





TWO INDIAN CAMPAIGNS, IN 1857—58.

BY

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INTRODUCTION.

THIS short narrative of two Campaigns in the North-West Provinces of India and in Oudh and Rohileund, during the War of the Indian Mutiny, in 1857-58, has been compiled for the most part from private letters written to friends at the time of the operations which I have attempted to describe.

As a Subaltern of Engineers, it was my good fortune to serve in these Campaigns, including the whole of the Siege of Delhi, from the 8th June to the assault and final capture of the City on the 20th September, 1857; and at the capture of the City of Lucknow by the force under Lord Clyde in March, 1858, and the subsequent operations in Rohileund.

Through the kindness of Mrs. Baird Smith, I have had access to the reports and diaries of the Chief Engineer of the Delhi Field Force written during the Siege of Delhi, and have availed myself of these in many of the details in Chapters IV. and V. on the siege and capture of the City. I have also obtained valuable information from *The History of the Indian Mutiny*, by Sir John Kaye and Colonel Malleson, in a few instances; and have referred to *The*

Journal of the United Service Institution for the detailed account of the operations of the Garrison under General Sir James Outram at the Alum Bagh.

The Frontispiece portrait of Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala has been reproduced at the S.M.E., Chatham, from a photograph by Messrs. Maull & Fox; and that of Colonel Baird Smith, from an enlargement by Hollyer from a Calcutta photograph, reproduced by Mr. C. E. Treble, photographer, Brixton. The maps and pictures of Delhi and Lucknow have also, by the kind permission of the Commandant, been reproduced at the S.M.E., Chatham.

E.T.T.

ATHENÆUM CLUB,

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TWO INDIAN CAMPAIGNS, 1857²—58.

CHAPTER I.

OUTBREAK OF THE MUTINY.

“ Thanks to the kindly dark faces who fought with us, faithful and
few,
Fought with the bravest among us, and drove them out, smote
them, and slew ”

Defence of Lucknow —TENNYSON.

SITUATED on the Ganges Canal, at a distance of 20 miles from Hurdwār, in the North-West Provinces, lies the station of Roorkee, a small town separated from the cantonment by the canal. The station is now connected with Lucknow and Saharunpore by the Oudh and Rohileund Railway, but at the time of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny the only railway in the Bengal Presidency was a short line between Calcutta and RaneeGUNGE, distant about 700 miles from Roorkee. At the time of the Mutiny, the only Corps stationed at Roorkee was the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners, trained native sappers under European officers, and non-commissioned officers of the Corps of Engineers.

Roorkee was also the centre of the Irrigation Department, which controlled the great system of canal works which

irrigated the district, and which joined the Ganges at a point near Cawnpore, distant about 300 miles south of Roorkee.

A large range of buildings, used as a foundry and workshops for the canal, extended for some distance along the left bank of the canal, and was enclosed by a high wall of brick masonry. The Thomason Civil Engineering College, named after Mr. Thomason, Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, is distant about half a mile from the canal, and on the same side as the cantonment and workshops.

At the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny, the Corps of Bengal Sappers and Miners was commanded by Captain Edward Fraser, of the Bengal Engineers, Lieutenant F. R. Maunsell (now General Maunsell, C.B., Colonel-Commandant of the Royal Engineers) was the Adjutant, Lieutenant Geneste was Interpreter and Quartermaster, and Surgeon-Major Turnbull in medical charge. There was a paucity of bungalows for the officers, and several of the officers of Engineers who were attached to the Sappers and Miners lived in one of the European non-commissioned officers' barracks, which had not long been built.

At about 8 o'clock on the morning of May 13th, 1857, two or three of the officers were standing outside their quarters looking at a pony which had been brought to the lines for sale, when Lieutenant Ward rode up and called out, "Have you heard the news? We are to march to Meerut this afternoon." Shortly afterwards a parade of the whole Corps was ordered. Nine officers, 50 British non-commissioned officers, and 700 native sappers were at first under orders to march, but later in the day the number of

the latter was reduced to 500. By great exertions on the part of Captain Fraser, Major Baird Smith, who was then Superintendent-General of the Ganges Canal, and Lieutenant Maunsell, a sufficient number of boats was collected for the officers and men, and we marched down to the landing stage and embarked at about 6 p.m. At Asuffnuggur Falls, about three miles below Roorkee, the boats had to be passed through the locks. Some of the officers who were under orders to remain at Roorkee, and several civilians, came out as far as Asuffnuggur.

At this time none of us, with the exception of the Commandant, were aware of the state of affairs at Meerut. We thought that a local riot had occurred, and that we were ordered to Meerut for the purpose of helping to quell it, and we expected to be away for about a week.

The officers who embarked in the boats were the Commandant; Adjutant. Lieutenant Geneste, Interpreter and Quartermaster; Surgeon-Major Turnbull, Medical Officer; and 2nd Lieutenants L. Tandy, A. McNeill, J. U. Champain, D. Ward, E. T. Thackeray.

At daybreak on the following morning we continued our progress, the men rowing the boats, and, assisted by the strong stream of the canal, we travelled at the rate of from four to five miles an hour.

On arriving at one of the locks we found the machinery for raising the sluices broken, and this caused considerable delay, as it had to be repaired. We pushed on during the whole of the 14th May, passing many corpses of natives floating in the canal. Most of these corpses had wounds in the head, showing that the men had been killed by blows from lathes or iron-bound sticks. At night explosions

were heard in the direction of the villages bordering upon the canal banks. These explosions were caused by the inhabitants of the villages filling ghurrahs, or earthen water jars, with gunpowder, and then firing them with the object of driving away the Goojurs, or plunderers, who were then infesting the district.

The corpses that we saw were those of villagers who had been murdered by the Goojurs either for plunder or to pay off some old grudge. During the day the heat was intense. As each boat passed under the canal bridges, the Sepoys shouted "Gunga Jee Ka Jai" (Victory to Holy Gunga). In this manner we proceeded quietly down the canal, repairing the locks as we went along to admit of the passage of the boats.

On the morning of the second day we saw a European driving along the left bank of the canal in a buggy. He was, I think, an overseer in the Irrigation Department. We hailed him to ask the state of things at Meerut, but he did not stop. He shouted, "They're cottin' throats in Meerut like mad, and burnin' 'ouses," and drove on in the direction of Roorkee. On the afternoon of the 14th we arrived at Sirdhana, and immediately disembarked from the boats. There was much difficulty in procuring carts to carry the Sepoys' baggage and ammunition to Meerut, which was about eight miles distant from the canal. During the march, and while in the boats, we only obtained three or four hours' sleep from the time of leaving Roorkee until we reached Meerut.

The Ganges Canal was the work of Colonel Sir Proby Thomas Cautley, Bengal Artillery. It was first contemplated by Colonel Colvin, B.E., who directed Cautley to

examine the project; but the results were so discouraging that it was temporarily abandoned. The severe famine of 1837-38 led to a re-examination, and Cautley reported on it in 1840. It was sanctioned by the Court of Directors in 1841.

It may not be here out of place to say a few words regarding this magnificent canal.

The work on the Ganges Canal was commenced in 1843; it was officially opened in 1854 by the Hon. John Russell Colvin, then Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces, when water was first admitted, and since then it has flowed uninterruptedly.

The Ganges Canal had in 1886 445 miles of main line, and 2,250 miles of minor channels for the distribution of the water. The corresponding figures for the Lower Ganges Canal are 556 and 1,889. The two canals had up to the year 1886 cost about 280 and 268 lakhs of rupees respectively. Their yearly returns in water rate and share of land revenue are about 33 and 19 lakhs, while the total revenue collected is 24 and 12 lakhs, showing a net return on capital expended of $8\frac{1}{2}$ and $4\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

But, in addition to this, it must be remembered there is the value of the crops raised owing to the canal water, which amounts to no less than 294 lakhs for the Ganges, and 179 lakhs for the Lower Ganges Canal. Thus the older work pours more wealth into the country yearly than it cost to make it entirely, and the newer one is running up to the same result.

We were unmolested on the march, and reached the cantonment of Meerut at about 3 a.m. on the 15th. On our arrival we found the cantonment in a state of semi-

siege. We marched in between the European regiments, the Carabineers and the 60th Rifles, and the Artillery standing ready at their guns. Some of the officers of the garrison met us, and as we marched to the lines of the European troops, informed us that the native regiments stationed at Meerut had broken out into mutiny on the evening of the 11th, and after murdering many of their officers, and any English people who happened unfortunately to have been in their bungalows, or driving or riding about the station at the time, and after plundering and setting fire to the bungalows, they had made off to Delhi. The regiments which mutinied at Meerut were the 3rd Light Cavalry and the 11th and 20th Native Infantry. Colonel Finnis, who commanded the 11th, had gone down to the lines with other officers of his Corps, to remonstrate and to dissuade the men from mutiny, when a soldier of the 20th discharged his musket and wounded the Colonel's horse. Then another musket was discharged into the Colonel's body, and he fell from his horse struck by several bullets. We also learnt the names of the officers and ladies who had been murdered. Of the former, four officers belonged to the 20th Regiment, two to the 11th Regiment, and two to the 3rd Light Cavalry.

Early on the morning of the 16th May I received orders from Captain Fraser, the Commandant, to take a party consisting of 3 British non-commissioned officers and 90 native sappers to the Grand Trunk Road, leading from the northern part of the city to Delhi, for the purpose of dismantling some old walls which had been built near the sides of the road. It was anticipated that an attack might be made by the rebels from Delhi, and the demolition of

these walls was considered desirable by the military authorities. It was about 10 o'clock when we started from the cantonment, and Captain Fraser, just as we were starting, gave me some detailed instructions about the destruction of these walls. The Commandant was very explicit in his instructions. The men were drawn up, with their picks and shovels, and their arms piled a little way off. When he had concluded, I ordered the men to unpile their arms, and we marched away. I never saw Fraser again alive. The sun beat down fiercely on our little party, and the hot wind felt like the air from a furnace as we passed the deserted and blackened remains of the bungalows which the Sepoys had set on fire a few days before. As we passed through the streets of the bazaar, the natives peered over the walls at us, and I remarked to the sergeant on their furtive and scowling looks. On arriving at the indicated spot, the men again piled their arms, and having, with the aid of the sergeant, marked out the tasks, the work commenced. A large portion of the walls had been demolished, when a little after 3 o'clock my attention became attracted by the sound of bugles in the direction of the cantonment. Almost at the same time a native trooper of the 3rd Light Cavalry galloped down the road at the side of which the sappers were working. He was in uniform, fully armed, with sword at his side and pistols in his holsters. His horse's mouth and flanks were lathered with foam, and he gesticulated and pointed in the direction of Delhi. I turned to look towards the men, and saw that many of them had laid down their pickaxes and shovels and had run to the piles of muskets, from which they commenced taking their arms.

Before any order could be given, they commenced running along the road, following the trooper in the direction of Delhi. I then ordered the bugler to sound the assembly, and by dint of threats and expostulation, and with the aid of the European sergeants, we succeeded in inducing 36 men to fall in. Looking towards the houses in the vicinity, I could now see large numbers of the Meerut "budmashes" collecting near the bazaar, and poking their heads over the walls, as if expecting to see what was coming next.

I ordered the little detachment to march to the lines, and before proceeding far we were joined by 28 men, who had at the first bugle call been undecided, but finally made up their minds to re-join their comrades who had remained staunch.

Just as we emerged from the city we were met by a squadron of Carabineers, under the command of a Captain of the regiment. On seeing us the officer halted the squadron, and desired me to halt the detachment. He then called me aside and told me in a few words that the main body of the sappers in the lines had mutinied, and had shot the Commandant, and that he had been ordered out with his squadron to bring in my party.

He then ordered some of his men to march in rear of my party, and we proceeded towards the lines. The native sappers who formed my party at this time appeared anxious, and the native officer addressed me protesting against the carabineers marching in rear of the men. It was evident that he was distressed by this movement, and that he expressed the views of the men in protesting against it. I told him to endeavour to quiet the men, and that all would be well. On arriving at the barracks we found all the

troops in garrison drawn up under arms, and the artillery with guns loaded. A Staff officer came forward and directed me to halt the detachment, and to pile arms. This was done, and the men's arms were then removed to the magazine. Shortly after this, in going towards the Dum-Dumma, I saw the body of the havildar who had tried to save the Commandant. He was lying on his face on the ground, the back part of his head having been blown away by a shot from behind. This, with the exception of the bodies of the villagers which we saw in the Ganges Canal, was the first victim of the Mutiny that I had seen, and the sight of the corpse of this faithful soldier treacherously slain by a Sepoy while trying to save the life of his commanding officer roused in the minds of all who saw it feelings of anger, and a desire for stern retribution against the mutineers. I now learnt that while Captain Fraser was issuing orders for the removal of the ammunition to the magazine he was shot from behind by one of the Sepoys, and the havildar was killed at the same time while trying to protect him. The Sepoys then fired at the Adjutant (Lieutenant Maunsell), who had a most narrow escape. Captain Fraser was buried in the Meerut Cemetery on the following evening, almost every officer and civilian who was not on duty attending the funeral. After the murder of the Commandant and the havildar, the Sappers fled from the cantonment. They were pursued by the Carabineers, and a party consisting of about 50 men were overtaken among the sand hills. They took up a position under cover of the hillocks, and commenced firing at the Carabineers. They were, however, overpowered and killed. Lieutenant David Ward, of the Engineers (afterwards

Colonel, and Secretary to the Government, North-West Provinces, in the Public Works Department), had on the morning of the same day also been sent out with a party of sappers by Captain Fraser to execute some entrenching work on one side of the station. This party remained faithful, and Lieutenant Ward brought them back to the lines, where they were disarmed. On the following morning some of these men expressed a wish to be allowed to go out to bury their comrades who had been killed by the Carabineers. Lieutenant Ward volunteered to accompany them, and went out with a party of Sappers to bury the men who had been killed on the previous day. This was a highly dangerous service, as it was thought at the time that the sight of their slain comrades might excite the passions of the men. Ward brought back his party to the lines after this hazardous duty.

We had now about 50 European, non-commissioned officers, and about 150 native sappers. The latter did excellent work in fortifying the Dum-Dumma and other buildings in the station.

Several men who were implicated in the murder of Europeans were caught at this time, and were hanged after being found guilty by the court-martial. Lieutenant Champion Möller, of the 11th Native Infantry, hearing that the murderer of one of the ladies was in the bazaar, drove into the bazaar in a buggy, secured the murderer, and brought him back to the lines, where he was tried by court-martial and sentenced to death. Two days after the mutiny of the Sappers I received orders to take a small detachment of the 3rd Light Cavalry to a village distant about seven miles from Meerut, to collect some tools which

had been collected in the village. The sowars, or troopers, were the remnant of the regiment who had mutinied on the 11th, who had gone off to Delhi after killing two of their officers.

The General commanding the Meerut Division, with his Staff and several other officers, occupied one of the Horse Artillery barracks, while most of the residents took up their quarters in the Field Magazine, afterwards known as the Dum-Dumma, an enclosed space of about 200 yards square, with walls 8 feet high, a ditch, and four bastions, one at each angle. Thus strengthened, it was easily defensible against any number of insurgents unprovided with guns or mortars.

So completely was the rest of the cantonment deserted, with the exception of the barracks occupied by the troops, that many of the natives believed that the Europeans had been exterminated.

From the cantonment the rapine and lawlessness extended into the surrounding district. Travellers were stopped on the roads, the mails were plundered, houses were forcibly entered and sacked, and sometimes all the inmates were murdered. The greater number of the atrocities at the time of the outbreak on the 11th were committed by the budmashes from the Suddur Bazaar, who swarmed out on seeing the conflagration and murdered any of the unfortunate Europeans who happened to be in their bungalows. A party consisting of twelve ladies and gentlemen, amongst whom was Lieutenant Salkeld, of the Engineers, who afterwards blew in the Cashmere Gate at Delhi, after escaping the massacre at Delhi on the 12th May, crossed the Jumna and made their way to Meerut. They walked the whole

way, exposed to the attacks and insults of the villagers, and to the intense heat of the sun's rays. Some of the party were wounded, and they were without shoes. They were pelted with stones at many of the villages through which they passed, were robbed of everything they possessed, and were almost naked. They lived on grain, and on arrival at Meerut were in a most exhausted and destitute condition.

Martial law was proclaimed at Meerut, but it was not until the 24th May that a party of Carabineers was sent out to punish a village in the vicinity which was swarming with Goojurs. On the afternoon of the 27th May, "to our great delight, the long expected order was issued for a column, under the command of Brigadier Archdale Wilson, to march towards Delhi, to join the force which was moving down from Umballa, under the Commander-in-Chief, for the capture of the city of Delhi.

It was at this time that the Meerut Mounted Corps was raised, whose history as the "Khakee Resala," by which name it was so well known, has been so ably written by Mr. Dunlop, C.S. This corps did much to quiet Meerut and the surrounding districts.

CHAPTER II.

ACTIONS ON THE HINDUN AND BATTLE OF BADLE-KA-SERAI.

“ For not an eye the storm that viewed,
Changed its proud glance of fortitude;
Nor was one forward footstep staid,
As dropped the dying and the dead.”

SIR WALTER SCOTT.

THE column which marched out of Meerut on the 27th May consisted of two squadrons of the Carabineers, a wing of the 60th Rifles, Scott's Light Field Battery, Tombs's Troop of Horse Artillery, two 18-pounders, all manned by Europeans, with a small detachment of native sappers and some irregular horse.

On the 30th May the column arrived on the left bank of the River Hindun, near a place called Ghazee-oo-deen-nuggar. This place is now an important junction station on the East Indian and Punjab Railway, about 10 miles distant from Delhi. The town is situated on the left bank of the Hindun River, and has some ancient traces of walls.

I visited the place in 1868, eleven years after the battle, and could remember the configuration of the ground. The ditch round the village, which I recollect to have been filled with dead mutineers, had been filled up and the walls levelled. A long causeway carries the Grand Trunk Road across the valley, within which the stream, shrunk during the scorching heats of May to a mere rivulet, wanders in a channel of extreme tortuosity, fordable both by infantry

and artillery, though from the prevalence of quicksands the process is not altogether free from risk or mishap. A suspension bridge spans the stream, and on the right bank the causeway was covered by a toll-house, capable, if need were, of some defence. Villages, furnishing considerable means of resistance in their mud-walled houses and narrow lanes, are scattered at intervals along the road, and the ground is in ridges of sensible magnitude on both banks, but especially on the right.

At the camp on the Hindun, 14 Engineer officers occupied one European privates' tent, with a single thickness of canvas. On arriving at the Hindun, we had our tent pitched, and had some stew for breakfast. The heat was so intense that we wrapped wet towels round our heads, and lay down with our heads under the solitary table that we had brought as a mess table.

About 3 o'clock in the afternoon a round shot was fired into the camp from the opposite side of the river. The shot killed a non-commissioned officer of the Carabineers.

The bugles sounded, and the troops fell in, and at once marched towards the bridge that spanned the river. The shot fell thickly about us as we advanced. The mutineers, flushed with success, had come out from Delhi to give battle to the Meerut Brigade before its junction with the Umballa Force. They had planted some heavy guns on a ridge to the right of our camp, and from their position commenced firing into the camp. Under cover of the fire of the 18-pounders and Scott's Field Battery, the 60th Rifles advanced, and moving along the causeway, came to close quarters with the enemy.

The mutineers broke and fled under the galling fire

poured in upon them, and numbers were bayoneted. They left five guns in our hands. Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Tombs, with the Horse Artillery and Carabineers, dashed across the Hindun to the right, and successfully turned the left flank of the enemy. Major Tombs's horse was shot under him during the action.

A Sepoy of the 11th Regiment fired his musket into an ammunition waggon just as a party of the 60th, under Captain Andrewes, were gallantly seizing the guns. Captain Andrewes and several men of the 60th were killed by the explosion, and others were carried away wounded.

About noon on the following day, Whit Sunday, the bugles again sounded the alarm. The enemy had again come out from Delhi, and had taken up a position on the right bank of the Hindun, about a mile from our advanced posts on the bridge.

The Artillery were sent forward to reply to the enemy's fire, the Rifles, with two guns, and the Sappers occupying the head of the bridge. The fight was one almost entirely of artillery. Lieutenant Perkins, of the Horse Artillery, was killed by a grape shot. Our men suffered fearfully from thirst and sunstroke, 12 of the 60th Rifles being struck down by the sun, of whom 4 died.

When the enemy's fire slackened, a general advance was ordered, and the enemy retreated, carrying off their guns to Delhi. Our men were so exhausted by the heat, and by thirst, that they were unable to improve their victory. On this occasion I first experienced the tortures of thirst. When the bheesties came up there was a rush for the water, and I saw one man who had been sunstruck in a raving condition.

On the 1st June our column was reinforced by the arrival in camp of the 2nd Goorkhas (Sirmoor Battalion), 600 strong, under the command of Major Reid (now General Sir Charles Reid, G.C.B.).

We remained in our position on the Hindun from the 1st to the 5th June, and on the evening of the 5th we commenced our march to join the force that was moving down from Umballa, under the Commander-in-Chief, General the Honorable A. Anson.

