self-sufficiency. It is the legitimate result of the Leibnitzian rejection of the idea of continuity; but it is Leibnitz with the speculative element left out—Leibnitz reduced to tautology by the omission of all those parts of his philosophy, in which he breaks through the limits of bare Nominalism. In the same spirit Wolff, while accepting the doctrine of the individuality of monads, rejects the idea of their perceptive or representative character, which was the Leibnitzian expression for their relation or connexion with the general system of things. But with this change Monadism degenerates into something not very different from Atomism, and the unity of the world comes to be regarded simply as an external and mechanical composition of unrelated elements. The human soul, indeed, is still said to be a *vis-*

His
Monads
reduced
almost to
Atoms.

representativa universi; but the pre-established harmony is seldom treated as anything more than a harmony of soul and body, and those hints of the higher nature of the spirit as 'representative rather of God than the world,' which we find in Leibnitz, not only remain undeveloped, but seem to be utterly forgotten. "The mind of Leibnitz was such," said Lessing to Jacobi, "that he could never bear that truth should be confined within too narrow limits. . . . It is for this I value him—that is, for his great manner of thinking, and not for this or that opinion which he seemed to hold, or even which he really held." * It is just this 'great manner of thinking,' that breaks through the limits of systematic consistency, that 'strikes fire from every pebble,' and sees the whole in every part, which was entirely wanting to Wolff. His clear understanding, on the contrary, apprehends every part by itself, as if it were a whole; and when he combines his thoughts, it is not that by their own movement that they pass into each other, but that, by an external movement of intellect, they are put together like the pieces of a machine. With Leibnitz, the 'harmony' is ever on the point of passing into a self-differentiating, self-integrating unity of relative elements; with Wolff it is a mere Teleology, by which things which have no inner relation are fitted together to secure an end which is entirely foreign to them. For to him there seems to be no transition or mean between absolute identity and absolute difference. If a predicate is not completely contained in the notion of a subject, it has no connexion with it. If two subjects are different they are

* Jacobi, *Werke*, B. IV., p. 63.

independent, and capable only of an external combination.

We have seen how this manner of reasoning ^{His} disturbs Wolff's view of the first and simplest con- ^{theology.} ceptions of ontology, the conceptions of 'something,' 'nothing,' and 'becoming.' The same distortion meets us again at the last point to which his speculation reaches—his conception of the relation of all individual substances to God. The contradiction between the finite and the infinite, which was implicit in Leibnitz, becomes explicit in Wolff. The purely individual, unlimited nature of the simple substance cannot be attributed to God. God, therefore, cannot be a substance in the same sense as the finite individual, nor can we attribute to him any predicate of the finite individual, even his activity, except *per eminentiam*. "Hence we see why the Scholastics said that God was *super prædicamenta*, and why it is difficult to imagine any higher genus under which he and his creatures should be brought as species; and we see also why we should not be troubled about such hyper-transcendent conceptions."* But this is just what we do not see, for we are here brought face to face with a difficulty which cannot be solved in terms of the Wolffio-Leibnitzian philosophy. If God and man are individual substances, according to the exclusive and repellant conception of individuality given by that philosophy, then there is no room in the universe for both. God is reduced to a mere name for the harmony, or man to a mode of the divine Being. It is only so far as individuality is conceived as at the same time universality—i.e., as admitting a positive as well as

* Wolff, *Ontologia*, § 847.

a negative relation to other beings—that we can reconcile the two, that we can admit the unity of the finite and the infinite without the annihilation of either. This, however, is a conception entirely beyond Wolff's horizon; he is therefore in a strait between Atomism and Spinozism, and really combines in his system the errors of both. He admits Atomism so far as to make it impossible to account for any unity of existence or even of knowledge; he admits Spinozism so far as to leave no room for individuality either in man or in God. And if these two phases of his speculation do not lead to a manifest contradiction, it is only because they alternate, and are never brought face to face with each other. As is not unfrequently the case with writers who make, like Wolff, an almost obtrusive display of clearness and logical precision, what we find when we penetrate below the surface is a 'nest of contradictions.'

Correspondence in the result of the English and the German Individualism.

When we look back on the review we have now concluded, of the individualistic philosophies, we find a certain parallelism in the fate of the two great schools of England and Germany, though the one seems to end in a dogmatism, and the other in a scepticism. Locke and Leibnitz equally profess to base their philosophies upon the individual consciousness, the former, however, looking for knowledge and reality mainly to the passivity of sensation, the latter mainly to the activity of thought. Both introduce a consciousness of the universal, a conception of the world in *ordine ad universum*, of which they can give no consistent account. In both cases the development of the system frees it from an element which is in contradiction with its

first principle, and, at the same time, shows the insufficiency of that principle to account for real knowledge. The result of Hume was to show that, taken by themselves, the mere sensations or impressions of the individual cannot relate themselves to, or connect themselves with, each other, and that therefore they can never be referred to objects more permanent than themselves, so as to give rise to knowledge, or even the illusion of knowledge. Leibnitz might seem to have protected his philosophy from such an ineffectual end, when he pointed out how the activity of the intelligence contains in itself certain forms of thought, which give order and unity to the matter of sense. But, as he regarded this activity of thought as purely subjective and individual, as dealing merely with mental representations and not with objects; so he tended, as we have seen, to reduce it to a purely formal and analytic process. For if we exclude all objective reference of our ideas, all that seems left is to compare them together, and determine their agreement or difference. Synthesis and objective reference, as Kant was to show, necessarily go together; and when the latter is denied, it is inevitable that the former should soon be denied also. / This, which is merely a tendency in Leibnitz, a tendency produced by the necessary logic of his principles working against his better mind, is fully developed in Wolff, with whom the activity of thought loses all content and reality, all principle of progress, and becomes an empty revolution upon itself. Extremes meet, and the ultimate result of Wolff has only a nominal difference from the ultimate result of Hume. / If the scepticism

of the latter dissolved reality into an unconnected flux of sensations, the dogmatism of the former reduced it to an endless tautology of thought, abiding with itself, and never going out of itself. Whether we ask the question, 'what is the subject in itself?' or the question, 'what is the object in itself?' we must in both cases get an unmeaning answer. The subject in itself is the formal self-identity of thought without difference, the object in itself is the mere difference of sensation without unity or relativity. But pure identity or pure difference, pure subjectivity or pure objectivity, come very much to the same thing. A merely logical philosophy may die of inanition, and a merely sensational philosophy of paralysis; but the nature of the disease that killed it matters little to the corpse. But while Hume found the ultimate reality in the single sensation, the '*minimum sensible*,' of which nothing can be known or said, and while Wolff's idea of truth was a mere formal identity, which is absolutely meaningless, except in relation to some given difference, it was the merit of Kant to see that these two factors of knowledge have meaning only in their unity, and that 'conceptions without perceptions are empty, and perceptions without conceptions are blind.' By this essential insight he was led to a new integration of thought, by which Locke and Leibnitz were reduced into elements of a higher unity. The result was a last form of Individualism, which was, at least potentially, something more than an Individualism. So much has this fertile idea changed the aspect of the intellectual world, that there is not a single problem of philosophy that does not meet us with a new face; and it is perhaps not unfair to say,

that the speculations of all those, who have not learned the lesson of Kant, are beside the point. In the following pages we have to show by what course of intellectual development Kant was brought to that view of the relations of thought and reality which gave a new beginning to philosophy, and how far, and with what success, he developed it.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KANT.

PART FIRST.

THE PRE-CRITICAL PERIOD.

KANT was the son of an humble tradesman in ^{Kant's education.} the city of Königsberg. His father was of Scottish descent; and perhaps it may be more than an inspiration of national vanity that makes us see some traces of the Scotsman in the combination of moral intensity with sobriety of understanding which formed the basis of his character. The influence of his home, and of his early training in a school presided over by a clergyman who was a leader among the Pietists (*tetrica illa quidem, sed utilis tamen nec pœnitenda fanaticorum disciplina*),¹ did much to develop the first of these characteristics. "The religious ideas of those times," Kant wrote at a later period, "and the prevalent notions of virtue and piety could hardly be said to be either clear or satisfactory, yet the root of the matter was in them. Say what you will of Pietism, no one can deny the real worth of the characters which it formed; they possessed the highest that man can possess—a peace, a cheerfulness, an inner harmony with self, which was

¹ Ruhnken's Letter in Schubert's *Life of Kant*, p. 21.

disturbed by no passion. I yet remember what happened on one occasion, when difficulties arose between the trades of the leather-cutters and the saddlers with reference to their respective rights. My father's interests were seriously affected by the contest; yet even in domestic conversation, the difference was discussed by my parents with such toleration and indulgence towards the opposite party, and such fixed trust in Providence, that, boy as I then was, the memory of it will never leave me."¹ Kant was intended by his parents for the Church, and was sent to the university with that object; but the wider interests of science and philosophy which there opened upon him soon made him prefer the career of a teacher. He was instructed, as a matter of course, in the Wolffian philosophy, which then reigned supreme in all the universities of Germany. But at this time he seems to have given most of his thoughts to mathematical and physical science. His earliest work, published at the end of his university curriculum, in his twenty-third year, is a half-physical, half-metaphysical essay on the idea of force. After nine years, which he spent as a tutor in various noble families, he returned to the university as a *privat-docent*; and among the various papers which he published during the next six years, there is only one that is not on a physical subject. The most important of his works in this period is a *Natural History and Theory of the Heavens*, in which he extends Newton's mechanical theory of the actual planetary system, to explain also the genesis of that system, and anticipates many of the ideas which were afterwards developed by Laplace. After 1762,

¹ Schubert's *Life*, p. 16.

his thoughts took a more definite direction towards philosophy, which occupied him in the main, though not exclusively, for the rest of his life.

When Kant says that Hume first awoke him out of his 'dogmatic slumber,' he must not be understood too literally. So far as his published writings enable us to trace his mental development, he never was a contented disciple of the Wolffian dogmatism, nor did he ever break away from it by any sudden revolution of opinion. Even in his student days, he had detected the weak and unsatisfactory character of the prevailing philosophy. "Our metaphysic," he says in his first work, "is like many other sciences, only on the threshold of profound knowledge; God knows when it will step over the threshold. It is not difficult to see its weakness in many of the things which it undertakes; we find only too often that prejudice is the main strength of its arguments."¹ But it was not in Kant's nature at once to break with the system whose weakness he had detected, or as a Lessing or a Herder might have done, to rid himself of it at a stroke by a pointed epigram. His work was a work of patient mining, of experiment after experiment, criticism upon criticism; nor did he ever leave any question till it was thoroughly exhausted. And it was just because his method was thus exhaustive that the revolution of thought produced by it was so great and irreversible. What Kant has done no one need do over again. "Kant, the destroyer of the old metaphysic," says Rosenkranz, "at the end of the century seemed to his contemporaries a giant of intellectual force, and already in

The continuity of his intellectual development.

¹ *Werke*, V., p. 35.

1786, was described by Mendelssohn, as the great Iconoclast (*den alles Zermalmenden*). But this great revolutionary spirit appears to have formed itself in the most peaceful continuity, and with the softest gradation of progress."¹ The negative in Kant is always accompanied by the positive. At each step some new insight into the defects of previous philosophy calls forth an effort to remedy it. One after another, the leading ideas of the Criticism of Pure Reason are put ~~in~~ the place of their equivalents, until finally, in the year 1770, when Kant was elected professor of philosophy, he unfolded in his inaugural discourse the leading thought, out of which, by ten years' additional labour, his great work was developed. The steps of this progress must now be traced.

Wolff's philosophy had vindicated the rights of reason to penetrate into every subject, to analyse and dissect all man's beliefs, whether sacred or profane. / This claim was the more readily admitted, because the demand for freedom of thought was accompanied by the utmost doctrinal orthodoxy. To Wolff and his immediate followers the method he adopted seemed the most effectual means of establishing the truths, not only of natural religion, but also of Christianity. In fact, as it was merely a formal method, a method of analysis, it was indifferent to any special content, and might be applied to prove or disprove anything. It was a mill that ground any one's corn. All depended upon the presuppositions with which each particular writer started. Yet in the long run its action was decidedly negative or sceptical. For the analytic

¹ *Werke*, XII., p. 121.

spirit, that seeks the reality of things in their dis-severed elements apart from the bond that connects them together, is sure ultimately to banish all consciousness of the life and unity of the whole. Standing in a merely external relation to the matter of belief, binding its parts together or separating them at pleasure, thought gradually loses hold of any objective reality that stands above it and limits it. It learns to sport with truth, and may even seek to assert itself against truth. It is thus that the consciousness of spiritual freedom, when it is merely formal, *i.e.*, when it has not in itself any definite contents, becomes lawless and revolutionary. He who believes only in that which finds evidence in the activity of his own intelligence, and who finds in that activity the evidence of nothing in particular, is devoted at once by his trust in himself, and by his inward barrenness, to the work of destruction. The spirit of the Encyclopedists, as it passed into Germany, found the place swept and garnished by the Wolffian philosophy. Its opponents indeed appealed to feeling, in order to raise a temporary bulwark against thought; and a Protestantism, whose deep subjective apprehension of Christianity was revived by the influence of Pietism, was able for the time to respond to the appeal. But a permanent resistance can be made to thought only by thought itself. The French exaltation of Reason as a negative and dissolving force, before which all positive elements of belief, all established systems of morality and religion, all traditions and institutions of the past must melt away, could only be met by a deeper insight into that positive and constitutive power of reason, in virtue of which it is

itself the author of an ordered world of thought and action.

In tracing the history of Kant's progress towards the *Criticism of Pure Reason*, we must always keep in view the merits and defects of the philosophy from which he started. Now, in the first place, the Wolffian philosophy had asserted the rights of reason, the reality of knowledge, and, consequently, by implication, the ultimate unity of knowing and being; but, on the other hand, by reducing thought to a purely formal activity, by denying to it any criterion of truth except the logical laws of identity and contradiction, it practically made reason dependent for all its contents on something else than itself. In the second place, it had asserted the absolute independence of individual substances in such a sense as to exclude all *real* relations between them: and, as a necessary consequence, in such a sense as entirely to separate thought and perception, viewed as modifications of the individual mind, from the objects to which they refer. It thus produced a cosmology, which approximated closely to atomism, and a psychology, which could only by sophistry be distinguished from subjective idealism, or, as Wolff calls it, egoism. Lastly, its treatment of the relations of the finite and the infinite had issued in inevitable self-contradiction. It conceived God as an exclusive and individual substance, the first of monads, and also as a universal being, who transcends all the limits of individuality: yet, at the same time, it established such an opposition between the individual and the universal, as to make it impossible to assert the reality of God without denying the substantial

Kant's
gradual
progress
from the
Wolffian
to the
Critical
philosophy.

reality of all that is finite, or to assert the reality of the finite without denying God.

Now, on all these points we shall find Kant, in his pre-critical period, gradually advancing to a more consistent view. (1.) In opposition to the Formalism of Wolff, he asserted, at as early a period as the year 1763, that, while *pure thought* in itself is analytic, or ruled by the law of identity, *knowledge* necessarily involves synthesis. And this synthesis, which he at first conceived to be either empirical, or, as in the case of mathematics, arbitrary, he ultimately discovered to involve a necessary *a priori* movement both of perception and conception. (2.) In opposition to the Individualism of Wolff, and the pre-established Harmony, Kant asserted that there are real relations between individual substances. These relations were not, in the first instance, conceived by him to be involved in the nature of the individual substances themselves, but only to be determined in them by the power of God, who made them parts of one universe. In the year 1768, however, Kant had come to perceive that things in space are bound together by relations which are due to the nature of space itself, relations which are prior to, and presupposed in, their individual existence. From this point of view, therefore, the relativity of things in the world of experience is not an accident, but something that belonged to them by the same necessity as their individuality. Lastly, Kant modified the Leibnitzian Individualism by the idea of an original Unity, which precedes and determines all things, both in reality and in knowledge. This idea was, indeed, obscured in his mind during a period in which he devoted him-

self to the empirical philosophy of England, but it reappears in his latest practical work in a slightly altered form. It is, however, only in the *Critique* that the unity of knowledge altogether frees itself from its first pantheistic form, and becomes the unity of 'Apperception,' or self-consciousness. Such are the most important points in the early development of Kant's speculation. The remainder of this chapter shall be devoted to a more detailed consideration of them.

Anticipations of the distinction of analytic and synthetic judgment in his earlier writings.

In the new exposition of the principles of metaphysics with which Kant, in 1755, commenced his career as a teacher of philosophy, he shows himself still, on the whole, a disciple of Wolff. Yet it is noticeable that he controverts the Wolffian reduction of the principle of sufficient reason to the principle of identity.¹ He allows that such a reduction may be possible in regard to the *ratio cognoscendi*, or *ratio consequenter determinans*, but not in regard to the *ratio fiendi*, or *ratio antecedenter determinans*. In other words, we can reason from effect to cause, from the particular case to the general rule implied in it, by pure analysis; but we cannot so reason from the general to the particular, from the cause to the effect, for in this case we are adding to the subject predicates, which are not involved in our previous conception of it. Or at least we can reason thus only in the case of God, for God is the only Being 'whose existence is prior to, or, if you prefer it, identical with His possibility.'² In every

¹ *Werke*, I., p. 18.

² Cf. *Werke*, I., p. 19. *Qui hæc qualiacunque nostra examinaverit, videbit me rationem veritatis a ratione actualitatis sollicitè distinguere. In priori solum de ea prædicati positione agitur, quæ efficitur per*

other case we can reason *upwards* by identity, but not *downwards*. Thus, to take Kant's example, the eclipses of Jupiter may be the means of our discovery of the rate of the propagation of light; but no one would say that these eclipses are the real reason of the rate being such as it is. On the contrary, the phenomena of these eclipses could only be what they are on the presupposition of the actual constitution of light. But if we adopted the Cartesian theory, that the reason of the propagation of light lies in the definite elasticity of the globes of ether, and if we were able on this basis to calculate the rate of its propagation, we should be tracing it to its real reason, or its *ratio antecedenter determinans*. In the one case we should be saying simply that a predicate is true of a given subject, because it is contained in the idea of that subject. In the other case we should be uniting to the notion of the subject a predicate not contained in it, and therefore we should have to ask, what element must be added to the notion of the subject, in order to connect the new predicate with it, and exclude the opposite predicate.

notionum, quæ subjecto, vel absolute, vel in nexu spectato, involvuntur, cum prædicato identitatem, et prædicatum, quod jam adhæret subjecto, tantum detegitur. In posteriori circa ea quæ inesse ponuntur examinatur, non utrum, sed unde, existentia ipsorum determinata sit; si nihil adest quod excludat oppositum, præter absolutam rei illius positionem, per se et absolute necessario existere statuenda est; si vero contingenter existere sumitur, adsint necesse est alia, quæ ita non aliter determinando, existentie oppositum jam antecedenter excludant. Note the distinction between the *ratio identica* of God's existence and the *ratio genetica* of the existence of finite beings. This passage does not seem to have been considered sufficiently by those who deny that the germ of the distinction of analytic and synthetic judgment is found in this early treatise. Note also in Proposition XIII. the distinction between that which individual substances are in themselves as individuals, and their combination through their dependence on a common principle.

Confusion
of the
regressive
movement
of Science
with
formal
analysis.

The principal criticism to be made on this view is, that it confuses the regressive process whereby science discovers the universal from the particular with mere formal analysis. But does the scientific man discover a general law by mere analysis of the facts which he uses it to explain? Is the law of the propagation of light to be reached by mere analysis of what is logically involved in the eclipse of the satellites of Jupiter? Is, in short, a general law nothing but a common quality which we discover in a number of individuals? To say so is to reduce science to a mere useless process of ascending logical [trees of Porphyry] in order to come down again. After the law of the propagation of light has been discovered, it will form part of our conception of an eclipse, and can be found by analysis of that conception, but not till then. Such analysis presupposes synthesis; and though the conception, that makes synthesis possible, may be suggested by what we already know of the objects, it cannot be found by simple logical analysis of the notion of these objects. Only if our first knowledge of an object in perception contained already all the elements of complete science, could we be justified in regarding the process, whereby we advance from fact to law, as purely analytic. The fall of an apple, or the revolutions of a planet, may presuppose gravitation, but no mere dissection of the ideas of the former could give us the idea of the latter. Only in the synthetic mind of a Newton, that saw the whole in every part, could the unity spring out of the diversities of motion in celestial and terrestrial bodies. But when the universal law had been thus discovered, it immediately transformed those

first imperfect conceptions of the particulars, on which the discovery itself was based. Thus the analytic process of science is also synthetic: it not only connects facts together by finding a common principle in all their apparent difference and contradiction, but, by throwing the light of this principle upon them, it alters the aspect of the facts. Kant, however, governed as he was by the Leibnitzian theory—that the confused ideas of sensation contain in themselves a complete representation of their objects, and that all that science can do is to make these ideas clear and distinct—was unable to see the difference between the so-called analysis of science and the formal analysis of logic. But when the regressive process is thus misconceived, the progressive process cannot be properly understood: when thought is supposed to rise to the universal by a mere abstraction, that separates it from the particulars, with which it is externally united, it must, by a parity of reasoning, be supposed to proceed *from* the universal to the particulars only by externally adding on the marks, which have been dropped on the way upwards. Kant, therefore, in this early treatise, is still in his ideas of method substantially at one with Wolff. Yet he is already seeking for something better. And when he adopted the distinction of Crusius between the real reason or cause of things, and the ideal reason or cause of our knowledge, and suggested that the former involves synthesis, though the latter does not, he was already indicating the direction of his subsequent investigations into the nature and relations of analysis and synthesis.

He discovers that all logical processes are analytic.

In a series of treatises, which mark the years 1762-3, and of which it is not easy to determine the precise order, Kant follows out with great keenness the distinction between the connexion of thoughts, as it is determined by formal logic and the connexion of things. In the essay *On the false subtilty of the syllogistic figures*, he takes the first step by pointing out the limits of the movement of pure thought. All the syllogistic processes are, he argues, reducible to analysis, though this is somewhat concealed by the artificial complexity of the logical theory of figures. The first figure is the only one which fully expresses all that it implies, and so exhibits the movement of thought in its simplicity; for the evidence of the other figures rests on the possibility of reducing them to the first, by the conversion of one or both of their premises. The sole principles of syllogism are these two:—*Nota notæ est nota rei ipsius*, and *Repugnans notæ repugnat rei ipsi*:—and these are themselves only corollaries of the laws of identity and contradiction, which are the principles of affirmative and negative judgment. Hence there is no ground for saying that reason, the faculty of syllogising, is different and distinct from understanding, the faculty of judging. Syllogism is just the activity of thought whereby a judgment is made complete, as judgment is the activity of thought whereby a conception is made distinct. The whole process is discerned to be a process of pure analysis, whenever we free it from the useless subtilties that hide its real character.

And that the only possible *a priori* synthesis

When Kant had reached this view of Logic, and of the relations of thought which it analyses and explains, it could scarcely escape his notice that

there was something essentially unsound in the elaborate demonstrations of the Wolffians. If thought proceeds by mere identity, and cannot by all its activity get more out of conceptions than is already given in them, then the method of beginning with a few simple definitions and axioms, and pretending to deduce everything from them, must be an inversion of the proper method of philosophy. How can the pyramid of knowledge be balanced on its summit? How, by mere analysis, is so much to be got out of so little? This problem was specially brought under Kant's attention in the subject set for a prize essay by the Berlin Academy in the year 1762: "Are the truths of Metaphysics susceptible of the same evidence as the truths of Mathematics, and what is the nature of their certitude?" In discussing this question, Kant comes to the conclusion, that the example of mathematics has been the great snare of previous philosophy. The brilliant success of mathematical methods within their own sphere, had naturally led Des Cartes and Spinoza, Leibnitz and Wolff, to suppose that the same apparatus of definitions and postulates, and axioms and demonstrations, might be applied with equally great results in another department. But, as Bishop Warburton remarks, "nothing could be more fatal to philosophy, than the imitation of the method of mathematics." For the business of Mathematics is, not to analyse given conceptions, but by arbitrary synthesis to produce new conceptions that are not given. The few conceptions, which it presupposes, the conceptions of quantity and space, it does not need to analyse: it simply takes them as they are given in the common con-

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sciousness. On the other hand, its own special objects are produced by the very act of mind that defines them; that is, we produce them by putting together given elements in an arbitrarily determined way. Hence we can be quite sure, that there is nothing in these objects, except what is involved in their definition. The definition of a circle is just a prescription of the process whereby the figure, to which we attach the name of circle, may be drawn: the circle is not given as an object before the definition, but comes into existence with it. Further, when we observe the nature of mathematical deduction, we find that, though the truths established by it are universal, they are always exhibited in an individual concrete instance, which is brought before the eyes, or, at least, before the imagination. Thus, to prove that space is infinitely divisible, the mathematician draws two parallel lines, and one cutting them at right angles; then from a point in one of the parallel lines, he draws lines, passing through the perpendicular, to various points in the other parallel line; and from the infinity of the number of possible sections of the perpendicular in this one instance, he discovers the infinite divisibility of space. But in philosophy, we must proceed in a quite different way. *There* we have not to produce an object by arbitrary synthesis, but to discover what it really is, not to add new elements to that which is given, but in simply to find what elements are contained in it. Clear definition, therefore, is rather the highest end at which the philosopher has to aim, than the first point from which he starts. And it is far from easy for him to see things exactly as they are given, and to be sure that, in defining them, he

has omitted nothing. Most philosophers have sinned both by arbitrary combination of things, which • are given separately, and by arbitrary separation of things, which may, for aught we know, be necessarily combined. The fanciful synthesis that produced the Leibnitzian conception of the slumbering monad, is equally groundless with the rash dogmatism of others about the possibility of a soul without a body. Again, as another point of difference between the philosopher and the mathematician, we must remember that the sign which the former has to express his general conception, is not an individual instance, in which its nature is fully represented, but simply a word, an arbitrary mark which, in itself, exhibits to us nothing of the meaning of the conception it expresses. He is forced to deal with his conceptions *in abstracto*, without being able to 'envisage' them *in concreto*, and so to verify or correct them by the congruity or incongruity of their signs. From all this it follows, that philosophy cannot imitate the methods of mathematics. It must proceed by way of analysis, not by synthesis: and, indeed, it must often be content with an analysis, which is far from complete. What it should copy is not the method of mathematics, but "the method which Newton introduced with so great profit into natural science. According to that method, it is the duty of the physicist to seek, by means of sure experiences, (aided, of course, by geometry,) the rules, according to which certain natural phenomena take place. For, even though we may not be able to see the *first* grounds of these phenomena in the nature of bodies, yet it is certain that they operate in the way

The method of philosophy is, therefore, analytic.

determined; and it is an explanation of the complexity of natural events, when we clearly show that they fall under well-attested rules. In like manner, in *Metaphysic*, we ought to seek by sure inward experiences, *i.e.*, in the immediate evidence of consciousness, those marks which are contained in our conception of any general property of things: and then, though we may not know all that is essential to the constitution of the things in question, yet we may safely avail ourselves of our knowledge so far as it goes, as a sufficient basis for many inferences about them.”¹ So far, then, is it from being the case, that we can proceed from a few simple notions to demonstrate everything, that we must rather allow that philosophy has many starting points, or in other words, that there is an indefinite number of material truths, which cannot be proved, and which we must simply take as they are given.² And if there is room to hope, that some day we may reverse our steps, and proceed as in mathematics from the simple to the complex, yet we must allow that that day is still a long way off. “We are still very far from the time, when it will be possible to proceed synthetically in *Metaphysic*; only when analysis has helped us to perfectly clear and distinct conceptions, will synthesis be able, as in Mathematics, to subsume the complexities of knowledge under its simplest principles.”³ “*Metaphysic* is undoubtedly the most difficult of sciences; but it is a science that has not yet come into existence.”⁴

If we compare this view of science with that which is expressed in Kant's first treatise, we see that he has made a considerable step toward the

¹ I., p. 92.² I., p. 103.³ I., p. 97.⁴ I., p. 88.

critical point of view. Here, as there, the regressive movement of science is conceived to be a process of logical analysis, guided solely by the law of identity: and it is under this presupposition, that Kant calls upon philosophy to imitate the method of science. But of the progressive, or synthetic, movement of thought, as it appears in Mathematics, a new idea is presented to us. In that science, it is shown, that there is a spontaneous, or, to use a later expression of Kant's, a *constructive*, movement of thought. In Mathematics, reason can advance from the simple to the complex, adding at every step new elements to its first conceptions, simply because it arbitrarily constructs its objects while it defines them. It has not yet occurred to Kant to explain the objective validity of mathematics by the doctrine that Time and Space are the forms of perception. He is, therefore, obliged to treat mathematics, very much as Locke had treated it, as a system of mere 'ideas,' with which the real world happens to correspond. In the other sciences, however, in which we deal directly with the real world, he can admit no such arbitrary and artificial process of synthesis. *There* we must take things just as we find them, and all that science or philosophy can do is just to analyse what is given. *There* the utmost limit of knowledge will be reached, when, by careful analysis of experience, we have arrived at certain primary conceptions or indemonstrable *material* principles of truth. From these, indeed, by aid of the *formal* principles of identity and contradiction, we can again descend to particulars. But the whole process in both ways will be purely analytic.

Whence,
then,
comes the
first syn-
thesis?

This last statement is of no small importance in relation to the judgment of the Kantian philosophy. For when Kant had thus distinguished the *formal* from the *material* principles of knowledge, or, in other words, the process of analysis from the matter to be analysed, he could scarcely avoid asking himself, whence this matter is derived. To analyse is to sever elements from each other, but before they can be severed, they must have been united. Analysis presupposes synthesis; and Kant could not long be content with the Wolffian doctrine, that all synthesis is confusion, and that to reach truth is simply to analyse our conceptions. Yet if he denied that doctrine, what account was he to give of the combination of elements in experience?

The precise point at which this difficulty began to trouble Kant may be determined almost with certainty, if we compare his essay *On the false subtilty of the Syllogistic Figures* with a remarkable treatise published not more than a year afterwards, entitled *An attempt to introduce the idea of negative quantity into philosophy*. In the former of these works, Kant, as we have seen, reduces all logical operations to analysis. Yet, in spite of this, he declares that in the power of performing such operations lies the distinction between merely sentient beings like the animals, and intelligent beings like men. The animals, he says, have no *distinct* conceptions, or, in other words, make no judgments, and in this lies their inferiority. It might seem, indeed, that the ox has a clear representation of the door of its stall, and can, therefore, use that representation as a means of giving distinctness to its conception of the stall: just as a man selects

a particular attribute of an object, and makes it the predicate of a judgment concerning the object. But this is not the case. For it is one thing to have before the mind a clear image of that which is an attribute or mark of a thing, and it is quite another thing to discern it as a mark of the thing, *i. e.*, to separate the two ideas and refer them to each other, as in the judgment, 'This door belongs to this stall.' It is one thing to distinguish objects, it is another thing to know the distinction of objects. Positive and negative judgment, therefore, imply something more than the association or dissociation of one feeling from another. And to determine the distinction between men and animals, therefore, we have only to discover what power it is that makes judgment possible to us. "My present opinion is, that that power or capacity is nothing but the faculty of inner sense, *i. e.*, the mind's faculty of making its own ideas into the object of its thoughts."¹

This deliverance of Kant is worthy of notice because of the contradiction which it involves, and the relation of that contradiction to his subsequent views. At the very moment in which he reduces the act of judgment to mere analysis, he still speaks of it as the distinctive act of intelligence in contrast with sense, as the intellectual act whereby mere sensations are turned into objects of thought. But it is obvious that *both* of these propositions cannot be true. If the objective consciousness is produced by the faculty of judging, then judgment must not merely analyse the presentations of sense, but

It must be given : for by mere thought we cannot discover real reasons, positive and negative.

¹ I., p. 73.

must add something to them. If, on the other hand, judgment is an analytic process, which can add nothing to the matter to which it is applied, then something more than judgment is necessary to turn subjective feelings into the knowledge of objects. Accordingly, in the *Attempt to introduce the idea of negative quantity into philosophy*, we find Kant maintaining that there is a marked contrast between the logical relations of ideas, and the real relations of things, and that we must necessarily go beyond the former in order to attain a knowledge of the latter. For, he argues, the logical method of dealing with ideas according to the rules of identity, only enables us to understand how a consequence should follow from a reason, when the conception of the former is contained in the conception of the latter, and "can be got from it by mere analysis." "In this way," he adds, "necessity is a reason for unchangeableness, composition is a reason for divisibility, and infinity a reason for omniscience. In all these cases I can clearly understand the connection of reason and consequent, for the consequent is identical with a part of the conception of the reason. But how one thing should arise out of another, and when it is not connected with it, according to the rule of identity, *this* is the point which I should much like to have explained to me."¹ To understand the logical reason of a thing is only to understand that a thing remains itself; to understand the real reason is to understand that, because one thing exists, something quite different comes into being. And

¹ I., p. 157.

there is a parallel difficulty in the case of real as distinguished from logical opposition; for, to understand logical opposition, is simply to understand (what is involved in the law of contradiction), that we cannot at once assert and deny a predicate of one and the same subject. But it is quite a different thing to say, that the assertion of one predicate involves the denial of another predicate, which is not its contradictory. "I understand, *e.g.*, how, when I assert that God is infinite, I am forced to deny that he is mortal; for his mortality would contradict his infinity. But how it is, that by the motion of one body, the motion of another body should be stopped, is quite another question. For we cannot say, that the motion of one body is the contradictory, or logical negative, of the motion of the other."¹ In the case of the negative consequence, therefore, we have the same difficulty as in the case of the positive consequence; and, as of the latter we can only say, that it is not explained by the logical law of identity, so of the former we can only say, that it is not explained by the law of contradiction. "I have carefully considered the nature of our knowledge as it is expressed in judgments as to reasons and consequents; and I shall take a fitting opportunity to communicate the results of my enquiries. But the sum and substance of what I have to say is, that the relation of a real reason to its positive or negative consequent, *cannot be expressed by a judgment, but only by a conception*. And though, by analysis, we may reduce such concep-

¹ I., p. 159.

tions to simpler conceptions of real reasons, yet, in the end, all our knowledge of this relation must terminate in simple, and irresolvable, conceptions of real reasons or causes, whose connection with their consequents cannot be further explained."¹ In other words, Kant holds that reasons and consequents are *given* in connection with each other, and that we must take them *as* they are given, without any explanation whatever. The formal or analytic activity of thought, the principle of judgment, does not enable us to trace any connection between cause and effect, for they are neither identical nor contradictory. We must, therefore, fall back on an original unity of conception, a nexus in the matter of thought as it is given in experience, which it is impossible for thought itself, governed as it is by the law of identity, either to explain, or to explain away.

Was Kant
at this
time influ-
enced by
Hume?

In this essay Kant seems to approximate so closely to the ideas, and even to the language, of Hume, that some writers have supposed that, at this time, he had already come under the influence of the Scottish philosopher, and been awakened by him from his 'dogmatic slumber.' But, in the first place, it is to be noticed, that Kant has not yet reached Hume's conclusion, that no necessary connection of ideas can be given in experience. All he says is, that such connection or synthesis must be *given* in some way, and ere it can be known, and that it cannot be demonstrated by any analysis of ideas. And, in the second place, even so far as his conclusion is the same with Hume's, it is reached by a

¹ I., p. 160.

different road; viz., by considering, not what can and what cannot be got out of sensations, the supposed matter of knowledge, but, what can and what cannot be got out of the logical form of thought. It is noticeable, as confirming this, that Kant's treatise is mainly occupied, not with the question of causation, but with the question of the difference between logical and real negation. It had been a presupposition of the Leibnitzian, as of the Cartesian, philosophy, that there can be no opposition between positive realities, but only between reality and nonentity; or, to express the same idea from the subjective side, that affirmation cannot be inconsistent with affirmation, but only with negation. But Kant attempts to show, that this arises from a confusion of the negative of pure thought, which simply takes away a predicate without putting anything in its place, with the absence of a quality from a real subject, which *may* be a mere defect or want, but is as likely to be produced by positive forces that counterbalance each other, as, *e. g.*, rest is the effect of moving forces, which are equal and opposite. Following out this thought in another treatise, which was written about the same time, on the *Only possible ground of proof for the Being of God*, he argues that though all reality must come from God, it is not accordant with reason to say that all reality must exist in God. "Philosophers have been wont to attribute all reality to God, or the necessary Being, because they did not observe that it is impossible for all kinds of reality to consist together in one subject, as its attribute. Thus the impenetrability of matter, its extension, etc.,

Difference
of real and
logical re-
pugnancy.

cannot be the properties of a being that has understanding and will." The definition of God, as the *omnitudo realitatis*, was only admitted because it was supposed that "reality can never be contradictory to reality, because both are true affirmatives. But, though I allow that there is here no logical contradiction, yet this does not exclude real repugnancy."¹ Such real repugnancy we must exclude from the nature of God (who is, therefore, *not* the sum of reality): but we must admit that it exists between many things in the world of experience. From this it appears that Kant had already discovered the error committed by previous philosophy in its absolute separation of affirmation and negation. In relation to pure thought, indeed, he still maintains their separation. Thought of itself cannot go beyond the limits which are marked for it by the laws of identity and contradiction; it cannot combine with each other elements that are opposite or even different. It can never pass from the affirmation of one thing to the affirmation of any other thing. It might seem that it could pass from the affirmation of one thing to the negation of another; but even this is excluded, as a confusion of real opposition with contradiction. It follows, therefore, that wherever there is a synthetic movement of any kind, positive or negative, we must go beyond thought, and look to that which is given in experience.

In the same treatise, Kant made another step towards his complete emancipation from the Wolffian dogmatism, when he denied that any analysis of our

By mere analysis it is impossible to pass from thought to existence.

¹ I., pp. 188-9.—Cf. Paulsen: *Versuch einer Entwicklungs-Geschichte der Kantischen Erkenntnisslehre*, pp. 64-5.

thoughts can ever assure us of the reality of their objects. Being, or Existence, he says (in language afterwards repeated in the *Critique*) is no possible predicate of anything. It is not part of the content of any conception. "Take any subject you please, say, Julius Cæsar. Gather into the conception of him all his thinkable predicates, those of time and place not excepted, and you will soon understand that, though you have given him all these attributes, you have still left it undetermined, whether he exists or does not exist." "Where, in our ordinary manner of speech, existence appears as a predicate, we must understand it as a predicate not of the thing itself, but of the thought of the thing. When, *e. g.*, we say, that the sea-unicorn¹ exists, but not the land-unicorn, this means only, that the conception of the former is an empirical conception, a conception of something that actually exists. In order, therefore, to show the truth of such a proposition, we have not to examine what is contained in the conception of the subject, (in which we could find only predicates of possibility,) but we have to inquire into the origin of that conception. The question, in short, is whether we have got the conception by seeing the animal, or by information from others who had seen it. If, then, we were studying perfect accuracy of language, it would be better for us to say, *not*, 'The sea-unicorn is an existent animal,' but 'An existent marine animal has all the predicates I unite in the conception of a unicorn.'"² Hence, the Cartesian argument for the being of God must be pronounced invalid. We can no more say, that a perfect Being exists, because the idea of per-

¹ *i. e.*, the narwhal.

² *I.*, pp. 171-2.

fection includes existence, than we can say that a perfect horse exists for the same reason. The utmost that can be said is, that, if we think of a perfect being, we must think of him as existing, but not that he actually exists. Being is a simple idea, which we cannot easily define. When used as the copula, it involves the *relative position* or assertion of something, i.e., the position or assertion of a predicate in relation to a subject. But, when it is itself used as a predicate, it means the *absolute position* of a thing, i.e., its assertion simply in relation to itself; or, to put it in another way, Being does not supply a predicate for any subject, but rather a subject to which predicates may be attached. When, therefore, we ask for a proof of the being of God, we are not asking for a middle term by which we may show that the predicate of being can be attached to God, but we are seeking a proof that something given as existing has all the predicates gathered into the idea of God.

Wolffian
definition
of existence or
reality.

The result of these considerations is, that all the Wolffian explanations of the idea of existence, or reality, must be rejected as inadequate, or even positively erroneous. The definition given of it by Wolff himself, as the "complement of possibility," is inadequate, as it does not tell us *what* has to be added to possibility in order to constitute reality. Baumgarten, one of his most eminent followers, explained, that the possibility of a thing was its logical essence or definition, with the properties deducible therefrom; while the "complement" necessary for reality, consisted of all the accidental predicates, which might belong to the thing, but which are not included in the essence. But this is

absurd ; for we may determine all the predicates of an object, both necessary and accidental, without passing beyond possibility. Nay, we may even say, that in order to be possible, an object must be completely and individually determined : for a possible man must be of a certain age, stature, figure, &c., and a man in the abstract is not possible. Equally absurd is the view of Crusius, that it is the determinations of time and place that make the difference between possibility and reality. For, not to mention that this would involve the questionable principle, that all that exists is limited by conditions of time and space, it is clear that we can think of possible, as well as of actual, time and place. The true distinction of the real from the possible is found, not in the matter or extent of knowledge, but in the *manner* of knowing. In the case of all beings except God (whose existence is proved by Kant in a manner of which we shall have to speak afterwards), the distinction is simply that the actual is given in experience and the possible is not.

We see, then, that in the treatises of the year 1763, Kant lays bare a twofold defect in the analytic method of the Wolffians, which nevertheless he still maintains to be the only method for pure thought. In the first place that method does not explain synthesis, and especially the synthesis involved in the idea of cause ; and in the second place, it does not justify the transition from the subjective to the objective, from thought to reality. The close connection of these two points, upon which Kant afterwards insisted so much, is not yet traced ; but in both cases he refers us generally to experience. It is experience that enables

Kant an
Empiri-
cist.

us to connect things with their real causes, as it is experience that enables us to connect thought with reality. Mere thought, as it never passes beyond what is contained in the conceptions with which it starts, so it never enables us to assert their agreement with objects. Only in the case of mathematics is a synthetic procedure allowed to thought, and this synthesis is at the same time declared to be arbitrary. In other words, thought in mathematics has to do only with its own constructions, which have no reality except in the mind that produces them. How such constructions of the imagination,—for they can be nothing more—should yet be the source of real knowledge, is a problem which Kant does not yet consider.

Meta-
physic
compared
to Sweden-
borg's
system of
ghosts.

It is, however, in an essay of the year 1766, on the *Dreams of a Ghost Seer illustrated by the Dreams of Metaphysic*, that Kant first explicitly and openly declares war upon the old philosophy, and joins himself to the Empiricists. In examining the *Arcana Cœlestia* he was struck with the symmetry and self-consistency of the fanciful system of the spiritual world constructed by the imagination of Swedenborg, and with its similarity to the artificial harmonies of the Wolffio-Leibnitzian philosophy. Both seemed to him equally plausible and satisfactory, if we are to take self-consistency as a sufficient evidence of truth; both equally unreal and baseless, if we demand any other evidence. Both are to be traced to the workings of an *intellectus sibi permissus*, a reason that follows every hint of suggestion without rigid self-criticism or demand for verification. "Many conceptions," he says, "arise in our minds from some obscure suggestion of experience, and are

developed to inference after inference by a secret logic, without any clear consciousness either of the experience that suggests or the reason that develops them. These conceptions—of which there are no small number—may be called *subreptive*. Some of them are mere illusions of the imagination, others again have a true objective meaning, for inferences of which we are not distinctly conscious are not therefore erroneous.”¹ But they all require to be analysed, and traced back to their origin, ere we can be sure of them. Until those beliefs that have grown up in the dark recesses of the soul have been thus brought out into the light of conscious reason, we can have no confidence in its validity. And very often there is a certain reluctance to such a critical operation, especially in the case of conceptions that have grown with our growth, and become, as it were, an essential part of our habits of thought. Hence it is that the profound philosopher so often “becomes a sophist to defend the illusions of his youth.”

If a spirit or ghost be defined, according to the common notions on the subject, as a being that can be present in a portion of space without manifesting that quality of resistance or solidity which distinguishes material objects, no one can say that such a being is impossible. We have no knowledge of the conditions on which the possibility of substances *with* the quality of solidity depends, though experience shows us that they exist: therefore we can have no *a priori* reason to deny the possibility of substances *without* that quality. Arguments for the existence of such substances have been drawn from the nature

¹ VII., p. 36.

of thought as implying a simplicity and self-determination in the spiritual substance altogether inconsistent with the nature of matter; for the qualities of extension and solidity seem to imply complexity and determination from without. On this basis an elaborate system like that of Swedenborg or Leibnitz may easily be constructed. According to such a system we may suppose, if we like, that there are two worlds: a world of matter ruled by physical laws of attraction and repulsion, by which all things are connected together, and a world of spirits, which also we may suppose to be held in perfect communion with each other through the agency of moral laws. How these two sets of laws can meet in the individual life of a substance, which is both material and spiritual, may be a mystery. But we may suppose that the ordinary consciousness of man, though indistinctly influenced by the laws of that higher world to which as a spirit he belongs, directly brings him into relation only with the world of matter. It is consistent also with such a system to allow that individuals of abnormal powers, or ordinary individuals in abnormal states of mind, may rise to a consciousness of their spiritual relations. We may expect, however, that in passing into, and combining with, the ordinary consciousness, such relations will be distorted by the imagination. By these principles we may explain the phenomena of spiritual appearances, giving due importance to the numerous witnesses for such phenomena, and keeping at the same time the due amount of scepticism warranted by the varying and doubtful accounts of these witnesses.

Both systems are usually

But when we look a little closer at this symmetrical scheme, new doubts and difficulties spring up. "When

we are awake," it has been said, "we live in a world that is common to all; when we dream, we live each in a world of his own." This world of our own may be constructed for the intellect or for the senses; in both cases it is removed from the ordinary tests of experience; it is not part of that order and connexion of things which is present to our waking consciousness. Its only test is self-consistency, and this test may be equally satisfied by many different systems of speculation and superstition—by a world of Swedenborgian ghosts alike with a world of Leibnitzian monads. When, however, we ask what experience can be appealed to in support of either, and when we find that there is little or nothing of the sort, except some visual appearances which are presented in peculiar states of the body to many men, and which, to certain peculiarly constituted men, are frequent, or even constant, is it not necessary to ask, in the first place, whether these are the sole hypotheses on which such appearances can be explained? Is it not possible that they may be due to some disorder in the bodily functions, and especially in the organ of vision, rather than to the influence of real spiritual beings upon us? In that case, the true method of dealing with ghost-seeing would be *medicinal*. It is not, however, necessary positively to assert this; enough is gained when we can balance a purely physical theory against a spiritual or spiritualistic one, and thus free our minds from the bias which our hopes or wishes give to the latter. We cannot absolutely deny, but as little can we assert, the reality of ghosts, for we cannot know anything about them. In like manner we cannot absolutely deny the doctrine of monads with their

tested only
by their
self-consis-
tency, but
the true
test is the
connexion
of experi-
ence.

purely individual and spiritual existence out of space and time and their inner harmony, but we have no evidence for it. The latter is, indeed, if anything less worthy of attention than the former, for "we may learn something from illusory experience, but scarcely anything from illusory reasoning." But from the nature of the case we are able to assert that it is not possible for our conception of such imaginary beings to rise from the region of opinion into the region of knowledge. "This may seem rather a bold statement to make, when we find it impossible either by observation or reasoning to exhaust, or at least to know that we have exhausted, the nature of any object of sense, be it even a grain of sand, or a drop of water; so immeasurable to a limited understanding like man's is the complexity which nature presents even in its smallest parts. But it is quite different with the doctrine of philosophy in regard to spiritual beings. That doctrine *can* be completed, though only in a negative way. In other words, we can fix with certainty the limit of our knowledge, and convince ourselves that the various natural phenomena of life, and the laws of the phenomena, are all that we are allowed to ascertain; but that the principle of this life, the spiritual principle, which we suspect beneath the natural, cannot be made the object of positive thought, seeing we find no data for such thought in all our sensations. We are driven, therefore, to call in the help of negatives to aid us in thinking of that, which is so widely different from all that is sensible; although the possibility of such negative thought rests neither on experience nor on reasoning, but solely on a fiction of the imagination. But to such fictions reason is obliged to have recourse, in default

of any other means to determine its object. On this footing Pneumatology can be nothing more than a doctrine of our necessary ignorance of a certain problematical class of beings, and, if it confine itself to this, there is nothing to hinder it from solving the problem which is set before it."¹

Towards the end of the essay, Kant enforces this last idea that the main end of philosophy is to define the limits of human thought, in a passage which is worth quoting, because of the relation it bears to his subsequent speculations. "Metaphysic," he says, "of which it is my fate to be a lover, although I can boast of few of her favours, has two kinds of advantages to bestow upon us. The first of these is to solve the problems, which reason suggests when it looks into the hidden nature of things. But here too often, as in the present instance, the result of enquiry disappoints the hopes that inspired it,

Meta-
physic
should
become
the science
of the
limits of
thought.

*Ter frustra compressa manus, effugit imago
Par levibus ventis volucrique simillima somno.*

The other advantage of Metaphysic is more certain, as it corresponds better with the nature of the human mind. It is to enable us to perceive whether the problem is capable of being solved from the data that are within our reach: or, in other words, to determine what relation that problem has to the empirical conceptions on which all our judgments must be based. In this point of view, metaphysic is the science of the limits of human reason; and since in a small territory we frequently come upon boundaries, and it is always of more importance to know well our actual possessions, and to assert our

¹ VII., pp. 77-78.

ownership of them, than blindly to seek after new conquests, we may declare this to be at once the least known, and the most important, use of the science, as it is certainly a use, which only long effort and experience has discovered. In this essay I have not pretended to determine these limits accurately, but only to indicate them, so far as is necessary to bring the reflecting reader to the conclusion that he may safely spare himself the useless trouble of investigation, in a case where the data would have to be sought in another world from that which is present to his senses.”¹

Knowledge
rests on
ultimate
facts.

The importance of this negative use of metaphysic, Kant proceeds to say, lies in the fact that it is only the known impossibility of gaining anything by attempting to go *beyond* the limit, which will induce men to confine themselves *within* it. “So long as it is thought possible to reach that distant goal of knowledge, so long it is vain for a wise simplicity to protest that we can do very well without it. The pleasure of widening knowledge readily takes the appearance of duty, and the deliberate self-restraint of reason seems a simplicity, not of wisdom, but of stupidity, that sets itself against the elevation of our nature. The questions of the nature of spirit, of freedom and predestination, of the future state, &c., at once set in motion all the powers of the understanding, and draw men by their importance into a rivalry of speculation, that invents and determines, dogmatizes and controverts, with every new semblance of insight. But if such enquiries end in a philosophy that examines its own procedure, and takes cognisance, not only of objects, but also of

¹ VII., pp. 98-9.

their relation to the mind of man, the limits are drawn closer, and the boundary-stones are laid which will henceforth prevent speculation passing beyond its proper sphere. It needs some philosophy to discover the difficulties that surround many conceptions, which are treated by the ordinary consciousness as easy and simple. A little more philosophy drives away the illusion of knowledge to a still greater distance, and persuades us that such objects lie entirely beyond the horizon of man's intelligence. In regard to the relations of cause and effect, substance and action, philosophy is useful at the beginning to disentangle the complex phenomena, and reduce them to simpler ideas. But when, finally, we arrive at the fundamental relations of phenomena, the business of philosophy is ended. As it is impossible by reason to discover how anything can be a cause, or have a force in it, these relations must be taken purely from experience. For our rule of reason proceeds only by comparison, according to the laws of identity and contradiction. In so far, indeed, as anything is a cause, it posits something different from itself as an effect, and, therefore, something its connection with which cannot be explained by logical agreement. But, on the other hand, there is no logical contradiction involved in our *refusing* to regard anything as a cause; for it is not self-contradictory, when one thing is posited, to remove or deny anything else. Hence the fundamental notions of things as causes, as also those of forces and actions, are quite arbitrary when not taken from experience, and can neither be proved nor disproved. I know quite well that thought and will move my body, but I can never by analysis

reduce this phenomenon, as a simple experience, to any other experience, and, therefore, though I can know its reality, I cannot understand it. That my will should move my arm is not to me more intelligible than that it should hold back the sun in its course; the difference is only that I experience the former, but that the latter has never come under the observation of my senses." And so of spirits and their relations we can say nothing, not because they are unintelligible, for gravitation is quite as unintelligible, but because such relations cannot be verified by experience.

Kant at
the point
of view of
Locke.

The essay which we have thus epitomised exhibits Kant as a thoroughgoing adherent of the empirical philosophy. It shows that he had already derived from empiricism his deep conviction of the limited character of human knowledge, and that, like Locke, he was ready to confine philosophy to the work of determining what these limits are. Yet it also shows that he had not yet passed through that great crisis of thought, which he called afterwards his 'awakening from dogmatic slumbers.' This 'awakening' he always ascribed to the influence of Hume's observation, that the nexus of cause and effect is not given in sensitive experience, and that, indeed, no necessary principle of synthesis can be so given. But from the passage just quoted we see that the problem had not yet taken this shape for Kant. On the contrary, he distinctly states that the ultimate synthesis, the fundamental relations that underlie all knowledge, are given in experience, and that all the mind can do is by analysis to break up the complexity of empirical facts, and so detect these relations in their simplest forms. The point, therefore, that Kant has

reached may be thus defined:—He has discovered the necessity of synthesis for knowledge. He has discovered that this synthesis is not possible through the mere logical manipulation of ideas, which can make their content clear and distinct, but which cannot add to it. If, however, these two propositions be true, if synthesis is necessary and thought cannot produce it, it must be given in sensational experience prior to thought. Kant is thus drawn into a position very much resembling that of Locke: he adopts the sensational principle without any consciousness of the difficulties that arise when that principle is developed to its logical results. It was only after he had been a disciple of this philosophy for a considerable period, that Hume made him aware of these difficulties, and showed him that this path of speculation also, like the Wolffianism of his earlier days, ended in nothing. Then at last, by the shock of this discovery, he was forced to seek a new basis for philosophy, and to construct a theory which should avoid at once the emptiness of the Wolffian dogmatism, which he had found out for himself, and the self-contradiction of the Lockian empiricism, of which Hume had made him conscious. For this work he was specially fitted, just because, in his own mental history, he had passed through all the phases of the two great speculative systems, which he sought at once to unite and to transcend.

Before, however, we can estimate aright the conflict of thought out of which the Critical philosophy was born, we must retrace our steps to notice a second line of speculation which runs through all the earlier writings of its author. Kant never thoroughly accepted the Individualism of Wolff. In the *Diluci-*

Kant's
early op-
position to
Wolffian
Individu-
alism.

datio Nova, his earliest philosophical work, he already objects to the pre-established harmony, and asserts the *reality* of the relations of substances. There is, he argues, a *commercium* between all individual things, which, though not logically implied in their very existence, is yet coeval with that existence, and has its source in the same principle. “Est realis substantiarum in se invicem facta actio, seu commercium per causas vero efficientes, quoniam idem quod existentiam rerum stabilit principium, ipsas huic legi alligatas exhibet.” If it were not so, it would be impossible to conceive of individual things, as all, notwithstanding their individuality, contained in one space, and constituting one world: for space is a relation of substances, which is not already implied in their mere existence. “Since, therefore,” he argues, “the existence of substances is plainly insufficient to account for their mutual connexion and reciprocal influence, and an external nexus of things independent implies a common cause, through which their existence is determined with relation to each other; and since, without such a common principle, no general bond of union can be conceived, we have here a most evident proof of the existence of God, and indeed of one God—a proof which is far more convincing than the common argument *ex contingentia mundi*.”¹

Reality of
the rela-
tions of
substances.

The importance of this divergence from the strict Leibnitzian theory will be appreciated by those who have considered the consequences that flow from the denial of the real action of individual substances on each other. Leibnitz had argued that, because substances are individual, there can be no real rela-

tion between them. Kant, on the other hand, argues that, because all individual substances are parts of one world, therefore they have real relations to each other. At the same time, while he thus recoils from the extreme of Individualism, he does not altogether renounce the individualistic point of view. While individual substances are conceived by him as having real relations, yet these relations are not necessary properties, but only separable accidents of them; in other words, the relations are not deducible from the definition of the substances themselves. Hence, God is still introduced by Kant (as by previous philosophers) as a *Deus ex machina*, or external synthetic principle, to bind together things which are not in themselves related. • The two aspects of substances—their individuality, and their community or relativity—are not directly connected with each other; they are only indirectly connected, through their common origin in God, who has created the substances, and bound them together in one universe.

In the *Monadologia Physica*,¹ written about the same time, Kant follows out the same idea into its physical application, seeking to unite the theories of Newton and Leibnitz, and to vindicate at once the individuality and the relativity of the substances that constitute the material universe. The monads are, as Leibnitz had maintained, not atoms, but points of force, and therefore, taken separately, they are not in space, which is merely a form of relation between substances. Yet we must not, on the other hand, think of them as having only negative relations to each other, or as purely *repulsive* forces; but also,

Attempt
to combine
the
physical
theories of
Leibnitz
and New-
ton.

¹ V., p. 255.

according to the principles of Newton, as positively related, or as *attractive* forces. For substances, which were merely *repulsive forces*, would at once *isolate* themselves from each other, and dissolve all continuity. They could never unite so as to form one world. No universe, no connected system of things, could ever be made up out of such individuals. The units, therefore, in the system of things, must be conceived as centres, at once of attraction and of repulsion: as at once excluding, and combining themselves with, all the other units of the system. The *repulsive force* is, indeed, the primary element in their constitution—it is that by which they are individualised; but the attractive force is also necessary to them, for it is that by reason of which they all form parts of one universe. Kant, like Leibnitz, starts with the individuality of things, as their primary reality; but he does not, like Leibnitz, deny their relativity, or consider it as purely ideal. It is to him a secondary, but not a confused or imperfect, conception.

Relation
of Kant to
Spinoza.
The argu-
ment for
the being
of God.

The characteristic work of Kant was the reconciliation of differences: on the one hand, the reconciliation of the two forms of Individualism, which has prevailed during the second period of European philosophy; on the other hand, the reconciliation of the Individualism of this second period with the Universalism of the first. It is, therefore, not unworthy of notice, that, in his earliest writings, he had already modified the individualistic principles of Wolff by introducing an element borrowed from, or at least, akin to, the earlier philosophy of Spinoza. Rejecting the Cartesian argument from the thought of God to His existence, he yet repeats that argu-

ment in a form that better expresses its true meaning. In the *Dilucidatio Nova*, he argues that as all determination presupposes something to be determined, so all finite existence presupposes the infinite. In this one case, the transition from thought to existence, from possibility to reality, does not involve a paralogism; for here we are dealing with the matter of all thought, the Being "*cujus existentia prævertit ipsam, et ipsius, et omnium rerum possibilitatem.*"¹ This argument has been usually treated by commentators on Kant as a remnant of that scholastic Wolffian method, which he was afterwards to overthrow; but we have seen, in considering the philosophy of Spinoza, that it conceals under a defective form the assertion of the universality of mind. To say that reason sees all things in their truth through the idea of God was, in Spinoza's language, to say that reason apprehends the world, not *in ordine ad individuum*, but *in ordine ad universum*. The defect of the Spinozistic philosophy lay, not in his assertion of this doctrine, but in the false conception of the relation of infinite and finite, universal and individual, with which he accompanied it. When, therefore, Kant revived the Spinozistic view, and declared that the idea of God is the presupposition of all things, he was taking the first step towards the recovery of a truth which had been hidden during the era of Individualism. Yet Kant was never merely reactionary. From the first he aimed at a compromise, in which the one-sidedness of both the earlier systems should be avoided, and the truth, which each contained, should be preserved. As we proceed we shall see how time and

¹ I., p. 14.

reflection gradually brought each of these elements of his philosophy to a better expression, and turned the compromise into a more perfect unity.

In the second period of Kant's mental history, as is shown by his treatise on the *Only possible basis of the proof of the being of a God*, he still retained this conception of God as the ultimate matter or real ground of the possibility of all things, as the principle of unity through which all things finite are, and are known. But at this time the *a priori* principle of synthesis was gradually losing credit in his eyes, and Empiricism was taking its place. He had clearly proved that the movement of pure thought, as it is analysed by logic, cannot add to knowledge, and the only alternative seemed to be that all such additions should be made by sense. Not only the elements of truth, therefore, but even the combination of these elements, must be given in sensible experience. Philosophy must renounce all *a priori* speculation, and become a doctrine of the limits of the human understanding, teaching it to seek the universal in the particular, and only there. She must content herself with the task of guarding the frontier of experience, and saying to all who attempt to overpass it, "Thus far, and no farther." It is with this thought that Kant, in words we have already quoted, concludes his comparison of the dreams of Swedenborg with the speculations of Leibnitz. The visions of philosophy are lofty, but in a resolute critical spirit, though with a lurking regret, he declares that they are nothing but visions.

Revival of
the Uni-
versal in
the form of
the idea of
Space.

If, however, Kant ever lost sight of a Universal, that is prior to the particulars and conditions them, it was for no long period. Up to 1763 he had still

maintained that the idea of God is the precondition of all thought and being. And if, as the empirical philosophy of England gained a hold upon him, that idea gave place to a more consistent Individualism, yet already, in 1768, the Universal appears in a new form. In a short essay on *The first ground for the distinction of regions in space*, Kant maintains that the idea of space in general is not acquired, either by a consideration of the common element in particular spaces, or by a combination of particular spaces into a collective whole, but that, on the contrary, the idea of the one absolute space is presupposed in the determination of all particular spaces, and things in space. In asserting this doctrine, Kant, in principle, declares war against both the great forms of Individualism: for Individualism cannot regard the whole as prior to the parts. To Locke as to Leibnitz, space is an idea of the relations of objects, and, therefore, logically posterior to the ideas of the objects themselves. But Kant here contends that when we examine carefully the 'judgments of perception'¹ regarding the extension of objects, we find in them "an evident proof that absolute space has a reality of its own, independent of the existence of all matter, and is itself the first ground of the possibility of matter as a complex or divisible substance."² In other words, we cannot determine matter as extended, or as having its parts definitely situated in regard to each other, except in relation to absolute space, as a unity in which every particular extension is included. "The determinations of space are not consequences, but reasons, of the positions of different parts of matter in relation to each other."³

¹ V., p. 294.² V., p. 294.³ V., p. 301.

Argument
for the
priority of
Space to
objects in
Space.

The argument is as follows:—Space has three dimensions, and in it, therefore, we can draw three planes, cutting each other at right angles. “And as we know through our senses what is without us, only in so far as it stands in immediate connection with ourselves, so it is in the relation of three such planes to our body, that we find the first ground for a definition of the different regions in space.”¹ The plane at right angles to our body we call horizontal, and, by relation to it, we distinguish the regions which we call ‘above’ and ‘below.’ The other planes enable us to distinguish the regions ‘before’ and ‘behind,’ ‘right’ and ‘left.’ In these distinctions we find a means for determining differences which we can define in no other way. Thus a screw that turns to the right, and one that turns to the left, may absolutely correspond in all their parts, but they cannot be substituted for each other, nor placed so as to coincide. The right and the left hand, or again the body and its image in the mirror, are other instances of objects, which, though perfectly corresponding with each other in all their parts, and in all the relations of their parts, yet cannot occupy the same space: they are what we may call ‘incongruent counterparts’ of each other. Now, it is to be noticed that, in this distinction, there is always implied a relation of the parts of the body, not to each other, but to space. The order of the parts in any complex body might be inverted without making the least change in their relations to each other, or to the body as a whole. The right is not distinguished from the left hand, except in relation to the space it occupies. And so in like manner, the whole

¹ V., p. 295.

order of the heavenly bodies might be inverted without any change so far as their relations to each other are concerned: the difference would be only in their relation to absolute space. While, therefore, we cannot immediately perceive absolute space, we perceive distinctions of body which presuppose it, and which could not exist without it. "Space is not itself an object of external perception, but it is a fundamental conception, which first makes all such perception possible. Nothing, therefore, in the form of a material object, which is connected with its relation to pure space, is discerned by us, except through a comparison of it with other material objects."¹

We have now before us a tolerably complete view of the different forces, which were contending in the mind of Kant, prior to the time when the writings of Hume began to exercise an important influence on the course of his speculations: and by comparing the essay we have just considered, with one that followed it two years afterwards, on *The form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world*, we are able to form a conception of that crisis, which Kant called his "awakening from dogmatic slumbers."

The ques-
tion of
a priori
synthesis
suggested
by Hume.

He had arrived at the conviction that absolute space is an idea which is not given in outward experience, yet which is the very condition of its possibility. Hence he could no longer conceive material substances as monads or exclusive individuals. The unity of such substances as in one space is given before their isolated existence, and they must therefore conform to the nature of space. Hence,

¹ V., p. 301.

also, the synthesis of geometry, which, at an earlier period, Kant had treated as an arbitrary process of construction, acquires a real and objective value. The science which deals with the determination of all the different possible figures in space, is at the same time dealing with the determination of all possible outward objects. Here, therefore, we have a principle that determines how things must be connected or related, *before* they are actually given in sense, a principle of synthesis that is not derived from experience, but from the mind itself.

But can any principle of synthesis be given in experience? This, as I have said before, was the far-reaching doubt which Hume's essays awoke in the mind of Kant. Hume's demonstration, that one particular link of thought, the link of cause and effect, was not so given, reached Kant just at the time when he was prepared for it by his own mental development, and when he was certain to universalise the principle it contained. Kant had proved to his own satisfaction that thought in itself could afford no principle of synthesis, and had consequently assumed that that principle must be found in experience. In one case, however, he had now discovered that it is not so found. The synthesis of mathematics, which at first he had conceived to be arbitrary, he now saw to be based on an idea, which is presupposed in experience, and which therefore cannot be derived from it. If, then, the synthesis of causation also is denied to have an empirical ground, what follows? Is it not clear that Empiricism must be altogether rejected as an explanation of knowledge? Take away from experience the ideas of time, space, causation, and the like, and what remains? Only

a series of sensations without connexion, and therefore without intelligible meaning. If, therefore, there is connection and intelligible meaning in the empirical consciousness; if it sets before us a world of definitely related objects, the reason must be found in the *a priori* forms by which the matter of causation is organised and combined. And it will be the business of philosophy to discover and enumerate the *a priori* elements of knowledge, and to determine their relations to each other.

In the dissertation *On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world*, Kant attempts this task. The materials he had before him for executing it were twofold: on the one hand, his own recent discoveries in relation to space and time, and on the other hand, the metaphysical principles of his earlier works in relation to the causation and reciprocity of substances—the modified Leibnitzian doctrine of the *Dilucidatio nova*. When, however, he tried to combine these two elements, it became obvious to him that they were of a different and even discordant nature. The individualistic metaphysic of the earlier treatises, modified as it was, did not harmonise with the view of outward experience expressed in the treatise *On the first ground for the distinctions of regions in space*. The conception of God, and again the conceptions of substance, cause and reciprocity, are ‘general ideas,’ but they are not universals in the same sense as the idea of space. For it is to Kant, as we have seen, a fixed maxim that thought of itself cannot go beyond analysis, or add to the ideas which it apprehends. In other words, it is absolutely bound by the laws of identity and contradiction, and therefore

Difference
between
the
a priori
of Space
and Time,
and the
a priori
of pure
thought.

it cannot proceed from a conception to any other conception which is not either contained in itself, or else its logical contradictory. In consistency with this logic, the general idea of God, as *Omnitudo realitatis*, cannot of itself lead us to any particular predicates, either of God himself or of the world, to which he is supposed to give its unity. The Spinozistic unity is not pregnant with any differences. And on the same principle, no general notion can be regarded as in any sense determining the particulars, that are subsumed under it, or as giving us the slightest clue to what they will be. If, therefore, we suppose with Kant, that the mind brings to experience the conception of a general unity of all things, in other words, the idea of God; and again, conceptions of the special unities or connections of things, such as causation, reciprocity, etc., yet such conceptions will not enable us to anticipate the particular elements of experience. They are not in this sense synthetic. On the other hand, the ideas of Space and Time *do* enable us to anticipate the particulars included under them. They are not merely genera under which we can subsume particular things, but they are themselves principles that determine their own specification. And it is because of this, that they furnish the bases for the *a priori* science of mathematics, a science which, though constructive and synthetic, is yet objectively real: *i.e.*, a science which enables us to make judgments, which are empirically true, though not derived from experience.

The consideration of this difference led Kant to a result which had the greatest influence on all his subsequent speculations. It made him draw his

well-known distinction between *Conceptions* and *Perceptions*, and also it made him rank Time and Space among the latter, and not among the former. A conception with Kant is always an abstract idea, fixed and definite, and made up, if it is complex, of a certain number of marks or subordinate conceptions into which we may analyse it, but to the number of which we cannot add by mere thinking. It is always a *genus*, under which we may bring species, and individuals, but is neither itself an individual, nor does it contain individual parts in it. A perception, on the other hand, is never fixed or definite in the number of its marks; it contains in itself a potential infinity, which analysis cannot exhaust; it is a continual source of new synthetic judgments, and it presents to us an individual whole, capable indefinitely of division into parts which may themselves be regarded as individuals. Now, Space, as we have already seen, possesses this character, and, therefore, we must class it, along with the kindred notion of Time, as a perception. They are, indeed, *a priori* perceptions—perceptions that are not given in sense, but belong to the mind itself. This, however, does not prevent their being objectively real, like the other perceptions, for space is the condition of all external experience, and, therefore, of all objects presented in that experience, and time holds a similar position in regard to all experience whatever, whether external or internal.

But here a new difficulty arises. If our knowledge is made up of two constituents differing so widely as conception and perception, what are we to think of its value? Must not this essential dualism in our knowing faculties throw discredit on all their

How are
they to be
united in
know-
ledge?

products? Is not experience made up of elements like oil and vinegar, that ever repel each other? Or, if a unity is achieved, must it not be by one of the elements gaining the mastery over the other? and, in that case, which of them is the preponderant element? Are we to say that the world as it is to conception is the real world, and that the world of perception is illusory? Or does perception apprehend the reality of things, and does conception deal merely with abstractions?

The general connexion of experience is dependent on the idea of God, and the conceptions of substance, cause, and reciprocity.

It is this difficulty with which we find Kant wrestling in the beginning of his dissertation. On the one hand he already partially discerns, (what he afterwards came to see more clearly,) that no knowledge is possible without connective conceptions, like those of cause and reciprocity. At least if, as he seems still to admit, objects can be known without the aid of such conceptions, yet without them they cannot be combined together and known as parts of one world. The mere form of outward perception is not sufficient to supply a bond of union between the different objects perceived. It is not enough to say, that everything must be *somewhere*, and that, therefore, the unity of space is in itself a nexus between all things that are contained in it. "Space is but the intuitively given possibility of a universal co-ordination of things in one universe. Hence we cannot by its means determine the principle of that very correlation of all substances which, as intuitively apprehended in perception, we call space."¹ In other words, the perception of things as in one space, presupposes the unity of the world, and the mutual relation of all things in it. It is, indeed,

¹ I., p. 326, *De Mundi sensibilis etc.*, § 16.

but the form or aspect taken by the co-ordination of things in relation to our sense. But to produce this co-ordination two things are necessary: in the first place, all the manifold objects presented in sense must be referred to a principle of community, a *principium commercii* (which in this essay is still found in the idea of God); and, in the second place, this principle must be conceived as realising itself in a reciprocity of causation, by which all these objects act or react on each other. Only in so far as these conceptions, the conception of God and the conceptions of substance and reciprocity, guide us in organising our experience, can that experience represent to us the order of the universe with all its parts embraced in 'one space. On the other hand, while conceptions are thus necessary, they are not in themselves sufficient for knowledge or experiences. For they are general and abstract, and they can be individualised or realised only through the perceptions of sense. "Without perceptions," as Kant afterwards expressed it, "conceptions are empty." The pattern of the world, which our understandings carry in themselves, is only an abstract and general sketch, which depends upon sense for the filling up of its outlines. It is a simple, fixed, and definite thing, to which new elements cannot be added, by development from within, but only by its application to the formal or material perceptions which are given from without. In a sense these sources are sufficient, as indeed they are unlimited; no mind can ever exhaust either the formal determination of space or time, or the material data of sensation. But if it be asked, whether the filling up corresponds with the outline, whether perception

But the particular matter of experience must be given in sense, and under its forms.

corresponds with the requirements of thought, the answer cannot be so satisfactory. The world as we can, and, indeed, must think of it, is not the world as it is *given* in perception under conditions of time and space. For we can never have any object presented to us without thinking of it as part of a whole, which is not itself a part of anything, *i.e.*, we must think of everything that exists as part of one universe. And, on the other hand, we can never have any object presented to us which we do not conceive as either itself simple, or made up of simple parts; *i.e.*, we must think of everything that exists as an individual substance, or an aggregate of individual substances. We *must* so think, for we can never rest satisfied in synthesis with anything short of an absolute whole, or in analysis with anything short of a simple part. Yet these ideas of the universe, and of the simple individual substances which we cannot avoid thinking, can never be realised by us in perception. The world we perceive is one in which every part is capable of further division, and every whole of further addition. It is a world in which we can never reach either an absolute beginning, or an absolute end; in which the regressive process of division, and the progressive process of composition, are equally unlimited. And the reason of this lies in the very nature of our sensitive perception of objects; for we cannot perceive objects except under conditions of space and time; and in space and time it is impossible to reach either a maximum or a minimum. The problem set by thought to perception is one which perception from its very nature can never solve.¹

¹ I., p. 302, *De Mundi sensibilis etc.*, § 1.

But this inadequacy must mean one of two things. It must mean, either that the demand of intelligence is irrational, or that sense does not apprehend the reality of things. To adopt the former alternative would involve absolute scepticism; nor is it necessary to adopt it. For sense, though it is inadequate to reason, does not contradict it. It only seems to do so when we confuse the impossibility of perceiving or picturing an object to ourselves with the impossibility of thinking it. But, what intelligence apprehends in the abstract, cannot always be perceived or represented in the concrete, in accordance with the laws of our sensitive faculty: *quas mens ab intellectu acceptas fert ideas abstractas, illas in concreto exsequi, et in Intuitus commutare sæpenumero non potest.*¹ Hence the objects of our experience are merely phenomenal.

This defect in our mode of apprehending things in the concrete, does not affect the certainty of the general truths apprehended by intelligence. On the contrary, the defect of our sensitive modes of perception is shown by their incongruity with these general truths. It is this that enables us to see that things of sense are merely phenomenal, while intelligence alone apprehends things in their reality. Yet, on the other hand, the antithesis of phenomenal and real must not be pushed too far. The discordance of an experience, which is conditioned by time and space, with the ultimate principles of intelligence, may show that it is not absolute knowledge; but should not lead us to suppose that it is mere illusion. Sense changes the impressions it receives, but it changes them in a regular and uniform manner, according to forms that are universal. And the application of conceptions of the understanding to

¹ I., p. 305, *De Mundi sensibilis etc.*, § 1.

the matter so formed, produces a systematic and self-consistent result. If, therefore, the world of experience is a world which has no existence except to beings who have forms of sense like ours, yet it is a world that exists to *all* such beings. All men have a community, not only of intelligence, but of sense, and experience remains, for all practical purposes, quite as much a reality, as it could be on any other theory.

Relation of
the *Dissertation*
and the
Critique.

It is unnecessary to follow Kant into the further development of his theory. The account given of the forms of inner and outer sense, is substantially identical with the account of the *Critique*, and need not, therefore, be anticipated. What has been already said is sufficient to show the importance of the dissertation *On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world* in relation to the history of Kant's mental development. It is in this work that we first hear of understanding and sense, as co-equal, yet heterogeneous, sources of knowledge: the former supplying the connective principles, the latter the particular contents, of experience. In it also time and space are for the first time definitely assigned to sense, as its constitutive forms. Yet while in these respects Kant seems already to have reached the critical point of view, there are also some important differences which deserve attention, as they help to account for many peculiarities in the language, and perhaps also in the matter of his later philosophy.

The intelligence is
conceived
to apprehend
things as
they are in
themselves.

(1.) In the first place, then, we have to observe, that, while Kant already regards the objects of sense as phenomenal, he allows that the objects of *intelligence* (under which name he includes the

two faculties afterwards distinguished as *reason* and *understanding*) are absolutely real. The conceptions of substance, cause, and reciprocity, which in the *Critique* were to be reduced into mere forms of the human experience, are still treated as having a universal value. The general idea of the world, evolved by the understanding, the idea of an order of individual substances, contingent in their nature, and interdependent in the succession of their states, is still supposed to correspond to the real order of things in themselves, though the special form, which this order takes in perception, is ascribed to the limited nature of our sense. It had not yet occurred to Kant, that the forms of understanding, by which the matter of sense is combined together into that systematic unity of knowledge which we call experience, are themselves also subjective, or due to the peculiar constitution of the human mind. Hence the contrast between intelligence as dealing with reality, and sense as dealing with appearance, is yet unbroken. *Quum itaque, quodcunque in cognitione est sensitivi, pendeat a speciali indole subjecti, quatenus a præsentia objectorum hujus vel alius modificationis capax est, quæ, pro varietate subjectorum, in diversis potest esse diversa; quæcunque autem cognitio a tali conditione subjectiva exemta est, non nisi objectum respiciat, patet sensitive cogitata esse rerum repræsentationes, uti apparent, intellectualia autem sicuti sunt.*¹ We shall see in the sequel, that some of the peculiar difficulties of the *Critique* arise from Kant's effort to preserve the contrast between the phenomena and

¹ L, p. 309, *De Mundi* etc., § 1.

things in themselves, after the opposition between intelligence and sense has been removed, or at least has assumed a totally different aspect.

And the
unity of
experience
is found in
God, and
not yet in
the Self.

(2.) Closely connected with this, but still more important, is the difference between the view of the *Dissertation* and the *Critique* as to the ultimate principle of unity in knowledge. That unity which in the *Dissertation* is still traced back to the idea of God, in the *Critique* is derived from the consciousness of self. The truth is, that at the point we have reached, that great revolution of thought, which first gave due importance to the subject as distinguished from the object of knowledge, in Kant's mind, was only half accomplished. He had not yet clearly asked himself the important question to which I have before referred—the question, how man as an individual can know a world in which he is but a part; or, in other words, what nature he must have in order to be not only an object, but also a subject, of knowledge? For if man is simply an individual, like other individuals, he cannot know anything but his own thoughts and sensations. All knowledge presupposes that its subject can transcend the position which belongs to him purely as an individual, and can look at himself and all other objects as part of a universal order. This Kant had discerned, and therefore, even in his earliest treatise, he regards God as the presupposition at once of all being and of all knowledge. We cannot, he argues, know the world as a systematic combination of individual substances which, in spite of their individuality, are mutually interdependent, except so far as we refer them to a common cause in God. In other words, the individuality of things

and their relativity go together, both in existence and in knowledge, so that we cannot apprehend anything as a substance without apprehending it as connected with all other substances in one world. But as these two aspects of things are held to be quite independent of each other, so their unity appears only as the result of the will of God which has combined with the existence of each individual a relation to all the others. The mind, therefore, that apprehends other things than itself, must apprehend them through the idea of God. Thus the idea of God is the central conception of the intelligible world. And inasmuch as the sensible world is only the intelligible world as it is apprehended under the conditions of our sense, this idea also underlies the unity and universality of space and time. When we refer a sensation to an external object in space, and so determine it in relation to all space, we are simply referring it to the unity of all things, in the form which that unity necessarily takes to our sense. Hence space may be called *omnipræsentia phenomenon*, and time *æternitas phenomenon*, and we 'see all things in God,' though not as they are in God. In a note to the fourth section of his Dissertation, Kant suggests this inference from the principles he has laid down; but he immediately shrinks from its boldness and apparent mysticism. It was, in fact, a necessary consequence of the individualistic element which still survived in Kant's philosophy, that the objectivity of knowledge could be saved only by a miracle. But Kant has no sooner seen the necessity for a *Deus ex machina* to complete his theory, than he feels that he is on unsafe ground, and

begins to look for something more rational and intelligible.¹

Transition
to the
Critical
point of
view.

In this enquiry, two alternatives lay before him. On the one hand, he might have renounced the individualistic prejudice altogether; he might have opened up the question as to the nature of thought and its relation to the thinking subject. He might have enquired whether thought can be considered as the property of an individual as such, in the same sense as the colour of a stone or the chemical constitution of a plant. Or, on the other hand, taking thought still as the property of the individual thing that thinks, he might have narrowed his view of knowledge to correspond with this conception. It is this latter alternative that Kant at first *seems* to choose in the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Hence, as we shall find, his first step is to renounce the knowledge of things in themselves altogether, and to deny that the forms of the understanding are of any use, except in arranging the matter of sense. His next step is to refer the unity, presupposed in all experience, not to the idea of God, who in himself is beyond our apprehension, but to the consciousness of self, the "thing that thinks." Yet in spite of this apparently individualistic starting-point, the *Critique* turns out in its result to be the refutation of Individualism. For the consciousness of self is conceived as the ground of the knowledge of a world, which, though phenomenal, is the same for all men. Nay, in the sequel, it is conceived as the ground of our knowledge, not only of the world of phenomena, but of its limits; and hence of, at least, the *existence* of an intelligible world beyond it, a world of which the

¹ *De Mundi sensibilis etc.*, § 22, Scholion I., p. 330.

moral law forces us to regard ourselves and all other intelligent beings as the inhabitants. Thus, though himself still embarrassed by individualistic scruples, Kant lifts us gradually beyond the atmosphere of individualism, and prepares the way for the recognition of the essential unity of thought and being, the individual and the universal. That this is the result of Kant's speculation in the *Critique of Pure Reason*, it will be one of the main objects of the following chapters to show.

PART SECOND.

THE CRITICISM OF PURE REASON.

CHAPTER I.

THE PROBLEM OF THE CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.

KANT'S PREFACES AND INTRODUCTIONS.

First appearance of Criticism.

WE have now traced Kant's progress toward Criticism up to the point marked by the dissertation *On the form and principles of the sensible and intelligible world*. In that dissertation we still find a curious combination of the modified Wolffian metaphysic of his earlier works, with the Critical view of the forms of perception. The doctrine that sense is inadequate to intelligence, and that, consequently, human knowledge, in its particular determination of things, can never be brought into harmony with the general idea by which it is guided and stimulated, is stated in the *Dissertation*, very much in the same way as in the *Critique*. But the *Dissertation* still treats the understanding as a faculty which apprehends things as they are in themselves, and it evades the question of the possibility of knowledge (as Des Cartes and Leibnitz had evaded it), by the interposition of

God between the individual mind and its object. Indications, however, are not wanting, that Kant already shrank from this solution of the difficulty; and, in a letter on the subject, he even tells Lambert to neglect those sections of the *Dissertation* which deal with the form and principles of the intelligible world:¹ for, although they had been introduced for the sake of completeness, he was sensible that they required careful reconsideration. And in less than two years after the publication of the *Dissertation*, he had utterly abandoned the ideas expressed in this part of it, and had thereby placed himself at the point of view from which the *Critique of Pure Reason* was written. In a remarkable letter to Dr. Marcus Herz, dated the 21st February, 1772, Kant announced that he had had before him for some time the plan of a work, to be called *The Limits of Sense and Reason*; but that, in attempting to realise it, he had discovered, that an essential point had been hitherto overlooked in all his own metaphysical speculations, as well as in those of all previous philosophers. "For," he goes on, "I put this question to myself, On what ground rests the relation of that in us, which we call an idea, to the object? If all that the idea contains is simply the mode in which the subject is affected by the object, we may easily understand how it should correspond to that object as an effect to its cause, and how, therefore, this determination of our mind should be an idea of something, or, in other words, should have an object. Hence it is intelligible that our ideas, so far as they are passive, or sensuous affec-

Problem
of the
relation of
object to
subject in
experi-
ence.

¹ I., p. 360.

tions, should have a relation to objects, and, in this way, that principles borrowed from the nature of our soul should, nevertheless, apply to all things that are presented in sense. Or, again, if that which is called an idea in us, were in relation to the object an activity—that is to say, if the object itself were produced by the idea, (as it is sometimes supposed that the ideas in the Divine Mind are the archetypes of things,) then, in this way also, the conformity of ideas with objects might be understood. We can therefore discern at least the *possibility* of two kinds of intelligence, an *intellectus arche-typus*, whose perception should itself be the ground of the existence of things; and an *intellectus ectypus*, which should be confined to the analysis of data supplied entirely from the impressions of sense. But *our* intelligence does not fall under either description. It is not (if we leave moral ends out of account) the cause of the objects it apprehends, nor are these objects the causes of its conceptions. The pure notions of the understanding cannot be abstracted from the feelings of sense, nor are they merely the expression of the character of our sensitive receptivity. They have their sources, indeed, in the nature of the soul; but they are neither the result of the action of the object upon it, nor do they produce the object. In my *Dissertation* I was content to explain their nature in a negative way, and to say only that they are not modifications of the soul produced by the object. But now I must ask in what *other* way an idea is possible, which refers to an object, without being the effect of an impression from it? I formerly ventured to say, that the ideas of sense represent things as they

appear, while the conceptions of the understanding represent things as they *are*. But how can the ideas of these things be given to us, if not by the manner in which they affect us? Or, if they are based on our own inner activity, whence comes their agreement with objects which yet are not their products? How can pure reason lay down axioms about things without any experience of them? In mathematics, the difficulty is not great, because objects are only capable of being, or being represented as, *quantities*, in so far as we produce the ideas of them by repeating a unit for a number of times. The mind is active in generating quantity, and therefore we can see how the principles of quantity should be determined *a priori*; but when we ask how the understanding, purely *a priori*, can form the conception of things in their *qualitative* relations, or lay down real principles about their possibility, which are not derived from experience, but to which experience must exactly conform—we ask a question over which the greatest obscurity has hitherto rested.”