This flank march was a difficult and hazardous operation, and the strictest precautions had to be taken to guard against surprise.

We started at 6 p.m., and after marching a mile the force was halted to allow of the arrival of the last of the camels and carts. This was repeated during the whole night. The night was dark, and the pony that I was riding fell twice into ditches at the side of the road. Immediately on the order to halt being given, the men lay down in the road, and instantly fell asleep until they were again awakened. Flanking parties of the Carabineers, the 60th Rifles, and the Goorkhas were on each side of the road, and protected the column against attack.

In this manner we marched through the nights of the 5th and 6th June, and were unmolested during the march.

It is scarcely credible that the enemy, on ascertaining our departure from the Hindun, should not have attempted to attack the column while making this flank march. But so it was. It is probable that the rebels were paralysed by the combats of the 30th and 31st May, and by the loss of their guns.

On the morning of the 7th we reached Paniput, and

found the force under the Commander-in-Chief, General Anson, where we learnt that he had died of cholera on the 26th May at Kurnal, and had been succeeded by General Barnard.

The meeting with old friends in the Umballa Column caused in all much rejoicing, and all were eager for the attack on the enemy's position at Badli-ka-Serai, which it was known would be made on the following morning.

We were here joined by some of the officers who had escaped from Delhi; among these was Lieutenant (now Major-General) Thomason, of the Engineers.

The force that was in camp at Alipore, and which arrived there on the 5th June under the command of General Sir Henry Barnard, who had succeeded to the command on the death from cholera of the Commander-in-Chief, General the Honorable A. Anson, consisted of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, 75th Regiment, and the 1st and 2nd Bengal Fusiliers, Money's troop of Horse Artillery, and the siege train. It had been thought at one time that it would be necessary to move upon Delhi from both banks of the Jumna, and after the battles of the Hindun Wilson's force had halted for orders from the Chief. These orders were received on the 4th June, and were given on that evening, as has been before stated. Wilson commenced his march, and soon after midnight on the morning of the 6th he crossed the Jumna at Baghput.

On the 6th the siege train arrived from Phillour. The train consisted of 8 18-pounders, 4 8-inch howitzers, 12 5½-inch mortars and 4 8-inch mortars. The officer in command of the train was Lieutenant Griffith. Major Kaye commanded the whole detachment. On the morning of the

8th we marched out of Alipore at 3 a.m. to attack the enemy, who were strongly entrenched at Badle-ka-Serai, their forces consisting of cavalry and infantry, and 30 guns. The company of Sappers to which I was attached formed part of the third column. Four heavy guns, Money's Horse Artillery troop, and part of Scott's Battery were sent in advance to silence the enemy's fire, but the guns of the mutineers were of heavier metal than our own. For some time it was an artillery duel. Major Tombs had two horses shot under him.

After we had marched from two to three miles, the sound of heavy firing was heard in our front, and we knew that the first column was engaged. As we drew nearer, the round shot and shell whistled past us, tearing up the ground and striking down many men, horses, and bullocks. The Goorkhas (Sirmoor Battalion), under the command of Major Reid, were with this column; also the 75th Regiment.

We passed one of our batteries, commanded by Major Alfred Light, Bengal Artillery, which had to bear the brunt of the enemy's fire. One tumbril had blown up, and two or three artillerymen were lying dreadfully scorched and dying in the road. Dead bullocks were lying all about, killed by the enemy's round shot. The enemy had taken up a splendid position, and had entrenched themselves strongly at Badle-ka-Serai, distant about four miles from Delhi, from which we drove them.

We captured four heavy guns here. Many of the enemy had posted themselves in a strong walled village, the entrances to which were barricaded, and from which they fired at our side. When our little party of sappers came up, we burst open the doors and rushed in. We had orders

to destroy all the villages on the line of march which had harboured rebels.

After capturing the position of Badli-ka-Serai, our force rested for about half an hour, and then, as we again advanced, the enemy retired to the heights above Delhi. They poured a very heavy fire on us as we advanced, but they never waited to let us come close, but fled into Delhi, leaving 20 guns in our possession. Colonel Chester, Captain Russell, and Lieutenant Harrison and 50 men were killed on our side, and about 150 wounded. The enemy lost great numbers.


Lieutenant (now Colonel) Alfred Jones greatly distinguished himself during the action by capturing one of the enemy's guns and turning it upon them, and was awarded the V.C.

The troops were posted at intervals along the ridge which overlooks the city. We were all much exhausted after the action and the march under a hot sun. Wounded men were continually brought into Hindoo Rao's house, a large building situated on the ridge overlooking the city.

The camp was pitched in rear of the ridge, and a bungalow that had partially escaped the conflagration after the Delhi massacre was took off for the headquarters of the Engineers. We located our mess in the billiard-room.

On the evening of the 8th I received orders to proceed to Hindoo Rao's house with a small party of sappers, and we were engaged during the night in laying out and constructing a battery. The enemy opened a heavy fire at daybreak on the following morning on discovering that we had thrown up more earthworks.

PLAN
to illustrate the operations of the
BRITISH ARMY
BEFORE
DEHLI
IN THE YEAR 1857.



of which were capable of supplying shelter, though not by any means shot-proof shelter to men and cattle.

Hindoo Rao having died some time before the mutiny broke out, the place was unoccupied. About 180 yards to the left of Hindoo Rao's house stands "the observatory," an ancient structure suited to the purposes of Hindoo astronomy, built by the Rajpoot astronomer Rajah Jai Singh. It is of irregular form, dark and ill-ventilated, but as a support to Hindoo Rao's house was found very useful, and was permanently occupied during the siege. About 650 yards further to the left there was an abandoned mosque of the oldest Pathan type in a somewhat ruinous condition, but still affording accommodation for an outpost of respectable strength. This also was suited for a permanent position.

At the distance of nearly a mile from Hindoo Rao's house stands the Flag Staff Tower, a double-stoned circular building of Gothic design, which commands an excellent view of the ground lying between the city and the ridge. This building offered sufficient means of shelter to make it useful as a post. Other posts were decided upon from time to time during the siege.

On driving the enemy from every point of the ridge on the 8th June, Sir Henry Barnard occupied at once, in strength, the four points just alluded to. He established the headquarters of the Sirmoor Battalion, 2nd Goorkhas, under Major Charles Reid, in Hindoo Rao's house, and there this distinguished corps remained unrelieved from the first day of the siege to the last.

Each of the picquets mentioned was supported by two field guns.

The headquarter's camp was established on the plains to the westward of the ridge, and occupied the old parade ground of the Delhi cantonment. Immediately in rear of the camp there runs a broad, rapid stream, being a drainage channel from the Nujufghur Jheel to the river Jumna, and along the right flank, at a distance of about a mile, flows the Western Jumna Canal, which, crossing the ridge by a bold cutting through the solid rock executed in the time of the Emperor Shah Jehan, passed through the suburbs of Kissengunge, and enters the city through a culvert in the wall near the Lahore Gate, and traversing the entire breadth of the city, falls into the river Jumna close to the Begumabad Gateway.


Three main lines of road only are immediately connected with the operations before Delhi. The first and most important was the Grand Trunk Road, by which communication was maintained with the Punjab, and along which all reinforcements and supplies were necessarily brought from the country lying to the rear of the force, on the resources of which it was mainly dependent. The second was merely a branch of the first, connecting the camp with the Grand Trunk line at about a mile and a-half to the rear.

It formed the old cantonment road to the city, crossing the Nujufghur Drain by a substantial bridge, damaged, but not destroyed, by the enemy during his retreat from the field at Badle-ka-Serai on the 8th June. The third was the line of road connecting Delhi with Rohtak, Hissar, and other places to the south westward, along which the enemy drew a considerable portion of his supplies. All the other roads centring at Delhi were completely commanded by

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The Ridge DELHI from Hindoo Rao's looking West.

a place as Delhi. Five or six hundred phowrahs, or native digging tools, 200 or 300 pick-axes, and such other implements of sorts as could be collected on a sudden demand, constituted the main dependence of the force at the commencement of the siege. Materials such as the bazaar could furnish were readily procured for the Park, but the general incompleteness of the equipment in tools was very marked.

The siege ordnance available for operation consisted of :—

24-pounders	2
18	„	9
8-inch howitzers		4
6-inch mortars	6
—						
Total	21
5½-inch Coëhorns		12
—						
Grand total	33

So many fluctuations in the strength of the force early occurred that it is of little practical use attempting to give the precise numbers, but from 500 to 600 sabres, from 2,500 to 3,000 bayonets, and 22 field guns, may be taken as fairly representing the strength during the earlier operations.

It is, of course, also extremely difficult to form any accurate estimate of the strength of the enemy, but as some of the most important accessions which he received did not occur until the siege had been for some time in progress, it may be inferred that on the 8th June the garrison of the place did not exceed about 8,000 or 9,000 disciplined soldiers, supported by probably about the same number of half-disciplined and wholly undisciplined though armed men.

For operations in the open field the sole strength of the garrison was in the trained soldiers, but for the operations in the rugged ground around Delhi, resolute men, familiar with their weapons and profiting by the universal cover everywhere supplied in some house or other, were antagonists whom it was necessary to respect.

In all the important materials and munitions of war the command of the arsenal in Delhi made the resources of the enemy, practically speaking, unlimited. Food was drawn with unrestricted freedom from the whole of the open districts to the east, south, and south-west, and there is no reason to suppose that money was deficient. With all the primary elements of a successful and vigorous defence the enemy was, therefore, abundantly provided.

The permanent posts for the ridge had scarcely been occupied on the 8th June when the enemy, rallied with such reinforcements as the garrison could supply, attacked the position on its whole length, but were immediately driven back on the picquets being reinforced.

The most notable point in connection with this attack was the vigorous support it received from the fire of the heavy guns on the More and Cashmere Bastions, and the first engineer operations resolved on were directed against the former of these works:

It was determined by the Chief Engineer, in communication with the Brigadier commanding the Artillery, to commence on the night of the 8th—9th June two batteries in the neighbourhood of Hindoo Rao's house for two guns each. These were designated Salkeld's and Wilson's Batteries. The armament of each was an 18-pounder and an 8-inch howitzer, and it was supposed that the fire of these

four pieces would suffice to subdue, if not to silence, the guns on the Moree and Cashmere Bastions. The range to the Moree Bastion was about 1,500 yards, to the Cashmere Bastion 2,100 yards, and to the Martello Tower, between these two main works, from which occasional support was given to them, about 1,830 yards.

Several casualties occurred from round shot, one being a European sapper. The enemy again attacked on the right flank in great force, but were beaten back with heavy loss.

By the morning of the 9th June Salkeld's Battery was completed, armed, and opened fire on the Moree Bastion, and by noon of the same day Wilson's Battery was also completed, its howitzer being directed on the Cashmere Bastion, and its 18-pounder on the Martello Tower, where the enemy had placed a gun *en barbette*.

Heavy fire continued uninterruptedly on both sides, and it very soon became apparent that a decided superiority was with the enemy. The fire of the four guns in Salkeld's and Wilson's Batteries produced no apparent effect on any of the enemy's works; casualties became serious, and it was clear that if any result was to be produced it was essential that the strength of the batteries on the ridge must be increased.

Accordingly, a mortar battery, called Maunsell's Battery, for two mortars, was commenced, and an additional gun portion was added to Salkeld's, Wilson's, and Maunsell's Batteries respectively. While these works were in progress the enemy attacked the right of the position with great vigour, but was repulsed, and on the 11th the whole of the guns, aided by the mortars, opened fire.

The effect of the increased fire from the ridge batteries

was so far satisfactory that the enemy's fire was somewhat more subdued than before, but the general result was not encouraging. The enemy still maintained a most effective fire action, and having a vast reserve store of heavy guns, he was much more reckless in his method of firing, and took much more out of his guns than the English could venture to do with their scanty supply of pieces of large calibre, the disabling of even one of which was a great misfortune. Hence no real progress had been made.

On the morning of the 12th another resolute attack on the whole position was made by the enemy. It was carried out with unusual determination, and had partial success, a picquet at the Flag Staff post having been cut off, and the two guns there being nearly captured. Ultimately, however, the enemy was driven back at all points with loss. The weakness of the left centre of the position was, however, made so apparent by the partial success of the enemy's first attack that means of strengthening it were essential. Between the ridge and the river in front of the part of the position now under notice lies a low, flat piece of ground traversed by the main road from the cantonment to the city, and on the eastward of this road is Metcalfe's house, a large building which had been sacked and partially destroyed during the outbreak on the 11th and 12th May; about 200 yards to the right of the house there is a substantial masonry building formerly used as a cow-house, while about 400 yards further in advance, or nearer to the place, there is, or was at that time, a large roomy row of stables. The stables and cow-house were occupied on the evening of the 12th June by strong infantry picquets, supported by a troop of cavalry at first,

and afterwards by some field guns stationed on a high artificial mound, probably an old brick kiln, near to the dwelling house. Considerable variations in details for the tenure of this advanced position subsequently occurred, but throughout the whole of the preliminary operations the stable and cow-house picquets were obstinately maintained, and proved of great value in protecting the left and left centre of the main line of picquets on the ridge. The distance of the stable picquet from the Water Bastion was about 1,300 yards, and from the centre of the British camp about 2,830 yards, or rather more than a mile and a-half.

On the night of the 11th—12th June a new mortar battery, called *Perkins' Battery*, named after Lieutenant Perkins (now General Perkins, C.B., R.E.), was commenced, and during the action of the 12th a working party of 60 sappers, under Lieutenant Geneste,* employed at the time on the batteries, made a very gallant attack on a large body of the enemy, beat them back from the position, and killed a considerable number of them. The casualties among the Sappers were three men wounded.

On the 13th the new mortar battery, having been armed during the previous night with two guns, opened fire. The enemy were found to have erected substantial earthen works on the Cashmere and Moree Bastions for the protection of the guns placed there *en barbette*, and the firing during the day was not vigorous. An attack was, however, again made on the right of our position, but was repulsed without difficulty, although supported by a very heavy fire from the whole of the batteries of the place. In the course

* Lieut. Geneste died very soon after the siege from the result of the exposure he had undergone.

of this attack the enemy made one very dangerous movement of advancing from Kissengunge with field guns up to the crest of the ridge on the extreme right, and from thence enfilading the entire line of the English batteries. The movement, however, was not persisted in, but it was plain that the enemy had observed a very weak point in the position, and was likely to renew his attempt upon it.

On the night of the 15th—16th June a trench of communication was made between Salkeld's and Wilson's Batteries, revetted inside with stones; the soil being very rocky, the work was one of great difficulty, and proceeded slowly. The enemy was very quiet all night and day, and no attack was made on the position.

It was observed, however, on the 17th, that the enemy had commenced work on a battery in the suburbs of Pahareepore, and although the mortar practice from the batteries on the ridge was excellent, progress was not stopped.

It being of the greatest importance that no permanent lodgement should be permitted on a site where guns would take all the ridge batteries in reverse with disastrous effect, Sir Henry Barnard determined on an attack in order to clear the suburb. This duty was effected with characteristic brilliancy by Major Charles Reid and Major Henry Tombs with the small columns under their respective commands, supported by four guns. The enemy's battery was captured and entirely destroyed, some loss was inflicted, and the only gun he had brought out from the place was taken. Lieutenant Perkins accompanied the columns as Field Engineer, and Lieutenants Fulford and Jones, with 40 sappers, effected the demolition of the battery and parts of the suburbs which it was considered expedient to remove.

The great danger of leaving the extreme right of the position unprovided with permanent means of defence now forced itself into notice, and accordingly, on the night of the 17th, a new 3-gun battery, called Johnson's Battery, named after Captain Johnson (afterwards General Sir Edwin Johnson, G.C.B.), was traced out on the rocky plateau, about 300 yards to the right of Hindoo Rao's house.

Not a spadeful of earth was locally available for the construction of the battery, the soil being bare rock. Material had, therefore, to be brought from the low ground in rear of the ridge, and the progress of the work was, accordingly, slow. In the morning the enemy showed so much jealousy of the work, and kept up so constant and so hot a fire, that during the day of the 18th progress was virtually suspended. On the night of the 18th—19th it was resumed as vigorously as circumstances permitted, and by the morning of the 19th the parapet of the battery and epaulments was raised to a height of five feet on the left and six feet on the right.

The rocky terreplein was raised by aid of the jumper; and platform space for two guns secured. But more could not be done by daylight as the enemy's fire was incessant and heavy, causing some casualties among the working parties.

By incessant labour on the part of the Sappers and Pioneers employed, the battery was at last completed, and mounted with three guns by the 22nd June. But while this work was in progress on the extreme right front of the position, movements of most critical importance were taking place on the right flank and rear.

The garrison having been powerfully reinforced about this time by the junction of the Nusseerabad Brigade, a

general attack on the British position seems to have been resolved on.

The various out-look posts reported on the afternoon of the 19th that masses of infantry, supported by artillery and cavalry, were steadily defiling through the Lahore and Ajmeer Gates, and gradually extending through all the strong ground in front and on the right flank of the position. Scarcely an hour before sunset the high ground immediately in rear of the camp was seen to be occupied by a powerful detachment of the enemy, strongly posted in the gardens and among the ruined walls thickly strewn over the neighbourhood. The crisis was very grave, for the enemy immediately attacked the camp from this position, directing a vigorous fire of artillery upon it, while so general was the threatening aspect of affairs on the front and flanks that only a very feeble fire could be spared to meet this most dangerous movement.

The cavalry and field artillery, however, under Brigadier Hope Grant, after a severe engagement, checked the advance of the enemy for that night, and on the morning of the 20th he was found to have retired from the ground. His retirement was, however, merely momentary, and the position being re-occupied almost before the troops reached camp, it was necessary to repeat the attack. A vigorous fight ensued, ending in the complete rout of the enemy, though at heavy loss in officers and men to the column engaged, which, being about 600 strong of all arms, had about one-third of its number killed or wounded. The result was, however, so far decisive that no attempt was again made by the enemy to operate on the camp itself from the rear, and the construction of a strong breastwork

and battery for two 24-pounders added still further to the security of this part of the position. During the fighting on the 19th Major Yule, of the 9th Lancers, was killed. Daly (afterwards General Sir Henry Daly, G.C.B.), of the Guides, and Becher (afterwards General Sir Arthur Becher, G.C.B.), Quartermaster-General, were wounded.

On the 22nd June a party of sappers, under Lieutenant Salkeld, of the Engineers, destroyed the bridge carrying the Grand Trunk Road across the Nujufgurh Jheel Drain. The bridge was of native construction, and of very massive proportions, having two arches and a central pier. A charge of 325lbs. of powder, lodged in three chambers in the pier, effected complete demolition, destroying both arches.

On the night of the 23rd another party, under Lieutenant Maunsell, accompanied by Lieutenant Jones,* of the Engineers, destroyed the only other bridges across the drain in the immediate vicinity of Delhi. Both bridges were completely demolished, and, as it instantly appeared, with excellent results, as the Engineer detachment had scarcely left the ground when a strong party of the enemy, with artillery, occupied it in preparation for a general attack on the British position.

On the 24th it was found impossible for him, however, to transport his guns across the broad, deep, and rapid stream thus unexpectedly interposed, and it followed that during the vigorous assault of the 24th the rear of the camp was not threatened as before. The whole of the right of the position was, however, enveloped by the enemy's attack on that day. The suburb of Subzee-Mundoe was occupied by

* Killed during the siege.

him in force, and held with much tenacity. Johnson's Battery was attacked, and from Pahareepore the works near Hindoo Rao's house were taken in flank by a battery of field guns, and some loss inflicted on the troops occupying them.

But the result of the fight was, as it had ever been, the defeat of the enemy at all points, heavy loss being inflicted on him while he retired sullenly into the city. Subzee-Mundee was subsequently held in strength by a regiment of Europeans; a large serai, or travellers' resting place, and a Hindoo temple being prepared for occupation by the troops, and fortified as efficiently as means would permit. Considerable clearances of old ruins and jungle were effected in the vicinity of this post, and its maintenance in support of the advanced battery on the ridge was found to be of much use.

In the many attacks of the enemy on the position, the detachments of Artillery with the light guns at Hindoo Rao's house suffered seriously, and cover was accordingly provided for them in a new battery marked "Champain's."* This work was rather of the nature of a breastwork than a regular field battery, the object being to cover the men as much as possible without restricting excessively the sweep of the guns. A similar covering breastwork was provided for the guns at the Mosque, with great labour and difficulty, however, owing to the want of materials. Reports having been received of the intentions of the commander of the garrison to convert the dry ditch of the fort into a wet one by turning into it the waters of the West Jumna Canal, it

* Named after Lieutenant Champain, Bengal Engineers (afterwards Colonel Sir John Champain, K. C. M. G., who died in 1887).

was determined to cut off the supply at the ancient aqueduct before mentioned. This was done in the first instance by a party of sappers, under Lieutenant Champain, who cut through the bank of the canal above the aqueduct, and this turned the whole stream into the Nujufgurh Jheel Drain. Subsequently the partial demolition of the aqueduct was effected by powder, and the passage of the canal permanently interrupted.

From the 28th June, accordingly, no water entered the city through the canal channel, but no practical inconvenience was thereby caused to the garrison, as they had complete command of the river Jumna. The fact is noteworthy, as very erroneous conceptions on this, as on many other points, prevailed in England at the time and since.

On the 28th June the Engineer Brigade was strengthened by the arrival of Captain Alexander Taylor (now General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B., President of the Royal Indian Engineering College, Cooper's Hill), and by the appointment as Field Engineer of Lieutenant W. W. Greathed (afterwards Major-General and C.B.), who had up to that time been acting as extra Aide-de-Camp to the Major-General commanding.

Captain Taylor relieved Major Laughton on the 29th; on the 2nd July Lieutenant J. T. Walker (afterwards General, C.B., F.R.S.), Bombay Engineers, was appointed Field Engineer.

During the first three weeks of the siege the Delhi field force was engaged in repelling the enemy's sorties. There were usually three or four sorties in each week, and some of these were on a very large scale. Large bodies of the rebels could be seen issuing from the Lahore Gate; cavalry,

artillery and infantry. The general plan of the sortie was to turn our right flank by a large force, and to penetrate into our camp, while smaller numbers advanced under cover of the rocks and bushes for a direct attack on the fort. In crossing the road leading from the Lahore Gate to Subzee-Mundee the cavalry and artillery came under the view of our right battery, which poured a heavy fire on the enemy's troops. Those that escaped this ordeal seemed to have swerved to their left, and returned in a disorganised state by the Kabul Gate or by some of the other gates. The repelling of these sorties sometimes occupied several hours. The enemy also made night attacks on our position, and a continued roll of musketry would be kept up for hours. There was a small post among the rocks on the right hand of this position called the Sammy House, where I remember seeing the corpses of the mutineers after these attacks piled in heaps to a height of several feet, sweltering in the sun, there being no men available to bury them. How great was the disparity of numbers may be conjectured from the fact that on our arrival on the ridge on the 8th June, the Delhi Field Force did not number more than 3,800 men, and on the day of assault, on the 14th September, were only about 14,000. The number of revolted Sepoys and men in the city varied during the siege from 12,000 to 35,000, in addition to the armed inhabitants.

A few days after the commencement of the siege I ordered to take a party, consisting of about 100 unarmoured coolies, a few native sappers, and three non-commissioned officers, and six elephants, to Metcalfe's house to demolish some walls, and to clear the ground around the picket which was stationed at this spot.

Metcalfe's house, which had been the residence of the Commissioner of Delhi, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, was a large house surrounded by a beautiful park. It is situated on the right bank of the river Jumna, distant about half-way between the ridge and the city. After the massacre of the Europeans at Delhi on the 12th May, the house had been gutted, the valuable library belonging to Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, and all the furniture and effects, being plundered and destroyed by the mutineers. Before starting for Metcalfe's house, I had explained to the sergeant in charge of the elephants that he should take the turning to the left, and we started as it was getting dusk. I rode at the head of the little detachment, and, on arriving at the park gates, turned to the left with the sappers and coolies. After journeying some distance towards Metcalfe's house, I halted the party, and galloped back to the gates. It was now dark, and I could see or hear nothing of the elephants. I then conjectured that the sergeant in charge must have tarried somewhat behind, and in the darkness must have failed to notice that we had turned to the left through the park gates, and, in fact, that at that moment he must be quietly walking along the road with the six elephants towards the enemy's picquets at Ludlow Castle, about 300 yards distant.

All this passed through my mind in much less time than it takes to write it. I turned my pony to the left, and galloped in the darkness in the direction of Ludlow Castle. I was only just in time. The sergeant was calmly walking along the road to destruction with the six elephants, with their mahouts, and some of the coolies. I touched him on the shoulder, and turned him round without speaking.

The enemy's advance post at Ludlow Castle could not then have been more than 80 yards distant, but the night was very dark, and they heard no sound. We got back to the park, and arrived at Motealfe's house in safety. Here we worked during the night, the elephants using their trunks to tear down trees and brushwood, and using their vast weight to push down the mud walls of the servants' houses, and other buildings that were in too close proximity to the Commissioner's house. I recollect the Brigade-Major of Engineers, Lieutenant Chesney,* visiting the position the following morning, and giving some detailed instructions about the relief of the parties, and the manner in which the ground was to be entrenched. Sir George Chesney was twice wounded during the siege.

During the first three weeks of the siege we lost about 20 sappers killed and wounded, a large proportion considering the small number engaged. An excellent non-commissioned officer, Sergeant Davies, was killed by a round shot in one of the batteries. He was a great favourite both with the officers and the men, and an excellent draughtsman. He did not die immediately, but first wrote a letter to his brother, a clergyman at Swansea. Many of the Artillery and Engineer officers at the time of the siege had wonderful escapes from the enemy's shot and shell.

Scarcely a house in the old cantonment was left untouched by the rebels. At this time about 20 native regiments of the Bengal native army had mutinied, and we received accounts daily of the mutiny of some regiment.

On the 18th June the rebels were reinforced by the mutinied brigade from Nusseerabad, bringing six guns with

* Sir George Chesney died in London in April, 1895.

them. To celebrate the event, the rebels came out in force, and made an attack on our rear. The contest was most desperate, and the loss on both sides was great. Major Yule, of the 9th Lancers, was killed ; Daly, of the Guides, and Becher, the Quartermaster-General, were wounded. Some of the officers who happened not to be on duty, hearing the sound of heavy guns in our rear, rode out in the direction of the firing. Clouds of dust obscured the air as we approached, and numbers of wounded men were carried by us. We heard that several officers had been killed or wounded, but could not judge from the uncertain accounts of the wounded men how the battle went. As it became dusk, we started back at a gallop, but my horse stumbled in a rut in the road and came down heavily with me. I then discovered that the saddle girth had snapped, and I had to ride the rest of the way to camp without a saddle girth at a foot's pace. Of our troubles at this period of the siege, that great soldier, Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, wrote, at this time, June 22nd.—“The wounded generally are doing well, poor fellows, considering the heat, dirt, and want of any bed but the dry ground. Their pluck is wonderful, and it is not in the field alone that you see what an English soldier is made of. One poor fellow, who was smoking his pipe and laughing with the comrade by his side, was asked what was the matter with him, and he answered in a lively voice, ‘Oh, not much, sir, only a little knock on the back ; I shall be up and at the barracks again in a day or two.’ He had been shot in the spine, and all his lower limbs were paralysed. He died next day.

“It would not so much signify if we could but get the rebels into the open field, but for every gun we can bring

to bear upon them they can bring four heavier ones against us. We drive them before us like chaff in the field, but they can, and do, attack us in two or three quarters at once, and our unfortunate soldiers are worked off their legs. I do not say this to make matters gloomy, for I am as confident as ever of the result; but we may be a long while yet, and a weary while, before that result is arrived at."

The Commissioner of Delhi, Sir Theophilus Metcalfe, was in our camp at this time. His house, as before mentioned, which had been completely gutted by the rebels, was occupied by our picquets. The mutineers used our bugle calls, and frequently came out to fight wearing their red coats. The buttons on the uniforms of the corpses bore the numbers of the regiments that had mutinied. The work of the artillery in the batteries at this time was most arduous. One man was told off to watch for the flash of the enemy's gun, and when he saw the flash from the batteries, he shouted "down," and everyone closed up under the shelter of the parapet. The most dangerous part was getting into the batteries, as the enemy had constructed a battery on the right of our position, at a place called the Red Gurb, from which their shot enfiladed the ridge, the shot and shell crashing along the ridge, and striking down anyone who happened to be exposed: One shot fired from this battery entered the doorway of Hindoo Rao's house and killed an officer, Lieutenant Wheatley, and eight men of the 2nd Goorkha Regiment, and wounded seven men. After this a large earthen traverse was thrown up in front of the doorway, which stopped the shot from entering the building. The Goorkha Regiment (Sirmoor Battalion) made use of the upper storey of Hindoo Rao's house as an hospital. I

remember one of the Goorkha officers asking me to have some dinner with him one evening. While we were eating, there was a tremendous crash in the upper storey. The officer merely remarked that there was a shot upstairs, and a dead Goorkha soldier was carried past us a few minutes afterwards.

At this time we received the news of the revolt of the whole of the Province of Oudh and of the Gwalior contingent. The enemy received reinforcements almost daily. We could hear the strains of the bands of the mutineer regiments as they marched into the city across the bridge of boats. They played "Cheer boys, cheer," and other English tunes. After hearing the bands, we were always on the look-out for an attack, as the best regiments were sent out immediately on arriving to make a grand attack on our position. However, we also received some welcome reinforcements. A battalion of the 8th King's, a detachment of the 61st Regiment, and two regiments of Sikhs marched into camp at this period. We lost eight officers killed between the 8th and 20th June. Two native sappers were struck by fragments of a shell close to me, as we were going into one of the batteries. One poor fellow had his leg taken off and died in an hour; the other was severely wounded. As there was no medical officer present, I tied up the wound with a handkerchief. The behaviour of the men in all the regiments was beyond all praise. One of the Carabineers was struck by a shot, which carried away his arm and leg. He said, "Oh! there goes my arm and leg, give me a drop of water, please."

July 3rd.—Last night we were all ready for the assault, and very eager for it, but the order was countermanded.

Plans had been prepared on tracing cloth by the Engineer officers, and everything was in readiness. There were to have been five storming parties, with two Engineer officers to each party. Lieutenant W. Greathed (afterwards Major-General and C.B.), with Lieutenant A. McNeill and myself, were told off to head one of the storming parties, and to blow in with powder bags a grating through which the canal entered the city, but from which the water had been turned off. At this time we had 22 officers of Engineers with the Delhi Field Force, Colonel Baird Smith being in command. •

The late Major-General Wilberforce Greathed was a most distinguished officer. On the outbreak of the Mutiny he was attached to the Staff of the Lieutenant-Governor of the North-West Provinces as a *confidential Aide-de-Camp*. The day of his arrival at Agra he was despatched to Meerut with instructions to restore order, and open communications as far as practicable. Returning to Agra, he was sent on a second expedition to relieve some persons beleaguered in a factory in the Doab. In this he was successful. His next mission was as bearer of dispatches from Lord Canning for the General in command of the force moving on Delhi. The peril of this mission was very great, but it was accomplished in safety. Arriving at the camp before Delhi, he was appointed extra *Aide-de-Camp* to Sir Henry Barnard.

Lieutenant Walker* was severely wounded on the 14th July. The Chief Engineer thus alludes to this incident:—

* Afterwards General Walker, C.B., F.R.S., for many years Surveyor General of India. General Walker died in London in February, 1896.

"The casualties in the Engineer Brigade included three officers * * * Lieutenant J. T. Walker, of the Bombay Engineers, a young soldier of rare daring and self-possession, who was shot through the thigh after performing one of those noble acts of devoted valour. Directed to blow in the gate of a serai occupied in force by the enemy, he could only obtain a number of cartridges from the nearest field battery, as the supply of powder needful for the purpose; carrying these cartridges himself in full view of the enemy under a heavy fire, he was fortunate enough to succeed in lodging them against the gate without being hit. He lit the match and retired; but seeing after a time that the port-fire had burned out, he advanced again and re-lit it, when again it failed.

"He then procured a musket, moved out to the vicinity of the gate and fired into the powder, exploding it at once and blowing away the woodwork effectually. The attacking party at once rushed in and slew the whole of the enemy found inside. After this successful shot, however, Lieutenant Walker received a very severe gunshot wound in the thigh, the ball passing quite through the leg. Before recovering from this wound an attack of cholera supervened, and his services were lost for the remainder of the siege, just at a time when his excellent qualifications as a military surveyor, his clear intellect and proficient and cool courage, would have made his aid invaluable."



CHAPTER IV.

SIEGE OF DELHI (Continued).

LIEUT.-COLONEL BAIRD SMITH took command of the Engineer Brigade on the 3rd July, having travelled about 75 miles the previous day by such aid as he was able to procure, in the hope of being present at an assault of the place planned for the morning of the 3rd.

On reaching camp, however, at about 2 a.m., the Chief Engineer learnt that the project, like others of the same kind previously entertained, had been abandoned. He also learnt that the enemy was threatening in force the road from Badli-ka-Serai. On the same day, a strong column under Major Coke (now Major-General Sir John Coke, K.C.B.) was directed to proceed to Alipore, a point on the line of communication with the Punjab, where the enemy had established himself, having turned the position of the English force by a movement past its right flank on the 3rd of July. Happily, however, he withdrew, abandoning the advantages of his position, after inflicting some loss on the Commissariat post at Alipore.

After carefully inspecting the ground, and becoming acquainted with the details of the position occupied by the force, its capabilities, resources, and future prospects, the Chief Engineer arrived at the following conclusions :—

As regarded the plan of defence adopted by the enemy, it was quite clear that two leading ideas pervaded it ; first, to drive Sir Henry Barnard from his advanced position on the heights by incessant attacks on the position itself ;

and secondly, to force him to abandon that position by operations on his line of communications with the Punjab.

Of these two ideas, the enemy held the first with perfect clearness, and acted on it with an unswerving tenacity of purpose, which repeated defeats could scarcely shake. The second was neither apprehended distinctly, appreciated properly, or acted on vigorously by him. It is scarcely necessary to add that this want of discrimination influenced most gravely the fortune of the siege.

The garrison by the beginning of July must have consisted of not less than from 15,000 to 18,000 trained soldiers, and irregulars in even larger numbers.

The besieging force numbered of all arms under 5,500 fighting men, Europeans and natives. An enterprising enemy might, therefore, with perfect ease, have maintained one or more strong moveable columns, operating constantly on the communication, stopping convoys, harassing small detachments, disturbing the whole tract of country whence supplies were obtained, and finally, in all human probability, compelling the General to raise the siege from the impossibility of procuring subsistence for his army in a position so utterly insecure.

Instead, however, of obstinate and continuous operations of this class, the enemy was satisfied to make feeble efforts, never sustained for any considerable time, and easily warded off by corresponding movements of columns detached from the force. It was necessary, however, at the time now under notice, to take precautions against both forms of attack. The vast numerical superiority of the enemy converted the position of Sir Henry Barnard's force from the very first into that of a besieged, instead of a besieging, army.

Commencing on the 8th June, the attacks by the garrison on all points of the ground held outside the walls were incessant. The casualties of the force day by day were most serious. Many of its bravest and best officers had been killed or severely wounded; the daily average of casualties among the soldiers averaged from about 30 to 40, and on occasions of vigorous combats the loss rose from 100 to 150. It was scarcely possible to resist the conviction that the army was steadily and surely being used up by the ordinary process of the siege, and it seemed as though a simple calculation would show how long such a rate of waste of life could be sustained in presence of an enemy by a force numerically so feeble; long it plainly could not be. To shorten the siege, or limit the waste of life, were the urgent necessities of the position. The former could be effected only in one of two ways, the first by regular operations against the place, or second by an assault *de vive force*. The insufficiency of Artillery and Engineer *matériel* for even the most limited formal operation made the first plan wholly impracticable. An official return supplied to the Chief Engineer on the 4th July showed that in the Artillery Park the entire ordnance supplies of ~~the~~ force were—

Round shot, 24-pounders	150
„ „ 18-pounders	628
Shells, common, 8-inch	2,016
„ spherical, 8-inch	192
„ common, 24-pounders	240
„ spherical, 24-pounders	43
„ 5½-inch, 24-pounders	3,200

These details tell their own tale, and require no emphasis.

Such fire, indeed, as the batteries on the ridge were competent to sustain was sustained by purchase from day to day of the shot fired by the enemy, which were sedulously picked up by the camp followers. The whole supply of ordnance powder for 17 siege pieces in position was no more than 11,600lbs., barely sufficient for one day's active firing, and even the musketry powder had sunk to 12,900lbs. The Engineer Park was quite as insufficiently supplied for even the briefest formal operations.

It is questionable whether batteries could have been maintained, even if their first construction had been practicable, as revetting materials were in extremely small numbers. Hence there was no hesitation whatever in abandoning all idea of operations of this class.

The second course, viz., an assault *de vive force*, was plainly a most desperate expedient in the actual condition of the force at the moment. It could only have been justified by assurances of the highest authority that the critical emergency of political circumstances had been such that all risks must be run to achieve a success.

The possibilities of success were sufficient to have warranted the General in making an attack even so desperate as that on Delhi would have been. The Chief Engineer came to this conclusion at the time, and adhered to it until circumstances to be explained hereafter had completely changed.

Assuming, however, that an assault involving such undeniable risks might be deferred, systematic provision for reducing the waste of life on the ridge was of the most urgent necessity, and though the means were small, both in men and material, it was absolutely necessary that they

should be used and multiplied if the position were to be maintained for even a day.

On the morning of the 5th July, Sir Henry Barnard received the Chief Engineer at a confidential interview, which lasted about three hours.

The General in command explained to the Chief Engineer in the most unreserved terms his views of the position of the force, and at first, especially, he was evidently and most justly impressed with the deepest anxiety for its safety, and felt acutely the heavy weight of personal responsibility that must attach to his own decisions. The general conclusions to which the Chief Engineer had come, as briefly detailed above, were duly submitted to the General, and were fully discussed. Reserving his final decision, however, at the moment, he appointed a second meeting at noon of the same day, when he expected to be prepared to give definite orders.

There were no external signs of fatal sickness at that time apparent about Sir H. Barnard. A worn and anxious expression of face, with a certain heaviness and dimness of eye, not at all natural to him, were the only signs of suffering that attracted the Chief Engineer's notice. And even these passed away as the discussion advanced, till the general cheerfulness of bearing under all difficulties, which did so much to win for him the warm affection of the whole force he commanded, resumed its usual glow, and the Chief Engineer left Sir Henry Barnard at the close of the interview as resolute for the present, and as hopeful for the future as ever.

Scarcely an hour or two passed before the General was stricken with a deadly attack of cholera, and on the Chief

Engineer's return to headquarters at about 11 a.m. he was met by the medical attendants with the assurance that he could now see no one, and that the worst was to be feared as to the issue of the disease. The anticipation was realized the same afternoon, and it was with the truest sorrow that the army learnt of the loss it had sustained in the premature death of a chief admired by all for his undaunted courage, his unwearying activity, his single-hearted devotion to duty, and beloved by all for his thoughtful care, courteous bearing, generous appreciation of the efforts of his officers and men, and the general spirit he diffused around him. No one can make the conduct of Sir Henry Barnard during that terrible month of June, 1857, a careful study without feeling that few soldiers have ever faced sterner perils with a stouter heart, and none have surpassed him in devotion to the Crown, or in the resolute discharge of duty under physical and moral conditions, so exhausting that life sunk beneath their pressure.

On the death of Sir Henry Barnard, Major-General Reid, C.B., assumed the command of the Delhi Field Force.

The Major-General having communicated to the Chief Engineer his opinion that an assault *de vive force* was not expedient, attention was sedulously given to strengthening the position on the ridge, providing cover for the troops clearing jungle and brushwood on the slopes, so as to diminish as much as possible the cover for the enemy, and finally to the security of the communications, by the demolition of all the bridges by which the enemy could cross the Western Jumna Canal or Nujufghur Jheel Drainage Cut with his artillery. On the 7th July, Lieu-

tenants Greathed and Fulford,* with a detachment of sappers and pioneers, destroyed the Shalimar and Badlee bridges, as well as a third bridge. These bridges had all superstructures of wood on masonry abutments and piers, and the demolitions were effected by the use of small charges sufficient to clear away the masonry retaining the girders, and by the subsequent removal of the latter and the roadway resting on them. The beams were required for use in the Engineer Park, and it was important to save them. On the 8th, Lieutenants Geneste and Champain accompanied a strong column to Busaye, on the Nujufghur Jheel, and there destroyed the Busaye Bridge, the only remaining work of the kind on the Drainage Channel within moderate distance of the city. On the 9th, the remaining bridges between the camp and Alipore were dismantled by Lieutenants Stewart (now Lieutenant-General, retired list) and Carnegie. On the same day, the Poolchuddun Aqueduct, of which the demolition had previously been only partial, was completely destroyed.

As part of a concerted scheme, apparently, a detachment of the enemy's cavalry charged into the camp on the 9th, and after causing considerable confusion and some loss was repulsed with heavy slaughter. A general attack was also made on the position under cover of a very hot fire from the place. A strong column under Brigadier General Chamberlain advanced through the suburbs, clearing them of the enemy and driving him into the city.

It suffered most severely, however, the loss on this day

* Lieutenant Fulford died at Calcutta in 1858, on his way to England, from the result of exposure undergone during the siege, and in the campaign in the Arrah District.

being 228 in killed and wounded, considerably heavier than any other action in which the force had previously been engaged.

The Engineer Brigade was, however, happily strengthened the same day by the arrival of 300 Punjab sappers armed, under the command of Lieutenant Gulliver (now Lieutenant-General, retired list), and 600 pioneers unarmed, under Lieutenant H. A. Brownlow (now Lieutenant-General, retired list).

The latter had been formed by the Chief Engineer, on receiving orders to take command of the brigade, by volunteers taken from the workmen employed on the Ganges Canal at Roorkee. Strange to say, these men, who were at once transferred from the peaceful tasks of day-labourers to the most dangerous duties of working parties in siege operations, never exhibited a symptom of fear, but worked under the hottest fire like veterans, and were invaluable. The casualties among them were inevitably very numerous, but no instance occurred of their having hesitated to obey any order, whatever its consequences might have been. Lieutenant Brownlow brought with him under their escort a large supply of stores of various kinds for the Engineer Park, drawn from the workshops of the Canal Department.