“Plato assumed a prenatal, Malebranche a present, intuition of the divine Being, as the source of the pure notions and principles of the understanding; and various Moralists have adopted a similar hypothesis to account for our primary ideas of moral law. Crusius, on the other hand, spoke of certain rules of judgment and conception, which God has implanted in the human soul in exact conformity with the constitution of things. The former writers, therefore, based their systems on a *supernatural influence*, the latter on an intellectual *pre-established harmony*. But such a *Deus*

Rejection
of the
*Deus ex
machina.*

ex machina is the most extravagant resource to which a philosopher can betake himself in explaining the origin and value of our knowledge: for it not only involves a palpable case of reasoning in a circle, but also stimulates and encourages all the whims of pious fancy, and all the dreams of baseless speculation."

"While in this way I was searching out the sources of intellectual knowledge, without which we cannot determine the nature and limits of Metaphysic, I succeeded in making a distinct division of the parts of this science; and I sought further to gather Transcendental Philosophy, or, in other words, all the notions of pure understanding into a certain number of Categories. Nor did I follow the manner of Aristotle, who simply set them down one after another, as they occurred to him, in his ten Predicaments, but I aimed at a systematic classification, determined by a few fundamental principles. Without, however, going into any further detail, I may say that the essential part of my task is now done, and that I am in a position to lay before the public a *Criticism of Pure Reason*, which explains the nature both of theoretical and practical truth, in so far as it is derived purely from the Understanding; and I expect to complete and publish the first part of this system, containing an account of the sources of Metaphysic, its methods and limits, within about three months."¹

How is
knowledge
possible on
the basis of
Dualism?

It took eight years of additional labour before the promise of Kant could be fulfilled, but this passage is of itself enough to prove that he had already broken the last threads that bound him to

¹ I., p. 25.

the philosophy of his youth, and was working on the lines of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. He had discovered that the universal position, which was asserted for thought by the Leibnitzian philosophy, was reached by the assumption of a *Deus ex machina*. For by that philosophy, subject and object were first set in opposition to each other as exclusive and independent individuals, and then, at a turn of the hand, the idea of God was brought in to bridge over the gulf between them. But thus, as it seemed to Kant, the ultimate principle of truth was placed in that which most of all stood in need of proof, and the knowledge of objects was based on a conception which presupposed that knowledge in its highest form. His first step, therefore, was to demand that the limits of individuality should be honestly accepted, and not broken through by any arbitrary assumption. Taking his stand on the ordinary dualism of subject and object, and admitting that consciousness cannot immediately deal with anything but its own states, he asks how, on these terms, knowledge is possible. We can conceive its possibility, he answers, in two ways: viz., by supposing that in knowledge the mind is either wholly passive, or wholly active; that, on the one hand, it makes no contribution to the matter it knows, or that, on the other hand, the act of knowing creates the object known. But, in the present case, both these alternatives must be excluded: the former, because (as the *Analytic* was to show in detail), it is impossible to conceive knowledge as an effect passively received; the latter, because the products of our understanding are merely general notions,

which require to be specialised, and so referred to objects, by means of the matter of sense. If, however, we thus refuse to accept either horn of the dilemma, it becomes impossible to vindicate knowledge in the sense in which it has hitherto been asserted. Of the external object in itself, the assumed cause of sensation, or of God, who, by some philosophers, was put in its place, we can know nothing: for direct contact with anything else than our own states of consciousness is excluded in the only two ways in which it could take place. If, therefore, there exists for us an objective world which we can know, it must be of a different character: it must be a world whose centre and principle of unity is to be found, not without but within, not in the idea of God, but in the consciousness of self. Only if the consciousness of self contains or manifests itself in universal conceptions which enable us to determine our sensations in relation to a world of objects, can we have any knowledge that deserves the name. The *phenomenal* objectivity, however, that can be reached through the determination of sense by thought, must be carefully distinguished from that *real* objectivity, which philosophy had formerly pretended to discover. The intelligence, in order to vindicate its rightful claims, must renounce its false pretensions. Hence the introduction of the idea of *Criticism*, which appears for the first time in the above letter, and which involves a distinction of the sound part of our knowledge from the unsound. The negative and the positive side of the truth are henceforth, with Kant, inseparably connected together, and a theory of the *limits* of human knowledge has become

Separation
of Analytic
and Dialectic.

a necessary part of the theory of its nature. And, whereas, in the *Dissertation*, we have only the general opposition of Sense and Intelligence, in the *Critique* a further division is found necessary between the Reason and the Understanding. Consequently, the *Analytic*, showing the nature of that knowledge of phenomena which is attainable, must be followed by the *Dialectic*, to explain and account for that natural illusion, which makes us suppose we possess, or have within our reach, the unattainable knowledge of absolute reality.

The object, then, which Kant proposes to himself, is a criticism of human knowledge, with the view of determining its nature and limits. Such a criticism he declares to be necessary for two reasons. The first of these is the failure of philosophy to arrive at any definite or permanent conclusions in regard to those subjects, which above all others we must desire to understand. The past history of human thought shows that there are certain things which mankind have been continually endeavouring to comprehend, certain questions which they have never been content to leave unanswered. It shows also that the answers to these questions have varied with every new system of philosophy. It shows that every theory that has gained a temporary authority, has ultimately led to absurd or contradictory results, and has perished at its own hands, or at the hands of some opposite dogmatism which it called into existence. Yet the scepticism resulting from the failure of dogmatic philosophy has never been more than a temporary halting-place in the history of opinion. It has never induced mankind to set aside such problems as

The necessity of Criticism, both in relation to meta-physical and empirical truth.

absurd, or, for any considerable period, arrested the effort to solve them. Nor is this to be wondered at. "It is vain to strive after an artificial indifference towards enquiries whose object can never be indifferent to the nature of man." It seems as hard for a moral and religious being like man to be content with knowledge of the things apprehended by sense, and to renounce all enquiry into the being of God, human freedom, and the relation of the order of the world to that freedom, as it is by all his efforts to attain any satisfaction in regard to them. Whence comes this ever-recurring question as to that which is beyond sense and experience, and why, since we are able to ask, are we not able to answer it? Why is it that other sciences progress, but that metaphysics is ever beginning again? What is the necessity that explains the continual repetition of a hitherto ineffectual effort,—that explains both why it is repeated and why it has been as yet ineffectual?

The necessity of such an enquiry is felt still more keenly when, in the second place, we consider how naturally, almost inevitably, we are led, in the extension of our empirical knowledge, to speculate about that which is beyond experience. For the acquisition of experience itself is impossible without the use of certain metaphysical, *i.e.*, non-empirical, principles, such as the principle of causality. Yet let us once admit the use of such principles, and we are imperceptibly led on from one point to another, till we find ourselves carried beyond the regions of experience altogether. Our rational nature drives us to seek for a unity beyond difference, for an ultimate truth, for a first condition

or cause, and will not allow us to be satisfied with anything short of this. "Every road leads to the end of the world." Thus he who connects one event with another by means of the principle of causality, cannot but seek for the cause of the cause, and again for the cause of that: nor can he rest in his enquiry till he is able either to complete the infinite series, or to find a first cause in which the series terminates. But to do either, he must pass beyond the region where experience is possible, and make assumptions which experience can never test or verify. If he be tempted notwithstanding to advance, he finds at first an easy and unrestricted course of speculation opened to him. For "he who goes beyond the sphere of experience, is safe from being contradicted by experience, and if he only avoids contradicting himself, he need not fear any other refutation." But ultimately, as the past history of philosophy proves, he finds that what is easily asserted can as easily be denied; and that he has entered upon a vague region of opinion, where every dogmatism is waited on by an opposite dogmatism, and both by a scepticism.¹

It appears, then, that the interests of empirical, and of metaphysical knowledge, are necessarily bound together, and that we cannot discuss the nature and vindicate the claims of the former without explaining both its connexion with, and its difference from, the latter. It is natural that the relative importance of these two parts of the *Critique* should be differently estimated by different persons. To some, as to most of Kant's cotemporaries, the negative or dialectical side of his work

Analytic
and Dia-
lectic
necessary
comple-
ments of
each other.

¹ *Introduction to Critique*, 1, 2, cf. I., p. 492.

seemed most important, as their main interests lay in the region of metaphysics. Others again have given great, and even exclusive, prominence to his defence of physics and mathematics against scepticism, and among these we may reckon some of the best of the recent commentators on the *Critique*. But to Kant himself the two parts were the necessary complements of each other, and if he sometimes seemed to lay greater weight on the one than on the other, it was only because, like a good general, he carried all his forces for the moment to the point of attack.¹

Relation of
Criticism
to the
Leibnitz-
ian and
Lockian
philoso-
phies.

The same result will be reached if we consider that the Kantian philosophy arose out of the union of two opposite systems, which it at once refuted, united, and transcended. Kant's position had therefore to be fortified, on the one side against Leibnitz and Wolff, and on the other side against Locke and Hume. In relation to the former, Kant had to show that no *Deus ex machina* is provided to carry our minds across the gulf that separates them from things in themselves. He had to show that the knowledge of absolute reality is impossible, and at the same time to explain the strange fact that we

¹ Compare, in illustration of this fluctuation, the often-quoted note to the Preface of the *Treatise on the Metaphysical basis of Physics* (V., p. 313), with the explanation of it given at the end of the *Essay on the use of Teleological principles in Philosophy* (VI., p. 389). Paulsen (p. 209) calls attention to these passages in support of his view, that the Analytic was in Kant's eyes the most important part of his work, although in his later years he sometimes allowed his own judgment on this point to be warped by the opinion of his contemporaries. My view is, that Kant could not weigh the relative importance of what were to him necessarily interdependent parts of one whole, and that some vivacious expressions are to be explained simply by the nature of the attacks he was from time to time repelling.

are driven so constantly, and, as it would seem, inevitably, to seek after it, or even to assume that we have it. So far Kant goes with the English empirical school; but at this point he turns round to ask how, in consistency with these admissions, the facts of our ordinary consciousness and experience are to be explained: in other words, how the conscious subject can know anything else but himself, and his own states of mind. In one sense he cannot, *i.e.*, he cannot know that which is not brought within the range of consciousness. But this negative conclusion leads necessarily to the revival of the problem of knowledge in a new form. Knowledge of reality outside of, and independent of, consciousness being impossible, what is the meaning of the distinction that we actually make between reality and illusion, between knowledge and imagination, between what *seems* and what *is*? Grant to Berkeley that the object as given is merely a sensation, and the question immediately presents itself, how sensations should be represented as objects? If what we have thought of as *without* consciousness, is really *within* it, still the opposition of without and within, of object and subject, of being and thought *within* consciousness, remains to be accounted for. If both factors, as they are now supposed to do, fall within consciousness, consciousness itself must explain its own dualism. Both the consciousness of the world without us, and the consciousness of the individual self as an objective existence to be ranked along with others in that world, want explanation: an explanation which *cannot* be found in any immediate contact with things in themselves (for things in themselves cannot get over into our minds any more than our minds can transcend themselves

to get to them), and which, therefore, *must* be found either in mere sensations, or in mere thoughts, or in some combination of the two.

Difference
of the
methods
of Reid
and Kant.

We may illustrate the view taken by Kant by comparing it with that of Reid and his followers. Reid, like Kant, sought to maintain the possibility of knowledge against the so-called Idealism of Berkeley, and the Scepticism of Hume; but his method of doing so was very different. It consisted simply in denying the representative view of knowledge altogether, and asserting that the immediate objects of the mind in perceptions are not ideas, but things. This assertion *might* have an intelligible meaning from the point of view of an Idealism, to which the distinction of ideas and things was not an absolute one; but from the point of view of 'Natural Dualism,' as it has been called, in which the absoluteness of that distinction is maintained, it is simply irrational and incomprehensible. It is an assertion which is necessarily retracted in detail by Reid himself, whenever he comes to deal with perception as involving a relation between the object and the mind. To hold that consciousness can apprehend things in themselves, was, after Berkeley, a logical impossibility. Yet this is necessarily the meaning we must give to Reid's declaration that the objects of perception are not ideas but things, seeing we cannot attribute to him a denial of the existence of things in themselves apart from their relation to thought. His appeal to common sense was therefore little more than a claim to assert without argument a doctrine which had been proved untenable, and which contained in it a manifest contradiction. For it is

nothing less than a contradiction to maintain the *reality* of knowledge without abandoning that dualism of thought and things which had necessarily led the followers of Locke to the denial of its *possibility*. Kant, in vindicating knowledge, took an altogether different course. Admitting that we cannot apprehend absolute reality or know things in themselves out of relation to consciousness, and thus withdrawing from the ground proved untenable by Berkeley and Hume, he seeks to show that there is real knowledge within this limit; that if all the objects of our thought are, in a sense, subjective, *i.e.*, relative to *our* senses and to *our* understanding, yet this does not make them cease to be definite and knowable objects connected together in the order and system of one world. They may be merely phenomenal, but they are phenomenally real. And the mind can find in them an endlessly fruitful field of enquiry, even though it is for ever shut out from absolute reality.

Before, however, going on to show how Kant vindicates the claims of phenomena to be treated as realities, we must turn aside to notice an objection that may naturally be suggested by what has just been said. What place, it may be asked, is left for the Dialectic at all, if things in themselves are utterly beyond our knowledge? If we do not, in some measure, know what they are, how do we know even that they exist? It is intelligible how Kant, on the basis of that dualism with which he started, should have declared that what we know is not a thing in itself, not an object of which the one determination is that it is not in consciousness. But should he not have carried his logic a little farther, and maintained that such an object is a mere fiction

Why does Kant still admit the existence of things in themselves?

of abstraction? To attempt to conceive an object divested of every relation to the subject,—is it not as vain a piece of logical trifling, as if we should set ourselves to think the idea of a father without a son? And might we not as reasonably argue that human reason is limited, because we fail in the impossible effort of abstraction in the latter case as in the former? Instead, therefore, of saying, that we know phenomena, and not things in themselves, should we not rather dismiss the conception of things in themselves altogether, and say simply that all reality is relative to consciousness?

Can we
know the
limits of
our know-
ledge?

Such an objection could not altogether escape Kant, and when he is brought face to face with it, he tells us that the conception of the thing in itself is a 'problematical conception,' which cannot be verified, at least by the speculative reason; or that it merely indicates the limits of our knowledge without throwing light on anything beyond these limits. In this way the issue is changed from the subject to the object, and the question comes to be, *not* how can we know things in themselves, but how can we know the limits of our own knowledge? Ere reason can thus criticise itself, it must in some way or degree be able to emancipate itself from its own limits. It must have some *ideal* of knowledge, by comparison with which it perceives the defects of its *actual* knowledge. It is easy to illustrate the proposition that to know a limit as such is to be in some sense beyond it. If I throw a stone as far as possible, I can criticise my throw, because I see beyond the point I have reached. If I try to distinguish a distant object, I can discern the imperfection of my view of it, because I know that the

object must be defined beyond what I see. If even I task my power of thinking to the utmost, and fail to discover the solution of a geometrical problem, I can recognise that this inability is subjective and individual, because I can still, to some extent, discern the possibility and conditions of its solution: in other words, there is still a position beyond the limit, which in thought I can take up, and from which I can criticise myself, and become conscious of my own defect. But how is it possible for me, as a thinking being, to criticise thought and intelligence in themselves, so as to discern their absolute limits? from what point of view can I see those limits? The criticism of thought is still thought: whatever height we ascend, this atmosphere is still about us. On the other hand, while thought in general cannot be criticised by itself, while the assumption of the ultimate identity of thought and being is unavoidable, particular forms of thought can undoubtedly be criticised, in so far as thought can transcend these forms. The criticism of pure reason is possible, if there is a higher point of view secured for us by the very nature of intelligence, from which we may overlook and criticise the ordinary consciousness, or as Kant calls it, experience. It is the aim of the Dialectic to show that this is the case; that there are certain ideas of reason, which are regulative of all our empirical knowledge, and which also limit it; and yet, at the same time, that the higher realities to which these ideas point by contrast, are beyond our knowledge. How far the conception of such a subjective ideal of knowledge, which has no reality necessarily corresponding to it, is a tenable one, we shall have afterwards to consider.

The objects of experience not given, but determined as such by the mind.

Reserving, then, for the present, all questions in relation to things in themselves, we turn with Kant to the more fruitful field of phenomena, the world within consciousness. And here the chief thing to be explained is, how mere phenomena can present to us the aspect of a world at all. In other words, how can our sensations or ideas, the states of our own consciousness, be represented as an objective system of things, bound together into a whole by definite laws? Whence comes the permanence and reality we attribute to phenomena, if they are nothing but the ever-changing ideas or representations of our minds? Whence comes that connection according to universal laws independent of the accidental associations of the individual, which we ascribe to the objects of experience, if they have no existence except in the mind that apprehends them? The secret of the objectivity of phenomena, and their connection as parts of one world, must obviously be sought, not without but within, not in what is simply given to the mind, but in what is produced by it. What comes from without is at the most a sensation or impression, which is itself but a passing phase of our inner life, and has no reference to anything but itself, no connection with other sensations, and no relation to an object as such. If out of such sensations a world of objects is made, it must be made by some mental activity. In order, therefore, to account for the world of experience, the world we know, or seem to know, both in our ordinary consciousness and in science, and to account for it without denying its phenomenal character, we must change our point of view. As Copernicus found that the apparent motions of the stars, which he could not explain so

long as he regarded them as moving, and himself as at rest, became clear and simple so soon as he conceived himself to be moving, and the heavens at rest, so it is here. We cannot find an explanation of the peculiarities of our objective consciousness in the things that produce impressions on our senses, for these things are unknown to us: nor, in the bare impressions themselves, which are but momentary states of our subjectivity: we must seek it, therefore, in the *a priori* conditions of perception and thought, in an activity by which the mind *transforms*, or rather, in strictness of language, *forms* its impressions.

Now what is this activity? Kant's answer is, that it is synthesis. Mere impressions are isolated and unconnected. They have no relation to each other, and hence no relation to any object more permanent than themselves. Only so far as we relate them to each other, recognise them as repetitions of each other, and connect them with each other in definite and unchanging ways, can the shifting phases of our sentient life be to us the representation of a world of objects, which we distinguish from ourselves, yet conceive to be permanent with the permanence of the self. Nay, it is only in so far as we thus determine the data of sense, that we can exist for ourselves as permanent individual objects among the other^a objects of the world. Synthesis is necessary for objectivity, and as there can be no synthesis without some link of connection by which the different elements are brought together, so the activity of the mind must bring with it certain principles of relation, under which the manifold of sense must be brought, and to which it must

A priori
synthesis
necessary
for know-
ledge,

conform. Nothing can supply the place of a necessity from without but a necessity from within. By an object we mean something which, in the connexion of its elements, is fixed independently of the impressions or ideas of the individual, and which determines, and is not determined by them. And this independence, as in the case of phenomena it cannot be accounted for by the presence of the object *apart from* the activity of our thought, so it must be explained by the fact that *in* that activity—*i.e.*, in uniting a multiplicity of sensations in the conception of an object, the mind is bound down, or binds itself down, to certain definite ways of operation. It is therefore the aim of the *Critique* to detect the forms of synthesis which are necessarily implied in experience, and to show that they *are* so implied. This is the idea expressed by the epithet ‘transcendental,’ which Kant so often applies to his philosophy. A transcendental criticism has not simply to seek out and determine our *a priori* ideas, nor has it, on the other hand, to examine generally the bases of our knowledge of objects. It has to deal with “our *a priori* ideas in so far as they form a ground of the knowledge of objects”;¹ to discover and verify that part of knowledge or experience, which is derived purely from the mind itself.

But further, as the world of experience is a world of objects which are all united in one space and one time, there must be a unity of principle in the mind that gives connexion and system to the objects of its knowledge. It will not therefore be sufficient to give a number of isolated rules for *a priori* synthesis

And a system of synthesis necessary for the knowledge of a world of objects.

¹ *Critique, Introduction, § 7: Tr., p. 16.*

without showing their connexion with each other, for in that case we could never be sure that our catalogue was complete. We must develop our criticism systematically upon one principle. We must not only discover "the general ground of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic judgments, but also determine the special conditions of each different kind of these judgments: we must mark out and define this whole department of knowledge, and that not only in a general sketch or description, but in an organic system of conceptions showing specifically their sources and divisions, their extent and limits." And this task, as Kant thinks, will not involve much prolixity; for that which is universal and necessary must be derived from the nature of mind itself, and we do not therefore require to examine the "nature of things, which is inexhaustible, but only the intelligence," which is limited and definite. "Reason constitutes a sphere so completely separated from all others, and so thoroughly united within itself, that we cannot intermeddle with any part without touching all the others, or settle a single point without determining for everything its place and relation to everything else. *Outside* of this sphere, there lies nothing that could better our judgment in regard to what lies within it; and *within* it, every element is dependent for its value and use in its relation to all the rest. And as in the structure of an organised body, the meaning and purpose of each member can only be deduced from the idea of the whole, so it may be safely said of such a criticism that it is not to be depended on, unless it has been brought to absolute and exhaustive completeness,

and that it has done nothing unless it has done everything."¹

Kant then seeks to show that there is a certain defined plan or scheme, a system of synthesis, as we may call it, involved in the nature of the human mind, in its consciousness of self, and the modes or forms of its conception or perception; an *a priori* system to which all experience conforms, because it is only by virtue of it that there is such a thing as experience at all. Not as if this system were prior *in time* to experience; for though all 'does not spring out of experience,' there can be no doubt that for us 'all begins with experience.' The powers of the mind can only be known in their exercise, and they do not exercise themselves on themselves, but only on the matter of sensation. But the very idea of experience involves that something more than that matter is needed to constitute it, to determine the fleeting sensation in relation to objects, and to unite these objects as parts of one world. And by careful analysis we may detect both the special connective notions and laws, and the general principle that binds them all together, and determines their relation to each other.

It has sometimes been objected to Kant (and the objection has been repeated by two of his most recent interpreters),² that his idea of experience is somewhat vague and shifting, and that it is put sometimes for the ordinary consciousness or common-sense view of things, and sometimes for the developed consciousness of science. Between these, it is urged, there is an essential distinction, for it is only

¹ *Prolegomena, Introduction, III.*, p. 13: Tr., p. 13.

² *Paulsen*, p. 175. *Hölder, Darstellung der Kantischen Erkenntnisslehre*, p. 31.

Does Kant vary in his idea of experience?

science that regards the world as a system governed by general laws, while the ordinary opinion of men, so far from being imbued with this idea, is constantly in rebellion against it. The answer is, that though Kant certainly did not overlook the inconsequences, or over-estimate the value of common sense, yet he clearly recognised that the distinction between it and science is a vanishing one; or, in other words, that the same principles which underlie the ordinary consciousness of the world, when carried a little further, enable us to correct it, and raise it into science. The simplest human consciousness contains more than sensation, it contains a reference of sensation to objects; the simplest human consciousness also contains some conception of the unity of all objects in one world, (were it but that it represents them all as existing in one space and one time.) And it is a necessary part of Kant's argument to show that between this first form of experience and the most developed scientific view of the world there is only a distinction of degree. The mind that has explicitly done so much, has implicitly done much more. If the common consciousness understood itself, it would be the scientific consciousness, and the inconsistencies of the former with the latter are also inconsistencies with itself. The intelligence carries in itself principles by means of which it construes the matter of sense; to use Kant's own metaphor, it is like the reader of unpointed Hebrew, who supplies for himself the vowels by means of which alone the consonants can be raised into expressive sound. The pure consonant no one has ever uttered; the pure sensation can be brought in no relation to intelligence. But while matter altogether unformed is a mere

abstraction, like the Aristotelian *πρῶτη ὕλη*, the process of forming is one that may be at very different stages in different minds. Hence, as we shall see, Kant admits a certain relative contrast between judgments of sensible perception (*Wahrnehmung*) and judgments of experience, though he would have been the last to maintain, and indeed it would have destroyed all his own work to maintain, that there are, strictly speaking, any judgments of perception at all.¹ The scientific man proceeds from an experience, which is already to a certain extent organised, to an experience more completely organised, but he cannot deal with completely inorganic sensation, and in all the advance of knowledge he can only seek for a more thorough application of the principles implied in ordinary experience. This, indeed, is just the truth that underlies his continual assertion of facts against arbitrary hypothesis. "When Galileo let balls of a particular weight, which he had selected, roll down an inclined plane; or Torricelli made the air carry a weight which he had previously determined to be equal to a certain volume of water; or when, in later times, Stahl changed metals into lime, and lime again into metals by withdrawing and restoring certain elements of their composition, new light was thrown upon scientific enquiry. For henceforth men of science comprehended that reason has insight only into that which she herself produces on her own plan, and that she must, according to fixed laws, anticipate nature with principles of judgment, and compel it to answer her questions, or not let herself be drawn by it as it were in leading strings; for observations made on no previously fixed plan will

¹ Cf. the discussion of this point in chapter 8th, seq.

never meet together in the discovery of a necessary law, which is the only thing that gives satisfaction to reason. In order to be instructed by nature, the intelligence must go to it not as a scholar who accepts everything the master says, but as a judge who compels the witnesses to answer his own questions. It must therefore bring with it, on the one hand, its own principles, according to which alone concordant phenomena can be admitted as laws of nature, and, on the other hand, the experiment which it has invented according to these principles. Therefore even the science of Physics entirely owes the advantageous revolution through which it has passed to the happy thought that we must not indeed imagine laws for nature, but make that which reason itself puts *into* nature our guide to discover that which can be learnt only *from* nature, and which reason in itself is powerless to teach."¹ It is therefore the same secret plan and principle, involved in the very nature of human intelligence which unconsciously guides all minds in the first production of experience, and which also, with more or less clearness of consciousness, has lighted every great man of science to the knowledge of nature's law; and it is this that Kant proposes to discover and verify in his transcendental criticism.

We have now so far explained the object of the *Critique* as to make it easy to understand how Kant comes to attach such importance to the question of the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. But Kant's own statements on the subject in his introduction to the *Critique* and the *Prolegomena* are so important, and they have given rise to so many

Are Kant's
statements
in the *In-
troduction*
exact?

¹ *Preface to Second Edition*, p. 668 : Tr., p. 27.

serious misunderstandings, that it is necessary for us to give some more definite account of them. In these preliminary statements, Kant is anxious rather to explain what he means by *a priori* synthesis, and to illustrate its importance from different sciences, than to show that it lies at the root of all knowledge. Hence he does not hesitate, for the present, to speak of empirical synthesis as if it were entirely independent of *a priori* synthesis, and to treat the necessity and universality of a judgment as in itself a sufficient evidence that it has not been derived from experience. But if we take such statements as conveying the whole truth of the matter, we make the *Critique* a sealed book to ourselves, and we empty the 'transcendental Deduction,' which contains its central idea, of all serious meaning. It is therefore essential to remove such an obstacle at the outset, by giving a detailed account of Kant's argument as nearly as possible in his own words, adding at the end such criticisms as seem to be necessary to show its bearing, and the limitations with which it must be understood.

Analysis
and Syn-
thesis.

✓ Kant begins with a contrast—with which we have already become familiar in considering his earlier works—the contrast of analysis and synthesis. The great question of philosophy, he tells us, has been long obscured by the confusion of these two processes, or by the supposition that mere analysis of our thoughts can add to our knowledge. It must be admitted that we make a great *formal* improvement in our knowledge by dissecting the conceptions of things we have already acquired. But it was a mistake, though a natural mistake, in Wolff to suppose that the logical process can add to

the contents of thought. It was indeed a mistake which was fruitful of other mistakes. For just because he did not observe the wide gulf that separates such formal improvements of thinking from real advances in the knowledge of things, he insensibly let the legitimate process by which experience is analysed, pass into the illegitimate process by which experience is transcended. Our first step therefore must be to make this distinction as clear as possible.

There is undoubtedly one sense in which we can advance our knowledge, *a priori*, without aid from perception or experience. We can analyse the conceptions we already possess, we can separate all the elements of a complete conception from each other, and thus we can come to think distinctly and articulately what before we thought confusedly and indistinctly. ~~This is an advance in knowledge, but it is~~ only a formal and not a material advance. It adds nothing to the content of our thinking. The new judgments which it enables us to make are all explicative or analytic. They are no real addition to our knowledge; they only show that we have become clearly conscious of what we knew before. Thus we may take the conception of body, and make it the subject of a judgment: "All bodies are extended," or "all bodies are heavy." Are these analytic or synthetic judgments? To determine this, we have only to consider whether the predicates of extension or weight were before included in our conception of body, and whether we arrived at these predicates by a simple consideration and analysis of that conception; or whether, on the other hand, we had to seek for the predicate beyond

the mere conception of the subject. If the former be the case, we have a merely analytic, if the latter, a synthetic, judgment.

Now it is obvious that when we make such judgments, in which we pass beyond the conception of the subject, we require something else than that conception to enable us to make them. No alchemy of reason will enable us to extract from a conception what is not contained in it. If, *e.g.*, the predicate "heavy" is not involved in our conception of 'body,' we shall never be able to make the judgment, "all bodies are heavy," unless we have something else than the mere conception to assist us. In every case of synthetic or ampliative judgment, therefore, there is a third something, a mean or middle term of transition, that enables us to get beyond our previous conception of the subject, and connect a new predicate with it. Conception A does not contain conception B: therefore, to make the judgment A is B possible, we need a third something, X, to be the middle term. And without such assistance, we should never be able to make any progress in knowledge.

Empirical
and
a priori
synthesis.

Now, in the case of empirical truth, it is easy to see what enables the understanding to make synthetic judgments. The third something or X here is simply "complete experience" of the objects which we think under the conception, *e.g.*, our conception of body contains the predicate of extension and impenetrability, but it does not contain the predicate of weight. But then we are not confined to our conception. The conception is only an imperfect representation of body as it is presented in perception, or, in other words, it contains only a part of

the attributes so presented. Therefore, the "complete experience" of body will enable me to amplify my conception, and to predicate of it not only extension and impenetrability, which are already involved in our conception of it, but also weight, which is not so involved. A conception, in fact, corresponds to an object which has been perceived, and imperfectly represents that object. And a renewed act of perception enables us to supply this defect of the conception, to add to its context, and make it a more perfect representation of the object.

But it is not so easy to see how synthetic propositions should be possible in cases where we cannot thus appeal to experience. Take the proposition: "everything that happens has a cause." The predicate here cannot be said to be involved in the notion of the subject. Under the conception of "something that happens," I think indeed of an event in time, which is therefore preceded by another time, etc.; and I can, by consideration of this conception, make several analytical judgments. But I can by no means extract from it the conception of a cause. Where then do I get the middle term that enables me to reach beyond the conception of something that happens, and connects with it the entirely different conception of a cause? In this case, it cannot be experience. For experience would never enable me to express my judgment universally, or to say, "everything that happens has a cause." The utmost which experience can attain to is frequency or generality, never universality or necessity. Experience may enable me to think something as true or false, but it cannot oblige me to think it, or make it impossible for me to think

the opposite. Universality and necessity of judgments show that they are not based on experience, but on *a priori* conditions, *i. e.*, that they are based on the nature of the mind, and not of the things by which it is impressed. Either such judgments are invalid, and their necessity and universality is a delusion: or, they imply an *a priori* synthesis; *i. e.*, a synthesis which has not experience or sensation for its middle term. But, if so, the question recurs, what is the middle term, the X, by help of which the mind connects this new predicate with the notion of the subject? In other words, what is it that makes a synthetic *a priori* judgment possible?

Synthetic
a priori
judgments
in Mathe-
matics,
Physics,
and Meta-
physics.

The importance of this question will be more clearly seen if we take a glance over those sciences that are supposed to furnish us with our most certain knowledge: for all these sciences contain judgments which are expressed with universality and necessity. And if this universality and necessity is not a delusion, if such judgments are not mere provisional expressions of past experience, but real anticipations of what will always hold good, then we must conclude that an *a priori* synthesis, or an addition to our knowledge without sensuous experience, is not impossible. And this opens up before us the possibility that we may be able to pass beyond the limits of experience altogether, and know that which can never be presented in it,—unless we find that there is something in the very essential nature of our *a priori* synthesis which prevents such an extension of it beyond empirical limits. Now, it cannot be denied that there are such synthetical judgments in mathematics. In fact, all mathematical judgments

are synthetic, or if analytic judgments are made in mathematics, they are quite subordinate in importance: they serve only to complete the methodical statement of the logical chain of proof, and never supply the principle on which it rests. All mathematical judgments, except these, are synthetic, and synthetic *a priori*, since they are at once universal and necessary. If we take even the simplest example from arithmetic, *e.g.*, $7 + 5 = 12$, we find that the bare conceptions of $7 + 5$ are not sufficient by analysis to give us the conception of 12. We need a third something to carry us from the former to the latter; and that something is in this case a perception that corresponds to one of the numbers, *e.g.*, 7 points or 5 fingers. Say I take the number 7, and call to my aid the perception of 5 fingers; I then proceed to number the units which were united in the conception of 5, and add them successively to 7, and thus I see the number 12 generated, as it were, before my eyes. Yet, as this synthesis is expressed with absolute necessity, it cannot derive its form from the particular perceptions, the five fingers, through which we discern its truth. Otherwise, we should have a necessary and universal truth of experience based on one instance. Again, take the proposition that the straight line is the shortest distance between two given points. This is a judgment that involves synthesis, *i.e.*, a judgment we could not make without going beyond the conception of straightness; for it is impossible to extract anything about smallness or greatness of quantity out of that conception. And the synthesis is *a priori*; for the instant it is apprehended, it carries with it the conviction of its universality and neces-

sity. But, secondly, physical science contains among its principles many judgments that are synthetic *a priori*. The judgment, *e.g.*, that, in all changes of the material world, the quantity of matter remains unchanged, or the judgment that, in the communication of motion, action and reaction must be equal to each other, may be taken as examples. They are *a priori*, for they are seen to be necessary and universal, so soon as they are thoroughly understood, and no proof of them can be derived from experience, which does not really presuppose them. Yet they are synthetic; for, to take the first of them, the notion of matter does not involve the notion of permanence, but only of the occupation of space; and in order to think it as permanent, we must go beyond the notion of matter, and add to it a predicate which is not included in it. Lastly, if these most certain kinds of our knowledge, the best ascertained sciences of empirical reality, contain *a priori* synthesis, it can scarcely be necessary for us to prove that metaphysics, if metaphysics is possible, requires such synthesis. The difference in this case is, that the knowledge required is not only beyond what can be got by experience, but it even relates to objects which can never be empirically presented to us at all—objects, the very existence of which has to be demonstrated by an *a priori* synthesis.

Traces of the distinction in previous philosophies, especially in Hume.

These instances will make clear the great importance of the question we have raised, and of the distinction presupposed in it. The distinction between analytic and synthetic, and the distinction between synthetic *a priori* and synthetic *a posteriori*, are at the foundation of all sound philosophy, and

the neglect of them explains why the greatest efforts have failed to produce a system that could resist attack. Leibnitz and Wolff ignored the distinction altogether, and consequently produced a dogmatic philosophy, which substituted the analytic explanation of our thoughts for the proof of the reality of objects corresponding to them. Locke had a passing glimpse of it, but he did not use it to any purpose. Hume came nearest to it when he pointed out that the principle of causality takes us beyond the impressions of sense, and what is immediately given in them. But, as he supposed this to be the *only* case of such transcending of sense, he was led rather to question the validity of the principle of causality, and to explain it away, than to investigate the conditions under which in general it is possible to go beyond these impressions.

“Since the Essays of Locke and Leibnitz, or rather since the very dawn of metaphysical science, no event has happened that might more powerfully have influenced its fate than the attack which Hume made upon it. For if he did not himself carry light into this department of knowledge, he at least struck a spark, from which light might have been kindled, if it had fallen on an inflammable substance, and its first radiance had been carefully fostered.”

“Hume started mainly from a single, but very important, notion of Metaphysics, the notion of the connexion of cause and effect (including the subordinate conceptions of action and power). He put reason, that claims to be the parent of this conception, to the question regarding it. He asked with what right it could assert that there is anything in the world possessed of such a nature that, whenever

it is posited, something quite different must also be posited. For that is what is involved in the notion of a cause. He then proved irresistibly, that it is entirely impossible for reason, *a priori* and from the mere analysis of conceptions, to arrive at the idea of such a *necessary* connexion between two independent things. It seemed to him impossible to understand how, because something exists, it is necessary that something quite different should exist, or to discover from what source, before the perception of the things connected, we could get the conception of such a connexion. And from this he concluded, that reason is entirely self-deceived in claiming for its offspring a conception which is really a bastard child begotten by experience upon imagination. For it is imagination that brings certain data, received from experience, under a law of association, and substitutes the subjective necessity—*i.e.*, the custom thereby produced, for an objective necessity of reason. And thus he arrived at the result that reason has no power to think such necessary connection of independent things even in general, and that all pretended *a priori* knowledge is nothing but common experience, passing itself off with a false stamp of necessity, or, what comes to the same thing, that there is no such thing as metaphysics, and can be none.”¹

This conclusion of Hume was too hasty, and it is probable that he would have hesitated to draw it, if he had considered the question in its universality, and had seen that the rejection of *a priori* synthesis involves far more than the principle of causality, and that especially the logical consequence of it must be the denial of validity to the most evident and certain

¹ *Proleg., Introd.*, p. 6 : *Tr.*, p. 5.

of sciences—the science of mathematics.¹ Still, he did raise in this particular case the great question of the possibility of synthetic judgments, and his scepticism was a challenge to all the metaphysicians of the time to vindicate the claims of their science.

It was a challenge, however, to which they made no satisfactory reply. Hume's immediate opponents—Reid, Oswald, Beattie, and Priestley—were so far from giving one, that they altogether mistook the point of his reasonings, and with great vehemence of language, set about proving the validity of the conception of cause, from the point of view of common sense. “The question, however, was not whether this conception is useful, or even indispensable, for the knowledge of Nature, for that Hume had never denied, but whether its truth is independent of experience, and whether it has, as on that supposition it may be supposed to have, an application which is not confined to the objects of experience.” *This* it was that they had to prove, and to call in common sense as an oracle, in order to cut the knot philosophy was unable to untie, was to appeal to the vulgar on a question of science. “Hume, I should think, had as good a claim to the possession of sound common sense as Beattie, and he possessed besides that, to which Beattie had no claim, to wit, that critical reason which keeps the common under-

The philosophy of common sense evades the problem.

¹ Did Hume consider mathematical truth to be analytical? Kant thinks that he must have done so; but from the well-known contrast of ‘relations of ideas’ and ‘matters of fact,’ we should rather conclude that, in the *Essays*, he had fallen back on the opinion of Locke, that such truth is merely *ideal*. In the *Treatise* he, more consistently, treats mathematical truth as derived from the analysis of sensible experience, and he is therefore forced to deny its exactness. See Green's *Introduction*, § 274. There is no proof that Kant had ever read the *Treatise*.

standing in check, and prevents it intruding into speculative matters, or assuming to decide where these are in question. For common sense has no power of justifying its own principles, and it does not remain *good* sense, unless it keeps to its own sphere. Hammer and chisel are very good instruments for carpenters' work, but we must use the needle for engraving. And so the speculative and the ordinary understanding have each their own place and use: the latter in deciding on matters of experience, and the former in metaphysic, where we have to make universal judgments based on pure conceptions."¹

Kant generalises, in order to solve, it.

Kant, when he was awakened by Hume from his 'dogmatic slumber,' proceeded to deal with the question in an altogether different way. Seeing the nature of the question raised by Hume, viz., whether Reason by itself and independently of experience has any synthetic power, i.e., any power of connecting things together by means of conceptions not given to it in experience, he gave to that question the necessary generality. He asked whether there are any *other* cases besides the case of causality involving a synthetic movement of thought, and he set himself to discover them, and make a complete list of them. Whatever principles of connection involve universality and necessity, these, he said to himself, cannot be legitimately derived from experience. Guided by this rule, he discovered, as has been already shown, that Geometry, Physics, and Metaphysics all contain such principles. He saw, therefore, that if with Hume we declare that *a priori* synthesis is impossible, and that the appearance of it only arises from

¹ *Prolegomena*, p. 8 : Tr. p. 7.

our mistaking a subjective necessity based on custom for an objective necessity of reason, we must necessarily go much farther than Hume did, and we must deny the validity not only of Metaphysics, but also of Mathematics, and of the *a priori* part of Physics. On Hume's principles we must reject not only the science that pretends to speak of what lies beyond experience, but also what has been hitherto supposed to be our most exact and certain knowledge in regard to things within the sphere of experience. The question of the possibility of *a priori* synthetic propositions is not therefore a question of Metaphysic alone, but breaks up into three questions, each of which has a special importance. How is pure Mathematics possible? How is pure Physics possible? and, lastly, how is Metaphysic possible? It is, however, to be remembered that as to the last question our position is somewhat different from that in which we stand in regard to the other two. For of Mathematics and Physics there can be no proper doubt that they are possible sciences seeing they actually exist. They are connected and self-consistent systems of truth in regard to the objects of experience, whose possibility is proved by their actuality; and hence the only question with respect to them seems to be *how* they are possible. But the progress of Metaphysic has hitherto been so unsatisfactory, and its successive systems so unproductive of definite results, that its very existence as a science may be questioned. Hence, before we ask *how* it is possible, it seems in the first place necessary that we should prove *that* it is possible. But this is not altogether so. For there is a sense in which no one can deny

the existence of Metaphysic. No one can deny that human reason is continually driven, and that not only by mere vanity, but by its own essential needs—to raise questions which find no answer in experience. In this way every one necessarily becomes a metaphysician so soon as the speculative instinct has been awakened in him. Thus it is in any case a legitimate enquiry, how Metaphysic is possible as a natural tendency of the mind. Nor can we stop short here: for we cannot really determine the subjective necessity without determining also the objective validity of metaphysic. Either, therefore, we shall succeed in solving its problems, or, failing this, we must be able to show that the mind is incompetent to solve them. Thus, either in knowledge or in clear consciousness of the grounds of our ignorance, we shall find a satisfactory conclusion of our researches.¹

Imperfections of Kant's introductory statement.

We have now before us Kant's account of the objects of criticism as it is presented in the *Prolegomena* and in the introduction to the second edition of the *Critique*. It agrees substantially with the results we had previously derived from a general view of the whole work. There are, however, two important points of difference to which we must advert. In the first place, Kant does not clearly explain the relation in which *a priori* and *a posteriori* synthesis stand to each other. On the contrary, he speaks of them as if they were co-ordinate and independent species of the same genus. Hence, for all that is said in these sections, we might imagine him to be maintaining the old Wolffian idea that there is a rational or *a priori* part, as well as an

¹ *Introduction to Critique*, § 6 : Tr., p. 12.

empirical or a *posteriori* part, in every science. But this is merely a preliminary, and therefore inexact, statement of the Kantian view, for if the *Critique* proves anything, it is that there is no experience without *a priori* synthesis. It is a frequent, we might say an invariable, characteristic of Kant's method of exposition, that he first treats as entirely separate things what he afterwards shows to be merely elements or factors of a unity. His intention, no doubt, was to give clearness to each part by taking it by itself, before he considered it in its relation to the other parts. But the result is, that he often seems to be reasoning in a circle, when he is really advancing from an external and fragmentary view of a subject to the apprehension of it in its essential unity as a whole.

And so it is here. For, in the second place, so long as *a priori* truth and *a posteriori* truth are regarded as separate and independent parts of knowledge, so long the only proof that judgments are *a priori*, or not derived from experience, must be found in the fact, that they are universal and necessary. But a reference to the mere feeling of necessity that accompanies a judgment, seems to be a very insufficient way of meeting the scepticism of Hume, who has the ready answer, that the necessity is merely subjective, and produced by custom. Kant indeed says, that Hume would have hesitated to carry out his principle if he had seen its application to mathematics. But why not? In the earlier treatise, which Kant does not seem to have studied, Hume had actually attempted to reduce mathematical truth within the limits of sensational experience. The impossibility of getting

rid of *a priori* judgments, or explaining away their necessity, really rested for Kant, not merely on the nature of these judgments in themselves, but on their relation to all knowledge. The very foundation of Hume's argument is destroyed when it is shown that for us, as thinking beings, there could be no knowledge or experience whatever, except through these very necessary principles, which he seeks to explain away. For no custom or association, based on a repetition of experiences, could be the source of the very principles on which experience rests. And it is to this view of the subject that Kant directs us, when he asks the significant question, "Whence could experience itself derive its certitude, if all the rules on which it proceeds were themselves also empirical and contingent?"¹

The
Critique
not meta-
physical,
but tran-
scenden-
tal.

To sum up what has been said, the *Critique* is, in Kant's language, not metaphysical, but transcendental, although it must necessarily be, to a certain extent, metaphysical, in order that it may be able to solve the transcendental problem. In simpler words, Kant seeks to discover our *a priori* ideas, not for their own sake, but as the ground of our knowledge of objects. He endeavours to show that knowledge is possible only through *a priori* synthesis, and to determine the nature and limit of this synthesis. By means of the criteria of necessity and universality, (though these alone, as we shall see, are by no means sufficient for the purpose,) he finds out the *a priori* elements of conception and perception. This forms the first part of his work, or, in his own phraseology, the metaphysical exposition and deduction of these elements. But this dis-

¹ *Introduction*, § 2 : Tr., p. 3.

covery has to him no value for itself apart from the transcendental deduction, by which it is proved that just these and no other *a priori* ideas are the foundation of all our knowledge, and that, in their connection with each other, and with the consciousness of self, they constitute that systematic unity of intelligence which seems to reflect, because it is itself the creative source of the objective unity of the world.

CHAPTER II.

UNDERSTANDING AND SENSE.

The relation of
Æsthetic
and
Analytic.

IN the preceding chapter we have explained Kant's reasons for making a distinction between what he designates the *Dialectic* on the one hand, and the *Æsthetic* and *Analytic* on the other; but we have still to examine his reason for separating the *Æsthetic* from the *Analytic*. It is his view that the organic plan of experience is derived from the mind; but that in that organic plan there are two parts, a part due to the activity of the understanding, which binds together the unconnected data of sense, and a part due to the form of sense, i.e., to the manner in which our sensuous nature modifies the impressions it receives. Further, it is just because of this modification by the forms of sense that sensations, which in themselves are transitory and unrelated existences, become, not indeed actually related, but capable of being related to each other by the understanding, and so made into parts of a connected experience. Experience, then, even in its *a priori* part, even in the organic plan which it owes to the intelligence, is made up of two factors or elements, one of which is

contributed by understanding, and the other by sense. "It is possible that these two great branches of the tree of knowledge spring from one common root, but that root is hidden from us."¹ The difference is for us an irreducible one, and indeed, as we shall see, it is just because it is irreducible that Kant holds human knowledge to be confined to the phenomenal. It is therefore necessary that we should clearly apprehend his reason for referring knowledge to two such disparate sources.

In the account of the pre-critical development of Kant's ideas, we have already shown what was the first form which this distinction took in his mind. It was a form which is sufficiently familiar to us 'in exoteric discourses,' as one of the commonplaces of the popular logic and psychology. According to this view, objects are supposed to be presented to us through sense in their complete individuality and determination, while to the understanding is left the formal business of abstraction and generalisation, by which single qualities or attributes are separated from the rest, and made the basis of classification. Besides this formal office, understanding is asserted by some, and denied by others, to be itself the source of certain general notions, such as those of cause, substance, &c. In both its real and formal use, however, the objects of the understanding are supposed to be 'general ideas,' and the only use of these ideas, whether derived from the intelligence itself, or got by analysis of the objects of sense, is to determine the individuals which fall under them, and connect them together into classes. There are, therefore, according to this view, two

First form
of the op-
position of
Sense and
Under-
standing.

¹ *Introduction*, § 7 : Tr., p. 18.

distinct kinds of knowledge, knowledge of the universal, and knowledge of the particular, and the only question to dispute is, whether the former is merely an abstract repetition of the latter, or whether it *also* contains elements that are peculiar to itself.

Second
form of it.

It is a very different theory, however, that suggests itself when we begin to reflect on the real nature of the data of sense. For then it appears that if we abstract from all the work of intelligence, there can be no such thing as a perception of an individual object. Sense of itself cannot determine an individual as such; its data are a series of isolated feelings that have no connexion with each other, and no relation to any object more permanent than themselves. And the conceptions of the understanding, the conceptions of cause, substance, &c., must be used to bind together the manifold elements of sensation ere any intelligible reality, any object capable of being known, ~~can~~ exist for us. From this point of view, therefore, we can no longer talk of perception as giving one kind of knowledge, and conception another, for both elements are necessary, and either, severed from the other, loses all its significance. 'Conceptions without perceptions are empty; perception without conception is blind.' They are factors, and not species of knowledge, and therefore cannot be understood except in their unity.

Kant
adopts the
former
in the
Æsthetic.

Now, it is to be observed that, in the *Æsthetic*, Kant adopts the former view of the distinction of perception and conception, reserving the correction of it by the latter for the *Analytic*. While, therefore, he seems in the *Æsthetic* to be abstracting from all that is not given in sense, he is not really

doing so. His elimination of the elements, contributed by the understanding, is necessarily imperfect, so long as he permits himself to conceive of sense as a source, not only of sensations, but of perceptions, as presenting to us not merely a 'manifold' of isolated feelings, but individual objects determined in time and space, as well as time and space themselves as objects. Here, therefore, as in many other places, we find Kant making his way into the subject by aid of the ordinary modes of representing it, though the result of his speculation is to take him beyond those modes. It has been a source of confusion to many of Kant's readers, and at times, perhaps, even to Kant himself, that the language of the earlier part of his work is not reformed in view of the conclusions which he ultimately reaches. In explanation, we may remember that the theory of the *Æsthetic* was developed at a time when the ideas of the *Analytic* had not yet been fully matured. Afterwards Kant satisfied himself with simply indicating that the *Æsthetic* must be corrected in accordance with these conceptions, and, with this general caution, left the student to follow the same course of development and self-criticism through which he himself had passed.

Kant, then, takes his stand for the present on the common opposition of perception to conception, as that of the individual to the general; he assumes also that the ordinary Logic gives a sufficiently accurate account of the relation of the one to the other. Logic, indeed, is to him the one branch of intellectual science which is in a satisfactory state, and has been so almost from the time when it was completed; as if at a stroke, by Aristotle. He often

His view
of Logic.

returns to the contrast between the security and permanence of its doctrines, and the uncertainty and continual variations of Metaphysic. "Logic," he says, "had attained the certain movement of a science in the earliest times, as we may see from the fact that, since Aristotle, it has never been forced to make a single step backwards, unless we find such a regress in the clearing away of one or two useless subtleties, and the more accurate expression of a few of its definitions: things which we may regard rather as improvements in the elegance of its form than as adding substantially to its certitude as a science. It is noticeable also that, to the present day, it has not been able to take a single step forwards, which seems to show that it came from its author's hand completed and perfect. For, if some moderns have thought to extend the sphere of Logic by bringing in chapters from Psychology about the various faculties of the mind, and chapters from Metaphysic about the origin of knowledge, and the different degrees of certitude with which we apprehend different objects: or again, chapters from Anthropology about the causes and cures of prejudice,—they have merely shown their ignorance of the peculiar nature of the science with which they were dealing. We do not add to the sciences, we rather deform them when we let their distinctive bounds be lost. And the limits of Logic are accurately determined, when we define it as the science which treats of the formal laws of all thought, without regard to its object or its origin, whether empirical or *a priori*, and also without regard to the accidental or natural hindrances which it encounters in our own minds."¹

¹ Preface, 2nd Edition, p. 64: Tr. p. 24.

This view of the certainty and completeness of Logic within its own sphere, was ever present to Kant, and we shall see in the sequel that he returns to it again and again as a secure starting-point for his speculations.

Now, the theory of formal Logic lends itself most naturally—so much we may say at the outset—to the first of the two views of knowledge which we have mentioned. At least, if formal Logic gives a sufficient account of every possible process of thought, as many Logicians have maintained, then thought is confined entirely to the task of analysis, without the possibility of synthesis. Its products are merely partial conceptions of objects that must be previously given to it as wholes, and if we ask how the wholes are given, the answer naturally is, that they are given through perception. Perception, therefore, can alone give value to conception, for it is only through perceptions that the conceptions can be related to objects. From these conclusions flow a number of characteristics by which perception and conception are distinguished from each other. A conception is always general, never individual: it may be complex, but it is at least definite and limited: it may have an indefinite number of individuals *under* it, but it cannot have more than a definite number of marks *in* it: hence it is always possible to analyse it completely, or reduce it to the simple parts of which it is composed. On the other hand, perception is always individual, and its complexity is such that we can never completely analyse it; it has a certain potential infinity, if we may use the expression, which can never be exhausted. A perception, therefore, can never be changed into a

Contrast of
perception
and con-
ception.

conception. Logicians tell us that we can never find an *infima species*, or define the individual. "For if we have a conception that we immediately apply to the individual, there may still be specific differences present in the individual perceived, which we either do not remark, or which we leave out of account."¹ Hence perception continually enables us to add to our conception of its object, while thought only elicits or evolves into clear consciousness the differences of the matter given to it, and can add no new element to that which is given.

In the *Æsthetic*, as I have already said, Kant proceeds on this view. He points out, indeed, that there are conceptions, such as those of substance and cause, which the mind does not get by analysis of the individual objects given in perception, but of which it is itself the source. But he does not tell us, as he afterwards tells us in the *Analytic*, that sense only presents to us a mere "manifold," which requires to be bound together in the unity of a conception ere it can be apprehended as an object. On the contrary, he for the present takes this unity as a part of what is given in sense. He maintains, in short, the ordinary contrast between the generality of the conception and the individuality of the perception, and it is on this basis that he discusses the question as to the nature of the ideas of Time and Space.

Two senses
of *synthesis*
in Kant.

The import of these remarks, and the relation of the *Æsthetic* to the *Analytic*, may perhaps be made clearer by an anticipatory explanation of the different senses in which Kant uses the word 'synthesis.' There are two things to be accounted for in know-

¹ Kant's *Logic*, § 11 ; III., pp. 277-9.

ledge, which we may call its differentiation and its integration. In other words, we have to ask, in the first place, how new matter of thought is added to, or springs out of, that which is already known; and we have to ask, in the second place, how these new elements are combined into a unity of thought with those that were apprehended before. There can be no progress in knowledge without both of these processes. If there be no differentiation, if no new elements are presented for our apprehension, it is obvious that thought must remain inert, or at best must circle round itself in monotonous tautology without any movement of advance. And it is equally clear that if there be merely a continuous series of new feelings or ideas which are never bound together in one consciousness with those that presented themselves before, there can be no real progress, but only change and alteration. For progress of knowledge it is required that at every step onwards the mind should return upon its own unity. The movement of intelligence must be at once differentiating and integrating, or, if we prefer it, inductive and deductive. Nor is it possible to apprehend one of these movements in its true character except in immediate connexion with, and relation to, the other. Now, in order to simplify the subject, Kant attempts, in the first instance, to treat these processes separately; and what is perhaps more confusing, he uses for each severally as well as for their combination the same term '*synthesis*.' In the *Æsthetic*, where he is dwelling on the part which sense has in experience, he tells us that pure thought is merely analytic, and that for synthesis we need perceptions:—meaning, of course, that perception

alone can give us new content for thought, new matter to apprehend: in other words, that pure thought cannot *differentiate* itself. In the *Analytic*, on the other hand, where he is dwelling on the element contributed by the understanding, he tells us with equal decision that, while perception can set before us a manifold content for apprehension, it cannot enable us to bind it together into the unity of an object, and that synthesis "is the one thing that can never be given through objects, but must be effected by the subject for himself, for it is essentially an act of his spontaneity:"¹ in other words, perception cannot *integrate* itself. The common point in both these senses of the word synthesis is, that they are both opposed to analysis, which, according to Kant, proceeds by mere identity, and therefore does not enable us either to combine what is given in separation, or to add any new elements of difference to those that are known already, but only to break up into its parts a whole that was formerly compounded of these very parts. In both kinds of synthesis, therefore, there is an advance made in knowledge, whereas in pure analysis there is no advance.

Now, as we have already said, these two processes of differentiation and integration cannot properly be separated. The difference and the unity of thought are so related that one cannot be truly apprehended except in relation to the other. When Kant, therefore, pretends to sever them, and to set before us perception without conception, it is only that he neglects for the moment the element that is due to conception, not that he really gets rid of it. To get

¹ *Transc. Deduction*, § 15, p. 731 : Tr., p. 80.

rid of it would be to represent to the mind a mere manifold without unity, which is obviously an impossible feat. He is obliged, therefore, to assume for the moment, subject to subsequent correction,¹ that sense presents us with individual objects as such, and that the understanding, on the other hand, is simply the faculty of the Universal—i.e., that its function is to connect together individual objects by means of general conceptions, got either from the analysis of these individuals, or drawn by the understanding from itself. That experience or knowledge of objects is impossible without conception, he does not yet maintain. Rather he allows, in the meantime, that it is possible, and on that hypothesis he shows that it presupposes certain *a priori* forms by which the matter of sense is determined in all our perceptions. The examination of the soundness of the hypothesis itself is reserved for the *Analytic*.²

¹ Which correction is given, § 26, note, p. 753 : Tr., p. 98.

² There is still a third sense that might be given to the contrast of Sense and Understanding : they might be regarded as different stages in the development of knowledge. But this we do not yet need to consider.

CHAPTER III.

THE ARGUMENT OF THE ÆSTHETIC.

KEEPING in view the explanations of the previous chapter, let us now see how Kant deals with knowledge in so far as it is given through sense. To understand his argument, it must be remembered, in the first place, that the question he tries to answer relates to the possibility of the attainment of knowledge by beings who are confined to their own minds, and who can know nothing, strictly speaking, but their own 'ideas,' the modes of their own consciousness; and in the second place, that he seeks to show that this possibility is dependent on another—viz., the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments. An objective consciousness is possible for us, only if we can go beyond our immediate impressions, and determine them by universal principles of relation derived from our own minds.

Are there
any *a*
priori per-
ceptions?

Are there, then, any such universal principles of relation that determine us in the *perception*, as distinguished from the *conception*, of objects? Does the mind bring with it to perception any constitutive forms that enable us to anticipate what its percep-

tions shall be? To ask this question is the same thing as to ask, whether there are any of our perceptions, or any elements of our perceptions, that are independent of sensation? For in sensation we are passive—we wait for something to affect us—and in the mere constitution of our sense as capable of affection, there is, so far as we can see, no necessity for its being affected. We cannot anticipate anything that depends on the actual affection of our sensibility, nor can we, when affected, assert that we shall be affected again in the same way. Whenever therefore we can make any universal assertions as to objects presented through sense, whenever we can say of such objects that they must be such and such, our assertions must, it seems, be based on the very nature of our own sensibility, and not on the nature of the objects affecting it. For such knowledge is in the widest sense anticipatory,—it is knowledge, not of what is given or has been given, but knowledge of what must always be given. Therefore, if such knowledge exists, it is necessarily knowledge based on the constitution or form of sense.

Now, even when we eliminate from our idea of an object all general conceptions, such as the conceptions of cause or substance, and when we regard it simply as an object of perception, it still preserves a certain determination that does not belong to any mere sensation or feeling. For an object of perception is one which is presented to us as *here* in a particular part of space, and *now* at a particular point of time; or, at least, if it be merely a state of our consciousness, as *now* at a particular part of time—that is, it is determined in space and time, or at least in time, with reference to other objects. And

these determinations, as will be manifest when we examine their nature, are not derived from any sensation, though they immediately attach themselves to all the objects of sense as such. If perception be the faculty that apprehends the individual, it necessarily apprehends it as occupying a definite position of space, when it is an external object; and whether it be an external object or a state of the mind, it apprehends it as occupying a definite time. Yet time and space are not given in sensation. They are not the sensational matter of perception, but something that "makes it possible for us to represent all parts of that matter as arranged in certain relations to each other;" and this we may fairly call the form of perception.¹

Now, as we have already observed, there are two ways in which the manifold matter given by the different senses is arranged. On the one hand, it is arranged as in an external world, a world which is different from the mind that thinks it, and is supposed to exist independently of the train of our thoughts or perceptions. Such a world is a world *in space*. On the other hand, the matter of sense is arranged as in an inner world, as occupying a certain place in the series of states that constitute our inner life. Such a world is a world *in time*. Time and space are therefore respectively the forms of inner and outer perception. We cannot perceive anything as existing *without* us, *i.e.*, independent of the train of perceptions, feelings, etc., which constitute our life without localising it, *i.e.*, putting it in a certain relation of externality to other things in space; nor can we perceive anything as *within us* as forming part

¹ *Æsthetic*, § 1: Tr., p. 21.

of the train of our perceptions and feelings without dating it, or placing it in a certain relation to other states of the self in time. Lastly, as we cannot perceive space as in time, or time as in space, so we cannot confuse, but must necessarily distinguish the inner and the outer life. Yet as our perceptions of outer things are at the same time represented as states of our consciousness, they fall indirectly under the form of inner sense.

Now, what *are* Time and Space? Are they substances? Are they qualities or relations of things that would exist in themselves whether they were perceived by us or no? Or, finally, are they conditions or forms of our perceptions of things, *i.e.*, are they ways in which we are obliged to regard things because of the character of our perceiving faculty? What has been already said points to the last answer as the true one, but in order to arrive at a satisfactory settlement of the question, we must give both a *metaphysical* and *transcendental* exposition of space and time. In other words, we must first show from a consideration of their nature, that they are *a priori*, and what kind of *a priori*; and then, in the second place, we must prove that the view of them we have thus obtained is the only view that is consistent with their relation to objective knowledge or experience.

Different theories of the nature of Space and Time.

The metaphysical exposition involves two main questions, first, whether space and time are *a priori* or *a posteriori*, involved in the nature of the subject, or resulting from impression made upon it from without; and, secondly, whether they are conceptions or perceptions, products of understanding or of sense. Now to answer the first of these questions, we have

Space and Time are *a priori*.

to consider (1) that the ideas of time and space are *logically prior* to experience. For experience must be internal or external, of the inner or the outer world. But to perceive anything externally is to perceive it as standing in a relation of externality to something else, either as *out of me, i.e.*, occupying a different part of space from that which my body occupies; or *out of other things, i.e.*, occupying a different part of space from them. But such localisation of objects with reference to each other presupposes space *in* which the localisation is made. Again, to perceive anything internally, is to perceive it in time. For I cannot determine anything as a state of my mind, unless I relate it to, yet distinguish it from, other states of my consciousness, as preceding or following them; in other words, I must date it in relation to the other states. But this, again, presupposes time as that *in* which the states are arranged in definite connexion with each other. (It is to be observed in passing that Kant is not here contending that the forms of perception are in time prior to any other perceptions; in fact, to do so would have been absurd for any one who held time itself to be a form of perception. What he means is simply that the perception of objects as *in time* and space, from the mere logical relations of the ideas, implies and presupposes time and space themselves. Kant is probably thinking of Leibnitz, as well as of Hume; for, to both, time and space were relations of objects, which presupposed the objects related; and what he says is simply that the truth is just the reverse of this. Space and time are the presupposition of all determinations of objects in inner and outer experience, and cannot therefore be secondary to,

or dependent on, the apprehension of these objects.¹

But (2) may not time and space be prior to the apprehension of objects, and yet, as Hume maintained, derived from sensation? May they not be the first ideas got from sensation? To this Kant answers, that such a derivation of time and space is impossible, because they are not only prior to all experience, but also inseparable from our intelligence. We cannot in thought abolish either the one or the other, though we may think away all objects existing in either. We can conceive space emptied of objects, but we cannot conceive of the non-existence of space: we can conceive that nothing should occur, but we cannot conceive of the non-existence of time. Time and space, therefore, are *a priori*—i.e., they are grounded on the nature of our faculties, and not in the nature of the objects, that may be presented through them. (Here again we must remark that Kant does not mean that space and time could have been apprehended without any experience, which indeed it is essential to his position to deny. But he means that space and time belong to that 'organic plan,' as we have called it,

¹ It is because he misses the exact point which Kant is here proving, that Ueberweg accuses Kant of reasoning in a circle. Kant is not yet proving the *a priori* nature of space and time, or he is proving it only on the hypothesis (to be further verified in the next paragraph) that time and space are not sensations. Cf. Cohen (p. 7), whose statement here is very good, though it perhaps adds a little to that which Kant has distinctly expressed. It is true, as Hölder (p. 11) observes, that Kant states the first point as if he were proving already, not only *priority*, but also *a-priority*, when he says that "Space is no empirical conception abstracted from outer experience." But the proof is incomplete, unless we exclude the idea that time and space are given in sensation, and this no doubt is the reason why Kant adds the second argument.

of experience, which is involved in the nature of our intelligence. This he proves by the fact that while we can think away all objects and events, space and time still persist, and will not be suppressed even in thought. Kant was afterwards to show more fully, that *all* the parts in the *a priori* plan of experience are so related to each other, that we cannot suppress any one of them without suppressing them all. It is true that he shows also at the same time, that the consciousness of objects as such, though not of any particular object, is a part of this plan; which would involve a limitation of the above statement that we can think away all objects. We must, however, remember that Kant is still arguing on the supposition that objects can be given as such in sense perception apart from any activity of conception.)

Space and Time are perceptions, not conceptions.

But if space and time are elements contributed by the mind itself, it still remains to be determined to what faculty of mind we are to attribute them. Are they perceptions, or conceptions? That they are the former is proved (3) by their individuality and (4) by their infinity. If space (and what we say of space holds good of time also) were a *conception*, it must be general, and not individual, abstract, and not concrete. To take the first, (3) space is *not* general, for, if so, it would express only the *common element* in all spaces; or if we conceived it as a whole, it would be a collective, and not an individual, whole. But we do not arrive at the idea of space either by generalisation from, or by combination of, particular spaces: on the contrary, we determine particular spaces by cutting off portions from the one all-embracing space. Space, therefore, is an individual whole, which is ideally prior to its parts, and is pre

supposed in them. But an individual can be given only in perception; and in this case, in a *a priori* perception. An *a priori* perception, therefore, is the basis of all our conceptions, not only of space as a whole, but also of every particular space: for we do not get our conception of lines and figures in space by analysis of our perceptions of objects, but by an ideal movement of construction, in which we ourselves draw limits and construct figures in it.

Lastly (4), Space is not abstract but concrete; for it is 'represented as an infinite whole.' The moment we apprehend space as an object, it is determined for us as a quantity which has no limit, and the content of which we can never exhaust. We can go on *ad infinitum* to determine parts and relations in it, just as we go on adding to our conception of an object of sense by closer inspection of it. Now "such limitlessness of progress can only be given in perception: for no mere conception of relations could carry with it such a principle of their infinity."¹ For, as we have remarked before, in a conception, the parts are always definite and limited in number. We may think of it as a genus that comprehends an infinity of species and individuals *under* it; but we cannot think of it as containing an infinite number of conceptions *in* it. It is no infinite storehouse from which you may always get new materials. Only perception, which presents objects to us in their concrete individuality, can open up an unlimited possibility of their continuous determination.²

¹ This expression is from the first edition of the *Critique*, p. 36.

² In the last two paragraphs I have somewhat expanded Kant's statement, but not, I think, added anything not involved in it. The

What is
meant by
forms of
percep-
tion?

The metaphysical exposition of space and time has brought us to the conclusion that they are *a priori* perceptions which we cannot suppress even in thought, and which are the forms of all other perceptions. Were it not that the point has often been misunderstood, it would seem unnecessary to explain that form does not here mean a receptacle into which certain things, which have previously a definite character of their own, are introduced, and by which that character is in some degree changed. We may indeed call them changed, if we look to what they would be to merely sensitive beings who had no such forms of sense; but we must remember that sensations as such have no character for an intelligence. They are in themselves formless, and they cannot become objects either of inner or outer experience till they are formed. Whether anything more than these forms of perception is required to make them into such objects, Kant does not yet consider.

✓
The tran-
scendental
exposition.

In the 'transcendental' exposition, Kant reaches the culminating point of his argument, and shows what is the special value for knowledge of the *a priori* forms of perception. In it he seeks to prove (1) that there is a great department of science which is based on these ideas of space and time; and (2) that his own theory of the nature of these ideas explains, and is the only theory that explains, the

contrast between the perception, in which the individual is given in its complete determinateness, and the conception, which is made up of a definite number of marks, is assumed throughout. Yet Kant can scarcely avoid indicating that the individual is so determined only by a progressive process, and that the completeness of its determination is a merely ideal presupposition. But we cannot as yet stop to explain the nature of this process, nor its presupposed infinity of progress.

possibility of such science. As to the first point, it is almost self-evident that the mathematical sciences start from the ideas of space and time. "Geometry has for its basis the pure perception of space; even Arithmetic produces its conceptions of number by the successive addition of units in time; and, at any rate, no one will deny that pure Mechanics would be unable to produce its conceptions of motion except by means of the idea of time."¹ But though based on the ideas of space and time, these sciences are not developed by mere analysis of these ideas. They are, on the contrary, the products of a long process of synthesis, by which new elements have been, and are constantly being, added to the ideas from which these sciences started. But this synthesis is possible only on the supposition that time and space are perceptions of sense, to which, therefore, we can return again and again to add to our conceptions, just as we return to look at an object in order to add to the conception carried away from our previous perception of it. Again, this synthesis is *a priori*, for if it were *a posteriori* we could not explain the necessity and universality that attaches to it. Lastly, space and time are not only *a priori* perceptions, but they are the very forms of all perception. For if they were not, how could sciences based upon them add to our knowledge of the objects of perception? How otherwise were it possible that subjective ideas, ideas that have no root in actual experience, but only in the constitution of the faculties of perception, should yet be objective in their application—*i.e.*, so related to experience that whatever is demonstrated

¹ *Proleg.*, § 10, p. 38: Tr., p. 45. 'Even Arithmetic'—*i.e.*, Arithmetic abstract though it is.

of them holds good of all empirical objects? The Mathematician, taking his start from the pure perceptions of space and time, goes on freely constructing figures in space without any reference to experience, and demonstrating the properties of such figures. And he is sure that, not only the special figures he uses in his diagram, or the figures he constructs in his imagination, will have these properties, but that he has been, by this purely *a priori* process, discovering universal truths of experience. Thus, he anticipates empirical perception in his pure perception, and that with apodeictic certainty. How can this be? How can any one perceive *a priori*? Obviously only if time and space, on the pure perception of which he basis his results, are the forms of all sensible perceptions. Otherwise, we might indeed imagine Geometry as a complex and self-consistent system of ideas, but it would be a mere elaborate piece of fancy, a creation of imagination without any objective validity. But if these are the forms under which we necessarily perceive inward and outward phenomena, then it is obvious that these phenomena must agree with the forms, and not only with them, but also with all the results of mathematical and mechanical sciences, in so far as these results are based on them.

It is not a complete deduction of Time and Space.

(In this 'transcendental exposition' one point seems to be wanting which Kant includes in the idea of a 'transcendental deduction.' It is proved that the objective validity of mathematics presupposes that time and space are the forms of sense; but it is not yet proved that it is only through *a priori* synthesis according to such forms that there can exist for us an objective world of experience at

all. Yet the full meaning of the Kantian principle cannot be seen, nor Hume's derivation of necessity from empirical association precluded, till it has been shown that there is no experience of objects, and indeed that no objects of experience are possible, except through such synthesis. But as Kant still goes upon the supposition that time and space can be given as objects in mere sense, he does not yet find it necessary to deny that other objects may be given as such in sensation, subject only to the conditions of space and time. The correction in both cases comes in the *Analytic*. It is desirable for us, however, to keep this in mind, as otherwise the full bearing of the *Æsthetic* cannot be seen.)

We are now able to answer the question with which we started. Time and space are not real things or objective realities; neither are they any qualities, relations, or determinations of such things. 'For neither absolute nor relative determinations of things can be perceived in anticipation of the existence of the things to which they belong.' Until something actually affects us, and so is presented to the mind, there is nothing to know, no object for knowledge; and what is known in anticipation of such affection, cannot be more than the constitution of the subject. Space, therefore, is simply the form of external sense, and hence the formal condition of all external phenomena. Time, in like manner, is simply the form of internal sense, and hence the form of all phenomena whatever: immediately of internal phenomena, but mediately also of external phenomena: for, as already indicated, all our perceptions, whether their objects be internal

Time and Space are empirically real, and transcendently ideal.

or external, come, as determinations or states of our mind, under the inner sense, and are subjected to its conditions. But, while we say that time and space are the conditions of phenomena, as they are presented to our mind through sense, we must always remember that they tell us nothing of the nature of things in themselves. If we abstract altogether from our faculties of perception and their peculiarities, time and space are nothing. They are but subjective conditions of *human* perception, and human perception is always sensuous. They tell us, therefore, nothing of what things are, independently of our senses. Hence we cannot say that all *things* are in time and space, but only that all *phenomena* are in time, and all *external phenomena* in space. We hold, therefore, that time and space are *empirically real*, i. e., that they have objective validity in relation to things as objects of sensuous experience, but we hold, at the same time, that they are *transcendentally ideal*, i. e., that they have no objective validity, no validity in relation to things in themselves as they are regarded by reason, apart from the constitution of the sensibility through which they are apprehended.

Finally, it is to be observed, that time and space are the *only* perceptions we have that are thus subjective in their origin, and objective in their validity, the only perceptions that are *a priori* and yet empirically real. We must not, therefore, think of illustrating the ideality of space and time by the subjective character of other determinations of objects derived from sense, such as those of colour, taste, and smell. Such determinations are

subjective, but they have no ideality. They are merely subjective sensations and not perceptions. The colour of a ribbon, the taste of a wine, the smell of a rose, are not objective determinations of the ribbon, the wine, and the rose, regarded even as phenomena: but they are due to the special character and state of sense in the subject that perceives them. They may be different in different persons, or in the same persons at different times. They do not, if we may use the expression, belong to the *phenomena in themselves*, but are accidentally added as effects of our particular organisation in its connection with them. They are not *a priori* perceptions, but dependent on actual sensation. Hence, apart from experience, we cannot anticipate the character of any taste, or smell, or colour. But space and time are pure forms of perception, which contain in themselves nothing of sensational impressions, nothing that is empirical; and hence we represent, and must be able to represent, to ourselves all their possible determinations, without any aid from experience.¹

This doctrine of the empirical reality and transcendental ideality of space and time may be confirmed by contrasting it with the only two other possible doctrines as to their nature—the doctrine maintained by English philosophers like Clarke, and the doctrine maintained by the school of Leibnitz. The former of these is the doctrine generally supported by mathematical physicists, that space and time exist in reality independent of anything else. In this doctrine we are obliged to burden ourselves with the idea of two eternal and infinite existences,

Contrast of this doctrine with the theories of Clarke and Leibnitz.

¹ *Kritik*, p. 48 : Tr., p. 35.

which properly are not real things, but mere forms of the relations of things; and which, though thus their sole meaning and purport is to contain things, have an existence independent of them. For space and time, if we abstract from their special determination by objects, are mere potentialities or possibilities of relations. Space is the possibility of an order of coexistence which is involved in the constitution of an outer sense. Time is the possibility of an order of succession and coexistence which is involved in the constitution of inner sense. If, then, we translate such forms of relation into objective realities, we are immediately involved in great difficulty. We need not wonder that the 'good Berkeley' was driven to treat matter as an illusion because he conceived it to be conditioned by such a self-contradictory existence as a transcendently real or objective space. Nay, if we adopted his premises, we should be driven to carry his argument a step farther. For the same principle would lead us to [treat our own existence also as illusory] since it is conditioned by so contradictory a thing as a transcendently real or objective time.] What recommended this theory to men like Newton and Clarke was that it justified the application of mathematical doctrine to the objects of experience. But this advantage brings with it an insoluble difficulty in regard to all other objects that are beyond the range of experience. If time and space be real things and real conditions of all other things, they must be conditions of the super-sensible as well as of the sensible. And then we fall into the "dangerous dilemma" spoken of by Berkeley, of thinking [either that space is God, or that there

is something besides God which is eternal, uncreated, infinite, indivisible, immutable.”¹ Theologians tell us that the perceptions of God are not limited by conditions of time and space. But why should they *not* be so limited if time and space are real existences, and the conditions of all things? God must know things under their real conditions. If time and space be real, they must be conditions at once of the divine existence and the divine knowledge. Other difficulties will be noticed when we come to consider the antinomy between the conception of the world as an absolute whole, as it presents itself to reason, and the conception of the world as an existence in space and time, as it is given in experience.²

The other theory, maintained by Leibnitz, and adopted for the most part by the metaphysical physicists, is that time and space are only confused ideas of the relations of things in co-existence and succession. Such ideas must of course be derived from experience, and cannot be prior to it, for it is impossible that we should empirically know the relations of things unless we first know the things to which these relations attach themselves. They must be simply the results of abstraction, represented by imagination in a generality, which arises from the omission of the limiting conditions under which they are presented in experience. This view has one recommendation in its favour. It enables us to understand why the conditions of time and space

¹ *Principles of Human Knowledge*, § 117. *Kritik*, p. 719 : Tr., p. 42. Cf. p. 47 : Tr., p. 34.

² As illustrating these remarks, it is worth while to compare the controversy between Leibnitz and Clarke. Erdmann's *Leibnitz*, p. 746.

should be limited to phenomena, and should have no validity in relation to things that cannot be presented in experience. But, at the same time that it explains the limitation of the truth of Mathematics to objects of experience, it takes away all explanation of the *a priori* synthesis which that science involves. For if mathematical judgments are empirical, how can they be made in anticipation of experience, and with a necessity and universality which experience could never justify? and how should the things of experience necessarily conform to the conditions thus determined? Thus the positive argument for our view is strengthened by a negative argument which shows the impossibility of explaining the facts by any other view. And not only can we repel the objection of those who maintain that the doctrine of the ideality of space and time reduces all things to illusion, but we may boldly turn the tables on them. For the only other theories of time and space that have been or can be proposed, end in turning the most evident of sciences, Mathematics, into a mere arbitrary product of imagination, or save its truth at the expense of raising time and space into absolute conditions of things, and thereby ultimately, as Berkeley feared, putting matter in place of God.

Transcendental
Idealism
alone
saves the
truth of
Geometry,

“So far is it from being the case that my doctrine of the ideality of space and time turns the whole world of sense into an illusion, that rather it is the only means of justifying the application to real objects of one of the most important bodies of truth—viz., that which is contained in the *a priori* science of Mathematics. It is the only doctrine which prevents all mathematical science from being regarded

as mere illusion. For how, except on my theory, could it be shown that the perceptions of time and space, borrowed as they are from no experience, and presented *a priori* in our minds, are more than arbitrary creations of imagination or chimeras of the brain, to which no object corresponds, or at least, adequately corresponds, and that consequently Geometry, which is founded on such perceptions, is not a science of illusion? When, however, it is observed that the objects of sense are mere phenomena, the validity of mathematical truth in relation to all such objects becomes at once obvious and unquestionable."

"Again, it is so far from being the case that my philosophy, when it treats all that is presented by sense as phenomenal, must needs turn all the truth of experience into mere illusion, that, rather it is the only means of obviating that transcendental illusion by which hitherto Metaphysic has been deceived and misled into a [childish hunt after bubbles.] For so long as philosophy mistook phenomena, which are merely [relative to the mind] for things in themselves, so long it was obliged to extend the conditions of the former to the latter, and thereby it fell into those remarkable self-contradictions of Reason which are exposed in the *Dialectic*, and which disappear at once before the single remark that judgments based on conditions of phenomena hold good so long as they are applied within the limits of experience, but that when they are carried beyond those limits they become transcendent and produce nothing but mere illusion."¹

And
secures us
against the
illusions
of Meta-
physic.

The only method, then, by which we can steer

¹ *Proleg.*, Part I., Remark 3, p. 49 : Tr., p. 59.

our course safely between the opposite dangers that beset us, is that which we have already described. The *a priori* doctrines based on the perceptions of time and space are not illusory, because phenomena are more than mere contingent affections of the subject, though less than things in themselves. They are more than mere contingent affections of the subject, because they are subjected to certain necessary conditions that belong to the very nature of his faculties, and not to the nature of the things presented to him. But it was natural that those who were repelled by the notion of the *transcendental* reality of space and time, and who did not see how to prove their phenomenal or *empirical* reality, should be led to treat phenomena as mere [subjective appearances or illusions]. For he who looks for absolute objectivity or transcendental reality in what is merely phenomenal, will soon be led to regard the phenomenal as illusory. Seeking a higher reality or objectivity in experience than is to be found there, he will neglect the reality that is to be found, or he will take what he does find to be purely subjective in *both* senses of the word; the empirical will be to him the affection of the subject and nothing more. But he who understands that phenomena, as perceived, are more than sensations—who understands, in short, that they are perceived under conditions of space and time, and subject to all the universal or necessary laws, which mathematics discovers to be involved in these conditions, will see already (what will become clearer afterwards, when we have considered the intellectual as well as the sensational conditions of experience,) that the relativity of phenomena to the faculties of

the subject does not necessarily imply that they are merely subjective.

“Time and space, with all that they contain, are not things in themselves, or properties of things in themselves, but merely their appearance to the subject.) So far I go along with the Idealists. But they, and specially Berkeley, regarded space and all its determinations as empirically given—*i. e.*, as known through sense on the same terms as the phenomena in space. I, however, take my stand at the outset on this, that space (and time also, which Berkeley overlooked), with all their determinations, can become known to us *a priori*, because they are the pure forms of sensibility that make all its perceptions, and hence all phenomenal appearances possible. Now, as there can be no truth without necessary and universal laws as its criteria, it follows that experience, as with Berkeley it rested on no *a priori* principles, could have no criteria of its truth. Whereas with me, time and space (in combination with the pure conceptions of the understanding) prescribe their laws *a priori* to all possible experience, and thus furnish a secure criterion by which we can distinguish truth or experience from mere subjective illusion.”¹

Time and Space become criteria of empirical reality.

This doctrine would have met with less opposition had it been confined to the outer sense only, and its form of Space. More objections suggest themselves to its application to the inner sense, and its form of Time. Two especially are mentioned by Kant in the *Æsthetic*.

Objections to the ideality of Time.

The first is the objection of Lambert, that the

¹ *Proleg. Append.*, pp. 154-5. Kant here states the point alluded to in p. 242 as wanting to the transcendental exposition.

denial of the absolute reality of Time involves the denial of the reality of change. But, he argues, the reality of change cannot be doubted, for even though an Idealist should deny all outward phenomena and their change, he must at least admit that there is a continual change in the states of his own mind. Now change presupposes time, therefore time must be real. To this Kant has a ready answer that time *is* real, *i.e.*, real as the form of all internal perception. But this implies only *empirical* reality, *i.e.*, only reality for the objects of sense in relation to the mind. Nor, indeed, is it denied, that there is a deeper and absolute reality behind that phenomenal appearance we call change. But all that we can say about it is, that if we ourselves, or any other being, were to perceive in its absolute reality that which now presents itself to us under the aspect of a change, *i.e.*, if we should perceive it apart from the conditions of sense-perception, we should perceive something not in time, and therefore not changing. But what that something is we do not know.¹

The other objection, which indeed has been partly hinted at in the statement of this one, is more important. It is that Time is the form of the *inner life*. Now it is supposed by Des Cartes and others that, while external things are known by us mediately, the states of consciousness that constitute our inner life are immediately present to us. Hence, while they would readily admit the ideality of space as the form of external perception, they would be inclined to maintain the reality of time as the form of internal perception. But all this rests on a mistake as to the nature of our self-knowledge. The

¹ *Kritik*, p. 45 : Tr., p. 32.

states of our mind are really known to us in the same way as are facts of the external world, *i.e.*, as phenomena, and not as things in themselves. In the former case, as in the latter, nothing is an object of thought to us except so far as it is *given* in sense. The inner world which we know, is like the outer, phenomenal, not noumenal. The pure consciousness of self indeed is independent of sense, but that consciousness only tells us *that* we are, and not *what* we are. But of this distinction we shall speak more fitly afterwards. Here it is only mentioned to preclude the possibility of a confusion between the phenomenal and the real.

The conclusion of the *Æsthetic*, then, is that Space and Time are pure perceptions, and the forms of all our perceptions, that therefore they explain to us the possibility of synthetic *a priori* judgments in regard to all objects of experience, but that such judgments can have no validity in relation to objects not given in Experience.

CHAPTER IV.

CRITICISM OF THE ÆSTHETIC.

THUS far we have followed Kant's own exposition, only attempting to give greater clearness and closer connexion to the expression where that seemed possible. Kant's early training in the Wolffian school had developed in him a scholastic tendency to an unnecessary minuteness of division, which sometimes interferes with our apprehension of the unity of his thought; and there is some advantage gained simply by freeing his argument from the artificial breaks in its continuity. It now remains for us, in the first place, to defend the theory from misunderstanding where it has been and is most liable to be misunderstood; and in the second place, to show wherein it is defective,—which will naturally lead us to enquire how far the defect is supplied in the *Analytic*.

General
argument
of the
Æsthetic.