Between the 10th and 14th July active work was carried on in strengthening the right flank of the position. Early in the siege, a lofty mound, evidently a disused brick-kiln, had been taken possession of, its crest roughly formed into a battery for three heavy guns, and an approach of easy slope cut along its face.

It was called "The General's Mound," from having been

a favourite position of Sir Henry Barnard during the many fights of which he was an eye-witness. It was between this mound and a mass of ancient Mahomedan buildings abutting on the Nujufghur Jheel Channel that the enemy's cavalry broke through on the 10th, and it was necessary to make the ground impracticable for horsemen. Strong parapets, deep ditches, and thick abattis of trees and brushwood were carried over all the open spaces; provision was made for placing field guns in battery behind the bank on the right of the mound. The line to the Drainage Channel was thereby strengthened to be safe against attack. On the morning of the 13th July, the Engineer Brigade lost one of its best and bravest officers by the death from cholera of Lieutenant Edmund Walker. Young in years, but ripe in varied experience, an accomplished soldier, a gallant gentleman, and a friend endeared to his brother officers by many noble qualities, his premature death was felt as a general private sorrow, and a severe public loss.

Part of the ground in front of the Pagoda piequet being wholly unflanked and supplying cover frequently taken advantage of by the enemy, it was determined that a small battery for two field guns should be constructed on the right of Perkins's Mortar Battery, a position commanding the ground in question. There being reason to anticipate another general attack on the right of the position, the battery, for the sake of expedition, was built of sandbags, covered with a screen of gabions. The pioneers completed the work between 3 a.m. till 11 a.m. on the 15th, notwithstanding interruption from the enemy. This battery was called Taylor's Battery, named after Captain Taylor.

About sunrise the enemy attacked, as was expected, and

the contest continued with variable vigour throughout the day. The position had been so gradually strengthened in all its parts that no impression could be made upon it. The troops remained quietly under cover of their parapets, and the artillery inflicted heavy loss on the enemy from all the batteries on the right.

Scarcely any casualties had occurred until it was determined to move out and drive the enemy from the strong and rugged ground he usually held. This was done, of course, but with some loss, and in the impetuosity of pursuit the column followed the retreating enemy close up to the walls of the city. There they were received with a murderous grape-shot fire, and officers and men fell thick and fast.

The commander of this column, Brigadier Chamberlain, was struck down by a dangerous wound, and before the troops could be extricated from their position, 13 officers and 209 men were placed *hors de combat*. The casualties in the Engineer Brigade included 3 officers, Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers, severely, and Lieutenants Geneste and Perkins slightly, wounded.

The total casualties in the two actions of the 10th and 15th having risen to nearly 500 men, it was necessary to abandon all idea of any active operations against the place from the latter date. Up to that date it had been the personal conviction of the Chief Engineer, duly submitted to the consideration of the Major-General commanding, that the possibilities of success by assault were such as would justify the attempt being made, should the political necessity for it be so great as to warrant very grave risks being accepted. It was no matter of regret to the Chief Engineer

that his judgment on this point was never put to the test, it having been held that the risks were greater than the circumstances of the moment would warrant the General in meeting, but from this time his views were entirely in accordance with that conclusion, and thenceforward but one idea regulated the operations of the Engineer Brigade, to prepare, namely, by economy of men and material on the spot, and by collection of the same from every available point for the breaching of the city walls, and the attack of the place by siege operations, followed by open assault.

On the 16th and 17th, the breastwork at the Pagoda picquet was strengthened, and a traverse constructed, batteries were repaired, and a magazine made for Taylor's Battery. Metcalfe's picquet was strengthened by a ditch in front of the cow-house. On the 18th a party of Major Coke's corps raised and strengthened the breastwork between Johnson's Battery and the Crow's Nest. At Metcalfe's picquet, an officer and 40 men were employed during the night in endeavouring to ascertain the truth of the supposed existence of an enemy's mine under the stable. The noise of what seemed to be miners at work was distinctly heard, but ceased on our party commencing to drive a shaft in the stall of the stable where the noise was most distinctly heard. On the 19th another desultory attack was made on our right, which continued for some hours. Our men suffered but little loss while behind their trenches and breastworks; most of those hit being struck by shots from the Subzee-Mundee taking them in reverse.

In the afternoon, a column under Brigadier Jones advanced and drove the enemy out of the Subzee-Mundee and Trevelyan Gunge. Lieutenant Crozier, of the 75th

Regiment, was killed on this occasion. On the 21st and 22nd the rear breastwork at the Metcalfe picquet was completed, very much improving the defences at that part, and placing them in a most satisfactory condition. On the 23rd and 24th, 30 sappers and 450 pioneers were employed in clearance at Subzee-Mundee, and in continuing the gabionade for a light mortar battery at the Crow's Nest post.

On the 25th—26th July, the lines of fire of the contre battery were altered and re-adjusted, so that one embrasure should bear on the Moree, a second on the Cashmere Bastion, and the third on Ludlow Castle. Lieutenant Greathed, with 40 sappers, completed the demolition of the Rohtuk Road Bridge, leaving a gap exceeding 60 feet in width.

Heavy rain fell on the 27th. The clearance round the Subzee-Mundee post was, however, continued, and the interior defences at the Pagoda picquet were strengthened and completed. On the left front the Flag Staff breastwork was improved. In addition to the above works, the preparation of gabions and fascines in the Engineer Park was continued daily without interruption.

On July 26th we had received no letters for six weeks, all having been stopped or lost, and we were still waiting for reinforcements. The enemy continued to make attacks on our position three or four times a week. Their average losses on each occasion amounted to some 300 or 400 men killed and wounded. Our position at this time was thoroughly entrenched on all sides, and perfectly secure from the enemy's attacks. About this time some attempts were made to destroy the bridge of boats across the Jumna river near the Selimgurh fort, by floating down rafts with

infernal machines, but none of them were successful. The rafts were formed of heavy blocks of wood secured together by ropes. In the centre of the raft was placed a barrel of gunpowder, with a pistol with the trigger at full cock placed in the barrel in such a manner that a sudden jar caused by the raft striking against an obstacle would discharge the pistol and ignite the gunpowder. After preparing these rafts, we used to row the rafts out into mid-stream, and there abandon them to the stream. None of the rafts, unfortunately, reached the bridge of boats. They generally were stopped by the sandbanks without exploding, but one or two exploded. At this time we had been seven weeks in front of the city with a force of about 3,000 men, and had to repulse the enemy's sorties, which were sometimes made with a force of 10,000 or 12,000 men. One of the greatest discomforts at this period of the siege was the great plague of flies. On picket duty the officers amused themselves by making labyrinths with sugar and water on paper, a little gunpowder being also sprinkled on the paper. When the flies accumulated into a black mass the powder was ignited and the flies were then got rid of, but only for a short time, after which they would collect as thickly as before.

It was usual to watch the enemy's sorties from the batteries on the ridge. They sometimes occupied an hour in issuing from the city—cavalry, artillery, and infantry. The ground between the ridge and the city was very favourable for the enemy, being covered with rocks, trees, and bushes, from behind which they were able to pick off our men.

It may be remembered that the siege took place during the rainy season, so that the troops were continually

drenched. The Engineer officers had to take parties of unarmed coolies out at dusk, and to work between the ridge and the city, their work usually consisting of felling trees and bushes, and clearing the ground in front of the picquets. Attacked by the enemy in the darkness and rain, it was really wonderful how patiently these poor coolies bore their sufferings, and their conduct was a matter of universal admiration. All the troops suffered alike. The officers received a daily tot or ration of rum like the men. Many of us carried a soda water bottle, containing the rum ration, into the trenches, and I attribute having survived the exposure and wet at this time in a great measure to this cause.

Many of us suffered from dysentery, and cholera had now begun its dire work. Lieutenant E. Walker, of the Engineers, who occupied a bed next to mine, was taken ill in the night, and died in about five hours, as already stated. The commander of the Delhi Field Force, Sir Henry Barnard, was seized with cholera on the 5th July, and also died in a few hours. All the officers who were not on duty at the time attended his funeral. Our uniforms were in rags, and we were glad to purchase articles of uniform or clothing of any kind at the sale of the effects of officers who had been killed or died. These sales took place almost daily; a bottle of beer sold for 4 or 5 rupees, and a bottle of brandy for 20 rupees. I dined at the Staff Mess on the evening of 17th June, after an attack which had been made on the enemy's battery at the Red Gurh, under command of Major (afterwards Sir Henry) Tombs.

I remember his coming into the tent with the blood flowing from his arm from a wound he had received during the

attack. Sir Henry Barnard proposed his health, to which we all drank.

Lieutenant Low (now Major-General Sir Robert Low, G.C.B., lately in command of the Chitral Expedition) and Lieutenant Evans, of the 9th Lancers, were at this time Aide-de-Camps to General Barnard.

Captain A. Taylor was at this time second in command of the Engineers. He seemed to have a charmed life. It was his habit to go about alone, sometimes mounted, but more frequently on foot, between the ridge and the city, reconnoitring the enemy's position, and he seemed to have the faculty of dispensing with sleep. On several occasions he succeeded in penetrating, alone and in daylight, through the enemy's outposts, to study the ground on which our operations would have to be conducted. Captain Greensill, H.M. 24th Regiment, who was attached to the Engineer Brigade as an Assistant Engineer, was shot dead by one of our picquets at night, being mistaken for one of the enemy. On the 9th July the enemy's cavalry broke into our camp, and cut up several grass cutters, whom they happened to meet. The morning was very dark and misty, and they were at first mistaken by our own men.

On this occasion Major Tombs saved the life of his subaltern officer, Lieutenant (now Lieutenant-General Sir James, G.C.B.) Hills Jones, twice going to his rescue and killing his opponent on each occasion. Lieutenant Hills was severely wounded, and both officers were awarded the Victoria Cross.

Although during the sorties that were of almost daily occurrence the fighting generally ranged along the whole of the front of our position, the picquets stationed at the

Subzee-Mundee may, perhaps, be awarded the palm for the deadly nature of the combats which they sustained, and for the severity of the fighting. Hand to hand combats were of frequent occurrence. On one occasion, during one of these fights, a rebel Sepoy thrust his head through an opening of the wall of the serai. A Goorkha Sepoy below the wall seized him by the hair and chopped off his head with one stroke of his kookree. Lieutenant T. Cadell (now Colonel Cadell, V.C., Indian Staff Corps), on the 12th June, unaided, rescued two wounded soldiers under a heavy fire, and was awarded the Victoria Cross. On the 8th June, Sergeant-Major C. Condar, 75th Regiment, penetrated, with three others, into a serai or walled enclosure held by the enemy, and rescued a wounded man. And again, on the 18th July, he returned under a cross fire to rescue wounded men. Colour-Sergeant S. Gavin, 60th Regiment, on the 23rd June, led a small party and dislodged the enemy from a house, and was conspicuous by his gallantry during the whole of the operations before Delhi. Colour Sergeant P. Green, 75th Regiment, also rescued a comrade on the 11th September, 1857, when hotly pursued by the enemy. The three non-commissioned officers above-mentioned were all decorated with the Victoria Cross. Private J. Thompson, 60th Regiment, on the 9th July, saved the life of the Captain of his company (Captain Wilton), when surrounded by the enemy, and was elected by the privates of the regiment for the decoration.

The route by which the troops marched from the camp to the ridge before arriving at the latter was much exposed to fire from the enemy's shot and shell throughout the siege. The shot fired from the city which missed the batteries on

the ridge just cleared the top of the ridge and fell in the valley beyond. Dead camels, horses and bullocks lay in every direction in this valley, and the stench was almost unbearable. The enemy had some shell of large calibre, and one evening, when riding out of the camp with another officer, Lieutenant Fulford, our horses became alarmed by an extraordinary rushing sound in the air. A 13-inch shell pitched almost at our feet, and buried itself, but, fortunately, without exploding. Lieutenant Edward Jones, of the Engineers, while engaged in superintending the construction of a breastwork, was struck by a round shot on the left leg, the shot also carrying away the calf of his right leg. His left leg was amputated immediately, and for two days he went on well. I saw him on the afternoon of the day on which he was wounded, and he seemed in good spirits and spoke cheerfully. He was lying on a small camp bed in the hospital tent. On the third day after he was struck, he was seized with fever, and died on the fourth day. The swarm of flies that invaded every part of the camp, and especially the hospital tents, greatly aggravated the sufferings of the wounded. Jones was a highly accomplished and talented officer, and his loss was deeply felt in the Corps of Engineers, as well as by his friends and all who knew him. He passed second in the Engineers out of Addiscombe in December, 1854, the first Engineer being Aeneas Macdonnell, who was drowned in a boat accident at Chatham in 1855. The Engineers of this term were singularly unfortunate—three, Macdonnell, Edon, and Battine were drowned in the boat accident at Chatham, Jones died from his wounds at Delhi, Meiklejohn and Dick, of the Bombay Engineers, were killed at the assault of the fortress of Jhansi, and

Gordon was drowned in the war with China in 1861. Of the survivors there still remain Colonel James Lindsay, Madras Engineers, retired; Colonel J. G. Forbes (Bengal), retired, and late Secretary to the Government of India in the Public Works Department; H. A. L. Carnegie, who retired from the service immediately after the conclusion of the war of the Indian Mutiny; and myself. Major-General Delafosse, C.B., the only survivor of the Cawnpore garrison, also belonged to this term.

At this time of the siege, 26th July, I learn from my diary that out of 45 non-commissioned officers of sappers who left Roorkee on the 14th May, 10 died at Delhi during the first six weeks of the siege, 1 was killed, and 9 wounded, and on the date above mentioned we had scarcely any fit for duty. Lieutenant Carnegie was slightly wounded by a musket ball in the arm. Among the wounded at about this time were Lieutenant J. T. Walker, Bombay Engineers, and Lieutenants Geneste* and Perkins, Bengal Engineers. We also heard at this time of the death of Lieutenant Innes, who was killed by the mutineers at Allahabad. He came out to India with Jones and myself in the *Ripon*, an old paddle-wheel steamer, in which we all nearly went to the bottom of the Bay of Biscay, being three days in a storm in the Bay without progressing a yard, and finally having to run into the Port of Corunna, in Spain. In the same ship were Lieutenants Hudson and Vyso, of the Carabineers, both of whom were killed in a charge at a place called Khasgunge, in the Doab, during the march from Delhi to Lucknow, with the column under Sir Thomas

* Lieutenant Geneste died in 1858, from the effects of the exposure undergone during the siege.

Seaton, in December, 1857. Another officer of the same regiment, Lieutenant de Bourbel, was wounded at the battle on the Hindun. It now began to be understood in the camp that the mutineers had broken out into mutiny some days before the time decided upon by the confederation, at the head of whom was the Moolvie of Fyzabad. This is also the view taken by Colonel Malleon in his history of the Indian Mutiny, and he states that the date fixed upon was the 31st May. . The punishment at Meerut of the 89 troopers of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who were sentenced by a court-martial to periods of imprisonment varying from 6 to 10 years for refusing to take the greased cartridges, precipitated the Mutiny. In a letter written from Delhi on the 26th July, 1857, I find that even as early as that time it was commonly reported that out of 74 regiments of infantry in Bengal, it was believed that only 5 remained staunch. We heard at this time that the Europeans at Agra had been compelled to retire into the fort, and we also heard of the capitulation of Sir Hugh Wheeler, at Cawnpore, and the subsequent massacre of all the Europeans at that station with the exception of Lieutenants Mowbray-Thompson and Delafosse, and two privates, who escaped after undergoing wonderful adventures and sufferings. It was frequently believed, and stated both by officers and men at this period of the siege, that death would be preferable to falling into the hands of the rebels.

The principal officers with the siege batteries were Colonel Garbett, Major James Brind (afterwards General Sir James Brind, G.C.B., and Colonel-Commandant of the Royal Artillery), Major Murray Mackenzie, and Major Kaye (afterwards Lieutenant - General). Major Mackenzie was

struck by the splinter of a shell on the 30th June, and died at Simla from the effects of the wound. Colonel Garbett, also, who was appointed Brigadier of Artillery on the appointment of Major-General Wilson to the chief command, was wounded on his way from one battery to another, and though the wound was little more than a graze, of which he took no notice at the time, it became afterwards a most virulent sore, which compelled him to take to his bed, and subsequently to leave the camp. He ultimately died of fever. Major Gaiskell, who joined at a later period of the siege, succeeded Colonel Garbett in command of the Artillery. Among the officers distinguished during the siege were Captain Johnson, Assistant Adjutant-General of Artillery (afterwards General Sir Edwin Johnson, G.C.B., Director-General of Military Education); Major Fagan, killed on the 13th September; Lieutenant Alfred Light (now Major-General), Captains Griffiths and Young, Commissioners of Ordnance; Lieutenant Minto Elliott (now Major-General), with the Artillery, and many others. There were also at the siege two officers, Lieutenant Roberts (afterwards destined to become Commander-in-Chief in India and Field-Marshal Lord Roberts of Kandahar) and Sir Donald Stewart, G.C.B. Lord Roberts was Deputy-Assistant Quartermaster-General of Artillery during the siege, was wounded on the 14th July, and his horse was shot under him on the 14th September.

Sir Donald Stewart commanded the volunteers serving in the Allypore District in May and June, 1857, and all communications with the upper provinces having been cut off, he volunteered to carry despatches from the Governor of the North-West Provinces to the officer commanding at

Delhi. On arriving at the camp he was appointed Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General of the Field Force, and served throughout the siege, and afterwards as Assistant Adjutant General at the siege and capture of Lucknow, and in Rohilkund.

Among other distinguished officers still living who were present at the siege are General Sir Henry Norman, G.C.B., Governor of Queensland, who was Adjutant-General after the death of Colonel Chester, killed at the battle of Badli-ka-Serai. General Sir Charles Reid, G.C.B., who commanded all the advanced posts on the right of the Delhi ridge, including Hindoo Rao's, the key of the position, during which 26 separate attacks were made, and also a column on the 17th June for the attack of Kissongunge, and the 4th column of assault on the 14th September, being severely wounded on that occasion. General Sir D. Probyn, K.C.B., who commanded the 2nd Punjab Cavalry. General Sir John Watson. Colonels Waterfield, Seonce, and Cantor, the latter of whom was selected as one of the subalterns of the ladder parties at the assault; and many others.

29th July.—This was the 50th day of the siege. The drainage of the camp and of the whole position was improved, and the ground in front of the centre battery cut away to enable the guns to fire on the ground 300 yards in their front. These and works of a similar nature were continued without intermission during the month of August.

At dawn on the 12th August a column consisting of
 350 1st Bengal Fusiliers,
 100 2nd Bengal Fusiliers,

100 8th King's Regin
 100 75th Regiment,
 300 Coke's Rifles,
 100 Sirmoor Battalion
 100 4th Sikhs,

total, 1,150 infantry, with cavalry and six guns in support, moved down to Ludlow Castle, to capture the two field guns which had been annoying us from the front of the stable of Metcalfe's house. The operation was successful, four light guns being seized on the road by Ludlow Castle, many of the gunners being bayoneted, and considerable loss inflicted on the enemy. Our loss was 19 killed and 90 wounded. Lieutenant Sheriff, 2nd Fusiliers, was wounded mortally ; Brigadier Showers and Major Coke, severely ; Lieutenant Owen, 1st Fusiliers, and the orderly officer to Brigadier Showers, slightly.

On the night of the 19th August, reports having been received that Lieutenant Hodson—who had gone in the direction of Rohtuk, to watch a body of mutineers, supposed to have moved in that direction—was in difficulties, a force consisting of about 1,000 infantry, 200 Mooltance Horse, some Guide Cavalry, and six guns, under Major Tombs, the whole under Brigadier-General Nicholson, marched at 11 p.m. to relieve him. The rain fell in torrents, and the column returned, having found the road impracticable beyond Alipoor. On the 22nd the enemy brought out three light guns, and about mid-day made a feeble attack on the centre battery, occupying the gardens below it, and firing up into the embrasures, but they retired again in the afternoon. On the 24th, Captain Taylor, with Lieutenants Medley,

Home and Thomason, made a reconnaissance of the ground from the Pagoda picquet to Marshall's house. The enemy's skirmishers fired heavily at the party, and one Goorkha was mortally wounded. —

I was sent out with a small party of sappers and some unarmed coolies in the beginning of August to a place about eight miles in rear of the camp, to repair an embankment in one of the irrigation channels which had burst, and from which an inundation was apprehended, with a party of irregular cavalry, under Lieutenant Willock, as an escort. From the time we left the camp, before daybreak, until our return to camp late in the evening, the rain fell in torrents, and every man of the party was drenched to the skin. The rain fell so heavily that the enemy remained quietly within the city walls, and we were unmolested.