The whole argument of both these parts of the *Critique* turns upon two relations—the relation of conception and perception, and the relation of object and subject. In discussing the former relation, Kant thinks mainly of Leibnitz and Wolff; in discussing the latter relation, mainly of Berkeley and

Hume. The sketch of his mental development which we have given, may serve to explain how the critical philosophy was developed out of the conflict with these two schools. That conflict had two distinct stages—for Kant's struggle with the German dogmatism was well-nigh over ere his struggle with the sensationalist scepticism of this country had begun. In other words, he had come to the conclusion that thought cannot add to our knowledge, but can only analyse the data of perception, and that perception alone sets us face to face with the individual reality in all its determinations, before he had been awakened by Hume from his 'dogmatic slumbers,' and taught to ask the question, How am I, an individual subject, through my own sensation, the passing state of my own consciousness, to apprehend objective reality? Now, the *Critique* follows in its arrangement the order of Kant's intellectual progress, and therefore it is only in the *Analytic* that we reach the peculiar critical point of view, while the *Æsthetic* represents, at least in its main outlines, the ideas of a time when Kant did not yet doubt that sense of itself enables us, and that it alone enables us, to acquire and increase our knowledge of objects. At that time the only question that could arise, was in relation to the *kind* of perception through which in different cases objective reality is presented to us; and it was assumed that, if there is any *a priori* element in knowledge, it must necessarily be an *a priori* perception. Accordingly, in the essay *On the ground of the distinction of regions in Space*, we found Kant already maintaining in substance, if not in exact words, that besides the sensible perceptions there is an idea of space, which is the *a priori* form

of external perception.¹ Now, as we have already seen, the *Æsthetic* proceeds upon this view. It does not yet question the fact that objects can be presented to us in sense without aid from the understanding: it seeks only to show that the perceptions of time and space are logically prior to the perceptions of objects, and that they cannot be empirically given. We may therefore sum up its argument thus:—We can have knowledge of objects only in inner or outer experience—that is to say, only when we represent them as determined in space and time. Space and time, therefore, are presupposed in the knowledge of objects; and if they were empirical perceptions, they would need to be prior in time to all others. But the ‘determinations of objects cannot be empirically given before the objects themselves are given;’ therefore the priority of space and time must be taken as an ideal priority—that is, priority of mental forms or conditions of perception. This view is confirmed by the fact that when in thought we separate time and space from the objects of sense, and consider them for themselves, we are able *by their means alone* to make many necessary judgments concerning the things of experience: thus, even in time, anticipating the particular data of experience. Nay, we are able to construct whole sciences, which, though based purely on this abstract representation of time and space before the inward eye, yet furnish us with the most certain and exact knowledge of empirical objects.

¹ “Der absolute Raum kein Gegenstand der aussern Empfindung, sondern ein Grundbegriff ist, der alle dieselbe erst möglich macht.” V., p. 301. The terms are not yet used exactly, but the idea is there.

We have already pointed out how this argument falls short of that which Kant calls a 'Transcendental Deduction'¹ of space and time. Such a Deduction must seek, not merely to prove that time and space are *a priori* conditions of the knowledge of objects; and sources of necessary truths in relation to them; but, also, that it is only *through* these conditions that objects as such exist for us at all. But to carry out this argument it would have been necessary to break down the presupposition of the *Æsthetic*, that individual objects are given to us as such through sense, and this Kant refuses, as yet, to do. He mentions, indeed, the distinction of sensation and perception, but he refers them both to the receptivity of sense, and he takes, as yet, no notice of the activities of imagination and understanding, which are implied in the transition from the one to the other. When, however, we have once realised that what is given in sense is, strictly speaking, not perception, not the idea of the individual object as such, but simply sensation; and that sensations are 'perishing existences' without relation to anything but themselves, the problem of the *a priori* conditions of knowledge takes a new meaning. We have then to find in the necessary principles of sense and understanding, not merely one kind of knowledge which precedes and qualifies all other kinds, but the ultimate reason why there exists for us such a thing as knowledge, or an object of knowledge at all.

The *Æsthetic*, then, is to a certain extent accommodated to the popular point of view, according to which sense presents objects to us, and understanding

It falls short of a Transcendental Deduction.

Hence its reply to Hume is incomplete.

¹ And it is for this reason, perhaps, that he calls it only a 'transcendental exposition.'

analyses them. If this be not kept in view, or if this part of Kant's work be taken as expressing his ultimate thought about space and time, many misunderstandings are likely to arise. Thus, the possibility of explaining the *a priori conditions* of experience as *results* of experience, is absolutely precluded only when it is shown that it is through these *a priori* conditions alone that any experience of objects is possible. Hume is not fully answered till it is proved that sensation affords him no standing-ground whatever, apart from the *a priori* conditions of perception, from which to explain these conditions; for the necessity of the *a priori* judgments, based on the ideas of time and space, may still be construed as a subjective result of association, so long as it is not shown that such necessities are the only ground for objective judgments. But when it is proved that such necessity alone makes knowledge possible, the scepticism that would explain it away may easily be shown to be suicidal.

Controversy as to the transcendental reality of Time and Space.

Again, so long as the objectivity of experience is not shown to be based on the *a priori* principles of sense and understanding, so long the full meaning and necessity of Kant's assertion that time and space are determinations of phenomena, and not of things in themselves, cannot be appreciated. Empirical reality cannot be clearly understood as absolutely excluding transcendental reality, till it is proved that transcendently ideal principles *alone* can be the source and justification of empirical reality. This may be illustrated by reference to a controversy which has excited much interest in Germany. In his *Historical Contributions to Philosophy*, Trendelenburg made a plausible criticism on

the doctrine of the *Æsthetic*. Kant, he said, had confined himself to a choice between two alternatives in a case where three views were possible. He had asserted that space and time must be either purely subjective or purely objective. And when he had proved to himself, by the necessity and universality of mathematical judgments, that they are subjective, he at once concluded that they are not objective: or, what is the same thing, that their objective value extends merely to phenomena. But why should they not be both subjective and objective? Why should they not be *a priori* possessions of the mind, and yet at the same time elements of knowledge, not merely of phenomena, but of things in themselves? Kant's dilemma is defective, as it does not cover the whole field of possibility.

Now, it is possible to meet this argument even from the point of view of the *Æsthetic* alone, and to show that it involves a complete misconception as to Kant's attitude towards the problem of knowledge: but the answer becomes much clearer if we anticipate the point of view of the *Analytic*. Kant, as we have already said, met the difficulty into which philosophy had been brought by Berkeley and Hume, not like the Scottish school, by a simple re-assertion of the ordinary common-sense belief in the real existence of the things we perceive, but by admitting the impossibility of our knowing any *absolute* objectivity, yet at the same time setting up a new *relative* objectivity within the circle to which knowledge is thus confined. Things in themselves are, *ex vi termini*, not our ideas; they are, at the most, the unknown causes of these ideas. They cannot be presented to us at all, for their qualities

Kant's
view of
objectivity
as resting
on the
a priori
determin-
ation
of Time
and Space.

“cannot pass over into our minds:” or even, if we admit such a possibility, they can be presented to us only through sensations. But sensations are fleeting states of consciousness, which, taken by themselves, have no reference to each other, or to anything more permanent than themselves. If sensations, therefore, are so interpreted, that they give rise to that knowledge of an objective world we call experience, it must be by the aid of principles of synthesis, which the mind itself brings with it. Now, these mental principles are, as will be afterwards shown, simply principles of the determination of objects in space and time. Hence the necessary judgments of mathematics, and all necessary judgments based on the ideas of space and time, are criteria of objective reality: that is to say, we determine the content of our perceptions as objective in virtue of their conformity to such necessary judgments, and would *not* determine it as objective, if it did not so conform. Objectivity, in short, in the only sense in which it can be predicated of phenomena, is just this conformity.¹

Impossibility of combining transcendental with empirical reality.

Now, when Trendelenburg asks whether space and time may not be ‘both subjective and objective,’ this is equivalent, in Kantian phrase, to the question, whether space and time may not be both empirically and transcendently real. Can we suppose for a moment, in consistency with Kantian principles, that the objective world of phenomena, which for us is developed out of sensation, by means of the *a priori* principles of understanding applied to the forms of sense, is *also* a world of things in

¹ *Prolegomena, Appendix*, pp. 154-5, quoted in the last chapter, p. 251.

themselves, that exists without any relation to our understanding or our sense at all? Is it possible that the object which we determine for ourselves *in* consciousness, exactly corresponds to an object which exists independent of our determination *out of* consciousness? The absurdity of such a supposition, on Kantian principles, is obvious. Setting aside an absolute Idealism, which would deny the dualism of thought and being, and thus get rid of things in themselves altogether, we can give meaning to the assertion, that empiric reality may also be transcendental reality, only by reviving the old hypothesis of pre-established harmony: and we do not need to know much of Kant to understand what he would think of that kind of explanation. In fact, he has told us explicitly what he thinks of it. "I would like," he says, "to know what I should need to assert in order to avoid the idealising of space. I would need to say, not only that the idea of space completely corresponds with the relation which our sensibility has to objects, which is what I *have* said, but that it is in all points like the objects themselves. But this is an assertion to which I can attach no meaning whatever, any more than I attach meaning to the assertion, that the sensation of redness is *like* that quality of cinnabar which excites the sensation in me."¹

The 'third course' of Trendelenburg was, therefore, not overlooked by Kant: it was excluded by the necessity of his logic. To Kant, and all who like Kant, hold to the existence of things in themselves, the empirically real must be transcendently ideal, and conversely the transcendent-

Double meaning (subject and object in Kant.

¹ *Prolegomena*, § 13, Note 2: Tr., p. 56.

ally real must be empirically ideal. For if the external object is external, in the sense of Des Cartes, as being *out of thought* or consciousness, then it cannot be known, or it can be known only by a miracle. On the other hand, if the external object is an object we can know, it must be *within* consciousness: and within consciousness an object can exist for us only through the determination of the matter of sense by *a priori* principles of understanding. From this point of view, therefore, Kant makes a double distinction between objective and subjective. The absolutely or merely objective is the thing in itself; the absolutely or merely subjective is sensation, the isolated and momentary affection of the subject as such. But neither of these can explain knowledge and experience, for an object must relate itself to the subject ere it can be known; and a mere subjective sensation must be referred to an object ere its content can be anything whatever for intelligence. But the mere subjectivity of sensation disappears in so far as its content is determined in time and space by means of the necessary principles of understanding and imagination that are implied in this determination. In space and time, therefore, we have a subjective which is empirically objective (just because it is a necessary condition of perception involved in the very constitution of the subject), but which cannot be conceived as objective in any other sense.

If we look back at the course of English philosophy from this point of view, we can see how Kant must necessarily have regarded it. Locke, in so far as he maintained the objective reality of the primary

qualities of matter, had taught that space at least is at once empirically and transcendently real. To Berkeley, it became obvious that transcendental reality, or "matter in itself," cannot be known by us, and that our object is an object in consciousness. To him, therefore, the only reality was empirical reality. As, however, he went on to say that the *esse* of things is their *percipi*, or that the object is simply the sensation, he left no room for any transcendental ideality, and Hume had little difficulty in showing that on Berkeley's principles even empirical reality must disappear. To Hume himself there was nothing left but an empirical ideality—an illusion of knowledge produced by the association of sensational elements, which in themselves had no connexion with each other, and therefore no relation to any object. Kant, on the other hand, shows that *without* the transcendental ideality of space and time not even the illusion of knowledge can be explained, and that *if* such ideality be admitted, it carries with it the admission of the other principles, and particularly the principle of causality, against which Hume had directed his scepticism. Kant, therefore, may be said to return to the position from which Berkeley had been logically dislodged by Hume. Yet he feels himself at liberty to speak of Berkeley as one who confused reality with illusion: a judgment which is not strictly correct, if it be meant that Berkeley did not recognise the distinction; but which is defensible on the ground that he had no right on his own principles to recognise it. On the other hand, the doctrine of Locke and of common sense, that empirical or transcendental reality are identical, or even in harmony with each other, is to Kant

an utter absurdity. To maintain it is indeed logically impossible without a complete renunciation of that absolute Dualism which he inherited from his predecessors, and which he had "never once thought of questioning."¹

Change of
Kant's
point of
view in
Analytic.

In what has been said, we have already partially anticipated the change of our point of view which becomes necessary as we pass from the *Æsthetic* to the *Analytic*. But this change we must now consider more definitely. "Objects are given in perception,"—what does Kant mean by this? According to the ordinary psychological view, it would mean that the individual object, in its complete determinateness as an individual, is presented to us in sense without any activity of thought, and that all that thought can do is to dissect or analyse it. And at first sight there is much in Kant's language that might lead us to attribute this view to him; it is in fact the provisional hypothesis from which he starts. In the earlier treatise, of which the *Æsthetic* is for the most part a reproduction, all doubt seems to be removed by the direct assertion of the *passivity* of the mind in perception. "The perception of our intelligence," Kant there says, "is always *passive*, and therefore it is possible only in so far as something is able to affect our senses. By this it is distinguished from the divine perception, which, being the cause and not the effect of its objects, is archetypal and perfectly intellectual"²—*i. e.*, it has the activity which in *our* case belongs only to thought.

¹ *Proleg.*, § 13, Remark 3, p. 51: Tr., p. 61. In one sense this is not quite true, for Kant did speak of the thing in itself as problematical, at least to the speculative reason: but it is true that he never questioned the general point of view of Dualism. But of this afterwards.

² *De Mundi*, &c., § 10; L., p. 314.

In the *Æsthetic* itself, the word 'passive' is not used, but 'receptive' seems to convey the same meaning, used as it always is in direct contrast with the 'spontaneity' of Understanding: and the whole line of argument by which it is proved that time and space are perceptions, not conceptions, is most naturally taken in the same way. Yet we must note that there are occasional expressions that prepare us for another theory. Attention is drawn to the distinction between sensation and perception, though both are attributed to sense. Sensation is said to be 'the effect of an object on the mind in so far as we are affected by it,' while perception is said to refer to an object.¹ The same unexplained difference appears in the definition of space as "the formal capacity of the subject to be affected by objects, and to acquire thereby the immediate idea or perception of them,"² and again "in the definition of sense as the capacity of acquiring ideas through the manner in which we are affected by objects."³

Now, this distinction is explained so soon as we turn to the *Analytic*. There we learn that what is attributable to sense is only an element and not a kind of knowledge, and that sensation or perception does not refer *itself* to objects, but is only so referred by the understanding. Nay, "perceptions without

Sense gives not a kind, but an element of knowledge.

¹ It is noticeable that in the *Æsthetic* Kant avoids, as far as possible, all expressions about perception that imply activity, though he introduces them freely elsewhere. Thus we hear nothing of the *a priori* construction of figures in perception by Geometry. Also in the second edition, Kant deliberately removed the remarkable expressions quoted p. 239, about the 'endless progress in the perception' of space. He probably meant the reader *so far* to take the perception as something purely given.

² *Transc. Exposition of Space*, p. 713: Tr., p. 25.

³ *Æsthetic*, § 1, p. 31: Tr., 21.

thought" would produce in us no knowledge whatever; they would be "for us, as thinking beings, as good as nothing." If we were merely sensitive creatures, "a *Gewühl*, or chaos of appearances, would fill our minds, without giving rise to any distinct apprehension of objects, such as we mean by the term experience."¹ Perhaps the clearest passage that we can quote, to show that perception in itself did not, in Kant's view, constitute anything like knowledge, is from his letter to Dr. Herz, in which he is defending himself against some objections of Maimon. There he says, that, without conceptions of the understanding, "all the data of sense would give me no idea of objects, nay, would not even enable me to attain to that unity of consciousness which is necessary for the knowledge of myself as an object of inner sense. I should not be capable even of knowing that I have these sensations, and consequently, for *me*, as an intelligent being, they would be absolutely nothing at all. It is true that if I make myself in thought into a mere animal, I can conceive these sensible ideas as carrying on their regular play in my soul, seeing that they might still be bound together by an empirical law of association, and so have influence upon feeling and desire. This I can conceive, if I suppose myself to be conscious of every single idea of sense, but not conscious, by means of the synthetic unity of apperception, of the relation of these isolated ideas to the unity of the conception of their objects; but, then I should not through these ideas have knowledge of anything, even of my own state."²

¹ *Deduction* (1st edition), part 2, § 4, p. 102: Tr. p. 203.

² XI., p. 57.

Here, then, we have a view of the data of sense very different from that which we have hitherto had before us. According to this view, sense apprehends, not the individual object, but isolated and transitory feelings unconnected with each other, and unrelated to anything more stable than themselves. But out of such mere isolated units of sensation no knowledge can be got. They cannot be determined even *as* isolated units, as 'here,' and 'now' present to the individual consciousness. For, in order to be determined as 'here' they must be referred to an object, and that object must be determined in relation to space and the other objects in space. And in order to be determined as 'now,' they must be referred to the individual self as a permanent subject whose states have a definite relation to each other in time.¹

There is a certain illusion of thought into which we very easily fall when considering this subject. It is not incorrect to say that sensation is of the individual object at a particular moment of time, and a particular point of space: αἰσθάνεται τόδε τι καὶ ποῦ καὶ νῦν. But this may be understood in two ways. It may be understood as meaning that, to us who look upon the sensitive consciousness from without, who regard the sensitive being as an individual object, related to all other objects in space, and determined by them in its successive consciousness—to us it is manifest that sensation must always be of an individual thing, at one particular moment, and in one particular place. Or it

Ambiguity of the assertion, that sensation is of the individual.

¹ It is a question we shall afterwards have to answer, whether pure sense, as such, can supply even an element of knowledge.* But this point we need not at present consider.

may be understood as meaning that the mere sensitive consciousness *itself* apprehends the object as an individual object, determined in space and time. If we adopt the former explanation, the words quoted from Aristotle express what are the limits of the individual sensitive consciousness, as these are understood by beings who are not themselves merely sensitive, but who judge of that which is immediately given in sense by relation to that which is not so given. But if we adopt the latter explanation, we really make sense transcend its own limits, and criticise itself, and we confuse the order of the world to thought, the *ordo ad universum*, with the order of the world to sense, the *ordo ad individuum*.

Can the
forms of
sense
themselves
give objec-
tivity to
sensations?

But, it may be said, does not Kant himself tell us that time and space are the forms of sense, and does not this imply that sensations as they are received arrange themselves with reference to each other in an order of coexistence and succession in one space and one time? And is it not most natural to interpret expressions like those quoted above as meaning, that the one thing necessary to turn sensations into perceptions is just the form of receptivity itself? In this way a connexion of perceptions would be established in sense itself prior to any activity of the understanding. This difficulty must be met at the outset: for, if we do not preclude any such interpretation, the argument of Kant against Hume will lose all its force. The point of that argument is, that Hume, in assuming that objects or sensations are known as succeeding each other in time, has already assumed that law of causality which he pretends by this means to explain away.

An actual connexion of perceptions in relations of time and space is what is meant by experience, and if so much were supposed to be already given in sense, there would scarcely be any need for an intervention of the understanding to give us more.

We have, therefore, to observe that what Kant says is *not*, that the forms of sense arrange its matter, but simply that they “make it *possible* for the manifold of phenomena to be arranged in certain relations.”¹ So space is called “the possibility of things being beside each other (*Möglichkeit des Beisammenseins*),” *i. e.*, it is not a ready-made whole in which things can be placed, but a form necessarily given to a certain relation which is otherwise determined. When I refer the content of my sensations to an external object, I necessarily represent each object as *out of* or *beside* some other object to which I relate it, and this implies that I place them both in space: but space is itself no principle of localisation, as is shown by the fact that I cannot localise an object with reference to space itself, but only to another object. The synthesis of the understanding is necessary to actualise space. The isolated data of sense must be connected in a particular way in the conception of an object or objects, in order that they may be referred to space, though, when this connexion is established, the object or objects *must* be referred to space. Space, indeed, when thus actualised is “represented as an infinite given whole,” in which everything is included, but this only means that everything in space is determined as part of a certain series of experiences which, by successive synthesis, I can carry on as far as I please, and which I know

¹ *Æsthetic*, § 1, p. 32: Tr. p. 22.

beforehand to be interminable.¹ Really space can never be given as a whole, for difference is essential to it, and the moment we conceive any space as a unit, we are forced to relate it to another space beyond it. Hence Kant rejects the view of the mathematical physicists, that space is a real thing that includes all other things. If space were a real thing, the relations of objects included in it to each other would be fixed by their relation to space itself: but, on the contrary, it is only when objects are determined as related to each other in certain definite ways that we find ourselves obliged to refer them to space. Space, therefore, is simply the condition under which a certain relation or connected arrangement of phenomena is possible, but does not of itself constitute any relation of things. And it is referred to sense, and not to the understanding, because, like sensation, it is a mere possibility which waits for the understanding to determine it as actual.²

When we have got thus far, we see that in the *Æsthetic* Kant has allowed himself to speak of that as actualised in sense-perception, which he afterwards confesses to be for sense a mere possibility. If we reduce sense to what really belongs to it, all that is left is a mere manifold, a series of transitory sensations without relation to each other, and hence, without relation to any object, but which yet have a certain condition attached to them that makes their content capable of being arranged by an intelligence in a world of objects in time and space. Unless, however, such an intelligence is brought to bear

¹ Cf. *Metaph. Anfangsgr. d. Naturwissenschaft*, I. 1, Remark 2; V., p. 322.

² Cf. Letter to Dr. Herz: XI., p. 29.

upon the sensations, so as to retain and connect them with each other, this possibility can never become actuality. Even the forms of time and space, if we regard them in themselves, are but forms of difference, or rather, of differentiation, which have no meaning except in relation to the integration of thought. Or, to put the same idea in Kantian language, they are but forms of the manifold as such, and the manifold, out of relation to unity, is "for a thinking being as good as nothing."

As we enter on the study of the *Analytic*, therefore, we have to strip perception of its borrowed attributes: we have to consider *in the doing*, that which the *Æsthetic* generally regards *as done*. We have to ask how the fleeting sensations can be arrested in their flux, and connected together so as to become perceptions of objects, whether in inner or outer experience: or, in other words, how a sentient subject, who is also intelligent, must determine his feelings by thought, before he can represent himself as one individual in a world of individuals, all of which are included in one space and one time, and have their successive and coexistent phases definitely determined in relation to each other. In the *Æsthetic* all this was simply supposed to be given in sense. The perception was there regarded as setting us face to face with the individual in his complete, not to say infinite, determination, which no conception can ever fully represent. Now, however, we have to recognise, that the idea of the individual is the result of a process which is ever going on in experience, and that the infinity which is attributed to it merely means that we know the process can never be completed. This has been already shown in the

Experi-
ence is
(1) a pro-
cess of
synthesis,
and (2) an
endless
process.

case of space, but it is equally true of time, and of every object of experience, known under conditions of space and time. That space, as an object of perception, is represented as an infinite whole, means only, that so soon as we represent any part of space, we must represent another space beyond it, and so we discern that we can never have experience of an end to space. We can never actually perceive the infinity of space, yet when we perceive space, *i. e.*, when we represent it as an object, we are obliged to represent it as an actual infinite. The first perception of space in short involves the determination of it as infinitely extensible, and infinitely divisible, and whenever we regard it as an object existing apart from our determination or knowledge of it, we have no resource but to regard it as infinitely extended and infinitely divided. From the same point of view, we must also think of it as having already determined *in* it, all that Geometry by its progressive construction evolves *out of it*. And the same principle applies to empirical objects, and is the true interpretation of the logical axiom that we can never 'define the individual.' Whenever we refer any of our sensations to an object, or in other words, whenever we perceive an empirical object, we necessarily regard that object as absolutely determinate, *i. e.*, negatively or positively determined in relation to all other objects, though we do not, of course, actually apprehend all this determination. In *perception*, in short, we are progressively determining an object which essentially differs from an object of *conception* in this, that it is presupposed to be infinite, because known to be inexhaustible. We must, however, distinguish between the process of

perception or experience and its object. The object, in being determined as such, is fixed as a centre for a progressive determination which can find no limit except in an absolute whole of knowledge, a whole which is supposed to be completed in the object, while to us it is incapable of completion. Thus the object as the goal of knowledge is the completely determined individual. But the perception or experience of the object is an endless process of specification, which, beginning with the most general and vague determinations, *e.g.*, with the simple reference of a sensation to an object in general, goes on to determine that object in all its particular relations, and could only end with a perfect individualisation by which that object would be at once distinguished from, and related to, the whole universe.

In this progressive perception and determination of objects, however, there are two things to be considered; one is *the idea of Totality* which guides it, and is, in fact, its moving principle; the other is *the actual process* by which additions are made to knowledge. What is the meaning and validity of this end which we are always pursuing, yet never attain, which is necessary to us as the spur of all effort and curiosity, yet which seems to hide itself from us whenever we turn the eye directly upon it, which is the necessary presupposition of all our knowledge, yet which, so far as we can see, it is impossible to verify? This is a question which we must defer for the present, and which can only be considered fully in the *Dialectic*. For the present we are concerned only with the *actual process* by which knowledge is generated and increased. And as we

From this view of it spring the problems of the *Analytic* and the *Dialectic* respectively.

have seen that sensations are but an unconnected manifold, so it is obvious that the first thing we want is a *connecting principle or principles*. Sense in itself is endless dispersion, or differentiation without integration; it is an explanation, therefore, at most, of continual change, but not of progress; for it does not bind together the phases through which it passes in reference to a permanent unity; and hence it can never generate what we call knowledge or experience. Even the *a priori* forms of Time and Space, as forms of sense, are not in themselves principles of connection, they rather offer a manifold of elements capable of being connected; nor does it make any difference that they offer those elements *a priori*. In the case of the pure and empirical conceptions alike, we must look to the understanding as the principle of synthesis, the source of the connective conceptions by which both the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* manifold of sense are connected together, and, by means of this connection, determined as objective.

Here, then, we are brought to the verge of the *Analytic*. We have found that it is necessary to consider sense as giving us less than we at first attributed to it, and therefore we must now attribute more to the understanding. Sense does not set before us the individual object as such, but merely the unconnected material out of which the individual object may be made by a combining process. The understanding, therefore, can no longer be confined to the formal business of analysing the perceptions; it must supply the principles of unity that are necessary for their production. Or, in other words,

if sense is synthetic only in the sense of supplying continually new elements to add to our previous conceptions of things, the understanding must be synthetic in the other sense of supplying the principles, whereby the new elements are bound together in one experience, or, what is the same thing, in the experience of one world.

CHAPTER V.—

GENERAL VIEW OF THE ANALYTIC.

The two
factors of
know-
ledge.

KANT, as we have shown in the last chapter, was obliged to make a new beginning in the *Analytic*. He had hitherto treated perception as a kind of knowledge: he now treats it as merely an element of knowledge, which is incomplete and meaningless in itself. He therefore states at the outset, what he afterwards to exhibit in detail, that knowledge is the product of two factors, which are contributed by sense and understanding respectively, and neither of which is in itself sufficient for the result. "There are two sources in the mind from which all our knowledge is derived. The first is our capacity of having mental representations awakened in us (our passive receptivity of impressions). The second is our faculty of knowing an object by means of these impressions (our spontaneity in originating *conceptions*). By the former an object is presented to us, by the latter the object is thought in relation to the idea thus awakened in the mind; or, in other words, an idea, which is in itself a mere modification of consciousness, is referred to an object. Perceptions and conceptions,

therefore, contribute the elements of all our knowledge; and neither conceptions without perceptions, nor perceptions without conceptions, can give knowledge. . . . If the receptivity of our mind—*i.e.*, its capacity of having ideas awakened in it when it is in any way affected—be named *sense*, the faculty by which we ourselves produce ideas, or the spontaneity of knowledge is what is called *understanding*. We are so constituted that perception with us can never be other than sensible; in other words, it tells us nothing except the manner in which we are affected by objects. On the other hand, the faculty of thinking the object of sensible perception is understanding. Neither of these faculties of ours has any preference over the other. Without sensibility, no object could be given to us, without understanding, no object could be thought. Thoughts without content of perceptions are empty, perceptions without conceptions are blind. Hence it is as necessary to make our conceptions sensible—*i.e.*, to find an object for them in perception, as it is to make our perceptions intelligible—*i.e.*, to bring them under conceptions. Nor is it possible for these two faculties to exchange their functions. Understanding can no more perceive anything than the senses can think anything. Knowledge can only come of the union of the two; yet we must not on that account confuse the two distinct elements: nay, we have every reason carefully to separate and distinguish them.”¹

This Kantian language is liable to be misunderstood, if we do not carefully observe the double force of the word ‘object.’ When Kant says that

Relation
of thought
(synthesis)
and objec-
tivity.

¹ *Kritik*, p. 56 : Tr., p. 45.

“through sensibility objects are given to us,” he does not mean that they are given to us *as* objects. He only means that there are mental modifications produced in us, by synthesis of which the understanding can determine an object. But he thinks of the manifold of sense as the result of an object, a thing in itself, affecting the sensibility; and on the other hand, he treats the object, which the understanding determines through synthesis of the manifold given in sense, as identical with, or, at any rate, phenomenal of, the object that affects sense. Without considering at present how far he is justified in this mode of conception, it may be observed that his meaning here would have been less ambiguous if he had simply said that there is a ‘manifold’ given in sense, which the synthesis of the understanding enables us to determine as objective. For when Kant says that, ‘through understanding objects are thought,’ he means ‘thought *as* objects.’

What can
sense give
us?

To understand the subsequent reasoning then, we must clearly realise what, in Kant’s view, sense can give us, and what it cannot give us. It can give us subjective ‘appearances’ and not objects; it can give us an unconnected ‘manifold,’ but not the synthesis that binds it into one object. Objectivity and synthesis are the contributions of the understanding, and the first point necessary is to see how these two things are related to each other.

First
answer
to this
question.

Now if for a moment we attend only to the first of these characteristics of sense, as Kant sometimes allows himself to do, if we remember *only* that it sets appearances before us, and not objects, it seems reasonable to say that there can be no doubt of the *subjective* reality of the phenomena that are pre-

sented to us by sense, whatever doubt there may be about their *objective* reality. There can be no doubt that appearances appear, that mental representations are in our minds, or are presented to us in sense. So long as we conceive such phenomena as a mere phantasmagoria passing before our mental vision, and do not ask any question, or make any assertion, as to their correspondence with any object beyond themselves, so long, it would seem, we cannot be deceived. Thus "the senses set the planets before us, now as moving onward in their course, and again as turning back, and in this there is neither truth nor falsehood, so long as we are content to regard it all as mere appearance, and to make no judgment in regard to the objective movements."¹ The question of truth or reality only arises when we go beyond the appearances, and make a judgment in which they are referred to an object. So long as the mind passively apprehends that which is presented to it, so long it cannot err; for as yet there is to it no distinction between appearance and reality, and therefore no possibility of mistaking the one for the other. To render such mistake possible, the mind must be active; it must go beyond what is immediately given in sense, and refer it to some object, which perception may represent, but which it does not exhaust, and with which, therefore, it is not immediately identical. This object we do not need here to determine, except by saying that it is something which is independent of the individual sensation or perception of it, something[†] which exists apart from its appearance. The immediate perception must be referred to something not perceived,

¹ *Proleg.*, Part I., Rem. 3., p. 41 : Tr., p. 57. *

must be compared with it, asserted to agree or not agree with it, ere we can pronounce that it is either true or false, that it gives or does not give knowledge. For the attainment of knowledge, therefore, sense, as the mere receptivity of the mind, is not enough; knowledge implies the distinction of reality from illusion, and that again requires a spontaneity of the mind or judgment which goes beyond what is immediately *given*, and refers it to what is not given.

But when we consider the matter more carefully, we see that the statement above quoted is not strictly accurate. To say that the planets *appear* to our senses at one time to be receding, and at another time to be advancing in their course, is already to attribute too much to sense. He who can make such a statement has before his mind, not merely an unconnected 'manifold' of sensation, but a connected system of phenomena. He stands at a point of view at which he could not be placed by mere sense without acts of judgment—at the point of view of the objective consciousness. The contents of visual sensation are represented by him as an order of heavenly bodies moving in space, and are thus bound up, according to definite principles of synthesis, with his other experiences of the external world. No doubt, *after* this synthetic process is completed, a doubt may arise in his mind as to the objective value of its result. He may then doubt whether certain movements are real or apparent, whether certain phenomena, which he had interpreted as movements of the planets, are not rather to be explained in some other way, *e.g.*, as movements of the spectator, or even as due to the

Second and corrected answer. No appearance without reality.

diseased state of his eyes. But, in all such doubt, he still presupposes the general reality of the objective consciousness, and merely hesitates about the place of certain phenomena in it. He doubts only whether, in his first synthesis, he has put certain data of sense in their proper relation to certain other data of sense. The question is one touching the particular, not the universal: it relates, strictly speaking, not to the reality of the facts, but only to their position in the context of experience. While, therefore, it is true that appearance is not reality, we must remember that there is for a thinking consciousness no possible return to the unorganised data of sensation, the mere 'appearances of sense' as such. We cannot, in strict accuracy, imagine a previous state in which things are presented to us as 'appearances,' before they are determined as real: for the determination of them as in some sense real, is presupposed in their determination as appearances. To doubt whether experience deceives us, we must already have determined it *as* experience. An illusion is but a reality referred to the wrong place in the context of experience.

The result of these remarks is, that the judgment, whereby the data of sense are referred to objective reality, must be traced back to a much earlier point in the genesis of experience than that to which Kant, in the passage above quoted, has traced it. For whenever we connect a sensation with anything else than itself, we make such a judgment. Whenever we refer a sensation to an external thing which we know by means of it, or to the subject of which it is a state: whenever even we speak of it as a definite sensation, which can be recognised as the

Hence
thought is
involved
in the
simplest
percep-
tion.

same, and distinguished from others on its recurrence, we have lifted the sensation out of its simple singularity, and given it a general determination which is independent of its particular existence. We have, in other words, turned it into the predicate of a judgment regarding something more permanent than itself, and hereby given it a value for knowledge which in itself it had not. By such judgment it becomes, so to speak, attached to a fixed nucleus, through which it may be gradually connected with many other elements of knowledge, instead of simply passing away to give place to other equally transitory sensations. For the *object* in the most general sense is that fixed centre of progressive determination, by relation to which the data of sense alone acquire a definite meaning, and so become capable of being combined in the unity of one experience with other data of sense *ad infinitum*.

The transcendental object gets a meaning for us only through forms of synthesis.

Now what is this object, to which, in perception, the content of sensation is referred? If we take the given object by itself in its abstraction as simply meaning something, which is not itself apprehended by sense, but to which the perception of sense is judged to correspond, we find ourselves in a difficulty. For it would seem that all we can know of such an object is, that it is not a perception, and "outside of our knowledge we can find nothing to set over against our knowledge as corresponding with it." The object, in this sense, is merely an unknown quantity, an x of which we can say nothing. An object out of relation to our perception has as little value for knowledge as a mere sensation without relation to any object. The mere

generality of the one would be as empty and unmeaning as the mere singularity of the other. The object, in any sense in which it has a value for knowledge, must be something which in one way or other determines the sensations referred to it. Now "we find that our thought of the relation of our knowledge to its object carries with it something of necessity: the object, to wit, is viewed as that which hinders our experiences from coming to us at hap-hazard, or in any way we please, and binds them down beforehand to a certain definite course: for all our ideas which are supposed to refer to any one object must, in reference to it, harmonise with each other—*i. e.* they must have that unity which the conception of an object implies."¹ In other words, there is no possibility of fixing the data of sense in reference to the mere abstract idea of an object in general, except in so far as we fix them in reference to each other. Objective reference of perception is impossible without synthesis of perceptions, and is, in fact, only another aspect of the same thing. When we say that a perception refers to an object, we mean that under certain conditions the *same* perception might always be had; that, in other words, certain data of sense are fixed in reference to the other data, or have a certain definite place in the content of experience. In all cases we can transcend the immediate sensation, and refer it to an object, only in so far as we connect its content with the content of other sensations. If it were otherwise, reference to an object would mean merely reference to an unknowable something; and even if that were possible, it would be no gain for know-

¹ *Analytic* (First Edition), II., 2, 3, p. 97: Tr., p. 199.

ledge. Now if this be so, if definite connection of the data of sense and objectivity are only two different aspects of the same thing: if we cannot think of a sensation as a fixed and definite thing or quality of a thing, except so far as we distinguish it from, yet relate it to other sensations: then it is obvious that all knowledge depends on the mind bringing with it principles of combination, in conformity with which the content of sensation is referred to objects. To explain the fact of experience, we must conceive the understanding as combining the matter of sense, which in itself is an unconnected manifold, by means of certain conceptions, which we may indifferently call 'forms of synthesis,' or 'conceptions of objects in general,' according to the aspect in which we choose to regard them. Only in so far as the flux of sensation is arrested, and the retained content of it is organically connected by means of such conceptions, can such a thing as knowledge or experience come into existence.

Let us gather up the results of our investigation, so far as it has gone. Immediate perception (sensation) gives us no knowledge, except when we refer it to something not immediately perceived, for it is only in this reference that a perception can be said either to present us with truth or falsehood, either to lead or to mislead us: and this something is, of course, the object which the perception is conceived to represent. But the mere thought of an object in itself would be nothing: it would be a mere unknown quantity with which no perception could be compared. An assertion that a perception is objective, means therefore that it is connected with other perceptions, and it means

further that this connection is regulated by a universal law, which is independent of any particular experience. Now, the conception of this universal law, as it cannot be got from sense, must be got from the understanding. The understanding alone can enable us to go beyond what is given in sense, and to regard the perceptions of sense as objective, for it alone can give us the conception of a fixed or universal law in conformity with which they can be interpreted as objective.

It may be said that, after all, this conception of objective law and order is itself a result of association, that the subjective necessity of thinking one idea after another, which it has frequently followed in previous experience, from the constraint it puts on the imagination, itself gives rise to the idea of an objective connection—i.e., a connection independent of our thoughts. But this, as will be afterwards shown more fully, is inconceivable. For a law of empirical association of objects known as such, already presupposes a consciousness that has gone beyond immediate sensation, and the association of sensations. It presupposes a consciousness to which sensations are already perceptions of objects, and therefore any attempt to conceive of such a consciousness as the result of association, necessarily involves a *petitio principii*. Before perceptions can be associated in the sense required, they must cease to be transitory states of feeling, they must be fixed and defined as objects which have the permanence of the consciousness to which they are objects, and they must therefore stand in a fixed relation to, and connection with, all other objects of that consciousness. In other words, they must be already con-

Is association sufficient for this synthesis?

nected according to a fixed law of objective relation, ere they can be associated with each other according to any subjective law.

Assump-
tions in-
volved in
the theory
of associa-
tion.

The possibility of the explanation of the objective consciousness by means of association rests mainly on an individualistic assumption, which we shall find Kant assailing in many parts of the *Critique*, the assumption, viz., that in the beginning of experience, the individual has to deal with his own perceptions or sensations, determined *as his own*, and that gradually and by inference he arrives at the consciousness of the existence of other beings than himself; that, in short, we begin with inner experience as such, and that the only difficulty of philosophy is to discover how we can legitimately add outer experience to it. Against this view, Kant maintains, in the first place, that inner experience can only come into existence by the same process as outer experience, by the determination of the matter of sense by thought. For it is one thing to have sensations, it is altogether another thing to determine them as my sensations—*i.e.*, to make them into objects and represent them as states of this individual subject. The mere stream of sensitive states, or the combination of them by an empiric law of association, is as inadequate to explain the consciousness of ourselves as objects, as it is to explain the consciousness of any other objects. In the one case as in the other, knowledge of objects as such can only be produced by the application of universal principles of synthesis to the manifold of sense. In the second place, as we shall see, Kant maintains that not only is inner experience produced in the same way as outer experience, but also that it is secondary and depen-

dent upon outer experience, so that we can only have consciousness of our own inner states as such in contrast with, and relation to, a world of external objects. On both these grounds, he altogether rejects, so far as experience is concerned, the individualistic point of view, and thus deprives the associative psychology of that empirical basis, which it needs in order to explain the remainder of experience.

The above remarks may be sufficient to prepare the way for the discussion of the problem of the *Analytic*. The solution of that problem has three stages which are closely connected, but which for the sake of clearness it is necessary to separate from each other. In the first place, assuming that certain pure conceptions supplied by the understanding are necessary for knowledge or experience, Kant seeks to discover what and how many they are. This we may call, in correspondence with the language used in the *Æsthetic*, the metaphysical part of the problem.¹ In the next place he has to show that these *a priori* conceptions are objectively valid, *i. e.*, that experience is possible through them and only through them. This is the object of the *Transcendental Deduction*. Lastly, he has to determine the mode in which those conceptions are applied to the matter of sense through its forms, and what is the content and compass of the *a priori* knowledge which is thus produced. This involves the discussion of the *Principles of the Pure Understanding*.

Three
questions
of the
Analytic.

¹ The expression, 'Metaphysical Deduction,' is used in this sense in § 26 of the *Transcendental Deduction*, p. 752 : Tr., p. 77.

CHAPTER VI.

THE TWO LOGICS—THE DISCOVERY OF THE CATEGORIES.

Difference
of formal
and tran-
scendental
Logic.

WE have already spoken of Kant's opinion of the ancient Logic. It is to him the type of a perfect science, and a science completed almost at a stroke by its founder. The effect of this opinion on the structure of the *Critique* is great. Again and again, in the course of it, do we find Kant returning to the Aristotelian Logic, and taking it as a safe point of departure, from which he may prosecute further investigations into the nature of knowledge. Thus, at the beginning of the *Analytic*, he draws a parallel between it and the new transcendental Logic which he is setting himself to construct. Pure general Logic, he tells us, is a science that deals only with the form of thought. It analyses the process of thinking, so far as that process is the same for all ideas or conceptions, without regard to their source and nature, and hence without regard to their value as a means to the knowledge of objects. It is purely analytic, and its highest principle is the principle of identity and contradiction. But we can imagine another kind of Logic, not only of thought, but of knowledge, which should inquire, not merely how the mind re-

lates its ideas to each other, but how it relates them to objects, which should be not merely analytic, but also synthetic, and which should furnish a criterion, not merely of consistency, but also of truth. A criterion of all truth, indeed, is impossible, for by a criterion we mean something more general than that to which it is applied. But no general principle can enable us to determine the particular matter of knowledge. A Logic that should supply such a criterion would be all science. But if there be a part of our knowledge which is due to the mind itself, and if we can, up to a certain point, determine objects *a priori*, then a Logic that should contain this part of knowledge would furnish a general criterion of truth. For it would not merely enable us to lay down the negative conditions of knowledge, which is all that formal Logic pretends to do, but it would also enable us, up to a certain point, to determine its positive contents. It would give us, in fact, a general knowledge of what all objects of knowledge must be, whatever more they may be besides. We may call this proposed science, *transcendental* Logic, for transcendental is the word by which we have learnt to distinguish *a priori* ideas so far as they have an objective meaning, or, in other words, so far as they enable us to know objects. Such a Logic will, in one point of view, be narrower in its scope than pure general Logic, in so far as it will reject from its consideration all conceptions of *a posteriori* origin; but, in another point of view, it will be wider, for it will have to do not only with ideas, but with objects.

Now, as there are three divisions of pure general Logic, which deal respectively with apprehension,

Three parts
in each of
these
Logics.

with judgment, and with reasoning, may we not expect that the transcendental Logic will have three corresponding parts? Kant answers that there really is something to correspond to each. Knowledge, being essentially the reference of our ideas to objects, involves an act of judgment, in which this reference is made. But, to make this possible, we must first have conceptions of objects to which the ideas got from perception may be referred. Accordingly, the first question which the transcendental Logic has to answer is, What are the conceptions of objects in general derived from the understanding? And the second question naturally follows, What are the principles of judgment to which we attain, when the perceptions, and especially the *a priori* perceptions, are determined by these conceptions? The transcendental *Analytic* therefore divides itself naturally into two parts—the *Analytic* of conceptions, and the *Analytic* of principles, which correspond respectively to the parts of the general Logic treating of apprehension and judgment. And, finally, as we proceed in general Logic from the immediate connection of perceptions in judgment to their mediate connection in syllogism, so in transcendental Logic we must ask, whether there are not certain highest principles of connection among judgments which give unity and system to all our knowledge. This is the question considered in the *Dialectic*. There is therefore throughout a parallelism between the two Logics, though, as we shall see, the *Dialectic* turns out to be no theory of knowledge, but rather a theory of its limits, and an explanation of the illusions by which we seem able to transcend these limits. It is important to keep this parallelism continually

before us; for it was ever in Kant's mind, it was, as he tells us, the guiding thread that led him to his discoveries, and very often it explains peculiarities in his mode of statement that are explicable in no other way.

First, then, we have the *Analytic of Conceptions*,
 or, in other words, the discovery and verification
 of the pure conceptions of objects due to the
 understanding.

Analytic of
 Concep-
 tions.

Supposing that there are such conceptions in the mind, how shall we find them out? For we want a list, and that an exhaustive list of them. Such a list must contain nothing empirical and nothing that is due to sense, whether pure or empirical, and must exclude even the pure perceptions of time and space. It must contain only fundamental or root conceptions: for we do not wish to mix up anything secondary or derivative or complex with that which is simple and primary. Lastly, while it thus excludes everything *but* the pure *a priori* conceptions of the understanding, the conceptions in which lie the possibility of all synthesis, and hence of all knowledge of objects, it must include *all* those conceptions, or, in other words, it must embrace the whole content of the pure understanding. To secure such completeness, it will not be sufficient to take up pure conceptions one after another, as they present themselves in the analysis of ordinary experience. For then we could never be sure that further analysis of experience would not yield other conceptions, in addition to those we had already discovered. "We can never be certain of the scientific completeness of the Transcendental Logic, so long as it presents the aspect of a mere aggregate of conceptions

tentatively brought together. Such certainty is attainable only if we are able to start with an *idea of the whole of a priori knowledge* derived from the mind, or if from that idea we determine the division and articulation of all its constitutive parts. For then only can we have that combination of all the parts in the unity of a system, which is the test of exhaustive completeness.”¹

The guiding thread to the discovery of the pure conceptions.

Now, where are we to find this *idea of the whole*? To answer this question we only need to recollect that what we are seeking to discover is not merely certain conceptions which the understanding *has*, but rather conceptions which the understanding *is*—conceptions that, strictly speaking, *constitute* the understanding. We are seeking, in short, to analyse the faculty of understanding.

But we have already seen what is the characteristic activity of the understanding. Its business is to judge or subsume different conceptions or perceptions, under more general conceptions that connect them together. Now, if we suppose, as is usually supposed, that sense presents us in perception with the ideas of things in their concrete individuality, this work of the understanding can be performed by mere analysis. Given the ideas of a number of individual objects as such, we can easily connect them together by abstraction and generalization. We only need, in short, to compare the individuals, to observe their common elements, abstract from their differences, and so combine them under generic names. And this process we may repeat again and again till we arrive at a unity of all things in the abstract conception of an object in general. But then we

¹ *Transc. Logic*, 1st part, p. 66; Tr., p. 54.

have to consider that sense does not, in the first instance, and by its own power, give us such ideas as we have here supposed, the ideas of individual objects in their complete determination as individuals. On the contrary, what sense, strictly speaking gives us is simply an unconnected manifold; and before the conception of an individual as a concrete unity could be arrived at, the isolated perceptions of sense must have been brought together and united with each other. Hence, before the analysis with which the ordinary Logic deals, and the secondary synthesis to which that analysis leads, there must be a primary synthesis. And as the understanding cannot derive the principles of this primary synthesis from the elements to be combined, it must find those principles in itself. It follows then that the understanding has in itself *a priori* forms of synthesis, or, what we have seen to be the same thing, conceptions of objects in general, which are its instruments in giving unity to sense experience. These *a priori* conceptions are the rules which it follows in putting together the manifold data of perception with a view to knowledge; and except so far as the data of perception are arranged according to these rules, they are 'blind,' and cannot give to us any knowledge of objects. "They are to us as thinking beings absolutely nothing."

Now, we can easily see how a general idea may furnish a rule for the synthesis of the elements to which it is applied. Our conception of a triangle serves for a rule or limiting condition, under which we bring together the elements of every triangular figure: and our conception of the decadic system of numbers serves for a rule, under which by addition

The con-
ceptions,
which
are the
primary
forms of
synthesis,
are already
deter-
mined by
the logical
analysis of
judgment.

we produce particular numbers. Or, again, our conception of matter as extended and impenetrable serves for a rule, subject to which we put together the elements in our idea of every particular body. But all these relatively general conceptions as rules of synthesis, are subject to a highest and most general set of rules which are found in the pure conceptions of the understanding. For, whatever be the object of thought, its manifold must be put together in conformity with the rules of synthesis which flow from the conceptions of objects in general. And this, as appears by what has been said, is the same thing as to say, that its manifold must be put together according to rules involved in the very nature of the understanding, as the faculty of judging.

What then are the conceptions involved in the very process of judgment? or by what conceptions can that process be supposed of itself to produce unity in our ideas? This is the meaning of Kant's enquiry, 'What are the functions of unity in judgment?' If we can give a complete enumeration of these *functions of unity*, which are implied in the nature of judgment, and which therefore by the very act of judgment must be added to the data on which it is exercised, we shall have a complete list of the *a priori* conceptions of the understanding.

Now ordinary Logic has already prepared the way for the answer to this question by its determination of the forms of judgment. For, in the first place, it defines judgment as "the idea of the unity of the consciousness of different ideas," or, "the idea of the relation of different ideas as united in one concep-

tion.”¹ Further, it distinguishes in judgment the matter of the ideas connected, from the form of unity superinduced on that matter, *i.e.*, “the determination of the manner in which different ideas are brought into the unity of one consciousness.”² And abstracting from the *matter*, Logic directs our attention to the *form* of thought, and shows that all judgments are determined in four ways : in quantity, quality, relation, and modality, and that under each of these points of view there are three kinds of judgment. In all this formal Logic has to do only with what we have spoken of above as the judgments whose synthesis is based on analysis. For a judgment is formally right when its predicate is contained in the conception of the subject ; formally wrong when it is not. But then, as we have just seen, such analysis presupposes another synthesis, and therefore presupposes certain original forms of synthesis or combination, which are the *limits* of analysis. For however far we may carry our analysis, there is a point beyond which it cannot be carried without destroying the very conception analysed, and hence destroying the judgment itself. When we come to this point, therefore, we strike upon the essential forms of connection involved in the very act of judgment ; and these, which are the last presuppositions of the analysis, the last binding elements which analysis must respect, if it would not by its very excess annihilate itself, must be the first principles of synthesis, or the primary rules according to which the elements of thought are put together. If, therefore, we may suppose that formal Logic has duly and sufficiently enumerated the forms of

¹ Kant's *Logic*, § 17 ; III., p. 282.

² *Id.* § 18.

judgment, viewed as an act of analysis, we may be sure that it has at the same time pointed out the conceptions that guide us in our primary synthesis, in our first putting together the elements of our knowledge of objects. That beyond which we cannot go without annihilating thought itself, must be of the very essence of thought. When we determine it, we have determined at the same time the first lines of the foundation upon which all knowledge must be built.

General
ideas as
rules for
specifica-
tion.

Kant's view, then, may be thus explained. The beginning of knowledge implies certain general principles which are progressively specified. The general conception I already have of any object is a guide to me in putting together the particular elements of perception by which that conception is further determined. Thus, having the conception of matter as extended, I go on to put together on this basis the various elements presented to me by touch, taste, &c., in conformity with this original conception. Every general idea, in fact, is a rule for the synthesis of the particular subsumed under it. And ultimately all combination of different elements (and there is no knowledge without combination of the different elements) must rest on the conception or conceptions of objects in general. For only as subsumed under these conceptions, or as specifying and further determining them, can any special object be known. These are the ultimate principles of the unity of judgment. If we desire to express it so, we may call them the first predicates of all objects of thought. But it would be less misleading to say that they give the first definition of the subject to which all other determinations must

be attached as predicates. For only as referred to a *transcendental object* can any datum of sense have a meaning for us; and the categories are the predicates by which that object is first defined, and the presuppositions of all further definition of it. In fact, apart from the categories, the transcendental object is a mere x , which has no relation to perception. These first predicates therefore remain when we abstract from all that is empirical. They are the last in analysis, as they are the first in synthesis. Kant has a good right to say that *if*, and so *far* as Logicians have fully and exhaustively pointed out the functions of unity in analytic judgments, they have at the same time given us a direct clue to the first principles of experience.

But this immediately raises the question, whether the Logicians have really done so, and whether they have done it so systematically that we are at liberty to start from their work as unquestionably perfect. Kant at the outset had set up a high standard for himself; he had demanded that the completeness of the list of *a priori* conceptions should be shown by their systematic unity—a unity in which the idea of the whole should determine at once the number and relation of the parts. But, in the end, he assumes that the ‘logical system’ is perfect, and that all that is necessary is to build a ‘transcendental system’¹ upon it. He points out, it is true, the unity *in* which we are to seek for system, but he does not show how the diversity of elements springs from that unity. He says that as thinking is judging, all the categories must be involved in the activity of judgment; but if he had fulfilled his promise, he must

Can the logical enumeration of the forms of judgment be taken as a *system*?

¹ *Proleg.*, part 2nd, § 24; *III.*, p. 68; *Tr.*, p. 81.

have shown us from the very nature of the synthesis of judgment that these and no other categories are involved in it. This, however, he is so far from doing that he actually denies that it can be done. "Of the peculiarity of our understanding by reason of which it can produce unity of apperception only by means of the categories, and by just this number of them, we can give no account any more than we can account for our having just these and no other functions for our judgments; or for time and space being the only forms under which perception is possible to us."¹ The objection, therefore, which Kant brings against Aristotle is an objection which can be justly urged against himself—that he picked up his categories without principle, or rather without developing his principle. He pointed out the activity of thought in which the categories are involved, but, without further attempt to prove them, he simply adopts them on the authority of Aristotelian Logic. His warrant for doing so lies mainly, it would seem, in that Logic having lasted without change since the time of Aristotle; and on this warrant he does not hesitate to speak with the greatest confidence as to the completeness of his enumeration.

Validity
of the
distinction
of form
and
matter.

The first point that calls for criticism is the distinction of *form* and *matter*. Why should quantity, quality, relation, and modality be referred to the former and not to the latter? The matter of general Logic, as we have seen, consists in 'the ideas which in the judgment are combined in a unity of consciousness.' The form is 'the manner in which they are combined.' But it is difficult to see how a division of

¹ *Kritik*, § 21, p. 744: Tr., p. 89.

conceptions can be based on this distinction. Every conception of an object, as Kant himself has shown, determines the 'manner and way' in which the different elements of that which is subsumed under it shall be combined. Every higher conception may thus in relation to the lower be regarded as form, and every lower in relation to the higher as matter. If, on the other hand, it be said that logic has to do only with the *necessary* form of judgment, this necessary form can only mean the minimum of generic unity, which must still be left when we distinguish different elements of a conception, and yet relate them to each other in a judgment. But what is this minimum? On what principle can we say that it contains all that Kant asserts to belong to it, and no more? In reference to this question, it is interesting to observe how the idea of limiting Logic to the *form* of thought has worked itself out in the history of the science. The inevitable result of the search for bare form without matter has been to eliminate one element after another till the judgment disappears in the expression of bare identity. First, modality is excluded, because analytic judgments are always necessary, and with any other connection of conceptions than that which is mediated by analysis formal Logic has nothing to do. In the next place, the various relations expressed in the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments are reduced to the single relation of containing and contained quantity. Then Sir W. Hamilton proposes that the predicate should be quantified, on the principle that what is implicit in thought should be made explicit in Logic. The predicate being quantified, and the

judgment thus reduced to an equation, the next step is that it should be numbered. Mr. Jevons¹ goes a step farther, and argues that if the predicate is to be quantified on the ground that what is implicit in thought should be made explicit by Logic, then it should be qualified by the subject, because in the judgment it is implicitly limited thereby. Thus the formula of the judgment will be, not $A=B$, or $A=\text{some } B$, but $A=AB$; or, not 'All men are mortal,' or 'All men are some mortals,' but 'All men are mortal men.' There thus remains but a single step to be taken to bring formal Logic to the *euthanasia* of pure form, viz., that the subject should also be qualified by the predicate. The judgment would then take the form, $AB=AB$, or 'Men mortal are mortal men,' and would pass into the tautological expression of an identity.

The formal judgment is no judgment at all.

The truth, then, is that the elimination of matter from the judgment can only stop when the form has been reduced to a *simple identity*. A tautological judgment is the only pure analytic judgment, and a tautological judgment is, strictly speaking, no judgment at all. It is a judgment that is never made. Identity has no significance except in relation to difference. Even where there is an appearance of a simple identical judgment there is always an implied *nuance* of difference between the subject and the predicate. 'A man's a man for a' that.' In the purest analytic judgments which we can make there is always a synthesis of differences. Kant indeed says that the judgment: 'All bodies are extended,' is an analytic judgment, because the quality of extension is already contained in the con-

¹ *Principles of Science*, I., ch. 3.

ception of body. He forgets, however, that on the supposition that extension had already been thought as the property of all bodies, there would be no meaning in this judgment, unless bodies had other qualities than extension, qualities in which they differ. What we have in this judgment is therefore only the inverted expression of a synthesis of extension with other qualities, with which in all the different objects called bodies it is associated, and it is this implied synthesis that gives meaning and interest to the judgment. The so-called analytic judgment, when it goes beyond tautology, is simply the reversed synthetic judgment—the synthesis with the subject put for predicate. The object of making the judgment, ‘All bodies are extended,’ is to determine part of what has the predicate of extension as body, not simply to analyse the conception of body. Thought *must* proceed synthetically from the less to the more determinate, and it is only in appearance that it ever proceeds otherwise.

Another aspect of the objection against formal Logic is suggested by the last paragraph, namely, that it separates conceptions which have no meaning except in relation to each other. Governed mainly by a physical analogy, and regarding conceptions as quantities that include or exclude each other, it severs identity from difference, and affirmation from negation. Thus it treats the affirmative and the negative judgment as two distinct and independent acts, which have no necessary relation to each other. But in so far as this division is insisted on, both judgments lose all their significance. The affirmative, because it is not also negative, reduces itself to tautology, *i.e.*, the

Consequence of the separation of affirmation and negation, identity and difference.

assertion of sameness without any reference to differences; and in like manner the negative, because it is not also affirmative, reduces itself to an opposition of conceptions which have no connecting link, *i.e.*, the assertion of difference without reference to any identity. But mere difference and mere identity are equally unmeaning. It is equally unmeaning to say, 'The soul is the soul,' or to say, 'The soul is not a horse.' But according to the ordinary logical explanation of judgment, which Kant adopts, thought proceeds in this unmeaning way. The affirmative judgment proceeds by mere identity, or only declares that a thing is itself; the negative judgment proceeds by mere opposition, or merely declares the absence of one predicate without implying the presence of another. When, for instance, it is said that the whole sphere of reality may be divided in relation to any predicate, in what is called *dichotomy by contradiction*, *e.g.*, that 'everything must either be red, or not red,' it is obvious that this gives a meaning to the negative judgment according to which it simply removes the positive judgment without putting anything in its place. According to this doctrine, in saying 'The soul is not red,' we do not assert that it is any other colour. The negative is supposed to take away not only the species red, but also the genus coloured object, and even the idea of an object at all. But it may be safely asserted that such negative judgments are never made, except by way of a logical experiment, any more than positive judgments are ever made, which are merely tautological. In practice, the negative is always a definite negative, a negation which involves an affirmation, and so adds to the determination of its

subject, just as the positive is always a definite positive, an affirmation which involves a negation, and so excludes something not hitherto excluded from that subject. When we say 'The soul is not material,' we are already thinking of the soul as an object belonging to a genus which is now further to be divided or determined, and therefore if we deny that it belongs to one species of that genus, we imply that it belongs to some of the other possible species. Further, these other species are already, to a certain extent, determined, when we compare the possibilities left open by the genus with the principle of division implied in the determination of the first species. When it is said, 'This triangle is not right angled,' we have already, in the generic idea and the specific difference, the materials of determining the other species in which it must be included (it being assumed that it is a triangle we are dealing with). And the same is the case even where the principle of division is of a more empirical character. I cannot say, 'This stone is not red,' without having some idea of the class coloured objects, and of the different possibilities of colour it includes. The subject in all cases carries with it a certain determined sense. It is *so far* determined as to bring it under some genus, and the judgment gives a further determination by asserting or denying a possible species. If the judgment were not made under conditions of a presupposed generic determination, then there would be no principle under which the predicate could be selected, out of the infinity of possible predicates, to be affirmed or denied. It would be as natural to say, 'The soul is a bird, or not a bird,' as to say, 'It is material, or not

Judgment
always
synthetic.

material.' It does not occur to us to make such ridiculous judgments, simply because we start with a so far determined subject. On the other hand, the subject is never so far determined as to exclude the doubt whether the predicate does or does not belong to it: for otherwise, there would be no ground for making positive or negative judgments at all. We make judgments because a predicate suggests itself as possible, *i. e.*, as consistent with the generic determination of the subject. It is, however, a natural illusion that leads us to suppose that we make analytic judgments. The subject in the judgment, 'The soul is not material,' seems to be more specific than the predicate. But this is merely seeming.¹ The judgment would not be made if it were not that the soul is as yet known only as substance in general. We conceive it indeed as an object, and therefore as something that is in itself completely determined apart from our knowledge; but *for us* its determination has not gone so far as to determine its materiality or immateriality.

Now, if this be the case, if it be true that the real movement of thought is always determinant or synthetic, however it may appear otherwise, we at once get rid of the division between general and transcendental Logic, between the Logic of thought in itself and the Logic of thought in relation to objects. And we shall see afterwards that this brings with it very important results in regard to Kant's whole view of knowledge. Here we need only show the failure of another attempt he

Another attempt of Kant to distinguish formal from transcendental Logic.

makes to justify his distinction of the categories as such from the forms of judgment on which they are founded. The categories, he tells us, are "conceptions of an object in general, whereby its perception is regarded as determined in relation to one of the logical functions for judgment."¹ For, he argues, if I take the two ideas 'body' and 'divisible' and bring them into the relation expressed by the categorical judgment, it does not matter, so far as formal Logic is concerned, which of the two I take as predicate, and which as subject. I may say either, 'All bodies are divisible,' or, 'Some divisibles are bodies.' But when I subsume body under the category of substance, it is *then* determined that the perception of it in experience shall always be taken as subject, and never as predicate: It would appear then that, in Kant's opinion, the form of judgment is fixed when we give it an objective meaning, but not fixed when we take it as mere thought. But this simply means that formal Logic is, in this passage, supposed by him to abstract from certain relations of thought, and so leave the judgment undetermined in respect of these, while from other more general relations it does not abstract. Hence, the predicate may be more general than the subject, but cannot be less so: and the more general term, if taken in its full extension, must be the predicate, but as it need not be so taken, the order of the terms is indeterminate and conversion is allowable. This, however, is only to say that formal Logic attends to the *quantity* of our conceptions, but leaves them indeterminate in respect of *relation*. But why should quantity be considered by Logic any more than relation?

If the principle of judgment is the law of identity and contradiction, the only judgments that can be justified are the judgment in which subject and predicate are the same, and the judgment in which they are entirely different; and these, as has been shown, are not judgments at all. As, however, it is impossible to separate the form from the matter of knowledge, formal Logic is driven upon a curious dilemma. It has to choose between the alternatives of vanishing into nothing, and of including everything. If it is to give all the principles of synthesis in judgment, its principles are infinite in number, since *any* conception may be the ground of a synthesis, and, therefore, of the analysis corresponding. And, on the other hand, if it is to give only principles of analysis that are not principles of synthesis, it can discover *no* such principles at all. The only distinct line that can possibly be drawn between the formal and the material, must be drawn by considering all that is implied in thinking *objects in general* as opposed to any particular objects. If Logic has any sphere of its own at all, its business must be to consider what are the general conditions of thought and experience, as opposed to the conditions of thinking this or that particular object. But then the table of *a priori* conceptions of objects in general will rather determine, than be determined by, the table of the functions of unity in judgment.

The Categories, after all, do not correspond with the logical forms of judgment.

Kant's determination of the categories is got by considering what are the various forms of judgment under each of the four heads distinguished by logicians—quantity, quality, relation, and modality. He observes, however, that some distinctions are of importance to transcendental Logic, which formal Logic for its own

purposes can afford to neglect. Hence in quality he adds the *infinite* judgment to the positive and negative, and in quantity the *singular* to the universal and particular. Formal Logic does not need to distinguish the singular from the universal judgment, because, in both, the subject in the whole of its extension is included in the predicate. Nor need it regard the infinite or limitative judgment as distinct from the affirmative, for it has only to do with the affirmative or negative character of the judgment, and not with the character of the predicates which in it are asserted or denied. But transcendental Logic must take account of these distinctions, for it has to estimate the objective value of the judgments in question, *i.e.*, the value of the knowledge contained in them. Thus Kant has some difficulty ere he can get out of the formal judgment his full tale of categories, even in the case of quality and quantity. But he has still more trouble in the case of relation. For as formal Logic, in the limitation usually given to it, excludes all relations except those of extension and comprehension, the different forms of the categorical, hypothetical, and disjunctive judgments can have for it no special significance. All that it has to do with, is simply the relation of genus and species. When therefore Kant attempts to get out of these forms, as understood by Logic, the categories of substance, cause, and reciprocity, we are sensible of a considerable hiatus in the deduction; and by some of his efforts at explanation, Kant shows that he was sensible of this defect himself. Take, *e.g.*, the category of reciprocity: in following Kant's reasoning we are forced to convert a generic whole, which is simply the abstraction of a

common element in its parts, into the notion of a concrete or individual whole, the idea of which determines the parts, and their relation to each other. We can take any abstraction as a whole in the former sense, and we can divide it, in dichotomy *per contradictionem*, in reference to any other abstraction. We can say, *e.g.*, 'All men are red, or not red;' but in this case there is no necessity that the genus should include both species, nor does each species determine the others through the idea of the whole. And the same remarks may be applied to the relations of substance and accident, and of cause and effect. The mere conception of the relation of subject and predicate in the categorical, or of reason and consequent in the hypothetical judgment, cannot give us these categories, unless we interpret these judgments in a different way from that in which formal logic interprets them. If the judgment be limited to the ideas of comprehension and extension, as it has been by formal logicians, no alchemy will get cause or substance out of it. Either, therefore, Kant has limited Logic too narrowly or these categories must be rejected.

Kant's
possible
answer to
this objec-
tion.

The best answer that can be made to this criticism is, that Kant did *not* simply identify the categories as such with the forms of judgment. On the contrary, he always maintained that, as mere forms of judgment, these *a priori* conceptions have not that objective meaning which they gain from their application to the matter of sense. It may, therefore, be argued, that ere we can say anything as to the correspondence of the two lists, we must have considered the process by which the one is translated into the other, the logical into the transcendental.

This, however, does not completely meet the objection. For, if it be true that some of the pure conceptions have no distinct meaning in formal Logic, then the 'guiding thread,' by means of which the categories were discovered, is lost. The 'logical system,' on which the 'transcendental system' was reared, disappears, and we are left to judge of the latter by its own merits.

Let us, then, look at the list of categories itself, without reference to anything else. Is it complete, and what are the relations of its parts? To the first question Kant answers, that the list contains, not all the *a priori* conceptions of the understanding, but all the fundamental or root conceptions. In this two things are involved. It is involved, on the one hand, that the categories enumerated are not deducible from each other, and on the other hand, that all the other *a priori* conceptions are capable of being deduced from them. But, as to the latter of these points, it is to be observed that Kant has nowhere attempted to give such a deduction, though he often speaks of it as an easy task for any one who has before him the Wolffian handbooks of Ontology. "If any one takes the trouble to enumerate the Predicables, which he may easily derive from a good Ontology (*e. g.*, Baumgarten's), and to arrange them in classes under the Categories, not forgetting to analyse them as completely as possible, he will, by this procedure, produce a purely analytic section of Metaphysic, which will not contain a single synthetic proposition. This might be treated as a Propædæutic to synthetic philosophy, and its definiteness and completeness would not only make it very useful for this purpose, but its syste-

Complete-
ness of the
list of
categories.
(1.) Are all
categories
deducible
from those
given by
Kant?

matic character would even give it a kind of beauty.”¹

(2.) Are
they not
deducible
from each
other?

With regard to the other and more important point, the relation of the categories to each other, it has already been said that Kant, on his own showing, had no right to be satisfied with the completeness of his list till he had deduced the fourfold division of classes of categories, and again, the threefold subdivision of these classes from the very idea of judgment. And, indeed, notwithstanding his denial of the possibility of such a deduction, he really himself makes some attempt to supply it, or at least to give a reason for the threefold division of the categories. For, in various places of his works, he points out relations between the categories.² Thus, in the introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, he says: “It has been made a difficulty by some that my divisions in pure philosophy are almost always threefold. But this lies in the nature of the case. For if an *a priori* division is to be made, it must be either analytical, according to the principle of contradiction, and then it is always a Dichotomy: or synthetical: and, if in this case it is to be based on *a priori* conceptions (not as in mathematics on perceptions), then, according to that which is required for synthetic unity in general, the division must be Trichotomy; for it must be a division that includes, first, a condition, secondly, a conditioned, and thirdly, a conception springing out of the union of these two.” This is illustrated in a remark in the second edition of the *Critique*, where

¹ *Proleg.*, § 39, note, p. 92 : Tr., p. 111.

² *Proleg.*, l. c.; *Kritik*, § 11, p. 722 : Tr., p. 69. *Kritik der Urtheilskraft, Einleitung*, § 9, p. 39.

he says, "Universality or Totality is just multiplicity regarded as Unity: Limitation is just Reality combined with Negation. Community is just the Causality of Substances in reciprocal determination of each other; finally, Necessity is but Existence given through Possibility itself. Yet we are not to suppose that therefore the third category is merely deduced, and not a fundamental conception of pure reason. For the combination of the first and second conceptions to produce the third requires a special act of understanding, which is not identical with that involved in the first and second. Thus, the conception of a number, which belongs to the category of totality" (*i.e.*, involves the return out of multiplicity into unity), "is not always possible where the notions of unity and multiplicity are given (*e.g.*, in the idea of the infinite), and again, though I combine the conception of a cause and that of a substance, this does not at once enable me to understand what is involved in *influence*, *i.e.*, how a substance can be cause of anything in another substance. Hence it is clear that a special act of understanding is required for this third category: and so it is also in all the other instances."

Now it may be remarked, that the idea expressed in the first of these passages, the idea that there is a necessary distinction between analytical and synthetical division, is in direct and manifest contradiction with the principle of Kant's attempt to get the 'transcendental' out of the 'logical' system. If analytic division is always dichotomy, then for formal Logic there is never any third category, and it can give us no 'guiding thread' to the discovery of a list whose essential feature is triplicity. Kant,

Analysis cannot, by Kant's confession, be compared to synthesis.

in fact, here opposes, while elsewhere he connects, the two Logics. And, in so doing, he returns to a view of the subject which he had early developed in his treatise on negative quantity, and which was never quite absent from his mind.¹ There we found him arguing that there is an essential distinction between Logic and experience, between the law of the agreement or contradiction of conceptions, the positive and negative movement of pure thought, and the law of the connection or opposition of real things (positive or negative causation). We can understand by pure thought why it is that a thing remains what it is, why A is A: but we cannot understand why one thing should be the cause of another thing different from it. We can understand by pure thought why a thing should exclude its own negation or absence, but we cannot understand why it should be a negative cause, why it should neutralise something different from itself. A synthetic movement, either positive or negative, is to Kant a movement which our understanding cannot comprehend through the analogy of its own pure action, but which implies something given from without. Thought, in other words, cannot differentiate itself: its differentiation must come from some other source. And long before Kant had commenced the writing of the *Critique*, it had become obvious to him that the differentiation must come from the perception.

The law of pure thought not essentially different from the

Now, in speaking a few pages back of formal Logic, we have suggested another solution of the difficulty which never seems to occur to Kant; the solution, viz., that pure thought is not, as he imagines,

¹ Cf. ante, p. 140.

analytic, or governed by the laws of identity and contradiction, in the sense in which these laws are commonly understood. We have pointed out that in fact there is no movement of thought simply by identity or simply by difference, but always by both at once. Thought always proceeds from the less to the more determinate, and, in doing so, it cannot determine any object positively without determining it negatively; or determine it negatively without determining it positively. The subject being already so far defined, as belonging to a particular genus, the assertion that it does not belong to one of the species, involves already the assertion that it belongs to one of the other species; and as these species cannot be conceived except in relation to, and in contradistinction from, each other, the negative of one species already gives us a conception of the other or others (more or less accurate according to the value of the *principium divisionis*). Positive and negative determination are thus correlative, or, in the words of Spinoza, "Determinatio est negatio," which may be translated, affirmation is negation, or, determination is affirmation and negation at once. But if this be the case, the idea of the discordance of the Logic of thought (formal Logic) and the Logic of reality is a fiction, and the problem of their reconciliation is a self-made difficulty. If the logical determination of a conception implies its relation to its negative or opposite, then there is no difficulty in thinking of a reality in which opposites imply each other; the difficulty would be in thinking anything else. There is no ground for distinguishing logical from real position, or logical from real negation; for position and

law of
thought in
the deter-
mination
of objects.

negation are not separated from each other in thought any more than they are separated in reality.

Kant's
approximation to
this view.

In the passages just quoted, it seems at the first glance as if Kant was admitting part of what has just been stated; at least if he does not admit that analytical thought is no thought at all, he admits that thought has another species which is not analytic but synthetic, a synthesis based on pure conceptions;¹ and this is in other words to admit that thought can differentiate itself, and return out of difference into unity. And to this synthesis he attributes the origin of the third category in each class. A step farther would have led him to the conclusion that, in *Quality*, affirmation without negation, or negation without affirmation, are mere abstractions, and that all judgment is really governed by the category of limitation; and in like manner that in *Quantity*, unity without plurality, or plurality without unity, are but abstractions, and all judgment is really governed by the category of totality. If Kant had carried out this line of thought, he would necessarily have rid himself of any absolute distinction between analysis and synthesis: he would have merged formal in transcendental Logic, and he would have seen that the Triplicity, which *he* regards as the peculiarity of synthetic thought, is the characteristic of all thought. Nor would he then have supposed that it is necessary for thought to go beyond itself, in order to become synthetic. We have, however, always to keep before us, that when Kant speaks of 'synthesis out of pure conceptions,' he must be understood as speaking by way of anticipation; for such synthesis in his view is pos-

¹ Cf. ante, p. 310.

sible only by reflection of the perception on the conception; or, in other words, thought becomes synthetic only in relation to a given difference. In itself the understanding is tautological; it cannot create a manifold; but when the manifold has been presented to it, its tautology turns into synthesis or combination. We shall have to return to this point in explaining the transcendental deduction. For the present it is sufficient to notice that Triplicity is determined by Kant as flowing from the nature of synthesis, and that this is what really explains his introduction of the third category, which, as he himself admits in certain cases, has no right to a place in the theory of judgment as treated by formal logic.

It may be remarked, further, that in certain remarks introduced into the *Prolegomena*, and into the second edition of the *Critique*, there are traces of an attempt to explain also the classification of the categories. In the first-named work¹ he observes that the categories of quality and quantity are not doubled like those of relation and modality, in the former of which each category brings along with it its correlate, in the latter its opposite. In the *Critique* he says² that the first two classes of categories have to do with the objects of perception, while the last two refer to the existence of these objects, either in relation to each other, or to the mind. The former he therefore calls mathematical, and the latter dynamical categories: and he seems to connect the special significance of these two species of cate-

Explana-
tion of the
classifica-
tion of the
categories.

¹ *Proleg.*, § 39, p. 92: Tr., p. 111.

² *Kritik*, § 11, p. 73: Tr., p. 67.

gories with the fact that the latter have, and the former have not, correlates or opposites, when he says that "this distinction must have a ground in the nature of the understanding." The distinction on Kant's own showing is really not so wide as it appears, if, in all cases, the first and second categories are related as condition and conditioned, and the third is their unity. There is an implicit correlation even between the first and the second of the categories of quantity and quality respectively. So far as the difference exists, it serves to point to the truth that the dynamical categories in general are related to the mathematical as the second category in each class is related to the first: and this again seems to suggest that there should be a third class of categories in which difference returns with unity. This, however, is going beyond our record. Kant does not anywhere apply to the general classes of categories the principle that the categories are related as thesis, antithesis, and synthesis: and, indeed, it would have been impossible for him to do so without admitting as a class of categories what he only admits as ideas of reason. For if the first or mathematical class of categories, the categories of quantity or quality, give us the simplest conceptions of things in which they are referred only to themselves, or in which their relativity is latent; and if the second or dynamical class of categories give us conceptions of things according to which they are distinguished from, yet essentially related to each other; the third class of categories would, according to the general analogy, express the return out of relativity or opposition. It would give us conceptions of things as final causes, unities of ideal

differences, or identities which, through their differences, return upon themselves.¹

We must not, however, introduce into Kant the ideas of later philosophy, even when we cannot but see that the germ of such ideas is in him. All that need be said here is, that the 'artige Bemerkungen' of the second edition seem clearly to show that Kant was striving after some better derivation of the categories from the nature of judgment than was to be found in that simple reference to the logical forms of judgment with which he had satisfied himself in the first edition. Having observed that the third category does not properly belong to the analytic judgment, the judgment as it is treated by general logic, he was led to look on the act of synthesis as *itself* supplying the idea out of which the system of categories was to be developed and explained. But, though he had thus detected the imperfection of the source from which he derived his list, and had supplemented its defects from another source, he never got rid of the fiction that had been his first stepping-stone to the truth. The completeness of the list of categories, the 'transcendental system,' to the last rested, or seemed to rest, on the completeness of that 'logical system,' to which, nevertheless, it did not exactly correspond: and the idea of synthesis, out of which a better system might have been developed, was never applied but as a corrective. That the list thus obtained is imperfect, we need not wonder; we should rather wonder that so good a result was attained on such a method. Here, as in many other places in Kant, we find that his thought is really

Inconsistency of Kant's view of the relation of the two Logics.

¹ We shall have something more to say in chapter 11th about the distinction of the mathematical from the dynamical categories.

guided by a principle which goes beyond his expressed logic; and it is this characteristic that has made his writings so fertile of suggestion for speculations that go far beyond the limits within which he confined himself. His list of categories, with their threefold division, corresponding, as he himself tells us, to the three movements in the synthetic judgment, has a lasting value as the first attempt to analyse the synthetic movement of pure thought, and its merit is not really lessened by his inconsistent denial that pure thought has any synthetic movement at all. The demand for a complete and connected system of categories, a system implied in the synthetic process by which the dispersed data of sense are elevated into an organised whole of experience, was of itself enough to make an era in the history of philosophy, even if the attempt to supply what was wanting had been less successful.

The bearing of these remarks, however, cannot be fully understood until we have considered the 'transcendental deduction of the categories,' in which, on the one hand, they are traced back to the unity of self-consciousness, and, on the other hand, they are shown in their relation to the matter of sense, and the system of experience, which, by their means, is produced out of that matter.

CHAPTER VII.

KANT'S PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF THE OBJECT OF
THE TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION.

IF there be any truth in the view taken in the last chapter of the difference between the so-called analytic or formal, and the synthetic or real judgment, Kant's attempt to make the former a stepping-stone to the latter, or to find any kind of identity in the two processes, must lead to confusion and even contradiction. Analysis, as Kant himself tells us, is simply going back on the path which the mind has already travelled, proceeding from the more to the less determinate ; while synthesis is advancing on a new path, or proceeding from the less to the more determinate. But Kant, fixing his eye on the one point that generalising means combining, overlooks the fact that the combination of species under an abstract genus is just the reverse process to the combination of parts in a concrete or individual whole ; or, at least, if we cannot suppose him to be blind to so simple a logical distinction, he makes the comprehension of his reasoning difficult, by the way in which he uses the former to illustrate the latter. The key to this strange confusion of

Confusion
of abstract
and concrete
unity.

things essentially different will easily be found, if we remember that Kant always starts with the common opposition of perception and conception, as particular and general, but gradually as he goes on substitutes for it his own new sense of the terms, according to which perception must be taken to mean unconnected 'manifold,' and conception to mean 'binding or synthetic principle.' But this will become clearer when we have examined the general remarks by which Kant introduces his 'transcendental deduction.'

Are the
categories
of objec-
tive appli-
cation?

Assuming, then, that the list of *a priori* conceptions is legitimately derived from the analysis of judgment, Kant asks how he is to *deduce* or justify them in their objective application. In other words, he asks what value they have for knowledge. Are they merely *subjective*, or are they also objective, and if so, in what sense? Are they objective in the same way as the forms of space and time, *i.e.*, are they empirically real, or may they also be applied to things in themselves? This is the same doubt which we encountered in the *Æsthetic* in regard to the *a priori* perceptions of space and time, but it meets us here in a more dangerous form. For the *a priori* perceptions, though sources of universal and necessary propositions in relation to the things of experience, would not in themselves give rise to questions in relation to that which is beyond experience. But the categories, being conceptions of objects in general, do not carry with them their limitation to the field of experience, and therefore directly suggest questions regarding that which is beyond it. For if we have general conceptions which are independent of sensible experience,

it is not at once obvious that the knowledge we get by the use of these conceptions should be confined to the objects given by sense. And not only so, but the mind which is possessed of such conceptions is inevitably driven to consider whether the forms of time and space also, inasmuch as they give rise to necessary and universal perceptions, may not apply to objects in general, irrespective of sensible experience.

There is, then, a twofold question before us: can the *a priori* conceptions enable us to know objects, and if so, what kind of objects do they enable us to know? But the answer is simple. "There are only two cases in which it is possible that a conception that adds to the idea of an object should correspond with that object, so that they may necessarily refer to each other, and in a manner coincide. Either the object must make the conception possible, or the conception must make the object possible. If the former be the case, the relation of conception and object is empirical, and the conception cannot anticipate the object. This is the case with phenomena in regard to everything in them that is due to sensation. If the latter be the case, then as (apart from the causality of conceptions through the will, of which we are not speaking) a conception cannot in itself *produce* its object as an existing thing, there is only one way in which the *a priori* determination of objects by means of conception is possible. The conception, to wit, must be the condition under which the object can be known as an object. It has been already shown that the condition under which alone objects can be *perceived* is an *a priori* form in the mind. Now the question is whether there are

If so, they must be the conditions of experience.

not also anticipatory *a priori* conceptions in which lie the conditions, not indeed of the perception of objects, but of their being thought as objects. If there are such conceptions, then all empiric knowledge of objects must necessarily be in conformity with them, since, except through them, nothing could be presented in experience as an object. Now experience always contains, besides the perception of sense, a conception of an object that is given, or appears, *in* the conception. Hence, at the basis of all empirical knowledge, there must lie conceptions of objects in general as *a priori* conditions of its possibility, and the objective validity of the categories as *a priori* conceptions rests on the fact that they are the conditions required."¹

Kant's argument then is simply this: If the abstract conceptions are to be held to give us knowledge of objects, either objects, as they are presented to the mind, must bring these conceptions with them as a part of their content, or the mind must itself produce the conceptions, and so far produce the objects that are presented to it. But the former alternative is excluded: for sense presents to us only a manifold matter, and this manifold matter does not contain in itself the conception of an object. So far as sense goes, one perception or sensation follows another without any reference to a permanent object. The conception of an object, therefore, cannot be produced *by* the object as affecting sense, for sense cannot recognise it as an object. It remains that the mind should itself supply the conceptions of objects. But this does not mean that the mind actually produces its own objects. To suppose so

¹ *Kritik*, § 14, p. 88: Tr., p. 77.

would be to suppose that not only the conceptions of objects in general, but the particular determinations of objects were produced by thought. It would be to suppose the existence in us of an understanding which discharged also the office of sense, *i.e.*, of a perceptive, or, as it might also be called, a creative understanding. *Our* understanding, however, is confined to the general and abstract, and depends for the particular upon sense. And, therefore, when we say that it is the understanding which makes the objects possible, this can only mean that the general conceptions of objects, which the understanding supplies, are conditions under which the matter of sense is objectified, or referred to objects. On the other hand, as the conceptions so supplied by understanding are *only* general ideas, as they do not specify themselves, but depend for their specification on the matter of sense, so they have no significance or value apart from this matter. They are, apart from this matter, mere forms. They have, as Kant says, no objective significance.

On these two poles, then, rests the deduction or justification of the categories, and, at the same time, the limit of that justification. On the one hand, it rests on the sensuousness of all perception, and its inability to supply us with the conception of an object, and, on the other hand, on the generality of the pure conceptions of the understanding, and *their* inability to specify or particularise themselves; for this is what Kant means by saying that the understanding "cannot create its own objects as to their existence." Obviously, if perceptions be unable to determine themselves as objects, there is a place left open in experience for the pure conceptions. On

Interdependence
of perception
and concep-
tion.

the other hand, if the pure conceptions, as being merely *general* conceptions of objects, cannot determine or specify themselves apart from perceptions, then they have no value except in relation to such perceptions. In other words, the only conceptions which have any value or objective validity are those that are the conditions of the possibility of experience. "That a conception should be produced completely *a priori*, and should have relation to an object, without being either a condition of the possibility of experience, or derived from such experience, is impossible and contradictory. For, as no perception would correspond to it, it would have no content (*i.e.*, no specialising matter). Perceptions constitute the whole field of possible experience, and an *a priori* conception, which had no relation to such perceptions, would be only the logical form for a conception: it would not be a conception of anything."¹

Kant's
problem
changes as
we ad-
vance.