On the 25th August, Brigadier-General Nicholson, with a force consisting of about 2,200 men of all ranks, and 12 guns, started at 4 a.m. to meet a body of the enemy, which, it was understood, had left the city on the previous day for Nujufgurh, with a view of coming upon our rear. In the evening he came upon them posted in strength near the village of Nujufgurh, and drove them from it with small loss, taking 13 guns. Several men from Coke's Corps and the 61st were wounded in an attack on another village, in which the enemy had taken refuge, and which was walled and difficult of access. Here Lieutenant Lumsden, Acting Commandant of the Corps, a most excellent officer, was, unfortunately, killed, and also Lieutenant Gabbett, of the 61st, and Lieutenant Elkington, of the same regiment. The rebels left all their camp equipment behind them. Lieutenant Geneste and 30 sappers destroyed the Nujufgurh

Bridge after the action, though still under a heavy fire.

On the afternoon of the 26th the rebels attacked our right, bringing out six guns. Apparently, they supposed that the main body of our troops had gone out with Nicholson's column. About 50 sowars rashly charged up to within 50 yards of Salkeld's Battery, where many paid the penalty of their rashness with their lives. Our casualties were 12 in this affair. General Nicholson's column returned at dusk.

On the 27th a battery for six light guns was marked out in the Pagoda left trench. The enemy fired a good deal at our working parties, but without doing any harm, and our batteries sustained their fire.

On the 30th August, Lieutenant Warrant (now Major-General, retired list), the Field Engineer on duty, was dangerously wounded by a fragment of shell while laying out an embrasure. His arm was amputated close to the shoulder.

On the 1st September, a shell fired from the other side of the river bursting in the Metcalfe stable killed and wounded nine men, these being the first casualties that had occurred from this battery. One sapper was also killed and two wounded by a round shot coming through an embrasure when they were at work.

At 2 p.m. on the 3rd September, Lieutenant Ward, with 100 pioneers, commenced the cutting of trees between the main picquet and Ludlow Castle, to clear the ground on the left flank of proposed Battery No. 1. They were not molested.

On the night of September 3rd and 4th, Lieutenant

Tennant (now Lieut.-General, C.I.E.) was sent down to construct a battery for two light guns on the right of the 6-gun battery, to fire across the front of the Sammy House, but the fire was too hot to enable any work to be done. A road for light guns was, however, made to the 6-gun battery. A magazine was commenced for the 6-gun battery, but little progress was made owing to the stony soil.

On the night of September 4th and 5th, 150 men, under Lieutenant Geneste, commenced the 2-gun battery; 60 men with two officers continued the cutting of trees.

The siege guns arrived on the 5th September; the remainder of the 60th Rifles on the 6th; and the Jummoo Contingent, led by Richard Lawrence, on the 8th. All was now ready for the breaching of the city walls and the subsequent assault.

CHAPTER V.

ASSAULT OF DELHI AND CAPTURE OF THE CITY.


“ As the wolves that headlong go,
As the stately buffalo ”
*The Siege of Corinth.*²—BYRON.

BEFORE describing the siege operations which commenced on the 7th September, it will be as well here to mention briefly the leading characteristics of the place, the description being taken from the Chief Engineer's report.

The eastern face of the city rests on the Jumna, and during the season of the year when our operations were carried on the stream may be described as washing the base of the walls. All access to a besieger on the river front is, therefore, impracticable. The defences here consist of an irregular wall, with occasional bastions and towers, and about one-half of the length of the river face is occupied by the King's Palace, and its outwork the old Mogul Fort of Selimgurh.

The river may be described as the chord of a rough arc formed by the remaining defences of the place. These consist of a succession of bastioned fronts, the connecting entains being very long, and the outworks limited to one crown work at the Ajmeer Gate, and Martello Towers mounting a single gun at such points as require some additional flanking fire to that given by the bastions themselves.

The bastions are small, mounting generally three guns in



*The Bridge and Fort of Selimgurh Delhi.
Captured by Assault by the Delhi Field Force under command of Maj. General Sir Archdale Wilson, Sept., 1857.*

each face, two in each flank, and one in embrasure at the salient. They are provided with masonry parapets about 12 feet in thickness, and have a relief of about 16 feet above the plane of site. The curtain consists of a simple masonry wall or rampart, 16 feet in height, 11 feet thick at top, and 14 or 15 feet at bottom. This main wall carries a loophole for musketry 8 feet in height and 3 feet in thickness. The whole land front is covered by a berm varying from 16 to 30 feet in width, and having a scarp wall 8 feet high. Exterior to this is a dry ditch about 25 feet in width and from 16 to 20 feet in depth. The glacis is a very short one, extending only 50 or 60 yards from the counterscarp. The ground occupied by the besieging force presents some features deserving of notice as having exercised a most important influence on the plan and progress of the works of the attack. On the western side of Delhi there appear the last outlying spurs of the Aravelli Mountains, represented here by a low ridge, which disappears at its intersection with the Jumna about two miles above the place. The drainage from the eastern slope of the ridge finds its way to the river along the northern and north-western faces of the city, and has formed there a succession of parallel or connected ravines of considerable depth. By taking advantage of these hollow ways, admirable cover was constantly obtained by the troops, and the labour of the siege was materially reduced. The whole of the exterior of the place presents a mass of old buildings of all kinds, of thick brushwood, and occasional clumps of trees, giving great facilities for cover, which during the siege operations proved, on the whole, more favourable to us than to the enemy.

In anticipation of the siege, means had been taken to

store the Engineer Park with all the materials and tools required during the operations. The arrival of the siege train having placed the Artillery in an equally satisfactory condition, ground was broken as soon after its arrival as possible, being on the night of the 7th September, 1857.

The project of attack submitted by the Chief Engineer to the Major-General commanding, and honoured with his sanction, provided for a concentrated rapid and vigorous attack on the front of the place included between the Water or Moree and Cashmere Bastions, provision being made at the same time for silencing all important flanking fire, whether of artillery or musketry, that could be brought to bear on the lines of advance to be taken by the assaulting columns. Due care was also taken to protect the exposed right flank of the trenches from sorties. The left was secured by being rested on the river, and by the occupation of the Koodsea Bagh, a very strong post in front.

The best information procurable indicated that on the front of attack the fire of some 25 to 30 pieces would have to be subdued. To effect this, 54 siege guns were available.

Captain Taylor, as has been before mentioned, succeeded on several occasions in penetrating alone through the enemy's outposts, for the purpose of studying the ground, and on the general information so obtained, and his own knowledge of the locality, Major Baird Smith prepared the project of the attack. On the evening of the 6th September the project was formally considered by General Wilson. General Nicholson volunteered to accompany Taylor to see the ground and the points selected for the batteries. It was now dark, and they did not know the strength or disposition of the rebels. They went to some of the places of most

importance, and found them unoccupied. Nicholson was satisfied, and reported what he had seen to General Wilson, who then gave his sanction to the Chief Engineer's proposals.

The plan of attack consisted, in principle, in establishing on the front of the fortification selected an artillery fire so much more powerful than that of the enemy on the same front that the result must be to silence his guns and crush his works. The Chief Engineer had good information that on the front between the river and the Cashmere Bastion not more than 30 heavy guns could be brought to bear upon our approaches. So arrangements were made for placing 56 pieces of siege ordnance, of various calibres, against this front, and in about four days the whole opened with terrific effect. Two excellent breaches were made in the walls within 48 hours; the cover for the enemy's infantry was at the same time utterly swept away; an incessant storm of shot and shell poured into the place, and on the 14th September all was ready for the final assault, which was accordingly given with brilliant success.

On the 7th September General Wilson issued an address to the troops, complimenting them upon their past conduct, warning them that the hardest part of their task was now about to begin, but assuring them that if they maintained their discipline they could not fail to succeed, and bidding them spare women and children, but give no quarter to mutineers.

About the same time the last reinforcements arrived from the Punjab.

The officers and men were regularly practiced in the loading and unloading of the siege materials on camels, and

every vicissitude that would be likely to occur was duly provided for. It was necessary that the attack should be directed against the northern face, represented by the Moreo, Kashmir, and Water Bastions, with the curtain wall between them. The evening of the 7th was fixed for the commencement of the tracing of the assailing batteries. Under the orders of Lieutenant W. Greathed, I was told off to assist in the tracing out of No. 2 Battery. This battery was situated in front of Ludlow Castle, 500 yards distant from the Kashmir Gate. It was designed with the object of silencing the fire from the Kashmir Bastion, to dismantle the parapets of the walls to the right and left which gave cover to the defenders, and to open a breach to the stormers. If I remember rightly, about 1,400 camels were employed to carry the fascines and other siege materials. The camels were quietly loaded, and the working parties marched off at dusk on the evening of the 7th. I remember being much struck by the brilliancy of the fire flies which sparkled amongst the trees and bushes as we marched silently along with the long train of camels. Darwin remarks, with reference to fire flies, that when the insect is decapitated the rings remain uninterruptedly bright, but not so brilliant as before, and that local irritation with a needle always increased the vividness of the light. The rings in one instance retained their luminous property nearly 24 hours after death. It would seem that the insect has only the power of concealing or extinguishing the light for short intervals, and that at other times the display is involuntary. The larvæ possess very feeble luminous powers, on the slightest touch feigning death and ceasing to shine.

For about a fortnight previous to the commencement of

the siege batteries, large working parties were sent out to cut the trees and bushes near the sites proposed for the batteries, and, from letters written at this period I find that, of all the duties during the siege, the supervision of these parties was the most arduous. The men were at work from dusk to dawn, groping and stumbling about in the long, rank jungle, wet through with the rain and dew, and frequently attacked by the enemy.

On the 9th, 10th, 11th, and 12th, the batteries were completed. These were of great size, built up to the soles of the embrasures entirely of fascines. 1,500 camels were employed nightly in carrying down the fascines.

Everyone expected that the attention of the enemy would be attracted on the first night to the grunting and noise of the camels, but, strange to say, the animals were unusually quiet. Strange, also, though it may seem, the enemy fired very little on the batteries which were under construction, although a heavy fire was concentrated upon them after they were completed and had opened fire. Almost all the Engineer officers present, and fit for duty, were on duty for three nights continuously at this period.

On the 12th the batteries opened fire, and the first salvo carried away a large portion of the wall of the Cashmere Bastion. No. 1 Battery consisted of five 18-pounders, one 8-inch howitzer, four 24-pounders. No. 2 Battery was placed in front of Ludlow Castle, and consisted of two 18-pounders, nine 24-pounders, and seven 8-inch howitzers. A battery of six 9-pounders and two 24-pounders, under Major Romington, had been placed below Hindoo Rao's house, so as to play on the Moree Bastion. No. 1 Battery, which was within 700 yards of the walls, was planted in

advance of this. Four guns of this battery were directed against the Kashmir Bastion, and six against the Moree Bastion.

The batteries in this position were under the command of Major Brind.

There was also a battery of 10 mortars under Major Tombs, and another battery at the Custom House under Major Scott. During the construction of the former battery, a rocket fired from the Moree Bastion ricocheted among the coolies employed in the battery, killing thirteen. Their comrades placed the bodies in a row, and went on with their work as before.

To reach the battery in the Custom House was a matter of great danger, owing to the continual storm of bullets fired from the Water Bastion. I remember looking up at the trees and seeing the leaves falling from the hail of bullets.

From the 9th to the 14th, the morning of the assault, the pounding went on day and night from about 50 guns and mortars. The Moree Bastion was soon silenced, and the line of parapet which sheltered the sharpshooters was stripped. The Kashmir Bastion was silenced in ten minutes after the Ludlow Batteries opened upon it.

There were 70 casualties in the trenches on the first day of the opening of the siege batteries. In a letter from the Chief Engineer to Major Brind, commanding the Artillery, the former wrote :—

“No. 1 Battery was unquestionably the key of the attack, and on its success depended the opening of Delhi to our assaulting columns. The progress of the other batteries depended essentially on its efficiency, and but for your

moral courage, clear perception, and unwavering resolution in arming and working it in spite of all obstacles, consequences would have followed causing the greatest embarrassment."

The fire from the left section of No. 1 Battery had been steadily directed against the Kashmir Bastion, when about noon on the 10th the half-battery caught fire from the constant discharge of the guns. The rebels at once directed on the burning battery every gun they could command, and it was only saved by the gallantry of Lieutenant Lockhart, who was on duty at the battery with two companies of the 2nd Goorkhas. Calling for volunteers, this officer jumped on the parapet, followed by six or seven Goorkhas, and, taking the sandbags from the top, they smothered the fire with the sand. Two of the Goorkhas were shot dead, and Lockhart was shot through the jaw, but by great exertions the survivors succeeded in extinguishing the fire.

On the 11th, the mortar battery opened fire, and Scott's heavy battery was unmasked.

An hour before noon on the 12th, No. 3 Battery on the left was unmasked. It was situated in the Old Custom House, and was constructed to a great extent of sandbags. It was here that Major Fagan, of the Artillery, was killed on the afternoon of the 13th.

I entered the battery a few minutes after this sad event. The Major's helmet, with the fatal hole through it, was lying in the battery.

On the 10th September, Private Divano, 60th Rifles, distinguished himself by leading a successful charge, and on the 13th September, Bugler Sutton was one of the party

which reconnoitred the breach. This bugler had previously, on the 2nd August, when the enemy were attacking in force, rushed forward and killed a bugler who was in the act of sounding. Both of these men obtained the Victoria Cross.

In the Water Bastion the fire from the heavy guns at the Custom House, at 160 yards, played with fearful effect; the guns were dismounted and smashed, and the breach opened; while under the play of Tombs's mortars the curtain was literally stripped. The losses of the British from the enfilading fire of the enemy were very heavy, but the assault was no longer to be delayed, and on the night of the 13th the order was issued for the assault to take place at day-break on the following morning.

The dangerous duty of examining the breaches was performed by three Engineer officers, Lieutenants Medley,* Lang† and Greathed‡. Medley and Lang crept out and reached the edge of the ditch undiscovered, descended into it, and although they saw the enemy was on the alert they carefully examined the breach. A volley was fired at them, but they returned unhurt, and reported the breach practicable. A similar report was received of the breach in the Water Bastion.

I was on duty in the Custom House Battery on the night of the 13th, and about midnight received an order to return at once to the camp, and to join the reserve columns under Brigadier Longfield, Lieutenant David Ward being also told

* Lieutenant-General Medley entered the service in 1847, and died in 1886.

† Colonel Lang, R.E., formerly Head of the Thomason Civil Engineering College, Roorkee.

‡ Major-General W. W. Greathed, C.B., died December, 1878.

off to this column. The Engineer officers were told off to the several attacking columns by seniority.

There were to be four columns of attack, with a reserve; the first was to storm the breach in the Kashmir Bastion, the second that in the Water Bastion, the third to enter by the Kashmir Gate, when blown in by the Engineers, and the fourth on the extreme right to clear the Kissengunge suburb, and then enter by the Lahore Gate, while the reserve was to follow in the wake of the first three columns, and throw in supports when necessary.

The columns consisted of —

No. 1.—Under General Nicholson, 1,000 men.

No. 2.—Under Brigadier-General Jones, 61st Regiment, 800 men.

No. 3.—Under Colonel Campbell, 52nd Light Infantry, 1,000 men.

No. 4.—Under Major Reid, Commanding Sirmoor Battalion, 780 men.


Reserve.—Under Brigadier-General Longfield, 1,200 men.

After being told off to the different columns, the officers joined the storming parties, and marched with the column to their respective posts. I remember that on arriving with the reserve column at Ludlow Castle that it was just daylight. The guns from the batteries, which had kept up a heavy fire during the night, suddenly ceased, and for a few minutes there was a lull in the firing, and an unusual stillness seemed to prevail. This was suddenly ceased by a loud explosion from the Cashmere Gate, and by a fierce rattle of musketry from the different columns of assault. As the accounts of the blowing in of the Cashmere Gate by the party under Lieutenants Home and Salkeld have

varied in some slight particulars, I will merely in this narrative extract from a letter written immediately after the siege.

It was just daylight when the third column halted at a turn in the road which concealed them from view of the walls, but close to the Cashmere Gate. Lieutenants Home and Salkeld, of the Engineers, and Sergeants Carmichael, Burgess and Smith, and four sappers, with Havildar Madho and Bugler Hawthorn, H.M. 52nd Regt., advanced from the column up to the gate. It was an immensely heavy wooden gate, flanked on all sides by the walls. Home laid the powder bags at the foot of the gate. The party was instantly discovered, and a heavy fire opened upon them from all sides. Sergeant Carmichael took the fuze, and was on the point of firing it when he was shot dead by a Sepoy who placed his musket through a hole in the gate. Sergeant Burgess took the fuze from his hand, and was also shot dead, Lieutenant Salkeld then took the fuze, and was shot through the arm, and fell into the ditch, breaking his leg by the fall. As he fell he threw up the fuze, which Sergeant Smith seized, and fired the charge, and jumped into the ditch. At the same time the bugler sounded the advance, and on rushed the column. The charge blow up the gate, and about 17 of the enemy who were close to it. Our troops rushed in at the gate, up the bastion, and along the walls. At the same time the first and second columns attacked by the breaches, and the walls were cleared of the defenders. The Cashmere Gate presented a terrible sight; several Sepoys had been blown up by the explosion, and others, bayoneted or shot by the assailants, were lying all about. I noticed that the men on guard at the gateway were for

CASHMERE GATE



the most part men of the Hurrianah Light Infantry. I remember also noticing that they were a villainous-looking lot. The same scene of carnage and destruction was visible along the walls and bastions. No quarter was asked or given. I went into the Cashmere Bastion, and such a scene of destruction has seldom been witnessed. Almost every gun was dismounted and smashed by the fire from our guns, large pieces of iron being in many cases knocked out of the guns. Dead Sepoys lay about in all imaginable positions. The troops took up positions in the College and Church, but the enemy fired at us during the whole of the night of the 14th. I saw hundreds of wounded men carried by in doolies; I also saw the dooly carried by that contained General Nicholson, who had been shot. At dusk we made a battery by the College, and commenced shelling the town and palace. The battery was, as far as I recollect, under the command of Captain Hamilton (now Lieutenant-General Sir W. Hamilton, Bart.), and a heavy fire was kept up on the city from this battery during the whole of the night of the 14th. We lost most of our men in the town. They advanced too far without supports, and were fired at from the walls and houses. Our losses in the assault and taking of the city were 64 officers and 1,380 men killed and wounded.

Surgeon H. T. Reade (now Surgeon-General and C.B.) was one of the first in the breach, and succeeded in spiking a gun.

Captain R. H. Shebbeare, 60th N.I., was severely wounded while endeavouring to capture a loop-holed serai. The name of Ensign Phillips, 11th Bengal N.I., was proverbial in the Delhi Field Force for the number of gallant acts

performed during the siege. He was thrice wounded, and captured the Water Bastion on the 14th September with a small party of men. This gallant and promising young officer was killed during the street fighting on the 18th. These officers were awarded the V.C. for their conduct on the 14th.

Among the non-commissioned officers who greatly distinguished themselves on the day of the assault was Colour-Sergeant Waller, 60th Rifles, by charging and capturing a gun; Sergeant MacGunnis and Drummer Ryan, of the 75th Regiment, by throwing ammunition boxes into the water, thus saving many lives; Lance-Corporal H. Smith, 52nd Regiment, by removing a wounded comrade under a heavy fire at the Chandnee Chowk; Sergeant J. Smith and Bugler Hawthorn, who were with Lieutenants Home and Salkeld at the Cashmere Gate. All these men obtained the V.C., and Sergeant J. Smith afterwards obtained his commission.

Scott's Field Battery, which had entered the city by the Kashmir Gate, had during all this time rendered splendid service to the several columns, but at a large expenditure of life.

At the assault on the 14th, the storming party under Captain Baynes, R.M. 8th Regiment, lost the greater part of their number.

On the same day, from a detachment of 200 men of the 9th Lancers, the losses were 6 officers and 42 men.

Of the 17 Engineer officers engaged, Lieutenant Tandy was killed, and Salkeld died from his wounds a few days afterwards. Lieutenants Greshed, Maunsell, Chesney, Medley, Hovenden and Pemberton were wounded.

The losses during the fighting on the 14th were 8

European officers and 162 rank and file killed, and 510 wounded. Of natives 103 were killed and 310 wounded.

Lieutenant Bristowe, II.M. 8th Regiment, was killed on the 18th September.

On the 16th the Magazine was stormed by II.M. 61st Regiment, Wilde's Punjabs, and the Beloochees, the whole under Colonel Doacon, of the 61st. I was attached to this column. The enemy were surprised, and offered very little resistance. But in the afternoon they returned and made an attack in great force on the Magazine. They opened a heavy fire on the turrets, where men of the 61st were posted to keep down the enemy's fire. A soldier of the 61st was shot through the head by my side in one of these turrets. The poor fellow lived for about 20 minutes, writhing in agony on the ground. The rebels set fire to the roof of the Magazine, the fire being extinguished with much difficulty, and Renny, of the Artillery (afterwards Major-General), got upon the roof with some 10-inch shells, which were handed up to him, and which he dropped on the enemy's heads. He dropped five or six shells in this manner, and many of the enemy must have been killed, as they ceased their attack soon afterwards. We afterwards heard that the rebels who attacked the Magazine were fanatics.


On the 18th a reconnaissance was made by Captain Taylor, who penetrated as far as the Chandnoo Chowk; he found the houses partly occupied by their usual inhabitants, and not by an armed enemy. On the 19th, with a small detachment, Taylor worked through the houses and captured the Burn Bastion.

On the night of the 19th I was again on duty in a large house facing the palace, and received orders to place it in a

state of defence. This was done by placing sandbags between the interstices of the parapets on the top of the house. The enemy kept up a slack fire during the night. I was relieved at daybreak and returned to the Engineer camp, which had been removed down to the glacis outside the Cashmere Gate, and shortly afterwards we heard that the palace had been captured, and that the whole city was in our possession. The defeated rebels fled in every direction, and the British flag once more waved over the walls of the capital of Northern India.


A memorial monument commemorates the capture of Delhi. The besieging army subscribed one day's pay towards its erection, but this sum, though amounting to nearly 20,000 rupees, falling short of the estimate, the building was taken in hand by the Government, and completed at a cost of 21,400 rupees.

It is built on the ridge, on the site of the right battery, and being 110 feet high, is visible from every point. Though not bold and commanding, it is of elegant and chaste design. It bears on its faces the names of the officers and men of the several British regiments, and of the English officers of the native regiments, who fell during the siege. It is provided with a winding staircase on the inside, and the view from the top is very beautiful.



Memorial on the Ridge Delhi

Map of the Delhi District and Oude *Shewing the Routes of the Columns after the Capture of Delhi.*



English Miles 688 = 1 Degree

Route of Column under Brig-General Showers	-----
" " " " Colonel Gerard	-----
" " " " Brigadier Seaton	-----
" " " " " Walpole	-----

CHAPTER VI.

OPERATIONS IN THE REWAREE DISTRICT AND IN THE DOAB.—1857.

“ The year when the tempest of mutiny broke,
And the empire swayed like a storm-bent oak —

Verses Written in India — SIR ALFRED LYALL.

I REMAINED in the city of Delhi after its capture until the 1st of October, and went all over the town and saw the principal buildings.

Hodson went out and captured the King and the Princes on the 21st and 22nd September, and the two sons of the King and his grandson were shot by Hodson. Some of the Europeans in Delhi were, it is believed, killed by one of the King's sons with his own hand, and I can only affirm that I never heard a dissentient voice at that time to the statement that the Princes had deserved their punishment. I saw the bodies of the Princes exposed in the Kotwālī. They were dressed like native servants.

A column under Colonel Greathed (afterwards General Sir Edward Greathed, K.C.B.), of the 8th King's Regiment, went out from Delhi in pursuit of the mutineers. Lieutenant Salkeld lived several days after receiving his wounds. Home escaped untouched, but a few days afterwards was killed by an accidental explosion, while blowing up the Fort of Malagurh.

The first building that I went to see was the Jumma Musjid, the following description of which and of the city is taken from Beresford's *Delhi*, 1856.

“The most famous Mosque in the East, the Jumma Musjid, stands about half-way between the Delhi and Cashmere Gates of the city, and is close to the celebrated street called the Chandnee Chowk. It is built on a rocky eminence called the Jujala Pahar, and is considerably elevated above the surface of the ground.

“It has three entrances by handsome gateways of red sandstone, which are approached by magnificent flights of steps of the same material. The principal gateway is to the east side, and is much longer and handsomer than those on the north and south. This gateway is now closed by order of the Government, and it is only a few years ago that the Mosque was restored to the Mahomedans.

“They all lead into a large quadrangle paved with fine large sandstones, in the centre of which is a marble reservoir of water.

“On the west side of the square stands the Mosque itself, which is of an oblong form, 201 feet in length, and 120 feet broad, and surmounted by three superb cupolas of white marble, crowned with culices or spires of copper richly gilt. The front of the building is partly faced with white marble, and along the cornice are the compartments, each 10 feet long and $2\frac{1}{2}$ feet broad, which are inlaid with black marble inscriptions in the Niski character. (These give an account of the sums spent on the building). The interior is paved throughout with slabs of white marble 3 feet long by $1\frac{1}{2}$ broad, each decorated with a black border, which gives it an extremely beautiful appearance. Part of the inner wall is also faced with plain white marble. Near the kibla, or that part which indicates the direction of the city of Mecca, is a handsome Taq, or niche, adorned with a profusion of

rich friezework, and though joined in several places, appears to have been cut out of a solid block of white marble 4 feet high, and 6 feet in length. The Mosque is flanked by 2 minarets 130 feet high, composed of white marble and red sandstone placed vertically in alternate stripes, and access is obtained to the top of them by flights of narrow steps of red sandstone in the interior; at about equal distance there are three projecting galleries, and they are crowned with light pavilions of white marble. From these, very extensive views can be obtained. Three sides of the terrace, on which this magnificent edifice stands, are enclosed by a colonnade of sandstone, and each corner is ornamented by octagonal pavilions of white marble, the supporting columns being of red sandstone. In the quadrangle at the north-east and south-east are low pillars, on the top of which are fixed marble slabs, on one of which is engraved the Eastern Hemisphere, and on the other there are marked certain hour lines; each has an upright iron spike, or gnomon, and the shadows shown by the sun indicate to the faithful the time of prayer.

“ This splendid pile was commenced and finished in Shah Jehan’s reign (A.D. 1629–58), and it is said to have cost over £100,000, and to have employed a daily average of 5,000 workmen for a period of 6 years.”

THE FORT OF SELINGURH.

This is just outside the palace, the river separating the two; they were connected by a bridge of five arches, erected by Jehanghir, but of which there is no trace now, the British Government having replaced it by the present one.

Selingurh was built by Selim Shah, the son of Shih Shah

(commonly called the usurper). It was completed, it is supposed, about A.D. 1546, before the present city of Delhi was in existence. The name Nurgurh was given to it by the Emperor Humayon and his successors; this being the only name that was allowed to be used when speaking of it at Court, but it always retained its original appellation, and to this day is termed Selimgurh. After Shah Jehan's palace was built, Selimgurh was used as a State prison. The East Indian Railway passes through it.

The present Delhi, or, properly speaking, Shahjehanabad, was built by Shah Jehan, who commenced it in A.D. 1648, and beyond a few alterations and repairs to the battlements and glacis, the city is much the same now, externally, as it was in the days of the Great Mogul.

The city was entered by the Persian conqueror Nadir Shah in A.D. 1793, when the Emperor Mahomed, after having been defeated, was led back by the conqueror to his capital. A report arose that Nadir Shah had been killed, and the people rose on the Persian guard.

The Indian nobles gave over to be murdered the Persian soldiers placed over their houses to prevent any exactions from the troops of the invading army, but, notwithstanding these outrages, Nadir Shah endeavoured to still the tumult. At last he was wounded, and one of his chiefs was slain by his side, upon which he gave the order for a general massacre, he sitting at the Dureeba Gate, inside the city, to see how his orders were carried out, and from morning till night the wholesale slaughter continued.

The Emperor, it is said, with tears in his eyes, entreated Nadir Shah to give orders for the cessation of the massacre, and that order being given—such was the discipline of the

Persian army—was immediately obeyed. It was on this occasion that all the wealth accumulated by the Great Mogul Emperors Akbar, Jehangir, Shah Jehan and Aurungzib was lost to Hindostan.

The Peacock Throne of Shah Jehan, said to be worth 6,000,000 sterling, and gold and silver of an almost incalculable value, were carried off; the extortions of the Persians were carried out on high and low, and torture was not spared to induce the sufferers to reveal where their wealth lay. The empire never recovered from this disastrous invasion.

I suffered from a bad attack of fever, which returned whenever I was exposed to the sun, and, indeed, most of us were knocked up by the exposure of the campaign.

Sir Theophilus Metcalfe had an attack of cholera, but recovered. On the 2nd October I was ordered, with Lieutenant Humphrey, of the Engineers, to join General Showers's column, which was under orders to proceed to the Rewaree district. We had two companies of untrained Sikh Sappers. The column consisted of 120 men of the Carabineers, the 2nd European Fusiliers, a regiment of Goorkhas, a regiment of Sikhs, and two regiments of Irregular Cavalry, 1 battery of Artillery, and 2 heavy guns.

We captured four forts which had been deserted by the enemy, and which were all in a perfect state of defence. These were the forts of Bulubgurh, Rewaree, Jhujjun, and Kanound.

Of these, Rewaree was held by a refractory Rajah, named Toolsi Ram. He seemed to have been preparing his defences until the last moment, but on the arrival of the force about eight miles from the town, his courage seemed to have

failed, and he fled with all his troops, leaving his guns loaded to the muzzle with grape, and all his ammunition and stores.

Lieutenant Humphry and myself, the only Engineer officers present with the column, received orders to destroy the fort, which we did by blowing up the gates and bastions with large charges of the Rajah's gunpowder. We then set fire to the place and abandoned it. The Sikh sappers that we had with us were untrained men, who had been brought down from the Punjab to work in the batteries before Delhi. They were men of low caste—Muzbis—and although unskilful as sappers, we were glad to have them. The work of the European commissioned and non-commissioned officers was doubled during the siege of Delhi and the subsequent operations, owing to the mutiny of trained sappers at Meerut. Of these latter, who accompanied us to Delhi, more than half were killed or wounded.

Consequently, at Rewaree Humphry and myself had to fill the powder bags and place the charges in the mines, and we found that the Muzbi Sikh required the most constant supervision. The fort of Rewaree is situated about 50 miles to the south-west of Delhi.

The last fort that we captured was that of Jhujjur, where the Nawab was taken and sent into Delhi to be tried by a military commission.

We made many circuitous marches at this time, but were unsuccessful in coming up with the enemy, except on one occasion, when the cavalry cut up about 50 of the rebels.

The men of this force enjoyed excellent health, and the regular exercise of marching and good food enabled them

to recover from the effects of the privations and hardships of the siege. We now learnt that all the Engineer officers and sappers who were in Delhi when we left had been ordered to Agra. I thought it disappointing at the time not to have been able to have gone with them, but, as it afterwards turned out, it was very fortunate, as I was attached to the column of Brigadier Seaton, which had some severely-contested actions in the Doab, which will be afterwards mentioned.

At this time, October, 1857, not a European soldier had arrived higher north than Cawnpore. Great amusement was derived from some speeches that had been made in Parliament regarding the condition of the troops. The honorable member "wished to know if the troops before Delhi were supplied with tunics." Had he seen the ragged state of the troops at the early part of the siege he would have been greatly astonished.

The Queen's regiments wore clothes dyed khaki, with the exception of the 9th Lancers, who were always in white jackets and white cap covers, and the 60th Rifles, who kept to their dark green uniform. We heard at this time some details of the number of the European troops who were being sent out from England, and this caused great satisfaction in camp.

The natives in the part of the country where we were marching at this time did not believe that there were any Europeans in India except those that they saw with Brigadier Showers's column.

After capturing Jhujjur and the fort of Kanound, and on arriving near Buluhguth, the Rajah, a notorious rebel, came out to meet us in a carriage. The cavalry received

orders to fall in round his carriage, and escorted him back to the fort, when he was tried by a commission and sentenced to death. From Bulubguib we marched to Padshahpore, 29 miles from Delhi, where we were employed in repairing the fort. The nights at this time were very cold, and we were glad of rugs or anything to put over us. We usually marched at 2 or 3 o'clock in the morning, and were glad when we were occasionally allowed to light a fire on the march to warm ourselves.

Since the outbreak at Meerut on the 11th of May, I did not receive a line from my friends in Calcutta until November or December.

The Sikhs were great plunderers, and after entering some of the towns, everything of value was found to have been looted.

The arrangements with regard to the jewels and prize captured at Delhi gave great dissatisfaction to the troops, and it was generally believed that they did not receive their proper shares.

Brigadier Showers returned to Delhi on the 19th of October with three rebel chiefs as prisoners, and much booty, and also with specie of the value of £80,000, 70 guns, and a large quantity of ammunition. A few days afterwards I received orders to return to Delhi, but was only there for a few days. The town had a melancholy and deserted appearance, the shops being closed, and the streets empty. I was then ordered to join a column near Narnoul, in the Rewaree district. Lieutenant Humphry, who I had left a few days before, had been severely wounded while acting as Aide-de-Camp to Colonel Gerard in an action with the rebels at Narnoul. Humphry received about 17 wounds,

most of which were sabre cuts. I am glad to say that he is still alive and well, and is now Major of Invalids at Chelsea Hospital, where he has been for many years.

The action at Narnoul was a very severely-contested one. The rebels had taken up a strong position, but did not wait to be attacked, and advanced to meet our troops in the plain. Then ensued a cavalry fight; the Guides led by Kennedy, and the Carabineers by Captain Wardlaw, afterwards killed at Gungeree, as will be presently related.

The rebels fought well, but eventually gave way. The infantry and artillery followed up the advantage gained by the cavalry, and the enemy were soon in full flight; but Colonel Gerard, at this time riding in front on a white Arab, was mortally wounded by a musket shot. The rebels rallied and made a desperate effort to regain the battle, but in vain. The Fusiliers charged them, and again put them to flight. Lieutenant F. D. M. Brown, of the Bengal Fusiliers (afterwards Colonel in the Bengal Staff Corps), greatly distinguished himself on this occasion, and was awarded the Victoria Cross for rescuing a wounded soldier under a heavy fire, the enemy's cavalry being only 50 yards off. One of our elephants was struck by a round shot in this action.

General Seaton (afterwards Sir Thomas Seaton), who was at the time at Delhi, was appointed to the command of the Brigade, to take the place of Colonel Gerard. General Seaton kindly offered me a seat on his elephant, and we rode out to join the column, a distance of 35 miles. I think we were 12 hours doing this distance. On another occasion I rode an elephant 37 miles in a day in Upper Assam, and the latter was a much more fatiguing ride, owing to

the numerous streams and rivers that had to be crossed, the elephant frequently sinking over the girths, and swimming.

On several occasions while marching with General Seaton's column we saw very large herds of antelopes, but we had no time for shooting. On one occasion several of the animals leapt right on the top of a detachment of the 1st Fusiliers, who were marching in a deep ravine, and several were killed by the men.

A few days afterwards General Seaton led the men back to Delhi, previous to marching to join the force under Sir Colin Campbell, who was then at Cawnpore.

We marched out of Delhi on the 8th December, and a few days afterwards came upon the rebels, who had taken up a strong position between Gungeree and Khasgange. The cavalry, consisting of the Carabineers under Captain Wardlaw, some of the 9th Lancers, and Hodson's Horse, attacked and routed them, but the victory was marred by the loss of three gallant officers, Captains Wardlaw and Hudson, and Lieutenant Vyse. Just a year before I started from England for Calcutta in the *Ripon*, and among the passengers were 4 officers of the Carabineers going out to join their regiment. They were Captains Uniacke and Hudson, and Lieutenants Vyse and De Bourbel; of these Hudson and Vyse were killed at Khasgange, and De Bourbel was wounded at the action on the Hindun. Lieutenant Evans, of the 9th Lancers, Aide-de-Camp to Sir Henry Barnard, was also on board this steamer. Mr. Lucas, a gentleman travelling to India for pleasure, was also a passenger. He happened to be at Lucknow at the time of the outbreak of the Mutiny,

rendered excellent service as a volunteer, and was killed during the siege.

Lieutenant Baker Russell (now Major-General Sir William Baker Russell, K.C.B.) brought the squadron out of action at Khasgange.

The day after this action we again came up with the enemy, and defeated them with great loss, and captured several guns. Hodson, with his regiment, pursued the rebels for several miles, and left about 500 dead on the ground.

Either on this day or the preceding one Hodson killed 12 armed mutineers in a room with his own hand. A few days after this Hodson volunteered to ride across the enemy's country to carry despatches to Lord Clyde. The distance was about 55 miles, and had not been traversed by an European since the outbreak of the mutiny. He rode this distance, on his return skirting a village occupied by the rebels, but some of his men were killed. I saw him come into our camp on his return, and he looked fresh and smart as if he had just come back from a morning ride. The men cheered him as he walked through the camp.


We had another action at Mynporee on the 27th December, when we forced the enemy from his position, capturing six guns and routing them in all directions.


General Seaton's column arrived at Fettegurh on the 6th January, 1858, and joined the army under Sir Colin Campbell. It was an inspiring and delightful sight to see again the kilts and bonnets of the Highlanders and the troops fresh from England, and the sailors of Peel's Naval Brigade.

As Brigadier Seaton's column was now merged in the

larger force, under the Commander-in-Chief, Sir Colin Campbell, I will here conclude this portion of my narrative as being the end of the first campaign

* Some incidents of the second campaign, in which I had the good fortune to be engaged, and which included the siege and capture of Lucknow, the campaign in Rohilcund, and the capture of Bareilly, will be narrated in the following pages.





CHAPTER VII.

THE CAPTURE OF LUCKNOW.

"Well have we done, thy valiant countrymen;
But all not done; the French yet keep the field."

King Henry V. — SHAKESPEARE.

A FEW days after the junction of the column under Brigadier Seaton with that of the Commander-in-Chief, Lieutenant Patrick Murray* and myself were ordered out with a column under Brigadier-General Walpole, with a company of native sappers, to the Ramgunga River, distant about 10 miles from Futtehgarh. The enemy were on the other side of the river in considerable force with two or three guns, and occasionally sent a round shot into our camp; but this fire was almost immediately silenced by our guns. On one occasion a round shot pitched right into the tent where Murray and myself were sitting, smashing the table that was between us, and embedding itself in the ground in the floor of the tent. The shot was of irregular shape, about the size of a large orange. The movement of a force to the Ramgunga River, which was not fully understood at the time, was afterwards ascertained to have been a feint to induce the rebels to suppose that we were meditating an invasion into Rohileund while Sir Colin Campbell concentrated his forces for the capture of Lucknow. The ruse answered its purpose very effectually, as it kept a consider-

* Major Murray was afterwards 2nd in command of the Bengal Sappers and Miners, and died at Roorkee in 1872.

able number of the enemy engaged in watching our movements.

It was at this time that the outline of the proposed operations for the reduction of Lucknow were drawn up. In a memorandum to Lord Canning, dated December 22nd, 1857, Sir Colin Campbell wrote:—

“Colonel Napier has given the deliberate opinion, in which I coincide as regards numbers, that 20,000 men were necessary for the first operation of subduing the city. That having been performed, it will be necessary to leave a garrison in occupation, consisting of at least 10,000 men, viz., 6,000 in the city, and 4,000 in a chain of posts on the Cawnpore roads, until the whole province should have been conquered, and the rebels driven out of their last stronghold.”—(*Life of Lord Clyde*, Vol. II., p. 68).

Early in January, 1858, Colonel Napier returned to his post as Chief of the Staff to Sir James Outram at the Alum Bagh, while that General had been left with a force to hold the ground pending the return of Sir Colin. Whilst there he soon formed the opinion that the attack should be made on the east side, accompanied by a flank movement on the north across the River Gomtee, which would take the enemy's fire in reverse. He, therefore, devoted the interval between his arrival at the Alum Bagh and that of Sir Colin with his force to a careful inspection of the ground on both sides of the river. The following reasons for his views were published in the *Royal Engineers Professional Papers*, Vol. X.

The east side offered: first, the smallest front, and was, therefore, the more easily enveloped by our attack; secondly, ground for planting our artillery, which was

vacated on the west side ; thirdly, it gave also the shortest approach to the Kaiser Bagh, a place to which the rebels attached the greatest importance, more than all, we knew the east side, and were little acquainted with the west.

Everything was decided in accordance with Napier's view, and on the 10th he was appointed to the command of the Engineer Brigade. The city of Lucknow being upwards of 20 miles in circumference, it was utterly impossible to attempt an investment or a siege under ordinary conditions. The town is bounded on the north by the Goomtee, and on the east by a canal which runs northward from that river. About half-way between the canal and the Residency stands the King's palace—the Kaiser Bagh. This was the citadel of defence, and was covered by three lines.

The first was a flanked rampart on the main side of the canal, which formed a wet ditch to it. The second, with a circular trace, enclosed a large building called the Mess House, and another called the Motee Mahal, whilst the third consisted of a line of rampart to the north of the citadel. The first and second lines rested on the river to their left, and terminated on the right in the town itself, where it was impossible for an enemy to advance or turn them. Indeed, the only possible point of attack was from the east, supported by a corresponding advance on the other side of the river to take the lines in reverse. In front of the canal, and about a mile from it, was an extensive block of buildings called La Martinière, about five miles from Alum Bagh.

Lucknow at this time was in the hands of the rebels, and had been occupied by them since the removal of the garrison, with the ladies and children, by the relieving force

under Sir Colin Campbell. The Alum Bagh, distant about three miles from Lucknow, however, was still held by a garrison under Sir James Outram, consisting of 4,000 men.

At Futtehgurh there were about 5,000 men at this period, and about 3,000 on the Ramgunga. We had materials collected to form a bridge to cross the river, but the order to cross was not issued.

The enemy's cavalry used to come out of some topes of mango trees and gallop about on the plain. Then a shot from one of our 9-pounders would disperse them. We had a detachment of the Naval Brigade under Sir William Peel. After remaining a few days in camp on the Ramgunga, we received an order to join the headquarters of the Engineer Brigade, which was concentrating at Jellalabad, about three miles from Lucknow, and arrived at the former place on the 11th February, 1858.