The great difficulty of following Kant through this reasoning is, that the conclusion seems to take away all meaning from the question put at the outset. At first we are asked to consider whether the object makes the conception, or the conception the object possible. But in order to think this alternative, we must suppose that empirical objects are given to us from without, and that *a priori* objects are determined from within. We find, however, that no object is given to us, but only a 'manifold' or sensational matter, which, through the synthesis of the understanding, is referred to objects. The statement of the alternative must therefore be altered, and we must ask whether the conception is one that is constitutive of the objective conscious-

¹ *Deduction* (first edition), § 2, p. 20: Tr., p. 191.

ness in general, or one that is derived from sensation, when sensations are interpreted by that objective consciousness. For it is the understanding that produces the conceptions of objects in general, without which the matter of sense would never be more than mere transitory feelings, referred neither to permanent self, nor a permanent not-self. It is, therefore, only *after* the understanding has constituted for us an objective consciousness, a consciousness in which there is a permanent self, and a permanent not-self, that the question of the objective or subjective origin of a conception can properly arise. Hence we might say that it is the understanding, and not sense alone that presents objects to us, and that sense merely enables us to add new determinations to them when so presented. But, to put it in this way, might suggest the idea that the objective consciousness exists by the mere act of the understanding, prior to anything being given in sense: whereas it is an essential part of Kant's doctrine, that the understanding does not act of itself, does not of itself develop its categories, and by means of them produce an objective consciousness, but that the objective consciousness can only be evolved in the individual in relation to his particular sensations. The conceptions of the understanding are merely forms of synthesis, which have no significance, except when the 'manifold' or unconnected elements of sense are given to be brought under them. Hence Kant tells us that "objects in their existence" are given only through sense. Yet through sense they are not given *as objects*, and if existence means anything more than momentary sensation, they are not given *as existent*. What Kant means to say

Conse-
quent am-
biguity of
the word
object.

is, that the element of sensation is essential, as well as the element of conception: but just as he allows himself to use the word synthesis, at one time for the function of sense, and at another time for the function of understanding: so it is with the word 'object.' It seems to be employed to designate the element which, on any occasion, is regarded as wanting in order to complete the idea of experience. Hence the puzzling logomachy that arises when we bring Kant's thoughts and expressions together. The categories, which are conceptions of objects in general, are declared to be referred to objects only through perception, while it is just these very conceptions which make us conceive perceptions as objective, *i. e.*, as representative of a reality more permanent than themselves. Thus it is said *both* that perceptions apart from the conceptions of the understanding have no objective validity or reference to objects, and that the conceptions only refer to objects through the perceptions. Both the 'emptiness' of mere conception, and the 'blindness' of mere perception, are expressed as want of objectivity or reality. In the former case, the object means that which is actually felt or given in sensation, or perception, as opposed to that which is merely thought or imagined. In the latter case, it means that which is regarded as independent of its being felt, not indeed in the sense of being incapable of being felt, but in the sense of its being referred to consciousness in general, and so conceived to be independent of the sensation of the individual subject. Combining the two elements, we might say, with Kant, that the object is that which is *given* in individual sensation, yet *thought* or judged to be inde-

pendent of individual sensation. But then we must be careful to remember that it is not the object, but merely the sensation that is given. We cannot say the objects are *there* with perception, but are thought as objects, or are *there for us* only in conception; for it is the very essence of the Kantian idealism that objects are *not there* till they are thought, except in the sense, which itself involves a new difficulty, that perceptions are the result of an affection by the unknown thing in itself. Kant, in short, identifies the object in the sense of the unknown cause of sensation with the object which we find in sensation, in so far as we determine it by thought, and he declares that the latter must be conceived as *phenomenal* of the former.

The same or similar ambiguities are found in Kant's use of the word 'determine.' On the one hand, thought is said to determine perception, which otherwise is "for us, as thinking beings, as good as nothing:" yet, on the other hand, perception is said to determine thought, as it gives specification to the general conception of an object supplied by thought. In the one case, perception is conceived as presenting to us an indefinite something, which waits for thought to fix and define it. In the other case, thought itself is the universal which perception specifies. This ambiguity might possibly be explained by saying that perception in itself would be nothing for us as thinking beings, if thought did not bring with it conceptions of objects in general: but that it becomes something as referred to, and specifying such general conceptions. But the key to this difficulty, as well as to the corresponding difficulties in relation to the word 'object,'

And of the
word *deter-*
mination.

is to be found in Kant's comparison and confusion of the two Logics, of which I have spoken in the preceding chapter.

Does
knowledge
begin with
the uni-
versal or
with the
individual?

So long as we look at the question from the point of view of the ordinary analytic Logic, it seems necessary to suppose that it is perception that determines or specifies the general conceptions of the understanding, as it presents to us the individuals that may be subsumed under them: nor does it seem to make any difference, that these conceptions are conceptions of *objects in general*. From this point of view it is natural for Kant to say, that "all judgments are functions of unity among our ideas, in which, in place of the immediate idea of a thing, a higher or more general idea that embraces this and various others under it, is used to determine the object, and thus a number of possible cognitions are brought together into one:"¹ and to regard the conceptions of objects in general, as only the highest of all the conceptions that give unity to knowledge. But this mode of connecting together ideas by higher and higher conceptions, by which, as Kant supposes, unity is given to knowledge, ceases to have the value thus attributed to it, so soon as we recognise that objects are not *first* given in their complete determination as individual objects, and then found by abstraction and generalisation to have common properties; but that, on the contrary, the first determination of objects is general, and that the advance of knowledge is a process of specification and determination, whose goal is the completely determined individual. If that goal were attained, there would be little or no meaning in reversing the

¹ p. 69 : Tr., p. 57.

process, and returning to the general conception to connect the individuals, which, by the process of specification, we have separated. The reason that it appears otherwise, lies in a certain confusion of thought, which has already been partly explained, but on which we may add a few words.

Our first determination of objects is, in one point of view, the most general and abstract, in another point of view, it is the most purely individual determination of them; and the progress of knowledge, therefore, may be regarded either as a progress to greater generality or greater specification. The individual may be taken as either the 'terminus a quo,' or the 'terminus ad quem' of science. For the beginning of knowledge is the reference of a sensation to an object, of which it is interpreted as the quality. This object is determined merely as object in general: it is like all other objects, yet it is conceived as completely individual and independent. The simple quality attributed to it, is conceived as belonging to it in itself, apart from all relation to other objects. In the advance of knowledge, however, this simple individual object becomes progressively defined and determined. And not only is quality added to quality in an indefinite series, but its isolation is taken from the object. It is found that qualities are but relations in disguise, and that, therefore, completely to define the object in itself, is the same thing as to put it in relation to all other objects. Perfectly to individualise the object is to discover the laws that bind it to all other objects, and, therefore, complete knowledge of one thing, knowledge of it in its completely determined individuality, would be the knowledge of the whole universe in its

Ambiguity
of the
question,
and its in-
fluence on
Kant.

unity, the idea of the whole that explains the differences and relations of all the parts. Thus it would appear that knowledge does not proceed from the individual to the universal, according to the usual conception, but that, beginning with that which we may describe either as the abstract individual, or, as the abstract universal, it ends with what we may describe as either as the concrete individual, or the concrete universal. It is simply because the concrete universal, the universal as a principle of unity, has been confused with the abstract universal, or common element : and again, because the completely determined individual, which is determined through its relation to all things, has been confused with the mere singular unrelated atom : that science has been supposed to begin with the individual, and end with the universal, and that its process has been confused with a process of abstracting and generalising. So here, when Kant tells us that the only business of judgment is to unite individuals or species by bringing them under higher conceptions, he omits to notice that, unless the higher conception be one that determines the individual or species in a new relation not involved in our previous conception of them, it is a judgment not worth making, and one that would never actually be made, except as a logical experiment. Thus he hides from us the true relation between the different judgments he is comparing ; between the judgments by which the objective consciousness is first constituted, and the other judgments by which it is developed. And, in consequence, he is led to treat the categories as if they were the first predicates of judgment in which perceptions are the subjects, whereas, if we

wish to express their meaning in relation to experience, it would be better to say that they supply the first determinations of the subject, in relation to which alone perceptions have any meaning for us ; or, to put it in another way, in relation to which alone sensations become perceptions. The analogy drawn between the analytic and the synthetic judgment, and between the categories and other predicates, rather obscures than illustrates Kant's meaning. For we cannot think of the perception as subject of a judgment, without thinking of it as already determined, and only receiving additional determination from the predicate, and thus we are inevitably led to give to the sensation or perception *before* thought, a character which it has only *in* and *for* thought, and to lose sight of the fact that the perception in itself is 'blind.' Whether Kant himself did not sometimes lose sight of that fact, we shall afterwards have occasion to consider.

CHAPTER VIII.

TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION OF THE CATEGORIES.

Object of
the tran-
scendental
Deduction.

WE now come to the most difficult, but at the same time the most important, part of the *Critique* of Kant—that in which he gives us his analysis of knowledge, separating and naming one by one each of its factors, and showing that it is only by the united action of them all that the world of experience, the world of space and time in which we live, comes to be to us what in our ordinary consciousness it is. Unless this chapter be clearly understood, an intelligent apprehension of the other parts of the *Critique* is impossible. Its difficulty arises partly from a certain defect in Kant's theory, of which we shall afterwards speak; but it is mainly due to the fact that the processes of analysis and synthesis, the process of separating knowledge into its elements, and the process of reconstructing it out of its elements, somewhat interfere with each other. The very distinctness with which the different elements of experience are marked off from each other, is apt to give them for our thought a certain false substantiality and independence, which afterwards hinders us from understanding their interdependent

unity. To obviate this difficulty, it may be useful to take a general view of the whole argument before we follow Kant into its details.

We must first realise what the problem is. Ex-
 perience is always, even to the ordinary conscious-
 ness, *a system*—a system, it may be, only in its most
 general outlines, but still so far systematic. Even
 when the sense of law and order is most defective,
 common experience is to this extent organised, that
 all *objects* are represented as existing in one space—
 arranged, that is, with reference to each other, in
 definite relations, which correspond to the relations
 of different parts of space; and that all *events* are
 represented as taking place in one time—arranged
 with reference to each other in definite relations,
 which correspond to the relations of different parts
 of time. Further, while the unity of space and
 time is thus presupposed as conditioning all the *ob-*
jects of experience, on the other hand, presupposition
 is also made, tacitly if not explicitly, of the identity
 of the self which is the *subject* of it. Any one may see
 this, if he will only attempt to make the contrary
 supposition—that the self to which all his experiences
 are referred does *not* continue the same. It is evi-
 dent that, in that case, there would be a complete
 break of connection between the two successive
 series of experiences which were referred to the two
 different selves, and that no bridge could be thrown
 from the one to the other. The life before and after
 the division of the self, could not form parts of one
 experience, and the objects known would belong to
 two distinct worlds (as some have imagined that we
 live in different worlds when we sleep and when we
 wake). The identity of the self is, in fact, but the

Experience
is a sys-
tem.

subjective counterpart of the unity of the world as one whole, existing in one space and one time.

The subject is also, as an individual, one of the objects of experience. Twofold problem arising from this.

But further, notwithstanding the general correspondence of the self and the world, we find that, in ordinary experience, the individual does not regard himself simply as a universal *subject*, but also as one of the *objects* of experience—an object both of outer and inner sense—as one individual among the many individuals he knows; and in this point of view he finds himself limited by conditions of space and time, so that his *immediate* knowledge and action seem to be always confined to a particular moment of time, and a particular part of space, which he respectively calls ‘now’ and ‘here.’ Now, this view of experience suggests a special difficulty, and a difficulty which has two aspects, according as we choose to regard it from the point of view of the universal or the individual self. Taking our stand at the latter point of view (as was generally done by the English philosophers), the question is, how an individual, as such, can be a *subject of knowledge*, seeing he can have no direct experience of anything outside of his own sensations and ideas. For, even granting that objects exist outside of the subject, they cannot themselves ‘pass over into his mind.’ All they can do is to *affect* him, and produce a series of sensations, or states of feeling. And these affections could not give rise to any knowledge of the objects that produce them; nay, they could not even determine themselves as the sensations of an individual, received at particular moments of time, or in particular parts of space. Ere the individual can know himself as an individual, he must transcend himself, and relate

himself to a world without him; ere he can recognise his sensations as *of the here and now*, he must relate the moment and the place to all time and all space. It is obvious, therefore, that in the individual who knows himself as an individual, limited by conditions of space and time, there must be in some sense a *universal* consciousness—a consciousness in general—to which the consciousness that belongs to him as an individual is related, and by which it is interpreted. If it were otherwise, the latter could not have any definite meaning—could not give rise to any ideas of objects, or even of itself as an object. The universal consciousness must determine the particular contents of my sensitive consciousness, ere I can know myself as an individual standing in definite relation to other individuals, and having perception of them under definite conditions of time and space. The problem, therefore, on this side of it is, to determine what a merely sensitive being needs to convert a series of sensations into such a consciousness of the world as we actually possess.

In the other aspect of it, the difficulty would take a somewhat different shape. Taking our stand upon the universal consciousness of self, which is the counterpart of our consciousness of the world, we should have to ask how such a general consciousness can individualise itself, as it actually has done in us—in other words, how the knowing subject can be an *individual object of knowledge*? How is it possible that I, as a thinking intelligence (and therefore, as such, universal and indifferently related to *all* objects of knowledge) can yet be so definitely related to one of these objects, that I can even identify myself with it to the exclusion of all the others?

Here the problem is inverted ; and whereas in the former case we had to look to thought for the means of emancipating sense from its limit, now we have to look to sense for the means of restricting and limiting thought. And the possibility of such restriction can be admitted only if we are able here to repeat, in regard to the understanding, what we formerly said in regard to sense. Just as in that case we maintained that knowledge could not be derived from sense except through an intelligence which is universal ; so here we must be able to show that *our* knowledge could not be such as it is, unless the universal intelligence were limited in its activity by relation to a sense, which is by its essential forms confined to the particular ; or, more accurately, limited to the determination of an inner sense, in relation to an outer sense. How can we explain that we should be *conscious* of limits, except by the universality of thought ; yet, on the other hand, how can we explain that we should be conscious of *limits*, except through the particularity of sense ?

The vindication and limitation of knowledge go together.

Kant's deduction, then, has two sides or aspects in which it may be regarded, and is actually regarded by himself. On the one side, it looks toward the *vindication*, and on the other side toward the *limitation* of knowledge. / Knowledge is impossible without the unity and universality of the understanding : this is the answer with which Kant meets the scepticism of Hume. Knowledge is impossible except through the particular data of sense, and under the conditions of space and time with their inexhaustible difference : this is the objection which he opposes to the dogmatism of Wolff. Neither of these aspects of truth is to him more important than

the other, but they gain prominence alternately according to the point of view from which he happens to be approaching the subject. In the deduction of the first edition of the *Critique*, he follows mainly the 'path of ascent,' and beginning with the manifold of sense, he ends with the unity of pure self-consciousness: in the deduction of the second edition, he follows the 'path of descent,' and beginning with the identity of self, he ends with the manifold of sense, as it is given under the conditions of space and time. But in both, the general drift of the argument is the same. In both, Kant seeks to prove that experience is possible only through a certain combination of elements, none of which could be separated from the others, or changed, if the result was to be what it is. As, however, there are certain points which are more fully explained in each, and as Kant even suggests that they should be used as complementary, we shall first give a short sketch of the argument of the first edition, before explaining that of the second in more detail.

The substance of the argument is contained in the following words: "The consciousness of ourselves which we have, according to the determinations of our state in inner sensuous perception, is merely empirical, always changeable; hence we commonly call it inner sense or empirical apperception. From it we could not possibly get the idea of a standing or permanent self amid the flux of inner phenomena. For that which must always be represented as numerically identical, cannot be determined as such through empirical data. Only a condition, which precedes all experience, and makes it possible, can give force to such a transcendental presupposition." "Now

Deduction
of the first
edition
of the
Critique.

no knowledge, and no connexion or unity of the different parts of knowledge, can possibly be realised in us, without that unity of consciousness which precedes all data of perception, and in reference to which alone we can represent any object as such. This pure unchangeable consciousness, I will call the *Transcendental Apperception*. . . . The numerical unity of the apperception, therefore, is the basis of all conceptions, just as the manifoldness of space and time is the basis of all the perceptions of sense. And this transcendental unity of apperception it is, that produces out of all possible phenomena that can exist together in our experience a systematic connexion according to laws.”¹

How can a
sensitive
being
know?

The question is, what is necessary to elevate a merely sensitive consciousness (if, indeed, you can call it a consciousness) into an experience such as ours? How can the idea of a world of objects, all related to each other, at least through the one space and time in which they are included, be evolved out of the fleeting states of one sensitive individual, who is at the same time determined as himself but one of the objects in that world? While the fleeting stream of sensation flows on, never two moments the same, how can the elements brought successively into consciousness be retained, lifted out of their isolation, and made permanent elements in a systematic unity of experience, which is ever becoming fuller and more definite? The answer of Kant is, that this is possible only if the empirical consciousness—the apperception by the individual of his own states *in time*, is continually related to, and interpreted by, a transcendental apperception, *i.e.*, a con-

¹ *Kritik* (2nd edition), p. 99 : Tr., 201.

consciousness which is *out of time*, and which, therefore, transforms mere transitory sensations into objects that have a character independent of the immediate perception of them. This Kant attempts to show by beginning with sense, and adding on one condition after another, as it is proved to be necessary for the objective consciousness or experience, till, finally, he reaches the consciousness of the identity of self as the *first* condition of all knowledge. The following is an outline of the argument.

How can we know objects? Ere we can perceive any individual object as such, we must have a manifold before us, and we must combine this manifold into a unity. But to distinguish the elements of the manifold, means in the case of a successive consciousness like ours, to distinguish the times in which the manifold is given (for 'as contained in a single moment that which is presented to the mind can be only a simple unit'); and to combine the elements thus distinguished, means to reproduce the past sensations, and associate them with that which is present.¹ To account for knowledge, therefore, we must admit also the agency of a reproductive and associative faculty of imagination; otherwise the data of sense will perish as they arise, and no unity of an object will ever be presented to our minds. But even this is not enough. Association cannot generate the objective consciousness: for the subjective combination of ideas in the individual consciousness already implies their objective determination. In order to produce the effect required,

Necessity of (1) synthesis of apprehension in perception; (2) synthesis of reproduction in imagination; and (3) synthesis of recognition in conception.

Kant holds that consciousness, so far as it is passive, is serial that a number of different elements can be united in one consciousness only by synthesis, *i.e.*, spontaneity.

the elements associated must be definite, and 'definite' means 'defined in relation to each other.' When we speak of associating sensations, we mean by a sensation a certain state of the subject that has a general character, by which it is distinguished from other sensations, and can be recognised as the same on its recurrence. In other words, the associated sensation must be represented, not as it is to mere sense, but as it is when determined by the consciousness of an intelligent being—*i.e.*, it must be represented as an object which has a definite relation to other objects. And this is simply to say that the elements associated have an *objective affinity*, which is prior to their subjective association. If we could suppose the elements of knowledge to be *given*, without any definite relation to each other, we might suppose that, by a law of association, they were afterwards combined with each other (though their combination in that case would be quite accidental). But the elements of knowledge cannot be given in the character which they have to a thinking subject, except in so far as they are already related. In the consciousness of such a subject, therefore, the reproductive synthesis of imagination is chained down to certain definite conditions by the understanding: or, in other words, we can combine the manifold of sense in an object of thought, only in so far as we bring that manifold under some general principle of relation. Such a general principle of relation is supplied by a conception. When we bring the data of sense under a conception, we take them out of their mere singularity as feelings of the sensitive subject, and represent them as parts of an image or picture, which is

put together according to a general rule, independent of the momentary sensitive state of that subject. And it is just this that we mean by reference to an object: for an object is that which is independent of the perception through which it is given. Thus "we think of a triangle as an object, only when we are conscious of combining three straight lines according to a rule, in conformity with which such a perception might always be set before our minds."

"All knowledge, then, requires a conception, however imperfect and obscure it may be, and this conception is always a general idea, which serves as a rule to the particular."¹ The recognition of data of sense as objective is the recognition that they fall under such a rule. The virtue of this process of determination by conceptions, lies in the fact that, by means of it, the data of sense are taken out of their mere singularity as feelings, and made elements in a universal consciousness, in 'consciousness in general;' or, to put the same thing in another way, they are related to a consciousness, which the individual has, not *as* a mere individual, but as a universal subject of knowledge. It is, in fact, only in relation to such a consciousness that any individual can know himself or any other individual object as such, for only in that relation can an object be at once distinguished from, and yet connected with, other individual objects. Now we have said that such relation is produced by the data of sense being brought under conceptions. These conceptions may, to a certain extent, be empirical, and in that case they will always be uncertain, and may even be arbitrary and factiti-

The ultimate conceptions, by means of which experience is organised, are the categories.

¹ p. 98 : Tr., p. 199

ous (as when a man imagines that he sees a ghost). But there is a limit to this. For, in the first place, there are certain primary conditions of the representation of objects, to which even the *imaginary* construction of objects, must submit:¹ and, in the second place, all *real* objects must find a place in the context of one experience:² for, as it is one self to which all objects are related, so the world to which all objects are referred is *one* world. The synthesis, which has connected any particular data of sense under a conception of an object may, therefore, be tested by considering whether the object so determined can be connected with all other objects as part of one experience, or of one world. But this implies that the transcendental apperception is not merely a consciousness of the self as an absolute unity, but rather the consciousness of an activity of synthesis which contains in itself certain *a priori* conceptions, and which uses these conceptions as rules to produce connexion, and therefore objectivity in the manifold of sense. In other words, the Ego manifests, and is conscious of itself as an understanding: and this understanding is not merely a faculty of generalising, but contains in itself, or, if we like, is constituted by, certain general conceptions which are principles of relation for all the manifold of sense. And we have before seen that these conceptions are the categories. It is by the aid of the categories, therefore, that we "ourselves bring into phenomena that order and regularity which we express by the word *nature*, nor should we ever be able to find order and regularity in the world, if we ourselves, or the very constitution of

¹ Mathematical principles.² Dynamical principles.

our own intelligence, had not originally put it there. For this unity of nature presents itself as a necessary unity, *i.e.*, as a unity of the combination of all phenomena, of which we are certain prior to all experience. How, indeed, should we ever be able even to enter upon the process of combining all phenomena into a unity which is determined *a priori*, unless there were, in the original principles by which our faculty of knowing is constituted, certain grounds of this *a priori* unity, which, though subjective, have an objective value, as the source of the possibility of knowing any object of experience as such?"¹

This short epitome of the deduction of the first edition will become clearer after we have considered the deduction of the second edition. In the latter, some points, particularly the relation of the categories to the 'Transcendental Apperception,' are more fully explained, and some new questions are started in regard to the connexion of consciousness in general with the consciousness of the individual self. For these reasons, and because of the great importance of the subject in relation to the rest of the *Critique*, we shall give a detailed account of this deduction, so as to show the relation of all its parts, and we shall reserve all criticisms, which are not necessary for the explanation of Kant's meaning, for another chapter.

Deduction
of the
second
edition
divided
into two
parts.

The deduction of the categories, then, as it appears in the second edition, is divided into two parts. In the first part, Kant abstracts from the fact that the manifold of sense is presented to us under the forms of time and space, and simply assumes that a manifold is somehow given: and on this

¹ p. 112 : Tr., p. 215.

basis he shows that the objective consciousness or experience is possible only by means of the categories, as the forms through which the unity of self-consciousness is brought in relation to the matter of sense. In the second part he goes on to show that to produce such an experience as ours, the categories must be applied to the manifold under the forms of time and space, and he is thus led to consider the imagination as the faculty that intermediates between understanding and sense.

Sense incapable of synthesis.

In the first place, then, we start with the question, What beyond perceptions of sense is required for knowledge or experience? The manifold that is in our ideas can be presented in sense, if we regard sense as merely receptive of impressions. Further, in receiving impressions, sense may modify them by its own forms. But there is one thing that is impossible for sense, and that is to *combine* the manifold matter so presented. As merely receptive of impressions, sense cannot bind them together. To bring about that result it is necessary that the mind, which receives impressions in their isolated multiplicity, should react upon them. For synthesis, not only the receptivity of sense, but also the spontaneity of the understanding is required. Wherever, as in all our ideas of objects, there is a combination of manifold and different elements, *there* there is an act of synthesis by the understanding. "We can represent nothing as combined in the object, unless by our own mental activity we have combined it; and of all our ideas, synthesis is the only one that cannot be given or impressed upon us from without, but must be produced by the self-activity of the subject." Wherever we find unity in difference, or the combination

of various elements under one conception, there we trace the activity of the understanding. If there is room for analysis, there must previously have been synthesis. If the understanding has not previously bound elements together into a unity, it can find nothing to separate or dissect. At the beginning of knowledge, therefore, we find a synthesis, and for that synthesis the understanding must find the binding conceptions in itself.

But synthesis presupposes an identity or absolute unity in relation to which it is made necessary. What is manifold does not in itself necessitate synthesis. It is only in so far as manifold elements have, in spite of their difference, to be thought in relation to that which is numerically one and simple, that they require to be bound together under a unity of conception. Thus in a sensitive being which is the subject of many different impressions, these impressions will either remain isolated, or, if they be united and combined so as to qualify each other (as they must be if referred to one object, or one world of objects), then this implies their being put in relation to an identical consciousness, a unity in consciousness that through all its differences remains the same. Thus the synthesis of perceptions, as referring to one object, implies the possibility of an identical consciousness of self as having these perceptions. "It must be possible for the 'I think' to accompany all my ideas, perceptions, &c., for otherwise these ideas would be something in me which I could not think, *i.e.*, they would be either impossible, or, for me at least, as good as non-existent."¹ To set anything before me as an object is, potentially at least,

Synthesis
of the
under-
standing
presup-
poses
identity of
the self.

¹ p. 732 : Tr., p. 81.

to relate all its elements to the same self—a self to which also all other objects are related. An idea I could not so relate, I could not be conscious of as *my* idea, *i.e.*, I could not be conscious of it at all. Here, then, is one point of community between all the different elements presented to me through sense. To be, or represent, objects to me, they must in spite of their manifoldness and difference be so presented that they can be related to one self. They must, in short, conform to the conditions under which they can stand together in one general self-consciousness.

Yet the consciousness of the identical self is possible only through synthesis.

On the other hand, while synthesis involves a reference to the identical self, it must not be supposed that the consciousness of this self is independent of the activity of synthesis. On the contrary, we can be conscious of the identity of the self only in so far as we are conscious of the synthetic activity of the understanding. In what other way indeed could we explain such a consciousness? It would be absurd to suppose that the consciousness of self is contained in the mere perceptions, which are essentially manifold and unconnected. An empiric consciousness made up of mere sense perceptions would be scattered and broken up among them: it would have no reference to any identity of the subject. Nor can we explain that identity by saying that the consciousness of self is a common element in all our different perceptions; for in order to see the identity of a common element in different perceptions, I must bring them together in relation to one self. The discernment of a common element in different conceptions or perceptions, in fact, *doubly* presupposes the unity of self-consciousness. For, in the first place, a common

element is an element which, by an act of synthesis, has formerly been bound up with other elements not common to the different objects compared, from which by the act of analysis it is separated; and, in the second place, as has already been indicated, these different cases must be synthetically brought together in one consciousness, in order that the common element may be observed in them. But then, if such an explanation be excluded, if we cannot in any way extract the consciousness of self from that which the mind *receives*, we must derive it from what it *does*. And the consciousness of the identity of self must be generated by an activity of synthesis which extends to all its perceptions and ideas. 'The consciousness of self, therefore, as one in all the manifoldness and difference of its perceptions, involves the combination of all these perceptions into a system in which all the parts are definitely related to each other, and unless I could refer all my perceptions to such a systematic unity, to which I can always assume that they will conform, I should have 'a many-coloured ever-changing self,' lost in the multiplicity of these perceptions, or, in other words, I should not be conscious of a self at all.

From this reasoning we may conclude that, 'though the principle of the necessary unity of apperception is in itself an identical or analytical proposition, it implies a synthesis.'¹ In other words, the proposition 'I am I,' or ' $I = I$,' which expresses the bare consciousness of self, is a tautology: but at the same time it expresses a consciousness, which can only be realized through the presentation of many different elements in perception, and the integration

¹ p. 734: Tr., p. 83.

or synthesis of those differences. I cannot say 'I am I,' unless I can connect all my different perceptions, or bring them under a unity of conception. Hence, the consciousness of self is possible only to one who refers all his perceptions, in spite of their difference and variety, to the unity of one *objective* consciousness.¹

Objects determined as such in synthesis by means of conceptions.

This last expression brings us a step farther in the argument. The connection of perceptions in one consciousness in virtue of which I am conscious of the identity of self, is, we have just asserted, equivalent to their reference to objects, and indeed to one world of objects. For what is implied in the reference of a perception to an object? It implies simply that the manifold elements in it are combined in one consciousness; and this combination in one consciousness is possible only in so far as we bring the elements of the manifold under one conception. It is the definite relation or connection given to those elements by bringing them under one conception, that enables us to refer them to a real unity, which is distinct from our perceptions, and which is conceived as determining and not as determined by them. To take an example: how am I to know any object in space, say, a line? Obviously I must apprehend the manifold of space by ideally traversing it; but is this all? Certainly not; for if I forgot one element as I passed on to another, or if I did not definitely bind them together in my thought, I should have no object before me. I must therefore, in my apprehension of the manifold, be guided by some principle or law of connexion in order that I may bring any definite thing before my mind. "I

¹ The subject can be conscious of itself only in relation to an object which it at once excludes and determines.

must *draw* the line, and produce a distinct combination of the given manifold, so that the unity of this act is at the same time the unity of consciousness (in the conception of a line); thus alone can an object (here a definite space) be known.”¹ But, as we saw before, that the consciousness of the identity of the self was dependent on the synthetic activity of thought through which the manifold was brought together in one consciousness, so now we see that this synthesis is the same movement of thought by which all objects are determined *as* objects. Nay, we may go farther than this; for as we are conscious of one self only by means of conceptions, so ultimately we must represent all objects as forming a unity under one all-embracing conception, or we must conceive all objects as belonging to one world. For only through the consciousness of all objects as one, *i.e.*, as one world, can we be conscious that it is one and the same self that apprehends all objects alike.

Our self-consciousness, then, is determined in relation to consciousness of the object, and this consciousness of the object involves synthesis of the given manifold of sense. The manifold, however, must be given. The notion of the *ego* indeed is a pure thought independent of sense, but it could not be realised in an actual self-consciousness except in relation to the given manifold of sense. Its pure identity contains in it no difference, and therefore would not of itself make possible a judgment, in which the difference was transcended. If indeed we had an understanding which generated as well as connected the manifold, which was a source of differentiation as well as integration—which, in other words,

But the manifold must always be given externally.

¹ p. 736 : Tr., p. 85.

created its own object—then by such an understanding, self-consciousness could be realised without any matter being presented to it from without for synthesis. But our understanding is not of that character. Its pure simplicity is incapable of creating differences. In order to be differentiated, even so far as is necessary for the analytical judgment of self-identity, its pure light must be broken by a foreign object. Its power is simply this, that it can integrate given differences, can gather the manifold externally presented into the consciousness of one objective world, and that in relation to, yet distinction from, this world, it can accomplish the consciousness of self. Nor again can we explain this objective consciousness by association. Association is so far from explaining the objective consciousness, that it must itself seek explanation from it. The association theory cannot be expressed except in terms of that very consciousness it would account for. When we say the object A is connected with B in our minds, because it has frequently been associated with it in experience, we are but subsuming a particular relation between ourselves as sensitive objects, and other objects under the general principles of the objective consciousness. Nor does it make any difference if instead of speaking of objects, we say that we connect together the *sensations* that have frequently gone together in our past experience. For sensations identified as the same in repeated recurrence, are already objects. They are at least conceived as definite states of the sensitive subject, and this determination of them involves already those principles for which the association theory seeks to account. Hence, as Kant

ness is derived from objective unity under given conditions *in concreto*. Our accidental associations presuppose the objective consciousness, but cannot be used as the explanation of it.

The only point that remains is to prove that the list of categories derived from the forms of judgment corresponds to the principles of objective synthesis of which we have just been speaking. But this correspondence may be seen at once, if we consider what is the essential nature of the judgment. "I have never," Kant writes, "been satisfied with the explanation of judgment given usually by Logicians, that it is the conception of a relation between two conceptions. I will not raise the objection that this explanation is defective, as adapted only to categorical, and not to hypothetical and disjunctive judgments (which latter express a relation not of conceptions but of judgments): though this oversight leads to much confusion in the treatment of Logic. But I must note that it tells us nothing definite about the relation in question. When, however, I investigate more accurately the relation of the given elements of knowledge in a judgment, and distinguish them from relations of association, established by reproductive imagination—relations which have merely *subjective* validity—I find that a judgment is nothing but the mode in which we bring given conceptions to objective unity of apperception. And this is just what is implied in the use of the verb of existence as the copula. That verb, in fact, distinguishes the objective unity of given ideas from their subjective unity: for it indicates that they are related to the original apperception and its necessary unity, and that even where the judgment itself is empirical, and

The categories are the conceptions required.

therefore accidental. Thus, by the judgment: Bodies are heavy, I do not mean to assert that the conceptions of body and weight are *necessarily combined* in the empirical perception of them. But what I do mean is, that they *are combined with each other by means of the necessary unity of apperception* in the synthesis of perceptions, *i.e.*, that they are combined according to those principles of objective determination under which all our ideas ~~must~~ come, if *knowledge* is to be derived from them. Only by subsumption under such principles can the relation of two conceptions be made such that it admits of being expressed in a judgment, *i.e.*, a relation that is *objectively* valid: whereas a relation of conceptions determined by the laws of association, could have only *subjective* validity. For by principles of empirical association, I could only be enabled to say that, when I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight—but not to say that it, the body, is heavy. For this would be equivalent to saying that these two conceptions are bound together in the “object—*i.e.*, altogether apart from the state of the subject; and not merely that the subject has perceived them together, however often it may be.”¹

The general meaning of this is obvious after what has been said. A judgment in which two notions are bound together, asserts more than the connection of these two notions by association; it asserts that they are bound together in the object—bound together, that is, not by the accidental perception of them together or successively, so that one suggests the other, but by a law that determines the perception, and is prior to it. This, indeed, does not mean that there is anything in the nature of the perceptions,

¹ *Deduction*, § 19 : Tr., p. 86.

e.g., of extended body and weight, that forces us to think of the one as the necessary accompaniment of the other. But it means that, when we bind them together in the manner expressed in judgment, we must have brought them under a principle of necessary connection. If weight and extended body are not necessarily connected, their relation cannot be expressed in a judgment; if their relation is expressed in a judgment, it is asserted to be universal and necessary. Otherwise I should merely be entitled to say, 'These things have gone together in my experience hitherto;' but not that they necessarily go together; which is what I do assert, when I say, 'Bodies are heavy.' Schopenhauer objects to this illustration of Kant, that even to say, "When I carry a body, I feel weight," is to make an objective judgment as to my sensitive experiences. This is true; and might be admitted by Kant himself without inconsistency. And it calls our attention to an ambiguity in Kant's exposition of his principles both in the *Critique* and *Prolegomena*, which it is worth while to clear up before we proceed farther.

If I say, 'When I carry a body, I feel weight,' it would be natural to understand me as stating something about my own sensitive experience, to which I do not venture to assert that the experience of others will conform. My assertion is not therefore equivalent to the proposition, 'Bodies have weight,' which implies that the fact is one which is common to the experience of all sensitive beings. But still, in so far as I am asserting that the connection holds and will always hold good for me, I am making a universal judgment in relation to a particular object,

Ambiguity in Kant's view of judgment as expressing the objective consciousness.

viz., my own sensitive constitution. Nay, even if I be understood merely to say that such is now the relation of perceptions in my experience, I am still judging and speaking of myself as a sensitive subject with a definite succession or co-existence of perceptions in my inner life. The truth is, that whenever we determine a perception as a state of the subject, no less than when we determine it as a quality of an object, we make a judgment concerning it, and relate it to the transcendental unity of apperception. Even to say, 'Such is my association,' is to go beyond association. Kant contradicts himself when he expresses in a judgment, what on his own theory cannot be expressed in a judgment at all. Association brings up one idea after another, but does not itself give ground for the judgment: 'I associate A with B': for this involves that A and B are each fixed as definite objects of thought, and so definitely related to each other and to the self.

Kant's distinction of judgments of perception, and judgments of experience, cannot be maintained.

What has now been said throws some light on Kant's treatment of this subject in the *Prolegomena*. For there we find him distinguishing two kinds of judgments; judgments of *perception*, and judgments of *experience*. The former are judgments which merely express a connection of individual experience, and which, therefore, give rise only to a *subjective* association of ideas. The latter are judgments in which the connection is determined by one of the categories, and which therefore express an *objective* relation of things; or, what is the same thing, a relation valid not for the individual subject only, but for all perceiving subjects. In the passage above quoted from the *Critique*, we find Kant using the categorical form of judgments in contrast with

the hypothetical as indicating that the relation in question is determined by the category of causality; and this in spite of the fact that the category of causality is got from consideration of the hypothetical judgment. 'When the sun shines, the stone becomes warm,' is thus a mere judgment of perception, which becomes a judgment of experience in the form, 'The sun warms the stone.' But, in the first place, even allowing that the former of these judgments is a mere judgment of perception, it is so only as respects the special synthesis expressed in it; or, in other words, it presupposes many judgments of experience, by which the manifold of sense was combined into the conceptions of the sun on the one side, and the warm stone on the other. For these are presupposed as objects, and the only question is as to the objectivity (or universality) of the connection between them. In the second place, according to Kant's own doctrine as stated in the same passage, the judgment in all its forms expresses objective, and not merely subjective, connection. Strictly speaking, there is *no* judgment of *perception* possible, for perception does not make judgments. We can indeed explain how Kant is led to this mode of statement in the *Prolegomena*, seeing that there he is treating of the possibility of experience in the organised form which it takes in the empirical sciences. He therefore puts the question to himself like an experimental physicist, who, in trying to distinguish the phenomena that are really connected with each other among the many that appear to be connected, does not need to take special note of the fact that the experience with which he begins is already organised. Such

an inquirer, whose main interest is directed simply to distinguish real from apparent connection, might, in Kant's language, be said to be distinguishing judgments of perception from judgments of experience. But he would be more accurately said to be criticising the immediate judgments of ordinary experience, or examining whether the relations expressed in them were real, *i. e.*, whether they should have been expressed in judgments at all. Still it must be remembered that even the explanation of a connection of ideas as a mere subjective connection of association, is, in its way, a reference of that connection to the objective consciousness; for the sensitive subject is itself one of the objects of experience, which is definitely related to other objects. In fact, the question before the scientific man is not, strictly speaking, whether two things are connected in experience and consciousness in general, or merely in 'my consciousness,' but in what connection of experience they come—not whether the connection is real or unreal, but to what order of reality it belongs.

Result of
the first
part of the
Deduction.

We now proceed with Kant¹ to gather up the result of the first part of the Deduction. Without synthesis, no knowledge of objects can be derived from the manifold of sense, and synthesis is possible only as a relation of the manifold to the unity of the self. On the other hand, the consciousness of an identical self is only a consciousness of the continuity, or unity with itself, of the activity of synthesis whereby all perceptions are combined in one objective consciousness. Thus, out of synthesis comes the consciousness at once of the object and the subject

in strict correlativity, and it becomes of the utmost importance to determine what are the forms of synthesis. This question, however, is at once answered, when we see that synthesis in the sense required, or objective synthesis, and judgment are the same thing. When we judge we affirm an objective unity of perceptions, *i.e.*, a unity which is universally valid irrespective of individual experience, which gives the rule to that experience, but does not take its rule from it. Therefore the categories, which are deduced from the table of functions of unity in judgment, must be just the forms of synthesis we require.

So far, however, we have only taken into consideration the manifold of perception generally; and we have seen that it is through the categories that any such manifold becomes organised into knowledge of objects distinct from and related to the self. We have now to see how this applies to the manifold as it is actually given to us in our experience under the special forms of time and space. We have therefore to show first, that the categories get all their significance from their application to this particular manifold; and then, secondly, that their application to this manifold is implied in the determination of the objects of our knowledge, as they are actually determined in experience.

In regard to the first of these points, it seems sufficient to say what has already been indicated, that the categories would have no use except in relation to a sensuously given manifold, and that such a manifold is given us only under these special forms. A perceptive understanding would need no categories to bind together the manifold of *its* perception with a

The categories have objective validity *only* in relation to matter given under the forms of space and time.

view to its being brought in relation to the unity of the self. To such an understanding the differences would spring at once *out of* the unity; and it would not therefore require any artificial bond to bring the differences back *into* the unity. Such an understanding would immediately through the difference of its object return upon itself. But if the manifold be given apart from the self, a synthesis is necessary to make possible the consciousness of self in spite of the difference, by uniting the manifold in the conception of an object. This is the use, and the only use of the categories as means of synthesis of the manifold of sense. Now this manifold of sense is either *formal* or *material*. In so far as it is formal, or given in *pure* perception, in so far it is possible for us to fill the categories with content *a priori*, and so to have *a priori* knowledge of objects. And this knowledge by determination of the forms of sense according to the categories, is what we have in Mathematics. Yet even this can only by anticipation be called knowledge: for the *form* of sense, taken by itself, is not knowledge, but merely the possibility of knowledge. Whether there is anything corresponding to this form, whether, that is, there shall ever be an actual perception, is not to be known *a priori*, but only when we have the perception. Hence the science that arises from the application of the categories to the forms of sense, is merely provisional and problematical. It is science, only if there be matter given in accordance with these forms and conditions. The categories therefore have no value for knowledge except in application to objects of experience, *i.e.*, to matter given in actual percep-

tion, and according to the forms of our perception.¹

It is true indeed that the categories are not in themselves bound by the last of these limitations. For, while they have no value or use, except in relation to a manifold of sense, yet this manifold need not have been given under the forms of space and time.

Hence the greater generality of the categories does not extend our knowledge.

As pure notions of the understanding, they have no limitation to any special matter or form of sense. And, just as we can conceive that there might be other senses than those we have, so we can conceive that there might be other *forms* of sense than space and time. But this is a bare supposition: and since, as a matter of fact, we have no other senses, and no other forms of space, it is no real addition to our knowledge to say that, for aught we know, there might be others. This possibility of a sensuous perception of another kind than our own, is, in fact, nearly as barren as the possibility before mentioned, of a perception altogether non-sensuous, and purely intellectual. To the latter we can apply only negative predicates: we can deny that it will be limited by time and space: we can deny that it will be determined by the categories: for, as already said, the categories would have no application, except to a sensuously given object. Of the former we can say, that if matter of sense *were* given, the synthesis of that matter whereby knowledge was derived from it, must be guided by the categories. But this does not help us much: for when we separate the categories from their relation to sense, they sink back into mere functions of unity in possible judgments, and lose all objective significance.¹

¹ p. 743: Tr., p. 90.

Determin-
ation of the
form of
inner sense
by the
categories.

When we have thus realised that the only matter for the categories to determine is that which is given under the forms of our sense, it is no longer difficult to see what use must be made of the categories in order to produce our actual experience. The transcendental apperception acting through the categories, must determine sense, and particularly inner sense, in its form of time; or, regarding it from the other point of view, the categories must be restricted by the form of inner sense ere they can be applied to its matter. In this way we can explain both the nature and the limitations of our experience. For the form of inner sense, and hence of all sensible perceptions, is time: therefore the manifold matter of sense can be determined only in so far as the form of time is determined. Accordingly we must suppose that the categories determine *a priori* the ways in which the manifold of sense must be put together in time, in order to constitute the objective consciousness, or, in other words, to make experience possible.¹

The func-
tion of the
imagina-
tion in
knowledge.

But this determination of the manifold of inner sense by the categories implies a faculty of mind by which the categories,—which, in themselves, are mere forms of analysis,—become filled with content or difference. The pure synthesis of the understanding taken by itself is on the point of lapsing into the mere tautology of the analytic judgment, but by reference to the form of sense, its conceptions get a really synthetic meaning, and become principles of relation and connection in the manifold matter of sense. The *synthesis intellectualis* is thus

¹There are some ambiguities in this statement which will be explained in the next two chapters.

imperfect, except as the basis of the *synthesis speciosa*. The former has reference to a manifold of sensuous perception in general: the latter has special application to the manifold as given under the *a priori* form of our sense. We may call it the transcendental synthesis of imagination: for the imagination is that 'faculty by which we set an object before the inward eye without its actual presence.'¹ But we must observe that in this exercise of it, the imagination is not merely reproductive, but productive; *i.e.*, it does not merely revive an original formerly given in sense (for the categories can never be so given), but gives sensuous form to that which in itself is a pure conception of the understanding. And, whereas the reproductive imagination, in combining the elements of its pictures, is guided by empirical laws of association, the productive imagination, as it gives sensuous embodiment or expression to the categories, proceeds on necessary and universal principles. It is thus the mediator between understanding and sense. It is sensuous, in so far as it makes us perceive or 'envisage' its object, and all perception is sensuous. But it is intellectual, in so far as its synthesis is an exercise of the spontaneity, and not of the receptivity, of the mind, which gives determination to its object, and does not, like sense, receive determination from without. It is, in short, a faculty of determining sense *a priori* according to the categories; or, without speaking of a separate faculty, we may say simply that the synthesis of the imagination is an 'effect of understanding upon sense, and thus the first application, and

the ground of all other applications'¹ of the conceptions of the former to the perceptions of the latter.

Digression
upon the
conscious-
ness of self
as one of
the objects
of experi-
ence.

Before going farther, we may observe that the consideration of this process of imaginative synthesis enables us to understand how our individual self can be to us a mere object of experience like other objects, and to distinguish between it and the transcendental self, which is the unity presupposed in all knowledge. The latter is a bare thought, by which no object can be determined, though, on the other hand, no object can be determined as such except in relation to it. The former is one of the objects of experience, which we can know only under conditions of the form of sense. This, indeed, is at variance with what has been taught by previous philosophers like Des Cartes, who supposed that we are immediately and directly objects to ourselves, while other things can become objects to us only mediately or indirectly. But this opinion rests on a confusion of the faculty of apperception with the inner sense, which it is essential to the *Critique* to distinguish. For, as we have seen, the consciousness of self is realised only through the synthesis of the understanding, *i.e.*, we are conscious of ourselves only in the activity of thought, whereby we bind together the manifold matter of sense: and this activity can, by no means, provide out of itself a manifold matter to combine, neither can it take the given manifold into itself in such a way as to destroy all trace of its foreign origin.² In other words, it cannot differentiate its

¹ p. 746: Tr., p. 93.

² This seems to me to be the meaning of the phrase, "to bind together the manifold of its own perception" (p. 747: Tr., p. 94).

own simple identity, nor, when the 'manifold,' as Kant calls it, is supplied by sense, can it afterwards discover in that manifold any essential relation to the form of synthesis by which it is combined. It remains, then, that all our knowledge of self, so far as it refers to the pure subject which is the ultimate unity of all thought, is confined to the mere consciousness *that* we exist: and that all self-knowledge *beyond* this is merely knowledge of the phenomenal self, *i.e.*, it is modified by the form of inner sense through which we apprehend it. This will be seen if we consider the way in which we apprehend our inner life as a continuity of consciousness determined in time. For we do so only by affecting ourselves, or, in other words, only in that determination of our successive consciousness in conformity with the categories, of which we have just spoken. Such an affection of ourselves indeed is implied in all knowledge: for all knowledge implies that a determination of sensibility from within by the understanding should come to meet its antecedent determination from without. In order to combine the successively given manifold in the consciousness of an object, we must picture to ourselves, by a continuous act or ideal movement of imagination, the conception under which we subsume it. For, to apprehend an object as such, is to combine the elements of it as definitely related in one whole: it is to bring them into a unity of conception; and this unity of conception can only be applied to the different elements united, in so far as we realise or envisage it by a constructive act of imagination. Thus, to represent anything as an object in space, we must, in a continuous synthesis of imagination, construct its figure. To think of space itself as an

object, we must make a construction that exhibits its dimensions, by representing three lines drawn at right angles to each other. Nay, even to think of time itself as an object, we must do something similar. We must ideally draw a line, and then abstracting from the result of this process, we must think of the continuous synthesis of the manifold in it, whereby we go on adding new elements, and bind them to those represented before. Now, the consciousness of our own existence which we get, in so far as we oppose this constructive movement of thought to objects in space which we construct, in other words, the consciousness of our own existence as determined in time, is of the same kind with the consciousness of those other objects; *i. e.*, it is merely phenomenal. This is evident, because it is only in relation to those objects that we have this consciousness: it is evident also from the simple fact that it is only by a line in space that we can fix in one image the flowing unity of time. The self we know as an object is, therefore, merely phenomenal; it is not an objective presentation of the self presupposed in all thought. It is an internal object that exists for us, not in the pure thought of self, but only through the consciousness of that determination of sensibility by thought, through which external objects are made out of sensations. Behind the consciousness of ourselves under the form of time lies the transcendental subject, just as behind the consciousness of objects in space lies the transcendental object: but these are merely thoughts. The object we know is the phenomenal object, which we know only as we are affected from without, and the subject we know is the pheno-

selves, or, in other words, as the transcendental subject affects the inner sense. Nor is there any real difficulty in supposing that we affect ourselves. Every act of *attention* illustrates such self-affection. For, in the act of attention, we begin with some conception of an object, and what we do is simply to determine our inner sense to represent or envisage it in inward perception, in accordance with the rule of connection involved in the conception.¹

To return to our argument, which this digression about the phenomenal or particular self has interrupted, we have seen that the categories can only become the means of the determination of objects, in so far as by imagination they are used to determine the forms of sense, and, in the first instance, the form of inner sense. Now, we are not yet here considering the mode of this imaginative envisagement of the categories: we are simply seeking to show that all possible objects of our sense are actually determined as such by the categories. This will become obvious if we consider that to determine the objects of our senses as such, is to determine objects as in space and time, which are not only forms of perception, but also themselves perceptions of individual objects. For this means to put together the manifold of these objects in conformity with the unity of space and time, *i.e.*, as it must be put together, if there be only one time and one space, and if the manifold of all objects has to be united in the same way as the manifold of time

The determination of objects in space and time implies the categories.

¹ Cf. p. 303 (1st Edition): Tr., p. 253. We are thus conscious of ourselves as a *transcendental* subject (*that* we are), because we distinguish our own activity from the matter on which it is exerted: but we are conscious of ourselves as a *phenomenal* subject (*what* we are) only under form of time as distinguished from *space*.

and space is united. But the unity of space and time can consist in nothing else than the reference of their manifold to the one transcendental self, and the manifold of perception cannot be brought in relation to this unity of self, or determined as objective, except through the categories. Hence the forms of synthesis of the manifold of objects in general, in relation to the unity of self-consciousness, are necessarily also the forms of synthesis of the manifold of *our* sense in time and space.

It is easy to show by instances that the conformity of the objective synthesis to the unity of space and time is equivalent to its conformity to the categories: "When, by apperception of the manifold of sense, *i.e.*, by gathering it together in relation to the unity of self, I represent a house as an object, I presuppose the unity of space, and of all external sensuous perception; and I make, as it were, a drawing of its shape in conformity with this synthetic unity. But, if I abstract from the form of space, I find the same synthetic unity in the understanding in the form of a category: the category, namely, which is involved in all combination of homogeneous parts in one perception, the category of *quantity*." "Again, to take another example, when I perceive the freezing of water, I apprehend two states (of fluidity and solidity), as standing in a relation of time to each other. But I necessarily represent the manifold as synthetically united in time, which, as an inner perception, is the presupposition of all other perceptions; for, unless time itself were a definite succession, no determinate relation of sequence could be presented in perception. But, again, if I abstract from the form of time, and regard this synthetic unity sim-

ply as a condition under which the manifold of perception in general may be combined, I find in it the category of causality: and it is by the application of this category to my sensibility that I determine the relations of all that happens in time. Hence the perception of such an event, and therefore the event itself as a possible object of perception, stands under the conception of the relation of cause and effect.”¹

This concludes the *Deduction*, the results of which we may now briefly sum up. It is proved that objects can only be determined as such by synthesis of their manifold in relation to an identical self. It is proved that the forms of this synthesis are the categories. It is proved that, while these forms have no necessary relation to a manifold given under the special forms of our sense, yet they are the means of giving objective unity to the manifold so given; and that it is through the application of these forms alone, that the world can be represented by us as a connected system in one space and one time. Hence, if we examine how a manifold of sense, given under the *a priori* forms of time and space, must be determined in conformity with the categories, we may fairly expect to discover in our own minds the laws of nature. Nor is this really so strange as it appears at first sight; for all it means is, that there nature, as a system, would not exist for us at all, unless the manifold elements presented in sense were capable of being combined in accordance with the laws of our intelligence.

Result of the Deduction in (1.) the vindication, (2.) the limitation of experience.

¹ p. 743: Tr., p. 99. This last part of the *Deduction* anticipates much that is not fully explained till we reach the *Principles of the pure understanding*.

On the other hand, we must remember that there are two great limitations of this *a priori* knowledge. In the first place, as will be afterwards shown more fully, it is limited to the phenomenal world of experience. The nature to which our understanding can prescribe the law, is not the nature of things in themselves, but of things as they are for us with our peculiar forms of perception and conception. And, in the second place, even within the range of experience, our *a priori* knowledge only extends to the most general laws of nature—the laws that are involved in the very existence of nature, *i.e.*, an order of phenomena in time and space determined by laws. All particular laws of nature stand under these general laws, but the former cannot be determined from the latter. It is impossible, therefore, to anticipate on *a priori* principles the particular data of experience.

Finally, we must again point out that this is the only way of explaining the agreement of the conceptions of our understanding with experience. For, as we have seen, there are only two possible alternatives: either experience must make the conceptions possible, or the conceptions must make experience possible; and as the former alternative is excluded by the nature of experience (which, as we have shown, must be based on that which is not itself empirical), the latter must be the truth. If any one seeks to evade this conclusion by some hybrid scheme of pre-established harmony between the conceptions implanted in us by the Creator and the objects without us, it need only be observed, that the necessity which belongs to the principles based on these conceptions—and which must belong to them,

if they are to perform their office—for ever precludes the verification of such a hypothesis. For, if we supposed that there was merely an accidental coincidence between the conceptions in our minds, and external things, the necessity of the judgments in question could not be explained. And, without such necessity, there would be no basis for experience at all.

CHAPTER IX.

CRITICISM OF THE DEDUCTION.

In what
sense do
the factors
in experi-
ence imply
each
other?

THE aim of the *Deduction* was, in the first instance, to vindicate the categories as a system of *a priori* conceptions necessary to organise the manifold of sense. As a matter of fact, however, it equally treats of the necessity of the manifold of sense, as given under the forms of time and space, to realise, or give real meaning to, the categories. It sets experience before us as a whole of independent parts which can be distinguished, though not separated, or which, if separated, lose the value which they have in the unity of experience. What, then, is the nature of this mutual implication of the elements of experience? We might conceive it in two different ways. We might conceive experience as being ideally distinguishable into elements, which yet are correlative with, or implied in, each other, and which, therefore, are as inseparable, even in thought, as an outside is from an inside, or the quality of having its angles equal to the right angles from a triangle. Or we might conceive it as a result, which cannot be attained except by certain definite means, just as a house cannot be built without materials of various

kinds, which have no previous affinity for each other, though they are all necessary in view of the builder's purpose. Now little consideration is necessary to show that it is rather on the latter than on the former analogy, that Kant's proof of unity of experience is constructed. He regards the different elements as reciprocally presupposing each other, but he does not regard this reciprocal presupposition as resulting from the nature of the elements themselves. They must all be combined if there is to be such a thing as empirical knowledge, but, we are distinctly told, they have in themselves, apart for this purpose, no necessary connection with each other. Their union is a necessity imposed from without. The elements must all be present, because a given result has to be produced, but they are not treated as factors of a relation, which lose their meaning when taken away from each other, and from the unity of one definite whole. In this way, the identical self, the categories, time and space, and the manifold of sense, appear as independent things, and Kant seems to construct experience, as a watchmaker constructs a watch, out of pre-existing parts.¹ Yet, when we come to the end, and look back on the whole process of his reasoning, it seems impossible to avoid the suspicion, that he has proved the unity of experience in a higher sense than he intended, and that, in fact, he has refuted the presupposition of the existence of independent parts in knowledge, with which he began. If this suspicion should be verified, it will follow that there is a certain inevitable mis-statement involved

¹ This contrast, however, must be modified by what is said in the sequel.

in Kant's method of proceeding from the parts to the whole: for, if at the outset, we treat the elements of knowledge as if they were independent wholes, the *real* whole, when it is reached, must take to us the appearance of an artificial and external combination. And, to correct this mis-statement, it would be necessary to do what Kant never did: to reverse our steps, and consider how the parts or factors of knowledge are determined, when we regard them from the point of view of their unity.

Kant's
analysis
interferes
with his
synthesis
of these
factors.

In a sense, analysis and abstraction constitute an important and even a necessary step toward the truth. It is only when we sever the elements of knowledge from each other by analysis, that we can distinctly see the link of connection that binds them together. It is only when we isolate and fix in abstraction the correlated parts of the organic whole of truth, that we become clearly conscious that they *are* correlated. Synthesis in the highest sense is possible, only when analysis has done its perfect work. When, therefore, Kant starts by considering the elements of experience *apart from* their unity, and when the result of his reasoning is to show that they can only be understood *in* their unity, he is simply following that necessary process of self-correction, by which thought always advances from a less adequate to a more adequate view of its object. We begin in knowledge with a part, though this involves a false conception of the part as if it were a whole: but the effort to combine this part with other parts gives rise to a contradiction, which cannot cease till the abstraction of our first conception is corrected, or, in other words, till the parts are deprived of their false independence, and defined

anew as elements in a greater whole. This is the true synthetic logic which guides Kant's thought. It is good logic, though the conclusion may be said to contradict the premises. It is, in fact, the logic by which every great scientific discovery is made: for, in every such discovery, a certain provisional conception of facts becomes the means for the discovery of some general principle which alters that very conception. Unfortunately, however, Kant, though he really proceeds on this method, does not understand his own procedure. Often he makes as if he were constructing experience out of elements prior to experience, while he is really showing the elements of it to be so correlated, that the abstraction by which we isolate them necessarily destroys itself. And there is an unsolved contradiction between his result and his starting-point, because he never revised his first conception of the different faculties or elements of knowledge in the light of that unity which it was the final result of his work to demonstrate.

It has been a matter of controversy whether Kant's method is psychological or metaphysical. The answer is, that there is a delusive appearance of psychology in it. In asking how far that which we call experience can be produced out of sense and understanding, with their respective forms, Kant seemed to take the position of a spectator, whose mind, of course, had been already developed, and who was watching the growth of another mind out of its elements. He seemed to forget for the moment that it was his own mind he was examining; and, therefore, he gave to a process which is really the exhibition of the necessary relations of all the elements of developed knowledge, the false appearance

The transcendental method is not psychological.

of an observation of the genesis of knowledge. Thus he gave occasion to the misunderstanding of Fries and his followers, who reduced the *Criticism of Pure Reason* to empirical Psychology. But, apart from other objections to such a view of it, which will be mentioned afterwards, observation of the genesis of knowledge or, what is the same thing, observation by the mind of its own genesis, is the crowning absurdity of speculation: for there is nothing to observe, unless the observer puts his own developed consciousness in the place of the undeveloped consciousness he is observing.¹ And if he does thus introduce his developed consciousness, all he can possibly examine is the reciprocal dependence of its elements. He cannot possibly trace back knowledge to faculties or elements, which have a character independent of their relation *in* knowledge. We have no standing ground outside of the universe of thought, from which we can determine the factors that produce it. 'The mind is its own place,' its place includes everything knowable, and, therefore, as no one did more than Kant to show, it is impossible to explain it by going out of itself. Even if, *per impossible*, we could regard the mind or knowledge as developed out of pre-existing elements, these would be unknowable in themselves: they would be knowable only as they appeared as elements, in relation to each other, *within* the unity of thought. If, therefore, Kant had sought to find a key to the unity in the difference of knowledge, instead of finding a key to its difference in its unity, he would have disregarded the very limits of knowledge laid down by himself. He would have been

¹ Green's *Introduction to Hume*, § 9.

pretending to know things in themselves. The real force of his argument is seen when we regard it not in its psychological, but in its metaphysical, or, to use his own expression, transcendental aspect; not as an account of pre-existing faculties, to which the genesis of knowledge is traced back, but as a demonstration of the necessary factors or elements which, in the unity of actual knowledge, imply each other. But Kant's continually repeated expression 'conditions of possible experience,' may very easily suggest the false idea of going back from the result to conditions, which exist before it, and have a character independent of it, rather than the true idea of resolving a complex whole into the elements which, by their necessary inter-dependence, constitute it, and which, apart from the whole, have no determinate character at all.

The truth is, that the view which Kant adopts is a compromise between the psychological and the transcendental. Knowledge or experience is to Kant a systematic whole, an organic unity that "can grow only from within (*per intussusceptionem*), but cannot increase by external additions (*per appositionem*). It is thus like an animal body, the growth of which does not add any new limb, but, without changing their proportions, makes each for its special purpose stronger and more energetic." ¹ It is, moreover, an 'architectonic unity,' *i. e.*, it is based on an idea of pure reason, which determines the place and relation of all its parts. In conformity with this view, Kant generally recognises that the elements of knowledge can be contemplated only as elements or factors of a whole; yet he sees no such necessary relation be-

But it has
psychological
elements
mingled
with it.

¹ p. 642: Tr., p. 504.

tween them, that they must be united with one another in just *this* whole. For, in the first place, he puts a wide gulf of division between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* parts of knowledge, *i.e.*, between the organic plan of knowledge which is derived from the nature of the intelligence itself, and the particular contents of experience with which it is filled up. There must, indeed, be an empirical manifold of sense to fill up the plan, else there would be no knowledge; but what that content shall be, remains, so far as we can see, accidental. In the next place, even the *a priori* plan of experience is not homogeneous, for there is in it an element contributed by the understanding, and also an element due to sense; nor has the former any necessary relation to the latter, though both are necessary to the plan, and neither could exist alone. Even if we go farther into detail, we still find the same imperfect connection or integration of the elements of experience. For Kant tells us that there is nothing in the transcendental apperception which absolutely determines the number and nature of the categories, and nothing in sense which absolutely determines the number and nature of the forms of perception. The apperception and the understanding, the imagination and sense, thus fall asunder; and, although none of them could exist alone, there is still an admitted possibility that each of them might be an element in a different whole. The transcendental apperception depends on synthesis, but not on *just these* forms of synthesis. The synthesis requires a given manifold, but the manifold need not be given under *just these* forms of perception; and though the forms would be nothing without particular contents, the contents, for all that we can see, might

be altogether different. Kant therefore, as we have said, makes a compromise between the psychological and the metaphysical view of the unity of human knowledge. He goes so far with the metaphysician as to deny, that we can examine the parts of knowledge as things in themselves, out of relation to the whole in which they are combined; and he goes so far with the psychologist as to admit, that the whole is not in every part in such a manner as to exclude the possibility of its being bound up with other parts in another whole. The unity of knowledge is to him, after all, only a generic unity, which does not contain the principle of its own specification, though it marks out the sphere within which all the species must fall.

In the light of these remarks we may now proceed to consider the different transitions of the *Deduction*. Kant starts with the opposition of the pure intelligence, expressing itself in the bare thought of self, or the judgment 'I am,' to the given manifold of sense. The self, as we think it, is represented by him as a pure unity *apart* from its relation to the matter of sense; and the matter of sense as in itself manifold. Yet this qualification of the matter and form, the difference and the unity, apart from each other, is immediately retracted. In pure thought we do not get beyond the judgment 'I am I;' the judgment as analysed by formal logic: nay, it appears we do not even get so far: we cannot make the judgment of self-identity except through the synthesis of differences, which are supposed to be given from without. And, on the other hand, Kant has no sooner said that every perception 'contains a manifold in itself,' than he goes on to show

Relation
of the
identity of
thought
and the
difference
of sense.

that this manifold 'cannot be represented as such,' except through a process, which involves the synthesis of its differences in an object related to, yet distinguished from, the self. In fact, if we characterise the subject as a bare unit of identity, the object as bare difference, it is obvious that each of them is an abstraction, which cannot be thought except in unity with the other, and to which it is as absurd to attribute independent existence as to suppose one end of a stick existing without another end. If we could conceive thought as existing by itself, its activity would be a pure tautology, a movement by identity and by identity alone. If it could be conscious of itself, it would be limited to an eternal 'I am I.' On the other hand, if we could conceive sense existing by itself, it would simply be a flux of differences without relation, a manifold whose elements never qualified each other. If it could, *per impossibile*, be active and so conscious of itself, its language would be an eternal 'I am not I.' But in such absolute separation it is impossible for either thought to know, or for the manifold to be an object of knowledge. Each must be apprehended in relation to the other. The only possibility of knowledge is that the identity of thought and the difference of sense should be brought together and reflected on each other. Thought in itself has no possibility of differentiation, nor sense of integration. A mere identity would not be conscious of itself except in relation to a given difference, and a mere difference could not be known except in relation to an identity. As has been shown before, the judgment: 'A is A,' has no meaning, and indeed it is a judgment that could not be made, except in reference

to a presupposed distinction; and in like manner, a negative judgment, while it asserts a distinction, must have reference to a presupposed unity. Absolutely isolate identity from diversity, and you annihilate both. Accordingly, when Kant thinks of understanding as in itself tautological, and of sense as merely an organ of difference, he is obliged to deny consciousness to both. Consciousness and self-consciousness can only arise by relating the two to each other, *i.e.*, through synthesis. The analytic judgment of self-consciousness, 'I am I,' cannot be made except through the synthetic judgment, whereby the manifold of sense is united in the conception of one object. Synthesis puts the one self in relation to the manifold sensible as subject to object, and makes possible the apprehension of each by means of the other. For synthesis, like sense, involves differentiation, yet integrates the differences, which for mere sense is impossible: and it involves integration like thought, but is an integration of *differences* which the pure understanding cannot originate for itself.

Now, this is just what is implied in Kant's next step, by which he puts the categories between the pure Ego and the manifold, as the necessary media by which alone the former can become a real self-consciousness, and the latter an object of knowledge. But according to his usual analytic mode of conception, the categories appear only as a *third something* which binds together elements not themselves essentially related. Pure unity or absolute identity, he argues, has no possible relation to mere difference, and the bare thought of self can be no principle of synthesis in a given manifold. The unity of thought.

The categories differentiate pure thought, and integrate the manifold of sense.

must differentiate itself in order to supply conceptions that make possible the combination of the manifold, and also the relating of that manifold, as an object, to the conscious self. The categories are thus represented as instruments wherewith the understanding is armed for the apprehension of the manifold; or for the conversion of the crude matter of sense into an intelligible world of experience. Why the understanding has precisely these categories and no others, Kant declares it impossible for us to perceive; all he attempts is to show that it is necessary for the understanding *in some way* to differentiate itself into categories, ere it can put itself in any relation to the manifold, or even attain to self-consciousness. Yet he reduces this differentiating power as far as possible, when he points to the analytic judgment as bringing with it certain forms of thought. Another thought lies very near, if it is not expressed in so many words by Kant, the thought, viz., that the analytic judgment of self-consciousness contains in itself all the forms by which the manifold may be synthetically combined and so determined as objective. And it is only natural that we should find these forms to have quite a different significance, when we regard them as principles of synthesis of the manifold of sense, from that which they have when we regard them merely as expressions of the unity of thought with itself.

We have then, when we go thus far along with Kant, a conception of three elements which presuppose and are presupposed by each other. The manifold of sense is presupposed as matter for synthesis under the categories: the synthesis under the categories is presupposed in the analytic judgment

of self-consciousness: and the analytic judgment itself supplies the categories which are the forms of synthesis of the manifold of sense.

But yet, in spite of this general relativity of the different elements, their unity is not conceived as a necessary unity. For (1) the categories, though they are "species of the synthetical unity of apperception of the manifold given in perception,"¹ do not seem to be determined in number and character by their genus, the unity of apperception itself; and, (2), there is no necessary connexion between the conceptions or forms of synthesis and the particular manifold of perception, which has to be synthetically combined, although apart from it these conceptions sink into mere functions of unity in the analytic judgment. In other words, thought in itself is tautology, and is only drawn out of tautology by relation to a manifold.

Yet they are not conceived as determined in number and nature by the idea of self-consciousness.

Now, in regard to the first of these points enough has been said in the seventh chapter. It was there pointed out that Kant's assertion, that the number and relation of the categories are determined *a priori* by the very idea of judgment, comes into direct collision with his other assertion, that we cannot know *why* the categories are just what they are and of the number they are. The former assertion is not, indeed, fully verified, for Kant's derivation of the *transcendental* from the *logical* system, and his attempt to vindicate the threefold division of the categories from the idea of synthesis, cannot be considered sufficient for the purpose. Still if it be true, as he declares, that the consciousness of self is one with the consciousness of synthesis, that synthesis is

¹ I., p. 502.

judgment; and that out of the very idea of judgment as the activity of the understanding, we can determine the whole system of *a priori* conceptions, then the transcendental unity of apperception and the categories cannot be treated as two separable elements, nor even as two elements, which, though not separable for us, may be separable for some other intelligence. Rather, we must regard them as different aspects of the same thing, or, to speak more correctly, as factors in a unity, of which we can say nothing whatever if we do not relate them to each other. And thus even the possibility of thinking either of them as elements in a different whole is altogether excluded.

Nor are they supposed to be necessarily related to the manifold of sense.

In regard to the second point also, a good deal has been said in the seventh chapter. The absolute separation of conceptions and perceptions stands and falls with the idea that thought in itself is purely analytic, or, rather, tautological, *i.e.*, ruled by the laws of identity or contradiction as understood by formal Logic. If there be no such thought, if the relation to difference is essentially bound up with all affirmative, and the relation to identity with all negative judgment, and if, therefore, all thought is at once differentiating and integrating, analytic and synthetic, then the understanding and sense cannot be opposed to each other in the way in which Kant opposes them. We may indeed say, if we like, that pure thought is not synthetic in itself; but then we must also say that it is not possible for thought to abide in itself; that it is its very nature to relate itself to the difference or manifold of perception, and that it is only by a false abstraction that we can contemplate it as an independent thing, which has a

law of its own action different from the law by which it is governed in its relation to perception. Or, to put the same idea in another way, if we can separate conception from perception, understanding from sense, our abstraction can have value and meaning only in so far as it enables us to discern *in* pure thought that same movement, by which thought ultimately breaks through its own limits, and so relates itself to perception. If our analysis of pure thought does not enable us to discover anything but abstract identity or abstract difference, it will be no preparation for the consideration of thought in its application to the matter of perception. A Logic built on such a foundation will be no guide to the sciences of nature and spirit, indeed it will be nothing more than a scholastic trifling with abstractions. The Logic that has a real value must be a Logic that treats the understanding as a synthetic principle, a principle which differentiates itself into a multitude of categories, and which becomes conscious of its unity or identity only through this differentiation. Kant himself acknowledges that an understanding which had no difference in itself, an understanding without categories, could not relate itself to any manifold or difference given from without; and though he makes this differentiation in its turn dependent on relation to the given manifold, the value of the admission remains the same; for the idea of an understanding in itself, *unrelated* to a manifold, is a mere abstraction, and the only understanding we can possibly examine, or even think of, is an understanding that has a manifold within it, and so stands in relation to a manifold without it.

These considerations may enable us to criticise the comparison which Kant draws between a perceptive

or intuitive understanding and an understanding like ours which is merely discursive. A perceptive understanding would not be dependent upon a given manifold, but would create the manifold it apprehended: it would not therefore need categories as instruments by which to produce synthetical unity in the manifold, and thus to attain to consciousness at once of the object and of itself. Kant contrasts such an intelligence with *our* intelligence simply because, as we have seen, he regards the reciprocal dependence of the apperception, the categories and the manifold of sense, as a general, and not as a particular, dependence—*i.e.*, as a dependence of elements which yet are separable from this particular whole. Hence he thinks himself at liberty to imagine a consciousness of self, which should not have just these categories as the forms of its relation to the manifold. But if the consciousness of self is correlative with the consciousness of a manifold object, and if the categories are the necessary forms of synthesis by which this correlation is determined, then it is obvious that we must take Kant's assertion, that, "Of any other understanding than ours we have not the slightest conception," more literally than he intended. For there is no intelligible meaning in supposing a relative to exist without its correlative. Either, therefore, a perceptive intelligence is impossible, or our intelligence must be regarded as perceptive.¹

¹ It is to be observed that Kant is not always quite at one with himself as to the limitation of the categories to matter given in sensuous perception. Cf. I., p. 503; *Proleg.*, § 34. In the former of these passages Kant's language is, at least, ambiguous. In the latter, and in the others quoted by Thiele (*Intellectuelle Anschauung*, p. 23), it is not necessarily implied that the categories *would* apply to an object of intellectual perception, but only that we have no such object given

If there is any objection to this view, it must be based on the ground of the special limitations of *our* perception, and Kant, indeed, maintains that while *our* perception is limited to the forms of space and time, we can at least conceive of a perception which should not be so limited. In other words, the forms of synthesis, while they carry with them relation to a manifold, do not carry with them relation to just such a manifold as this. Therefore, though it were granted that the consciousness of self is possible only through a synthesis of the manifold under the categories—even then Kant maintains that this synthesis need not determine objects *in space and time*. Thus the consciousness of unity or identity with itself, which the mind has through its synthesis of the manifold, may be correlative with a consciousness of objects as such; but it does not involve an objective consciousness like ours, a consciousness of objects as in space, or a consciousness of the individual self as determined in time.

Now, it may throw some light on this question if we observe, that while, in the first part of the Deduction, Kant had revived, under a subjective form of expression, the problem of ancient philosophy; in the second part of it, he is dealing with the peculiar problem of modern philosophy. When he discussed the possibility of the synthesis by the understanding of the manifold of sense, he was simply asking, with Plato and Aristotle, how the one can be combined

to us to which we might apply them, even *if* they were applicable. Kant, it may be remarked, never clearly realises to himself whether he means by the perceptive understanding a unity which transcends the difference of sense and understanding, or merely a unity in which that difference—even as a relative difference—does not exist, though his language, on the whole, suggests the latter alternative.

Not, at least, to the manifold of *our* sense.

Relation of the Deduction to the problems of ancient and modern philosophy respectively.

with the many; and when he goes on to consider how the categories can be applied to a manifold given under the forms of space and time, he is asking, with Descartes, how mind can relate itself to matter. And the transition from the one problem to the other is just an instance of that necessary evolution of thought, by which the more abstract problem or opposition generally yields to the more concrete and complex. Having proved that the consciousness of the identity of the subject is impossible except in relation to the manifold of the object, Kant necessarily proceeds to consider the unity of the one and the many in the two opposite forms in which it now appears—on the one hand, as a mind or knowing subject that, in all the manifoldness of its perceptions, preserves its unity with itself: and, on the other hand, as matter or known object, which, through all the relation and connexion of its parts, still preserves its manifoldness or difference. Descartes took up the same problem, at the beginning of modern philosophy, without any thought of the process whereby it had been developed into its modern form. Mind and matter were to him substances with qualities, which were, in every respect, contrasted and opposed. Matter was essentially extended or spatial, that is to say, self-external or made up of *partes extra partes*, so that no simple unit could ever be found in it, and no limit of its extension could ever be reached; for its essential and inseparable attribute was spatial extension, and no one can think of a space that does not contain spaces, or that is not itself contained in another space. Viewed, therefore, in abstraction from any subject (or, in Kantian language, as a thing in itself), matter was necessarily conceived as

at once infinitely extended and infinitely divided. On the other hand, the mind was conceived as absolutely simple and single, as that which, in spite of the variety of its states, is always in itself, so that no difference can break its unity. Between two such opposites finally there could be no link of connexion, and a *deus ex machina* was therefore found necessary to harmonise the one with the other.

Now Kant supplies the key to this difficulty, when he points out that the opposition between mind and matter is not an opposition between consciousness and something else than consciousness, but an opposition between two factors of consciousness. The unity of experience embraces both the inner and the outer life. Matter in space is not that which is out of mind, for of things in themselves we can have no knowledge. Consciousness in general must be regarded as transcending the distinction of the world within and the world without, at the very moment when it establishes that distinction. To this it only requires to be added that inner and outer, mind and matter in the Cartesian sense, are *correlative opposites* that imply each other. The absolutely simple self, and the infinitely extended and the infinitely divided world of matter, which Descartes considered it impossible to unite, it is really impossible to separate. He and his followers were vainly seeking for a link to connect two things, which can only be defined in relation to each other, and which, except in this correlation, can have no existence. For an Ego not in relation to a spatial world, or a spatial world not in relation to an Ego, are simply abstractions, to which no definite meaning can be attached. Consciousness can only embrace

Mind and matter are correlative opposites embraced in one consciousness or experience.

either as it embraces both. It cannot gather itself on the one side into the absolute unity of a self, except as it excludes, while it relates itself to, the absolute diversity of a world in space. The reality of both is therefore to be sought, not by taking each by itself as an independent object of knowledge, but by considering both in the unity of the process whereby they are determined in opposition, yet in relation, to each other.

Kant's
assertion
that object
and sub-
ject, as
known,
only exist
in the
process of
know-
ledge.

Now whenever we thus realise the dualism of mind and matter as a dualism of elements which in consciousness are determined only in relation to each other, we get a new insight into Kant's analysis of experience. Regarding both as factors in experience, which *are* only as they are known, Kant argues that the absolute unity of the one and the infinite extension and division of the other, must be understood in a limited sense. All that the infinite extension and division of matter in space means is, that an experience of an absolute limit to extension or division is impossible: if, therefore, we abstract from the relation of the objects to the unity of the self in the actual process of experience, we can put no limits either to its extension or its division. And all that is meant by the absolute unity or simplicity of mind is, that an experience of a break in the unity of the self, the subject to which all knowledge is referred, is impossible; and that, if you abstract from its relation to the manifoldness of the object, you must conceive the soul as an absolutely simple unit. But both elements, thus abstracted from, are necessary to all experience, and you cannot take away either without annihilating the whole. Yet at the same time, by what Kant calls a necessary illusion, the source of which he

seeks in the *Dialectic*, we are obliged to regard the subject and object of experience as existing apart from the process of experience itself, and as having in themselves, *before or apart from* experience, all the qualities which, in the process of experience, we determine to be in them. Matter therefore, because, in experience, we cannot come to an end of its extension or division, appears as the infinitely extended and divided object; and mind, because, in experience, we cannot but refer all diversity to its absolute unity, appears as absolutely indivisible and unextended. Thus we refer experience, on one side, to a transcendental object, and, on the other side, to a transcendental subject, which are quite distinct from the process through which they are known: and because of this necessary separation of the subject and of the object from the unity of experience, the qualities of both receive a false interpretation. *In* experience the unity of the self and the infinity of the object exist only in continual 'becoming,' in the differentiating and integrating process of synthesis; but when we take them out of the process, and regard them as fixed realities or substances, which exist apart from their being known, we necessarily attribute to the former an absolute simplicity which can never belong to any self-conscious *subject* of experience, since experience knows identity only in relation to difference; and we necessarily attribute to the latter an infinity of difference which also can never belong to any *object* of experience, for experience knows difference only in relation to identity. Experience is a process by which object and subject are progressively defined in relation to each other. The flowing stream of mere

we can say nothing either of these or any other objects.

It is obvious that here Kant comes very close to Berkeley, who found the *esse* of things, not in their *intelligi*, but in their *percipi*. For, in this doctrine, it is necessarily involved, that reality (as we know reality) lies, *not* in the objects to which, in the course of experience, we refer our perceptions, but simply in the stream of momentary perceptions themselves, as they occur. The reference to objects has value, in short, only as it enables us to connect these perceptions, and so recal past or anticipate future perceptions. To say that space is infinite merely means that I, in the course of my experience, can never possibly perceive an end of it; to say that the moon has inhabitants means only that, under certain circumstances, I would have certain perceptions;¹ even to say that I existed yesterday, or will exist to-morrow, merely means that a certain unbroken connexion of experience, related to one consciousness of self, connects certain perceptions together. The reality, in short, lies in the individual perceptions, and ultimately we must say in the individual sensations, and not in the *universal*, the self or the object, which make these perceptions or sensations intelligible. But to say this is to say, that the only reality which can ever be present to us in experience is, by the very process of knowing it, changed into illusion. For the sensitive consciousness has a value for knowledge only as it is interpreted in relation to the transcendental object and subject as realities independent of it; yet, according to the view just stated, this interpretation is essentially illusory,

His nearest approximation to Berkeley.

¹ p. 388 : Tr., p. 307.

except so far as it enables us to predict the contents of the sensitive consciousness itself.¹

We see thus that Kant is 'in a strait betwixt two.' His limitation of knowledge to phenomena implicitly involves the doctrine that the ultimate reality is perception or even sensation. Yet, at the same time, he maintains that sensation as such is nothing for knowledge, and that experience involves reference of the transitory sensation to a permanent object and subject, each of which is conceived as a real existence independent of the perception through which it is known. This, however, would be an existence *not* experienced: and Kant, therefore, holds it to be no existence at all, except as a remembered or anticipated experience. But "if water chokes us, what shall we drink?" The very process of knowledge is a process of illusion. It is a process of the organisation of sensations by reference to an object and a subject which (at least *as* they are determined in this process) have no reality. Being is thus absolutely separated from knowing: for the very process of knowledge is a reference of Being to that which is not, or, at least, is not as it is known. The shade of Berkeley is surely avenged on the philosopher who declares that knowledge, inasmuch as it necessarily transcends sensation, necessarily refers to the unreal.

Can
anything,
strictly
speaking,
be *given*
in sense?

There are, however, some criticisms on the Kantian conclusions which are suggested even by the course of his own argument in favour of them. In

¹ Note that, from another point of view, Kant leads us to the conclusion that the reality (transcendental reality) is *only* in the subject and object, as things in themselves, of which, however, we know nothing, except that they exist: but of this afterwards.

the first place, it is an error, on Kant's own showing, to think of knowledge as made up of an element given by sense, and an element which arises from the determination of sense by the understanding. The plausibility of such a conception arises altogether from a confusion between sense, as it supplies a factor in the intelligible world, and sense, as it might be for a purely sensitive being to whom there was no intelligible world at all. In the latter meaning, sense is indeed prior to *conception* in the individual life: but it is also and equally prior to *perception*. *Implicitly* sense may be said to be both perception and conception: it is the germ from which in the development of the individual they may both spring: but *explicitly* it is as little the one as it is the other. Hence the idea that there is something *given* in sense which is afterwards *determined* by thought, must be abandoned by the transcendental Idealist; for nothing can be given as an element of that consciousness of the world which we as thinking beings have, except so far as it is determined. The dualism of perception and conception, which arises within that consciousness, is not an absolute dualism, but the dualism of two elements which spring from one source, and which are moulded from the first, in relation to each other, by one principle. The idea of an element in knowledge which is simply 'given,' is to Kant the source of endless perplexities. Sometimes this element almost disappears, and Kant recognises that, as 'given,' it is 'for a thinking being as good as nothing.' At other times he speaks of it as if, as 'given,' it were already determined as a 'manifold,' and even as a manifold in time and space. He never seems to doubt

realise, what, nevertheless, his own reasoning more than anything else has enabled us to see, that, though there may be something 'given' in the sense that the individual subject is sensitive before it is conscious, yet that, as merely 'given,' it never passes the portals of the intelligible world. The waking of self-consciousness from the sleep of sense is an absolute new beginning, and nothing can come within the 'crystal sphere' of intelligence, except as it is determined by intelligence. What sense is to sense is nothing for thought. What sense is to thought, it is as determined by thought. There can, therefore, be no 'reality' in sensation to which the world of thought can be referred; nor can the idea of object and subject, which are necessarily involved in all rational experience, be considered as in themselves unreal, while the particular perceptions, which become 'blind' and unintelligible the moment we withdraw these conceptions from them, are considered to be real.

Kant's distinction between what is implicit and what is explicit in the empirical consciousness.

While, however, we criticise Kant's assertion that, by sensation, as such, apart from thought, any element of experience is given, we must remember that the same objection does not apply to another mode of statement which he often uses. Kant not unfrequently calls our attention to the fact that experience, in its first forms, involves elements of which the individual is imperfectly conscious. Thus, in the *Deduction* of the first edition, he says that knowledge requires a 'unity of consciousness, in which the manifold as successively perceived, is bound together into one idea,' that "this consciousness may be but weak, so that we become aware of it only in the result produced, and not in the act of

producing it: but that, nevertheless, this unity of consciousness must always be present, though it has not clearness sufficient to make it stand out,"¹ or distinguish itself from the other elements of the idea in question. The same view is suggested by Kant's frequent reference to imagination as a blind faculty of synthesis, a faculty that acts upon principles of which it is unconscious (*i. e.*, which it does not distinguish from the product of its constructions), while it is, at the same time, declared to be the office of the understanding "to bring the synthesis of imagination to conceptions:" *i. e.*, to bring to clear consciousness the conceptions which underlie the activity of the imagination, and are the guiding principles of that activity. Lastly, the same view is involved in Kant's mode of speaking of the pure apperception. The 'I think,' he declares, "must be *capable* of accompanying all my ideas, for otherwise something would be presented in my mind which could not be thought: and that is the same thing as to say, that the idea would be either impossible, or, at least, it would be nothing for me." So also in the parallel passage in the *Deduction* of the first edition, he says:² "All ideas have a necessary reference to a possible empirical consciousness, for, if they had not such reference, it would be impossible to become conscious of them, and this would be equivalent to saying that they did not exist. But again, all empirical consciousness has a necessary reference to a transcendental consciousness (prior to all experience), *i. e.*, to the consciousness of myself as the original* apperception. It is, therefore, absolutely

¹ *Deduction* (1st Edition), p. 97 : Tr., p. 198.