A serious attack had been made on General Outram's position at the Alum Bagh on the 16th January.* In the morning a body of the enemy, of which the strength is not estimated in the despatch, led by a Hindu fanatic who was attired to represent the Monkey-god, made a sudden set on the Jellalabad half-way picquet, at the time commanded by a subaltern, and were received by a fire of rifles, which drove them back with the loss of their leader, who fell mortally wounded into the hands of the picquet, and of more killed and wounded than the enemy could carry off. Two 9-pounder guns, brought up from camp under the

* The convoy from Cawnpore reached the bridge post at 2 p.m. on the 15th, and was to have halted for the night, but was ordered to resume the march that evening, and starting at 7 p.m., came into camp at 2 a.m., so that the escort was available towards repulsing the attack of this day.

escort of a subaltern and twenty-five men from the right brigade to support the picquet, compelled an abandonment of the cover in front which the enemy had used as a point of *appui*. The left front and flank were threatened throughout the day, and after dark the enemy's infantry assembled in great strength in front of picquet No. 5, at the time commanded by a Major (having been reinforced up to 200 men), who allowed the rebels to approach within 80 yards, and then gave them grape from three guns, with bullets from his rifles. As they withdrew with loss, he followed them up with shells from a mortar. Attempts by cavalry against the left rear had been watched and checked throughout the day by four horse artillery pieces, escorted as usual. The Division had a bombardier killed, and eight men wounded.

The successful repulse of this attack and the prospect of the Commander-in-Chief soon moving in the direction of Lucknow relieved the General of much anxiety; but still he felt it necessary to warn headquarters that, owing to the enormous numbers of the enemy and the extent of his position, he was obliged to keep his men in readiness, and as there was a perceptible change in the temperature, the hospitals would begin to fill under so much exposure. Moreover, that, unless reinforced he was compelled to detach another convoy, he would have hard work in repelling the incessant attacks of the increasing hosts of the enemy, headed by the many territorial chiefs reported to be in the city or immediate vicinity.*

* It must not be supposed that the General allowed his anxiety to be shared by his troops. Seldom has duty of any sort been performed with greater confidence and cheerfulness by all ranks. In

The Intelligence Department had about this time news that a grand assault was being planned, and that a particular day, the opening one of a festival, had been fixed for the purpose. The affair, however, did not come off, much to the disappointment of the General, who, having been rejoined by the convoy escort and reinforced by some cavalry, had hoped to give the rebels a severe mauling and to get some of their guns. The spies reported a day or two afterwards that the enemy's troops and guns had taken up their positions during the night; that in the morning their Generals had ensconced themselves at a respectable distance in their rear, that the men were accoutred, and all were apparently in readiness. They did not advance, however, and the Generals sent for the commanding officers of Divisions, etc., to inquire the reason. They replied that they would attack, since it was better to die fighting than to be hanged, but they must have their pay first.

From this period till the 15th February the rebels are described as evincing a nervous restlessness, which betrayed itself in constant assemblies of cavalry and infantry, and by demonstrations of attack, which were instantly stopped by a few rounds from the guns at the outposts. About this time the concentration of troops and material for the projected attack on the city had commenced, and on the Cawnpore road stood a succession of detachments at intervals of an easy day's march, somewhat resembling the system of stages by which a German field army maintains the intervals between the attacks, as much as possible was done to relieve the monotony of camp life. Officers off duty were allowed to go for short distances shooting, and to get up races. During Christmas week the usual sports were organized for the men.

communication with its base. The continued movement of troops and stores was known to the enemy, and caused the activity on his part which, though occasioning few casualties to the British Division, constantly necessitated its turning out and remaining under arms.

It was during this interval of comparative inaction that, in consequence of information that the enemy's positions were greatly weakened in troops, large numbers having left the city to meet the different advancing columns of the Commander-in-Chief's army, the General commanding the Alum Bagh felt satisfied that by a simultaneous movement from his right and left he could take in reverse the batteries in front, which played on the Alum Bagh and the advanced posts, capture and destroy the guns, of which he understood seventeen to be in position on the south side and five on the north bank of the canal. He hoped to be able to accomplish this with little loss, provided the operation was undertaken before the approach of the other columns and the consequent return of the rebel detachments to the city, but as he felt that he might thereby be anticipating a move which should form part of the combined operations, he referred his proposal to headquarters, where it did not meet with approval.

On the 13th February the news from the *Court Journal*, as the epitome of daily intelligence was styled in the British camp, was to the effect that an attack at all points of the position was planned for the 15th. It seemed probable that under the mingled taunts, promises, and threats of the so-called "Queen Mother" the rebels might be induced to make one desperate last attempt, and that if she herself—"the best man of the lot," as the General

styled her—should come out, as was expected, it was possible that the whole force then assembled in Lucknow, regular and irregular, might be inspirited to come to the scratch. The General, with a view of being able to inflict a heavy blow, requested when passing on this intelligence to army headquarters, by this time returned to Cawnpore, that a battalion which had been withdrawn from his command in exchange for a raw one of native Sappers might be countermarched to rejoin him. The request was complied with, but next day it was reported from the city that the expected movement of the rebels had been abandoned, and a message was sent to the bridge post for the battalion to resume its march on Cawnpore.

Notwithstanding, however, the failure of the rebel Court to induce their troops to come out in mass, a demonstration took place on the day in question, concealed to some extent by a violent dust-storm, round the left of the British position against the high road, along which a convoy was at the time marching. The horse artillery, as usual, escorted by cavalry, and dashing well out, supported also by the nearest battalion of the left brigade, sufficed to disperse the enemy's cavalry and infantry, wounding their chief, a Mahomedan dignitary, who rode in a litter. The Division had only one man wounded.

Next day, the 16th February, the rebels, while they threatened, as on former occasions, the left flank with cavalry and infantry, filled with the latter arm their trenches* and the groves in rear of these, but although

* From what may be termed their primary line of trenches, of which the right rested on the village Bura, they had by this time pushed an extension to a point north west of picquet No. 5, and from that point had by means of a zig-zag approach provided cover for their attacks to within close proximity of that post.

they began their demonstration in the morning, they did not muster resolution enough for the attack till about 5.30 p.m., when they suddenly issued in clouds of skirmishers against the guns of the centre and left, and in large bodies advanced on the village where picquet No. 5 had been reinforced to a strength of 200 men under a Lieutenant-Colonel. This outpost had three men wounded before they repulsed the enemy. For a couple of hours after dark a heavy musketry fire was kept up against the north and east faces of the Alum Bagh without occasioning any loss to the defenders, who aimed grape and shrapnel at the line indicated by the flashes of the rebels' muskets.

On the 17th, while a partial advance against the right and left picquets was repulsed by artillery fire, some 2,000 infantry, sent by the enemy towards the right rear, withdrew towards the city on the appearance from camp of a couple of squadrons and two guns.

The information received at this time was to the effect that the rebels proposed continuing these attacks daily and from all quarters. Consequently the picquets had to be maintained at abnormal strength, and the troops were harassed by constant turns out.

For instance, picquets Nos. 4 and 5, which at the outset had been each 50 strong, had their numbers from time to time increased, so that at one time the former consisted of as many as 100 men under a Captain, and the latter of 800 under the command of a field officer.

In échelon behind the line of these two picquets—both of which were armed with guns—was established a fresh battery guarded by an escort, or picquet, as it was termed at the time, of from 20 to 50 men under a subaltern. Two

guns were sent to picquet No. 6. The Jellalabad half-way picquet was furnished from camp; strength, 2 subalterns and 50 infantry. The Alum Bagh detachment was increased to 275 rank and file. *Per contra*, the augmented strength of the advanced posts in front, and the additional security given by the approach of troops along the Cawnpore road, admitted of the reduction of picquets Nos. 1, 3, and 9 to the strength of ordinary camp guards, 1 non commissioned officer, 12 or 18 rank and file.

The proportion of men at the outposts to those in camp was, however, now so great that the reliefs of many of the picquets could only be effected every three days, sometimes only weekly. Frequently that of one strong picquet or detachment had to be postponed, and the men who had come off one post in the morning had to mount another in the evening.

The General again remonstrated against his troops having under these circumstances to furnish the convoy escorts half-way to the bridge post in rear.

On the morning of the 21st February, while the strength of the Division, particularly in cavalry, was reduced by such an escort, a simultaneous movement took place threatening both flanks, as well as the whole front of the position, the points actually attacked being the north-east angle of the Alum Bagh and the fort of Jellalabad, with the half-way picquet. The troops holding these posts were reinforced, while a body of about 250 cavalry, with two guns, was sent to the rear of the fort, and coming suddenly on about 2,000 of the rebel cavalry, drove these back on their infantry, some 5,000 strong, which latter, after advancing to within range of grapo, retired with loss. The left flank

was threatened by from 8,000 to 10,000 infantry, with 500 cavalry, against which force were sent, with the usual result, 4 horse artillery pieces, escorted by about 120 troopers, and supported by the available strength of the left brigade. The Division had 9 men wounded, while reports from the city gave the loss of the enemy as 60 killed and 200 wounded in front of Alum Bagh, with some 80 or 90 casualties near Jellalabad.

A few days before the 25th, the first instalment of troops composing the force which the Commander-in-Chief* was concentrating for the capture of Lucknow arrived within the lines of this Division, and were temporarily at the disposal of the General. These consisted of a battalion which had for some days past been distributed on the line of communication with Cawnpore, of several squadrons, and of a troop of horse artillery. By this time, also, a large quantity of combustible stores had been collected in the fort of Jellalabad.

An attack was expected on the 29th, but did not come off.

On the 2nd March, the advance of the Commander-in-Chief with a second division of infantry, a brigade of cavalry, and four batteries from the Cawnpore road, by a line leading east of Jellalabad, into a position of which the right rested on the River Goomtee behind Dil Khoosha, followed on the two next days by the closing up of the siege train and of a third division of infantry, caused the withdrawal of the bulk of the rebel forces to the extensive defences which they had constructed along and in advance of the eastern end of the canal, and thus removed the pressure on the front* of the 1st Division, which had stood

* On the 3rd, however, the enemy were in some force to the left front and flank, so that the General thought it right to collect the

for three months unsupported. It had been for some time previously made movable by provision of carriage for baggage and tents, and it was now gradually reduced by the withdrawal from its organization of the greater portion of the cavalry, of which part was sent to preserve communication between Jellalabad and the Commander-in-Chief's camp, while the remainder, made up by fresh arrivals to the strength of a brigade, was extended westward to watch the exits from the city in that direction--and by the successive despatch of battalions and guns to reinforce the main attack from the east. The General was summoned on the 5th to conduct with other troops a turning movement on the north bank of the Goomtee. In his former camp there remained on the 12th but one brigade of infantry, and on the 16th only two battalions with the horse battery.

Meanwhile the advance, from the eastward, of the army by a movement in *échelon* from the right, as the intrenchments and palaces held by the rebels were successively turned or stormed, had the effect of causing the old pressure on the Alum Bagh position to be renewed to a serious extent. On the 15th the gross of the army was established on a line fronting to the south-west, and, therefore, towards the Alum Bagh, from which post the left was distant a crow's flight of about three miles. The space intermediate between the Commander-in-Chief's inner flank and the canal was filled by a body of Nepanlese troops, which had arrived on the 12th as allies against the Oude Pretender, and had come into line with a force of about 9,000 infantry and 24 field guns drawn by men. On the 15th one of their attention of headquarters to this fact, and to report that, being for the time short of cavalry, he might find it difficult to protect the line of communication as well as his own camp.

detachments, after a short fight, took possession of the Yellow House, a building midway between Alum Bagh and the canal, but withdrew from it after dark without giving notice to the British outposts, who were in the sequel somewhat embarrassed by uncertainty as to whether that point was occupied by friend or foe.

During the whole time Sir James Outram held the position at Alum Bagh, from the 22nd November, 1857, to the 17th March, 1858, Captain Olpherts (now General Sir William Olpherts, V.C.), commanded a battery, and was present at all the engagements at this time. It would be unnecessary and out of place in this short narrative to describe the previous services of Sir William Olpherts at the disbanding of mutineers at Benares, and at the Relief of Lucknow by Havelock, those being so well known.

On the 16th, the Commander-in-Chief's right, led by the former General of the 1st Division, gained another mile to the westward, "And in short," as was the language of His Excellency's despatch, "the city was ours." With like brevity it is stated that on the 16th, for the last time, the enemy showed in some strength before Alum Bagh . . . that the Goorkha leader was requested to move to his left up the canal and take the position; that His Highness executed this very well, and that he seized the positions, one after another, with little loss to himself, the guns of the enemy falling into his hands.

Some details, however, of this, the last brush that took place on the front of the position, may not be uninteresting. They are produced in nearly the identical words of the field officer who commanded in the Alum Bagh enclosure.

Between 8 and 9 a.m. he observed from the roof of the

palace a large body of cavalry coming out of the city, and infantry manning the batteries and trenches along the front of the position. An orderly was immediately despatched to the Brigadier in camp, who, in consequence of this and subsequently received information, telegraphed in the course of the day to the Chief of the Staff with Army Headquarters :—

“The enemy are coming on in immense force—both cavalry, infantry, and field guns on my left front and towards the dense wood close to Alum Bagh. Nothing seen of the Goorkhas. I have drawn up my infantry and field guns, and my batteries have opened upon them. I have only 140 cavalry here.”

The rebels' movement continued to be observed from the Alum Bagh roof, their cavalry in most regular order proceeding along the rear of their batteries. A few shots were fired from the heavy guns of the outpost, but the range at the nearest point of their line of march was upwards of 2,000 yards. They were accompanied by three horse and two bullock guns, and their numbers were estimated at not less than 3,000 sabres. This cavalry continued their march till they had passed the left flank of the position some distance, and then, developing themselves upon the plain in order of battle, were seen to charge down in the direction of the village held by picquet No. 6. During this time the batteries and trenches in front of Alum Bagh and of picquet No. 4 had become crowded with infantry. About 1,000 men with colours came out and took position, in spite of the fire of the British rifles, about 400 yards in front of the Mosque picquet, and kept up a warm matchlock fire upon it and the enclosure. Some discharges of grape

from all the available guns caused them severe loss, as appeared from the bodies and traces of blood found next morning. The enemy's trenches had on the previous occasion been seen by the field officer to be crowded, and he estimated the strength of their infantry in front of him at not less than 5,000. This attack commenced simultaneously with the cavalry charge, and was not abandoned till about noon. As heretofore, the more open left flank was freed by the dash and fire of the horse battery, supported by the available infantry from camp.

Another account, though not entering into detail of the particular posts attacked, states that greater boldness was on this occasion evinced by the enemy than on any former attack, that a charge was made up to the abattis, and that one man was actually cut down within the British intrenchment.

On the following morning the same field officer, observing the enemy's works to be apparently deserted, obtained the Brigadier's sanction for a reconnaissance, and with 40 men proceeded as far as across the canal, inspecting the batteries and trenches on both banks, and paying a particular visit to one gun, which, though the range of over 2,000 yards from the Mosque near which it was placed had rendered the missiles all but harmless, had been the noisiest sender of scolding messages to the British, and had been known to our men by the pet name of Nauey Dawson.

Thus the important duty of covering the Cawnpore road, which still formed the line of communication for the British Army Corps until the course of operations in the city had brought the left forward to the westward of Alum Bagh, was successfully performed up to the last by the remnants of the 1st Division.


The foregoing account has been compiled from the published despatches, from correspondence of the General, lent by Sir Francis Outram,* and from materials supplied by Lieutenant-Generals Dodgson and Spurgin, who served in the Division as Deputy-Assistant Adjutant-General and Brigade-Major respectively, and supplemented from the recollections of some of the regimental officers.

After the evacuation of Lucknow, Lieutenant McLeod Innes (now Lieut.-General) was posted to General Frank's column during its march through Oude, and greatly distinguished himself at the Battle of Sultanpore, obtaining the V.C. on this occasion. He afterwards joined the army before Lucknow, and was severely wounded on the day of joining. It would be unnecessary in this short narrative to refer in detail to the services of General Innes when in charge of the mining operations during the heroic defence of the Residency, these being too well known to require recapitulation.

At Jellalabad we remained until the 2nd March preparing siege material for the capture of Lucknow. The main body of the army under the Commander-in-Chief, was at Bunteera, about nine miles from Jellalabad. On the 23rd February the enemy attacked our position at the Alum Bagh in great force, and were driven back with the loss of four guns and many men killed.

On the 28th February the Commander-in-Chief moved his army right up from Bunteera, passing our Engineer camp at Jellalabad to Dilkoosha, a large house held by the enemy. It was a grand sight to see regiment after regiment

* The sketch made at the time by Lieutenant (now Major-General) Hutchinson, Royal Engineers, has been furnished from the same quarter, and slightly altered.



*La Martinière * College , Lucknow.*

of Highlanders and British infantry, and Sikhs, and the regiments of British cavalry. The enemy were completely taken by surprise, and abandoned the Dilkoosha, leaving one gun. We had no losses on our side.

On the 2nd March the Engineer Brigade moved to Bibiapore, a large house about 500 yards from the Dilkoosha, and close to the river Goomtee. The Engineer Brigade was very strong, and was under the command of Brigadier Napier (afterwards Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala).

From the top of the house at Bibiapore we obtained our first view of Lucknow. We could see La Martinière College, a large, handsome building, about a quarter of a mile from Dilkoosha. We could also see the enemy's first line of entrenchments looking very formidable, and were told as a consolation, that they had two more lines in rear with ramparts twice as thick, and ditches twice as deep one behind the other. We were also told that almost every house and street were loop holed, and we found it true. Every outlet had been covered by a work, and on every side were prepared barricades and loop holed parapets. The amount of labour expended on the works by the rebels was enormous. Streets a mile long had almost every house loop-holed, and guns pointed from many of them. The bridge had been also ruined.


On the night of March 4th we completed two bridges of casks across the Goomtee, a very troublesome and difficult operation. General Outram with his division, consisting of the Queen's Bays, 9th Lancers, and the Highland Brigade, and other troops, crossed the river on the 6th, and met with little opposition. The remainder of the army being posted

at Dilkoosha, about 1,000 yards in rear of La Martinière. Brigadier Franks joined the force about this time with Jung Bahadoor and 4,000 Goorkhas. This manœuvre of crossing the river was a splendid success, and completely baffled the enemy.

The rebels earthworks on the south side of the river were enfiladed by the guns of Outram's division on the other side of the river.

On the 7th the Sepoys made a sharp attack on General Outram, but were repulsed without difficulty, and retired within their lines, leaving him free to push forward.

While referring to La Martinière, special mention must be made of the excellent service rendered by the boys of the Martinière College, whose gallantry in the defence of the post assigned them in the Residency of Lucknow has rarely been surpassed, and forms a bright page in the history of that long siege. In the grounds of the "Baily Guard," the historic Lucknow Residency, there may still be seen a masonry pillar with a marble slab inserted, on which are inscribed the words "Martinière Post." That pillar indicates the portion of the defence that was held by some 60 boys and their tutors throughout the long siege, and the corps of three companies now formed by the students of the College, and attached to the Oude Volunteer Rifle Corps, wear as a badge on their accoutrements a turreted castle, with the words "Defence of Lucknow," the same honour as was awarded to the 16th, the Lucknow Regiment of Bengal Infantry, which was formed in 1858 from the loyal remnants of mutinous native regiments, who fought throughout the siege on the side of the British, and held firmly to the post called the "Baily Guard."



The Residency Lucknow

Nor should the students of the Civil Engineering College at Roorkee, and engineer apprentices of the ironworks at the same place, be forgotten. They also took up arms, and helped to garrison the place of refuge formed in the workshops; they also assisted in keeping the district quiet. Eventually many of them attached themselves as volunteers to corps of the line, and served with the Rohilund Field Force from its formation in the autumn of 1857 until it was broken up in the summer of 1858.

On the 8th March the Martinière was assaulted and captured with very little loss. Lieutenant A. M. Lang (now Colonel), and Lieutenant J. G. Forbes (now Colonel, late Secretary to the Government of India, Public Works Department), and myself, and Lieutenant Swetenham and Lieutenant H. J. Nuthall, were told off as Engineer officers to accompany the assaulting columns. We had each a party of sappers, and drew up in rear of the Dilkoosha. The party to which I was attached joined the 42nd Highlanders, and at the word of command the troops raced across the space between the Martinière and the Dilkoosha.

The Highlanders presented a splendid appearance in their kilts and bonnets, and rushed forward with loud cheers, and we captured the place with small loss. Lieutenant Forbes was slightly wounded. We pushed on to a village on the right close to the enemy's first line of entrenchments. To our astonishment we saw an officer of the 1st Bengal Fusiliers standing on the bastion, and waving his hand to us. This was Lieutenant Butler (now Major), who had swum across the river, and had climbed the parapet, remaining there until the work was occupied by our troops.

For his conduct on this occasion Butler was awarded the Victoria Cross.

On the evening of the 9th, Sir Colin Campbell, who had secured the Martinière in the morning, was able to advance on the canal line, which had been enfiladed, and taken in reverse by the batteries already established by General Outram. He secured the line without loss. The forward movement was now continued, the houses and palaces being used as an approach. In this way the second line was turned to the left. Batteries were then thrown up to break a large block of palaces called the Begum Kotee on the right, which we then stormed and carried.