² p. 106, note : Tr., p. 208.

necessary that in my knowledge all consciousness should be bound together in *one* consciousness (of myself). . . . The mere idea 'I,' in reference to all other ideas (whose collective unity it makes possible), is the transcendental consciousness. This idea may be clear (empiric consciousness) or obscure. This we do not need to consider at present, nor even indeed whether it actually exists at all: but the possibility of the logical form of all knowledge rests necessarily on the reference of it to this apperception *as a faculty*." In other words, Kant is here examining what elements are involved in knowledge, and therefore does not need to consider how far the clear consciousness of them is developed in the individual, nor indeed whether the individual ever actually develops that consciousness at all. The individual (the sensitive being who becomes the subject of knowledge) may be at different stages on the way to clear self-consciousness. He may be sensitive with merely the dawning of consciousness; he may be conscious of objects, but not distinctly self-conscious: or, he may be clearly conscious of the identity of self in relation to the objects. All this does not concern us when we are treating of the conditions of the possibility of knowledge. Thus we can imagine him to have many perceptions which he has not distinctly combined with the idea of the self; or we may even suppose him (like children in the earliest period of their life) not to have risen to the idea of self at all, to the separation of the Ego from the act whereby the object is determined. But we cannot imagine him to have in his consciousness any ideas that are incapable of being combined with the idea of self: for such ideas would be ideas incapable of being

thought, incapable of forming part of the intelligible contents of consciousness: they would be, for us, as thinking beings, 'as good as nothing.' Though, therefore, we can think of an experience in which all the elements which the critical philosopher distinguishes are not consciously or separately present to the individual, we cannot think of an experience which does not imply them all. There can be no contents of consciousness which are not capable of being combined with the pure consciousness of self: or, to express the same thing subjectively, we may think of consciousness without distinct self-consciousness, but we must think of it 'as determined in relation to the *faculty* of self-consciousness.' We cannot in any way determine the elements or factors of self-consciousness and experience, unless we think of them in that character which they have as elements or factors. Hence we cannot explain self-consciousness by reference to consciousness, or consciousness by reference to sensation; but, on the contrary, we are obliged to regard the last two as pre-determined in relation to the first. Just as the conception of the understanding may underlie and govern the synthesis of imagination long before it becomes itself a special object of thought, so the unity of the self is the principle of all experience, though it is only the eye of criticism that detects it.¹

To do justice to Kant's transcendental *Deduction*, we must further observe that he is not trying to determine the elements which require to

The transcendental problem is really the *first* problem of philosophy.

¹ Some of the points mentioned in this paragraph have been suggested by Thiele's treatise (*Intellectuelle Anschauung*, § 13), which reached me only as these sheets were passing through the press.

be added to the experience of a sentient being in order to raise it into the experience of a rational being. Such a question would carry us entirely away from the transcendental point of view. The conditions, whatever they may be, under which a rational consciousness or experience is developed in a sentient being, do not affect the nature of experience itself. It does not cease to be true that all knowledge, and, therefore, all objects of knowledge are related to the consciousness of self, however that consciousness may come into existence in the individual. It does not cease to be true that the consciousness of self is the necessary correlate of the consciousness of a material world, whatever may be the process through which sensation passes into perception. Nor can it be truly said that the latter question is prior to the former. To proceed from sense to consciousness, and to explain consciousness by sense, is a gigantic *hysteron-proteron*; for it is only in relation to consciousness that sense, like every other object, becomes intelligible. And in the same way, to explain time and space psychologically or physiologically, is to explain them by phenomena which are known only under conditions of time and space. The 'physiologist of mind' who asserts that mind is essentially a function of the material organism, may be fairly met by the objection of Kant that his explanation is transcendent. To go beyond the intelligence to explain the intelligence, is to cut away the ground on which we ourselves are standing. So, again, when the psychologist applies the law of association to the genesis of mind, he is obliged to presuppose a fixed and definite world of objects acting under conditions of space and time upon the sensitive subject, in

order by this means to explain how the ideas of the world and of himself may be awakened in that subject. And this is to suppose that the world exists, as it can exist only to mind, before the process whereby associations are produced. The necessity, which is at the basis of our consciousness of objects, is thus interpreted as the result of the repeated actions of these objects upon the subject; or, in other words, the theory is stated in terms of the consciousness it pretends to explain. Nor is the theory improved, as an ultimate explanation of the intelligence and the intelligible world, when the process of association is protracted, as it is by Mr. Spenser and others, through an indefinite series of generations, or even when the present consciousness of men is regarded as the result of a gradual adaptation of a race of the animals to its circumstances, and which has been going on for millions of ages. If it were proved to-morrow that man is developed from an Ascidian ancestor, it would still remain certain that the consciousness which makes us men, is independent of time and development; and the Darwinian theory, like every other intelligible view of things, presupposes time and space, and all the forms of thought that are necessary to an intelligible experience.

From what has been said, it is sufficiently evident that experience cannot be regarded as the product of two different faculties by one of which is supplied the general, by the other the particular, by one the unity, by the other the diversity of knowledge, any more than it can be regarded as the product of the action and reaction of two things called mind and matter. It must rather be con-

Does Kant rise to the idea of a unity that manifests itself through all the differences of the faculties?

sidered as a process which, though it involves the determination of subject and object, understanding and sense, in opposition to each other, yet in this opposition and difference manifests only one principle. How far is this idea of a unity that transcends all the differences of experience to be found in Kant? The nearest thing to it is the 'Transcendental synthesis of imagination;' for imagination, in his view, stands between sense and understanding, and partakes of the nature of both, being reproductive in relation to the former, and productive in relation to the latter: having the integrating office of the one as well as the differentiating office of the other. But if we are tempted to think of imagination as the unity of the two other faculties, we are speedily checked by Kant's intimation that productive imagination is only the 'effect of the understanding upon sense,'¹ and, therefore, presupposes both. Nor does it make the matter any clearer when we combine this with what is said in the *Deduction* of the first edition, that "the unity of apperception in relation to the synthesis of the imagination is the understanding;"² so that imagination and understanding necessarily presuppose each other. Driven from this we are, therefore, forced to seek the ultimate unity of thought in the transcendental apperception. And this, indeed, is the view to which Kant's language most naturally leads us. For, we must remember, that while the Ego is but one term in the opposition of subject and object, it is the term to which *spontaneity* or *activity* is attributed, and which, therefore, is conceived as transcending the difference between itself and the other term. The Ego takes up the given matter

¹ p. 746 : Tr., p. 93.² p. 108 : Tr., p. 208.

of sense and subjects it to its own unity, and it is only as it does so that it becomes conscious of that matter as an object. Yet, on the other hand, we must also remember that this pure activity is identified with the abstract Ego, the 'thing that thinks,' and thus with the subject, as it is *opposed* to the object of knowledge. The judgment, 'I am' is said to be given only through the judgment, 'I think,' and the judgment 'I think' must always take the form, 'I think something': it implies, therefore, an 'indeterminate perception,' as well as the pure intellectual idea of the Ego.¹ Self-consciousness is the correlate of the consciousness of the object, and the object must be empirically given. Thus the simplest self-assertion of the Ego contains an empirical element. The judgment 'I am' may be analytic, but it implies a synthesis, for which the matter is given from without. It is only as acted *on* that the mind can act, and, therefore, the assertion of its pure spontaneity, as well as of the pure passivity of the sense, is in effect retracted, and thus we have in knowledge merely a case of action and reaction, in which the Ego is passive as well as active. Or, in other words, the Ego does *not* transcend the difference between itself and its object.

What, therefore, we find in Kant's deduction is a circle of elements which reciprocally presuppose each other, and each of which appears alternately as condition and conditioned, while the unity, which is everywhere implied in this circle reasoning, is nowhere distinctly expressed. The want of it, however, is shown by the continual effort at mediation, which is visible throughout the discussion. Two

No; he ends with a circle of elements that presuppose each other.

¹ p. 798, note: Tr., p. 249.

elements, not seen to be correlative, necessarily require a third something to bind them together. Thus the categories are *media*, which connect the apperception with the *schemata* of imagination; the *schemata* of imagination are *media*, which connect the categories with the manifold of sense; and the manifold of sense and the apperception in their turn appear alternately as *media*, whereby the unity of thought is developed into the categories, or the categories are applied to the objects of experience. Thus the unity of knowledge, the unity of the intelligence and of its objects, continually eludes Kant's grasp, though he is continually seeking it; and the reason is, that at every step he starts from a presupposed difference.

Opposition
between
Pheno-
menalism
and Tran-
scenden-
talism.

The truth is, that there is a necessary collision between Kant's *Phenomenalism* and his *Transcendentalism*. The doctrine that the objects of our knowledge are merely phenomenal, rests, in part at least, on the idea that the elements of knowledge are not necessarily related to each other, or, in other words, that they have a meaning apart from the unity of experience. Kant may declare that "perceptions are blind, and conceptions are empty," when they are not brought into connection with each other; yet his method continually leads him to treat both as having, prior to the synthesis by which they become elements in experience, a definite character of their own, which is only *modified*, but not suppressed, by their being brought into relation with each other. This definite character, however, must belong to them as things in themselves, and can be *known* to belong to them only by an intelligence that transcends experience. Kant, therefore,

is logically obliged to desert the transcendental point of view; for he must cease to look at experience from the point of view of its own unity, and suppose himself to apprehend the faculties in their *noumenal* reality as things in themselves, ere he can, at least on this ground, condemn experience as *phenomenal*. On the other hand, just in so far as he adheres to the transcendental point of view, he is obliged to regard everything that comes within the range of experience as a relative element, which has no meaning, or 'is for us as thinking beings as good as nothing,' when we absolutely sever it from the other elements. It is impossible to bring these two views into harmony with each other: it is impossible to regard experience *from the inside*, as a circle of elements that reciprocally presuppose each other, and at the same time, to break through the circle and look upon it *from the outside*, as a combination of elements that are separable from, and indifferent to, each other. Yet Kant's position is incapable of being stated without alternately taking each of these courses. We cannot vindicate the forms of sense, the categories, the apperception, etc., except on the ground that no knowledge is possible which does not imply them all, and that each implies all the others. On the other hand, we cannot assert that knowledge is merely of phenomena in Kant's sense, except in so far as we regard each in turn as separable from the rest, and especially the matter and forms of sense as separable from, and even opposed to, the categories of the understanding. But we cannot maintain this independent position for the understanding, unless we suppose that thought has a different law or prin-

ciple of movement in itself from that which governs it in its application to the matter of sense, which, as we have seen, is a false assumption. And we cannot maintain it for sense, unless we suppose that sense can 'give' something for knowledge, independent of thought, which, by Kant's own confession, is also a false assumption.

General
bearing of
the tran-
scendental
method.

If, then, we exclude all such attempts to look at knowledge from the outside, and keep strictly to the transcendental point of view, the argument of the deduction may be thus stated. A self-conscious being, *ex vi termini*, is one who can return upon the history of his thought. His consciousness of himself and the world contains a multitude of elements which he can distinguish from each other, and regard each for itself. Thus he can sever subject from object, conception from perception, and one element of conception from another, till he reaches the simplest fibre of thought that lies at the basis of all our experience. But the best result of this process must be to show, that these elements require each other, and that, wherever we begin, we are driven on by necessary filiation from one element to another, till we restore again in a higher form, and with clearer consciousness of its nature, the whole with which we started. This really is the meaning of Kant's proof that the possibility of experience rests on certain conditions. He who denies the truth of this or that experience must base his scepticism on experience in general: and again, he who doubts experience in general, must base his scepticism on the elements of experience, which he maintains have been illegitimately combined. But let him take his stand where he will, it may be shown that he cannot

maintain his position without advancing—cannot assert what he does assert without asserting more, inasmuch as that which he admits contains implicitly all that he denies. Is it that, like Hume, he admits the reality of sensation in order to disprove the reality of experience? Then it may be shown that sensation, as such, is ‘for us as thinking beings nothing at all,’ unless it is determined by the forms of sense and the categories. Is it that, like Leibnitz, he maintains the reality of the object of thought as opposed to the object of perception? Then it may be shown that relation of the subject to a world in space and time, is essential even to pure self-consciousness. Is it, lastly, that he admits the reality of objects in space and time in order to deny casual or necessary relations between them? Then it can be shown that implicitly relations of causality and dependence are involved in the relations of things as in space and time. Scepticism is thus excluded, simply because not a foot of ground is left on which it could take its stand to deny the reality of knowledge. It cannot prove the illusiveness of knowledge except by steps which involve that it is not illusive.

We have now explained the general nature of the transcendental deduction, and its application to the different elements of experience so far as that seems to be possible at this stage of the argument. There are, however, certain points in the deduction, particularly in relation to the application of the categories to the form of inner sense, which cannot be made fully intelligible till we have considered what Kant calls the schematism of the categories: *i. e.*, the place of the imagination in knowledge.

CHAPTER X.

THE SCHEMATISM OF THE CATEGORIES.

Agreement
and differ-
ence of the
logical and
transcen-
dental
judgment.

SUPPOSING it to be granted that the categories are the forms of synthesis by which experience is made possible, can we say anything more about the way in which they are applied to the matter of sense? According to his invariable method, Kant seeks in ordinary Logic a 'guiding thread' to the discovery of this new element in the transcendental Logic. The problem is, to subsume our experiences under the categories, or, in other words, to use the rules supplied by the pure understanding so as to make judgments about our particular experiences. Now, generally speaking, no rules can be given for an act of judgment. It seems, indeed, even absurd to ask for rules for an act which is itself the application of rules; for we might just as well ask for rules for the application of these, and so on *ad infinitum*. Judgment is a matter of mother wit, which we may discipline and draw out by means of examples, but which no learning can either supply or enable us to dispense with. There is, however, Kant argues, a peculiarity about the *transcendental* judgment, which makes it possible for us

to lay down rules for it. For in this case we know *a priori*, not only the rules, but also, within certain limits, the cases to which they have to be applied. We know, in short, that objects corresponding to the categories can be presented to us only under certain conditions, and therefore we can apply the categories as rules to these conditions; and thus, up to a certain point, determine what the nature of the objects must be. We know that the simple unity of self can be brought into relation with the manifold only in a successive perception of it, and that therefore 'time must be contained in every empiric representation of the manifold.' Hence we know that a determination of time must be involved in every determination of an object, and that the categories cannot determine the manifold matter of sense as objective, unless they also determine it in certain ways in relation to time.¹

How, then, can the categories be translated into determinations of time, and under what form do they reappear when so translated? This is what Kant calls the *Schematism of the Categories*. To ask how the categories are schematised, is simply to ask how they are applied to the form of inner sense, that through it they may be applied to the matter of all sense. For, as a category is a pure conception, it is not in conformity with the perceptions of sense, and we need, therefore, a third something, a mediating link, to enable us to apply it to them. Such a mediating link, however, is found in the form of inner sense, which, like the category, is pure and *a priori*, and; like the perception, is sensuous. If, therefore, we are able to reflect a category into time,

Schematism.

¹ p. 118: Tr., p. 104.

it will then become easy to subsume phenomena under it.

Difference
of schema
and image.

To understand the nature of this process, we must consider what an important part imagination plays in all knowledge. Imagination is not merely a faculty of artistic invention; on the contrary, its agency is employed in every case, in which we make use of general notions to determine anything whatever. When, *e.g.*, I think of the dog, I have not before my mind the image of any particular dog, but only a general idea, in which I abstract from time and place, as well as from all the other specialties of determination that must belong to such an image. Yet, at the same time, I do not think of the general idea in itself altogether without relation to such circumstances. I think of it rather as a rule, according to which I could draw an image if required; and thus it brings with it an inchoate activity of imagination, which yet does not go so far as actually to produce any definite picture. Now, this general power of imagination, by which it puts conceptions into relation with the general conditions of time and space, under which they must be realised and represented, without actually realising or '*envisaging*' them in any one image, is what Kant calls its power of schematising. "The schema in itself is nothing but a product of imagination; but since in it the synthesis of imagination does not go so far as to produce any single perception (or the perception of any single object), but only so far as to give unity to the determination of the sensibility, it is carefully to be distinguished from an image. Thus, when I put five points in a row, one after the other, I get an image of the number five. But if I think of a number in

general, which may be anything between five and a hundred, I merely represent to myself a method by which I *could* produce the image of any number, rather than actually produce the image of one definite number; and hence it is that the schema is often confused with the conception, while the image never is so confused."¹

To understand this clearly we must remember that, in Kant's view, a conception is a fixed abstraction which may be simple or complex, but which, in all cases, is definite and unchangeable. We may discover by analysis the number of marks contained in it, but we cannot add to that number unless we bring in the new elements from without. It has no principle of movement or growth in itself. As general, it is indeterminate, and does not contain in itself the conditions of its own possibility. We can, indeed, see whether it is *logically* possible—whether it contains contradictory elements or not. But whether it is *really* possible—whether it could be presented as an object under conditions of time and space—we do not see from itself. Hence, we can say little or nothing about it, if we do not relate it to, at least, the general conditions, under which it might be presented in experience. Now imagination gives to the abstract conception a kind of life which it has not in itself, simply by bringing it into relation with the general conditions of space and time. It is this schematic power of imagination which makes mathematics possible; for we could discover nothing about the properties of a triangle without drawing it, yet as little could we discover anything, if we were limited

Use of the
schema.

¹ p. 124: Tr., p. 109.

in our thought to the particular triangle we draw. We need for mathematical reasoning more than the conception, yet less than the image; we need, in short, the schema. And this is equally true of empirical conceptions. The definite number of marks combined in the conception of a dog corresponds to an infinite number of possible images. In order to make any use of my conception, *e.g.*, to subsume any particular object of experience under it, I must, so to speak, project my conception into space, and make it a rule or principle of determination for my perceptive or representative faculty. Only thus, in the meeting of a productive effort of imagination, whereby a conception is schematised, with the reproductive effort whereby the manifold is gathered into one image, can an individual be brought under a general conception. "This schematism of our understanding, in view of phenomena and their mere form, is a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true masterpieces it is hard for us to detect or explain."¹ It is sufficient here to note that it is this hidden art which makes it possible for us to relate our general ideas to the particulars that fall under them, and, on the other hand, to generalise our knowledge without losing ourselves in vague abstractions.

Schematism, then, is a process common to all our thought, a process without which all our use of general ideas would be futile. It is a process, therefore, to which the categories, like all other general ideas, must be subjected, ere they can have any objective application. But in the case of the categories there is this peculiarity that the schema is not an inchoate

¹ p. 125 : Tr., p. 109.

image; for a category is a conception which never can be brought into any image. The schematism of the categories is merely the general determination of sense through its form, according to conceptions, which must take place before any object can be known as an object.

Now, taking the categories successively under the heads of *quantity*, *quality*, *relation*, and *modality*, we have to ask how they must be schematised in order to be applied to the manifold of our sense. And first of *quantity*. The objects of outer sense are all *quanta*, in so far as they occupy space, and so also are the objects of inner sense, in so far as they occupy time. Hence, in space and time we have pure images of *quanta*—in the former case of *quanta* of outer sense, in the latter case of *quanta* of inner sense (and it must be remembered that all objects whatever are, in one aspect of them, *quanta* of inner sense). But, then, we can only produce the image of time, or (what is the same thing, since time is only a form of perception), we can only *produce time*, by that synthesis of homogeneous units which we call numbering. In other words, we can represent a succession in time only by distinguishing parts in a continuity of homogeneous perception, and relating them to each other as the units in numbers are related. Number, therefore, is the schema of quantity.

Number
the schema
of Quantity.

In the next place, how is *quality* to be schematised in relation to time? Quality contains the categories of reality, negation, and limitation, and it is obvious that we must represent the positive or real as a time that is occupied, and the negative or unreal as a time that is empty. In relation to the

Degree the
schema of
Quality.

inner life, fulness or emptiness means the presence or absence of a state of feeling or sensation. Further, each such sensation must be represented as having a particular degree of intensity, *i.e.*, we cannot regard it as a simple unit, but must think of it as occupying a place in the scale of being between nothing and infinity, or, in other words, as a magnitude which has grown up from nothing by a continuous process, and which can disappear only by a similar continuous process of decline. This is involved in the mere fact that it is felt in time, and without reference to the extent of time which it occupies. The schema of quality therefore is *degree*.

Schemata
of Rela-
tion.

The translation of the other categories is simpler. Substance, as a pure conception, is that which is always subject, and never predicate. It is schematised as that which remains permanent through all change, as the "substratum of the empirical determination of time." So again, causality, which, as a pure conception, expresses the relation of reason and consequent, becomes schematised as invariable sequence. A cause is that which something else follows in time according to a universal rule. And reciprocity, which, as a pure conception, is but the relation of parts or species in a generic whole, becomes in like manner invariable coexistence, or coexistence according to a universal rule.

Schemata
of Modal-
ity.

The schematism of the categories of modality is equally easy. Possibility which, taken logically, is mere non-contradiction, is schematised as "agreement of the different elements gathered together in the conception of an object with the conditions of time in general." That an object is possible means merely that there is nothing in the nature of time to

prevent its existence; as, *e.g.*, from the nature of time itself contradictory predicates cannot belong to a subject at the same time, but they may at different times. Actuality is schematised as existence at a definite time, and necessity as existence at all times.

Schematism is, then, but an *a priori* determination of the manifold as given in time, according to the categories, or to look at it from the other side, it is a restriction of the categories, in conformity with the form of our inner sense. Thus restricted, they obviously apply only to phenomena. This, however, does not imply that, apart from this restriction, they enable us to know things as they are in themselves: for, apart from this restriction, the categories are mere functions of unity in the formal or analytic judgment.

But how does this schematising of the categories give them an objective signification even in relation to phenomena? The full answer can only be given in the following chapter which explains the principles of the pure understanding, and the necessity of their application in order to the constitution of experience. But it may make the meaning of the schematism clearer if we give here a general idea of it.

We must, in the first place, remember that analysis and subjectivity on the one hand, and synthesis and objectivity on the other hand, go together in Kant's mind. To go beyond the conceptions we at any time possess, to do more than analyse them, is to go beyond ourselves: it is to apprehend in *perception* an object in which the qualities, which we have *already* combined in our *conception*, are united with other qualities. It is to combine our conceptions

The principles of analysis and synthesis.

with new perceptions, in order that we may add to these conceptions. Thought, as it abides in itself, is analytic: to be synthetic it requires a third something, by which the old may be mediated with the new. The formal judgment is in its essence tautological: it is governed by the law of identity and contradiction. Sometimes this law is so stated that its pure analytical meaning is concealed. "It is impossible that a thing should be, and not be at the same time," is not the pure expression of the principle of contradiction, because it brings in a reference to the nature of time, which permits contradictory predicates to exist in a subject successively, though not in coexistence. As a mere logical principle, the law of contradiction must abstract from conditions of time. Its true form, therefore, is that "No subject can have a predicate that contradicts it." For to say: 'A man cannot be learned and unlearned at the same time,' we must know something not only of the nature of the subject, but also of the nature of existence in time. But to say, 'No unlearned man is learned,' we need only know the meaning of the subject.¹

Now this consideration already prepares us to see that when the categories, which are merely the functions of unity in the formal judgment, are reflected into time, they may become synthetic principles of knowledge. Time furnishes a 'third something,' through which the forms of analytic unity with their merely transparent difference (a difference that in itself vanishes in tautology), become forms of synthetic unity, *i.e.*, of a unity with a real difference in it. Hence the schematism of the categories, the

The latter implies the form of inner sense.

¹ p. 133: Tr., p. 116.

translation of them into time-determinations, is no mere idle play of the imagination. It is the translation of the categories into the sole form in which they can furnish principles for the determination of objects. For time is the form of all perception, and, therefore, when we determine what is true of an object as represented under conditions of time, we are determining what is true of all objects of experience whatever. As, therefore, the law of identity and contradiction is the highest principle of all analytic judgment, so the highest principle of all synthetic judgment is, that "every object stands under the necessary conditions of the synthetic unity of the manifold of perception in a possible experience." And these necessary conditions are just the principles of judgment which arise from the application of the categories to a matter given under the form of time.

The first difficulty that is presented by the sections of the *Critique*, of which we have just given an account, is one that arises from Kant's persistent attempt to connect the transcendental with the logical judgment. In the logical judgment, an object already determined is brought under a general conception which is part of its determination. Hence when Kant speaks of phenomena as subsumed under the categories, which are conceptions of objects in general, we are apt to forget that phenomena are determined as objects only by means of the categories, and that prior to this so-called subsumption, they do not exist for us as objects at all. In fact, as has been said in an earlier chapter, it would have been less misleading if Kant had spoken of the

Comparison of logical and transcendental judgment is misleading.

categories, not as *predicates* to be attached to the matter of sense given under the forms of time and space; but, as first determinations of the *subject*, to which the determinations of time and space, as well as all other determinations, have to be attached as predicates. Kant's own assertion that "perceptions without conceptions are blind," involves that in the categories we have the ideal nucleus, around which all experience must be organised, and without which there would be no intelligible experience whatever. The reasons why this form of statement did not commend itself to him, are, however, not difficult to understand. Partly it was that he looked to the individual life in which it is undoubtedly true that sensation precedes thought: and did not sufficiently keep before him the fact that sensation as such—sensation as it precedes thought—furnishes no element of experience. Or, to state the same thing in another way, in the unity of sensation the two elements of perception and conception are yet undistinguished, and we have as little and as much right to say that mere sense *conceives* as that it *perceives*. The main reason, however, why Kant feared to speak of the conceptions of the understanding as ideally prior to all perception, lay in his conviction that these conceptions become conceptions of *objects* only in relation to a given manifold of perception: and that, taken in themselves, they have a purely formal value as functions of unity in the analytic judgment. But this is a point on which we have already spoken. In one sense we may admit, and even go beyond, Kant's doctrine. If the abstraction of the categories from the unity of experience means the conception of them as related to nothing but

themselves, it is true that ultimately such abstraction must empty the categories of all meaning, even of that meaning which Kant still leaves to them. All abstraction of parts or elements in our experience from the unity of the whole, valuable and useful as such abstraction may be, involves a certain inaccuracy, a certain imperfection in our conception of the elements thus abstracted. And, if we insist on this inaccuracy, and pursue it to its ultimate consequences, we necessarily deprive the elements in question of all meaning and value. This, in fact, is the Nemesis that overtook the Wolffian school, and the dread of it, as a kind of *horror vacui*, was never absent from the mind of Kant. Unfortunately this dread did not lead him to doubt the sufficiency of the received Logic as an account of the movement of pure thought, but only to insist that, in knowledge, the movement of pure thought must be supplemented from another source. Hence, he never ceases to maintain that the understanding in itself is purely analytic and subjective, and that its conceptions acquire a synthetic and objective meaning only when related to the perceptions of sense. But thought, thus deprived of all real movement or progress *within* itself, can have no movement *out of* itself. Its relation to perception must be merely external: *i.e.*, it must be mediated by something else than itself. Imagination, therefore, appears as a *Deus ex machina*, a mediating power, interposing between perception and conception, sense, and understanding, and connecting them with each other. Thus, on the one hand, imagination gives life or synthetic movement to the dead abstract conception, by putting it in relation to the movement of sense; and, on the other hand, it stays the flux of

Necessity
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sensations, by bringing them under the categories, and so putting them in relation to the permanent unity of intelligence. But the power which thus relates the two elements of knowledge, must stand above their difference, and include them both in itself; and, from this point of view, imagination seems to be a name for the intelligence as a whole, while sense and understanding sink into mere abstractions, or elements which have existence only in the unity of the whole. This, however, is an idea, which, though involved in Kant's words, is never clearly expressed by him, still less followed out to its necessary consequences. On the contrary, as we have pointed out at the end of the preceding chapter, Kant speaks of imagination, not as the unity of the two other elements, but as a 'third something' which stands between them, and relates them to each other.

Objection
to any
absolute
division
of the
faculties.

These contradictions were inevitable, because Kant never clearly saw, that what we call separate faculties, are either different elements in the unity of knowledge, or, if we take a more concrete view, different stages in the process of knowledge, and that therefore they cannot, consistently with the unity of intelligence, be regarded as differing from each other in their essential principle and character. The mind cannot be conceived as an assemblage of independent powers, which act and react on each other, and express the result of their reciprocal determination in the judgments of experience. Nor can it be regarded as a manufactory divided into departments, each of which is engaged in a separate process, and completes its labours on the common material, ere it is handed on to the next department. Yet, if we discard such analogies, we must discard with them the

ascription of independent substantiality to each of the different phases of intellectual life. Nor can we, like Kant, imagine that the function of one part of the mind is purely differentiating, of another purely integrating, and that a third partakes of both characters, and, therefore, is able to mediate between the other two. It would be fatal to the possibility of knowledge, because fatal to the unity of intelligence, to admit that the faculties into which we ideally divide the mind are ruled by essentially different laws; or that the law that regulates their independent or individual action is not the same as that which regulates their combined action in the production of knowledge or experience. If the understanding had no synthetic movement in itself, it could never receive such synthetic movement from the imagination, and its schemata. If perception were essentially different from pure thought, it could derive no rules from thought, even through the mediation of imagination. When, therefore, Kant says that we cannot think of objects, or, in other words, cannot think synthetically, except so far as we schematise our thoughts, we may admit the truth of this assertion if it be understood merely to mean that the mind cannot rest in pure thought, but is driven, by the very nature of thought itself, to realise or 'envisage' its conceptions under the conditions of space and time. But when he goes on to explain that pure thought is merely analytic, and, therefore, has in itself no necessary relation to perception, or, indeed, to anything but itself, and that it is only the imagination which takes up the abstract conceptions produced by thought, and, by an external process, connects them with the form of perception, then we must withhold

our assent ; and that on two grounds. In the first place, as we have seen, thought, *even in itself*, is synthetic, or has in it a movement towards difference as well as a movement towards identity ; and, in the second place, thought *cannot abide in itself*, but necessarily relates itself to perception. That we feel the need of “envisaging” our conceptions, or of representing their objects to ourselves under conditions of time and space, is an obvious fact. And the explanation of it is to be found in the principle stated in the last chapter, that pure thought, or, more definitely, abstract self-consciousness finds its necessary correlate in an external world in space and time. Pure thought, in other words, is an abstraction, which, when isolated from the unity of experience to which it belongs, ultimately becomes dialectical, or self-contradictory, and so forces us to *retract our abstraction*. The *nisus*, or living tendency of thought, from the universal to the particular, is not to be explained by saying that imagination fastens an *external* schema upon the universal ; it is to be explained from the nature of the universal itself, and the *internal* necessity by which it is driven to develope or particularise itself. The pure unity of intelligence must go out of itself, must lose itself, in order, in the highest sense, to find itself. It must differentiate itself in order to reach a true integration. It must be present to itself, in the first instance, as an external object, or world of objects, in order that, out of this difference and externality, it may rise to the consciousness of self and the comprehension of its own unity.

If now we turn from this general view of the relations of thought and imagination to consider Kant's doctrine of schematism, we are met by another

difficulty. There are two forms of sense, space and time, but Kant, for the most part, confines himself to the form of inner sense. His ground for this almost exclusive attention to time is, that inner sense is that through which *all* the manifold of sense is given, and that, therefore, a determination of its form by the categories is presupposed in all other determination of objects. In other words, all determination of objects by the categories must be, in the first instance, time-determinations. Plausible, however, as this doctrine at first appears to be, it is an example of that *μετάβασις ἐς ἄλλο γένος*—which was pointed out in the last chapter. In passing from conception to imagination, Kant suddenly sinks from the transcendental to the ordinary psychological point of view. This may readily be seen if we examine one or two of the passages in which the position of the inner sense in experience is explained.

“Because,” says Kant in the *Deduction*,¹ “there is a certain form of sensible perception, which exists in the mind *a priori*, as a form of its receptivity, therefore the understanding as a spontaneity can determine the inner sense, through the diversity of the data of perception, in conformity with the synthetic unity of apperception.” There seem to be only two possible interpretations of this passage, and both of them alike are excluded by the principles of Kant. Does it mean that perceptions, *after* they have been given under the form of inner sense, *i.e.*, as successive in time, are *then* determined by the understanding in relation to objects? This can scarcely be Kant’s meaning, for, in his view, the determination of our inner states in time is already the empirical determination of self as an object, and

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¹ p. 745 : Tr., p. 92.

he elsewhere argues that such a consciousness of self is possible only in relation to predetermined objects in space. Indeed, to admit that the consciousness of our perceptions as such was prior to consciousness of objects in space, would have involved a return to the dualism (and problematical idealism) of Des Cartes, which makes the external object a thing in itself, *external to consciousness*. But, if we exclude this interpretation, then the only alternative is to understand Kant as meaning, that our sensitive perception actually is successive, but that it is through the determination of this successive consciousness by the categories that we know all objects, even the successive consciousness itself. On this construction, however, Kant would be speaking of the sensitive self, not as a phenomenon, but, as a thing in itself, and yet, at the same time, as conditioned by time, which is merely a form of phenomenal reality. The truth is, that no consistent meaning can be given to the passage: all that it shows is, that Kant is divided between two irreconcilable lines of thought. If we look at knowledge *from the outside*, in the method of Locke, we may suppose that the only question is, how a world of objects in space are to become known to a simple self, to which, because of this simplicity, they can be presented only in a succession of sensations or perceptions: and the answer from this point of view naturally is, that such a world can become known to such a self, only if the elements successively given are synthetically combined by means of the categories. But it is not difficult to see that here, from the Kantian point of view, both the question and the answer are transcendent. For they both involve the doctrine

that the world is in space, and that the sensations of the individual *are* successive, apart from their *being known as such*. And such a separation of the *esse* from the *intelligi* is, on Kantian principles, inadmissible. On the other hand, if we look at knowledge *from the inside*, i.e., from the transcendental point of view, we cannot put the determination of our inner sense in time before the determination of objects in space. "We can think of time," Kant himself tells us, "only in the following way, viz., by drawing a straight line (which we take as the outward image of time) and fixing our attention entirely on the act of synthesis, whereby we successively determine our inner sense, and so on the succession in our determination of it."¹ This means that in the explicit determination of a line in space, there is an implicit determination of our perception of it in time, which only needs to be made explicit, to enable us to attain consciousness of our inner states as determined in time. But it involves also, that the explicit consciousness of the succession of our states of mind in time, is logically dependent on the consciousness of objects in space. It was the supposition that the reverse is true, and that "outer sense is the object of inner sense," which gave rise to the errors of Schopenhauer, and to his somewhat vulgar misinterpretation of the motives of Kant for the changes made in the second edition of the *Critique*. We shall have to return to this subject in a subsequent chapter. For the present, it is sufficient to point out that Kant is unfaithful to his own principles, if he speaks of sensations, either as *actually* successive, apart from their being *known as*

¹ *Deduction*, § 24, p. 748 : Tr., p. 94.

successive, or as *known* as successive, prior to their reference to external objects. For, in the former case, he is treating phenomena as things in themselves, and in the latter case, he is taking the inner life out of its relation to the outer life in the unity of experience.

Kant's treatment of the opposition of matter and mind compared with that of previous philosophers.

The key to the difficulty, as we have already indicated, is to be found in that excess of abstraction by which Kant isolates the elements of experience. The first form in which the relation between subject and object presents itself to Kant, is substantially identical with the Cartesian dualism, in which the terms of mind and matter are set in an abstract antagonism to each other, that seems to make all mediation impossible. According to this view, the *subject* is an absolutely simple self, purely active, but in its activity ever abiding within itself, determining itself and nothing else than itself; while the *object* is matter: infinitely divided,—i.e., infinitely complex or self-external, and purely passive or determined from without. Kant adopts this abstract opposition, but expresses it in a subjective way, so that with him the extreme terms are the Ego, which is active but confined to a purely analytic activity, and the matter of sense which is essentially complex or manifold without unity, and which is given altogether independently of any activity of the Ego. Starting with this dualism, Kant cannot account for experience, except by supposing that, while the manifold elements of sense are necessarily *given* in succession to the simple self, they are synthetically brought together and determined as objects in relation to the consciousness of all through the categories. Thus the categories and the form of

inner sense are the media between the apperception and the given manifold of external sense, or what from this point of view is the same thing, the external world (for the external world *in its abstraction* as manifold and self-external, can scarcely be distinguished from the manifold of sense taken without relation to any unity). . . When, however, we consider all this on the transcendental method, *i.e.*, when we regard knowledge from the point of view of its own unity, and not from the external point of view of one who puts together parts that exist, and are known, independently of each other, we must give an altogether different explanation of it. What we must then say is, that pure matter on the one side, and pure apperception on the other, are mere abstractions, *i.e.*, that they are not the subject and object of actual experience. The subject of our experience is not a bare unity which abides in itself without relation to an external world: the object of our experience is not a matter which is absolutely complex and passive. Indeed, such a subject and such an object are inconceivable, as is shown by the fate of the philosophies that adopted this extreme of dualism. The Cartesians found it impossible to restore the unity of knowledge, except by the *Deus ex machina* of Occasionalism; while the philosophers of the next generation evaded the difficulty by the more summary process of denying the reality of one of the opposed terms. Thus Spinoza, in one of his letters, questions the Cartesian view of the absolute passivity of matter,¹ and Leibniz, following out the same line of thought, maintains that all real sub-

¹ Letter 70. In the *Ethics*, on the other hand, the Cartesian view seems still to be accepted by Spinoza.

stances are active and self-determined. On the other hand, Locke adopts the opposite course of assimilating mind to matter, and his followers try to explain knowledge on the hypothesis that thought as well as matter is passive, or subjected to laws that do not spring from its own nature.

Ultimate
conse-
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scendental
view of it.

Kant, as we have seen, returns to the dualism of Des Cartes, with two important differences. In the first place, he generally expresses it in a subjective way, as an opposition of factors in knowledge, rather than of elements in existence: and, in the second place, he sees the necessity of a mediation between the factors, which shall not be a mere *Deus ex machina*, but shall be implied in the very nature of the factors themselves. Hence, the dualistic statement with which he begins is modified and corrected as he goes on. If it is said at first that sense is a receptivity, and that the matter it receives is manifold without unity, a flux of differences without synthesis, it is subsequently explained that sensible perception involves a reproductive synthesis of the imagination.¹ If, at first, understanding is defined as a pure spontaneity, which in all its movement never goes beyond its own identity, it is immediately added that analysis presupposes synthesis, and that the pure conception must be schematised by the productive imagination. In this way, understanding ceases to be a merely analytic activity, which produces only formal judgments, and sense ceases to be a mere passivity, through which an unconnected manifold is given: they become names for the two opposite moments, or phases of the differentiating and integrating

¹ *Deduction* (1st Edition), p. 109, note: Tr., p. 211.

movement of thought. . If, therefore, we bring to a focus all Kant's different utterances on the subject, and allow for that which is due to his dualistic starting-point: and further, if we hold consistently to the transcendental point of view, and refuse to determine the elements of knowledge apart from the unity of knowledge; we must necessarily admit, not only that understanding and perception, mind and matter, are correlative, but also that the intelligence transcends the distinction of these different powers or objects. And it is only the converse of this to say, that these powers and objects have no existence apart from the process whereby they are related, or relate themselves to each other. Mind exists only in the process whereby it goes out its own unity to relate itself to, and express itself in, a material world. The material world exists only in so far (if we may use the expression), as it goes *into* itself, or sublates its own self-externality, and so, finally relates itself to, or becomes conscious of itself, in mind. Or, to gather up the whole process of being and knowing in one formula, the universe is the process whereby spirit externalises itself, or manifests itself in an external world, that out of this externality, by a movement at once positive and negative, it may rise to the highest consciousness of itself. These words will naturally seem to be the wild dreams of an idealism that has lost its grasp of facts, so long as we do not see that they are the necessary result of a philosophy that refuses to treat mere abstractions—the abstraction of a mind out of relation to any object, and the abstraction of an object out of relation to mind—as independent and complete realities. In truth they only express that unity between the

intelligence and its objects, which is presupposed in all experience or knowledge whatever, and which all science and philosophy is a more or less successful attempt to realise. To apprehend this truth is not to leave the solid ground of fact and experience for an airy region of speculation, but, simply, to correct the abstractions of common sense, which, in its ordinary conception of fact and experience, forgets the most important element present in it, viz., the intelligence itself.

Kant, as has been said, generally expresses this opposition in a subjective way, as an opposition between various faculties of the mind, rather than as an opposition of mind and matter. But he cannot altogether avoid the latter form of expression, and it is on his own principles equally admissible; for the opposition of mind and matter is only an opposition of terms, both of which are included in the unity of experience. And as we have already seen, he was led by the logical necessities of his position, necessities of which, perhaps, he was himself not fully conscious, to maintain two points which are closely connected with each other, and in which his doctrine contrasts with all previous philosophy. The first is, that mind and matter are in *relative* opposition to each other, and not simply identical, as it was, at least, the tendency of the schools of Locke and Leibnitz to assert. The second is, that they are *not in absolute* opposition, as was maintained by Des Cartes, but that consciousness, while it distinguishes mind or inner experience from matter or outer experience, at the same time transcends the distinction; or, in other words, that the distinction is not a distinction of consciousness from something else than conscious-

ness, but a distinction of two factors which in consciousness are necessarily combined.

With regard to the first of these points, we have only to observe how Kant deals with the conceptions of mind and matter respectively. In his view of mind he holds a middle course between the school of Des Cartes and the school of Locke; and maintains that it is neither a pure self-consciousness, an activity without passivity or dependence on anything else than itself, nor a *tabula rasa*, which is recipient of impressions from without, and which gradually has associations of ideas determined in it by the objective connexion of these impressions. In the abstract, indeed, mind *may* be described as pure self-consciousness, but it cannot realise itself except in the consciousness of an individual self, whose states are determined in time; and this inner time-determination again depends on the consciousness of an external world of objects. In other words, the consciousness of the self as an object in time implies the consciousness of a material world, in opposition, yet in relation to which, the inner life of the subject is determined; but neither the individual self nor the external world could be made objects of knowledge, except by a transcendental apperception which determines each in relation to the other. For it is this apperception—this pure self-consciousness, realising itself in the individual, that alone can determine the individual and the world as acting and reacting on each other. In like manner, in his conception of the external object or matter, Kant attempts to avoid the one-sidedness of Des Cartes, who held it to be purely passive, and infinitely extended and divided (or essentially self-external,

According to this view, mind is not pure activity and self-identity,

And matter, not pure passivity and self-externality.

and the opposite one-sidedness of Leibnitz, who denied that it is extended or passive at all except to the *confused* apprehensions of our sense. In the treatise *On the Metaphysical Basis of Physics*, therefore, he maintains, that matter is essentially active (or, what is the same thing when we are speaking of an object of experience, that we have experience of it only as active); but that its activity is *motion*, which implies relation to, and determination by, something external. Force, therefore, is essential to it, and it is moved by its own inherent forces; yet, at the same time, diversity or manifoldness of parts is equally essential to it, and its forces always involve relations between different parts. Matter, therefore, is self-external, and all its parts exclude and repel each other; yet, on the other hand, this repulsion cannot be conceived as absolute, or as a repulsion which destroys all relation between the parts; and, therefore, all the parts necessarily attract each other or tend to combine and overcome their reciprocal externality. On this construction of matter something further will be said in the twelfth chapter: for the present it is sufficient to observe that the mutual attraction which is ascribed to the parts of matter, notwithstanding their externality and mutual repulsion, is just the counterpart of the doctrine that mind can be conscious of itself as an object only in so far as it determines itself in time in relation to the external object in space. On both sides Kant is breaking through the abstract antagonism of the elements of experience, and showing that each of them, inner and outer experience, contains in itself that which explicitly is the special characteristic of its opposite. Mind is essentially

self-determining, yet it is presented to us, or realises itself in experience, only in a process in which it is determined by, or in relation to, something else than itself. Matter is essentially self-external or determined by another, yet it also is an object of experience; and, as a necessary consequence, it realises itself, only in a process by which it negates, or, if we use the expression, sublates its own complexity or externality. Universal attraction is thus the first step in that process of nature, whereby, in the end, it rises to the consciousness of itself in man.

And this leads naturally to the second point, that the two factors thus conceived no longer need a *Deus ex machina* to bring them together, or combine them in one experience. Each, in fact, is but the necessary counterpart of the other, and can only be understood as in movement toward the other: and the ascending scale of the forces of nature exhibits only the necessary steps in the process, whereby thought comes to the consciousness of itself. This is the real meaning of that mediation between the categories and the manifold of sense which is ascribed to the imagination. The form of inner sense is the medium through which the two extremes are brought together, only in the sense, that it is *as in time*, and, therefore, as changing, that the external object becomes intelligible; while matter, as merely self-external and inert, according to the ideas of Des Cartes, would have been an insoluble problem to thought, inasmuch as the intelligence could not find itself in an object which had no trace of its own unity. On the other hand, when we represent the mind, not as a bare unit, or an activity confined to pure analysis, but as synthetic, we, at the same time, make it intelligible that the process

Mind and matter as necessary factors in the unity of experience.

by which it comes to the consciousness of itself, should involve a relation to a world in space, and also that, in this process, the mind itself should be represented as an object under the form of time, while yet, as the universal subject of knowledge, it is not in time. If, on the other hand, the mind were conceived as in itself purely analytic, we could not understand how it could relate itself to an objective world at all, and to explain the possibility of knowledge, we should be reduced to the desperate resource of a pre-established harmony. Kant does not, indeed, combine his theories of knowing and being as we have just done, still less does he bring together his construction of matter and his transcendental account of mind: on the contrary, he generally regards the elements of experience as definable apart from their unity, and reaches that unity only by piecing them together. Yet the results we have just stated have been reached simply by following out Kant's transcendental method, and by persistently regarding all his different utterances from the transcendental point of view.

Having thus considered the general theory of schematism, we have now only to make a few remarks on the special schemata of the different categories as they are given by Kant.

1. Kant's assertion that *number* is the schema of quantity does not quite agree with his general account of the relation of conceptions to their schemata. For a schema, according to that account, is something that comes into existence when we change a pure category into a determination of time. But this seems to imply that the category and time are first given separately, and *then* afterwards reflected

Criticism
of the
schema of
quantity.

on each other. But how is it possible that the idea of *number* (as the schema by which the manifold of sense, given under conditions of time, is brought under the category of quantity) should be produced in this fashion? Kant himself says that *time* itself is produced when the manifold is brought together in a synthesis of units, which are represented as homogeneous—*i.e.*, in ‘a synthesis which, when we consider it abstractly,’ is number. In other words, number as well as quantity is a category, which is involved in the perception of time as an object. In another place he tells us that “phenomena cannot be apprehended except by that synthesis of the manifold whereby the image of a definite space and time are produced.” Can we then suppose that time and space in general are *first* given, and that number is *afterwards* generated in the determination of particular times and spaces? Such is the solution suggested by the *Æsthetic*, when it speaks of time and space as being “represented as infinite given wholes.” But that expression finds its justification only in the spirit of accommodation that pervades the *Æsthetic*. The infinity of space and time is not, according to the doctrines of the *Dialectic*, a datum of sense prior to the synthesis of the understanding, by which the images of particular times and spaces are generated, but simply that extension of the synthetic process to the unconditioned, which is due to pure Reason. Space and time, therefore, are apprehended as objects by means of a successive synthesis, which, “when we represent it as in its generality, gives us the conception of the understanding;”¹ and in this case the conception is not merely *quantity* but

¹ p. 67 : Tr., 63.

number. Hence we cannot conceive time or space as perceptions through which quantity is schematised as number, but, on the contrary, we must regard number itself as ideally prior to time and space, *in the same sense* in which pure apperception and the categories in general are prior to time and space, and in which time and space are ideally prior to the determination of objects as existing in particular times and spaces.

Criticism
of the
schema of
quality.

2. On the Schematism of *Quality* as degree we have also a criticism to make. 'That in phenomena,' says Kant, 'which corresponds to the sensation, is the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves (their reality). Now, every sensation has a degree or quantity, whereby it may occupy the same time (*i.e.*, the inner sense in view of the same idea of an object), with more or less completeness.' Many critics of Kant, like Schopenhauer,¹ have taken offence at this sudden introduction, among the *a priori* principles, of an observation which appears to be derived from empirical Psychology. The key to this apparent inconsequence, however, is found in what we have said, in this and the previous chapter, about Kant's lapse from the transcendental to the psychological point of view. Kant, in this place, does not ask himself the transcendental question: What are the elements that imply each other in our experience, in our consciousness of the world and of ourselves? He asks himself only, how such experience is to be acquired by a presupposed individual subject. And to this question the answer naturally is, that it is acquired by such a subject through the sensations, which constitute the matter

¹ *Die Welt als Wille, etc.*, p. 530 (2nd edition).

of all his knowledge. The transcendental question, however, is not whether my sensations are essential to the development of knowledge in me as an individual subject (which no one would be prepared to deny), but whether the knowledge of my sensations, as such, logically precedes the knowledge of all other objects, and furnishes the sole immediate 'reality' to which that knowledge refers. And to this question we must answer, that the 'real' is *not* given as such in sensation, that our sensations are only 'real' to us as other objects are real—*i.e.*, in so far as they are determined, in relation to other sensations, as parts of the context of an inner experience, which again is itself determined in relation to, and contrast with, an outer experience. We are therefore driven back upon the dilemma mentioned in a previous page. If sensations, as such, can be described as the 'real' element in all knowledge, then we must either maintain, that the individual subject and his sensations have, as things in themselves, the same nature which they have as objects of our knowledge, which, on Kantian principles, is an absurdity; or we must maintain that in experience my sensations are *known* as mine prior to their reference to any other object than me, *i.e.*, that I know myself as a phenomenal object before I know any other phenomenal objects: and this also, on Kantian principles, is an absurdity. The legitimate consequence of the transcendental view of knowledge, on the contrary, is, that my sensations, as known, are just as real and just as unreal as any other object of experience (transcendentally unreal, phenomenally real). For it is only through the understanding *that* they are determined as inner experiences, or indeed as objects

at all; and *till* they have been so determined, no question can be raised as to their reality or unreality. The schematism of the category of quality might therefore be illustrated just as well from external as internal experience, from the relative intensity of the properties of objects as from that of the sensations of the subject.¹

It is to be observed, also, that it can only be *illustrated* from either. The remark made about number, the schema of quantity, applies also to degree, the schema of quality. We cannot suppose that there is a manifold determined as in space and time on the one side, and the category of quality on the other; and that the schema of degree arises out of the reflexion of the one upon the other. The determination of objects in time and space presupposes a synthesis, which, taken in *abstracto*, is the conception of degree. Degree, therefore, has quite as much right to be placed among the categories as quality. Both, like quantity and number, are conceptions which may by abstraction be severed from the unity of experience, and both are more general than, and therefore presupposed in, the perceptions of time and space as well as of objects in time and space.

The examination of the schemata of the remaining categories of relation and modality, may be reserved with advantage for the next chapter.

¹ On this point more will be said in the next chapter.

CHAPTER XI.

THE PRINCIPLES OF PURE UNDERSTANDING.

IN his remarks on the list of the categories, Kant had distinguished quantity and quality as the mathematical, relation and modality as the dynamical, conceptions of pure understanding. The former he had said, "relate to the *objects* of perception, whether pure or empirical; the latter to the *existence* of these objects in relation to each other, and to the understanding." This distinction is now transferred to the Principles of Pure Understanding, and it therefore becomes important to determine its exact meaning.

The distinction, as drawn by Kant, may be stated as follows. It is possible to represent or imagine objects without determining them as existent. Every effort of productive imagination, every geometrical, every poetical construction is of this character. For in all such cases we put together the elements of a picture or representation of an object in conformity with the idea we have formed of it, irrespective altogether of its reality. Free, however, as is the working of the imagination, there are certain conditions which it is bound to respect. For to represent an object is to 'en-

Relation of
imagina-
tion and
know-
ledge.

visage' it in time and space, and therefore in conformity with the conditions of time and space. In other words, we must put together its manifold as the manifold of time and space themselves are put together. On the other hand, to determine an object as existing is not only to picture it, but to know it; *i.e.*, it is not only to combine its manifold in conformity with the conditions of representation in space and time, but to combine it with all other objects and events in one context of experience. The object, as known, is therefore subjected to a number of conditions, besides those to which it is subjected, as merely imagined: in other words, the conditions of mere imagination are more general than the conditions of knowledge. We can imagine what we do not, or even cannot, know, but we can never know what we cannot imagine. For if an object could not even be represented as possible in consistency with the nature of time and space, it is absurd to suppose that it could be known to exist. For example, we can never know the existence of two pieces of matter in the same space, or the union of youth and age in the same person and at the same time. But we can easily imagine many things that are utterly impossible—*e.g.*, a man with a horse's head, a candle blazing *in vacuo*, a nymph changed into a fountain, &c.¹ For the impossibility of these things does not arise from the existence of time and space, which are the conditions of all representation of objects, and imagination does not need to respect anything else.

¹ p. 760: Tr., p. 122, note: cf. Spinoza, *De Intell. Emend.*, ch. 8. The validity of this idea of Kant, that imagination limits knowledge, will be considered at the end of the chapter.

It may further illustrate Kant's meaning if we say that imagination, like the pure understanding, is a faculty which requires abstraction in order to its exercise. To deal freely with the pure conceptions of the understanding, and determine their relation to the mind and to each other, we must break up the unity of experience, and distinguish these conceptions from the other elements of that unity. So, in like manner, it is possible for us to abstract from all that connexion of objects with each other in the context of experience, in virtue of which alone we say that they exist or are actual objects, and to attend merely to the general conditions under which they must be represented in space and time. This abstraction, indeed, does not go so far as the abstraction of the pure understanding, but it is the source of all that power of dealing freely, or even arbitrarily, with the data of experience—separating and reconciling them at pleasure, under the guidance of any inspiring principle or idea—which is the distinguishing gift of imaginative natures, and which must be possessed in some measure by every one who has any spiritual freedom at all. At the same time, we have to remember the danger that accompanies this gift. Imagination is abstraction; like all abstraction, it ultimately involves a contradiction, so that, if carried to its utmost consequences, it is self-destructive. It rends certain elements of truth or reality from the connexion which alone gives them meaning, and even makes them possible. And, though this may be necessary as a step to higher knowledge, yet it may easily become a source of delusion, if we do not remember that the highest value of all analysis is only to prepare the way for synthesis. Hence the

The freedom of imagination due to its abstraction.

mere vagaries of a fancy, which respects absolutely nothing but the conditions of pictorial representation in time and space, and pleases itself with impossible combinations of all things in heaven and earth, have, even in poetry, a very limited value, and the highest efforts of poetical imagination are those, the result of which approximates most nearly to the reconstruction of experience; which, in fact, take almost no other liberty with reality than that which is required to bring the long drama of life within the limits necessary for the exhibition of its ideal meaning.

Difference
of homo-
geneous
and hetero-
geneous
synthesis.

Connected with this is another point of contrast between the mathematical and the dynamical principles. The mathematical principles are, Kant tells us, principles of "a synthesis of homogeneous elements, which do not necessarily belong to each other." They are, in other words, principles of quantitative synthesis; and there is nothing in the nature of quantity which forces us either to go on to, or to stop at, any particular number or degree. On the contrary, the very conception of quantity implies that it can be increased or diminished without limit. All that is determined by these principles, therefore, is, *not* that you must combine any element with any other, but that, if you do so, you must do it in a particular way. On the other hand, the dynamical principles are principles of the "synthesis of heterogeneous elements, which necessarily belong to each other." The elements brought together in such a synthesis are complementary, elements which, therefore, it is impossible to separate from each other. And, indeed, as we are obliged to bring *all* the data of perception under dynamical principles of synthesis—*i.e.*,

to conceive them as all necessary to each other, we can never stop combining till we have reached an absolute whole of experience; which means, as we shall afterwards see, that we can never stop combining at all. This exactly agrees with what has just been said of the freedom of imagination and the limitation of knowledge. Any one thing, regarded as part of the context of experience—or, what is the same thing, as part of the one world of experience—stands in necessary relation to all the other parts of it and to the mind: and it is just the office of the dynamical principles to determine things in this necessary relation. When, therefore, thought regards objects and events from this point of view, as parts necessarily related to other parts in the unity of experience, it has no liberty, it cannot represent them to be other than they actually are. But the office of the *mathematical* principles is merely to determine the conditions under which any object taken by itself, and without relation to the others, may be represented in space and time; and therefore, so far as these principles are concerned, we are at liberty to abstract from any other relations of the object save those of time and space. Thus we can easily imagine or picture a house without picturing anything else. The picture is self-consistent, and its parts are related to each other like the parts in space; we do not need to concern ourselves about the other conditions necessary to its existence, such as, for instance, the ground on which it must stand, the materials of which it must be built, and the law of their relations to each other and to the external world in general. At the same time, we know that this picture is an abstraction, and that the object pictured is impos-

sible, unless it can find a place in the context of our experience.¹

Kant's
deduction
of the
mathema-
tical prin-
ciples.

The two mathematical principles are principles which justify us in applying Mathematics to experience, because they determine all phenomena as extensive and intensive quanta. The first, the 'principle of the axioms of perfection,' is, that "all phenomena, as perceived, are extensive quanta." The second, the 'principle of the anticipations of sensuous apprehension,' is, that "in all phenomena, the Real, which is the object of sensation, has intensive quantity, or degree;" in other words, that all phenomena, as given in sense, are intensive quanta. The first of these principles is proved by the fact that phenomena can be represented, or made objects of consciousness, only "by the same synthesis which produces the representation of a definite time or space." It is, in short, in time and space, that all objects and events must be represented as such; and therefore, the manifold of these objects must be combined in the same way as the manifold of space and time. But space and time are necessarily represented as extensive quanta, *i.e.*, by the synthesis of homogeneous units; therefore, the manifold of objects and events must also be bound together as extensive quanta. The second mathematical principle is proved from the fact, that, in all phenomena, there is a matter derived from sense: and that this matter can come into our consciousness only under conditions of time, *i.e.*, "by a synthesis of its production as a quantum," which is subjected to the form of time.

¹ Cf. Spinoza, *l. c.* In the above account of Kant's doctrine I have been obliged to introduce more of my own interpretation than usual: I could not otherwise get a distinct meaning out of Kant's words.

Even therefore, when we abstract from all *extensive* quantity, and take the sensation of the moment by itself, we can determine it as a phenomenon in time only in so far as we represent it as an *intensive* quantum; *i. e.*, a quantum which has grown up out of nothing by a continuous process in time, and which, therefore, is divisible into a number, and indeed, into an infinite number, of degrees.

Now, if it be true that the matter of sensation must have intensive quantity, it is obvious that all objects must have intensive quantity; for all objects have a sensible matter, and there can be no experience of empty space or empty time. Hence, also, the Atomistic doctrine of the existence of a vacuum, rests on a pure assumption. Proof of a vacuum is, Kant argues, impossible: for, if possible, it must be based either on experience or on some inference of experience. Now (1), there can be no actual experience of a vacuum, for it would be an experience of a pure form of sense without any matter; but, though the sensations that constitute the matter of sense may vary greatly in intensity, they can never be wholly absent without the annihilation of experience. Nor (2), can a vacuum be inferred from experience, for it is not legitimate to argue from intensive to extensive quantity. Vacant space, in short, could be inferred only from the fact that sensation is less intense at one moment than at another. But what hinders us from supposing that space may be filled with matter varying in its qualitative intensity, without absolute vacuum anywhere? ¹

In the argument of Kant which we have epitomised in the last two paragraphs, two assertions are

He maintains a vacuum to be indemonstrable.

¹ p. 150 : Tr., p. 130.

bound up together. The first is, that we cannot represent quantity without quality, or time and space without something existing or occurring; and the second is, that, though *a priori* we know nothing of the qualities of this something, we know that these qualities, whatever they are, must have intensive as well as extensive quantity. On each of these points a little explanation may be useful.

Time and space are only forms of the relations of objects.

1. Time and space are forms of the relations of objects. Space has no meaning except as that in which objects are represented as existing, and existing in a certain relation of position to other objects. Time has no meaning except as that in which events are represented as occurring, and occurring in a certain relation of co-existence and sequence to other events. Hence Kant calls space the 'potentiality of juxtaposition.' But the potential, though it may be distinguished from the actual, cannot be regarded except as a moment in it. We cannot have an experience of empty time or empty space, apart from an experience of objects and events in them. When, indeed, we have had experience of objects and events under these forms, we can by abstraction separate the forms from the objects, and regard them by themselves as if they were objects. Nay, we can determine them in this abstraction by an *a priori* synthesis, and so construct the mathematical sciences. But even in this *abstraction of the imagination*, as we may call it, we are unable to deal with time, space, and quantity purely in themselves. Quantity always is quantity of something; and even Arithmetic and Algebra, which deal with quanta in their utmost abstraction, are obliged to use symbols and thus to represent the other element from which abstraction

is made. So space and time, without objects or events, are abstractions which cannot be represented or 'envisaged,' much less known.¹

In Kant's statement of this idea, however, we are somewhat confused by the irrelevant consideration that all experience has a matter, and that that matter is supplied by sense. 'In all phenomena the real is the object of sensation.' Strictly taken, this carries us back to the Berkeleian doctrine that the '*esse*' of things is their '*percipi*,' especially when we find Kant also saying that sensation is the element which constitutes 'the transcendental matter of all objects as things in themselves.' From the transcendental point of view, however, we have nothing to do with the conditions under which knowledge is developed in the individual sentient subject, but solely with the conditions under which all objects are represented. So far as sensations are represented as objects, they must, no doubt, be represented as events in time, and thus they may be considered as the *real* subjects of time-relations like any other events. But to speak of sensations apart from the conditions under which they, like all other events, are represented or known, is to desert the transcendental point of view and to confuse sensation with the consciousness of sensation as an object or event in time.

2. But in the second place, Kant goes on to maintain that we cannot represent any objects except as having intensive as well as extensive quantity. We may, indeed, abstract from extension, and exclude one kind of quantitative determination; but then we must

Intensive
and exten-
sive quan-
tity imply
each other.

¹ This contradicts what Kant says in the *Metaphysical Exposition* of space and time (cf. p. 237), but it agrees with what has been said of the Imagination at the beginning of this chapter.

immediately think of intensity, and so bring in another kind of quantitative determination. For if we exclude both kinds of quantitative determination, we can no longer represent the object as a phenomenon in time or space at all. If we do not regard a phenomenon as having a multiplicity of parts *within* it, and so as an *extensive* quantity, we must regard it as a unity, which is, at the same time, determined as a multiplicity through its relation to other phenomena *without* it, and so as an intensive quantity. To this it only requires to be added that intensive and extensive determination imply each other, and that all quanta may be regarded in both ways. Kant, indeed, seems to regard the pure quanta of space and time as merely extensive, because there is no possibility of accumulation of space in one space, or of times in one time. But this is to forget that space and time are *continua*, which are not made up of simple parts; and that, therefore, whenever we regard a time or a space as a unit in relation to other times and spaces, we must regard it as an intensive quantum; *i.e.*, as a quantum which has its determination as quantum only in relation to other quanta without it. This may be illustrated by our use of the term *degree* in relation to the circle; for the degree is a quantum which has its determination only in relation to the other degrees. There are not, therefore, two quantities, one of which belongs to time and space and the other to things in time and space; but the quantitative nature of each is capable of being stated in both ways; or rather, it has these two sides, and every quantity is both extensive and intensive. In intensive quantity the difference (which yet essentially belongs to it as a quantity), is regarded

as external, and the unity is made prominent; in extensive quantity, the unity (which is also essential) is regarded as external, and the difference is made prominent; but neither the one nor the other moment can be wanting.¹

Now, if all phenomena, as in space and time, are intensive and extensive quanta, they cannot be represented as *minima* or *maxima*, either in degree or in extension: for quanta, as such, can always be increased or diminished, and there is no such thing as a greatest possible, or a least possible, quantity. Thus, to take first *extensive quantity*, we cannot determine any phenomenon in space or time as a *maximum* of extension, *i.e.*, as filling all space or all time. All spatially or temporarily determined phenomena are necessarily represented as *in* space, and *in* time, and an experience of a limit of space or time would contradict the very ideas of space and time as quanta. On the other hand, we cannot determine any phenomenon in space and time as a *minimum* of extension, *i.e.*, as filling only an indivisible moment or point: for, points in space, and moments in time, are only limits. Time, as Aristotle pointed out, is not made up of *Nows*, nor space of *Heres*. Again, in regard to *intensive quantity*, or degree, we cannot determine any phenomenon in space and time as having either a *maximum* or *minimum* of intensity: for such absolute intensity would exclude all relation of the phenomenon to other phenomena; it would be a *Now* which had no relation to past or future, a *Here* which had no relation to other places, *i.e.*, it would be inconsistent with the very idea of space and time,

Impossibility of *maxima* or *minima* of quantity.

¹ Cf. Hegel, *Logik*, I., p. 248. Stirling's *Secret of Hegel*, vol. II., p. 311. Aristotle's *Physics*, book iv.

and of quantity itself. In the same way, a phenomenon that had a *minimum* of intensity, would be a phenomenon incapable of being put in relation to other phenomena: it would be a *Now* that was absolutely lost in the past and the future; a *Here* that was indistinguishable from other spaces, *i.e.*, it would not be determined as in space and time at all. Another way of stating the same thing is to say, that a *maximum* of intensity would be an intensity in which all extension was absorbed, and a *minimum* intensity would be an intensity which was lost in extension. And conversely, a *maximum* extension would be an extension without reference to intensity, and a *minimum* extension would be an extension absorbed in intensity. It is, therefore, only in their relation to, and their determination by each other, that either intensive or extensive quantity has any meaning.

Criticism
of Kant's
view of the
vacuum
of the
Atomists.

These considerations lead us to a different view of the argument against the Atomists from that which Kant presents to us. As he states it, it seems to be an argument only against their *vacuum*, but, in truth, it is an argument equally against their *plenum*. According to their doctrine, the principles of nature are atoms and the void—absolute *plena*, or impenetrable and indivisible substances on the one side, and a pure *vacuum*, absolutely penetrable and divisible, on the other. Thus the atoms are *maxima* of intensity, and *minima* of extension, while the void is *minimum* of intensity, and *maximum* of extension. The mistake of the Atomists, therefore, lies not in arguing from intensity to extension; for these, as Kant himself shows, reciprocally imply each other: but rather, in overlooking the re-

lativity of the quantitative determination of things, for both atoms and the void are represented as quanta, though they contradict the very idea of quantity, as that which has no limit either of increase or diminution.

The result, then, of Kant's arguments as to the mathematical principles is, that all representation of things as in time and space, involves a double quantitative determination of them. And this implies that they cannot be *maxima* or *minima*; for, from the very nature of quantity, absolute *maxima* or *minima* are incapable of being represented, much less experienced or known. The known must be capable of being imagined, the imagined must be in space and time, and that which is in space and time must be quantitatively determined according to both the forms of quantity.

We now proceed to consider the *dynamical* principles, or the conditions of knowledge, as distinct from the conditions of imagination. Imagination differs from knowledge, as has been said, by its abstraction. We can represent that to exist which does not exist, and that to happen which does not happen, only so long as we abstract from that unity of experience, in which all objects and events are necessarily included. When, however, we consider that every object *must* exist in a definite part of the one space, and that every event *must* occur at a definite moment of the one time, we see that, in Spinoza's language, the sphere of imagination is narrowed as the sphere of knowledge is widened. And while, by the abstraction of the imagination, we can leave out of account the particular context of experience in which any object occurs, we cannot imagine that it should not have a

Kant's
proof of
the dynamical
principles.

particular place in that context: and, as our knowledge of that context increases, the limits of possibility are more and more accurately determined, till at last every object must be conceived as either necessary or impossible. Apart from the abstraction of imagination, in short, the only possible is the actual, and that which is not actual is impossible.

The Analogies of experience.

These considerations as to *modality* will, however, be better understood, after we have seen what is meant by the determination of any object as actual, *i.e.*, after we have explained the *Analogies of experience*. To determine any object or event as actual is, according to Kant, to give it a definite place in the context of one experience, or, what is the same thing, to determine it in one space and one time in relation to all other objects and events. Now, on what does this empirical consciousness of the world as one system of objects and events depend? Kant answers that it depends on the application of the three schematised categories of *substance*, *causality*, and *reciprocity*. Under the limitation of their schemata, these categories give rise to three principles of judgment: first, the principle "that there is a substance in phenomena, which remains permanent through all their changes, and the quantity of which is never increased or diminished;" secondly, the principle, "that all changes take place according to the law of the connexion of cause and effect," in other words, "that everything that happens presupposes something else on which it follows according to a universal rule;" and thirdly, the principle "that all substances, in so far as they are coexistent (in space), are in complete reciprocity," in other words, are in continuous action and reaction on each other

according to a universal rule. These principles are proved on the transcendental method, by showing that without them could be no empirical consciousness of the world as an objective unity in space and time. They cannot be derived from experience, for they are necessary to experience. Hume had maintained that the principle of causality is simply the general expression of a subjective habit of mind which is due to the repeated experience of sequence. The *post hoc* is the reality which, by an illusion of the imagination, is turned into the *propter hoc*. Kant answers that the experience of the *post hoc* is itself impossible, except to a mind that connects phenomena as cause and effect. And he adds that there are two other principles, implied in the objective consciousness of things in space and time, which cannot be referred to association—viz., the principles of substance and reciprocity. Our conviction that, amid all changes of state, there is in objects something which remains identical with itself, and which can neither increase nor diminish, cannot be explained by the fact that we have repeated or continuous experience of the same perception or object; for an object or perception can be recognised as the same in its recurrent appearance, only by a consciousness that organises its experience according to the principle of substance. Nor can the repeated co-existence of objects in one space be the ground on which we base our belief that they are reciprocally necessary to each other; for it is only a mind, which organises its perceptions according to the principle of reciprocity, that can determine objects as coexistent. Thus the permanent identity of objects, and the determination of their coexistent and successive

states by the principles of causality and reciprocity, are presupposed in, and cannot be derived from, the experience of things as determined in space and time. Or time and space are forms that may be given to the relations of phenomena, when these phenomena are otherwise determined as belonging to the context of one experience, but they cannot themselves be the source of such determination.

Refutation
of different
forms of
the asso-
ciation
theory.

There are two different points of view, from which attempts have been made to explain away the principles of judgment, as the results of association. Some theorists endeavour to go back all the way to pure sense, and to trace all the categories and principles of understanding to sensation and the association of sensations. To such writers Kant's answer is, that sensations, as such, are nothing for thought. And, indeed, it has always proved impossible for a sensationalist philosophy consistently to keep to this point of view. Inevitably, with more or less consciousness, the sensationalist assumes that sensation, for the merely sensitive subject, is already determined in some of the ways, in which it is determined for the thinking subject. And the simplest relations, which it seems natural to attribute to the sensible, as such, are those of space and time. Accordingly, in his earlier work with some disguise, and in his later work with scarcely any disguise at all, Hume assumes a consciousness of coexistence and sequence as included among the data of sense. All he seeks to prove is, that the causal judgment is an illegitimate extension of the judgment of mere sequence, and the judgment of

of sameness or similarity in different successive perceptions. To this modified Sensationalism Kant's answer is, that there can be no consciousness of the sameness of perceptions or of objects perceived in different times, which does not presuppose the permanent identity of substance, no consciousness of the succession of events, which does not imply a causal law of invariable sequence, and no consciousness of their simultaneity, which does not presuppose reciprocity, or, what is the same thing, a causal law of invariable coexistence.

To begin with *substance*. Experience is a know-
 ledge of objects, all whose successive phases are
 connected together as events in one time. If this
 unity of time, as that *in* which all changes occur,
 were not presupposed, there could be no idea of
 change at all. A consciousness of time, as some-
 thing not itself changing, is the necessary correlate
 of a consciousness of change or succession *in* time.
 But time in itself cannot be an object of percep-
 tion; nor is it a general idea given along with
 each perception; for then we should be able to date
 a perception in reference to absolute time, and that
 without relating it to any other perceptions. But,
 on the contrary, it is only as we connect a percep-
 tion with other perceptions, that we can represent it
 as in time at all. Time, in other words, is a mere
 form given to the relations of perceptions, which pre-
 supposes that they are otherwise related. We can
 connect events as *in* time, only in so far as we relate
 them to each other in the same way that the
 moments of time are related, and there must, there-
 fore, be some determination given to objects as *in*

The prin-
 ciple of
 Substance.

of time itself. As all times are in one time, so all changes must be in one permanent object. The conception of the permanence of the object is implied in all determination of its changes. "Change involves, that one mode of existence follows another mode of existence in an object recognised as the same. Therefore a thing which changes, changes only in its states or accidents, not in its substance; and, to use an expression only apparently paradoxical, only the permanent changes, while that which has nothing abiding in it cannot suffer change."¹ An experience of absolute annihilation or creation—of an object coming into existence from nothing, or an object ceasing to be—is impossible; for it would be an experience of two events, so absolutely separated from each other, that they could not even be referred to one time; in other words, they could not be regarded as belonging to one world of experience. And as it is on the synthesis of phenomena that the consciousness of the identity of self depends, there could not be one consciousness of self in a being that had two such experiences. We cannot, indeed, assert that the creation or annihilation of substance is an *impossibility*, but we must assert that it is an *impossible experience*. It is absurd, therefore, to explain the idea of substance as a result of the empirical consciousness of the similarity of successive or recurrent perceptions; for the consciousness of such recurrence or continuity of perception already involves that these perceptions are determined in relation to a permanent identity.

The principle of Causality.

In the second place, Kant argues that the judgment of sequence cannot be made except on the

¹ p. 160 : Tr., p. 140.

presupposition of the judgment of *causality*. For time is a mere form of the relation of things, and cannot be perceived by itself. Only when we have connected events with each other, can we think of them as in time. And this connexion must be such, that the different elements of the manifold of the events are determined in relation to each other in the same way as the different moments in time are determined in relation to each other. But it is obvious that the moments of time are so determined in relation to each other, that we can only put them into one order, *i.e.*, that we can proceed from the previous to the subsequent moment, but not *vice versa*. Now, if objects or events cannot be dated in relation to time, but only in relation to each other, it follows that they cannot be represented as in time at all, unless their manifold is combined in a synthesis which has an irreversible order; or, in other words, unless they are so related according to a universal rule, that when one thing is posited, something else must necessarily be posited in consequence. In every representation of events as in time, this presupposition is implied; and the denial of causality necessarily involves the denial of all succession in time.

The same argument may be applied to coexistence in space, and the principle of *reciprocity*. We cannot represent objects as coexisting, by a direct reference of them to space; for space is not perceived by itself, and objects are perceived as in space only when they are related to each other, as the parts of space are related. The relation of spaces must therefore be perceived *in* objects, if these objects are to be perceived as *in* space. But the parts of space are necessarily represented as reciprocally determin-

The principle of Reciprocity.

ing each other. Hence, only in so far as phenomena are represented as reciprocally determining each other, can they be referred to objects in space. The same necessity, therefore, with which each space is represented as determined by all other spaces, must be found in the relations of objects, for only as it is found in the relations of objects, can it be found in the relations of the spaces which they occupy.

Schopenhauer's
objection
to the dé-
duction of
Causality.

This is Kant's general argument. There are, however, a few inconsistent or ambiguous statements introduced into it, and especially into that part which refers to the principle of causality, which must be examined, before we can fully justify the above interpretation of it. Thus at the beginning of his discussion of the second *Analogy of experience*, Kant distinguishes two cases—the case of such an object as a house, where the sequence of our perceptions is reversible; and the case of a boat sailing down a river, where it is irreversible. We can begin either with the top or the bottom of the house, but we cannot see the movements of the boat except in one order. In the latter case, therefore, as Kant argues, we give to our perception of succession an objective value, but in the former case we regard it as merely subjective; or, what is the same thing, in the latter case we bring the sequence in our perceptions under the category of causality, and in the former case we do not. Now it is evident that if this were the only proof for the transcendental necessity of the principle of causality, we *could* have a judgment of sequence (*viz.*, in our own perceptions), which was not a judgment of causality, and thus Kant's argument against Hume would lose all its force. But Kant

either forgets, or abstracts for the moment from the fact, that whether we say the sequence is due (as in the case of the house) to the movement of our organs of sense, or whether we say that it is due to the movements of the object perceived (as in the case of the boat)—in both cases we make a judgment of objective sequence. And if it be true that we can date events in time only in so far as we can put them in causal relation to each other, in both cases alike there must be a judgment of causality. Kant, in fact, has here made the inconsistent admission that one kind of sequence can be determined without any help from the principle of causality. But if we could determine one kind of sequence without reference to causality, it would be difficult to prove that causality is necessary to determine any other kind of sequence. Kant's argument can be valid only if it is made universal, *i.e.*, if it is shown that all judgments of sequence are implicitly judgments of causality. And the remark, *mutatis mutandis*, holds good of judgments of reciprocity and co-existence.

Schopenhauer,¹ who has pointed out the inconsistency of Kant's statement, that we can have a judgment of sequence which is not objective, also denies the Kantian doctrine that objective sequence implies causality. It is, he argues, absurd to say that sequence is equivalent to causality, for in that case we should never recognise any sequence except between cause and effect. But night and day have followed each other constantly from the beginning of the world, without any one being tempted to find

¹ See also an able essay by Dr. Hutchison Stirling, which appeared in 1871 I think, in the *Fortnightly Review*, entitled, "Kant refuted by dint of muscle."

the cause of the one in the other. There would have been no meaning in Hume's argument that the only objective reality in causality is sequence, if there were nothing more in the idea of cause than is already expressed in sequence. All scientific attempts to discover the cause of any phenomena, imply a distinction between the specific cause of that particular phenomenon, and the other things that existed before it.

The judgment of sequence implies the judgment of causality

To this objection of Schopenhauer we may answer, that the judgment of causality indeed expresses more than the judgment of sequence *expresses*, but not more than it *implies*. Our first unscientific view of the world contains already the idea of its unity, and of the correlation of all its parts, but this idea is still undeveloped and obscure. Common sense at first represents the universe as a collection of individual things, whose only connexion is that they are all included in one space, and as a continuous series of events, whose only connexion is that they all happen in one time. The unity of space and time thus seems to establish no necessary relations between the objects which exist and the events which occur in them. The relations of sequence and coexistence are relations of mere externality, relations which leave the things related absolutely indifferent to each other. Hence the consciousness of such relations between things and events is quite compatible with the absence of all explicit recognition of law or order in the universe. When things are conceived *merely* as existing side by side in different spaces out of each other, when events are conceived *merely* as happening in different times after each other, the play of chance and arbitrary will seems to

be unlimited. The wildest superstition, and the greatest feebleness of the scientific spirit, is consistent with a consciousness that does not go beyond the unity of space and time. Yet in spite of all this, Kant is not wrong in saying that he who knows the world as *one* world, in which every object and event is determined in space and time in relation to every other object and event, has already *implicitly* recognised that it is a system of substances, which reciprocally determine each other, and whose coexistent and successive states, therefore, are necessarily connected as parts of one experience. In other words, we cannot *realise* or become clearly conscious of that which is involved in the former without asserting the latter view of things. We cannot like Hume set succession against causality, for so soon as we 'bring to conceptions,'¹ or, in other words, to clear consciousness, the synthesis by which two events are determined in time in relation to each other, we see that it contains or involves the category of causality. For the relation of one moment to another is such, that the apprehension of one moment is the condition of the apprehension of the next; and therefore, in attributing succession to things, we are already attributing to them necessary sequence.² To find the particular for this universal, the special threads of causality which connect the sequent states of objects, is of course a matter of careful observation and experiment. But in asserting sequence, we have by implication asserted, that the threads are there; and the denial that any subsequent state of the world was the effect of the previous state, would

¹ p. 77: Tr., p. 63.

² Since events are not dated in relation to time itself.

be equivalent to a denial that it is subsequent, and so, ultimately, to a denial of the validity of empirical consciousness of the world in time. In like manner, the assertion that objects coexist in space, is implicitly the assertion that they determine each other as the parts of space determine each other; and therefore we cannot deny reciprocity without being ultimately forced to deny coexistence in space.

Kant's
statement
about the
three
Analogies
of experi-
ence.

Another point, which seems to require more attention than Kant has given to it, is the relation *between* the three Analogies of experience. Are they principles entirely independent of each other, or are they necessarily connected as different aspects of one principle? Sometimes, especially in his earlier essay *On the idea of negative quantity*, Kant seems to oppose the principle of causality to the principle of substance, as synthesis to analysis. I can well understand, he there declares, how a thing should remain what it is, by the rule of identity: but I find it difficult to see how it can be, that when one thing is posited, another and quite different thing should appear as its consequent. In this point of view the principle of identity, which rules formal Logic, is identified with the principle of substance, as it was by Jacobi when he said, that the only logical system of philosophy is pantheism. In the *Critique*, however, Kant recognises that the principle of substance in its application to phenomena in time is synthetic: *i.e.*, it is synthetic to assert identity or permanence of that, which is at the same time recognised as having difference and change in it. But if this be so, then it is obvious that, in their synthetic meaning, the principles of causality and substance are inseparable from each other, or, in other words, that they are different

momenta of one thought. Lastly, in his remarks on the list of categories, Kant speaks of the conception of reciprocity as combining in it the conceptions of substance and causality, but he does not make any use of this idea in treating of the analysis of experience. In other words, he does not attempt to show how the three principles grow out of each other. The subject is too extensive to be discussed here, but we cannot dismiss it without one or two remarks.

The principles of substance, causality, and reciprocity may be regarded as marking three successive stages in the development of science. / The beginning of science was the search for a substratum of things, a unity in all difference, a permanent in all change. 'The one remains, the many change and pass,' was the doctrine in which early speculation found most satisfaction. And as thought, at every stage of its progress, strives to make itself self-consistent, so it was natural that in this connexion it should also be asserted that all difference and change are illusory appearances. Understood in this sense, the principle: *Ex nihilo nihil fit*, involved a pantheistic denial of all change and development. Everything, on this view, necessarily remains in its simple identity with itself. As, however, the principle of substance has no meaning except as the discovery of identity *beneath difference*, so the substance, which is not causal, which does not in some way differentiate itself, is soon perceived to be no explanation of anything. Science cannot long rest content to conceive the substance of things as a substratum, an unchangeable something, which underlies the process of change: it must inevitably

They correspond to three stages in the development of science.

advance to the conception of it as manifesting itself *i.e.*, its identity, in difference and change. The permanent in things need not lie, as the Atomists supposed, in certain definite properties of them, which remain fixed while all their other properties change. All the properties of matter change in one point of view, and remain fixed in another. For what remains is not the definite size, shape, weight of objects, but only certain relations, or laws of the connexion of objects, which maintain themselves through all the variation of their qualities, and which cannot be defined except in relation to that variation. Such considerations lead us to a conception of cause which includes substance, and is already in germ reciprocity. The law, which is the permanent element in all change, cannot itself be defined, except as a relation of substances or elements, which, though distinguished from each other, yet show what they are only in their relations. A law must state not merely that something goes before and something follows: it must also state that this result is produced by at least two bodies, two elements, or, it may be, two forces, acting and reacting on each other. The idea, therefore, which underlies causality, and to which we are necessarily led when causality is fully explained, is the idea of different substances, or substantial unities of some kind, which act and react on each other. Under this category of reciprocity we conceive the world as at once continuous and discrete: as a collection of individuals, each of which manifests its own nature in its acts, while yet each can only act as it is acted on by the others.

Is there a
higher
category
than re-
ciprocity?

It may be said that this view of things (which is the highest scientific conception of them admissible

on Kantian principles) is self-contradictory, in so far as it combines the idea, that everything is determined by itself, with the idea that everything is determined by other things. And this is quite true. There is a contradiction in the category of reciprocity which prevents us from resting in it as the *ultimate* category of things. Reason cannot find satisfaction in a circle reasoning any more than in an infinite series of reasons; and while causality, if received as the ultimate category, would lead us to the latter result, reciprocity would lead us to the former. Yet, though every imperfect category thus breaks down at last in contradiction, this does not take away its relative value in the scientific explanation of the world. "It is," says Professor Flint, "only meagre and pragmatical historians, or rather historical logicians, who affirm rigidly and invariably that A is the cause of B, and B of C, and C of D, &c. Whenever there is an organism like the living body, the mind of man, or even a society, wherever there is correlation of parts and functions, wherever there is action and reaction, the singular linear series of causes and effects is not found. A is the cause of B, and B of A, inconsistent as it may sound, is often a truer formula than A is the cause of B, and B of C, consistent as it may seem to be."¹ Whether this 'inconsistency' can be remedied—whether it is not the indication that we can, and must, seek for a still higher category, under which we may reconcile the unity and difference of things, instead of alternately presupposing the one or the other, is a question which properly belongs to the *Dialectic*. For the present we would simply notice that the

category of action and reaction is the highest we can reach, so long as we start with a given and unexplained difference, and seek only to find a mediation between its terms, without regarding the difference of the terms as itself the expression of one principle. It is the highest category of the finite as such, and it may be said, moreover, that it is that category in which the best scientific thought of our time in every department, (and not merely in those departments mentioned by Professor Flint) seems to find satisfaction. If, however, our knowledge does not contain in it an inherent contradiction which can never be solved, if it is true, as we have often argued, that there can be nothing absolutely *given* in knowledge, but that reason can only deal with that which is determined by itself, then we must regard such a category as merely a temporary and imperfect halting-place of thought, when it has not yet reached its ultimate unity with its object and with itself.

Is know-
ledge
limited by
imagina-
tion?

The question whether our knowledge can be raised into a higher form than that in which it is determined by the principles of causality and reciprocity, is only another form of the question whether the intelligence of man is limited, as Kant maintains, by his imagination. If we can know that, and only that, which we can represent under the forms of space and time, then reciprocity is the highest category of science. For what is essential to such representation is, that the objects or events represented should be thought as external and indifferent to each other, or rather that they should *not* be thought as essentially related to each other. The thought of their relativity may, indeed, come in as a

secondary or modifying element, but it must not be carried so far as to destroy the independence of the parts related.¹ Now imagination, as it bodies forth to itself the relations of different objects in space, even when it represents them as acting and reacting on each other, still presupposes in them a certain indifference or independence, which prevents their existence from being exhausted in their relations. Or, to put the same thing in another way, the parts it comprises are externally put together, and their unity in one whole is a secondary and subordinate aspect of them. In order to imagine anything, we must keep asunder the elements of its existence, we must separate its individuality from its continuity or relativity, and the highest categories which we can apply, consistently with this abstraction, are the categories of causality and reciprocity. Whenever we go beyond this point of view, whenever we apply the ideas of final cause, of development, or of self-determination, whenever we conceive any object as self-differentiating, yet, through its differences, returning upon itself, we transcend the sphere of imagination, the sphere of the representation of things as in space and time. Such intimate union of individuality and relativity may be *thought*, but it cannot be *pictured* or '*envisaged*' in sensuous objectivity. If, therefore, science is limited by imagination, as Kant would teach us, it is obvious that it is impossible for it to employ such categories, and any objects that require such categories to determine them, are beyond the strict pale of science. The

¹ In the ideas of space and time (cf. ante, p. 97), the elements of continuity or relativity and individuality fall asunder. This is the case with

effect of this conclusion on Kant's general view of the sciences will be seen in the next chapter. Its ultimate result is the denial, in the *Dialectic*, of the possibility of knowledge of the soul, the world, and God.

The postulates of empirical thought.

The object of the 'Postulates of Empirical Thought' is mainly to call attention to the distinction between the 'given' element of knowledge, and that which is due to the spontaneity of thought. The first postulate is, "That which agrees with the formal conditions of experience (both of perception and conception) is *possible*." *Possibility* can be predicated of the categories, because they are conditions of the determination of objects ~~as~~ such. It can be predicated also of the forms of perception, and of the products of the constructive synthesis of mathematics, in so far as they are based on these forms, because we cannot have any experience except under them. But beyond this, we can know nothing about the *possibility* of any object, except so far as it is *actual*. Now, according to the second postulate, "What is connected with the material conditions of experience is *actual*." In other words, to know the actuality of any object, we require either sensible perception of it, or, at least, the connexion of it, according to the Analogies of experience, with something else which is sensibly perceived. For it is only through these principles that we arrive at any conclusions as to the existence of any thing, which is not immediately given in sense. In these, and especially in the principle of causality, we have a guiding thread, by which we are often able, from actual perceptions, to conclude to the existence of something in the chain of possible perception, of

which we have not, and of which possibly, according to the constitution of our organs, we never can have, actual perception, *e.g.*, a magnetic fluid pervading all bodies. We conclude, in such cases, from our actual experiences, and the laws of their connexion, that, if our organs were fine enough, they would perceive something. This, however, is the limit of the *a priori* extension of our knowledge. "If we do not begin with experience, or if we do not proceed in our investigations according to the strict laws of the empirical connexion of phenomena, it is vain for us to attempt to discover the existence of anything whatever."¹ The third postulate: "That the connexion of which with actuality is determined according to the universal conditions of experience, is necessary," only repeats, what has been already anticipated, *viz.*, that no object of sense, and hence for us no object whatever, can be known *purely a priori*. The highest necessity our experience can reach is, that a thing should be known relatively *a priori*, *i.e.*, known as necessary in relation to something else already known to exist. Necessity of existence, therefore, can never be inferred directly from conceptions, but only "from the connexion of that which is inferred, with that which has been perceived." Nor can any inference enable us to determine the existence of any new substance. For every such inference must rest upon the law of causality, which determines nothing but relations between the states or accidents of substances. On the other hand, *relatively*, we may assert the necessity of *all* states of substances, since all such states are bound up in causal connexion with other states,

and the principle that 'everything that happens is hypothetically necessary,' is a principle, without which nature itself would not exist for us. While, therefore, in virtue of the law of causality, we can assert that there is a necessity in nature (*in mundo non datur casus*), we may equally assert that this necessity is not a blind but a conditioned, and, therefore, intelligible necessity (*in mundo non datur fatum*). Both these laws result from the dynamical principles, and if we combine them with the mathematical principles already examined, we may add two other laws of equal certainty, the law that there is a continuity in the series of phenomena (*in mundo non datur saltus*); and the law that no experience can be such as to prove a vacuum (*in mundo non datur hiatus*). "Finally, these laws may all be gathered up into the one proposition, that nothing can be admitted in empirical synthesis, which could be a hindrance to the understanding in establishing the continuous connexion of phenomena in one experience."¹

Is the possible wider than the actual?

The above account of the principles of modality is enough to show the vanity of all the discussions of philosophers on the question, whether the field of the possible is wider than the field of the actual or the necessary. For whenever we go beyond the mere form of experience, we can determine that anything is possible, only in so far as we determine that it is actual, and this again implies that it is hypothetically necessary. The predicates of possibility, actuality, and necessity, in short, add nothing to the content of any conception, but only indicate its relation to our faculty of knowledge. And it is for this

¹ p. 191 : Tr., p. 171.

reason that, by a mathematical analogy, they have been called *postulates*.

We have already said so much about the supposed absolute division, which Kant here asserts, between the *a posteriori* and the *a priori* element in knowledge, that it seems unnecessary to add anything further. As self-consciousness is conceived to have merely accidental and external relations to the categories, and the categories to have merely accidental and external relations to the *a priori* forms of sense, so, finally, the general schema of nature is conceived to be accidentally and externally combined with the particular matter of experience. In fact, it is this last point, the opposition between the necessity of thought and the contingency of fact, which gives plausibility to Kant's view of knowledge as a composite result of elements not in themselves related to each other. Nothing seems clearer to common sense than the accidental character of the contents which, in experience, are brought under the necessary laws of thought. The principle of causality may be necessary, but, as Hume asked, what discoverable relation except sequence is there between the particulars it binds together? The contingency of the particular laws of nature and experience is the best available proof that they are merely 'given,' or, what is the same thing, that the mind is passive in regard to them.

The opposition between *a priori* and *a posteriori* not absolute, according to Kant's own admissions.

The progress of Kant's own argument has, however, itself enabled us to transcend this point of view. It has enabled us not only to discern a relativity between the *general* elements of experience, but also to see that no element in experience can be purely *given*, purely *a posteriori*. The form of the

mind already belongs to everything which is an object to the mind, and the apparent contingency of the elements of experience to the eye of common sense, shows only that the relations of these elements are as yet determined merely as relations of time and space. But the determination of things as in space and time, as Kant has shown in the chapter of his work we have just examined, implicitly contains in it a determination not only by the categories of quantity and quality, but also by the categories of cause, substance, and reciprocity, *i.e.*, it involves a higher synthesis than it *expresses*. This synthesis is evolved or made explicit by science, when it discovers the laws of nature. It is true, indeed, that even the synthesis of science leaves an element of accident in the relations of objects to each other and to the mind. But the question immediately arises whether the intelligence can rest content with such a result, or whether the effort to find the unity of thought in things, which has led it beyond the ordinary consciousness, must not be repeated till the difference and contingency is completely overcome. It has sometimes been treated as an absurdity to assert that necessities of thought should be of gradual discovery; but, properly understood, there is no absurdity in the matter. If it is not absurd that men should reason without being logicians, neither is it absurd that the growth of experience should be guided by laws and principles, which are beyond the consciousness of the individual, though implied in that consciousness. It was Kant's work to disclose some of these principles, to show, in fact, that the common consciousness of things as in space and time is dependent for its possibility on principles which are not expressed in it, but which

are first explicitly stated and consistently applied by science. But may not the same process be repeated with reference to the ordinary scientific consciousness? May it not be shown that science itself implies principles other than those of which it is distinctly aware, or those which Kant's analysis of it has disclosed? Is it possible to maintain the absolute-ness of Kant's distinction between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori* elements of knowledge, between the organic plan of experience, which is due to our mental constitution, and the matter of sense, which is organised by means of that plan? If experience cannot be conceived as a compound of the purely intelligible and the utterly unintelligible, it seems necessary that the distinction between *a priori* and *a posteriori* should disappear from a higher point of view; or should be used to indicate a difference not of the kinds, but of the stages, of knowledge. On this supposition everything will at first be *a posteriori*, in the sense that, in the beginning of knowledge, the world appears to be a combination of things and events which have no relation to each other or to the mind. And everything at last must become *a priori*, in the sense that perfect knowledge would see all things in relation to each other and to the mind. This goal of knowledge, indeed, may be distant, but it is essentially involved in the very nature of knowledge. And it may be shown that there is a contradiction in treating the common scientific point of view as absolute; since it could not be attained except by the tacit assumption of an idea of truth, which yet cannot be realised in it.

These thoughts, however, anticipate in some degree the argument of the *Dialectic*, which we have yet

to examine. The next chapter will prepare the way for that argument, by considering Kant's view of experience in its application to the different sciences. If we find that his idea of knowledge, based as it is on the absolute distinction of the *a priori* and *a posteriori* elements of knowledge, is not wide enough even for *empirical* science, we shall be less disposed to admit its sufficiency, when it is used to prove the impossibility of a science which goes beyond experience. And, perhaps, it may even be shown that we cannot explain phenomena except on principles which break down the absolute wall of division between the phenomenal and the noumenal.

CHAPTER XII.

KANT'S GENERAL VIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL SCIENCES.

IN the last chapter we have considered the principles on which phenomena are determined as objects of experience under conditions of space and time. Taking these principles together, we reach the general idea of nature as a system of substances, whose quantum of reality always remains the same, but which, by action and reaction upon each other, are constantly changing their states according to universal laws. And the proof of this idea of nature is not dogmatic but transcendental, *i.e.*, it is proved that without it there could exist for us no nature and no experience at all. These principles, in short, are the general laws, which form the definition of nature, and which apply indifferently to all objects of experience whatever.

The general idea of nature.

But now we have to consider another question. Do these general laws contain all that, from a transcendental point of view, we can discover about the objects of experience? When we go beyond these laws, is our intelligence equally and indifferently related to all objects of experience, or does it stand in special relations to particular objects? Are internal and ex-

Are all natural objects similarly related to the intelligence?

ternal phenomena, are the phenomena of the organic and the inorganic world to be treated on exactly the same principles, or are any of them intelligible in a higher sense than the others? Do Psychology and Mechanics, Chemistry and Biology, stand all on the same level as sciences? or, if not, which of them has the preference? On these questions Kant touches in various places in the *Critique*, especially where he distinguishes between the sciences that have to do with the objects of outer sense and the science of the object of inner sense, but he discusses them more fully in his treatise *On the metaphysical basis of Physics* and on the *Critique of Judgment*. Before going farther it will be desirable to gather, from these various sources, his general view of the relations of the sciences.

Psychology
contrasted
with
Physics.

Already, in the first edition of the *Critique*, Kant observes that Psychology is not capable of the same kind of scientific treatment as Physics. "When we compare Psychology," he says, "as the Physiology of the inner sense, with Physics as the object of outer sense, we find that, altogether irrespective of their empirical contents, there is a remarkable distinction between them. For, while much knowledge can be drawn by *a priori* synthesis from the conception of an extended and impenetrable thing, no knowledge whatever can be drawn *a priori* from the conception of a thinking being. Both, indeed, are phenomena, but the phenomenon of outer sense, as occupying space, has in it something standing and permanent, which takes the place of a substance in relation to its changeable phases: it, therefore, is an object which can be synthetically determined. On the other hand, time, which is the sole form of inner sense, has

in it nothing permanent: and, therefore, in phenomena, which merely occupy time, we find a change of determinations, but no determinable object. For in that which we call the soul, all is in perpetual flux, and nothing is permanent, except (if you will have it so) the pure Ego, which seems to represent, or rather we should say, to *indicate* a simple object, because it is without content or multiplicity. But *this* Ego could not be the source of rational knowledge of the nature of a thinking being, unless it were a pure perception; for only a pure perception can enable us to make synthetic *a priori* judgments. Now, the Ego is neither a perception, nor the conception of any object, but simply the form of consciousness, which may accompany both perception and conception, and by its presence make them instrumental to the knowledge of objects."¹

In a passage introduced, in the second edition of the *Critique*, into the deduction of the Postulates of Empirical Thought,² the idea here expressed that the phenomena of the soul have in them nothing permanent, is made the basis of an argument against the problematical Idealism of Des Cartes. Des Cartes had maintained that the object of inner sense is known immediately and therefore with absolute certainty, while the object of outer sense is known mediately, by inference, and therefore doubtfully. To this, Kant answers, not only that both objects are equally phenomenal, but also that the knowledge of external phenomena, as determined in space, is prior to the knowledge of internal phenomena, as determined in time. For, to be conscious of oneself as determined in time, is to be conscious of a series of inner states

Kant's
argument
against the
Cartesian
Idealism.

¹ p. 305; Tr., p. 253.

² p. 773; Tr., p. 166.

which continually change. But, by the first Analogy of experience, it is impossible to be conscious of change except in relation to something permanent, which is determined as a substance. Now, no such permanent can be found in the states of the mind, which are always changing; nor can it be found in the pure subject, the unity of apperception, which is the general presupposition of the determination of all objects alike. But the object of outer sense has a permanent manifold of *partes extra partes*, none of which can be annihilated, and therefore, in relation to it, the manifold of inner sense can be determined as changing. In other words, we can be conscious of our mental states as determined in time, only in relation to an object in space.¹

Insufficiency of the argument.

This argument rests on the principle of substance, yet when we consider it closely, it is inconsistent with Kantian deduction of that principle. In that deduction it was shown, that we can know change only as change in a permanent substance, and that an experience of absolute change, *i.e.*, change not *in* a permanent substance, but *of* the substance itself, was impossible. Here, however, it is maintained that the phenomenal self, the object of inner sense, because it has no permanent *in itself*, can be known as changing only in relation to the permanent of outer sense. If, however, no object can be determined in time, except so far as its changes are the changes of a permanent substance or substratum, then an object, which has no such permanent in itself cannot be determined in time, and that is equivalent to saying that it cannot be determined as an object at all. For it cannot be brought under the category of substance,

¹ p. 772 : Tr., p. 166 ; cf. p. 685 : Tr., p. xl. (Preface to 2nd Edition.)

and, as the other categories presuppose substance, its changes cannot be determined by the principles of causality and reciprocity. Either therefore the application of these principles is not necessary to determine an object of experience, or, if they are, then the object of inner sense, the phenomenal self, cannot be determined as an object of experience.

In effect, though not very decidedly, Kant adopts the latter alternative. In his treatise *On the metaphysical basis of Physics*, he deduces the mechanical law, that the *quantum* of matter cannot be increased or diminished, from the principle of substance, and at the same time denies that we can discover any similar law of the phenomena of inner experience. "As the object of inner sense does not consist of parts which are external to each other, and as, therefore, its parts are not substances, its increase or diminution is possible consistently with the principle of substance. Thus the clearness of ideas in my soul, and so also my faculty of apperception, have a degree, which may become greater or less, without any substance needing to come into existence or cease to exist. But as, in the gradual diminution of this faculty of apperception, it must at last entirely disappear, the substance of the soul, in spite of its simplicity, may in this way be exposed to extinction, an extinction, however which will take place, not by division or separation of the composite being in which it inheres, but by gradual process of decay."¹ To say this, however, is to say that there is no permanent object of inner experience to which the category of substance can be applied. What here takes

The principle of substance does not apply to the soul.

¹ *Metaph. Anfangsgr. iii. 2. p. 407. Cf. Kritik p.*

the place of a substance is simply the pure Ego, which cannot be brought under this or any other category.

Kant's
view of
Psychology as a
science.

The consequences arising from this view of the soul as an object of knowledge are exhibited in another passage of the same treatise, where Kant tells us that empirical Psychology cannot be regarded as a science in the proper sense of the term. It cannot claim to rank as an *exact* science like Physics, "for Mathematics is not applicable to the phenomena of inner sense and their laws. The only ground on which such an application of Mathematics could be considered possible, lies in the *continuity* of the series of changes through which our consciousness passes: But the knowledge of mind which we might acquire by regarding it in this point of view, would bear the same proportion to our mathematical knowledge of matter, which the doctrine of the qualities of a straight line bears to the whole of Geometry. For the pure inner perception, in which the phenomena of the soul have to be construed, is time; and time has only one dimension. Nor again can Psychology be compared even to a systematic art of analysis, or experimental doctrine such as we have in Chemistry, for the manifold elements of inner observation cannot be separated, or can only be *ideally* separated from each other: nor can they be kept in isolation and combined at pleasure like the chemical elements; still less can we subject another thinking being to the experiments necessary for science. Moreover, when we observe, our observation changes the state of the observed object. Psychology, therefore, can never be more than a natural history, or a tolerably systematic account of the inner sense; but it

cannot be either an exact or an experimental science of it."¹

The truth is, that Psychology has no very distinct place in the Kantian system of knowledge. It does not treat of the universal principles of knowledge, for these, as Kant showed, are prior to the knowledge of any particular object, and hence they have as much and as little right to be introduced into Physics as into Psychology. Properly they belong to the science of transcendental Logic, which is neither the one nor the other. On the other hand, if Psychology be regarded as dealing with the object of inner sense as distinguished from the objects of outer sense, it is neither an exact nor an empirical science. For it does not admit of mathematical treatment,² nor can its object be determined by the categories, which are necessary to the determination of all empirical objects. That there may be objects which can be known as such, though they cannot be adequately determined by the categories of substance, causality, and reciprocity, is not yet recognised by Kant. Hence Psychology is left in a somewhat indefinite position, as it has to do with an object which is "indicated or pointed out" by the pure Ego of apperception, but not presented to us in any perception which can be brought under the category of substance. It belongs to a region of opinion, or at best of empirical generalisation which can never be definitely occupied by science.

The Kantian difficulty in relation to Psychology has two sources. It springs, in the first place, from

¹ *Metaph. Anfangsgr.*, Vorrede, p. 310.

² It would be out of place to do more here than allude to the Her-

the opposition of inner and outer sense, and in the second place, from the idea that all science is based on the application of the categories of relation.

Is pure inward observation possible?

In the first place, it is the Kantian view that the soul is observed only under conditions of time, while all other objects are observed also under conditions of space. Hence these objects are within the sphere to which Mathematics can be applied, or even if, as in the case of Chemistry, no quantitatively determined law (*e.g.*, no law of the attraction and repulsion of their parts, which determines their other qualities)¹ can be discovered, so as to make such application of Mathematics possible, still these parts are fixed and definite, and can be empirically determined, or separated and combined with each other at pleasure, without loss of their identity. On the other hand, the mere states of the conscious subject are evanescent and indefinite, and when we wish to examine any one of them, it disappears among the others in such a way that we can no longer definitely recognise or recover it.

Now, on this point, as is often the case, we can answer Kant, only by carrying his own criticisms a little farther, and denying altogether the possibility of pure inward observation. The inner life cannot be set on one side and the outer life on the other side, as objects to be observed apart from each other. If we attempt to examine our inner being by itself as a subject of sensations and feelings, we find nothing to observe, for we can only make our individuality an intelligible object in so far as we can conceive it as related under conditions of space and time to other objects. Pure inner observation would be the obser-

¹ *Anfangsgr.*, Vorrede, l.c.

vation of an abstraction which has no independent existence. We should not be conscious of a self at all except in relation to, and in distinction from, other objects; for self-consciousness grows along with the consciousness of the world, and the riches of the inner and the outer life are two opposite aspects of the same thing. The narrow range of knowledge and action, within which the savage is confined, is the counterpart of his inward poverty of spirit; and the enlarged consciousness of his own life, which the civilized man possesses, may also be expressed by saying that the world for him has become greater and wider. It is absurd, therefore, to oppose to each other two elements of reality which cannot be separated; or to suppose that one of these can be made the object of observation apart from the other.

It is, however, easy to see what it is that leads to the common mistake that Psychology must be based on internal, and the other sciences on external observation. It is plausible to say that we must look inwards to know the soul and outwards to know the body. But the plausibility of this assertion is due to a double oversight. On the one hand it is forgotten that the knowledge of outward objects is the determination of them by the forms of consciousness in general, *i.e.*, by their reference to the Ego, as the universal *subject* of knowledge; on the other hand it is forgotten that the knowledge of ourselves as *objects* is mediated by the knowledge of other objects, and especially of other spiritual beings. On the former of these points we may remark that if it be true that it is only through our own minds that we know the minds of others, in the same sense it is also

Sense in which all knowledge is self-knowledge.

true that it is only through our own minds that we know material objects. Kant, indeed, on one occasion, mentions it as a point of distinction between Psychology and the other sciences, that we can know other self-conscious beings only in so far as we put ourselves in their place, and, as it were, transfer to them our own Ego. "I cannot," he says, "get any idea of a thinking being from external experience but only from self-consciousness. Such objects are, therefore, nothing more than the transference of this my consciousness of myself to other things, which only in this way can be represented as thinking beings."¹ But the truth is that no object whatever can be made intelligible to us except by the same transference to them of some form of consciousness. For what are the categories through which objects are determined as such? Kant himself called them 'species of the synthetic unity of apperception,' and thereby in effect admitted that all determination of objects as such may, in another point of view, be regarded as the discovery of one of the forms of self-consciousness in them. In other words, the process by which we determine material objects as such, and the process by which we determine spiritual objects as such, are identical, except that in the latter case the category or species of the unity of apperception, which we must use to determine the object, is a higher one. But if in the latter case we have to use self-consciousness itself as the category by which we can make the object intelligible to ourselves, whereas in the former case, we can make the object sufficiently intelligible by means of such conceptions as causality and reciprocity; yet it must be con-

¹ p. 279; Tr., p. 240.

sidered that causality and reciprocity are contained in, though they do not fully exhaust, the idea of self-consciousness. They are implicitly, what it is explicitly: they are in germ, what it is in full development. Substance, causality, and reciprocity are only imperfect expressions of that conception of unity in difference, which, in a higher form, appears as the idea of final cause, and which ultimately reveals itself as the idea of self-consciousness. In determining inorganic objects, we may not find it necessary to use any but the first order of categories; when we come to the organic world we require, as Kant himself maintains, the second order: and when we reach the spiritual world, we can accomplish our purpose of making it intelligible with nothing less than the third. But this difference is not an absolute one; the categories are not to be put side by side, as independent and unrelated conceptions, any more than the inorganic, the organic, and the spiritual worlds. As spirit gathers up into itself and transcends both mechanism and life, so the category of self-consciousness is the ultimate truth of that which is partially expressed in efficient and final causality. As the ancient philosopher said, ὁμοιον ὁμοίῳ αἰσθάνεται: by that in us which is kindred with the material, we know material objects without us, and by that in us which is spiritual we know spiritual objects without us.

And this leads us to say, in the second place, that outward and inward experience cannot be separated from each other. Still less can we say that Psychology rests on the latter and Physics on the former. If 'consciousness in general,' to use the language of

Psychology does not deal with the object of inner sense as opposed to outer sense.

first is also the last, and the self-conscious being, as Psychology regards him, is the highest natural being, the being in whom nature transcends itself. Nature becomes self-conscious in man: and we cannot understand man, if we isolate him from Nature. The inorganic and organic world is the presupposition of the life of spiritual beings, and that life cannot be made completely intelligible except in relation to the necessary conditions of its development. What we call the outward world and oppose to our own inner experience, is thus a necessary part of that experience. Further, even viewing spiritual life in itself, we cannot isolate inner from outer experience, since the riches of the individual spirit consist mainly in the depth and extent of its relations to other spirits. A self-conscious being, isolated from his fellows, existing alone in an unconscious world, is a figment of abstraction. Such a being, if we could conceive him to exist, would be only *potentially* self-conscious: *i.e.*, he would have no inner life to analyse or contrast with the outer life. All inner life, in short, may be described as a returning upon self out of an outer life, to which indeed it is opposed, but which also it presupposes. In this sense there is truth in Kant's assertion, that the consciousness of the individual self as an object is posterior to the consciousness of the external world. But in so far as he separates the one from the other as objects of observation, or assigns any especial content of science to the one or the other exclusively, he is the victim of a confusion of thought, which his own work did much to dispel. He is in fact turning a distinction between two elements which enter into all knowledge, into a distinction between different kinds of

knowledge; and the consequence is, that he is obliged to deprive Psychology, thus reduced to the self-observation of the individual, of its proper place in the system of the sciences.

The correction of this error may, as we have said, be derived from Kant himself. When in the *Critique of Judgment* he maintains that the phenomena of life cannot be made intelligible, unless we suppose that an intelligence like our own, acting with definite design, has produced them, he practically admits that the categories, by which one order of existence is empirically determined, are inadequate to another order of existence. It is true, that he also declares that this conception of design, which we apply to the organic world, has only a subjective value in relation to the organisation of our knowledge, and not an objective value as teaching us what things are, and that, consequently, the only valid determination of living beings as objects, is their determination by the principles of substance, causality, and reciprocity. In the same spirit, and with a similar qualification, he admits that the phenomena of mind can be understood only by the aid of the idea of self-consciousness. In a passage already quoted, he says that we can represent a thinking being as an object only in so far as we transfer our own consciousness of self to him, and immediately adds that, in this transference, the proposition 'I think' is taken problematically, not as containing a perception of an existent object (as in the *cogito ergo sum* of Des Cartes), but merely as a possible hypothesis, in order to see what qualities are deducible from it.¹ But with this qualification, which we shall not discuss at present, Kant

Kant's admission that higher categories are necessary for Biology and Psychology.

maintains that living beings, and still more, conscious beings, are objects which we cannot sufficiently determine by the application of the general principles of pure understanding, or, in other words, by the schematised categories of substance, causality and reciprocity. We may indeed *begin* to determine them by these categories, in so far as they have an external existence, and stand in definite relation to other objects in space and time. But there is a relation between the parts of a living being, which can only be expressed by the category of finality, or in other words, by saying that every part is both cause and effect of every other part. We therefore cannot treat Biology purely as an experimental science like Chemistry: for a living being is no compound, the parts of which can be definitely determined prior to, and apart from, their relations to each other. Nor can the action and reaction of the animal and its environment be reduced under the categories of causality and reciprocity. Still less can we apply such a method of explanation to spiritual life. We cannot divide the soul into independent parts, corresponding to parts of the body, and explain the phenomena of conscious life by their action and reaction; for, to do this would be to neglect the essential fact of the unity of self-consciousness. Mind, in a higher sense than even life, is whole in every part. Nor, again, is it possible fully to explain any of its phenomena by an action or reaction between the conscious self and the body, or between the mind and the outer world; for nothing exists for the self except as it is apprehended by the self, and self-consciousness is a unity which transcends the distinction between itself and the world.

The thinking being as such cannot be regarded as external to the objects to which he is related, in the same way as, *e.g.*, one stone is external to another. Hence the categories which imply such externality and difference are inadequate to the relations of mind, and may often rather obscure the facts of its development than throw light upon them. Thus those who treat the will and the motives as if the former was a weight and the latter a lever, place a sufficiently clear picture before the imagination; but they explain the action of a spiritual being only by omitting the very fact to be explained. But this circumstance should not lead us, as it leads Kant, to doubt whether Psychology can be raised into a science at all: it should only enable us to see to what kind of science it belongs. For it is an altogether false assumption that the range of science is limited to those things which can be adequately determined by the principles of causality and reciprocity.

We are now in a position to answer the question stated at the beginning of this chapter. Kant distinguishes four orders of science. The first place must be given to Physics, in so far as it is capable of being treated mathematically. Next come the experimental sciences, of which Kant takes Chemistry as the example—sciences treating of objects, whose qualities are the result of the combination or separation of definite parts, and which therefore are adequately determined by the categories of causality and reciprocity. The third place belongs to Biology, which requires the aid of the problematical conception of final cause: and the last, to Psychology, which, as it is founded in pure internal observation and incapable

Kant's
four orders
of science.

of being determined by the Analogies of experience, scarcely deserves the name of science at all. Of the last two something has been said, and more will have to be said in connexion with the *Critique of Judgment*; and the second requires no special treatment. The first is discussed by Kant in his treatise on the *Metaphysical basis of Physics*, of which a very short sketch may be here introduced to complete the account of the Kantian organisation of science.¹

Metaphy-
sic of
Physics.

Kant starts with the principle that the *a priori* determination of objects is confined within the same limits as the application of Mathematics. This principle is an immediate consequence of the Kantian view of experience. For things are capable of being mathematically treated only in so far as they are capable of *a priori* construction, *i.e.*, in so far as their connexions and relations can be represented in *a priori* perception. Now, the fundamental determination of that which is the object of external sense must, according to Kant, be *motion*; for by motion alone can the external sense be affected.² Taking therefore from experience the fact that there is something which is moveable in space and which occupies it, the Metaphysic of Physics has to determine under what conditions the conception of this object must be constructed or represented in space and time; for these are, of course, the *a priori* forms under which all objects of outer sense must be represented. To *discover* these conditions, we must consider the conception of matter

¹ We shall have to return to this subject for another purpose in the second volume. I have translated the title of Kant's work *Metaphysical basis of Physics*, though Kant's word is 'Naturwissenschaft,' which is more general; but, as we have seen, the former name sufficiently indicates the contents of the treatise.

² *Metaph. Anfangsgr.*, p. 317.

as determined by the four species of categories in relation to the pure forms of perception.

1. Matter, *quantitatively* defined, is 'the moveable in space.' In this point of view it is the object of a science we may call *Phoronomy*. But motion, like space, is essentially relative; if motion, or at least, if motion in a straight line, takes place in any space, we may indifferently consider it as a motion of the body, or as an opposite motion of the space; and as we can never reach a space, which is not contained in space, there is no rest, which, in reference to an including space, may not be interpreted as motion; and again, in reference to another space including that, as rest, and so on *ad infinitum*. Absolute motion and absolute rest, therefore, like absolute space, cannot be objects of experience. In other words, we can never speak of *one* body as either in motion or at rest, but only of different bodies as in motion and at rest relatively to each other, in so far as the distance between them changes or remains the same. From this we see how it is possible to *construct* or represent the combination of different motions. We cannot add motion to motion in one body, except by representing one of the motions as taking place in the body itself, and the other in the space it occupies. And this holds good whether the motions are in the same or a different direction.

2. Matter, as *qualitatively* defined, is 'that which occupies space.' In this point of view it is considered by *Dynamics*. But the occupation of space by a body means the exclusion of other bodies from that space: hence it implies a *moving force*, and, in the first instance, a repulsive or expansive force. This is the affirmative or positive side of the existence

Matter as
deter-
mined in
Quantity.

Matter as
deter-
mined in
Quality.

of matter ; but as, according to the principle of the Anticipations of perception, affirmation cannot be absolute, and every property of an object of experience must be regarded as having a certain limit of degree, so the intensity of this force must always be regarded as something between nothing and infinity—as something which never can be altogether annihilated, yet always can be transcended by a greater force. Matter is, therefore, originally elastic, and though it can always be pressed into a smaller space by the application of a greater force, it can never be penetrated or destroyed. On the other hand, the repulsive or expansive force, though it be the fundamental characteristic of matter, cannot be the only force in it. For a matter determined only by such a force would not occupy space ; being purely expansive, it could not limit itself, and as it could not be limited by mere space, it must, therefore, disperse itself *ad infinitum*. For the possibility of matter, therefore, as occupying space, another force must be assumed, a force which, as the negative or opposite of repulsive force, is attractive. The existence of matter is possible only as these two forces limit, and are limited by each other. For it is to be observed that matter, moved solely by an attractive force, would not occupy space any more than matter moved solely by a repulsive force. If the latter would disperse itself *ad infinitum*, the former would vanish in a mathematical point. Only by the interaction of the two, is matter, as that which occupies space, possible. The law of that interaction, however, is a matter to be determined by observation and experiment. The Newtonian law of the increase of attractive force, inversely as the square of the distance, requires to

be supplemented by some general law of repulsion.

3. Matter, as determined by the categories of *relation*, is 'the moveable, in so far as it has moving force.' In this point of view it is considered by *Mechanics*. In *Mechanics*, the *quantum* of motion is estimated not by velocity merely, as in *Phronomy*, but by velocity multiplied into mass. From the application of the three Analogies of experience to matter thus conceived, we get the three laws of *Mechanics* (1), that the quantity of matter always remains the same; (2), that all change of matter requires an external cause (or, in other words, that a body remains in its state of motion or rest, if it is not made to change it by an external cause); (3), that in all communication of motion, action and reaction are equal. According to this law we must dismiss all ideas of *vis inertiae*, as a resistant force, which is not also an active force: and as motion is relative, a body can never move another body, which relatively to it is at rest. When, therefore, we consider the bodies merely in relation to each other we must distribute the quantity of motion equally between them. And as in *Mechanics*, quantity of motion is estimated by mass multiplied into velocity, we must conceive of the velocity of each body as being inversely as its mass.

4. Finally, we come to *modality*. Matter is an object of experience only through motion, and the application of the postulates of empirical thought to it, in this point of view, enables us to lay down the following principles: (1) The motion of a body *in a straight line* in an empirical space is *possible*, for it may be indifferently attributed either to the body or

Matter as
deter-
mined in
Relation.

Matter as
deter-
mined in
Modality.

the space ; and the motion of a body in relation to no other body or empirical space outside of it, *i.e.*, its absolute motion, is *impossible*. (2.) The *circular* movement of a body in relation to the space around it is an *actual* predicate of it, and the opposite motion of the surrounding space is a mere illusion. For a circular motion, as being the continual change of direction, requires by the second mechanical law a new force to produce it at every moment. (3.) Lastly, By the third mechanical law, to the motion of a body whereby it moves another, the opposite motion of that other is *necessary*.

Difficulties
in Kant's
construc-
tion of
matter.

On the ideas of the *Metaphysical basis of Physics* we shall only make two remarks. The *first* is, that Kant does not in any way attempt to show how the idea of matter is derived from experience, except by saying that it is by motion alone that outer sense can be affected. Now if this means, as it seems to mean, that our organs of sense need to be stimulated by the external motion of their object, the fact, however true, is obviously irrelevant as an explanation of the origin of our conception of matter. For ere we can think of the organs of sense and of other objects as acting on them, we must already possess that conception. It is possible that Kant meant merely that the perception of motion is the first empirical element given under the form of outer sense.¹ In that case we have merely the general difficulty of combining the empirical with the *a priori* element, a difficulty on which enough has been already said. In the *second* place, we have to notice that,

¹ The true answer to this question from the transcendental point of view has been already indicated, so far as is necessary for our purpose, in Chapter X., p. 430.

while Kant here suggests a construction of matter out of two opposite forces, he does not put these opposite forces on the same level. The repulsive force belongs to the definition of matter; the attractive is said to be necessary to its possibility, but not primarily to belong to its definition. This seems to be a distinction without a difference; for if a definition is to exclude what is necessary to the possibility of the thing defined, (and necessary not because of any external condition, but from the very nature of the thing itself,) what can be its value? The truth seems to be, that here, as in an earlier treatise on the same subject to which we have before referred, the individualistic principles of the Wolffian philosophy in which Kant was first trained, partially maintain themselves against his maturer thought. The monad of Leibnitz was really exclusive of, and only ideally related to the other monads: Kant makes both the exclusion and the relation, both the repulsion and the attraction, real. But he still conceives the former as the primary determination of matter, and the latter as secondary.¹

That matter, conceived as a subject of force, must be resolved into a duality of forces, is a thought which had great influence on subsequent philosophy. It was a fatal blow, whose efforts have not yet been fully seen, to all Atomistic theories, and indeed to all theories which explain away attraction or reduce it into a form of repulsion. When it has been recognised that repulsion on the one side presupposes attraction on the other: that in short attraction can only be conceived as acting against

Importance of the idea of a dualism of forces in matter.

¹ Cf. Hegel, *Logik*, i., p. 192, which passage contains an elaborate criticism of Kant's ideas. Cf. also *ante*, p. 161.

repulsion, and repulsion as acting against attraction : it may easily be inferred that these two opposites are no real independent entities, but factors of a higher unity, which are only by abstraction separated from each other. In reality, one force cannot be conceived without the other, and therefore the truth is the unity, which manifests itself in these opposite forms. The development or defence of this thesis would however be out of place here, where we wish only to show the general bearings of Kant's metaphysic of nature.

Kant's
general
view of the
sciences.

We may now sum up the results arrived at in this chapter, in relation to the system of the empirical sciences. In Kant's view the name of science, in its highest sense, can be given only to Mathematics, and the pure part of Physics. Experimental Physics and Chemistry, may claim the same title in a lower sense, in so far as they are capable of being brought under the Analogies of experience. Biology is science, in so far as it is capable of being brought under the same principles : but in so far as we need the problematical conception of final causes in order to investigate the phenomena of life, we introduce into these phenomena a mode of thought which it is impossible to verify. It may be necessary for us thus to represent the living being, but we cannot say that it is necessary for the living being to be as we represent it ; for we can never justify, from the transcendental point of view, the application of the category of final causality, as we *can* justify the application of the categories of substance, causality and reciprocity. Lastly, Empirical Psychology, in so far as it deals with an object known only under the form of inner sense, and therefore with an object incapable

of being identified as a substance, or of having its states determined in relation to each other by the categories of causality or reciprocity, is excluded from the strict pale of science. Besides the general limitation of science to the sphere of experience, there is therefore, in Kant's view, a special limitation of it to the object of outer sense ; and even to the phenomena of the inorganic world ; a limitation, it may be remarked, which is a necessary consequence of the doctrine that experience is limited by imagination. At the same time, we must remember, that, besides the empirical sciences, there is another department of knowledge fully entitled to the name of science, and which Kant distinguishes from them as 'the science of the Empirical,' or, in other words, the science of Transcendental Logic, which deals with the universal conditions under which all objects of Experience are known.

CHAPTER XIII.

DISTINCTION OF PHENOMENA AND NOUMENA, AND THE
AMPHIBOLY OF THE REFLECTIVE CONCEPTIONS.

The idea
of the
Noume-
non.

AS Kant approaches the end of the *Analytic*, the question of the nature of knowledge passes into the question of the limitation of knowledge. Thus the two chapters, *On the ground of the distinction of Phenomena and Noumena*, and *On the Amphiboly of Reflexion*, in which he shows the impossibility of any knowledge of objects not presented as experience, prepare the way for the *Dialectic*, in which he discusses the sources of the illusory appearance of such knowledge.

Does it
originate
in sense?

Whence comes the idea of a Noumenon? Certainly not from perception, for perceptions in themselves cannot suggest the idea of an object which, *ex hypothesi*, is not perceived. The *Æsthetic* showed that perception takes place under certain forms, which are at once *a priori* and objective, *i.e.*, which belong to the mind itself and not to the matter of the affections that come to it from without, yet which are objectively valid, because they are forms under which that matter is necessarily represented in being referred to objects. And to this, in the *Analytic*, it

was added that the very reference to objects, which is implied in the translation of sensations into perceptions, is possible only by means of the categories. As, therefore, it is through the understanding that we know even phenomenal objects as such, so it would seem that we must look to the same faculty for the revelation of any objects that are *not* phenomenal, if such revelation be possible.

But, it must now be asked, can we get the idea of a Noumenon from the understanding with its categories? And again, the answer must be negative. The categories, apart from the perceptions, have no 'objective significance;' they are forms through which the perceptions may be thought as objective, but they do not in themselves enable us to determine any object as such. If we abstract from the reference to possible experience, we can say nothing about the possibility of objects *corresponding* to the categories, and hence we cannot by their means make any synthetic judgments regarding objects that are beyond the sphere of experience.

Lastly, we possess the idea of an object in general, but this will not answer the purpose; it is too indefinite to be in itself the knowledge of anything, being merely an *x*, which correlates with the unity of self-consciousness. It is but a unity in the manifold which corresponds with the unity of the Ego that apprehends it. And this *abstractum* is realised and determined only by the application of the categories to the matter of sense. In itself it is but the idea of a sensuous object in general.

Thus at first sight it would seem that neither in sense, nor in understanding, nor in the pure apperception, have we any ground for the conception of a

Or in the
Under-
standing?

Or in the
transcen-
dental
Appercep-
tion?

The two
species of
Noumena.

noumenon, or for the distinction of it from phenomena. It is necessary, however, as Kant urges, to distinguish two senses of the word *noumenon*—a negative and a positive sense. In a negative sense, a noumenon would be an object *not given in sensuous perception*; in a positive sense, a noumenon would be an object *given in a non-sensuous, i.e., an intellectual perception*. Now a noumenon, in the latter sense, is utterly beyond our reach. We are so far from being able to comprehend its possibility that we cannot even form to ourselves any idea of the faculty to which alone it could be presented; we cannot picture to ourselves a *perceptive understanding*. But the conception of a noumenon *in the negative sense* is still possible to us, and, indeed, it is forced upon us by the criticism of our powers of perception and understanding. “The conception of a noumenon, *i.e.*, of a thing which is to be thought not as an object of sense, but as a thing in itself (the object of understanding only), is not self-contradictory; for we cannot say that sense is the only possible mode of perception. Nay, this conception is even *necessary* to prevent us from extending sensuous perception to things in themselves, and so to limit the objective validity of the knowledge derived from sense. We give the name of noumena to all objects, to which sensuous perception does not extend, just for the purpose of showing that such knowledge is not all that understanding can think. Yet in the end we have to acknowledge, that we cannot understand even the possibility of such noumena, and that the sphere of knowledge, which we thus reserve beyond the region of phenomena, is

standing that *problematically* extends beyond the phenomenal; but no perception, and not even the conception of a possible perception of objects beyond the sphere of sense, on which the understanding might be used *assertorially*.”¹ Thus “understanding limits the sensibility without extending its own sphere. It warns sense not to presume to speak of things in themselves, but only of phenomena; and, in so doing, it sets before itself a thing in itself, but only as a transcendental object, which is the cause of phenomena, and not itself a phenomenon, and which, therefore, can be thought neither as quantity nor as reality, nor as substance, etc., (because all these conceptions require sensuous forms, in which alone they determine objects for us). Of this transcendental object we are unable to say whether it is in ourselves or out of us, whether it would be annihilated with our sensibility, or would continue to exist even if we no longer perceived it. If we choose to call it a noumenon, in order to show that we do not represent it as sensuous, we are at liberty to do so. But, as we cannot apply to it any one of the categories, the conception of it is for us empty and meaningless, except in so far as it calls our attention to the limits of our sensuous experience, by marking off a vacant space which we cannot fill up by the aid, either of possible experience, or of the pure understanding.”² The misunderstanding, by which we are tempted to treat noumena as positively determined objects, is caused by the fact that the conditions of the objective determination of perceptions are prior to, or presupposed in, actual perceptions. ‘Apperception, and with it thought, precedes

¹ p. 210 : Tr., p. 187.² p. 234 : Tr., p. 206.

any possible definite arrangement of our ideas. Hence we think of an object in general and give it a sensuous determination, but at the same time we distinguish the object, taken *in abstracto*, from the particular mode in which we apprehend it by sense. And though it be true that such bare thought is but a logical form without content, yet in this case it seems to be a mode in which the object exists in itself, apart from the limits of our sense perception."¹

How can we know the limits of knowledge?

So far we have simply given Kant's view, as he presents it to us; but when we examine it closely, we find ourselves involved in no small difficulty. The question is—how are we able to discern the limited nature of our experience? How, if we are confined to phenomena, can we discern them *to be* phenomena, seeing that this implies a contrast with noumena, which, *ex hypothesi*, we cannot know? Kant answers that the noumenon is for us purely a limitative conception (*Grenz-begriff*), and denotes a merely problematical extension of reality beyond the sphere of phenomena. There are certain among the *conditions* of our experience, which make it impossible that we should conceive the *objects* of such experience to be absolute realities. But our knowledge of absolute reality is purely of a negative character, and the assertion of the distinction of noumena from phenomena is justifiable, only when it is taken as another way of expressing the consciousness of our own limitations.²

Difference in the answers derived from the *Æsthetic* and the *Analytic*.

One great difficulty in understanding Kant's meaning arises from the fact that the opposition of phenomena and noumena seems to be based on dis-

¹ p. 235 : Tr., p. 207.

² Cf. *Proleg.*, § 59, etc.

ting and even opposite grounds in the *Analytic* and the *Æsthetic*. In the *Æsthetic*, Kant presupposes the existence of things in themselves as affecting us, and argues that there are certain elements in our knowledge, which could not be introduced into the mind by means of these affections, but must be due to the forms of its own sensibility, viz., the forms of space and time. For these forms are the ground of universal and necessary judgments, which relate by anticipation to all the objects of experience, and which, therefore, cannot themselves be derived from experience. And as these are the forms of all perception, so, for this very reason, no perception can present to us things as they are. If perception were of things in themselves, it must be altogether empirical; as it is *a priori*, it can only be a perception of phenomena.¹

Now this reasoning seems conclusive just because the *Æsthetic* presupposes an opposition between the mind and things in themselves, and inquires only how the latter can be presented to the former through its own affections and sensations. It presupposes in fact a dualism between the subject and the object, a dualism which it is left for the understanding to establish. But the *Analytic* teaches us that the understanding is incapable of establishing any such dualism. The understanding enables us, not to refer sensations to *noumenal* objects that produce them, but simply to combine the manifold of sense in accordance with conceptions, and so to determine *phenomenal* objects for these conceptions. Hence it does not suggest any contrast between these objects and a higher noumenal reality. Nor is it possible in the *Analytic*

¹ Cf. *Prolegomena*, § 11 : Tr., p. 46.

to repeat the argument used in the *Æsthetic* in reference to the forms of sense, and to say that because the principles of the understanding are universal and necessary, *therefore* they are due to the mind and not to things; for it is just these universal and necessary principles that enable us to determine objects as such. On the contrary, the argument becomes inverted. Knowledge must now be proved to be phenomenal because we have not a perceptive understanding, *i.e.*, because the universal and necessary principles of the understanding are applied to a contingent matter, to a matter which has no necessary connexion with them. In other words, the proof of the phenomenal character of the objects of our experience must now be found, *not* in the fact that we can partially anticipate experience by universal and necessary judgments, but in the opposite fact that there is a part of knowledge which we cannot so anticipate.¹ In the *Æsthetic* the argument is that, if we know things in themselves, our knowledge must be purely empirical: from the point of view of the *Analytic*, the argument must be that, if we knew things in themselves, our knowledge would be purely *a priori*. These two views are so far in agreement, as absolute empiricism and absolute *a priori* knowledge would both imply an identity of subject and object; in the one case, the mind would be completely lost in things, in the other; it would create its own object. But as on the former alternative there would be no mind at all, it is the latter alternative only that we need consider.

¹ If the categories are said not to be applicable to the thing in itself, it is because they are supposed to be separable from the Apperception; cf. *ante.*, p. 384.

Now, from this point of view, it becomes obvious that *the conception of a noumenon can arise only in an intelligence that possesses an ideal of knowledge, to which its actual knowledge does not correspond.* And this ideal cannot be presented to it either by sense, or by the understanding, as these have been hitherto analysed by Kant. It is only in so far as the intelligence, in applying the categories and by their means organising experience, is at the same time guided by an idea of truth, to which this process and its results do not completely correspond, that it can become conscious of the distinction of phenomena and noumena. And such an idea, according to the Kantian division of the faculties, can be derived only from the *reason*. Kant, therefore, in bringing the question of the limit of knowledge into the *Analytic*, anticipates the natural course of his argument, and seems to give to the understanding more than its due. We may, however, explain the apparent error in this way. In the *Deduction of the Categories*, Kant was already obliged to refer to the unity of apperception, as the source of all the categories, and at the same time to observe that none of the categories completely corresponds to that unity, seeing that they all imply a *given* difference.¹ Out of this observation arose the idea of a perceptive understanding, which should have no need of categories to apprehend the difference of the object, seeing that all the manifold which it apprehended would be developed from itself. The idea of a unity of thought that transcends all difference, or absorbs all difference into itself, is in fact already interwoven with the whole of Kant's argu-

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ments, and without it his continual assertion of the defects of our knowledge would have no meaning. Yet it is not less true that such an idea finds its proper place and explanation, if anywhere, only in the *Dialectic*.

Kant's
view of the
errors of
Leibnitz.

The origin of the Kantian doctrine of the limitation of our knowledge is made somewhat clearer by the *Appendix to the Analytic*, in which he criticises the Leibnitzian Monadism. The error of Leibnitz, according to Kant, was two-fold; he supposed (1) that knowledge is possible by means of conception without perception, and he supposed (2) that the objects of knowledge are things in themselves, and not merely phenomena. These two mistakes spring from one source; for, unless Leibnitz had held that the understanding can determine objects without aid from sense, he could not possibly have maintained that its objects are things in themselves. It is because the understanding is in itself merely analytic, or at best produces out of itself only a few general conceptions, that Kant denies to it any relation to objects, except in so far as it uses its conceptions to bind together the scattered manifold of sense. Its objects are held to be phenomena, and phenomena only, just because it has no power of specifying the pure generality of its own conceptions, or because it is, in Kantian language, a discursive and not a perceptive understanding.

If by pure
thought
we can
know
objects,
Monadism
is true
Philoso-
phy.

Now if, like Leibnitz, we held conceptions to be in themselves objectively valid, we should have a right to transfer to objects whatever is true of the corresponding conceptions. Whatever relations, therefore, we discovered in conceptions as such, these we might at once attribute to the objects of these

conceptions. On this hypothesis we should at once be able to lay down certain *a priori* principles in regard to the connexion of objects and also of the elements in the conception of any one object. In the *first* place, we should assert the 'identity of indiscernibles,' that is, the principle, that objects in which there are no distinguishable elements are numerically identical with each other. In the *second* place, we should assert that qualities, essentially opposed to each other, cannot exist in one object; inasmuch as position and negation cannot *logically* be united in one conception. In the *third* place, as the thought of an object begins with the determination of what it is in itself, and proceeds *logically* from this to the discovery of its relations, we should assert that every real object has an inner nature, which is independent of, and prior to, its relation to other beings. *Lastly*, as the matter of conceptions, that is, the elements combined together in them, must *logically* be determined before we proceed to ascertain the manner of their combination, we should assert that the matter of things is prior to their form.

It was on these principles that Leibnitz developed his system of Monadism, and pre-established Harmony. Hence he maintained, first, that the world is a collection of individual substances, each of which has a special distinguishing character that makes it unlike any other substance:—secondly, that there is no real opposition between, or in, substances; for though finite substances have a limit or negative side to their existence, this is merely a want or absence of something present elsewhere, and involves no positive conflict of elements:—thirdly, that each of the individual substances has an inner nature in-

dependent of and prior to its relation to the other; and that, as all the qualities by which we distinguish material substances, even those of impenetrability and extension, are mere external relations, so there must be, in every such substance, either thought or something analogous to thought; for only mind has an inner nature, and to whatever we attribute an inner nature, we must, for that reason, attribute something like a mind: *lastly*, that the connexion of substances must be taken as a *form*, which is superinduced on an independently given matter. Hence he conceived time and space as forms of relation, which are posterior to, and dependent on, substances *in* time and space, and "the peculiar value which each of these seems to have independent of and prior to things," has to be explained away, as due to the confusion or obscurity of our conceptions.

Now all this erroneous system arises simply from the neglect of the true conditions of objective knowledge. "Leibnitz intellectualised perception just as Locke sensualised the conceptions of the understanding." Hence he did not understand either the limitation of our knowledge to phenomena, or the conditions to which, by this limitation, it is subjected.

But the necessity of perception disproves the whole system.

But from the point of view of the *Critique* of Pure Reason, it is easy to overturn every one of these principles. For (1) indistinguishable conceptions do not necessarily imply identical objects. Ere we can say that two objects are identical, we must know whether they are presented to us at the same time, and in the same place. As all parts of space and time are alike, so *in* space and time there may exist

any number of like objects, provided they do not occupy one place at one time. (2) *Logical* negation and affirmation cannot go together, and hence if we follow the laws of pure thought—the laws, that is, of identity and contradiction—it is impossible for any opposition to exist in or between realities.¹ But the same thing does not hold good of phenomena. It is possible, *e.g.*, for a planet to have both a centrifugal and a centripetal tendency impressed on it at once, or for a stone to be driven at once toward the west and toward the east by contrary forces; and the zero, which is the result in such a case, must be regarded, not as a mere privation or non-existence, but as a counterpoise of opposites,—in which there is more reality than in one simple unimpeded, and therefore manifested, tendency. (3) While external relations of things as determined by pure thought would imply and presuppose an inner nature belonging to the thing itself, (for how can we think of relations without presupposing things related?) the case is different with phenomena. For these are presented to us only under certain *a priori* conditions of their relation or connexion with each other, and they have, properly speaking, no existence in themselves, apart from their relations. Thus the very properties of phenomena, which constitute the substance or substratum of all their determination, are repulsive and attractive forces and therefore nothing but relations. Lastly, the logical law that we must have a determinable matter before we can determine it by a form: in other words, that we must have two conceptions given before we can determine their relation in a judgment, cannot be

¹ Cf. ante, p. 145.

applied to the phenomenal objects of experience. For we cannot reduce time and space into relations of previously given objects, without explaining away their essential character, or reducing them, as Leibnitz did, into confused and obscure ideas.

The philosophy of Leibnitz, therefore, is to Kant the type of a *pure philosophy of the understanding*, which bases itself on the *conception* of individual existence without any regard to the conditions of *perception*. And the office of 'Transcendental Reflexion' is to detect the consequent 'Amphiboly,' or substitution of the unknowable objectivity of things in themselves for the knowable objectivity of phenomena. This office it discharges by directing attention to the faculties through which objects are known, and by showing that, in the supposed knowledge of things in themselves, there is wanting one of the essential constituents of objective truth. When we realise the mere generality of conceptions, as such, and the necessity of sense in order to individualise them, we cannot but discern that the Leibnitzian mode of philosophising ends in nothing.

Kant accepts the logical, while he rejects the meta-physical, principles of Leibnitz.

Now, in all this reasoning, it is to be observed that, Kant adopts the principles of Leibnitz in their *logical*, while he rejects them in their *real* bearing. If pure thought *could* apprehend objects, it is admitted that it must apprehend them in this way. And, on the other hand, if things in themselves *could* be objects of knowledge, it is admitted that they must be determined according to these principles. Thought in itself, therefore, must apprehend its objects by an affirmation which is independent of negation, in an identity which has no relation to difference; it must apprehend their inner nature prior to their relations, and their matter

prior to their form. If *we* do not thus apprehend objects, it is because, in our experience, pure thought does not abide in itself, but is put in relation to a foreign element derived from another source. The pure white beam of the light of intelligence is broken, in our experience, on the manifold of sense, and thus the object which we apprehend acquires a character altogether different from that which the understanding of itself would give it. Affirmation and negation, identity and difference, inner and outer, matter and form, cease to be separated from each other, not because their own essential nature, as conceptions, involves their unity with each other, but by an external necessity, which is due to the dependence of conception on perception. And, again, it is because of this external though necessary combination of disparate elements in our knowledge, that we are obliged to regard its objects as only *phenomena*.

A careful consideration of these statements of Kant seems to show that they imply two inconsistent points of view. Pure thought, it is maintained, fails to determine objects as such. Why? Because it is in itself analytic, and can only determine a given matter. Something else, therefore, is required for knowledge; and yet, just because of this something else, our knowledge is denied to be absolute knowledge. Surely this is to play fast and loose with the limits of experience, and to exalt the understanding into the absolute rule of knowledge, at the very moment when it is also denied that it can be a source of knowledge at all. *Either knowledge is possible to thought in itself and by its own laws; or, if it is not thus possible, then the presence of the other element,*

Kant turns
Logic
against
Experi-
ence, and
Experience
against
Logic.

which is necessary for knowledge, cannot make the knowledge phenomenal. It is not admissible at once to deny knowledge to be of things in themselves because it is not pure thought, and to deny pure thought in itself to be capable of any knowledge. Yet Kant does both. He criticises pure thought—as pure thought was conceived by himself as well as by his Leibnitzian and Wolffian predecessors—by a standard derived from experience; and then, by a sudden change of front, he criticises the unity of experience by means of an ideal derived from pure thought.

He is still
influenced
by the
Wolffian
Philosophy.

It throws much light on the *Critique*, to reflect that—as is manifest through the whole course of his development—the mind of Kant was to the last deeply impregnated with the modes of thought which it was his business to combat. “He expressed, in the language of Dogmatism, a philosophy, whose object was radically to destroy all Dogmatism,” and he did so just because he had never entirely freed himself from the prejudices of the system which he destroyed. He was the discoverer of a new Logic which represents the real synthetic movement of thought; yet he introduced it, as it were, with an apology, as something which is forced upon us by reason of the limitations of the human understanding. The process of the old Logic, he seemed to think, could alone reveal the absolute truth of things to us, *if* by us absolute truth were attainable. But, unfortunately, truth is *not* thus attainable, and therefore the strict law of pure thought must bend to the exigencies of a mind which cannot act except on a foreign matter, though this limitation deprives it of the power of knowing anything but phenomena.

Even when Kant is recognising the emptiness of the thought which separates the positive from the negative, identity from difference, he is still unable to free himself from the prejudice, that such thought alone is in perfect harmony with itself and with truth.

Again, Kant was the founder of a new philosophy, which was fatal to the Leibnitzian, as well as to the Lockian, Individualism, just because he recognised that time and space are logically prior to things in time and space. For thus he broke down the opposition between the individual and the universal, between the thing in itself and its relations.¹ But this doctrine, again, he confines to phenomena, and he still upholds the absolute separation of inner and outer, form and matter, as implied in the necessary law of pure intelligence. Thought, if determined by the law of understanding *in itself*—or, what is the same thing, by the understanding dealing with things in themselves—would begin with the determination of things as individual substances, and proceed to the determination of their relations. It is only in dealing with things given in perception, that it is forced to proceed in the opposite way, and to presuppose the universal form of the relations of things, ere it can deal with the things themselves. Yet this necessity, again, makes it impossible for it to apprehend any reality which is other than phenomenal. The power of an early accepted mode of thought even over a mind that is striving to free itself from it, was never more remarkably illustrated than in the admission of Kant, that, *if* any knowledge of things in themselves were possible, the philosophy of Leibnitz

¹ Cf. ante, p. 165.

would contain it. When we have examined the *Dialectic*, it will probably become clear that without this inconsistent doctrine, at once of the emptiness and of the absoluteness, of the individualistic Logic and Psychology, the whole position taken up in the *Critique* both in relation to experience and to that which is beyond experience, becomes untenable.

The four
categories
of Reflexion.

Before leaving this subject, it may be worth while to consider why it is that Kant supposes 'transcendental Reflexion' to be confined to these four points of view. "Reflexion," he says, "has nothing to do with objects, nor is it its aim directly to acquire conceptions of them. It is the state of mind in which we set ourselves to find out the subjective conditions under which we can acquire such conceptions. For it is only by the consciousness of the relations of given representations to our different sources of knowledge that we can determine aright their relation to each other."¹ It is, however, not easy to see why many other categories, such as substance and accident, or possibility and reality, might not be introduced in this connexion. The scholastic mode of thought which Kant is describing, and, in relation to phenomena, assailing, affects all the categories that express relation or reflexion. It was the error of the schoolmen, inherited by Wolff and even by Leibnitz, to treat whatever elements of thought are distinguishable as separate realities—to divide part and whole, cause and effect, &c., from each other, and regard them as independent of each other. And it would not be difficult to show, in the manner of Kant, that the comparison of conceptions in reference

to every one of the categories of reflexion would fall out differently; according as we did or did not abstract from the conditions of time and space. Kant's selection is suggested partly by Leibnitz and partly by the four heads of his own categories, but he gives us no direct statement of the principle by which he was guided.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL DIALECTIC. THE NATURE AND
ORIGIN OF THE IDEAS OF REASON.

Philosophical
Positivism
must be
based on
Criticism.

WE now reach the proper region of Metaphysic, the region of ideas in the highest sense of the word. Kant's treatment of this part of science has no less originality than his views on the basis of Physics and Mathematics. The conclusions he reaches, indeed, are among the commonplaces of what, in a wider sense, we may call modern Positivism. But no one, except Kant, has sought to find the ultimate ground for these conclusions in the very nature of experience; no one, except Kant, has endeavoured to account for the power of non-empirical ideas over the human mind in spite of their asserted emptiness and baselessness, or to show what use they have in the organisation of knowledge. But a philosophical Positivism, if it is to rest on anything deeper than a general assertion of the failure of all past attempts to construct philosophy, must be based on some such reasonings as those which are contained in the Kantian *Dialectic*. In this chapter we shall first, according to our usual method, give an account of Kant's argument, and then add what criticisms seem to be necessary.

The objects of Metaphysic are of the highest interest to man. but the foregoing enquiries seem to show ~~that these~~ objects are quite beyond his reach. If knowledge is experience, and all the objects of experience must be given through sense, it is obvious that God, the Universe in its totality, and the Soul, cannot be known. For, whatever be their nature, they are not objects which are capable of being presented through sense.

We cannot, however, be content with this merely negative conclusion. For it is, at least, certain that we *think* of these objects as if they were real. There are even three so-called sciences which pretend to deal with them—viz., Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. Now are they merely themes of scientific speculation; they are closely bound up with all the great interests of our life, both theoretical and practical. Of their relation to practical life we need not speak here, further than to notice that morality presupposes the three ideas of God, Freedom, and Immortality; and that these again involve a belief in, if not a knowledge of, the objects of the three metaphysical sciences. On the other hand, their theoretical value will be seen, if we consider that all science necessarily aims at unity and system. Science necessarily seeks to find one principle in all the multiplicity of phenomena, and one system in all the apparent confusion of the world; how, then, can it avoid postulating an object in correspondence with its endeavours? Is it not this postulate which, with more or less distinctness of consciousness, gives rise to all scientific curiosity? If it be the aim of rational Psychology to determine the soul or subject of

Connection of the objects of the metaphysical sciences with theoretical and practical interests.

thought, through all the multiplicity of its faculties and states, as a simple unity; if it be the aim of rational Cosmology to gather all the variety of objects of experience into the complete system of one universe; and if it be the aim of rational Theology to find an absolute unity of all things, a unity which explains and subordinates all differences, even the difference of subject and object; then it would seem that these different branches of Metaphysic are only attempting to realise and define the objects which all science presupposes, and without which its efforts would be meaningless.

If, therefore, notwithstanding all this, we hold to our previous conclusion, that none but empirical objects can be known, and that metaphysical science is illusory, we must be prepared to explain more fully the nature of an illusion, which is so closely connected with all our intellectual and practical life. For this, whatever its source, is at least a *persistent* illusion, an illusion which does not cease with explanation, any more than the moon ceases to appear enlarged as it approaches the horizon, when we have discovered that the causes of that appearance are subjective. In both cases, therefore, we must trace back the illusion to something in the very nature of our faculties of knowledge: and in both cases a true theory or explanation, though it cannot take away the illusory appearance, will prevent it from deceiving us.¹

As in our search for the categories, we may best enter on the discussion of this subject through the gate of the ordinary Logic. Logic speaks not only of apprehension and judgment, but also of a process

Is reason a source of *a priori* conceptions?

¹ p. 241 : Tr., p. 211.

and a faculty which we have not yet considered, the process of *reasoning* and the faculty of *reason*. Accordingly we have now to enquire, whether this faculty is merely logical and formal, or whether it is not also the source of certain *a priori* conceptions of objects. For, as in the case of the understanding, it is possible that the formal use of reason may guide us to the discovery of its real use.

Now reasoning is the process of mediate inference, *i.e.*, inference through a middle term. In a syllogism, there is, first, a general rule apprehended by the understanding; secondly, the subsumption of a conception under the condition of this rule by judgment; and lastly—what is the peculiar work of reason—the determination of this conception by the predicate of the rule. In other words, a syllogism is a judgment made by means of the subsumption of its condition (the middle term) under a rule. The problem of reason in its logical use is always to connect a given predicate with a given subject, and the major of the syllogism supplies the rule by which this connection may be made. Or, starting from the conception of a subject, reason seeks, by analysis of it, to find some more general conception by means of which it may be brought under a rule: nor is its work completely finished, till it finds the *most general* condition, under which such determination is possible. “The proposition ‘Caius is mortal,’ might be got by us out of experience, by means of the understanding. But, as a rational being, I seek for a conception containing the condition under which the predicate is connected with the subject, and this I find in the conception of man. Then having subsumed this condition, taken in all its extent, under the rule (All

It is the
faculty of
principles.

men are mortal), I determine the subject (Caius) accordingly." The major proposition or rule may, of course, be subjected to the same process, and this may be repeated again and again in a series of pro-syllogisms, till we arrive at the first absolute and sufficient condition for the application of the predicate to the subject. Now, this is just saying, that the aim of reason is to find a *principle*, by which the combinations of our thought may be explained, and that it can only be satisfied with a *first principle*. Reason is, therefore, the faculty of principles, or the faculty that gives unity to knowledge by means of principles. And if it has any real use, if there are any *a priori* conceptions of objects involved in the very nature of reason, we may expect that these conceptions will furnish the first principles of all our knowledge.¹

What are principles in the highest sense of the word?

For the purpose of formal Logic, *any* general proposition, inasmuch as it can be made the major of a syllogism, may serve as a principle. But, in the narrower and proper sense of the word, we can give the name of principle only to a proposition, which forms an absolute beginning for knowledge—which does not depend on any other proposition, and on which all other propositions depend. Now no empirical generalisation can have this character, for in no empirical generalisation is the subject necessarily, and therefore immediately, connected with the predicate. It is always a fair question to ask, why a particular predicate is connected with a particular subject, so long as it is connected with it *empirically*, and not contained in it; and the answer to such a question must be given in a series of pro-syllogisms,

¹ p. 243 etc. : Tr., p. 213.

by which the cause of the connection is assigned, and the cause of that cause *ad infinitum*. Besides, all such propositions relating to matters of fact, presuppose what we have hitherto called the *a priori* principles of the understanding, and, for that reason, cannot themselves be regarded as principles.

Can we then regard even the principles of the understanding, as principles of knowledge in this highest sense? ¹ This also is impossible, if we have rightly defined their nature in the *Analytic*. For the principles of the understanding are not the *pure* categories, which in themselves have no objective meaning. It is only when we subsume the pure forms of perception under them, that the categories become principles of *a priori* synthesis and conditions of possible experience. As, then, it is only in relation to a given matter, that the understanding is synthetic, so its principles cannot be regarded as *first* principles of synthesis, or absolute starting-points for knowledge. Its synthesis always has a presupposition. When, *e.g.*, we say 'Everything that happens has a cause,' the conception of what happens does not in itself involve the conception of a cause; but the principle of causality shows how we may attain a definite empirical apprehension of that which happens, *i.e.*, by considering it as an effect. But the necessity of a conception, with a view to empirical knowledge is a different thing from the *immediate* necessity of a principle, which rests entirely upon itself.

It appears, then, that what is necessary to constitute a first principle is, that it should be a *syn-*

Are the principles of the Understanding principles in the highest sense?

Principles of law are attainable.

¹ In German Kant is able to use the two words 'Principien' and 'Grundsätze' to distinguish the principles of reason and of understanding.

thetical proposition based on a pure conception. Of the meaning and use of such a principle, we may find an illustration in the codification of the law. For the aim of codification is to simplify legislation, and legislation can only be simplified by reducing the endless multiplicity of civil statutes to a unity of principle. Now this is quite a possible thing, since the laws of civil society are, in their idea, only the limitation of the freedom of each member of society to conditions which make it consistent with the freedom of all the members. These laws, therefore, relate to that which is essentially the product of our own activity. In the region of practice, human reason has true causality, and ideas are efficient causes of existences in harmony with them. Here, therefore, truth is to be discovered not by looking to what *is*, but to what *ought to be*. "The Platonic Republic has often been contemned as an empty dream: and Brucker especially finds a peculiar absurdity in the Platonic assertion, that no prince could rule well if he did not guide himself by ideas. But a constitution of the greatest possible human freedom, a constitution that only determines the conditions, under which the freedom of each can subsist consistently with the freedom of all, (which must not be confounded with a constitution on the greatest happiness principle, for that could only exist as a result of the other), is at least a necessary idea of reason, and it must always be present to the true legislator, not only in the first sketch of his constitution, but in all the particular laws of his state. In considering such an idea, we must, in the first instance, abstract from all present hindrances to its realisation—hindrances which may perhaps

spring; not so much from the inevitable limits of humanity, as from the neglect of true ideas in legislation. For nothing can be more harmful and unworthy of a philosopher, than the vulgar spirit of deference to so-called adverse experience, when, in truth, this experience would never have existed, if at the proper time the regulations of civil society had been modelled upon the ideas of reason."¹

But while we may reasonably seek in our own reason for ideas which shall form objective principles of morality and law, it is quite another thing to seek there for principles of *knowledge*, i.e., for principles which have their origin purely in the mind, and yet enable us to know objects not produced by the mind. Such an attempt seems, indeed, to carry absurdity on the face of it. How out of pure thought are we to know things given independently of pure thought? The knowledge we get from the pure understanding is not analogous to this, for, though its principles of synthesis precede experience, they are justified not from themselves, but as the grounds of the possibility of experience. Here, however, what is required is a knowledge of objects by a synthesis of pure thought, which is neither derived from experience nor presupposed in it, and, indeed, which neither is, nor can be, realised in experience.

But how
can we
have first
principles
of know-
ledge?

However this question may be determined, (and it is the object of the *Dialectic* to consider it), we can now lay down certain characters which must belong to the ideas of reason: we can see what is the *kind* of knowledge to which reason points, and which is needed to satisfy it. In the *first* place, it is a knowledge which is related to the knowledge we get through the

Character-
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the prin-
ciples re-
quired.

¹ p. 255 : Tr., p. 222.

understanding, in somewhat the same way as the principles of the understanding are related to the manifold of sense. For just as the understanding gives unity to the perceptions by bringing them under its rules, so reason seeks to give unity to the rules of the understanding by bringing them under principles. It seeks, in short, to give complete unity and universality to the work of the understanding. Hence it does not relate itself immediately to the perceptions of sense. It presupposes the work of the understanding, and would not be possible apart from that work, but it sets before the understanding an ideal of completeness, and unity, which the understanding itself could never suggest.¹

In the *second* place, the unity and universality to which reason points is nothing less than the *Unconditioned*. For reason goes back by prosyllogisms from condition to condition, and can never find rest in anything but an absolute first principle, or a condition which has itself no previous condition. Thus even in its *logical use*, reason seeks for the unconditioned to complete and give unity to its knowledge of the conditioned. And if, in its transcendental use, it is the source of certain peculiar conceptions, which have objective value, these conceptions must be *ideas of the unconditioned*. In other words, if we assert that reason supplies out of itself a knowledge of the things which are its objects, we mean simply that, wherever the conditioned is given, there reason itself supplies the whole series of its conditions. And this is equivalent to saying that reason gives the unconditioned for all conditioned existence presented to us in experience.

¹ p. 248 : Tr., p. 217.

Now this step from conditioned to unconditioned implies a pure *a priori* synthesis. For, though from the conception of the conditioned, we may by analysis derive the conception of a condition, we cannot derive from it the conception of the unconditioned, except by *synthesis*. And this synthesis is transcendent—*i.e.*, it is a synthesis which cannot be represented as a phenomenon, or verified in sensuous experience. For experience by its very nature, is of the conditioned; it is a knowledge of objects through principles which determine phenomena only in relation to each other—*i.e.*, as conditioned by each other. The objects of reason are, therefore, objects of pure thought.

Now what *are* the ideas of reason? We have already mentioned them as the subjects of the three metaphysical sciences—Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. And we are brought to the same result by a consideration of the different forms of syllogism—the categorical, the hypothetical, and the disjunctive. For if we follow the regressive movement of reason according to these three forms, we are led by it to three forms of the unconditioned, “the unconditioned of the categorical synthesis in a subject; the unconditioned of the hypothetical synthesis of the members of a series; and the unconditioned of the disjunctive synthesis of parts in a systematic whole.”¹ In other words, the series of prosyllogisms ends in the idea of a subject which is no longer a predicate, in the idea of a presupposition, which has itself no presupposition, or in the idea of an aggregate of the members of a division, in which no new member is required to complete the extension of

The three ideas correspond to the kinds of syllogism.

¹ p. 260 : Tr., p. 226.

the conception. Looking, therefore, to the movement of reason toward these three goals of thought, we see that there are three ideas of the unconditioned, which are set before reason by its very nature, if not as determinate objects, yet at least as problems which it must seek to solve. And thus we are driven by reason to ask, whether there really are unconditioned objects, determined in these three ways, or whether our tendency to seek such unconditioned objects has its use merely "in giving such direction to the understanding as may enable it at once to extend its researches to the utmost, and maintain the greatest unity and harmony with itself." If we have here a set of insoluble problems, mere questions without possible answers, the questions are at least *not arbitrary*, but forced on us by the natural exercise of our rational powers. And, therefore, the decision that they are insoluble, and that these ideas have no objective value,—if that should be the decision to which we are led,—will only enable us to see more clearly their value as *ideals*, or guiding principles of science.

They also correspond to the most general relations of thought and experience,

The three ideas of reason correspond to the three most general relations of our thoughts or ideas to existence. All our ideas refer, on the one hand, to a subject, and on the other hand to objects; and these objects again may be regarded in two points of view, either as phenomena or as things in themselves. If, then, the three orders of syllogism have a reference to the three forms of the unconditioned which are implied in all knowledge, it is obvious that they must bring us to an absolute subject, as the unity presupposed in all thought—to an absolute unity and complete synthesis of all the conditions of phenomena—

and to an absolute unity of the conditions of all objects of thought whatever. But the thinking being, thus regarded as the absolute or unconditioned subject, is the object of the so-called science of Rational Psychology; the complete unity of all phenomena; or things in space and time, is the object of the science of Rational Cosmology: and the absolute reality, the *ens entium*, or reality that includes and transcends all other realities is the object of the science of Rational Theology. If, therefore, reason is able to solve all the problems which it suggests, it will enable us to establish all these sciences on a firm basis; or if not, to find the key to the difficulties which render them impossible.

In Kant's introduction to the *Dialectic*, which we have thus summarised, there are two points which seem to call for criticism. First, there is Kant's view of reason as a separate faculty; secondly, there is his way of showing that there are just three ideas of reason.

Kant takes up reason as a separate faculty, as he had taken up understanding and sense. He makes no attempt, at least in the first instance, to connect it with the results previously attained in the *Analytic*. He observes that the ordinary Logic deals with the three processes of Conception, Judgment, and Reasoning; and, as he had discovered that the first two of these processes have a real as well as a formal aspect, so he now asks whether the same thing does not hold good also in the case of the third. Is reason, like understanding, the source of certain *a priori* conceptions of objects, or is it

Criticism
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gism.

merely a faculty of mediate inference? This question Kant does not as yet answer, but he points out that, if there are ideas of reason, they must be ideas of the unconditioned. For, as it is the essential business of reason, in its logical sense, to find the highest condition under which any given judgment is true, so, in its transcendental use, (if it has such a use,) it must be the source of certain ideas of the ultimate or unconditioned conditions of things. And as such ultimate conditions can never be realised or presented in sense, so reason must in this case be synthetic: and synthetic—not merely, like the understanding, in reference to a given manifold of sense, but out of pure thought. For if pure thought is not capable of synthesis, then the claim of reason to be the source of ideas of objects must be invalid, and it must content itself with the humbler task of directing and stimulating the development of empirical knowledge.

So far the guiding thread, which discloses to us the faculty and the ideas of reason, is simply the fact of Logic—the fact that we not only conceive and judge, but also reason, and that our reasonings take certain syllogistic forms. But, what was before said in relation to the formal or analytic judgment holds good also in relation to the formal syllogism; pure analysis is impossible; or, if it is possible, it satisfies none of the demands of reason. The abstract universal, which we reach merely by letting drop some of the marks of the particulars that fall under it, is no *principle* for the explanation of these particulars; it is a unity of genus which does not afford any ground for the difference of its species. The universal of science cannot be a mere highest abstraction.

it must be a concrete universal, a universal which is not reached by emptying the particular of its contents, but which adds to those contents. And philosophy, when it seeks the highest unity, is not in search of a mere phantom of pure being, but of a unity, which necessarily manifests itself in, and explains all the differences of thought and things. Here, therefore, in the case of the reason, as in the case of the understanding, we are rather embarrassed than assisted by the comparison of the formal process of analysis with a process which is essentially its very opposite—which aims, indeed, like it, at universality, but at a universality which is identical with the most determinate individuality. The guiding thread of Logic guides, if at all, in the wrong direction. And we shall best understand the real purport of Kant's argument if we free ourselves altogether from its influence.

There is, however, a deeper, and more real connexion of the understanding and reason, of the *Analytic* and *Dialectic*, and one which has no reference to formal Logic. For, in the *first* place (as is shown in the previous chapter), that conception of the limit of knowledge, which is constantly insisted on throughout the *Analytic*, already implies the ideas of reason. If there were no mental necessity forcing us to seek a further determination of objects than that which is attained by the understanding through the application of its categories to the matter of experience, we could have no consciousness of the limited character of the knowledge derived from that process. The consciousness of a limit is dependent on the tendency to go beyond it; and noumena must be present, as at least possible objects, ere phenomena can be recognised as

The true deduction of the ideas, and their relation to the *Analytic*.

merely phenomena. Whence arises our dissatisfaction with the determination of phenomena under such forms as those of substance, cause, and reciprocity? It arises partly, as Kant himself shows, from the fact that the synthesis expressed in the categories is inadequate to the demands of intelligence. We have an idea of a higher unity than can be conceived, *e.g.*, under the category of causality, with its necessary opposition of the cause and the effect which it relates to each other; and therefore we are driven on to seek the cause of the cause, and the cause of that again, *ad infinitum*. This very infinite regress, in short, is the search for a higher unity, the idea of which must be present to the mind from the first. In so far, therefore, as the conception of the limitation or imperfection of empirical knowledge, and the recognition of its phenomenal character is introduced into the *Analytic*, in so far we have in it already the idea of reason, at least in its *negative* aspect.

But, in the *second* place, this is not all. The ideas of reason are present in experience, not only in a negative but in a positive way. The Deduction of the categories showed that the determination of the world of experience, as such, implies certain presuppositions which are nothing less than these ideas. Were it not for reason, the *motive* and principle of the use of the understanding in experience would be wanting. For why should we apply the categories? Because, answers Kant, without their application experience would be impossible, or perceptions could not be determined as objects. And why again should perceptions be determined as objects? Because we can only be conscious of the identity of self, and hence of a self at all, as opposed, yet in relation to, a

world of objects determined in one time and one space under the categories. Underlying experience, therefore, or presupposed in it, is the consciousness of subject and object, self and world, each fixed in its unity with itself and its distinction from the other, and both again related to the higher unity of consciousness in which they are contained. Now, *these* are just the three ideas of the Soul, the World, and God, as Kant explains them in the *Dialectic*. All these ideas, therefore, are implied in the constitution of experience, though it is also true that experience cannot be made adequate to them. The understanding is but an expression and an imperfect expression of the reason; and the peculiar doctrine of Kant is simply, that reason, though conscious of this imperfection, is yet unable to express itself in any better way.

We may here introduce a general remark as to Kant's method, which partly explains the differences of the point of view taken up in the different parts of his work. The *Critique of Pure Reason* is regressive rather than progressive in the development of its thought. The *Æsthetic* finds its ground and presupposition in the *Analytic*, and that again in the *Dialectic*. Nay, we may say that the *Dialectic*, in its turn, finds its presupposition in the *Critique of Practical Reason*. The consequence of this is that the language of the earlier parts of the work must be regarded as, to a certain extent, inaccurate, or, at least, ambiguous. Ideas which are explained only in the later chapters have to be used in the earlier chapters where their true meaning is yet obscure. And when so used, such ideas must often be regarded simply as symbols, which represent something not yet determined.

The
Critique
regressive
in its
method.

Hence arises a peculiar difficulty of the *Critique*; for these symbols are likely, in the first instance, to be taken by us literally, in their most obvious sense: and even when this error is corrected, it is often doubtful whether the explanation afterwards given justifies the previous use of the symbol. Thus when Kant tells us, in the *Metaphysic of Ethics*, that the "conception of an intelligible world is merely a point of view beyond the phenomenal which reason is obliged to occupy in order to think itself as practical,"¹ it is not easy to see how far, on this understanding, we can justify the use of the thing in itself made in the earlier part of the *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant never reversed his steps, or reconstructed the *Critique* on the basis of the ideas ultimately reached; but it was a true speculative instinct that led Fichte to perceive that the principle on which the whole system depends is found in the *Practical Reason*, and therefore to remould the Kantian system from that point of view, however little we can attribute to Kant the results which Fichte by this process reached. Be this as it may, there can be no doubt that the *Dialectic*, which is the last in order of the parts of the *Critique*, first clearly expresses the central idea of the *Critique*, and explains the relations of two things which in Kant always go together, viz., the nature of our knowledge and its limitation to phenomena. For, while it is reason that makes the understanding determine the sensibility so as to produce experience, it is also reason that forces us to regard the experience so acquired as merely phenomenal.

¹ VIII., p. 93: *Metaph. der Sitten*.

In one sense we may fully admit Kant's conclusion that empirical knowledge is phenomenal, and that the very impulse of reason, which produces experience, also drives us beyond it. It is because the self-conscious intelligence seeks its own unity or identity in all things, that we have the desire to know objects, as it is also the more or less perfect recognition of this unity in them that constitutes knowledge. In ordinary experience, and in science in the narrower sense, knowledge, as Kant showed, consists in the application of the categories of quantity, quality, substance, cause, or, at highest, reciprocity. But such categories contain a contradiction which they do not solve, or, to put the same thing in another way, they do not completely bring the differences of things under the unity of the mind. The very necessity, which forces us to make the world intelligible to ourselves by the application of such categories, again turns the resulting knowledge for us into a problem, which must be solved by the application of higher categories. Hence the knowledge of empirical objects cannot be separated from the conviction of their phenomenal character; or, at least, its development must in time lead to such a conviction, since the light, that enables us to see them, enables us, and indeed forces us, to see beyond them. In saying this, however, we must, at the same time, guard against a misunderstanding to which Kant has given some occasion. Kant maintains that the phenomenal is not the illusory; but, as he refuses to admit any definite relation between phenomena and things in themselves, the reality which he leaves to the former cannot mean much more than what Leibnitz expressed when he said, that the external world

Sense in which experience may be admitted to be phenomenal.

might be a self-consistent and well-ordered dream. It is, however, impossible to admit that intelligence can discover its object to be phenomenal without discovering anything more; that it can condemn its own knowledge without the possibility of going beyond this negation. The consciousness of imperfection is itself the germ of perfection. An intelligence cannot discern any limit which it cannot pass; it must already have some idea of absolute knowledge ere it can perceive its actual knowledge to be relative. It is irrational, as was shown in the previous chapter, to set up, as a standard for knowledge, any mental law or logical requirement, which, at the same time, is confessed to have no objective validity. Either, therefore, we must treat the movement of thought, which seems to drive us beyond the empirical, as absolutely illusory (though even then we must find some explanation for it); or, we must allow, that the negative consciousness of the phenomenal as such, implicitly contains in it a positive consciousness of the noumenal.^o In other words, the distinction of phenomena and noumena is a distinction, not of two totally different genera of objects, or even of two unconnected views of the same objects, like the attributes of Spinoza, but simply of two stages in the development of knowledge. The phenomenon is the object, as it is to the common consciousness, or even to science—which, though it apprehends the laws of things, does not connect these laws with the highest principle; or which, though it applies categories to objects, yet does not bring them under the highest category. The noumenon is the object seen, as philosophy endeavours to see it, in the light of the highest principle, and in perfect unity

with all other things and with the mind. In transcending the empirical consciousness, philosophy does not abandon experience, or translate itself into an altogether different region. Rather, it presupposes experience, and only carries *its* incomplete synthesis to a higher unity ; or to put the same thing in other words, it seeks to correct the abstractness, which belongs to the empirical consciousness, even in its highest form, by regarding its objects, not only in their relations to each other, but also to the intelligence which they presuppose, and through which they must ultimately be explained.

The ideas of reason, according to Kant, are three in number, but he already indicates, what will become clearer in the sequel, that these ideas are not entirely independent of each other. "The most general relations that can exist in our thoughts are, first, the relation to the subject : second, the relation to objects, either as phenomena, or as objects of thought in general. Taking into account this last subdivision, therefore, the conceivable relations of our thoughts are altogether three in number. First, the relation to the subject ; second, the relation to the manifold of the object as a phenomenon ; third, the relation to all things in general."¹ According to this division, both the second and the third idea have to do with *objects*, though the second has to do with them as phenomena ; and the third, as things in themselves. If, however, we remember that things in themselves are properly the objects of a perceptive understanding, or creative intelligence, in which thought and perception, object and subject are absolutely united, it becomes obvious that the third idea

The three ideas of reason in their relation to each other.

¹ p. 268 ; Tr., p. 232.

is really the synthesis of the other two; it is the idea, not of an absolute object, but of an absolute subject-object, as later philosophy expressed it. That Kant saw this is proved, not only by his treatment of the idea of God, of which we shall have to speak afterwards, but also by his assertion that the three ideas are related as the terms in a syllogism. "It is to be observed" he says, "that the three transcendental ideas have a certain unity or connexion with each other, and that, by means of them, pure reason is able to combine all its knowledge into a system. To proceed from the knowledge of self to the knowledge of the world, and then through it to the knowledge of the Supreme Being, is so natural that it seems to resemble the logical march of reason from premises to conclusion. Now whether the explanation of this is to be found in a latent tie of relationship, like that which in other cases connects the transcendental and logical movement of thought, is a question that must wait for its answer till the examination of these ideas is concluded. All we could aim at in this preliminary chapter was, to rescue the transcendental ideas from the ambiguous position which they occupied so long as they were mixed up with the conceptions of the understanding, to exhibit their origin, and as a consequence, the definiteness of their number, (which cannot be possibly more or less than three) and, by showing their systematic connexion with each other, to mark off and limit the peculiar sphere of pure reason."¹ The triplicity of the ideas of reason is in fact but highest instance of that threefold movement which Kant had before discerned in the categories, and which he declared to be characteristic of all

¹ p. 271 : Tr., p. 234.

synthetic thought. And the logical syllogism has claim to the importance which Kant attaches to it only so far as it is one expression of this movement.