From thenceforward the Chief Engineer pushed his approach with the greatest judgment through the enclosures by the aid of the sappers and heavy guns, the troops immediately occupying the ground as we advanced, and the mortars being moved from one position to another as ground was won on which they could be placed (Sir C. Campbell's dispatch)

At length the third line was turned, and the Kaiser Bagh entered. Supports were quickly thrown in, and the Mess House, the Tara Kotee, the Motee Mahal, the Engine House, and the Chuttur Munzil were rapidly occupied by the troops, while the Engineers devoted their attention to securing their positions towards the south and west.

Owing to being taken in flank by the fire from the guns with General Outram's division, and to our advance, the enemy had not only evacuated the Martinière, but their first line of entrenchments as well, and we clambered up as well as we could by digging a few holes in the ramparts,

and getting up with our hands and feet, using the holes like a ladder.

So the first line up to Bank's house was captured without great loss on our side. While advancing from the Martinière to the village we came under rather a heavy fire from the ramparts on the left, and here the Highlanders lost a few men. We could see the Sepoys running along the ramparts in hundreds as we got in on the right.

On the 11th, the Artillery and Naval Brigade, under Sir William Peel, had battered and breached the Begum Kotee with three 68-pounders. This was then assaulted and carried by our troops, the enemy losing about 500 men, being killed inside. Lieutenant McBean,* Adjutant of the 93rd Highlanders, here gained the V.C., and greatly distinguished himself, killing 11 of the enemy with his own hand in the main breach.

It was after this assault that Hodson, of Hodson's Horse, lost his life. He was the finest leader of irregular cavalry in India, and his loss was greatly mourned by everyone in the force. We had arrived at Bank's house just as the party going to attack the Begum Palace had started, and fell in with them. Previous to this he had said in a laughing manner to his friend Brigadier Napier (afterwards Lord Napier), who was directing the attack, "I am come to take care of you, you have no business to go to work without me to look after you." The place had been taken before he was wounded. When the soldiers were searching for concealed Sepoys in the court-yard and buildings adjoining, he said to his orderly, "I wonder if any of the rascals are in there."

Afterwards Major-General McBean. He died a few years ago.

He turned the angle of the passage, looked into a dark room which was full of Sepoys; a shot was fired from inside. He staggered back some paces and then fell. A party of Highlanders hearing who had been hit, rushed into the room and bayoneted every man there. He was shot through the right side of the chest, the ball entering in front and going out behind. He was taken in a dooly to Bank's house, where his wound was looked to and dressed. At daylight the following morning he was much better, his hands being warm and his pulse good. The officer in medical charge of the regiment hoped that if the bleeding, which had ceased, did not return he might recover. At 10 a.m., however, bleeding came on again profusely, and he rapidly became worse. He sent for General Napier, to whom he gave directions about his property, and sent messages to his wife.

After this he rapidly sank, though he remained sensible, and was able to speak until he became too weak, and at twenty-five minutes past one he died. He was buried that evening by the Rev. W. Clarke, the Commander-in-Chief and his Staff being present. Thus, on the 12th March, 1858, in his thirty-seventh year, closed the earthly career of this brave and talented officer. One of those best qualified to judge declared that Hodson with his regiment would have been worth 10,000 men, had he been spared to take part in the subsequent operations in Oude. His particular qualifications for Asiatic warfare would have found an appropriate field for their display.

Sir Colin Campbell, in a letter of condolence to his widow, dated March 13th, thus expressed himself.—

“I followed your noble husband to the grave myself, in

order to mark in the most public manner my regret and esteem for the most brilliant soldier under my command, and one whom I am proud to call my friend."

In the evening I was ordered to go down with a party of sappers to construct a battery at the side of the Begum Kotee. Such a sight as the place presented I have never seen. Imagine a splendid house, or palace, with gardens, and lamps with enormous mirrors and chandeliers, dead Highlanders and Sepoys lying in all directions.

The Engine House was captured by the 20th Regiment. The Sepoys seemed paralysed by the suddenness of the attack, and had not time to escape. They were piled in heaps among the machinery. A portion of the room had caught fire, and added to the horrors of the scene. While running across from the Begum Kotee we came under a storm of bullets.

At night a great part of the city appeared to be in flames. Fires were seen in all directions, while the shells from our batteries continued to pour into the city. I counted four shells in the air at the same time. The enemy was badly supplied with shell, those that they used being for the most part brass. This was the last day of regular fighting, but the rebels hung about the native city for a few days. The losses on our side during the operations were about 25 officers killed and 50 wounded, and 800 men killed and wounded.

The force under Outram, which had been advanced on the other side of the Goomtee, now re-crossed on a bridge of casks, and pushed forward to capture the Residency. This was the last move, and the enemy abandoned the defences. Still, there were detached forts held by desperate


hands of natives, and it was not till the 21st that all fighting ceased.

During the operations a sad casualty occurred. At the Jumma Musjid nine cartloads of powder were found in a court yard, which General Outram directed to be destroyed.

As there was a well on the spot it was considered that the best method of destroying the powder, which was in tin cases, would be to throw them down into the water. A line of men was formed, and the cases passed from hand to hand as quickly as possible. By some fatality one of the cases exploded in falling. A flame of fire flashed up, and ignited case after case along the line until the carts were reached, when they also exploded. Captain Clarke, R.E., and Lieutenant Brownlow, R.E., who were superintending the operations, received such injuries that they both died during the night. With one exception, every man forming the party, to the number of 22, was killed. Strangely enough, the only one to escape was the man who was throwing the cases down the well. He was rendered senseless, but eventually recovered.

Another sad casualty occurred in the Engineer Brigade Lieutenant Cape, who was attached to the Brigade as Baggage-Master, entered alone some buildings in the city shortly after the capture. Some armed rebels were concealed in the buildings, who seized and decapitated the unfortunate officer.

The duties of the Engineer officers during the capture of Lucknow, although arduous, were not of such a dangerous nature as at Delhi, and the operations lasted only for fifteen days. The Kaiser Bagh, at the time of its capture, was a



The West Gate KAISER BAGH, LUCKNOW, Captured by Lord Clyde's force March 1858.

splendid mass of buildings with large gardens and gilt domes and statues.

The amount of loot obtained by some of the regiments was considerable. Diamond necklaces, shawls and swords of great value, were sometimes obtained by private soldiers, and sold for a few rupees. For two or three days after the capture of the town we were employed in putting out fires and destroying loose gunpowder, an immense quantity of which we found in the positions occupied by the rebels.

We remained at Lucknow until the 9th April, when the Bengal Sappers and Miners were attached to a column under Major-General Walpole, which was ordered to march through Rohileund, to co-operate with another column marching south for the recapture of Bareilly, and other towns which had been held by the rebels since the outbreak of the Mutiny.

CHAPTER VIII.

CAMPAIGN IN ROHILCUND AND CAPTURE OF BAREILLY, 1858.

“When the fiery fight is heard no more,
And the storms have ceased to blow.”

T. CAMPBELL.

THE force under the command of Brigadier-General Walpole, which was directed to march through Rohilcund for the subjugation of that district and to recapture the cities of Shahphanpore and Bareilly, consisted of Her Majesty's 9th Lancers, 42nd, 79th and 93rd Highlanders, 4th Punjabees, 23rd Company of Royal Engineers, Artillery and Sappers, the latter under the command of Major Maunsell, R.E. The force left Lucknow on the 8th April, the orders received by Brigadier-General Walpole being to march to the Ganges, and to await near Futtehgurh the arrival of Sir Colin Campbell, who would draw to himself, as he advanced, other columns advancing to the same point. The force arrived at the small fort of Rohiya, two miles from the Ganges, and 51 west by north from Lucknow, on the morning of the 15th April. The dispositions for the attack of the fort were very indifferent, the skirmishers being ordered to advance without supports, no previous reconnaissance having been made. The fort was concealed in thick jungle, but one side was open. The enemy, who were commanded by a noted rebel named Nurput Singh, could not have numbered more than one eighth of the British force, and among them were many excellent marksmen.

Brigadier The Honourable Adrian Hope, who was in command of the Highland Brigade, one of the most gifted officers in the British army, after the check of the skirmishers in the ditch of the fort, went forward to endeavour to keep the men together, but he was immediately shot. Captain Cafe (now Lieutenant-General Cafe, V.C.), 56th N.I., greatly distinguished himself by bearing away, under a heavy fire, the body of Lieutenant Willoughby. Our guns then opened fire on the fort, but caused little, if any, loss to the enemy, and the troops were ordered to lay down under cover during the greater part of the day.

About mid-day, while carrying out an order to report if there was any opening in the jungle on the west side of the fort, a bullet passed through my pony's neck, killing him on the spot. I at first thought that he had only stumbled, but on disengaging myself from the stirrups found that he was dead. After reporting on the condition of the jungle on the west side I rejoined the Sappers. It was generally believed in the British force that Colonel Hagart, commanding the cavalry, sent a message to General Walpole to say that he could ride into the fort on one side, and I have never heard any contradiction to this statement. Our losses were two officers and 16 men killed, and five officers and 88 men wounded. The enemy evacuated the fort during the night. The Engineers, who were under the command of Major Lennox, V.C. (now General Sir Wilbraham Lennox), were employed on the following day in blowing up the fort. On the 18th the force continued its march to Belgram, 8 miles; on the 19th, 11 miles, to Sandee; 20th, 6 miles to Mungowar; 21st, 8 miles, to Shahbadpore.

The march of the Highland Brigade through Oude and

Rohileund was a grand and imposing sight. The regiments marched in line of battalions, wearing their bonnets and kilts, and with their bagpipes playing. Hares, pea fowls, and antelope started from the grass, and ran the gauntlet of the line, occasionally being knocked over by the men. The large tops of mango trees, which are so scattered over this district, formed most excellent camping grounds at the end of the march.

On the 23rd we found the enemy in position on the opposite side of the Senda Nuddee, where they were attacked and routed, with the loss of 4 guns, the cavalry and horse artillery pursuing for five miles to Aligunge.

Sir Colin Campbell, who had left Lucknow on the 7th, overtook General Walpole on the 27th. On the 30th, just when entering Shahjehanpore, Sir Colin was informed that General Penny had been killed in a night skirmish. Shahjehanpore was found evacuated, and Sir Colin left a small force under Colonel Hales to hold it. On the 3rd May he was joined by the column which General Penny had commanded, and next day he was within a single march of Bareilly.

Khan Bahadoor Khan, reinforced by hosts of rebels flying before Brigadier-General Jones, who had gained two brilliant victories on his march from Roorkee, was determined, though menaced in front and in rear by two powerful armies, to strike a blow for his cause. Between his capital and the position occupied by Sir Colin's army was a deep stream called the Nuttia Nuddee, spanned by a bridge. He crossed the bridge in the evening and planted his guns on some sandhills situated on either side of the road by

which Sir Colin would have to advance. His first line of infantry, with cavalry on its flanks, was drawn up so as to cover the guns. The second line remained in the cantonment near the town.

Early in the morning of May 5th Sir Colin put his troops in motion. At the sixth mile-stone he halted, and formed them up in two lines. The second line was to defend the baggage and the siege train. The whole force amounted to 7,637 men, with 19 field guns. About 7 o'clock, as the first line was approaching the bridge, the enemy's guns opened fire. The British cavalry and horse artillery advanced from both flanks, and the horse artillery, unlimbering, replied to the challenge. The enemy's first line broke, and leaving several guns behind them, fled across the bridge into the cantonments. The British pressed on in pursuit. The left halted on the bank of the stream. The right crossed the bridge, and moved forward about three-quarters of a mile in the direction of the town. A regiment of Sikhs took possession of the irregular cavalry lines on the left of the road.

The Sappers were with the left column, and a curious thing happened, which was witnessed by nearly the whole of the force. There was a large number of Ghazis (fanatics) among the rebels. One of these, wearing a green turban, walked alone out of a tope or grove of mango trees. When he came close to our troops he fired his matchlock, and then, choosing his tulwar, he rushed on the cavalry. He was, of course, cut down.

During the battle a number of Ghazis, with their green turbans, heads bent low under their shield, and flourishing their tulwars in the air, rushed down, shouting "Deon,

Deen * upon the astonished Sikhs in the irregular cavalry lines, driving them back upon the 42nd Highlanders, who had lined up to support them. Sir Colin was sitting on his horse close by, and had a narrow escape. As he was riding from one company to another, he saw a Ghazi, apparently dead, lying before his horse's legs. In a moment the man sprang to his feet, and was about to strike when a Sikh rushed up, and with one blow of his tulwar slashed off his head. The 42nd Highlanders repelled the charge of the Ghazis, killing a large number.

Meanwhile an exciting scene had been enacted in another part of the field. The baggage train had halted in the rear. Suddenly a vast wave of white clad sowars was seen pouring down. Their tulwars flashed in the sun; their horses' hoofs thundered over the plain. Camp followers with cloven skulls, and bleeding wounds, rolled over on the ground. Men, women, children, horses, camels, and elephants shrilly trumpeting, fled in one confused mass. But our cavalry now charged. Tombs's troop coming up at a gallop, fired round after round into the rebel cavalry, and the sowars were scattered in every direction.

The battle lasted for six hours, a scorching wind was blowing, and several men died from sunstroke. Sir Colin, therefore, in mercy to his troops, who were faint and parched with thirst, allowed them to rest.

We advanced next morning into the cantonments, and found that Khan Bahadoor Khan, with the greater part of his army, had fled. The sound of distant firing was heard. It proceeded from the guns of Jones's column, which was forcing its way into the city from the north.

Religion.

Next day the city was occupied after much fighting among the houses, and the two columns united. During the fighting in the town Lieutenant Hovenden, of the Bengal Engineers, and myself, with some sappers, went into a house where there was a party of nine Ghazis. Hovenden put his hand upon the door, and had his fingers nearly slashed off by one of the Ghazis inside. We had to bring up a gun and knock the place about, when the Ghazis jumped from the roof of the house, and rushed out with their flashing tulwars. An officer of the Highlanders was also there with some men. Two of the Highlanders were wounded, and the officer and myself had just time to step behind a small bank of earth when the Ghazis came at us like tigers. The bank of earth saved us, as 16 Ghazis were shot down by the Highlanders before they could reach us. I secured the tulwar of one of the Ghazis who had wounded one of the Highlanders.

Two men of the 23rd Company, Royal Engineers, 2nd Corporal Joseph Wren and Sapper Charles Reynolds, died of sunstroke on the day of the battle of Bareilly.

While we were in camp a few days after the capture of the city a tremendous storm of rain, accompanied by thunder and lightning, passed over the town. Many of the tents were blown down. Lieutenant Forbes, R.E., and myself shared a single-pole tent between us. The storm came on suddenly when we were both asleep. The pole of the tent came down or snapped, and we were left struggling under the canvas like rats in a trap. The rain fell in torrents, and when we succeeded in releasing ourselves we were as wet as if we had just stepped out of the river. We obtained shelter in the tent of a friend who

had been more fortunate than ourselves, and who gave us some rum.

A somewhat similar cyclone passed over the station of Roorkee in the autumn of 1883, unroofing several of the barracks occupied at that time by the Dorsetshire Regiment. Some of the men had very narrow escapes, but fortunately no lives were lost. The buildings had thatched roofs, and the wind caught the roof below the protecting eaves, lifting the former bodily from the roof timbers. At the hill station of Mussooree the report was telegraphed that Roorkee had been "blown down by a storm." Although a great deal of damage had been done, it was not so bad as had been reported; the damage being confined to the buildings occupied by the European troops. A large number of trees were also uprooted by the storm.

We remained in camp at Bareilly until the 8th June, when the 23rd Company, R.E., and the Bengal Sappers and Miners were ordered to march to Roorkee, and arrived there on the 18th June, 13 months from the time of starting in the boats on the canal.



APPENDICES

APPENDIX A.

THE following is an instance taken from the Official Report of Mr. Fleetwood Williams, Commissioner of Meerut, of the lawlessness prevailing at this time:—

Ram Dyal, a prisoner confined in the civil gaol, under a decree for arrears of rent, hastened to his village, Bhojpoor, during the night of the 10th May, and the next day at daybreak collected a party and attacked a money-lender who had a decree against him, and murdered him, with six of his household.

Kaye's "History of the Sepoy War," Vol. II., p. 173.

APPENDIX B.

ABSTRACT of the field state of the army before Delhi at the close of July, 1857:—

Infantry officers and men	...	4,023
Cavalry	...	1,293
Artillery and Engineers	...	1,602

Total, including native troops ... 6,918

Exclusive of non-effectives:—

Sick	...	765
Wounded	...	351

Total ... 1,116

Return of sick and wounded of all ranks of the Delhi Field Force, September 11th, 1857:—

Total	...	3,074
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APPENDIX C.

RETURN of officers of the Engineer Brigade, Delhi Field Force, who were present during the siege :—

Lieutenant-Colonel R. Baird Smith, Chief Engineer.

Major Laughton, Bengal Engineers.

Captain A. Taylor.

Lieutenants Walker, Home, Salkeld (killed), Medley, W. Greathed, F. R. Maunsell, Tennant, Gulliver, Stewart, Warrant, G. Chesney, H. A. Brownlow, P. Geneste, Hovenden, A. Perkins, E. Walker, A. Lang, Thomason, L. Tandy (killed), A. McNeill, P. Murray, J. Champain, R. Pemberton, D. Ward, Tulford, E. Jones (killed), H. A. L. Carnegie, E. T. Thackeray, T. G. Forbes.

Assistant Engineers :—

Lieutenants Bingham (Bengal Sappers and Miners), Nuthall (Bengal Staff Corps), Gustavinski (Bengal Staff Corps), Knowles (Bengal Staff Corps), Captain Greensill (H.M. 24th Regiment) (killed)

APPENDIX D.

AND so the month of July came to an end, and left Wilson in good spirits, for Sir John Lawrence, never slackening in his great work, had responded to the General's appeal by fresh promises of help, and he had cast away all thoughts of raising the siege. Writing on the 30th July to Mr. Colvin, who had earnestly protested against the thought of withdrawing from Delhi, he said : "It is my firm determination to hold my present position, and to resist every attack to the last. The enemy are very numerous, and may possibly break through our entrenchments and

overwhelm us, but this force will die at its post. Luckily, the enemy have no head and no method, and we hear dissensions are breaking out among them. Reinforcements are coming up under Nicholson. If we can hold on until they arrive, we shall be secure. I am making every possible arrangement to secure the safe defence of our position."

Kaye's "History of the Sepoy War," Vol. II., p. 593.

APPENDIX E.

THE Punjab Frontier Force was raised in 1849, on the annexation of the Punjab, wholly on the irregular system, and in that force the irregular system was seen at its best. When the great crisis arose in 1857, this force was ready for the emergency, untainted by the general disloyalty, and eager to be employed in the defence of the Empire. At the capture of Delhi, of the 2,750 men who composed the three main assaulting columns, 1,300 belonged to the Punjab Frontier Force.

On the revolt of the Bengal army in 1857, the lately disbanded Sikh army took the place of a reserve. Its old and tried soldiers then swarmed in every town and village of the Punjab. Corps of cavalry, infantry, and artillery were rapidly raised, commissions were given to men of family and influence, who brought their men with them. The corps were organized on the irregular system of the Punjab Frontier Force, and at once put in the field to fight for the Government which had so recently conquered and annexed their country, and against the Hindostani auxiliaries who had aided in the overthrow of the Sikh power. Many other corps were also raised from Pathan tribes and the warlike peasantry of the North-West.

APPENDIX F.

THE Engineer Brigade at the capture of Lucknow consisted of the 4th and 23rd Companies, Royal Engineers, the C Company, Madras Sappers and Miners, the Bengal Sappers, and some Punjabees and Sikhs, who acted as pioneers. The officers of this brigade were Colonel R Napier (afterwards Field Marshal Lord Napier of Magdala, G.C.B.), Brigadier in command; Lieutenant Colonel Harness (afterwards General Sir Henry Harness, K.C.B.), commanding the Royal Engineers; Major Nicholson (afterwards General Sir Lothian Nicholson, K.C.B., Governor of Gibraltar; died in 1893), commanding the 4th Company; Captain Clerke, commanding the 23rd Company (killed), Captain Cox, Adjutant; Major Lennox, V.C., Captain Beaumont, Lieutenants Scratchley, Malcolm, Pritchard, Wynne, Swetenham, Keith, and Harrison; Captain Taylor (now General Sir Alexander Taylor, G.C.B.), commanding the Indian Force; Captain Gulliver, commanding the Punjab Pioneers, Captain Maunsell, commanding the Bengal Sappers; Lieutenant Champain (afterwards Colonel Sir John Bateman, K.C.M.G.; died in 1885), Adjutant, Captains Tennant, Hovenden, Brownlow, Young, Hutchinson, Watson; Lieutenants Pemberton, Murray, McNeill, Ward; Second Lieutenants Fulford, Carnegie, Thackeray, Forbes, Judge, and Smyth, all of the Bengal Engineers; Lieutenants Scott, commanding Madras Sappers, and Burton, M.E.