The three ideas of reason are presupposed in all experience, but the question of the Dialectic is, whether they can be treated as giving us knowledge of real objects: *i.e.*, whether by them we can determine the nature of the soul, the world, and God in themselves, and so find a basis for the sciences of Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. Kant's view, which will be examined in the following three chapters, is that this is impossible, and that each of the pretended sciences involves some form of sophistical reasoning. The general description of this sophistry is that an idea, which has a validity only in relation to experience, is separated from this its empirical use, and regarded as itself determining an object for thought. There are, however, special peculiarities in each of the several cases, which make it necessary to consider them separately. "There are three kinds of dialectical syllogisms of reason, as there are three ideas of reason, to which, as conclusions, these syllogisms bring us. In the syllogism of the first class, I argue from the transcendental conception of the subject" (involved in all experience) "in which there is nothing of difference or multiplicity, to the absolute unity of the subject itself; though of the subject in itself, apart from its relation of experience, I have no conception whatever. This dialectical syllogism I shall call the transcendental *Paralogism*. In the second class of sophistical syllogisms, I start with the transcendental conception of the absolute totality of

Different kinds of sophistry connected with the three ideas, and giving rise to the three so-called meta-physical sciences.

the series of conditions for a given phenomenon, and infer from it the unconditioned synthetic unity of the series, and as, in this case, there are always two possible ways in which this unconditioned unity may be determined, each of which involves a contradiction, I reason from the self-contradiction of one of these ways of conception to the truth of the other—not observing that the argument may be retorted with equal effect. The state of reason produced by these dialectical arguments, I shall call the *Antinomy* of pure reason. In the third class of sophistical syllogisms, I reason from the totality of the conditions under which I think of objects as such, *after* they have been given to me in sense, to the absolute synthetic unity of all the conditions of the possibility of things in general,” (whether they are given in sense or not). “In other words, I reason from things which I do not and cannot know by means of the mere transcendental conception I have of them,” (but only when this conception is applied to the matter of sense), “to a Being of all Beings, an *ens entium*, whom I do not know, *even* in a transcendental conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no idea whatever. This dialectical syllogism I shall call the *Ideal* of pure Reason.”¹

¹ p. 274 : Tr., p. 236. The above translation is something of a paraphrase, as Kant's meaning is very concisely expressed.

CHAPTER XV.

THE TRANSCENDENTAL PARALOGISM OF RATIONAL
PSYCHOLOGY.

IT has been already shown that the unity of self-consciousness underlies all experience. The 'I think' is the "vehicle of all conceptions, and so of the transcendental conceptions along with the rest." It is not put in the list of these conceptions, simply because it expresses the 'qualitative unity,' which is the presupposition of all thinking. We cannot treat it as one of the conceptions of the understanding, since "it only serves to express that all thinking is conscious thinking." But then, it is to be observed, that the Ego appears, not only as the presupposition of all thought and experience, but also in another character, as one particular object of experience as the object of inner, as opposed to outer, sense, of Psychology as opposed to physical science. It might seem, therefore, that we have here an object which, unlike other objects, requires no perception to determine it, but is known purely *a priori*, through transcendental apperception.

Kant's
view of
the Ego as
subject
and as ob-
ject.

Admitting, however, such an *a priori* Psychology to be possible, we must observe what is its sole basis

Rational
Psycho-
logy must

be developed out of the one proposition, 'I think.'

and subject matter.* It must be entirely founded on the simple proposition 'I think,' without any additional datum of any kind. For anything more would require experience, and "if a single observation of my inner state were introduced among the grounds of this science, it would cease to be a rational, and become an empirical, Psychology." Rational Psychology, accordingly, takes the bare *Ego* of transcendental apperception as something given, and proceeds to determine it by the categories in the following fashion. In the *first* place, the consciousness of self is an underlying substratum, a permanent presupposition, of all thought and experience; therefore, we must determine the soul as a *substance*. In the *second* place, the thought of self is the unity to which all the manifold of experience is referred, and through which it is known: if it were itself manifold, knowledge would be impossible; therefore the soul is a *simple* substance. In the *third* place, the *Ego* is necessarily represented as the same at different times; for if it were not, then no unity of experience, no connexion of thought would be possible; therefore the soul is *numerically one*. And *lastly*, I cannot think myself, except as having an existence distinct from the objects in space which I know; therefore the soul is an *actual* object which has relation to *possible* objects in space. Having thus determined the soul or self according to the classes of categories, as a substance, simple, numerically one, and existent in itself in relation to possible objects in space, we can infer from these predicates all the other asserted results of rational Psychology. For as the thinking substance is never apprehended by external sense, it is *immaterial*; as it is a simple, and

therefore indivisible, substance, it is *incorruptible*; as it is an intellectual and self-identical substance, it is *personal*; and taking all these characters together, it is *spiritual*. "Its relation to objects in space gives us the conception of its *commercium* with bodies," in which communion it is a *principle of life*, and when we limit this view of it by the consideration of its spirituality, we infer that it is *immortal*.¹

Now, in order to determine the value of the science thus built up, we must first of all criticise that application of the categories to the pure Ego on which it is founded. Can we properly subsume under the pure conception of the understanding, that unity of self-consciousness, which is presupposed in them as it is presupposed in all experience and thought? Can we bring the source of the categories under the categories? "By the 'I' or 'he' or 'it,' the thing that thinks," says Kant, "is expressed nothing but a transcendental subject of thought ($=x$), which is known only through the thoughts which are its predicates, and of which apart from these we can have no conception." "Hence, when we attempt to think this Ego as an object, we find ourselves involved in a vicious circle: for we must always employ the idea of it, in order to make any judgment regarding it." And this is an "inconvenience or awkwardness" (*Unbequemlichkeit*), which we cannot escape, just because the unity of the Ego is not any one special object, but the universal presupposition or form of the thought of all objects. How, then, is it possible for us to determine it, as we do other objects?

Objections to the determination of the Ego by the categories.

¹ p. 278: Tr., p. 239.

Distinction
of the
objective
self from
the univer-
sal subject.

It may throw some light on this question from another side, if we consider what that Ego is, which we know as object. The transcendental unity of self-consciousness is one thing, and the unity of my consciousness of my individual self, as an object whose states stand in a certain definite relation of succession to each other in time, is another. The latter is the objective, but phenomenal, self, which we distinguish from other objects of experience; the former is the unity of thought presupposed in all experience. Further even the pure unity of thought can be actualised only in the relation to sense. We may admit that the consciousness expressed in the proposition, 'I think,' does not itself imply the determination of the manifold of inner sense in time, but it certainly implies at least an 'indeterminate empiric perception,' which, in that proposition, is referred to the self. "Observe that by calling the 'I think' an empiric proposition, I do not mean that the 'I' in it is an empirical idea, for, on the contrary, it is purely intellectual. But I do mean that, without some empirical idea, which supplies the matter for thought, the judgment 'I think' could not be made; though the empirical element is but the condition of the application or exercise of a purely intellectual faculty."¹

The tran-
scendental
subject
cannot be
made an
object.

If this be so, it follows that the Ego in itself is no independent object of thought. To treat it as such is to treat an element in experience, in abstraction from the other elements that are necessary to it, as a separate existence. It is, in Spinozistic language, to elevate an abstraction into a *res completa*. "With a view to determine the conditions of the possibility

¹ p. 798 : Tr., p. 249, note.

of experience, I abstract from all actual experience, and think of myself merely as a knowing subject. But this does not authorise me to conclude, that I can be conscious of my own existence *apart* from experience and from the empiric conditions of that existence. To do so is to confound the possible abstraction from my empirically determined existence, with an imaginary consciousness of the possibility of the separate existence of my thinking self. It is to take the thought of the unity of consciousness, which, as the mere form of knowledge, is presupposed in all determination of objects, for the knowledge of the substantiality of myself as a transcendental subject.¹

The truth, therefore, is, that of the Ego in itself, *apart* from its relation to experience, we know nothing, and that, even *in* experience, the Ego appears not as itself an object, but as the logical unity, to which a thing must be related, ere we can think it *as* an object. And the supposed science of Rational Psychology is based on a confusion between the transcendental subject and the object of inner sense, and upon a transference to the latter, as *real* predicates, of the *logical* characteristics which belong to the former. The syllogisms of Rational Psychology are, therefore, Paralogisms (*sophismata figuræ dictionis*), in which the middle term is taken in two different senses: what is asserted in the major of objects of possible perception, being applied in the minor to the transcendental subject, which is not, and cannot be an object of any perception. In this way the categories, which can be applied only to the former, are transferred to the latter, and the universal conditions, under which

¹ p. 801 : Tr., p. 251.

objects are thought, are turned into universal predicates of thinking beings as objects.

Sense in which the categories may be applied to the pure subject.

Now in regard to the universality of the predicates which we apply to thinking beings, two things must be admitted: in the first place, that we necessarily conceive ourselves as pure subjects, abstractly simple and identical with ourselves through all changes of our states, and distinct from the external objects presented to us; and in the second place, that we necessarily conceive of all other thinking beings as having a consciousness of themselves and other objects, of the same character as our own. "It is at first sight strange that the condition under which I think, and which therefore is merely an attribute of my subject, should be assumed to hold good universally of all beings that think, and thus that a proposition, which appears to be merely empirical, should have universality and necessity attributed to it." But this is explained by the fact that it is only through self-consciousness and not through outer experience, that we can have any conception of a thinking being at all. We cannot represent such a being except by transferring to him the consciousness we have of ourselves with all its conditions. But this transference does not enable us to know him as an object in this pure self-consciousness, any more than it enables us to know ourselves as objects.¹

Substantiality of the Ego.

We are now in a position to see the real value of the four fundamental propositions of Rational Psychology. In the first place, it is undoubtedly true that in all experience I think myself as subject and never as predicate; and, therefore, it seems natural

¹ Cf. ante, p. 482.

that I should regard myself as a substance, in which my thoughts, feelings, etc., inhere as accidents. But this means nothing more than the analytical judgment that all my thoughts and experience are mine, or that, so long as I think, so long my consciousness of myself is the correlate of all my consciousness of objects. I cannot, from such a use of the category of substance, draw any inference as to the permanence of myself as a thinking being beyond the moment of my thinking: I can only say that, *while* I think I am obliged to refer *all* my thoughts to one self. In order, however, to draw any such inference from the category of substance, as I feel entitled to do when I apply it to external objects, it would be necessary for me to have some "standing and permanent" perception of self to subsume under the category. But I find, on the contrary, that there is no permanent perception of the object of inner sense, and no perception of anything within me, that I can represent as permanent, such as there is in the case of matter.

In the second place, I am conscious of myself as *singular* or simple, as having no manifoldness or difference in me. And from this it is natural to infer the simplicity of my being. For thought is not, it may be argued, like an effect which "can be produced by the concurrent action of many independent substances, as the motion of a body is the united motion of all its parts. If a composite substance could think, each part of it would contain a part of the thought, and only all the parts taken together would contain the whole thought." But this is absurd: there could be no thought at all, unless the different elements were gathered together in reference to a subject, which, as thinking, is a simple unity. Now,

Its simplicity.

this argument is good so far as it goes, but all that it proves is, not that I must *be* absolutely simple, but that knowledge is impossible unless I can *think myself* as simple. Consciousness itself, for all we can see, may be an effect which is one in itself, though many things unite to produce it. We cannot argue from the simplicity of the consciousness of self to the simplicity of the self. Further, even if we granted the simplicity of man's soul, the common argument from simplicity to incorruptibility would not hold good. For consciousness has not extensive, but only intensive quantity, or degree of vividness, and a lessening of this quantity, or diminution in the degree of vividness, does not involve that annihilation of substance which would be involved in the diminution of the quantity of matter in space. We may, therefore, think of consciousness as gradually diminishing in intensive quantity till it disappears altogether, though, so long as it exists, it must be simple in quality.¹

Its identity.

In the third place, what we have said of the simplicity also applies to the numerical oneness or identity of the soul at different times. We must think of the self as remaining the same through all change of its states. But just as a motion passes from one billiard ball to another without ceasing to be the same motion, so consciousness may pass through many substances without losing its self-identity.

Its actuality in relation to possible objects in space.

Lastly, we undoubtedly do distinguish ourselves from external objects in space (as, indeed, it is necessary to think objects as in space to enable us to distinguish ourselves from them). But if, on this ground, we go on to assert that the subject has an

¹ Cf. ante, p. 477.

existence in itself independent of these objects, we are shooting beyond the mark. "Whether this consciousness of myself is even possible without external things, through which ideas are given to me, or, in other words, whether I could exist as a thinking being, without being a man, is utterly beyond my knowledge." One thing is clear, that the consciousness of self, as it appears in us, is, in all its characters, dependent on something else for its realisation. I cannot be conscious of myself as subject except in relation to an object; as simple, except in relation to a manifold which I synthetically unite; as self-identical, except in relation to many things successively apprehended; and so also I cannot be conscious of myself as distinct from and independent of all that is external and material, except by means of the relation in which I stand to that which is external and material. Hence, I cannot be sure, that that, to which consciousness negatively relates itself, is not a necessary condition of consciousness. The consciousness of the simplicity, self-identity, and independence of the Ego, is in *our* case mediated by a consciousness of the object under the form of external perception; but whether this mediation is necessary, or whether self-consciousness is possible without it, we cannot tell. And still less can we tell how the self which underlies consciousness, and the thing in itself which underlies the determined object, are related to each other.

I have given in the last paragraph the general bearing of Kant's discussion of the fourth Paralogism, but it is necessary to observe, that both the statement and the treatment of it are different in the first and second editions of the *Critique*. In the first edition

Different form of the fourth Paralogism in the first and second editions of the *Critique*.

the Paralogism is, that external phenomena, as they are ~~known~~ indirectly, as inferred causes of our ideas, and not directly like our ideas themselves, are doubtful or problematic existences. In the second edition, the Paralogism is more strictly confined to the object of Psychology, and its purport is, that the existence of the self is independent of external phenomena, since we are conscious of ourselves as distinct from them.

First edition—External and internal experience equally immediate.

Hence, in the first edition, Kant's answer to the Paralogism is to show that we have no more right to deny the reality of external than of internal experience, since both are equally phenomenal, and both are equally immediate. At the root of the Cartesian Idealism, he finds a confusion between two senses of the word external. If "the external" means that which is out of consciousness, that which is not an object of experience, then it is the unknowable, the thing in itself. But if it means that which is in space, that which is the object of external experience, then it is knowable, and, indeed, equally knowable with the object of internal experience. Now, Des Cartes did not make this distinction; in other words, he confused the thing in space with the thing in itself. Hence he could not admit the possibility of any direct knowledge of the external object, and was forced to treat even its existence as doubtful. The transcendental Realist necessarily turns into the empirical Idealist. If I suppose that things in space are out of me, in the same way in which they are out of each other, I ~~cannot~~ suppose them to be brought into relation to me except by a doubtful inference. But if I realise that space and it all that contains are but perceptions of my mind,

then the externality of things ceases to have the meaning of *outness* with reference to the mind. Only material bodies can be out of each other, and space with all the objects which it contains is *in* me, quite as much as time and all the changes of my state that take place in it. The phenomena of outer and those of inner sense are equally phenomena of consciousness, and equally removed from things in themselves. The only difference is, that the perceptions of outer sense, "as they represent objects in space, have an illusory appearance of detaching themselves from the mind and hovering without it, though space, in which they are perceived, is after all only an idea to which no counterpart can possibly be found outside of the soul."¹ And instead of saying that things in space, as such, are independent of us, we should rather say that, as in space, (which is only the form of our perception), they cannot be independent of us, and, conversely, that if there be things independent of us, they cannot be in space.

In the second Edition, the question raised relates more definitely to the subject of Rational Psychology. Can we conceive of a self-consciousness confined to pure thought, or, at least, a self-consciousness without external perceptions? In the argument against Idealism, Kant had maintained that the knowledge of the phenomenal self through internal sense presupposes the knowledge of other objects through external sense. Here he goes a step farther, and questions the possibility of even a pure consciousness of self without external perception. The

Second
edition—
Self-con-
sciousness
dependent
on external
experi-
ence.

not for us in our present state of being realised in an actual 'I think,' except in relation to a manifold, determined by synthesis as objective. And as the consciousness of the internal object is posterior to the consciousness of the external object, so it would seem that there can be no self-consciousness except in relation to the consciousness of external objects. How, then, can we regard the idea of a separation between the self and these objects, or the idea of the absolute independence of the soul in relation to matter except as a problematic conception of something which experience can never either verify or disprove? We cannot say that the self may not exist and be conscious under other conditions, but neither can we base any argument for this on the fact that we are conscious of ourselves as distinct from material objects. For distinction is still relation, and it may be necessary relation.

Danger of
Material-
ism avert-
ed by
transcen-
dental
Idealism.

External perception, then, may be necessary to the realisation of self-consciousness; or if we like to put it in that way, matter may be necessary to mind. At the same time, the very process by which we have arrived at this result secures us against the dangers supposed to lie in it. It secures us from Materialism by showing that matter, like space, which is the necessary form of its perception, is phenomenal, and that, therefore, no explanation of mind that resolves it into matter is possible. For such explanation would be the explanation of mind by one of its perceptions. If, on the other hand, Materialism be taken as meaning, not that matter, as we know it, —matter as an external phenomenon under the form of space,—is the cause of mind, but that the unknown thing in itself, which underlies external phenomena, is

the cause of mind, it is a theory which we can neither accept nor reject, because it has no intelligible meaning.¹ The very statement of such a doctrine takes us beyond the limits of the knowable, and its acceptance would have no dangerous results, and, indeed, no results whatever. Materialism is dangerous only when it takes matter, as we know matter under the form of space, for a thing in itself, and asserts it, in this sense, to be the cause of mind. But transcendental philosophy, while it refuses any spiritualistic answer to the questions of rational Psychology in relation to the nature and destiny of man, is also an immoveable safeguard against the theory which is opposed to Spiritualism. It shows, in short, the irrationality both of materialism and of spiritualism, and thus by sweeping away all speculative solutions of the difficulty, it secures to the moral consciousness of men a free space for its assertion of man's higher nature.

In this section of the *Critique* there are two things that seem to call for special remark. The first is Kant's criticism of the metaphysical psychology of the Wolffian school, and the second is the self-consistency of Kant's own position.

In the Wolffian philosophy a broad line of distinction was drawn between the rational and the empirical, and Kant's refutation of that philosophy consists mainly in holding it to this distinction. If the soul is to be known in itself, it must be known by pure thought, abstracting from all that is empirical. But if we abstract from *every* element which is due to

Kant shows that the Wolffian distinction between rational and empirical Psychology is fatal to the former.

¹ A distinction, which casts some light upon the *soi-disant* materialism of Professor Tyndall.

experience, all that is left is the 'I think' of consciousness, and all rational Psychology must be built on that one datum. Nay, even this 'I think,' in the sense in which it includes 'I am,' is, in one aspect of it, an empirical proposition. It already, in the simplest expression of it, implies a reference to the manifold of sense. The conscious Ego cannot determine itself as simple, except by abstraction of the unity of the self from the manifold, which is synthetically combined in relation to it. It cannot determine itself as identical in different times, except in so far as it brings together the changes and differences in its states into the unity of one experience of objects. It cannot be conscious of itself as an independent being existing in itself, except in relation to an external world. But if thus even the pure self-consciousness can be apprehended only in relation to something that is not itself; if the Ego cannot compass self-consciousness, or, at any rate, *does not* compass self-consciousness except through this other element; then it cannot know itself in its absolute reality as a thing in itself. The transcendental apperception is not empirical, but it implies a relation to the empirical. It is simply a name for the unity of our consciousness of the empirical, and to treat it as an object known like other objects is to treat an abstraction as a reality. The self which we know as an object is not the pure subject, but the object of inner sense.

Kant, therefore, admits the Wolffian distinction of empirical and rational, of *a posteriori* and *a priori*; he admits, further, that being in itself, if it be known at all, must be known *a priori*; but then he turns round, and declares that *nothing* can be so known by

us, and that the empirical is always an element of our knowledge. Even the pure self-consciousness is only one element in experience, or rather a condition of its possibility, and if we take it by itself apart from the matter of sense, what we have in it is not the reality of the soul or mind, as it exists apart from sense, but a mere abstraction, which can exist only in connexion with other elements of the whole from which we abstract it.

But here, again, we come upon the old difficulty that embarrasses Kant's thoughts at every step, and reappears always as the inexplicable surd of his philosophy. Every assertion of the possibility of knowledge of mind in itself, or of matter in itself, is met by Kant with the demonstration that mind and matter are but elements in the unity of experience, and so known only in relation. Yet, on the other hand, the assumption that they are unrelated things, which, if known truly, would be known apart from this relation, is still retained from the Wolffian Metaphysic. The phantom of an *existing* thing in itself remains, while the *known* thing in itself is rejected. Yet even the thing in itself does not always retain its fixed position in relation to knowledge. For while it generally appears to be equivalent to the abstraction of a mind without an object, or an object without a mind, it is also referred to as the object of a perceptive understanding, *i.e.*, the absolute unity of subject and object. From the former point of view, the great hindrance to knowledge is, that we cannot apprehend things apart from their relations; from the latter point of view, the great hindrance to knowledge is, that we cannot apprehend them in their complete relativity. Kant,

The conflict in Kant between the unity and the dualism in Knowledge.

therefore, at one time, as in the present chapter, criticises the dualism of knowledge from the point of view of its unity, and at another time, as in his examination of the ontological argument for the being of God, he criticises the unity of knowledge from the point of view of its dualism. To the philosopher who claims to know the Ego, or their object, in themselves, he points out that they are only known in relation to each other; while to the philosopher, who tries to discover identity in their difference, he points out that they are *two*, and not one. . Perception and conception are necessary to each other, and, apart from each other, they have no intelligible meaning; yet there is a great gulf fixed between them, which there is no possibility of bridging over or filling up. The two points of view which thus alternate in Kant's thought, can be made consistent only if we conceive thought as at once integrating and differentiating; necessarily implying duality, yet, with equal necessity, implying a unity that manifests itself in, and returns upon itself through, the difference.

The
'vicious
circle' of
self-con-
sciousness.
Kant and
the an-
cient Scep-
tics.

In the chapter before us, the relativity of our consciousness of the Ego to the other elements of experience, is supposed to prove that, as known, it is not, and cannot be, a thing in itself. Kant's tendency to oppose relativity to reality reaches its climax in the assertion, that the Ego cannot be known as it really is, because it must be known in relation to itself. It stands, so to speak, in its own way, for we must use it as a subject in order to know it as an object. In speaking of this 'awkwardness,' Kant seems to have in his mind a double contrast; on the one hand a contrast between the con-

sciousness of the mind by itself and its consciousness of other objects ; and, on the other hand, a contrast between a knowledge in which there is distinction of subject and object, and a knowledge in which that distinction does not exist. Other things are known as objects in relation to the subject, but the subject is only known in relation to itself, and this, as Kant asserts, involves a 'vicious circle.' The answer is, that this 'circle' of self-consciousness which is here treated as a reason for ignorance, is the reason for knowledge. It is just because all things are relative to self-consciousness, but self-consciousness only relative to itself, that there is such a thing as knowledge at all. If the mind were referable to another principle than itself, then knowledge would be impossible ; for the knowledge of things must mean that the mind finds itself in them, or that, in some way, the difference between them and the mind is dissolved. Kant's reasoning is very like that of the ancient Sceptics, who maintained that knowledge is impossible, because the mind has only the choice between three courses, all equally fatal to knowledge. It must either (1) start with a first principle, which, because it is a first principle, is necessarily an assumption ; or (2) it must go on seeking reason for reason *ad infinitum*, though an infinite series of reasons is equivalent to no reason at all ; or (3) it must find the reason for A in B, and then again the reason for B in A, in which case it reasons in a circle. The answer is, that the only principle with which thought starts, is its own nature, and that this is no mere assumption, because an assumption is an arbitrarily chosen alternative, and in this case there is no alternative and therefore no arbitrary choice.

Thought in its universality and its ultimate identity with Being, is presupposed in every alternative that is capable of being expressed or conceived ; and there is therefore no possible standing ground for scepticism within the intelligible world. Again, thought is no simple first principle, because it is a unity that involves a difference of elements, each of which may be proved through its relation to the other. The very idea of self-consciousness involves a distinction of object and subject which is again sublated or dissolved by the correlativity or implicit identity of the self knowing with the self known. It is in a sense a circle ; but all the progress of reason consists simply in bringing what is, or appears to be, *without* this circle, *within* it ; or what is the same thing from the opposite side, in developing the formal intelligence of the individual, till his self-consciousness becomes one with his consciousness of the world. Knowledge in the highest sense consists in the mind finding itself in things, that is, in making all the distinctions of things as transparent, as much the manifestation of an identity, as is the distinction between the subjective and objective self in self-consciousness. An endless regress from reason to reason is no explanation of the world which satisfies the intelligence ; what does satisfy it is the discovery of laws, or, in other words, of the necessary correlativity of those very things, which at first appeared independent of, and indifferent to, each other ; for every such law is a manifestation of a unity in objects, which corresponds to the unity of consciousness with itself. Nor can there be any final rest for thought until the last dualism is removed in the discovery of a highest law,—a law which shall explain

and bring back to unity even the difference of mind itself from the object of its knowledge.

The view of the logical movement of pure thought which Kant inherited from preceding Logicians, led him to a very different conclusion. If knowledge was to be absolute, it seemed to him that it must not reach identity through difference, but be absolutely without difference. Each object, to be apprehended in its reality, must be apprehended apart from all relation to other objects. Hence, it is regarded as a hindrance to the knowledge of things in themselves, that we must know them through our own faculties of conception and perception : nay, even the relativity of consciousness to itself, as it implies a duality of knowing and known, is supposed to prevent us from knowing the real self. It is not difficult to see that this mode of reasoning implies an ideal of knowledge which is self-contradictory, which, indeed, is the very negation of knowledge : for knowledge implies a difference, a relation, which may, indeed, be transcended, and brought back into unity, but which cannot be simply denied. We cannot know, unless we distinguish the self from, and relate it to, the object ; yet this distinction is here supposed to make knowledge impossible. It is obvious that Kant thus turns the idea of consciousness against itself. His argument implies that the true knowledge would be identical with its object, in such wise as to leave no room for a distinction, even the distinction of consciousness. It would be unity without difference, subject without object, affirmation without negation. It would be pure being in the abstract without knowing, or what is the same thing, it would be an intelligence

Kant's
ideal of
knowledge
self-con-
tradictory.

that knew nothing. Surely it is evident, that it is no weakness of the human mind, that prevents it from having a consciousness such as this, a consciousness which annihilates the very idea of consciousness. Rather it is its strength, that will not let it rest in any such abstraction. But Kant, under the dominion of a method which he derived from the very school he was assailing, confounds the concrete unity of thought, in which differences are dissolved, with a mere unit,—the abstraction of an element, which cannot be thought at all except in relation to other elements; and then makes this very inability to think the unthinkable a reason for asserting the limitation of our knowledge, and the merely phenomenal character of its object. It is because of this confusion, that the idea of a perceptive understanding remains with him an empty possibility. For if he had once distinctly realised, that the true ideal of knowledge is not the extinction, but the reconciliation, of the differences and contradictions into which we are brought by the understanding, he would not so easily have convinced himself that the ideal is unattainable.

That the soul cannot be brought under the four categories does not prove it unknowable.

(If the soul, as the subject of thought, is to be known at all, it must, Kant argues, be brought under such categories as substance, numerical unity, simplicity, &c.; but these categories are not applicable to it, except as expressing its relation to a phenomenal or given object in experience, and therefore they cannot tell us what the mind is in itself. Kant never thinks of questioning the proposition that, if we could know the soul, we must know it by the application of such categories; on the contrary, he maintains that, as we cannot know it thus, we cannot

know it at all.) Yet the real effect of his argument is to show that the Wolffian method, as well as the Wolffian results, was empty and absurd, and that rational Psychology was throughout a misinterpretation of the consciousness it proposed to explain. We necessarily think of self as the subject of all our thoughts, but this does not mean that there is a substratum or substance in us which is separate from all our thought and experience. We necessarily think of the subject as a unity in relation to all the manifold of the objects we know, but this does not mean that that subject is an abstractly simple entity, which has no difference or multiplicity in itself. We think of it as one amid all the changes of its successive states, but this does not mean that it is an arithmetical unchangeable unit, without growth or development. We think of it, lastly, as distinct from the external world in space which it knows, but this does not mean that there could be such a thing as a pure spirit, that did not manifest itself in, or in relation to, a world in space and time. The error of Wolff, therefore, lies, not in his attempt to apprehend the mind as it is really, or in itself, but in his attempt to determine it by categories that are altogether inadequate to its nature. The first condition, indeed, for determining the intelligence as it is, is to transcend such categories as abstract unity, simplicity, or substance. If the question be whether the mind is simple or complex, substantial or accidental, the true answer is, 'neither the one nor the other,' or, if you prefer it, 'both the one and the other.' In other words, the sphere of thought, in which we can choose between such alternatives, is not the sphere of thought to which Psychology

belongs. Such categories may be of use in the region of Mechanics or Chemistry, but they are not adequate to life, and still less to consciousness. We cannot understand either, unless we have risen above even such categories as causality and reciprocity to the idea of a unity which through difference returns upon itself.¹

Kant's application of the category of intensive quantity to it.

The same considerations enable us also to correct Kant's criticism of the argument (used among others by Mendelssohn), from the simplicity to the indestructibility of the soul. Kant points out that what is simple, as having no *extensive* quantity, may yet be complex, if we take into consideration *intensive* quantity or degree, and that what has intensive quantity may vanish away, not by the abstraction of parts, but by gradual lowering of its intensity. The simplicity of the consciousness of self does not exclude varying degrees of vividness, and it is easy to imagine that this variation may end in its dying out altogether. All that need be said of this objection is that it is as good as the argument against which it is directed; for that argument was based on the supposition that the soul has the simplicity of an atom or indivisible material element. The proper criticism, however, is that of Hegel, that quantitative complexity or simplicity, whether in the form of intension or extension, are inadequate categories, from which no conclusions of value can be drawn as to the nature of the soul. *Its* simplicity and unity is of a kind that does not exclude, and cannot be opposed to complexity and diversity. And it would be as legitimate to argue that, because of the manifold powers of the soul, it is divisible and

¹ Cf. ante, p. 485.

destructible, as to argue that, because of its oneness, it is indestructible. The question belongs to another sphere of thought altogether, and no valuable result can be gained by dragging it down into the region of external quantitative relations.¹

From a slightly different point of view we may answer the assertion of Kant that there is no such science as rational Psychology, by saying that there is such a science, and that Kant in his *Critique* has given the first outline of it. For rational Psychology, according to him, deals with the transcendental subject, and therefore with the conditions of thought which are prior to all experience—in other words, with the idea of knowledge in general, apart from the determination of any particular object, external or internal. The effect of Kant's *Critique*, properly understood, is to vindicate as transcendental Logic, what he repudiates, and justly repudiates, as Psychology. The examination of self-consciousness in general, as the precondition of all knowledge, of the categories, in which it expresses itself, and by which it organises experience, and of the ideas of reason, by which it gives the last unity to experience, and rises to that which is beyond experience—all this is falsely conceived when it is placed in the sphere of Psychology. For it is an examination of ideas and conceptions, which underlie all knowledge, and not an examination of mind in its relation to, and distinction from, matter. No doubt, the movement from the lower categories to the higher, the logical movement from the categories of quantity and quality to the categories of cause and substance, and from these again to the ideas of final cause and of self-consciousness itself, has a

The true
Rational
Psychology is
transcendental
Logic.

certain parallelism with the outward development of the sciences, from Mechanics to Biology, and from Biology to Psychology. It has already been remarked that categories which are useful in a lower sphere, say in the sphere of Mechanics and Chemistry, cease to be adequate in the sciences of Psychology and Ethics. The mind comprehends things by drawing from its own unity all the conceptions that are necessary for the understanding of them, till at last in the sciences of spirit it returns upon itself, or has to use the conception of itself as the category, whereby it explains the object (an idea which Kant naively expresses when he says that 'we can only think of self-conscious beings in so far as we transfer our own consciousness to them'). But this fact that the mind is the 'brief abstract' of all that it can know, does not make it less necessary to draw a clear line between Logic, *i.e.*, transcendental Logic, and Psychology; or make it less of a 'paralogism' to treat Psychology as the basis of all science. To do so is to put the complex before the simple, and to mistake the ultimate unity, with which knowledge must end, for the primitive unity, with which science must begin. The Kantian Logic, no doubt, has a psychological aspect, for though the *Critique* deals not with mind as the internal, in opposition to the external, object, but with the 'organic plan' of experience, which consciousness in general brings with it, yet it opposes the objects of experience as phenomena of our minds to things in themselves. But, with this exception, (which disappears with the false assumption of things in themselves), the Kantian *Critique* is so far from being Psychology that it is the first conclusive refutation of the psychological view of knowledge.

CHAPTER XVI.

RATIONAL COSMOLOGY, AS EXPLAINED AND CRITICISED
BY KANT.

RATIONAL Cosmology deals with the idea of the world as a totality of phenomena in one time and space. In this world, as transcendental Logic has shown, every phenomenon is determined in relation to other phenomena. It is determined in time, by relation to preceding and coexisting phenomena; in space, by relation to coexisting phenomena; and except through such relations it could not be determined as an object at all. Yet such determination of phenomenon by phenomenon is never complete and final; for the determining phenomenon requires to be determined by another phenomenon, and that by another, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, then, reason demands a complete and final determination of objects in the phenomenal world, it demands something which, in this region of knowledge at least, can never be attained. For here every answer gives birth to a new question, and no conclusive answer can ever be given. Now that reason does make such a demand, has already been shown. The hypothetical syllogism of formal Logic put us on

Peculiarity
of the pro-
blems of
Rational
Cosmo-
logy.

the track of an idea of reason which should express the completion of the empirical regress, and so enable us to comprehend the world of phenomena as a whole, bounded and limited only by itself.

Now the peculiarity of the problems of reason which are connected with this idea is, that they immediately take the form of dilemmas. They offer us a choice of alternatives, in one or other of which, according to the law of excluded middle, truth must lie. The 'unconditioned totality of phenomenal synthesis' must consist either in a finite or infinite series, in a series which has, or one which has not, a beginning. In the former case, we shall reach totality by discovering the unconditioned condition which forms the first member of the series; in the latter case, we shall reach totality by summing up the series of conditions, which, as infinite, is unconditioned.

The four
Antino-
mies.

Let us, then, taking those in each class of categories that give rise to a series, consider what are the different forms of dilemma that arise when we follow the regressive movement of reason from the conditioned to the unconditioned. In the first place, phenomena are extensive magnitudes, whether we regard them as in space or as in time. Now, phenomena as in time constitute a series; for a time is determined as such only by relation to a preceding time; and (as time is not perceived by itself) a phenomenon in time is determined as such only by relation to a preceding phenomenon. But totality in the synthesis of phenomena in time cannot be attained, except by tracing them back to a first phenomenon, which is determined in time in relation to no previous phenomenon; or, if this is impos-

sible, by summing up the infinite series of times and phenomena in them. And the same, *mutatis mutandis*, holds good of objects in space; for though space itself is not serial, the synthesis, by which we determine phenomena in space, is serial. We can determine one space only by relation to another space, and that again by relation to another beyond it; and so also (as space is not perceived by itself), we can determine a phenomenon as in space only by reference to another, and so on *ad infinitum*. For totality of synthesis, therefore, we must be able either to reach a last phenomenon in space, or else to sum up the infinite series of space and phenomena in them.

In the second place, matter, or the object of external perception has intensive quantity; in other words, it is never simple or indivisible; for every space is made up of spaces, and every spatial phenomenon, therefore, must be regarded as made up of parts, which are the conditions of its existence as a whole. Hence we cannot complete our knowledge of any external object unless we divide it into its ultimate parts, and enumerate them all. But to do this would imply that we are able, either to reach simple and indivisible parts, or to sum up an infinite series of parts within parts.

In the third place, under the head of Relation, all phenomena, as objects in time, are determined as effects of causes, which, in their turn, are effects of other causes; and the totality of synthesis, according to the category of causality, cannot be attained unless we are able either to reach a cause which is not an effect, a *causa sui*, or to sum up an infinite series of causes.

Lastly, under the head of Modality, we have seen that all phenomena, as objects, are in themselves contingent, or only hypothetically necessary, *i.e.*, necessary on the presupposition of the existence of something else: we cannot, therefore, reach the unconditioned totality of synthesis, unless we are able either to discover an existence which contains the conditions of its possibility in itself, *i.e.*, an absolutely necessary Being, or to sum up an infinite series of phenomena, which are contingent in themselves, but necessary in relation to each other.¹

They all
contain
the same
dilemma.

In all these cases we start with given phenomena, and seek for the complete conditions of their possibility; and in all, reason may be satisfied, either with an absolute beginning, or a completed infinite series. "In the latter case, the series is without limit *a parte priori*, yet given as a whole, though the regress in it is never completed, and can only be called potentially infinite. In the former case, there is a *first* in the series. If we look to quantity in time, this first is a world-beginning; if to quantity in space, it is a world-limit. If we look to quality, it is a simple and indivisible part; if we look to causality, it is an absolute self-activity or freedom; if we look to modality, it is an absolute necessity of Nature."

Now these problems are not *arbitrary*; they are forced upon us by the nature of reason itself. If there is an illusion in the dilemmas upon which they drive us, it is at least a natural illusion. We cannot avoid asking the questions, for on our asking them depends all the movement of our reason; and when we ask them, we seem inevitably to be

¹ p. 330 : Tr., 260.

forced to accept one or other of the alternative answers.

Yet even prior to any minute examination of the reasoning by which they are supported, we may see that both the alternative solutions of the problems of reason *must* be illusory. For the questions asked by reason must be answered, if answered at all, by the understanding, which alone enables us to determine any object as such; and yet no synthesis of the manifold by the principles of the understanding can possibly be adequate to the absolute unity and totality of reason. There is a hopeless see-saw between the two faculties; for if we adopt such a conception of the Unconditioned as alone is adequate to the idea of reason, we find it is too great for the synthesis of the understanding; and if we adopt such a conception of it as can be definitely apprehended by understanding, we find that it is too small for reason. The understanding cannot determine an object absolutely but only by relation to another object; hence it is impossible for it to rest in the conception of an absolute beginning; yet it is equally unable to embrace in its synthesis a series which has no beginning. The consequence, therefore, is that, in all metaphysical conflicts, the victory remains with the attacking party, and reason fluctuates between two alternatives so related, that the negation of the one seems necessarily to involve the assertion of the other, while yet either, taken by itself, involves an absurdity. The strength of Scepticism has always lain in the exhibition of this apparent self-contradiction of reason, according to which everything, which can be asserted, can, with equal reason, be denied: its weakness has lain in its

Solution of
the Anti-
nomies
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Under-
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questions
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incapacity for explaining the meaning of this self-contradiction. Yet if it be not explained, Scepticism destroys itself; for, like every other rational system, or doctrine, Scepticism presupposes the general competence of that intelligence, whose deliverances in certain specific instance it refutes. If reason were utterly incompetent, it could not determine even its own incompetence. Criticism, on the other hand, while it shows the origin and necessity of the problems of Metaphysics, seeks to vindicate the trustworthiness of reason and at the same time to limit it; or, in other words, to prove the subjective, at the same time that it denies the objective, validity of the ideas of reason. In order to do so much as this, however, it must solve three problems.

The three problems of *Dialectic* in relation to the Antinomies.

In the *first* place, it must discover the nature and extent of the antinomies of reason, and must show that they are *dogmatically* insoluble; or, in other words, that, whichever of the alternative solutions we adopt, we are led into absurdity and contradiction. In the *second* place, it must account for these antinomies, from the nature and relations of our faculties. And, *lastly*, it must show what is the use of the ideas of reason, supposing it to be proved that they do not enable us to determine any object that is beyond the limits of experience. For we cannot vindicate the intelligence or avoid the absurdity of absolute scepticism, if we find nothing but illusion in those ideas to which we are driven by the necessity of reason itself. No satisfactory result, therefore, will be achieved till we discover the positive meaning and value of these ideas, if not as adding to the amount of human knowledge, then at least as necessary to give aim and direc-

tion to its progress and systematic unity to its results.¹

The first of these problems has already been partially solved. For we have shown that antinomies arise in connexion with the extension, or elevation to the unconditioned, of those categories which produce a series, and we have indicated in general what are the problems of rational Cosmology that spring out of this process. All that remains under this head is to show in detail the nature of the arguments by which the thesis and antithesis of each of these antinomies are supported.

Proof that the Antinomies are dogmatically insoluble.

The *first Antinomy* relates to the limitation of the world in time and space. The thesis is, that "the world had a beginning in time, and is also limited in space." For this it may be argued, in regard to time, that, if there were no beginning of the world, then, at any given point of time, we must say that an eternity has passed, *i.e.*, that an infinite series, which, *ex vi termini*, cannot be completed, has actually been completed. Again, if the world has no limits in space, it must be an infinite given whole. But a quantum can only be given by the successive synthesis of its parts; and if the whole be infinite, as in the case supposed, the synthesis cannot be completed except in an infinite time, *i.e.*, it can never be completed. Hence, *the denial of either member of the thesis involves an absurdity.*

First Antinomy.

For the antithesis, that 'the world had no beginning in time, and is unlimited in space,' it may be argued that, if the world had a beginning, there must have been a time when it was not. But nothing can begin to be in empty time; for "no moment of

¹ p. 334 : Tr., p. 263.

empty time has in it a distinctive condition, by reason of which a thing should be rather than not be." In other words, a relation of an event to empty time, by which its date should be determined, is impossible; for the time of one event can only be determined in relation to the time of another that precedes it. In like manner, to say that the world is limited in space, is to say that there is empty space beyond it by which its limit is determined. But a spatial relation, which is not a relation of objects *in* space, but a relation of objects *to* space, is impossible. Space, in fact, is nothing but 'the possibility of external phenomena.' "Empirical perception is not compounded of phenomena and space" as *separate* elements: for space is a mere form of the relations of possible objects, and not itself an object to which other objects are related. Hence *the denial of either member of the antithesis involves an absurdity.*

Here, then, is an absolute Antinomy of reason, demonstrated apogogically on both sides. On the one side it is argued, that if the world is determined as having no limits in time or space, it must be so determined by an endless synthesis, which yet is completed; and, on the other side, that if the world is determined as having limits, then empty space and empty time must be regarded as actual existences, which limit other objects, and not as mere forms of the perception of objects. In other words, phenomenal objects in time and space are always related to a 'beyond,' which itself must consist of phenomenal objects; yet an endless series of phenomenal objects is impossible. Reduced to its essentials, therefore, the reasoning is, that we necessarily determine the

world, in space and time as limited in extension, yet with equal necessity we remove the limit, and relate it to something beyond, which, in its turn, must be determined as limited, and related to something beyond, and so on, *ad infinitum*.

The *second Antinomy* relates to the divisibility of matter. For the thesis, 'that every composite substance in the world consists of simple parts, and that there exists nothing which is not either itself simple, or composed of simple parts,' it may be argued, that, if there be no simple parts, then you cannot annihilate all composition even in thought. But composition is, by the very idea of it, an accidental relation—a relation which you *can* annihilate without annihilating the substances compounded. Infinite dividedness, therefore, or composition which is not of simple parts, cannot be admitted by any one who holds that there is a substantial reality in things beneath their accidents. Therefore *the denial of the thesis involves an absurdity*.¹

The second
Antinomy.

For the antithesis, 'that no composite thing consists of simple parts, and that there does not exist in the world any simple substance,' it may be argued, that simple parts could not exist in space, for every space is made up, not of simple parts, but of spaces. As, therefore, we cannot get rid of composition in space, so we cannot get rid of it in any external object. Nay, we cannot get rid of it in any object at all, either external or internal; for such an object

¹ Kant's statement of this argument is very obscure. It is unravelled by Hegel (*Werke*, vol. III., p. 208). Hegel remarks that the word 'composite' is not in its proper place here: for it is merely tautology to say that the composite, as such, is made up of simple parts. What Kant means is rather the 'continuous.'

must needs be presented to us in a perception that does not contain a manifold; and this is impossible. The supposition that the *Ego* is such an object has been sufficiently refuted in the preceding chapter. Hence *the denial of the antithesis involves an absurdity.*

Here, then, is a second Antinomy of reason proved apogogically. The sum of the argument for the thesis is, that an infinitely composite substance is a contradiction; for it would be a substance entirely made up of external and accidental relations. And the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that no object of experience, as such, can be simple. It is noticeable that the argument for the thesis is not, in this case, derived from the impossibility of completing an infinite series by division (as in the first Antinomy it was derived from the impossibility of completing an infinite series by composition), but from the metaphysical conception of the individual substance or monad, which Kant had inherited from the school of Leibnitz. This inconsistency is another proof how deeply the mind of Kant had been impressed with the Individualism of his predecessors. If Kant, in dealing with the second Antinomy, had gone on the same principle as in dealing with the first Antinomy, the essentials of the reasoning would have been, that we necessarily determine the object in space as limited in division, and so as simple, yet with equal necessity we remove this limit, and regard it again as complex, and so on *ad infinitum*.

The third
Antinomy.

The *third Antinomy* relates to the possibility of a first, or free, causality. The thesis is, that "causality, according to the laws of nature, is not the sole causality from which the phenomena of the world as a whole

are deducible, but that it is necessary for their explanation also to assume a causality by freedom." For this assumption, it may be argued, that, according to the laws of nature, we must seek for the cause of a change in some change that has gone before it; for if the cause were not a change, but something permanent, then the effect likewise would be always in existence, or would not be a change. According to the same principle we must seek the cause of the causal change in another change, and so on *ad infinitum*. If, therefore, all happens according to the laws of nature, the cause of phenomena is always a subaltern, and, therefore, never a first cause: or there is never a sufficient cause for the events that happen. And this contradicts the law of causality itself. There must, therefore, be a cause not according to the laws of nature, but according to freedom, if the law of causality is absolute: or, *the denial of the thesis involves an absurdity*.

For the antithesis, that "there is no such thing as freedom, but that everything happens purely according to the laws of nature," it is argued that, if a free causality exists, it must be conceived, not only as beginning the series of causes and effects, but also as determining itself to begin it, *i.e.*, "it must make an absolute beginning, and nothing must precede it or determine its action according to definite laws. But every beginning to act presupposes a state of the not yet acting cause, and a dynamic first beginning presupposes a state which has no connexion of causality with the previous state of the same cause, *i.e.*, that follows in no way from it." But this is inconsistent with the law of causality; it would, in fact, be the

transcendental freedom are related to each other as law and lawlessness." *The denial of the antithesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.*

The sum of the argument for the thesis then is, that there is a spontaneity or free causality, because without it the law of causality comes into contradiction with itself, since, in that case, no sufficient cause can ever be given for anything; and the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that there is no free causality, because, if it existed, it would be uncaused, and so would contradict the law of causality. Thus the principle of causality at once posits an absolute beginning, and yet negatives an absolute beginning, and the alternate position and negation leads to an infinite series.

The fourth
Antinomy.

The *fourth Antinomy* relates to the possibility of a necessary Being. For the thesis, which declares that "there is a necessary being belonging to the world, either as its part or its cause," it is argued, that the world of experience, being a world in time, contains a series of changes, each of which is hypothetically necessary, or, in other words, made necessary by a condition that precedes it. Whatever is thus conditioned, however, presupposes a complete series of conditions up to that which is unconditioned, or absolutely necessary. There is, therefore, an absolutely necessary being implied in all change. And this necessary being belongs to the world of experience, and is not outside of it. For the beginning of a series of changes in time cannot be determined, except in relation to something that has preceded it in time, or has existed in the world of experience at a time when it did not exist. To go out of the world of experience would involve a *μετά-*

βασις ἐς ἄλλο γένος, and would lead to a different kind of necessity from that which is wanted. For our argument is from the *contingent* to the necessary. Now the contingent, in the sense in which that word is applied to objects of experience, means that which has a cause in something other than itself, something which existed previously. But the contingent in the pure conception of it (which, of course, abstracts from the conditions of experience) is that of which the opposite is not self-contradictory. And we can never say that what is contingent in the one sense is contingent in the other. Hence, when we argue from the contingent of experience to the necessary, we must argue to a being who is necessary in an empirical sense, a necessary being in the world, and not out of it. *The denial of the thesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.*

For the antithesis, that "there is no necessary being either in the world or out of it," it is argued that, in the first place, such a necessary being cannot be *in the world*. For if so, then there must be an unconditionally necessary, *i.e.*, an uncaused, beginning of the series of cosmical changes, or if not, then the infinite series of changes, each of which is contingent, must, as a whole, be absolutely necessary. But the former supposition is inconsistent with the dynamic law of the determination of all phenomena in time, and the latter is absurd in itself; for a multitude of things taken together cannot be necessary, if no one of them possesses necessary existence in itself. In the second place, the necessary being cannot be *out of the world*; for, as the first member of the series of causes of phenomena, the

The denial of the antithesis, therefore, involves an absurdity.

The parallelism between thesis and antithesis would have been more complete, if Kant had not introduced under the former the proof that the necessary being must be in the world. Overlooking this irregularity, the sum of the argument for the thesis is, that there must be a necessary being either *in* or *out* of the world, because the contingent presupposes the necessary; and the sum of the argument for the antithesis is, that there can be a necessary being neither *in* nor *out* of the world: not in the world, because no being in the world can be necessary; and not out of the world, because no necessary being out of the world could be causally related to the contingent in the world. In short, we necessarily explain the contingent by the necessary, but every necessity we can reach is only hypothetical, *i.e.*, contingent.

The collected theses form one system of philosophy, and the collected antitheses another.

These, then, are the four antinomies of rational cosmology. They are no more and no fewer, because the number of the categories which give rise to a series are just so many. It is noticeable, however, that the solutions given of these different problems are not unconnected, but that all the theses naturally gather themselves into one system of philosophy, and all the antitheses into another and opposite system. The same tone of mind, the same general interests, speculative and practical, which lead us to accept the thesis or the antithesis respectively in one case, lead us to accept it in all the other cases. In this way there arises, on the one side, a system of 'Dogmatism of pure reason,' and, on the other side, a system of Empiricism, which often slides into a dogmatic

Materialism. And, if for the moment we abstract from the question of the truth of these rival systems, it is easy to see that, for the maintenance of both, there are powerful motives, springing out of the most pressing needs and tendencies of our moral and intellectual nature. To believe that the world is not eternal and infinite, but that it had a beginning and has a limit to its extension in space; that everything is not divisible and transitory, but that there exists an indissoluble unity of substance, if nowhere else, at least in the self-conscious intelligence; that a spiritual being is a free causality, and not like other things bound in the chains of nature and fate, and that the order of nature is not the ultimate fact to which our thoughts are limited, but that beyond the contingent world there is a necessary Being, who is its first cause—all this gives support to our moral and religious life, as well as satisfaction to our highest intellectual cravings. If our view were limited to the phenomena of sensible experience, we could not believe in a God, or a higher destiny for ourselves: if we conceived the law of nature to be the ultimate truth of things, we could not hold to the absoluteness of the imperative of duty; our deepest moral experiences of repentance and change of character must be regarded as illusory, and, at the same time, the architectonic impulse of reason, which seeks to refer all science to one principle, must remain unsatisfied. On the other hand, Empiricism, when it bids us seek empirical conditions for every condition and event or existence, when it refuses to admit the conceptions of an indivisible existence, a free causality, and a necessary Being, has this great recommendation, that it “keeps the under-

standing to its own sphere, the sphere of possible experience, by the discovery of whose laws alone it can extend without limit its certain and definite knowledge." So long as Empiricism takes its principles in this sense, as warnings not to quit the region within which definite knowledge is possible, it is strong and, indeed, unassailable. Its danger lies in this, that it is apt to become dogmatic in its turn, and to assert that no other region exists. And, when it does so, it not only sets itself in opposition to the moral and religious consciousness of men, but also lays itself open to the same objections which it brings against its adversary. For, as we have seen, the assertions, that the world is without beginning or limit, and that there is no simple substance, no free causality, and no necessary being, are not less groundless and self-contradictory than the counter-assertions of the dogmatism of pure reason.¹

The cause of the Anomalies, in the nature of our faculties, must be discoverable.

We seem then to stand in this peculiar position that there are certain questions, which we are driven by our very nature to ask, and to answer in one of two ways. But if we answer them in one way, we come into collision with the principles which underlie our moral and religious life, and even with the highest ideal of our intelligence; and if we answer them in the other way, we confuse our understanding by mixing dreams with realities, things which we cannot, with things which we can, verify; and we are diverted from investigations that can be pursued indefinitely with ever-increasing profit, to a fruitless effort after that which always eludes us. Since, then, interests which we cannot surrender are ranged on each side of this necessary but insoluble problem, it behoves us to

¹ p. 367 : Tr., p. 290.

consider, whether we cannot throw light upon it by a discovery of the very source of the problem in the nature of our intellectual faculties.

Now, in the first place, it may safely be asserted *a priori* that it is not impossible in this case to discover the cause of the difficulty. For this is one of these departments of knowledge in which we must be able to answer every question we are able to ask. "The answer must come from the same sources out of which the question itself arose."¹ In the explanation of the phenomena of nature, this is not the case; there our knowledge is often insufficient to solve the problems suggested by the phenomena we have observed. But in Ethics no problem can be insoluble; we *must* be able to discern what is right and wrong, for right and wrong involve responsibility, and there can be no responsibility except where there is knowledge. And so also in transcendental philosophy, the conception, which causes us to ask the question, must enable us to answer it, seeing that the object is presented *only* through that very conception. The idea which reason gives us of the object is in fact our only reason for saying that the object exists, and therefore all possible questions as to the nature of the object are merely questions as to the contents of the idea. Hence there is no presumption in our pretending to solve the problem, nor can we escape from the obligation of solving it by alleging the limits of our intelligence.

To the questions of Rational Psychology we gave no answer, for no answer *was* the answer. The problem was to determine the transcendental subject as an object or thing in itself, and all that could be said

¹ p. 378: Tr., p. 298.

by way of solution was that the transcendental subject cannot be determined as an object at all. But the case is different with the questions of Rational Cosmology; for here we have to do with ideas, of which both the object and the empirical synthesis required for its conception are given; and the questions which the reason suggests relate only to the continuation and completion of this synthesis so as to embrace an absolute totality. In other words, the ideas in question do not relate to a thing in itself, which, as such, cannot be known at all, but to the objects of experience, which can be and are known. Only we must observe that the question is not, what can be given *in concreto* in experience, but only what lies in the idea itself, for the empirical synthesis can only approximate to the idea (but never enable us to 'envisage' it in an object). "All the questions of rational Cosmology, in short, must be capable of being answered out of the idea alone; for the idea is a mere product of reason, which consequently cannot disclaim the obligation to answer questions about it, or ascribe the difficulty to the unknown object."¹ In other words, understanding presents us with an object in relation to other objects, through the synthesis of the empirically given manifold, and reason suggests the idea of a world, an absolute totality of objects, determined by such synthesis. And as this idea relates to experience alone, and yet no object adequate to it can be given in experience, reason must determine out of itself alone its objective meaning and value. We cannot, therefore, take refuge in assertions of our ignorance, as if the idea had an object independent of itself. The object can

¹ p. 279: Tr., p. 300.

be presented to us, if at all, only through the idea; and if it be found that the idea is inadequate to determine the object, then it is also inadequate to tell us that there is any object at all. Thus the question will be solved *critically*, by the discovery that the idea has only a subjective value, if it cannot be solved *dogmatically*, by the determination of the object in question. But in any case, critically or dogmatically, reason must answer all its own questions.

Now the consideration of the Antinomies has shown the impossibility of a *dogmatic* answer; it has shown us in all the cases that, if we suppose the question settled in one way, the empirical regress necessary to realise the idea of the unconditioned is too large to be accomplished by the understanding in its empirical synthesis: and that if we determine it in the other way, the empirical regress accomplished by the understanding is too small for the idea of reason. In other words, when we determined the question one way, we were obliged to think of an infinite series as completely given, *i.e.*, of a finite infinite; and when we determined it the other way, we were obliged to think of a finite beyond which nothing could be given, *i.e.*, of an infinite finite. If then experience, which alone can give reality to any conception, altogether fails to realise this idea, it follows that it is nothing *but* an idea, *i.e.*, a thought without an object; and we must seek for its meaning and value somewhere else than in such an object.

On the other hand, Transcendental Idealism offers us a clear *critical* solution of the difficulty, enabling us to detect the illusion, which has led to the objec-

Impossi-
bility of
dogmatic
solution of
the Anti-
nomies.

And possi-
bility of a
critical
solution of
them.

tive interpretation of the cosmological ideas, and at the same time to see their real subjective value. For it directs our attention to the fact, that the objects which we know in experience, are merely phenomenal, *i.e.*, that they have no existence in themselves, apart from our empirical knowledge of them. If this be true, it is obviously absurd to speak of *such* objects as having attributes, which, by their very nature, cannot be experienced. Space and time are mere forms of our perception, and we can say nothing whatever as to the presence or absence, in objects in space and time, of qualities that could not possibly be perceived. The questions of rational Cosmology cannot be answered, because they cannot rationally be asked. Thus, *e.g.*, it is only in a confusion between phenomena and things in themselves, that any one can ever raise, or discuss, the problem, whether the world is finite or infinite in extension. Properly speaking, it is neither the one or the other; for the world, as an object of experience, can never be determined either way. We speak, indeed, of a phenomenon as having attributes of its own: but this does not mean that it has any predicates in itself apart from our perceptions of it; it means merely, that we (and all beings like us) under certain conditions have certain experiences. "That there may be inhabitants in the moon, though no man has ever observed them, must certainly be admitted, but this means only that in the possible progress of experience we might come upon them: for everything is real that stands in one context with a perception, according to the laws by which in experience we proceed from one perception to another." But to say that a thing is real in the sense that it might be perceived,

and to say that it exists apart from all perception, are quite different things. "To call a phenomenon a real thing before it is perceived, either means that, in the progress of experience, we must come upon such a perception, or it means nothing at all." It may indeed be said that our sensibility is a receptivity, and that, when it gives us ideas, we must explain those ideas by a non-sensuous or intelligible cause that affects us ; but of this cause we know nothing. We cannot perceive it as an object, and when we call it the *transcendental object*, this is merely "that we may have something that corresponds (as an activity) to the sensibility as a receptivity." To this transcendental object we may, if we will, ascribe all the compass and connexion of our possible perceptions, and we may speak of it as given in itself before all experience. "Thus we may say that the real things of past time are given in the transcendental object of experience, but for us they are objects and realities of past time only in so far as we represent to ourselves, that a regressive series of perceptions would lead to them as conditions of the perceptions of the present moment." And in like manner, when we speak of things existing, which we have not perceived, we can only mean that they are contained in a part of experience to which we may advance from the point we have already reached. "It is all one to say that, in empirical progress through space, I would come upon stars which are a hundred miles farther off than the farthest I see, and to say that such stars may exist in the spaces of the universe, though no man has perceived or even will perceive them."¹

¹ p. 388 : Tr. p. 307. Cf. note p. 291.

Both systems of Rational Cosmology rest on a confusion of phenomena with things in themselves.

Now as this is the case, and as the objects of experience exist only *in* our experience of them, it is easy to see that *both* the rival systems of Rational Cosmology rest upon an illusion. For they both proceed upon the principle that, the conditioned being given, the whole series of conditions up to the unconditioned is given; and therefore they seek by means of the conditioned, to determine what the unconditioned is. Now this would be a correct procedure, if the things of experience had a nature, which was independent of our experience of them; for, in that case, we, who apprehend the conditioned as such, must necessarily apprehend that by which it is conditioned. But a phenomenon is nothing, apart from the perception of it. When we apprehend it as conditioned, this only means that, as an empirical object, it is connected, according to necessary laws of the understanding, with other perceptions. Nor can we know with *what* other perceptions it is connected, except in so far as these perceptions are actually given in sense. When, therefore, we have determined an empirical object as conditioned, (and of necessity we must thus determine it), all that by this means we know is a phenomenon, and the law of its connexion with other phenomena. But while we are thus enabled to seek out these other phenomena, and have, moreover, in the Analogy of experience a criterion, by which we may recognise them when we find them, we cannot determine *a priori* what they are. On the other hand, we do know *a priori*, that in this process of connecting phenomenon with phenomenon, we never can come to an ultimate object, an object which has no further relation or condition. Consequently, so long as we

speak of phenomena, we cannot say that the conditioned being given, the unconditioned is given with it; but only that the conditioned being given, the unconditioned is set before us as a *problem to be solved*. The illusion of rational Cosmology is that it takes the problem for its own solution. It is true that the mere conceptions of the conditioned and the unconditioned are necessarily related to each other, and we cannot have the one without suggestion of the other; but this does not by any means imply that, when we know the conditioned, we immediately know the whole series of its conditions, and so the unconditioned. For here the conditioned, as an object of knowledge, is not a mere conception, but an experience; i.e., a perception determined by a conception. If then we argue from the conditioned, which is given empirically, to the unconditioned, which is not so given, we are committing a *sophisma figuræ dictionis*; we are taking the conditioned in two senses. In the major, when we say: 'The conditioned implies the unconditioned,' we mean the mere conception of the conditioned; but in the minor, when we say: 'This phenomenon is conditioned,' we mean the conception as applied to an empirically given matter. The merely formal or logical principle, that the premises are presupposed in the conclusion, in which abstraction is made of all time-conditions, is thus changed into the material principle that one phenomenon *in time* being given, the totality of the regressive synthesis of phenomena is given along with it.¹

We see, then, that the real solution of the Antinomies of rational Cosmology is, that the quarrel

¹ p. 393 : Tr., 310.

is about nothing; for it is about the objects of experience, viewed as if they were altogether independent of experience. In spite of the apparent contradiction of the thesis and antithesis, they may be, and indeed are, both untrue; for the condition is absent, under which alone either predicate can be applied to the subject. If it be said that either a body smells well, or it does not smell well, it may be answered that there is a third possibility, viz., that it does not smell at all. So here; when it is said that the world is either finitely or infinitely extended in space, it may be answered that it is neither the one nor the other, for both alternatives presuppose a world in itself, independent of our perception. But the world in itself is nothing; it is neither finitely nor infinitely extended, for it exists only in an experience which never is completed. At any point the regress is finite, but at no point is it terminated.¹

The functions of the transcendental ideas in relation to experience.

We have now answered two of the questions which we proposed to ourselves; we have discussed the nature and extent of the Antinomies of Reason, and we have traced them back to their origin in the nature of our faculties. It remains for us to consider the third question,—what is the function of the transcendental Ideas out of which the Antinomies spring, or what particular purpose do they fulfil in the organisation of knowledge,—seeing that they do not enable us to determine the nature either of phenomena, or of things in themselves. And to this, after what has been said, the answer is not difficult. “The principle of reason, properly speaking, is a mere rule which commands a continual regress in the

¹ This however does not, as we shall immediately see, exclude a slightly different view in regard to the dynamical antinomies.

series of the conditions of given phenomena, and never allows that regress to stop at any point, as if it had there reached the unconditioned." It is no *constitutive* but only a *regulative* principle. It does not enable us to anticipate what will be discovered in experience, but merely directs us continually to widen and extend our experience to the utmost. It does not tell us "what the object is, but simply how the empirical regress is to be carried out so as to arrive at the complete conception of the object."

We may now proceed in the light of what has been said to solve the Antinomies of Reason. As regards the first two Antinomies, which relate to ideas of a Mathematical Transcendent, we need only repeat that *both alternatives are false*. The world has not a limit in time or space, nor is it given as unlimited ; but the empirical regress finds at no point an absolute terminus. In other words, space and time, and the world in space and time, are to be regarded not as infinitely or finitely *extended*, but as infinitely (or, as Kant puts it, indefinitely ¹) *extensible*. Again, space and matter in it are not to be regarded as actually

In the Mathematical Antinomies, both theses and antitheses are false.

¹ In the eighth section of the chapter on the *Antinomy of Reason*, Kant considers the use of the terms *ad infinitum* and *ad indefinitum*. The former, he says, may always be used in case of *progress*, as in producing a straight line, as in progress it is not required that the members should be given, but only capable of being given. In the case of regress he makes a distinction ; we may say that a piece of matter is divisible *ad infinitum*, for here the whole to be divided is given, but of the regress to a beginning of the world in time, or a limit of it in space, we should say that it is *ad indefinitum*, for though another member of the series is always possible, and, therefore, we are entitled to *seek* for it, we cannot say that we must be able to *find* it. This distinction does not seem to have any rational basis, for, on Kant's theory of experience, the parts of a definite space are not *actually* in it as parts prior to division, any more than all previous times are *actually* in the present. And the *potential* existence is the same in both cases.

But in the
Dynamical
Antino-
mies, both
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regarded
as true.

divided into a finite or infinite number of parts, but as infinitely *divisible*. As regards the last two Antinomies, which deal with a Dynamical Transcendent, we may also say that *both alternatives are false, if they be taken as relating to the world of experience*. For it is certain that a free cause and a necessary being cannot be given in experience, and it is equally certain that an infinite series of causes or hypothetical necessities cannot be so given. In this sense, therefore, the solution of these Antinomies must be the same as that of the others; the series of conditions is infinitely extensible, but not infinitely extended. But there is a peculiarity of the dynamical principles, to which we formerly referred for a different purpose,¹ and which distinguishes them, in this reference, from the mathematical principles. The peculiarity is, that they express a synthesis of elements, which are not necessarily homogeneous. The mathematical synthesis necessarily proceeds from parts in space to parts in space, from events in time to events in time. Hence, when, by the aid of such synthesis we seek to pass from the conditioned to the unconditioned, we must take the unconditioned as homogeneous with the conditioned. We must explain a quantitative finite by a quantitative infinite. And thus we are entangled in an insoluble contradiction; for we are driven to put under the conditions of experience that which cannot be made an object of experience. In this case it is evident that every possible answer to the questions of the reason must be equally false.² But in the case of the dynamical principles, we may escape from such a dilemma, because the terms connected

¹ Cf. ante, p. 440.

² p. 407 : Tr., p. 322.

by these principles may be heterogeneous. The elements related as cause and effect, necessary and contingent, need not, so far as they are determined by these categories, have any similarity. Hence, when we pass by the aid of these categories from the conditioned to the unconditioned, we do not necessarily regard the former as in any way *like* the latter. While, therefore, in the former case, we had to look for the unconditioned in the sphere and under the conditions of experience, and were, therefore, necessarily forced to contradict ourselves; here we have an alternative, for we may look for the unconditioned either *within* or *without* the world of experience. And thus it becomes possible to suppose that the thesis and antithesis are both true in different senses: the one as referring to the relations of phenomena *within* the world of experience, and the other as referring to the relation of the phenomenal to the noumenal or intelligible world. Here, therefore, we may regard both thesis and antithesis as true. The antithesis, that there is no free cause, and no necessary Being, is true of the phenomenal world, in the sense that the empirical regress can never bring us to a cause which is not an effect, or a necessity which is more than hypothetical. And yet the thesis, that there is a free causality and a necessary Being, may also be true, in the sense that the phenomenal world is a result of the activity of one or more free causalities in the intelligible world, and that beneath the play of contingency in the former, there is an absolutely necessary Being in the latter. It is to be observed, however, that we do not here attempt to *prove* the existence of a necessary Being or of a free causality, but merely to leave room for them in case they should

The intel-
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ters.

be otherwise proved. If it can be demonstrated or made probable on other, as, for example, on moral, grounds that there is an intelligible world, of absolute freedom or of absolute necessity, we have shown that no objection to its existence can be based on the principles of causality and necessity. For these principles, in the sense in which they are inconsistent with such forms of the unconditioned, apply only to the world of experience. They are principles, whereby phenomena in the visible world are related to each other, but they cannot be used as arguments against a theory of the relation of the intelligible world to the phenomenal. And it may quite well be the case, that the phenomena of the sensible world, which, as phenomena, form part of the context of experience, and have to be explained in one way in relation to other phenomena, may have to be explained in a quite different way, when we consider their relation to the intelligible world. The principle of causality may, therefore, be used in two senses; in one sense, as applied to phenomena, and as determining the relations of these phenomena in time; and in another sense, as applied to the connexion of phenomena with things in themselves, which are not in time at all. For the positive proof of such a connexion we must, however, refer to another place. Here it is sufficient to have pointed out the possibility of it, or, in other words, the possibility that phenomena, and especially the phenomena produced by the action of moral beings, have an intelligible, as well as an empirical, character.¹

Summary
of Kant's
conclu-
sions.

The general result of this chapter on the Cosmological Ideas is :—that, as ideas of the totality of

¹ p. 418 : Tr., p. 330.

the world of phenomena, they have no objective value, because the phenomenal world exists only in a sensible experience in which totality can never be given; that both the opposite systems of philosophy, which attempt to construe this totality, end in contradiction, because they both regard objects, which have only an empirical reality, as things in themselves; that, in the case of the Mathematical Ideas, there is no escape from contradiction except in this insight into the falsity of both alternatives; while, in the case of the dynamical Ideas, it is possible to reach a somewhat more satisfactory result, by referring the predicates of the Thesis to the object, as noumenon, and those of the Antithesis to the same object, as phenomenon; and, lastly, that in relation to our knowledge of the world of experience, all four Ideas have merely a regulative, and not a constitutive, value; that is, they enable us to set up certain subjective rules, by which the greatest possible extension may be given to our empirical knowledge, but they do not supply objective principles, by which the nature, either of the objects of experience, or of things in themselves, may be determined.

CHAPTER XVII.

CRITICISM OF THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE AS TO THE
NATURE, ORIGIN, AND SOLUTION OF THE ANTINOMIES
OF REASON.

AS the preceding chapter has shown, Kant holds that reason is in itself antinomical, *i.e.*, that it comes into contradiction with itself by a necessary illusion, an illusion the cause of which is not to be found in accidental circumstances, but in its own nature. He holds, however, that reason thus contradicts itself only in one province of Metaphysics, the province of Rational Cosmology; while in the provinces of Rational Psychology and Theology, it is free, not indeed from illusion, but from this particular kind of illusion. Lastly, he holds that Transcendental Idealism, though it cannot remove the illusion, can yet explain it, and therefore saves us from being misled by it. For Transcendental Idealism supplies the only possible solution of the antinomies, and discovers a true *subjective* meaning for those ideas, which, in their *objective* application, lead only to absurdity and self-contradiction.

We have, therefore, to consider these three questions:—First, Does reason naturally and neces-

sarily produce antinomies? secondly, Does it produce them only in one sphere, or in all spheres of its activity? and, thirdly, Are its antinomies, in all cases, or in any case, insoluble?

Now, that reason in its progress towards truth, naturally and necessarily develops antinomies,—*i.e.*, contradictions, or, at least, apparent contradictions—can scarcely be denied. Every complex thought contains an opposition to be reconciled, a difference whose terms have to be mediated with each other. The aim of philosophy and science is always to find some kind of unity, where at first there appears to be only diversity, or even inconsistency; it is to find the one in the many, identity of substance under difference of accidents, identity of force under difference of forms, identity of law under difference of phenomenal appearances. And this aim presupposes in all cases a consciousness of multiplicity and diversity, as that which needs explanation, and which, unless it gets explanation, tends to become absolute contradiction. Reflexion awakens with the sense of the implicit contradiction which is contained in difference. Every one, however little he may have considered the philosophical problem of identity, has felt the practical difficulty of recognising an individual, formerly known, notwithstanding the changes that time has produced; and when, in spite of these changes, the individual is recognised as the same, the recognition implies an attempt, however imperfect, to explain the difference in consistency with the sameness. There is, no doubt, a great difference in import between this simple difficulty and the ultimate question of philosophy, the question as to the unity of all things

Reason
necessarily
produces
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mies.

and of the mind that knows them; but the two questions are fundamentally of the same character, and the former, in the development of thought, naturally leads to the latter. Ever the problem of thought is to reconcile differences, to find harmony in apparent opposition and contradiction; and that which constitutes the impulse after knowledge is the never-ceasing unrest of thought, till it discovers its own unity in all that it apprehends.

Example
from
Casuistry.

Every difference is a possible contradiction, and therefore requires explanation. To illustrate this principle, we may refer to the supposed science of Casuistry. The aim of the casuist was to develop a complete, and universally applicable, system of morality, on the basis of a number of commandments, each of which was supposed to be of absolute authority. It was soon found, however, that in their particular development these general commandments came into collision with each other; in other words, that cases were continually arising, which were capable of being subsumed under two or more commandments, and therefore of being determined in opposite ways. The casuist was constrained, therefore, to invent expedients to explain away this opposition, and to preserve an apparent absoluteness for each of those laws, which, in reality, he was obliged to treat as relative, and limited in their application. At first sight there is no opposition between the command, 'Thou shalt not kill,' and the command, 'Thou shalt not steal.' So long as we regard these rules in the abstract, they stand side by side, independent of, and indifferent to each other. But the attempt to apply them to particular cases soon discloses their divergence. If one man regards all

things as subordinate to the sacredness of human life, and another regards all things as subordinate to the inviolability of property, the two will arrive at very different practical results. In morality there can be only one absolute principle; and if there be ten commandments, or more than one commandment, we must either treat one of them as that to which the rest are subordinate, or seek for some principle superior to all, and of which they are only the partial expressions.

And the same thing holds good of *every* difference that can be presented to thought. When we say, like Xenophanes, 'looking up to the expanse of heaven,' that the universe is one, and when, again, we speak of the endless multiplicity and diversity of the forms of existence, we may simply be giving expression to the different aspects of things which strike us at different times and in different tempers of mind. But the inevitable progress of thought brings the assertion of 'the One' into collision with the assertion of 'the Many'; and then we have only the alternative, to sacrifice one of these assertions to the other, or to treat both as imperfect expressions of some higher principle. If we accept the former alternative, we must explain away, either the multiplicity, or the unity of things; we must either say with the Eleatics, that the one only seems to be many through the delusion of sense, or with the Ionics, that the unity of the world is merely an illusion of abstract thought. If we accept the latter alternative, and refuse to limit ourselves to either of these one-sided theories, then we must ask, with Plato and Aristotle, whether there is not a point of view from which unity and multiplicity can be reconciled, or from

Example
from
Greek
philosophy.

which difference can be regarded as the necessary expression of identity.

Example
from
Mediæval
philosophy.

Again, to take one more example, the mediæval controversy of Nominalism and Realism related to two aspects of things which do not in the first instance present themselves as contradictory, but only as different. So long as they do not bring their thoughts together, men may be content to say that things are individual, though they have universal attributes, or are related to each other by universal laws. But as soon as reflexion awakens, they are driven to ask, whether it is in the universal principle or law that we are to seek the permanent reality, of which the individual is only a transitory and limited manifestation; or whether on the other hand it is the individual alone which really exists, and the universal is merely a name. And when these two views of things have thus developed out of difference into contradiction, it is obvious either that one of them must be adopted to the exclusion of the other; or, if both are to be retained, that they must be degraded from their position as absolute principles, and treated as one-sided and abstract elements of a truth which embraces and transcends them both. From such a point of view, it would appear that it is equally absurd and contradictory to say that individuals alone exist, and that the universal is a mere abstraction, and to say that universals alone exist, while the individual is a mere appearance; since in truth, the universal exists only as it individualises itself, and the individual exists only to manifest or realise the universal.

Common
sense solves
problems

Generally, then, we may say that every difference is an *implicit* contradiction, which in the progress of

thought sooner or later becomes an *explicit* contradiction, and that, on penalty of universal scepticism, this explicit contradiction must be solved or reconciled by the discovery of a more comprehensive principle; for if thought cannot make itself self-consistent, it must ultimately fall into despair of itself and of truth. In our ordinary consciousness of the world indeed, this necessity is hidden; many differences of thought sleep together in unbroken harmony without ever coming into active collision. Common sense cuts many a knot without even being conscious of it. In morality, *e.g.*, it sees no difficulty in admitting the commands: 'Thou shalt not kill,' and 'Thou shalt not steal,' as equally absolute; and it avoids any practical collision between the two simply by applying one principle at one time, and another at another. Thus, while it solves the problem of ethics, it often conceals from itself even the fact that there was a problem to be solved; like the judge, who professes to be a mere interpreter of the law, while he is really adding to it. Were it not, indeed, for this healthful unconsciousness with which, at first, we take different aspects of things into our minds without being conscious of the contradictions or difficulties involved in them, the first steps of knowledge would be embarrassed by an anticipation of its ultimate problems. But on the other hand, it is certain that the problems are there, that with time and reflexion the contradictions must ripen, and that in one way or other they must be solved. And the whole history of intellectual progress is just the history of the development of a consciousness of difference into a consciousness of contradiction, and again of a consciousness of contradiction into a con-

without
being con-
scious of
them.

sciousness of the higher principle in the light of which the contradiction disappears.

First stage of thought, in which the reflective sense of contradiction is not yet developed.

If this be true, it follows, that Antinomy is not merely the accidental product of a false negative dialectic, as has been generally supposed, nor, as is supposed by Kant, an essential phenomenon of the intelligence merely in its application to one set of problems. On the contrary, it is the necessary law of thought in itself, from which it cannot in any region escape. The first stage of intelligence, the stage of common sense, is one in which there is an undeveloped consciousness of the unity of thought with itself through all the diversity of its application, and an equally undeveloped consciousness of the discordance and opposition of the different aspects of things which are gathered together in knowledge. The contradiction of objects with each other and with the thought that apprehends them, is not yet perceived, and hence the reconciliation is not wanted. The identity is felt through the diversity, the diversity through the identity, and no more is required. At times indeed, one aspect of things is more prominent than another. Religious emotion lifts man above the divided and fragmentary existence in which, in his secular life, he usually dwells, and makes vividly present to him a unity, which in general is but shadowy and uncertain. But he passes through the one state of consciousness after the other, without bringing them into contact or considering whether they are consistent or inconsistent.¹ For

¹ Cf. Spinoza, *Eth.* 11., Schol. 10. "Thus while men are contemplating finite things they think of nothing less than of the divine nature; and again when they turn to consider the divine nature, they think of nothing less than of the fictions, on which they have formerly built up the

many, indeed, there never is any conscious discord, and hence there never is any effort after inward harmony. But even where the intellectual impulse is feeble, the moral difficulties of life are constantly tending to awake in us a sense of the differences and oppositions that exist in thought and things. And as the mind cannot abjure its faith in itself, it is forced by the necessity of its own development upon a choice between different elements of its life, which seem at first to contradict and exclude each other.

With this choice begins the second stage of culture. Conscious of discord with itself, the mind now takes refuge in a philosophy of the understanding which treats elements of the truth as the whole truth, and raises abstractions into independent entities; which sacrifices experience to self-consistency, and truth to system. Such a mode of thought breaks up the unity of man's natural and spiritual life, and offers him only the choice between its *disjecta membra*. It expresses itself in a one-sided Realism or an equally one-sided Nominalism, an Idealism or a Materialism, a Pantheism or an Individualism, a Stoicism or an Epicureanism, whose meaning lies mainly in its opposition to the alternative system. Against such philosophies of the understanding the common consciousness is always ready to protest, and to re-assert the validity of both the elements which are thus opposed to each other. But common sense can only cut by faith the knots which its logic is unable to untie. If it upholds the completeness of truth against the abstract unity of Dogmatism, or knowledge of finite things. . . . Hence it is not wonderful that they are always contradicting themselves."

Second stage of thought, in which contradiction becomes conscious, and leads to one-sided Dogmatism.

The protest of common sense against Dogmatism and Scepticism ineffectual.

the negations of Scepticism, yet it does nothing to improve the method of the former, or to solve the difficulties raised by the latter. With the school of Reid, it sets immediate feeling and perception against demonstration, and maintains that there are certain data of outward or of inward experience, which have only to be accepted in implicit faith. With Bacon, it contends that thought is not adequate to the subtlety and variety of nature, and preaches a return to observation and fact. It calls upon science to take nature and consciousness as they present themselves, and not to thrust any of the idols of the mind between it and the world it seeks to understand. Such protests undoubtedly have a certain practical value in awaking a consciousness of the imperfection of those one-sided systems, which make things plain by the simple process of leaving out the difficulty. But they do not themselves contain any solution of that difficulty. To return to experience and fact, if we take the words strictly, is as impossible as to return to the innocence of the child, or rather to the animal's unconsciousness of evil. To take feelings and impressions as they come without allowing any determination of them by thought, is not a course possible to a thinking being, and if it were possible, it would not be knowledge. And to do as common sense does, to accept difference and opposition side by side with a general consciousness of the unity of the mind and the world, is not possible to one whose attention has been directed to the discordance between these different elements. Bacon, when he tells us to hold to facts and neglect the mind's anticipation of unity, falls into an error, the opposite of that of the schoolman

who bids us hold to general principles and neglect the facts. If the latter would imprison us in one-sided and abstract views of things, the former would make us sit down contented with an incoherent picture of the world, without any attempt to make it coherent. Bacon and his more modern successors are, *in practice*, very far from such a result, but *logically* they commit themselves to it. If they had examined more deeply the nature of knowledge, they would have seen, that the very enquiries of science presuppose that difference is in itself a problem, *i.e.*, that the mind cannot rest in difference as an ultimate fact, but necessarily presumes that it can be either explained or explained away. No rational curiosity could exist, unless a contradiction was felt to exist between the mind's unity and the difference of its objects, or, in other words, between the form of knowledge, and the contents with which it is filled. And every step in the progress of science and philosophy, every endeavour to mediate and reconcile this antagonism, presupposes the goal of an absolute unity, in which alone the intelligence can find rest and satisfaction.

Kant, to a certain extent, occupies the same ground with Bacon. Like Bacon, he holds that there is an opposition between the unity of the mind and the multiplicity of the matter which it apprehends, though he is inclined rather to say that nature and experience are inadequate to the unity of mind, than to say that the mind is inadequate to the subtlety of nature. Knowledge, in his view, can exist only in so far as these opposites are reconciled to each other. Experience cannot be mere reception of a given matter; it is possible only if the matter of sense be determined in

Kant's
critical
position
explains
the nature
of his
Antino-
mies.

relation to the unity of self-consciousness, through the synthesis of the categories. As, however, the two elements in knowledge, its form and its matter, are heterogeneous, so their combination must give rise to insoluble contradiction. And this explains why Kant finds the antinomies just where he actually finds them. Pure thought in his view is not antinomical; on the contrary, it is analytical, or even tautological; but it necessarily *becomes* antinomical, when it is related or applied to the manifold of phenomena. The demand of reason for unity is the very source of experience, yet it is a demand which can never be completely satisfied *in* experience. Experience is thus an infinite series of attempts of the mind to solve a problem, which, from the very nature of the terms, can never be solved. The ideas of reason at once make necessary that continuous effort, out of which all our empirical knowledge springs, and point to a goal, which that kind of knowledge can never attain. For the abstract unity of the pure Ego can never be realised in an object, which is essentially manifold and different. The mind can never find itself in the world of space and time which it apprehends.

Origin of
the Mathe-
matical
Antino-
mies.

The Mathematical Antinomies, with which Kant begins, arise out of the conception of the world in time and space as an object; and they are due to the contradictory nature of the elements involved in the ideas of time and space themselves. Thus space is necessarily conceived as a unity—as in continuity with itself; yet, on the other hand, it involves externality, and must therefore be conceived as manifold or discrete. In other words, a space, when we conceive it as a unit, has no other attribute except that of being external

to another space ; it is essentially a relation, and one space would be an absurdity : it would be *a relation without terms*. Yet on the other hand, all space must be conceived as one : for two separate spaces, not included in one universal space, would be *terms without a relation*. Space, in short, as the abstraction of externality, *cannot* be a unity ; while yet, when conceived as an object in relation to the unity of apperception, it *must* be a unity. And the two moments of continuity and discretion, which are equally necessary, seem to contradict or exclude each other.

Kant's solution of this difficulty is, that objects in space are merely objects of experience, and that therefore we cannot speak either of them, or of space, as *actually* having in them any qualities, which are not given in experience. Now space and the world in space, as they are given in experience, are only *finitely* extended, and *finitely* divided ; yet at the same time, by reason of the necessity of reason, which forces us to determine all things in relation to the unconditioned, they are conceived both as infinitely extensible, and infinitely divisible. But while there would be a contradiction between infinite and finite extent, or infinite and finite dividedness, there is no contradiction between finite extent and infinite extensibleness, or between finite division and infinite divisibility.

Criticism
of Kant's
solution of
the Anti-
nomies of
Space.

Now, with a slight alteration, we may admit this solution as valid. Space in itself, and the external world in itself, is only the abstraction of an element in experience, and contradictions must arise, whenever we treat abstractions, or in other words, elements of reality, as *res completæ* or whole realities. Now, when we think of a spatial world as unrelated to thought, we are obliged to conceive it as complete

and whole in itself, and therefore as infinite in extension and division. But the truth of the matter is that this abstraction is false, and that the world in space, as that which is essentially self-external, finds its necessary counterpart in the unity of mind, as that which is essentially *in itself*.¹ The antinomy of space proves that space is necessarily related to something else than itself, and cannot be made intelligible except in this relation. To put the same thing in another way:—The world in our first imperfect conception of it, is merely a collection of individual things and beings; and each of these, as individual, is a whole in itself; yet each again is externally related to all the others, and so constitutes one whole with them. Space is itself but the utmost abstraction of this way of viewing things, in which their individuality and their community or relativity are put side by side, without any mediation or connexion. Both elements of the idea are essential, yet the one seems to contradict the other. The reconciliation of the seeming contradiction, however, is to be found not in the idea of space itself, but in the further development of the opposite and necessarily related conceptions of individuality, and community, which here appear in their simplest, therefore apparently irreconcilable, forms. It is, indeed, true, as Kant says, that, at first, we necessarily think things as in space; but though we begin with space, we do not end there: and the solution of the difficulties that belong to this first ‘form of perception’ is to be found by a deeper comprehension of the elements that are contained in it, and their relations to each other; for it is quite false to suppose with

¹ Cf. ante., p. 287 : also p. 426.

Kant, that we must take space merely as a form of perception, and that it cannot be resolved into its elements, and brought into a higher unity of thought. It is a perception only so long as we are content to perceive and imagine, without thinking or knowing it.

The same remarks, *mutatis mutandis*, apply to the antinomy of Time. Has the world in time, or time itself a beginning, or has it not? Kant answers as before, that the empirical regress is always finite in extent, yet indefinitely extensible, and that any question as to time or things in time, apart from this regress, is meaningless. Time is only a form of perception, or of phenomena as given in perception, and, in terms of it, we cannot answer any question about things in themselves, simply because the question itself is irrational. This answer might be taken in a higher sense than Kant intended, as meaning that things, regarded simply as in time, are not seen in their truth. Space is the abstraction of self-externality, and, therefore, gives rise to a contradiction between the independence of things in it, and their essential relativity, or continuity; and time only contains the same elements, viewed as passing into each other. 'Time,' says Hegel, 'is the first negation of space:'¹ by which is meant that, while the externality of things is not denied when we conceive them as in time, their indifference or permanence in this externality is denied. Finite things are first represented as indifferent to each other, and so as in space; but the relation of externality, as it is still a relation, implies the negation of indifference. To exist in space, is for things to relate themselves to each

Criticism
of Kant's
solution of
the Anti-
nomy of
Time.

¹ Encyclopädie, §§ 257-8.

other, and so to lose their separate individuality and hence things in space are necessarily also in time. Their existence is but the process, whereby, as separate or limited substances, they cease to be or pass out of themselves; and time is but the abstraction of this process. Hence arise the Antinomies of Time, that so early drew the attention of the dialectic Zeno. 'The flying arrow rests:' it at once is, and is not, in the place through which it passes. The moments of time are external to each other, yet they exist only as they pass into each other; and thus time contains the two moments of continuous self-identity, and absolute change. Moreover these moments appear in abstract, and therefore apparently irreconcilable, opposition to each other; and, as is always the result in such cases, they give rise to an infinite series. Hence, we no sooner consider a time as one, than we are obliged to relate it to a time before or after it, and again we are obliged to regard these two times as one, and so on *ad infinitum*. No solution of this antinomy can be found in terms of time itself, or without reducing time to a moment in a higher conception, in which the elements of self-identity and relativity find a better reconciliation than they do in time.

The Dynamical principles take us beyond the contradiction involved in the Mathematical.

Is such a reconciliation to be found in the application of the category of Causality to things in time? In a former chapter it was shown that, what in one point of view is the application of that category to phenomena in time, in another point of view is simply the development into clear consciousness of what is already involved in the determination of them as in time.¹ The category is implicitly con-

¹ Cf. ante, p. 458.

tained in that to which it appears to be externally applied. And the same was also proved to hold good of the category of Reciprocity, which Kant, constrained by the external principle of symmetry he had adopted, here leaves out of account. In determining successive phenomena as causally related, and co-existing phenomena as reciprocally dependent, we bring together the two moments of unity and diversity, individuality and universality, continuity and discreteness, in a way in which they are not united when we conceive phenomena merely as coexisting in space or successive in time. By the use of these categories, therefore, we make a step towards the solution of the contradiction which is involved in the conception of things as in time and space. Or, looking at the same thing in another point of view, by the conception of the phenomenal as a systematic unity of mutually determining parts, we have brought it nearer to the unity of mind, or enabled mind to find an analogue of itself in the object. But we have yet only made the first step in this direction. The idea of the world as a system of causal substances is, in Hegelian phrase, only the *first negation* of the idea of it as a mere aggregate of phenomena, bound to each other only by the external relations of time and space. The dynamical synthesis transcends the mathematical synthesis, in so far as it determines the separate phenomena, as, at the same time, necessarily related to each other. But it still leaves these phenomena a nature of their own, apart from the synthetic principle of their relations. The particular manifold is still empirically given; the particular laws of nature, which specify

developed out of these principles. Hence the mind's presumption of unity is not yet justified, or reason does not yet find *itself*, but only an analogue of itself, in the object. The contradiction which lies in the determination of the world as one world, while yet each part is exclusively and negatively related to all the others, is not yet overcome, and the result, of course, is an Antinomy, and the infinite series which necessarily springs out of Antinomy.

For they
evade con-
tradiction
by a dual-
ism.

Kant, however, mentions an important difference between the dynamical and the mathematical principles, namely, that they make possible a transition from phenomena to things in themselves.

In seeking the unconditioned for a *quantitative* conditioned, we were forced to seek it in the region of quantity; hence there was necessarily an absolute contradiction between the thing sought and the region wherein it had to be sought. A quantitative unconditioned is an absolute contradiction—it is a quantum which is no quantum; and, therefore, *both* the alternatives in the Antinomy had to be pronounced false. But in seeking the unconditioned for the conditioned, according to the *dynamical* principles, we are not confined to an unconditioned which is homogeneous with the conditioned. We may connect the phenomenal conditioned with a noumenal unconditioned; and then, however little we may be able to determine what this unconditioned positively is, there will, at least, be no contradiction involved in the mere conception of it. Nay, as Kant shows, the principle of causality itself presupposes a higher cause than can be found in the infinite series of phenomenal antecedents. For as that principle.

what particular phenomena shall be connected as cause and effect, the causality of the cause itself requires explanation. Thus, as applied to phenomena, the principle contradicts itself; it gives for events or effects a reason which is no reason, a cause which is no cause. The true cause must be the cause of the infinite series, or of the combination of its elements with each other, and not merely a member of the series; it must be a *causa sui*, or otherwise it will involve a repetition of the very question to which it pretends to give an answer. Now, this reasoning of Kant points to the truth, that the demand for a causal explanation of things is, in its ultimate meaning, the demand for a unity which shall at once determine and transcend the difference of cause and effect. The same principle which forces us to seek for an impossible unconditioned *in* time now forces us ultimately to seek for an unconditioned unity *out of* time, a unity from which the whole series of states, and even the fact that there is such a series, (even the existence of time itself) shall be explained. Thus, in asking for the complete cause of a phenomenon, we are, in effect, asking for nothing less than an absolute determination of it in relation to the whole universe.

This may be made clearer by a consideration of the scientific use of the conception of causality. In seeking for causes, we are, according to Kant, seeking for invariable antecedents. Yet we commonly call gravitation the cause of the phenomena of the heavens. Now, gravitation is not the invariable antecedent of these phenomena, it is the simple expression of that relation of bodies in space, which enables us to connect all their successive states, and

The idea of Causality in science passes into the idea of law, and from that into the idea of the *causa sui*.

even to prophesy what at any time that state will be from what it now is. But if 'cause' mean that which enables us to account for a thing, gravitation is more fitly so named than any mere antecedent phenomenon. It may, indeed, be objected, that gravitation does not enable us completely to account for any definite position of a material body relatively to other bodies, unless we know their previous position; it is not a principle of the creation or first determination of matter, but it presupposes it as already given. And so far we may say that gravitation is not the *complete cause* of anything, since there is always something left over, which that law does not explain, and for which, therefore, we have to seek a further cause. Hence the ultimate problem of science must be to find a principle which determines the existence as well as the relations of the objects subjected to it; and which is not simply, like gravitation, the general expression of some of these relations. And this requirement evidently will not be satisfied unless we can explain the form of time itself, and so transcend it *wholly*, as we already *partly* transcended it, when we discover a law, like that of gravitation, which is independent of time. Kant, then, is right in saying that the category of cause points to a noumenal self-determined Being, a *causa sui*, which cannot be presented in experience under the form of time. Or, if we like to put it so, the category of cause is one of those which suggest a doubt as to the world of time, a doubt whether the determination of things, as in time, is a complete explanation of them. It suggests a dualism between phenomena and things in themselves, between time and eternity. It thus enables us not merely to combine phenomena with each other

but also to make transition from them to the noumena, although the transition is as yet merely *negative*, i.e., it enables us to define noumena merely as *not phenomena*, or, what is the same thing, it enables us only to see that phenomena do not explain themselves.

The defect, however, which attaches to all transitions from the conditioned to the unconditioned, in so far as they are made by means of the principle of causality, lies in the nature of the category of cause itself. Not only does that category lead to contradiction in its application to experience—it is contradictory *in itself*: It presupposes what it denies, and denies what it presupposes. It implies a dualism, which it at the same time leads us to reject. For we necessarily think of causality, at least in the first instance, as a relation of things which involve, but are not identical with, each other: or, in other words, causality repels from each other the two things which it connects. Accordingly, when we relate the phenomenal to the noumenal world, as effect to cause, we, at the same time, separate them from each other; and thus the principle of causality suggests the idea of two different worlds which condition each other. But, on the other hand, the idea of the existence of two separate worlds which condition each other comes into collision with the very conception of cause, according to which it is the *complete* explanation of its effect; and in this point of view we have again to regard the cause, not as exteriorly related to the effect, but as identical with it, or as containing it in itself. Hence we are obliged to think of the phenomenal not as another world than the noumenal, but

The category of Causality inadequate to the relation of phenomena to noumena.

other words, what *to us* is the phenomenal is *in reality* the noumenal; or the noumenal is just the truth of the phenomenal. In the section on the 'empirical and intelligible characters' of things, Kant wavers between these two views. At times he seems to treat the intelligible world as the whole reality of the phenomenal, while at other times he regards the former as different from the latter, though connected with it by the causal relation. It is impossible for him to avoid a certain hesitation on this point. He cannot suppose the noumenal to be a only reality, for even if the phenomenal world were reduced to a mere illusion of our minds, the question would still remain, why the illusion should exist. The noumenal or intelligible must contain in it a necessity for the existence of the phenomenal world: or in other words, the intelligible world, merely as the intelligible world, does not contain all reality in itself without the phenomenal. To Kant, however, the phenomenal and noumenal worlds are separated by a great gulf; the *self-determination* that belongs to the latter seems to him the direct negation of that *determination by another*, which is characteristic of the former; they are opposed "as lawlessness to law."¹ Hence they can be related only externally, and that in spite of the fact that, by the very definition of the unconditioned, there can be nothing to which *it* is externally related. The source of the antinomy lies really in the inadequacy of the category of causality to the object to which it is applied, and indeed in its inadequacy even to itself. For, like quantity, like the ideas of time and space, causality contains *in itself*, even apart from its application,

¹ p. 355 : Tr., p. 279.

a contradiction, which cannot be solved except by advancing to a higher category. In applying it, therefore, we fluctuate between two thoughts or terms which are never perfectly united—at one time speaking of the cause and the effect as absolutely identical, and at another time as absolutely different from each other. The cause, in fact, both is and is not one with its effect, according to the way in which we regard it. But the solution of the antinomy is to be found only in another category, in which the elements of identity and difference are more perfectly reconciled with each other, a category which is imperfectly expressed even as self-determination, or *causa sui*.

The category of Causality, then, is a category of the finite, a category adequate only to phenomena in time as such, yet its application to such phenomena implies an effort of thought to take from them that isolated and independent character, which they have when *merely* determined as *in* time. It, therefore, involves at once the admission and the denial of their isolated and independent character. And it is quite consistent with the general law of our intellectual progress, that we should thus advance in knowledge by the aid of a conception, which itself must ultimately be rejected, or at least transformed. The search for the explanation of things must begin with certain ideas of them, which furnish the premises of all our reasoning, but the conclusion we reach reacts upon the premises. So here, the attempt to find the causes or reasons of things begins by taking them as independent substances, yet as finite and determined by each other in time and space ; but the mind cannot reach a final solution of the problem thus set before

But it negates itself, and changes thus into a higher category.

it until it ceases to regard them as merely independent and external substances. Hence in the transition which it mediates from the conditioned to the unconditioned, the category of causality itself disappears, or it reappears after this transition in another and higher form. And to continue still to apply it to the unconditioned, is to fall into the contradiction of assigning conditions for the unconditioned. The negative relation of thought to its starting-point must be observed, if we would not continue to demand a kind of explanation which is rendered impossible by the very nature of the region into which we have passed. If we persist in such a demand, the inevitable result must be an antinomy like the present, in which the principle of causality at once excludes the idea of self-determination, and makes it impossible for us to find a satisfactory explanation of things in anything else.

Because he denied the synthesis of pure thought, Kant did not advance to this higher category.

This advance from the category of causality to a higher category was impossible to Kant, just because, according to his fundamental principles, the intelligence of man is not synthetic except in relation to given matter ; in other words, it cannot create matter out of itself, or produce out of its own unity the different elements which it binds together. In itself it is not *synthetic*, because it is not *antithetic* ; it is ruled simply by the law of identity, because it evolves no difference out of itself. It is not even self-conscious, except in relation to a given difference or manifold ; and, if it does not determine *itself* without an external stimulus, still less does it determine anything else. The idea of freedom or self-determination is, therefore, an empty one ; it finds nothing to subsume, even in self-consciousness, at least so far as speculativ

reason goes. In answer to this, however, we need only repeat what has been said already, that the result of Kant's own argument is to prove (1) that thought is synthetic in itself, and (2) that it is only on the supposition that thought is synthetic in itself, that it can be synthetic in relation to any given matter of experience.

(1) Thought is synthetic in itself. Purely analytical thought would be tautology, that is, it would be no thought at all. Even if we confine ourselves to the purest conceptions of the understanding, we have in them always a unity of moments, none of which can be apprehended in itself without relation to the others. To follow Kant's own list of categories, it is impossible to conceive an affirmation which does not involve a negation, and through that negation determine or *limit* its subject. It is impossible to conceive an abstract unity, which is not relative to and does not contain in it a multiplicity, and which, therefore, is not in some sense a *totality*. And the same is sufficiently obvious in the case of all the other categories of Kant's list. It is impossible to lay hold of any thought without discovering this movement of differentiation and integration in it, and it is only by a violent abstraction that we can hinder our minds from being involved in the movement, and carried along by the necessity, which makes a thought display to us all that is in it. 'Ideas are living things, and have hands and feet.' And to adopt the usual logical resource of distinction, and to say that the movement is in our minds, but that there is no such movement in objective reality, *e.g.*, to say that in reality the positive is separated from the negative, though not separated from it in our

Thought
synthetic
in itself.

thoughts, is merely to put two difficulties in place of one.

The highest category of pure thought, and that to which all the others point as their source, is the idea of self-consciousness itself, with its necessary yet transparent difference. In Kant's strange inversion of the truth, this, which is the form of all knowledge, is itself, as we have seen, treated as an obstruction to knowledge.¹ Such is his devotion to formal identity as the absolute law of thought, that he regards the intelligence as itself unintelligible, because it does not conform to that law. Yet, at the same time, this very unity of self-consciousness is made the condition and presupposition of all knowledge, and the categories are regarded as the subordinate forms in which this unity must express itself in order to the production of experience. To know, in other words, is for the intelligence to find itself in its object, yet it can never *perfectly* find itself in the object, and least of all when the object is the intelligence itself. Such is the result to which Kant is inevitably brought by his assertion, that thought in itself is not synthetic.

Only if
synthetic
in itself
can it be
synthetic
in relation
to any-
thing else.

But (2) it is only as thought is synthetic in itself that it can be synthetic in relation to anything else. The same necessity by which thought *in itself* advances from one category to another, till it finds its culmination in the idea of self-consciousness, is also the necessity by which it necessarily goes *out of itself*, or conceives self-consciousness in necessary opposition, yet necessary relation, to the world in space and time. And if by a violent abstraction we separate these elements from each other, they immediately

become self-contradictory. There is no need, therefore, to seek for an artificial bond between elements which imply each other. The external world, which we at first regard like Des Cartes, as that which is outside of the intelligence, is the necessary correlative or counterpart of the intelligence, and in the discovery of *its* laws we are taking the necessary course by which alone we can come to the knowledge of ourselves.

What causes this view to be rejected with such decision by Kant, and by most men of science, is the supposition that it involves the substitution of *a priori* speculation for the investigation of nature. Whatever the mind has in itself, it is supposed to be capable of knowing by mere self-observation. But as the brooding of thought on itself never unlocks any of the secrets of nature, the necessity for a painful and laborious interrogation of nature ere it will reveal its laws, is regarded as proving that these laws have no relation, or only an accidental relation to the laws of thought and the mental unity that underlies them. Or if, as by Kant, it is admitted that the most general laws of nature are, at the same time, necessities of thought, yet it is contended that its particular laws are to us accidental, and, therefore, independent of the mind by which they are known. But if it be true that the unity and totality of synthesis, which Kant treats as a postulated, but unattainable, end or ideal of knowledge, is simply the assumption by the intelligence of its own unity with itself under every difference which it apprehends ; and if this assumption is one which the intelligence must make, even in its first step toward knowledge—even in the determination of what is

This view does not involve the substitution of *a priori* speculation for empirical sciences.

sion between the *a priori* and the *a posteriori*. The *a posteriori*, in fact, is nothing but the object in which the mind has not yet found its own unity. Science, in all its work of observation and experiment, has for its end just this—to break through the husk under which the external world hides from us its affinity with thought. Perception with its determination of objects in space and time, is itself the first stage of this process of transformation, though much more must be done than is involved in mere perception, before the relation of the object to thought can be fully discerned. By patient investigation the object must be resolved into its constitutive relations, and the law, which is hidden under the apparent arbitrariness and accident of its phenomenal existence, must be brought to light. Still the difficulty and laboriousness of this process does not make the end less certain, inasmuch as it is presupposed in the whole process, and is, in fact, merely the idea of knowledge itself. For, as has been said before, every difference, and above all, the difference between the form and matter of thought, involves a contradiction which, if insoluble, must be fatal to knowledge itself. There cannot be an irreducible dualism between the intelligence and the world as the object of intelligence; for such dualism would involve a universal scepticism, which, as such, is self-contradictory. The utmost that could in any case be said is, that for a particular difference of elements (which, as a difference of elements in one system of thought or experience, we must assume to be merely relative), we are not able, in the present stage of knowledge, to discover the underlying unity. To say that there is such a unity is merely to assume that there is such a thing

as knowledge or truth, and this is already assumed even in the statement of the difference and the difficulty in question. To say, on the other hand, that this unity can never be known, can at most be only the subjective assertion of an individual that *he* does not know it. But to say with Kant that knowledge is made up of two elements which are both essential, and of which the one is known only in and through the other, and at the same time to maintain that these two elements are independent and irreducible to a unity, is to combine in one word the assertion of absolute knowledge and absolute ignorance.

The view of the progress of thought from the conditioned to the unconditioned which we have given may be summed up thus :—In all its stages thought is a process from unity to difference, and from difference back again to a higher or more concrete unity. In the first stage of empirical knowledge the unity is not yet separated from the difference, but rather merged in it. This is the stage of perception, the stage in which the principles applied are merely what Kant calls the mathematical principles. Now, in this stage, and just because of the *immediate* combination of identity and difference, the antinomies and contradictions that arise appear to be absolute, and both thesis and antithesis must be pronounced false. Thus the same objects in space have to be regarded as independent totalities, and yet parts of a greater whole ; or, again, as individuals, and yet infinitely divided. Hence, in so far as this determination of them is regarded as ultimate or absolute, there is no escape from contradiction. A partial deliverance from this dialectical difficulty is attained in the second stage of thought, where the reflective

Three stages in the progress of thought from the conditioned to the unconditioned.

or dynamical principles come into play. For now the unity may be sought, not in the difference, but beyond it. Being has now for us two sides—it is not only phenomenal, but noumenal; and the difficulty, which lay in the double conception of the same thing, is *partially* obviated by the dualism, which gives the thing two separate forms of existence. It seems possible, therefore, to escape contradiction by referring one of the predicates of things to their absolute reality, as it is apprehended in pure thought, and the other to their appearance, as it is presented in perception. But the difficulty thus evaded only returns in another form when we ask what is the relation of these two forms of existence. After all, it is only one universe we know, and only one mind that apprehends it; and there must be a point of contact between two spheres of reality, which both belong to the former, and are apprehended by the latter. Nor can we escape the difficulty by saying that the noumenal alone is real, and the phenomenal is but appearance. For even an appearance is in some sense a reality and requires explanation. The noumenal, must, therefore, be conceived as going out of itself, or necessarily manifesting itself a phenomenon; and the phenomenon must be capable of being seen, *sub specie aeternitatis*, as identical with the noumenon. Or, again, to look at the same thing in its subjective aspect, understanding and sense cannot be absolutely separated, for they are referred to one self; and this implies that there is a point of view from which their difference dissolves itself—a point of view from which perception is seen as a form of thought, or thought as necessarily manifesting itself in perception. The Kantian supposition

of a subjective irreconcilable difference of faculties in one mind, like the Spinozistic supposition of an objective irreconcilable difference of attributes in one substance, is untenable. But, then, the only other possible view is, that perception is the necessary counterpart of thought; or, what is the same thing from the other side, that the world in space and time is the necessary counterpart of the intelligence. The intelligence, indeed, finds the world at first as a foreign and strange existence, with which it seems to have no relation, or only a relation of opposition. But science, while thus, in the first instance, it seems to involve a renunciation of self, a self-surrender of the intelligence to the object, yet in the long run must bring the intelligence back to itself, as the unity which necessarily manifests itself in the world, in order that through the world it may attain a higher self-consciousness. This last thought, however, carries us up into the sphere of that which Kant calls the Ideal of Reason. For the ideal of reason is just the perceptive understanding, or the unity of being and thought, and in this ideal, if anywhere, must lie the solution of the antinomies.

Before going on to consider this ideal, we must again call attention to a point in Kant's discussion of the antinomies, which has caused some difficulty. In the section on 'Transcendental Idealism as a key to the solution of the pure Cosmological Dialectic,' Kant speaks of the non-existence of the objects of experience almost in the very language of Berkeley. Everything we say about the things of experience must, he maintains, relate to our past, present, or future experience of them. If, therefore, we speak of any attribute of a thing which is not actually

Relapse of Kant into subjective Idealism in the sixth section of this chapter.

perceived in it, we can only mean that at some point in the context of experience it has been, or will be, perceived. "That the moon may have inhabitants, though no man has observed them, must be admitted, but this only means that, in the possible advance of experience, we might come upon them."¹ Now such language has an intelligible meaning in the mouth of Berkeley, to whom the substantiality of the individual soul was not a matter of doubt, and who applied his idealism merely to the external world; but what can it mean to Kant? With Kant the Ego, as an actual self-consciousness determined in time, presupposes a world determined in space. Hence, if we assert that the world does not exist, except in experience, we must equally assert that the individual self does not exist except in experience. From this point of view it is as reasonable to say that I exist only in perceiving the object, as to say that the object only exists in my perception of it. To say, therefore, that any quality or object not actually perceived must be referred to the continued existence of the self as perceiving, has as much and no more meaning than to say that it must be referred to the continued existence of the object perceived. And inasmuch as neither a self nor an object would exist for the being that was confined to that which is immediately given in sense, the legitimate result of identification of reality with perception would be to deny reality to both subject and object.² If we go beyond the sensation of the moment, we must treat the external object as real for the same reason that we treat the self as real. But Kant's language suggests the idea that, while the *object* has an existence beyond the

¹ p. 389 : Tr., p. 308.² Cf. ante, p. 391.

moment only in relation to the future experience of the subject, the *subject* on the other hand has an existence beyond the moment apart from its relation to the object, *i.e.*, it suggests that very Berkeleian theory which he himself has proved to be impossible.

The truth seems to be that Kant never quite freed himself from the traces of his early Individualism, although in the second edition of the *Critique*, particularly in his criticism of Idealism, he took several new steps in that direction. Schopenhauer, unable to conceive of any Idealism that goes beyond Berkeley, regards this simply as an inconsistency, and indeed as a relapse into a kind of common sense Realism which Kant himself had utterly disproved. But it is really an advance of Kant toward a more complete Idealism, an advance which was necessitated by the principles Kant himself had laid down, even in his first edition. For there he had already maintained that outer and inner experience stand on the same level. The defect of Kant is, not that he falls back from the Idealism of the first edition, but rather that, in deserting it, he does not go far enough, but still leaves a colour of plausibility to the Berkeleian identification of reality with the perceptions or sensations of the individual subject. For, when once it had been shown that we do not know external objects merely by inference, but that the outer world is an immediate object of experience in the same sense in which the individual self is an immediate object of experience, the only object which it still remains possible to contrast with our experience is the empty thing in itself. And this is simply the abstraction of an object in general, which has no meaning except

in relation to a subject. Hence the assertion, that the things of experience exist only as we know them, is either untrue or unmeaning. For, if it is intended to convey the idea that these things exist only in the perceptions of individuals, and at the moment of their perception of them, it is untrue. And if it is intended to convey the idea that they do not exist except in relation to thought or self-consciousness, there is no force in the word 'only.' For there is no other reality.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE IDEAL OF REASON, AND THE CRITICISM OF RATIONAL THEOLOGY.

HAVING considered the subjective unity of self-consciousness, and the objective unity of the world, as objects of reason, Kant now proceeds to consider an idea which implies the synthesis of these two terms: *the Idea of God*. In his criticism of Rational Cosmology, he had taken his stand on the formal unity of thought with itself, and had argued, that, though the unity of thought is at the basis of all determination of the manifold of sense in experience, yet that determination can never be adequate to it. For such a return of the differences of the world into unity would imply the determination of the world as a whole; and the world in time and space can never be determined as a whole. Now, in the criticism of Rational Theology, it only remains for Kant to show that this dualism of subject and object can never be overcome, that there is no way in which thought can, out of itself alone, determine any object as such, without the aid of the given manifold of sense, and on the other hand, no way in which it can rise from the conditioned empirical

objects to an object free from empirical conditions, and adequate to the unity of thought.

The subject naturally divides itself into two parts. In the first place, Kant considers the nature and origin of the Ideal of pure reason, or, in other words, the Idea of God; and in the second place, he examines the arguments by which Rational Theology has attempted to prove the existence of a Being corresponding to that Idea.

Origin of
the idea of
God in the
transcendental
principle of
complete
determination.

1. How do we obtain the Idea of God? The logical law of excluded middle enables us to say that every predicate must be either affirmed or denied of every subject. We can always lay down with certainty that 'A is or is not B,' whatever A or B may mean. But such a dichotomy has nothing to do with the question of the reality or unreality of the thing, which is the subject of predication. The proposition: 'A is B,' may be true or false; it tells us nothing in either case as to the existence or non-existence of A, but only what is contained in the conception of it. But beyond this mere formal principle of determinability there is a 'transcendental principle of complete determination.' In other words we have a right to speak not only of conceptions, but of things, and we are able *a priori*, not merely to say what is included in the given conception of a thing, but to declare that the thing itself must be determined, positively or negatively, in relation to every possible predicate. "And this assertion involves more than the principle of contradiction, for it is an assertion not merely in regard to the relation of two contradictory predicates, but in regard to the relation of the thing in question to the sum of possibility, as the sum total of all the predicates of things." "It, in

fact, involves that, in order to know anything completely, I must know all that is possible, and determine the object by this knowledge, either affirmatively or negatively."¹ We cannot think of anything as existing without putting it into relation to a whole that includes not merely all that is actually given, but all that can be given. For we have in reason an idea of the complete determination of objects as such; and though we see that this idea can never be realised in experience, yet we are obliged by it to think of every object of experience as perfectly and individually determined.

To put this in a slightly different way, knowledge is always the result of a process of specification or determination. To set any object before our minds, is to determine it by predicates, which at first may be vague and general, but which must gradually become more definite and specific. It is to commence a process, which can only come to an absolute end, when we have determined the object in relation to everything else, and so completely individualised it. This end or goal is, however, anticipated from the very beginning of knowledge; for, as soon as we have determined an object as such, we have determined it as an individual, a centre of relations with the whole world. And as our knowledge extends, we do not suppose ourselves to be creating the object, but only to be discovering what it is. In other words, we assume that the thing is completely determined in itself, before the mental process by which we determine it, has commenced. Our first determination of things, therefore, brings them into relation with an idea of completed

Anticipat-
ed deter-
mination
of objects
in relation
to the
*omnitude
realitatis.*

knowledge, which experience can never enlarge. Our knowledge grows as a smaller circle within a larger one, to which it gradually approximates, but which it never reaches ; and the growth of the smaller circle is always guided and stimulated by a general idea of the larger. In this way, through the idea of totality, the positive and negative judgments acquire a transcendental, and cease to have merely a logical meaning. They come to express not merely agreement and opposition in conceptions, but existence and non-existence in things. The totality of possible predicates means the whole of existence, while the negative predicates merely express the absence of elements of that whole. Hence the number of positive predicates, by which a thing is determined, indicates the amount of existence it contains ; or, in other words, its positive relation to the presupposed whole of existence.

The *omnitudo realitatis*, taken as a thing in itself, which is the cause of all reality.

Now this whole of existence, (*omnitudo realitatis*) which is presupposed in the determination of all objects, is naturally and almost inevitably taken as a thing in itself, which is the condition of every thing else. And “the manifold nature of things is only an infinitely various manner of limiting the conception of the highest reality, which is their common substratum, just as all figures are possible only as modes of limiting infinite space.” We cannot, however, say that the *ens realissimum* is a mere aggregate of all the different individuals, which are determined by limitation of it. On the contrary, they presuppose it, and it must therefore be taken, like infinite space prior to division by finite figures, as simple and individual. Nor again can we suppose that finite things are divisions or parts of the *ens realissimum* ;

for that would be to introduce limitation, and so negation or non-existence, into that which is purely affirmative, or positively existent. We must, therefore, suppose that the highest reality is the *ground* of the possibility of all finite things, and that they are not limits of it, but merely of its complete result or product. And thus the characteristics that belong to the world of sense, and to sense itself as finite, are not parts of the idea of the *ens realissimum*, though they may be regarded as belonging to the series of its effects. "If thus we hypostatise this idea of the *ens realissimum*, and follow it up to its legitimate development, we arrive at the conception of a Being who is individual, simple, all-sufficient, eternal: in short, at the idea of a Being whom we can determine in his unconditioned perfection under every category. We arrive, in fact, at the idea of God in a transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason becomes the object of a Rational Theology."¹

When, however, we proceed to construct such a Theology, we are forgetting the nature of the idea in question, and the necessary conditions of its use. It is true that in the determination of things, as they are given in experience, we always presuppose the conception of their complete determination in relation to the totality of possible experience. But we are not on that ground to suppose that this conception represents any objective reality. The things known in experience have no existence out of the experience in which they are known; and, from the nature of experience, their determination can never reach totality. A totality of all experience, and a determination of any individual thing in relation to that totality, is

The usefulness of the conception in experience confused with the existence of a corresponding object.

¹ p. p. 453: Tr., p. 351.

impossible; though it is the ideal of such a totality which stimulates all our successive efforts to combine our experiences. But when we suppose that this ideal represents an actual object which is capable of being determined, we are transgressing the limits of its proper use in three ways. In the *first* place, we are turning an idea, which is the presupposition of experience, but can never be realised in it, into an actual object. In the *second* place, we are turning the ideal unity of experience into a real unity of things in themselves. And in the *third* place, we are turning the distributive conception of a totality into the individual conception of one Being, who includes all reality in himself. In short, we first realise what is merely an ideal of experience, then we treat this realised ideal of experience as an idea of the unity of all things in themselves, and lastly, we regard this unity as separate from, yet presupposed in all things; we conceive it as an individual, and, indeed, as a personal God.¹

General
character
of the
proofs of
the being
of God.

From this point of view we are prepared to criticise the different supposed proofs of the Being of God. In general we may say that they are all based on the connexion which is supposed to exist between two conceptions, the conception of an *ens realissimum*, and the conception of a necessary Being. A necessary Being is the presupposition to which we are led by a natural and inevitable tendency of our reason. "Following this natural dialectic, we begin, not with mere conceptions, but with common experience, seeking a basis for thought in actual existence. But this ground sinks beneath us if it does not rest on the immoveable rock of necessity. And necessity itself would require something else to rest on, if

¹ p. 455 : Tr., p. 359.

there were any empty space beyond or beneath it, if it did not fill all things, so as to leave no room for a question as to its cause."¹ Where, then, are we to find the conception of a Being whom we can thus determine as absolutely necessary? Understanding, when it looks about for such a conception, finds none that answers its purpose, none that has not in it something discordant with the idea of absolute necessity except the idea of the *ens realissimum*. For as the *ens realissimum* contains in it the condition of all that is possible, it requires itself no preceding condition, and is incapable of any. We cannot, indeed, say that only such a Being is absolutely necessary, for there is no contradiction in supposing a limited being to be necessary; but we can say that only the *ens realissimum*, only a Being which contains all reality in itself, can be seen from the very idea of it to be necessary. If, therefore, we were obliged to make up our mind one way or another as to the nature of necessary Being, we should inevitably decide that it is the *ens realissimum*. But if we are *not* obliged to make up our mind, (and apart from practical considerations, which we have not here to consider, there seems to be no such obligation), the fact that necessity might be possibly conjoined with finitude is enough to weaken the force of any argument which identifies the necessary Being with the *ens realissimum*.

This and other logical defects attaching to the arguments for the Being of God will, however, become obvious if we examine them in detail. "There are only three modes of proving the existence of a Deity on grounds of speculative reason. We may

The three
forms of
argument.

start from determinate experience and the peculiar constitution of the world of sense, and rise from this, according to the principle of causality, to a highest Being," who, in his works, manifests his character. We may start again from indeterminate experience, from the mere existence of some empirically known object, and conclude therefrom the existence of a first cause or necessary Being. Or, lastly, we may abstract from all experience, and deduce the existence of God from the *a priori* idea of him. The first is the *Physico-theological*, the second the *Cosmological*, and the third the *Ontological* argument. This is the natural order in which these arguments appear in the development of reason. But it is better to discuss them in the reverse order, because, as will soon appear, that is the order in which they logically presuppose each other.

Objections
to the On-
tological
argument.

The *first argument* is that because the idea of God includes existence, therefore he necessarily exists. It may be differently stated, according as the idea of perfection, or the idea of *omnitudo realitatis*, is made the middle term, but in both cases the essential point is, that what must be thought as existing, necessarily exists.

Now, in the first place, if we look at this argument from the point of view of formal Logic, it is obvious that, provided we avoid self-contradiction, we may include in a conception which we make the subject of a judgment, any marks or predicates we please, and existence may be one of these predicates. Further, if we have thus included existence in the conception of the subject, we can, of course, extract it again from that conception by analysis. If our conception of God includes existence, it would be con-

contradictory to predicate non-existence of him, just as it would be contradictory to assert that a triangle has not three angles. But in all such cases it is to be observed that the predicate is asserted only on condition of the assertion of the subject. If a triangle exists, it cannot but have three angles; and so if God exist, he is, in the case supposed, a necessary Being, *i.e.*, he exists by the necessity of his nature. There is a contradiction in supposing the existence of a triangle without three triangles, or the existence of a God who is not necessarily existent. There is a contradiction, in other words, in supposing the existence of the subject without the predicate; but there is no contradiction in supposing that both are non-existent, or denied together. There may be no such thing as a triangle, why should there be such a Being as God?

This objection could be met only by showing that there are subjects which we cannot think away, cannot suppose to be non-existent, whose existence is presupposed in the thought of them. And this accordingly is what has been asserted in the present case. It has been said that God is just the one subject, whom it is a contradiction to suppose non-existent. But then on what ground can this assertion be made? Is it not a contradiction to include existence in the mere *conception* of anything? Does such an inclusion not involve a confusion of the copula, which expresses the position of a predicate in relation to a subject, with the verb of existence, which expresses the absolute position of the subject itself? In the former sense, it is the expression of analysis, in the latter, of synthesis; *for existential propositions are all synthetic*. Such propositions add something to

Existential
concep-
tions are
synthetic,
and there-
fore imply
perception.

the thought of the subject, and cannot express simply what is included in that thought. It is a contradiction, therefore, to put into the thought of the subject the very predicate by which it is determined as existing not merely in thought. In one sense, indeed, existential propositions are not synthetic, for they do not add to the *contents* of the conception of the subject. There is no more in the thought of a hundred actual, than there is in the thought of a hundred possible, dollars. But they are synthetic in the sense that something is added in the predicate, which is not included in the thought of the subject. I am in a different position as *thinking* from that in which I am as *possessing* a hundred dollars; for, in the one case, the object is merely an object of thought, in the other it is presented in sensible experience. To say that a thing exists, is to say that it is given through sense, and under the conditions of experience. Therefore, no proof based on conception can ever give us a right to say that anything exists.

Objections
to the
Cosmo-
logical
argument.

(2.) The Ontological argument, with its strange attempt to extract being out of thought, would, probably, never have been invented but for its connexion with a second proof, which we have now to examine. The *Cosmological* argument takes its start, not from the conception of God, but from the contingent objects of experience. Contingent things exist—at least, I exist—and as they are not self-caused, nor can be explained as an infinite series, it is inferred that a necessary Being must exist. Further, this necessary Being must be the *ens realissimum*, the Being that includes all reality, for such a Being alone rests on itself, or has all the conditions of its existence in itself. At least we can think of no other

Being the conception of whom contains the marks of necessary existence.

The Cosmological argument is usually considered to be entirely independent of the Ontological, and to be superior to the latter, in so far as it starts with an existence of which we have experience, and not with a mere thought. Really, however, it has all the defects of the Ontological argument, with additional weaknesses of its own. It is, indeed, a nest of dialectical assumptions. In the *first* place, it makes a transition from the things of experience to the things in themselves, and that by means of the category of cause, which applies only in relation to the former. In the *second* place, it takes an idea of absolute necessity, which is merely an ideal for empirical synthesis (though an ideal which empirical synthesis can never reach), as itself an object of knowledge. And, *lastly*, it involves or presupposes the Ontological argument; for we cannot argue from the conception of the necessary Being to that of the *ens realissimum*, unless the two conceptions are convertible; and if they are convertible, the Cosmological argument becomes unnecessary; for the Being of God is already proved from the definition of God.

We come lastly to the *Physico-theological* argument, the argument from design. This argument has a high popular value, as elevating our view of nature, and bringing it into accordance with the moral feelings of men; yet regarded simply as an argument, it is even more defective than those we have already examined. "The essential points of the argument are as follows:—(1) In the world we find everywhere clear signs of an order which can only spring from design—an order realised with the great-

Objections
to the
Physico-
theological
argument.

est wisdom, and in a whole, which is indescribably varied in content, and in extent infinite. (2) This purposeful order is not necessary to the mere *existence* of the things of this world taken in themselves; on the contrary, it is a foreign attribute accidentally attached to them. The various objects of nature might have existed without co-operating to produce any definite end, if they had not been selected and arranged in relation to that end by a rational principle under the guidance of certain ideas. (3) There exists, therefore, a sublime and wise cause (if not more than one), and this cause is not to be found in the productive energy of an all-powerful, but blindly working Nature, but in the freedom of an intelligent agent. (4) The unity of this cause may be inferred from the unity of the parts of the world in their reciprocal relations as members of an artfully compacted structure—inferred with certainty, so far as our observation goes, and beyond that with a probability based on the most obvious application of the principle of analogy.”¹

Now, it is evident, in the first place, that this argument involves the transference, to the relation between God and the world, of ideas borrowed from human art. Art deals with a material possessing qualities and laws of its own, and it makes use of these qualities and laws for the production of a result to which they have no necessary relation. Thus the architect, in building his house, takes advantage of the weight and other qualities of the stones; but there is nothing in these qualities which makes it necessary that the house should be built; they have only an

¹ p. 486 : Tr., p. 384.

accidental relation to the end for which they are used. In like manner, in the argument from design, we are obliged to think of God as dealing with materials which have nothing in their own nature to make it necessary that a world regulated by ends of the highest goodness should be produced out of them. Hence the idea we reach is that of a world-architect, who is limited by the character of the material he uses, rather than the idea of a world-creator, for whom the means can have no existence apart from the end. But surely the latter alone is the true conception. How can the divine Being be conceived as creating a nature which has no reference to his purposes, in order that afterwards he may, by skilful arrangements, subject it to his purposes?

In the second place, supposing this objection waived, how can we vindicate an argument from finite order and good to infinite wisdom and goodness? The idea of God has no definiteness, unless we define it by the category of totality. For to speak of him as a being of *very great* power, or wisdom, or goodness, is to define him not in himself, but by relation to the mind of the observer, and the standard which that mind brings with it. And such relative greatness may indicate the lowness of the standard quite as much as the loftiness of the object judged by it. Hence God is nothing definite, if he is not *all*. But on the other hand, such totality is beyond the reach of our thought or experience. We cannot say what is "the relation of the greatness of the world, as we have observed it, to perfect wisdom, or what is the relation of the unity of the world, as we have observed it, to absolute unity."¹ In other

¹ p. 489: Tr., p. 386.

words, we can never reach totality by an empirical process, though it is only from totality that we could get any definite idea of God.

There is only one way in which it is possible to supply this defect in our argument, and to justify the leap from empirical multiplicity to totality—that is, by showing that the contingent implies the necessary Being, and that the necessary Being, as such, includes in himself all reality actual and possible. But, thus stated, the argument loses its independent value, and depends for its validity on the two preceding arguments. In other words, it has in it, besides its own especial defects, the defects both of the Ontological and Cosmological arguments.

Negative
result of
the criti-
cism of
Rational
Theology.

The result of this criticism of the three arguments is, that there is no possibility of a speculative use of reason in the sphere of Theology. We are thus involved in a dilemma from which there is no escape. On the one hand, the very nature of the idea of God as the *omnitudo realitatis*, shows us that he can be known only through pure conceptions. Yet, on the other hand, through mere conceptions no existence can be known as such. It is the Ontological argument alone which is conformable to the idea of God; it is the Cosmological and Physico-theological arguments alone from which existence could be proved. Either, therefore, God must be thought as existing, and then he is not known as *ens realissimum*, i.e., not as God; or he must be thought as *ens realissimum*, and then he cannot be proved to exist.

It leaves
still room
for a Moral
Theology.

Since then it is impossible speculatively to prove the existence of God, the utmost which, in this sphere, we can attempt, is to free the idea of him from any anthropomorphic or empirical element,

and to show that the proof of his *non-existence*, equally with the proof of his existence, is beyond the power of human reason. This merely negative attitude of thought, however, leaves the way open for obtaining an assurance of God's existence in another manner, namely, through the practical reason. For if the absolute law of our moral life presupposes or postulates the existence of God as an absolute intelligence, then the pure Ideal of reason, the conception which includes and crowns all human knowledge, will be shown to be objectively real; and Criticism, which silences the voice of speculative reason, will have precluded every objection on its part. The practical reason will thus give assertorial value to the problematical results of theory; and we shall find that which Archimedes did not find, a fixed point on which reason can set its lever—resting it as we do, not on a present or a future world, but on the idea of freedom."¹

Following the analysis we have given of this section of the *Critique*, we have to consider two points: First, Kant's account of the *Idea* of God; and, Secondly, his criticism of the arguments for the *Being* of God.

The *Idea of God* is, according to Kant, *the Idea of the absolute Totality of Experience, represented as an individual, and indeed a personal, Being.* As every object of perception or experience must be determined in relation to our consciousness of self, so the ideas of space and time as wholes are presupposed in the determination of any particular space and time, and the idea of the world as a whole in the determination of any

Kant's
view of the
idea of God
in relation
to experi-
ence.

¹ I., p. 638.

special object in that world. In this sense the idea of the whole of experience precedes and conditions the apprehension of the parts. But, on the other hand, it is to be remembered that in experience this idea of the whole can never be realised; for its realisation would imply that the presupposed unity of thought, the unity of self-consciousness, should itself be discovered to be the principle from which all the multiplicity of experience comes; or, in other words, that the multiplicity of the world in time and space should be discovered to be but the necessary manifestation of the unity of consciousness. But this mode of bringing back multiplicity to unity is, in Kant's view, absolutely precluded by the nature of experience and of time and space as its conditions. A totality of time and space is impossible; therefore the very conception of the multiplicity of phenomena as conditioned by time and space makes it impossible to determine the world of phenomena as a whole, or to find the unity of self-consciousness. Hence the supposed idea of God is but the idea of a totality presupposed in experience, but which experience can never attain; it is the idea of an absolute synthesis of thought and things which can never be realised, so long as the things which we know are given under the forms of sensible perception. It could be realised only by a perceptive understanding, by an intelligence in which the opposition of sense and understanding did not exist, and in which the difference of the latter and the identity of the former were subsumed under a higher unity.

Three
elements,
according
to Kant,
combine to

From this point of view Kant accounts for the illusion on which rational Theology rests. The beginning of the illusion is, that the ideal, by which

the intelligence is stimulated and guided in determining the objects of experience, is confused with an actually experienced object. This object is next treated as a thing in itself, an *ens realissimum*, which includes all reality; and, as it is known by pure thought, we seem to be authorised to apply to it the principles of identity and contradiction, and that, not merely in a logical, but in a transcendental sense. Kant, as we have seen in a previous chapter, did not object to the Leibnitzian view of the determination of things by pure thought, but only denied that such determination could ever produce knowledge. He admits, therefore, that the absolute reality, if determined at all, must be determined only by pure affirmation, without any negation, and that all negative predicates must be regarded as expressing only the absence of the corresponding positive predicates. According to this principle, the infinite is to be represented simply by negating, or removing the limit from all finite existences, or in Cartesian language, by taking the affirmative predicates of the finite *sensu eminentiori*. Lastly, this *omnitudo realitatis* is conceived as an individual subject, which is not, however, like the human subject, limited by an object given to it from without, but which creates its own object, or in whose consciousness of self the existence of the object is at the same time given; it is, in the language of later philosophy, an absolute subject-object.

produce
the idea
of God :—
(1) The
idea of
completed
experi-
ence ; (2.)
The idea of
the unity of
all positive
predicates ;
(3.) The
idea of an
absolute
self-con-
sciousness.

The idea of God, therefore, arises out of the union or confusion of three elements, which are clearly distinguishable from each other: (1) the idea of completed experience; (2) the idea of the unity of

all positive predicates; and (3) the idea of the absolute subject-object, or perceptive understanding. The first of these, taken by itself, is an *ideal*, which can never be completely realised, though it is always being partially realised, in experience; the second, taken by itself, is a subjective and merely logical form of thought, of whose objective reality or even possibility, we can say nothing; the third is the idea of an intelligence which transcends the dualism between the logical and real which belongs to *our* intelligence; but of its existence or its conditions, we know, and can know, nothing.

If we exclude the second idea, which is a logical impossibility, the first becomes identified with the third.

After what has been said elsewhere, we do not need to add much in criticism of the second of these ideas of Kant. If we deny that there is any purely analytic movement of thought, which contrasts with its synthetic movement in relation to given matter of sense, we must equally reject the Spinozistic conception of a unity of all affirmative predicates. In abstracting from the negative determination of things, we at the same time abstract from their affirmative determination; and the ultimate result at which, by this negative process, we arrive, is the mere blank notion of Being—*i.e.*, not the absolute fulness of existence, but the absolute void. The scepticism, therefore, which Kant directs against this conception as an object of knowledge, only needs to be turned against it as an object of pure thought.

When we have got rid of this logical spectre, and have discovered that thought is always synthetic as well as analytic, negative as well as positive, the two remaining ideas, the idea of completed experience, and the idea of the absolute subject-object,

begin to approximate to each other. For if thought is not absolutely opposed to perception, as analysis to synthesis, then the forms of time and space and the categories cease to be heterogeneous, and the ground of the absolute opposition between phenomena and noumena is taken away. In other words, we no longer find that insoluble contradiction between form and matter *within* experience, which forced Kant to look for the unity of the two altogether *outside* of experience. On the contrary, we now discern that, even in experience, thought transcends the dualism which it creates between subject and object, between itself and things; though it is true that the *complete* reconciliation of these opposites can be achieved only in the whole process of the development of science and philosophy. While Kant, therefore, is right in regarding all our experience as springing from an ideal which is implied, but not realised, in it, he is wrong in regarding this first presupposition as a mere idea that *cannot* be realised. For what cannot be realised cannot be even so much as an ideal. To suppose that all experience is an effort after that, which the very nature of experience precludes us from attaining, is a conception which contains an absolute contradiction. It is possible, indeed, to suppose that, merely in terms of ordinary experience, the ultimate problem of experience cannot be solved, and that it is necessary for that solution to rise to higher categories than those of causality and reciprocity; but it is not possible to think that there is any absolute hindrance to the solution of a problem which is involved in the very idea of knowledge, and of the intelligence itself. We may turn against Kant his own remark, that if the questions

of reason could not be answered, they could not be asked. The problem itself is the beginning of the solution. One insoluble contradiction would logically involve absolute scepticism, for it would throw a doubt on the very principle out of which all knowledge springs; knowledge, therefore, cannot be vindicated, even as the knowledge of phenomenal appearance, if it is absolutely severed from the knowledge of the noumenal reality.

Kant
balances
the first
and second
of these
ideas
against
each other,
so as to ex-
clude the
third.

Kant conceals the contradiction involved in his view of knowledge by what is really a see-saw. He balances against each other the first and the second of the three conceptions which have just been mentioned in such a way as to exclude the third. He admits the conception of a unity of all affirmatives, so far as to condemn the world of experience as merely phenomenal, because it involves real oppositions. He admits the conception of the unity of all experience through all its differences and oppositions, so far as to condemn the logical idea as merely subjective and 'empty,' because its movement is by mere identity. And while he thus alternates between the merely logical and the merely empirical, he never rises to a higher idea of unity; or if he does rise to it, and even goes so far as to name it 'perceptive understanding,' it is only to reject it again, because it does not contain the two previous ideas in their separation and opposition to each other. His criticism of the arguments for the Being of God (which are really different forms of expression for the transition to this higher idea of unity) is therefore little more than a reassertion of the fundamental dualism which pervades every part of the *Critique*.

The Onto-
logical

To the *Ontological* argument, which in his view is

presupposed in all the others, and which asserts an ultimate unity of thought and being, he opposes simply the assertion of their difference. A hundred dollars in thought are not a hundred dollars in the pocket. Being is not a proper predicate of a conception, for it expresses that which is not in conception merely but also in perception, and it is absurd to make into a part of our thought of an object the very predicate, of which the essential meaning is that the object is not merely a thought.

argument
is dis-
proved by
Kant, if it
be taken
as an
ordinary
syllogism.

In answer to this, we might repeat all that has already been said about the unity which is presupposed in all the difference of knowledge, and is at the same time the predetermined end to which it points. But it may be more useful here to show how Kant's own criticism has modified the natural sense of the opposition of thought and things, of knowing and being. If we were allowed to interpret his words as meaning that thought presents to us merely what is in our own mind, and perception that which is without our mind (and this is the sense in which such an assertion is often taken), there would be little difficulty. But this interpretation would imply an individualistic theory like that of Locke—a theory which the *Critique* has utterly undermined. In what sense, then, does perception, as opposed to thought, present us with objective existence? According to Kant, it is by the application of the categories that the manifold of sense is determined in relation to objects; though, on the other hand, it is also true that the manifold of sense is necessary, ere the categories can get a synthetic, and therefore objective, value. Hence, according to Kant's own showing, the opposition of subject and

But not if
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ultimate
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and being.
How far
does Kant
go in this
direction?

object exists only in the mutual determination of the form of thought and the matter of perception by each other, and we have no right to consider the one as exclusively subjective and the other as exclusively objective. Existence is not something given in perception alone, but only in perception as determined by thought. It is not, as with Locke, equivalent to that which is *not thought*. It is only the objective as opposed to the subjective element of consciousness; it is therefore one of the two terms which *in thought* are necessarily opposed, yet at the same time necessarily related to each other; or, in other words, thought transcends the distinction which it makes between itself and existence. If, however, we surrender the absolute opposition of thought and existence, and confine ourselves to the opposition of thought and perception, (which alone can be admitted from the Kantian point of view), we fall into another difficulty; for of perception as absolutely isolated from thought, nothing can be said. It is not in this sense a part of the intelligible world. Thus the opposition between thought and perception disappears by the extinction of its terms, or at least of one of its terms. Either, therefore, we must regard the opposition of thought and perception, or of thought and existence, from the point of view of the unity of experience, and then there is no dualism between thought and that which we oppose to it, which thought itself does not transcend; or we must conceive of that opposition as an opposition between the unity of experience and something not yet determined by it (call it sensation or a thing in itself, or what we please), and then of this other element we can say nothing, not even that it exists.

This criticism of Kant's argument does not affect it as an *argumentum ad hominem* against the rational Theology of his immediate predecessors. A philosopher, who takes his start with God as a given subject and, by the mere analysis of the conception of God, attempts to prove his existence, might as naturally think to pay his debts by including the notion of existence in his thought of a hundred dollars. But it is quite a different thing, if we regard that argument as pointing to the ultimate unity of thought and Being, which is at once the presupposition and the end of all knowledge. Taken in this sense, the argument is but one example of the principle that abstract or imperfect conceptions of reality give rise to contradictions, and so force us to put them in relation to the other conceptions which complement and complete them. For pure thought cannot be conceived as dwelling in itself, but only as relating itself to existence, to a world in time and space; and it is only (1) through the opposition between itself and such a world, and (2) through the transcendence of that opposition, that it can come to the full consciousness of itself. In the language of Theology, the Ontological argument expresses the doctrine that God as a spirit is necessarily self-revealing in and to the world.

The other arguments properly express the same transition from the other side—that of the *world*; and to Kant's treatment of them, therefore, the same criticism may be applied. Good as *argumenta ad hominem*, his objections do not touch the validity of the process of thought whereby the mind rises from the finite to the infinite. In other words, the Wolffian form of the cosmological and physico-

So also
Kant's ob-
jections
tell against
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the two
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ments.

theological arguments disappears before Kant's objection, but not the transition of thought, which is imperfectly expressed in these arguments.

The true logic of the movement of thought from finite to infinite is negative as well as positive.

It is true, for instance, that the ordinary syllogistic argument from the world to God has the fatal defect of putting more in the conclusion than is contained in the premises. It is a pyramid of reasoning that rests not on its base, but on its apex; for while it may be true that the world is, because God is, we cannot say conversely that God is, because the world is. According to the rules of syllogism, even when aided by the principle of causality, we can only argue from the finite to the finite, from the world to the world, and not from the finite to the infinite, or from the world to God. This would be a fatal objection to the argument, if the analytic syllogism with its movement by identity, were the only movement of thought; if there were no such thing as a synthesis, by which an imperfect and inadequate idea could lead to one more perfect and adequate; if thought were always related positively, and never also negatively, to its starting point. Kant himself, however, is not altogether without the idea of another kind of argument than the syllogistic. In a remarkable passage already quoted, he tells us that the intelligence at first takes its stand upon the reality of experience, and that it is because this ground sinks beneath us, *i.e.*, because experience itself qualifies its object as contingent, that we are forced to look deeper for a necessary Being, to give to the contingent a reality which it has not in itself.¹ Now this account of the mental process only needs to be developed and freed from Kantian pre-

ent logic of Religion, the logic that underlies the elevation of human thought from the finite to the infinite. It is a logic not reducible to syllogistic rule, because it is synthetic and not merely analytic, because it involves difference, as well as identity, because it has a negative as well as a positive side. Why do we seek in things, in the world, and in ourselves, a truth, a reality, which we do not find in their immediate aspect as phenomena of the sensible world? It is because the sensible world as such is inconsistent with itself, and thus points to a higher reality. We believe in the infinite, not because of what the finite is, but quite as much because of what the finite *is not*; and our first idea of the former is, therefore, simply that it is the negation of the latter. All religion springs out of the sense of the nothingness, unreality, transitoriness—in other words, of the essentially negative character of the finite world. Yet this negative relation of the mind to the finite is at the same time its first positive relation to the infinite. ‘We are near waking when we dream that we dream,’ and the consciousness of a limit is already at least the germinal consciousness of that which is beyond it. The extreme of despair and doubt can only exist as the obverse of the highest certitude, and is in fact necessary to it.

Now the cosmological argument represents this transition in the simplest aspect; but if we take it in its positive form (“Because the contingent is, therefore the necessary being is”), without also observing that it might with at least equal force be expressed negatively (“Because the contingent *is not*, therefore the necessary being is”), it is exposed to all the objections of Kant. To argue

The negative side of the Cosmological argument.

positively from the contingency of the world to the existence of a necessary being, which is external to it and related to it only as cause to effect, is to reduce the necessary being to another contingent. For if the world is determined *only* as an effect, and is conditioned by its cause, the necessary being is at the same time determined *only* as a cause, and is conditioned by his effect. The transition from the contingent to the necessary, from the finite to the infinite, however, is one which ‘sublates,’ or forces us to give a new meaning to, the category by means of which the transition is made.¹ The first becomes last, and the last becomes first, and the finite, so far as it is regarded as still having some kind of reality, is only a mode of the infinite. This is the *conscious* logic of systems like that of Spinoza, as it is the *unconscious* logic of all those religions which have a Pantheistic basis. In such philosophical and religious systems the fundamental thought is, that ‘the world of finite beings is nothing, and that God is all in all:’ the highest reality is determined solely by abstraction from the finite, and all the difference and change of the phenomenal world is lost or absorbed in the idea of an absolute substance, of whom we can say nothing, except that *He* or *It* is.

Its
positive
side.

And in this, indeed, lies the imperfection of argument *a contingentia mundi*, as well as of the Pantheistic idea of God to which it leads. It reaches the Infinite only by negation of the finite: hence its infinite has no positive determination except through the finite. Further, if, according to this logic, all finite existence is equally lost in God, yet it is also true that all finite existence equally comes from God.

¹ Ante, p. 600.

Hence it is, that Pāntheism as a religion so easily associates itself with Polytheism, and the adoration of an ineffable Being who cannot be brought under any predicate whatever, passes at a stroke into a wayward idolatry that deifies anything and everything. The Being of whom we only know that He is, is yet

“As full and perfect in a hair as heart.”

The distance of the finite from the infinite annihilates all distinctions, and all things and beings are equally near to the Absolute and equally far from it. Everything, as apart from God, is denied, yet everything, in God, is reaffirmed, and the pure abstraction of Being sinks, as in the popular religion of India, into an endless confusion of deities without definite character or relations to each other.

But the lesson to be learnt from this imperfection of the cosmological argument and of the religion that corresponds to it, is not simply, as Kant argues, that it is invalid, but that we cannot stop short with it. The idea of God as *merely* the infinite, or *merely* the necessary Being, is unsatisfactory, even self-contradictory, and that in the same way as the argument which leads us to this idea of him; but the discernment of its imperfection prepares the way for a better argument and a higher idea. What Kant refutes therefore is not the idea of God, the idea of a unity to which the finite and contingent are to be referred, but *this form* of the idea.

It points to a higher kind of argument, and a higher idea of God.

That the physico-theological argument grows out of the cosmological is shown by the actual development of Greek philosophy. *Absolute* necessity is one with freedom, for it is the necessity of self-determination. The unity of the Eleatics and the

The Physico-theological argument, and its relation to the monotheistic idea.

fate of Heraclitus grows into the self-determining reason of Anaxagoras. The idea of final cause which rules the Aristotelian philosophy is also the idea which underlies all monotheistic religions. Under that idea the world is reduced into a mere matter, in which God executes his purposes. As a syllogistic argument, indeed, the argument from design is open to all the objections which Kant, following Hume, brings against it. The externality of the matter on which God acts makes God finite, and the notion of creation introduced by the Jewish religion cuts the knot instead of untying it. Further, as Kant argues, the designs which are executed in the world are finite; we cannot conclude from them to infinite, but only to very great wisdom and power. Or, to look at the objection from the other side: there is no definite connexion between the particular designs realised in the world and the nature of God. In the Aristotelian philosophy this defect is shown by the irreconcilable opposition between the pure self-consciousness of God and the finite world, which yet is declared to exist only through the divine energy. In monotheistic religions the same defect is shown in the assertion of arbitrary will as the source of all created existence. It is of God's 'mere good pleasure' that all things are and subsist. The imperfection of the argument from final causes and the imperfection of monotheistic religions are therefore one and the same thing; and it gives rise to objections which are fatal to this particular way of conceiving that absolute unity which we call God. As, however, we cannot, without self-contradiction, avoid the assertion of the absolute unity in one form or other,—as that unity, in fact, is pre-

supposed in all thought and experience,—no objections can force us to surrender the idea of God itself, though they may force us to give a new form to that idea. As the cosmological argument implicitly contained the physico-theological, so the physico-theological argument contains the ontological. Absolute necessity was seen by Greek philosophy to be equivalent to freedom; absolute freedom again, in its turn, is found to be not mere arbitrary self-determination or will, but self-revealing spirit. Or, what is the same thing, Pantheism and Monotheism are necessary stages, through which human thought passes on its way to Christianity.

To understand this, we have only to consider that the very defects which Kant finds in the argument from design, and consequently in the idea of God as a designer, are remedied when we apply to the divine nature this higher category. God is the unity of intelligence, conceived as necessarily related to, or manifested in, a world in space and time, yet through that world returning upon itself. In other words, the ontological argument—the argument from thought to being—when relieved of its imperfect syllogistic and therefore analytic form, is simply the expression of that highest unity of thought and being, which all knowledge presupposes as its beginning and seeks as its end. Idealism, in the sense that all things and beings constitute a system of relations which finds its unity in mind, that every intelligence contains in it the form of the universe, and that therefore all knowledge is but the discovery of that which is already our own—but the awaking of a self-consciousness, which is at the same time a consciousness of God—*this* Idealism

Transition
from the
Physico-
theological
to the
Onto-
logical
argument.

is the real meaning of the ontological argument and the only meaning in which it is defensible. It is, in fact—to repeat what has already been said—simply that idea which Kant constantly rejects, but to which he ever returns, the idea of a perceptive understanding.

Result
of Kant's
criticisms.

The above paragraphs very shortly summarise an argument which it would require a complete treatise on Natural Theology to develope. But enough has been said to exhibit Kant's position in relation to previous as well as to subsequent philosophy. Kant's criticisms of the arguments for the being of God form an era in the history of philosophical Theology, just because they finally explode the method of dogmatism, and enable us to see what is the only point of view from which such a Theology is possible. His aim throughout is to show that the only unity of thought and being which can be known is the unity of experience, and that *this* therefore is the only realisation of that ideal to which men have generally given the name of God; or, at least, the only realisation of it, cognisable by the speculative reason. After what Kant has said, it is vain to repeat the old arguments in the old form. The only question that can now be put is, whether the unity of experience which he recognises does not itself implicitly contain that very idea of God as a perceptive understanding, which he rejects; whether, in fact, the legitimate development of Criticism, involving as it does the final rejection of the 'thing in itself,' does not at once carry us onward from Transcendental to Absolute Idealism.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE REGULATIVE USE OF THE IDEAS OF REASON.

IN various parts of the *Dialectic*, and particularly in the discussion of the Antinomies, Kant points out that the Ideas of reason, though they do not give us any knowledge of things in themselves, yet have an important function in relation to experience. But in a special section at the close he endeavours to put this truth in a clearer light, and to determine more precisely the office of reason in the production and organisation of empirical knowledge. To this section, which sums up briefly the general lesson of the *Critique*, we must now devote a little attention.

Function
of the
ideas of
Reason in
relation to
experi-
ence.

Kant begins by saying that "everything that is grounded in the very nature of our mental powers, must have a meaning and purpose which is in harmony with the proper use of these powers."¹ And reason with its ideas cannot be an exception to this rule. Now, reason, as we have seen, never deals directly with objects as they are given in perception; but only indirectly as they are determined by the understanding. Its only function is to give direction and systematic unity to the work of the under-

¹ p. 499 : Tr., p. 394.

standing. It brings with it an ideal of Unity in Totality, Totality in Unity, which it seeks to realise in knowledge; but the only weapons it can use for this purpose are conceptions and perceptions. The great aim of Criticism, therefore, is to prevent us from mistaking this idea, which is merely a principle of the *organisation* of experience, for an actual object beyond experience. "The transcendental ideas have no constitutive, but only a regulative use; in other words, their use is to direct all the operations of the understanding to one end, or point of union. This point is indeed a mere idea, or *focus imaginarius*, since it lies beyond the sphere of experience, and the conceptions of the understanding do not find their source in it; yet it serves to give to these conceptions the greatest possible unity combined with the most extended application."¹ This will be seen more clearly if we consider the different forms in which this idea presents itself to us.

The principle of Homogeneity.

Now, in the first place, all our empirical investigations are stimulated and directed by the search for unity. The logical rule, *Entia non sunt multiplicanda præter necessitatem*, seems indeed at first to be a mere principle of economy or conciseness: but when we consider things more closely, we find that there is a transcendental principle of reason underlying it. By the very nature of our intelligence, difference and multiplicity are a problem to us; and all our attempts to explain phenomena have relation to a projected or assumed unity of principle beneath them, however little we may be able to determine the value of this unity in particular cases. Hence it

¹ p. 501: Tr., p. 395.

is that in Psychology we can never satisfy ourselves with the reference of the different activities of thought to so many different faculties, but are ever driven to seek for some fundamental power of which these supposed faculties are but the different forms or manifestations. Hence it is also that in Physics and Chemistry we are ever seeking for some fundamental element or force, which underlies and explains the difference of substances and the variety of their changes. In setting this ideal before us, reason does not beg the question, for it does not determine what kind or degree of unity is to be found in experience: but it certainly *commands* us to seek for unity; and from the duty which it thus imposes on us, no amount of unsuccessful effort can ever release us. Dependent as our reason is upon experience for all the materials with which it deals, it cannot pretend to arrive at any result by its own pure energy: yet, on the other hand, it can never admit that in all the apparent diversity of nature, there is any absolute and insoluble difference of principle, however little it may be able to say what is the nature of the one principle after which it seeks. To renounce the search for unity would be for reason to renounce itself.

But in the second place, the tendency to generalisation and identity is balanced by another tendency to specification and distinction. This second tendency is necessary in order to check that levity and superficiality of thought which prematurely snatches at an abstract and empty generic unity, without having regard to the multiplicity of species and individuals included under it. And if the former, which we may term the idealistic tendency, is neces-

The principle of Specification.

sary to prompt men to the explanation of Nature, the latter, which may be designated the empirical tendency, is necessary to prevent facts from being explained away, and to bring into prominence the diversity which often underlies the superficial identity of things called by one name. Logicians, accordingly, are wont to lay down the rule, that *Entium varietates non temere esse minuendas*. But "this logical law also would be without meaning or application, if it did not rest in a transcendental principle of specification, a principle which does not indeed involve the assertion of an actual infinity in the objects of our knowledge, . . . but which nevertheless lays upon our understanding the obligation to seek under every species for lower species, under every difference for still finer points of distinction."¹ And the deduction or justification of this principle is simply this; that conception can never be adequate to perception, though it must continually strive to make itself so. We can never define the individual, yet the individual is the end, which in all definition we strive to reach. "The knowledge of phenomena in their complete determination (which is possible only through the understanding) demands an endless progress in the specification of our conception of them, and in this progress differences always remain behind, from which, in defining the species, and still more the genus, we were obliged to abstract."² The individual object of perception, like the form of perception, has always a 'principle of infinity' in it: and just as we can never admit that any division of space is final, i.e., is a division into indivisible units, so we can never admit

¹ p. 509: Tr., p. 402.² p. 510: Tr., p. 402.

that by any number of qualitative determinations, the whole content of any individual thing can be exhausted.

Lastly, to complete the systematic unity, we must add to these two laws the law of *Affinity*. The principle of Affinity. This law commands us to avoid all violent leaps, alike in specification and generalisation, and to bind together without any break of continuity the highest unity with the lowest difference. As we can never admit that there is any generic difference which may not be embraced in a higher unity, nor, on the other hand, that there is any *infima species* which cannot be further divided; so we cannot admit any immediate transition from the one to the other. It is a logical rule always to look for links of connexion or intermediate steps by which the path of integration or differentiation may be made more smooth and easy. And this logical rule also rests on a transcendental principle, which, though not derived from experience, guides us in the investigation of all empirical objects. As a matter of fact, indeed, we often find breaks in the chain of natural species, which our experience does not enable us to fill up: but we cannot admit such *lacunæ* as final, and we are forced by the command of reason to seek for an order or continuous scale of forms, which shall bind them all together in one system, and exhibit the place of each in relation to all the rest.

“If we place these three principles in the order of their empirical application, we must begin with *Multiplicity*, proceed next to *Affinity*, and end with *Unity*. Reason presupposes the empirical knowledge of the understanding, and seeks to give unity to that knowledge by means of ideas which go far

beyond experience. Now, the affinity of the manifold, (as that which, in spite of its differences, falls under a principle of unity,) relates not merely to the things of experience, but still more to their qualities and forces. Thus, *e.g.*, by a first approximation of experience, we determine the orbits of the planets as circular; and when, by subsequent observation, we discern movements inconsistent with a circular orbit, we proceed (according to the principle of Affinity) to invent suppositions which involve the continuous variation of the circular form through an infinite number of degrees. In other words, we suppose the planets to approximate more or less in their orbits to the circle, and therefore to describe an ellipse. The paths of the comets are still more eccentric, as they do not, so far as our observation goes, return on their own course: but even these we bring within the compass of the same genus, by supposing that their orbit is parabolic: for a parabola is but an ellipse with the major axis lengthened *ad infinitum*. Thus guided by the principle of affinity, we keep hold, in our observations, of a generic unity under all differences of orbit; and hence it is, that in the end we are able to trace all the various movements back to one common cause, viz., gravitation. And from this point again, we extend our conquests through the realm of nature, and endeavour to explain by the same principle all its varieties and apparent deviations from rule.”¹

These principles do not enable us to know objects, but only to organise our experience.

The three principles of *Homogeneity*, of *Specification*, and of *Continuity* or *Affinity*, as is now sufficiently evident, have a peculiar position in our intellectual constitution. Their use and value is that they

¹ p. 514 : Tr., p. 406.

enable us to organise our experience; whilst, on the other hand, experience could not exist except in the effort to realise them. Yet, *in* experience, they cannot be realised. “The empirical use of the reason stands in an asymptotical relation to these ideas, *i.e.*, it can approximate to them, but it can never reach them.” Neither *in* experience nor *beyond* experience have these ideas an objective or constitutive value:—not *beyond* it, for, when we abstract from experience, we abstract, at the same time, from all the conditions of understanding and sense, under which alone we can determine an object as such; and not *in* it, because an absolute unity, a complete totality of difference, and a perfect continuity of unity and difference, are all equally impossible as objects of experience. It remains, therefore, that these principles must be considered to be purely *regulative*, and that if we refer them to objects, these objects must be regarded as of a purely ideal character. To put the same thing in another way, it is useful, and, indeed, necessary for the development of experience that we should proceed *as if* the ideas of reason were ideas of objects. We cannot, indeed, properly speaking, schematise them and subject them to determination by the categories; for there can be no schema of the unconditioned. Still we can think of a *maximum* of homogeneity, specification, or affinity; and this is so far analogous to a schema that we *can* apply the categories to it. Yet we must always remember that this progress is illegitimate if regarded as determining objects for these ideas; and legitimate only in so far as it puts us in the right attitude of mind for determining *other* objects, *viz.*, the objects of experience.

The ideas of reason, therefore, form "merely the problematical foundation of the connexion which the mind introduces among the phenomena of the sensible world," and in their application reason is "occupied, not with any object, but with itself."

Their relation to the three meta-physical ideas.

Now, the objects which reason, by means of its ideas, is supposed to be able to determine, are the *soul*, the *world*, and *God*; and these it has been our object in the previous chapters of the *Dialectic* to examine. We have seen the futility of the three supposed sciences of Rational Psychology, Cosmology, and Theology. We have seen that the transcendental ideas do not enable us to determine any *real* objects. Yet this does not hinder us from acknowledging their value as setting before us *ideal* objects, and so enabling us "to produce systematic unity in the empirical employment of our intelligence." We cannot determine the soul as a pure self-identical unity, but this does not make it less necessary to "connect all the phenomena, all the actions and feeling presented to us in inner experience, *as if* the soul were a simple substance, which maintains (through life at least) its personal identity, though its states are constantly changing."¹ We cannot determine the world of experience as an infinite whole; nay, many things make us regard it as really dependent and finite; but this does not make it less necessary, in the sphere of Cosmology, to trace back the phenomena both of internal and external experience, from condition to condition, as if they belonged to a chain which was itself infinite." We cannot determine God as an absolute intelligence; but this does not make it less necessary, in the sphere of Theology,

¹ p. 540: Tr., p. 427.

to "regard the whole system of possible experience as forming an absolute, but, at the same time, a purely dependent and conditioned unity, which has its highest, all-sufficient ground in a self-subsistent, unconditioned, and creative reason." For it is by setting before itself such an ideal object, and by treating all the phenomena of the world of experience 'as if they drew their origin from such an archetype,' that reason is enabled to give the greatest unity, extent, and system to our knowledge. We must, however, distinguish most carefully between the problematical assumption of the existence of these objects, with a view to the organisation of our experience, and the simple assertion of their reality. "I may have sufficient grounds to assume, in a relative point of view (*suppositio relativa*), what I have no right to assume absolutely."¹ The consciousness of the limits of experience goes along with and implies the consciousness of that which is beyond experience, and we cannot really apprehend the meaning of the phenomenal without thinking of it as standing in relation to the noumenal. But when we attempt to determine this relation, we can only represent it by means of analogies which we borrow from the relations of empirical objects to each other. We are obliged to conceive the relation of mind to its states on the *analogy* of the relation of a substance to its accidents; we are obliged to conceive of the relation of the phenomenal world to the noumenal, on the *analogy* of the relation of a phenomenal cause to effect; and when we attempt to conceive of the whole finite world in relation to the unity which gives it systematic connexion, we have

¹ p. 524: Tr., p. 414.

no other *analogy* by which to represent this relation, except that which is derived from the relation of an intelligent being to the effects which he produces, when he subordinates all his actions to one idea or purpose. At the same time, while we must use such analogies, we ought always to be aware that they are nothing more than analogies. "It must, *e.g.*, be perfectly indifferent to us whether it is asserted, that divine wisdom has disposed all things in conformity with the highest aims, or that the idea of supreme wisdom is a regulative principle in the investigation of nature, and at the same time, a principle which gives systematic unity to nature according to general laws, even in those cases in which we are not able to detect any manifestation of that unity. In other words, it must be quite indifferent to us whether we say : God in his wisdom has willed it to be so, or Nature has wisely arranged it."¹ To sum up the whole matter in a word, the ideas of reason are 'heuristic, not ostensive' : they enable us to ask a question, not to give the answer. To adopt any other view, and to suppose that, by means of the transcendental ideas, we can have knowledge of real objects, is to put reason to sleep, or to turn its activity in a wrong direction. The dogmatist, who thinks that by pure *a priori* speculation, he is able to demonstrate the unity and immateriality of the soul, or the origin of all things in a supreme intelligence, is apt to lose all interest in empirical research into those phenomena of the inner or the outer life, through which alone the soul and God are revealed to our knowledge. Or, if he interests himself in either, it is not with a view to question experience

*Ignava
ratio and
perversa
ratio.*

¹ p. 540 : Tr., p. 427.

according to the *a priori* principles of intelligence, but rather with a view to distort empirical facts till they correspond with the results of his *a priori* reasonings. By the external system of Teleology, which he thus imposes upon nature, he prevents himself from discovering the real nature of its unity, and his whole argument is a vicious circle, which assumes the very thing it professes to prove. In order to overthrow such artificial theories it is only necessary to point out, that the idea of final causality—the idea of nature as a system ordered by a supreme intelligence—though it inevitably springs out of the relation of mind to its object, and though it points to the true goal of science—the only goal in which thought can find an ultimate satisfaction—is merely an idea. The matter to which this idea has to be applied is so far from having any necessary relation to the idea, that we cannot be sure of its realisation even in a single instance, however manifestly that instance may present the features of design. For it is not safe to argue, that because a purpose is realised in certain phenomena, therefore the phenomena existed in order to realise it. All that we can say is, that from the nature of intelligence, this is the natural aim and end of all its efforts after knowledge. “The greatest systematic unity, and consequently the teleological unity of all things, is the idea upon which is based the most extensive use of human reason.”

In this last section of the *Dialectic*, Kant expresses, perhaps with more definiteness and completeness than anywhere else, his peculiar view of the position of reason in relation to knowledge or experience. Very few, if any, of Kant's successors have preserved that

The three points of Criticism in relation to the Ideas of Reason.

exact balance between trust and distrust of reason, which is characteristic of the *Critique*, and which constitutes its main difficulty. Almost every subsequent writer, who has not gone beyond Kant in the direction of Idealism, has fallen back on a much simpler combination of scepticism and empiricism, and has treated the ideas of reason as mere *Idola*, that stand between the mind and truth. But Kant lays equal weight on all these three points ; first, on the necessity of the ideas to direct and systematise experience ; secondly, on their uselessness to determine the nature of things in themselves ; and lastly, on the inadequacy of experience for their realisation. Especially in this section, which contains the final result of the *Dialectic*, Kant is solicitous to maintain himself on the exact razor-edge of critical orthodoxy, and he scarcely ever mentions one of these points without immediately modifying his statement by a reference to the other two.

The third principle, with Kant, is an imperfect synthesis of the other two.

At the point which we have now reached, little more need be said in illustration or criticism of the three principles of Homogeneity, Specification, and Affinity. The first principle, it is obvious, expresses the necessity to experience of the pure unity of thought ; the second expresses the equal necessity of the manifold of perception ; while the third expresses the necessity of a combination of these two elements in spite of their essential opposition. No experience is possible, unless both are present, yet their perfect synthesis is impossible. Hence, (1) as there can be no conception without perception, it is impossible to determine even the thinking subject, much less any other object, as a pure or absolute unity. And (2) as there can be no perception without conception, it

is equally impossible to determine the world of objects as a complete or absolute diversity. Lastly, while experience is nothing but a search for the unity of intelligence through all the manifoldness or diversity of the world of experience, it is a search for that which, from the very nature of experience, can never be found. Experience is thus a unity of elements or factors, which for ever attract, yet for ever repel, each other. No experience could exist except through their synthesis; yet this synthesis is accomplished only in an infinite series of approximations to an ideal, which is incapable of realisation.

The only difficulty in understanding Kant's meaning at this point, is one which arises from his not tracing very clearly the connexion of the three principles of Homogeneity, Specification, and Affinity with the three ideas of the Soul, the World, and God. The Principle of Affinity, or Continuity, indeed, seems, in the first instance, to suggest to Kant only the quantitative conception of a series of intermediate stages, a *continuum formarum*, by which the whole scale of being, from the highest genus to the lowest species, might be filled up. We must, however, remember that the tendency to look for intermediate links is only one form of the general necessity of intelligence, to seek for its own unity in all its objects. When this is understood, it becomes obvious that the teleological explanation of the universe is only a higher manifestation of the principle of affinity. Kant does not here identify the teleological idea with the idea of a perceptive understanding, which is elsewhere¹ taken as its equivalent. But this identification is implied in his assertion that the end of

¹ As in the *Critique of Judgment*.

Supreme Intelligence can be nothing but the “realisation of its own ideas” of Unity and Harmony;” *i.e.*, of itself. The result of the whole argument therefore is, that the idea of a perceptive understanding is the necessary *ideal* of all intelligence, the goal of all science: though, from the nature of the case, the *reality* of experience can never correspond to it.

The opposition of perception and conception makes the problem of knowledge insoluble.

The ultimate decision therefore as to the truth of the Kantian Criticism of Pure Reason, must turn upon the opposition of perception and conception, as factors which reciprocally imply, and yet exclude, each other. If thought in constituting knowledge or experience has to deal with something foreign to itself, something of an essentially different character from pure thought, there seems to be no escape from the Kantian paradox. Knowledge, in that case, must involve at once the assertion and the denial of unity of thought; it must be a continuous effort after the solution of an insoluble problem. It may, indeed, as Kant maintains, solve by the way many other problems; but *its own problem*, the problem which is involved in the very idea of knowledge, it cannot solve. It is a physician that can heal everyone's wound but its own. The answer of experience has no direct relation to the question of thought, though without the question of thought, there would be no answer of experience. When there is something incommensurable in two quantitative terms, that have to be brought into relation with each other, the only possible result is an infinite series; and, for similar reasons, the combination of thought and perception in experience can never give a final answer in terms of thought.

But how is such an opposition in the factors of knowledge possible? How, in other words, can anything come within consciousness which is essentially different from consciousness? How can we think that which, *ex hypothesi*, is unthinkable? How can any object, any manifold, anything definable or nameable, be presented to a conscious being, whose thought does not transcend the distinction between itself and that object? Those who maintain the Kantian dualism must show its possibility, and must answer, in some way, the many objections which have presented themselves in the course of our examination of it. They must maintain the Kantian distinction between the laws of pure thought and the laws of thought in the determination of objects. They must explain how thought can discern its own absolute limits without emancipating itself from them: how it can know the phenomenal as such, without a glimpse of the noumenon. For, unless they are able to do all this, they must admit that the Kantian philosophy is only the first stage, though of course a necessary stage, in the transition of philosophy to higher forms of Idealism. In so far, indeed, as Kant sought in the *Critique* to show the necessity of thought, of the conceptions of the understanding and the ideas of reason, to the constitution and organisation of experience, his work was successful: at least his reasoning has never been refuted. But when he limited his recognition of thought to the sphere of experience, he was, as we have endeavoured to show, still hampered by logical and metaphysical traditions, derived from those very predecessors whom he was assailing. The analytical Logic of the schools still holds its place in the

But such an opposition is self-contradictory.

Critique, alongside of the transcendental Logic of synthesis, which must ultimately be fatal to it. The sceptical prejudices of Empiricism are still strong enough to force a compromise upon the very criticism that destroyed the empirical philosophy. The Individualisms of Locke and Leibnitz cast a shadow over the book which has absolutely annihilated Individualism. But it is perhaps just because Kant's mind was deeply impregnated with the ideas from which it was his work to liberate the philosophy of his time, and because he had to struggle with them at every stage, not only in others, but even in himself, that the *Critique of Pure Reason* is the safest and surest guide into the new region of thought, which it first opened up. A certain reluctance is necessary to complete and conclusive energy, and no one ever was a great innovator (*ein alles Zermalmender*) whose mind was not imbued and penetrated with the spirit of the past.

The results
of the
Critique.

It may be useful to sum up in a few words the argument which we have now completed.¹ It has been our aim to show that the result of Kant's *Critique* is, in the first place, to destroy the one-sided Individualism which prevailed during the second period of the history of Modern Philosophy; or perhaps we should rather say, to correct and transform that Individualism, by the aid of ideas ultimately derived from the equally one-sided Universalism of the first period. Thus Kant endeavoured to

¹ I have not thought it necessary in this volume to say anything about that part of the *Critique* which Kant calls the 'Doctrine of Method'; for the subjects there discussed either have been already anticipated, or they involve questions connected with Kant's practical philosophy.

show that consciousness transcends the opposition of self and not-self; or, what is the same thing, that self-consciousness contains the unity to which, not merely the phenomena of inner experience, but also the phenomena of outer experience, are referred. In order to maintain this position, however, he was obliged, *in the second place*, to show that the understanding is not purely analytic, but that it is the source of certain conceptions, which, in their application to the perceptions of sense, are principles of *a priori* synthesis. These principles are of objective validity, because they are the principles which constitute the objective consciousness; or, to express the same thing from the opposite point of view, we know objects because, in so far as their most general determinations are concerned, we produce the objects we know. On the other hand, the effect of Kant's reassertion of the synthetic principle in thought was to some extent neutralised by his denial that thought is *in itself* synthetic. For, if pure thought in itself is not synthetic but analytic, it follows necessarily that *the ideal* of knowledge derived from pure thought, and the *reality* which is known by the application of the pure thought to the form and the matter of sensuous experience, are at variance with each other. Hence, *in the third place*, Kant maintains that the universality of consciousness is limited to experience, and that there is an impassable gulf between things as they are known, and things as they are in themselves. In this volume, however, we have attempted to show that Kant was justified in his assertion of the reality, but not in his assertion of the limitation, of knowledge: that thought is synthetic not only in its application to a matter

given from without, but in itself; and that, consequently, there is no ideal of knowledge, which it is impossible, from the very nature of knowledge, to realise. Thus, the thing in itself, which Kant had reduced to a phantom, is banished from the intelligible world,¹ and the consciousness of man finds no limit in itself to preclude it from the knowledge of its object. The division between thought and the reality which thought seeks to apprehend, is not an absolute dualism, but only that separation which precedes and makes possible a higher kind of union. The labour and pain of experience, of science, and of philosophy, are not wasted in a vain effort after the unattainable; nor are we, as Kant supposes, tempted to pursue a lower good, by the illusive hope of something better. Rather, we should say that every step of spiritual progress implies the end, and is, in a sense, the anticipated fruition of it. Slow as is the advance of knowledge, the hope by which it is moved is nothing less than certainty, for it is a faith bound up with the very idea of knowledge, and the consciousness of self.

¹ Jacobi wittily remarks that Kant's thing in itself "as in itself real, but unknown and unknowable by us, enjoys a position of *otium cum dignitate*," which is the next thing to non-existence. *Werke*, III., p. 74.

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